Breeding Demons

A critical enquiry into the relationship between Kant and Deleuze with specific reference to women

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Summary

This thesis addresses the relation between Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze, with reference to women. It argues that Deleuze's "methods" reveal an intensive dynamic in Kant obscured by readings which concentrate on the molar structures in his thought and that this dynamic is implicated with the deployment by Deleuze (and Guattari) of becoming-woman as a middle line which escapes the rational tribunal. It insists that a philosophy of difference function as a positive elimination of relations to unity, to the subject and to other figures of power in philosophical thought and that Deleuze's oeuvre is a critical and creative engagement with the transformation of philosophical problems and the relation of thinking to history which emerge from this.

The other theme, that of women, is addressed through Luce Irigaray's reading of Kant and Rosi Braidotti's reading of becoming-woman. I argue that whilst the former's critique of an uncritically assumed symmetry in Kant's work is effective and well-directed, she becomes caught in her own methodology of jamming, but that there are nonetheless strong and productive directions in her thought, many of which are parallel and/or connected to those of Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-woman. Against Braidotti's interpretation of becoming-woman, I argue that it adopts a molar political strategy and as such does not connect with the force behind this thought.

Lastly, this thesis is an argument against bilateral sexual difference, in favour of distributive or 'n-sexes': the title, Breeding Demons connects the theme of demons in Deleuze's writing to the cycles which effect such distributions.
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For Emily
Introduction

Side-Communication

‘Philosophie, rien que de la philosophie, au sens traditionnel du mot’.¹

Two primary themes inform the direction of this thesis. The first is the relation of Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze and the second, the position of women in philosophy, both as philosophers and as creatures with a philosophical design which women themselves have had no part in creating. The two problems connect in the concept of becoming-woman, found in *Mille Plateaux* (1980), the second of the two volumes of *Capitalisme et Schizophrénie*, which Deleuze co-wrote with Félix Guattari.

I Revolution

Each element - Kant, Deleuze and women - is attached in its own way to revolution. The French revolution ‘finds in the hearts of all spectators (who are not engaged in this game themselves) a wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm’, Kant wrote, sounding close to enthusiasm himself, from the safe, if by that time censorial Prussian State under the rule of Frederick William II.² Under his uncle, Frederick the Great, Prussia had been shaped by a thirst for power and glory, rationalized through the medium of Enlightenment ideas. Unlike his mystically inclined nephew, Frederick was religiously indifferent, believing his authority rested in the State itself, and he set about shaping it in a way which would reflect this status. He instigated massive land-reclamation and colonization projects; he established a huge bureaucratic administration; his codification and uniformization of the law resulted in a new political character, the citizen; and he quieted the Prussian aristocracy, enlisting their services for the State with privileges and rewards. For Frederick, the idea of the

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State as servant to the people was anathema: to Voltaire, he wrote: ‘I view my subjects like a herd of stags on some noble’s estate[,] their only function is to reproduce and fill the space’. Kant flourished on Frederick’s estate, and could observe from its safe pastures events unfolding in less stable areas of the world, revolutions with less order than that of Frederick.

Deleuze’s pre-1968 writing has the appearance of conservatism, in both language and tone. But the appearance is misleading, and to sustain it requires deliberate effort. His collaboration with Félix Guattari in the two volumes of Capitalisme et Schizophrenie effected a transformation in thought, taking it out of the academy and restoring it to life and desire, energizing language with fresh air. It sides with no politics; ‘Démocratie, fascisme ou socialisme, lequel n’est hanté par l’Urstaat comme modèle inégalable (democracy, fascism, or socialism, which of these is not haunted by the Urstaat as a model without equal)?’ Attack, with joy, the oedipal, the familial, the statist, the fascistic, the ideological, the patrimonial and the repressive, L’anti-oedipe, the first volume, is thought as exterminating angel. To the extent that thought returns to the subject and to subjection, ‘L’anti-oedipe a été un échec complet’.

Yet there are continuities which run throughout his work, consistent themes; an initial list might include intensities, the problem of critique as production, the body, the strangulation of thought by consciousness and conscience. And consistent names: Spinoza, Artaud, Freud, Nietzsche, Marx, Leibniz, Kant, Simondon, Canetti, Geoffroy St. Hilaire - again naming only a selection. May ‘68 and the collaboration with Guattari catalysed the assemblage of these characters and themes, together with many others, into an up and running machine of thought without image or single origin, which proliferates potential directions with each reading. There is treachery in
choosing to follow the continuities, as this thesis does, rather than emphasizing the break. But:

‘Etre traître à son propre règne, être traître à son sexe, à sa classe, à sa majorité - quelle autre raison d'écrire?

(What other reason is there for writing than to be traitor to one’s own reign, traitor to one’s sex, to one’s class, to one’s majority?)’ (DP, 1977:56; 1987:44)

In an attack on the re-domestication of thought in France in the '70's, Deleuze points to the convergence of disparate and apparently contrary positions on one agreed point: hatred of May '68, and the declared impossibility of revolution, either explicit or tacit, in the enthusiasm for the principle of election. For this, one must first place oneself as a subject, a citizen - a Staatsbürger; for this man, Deleuze argues, revolution becomes ‘l’acte pur du penseur qui la pense impossible (the pure act of a thinker who thinks it [revolution] impossible)’. A similar convergence can be seen today also, this time in relation to the reception of Deleuze’s work, and this time the point of unity is possession. Those who do not live up to the revolutionary potential are castigated for their ‘craven submission to the Academy’, whilst those less craven are charged with a range of crimes from mis-reading, philosophical inadequacy, outright lunacy, and desiring the impossible. Each side has its orthodoxies and its enemies, its image of revolution and of thought. A running theme throughout Deleuze’s writing is that of the image of thought, and the stultifying effect it has on the potentials for thinking. This thesis claims neither right or wrong, truth or falsity. It is an idea, a problem which does not here pretend to a solution. Indeed, whether writing solves anything is doubtful.
This brings me to the third theme, that of women. At the time of both revolutions, the Kantian and Deleuzian, the rôle of women was in transformation. What characterized female nature became uncertain towards the end of the eighteenth century; many qualities previously attributed to women became associated with maleness - the sublime and genius both attribute a femininity to men, and a relation with nature and imagination which had previously been associated with the wildness and unrestrained immorality of women. Christine Battersby writes: 'there was no longer a consensus about which features of the psyche doomed females to perpetual inferiority', and traces their re-definition as culturally refined, self-controlled (when virtuous), and generally domesticated. 8

Kant solves the problem of apparently contrary qualities of sexual wildness and cultural refinement by distinguishing between an anthropological and a cultural perspective on women. In an uncivilized state, superiority belongs to man, and the proper nature of women is as unrecognizable in a crude state of nature as 'that of the crab apple and the wild pear, which reveal their diversity only when they are grafted or inoculated'. 9 It is only through culture - the end of a reason which women do not have - that properly female qualities develop, a beautiful understanding and sensible virtue fitting her for marriage and legal reception of nature's true gift, the foetus. Concomitant with the culturally driven emergence of qualities which, in a natural state remain indiscernible, women appear to achieve a kind of activity, or power, which is exercised against or over men. However, the range of this power is limited to domesticity and expresses a desire for domination which is revealed through tears, nagging, manipulation and a shrewdness in the exercise of her charms, as a consequence of which man is 'imperceptibly fettered by a child'. 10 Whilst she 'should reign [herrschen]' 11, Queen of the domestic arena, 'supreme command in the household' is the prerogative of 'only one person who co-ordinates all occupations in
accordance with one end, which is his. The apparent power of women is thus gifted by men through a cultural and socio-political order which is extrinsic to women's own desires; moreover, women’s power is permitted within the framework of a space already divided into public and private spheres, limiting women’s dominion to the latter and tolerating it only within the co-ordinated ends of man.

That the gifted power ends on the doorstep is made clear by Kant in *Der Metaphysik der Sitten*, where he differentiates between active and passive citizens: the latter includes journeymen, household servants, juveniles, and all women. Passive citizens are those who, whilst included quantitatively as members of the State, are qualitatively differentiated from the legislating active members. Disenfranchised and playing no part in its constitution, they are nonetheless subject to its law. Whilst Kant holds out the possibility of transition from passive to active citizenship, this is clearly not an alternative for women: to become an actively legislative and vote-holding *Staatsbürger*, a woman would have to be able to become a man.

Women’s truth, Kant says, comes from the world: what it says is true and what it does is good. They can as well learn theoretical principles as they can grow beards, he mutters; as for girls, they ‘must be got used to smiling in an easy, unconstrained way when they are still very young’ for smiling ‘gradually moulds them within as well and establishes a disposition to joy, friendliness and sociability’. Moulding, growing, pruning, cultivating; women become problems of the landscape, country gardens created as a resource and for relaxation from the real life of public affairs. By encouraging smiling in girls, Kant seems to envisage the prospect of self-pruning women. Whilst his comment on smiling applies to children in general, it is ‘especially girls’ at which it aims.
Introduction

In the 1960’s and ‘70s, Western women’s lives were affected in radically different ways: the Pill removed sexuality from reproduction; women began to work in greater numbers (though still for the most part in menial “female” occupations); lesbian separatism developed; women began to attack their assimilation into class structures based on the social status of men; to question the exclusion of home labour from economics; to play with the images assigned to them on their own terms; they began to write and to be published; to uncover a richer and more diverse view of women’s rôles in history, and to move into territories previously defined as male, either positively so, or on the grounds that women’s biology/minds/ hormones etc., naturally excluded them from large areas of life. Most importantly, women ceased to prune themselves in line with male expectations. Men began to concern themselves with the movements of women, and many could find no more original response to the changes than ridicule or tired appeals to the proper and natural function of women as reproduction animals.

The most important argument is economic. In the West, the decline of industrial capital and the emergence of information technology has transformed the labour market: physical strength and brute force have lost their value, to be replaced by manoeuvrability, flexibility, ease of transition between different areas of life, interactive skills. One in four women in Britain chooses not to bear children, and many women who do have children prefer to bring them up without men. Fewer and fewer women are choosing to confine themselves within the legal bondage of marriage. The Internet has opened up space for playing with gender assignations, whilst cyberfeminism drives home historical connections between women and technology, messing up its image as toys for the boys. Oedipus collapses all around, as women begin (slowly) to gain the economic control over their lives which releases them from their historical dependency on men.
What, however does this have to do with the debate over Deleuze, from where this discussion of women began? The issue is treachery. The academic debate over Deleuze divides him into two parts, one revolutionary, of the streets, and the other institutional, of the university, but it can be paraphrased as an argument over which side is the most treacherous? Is there more treachery in throwing aside the constraints of the academy, rejecting its theory, desiring the ascription of labels, or in assimilating Deleuze with, for example, problems coming out of deconstruction. In the context of economic viability, there is no difference, since these debates occur for the most part amongst well-paid men. It is therefore not a debate into which women fit easily, anymore than they fit easily into philosophy, or into class structures. Rage against the academy is less clearly a revolutionary position for those who have been fighting against restrictions on their entry into it, and the rejection of theoretical approaches to Deleuze’s work sits differently when history has spent much effort persuading women of their theoretical inadequacies. This is why remarks such as those of Rosi Braidotti’s are problematic. She writes:

‘Philosophy creates itself through what it excludes as much as through what it asserts. High theory, especially philosophy, posits its values through the exclusion of many - non-men, non-whites, non-learned, etc.. The structural necessity of these perjorative figurations of otherness makes me doubt the capacity, let alone the moral and political willingness, of theoretical discourse to act in a non-hegemonic, non-exclusionary manner’. 16

History has created itself through similar exclusions: science, economics, law, engineering, politics, - the list can be continued at will - all have exercised either
Introduction

theoretical or practical restraints against women. Philosophical theory provides an abstract structural account of these exclusions and is, as Braidotti says, created through them. However, unless one subscribes to the view that thought, as opposed to institutional philosophy, is generated by exclusion and the exercise of the negative on difference, the case against infiltrating theory as well as practice seems slight. Moreover, the theory/practice distinction is, once more, an artifice of the exclusionary mind. As will be discussed in the thesis, Deleuze’s understanding of the theory/practice relation is not one which divides down a central line; it is instead one of mutual and reciprocal interaction, theory opening space where practices are blocked, and so transforming the potentials of practice, and practice mobilizing theory, breaking down walls and moving through crevices, and in so doing transforming what is understood by both theory and practice.

Bedtime stories for children need not of necessity be peopled by fairies, and uncut minds understand power with ease, since it is exercised upon them without the possibility of escape. Children are pragmatists too: generating variations without regard for rule, in response to the situations they discover, transforming language into a toy, a game which changes whilst it is played, a field of edible words. Leaving girls to think so they can smile for themselves, rather than re-furbishing historical tales of their necessary exclusion from certain women’s, whilst at the same time leaving boys to do the same, rather than imposing the burden of history of their backs; these seem most profitable for the future becoming-woman. It is for these reasons, amongst others, that I am uninterested in the attribution of reactionary/revolutionary labels and the fight for possession over Deleuze (or Kant). Revolution belongs to the young. Cold indifference to opinion is something one learns.
II Critique

‘Copernicus said:

“When you have once seen the chaos, you must make some thing to set between yourself and that terrible sight: and so you make a mirror, thinking that in it shall be reflected the reality of the world; but then you understand that the mirror reflects only appearances, and that reality is somewhere else, off behind the mirror; and then you remember that behind the mirror there is only the chaos.”

Dark dark dark.”¹⁷

Kant effected a revolution in philosophy, through the introduction of time into the subject, effecting its disjunction into two elements, the ‘I think’ and the ‘I am’, the relation of which is neither logical or empirical, but transcendental. This means real conditions, for the transcendental is materially conditioning, rather than merely logical - that is, it does not simply impose epistemological restrictions on the possibility of understanding the world, but is implicated in its material order. The relation of indeterminate existence - “I am” - to determining thought - “I think” - is determined in or as time; that is, the existence of the subject is determined in time and consciousness of this existence is represented as time - that is, as the subjective and psychological experience of succession. The condition of this determination is transcendental, rather than either logical, through the medium of a “therefore”, or theological, through the medium of pre-established harmony. The introduction of time as a transcendental form is, to use an anachronistic term, part of Kant’s anti-logicist project, and the movement
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away from a rationalist epistemology devolved from concepts. Leibniz, for example, says of time (and space), that, in the absence of living creatures they 'would exist in ideas only, as mere possibilities' whose truth is grounded in God. The difference to the Kantian conception of time as a form of intuition whose ideality is immanent to the constitution of human knowledge, and a condition of its real possibility - that is, a transcendental condition - is quite clear. For Leibniz, the essence of time is continuous succession, this being generated by the aggregation of monads, the ultimate and simple elements of reality. One might go on to inquire about a succession of perceptions within a monad. The complexities implied by this question are too great to pursue in depth, for two reasons. Firstly, the matter is tangential to the thesis, and secondly, Leibniz himself has little of an explicit nature to say about time, and nothing which supports the claim that it can be discussed in terms of what happens within a monad which does not also include the world. However, the direction in which this question might be explored can be suggested by the following. Each monad includes the entire world: 'in every particle of the universe there is contained a world of infinite creatures'. Separation of the temporality of a point of view or perspective within a monad from that of the aggregate which it includes it thus illegitimate, in Leibniz's own terms. As he writes, it is impossible 'to conceive of the possibility of any internal motion being started, directed, increased, or diminished within it, [a monad] as can occur in compounds, where change among the parts takes place.' Although the principle of change comes from within a monad - necessarily, since they have no windows - each monad is a universe and time (and space) are nothing 'other than certain orders of things.' That is, they cannot be thought in the absence of the physical relations amongst bodily organs, which the soul or monad represents.

Through abstraction from phenomenal relations, or appearances generated through the monadic activity of appetition, Leibniz draws his mathematical conception
of time, which, whilst well-founded, is nonetheless an useful intellectual fiction - that is, it cannot be intuited, or perceived phenomenally, but can, nonetheless, be understood. This intellectual fiction is non-contradictory - that is, its truths are necessary - and distinguishes mathematical time, as a possible fiction, from the impossible fiction of supposing that time is other than certain orders of things. A physico-mathematical view of the world, from a Leibnizian perspective, is thus a view imposed on an already given world of determinate extension and change, the "already given" being an ideal consequence of the co-ordinated activity of the only real elements in Leibniz's system, the monads. Mathematical consistency thus occupies a different order of ideality than phenomenal coherence. The universality of both, however, is a function of the mirroring by every monad of all the activity of all others, in a network of interconnections: if this mirroring were only partial, no universal systematic physico-mathematics or public phenomenal world would be possible, since there would be different orders of temporal and spatial co-ordination amongst different groups of monads. What guarantees the interconnectedness of all monadic activity is pre-established harmony, or God.

There are interesting directions in which to take this formulation: the idea of an infinitely interacting network, so important to Deleuze's understanding of Kant, is already plain from this brief discussion and such a system, as will become clear in the thesis, is integral to Deleuze's understanding of the Kantian faculties. However, the function of this brief excursion into Leibniz is to mark his difference from Kant with relation to time. Kant turns the Leibnizian view upside down and re-formulates the situation and value of its terms: the well-founded and useful fiction (in the sense that it does not refer to any real properties of the world) of Leibnizian mathematical time becomes in Kant a presuppositional form of experience, a condition of the possibility of knowledge of the object. In this way the separation of phenomenal and mathematical
time is closed, mathematics becomes immanent to the production of phenomenal knowledge, rather than abstracted from it and the empirical world is immediately physico-mathematical. This allows Kant to say that time is empirically real, whilst for Leibniz it is only ever ideal. Moreover, for Kant, the universal status of mathematics, and the claim of a single time of which all different times are parts, is no longer guaranteed by pre-established harmony gifted by God, nor does it ‘remain when abstraction is made of all subjective conditions of its intuition.’ Not even as a possibility in the ideas of God. Independently of these subjective conditions, ‘time is nothing’.

A last point is that for Kant, the pure form of time as such must be distinguished from time as succession. ‘Time has only one dimension’, and that dimension is experienced both subjectively and objectively as succession. However, if the pure form of time is confused with the experience of time as succession, which is a mode of time, the transcendental import of the Aesthetic is lost; time is conflated either with its conceptual formulation in terms of causally determined motion, or with a psychologistic, and (apparently) arbitrary sequence of subjective states in inner sense. ‘Motion, as an act of the subject...first produces the concept of succession’; succession is part of a temporal language, as are co-existence and duration, but as pure form, it is a condition of the possibility of that language, so whilst succession can be described as a mode of time, the form of this mode - time - cannot itself be described as successive. If succession is ascribed ‘to time itself, we must think yet another time, in which the sequence would be possible’. Succession pertains to the parts of time - that is, to the experience of determinate quanta of intuition in inner sense - and thus to a limitation of the pure form of time; ‘different times are but parts of one and the same time’, but that one and the same time is not itself successive.
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In one of the four metaphysical expositions of time in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant writes:

‘Only on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (successively).’

Different times, or as Kant says ‘parts of time’, are successive: however, different times - points or instants - are limitations which presuppose the transcendental and pure form of time. But once more it must be emphasized that this does not imply that the pure form of time can be collapsed into succession: for whilst the parts of time are successive, the pure form of time is a continuum not comprised of points or instants. Whilst it can be divided into parts, which exists only as a function of this division, it is not equivalent to these parts or to their successive addition. To think thus would be to lead Kant back towards a Leibnizian perspective on the problem. This is a critical difference, not only for a rigorous reading of Kant, but also for understanding the attention Deleuze pays to the pure form of time.

It is time which opens up the problem of the transcendental, and the differences which flow from it, between phenomena and noumena, appearances and things-in-themselves. Kant’s criticisms of Leibniz for intellectualizing sensibility, for not thinking forms of intuition outside the relations of things and for conceiving of ‘time as the dynamical sequence’ of the states of substance, leading to its formulation as something akin to confused concepts, may not be drawn from direct contact with Leibniz’s writings: nonetheless, the latter offer no support for any reconciliation of the Kantian and Leibnizian positions on time. The Copernican revolution evicts God from theory and removes the form of time from reason, logic, meaning and psychology.
Kant’s work covers a huge range; science - including physics, biology and chemistry, the latter two first emerging as sciences at the close of the eighteenth century -, aesthetics, history, politics, morality, anthropology, logic, mathematics, geography and pedagogy and more. Despite this vast spread of interests, however, a single problem might be said to drive both the direction of his thought and its immediate reception -the problem of critique, as a demand for immanence of criteria. ‘Our age is, in especial degree, the age of critique, and to critique everything must submit’, he writes in the Critique of Pure Reason, the first of the three critical works. A critical tribunal, in which reason functions as both subject and judge, was to legitimate all claims to knowledge, and its necessity for Kant was paramount: in the absence of such a legitimation, he argues, reason lapses into its natural state, a state of war.

Response to the critical challenge was swift: why must everything so submit, from where does the authority of reason come? On what does it base the privilege of its first principles? That it was no longer God was recognized immediately: indeed, there was an injunction against the teaching of Kant’s work at Marburg, pending a report on the dangers of its scepticism - epistemological as well as theological. It was lifted, however, on the basis that even if his work was sceptical, ‘undermin[ing] the certainty of human knowledge’ it was so obscure as to be largely unintelligible, and thus of no danger. But the response to the implications of critique were swift. As Beiser writes in The Fate of Reason, post-Kantian philosophy begins with the meta-critical question of the authority of reason, and ‘looked critically at the possibility of criticism itself.’

Schopenhauer, a philosopher who titles himself the first Kantian, dismisses the post-Kantians, (mostly through polemic, seldom with argument): ‘serious
philosophy still stands where Kant left it’, he declares, ‘I therefore take my departure from him’. Schopenhauer sets off in a direction very different to that of the meta-critical challenge. He is uninterested in the arguments over reason and responds to the practical philosophy with the comment:

‘[W]hen Kant demolished old and revered errors, and knew the danger of the business, he had only wanted to substitute here and there through moral theology a few weak props, so that the ruin would not fall on top of him, and he would have time to get away’. 37

Instead, Schopenhauer privileges the Transcendental Aesthetic, calling it the diamond in Kant’s crown; the thing-in-itself, which he calls will; and Ideas, which he calls Platonic, but which are more Kantian than this suggests and than Schopenhauer himself will allow. He is critical of Kantian Ideas for their remoteness from perception, and of Kantian perception for being pure, in the sense of divorced from empirical data: for Schopenhauer, Ideas are inseparable from perception, and ‘perception is throughout the source of all knowledge.’ 38 It is this insistence on a perceptual and objective element to the transcendental, which is both impersonal and pre-individual, (prior to the principium individuationis and the subject-object division) that Deleuze shares with Schopenhauer. Nonetheless, despite their relation with perception, Schopenhauerian Ideas retain the Kantian characteristic of not being objects of representation, or phenomena subject to the forms of space, time and causality.

Schopenhauer eliminates the possibility of conceiving of the thing-in-itself either as an object somehow ‘behind’ representation, or as the implicit cause of sensation, this latter being a purely subjective component of perception, - under the skin, as he puts it; he also rejects the association of Ideas with the theological-
metaphysical register in which Kant places them, whilst retaining what is essential to the Kantian notion of the transcendental, which is that it expresses immanence of criteria and real conditions as opposed to those which are purely logical. For Schopenhauer, however, Ideas are not immanent to reason, but are immediate and direct expressions of relations of variance of the will. In effect, he is opening up a thought of relation (the transcendental being concerned with relations, not objects) which is neither conceptual or psychologistic; a rigorous thought of the transcendental.

A Schopenhauerian Idea is defined as an adequate objectification of the will. By adequate objectification, Schopenhauer understands the material manifestation of the will, its corporealization, not as mediate knowledge, worked through the secondary functions of the brain, or intellect, but as a condition of experience, as material, non-conceptual and impersonal, expressing the activity of the will in-itself outside the laws of experience. In this sense, Ideas and their adequate objectification function as real conditions of empirical experience rather than, as for Kant, regulative tools for the delimitation of speculative reason and place-holders for its practical legislation.

Schopenhauer's criticism of Kantian Ideas aims at their subjective formulation, in terms of the focus imaginarius, and is thus in line with his more general criticism of Kant's failure to consider the objective, or physiological aspects of knowledge. This leads him towards consideration of the material conditions of empirical perception, in the direction of the thing-in-itself, or will. Part of his attachment to the term Platonic as a qualification of Ideas is to highlight their relation with perception and emphasize the borrowed reality of the phenomenal world; Plato's Ideas, unlike Kant's, are empirically manifest in copies. He writes:
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'To the brook which rolls downwards over the stones, the eddies, waves, and the foam-forms exhibited by it are indifferent and inessential; but that it follows gravity, and behaves as an inelastic, perfectly mobile, formless, and transparent fluid, this is its essential nature, this, if known through perception, is the Idea.\(^{39}\)

(Original italics)

The inessential aspects of natural phenomena belong to borrowed reality, to the unfolding of the Idea through the functions of the brain, whilst Ideas are 'the whole thing-in-itself, only under the form of representation'.\(^{40}\) Under this form, and at the lower grades of objectification, Ideas are represented under the title of laws of nature which allow for their recognition in particular cases: gravity, electricity, crystallization, magnetism, fluidity, elasticity, chemical properties, sexual desires. However, the nature of the forces that these laws express is 'something entirely strange and unknown'; for Schopenhauer, force is thought on an intensive register, as a qualitas occulta emerging from immanent relations of the will, a residuum of which always remains exterior to the formal description of law.\(^{41}\) The will or thing-in-itself is antecedent to these laws, not causally so, but as the blind quantitative drive of the will, outside measurability and formal description. Ideas are the direct objectivity of this drive, standing between the representation of particulars referred to by laws of nature and the 'variance with itself essential to the will'.\(^{42}\)

Effected through the incessant immanent self-variance of the will, the world as representation is manifest with ever-increasing complexity - from blind forces of nature to inorganic structures to organic entities such as plants, and then on to animals and man. Variance of the will is expressed also in conflicts of Ideas, the resolution of this conflict involving the analogical assimilation of the conflicting orders into higher
Ideas. (This is not to say that this complexity can be read back into the will.) Each Idea is thus both the resolution of problematic relations of the will at lower grades of objectification, and is itself a problem. 'Each attained end is at the same time the beginning of a new course, and so on ad infinitum.'\(^43\) Each Idea is abstract, eternal, and unchanging, yet nonetheless, each 'gains an entirely new character just by taking up into itself from each of the subdued Ideas an analogue of higher power', expressing a different set of abstract relations.\(^44\)

So whilst Schopenhauer describes Ideas both as archetypes, and as Platonic, the facility for analogically assimilating prior grades of adequate objectifications in such a way that their character is transformed also marks a definite difference from Plato's theory of forms. Moreover, Ideas and the adequate objectification of the will are differentiated not in kind, but by degree: as has been said already, they are intensive, and exterior to the forms through which the ideal world of representation is ordered. Secondary qualifications of the intensive gradations of the will introduced from this ideal perspective are thus not pertinent to exploring the real constructions of the thing-in-itself.\(^45\) It is in this sense that they are problematic, in a Kantian sense, since they cannot be referred to a universal law. Rather, they express the resolution of a conflict of the will at a certain degree, and the emergence of a qualitative force, which representation ('a very complicated physiological occurrence in an animal's brain')\(^46\) universalizes with the term "law of nature", but whose real conditions can be referred to only as qualitas occulta. It is in this sense that Ideas are abstract and diagrammatic, since they articulate the essential aspects of a real problem which cannot be expressed in terms of representation, but which is nonetheless only manifest empirically. Ideas are thus abstract, problematic and diagrammatic expressions of the will, whose solution is materialized through blind and non-cognitive striving.
Schopenhauer also collapses the elaborate architecture of the Analytic through the Aesthetic, the conjunction emerging as a single principle of sufficient reason comprising time, space and causality, the three formal elements of the world as representation. The material element of the will or thing-in-itself, at the adequate level of objectification of which the animal is the phenomenon, is the brain, and its intellectual functions, which structure the world as representation are secondary control and guidance mechanisms, which he refers to as parasitic upon the will. It is this physiological aspect of the will which, as has been remarked above, Schopenhauer chides Kant for neglecting, and which Nietzsche, first as student then as critic of Schopenhauer, develops more fully, taking it further from its Kantian source, and reformulating critique in terms of the will to power. Its importance, both for reading Kant, and for reading the relation of Deleuze and Kant is to emphasize the difference between a psychologistic rendition of the transcendental, in terms of subjectivity, and a rigorously critical formulation, in terms of material conditions. Schopenhauer's philosophy drives in the direction of the transcendental empiricism which Deleuze refines.

Deleuze's second book, written in 1962, nine years after a slim volume on Hume, is Nietzsche et la Philosophie. In this book critique is addressed as a problem concerning the quality and relations of forces: 'tout le reste est symptôme (everything else is symptom)'. The will gives, Deleuze writes: 'elle n'aspire pas, elle ne recherche pas, elle ne désire pas, surtout elle ne désire pas la puissance. Elle donne (it does not aspire, it does not seek, it does not desire, above all it does not desire power. It gives)'. The genetic or critical principle of the will gives sense and value - quality - to the relations of forces immanent to the will. That is, the qualitative expressions of quantitatively differentiated relations are not qualified by anything extrinsic to those relations: sense and value emerge from real relations, manifest, as Schopenhauer made
clear, as forces, and outside the scope of conceptual cognition, rather than being qualified according to the requirements of a philosophy of representation - the most basic of which are identity and the subject-object division.

Sense and value are thus no longer functions of a systematic disjunction between theory and practice, which legitimates the separation of (scientifically objective) fact and (morally objective) value, but become immanent to the determinations of relations of the will, or thing-in-itself. The subject becomes integrated into the network of relations generated through the determination of force relations immanent to the will, and has no values separable from its empirical effects. There is no longer a single territory under two contrary sets of principles, those of speculative reason and those of practical reason, and a vertical and hierarchical series of conduits leading to and from a rational subject, but a horizontal plane of relations of which the subject is a late and peripheral effect. Since the relations immanent to the will are understood as differential and conjunctive, rather than contrary and disjunctive (as is the case when the noumenon/phenomon axis in Kant is taken to be the critical one), and these relations become generative of the transcendental, rather than the consequence of its conditioning, the transcendental becomes entirely vacuous until empirically constructed, but is not to be confused with that empirical construction.

Hence Deleuze's attraction to the pure form of time and his demand for a 'properly transcendental empiricism'. And hence, also, his criticism of Kant for being overly psychologistic in his formulation of synthesis; it is not that Kant is too empirical, according to Deleuze, but that he is insufficiently empirical, since he hypostatizes the senses and values of human (male) experience and universalizes them, as conditions for the possibility of knowledge of the object, and a unified experience, and then reduces the empirical to representation. The empirical is constructed through
the lens of a set of conditions which are specific to a subject defined as active, spontaneous, rational, morally legislative and scientifically objective: all characteristics, as will be seen later in the thesis, specific to white males.

The transcendental, taken from this perspective, is traced from the values and senses of a specific and psychologically coloured empiricism. Deleuze insists that the transcendental is impersonal, pre-individual, a field of singularities and a problem which cannot be solved through the instances of its solutions; that is, it is produced as the relation of the empirical with something which is not empirical, and which cannot be defined as either the negative limit of the empirical, a conditioning principle extrinsic to experience or as a priori. Instead, it becomes a relation with the will, or thing-in-itself, understood as pure exteriority, the immanent threshold of sensible experience. (A fuller discussion of this will be found in a later chapter.) In this way, rather than critique being legitimated through an image of thought as rational and legislative, it becomes a positive principle of genesis.

It also destroys. Critique becomes something new in Nietzsche, and something which, in conjunction with the typology of forces, turns back on the questions raised by the post-Kantians, with results which would confirm their misgivings about its implicit atheism. The division of the world into the real and the apparent is attacked, the subject becomes an effect of the will, and critique becomes immanent, not to reason, but to the will, a genetic principle which thinks against reason, against itself, against conditioning and against the image of thought; against truth, error and method.

The problem of the critical relations of forces, as quantitative degrees of the will to power which effect a particular quality, that quality which is willed, is one which remains with Deleuze throughout his writing, and which finds its consummate
destructive force in L'anti-oedipe, the first volume of Capitalisme et Schizophrenie, as the machinic or desiring unconscious, and its most positive and creative expression in the second volume, as the machinic phylum. It is this latter book that Deleuze describes as philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word, as the creation of concepts; which does not interpret, nor call for interpretation, and which works, without labour, and plays, with all seriousness.

III Demons

This thesis addresses the relation of Deleuze and Kant in terms of these problems: forces, the image of thought, the principle of recognition, the question of production, the materiality of the thing-in-itself, the genesis of sense and immanence of criteria. An additional element, which comes from Deleuze's book La philosophie critique de Kant, is that of a network. The network of faculties, Deleuze says, is the true transcendental method, and the Kant book (1963) is structured around their changing relations in each of the three Critiques. Systematic variations in these relations correspond to different methods of realizing an interest of reason. This notion of system runs throughout Deleuze's work. He understands systems as open, nested and interconnected: everything connects to everything else, everything is implicated in the genesis of everything else, not as a universal principle or conditioning element, but through the rhizomatic interaction of forces. The concept of an assemblage, which emerges through his collaboration with Félix Guattari, molecularizes the notion of a faculty system, of body as a complex and articulated construction of interconnected components whose operations shift depending on the bodies into which they plug and the nature of relations into which they enter.
However, these are not simply images, for Deleuze shares Kant’s insistence on the importance of science for philosophy. His theory of forces emerges from work on embryology, biology, technology; amongst the vast range covered with Guattari in *Mille Plateaux* are genetics, geology, the movement of populations - both molecular and animal, evolution. Whilst these themes are not explored in this thesis, Deleuze’s insistence that his own work, and that with Guattari, is empirical, must be kept in mind. ‘[E]n vérité, l’inconscient est de la physique (in reality, the unconscious belongs to the realm of physics)’.\(^5\) There are no metaphors; if something works, it is because it is real.

So what of becoming-woman? This too must be real. Philosophy has associated women with nature, matter, space and babies, ever since Plato spoke in the *Timaeus* of the receptacle or womb whose neutral plasticity accepted without discrimination the impress of eternal forms. The receptacle nurses becoming, but is itself immutable. It is this supposed permanence of function attendant on women which becoming-woman seeks to break away from; from women as reproductive and essentially sexual creatures to women as self-organizing systems which are effected only through their interactions with other machines in their environment, which is no longer defined as nature, indeed, which has no definition until it is generated.

Deleuze has been criticized for neglecting feminist projects directed towards the constitution of a specifically female subjectivity. Rosi Braidotti describes herself as a Deleuzian, but nonetheless accuses his position on women on the grounds that it comes from a male embodied subject. Yet criticisms such as these have limited purchase on the impulse infecting Deleuze’s work, which is to expose the mechanisms by which transcendence is produced, as a real rather than imaginary or ideal repressive mechanism. Deleuze does not deploy becoming-woman as a feminist theory, as a
theory of woman, but as an element in the critical arsenal of pragmatics, or auto-critique. Essential to the diagnosis of limitations imposed on desiring or machinic production through the negative real generated by transcendent, or illegitimate syntheses, to the destruction of the forms which perpetuate these limitations, and to the formation of a radical and positive critique, becoming-woman has no organic location or social image, aesthetic norm or political motivation.

'It y a un devenir-femme qui ne se confond pas avec les femmes, leur passé et leur avenir, et ce devenir, il faut bien que les femmes y entrent pour sortir de leur passé et de leur avenir, de leur histoire.

(There is a becoming-woman which is not the same as women, their past and their future, and it is essential that women enter this becoming to get out of their past and their future, their history)' 51

It is comments such as this which have, unsurprisingly, led to women questioning the use of becoming-woman, especially at a time when women are uncovering the extent of their historical involvement, and the degree to which it has been obliterated by the macro-histories of the subject. Yet Deleuze’s comments always function in two directions at once. Women’s history, on a macro-level, has been couched in terms of their relations with the subject: getting out of this history and the future it projects means at the very least changing the elements in relation to which women are understood, and it is this transformation of the assemblages into which women move, and through which they are created which becoming-woman effects.

The other question, of course, might be; what right has a man to tell us what and what is not essential for us? And there are occasions on which Deleuze (and Guattari’s) philosophy takes on a prescriptive air; look out for the fascist within you, they say, suggesting everyone has a hidden policeman. Moreover, distinctions such as
that in *L'anti-oedipe*, between legitimate and illegitimate synthesis suggest a bilateral
disjunction and a potential re-vitalization of dialectics, against which the whole tenor
of their work drives. However, this thesis does not challenge or address these problems,
for three reasons. Firstly, because one of the most important and fruitful effects of
Deleuze’s writing lies in its generosity towards those thinkers he admires. If the
conflictual approach of dialectics, and the operation of the negative as a mechanism of
movement is to be dissolved, such generosity is necessary as a strategy of reading.
Secondly, because to address the molar sexuality of an author as a reason for
discounting elements of his or her writing seems precisely what feminism must not do,
and cannot, without reproducing precisely that against which it has argued. What a
book does, and what movements it effects, are more important than the specifics of the
physical bodies which wrote it. And lastly, to quote a friend: “The problem is one of
thinking the included disjunction of the legitimate and the illegitimate; of thinking the
transcendent such that its relation to the immanent is itself one of immanence.” If this
is misunderstood, the movement of becoming-women, as Deleuze and Guattari use it,
is also misunderstood, because it is this problem which underlies the AND logics of
Deleuze’s empiricism, and which mobilizes the movement of desire outside the
conditions of its production without generating transcendence.

This perspective demands a new understanding of the body. Nature, matter,
affection, passion, etc. are not static terms, and as technology drives the perpetual
reformulation of their scientific conceptualization, so too must the understanding of
their relations and interconnections with woman change. One aspect of the problem of
a philosophical feminism is the generation of a response to these transformations:
beginning from the perspective of “real women” as fully formed socio-political,
cultural, ethical or aesthetic entities does not constitute a response, because it cannot
negotiate changes which impact on the machinic production of bodies.
As they are philosophically formed, women, like God, are always around, usefully, and sometimes not usefully, creative and of great consolation. Schopenhauer attributes the dramatist, Jouy, and Byron, a poet, with 'the correct viewpoint for estimating the value of women'. The former writes: 'Without women, the beginning of our life would be deprived of help, the middle of pleasure, and the end of consolation.' The latter omits the middle pleasure zone, concentrating instead on women's rôle as breeder and educator of the young, and as nurse with patient ears for the dying sighs of men. Women are cast as altruists, essential components in framing the construction space within which humans live and die, whilst they themselves appear to be neither born nor to die.

Observation of actual women is mediated by a litany of exclusive disjunctions, each specialty or discipline incorporating its own version: if you don't have a penis, you must be castrated; you may have facial hair, or you shouldn't; you don't have testes, you must have ovaries; you have no y chromosome, you must have two x's; you have a flat chest or you have breasts; you desire men or you don't; you raise your consciousness or produce an argument; you are either a woman or a man. Variations on the endless series of alternates which sift uniformity over bodies like a caul are considered accidents, the result of systematic errors in the interpretation and implementation of codes given in advance. Integrations of the body with non-organic matters are tolerable only to the extent that it is curative of these aberrations. You can get a pace-maker or have your penis involuted into the cavity of your body only if you are judged sufficiently sick first.

Deleuze calls the gods operating these exclusive disjunctions the forms of recognition and their statement is 'C'est donc moi, le roil c'est donc à moi que revient
le royaume (so I am the king! So the kingdom belongs to me)! There is something
remaining of this statement in the argument over possession of Deleuze's thought. The
lineage of the gods is one of repetition of identity, the occurrence and recurrence of the
same analogies, myths and fears, whereas becoming-woman is a line of material
invention, of 'connexions qui sautent d'arbre et arbre, et lui déracinent (connections
that jump from tree to tree and uproot them)'. The problem is not how to distribute
the fruits on an equal basis with men, but how to destroy the trees on which they grow.

Deleuze calls the jumping signals flashing between the trees demons: demons
are 'puissances du saut, de l'intervalle, de l'intensif ou de l'instant et qui ne combient
la différence qu'avec du différent (powers of the leap, the interval, the intensive and the
instant; powers which cover difference with more difference)'. With no identifiability
or function separable from their productive synthesis, demons become signs only on
assemblage, in the formation of matters into intensive patterns, communication
structures. Immanent to its function, nothing other than what it does, and it does and
thus is nothing except through interaction, a demon is a pure information point, a
pixel.

De Landa expands the theme of demons in his book War in the Age of
Intelligent Machines. Demons create a space called a Pandemonium, where 'control is
never passed from a higher authority to a lesser authority. There are no hierarchical
levels, but only a heterarchy of demons capturing control whenever they are invoked
into action'. What invokes them into action are data patterns: indeed, they are
themselves no more than data patterns, or packets of information, which function as
both messages and addresses. The survival of a demon is a function of its interaction
with other demons in its locality, where locality is not a geographical position given in
advance, but the consequence of connections generated amongst demons in the process
of developing problem-solving strategies, whose duration is a function of the patterns they form, rather than imposed by external criteria, or a function of the life-span of a single demon (indeed there are no such things). It is from here, from Deleuze and DeLanda, that the title of this thesis comes. It seeks to uncover the demon potential of Kant, the play of forces immanent to an actual continuum, an intensive and tactile space, which, if Kant is read "appropriately" - by which I mean, in line with the formulation of problems in Kant as they are articulated from the perspective of a subject, remain imperceptible.

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The range of the thesis is kept deliberately close: there are few other players than Kant and Deleuze. This is undoubtedly a betrayal of both Kant and Deleuze, since both can be addressed from a myriad other perspectives. There is no Marx and little Freud, no Fichte or Hegel, no Lacan or Lyotard, all of whom connect with both or either of Kant and Deleuze. However, there are reasons for this, which arise from the theme of feminism, or perhaps more accurately, the situation of women in and by philosophy, which is not of necessity equivalent to feminism. For women, the problem is not that of the subject: it once was, when feminism positioned itself as the victim of the power of a subject which it was not. Women have been situated by this subject alongside the object, as more or less its equivalent, in terms of being exchangeable commodities, and alongside nature, defined in terms of material reproduction rather than conceptual production. My intention is not to argue with this, but to utilize Deleuze's method of eliminative deduction: to eliminate the subject and its perspective and discover the movements through which the object is formed, and to diagram the intensive field which the construction of a subjective space covers up (and which, as will be seen, makes Kant nauseous): to suggest a breeding ground for demons.
Chapter 1

‘a book on an enemy...’

Le discrédit dans lequel est tombée aujourd’hui la doctrine des facultés, pièce pourtant tout à fait nécessaire dans le système de la philosophie, s’explique par la méconnaissance de cet empirisme proprement transcendental, auquel on substituait vainement un décalque du transcendental sur l’empirique.

(Despite the fact that it has become discredited today, the doctrine of the faculties is an entirely necessary component of the system of philosophy. Its discredit may be explained by the misrecognition of this properly transcendental empiricism, for which was substituted in vain a tracing of the transcendental from the empirical). ¹

The slenderness of Deleuze’s book on Kant - his book on an enemy, he says - seems to belie the immensity of the task implied by its title, La philosophie critique de Kant: Doctrine des facultés. Yet in little over a hundred pages, Deleuze produces an elegant and efficient map of the three Critiques which is far from a simple commentary or introductory text.

‘[L]a bêtise... est la faculté des faux problèmes, témoignant d’une inaptitude à constituer, à appréhender et déterminer un problème en tant que tel’ (stupidity...is the faculty for false problems; it is evidence of an inability to constitute, comprehend or determine a problem as such’).² The intelligence in Deleuze’s reading of Kant lies in his constitution of critique as a real problem, on his selection of elements and in his concentration on its systematics. Focusing on the network of the faculties, on the two senses of this word in Kant’s own writing, on their disjunction into higher and lower forms, and on their illegitimate and legitimate employment, he deduces a consistent

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geography of Kant and takes up the keen edge of critique. This first chapter looks briefly at *La philosophie critique de Kant* and then more broadly at themes in Kant of importance to Deleuze’s philosophy.

I System: Faculties in Theory and Practice

Two senses of the word faculty are always in play; faculty as source and faculty as relation. Each faculty is understood both as a type of relation between a representation and something else (an object or subject), and as a source of representations. To each relation corresponds an interest (or disinterest, in the case of aesthetics) of reason and each source legislates a means of realizing this interest, since ‘rien ne nous garantit que la raison se charge elle-même de réaliser son propre intérêt (there is no guarantee that reason itself undertakes to realize its own interest)’. Where reason is disinterested, it is because it has no affective relation with the world, nothing to either gain or lose; this allows feeling to achieve its higher and culturally dignified form, as a pure operation of judging of which pleasure is a consequence, independently of desire and knowledge. Faculties in the first sense, as relation, are knowledge, desire and the feeling of pleasure and pain, whilst faculties in the second sense, as source, are sensibility, understanding and reason.

It is immediately clear that the correspondence between the two senses of faculty is not straightforward. Establishing a relation of correspondence between knowledge and an object involves input through sensibility; the accord of sensibility and understanding relies on the schema of imagination; systematizing knowledge requires the aid of reason. So two problems emerge. Taking the faculty of knowledge as an example, there must first be a convergence of sources, each contributing a unique component to the production of objective knowledge - intuition, in the case of
sensibility, concept, in the case of understanding, synthesis (according to schemata), in the case of imagination, and Idea in the case of reason. There is a further difference, in that three of the faculties are active, whilst sensibility is passive. So the common accord of the elements of knowledge involves a dynamic as well as a formal element; it is a problem of forces as well as of form, of the relation of passivity to activity. This relation cannot be thought through the concepts of substance or cause, since this throws the problem into the domain of understanding, rather than understanding it in terms of relations amongst faculties as powers which must be thought antecedent to the specific constitutional order of any of them individually. It is clear that both sensibility and imagination operate, in the first Critique, under the management of understanding - Kant writes, for example, of a 'synthesis which does not belong to the senses' by which 'understanding determines the sensibility'. But passivity here is constrained, in that it is constituted through the relation of sensibility to the activity of understanding, from the perspective of understanding, and thus not transcendentally; as Kant writes, it is 'a matter of fact' that the unity apparently belonging to sensibility, through which the forms of intuition become formalized and conceptual, is determined by understanding. A matter of fact, rather than a problem of the real conditions of the possibility of facts. This means that this determining synthesis is not transcendental.

