PUBLIC BODIES, PRIVATE MOMENTS: METHOD ACTING AND AMERICAN CINEMA IN THE 1950s

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Declaration

In chapter 1, parts of the section 'The voice and the body in film acting' have reworked passages from the entry on film acting which I have contributed to John Hill and Pamela Church Gibson (eds.) The Oxford Guide to Film Studies Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Summary

The thesis deals with two central issues:

a) the construction of a framework for the study of film acting which places performance in a cultural context

b) the cultural significance of Method acting during the 1950s with specific reference to American cinema of the period

The first chapter considers the ways in which the voice and body in film acting are made meaningful in the context of beliefs about acting and personal identity. The chapter also proposes ways for situating the practical activity of film acting in a context of cultural production.

The remaining chapters study the cultural significance of Method acting through separate analyses of the Method technique, style, representation of gender, and image of star performance. Readings of the Method technique and style are placed in the context of a 'culture of personality', in which the significance of the Method was produced in the ways that acting signified beliefs about personal identity. The discussion of the Method style is then developed in the analysis of the ways in which the style was used in film melodramas to represent the gendered anxieties of the rebel hero. Finally, Marlon Brando's image and performances are studied for how the actor personified the meaning of the Method. Together, technique, style, gender representation, and stardom, are studied as various aspects of what is called the Method discourse.
Introduction

During the scene from *On the Waterfront* (Elia Kazan 1954, US) where Marlon Brando and Eva Marie Saint have escaped from the church and are walking in the park, Brando’s left hand performs a number of actions. He pushes away a tramp who bothers them and uses his hand to point a threatening finger when the tramp accuses Brando’s character, Terry Malloy, of ‘still being a bum’. He tucks the hand back in his trouser pocket and continues walking. Saint, playing the part of Edie Doyle, takes a pair of gloves from her coat pocket, and as she does so, one of the gloves drops to the ground. They stop walking and Brando/Terry stoops to pick up the glove with his left hand. He looks at the glove, passes it to his right hand, and continues talking as he picks flecks of lint from the fabric of the glove. Most of the time, Brando/Terry is concentrating on speaking to Saint/Edie and only occasionally does he look down to see what his hands are doing. The handling of the glove is entirely incidental to the dialogue. When Brando/Terry sits on a child’s swing, his left hand continues to clean the glove. After a while, without looking, he slides the glove onto his left hand. The glove is tight and he has to use his right hand to make it fit. The conversation turns to Edie’s college studies, an unknown field to Terry. When he asks Saint/Edie ‘what do y’ do up there’, Brando/Terry’s hands go outwards, a gesture which could show both openness and emptiness. As the conversation continues, Brando/Terry takes a pack of chewing gum from a jacket pocket with his right hand. Saint/Edie and Brando/Terry start to walk again. He transfers the chewing gum to his left hand and takes out a stick with his right hand. The pack is placed in a trouser pocket. Brando/Terry wipes the stick with his left hand. They stop walking. Brando/Terry strips the paper from the stick of gum with his left hand and places the gum in his mouth with his right. The left hand drops the chewing gum paper and Saint/Edie pulls her glove from Brando/Terry’s hand. This hand is then returned to the trouser pocket for the rest of the scene. The series of movements which Brando’s hand performs...
in this scene are the kinds of activities which actors refer to as 'business', the minute actions of using and manipulating objects in acting.

Talking about the scene, the director Elia Kazan offered this interpretation of the significance of the business with the glove:

[the] use of objects in [the] scene ... was partly accidental and partly the talent of the actor who was in it ... [he] is walking [her] home, rather against her will; and she on the one hand is attracted to him, and on the other hand wishes that he'd leave her alone because there's a social stigma attached to him, so she'd rather lose him, and at the same time she's attracted to him and would rather keep him.

And he, too, is attracted to her, but he's also shy, and tense about connecting with her because he was responsible for the death of her brother. But mainly Brando wants to keep her, despite her desire to get rid of him. As they were walking along, she accidentally dropped her glove; and Brando picked the glove up; and by holding it, she couldn't get away - the glove was his way of holding her. Furthermore, whereas he couldn't, because of this tension about her brother being killed, demonstrate any sexual or loving feeling towards her, he could towards the glove. And he put his hand inside the glove ... so that the glove was both his way of holding on to her against her will, and at the same time he was able to express, through the glove, something he couldn't express to her directly. So the object, in that sense, did it all.

(quoted in Ciment 1974, 45-46)

Kazan's interpretation of the scene constructs an entire subtext. Brando's handling of the glove is read as revealing the ethical, psychological and sexual tensions of the situation. Terry was involved with the murder of Edie's brother. His sense of moral responsibility conflicts with his desire for Edie. If he wants to form a relationship with her, Terry obviously cannot tell Edie what he has done. Kazan's reading of the business with the glove seems entirely plausible in these circumstances: the handing of the glove fills in the subtextual truth which the words of the dialogue do not articulate. Although the hand says so much, many questions still remain: if Kazan's detailed reading of the actor's gestures seems plausible, what are the reasons for why the handling of the glove should be read as
so meaningful? The narrative circumstances have set up the underlying tensions between Terry and Edie but why, of many possibilities, should it be that the glove more than anything else appears so resonant with subtextual meanings? Can the handling of the glove not be simply read as the handling of a glove? What makes the manipulation of the glove into something more?

While acting remains a continual component of narrative cinema, film acting has seen relatively little attention in the debates of film studies. Some of the initial work in this area has provided valuable insights which are in need of development (see for example Dyer 1979 and 1982, King 1985, Naremore 1988 and Pearson 1992). In her introduction to one of the few contributions to a scholarly analysis of film acting, Carole Zucker explains some possible reasons for this neglect (1990, viii). Film studies is a relatively new area of study. Zucker suggests that the need to establish the academic authority and legitimacy of the new subject may have led to scholars departing from the concerns of ‘ordinary’ moviegoers, including evaluations of acting. Secondly, as aspects of camera movement, script, editing, lighting and music all have an effect on the act, it is difficult to determine what exactly is the contribution of the actor. Although film acting does not operate independently of these other elements, nevertheless, I would argue that the significance of acting can be traced in the actor’s uses of the voice and body and that it is these ways of speaking and behaving that any study of film acting must start from. Something as small as Brando’s handling of the glove already raises major questions for the study of film acting: how can the actions of the hand be described; what do those actions mean; what is it that makes the hand mean the things it is believed to mean; because Brando is playing a character, is the hand Brando’s or Terry’s?

