AMERICAN AND EGYPTIAN MEDIA COVERAGE
OF THE CAMP DAVID PEACE ACCORDS

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by

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SUMMARY

This thesis is concerned with the way multi-national issues are dealt with by media. I illustrate this by the example of the media treatment of Mideast relations, concentrating on three newspapers: The Washington Post and The New York Times from the US, and Al Ahram from Egypt. The events central to the study lay within the Camp David Period of September 1977 to March 1979, with the signing of the Camp David Accords in September, 1978, and the Treaty in March, 1979 ("Camp David").

Because of the media coverage this is an ideal series of events to study methods of filtering information within newspapers. Since Camp David created as much interest in the Mideast as in the West, a comparison of different reports is fruitful. Within Chapter 5 I utilise a content analytical method to discover what biases may have been present in the reporting of Camp David, widening this to deal with issues of journalism and the North/ South divide, and show that media is less an investigative tool and more an anchor for established views.

A tentative conclusion is an identification of the lack of what are considered journalists’ most valued qualities: objectivity and professionalism. I identify a misunderstanding in the lay-person’s view of the media profession; as The Washington Post and The New York Times show, although articles may have attempted a balanced format, these media may not have been investigative internationally (though they were domestically). We have to be wary when extrapolating from only three newspapers to the wider world (though I studied other newspapers and media) but since these titles were chosen for their standing and influence, some wider conclusions may be drawn. The thesis indicates no single viewpoint of developed media; no "conspiracy" somehow politically to defraud or act directly for domestic interests.

I seek a perspective on developed media in a simultaneous analysis of the Egyptian media and its milieu. What I contend is of interest is that forces acted on Al Ahram, The Washington Post and The New York Times which, though different in kind, were more similar in effect than heretofore argued. Western journalism I assess as operating within a narrower set of models than is frequently believed.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is principally concerned with how, in one area of international relations, multi-national issues are dealt with by media. I illustrate this by the example of the media’s perception of Mideast relations, focusing on three particular newspapers (though with other references): The Washington Post and The New York Times from the US, and Al-Ahram from Egypt.

The event central to the study is the negotiation for and signing of the Camp David Accords in September, 1978, but the thesis covers the entire "Camp David Period" from September, 1977 (when the possibility of the Geneva Conference was firmly put on the agenda by the Carter administration) until March, 1979 (when, on the 26 March, the Treaty was signed in Washington). For the purposes of this thesis "Camp David" shall be considered to mean the entire period and/or the actual treaties and accords as the context shall indicate.

The usual view of the period (the 1978 Accords and the 1979 Treaty are Appendices A and B) has been one of a successful international rapprochement, the prime foreign relations achievement of the Carter presidency, and an example of realpolitik. Palestinian issues raised were submerged by political and military gains for Egypt and Israel (Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, demilitarization of the north Sinai corridor, stationing of a UN force, access for
Israeli ships to the Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal) and by increasing Egyptian domestic instability (see Chapter 3). Promises about the autonomy of the Occupied Territories (after a five year moratorium) were marked only by Palestinian protests in 1984 (the year of promised elections).

This thesis illustrates how the media can be subject to bias in failing to report issues relevant to a Mideast agreement (for example how Sadat was out of touch with the needs and aspirations of Egyptians or how Palestinians were unserved by negotiations for peace, and how US perceptions and domestic considerations permeated their interpretation).

Because of the heavy media coverage of Camp David and its relatively short duration, it was an ideal period for studying methods of filtering information within those newspapers. Also, since the event created as much interest in the Mideast as in the West, though for different reasons, there were recurring points of reference in reports on the same events, while those events were ranked as important by both sets of media.

Before examining the reporting of Camp David (and specifically a content analysis of its first part - September 1977) I deal with wider issues of developmental journalism (directly relevant because illustrative both of Western treatment of Third World events, and developing countries' journalistic attitudes), and clarify wider
issues of media standards by appeal to behaviour codes involved in written and broadcast journalism within the West and the Third World.

Chapter 1 is primarily concerned with a study of the New International Information and Communication Order (NIICO) to specify the nature of supposed media biases and where they may be operative. This gives a formal philosophical context for the information and conclusions contained in Chapter 5 (showing clearly what exactly critics of the Western press may mean by "bias" or "subjectivity", and allowing a consideration of whether these terms have any relevance to the way Camp David was treated in both the US and Egyptian press). The effect media may have on determining foreign policy, domestic political policy, or, indeed, public debate is not at issue.

One of the purposes of this thesis is to investigate what are considered to be journalists' most valued qualities: objectivity and professionalism. Sometimes the editorial or owners' line, or the established views of that particular readership can have a marked influence, and the media may be less investigative internationally than domestically. Though one should be wary when using only three newspapers to illustrate these characteristics of the media in general, the importance of all three newspapers in their societies suggests wider conclusions may be inferred. Historical research and discussion is therefore included: the
Mideast from 1947 to the present; the relationship of developed to developing nations; post-colonial media, all help set the framework in which Camp David was reported.

But this thesis is not concerned with the rights and wrongs of the journalistic debate or with the relative effectiveness of different types of journalism for the developed and developing world, though the debate itself (including the heated controversy of the 1970s regarding developmentalism, and culminating in the Brandt Report) is discussed. The centre of the thesis remains the relative inflexibility of media identified as an imbalance between the developed countries' view of themselves and the view they have of the rest of the world (specifically the Mideast). The thesis allows that there is no single viewpoint within the plethora of developed media; that there is no "conspiracy" to somehow politically defraud underprivileged nations, or act directly for domestic interests. The way developed media act may show a paucity of historical awareness; occasional resistance to unorthodox views, and a desire not to upset whatever consensus the editors perceived to be acting most directly upon their papers but this, I contend, could be inherent in all media to a greater or lesser extent: notions of objectivity and professionalism, praiseworthy targets in themselves, may be corrupting if it is believed they can be attained in fact.

I believe the only way a correct perspective on developed media
during this time period could be effectively maintained is to offer (as I have) an analysis of the Egyptian and US media within their respective milieu. What I contend is of interest is that forces act on Al Ahram, The Washington Post and the New York Times which, though different in kind and intention, are similar in effect and substance.

Chapter 1, in dealing with the communications debate from the perspective of developed and developing media shows the structural potential for imbalance which following chapters articulate more precisely. Chapter 2 outlines the politics of the specific historical area the thesis covers, while Chapters 3 and 4 deal respectively with the Egyptian and US journalists' responses to Camp David.

It is in Chapter 5 that I deal with the specifics of comparison between Al Ahram, The New York Times and The Washington Post using a limited content analytical approach.

My conclusion is that once agendas have been set within establishments it is virtually impossible for establishment organs such as these to disappoint them. With this in mind, I opine that Camp David may have been granted its designation of successfully completed peace accord by virtue of the way it fitted certain agendas rather than by any reference to solid post-1979 achievement of its aims.
CHAPTER 1:
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS ORDER (NIICO)

1.1 Introduction

This chapter concerns NIICO and its relevance to coverage of Camp David both in the US and the Mideast, but specifically in the three papers at the centre of the content analytical section of Chapter 5: The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Al Ahram.

The NIICO debate reached its peak in the mid-1970s, when there was a general realisation of the importance of Third World access to the benefits of advancing communications technologies linked to the media. Many Third World countries were left behind their needs ranging from information technologies for education through to their direct use in and by national industries. Externally the problem of technological imbalance manifested itself specifically in an inability to articulate adequately Third World demands within international and developed fora. The problem surfaced both as an image-distortion by the West of Third World issues (in this case the variety of Arab demands associated with Camp David and Palestinian concerns specifically) as well as the aforementioned lack of articulacy in all matters vital to Third World interests.

Al Ahram furnishes an example of the ineffectiveness of a Third World newspaper (albeit a newspaper with a longer history than most in the Third World): restricted by internal Egyptian regulations, lack of resources, poor journalistic training, and
few of the many supporting structures enjoyed by Western newspapers (use of agencies for general news, reports from a worldwide set of correspondents and stringers, and exchange and debate on issues within a set or sub-set of similar organisations). The thesis provides contexts for the analysis of the handicapping of Third World media as well as for the empowerment of structures supportive of Developed media (Chapters 3 and 4) and offers a socio-historical frame for Camp David itself (Chapter 2).

NIICO highlights and measures the imbalance of media from the decolonizations of the 1950s and 1960s to the difficulties in remedying those biases today. Imbalance in the coverage of Camp David acts as an example of precisely those demands articulated by NIICO. The furnishing of the Third World since colonization with a media established and run for and by the colonizing nations remains the core problem even today, characterized by dependence on Western expertise and products. Basically developing media were too weak to offer sufficiently powerful counter-balances to Western media. Accordingly Western news distribution services with their own agendas and cultural contexts dominated the reporting of Camp David displacing access to the media debate of different interests. Decolonization has not seen an end to the dual ranking of nations: Northern states (the old colonial powers plus the US, USSR until 1991, and China - a reborn colonial power) still monopolize world resources and production. One of the burgeoning production areas is information: news, geological information processed by satellite,
satellite time and computer-based interactive technology. The benefits of change in the processing of information are enjoyed in the North, while developing countries often languish with old equipment, poor training and little access to new technology.¹

The gap in the getting and processing of information had become so wide by the late 1960s (combined with a belief among some developing countries that information held the key for further development) that there were calls for NIICO in the developing world. For the North such calls ran contrary to a dominant view of the natural "free market" for communications, what in the US was seen as a constitutional support for the unfettered gathering and distribution of information.² UNESCO (the United Nations body most concerned with containing developed states' desires not to inhibit communications technologies) was itself inhibited by financial and political measures which effectively killed NIICO as an issue during the 1980s.

Third world interest groups considered media a positive force for amelioration despite fears that communication techniques and the media itself might increase developing countries' inability to free themselves from underdevelopment.³ Western responses varied from country to country, and from media to media (and indeed within the media there is very little uniformity in approach to any question). This could be characterized overall as "laissez-faire" (with the media perceived ideally as sacrosanct). "In the economy-at-large, economists ... welcomed a continuously

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expanding pool of goods and services. ... If everyone received more information it was believed, the course was a correct one."

Western media goals, frequently aggressive and often vaguely formulated as the "free flow" of global media information, may benefit Western media producers (those having resources). Yet entrepreneurial goals are signified as impartial "standards".

Standards for ethical communication rooted in an American value system ... are not widely shared throughout the world. Criteria of linear logic, empirical observation, and objective truth are not used to assess communication ethically in various other cultures, religions, and political systems. 5

Even where a Western journalist is aware of developmental problems, there is a chance that they will be encouraged by the media hierarchy to tune their work to domestic levels of interest and awareness.

The most persistent problem is that Western news agencies may employ people well-trained in every domestic journalistic task but not necessarily qualified to report extra-nationally. 6 The media may frequently see things subjectively, despite attempts to balance away biases using unorthodox or foreign journalists (Robert Fisk writing about the Mideast for The Independent, or Yusef Ibrahim writing for The New York Times). For Third World media systems the persistent problem is that technical achievement cannot easily be shared at the point of research, development or (increasingly) production. Third World nations may find themselves in a system suited to advanced countries which
already have good access to information and know-how in vital areas.

The origins and implications of international information are bound together in their colonial beginnings. One reason why "free" or "developed" international media can so easily appear to the developing world as propaganda is that it inherited so much from colonial mind-sets. The world media system as it exists today is a direct inheritance from colonial media practices, bringing with its past a significant amount of ethnocentrism regarding the needs of the developing world.

Somehow the gaps between the knowledge which experts share and the widespread ignorance of ordinary citizens has to be bridged and there is really no other way to achieve this than through the mass media. ... The balance in the flow of information asked for by UNESCO is an integral aspect of its quality. ... The disadvantaged and the oppressed ought to be represented and to have some voice. Mass media, and especially news, are still for many people the only way in which they can reach some understanding of the conditions of the world ... . The more interdependent the world becomes, the more important it is that the interdependence be sustained by information and understanding.

This chapter will look at four different stages of development within the field of information and communication, and relate the current arguments and situations to the Third World and the Mideast in particular. It could be considered that the Mideast is an almost perfect example of the tensions in present media practice.

The central theme is essentially a challenge to the simplistic concept that a free flow of information is universally viable. Emerging from this is an analysis in section 1.2 ("International
Communication and the Developing World) of the dependency generated by the free flow of information. I will focus attention on the way in which Third World media systems were shaped by First World forces, infrastructure laid down by colonizers at the height of their administrative power. What the Third World inherited was a media system directly derived from a European model. The chapter then concentrates on the way developed countries' media infrastructures have maintained links with the Third World after independence. Western assistance, and the nature of this assistance constituted the focus for UNESCO criticism, at least until the withdrawal of American and British finance in the mid-1980s. Section 1.3, "The Information and Communication Order in the Post-Colonial Era: the International Political and Economic Context", looks at the considerable imbalance in the flow of news from the West to the Third World, and specifically at Western superiority in the field of news-gathering and dissemination (the direct result of centuries of experience which had built up the existence of strong Western news agencies). The output of these agencies dominates the news market of the Third World. This section argues that much Third World news is only published or broadcast by these agencies. The imbalance in this area of news-gathering encouraged the non-aligned countries to form their own Non-Aligned News Agency Pool (NANAP) in 1975. I will discuss the importance of this pool and the problems besetting its effectiveness as an alternative news-gathering organization, which, almost before it started, was the object of Western criticism. Section 1.4, "Conflict Between Media: Image, Lifestyles and Values" looks at the overall effect
of free flow and discusses its implications. My conclusion rests on the supposition that the present information imbalance is unlikely to be corrected because it is neither institutionalised nor planned.

1.2: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: COLONIALISM AND THE MEDIA IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Understanding the media imbalance between developed and developing countries has to be in the context of the relationship between the West and its dependent states prior to de-colonization. The colonial expansion of Europe into Africa and Asia was in large part a desire for new markets outside Europe (while simultaneously bringing the South into the European cultural and military sphere). Western interests focussed on communicating news to and from the metropolitan centres of Europe, especially trading information. Such news was important to colonial industries, banking and financial organizations. Another, equally important task of the colonial media systems, was the molding of some kind of homogenous ideology among settlers.11

A notable factor in most colonial media was the use of European languages even if the broadcast was directed into rather than out of the colonies.12 Newspapers were often printed only in English, French or Portuguese. This creeping linguistic homogenisation continues today within the media systems of Third World countries. The use of European languages in some Third World media systems was an easy way out of the problems faced in broadcasting within a multi-linguistic and multi-cultural milieu (such as the Ivory Coast). Because the information infrastructure
was created by Europeans any growth of an indigenous media was likely to be minimal. Broadcasting reflected the order and values of a foreign ruling class, and was dependent on the European system for survival.

A listener could easily imagine he was tuned to a Parisian station. Music was mostly French or French versions of American popular music. There was little indigenous music ... Announcers were both French and Ivorian and spoke in excellent French. In fact all but six of the hundred and seventy-five hours a week of broadcasting were in French. There was very limited news broadcast in nine of the vernacular tongues.13

Whereas the use of French in the Ivory Coast could be seen as an advantage, offering as it does the chance of a media and educational lingua franca simplifying the problems of numerous indigenous languages, the content of broadcasts created a specific cultural deficit by their Euro-centrism. Granting independence had hardly any effect: the systems tended to be kept going in the same way as before, change being too expensive, too complicated or threatening to cut off Western help.14 15 If first steps were taken to turn a European model into indigenous media, they consisted in restricting organizations from doing what they had done for years. This might mean crude censorship of "Western" viewpoints. Such draconian measures reflected the bewilderment (or simple authoritarianism) of new governments faced with legislating in the complex system of media.16

As most Third World countries inherited media developed during colonial rule there was a discrepancy of technology for maintaining that media. Equipment had to be purchased from the West and the experience of ex-colonies’ media showed a powerful monopoly
of Western media concerns,\textsuperscript{17} and often with that an extension of Western structures.\textsuperscript{18}

Dependency can divide media personnel of developing nations from their native material. One media-linked revolution occurring worldwide is loss of adhesion between classes in societies and the creation of an international information elite which, coupled with the growing technico-economic dependency of their countries on Western expertise, isolates the entrepreneurial classes within their own societies. This in turn strengthens dependency since elites see no reason to invest in domestic projects (which would be risky) while their money is invested safely elsewhere. The gap between classes in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico grew through the 1970s and 1980s in proportion to the increase in information technology (whose infrastructures existed mainly at some central location) and was reflected by the flight of capital from those societies. Western aid often accelerated this process.\textsuperscript{19}

Dependency theory gives us a clue as to the evolving structures of international media. The lack of meaningful independence in the poorest countries has been exacerbated since the debt crisis of the mid-1980s with a net outflow of capital from the developing world. The consequent influence of Western banking over parts of the Third World might be described as "neocolonialism".

In contemporary dependency theory there is a greater element of doubt as to whether the circle of dependency ... is or is not absolutely vicious, and as to whether significant change is possible within the existing international order. ... There is substantial evidence to
show that many weaknesses in the economies of poorer nations are partly caused by and sometimes reinforced by the political and commercial interests of the stronger economies.\(^{20}\)

It is possible to see the debate as loaded, employing exaggerated claims that are difficult to substantiate, and owing much to political and sociological rhetoric.

The contours of debate have perhaps been too much influenced by the Latin American experience, where North American penetration of technology, advertising, low-brow canned US media fodder, has been especially acute in conditions of relatively low national government regulations. There is a general tendency towards exaggerated claims for media impact. When the particular dangers predicted in relation to one innovation fail to materialize ... attention moves on to the next incipient weapon of imperialism.\(^{21}\)

Neo-Marxist dependency theory, as outlined by Gurevich, Bennett et al, explains aspects of prima facie dependence without being able to provide a convincing analysis of what such dependence might create within the society.\(^{22}\) Gearing up the Third World to consume what the First produces is one way of interpreting what motivates organizations such as USIS (United States Information Service). Such assistance serves many publicly-unacknowledged goals for the donor country, but need not necessarily be suspect. It may be described as neo-colonialism, corruption or effective business practice, or simply as a means of offering objective news and information on a wide as possible basis.

1.3 THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER IN THE POST-COLONIAL ERA: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Whatever conditions surrounded the various types of changes labelled "political independence", and however much we may need to qualify that term with other terms such as "neo-colonialism"
independence from European rule did mark a new beginning for many Third World countries. It allowed their entry into the international community, which, prior to their independence, had been composed mainly of Western European states. This new development in international relations brought with it a need for re-adjustment on the part of both the Third World and Europe. For the former it meant their political destiny was for the first time in their own hands (at least primarily) and that their activities were governed by an international code of conduct, while the West had to adjust to the shock of accommodation to new members of the international community who previously had made up their Empires.23

For the first time international relations had to be conducted not between ruler and ruled, but as a relationship of political equals. This required a new set of rules in international conduct, especially on the economic and diplomatic front: the Third World, given its young and fragile economies, needed protection in its commercial activities with the West. It is possible that such protection could be achieved for some countries through a period of isolation, though this solution was contestable. As part of an assertion of much needed national independence, and in recognition of the fact that such independence may need an amount of isolation, the Third World had at some point to be given similar opportunities for economic planning. However, international aid might lead countries away from internal development and towards the reconstruction of First
World structures; the relationship between the Third World and the West remaining the same, more or less.

Foreign economic aid is frequently advocated ... as a road to development. In the post-War period public ... funds for promoting development became a regular part of Northern foreign policies. Economic aid was used because it fitted well the desire of the developed market states to maintain the existing structure of international economic relations and at the same time to garner political influence in the developing world by responding to Southern desires for development. Aid, however, was a second-best solution for the South, for it involved neither a change in the management of North-South relations, nor a meaningful redistribution of economic benefits.24

Economic institutions devised to rescue states at times of economic difficulties operate along conservative fiscal lines. Many problems faced by the Third World and Europe today derive from a background of Western political reluctance or inability to make the developing nations trading concessions. The first major reaction to the needs of international trading commitments exemplified by Bretton Woods was the Havana Charter of 1947.25

But as the various GATT rounds illustrate developed states need pay very little attention to areas where their concerns are not directly affected. The consensus among Western politicians is that the international market should not be tampered with until it automatically re-adjusts itself in the face of economic and commercial problems. It is perhaps the last phase of Western political reaction to the failed optimism of Bretton Woods.

In December 1974 a group of Third World countries pressed through the General Assembly of the UN the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. This included an article on the right of the
South to form producer associations and the duty of the North to respect the right by refraining from applying economic and political measures that would limit it. Yet by the late 1970's the prospects for these new producer cartels seemed dim indeed. Virtually none had succeeded in maintaining higher commodity prices in the face of depressed market conditions: most were fraught with internal dissension; and a few never really got off the ground.26

The increasing frustration led to developing states during the early Seventies calling for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) together with a complete change in the structure of information communication.27 This began the impetus leading to the deliberations of the Brandt Commission reports which received scant interest (perhaps because of fears of inflationary tendencies underlying the structures proposed).28 NIICO had similar beginnings and constraints, UNESCO formally pledging itself to work towards it in 1978. The argument inside UNESCO was that domination of all structures and resources of communication by the agencies (private and public) of the developed world was detrimental, distorting a nation's image of itself by marginalizing Third World news. Further, even training for communicators (both technical and creative personnel) was conducted by Westerners, usually in Western countries. This training could be said to instill alien priorities at variance with a nation's social needs and economic development priorities. In other words Western media may be accused of setting a cultural agenda and thereby eclipsing alternative values. In their place an interna-
tional culture held up Western ideals to which people must aspire to become modern. Finally, the ownership of communications technologies by Western powers was said to mean that any reform which did not put power over these technologies in the hands of the people of the Third World would only complicate the problem. Calls for change and re-adjustment in favour of developing countries were already being outpaced by technological and economic changes in the West from the mid-1970s.

The economic role of the information and media industries and the services they provide are primary factors in the maintenance of the system. Whatever complaints come from UNESCO, and however justified the attacks may be, little change can be effected without developed countries making their own specific economic decisions. Notions of "social responsibility" within the media are very limited in the face of a technology which has fewer political constraints the further one moves from domestic political interests. The UN and its agencies have been used for pushing Third World demands for economic change, but there have been few concrete results (an example of such failure would be the Brandt Report's inability to resurrect the NWEO). Success in controlling and changing the world's financial organizations has been enjoyed only by and within the West, whose governments have been able to overcome the difficulties involved in getting together on equal terms and with some amount of consensus to meet their own trading and economic needs, and to tackle their own environmental and political problems.
The continued underdevelopment of the Third World means that they furnish the West with a market which can be used advantageously by Western corporate capitalism. It is this economic and technological imbalance which places the developed nations in a monopolistic position in areas of information and communication.

1.3.1 PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THE PHILOSOPHY OF "FREE-FLOW"

Presently most Third World countries have an indigenous news agency of some sort, although the capacity of their operations is frequently limited due to shortage of funds and trained personnel, and the ability to satisfy even their own and neighbouring countries' thirst for news is limited. Press Trust of India is typical, despite the resources of so large a nation. Such constraints leave a vacuum in the area of newsgathering and dissemination which Western news agencies are keen to fill.

The first serious call for a change in the field of communication came at the meeting of Non-Aligned Countries in March 1976 in Tunisia, where the acronym NIICO (New International Information and Communication Order) was coined. The call came as a result of mounting concern on the part of Third World states over the growing imbalance between themselves and Western Europe. German Carnero Rogue, a Peruvian media specialist, articulates this concern.

Since information in the World showed a disequilibrium favouring some and ignoring others, it is the duty of the non-aligned countries and other developing countries to change this situation and obtain the decolonization of
The founding of UNESCO had been encouraged by the West as a result of a re-think of its attitudes after the conclusion of the Second World War (a re-think sought directly by the US).

The triumph of the "value-free" American ideology of the media was nowhere more remarkable than in UNESCO, the United Nations agency whose areas of activity include the media. UNESCO has propagated such American notions as the "free flow of information", which inevitably favour the major media exporting nation. The most active architects and proponents of UNESCO media doctrines have been Americans; they have openly based these doctrines upon American research - despite the commercial advertising and Washington foreign policy strains in the financing of this research.

Tunstall clearly indicates the strains that later lead to UNESCO's rejection of American influence, beginning at the Twentieth UNESCO Conference where newly-independent Third World governments, supported by the USSR (taking a belated interest in UNESCO affairs) voiced their dissatisfaction at the style of Western reporting of Third World issues, and calling for some form of international control.

The case for control was defined in terms of "strengthening peace, and combatting war, propaganda and racism", terms which it is hard to oppose. But the draft declaration added that all such reporting should be done "with due respect for the sovereignty and legislation of the country in which these media are located", and that "the mass media should make known the versions of facts presented by states, institutions and individuals who consider that the information published about them has done serious harm to their efforts" to strengthen peace, fight war, racism and colonialism.

The US took the issue of the promotion of knowledge, peace and security through international media very seriously, introducing
this concept into the constitution of UNESCO, but with a market idea of media, using fixed points of reference regarding media and how competition should work according to the Western and specifically American model. The one-sidedness of the idea of free-flow simply did not register, nor did the implications of the founding phrases of UNESCO in the world of a growing number of newly-independent nations.

The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for human rights, a fundamental freedom which is affirmed for the people of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by charter of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{36}

The UNESCO charter also could be used to promote developmentalism and even discrimination against primary media producers in the West. With such wording it was inevitable that media would soon be on the UNESCO agenda. At the first session of the general conference (1947) the US suggested that UNESCO should establish a worldwide communication system using funds of $250 million. But this proposal was rejected by the UK which believed such a system would be used by the US as a propaganda platform. Although the suggestion was never realised, US influence remained strong in UNESCO (though by the sixties this had begun to decline as membership of newly-independent Third World states increased).\textsuperscript{37}

There are many aspects to the problem of information imbalance between the West and the Third World, the most prominent being the flow of news.\textsuperscript{38} The main reason for this is the existence of
powerful Western news-gathering agencies. Typical of these agencies are Reuters of Great Britain, UPI (United Press International) of the US (finally eclipsed as a force in the late 1980s and sold in 1992), AFP (Agence France Presse), AP (Associated Press), IPI (International Press Institute), IPS (International Press Services) and CNN (Cable News Network). These agencies, together with TASS (or TASS/ITAR as it became known in 1991), control about ninety per cent of all the world's information.\textsuperscript{39, 40} IPI/IPS (the International Press Institute and the International Press Services, see below) is tiny by comparison: understaffed, underqualified and underfunded.

Imbalance of this kind may allow one-sided pictures of different cultures to be constructed, and expectations of Third World states and cultures to be developed which (whether positive or negative or merely simplistic) it may be difficult for a journalist to disappoint, and equally difficult for that professional to notice events which may conflict with those expectations. Crisis-dominated news coverage of Africa in the 1980s would be a perfect example of this phenomenon, or coverage of the Mideast where a popular perception of Israel (a nation under siege) was maintained despite contrary evidence from reporters. One of the characteristics of news gathering agencies as well as the media itself is of a subjective conservatism which does not like to disappoint the expectations it may have built up with readers over time, and has little time or space to qualify. This is partially demonstrated in the reporting of Camp David by Western agencies during the 1970s and 1980s (see Chapter...
During the November 1991 abortive Madrid Summit, The Sunday Times in its major coverage included two articles on Palestinian "terrorism", one as a front page story about Abu Nidal. Within this frame it would be difficult to condemn Shamir's tactics of "finger wagging" or approve the "insult trading" of Palestinian delegates (Abdel Shafi and Saeb Barekat).

Hardening Western attitudes to calls for a new international economic structure (see above) also prevented favorable consideration of the need for NIICO. However, the West softened a little in the mid-Seventies in the face of concerted Third World opposition, fearing that they might drive Third World countries increasingly into the Soviet sphere of influence. Western Europe and the US began actively to discuss international media problems once more, starting with the US Senate Committee for Foreign Relations in 1976-1977.

This effort on the part of the US to mobilize financial support for a Third World media structure, was termed by some a Marshall Plan for telecommunications. This effectively acted as a bargaining chip for the West in their negotiations with the Third World over information and communication issues at the 20th UNESCO Conference of 1978, but was countered by Third World states themselves. In US terms NIICO would be a channel for technology from the West to the Third World (within the context of a free flow of information), however the final resolution which was adopted put forward certain requests.
Requests the Director-General to intensify the encouragement of communications development and to hold consultations designed to lead to the provision to developing countries of technological and other means for promoting a free flow and wider and better balanced exchanges of information of all kinds;

Invites the Director-General for this purpose, to convene as early as possible after the conclusion of this twentieth session of the General Conference a planning meeting of representatives of governments, to develop a proposal for institutional arrangements to systematize collaborative consultation on communications development activities needs and plans... .

Consequently, the International Programme for the Development of Communications (IPDC) was established at the 20th session of the UNESCO General Conference in Belgrade (1980). This programme failed to satisfy the US and therefore at the 21st Session another US/Third World resolution was considered. The International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems (the MacBride Commission, having its origins in the dissatisfaction which grew from the 1960's onward, see above) had as far back as 1977 begun an attempt to solve the problems of communication and information.

There is an obvious link between communications on the national and international levels. To isolate one from the other ... would not only be a mistake, but is really impossible. So many complaints and criticisms in the international sphere, justified or exaggerated, about monopolies and imbalances in communication, or about the role of transnational companies or the neglect of cultural identity and heredity, are certainly connected with what is often taking place inside various countries.

Most of the participants, having been strong advocates of the free flow concept of information, found the Commission comforting and encouraging since it did not suggest a fixed programme based on militant principles hostile to their free flow position. This
was because the Commission stressed a need for reform of the existing system, keeping the basic Western information and communications philosophy intact, the belief being that any measure considered too radical by financing countries such as the US would simply be dropped. What McBride broadly-argued was a "development theory" of media which recognized a commonality and uniqueness in the problems of mass media in the Third World, putting philosophies of free flow into new context. McBride noted the factors which might make a separate theory and practice necessary.

One circumstance is the absence of some of the conditions necessary for a developed mass communications system: the communication infrastructure; the available audience. Another, related, factor is the dependence on the developed world for what is missing in the way of technology, skills and cultural products. Thirdly, there is invariable devotion of these societies to economic, political and social development as a primary national task ... .

Out of these conditions have come a set of expectations and normative principles about mass media which deviate from those which seem to apply [elsewhere].

Expressing constant mistrust of each others' aims and requirements, the Third World and the West continued to push their demands through the 1970s and 1980s. UNESCO still, despite all the difficulties, tried to reconcile viewpoints while in favour of NIICO. What remained undefined was the concept of such an order itself (apart, that is, from its partial incarnation in the form of the IPI and IPS). The West continues to support the principal of free flow (notably in the GATT round of 1993), while the Third World knows it is its understanding of the problems of information flow, and the political implications, that gives their demands credibility.
1.3.2 THE NON-ALIGNED NEWS AGENCY POOL - SOLUTION OR ANOTHER PROBLEM?

From 1960 to 1990 very little change occurred in world news flow because very few politicians in developed countries regarded alternatives to free flow as anything short of crude censorship (though the advent of satellite technology is causing change).

Developing countries have moved to free themselves from dependency, and one of the most significant efforts has been the establishment of NANAP, see above. It has no headquarters and no specific funds allocated to it but operates so that each member country dispatches news which it wishes other members to receive. The sender of the news provides the payment for its dispatch, at the same time the receiving country or countries would be under no obligation to publish anything. Although NANAP has not enjoyed anything like the commercial success of the older, Western agencies, the ideas behind it continue to inform developmental debate.

Because this type of news agency is government-run, criticism may suggest lack of objectivity or journalistic freedom. It was hoped that the pool would one day be capable of satisfying the Third World need for mutual news-exchange, since it aimed at reflecting Third World events in a more positive light. NANAP was conceived as very much a materialization of more abstract notions of some form of developmental journalism, encouraged by Asian journalists such as those of the Philippines.
In much the same way as NANAP, indeed with the same fundamental philosophy and needs, the concept of developmental journalism was born out of what some Third World journalists and broadcasters saw as a need for a socially and politically responsible system of reporting with events in Third World societies: a system that would take into account the special needs of developing cultures. Concepts of objectivity and responsibility, it was observed, are ideally approached within the framework of local needs. Western attitudes were not rejected but neither were they seen as candidates for wholehearted adoption in the radically different environment of developing societies. Developmental journalism, according to the definition offered by the Non-Aligned journalists, ought to take into consideration all the unique components of events which make news in Third World societies. Although to Western eyes a free and democratic media should act objectively and responsibly as a watchdog over government conduct, when related to the media in the Third World these qualities should be determined by local exigencies. The problem of slanting media towards local needs in the Third World was only one of many, the biggest problem remained putting the Third World on the Western agenda at all without having it summarized in terms of calamity, war or underdevelopment. The common denominator remained the need for some kind of independence and self-respect.

Although the principle of NANAP was founded on a real need to balance the flow of information between the West and The Third World, as well as within the Third World itself, its operation
was never smooth. The reasons were inadequately qualified journalists, problems of ideological differences between members, and insufficient funding. Since the languages employed by the Agency were limited to English, French, Spanish and Arabic this caused difficulties in translating pieces of news into other languages: linguistic barriers do not simplify problems of information exchange through the medium of a news agency. Problems of translation and funding remain considerable hindrances to any effective use of a pool by contributor states, let alone the problems already mentioned originating in (Western) opposition or general technological change.

Naturally, the majority of the criticism faced by the organizers of a non-Western news pool came from the excluded Western media owners, experts and journalists. The president of UPI, Roderick Beaton, articulated this criticism as part of an attack on UNESCO.52

I can’t see ... how the kind of thing they are proposing could have any credibility. The information that would be sent out would be sent into a pool by the government and then distributed. It would essentially be propaganda. But the thing that disturbs us most is UNESCO sponsorship, they are going against the United Nations Charter.53

Despite all the criticisms of NANAP, in a limited way it met the expectations of member states and articulated a fundamental frustration. It increased its circulation - producing up to forty thousand words a day by the end of the 1970s and having within it up to eighty governmental news agencies.
1.4 CONFLICT BETWEEN MEDIA: IMAGE, LIFESTYLES AND VALUES

The conflict between indigenous and imported media is clear in most Third World societies. Besides the tendency of imported media to upset government economic planning it may also stifle indigenous media. The capacity of Western media, especially television, to damage that of developing countries, is powerful in those states bordering a nation with a high media profile and output. The superiority of Western media in production and programme contents is more often than not the reason a neighbouring audience is lured away from its own broadcasts. Western programmes may be persuasive sources of information and attractive entertainment: their effect on the weaker media of neighbours can be to attract and sustain large young, impressionable audiences.

The level at which indigenous media may retaliate is low. In many Third World cases the role of the media is not primarily to entertain but to act as an instrument of government. Compared to imports this overtly propagandist role for media is likely to be regarded by a population as unattractive; consequently Western media becomes widely accepted. Canada, ranking with the highly industrially-developed, ironically has long been faced with a situation similar to that of the Third World, complaining about powerful US media penetration of its society and the consequent corruption of its culture. Issues of deculturalisation are a constant worry to Canadian government and media specialists. Nowhere has this re-culturalisation been strongest than in the
Third World, media penetration going hand in hand with some form of dependency. This link is consolidated through the openness of international systems of trade in commercial media products, such as film. 55 Even in relatively wealthy African countries domestic economics can lead to dependence on foreign media. 56 Tanzania's relative independence is a rare example of a directed effort to rid domestic media of colonial traces through investment in the training of journalists and broadcasters within the country itself. (The foreign training of journalists producing an orientation of those individuals towards foreign cultural values, is an alienation already pervasive in Africa. 57)

Turning this tide of cultural swamping by the West would require an independent media policy, and the implementation of media systems modelled on national requirements and not on any foreign notions of what the developing society may need. No matter how attractive an imported broadcasting network might be, foreign-built systems can rarely be adequate to the hugely different needs and aspirations of the societies on which the networks are imposed. Since direction of movement of cultural activity is virtually all in one direction (from the West to the Third World) there will obviously be limited possibilities for any real kind of cultural exchange and interaction.

It is tempting to enter the world media market only as a buyer, and avoid the headaches, financial restraints and other problems of home production. On an individual level the temptations are harder to resist, and the reasons to resist them more abstract.
1.4.1: THIRD WORLD MEDIA PROFESSIONALISM

In many cases what is striking in the Third World is the lack of qualified (and many underqualified) personnel employed in the media. Perhaps this is because governments do not wish to employ the well-educated and well-trained in this sector, and potential personnel are required instead to fill posts in government ministries and other political positions. This lack of professionalism is partly the result of the media operated as an extension of government. Journalists and broadcasters are not always seen as professionals using their own creative initiative. The blame must partly fall on governments who make it their duty to instill fear in journalists. There is nothing left for professionals under such conditions except to publish material underground or move abroad.

National training centres for journalists and broadcasters in the Third World can be replaced by foreign forms of training only with difficulty, though there is still a lack of proper training. However, those countries which do have such facilities are tempted to have their journalists and broadcasters receive their final training in the West. The effect is to consolidate a link between the West and the Third World. A significant problem from any Western training for Third World journalists and broadcasters must be the frustration when they return home to systems far removed from the technologies they have been trained to use. The problems their societies face can be different to remedies they have learnt abroad. Dependency is plainly a
factor in the free-flow of media technology to economically vulnerable states.  

Like the concept of media itself (and any export from the West which has with it a philosophical link to the ideology of advancement and is therefore perceived by the exporter as a neutral export, of great advantage to the importing country) media technology cannot easily be promoted with the interests of development in mind. Western entrepreneurs are liable to see under-development as a boon, areas where they can escape the rising cost of labour and the restrictive practices in the West. The US has encouraged South American countries to accept multinational activities (a drive explicit in the founding sentiments of the IMF - see above), while these same countries could not easily afford the full costs (economic, environmental, social) of these giants.

There would be a special centre set up in Colombia, funded by the Ford Foundation amongst others. This agency would help make the programmes and combine the educational needs of the various Latin American nations. Each government would have the dubious privilege of awarding the contracts for ground equipment to the foreign corporations. Most of the money to pay off the corporations would be loaned from Western nations or international agencies.  

If the legislatures of the West are uninterested in the imbalances of trade generally (and this may after all only be the outcome of their own trading problems) then the problems of developing media are likely to rank low on any international agenda.
1.5 CONCLUSION: THE GENERAL ARGUMENT OF MEDIA IMBALANCE IN THE THIRD WORLD AND THE MID EAST IN PARTICULAR

No study of the treatment by media of any world event can be made without considering the wider issues of possible international bias, its causes, and how such distortions are effected. Camp David came as one media event in a continuum of misinformation as well as within an unequal relationship between developed and developing countries. To understand the processes behind the reporting of Camp David, together with the range of initiatives during and after, one must look not only at the imbalances of media information but also at attempts to redress the balance, in this case in the context of the NIICO debate (see above). If there are lessons to be learnt from Camp David they could include ideas about the professionalism of journalists, economic relationships of nations and the way this changes the flow of information, how the changes in information technology have altered the arenas of debate, as well as how far those arenas remain much the same with broadcast media (especially television) as with newspapers.

A study of the reporting of Camp David can be seen as a paradigm of how public perceptions are created and sustained, and whether public perceptions can be an important element in the domestic political processes which mould foreign policy. A perception of Israel (or any country) in the US is constructed out of an unqualified historicism (not unusual in popular culture of all periods and places) and ideas of maintaining an international status quo. However inadequate developmental journalism may be,
however naive and unworkable in the face of the financing of media multinationals in the age of satellite television, the criticisms of its proponents can be levelled at Camp David. Too often "new" ties between countries with older, colonial relationships have (almost ipso facto) been old ties.

It might be perceived by developmentalist critics that if Western multinationals realised the potential of change for boosting profits there could be an alteration of the present state of affairs. But for such recognition to take place, Western capitalism would have to be a more cohesive entity than it is, and media (a set of interrelated but independent ventures and concerns) less unaffected by debates on dependency or imbalance. Both scenarios are unlikely to change because there is neither the climate for such change to take place, nor the incentive (financial or legislative). Developmentalist economists enjoying the first blush of decolonialization in the 1960s overestimated both the amount of inter-dependency between poor and rich nations, and the naturally selfish nature of Western economic development. With the advent of a more global economy by the late 1980s the ideals of inter-dependency were replaced by the reality of old-style dependency of the very poorest nations (mostly in Africa) and new agendas in the economically unstable West. Old ideas of strong and stable Western economic development trickling down towards poorer nations continued, but not unchallenged. Gradually ignorance of Third World problems turned towards fear that underdeveloped countries might threaten their Northern neighbours (either through demographic shifts or
economic and political instabilities). During these changes independent media (despite financial problems because of economic change and depression) grew in power. By the 1990s much of the larger developed media were more independent of national restrictions, and rather than reflecting the politics of host nations reflected the needs of an international market. Yet while CNN or ITN produced a politically more homogenous package (due in part to the vanishing of old political polarities) never before had Third World problems been so instantaneously and thoroughly consumed by developed nations.

The media system in the Mideast suffers from problems similar to most Third World countries. Arabic remains one of the strengths of indigenous culture, there being a high level of interaction between the media systems of Arab countries. For example both Al Ahram and Al Gumhuryah have a circulation outside Egypt and broadcast media reach Arabic countries in the age of satellite almost as a single nation. Relative cultural isolation in developmental terms means there is the danger of an overemphasis on the ideologies of each country preventing the easy flow of information between countries (this is one of the problems faced in the reporting of Camp David). The other notable factor is the existence of regional media powers such as Egypt; (prior to the troubles of the 1970s and 1980s the Lebanon also made an impact on the media systems of neighbouring countries) but it may be worth noting a dramatic increase in education from the 1960s has meant that Arabic culture is no longer as self-contained as it once was.
The major media centres in the Mideast unfortunately are located in countries where financial and other restrictions hinder their playing a greater role. Similar difficulties to those faced in other Third World countries (including the traditional lack of adequately trained individuals to run an advanced media system, coupled with an inadequate technology) hinder efforts. Even those possessing advanced equipment often do not have the necessary personnel for its fullest use. This is especially so in the case of the Gulf States.