As the Introduction made clear, the transcendental as a problem must be thought in relation to the Aesthetic rather than the Analytic, in order to preclude a psychologistic interpretation thought in terms of the subject. In order to understand this dynamic relation of the faculties, therefore, a thought of passivity not delimited in advance by understanding needs to be formulated: this is the topic of a later chapter, however, so will not be pursued here. A further point is that the type of activity associated with understanding differs from that attaching to imagination: the former is described by Kant as spontaneous, the latter as productive. In order to preclude the
collapse of the Kantian architecture into the dry zones of concepts and understanding, these differences need to be articulated; if they are not, the dynamic relation amongst the faculties is subsumed under formal constraints imposed by the operations of judgement and the functional unity of the categories, and the problematic aspects of the system of faculties, together with the manner in which Deleuze understands this as integral to critique, to critical method, are lost.

The second problem addresses the first, that of convergence in a common form. The achievement of common sense - whether logical, moral or aesthetic - is dependent on an attitude of reason - interest in logical and moral common sense, and disinterest in aesthetic common sense. Common sense is a managed convergence of faculties on a shared task of recognizing an object as the Same. In the first Critique, Kant refers to a 'common function of the mind [gemeinschaftliche Funktion des Gemüts]' by which the disparate components of knowledge are combined into one representation. In the Critique of Judgement, the idea of common sense [Gemeinsinn] provides the criteria by which subjective judgements of taste can be presented as objective, removing taste from the private domain of the individual, legitimating the demand for universal assent to aesthetic judgements on the beautiful and attributing them with the modality of necessity. Common sense is the means by which the quality of sensation can be conceived of as uniformly and universally communicable; taste, Kant writes, 'could be called a sensus communis aestheticus, and common understanding a sensus communis logicus.' Under the idea of common sense, therefore, a subjective quality of feeling, different to sensation, becomes the ground for an objective statement of aesthetic value.

Common understanding 'is regarded as the very least that we are entitled to expect from anyone who lays claim to the name of human being'; it functions both
vertically, as a means of differentiating man from the animals, as a creature who rises above sensation, and horizontally, as a means of ensuring the propagation of "truth, propriety, beauty, or justice", as shared human ideals which define a community of man as a creature with "higher cognitive powers". Membership of this community is thus predicated on assent to its cultural values, its epistemological norms and its moral laws: as will be seen, all these are problematic in relation to women.

Common sense, a uniform accord amongst the faculties such that knowledge, taste and morality become public zones, rather than personal and private, becomes a question not only of establishing relations, but also of ensuring that they reflect (for a naturalized common sense) or realize (a priori common sense) an interest (or disinterest) of reason. "L'idée d'une pluralité (et d'une hiérarchie) systématique des intérêts...domine la méthode kantienne (The idea of a systematic plurality (and a hierarchy) of interests...dominates the Kantian method")¹¹: this community of interests is the 'principe d'un système des fins (the principle of a system of ends)' unrealizable by nature.¹² Immanent critique, as the method of transcendental philosophy in a Kantian sense, sets out the nature and realization of these ends.

The balancing of interests of reason does not form common sense, but good sense: privileging speculative interests threatens practical interests, and Kant's statement of good sense, of limiting knowledge to make room for faith, indicates two things. Firstly, that achieving equilibrium of interests requires both limitation and negation, which, as will be seen later in this chapter, are two of the functions which Deleuze argues corrupt the critical method and lead to a degenerate formulation of the transcendental. And secondly that good sense and common sense complement each other, in the formation of a single Image of thought, another line in Deleuze's relation with Kant which is addressed in chapter two.
To ensure the balance of interest and system of ends, one faculty (in the first sense, as relation) must play two roles: it must contribute, on a horizontal plane of integration, to common sense, and also, through the discovery of an autonomy from natural common sense and an internal legislative capacity, determine the relation of common sense to its objects, legislating vertically, from above, for the realization of an interest of reason. That is, one faculty provides the *a priori* conditions of natural common sense, colouring it as logical, aesthetic or moral. In the case of knowledge, it is understanding that legislates: it determines imagination to synthesize schematically, according to the concepts, and generalizes over intuition. In a 'synthesis which does not belong to the senses' but to an imagination constrained to schematize by universal rule 'the understanding determines the sensibility', defining it as a receptive channel, and as contributing to the delimitation of differences, between objective and subjective knowledge, and between legitimate and illegitimate theoretical claims.\textsuperscript{13} To contribute to theoretical or logical common sense, sensibility must be free of subjective sensation - pleasure and pain - but nonetheless have a form of immediacy with the real in experience which legitimates the claim of objective knowledge, confirming or contributing towards a speculative interest of reason.

Determination of sensibility by understanding also produces a limiting device, the noumenon, the representation of an object in a purely intelligible, non-sensible world. At the same time as understanding 'entitles an object in a relation mere phenomenon...[it] ...forms, apart from that relation, a representation of an object in itself(Gegenstande in sich selbst)', on which the concepts have no legitimate purchase, but which, nonetheless, the understanding 'must think'.\textsuperscript{14} Thinking in the absence of sensibility - and so in the absence not only of intuition, but also of intensive magnitudes, the real in experience, understanding thinks of a negative object which
forms a conceptual limit of the objective validity of sensible knowledge, preventing the intellectualization of sensibility, (an Aristotelian failing which Kant accuses Locke of perpetuating). Although Kant appears to assimilate the thing-in-itself and the noumenon, the function of the two is quite different. The noumenon concerns limits, and the negotiation of a single territory under the forms of two different laws, and is not unknowable in principle, only in relation to the limitations of human cognition. Articulated in relation to phenomena which are objects constituted according to the unity of rule of categories, the noumenon is a gap which can be filled and made positive only by practical reason. The thing-in-itself, however, attaches to problems of thresholds, to matter and sensation, and so to intensities. Deleuze does not discuss the thing-in-itself explicitly. However, as has been seen in the Introduction this Kantian problem feeds through the Schopenhauerian will and on into Nietzsche's will to power. Whilst there are clearly differences to be argued between the thing-in-itself, the will-to-life and the will-to-power, the fundamental problem is that of an impersonal, non-transitive and unconscious process inseparable from but not identical with, force. Deleuze will call this process machinic or desiring-production. Having declared this thread as common throughout the different formulations provided by these three thinkers, a lengthier discussion will be left for chapter two.

The noumenon, as the negative doctrine of sensibility, is an object produced by understanding when it claims determinate knowledge of something in general, extending its legislation beyond the aggregation of particulars in experience and seeking knowledge independently of sense. Since the accord of the faculties in knowledge is not free, as it is in aesthetics, the production of common sense must involve not only mechanisms for convergence amongst the various sources but also the exclusion of differences which are either not commensurate with realizing a speculative
interest of reason, or which trample on other interests of reason. The noumenon is a solution to the co-ordination of speculative and practical interests.

The transcendental use of understanding, its claim to know something in general, or the negative noumenon, converges with the transcendent use of reason, and reason's claim of knowledge of an object corresponding to an Idea. Under what conditions of possibility? It is this latter uncritical 'supposition qui entraîne l'entendement lui-même dans son usage transcendental illégitime (supposition that draws the understanding itself into its illegitimate transcendental employment)'\(^{15}\). Or as Kant puts it, speculative reason is 'compelled to assume' the noumenon, pressed by law to provide the negative space for the transfer of one kind of causality into another.\(^{16}\) The Critique of Pure Reason militates against the confusion of these two zones. Whilst different legislative powers are involved, they occupy a single territory, and only by acting negatively against the passivity of sense is the negotiation of this space between reason and understanding successful in realizing an end of reason.

Understanding utilizes the noumenon negatively, limiting sensibility by providing a foundation for appearances, only if it does not also suppose itself to have legislative authority over this object: it must, at the same time as limiting sensibility 'set[-] limits to itself'.\(^{17}\) Reason allows understanding to operate in its speculative interest only if, whilst legislating over experience it also recognizes the limits of its jurisdiction: so understanding legislates in two senses, both in relation to the convergence of faculties in common sense, and in relation to itself. In relinquishing the claim to know an object in general independently of sense, understanding leaves free a space which, in its positive sense is filled by morality: understanding projects a negative surface on which practical reason inscribes its positive face, the pure form of Law.
In exploring relations amongst the faculties in his book on Kant, Deleuze makes marks: that is to say, certain problems are flagged or differences made precise, spaces made clear, which are taken up, in radically different form, in his later work. For instance, he writes:

‘chaque fois que nous nous plaçons ainsi du point de vue d’un rapport ou d’un accord déjà déterminé, déjà spécifié, il est fatal que le sens commun nous paraisse une sorte de fait a priori au-delà duquel nous ne pouvons pas remonter.

(each time we assume the perspective of a relationship or an accord which is already determined, it is inevitable that common sense should seem to us a kind of a priori fact beyond which we cannot go).’

In other words, common sense cannot answer the question of its own genesis, of an a priori subjective accord, a balance of difference not predicated on unity and not determined by experience. Deleuze’s criticism of Kant is, at its most naked, that whilst he provides an account of the production of representation, he fails to provide an account of the production of production, and in the book on Kant, the question of the genesis of the faculties and of their accord is opened. What produces the effect of formal laws extrinsic to experience, which determine universally its nature, shape, pattern and order through the various determinate relations amongst faculties? Kant rejects a Leibnizian solution through pre-established harmony and indeed, the first
Critique provides no solution at all. The problem is deferred until the Critique of Judgement, where it can be seen that the common sense relations of differentiated faculties brought about by the legislation of one faculty over others are dependent on their prior free and indeterminate accord. The universal, necessary and public space of cognition has its genesis not in law, but in a proportionally differentiated 'attunement [Stimmung] of the cognitive powers', the differences being conditioned by 'what difference there is among the objects that are given.' From the free accord of imagination and understanding in judgements of taste in the beautiful, and from that which arises out of the discordant and unregulated relation of imagination and reason in the sublime, a public space of communicability is formed, 'the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which must be presupposed in any logic'. In judgements of the sublime and of the beautiful, reason is disinterested. However, the possibility of disinterest itself testifies to their security. Judgements of taste on the beautiful have a logical form commensurate with understanding and the idea of a norm or standard of beauty is achieved through an averaging process which, whilst not conscious, is nonetheless mechanically repeatable. And judgements on the sublime require culture.

The problems of the genesis of the faculties is one amongst others which will find, through labyrinthine routes, a solution in machinic production, and the relation of machinic assemblages to the body without organs, and is addressed in chapter two. The beginnings of this solution follow on in chapter two, but it is not fully explored until a later one, when more of its elements have been provided.

Another mark made on the Kantian system in La philosophie critique de Kant pertains to Deleuze's empiricism, and the space that Kant opens up for a pre-legislative dynamic - the dynamic which Schopenhauer will take up and call the will.
Chapter 1

Theoretically, this is not possible: objects of knowledge constructed in contradiction of natural law are impossible, outside the limits of understanding, this latter being defined as giving the law to nature. It is illegitimate for understanding to make a claim over the empty space of the noumenon on behalf of knowledge, a claim to know the object in general. It treads on the feet of practical reason and breaks the systematic unity of the ends of reason apart: ‘nous perdons seulement la condition sous laquelle [notre existence intelligible] fait partie d’une nature et compose avec les autres un tout systématique (we lose the condition under which [our intelligible existence] forms part of a nature and composes, with the others, a systematic whole)’. Practical it is not possible either. Practical reason gives the law to freedom as absolute and categorical, and pure practical reason has no choice but to act legitimately - that is to say, within the realm of law. Practical reason is meant to realize its Law in action. But the space that Deleuze opens up is against Law not through intent or choice, but through reference to a pre-legislative economy - that economy of the will which Schopenhauer will draw from Kant and which seeds one of the directions which feeds into Deleuze’s thought.

Whilst the previous mark was concerned with the production of harmony amongst the faculties, here it is a question of what conditions the good sense union of sensibility and intelligibility and the coherence of theory and practice. What ensures that good sense is good in itself, rather than merely a means to some other, not necessarily good, end? What ensures that restriction of one legislative domain by the affairs of another is limited to their territorial effects, whilst the domains themselves remain separate? Only insofar as a creature is both legislator and obedient subject of the Law, in its pure form, does there arise ‘a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws - that is, a kingdom [ein Reich]’ and this end is possible only insofar as good sense is categorically defined as ‘necessary, in virtue of its principle,
for a will which of itself accords with reason'. What conditions the union of sensibility and intelligibility as good sense is Law, the positive side of Kantian theory.

Where good sense is absent, or there is a positive failure to recognize the ideal of the Reich, we 'cessons d’être sujets, mais d’abord parce que nous cessons d’être législateurs (cease to be subjects, but primarily because we cease to be legislators)', so transforming our relation with both sense and desire. It is this transformation of sense and desire outside the framework of both the subject and law which points towards a pre-legislative domain, for which Kant opens a space. Making a point which is integral to a later theme in his work, regarding the impossibility of a completed system - he says often that something always escapes - Deleuze argues against the identification of practical reason, as pure form of Law, and freedom, as a problematic idea. This is not a point about Kant’s moral theory. It is indeed the case that the space between freedom and legislation opened up by Kant is immediately closed, and that it must be assumed that obedience to maxims contrary to the categorical imperative nonetheless still constitutes a choice. What is important in Deleuze’s use of Kant is the selection of gaps and breaks within the construction of the critical system; that is, he does not produce a reading or interpretation of Kant but rather constructs a machine which utilizes those breaks and gaps, putting critique to work beyond the limits of reason, speculative or practical.

In his reading of Kant and his movement of critique beyond the threshold of reason, these smallest differences generate global effects on the system, because they are mobilized intensively, across the actual continuum and not extensively, through the lines scored on space by its theoretical demarcation. In this case as in others the issue concerns the real nature of problems, or the nature of real problems. Not: what
In an interview with Foucault, Deleuze talks of the relation of theory and practice; instead of a defined and immovable limit demarcating the two, he refers to a mobile connection. Under the conditions of representation, practice is at times the application of theory, its technical consequence, a theory applied to matter, whilst at others, theory is a consequence of practice, drawn out of the empirical or through the subjective maxims of the pure form of Law. However, Deleuze wants to fragment their relation, and to reformulate theory as local, relative only to the domain it describes and exhausted by its practice, rather than universal and legislating beyond the concrete exhaustion of its terms. It may have application to other domains, but the theory itself does not involve the necessity of this. In other words, it is contingent, encountering obstacles, problems which necessitate side-ways moves, the incorporation of new elements, which do not function as buttresses to the theory, additional hypotheses in support of a major claim, but whose addition feeds back into the theory to transform its nature. It is in this sense that Deleuze’s work might be called theoretical: rather than providing a single set of rules which encompass all concrete machines, and in terms of which all empirical contingencies can be hypothesized, he provides radically abstract rules, whose functioning is not pre-inscribed in their articulation, but contingent and differentiated according to the domain of practice. Practice is described as an assemblage of relays, which mobilize a theory, moving it across domains, through walls, whilst theory allows for the relay of practices. The relation is one of mutual reciprocation and interaction, rather than of fixed rule and principle. There is an action of theory and a passion of practice, a series of transformations by which theory becomes practice and practice becomes theory. 'Un système de relais dans un ensemble, dans une multiplicité de pièces et de morceaux à la fois théoriques et
pratiques (a system of relays in an assemblage, a multiplicity of parts and fragments simultaneously both theoretical and practical). As is often the case with Deleuze's reformulation of philosophical orthodoxies, such as the separation of theory and practice, the distinction becomes untenable once it is reconfigured; instead of a distinction one is left with an assemblage, a machine which constructs both theory and practice, but which is definable in terms of neither.

This digression on theory/practice relations explain Deleuze's attention to the gap which maintains their separation in Kant, and the utilization of the tiniest interval teased open between freedom and law as an interzone of autonomy, where desire is not constrained by law to produce objects, nor sense similarly constrained by understanding. The idea (here, of freedom) remains problematic, as it is in the theoretical philosophy, but practical Law provides no solution to it, because it is no longer an idea produced under compulsion, familiar and repeated, and governed by duty, obligation and pain, but one which mobilizes the potential for departure from this particular territory.

Kant writes of the occupation of the 'vacant place' of the noumenon by the moral law:

'Speculative reason does not herewith grow in insight but only in respect to the certitude of its problematic concept of freedom, to which objective, though only practical, reality is now indubitably given.'

The 'zone de libre-arbitre (zone of arbitrium liberum)', however, is unknown, uncertain, and the nature of its reality is not indubitably given: that is, it is

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contingent, its conditions are unknown and its effects are not played out on the territory where the laws of theory and practice operate mutually restrictive devices against each other. It is neither a negative theoretical device limiting sensibility nor a positive practical device.

The logical test of practical reason is made by analogy with theoretical laws:

'\textit{the maxim which I adopt in respect to freely disposing of my life is at once determined when I inquire what it would be in order that a system of nature could maintain itself in accordance with such a law}.'\textsuperscript{29}

A theoretical model of a form of law is a test for pure practical reason; the subject judges the truth or validity of the law he applies to himself by an analogy between the two domains of theory and practice: a correlation of the two confirms the unity of natural causality and freedom under the law, and the noumenon is the name for this correlation. As Kant says, 'the concept of freedom is \textit{meant} [\textit{der Freiheitsbegriff soll}] to actualize in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws'.\textsuperscript{30} This meaning would translate into theoretical nonsense, if the laws of the sensible world were incommensurate with those of the practical. If the two domains of theory and practice did not resolve into - at least in principle - an unconditioned unity, the territory which they share would crack apart: this is what Kant recognizes when he calls for a critique of reason as a means of preventing a lapse into a state of nature as warfare, and what he is underlining in his references to nomads and barbarians who cross the terrain of thought without having first secured possession of a ground.
In the Prolegomena, Kant says that discovery of the *a priori* concepts of understanding demands no greater insight than detection of grammatical laws: in no case is it possible to say 'why each language has just this and no other formal constitution'. Theoretically, one must assume it is contingent. However, that it is not contingent but bears a necessity predicated on moral law is made clear by the statement above: the meaning of freedom, and the fact that it makes theoretical sense - that analogies between moral maxim and theoretical law are possible - is a function of the Law.

The autonomous interzone in freedom on which Deleuze picks up escapes this analogy and the meaning of law: it is intelligible (which means no more than it expresses sense) and sensible (which means that it is intensive and that it is not legislative - sensibility does not legislate, being immanently passive, where passivity is not understood in relation to activity, but as passional and generative of affects). It thus cuts a transverse line across Kant’s system which escapes the systematics of reason, its cultural, moral, political and theoretical ends, and describes a different diagram of critique, one of practice and pragmatics, and a contingent autonomy. It is sensible; relative in the sense that it is attached to the concrete, but not relative in a liberal sense whereby one is necessitated to respect alternative opinions, alternative approaches; intelligible, but not rational, problematic but not subjective, effective but not caused and patterned but not meaningful. Falling on the side of neither theory nor practice, having unhinged sensibility from its reliance on various forms of imposed activity and disassociated autonomy from the freedom to impose Law on oneself, something escapes reason but not critique, nor indeed the problem of the transcendent.
The interconnections amongst the faculties and across the three *Critiques* produce a ‘véritable système de permutations (complete system of permutations’), at once both static and creative, which distributes amongst itself the immanent problem of its own construction.\(^{32}\) This latter point is of importance: Deleuze’s reading of Kant is not comparative - his interest is not in whether Kant produces a more theoretically consistent epistemology than another philosopher, or in how apposite his practical philosophy is to the late twentieth century, but in what is immanent to the production of Kantian philosophy. So there are no (or very few) accusations of unjustified assumptions, Scholastic hangovers or claims that some other thinker has generated more satisfying solutions to problems with which Kant deals: nor does Deleuze engage in corrective analyses, suggesting “improvements” to Kant’s thought in order to rectify apparent inconsistencies. There are ‘pas d’idées justes, juste des idées (no correct ideas, just ideas)’, some of which are illusions, but none of which are wrong.\(^ {33}\) The little Kant book begins with Kant’s own definition of philosophy, as ‘the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason’.\(^ {34}\) And Deleuze reads the system of faculties within these terms; but through the additive effect of the marks he makes and the selection and connection of elements which, unhinged, elude these ends, he removes the thought of a faculty system from its contained place within a subject, and opens it up to the world. This is the beginnings of an assemblage, or desiring-machine. Whilst he calls the book a book on an enemy, Deleuze is neither destructive nor aggressive, but camouflaged, disengaging the Kantian machine from common sense in the process of analyzing its production as such.

The problems of critique are production and the real, synthesis and sense, and the transcendental method concerns *how*, rather than what, or in which direction, to
think: not how one must, or how it is possible to think, but what are the conditions of a

genealogy of thinking; how does practice mobilize theory, through walls, outside
departments, beyond institutions and into the streets? How does theory diagram
practice, transforming its potential directions? Because Deleuze understands the
transcendental in a rigorously critical manner, it does not function as a conditioning
presupposition; as will be seen more clearly in a later chapter, it becomes an abstract
machine, evacuated of structure and immanent to the production of the concrete, a

genetic rather than conditioning element. This is the route that Deleuze takes,
connecting the marks and gaps in Kant and using the machine he constructs to undo
common sense and depart from the direction of good sense, his language changing as
the system produces its own escape lines, becoming less academic, faster, more dense
as it picks up speed, until in L'Anti-Oedipe his practice escapes philosophical theory
and builds a different, strange machine. But I am running ahead of the problem of this
chapter.

"[Il]l'y a des Idées qui parcourent toutes les facultés, n'étant l'objet d'aucune
en particulier (there are Ideas which traverse all the faculties, but are the object of none
in particular)”; Ideas which “vont de la sensibilité à la pensée, et de la pensée à la
sensibilité (go from sensibility to thought and from thought to sensibility)." 35 But pass
not through theory, practice, or their completion in an Image of thought. It is this
problem, of thought as the superior or transcendental exercise of sense, the practice of
sense, rather than its theoretical description, which Deleuze pursues, and the remainder
of this chapter explores further aspects of Kant's writing which support his claim that
sense is the real discovery of transcendental philosophy.

The system of faculties, Deleuze argues, points towards a transcendental
empiricism implicit in Kant, the discovery of sense as a transcendental faculty being
radically incommensurate with the general logic of the understanding. Kant betrays this discovery on three counts at least. Firstly, through the convergence of knowledge into a form of common sense; secondly, by directing thought teleologically, complementing common sense with good sense; and lastly by installing a form of conditioning which dictates that problems are understood in terms of the possibility of their solution. These components - an emphasis on the network or system of faculties, the problem of the vector of thought, and the discovery of sense as the properly transcendental element - are at the basis of Deleuze's relation with Kant.

IV Problem I

In *Différence et Répétition*, Deleuze writes that what is essential to any problem is 'the genesis of the act of thought, the operation of the faculties'. A problem, or Idea, is defined not through the possibility of its solution, through a need to provide a correct, or true response to a question, but transcendentally. Understood in terms of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, this remark suggests that the transcendental as a problem cannot be characterized in terms of the *Analytic*, since this instances only a solution, the functions of judgement providing a conceptual framework for a set of propositions true within a given and limited field. The transcendental problem, or Idea is one for 'which there is no solution' in advance, no common sense answer, and, according to the limits of knowledge established by Kant, no solution in principle. Each solution is complete, but problems are abstract - Deleuze is critical of Kant for naming the Ideas, a move which defines an area or possibility of solution. How else, for example could God, freedom and immortality be solved other than by religion or morality?
Yet whilst a problem cannot be defined in terms of its solutions, just as the concrete practice of theory never resembles the theory itself, nonetheless a problem determines and is inseparable from its solutions; there is thus a paradox. Tracing the outlines of a problem from the instances of its solution and trying to solve paradoxes with a reversible and symmetrical logic falls foul of natural or philosophical illusions, leading to a misunderstanding not only of the sense of an Idea, but also of the nature of the transcendental. One ends up oscillating between two domains, without the two every meeting or interacting. Deleuze takes the transcendental as a serious problem, and is rigorous about the need to understand it in terms of immanence. However, unlike Kant, it is not immanent to reason, but to critique; it becomes the principle of critical practice, the abstract thought of zero presuppositions. This is one reason why, as theory, it is not traceable from its solutions, since solutions are empirical, contextual, temporary, and their discovery feedback into their conditions and transforms them, as different.

Deleuze’s problems are sense and thought, Ideas inseparable from their solutions, yet not traceable from the instances of these. Problems are given as produced, as empirical and produced as given, immanently, this relation being neither symmetrical nor bilateral, each element being continually displaced and destabilized in a becoming which is not anchored to being. A solution is unilaterally differentiated from its problem: ‘le distingue s’oppose à quelque chose qui ne peut pas s’en distinguer, et qui continue d’épouser ce qui divorce avec lui (something which distinguishes itself - and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it)’. The paradox of this relation, of a surface rising from itself, folding within itself and involuting, is inseparable from Deleuze’s thought.
Deleuze marries Kant's insistence on immanence with a Leibnizian system, which he plugs into the crack within the Kantian subject effected through the introduction of time, a sense which fractures general logic. The *Transcendental Aesthetic* becomes a problem whose genesis is connected with the unfolding of an infinite plane of immanence, and with material relations which produce rather than presuppose time and space. From Kant, there is the illegitimation of a transcendent determining form and from Leibniz a system whose elements are nested; 'Each portion of matter may be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But every branch of each plant, every member of each animal, and every drop of their liquid parts is itself likewise a similar garden or pond.' This opens out a radically different Kant, and begins to characterize Deleuze's critique as a microanalysis of power: of the mechanisms by which signs are inverted, positive to negative or negative to positive; of the slightest deviations from the systematics of reason, which, when connected, escape the damage of law. By marrying systems against reason, and by cutting across Kantian territory, rather than following the lines of its structural organization and the rules of his thought, Deleuze begins to uncover the genesis of the transcendental in sense, imperceptible to the conceptual generalizations to which it is reduced in the *Analytic in the first Critique*. Rather than functioning as a set of conditioning principles, the transcendental becomes a part added alongside the concrete machine, not as a whole in terms of which the machine can be explained, but as another working element immanent to the empirical, but not definable in its terms.

By connecting critique and the network of the faculties with an open systematics of nested and differential elements not co-ordinated by or subordinated to a centralized subject, the whole assemblage functioning instead as an intensive magnitude modulated through the pure form of time, Deleuze flips Kant onto an intensive synthetic axis, connecting time with the discussion of intensity in the
Anticipations of Perception, using only the smallest intervals and differences in Kant’s writings in the creation of an effect which does not leave Kant intact, but opens him up, as a surface of variation and change. It is important not to understanding nesting extensively: each “nest” is not inside another, in the sense that, by analysis, one could discover and lay out a coherent and total system. Because the system is intensive, each movement changes the relations of all parts, the distributions and densities of space. Deleuze follows a critical vector which is neither mechanically nor organically structured - that is, it is neither a system of understanding or an architectonic of reason - but ‘an unconscious in finite understanding...that Kant will himself be forced to discover when he will hollow out the difference between a determinant and a determinable self’\(^41\): the problem of time, sense and the thing-in-itself.

Because Deleuze does not argue relations between the three Critiques, or internal to any one Critique in terms of contradictions or resemblances between them, critique becomes an open system which is ‘merely transformed by the different foldings it receives’, a plastic and mobile space.\(^42\) The transcendental becomes an abstract distributed surface of flows and assemblages rather than a hierarchical edifice enclosed within the bounds of reason, and each Critique becomes an engagement with a reason whose sense constitutes a response or solution to transformations in the abstract space of the transcendental: a machine.

This move is of crucial importance, since it implies infinite variations generated immanently to a finite open system by intensive elements: a system in continuous displacement. By bringing what is imperceptible and analytically intractable within Kant’s philosophy to its surface and allowing it to function synthetically, by connecting and interweaving lines and elements from philosophies and philosophers, stealing something from here, something else from there, Deleuze
assembles a nuanced, fluid Kant, no longer the stolid moralist and oppressor of
difference but unknowing inventor of a problem.

The critical treason in Deleuze’s reading of Kant is double, in two senses. One, chronologically, because although the potential of the transformation is implicated in the early work, it is only in Deleuze’s later writings that the components selected and connections effected interact without reference to their source, critique becoming an impersonal and abstract machinic force, auto-critique, or as it comes to be called in *Anti-Oedipus*, schizoanalysis. By which time it is as legitimate to claim that Kant has nothing to do with Deleuze as it is to claim that Deleuze has produced a Kant-becoming. And secondly, because Deleuze splits Kant across an unfamiliar axis which connects intensities with differential relations, so drawing the problem of force into the dialectic, and Ideas with individuals, so the latter become solutions to the former.

Again, a paradox, Deleuze’s critique being both immanent to the system of faculties, as an intensive depth, whilst at the same time differentiated from Kant, not as a single line of departure, but through the selection of tiny intervals, and their connection in a movement which transforms the nature of the conditions, and opens out the potential for a Kant whose problems are not locked into a subject. His concern is not to establish a doctrine of faculties, but to determine its presuppositions and discover its machinery. In the next chapter, the image of recognition which blocks this move will be circumnavigated.
Losing Face

‘La noologie, qui ne se confond pas avec l’idéologie, est précisément l’étude des images de la pensée, et de leur historicité. D’une certaine manière, on pourrait dire que cela n’a guère d’importance, et que la pensée n’a jamais eu qu’une gravité pour rire. Mais elle ne demande que ça: qu’on ne la prenne pas au sérieux, puisqu’elle peut d’autant mieux penser pour nous, et toujours engendrer ses nouveaux fonctionnaires, et que, moins les gens prennent la pensée au sérieux, plus ils pensent conformément à ce qu’un Etat veut.

(‘Noology, which is distinct from ideology, is precisely the study of images of thought, and their historicity. In a sense, it could be said that all this has no importance, that thought has never had anything but laughable gravity. But that is all it requires: for us not to take it seriously. Because that makes it all the easier for it to think for us, and to be forever engendering new functionaries. Because the less people take thought seriously, the more they think in conformity with what the State wants’). ¹

In its broadest sense and throughout, Deleuze’s writing constitutes a critique of images which have protected the assumption that everyone knows what thinking means. In the early book, Nietzsche et la Philosophie, he summarizes three theses essential to the dogmatic image of thought: truth is the formal possession of sincere thought; error is in opposition to truth, the effect of forces alien to thought; method is the means by which the formal possession of truth is protected from the distractions of error - ‘corps, passions, intérêts sensibles (body, passions, sensuous interests)’. ² Truth is abstract and universal, method is independent of context, and always remote from the errors of the senses.
Deleuze writes that it is disturbing that thought understood in this way 'n’ont jamais fait de mal à personne. Le fait est que l’ordre établi et les valeurs en cours y trouvent constamment leur meilleur soutien (has never hurt anyone. In fact the established order and current values constantly find their best support in truth conceived in this way). By not taking seriously the professed innocence of thought, by not exploring the prejudicial nature of an image which protects itself by negating the body, the senses, the passions, desire and the potential cruelties of thinking, philosophy embraces stupidity, and even this is misunderstood, as bestiality or laziness or error. Stupidity is not these, however but the condition under which misadventures in thought are categorized as either truth or error: leading to thought as quiz-show, Deleuze says. Stupidity is a structure of thought as such: hence Deleuze’s question: why has stupidity never been considered as 'l’objet d’une question proprement transcendentale (the object of a properly transcendental question)? Whilst the legitimacy of thought as a juridical and image-bound process is deduced, the intelligence of this process, of this sort of deduction as a legitimation of the real nature of thought, is never made the object of critique.

Deleuze targets several prejudices: that thought has a natural rectitude; that amongst the undeniable elements of thought are included subjectivity, representation, and discourse; that a common sense proper to the nature of thought distributes a form of the Same, an identity continuous throughout the diversity of empirical fields: that good sense determines a principle of direction which forces choice and eliminates alternative routes and patterns of thought: that thought has a form of interiority modelled on the State which, once given, is universalized: and finally, that the value of thought is established - that it is, indeed, we who think, who know who we are and what we think. The first person plural indicates not modesty or reticence in the face of
saying ‘I think’, but illustrates that thought has been consigned to regurgitating the particular in the light of what is generally thought, of what thought holds in common. Deleuze’s reading of Kant is twofold, however: the critique of the dogmatic image simultaneously engages elements of critique which are not under the regulation of good sense, nor constituted by common sense, and so not under the grammar of the “we”. This minor treatment of Kant strips out the power structures, culture, doctrine, dogma, the ends of reason, sense and thought, so efficiently and elegantly mapped out in the little Kant book, to expose critique’s potential becomings.  

I Recognition

The principle presupposed by the image of thought, Deleuze argues, is that of recognition. Recognition implies a transcendental model which orients thought according to rules of distribution which function specifically to limit and control its relation with sense by requiring thought to be thought of an object, of something, something in general, something = x. The element of generality, of both scope and direction, is essential to the dogmatic image of thought, since it allows for the substitution of particulars on a horizontal plane, each and every object being exchangeable for any other object, and the subsumption of particulars on a vertical plane, each relation being contained under emptier but more general laws. There is no need for caution, thinking on this plane, because it is a general space organized identically throughout. No danger, no surprise. Extrinsic to sense, the form of the object in general lays claim to the empirical in advance of experience, and prejudices the potential force, direction and distribution of synthesis by explicating it along generally familiar lines.
Recognition of the particular depends on the field of sense becoming an object in general for the understanding. As Kant says, 'the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses' and produce recognition, since sensibility is passive, intuition is singular and the real is *a posteriori*. The conjunction of heterogeneous sensible presentations into a field of generality must therefore be an act of understanding, the faculty of representation. However, by generalizing the manifold diversity of sense under the form of an object, the real elements of sensible relations are inverted and hidden, and the transcendental problematic is lost. Conceptual determination according to the unity of rule special to understanding generalizes over difference in order to lock it into a relation with identity: sensible relations are thus formalized according to the categories of substance, causality and community, and the material interactions of bodies are covered over, each relation being a particular instance of a formal and general rule.

In the *Aesthetic*, Kant says that the parts of time and space, which are pure intuitions, presuppose the whole: time is not composed of times nor space of spaces. However, according to the axioms of intuition 'All intuitions are extensive magnitudes', which is to say 'the representation of the parts makes possible, and therefore necessarily precedes, the representation of the whole'. When predicated of the object in general, as empirically real, intuitions - which 'rest on affections' - become fixed quantities, discrete quanta with particular values which are a function of neither sensible nor real relations but of the formal concept of magnitude, and their affective genesis formalized, generalized and brought into relation with unity. According to the concept of magnitude, space and time are divided into metric intervals, quanta. As the experience of space is rendered axiomatically extensive, all real data becomes subject to cardinal measurability, the former indirectly, through
reference to extensity, and the latter directly, and can thus be summed according to an additive (+1) principle.

Matter, in this context, is condensed into a point, and the qualities of forces are evaluated independently of real differences in the intensities from which they emerge. Since the judgement of which the concept of quantity is a function is universal, this segmented Euclidean spatio-temporality becomes the field of thought to which understanding is limited, the surface on which the image is organized and across which a single subject expresses itself in an object in general. In this way a nested and intensive system, which is ordinal without the order of the sequence being determined by anything extrinsic to the system, becomes subject to a principle of succession which dictates that each element counts as a unit of the same magnitude. Ordinal does not mean first, second, third...etc., but first, ninth, twenty-third, second, seventeenth: not as arbitrary leaps, but as expressions of relations structuring a problem, of qualities of force rather than quantities of substance.

Only by unhinging the Aesthetic, together with imagination, from understanding and its empty conceptual boxes can the empty form of time become a carrier of intensive distances and depths of a space without uniformity, which is produced as it is crossed, rather than being there before you arrive. This is what Deleuze means when he calls the pure line of time a labyrinth: it is spatially intensive, just as space is temporally differentiated, and there is no single and uniform time which comprehends all space. But one must be careful to differentiate - as Kant does - between intensity and intensive magnitude. Intensity is correlated with the material qualities of the real:
Chapter 2

‘Appearances contain in addition to intuition the matter [Materien] for some object in general...they contain, that is to say, the real [das Reale] of sensation as merely subjective representation, which gives us only the consciousness that the subject is affected and which we relate to an object in general.'\(^{12}\)

Kant is referring to the real here, and not to the concept of reality: the real in sensation, or matter of perception, is that qualitative aspect of empirical experience which, unlike conceptual reality, cannot be known or anticipated \textit{a priori}, but without which the form of the object in general remains empty and logical. \textit{A posteriori} and intensive, the singular qualities of real relations are, as remarked above, masked, diverted and distributed according to conceptual rules extrinsic to their production; the qualities of forces are qualified under the general conditions of possibility, making them commensurate with subjective unity through their relation to the object in general, or transcendental object, correlate of the transcendental subject.

Through this relation, degrees of intensity become re-describable as intensive magnitudes. Intensities effect (but are not equivalent to) sensation, or affects and Kant thus ascribes them (not their genesis, but their effect) to the subject; intensive magnitude, ‘a degree of influence on the sense’, is ascribed to ‘all objects of perception, in so far as the perception contains sensation.’\(^{13}\) The problem of the generation of intensities, as singular and instantaneous effects which testify to relations of bodies and of real forces, is lost in this move, which follows that same split described at the opening to the \textit{Transcendental Aesthetic}, which isolates an objective and subjective element of sensibility. The intensive and real continuum of which all quanta are composed is rationalized through the form of the object, which is folded back over intensities, splitting them into sensations on the one hand - subjective, unmeasurable,
private experiences of a closed body, and degrees of intensive magnitude on the other -
objective, measurable, public experiences of qualitative motions by cognitive subjects.
Kant can only then make the claim that though it may

'seem surprising that we should forestall experience, precisely in that
which concerns what is only to be obtained through it, namely, its
matter...none the less, such is actually the case.'\textsuperscript{14}

Intensities experienced as sensation are instantaneous. If succession, a concept
first produced by '[m]otion, an act of the subject [Bewegung, als Handlung des
Subjekts]'\textsuperscript{15} is not taken into account, then intensities have no extensive magnitude,
because their apprehension 'does not involve a successive synthesis proceeding from
parts to the whole representation.'\textsuperscript{16} That is, they are real qualities, but are not
commensurable with the axioms of intuition; instead they are discrete and singular, yet
complex, since the real is infinitely divisible. In the move from intensities understood
thus to intensive magnitudes as general and anticipatable qualities corresponding to a
degree of influence on the sense, infinite divisibility is formulated on the extensive
axis, the pure form of time becomes the form of succession, the act of a subject, and the
intensive continuum becomes correlated with the successive continuity of time,
determinable either subjectively, in terms of inner sense, and thus as directional, or in
terms of the body, and thus without relevance to cognition, or objectively,
epistemologically, in terms of quanta, and thus as rational and extensive. In all three
cases the real problem of intensities - of an infinitely divisible, impersonal and pre-
individual heterogeneous manifold of real qualities - is lost.

Deleuze is critical of Kant's use of recognition in the Analytic of the first
Critique, not only for its specific employment in that context, but for its wider function,
which is to provide thought with a model of the "concordance des facultés fondée dans le sujet pensant comme universel, et s’exerçant sur l’objet quelconque (harmony of the faculties grounded in the supposedly universal thinking subject and exercised upon the unspecified object)." Common sense, the collaboration and convergence of faculties on the shared task of recognizing an object as the Same, limits thought by requiring that, to be legitimate, it adhere to this model. Recognition of the object thus becomes the means by which the real relations of sense are differentiated from the formal relations of judgement and understanding. That is, recognition is the mechanism by which the truth of image and the errors of the body are distinguished.

But: ‘Il y a dans le monde quelque chose qui force à penser’ (Something in the world forces [us] to think') The limitations imposed on thought by the principle of recognition and on sense by its generalization under the form of an object imply a paralogism at the heart of Kantian epistemology: sense is separated from what it can become by a régime of relations which reduce the real to a condition of general possibility, and negate its genetic rôle in thought. In the first Critique, sense's only logic is conceptually conditioned. What forces thinking is discounted by this condition, which separates a content of thought from a form, and then determines the former on the basis of the latter, endorsing hylomorphism.

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The above gives a negative aspect of Deleuze’s Kant, and as such is derivative of the positive aspect of critique. “[D]evant un tel génie, il ne peut être question de dire qu’on n’est pas d’accord. Il faut d’abord savoir admirer; il faut retrouver les problèmes qu’il pose, sa “machinerie à lui” (in front of such genius, perhaps it is not only a question of saying that one does not agree. First of all, you have to know how to
admire; you have to rediscover the problems he poses, the "machinery in itself"). It is this positive and generous consideration of the machinery, of the network of faculties, which gives Deleuze's critique of Kant its force: he operates with courtesy towards his enemy, camouflaging the movements which effect the turn of the result against its origin, forging a strange alliance and producing a monstrous offspring. Of his practices in the history of philosophy at the time of writing the Kant book he writes that he looked on it as a process of screwing (enculage).

His reading of Kant is, once more, double, a Kant of recognition and the image of thought, bureaucratic and moralizing, counterposed with a Kant of synthesis, insistence on real conditions and sense as the problem and discovery of the transcendental. Unless the network of faculties is simplified, and the critical machinery collapsed back into understanding, (in which case the real problem of the transcendental is also lost) it is quite plain that imagination is the productive engine of synthesis, and that it is only in its epistemological operation that it is legislated by understanding, and annexed to recognition. Understanding does have a facility for synthesis: however, this is an empty and merely formal combination in the absence of data provided through the synthesis of imagination. This latter brings "the manifold of intuition into the form of an image" by taking "impressions up into its activity". The manifold of intuition, even if pure, is not empty, but nor is it uniform or necessarily commensurate with the possibility for recognition: that this is the case is clear from the third Critique, where concepts have no purchase, on either aesthetic or natural production.

As Buchdahl writes, this synthesis of imagination is a "pre-categorised process". If recognition is allowed to infect synthesis at the level of transcendental imagination, the import of the schematism for the relation of sensibility and
understanding is lost. Kant writes that the ‘application of categories to appearances becomes possible by means of transcendental determination of time’ (italics added). Recognition works at the level of the image, whilst the schema, ‘a product and, as it were, a monogram of pure a priori imagination’ is a mediating function, a “third thing” clearly distinguished from the image, which allows for the application of categories to the appearances synthesized in apprehension. In other words, as is indicated by the words ‘becomes possible’, the relation of the concepts to appearances is transcendentally conditioned by the determination of time through imagination; understanding has no immediate relation with the manifold of intuition, and only because, in the epistemological task of the first Critique, imagination is functioning under the management of understanding, is the determination of time consistent with the concepts. Were time only and necessarily determinable according to the pure categories of understanding, all experience would be exhausted by the architecture of the first Critique. Synthesis does not require recognition; recognition presupposes synthesis. The combination of representations by understanding and the spontaneous addition of a formal rule to material data presupposes the synthesis of imagination. If this important role of imagination is missed, then the real problem of synthesis is also missed.

Mapping the Kant of real problems and sense involves both an abstract problem, that ‘does not explain, but must itself be explained’, and an empirical problem, of ‘analyzing the states of things, in such a way that non-pre-existent concepts can be extracted from them’. Abstract and empirical together and at once, a singularity, and not a particular. Explanation in Deleuze’s sense is not, however, discursive clarification or interpretation. Analysis of a substantial multiplicity, of the state of a “thing” made up of ‘a set of lines or dimensions which are irreducible to one another’ is neither exhaustive nor definitive, because the lines tangled in a multiplicity
are becomings, material solutions or explanations to real problems of matter and energy flows. There is, for an empirical logic of multiplicities, no "thing"; only sets of inseparable and continuously varying relations, and analysis is at once synthesis, since plugging into a multiplicity effects its reconfiguration, and any change in relation is, for an intensive, nested and real system, also a change in nature. There is always an escape: indeed, if critique were not immanently creative, Kant would be a dull enemy and a feeble ally.

II Sense

In *Différence et Répétition*, Deleuze differentiates between the given (le donné) and "ce par quoi le donné est donné (that by which the given is given)". Difference is "ce par quoi le donné est donné comme divers (that by which the given is given as diverse)" , the virtual and real condition of concrete appearance, substantial multiplicities. Sense is thus both abstract and concrete simultaneously, perceptible and imperceptible; it neither explains nor hides itself by forced conduction along pre-given co-ordinates but is self-organizing, actualizing the differential relations of the problem as a distribution of multiplicities, or diversity; and whilst space is always to varying degrees segmented and partitioned, ordered and structured, there is at the same time something that always escapes.

Deleuze’s formulation of the relation of difference and diversity addresses the paralogism mentioned above; sense is not separated from what it can become by the form of possibility, nor channelled by a régime into providing the content for logical meanings and forms imposed from outside sense. Instead, it individuates a body, making solutions to problems perceptible whilst simultaneously adding the imperceptible alongside, not as a unifying or unified element, or as causally related to
what is perceived, but as an additional component, which differentiates this assemblage
from that; not extensively, according to properties or characters attaching to identical
units, such as organisms or persons, nor through comparisons of differences on the
basis of a prior commonality, but as the immanent condition of a body as a singularity,
or haecceity, the term used in Mille Plateaux

Deleuze distinguishes two senses of difference; differentiation, which belongs
to a problem, and differenciation, as the concretization of the differential relations of
the problem. Where these are confused, and the process of actualization is taken to
instantiate the relations of the problem, the problem discussed earlier, of confusing
solutions with problems, and attempting to trace the nature of the problem from the
instances of its solutions arises.