A final problem which Zucker identifies is the difficult questions of human presence raised by film acting which are bypassed by film studies. Zucker does not explore this issue any further, although it is the problem of presence which I would argue has been most instrumental in preventing developments in the study of film acting. In particular, I suggest that debates on authorship and the politics of subjectivity have problematised ideas of individual presence, and that it is these debates which have lead to the exclusion of acting as a legitimate concern for film study.

The auteur theory of the fifties and sixties concentrated on the director as the centre of creativity in film-making, failing to see how other personnel, including actors, could be
active in production. This romantic conceptualising of individual creativity was challenged as film studies in the seventies increasingly experienced the influences of French structuralism through the importation of semiotics, Louis Althusser's neo-Marxist theory of ideology and Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic reading of the ways in which structures of language form identity and desire (see Lapsley and Westlake 1988). Auteurism was based on the humanist notion of the freely acting creative individual. The structuralist and post-structuralist influence on film studies saw identity as the product and effect of structures of signs, power and desire, which made the individual the subject of meaning, ideology and pleasure. For the individual auteur, film was a medium through which he, and occasionally she, could express a conscious and unique vision of the world. Cine-structuralism challenged this instrumental view of language and images as a transparent medium of expression. Language and images were read as systems, whose meaning was coded by the culture in which they were circulated. The human subject was believed to be only an effect of those codings, so that the work of critical analysis was taken to require reading of the ways in which codes produce subjects and not the ways in which individual subjects produce codes.

Pam Cook summarises the structuralist challenge to authorship as problematising notions of 'individuality', 'presence' and 'intention' in film production and meaning (1985, 170). I would argue that it was the structuralist criticisms of these beliefs which has prevented the sustained development of any study of acting in film scholarship. Actors do appear to be individuals on-screen, who have the effect of producing a kind of presence in film, and interviews and biographies do indicate that actors practice their work based on conscious intentions. While the structuralist tendency regarded beliefs in individuality, presence and intentionality as things which were ideologically constructed, film studies has done very little to examine those constructions in any detail.

One area of development in film scholarship which has approached issues of individuality and presence is the study of stars and stardom. Significant here is the work of Richard Dyer. The importance of a study of stardom is identified by Dyer when he explains that stars 'articulate what it is to be a human being in contemporary society; that is, they express the particular notion we hold of the person, of the “individual” ... “The individual” is a way of thinking and feeling about the discrete human person, including oneself, as a separate and coherent entity' (1987, 8). Studies of stardom have included
the analysis of stars as images of individuality and the identifications formed between moviegoers and those star images (McDonald 1995). Star studies have also included some discussions of acting but usually without reflection on what acting involves as a signifying activity. Acting, I would argue, is part of the process of articulating ideas about the individual in film. With acting, ideas about the individual are specifically constructed through the uses of the voice and body. Acting is a part of the ways in which the images of stars produce ideas about the individual but stardom is not limited to acting and the workings of film acting are not just limited to illustrating stardom. Zucker points out the difficulties which acting presents about ideas of human presence. However, I would suggest that it is the questions raised by such difficulties that makes film acting a necessary and important part of a historical or critical film studies. Historically, acting raises the question: in what conditions do the actions of film actors produce beliefs about human presence? Thinking critically, questions can be asked of what versions of presence are produced in acting, and what is the possible significance of those presences?

To study film acting will not necessarily involve a reinstatement of notions of the unique individual, metaphysical beliefs in the mysteries of presence, or the fully conscious control of intention. However, what is required is a reconceptualising of the ways in which individuality, presence and creative intentionality become part of the currency of beliefs about acting in the cinema. To begin to develop the study of film acting, there are three core problems which need to be addressed. First, semiotics challenged beliefs in individual expressivity and the presence of the author, by showing how signs or codes organise and construct meaning. However, in acting, the production of meaning continues to appear intimately connected with the individual. In part, this is the effect of the actor appearing on screen as a recognisable person: e.g Brando as Terry Malloy. It is also an effect of the ways in which the voice and body act as signifying media which, despite, or even as the result of, technologies of reproduction, still appear to be physically linked to actor. Also, Brando does different things in his acting from what Saint does in her acting. Actors develop manners which seem to be idiosyncratically their own. Finally, the scene between Brando and Saint in the park has moments which appear to happen by chance as things which are only happening to these two particular people. These moments do not seem to occur by an organised structure of possibilities but instead look unplanned as disorganised or spontaneous, and so apparently natural,
behaviour. An initial problem for the study of film acting is therefore to analyse the ways in which the codes of acting codify individuality, presence or intentionality.

Secondly, Kazan's reading of the scene between Brando and Saint develops numerous subtextual interpretations, things which are not visible in the outward appearances of the scene but which belong to the internal dramas of the characters. The narrative circumstances alone are not sufficient to explain why the handling of the glove should signify so much. Brando's hand and the whole narrative of *On the Waterfront* are made meaningful in a cultural context of other beliefs about morality, psychology and sexuality. Identification of the signs and codes which signify individuality and presence in acting must therefore be related to the contextual knowledges which define particular beliefs about individual experience.

The critical shift from auteurism to structuralism mapped a familiar sociological problem in the opposition of agency to structure. Auteurism regarded the film director as the rationally acting agent, creatively using language and images to express his or her personal vision. Structuralism argued that the meanings of language could not be individually determined but were the effect of cultural codings. In acting, the codings of individuality are not individually originated but are formed in a pattern of signs and cultural conventions. However, there is a difficulty with only seeing acting as a collection of signifying systems. In the simplest of terms, Brando and Saint appear on screen to be doing something. They move and speak. There is action in the performance. The acting of Brando and Saint is not only an effect of signification but also of work. Acting combines meaning and labour, the labour of making meaning. The actions of the voice and body in film performance are signs of character and signs of a working practice. A third problem for the study of film acting is therefore to explore how acting is practised and how that practice relates to the formation of meaning. Also, by seeing acting as part of the film-making process, then questions are raised of the ways in which the work and meaning of acting practice relate to the conditions of film production. To address these issue should not mean either the reinstatement of the autonomous agent, or the absolute determining power of structure, but the attempt to find a middle ground in which acting practice can be read as structured agency.