Outflow of Mideastern news through Western media is according to its relative value for Western audiences. "Value" in this sense may mean (i) cultural (linguistic, political or religious) similarity (ii) similar history (iii) radical divergence - the fascination of the different (iv) topicality (v) specialist interest (ie financial or health issues). Coverage of Camp David may have had elements of all five "value" measures, but especially (i) and (ii) which relate directly to the Western connection to Israel. While Arabic media used Western news agencies to bolster sparse reports, public opinion within the Mideast could not easily be accounted for by Western commentators who quite often saw consequences apart from any relevance they had for the region. This news movement was very much on the terms of the primary consumers, and the inability of the arabs to promote their own points of view stemmed directly from the inadequate media resources at their disposal as well as cultural habits not used to self-promotion in the Western tradition.
Coverage of Camp David in the US press critical of the form and content of the agreement (collectively called the "rejectionist front") played a relatively minor, low-key role in the reporting of the event, and has had little impact on the image of the Mideast in the US establishment from Kissinger onwards. The "rejectionist front", negatively labelled and given little media space has been damned through national and political disinterest.

The importance of Camp David (and the diplomatic communications surrounding it) to the West obviously comes from the extraordinary recognition by an Arab State of the existence of Israel, and Western knowledge that anything which made another Arab-Israeli war less likely could only be a boon politically and commercially. (The great fear haunting regimes since the Ford Administration was of another Arab oil embargo.)

The imbalances in reportage of the processes of Camp David was a reflection of general world media biases, with the addition of cultural differences hindering mutual comprehension. The lack of resources and access to information combined with a lack of Western political expertise simply did not permit the Arab community of nations to put their case effectively. This example makes sense of developing nations' call for a new communication order, at the same time highlighting what continues to be a resistance to change within the media industry itself. This research will focus primarily on such media imbalances and will attempt to uncover the disadvantages facing Third World countries.
as long as this imbalance remains, with conclusions in terms of the reporting of Camp David specifically.
CHAPTER 2:

PEACE INITIATIVES LEADING UP TO CAMP DAVID

2.1 Introduction - the Historical Context

The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict is complex and heterogenous, for the purposes of this thesis beginning in the post Sykes-Picot period from 1918. A mingling of radically differing interest groups without a stable commonality of history or interests created a complex of antagonistic politics.²

Although at the heart of this antagonism there are two main contenders, the Israelis and the Palestinians, it would be wrong to assume that they were the only parties in the conflict or that the violence was somehow hermetically sealed in a Mideastern scenario. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians encompasses a number of other parties: principally the US, the wider Arab nations and the USSR/CIS. But the issues involved, and the lack of clarity in the political structure set up in 1948 has inevitably allowed contention to spill into the international community (which created Israel under the auspices of the UN). Finally, issues of race and territorial dispossession are the most powerful and problematic, especially in the Twentieth Century. Consequently the problem of Israel and Palestine continues to have a considerable effect on Western political thought after fifty years.

Europeans have (for the most part) seen themselves as hosts to the Jewish people, a group which rarely achieved satisfactory integration in most European societies. The main historical
problem stemmed from the persecution of Jews by their European hosts, and this lead the Western powers towards a solution: the accommodation of Jews in a land of their own. The appropriate location was felt to be Palestine, the land from which many of their progenitors had been evicted, and for which Zionists felt a profound longing.

One justification for the establishment of "a National Home for the Jews" on Arab land was the belief the two communities might coexist. The legitimacy of one state (Israel) and the non-existence of an Arab nation (or in US diplomatic parlance "entity") called Palestine within and around it, has made it difficult for Palestinians to effect a change in the course of post-1948 events, any reform having to occur within the legislative boundaries of Israel, or within its aegis. Over the years the international community as a whole has lacked the political will to face the problems involved. The existence of a large domestic group of Israeli sympathisers and deep suspicious of the USSR encouraged the US to back the Israelis with military and economic aid, backing Israel with Western (specifically US) economic and military investment in a region troubled by instability. With Western influence in Lebanon in the period 1970-1990 reduced by anarchy and Syrian intervention, Israel was a possible lever for US policy in the region (Egypt was perceived as too unstable and factious).4

It did not take long to discover advantages Israel could confer on the US: even as a block to the progressive development of the
military power of other states in the region. Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear installation in 1978 is one example. Israel has given the US a military presence by proxy in a region perceived as threatened first by Soviet expansion and then by a regional Islamic resurgence.

The major proposals for a settlement in the Mideast and the explanation of the political background to the media treatment of Camp David will be dealt with in this Chapter. Here the aim is to frame the processes of Camp David with a chronological analysis of the changes in the Mideast since 1948.

The Balfour Declaration by this time had petrified one strand of British policy in Arabia. Although this letter was personal and not (at the time) a matter of wider policy, it later acted as a foundation for the development of a Jewish State in Palestine. The "declaration" failed to comprehend how one people could be planted on another without a loss of rights and political status for the latter. Balfour was, like many Westerners, ignorant of (and perhaps even prejudiced against) Arab culture; his views demonstrated in a memorandum written in 1919.

... In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The four great powers are committed to Zionism, and Zionism ... is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.
The "Europeanism" of the Jewish settlers was seen by some as worthier than the civilization of the Palestinian peoples, despite Balfour’s asseverations in his famous letter to Rothschild that "nothing may be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine". Either Balfour was ill-informed about the intentions of the Zionist movement to create a State of Israel on lands occupied by Palestinians, or could not see the consequences of that settlement; it was in hindsight an unrealistic act to expect a national group to suffer loss of land and at the same time not consider their rights prejudiced. Asseverations that the Declaration was not a call for a State but only for a "home" do not release Balfour from the charge of lack of political wisdom in making his statement vague enough to be agreeable to many and yet believe it unnecessary to provide any realistic political guidance for the settlement of Palestine.

2.1.2 THE PERIOD 1920-1948

The period from 1920 (the Allied peace treaty with Turkey and the League of Nations entrustment of Palestine to a British mandate) to 1948 is essentially twenty eight years of movement towards a Jewish state which would exclude the native Palestinian population even from the partial independence allowed other Arab states following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1919.8

The idea of statehood is stronger, and simpler to understand, than the concept of some kind of "home", an amorphously designat-
ed place of refuge for the world's Jews, and the 1920s and 1930s saw the idea of a state replace generalizations. What clinched the issue in international terms was the disastrous conclusion to European anti-semitism between 1941 and 1945 following the Wansee Conference. The moral force behind righting the wrong was too great for there to be an equally righteous voice raised in defence of the Palestinians who were marginalised in a series of moves culminating in the UN Declaration of Israeli Statehood in 1948.

On 29th November 1947, the General Assembly, by a majority of only one vote, recommended the partition of Palestine. The immediate result was to deprive the Palestinians of their homeland [and] the effect of the General Assembly Resolution on partition provided for the establishment of:

(a) A Jewish State on 56.47% of the total land area of Palestine, although Jewish land ownership in this territory did not exceed 9.38%; the population of this state would have been 498,000 Jews and 497,000 Arabs with the Jews established as the ruling class contrary to Western democratic principles;
(b) An Arab state on 42.88% in which Jewish land holdings were a mere 0.84%, and the Jewish population would have been only about 10,000 souls;
(c) An international zone of Jerusalem on about 0.65% of territory.

The larger portion of the land went to Jews, and in the period which followed, more and more leached out of Arab ownership. The original unfairness of land division was therefore exacerbated by a further shift of power away from the indigenous peoples. The situation in 1948 was not helped when the natural arbiter, the UN, was seen to do nothing during the partition, despite the growing conflict between arabs and jews, which inevitably lead to the flight of a large number of Palestinian Arabs to neighboring Arab states. Despite efforts at finding a settlement for
the Mideast conflict but each party has its interests when setting out suggestions for peace: no two groups could be further apart than the Israelis and Palestinians: the claims of one are almost totally at variance with the rights of the other.

There were, up to 1977-79, some fourteen important peace initiatives taken by various parties (not counting the 1947 Partition Plan). The initiatives start with mediation and conciliation as the UN attempted to effect an initial settlement. On 14th May 1948 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 186, asking for a mediator chosen by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The man given this task was the Swedish ambassador to the USSR, count Folke Bernadotte. After looking at the problem Bernadotte concluded his task with firm proposals: too firm as it turned out for the founders of Israel.

This was the first real initiative taken by the UN. However the assassination of Bernadotte together with UN observer Colonel Serot by the Stern Gang in Jerusalem on September 17th 1948, brought this effort to a halt. The assassinations reflected the antagonism of many Jewish settlers to moves to promote peace between them and Palestinians. Ever since Israeli governments resisted initiatives recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people to nationhood (including thereby the exercise of sovereign rights over land, property and freedom of movement). Israeli governments' continuing objection to any reconciliation centered around its rejection of various points, mainly concerning the positioning of the border formulated at the Lausanne Protocol
signed on 12th May 1949 and based on the November 1947 UN partition resolution. While signing the Protocol Israel nevertheless felt the partition resolution to be void, taking instead the borders of the British Mandate and the armistice lines of 1948 and 1949 as the basis for borders. "In effect Israel's territorial proposals at the Lausanne discussion in 1949 meant that the Palestinian Arabs would be left with about 20% of the area of their own country."^14

Israel had always been unhappy about the cross-border position of Jerusalem which the General Assembly announced to be placed under an international regime (decided in a resolution in 1947). The Arab states accepted but Israel rejected this, only allowing an international regime for the religious places in the Old City which were under the control of Jordan. The UN effort to bring some form of agreed settlement failed, and its commission was left to deal with refugee problems.^15

2.1.3 THE PALESTINIAN PEACE PLAN, 1947/1948

The Palestinian Peace Plan was announced at the UN in 1947 and adopted into the Palestinian National Charter in 1964. It contains the premises for the setting up of a Palestinian state: (1) the state should be a single democratic entity occupying all the lands of Palestine and (2) have equal non-racial rights for all its citizens.^16
The original peace plan was rendered a historical anachronism by the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949: Israel established itself on its own, rather than UN terms.

2.1.4 RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338

Resolution 242 is that most adroit of UN creations, a statement which in some parts can please most people, and whose meaning can be differently construed. 17

Resolution 242 was deliberately ambiguous. It recognized ... that the superpowers, the regional contestants and the local ones, had differing interpretations of what it meant. Did it mean a return to the 1949 Armistice Line? Did "a just settlement of the refugee problem" imply implementation of Resolution 194 of 1948 (confirming the right of return), as an innocent might assume? The fact is that Israel, the Arab States, including the new State of Palestine, the United States and the Soviet Union have different interpretations. 18

The background of Resolution 242 starts with the unsuccessful attempt by the General Assembly and the Security Council to get Israel to withdraw from the land occupied in June 1967. The USSR and US disagreed over the methods which should be used to hasten the withdrawal. The USSR wanted Israel condemned as an aggressor as well as demanding its withdrawal from the territory. The US wanted to avoid any outright censorship of Israel, seeking instead to use the issue to engineer a form of settlement between Israel and pro-Western Arab states.

Amalgamation of Soviet and US needs meant that (despite later PLO acceptance) Resolution 242 is vague and fails to address directly Palestinian problems, or indeed confrontation in the Mideast. 242
was adopted "unanimously" precisely for this lack of specificity: different parties took different meanings from the resolution as it suited them, Israel seeing that although their act of territorial aggression was denounced in the second paragraph of the resolution (and in 1.i and 1.ii - see Appendix E), the fact of Israeli claims (fundamental to Israeli foreign policy) was not challenged. Without direct confrontation with UN policy or the policies of those on the Security Council Israel was able to unilaterally interpret 242, and continue doing as it wished, avoiding prolonged censure from the US or Europe.

The two most important aspects of 242 are in the words "just and lasting peace" or "just settlement" repeated three times, and the notion of "secure and recognized boundaries" also alluded to three times. Since Palestine is not a state (and the Palestinian people referred to only as a refugee problem, a denial of national rights which initially caused the PLO to reject 242), the only countries to which 242 could be referring (so the Israeli argument went) were Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. As Kimche put the problem so succinctly "everyone subscribed to it and no one believed in it, since [no one] could agree on what the Resolution meant."  

The PLO saw 242 as relegating Palestine to a refugee problem, keeping it out of any Mideastern peace settlement. The PLO's initial rejection of 242 was what kept the Palestinians out of any peace contacts. When Israel accepted 242 (under US pressure) in 1970 it did so on its own terms, refusing to demilitarize the
Occupied Territories, and maintaining heavy armaments on the Golan (which it used in 1970 to shell Jordanian targets). Israel’s strategic position (and, in the US, political considerations) led to a greater latitude where Israeli breaking of 242 (and the 1949 Geneva Convention) was concerned. Despite Israel’s adoption of 242 both its value and the value of 338 were reduced to that of a plan to get antagonists round a table.²¹ 338 was adopted in the wake of the war of 1973, and has about it a desperation to implement 242.

2.1.5 THE ROGERS PEACE PLAN 1970

The Rogers Peace Plan was constructed along the lines laid out in Resolution 242, and was accepted in 1970 by the Israeli government (though with internal dissention). This new US interest in the Mideast occurred at a time of logistical demands in Vietnam, and since there was a threat of engagement on Egyptian territory, possibly with Soviet troops, some kind of agreement using the broad structure of 242 became necessary not just to prevent a face-off with the USSR (which had promised Nasser anti-aircraft batteries to protect the Suez Canal) but also to protect US influence in the Arab world.

Rogers’ position in 1970 was strengthened since Nasser was increasingly willing to use US influence to end a dispute which had become both wasteful and dangerous. At the centre of Rogers’ peace proposals was an American interpretation of 242, essential-
ly an exchange of land for peace, and a full and comprehensive agreement which would be final. It came to nothing.

2.1.6 THE JARRING MISSION 1969/1971

The mission led by the Swedish Ambassador to the USSR, Dr Gunnar Jarring, had two parts separated by the 1969-1970 Israeli-Egyptian war. This broke off Jarring’s first efforts but Rogers suggested that Jarring try again to organize some kind of acceptance of Resolution 242.

Under military and diplomatic pressure Egypt and Jordan decided to accept the Resolution while Syria rejected Jarring’s attempts on the assumption that Israel had no intention of withdrawing to pre-1967 boundaries, a fact confirmed officially in 1971 in an Israeli letter to Jarring. Effectively 242 had been used by Israel to create a moral buffer for its annexation of territory for the purpose (stated as legitimate in 242) of security. For a time Jarring was seen as a threat by Israel as the UN acknowledged Palestinian rights (in a very limited refugee-status) to be part of an Arab-Israeli peace process. Jarring had no mandate to secure international talks, and no support from the US (the most important external force in Israeli international relations). Oddly it is Jarring and his plans for a peace settlement which were first picked up by Kissinger (once he had begun to appreciate the complexities and importance of the problem) and then by Jimmy Carter.
... For all its ambiguities and ultimate shortcomings, Resolution 242 was to be the starting-point for every attempt to resolve the Middle East conflict over the next two decades.

... Ambassador Gunner Jarring ... was condemned to follow a lonely and ultimately barren road. ... If anything, his mission confirmed the impotence of the United Nations in this kind of negotiation. ... In February 1971 he presented a final plan to the Egyptian and Israeli governments which, though unsuccessful at the time, contained many of the key elements of the subsequent Camp David Accords. 2

In March 1972 Jarring gave up the attempt to make anything of 242, a Resolution which denied Israel the ability to find a way to claim permanently areas captured during 1967, and from the Palestinian perspective failed to recognize them as a legitimate nation. The central issue of the Arab/Israeli antagonism, namely Palestinian rights, failed to be reported as a significant part of the dispute, as was the insufficiency of 242 to answer questions or tackle problems (from any perspective).

2.1.7 GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE (IN PURSUANCE OF 338) 1973

The multilateral Geneva Conference had two brief spans of life. The first in 1973 was an unmitigated failure; the second in 1977 acted as a prelude to Camp David but was never convened. There remained throughout this period a basic incoherence in US Mideast doctrine (which surfaced most obviously in the Reagan Plan of 1982). 23

The Geneva Conference summarizes many of the deepest problems faced by all peace initiatives since 1948: that the Israelis felt and wanted no common ground with Palestinians; that the US
complied with this, partly due to internal political pressure and partly because the State Department wanted as far as possible to keep the USSR out of any major Peace programmes in the Mideast; and finally that Israel felt no imperative to adhere to or comply with the terms of UN peace proposals.

The maverick element added to the problems surrounding Geneva in 1973 was Henry Kissinger. Chomsky is unstinting in his criticism of Kissinger's tactics, saying that he was the person with prime responsibility for all the difficulties of 1973, mainly because he had instructed the State Department to cease efforts towards a peaceful solution. Basically Kissinger was a man who came late to the belief that for a country committed to Israel then the rest of the Mideast had to have strategic significance. Part at least of Kissinger's judgement about the region may have been based on a dismissal of Arabs as a force to be reckoned with or a culture to be considered seriously. Until 1967 they were only the accidental peoples surrounding a Western enclave. (Many US media reports continued to see them in this way.)

The Genevan Peace Conference of December 1973 was the direct result of the October ("Yom Kippur") War. The war was initially one of attempted recapture by Egypt and Syria of territory captured by Israel in 1967. The US supported Israel with enough supplies to allow her to mount an offensive despite sustaining heavy losses. Although a cease-fire was accepted by all sides, the Israeli army maintained its forward momentum. Following the war, the demand for a Mideast conference was persuasive (coming
mainly from the US and its European allies). But there was not enough common ground on which to build concrete proposals. The US and the USSR sponsored the conference in the knowledge that the October War had very nearly escalated into superpower conflict. The US was looking for a way of maintaining and extending influence and of lessening the likelihood of any use of the Arab oil weapon.

In this amorphous diplomatic situation (six weeks after the cease-fire went into effect) a general peace conference between Israel, Egypt and Syria was convened at Geneva under the auspices of the UN and co-hosted by the US and the USSR. The lack of mutually-agreed aims meant that it met once and was one of the chilliest international gatherings of all time. The two sides refused to acknowledge one another’s presence, would not shake hands or even look one another in the eye. The Israelis refused to permit the seating of any representative of the PLO, offending their Arab opposite numbers. Syria and Egypt insisted that the principal issue to be discussed was the withdrawal of Israel’s armed forces from the Occupied Territories and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinians. The Syrians, unlike the Egyptians, maintained the long-standing Arab position that Israel was an illegitimate state. The Egyptians, on the other hand, implied that should Israel withdraw and make an overture to the Palestinians, Cairo could offer recognition. The Soviets backed the Arab position but were troubled by the apparent divergence between the two allies. Moscow had no influence with Israel.26
That left the US. Kissinger saw a grand opportunity to assert US views in the region. The squabbling between Egypt and Syria, and Egypt and Libya, suggested that properly applied pressure could separate the major Arab combatants. Since Egypt maintained the most powerful Arab armed forces its attitude was crucial to the success of the negotiations. The first frosty meeting between the belligerents was never repeated. Instead Kissinger embarked on an eighteen-month-long mediation effort. It represented probably his greatest temporary success in office. The only way forward appeared to be negotiations which were not face-to-face, through what became known as Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy".

2.2 CAMP DAVID

The outlines of the various peace plans drawn up attempting settlement in the Mideast show the dilemmas which follow initiatives of this nature; any peace plan is merely the latest attempt to iron out deeply-rooted problems going back into both the period of direct and indirect European colonialism and each was drawn up giving Palestinians and Jewish Israelis unequal weight. None treated the Palestinian problem seriously.

Carter's Camp David initiative came as a surprise which, as it progressed, was received in the West (and the US) as a major step towards a lasting settlement. It was seen as a major peace effort because of support given by an Arab leader. Egyptian status and Sadat's Westernized and conciliatory tone, seemed to legitimize Carter's efforts, and finally Camp David. The process took on
a depth of meaning since it aimed at bringing in Arab parties to the agreement. (No one thought that since the peace was accepted by one Arab leader it further de-legitimized it in Palestinian and other Arab eyes.) Sadat's actions meant that an Arab leader had acknowledged Palestinians as no longer playing any crucial role in the determination of the region's peace (despite constant asseverations in his domestic press - see Chapter 5). Thus it could be argued that Camp David had a negative (postponing) effect on the cause of Palestinian national self-determination.

Camp David had different effects: Egyptians felt changes in their economic and social life, while for Israelis it was one block in a general process of security and maintenance of US commitment to the Mideastern status quo. In effect, Camp David was about military security for Israel and economic security for Egypt. The Israelis saw their security in fixed external terms, while the Egyptians (faced as they were with economic stagflation, diplomatic stalemate inside and outside the Arab League, social discontent over the price of food and basic resources) saw security in internal, political terms. For the Carter administration the process towards Camp David resolved a longstanding feeling of inadequacy within Mideastern diplomacy, bridged the gap which previous administrations had created at the State Department between the Arab world and the US, and mended bridges with European powers critical of US support for Israeli expansionism. Finally, Camp David offered a firm US initiative to compete with both Soviet and Islamic interests in the area.
The peace moves between Egypt and Israel allowed the West to gain confidence in the policies of the previously suspect new Israeli leadership. This confidence for the US took the form of inflows of capital into Israel and Egypt as a sign of encouragement for both countries. American investment in Egypt's banking and financial sector was made possible after the acceptance by Sadat of Israel's right to exist. Such investment had been requested by Nasser, but a call for economic assistance was linked to his strongly independent desire to promote an indigenous economic base. "... Nasser's Egypt had tried, in 1953, to interest foreign and national capital and to direct it towards productive enterprises, but without subjecting it to political conditions. There was no result. Hence the "Egyptianization" measures followed by nationalizations." 28

Seeing this as unfairly uncompetitive the West shunned any offer Nasser made, preferring to wait for more of a free hand in the Egyptian economy. With his economic initiative (known as "the open door policy") Sadat paid a heavy price in the trade measures linked to Camp David. His eagerness for a stable relationship with his powerful neighbour may have obscured the damage being caused by the unilateral trade policy. Whatever the reason, economic problems became the preliminary to extremes of social unrest. 29

Camp David generated two main camps: the US and its allies, and the Arabs and so-called "rejectionists". There was, in the first group, a simplistic (and, considering the internal state of
Egypt, uninformed) optimism regarding the outcome of Camp David. Given the sophistication of US media it is curious that the initiative became simply portrayed as positive: the realization of a long-held dream of stability in an area that was important (not least for military and strategic reasons, though also for religious and social ones). After the long haul of Vietnam, peace, of whatever kind, would be warmly embraced. Camp David was an honourable peace for the US by proxy: "for most Americans, Camp David stands out as a proud moment in their recent history. Politicians regularly embrace Camp David as the centerpiece of American policy towards the Mideast".30

This political and diplomatic coup dazzled many Western politicians and media specialists. That there was finally a treaty signed by two long-term enemies was welcomed at a time of political and economic gloom. Those who felt tired of war and wished to rehabilitate the general perception of their nations lead the public to believe in the value of Camp David and barriers were erected to any criticisms. Those who raised objections were dismissed as pessimists because they rejected a situation where friendship was seen as a political reality between Sadat and Begin, the implication being that peace was an end in itself, no matter what the ramifications. Few asked why the Arabs had steadfastly refused to recognize Israel. Arab issues, if they were heard, were dealt with by Western news agencies in Western languages.
The imbalance of information (see Chapters 1 and 3) together with extensive support for Camp David in the West, hindered objective discussion. Feelings of abandonment by regional peoples, especially Palestinians, were given a particularly low profile (see Chapter 5).

2.3 EGYPT AND CAMP DAVID

The Egyptian press failed to reflect the discomfort present in the domestic population regarding the detente between their country and Israel simply because Sadat was adamant that his policies should be supported. Journalists who dared express doubts, and some who objected outright, were simply removed or jailed.31

The October War helped legitimize Sadat’s presidency, freed him from the perceived stagnancy of the Nasser legacy and gave him the freedom to move faster towards the political and diplomatic change he felt was needed. A peace pact with Israel and simultaneous movement towards the West were logically linked in Sadat’s strategy.32 This realignment created a great deal of debate within Egypt. In an economy starved of cash, investments and new technology, an injection of this sort was bound to have an effect. Egypt embarked on a programme of economic management geared to an enterprise culture. There were efforts to create the infrastructure for tourism seen as a vital conduit of Western money to Egypt. It also managed to create a new set of groups and initiatives dormant since the 1950s. Given the fact that the
country for over seventeen years was pushed towards self-reliance. This kind of programme came as a great shock to many Egyptians. As the economy became further involved with that of the West and (to a certain extent) less reliant on other Arab countries, old habits of state investment and handouts to particular industries, together with the reliance of a large civil service on government patronage, were progressively shut down after 1973. Subsidies of the kinds enjoyed by Eastern European citizens under communism (such as for basic foodstuffs) were effectively ended: prices rose, inflation mounted and discontent peaked during 1977. (Though to read Al Ahram one might imagine these were years of plenty for the average Egyptian, with Sadat as a beneficent monarch - see Chapter 5.)

Legitimizing these changes by a form of political double-think, Sadat termed his new programme "Inftaha" (Egyptian-style glasnostch or openness). It is easy to understand US and European willingness to aid a country abandoning pretensions to a socialist economic structure (there had never been any real political socialism within Egypt; what Nasser handed on was old fashioned nationalism). Huge changes took place following 1973 without any major upheaval (the Egyptian military maintained a permeating presence within society). Inftaha essentially meant closing down organizations of the left tolerated under Nasser (though Nasser was no friend of the left, and jailed a number of communists during his administration) and altering the economic structure of government. To begin with people did not feel any changes, though within three years it became apparent that
economic and political involvement with the West was not having any obvious benefit to Egypt. Simultaneously the Inftaha's social effect was the opposite of calm and political tranquility.

The difficulties which surfaced resulted from the emergence of three separate classes: those who had economic power, those who had had greater access to economic power but felt they were losing it, and those without it. While under Nasser such differences were consciously repressed, they re-emerged and became difficult to control.

The political shift entailed first of all a swift decrease in Soviet involvement (a move belatedly welcomed by the US). The impact of this changing relationship was not just the sacking of at least two thousand Soviet military advisors but the generation, especially among the middle classes and Egyptian "nomenclatura", of a new level of expectation which failed to be matched by the economic environment and the chances offered in the early 1980s. What the new alliance did was create a new reliance on the US for political and military guidance. Egypt had never been as reliant on the USSR as it became on the US. Political, diplomatic and economic pressures from the US may have speeded the rapprochement with Israel.

There was more to Sadat's peace activities than domestic economics and foreign pressure. Part of Nasser's legacy was a nationalism (not easily assuaged without the return of land occupied by Israel - territories such as Sinai and Ta'aba)
naturally at odds with the humiliation of another military failure. The 1973 October War had had a devastating impact on Egypt militarily and socially (many Egyptians died in the conflict). If peace meant the elimination of war and the ready supply of US aid the effort was likely to be supported.

From Nasser onwards Egypt had attempted the role of leader of the Arab world. The possibility that Egypt's security pact with Israel and reacquisition of Sinai could be a preliminary to winning back some of the lost Palestinian territories was never a serious military option but provided powerful rhetoric. 33

2.4 ISRAEL AND CAMP DAVID

Political and social changes must be accounted for when looking at the Israeli attitude to Camp David: internal shifts in the political structure within Israel at that time are useful in an understanding of the Israeli reaction to the peace initiative.

During the Camp David Period Likud were in power, the first time Labor had been in opposition. Likud had won ground within the Knesset on two fronts: consolidating popular nationalism of the centre with people like Dayan (who had been Labor supporters, and still had a popular following) while ensuring legislative power by wooing the religious parties of the far right (who represented a small percentage of Israelis but appealed to a wider constituency than their vote). The dilemma faced by Likud was one of balancing the country's need for US aid (only in 1991 was there
wide discussion of Israel's ability to abandon such bilateralism) with a profound belief in Israel's territorial role in the Mideast. Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) could be coupled with the Golan and Gaza to serve the imperative of protecting Israel. This was fine so long as the US perception of the Mideast was uncertain, and so long as the Jewish Lobby in Washington maintained its efforts on Israel's behalf.

In 1977 Likud was buoyed by increasing Ashkenazim immigration from the USSR and popular support for the settling of the Occupied Territories (at that time including Sinai). But embattled attitudes can give way to constructive diplomacy with neighbours. "Eretz Israel" (Greater Israel) had to play a wider diplomatic game, and some annexed territories might be used to secure US approval (the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan were not negotiable at that time). Peace could entail giving up something despite the awkward consequences for a right wing party such as Likud. However this offered a period of stability between Israel and at least one militarily important Arab neighbour; domestic Israeli stability through a renewed sense of security (perhaps not felt since 1948); and finally a move towards peace would release Israel from its border security commitment on the Egyptian front, leading to the reorganization to other more pressing areas such as the Syrian and Lebanese borders. Israel made certain the US would guarantee Israel's southern borders. A limited peace could be important in terms of US aid, internal politics, military deployment, and an effective wedge in the traditionally shaky Arab opposition. Peace could allow Israel a
more relaxed political climate, and change some Western perceptions of Israel as a militarized monolith. Within Europe the stigma of Israel as pariah state could be significantly lessened, and was (in the short term).

Israel on the eve of President Sadat's initiative was at a political crossroads as the old power structures in place since 1948 began to alter. In 1977 the country marked the tenth anniversary of the Six Day War and the occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Sinai, Gaza and (most importantly) East Jerusalem. No consensus existed on the implications of the occupation of these areas for the shape, demographic composition and political fabric of the state. Israeli near-defeat of 1973 had a demoralizing effect on many citizens: military commanders and government ministers had been exposed as human, the myth of military invincibility shattered and a measure of fatigue set in. As economic conditions worsened and domestic strife grew, the integrity and efficiency of the existing leadership was challenged. Finally, in May 1977 elections had ended the hegemony of the Labor Party. Negotiations with Egypt began in this atmosphere of fluid uncertainty, and their outcome could not but touch upon key facets of the domestic political debate.

Peace with Egypt meant the opening of a new market and a new image for Israel in the Mideast, perhaps even a positive one, something it had never enjoyed. This is not to say that anyone believed Israel would have better relationships with other Arab states but partial respectability and partial security is better
than none. If a new initiative could achieve this it would balance the doubtful military position of the 1970s. From May 1977 international relations became insecure, despite (or indeed because of) Camp David. Begin's Likud coalition was never seen as a reliable Mideast partner by either the Carter or following administrations. (This combined with a significant shift in National Security policy towards a more holistic Mideastern outlook.)

The Egyptian-Israeli peace process palpably relieved much of the anxiety felt by most Israelis. As the fear of war lessened, the public's attention and energy turned towards domestic issues ... . Menahem Begin's skillful linkage of peace and social welfare in his argument for the ratification of the Camp David Accords reinforced this ... . Thus the treaty indirectly sanctioned an extractive view of politics ... raising popular expectations of government and influencing the tempo, nature, and content of social exchanges. 53

Sadat also used peace to strengthen his position at home, however he gained less than Begin and, consequently, his domestic political gains were more easily corrupted. For Sadat, Camp David merely postponed problems of internal strife which later reappeared as violently as before.

2.5 THE US AND CAMP DAVID

Although Camp David was signed by Israel and Egypt, the US was the broker, and, like Israel and Egypt, had various domestic and international circumstances which shaped its relationship to the treaty. There was pressure to maintain strong military and logistical support for Israel but also pressure towards a wider consensus within the Mideast, at least some of which came from
US allies in Europe. The ideal solution was to fill the void left by the USSR and adopt another client state (though with fewer heavy commitments to Israel).

Carter was of course a major element in the process towards adopting Egypt, and guiding Israel towards a treaty. The Washington Post and The New York Times hinted (see Chapter 5) that Carter needed some kind of fillip to his flagging presidency. Newsweek commented after Camp David in an article about the Carter presidency entitled "Can the Magic Last", "... it was, quite simply, Jimmy Carter's finest moment" but as the euphoria surrounding the signing died away so did Carter's presidency. His role (like any president's) was to demarcate a special area of responsibility which would be his alone, not a hangover from previous administrations. This special area, despite being a key area of foreign policy, was not domestically important enough to reinvest his administration with public confidence.

Prior to the manoeuvring over Camp David the US had had few diplomatic successes. Three years earlier it had managed to pull itself out of Vietnam, so it was not surprising that the new Democratic administration had a desire for a peace-creation programme. Historically the US had had relatively little to do with the Mideast; however the paradox of having a client state in the area created a dilemma. To the US the aim in the Mideast was to ensure stability with political parity (see above). During the 1960s and 1970s this meant keeping Israel powerful and the USSR out.
Global US strategy could be summarized on three counts: extending US influence, both political and economic; facing out Communism as the natural antagonist to these US interests; and finally, strengthening US military security. On these terms it was easy to protect and use Israel, since opposition could be identified with Communist subversion. Israel was only one client state among many, vital for the US global strategic balance. In this sense Camp David would have been perceived as a step in a process of stabilization, where Israel would relocate her resources once Egypt was secured within the US ambit. The Palestinian problem was indefinitely postponed: the complaints of the Arab League, the PLO, or of non-aligned factions in the UN mattered little. What transpired was a media success for the main figures which would paper over a lack of adequate US diplomatic philosophy.

Yet Camp David was a far more ambitious peace plan than any other in the history of initiatives in the Mideast. It also was one of the most controversial and least understood. Although it received support from public, political and academic circles in the West and especially in the US, it failed to gain significant support in the Mideast. To understand the contending views an analysis of the Treaty and Accords is vital.

2.6 THE CAMP DAVID RESULT

Because of its subject-matter and context (see above) Camp David tended to attract (some might say even generate) subjective media coverage. Not only was Israel the central topic (emotively as
is seen from coverage in both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* - see Chapter 5) but peace between an Arab country and its antagonist was revolutionary. Interest thus focussed on the nature of an exciting change not on its critics. Although the Camp David Accords, signed on September 17, in both the preamble and the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel" (see Appendix A) talk specifically about wider issues than merely the Israeli/Egyptian axis, the result of Camp David both within the media and in terms of Mideast changes, was merely to sanctify the new relationship. Palestine was not on the agenda.

The least powerful of the groups, the Palestinians, receiving almost nothing from the Treaty, were amongst its most vociferous critics. Egyptians remained ambiguous, depending on which part of the political and religious consensus was consulted, while Israel's other neighbours (the Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians) saw the Treaty as a further division in the traditionally shaky Arab solidarity.

The first part of the Treaty (see Appendix B) contained matters not only relating to Egypt and Israel but also to the situation of the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinians from those territories. But the Palestinians were officially excluded from attending any of the negotiations on their own if not represented by an acceptable party, meaning a sovereign state.
Sadat was faced with the political contradictions of the Treaty, contradictions stemming in part from roles which he himself assumed. On the one hand he had officially declared himself as a spokesperson for the Palestinian people as well as negotiator for the return of occupied portions of his own country. Yet when the matter was complicated by accusations of other Arab States (in terms of Egypt breaking ranks with the stance of the Arab World as a whole) Sadat claimed that his chief aim was to negotiate on behalf of his country alone.

At Camp David ... Sadat made it clear in writing that Egypt would assume [Jordan and Palestine's] role in negotiations for an interim regime if they did not come forward to speak for themselves. This was a controversial decision even within the Egyptian delegation ... . Egypt, as the strongest Arab state, could afford to ignore the criticism of other Arabs. It was not shackled by the requirement of consensus. At the same time, it was never clear whom, if anyone, Sadat could really speak for among the Palestinians.

By the time the Camp David negotiations had been completed, Egypt and Israel were committed to two tracks of negotiations: one dealing with their bilateral problems, which would lead to an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty; and the other involving negotiation to establish a self-governing authority for the West Bank and Gaza for an interim period of five years. 37

The peace plans predating and postdating Camp David highlight the difficulties of establishing workable formulae. Camp David, far from learning from previous mistakes was neither less complicated nor more far-reaching. Backed by no direct sanctions for change it caused as many problems as it solved, and as a result Israel was able to invade Lebanon without worrying about her southern borders, because of the guaranteed neutrality of Egypt.
Sadat's initial plan entailed Israel withdrawing from the territories occupied in 1967. This would be non-negotiable. The second point was that Israel should recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination through the establishment of a state. The Israeli reaction to this was negative: Camp David was to remain an initiative with Egypt, nothing to do with questions of Palestine. Camp David was an answer to one, medium-term problem; not the business of any states except the US, Egypt and Israel.

A withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza was inconceivable for the Begin administration. As a result Begin submitted an autonomy plan to the Knesset on September 28, 1977. He used the names "Samaria and Judea", for which territories he stated the Palestinians could have autonomy: elected administrative councils for education, finance, commerce, agriculture, justice and the police. There would also be a commission of representatives.

Representatives of Israel, Jordan and the administrative council would lay down rules for the return of Arab refugees in reasonable numbers, provided that its decisions were adopted anonymously. Security and maintenance of public order would remain in Israel's hands. The Israelis would have power to buy land and to settle in the occupied territories. As to the future the plan stated that Israel maintained its rights and claims to sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, but in view of the existence of other claims it proposed that the question of sovereignty remains open.

But priorities dictated Sadat stress the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai rather than the return of Palestinian territories. He concentrated on the dismantling of Jewish settlements in Sinai, but Begin could not countenance this without a substantial benefit in military and political terms. Potential deadlock
encouraged the achievement of Sadat’s priorities at Camp David: the return of Sinai but little else.

[Israel] ... agreed to dismantle all seventeen settlements it had established and to withdraw all its armed forces and "civilians" from Sinai. The price paid in return was Egypt’s recognition of Israel, its abandonment of its original position on Palestinian rights (self-determination and the Palestinian State) and its acceptance of Begin’s "autonomy" plan for the West Bank and Gaza.

Camp David was no more innovative regarding the Palestinians than Begin had himself been at the Knesset in 1977. The plan was that Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Palestinian "representatives" should take part in its implementation. Neither the Palestinians nor the Jordanians wanted to participate and were not asked. This autonomy plan was broken down into three stages, first that there would be a transitional period of no more than five years, during which those occupying the territories (the Palestinians) would have full autonomy, being able to elect their own selfgoverning authority. Later, Israeli military government and its civilian administration would be withdrawn to certain pre-ordained security points. The second stage would entail Israel, Jordan and Egypt defining the structure of the operation of the self-governing authority and its responsibility. The third would be a three year period with self-government not later than the third year from the establishment of the authority. From then on decisions about the position of the West Bank and Gaza would be clarified.

Egypt insisted this would be a first step toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. To Israel on the other hand this
marked the beginning of a circumscribed autonomy which was soon disposed of. Israel insisted on retaining sovereignty and as a result of this Egypt and the US distanced themselves from the Israeli plan. The autonomy talks were suspended by Egypt altogether in 1982 after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Israel withdrew from Sinai in accordance with the Treaty (withdrawal was completed by the 25th April). Both countries agreed to limit the number of troops on their mutual borders, and called for the UN to send a force to be stationed there as observers. Camp David, as a result of this confusion of unresolved differences, was a significant achievement for Israel.

In this first test of strength between the Camp David participants, Begin won. It was a strong signal to the Palestinians and Jordanians who were watching to see what in reality the Camp David Accords meant to them. In short the one tangible gain Carter thought he had achieved at Camp David for the Palestinians was immediately lost, and with it much of the credibility of the agreement in the eyes of the Jordanians and Palestinians.

In terms of original aims, Sadat paid highly for territorial integrity: Israel remained adamant about control of the most vital territories and coming to terms with the existence of the Palestinian problem. The notion of the establishment of a Palestinian state is something Israel never conceded as a possibility under either Likud or Labor. Camp David, despite its frequent invocation of UN SC Resolutions 242 and 338 (see Appendix E) failed to answer Palestinian demands. Camp David's broad appeals to justice and security made it possible for Palestinians to continue to make the Mideast a battleground from whence to vent their political frustrations and propagandize their demands. Despite the rhetoric, the treaty failed to dampen
enthusiasm for a military solution to the problem: in fact military activity (both open and covert) vastly increased. Lebanon was the major battleground, though elements in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Libya were sucked progressively into escalating confrontation.

During this Egypt was, by default, one of Israel's advocates and the whole face of the Arab-Israeli conflict was changed. If peace, in the words of the preamble to Camp David, could be regarded as "liv[ing] in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force" and "achiev[ing] peace and good neighborly relations"[^42], then the Treaty left the hostility and suspicion between Egypt and Israel essentially unchanged; there were few concrete propositions, which negated gains from the neutralization of actual hostility between the two countries. Diplomatic and cultural ties were used to measure the success of the Treaty but neither thawed the cold front between the antagonists nor enhanced social contact between people in either society. Israel remained a strategic winner and the Treaty gave little to Egypt (except avoidance of a repetition of 1973).

The treaty effectively demilitarized Egypt, and Camp David ensured its new defensive role. Israel managed to move in the opposite direction: armed forces were enlarged (not only in the nuclear arena), rapidly building one of the strongest forces in the region[^43]. Egypt was left almost bankrupt of defense capability: it had not managed to renew any of its weapons systems nor asked any of its allies (Arab or US) to help rearm it[^44].
Other Arab states, recognizing change in the region, strengthened their military capacity knowing that Israel was doing so. In their minds Egypt had backed down in the face of Israeli aggression (such as that against Lebanon in 1982) and had accepted US aid as a salve to their political conscience. These developments hurt Egypt politically and financially and rich Arab states found themselves unable to back Egypt because they could not understand nor approve Sadat’s policies. This was followed by the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League (in 1979) and the removal of the Arab League headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. The humiliation of this development caused two of Sadat’s ministers to resign in protest: Ismael Fahmy (Foreign Minister) and Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel.

Sadat was under pressure to remove himself from Nasser’s shadow (who had been a titular head of the Arab world and thereby automatically the most difficult act Sadat could follow), and possibly because of this pressure he became more of an actor than a politician.

The leadwriters outdid one another in the superlatives they heaped upon him. Sadat was truly a great man. His pilgrimage was a sublime gesture ... a watershed in history. ... A famous columnist remarked how petty Sadat had made Nasser seem by comparison. There was an extraordinary euphoria, an unreasoning belief that peace between Arab and Jew - so desirable in itself, and so vital to Western interests - was finally at hand.

Sadat’s method of peacemaking (establishing a concordat with Israel before gaining any of his demands) gave Israel the dignity and approval it desired without any quid pro quo. Egypt entered Camp David the weaker partner, fearful of domestic opinion should
there be further conflict, and uncertain of the outcome of the peace process as domestic insecurity grew.