This early formulation in Différence et Répétition of two communicating
orders of difference which cannot be referred to a single unifying principle carries
through, though in different terminology, into the later work. In Mille Plateaux, for
example, the concrete individual is named an assemblage, whilst differential problems
become abstract machines: in both cases, what is important is the relation between the
two. The variables negotiated by the assemblage effectuate the machine, and the latter
does not exist independently of the former, whilst the former does not function
independently of the latter. There are passages of communication between the two,
variations in the variables selected which in turn change in nature of the variables. It
was said above that there is no time uniform for all space, and no space distributed in
advance of its occupation: each assemblage or body effectuates a singular machine,
realizing a space and time without comparison. (The system, needless to say, does not
wear democracy with ease.)
Kant is criticized, as has been seen, for isolating his abstract components from the empirical, his practice from his theory, disallowing their communication and the transformation of the problem, or abstract machine, as it interacts with its solutions. The Kantian transcendental is folded back over the empirical, appearing as a miraculous condition of its order, independently originated and establishing a set of invariant constants. Deleuze, however, sets the constants in motion, so that a problem becomes a set of variables, the difference amongst things which have nothing in common, and itself varying in relation to the concrete. He describes philosophy as the creation of concepts, but concepts which remain contingent.

That by which the given is given is not time or space, but their genesis, a set of intensive syntheses immanent to the formation of a pure straight line and a rhizomatic distribution - a labyrinthine, ant-like line, the effect of time unhinged from cardinality, of passive syntheses. These latter are the imperceptible and contingent cycles of the sufficient reason of sense, the molecular patternings of perception whose emergent effect is the concrete world, not as a theatre of representation, but as a shifting and mobile field of directions and tendencies. In unhinging time from cardinality, logic and the order of succession, Kant is also disconnecting it from generality, making it autonomous of understanding and of consciousness - of movement, succession, co-existence, etc., - which are modes, or consciousnesses of time. As has already been remarked in the Introduction, to confuse the pure form of time with one of its modes is to reduce it to a psychologistic notion. It might be argued, with reference to the Second Analogy, that subjective succession is definitive of the form of time. However, succession is merely subjective consciousness of time, tied up with the apprehension of perceptions rather than with their materiality; the function of the Second Analogy is to demonstrate that objective relations amongst appearances, as

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opposed to the arbitrary successions in inner sense, are governed by the concept of causality. Kant writes:

"The objective succession will therefore consist in that order of the manifold of appearance according to which, in conformity with a rule, the apprehension of that which happens follows upon the apprehension of that which precedes. Thus only can I be justified in asserting, not merely of my apprehension, but of appearance itself, that a succession is to be met with in it."29

The distinction being made is not that between the pure form of time and a rule-determined causal and objective order, but between a subjective, conscious experience of time-relations as successive and arbitrarily ordered and an objective conscious experience of time-relations as causally determined. To confuse the pure form of time with succession is to commit the critical error of formulating conditions in terms of the conditioned.

Kant's insight, Deleuze argues, demands 'une nouvelle définition du temps (et de l'espace), (a new definition of time (and of space))', which considers it within its own terms, as aesthetic and as singular, rather than in terms of understanding, as conceptual and general.30 This in turn necessitates a different theorization of imagination in relation to time, and sensibility, in which it is no longer rigidified by its common sense function of schematizing along channels of conceptual unity. This break up of common sense is one amongst other problems that Deleuze works out in Différence et Répétition, beginning to seed the apparatus of Anti-Oedipus, where the sense of a faculty has been melded onto that of real distributions, and becomes a function of the relations of a substantial multiplicity, or assemblage, which is not
definable as a unity or as in relation to a unity. The assemblage is the basic unit of machinic critique, composed not of an aggregate of extensive units, a sort of clutter of randomly collected bits and pieces, but as a series of inter-related affects, continuously mobile and in variation; rather than existing in time, an assemblage is chronogenetic, generating a temporal and temporary metastability as an effect of the infinite firings of intensive difference which comprise its substance.

There are 'des facultés non encore soupçonnées, à découvrir. Car on ne peut rien dire d’avance, on ne peut pas préjuger de la recherche' (faculties yet to be discovered, whose existence is not yet suspected. For nothing can be said in advance, one cannot prejudge the outcome of research'), or of relations amongst senses with nothing in common. In *Différence et Répétition*, Deleuze's productive interest in Kant focuses on what forces sensibility to sense, on the relation of sense, as both sensation and intuition, to the thing-in-itself, which Deleuze re-names a dark precursor and disconnects from the unity which Kant allows himself to postulate in relation to it. What is important for the dark precursor, or 'l’en-soi, c’est que, petite ou grande, la différence soit interne (the in-itself, is that the difference, whether large or small, be internal)'. Difference is not a function of the relation of an identity to its external environment; indeed the determination and definition of something as a boundary or limit becomes increasingly problematic. Without moving outside the terms of the problem, components whose sense is purely extensive cannot be introduced as mechanisms for its solution. As remarked above, two senses of difference are in play, that of the problem - differentiation, and that of its concretion or actualization - differenciation. Where the difference of the in-itself, or dark precursor, is confused with the concrete order of differences, the critical move of the transcendental is lost: subjectively experienced features of experience are mistaken for real relations, which
in turns suggests that representation is understood not as a mode of construction or production, but as production of the real.

Deleuze does not refer specifically to the thing-in-itself or to its formulation within the Kantian system. Similarly, remarks concerning the thing-in-itself made here do not constitute an interpretation of the term or of its particular functioning within the first Critique. It is under any circumstances important not to present a crude formulation of the thing-in-itself as an object, as the concept of an object, or as synonymous with the noumenon; it is crucial that it is not understood in such terms in order to track the manner in which Deleuze takes up this problematic. Whilst Deleuze’s formulation of the “in-itself” of difference appears much transformed from the few and inconsistent references to it in Kant’s own work, it is nonetheless implicated with the same problem, which as discussed in the Introduction, are addressed first by Schopenhauer in his deployment of the thing-in-itself as the will. That is, the problem of a blind (in the sense of non-teleological, non-directed, unconscious, non-intentional) dynamic force or drive antecedent to law.

As such a drive, the thing-in-itself is immanent to the empirical, since without it the empirical is no more than a logical form devoid of objective (material) reality; that is, it does not function as a limit to the empirical. Nonetheless, it cannot be thought through or in terms of the empirical without this leading to a transcendent formulation. It is against such uncritical tendencies that this reading of the thing-in-itself operates. There are only two elements to be considered - firstly, a continuum of intensities, a full space of varying degrees of density and compression and secondly, the empty form of time. It is in this context that the dark precursor needs to be understood. In Kant’s own terms, this is not a problem for consciousness, since from the position of consciousness there are no relations other than those which appear, and those which
appear are, for consciousness, axiomatically extensive; so whilst it may be true to say that consciousness is also intensively differentiated, the qualities of intensity are extensively qualified. Nor is it a problem equivalent to that of the noumenon. The noumenon is 'something in general' distinguished from sensibility and leaving as residue 'a mode of determining the object by thought alone - a merely logical form without content' which firms the ground for the analogical conversion of natural law and maxims of moral law. But the thing-in-itself as precursor is a differenciator, however, the 'in-itself' of difference, which Deleuze also calls demon, signal or leap.

A majoritarian reading of Kant boxes the thing-in-itself into a single problem: this is how it becomes assimilated with the noumenon and conceived in causal terms, as both a principle of the convertibility and exchange of subjective terms - moral maxims into general laws of science and back again - and in relation to the strange causality of freedom under the Law. It characterizes it negatively, too, as a concept of a sensuously perceived thing in so far as it is not perceived in space and time. The leap is thus no longer a flash-flow but a labour. Not an autonomous interval but freedom and equality under Law. Deleuze precision engineers critique, stripping it down whilst remaining rigorously transcendental (in the sense of immanence of criteria) by deploying sense against conversion and exchange, by not pre-supposing unity, and by illegitimating the resignation of thought to illusion, philosophical or physical. The thing-in-itself ceases to be a single problem with a single solution, but becomes a singular matter immanent to and indistinguishable from its collective solution in a concrete assemblage, but imperceptible, and not explicable through reference to that assemblage. It cannot be thought in terms of (Kantian) substance - a concept, and thus not in terms of permanence either. It is through the interrogation of this relation between an intensively differentiated continuum, the in-itself of difference, and the
pure form of time that Deleuze teases critique from reason and the transcendental from the subject.

Illuminations are to be dismembered, not resisted. As the process of shifting the ground and uncovering elements inverted by negation and constrained by limitation continues, the nature of the transcendental and of the thing-in-itself become transformed, as each is divorced from the structures of unity, recognition and the image of thought. The transcendental - by which Deleuze means the pure empty line of time unhinged from cardinality - becomes increasingly abstract, whilst the thing-in-itself becomes an intensive problem, synthesized as the variables of the transcendental are selected in the formation of a body, or assemblage; the thing-in-itself becomes produced as the imperceptible, or inaccessible, produced through the given, as the difference of the given, rather than as its cause. It remains unknown, since it is by definition imperceptible.

Kant introduces the problem of the thing-in-itself in the Transcendental Aesthetic, in an argument pitched at Leibniz, against the confusion of the forms of space and time with properties of objects of representation or things-in-themselves.

"The true correlate of sensibility, the thing-in-itself [Ding an sich selbst] is not known, and cannot be known, through these representations; and in experience no question is ever asked in regard to it."35

There are some clues here as to the direction in which to explore the thing-in-itself. Firstly, the apparently trivial remark that the thing-in-itself cannot be known through the representations of space and time serves as a reminder that the problem attaching to
the thing-in-itself, unlike the noumenon, is not primarily epistemological. When Kant refers to the thing-in-itself as underlying the appearance of matter,\textsuperscript{36} - which, as Chapter Three discusses, is composed of forces - this substrate cannot be thought in terms of substance, since the thing-in-itself is definitionally not within the possibility of conscious human knowledge. Nor can the forces which compose it be understood in terms of causality, for this again would be to give it an illegitimate attachment to the categories and once more to formalize it as an intelligible but non-sensible object, and eject the material problematic of the thing-in-itself out into the practical zone of the noumenon. It is not known through space and time since they are aesthetic forms rather than cognitive formalisms, but it also \textit{cannot} be known; that is, whilst Kant postulates a non-human form of intuition which could provide access to the noumenon, no such intuition is postulated for the thing-in-itself. This moves one away from any serious consideration of the thing-in-itself in conceptual terms. Secondly, by calling it the correlate of sensibility, but distinguishing it from the forms of space and time, Kant is implicating the thing-in-itself with sensation, and thus with intensity and with matter.\textsuperscript{37} In other words, the thing-in-itself attaches to the problem of real possibility - that is, to the unique problem addressed by the transcendental - rather than to that of logical possibility. Thirdly, the thing-in-itself is not a problem which arises in experience; experience is its solution. This means it is not a problem which can be formulated in terms of consciousness, either, since Kant understands experience solely in terms of consciousness. These three points suggest, then, that it is in the areas of intensity, matter (not understood in terms of the logical concept of substance, but rather as the unspecified and undefined "given") and the unconscious that solutions to this problem might be discovered.

Sensation, as Kant explains in the Prolegomena, does not contain space or time, nor \textit{`occupy any part of space or of time'}.\textsuperscript{38} It neither has time or space, nor is it
inside time or space. And as an intensity, sensation is not a quantity, in any straightforward sense, but a degree, the quantity of quality. The concept of quantity is non-relational - it is the subsumption of appearances as intuitions in space and time - whilst degree is the expression of a relation of intensity, the singular real of any perception, a differential, and that element which cannot be anticipated but which becomes the content of the form of intuition when expressed through the axiom of extension. Only insofar as it is correlated with sensibility, and the forms of intuition can degree be estimated quantitatively - that is, only when brought into relation with possible experience in general can the qualitative intensity be formulated proportionately with any other qualitative intensity.

It was said in the Introduction that Schopenhauer eliminates the possibility of conceiving of the thing-in-itself as an object “behind” representation, formulating it instead as antecedent to the formal and secondary aspects of the world which are added by the intellectual functions of the brain - that is, those functions which generate the world as representation. This is moving in the direction of the perspective of the object - which, it will be recalled from the Introduction, was the perspective from which this thesis addresses Kant, the perspective of women - and towards a positive formulation of the thing-in-itself, since it directs attention towards intensities, (for example, *qualitas occulta*) and away from the borrowed reality of the conscious representations of the subject. The thing-in-itself is no longer explained negatively - that is, as the concept of a sensuously perceived thing insofar as it is not perceived in space and time, but becomes implicated with a positive and unconscious dynamic which is imperceptible - that is, not part of the visible world of representation, which is structured through the secondary functions of the intellect - but which is nonetheless immanent to perception, in that it is connected with sensation. The thing-in-itself becomes produced as the imperceptible, or inaccessible, produced through the given, as the difference of the
given, rather than as its cause. It remains unknown, since it is by definition imperceptible.

This does not mean in any sense that it is outside representation; indeed, the problem escapes the limited theatre of that doctrine. The thing-in-itself or demon becomes immanent to perception as the imperceptible, though not for empirical reasons such as might be overcome by more sophisticated microscopic instruments, or more powerful telescopic devices. This reduces the problem back to extension. It has rather to do with movement, not as the motion of an object in extension, but as a stationary process or principle of composition, which is at once both secret and transparent, continually escaping perception, but nonetheless effecting it. It is in this sense always in advance of perception, a source of time rather than a movement in time. It has thus less to do with an economy of vision than one of affective or intensive differences, with variations in heat, in pressure, in density, in the tone of a voice, in clandestine changes which escape perception, which go unrecognized but whose effects are, of a sudden, there.

The difference of diversity from that which gives diversity is intensity, the 'raison du sensible (reason of the sensible)' which forces thought, which is not caused nor causal in any simple sense, nor outside the world, but immanent to its production: an abstract vector which distributes a surface, rather than an origin and source of knowledge. Rather than the faculties being independently defined, they are measured empirically, according to 'ce qui revient à chacune sous la forme de leur collaboration (to that which pertains to each, given the form of their collaboration)'.

This means that faculties emerge, flash and die, as inconstant variables, rather than as the constants in terms of which variations can be defined. Faculties become the effects of relations into which a body enters, and thought becomes a game whose rules
change in the playing, where the pieces come and go, where anything can move in any
direction and the point is less to win than to maintain a line and to keep a space open,
play by play, rather than according to a single over-arching strategy. The demon, or
dark precursor operates in the intervals, a practice which leaps theoretical boundaries,
confounding recognition, relating disparate systems, determining ‘à l’avance le
chemin renversé (a path in advance but in reverse)’. 41 It is a form given but not a
priori: which is to say, it is a signal of material-forces given immanently to the
formation of a path or line of flight, to the labyrinthine line of the pure form of time.

The form of the dark precursor is not, as was the noumenon, a logical form
without content, a shadow compelled from without, nor, like the thing-in-itself is
theorized, a causal problem, or something outside the system, but an immanence of
field, a critical and material provocation, a demon, incitement to alliances and
distributions of difference. Deleuze is diagramming a keen critical unconscious of
Kant: not The Unconscious, which is a theatre for the staging of conscious
representation, but a principle of sufficient reason for sense, the genesis of thought.

III Problem II

For Kant, the principle of sufficient reason is a logical relation of grounds to
consequences; ‘it is quite customary’, he writes to Reinhold, ‘for the conjurors of
metaphysics to make sleights of hand, and before one realizes it, to leap from the
logical principle of sufficient reason to the transcendental principle of causality,
assuming the latter to be already contained in the former.’42 So whilst it may serve
understanding as a formal justification of synthetic connections amongst concepts, this
principle says nothing about the effective genesis of real conditions and relations
amongst things - the objective problem of transcendental philosophy. ‘That every thing
must have its reason is the transcendental (material [materielle]) principle', and to move from the logical principle of sufficient reason to the material or transcendental principle as if they occupied the same domain is a critically illegitimate step, confusing the reason for the genesis of things with the logic governing propositions. 43

The principle of sufficient reason rests on the principle of contradiction, a negative condition of analytic judgements, and governs judgements;

‘That every proposition must have a reason is the logical (formal) principle of knowledge, which is subordinated to, and not set beside, the principle of contradiction.’ 44

The principle of sufficient reason as Kant understands it is a logical principle governing propositions about experience, rather than a material or transcendental principle implicated in the construction of experience. No one has, or ever will prove, Kant continues, the transcendental (material) principles of things from the logic governing propositions, or judgements or in ‘general from mere concepts without relation to sensible intuition.’ 45 As has been said previously, it is in Aesthetic that the real problems of critique, and of transcendental philosophy lie.

Transcendental principles, express the real, rather than merely hypothetical or possible conditions of things, and involve both a formal and a material component, to which correspond, subjectively, intuition and sensation. Kant writes, again to Reinhold, (in a letter which elaborates on the manifold errors in Eberhard’s understanding of critical philosophy):
Deleuze's argument with Kant is directed less at the distinction between transcendental and hypothetical conditions, than towards the latter's differentiation of sensibility according to a disjunction which belongs properly to understanding rather than to sensibility. That is, Kant compromises the radicality of the distinction between real, or transcendental conditions, and hypothetical, or logical conditions. He divides sensibility into an objective component, intuition, which is necessary for mathematics, and provides content for concepts, and a subjective element, of sensation. In strictly aesthetic terms, in terms of the pure line of time, however, this distinction plays no role. Difference cannot be articulated according to an exclusive disjunction in this manner, Deleuze argues, without subjecting it to transcendent operations. Nor can the transcendental, as an abstract material principle, be articulated in relation to understanding: it must rather be immanent to the production of sensibility, perception, sensation, bodies and passions. He takes the transcendental into the heart of the thing-in-itself, as matter, and in doing so, dissolves its structural containment within the a priori.

The problem to which sensation and intuition correspond is intensity, not as an empirical matter, - that is, not couched in terms of sensation, which tends to leads towards its formulation in terms of a subject - but as a transcendental principle, and its sufficient reason is a logic of sense -a diagrammatic and material aesthetic. Within the conceptual or formal understanding of time and space, which generalizes over intuition
in order to render it commensurate with rational or cardinal divisibility, intensive magnitudes can be anticipated, because the axiom of extension affects not only forms of intuition, but also matter and the dynamics of the real in space; as has been said, intensive magnitude is a constructed category, whilst intensities are qualities of force, and Kant does not understand force as constructed. It is not that the perception of matter can be anticipated, but that any perception of matter can be anticipated to be obedient to the axioms of intuition and the laws of phoronomy. Forces, for Kant, move across the straight lines of extension. With time and space logical constants integral to the form of generality which rationalizes sense in terms of uniformity, the quality of material forces becomes open to the claim that it too can be anticipated, and moreover, that what is anticipated can in principle not fail to arrive.

In the *Schematism*, Kant says:

"that in the objects which corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (thinghood, reality) [alle Gegenstände als Dinge an sich (die Sachheit, Realität)]." 47

Kant defines matter in the following terms: quantitatively, as motion in extended space, along lines between points; qualitatively, as the filling of space through intensive forces - attraction and repulsion - which have a determinate degree (force limited by an *a priori* point-line system) and, beyond that determinate degree, as infinitely divisible. 48 The infinite divisibility of this "beyond" is where the problem of the real filling space is evacuated to: that which cannot be analyzed to exhaustion or made determinate extension. Theoretically, matter appears as either randomly chaotic (beyond), or dead (determinate). Whilst the space and time of determinate degrees of
force and motion is conceptual, the problem of infinite divisibility, as an intensive matter, is transcendental. The line or limit is only theoretical, a beyond of determinacy, of matter already dead, and only theoretically do the two sides of the system, determinate here and infinitely divisible there, sum to unity. The line is conceptually extensive, a limit, but intensively it is a threshold and changes in nature as it changes in degree, rather than delineating a rational succession of states, a modulation and not a mould. ‘[U]ne pure ligne droit (a pure straight line)’ of time is not a successively constructed extension, but a vector tracking the autonomous involutions of a surface without extrinsic given condition. Any limit is thus only relative, and not definitive, marking a penultimate beyond which is not chaos and disorder, but which necessitates modifications in the structures which populate the space within the limit.

The pure form of time is not defined in terms of motion or point, nor space as line or organized plane. Kant says that ‘extension and figure...belong to pure intuition’, but without common sense there is no conceptual definition of either, no image according to which extension and figure are recognizable. In the Aesthetic, intuition is given, not constructed so unhinged from common sense, there is no necessity immanent to time which dictates its functional convergence with Euclidean axioms, nor to forces which dictate their functional convergence with gravity or thermodynamics, nor to material production which forces its functional convergence with mechanism. These are purely contingent solutions, historical answers to questions from consciousness.

In L'anti-oedipe, Deleuze (and Guattari, here) write: ‘ce qui met si longtemps à arriver à la conscience, c'est la nouvelle que la mort de Dieu n'a aucune importance pour l'inconscient’ (what takes so long in coming to consciousness is the news that the death of God makes no difference to the unconscious"). It is understanding this
which allows him to travel so efficiently through Kant's network of faculties, and
discard elements which make no difference to the transcendental as an abstract and
naked surface on which the diagrammatic solutions of problems immanent to relations
of force are recorded, but merely impede its potential solutions by intervening with
demands for recognition, with a prior format for recording, an image of thought. In
Différence et Répétition, Deleuze begins to diagram an impersonal and unconscious
consistency of sense, mapping the forces of thought, the sufficient reason of the
sensible: the death of God is as irrelevant here as is his life. The line beyond which is
the beyond of representation - and thus +1, the inverse image of representation,
stupidity face to face - is dissolved in a threshold or surface which folds into itself,
continuously changing in nature and form. What is so intelligent in Deleuze's reading
of Kant is his selection of the elements which express this indifference, even though
many do so only negatively: for Deleuze, 'la négation, c'est l'image renversée de la
difference' (the negative is difference inverted, seen from below).52 The in-between, or
middle, or AND logics of machinic or rhizomatic sense which function in the two
volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia are assembled through the inversion of the
negative through difference, rather than through an identity which would restore it to
unity, as the single positive term. Demons string variables and sequence connections,
and are nothing other than those variables and connections, functioning only through
relations and never as the terms related, not recognizing or recognized, exploring a
pure straight line of time, a line of flight, without monogram, profile or name.

Within the general field of understanding, the intensive real in experience, 'is
viewed as a cause...[and]...the degree of the reality as cause is then entitled...the
moment of gravity'.53 Viewed as a cause means viewed hypothetically: that is, intensity
as an issue for the principles of understanding is not problematic, and any absence of
information which could confirm an hypothesis and determine causality is merely a
subjective insufficiency in knowledge, and correctible. 'No misunderstanding is...possible which cannot easily be removed', since the dynamic or quality of intensive magnitudes presupposes the axioms of extension conducting force potentials and qualities across the striated, linear and punctuated metric of a general and extensively quantified space.\(^5\) What is differentiated from the general is recognized just enough to confirm that it is self-cancelling, given enough time: that it has internalized the control systems appropriate to it, and will apply them, given sufficient time. Aberrations are only ever temporary.

'Et ce qui est en jeu dans cette différence, c’est toute la répartition,
toute la détermination, toute la destination, tout l’exercice des facultés dans une doctrine en général.

(At issue in this difference is the whole distribution, the whole determination, destination and exercise of the faculties within a general doctrine'.\(^5\)

Rational science systematizes connections amongst empirically gathered data according to a coherence of grounds and consequents. The aggregate unities distributed by understanding, in its legitimate use immanent to experience, would not unite into a systematic whole, if Ideas of reason did not provide an ideal focus outside experience for the convergence of concepts of understanding. But this perspective on distribution is subjective: the focus imaginarius regulates for formalism, which is to say, for syllogistic relations, maxims of theoretical reason which have judgements for relations and conceptual representations for their content. For a formal system, it is 'not the idea in itself, but its use only, that can be either transcendent or immanent'.\(^5\) It is judgement as a tool of the subject - the application of logical principles - that errs.
Transcendently - which is now immanent to sense and objective problems - there is no error, because there are no facts, but there are still illusions.

One illusion is that there is an analog between the way understanding functions in the production of the object in general as correlate to subjective unity, unifying diversity within the form of the Same - (common sense recognition, in other words), and the way in which reason

'unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding, which otherwise are concerned solely with distributive unity'. 57

This analog is logical, rather than transcendental, but the transition from theoretical constitution to regulation is void of real relations, since its base is in concepts and generality rather than in singularity and sense. Firstly, real relations need to be distinguished from relations of reality; the real (das Reale) and the concept of reality (Realität) are not equivalent or interchangeable terms. This is important, firstly, because to understand the difference between real and formal grounds in terms of a concept (a formal and empty function, in the absence of intuition) is clearly to miss the force of this distinction. Real relations, those which engage with the problem of the transcendental, involve intuitions and existence, rather than concepts and cognition, as has already been remarked, and are associated by Kant with perception, actuality, matter and existence; in short, with issues surrounding the problem of intensities. 'It is sensation...that indicates actuality [Wirklichkeit] in space or time'; it is perception through which 'the material [Stoff] required to enable us to think objects of sensible intuition must first be given' 58, it is the real [das Reale] 'which constitutes the thing
Chapter 2

itself [das Ding selbst]' and which ‘must be given - otherwise the thing could not be conceived at all’. 59

These elements of experience are given through or in relation with the pure form of time. In the Logic, Kant writes of the difference between concepts and intuitions, calling the former general [allgemeine] or reflected presentations, and the latter singular [einzelne] presentations. 60 (Singular here must not be confused with singular judgements.) In order to suppose that regulative judgements have a purchase on the material necessary for thinking empirical objects, it must be supposed that reason has access to the thing-in-itself, and to the real which constitutes it. Kant eliminates this as an answer, however; in experience, which for Kant means conscious experience, ‘no question is ever asked in regard to it’. 61 Even if one chooses to suppose, in a theological mode, that this is God - clearly not an intellectual response - Kant illegitimates rational access to such an entity. Moreover, existence is not a matter to be resolved by appeal to figures of belief.

Hypothetically, reason can move from comparative resemblances amongst particular cases in relation to a rule, in order to discover whether these cases follow from the rule; it can then generalize over ‘all particular instances, even to those which are not themselves given’. 62 But problematically, it can’t: there is no way of finding an Idea on the grounds of its general solution, amongst particular cases, since objectively, Ideas interact with sense and the singular logics of bodies, outside the possibility of constituting general conformity. Problematically, there is no universal account of the particular through which to protect its objective status or serve as a general rule for what is not given: there is, in other words, no substitution for a problem, the object of an Idea, whereas there are substitutions for representations, the objects of concepts. The analogy between understanding and reason illegitimately carries substitutability into
the Ideas. God, Freedom or Immortality: in Kant, if you pick one, you get all three. But Ideas are singular, and it is as singularities that Deleuze plugs sense into Kantian ideas.

‘Les Idées sont les problèmes, mais les problèmes apportent seulement les conditions sous lesquelles les facultés accèdent à leur exercice supérieur.

(Ideas are problems, but problems only furnish the conditions under which the faculties attain their superior exercise)’ 63

Problems are the abstract grid through which that which forces sense - difference in diversity, a demon or dark precursor - becomes concrete, not in terms of a previously settled model or configuration of faculties, but by becoming unhinged from all models. It is only so that they produce their own superior exercise, or immanent autonomy in relation to intensity, rather than in relation to common sense or the image.

Deleuze’s diagram of Kant draws problems of sense - of intuition and intensity - together with Ideas, but in the process the whole surface of critique is re-wired. In Différence et Répetition he defines transcendent and transcendent:

‘La forme transcendente d'une faculté se confond avec son exercice disjoint, supérieur ou transcendant. Transcendant ne signifie pas du tout que la faculté s'adresse à des objets hors du monde, mais au contraire qu'elle saisit dans le monde ce qui la concerne exclusivement, et qui la fait naître au monde.
(The transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its disjointed, superior or transcendent exercise. Transcendent in no way means that the faculty addresses itself to objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that is grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world)'.

Disjointed, or unhinged from common sense, nothing legislating their convergence into analogical equilibrium, or, in the good sense formulation, thermodynamic equilibrium, the faculties give no hypothetical solution, only real ones. A faculty becomes the formation of a pipe, a connection in an assemblage or multiplicity, or a leap which snaps the order of Kantian sense, changing its nature and degree, and an Idea a system of connections between these differential genetic elements, a multiplicity or assemblage. A machine which grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively, without substitution, singular and real.

This is not to say, however, that the transcendent and the transcendental are the same: being indistinguishable from each other does not necessitate their identity. Kant is quite clear that they are not interchangeable terms. A principle which removes limits, 'or even commands us actually to transgress them, is called transcendent'. They are actual, rather than transcendental principles, and incite the possession of unlimited domains, and their illegitimacy rests in their use of empirical, or actual principles to describe spaces outside the conditions of their generation: that is, they encourage the transfer of a solution from one problem to another, without regard for differences in the variables. This is why, for example, Ideas of reason have no constitutive value for theory, being only regulative in relation to the empirical.

The transcendent is counterposed to immanence, which describes the legitimacy of the transcendental. The transcendental has two senses: there is the
transcendental use of the concepts, under the compulsion of reason, as described in chapter one, which produces the concept of an object in general and limits sensibility. This is illegitimate, Kant agrees, but since there are no actual principles informing such errors of judgement 'not duly curbed by criticism', because understanding is in this case disconnected from sense, the transcendental use of understanding does not threaten the security of the system. Because there is no empirical incitement to transgression - and it is thus not pathologically or affectively motivated - there is no danger from the transcendental use of understanding. Indeed, as has been seen, it is compelled by reason. The transcendent use of a faculty unhinged from its common sense relations, however, is precisely what the noumenon is designed to preclude: it limits sensibility. It is in this sense that Deleuze understands it, as transcendent with regard to established relations, exacerbated by a problem for which these relations cannot articulate a solution. He calls it indistinguishable from the transcendental because it is a movement incited by a singular abstract machine; it is transcendent in relation to extant empirical orders, in that it aggravates the limits of that order. In this sense it is related to practice, as a mechanism for moving through walls. It only remains transcendent if it carries the principle of possession - for example - specific to a particular configuration of the faculties across the threshold and over the wall. Because it does not then grasp what is exclusive to both its operation, bringing it into the world, but remains bound by principle outside the operation. It is in this sense that it is transcendental, immanent to the concrete genesis of a solution.

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'Plutot qu'à ce qui se passe avant et après Kant (et qui revient au même), nous devons nous intéresser à un moment précis du kantisme, moment furtif éclatant...
(Rather than being concerned with what happens before and after Kant (which amounts to the same thing), we should be concerned with a precise moment within Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment...). 67

Deleuze calls this brief flash of thought without image ‘schizophrénie du droit (schizophrenia in principle)’ which leads directly to Anti-Oedipus, the first volume of Capital and Schizophrenia where critique has become schizoanalysis. 68 In Différence et Répétition, he complains that Kant does not follow this moment: moreover, he implies that Kant was aware of it, but chose good sense and a philosophy compliant with common sense. ‘[Q]uitte à compromettre l’appareil conceptuel des trois Critiques (at the risk of compromising the conceptual apparatus of the three Critiques)’, he redeems and stabilizes it, civilizing thought and recognizing its image in Law. 69

The critical project of L’anti-oedipe is explicit: Deleuze and Guattari, referring to Kant, denounce ‘l’usage transcendant des synthèses (transcendent use of syntheses)’ by psychoanalysis, today’s cogitatio universalis. 70 Auto-critique, or schizoanalysis, plays in relation to psychoanalytic Law and myth a rôle parallel to that played by reason in the first Critique in relation to metaphysical dogmas and mystic enthusiasms: both critiques distinguish illegitimate and legitimate syntheses, extract thought from myth and ideology and above all emphasize immanence. Their essential tendency is eliminative and materialist. But one of the factors that differentiates Kantian critique, stilled by the hand of redemption, from auto-critique, is that whilst each invents its own destructions and invests in its own decline, the former does so for the sake of - what it is in the process of destroying - a metaphysics based on theological premises: God is not alive, for Kant, but nonetheless an unconditioned unity continues to operate as a limit, endlessly displaced and internal to the engine of critique, as an
axiom of productive synthesis. The system gives to itself with one hand what it takes
back with the other. Auto-critique invents in destruction and invests in decline, but not
for the sake of - anything.

Kant's care is evident in his stabilization of the system of faculties at the risk
of compromising the machine he has built, and it is the stability disciplined into a
system which presents an image, not what escapes it. Deleuze's positive and sober
critique of Kant addresses its instabilities, and it is from these that Anti-Oedipus takes
its critical sense (though there are other senses too) fuelled by their refinement in
Différence and Repetition. The method is one of the undisciplined micro-analysis of
the disciplined microphysics of power.

Noology, as a science of cognition whose principles derive from the Mind
rather than from the richness and multiplicity of concrete experience, is a common
target of both Kant and Deleuze. At the end of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant cites
Plato as 'the chief of the noologists', his philosophical error being to intellectualize
knowledge and collapse intuition into cognitive functions. Kant's cure to the
intellectualization of knowledge is well known: intuition and cognition become twin
stems of knowledge, giving rise to an industry attempting to resolve this disjunction, in
intellectual or aesthetic intuition, in God or the State. As has been seen, however,
Kant's cure itself comes under criticism from Deleuze, the force of the explosive
moment, of the introduction of time into the subject, being vitiated by its restriction
within extension. As has been argued, it is this aspect of Kant from which Deleuze
forges the force of his critique, taking the sense of synthesis together with the problem
of Ideas and dissolving with consequent resolution the image of thought. Moving the
aesthetic away from extension, refusing the division of sensibility into objective and
subjective elements, and the postulation of the unity of the thing-in-itself, Deleuze
introduces sensibility to problems of force which cannot be reconciled with the image of thought or the conceptual mechanics of the understanding, and initiates a thought of movement which does not belong to objects, but is a kinetics of packs, populations, bodies that are multiplicities without relation to unity.

***

'Perds le visage (lose your face)', Deleuze writes, because it is scarred with 'les deux maladies de la terre, le couple du despot et du prêtre (the two diseases of the earth, the pair of the despot and the priest)'. Losing image, becoming vague without becoming homogeneous or unclear, speeding and slowing in continuous qualitative transformation, Deleuze is not a destructive writer, but one of camouflage; his tactic is to 'glisser son corps comme une pièce dans de pareilles machines (slip his body into such machines as one part among the others)'. Philosophy as enculage. To flee, leave, evade are subjects of movement: to flee is to trace a line, but unlike the lines drawn explicitly by Kant, measured extensively through the addition of discrete units, lines of flight exceed the perspective of the image. Each line has its subtleties and nuances, qualities of speed and slowness, and Deleuze is explicit about selecting philosophical components to assemble machines which flee and make weapons of flight at once, rather than those which adopt a position or a stance.

Kant, he declares enemy. As this chapter has shown, Kant is a problem, because he is himself in between, and because of this, open to diverse and contrary deployment. He is not properly enlightened, not properly idealist, not properly romantic, not properly Newtonian, not properly religious. Not only chronologically, Kant is a critical juncture between Spinoza and Nietzsche, the two thinkers who, Deleuze says, released him from his debts and who without doubt (though beyond this thesis) inform his re-writing of critique.
Forces and Deductions

`Un espace dynamique doit être défini du point de vue d'un observateur lié à cet espace, et non d'une position extérieure.

(A dynamic space must be defined from the point of view of an observer tied to that space, not from an external position).’

In chapters one and two, Deleuze’s identification of the network of faculties as constitutive of the transcendental method was explored, together with his attack on the principles of recognition and the image of thought in Kant’s critique. His relation with Kant operates on (at least) two faces simultaneously. At the systematic level he explores connections, functions and operations amongst the faculties; questioning the repetition of the model of common sense as a mechanism for the stabilization of these relations, and its complementary, good sense, which is the common sense of teleology, Deleuze begins to expose his real relation with Kant. As the last chapter remarked, this is firstly and foremostly positive; Deleuze does not destroy without utilizing the components he has disarticulated to build new machines, and this is the second aspect of his employment of Kant. He occupies a space, and then re-distributes it, from the inside, not from the position of an external observer.

If one wanted to describe a method in this aspect of Deleuze’s engagement with critique, it would be one of selection and connection; intensity is connected with ideas, and dialectics is re-distributed as a problem of real differences of magnitude; thought is connected with sense, removing the former from the rule of concepts and identity, and relating it with the now objective problematic of ideas; the thing-in-itself is connected with difference, with that through which the given is given as diversity.
What forces thought is discovered in sense, rather than in the illusory figures of possibility, recognition, generality and the image.

A question which emerges from the re-wiring of the system of faculties is that of forces. Kant doesn’t explain the relations of forces in the first Critique in the distribution of intensive magnitudes; the real moment of a cause, as has been mentioned before, is simply described as gravity, allowing force to be conceptualized in relation to substance. Mille Plateaux, in a discussion of a difference between nomad and royal science, opposes two models; that of the Compars, whose primary distinction is a hylomorphic one, between matter and form, constructed through the selection of constants and law, and that of the Dispars, the relevant distinction of which is ‘matériau-forces (material-forces)’ which compose themselves by ‘mettre les variables elles-même en état de variation continue (placing the variables themselves in a state of continuous variation)’. Each model is characterized by different distributions; the Compars by logos, which divides ‘un espace laminaire, strié, homogène et centré (a laminar, striated, homogeneous, and centred space)’ and presupposes gravity, and Dispars by nomos, a tactile space of contact and affects, which is homogeneous only ‘entre points infinitement voisins (between infinitely proximate points)’ yet which is not differentiated by pre-formed relations and connections.

The most obvious model of science in Kant is that of the Compars: he is famously an admirer of Newton. However, Deleuze’s relation to Kant and his deployment of critique as essentially economic suggest that the other model must also be implicated in Kantian critique. In Difference et Répétition, L’anti-œdipe and Mille Plateaux, a continual emphasis is placed on the co-existence of the two models: the material-forces distinction does not replace the matter-form distinction anymore than the State replaces the nomads. ‘L’histoire ne fait que traduire en succession une
coexistence de devenirs (all history does is to translate a coexistence of becomings into a succession)\textsuperscript{5}. A purely historical perspective, leading to an evaluation of Kant’s work in terms of what came before and followed after him, and the division of his philosophy as a whole into pre-critical and critical (and, in some cases, as post-critical and senile) writings, will discover only this translation. Deleuze looks instead for consistencies in the system, and for the weightings and privileges attendant on certain structures which repress or cover becomings, and translate them into chronological movements. His interests is in critique as a singular and economic problem, rather than in the successive attempts at solving this problem which run throughout Kant’s work and are continued by his successors.

For Deleuze, the machinic elements of critique are in its systematics, hidden in the theory of forces, in the problem of Ideas, and in the network of the faculties, and it is on these that he focuses. His critique does not progress from Kant, but rather abstracts out the various machines operating in his work, allowing forces and patterns hidden beneath and covered over by royal and state divisions of space and operations of power to be exposed. The régimes of molar and molecular (which for the moment can be taken to correspond roughly with the division of Compars and Dispars) are immanent to each other; what differs - as Kant always says - is not the ideas themselves, but the use to which they are put. Royal science deploys ideas reproductively: reduce something to a unit and make more of the same. Nomad science follows ideas, and an idea which Deleuze follows in Kant is that of repulsive and attractive force, in order to uncover further the conditions of real production.

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant discusses fundamental qualities of material forces - repulsion and attraction (Zurückstoßungskraft/repulsive Kraft and Anziehungskraft). The latter functions in
empty extended space, as action at a distance, and is constructed through negation and limitation; it belongs to the Compars model. The former is a force which, like nomos, distributes a space of contact, intensive magnitudes filling space without determinate measure and belongs to the Dispars. In this chapter, Deleuze’s method of deduction is explored, which functions simultaneously with his selection of the system of faculties as the real elements which constitute the problem of critique as such. But first, forces.

I Attraction and Repulsion

According to Kant, 'the only two moving forces that can be thought'⁶, and which are fundamental to matter, are repulsion and attraction. These are differentiated in a variety of ways.⁷

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force of Repulsion</th>
<th>Force of Attraction</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force of extension:</td>
<td>Force of penetration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impenetrability = function of dynamic relation of repulsive forces - degree of compression.</td>
<td>(of space)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving [triebende], diffusive</td>
<td>Drawing [ziehende]: compels approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansive: relation of repulsion &amp; expansion is condition of elasticity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of matter as essentially space-filling (substantial)</td>
<td>Inferred on the basis of the possibility of matter as matter in general, operates across empty space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation of repulsion/expansion is condition of elasticity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not limitable by space</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Repulsion

"[B]y means of the sense of feeling [Sinnes des Gefühls]" repulsive forces provide 'the size and shape [Größe und Gestalt] of an extended thing." Their magnitude is aesthetic and intensive, and contact amongst repelling forces is physical and immediate; there is 'no actual distance of parts, which always constitute a continuum as regards all expansion of the space of the whole' ⁹. That empty space could not be proved through experience was made clear in the first Critique, in relation to both the Anticipations of Perception and the infinite divisibility of intensive magnitudes, and at length in relation to regulative judgement, which is governed subjectively by three logical maxims asserting the continuity of nature; the absence of a vacuum - non datur vacuum formarum; the impossibility of leaps in nature, transitions between species comprehending 'all the smaller degrees of difference that mediate between them' ¹⁰ - datur continuum formarum: and the law of their conjunction, continuum specierum, which 'recognise[s] a relationship of the different branches, as all springing from the same stem' ¹¹. Homogeneity and specification are thus joined in an arborescent form, leading to a problem of roots, and what grounds them. This logics of continuity presupposes a transcendental law, 'lex continui in natura' ¹². Kant is at pains to avoid the suggestion that attraction at a distance is across a real empty space, or that variations amongst species correspond to real gaps.

In the MFNS, Kant’s concern is with an intensive continuum of force, and with the possibilities of constructing a concept of full space which will give material weight to the law of continuity in nature and support his claim that nature knows no vacuums. The distributions of bodies considered as expressing intensive qualities are not determinate, in relation either to themselves or to a geometric boundary; prior to
the construction of the concept of quantity the most one can say is that there are regions of density and patterns of flows. This follows quite clearly from the description in the first Critique of intensive qualities as flowing, and from Kant's assertion that there is no legitimacy in the assumption that the real [das Reale] is uniform in degree. To understand this, it is necessary to differentiate between a body - 'a matter between determinate boundaries', assumed to be intensively homogeneous, and density, which is a function of the relation between attractive and repulsive - that is, intensive - forces.\(^\text{13}\) Density is unsuitable as a means of thinking relations amongst matters, precisely because of its heterogeneity and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of establishing proportionality amongst intensively differentiated regions of space without introducing a principle of determination - such as extension - which segments, orders and determines matter in space in such a manner that it is analytically tractable - which is to say, homogeneous with regard to its units of composition. '[N]o comparison can properly be permitted between heterogeneous matters with regard to their density'\(^\text{14}\); the determination of intensive qualities, and the relative proportionality of attractive and repulsive forces is a function of their relation with extensive quanta, their characterization as qualities of bodies confined within determinate boundaries, or, as Kant expresses it, their 'represent[ation] as specifically homogeneous among one another'.

In the Aesthetic Kant says that removal from the representation of a body of those aspects belonging to sensation leaves extension and figure; however, there is nothing in this remark that determines the nature and configuration of such figures, since determination is a function of understanding, and mathematical objects exist through construction in pure intuition, which requires productive imagination. There is thus no weight to the claim that Kant can be refuted by the existence of non-Euclidean geometries, or by forms of non-rational mathematics, since there is no formal
grammar, as it were, to the pure forms of space and time. They underlie the possibility
of geometry and mathematics, but the process of numbering is prior to the concept of a
number, just as the figuration of spatial bodies is prior to geometric axioms. Kant’s
elucidation of intuition is confined to a three-dimensional space and the one-
dimensional line of time is axiomatically extensive and produced through the
successive addition of units. But the forms of intuition themselves are empty. This is a
complex issue and outside the scope of this thesis, so will not be pursued in any depth.
It must be kept in mind, however, that pure intuition is vacuous and that the
construction of spatio-temporal figures concerns the relation of imagination to
intuition, so is implicated with the functioning of the former, a topic for the next
chapter, and that intuition itself does not contain pre-given restraints on the potential
for such constructions. As has already been seen, the pure forms of space and time are
empty; what configures space along Euclidean lines - for example - is the feeding of
axioms into the process of construction, and not any characteristic of intuition. As
Buchdahl points out, it is necessary to differentiate between the principle of the axioms
and the axioms themselves; the

"latter do indeed presuppose the former, as providing a “proof” that
extensional axioms have a synthetic a priori status in general. But
this does not tell us what axioms there are, nor whether there is a
single and unique set of such axioms."15

At the level of principle - that is, transcendentally - there is no legitimacy in the
assumption that space or time have any formal grammar or any specific axioms -
Euclidean or otherwise - constraining the nature of the empirical. ‘[T]here is no
contradiction in the concept of a figure which is enclosed within two straight lines’;
however, given space - that is, the extended space of experience as experience of

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objects - operates against the possibility of non-Euclidean, synthetic geometries, because it is already configured as three-dimensional and linearly co-ordinated. The logical grammar of understanding and the principles of judgement construct one space, of which all spaces are parts; there is thus, as it were, no space for alternative geometries. But from the perspective of the pure forms of space and time, thought outside the constructions governed by definitions and axioms of understanding, there are no pre-given restraints on their potential configuration. Deleuze exploits this to the full.

As the above list notes, repulsive forces are not limited by space; they have no exhaustive extension, but become infinitely diffuse, until 'no assignable quantity of matter would be found in any assignable space.' Repulsive force alone, therefore, gives no concept of the dynamic magnitude of a body; no concept of quantity is constructible from the diffuse indeterminacy of intensive magnitude; space is full but not denumerable, occupied without measure. It is not the case that repulsive force alone is an impossibility for Kant: he spends considerable time in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science discussing the qualities of repulsion, defining physical contact in its terms, as a problem of infinitely small distances, and characterizing it in terms of feeling. What is impossible is any determinate quantification of repulsive forces, in the absence of their relation to attractive forces and the mathematical punctuation of space. That is, any workable (in a scientific or epistemological sense) definition of matter depends on the construction of repulsive forces according to a metric which is not immanent to those forces themselves, but arrived at through the postulation of attractive forces acting at a distance across empty space according to the principles of phoronomy.