In response to the criticisms of the authorial subject in structuralist literary analysis, Michel Foucault argued
the subject should not be entirely abandoned. It should be reconsidered, not to restore the theme of an originating subject, but to seize its functions, its intervention in discourse, and its system of dependencies. ... we should ask: under what conditions and through what forms can an entity like the subject appear in the order of discourse; what position does it occupy; what functions does it exhibit; and what rules does it follow in each type of discourse? In short, the subject ... must be stripped of its creative role and analysed as a complex and variable function of discourse.

(1969, 137-138)

The term 'discourse' is itself a part of the structuralist influence on critical studies of culture, and with the development of such studies, then the term has been open to much overuse and variable meanings. Here, however, I shall use the term in the manner suggested by Chris Weedon, Andrew Tolson and Frank Mort, when they define the idea of ‘discursive practice’ in Foucault’s work as ‘statements ... linked by a coherence to form and define a distinct field of objects ... a particular repertoire of concepts, a specific “regime of truth” ... and a definite set of subject positions’ (emphasis in original, 1982, 210). The discourse of authorship produces out of a series of statements or texts, the identity of the author and authorship as an institution, which form the objects which bring together those statements to make them cohere into certain kinds of truth, the truths about what an author or authorship is believed to be. Authorship, as a discursive practice, then produces a position from which to understand and make sense of the kinds of people that authors are and the kinds of things they do in their work. Likewise in film acting, actual film performances combine with reviews, articles, interviews, biographies and documentaries, to produce discourses which articulate what the work and signification of film acting means, and the type of individual or professional person that a film actor is.

Foucault’s reading of the authorial subject as an effect of discourse would suggest that instead of seeing the author or the actor as someone who makes the meanings found in discourse, the analysis of discourse should look at what meanings and sense are made to produce the creative subject as a maker of meaning. Instead of stripping the author or the actor of his or her creativity as Foucault suggests, questions of authorship need to look at the ways in which that creativity is created in discourse. If such analysis should then find
the reproduction of beliefs about individuality, presence and intention, then those are the very beliefs which the study of authorial or actorly discourse must examine.

Foucault regards the name of the author as performing the function of cohering the discourse of authorship (1969, 123). The name of Brando appears in histories of film, not so much to group together a number of texts, but to bring together some meanings about acting. For example, in their introduction to film history, Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell mention Brando in connection with Method acting. They identify the Method as an acting technique which they explain 'required the actor to ground the performance in personal experiences' and for which 'Improvisation was one path to a natural, if sometimes painful and risky, portrayal' (1994, 400). The scene with the glove from On the Waterfront is read as exemplifying this technique. The naming of the Method forms a whole additional set of associations. Thompson and Bordwell see the origins of the Method technique in the work of Constantin Stanislavski at the Moscow Art Theatre, and in the use of that technique in the United States during the thirties by the Group Theatre. Kazan is identified as a member of the Group, and his directing work then produces additional associations with the writing of Tennessee Williams, the theatre world of Broadway, and the film world of Hollywood. Kazan is also linked to the Actors Studio, which Thompson and Bordwell name as the place at which the Method technique was practised. Brando's association with the Method is also used to connect him with other actors like James Dean and Karl Malden.

John Belton also links Brando's name with the Actors Studio and the Method technique, identifying Lee Strasberg as having a key role in the development of the Method technique, which Belton describes as 'training exercises which require that actors use their own past experiences and emotional histories as a basis on which to build an inner identification with the characters they portray' (1994, 106). Graham McCann sees a connection between Brando and the Method but he describes the Method in different terms: 'In Method acting the most important element is the inner subtext which emerges, often in silences between the lines, from the character's struggle with the group and with the character's own fissile nature' (1991, 29). With McCann, the Method has shifted from a technique to a style and set of dramatic conventions. For McCann, the Method style links Brando with Montgomery Clift and James Dean, who are read as 'at their best in schismatic parts based on the unresolved tension between an outer, social mask and an
inner, private reality of frustration and confusion which usually has a sexual basis’ (p.29). Richard Dyer describes the conventions of the Method in similar terms: ‘Although in principle the Method could be used to express any psychological state, in practice it was used especially to express disturbance, repression, anguish, etc.’ (1979, 161). Dyer refers to Brando’s performance in *A Streetcar Named Desire* (Elia Kazan 1951, US) to illustrate this type of acting. Lez Cooke (1986, 20) and James Naremore (1988, 193), both use the glove scene from *On the Waterfront* to identify the Method in practice.

Belton also uses Brando’s name in two further ways. He sees Brando as part of ‘a ... generation of tormented, high strung young actors ... who embody the alienation, anguish and sensitivity of 1950s teenagers’ (1994, 106). Clift and Dean are cited as other examples of this generation. Belton also places Brando with a collection of ‘anti-stars’, stars ‘who refuse to behave like stars’, which includes as diverse a range of film performers as Woody Allen, Robert De Niro, Clint Eastwood, Paul Newman, Robert Redford, Bill Murray, George C. Scott, Shirley MacLaine, Meryl Streep, Sean Connery, Michael Caine and Dustin Hoffman (p.108).

As the Method is read as several things—a technique for acting; a place, the Actors Studio; a style, representing a restricted range of psychological and emotional meanings; and a collection of people, e.g Brando, Strasberg and Kazan—then it forms a discourse on acting. Strasberg regarded the term ‘Method’ as a label imposed by people from outside the Actors Studio (Hethmon 1965, 41). The naming of Method gave an identity to the techniques practised at the Actors Studio. It made the work of the Studio describable and knowable. Equally, the identification of a Method style names a particular rhetoric of vocal and physical mannerisms, and the meanings which those manners were believed to represent. To view the Method as a discourse is to presume that it is not just a technique or an acting style, but that it is both technique and style, and that these are elements combined in discourse to circulate the meanings of the Method in many contexts. The Method discourse conceptualises acting as a work of personal introspection, which can signify forms of psychological and emotional disturbance. Brando had very little involvement with the Actors Studio and he openly rejected Strasberg’s working techniques. However, Brando exemplifies the Method style and his star image defines the image of the Method actor. Irrespective of Brando’s own feelings about Strasberg and the Actor Studio, he becomes associated with the Method technique through his place in the
Method discourse. The Method discourse produces beliefs about the individual in beliefs about acting and Brando's function in that discourse is to represent those beliefs as the image of an individual actor. Brando's stardom personifies and give coherence to the Method discourse.