... Anwar Sadat came with his pockets empty. His armed forces were weakened and ... demoralized. His popularity was at a low ebb, as the food riots in Cairo in January 1977 had demonstrated. His relationships with other Arab governments, so important to the Egyptian economy, had deteriorated steadily through the successive forced disengagement agreements, and the trip to Jerusalem.

One person who was fully aware of Sadat's position was Menahem Begin.\textsuperscript{48}

Sadat, unlike Begin, knew how to play Western media: by giving plenty of interviews to US media, he managed to improve his difficult designation as an Arab leader. As an US television producer was reported in the \textit{Daily Telegraph} as saying, "you sure have a great president here. He knows the deadline of every news show in the States",\textsuperscript{49} but it is possible that approval was as much for being a Westernized non-communist Arab (along with King Hussein) as for flying to Jerusalem to embrace Menahem Begin. Approval can be triggered strongly in one group by a member of another adopting their standards or rules; this movement (performed by Sadat) was guaranteed in a press previously hostile to Arab grievances, and was a sentimental magnanimity typically associated post military victory.

The US and Israel had been campaigning for a formula which would lift the military dimension of this conflict from the Mideast; isolate the Palestinian question from the main stream of Arab politics while not diminishing the strength of Israel. It was a single campaign geopolitically without much thought to the long-term consequences of the Egyptian position and the failure to
address resentment in other Arab states which saw Camp David as a peace between Egypt and Israel, brokered by an unsympathetic power. The Jordanians rejected it and the Palestinians would not acknowledge it (despite the fact it was signed with their interests very much at the centre of the framework).\textsuperscript{50}

Camp David gave Israel short-term respite from US pressure, long-term military advantage to Israel, and offered the possibility of later ignoring awkward terms. The wording of the Treaty regarding Palestine was based on a draft declaration for the Palestinian problems brought by Begin before the Knesset to establish an Israeli version of Palestinian autonomy. What Palestinian autonomy meant in real terms was a continuation of conditions within the Occupied Territories. Although Palestinians might conduct some economic activities and basic educational and other administrative matters, politically the Occupied Territories were neutered.

Camp David created a radically new atmosphere in the Arab world (and Egypt). There was a sense of fragmentation and insecurity: one of the major powers in the region was eliminated from the equation, and eliminated voluntarily. The Treaty brought about a unity in imbalance within the Arab world. Egypt had to adjust to its new role of being part of a no-man’s land between East and West (although Sadat had a vision of joining NATO at a later stage), while its stand on Palestine changed completely.
Hope that trade arrangements with the West would engineer an economic revival were not fulfilled. Fragmentation of Egyptian society increased to the point where for the first time in modern Egyptian history ethnic and religious differences became a source of strife. This potential for trouble was made worse by Sadat’s paranoia (his need for political orthodoxy led him, for example, to depose the Coptic Pope) and the increasingly fragmented mood of society, both of which had a common denominator in a perception of themselves as no longer part of the Arab world. There was widespread political encouragement for this idea, and for a new pan-African identity, suggesting the Egyptian people had little in common with Arabia except religion and language. Sadat rode a wave of popular nationalism within Egypt following new Western investment which temporarily allowed him to manage social divisions and unrest, contain internal fragmentation and prolong his control of the divergent elements of Egyptian society.

But when Sadat closed the PLO office in Cairo he underestimated the depth of feeling within the PLO who for the first time gained almost unequivocal support from the rest of the Arab world. The depth of the injury given the Palestinians effectively united the resentment of the Arab states towards Egypt, and gave it a temporary focus (at least until the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon). Within Egypt as well, Sadat’s adoption of the Israeli-US position created a temporary sense of common horror.

There was ... good reason for the gravest misgivings. At a stroke [Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem] shattered the most sacred of Arab taboos. The "psychological barrier" which Sadat claimed to have breached was indeed formidable. Even the earliest days, when the "Zionist menace", as the
Palestinians called it, was embryonic, they had refused to confer upon it the legitimacy of direct negotiations.51

2.7 CONCLUSION

Camp David could not hope to tackle structural Mideastern problems, and was never intended to do so. The return of Sinai and the incoming US aid packages were its only gain to Egypt (though even these advantages could be disputed). It became clear quickly, as Israeli West Bank and Gaza settlementation accelerated, and the Israeli military clamped down within those areas, that the Palestinian question would not be resolved. Israel, until the withholding of the 1991 aid budget by George Bush, had no need to observe either the UN strictures or the details of Camp David. The overwhelming desire on the part of the US was to accommodate Israel and to keep the USSR from reasserting its presence in the area (which was the threat perceived in any action which might be critical of Israel). These factors masked every other relevant issue. The problem of the Palestinians was not ignored, it was denied: politically and often in the media; the settlement of the refugees in a homeland of their own has come consistently last on the list of priorities. (Little direct mention was made in either The Washington Post or The New York Times during this period of a Palestinian state rather than "entity", see Chapter 5.) Any perceived abuse of human rights by Israelis rarely received condemnation in The New York Times which was not somehow linked to suggested (or overtly proposed) Palestinian/Arab socio-political or religious/racial inadequacies. The Washington Post’s criticisms of Israeli actions were more frequent, but so were

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criticisms of other involved parties (see Table 5.3 B). It was only when the Palestinian population resorted to the Intifada that Western public opinion took interest in what was happening.

Camp David may be one example by which to measure the credibility of Western media.

That [the West] could have reached conclusions about Sadat so sharply at variance with the Arabs' and Egyptians' own, that a formidable scholar-statesman such as Henry Kissinger could call him "the greatest since Bismarck" ... raises far-reaching questions about international relations ... about the qualifications of the Western media which, for all their massive coverage of the man, ended up with such an unreal portrait of him. ... There is but one reason why Sadat won such honour in the West: he made peace with Israel. It is essentially that ... which caused the West to ignore, minimize or excuse flaws of character and conduct which it would find repugnant in its own leaders.32

Camp David should be considered an initiative from which neither Carter nor Sadat gained much in the medium term, and almost nothing in the long term. For Carter (as for any major politician - George Bush's Gulf War being a good example) foreign policy initiatives failed to convince even the most sympathetic media that his administration had ideas. Within days of the ending of Camp David both The Washington Post and The New York Times were profoundly critical of him. What this Treaty cost Egypt was isolation, with no political or diplomatic certainty or direction. Economically Egypt took a downturn after 1980, where failing infrastructure and a small middle class could not be buoyed up by US aid. Israel did not withdraw from territories other than Sinai, and the sections the agreement dealing with Palestinian sovereignty were shelved. Carter was in no position to insist on anything. By 1981 Sadat was using more repressive measures

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against his opponents, Camp David his most costly political gamble. He recognized later that he had conceded too much to Israel. "Begin has offered nothing. It is I who have given him everything. I offered him security and legitimacy and got nothing in return."
CHAPTER 3:
THE OBJECTIVITY OF JOURNALISM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF EGYPT

3.1 Introduction: Professionalism and Objectivity

In developing societies such as Egypt, what distinguishes journalism? Are objectivity and professionalism keys to its functioning? How far are the criteria of professionalism, often important to First World journalists, altered by relationships to a political order such as Egypt's? What insights can this throw on the reporting of Camp David?

Andrew Neil, editor of The Sunday Times (considered by some as a maverick right-winger outside the UK press establishment) viewed the idea of journalistic professionalism as a red-herring. "Journalists are tradesmen and women, not professionals." If journalists and editors are tradespeople, then the burden of choice or blame for good or bad reporting may be considered to fall equally on the consumer as the publisher. People, the argument goes, get the press they deserve. But this in turn begs questions of education, availability of news, resources to purchase news, and pressure to withhold news. Opposing Neil, an argument in favour of greater professionalism would need to hold to two crucial points: firstly that society is self-educative on a strictly rational basis; and that, secondly, news is important enough to the political system to be considered a pillar of that system (as it is, constitutionally at least, in the US).
There are problems associated with categorising journalism within a society. (1) If journalism is concerned with the transmission of information considered vital (perhaps socially, politically or economically) reliability of service becomes important. Both professionalism and objectivity would be important measures of that service, and these twin notions might help clarify whether journalism could or should have standards, possessing regular codes and boundaries to performance: in other words journalistic "duties". (A duty as such could only be said to exist if that service were important rather than merely like, say, the trade of a mechanic governed by simpler standards of professionalism. Whereas mechanics should be constrained by legislation aiming to make their work safe and any contractual relationship with their "public" within limits designed to avoid fraud, journalists like doctors or politicians may be perceived to offer a service of greater magnitude. Their contract with the public is (i) more difficult to define in terms of service offered; (ii) more various; (iii) difficult to constrain by "safety" rules, or rules to limit fraud because the product (perhaps criticism of a political act) is not the same as the skill needed to mend a faulty brake. (2) Discomfort may arise since little educationally leads them towards their profession. (This has been less so in the US where universities offer journalism courses.) Often professionalism has been created for journalists from within their own ranks.² Finally (3) journalists, broadcasters, editors and media proprietors may wish to avoid being labelled as part of an entertainments industry, if only because there are many cases where journalism (especially the broadcast variety) errs
towards showbusiness, and some newspaper professionals could fear
an alignment with the "tabloid" (sensationalist, non-analytical,
politically extreme) press. But such a wish by itself does not
help create a categorization.

Those opposing the US system of feeding media direct from
university courses might consider it would remove the variety of
the profession and impose uniformity. But journalists could see
change as useful, encouraging a higher quality product, and the
adoption of beneficial "contractual" rules governing media.

For journalists in the United States, objectivity is the
most important professional norm, and from it flows more
specific aspects of news professionalism such as news
judgement, the selection of sources and the structure of
newsbeats. Objectivity does not reside in news stories
themselves; rather it resides in the behaviour of journal-
ists .... Journalists must act in ways that allow them to
report the news objectively. ... Objectivity does not mean
that they are impartial observers of events ... but that
they seek out the facts and report them as fairly and in as
balanced a way as possible. ... By having journalists
define objectivity as being the balanced reporting of the
facts, the question of whether or not objectivity is
possible in its scientific sense is neatly side-stepped.3

The status of professionalism might make it easier to define the
role of journalists (especially as societies become more
regulated, and comparisons can be made with other professionals).
Objectivity, though, is not professionalism: objectivity is a
term surrounded by undefined areas lending it to an infinite
number of reinterpretations. The two terms cannot be considered
interchangeable and journalists can never claim freedom from
bias. Objectivity in media is an ideal to which journalists and
producers aspire, while being aware that it is functionally
unattainable. Semantically value-neutral words could only exist outside a sociological context.

[I have] questioned the possibility of objective value-free reporting. ... [T]hat representation in a semiotic medium such as language is inevitably a structuring process; that values and implicit propositions are continuously articulated as discourse on a subject proceeds, so that discourse is always representation from a certain point of view. ... I am not saying that newspapers are particularly "biased" (even though they have a political axe to grind), all texts ... are discursive constructions of some world.4

The preceeding may indicate how difficult it is to resolve contradictory ideas present in defining "professionalism" in terms of journalism.5 There are clear arguments concerning the usage and abusage of language both in developing journalism and in the West's own media. Language can easily be used to modify perspectives, one party transferring the argument onto its own linguistic territory. Propaganda is an obvious, crude case; but every media has its own perspective and this may transform itself into bias. Subtle differences such as an appeal to Western kinship can be used: Israelis were (during Camp David) rarely portrayed as non-Europeans, and only when unavoidable were they portrayed as gratuitously violent (see Chapter 5); Palestinians and Arabs in general were shown as either neutral or antithetical to Western traditions (veiled women and men dressed in Keffiyeh were images often chosen to represent the Arab).6 There may be a belief that journalists' objectivity is a natural extension of their function; whether an ideal or no, this perception expressed as the wishes of media experts is not rare.

I assert the strongest possible mission for the news profession: does it promote justice? Does it aid in fulfilling the stirring vision in which justice flows down
like a mighty stream? In a day when the powerless have few alternatives left ... should the press not serve as a voice ... for those who cry out to be heard?  

If subjectivity is taken as a norm, objectivity, especially in the context of developing media, has to be something brought to the media rather than hoped for as an intrinsic part of that media. Can one expect the Financial Times to be more independent of the financial institutions it reports (without, at the same time, asking it to stop being the Financial Times)? The prime motive of much media may not be objectivity or professionalism but profit. Objectivity, like any quality, may only be seen as of value insofar as it enhances a paper's reputation, and increases (or sustains) market share. In world media terms profit need not always be a prime consideration; it may be replaced by service to a political elite.  

Thus is would be difficult (perhaps inappropriate) to assess professionalism in a Third World context, employing concepts used in similar assessments of Europe and the West generally; the most influential factors (relationships between media and government, history of media, development of methods of criticism, relative social affluence) are vastly different. It is also inappropriate either to judge one in terms of the other, or using the same parameters. Journalists in a Third World country can have a different relationship to society and might be seen as professional by dint of their government-employed status.
3.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EGYPTIAN JOURNALISTS AND SADAT'S REGIME

Few states regard media as inviolable; most see it as a luxury of stable society (it is often added that media are vital for such stability). With this in mind, it is not surprising that journalism within Third World states is often run, as in Egypt, as some form of government near-monopoly. Such political involvement in the media creates a different definition of journalism. With government controls investigative journalism is difficult to conduct: journalists cannot be independently critical and there may be problems with objectivity. There is also the question of the suitability of journalism as a value-neutral profession. It is considered easier for a conscientious journalist to cover a foreign than a domestic story, since fewer preconceptions are brought to the former. Moreover, allegiance varies from a journalist deeply committed to a political viewpoint (crusading columnists such as Bernard Levin of The Times, Ben Bradlee of The Washington Post) to those who would admit to merely being hardworking hacks intent on making a living. However it is unlikely that even the least ideological hack is neutral, or that neutrality is valuable in writing which relies more on rhetoric than rigour. There are other obstacles to journalistic professionalism. Every Western newspaper carries publicist-generated material in obvious form (page adverts) or more subtle penetration via commercial involvement in the paper itself. Once a newspaper runs advertising for, say, British Aerospace, can it be relied upon to offer entirely objective criticism of the arms industry? A final barrier to professional-
ism may be ownership of media. Although proprietors such as Rupert Murdoch do not admit to their papers disseminating their own ideologies,\textsuperscript{12} the political slant of News International shows this to be largely misleading. Few professions lend themselves as fully to expressing the owners' mind-sets as the media.

Egyptian journalism remains a government near-monopoly: even with resources from advertising media remains attached to government infrastructure. As has been noted the editor of \textit{Al Ahram} may be considered a civil servant: journalists and editors are most of the time appointed by government organizations. Although organizations such as the BBC are also government-owned, a balance has been struck to give the Corporation if not full, at least limited autonomy. In the case of Egypt the relationship between government and journalists is not that only of nomenclatura to central official; the government makes use of the law to challenge work seen as unfit for publication and has at its disposal security and religious litigation, both of which can be used to challenge anything seen as seditious. This has resulted in journalists emigrating to escape restrictions. (Zaher Mikhaeel offers a notable objection to demands for journalistic freedom in the Third World; freedom, he says, has to be accompanied by responsibility.\textsuperscript{13}) Under such conditions it is difficult for journalists to acquire professional status:\textsuperscript{14} for example, Egypt has journalists' syndicates but lack of freedom renders attempts to strengthen professionalism futile, and this leads to a dearth of journalists with "professional" attributes. Many skilled individuals tempted to work in media may be deterred
by restrictions and lack of professionalism. Egypt could meet such professional requirements as it has the layer in society from which journalists of quality might be furnished. (The Egyptian middle classes, boasting some form of higher education, are an unusually large group for an Arab country.)

3.3 EGYPTIAN JOURNALISTS AND DEVELOPMENTALISM

For a development theory to have general validity there must be common conditions within developing countries which limit the application of other theories or that reduce their potential benefits. One circumstance is the absence of the conditions necessary for a developed mass communication system: the communication infrastructure; professional skills; the production and cultural resources; the available audience. Another factor is dependence on the developed world for technology, skills and cultural products. Thirdly, there is the devotion of these societies to economic, political and social development as a primary task, to which other institutions should submit, though some are aware of coincident interests in international politics. Out of these conditions have come a set of normative principles about mass media which deviate from those that seem to apply in any systems of the First World. 15

Journalism in developing countries is often a balance between dependence and identity. It differs most from Western notions of media in its idea of function: media has a "use", an important view for developing countries but one which, in the West, is
associated with totalitarian attitudes. This appreciation helps widen the gap between developing and developed points of view.

The normative elements of emerging development theory are shaped by ... circumstances ... [which] have both negative and positive aspects. They are, especially, opposed to dependency and foreign domination ... . for positive uses of the media in national development, for the autonomy and cultural identity of the particular national society. To a certain extent they favour democratic, grass roots involvement, thus participative communication models. ... [C]ertain freedoms of the media and of journalists are subordinated ... . At the same time, collective ends rather than individual freedoms are emphasized. One relatively novel element in development media theory has been the emphasis on a "right to communicate", based on Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.16

Developmental journalism implies that fragmented societies call for a specially coherent operation among political groups. It is hoped there could be some kind of coexistence between media and government.17 However the arguments for and against developmental journalism are that either journalism is a resource like any other and may therefore be used in very much the same way, say, as a bank, or that tied as it is to the functioning of democratic rights, media cannot be restricted without denying those rights; and that such denials have nowhere proved beneficial to development of Third World societies (in fact most often quite the reverse). The very size, undeveloped and dependent nature of the press in many Third World countries has propelled it into supporting the government, hence one of the synonyms for developmental journalism is "development support communication". But this could never be a clear concept.

It is not easy to give a precise and neat definition [of developmental journalism]. However ... one can isolate the following elements: the media should carry out positive development tasks as defined by national policy-makers; the
state has the right to restrict media operations and exercise direct control; the operational model should not be from the centre to the periphery; special efforts should be made in the promotion of national culture and integration; greater emphasis should be put on collective ends rather than on individual rights and freedom.18

Communication values such as these cover a variety of relationships between government and media. Both UK media and the media in China would say it had a social conscience; there is no limit to the way journalism is interpreted. Although the concept may be neutral one can understand the antipathetic reactions it has caused. In many developing countries, particularly those in Africa, the need for national development has facilitated the establishment of authoritarian political institutions, in which basic human rights and freedoms are suppressed.

Developmental journalism puts the press in an abjectly subservient position to the government and reduces it to a mere mouthpiece ... . There is, however, another interpretation of the concept, which assigns to the media a watchdog role, consisting of scrutinizing the activities of the government in the area of development by measuring performance against promise. This second school of thought sees the relation between the developmental journalist and the government as one of a critical observer rather than an obsequious and uncritical advocate.19

A problem faced by those Third World governments interested in harnessing media to local problems, is that, by their nature, media have a momentum of their own, related partially to their goals, and partially to their means.

Another tangle in which media in developing countries find themselves is how to harmonize the compulsions of the media and the governments' constant efforts to regulate them. ... To be effective, they have to be necessarily decentralized and enjoy a fair degree of autonomy. However in India and other Asian countries, they have been converted into over-centralized, top-heavy bureaucratic monoliths. What happens to them under such circumstances? Their growth
comes to be determined not by plans and professionals, but by events and accidents.²⁰

Egyptian media under Sadat has been faced with exactly this problem. Unable to come to terms with its highly developed capabilities (such as the relatively high standard of its journalists) and the demands of the government in terms of Israeli-Egyptian and Arabic-Egyptian detente, a gap opened up at the level of political participation and consensus, and it is given a louder and more coherent voice than in many other Third World countries by the large and articulate class of media intellectuals. This has proved problematic since Egypt has, for reasons of class and education discussed above, a natural interest even reliance on written media among a broader than usual social group for a Third World state. But the subordination of Egyptian culture to the influx from the West created doubt, uncertainty and reaction (in the form of resurgent Islam). This reaction to cultural imports was less of a problem in Egypt than other Arab countries because of the isolationism imposed during Nasser's presidency, and the strongly-developed nature of the indigenous press even during the colonial period, but still the problem existed. Indeed it was exacerbated under Sadat when external barriers broke down. The resulting problems varied from the more complex issues of language integrity to the less abstruse but inevitable attraction among younger Egyptians to Western styles of dress and codes of behaviour, and the resulting friction caused with conservative elements in society.
One problem specific to Egyptian and Arab media is written Arabic. This is difficult for the average person who is less well-educated to understand, catering for the educated who know its classical base. Classical Arabic can be seen as an exclusive code, much like specialist English usages (by academics for example) but taken to a greater extreme. A problem of language may be different for each Third World country, but in some form it is present in each. The eroding of a sense of Egyptian autonomy before and during Camp David created an atmosphere of ambivalence in the national media; while any independence was cancelled by fear and the position of journalists as civil servants. In Egypt there was from Nasser until Mubarak no clear distinction between the role of media and of government. Even with a media so old and well-established there was dogmatic subservience to authority symbolised (especially in the Nasser and Sadat administrations) by a concentration on the portrait of the president, which took a regular central place in every paper.

One of developmental journalism's central concepts is that media will assist development by furnishing the groundwork for discussion of policies. With illiterate populations (the highest illiteracy rates are in groups most basically effected by economic changes) this may be fanciful. Sadat's "open-door" economic policies were never comprehensively explained, nor could they be to the urban poor largely effected by his raising the price of bread. Had they been explained would those who rioted in 1976 and 1977 have listened? The ordinary Egyptian remained
out of touch with government actions. Egypt had become, by the late 1970s, an example of the failure of conventionally-applied, state-orientated journalism within a developing society. Nasser, realizing the power of radio, monopolized it. "After the revolution, and particularly once colonel Nasser emerged as the undoubted leader of Egypt, broadcasting suddenly became a vital means of welding the new country together into a coherent nation and making its influence felt as a vital force throughout the Mideast."

Governmental control was clearly in Nasser's mind when he drew up the policies of the broadcasting organizations.

1. To enhance the standard of all kind of art.
2. To strengthen the national consensus as well as the social, co-operative feelings, to promote the essence of co-operation between individuals and groups; to encourage favourable habits and customs and to discourage improper ones.
3. To participate in educational campaigns among the people, and to follow up intellectual and artistic activities among the cultivated circles.
4. To deal with social problems and to exert adherence to moral and ethical values.
5. To revive the literary, scientific and artistic Arab heritage.
6. To acquaint the people with the best products of human civilization.
7. To enlighten public opinion about internal and external news and to inform of the various worlds trends.
8. To bring the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Arab world to the notice of foreign countries.
9. To promote talents in every field of intellect and inventiveness.
10. To promote relations between residing compatriots and those who left the country.
11. To entertain the compatriots.

What appeared as enlightened (even "developmental") aims actually lead to central control. The difference between Sadat and Nasser was that Nasser intended to use broadcasting and the media in more restricted ideological terms, Sadat's probable aim was to direct a heterogenous public to support an unpopular programme.
of detente. The media system under both leaders was a vehicle continuously carrying favourable comments on the man his regime and his policies. Media was considered too vital and potent to be left in the hands of "mere" journalists. In Egypt half the leading journalists, broadcasters and press editors were and are politically prominent individuals in society. Even Nasser and Sadat retained strong connections with the press and were associated with it before they rose to power, (the former was famous for his revolutionary writing prior to his leadership, and the latter was editor of a prominent Egyptian newspaper - the daily Al Gumhuryah). Conflict arose partly because of this personal political contact, putting journalists in an invidious position. To further complicate matters, the extent of a government's fear of such individuals was expressed in Sadat's paranoia. Journalists' reaction to suppression was abstinence from political criticism; an exercise in self-censorship. Some general anxieties were channelled elsewhere: the novels of Naguib Mahfouz were a radically different commentary from that favoured in the anodyne columns of the official dailies. Although Sadat issued a decree to end press censorship in 1974, control remained since he had appointed editors and press union leaders sympathetic to his own policies and political ideology (as had Nasser). In essence, Sadat's methods differed very little from Nasser's.

On 28 August [1974] Sadat asked a special committee to draft a working paper for the reorganization of the press. Speaking to editors in Alexandria, he criticized newspapers for sarcasm about the country's economic position, reinforcing the impression that editors who did not keep control would be dismissed (as Hiekel had been) or transferred to other newspapers. A switching of editors
duly took place affecting al Ahram, al Gumhuryah and the Egyptian Gazette. [In 1976] Sadat ordered yet another major reorganization of the senior management and editors of the main newspapers and publishing houses.28

The Bread Riots were a test of press loyalty to Sadat. Most passed but the left-wing al Tali'a (from al Ahram's media stable) and Rose el-Yousuf suggested that the riots had been an expression of popular dissatisfaction.29 By April 1977 both publications had new editors. Despite attempts at controlling debate that Spring saw a lively discussion of domestic and foreign policy issues conducted in the Majlis and universities. The government fought back by imposing printing and financial restrictions and then use the Socialist Prosecutor, who began seizing issues of al Ahali on the grounds of being anti-democratic.30 Whether or not specific censorship laws had been abandoned, there remained a consensus imposed top-down.

Under such conditions of limited freedom the press changes. One of Sadat's chief opponents was Mohammed Heikal, appointed editor of Al Ahram. Heikel pointed out in Autumn of Fury31 that, in the entire history of the paper, there had been five editors; after Sadat dismissed him the newspaper changed editors eight times in eight years, demonstrating the political conflict in which Sadat later found himself enmeshed. The Egyptian literate middle classes were on the whole politically aware, their interests usually well catered for (there are nine daily newspapers in Cairo alone), but Nasser and Sadat set a tone of propagandism which encouraged people towards external media (the Voice of America, the Arabic service of the BBC, or the media of neighbor-
ing Arab states). The government had a unique way of disciplining journalists when it saw publication of material as undesirable: material was suppressed while the state continued paying the journalists responsible their salaries. It was a highly paternalistic discipline of frustration. Combined with vaguely-applied laws at the government’s disposal censorship in Egypt had, as elsewhere, a pseudo-legal basis, appealed to sometimes in the name of religion and sometimes of security.

3.4 CAMP DAVID

Any moves towards peace in an area beset with conflicts are difficult to gainsay. When favourable analysis made the headlines during Camp David it was difficult for any Egyptian group to challenge without seeming to be retrogressive and bellicose. Those who opposed the peace (on whatever grounds) were dismissed as pessimists (see Chapter 5). When looking at the reporting of Camp David issues were often simplified by turning the West’s strongest regional supporter, Sadat, into a hero. In the face of simple optimism, complexities which might have lead to reservations could be branded negative and pessimistic. Yet despite favourable media attention public opinion remained just as rejectionist, possibly as a direct reaction to the pressure put on the media by Sadat’s administration. Despite the higher level of professionalism among Egyptian journalists, to talk of objectivity under such conditions would be invalid.
There were similarities between the Egyptian and US press treatment of Camp David. The case of *Al Ahram* was typical: the difficulties faced by the editors and journalists were enormous. This being a newspaper of importance internally and externally, it could not but toe the official line. For most journalists and some editors this may have been anathema, but still little of their vilification could be articulated (though continuous references to the "progress" Sadat made domestically and internationally in *Al Ahram* might be a negative indicator of the pressure journalists were under). Most articles treating Camp David had their sources in official announcements (see Chapter 5.6). If the government condemned Israel, editorial comment took the same line. There was little independent commentary or condemnation of government action; no substantive critique of Camp David, and after the Treaty in 1979 both *Al Ahram* and *Al Gumhuryah* stated what, in essence, was the official line.

There is no dispute except that Israel is not ready to respond to the call for peace with a spirit of understanding and law acceptable by international society, that is the assurance of sovereignty and no further annexation of land by force. Menahem Begin ... is not ready to give up his style of trickiness and dishonour, the biggest indication of which is [his] ... intention to [follow] the American suggestion which Egypt has not as yet agreed to.

What Israel has to understand clearly is that Egypt will stand by its position of not giving up even one square centimeter of occupied Arab land .... It is up to Israel to understand that the spirit of peace is one of the most important steps towards a peaceful agreement, if Egypt does say yes to a friendly relationship and good-neighborliness, then the other side must also have the intention of agreeing with the Egyptian spirit of peace. 32

*Al Ahram* during the 1970s and 1980s became illustrative of a clash between media and government, the latter yielding little;
the agenda (if there was a single agenda apart from political and
diplomatic needs) was one of using media to help justify
government actions rather than explain them.

3.5 CONCLUSION

According to theories of developmental journalism media machinery
should be in the hands of journalists who in cooperation with the
state offer positive aspects of indigenous culture and politics
to the nation, relating these things to the experiences of
ordinary people. However this suggests far greater unity of
purpose in a population than is usually the case, and remains an
ideal. The paradox might be that developmentalism exists between
two states of government practice: total control (or a state of
heavy censorship and government interference as in Egypt) and a
minimum of legislation (Europe and North America). The more media
moves towards the latter state, the less the influence of local
legislation. As the media become increasingly supra-national
determining forces shift: perhaps towards the consumer, perhaps
towards the producer. The local or regional isolation suggested
by some developmental journalistic theories may no longer be
possible. On the other hand the role Al Ahram played in Egypt
during the 1970s may also be outpaced or challenged to act
differently by broadcast media which have their origins and
legislative restrictions in the West.

The situation under Sadat showed that most media in Third World
countries were still subject to controls, and were not able to
enjoy a great deal of professional integrity. Egyptian media, subject to government interference, was in this respect not dissimilar to other old-established media of the Third World. In Chapter 5 I hope to show how (1) *Al Ahram* may have been "cued" by Western media, and (2) how thoroughly certain government viewpoints were maintained.

The information systems in any developing countries breed discontent. The reasons for this are many, and vary, but can basically be summed up as (a) journalists caught in the gap between First and Third World political practice, aspiring to report the former but having to deal with the latter: few journalists from developing countries can avoid comparing themselves on a story-by-story basis with journalists from developed countries, a situation especially true in broadcast media which uses so much professionally-produced First World product (CNN, ITN, BBC, ABC and RTF and others sell worldwide); (b) having to cope with domestic structures to which the questioning "objective" nature of journalism may be antithetical; (c) journalism, attracting expressive talent, may in the end become a block to that talent (see above for details of Egyptian writers in this position); (d) the histories of many developing countries since independence (Egypt is typical) show a decline in press freedom. Discontent, instead of being expressed by media, may develop into social trauma; disillusionment with the system thus increases, encouraging public and journalists to look elsewhere for information. There was, during the 1970s and 1980s, no attempt to alter established practices within Egypt. Despite
Al Ahram's attempts to be objective under al Jamal (see Chapter 5) and subsequently the paper's role as a part of the establishment increased. No ideas comparable to developmental journalism were evolved (in fact, the only Arabic-speaking states to come close were in North Africa, and there hardly for developmental reasons). Western notions of objectivity and the political problems of developing states might not be adequately balanced in developmental journalism.

The Egyptian press at the end of the Sadat era entered a period where no philosophy of media obtained: instead the insecurity which grew through the 1970s and into the 1980s within government, society and media lead to the latter's fearful subservience.
CHAPTER 4: US JOURNALISTS' FAVOURABLE RESPONSE TO THE PEACE INITIATIVE

4.1 Introduction: Domestic and Foreign News Gathering

Attitudes to domestic news and attitudes to foreign news may change when people (including journalists) move out of their domestic culture, and interest may concentrate on issues which relate back to that culture. This may be because of lack of knowledge about distant places which means they are difficult to slot into a "cultural" world map, while proximity equals greater familiarity and therefore interest; there may be market resistance to foreign news; and media resources mean that the further from home base a reporter operates the more expensive it becomes. All this combines to create the effect that, should a foreign news story not be linked to domestic consumers, its coverage may change: either diminish or, perhaps, be specified according to the interest groups comprising the paper's readership. Northern Irish issues covered by The New York Times, film issues covered by The Los Angeles Times, shipbuilding stories in The Glasgow Herald or the coverage of winemaking by Le Sud-Ouest all differ because of their constituencies. A good illustration of this would be the coverage of specific minority issues, where (for example) a newspaper serving a city with predominantly Hispanic or African communities would be likely to offer more news regarding those racial groups (in the widest sense) than a newspaper in a city with a smaller percentage of non-European readers. Constituencies such as gender or religion would remain relatively stable, though coverage may then differ according to more political criteria.
This skewing of interest could also be the case in US reporting of the background and proceedings of Camp David. (Specific treatment of *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* will be dealt with in the analysis of those newspapers in Chapter 5.) An element in this constituency-sensitivity during the 1970s, and a major factor affecting reporting of any event in the Mideast by US newspapers, was the sizeable and well-organized Jewish lobby ("the Lobby") which energetically worked as Israel's unofficial unpaid embassy to the US; a second factor was the polarization of news between good and bad outcomes, a factor in most media. A case could be made by editors and proprietors that positive reporting of Camp David (combing away confusing difficulties such as Palestinian rejection of the dialogue) made for a more receptive and (in times of economic difficulties and low national prestige) more interested audience, and thereby perhaps increasing sales. The "Good News" factor (news linked positively to issues of local/national identity) is often in direct contention with the "Hard News" factor (objective, non-constituency-sensitive news). The former can mean anything which will comfortably fit scheduling and audience expectations, the latter (unusually) discounts the "natural" (domestic/local) constituency of the news-gatherer (see 4.3 below).²

4.2 SETTING THE AGENDA

An analysis of the US media response to the Camp David period under study (1977-1979) has to offer some kind of definition of news agenda. The painting of a picture entails the creation of,
or recognition of borders (ie, where it ends). Not only does this affect what is omitted, it must also change what is included. The agenda of the Camp David summit was largely set as the structure of the Geneva Peace Conference (envisaged by Carter and Vance in 1977, but abandoned in November that year). It was an agenda which centered around Israel (minus its Arab inhabitants) and included Egypt (minus its anti-Sadatist faction); it did not include the Palestinians as central players, not other front-line Arab states. (As Chapter 5.6 below indicates, while the two US papers gave extensive coverage to Israel, Egypt and their leaders, the Palestinians were quantified as secondary players, while other Arab states hardly figured at all (unless in a negative context - see table 5.4). This was an agenda for rational peace between peoples, unclouded by Mideast complexity.

As has been stated (see 4.1) the media acts generally, if non-purposefully, to support values dominant in a community through a mixture of personal and institutional choice, external pressure and anticipation of what a large heterogenous audience expects and wants. One view might be that it is essentially conservative because of a combination of market forces, operational requirements and established work practices. Another may suggest the media is actively engaged on behalf of a ruling (and media-owning) elite in constraining political and social deviance. Whichever may be more plausible in this context (and there are elements of both in the structure of most newspapers) agenda-setting when media act in concert within a consensus, or under pressure from external interest groups, acts as a block to
new ideas, and supports stereotypical perspectives. It could be that the more internally fragmented a society is (the US like all large nation-states is a series of societies which sometimes find the need to assert a common goal) the more its media set an agenda to cohere the surrounding world, especially in those areas where national philosophy might be most seriously tested (the Mideast for example). Such is the effect of the Camp David period.

When the media publicize dissent ... the effect ... is to minimize its sources and objects, to magnify its fragmentation and incoherence. That effect comes about far less by positive act of will on the part of media producers, or in response to active establishment pressure upon them, than by the sheer inertia of understanding of the world of affairs circumscribed by the horizons of those who run affairs.

There are unlikely to be concerted internal efforts to solve structural maladjustment of a news system (resulting, say, in bias and/or omission of news) and external efforts would be deeply resented as independent. Western media asserts its professionalism and resists enforced change. Add to this that, with few exceptions (one being the much-criticized MacBride report), Western journalism's freedom from criticism of its international coverage since 1945 and the possibility of change becomes negligible. If, on occasion, cases of agenda-setting are discussed these tend to be overt censorship on developing media rather than pressures on domestic media. The way the conflict in Northern Ireland has been reported in Britain illustrates this.

Another inflection of the official discourse on Northern Ireland is to emphasize the continuing human consequences of terrorism on the innocent civilian population of the province. This approach is to be found in all types of
actuality coverage ... . The "who, what, where?" format has become standard for reporting incidents in which someone is killed, as have the follow-up filmed reports which concentrate on the bravery and good character of the victim and the sorrow and endurance of their families and kin.6

This has also been the form taken by reports of PLO Fatah and Hamas attacks on Israeli settlers on the West Bank, or other Israeli civilians.7 Censorship is only the visible tip of agenda-setting. The coverage of Camp David said little about the environment of the Mideast, and Western journalists, by not dealing with Arab issues adequately, allowed topics not considered important in the West to leave the agenda. By not presenting the matter in greater detail US journalists weakened the case of Arab grievances. If the media do not tell people how to think they can (as sole transmitters of news) form the boundaries of what people think about, or build on what is familiar. The importance an event such as the breaching of the Berlin Wall found wide coverage in Western media. During the week from November 13 1989, an average of 54% of international news in The Times, Le Monde, and The Irish Independent covered the Eastern European thaw: the Wall was of political and military significance to the West. Third World issues are unlikely to summon such enthusiasm. Events receive attention for the horror value (earthquakes and famine), comforting relationship value (visits of Western figures to developing states) or linking the interests of the West to a political event elsewhere (Panama, Nicaragua, the Pergau Dam project in Malaysia). Where they cannot so easily be linked (Sudan, Ethiopia) there is less news until something extreme occurs (the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Miriam
in Ethiopia, the actions of President Habre of Sudan and the following UN handling of the crisis).

4.3 "GOOD NEWS" AND "HARD NEWS"

Sympathetic attitudes are not the norm in the business of world news; for most Western journalists (and, indeed, Third World journalists not in the "Developmental" camp) the skewing of news towards the consumer, and the fickleness of the consumer are as much problems as difficulties of objectivity and independence. However the modern Western consumer, glutted with information and relative wealth, contrasts with the media consumer of the pre-television period. The old polarities have gradually vanished in favour of a plethora of domestic identities (groups, minorities, religions, allegiances of various types), while the "consumerization" of news may well be reflected in the coverage of Camp David (especially in broadcast media) with "Good News" craved as part of the international picture, or, where such news is absent, then at least a feeling of national superiority or security. The closer to home the more complexity reporting can bear. But the issue of reporting adequately has more at stake than the temporary mind-set of a reader.

The favourable response by the Western press and, in particular, the US towards Camp David was a single set of responses, limited by the usual constraints of time and political contingency, to a complex and far-reaching situation. In part the "Good News" /"Hard News" contention also changed the complexion of the
reporting: translated to the Israeli-Egyptian summit what the US public were fed were positive images supported by a White House seeking breaks of that sort, in a media which naturally simplified. Finally if consumers were not dictating the agenda they were clients to be pleased rather than people to be informed. At the start of the peace process other attendant problems (the Palestinians, Jordan, the status in Egypt of Sadat himself) were aired. By the end everything had been simplified into "the conclusion of an enmity and the beginning of a friendship" with the US as broker.\textsuperscript{10} Although hailed as a triumph the Accords really did little except satisfy a Western yearning for peace on a superficial level (see Chapter 2). (The Camp David Accord was Carter's only major foreign policy initiative given major domestic press coverage, one of the few major foreign policy manoeuvres since Nixon's visit to China in 1973). It is possible the US press merely satisfied a perceived need for good news, fearing there had been too much hard news: criticism over Mideastern policy and Far Eastern policy, very little movement in the SALT talks, an administration which actively sought to distance itself from the policy of Kissinger without offering anything as press-friendly lead to a media demand for positive achievement. Whatever national feeling of inadequacy the Summit addressed, it could be said that within the US Camp David was a treaty for US consumption; its reporting a victory of "Good News" over "Hard News".

In the build up to the Accord certain US newspapers (\textit{The Washington Post} notably but even \textit{The New York Times} occasionally,
see Chapter 5) perceived Palestinians as more than a footnote, editorialrecognizing an agreement between Egypt and Israel must be linked to the background of the conflict (again see Chapter 5). These observations were later overwhelmed (or rendered irrelevant in terms of "grander" issues of peace) by events at Camp David: the history of the Palestinian conflict was perhaps too far from, and too subtle for the satisfying of public concern to be reportable in detail. The fact that, since 1978, no significant improvement in the Arab/Israeli relationship occurred until 1993 starkly indicates how far a Western perception of good news created a climate of superficial diplomacy. The atmosphere of uncritical Egypt/Israeli bipolarity could be said to have lasted ten years after Camp David period (up to the Intifada of 1988). Historical support for Israel and fear of Soviet influence allowed Western media to reflect anxiety over an area traditionally prone to superpower patronage. Although "hard news" (especially in US terms) might not deliver the Mideastern viewpoint in detail, "good news" (in the sense of reporting supportive of administration viewpoints) was inadequate to the political reality and changes of the area.

4.4 INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBYISTS – AN UNBALANCED MEDIA

Camp David is almost unique amongst US news issues over the period 1969-1989 in that there was a larger constituency for a positive outcome at home than internationally. US journalists were involved in issues which concerned not just the inhabitants of the Mideast but their own domestic consumers. Here was the US
energetically moving for peace rather than using its power to destroy (if Vietnam was a blow to US prestige, Camp David could conceivably be a better indication of the nation’s vision), and while Palestinians (and other Arab nations) summed up all that was negative and antagonistic to Western interests, an image of a "Western" Arab such as Sadat was more palatable. This media-presentation may have enhanced a preference for a limited settlement.

In the course of working for the Egyptian-Israeli peace, the negotiators lost the objective of a broader Middle-East settlement. Many observers ... argued that the war in Lebanon would never have happened on the scale it did if Egypt and Israel had not been at peace ....

Lebanon, however, was never the central concern of the Camp David negotiations. The Palestinian question was. And on that score the record shows that Camp David did little to bring about a settlement. 12

How far the media at home informed Carter’s view of the Mideast is not quantifiable, but pressures from the Jewish Lobby Quandt notes were only overcome when Carter was no longer president and could visit those areas of the Mideast for himself. 13

Besides understanding the Palestinian issue less well than the Egyptian Israeli dispute, Carter also found that the constraints of the American political system came into play whenever he tried to deal with the Palestinian questions. Even to refer to the Palestinian rights or a Palestinian homeland could set off shock waves within the American Jewish community. These would be instantly felt in Congress and relayed back to the White House. Before long Carter learned to say less in public, thereby giving the impression that he was backing down under domestic pressure.

Finally, when Carter turned his attention from the Mideast after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, both Arabs and Israelis knew that American attitudes and priorities had changed. 14
Political restraints could conceivably be linked to similar constraints felt by media. Which would come first is another matter. The lack of truly independent news about the Palestinian crisis reaching Carter might have compounded a political sensitivity.

