Plans, prices, and corruption: The Soviet firm under partial centralization, 1930 to 1990
Harrison, Mark, 1949- and Kim, Byung-Yeon. (2006) Plans, prices, and corruption: The Soviet firm under partial centralization, 1930 to 1990. Journal of Economic History, Vol.66 (No.1). pp. 1-41. ISSN 0022-0507Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022050706000015
On the basis of new historical research on the Soviet command system we analyze the choices of a plan-setter and an effort-setter who interacted with each other and an external market to determine real output, hidden inflation, and the quality of corruption. We show that the performance of the Soviet economy was affected not only by the level of corruption but also by its quality, that is, how corrupt incomes were used. Our results explain rapid Soviet economic growth despite high corruption levels, and why slower economic growth in the 1970s was accompanied by increased privatization of rents.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
D History General and Old World
H Social Sciences
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Journal of Economic History|
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Number of Pages:||41|
|Page Range:||pp. 1-41|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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