This thesis will look at two particular issues. Earlier I suggested that studies of film acting could develop from an understanding of acting as signification and work. In chapter 1, I shall be developing ways of looking at acting as cultural codings and situated practice. This framework will then be used to examine the ways in which, during the fifties, the Method discourse entered American culture. Chapter 2 looks at the ways in which the Method technique defined the work and identity of the actor through a truth in acting. In chapter 3, I discuss the terms in which the Method style was described in the fifties, identifying the significant characteristics of the style and considering the effect of those characteristics in some examples of Method performances. Chapter 4 considers how social change produced anxieties about American masculinity in the fifties and the ways in which the Method style was employed in the rebel narratives of the period to represent those anxieties. Finally, in chapter 5, I will be looking at the characteristics of Brando's image, considering the links between the Method discourse and stardom, and examining the ways in which Brando's acting work during the fifties indicated the cultural limits of the Method. In displays of film acting, small actions such as the handling of a glove become burdened with a multitude of meanings. It is the intention of this thesis to explore how film acting can represent beliefs about individuality, presence and creative intention. By studying the Method discourse in the fifties, I set out to show how those beliefs could be conceptualised in particular meanings and specific cultural conditions.

Amongst the sources used in the thesis there are some documents for which full referencing details were not available. Several press cuttings were obtained from the microfiches on Marlon Brando at the library of the British Film Institute in London and the Actors Studio clippings folder at the Library and Museum of Performing Arts at the Lincoln Centre, New York. Many of these sources were photographed, cut, or of such
fragile quality, that page numbers, dates, or periodical titles, were missing. These items functioned as essential primary source materials without which the thesis would have significantly suffered. In the text of the thesis, I have identified the location of these items by entering in the space where the page number would normally be identified, either 'microfiche' for sources taken from the BFI library, or 'clipping' for sources from the Lincoln Centre. In the bibliography, I have provided the most complete referencing details which I had available, and again, 'microfiche' and 'clipping' are used to identify the locations of these sources.

Film reviews are used as primary sources in the thesis. All these sources are listed in the bibliography under a separate section from books and articles. Where reviews were anonymously authored or credited by initials only, they are referenced in the text of the thesis and the bibliography by the name of the periodical, followed by the date of publication: e.g (Monthly Film Bulletin 1950, 168) would refer to a quote from the review for The Men which appeared in issue number 202 of that year. Reviews from Variety are all taken from the collections Variety’s Film Reviews. Vol.8: 1949-53, Variety’s Film Reviews. Vol.9: 1954-58 and Variety’s Film Reviews. Vol.10: 1959-63, all 1983, New York: R. R. Bowker. These collections compile reviews by date, without the page number from the original document, and the collected volumes have no page numbers of their own. The thesis and the bibliography does not therefore include page numbers for these sources but the items can be found in the collected editions by using the date.

Several press releases on actors were consulted in the writing of the thesis. These are listed in the end section of the bibliography. The origin of these sources was identified by the details given on the headed paper they were printed on, which usually named the distributor and sometimes a Director of Publicity. In the text of the thesis and the bibliography, these sources are identified by the name of the distributor, and where possible, the name of any specified individual. Most of these documents had no date, but where dates were available, they are referenced accordingly. In cases where dates were missing, it was possible to provide an approximate date by using either the name of the film currently undergoing promotion, or tracking in the release biographical details on the actor’s previous roles. In these cases, 'circa' is abbreviated to 'c.'
Chapter 1: Conceptualising film acting

Acting is the mode of film performance specifically concerned with the representation of dramatic character. In this chapter I intend to consider in what ways the relationship of actor to character is made meaningful. Initially, I shall examine the ways in which film acting can be understood as systems of codes. Secondly, I will look at different beliefs about the work of acting and how these produce models of the relationship of actor to character. I will then be discussing the ways in which modern concepts of the self contextualise the meaning of acting in contemporary Western culture. Finally, I will be considering ways of understanding acting as a practice structured by the institutional conditions of cultural production. These points of debate will form the framework for the study of Method acting in subsequent chapters.

The voice and body in film acting

In a famous case of experimentation, the Soviet film-maker Lev Kuleshov took shots of an open prison door and a bowl of soup, together with two reaction shots of an actor longing for freedom and feeling hunger. The reaction shots showed different expressions on the actor’s face, but when the shots were juxtaposed, Kuleshov argued that their meaning changed (1929, 54). From this exercise, Kuleshov concluded that editing had more effect on film performance than acting. Walter Benjamin (1936) saw the impact of film technology on the actor as part of a wider cultural change. For Benjamin, technologies of reproduction such as film, had the effect of separating the art object from its creator. Benjamin believed this diminished the ‘aura’ attached to works of art, as they no longer conveyed the ‘presence’ of the person who made them. With film, Benjamin believed reproduction had the effect of separating the actor from the recorded act, which
diminished the presence of the performer. This argument reads the waning of presence in two ways: in the recorded image, the actor is observed to be no longer physically present, and also, reproduction is regarded as lessening the sense of individual charisma which Benjamin believed original works of art to have. In John Ellis's (1982) view, the overall effect of film reproduction lies in the ways it forms an illusion of presence in absence, the illusion that there is something or somebody present, when that spectacle is in fact recorded, reproduced and absent. In their various ways, Kuleshov, Benjamin and Ellis each make the film actor more absent than present. They each emphasise the meaning of the film medium over the work and signification of the actor, discussing what film does, and what film does to actors, but without attention to what film actors are doing. Ellis's arguments are representative of structuralist developments in film studies, which discussed 'performance' as the performance of the film apparatus, not the actor (e.g. Heath 1977). This neglect of actors in film study has made film actors only an absence, instead of a presence in absence.

Benjamin's conclusion that reproduction removes the 'aura' of presence from film acting is debatable, not just because the film image still makes the actor appear to be present, but also because the work and signification of acting construct the performer as a special, even charismatic, focus of attention. Instead of simply dismissing notions of 'aura' or 'presence' as metaphysical and mystical qualities in film acting, questions can be asked of in what ways are such effects constructed from the material elements of the film actor's voice and body. In a medium of reproduction like film, in what ways do the voice and body construct 'presence' to compensate for the actual absence of the actor? How can something which is absent and does not exist – i.e the dramatic role – be made into something present and which appears to exist?