The US press's relationship to Israel was and is careful regarding events elsewhere it might have criticised. The economic-military relationship cannot be divorced from the attitude the US press displays towards the Mideast.

The essential features of the U.S. contribution towards the creation of a greater Israel were revealed in a stark and brutal form in the September 1982 massacre of Palestinians in Beirut, which finally did elicit widespread outrage, temporarily at least. ... The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was supported by the U.S. and editorial comment generally, though qualms were raised when it seemed to be going too far (perhaps threatening U.S. interests) or to involve too many civilian casualties. All of this is reminiscent of the U.S. attack on South Vietnam in 1962, then most of Indochina a few years later, to mention an event that did not take place according to standard U.S., journalism and scholarship. 15

The US attitude regarding aid to Israel (which may possibly include the knowledge that helping in the creation of Israeli nuclear capacity thereby broke their signatory agreement to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) had a distorting influence on the US press. 16 They avoided the obvious in preference for detailed information, and never come close to criticism of the basic tenets that underpin US military and economic aid to Israel, let alone the fact itself. 17 As for critical Arab voices, these were treated in the US media often in terms of anger and resentment that the Peace Treaty should be jeopardized. Criticism was seen as intransigence, a short-term irrational rejection.
With media treatment such as this the public could have had little choice (offered the option of pessimism or constructive optimism).

Whether on television or in newspapers the constant portrayal of a leader or issue may be an effective way of capturing an audience. It may make them identify with the matter and believe in its solidity or at worst abstain and distance themselves from it; the latter would take (at least initially) a greater intellectual jump. Thinking under these circumstances was more likely to be geared to the sentimental or confrontational: thus Western admiration of Sadat and his politics did not arise from any understanding of Arab politics or the uniqueness of the man as an Arab leader, but instead because of Sadat's own admiration of Western alternatives. Egypt's cosmopolitan history might partially explain the dualism Sadat represented but taken out of context by the Western media he became (from the November 1977 visit onwards) an image of logic and realism in a corner of the world portrayed as lacking both.

Western journalists have advantages not enjoyed by their Third World counterparts (see Chapter 3): relative freedom to report, greater mobility because of greater resources, little interference from government, and traditional latitude for interpretation. International issues create different dilemmas, since they matter to a specialized group and effect the ordinary public only tangentially, or, in the case of the Egypt/Israel Accords, with an appeal to national pride. Publics, primarily seeing politics
in terms of the advancement of domestic interests, purchase and consume news which views the world in a similar way.

4.5 THE MIDEAST AND WESTERN MISPERCEPTIONS

If Egypt could now be classed (alongside Jordan and Saudi Arabia) as within the loose ties of Western influence, then its consolidation and stabilization were important; other Mideastern states could be relegated or ignored. Whether Washington took its cue from the press, or the press took their cue from politicians or vice versa is debateable; what is clear is that the US media did not fully report all aspects of the Camp David process.

It had been difficult dealing with (or sympathetically reporting) people not culturally or ideologically similar, and journalistic integrity could be said to have been undermined by stereotypical characterization. Images of corruption, religious fanaticism, political terrorism and catastrophe quickly were used to build up a vision of Arabia (see footnote 18). The dumping of socio-political areas into easily retrievable stereotypes-categories with which journalists could feel comfortable did not produce an atmosphere conducive to unbiased reports on Arabia. The reporting of criticism of the Camp David Accord is typical. That Sadat was isolated and rejected, not only by the rest of the Arab world but increasingly by his own people, failed to dampen the enthusiasm of Western journalists for the Peace treaty.
Since Mideastern issues were measured by their political, economic or strategic value (or threat) to the West (the October War of 1973, Iranian revolution of 1979, Iran-Iraq War and finally, Gulf War of 1991 illustrate this). Israel's proliferation of weapons systems (and their attendant support via other "pariah" states, notably South Africa which helped considerably in the development of the Israeli nuclear weapon during the 1970s) were non-events compared to the coverage of Libya, Iraq, Lebanon or Iran. Most problems concerning the Mideast were measured as frustration suffered by Western countries (especially the US) faced with Arab hostility. Arab defiance could reflect their desire for independence from Western policies (or an independence commensurate with their oil-based power).

Another reason for US complacency was its self-absorption. What goes on outside its sphere of direct political activity and cultural similarity sinks low on the agenda. Although usual, this has been one of the prime reasons for discontent among non-Western states. While South Africa occupied a great deal of media time during the 1970s, equally reprehensible non-European regimes such as Indonesia received scant attention. (Challenges to the international information order (see Chapter 1) derive from a similar discontent with the world system.) Israel may often be perceived in the Mideast as a symbol of Western antagonism. The US aid package and unstinting support of Israel in international fora, fostered among Palestinians in particular a perception of their fight being against a form of US/Western colonialism as
much as against the harshness of the Israeli state and its actions since 1948.

Given the cultural and historical experience of Europeans and their Jewish groups, any attempt to change the relationship built around Israel is difficult. Alternatively, the changes through which the Arab world passed in the period since 1945 did not make it easy for Arab countries to acquire friends or change attitudes. The Islamic revival created a wave of criticism and misunderstanding, not only of the Arab character but the Islamic religion as a whole. From it came the use of the term "fundamentalist" which, by the early 1980s, had come to cover any overt or organized expression of Islam. It also appeared because of the profoundly anti-religious streak in 20th Century Europe and, contrastingly, the pervasive Christianity of the US.

There are other factors governing the US’s media relationship with Islam: but the bias of information may be due to the incomprehension of one culture by another. Any understanding of the media imbalance between Israel, her allies and the Arab world has to take this into account. The Arab camp, whether collectively or represented by aggrieved groups such as the PLO, has little history of political endeavour or sufficient secularization of thought. Arabs were at a disadvantage, especially where the manipulation of the US media was concerned. The argument that Arabs need to learn how to perceive political topics without recourse to religious analogies is a self-justifying truth, since US political and media systems (and with
them a wider Western model) can only be moved significantly by appeals they understand. The secularization of Western societies has now proceeded so far that religious thought has ceased to be a consistently major element except in a purely negative way.

4.6 CONCLUSION

When Third World issues are assessed and judged in the US media, journalism can either be tinged with apologetics (both The New York Times and The Washington Post saw the Lebanon debacle of 1982-1983 as regrettable but necessary), possible distortion (coverage of Nicaragua from 1979 to 1988) or perhaps even ignorance (a non-event such as the genocide in East Timor since 1976). This last may have direct political causes, for example the need for the US in the Pacific Basin to cultivate a powerful and mineral-rich country to offset a general regional antagonism; or could be coupled with media and public apathy about a little-known nation, and even the success of Indonesian propaganda in creating a communist insurgency out of the Fretelin resistance. But the media, despite proclaiming a freedom from political bias, will always find it difficult to free itself from forms of previous public misinformation.

Journalism as a profession (like most other professions) finds it difficult to exist outside the range of domestic political expression through which and to which it is reporting. From 1974 to 1979 the stress, politically and diplomatically, was on rapprochement (possibly in the aftermath of Vietnam, or because
of a general tiredness with the repetition of confrontation in the Mideast). Criticism was acceptable in small doses for Israel, and large doses for Arab parties. Movement outside the consensus was unlikely, and as the September 1977 reporting of Camp David within the US media may suggest (see Chapter 5). At crucial moments of national policy there is a likelihood that media may converge to make a similar commentary. Journalists' overall support for the Accords has a wider context: a) the given nature of the political and social composition of their own societies, b) the personal experience, education and political leanings of journalists themselves, c) the commercial and editorial impact on the outcome of the journalists' work and d) the general Jewish/US experience. Jewish/Arab problems were largely viewed by even the more liberal US journalists from a single perspective: the (innocent) victim versus (fanatical) aggressor. It took the shocking images of the Intifada to jolt US journalists out of this complacency, so that (even for those Jews within the Lobby itself) the old idea of Israel as an outpost of Western values in a hostile area began to change.

The ideological composition of journalists, added to their political myopia in given situations, combine to create a strongly subjective coverage of international affairs. Within the period 1964-1989 this has proved to be one of the most potent reasons behind US journalists' misinterpretations of the Mideast (which despite its size and importance is covered in a very sparing way by US agencies and newspapers). In The US Press and Iran, Dorman and Farhang point out the failings of journalists
when their roles as news-gatherers are corrupted by poor coverage, lack of domestic interest and (most importantly) their own personal misinterpretive ideologies. The narrower the public debate the more likely will be the establishment of "circular delusion". In such circumstances what debate there is takes place on a small range of issues (such as the Shah as friend to the US, the Ayatollahs as fanatics bent on spreading an Islamic Revolution, the upheaval in Tehran as an example of this (with innocent US diplomats caught up in it) which either then distorts or obscures the wider explanation for events. The US and its journalists had a limited understanding of the events in Iran (often because of disinterest or access to limited strata of Iranian society) in a similar way that it had limited understanding of events in the Mideast. Israel was well-reported, with figures like Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan household names in the US; but the Arab inhabitants of the region had no such footholds (except negatively) as thus the "circular delusion" became chronic.

Students of the American press who argue that it is not the role of journalism to go beyond the surface of events but simply to state the objective facts will do well to compare American news coverage of, and editorials on, strikes in Poland and resistance to martial law there, with the attention given to the strikes in Iran in 1978. Where Poland is concerned, the Solidarity movement, its leaders, its tactics, and its achievements are well-known to the attentive American public, and sympathy and admiration for their cause and conduct among Americans cannot be in doubt. In the case of Iran in revolt, the opposite was true.

It has taken the 1987 Intifada, the Beirut debacle of 1982-1983 when 241 US marines and 58 French soldiers died, as well as a group of "terrorist" incidents worldwide, to put the Palestinian
question on the US political and media agenda. Whereas bias is obvious in its cruder forms, once it covers itself with references to a secularist political climate taken for granted in its domestic picture and transferred to the international arena, reporting becomes thoroughly antagonistic to non-Western, non-US societies.

It was possible in the case of Iran for the regime apologists to appeal to prejudices, sensibilities, and a worldview of the journalistic fraternity that was at once a part of but separate from the statist political perspective and ideology ... . In short ethnocentrism was in the service of ideology. However ... ideology is the constant and ethnocentrism is a variable. The same or similar qualities in Iranian revolutionaries which were repugnant to American journalists were ignored or transformed into virtues when the subject at hand was resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan.23

When Camp David is assessed in terms of the links likely to be made by US journalists reporting the Mideast then it is clear there is imbalance. The Mideast was seen in the mid to late 1970s in terms of superpower conflict, potential Soviet aggression, and the need of the US to support a client Jewish state because of the recent history of that people. Ignorance of the Arab viewpoint, life-style, religion and politics, combined with a feeling that oil-based power was an artificial and unnaturally damaging anomaly to be used against the West (a charge which Western media writers might not think could be levelled against Western military and economic power) fed a feeling of "us versus them".

US journalists may claim their motives to be governed by objectivity and neutrality. But it would be difficult for them
to substantiate such claims after the imbalances in the coverage of Camp David. Essentially what is faced by those who study the US coverage of Camp David is a wall built since 1948 (or some would say the start of the Cold War) constructed with a singularly US-centric world picture.

... To make attitudes to Islam very clear, a whole information and policy-making apparatus in the United States depends on these illusions and defuses them widely. Large segments of the intelligentsia allied to the community of geopolitical strategists together deliver themselves of expansive ideas about Islam, oil, the future of Western civilization, and the fight for democracy against turmoil and terrorism. ... Islamic specialists feed into this great stream. ... A little lower down come the mass media, which take from the other two units of the apparatus what is most easily compressed into images: hence the caricatures, the frightening mobs, the concentration on "Islamic" punishment, and so on. All of this is presided over by the great power establishments - the oil companies, the mammoth corporations, the multinationals, the defence and intelligence communities, the executive branch of the government. 24

Not only is domestic and foreign news coverage separated by feelings of their relative importance to the domestic consumer, it is also separated by differing supplies of accurate information, the personal political and social bias of individual journalists, and underlying ethnocentrism. This latter helped the US media refuse to acknowledge the extent of Palestinian grievance until ten years after the Camp David Accords. The peace initiative itself, extremely limited in reality, achieved in US press terms what it never managed in the Mideast, a feeling of progressive stability and a limiting of regional tensions and violence. What the region has witnessed since 1978 is exactly opposite to the feelings encouraged in consumers by the favourable response of the US press.
Media-directed efforts by the PLO during the early 1990s (in the form of their representative Isam Hirawi) were more successful: partly this may have been due to the westernized profiles of the representatives (speaking English well and dressing in Western fashion). Israeli intransigence and Palestinian deftness with media during the abortive Madrid Summit of November 1991 could have contributed to an alteration in US bias. How far US media was attempting to understand the Mideast is impossible to judge. It could be possible that, tired of one angle on the news, and excited by a new pantheon of sympathetic characters, media chose to show things from a Palestinian viewpoint for a while. Real US support for Israel would be unlikely to wane. There would have been a different perception of Israel had there not been so large a Jewish Lobby in the US but it is debateable whether its absence would have led to no involvement at all.
CHAPTER 5: A COMPARISON OF THE US AND EGYPTIAN REPORTING OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on the method and style of coverage of Camp David, looking at Egyptian and US press. My analysis will have two sources of data, the first will cover all three papers over the Camp David period. The second source involves a detailed content analytical sampling of the papers during September 1977 (see 5.6). The result will be an examination of journalism in practice in the developed and developing world. The New York Times and The Washington Post were chosen because of their international profiles; both are aware of their international audience in a way which, say, The Boston Globe is not, and both consider objectivity and professionalism to be essential foundations of journalism. Al-Ahram is of value since, during Sadat's period, the government was heavily involved in journalistic affairs (this involvement was highly visible in what is Egypt's most famous newspaper). Government involvement extended to appointments and purges. Al Ahram's position as an Egyptian voice in the Arabic-speaking world, quoted beyond that world because of its English language sister copy, made it very vulnerable to the nervousness of an uneasy government. Al Ahram in many ways epitomizes difficulties facing newspapers in developing countries.

The last twenty years have not shown a proportionate increase in the amount of coverage of international events by Western papers and agencies as they witnessed a vast increase in media
facilities. At least 45% of all major Mideast stories covered by the Washington Post during Camp David were taken from news agencies such as Reuters or AP: whereas Washington Post reporters would write major analytical pieces, these would be bulked out in agency reports which by their nature were stating basic facts rather than offering a point of view. Journalistic commentary had to wait for a "significant" event which could then be built into a major news article or editorial. The resulting image of the two newspapers studied was less monolithic than expected, even in a paper like The New York Times whose constituency contained many supporters of Israel.

Views of Israel, of Jews or Arabs generally, of Begin or Sadat and of Mideast peace in the Western press proved to be governed far more by individual events than by any world picture. If there was censorship akin to the cruder and more forthright type suffered at Al Ahram it lay in the omission of news from the Mideast rather than its treatment. During the period under study US newspapers, again surprisingly considering their constituencies, covered less of the Mideast than their international counterparts. Finally September to October 1978 in both papers showed less sympathy towards the alienation felt by Palestinians and other Arabs to Camp David. The story, exhaustively covered during September, 1978, was perhaps suffering fatigue.

Although prominent, news of the Mideast in both papers never challenged space given other leading international stories during
September 1977. Panama and Europe both received more coverage than the Mideast, the former because of the renegotiation of the Panama Canal Treaty being debated within the Congress, the latter because of the US commitment and presence there. Reports on South Africa (the murder of Steve Biko occurred within this month) and China both occupied similar space. What news was covered was covered differently by each paper, with The New York Times offering a range of smaller articles on the Mideast, while The Washington Post offered less space but greater depth. Often The Washington Post treated Mideast items of more esoteric interest, at the base of pages otherwise concerned with US news. (See for example September 11th and 12th, 1977 for this unusual placing of different news varieties.)

But what exactly were the forces acting on the newspapers concerned? What role did editors play in the direction their newspapers took? Did the "gatekeeping" role of the editorial become a censoring role? (See particularly the sections on the editorial within The New York Times, below.) Or were attitudes, which considered Arab behavior in a negative light, combined with a fear of too much criticism of Israel in the Western press the motivating force?

The study will begin by looking at Al Ahram from 1977: here the task will be to trace the way the media treated the Palestinian-Israeli issue from the starting-point of 1977, moving to 1978, when the Accords were signed. 1979 will be examined to witness the damage done to the Arab and Palestinian argument by what was,
effectively, an extension of Western media consensus into a Mideastern political arena. It must be remembered that throughout this period Al Ahram remained a controlled organ of the state; as a propaganda medium it was a running apologia for Sadat.

5.2 "AL AHRAM" 1977-79

Faced by the different structure of Egyptian society Al Ahram's reporting must be analyzed with that social context in mind. Of what is Egyptian newspaper coverage representative? No society can be represented by a single newspaper, but political messages the ruling party wish to convey (and the readers of Al Ahram were a narrower class than read The New York Times) are shown by the extent to which the paper during this period represents the party's views (ie Sadat's) rather than any other group's.

Although Al Ahram is an influential newspaper among readers, its influence on Egyptian government policy must be negligible since it is an organ of government. The only time this paper managed to raise consciousness in Egypt and the Arab world was under Nasser, not because he gave it freedom of expression but because of his initiation of a political system which appealed widely at a time when the aim of most political arabs was to fight colonialism.

The structures of state adopted by Nasser were monolithic. This made the transition to Sadat from Nasser (from a charismatic arab to a Westernized "moderate") an interesting adaption of a
previous closed system into a new, still anti-dissentionist system of control. After Nasser national newspapers became tools to consolidate public opinion, and continued in this role until the early 1980s. Nasser like Sadat made enemies within the circle of media professionals but his restrictions were part of a vision for an independent Egypt, less the result of a growing paranoia such as Sadat's, where criticism became anathema. "Under the press law which followed the 1979 "law of shame", it is an offence to challenge the truth of divine teaching, to advocate opposition or hatred of state institutions, or to publish abroad false or misleading news ... which could damage the interests of Egypt." The press laboured under the same restraints it had under Nasser, but without the excuses; a gap of credibility thus developed within the system. Although the papers continued as a platform for the government's and Sadat's objectives, the political climate began to change. The newspapers' hold on public opinion between the October War of 1973 and the Bread Riots of 1977 was eroded. Although strains can be witnessed by the turnover of editors on Al Ahram, this was not reflected in open debate. The effect was to constrict journalists' action and diminish the authoritativeness of the press, eroded by misapplication of resources and lack of trust in the elite which controlled it. Sadat's vaunted new air of openness failed to materialize. (During August and September 1978, Sadat's photograph appeared in all but four editions of Al Ahram, and his statements or proclamations in all but three.) While in the West media works within a self-perpetuating consensus, in the Third World consensus is enforced from above.
The Arab world reacted slowly to the news of Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem. (The Arab League was used to dissention but action - of whatever kind - was rare; when it took place, and proved to be antithetical to accepted thought and practice, the shock was profound.) Suddenly the most vital front line state (the concept of confrontation states "du'el jeb'het el muwajeha" was an oft-repeated one in Arabic newspapers, and Egypt was the state which had been the standard-bearer in the confrontation with Israel since the original Arab Army in 1948) had conceded to US pressure. This was difficult to accept. Al Ahram, with its wide arab readership, was filled more and more with expressions of hope for the new US-brokered Israeli-Egyptian peace move (this began as early as September 1977 - see below). Editorials extolled Sadat's statesmanship, using rhetoric about his place at the head of the arab world: particularly galling to other Mideast readers. The newspaper was in the unique position of isolating its domestic readers from adverse external arab criticism while galvanizing external criticism by those very editorials. 1977 showed that what had appeared as a culturally united entity (arab countries of the Mideast) was deeply divided. The Arab League, never much more than a talking shop, became after 1977 even more of an anachronism. Al Ahram acted as the weathervane of changing arab nationalism, marking in particular the way Egypt pursued its own self interest. Al Ahram tended to construe arab anger as intransigence and Sadat's position as realistic.
While Al Ahram mentioned adverse Arab reaction it did so in a low key, often days after the event and the attendant reaction (see below). One of the jobs of mainstream Egyptian media was to shield government from adverse criticism. The hostility of other Arab states started as surprise at Sadat’s initiative with Begin’s Likud coalition government which had made its determined position regarding occupied territory extremely clear before receiving Sadat or signing any Peace Treaty. Al Ahram sought to avoid confrontational issues and simplify problems Sadat faced.

Sadat used staged demonstrations of support (such as the ones on his return from Jerusalem and Camp David, both trumpeted in the pages of Al Ahram) as the peace process continued but difficult to ignore was the expulsion of Egypt from major Arab fora (which translated into political pain when the rich oil states withheld aid). Al Ahram gave an idea of Sadat’s position domestically, but often inversely: the size and positioning of his picture on the front page was in proportion to the level of hostility his government faced. In late 1978, following weeks of unrest, Sadat’s picture on the front page of Al Ahram (21st December, 1978) suggested that even Nasser himself never managed to attract such crowds in the Nile Valley. Compare with this the comments of el Jamal. "President Sadat, when he decided to focus on freedom and democracy as a basis for his government, was trying to give each citizen the opportunity to express his opinion even though this might contradict that of the head of the republic.”

Al Ahram acted as a major support vilifying critics and ignoring opposition, and as it was an Egyptian paper read abroad Sadat had
to be aware that it was a window into Egyptian society, and because of its reputation *Al Ahram* might be perceived as more than a cosmetic media reporting the government line: an authoritative, semi-official source of information about Egypt. No criticism and only moderate width could be allowed. *Al Ahram* from 1977 to 1981 struggled to portray a unified country, a perfect candidate for continued US aid.\(^\text{10}\) (*Al Gumhuryah* is the only other Egyptian newspaper mentioned during 1978 and 1979 in *The New York Times* or *The Washington Post*, once, in the former, in September 1977, while *Al Ahram* is mentioned in four major *New York Times* editorials, and is quoted as "authoritative"\(^\text{11}\)).

While *Al Ahram* was considered a useful instrument of propaganda it must also have served to isolate Sadat within his own misinformation; visits to the streets where unrepresentative crowds could be encouraged (the parallel with Ceaucescu is worth noting) and then, duly, reported in photographic detail.\(^\text{12}\)

It is difficult to gauge exactly the support Egyptian journalists gave Sadat: how much of a reporter's work was good journalism (investigative, objective and critical) and how much was rote (churning out the type of material the editor demanded). In *Al Ahram* between 1977 and 1979 there is nothing critical of Sadat, even the mildest irony is absent. The writing is direct, matter-of-fact and repetitive, or, in certain sections very rhetorical.

The most important use during 1977, both of the editorial within the paper (called "Comment of Al-Ahram") and more general copy,
was to give the impression of tough government, while actually Sadat was bending more and more to US demands, both on internal and external matters. In July, 1977, the paper was careful to show Sadat giving no ground, retaining the tough bargaining position he had been portrayed as adopting. On July 14, the headline was typical.

Sadat: no end to the state of war as long as there is one Israeli soldier on the soil of Egypt. ...

Sadat went on to say "We hope to achieve positive results for the new peace initiative we started together. We have no objections to ensuring the security of Israel, so long as Egypt received similar assurances".13

Sadat is, throughout 1977 and 1978, quoted appealing to public sentiment concerning the "sacred" land of Egypt, often about the importance of the Palestine question. Occasionally this was topped up with calls to arms. On September 19, 1977, as the whole Geneva protocol looked like failing, and Sadat was under fire from critics within his own cabinet (unrest in the country as a whole seemed muted however), he signalled "we will retake by force what the Israelis took if the effort for peace fails".14

As it had during the wars of 1967 and 1973 Al Ahram's level of propaganda rose steeply, this time not in response to a military emergency, but to a peace campaign which the authorities felt might not be well-received.15

Al Ahram during the 1976-79 period shows an intriguing level of misrepresentation with two basic strands: the constant mentioning of guarantees regarding Palestine, and the trumpeting of domestic democracy. Regarding the first, July is a typical month from
1977: on July 2, 14, 17 and 29 the vital link with the fate of Palestine for any Egyptian-Israeli peace process is strongly stressed. On August 13 the editorial is a repeat of the government line.

What Israel Must Understand:

How with Vance's visits to the region's leaders finished, the realities of the peace effort have emerged.

1. Egypt, and with it the rest of the Arab world, has put forward its position very clearly. If peace is to return to the region, and if Israel wants to be one of the region's states, then Israel must contain herself, enforcing international laws which stress the illegality of territorial occupation, and recognising and implementing UN Security Council Resolution 242 and indeed all General Assembly resolutions regarding the Palestinian question.

2. The Palestinians, vital to any just solution of the present problems, have been recognized as flexible and diplomatically-inclined recently. Discussions between the PLO and Washington are in the offing, a positive step we should bear in mind.

3. The Israeli side once again adopted an intransigent series of positions, rejecting the representation of the Palestinians at the Peace Conference [at Geneva] ... .

Disregarding the ... realities of the need for separate treaties between Israel and each Arab state ... the main problem is that of Palestine and the Occupied Territories. The editorials (and wider copy) had to articulate criticism of Israel, support for the Palestinians and for a wide range of peace moves. The US had always to be given a favourable press, and even the Jewish Lobby could only be spoken of obliquely as "hidden powers". Al Ahram's timidity during 1977-79 showed how narrow the journalistic guidelines were. By the time of Camp David Al Ahram was a government organ in a way it never had been (even in Nasser's more autocratic later years it ran articles critical of the government). What Al Ahram did know was that,
despite Sadat's occasional belligerent outbursts (such as that of 19 September, 1977), Israel had ceased to be a target. After the visit to Jerusalem, Al Ahram would wait for Sadat to criticise Israel over a specific point before the paper launching an attack. Israel was the only shifting ground. Palestine was mentioned as major copy in over 70% of editions between October 1977 and August 1978, almost never critically (though the PLO leadership did occasionally receive criticisms). The US was mentioned in 32 major stories over the same period, and despite the oblique reference to the Lobby mentioned above, there was little overt criticism. The USSR now ranked with Syria and Libya as states most worthy of scorn.

By the time Camp David was on the agenda, even criticism of Israel softened. On August 1, 1978 the "Comment of Al Ahram" editorial section (on the front page) avoided criticism of Israel by reporting on US disappointment regarding Sadat's preparation for land negotiation. By shifting stress onto the US Al Ahram avoided apportioning blame. On August 5, 1978 he stated that the aim of forthcoming talks was "total and just peace": the phrases had begun to repeat themselves. Without any proper criticism or width of reporting the paper recirculated observations, which ended their media existence as meaningless quotations. On August 10 the "Commentary" read "If the US is just a spectator for the sake of its own security, rather than getting involved, it would be intolerable": while the official line had to remain supportive of US aims and later Camp David, Al Ahram felt free enough to express mild discomfort.
By August 18 the government line was firmly established. Warnings about possible failure of Camp David were stressed (warnings within editorials on page 5 were very frequent, 12 within a month and a half, combined with full page expositions of Sadat’s grand strategy). The phrase "last chance" was re-used so that, rather than thinking about wider implications of the process under way, readers would ignore criticism for the sake of that vital window for peace. It is a curious cross-fertilization, since *The Washington Post* had been saying that this was indeed a last chance for Mideast peace. As Camp David proceeded Egyptian reporters relied heavily on US journalists for information and opinion. This identification was a top-down process at *Al Ähram*, a result of the growing identification of Sadat’s administration with US aims.

September, 1978, proved to be a predictable month for *Al Ähram* (and no less so for *Al Gumhuryah* which fitted a similar pattern). Dissent from the opinion of the importance of Camp David was obscured by repeated assertions of the need for a positive outcome,20 while criticisms of Israel became less strident (and concentrated more on the character of Begin). On September 3, Omar Asel, a member of the Egyptian Writers’ Union (but no friend to fellow members Mohammed Heikel or Naguib Mahfouz, both of whom held out against Camp David) wrote a wide-ranging article which, despite its support for Sadat’s policies, nevertheless offered a slightly different tone (the reason for this might have been the need to offer an amount of divergence for the sake of plausibility within the main copy). "We want the residents of the
region who have suffered from Israel's existence over the past 30 years to offer their thoughts and ideas on this subject [of peace]. Let them see the US as a partner who feels duly responsible for this present situation." The variation was minimal - Omar Asel was only the third major "independent" voice to be quoted in Al Ahram in more than a year.

Once Camp David began Al Ahram's rhetoric increased. On September 6, Sadat was pictured from the previous day with Carter and the headline "Mideast Peace the Agenda for the Camp David Summit Beginning Today". Sadat was quoted at length, which was not unusual. "There is no time now for discussion or old-fashioned ideas. The challenge is enormous, and we must not disappoint the world's hope of peace. Indeed, the eyes of the world are on this perilous summit, and everywhere there are conflicting ideas about the result." Through September a simple agenda was maintained. September 6 saw a page of photographs of arrivals at Camp David, while the editorial, general copy and report by Hamdi Fu'ad on September 6 were the last direct response to events for almost a fortnight. Carter's desire to negotiate without the world's press wanting details of every move meant that Al Ahram became more repetitive from September 7 on, with editorials sent from Washington, fearful of Israeli and specifically Begin's subterfuge, and confused by the lack of information. Even The Washington Post was no more revealing. Lack of commentary was excused by the fact of Camp David's secrecy."
By September 9, coverage was general, with nothing to add to earlier reports. The following day offered one of three variations on a theme: "Positive Progress at Camp David". The other choices could reflect intense discussion or problems and by September 11 it was the latter the editorial was sensing, as the sub-heading indicated: "Egyptian Sources Say there is Deep Division, and Forward Movement is Difficult". Direct commentary was replaced by vague references and continuing praise for "US Efforts". The limited analysis included assurances that Sadat maintained his commitment to justice, while trying hard not to appear to ditch the more specific Palestinian agenda. "The essence of the problem at this latest stage of the talk at Camp David is Egypt's desired aim of an agreement over a just and permanent Mideast peace, while the specifics of the Palestinian question remain to be tackled."

Oddly neither this edition of Al Ahram, nor that of the following day mentioned Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League, despite a report on September 12 of a meeting of that body, and an editorial ignoring Egypt's novel status. What the editorial did instead was offer Camp David as a more important event, where Sadat was fighting for Arab rights, a line repeated on September 15 when the editorial praised Egypt for standing alone and "playing its role [at Camp David] on behalf of the Arab world". By September 13, the low-point at the negotiations, with widespread rumours of breakdown, Al Ahram's headline admitted problems, blaming Israel, while the editorial vilified the Arab League - presumably to deflect attention. Fears for the collapse
of the Summit and the consequences grew and on September 17 the editorial prepared to heap blame on Israel.

The Structure Israel Demands:

The only Israeli experience is with enmity and greed. ... They talk of peace but come to their own conclusions, meanwhile through these discussions - which Menahem Begin started - it is obvious that Israel wants no other framework for peace than everlasting military preparedness.26

When September 18 brought the announcement of a peace treaty, the editorial was lost for words, commenting that Camp David had been a "clash between two viewpoints" while it was "difficult to comment on the outcome". This could be shorthand for saying the outcome was far from noteworthy, and that previous commentary had been nearer the truth. The Al Ahram editorial now seemed to come increasingly into conflict with the official line, insinuating that Israel had been the only real winner of Carter's initiative. These reflections on September 18 were camouflaged on the news pages in what read more like sports than news coverage, with no analysis, dissenting notes appearing as muffled editorials.27 Typically of Al Ahram (and other Arabic newspapers) criticism had to be read from what was not said rather than what was. To expect other from Al Ahram (or Al Gumhuryah whose coverage was much the same during this period) would be mistaken. Al Ahram followed a government line as a civil servant might, while finding it difficult to lose totally his distrust of Israel. Nevertheless he performed his propaganda task, using the editorial to stress Sadat's achievement. On September 19 his commentary was headed "The Impossible Achieved", stating "the whole world, without exception, applauds the agreement". The gap between the style of
journalism in *The New York Times*, where bias was tempered by fact and balanced opinion, and *Al Ahram*, whose role was merely to beat out the government line remorselessly, was glaring. Where *The New York Times* followed consensus, *Al Ahram* stated policy. And this, in a nutshell, is the difference between the two types of world media: one comments on events and reflects social concerns, the other seeks to impose the policy of an autocratic government. Detail or balancing opinion were absent from *Al Ahram*. In the West government and popular consensus are similar, in Egypt they are not: *Al Ahram*'s editorials were propaganda, reading more like ministerial statements than newspaper opinion, espousing over the Camp David period what was termed "Sadat's responsibility".28

The period following Camp David saw *Al Ahram* alter its portrayal of the peace process: caution replaced the repetitive propaganda of the previous months. For the first time that month, September 20 saw a headline not about Camp David but Sadat's internal political restructuring.29 The results of Camp David were relegated to internal pages, with favourable international reaction (quotations from the *Tokyo Shinbun*, *The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph* of London), and stressing Egypt's position within an international consensus. Arab opinion was ignored (though a brief article on September 21 acknowledged a dispute with Jordan) and both the Editorial and an opinion article by Mohammed Ali el-Oweni entitled "The Responsibility of the Arab After the Birth of Peace" further minimalized dissent.30 The Editorial was typical. "... Had the treaty been simple it wouldn't have taken 13 days. ... [It was] a unique conference in the history of
recent Egyptian diplomacy, but the principles arrived at proved a framework for a just settlement to dispute, especially regarding Palestinian problems."

As 1978 progressed, Al Ahram shifted in two areas: reporting the Palestinian problem, and continuing the reorientation towards the US (supported, according to Al Ahram, by an Egyptian consensus). Palestinian opposition to Sadat's initiatives received media condemnation in Egypt (though how far this was reflected in popular condemnation is difficult to say; it is possible (given similar reactions in other Mideast states) that Egyptian public opinion reacted negatively to Palestinian criticism of Sadat, and that in this area at least the government found a degree of public support).

By denying the opposition newspapers access to officially-generated news and by harassing their journalists, the government has sought to induce the opposition papers to go to excess, to report rumours as fact ... and to use intemperate language. In general this strategy has succeeded, for as the novelty value of the papers wore off in the middle 1980s, so did their circulations plateau and their reputations as reliable sources of news deteriorated.

Al Ahram did what it was meant to do, uniting a sufficiently large consensus behind actions which may have otherwise been unpopular.

5.3 THE US PRESS AND THE MIDEAST 1977-1979

Despite the freedoms US journalists enjoy in comparison to their Egyptian counterparts, the respective coverage showed a similarity at certain points - for example at the signing of the Camp
David Accords themselves. US journalists did not consider wider consequences within the Mideast of Carter's new Pax Americana: much of The New York Times' analysis especially was limited to immediate rather than long term concerns. It is possible that, at times and under certain pressures, news media tend to the anodyne because it is perceived the readership want a certain type of resolution: at these times coverage tends to be based on what are perceived to be the salient moral issues of that particular incident at that moment.

Although Egypt played a crucial role in the US Mideastern policy from Kissinger onward, the US press still treated the Mideast simplistically. Occasional articles covering the area in depth were outweighed in my sample month of September, 1977 by basic agency news which often merely repeated what had been printed the day or week before. And whereas there were no obvious biases and surprisingly little in the way of pro-Israeli sentiment (Jewish reporters such as Elizur in The Washington Post and Gwertzman in The New York Times were particularly objective and critical of Israeli policy) news items tended to be foregrounded in one of two ways: as part of a peace initiative or a military event (such as the Israeli incursion into Lebanon).

The New York Times despite its large Jewish readership looks at Mideastern affairs as special interest foreign news and judges through what it sees as lessons of Western history: understandably criticism of Israel often is made through the Western perspective of Jews in Europe. But the agenda set by politics is
The lines of conformity show there are major rifts between the media perception of major stories and the mainstream political perception: both the Washington Post and the New York Times can be said to have been well to the left of attitudes expressed about the Mideast on Capitol Hill throughout the 1977-1978 period. (Within Egypt similar lines of conformity were under strain, which increased during the Sadat years and was at its height during the period under investigation.) The similarities between the two US papers and Al Ahram must be related to the relationships both have with their respective governments; the wish of the Egyptian government to influence, and the fear of US legislators to offer maverick opinion (which is how criticism of Israel would be seen). While the Egyptian media system exists within a relatively simple symbiosis, US media exists in a heterogenous climate of interest groups, and offers a great width of opinion. Depending on the issues, certain groups may gain ascendency, but it would be rare to single out just one group or strand of interest.

Simplification will always occur within media (by necessity, almost no one wants to open a paper with articles running to fifty pages) yet the Israeli/Arab issue, communicated to a public which cannot be said to be particularly pro-Arab, was rarely couched in simplistic terms. While relatively little attention had been paid to the core problems of Lebanon’s civil war or the collapse of the Arab consensus of 1972-1974, this was more than offset in both papers by coverage of Arab League affairs and occasional snapshots of the daily realities for Lebanese coming
under bombardment from the Israeli military or their client Christian militias. During the September, 1977 analysis neither newspaper can be accused of lack of sensitivity to the region. There might even be said to have been great care taken not to mis-report events. However, processes of simplification and identification of complex issues with personalities (Sadat and Begin) shifted, during the Camp David Conference itself, media discussion away from historical consequences towards personal differences, influences and impacts. There are similarities to the reporting of the Iranian revolution.

It may be some measure of the lack of understanding of Iranian history by American journalists that it took them so long to discover Khomaini, given the penchant of the American media to explain politics, revolutionary or not, in terms of personalities.

... Coverage in the weeks before and after the Ayatollah's return to Iran ... gave the clear impression that Khomaini had made the revolution, instead of the other way round. This tendency to see the politics of a country as ... synonymous with a strongman was neither new to press coverage of Iran ... nor to the Third World ... .

... [S]uch treatment by the press reduced a mass movement that had complex and long-standing forces behind it to the product of the iron will of one man.
and Brinkley at NBC. The US newspapers I studied may have inclined more to personality-led news coverage during the brief euphoria linked with Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, and when he and Begin signed the Accords with Carter. Until then the Begin government had been criticised by both papers for its policies on settlements and intransigence in negotiation, while Sadat was seen as ruling over a country racked with poverty and corruption. The optimism linked to personal appearances mentioned above seems to be a short-lived and specific phenomena. Only Dayan (identified as individual, liberal and intelligent), Begin's foreign minister, might fit Dorman and Farhang's criticism of the US press.

Neither were there negative semantic codes for groups elsewhere vilified by the US media: Palestinian fighters were consistently described as "guerillas" in both papers over the September period, and the PLO was referred to in neutral terms. Where necessary Arafat or his aides were reported without bias in positioning within an article or adverse commentary in introduction. Ariel Sharon (Begin's housing minister) was characterised in both US papers as somewhat extreme. Allegations of Israeli torture were reported (though not well-covered in the long-term, and indeed "proved" false by a major article in The New York Times in 1978, see below). On certain occasions Arab spokespeople and their opinions took precedence over Israeli counterparts (see below) but much depended on wider events and the editing team's (or owner's) decision to foreground those events as of greater overall importance: this is what happened during Camp David
itself, but not for long. While the wider US media brought Sadat credibility among audiences who were, prior to this, skeptical of Arabs and ignorant of their politics, the quality press (represented by the two newspapers I studied) treated Arab politics with a degree of complexity.

5.4 HOW THE EDITORIAL WORKED WITHIN "THE NEW YORK TIMES" AND "THE WASHINGTON POST"

The Editorial in all three papers played a key role (though its role in Al Ahram was a dogmatic summary of facts and statement of political obedience). In some cases the editorial can be seen as a governor, controlling the attitude and direction of the paper's bodycopy. Nicholas Coleridge considers both paper's editorials to be relatively free of proprietorial intervention (unless in a subtle, hands-off way) and there was nothing I saw which offered an alternative view. During my period of research there seemed in the US papers to be three editorial positions: forward (an encouraging, sustaining copy which supported other journalists); neutral (taking an objective position or not commenting at all) and reverse (where the editor may have found himself at odds with some of his staff). The effect this had on the rest of the paper varied. In some cases (especially in The Washington Post) editorial realignment during the Camp David period can be seen encouraging other writers to change tack in a typical "reverse" mode.

From 1967 onward The New York Times editorials had more or less supported Israeli moves, while the views of independent reporters
varied. 1973/4 showed a consistent approval of Israeli actions (perhaps partially as a reaction to the unpopular Arab oil embargo), but approval was never unequivocal. When Begin arrived as a suspiciously new political character after the relative "liberalism" of Meir and Peres, both papers found much to criticize. *The New York Times* generated an image of qualified support by tempering its journalism, using opposing voices at crucial times and not avoiding criticism of Israel. *The New York Times* cleverly introduced levels of support into editorials, indicating a maturity and depth which would then build more general attitudes and important judgements to be made later into a plausible structure. Hence the editorial of July 28, 1977, "Israel's Unsettling Settlements": the activities of the Gush Emunim were a useful way to balance reporting of Israel. (Criticism of the Gush Emunim, in similar ways to the later treatment of the Kach and Kehane Chaim, was very frequently strong: these organisations were seen (are seen) as very negative. Yet links with Israeli structures such as the security forces or Knesset parties were almost never explored. Israeli extremism remained maverick, while Palestinian (or Arab) groups such as Hamas were representative. While falling short of full condemnation the July 28 editorial showed that if the newspaper had a "line" it took into account the interests of the US administration in its foreign dealings. Begin's authorization of more settlements on the West Bank were described as "complicating further his relations with the US".38
Editorials set a tone, of acceptance, criticism or rejection, mirroring not just wider political opinion but also the events behind them as a cross between analysis and personal viewpoint. Dayan could be openly praised (because of his Western appeal and relative distance from Begin, see above), and the PLO criticised for any Fatah violence. But there was, both within editorials and the wider journalism of The New York Times, a divided attitude to rights and wrongs in the Mideast. While the editorial most of the time expressed support for Israel, there were lapses. For example, the already-mentioned editorial of July 28, 1977, where an important central plank of Begin's domestic policy (the absorption of "Judea and Sumaria" into Eretz Israel) was thoroughly criticized. Then there was, two months later, an attack on a major aspect of US Government Mideast policy, the supposedly forthcoming Geneva Conference. (Earlier criticism of the proposed conference from the Jewish Lobby had not been reported.) But the incursion of the Israeli armed forces into Southern Lebanon, Carter's criticism of the incursion, and a lack of positive images of Israeli activities (even in The New York Times itself - see below), combined with a September 14 editorial which talked of a "Palestinian Entity". (See 5.6 for further analysis.) The editorial then tipped the balance in the opposite direction, showing some support for Israel, (perhaps to offset US criticism of Israeli actions). The editorial shifted perceptibly from support (September 14) to neutral (September 26) to criticism (September 29).
The editorial of September 29 is the key tone-setter for the newspaper's journalism over the next month, (only interrupted on October 14th with a neutral/positive shift into criticism of Israeli West Bank policy). The editorial of September 29 was fiery and alarming (this was almost never the case with The Washington Post, where editorials were notoriously stodgy): editorial rhetoric went beyond immediate criticism to give an impression of deeper disapproval (see 5.6). For two weeks following the September 29 editorial The New York Times ran a series of articles supportive of Israeli policy. The effect was to offset New York Times material which had preceded the September 29 editorial. Typically, The New York Times offered Mideast material in a series of pulses, perhaps in an attempt to balance out other, less pro-Israeli material (see Chart 5.1.3). (Such "sandwiching" of items to their advantage or disadvantage, or simply in order to introduce variety similar to domestic reporting, without endangering a stance on a particular issue, is not unusual.) On October 15, the editorial returned to the subject of Israeli actions on the West Bank and tacit support for Gush Emunim. There was concern expressed, less this time about confounding the Carter proposals for Geneva than that the Israeli government should wrong-foot itself (in the form of Dayan's so-called "Mideast Plan" discussed the day before). The context of October 15's editorial is of particular interest.