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In Kant, this distribution of repulsive forces is subjected to negation; the
multiplicitous difference of degree is 'represented...through approximation to negation
= 0'\textsuperscript{18}, and intensity becomes thought of as a unit, representable as a point, the real
moment of cause. The actual intensive continuum filling space can then be
mathematically conceived as a uniformly homogeneous field of points, all
interconnected with each other, no part more distant than any other, because their
relation is intensive, rather than extensive. Through the medium of the point, repulsive
force can conceived of in relation to a uniform and undifferentiated mathematical
continuum, extending to infinity.

If, as Kant desires, repulsion is to become the basis of the movable, the topic
of mechanics, then it cannot itself be thought of as mobile, just as, for time to be the
form of everything which changes, it cannot itself change. The immanent dynamics of
repulsive force have to be distributed uniformly, which means they have to be recorded
in a manner different to their production, because the mechanical field into which they
are to be folded is based on a principle of a unity of force, whilst intensity is
immanently differentiated. The homogenization of force is the first move in this
recording process, and forms the concept of substance.

In relation to substance, force is determinately defined, as a state of matter,
rather than as an intensive vector. In the latter case, the given as diversity and that by
which the given is given as diverse are immanently entangled, rather than subordinated
to the principle of an 'ultimate subject of existence' and there is neither assignable
origin nor end to the vector.\textsuperscript{19} Empirical time and space are constructed through the
movement of forces, rather than through reference to axiomatized quanta. Difference is
thus virtual, or immanent to the actual continuum, and rather than being subjected to
limitation, changes in nature as it changes in degree. It has been said that space cannot
limit repulsive force. Nor, however, is the filling of space self-limiting: immanently repulsive, matter is 'compelled...to continuously expand' its occupation of space. In relation to substance, this expansion is necessarily a relation with unity, and thus of determinate and measurable extension. In relation only to itself, intensive expansion is not defined or conceivable, and hence becomes a problematic, rather than a theoretical issue. Deleuze, by critiquing the formation and assumptions of common sense and setting a different model of science against that of universal gravitation, opens up this space, and focuses on the problem of how repulsion is first set up (a matter addressed later in this chapter).

Repulsive force is a force of surfaces: every part touches every part, and there is no empty space: 'physical contact is the reciprocal action of repulsive forces at the common boundary of two matters'. But the boundary is only common in the sense that two matters are infinitely proximate, for it is immanent to the field of each. It is not common in the sense that both matters share a law which their relation instantiates nor is it formed through the subordination by one matter of another. The boundary or limit is not governed a priori by any element implicated in its formation, but produced as an effect of the relation of forces at different intensive degrees: it is common only in the sense that it is a difference common to all distributions. Contact, Kant says, is differential, a problem of 'infinitely small distances'.

The model here is not hylomorphic, since the dynamic filling of space by repulsive forces is materially distributive, but there is as yet no differentiation of matter and form. For this, contact has to be referred to a limit, a point: it is the same problem as that of sensation, noted above, where the subjective indeterminacy of sensation appeared to void the possibility of objectively measuring intensive magnitude. "La géométrie et l'arithmétique prennent la puissance d'un scalpel" (Geometry and
arithmetic take on the power of the scalpel), Deleuze and Guattari say in *Mille Plateaux*, and it is this function which orders the homogeneous and dead space across which the true force of attraction drops bodies and draws lines.

**Attraction**

Unlike repulsive forces, which fill space by means of the sense of feeling [*Gefühl*], (and thus are in the sphere of aesthetic, rather than speculative or practical judgement) attractive force is characterized as ambivalent in relation to sensation [*Empfindung*]: either there is 'no sensation at all' or there is sensation, but no determinate object, and it is this that makes it appear at first problematic as a fundamental force, since no determinate quanta of intuition can be correlated with the spread or absence of sensation. There is either zero sensation of intensity, which as Kant says 'would involve the representation of the instant as empty, therefore = 0', and repulsive forces necessitate the impossibility of this. Or there is sensation but no determinate intensive magnitude, or 'degree of influence on the sense' which would validate the objectivity of sensation, attributing to it an objective cause. So attractive force becomes open to the accusation of having only subjective validity, and of functioning in a space with no real dynamic qualities.

No positive concept of real attractive force can be constructed: it is inferred, Kant says, but not derived, and on the basis of the possibility of a general concept of matter, so its positivity is not real but conceived. Independently of repulsion, attraction becomes purely mathematical: if there were only attractive forces, the parts of matter would 'coalesce in a mathematical point' in empty space. As Kant says, mathematics 'presents the most splendid example of the successful extension of pure reason, without the help of experience', and it is through mathematics that the heterogeneous
involution and division of repulsive forces becomes tied to points of attraction, becoming uniform and inert. Synthetic, and thus productive, but a priori and thus merely possible in relation to the real, Kant's mathematics grounds the royal description of space, as 'strié par la chute des corps, les verticales de pesanteur (striated by the fall of bodies, the verticals of gravity)'.

Space is inverted through the negation of dynamic intensities, and the real is sucked through an impenetrable point, its sign inverted. Its depth becomes empty, voided of continuously differentiated degrees of intensity and re-distributed as homogeneous, parallel, Euclidean, inertly receptive to the mechanical principles of order: the shift is from feeling to sight, from an intensive distribution to a determinate vision, from a real space unobservable from outside to an ideal space only observable from outside. There is a cancellation of indeterminate sensations in favour of a split sensibility according to a difference imposed from outside, by understanding, rather than one which emerges from intensive magnitudes.

The force of attraction is defined in terms of the action of points at a distance, 'through every space as an empty space', but only two bodies at a time defining, as Deleuze and Guattari say, 'la forme d'intérieurité de toute science (the form of interiority of all science)'. In the construction of this form real magnitudes are assigned a negative value, and space is covered over with extensive lines, pillars of force, giving rise to a third form of compression, resulting from the relation of repulsive and attractive forces, which establishes a direction to flows of force, distributing a before and an after of time in relation to which a before and an after of intensive distribution can be determined. The point becomes a present, but a vacant one, which defines a direction of time 'du passé au futur, comme du particulier au général (from past to future as though from particular to general)', from the
determinate point or state of matter, the moment of gravity, to the homogeneous chaos of uniformly dispersed intensity. Kant's dynamics are thus commensurate not only with mechanics, but will support too a thermodynamics of good sense. The 'thèmes d'une réduction de la différence, d'une uniformisation du diverse, d'une égalisation de l'inégal (themes of a reduction of difference, a uniformisation of diversity, and an equalisation of inequality)', fused in thermodynamics, established basic definitions satisfying, Deleuze writes, 'tout le monde, y compris à un certain kantisme (everybody, including a certain Kantianism)'. Deleuze, however, finds a third relation, generated through the conjunction of the purpose-driven directionality of force proper to teleology and thermodynamics (the force of good sense) and the determinate conceptualization of force as the moment of gravity (the force of common sense). This conjunction drives critique across the thresholds of rational ends and towards machinic or auto-critique, which is not principled by unity but according to a principle of difference: given nothing but difference there is nothing in common but there is still difference.

Extension is the cancellation and covering up of intensities, their incorporation into an mechanical common sense and eschatological good sense, which organizes things 'dans les conditions de l'étendue et dans l'ordre du temps (in the order of time and under the conditions of extensity)' so that difference is encouraged to cancel itself, as time becomes subject to logic and material forces become hylomorphically arranged. In order to understand this one must recall a remark made in the Introduction, pointing out that this thesis is not written from the perspective of the conscious Kantian subject whose capacity to intuit intensity is restricted to within extended homogeneous space and time. Rather, it takes a route driven by the position in which Kant has placed woman - that is, a position aligned with the object, with nature, with imagination and sensation, on the thresholds of the system of consciousness, neither wholly outside nor completely incorporated within it. From this
perspective, as Chapter Six makes more explicit, the mechanisms which construct extended homogeneous space - negation and limitation, the axiomatization of all magnitudes as extensive, the reference of all events (or accidents) to a permanent subject/substance - are mechanisms which cancel out and cover up the immanent movements of nature, sensation and imagination with the demands of order and uniformity, in order to produce a nature of regularity whose laws are given by the subject.

From the perspective of the subject intensity is thought only within the bounds of extension. However, it is precisely because Kant does not completely eliminate those figures associated with intensity - the thing-in-itself, imagination, sense and sensation - with the logical demands of the concept that he presents the occasion for a different reading, one which does not require a woman reader to become a Kantian by becoming first an honorary man. If the theoretical writings are read in conjunction with Kant’s writings on history and politics such a position is not, from the perspective of “orthodox” Kantianism, a tenable one, since women remain always the passive components in any theoretical, social or political space.

The final moment in constructing a dynamic concept of matter, a substance commensurate with mechanical expression, is limitation, which defines and confirms the degree of negation necessary to generate a universal and permanently uniform containment of repulsion by a point of attraction, and form a general concept of matter.

Attractive force splits into true and apparent. Attraction is apparent when the combined force of two bodies is not biunivocal, and their approach is not intensively symmetrical: one body ‘has been driven [getrieben] toward the first body from elsewhere by impact’. But impact is an empirical and derivative concept of force,
rather than a fundamental property, and so includes an admixture of elements, both empirical and a priori. Yet although it results from physical contact rather than being a function of the relation across empty space of the bodies involved, the effects of impact can, given a generalized concept of matter and a science of forces, be anticipated a priori. Apparent attraction is the negative of repulsive force and 'proper object of our external perception'\(^{35}\); in order to discover the true attraction at its basis, the mass of a body must be understood in terms of a point at its centre, and the relation of forces understood as constant for all variables. True attraction, Kant says, is estimated without the intervention of repulsive force or the need to accommodate intensive variations, and it is in this, its true and mathematical sense, that attraction is the ground of possibility of matter as matter in general.

II Lagoon Dynamics

Kant gives two fine illustrations of the effects of disequilibrated forces, where the dynamics of full space do not slide unproblematically into points and striations and mechanical relations, and in both cases, imagination is involved as an exacerbatory process of the destabilized relations of repulsion and attraction. In the first chapter, the schematizing function of imagination under the determination of understanding was mentioned briefly, as was the focus imaginarius, a subjective focus mediating the transition from the distributive unity of understanding to the collective unity of reason. When the faculties are unhinged, and their relations not ordered by common sense, imagination comes to play a different rôle.

In the sublime, the inadequacy of imagination to fulfil its two theoretically assigned functions of apprehension and comprehension, and thus provide a qualified quantum of intuition to understanding, is felt as pain and resolved by the superior
might of reason into negative pleasure. In its attempt to use nature as a schema for the
presentation of the sublime, imagination becomes alternately attracted and repelled by
natural might [Macht], and disengaged from sensibility and understanding, it moves
vertically into a realm of incomparable quantity, the magnitude of the supersensible,
where reason asserts its dominance [Gewalt] over the exertions of imagination. This is
much written about however, so in this chapter a different example will be looked at.36
The sublime recurs, however, in the context of a discussion of imagination in the next
chapter.

Crossing water, 'on a trip from Pillau to Königsberg, if this can be called a
voyage', Immanuel Kant, Professor from Königsberg, grows seasick.37 Diagnosing his
condition, he pins the nausea down to 'antiperistaltic movement of the intestines by the
abdominal muscles' reversing the cycle of ingestion and evacuation through the
organism.38 Swelling waters on the lagoon interfere with the successive and automatic
compression of the tubular pathways in the body; ‘repeated rising and falling' of the
field of appearance, felt first as a disturbance in sight is, when 'provoked, by
imagination', exacerbated and thrown into reverse.39 If this reversal is not
countermanded, the organism exports matter, the process of which through the body
has been unbalanced by dynamic distortions in its environment. Regulated and directed
wave-like contractions in the vermicular canals through which the organism ingests
and dispels waste are unable to negotiate an equilibrium with wavering uncertain
waters, and excited to confusion. The proper organization, contents, and connections of
the input/output channels running through the closed volume of a whole body become
disordered. The irregular and unregulated flows of the waters play havoc with the
regulated structure of the organism and under the provocation of imagination, sight
turns back in on the organism and the outside world darkens. Kant's analysis of this
problem is instructive, since it is one of the few occasions on which he can indeed be
said to occupy a dynamic space, not as an observer, but as a body interacting with the forces with which it connects.

'Sight is the noblest of the senses' Kant writes, and 'comes closest to a pure intuition' 40; the purity of the light medium being imperceptible except through its special organ, the eye, the object seems independent of sensation. As said above, sensation was initially problematic in relation to attractive forces, either lacking a determinate object, or not felt at all, and Kant solved this difficulty of an intensive distribution without determinate form or relation by negating the forces implicated with feeling and physical contact and collapsing matter into a point, a limit. On the water, however, such a resolution is precluded. The homogeneous space of universal attraction, the world organized as a laboratory in which sight is privileged, gives way to a turbulent and fluid heterogeneous field in continuous variation, to which none of the corporeal senses are adequate, and which effects their recoil back into the body in a refusal of their tentacular role on behalf of the empirical subject. The response is similar to that of the sublime; in both cases, what is looked for is a place of safety, from where the disturbance can be estimated as fearful, but the subject can be unafraid. In the case of the sublime, this is culture. Kant writes:

'The vast ocean heaved up by storms cannot be called sublime. The sight of it is horrible; and one must already have filled one’s mind with all sorts of ideas if such an intuition is to attune it to a feeling that is itself sublime, inasmuch as the mind is induced to abandon sensibility and occupy itself with ideas containing a higher purposiveness'. 41

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Out on the lagoon, does Kant experience the sublime? Certainly, his description suggests he is induced to abandon sensibility. Whether cultural ideas are sufficient to sublimate his nausea? - this is unclear.

Light, the medium of sight, 'unlike sound, is not merely a wave-like motion of a fluid element that spreads through space in all directions, but a radiation that determines a point in space for the object'. And in the MFNS: 'nothing prevents one's thinking of light-matter as originally and indeed thoroughly fluid, without being divided into fixed particles'. Whilst not composed of discrete quanta, illumination nonetheless determines a unit or quantum of intensity. In his discussion of forces, Kant contrasts a model of the diffusion of light provided by optics, 'by means of rays diverging in a circle from a central point' with one depicting the diffusion of repulsive forces across a spherical surface.

The optical model returns a problem of empty space, not as proposed by the concept of action at a distance, but between the real elements filling space. If diffusion is represented in terms of lines, the actual continuum of intensive force becomes segmented, broken into discrete elements, repulsion as the filling of space becomes confused with the enclosure of space, and the only light is that of the lines, 'as if there were always to be found places devoid of light between the rays'. Kant is of course anxious to prevent an account of material force in terms of monads, or atomic elements, or suggest the possibility of real empty spaces increasing as the rays are further extended. In his preferred model 'light diffuses itself everywhere from an illuminating point in spherical surfaces', from one point to all distances, not as rays, but in divergent circular waves. The degree of intensity then becomes a function of the extension of the diffusion surface across which it is distributed; the greater the extension, the less the illumination, the illuminating point remaining constant. Space
remains full, in actual terms, but the conditions of its organization are given by a principle extrinsic to this space, which folds itself back over it and records movement on its surface in terms different to those which produced it.

Deleuze’s argument with Kant - that he provides possible conditions for the production of representation, and not real conditions for the production of production is focused on this folded back surface, on the stratified space it generates, and on the condition or idea implicated in the disjunction which elevates law above the real. In effect, his criticism is that Kant provides no real account of the conditions for the tactile and full space of the actual continuum, only ideal and possible conditions for the visual and empty space of continuous attraction in which these forces are enclosed. There is no transcendental account of the construction of the enclosure. A lex continui in natura underpins an arborescent model of the species, in terms of which it is possible to ‘recognize a relationship of the different branches, as all spring from the same stem’ and a linear model of forces, in terms of which each is a function of substance, as the radical of power, underpins a striated model of space.46

The point is a centre of resonance, ‘un point d’accumulation, comme un point de croisement quelque part derrière tous les yeux (a single point of accumulation that is like a point of intersection somewhere between the eyes)’47; sight and the coalesced intensive force figured as a mathematical point in the interests of theorizing action at a distance across empty space converge on the same model, the eyes of the subject, all implicated in the direction of the systematic ends of reason. In the case of sight, radiation determines a point in space for the object. In the case of action at a distance, force is represented ‘as converging at the attracting point from all points of the
surrounding spherical surface⁴⁸; in both cases, for the direction of determination to be objectively valid, it must be a function of ‘all points of the surface’ and not determined by the illuminating centre.⁴⁹ Only thus can intensity be quantified as equal in all space, regardless of its compression or density, its connections, directions or speed. If it were a function of the illuminating centre, it would need to be understood as increasingly diffuse and, as mentioned above, would result in the absence of assignable quantity or position of intensive magnitudes. Besides, good sense may be eschatological, but it does not take its end as real: there is no real force of attraction, as seen above: true attraction is a mathematical construct, a point, and a basic point of Kantian philosophy is that existence - the real in knowledge - is not constructible. As Kant writes, ‘the real in space’ is a distribution of repulsive force and ‘the proper object of our external perception’; its negative, namely, attractive force is not described as real, however, but as necessary for the ‘possibility of the concept of matter’. In order for a conceptual - that is, logically and mathematically tractable - formulation of matter, the real must be subject to negation and limitation. Attraction belongs to the possibility of matter as matter in general - that is, its possibility is formally rather than really configured.

To describe the relations of horizontally diffuse and differential intensities in terms of a point, and ‘indicate the rectilinear direction, straight lines must be drawn from the surface and all its points to the illuminating point’.⁵⁰ These are the lines described by falling bodies, the pillars which striate space, pegging difference to points; the central illuminating point does not determine direction, merely organizes a resonance amongst all points on the sphere, effecting their communication within the interior space behind the eyes.

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Kant’s nausea is the outcome of unanticipated alterations in the vectors of forces which preclude the smooth transformation from dynamics to mechanics or thermodynamics; there are aleatory lines departing from the rectilinear, directions outside anticipated variations, not forestalled by a rule or law, and the dynamics of the ocean do not translate into the substances and forms of the land. On Kant’s lagoon, the regularity of the body begins to breakdown; no more pure logical movement, continuous quality of medium. Instead of completing an indeterminate aesthetic space, *ein Vorgriff*, and driving objective production to the benefit and purposes of the ultimate substance of existence, intensities explode into the noise of the waves. Undirected and turbulent, they return on the body, also incomplete, only to be further exacerbated by an imagination unhinged, synthesizing without schema or rule. Kant’s desire for symmetry becomes ridiculous as the incompleteness of the imaginative circuit is mimicked or mirrored by a similarly incomplete organic circuit. The geometric completeness of sight is unhinged, vision becomes waveform, and the body becomes a complex of channels and disordered reversals.

Its anticipatory systems failing it, an organism becomes ‘more conscious of the organ’s being affected than of the reference to an external object’51;

‘In other words, the intensity of the sensation, in both cases, prevents us from arriving at a concept of the object and fixes our attention merely on the subjective representation, namely the alteration of the organ’. 52

In an organism ‘just as each part exists only as a result of all the rest, so we also think of each part as existing for the sake of the others and of the whole, i.e., as an instrument or organ.’53 Its turbulence connecting with a zone of the body, fomenting
sudden, violent or unanticipated alterations of a single organ, here the eye, intense sensation disequilibrates the careful structure of the whole. Indeed, there is no whole, for the systematic interconnection of the parts of the body according to a principle of wholeness has broken down. Organs no longer exist for the sake of the others and of the whole, imagination no longer makes space for objects, and unity mutates into a chaos of traffic on a circuit, a congealed transformational zone, a direction and intensity of flows across an indeterminate non-organic body. The object is the constant of subjectivity, its fetish. With its point gone, what could a subject be?

III Deduction I: Kant

'That laborious deduction of the categories was needed for theology and morals and how fruitful it was for them.' 54

Dieter Henrich argues that the model for the deductions in Kant’s critical writings comes not from logic but law. Whilst the steps in the proof may function syllogistically, its status as a deduction is not defined by this. 55 Deduktionsschriften (deduction writings), used in Germany since the late fourteenth century, were widespread by the beginning of the eighteenth century, and for the most part sought to justify claims of the succession of reigns or of territorial inheritance. Henrich points out that Pütter, coauthor of the text Kant used in teaching natural law and defender of the imperial ideal of the Reich, was ‘the most admired deduction writer of Kant’s time’ and that its widespread practice gave Kant reason to think that the transference of ‘the term “deduction” from its juridical usage to a new, philosophical one’ would be understood. 56 Henrich argues for a structural similarity too; Kant’s deductions follow the requirement for brevity and solidity and the custom of appending a brief summary of the salient points of the case at the close of the argument - Henrich points to the
Brief Outline of this Deduction which closes the B edition of the first Critique as an example.

Deleuze says of Kantian critique that it amounts ‘à donner des états civils à la pensée considérée du point de vue de sa loi naturelle (to giving civil rights to thought considered from the point of view of its natural law)’ and Henrich also argues that Kant uses ‘Natural Right...as a paradigm’. Beneath the regional specificities of civil rights lies a generic concept of natural right, a reference to an ‘original acquisition’ which cannot be legitimated because no objective account of its possession can be provided. No physiology could warrant the supreme situation of man in relation to the law, even if Kant thought such a physiology possible. Nonetheless, this natural right, whilst not being instrumental in the deduction of civil rights both grounds and is supported by them. The relation of natural right to civil law is analogous, in Kant, to that of the sublime to culture. Neither culture nor natural right ground either the sublime or civil rights. Nonetheless, just as the sublime requires culture, civil law requires natural right. As has been seen, Law is meant to be exercised empirically, but this requires the natural capacity to do so: in talking of women, Kant refers to their physical weakness and to the superior strengths of men. Here is a direction in which the natural rights required by civil law might be found.

Natural right functions much as repulsive forces do in the discussion above, when brought into relation with attraction. The channels and conduits of the law define the civil rights of a body, but these have no real power in the absence of the natural right which underpins them, just as the striations of empty space have no real force independently of the tactile full space of the actual continuum. What counts as a legitimate and quantifiable action is in both cases defined in terms of its difference from a mobile diversity of intensive distributions on the one hand, and from a centre of
resonance on the other, and what is diverse in relation to action so defined is rendered uniformly exterior to the problem of law, as legally and substantially inert. The centre of resonance becomes the source of all form, of the power in its application and the end towards which true actions lead: possession.

Extended corporeal space is established in the relation of repulsive and attractive forces, and compressed between true and apparent attraction. Whilst the court of reason constitutes its territory in the space between the two parallel series of natural and original right, the ground of the court, the substratum of so-called natural right, is formulated reductively through the evacuation of bodies, passions and sensuous interests: there is no feeling implicated in the proper exercise of law, for either subject or legislator, and just as feeling, or the physical contact of repulsion needed to be weeded out in the construction of royal science, so too must it be eliminated here. For nature to carry right a law extrinsic to it must govern its application. And it is through the critique of practical reason, for which as Kant says, the deduction was so necessary, that 'the obligation to prevent the empirically conditioned reason from presuming to be the only ground of determination of the will' is legitimated. 60

Henrich points out that deduction means 'to carry something forth to something else' 61: it is thus implicated with a channel or duct, the dimensions and directions of which are defined according to principles of law which in turn define the legitimacy of empirical objects brought before the law, and the conditions of possibility under which actions are recognized in the court of reason. The deduction is thus also a reduction, compressing actions into legal form and eliminating intensities not commensurate with a juridical concept of action. The real possession of an original acquisition cannot be justified independently of factual data, but the data must be
formulated in a manner that 'suffice(s) to justify the claims attached to our knowledge.' And again, a principle of continuity is implicated, this time of possession.

Parallel and complementary to the reductive formulation of substance as that in relation to which actions have juridical weight, and count as justification towards a claim - the subject has a de facto case - are interests of reason. As affective constituents are defined out, an empty space opens into which interests of reason are defined, transferring the ground of law from nature to reason, shifting right from nature to law and defining what is outside the law, in the sense of not being a recognized action, negatively. The same series of moves which constitute a body as a mechanically movable inert substance in space, define the subject as similarly movable, no longer in relation to a theory defined in terms of force, but in terms of a practice defined in terms of power.

IV Deduction II: Deleuze

'ce qui est soustrait, amputé ou neutralisé, ce sont les éléments du Pouvoir, les éléments qui font ou représentent un système du Pouvoir'

(what is substracted, amputated or neutralized are elements of power, the elements which make or represent a system of power).

Deleuze understands deduction eliminatively. Real critique and real creation are not differentiated, and the destruction of the image of thought and the elements constitutive of its power are immanent to the real genesis of thought. There are always two things occurring simultaneously, and the negative is always an effect of the
positive, but there is no determination of signs in advance of the formation of the division: creation is not of necessity positive, anymore than destruction is of necessity negative. It is important not to confuse Deleuze’s method as prescriptive of a better future, or as claiming more truth than any other: uncovering the real conditions of the production of production is not an exercise in curing the world of its ills, but rather of describing the mechanisms implicated in its construction, and it is in this sense that Deleuze’s is a rigorously critical project.

This method of eliminative deduction complements that of selection, by stripping out the signs of power in a writer or system or order, so allowing for a description of the development of virtual elements disguised or covered over by constructions submitting to the requirements of law and systematic unity. ‘Soustraire l’unique de la multiplicité à constituer; écrire à n-1 (subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constitute; write at n -1 dimensions).’64 The method is positive, in that it is not simply a case of removing arbitrary components, but of selecting elements which collapse the necessities attaching to functions of power, unity, law, the State: the negative elimination is thus a function of a positive operation. He calls the method minoritarian and it differs from majoritarian thought, which operates on a principle of recognition and law, in the following ways: majoritarian law makes doctrine from thought, facts from events and normalizes by admiration; a minor literature disengages life from culture, becoming from history, thought from doctrine, and bodies from society. Minorities are defined not in terms of their denumerable quantity - which would, for example, exclude women from minoritarian status - but ‘par l’écart qui les séparent de tel ou tel axiome constituant une majorité redondante (by the gap that separates them from this or that axiom constituting a redundant majority)’65. As minoritarian in method, Deleuze’s deduction focuses on exposing the differential intensive elements and problematic sensations which attraction cancels by
condensation into a point, an axiomatic quantum immanent to real distributions, and tracking the tactile connections of the actual continuum, generating simultaneously a radical new description of space.

In *Mille Plateaux*, Deleuze and Guattari describe the coexistence of mechanisms in primitive and nomadic societies, which anticipate the State in two senses, both warding off or repulsing centres of resonance, and incorporating vectors moving in their direction. Before appearing, the State

‘agit déjà sous forme de l’onde convergente ou centripète...qui s’annule précisément au point de convergence qui marquerait l'inversion des signes ou l’apparition d’État.

(already acts in the form of a convergent or centripetal wave...*that cancels itself out precisely at the point of convergence marking the inversion of signs or the appearance of the State*). 66

The model fits neatly with Kant’s description of attraction as a wave-like convergence from all points on the surface of a sphere towards a point. The point made in *Mille Plateaux* is that this movement is anticipatory of the State, rather than effected by it, responding to it as something which does not yet exist, but which nonetheless ‘agit déjà sous une autre forme que celle de son existence (is already in action, in a different form than that of its existence)’. 67 The point of attraction is thus doubled, functioning both virtually, as a real potential to be anticipated and warded off, and actually, as concrete, effectuated. The inverse movement of a diffusive, divergent wave testifies to this actual operation, to the concrete striation of space and division of forces in terms of an order folded back over the surface of the flows, imposed from one point on all distances.

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Rather than searching for the origins of the resonant central point, the State, or giving a chronological account of its emergence from pre-State societies, Mille Plateaux divides the existence of both - state and nomadic societies - into virtual and actual potentials, arguing that both have always existed, and that virtual potentials co-exist alongside concrete machines, but cannot be described in their terms. The move is familiarly Kantian: the transcendental cannot be described from the empirical, but is its condition. Where it departs from Kant is in its refusal to generalize over the virtual, and reduce it to a possibility recognizable in its concrete instantiations, and in the positive feedback from the concrete which functions as a selective mechanism, potentiating the actualization of virtual elements. There is no Law, no lex continui in natura, no Master, no Slave and no Rebel, and the economy is not visual, but tactile, affective, a matter of sensation and intensity rather than sight and extension. Every assemblage is individuated simultaneously as both singular and collective, virtual and concrete, and only by empirical exploration of the branchings, proximities, contacts and connections into which an assemblage enters is its mode of functioning disclosed. Thus, for example, when addressing the situation of women in relation to capital, no general statement is possible which comprehends the complexities and degrees of attachment to this system, and attributes a position of women as a whole. Instead, the actual situation of individual women has to be explored, and the micro-physics of power organizing and blocking lines of becoming followed at the local level, rather than from a global perspective.

Kant defines points of contact, tactile proximities in full space in terms of relative degrees of compression, and Deleuze and Guattari focus in on this problem. Rather than uniformizing their distributions, a move which proposes both an initial and eventual equilibrium, initially that of unity, or the present, and eventually that of
homogeneous entropy, or the future, each is taken as singular. So a different concept of chaos emerges, one which is not unformed and uniformly homogeneous, but which is patterned, populated by haecceities, or ‘des modes d’individualisation qui ne procèdent ni par la forme ni par le sujet (modes of individuation proceeding neither by form nor by the subject’, and which is immanent to the content and expression of bodies and their languages. 68 Each plateau describes a singularity, a concrete date which effectuates a set of virtual elements in a configuration without precedent or model, a region of chaos sufficiently massive for exploration by human methods. Unformed matter is no longer the future generality of good sense, heat death or the kingdom of ends, but ‘une matière-mouvement qui comporte des singularités (a matter-movement bearing singularities)’, the stuff of bodies, or content; and a nonformal functions diagramming a plane of consistency or abstract machine, is ‘une expressivité-mouvement qui comporte toujours une langue étrangère (an expressivity-movement always bearing a foreign tongue)’, the stuff of language, or expression. 69

An abstract machine is defined in terms of concrete flows on its surface, flows of air, breath, heat, food, sperm, shit, sex, words, sunbeams, money, stones, etc.: ‘continuums of intensity, blocs of becoming, emissions of particles, combinations of fluxes’. 70 The theory of assemblages or multiplicities arises from these flows, from nonformal functions, tendencies to the limit, unformed matters and the atypical expressions of minoritarian sciences and literatures, philosophies and arts, which no longer refer to disciplines or faculties, but to the relative mix of elements composing a machine. The State is an abstract machine, and there has always been a State, Deleuze and Guattari argue, and nomadic societies, far from being precursors of the State, are always in some relation to them. Instead of separating the waves of attraction and repulsion, convergence and divergence into two separate tendencies Mille Plateaux seeks to theorize them as simultaneously concretizing different virtual tendencies, or
abstract machines, so that any assemblage or multiplicity is both attached to the strata, which are State apparatus of capture, and so interior to its territory and as transversed by a vector of escape, which eludes and evades that order. Applied to Kant, this exposes a third kind of line, which is neither that of convergence or divergence, nor that which biunivocalizes relations between two bodies, which Deleuze and Guattari call a line of flight.

The surface on which forces are distributed is no longer made uniform by rectilinear lines striating space, and organized by a superstratum elevated vertically above it and functioning as a central resonator for all points on the sphere, but is instead a differential field of thresholds and gradients of intensities. This intensive space, or spatium connects with discussions in chapter one - with the given as intensive, the sufficient reason of sense which forces thought: with Deleuze's definition of the transcendent form of a faculty as grasping that in the world which concerns it exclusively, differentiating the transcendental: with Kant's definition of transcendental matter as that which corresponds to sensation: with the thing-in-itself, or in-itself of difference. Deducting the assumption of unity which covers over the real problematic involved in these elements, and attaches them to a subject-based epistemology and an ontology of being, Deleuze opens up the problem of diagrammatization of this differential field, populated by spatio-temporal dynamisms, torsions, drifts and larval subjects. Rather than, as with Kant, attempting to construct a concept of quantity which could contain magnitudes of intensity, and allow for their mechanical distribution through the medium of a subject, Deleuze concentrates instead on the nature of lines, flows, connections and distributions immanent to material-forces.
In Difference et Répétition, difference of intensity, infinitely doubled differences potentiating infinities is called disparity, dispars, the dark precursor or demon: this function was met with in an earlier chapter, where the importance of difference as internal was noted, together with its rôle as differenciator. The model of science as Dispars, as demonic rather than divine in nature, is thus never concretely completed: it does not present, like Compars, a finished world, but a cosmos in continual involution, perpetually variable, dividing into itself and with each division changing in nature. The demon is implicated with the causality specific to nomadic science, a reverse causality that testifies 'd'une action du futur sur le présent, ou du présent sur le passé (to an action of the future on the present, or of the present on the past)'. Again, however, this is not a generalizable function, but is specific to each system; its connection with the concrete actualization of any distribution is always an effect, rather than a condition of its operation. The demon, or dark precursor 'détermine à l'avance le chemin renversé, (determines their path in advance but in reverse)', functioning as a virtual attractor, the nature of which is only discernible in retrospect. It is not something always already there, however, but generated in the process of its concretization, like the convergent wave or the anticipated potential.

It is important not to confuse reverse causality with teleology, however: as mentioned before, machinic production expresses the conjunction of mechanism and teleology through difference, taking synthesis across the threshold of antinomic division, changing the assemblage and re-wiring the transcendental network, unhinging the faculties and differentiating the process of production from its source conditions. Reverse causality is without finality: the future is not somehow there in advance, pre-determined and fated; rather it is virtual to the formations of the actual.
The demon is not a point or principle in advance of individuation, or a form governing beforehand the material constitution of a machine, body or system: it is instead a radically local function, an element in a science of intensities which invents orders of communication amongst differences for which no prior order exists, using of necessity the elements of a majoritarian form but speaking of necessity a foreign language. Whereas Kant reconcile differences in intensive magnitude by referring them to an extensive space which equalizes them out into a uniform field, Deleuze uses such differences as communicating principles amongst disparate series, which are themselves composed of intensive differences, and it is the complications of the relations generated in this manner which demand the invention of new concepts, new terms, new functions and new distributions and the creation of a foreign philosophical language.

The re-formulation of the thing-in-itself in terms of a plane of consistency, an intensive magnitude immanent to and simultaneous with the given does not cancel its status in Kant as an objective problematic; it continues to demand a solution. However, it transforms what counts as such. Jacobi said:

'I need the assumption of things-in-themselves to enter the Kantian system; but with this assumption it is not possible for me to remain inside it'.

Jacobi was responding to the thing-in-itself in the context of representation, as something which, in some undefined manner, is the cause of the content of representations, but is itself unrepresentable. Deleuze's method of deduction, and critique of representation changes the nature of the problem, however, because it
changes the field of its solution. Firstly, there is no problem of access in Deleuze: as has been said, any machine is already integrated on the strata, as well as facing away from it, on a plane of consistency, and thus potentiated by both actual elements comprising the State, and virtual elements which anticipate and repel it. No assumption of a content above and beyond that distributed on the strata, or composing lines of flight is necessary. Deleuze reminds continually that critique is immanent: a critique of the State cannot situate itself outside its object, and to do so would be to repeat identically old errors. Besides, Deleuze’s understanding of system is in terms of openness; there is no outside to open systems. ‘Elles ne répondent pas à la condition visuelle de pouvoir être observées d’un point de l’espace extérieur à elles (they do not meet the visual condition of being observable from a point in space external to them).’ 74

Secondly, Deleuze can be said to read Jacobi’s claim that the assumption of the thing-in-itself ejects one from the Kantian system as positive. From within Kant, Deleuze subjects representation to a rigorous critique and deducts the components of power, generality, recognition and unity of image which restrict its operation, undoing common sense and good sense. The thing-in-itself can no longer be defined, following that critique, in relation to representation, as the unrepresentable, however, but must be re-formulated in terms of the production of production. It is in the process of deducting the power structures from Kant that the movement of feedback is released, and it is this which allows for the re-formulation of the thing-in-itself in terms of difference and intensities. Instead of being a general problem, it becomes one of singular distributions of intensity on a smooth surface, of vortices and turbulences which have no definition outside their concrete swirlings and speeds, displacements and divergences. An infinity of demons, of molecular leaps, qualities, emerge from intensive magnitudes, and in differentiating themselves from that magnitude, also carry it with them, immanently.
This is why Deleuze is a philosopher of both surface and depth, and why the thing-in-itself retains its paradoxical nature, but instead of paradox being cancelled out in extension and representation, it becomes a prolific machine, an engine of the real without condition or presupposition. The positive feedback from the concrete to the virtual precludes there being “a problem of the thing-in-itself”; singularity is perhaps a more appropriate term for it, in the context of Deleuze.

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The relation between Kant and Deleuze has become both closer and more distant in this chapter. Deleuze's deduction of the power components in Kantian critique and his deployment of a method remote from the juridical model force a gulf between the two. His concentration on the explosive moment within the subject (amongst the topics addressed in the next chapter) and his distribution of the network of faculties as an interconnected surface rather than an organic or hierarchized edifice imply a distinctly unKantian approach. However, his subtractive deduction uncovers directions and problems in critique which are missed when the structures erected by Kant are taken to be constitutive of the transcendental, and when the movement of critique is confined within the science and economics of the Enlightenment. It is Deleuze's attention to forces and flows, limits and thresholds, and synthesis (again, a topic for the next chapter) which re-connect him with Kant, and with the real problems of critique.

Deleuze's relation with Kant is, however, more complex than the above suggests, including many elements for which this thesis does not have space. In his paper *Sur quatre formule poetiques qui pourraient resumer la philosophie kantienne*, Deleuze weaves Hamlet, Rimbaud and Kafka into the heart of Kantian problems.
Hamlet and Kant together achieve 'l'émancipation du temps (the emancipation of time)'; Rimbaud and Kant, in their different ways, proclaim 'Je est un autre (I is another)'; Kafka and Kant alike describe the practice of law on the body. Kafka illustrates the immediacy of Kantian law with the body; through this story, its vaulted magnificence subsides into the bureaucratic pettiness of the officer delighting in the perfections of a machine which writes law directly onto the flesh. It is not known, but met with in its execution, its application through pain and violence.

In each case, when the strangeness of these alliances is pursued a problem of forces and of systematics is uncovered. Kantian philosophizing is remote from the spaces of force, however, a task rather than a movement, and whilst Deleuze describes him as the analogue of a great explorer, his exploration is limited to the surface, and does not travel the intricacies of its depth. He is concerned rather to prevent tunnellings and connections which do not follow the strict lines of extension or the strict rules of law.

"The worker in the field of philosophy, especially pure philosophy (logic and metaphysics), must hold his object hanging in midair before him and must always describe and examine it, not merely part by part, but within the totality of a system as well."\textsuperscript{15}

This contrasts directly with the opening of this chapter, and Deleuze's comment about the need to occupy space without measuring it: Kant's method is to take each part and refer it, through a variety of means - analogy, resemblance, comparison, proportionality, directionality, numerical identity, and so on - to the ends of reason, to the totality of the system. All the seasickness in the world could not, it
Chapter 3

seems, persuade him that attraction at a distance across empty space is inadequate as a theory of force.

The next chapter looks at Kant’s theory of synthesis, as an act of the subject, and Deleuze’s deduction of unity from synthesis, leading to its formulation as passive, together with the changes effected within imagination as a result of these changes.
Passive Synthesis

'Profondement schizoïde est la théorie kantienne d’après laquelle les quantités intensives remplissent la matière sans vide à des degrés divers.

(The Kantian theory according to which intensive quantities fill up, to varying degrees, matter that has no empty spaces, is profoundly schizoid).'

In L'anti-œdipe themes from Deleuze’s earlier works are not lost, but by virtue of its language and his alliance with Guattari, they are transformed; the academic tones of Différence et Répétition give way to a compilation vocabulary, built from fragments stolen from a variety of sources, Artaud, Marx, Freud, Lacan and Kant being amongst them. (Theft is another of Deleuze’s methods.) However, the apparatus of the book is familiar, and situates it in the context of Kantian critique: three syntheses as the productive machinery, a distinction between their legitimate immanent use and illegitimate transcendent use, a transcendental principle, paralogisms. To select familiar elements is to run counter to the sentiments the book expresses (Destroy! Destroy! being one); however, to understand why Kant’s theory of intensities is called schizoid by Deleuze and Guattari, it is necessary to look at the way in which synthesis works, and at the transformation of the transcendental. This will connect it with Kant, and the previous two chapters. Women are also introduced in this chapter, but only by identifying in passing those terms with which philosophy has associated them, precursory to the longer discussions in the two following chapters.
In his preface to the English edition of *L'anti-oedipe*, Foucault cautions against looking for a philosophy in the book, for "a flashy Hegel"; no more should a flashy Kant be looked for. Although the book expresses an explicit alliance with Kantian critique, and with the transcendental method, the networks it deploys are not those of common sense, and the criticism is not confined by reason. The central Kantian themes are immanence of criteria and synthesis. Immanence not to synthesis, or machinic processes, but of machinic processes. That is, there is no containment of synthetises within something which is not synthesis, and nor is there a goal. The language of the book is not flashy either, but integral to the problems with which it deals. In Kant, imagination synthesizes; however, the psychological overtones of imagination cannot be killed, no matter how careful the attempt. Whilst exploring the Kantian imagination and unhinging it from its proper speculative, aesthetic and practical uses exposes a way of connecting Kant and Deleuze, the peculiarities and nature of this linkage are missed if terminology particular to human machines is used.

Deleuze and Guattari have been criticized for exploiting the term schizophrenia. Elizabeth Grosz writes of objections to their investment

\[ \text{‘in a romantic elevation of models of psychosis, schizophrenia, and madness, that on the one hand, ignore the very real pain and torment of individuals, and, on the other hand, raise pathology to an unlivable, unviable ideal for others.’}^{14} \]

It is indeed not difficult to see the schizo as an image or model, if one is searching for such things. However, the vector of Deleuze’s writing militates against this; his critique of the image of thought was referred to in chapter two, and on a more general level, the nature of his writing changes from book to book, using new
vocabularies which continuously draw in new elements and open different holes. If one is inclined to personal sympathy rather than to making things work - which is not the same as interpreting what Deleuze means by schizophrenia - then no doubt there are criticisms to be made. But schizophrenia, as it is employed in L'anti-oedipus, refers to a machinic, rather than a human operation, of inclusive disjunction. Rather than the either/or of exclusive disjunction, the schizoid intensity both differentiates and includes difference, in a continuous variation of variables which shucks off orders imposed from the outside; it refers to the release of intensities, the emission of spores.

In Différence et Répétition, Deleuze writes:

'It ne s'agit pas d'opposer à l'image dogmatique de la pensée une autre image, empruntée par exemple à la schizophrénie. Mais plutôt de rappeler que la schizophrénie n'est pas seulement un fait humain, qu'elle est une possibilité de la pensée, qui ne se révèle à ce titre que dans l'abolition de l'image.

(It is not a question of opposing to the dogmatic image of thought another image borrowed, for example, from schizophrenia, but rather of remembering that schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also a possibility for thought - one, moreover, which can only be revealed as such through the abolition of that image).

'Not only a human fact' is crucial. L'anti-oedipus is neither an anti-humanist nor post-humanist text, as some enthusiasts would claim; it is simply not interested in this argument, in the same way that Deleuze is uninterested in tiresome discussions over whether philosophy is dead, whether we live in a post-philosophical age. Machinic synthesis is impersonal, and indifferent to human divisions: it does not differentiate man and nature, nature and industry, industry and history, but is immanent to the cycles it synthesizes, generating difference but not presupposing any
pre-given and conditioning articulations of its nature, adding difference at each level of
production, rather than cancelling it in extension. Deleuze and Guattari are engaged in
formulating an abstract account of production that does not isolate production from
desire, nor privatize desire within the family in order to leave a social field free for
labour. To say that schizophrenia is not only a human fact is simply to issue a
reminder that the term is not used with reference to the social construction of the
schizophrenic, but as a potential of thought. Much as Kant says that the transcendental
is illegitimate if conceived of in the image of the empirical.

Humanity is a term for a particular mode of production, involving the
rationalization of processes on the grounds of universal necessity, global superiority,
exclusive binaries (reason/nature, man/woman, sane/insane, good/evil etc. etc.);
insofar as ‘elle fait du luxe même un moyen d’investissement (it makes luxury itself
into a means of investment)”6 and operates with an arsenal of rules within a
complementary framework of cynicism and stupidity, impotence and power. However,
L’anti-œdipe is a critical book and as such not sentimental about the values that this
mode of production protects and requires. Its problem is to find out how they work,
how to undo them, and let a bit of fresh air into thinking. The schizo is not an image or
model, but an illustration, a working attempt to expose the uncritical assumptions in
philosophical dogmas.

Deleuze is critical of images of thought which are based on

‘l’extrapolation de certains faits, et de faits particulièrement
insignifiants, la banalité quotidienne en personne, la Récognition,
comme si la pensée ne devait pas chercher ses modèles dans des
aventures plus étranges ou plus compromettantes.
(extrapolation from certain facts, particularly insignificant facts such as Recognition, everyday banality in person; as though thought should not seek its models among stranger and more compromising adventures).\(^7\)

The schizo is not a metaphor, but a principle, but rather than being based on everyday facts, it is the principle of their criticism, as empty of meaning as God; the schizo exists no more than does God, just as madness exists no more than reason. Everything can be banalized, and at this we are particularly adept. Both are made, under different conditions, according to different modes of production, along different lines of thought. There is not a choice between a world modelled on the schizo and one modelled on God; the processes and relations deployed in *L'anti-oedipe* are past the opposition between the multiple and the one. There are only markets, connections, breaks and flows, blockages or escapes, consumptions, distributions. To the question: do you believe in God? Deleuze and Guattari write: 'bien sûr, mais seulement comme au maître du syllogisme disjonctif (of course, but only as the master of the disjunctive syllogism)'.\(^8\) God, like the schizo, is a machinic operation, a production; because there is no unconscious material, no theatre staging myth and fantasy, only the cycle of production, there is no schizo in the unconscious, just as there is no God. Both are produced as effects of machinic synthesis, which either over-code it, and direct it towards defined ends - exclusive disjunction, in the case of God; or displace and differentiate it, intensifying synthesis and proliferating identities, in inclusive disjunctions which add difference and so shoot relations outside the terms related.