One way of understanding the film actor's position in the play of presence and absence is suggested by what James Naremore (1988) calls the 'performance frame'. At one level, this frame is to be understood as the limits of the film frame, equivalent to the proscenium arch in theatre, marking the boundary between the everyday world of the audience and the dramatic world of the actors. Whatever appears in the frame may be more or less similar to the appearances of everyday life, but by appearing on screen, the actions of the actor are immediately 'framed' as distanced from the everyday. When turned into public spectacle, the contents of the frame become more significant and meaningful than the
experiences of everyday life. At a further level, the performance frame therefore constructs a context for dramatic meaning. Although the film actor only appears as a recorded image, an actor may still have a ‘presence’ entirely because his or her actions are contextualised as meaningful. Barry King describes this effect as the ‘hypersemiotisation’ of the film actor (1985, 41). The film actor has presence because the frame invests every action of the voice and body with meaning.

The performance frame only provides a context for the meaning of film acting and does not account for the ways in which the voice and body in acting actually construct meanings. As any observation of film acting makes immediately clear, dramatic acting never exactly imitates everyday behaviour. In a discussion of works of art, Anne Sheppard (1987) suggests that the term ‘imitation’ always implies that art can copy or mirror a pre-existent sense of the real. Sheppard argues that the realistic effect in art is not an effect of imitation but of representation. In representation, a difference is always detectable between art and the real, so that ‘we remain aware of the medium of representation even while we see what it is that is represented’. Instead of imitation, the link between the representational object (A) and what is represented (B) ‘is better captured by the phrase “seeing in” than “seeing as”. We do not so much “see A as a representation of B” as “see B in A”’ (p.13). In approaching art as representation, the question is not if A is a representation of B but, as Sheppard suggests, ‘”What is it for A to be a representation of B?”’ (emphasis in original, p.13). Acting, even realistic acting, does not mirror real behaviour. Brando’s performance as Terry Malloy is realistic, even though differences can be detected between this act and everyday acts. Depending on your response to the performance, Brando could be said to have become Terry. However, in this instance, to read film acting as representation is not to raise the question of whether Brando did or did not become Terry, but to explore what it is for an actor to become a character.

Stephen Heath (1979, 179-82) proposes that the process of representation in film acting combines different sources of meaning. The role played by the actor can be divided between the ‘agent’, or narrative function, and the ‘character’, formed from a set of individuating traits and peculiarities. Additionally, the actor may already be a source of meanings known from previous performances, what Heath calls the ‘person’. Each of these sources is visualised in the ‘image’ but at some points the image may also stand
apart from these other meanings to present the performer as pure spectacle. For Heath, 'agent', 'character', 'person' and 'image', are never integrated to form a closed coherent construction, but are various points of meaning which remain in continuous circulation to form what he calls a 'figure'.

Readings of narrative in film studies tend to focus on the character not the actor. This presumes the actor 'becomes' a role, making the actor absent from analysis. Heath's model would suggest that the actor never absolutely 'disappears' into his or her role: the actor does not become the role but is always in a process of becoming the role. In this process of becoming, the actions of the voice and body produce hypersemiotised fragments, what Heath (1979, 183) calls 'intensities', which construct the relationship of actor to role in an act of becoming. It is because these actions are active - articulating, moving, in process - that the voice and body are not just signifying actions but also signs of work.

Different effects are produced in acting depending on the extent to which the actor or the role appears to be foregrounded. Examples of acting where the actor can be seen to work at significant transformations to 'become' their role, is described by Barry King as 'impersonation' (1985, 41). King defines 'personification' as acting in which an actor looks the same and uses the same mannerisms across a series of roles (p.42).

'Impersonation' is the effect of the actor constructing differences between roles through transformations of the voice and body. 'Personification' connects similarities between performances, foregrounding the continuities of the voice and body. These two categories are not exclusive, for any example of film acting will belong somewhere between the poles of impersonation and personification.

Impersonation and personification are also influential in the formation of aesthetic judgments about acting. Respected performers are often admired for what is read as their ability to be transformed into different roles. This critical judgment is premised on a realist aesthetic, valuing the actor's skills in attempting to close the gap between actor and role to form a figure integrated into the narrative fiction. Personification disrupts this closure, emphasising the actor's identity against the single role. Personification has tended to be integral to the acting of film stars and it is because stars always appear to 'be themselves' that their star acting is so often criticised.

Heath and King offer terms for seeing how the relationship of actor to character is
constructed at several levels but they do not provide the means for understanding the
detail of how the voices and bodies of film actors produce that relationship. Richard Dyer
identifies the appearance, speech, gestures and actions of actors, as elements in the
construction of character in film (1979, 121). By their physical appearance, actors already
represent a set of meanings. The use of costume, make-up, hairstyle or posture, become
the means for impersonatory transformations. With speech, it is necessary to distinguish
what is said against how it is said. Apart from cases where actors improvise, dialogue is
usually produced by the writer. It is in how the writer’s dialogue is spoken that the work
of the actor is identified. The ‘paralinguistic’ features of volume, tone and rhythm, are the
elements by which the actor’s voice inflects the script. Dyer divides the signification of
the body between ‘gestures’, indicating the personality and temperament of the character,
and ‘actions’, which are movements produced for the purpose of effecting a change in the
narrative (pp.126-128). It is these ‘bits’ of voices and bodies from which the relationship
of actor to character is constructed.

Both the vocal and bodily significations of acting present a difficulty for the detailed
analysis of film acting. Despite references to ‘body language’, physical movements, and
also the paralinguistic dimensions of speech, do not divide up into basic units similar to
the letters and words of written and spoken languages (Pavis 1983). There is a difficulty
therefore in analytically breaking down film acting performances into component signs.
Instead, the semiotic concept of codes can more usefully be applied in the reading of the
acting text. A code is formed through how a set of signs, or signifying features, are
deployed in familiar ways to signify a conventionalised set of meanings. As Martin
Krampen explains, a code is formed as ‘two universes (of discourse), a universe of
indicating facts (indicators) or of signifiers ... correlated with a universe of indicated facts
or of signifieds’ (1994, 126). To analyse a code need not involve looking for basic sign
units but can instead be concerned with identifying certain material features, the
‘indicating facts’ or signifiers which make a code significantly different from other codes,
along with the meanings indicated or signified by those features.