Criticism of Israel, as often the case in The New York Times, was more a tool of support than of opposition. On October 13 (reported the following day) the Carter cabinet had been pleased
by the Israeli approval of their working paper for Geneva. Although the editorial position on Geneva remained ambivalent, what was salvaged from the news was proof of Israeli reasonable-
ess, an important aspect to Mideast news for the paper. This proof opened a window through which the paper could be critical of Israeli policy. Hence the editorial of October 15, "Unsettling the West Bank", strong in its censure of Israeli (and specifically Begin's) intransigence regarding settlements. The editorial did not once mention Palestine, the PLO, any Arab leaders or the feelings of Israeli Arabs to Israeli expansionism (though wider copy did). Problems exist only in terms of chosen criteria: Israel and US policy. It is possible that the paper felt it had more latitude to criticise Begin because it had already reported glowingly of Dayan's separate "peace plan", discussed Israeli approval of the Geneva pre-talks protocol, and planned articles on Sadat to swing attention away from unfriendly Arabs such as Arafat and King Hussein. Although there were variations, editorials in the two US papers I studied were often an opportunity to be carefully critical, proving journalistic credentials about impartiality and avoiding the numbing effect of a prolonged single viewpoint.

Sadat's name became a key for editorial choice of where exactly good initiatives occur. Dayan, another useful key, this time to prove Israeli moderation, created when referred to with Sadat a feeling that there was level ground in Mideast politics, and that dissention was neither representative nor productive. In this atmosphere, whatever the specific merits or demerits of Geneva,
The New York Times managed, through editorials and the design of the paper's running stories sandwiching those editorials, to dismiss the Peace Plan in favour of an appeal to an amorphously rational accord. The October 23 report on PLO rejection of the Geneva Peace Talks protocol was structured to show Palestinian antagonism. In the first paragraph of the bodycopy, there were five negatives associated with the PLO response, the first time in five months that there had been any major reporting on the PLO (apart from small news paragraphs on meetings or Fatah actions). Despite the fact that The New York Times editorial staff appeared to be running a line highly critical of Geneva, presenting Arab opposition to Israel in a gloomy light. This is bias through tone, rather than the action of editorials aiming to discredit. The subtle nature of this anti-PLO and anti-Arab (minus Sadat) line was illustrated in the November 1 editorial. Again, this was a consolidation piece, effective through omissions rather than direct comments. Whereas the subject is the Occupied Territories there is no mention of Palestinians or their treatment by Israelis. This was The New York Times' favoured point of view, and it is possible, looking at editorials over the three-year period, that the omission was not due to any simple bias against Arab culture, certainly not a deliberate attempt to propagandize, but rather a lack of knowledge of or interest in a different social, religious and political outlook. The New York Times, like Al Ahram, had constantly to confront wider aims (editorial and constitutional in the former's case, political in the latter's) with events. Generally The New York Times did very well by anticipating changes.
anticipated as far back as 1974/75, and played a part in allowing condemnation of Arab anti-Israeli policy to continue without creating questions as to why such condemnation existed. Once a major Arab state broke ranks such questions became editorially redundant anyway. Here with Sadat was proof of Mideast progress despite other Arab intransigence. On 21 November The New York Times presented a major headline: "Sadat Offers Israel 'Peace With Justice', but Calls for Return of Occupied Lands; Begin Hails his 'Courage', Asks Wider Talk". The eulogizing of Sadat now grew stronger. All but one small front page column on 21 November, 1977 was dedicated to the detail of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem on the 20th. Each section of the front page began with reference to one of the major leaders (Carter, Begin or Sadat, the latter praised in profiles) and pages 17-22 contained comments and direct transcripts. All this was very different to the usual style of the paper, with high-profile photographs on page 22. The final comments only referred to the PLO and Palestine, and were negative in reference: "PLO Condemns Speech by Sadat, Calls for Sanctions Against Him". Again it was the editorial which summarized the day's news (and illustrated that there may have been more in-house unanimity than in The Washington Post).

Only the innocent and the cynical deny the value of ceremony, because the formality of manners suppresses the reality of selfishness. Where pain has destroyed innocence and where hope survives cynicism, as in the Mideast today, the traditions of civility embodies wisdom itself.

Do not let go, therefore, of the images that television conveyed so dramatically yet fleetingly. ...
And if the Soviet Union cannot bring itself to respect the promise of this encounter, it will need to be blocked from mischievous obstruction. 45

The next day's editorial shifted to play up the positive role of the US in the Jerusalem visit (offsetting months of criticism of Carter's proposed Geneva protocol, now out of date). Arab criticism was cast negatively, comment on the details of such criticism being out of place once pictures of happy Cairenes and Tel Avivians on page 5 appeared. (The effect was similar to Al Ahram's use of photographs to prove a wide-spread opinion which could not possibly then be criticized or doubted.) 46

Once this large supply of news on the Egyptian/Israeli rapprochement was over, wider reporting began again. Between November 28 and December 6, Arab and other criticism was foregrounded. The "soft" criticisms of Assad came ahead of the "harder" criticisms of the PLO or the USSR, but still there is the negative note, sustainable by its duller formatting and lack of interesting visual material (no Sadat/Begin handshakes) and positioning (bottom of pages, or next to full-page advertising). As the Arab criticisms were reported they slipped back from leading columns to relatively minor positions. On December 6, the headline "Egypt Cuts Relations with Five Arab Nations Opposed to Peace Bid" sandwiched the previous days' disturbances with evidence of what was regarded as "rational" or "non-radical" political action. The balance was restored in typical New York Times style and the sandwiching was strongly supported in the editorial.
Simplistic words like radical and moderate do not serve very well in this situation. But from the point of view of American interests the radical group seeks instability and unending hostility to Israel. The moderate group seeks stability and economic development. It is clear that Americans must favor stability, for the sake of Israel and the people of the Mideast. It is just as clear, as so often before, that an outmaneuvered Soviet Union seeks to profit from turmoil by encouraging the radicals. It is a poor partner for peacemaking at this juncture. 47

A transcript of Victor Rothschild's essay "On Palestine" first published in 1946, followed the editorial with anti-Arab commentary sustaining the idea of embattled Israeli moderation, Soviet and Arab radicalism, and the endangering of hope for change in the new Sadat/Begin detente. The New York Times persisted in this duality throughout the period of Camp David. The good moderates were those talking on US terms with each other, and constituted Israel plus any others who wished to join the talks; radicals included every other Arab nation. Hence the spread of photos of Sadat, the in-depth concentration on his administration and country, and on December 9, a paean of praise in favour of Sadat's chief negotiator, Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguib. Known in Egypt as just another of Sadat's creatures, Meguib's character received an amount of acclaim out of proportion to his usual international profile or role within Egypt.

The New York Times had, with its divisions of right and wrong in Mideastern terms, and its support for the faction within Begin's coalition lead by Dayan, plus its eulogizing of Sadat and his cabinet, constructed a highly simplified vision: a portrait of Egypt as a partner for peace, a country both the US and Israel could trust. Christopher S. Wren, The New York Times' correspond-
ent in Cairo, shifted from criticism of Egyptian and Arab society: "Egyptians Rally in Support of Sadat as he Calls his 'Hard Line' Arab Critics 'Dwarfs'" ran a headline on page one of December 9. The fact that Sadat used rallies like Carter used press briefings was ignored as Wren went on to profile a 15 year old schoolgirl.

Suzan Attef ... stood in the warm sunlight of Cairo's Abdine Square today with tears welling in her eyes. Her father died fighting in the war against Israel in October 1973. . . .

"Now we are going to live in peace thanks to Sadat" she said, "now our fathers will not be killed in wars".48

Simplified, high positivity (semantically uncluttered)49 had been in evidence since the pictures of the Jerusalem visit (and emotional appeals were present at some time in almost every newspaper). Here strong positivity was used to prove a form of historical force: an inevitable fairness bringing nations to realise a view of politics which demanded a positive denouement. This positivity continued from mid-October, 1977, right into the Camp David Accords in September, 1978. Editorials shifted to compensate (the editorial board perhaps realizing that too much of a good thing is not a good thing for a newspaper). To balance the emotionalism of 15 December's photographs of Begin and his ambassador to the US, Simcha Dinitz, embracing, with a charged commentary on peace in the Mideast, the editorial discussed less palatable issues and actually tackled the rights and destiny of a hitherto almost invisible group where The New York Times editorialists were concerned, Palestinians. Palestinians had been obscured in the euphoria, now editorials linked together praise
for Sadat, and concern for the Palestinians. The New York Times went so far as to pursue criticism of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza settlements, calling them "indefensible". This was nothing new, the settlements and Gush Emunim had been singled out for criticism within the paper since early 1977 (see above). February, 1978, was the high water mark of this softened New York Times line, followed in March by the Fatah attack and another major Israeli incursion into Lebanon (the first within the aegis of this research had been September, 1977). While it lasted the complexion of the paper was softened; there was greater latitude of thought and encouragement for articles which might tread on what had been dangerous ground. James M. Markham was allowed to write a couple of articles on the Palestinian diaspora and the PLO, both more sympathetic than comparable articles written before Sadat's Jerusalem visit. Once Mideast confrontation dropped, empathy for Palestinians rose.

After the March 13 Fatah killings in northern Israel, positivity-empathy had no place; editorials retracted to a hostile position, and debate (minimal with Markham's material) vanished. The New York Times continued to support Israeli military action. Again editorials set the tone. "Israel Poses a Test: By sending troops into Southern Lebanon, Israel has asked the world, and particularly the Arab world, to give it some assurance that terrorists will not be left free along the border to prey upon its vulnerable population. It is a fair request ... ." This was followed by copy strongly sympathetic to pro-Israeli outrage. "Letter to a Palestinian Military Spokesman" by Cynthia Ozick

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directly compared Fatah violence at the Imri Tel-Oren killings to Israeli "civilization".

The rest of March and April 1978 saw a slackening of interest in the Middle East; possibly enough material supportive of Israel had been printed to allow a return to the pre-March debate. Sabah Kabbani, Syria's US ambassador, replied to the paper's strong advocate of Israel, William Safire, and Nicholas Gage, Safire's strongest opponent on The New York Times' staff, wrote of the Israeli destruction of Bint J'bail. This was an attempt at balance, with articles designed to offer a wider picture and leading, during the 1970s and early 1980s, to a series of Arab and pro-Arab voices (often ambassadors or novelists) supported in occasional sympathetic articles by Nicholas Gage or Frankel, and sandwiched between layers of pro-Israeli writing. The period up to Camp David illustrated this exactly, and the month of June, 1979 illustrated it in miniature.

On June 2, 1979, a large article by Monroe H. Freedman and Alan M. Dershowitz called "Israeli Torture They Said" effectively destroyed (at least for the readers of The New York Times) the case of Sami Esmail, a Palestinian-American accused of Fatah links in Israel. Allegations were rubbished and Esmail impugned as a liar. The piece concluded "on the basis of direct observation of the Israeli criminal justice system ... it is our conclusion that Israel's system ... is one of the most highly civilized in the world." The guilt or innocence of Esmail, and the veracity of his allegations of Israeli brutality, acted as
metaphors for Freedman and Dershowitz's conclusion (a conclusion which, once again, offered the model of civilized Israel and uncivilized Arab states) and the investigation illustrated a boundary of sympathy towards Israel which The New York Times rarely crossed. In June and July, 1978, the growing realization that some kind of peace initiative was in the offing generated an editorial commitment to a greater level of exposure for critics of Israel such as Abdullah Salah (Jordan's US ambassador, and long-time advocate of some form of Israeli-Palestinian confederacy), as well as editorials which again mentioned Palestine (of itself a likely indication that The New York Times felt Israel's position to be strong enough to support wider discussions). The New York Times' position on the Occupied Territories had already been stated, so criticism by Wren need not be construed as anything more than another part of the paper's line of "acceptable" criticism. Despite these minor gestures towards a wider viewpoint, major articles and editorials always provided information anchored in a belief that, fundamentally, Israel was not a client state using repressive measures (all of which was part of The Washington Post's mainstream criticism of Israel up until July 1978 - see below) but a democratic independent state which, if sometimes overzealous, could be excused. Sadat helped a lot in this portrait of Israel: here at last was an Arab who saw it "our" way, proving the old structure of moderates versus radicals, with Israel and Egypt in the first camp, and everyone else in the latter. On July 8, 1978, the headline and page 2 were devoted to picking up the Mideast peace process after nearly three months on ice, and
although Egypt is painted as "undemocratic" in comparison to Israel, the suggestion of the further coverage on page 3 was that Egypt must be a good partner in any peace process. July's editorials, sympathetic to a Palestinian "entity", were typical of the paper's to and fro structuring of the Mideast debate: one moment allowing more latitude for critics of Israel, the next compensating with tough pro-Israeli editorials and critical anti-Arab articles. These compensations by the editorial staff were scattered with guest writers whose views were outside the usual New York Times consensus.

The printers' strike (August 10 to November 5, 1978) took The New York Times out of general circulation, though I read the unprinted copy. Because of the nature of the writing (without audience) only basic points can be made about that particular period (though I detected no particular deviation from previous trends or characteristics). The meeting itself was covered by Frankel in a sentimental and uncritical fashion, while, following the Summit, were articles by Henri Zoller on Israeli settlements in Sinai (specifically at Sadot) and Volkhard Windfuch (of Der Spiegel) sympathetic to Jewish settlements. On November 6 The New York Times was restored, and printed a lead article on Camp David by Hedrick Smith, with a photograph of Begin and Sadat embracing, entitled "After Camp David Summit, A Valley of Hard Bargaining". Smith was optimistic, but dismissive of Arab opposition. "The brilliance of that moment [Camp David] was darkened almost at once by the angry reaction of most of the Arab world ... ." By November 1978 the Mideast and Camp David were exhausted as
newsworthy items. The absence of editorial coverage at this stage was typified by bland and matter-of-fact articles written on December 6/7 about the demolition of houses belonging to families suspected of PLO links: there were no "special correspondent" articles nor direct condemnation.

The New York Times found itself at an impasse. It could not generate enthusiasm for Camp David after the event, and a significant section of Jewish-American public opinion was antagonistic to Carter’s peace plans. Whereas the paper’s "News Analysis" sections talked about Carter’s difficulties, the editorials stayed clear. On December 18, William Safire, writing in the "Essay" section of the paper, contributed a major attack on Carter and Camp David: "Carter Blames the Jews".

We now know that the Camp David summit – that pre-election public relations extravaganza that halted, for a time, the crumbling of confidence in Mr Carter’s competence – produced no genuine agreement at all. ... With Israel accepting and Egypt rejecting the draft treaty submitted by the Americans, Mr Carter showed his pro-Arab tilt: coolly, deliberately, he betrayed the Israelis. 61

Other articles supportive of the Summit, such as that by Anthony Lewis ("Still Within Reach" in the "Abroad at Home" section of the same date) which took the broad Kissinger line, could not hope to be as interesting and controversial. Polemic was provided by Safire - readers had to wait until January 29, 1979 for a compensating article by Edward Said. What had been a sandwiching effect before Camp David, with the bias towards Israel but supporting a broad Carter plan, became a more antagonistic structure. The editorial as governor seemed to have broken down,
either as an after-effect of the strike which had somehow interrupted the continuum, or because *The New York Times* had boxed itself into a corner: unable to support the Camp David Accords, yet committed to a warmer attitude toward Egypt; slowly backing away from any public support for Carter's foreign policy, yet remaining critical of some aspects of Israeli activity. There had, between March, 1978, and the same month a year later, been a shift to the right, away from the careful balancing act of previous years.

*The Washington Post* had (and has) no commitment to a narrow constituency, nor the same range of political restrictions governed by minority sensibilities. If it has a specific audience then—it is Capitol Hill itself: it considers itself, by virtue of its position close to the Hill, as a nationwide US newspaper. It is a larger paper than *The New York Times*, spending more space on coverage, yet with fewer resources, not covering as much of the globe.\(^6\)

The editorials were themselves different in content, in the sense that the editor, Ben Bradlee, did not attempt to regulate the paper in quite the rigorous way that his opposite number at *The New York Times*. There was a balance of power at *The Washington Post*, with a dominating editorial voice in concert with the feelings of the owners. Russ Wiggins had managed this under the conservative owner Phil Graham, and Bradlee maintained the same kind of symbiosis with Kay Graham (Phil's wife, who took overall control when he died). Whereas *The New York Times* had a wider
range of journalistic opinion on its staff (the majority may have been right of centre, but there remained those such as Wren to offset the trend) The Washington Post contained a band of more liberal opinion. Hence there was much less counterpoint and more harmony, with Bradlee gently conducting rather than having to plot the management of trends and issues. 63

Editorials frequently covered as many as four issues, and spoke mainly for a Democratic Senatorial consensus. But the wider copy of The Washington Post was not like the editorials. It was heterogenous, and allowed an element of irony and humour absent in the strict, matter-of-fact style of The New York Times. The editorial was a follower of already-stated opinions and trends from its lead writers and acted as if its role was not be to lead or direct but encourage. 64 From March until July 1977 the editorial only mentioned Mideast problems directly seven times, but as Carter’s push towards a conference became more determined the editorials picked up on this. Unlike The New York Times, The Washington Post had been systematically critical of Carter’s foreign policy: a typical editorial comment would have been that of July 2, 1977 which accused Carter of "disingenuousness", and built on these criticisms a fortnight later (July 21) in a piece called "Begin’s Beginning", it appeared cynical about Carter’s Genevan plans and implicitly acknowledged the wealth of problems ahead, the biggest being Begin himself. On 28 July, the editorial summarized what was felt to be crucial to the debate in a piece entitled "Israel’s Challenge to Carter". "The Israeli government’s decision to legalize three previously illegal
settlements on the West Bank is more than 'deeply distressing' as the State Department declared. It is reckless, provocative and indefensible."65 Unlike the structure of The New York Times where, if there were a deeply critical editorial then there would be relative silence in other comment columns or, perhaps, a balancing item in the next few days, The Washington Post used the same edition for the most damning article on Carter's foreign policy that year, "Carter's Illusory Mideast Policy" by Edward R.F. Sheehan. "United States policy in the Mideast has assumed dreamlike dimensions. There exists an almost phantasmagoric contradiction between American theory and practice in the Arab-Israeli conflict."66

Editorial policy where the Mideast was concerned appeared not to offer a single opinion though he determined that Israeli policy was wrong, and US policy disingenuous. Where the PLO was lambasted or ignored in other papers, The Washington Post was less dismissive. August 14's editorial responded directly to the announcement the previous day by Arafat in Cairo that the PLO was prepared to accept the principle of UN Resolution 242. The response was positive (while The New York Times did not react, though there was a small article on an inner page A16). (When The Washington Post felt the need to criticize the PLO, as it did on September 24, 1977, it did so in broad terms, refraining from the condemnations offered in The New York Times - see Table 5.2, A/B.) The most profound difference between the two papers regarding Israel is how they saw that country internationally. The Washington Post appeared to show Israel as more independent,
on a par with other nations in terms of criticism. The September 21 editorial, "Offering Israel a Choice" (the choice being the land for peace alternative) illustrated this. "If Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan accomplished anything else in Washington, he put at least a temporary gloss of flexibility on an Israeli policy that had seemed increasingly rigid and negative ... . Perhaps this, rather than real progress towards a settlement, was his purpose." the editorial went on to describe Dayan's offer of "limited autonomy" for the West Bank and Gaza as "an appalling idea", but was not immune to the emotional positivity described earlier. When Sadat visited Jerusalem the response was a mixture of emotionalism and limited criticism entitled "Shalom/Salaam".

Peace cannot be made on one Sunday morning in Jerusalem. But peace can be made over time, we believe, in Jerusalem and Cairo and Damascus and Amman and, yes, Geneva. It can be made if Arabs and Israelis deepen and extend their direct relationship on the model that has now been set so courageously, and so respectfully, and so touchingly, by Anwar Sadat and Menahem Begin.

On November 28, 1977, the editorial used the word "breathtaking" for the visit, but the effect of editorial caution (despite the adjectives) was to allow parallel developments in writing within the paper, one cautious, one optimistic. These strands lasted until after the Summit, and petered out once Begin began backtracking on his commitments in late 1978 and 1979. Therefore, there is a broad parallel between The Washington Post's editorial outlook during this period, and that of The New York Times. As the title for the editorial of December 23, 1977, "No Turning Back", shows, while previous editorials had been skeptical and widely-balanced, once the peace process began to pick up momentum
in early December with Sadat's acclaimed return to Egypt, articles by skeptics such as Joseph Kraft changed to a fuller endorsement of events. The December 23, 1977, editorial illustrates The Washington Post's changing perspective.

As President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin prepare for their second summit meeting at Ismailia on Sunday, their course, or so it seems to us, is firmly, almost irreversibly fixed. It derives its trust with overwhelming force, we think, from two extraordinary personalities, from the roles they have cast for themselves in concert, and from the relationship they have, accordingly, struck up. Mr Sadat and Mr Begin give every evidence of men gripped ... by the idea of peace. Each conveys an unmistakable sense of the moment. Each has subordinated normal state calculations to a historical imperative. ... They have set out, we believe, on a road on which there can be no turning back.

Through January 1978 editorials maintained this optimism, forgetting earlier criticisms of Begin's government, and warnings about the plight of the Palestinians. In some ways Sadat's Jerusalem visit was a more powerful media event than Camp David, in that it was unexpected, photogenic, personality-governed and short. On The Washington Post there were also two streams of writing, one skeptical, the other endorsing the new peace process. Editorials initially followed the former. Yet the editorial of 12 February, 1978 compared interestingly with previous editorial statements about Begin.

The squabble over whether Prime Minister Menahem Begin and his government did or did not assure President Carter that Israel would establish no new settlements and expand no old ones in the occupied territories is corrosive and distracting and badly needs to be set aside. We are prepared to accept that, on both sides, words were spoken and heard selectively without there being any intent to mislead. The United States and Israel cannot afford to let a mutual misunderstanding disrupt what ought to be a cooperative and trusting approach to Mideast negotiations.
While the editorial did go on to criticize the Israelis for their continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, this condemnation diminished in favour of the Israeli–Egyptian peace. By March, The Washington Post almost achieved the flavour of The New York Times when the debate was soured by the Fatah action on March 11. The Palestinian attack encouraged a reaction suggesting the Israeli viewpoint had not been put sufficiently strongly. The edition of March 12, 1978, offered this wider focus, with articles by Simcha Dinitz, Kraft and George F. Will all strongly in favour of a new attitude towards Israel. The wider issues of Middle East peace were, by March, hijacked in partisan discussions about minor changes of Israeli policy and détente with Egypt. A year before Begin had been The Washington Post's bête noire; by April 1, 1978 a lead staff reporter, Clayton Fritchey, could write "A Pause in Judging Begin", critical of Sadat and positive towards Begin.68

While there were reporters continuing the older criticisms, and seeing the process of détente as a Middle East side-issue (notably Greenway and Raspberry), editorials offered optimism, but each seemed to contain contradictions. On April 6, in an editorial entitled "Goading Israel" Bradlee lambasted Secretary of State Vance for exactly the same criticisms Bradlee had voiced nine months before: using US-supplied weaponry outside Israeli boarders. Bradlee implied Israel had a special case, despite the breaking of US legal restrictions, and took Vance to task for "insensitivity". Even columnists such as Kraft reflected a certain doubt of confusion by being guarded where criticism of Israel was concerned.

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When faced with unpredictable change in the Mideast, The Washington Post opted for status quo policies in its editorials. It never marked the idea of arming Arab countries positively (with the later exception of Egypt) but equally distrusted the Begin administration's commitment to peace. Much of 1978 was filled by positive calls for peace in editorials and wider copy, and anything which seemed to prevent summity was castigated. The problem of Israeli activities in the Occupied Territories was downplayed in favour of virtually any moves towards Israeli-Egyptian rapprochement. Then suddenly the editorials fell silent. For the period of August 9 to September 19, when the Camp David Summit was concluded, The Washington Post editorials said almost nothing about the Mideast peace process. Then on September 19, in-a sweeping editorial on Camp David, it offered an encomium on Carter and "The Jimmy Carter Conference".

It is a marvelous thing that has been done at Camp David. For the first time in a 30-year conflict that has repeatedly brought the region to war, a "framework" for peace has been found. ... It is the best available agreement ... the only one in 30 years ... that addresses the heart of the problem in a comprehensive way. ... It was in truth Jimmy Carter's conference. We salute him: he did a beautiful piece of work.

Underneath praises for Carter the phrase "the best available agreement" hints at what were to be the perceived shortcomings of Camp David as a whole.

5.5 THE EDITORIAL IN CONTEXT

Editorials are never alone: they are contextualised within their newspaper, and closely linked to the editorial's influence over
structure is the way different views are placed. Often the running order and the way items are sandwiched dictates how items will be read. In *The New York Times* editorials did not crudely balance criticism of Israel (say by a guest writer) with benign comment. This would be too obvious in a newspaper such as this, and therefore ineffectual in terms of either stating or leading opinion. *The New York Times* aimed at widely-based consensus and there would be periods of greater and lesser criticism, depending on the editor's judgement. Criticism of Israel could be sustained while Israel itself was in dialogue with Egypt but the more isolated Israel was the less attractive criticism became. As we shall now see, one or two *Washington Post* journalists also were muted by editorial changes through the latter months of 1978, while journalists writing in *The New York Times* maintained previous positions (mostly supportive of Israel).

*The New York Times* aimed at political inclusiveness in its limited coverage, but tended to reinforce editorial opinion by offering token non-standard articles. Where *The New York Times* was dour and plain *The Washington Post* (despite the plain matter-of-fact editorials) could be ironic, which together with the layout (quality photographs, better print quality, fewer basic, information-only articles) made the paper more immediately accessible. In style of reporting, *The Washington Post* seemed closer to *Newsweek* in accessibility.

[Shmuel] Katz [Begin's representative in Washington] rejected an Israeli return to the pre-1967 borders, the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan River, or any negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. At the same time, he said Begin is
willing to negotiate with the Arab states "without preconditions". 70

Also more typical of broadcast media was the paper’s sampling of a wide range of opinion, much critical of the status quo. Criticism of Israel was frequent, with discussion from the Palestinian point of view. As the paper recognized a greater width of opinion the tone was less optimistic than that of The New York Times. Finally, foreign press enquiry played a more important part in The Washington Post, a typical example being Nicholas von Hoffman "Israeli Torture: Disturbing London Times Report" (the next year The New York Times was to carry a large article of denial – see above).

To some extent all news in America is what The New York Times calls news, but even more so with foreign news. In part this is because the Times spends the money that other papers, the magazines and the networks can’t spend on foreign correspondents, but it is also because so few print or broadcast editors are able to make independent judgements ... [They] ... prefer the safety of letting the nation's most prestigious paper do their decision-making for them.

This is particularly easy with an issue like Israel where any adverse publicity is likely to win an editor vociferous abuse from the nation's best organized lobbies. It doesn't work that way abroad, however, where the mass media are giving the publics in the other democracies far less-biased accounts. 71

Von Hoffman was setting out not only his own vision of how US print media operated, but also, obliquely, the manifesto of The Washington Post, which liked to think it could avoid these pitfalls and be independent. For the long period of Mideast tension up to Camp David this was true (though as I have stated, Camp David itself narrowed the paper's approach). The paper ranged widely in its search for comment, where The New York Times
kept to reliably conservative sources. For example, Begin's visit to the US in July 1977 received a warm review but little analysis in The New York Times. The Washington Post on July 16 offered a front page story and major analysis (page A12) by staff writers Stuart Auerbach and Susan W. Stewart which showed how far apart Begin and Carter were regarding Palestine and settlements, and mentioned Arab reaction to the visit (something The New York Times hardly ever did on such occasions). Analysis was thorough (in contrast with that during Camp David), with one section under the sub-heading "Seen From Syria, The Outlook is Gloomy for a Mideast Peace". The Washington Post cultivated an atmosphere where to be without that wider picture would have been running against the style of news. "Syria fears that Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, economically dependent on the US and Saudi Arabia and beset by internal unrest, may feel compelled to make a deal that is unacceptable to Damascus, as he did in the Sinai Agreement of 1975." The New York Times had a clear editorial conclusion about agendas (much in the same way as Al Ahram), while The Washington Post offered broad analysis rather than a single editorial point of view.

Three major Washington Post staff reporters, Rowland Evans, Robert Novak and Edward R.F. Sheehan wrote at length on the holes in Carter's approach to the Middle East question. While these reporters were critical of Israeli and US policy, the paper maintained independence from a "viewpoint" by using pro-Israeli Robert G. Kaiser, and printing articles in support of Israel. The structure of balancing was much the same therefore in The New
York Times as in The Washington Post; the latter however started from a position which was much less orthodox and editorially more critical. Ideas such as Kaiser's (or James H. Sheuer's, one of the Lobby's favoured Representatives from New York) were stated from the defensive.

On November 21, 1977, following a reactive Washington Post editorial the previous day, Ronald Koven and H.D.S. Greenway expressed skepticism. Koven's front page report covered the growing Arab boycott of Egyptian policy and the anger of West Bank Arabs (a group seemingly invisible to The New York Times), while Greenway debunked the relationship between Sadat and Begin.

"The Israelis can no longer say ... that no Arab leader is willing to recognize Israel as a legitimate neighbour. But there was little indication tonight that Sadat's unprecedented visit and his presentation of the Arab position had caused any dramatic breakthrough."³⁷³

A different attitude is visible in Thomas Lippman's report from Cairo. "Egyptian officials have been warning against overoptimism as a result of the Sadat visit, saying that no matter what the response there would be difficult negotiations before peace could be achieved. But those warnings were largely ignored as Egyptians saw their leader undertake a mission that strained credulity."³⁷⁴ That Sadat himself was not a favourite among non-Egyptian Arabs was left in no doubt by Fitchett's reports from Beirut: Arab views were presented by The New York Times' team not as reaction, but as thought-out skepticism.³⁷⁵ Papers such as Al Amwar and Al
Thawra in Baghdad were quoted as part of a regular piece called "Other Voices", which over the 1977-79 period quoted many major Arab newspapers and broadcast media, as well as European sources. During the euphoria of Camp David such alternatives were avoided.

Joseph Kraft is a good example to take since he was the most pro-Israeli of the regular columnists. The rest of the Mideast Desk's staff were typically more skeptical. Jonathan C. Randal (who, with Jim Hoagland and Claiborne, disagreed with Kraft over most Mideast issues) offered a rare Palestinian perspective: "Dejection, Anger on the West Bank"; after a week of bland reporting of the various Egyptian-Israeli meetings, Randal wrote a report that tipped the paper away from polarization. Sympathy for the residents of the Occupied Territories supported Bradlee's concern about the increasing number of Jewish settlements in those areas, but there was little in the way of a precise editorial line: whereas The New York Times editorial had opinions and made these felt, The Washington Post offered no overall vision.

On September 19, 1978, The Washington Post showed its divisions with an in-depth analysis on several pages (including the front page) of the Accords. The editorial quoted above was supportive and made sure there was enough primary material (speeches by Carter, the texts of the Accord itself) to provide padding for any awkward observations. Hoagland mentioned disagreement at Camp David, David Brodie concentrated on domestic political effects.
for Carter, while Lippman's report (taking in Cairo, Amman and Jeddah) ran under the title "Camp David Accords Deepen Split in Arab World".

Following Camp David The Washington Post, sensing media overkill as it had after Sadat’s Jerusalem visit of 1977, concentrated on domestic issues, and Carter’s brief popularity before the disastrous final eighteen months of his presidency. In October and November 1978 there were only five major reports from the Mideast (Lippman repeating criticism of the Israeli treatment of Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza) and in December a shift of interest to Lebanon, and of course Iran.

The New York Times' closest approximation to Lippman was Henry Tanner, the paper's Cairo correspondent. Tanner was, however, often antagonistic to Arab states, associating them with violence and intransigence, and together with Shultzberger painted Begin (still a new politician for the US public in June and July 1977) as a radical re-born as a moderate, and the Begin administration's determination to settle the Occupied Territories as understandable. The pro-Israeli line pursued on The New York Times was only partially balanced and thereby softened in the commissioning of articles from those likely to take an opposite point-of-view. Ghassan Tueni, the publisher and editor of the Lebanese newspaper An Nahar, wrote critically of the US involvement in the region on August 19, 1977. Other notable Arab voices included Ismael Fehmy (September 23, 1977), Sabah Khabanni (March 17, 1978), Abdullah Salah (June 20, 1978), Fouad Adjami,
Like pro-Israeli commentary these were printed ex-nihilo, with no reaction or introduction.

5.6 SEPTEMBER 1977 - A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF ONE MONTH OF "THE NEW YORK TIMES", "THE WASHINGTON POST" AND "AL-AHRAM" IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE BIAS WITHIN THOSE PAPERS

5.6.1: The Theory Involved

Content analysis, the most well-used of all unobtrusive data-sifting methods, is essentially "... a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context"79; making and partially substantiating inferences without conclusive data, of gathering data systematically and objectively analysing it without creating patterns where they might-not exist. The results of content analysis should be obvious as data ("manifest"), not the result of subjective reading ("inferring").

With this in mind the content analytical approach to the three newspapers follows these stages:

(i) Defining, gathering, offering the data and making the data manifest (as information in the form of graphs, charts or other systems).

(ii) Concluding - or inferring - information from that data within its context, analysing the result to test initial understanding of the newspapers from previous observations.

Content analysis is a tool not a complete kit50. It may offer a certain objectivity and insight into data (especially within the field of media studies) but it is limited by the resources available to measure data as well as by the unquantifiable
subjective influences on that data (in the case of Al Ahram how do we quantify government influence, the influence of particular editors and journalists, or of specific events)?

5.6.2: How The Theory is to be Applied

Taking this methodology I have developed analyses to show how the newspapers reported Camp David with specific concentration on linguistic elements: (1) frequency distribution of linguistic markers (positive and negative markers / more detailed semantic markers of highest distribution) and (2) the interrelation of these elements between the three newspapers. I shall be analysing what these newspapers said (and inferring from this the decisions regarding news). From this I shall attempt to establish criteria for judging the meaning, influence and emotive effect of what is being said.

What I hope to identify is a socio-ideological theme within the papers in their use of raw news events. Are these events transformed by the papers themselves, and, if so, how? Can judgements be made on the papers' linkage of information about the Mideast peace process and the surrounding society for which the news is destined or aimed? What kind of "designing" (of newspaper contents) goes on? With this aim I have concentrated on specifying what may have been influences, trends and biases in the three papers. The context was the short-lived Geneva peace initiative: the antecedent to the Camp David Peace Accords. Because of the importance of context sensitivity, I have
attempted to avoid de-contextualizing any data. Should this happen I try to redress the effect in the final section dealing with specific linguistic patterning.

5.6.3: The Period Chosen

September 1977 was chosen out of the three-year period centering on Camp David itself (September 1978) because: (1) The material reporting Camp David itself has already been extensively covered and incorporated into the earlier sections of this chapter in a wider criticism which includes as great a time period as possible. Therefore I needed a period that would, without actually being September 1978, effectively mirror the concerns of that month, perhaps by illustrating that period more clearly as the first official steps in the thawing of the relationship between Egypt, Israel and the US. Prior to the month under content analysis this thawing had been shrouded or negligible. (2) Camp David was the direct heir to the planned-for Geneva Peace Conference, and thus press coverage mirrored the later developments (especially in Al Ahram) for which September 1977 was the model. The significance of the abortive Geneva Conference has been underestimated in studies elsewhere. (3) The nature of Al Ahram's coverage of the Camp David Accords was essentially a re-working of US State Department press releases and US media. During September 1978 the level of rhetoric and repetition used to fill pages was high, based around material from elsewhere. (4) One month was chosen rather than a longer period because thereby analysis could be concentrated. A shorter period would have

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offered too little. (5) The distorting sentiment of September 1978 was less apparent allowing a clearer view of those newspapers' treatment of Mideastern and Israeli-dominated issues. 

(6) Lastly, September 1977 was unique; talks of and moves towards peace escalated through that month, allowing clear inferences to be made with regards to comments within the papers and their treatment of events. The month also contained a major Israeli incursion into Lebanon which had more or less ended by the 28th. This event was not repeated a year later, yet may excite precisely those potential biases to be studied. Although there were other Israeli incursions into Lebanon, and a great deal of involvement by proxy, it could therefore be said that September 1977 contained in microcosm many of the elements effecting the Accords and Treaty.

5.6.4: Criteria Used - the Purpose of Content Analysis Regarding Any Understanding of Newspaper Coverage

In the analysis of and comparison between The New York Times, The Washington Post and Al Ahram, I use the following parameters:

(1) Any news about Israel excepting domestic news with no international importance (such as the banking scandal involving Begin on September 10th\(^{83}\)).

(2) Egyptian news subject to the same criteria as (1).

(3) Any mention whatever of Mideast peace moves (at this stage designated as "Geneva Peace Plan").

(4) Any mention of the PLO.

(5) Wider reference to Jewish and Arab culture in US papers, if germane (within the above contexts).
Using these designations I set out and offer conclusions from:

(i) What percentage of the newspapers' daily international coverage over the month chosen (September, 1977) was given over to Mideast peace moves and questions of Mideast detente. (See Table 5.1 and Chart 5.1.2/3). (This may indicate the newspapers' attitude to international news and to Mideast news in particular.)

(ii) Were biases visible in the papers' coverage? (See Table 5.2, A/B/C, 5.5, A/B.) If so, in what direction did they lead? Were there similarities between them? How objective were the papers? (This will be measured as balance of references within and between articles.)

(iii) What form did the coverage take? Were there trends in word use? Were certain groups/ideas given greater space or analysis; if so, where lay these emphases? (See Tables 5.3, A/B/C, and 5.4, A/B/C.)

News stories were categorised according to:

(a) Position within the paper (front-page leader; agency news; correspondent article; editorial; guest writer).

(b) Subject (general Mideast; Israel; Palestine; Egypt; combinations of these three; other Arab states/Arab culture and society generally; the US and the Mideast).

(c) By linguistically analysing and comparing the newspapers using specific sets of semantic markers as stylistic features.

There will be explanations of how data may have been formed by its environment. (Al Ahram is useful as an example not only because of its reputation as the leading Arabic newspaper but
also because its format allows comparison with Western counterparts.)

5.6.5: Defining Terminology

The following terms will be used in specific ways and are defined as follows:

"A Marker" - words/phrases (either nouns, adjectives, verbs or adverbs) used to describe, explain or somehow delineate a certain group.

"To Pulse" - "Primary/Secondary Pulsing" - to surge, or increase in frequency.

"To Cue" - to start or initiate.

"A Set" - a specific group of associated meaning.

"Meaning set" - a specific semantic group.

"Noun Phrase" - a group of words clustered around a noun, modifying it.

"Modification" - adding, extending or precisely locating meaning.

"Modifier" - an adjective or adverb (or adjectival or adverbial structure).

"To Code" - to give a linguistic unit a numerical alternative for the purposes of tabulation.

Symbols used in the various Tables:

@ = Arabs/Arab groups

# = Israel

I = Israeli-associated groups (e.g. the Lebanese Christian Falange and the Israeli Lobby in the US)
P = Palestinian people
* = PLO
US = The United States
$ = US economic interests (e.g. arms sales)
+ = Peace moves/ Genevan Protocol
E = Egypt

5.6.6: Analysis of September 1977 in the Three Newspapers

Whereas The New York Times concentrated an average of 17.5% of its foreign reporting during 1977 on the Mideast, The Washington Post’s Mideast average was only 13.5% (despite mounting political pressure towards a peace agreement this showed barely any change from 1976 - 14%: although the decrease may not have been statistically significant of itself, the fact that there was no increase despite heightened activity may be). This included routine material from press agencies: a significant amount of which was from Reuters, UPI and AP. (Over the month 11% of stories on the Mideast were agency-sourced in The Washington Post as opposed to 8% in The New York Times. This may show fewer resources or a different sorting of material, say into a greater category of day-through-day facts and a smaller category of news for analysis and debate.) Although The New York Times averaged a higher frequency of stories on the Mideast Peace and associated matters as a percentage of all Mideast stories (20.5% as opposed to The Washington Post’s 18.2%), and although its greater resources meant that a larger proportion of those stories were not agency-sourced (43% of The Washington Post’s Mideast stories
were from agencies) there were 13% more in-depth reports of greater complexity and length in The Washington Post (including editorials, feature articles and articles by guest writers). The significance of these differences is visible in the complexion of the news stories (measurable using the tables of positivity/negativity markers - 5.2, A/B/C and 5.4, A/B/C). While The Washington Post made specific criticisms (especially of Israel) The New York Times offered a wide spread of criticism through one grouping (Arab/Palestinian/PLO) and a wide spread of support through another (Israel/US Peace efforts).