In this chapter synthesis, as the basic apparatus of *L'anti-oedipe* will be looked at, and drawn out of its connections with Kant and the activity of a subject.
Kant takes this conclusion into a discussion of the noumenon. The noumenon, as argued in *Chapter One*, is an object produced by understanding when it claims determinate knowledge of something in general, in its search for knowledge independent of sense. The claim to determinate knowledge of a substantial transcendental subject is just such a move on the part of understanding; the transcendental, rather than immanent employment of the concepts compels speculative reason to assume the noumenon, limiting sensibility and initiating the transfer from epistemological to moral law. Yet following on from his clarification of the error which leads to the psychological paralogism, Kant remarks on the legitimacy, in the practical field, of assuming the substantiality and freedom of the subject, as logical functions of ground and consequence. In a different legislative domain, a non-sensible but intelligible rational principality, theoretical illegitimacies find a practical utility.

Yet this move is not necessitated by Kant's conclusion as expressed in the comment quoted above, for as has been argued, the noumenon and the thing-in-itself are not synonymous, nor do they fulfil the same function. The conflation of the noumenon and the thing-in-itself relates to the collapse of the important difference between productive imagination and synthesis as thought without identity on the one hand, and understanding and the unity of synthesis effected through the formal logic of the concepts on the other. It is this latter formulation of synthesis which leads towards the noumenon. The former is implicated with intensity and thus with the material qualities of the real rather than its formal values. This allows a different direction to be drawn from the quote above regarding the heterogeneity or otherwise of the thing-in-itself as a substratum to the materiality of appearances. For it cannot be confused with either substance or causality and thus taken towards the epistemological limit of the noumenon, the realm of practical reason and a moral subject. Rather one is
It is to synthesis...that we must first direct our attention, if we would
determine the first origin of our knowledge.19

In chapter two, Deleuze’s eliminative deduction was discussed, as a positive
selective method which collapses the power operators in a writer, exposing problematic
undercurrents, and bringing to the surface of his writing patterns which, under the
covers of law, appear as an undifferentiated or chaotic depth. (It is worth remembering
this before attempting to read the schizo as such an operator.) Part of the difficulty of
reading L'anti-oedipe within a strictly philosophical register is that its language and
relations are assembled from philosophy, science, economics, literature, psycho-
analysis, politics and art, so reading it solely terms of its connections with Kant is
undoubtedly a limited exercise. However, Deleuze’s work feeds back onto Kant, and
exposes not a firm ground and a certain unity, but a dynamic, mobile and immanently
differentiated space.

This does not mean a space that is unable to function as a basis for a theory of
mechanism. However, Kant’s claims for mechanism have to be re-sited: it no longer
presents a universally comprehensive theory encompassing the totality of objective
movements in space, but becomes a limited description of a motions across empty space
according to ideal principles, following predictable and pre-determined channels. In
mechanism, the process of individuation, or differenciation, is constrained and
governed from an external position. That Kant is aware of this is clear from his
discussion of teleology in the third Critique, where he distinguishes the formation of
natural bodies from mechanical bodies on precisely the difference between something
set into operation from the outside, and something which is formed through the
relations of forces immanently to it.\textsuperscript{10} Deleuze and Guattari formulate a third theory of production, or synthesis, which is neither purposive, as is the Kantian understanding of a natural body, nor mechanistic, but machinic.

There are several ways in which the relation of passive synthesis to Kant can be addressed. For example, there are three syntheses in both L'anti-oedipe and the first Critique, the former mapping loosely onto the three categories of relation: the synthesis of connection/selection with cause and effect, the synthesis of disjunction/recording with substance and accident, the synthesis of conjunction/consumption with community/reciprocity. These relations can also be connected with the problem of the modes of time specific to each relation - succession, permanence and co-existence respectively, as discussed by Kant in the Analogies of Experience. Another possibility is looking at the qualities of force which correlate with each synthesis, libido with connection, numen with disjunction and voluptas with conjunction. However, because the underlying question in this thesis is where women are situated in the theoretical structures of philosophy, or more precisely in Kant and Deleuze, the axis privileged is that of passivity, women having been situated in relation to this by philosophy, and the problem of how passive synthesis relates to Kantian synthesis.

Kant defines synthesis as an act of combining difference under unity, in which elements of knowledge are gathered, whether of pure or empirical origin, and united to form the content of a representation.\textsuperscript{11} Although he refers to it as a connection 'thought without identity' \textsuperscript{12}, amplifying rather than analyzing or explicating the content of concepts, he also say that 'all combination or separation that constitutes thought relates' to a simple "I".\textsuperscript{13} It is, in other words, a limited amplification. Thinking turns a circle through these two statements on synthesis, from synthesis as relation of difference not constrained by the logical formalism of a concept to a relation of
difference anchored to identity; this latter understanding of synthesis then serves as the model of the possibility of synthesis in general. Synthesis is drawn into the subject, and differences in the flow of imagination and variations in qualitative intensities - in degree of intensity - are equalized through the concept of magnitude.

The formulation of synthesis as a process anchored to identity, rather than thought without reference to it, is bound up with Kant's argument against confusing the apparent heterogeneity of objects of inner and outer sense with a real difference, a confusion which leads to the attribution of a separate and substantial existence to the purely formal unity of thought. From the thought of a subject abstracted from the empirical experience of an existing body an illegitimate epistemological claim is made to the effect that 'I have knowledge that what is substantial in me is the transcendental subject.'\textsuperscript{14} This implies the attribution of conceptual characteristics - such as substance or causality - to a subject assumed to exist independently of the body - in other words, to the transcendental employment of understanding. One can see the same tendencies at work here as were argued against in Chapter Two, with reference to the thing-in-itself.

Kant traces the source of this error to the mistaken assumption that the difference between inner and outer objects is something other than the result of the sensible limitation of human knowledge, an error which generates the thought of a subject with no object as a real, rather than merely logical form. His response is to point out that the heterogeneity of body and thinking is a function of the forms of intuition - space and time - rather than of any real underlying difference, and that

'what, as thing-in-itself [Ding an sich], underlies the appearance of matter, perhaps after all may not be so heterogeneous in character.'\textsuperscript{15}
lead - as Schopenhauer saw - towards a problem of forces which has no conceptual formulation, which cannot be thought through the subject, but which is immanent to the production of the world as representation.

Whilst one cannot argue with Kant’s point concerning the error of assuming that thinking and the body are composed of different “stuff”, his solution remains formal, in the sense that it ignores the materiality of the body in favour of the identity of the subject; it is only in this way that the final solution to the problem can be discovered in the form of practical law. When Schopenhauer accuses Kant’s view of the intellect for being one-sided and ignoring the physiological functions of the brain in favour of its formal intellectual functions he is moving towards an objective consideration of the intellect, not as an object of representation - which is to say, in terms of the epistemological structures following from the principium individuationis - but as thing-in-itself, or will: ‘In itself...and outside the representation, the brain, too, like everything else, is will.’ In Kant’s terms this would mean that rather than synthesis being subordinated to identity and thus attached to the subject, it is thought without identity; his point still holds concerning the error of assuming body and thinking to be other than externally differentiated, in accordance with the forms of intuition, but the direction in which this points leads is no longer towards the moral philosophy, but towards a deeper exploration of the material substrate underlying appearance.

Kant distinguishes two types of synthesis, figurative syntheses of imagination and intellectual syntheses of understanding. The former are ‘the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul’, whilst intellectual synthesis is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation, an act of understanding to which ‘the general title “synthesis” may be assigned’. The former is
synthesis proper, and combines intensive qualities, whilst the latter is a function of the
unity of the 'I think' and combines axiomatized quanta of intuition. The former is
implicated with the production of an actual continuum, with the dynamic commercium
of machinic synthesis, whilst the latter is associated with an ideal continuity, with the
conceptual community of human labour. As seen above, the difference is between
synthesis thought without identity, and synthesis brought in relation with identity, and
a different direction may be followed from each, one leading towards the problematic
thing-in-itself and the other towards the noumenon. In the first Critique, imagination
is annexed to understanding; it schematizes in accordance with the categories and the
continuous flowing quantities of productive imagination - degrees of intensity - are
given discrete and extensive formulation through the axioms of intuition. In the
production of objects of knowledge, the two syntheses operate in conjunction. However,
imagination is a separate faculty, not merely an adjunct to understanding, as is clear
from the third Critique, in the discussion of the mathematical sublime.

A synthesis of imagination produces continuously flowing degrees of
intensity, but sightlessly, without prior reference to recognition or concepts: that is to
say, the production of degrees of intensity is not governed a priori by the formal logics
of the concepts. Intensity attaches to that element in experience which 'can never be
known a priori, and which therefore constitutes the distinctive difference between
empirical and a priori knowledge' and there is no concept of degrees of intensity as
such for Kant, since sensation is not a concept. In respect of the sightless production of
continuous degrees of intensity, imagination is connected with intuition rather than
understanding; 'intuitions without concepts are blind'. A degree of intensity is not a
quantity in intuition, but the quantity of the quality of sensation, a degree of influence
on the senses. It thus has no connection with concepts as such; the spatial extension
of the object to which such a degree of influence is attributed can remain constant,
whilst the degree of quality of influence on the senses - the sensation itself - can vary without this difference registering conceptually. Deleuze's thought of synthesis results from this unhinging of imagination from unity and understanding, and of intuition from its modes, and theorizes productive synthesis as a positive intensive difference from the empty form of time.

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In L'anti-oedipe, synthesis is passive:

‘Le désir est cet ensemble de synthèses passives qui machinent les objet partiels, les flux et les corps, et qui fonctionnent comme des unités de production.

(Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production).  

The problem of synthesis is taken back to the question of a relation thought without identity, deducted from the act of understanding which relates it to identity. The starting point from which to explore Deleuze's formulation of synthesis is the subject. In the second of the four poetic formulae summarizing Kant, introduced by Rimbaud's phrase 'Je est un autre', Deleuze begins by asking under what form indeterminate existence - je suis, I am - is determinable by the je pense, I think. And the answer Kant gives to this problem arising out of Cartesian subject, is that it is determinable in the form of time; "therefore" is not sufficient as a theory of relations between the I and its other. Existence is determinable only in the pure form of time, 'comme l’existence d’un moi passif, réceptif et changeant (as the existence of a passive,
receptive and changing ego.)"^{26} and it is the production of this mobile and passive I am, rather than the activity of the fixed but spontaneous I think which is, for Deleuze, where the real problem of the subject in Kant lies.

The aesthetic is Kant’s most important contribution to philosophy and the insinuation of time into the heart of the subject the explosive moment referred to in chapter one, so Deleuze addresses this as the critical relation in regard to the subject in Kant, rather than the logical vehicle that accompanies representations. The epistemological problem becomes subordinate to one of affects and intensities, bodies and desires, and ontology gives way to blocs of becoming, or cycles of synthetic production.

The I am is an affect, but passively, rather than actively synthesized, and is characterized intensively: Kant himself says that ‘consciousness itself always has a degree, which ... allows of diminution”^{27} so putting the problem on an intensive register. Deleuze focuses on the relation of the degree of intensity to pure empty time, rather than to inner sense, the formal appropriation of time into the subject. That is, he does not theorize it in relation to modes of time which are analogous to conceptual relations. Set into variation through the deduction of the I think, the recognized principle of thought, the I am becomes a problem of becoming, in formation but never a form, because there is a continuous modulation of intensities through time and a continuous transformation in the quantitative degree which composes consciousness. This move is immediately of interest in relation to the question of women’s location in philosophy, since the passive/active and receptive/spontaneous axes have been amongst those used to articulate their difference from men, women being attributed with the first arm of each of the two disjunctions. Women are also associated with imagination in Kant. Deleuze’s shift of synthesis from an active mode of production to a passive
producing process, and from understanding as agent of unity to imagination as synthetizing continuous flows is implicated with the philosophical positioning of women.28 But a fuller discussion of this follows in the next two chapters; this remark is merely to begin weaving women into the discussion-to create an undertow, as it were.

The relation of passive synthesis to the distinction in Kant between productive or figurative synthesis and the intellectual synthesis which subordinates the former to unity is not one of opposition, and nor does passive synthesis correlate directly with the synthesis of imagination. Firstly, passive synthesis describes a transverse line across the oppositional axis, so is not directly associable with Kant's active/passive distinction. As has been said before, Deleuze's subtractive method does not remove through exclusion, but is instead a positive privation which removes the belts and blockages of limitation and negation.

In Kant's table of the concepts of nothing, the negation of reality results in 'a concept of the absence of an object, such as shadow, cold (nihil privativum)29, a trace of what was real remaining as a negative imprint. Deleuze's use of privation is positive, and rather than leaving a shadow of what has been removed, brings to the surface what was covered over by the concept. 'Soustraire et mettre en variation, retrancher et mettre en variation, c'est une seule et même opération (subtract and place in variation, remove and place in variation: a single operation).30 Subtraction effects the release of variations which do not fall onto either side of the disjunction, but include both as potentials, not in the form of binaries, but as elements of a multiplicity which cannot be scored down the middle, or reduced to the sum of its parts. Rather than the removal of a quality of reality - an intensive magnitude - leaving the shadow of itself, it opens up the quality of distributions which the axiomatization of quantities suppressed. The deduction of activity from synthesis does not therefore leave the
problem of passive synthesis in a Kantian register, but opens a space for the re-
formulation of passivity stripped of psychological overtones and cultural constructions
of women as the “passive (= weaker) sex.”

It is not that there is a movement between active and passive which cannot be
exposed, an undecidable median which is neither simply one or the other, and which
distributes this difference but is not determined by it. What effects a division in a
multiplicity does not straddle a distance between divided states nor make a clean break.
In Dialogues, Deleuze writes:

‘On ne sort effectivement des dualismes qu’en les déplaçant à la
manière d’une charge, et lorsqu’on trouve entre les termes, qu’ils
soient deux ou davantage, un défilé étroit comme une bordure ou une
frontière qui va faire de l’ensemble une multiplicité,
indépendamment du nombre des parties. Ce que nous appelons
agencement, c’est précisément une multiplicité.

(You can only escape dualisms effectively by shifting them like a load, and
when you find between the two terms, whether they are two or more, a narrow
gorge like a border or a frontier which will turn the set into a multiplicity,
independently of the number of parts. What we call an assemblage is,
precisely, a multiplicity).’ 31

The border or gorge does not institute a relation between intensity and
extensity, or active and passive syntheses; to formulate it thus turns the transversal line
into a diagonal which can be plotted on a plane graph. Intensity becomes subordinated
to the qualities filling extensity - force becomes relative to distance, for example, or
pressure to volume. The multiplicity, or in-between, or frontier, however, neither
distributes dualisms, nor reduces to them, because it is effected by asymmetrical and
differential conjunctions which, by including both arms of a disjunction construct an
assemblage which is not commensurate with the conditions of its production, but
escapes them, giving relations another direction. A very simple illustration might be
that of transsexuals: whilst the desire professed by a man might be to become a woman,
or by a woman to become a man, becoming-transsexual does not result in a simple
switch - this is an extensive appearance, effected by surgery - but the inclusion of both
terms, and the creation of a new sex contained by neither. What appears are n-sexes,
not two sexes; n-qualities, distributed not as the result of the qualification or
axiomatization of quanta necessitated by the attachment of production to identity, but
through the connections and relations into which a body enters, and of which it is
assembled.

This is the logic of empiricism, and of rhizomatics, the principle of which has
been quoted in relation to deduction in chapter two: subtract the unique from the
multiplicity to be constituted. Deduction works at the level of principles; it is not
merely a matter of taking a bit off, as if one were removing part of an argument which
did not contribute to the proof. Every qualification of force resulting from unity and the
monopolization of power by substance removed shifts the nature of the problem: each
movement changes space, each change in space effects the direction and speed of
movement. Evacuation of the principles which structure transcendental matter, or
intensities, according to unity, and of the principles which regulate the stability, purity
and upkeep of unity, shifts Deleuze's logic away from one of being, and the
'subordination des conjonctions au verbe être (subordination of conjunctions to the verb
to be)' . His operator is the AND,
Chapter 4

‘qui fait filer les relations hors de leurs termes et hors de l’ensemble
de leurs termes, et hors de tout ce qui pourrait être déterminé comme
Être, Un ou Tout.

(which makes relations shoot outside their terms and outside the set
of their terms, and outside everything which could be determined as
Being, One, or Whole). 35

Consciousness loses unitary sense and is no longer a priori but a posteriori,
the real effect of a singularity already in action, but in a different form than that of its
existence. 36 Transversality is not a diagonal on a co-ordinate system, but a movement
which generates new co-ordinates and a different system. Synthesis becomes an
additive function, rather than a relation with identity. Not, however, the addition of
equal units, but the addition of difference. Where God is the master of disjunctive
syllogism, unity is added to differential relations of empirical and heterogeneous
sequences, and difference is articulated according to the either/or: either production is
social or it is desiring - either it is public or it is private, familial, secret. The inclusive
disjunction of machinic production affirms diversity and adds difference, adds value
without siphoning off profit, breeding flows from flows, breaking and detaching
elements and setting them into motion in other directions.

II Passive

Deleuze fuses the problem of consciousness defined as a degree of intensity,
and thus as a multiplicity, or assemblage, with the real which forces thought, the
imperceptible and contingent cycles of the sufficient reason of sense. He does not focus
on either the I think or the I am, however, but on the ‘position passive (ce que Kant
appelle la réceptivité d’intuition (passive position [what Kant calls the receptivity of
intuition]) which is implicated with the pure form of time, a nonformal intuition, and with the passive syntheses of perception and individuation. This is the vector of passivity which does not resolve back into the system of binaries, but brings the underlying differences on which it is founded to the surface, so introducing variations which cannot be comprehended in biunivocal relations.

Deleuze does not find a self in Kant's Deduction: it is this, he argues, that betrays the death of God signified by the pure form of time, as condition of a finite empirical animal. Starting from a passionate and receptive self, a "me", rather than an "I", which is always an effect not an origin, a peripheral residue rather than a source, and defined in terms of affects, as a substantial multiplicity replete with faculties, not as functions of common sense but of multiplicities it plugs into, Deleuze then asks: what are the real conditions of its production? One no longer starts from one, but from zero, the pure and empty form of time.

The problem becomes one of the difference of thresholds and limits and the passive becomes a transient limit, a skin immanent to a threshold, rather than an existence contained within an I think, or a border distinguishing an inside from an
outside. Mobile and ambulatory, the passive “me” is a variable affect, and rather than being located behind the eyes, travels a body, changing its qualities as it engages different connections and transforms functions, each movement of different order, of different relations, different syntheses and times; every change in degree is a change in quality. If the passive has an apparent objective constancy or identity, this is a function of its empirical circumstances, of the social orders and codes which define it, rather than of the real conditions of its production; it is always corporeal, corporealizing, a thought of sense not of understanding or reason. Constants are temporary and mobile, rather than fixing parameters; relations are explosive and escapist, rather than placid and imprisoned.

The passive is a crack which transmits only itself, and transmission is not more or less than this crack: the cracked or fractured subject is its negative inversion, its dead consequence, an old transmission from Kant. Rather than the crack being encased between the I and its other, it is infiltrated by Ideas, abstract material problems 'émergent constamment sur les bords de cette fêlure, sortant et rentrant sans cesse, se composant de mille manières diverses (constantly emerging on its edges, ceaseless coming out and going back, being composed in a thousand different manners)', which do not form a unified totality, but inform the process of individuation which constitutes a self, not as a subject, but as a mobile affect. However, the passive is not to be mistaken for a subject nor the self mistaken for a body; a body is teeming assemblage of larval selves, bacterial, chemical, electrical, social, sexual affects composing a surface; Deleuze’s argument against the image of thought is that it inscribes an image on that surface, and so precludes exploration of the complexities of the interactions amongst all these different orders of selves. Unlike the subject, the assemblage does not say “mine”: the possibility of possession is bound up with identity, with law, with the deduction of right and to say “mine” presupposes I own myself as an object, contain
another. The passive without possession is composed of affects, is a crowd, a population, units of production, larvae, intensive degrees of imagination at a positive distance from the zero of the pure form of time.

Saying “mine”, and expressing possession of a space, is an effect of the illegitimate or paralogical use of the third machinic synthesis, conjunction. This has already been referred to in its legitimate formulation, as the AND logics of empiricism. In its paralogical employment, the actual dynamics of the commercium, the infinite proximities of the elements of repulsive force filling space, are contained within the boundaries of a subject, and conceptualized independently of real interaction. So the subject becomes prior to the lived state, and possesses its body as an object, owning its behaviour, rather than being a peripheral effect of the mobile affects which cross its surface. An assemblage of larval and swarming selves becomes totalized under the name of the agent, as the principle of its definition, in relation to which the dynamics of intensive space become passive; not in the sense of passive synthesis as the blind generation of real affects, but as inert in relation to the spontaneity of the acting subject.

Kant refers to this difference in the third Analogy, noting that a local spatial community has for its real condition the dynamic commercium of real interactions, which are co-existing and co-ordinated, but not according to any extrinsic rule. However, he turns this relation inside out, by making an ideal community the condition of the possibility of knowledge of the commercium, so situating the subject outside, in an elevated position; the subject does not then co-exist with the dynamic space, as a continuously mobile variant, but becomes the principle of its subordination to unity. Whilst the first synthesis, connection, is indicative of the escape of abstract flows
which have neither code or territory, and which effect the deterritorialization of space
and the decoding of flows, conjunction in its illegitimate formulation

‘indique...leur arrêt relatif, comme un point d’accumulation qui
bouche ou colmate maintenant les lignes de fuite, opère une
reterritorialisation générale, et fait passer les flux sous la dominance
de l’un d’eux capable de les surcoder.

(indicates their relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that
plugs or seal the lines of flight, performs a general
reterritorialization, and brings the flows under the dominance of a
single flow capable of overcoding them). 40

It is in the context of the relation of connection and conjunction that Deleuze
and Guattari come closest to admitting to history: they distinguish between a history
which takes for its elements classes and segments, and follows the major line
overcoding the vectors of escape and a microhistory which traces masses and flows - a
history of populations and packs, flows of money, of sperm, of blood, milk, rivers,
bodies; history as market, rather than as capital. The former, macrohistory, attaches to
the conjunction specific to subject as agent of synthesis: it is the acts of men which
constitute this history, allowing for the claim of this illegitimate use of conjunction -
‘c’est donc moi, le roi! c’est donc à moi, que revient le royaume! (so I am the king! So
the kingdom belongs to me)’. 41 The subject becomes the single flow overcoding all
flows, the consumer of time and of history from which both appear to emanate.
A Row of Doors

‘Le plan de consistance (grille) est le dehors de toutes les multiplicités.

(The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities).’

In the previous chapter Deleuze’s use of passive synthesis was discussed, together with the transformations in subjectivity when synthesis is not related to identity, nor understood as a spontaneous act of synthetic unity, nor confined within an image of thought. The passive “me” is not “other” to an acting I, but a mobile and variable affect, impersonal and intensive. In this chapter, changes effected in imagination by these shifts in the nature of the subject and synthesis will be looked at. This shift has implications for Kant’s association of the imagination with a soul, the latter being essential to the constitution of the category of the Person, defining a cultural body subject to law and capable of faith. Imagination is also involved in aesthetic judgements on the sublime, and the effects of the reconfiguration of synthesis as passive in relation to such judgements will also be explored. Lastly, the nature of a machinic continuum is addressed, in terms of the continuous exportation of the model of death, or zero, as the immanent condition of production.

I Soul

‘C’est l’imagination qui traverse les domaines, les ordres et les niveaux, abattant les cloisons, coextensive au monde...conscience larvaire allant sans cesse de la science au rêve et inversement.
(It is imagination which crosses domains, orders and levels, knocking down the partitions coextensive with the world...a larval consciousness which moves endlessly from science to dream and back again).12

In *Mille Plateaux* Deleuze and Guattari remark on the complementarity of impotence and power and their mutual reinforcement ‘dans une sorte de satisfaction fascinante (in a kind of fascinating satisfaction)’ particular to mediocrity and definitive of the glory of men of the State. In terms of its relations, this dynamic, incorporating impotence and dominant authority as reciprocal correspondants, operates very much like the Kantian sublime, in which imagination and reason push each other to their limit, the inadequacy of the former resulting from the superior might of the latter. In the sublime, the relation of production to reproduction essential to recognizing unity is disturbed: imagination apprehends, or produces intensive quanta, but there is no general rule appropriate to the comprehension, or reproduction of their degree in a determinate objective form. As it was out on the lagoon, the subject becomes turned in on itself, disconnected from sensibility.

Whilst Kant emphasizes that there is neither an interest or liking of reason in the sublime, and that it is a purely aesthetic judgement, it is only in the context of a cultured mind that the fine line between enthusiasm and fanaticism and the sublime can be negotiated successfully. But as was remarked in a previous chapter, that the sublime *requires* culture, ‘in no way implies that it was initially produced by culture’:\(^5\) its foundation belongs to the human predisposition for ‘(practical) ideas, i.e., to moral feeling’.\(^5\) Thus, whilst imagination and reason are discordant and the play of faculties unregulated in the sublime, ‘imagination is...really part of moral common sense’\(^6\) and only under the condition of a moral common sense, as a place of safety, are the violent agitation and ‘sacred thrill’\(^7\) of the sublime commensurate with rational faith. The
reconciliation of the sublime, of pain subsiding into negative pleasure, its fascinations becoming satisfying rather than threatening to reason, and its impotence giving way to authority is made possible by the movement out of nature, away from the sensible, and into the supersensible strata of Reason and Law.

It is indeed imagination that crosses domains and demolishes the orders and structures of the world; however, for Kant the movement from the world of objects, the world of science, to that of dreams is achieved through a relation of inadequacy and authority. Imagination in its cognitive rôle, schematizing relations of production to reproduction, or apprehension to comprehension, according to a rule of understanding, is inadequate in the face of the superior and incomparable supersensible dreams of reason; in the sublime, imagination apprehends or produces quanta which can neither be reduced to determinacy through analogy, nor reproduced or comprehended according to the axiomatics of extension. But this disordered relation between production and reproduction is legitimate only in the context of culture. As Kant says in the first Critique, before venturing onto the ocean, one must first be secure in the possession of the land. The case is very similar in the sublime: before the natural disorder and indeterminacy of faculties can be countenanced as within the ends of reason, and the fortitude of imagination, or the soul 'raised above its usual middle range', culture must first have prepared the ground.8

Authority and impotence are hand in hand, but the latter is rationally legitimate only if the former is first made certain. This is because the sublime in its dynamic, rather than mathematical formulation, testifies to the physical impotence of man in the face of nature - not external nature, but the nature of the faculties; the chaotic and overwhelming forces of the sublime are expressed in the vastness of nature, but the feeling of the sublime itself testifies to the containment of this vastness; man
has within him a disorder of immense magnitude, but reason in its cultured form is always adequate to this. Reason has 'a different and nonsensible standard that has this infinity itself under it as a unit' and it is this that prevents the sublime from being a degradation of humanity, and evidences instead its superiority over nature.⁹ Reason contains chaos, but chaos is no match, it seems, for reason.

In Mille Plateaux the interiorization of intensive natural forces is discussed in relation to the war machine and its containment by the State. A war machine is 'une pure forme d'exteriorité (a pure form of exteriority)', associated with the science of Dispars and with nomos, as full intensive and tactile space distributed without reference to law.¹⁰ A war machine has no necessary relation with violence: it is characterized rather by its relation to speed and intensity, and by its irreducibility to the mechanisms of capture specific to the State. In this respect, it is situated similarly to the position in which women have been established - or rather, not established - by philosophy, as necessary to the State, but not reducible to its forms and orders. The war machine is a pack, a gang of street children, a diffuse and mobile composition which cannot be understood in terms of class relations, age groups, sexual proclivities, or skin colours. In Brazil, the children are murdered by the State, in Borneo the women are prostituted by the State, in all States, the aim is to incorporate the war machine, by whatever means and in whatever form, whilst eliminating those elements which cannot be reduced to its monopoly. Mockery, murder, prostitution, criminality, the police, the army, the church, the academy, the school, the youth club, the hospital, the prison: all these ways of producing the war machine as a suicide line inside the State, rather than as a pure exteriority. It is noology, the image of thought, which serves as the mechanism of interiorization.
Chapter 5

The war machine is counter-statistical: it is of "une autre justice, un autre mouvement, un autre espace-temps (another justice, another movement, another space-time)" which testifies to an exteriority, but not an exteriority which is an outside to the State, in the sense that one might think of an outside to representation. As has been explained, the thing-in-itself is immanent to sense, produced in relation to it as the imperceptible, that which escapes thought but is not beyond it. It is not the "unrepresentable", but the imperceptible; not outside the limits of knowledge, but immanent to the threshold of sense. It is in this sense that the space-time of the war machine is outside the State, as a force which destroys the image, the rule, the law and order of the State, not through the exercise of violence, which is a State function, even when it appears to act against the State, even when it appears criminal, but by shattering and scattering the consistency of the image and forming alliances which run counter to the arranged systems. The form of exteriority testified to by the war machine is "le devenir-femme du penseur, le devenir-pensée de la femme... qui ne se laisse plus contrôler (the becoming-woman of the thinker, the becoming-thought of the woman... that refuses to be controlled)."

Of the aesthetic in the third Critique, Deleuze says "le sensible vaut pour lui-même et se déploie dans un pathos au-delà de toute logique (the sensible is valid in itself and unfolds in a pathos beyond all logic)." With this remark, he is forging an association between the sublime and thought as war machine, where thought operates solely through unregulated relations, charged with intensities foreign to the grammars of its language. Once more, Deleuze is drawing lines which ally the schizo with the explosive moment in Kant, and focusing on the primacy of sensibility and imagination, and on thought as potentiated on the basis of "un effondrement central, qu'elle ne peut vivre que de sa propre impossibilité de faire forme (a central breakdown, that it lives solely by its own incapacity to take on form)." If, as said in the previous chapter, this
breakdown is given image - Artaud is the one which crops up most frequently in Deleuze and Guattari's writing - and the image becomes a model, the sense of the war machine is lost. The point is treachery: the treachery of a man is never that of a woman, the treachery of a child never that of a mother, the treachery of a philosopher never that of a poet. This is what becoming foreign to one's own language means: it is not a matter of rebellion, of suicidal daring and a struggle to introduce shock-value into an otherwise pedestrian thought. This is why Deleuze and Guattari are so effective, and why, for example, to dismiss Différence et Répétition as a work of regular academic proportions is to miss the degree of its deviance.

When the war machine is interiorized by the State, as the sublime is interiorized by Reason, the relation becomes that of impotence and authority, the inadequacy of imagination and the superior magnitude of the supersensible. The central breakdown which potentiates thought is interiorized, made whole, contained and controlled within the image, and the pathos of the schizophrenic explosion becomes merely pathetic.

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In practical reason, imagination receives the sentence of the law. Kant's identification of imagination with the soul has already been noted in the previous chapter, and the schematism is described as 'an art concealed in the depths of the human soul'. In the first Critique the conditions for deducing the objective possibility of an immortal soul - and thus of an unbounded imagination - are absent, or at least, not immediately involved in speculation, and there is an admixture of sensible information in the construction of cognition. But practical freedom is antithetical to the functioning of imagination on behalf of understanding, at its middle range, where the
relation of production and reproduction is stable and determinate. The soul as immortal substance is an insoluble problem for finite entities, and speculations on its nature lead to paralogisms and claims of a rational psychology (which, despite its theoretical illegitimacy, Kant remarks, has a disciplinary use). The relation of substance (permanence) to force (intensity) is axiomatically extensive, and irreducible to a radical unity, matter appears heterogeneous and force diverse. Nonetheless, the idea of a fundamental power [Grundkraft] ‘is the problem involved in a systematic representation of the multiplicity of powers’ and imagination is no exception to this.

With practical reason, the possibility of the soul becomes a legitimate postulate of reason, on the basis of the determination of freedom by the Law. Only on this basis can immortality be framed without reference to modes of time, imagination removed from the framework of permanence and substance, and intensity reconfigured in relation to the will, as a drive [Trieb], rather than as a force [Kraft]. This takes the problem out of physics and into practical reason. Much as the understanding was compelled by practical reason to assume the noumenon in the interests of reason’s systematic growth, practical reason commands the assumption of an immortal soul, on the basis of the fact of a free will, in the interests of reason’s moral growth.

The practical postulate of an immortal soul is ‘an inseparable corollary of an a priori unconditionally valid practical law’. Under practical law, the focus imaginarius is no longer imaginarius, as it was in the case of speculative reason, a subjective idea regulating formal systematic unity, implicated with the negative noumenon, but real. The unity of law must be enacted, objectively, not merely posited, subjectively. Deleuze emphasizes that ‘un seul contresens est dangereux, concernant l’ensemble de la Raison pratique (a single dangerous misunderstanding regarding the whole of practical Reason)’ is failure to realize that ‘l’abîme entre le monde sensible et
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le monde suprasensible n'existe que pour être comble (the abyss between the sensible world and the suprasensible world exists only in order to be filled). \( ^{21} \) This was seen in an earlier chapter one, in Kant’s insistence that practical reason was meant to influence the sensible configuration of phenomena. The negative noumenon is the medium for the conversion of permanence from its sensible and conceptual relation with time and causality to its practical configuration as immortality through which the concept of substance becomes complete, and physical force discovers its impotence in relation to the drives of the will. As remarked above, however, this impotence is permissible and indeed predicated upon the \textit{a priori} magnificence of reason, and the containment of immanence, as pure exteriority, within reason. Disassociated from time, through the ‘marks of permanence’\( ^{22} \) which reveal its real nature, the imagination fades into the immortality of the soul.

Elevated above sense, man discovers the root of his duty to the Law in personality, and (according to the principle of exclusive disjunction and the necessity for practical law to be realized) at the same time its empirical counterpart is formed, The Person. The subject understanding objects in the first Critique was for the most part a merely logical function; The Scientist. But under practical law, the growth of the architectonic is no longer a methodical theorization of a subjective idea but the real practice of its objective construction. Kant's three Critiques build a law house for an organism with soul. With art on its walls too, for the characteristics of intensive permanence and substantive imagination are attached to exemplary works of art and their production by genius.

Speculative reason concerned itself with the plan for the court house - with the erection of a structure ‘just sufficiently commodious for our business on the level of experience, and just sufficiently high to allow of our overlooking it’. \( ^{23} \) This vantage
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sight has no objective substance independently of the fact of freedom, however, remaining merely hypothetical. But postulates of practical reason 'give objective reality to the Ideas of speculative reason in general'\(^24\); all the aggregate unities, the random data, the technical methods, the particular schemes, all the loose change of knowledge contributes to the supply of the creature which occupies that theoretical house, which is the Person. Persons are the objective ends of reason, of absolute value, and do not serve 'simply as means'.\(^25\) Reason is its own end, and everything contributes towards it: which legitimates the use of bodies as means, on the grounds that reason is not a body, and it legitimates the use of imagination as a means, on the grounds that imagination is not a soul, merely its empirical relative. Imagination is objectively legitimated in the form of a Person, relinquishing its role as medium between sensibility and understanding to take its proper place in the holy trinity of God, Freedom and Immortality. The (human) organism becomes a Person, imagination becomes soul and their empirical and relative forms become legitimately describable as means.

Independently of the objective value of an immortal substantial soul, and not confined by personhood, imagination does not lose its infinity; instead, it loses its reason and good sense. But it is not for that evil. The devil, Kant says, 'has reason, but not infinity.'\(^26\) The simplistic divisions of moral Law require that goodness have its devils just as white men need their women and their blacks to retain the vantage point of their situation over the business of experience, and Kant's devil without infinity is unimaginative and powerless, but nonetheless necessary. The State, as Deleuze and Guattari say, needs its impotence, and Persons need to be sinners too, to forget their immortality, in order that they might be reminded of it, under the Law.
Imagination is not a faculty of the ‘I think’, constrained to schematize on its behalf; like judgement, it is annexed to reason or understanding, in recognition of the particular interests of reason involved, but cannot be defined in terms of either. It is in between, but not produced by the poles it relates, or reducible to them. When imagination is unhinged from law and rule, and synthesis is not bound in a relation with identity, it becomes passive, passionate: this bears on the arbitrary freedom described in chapter one, since the passions, for Kant, involve the abolition of freedom, and the de-restriction of desire from principles of reason. Thus, whilst arbitrary freedom provided a space through which to choose against Law, it was only in the context of the network of faculties as constituted by Kant. The interzone does not remain open, however; the moment was passing and transitory, the door opens and passing through it dissolves its conditions.

Imagination ‘belongs to sensibility’\(^{27}\), only to sensibility, the conditions of which ‘carry with them their own differences’\(^{28}\), not the difference between subjective and objective elements, which sets the separation of sensation in subjective - pleasure and pain, and objective - sensibility as the forms of a priori intuition, but indeterminate quantities of infinity not accounted for by reason, not contained by its standard unit of chaos, which do not substantiate a soul, but a ‘multiplicité de fusion qui déborde effectivement toute opposition de l’un et du multiple (fusional multiplicity that effectively goes beyond any opposition between the one and the multiple)’\(^{29}\). When imagination is annexed to understanding, operating at middle range and contained by the generalizations of conceptual cognition, its productive capacities are constrained by the condition that anything it generates is reproducible. Contrary to what may appear to be the case in the first Critique, the condition of reproducibility is not
immanent to the operation of imagination, but rather a function it performs when deployed in conjunction with understanding, under its rule, in a theoretical domain. What makes reproduction possible, Kant says, is a rule to which appearances are subject; in other words understanding, as the faculty of rules, grounds reproduction. The difference between the two operations of imagination - apprehension and comprehension is not articulated clearly in the first Critique. That the two functions are separable, and that imagination does indeed have an operative capacity independent of understanding and the rule which makes reproduction possible is clear, however, in the discussion of the mathematical sublime in the third Critique, where Kant argues that for imagination to function within an epistemological framework, it must perform both acts - that of apprehension and of comprehension. It must both apprehend what is given in intuition and provide a schema for understanding. The formal comprehension of what is apprehended sensibly allows for the application of concepts to intuition and thus for the reproducibility of what is given, where reproducibility is a condition for the claim of objective knowledge: a scientific experiment which cannot be reproduced, either mathematically or in practice, cannot count as objective knowledge, for Kant. In the sublime, however, understanding is of no relevance to the functioning of imagination, which is brought into a conflictual relation with reason. The logical comprehension of apprehension which forms the basis for the reproducibility gives way to an aesthetic comprehension in a singular judgement without concepts. So, whilst it may appear as though reproducibility is required by imagination, this is only insofar as imagination is annexed to understanding, and functioning epistemologically. This does not, however, exhaust the power of imagination.

In the first Critique imagination is a labourer on the assembly line of knowledge, making things which could as well have been made by another, under
different empirical circumstances. When annexed to reason, its generative capacities are necessarily understood as impotent in relation to the supersensible dominion of reason. In relation to sensibility, however, imagination is neither under rule nor is there a standard according to which it may be judged as inadequate. It is a positive intensive distance from zero, the pure and empty form of time.

The subjective and objective division of sensibility, as has been remarked, are functions of understanding, not of imagination, just as the productive and reproduction relations of imagination are functions of recognition, not of intensities; when understood immanently, imagination has neither image nor schema, destiny nor vocation, limit or condition, outside its relation with sensibility. Sensibility is not split into subjective and objective elements, but becomes a surface, a plane of consistency composed through the descriptions of imagination, populations of intensities, infinities of different orders, local absolutes without standard. Intuition is singular, as has been seen, and it is in relation to singularities that Deleuze understands imagination, as the process through which an idea is actualized, becoming concrete. It draws difference, contracting a point, a singularity, not as a unit, but as a complex articulation, which does not cancel difference but covers it with more difference, extracting the elements of speed from the differences it contracts and releasing them onto the surface of time, like spores from a pod.

In a sense, imagination might be said to be always sublime; it is intensive, objectively indeterminate in relation to identity, infinite and without empirical comparison, but nonetheless differentiated, patterned. A process with no relation to identity, it becomes divorced from the idea of production. But it is more accurate to say there is no longer any sense to the sublime (and it does have sense for Kant, as a cultural item), because without understanding to set extensive limits on synthesis, or
reason to impose intensive penalties and feelings of respect for the law on imagination, convincing persons of their soul, the conditions of the feelings of negative pleasure and pain characteristic of the sublime are no longer operative. 'Moral law...by thwarting all our inclinations, must produce a feeling which can be called pain' \(^{30}\) and pain can be connected with 'all presentations in us, no matter whether their object is merely sensible or instead wholly intellectual' \(^{31}\). Different qualities emerge, however, from an imagination not pressed by religious or moral ideals, nor rationalized from a position of safety through the superior magnitudes monopolized by supersensible reason, becoming divorced utterly from the edification of nature into a cultural property.

'\[C\]omment se prolongent les continuums d’intensité? dans quel ordre les séries de transformations se font-elles? quels sont ces enchaînements alogiques qui se font toujours au milieu, et par lesquels le plan se construit morceau par morceau suivant un ordre fractionnaire croissant ou décroissant? Le plan est comme une enfilade de portes. Et les règles concrètes de construction du plan ne valent que pour autant qu’elles exercent un rôle sélectif.' \(^{32}\)

(How are the continuums of intensity extended? What is the order of the transformational series? What are these alogical linkages always effected in the middle, through which the plane is constructed piece by piece in ascending or descending fractional order? The plane is like a row of doors. And the concrete rules for the construction of the plane obtain to the extent that they exercise a selective role).\(^{32}\)

These questions always have an answer for Kant. In the end, all the doors lead to the same ends, to the standardized infinity of reason, because there is no longer imagination, only a soul, no longer a body, only an organism with personality, no
longer time, only immortality, no real patterns, only a schema borrowed from an idea of reason. Imagination and time do not, for Kant distribute a surface, but describe a corridor for the delivery of intensities to reason. This is why the sublime appears ejaculatory: an accumulation of heterogeneous force vectors constrained to be, whole, at the end, channelled along a single route. The critical path is ‘the only one that has remained unexplored’, Kant writes. But Kant mistakes its nature and its intellect with man’s existence and desire, and wraps the route around in a circle, forming nothing, as the ground from which nothing escapes. Through the doors, relations fly outside the terms related, outside the set which contains them, past One and the totality of being.

In the Kantian sublime, imagination ‘strains to treat nature as a schema’ for Ideas. That is, it attempts to produce a material determination of time which realizes the indeterminate object of the Idea, making the standard infinite real. It is necessarily the case that it can only fail in this task, however, since to succeed would suggest that reason itself was reproducible, and that the infinite could be externalized as a perceivable quantity; this is not a possibility of aesthetics, only of Law. To Deleuze’s comment that the abyss exists only to be filled, must be added the rider: but only by moral practices. Filling the abyss is legitimate only under the condition of Law. This is why Kant is so careful to insist that it is not nature itself that is sublime, and why nature is limited to the function of mirroring the unregulated discord of the faculties. There is always, for Kant, a relation of symmetry between nature and the relations amongst faculties: in the case of understanding, which gives the law to the relations of faculties in cognition, nature mirrors this relation by appearing lawful; in the case of reason, there is no law to the relation amongst the faculties - their accord has to be produced, and so nature reflects this, appearing indeterminate, overwhelming, fearful.
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Were imagination able to schematize ideas in nature, it would mean that the soul itself appeared in nature, or god did, or freedom. But this would render faith irrational, the soul material, and freedom a natural cause, undermining the theoretical operations of reason and allowing ideas a constitutive rather than merely regulative role. Again, this is legitimate only in the context of practical reason.

In the sublime, a 'rapid alternation of repulsion from, and attraction to, one and the same object' checks the breath and threatens the vital forces, producing pain. But this stammering and stuttering of intensities only resolves into the quality of respect associated with the sublime when imagination is qualified as inadequate; where there is no standard set, no image according to which the infinite is measured and no unit which contains it as an interior form, the stuttering and stammering does not resolve inwardly, into the interiority of reason, but outwardly, as the pure exteriority of the war machine, of another justice, another space-time, another origin, simultaneously making and passing through a door, an arbitrary freedom which is unrepeatable, unreproducible, image-free. The place of safety which assures the proper resolve of the conflict in the sublime is the Person, the consummate cultured man of State, rather than a physical location - though it is that too, since it is only men, for Kant, who are capable of the sublime.

The traits which distinguish women from men are those which 'chiefly result in making her known by the mark of the beautiful' whilst the 'noble sex [elden Geschlechts]', man, has 'a deep understanding, an expression that signifies identity with the sublime'. Even if women are in principle capable of the sublime, it is neither to be encouraged in them, and nor do they possess the inclination to cultivate it: their association is with beauty, a sensation which 'proclaims itself through shining cheerfulness in the eyes, through smiling features, and often through audible mirth'.
This relation of beauty to visible characteristics of the body suggesting a sunny disposition, together with the association of women with beauty, helps to explain why, as was remarked in the Introduction, it is girls especially who should be encouraged to smile; it functions as a steering mechanism, an element in the training of women (for, as Kant says, women are not educated, but trained) towards their proper cultural function, and away from the "masculine" pursuit of learning. Women, he says, carry books as they carry a watch, "so that people will see that she has one, though it is usually not running or not set by the sun."39

The cultured man has nothing to fear from the sublime, since culture is erected on the interiorization of its unregulated forces and then turns these forces against nature, in the specific form under which the State understands force - that is, in terms of violence. But from the blind play of imagination consequent on the sensible affection of a body emerges a persistence of passion, an intensive unit of production positively differentiated from the zero-dimensionality of time, an opening, a field of openings, a holey space. At this juncture there is no sense any more in psychologizing force with the term imagination.