With film acting, the analysis of codes shifts attention away from a search for basic
signifying units and towards looking at how particular features come together to form
acting styles. Style contributes to an aesthetic history of film acting. Roberta Pearson
(1992) has identified between 1907-12, in the short films that D.W Griffith directed for
Biograph during that period, a major transformation occurring in film acting style. Pearson describes this changes as the replacement of a 'histrionic' code by a 'verisimilar' code. The histrionic code was characterised by the film actor using large gestures to construct poses which had often been already defined in acting manuals of the period. With the verisimilar code, the actor used smaller gestures and did not strike standardised poses. Pearson uses the term histrionic to describe how the former was 'reflexive, referring always to the theatrical event rather than the outside world' (p.21). The verisimilar code had already appeared in the theatre, and as Pearson shows, the arrival of the new acting code in the cinema lead many critics and other observers at the time to comment on how it provided a new and desirable standard for realism in film acting.

Janet Staiger (1985a) has studied the terms in which the arrival of a new acting style in early American narrative film was received and interpreted. At the end of the nineteenth century, theatre critics in the United States remarked on what they saw as acting of 'reserved force'. Similar changes were seen in the cinema at the beginning of the twentieth century, where is was observed that actors were performing in ways which suggested 'suppressed emotion'. Staiger argues that the realism of the new acting was not just the effect of the actor's body but also resulted from a range of other transformations in film form, including the introduction of character centred narratives, dialogue intertitles to communicate thoughts and feeling, and the use of closer framing and continuity editing, which focused attention on the detail of the actor's face, particularly the eyes, as a significant source of meaning. As these techniques became centred on the individual character in film, so descriptions of the new way of acting as 'suppressed emotion' shows that commentators saw the transformation in performance style as representing a greater sense of private and hidden feeling.

While Pearson's category of the verisimilar is useful, for a broader history of film acting it is necessary to appreciate that realistic acting has appeared in many different codes and styles. The acting style of the Griffith Biographs, when compared to the conventional mannerisms of the histrionic code, appeared more realistic. However, today the acting of silent cinema is often judged to be unrealistic when compared to contemporary styles, which in time will come to define a particular type of realistic acting. Historical transformations in the meaning of codes is described by Umberto Eco's (1976) distinction between 'undercoding' and 'overcoding'. Undercoding is the effect of an
arrangement of signifying features being so new that their meaning is not readily determined but remains ‘imprecise’ or ‘rough’ (p.135). In a sense, undercoding is what happens to a code before it obtains the widely accepted meanings that will make it a code. Overcoding results from a code becoming well established and familiar. When the verisimilar code in film acting first appeared, its realistic effect could be explained as the result of undercoding. In contrast to the histrionic style, the verisimilar code may have been judged realistic precisely because of from absence of familiar or standard poses, the ‘anarchic’ irregularity of the everyday could appear opposed to the formalities of dramatic convention.

The opposition at work here can be defined as a difference between systematic and asystematic codes. Systematic codes, such as speech and writing, are said to be doubly articulated, for they provide a limited lexicon of indivisible basic units which combine at a secondary level to form larger statements. Asystematic codes have no lexicon of component units and instead appear at the level of the larger statement only. Gestures are asystematic codes because they are not divided into basic units, they signify as a larger gestural ‘statement’. The standardised poses of the histrionic code attempted to make a systematic language out of the asystematicity of gestures and poses. The movement from the histrionic to the verisimilar code replaced systematicity by asystematicity, and it was this semiotic effect which was interpreted as a movement towards greater realism in film acting. Asystematicity has largely defined all claims for realism in film acting: i.e realistic acting doesn’t look like formally agreed aesthetic conventions but rather approximates the clutter of everyday behaviour.

Eco sees one of the effects of overcoding to be that as new codes become familiar, minute differences in the use of the code are detectable. This has the effect of producing a range of subcodes which signify as ‘different shades of meaning’ (1976, 134). Variations on the verisimilar in film acting may not mark new codes in film acting but rather revised subcodings of a basic asystematic code. Those differences can be traced not only across historical periods but also between genres (deCordova 1986), ‘schools’ of acting, of which the Method style would be just one subcoding, and the performances of individuals actors who evolve the idiosyncrasies that mark a personal style or ‘ideolect’. One indication of the latter is what Richard Dyer (1979) refers to as ‘star performance’, in which a ‘specific repertoire of gestures, intonations, etc. that a star establishes over a
number of films carries the meaning of her or his image just as much as the "inert" element[s] of appearance, the particular sound of her/his voice or dress style' (p.162).

Despite the dominance of the 'verisimilar' in screen acting, it should be noted that the 'histrionic' component of screen acting never entirely disappears. Film acting remains distinguishable from everyday behaviour and so is always to a degree obviously acting. The difference between film acting and everyday behaviour arises from the establishment of familiar conventions in film performance. The styles of various acting subcodes demonstrate different sets of conventions. Difference between acting and everyday behaviour suggest that the 'realistic' in film acting cannot be explained as imitation but has to be examined for how a set of coded conventions represent a sense of the realistic.

Once it is recognised that the realistic in film acting is as convention bound as acting which appears unrealistic, the question remains of why some sets of conventions or codes should be interpreted as representing verisimilitude when others are not. Verisimilitude is not just an effect of signs, codes or conventions, but also of the context of beliefs in which those features are used and understood. As Tzvetan Todorov explains, 'verisimilitude ... has been taken ... for a relation with reality ... [but] the verisimilar is not a relation between discourse and its referent (the relation of truth), but between discourse and what readers believe it true. ... The latter is of course not "reality" but merely a further discourse, independent of the work' (1981, 119). A wider currency of discourses will have an effect on acting is interpreted as 'realistic' or 'truthful'.

'Believability' or 'plausibility' best describe how the realities and truths effected in acting are produced through the reality and truth found in other bodies of beliefs. Other discourses determine in what ways discourses of acting will, or will not, be understood as realistic, truthful, believable or plausible. As Christian Metz says of film in general, arts of representation — and the cinema is one of them, which, whether "realistic" or "fantastic", is always figurative and almost always fictional — do not represent all that is possible — all possibilities — but only the plausible possibles. ... the Plausible is a reduction of the possible; it an arbitrary and cultural restriction of real possibles; it is, in fact, censorship: Among all the possibilities of figurative fiction, only those authorised by previous discourse will be "chosen".