The parameters of the content analysis of Al Ahram was to consider the front page headlines and <Rai' Al Ahram> ("Al Ahram's Opinion", equivalent to the editorial in Western newspapers). The structure of Arabic newspapers differs from those in the West (and especially English language papers) by being simpler in design. The paper is governed by the headline (and head story plus pictures), and carries smaller stories as bodycopy, continuing the themes of headline and headcopy into the second and third pages. (In the case of the reporting of Camp David, when Sadat and Begin had signed the Accords, Al Ahram ran almost every square centimetre of seven pages of copy solely about the event.) With editorial commentary on both the front and (usually) fifth pages, and little discussion by external writers or staff, the paper took on the shape of an inverted cone, narrowing down to the final editorial and never deviating from the standard line. The effect of quotations (usually Sadat's), photographs (mostly Sadat), and commentary (on Sadat's
effectiveness), was to create a political broadsheet. Al Ahram excluded dissenting voices.

Besides the structure and content of headlines and body copy, the second consideration was the tone in which they were written. This varied from declamatory, through matter-of-fact to inquisitive (though it must be admitted that Al Ahram was inquisitive often only in a rhetorical sense). Al Ahram's headlines, the reports of government response and the editorial condemnation of anti-government activity were divided from Western newspapers not by differing moral standards as much as the relative simplicity with which Al Ahram went about its business of propping up the status-quo.

The percentage of Mideast stories varied through September, 1977, and naturally increased in all three papers as talk of a Geneva conference developed and positive noises from Egypt increased (in advance of Sadat's surprise visit to Jerusalem in November 1977). Table 5.1 indicates percentage frequencies and presence of major articles. This data can also be presented as a histogram (Chart 5.1.2) to show more clearly shifts and frequency alternations over the month. (0.5% of international stories in The New York Times were on Arab issues excluding Israel-centred stories or Egyptian stories, while The Washington Post offered 0.4%. These were almost all on the meeting of the Arab League and Arab Foreign Ministers meeting.) Chart 5.1.2 compared the whole range of Mideast news connected with Camp David (Egyptian politics, Israeli settler issues, Arab issues). However when the
frequencies were stripped down to three subjects (Egyptian/Israeli detente, Palestinian rights, Genevan protocol) a slightly different picture emerged (Chart 5.1.3).

Starred dates would not weight the frequency for that day, but should (for example) length or importance of article be incorporated by measuring only those articles over 500 words, and those articles whose subject was specifically centred on the Mideast Peace Protocol, and the inter-relational problems of the Israelis, Palestinians and Egyptians (Chart 5.1.3) then this enhanced the pulsing effect (see below). Specific bursts of press activity can be seen occurring between September 1 and 3, 4 and 8, 10 and 13, 14 and 17, 18 and 24, 26 and 30 (though these could be confuted into three, between September 1 and 8, 9 and 17, and 18 and 30). The difference between the two charts suggests there may be semantic shifts occurring which partially obscure underlying trends (with news concentrating on Mideastern topics peripheral to the Peace Protocol in-between days with more specific news).
TABLE 5.1: REPORTS ON THE PEACE PROCESS AS A % OF TOTAL INTERNATIONAL NEWS SEPTEMBER, 1977.

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<th>New Y Times</th>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
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Presence of major articles 12 13 9

174
Reports on Peace Process as percentage of Intl News

September 1977 analysis of AA/WP/NYT

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<th>70</th>
<th>60</th>
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Chart 5.1.2

Reports on Peace Process as Adjusted Percentage of Intl. News

September 1977

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<th>Percentage</th>
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Chart 5.1.3
The first conclusion about the Al Ahram figures of Table 5.1 and Charts 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 is that they may indicate how finely planned or controlled the paper was: at peaks of reporting on the peace initiatives there were often major stories about the US, or US involvement in the Peace moves. Starred dates in Table 5.1 show when these major stories occurred. Most reflected a new interest in the US as peace-broker or friend of Egypt (Table 5.2 C indicates this semantic trend more clearly). It is notable that the starred dates increase after the mid-point of the month and towards the end of the month (and peaked during the visit on November 19 by Sadat to Jerusalem, at which time most lost their earlier continuous criticism of Israel for a more sparing form). On only one of the high-percentage or starred occasions was there an article in Al Ahram critical of US efforts, and that was a relatively short criticism within an editorial on September 11 of US arms supplies to Israel (see analysis of editorial content, table 5.4 C below). This compares interestingly to September 1976 when 32% of articles about the US were either directly or indirectly critical. By September 1977 even in articles critical of the US/Israel relationship there were more neutral or positive markers, and articles elsewhere in the same edition of a less critical cast. However the most surprising correlation is between reports of the peace process and comment on Israel. While starred dates or high-frequency dates held stories on Israel (as usual with almost all editions of the paper during Camp David), following dates infrequently contained Israel-based stories of
the greatest critical content regarding Israeli activities (September 4, 7/8, 16, 21/22). Following the last pulse of peace process news (ending October 3rd) there were a series of articles with high percentages of critical markers modifying Begin, Dayan, Shamir and certain Israeli responses to peace. This secondary "pulsing" is visible in table 5.2 C, where pulses of strong negative modifying of Israeli markers were followed by pulses of positive modifying of US markers. (On all three papers secondary sets of figures were sampled in random topics usually contained in the non-specialist home/international sections: Al Ahram on health, The New York Times on US-Soviet relations, The Washington Post on judicial matters. It was found that, over a larger period, a similar if irregular pulsing may be present, though less marked on more specialist topics. US-Soviet relations in The New York Times most closely mirrored the coverage of Camp David. During the SALT talks between the Soviet Union and US under the Reagan administration the same pulsing can be seen, increasing in frequency up to the actual summitry, then falling off unevenly afterwards. Perhaps the more recurrent the topic the more likely it will have this frequency profile in the media. This pulsing is designated "primary".) So, despite the fact that other topics may have had more news-space allocated, this frequency profile would suggest that Mideast issues in US papers (the pulsing was visible in all papers consulted to some degree) were in a category of importance along with other strong issues at that time, (eg superpower detente). Although there was the aforementioned frequency patterning in Al Ahram, the pattern tended to be initiated and then resolved within a very short
space - (i) initial story; (ii) what could be designated a "balancing" story (though this may suggest direct control too strongly) [usually same date]; (iii) resolving story [often following date] (see Table 5.2 C, comparing US and Israeli issues covered). However with the US papers there did not appear to be a similar short-period fluctuation. This may reflect either (a) short-term editorial reaction in Al-Ahram, and longer-term planning for the US papers, or (b) a differing awareness of consuming groups. In order to establish whether pulsing is a phenomena occurring across newspapers independent of topic I took a random period of a month from a four-year period of the British newspaper The Independent (August 1993). I also chose a random topic from a list comprising 20 recurring topics within the British press at this time: ecological issues (also designated "environmental" or "green"). I only measured major articles on, and important references to the issue, discounting haphazard references. Looking at Table 5.1.4 there seems to be evidence of "pulsing", with frequency peaks between August 6 and 10, and again between August 23 and 30. This phenomena would not necessarily be expected in more general topics: in fact the wider the topic (eg the Mideast in general) the more likely the spread of articles will show fewer patterned fluctuations (the presence of a regular correspondent to cover an issue almost guarantees regularity of information).
<table>
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<th>GREEN POLITICS</th>
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The figures for the two US papers indicate four pulses of interest (see Chart 5.1.2): the first between the 1st and 7th; the second between the 12th and 15th; the third beginning the 19th/20th; the fourth beginning the 26th. The periods of highest frequency are demarked by more obvious low frequency days: 7/8; 14-17; 24/25. Although these pulses indicate a slow shift of increasing frequency roughly corresponding to Carter and Vance's push towards the proposed Geneva Conference and generally increasing towards the end of the month, there are two observations: (1) That the pulses do not coincide with any particular activity (Dayan's movements, the Arab-League's statements or US moves) except the Lebanese incursion by the Israeli army (the third pulse coincides with the height of the incursion and the heaviest losses, and does contain a major statement on peace moves by Dayan regarding the proposed Geneva Conference). (2) The initial dates of the pulses are consecutive for the US papers and Al Ahram. Whether one cued the other is not easily quantifiable. (There was no obvious influence of one paper on the other where individual words/phrases were concerned, and therefore no direct linguistic evidence for such cueing.) Increasing frequencies within the pulses may be because, as Israeli involvement in Southern Lebanon increased in depth and violence, so the percentage of news devoted to peace (and specifically the Geneva Conference) increased. This would be supported by the frequent incidences of "balancing" which the visible "peaks and troughs" in news coverage of a number of issues may suggest. Another could be that information about Geneva became more specific as Carter unfolded the idea and the
paper simply elaborated. However there does not seem to have been more incidences of reported peace specifics at particular times.

5.6.8: Semantic Shifts

From pulse to pulse there was a shift apart from frequency or subject and that was in the way news changed complexion. The task was then to measure this change if possible; to attempt to pinpoint any linguistic/semantic changes within and between individual pulses, and across the entire month. Was there any evidence of specific changes in the complexion the coverage had? Was there any patterning of markers from which to infer intention, policy or interference? Were there any biases? Did specific words or phrases (linguistic markers) associated with groups (PLO, Carter, Israel) which were positive, negative (condemnatory/dismissive) or neither (neutral) show greater frequency in the different newspapers?

Al Ahram might have been predictably negative about most Israeli actions (had Sadat been contemplating some form of rapprochment with Israel it may have been possible that he could signal compromise through Al Ahram and other newspapers and at the same time make "appropriate noises" for domestic consumption). However, were there other aspects discoverable by isolating specific linguistic markers? Table 5.2 (A, B, C) has sections for each paper and bands to locate approximately linguistic markers as either (1) very positive, (2) positive, (3) neutral (ie with no obvious cue towards positive or negative), (4) negative and
(5) very negative.

Establishing quality of linguistic markers would be threatened by the writer's subjective judgements, and could only be done (i) in context of immediate comment, treating one piece or section of news (the major subject of a paragraph; or article; secondary subjects and sometimes single noun-phrases if the modification was strong enough to merit inclusion) as a single entry in the table; (ii) in the context of general knowledge readers may be expected to have had of the subject (as far as possible estimated subject to subject); (iii) in the context of the stream of news of the month. For example, Al Ahram's description of Israel's actions as a threat <tahdeed> would be more negative than their use of the deprecatory Arabic adjective <mesrahiyah> meaning theatrical. The New York Times' description of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as <mild> was a positive judgement (or possibly neutral if other judgements within the same article were more condemnatory), while Dayan's offering of <substantive concessions> would be very positive due to the force of the pre-modifier.

Where there was a potentially damning report (say of the Israeli kidnapping of Lebanese civilians on September 3 "Israel Army Units Said to Kidnap 16 in Lebanon Villages") which included a denial presented without comment (in this case by the Israeli military) then it may be estimated that the headline contained more semantic impact that is negative to Israel. Later information might shift a reader's response to either the less
negative or neutral column (otherwise only used for substantial reports or articles which neither criticised nor praised). For example September 12 in The New York Times fully reported Dayan's peace plan with a number of positive words ("substantial self-rule", "... West Bank Internal Autonomy" [headline], "formula ... would rely heavily on ... moderate West Bank leaders") but added neutral-to-negative and purely negative words and phrases in association with the PLO ("excluding strong supporters of the militant Palestinian Liberation Organisation" - "strong" takes on a slightly more negative meaning within the context created by both the marker "militant" and noun phrase "Palestinian Liberation Organisation"). Israel would move up the positive axis because of phrases such as "[Israel] stands ready to integrate", "[Israel] would offer [Palestinians] a choice ... and be able to negotiate with the 700,000 Palestinians on the West Bank" (showing flexibility and reason).

These tables should be seen as preparation for the following section of linguistic analysis of sampled texts, and the measurements can only be an approximation. However what they lose on exactness they may gain on exposing patterning.

Some points must be made beforehand: I have tried to make the tables context-sensitive on several levels (i) in The New York Times the word <settlements> would not automatically be negative or positive, while in Al Ahram <mustotanat> (meaning "settlement, occupation") would be strongly negative by association with groups such as Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) and notions of
theft of Arab land (in *Al Ahram* for 1978 <mustotanat> was used 293 times in reports on the West Bank and Gaza, only 23 times was it contextualised by specific adjectives or other structures to identify the settlements as Israeli; we may therefore infer the noun was strongly associative). Also, after Arab complaints about Israeli settlements on the 7 - 8 September (*New York Times*), the word may take on greater negativity in US papers. Mentioning Israeli security arrangements would similarly not be negative in US papers (September 4's mention of a "security belt" on page 7) unless in context of Israeli incursions into Lebanon. Photographs can have an enhancing effect on markers within text (on September 10 the photograph of an armed settler may suggest notions of brave frontiersmen rather than aggressive expansionism among US readers) and this is taken into account. Articles from different viewpoints specifically designed to balance each other (18 September) are discounted. Markers indicating sympathy are taken to be positive. Although detail may be absent, the aim was to offer a construct as context-sensitive as possible. Table 5.2 records only major articles (nothing from agencies or stringers which tended to be short, factual accounts whose effect may not be as strong as an extensive "personal" account) leaving US newspaper editorials for table 5.4. There may be different symbols for the same date to show different treatment of various groups.
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Reports within reports (for example direct or indirect quotations) are not registered as positive or negative markers for the subjects of those reports unless that quotation is the major subject.

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These tables reveal predictable frequencies (the negativity with which *Al Ahram* treated Israel, the greater spread of positive markers for Israel in *The New York Times* than in *The Washington Post*), also shifts (*Al Ahram* was less negative towards Israel during the last days of September, while markers for peace and the US were notably highly positive). Less obvious is the consistent way both US papers treated arms sales to Saudi Arabia (negatively) and the frequency with which comments on Carter's administration's foreign policy were negative.

However, there were unpredictable elements. (Given that *The New York Times* could be seen as more likely to be less critical of Israel and more critical of Arab/Palestinian/PLO points of view, and that *The Washington Post* spoke within the context of the Capitol's Democratic majority - see above Chapter 4.) Therefore the thoroughgoing criticism in *The Washington Post* of Carter's policies could be judged unusual. Attitudes to Mideast groupings (Israel, PLO, Palestinians, Arabs in general) might be considered less predictable in *The Washington Post* than *The New York Times*, however there was still an interesting polarisation in the former: only 33% of markers modifying Israel could be judged either neutral or positive, while 57% of PLO markers were positive (though none very positive). 50% of US markers (§ and US) were negative or very negative, while 65% of Arab markers were either neutral or positive.

*The New York Times* proved unpredictable some of the time. 37% of the recorded markers in *The New York Times* were negative/ very
negative in the context of Israeli markers, or positive/very positive in the context of Palestinian/Arab markers. In *The Washington Post* there was a shift from the 21 September: despite two more days of strong criticism of Israel (23 September particularly strong) there was a shift towards positively marking a wider set of groups. Comparing Tables 5.2 (A, B, C) there may be a correlation with the frequencies recorded in Chart 5.1, which may be expected. But while there seem to have been two groupings of positivity markers in Tables 5.2 (A, B, C) before the 21 September watershed (5-7, 11-15) the second more obvious, these were not a representative grouping and in fact reflect single events (Arab League meeting, Dayan's diplomatic shuttle) rather than trends. These single events occurred during the final period (Fehmy's visit to Washington, Sadat's declaration of intent, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon) and there was a sustained multi-group positivity with peace moves mentioned on three separate occasions (21, 26 and 29 September). Since there was no corollary within *The New York Times* (excepting a shrinkage of negativity markers towards the end of the month) the shift within *The Washington Post* may have been an attempt to bring a number of groups within a peace-orientated consensus, or a response to a political and media momentum.

*The New York Times* had fewer very negative markers (7) than *The Washington Post* (10) and had broad bands of positive and negative markers with much less day-on-day variation, and was slightly more inclined towards strongly-positive markers (two marking Israel, one marking peace talks and one the Palestinians).
The New York Times was in general more positive towards Israel and Israeli groups than The Washington Post (discounting neutral markers, 46.2% of markers were positive or very positive [25.8% in The Washington Post]; 53.8% were negative or very negative [74.2% in The Washington Post]). Although the weighting itself within The New York Times may be expected (see above) the small deficit between overall positivity and negativity, slightly inclined towards the latter may be unexpected. However this may have been offset by the nature of the linguistic modification described below.

The conclusions to be drawn from these Tables are:

(1) That Israel was criticised negatively by both The New York Times and The Washington Post, but while the former concentrated its negativity on specific events (Israeli incursions into Lebanon) the latter's negative markers occurred in the context of other events linked with the peace process, Israel's Arab population, Israel's treatment of those indigenous to its Occupied Territories, historical events (the sinking of the Liberty in 1967) and so on.

(2) That Arab issues were consistently more negatively marked within The New York Times: 28.6% of markers on Arab subjects were positive, 71.4% negative (again excluding neutral markers). In The Washington Post 61.5% of markers were positive, 38.5% were negative. This was context-sensitive within The Washington Post (Arab League rejection of peace moves, Egyptian criticism of Israel) less so in The New York Times where negative (not very negative) markers occurred in articles which were not
contextualised around a specific Arab act. This may suggest (a) a more general viewpoint regarding Arabs/Arabic culture within *The New York Times*, (b) sensitivity to its Jewish readership, (c) a more "conservative" attitude towards Mideast events which considered negatively those groups historically antagonistic to US moves and interests.

(3) *Al Ahram* consistently criticised Israel (only on three occasions were markers neutral, none were positive), consistently praised Egypt (most often in terms of its leadership — specifically Sadat), and increased its positivity markers for the US as the month progressed (often linked specifically to talk of peace). Only on five occasions was the US negatively marked (and one of those was in the context of US arms sales to Israel). US and Egyptian positivity markers may be linked, and increase towards the end of the month. Without there being evidence at this level of any obvious linkage, there also seems to be some kind of break in frequency distribution trends around the mid-month (as there may have been in the US papers, especially *The Washington Post*). While US-Egyptian and Peace markers increased in frequency, PLO-Palestinian markers decreased (while having remained at a more or less consistent level within the paper over the year previously). If the same demarkation is made as was done for *The Washington Post* using the 21 September as a watershed date, only 15.4% of (positive) markers for either Palestinians or the PLO occurred after that date. This may have been due to (a) growing Palestinian hostility to the Genevan Protocol, but (b) a wish to avoid direct criticism of Palestinian groups within the paper, (c) a shift in agenda (despite rhetoric) away from
Palestinian centrality in the Peace process towards a new US/Egyptian axis.

These tables suffered from two major drawbacks: (i) When a particular event was reported a number of ways, and when there was no consistent negative or positive attitude within those markers collated, it was difficult to combine the differing impacts. I attempted to circumvent this by choosing only major analytical articles which were, in general, easily diagnosed as positive or negative. (ii) Linguistically it is not always obvious what constitutes a negative, positive or neutral word without analysing the context: such analysis could allow a certain amount of unwanted "intuitive" elements into the analysis. However, I feel the overall impression from these Tables is objectively obtained and clear.

5.6.9: Linguistic Markers Within Editorials

Tables 5.3 (A, B, C) continue this analysis of positivity/-negativity markers specifying editorials as context. It is possible that (1) these tables are merely "snapshots" of the previous Tables (5.2), (2) show some form of exaggeration of the newspaper's trends, or (3) indicate maverick opinion by the editorial staff. In neither of the US newspapers was the PLO ever positively marked (though The New York Times was predictably more damning). Nor did either paper produce any positive markers for the US administration: this time The Washington Post was the more critical. The major discrepancy from the markers recorded for
bodycopy was in the manner Palestinian and Israeli markers were distributed: Palestinians were treated very positively by The New York Times (almost identically in terms of positivity markers with Israel) while The Washington Post treated Israel consistently more positively. While both newspapers were condemnatory about more groups than they praised, once again The Washington Post was more thoroughly negative over a wider range.
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The two US papers treated the possibility of Geneva (symbol "+") in different ways. *The New York Times*’ response (see Table 5.2 A) contrasted with *The Washington Post*’s less positive marking of Israel. However, during the final five days of September *The New York Times* marked Israel negatively three times, once very negatively (compared with only one negative Arab marker). On only one occasion were Palestinians as a group negatively marked. While *The Washington Post* offered greater criticism of Israel it never used negative markers for the Palestinians as a people. Shifts during the month are worth comparing between the two US papers with markers becoming spread apart into strongly negative and positive for *The New York Times*, while *The Washington Post*’s reports on Israel, Arabs, the PLO and the US showed a distinctly negative shift. Illustrated by the histogram of reports on the peace process as a percentage of total international news (Table 5.1.2 / 5.1.3) the same pulses may be identified pushing apart the markers in *The New York Times*, but in *The Washington Post* shifting those same markers into the negative bands. The characterization of Egypt in Table 5.2 shows almost all positive or neutral/positive in *The New York Times*, but not in *The Washington Post*. (It may be that *The New York Times*, within the Genevan protocol context, found it easier to criticise the wider group "Arabs" than specific nations. In other contexts this may be expected to be the reverse.) Finally, whereas *Al Ahram* offered a consistency (Israel always negative, the US always neutral or positive) the two US papers seemed only consistent in one respect: linguistic markers linked to Arab news (excluding the Palestinians and Egyptians). These were either neutral (reports
on the Arab League) or negative or strongly negative (reports on the PLO, Syria, Iraq and Libya).

5.6.10: Specific Language Use in the Three Papers

I recognise that there are many complex theoretical models used for linguistic analysis (from structuralist to post-structuralist semantics); what I have tried to do here is offer a core analysis based on linguistic context and interpretation, suggesting possible variables and meaning-sets rather than any wider model. 87

This section further develops the enquiry into semantic shifts with the newspapers, concentrating on specific words and word-groups. It is more about the linguistic potential in certain structures and usages of the three papers than extensive mapping of linguistic usage. By "potential" I mean the semantic qualities in terms of judgement implicit in any set of meanings associated with a particular word or word-group, and any sub-sets of meanings/associations that word or word-group may have. For example, would the word <apprentice> have any particular associations within the context of, say, The Irish News88, An Phoblacht89, or The Belfast Telegraph90? And would these associations tell us something about the judgements implicit in those papers at particular times, and changes in those judgements over a period? It is possible that such associations may be telling in terms of overall semantic shifts mirroring more profound changes within the newspapers.
I wished to identify as precisely as possible (using Table 5.4 A, B, C) what characterisation was given to the following groups, and whether that characterisation changed over the month: Palestinians, PLO, Israel, Israeli groups (specifically the Lebanese Christian Falange), the US, Egypt and Peace moves in general. To establish meanings objectively in key words I sampled them in non-Mideast contexts for a random month in 1980 (July) and used standard dictionaries. In both the English language and Arabic papers these sets of words/word-groups could (1) vary widely in meaning according to context and within the contexts used; (2) occur in similar contexts with similar meanings and (3) frequently or only occur within associated contexts with a stable range of meaning. However, within the English language papers most of the words occurred as (1) or (2), while for Al Ahram more occurred as (2) or (3). This was partly because that paper concentrated its coverage (and associated discussions on war/peace) on its relations with Israel and the Israeli relations with its neighbours. It is also possible that linguistic patterns were more various in the English language papers, less so in Al Ahram (where the afore-mentioned linguistically conservative and rhetorical content was large). The phrase <salam adil wa-da‘im> ("Just and Meaningful Peace") occurred only semantically linked to Israel in articles on the Israeli treatment of its neighbours or arab populations (mostly Palestinians). The word <muharib> ("Warlike") mostly pre- or post-modified the noun <Israel> (though occasionally modified Libya (8%), the Phalangists (6%) and other, non-arab countries or groups (5.5%)).
The difference between the papers in terms of vocabulary use may have been partly due to factors in the US newspapers such as (1) wider writer-base, (2) a greater interest in providing information, (3) possibly a larger available vocabulary than the classical Arabic used as journalistic Arabic. There may also be a genuine difference in the re-use of words or word-groups reflecting differing views of audiences. Whereas a US (intellectual, white, middle-class) audience would reject some predictatable modifications (though such stock use of modifiers does occur within the realm of journalistic English employed by the "popular" or tabloid presses) an Egyptian (or Arabic-speaking) audience might not. What this linguistic examination may show, therefore, is a series of possible differences in reading groups.

Since there can be no certain analysis of the causes of such differences, I then went on to look at the similarity in frequencies. Could it be that the similarities indicated below suggest that the rhetorical style of Al Ahram (following set patterns of criticism/ praise/ description) might also be followed to a lesser extent within The Washington Post and The New York Times? There was some evidence (though nothing conclusive) to show this may be the case (see below).

Any words (often adjectives but also nouns with powerful associations - for example the nouns "guerilla, enemy, struggle, threat, settlement") which recurred in more than 5% of articles analysed were listed; proper nouns were excluded; as were words
recurring merely because the same piece of news was repeated in a later edition; neutral words (pronouns, modal verbs, articles, conjunctions) and non-associative words (such as "say", "report", "fly", "meet") even if they were in sentences which were not neutral, were excluded. Words with approximately similar meanings for similar contexts were pooled if their frequencies were also similar. (Certain words which did not have a definitive modifying function in articles linked to Camp David were omitted.) When a word/word-group had a specific cognitive association (ie <settler> with Israel) then a secondary association (ie comments of Egypt regarding such settlers) was recorded linked to that word group. Words from the same root (ie settler/-settlement) were treated using the same word-code. This left a core of words (or word groups) used frequently to attack, criticise or praise, or in neutral association. None of these word-lists are in order of frequency of occurrence within texts. Square brackets were used (1) for references which were not directly linked either to the word group, or more generally to the momentum towards Geneva/Camp David, or (2) to indicate words derived from the same root, or indirect association of a category with a modifier.
TABLE 5.4: Distribution of semantic markers within text (A) THE NEW YORK TIMES

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<th>SEPT 11-15</th>
<th>SEPT 16-20</th>
<th>SEPT 21-25</th>
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<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[] indicate either words derived from the same root, or indirect association of a category with a modifier.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Word(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Peace/Peace initiative/Peace plan, treaty etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Settler/settlement (Not &quot;peace settlement&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Militant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Controversial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Legitimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Military/army/armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Autonomy (3 times pre-modified by limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Negotiate/negotiation/discuss/discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Objections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Terrorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Guerilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Doubts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Obstacles (- to agreement/- to peace)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Deadlock (- to break [the] deadlock)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Rights ([political] rights / the right [to exist])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Talks (often pre-modified: crucial/important etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Inflexible/inflexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Insensitive/insensitivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>to Link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>to Enforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Withdrawal/ to withdraw</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 5.4.1 (B) The Washington Post

(60% of words were also recorded in The New York Times frequency list, modification patterns remain similar.)

1. <to Condemn>
2. <Moderate/ to Moderate>
3. <Aggressive>
4. <to Annex/ Annexation>
5. <to Propose/proposal>
6. <to Reject>
7. <to Dispute>
8. <Security>
9. <Peace/<Peace initiative>/<Peace plan>
10. <Settler>/<settlement>
11. <Threat>
12. <Militant>
13. <Legitimate>
14. <Military/<army>/<armed forces>
15. <Autonomy>
16. <Negotiate/<negotiation>/<discuss>/<discussions>
17. <Terrorist>
18. <Guerilla>
19. <Obstacles> ( - to agreement/ - to peace)
20. <Rights>
21. <Talks>
22. <Inflexible/inflexibility>
23. <Hard-line> (applied to states, groups and people)
24. <Occupy> (also Occupied Territories)
25. <Withdrawal/ to withdraw>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The English meaning</th>
<th>The Transliteration</th>
<th>The Arabic Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace plan</td>
<td>Khutat salam</td>
<td>خططة سلام</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace initiative</td>
<td>Mubadarat salam</td>
<td>مبادرة سلام</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just and durable peace</td>
<td>Salam Adil wa-da’im</td>
<td>سلام عادل ودائم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlements</td>
<td>Mustawtanat</td>
<td>مستوطنات</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delusion</td>
<td>Wahm</td>
<td>وهم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mis-understanding</td>
<td>Su’ fahm</td>
<td>سوء فهم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimidation</td>
<td>Tahdeed</td>
<td>تهديد</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge</td>
<td>Tahaddi</td>
<td>تحدي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stubbornness</td>
<td>Inad</td>
<td>عناصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation</td>
<td>Mu-wajaha</td>
<td>مواجهة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strife</td>
<td>Nidal</td>
<td>نضال</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggle</td>
<td>Kifah</td>
<td>كفاح</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight</td>
<td>Sira’</td>
<td>صراع</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage play</td>
<td>Masrahiyya</td>
<td>مسرحية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warlike or belligerent</td>
<td>Muharib</td>
<td>محارب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>Udwani</td>
<td>عدواني</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Aneif</td>
<td>عنيف</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands</td>
<td>Matalib</td>
<td>مطالب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggestions</td>
<td>Iktirahat</td>
<td>اقتراحات</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist</td>
<td>Irhabi</td>
<td>ارهابي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerilla</td>
<td>Maghawir</td>
<td>مغوار(غوريلا)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-faced</td>
<td>Muthabthab</td>
<td>متبذب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The enemy</td>
<td>Al-adow</td>
<td>العدو</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>Musa’id</td>
<td>مساعد</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Eijabi</td>
<td>إيجابي</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5.4.1 (C) AL AHRAM [PART I]
TABLE 5.4.1 (C) [PART II] Further clarification of meaning of certain words:

(i) <MUSTAWTANAT> - Settlement implying occupation, specifically Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories generally seen as illegal within Arab culture.

(ii) <WAHM> - Hoping for something impossible, wishful thinking, delusion.

(iii) <SU' FAHM> - Strong misunderstanding, with bad intention on behalf of the person giving the information.

(iv) <TAHDEED> - To threaten strongly, to belittle.

(v) <TAHADDI> - To challenge with a show of superiority.

(vi) <INAD> - Stubbornness and defiance.

(vii) <MU-WAJAHA> - Battle of armies.

(viii) <MASRAHIYYA> - Funny, comic and theatrical.

(ix) <UDWANI> - An emotional word often used to describe covert hatred as well as aggression.

(x) <MATALIB> - To barter or demand.

(xi) <AL-ADOW> - Antagonistic enemy state, immediately linked to Israel.

(xii) <EIJABI> - Constructive; not a different point-of-view, positive.

On occasions where the word "peace"/<salam> was the coded word, then it was not separately referred to under the symbol [+] for peace efforts.
There are questions this type of table (Tables 5.4) may not have answered, and may have obscured. Would it be accurate to state that peace moves involving the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, should be semantically linked directly to Israel, or was there a perceptual difference to be recorded, a difference between Israel (a state, racially identified, with problems and complexities of judgement like any state) and Dayan (popular War hero with charismatic personality)? Strictly-speaking I only needed to record direct semantic links (peace mentioned in context of Israel), but it should be realised that readers' perceptions may be quite different (in this example, criticisms given by a dynamic and likeable personality). Both The New York Times and The Washington Post had a tendency to "personalise" peace moves, but not (in the instance of Camp David) incidents of belligerency. This was a tendency reflected in the use of personalities such as Sadat and Dayan, and sometimes Carter, but was underplayed for Begin, Arafat and other Arab leaders. This may have reflected the perception that some characters were more positive in association than others. The other problem is one of semantics: for example "peace" can be meant without the word being used (ie The Washington Post front page head, "Role in Peace Talks Seen for Palestinians" by Marder, where although the word "peace" is used in the headline, there is no further re-use despite the fact that the bodycopy is directly concerned with that issue). This may also work negatively, for example as irony (reversed meaning association). Despite these inadequacies Tables 5.4 (A,B,C) do indicate where certain levels of semantic association occur. Twenty-five words were coded as a sample
The median: The Washington Post offered 22 words whose recurrance was higher than average, The New York Times 30, and Al Ahram 43. A group of 25 was therefore considered a good working sample.

(1) THE NEW YORK TIMES

Within The New York Times the recurrance of highest-frequency words or word-groups was not as high as with Al Ahram (see below). But as with each newspaper there were a small group of words (and associated word-groups) which recorded significantly higher frequencies: <Peace>; <War>; <Threat>; <Legitimate>; <Military>; <Negociate>; <Talks>. These can be grouped into two sets: (i) (Peace/Negociate/ Talks) and perhaps (Legitimate) and (ii) (War/Threat/ Military). (Indeed with all higher-frequency words it was noticed that there was this underlying split between those associated with belligerency and those associated with peace. This may have been because of the nature of the material, or because semantic references within individual newspaper texts tended to be more polarised. In turn this could be because of the stylised nature of the language used, or the fact that journalistic language may tend to use extremes as reference-points more often.)

Firstly, as might be expected, there was in the high frequency groups a split between Israel (and Israel-sponsored groups) and Palestine/the PLO (and other Arab nations). Association with the coded word of the US was infrequent and references to peace (outside the realm of code 1) was relatively small, with the exception of code 20.
Code 4 <War> showed association more frequently with Israel and Israeli groups, and there were no significant changes over the month.

Code 5 <Threat> was predominantly associated with Palestinian and PLO groups, almost never with Israel or Israeli groups.

Code 8 <Legitimate> only was associated with Palestinian/ PLO groups.

Code 9 <Military> had significantly high-frequency association with Israel and its groups.

Code 11 <Negotiate> showed a balance between groups.

Code 20 <Talks> also indicated balance between major groups.

Firstly there were realms of association: for example, the PLO (and Palestinians and Arabs) were the only groups linked to code 6, <Militant>, Code 13 <Terrorist> and Code 14 <Guerilla> which may be predictable. However some were less expected: Code 22, <Insensitive> was only linked to Israel, and Code 21 <Inflexible> was predominantly linked to Israel, while Code 18 <Rights> was predominantly linked to Palestinians. Secondly there were shifts over the month. Whereas in the code 1 group there were strong PLO/Palestinian references in the first three date categories, after the middle of the month these are less frequent, whereas references to other Arab groups, Israel and the US are more frequent. However, as with Code 4, association remained static.

(2) THE WASHINGTON POST

Again, a small group of words (and associated word-groups) recorded higher frequencies: <Peace>; <Settler>; <Threat>;
<Military>; <Negociate>; <Guerilla>; <Talks>. These were almost identical to those for *The New York Times* (with the exception of <Settler> and <Guerilla> included and <Legitimate> excluded. There were however significant differences in the use of these words/word-groups.

Code 9 <Peace> had less association Israel, and there was more association with both Palestinian/PLO and arab groups, as well as the US.

Code 11 <Threat> was associated with arab groups twice, but with Israel and Israeli groups three times.

Code 14 <Military> was almost exclusively associated with Israel.

Code 16 <Negociate> has a relatively high association with Palestinians and the PLO, far fewer for Israel.

Of the words not frequent in *The New York Times*, Code 18 <Guerilla> was used associated with the PLO/ Palestinians, <Terrorist> only once, while <Settler> was, expectedly, only associated with Israel.

Generally, the US government figured more often associated with the high-frequency words in *The Washington Post* than *The New York Times* (and this may be expected). There did not appear to be significant shifts over the period examined (see below), but there were some. The first was in the use of the word/word-groups <settlers> / <settlements>, which at the beginning of the month in *The New York Times* were associated only with information about Israel, but, as the peace process involved the settlements, so the association shifted to Arab and Palestinian association (in their condemnation of the Israeli settler movement). However the
coverage during the first half of the month, was replaced by less extensive items. If reference is then made to Table 5.2 it can be seen that the shift is not only in the use of the word-set <settler> but also towards a negative group of Palestinians/Arab associations.

(3) AL AHRAM

Partly because of the rhetorical quality of both headlines and articles (with high use of repetition, assonance, symbolism and metaphor, and relatively low instances of factual information in the form of specifics) there were groups of words which recurred with a greater frequency than groups in the US newspapers. Interestingly, although as the month progressed there was no obvious decline in Al Ahram's criticism of Israel (see previous Table 5.3 C), there were linguistic shifts visible in two related areas. (i) The first was words used for or related to the Geneva Peace Plan in a positive rather than in a negative context (ie when the meaning was to show what is possible or hoped-for), and (ii) the second was a shift in the use of words/phrases signalling the deepest criticism of Israel. It was found that while positive shifts were visible towards the peace plan, the number of phrases critical of Israel increased. This accords with the information from the positive/negative tables (5.2 C). By far the deominant subject was Israel, except where peace was the key word (Code 1,2,3) or the key word was positive (Code 24, 25). It is notable that the majority of the recorded words were negative in association, and that the negativity increased when the
frequency of peace words/phrases was highest (especially towards
the end of the month - compared Tables 5.4 and Chart 5.1.3). For
key words such as Code 7 (Intimidation), Code 10 (Confrontation),
Code 15 (Warlike), Code 16 (Aggressive), Code 17 (Violent), Code
20 (Terrorist) and Code 23 (Enemy) there were clear surges during
peak periods of information on the peace process. This may be
because, if peace were discussed, the paper sought to balance
what could have been an unpopular policy with popular, anti-
Israeli sentiment.

Why were there few shifts over the month for the US papers and
measurable shifts for Al Ahram? Perhaps because, although the US
newspapers recorded "pulses" of interest, the underlying semantic
field with its associations remained unchanged.

5.6.12: Editorials

There were three editorials in The New York Times (September 2,
14, 29), five in The Washington Post (September 9, 14, 18, 21,
24) and fourteen in Al Ahram (September 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, 14,
17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 26, 27) specifically relating to Camp David
(see table 5.4 A/B/C). Again words were coded according to their
use within other linguistic structures from very positive to very
negative.

Editorials may be expected to offer differing measures of a
newspaper's attitudes.

What is distinctive about newspaper editorials is not that
they offer values and beliefs, but that they employ textual strategies which foreground the speech act of offering values and beliefs. 94

In other words it may be expected that editorials have different linguistic/semantic qualities to other sections of newspapers, that, in fact, there are close affinities with "opinion" sections (conversational style, colloquial language, rhetorical elements). Methods of saying as much as direct semantic content may be considered vital to the editorial.
**TABLE 5.5 (A): ANALYSIS OF EDITORIAL CONTENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USED ISRAELI RESPONSES TO REBUT CRITICS</th>
<th>The New York Times</th>
<th>The Washington Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 (7 articles reported Israeli denials)</td>
<td>16 (12 in Lebanon fighting, 4 in other stories)</td>
<td>4 (7 articles reported Israeli denials)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|WHAT WERE THE ISRAELI REBUTTALS?| 4 within 1st paragraph, 10 within 1st 3 paragraphs| 2 in 1st paragraph, 2 in final paragraphs |

|ARTICLES SUPPORTIVE OF ISRAEL?| 3 offered PLO activity as justification| 1 (September 19, pg A14, article by J. Randal) |

|ARTICLES CRITICAL OF ISRAEL| 6 (2 on settlements, 3 on Lebanon, 1 on peace)| 13 (4 used strongly censorious language: cf Randal, September 2) |

**TABLE 5.5 (B) PERCENTAGE ANALYSIS OF EDITORIAL CONTENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% OF QUOTATIONS FROM ISRAELI SOURCES:</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% OF QUOTATIONS FROM PLO:</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% OF QUOTATIONS FROM OTHER ARAB SOURCES</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Washington Post marked Israel/Israelis/Israeli groups negatively only within two editorials (September 14 and 21) and on the latter occasion this was balanced by the negativity of the sentence "the Arabs, always ready to suspect the Israelis of tactical diversion, have a special grim regard for the architect of their humiliation in 1967 [Dayan]". This was not an unusual use of two semantic structures acting as negativity markers: the first the phrase "always ready to suspect the Israelis of tactical diversion" (an extended adjective-phrase surrounding the verb "suspect", which unless otherwise marked normally suggests non-valid suspicion) contextualises the noun "Arabs" negatively, while the following "have a special grim regard for their humiliation" uses two internal referents as markers: "grim" (usually a negative connotation whether meaning "aggressively determined" or "ugly") and "humiliation". Journalistic English (see above) enjoys such modifications more frequently than other forms of written English, but when these modifications are compared between differing head-nouns there is a clear semantic bias.

The three papers had very different linguistic editorial styles. The Washington Post offered ranges of criticism and avoided journalistic styles of English (even within the editorials); Al Ahram was declamatory and rhetorical (using repetition, assonance, exaggeration, metaphor and strong symbolism) rather than humorous or witty; The New York Times offered rhetorical techniques (especially within editorials and "viewpoint" pieces) but (as with The Washington Post) these techniques were either
used to amuse, even within a serious context, or within complex frames of meaning (intellectualised rhetoric). It may be that it was recognised some topics' complexity or controversiality could be restructured (deconstructed) by linguistic techniques more usually called "literary" than journalistic (topic-developing external references and a level of humour may be two evident techniques). Such adaption of language was more frequent in The New York Times than The Washington Post. Of the latter's five editorials which dealt either directly or tangentially over this period with Camp David none offered such techniques. Over a year from August 1977 to July 1978 the use of humour, perhaps the most frequent rhetorical device, was evident in approximately 28% of The New York Times' editorials, but in only 8% of The Washington Post's, and there limited to sarcasm. Within the period under study all three New York Times editorials concerning Camp David used humour in some form, none of The Washington Post's used similar structures. The most colourful of all the New York Times' editorials in September (on the 29th) was typical.

Al Ahram's "Ra'il Al Ahram" or "Comment of Al Ahram" was not quite the same as the editorial in the US papers. There is no such thing as "journalistic Arabic": the language used by most Arabic newspapers is Classical Arabic. However, this style can be used (and, indeed, is most often used) in a rhetorical style. Thus objectivity, or attempts to forge a recognisable editorial voice are less likely to be extensive. Rhetorical devices would exclude humour. Nevertheless like Western editorials it was written by the editor, el Jamal, took up the problems posed by
other stories in the paper, and offered a viewpoint rather than just news. In each edition there was only one editorial section (sometimes split between the front and inner pages).

Daily coverage varied considerably, and although the main interest was the political and military problems of the Mideast, other news was covered: cultural, religious, social, economic. But as has been noted The Washington Post offered less Mideast news than The New York Times. Whereas every day of September contained some Mideast news in The New York Times, The Washington Post had one day without any news whatever (September 2) and five days when the news was either peripheral (September 8 - front page "Cholera in Mideast") or only news in outline (September 1, 15, 16, 25, 30), and a further four days when news reporting fell below 200 words (September 6, 11, 26, 28). However, as if to counterbalance this paucity, there were nine occasions when the newspaper offered significant in depth coverage, with major articles: September 5, 12, 13, 19, 21, 22, 23, 26, 29. There were also five relevant editorials: September 10, 14, 18, 21 and 24. These editorials were directly applicable to events, two were supported by other copy within that day's paper.