Deleuze is not a philosopher of enthusiasm, of affects accompanied by the idea of the good, nor, in any simple terms, his philosophy aesthetics-based. The circuitous manner in which his deductions operate obviate the distinctions which have isolated science from art, history from nature, industry from nature and nature from society, and his theory of synthesis is not concerned simply with formulating a science of human perception, as Kant defines aesthetics in the first Critique. It is not, in Irigaray's words, a specular economy and nor can it be charted on the axis of impotence and power. Deleuze takes the machinery of the sublime - the oscillation of forces, the chaos of an unregulated network of faculties, the indeterminacy of nature -
but instead of consolidating these within culture and according to the ends of reason, allows it to function like a electrical charge, a shock which communicates itself through all the faculties. So instead of the sublime being a momentary discharge which does not effect changes in the formations of common sense and good sense, it is a disturbance which travels through the faculties, in between, operating by relays, a weapon of thought rather than a tool of culture, which catches its breath at the thresholds of breathlessness, rather than sinking back into contemplation of its own magnificence.

III Continuity

'Voilà ce que sont les machines désirantes: machines formatives, dont les ratés mêmes sont fonctionnels, et dont le fonctionnement est indiscernable de la formation; machines chronogènes confondues avec leur propre montage.

(Desiring-machines are the following: formative machines, whose very misfirings are functional, and whose functioning is indiscernible from their formation; chronogeneric machines engaged in their own assembly).'

The continuity of the process of desiring-production is an immanent cycle of production, distribution and consumption, three syntheses which produce a model of death, a body without organs. Everyone has one, everyone is one and makes one, Deleuze and Guattari write in Mille Plateaux; death does not lodge with God any more, everyone has death, is death, makes death, continuously evacuating the infinite into finitude, making a local absolute, an atheistic infinite. If this process is traced back to the sublime, and the discussion of the war machine, it can be seen that it is precisely
this that Kant could not allow. Because he named his ideas, giving death images which of necessity could not be realized, it necessarily remained contained within reason, an infinite virile secrecy which could not be evacuated; the Kantian system disallows the possibility of exporting chaos, and thus of differentiating its order, its levels, its patterns and its functionings.

The model of death is converted by desiring-machines, or machinic assemblages into an experience of death, conversion being a synthetic cycle, the production of production or bloc of becoming through which the model moves up from the depths of a body to its surface, simultaneously making and finding a door, and exteriorizing the interiority of a body, breaking down its orders and thus beginning once again from a different order, repeating infinity according to an infinite pattern of variation. This is not a reference to Death: exportation of the model of death into the experience of death does not mean that “one dies” - though it can mean that: nor is it a matter of an authentic death, the ownmost death of one’s self. It is only by breaking-down the model of death, evicting the interiority of the body that a body functions: breaking-down is the functioning of desiring-machines, a million little demises constructing the operations of a body.

In a thermodynamic model of this process, breaking-down would consist in an increasingly homogeneous field, where differences are reduced into unity, as the end of the possibility of labour, of the conversion of heat into work. This is not the model to which L’anti-codipe appeals, however. In Mille Plateaux and Logique du Sens Deleuze (and Guattari) refer to the emission of singularities, bursting like spores from a pod: this is the movement outwards of a model of interiority, an export process which conditions the functioning of a body, beginning always from the zero intensity of the model as principle of production, but rather than merely exhausting the model, as if it
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constituted a finite resource, the experience returns to the model, as difference, and the circuit repeats, but beginning from somewhere else, with a different model. Death and life become mutually immanent and a body is transalivedead, always in the middle, a conjunction which destroys the exclusivity of the two terms, together with an understanding of finitude as a limit, beyond which is the infinite.

If the cliché "death of the subject" means anything, it is this: the subject is a model continuously exported from the body, the experience of a solution to the problem of death, not as a sudden afflux of power, an exorbitant expenditure, but a continuously leaky process, a smooth plane of consistency rather than a pipe and an outflow into the kingdom of ends. The subject is the residue, rather than the source of this process, however, the creature which turns back and reflects on the circuit, identifies, recognizes, catalogues. In effect, the subject is death, whilst the process is life, for the process is always in advance of the subject, a future potential, an attractor. Because the cycle repeats differently, however, and difference repeats differently on each cycle, the subject, as the effect of this process, also appears differently; only if the attractor is zero-dimensional - the model of death as a black hole - does it appear to retain an identity, because it is then determined according to a single direction. What sense there is to the term subject becomes lost, however, when the only principle common to all selves is difference, and there is no model of unity - when the attractor is strange, chaotic, and thus unpredictable.

A body is a plane alive and teeming, populated with intensities, a substantial multiplicity, full of holes, not a determinate object. But Deleuze and Guattari advise caution: it is better, they say, to remain stuck on the strata than to evacuate the model too fast, at the wrong time, without sobriety.
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‘Liberez-le d’un geste trop violent, faites sauter les strates sans prudence, vous vous serez tué vous-même, enfoncé dans un trou noir, ou même entraîné dans un catastrophe, au lieu de tracer le plan.

(If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged towards catastrophe).’

If the model becomes experience at speeds not practiced, if distances are covered at too much speed that they are not bearable by the finitude of a body, they exhaust its capacity at once, in a sudden movement. It is, they say, a matter of the careful disarticulation of an organization, rather than a wild and mad leap into an unknown. The problem is not how to make the movement, but rather how to continue it, to describe a smooth plane. This caution is evident in Deleuze’s philosophy: by understanding how a philosopher works, how to mimic him (they are always him), and by being meticulously and rigorously involved in his operations, he succeeds in freeing what is blocked up within them, bringing their depths up to the surface.

The Freudian colouring of this movement is evident: the circuitous routes taken by the organism towards death are, Freud says, misunderstood if characterized as self-preservative. Instead, their function is to ensure that ‘any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism itself’ are warded off. For Freud, however, the organism seeks to return to an earlier stage, the inorganic. The inorganic serves as a model of death retained internally to the body, which in turn dictates an organic body be understood as a container, a box for the model, and what the organism seeks is to perfect a copy of this model. The route each organism takes is individual to it, but the principle governing the route is universal.
The movement from depth to surface is also evident in Kant; reason is the experience of death exported from a model of nature as massive, immense, conflictual, and of chaos as overwhelming through might. But the afflux is resolved in one model composed of inter-connected non-conflictual elements - the doctrine of faculties that constitutes the real transcendental method - which contribute to one end, that of the systematic unity of reason.

There is mechanism, or more generally, extensively empty and interiorized space, logical common sense: aesthetics, or more generally, harmonic reflection on the form of an object, resulting in a concept of an aesthetic common sense shared amongst men, which serves as the basis of other forms of common sense; teleology, or more generally, the reflection of nature as objectively and systematically purposive and of the body as an organism, nature's good sense; and, as the instigator of their contributions being directed towards a systematic unity, or kingdom of ends, reason - more generally, a juridical system based on the exclusion of intensities, which proposes a theory of desire as production of an object according to a model represented in advance by the law. Once it is established, the return of experience to the model as an intensive quantity which effects a transformation in its functioning is precluded. As Kant says, the model is produced out of the depths of reason, and by reason, and the completeness of this production leaves 'no task to our successors save that of adapting it in a didactic manner'.

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The Kantian transcendental functions as a splitting device, which separates the problem of experience into two elements, the model which conditions it and the
real content which materializes those conditions - the effect of this on sensation has been remarked above, its division into objective and subjective elements disallowing any reciprocal communication between the empty form of time and the intensive magnitudes of sensation. The model expresses its content, but both expression and content are themselves divided into form and substance, allowing for two different understandings of difference. But because of the master of exclusive disjunction, which is the principle of division between content and expression, the two arms of difference do not communicate. Reason is borne from chaos once only and then communications are cut, and reason constructs its own order, according to its own principles.

Kant writes:

\[ \text{‘the causality of an alteration in general, presupposing, as it does, empirical principles, lies altogether outside the limits of a transcendental philosophy.’}^{45} \]

For Kant, there is no real interaction of the heterogeneous and diverse distributions of experience and the homogeneous and unified divisions of the transcendental; the potential of experience is limited within the terms of the model, which, as an earlier chapter has shown, has for its ground permanent substance. And the model of death is contained within reason, by its monopoly over the legitimate application of pain.

Although for Kant, transcendental philosophy cannot answer some questions, such as that of the causality of alteration, or the particularity of its contents, it is founded on the elimination of the possibility of \textit{de facto} evidence collapsing the structural order it imposes on the empirical, so whilst it cannot explain the particular,
it can reduce the relations into which it enters to formally legitimated functions of the understanding. Kant knows about the doors; he just thinks they open on to known routes, or that passage through them is regulated. A substantial unity, ultimate subject of existence and ground of activity, whose genesis is not comprehended by the transcendental, but presupposed by it, defines the empirical subject within a limited intensive range, and this model of death does not rise.

The continuity of the process of desiring-production and the continuous exportation of the model of death constitute a response to this universe, and to Kant. Intensities are implemented as intrinsic genetic elements of the real, differentiated immanently and asymmetrically, rather than split according to principles of either/or: either phenomena or noumena, either empirical or transcendental, either man or nature, either reason or death. L'anti-oedipe removes the problem of critique from the court-house and transcendental analysis becomes the problem of determining the criteria for escape, for production of a line of flight of the smallest interval and the sequencing of connections which do not return to the conditions of their origin. Nature is no longer massive but molecular.

`Elles [machines désirantes] fonctionnent suivant des régimes de synthèses qui n'ont pas d'équivalent dans les grands ensembles (desiring-machines work according to régimes of syntheses that have no equivalent in the large aggregate"46; the relations into which they enter are not between objects, but connect partial objects, the elements of which desiring-machines are composed. Not as parts which go to make a whole, since desiring-machines are also partial objects, the elements of another machine. 

'Each portion of matter may be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But every branch of each plant, every member of each animal, and every drop of their liquid parts is itself likewise a similar garden or pond'.47
There are no simples, or ultimate elements, only a nested system of involuting differences: partial objects are desiring-machines are BwO’s are partial objects. The most quoted example Deleuze and Guattari give of the relation of partial objects is that of the wasp and orchid: the wasp is a liberated element of the orchid’s reproductive system, whilst the orchid ‘devient l’objet d’un orgasme de la guêpe elle-même libérée de sa propre reproduction (becomes the object of an orgasm in the wasp, also liberated from its own reproduction). ’48 The connection is not a link between the wasp and the orchid, but a conjugation of the two asymmetrical relations effecting a line of flight, a relation not confined by its terms, a bloc of becoming.

The model of the transcendental is not evacuated in a single output, but through an infinitely diffuse repulsion, the tiny intervals or demons leaps of the actual continuum, from the depths of a body, which is individuated or corporealized through that process but does not pre-exist it, in either principle or fact. A body does not exist as an individual, but as a series of variable affects, effected by the connections into which it enters, as a process, or bloc of becoming. To define a body is thus to discover what machines it plugs into, rather than, in the Kantian manner, as a product in isolation of its environment. ‘Un corps ne se réduit pas à un organisme (a body is not reducible to an organism’ .49 And in the absence of the organism, there is no soul, no house for the person.

Subtracting the unique from Kant’s theory of forces, Deleuze and Guattari set about the construction of a machine in which form and formation and functioning are not separable. A body is not defined socially, or biologically, or mechanically, but as an individuated band of schizoid intensities, none of which function as structural elements, but which are continually evacuated and replaced, as part of the process of its...
formation. There is never The Schizo, only schizoid quanta, break-flows, connections, intersections and interactions, transmissions and transformations. Related to unity, the system breaks down in a way that is not produced by the system itself. As a positive distance from zero, absent of presupposition (which is of course, impossible; a completed critique is not possible), a body is only what it does.
Becoming-woman

In the last chapter, the relation of passivity, as Deleuze and Guattari formulate it, to the active/passive difference in Kant’s philosophy was teased apart. A question arising from this is what instigates the leap? Is there an initiating function which drives a system over from the side of mechanism vs. teleology to machinic production, effecting the conjunction of an inclusive disjunction and the generation of multiplicities without reference to unity, full of exits, cracks, tiny intervals of difference leeching through the strict limits of possibility, and incommensurate with the antimonic progress of dialectical thought. There is such a function, which Deleuze and Guattari call becoming-woman. Becoming-woman, they say, has a special introductory power, as the key or first quantum in all becomings, on the way to becoming-animal, rushing towards becoming-imperceptible. In this chapter, becoming-woman will be introduced, but largely in the context of readings by those few feminists who have engaged with Deleuze. Irigaray’s reading of Kant will also be looked at. It will be argued that her project is not successful for reasons similar to the limited effectiveness of feminist criticisms, in that both adopt an uncritical position with respect to sexual difference, in their different ways. A fuller discussion of becoming-woman is found in the next chapter, pulling out the relations of this line to themes which have arisen in previous chapters.

1 Receptacle, which is now called space¹

Between the two layers of skin, the lower dermis and the upper epidermis are colonies of touch receptors. Merkel’s disks respond to sustained pressure; Pacinian corpuscles respond to changes in pressure, converting mechanical into electrical energy;
Meissner’s corpuscles record low-frequency vibrations. On a hand there are flexure lines, tension lines, papillary ridges. A tongue is replete with sensory talents, a nose collects moistures, sweet and dusty. Irigaray’s economy is one of touch.

‘Quand elle y revient, c’est pour repartir d’ailleurs.

(When she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere).

As do Deleuze and Guattari, Irigaray explores difference through the middle; not as a medium between two terms, but as distributing a tactile and intensive space. Multiple and interconnected, immediately autoerotic with her body, Irigaray’s woman is before the possibility of distinguishing activity and passivity. ‘L’homme... a besoin d’un instrument pour se toucher; sa main, le sexe de la femme, le langage (man needs an instrument: his hand, a woman’s body, language...’), but woman ‘est déjà deux - mais non divisibles en un(e)s - qui s’affectent (is already two - but not divisible into one(s) - that caress each other).’ Everything begins from a different place. The privilege given to sight by philosophy was remarked in chapter three, in the point of intersection behind the eyes functioning as the centre of resonance, and principle of recognition. Irigaray privileges touch: ‘La femme jouit plus du toucher que du regard (woman takes pleasure more from touching than from looking)’, she takes pleasure ‘justement de cette incomplétude de forme de son sexe qui fait qu’il se re-touche indéfiniment lui-même (precisely from [an] incompleteness of form which allows her organ to touch itself over and over again).’ However, her theorization of touch does not describe a simple oscillation between two terms, but a positive feedback which continually dissolves the middle, precluding it from functioning as a dividing term which would articulate the two lips as different in relation to unity, which could
privilege a right over a left side, a one over the two. She keeps herself as a secret, without knowing it.

In the context of a discussion of Freud, Irigaray calls the laws of the conservation of energy and of the fundamental dissymmetry of nature, (the move from the present to the future, as if from the particular to the general and the first two laws of thermodynamics), 'isomorphs of masculine rather than feminine sexuality'.6 This criticism is coincident with Deleuze's characterization of thermodynamics in terms of good sense. She continues:

"Feminine sexuality would perhaps harmonize better, if you need to invoke a scientific model, with what Prigogine calls "dissipative" structures which function by means of an exchange with the exterior world, which proceed by energy levels and whose order is not one that seeks balance but one that seeks passage over thresholds corresponding to a movement beyond disorder or entropy without any discharge."

In the last chapter, the sublime was characterized in terms of discharge, as an accumulation of heterogeneous force vectors channelled along a single route, and contrasted with the plane of consistency, as a plane of doors where relations fly outside the terms related. Irigaray's use of dissipative structures as a model suggest a coincident direction, (and Deleuze does refer to Prigogine): in far-from-equilibrium conditions, the behaviour of a system becomes highly specific, and there are no universal laws from which its overall behaviour, or future, can be deduced. It is in that sense a model which is not a model, since to make any further claims about a dissipative system, its particular behaviour must be explored. The system itself
determines its own intrinsic size and distribution, since its future is undetermined, which means that although associated with chaotic attractors, it can also return to a zero-dimensional or limit attractor; however, it is the implication of chaotic attractors and symmetry-breaking properties of dissipative systems to which Irigaray and Deleuze alike are drawn.

Of the tactile economy that she formulates, Irigaray writes that not only can the distinction between touching and touched not be upheld, but also that it is mobile and ubiquitous: ‘la femme a des sexes un peu partout (woman has sex organs more or less everywhere)’. There is no gap or room for intrusion, and no possibility of logically distinguishing what is seeing from what is seen, for the difference between them is not extensive with the co-ordinated intersections of space which meet behind the eyes. Nor is there a possibility of female sexuality according privilege to genitalia: the body becomes sexualized, not through a single privileged term, but as a surface of mobile passions.

For Irigaray and Deleuze alike positive feedback emerges through similar moves. Irigaray writes:

‘[S]on sexe, qui n'est pas un sexe, est compté comme pas de sexe. Négatif, envers, revers, du seul sexe visible et morphologiquement désirable (même si cela pose quelques problèmes de passage de l'érection à la détumescence): le pénis.

([H]er sexual organ, which is not one organ, is counted as none. The negative, the underside, the reverse of the only visible and morphologically designable organ (even if the passage from erection to detumescence does pose some problems): the penis).
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The comment echoes that of Deleuze, when he calls the negative difference seen from below, inverted. By removing the one from the multiple, she seeks to describe a specifically female space, which both engages with the philosophical tradition, whilst at the same time subverting its directions, by exposing the logical tricks, reductions, negations and limitations by which it secures the privilege of the subject. She explores the mystification of women, in systems of supposed transparency, their positioning as passive “other” to reason, and the primacy accorded to that faculty. Her abstract machine, or problem, is the gap, or hole in the system of representation, a crack: “son sexe représente l’horreur du rien à voir (her sexual organ represents the horror of nothing to see.)” By opening up this space and materializing it, she introduces it to Kant, to the tactility of the actual continuum, and the problem of fluidity, but in the process it loses its function as a receptacle.

Irigaray’s early writings in Speculum and This Sex Which Is Not One opened up a rich field of problems for feminism. Her method is one of mimesis: through detailed re-workings of writers, including Plato, Freud, Marx, Hegel, Kant, Aristotle..., she works at jamming their systems and exposing their inconsistencies, incoherences and uncritical assumptions:

“[L]’enjeu n’est pas d’élaborer une nouvelle théorie dont la femme serait le sujet ou l’objet, mais d’enrayer la machinerie théorique elle-même, de suspendre sa prétention à la production d’une vérité et d’un sens par trop univoques. Ce qui suppose que les femmes ne se veuillent pas simplement les égales des hommes dans le savoir.

(The issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which woman would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth and a meaning that are excessively univocal. Which
presupposes that women do not aspire simply to be men’s equals in knowledge).12

The extent to which her method is successful has been argued, and will be touched on below, but of primary interest here is her reading of Kant.

II Turn of the screw

There are, as has been seen, connections between Deleuze (and Guattari) and Irigaray: if there were not, the claims of the previous chapter about the rhizomatic nature of machinic production, and of a system in which everything connects with everything else, would be demolished. Both draw on the model of dissipative structures; both address the problem of third things whose effects are crushed between the terms they relate; the rigid hold of the subject on production; the regulation of imagination; the role of the copula in a system which has no place for the copulation, except through the language of law which belongs only to one member. Both look at the function of pain in the constitution of representation, and at the formation of bodies as necessarily mutilated in advance of their entry into its system.

In Speculum, in a piece on Kant called Paradox a priori, Irigaray focuses on gaps within Kant covered over by vague mechanisms which have no proper location in relation to the two stems of knowledge, or fall on one side or the other of the divide between a sensible and supersensible world, or are excluded altogether: schemata and transcendental objects. These are the third things that Kant deploys as means of moving between domains, without considering the nature and effects of that movement except in relation to the two connected terms - in other words, on the confinement of relations within the terms related.
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She identifies the function of the schema, third thing between sensibility and understanding, as that of negation: the multiplicity of sensations, of indeterminate matters, all the heterogeneous variations of nature, are negated in the formation of the passage through which understanding/I think draws on material nature and determines it as objective. Her case is illustrated with the example of enantiomorphic bodies, - of ‘differences that are internal as the senses teach’ - which are affective, rather than conceptual, and which Kant relates to intuition. The opening quotes of her paper refer to Kant’s theory of incongruent counterparts. ‘I shall call a body which is exactly equal and similar to another, but which cannot be enclosed in the same limits as that other, its incongruent counterpart.’ Amongst Kant’s examples are left and right hands and ears, hair whorls, twining plants and the spiral curvatures of shells, but his argument extends to asserting a privilege of the right over the left hand, of the right over the left side of the body in terms of skill and strength, and an advantage of power that the right side of the body has over the sensitivity of the left.

So in terms of affective asymmetry, a body is constructed according to differences weighted with significances. Kant’s solution to enantiomorphic bodies, alike in all properties, yet with unmistakable sensible differences, is to refer the problem to extensity, as a whole, in the form of an extensive magnitude, externalizing the affective differences in a world of constituted objects. Irigaray calls this mechanism of externalization a passage, and the function which she identifies as structuring the reappearance of sensible differences in extensive space is the transcendental object, which introduces a symmetry into the world. Through this object, the paradox of sensibly perceived and affective differences enter into the symmetries of a space whose planes intersect in the transcendental subject, the correlate of the transcendental object. Whereas the schema is integral to the determination of objects, however, the transcendental object functions regulatively:
'[T]his transcendental thing [Ding] is only the schema of the regulative principle by which reason, so far as lies in its power, extends systematic unity over the whole field of experience.'\(^{18}\)

In the first Critique Kant wavers, sometimes eliding differences between the transcendental object and the noumenon and sometimes upholding their separation, sometimes referring it to the thing-in-itself, and sometimes isolating it from the material problems implicated by this association. Its positioning is very similar to that of the schema, both describing an ambivalent and vague distribution between sensibility and intelligibility, one of which is incorporated into the construction of representation, the other of which functions from the outside, as an Idea. Like the noumenon, it is Janus-faced: 'regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, [Dinges an sich selbst] this object is intelligible in its action; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is sensible in its effects.'\(^{19}\)

There is thus an admixture of data compacted in the transcendental object, and it is this that leads to its tendency to collapse into either the thing-in-itself or the noumenon, the former pointing it outside the system of representation, and the latter internalizing it within the subject, as marker of its divided nature. However, it must retain its two-fold function, because, like the schema, it indicates a gap between sensibility and intelligibility that ‘can never be filled’, only gestured at, ‘through the ascription of outer appearances to that transcendental object [Gegenstände] which is the cause of this species of representations’ but ‘of which we shall never acquire any concept.’\(^{20}\) In its relation to appearance, the transcendental object connects with intuition, and with the framework of limitation time and space become when instituted as axiomatically extensive.
On the side of sensibility, from which it cannot be separated, it tends towards the thing-in-itself, and to the problem of material causality: ‘what matter may be as a thing in itself (transcendental object [Objekt]) is completely unknown to us’\textsuperscript{21}. This problem of matter as thing-in-itself, the transcendental matter referred to in earlier chapters, suggests a link between the transcendental object, the concept of reality and intensive magnitudes, since it is the latter, as has been said, which indicate the real in appearances. And Kant writes that transcendental objects ‘in our present state appear as bodies.’\textsuperscript{22} Irigaray’s point addresses precisely the problem of what is negated in the movement from transcendental matter, as the intensive stuff of affects, to the transcendental object, whose ‘permanence as appearance can indeed be observed.’\textsuperscript{23} What happens to bodies in the movement from intensive matter to appearances whose relations are a function not of the materiality involved but of the ‘present state’ of a subject? The word permanence signals a relation of the transcendental object to substance; to the negation of intensive differences within the substratum of appearances in general; to subjectivity; to the delimitation of sensible intuition as a complex of mobile and differentiated intensive magnitudes to logical time; to causality as a reference to determinate intensive quanta and to matter re-cast empirically, as a state.

Implicated with matter but not apparent, apparently but not cognitively causal, it must therefore be intelligible, although it is not known as an object: the transcendental object is ‘the purely intelligible cause of appearances’, and ‘can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, [Gegenstand] that is, objective reality.’\textsuperscript{24} In this respect it is related to the principle of convertibility, and Kant allows then it may be called noumenon ‘for the reason that its representation is not sensible.’\textsuperscript{25} Its intelligible function is to ‘leave open a space which we can fill neither through possible experience nor through pure understanding’\textsuperscript{26}. In its
intelligible form it is the terminus of contingency, a thought-entity without reason which we "have not the least justification for assuming." 27

Irigaray's argument is that the schema is a mechanism for disguising the transition from intensive, affective differences to extensive, geometric differences, and that the transcendental object performs a similar function, but this time the transition is between the limits of human knowledge and an intellectual intuition that must be assumed but cannot - like the transcendental object - be known or presumed to be constitutive of experience..

"Comme si" toute cette diversité trouvait sa finalité en une unité supérieure... à laquelle il importe qu’il se conforme aussi, du moins qu’il tente, sans la/le connaître.

("As if" all that diversity were directed toward a higher unity... which it/he also should strive to conform to, even without any knowledge of it). 28

As the schema allows for the reconciliation of sensibility and understanding, so the transcendental object allows for the reconciliation of understanding and reason, since in its intelligible form it serves as the object of a transcendent idea, and can thus be utilized regulatively, thought not constitutively. And Kant does indeed refer to analogies as the 'only resource' for making the movement between concepts of experience and 'some sort of concept of intelligible things'. 29

Irigaray's problem is with the nature of time involved in this process, of whose time Kant is referring to, and her question is: what is the time of the mirror? 'What can be more similar in every respect and in every part more alike to my hand and to my ear
that their images in a mirror?" Kant asks.\textsuperscript{30} Irigaray turns the question back on him, however, asking why asymmetry, rather than symmetry should be problematic, and concludes that 'Un miroir, donc, ici s'avoue comme supportant déjà l'apprehension des objets (already a mirror turns out to support the apprehension of objects).\textsuperscript{31} This was seen in the previous chapter, in the changing faces of nature according to the change relations amongst the faculties, nature always reflecting the order or chaos of the subject. Why should it be more strange that differences rather than identities are reflected? And does it make sense to speak of differences as reflected, in the absence of a unifying function which could testify to the fact that yes, indeed, those differences reflect these? Irigaray's argument drives towards the inevitable conclusion that reflection and difference are incompatible, the former belonging to the specular economy of rational insight and the latter to the empirical zones of touch, and that attempts at their reconciliation results only in the negation of difference by the cycle of the same particular to reflection.

Kant was concerned, in his argument with Leibniz, not to conceptualize spatial relations, and thus referred the sensible differences amongst enantiomorphs to intuition: Irigaray's question runs beneath this, and addresses the constitution of symmetry itself, the paradox of a world reflecting the identity of a subject, when it is, as Kant reflects, full of differences. How does the left side becomes collapsed into the right, sensibility into power? In her very different way, she is questioning the relation of synthesis to identity referred to in the previous chapter, and the representation of its products as a reflection of the legislative power of the subject.

Irigaray explores women's position in Kant in terms of this gap, or mirror, as a surface of reflection presupposed, uncritically, in order to address the problem of enantiomorphs. The time is of the subject, the subject is man, and the mirror a refusal
of the blindness which, as the last chapter showed, attaches to imagination and intuition. "Aveuglée dans le refus de son aveuglement par tout savoir qui, en son esprit, ne trouverait pas sa cause (In its own refusal of blindness, consciousness is blinded by all knowledge that does not find its cause in the mind itself)." Each third thing, each movement from sensibility to understanding, in the schema, or from the sensible to the intelligible cause, through the transcendental object, reflects a new facet of a single point of convergence, and a different blindness, each of which finds its cure in a different configuration of light, a new image of "un Père qui n'existe que dans un désir de tout légiférer librement (a Father who exists solely in a desire to exercise law freely over everything)." One blindness is given up for the sake of another, or one blindness is constructed in order to prove the necessity of another.

Irigaray addresses the same aspects of Kant as does Deleuze, but for strategic reasons concentrates on the internalization of the world within a subject: "la scène se passe toujours dans sa maison, son esprit (the action is always inside his house, his mind)." She understands the indispensable nature in Kant of a detour through the world, but attends to the re-formulation of that passage in terms of subjective reflection, the obliteration of a tacit symmetry with a spuriously problematic asymmetry and the representation of the world as mirror which reflects the laws of that subject. She becomes the matter inside the system, but speaking with a foreign tongue, she subverts its order. Women become the carriers of vagueness, of the gap and the mirror, being situated both inside and outside, the material gathered in the detour through the world, a smoked and blackened mirror veiling perception, and the surface inverted in the mirror, a kind of difference which remains unanalyzed. The paradox a priori of Irigaray's heading is this difference, incongruent and incommensurate with the representation or reflection of objects.
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‘Ce qui ne se fait pas sans peine. Ni sans reste. Mais que l’espace s’y résorbe en temps, et l’espoir subsiste toujours pour l’esprit de parachever cette opération dans un avenir à perte de vue.

(This is not achieved without pain. Or without a remainder. But provided that space is resorbed into time, there is still hope that the mind can perfect this operation at some point in the boundless future). 37

Irigaray draws her analysis through Kant’s theoretical writing and into the aesthetic and the collapse of imagination under the weight of its own inadequacy in the face of reason particular to the sublime, noting that it is the soul to which Kant appeals as a solution to appearance of the infinite and which paves the way to pleasure and to culture. She identifies the over-whelming nature of the sublime with the mother, and the culture which confines the legitimacy of the sublime with a site of learned resistance to and independence of its basis in that nature. Kant becomes caught in a bind, both searching for the presuppositions on which man bases his culture, knowledge, science and art, and simultaneously enclosing himself within a cycle of reflection which obviates the possibility of any real solution to his search.

‘The thread of a screw which winds round its pin from left to right

will never fit a nut of which the thread runs from right to left.’ 38

Irigaray’s claim is that it is precisely this that Kant does allow; whichever way that subject turns, the nut will take the screw, nature will take the laws of the subject. This is the paradox of symmetry, the possibility of a space, or gap, sufficiently plastic to be moulded to the demands of representation, providing its real nature is not taken into account, providing the one difference which cannot be analyzed does not enter the
house of the subject on its own terms, unmoulded, rather than as one of the building blocks of its erection. Providing it remains a means to the achievement of a value outside itself. It is the cruelty of this operation she challenges.

'Et, dans la souffrance que nécessite son plaisir, mettrons-nous là Kant avec Sade? Ou, un quart de tour supplémentaire - en plus ou en moins - étant donné à la subtilité de son esprit, avec Masoch?

(And, in the suffering made necessary by his pleasure, shall we place Kant next to Sade? Or, if the subtlety of his mind is given one quarter turn of the screw more, in or out - next to Masoch?)

***

Irigaray is a very difficult writer; her language resists the subtractive moves that Deleuze makes on Kant, and in this sense she is entirely successful in producing structures irreducible to their parts. She runs very swiftly over an immense field, racing in the space of thirteen pages through the three Critiques, collecting as she passes snippets from the Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime, and from Kant's writings on the family, and the rights of its members. This kind of overflight is another feature she shares with Deleuze; rather than picking over the bones of an argument, they catch what is integral to the machines they are building and incorporate it in the mechanisms of her escape. Her "method" - and as with Deleuze, this is a difficult word to use in relation to Irigaray - is to deploy the abstract machine, two lips which are not one, by operating both inside and outside the system simultaneously. However, Irigaray's escape is less effective than that of Deleuze; her critique does not quite succeed in escaping its negative function of jamming theoretical machinery, and as a result its positive consequences tend towards a valorization of the mysterious and a
definition of women in terms of motherhood, or in relation to a female divine and a feminine ethic.

Rosi Braidotti characterizes Irigaray's ethics of sexual difference as  

'the recognition that differences among women need not lead to the state of disaggregation and hostility that has always played into the hands of patriarchy'.

This is extremely problematic at an empirical level. Algerian women are shot in front of the classes they teach, but in Rwanda women have been implicated in massacres: women leave the Philippines for work in Saudi Arabia, but are not paid and beaten, by both men and women, whilst in the U.S. and in England, girl gangs thump their "sisters", sometimes to death. The dream of women united through their differences is a white liberal construct, and does not take account of the real and extreme range of differences amongst women, deploying, if only implicitly, an appeal to a unified thought of "woman". I prefer to retain a potential hostility. An image of sex replaces the image of thought and becomes equally restrictive. The only way out of this problem is to characterize those behaviours which do not coincide with the idea of universal sisterhood as produced by men: however, this returns women to the status of victims. Deleuze and Guattari's characterization of a body in terms of the machines it plugs into does not appeal to a base identity in terms of which all relations are understood, and so does not meet with these problems.

Where Irigaray's critique of Kant is most problematic is in its adoption of his formulation of nature in the sublime as massive, all-powerful and over-whelming, her association of this with the figure of the mother, and of imagination with women. Her
mimetic jamming method necessitates this, since it operates by keeping very close to the problems thrown up by a writer, as if both in parallel to him whilst at the same time cutting across and over, exposing incoherencies and logical trickery. She follows the detour of the Kantian subject through the outside, but her method does not allow her to build from the outside and away from the structures she criticizes, and so their ground does not lose its security. It is in this respect that Deleuze’s solution is more effective; by attending to the micro-deviations and molecular disturbances in the ground, and piecing together elements which in turn exacerbate those disturbances whilst at the same time escaping the structures, Deleuze builds a machine, whilst Irigaray constructs an image of women, which does not mirror the subject, but nonetheless remains biunivocally related to it, in that it retains precisely that mystery which philosophy and history have long attached to the fairer sex. Moreover, by reading relations in terms of sexual difference, she repeats the very problems for which philosophy is attacked by feminism.

III A Kind of Schizophrenia

One writer exploring the philosophical and scientific habits of attributing sexual values to everything around it is Evelyn Fox-Keller. She points to a ‘kind of schizophrenia’ plaguing understandings of science and gender, causing polarized oscillations between ‘fixed natural categories in one moment, and constructed, perhaps even indefinitely plastic, categories in another.’ The solution to this impasse, she argues, is ‘learning to count past two’. A first result of this is that matter becomes understood in terms of interacting forces, rather than as the content of form. Keller argues that this has been scientifically problematic because it seemed to sentimentalize nature; immanently cooperative matter self-organizing coherent systems without external direction implied a natural altruism of form on the part of individuals, their willingness to ‘die’ for the
system. A similar problem of balance concerns all trade-offs between group benefit and individual cost. The critical question concerns the maximum degree of cost to themselves individuals will tolerate before any socially desirable character is disinvested. This situation is clearly that of the multiple +1, and so does not correspond to the space occupied by Deleuze and Guattari.

Counting past two, but not by using another one, argues Keller, involves paying scientific attention to the middle ground ignored by zero-sum cost benefit analysis. She cites Lynn Margulis' work on bacterial sex as doing this; that it has been described as 'introducing feminism to Darwinism' rather than as a piece of "proper" science indicates a resistance to the radical differences implied by the breakdown of basic taxonomies in her work. It is problematic for feminism because the body as a whole object, complete with vagina or penis, womb or testes, is no longer the site for discussions of sexuality and reproduction: bacterial sex problematizes sexual difference beyond the possibility of its redemption by two bio-socially defined terms, male and female. Patterns conceived of as socially constructed, teleologically directed or divinely imprinted become understood as self-organizing material functions, and the body is merely one amongst many solutions to problems of matter and force. Initial explorations of these functions often drag anthropomorphic hangovers with them - altruism, for example, or zero sum games.

But thinking past two involves understanding that 'Nature is oblivious of all our romances, and knows nothing of our gender roles and distinctions.' The implication of all this is that feminist categories can only reach so far: a feminist epistemology can no more reach back into matter than can a male intellect. A further implication of Keller's paper is this: since the impulse towards sexing and gendering parts male or female, masculine or feminine is an old scientific habit, an imposition of
romance onto nature, its continuation by feminists is a subscription to that romance. At bottom her paper addresses the legitimacy of the thought of sexual difference which emerges as a question out of the middle.

IV Out of the middle

'Bref, une ligne de fuite, déjà complexe, avec ses singularités; mais aussi une ligne molaire ou coutumière avec ses segments; et entre les deux (?), une ligne moléculaire, avec ses quanta qui la font pencher d’un côté ou de l’autre.

(In short, a line of flight, already complex, with singularities; but also a molar or customary line with segments; and between the two (?), a molecular line with quanta which cause it to tip to one side or the other).

In Mille Plateaux the middle line, the line which causes the collapse back into an empty space of attraction and common sense, good sense and order, or becomes the subject of escape and effects a singular diffusion of intensive quanta and the distribution of full space is called becoming-woman. Becoming-woman is the in-between of the two systems, machining communications between orders of incommensurate potentials, that of the State and that of the nomad, of Compars and Dispars, logos and nomos, an itinerant vector. ' [D]iffusion procède au milieu, par le milieu, comme tout ce qui “pousse”, du type rhizome (diffusion happens in the in-between, goes between, like everything that “grows” of the rhizome type).  

There is thus an explicit connection between tactile, full space, and becoming-woman, the transverse line discussed in the previous chapter and the logic of conjunction, of the And, not as blockage and accumulation, but as an additive function. However, as seen,
the middle is not enclosed within its terms, and so becoming-woman becomes associated with the formation of substantial multiplicities with no relation to unity.

Deleuze and Guattari make no claim about "real women," and what their experience might be.⁴⁷ There is no image of women, nor determined direction to becoming-woman as line: the plane of doors, as has been said, does not represent the outside behind it, but is constituted by moving through the openings. Indeed, Guattari writes of becoming-woman in the context of queer politics: 'in order to understand the homosexual, we tell ourselves that it is sort of "like a woman"'. (G, 1981, p87) Women’s proximity to but absence of identification with or recognition in terms of the biunivocal relations of Law, empty striated space, etc., and the strangeness of their sexuality, from the perspective of an economy of desire based on a lacked object and an ejaculatory satisfaction, have marked them as dissident, deviant. Caught by the mechanisms designed to neutralize this deviance - marriage, domesticity, public invisibility, and sexual debt (in this economy, Guattari says, 'the woman owes her orgasm to the man' [Ibid.]), women become debtors to a system which uses their body to survive. The point is very similar to those made by Irigaray, regarding the position of women as necessarily inside and outside the space of representation.

Guattari argues that by detaching themselves from the profits promised to masculinity - power, control, monopolization of violence, etc. - men too become 'directly linked to a becoming-feminine body, as an escape route from the repressive socius' (Ibid.). (It is claims such as these which have worried feminism and led to the accusation of appropriation: a queer man is still a man, it is said.) In more general terms, he argues for the destruction of categories -woman, man, black, white, queer, straight, deviant - and for a distributed sexuality, n-sexes, without definition or border, temporal endurance or specificity. For a full space, of infinitely proximate and singular
sexes. Again, this has been the focus of feminist objections. Rosi Braidotti, for example, one of the first women to respond positively to Deleuze and Guattari’s work, calls it one of ‘sexual neutrality which does not allow for the fundamental lack of symmetry between the sexes’. 48 This criticism reflects Irigaray’s concern with the unexamined paradox of symmetry; but whilst de-stabilizing the rigid structures which form space as a three-dimensional domain of co-ordinating planes intersecting at the point of the subject, who provides the fourth dimension in the form of a time constant, Braidotti’s insistence on sexual difference as an articulation between male and female remains co-optable by that space. Difference is not, in her view, an immanently differential process which escapes the confines of the binary terms which it relates, however asymmetrical that relation might be.

Becoming-woman, as Deleuze and Guattari use it, is not biologically, hormonally, or chromosomally defined. Nor is it a gender theory; gender is a term whose field is composed by specific trajectories in the formation of socio-political and cultural spaces, which may or may not be attached to biological femaleness, which itself is not a transparent or determinate concept. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-woman is not a necessary condition of the possibility of biocultural concepts of femaleness or the feminine, but rather an immanent condition of becomings, and a positive element in an economics of desire, rather than in its socialization through codes and blockages. They refer to it as ‘le premier quantum, ou segment moléculaire (the first quantum, or molecular segment)’ 49 of becomings, and the key to a smooth itinerant line whose motion can be described neither in terms of convergence or rectilinearity, but through the smallest intervals, demon leaps effecting communication between the two orders of force, attraction and repulsion, in a patois which belongs to neither.
Unlike Derrida, whose work was embraced enthusiastically by feminists, Deleuze and Guattari have for the most part been treated with suspicion. Yet Deleuze’s critique of common sense and good sense, his attack on the image of thought, his empiricism and the privileging of materiality and force all suggest connections between the direction of his thought and arguments in feminism. A major strand of feminisms’ criticisms of philosophy is that it has no body; its exclusion, together with passions and sensuous interests - all identified by philosophy as “other” to the real problem of thought, and as the source of the apparent peculiarity and atheoretical nature of ‘women’s’ thought processes - has limited and restricted its relevance to the approximately fifty per cent of the human population who are male, since it is precisely on the basis of this exclusion that the (male) subject has been theorized. So its claims to universal and necessary truths are unwarranted.

Deleuze has been criticized for neglecting feminist projects directed towards the constitution of a specifically female subjectivity. Rosi Braidotti describes herself as a Deleuzian, but nonetheless accuses his position on woman on the grounds that it comes from a male embodied subject. Criticisms such as these have limited purchase on the impulse infecting Deleuze’s work, which is to expose the mechanisms by which transcendence is produced, as a real rather than imaginary or ideal repressive mechanism. Deleuze does not deploy becoming-woman as a feminist theory or as a theory of woman, but as an element in the critical arsenal of pragmatics, or auto-critique.
Chapter 6

V A Hesitant Discipless

In *Patterns of Dissonance* Rosi Braidotti says of Deleuze:

‘He severs the thread which links the puppets to the master and lets them circulate freely in space, that is to say no longer activated by a central power but through the multiple effects of attraction and repulsion of spatial entities, bodies intersecting with each other’. 50

Braidotti understands becoming-woman as a term operating outside bilateral oppositions, and as a departure from “the feminine” in its Derridean construction as essentially Heideggerian and derivative of a more primary ontological difference. 51 Locating the starting point of Deleuze’s work as the death of the subject 52, and noting the difference of a philosophy of intensities from one of representation, Braidotti goes on to explicate this difference through the body. The puppet body ‘as the other of a divinely-ordained mind’ is contrasted with a Deleuzian body defined as a ‘material surface where the codes of language interact...the pure product of cultural and social modes of interaction, there is nothing “natural” about them’. 53

Braidotti’s formulation of Deleuze is essentially political, and this means her analysis of becoming-woman is informed less by its functional operation in the transformation of a system of forces, and more by an appeal to “real women” 54, where this “real” is neither explored or explained. This collapses the generation of machinic difference and the breaking symmetries of the line implicated in becoming-woman onto the side of a politics organized in terms of binary sexual difference, limiting it to socio-cultural field, and so contracting the sense of becoming-woman. She is not incorrect, but her reading is incomplete, since it tends to operate as a restriction on
what she understands by ‘body’; material bodies - desiring-machines - become written
and defined in relation to a socio-political space, and it is in terms of this alone that she
understands becoming-woman. This is a retrograde step in relation to Irigaray.
Irigaray’s force arises from her interrogation and consequent jamming of the
theoretical bases of the relations into which Western philosophy has slotted women,
and her simultaneous disengagement of a different woman from the structural orders of
its systems and so problematizes across different axes, both inside and out. By
confining her debate to the political, Braidotti is unable to utilize this force.

Braidotti is critical of Deleuze’s ‘mechanized vision of desire’ on the
grounds that it results in a genderless amalgam of sexuality, a ‘dispersed
polysexuality’ which is uninformed by feminism, and she argues that he is caught in
the paradox of a philosophy of difference which does not take into account the very
difference that his use of becoming-woman suggests - that is, sexual difference. Her
claim about dispersed polysexuality is not incorrect, since, as seen above, for Deleuze
and Guattari sexuality does become a distribution rather than a bilateral disjunction.
But their project is neither feminist nor prescriptive: ‘we do not mean to say that a
creation of this kind is the prerogative of the man’, and has broader implications than
Braidotti’s reading suggests.

However, becoming-woman includes, but is not exhausted by the political
trajectory of “real women”, and machinic process are not limited to sexuality or
definable in its terms.

‘Nous ne croyons pas en général que la sexualité ait le rôle d’une
infrastructure dans les agencements de désir, ni qu’elle forme une
énergie capable de transformation, ou bien de neutralisation et
sublimation. La sexualité ne peut être pensée que comme un flux parmi d'autres, entrant en conjonction avec d'autres flux, émettant dans particules qui entrent elles-mêmes sous tel ou tel rapport de vitesse et de lenteur dans le voisinage de telles autres particules.

(We do not believe in general that sexuality has the role of an infrastructure in the assemblages of desire, nor that it constitutes an energy capable of transformation or of neutralization and sublimation. Sexuality can only be thought of as one flux among others, entering into conjunction with other fluxes, emitting particles which themselves enter into particular relationships of speed and slowness in the vicinity of certain other particles). 58

Sexuality is not equivalent to or a basis of desire, and a body is a geography and population of fluxes, a bloc of becoming, defined not in terms of its molar components - this one has breasts, this one a penis, this one is black and this one scarred, this one beautiful, this one plain - but by its affects and the linkages it effects with other bodies, by contiguous intensities which release sexualities as qualities of their difference. Deleuze suggests relinquishing the term desiring-machine, which comes from Guattari, in order to prevent the confusion of desire and sexuality.

Amongst the criticisms directed at Deleuze and Guattari is that they perpetuate historically entrenched associations of women - with madness, for example. History has also devoted much time to reducing women to sexual objects, however, and for feminism to perpetuate this attachment and use sexuality as the major defining factor of women seems not only to mitigate against their criticism of Deleuze and Guattari, but also to privilege one type of flow, rather than addressing the vast complexities of 'women's' lives and the myriad qualities of the force lines with which they connect.
Braidotti counteracts her positive response to connections between Deleuze’s work and feminist interrogations of traditional philosophical tales, both of which are engaged in ‘developing forms of subjectivity and modes of desire at the furthest remove from the Phallic model’: he is, she writes, ‘normative by omission’ and

‘[A]t no point in his thought does he take into account the specific history of women’s own attempts to redefine their subjectivity’. 59

Her position is no doubt strategic, borne out of a reaction against the proliferating philosophical use of “woman” as a newly privileged term through which to negotiate problems coming out of the “death of the subject.” However, it remains within the reach of negative operations connected with a traditional metaphysic of the subject, because it continues to search, however disguised that search might be, for something essential to women, an exclusive definition which characterizes them as a unified group, as “real women”. As has been remarked, above, Deleuze and Guattari are not claiming either to be feminists, or to be providing a theory of women; as for appropriation, the phantom of the victim is buried in this term. Braidotti’s criticisms might be filled out by examining the economic systems which produce women as consumers/subjects; by exploring the different empirical relations which generate their various and diverse situations. However, it is, as it stands, unsatisfying as a response to becoming-woman.