(emphasis in original, 1974, 238)
Metz's emphasis on the plausibility of the figurative aspect of cinema is particularly pertinent to approaching the meaning of acting as contingent on other discourses and beliefs. In film acting, the voice and body are active in the process of the actor becoming the character and the plausibility of those actions is made meaningful in relation to other discourses about the work of acting and beliefs about identity. The following sections therefore look at discourses on the practices of acting and the conceptualising of personal identity in a sense of self.

**Acting and emotion**

Although the actor/character relationship is fundamental to acting, there has been considerable debate over how the actor achieves that relationship. One of the continual grounds for debate has concerned the question of whether it is necessary for the actor to identify with the dramatic experiences of a character in order to make acting 'believable', 'plausible' or, according to a term much favoured by actors, 'truthful'. The debate can roughly be divided between practitioners and theorists of acting who argue that 'truth' in acting is only possible if the actor emotionally identifies with a character, against those who say that an actor can still produce the same emotional effects by imitating certain vocal and bodily manners. With the former, the actor 'becomes' a character, where for the latter, the actor always retains their distance from the character, as acting requires the use of established conventions of speech and action. With both sides of the argument comes a different approach to the practice of acting but also a different set of beliefs about how an acting performance is made sense of. Here I will not be concerned with assessing if one side or the other is the 'best' way of acting. Instead, what I want to look at is how the respective positions present different frameworks for the practice and interpretation of acting. My concern is therefore with how the terms of argument construct discourses which contain broader ideas on how meaning is produced in acting.

What is common to both sides of this debate on acting is the implied agreement that acting is emotionally meaningful. Where the debate splits is over the question of whether the actor must emotionally identify with a character, or if the same effect is achievable by imitating the external conventions of emotional behaviour. This debate can be read in
terms suggested by Toby Cole and Helen Krich Chinoy as a dispute between ‘emotionalists’ and ‘anti-emotionalists’ (1970, 161). These terms are potentially misleading. To be clear, ‘anti-emotionalists’ are not against emotion in acting but rather question the need for the actor to feel emotion when acting.

The key differences between the emotionalist and anti-emotionalist positions can be found in the contrasts between the views on acting of the French actor François-Joseph Talma and the French philosopher Denis Diderot. Published in 1825, Talma’s Reflections on the Art of the Actor argued that acting could only be great if actors became emotionally involved with the drama they acted. Talma saw actors of greatness as special people who possessed an ‘extreme sensibility’, described by Talma as ‘that faculty of exaltation which agitates an actor, takes possession of his senses, shakes even his very soul, and enables him to enter into the most tragic situations, and the most terrible of the passions, as if they were his own’ (1825, 181). Along with ‘sensibility’, Talma also believed a great actor had ‘a profound intelligence’, which controlled the emotional stimulus of the actor’s passion so that ‘sensibility furnishes the objects [which] the intelligence brings ... into play’ (p.181). ‘Sensibility’ was understood as an emotional link between actor and character, which ‘intelligence’ mediated and rationally controlled. As the exclusive properties of an actor’s greatness, ‘sensibility’ and ‘intelligence’ made the acting performance a moment of the actor’s personal and passionate self expression. Of the actor’s gifts, Talma believed that sensibility was most important, for it made the actor ‘inspired’, while intelligence alone could only make an actor ‘cold and regular’ (p.182). By these oppositions, Talma distinguished the seductive emotionality of the inspired actor against the detached and distant playing of the intelligent actor. While Talma concluded that the great actor should require both properties, he regarded sensibility as holding the most value, for emotive inspiration was believed to produce what rational intelligence alone could not.

In 1773, Diderot first published his pamphlet, Le Paradoxe sur le comédien (The Paradox of Acting). For Diderot, in acting the paradox was that while he agreed that emotion was vital to acting, he believed the actor had no need to feel that emotion in order to present it in performance. Written before Talma’s observations, the structure of Diderot’s argument rests on the same opposition of intelligence to sensibility and inspiration. In Diderot’s case however, the priorities are reversed, as the actor was

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required to ‘have a deal of judgment’, remaining ‘an unmoved and disinterested onlooker’, always with ‘penetration and no sensibility’, approaching each part by ‘mimicking everything’, (Diderot 1883, 162). It was Diderot’s belief that actors who relied on inspiration to bring the emotional stimulus to their roles could not provide consistent performances in the theatre night after night. Diderot argued that artistic control was only possible through rational intelligence, in which the thoughtful observation of everyday behaviour provided the actor with examples of what to do when playing their character in particular situations. Rather than waiting for the gift of inspiration, acting required the reproduction of externally observed behaviour, so that the actor could and should imitate each night the same actions to produce regular and consistent performances.

The debate between the emotionalists and anti-emotionalists has persisted beyond Talma and Diderot’s contributions. In the late nineteenth century, Diderot’s paradox generated argument between the English actor Henry Irving and the French actor Benoit Constant Coquelin. Irving defended the necessity of the actor’s emotional identification against Diderot’s anti-emotionalist polemic. The opposing view was articulated by Coquelin, who warned that the actor ‘should remain master of himself. ... never feel[ing] the shadow of the sentiments to which he is giving expression’ (1887, 199). In William Archer’s Masks or Faces? A Study in the Psychology of Acting, he raised the questions, ‘do actors feel? and ought they to feel?’ (1880, 363). From interviews with actors, Archer believed that actors do feel, and because certain emotional indicators such as ‘blushing, pallor, and perspiration’ could not be produced by physical control, he concluded that an actor needed emotional resources to be able to present a subtle and extensive emotional range (p.368). Archer held that the link between actor, character and audience could not be produced through imitation and mimicry but was an effect of what he explained as ‘emotional contagion’ (p.365).

In the twentieth century, the emotionalist position has been represented by amongst others, Constantin Stanislavski’s System and Lee Strasberg’s Method acting techniques. Both Stanislavski and Strasberg believed in the necessity of the actor’s emotional identification with their character. Stanislavski argued that ‘inner characterisation ... can be shaped only from an actor’s own inner elements. ... If this is effectively prepared, the outer characterisation should naturally follow’ (1999, 33). Reflecting on his own attempts
In my ... admiration for a great actor I attempted to imitate him. ... This has its
good and its bad side: copying a great example can train you in a good pattern, but
it also checks your individual creativeness. ... I was only repeating what the other
person had experienced in his emotions. ... Since my imitation was purely
external ... I strained myself physically to produce feelings. ... Finally I realised
the simple truth that such an approach to a part ... can never produce the image [of
a character].