This suggested two immediate conclusions. The first (supported by wider commentary on The Washington Post) was simply that the paper had limited funds for expensive international news (see above) which needed to be specifically applied. The second that Israel and the Mideast were seen as only one part of a wider international picture which should be given equal attention. A
third might be that tradition or editorial policy (or a mixture of both) dictated that news be covered either in outline (perhaps using agency material) or carefully. For want of a better expression The Washington Post offered a more considered approach.

This was reflected in the language. Although reports critical of Israel were couched carefully (as with The New York Times, see below) they were less attentive to Israeli government sources. Words such as "reportedly" played a role in both papers, but when a single day's report on one issue is compared between the two papers the distinguishing characteristic of The Washington Post's journalism was a care to avoid quoting the combatants regarding the veracity or not of a story. As usual Mideast reports were carried on page A16, this time column 4:

**Israeli Raiders Reportedly Seize 16 in Lebanon**

Israeli troops backed by armour stormed across the border into Southern Lebanon before dawn today and seized at least 16 people from 2 villages, usually reliable sources reported.

12 of the seized were released after several hours of questioning in Israel, the sources said, but at least 4 were still being held by Israel."

Compare this with a report of the same event in The New York Times which stated "Israeli Army Units Said to Kidnap 16 in Lebanon Villages" (the verb "said" acting in exactly similar way to "reportedly" in the first story). The report was smaller and less visible (at the base of the page) though it made up for this by being closer to the front page of the paper. But while The Washington Post treated its sources as "reliable", the New
York Times ended its report by a denial issued from the Israeli military that any incursion or hostage-taking had occurred. There is one other area of comparison: this was The Washington Post's only Mideast story for that day, but not The New York Times', which ran a major article (not by a staff reporter) on page 15 entitled "Appointment in Samaria" by Beverly Bar-Illam, a piece in support of the settler movement Gush Emunim. This is frequently described as "militant". It dwelt on the beauty of the place, its importance for Jews, and the fact (according to the writer) that until the settling of the 1970s it had been a deserted land. The effect on readers of one article running simultaneously with another is not quantifiable, but it is possible that Ms Bar-Illam's article (fluent, even poetic) could be more persuasive than the news article, casting Israeli actions in a softer light. (The piece contained 28 words or phrases either saluting the beauty of "Samaria", or in support of Gush Emunim; the fact of this latter was important since even Begin found the Gush an embarrassment at this stage, while calling the West Bank "Samaria" partly in an attempt to legitimize the title.) Linguistically The Washington Post's report carried fewer markers readers might feel biased: a style often called authoritative.

5.6.13: Conclusions from the Content Analysis

Evidence pointed to a number of possible interpretations of the way in which the three papers treated Camp David.
1. Israel and Israeli news were treated in a different way to other international or home news in all three papers. The New York Times was the most sympathetic towards Israel (for reasons outlined above). Despite that sympathy (which was more obvious in the editorials than the bodycopy) there was a considerable percentage of criticism aimed at Israel, especially in the context of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and recidivism regarding the Geneva Peace initiative. There was, nevertheless, a greater element of criticism attached to the PLO and Arab states (Table 5.2 A), and more specific linguistic analysis indicated a certain stability in the realms of criticism and support despite rather than because of individual events.

The Washington Post may have been more inclined to criticise Israel and less predictable where the PLO was concerned, and in key linguistic analysis (Table 5.4 B) showed itself to have no obvious or measurable biases, though certain key words such as <obstacles> and <guerilla> were uniquely the territory of Palestinian subjects. This may have been because the details of linguistic tendencies as mirrored in Table 5.4 are more likely to show up subtle biases, and these would be the most durable of all imbalances.

If biases do exist with the US newspapers, they are not easily detectable as inclusion/exclusion of news rather as subjectivization of news; or as negative modification or as opinion. The New York Times was consistently careful in its use
of the noun "guerilla" rather than "terrorist" to describe the PLO.

Al Ahram was predictable in most areas. There was no evidence that it took any linguistic cues from the US newspapers but it is possible that this occurred. The pulses visible in Chart 5.1.3 were less obvious with the Egyptian newspaper, which appeared to vary on a day-to-day basis.

2. There are "natural" journalistic trends visible in the treatment of Camp David over September, 1977. One of these is the way an issue "pulses", and does not appear to have a relatively continuous level of coverage over a period. It might be expected that some news items would not be liable to fluctuate in this way (for example, daily political news would rely on chance news items available to print). Other news items (where the material may be more continuously available, but where the interest to print it may be editorially-generated, for example traffic-related mortality rates or ecological issues) may rely on triggers to release interest within a paper. It is possible that these triggers may have been present during September 1977 in the US newspapers, although no obvious events suggested themselves at the start of the pulses discovered. It may be that the rise or fall of interest could be a natural phenomenon of the news media, but my conclusion from this data is that since information on the Mideast was more or less continuously available over the period, the pulsing of interest represented an editorial
perception that audience sympathy/interest for the material was limited.

3. There may be subtle linguistic biases, visible as trends in the way certain groups were described (positively/ negatively) or modified (what kind of adjectives/adverbs, how often these occurred, whether the occurrence could be interpreted as stereotyping). There appeared to be clearer unchanging tendencies in the way the groups studied were marked. The conclusion from this may be that once opinion is established within a particular newspaper it is unlikely to change and that, predictably, habitual attitudes were rarely disappointed.

5.7 CONCLUSION

While coverage of the 1977-79 detente between Egypt and Israel was often positive in the West it was almost universally negative in Arabic newsprint of the Mideast. However Al Ahram and its fellow newspapers in Egypt (with the exception of minor papers such as Al Wafd - see above) followed the presidential line. How many of its reporters (and indeed editors) disagreed with what they were asked to write is not the matter: what Al Ahram presents in its 1977-79 period is an illustration not of journalism (whether biased or not, whether subjective or objective) but of media under political control. Adventurous, inquisitive dissenting reporting (at a premium even under Heikal’s editorship) vanished from its pages, the paper becoming instead a government broadsheet dominated by Sadat. Journalistic ethics had been subverted: Al Ahram became propaganda in much the
same way as the Majlis or Egyptian broadcast media, supporting a head of state. The difference between Al Ahram in 1979 and 1921 is vast.

The same cannot be said of The New York Times or The Washington Post. There have of course been changes but not in their reflection of modern Western attitudes towards the Muslim or Arab worlds and the Mideast in particular. The moral complexity of the problem of Palestine and Israel (partially subjectivised by identification with a Western Jewish state) are wiped away by the desire (partially habitual) for simple bi-polar politics. The US press was caught in its professional desire for a balance between a desire for greater heterogeneity and the tendency media may have naturally (or perhaps develop under certain conditions) of creating a black-and-white morality for issues close to its constituency. The Egyptian press mirrored Sadat’s ideas through to the ratification at Camp David, though Al Ahram may have register-ed a level of disapproval through lack of commentary.

From The Washington Post and The New York Times a lot can be learnt both about the way the media develop and sustain a world view, and how notions of objectivity and professionalism are either subverted or buttressed by news events. From Al Ahram in the period of Sadat, a lot can be learnt about Sadat, Sadat’s methods of government and the Egyptian social heirarchy, since these are reflected in the editorial and semantic/linguistic structure of that newspaper.
This project has aimed to illustrate the importance of communication in and between societies, in particular between developed and less-developed ones. Its main tools have been historical contextualization and content analysis of a given sub-period of Camp David (a significant section of which was devoted to linguistic analysis). For detailed analysis and comparison, three newspapers are chosen — two from the US (The Washington Post and The New York Times) — the third from Egypt (Al-Ahram). We have to be wary when extrapolating from merely three newspapers to the wider media world, but since the newspapers were chosen for their standing and influence, I feel that some wider conclusions may be safely drawn.

The result has been to show that media are not always (and cannot always be) neutral instruments, but may be at times implicated in national and international political processes and that availability of information of all sorts (via media) is stacked (by virtue of technical and social factors) in favour of developed nations.

The debate over NIICO (covered in Chapter 1) highlighted for a period the importance of the media as national and international institutions rather than merely multinational businesses. The distancing of communication systems from those societies they ideally should serve has developed as a result of more than early
colonization (where information tended to be incoming facts about the home European country), or post-colonial reconstitution of the old dependency relationship (when technology, equipment, expertise and styles of reporting were imported directly from developed countries). Other factors were possibly that societies have, as yet, not developed a high regard for the importance of independence in indigenous media, while maintaining too high a regard for the media of the developed world. This latter may well be due to a lack of resources to furnish societies with an information infrastructure. Whatever the causes of such deficiency the result has been pressure for a degree of order to govern the ever-expanding medium of communication, and behind some of these demands have been nationalist fears of greater dependency or cultural absorption. Camp David acts as a symbol of these problems with US papers attempting balance by inclusion of heterogeneous input (different writers, some from the developing world), linguistically attempting to remove bias, but in the end offering predictable support for the diplomatic status quo (excluding Palestinian and other Arab complaints). Before examining the shortcomings of the reporting of Camp David I deal with the wider issues of developmental journalism, the ethics involved in both written and broadcast journalism within the West and the Third World. A considerable amount of historical research and discussion is therefore included: the Mideast from 1947 to the present; the relationship of developed to developing nations; post-colonial media, all relate to the way Camp David was reported. But this thesis is not concerned with the
rights and wrongs of the journalistic debate or with the relative effectiveness of different types of journalism for the developed and developing world, though the debate itself (including the heated controversy of the 1970s regarding developmentalism, and culminating in the Brandt Report) is discussed. The centre of the thesis remains the way media, through all this debate, effectively worked on one set of issues.

However, the thesis considers another flaw in media: the imbalance between the developed countries' view of themselves and their actions, and the view developed countries have of the rest of the world. The thesis allows that there is no single viewpoint within the plethora of developed media; that there is no "conspiracy" somehow politically to defraud underprivileged nations, or act directly for domestic interests. I do consider that the way developed media act, and specifically acted during the Camp David period of 1976-1979 in the US, shows a paucity of historical awareness, a lack of profound debate, a resistance to unorthodox views, a lack of knowledge of non-Western cultures and, finally, a desire not to upset whatever consensus the editors perceived to be acting most directly upon their papers.

The inability of the developing world to counteract this imbalance is made quite clear in the way the Western (specifically US) version of the Camp David Summit and Accords, as well as the overall peace process, was generally biased against viewpoints
critical of the US/Israeli status quo. What emerged in the US newspapers was a Western consensus in support of the Israeli position. Essentially, this reflected an image of a small state defending itself against aggressive odds.

As media expand, it seems, individual nations have less control over it. The weaker the nation (in terms of economic strength, social cohesion and cultural independence) the less control the nation (in the sense of a group wider than the governing party) can hope to exert over its media output, and the more prone that nation's media are to external news influences. *Al Ahram* (as fulsome in its praise of Camp David as *The Washington Post* or *The New York Times*) expressed the required amount of approval. Interestingly, the cynicism and alienation felt by a significant number of the Egyptian people seems to be reflected in the way editorials in *Al Ahram* vacillate from praise of Sadat and his policies, through distrust of Israel, to hints (especially in late September, 1978) that Camp David could not articulate Arab aspirations regarding Israeli expansionism and aggression.

With media infrastructure internally and externally at the centre of my concern in this thesis, I have used reporting of Camp David as a model. The reporting of the process leading up to the signing of the Treaty amply illustrates the consequences of a political issue when inadequately treated by external media and when similarly covered internally. All except the second chapter discuss
the problems of enforcing journalistic standards of practice at both the national and international levels, whether, indeed, there can be a universal code of practice when interests and values differ so hugely. For example there seems at present to be a new influx of nationalism on the world agenda. This makes the media of some countries (such as India, Russia, the former eastern bloc, China or parts of Africa) more inward-looking than in the heyday of non-aligned internationalism, but in quite a different way to the Western media in which will be reflected its readers'/viewers' self-interest in terms of foreign trade and older alliances.

It soon became apparent that there are constraints on the operation of media brought about by the nature of the media industry. Although by no means monolithic in structure (having many owners, being multi-structured in terms of editorial and reporting input, affected by numerous external stresses and restraints, and differing substantially even within the West) there are still tendencies of monopolization in terms of time, space and knowledge. It is an industry profoundly influenced by politics and which (because of the huge sums involved in publishing even the simplest national or regional broadsheet) rarely escapes the constraints of finance.

Thus it has always been difficult to strike any kind of balance satisfactory to all interest groups. When it comes to the international level, monopolization is made more real by the
concentration of both technological and human resources in the hands of a very few affluent societies. In the case of Egypt and the US, the media in the former is monopolized by the government (the government being the main source of financial revenue if the paper is government-owned, and even if it is not, most depend heavily on government advertising hand-outs) while in the latter media is constrained by more complex and multifarious but nonetheless effective influences. While in Egypt there are various laws and codes governing the industry (such as the Law of Shame under Sadat); media may often be self-censoring, because the operators of the media are civil servants. Although in the US the constitution ensures the free operation of the media, a heavy reliance on advertising for revenue handcuffs it to big business. Even relatively liberal newspapers find there are well-defined limits to political expression.

The continuation of the operation of international communication in this way will hamper the implementation of any idea which is different from accepted political practice. Camp David is a case in point. When tested, the media coverage followed an established path, reflecting the most powerful political views of the dominant groups (whether the Democratic right in the case of The New York Times or the Democratic left in the case of The Washington Post). Alternatives were expressed by political outsiders in both papers from time to time (Edward Said, for example, wrote in The Washington Post) but because a minority view plainly theirs was not
one that the paper was reflecting seriously.

Camp David mirrored what was desired by the governing classes in both Washington and Cairo. Opposition to this in the Middle East, under these circumstances, was muffled. The only form of expression was from the non-conformist fringes of the media, which in any case found it difficult to acquire a sustaining audience.

The thesis highlights the difficulty of breaking out of this bind. Objectivity, and professionalism, under such conditions, only became viable when used internally. (A good example would be the Bazoft affair, when a British journalist was hanged as a spy by the Iraqi regime. This crystallized the double standards operating on the international media scene. It took an obvious human tragedy for journalists to dig deeper into the malpractice of the Iraqi government. Iraq allowed journalists free access before this, but very little was said about the political behaviour of Saddam's regime.) Objectivity or professionalism are distorted constantly by the journalists' knowledge of their home market and its specific demands. In order to "anchor" a foreign news story the practice in all forms of media remains to offer obvious, tangible links to the domestic audience: the involvement of that country's nationals perhaps, or the threat to that country's interests.

Camp David can be seen in this way. Only after the signing of the Treaty in 1979 with the concomitant intransigence of the Israelis,
and the assassination of Sadat, did awareness of the unsuitability of the Treaty for most parties (except, arguably, the Israelis) come to be discussed within the Mideast.

The three newspapers were chosen for several reasons: the main one is their pre-eminence in the newspaper industry. These are established broadsheets that other media use for both source material and, indeed, a lead in how to treat important issues. Their importance allows them to be a measure of the extent of balance of news coverage internally and externally.

Because of their leading positions within the industry, they can also act as measures of journalistic neutrality, objectivity and positioning within the political consensus. This is no less so with Al-Ahram than the other two papers. An establishment newspaper, its journalists rank among the best in the developing world (if not in the world as a whole). Its political message carries weight simply because of the availability of resources to the paper, the political connections it has developed over time, the heavyweight journalists in its ranks as well as the important lack of any major Arabic language competitor. This allows an insight into what extent journalistic professionalism and values are reflected in a Third World newspaper. The other important point is that, given the strength of these papers (not in terms of reader numbers, but of political and social clout) they manage to reflect a narrow political order which does not encompass the popular
diversity and present reality of modern international relations.

The heavy media coverage of Camp David meant it was an ideal event to use to study methods of filtering information within newspapers. Also, since the event created as much interest in the Mideast as it did in the West, though for different reasons, it proved a more fruitful task comparing different reports on the same event, especially since that event was almost universally considered important.

One further aim of this thesis has been to compare, as between developed and less developed world media, what are considered to be journalists' most valued qualities: objectivity and professionalism. I identify a misunderstanding in the lay-person's view of the media profession: as *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* show, searching curiosity comes very much second to following the editorial or owners' line, or the established views of that particular readership. This in turn illustrates that media, far from being truly investigative on the international scene compared to the domestic one) build reports on pre-conceived notions of right and wrong.

When I conclude on the media coverage of Camp David the result is to show that media, in general, is much less a researching tool of curious journalists, and very much an anchor for established views.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. The relationship of pre- to post-independence media was either of inverse proportion, that is from relative freedom to state-control as in the cases of Burma, Tanzania or Zaire; or throwing out the philosophy of the colonial structures but keeping the structures themselves, which lead directly to forms of dependency, as in the cases of the Ivory Coast, Burkino Faso or Uganda.

2. The president of the World Press Freedom Committee voiced typical Western concern in a statement during the 1983 General Conference (Major Programme III - Communication in the Service of Man), saying "free flow could not be restricted, not even in the name of sovereignty ... intended processes of democratization could not menace the independence of private property". (Quoted in Communication and Domination, pg 149)


6. A good example was one of The New York Times' senior editors, John Boakes, who in August and September, 1977, was sent to the Mideast (specifically Israel and the Occupied Territories) which had never been an area of specialization for him. The resulting copy tended to support the Israeli status-quo, using terms such as "Judea and Samaria" without mentioning how or why they would be offensive to many indigenous people. (Cf September 9, 1977 "West Bank Voices", page A21) The Gulf War was another example. Of the Western television reporters posted to the Mideast to cover it, less than 30% had had previous experience of reporting from the area.


8. The Black/White Media Show, BBC2, December 1989ff, producer John Twitchin (BBC Education)


10. This criticism, voiced in UN organizations by the US and its allies, was basically a political complaint against Third World governments which (it was argued) combined too much independence with too little respect for the major source of UN funding -
specifically the US. The Pool itself was accused of politicization not commensurable with a news gathering agency.

11. France was one of the colonial powers which made full use of the media in this respect, using colonial communications systems to encourage support for its war effort. During the Second World War the Free French latterly used Brazzaville in the Congo as a propaganda centre.

12. Most newspapers in French ex-colonies, and many of the quality media in British ex-colonies, still communicate in the language of the colonizer.


14. The basic problem of post-colonial states was far from being only financial; the philosophical problem of how much of the colonial bath water was to be removed was resolved (or left unresolved) in different ways. States which had been part of the French Empire kept their ties with the old imperial power through cultural, educational, military and political systems set up in the image of those in France. Independence was a very francophile and francophone affair. This was less true of British possessions (based on trade rather than a cultural mission) and even less of the Dutch and Belgium colonies where the primacy of trade kept the cultures of the colonizers very much to themselves. The rule also appears to be that the better-considered and longer drawn-out the removal of imperial power was, the closer ties remained with that power.


First ... the volume of foreign news content in the domestic media tends to increase rather dramatically with independence, a phenomenon that is assumed to reflect the country’s new status in the international institutional order. Second, the pattern coverage of foreign news events is assumed to change, for the same reason, in the direction of a more global orientation rather than a preoccupation with events happening in the colonial "metropolis" which is characteristically associated with most colonial press systems.

16. Tanzania after de-colonization inherited a broadcasting system modelled on the BBC, but Tanzanian officials found it intolerable to have a broadcasting service exercising independence. To bring it under control they decided that once government policies were settled broadcasters and journalists could not discuss them further. Measures such as this were taken in a number of Third World countries. Burma, after enjoying a
relatively free press based on the British model (a press recognized as being the least restricted in Asia), imposed restrictions to deal with opposition and fragmentation. See F. Barton, *The Press in Africa*, (Macmillan, 1979) pgs 109ff, and Bertil Lintner, quoted pg 28, 1987 Teleconfronto "Libro Bianco, L'Asia dell'est e del sud".

17. This monopoly is self-perpetuating: once installed, printing technology or radio and television networks require a great deal of expert maintenance, as well as the requirements of day to day programmes and broadcasting hardware. International rules covering the sale and upkeep of technology are such that much "hi-tech" equipment sold by a manufacturer has to be installed and managed by personnel trained by that manufacturer. The manufacturing company has the right to insist on supplying its own engineers to carry out maintenance. The situation of dependency may be summarized as cultural homogenization proceeding in the interests of large successful groups.

18. All Indian Radio [AIR] got its name, its present administrative structure and its present programme pattern between 1937 and 1940 when India was part of the British Empire. ... in a form suitable for a colony, but after three decades during which vast political, economic and social changes have taken place in the world and in India, the only change in AIR is an increase in the number of its installations. There can be one or more of three explanations for this phenomenon; the first would credit our former rulers with extraordinary foresight and understanding of broadcasting; the second would reveal our lack of initiative and our incapacity to create organizations appropriate to our needs; and the third would expose the government's decision to retain ... vestiges of our colonial heritage which were neither democratic nor "progressive". (M. Masani, *Broadcasting and the People*, (National Book Trust India, 1975) pg 1)

19. One example of such aid is the US Information Agency, better known as the United States Information Services (U.S.I.S). In 1971 USIS had forty-eight agencies in thirty-four African countries, their objective being the promotion of US foreign policy abroad. This objective is pursued by the provision of recordings, news-stories, still photos, and films to be used by local media. The provision of free libraries, stocks of books to key institutions, exchange visits and the staging of public discussions, lectures and film-shows, constitutes an important level of informal contact between USIS specialists and influential people within the host country. This is a classic example of Western Aid with strings encouraging a new situation of dependency. Logic dictates that any aid in any form will create some kind of dependency; it is the kind that varies, and where media is concerned the type of dependency can be technological and/or informational. Whatever it is the result is that indigenous needs and development are at best superficially catered for. Whether this in turn causes acute sociological divergence is another matter.

21. ibid, pg 180-1

22. Gurevich, Bennett et al are basically neo-Marxist/structuralists. They tend to see the relationship between rich and poor countries as dominance-dependence, a core-periphery, power relationship where power is defined within the structure of this relationship as exploitation. Media, no less than financial institutions, can be seen as slowing development through integrating Third World societies into a relationship which works against them. Neo-Marxism perceives the terms of trade as unequal, the wealthier nations able to generate poverty and dependency. This can apply to any goods or services including media (some might say especially media since this is one of the largest industries of developed countries), and (as I noted above) similar unequal structures can exist within as well as between societies.

23. To a great extent the imbalance in international relations remains; as we shall see, the demands of developing countries are rarely treated on a par with the "needs" of the developed, and this is strongly reflected in the media. Every major newspaper has a pecking order of what it considers significant to its central interest. Europe is highly significant for The Washington Post, while the same paper treats vast countries such as China, India or Indonesia with relative disinterest. This is no more than a reflection of the way international relations will inevitably work, proportionately distorting concern to those areas perceived as closest to the interest of the domestic audience: newspaper reader or voter.


25. The Havana Charter was an initiatory step towards recognition that a desire for free trade was, by itself, not enough. There had to be a framework of agreements which would be given teeth by an equivalent to the IMF - the ITO (International Trade Organization). But that is where equivalence to Bretton Woods effectively ended. So strong was the protectionist opposition nationwide in the US (concentrated in Congress) that the Truman administration backed down from earlier determination to force a ratification of the Havana Charter, effectively killing the Charter when it did so (in 1950). This illustrates that international trade in anything - even news - is such that terms of trade are always going to be orientated towards the West.

26. ibid Spero, pg 270

27. Murphy ibid, pg 99

29. ibid, Murphy pg 99-100

30. Traber ibid, pgs 21ff, Herbert I. Schiller, "The Erosion of National Sovereignty by the World Business System"

31. H.I. Schiller, Introduction to Who Knows?, pg xv-xvi

32. Press Trust of India, the largest news-agency in Asia, employs only two hundred and fifty journalists. There are twenty correspondent in as many countries, making use of only fifty thousand kilometers of telex lines (and few additional fax or satellite communications links - the invaluable communications tools of the 1990s), sending only one hundred thousand words a day.

33. G.C. Rogue, speaking at the Non-Aligned Symposium of Information (Tunis, March 1976), reported in The New International Information and Communication Order Sourcebook (International Organization of Journalists, Prague 1986) pg 47f

34. J. Tunstall, The Media are American, (Constable, 1977) pg 208

35. G. Priestland, Speaking for Myself, (Lutterworth 1979) pg 6f

36. The Constitution of UNESCO, Article #1

37. During the 1960s and 1970s US policy towards UNESCO changed from supportive to condemnatory. One reason was that active campaigning for international cooperation on change in the areas of information and communication by the Non-Aligned Movement and UNESCO was biased in favour of the developing world. UNESCO is one of the few fora where the rules of play are dictated by the majority developing nations, so such a slant was inevitable.

US criticisms of UNESCO came to a head in the wake of the Conference for the Study of Latin American Communication Policies (San Jose, Costa Rica, July 1976). The Press Association and the International Press Institute (both Western-orientated) made it their task to campaign against the proposals of the Conference. (See Rosemary Righter, Whose News?.)

38. A study of four island countries by Tony Nnaemeka, ["Foreign News Flow in Three Island Press Systems Pre- and Post-Independence Flow Structure" in Communications and Development Review, Vol 2 No 2 (1978)] (the Cook Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Western Samoa) concluded that there was little or no native news gathering or dissemination; that the main suppliers of news to these islands were foreign agencies, based in Australia, New Zealand or France (AFP), and that most of the coverage concentrated on news about New Zealand or Australia. The general concern of the study expressed by an island editor was for "less reliance on former colonial countries for news and information". The report illustrated three important facts. The flow of news
between the Pacific islands and local "Western" countries is almost entirely one way - from ex-colonizers to their old colonies; there is little flow of news among Pacific islands in comparison to the flow from rim countries to the islands; finally, there is almost no intercommunication of news between the islands.

39. The Constitution of UNESCO, Article #3

40. It is estimated that AP has 2,500 journalists and photographers stationed in 62 countries; Reuters 1,150 correspondents located in a 183 states, filing 700,000 words of general news, sports and economic reports each day to the London head office from whence the reports are re-transmitted to a further 154 countries; U.P.I. 238 bureaux in 62 countries, with about 10,000 people working for it, and enjoying more than six thousand, five hundred subscribers in over 100 countries, circulating 5 million words daily. TASS had 325 subscribers in 1990 - though since the break up of the USSR and TASS's reformulation this has dropped.

By reason of their equipment and capital, Western news agencies have acquired a position of strength enabling them to offer a better service but also leading them to convey information reflecting the developed point of view. (An interview by Jaroslav Veis of Rupert Murdoch in Lidove Noviny, Feb 1990 Prague, suggests that News International sees no reason to alter its philosophy of news to suit differing markets.)


42. Western governments began to realize the importance of financial support for a Third World media infrastructure, if only to lessen demands for NTICO and soften the militant stand of Third World states. The US ambassador to the United Nations, John E. Reinhardt, clarified his country's position regarding financial and technical assistance. At the 20th session of the general conference of UNESCO in Paris in 1978 (UNESCO Yearbook, 1979, Paris) he confirmed the need for a more effective program of action. He stressed that this program should include American assistance to public and private communications sectors, identifying regional information problems within the Third World. Such assistance ought to include the establishment of learning centres for a program for advancing communication to the developing world through the introduction of technology (specifically satellite) to help meet the needs of Third World rural areas, he concluded.

43. The most notable among the consequent hearings and reports was the Kroloff and Cohen Report. This in the short term encouraged the US to increase aid to Third World media, but latterly has been seen by developing countries as just another attempt to control their efforts to press ahead for changes in the current structure of information-flow, by maintaining the old structures of news gathering by offering financial incentives to ward off changes. Importantly Kroloff and Cohen acknowledged that
the US had more to lose than any nation from a change in the world media order in which they had no direct influence. (Kroloff and Cohen, US Senate Commission Papers, 1977)

44. UNESCO Conference (1978) Resolution

45. The sequence of events ran as follows:

In 1976, UNESCO decided to set up a commission to study the communications problem specifically.

In 1978, there was an interim report.

In 1980, the Commission, head by Sean MacBride, published its report (later compressed into Many Voices One World, see bibliography). There were 82 recommendations. 72 were accepted by all 16 members of the commission. There was some disagreement on 10. The US objected to what they termed the commission's anti-commercial bias; the USSR (and its Warsaw Bloc satellites) wanted a measure of government controls; the Third World wanted a more balanced flow of information.

As a result of this report is was decided to form the IPDC.

46. Sean Macbride, ICSCP Presidential Address (December 14th 1977)

47. Macbride, ibid

48. There remains a heavy reliance on foreign agencies for meeting Third World demands for news: European and American capitals are still the centres for the world news industry, a fact clearly demonstrated in an amusing incident where a communications cable between two neighbouring African states (Accra in Ghana and Lome in Togo) had to be connected through Paris and London. According to Pradeep Krishnatray, "the 150 mile journey takes 48 hours which could be covered faster by a runner". (Pradeep Krishnatray, "Exploding the Traditional Myth", Media Asia, Vol 5, No 4, (1978) pg 193)

49. Satellite communication can only make disbalance worse in the short term, until prices of individual satellite channels become low enough for poorer countries to purchase. At which time it is likely that some at least of a people's cultural independence will have been eroded or lost through the absorption of high-quality (ie well-produced) Western product.

50. The first conference concerned with the setting-up of NANAP was held in New Delhi, from 8th to 13th July 1976. It was attended by fifty-nine countries led by their Ministers of Information. Amongst those who were most outspoken was Mrs Indira Gandhi who inaugurated the Conference, stressing the importance of a news pool which would help liberate developing nations from their colonial past.
Self-reliance in sources of information is as important as technological self-reliance. When the western media spread false stories about a country, it was difficult for others to discern the truth. Hence, the necessity to have more direct exchange among the Non-Aligned countries in the field of information.

(Indira Gandhi at the First General Conference of the News Agencies of Non-Aligned Countries, New Delhi, July 1976, quoted in News Agencies Pool of Non-Aligned Countries: A Perspective, NONAC, New Delhi)

51. The hopes of the IPI foundation cannot compete with the increasing costs of news gathering. The most likely outcome to the story of NANAP is as an adjunct to a larger, Western or Western-style news agency, using cheap channels on satellites, becoming an alternative news system, but having to compete, nevertheless, with the more expensive and slick Western and Westernized channels such as CNN.

It is hard to see how such an organization as NANAP can compete. Without the resources to commit to new technology the Third World will be outstripped in the market place: the newer the technology the quicker Western viewpoints will come to be the only viewpoints. When satellite television becomes the largest media system in, say, the Pacific by the mid 1990s, it is unlikely that dishes will be receiving much if anything about local issues.

52. The Economist (August 7th, 1976) also expressed reservations about both IPI and the conception of NANAP.

By facilitating the faster and wider flow of government handouts, this non-aligned press pool and similar regional scheme for Latin America also proposed ... may not add much to the sum of Third World knowledge. But as the Non-Aligned plan now stands, it should pose no great threat to press freedom either. Member agencies will have the option of supplementing pool reports with news from other sources, including western ones. But the danger signs are there. These include an Indian proposal for a Third World news agency censor in each country to sift out undesirable items. The Latin Americans went even further (following guidelines offered by the Russians) in urging special laws. The arrest of foreign correspondents shows newspapers publish material offensive to the government.

53. Roderick Beaton, quoted in International Herald Tribune, (July 20th, 1976)

54. "Canadian sovereignty in the next generation will depend heavily on telecommunication. If we wish to have an independent culture, then we will have to continue to express it through radio and television. If we wish to control our economy then we will require a sophisticated telecommunications sector developed and owned in Canada to meet specific Canadian requirements. ... Telecommunications, as the foundation of the future society,
cannot always be left to the vagaries of the market." Brian Murphy, The World Wired Up, (London, 1983) pg 51

55. In the case of Kenya, a continuing acceptance of the superiority of foreign theatre, cinema and television programmes is linked to an education system which promotes the superiority and nourishes the growth of Western education and languages to a point where the population have begun to refrain from indigenous forms of cultural expression; even native languages have had to give way to English. See Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, "Kenyan Culture: the National Struggle for Survival", J. Becker, G. Hedebro, L. Paldan, (eds) Communication and Domination: Essays to Honor Herbert I. Schiller (Ablex, 1986) pg 114

56. Due to a lack of wood pulp in Zimbabwe that nation's two daily papers can only manage a limited print run, and the editions are sold out by early morning. What passes for the indigenous media is then passed from hand to hand, reaching nothing like the majority of the ten million Zimbabweans. Most people interested in the news turn to radio and television, and increasingly to satellite-link services from the US, and now from Europe. Land broadcasting from South Africa is limited to southern Zimbabwe. Such natural economic limits on print media can be found in most African states except those on the west coast with a ready supply of timber. (News International investigated the possibility of an English language paper for African distribution, taking advantage of the tide of economic liberalization characterizing the 1990s.)

57. Indigenous media policies have been carried out quite effectively in Tanzania, in the realization that any major constructive change in that country's political and economic situation required a massive investment in the media and communication infrastructure. The route the media took in Tanzania is the independent one, to a point where that country has been described as one of the few in the Third World that come closest to fulfilling the aims of the NIICO.

58. The number of Third World states purchasing media equipment from the West is increasing; the manufacture of the equipment for decoding satellite television signals is limited to hi-tech Western companies (though Sony and Hitachi both have plans [1994] to open components and assembly plants in Africa and Asia). There is now a Third World media infrastructure built by European, Japanese and American companies. The spread of Western technology has resulted in a heavy reliance on Western technicians; use of advanced technology in societies where there is no real technological or industrial base increases dependency. Some Third World countries find it economically crippling to maintain media since their operation requires constant maintenance by engineers, technicians and specialists.

59. While most Western social observers (journalists and broadcasters) are overwhelmingly concerned with domestic politics rather than issues are far removed from the needs of a developing world which has not even yet satisfied the basic needs of
citizens for medicine, clean water, education and stable government. Training by the West means that individuals return with knowledge of Western media technologies, unknowingly agents in their promotion.

60. A few Third World countries have managed to cut across these dependency barriers. India, Brazil and Eastern Asian countries are notable cases. In the case of India, although they import certain technological facilities, the government requires their assembly in India itself (though this began to change following trade agreements in 1992). India, aiming at consolidating technological capacity, has created a small technologically elite group with secure income. The effect of the establishment of a technological infrastructure within some Third World countries has left those societies with sub-classes of people, in much the same way as industrialization did in the England of the 18th and 19th Centuries.

61. Murphy, ibid pg 104

62. It is highly unlikely than any CNN executive (much less an executive for News International) spends her or his time contemplating abstract debate within the UN. Energy is spent instead enlarging and consolidating, making more money and more effective television, attracting a larger audience and, of course, sustainable high-paying advertisers.

63. Al Ahram’s sales in North Africa, the Sudan and Central Africa are estimated as 8% of its total weekly run (Al Ahram’s own estimates, 1990) but it has to be remembered that in these countries a newspaper is a much more communal item.

64. The region also suffers from a traditional dependence on Western news agencies (although the language to a certain extent limits the exploitation of this market by Western media organizations). Over the years, especially in the case of some oil-rich Gulf states, there has been a tendency to open radio broadcasts and television channels for foreigners working there. These channels (in the case of Dubai for instance) are dumping grounds for Western media products. Some Arab countries are more vigilant about such inflow of foreign media material and there is a conscious effort to censor film and broadcast material as well as newspapers considered offensive and contradictory to the national ideology and religion.

65. Western newspapers are not global (with the possible exception The Financial Times, compilations such as The Herald Tribune, or magazines such as Time or Newsweek) and cater to their constituency. However, news services such as CNN, the BBC or TASS/ITAR are increasingly global - at least in terms of coverage.

66. The term "public opinion" has a different meaning in Middle Eastern terms. Often the public there is less well-informed (less-literate) and has much less chance to express itself as opinion. And because of the lack of inter-communication (no polls
of opinion, no media gauging the average citizen's ideas) there is no consensus of belief, no series of "pictures" of the society from the bottom up, only from the top down. If public opinion means anything, it refers to literate, male, middle-class (or political class) opinion. Where there is consensus it tends to be against common enemies (Israel, the US, Iraq) and for certain common standards (Islam, the Arabic language and culture).
1. The Sykes-Picot Treaty (1918) was a concordat between French and British Mideastern interests, dividing up the area following the collapse of Ottoman rule. There was no mention of Jewish immigration. The Treaty was named after the two leading career diplomats who drew it up.

2. The Jews were only one community; there were also the Palestinians, Hashemite Jordanians, Syrians, Egyptians and, most importantly, the French and English who had divided the Mideast into two areas of influence: below Turkey and North of the Tigris/Euphrates rivers would be French as far as Iran; the rest, including Egypt, British. Even within the colonial establishments different interest groups held sway. In Britain there was a pro-Arab lobby within the Foreign Office but this lost to the ascendancy of the pro-Jewish lobby which followed almost exactly the rise of Herbert Samuel, who fought the Zionist corner vociferously from 1914. He was High Commissioner for Palestine and Home Secretary in the 1920s, but was passionate enough about what Balfour had described as "a national home for the Jews" to end any hope the Arab Lobby may have had with the British Establishment.

3. See Balfour Declaration, appendix F

4. The West's and Israeli interests often match far enough for one to be of use to the other: without having to intervene militarily in the region (with the possible repetition of a politically unpopular loss of life) the US can use a dependent nation. (Though strategically not as potentially vital as Egypt, logically good relations between Egypt and Israel was a highly-desirable strategic solution.)

5. See Appendix F

6. At that time, as Balfour's letter suggests, the British did not officially view "a national home" as full statehood, but rather as a part of a regional protectorate under their control. Whatever the semantics surrounding notions of a state and/or a home, the priorities of British Mideast policy were not Arab. [See Appendix F]

7. Quoted in C. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, 1917-1948, pg 5


9. At the Wansee Conference in 1941 Eichmann, Himmler and Heidrich set in motion the "Final Solution for European Jews" which lead to the extermination of over 6 million people.

10. Sami Hadawi, Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948, pg 79
11. In the eyes of many in the international community the Palestinians were willingly giving up their homeland, though no evidence of Arab radio broadcasts or newsprint exhortations to the Palestinians to flee has ever been offered. Palestinians left not because they were advised to do so by other Arab states but because of atrocities by and fear of Jewish settlers. (Cf Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, pg 94ff.) The Israeli government carried out a clarification of land ownership, a process which made it less and less possible for Arab inhabitants to claim possession of land within Israel. (Following 1967 the same processes of expropriation began on the West Bank and in Gaza.) The Israelis decreed any inhabitant absent from land for a nominal period lost their rights of ownership. This made it difficult for Palestinians to claim once they found themselves in Syria or Transjordan.

12. Resolution No 186 (S/2) 14th May, 1948 (see Appendix D)

13. H. Cattan, The Palestinian Question, pg 81:

As regards the territorial question, Count Bernadotte states that the boundaries of the Jewish State must finally be fixed either by formal agreement between the parties concerned or, failing that, by the UN. ... He suggested that the disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State should be left to the governments of the Arab states with full consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine ... .

As to the refugees, he recommended "the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation commission ... ".

14. Cattan ibid, pg 83

15. Cf Cattan, ibid, pg 84

16. The PLO took an even more dramatic move away from its previous stand by accepting a solution based on a UN resolution (37/86D - 10th December 1982) which reaffirmed previous resolutions of November 1947, December 1948, October 1974, November 1974 and July 1980. The PLO made similar declarations through Yasser Arafat at the later stage of 25th July 1982, during the Beirut siege, at which time a US congressional delegation lead by Paul McCloskey obtained from Arafat a statement declaring he supported all relevant UN resolutions, a declaration repeated at the UN in 1988, and restated in August/September 1993 following Israeli overtures regarding Jerico and Gaza. [Cf Cattan, The Palestinian Question, pg 279f]
17. Resolutions 242 and 388, (see Appendix E)

18. McDowell, David, *Palestine and Israel: the Uprising and Beyond*, pg 60

19. The phrase "just and lasting peace" (in Arabic <Salam adil wa-da‘‘im>) became in the arab press almost synonymous with Palestinian rights (see Chapter 5.6).


21. When one surveys the nature and depth of the problem within the area of Palestine/Eretz Israel, the performance of interested outside powers seems lamentably inadequate. Resolution 242, a fine statement for 1967, now seems a flawed key to peace. With the inter-communal dimension rapidly overshadowing other aspects of the conflict, a more profound process of reconciliation is needed, in which 242 can be no more than an opening gambit. [McDowell, ibid, pg264]


23. Reagan tried to assuage Israeli fears by saying the US would never countenance a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, while telling the Arab League that the US supported withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories. Although this, by itself, is not necessarily an incoherent policy (since support for Israeli withdrawal does not automatically mean countenancing a Palestinian state) Reagan must have known that the Arab League would see support for Israeli withdrawal at least partially in terms of some form of Palestinian "entity".


28. G. Shoukri, *Egypt. Portrait of a President*, pg 74. These "nationalisations" tended to be of foreign-owned firms.

29. Prices of basic foods increased rapidly and continuously, so that the middle classes - let alone the lower classes - could not afford to keep pace with them. ... Over two million people were unemployed and immigrants to Arab and Western capitals reached a total of five million. Debts to the IMF and Western banks exceeded 24 billion dollars by 1981, and the crime rate in Egypt was the third highest in the world with the percentage of crimes increasing even in the last five years, while deficits in the
balance of payments grew higher year by year. (Shoukri, ibid, page ii)

30. M.B. Quandt, The Middle East ten Years After Camp David, pg 1

31. See for example M. Heikal, Autumn of Fury, pg 7

32. It is important to point out that prior to this change Egypt's economy was under strain from the hostilities with Israel, coupled with Nasser's policy of self-sufficiency through indigenous manufacturing infrastructure and the minimizing of imports, lowering the involvement of foreign economies.

33. As Chapter 5's account of Al Ahram's reporting of Camp David shows, there was more rhetoric than reality in Sadat's repetitions of support for Palestinian rights: Palestine became a stamp of wider legitimacy for diplomatic efforts with Israel.

34. See Naomi Chazan, "Domestic Developments in Israel", in William B. Quandt, (ed) The Middle East Ten Years After Camp David, (pg 150ff).