Becoming-woman does not, for Braidotti, result in the upheaval of exchange between men of women, and nor does she engage with desiring-machines outside the realm of metaphor: she quotes Irigaray - ‘isn’t it a sort of metaphor for her/it, that men can use?’ 60 Rather than leading to problems of material self-organization, undoing the possibility of implementing the schema of subjectivity by dissolving its parameters as it
passes through, becoming-woman remains within a representational frame-work, where women's bodies are still whole objects, defined sexually, with no critical account of this sexuality being provided outside the realm of social, symbolic and cultural images; this implies that despite her recognition of the intensive/extensive disjunction, she continues to conceive of this as exclusive, in order to retain a bilateral distinction between man and woman which is as a consequence only extensively legitimate - which is to say, illegitimate in Deleuze's terms. Matter remains outside.

Inside (representation) she is quite correct to say:

'The 'becoming-woman of...' is a force which appropriates women's bodies, an exchange among the master-thinkers of the feminine body: it perpetuates an ancestral habit of domination as the trait of the masculine discourse on women. It is still a misogynist mode of thought.'(B, 1991: 123)

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Returning to Deleuze's work in a later book, Nomad Subjects, Braidotti's hesitance is reduced. Nomadic becoming is seen as expressing Deleuze's 'quest for postmetaphysical figurations of the subject', which is no longer centralized and productive, nor even dead, but 'a term in a process of intersecting forces'. The later reading is more incisive, in that rather than being concerned with what she sees as the starting point - "the death of the subject" - her attention has shifted to the periphery, to the point of exit from death, and the question of the exportation and return of the model of death, as the immanence of experience, the zero added to each body as an assemblage. However, despite being more materialist, characterizing becoming in
Chapter 6

terms of 'sensitive matter, independently of the subjects involved and their determined forms'62 her understanding of force as 'highly constructed social and symbolic'63 continues to restrict it to a molar régime.

For Braidotti, sexual difference

'cannot be considered as one difference among many but rather as a founding, fundamental structural difference on which all others rest and that cannot be dissolved easily.'64

This contrasts directly with Deleuze's remark above, about sexuality being one flux amongst others. She is critical of Deleuze for privileging one becoming amongst others, that of becoming-women, but seems to want to privilege one difference amongst others, that of sexuality. Yet the idea of a fundamental structural difference is anathema to materialism: structures are generated, not original, plastic not fixed. Appeals to a founding structural difference which grounds all others and which is close-to immune from dissolution pushes Braidotti back towards basic bilateral disjunctions and a transcendent metaphysic.

Braidotti closes her chapter on Deleuze's becoming-woman as follows:

'Speaking as a Deleuzian who believes that desire is the effective motor of political change, as opposed to wailful transformation, I experience that “I know, but...” mode as a genuine, positive contradiction in Deleuze’s thinking.'65
"I know, but..." expresses her hesitancy in calling herself a Deleuzian because - "but" - he's a man. A hesitancy well-placed, since, like sexuality, Deleuze is one flux amongst others, and besides, disciplehood is not a condition one associates with his writing. Moreover, her understanding of this as a positive contradiction makes it a fertile move rather than one which closes down her relation with Deleuze. Whilst he (like Kant) privileges following over imitation, to attribute him with mastery of the lines he himself follows is in the end to approach his machines with cynicism, the capitalist disease. Some strange innocence is needed, 'd'une autre espèce, d'une autre nature, d'une autre origine (another species, another nature, another origin)'.

Her remark above obviates in a sense any need to critique the particulars of her argument: it is engaged less with what he writes, than with the difficulties feminists discover, when open to engagements with 'male' philosophies whose direction is not - unusually - antagonistic towards women, either openly or, like the work of Derrida, sycophantic - he'd love to write like a woman, he says, even though he finds feminism castrating! And Braidotti is not as naïve in her reading of Deleuze as the above criticisms imply: she understands that what is useful for feminism in Deleuze's writing is not what is said 'about women' - which is very little, but in its interdisciplinarity, in the abstract nature of the tools it offers.

In Patterns of Dissonance, Braidotti asks:

'What is the point of using the term "becoming-woman" in the analysis of masculine texts when it is clear that the study bears on the vicissitudes and the internal evolution of a system closed -and foreclosed - to women, that is, philosophy?'
Chapter 6

Several questions could be asked. Since Braidotti speaks as a Deleuzian, but claims philosophy is closed to women, where does this mean she locates Deleuze? Or, has her understanding of philosophy changed in the three years between the two books, between Deleuze as essentially misogynist and herself as hesitantly Deleuzian? Or, has she decided that whether or not Deleuze is a philosopher, he is at least a socio-political thinker who engages with feminism? Attempting to answer these questions maps one into an implied agreement with the basic claim that philosophy is systematically closed to women. This reduces philosophy to the canon of its history, to its secondary texts and academic institutions. Making it a discipline rather than an exploration.

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Limiting its attention to “female/feminine” centred problems and building systems and epistemologies on unexamined concepts of experience, based on metaphysically unquestioned assumptions, feminism will be doomed to intellectual ghettoization, and close down a potential market for its subversions. If it limits its attentions to science to pointing out the intrusion of social theory into scientific claims about women, and fails to deploy positively the technological transformations immanent to the new models science is producing, whose trajectory suggests the collapse of precisely those concepts against which feminism has in the past argued - objectivity, identity, idealism and dead matter, - feminism will be a side-line, of interest only to women fuelled by the political fluxes of desire. If it is the case that philosophy has misconstrued women, positioned them in places they would rather not be, and made claims about their intelligence, their bodies, their capabilities, etc., which are both disagreed with and are looking increasingly ridiculous, then there is little point attached to a continuing argument with reason designed from the position of its victim. For if women are not its victim, reason is either empty and impotent, or its function...
must be understood differently. Feminism becomes normative when it becomes incapable of engaging with philosophy beyond the limits of theorizations of gender and suggests that such an engagement is anathema to women. Kant says the same: women may as well grow beards as learn how to think.
Breeding Demons

'we will call them “demons,” because they are not controlled by a master program.'\(^1\)

I Changing the Object

'Warton was held down by wardresses as the doctor inserted a four-foot-long tube down her throat. A few seconds after the tube was down, she vomited all over her hair, her clothes and the wall, yet the task continued until all the liquid had been emptied into her stomach.'\(^2\)

It is easy to lose sight of the violence to which women have been subjected in their struggles to transform their situation, and to which they are still subjected. Jane Warton’s treatment in prison was a consequence of her protestation against this same treatment, which she had seen inflicted on women who, like her, had been imprisoned for engaging in suffragist activities. She was in reality Lady Constance Lytton, and had disguised her identity in order to illustrate the different treatments meted out to women in prison on the basis of their class status; on their visibility as appendages to men. On a previous occasion, under her family name, she had been treated more leniently, and released after a couple of days. This simple example illustrates that analyses of connections amongst women is not comprehended by class determined as a relation to modes of production. Warton was on the women’s side.

Yet class relations are only one example of the different orders across which women move, at odds with the major directions, passing through them but never at
home. This difference is also inscribed in the theoretical operations of philosophy, and means that finding where women are distributed within philosophical theories, such as Kant’s, is problematic: the elements privileged by commentators are for the most part those which are explicitly associated with men - spontaneity, superior strength, activity, reason, genius, abstract logical thought, firmness and accuracy of judgement, moral fortitude, duty, respect, honesty...the list could be longer, but the idea is clear. And it is not only that women are conceptually disconnected from the major concerns of philosophy; where those themes with which they have been associated are discussed - nature, passion, madness, imagination, beauty, receptivity, lying, sensibility, etc. - the relations according to which they are constructed do not emerge from those themes, nor indeed distribute them, but are imposed upon them from outside. Understanding is, after all, the lawgiver of nature.

This is why a system such as Kant’s appears so different when addressed from a perspective whose interest is in the theoretical underpinnings of philosophical misogyny, and looks to discover how deeply ingrained they are. Deleuze’s philosophy is not feminist, but it does not claim to be so: what it does, however, is build a machine which does not follow orthodox patterns, which is creatively destructive and rigorously and acutely composed, and which, by exploring the structures which support the spontaneously acting and judging subject, or man of State, crosses lines with feminist thought and provides means of accelerating the collapse of philosophical preciousness regarding what is appropriate to it. Deleuze does not provide a model: unlike Braidotti, I do not think one can “be a Deleuzian”. However, it is an exemplary machine of thought, and it is in this that its value for feminism rests, rather than in its explicit remarks on becoming-woman.
The isolated remarks which Kant makes about women in discussions of anthropology and aesthetics are the effects of more deeply ingrained structural and systematic misogynies, and it is to these that violence refers for its justifications and validations. Fernand Braudel writes:

‘The role of women is always a structural element in any civilisation-a test: it is a long-lived reality, resistant to external pressure, and hard to change overnight. A civilisation generally refuses to accept a cultural innovation that calls in question one of its own structural elements.’

Transformations in the visible images and operations of women, the collapse of the orders of their historical containment, such as the family, together with their accelerating infiltration into disciplines and cultures erected on the exclusion of women (and blacks, and anyone else who does not fit the model of recognition and image of thought) are changing the long-lived reality. In tracking the forces and flows of woman independently of the subject, in connection with natural technologies and material flows, one seeks to diagnose and generate legitimate descriptions of the future tense of women. This is the line of becoming-woman.

Women cannot simply be identified with objects, although they have been objects in part. Irigaray, reading Marx, writes:

‘Merchandises, les femmes sont...deux choses à la fois: objets d’utilité et porte-valeur.

(As commodities, women are thus two things at once: utilitarian objects and bearers of value).’
In terms of its utility, a woman’s body is material, but this is of secondary importance to its exchange value, Irigaray argues, which rests in abstraction and in the resulting cancellation of material difference. But this abstraction from utility generates problems, since it produces a value that lacks location: women do not have the visible signs of power, she writes, which are necessary in reflective economies, and thus the abstraction can be realised only through exchange, only by measurement in relation to a third term, to which neither of them correspond. However, for this to take place, horizontal relations amongst women need to be cancelled, or overcoded, the materiality of their bodies re-configured, for, in terms of their own affinities, the qualities which support abstraction are lacking.

This move is clear in Kant. Whilst he allows that individual men will have preferences for different women - blondes or brunettes, slim or curvaceous, vivacious or coy - when it comes to evaluations of beauty, as the quality of women which bears the value of abstraction, these differences, since they are based on physical attractions, must be discounted. All the ‘other merits of a woman should unite solely to enhance the character of the beautiful, which is the proper reference point’. However, judgements of the beautiful do not locate it as a quality of a body so judged, but refer it to a subject, and his feelings of pleasure or displeasure; only thus can a judgement be universal, since it is devoid of any specific attraction or agreeability. In such circumstances, Kant writes, one

‘must believe that he is justified in requiring a similar liking from everyone because he cannot discover, underlying this liking, any private conditions, on which only he might be dependent, so that he
must regard it as based on what he can presuppose in everyone else as well.6

In the case of judgements of the beautiful on bodies public taste is appended to a moral concept, presupposing an idea of what that body is supposed to be, what its function or purpose is. And for women, it is reproduction; in terms of this value, women's materiality is re-configured, in order to become the repository of an abstract exchange value, that attached to the capacity to produce a child. As the practical value of women, reproduction is visible, has form and beauty; the image is the Madonna. However, as a material and bodily function, it is fearsome and gives rise to disgust: to prevent this, which would suggest the tangling of sensible elements in the form of the object (the body) and so degrade the judgement both aesthetically and morally, women need to develop a sense of shame, which 'serves to draw a curtain of mystery before even the most appropriate and necessary purposes of nature'.7 Women must thus contribute to their production as exchangeable objects, whose abstract value is rests in their reproductive capacity. They must, as was remarked in the Introduction, be self-pruning. The intensive materiality of their bodies is thus made relative to extension, to a public and universally agreed upon quality of form which excites the contemplation of a community of subjects whilst simultaneously confirming the function of reproduction, which is no longer a messy material process, but a moral duty. Only then can this object become related on a plane of equality to other objects of the same type, through the medium of a third party, the judging subject.

Donna Haraway problematizes theorisations of women as objects, by complicating the idea objects are inert and passive in the face of judgement. Her challenge is directed at Irigaray's critique of specular economies and the privilege of touch. As a scientist and primatologist, observation is essential to her work; but her
theorisation of vision removes it from the mirrored economy of reflection, so that it
does not operate as a principle of identification or recognition. Observation ceases to
be, necessarily, a power move coded in advance through structures specific to a subject,
but becomes a manoeuvrable and manoeuvring direction, which neither takes charge
of, nor submits to, an object; it becomes a movement between, echoing Deleuze's AND
logics, a relation which effectuates both sides as both observer and observed, in a
manner which carries the logic of Irigaray's two lips, as a positive feedback process.
The object is no longer the result of formal impositions pressed onto intensive matter,
but a formation generated through material interactivity which does not arrive at the
logic of subjectivity, since the conditions of its production are technically incompatible
with the closed systems protective of a unified (or even fractured) identity.

"The body, the object of biological discourse, itself becomes a most
engaging being. Claims of biological determinism can never be the
same again. When female "sex" has been so thoroughly re-theorised
and revisualised that it emerges as practically indistinguishable from
"mind", something basic has happened to the category of biology."¹⁸

Haraway's claim is strong. Theories of female 'sex' no longer run directly (or
even indirectly) through the womb; desire connects instead with the intellect, and this
circuit has effects which bleed beyond the limits of feminism, to the very category of
biology itself. Feminist discourse feeds back into science, not as an addendum, but as a
challenge to its basic categories and methodologies. Haraway's demon, the cyborg,
draws technologically enhanced sensibilities together with female desire, in the
production of a body whose boundaries are no longer definable through a linear and
maternal nature, and for whom reproduction is no longer a privileged term. Intensities
are no longer confined within extensive form, nor re-structured according to moral
purposes, and, most importantly, the cyborg dissolves the veil of shame which lingered in feminism in its depiction of women as victims.

Remembering the violence remarked at the opening of this chapter does not necessitate an identification with the position of its victims (and certainly not with its perpetrators: who wants equality with this?). This is based on sentiment and turns women, once more, into objects of pity, as well as perpetuating an image of nature as violence and conflict. The cyborg is not based on identifications between women and 'nature in the Western sense', Haraway writes, but moves towards an anorganic nature, a techno-nature which debunks the privileges of the organism and the human, and the mechanistic technologies specific to this latter. Since Haraway's work on primatology connects with the cyborg too; the latter does not describe a relation of humanity with technology, but a much broader concept, which upsets the easy separation of teleological and mechanical orders and human and "other" primates. It is in this respect that it connects with Deleuze and Guattari's machinic phylum.\(^9\)

Haraway attacks both the production of women (by women as well as men) as victims, and the prescriptive voices which call for a unity amongst women, in the interests of some political aim, on the grounds that it attributes a shared identity amongst them, which effects the same cancellation of differences which women have argued against. 'There is nothing about being "female" that naturally binds women.'\(^{10}\) This has already been questioned in the last chapter, with respect to references to "real women"; Haraway's cyborg dissolves the possibility of such categories having any purchase on bodies, by dispersing sexuality, by dislocating it from discussions of lack, and relating it to the positive operations of the intellect.
The association of women, or the feminine, or femaleness with passivity and man/masculinity/maleness with activity has never been a simple one. The disjunction is unstable; as a reproductive animal, woman is conceived of as passive and receptive in relation to the activity and spontaneity of the man. Yet sexually she exerts an attractive force, although even this is not coherent, being intermixed with repulsion (the man feels repulsion, not the woman). The feminine has no necessary theoretical relation with women at all, but is rather attached to notions of genius. Christine Battersby, in an extended exploration of the relations of genius and gender, exposes the twists and turns in the value of the feminine, which are not limited to philosophy. ‘The medical texts imply (without ever making the implication explicit) that the human being who possesses genius will have the sexual organs of a male, but will also have feminine characteristics’. Genius feminizes, but females have neither the mental or physical stamina for genius; feminine is not the root of feminism, nor attached to the female. The parenthetical remark about implication is also important, for it is these undercurrents which carry themes whose force is made redundant by the explicit structures erected on their ground. Part of the task of feminism in relation to philosophy is dissolving the certainty of these erections. Kant gives graphic expression to the contraries and contradictions and implications of philosophy’s women in a quote from Horace appended, inexplicably and unexplained, to a footnote in the Anthropology: ‘A beautiful woman above ends foully in a black fish’. Reconciliation of the wide distribution of functions designated female/feminine/womanly with passivity has generated acrobatic thought processes and incredible claims. Freud has become a classic example. In his lecture Femininity, he is cautious, advising against the decision to make “active” coincide with “masculine”
and "passive" with "feminine"13, citing the relation between mother and child as one in which females are active, and the restriction of activity in male spiders to 'the single act of sexual union'14 as problematic cases. Yet whilst Freud is prepared to accommodate 'the influence of social customs, which...force women into passive situations'15 he undercuts himself by attributing a preference for passivity to women, 'on the basis of her share in the sexual function'16 (without questioning to what extent this is also socially inscribed), and by making woman's activity relative to 'passive aims'. His opening summation of the puzzle of femininity reaches its height in his description of what is truly feminine as masochistic in nature. Social pressures serving only to develop these destructive trends, so making truly feminine passivity that of the victim.

Yet Freud's advice against easy acceptance of the established mapping between the woman/man and passive/active oppositions comes to nothing: however complicated the distribution of activity and passivity become in the female - for example, the relation of little girls to their mothers is 'completely ambivalent, both affectionate and of a hostile and aggressive nature'17 - nonetheless the 'turn towards femininity' is signalled by a 'wave of passivity'18. The girl turns to her father and, 'with the help of passive instinctual impulses...which clear phallic activity out of the way', may perhaps 'turn out to be normal'.19 Phew.

In both volumes of Capitalisme et Schizophrenie, Deleuze and Guattari talk of the theft of little girls' bodies, and its necessity as preparatory to the theft of little boys' bodies. "[C]esse de te tenir comme ça, tu n'es plus une petite fille, tu n'es pas un garçon manqué, etc. (stop behaving like that, you're not a little girl anymore, you're not a tomboy, etc.)"20. The creation of female femininity appears directly counter to that of male femininity. The former is a process of restriction, limitation, repression and
prohibition, which serve to introduce the female body to its proper desires, the location
of its proper sexual being, its truly feminine passivity. The latter, however, attaches to
expressions of release, to the outpourings of genius and is close to madness.

But the point of this is not to engage in a debate with Freud concerning the
development of female sexuality. His words ring bizarre in much the same way as, for
example, Aristotle's, when he proposes his flower-pot theory of reproduction, which
also places women as both powerful and active, the potent materiality from which the
logos grows, and as weak and passive, since women themselves lack the power of the
logos growing inside her. What these discussions illustrate are the confusions and
contortions which grow from attempts to reconcile the passive/active opposition with
sexual or gender distinctions, and the mobility of characteristics attaching to each arm
of the disjunction, as historical contingencies shift privileges and values. The easy leap
from passivity to masochism; the assumption that, in children's play, passivity is
reacted against with activity, which annuls it, the degree to which this is successful
serving as a basis for 'conclusions as to the relative strength of the masculinity and
femininity that it will exhibit in its sexuality'; the characterisation of the libido as
constrained 'when it is pressed into the service of the feminine function'; the
physiological equivalence of this constraint evidenced by the 'small penis', or clitoris.
Freud offers these and many more examples of the problems generated by the
development of girls and women into proper passive feminine persons.

Kant is no less happy with the equation of woman with passivity. 'Her
philosophy [Weltweisheit] is not to reason, but to sense [Empfinden].' The critical
implications of this are not that women lack understanding, but rather that they lack
the methodological capacity with which to systematise knowledge. The architectonic
ordering of transcendental relations is absent in the female, so whilst 'the fair sex has
just as much understanding as the male...it is a beautiful understanding', rather than a rational one, and thus not only can she not contain chaos in a unit, as reason was seen to do in the discussion of the sublime, but her knowledge remains at the aggregate and random level, lacking pattern and systematicity. She can neither build a house with an overlook, nor does she have the reason to make the marks of permanence on her imagination and confirm the immortality of a soul. There is no rational compulsion attendant upon women’s understanding which condemns them to formulate objects in general or morality, no diktak commanding the conversion of their intellects into Law. However, the problem is irresolvable by further interrogation of the intricacies and confusions of Kant’s comments directly bearing on either the beautiful or woman. What is at stake is a break in the understanding of production, which is the focus of Deleuzian critique. To return to the flower-pot, there is no account of the production of the all-powerful soil from which logos emerges as a secondary mode of production. In Deleuze’s terms, there is no account of the production of the unconscious - of how, for example, Kantian reason came to contain a unit of chaos, and it is this uncritical assumption of a power possessed by a subject, still functioning illegitimately in Kant, that passive synthesis forces into operation, with rigour and unKantian consequences.

III Market Making

"Il est devenu le temps de la ville et rien d’autre, le pur ordre du temps."

(It has become the time of the town and nothing else, the pure order of time).
Deleuze says this of Kantian time. It is not meteorological, rural, governed by the seasons, the climate, growing patterns, the reproductive cycles of the animals; nor is it cosmic, celestial, referring to the movements of the stars, the turning of the world. It is the time of the town. But what does Deleuze mean by this, and how is it related to the problem of becoming-woman?

The problem of the town is one of circulation, of entries and exits, flows and polarisation's, frequencies, horizontal integrations and co-ordinations. The town is a 'point remarquable sur des circuits qui la créent ou qu’elle crée (remarkable point on the circuits that create it, and which it creates)', which makes no sense in isolation, but exists only as a point in a cycle of flows, a node in a network of transfers and transmissions, interactions and associations with other towns.

In *Mille Plateaux* Deleuze and Guattari draw on the work of Fernand Braudel, who writes of towns as 'electric transformers', accelerating tensions and rhythms of social and economic interaction. Braudel charts a history of the town (and writes that history was introduced with the town, with the appearance of the written word); he talks of its creating and conquering the countryside and of their mutual reciprocity; of thresholds of urbanisation at which self-generated transformations occur, beyond which a town achieves a minimum of efficiency; of the divisions of labour implied by the town; of rings of stone marking the effort for independence and desire for expansion in the middle ages, offering both protection against enemies and contributing to the control of the population inside the walls; of the complicated networks of Western towns and the regimented order of Roman towns; of the emergence of town-planning in the Renaissance; of vertical as well as horizontal growth; of taxation, credit, customs and excise. And of much more. But for understanding why Deleuze calls Kantian time the time of the town there is one
remark which stands out: 'every town, wherever it may be, must primarily be a market. Without a market, a town is inconceivable'.

Braudel differentiates between markets and capital. The former can be associated with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the production of production, the three syntheses of connection, distribution and consumption as a single cycle; market exchange 'is both an enclosing circle and a turning hinge', the co-ordinated, but not sub-ordinated, effect of a myriad connections, at fairs, shops, at cross-roads, on the corner, where prices are mobile but the emergent effect is one of a meta-stable and self-regulating system. From the chaos of the market emerges 'the first computer mankind ever had'; but rather than the program being fixed (e.g., as in a price list or through subsidies), and functioning as a control mechanism on the relation of input to output, or governed by extrinsic conditions it is itself subject to transformations as a result of the concrete flows which pass through it. The cycle itself adds difference to the potential of its own functioning: more simply, it learns and learning potentiates material changes in the routes and connections, distributions and conjunctions of the cycle. The space of the market is not striated and segmented by extrinsic operations; it has no *image*, no central memory or general rule, and is an actual continuum, presupposing nothing other that its immanent operations, a circulation of states, a-central, non-hierarchical, surface.

This contributes to understanding why Deleuze and Guattari call synthesis passive. The cycles of a market are not effected through the operation of an external agent, an identity to which synthesis is related, but through indirect interactions, productive connections which are not trades or exchanges (Braudel differentiates trade from the self-regulating mechanisms of markets) but break-flows.
Chapter 7

‘[T]oute machine est coupure de flux par rapport à celle à laquelle elle est connectée, mais flux elle-même ou production de flux par rapport à celle qui lui est connectée. Telle est la loi de production de production.

([E]very machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also a flow itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it. This is the law of the production of production).’

The continuity of the actual continuum, of a materially intensive full space, is conditioned by the breaks or interruptions of the machines. The break constitutes a partial object, partial not in the sense of incompleteness, which would return the process to an economy of lack specific to capital, and direct desire towards a whole object, a complete thing, once more framing the problem in extension (for how could an intensity be incomplete?). But partial (partiaux) in the sense of biased, evaluative, ‘comme les intensités sous lesquelles une matière remplit toujours l’espace à des degrés divers (like the intensities under which a unit of matter always fills space in varying degrees’) Objects become pieces of a journey, directions, tendencies, selective principles, elements in a sequence or chain, molecular, rather than molar. In a trade and exchange system, each object is complete - in the sense that an object of representation is complete - its value determined in advance of the process of exchange, through the system of pricing. Exchange serves not only to confirm this value which pre-occupies the object but also removes it from circulation, since it’s value then rests in its utility - that is, it belongs to the consumptive subject, that subject to whom the kingdom belongs. In the market, however, each interaction is only partial, objects are partial and rather than dropping out of circulation to be consumed, each
movement connects them with a different circuit, and different principle of selection, a
different sequence or chain.\textsuperscript{36}

Since the continuum is intensive, and so too are partial objects, the distinction
between flow and objects -which might be understood as that between money and
commodity -becomes dissolved. The difference becomes one of relative compressions,
or contractions of intensities; a break does not mean a separation, a removal of a
sequence which leaves a hole behind, but is itself a flow, a line of escape, a different
bias or directionality, which connects with another flow, effects a break or interruption
elsewhere.

Capital, on the other hand, through States as ‘modèles de réalisation
immanents (immanent models of realization)’,\textsuperscript{37} imposes external controls, ostensibly
with the purpose of protecting the consumer - of making things “fair” or “equal”. The
State corporatizes, industrializes, massifies, introduces regulative mechanisms,
taxation, credit control, tariffs, damaging the autonomous balance of markets, and,
more importantly, divorcing economic from social life through the medium of politics:
capital, Braudel says, is a political word. In effect, Braudel argues, capital functions as
an anti-market, as an inhibitor, or as Deleuze and Guattari express it, as
antiproduction. Unlike the State as an extrinsic transcendent unity - God, the Despot -
however, in a capitalist régime, the State as the agent of anti-production becomes
immanent to all flows, ‘une gigantesque entreprise d’anti-production, mais au sein de
la production même, et la conditionnant (a gigantic enterprise of antiproduction, but at
the heart of production itself, and conditioning this production)’.\textsuperscript{38} The cycle is thus
attached to an extrinsic determined image, from which its power and its movement
appear to emanate, and in terms of which all its relations are understood.
In *Passive Synthesis*, the difference between conjunction as a blockage, or point of accumulation that subjugates all flows to a single flow, and conjunction as AND logic was mentioned - the difference between a macro-history of great men, with the subject as agent of synthesis, and a micro-history of populations and flows. The former, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is the conjunction specific to capital, to the formation of an abstract attraction-machine, from which all flows seem to emanate. Like the Kantian transcendental, like the subject, capital appears as an unengendered presupposition of production, as the father of surplus value, folding back over markets and regulating the concretization of its abstract axiomatic.

The complexities of the relations between capital and the State, capital and the market, the difference between the social economics of a market and the political economics of capital, which re-describes social relations according to its own needs, are too intricate to explore here: another thesis would be needed. What is important for understanding the above comment of Deleuze’s about Kantian town time is the double aspect it implies. The town faces both ways; in one direction, it faces the State, and capitalist axiomatics and in the other it faces the market. Deleuze and Guattari call money and the market ‘la vrai police du capitalisme (capitalism’s true police)’; however, Irigaray’s question concerning what would happen if commodities learned to speak can be shifted sideways, and re-asked in relation to money and markets. What happens if money learns to speak, not with the voice of capital, as an expression of purchasing power, of hedonistic potential, of luxury and excess and of the expansion of power, but of its own behaviour, as a flow which resists accumulation, which always escapes, which effects movements, rather than buying things, potentiates mobilities and interactions which cross through capital zones, but never remain inside.
Community or commercium. From one perspective the town and the flows of trade appear organized by the capital and the State, and the town and its markets appear to depend for the flows that circulate through it on the resources these supply. In the other direction, the town is fundamentally a market in contact with other markets, from which emerges a world-economy different to the capital economy between States; indeed, Deleuze and Guattari write that not only did the towns not create capitalism, but that they anticipated it and warded it off. They point to the mechanisms of anticipation and inhibition referred to in *Forces and Deductions*, in relation to the warding off of the State by primitive and nomadic States; these mechanisms ‘jouent dans les villes “contre” l’Etat et “contre” le capitalisme’ (are at play in the conflict of towns “against” the State and “against” capitalism). Whilst capitalism won, however, the horizontal networks of the towns were not demolished as a result of this; for capitalism requires the markets, requires the release of flows it effects and the cycles it turns, just as reason needs time, in order not to be god, and men need women, in order not to die. But something always escapes.

Like the town time faces both ways: in one direction it is the chronological line of succession, defined by the unit, the corporeal present measuring actions and causes, to which past and future are relative, indicating only the relation between two presents. Here is formal time, the concept of time, physical and cyclical, concrete: time as money. In another direction, however, it is the pure empty form of time, the labyrinthine line which divides into itself, incorporeal, imperceptible, autonomous, divested of matter, and the time with which Deleuze credits Kant, in the first of the four poetic formulae; time unhinged from the cardinality of capitalism, which adds its coins one by one by one and keeps them in the bank, measuring its wealth relative to its history and the dreamed prospects of its future. The market is the turning hinge of the cycle; unhinged from the State and from capital, the market becomes.
‘Bref, une ligne de fuite, déjà complexe, avec ses singularités; mais aussi une ligne molaire ou coutumière avec ses segments; et entre les deux (?), une ligne moléculaire, avec ses quanta qui la font pencher d’un côté ou de l’autre.

(In short, a line of flight, already complex, with singularities; but also a molar or customary line with segments; and between the two (?), a molecular line with quanta which cause it to tip to one side or the other)’ (DG, 1980:249; 1988:203 - translation amended).

Deleuze and Guattari position becoming-woman as the first quantum, the first demon flash which tips the balance of becoming away from the strata, from customary orders and patterns and towards the molecular line. It is in this respect that becoming-woman relates to the town, and to time, as an itinerant movement which is in-between the State and the market, simultaneously facing onto and away from the strata. Precisely, it seems, as philosophy has always positioned women, as neither inside or outside, not properly one thing or another.

It is the potential for positioning women in relation to the town, rather than to nature, and for becoming-woman as a movement towards the market which effects the release of monetary flows from the accumulative tendencies of capital; it is this relation of women to the economy, as a bias of escape, rather than as an object exchanged between subjects in state capitalism, which includes socialism as well - that is missed by a purely politico-sexual analysis. For in the movement the balance tips from the molar to molecular, and women cease to be commodities, or even, as Irigaray says, commodities which speak, and instead begin to function as partial objects, biases,
evaluations. Whilst their interactions are not regulated from any external position, the combined effect - to those who remain outside, in the rare air of the State, capital, the subject - the movement appears purposeful, directed, the biases appear correlated, caused. If it is this latter, it is in the sense spoken of before, of reverse causality without finality, testifying to an action of the future on the present. Becoming-woman is this movement, a future not yet synthesized, but whose effects are becoming concrete today.

Both Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz, in their readings of becoming-woman refer to a Cartesian model of the subject, which has no relation with either time nor town. Not only does this make life much easier, for the Cartesian subject is something of a straw-dog against which to pitch an argument, but it also misses the philosophical forces on which Deleuze draws. The labyrinthine lines of the pure form of time feed throughout his work, and philosophy becomes a market-place without rules, with no historical pre-conditions determining the directions one can take, the associations and alliances one can make. Kant argues against Leibniz? Deleuze makes them bargain for space. Against Spinoza? He draws a Spinozist substance together with the critical demand for immanence. There is no truth, only ideas, no profit, only surplus flows to return to the horizontal integrations and latitudes of the market.

Deleuze and Guattari call this 'communication d'à-côte (side-communication); side-communication is surplus but not profit, composed of transferable fragments, 'suppléments dans l’ordre d’une multiplicité, plus-values dans l’ordre d’un rhizome (supplements in the order of a multiplicity, surplus values in the order of a rhizome)' which transfer information from one order to another, from one species to another, in an aparallel evolution - like the wasp and the orchid mentioned in an earlier chapter. It is perhaps because there is no grandeur or magnificence in these tiny connections that they have been overlooked, and so little thought has gone
into the patterns they follow and the systems they effect. Where nature is conceived of as red in tooth and claw, or a subject of rape rather than of passive exploration, its real patterns remain imperceptible. It is these movements which this thesis has showed are necessary to the construction of the extensive theatre of representation; singular asymmetrical connections, horizontal side-communications, intensities escaping points, money escaping the banks, sexuality escaping biology, desire escaping sexuality, everywhere a shifting drifting flow of mobile distributions on the body of the earth.

Side-communication relates also to Deleuze’s method of theft; because the market is not driven by ideology - as are state capitalism/socialism - the history of philosophy itself becomes a market, the tendencies and directions of which are not fixed, but which can be broken into, pieces and fragments stolen, taken elsewhere, connected with other machines. What counts is only if something works, which is to say, only if something releases flows, rather than containers, accounts in which to keep them. Because women have been characterised as both inside and outside, their movement - as Irigaray saw - is double; inside, on the strata, which corresponds to Irigaray’s occupation of the philosophical body, to her careful and elegant tracings of its magic geographies and logics - inside, women move in perceptible, and sometimes apparently recognisable ways. But through their relations with the outside, they are also and simultaneously imperceptible, their movements disappearing, becoming secret, only to re-appear elsewhere, different, re-configured, transformed. This is what deterritorialization means: the connection of leaps, tiny intervals, demons breeding demons, in a smooth continuous line of escape which re-territorializes somewhere else, differently - as Irigaray says, when she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere.

‘Mais que signifie devenir-imperceptible, à la fin de tous les devenirs moléculaires qui commençaient par le devenir-femme?'
(But what does becoming-imperceptible signify, coming at the end of all the molecular becomings that begin with becoming-woman)?

Elizabeth Grosz's response to becoming-imperceptible, or an-organic, is to situate it within a molar political context and refer it to the potential 'obliteration or marginalization of women's struggles.' She argues that, by the 'uncritical internalization of perspectives and interests devised and developed by men', women fail to notice the pitfalls of a movement which suggests, once more, that women function as a means towards the ends of men. Not only does becoming-woman not have any intrinsic or essential relation to women (that is, it is not an empirical concept, in the sense that it has the apparent stability of the concrete present - it does not "look like" a woman), but moreover, Deleuze and Guattari are explicit in saying that women must become-woman in order for men to be able to become-woman, and that sexuality goes by way of this latter becoming - 'par le devenir-femme de l'homme (by way of the becoming-woman of the man)'. Grosz equates becoming-imperceptible with the invisibility of women in a molar domain, and with the annexation of their desire to systems whose interests are elsewhere - in other words, with a failure of recognition.

However, that is to mistake the nature of becoming: it is not women who become imperceptible, or anorganic. Imperceptibility refers to the nature of movement, rather than to something that moves. To Irigaray's secret movements, to intensive distributions, connections amongst women and men, women and women, men and men, and all with machines, which have shattered the categories, broken the codes, dissolved the restrictions and emptied the bodies of meaning, effecting a release of sexuality from binary distinctions, effecting n-sexes, a million tiny sexes, and have released women from sexuality, by making it a quality of desire, rather than the
defining characteristic of their bodies. Because the problem is one of relations which escape their terms, and relation which effect biases, partial objects, not of how fully constituted whole objects are related. Becoming-imperceptible is sliding a body into machines, camouflaging movements and appearing, as if from nowhere, in the middle.

Deleuze notes that biologists have often questioned why life is effected through carbon, rather than through silicon, and goes on to say that 'la vie des machines modernes passe par le silicium (the life of modern machines runs through silicon)'. This is where becoming-women moves, where money released from capital moves, where life becomes non-organic, nature becomes a thinking machine, infinities of tiny demons leap, effecting a co-ordinated and fluid movement, eroding the statues of power, the historical. Becoming-woman moves towards becoming-imperceptible, but women do not dissolve or disappear in that movement: it is rather than life itself becomes mobile, because it is not longer in the womb nor arranged in the organisms which emerge from them, but instead becomes a movement, a cycle that turns on its hinges. Humans are no longer the privileged class, but the surrogate reproductive machinery of a machinic phylum which is passing across into a different base, in a movement which effects the conjunction of teleology and mechanism, and transforming the nature of intelligence.

V Breeding Demons

'...when demons are allowed to barter, bid and compete among themselves for resources, they begin to form “computational societies” which resemble natural ecologies (like an insect colony) or
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Philosophy and two thousand years of society built on the principles with which it has covered thought like a caul, has designed women as weak, passive, sensitive, mad, imaginary, material, natural, disgusting, prudish, whorish, virginal, Amazonian, foolish, untrustworthy, ammoral, childish and incapable of learning (Kant says that educating women is 'a malicious strategem of men'\textsuperscript{49}, and done only in the interests of male vanity). But, despite all this, men have still wanted to possess these peculiar, confusing and contrary animals they have been both fearful of and attracted towards. At times, philosophers have displayed apparent generosity towards women - one might use Plato's suggestion in the Republic that women too might be guardians in the ideal State, despite their natural weakness in relation to men. However, the move is duplicitous on two counts. Firstly, it is designed to introduce women as contributing members of a State whose orders and laws are established in the absence of women; the participants in the dialogue are men, and the functions and potentials of women are articulated from the perspective of men. The case is similar to that of passivity, as it functions in Kant in relation to activity: its characteristics are determined through the lens of an active, spontaneous and legislative subject - which, as the Introduction has shown, women are not. Secondly, the move is incorporative: that is, it does not envisage any transformation in the State effected by women through their introduction within it.

Looking elsewhere, one finds the same problem. Spinoza, for example, argues that 'women have not by nature equal rights with men'.\textsuperscript{50} His argument functions similarly to those more recently proposed, which exhort women to avoid dark places and "provocative" clothing on the grounds that they open themselves up to attack from men; women's spaces are limited and defined not through their own desires, but by those of men. Moira Gatens says of Spinoza's remarks on women that
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'women's political exclusion not on the basis of the qualities or predispositions of women, but rather on the basis of men's predispositions', calling them a "scar" on the body of his work. There are historical nuances and variations in the qualities attaching to women; as a philosophical entity, woman is designed to be fluid, and to operate in the problematic interstices which escape the ordered and segmented world of the subject. However, it is less the qualities themselves than their relative value in regard to the subject which is important: as has been remarked earlier, femininity attached to a man has associations of genius, whilst in relation to women, it attaches to passivity, defined through the lens of the active subject. So tracing transformations in the historical trajectory of philosophy's women exposes not only the fluidity of movement and qualities through which she is designed, but also the shifting values in those qualities, effected by historical changes in the subject. Nonetheless, their situation remains defined by and through the privilege of the subject: philosophy's woman is never so dangerous nor so mobile as to be able to either destroy or escape the defining perspective of the (male) subject. Kant says that even in a state of nature, women are domestic animals - already tamed, and useful if only to carry the bags. The wilder aspects of designed women are - like the sublime - always situated in a context, in the socio-cultural context of women, that of domesticity and reproduction.

A demon is a figure in the process of generating independence from design principles - in other words for an element in a learning system, a bias towards concretizing real solutions, like a market, which operates not through the accumulation of information, as goods, but through interactions with other demons, in a heterarchical space (a Pandemonium), which is continuously mobile, and perceptible, although the principles of its mobility are imperceptible, escaping recognition. The survival of a demon is a function of its interaction with other demons in its locality, where locality is not a geographical position given in advance, but the consequence of
connections generated amongst demons in the process of developing problem-solving strategies. The problem-solving strategies depend in part on what Manuel DeLanda, from whom this information on demons comes, calls “trust.”

Words such as this are dangerous, implying moral sensibilities dictating material interactions. Evelyn Fox-Keller has already been quoted in regard to this problem, of imposing human romances on nature. Fox-Keller located the critical question behind the apparent altruism of natural systems (their willingness to ‘die’ for the system) as a problem of quantifying the maximum degree of cost to themselves individuals will tolerate before any socially compliant character is disinvested - social in a bacterial, rather than human, sense. However, this is not sufficient, since it suggests there is an option for disinvestment through which the individual is retained, but in an isolated state. In systems where function and formation are inseparable, and where interaction generates a partial object, as an intensification of a movement or direction, disinvestment is equal to death, or more accurately, the complete eradication of the parameters in terms of which the initial problem was understood. So absence of tolerance to a system on the part of any element generated by it results in the extinction of that element, which in turn transforms the nature of the system.

The movement is that of the actual continuum, the basis of Kant’s dynamics, the material force of synthesis, the resource on which the subject draws, the detour he takes into the outside. What is missed when the position of women in philosophy is read solely in terms of their exclusion is precisely this movement, right at its heart. For philosophy has not simply been an abstract theoretical discipline, but has been instrumental in the organization of social, political, cultural, sexual, economic, legal, educational etc., etc, orders. In order to function as a real description of space - as Kant demands of transcendental philosophy - it has to have some account of real relations;
in order for him to declare with confidence that from the court of reason ‘nothing can escape us’, it must understand where the possibilities of escape lie. However, this is an impossible demand; something must always escape, unless the system is dead in advance, because life is an escape art, an art of destruction and creation, which is theorized under the name critique.
No Tribunal

"You think my gait "spasmodic." I am in danger, Sir.

You think me "uncontrolled." I have no Tribunal...."¹

Bacteria borrow genes from plants, animals & fungi: bacterial fungi find their way into animals and plants; animals and plants pass genes to each other. A body does not recognize itself from something not itself. There is only side-communication. Kant's arborescent schema, the law of continuum specierum, which 'recognise[s] a relationship of the different branches, as all springing from the same stem' is unnatural.² Transposons, as these jumping genes are called, come in different types: there is the P element, which invades fruit flies, the mariner, spread amongst species as diverse as earwigs and beetles. Molecularity.

Meanwhile:

'Over the past twenty-five years, a stack of laws has transformed Britain from a country that welcomed people to one that it is virtually impossible to get into.'³

Molarity

The difference in régime illustrated by these two examples is stark. On the one hand, an order built on the myth of nationhood, or heritage, on memory and history, on xenophobia and fear, a molar régime of regulation, dreams of sovereignty and independent agency. On the other, fluid communication, migrations without regard for the clumsy geographies of the
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political world, a market of tendencies and directions rather than objects and exchanges. A capitalist economy feeds through the State, which imposes its dogmas and fears, its racism and hatreds on the movements of people and money; a market is open; its principles immanent to its operation. Money doesn’t recognize boundaries any more than bacteria do; it is this difference which Deleuze and Guattari are pointing up in their distinction between rhizomatic and arborescent régimes, between molecular flows and molar structures.

The indifference of nomadic distributions to concepts and ideals is not wise and paternalistic, equal and fair, racist or misogynistic, but naïve and cruel, with a strange innocence. This is not to say that royal science does not have vicious observational habits amongst the tools of its wisdom:

"pure cultures...in Petri-dish concentration camps, are just bacteria whose social and community behaviour has been reduced to the level that we investigators can manage." 14

There are gaps through which things escape, solving problems without recognition, unless they are trapped on the Strata, deadened by a society with a hypertrophied conscience and little imagination. Breeding Demons has shown a relationship between Kant and Deleuze which is folded in gaps in Kant over which the tracks of third things - schema, transcendental objects, noumena - run, without thought that the intensive depth beneath them involves differently to the straight lines and segmented space of the subject. The degree to which it might be called a feminist thesis is the degree to which it indicates a potential for escaping the history of philosophy as an institutionalized and exclusively male domain, and making it work across different dimensions, according to different privileges. Woman the Object is an effect of the subject; but becoming-woman as the process of moving in-between, with AND logics and eliminative deductions suggests a different way out of the problem than

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seeking to constitute one more theory of subjectivity. Schopenhauer (a misogynist but not to the core, for like Fox-Keller he does not suppose nature shares our romances), and the first Kantian, speaks of a direction towards the imperceptible. Representation, he says, offers no route, for it places the thing-in-itself, or will, outside itself, and constructs its reality through ideal forms, the secondary functions of the brain which large and feeble organisms such as man require in order to negotiate the complexities of their world. He suggests, however, another way:

'It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, which, as if by treachery, places us all at once in the fortress that could not be taken by attack from without.'

This is very similar to a remark Irigaray makes about science, about the need to appear within it, in the middle; rather than adopting once more the external perspective and critiquing the surface structures she suggests finding the subterranean passages. Kant knew also of these tunnellings, or Maulwurfsgänge as he calls them. His critical response, however, was to block them off, since they threatened the ground and the 'security of the superstructures'. However, as his trip on the lagoon shows, and his theorization of repulsive forces, he too can be in the middle, without recognition.

"Il arrivait à des penseurs, dit-on, d'expliquer que le mouvement était impossible, et cela n'empêchait pas le mouvement de se faire.

(It is said that there were thinkers who explained that movement was impossible, but that this did not prevent movement from occurring)."

