Harrison, Mark, 1949- and Kim, Byung-Yeon. (2006) Plans, prices, and corruption: The Soviet firm under partial centralization, 1930 to 1990. Journal of Economic History, Vol.66 (No.1). pp. 1-41. ISSN 0022-0507

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Abstract

On the basis of new historical research on the Soviet command system we analyze the choices of a plan-setter and an effort-setter who interacted with each other and an external market to determine real output, hidden inflation, and the quality of corruption. We show that the performance of the Soviet economy was affected not only by the level of corruption but also by its quality, that is, how corrupt incomes were used. Our results explain rapid Soviet economic growth despite high corruption levels, and why slower economic growth in the 1970s was accompanied by increased privatization of rents.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions D History General and Old World H Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Economic History
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0022-0507
Date:	March 2006
Volume:	Vol.66
Number:	No.1
Number of Pages:	41
Page Range:	pp. 1-41
Identification Number:	10.1017/S0022050706000015
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/33677

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