35. Chazan, ibid, pg 176


38. Cattan, ibid, pg 144

39. Cattan, ibid, pg 145

40. The UN Security Council would not sanction the deployment of a peacekeeping force in northern Sinai because of the unacceptability of the Camp David Treaty to most of its members. In lieu of this the US established a multinational force in which it was and is the main participant.

41. Quandt in Beling, ibid, pg 80

42. See Appendix B, The Camp David Treaty, "Preamble" and "Framework".

43. Cf Yehoshua Raviv, "The Arab-Israeli Military Balance", in Centre for Strategic Studies Papers, 7, February 1980, pg 26

(a) Significant increase in ground forces order of battle by the addition of three armoured mechanized divisions.

(b) A marked quantitative and qualitative increase in combat material, tanks (mostly of high quality), armoured
personnel carriers and artillery – to compliment the increased order of battle; an increase of 1,300 tanks and 600 artillery pieces (including mortars).

(c) The establishment of an anti-tank missile network force of various models. The number of anti-tank missile launchers increased from 50 in 1973 to approximately 500 in 1980.

(d) Improvement in air defence by the addition of 5 surface-to-air missile batteries (of hawk and improved hawk varieties).

(e) Continuation of the build-up in air power (including latest model F-15 aircraft).

44. Cf S. Green, Living by the Sword, (Faber, London 1988) pg 103:

Egypt whose arms imports had exceeded those of Israel by more than two to one in the four years prior to the war, suddenly decreased the level in 1974. From 1974 to 1979 Egypt imported only $1.73 billion in arms, less than one third of the amount of Israeli arms imports in the same period ($5.2 billion).

45. For example, in 1975, it was reported that Egypt wished to drill for oil in El Tur on the Gulf of Suez. For this they had the backing of the US after exchanging the contract for the work with Amoco. Israel was furious – they regarded that territory as legally theirs and Egypt’s act as a violation of their territorial integrity. This resulted in the destruction of the drilling site by Israeli gunboat bombardment. Egypt stood helpless militarily, and other Arab states, for the first time since Egypt’s independence, had to resort to the reality of standing politically and militarily separate.

46. Only Sudan, Oman and Somalia failed to follow this diplomatic initiative.


48. Green, ibid, pg 109


50. Hirst and Beeson, ibid, pg 277. As Hirst and Beeson report Begin also understood the narrow limitations of the Treaty, but wanted to avoid Camp David being identified for what it was because "it would weaken and embarrass President Sadat".

51. Hirst and Beeson, ibid, pg 277

52. Hirst and Beeson, ibid, pg 356

53. Quoted in October, 15 January, 1978
1. Andrew Neil replying to Peter Sissons on "Question Time", BBC 1, October 22, 1992.

2. News professionalism controls the behaviour of journalists in two related ways: (1) it sets standards and norms of behaviour, and (2) it determines the professional reward system.

Since news professionalism establishes norms of conduct for journalists, it is unnecessary for individual news organizations to arbitrarily establish elaborate rules and regulations for staff members. Also, there is no need for news organizations to establish expensive and time-consuming training programmes for new journalists since all journalists come to the organization with a certain amount of professional training. But unlike engineering or accountancy, there are a number of educational paths that lead to careers in journalism. Journalism then, cannot rely just on controlling professional training ... journalists come to share the cognitive base of news professionalism. The norms of behaviour that emanate from news professionalism constitute [an] ... organizational mechanism. Since the behaviour of journalists is rooted ... in shared professional norms, this minimizes the problems of how news organizations are able to maintain control over journalists. But shared professional norms do not eliminate completely the problem of organizational control because (1) professionalism provides journalists with an independent powerbase that can be used towards heavy-handed interference by management in professional activities of news staff, and (2) professionalism provides too much freedom for journalists, and thus news organizations must adopt procedures that further limit the professional behaviour of journalists. (John Soloski, "News Reporting and Professionalism", Media, Culture and Society, April 1989, Vol 11 #2, pg 212)


5. I shall return to the question of editorials in Chapter 5, as well as the notion of "imbalance". At this point I recognize that both "balance" and "imbalance" are both unreal states, and are useful only in suggesting a mode of journalism rather than an absolute code. Despite the fact that The New York Times' editorials not always neutral as regards either the PLO or Arabs as a whole (see Chapter 5.6) a certain level of balance (however
minimal) was achieved by using contradictory articles by external writers.

6. Regarding the bias of language Paul Chilton uses the example of the terms which he refers to as "nukespeak" (the language used to discuss the complex sub-scientific world of nuclear weaponry). The terminologies consciously employed in this case helped, according to him, to legitimate the existence of these weapons despite the consequences of their use for the survival of the human race. (Paul Chilton, Orwellsian Language, pg 43)

7. Clifford G. Christians, "Reporting and the Oppressed", in Responsible Journalism, ed Deni Elliott, pg 111

8. On the Channel 4 programme HARD NEWS, broadcast on June 1, 1989, Clive Wolmann, who had worked for the Financial Times, stressed that journalists are restricted in their investigative role. Restrictions are incursions on the journalist's ideal role as independent reporter: they pervert his expression rather than just limit it. In the case of the Financial Times he realized that the reason behind the lack of in depth analysis in financial issues stemmed from the association of that paper with big business. This involvement subverts analysis which might hurt important sources. He mentioned the example of the Al Fayed takeover story as being typical of the way in which the Financial Times, made timid by traditional sources, only dared to publish comment and analysis after the event.

9. See F.W. Hodgson, Modern Newspaper Practice, (Heinemann, London 1989) pg 28ff. Hodgson, with references to Denis McQuail, suggests profit-motivation, like bias, is a difficult charge to substantiate. It may be only one of a number of influences, but considering the turnover of, say, CNN, it must be a major one.

10. As an example see how, during the 1991 Gulf War, CNN (Cable News Network) considered its viewing figures to be the prime indicator of its effectiveness as a news medium. By the 1990s professionalism could easily be confused with technical proficiency. This argument was not as widespread in the criticism of newsprint media - except at the upper end of the market (The Independent's use of high-grade photography probably added to its appeal, but did not make inroads into the market share of, say, The Guardian).

11. As Chapter 5 indicates, an Egyptian journalist on the staff of Al Ahram might accurately be labelled a civil servant.

12. Cf Hodgson pg 69 on the role of proprietors in policy making, as well as Coleridge chapters 1, 3, 11, 13, 22 and 24.

"It doesn't really matter much in the end who actually owns the various newspapers," Lord Rothermere told me ... "When one proprietor gives up ... another one pretty soon comes along to take his place. ... I rather doubt the general
reader has much idea when one owner hands over to the next fellow."

But, as Lord Rothermere knew well, Lord Rothermere was simply being polite. ... Much more than his editors or general managers ... the proprietor sets not just the agenda but the whole mood and context and level of expectation. (Coleridge, Paper Tigers, pg 534)

13. Cf Z. Mikhael, "Asian Journalism - Challenges, Problems and Solutions", in Media Asia, vol 13.3 1986, pg 166


16. McQuail, ibid, pg 95

17. Unfortunately, societies contain too many interest groups to allow a cohesive, centrally-designed media policy to be fair or effective.


19. Traber, ibid, pg 76

Traber also observes the problems associated with media defining its role in concert with the social authority.

While conceding that the purposeful use of communication for development calls for a certain measure of direction, the problem really lies in how to define the modalities for providing media with direction. A certain amount of cooperation with the government is needed in order to get to know its development thinking and priorities, if for no other reason than that the government is an important catalyst in the development process, and thus an important source of information on development issues.


21. The restructuring of Egyptian society after the British and Farouk was dependent on the consolidation of a new system of power. Such consolidation needed a system of propaganda. A mechanism was already available, and well-developed (if not to Nasser's specific needs) in the Egyptian press. Sadat inherited a system which had few connections with Western culture. He wished to reverse this and set Egypt on an economic path matching that of the capitalist West. However "... since 1972 as a result of Sadat's press policies seventy or more journalists had gone into exile abroad. The largest proportion had come from the Al Ahram". (Anthony McDermott, Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak, pg 249)
22. Typical would be *The Egyptian Gazette*, which for almost a year (1976-1977) carried front page a portrait of president Sadat with bold headlines of his policies and pronouncements. In both *Al-Ahram* and *Al-Gumhuriyah* during 1976-1978 Sadat’s portrait - more than Nasser’s before him - was displayed almost daily, with his comments concerning topical events (see Chapter 5).

23. One example was the bread riots of early 1977, started as a result of an increase in prices of a commodity used daily by the bulk of the people. Unexplained in any major daily paper, the government actions came out of the blue and caused widespread dismay and anger. In fact, looking at papers for late 1976 indicates that headlines about Egypt’s internal condition were strongly positive.


25. Head, ibid, pg 19

26. The centralization of the state’s major functions and concomitant domination of the people in order to further restructuring needed a mechanism to encourage and promote change. The extent of post-colonial change is easy to disregard.

The dominant anti-imperialist trend after 1945 was Arab nationalism, imbedded most notably in Nasserism ... . It represented opposition both to control of the economy by imperialism, large landowners and the Arab bourgeoisie, and in a profound transformation of the Arab countries prepared to empower the masses and organize them in democratic control of the economy. This force found expression in the expansion of the state sector which provided employment (large armies, nationalized industries, expansive bureaucracies), in private landowning and carried out certain anti-imperialist measures. It was anti-bourgeois in so far as capital accumulation and the provision of employment could be better advanced under state control. But within this overall domination by the state, a new ruling class was able to consolidate and exercise a new form of class dictatorship. (Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans*, pg 21)


*The Children of Gebelawi* ... created a scandal, not only because of its subject matter, but also because of its technique, which represented a complete abandonment of old-fashioned descriptive novel. Making allegorical use of religious history, it suggested that the new regime would ultimately not be much different from the old ones; and did so with a passionate, darting intelligence that seemed to
have turned political disappointment - even despair - into a new freedom of expression. (John Rodenbeck, forward to The Beggar by Naguib Mahfouz, University of Cairo Press, 1984)

A yearning for freedom from Nasser's rule is hardly disguised below some of the more descriptive passages of his novels The Beggar or The Thief and the Dogs; when read by a contemporary Egyptian the meaning would have been obvious. For an example of this see The Beggar, pg 114.


29. Hinnebusch, ibid, pg 151:

The journalists' syndicate ... was generally on bad terms with the regime. Since Sadat's succession, it fought to expand journalistic freedom against regime controls. Adding asperity to the conflict was the strong leftist ideological influence in the profession. In the mid-70s, a Sadat confidant, Yussuf Sabai, headed the union and tried to discipline it; but somewhat later a left wing journalist, Kamal Zuhayri, was elected. This press criticism of the government, and the opposition political activity of some journalists, led Sadat to attempt to abolish the syndicate. It deflected this threat, but could not prevent creation of a watchdog "higher council for the press", to make sure journalists adhered to Sadat's political [code of ethics].

30. McDermott, ibid, pg 248-250


1. *Le Sud-Ouest* in the local paper of the regions of Medoc and Acquitaine in south-western France, and is printed in Bordeaux.

2. A typical good news story is middle-brow tabloid news and current affairs. Good news has its strongest place on popular television news programs such as ITN in the UK and in papers such as *The Daily Express*, and *The New York Post* and *Daily News* in the US. Circulation or audience figures govern news handling. When the high-quality French news channel Le Cinq collapsed in 1992 it sent a message of caution to many media producers and investors in Europe. Hard news may partially be restricted to "quality" papers, domestic or non-sensitive reporting, and specialist, low-audience current affairs programming which operate off-peak or on minority channels.


4. This process is something the Glasgow Media Group publicized in *Bad News and More Bad News*, (Glasgow University Media Group, *Bad News and More Bad News*) and was underlined by Westergaard (*Mass Communication and Society*, pgs 104-110). Agenda-setting has been described in their study of the way industrial relations was covered in Britain, skewed against trades unions and towards the employers and status quo. But a process which works domestically, works equally (and for similar reasons) internationally, where constraints and biases work most effectively; where there are few interest groups, and where those which do exist are blessed with a credible series of attitudes probably well in tune with the attitudes of the nation as a whole.

5. Westergaard, ibid, pg 110


7. See Robert Fisk, *The Independent*, February 27th 1994, pg 17, "Israelis can be terrorists too" on linguistic agenda-setting in the context of Israel, the Israeli Armed Forces, the PLO and its associated groups, and Hamas, in the aftermath of the killing of 48 Muslim worshippers by Baruch Goldstein on February 14th, 1994.

8. To illustrate the selective concerns of the media the massacre in East Timor in 1991 of one hundred and forty demonstrators (Amnesty figures) in the capital Dili, the previous years' genocide of the East Timorese by Indonesia, and the statement by the governor of East Timor in November 1992 (in the week before the first anniversary of the killings) that it would have been better had one thousand demonstrators died rather than one hundred, was reported in all the major British papers. Only two, *The Independent* and *The Guardian* went to more than one paragraph, and in the US only *The Washington Post* went into detail.
9. Primarily the Western media has the filtering structure of news agency/service (such as AFP or Reuters), then selection of items by journalists from this agency, further selection by editorial staff - dividing material into various types of prominence - which in turn involve selection of graphics, followed by rewriting and cutting. This contributes to the type of response offered, and what falls within certain acceptable political limits (or what fails to). Response is further altered by previous days' reporting, other papers' attitudes, whether certain political attitudes would be covered at all. All these gate-keeping, restructuring tasks would take place within the general political atmosphere of the paper, and journalists would usually know where they stood on general issues.

10. US commercial interests might perceive Mideastern peace as a valuable prerequisite both for an avoidance of another oil embargo, as well as for better trading relations with the region as a whole. As reporting and editorials in both The Washington Post and The New York Times show (see Chapter 5), there was an ill-defined hope that the spirit of Camp David (reconciliation, arbitration and peace) would spill over into the other countries of the Mideast, and that interests could be better protected by the Accords.

11. It is difficult to know just how much the media hype associated with Camp David fed back into the political process, simplifying it. What can be said is that many media judgements of Arab politics showed a profound lack of sympathy - especially in US media.


13. The threat offered Israel by its neighbours cohered a defensive group into a lobbying party with the necessary credentials to be effective within the US system. The factor behind political and media support for Israel (and Camp David) is the relative economic strength of such a large lobby as well as its organizational strength and untiring professionalism. The only groups which come close to this kind of determination will be similar "minority" lobbies where past repression and present danger invigorate members into lobbying activities.

14. Quandt ibid, pg 321-322

15. Chomsky, ibid, pg 4

16. It would be absurd to suggest that, with all its intelligence capacity, satellite surveillance techniques, and leaks to the media even before Mordecai Vanunu's spectacular revelations in The Times of London in 1981, the US had no inkling of the traffic of enriched Uranium to Israel from South Africa during the 1970s.

subsidiary material (The San Francisco Chronicle, The Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Austin American Statesman) also offered no criticism. There was plenty of criticism about US military sales elsewhere in the Mideast, especially of Carter's arms package to Saudi Arabia (1977). The impression is that the fact of US military patronage was one of the immutables: questioning that might have lead to doubts about Israel's right to exist.

18. Within The Washington Post and The New York Times over the Camp David period (September 1977 - April 1979) the three Arab countries most mentioned in international news sections (as a total percentage of Arab countries covered) were Egypt (28%) Lebanon (21%) Saudi Arabia (19.5%) and Jordan (8%). Similar percentages were found in other US papers, with Libya, Iraq and Syria scoring larger percentages during the 1980s when these countries were closely associated with the incidence of "terrorism". From 1977 to 1994 there was a shift, and issues of Mideast peace were approximate-ly equal to issues of Arab-sponsored "terrorism". Percentage averages for those 10 years for the top issues from Arab countries were: Israel and associated peace moves - 18.5%; Arab-sponsored "terror" - 17% (including, most notably, the "Achille Lauro incident and the Lockerbie bombing); Palestinian issues - 11%; inter-Arab conflict (not counting the Iran-Iraq war which was a war between an Arab and a non-Arab country) - 6%; oil - 5.5%; Islam - 5%.

19. In the US even liberal papers such as the Boston Globe narrowed reporting of Camp David to stringers who followed reports by Reuters or AP in much the same mould as the two main papers studied and, later, barred critics such as Noam Chomsky from its columns. (See Chomsky, Deterring Democracy)


22. Dorman and Farhang, ibid, pg 157

23. Dorman and Farhang, ibid, pg 226

24. Said, Edward W., Covering Islam, pg 31-32

25. It is notable that not even liberal US papers like The Washington Post or The Boston Globe chose to go into great depth about Palestinian grievances. Interest remained specifically linked to the future of the Occupied Territories.
CHAPTER 5

1. Used in an abbreviated and selected form in *The International Herald Tribune* these two papers have the widest circulation outside the US of any US newspaper.


3. High-profile media in developed countries do also come under covert government pressure: the BBC and ITV in Britain and both *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, and more recently, CBS in the US have faced criticism of news coverage which changed content.

4. For September 1977 the following figures ignore agency reports, and first give a percentage of space used during that month for Mideast news of all kinds (out of a total news coverage, domestic and international) then as a percentage of only international news.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Washington Post</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsweek</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Boston Globe</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times (London)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian (Manchester and London)</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde (Paris)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each case, European newspapers gave more space to international news of all kinds, and used agencies less than their US counterparts.

5. The literate class in Egypt is narrower than in the US, and more or less limited to the educated middle and upper classes. Literacy in Egypt has been reckoned at 51.6% by 1990 (*Article 19: World Report 1991*, Library Association Publishing, London). *Al-Ahram* itself, in its annual report for 1993 published in Cairo, estimates its readership at something between 2 and 2.5 million. However sales do not equal readership, and the true readership total as papers are passed from hand to hand, may be nearer 10 million.
6. It should be noted that distribution patterns differ. Al Ahram is in many ways more international than the three US newspapers. Although there is the vehicle of The International Herald Tribune to spread leading articles from The Washington Post and The New York Times abroad, at home The New York Times speaks mainly to middle and upper middle class New Yorkers, and those resident in the commuter area around New York (say within 200 kilometres). Al Ahram, on the other hand, is sold in virtually every Arabic-speaking country, as well as having its English language sister copy printed in London. Even while a propaganda tool for Nasser and then Sadat, it spoke to a large audience. The style of its editorials as well as the contents of its first three pages suggest a combination of domestic propaganda as well as Egyptian policy statement for the Arabic-speaking world as a whole.

7. There are of course major differences. There was never any "Party" in Egypt to compare with the role of the Communist Party in the USSR. However, there was within the Egyptian system a vast civil service guaranteeing jobs for those migrating from schools and colleges, a system only finally challenged under Mubarak.


10. Whether or not Sadat knew what intelligence Carter received about Egypt (and it is certain that during 1977 and 1978 he was kept informed about the parlous internal situation in Egypt, despite the poor intelligence on Arab affairs in general) Al Ahram's role as a semi-official, semi-independent register of the country's situation read throughout the region and beyond, made it an obvious candidate for strict control.


12. In spite of the organization of popular demonstrations to welcome the president on his return from Camp David, he had to take note that the opposition was ever-increasing ... [H]is entire regime was deprived of any basis, as it was suspended between external power and internal repressions. Sadat felt obliged to "go into the streets" according to his own expression, to "face the people directly".

In parallel with this direct action by the president, the ruling regime started multiple actions to facilitate his task by preparing a cultural and informational background favorable to his move. ...

Ghali Shoukri, Egypt, Portrait of a President, pg 402

13. Al Ahram, July 14, 1977, pg 1 [Nb: when someone's name is used in a headline followed by a colon, the following words are considered to be a quotation, or a paraphrase of a quotation. There is a similar practice in some Western newspapers.]

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15. It is not unusual that, in national emergencies, free expression within media should be curtailed. What is interesting and paradoxical about the stifling of dissent in Egyptian newspapers from 1976 to 1981 was the inference (because of the level of censorship) that the country was passing through a grave national emergency, while the media were constantly suggesting how relatively normal and successful political life was. Sadat’s repression gave the lie to his assertion of normalcy.

16. Al Ahram, August 13, 1977, pg 5


18. Al Ahram quoted Sadat on September 19, 1977 in a headline on page 1 as saying to Carter "I can’t imagine the holding of any talks without the PLO".

19. This could have been an unofficial message from Sadat to the US expressing his disapproval, or one of the few times journalism could be seen peeking out from behind government control. Because of Sadat’s general lack of political subtlety the latter is more likely.

20. Al Ahram Editorials September 2, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, all stress Camp David as the great key to peace.

21. Al Ahram, September 3, Page 5

22. Al Ahram, September 6, pg 5

23. Al Ahram, September 19, pg 3


26. Al Ahram, September 17, 1978, Editorial

27. This clash indicates that Al Ahram should by no means be considered just a mouthpiece of the Egyptian government. That el Jamal could be less than enthused in print suggests that the lines of censorship which stretched between Sadat’s cabinet office and Cairo’s government newspapers were not always so tightly-drawn.

28. Al Ahram, September 22, 1978. This Editorial was more or less typical. A simplistic (and repetitive) Editorial line only underpinned by other, supportive, opinions. A basic duality can be observed between "responsibility" and lack of it. Egypt, in the person of Sadat, was portrayed as doing its moral duty.

30. Al Ahram, September 20, 1978, pg 7; Dr. Mohammed Ali El-Oweni, director of the media section of the Cairo-based School of Media and Communications, wrote an article which, together with the main Editorial, applauded the results of Camp David in specifically Arab terms, stressing that dissent was irresponsible and counter-productive both for Egyptians and Palestinians.


33. There is a curious gap between the US press and what was, undoubtedly, a better-informed government structure. The NSC, for example, was well-briefed by such as Quandt and Cordesman, while David Long worked in the State Department.

34. Dorman and Farhang, ibid, pgs 160f


37. Nicholas Coleridge, Paper Tigers (Heinemann, 1993)

38. Ibid, July 28, 1977

39. Ibid, September 14, 1977

40. Ibid, September 29, 1977

41. Ibid, September 14, 1977: Frankel's editorial talks of the "hopes" of the Dayan plan, while calling Palestine an "entity". On September 26, Frankel wrote positively about Sadat's role in the peace process. Then on September 29 Frankel launched a stinging attack on the PLO and Palestine (even as an entity this concept now was unacceptable).

42. Ibid, October 14, 1977, editorial

43. Ibid, the editorial of November 1, 1977 was deeply antagonistic towards Arab opinion, especially in the context of the Occupied Territories.

44. Ibid, November 21, pg 22, col 5/6

45. Ibid, November 21, 1977, editorial

46. The choice of photograph [November 21, 1977] is always important in major news items: it may be used to break up a page of type, or to balance serious issues with visual distraction, but a picture always says something. Page 5's happy, smiling
faces suggest that, where politics and policies matter — ie with ordinary people — there is less room for cynicism or criticism.

47. ibid, December 6, 1977, editorial

48. ibid, December 9, 1977, pg A3 (headline and photograph) "Egyptians Rally in Support of Sadat as he Calls his "Hard-Line" Arab Critics "Dwarfs"", by Christopher S. Wren in Cairo.

49. This could be part of a definition of "sentimentality".

50. ibid, January 19, 1978


52. ibid, February 2, 1978.

53. ibid, March 16, 1978, editorial. (See also opposite page, where William Safire supported recent Israeli military action: "Israel’s Answer").

54. ibid, March 17, 1978

55. ibid, June 22, 1978, pg A23.


57. ibid, July 6, 1978.

58. ibid, July 25, 1978.


60. ibid, July 6/7, 1978.

61. ibid, December 18, 1978, pg A19.

62. On average, during the period of my study The Washington Post offered more domestic material, and less international material than The New York Times (as a percentage of total copy):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>THE NEW YORK TIMES</th>
<th>THE WASHINGTON POST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
See Table 5.4 for a further breakdown in these percentages to show how much of that copy was devoted to Mideast material.

63. Bradlee himself enjoyed an enormous amount of prestige after *The Washington Post* published its famous account of Watergate. It might even be said that Watergate made him the most influential editor in the US (and the most famous US editor worldwide). Other papers, importantly, began to take the cue from *The Washington Post* and Bradlee: Halberstam mentions two of the most influential, the Milwaukee Journal, and the St Louis Post Dispatch. (*The Powers That Be*, page 528.) That influence is likely to have been wider still. But Bradlee himself was no radical journalist. He was, according to Halberstam, "irreverent in style rather than substance, in language but not in deed" (page 531). He was most importantly Katherine Graham's favourite. One final observation bears directly on Bradlee's treatment of the Middle East, and on Camp David in particular.

"Did [The Washington Post] have a moral centre? Should a newspaper have a moral centre? What worried many of the reporters and some of the editors about Bradlee was that a story was an end in itself. Get the story, best the opposition, stick it to them before they stick it to us. The story without any sense of the large context or implication." (Halberstam, page 563)

See also Nicholas Coleridge, *Paper Tigers* (London, 1993) pg 91 where Bradlee is described as "buccaneering".

64. Kay Graham, the paper's owner, was very much a hands-on personality, regularly, sitting in on editorial meetings. Her influence spread itself across the newspaper, and may have eclipsed Bradlee, or at least obliged him to take a lower profile. (See Halberstam, *The Powers That Be*, pg 560f)


66. ibid, July 28, 1977, pg A23.


68. ibid, April 1, 1978, Clayton Fritchey, pg A13.

69. Cf *Washington Post* editorials May 12, June 21, June 27, July 5, July 6, July 17, 1978, and that responding to the Brandt-Kreisky initiative, printed on August 9. All illustrate how Bradlee lost touch with what he previously had seen as vital areas of disagreement in the Mideast, for the sake of a summit.


71. Ibid, July 1, 1977. The "Poster" section (page B5)

72. ibid, July 16, 1977.
73. ibid, November 22, 1977, pg A12.
74. ibid, November 21, 1978, front page and pg A14.
75. ibid, November 21, 1977, pg A14.
76. ibid, November 22, 1977, pg A22.
77. Even H.D.S. Greenway was a little more critical - if only in a tangential manner. Cf his articles of April 6, 1978 (front page and pg A18) and May 12, 1978, pg A12.
78. ibid, January 16, 1978, pg A18. Randal went on to state "[Palestinian] residents sense no control of events".
79. K. Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, (Sage, London, 1980) page 21. See also page 26-7:

In any content analysis it must be clear which data are analysed ... the aim or target of the inferences must be clearly stated ... the task is to make inferences from data to certain aspects of their context and to justify these inferences ... [and] the kind of evidence needed to validate its results must be specified ... .

Also O.R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, (Addison-Wesley, New York 1969) page 14:

Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages.

And B. Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research, (Hafner, New York 1952) page 18:

Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.
81. Ibid Krippendorff, page 99:

Context sensitivity is displayed (1) wherever the researcher feels that the processing of his data must not impair their symbolic qualities and (2) to assure that these qualities are retained the analytical procedures used represents [sic] significant features of the context within which the data are considered. As analytical construct operationalizes what the analyst knows about the interdependencies between data and context.
82. Notably the following: Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle; Cattan, The Palestinian Question; Fraser, The US and the Middle East Since World War 2; Bailey, Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process; Beling [ed], Middle East Peace Plans.


84. The Washington Post and The New York Times have less monolithic structures. Consensus doesn't need to be enforced from the top down, it establishes itself via similar educational, religious and political structures. A large bourgeoisie, with identifiably similar interests, resources, articulacy and thereby, power, dominate. Other interest groups can be absorbed at different rates according to how easily they are to be fitted into the dominant social picture. The difference between Egypt and the US or UK is that in the former consensus must be imposed top-down, often despite a burgeoning bourgeoisie, while in the latter cases there is a trade off in power between the most significant social group and its representatives. Consensus might still need to be imposed at times (for example, The Boston Globe book-reviewing policy does not recognize South End Press, a left-wing co-operative company that publishes Noam Chomsky's work, presumably because the work published by South End is too far outside the consensus to be palatable).

85. These were: British Politics; British Economics; British Social Issues [ie unemployment and its effects]; Banking Scandals; Royal Family; US Politics; European Politics; Russia/the CIS [references to the old USSR]; Christian Religion; Islam; the Mideast; African Conflict and Famine; South Africa; Racism; Feminism [comprising equal rights, women's issues &c]; Sexual Politics [comprising gay rights]; Sexuality; the Arts; Military Issues; Green Issues.

86. The New York Times, page 3 far left column, bottom page, 250 words.

87. Krippendorff (page 107) does not attempt to tackle linguistic-based content analytical theory, but notes:

Analytical constructs for linguistic representations and for communications are very complex ... [the former] always involve several components operationalizing different knowledge about language use. One component provides a syntactical description of the linguistic material being analysed, one component infers the possible linguistic functions and meanings of words in their linguistic context, and a third maps the semantical interpretations onto a "world model" or "territory" of the discourse, whose logic allows the analyst to draw inferences about what is referred to and implied.

He goes on to note that the use of generalizations are almost inevitable.
88. The Irish Times, published in Belfast and Dublin, is perceived to have a majority Catholic readership, though this is now changing.

89. An Phoblacht is the newspaper of Sinn Fein, the umbrella political organisation which speaks for the IRA. It is non-sectarian (though presumably the majority of its readers are Catholic).

90. The Belfast Telegraph was the paper serving the Protestant community, though now it aims to be non-sectarian.


92. See Fowler, ibid.

93. I took a random selection of articles in the London-based newspaper Al Arab (first published 1970) in their correspondent section <Mujarad Raiee> "Only An Opinion" for December 1993. The articles were mainly attacks on Western or Arab establishments from a Libyan/Arab socialist viewpoint. Most of the articles ran for no longer than 300 words. Linguistically there was a very similar semantic structure, with the same style of repetitions and re-use of stock word/word-group phrases, the only difference being that Israel was not the main target, but only one of a range of targets. (The most villified of which was the US.)

94. Roger Fowler, Language in the News, page 209

95. This was not unusual for an Arabic newspaper. See also the "editorial" or "comment" <ra’il> sections of Al Gumhuryah, Al Wafd. Even stringers and ordinary columnists used rhetoric. The nearest equivalence in the West would be the tabloid style (using rhyme, assonance, symbol and exaggeration).

96. I recognise how problematic it is to define humour, but for the purposes of this definition it should be (i) inappropriate reference ("West Bank by Any Other Name", New York Times editorial, September 14th; "Slouching Toward Geneva" editorial, September 29th) (ii) sarcasm (iii) word-play - ie punning (iv) exaggeration).


"The Second Coming" appeared in Michael Robartes and the Dancer (Faber, London 1928) (a group of Yeats’ most apocalyptic poems, published during the increasing violence prior to the Irish Civil War, 1921):

Turning and Turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,  
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere  
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;  
The best lack all conviction, while the worst  
Are full of passionate intensity.

Surely some revelation is at hand;  
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.  
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out  
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi  
Troubles my sight: somewhere in the sands of the desert  
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,  
A gaze bland and pitiless as the sun,  
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it  
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.  
The darkness drops again; but now I know  
That twenty centuries of stony sleep  
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,  
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,  
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?

The conclusion that "the best lack all conviction, while the worst/Are full of passionate intensity" was a direct reference to the Carter Administration (then involved in the Lance scandal) could not easily be avoided. This editorial followed a significant dialogue on Capitol Hill concerning the role of the Palestinians in any peace conference. Each time a Mideast peace structure was put together obstacles were encountered, and the similarities between the Madrid Conference of October 1991, and the mooted Geneva Conference of 1977 are plain. The editorial (whether or not it recognized the nature of Israeli opposition) did recognize that any moves by Carter towards a dialogue with the PLO could only be to Israel’s disadvantage (and, for the editor, the discredit of the US administration). By implication, the editorial tried to squeeze Palestinian representation into an unimportant corner. "Israelis of every political stripe oppose a separate Palestinian state and fear, rightly, that a separate Palestinian delegation could set the stage for a separate state." (Note the use of the verb-adverb structure "fear, rightly", associating fear and its appropriateness with the Palestinians.) The "rough beast" of Yeats’ poem is probably the PLO, and whereas the foreground of the editorial talks in terms of Israeli fears and political problems, the subtext remains the poem, and the image of the Palestinian delegation as bestial and even Satanic. Using the word "right" (meaning correct) about the Israelis’ anti-Palestinian stance three times in the piece, but keeping the reader’s mind anchored in the Satanic image of Palestinian politics, projected an attitude more negative than distrust of or political disagreement with Palestinian elements in the suggested talks. This is the advantage of humorous rhetoric: it allows criticism to be far stronger (as it does frequently with satire).


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APPENDIX A

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AGREED AT CAMP DAVID

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

PREAMBLE

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:
- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
- After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.
- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.
- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of resolutions 242 and 338.
- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.
- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of the peace treaties, the parties can,
on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

FRAMEWORK

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A: West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A
strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

(1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

(2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

(3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

(4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional periods, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and
disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the time table for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
   (a) full recognition;
   (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
   (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

A. Sadat

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In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of the UN Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;

(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;

(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;

(d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

(f) the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

A. No more that one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.

C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.
D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el Sheik area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:
A. Sadat

For the Government of Israel:
M. Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America

LETTER FROM ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks after my return home I will submit a motion before Israel’s Parliament (the Knesset) to decide on the following question:

If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, "are you in favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you in favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas?"
The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely free from the usual Parliamentary Party discipline to the effect that although the coalition is being now supported by 70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I believe, both on the Government and Opposition benches will be enabled to vote in accordance with his own conscience.

Sincerely yours,

Menachem Begin

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT, SEPTEMBER 22, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime Minister Begin setting forth how he proposes to present the issue of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the latter's decision.

In this connection, I understand from your letter that Knesset approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any negotiations on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Enclosure:
Letter from Prime Minister Begin

LETTER FROM EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in Sinai" to be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the settlements:

1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty.

2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to this basic principle is therefore a prerequisite to starting peace negotiations for concluding a peace treaty.

3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "Framework" shall be void and invalid.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO
ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN,
SEPTEMBER 22, 1978

Dear Mr Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, describing how
you intend to place the question of the future of Israeli
settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its decision.

Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat’s letter to me on this
subject.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Enclosure:
Letter from President Sadat

LETTER FROM EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL
SADAT TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER,
SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic
of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem:

1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal
and historical Arab rights in the City must be respected and
restored.

2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.

3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled
to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the
Palestinian People in the West Bank.

4. Relevant Security Council Resolutions, particularly
Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusal-
em. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the
City are null and void and should be rescinded.

5. All peoples must have free access to the City and enjoy the
free exercise of worship and the right to visit and transit to
the holy places without distinction or discrimination.

6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the
administration and control of their representatives.

7. Essential functions in the City should be undivided and a
joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and
Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these funct-
ions. In this way, the City shall be undivided.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

LETTER FROM ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM
BEGIN TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER,
SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

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I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967 - Israel's Parliament (The Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "the Government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the State to any part of Eretz Israel (land of Israel-Palestine), as stated in that decree."

On the basis of this law, the Government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the Capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

Menachem Begin

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT, SEPTEMBER 22, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, setting forth the Egyptian position on Jerusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his information.


Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

LETTER FROM EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the implementation of the comprehensive settlement.

To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the West bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO
ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN,
SEPTEMBER 22, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows:

A) In each paragraph of the Agreed Framework Document the expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and will be construed and understood by you as "Palestinian Arabs."

B) In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appear, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD
BROWN TO ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER EZER
WEISMAN, ACCOMPANYING THE DOCUMENTS
AGREED TO AT CAMP DAVID, RELEASED
SEPTEMBER 29, 1978

September 28, 1978

Dear Mr. Minister:

The U.S. understands that, in connection with carrying out the agreements reached at Camp David, Israel intends to build two military airbases at appropriate sites in the Negev to replace the airbases at Eitam and Etzion which will be evacuated by Israel in accordance with the peace treaty to be concluded between Egypt and Israel. We also understand the special urgency and priority which Israel attaches to preparing the new bases in light of its conviction that it cannot safely leave the Sinai airbases until the new ones are operational.

I suggest that our two governments consult on the scope and costs of the two new airbases as well as on related forms of assistance which the United States might appropriately provide in light of the special problems which may be presented by carrying out such a project on an urgent basis. The President is prepared to seek the necessary Congressional approvals for such assistance as may be agreed upon by the U.S. side as a result of such consultations.

Harold Brown
APPENDIX B

THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY, MARCH 26, 1979

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel:

Preamble

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978;
Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbours which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;
Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects;
Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;
Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;
Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel:"

Article I

1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.
3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III(3).

Article II
The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

Article III

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:
   a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
   b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;
   c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory or by forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

Article IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in the areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.
3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

Article V

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Article VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligations in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

Article VII

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

Article VIII

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
**Article IX**

1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.
3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Done at Washington, D.C. this 26th day of March, 1979, in triplicate in the English, Arabic, and Hebrew languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:  
A. Sadat

For the Government of Israel:  
M. Begin

Witnessed by:  

Jimmy Carter  
Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America

**AGREED MINUTES TO ARTICLES 1, IV, V, VI AND ANNEXES I AND II OF THE TREATY OF PEACE**

**Article 1**

Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full sovereignty over the Sinai provided for in paragraph 2 of Article I shall occur with regard to each area upon Israel's withdrawal from that area.

**Article IV**

It is agreed between the Parties that the review provided for in Article IV(4) will be undertaken when requested by either Party, commencing within three months of such a request, but that any amendment can be made only with the mutual agreement of both Parties.

**Article V**

The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V shall not be construed as limiting the first sentence of that paragraph. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads as follows:

"The parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba."
The Provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(2) of the treaty, which reads as follows:

"The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other Party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty."

It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

"Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented."

Article VI, Paragraph 8, of Annex I provides as follows: "The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations force and observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council." The Parties have agreed as follows:

"With respect to the provisions of paragraph 8, Article VI, of Annex I, if no agreement is reached between the Parties they will accept or support a U.S. proposal concerning the composition of the United Nations force and observers."

The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto provide for establishing normal economic relations between the Parties. In accordance therewith, it is agreed that such relations will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such oil.

Republic of Egypt:    A. Sadat

For the Government of Israel:

M. Begin

Witnessed by:

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APPENDIX C:

LETTER FROM ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN AND EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, MARCH 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

This letter confirms that Egypt and Israel have agreed as follows:

The Governments of Egypt and Israel recall that they concluded at Camp David and signed at the White House on September 17, 1978, the annexed documents entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David" and "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel."

For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in accordance with the above-mentioned Frameworks, Egypt and Israel will proceed with the implementation of those provisions relating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They have agreed to start negotiations within a month after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Peace Treaty. In accordance with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The purpose of the negotiation shall be to agree, prior to the elections, on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority (administrative council), define its powers and responsibilities, and agreed upon other related issues. In the event Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, the negotiations will be held by Egypt and Israel.

The two Governments agree to negotiate continuously and in good faith to conclude these negotiations at the earliest possible date. They also agree that the objective of the negotiations is the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants.

Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the negotiations within one year so that elections will be held as expeditiously as possible after agreement has been reached between the parties. The self-governing authority referred to in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five years will begin. The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn, to be replaced by the self-governing authority, as specified in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East." A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will then take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

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This letter also confirms our understanding that the United States Government will participate fully in all stages of negotiations.
Sincerely yours,
For the Government of Israel:

M. Begin
Menachem Begin

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

A. Sadat
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, MARCH 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:
In response to your request, I can confirm that, within one month after the completion of Israel's withdrawal to the interim line as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send an a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive a resident Israeli ambassador in Egypt.
Sincerely,

A. Sadat
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN, MARCH 26, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one month after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line in Sinai, as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a resident Israeli ambassador.
I will be grateful if you will confirm that this procedure will be agreeable to the Government of Israel.
Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter

LETTER FROM ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, MARCH 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:
I am pleased to be able to confirm that the Government of Israel is agreeable to the procedure set out in your letter of March 26, 1979 in which you state:
"I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one month after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line in Sinai, as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a resident Israeli ambassador."
Sincerely,

M. Begin

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LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT, AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN, MARCH 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President/Prime Minister:
I wish to confirm to you that subject to United States Constitutional processes:

In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and will take such other actions as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

The United States will conduct aerial monitoring as requested by the Parties pursuant to Annex I of the Treaty.

The United States believes the Treaty provision for permanent stationing of United Nations personnel in the designated limited force zone can and should be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. The United States will exert its utmost efforts to obtain the requisite action by the Security Council. If the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Jimmy Carter
APPENDIX D:

Resolution No 186 (S/2) 14th May, 1948

Appointing a UN mediator

The General Assembly,
Taking account of the present situation in regard to Palestinians,

I

Strongly affirms its support of the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine and calls upon all Governments, organizations and persons to co-operate in making effective such a truce;

II

1. Empowers a United Nations mediator in Palestine, to be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to exercise the following functions:

(a) to use his good offices with the local and community authorities in Palestine to:

(i) arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the safety and well-being of the population of Palestine;

(ii) assure a protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine;

(iii) promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.

(b) To co-operate with the truce commission for Palestine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of 23 April 1948.

(c) To invite, as seems to him advisable, with a view to promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, the assistance and co-operation of appropriate special agencies of the United Nations, such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross, and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character;

2. Instructs the United Nations mediator to render progress reports monthly, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary General for transmission to the members of the United Nations;

3. Directs the United Nations mediator to confirm in his activities with the provisions of this resolution and with such
instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may issue;

4. **Authorizes** the Secretary-General to pay the United Nations mediator an emolument equal to that paid to the President of the International Court of Justice, and to provide the mediator with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the mediator by the General Assembly.
APPENDIX E

Resolutions 242 and 388

Resolution No. 242 (1967) of 22 November, 1967

STATING THE PRINCIPLES OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all member states in acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

   (i) withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in recent conflicts;

   (ii) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

   (a) for granting freedom of navigation through international waterways through the area;

   (b) for achieving a just settlement for the refugee problem;

   (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provision and principles in this resolution;

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4. **Requests** the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible.

**Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.**

Resolution No 338 (1973) of 22 October, 1973

**CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL OF ITS PARTS**

**The Security Council,**

1. **Calls upon** all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than twelve hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. **Calls upon** the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. **Decides** that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

**Adopted at the 1747th Meeting.**
APPENDIX F:
THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

Foreign Office,
2 November, 1917

Dear Lord Rothchild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any country".

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur James Balfour

FOOTNOTES:

1. A note by Carter at the foot of this document states:

"I have been informed that the expression 'West Bank' is understood by the Government of Israel to mean 'Judea and Samaria.'"

2. Two letters were sent - one to Begin, the other to Sadat - which were identical in all respects