It is said that there were thinkers who explained that women thinking was impossible: but this did not prevent the thinking from occurring.
Notes to Introduction

1. L'Arc, p99

2. K, VII:85


5. L'Arc, p99

6. Deleuze, Interview in Le Monde, 19-20 June, 1977

7. Alistair Welchman, 'Deleuze on Stage at the Academy' in British Journal of Nietzsche Studies (forthcoming)


11. K, VII:309

12. Ibid.

13. For this discussion, cf. K, VI, pp313-315


15. Ibid.


17. Dr. Copernicus, John Banville, Minerva, p209


19. Primary Truths, in Leibniz Philosophical Writings, p 91

20. Monadology, para. 7
21. Leibniz’s Fourth Paper (Correspondence with Clarke), in Leibniz Philosophical Writings, p218

22. cf. Monadology, para. 25

23. cf. Leibniz Philosophical Writings, pp. 218 & 235

24. K, III: A33/B49

25. K, III: A36/B52

26. K, III: A31/B46


29. K, III: A31-2/B47

30. K, III: A30/B46


32. cf. Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins Descartes to Kant, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969: ‘In his psychologising account, Kant frequently characterises the form of time also by the remark that all our sense-contents are “apprehended” always “as successive” (cf. K, III: B224/B234), something that reminds us of Locke’s attempt to define time in terms of the successive order of our ideas. But this would be a misunderstanding [italics added]. Both succession and simultaneity can only be expressed as happenings in time, characterised through time, which is - whatever it may be - still presupposed.’ (Buchdahl, p642n2)

The point of this discussion of time in the Introduction is precisely in order to preclude both a psychologistic rendering of time in terms of succession, and the introduction of meaning into the pure form of time through its reference to the relational grammar of empirical experience.

Buchdahl goes on to say: ‘[I]t is only in the context of an empirical language i.e., when regarded as forms in which perceptions (actual or potential) occur, that the expressions “space”, “time”, have a meaning; and this holds even in the case of intuitions that are “pure”, i.e., where we abstract from any sensory determinations or presence.’ (Buchdahl, p647) Independently of this empirical meaning, the pure forms of space and time have neither meaning nor definition: this radical
indeterminacy is, as will be seen later in the thesis, what is important in Deleuze's encounter with Kant.

33. K, IV: Axiin

34. Correspondence, fn. p122/Apr. 7/1786 to J Bering. 266. vol. x p441. and. Werke, XIII, 182f


38. S, 1969(II): 41. In On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Schopenhauer elaborates a theory of empirical intuition as intellectual: this is a consequence of his collapse of the elaborate Kantian conceptual architecture and might seem to eliminate the critical difference of understanding and sensibility - the transcendental difference. What it does, however, is displace it, referring it to the relation between the world as representation and the world as will, situating it on the level of Ideas and their adequate objectification, so rendering it an objective rather than subjective problematic, prior to the possibility of psychologistic interpretations. Perception is generated through understanding, a subjective function operating in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason; however, its explanation is physiological, and specific to animals, rather than merely to man: between the understanding of animals and that of man 'the difference is only one of degree.' (Fourfold Root, p111)


40. S, 1969(I): 175

41. S, 1969(I): 97

42. S, 1969(I): 146

43. S, 1969(I): 164

44. S, 1969(I): 145
45. This thesis employs the word “real” in a similar sense: that is, not as a conceptual term (e.g., Realität), but as a reference to uncaused actuality, or the effective qualities of the thing-in-itself or will, and, in a Deleuzian register, to the desiring or machinic unconscious.

46. S, 1969(II); 191


50. DG, 1972: 336; 1984: 283

51. DP, 1977: 8; 1987: 2

52. Welchman, On the Matter of Chaos, p153

53. The dangers of replacing a patriarchal God with a feminine divinity are pointed out by Teresa Brennan, who points to Kristeva’s appeal to the Virgin Mary and Irigaray’s feminine Godhead. Arguing against conclusions which focus on these appeals as strategic ploys, she asks: "strategy for whom? If we know that God does not exist but they need to believe that She does, what precisely are we saying?" Brennan’s comment on the difficulty of taking such appeals seriously is succinct: "The difficulty with these writings is less with the writings as such than with the commentators’ attempts to deal with the embarrassment of having an otherwise admired thinker apparently endorsing God." Brennan, 1993, p172, n6

54. Schopenhauer, Parerga & Paralipomena, Werke vol 4

55. DG, 1972: 106; 1984; 88

56. DG, 1980: 632; 1988; 506

57. D, 1968: 189; 1994; 145

58. DL, 1991: 164
Notes to Chapter 1


4. The question of the production of the a priori accord of faculties in common sense is not addressed by Kant until the third Critique, and his solution will not be explored this thesis.

5. K, IV: B161n

6. Ibid.


8. K, V: 295n

9. K, V: 293

10. Ibid.


12. Ibid.

13. K, III: B161n


15. D, 1963:40; 1984:26


17. K, III: B312/A257


19. K, V: 239

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20. K, V: 239

21. Machine assemblages, at this early stage of the thesis, can be read as Deleuze's re-formulation of a faculty system, and the BwO as the transcendental: however, this correlation must be read in scare quotes, since, as yet, how it is arrived at has not been explained. It will become clearer as the thesis continues.


23. K, IV: 433

24. K, IV: 414


26. L'Arc, 1980: 4

27. K, V: 50


29. K, V: 44

30. K, V: 176

31. K, IV: 323

32. D, 1963: 97; 1984: 68

33. DP 1977: 15; 1987: 9

34. K, III: A839/B867

Ralf Meerbote’s paper, ‘Deleuze on the Systematic Unity of the Critical Philosophy’ remarks on both the attention to system and the immanent nature of Deleuze’s book on Kant, leading to a presentation of ‘those leading ideas of Kant’s which shape the content and direction of the entire Critical enterprise’ (Meerbote, 347); this helps to elucidate ‘a number of rather more fragmentary discussions in the literature of parts of the Critical enterprise, often supporting those discussions and deriving support from them in turn’ (Meerbote, 354). This last remark highlights the positive nature of Deleuze’s interaction with Kant, with produces from within the system, rather than acting on it from the outside.


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37. K, III: A328/B385


39. cf Deleuze's preface to *Variations*. Jean-Clet Martin: 'Je crois à la philosophie comme système. C'est la notion de système qui me déplait quand on la rapporte aux coordonnées de l'Identique, du Semblable et de l'Analogue. C'est Leibniz, je crois, qui le premier identifie système et philosophie. Au sens où il le fait, j'y adhère.' (p7)

40. L, 1973: 190, para.67

41. D, 1993[2]:89

42. L, 1993:120
Notes to Chapter 2

1. DG 1980: 466; 1988: 376

2 D, 1962: 118; 1983: 103


5. cf. *Un Manifeste de Moins*, in *Superpositions*. Here, Deleuze explores Carmelo Bene's 'Richard III' as an illustration of the minor treatment of theatre. This is not anti-theatre, just as his reading of Kant is not anti-philosophy. It is rather a more precise operation, of subtraction and deduction. However: 'Vous ne pouvez même pas dire que c’est une opération négative, tant elle engage et enclanche déjà des processus positifs (you can’t even say that it is a negative operation, since it already engages and meshes with positive processes.)' (D, 1979: 103) Stable elements, constants, and the indicators of power are stripped out, to expose 'le rôle des opérateurs, répondant à l'idée d'intervalle «plus petit». (the role of operators, responding to the idea of the smallest interval).’ (D, 1979: 106) Negation is thus a consequence of affirmation. Cf. *Différence et Répétition*, esp. Chapter 1 for discussion of this Nietzsche-informed sense of affirmation and negation.

6. K, III:B129


8. K, III:A162/B203

9. K, III:A68/B93

10 The elimination of sensible differences in favour of distinctions which can be mapped in extensive space connects with the problem of enantiomorphic bodies, and with Irigaray's critique of Kant, and is addressed in chapter six. In 'Kant on the Impossibility of the "Soft Sciences", Nayak and Sotnak argue for the measurability of intensive magnitudes, and for some other way of differentiating between intensive and extensive magnitudes than through a difference between ordinal and cardinal measurability. They argue that 'the filling of space by matter is ultimately grounded in quality (force) [so] forces are not constructible in terms of quantity, for quantity would then be more basic than quality'. This latter is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari argue for: quantify writing, they say, in *Mille Plateaux*. See also 'Construction and Mathematical Schematism: Kant on the Exhibition of a Concept in Intuition' (Alfredo Ferrarin), where a difference is made between numbers and numbering; this is also a working difference in *Mille Plateaux*, in
relation to the distinction between science as war machine, or *Dispars* and science as royal state thought, or *Compars*. See Chapter Three for discussion of this.

11. i.e., problem as a differential idea, as discussed in the text.

12. K, III: B207

13. K, III: A166/B208


15. K, III: B154


19. L'Arc, p41

20 S, 1977: 112


22. Gerd Buchdahl, *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins, Descartes to Kant*, Blackwell (Oxford), 1969, p670. Another remark of Buchdahl’s clarifies the formalist function of understanding: ‘To say that it [the act of combination by understanding] is ‘logical’ and ‘spontaneous’ is to say that it is not a material detail, but only a manner of characterising the nature of objective cognition, and of the logical intentions of the cognitive judgement.’ Ibid p632n. Logically spontaneous combination provides nothing that goes beyond the concept of the subject, which is the problem of synthetic a priori judgement.

23. K, III: A139/B178

24. DP, 1986: vii

25. DP, 1986: vii


28. ‘Les gonds, c’est l’axe autour duquel la porte tourne. Le gond, *Cardo*, indique la subordination du temps aux points précisément cardinaux par où passent les
mouvements périodiques qu'il mesure. Tant que le temps reste dans ses gonds, il est subordonné au mouvement extensive: il en est la mesure, intervalle ou nombre.

(The hinges are the axis around which the door turns. Cardo designates the subordination of time to the cardinal points through which the periodical movements that it measures pass. As long as time remains on its hinges, it is subordinate to movement: it is the measure of movement, interval or number). (D, 1993[1]:40; 1963:vii)

That Kantian time is not logical time, but unhinged from the conceptual order of the understanding, and determined cardinally only in relation to understanding and epistemological common sense is a resource which Deleuze uses to the full. This empty form of time feeds right through his philosophy, into the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, as the zero intensity of the body without organs: this will become more clear as the thesis continues. Passive syntheses are the topic of chapter four.

29. K, III:A193/B238
30. D, 1993[1]:42
33. K, III:B345/A289
34. Allison differentiates between a causal and a semantic account of the thing-in-itself, dismissing the first on the grounds that if things-in-themselves are taken to be causes, then 'it is presupposed that we can refer to them, and this is the very point at issue.' The second differentiates between the concept of an appearances and the concept of a thing as it is in itself; he challenges this, on the basis that it suggests that appearances and thing-in-itself 'refer to two distinct entities, the claim being that reference to entities of the former sort presupposes the possibility of references to those of the latter sort' and thus does not allow for the 'transcendental distinction between two ways of considering one and the same thing.' (Allison, p240) His solution is to differentiate between modes of consideration, one which is empirical and sensible, the other speculative and reflective. It is this interpretation which leads him to the assimilation of the thing-in-itself and the noumenon: 'To consider an object as it is in itself is just to treat it as a noumenon'. (Allison p243) However, the collapse of the noumenon into the thing-in-itself, given the function of the noumenon as described in this chapter, pushes the compulsion to assume the object in general, or transcendental object, exercised by practical reason on understanding, back into transcendental matter and thus into sensation. This tendency to lock Kant down by the assimilation of differences into unities is
counter to Deleuze's insistence that the smallest differences can generate the greatest effects: there is more butterfly effect in Deleuze than in Allison.

35. K, III: A30/B45

36. K, III: B427 See also discussion of this issue in Chapter Four

37. Cf. p52ff.

38. K, IV: 309


42. K, XI: pp33–40

43. K, VIII: 194

44. K, VIII: 193–4

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. K, IV: A143/B183. Kemp Smith's translation of this passage reads it with a negative: 'that in the objects which corresponds to sensation is not the transcendental matter...'; This reading supports Allison’s case for drawing an equivalence between the thing-in-itself and the noumenon which collapses their difference. As said above (note 24), it is precisely these differences which Deleuze teases out.


49. D, 1993[1]: 41; 1984: ix

50. K, III: A21/B35

51. DG, 1972: 127; 1984: 106


53. K, III: B210/A169


56. K, III: A643/B671

57. K, III: A644/B672

58. K, III: A374

59. K, III: A581-2/B609-10

60. K, IX: 91

61. K, III: A30/B45

62. K, III: A647/B675


64. D, 1968: 186; 1994: 143

65. K, III: A296/B353

66 Ibid.


68. Ibid.


70. DG, 1972: 89; 1984: 75

71. K, III: A853/B882


73. DG, 1972: 8; 1988: 2
Notes to Chapter 3


5. DG, 1980: 537; 1988: 430

6. K, IV: 498

7. For a fuller discussion of the properties attributed to attractive and repulsive forces, and for the source of the information contained in the table, cf. K, IV: 496ff

8. K, IV: 510

The matter of differences which are felt, but not conceptual connects with the problem of enantiomorphic bodies, and is discussed in chapter six, with reference to Irigaray’s work on this.

9. K, IV: 505


11. K, III: A661/B688


13. K, IV: 525


17. K, IV: 508


19. K, IV: 503
Deleuze and Guattari take full advantage of the fact that Kantian intuition is not of necessity attached to Euclidean space nor to cardinality. From the four poetic formulae summarizing the Kantian philosophy, through Différence et Répétition and L'anti-œdipe and on into Mille Plateaux, the difference between cardinality and ordinality is a continuing theme. In Mille Plateaux there is a discussion of the difference between State and nomadic numbers. The former 'gain mastery over matter...control its variations and movements', and refer only to a single base. Numbering numbers do not presuppose number, but 'appear as soon as one distributes something in space, instead of dividing up space or distributing space itself'. They are 'ciphered, rhythmic, directional, autonomous, movable' and articulated, as opposed to metric, punctuated. (cf. DG, 1980: 483ff; 1988: 387ff) The complexities of this, however, are outside the current range of my knowledge; this remark indicates, but does not explain, the difference between the numbered numbers of the State and the numbering numbers of the nomos.
34. K, IV: 514

35. K, IV: 523

36. There is a discussion of the sublime in chapter five.

37. K, VIII: 169n

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. K, VIII: 156

41. K, V: 245-6

42. K, VII: 156

43. K, IV: 520n

44. K, IV: 519

45. K, IV: 520n

46. K, III: A660/B688

47. DG, 1980: 257; 1988: 211

48. K, IV: 519

49. Ibid.

50. K, IV: 520n

51. K, VIII: 157

52. K, VIII: 157

53. K, V: 373

54. K, V: 141
Attractors are of different types. Zero-dimensional attractors draw whatever falls within their basin to a fixed point of rest. A pendulum without a driving motor is drawn to a rest midway in its period, slowed by friction. Its phase diagram spirals inwards to a central static point. The State in Deleuze and
Guattari’s work functions as a zero-dimensional attractor. A limit cycle or periodic attractor describes an orbit; a pendulum driven at a constant rate circles continuously, any fluctuations being temporary deviations from equilibrium, being returned within a short time to the orbit. In other words, no fluctuation is sufficiently deviant to escape the basin of the attractor. A strange or chaotic attractor, which arose out of problems in fluid dynamics, refers to systems with no periodicity, which describe orbits which never return to the same point, never intersects itself, and is of infinite depth within finite space. This is because of what Gleich calls a ‘mille-feuille’ effect, and he quotes Lorenz: ‘We see that each surface is really a pair of surfaces, so that, where they appear to merge, there are really four surfaces. Continuing this process for another circuit, we see that there are really eight surfaces, etc., and we finally conclude that there is an infinite complex of surfaces, each extremely close to one or the other of two merging surfaces.’ (G, 1987:141) This has clear connections with the paradox of surface and depth in Deleuze’s writing, and with the infinitely involuting differenciation of intensities. See also: DG, 1991: 1994:206; and Prigogine and Stengers, Order out of Chaos.

73.B, 1987;124


75 K,VII:113
Notes to Chapter 4

1. DG, 1972:26; 1984:19


‘Rencontrer, c’est trouver, c’est capturer, c’est voler, mais il n’y a pas de méthode pour trouver, rien qu’une longue préparation. Voler, c’est le contraire de plagier, de copier, d’imiter ou de faire comme. La capture est toujours une double-capture, le vol, un double-vol, et c’est cela qui fait, non pas quelque chose de mutuel, mais un bloc asymétrique, une évolution a-parallèle, des noces, toujours «hors» et «entre».

(To encounter is to find, to capture, to steal, but there is no method for finding other than a long preparation. Stealing is the opposite of plagiarizing, copying, imitating, or doing like. Capture is always a double-capture, theft a double-theft, and it is that which creates not something mutual, but an asymmetrical block, an a-parallel evolution, nuptials, always “outside” and “between”.)

3. DG, 1984:xii


6. DG, 1972:266; 1984:224


8. DG, 1972:19; 1984:13


10. ‘[A] machine has only motive force [bewegende Kraft]. But an organized being has within it formative force (bildende Kraft) that this being imparts to the kinds of matter that lack it (thereby organizing it). This force is therefore a formative force that propagates itself - a force that a mere ability to move (Bewegungsvermögen) (i.e., mechanism) cannot explain.’ (K, V:374)

Kant’s third Critique was influential not only on the naturphilosophische movement emerging around Jena, but, more broadly, helped to shape the theoretical foundations of nineteenth century German biology; Blumenbach, an anthropologist and comparative anatomist, provided empirical confirmation of
problems on which Kant had been working, and Kant in turn influenced the course of Blumenbach’s own work.

In the third Critique Kant eliminates analogs for the formative force of natural bodies. To call organisms analogs of art is, for Kant, to suggest an external design agency, a rational power which can in principle be isolated from matter. Natural self-organization is implicated with a force which, whilst strictly unknown, is inseparable from matter and ‘preformed virtualiter in the intrinsic purposive predispositions imparted to the stock (Stamm).’ (K,V:423) Influenced by Blumenbach, Kant calls the force Bildungstrieb. Unlike mechanical or aesthetic relations, where the form of possibility is extrinsic to their sensible configuration, the reciprocal relations of force in a natural product are not formalized in advance of their dynamic distribution, and their qualities cannot be qualified and equalized in extension.

The direction in which this force develops, the nature of the material filling of space, is not determined mathematically, as is the space-filling force in mechanistic dynamics, but is, Kant argues, the function of a purpose - at least for the purposes of judgement. A natural purpose (Zweck) is an order manifest in a particular arrangement of the parts, from whose interrelation a result eventually emerges. Each part not only exists for the sake of every other part, but each part also stands in a mutually reciprocal productive relation to every other part.

Variations in the result can become hereditary, as mechanical feedback from the concrete situation of a body potentiates different aspects of the pattern of virtual preformation. However, the concept of intrinsic purposiveness requires that localized changes are conceived of as no more than the capacitation of ‘undeveloped original predispositions’ (K,V:420) in the virtual pattern. If this were not the case, the separation of mechanism and teleology would be compromised; if mechanical action were understood as a primary function in the material organization of the body, rather than simply a consequence of local selective pressures, or as Kant puts it, ‘a subordinate cause of intentional effects’ (K,V:414), then the door would be held open to suggestions of animism, to mystical internal forms, or the ‘alien principle (a soul)’ (K,V:375) as explanatory principles for the workings of a body which has been reduced back to mechanism.

The concept of a natural purpose holds teleology and mechanism, and the distribution of forces each implies, apart: understanding a maggot as a natural purpose gives no reason to ‘count on there being a mechanical way of producing it’ (K,V:412). But once a maggot is understood mechanistically, and disassembled through putrefaction, the idea of a purposive causality will not put the elements back together, and reproduce the same product. The forces of mechanism and teleology - gravity and Bildungstrieb - are materially incompatible, non-communicating distributions.
When discussing the character of natural organization, Kant differentiates the causality implicated in it from that which determines mechanical relations. In the latter, causal connectivity is progressive, 'constituting a descending series' (K, V: 372) of efficient causes; a cause conditions an effect and the necessity of the relation is enclosed within them, as between two points or states. When the will is implicated, dependency is both progressive and regressive, and any connection is both caused and effected. The general idea of reason covering the systematic and collective unity of this doubled causality is purpose. It is tempting to see a connection between Kant's theory of self-organization and purposive causality and the immanent distribution and reverse causality referred to by Deleuze and Guattari. However, they emphasize that reverse causality is without finality, and equate teleology with good sense. Whilst Kant's concept of teleology introduces the problem of self-organization, his solution is reconciled with the universality and necessity of mechanism, through the supersensible principle of convertibility; it is this collapse into unity which Deleuze and Guattari argue against, together with the exclusive disjunction which separates the zones of teleology and mechanism. In L'anti-oedipe they gloss the problem in the following terms: in both systems 'the machine and desire...remain in an extrinsic relationship, either because desire appears as an effect determined by a system of mechanical causes, or because the machine is itself a system of means in terms of the aims of desire.' (DG, 1972, 1980: 284)

An additional incidental point is that Kant's relation with Blumenbach illustrates his ongoing reference to empirical data.

11. There are clearly arguments to be had concerning what Kant means by the content of a concept: if it is taken to mean partial concepts conjoined under one more general concept, the definition is purely logical. In this discussion, however, it is to be understood as the heterogeneous manifold of intuition (empirical and/or a priori) combined according to a rule of synthesis given by understanding. It thus involves references to matter and to time and space. A real definition of concepts involves 'descending to the conditions of sensibility, and so to the form of appearances' (K, III: A240–41/B300) which separates logical content from real content, and contributes to the objective validity of a pure concept.

13. K, III: B420
15. K, III: B428
16. S, WWVII: Chp. XXII
17. S, WWVII: p273

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In the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, in *Refutation of Mendelssohn’s Proof of the Permanence of the Soul* (K, III: B 142), Kant argues against the possibility of proving a continuity of existence of a soul by any of the following means: negative arguments to the effect that since it cannot disappear or vanish, or be annihilated, it must be permanent; rational arguments seeking to prove the inexplicability of the I think based on a heterogeneous ground; logical arguments appealing to contradiction; materialist arguments based on the dynamical division of intensive quantities. His own case is based on a difference between intensive magnitudes of existence and the real. The real, ‘the supposed substance - the thing [*das Ding*]’, he argues ‘may be changed into nothing, not indeed by dissolution, but by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers, and so, if I may be permitted use of the term, by elanguescence.’ (K, III: B 414). However, the real is no less real for this remission of powers. This is important in relation to Deleuze’s argument against possibility, as a logical intervention which produces paralogisms by separating the real from what it can do. In *Différence et Répétition*, he writes: ‘Le virtuel ne s’oppose pas au réel, mais seulement à l’actual. Le virtuel possède une plein réalité, en tant que virtuel (the virtual is not opposed to the real but to the actual. *The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual*).’ (D, 1968: 269; 1994: 208) (Also cf. Deleuze’s Bergsonism, where the relation of the virtual to memory is explored.)

Elanguescence, or the remission of intensities, is a relaxation or diminution in the the density of intensive magnitude, a differentiation of qualities, and comes out of early work on the problem of calculus. (The term “difformation” rather than the more obvious “deformation” is used here, and below, in order to avoid the privative implications of the prefix “de-” and the generally negative sense of deformation. “Difform” carries the sense of diversity, asymmetry, non-uniformity and irregularity of form which deform does not and it is this positive dimension of intensity which is important for Deleuze.) In a brief discussion in *Superpositions*, Deleuze refers to attempts by physicists in the middle ages to theorize the multiplicity of types of qualitative variations in intensive forms, calling the geometry arising from this ‘une géométrie des vitesses et des intensités, des affects’ (D, 1979: 115); he mentions Nicholas Oresme (c. 1323-1382), who investigated the latitude of forms. Boyer’s *The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development*, refers to the use of the word ‘form’ here in the following terms: ‘There seems to be no scientific term which correctly expresses the equivalent of the word *form* as here used. It refers in general to any quality which admits of variation and which involves the intuitive idea of intensity - that is, to such notions as velocity, acceleration, density...In general the latitude of a form was the degree to which the latter possessed a certain quality, and the discussion centred about the *intensio* and the *remissio* of the form, or the alterations by which this quality is acquired or lost.’ (B, 1949: 73) The connection with Deleuze’s theory of intensive magnitudes is quite clear: in *Mille Plateaux*, it is mentioned explicitly:
Notes to Chapter 4

‘Nous distinguons: 1) les CsO, qui diffèrent comme des types, des genres, des attributs substantiels, par exemple le Froid du CsO drogué, le Dolorifère du CsO masochiste: chacun a son degré 0 comme principe de production (c’est la remissio); 2) ce qui se passe sur chaque type de CsO, c’est-à-dire les modes, les intensités produites, les ondes et vibrations qui passent (la latitudo); 3) l’ensemble éventuel de tous les CsO, le plan de consistance (l’Omnitudo, qu’on appelle parfois le CsO).

(We distinguish between: (1) BwO’s, which are different types, genuses, or substantial attributes. For example, the Cold of the drugged BwO, the Pain of the masochist BwO. Each has its degree 0 as its principle of production (remissio). (2) What happens on each type of BwO, in other words, the modes, the intensities that are produced, the waves that pass (latitudo). (3) The potential totality of all BwO’s, the plane of consistency (Omnitudo, sometimes called the BwO)). (DG, 1980:195; 1988:159)

Other references include discussions of: intensive latitudes as ‘diformément difformes (differently difformed)’ - Oresme’s latitudo difformiter difformis, (DG, 1980:310; 1988:253); Spinoza’s question of what a body can do, where latitude is defined as ‘faite de parties intensives sous une capacité (made up of intensive parts falling under a capacity)’ (Ibid.314/256) - which draws connections between the Omnitudo or “ailness” of the plane of consistency and Spinoza’s substance, central to Deleuze (and Guattari’s) work; Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, p35ff, where Omnitudo is associated with fractals and immanence.

19. K, III: B 130

20. cf. K, V: paras.25,26,27. Here, Kant explains the two functions of imagination - apprehension and comprehension - which function together in estimating magnitudes by means of number - as is necessary for knowledge claims: ‘imagination performs the combination that is required to present a magnitude’. [Ibid.p254] In the mathematical sublime the differential of these two functions exceeds the possibility of numerical quantification - the intensive difference cannot be extensively formulated, no magnitude can be presented - that is, none which can be reproduced successively as a measurable unit-none which can be numbered. Instead, the imagination inflicts violence on inner sense and ‘makes simultaneity intuitable’. [Ibid.259] The principle of progression which underlies the psychologic understanding of time as succession collapses, and imagination attempts to comprehend in an instant what is, in the theoretical framework, apprehended successively. This suffices to illustrate the independence of imagination in relation to understanding, an independence which is implicated, at the very least, in the first Critique, most notably in comments such as:

‘Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded.
There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension."[K,III:A121] The importance of this separation of the powers of understanding and imagination is great when one is considering Kant not from the perspective of the rational subject, but from the position of those associations attaching to women - which include nature, imagination and the object.

23. K,III:A51/B75
24. cf. K,IV:309n
25. DG,1972:34; 1984:26
27. K,III:B414
28. An essay by Irigaray focuses specifically on matters of fluidity. In This Sex Which is Not One, in The "Mechanics of Fluids" she points out 'a complicity of long standing between rationality and a mechanics of solids alone'(I,1985E:107), which leaves unconsidered the specific dynamics of fluids, having various "tricks" with which to side-step the problems it generates for a mechanics of solids. The theoretical engagement with fluid dynamics has, she argues, detached them from the reality of bodies. Her argument crosses Deleuze (and Guattari) on several points, including the non-denumerability of fluid diffusions, on its greater sensitivity to pressure, on the infinite nearness of its elements, and on its instability. It must thus also have closenesses to Kant's theory of intensities. Irigaray correlates the exclusion of fluidity with that of women: 'what she emits is flowing, fluctuating. Blurring.'(Ibid.112) Like fluidity, she argues, women lack definite identification, and are irreducible to the symmetry consecrated between the subject and its world in the theatre of representation.

There is also a connection between Irigaray's questions regarding mathematical analyses of fluids and the problem of instantaneous velocity implied by the quantitative study of variation addressed in the theory of the latitude of forms (cf.Note 16). Irigaray argues that fluid currents are considered in relation to a privileged axis, a point, which leaves some remainder: 'Up to infinite: the centre of these "movements" corresponding to zero supposes in them an infinite speed, which is physically unacceptable'.(Ibid.p109) Deleuze's response to this is complex; very briefly, it involves the insistence
that absolute or infinite speed proceeds by way of relative speeds; in other words, it is immanent to the creation of a plane of consistency, rather than transcendent, produced rather than discovered. Absolute speed is associated with nomos, or nomadic distributions; ‘seul le nomade a un mouvement absolu, c’est-à-dire une vitesse ; le mouvement tourbillonnaire ou tournant appartient essentiellement à sa machine de guerre (only nomads have absolute movement, in other words, speed; vortical or swirling movement is an essential feature of their war machine)’; a nomad is ‘dans un absolu local (in a local absolute)’. (DG, 1980:473-4; 1988:381-2)

29.K,III:A291/B347


32. The simplest example is that of convection. Take a cell of fluid which can be heated on the bottom and cooled from the top. The difference in temperature (an intensive quantity) controls the flow, heat being conducted towards the top of the cell; as the heat increases the fluid expands, becoming less dense, lighter, and the molecules move more rapidly, colliding as they push towards the surface. The system becomes chaotic. However, further increases in heat give rise to behaviour which is counter to assumptions possible from the point of view of the two constraints on the system, gravity and the second law of thermodynamics. A cylindrical role develops, heated fluid rising and cooling fluid falling in a continuous cycle, and the system displays a consistency and activity beyond the thresholds of behavioural possibility defined by the two constraints on the system, gravity and the second law of thermodynamics. cf. Massumi, A User’s guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari, p58ff.

33. Sandy Stone notes the ultra-femininity of both pre- and post-operative male to female transsexuals. The imperative which defines them is that of passing: they must pass as women both in order to be considered suitable candidates for the medical procedure and to minimize the difficulty of settling into the socially defined ways of a woman once they have been physically reconfigured. In the ‘60’s, when these operations became economically and medically interesting, a single book outlined the criteria according to which suitability was determined. Strangely, all applicants fulfilled these criteria; they had the book too.

Stone’s point is that the fixation on medical procedures and defined psychological criteria, and the willingness of medical institutions and their clients to satisfy them, is socially produced along with binary sexual difference and neither have any necessary relevance to the processes implicated in the continual invention of a body, processes which the theft of a child’s body channel along a pre-determined course. Male? Fourteen? Time to be a social nuisance, smash a window, get a gun. Female? Forty? Time
to go grey and wear sensible shoes. A molar body is fixed across a set of interconnected criteria whose most basic resolution is in terms of a sexual biology and a psychological and intellectual make-up which "fits" that sex and which has appropriate phenomena attached to it at any given age and in any given socio-economic bracket. Paul Broca, working in the second half of the nineteenth century, laboured hard to prove that brain size was correlated with intelligence. Since it was common knowledge that European males were more intelligent than women and other lesser human types, Broca's task was to generate quantitative data which would confirm this a priori truth. To do so, "[h]e traversed the gap between fact and conclusion by what may be the usual route - predominantly in reverse" (G, 1992: 85). Broca wanted to fix a brain which would correlate with the body in which he found it, rather than research the brain as such, and Stone's argument aims implicitly at thwarting this insistence on the permitted band of deviation dictated by the demand for unity, both historically and of the body. (Cuvier's brain, - which 'reflects a Euclidean space' (DG, 1980: 63; 1988: 47) - was, incidentally, discovered by Broca to be the largest in France.)

When expressions of desire become incommensurate with the codes applied to the body, the gulf is corrected by providing the body with a new set of sexual characteristics, making the content fit the expression. That is, if psycho-analysis cannot cure this problem it produced first. The misfit of desire with the socially coded body is clearly associated with the sex/gender distinction: the proper alignment of gender, or social coding and sex, or biological coding, results in the organization of a whole system, a whole man or woman. The paucity of this distinction is made clear by Stone, who argues for bodies in continual invention, becomings, rather than the medical re-invention of the occasional body so that it might properly contain the psychological make-up analysis has exposed. She calls these post-transsexual because there are no longer gulfs and gaps and sexual lines to be crossed but n-sexes, bodies machined by desire. Not the institutionalized re-arrangement of an object so that its gender and it's sex might once more meet, and the facts fit the advance conclusion.

Stone's desire for post-transsexualism is caught up with discussions in Difference and Repetition and A Thousand Plateaus of Geoffroy St. Hilaire's abstract Animal, because both refuse conditions extrinsic to the material processes through which bodies are formed as organs of a machinic assemblage, and repel the positions and places, images and instincts allotted to them, the fixation of desire on an object and the pre-occupation of bodies by imaginary values. Real engineering does not make objects, but assembles bits and pieces, partial-objects, transposable elements which, depending on their location and their movements transform the timing and control of development. The basic unit is the assemblage, a body composed through its own functioning, not organized from on high, and the human body is but a part of this, not its controller.

34.DP, 1977:71; 1987:57

35.Ibid.

36.cf. Chp.2, fn.67 on attractors.


38.In his Introduction to La Bête Humaine, Deleuze talks of the paradox of heredity, and the confusion of what is transmitted with the transmission itself; transmission, he suggests, transmits only itself, not as a message, but as transmission, a process not an object. Zola, cinematographic novelist, is caught up in a singular process of transformation which cuts through the novel as it does through philosophy and cinema. Transmission is the crack [la fêlure], or fundamental difference itself: the pure form of time, ‘le grand Vide intérieur’. (D, 1969:11) Wrecking linearity and installing an abstract core of sterility into processes of which a subject is no more than a residue, paradox is removed from the realm of logical problem to become a perpetuum mobile, and force of machinic production. The term term used by Deleuze (and Guattari) for this problem of transmission in Mille Plateaux is machinic phylum.


41.DG,1972:106; 1984:88


4. K, V: 266

5. K, V: 266


7. K, V: 269

8. K, V: 261

9. Ibid.


15. K, III: A141/B180


17. K, III: A649/B677

18. Architectonically, reason grows 'from within (per intussceptionem), but not by external addition (per appositionem). It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which is not by the addition of a new member, but by the rendering of each member, without change of proportion, stronger and more effective for its purposes.' (K, III: 833/B861) The Kantian faculties form delivery systems which remains unchanged by the delivery, since their products are absorbed into the ends of reason and fuel the growth of its strength, which in turn allows the strengthening of the delivery.
41. For the moment, this can be read as a transcendental function; however, the distance Deleuze and Guattari have moved this from its function in Kant as a condition of possibility for knowledge of the object will become clear in the explication of the body without organs, and its relation with desiring-machines (see also note 2).

42. DG, 1980: 199; 1988: 161

43. F, 1984: 311

44. K, IV: Axxi

45. K, III: A171/B213

46. DG, 1972: 342; 1984: 288

47. L, 1993: 190, para. 67


Notes to Chapter 5

19. K, V: 123

20. cf. Chapter 1 for discussion of the focus imaginarius.


22. K, V: 133

23. K, III: A707/B735

24. K, V: 133

25. K, IV: 428


27. K, III: B151


30. K, V: 76

31. K, V: 277


33. K, III: Axi

34. K, V: 265

35. K, V: 258

36. K, II: 228

37. Ibid.

38. K, II: 209

1. Plato, *Timaeus*, 52 (para. 20)

2. 1,1977: 28; 1985:29

3. 1,1977: 24; 1985:24

4. 1,1977: 24; 1985:24

5. 1,1977: 26; 1985:26

6. Irigaray, *Is the Subject of Science Sexed?* p. 75

7. Ibid, p. 76

‘During the nineteenth century the final state of thermodynamic evolution was at the centre of scientific research. This was equilibrium thermodynamics. Irreversible processes were looked down on as nuisances, as disturbances, as subjects not worthy of study. Today this situation has completely changed. We now know that far from equilibrium, new types of structures may originate spontaneously. In far-from-equilibrium conditions we may have transformation from disorder, from thermal chaos, into order. New dynamic states of matter may originate, states that reflect the interaction of a given system with its surroundings. We have called these new structures *dissipative structures* to emphasize the constructive role of dissipative processes in their formation.’PS, 1985:12

8 1,1977: 28; 1985:28

9 1,1977: 26; 1985:26


11. 1,1977: 26; 1985:

12. 1,1977: 75; 1985:78

13. K, IV:286

14. The context of Kant’s argument is a debate with Leibniz; for Leibniz, space is an abstract and mathematical description of relations that hold between objects. Kant’s claim is that he is providing the
philosophical grounds of the possibility of Leibniz's mathematical determinations. His solution in Directions of Space is later revised. Using the same example as that in Directions in the Inaugural Dissertation, in the later work he reaches a different conclusion, which heralds the so-called critical turn. In the Prolegomena he writes: 'What is the solution? These objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves, and as some pure understanding would cognize them, but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances, whose possibility rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility.' (K, IV: 286) The Newtonian solution of an actual absolute space is abandoned for one arising out of the Copernican revolution, and the reference of sensibility to the pure form of intuition.

15. K, II: 382

16. And it was from Adam's left rib, the myth goes, that God created Eve.

17. See Chapter 2, Note 24..

18. K, III: A682/B710


20. K, III: A394


22. K, III: A394

23. Ibid.

24. K, III: A109

25. K, III: A345

26. K, III: B345/A289

27. K, III: A566/B594


29. K, III: A566/B594
30. K, IV: 286


32. I, 1974: 264; 1985: 211


34. The word pupil comes from the Latin *pupilla*, meaning 'a little doll'; the Hebrew expression for pupil is similar, *eshon ayin* meaning 'little man of the eye'. When looking in the eye of your fellow man, you are supposed to see a doll-like reflection of yourself, a sort of visual homunculus.


36. The problem is spurious because in the case of a space containing nothing but a single hand, the hand itself may be asymmetric, but it is meaningless to speak of it as either a left or a right hand in the absence of any other structure; it is not merely, as Kant says 'completely indeterminate in respect of such a property' (K, II: 383) but completely senseless to question whether such an object is a right or left hand, because left and right mean, in a Humpty Dumpty way, whatever we want them to mean. Only when a body missing a hand is introduced, the sides of which have already been decided in relation to left and right (power and sensibility, good and evil, Adam and Eve, etc.), does the question of which hand it is make sense: and then the problem can be resolved by naming the hand right and in turn the side of the body on which it fits can be called right. Only when there are two asymmetric objects present in the same space do the labels applied to each cease to be arbitrary.


38. K, II: 381


40. B, 1991: 261

41. *Inventing Women: Science, Technology and Gender*, p. 50.

42. Cell suicide, or apoptosis, is vital at all stages of an organism’s life: during the embryonic development of mammals, about half of all nerve cells self-destruct, and a failure to do so results in the build up of surpluses; cancer, for example, and the proliferation of cells which cause it can continue only when cells fail to self-destruct. One would be hesitant to describe this as ‘altruistic’; it is to account for processes such
as these without qualification by human values that Deleuze and Guattari use the term machinic. cf. The Economist, May 4th 1996, p. 103-4.

43. Inventing Women: Science, Technology and Gender, p.56.

44. Ibid.


47. ‘To claim that women’s experience is a source of true knowledge as well as the substance of the world to be known (the “female world”) constitutes the same “epistemic fallacy” as the one encountered by classical empiricists.’ [Women’s Experience and Feminist Epistemology, a critical new-rationalist approach in Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology.


49. DG, 1980:342; 1988:279


51. For Derrida’s relation to Heidegger with regard to sexuality, cf. ‘Geschlecht: sexual difference, ontological difference’ in Research into Phenomenology, XIII, 1983

Derrida’s own perspective on sexuality is distributed through his work, but see especially Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche and ‘Women in the Beehive’ in Men in Feminism.

52. Braidotti is not the only thinker to describe Deleuze in these terms: Alison Assiter, for example, in a brief comment on Deleuze suggests the same. It seems an inappropriate description. Deleuze does not begin with the death of the subject, but rather with a desire to generate an account of its real conditions. Both Différence et Répétition and L’anti-œdipe contain accounts of the production of subjectivity, both as a fixed and actively synthesizing agent and as a passive and larval entity effectuated by the sensible conditions forcing thought. This is referred to in an earlier chapter. C.f. Assiter, Alison, The Enlightened Woman: Modernist Feminism in a Postmodern Age.


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54. Marnia Lazreg highlights some of the philosophical difficulties implicit in the appeal to “women’s experiences” as a basis for a feminist epistemology, noting the tendency of such positions to fall into problems attached to empiricism more generally.

‘In so far as experience is central to the empiricist philosophy and theory of knowledge, one might think that feminists’ use of this concept is grounded in a discernible intellectual tradition. Yet feminists generally do not explicitly seek any grounding for experience and often act as if they had just discovered its import. It seems as thought any relationship between feminists’ use of experience and that of acknowledged empiricists is either fortuitous or the result of the unexamined (and therefore unsuspected) effect of an intellectual tradition steeped in pragmatism and positivism.’ p51

‘As far as feminist theorizing is concerned...the concept of experience as it is currently used is insufficient since it includes men as a reference rather than as a constitutive component. Men are usually seen as having constructed women’s reality instead of being engaged in a continuous process of interaction with women that is equally constructive of their reality.’ p51/2

‘In sum, contemporary feminists’ use of experience as the foundation of a theory of knowledge fits into the tradition of the empiricist school of philosophy and encounters many of the same epistemological problems.’ p55

Her objection seems to spring from critical instincts, and ask for a more rigorous formulation of the empirical: in this, she shares tendencies with Deleuze.

Quotes from ‘Women’s Experience and Feminist Epistemology, a critical new-rationalist approach’ in Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology.


56. B, 1991: 120

57. DG, 1980: 351; 1988: 275


60. B, 1991: 120 (the quote is from This Sex Which is Not One)
Notes to Chapter 6


63. B, 1994: 112

64. B, 1994: 118


68. B, 1991: 125

1. DL, 1991: 120

2. June Purvis writing in The Times Higher Education Supplement, April 26, 1996, p. 21


5. K, II: 228

6. K, V: 210

7. K, II: 234


13. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 44

14. Freud, Femininity, p. 115

15. Ibid, p. 116

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid, p. 124

18. Ibid, p. 130

19. Ibid, p. 128


21. Freud, Female Sexuality, p. 384
22. Freud, *Femininity*, p.131

23. Ibid, p. 118

24. K, II: 230

25. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* was written in 1764, seventeen years before the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In her paper 'The “Charming Distinction”: Urteil as the Engagement of Reason in Kant’s Thought', Olga Lucia Valbuena writes: ‘Kant’s commentators have not afforded much space either to the “Observations” or the Anthropology in their assessment of Kant’s philosophical development. Critics tend to find these texts suggestive but ultimately dispensable curiosities of Kant’s early and late period, respectively. Such a position favors reading the critical writings as though the ideas generated there were somehow disconnected from the early influences and late affirmations of his thinking. However, there does exist a continuity between the empirical and the critical dimensions of Kant’s writings that is worth exploring.’ From: *Genders*, Number 4, Spring 1989, Copyright 1989, University of Texas Press.

This is the case not only in relation to women, but also with regard to intensity: from the early paper on living forces through to the *Opus Postumum*, intensity and problems of force are a continuous theme in Kant’s writings.

26. K, II: 229

27. D, 1993a: 42


32. B, 1985(2): 224

33. One might wish to suggest that the thought of market, as described, implies idealism, and to argue that such an apparently “free” market, with no extrinsic governing features to distort or persuade its development in favour of any particular direction, is an impossibility, a pipe-dream of capital itself. Briefly, there are two directions from which to begin a response to this. Firstly, that the dichotomy
between free trade or exchange on the one hand and constrained or planned or determined trade on the other belongs to capital. Markets are “headless”, acephalous, rather than free and their growth or development is effected through the partialities or biases of the elements of which they are composed. Secondly, the accusation of idealism illustrates a failure to comprehend immanence and the relation of immanence to its own abstraction, which is real; that is, it functions as a virtual machine added alongside the actual, rather than as an ideal abstracted from the concrete or describing a set of conditioning structures delimiting its form. It is at this point that Spinoza is perhaps most sorely missed in the discussion, for it is towards a Spinozist conception of substance and the unity of composition of common notions that this thought of market drives. However, that discussion is for another time and place.

34. DG, 1972: 44; 1984: 36

35. DG, 1972: 368; 1984: 309

36. This is particularly pertinent to women: in an exchange system, the value of women is determined in advance of their exchange amongst men; they are objects with an image which is confirmed through the actions of external agents. In a market system, as discussed briefly here, however, no bodies - those of women or of any other assemblage - has value in advance of its function within a particular machinic distribution. They are not priced - which is not to say they are priceless, merely that value ceases to be transcendent. cf. I, 1977; 1985 for a discussion of the treatment of women as commodities.


38. DG, 1972: 280; 1984: 235


40. DG, 1980: 70; 1988: 53

41. DG, 1980: 70; 1988: 53

42. This relates to two problems already discussed. The first is that of the thing-in-itself, as the differentiator or the demon of difference. A molecularized thing-in-itself and the empty form of time were mobilized against the theatre of representation, as the domain of the subject and molar state thought, in the interests of exposing an empirical and fluid continuum of forces filling space which is contained and punctuated by the conceptualization of motion as mechanical. The second is a reference in the previous chapter to a secret associated with Irigaray, and with the continuously positive movements of her abstract machine; of two lips which are not one and which escape the intervention of a middle as a dividing term.
which would articulate a binary relation, whilst at the same time mobilizing a movement of escape (it is this which Irigaray does not quite manage to effect, becoming jammed by her own machinery).

43. DG, 1980: 342; 1988: 279
44. G, 1994: 209
47. L'Arc, p101
48. DL, 1991: 177
49. K, II: 230
52. K, III: Axx
Notes to Conclusion


2. K, III: A661/B688

3. The Economist, May 4, 1996, p34

4. Margulis and Guerrero, ‘Two Plus Three Equal One: Individuals emerge from Bacterial Communities’ p61


6. K, III: A319/B376

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