(p.77)

Strasberg opposed emotional identification to what he called the 'French school' of
acting, in which the 'actor ... recognises what is going on in the scene and then tries to
find out how he should behave accordingly' (1965, 80-81). Against this tradition,
Strasberg argued that 'the actor need not imitate a human being. The actor is a human
being and can create out of himself. The actor is the only art material capable of being
both the material and the reality so you almost cannot tell the two things apart' (p.81).
For Strasberg, imitation could only produce a 'conventional reality', which would not
make sense or excite an audience, where the actor's emotionality would offer a reality
without which the audience would be 'less human, less alive, less excited, less amused
and entertained' (p.81). For Stanislavski and Strasberg, but also for Talma, Irving and
Archer, acting is something which happens 'inside' the actor. It is the inside where the
actor is presumed to produce the emotional stimuli which portray the character's feelings
and communicate those feelings to an audience. The actor's internality is therefore
conceptualised as the origin and source of all that goes on 'outside', which is not just the
actor's speech and the actions of the body, but also the responses of the audience.

Christine Edwards (1966, 134) observes that the actor Lekain was used by both Talma
and Diderot to illustrate what they believed were the best effects of their opposing
positions. For Talma, Lekain was an actor who had sensibility and intelligence, qualities
which made him 'a creature of passion' (1825, 186). In contrast, Diderot regarded Lekain
to be 'a cold man, who is without feeling, but who imitates it excellently' (quoted in
Edwards 1966, 134). Edwards argues that the shared use of Lekain as an example by
both Talma and Diderot shows that they a common vision of what acting should be, even if they disagreed over how that result could be achieved (p.134): Talma as an emotionalist was concerned with the cause rather than the effect of the actor’s emotional presentation, while Diderot as an anti-emotionalist regarded the effect to be more important (p.135).

The contrasting perspectives of the emotionalists and anti-emotionalists produce different theories of performance. With the emotionalist theory, the actor, possessed of natural sensibility, feels the emotions of character as his or her own and communicates those feelings to the audience. Acted emotions begin with the actor, and if the medical analogy of Archer’s description of performance as ‘contagion’ is followed through, then the actor’s voice and body present the ‘symptoms’ of an emotional condition which then ‘infects’ the audience. Contained in this theory of acting is a model of meaning as the transmission of a message from the actor to the audience. In this model, the interpretation of acting is directed towards trying to understand what the actor intended, or more accurately, what an actor felt his or her performance to mean. By placing the actor as the origin and source of meanings which are given to an audience, the emotionalist view of acting belongs to theories of art as expression, in which it is believed ‘that the real work of art is the expression in the artist’s mind and that the physical object ... is only its externalisation’ (Sheppard 1987, 24).

Such expressive theories play a major part in the Romantic tradition of the arts. Historically, M. H Abrams sees Romanticism as emerging from a movement towards valuing cultural production as the expression of personal identity:

Through most of the nineteenth century, the poet’s invention and imagination were made thoroughly dependent for their materials ... on the external universe and the literary models the poet had to imitate ... Gradually, however, the stress was shifted more and more to the poet’s natural genius, creative imagination, and emotional spontaneity, at the expense of the opposing attributes of judgment, learning and artful restraints. As a result the audience gradually receded into the background, giving place to the poet himself, and his own mental powers and emotional needs, as the predominant cause and even the end test of art.

(quoted in Goodwin 1993, 104)
Reading art as personal expression divorces its meaning from social conditions and concentrates on the artist as a unique individual whose ‘imagination’, ‘genius’ or ‘talent’, transcends material reality and contextual circumstances. Auteurism romantically saw ‘great’ directors as expressive individuals who transcended the industry of film production and the emotionalist theory of acting valorises ‘great’ actors as the possessors of a special sensibility which make them sensitive to the needs of their art.

The anti-emotionalist theory starts from the belief that in everyday life, emotions are indicated by familiar actions of the body and voice. It presumes that these indications are signs which can be observed and which are commonly understood. While it will be necessary for the actor to make choices about what behaviour to imitate, and the skill of acting will require controlling the voice and body to imitate that behaviour, the meaning of acting does not originate with the actor but is based on how actor and audience have a common understanding of what particular signs mean. Where the emotionalist theory places the actor as the source and origin of meaning in acting, in the anti-emotionalist theory, the actor is a mediator of signs and meanings, a professional whose work is located in the skill of reproducing ways of speaking and moving observed more generally in society.

It is the social production of meaning implicit in Diderot’s arguments which links the anti-emotionalist position to the dramatic theory of Bertolt Brecht. Diderot’s argument read acting as the use of socially meaningful conventions. Brecht examined the ways in which the conventions of performance could determine the social meaning and effect of drama. For Brecht, the work of the actor was seen as central to enabling audiences to form rational judgments about the drama they witnessed. Brecht, like Diderot, was against the emotional identification between actor and character. However, for Brecht, the distance between the feelings of actor and character was necessary to reveal how acting and the performance in general constructed meaning, and in so doing, drew an audience’s attention to the social and cultural beliefs and conditions which determined the production of meaning and the reproduction of social relations.

The emotional distance between actor and character contributed to the effect of alienation which Brecht believed was integral to a socially critical theatre.
[Alienation] consists in turning the object of which one is to be made aware, to which one’s attention is to be drawn, from something ordinary, familiar, immediately accessible, into something peculiar, striking and unexpected. What is obvious is in a certain sense made incomprehensible, but this is only in order that it may be made all the easier to comprehend.

(1940, 143-144)

It was the objective of the actor to make clear what Brecht called the ‘gest’ of the drama, which he defined as ‘the mimetic and gestural expression of the social relationships prevailing between people of a given period’ (p.139). For the audience, gestic performance was intended to disrupt the familiar and accepted ways of seeing the world, and provide the means for ‘allow[ing] conclusions to be drawn about ... social circumstances’ (Brecht 1957, 105).

Although Brecht’s ideas were intended to make the theatre into a context of rational inquiry, and while he argued that the actor should not form an emotional bond with his or her character, he still regarded emotion as one of the main mechanisms of meaning for the representation of social relationships: ‘The emotions have a quite definite class basis; the form they take at any time is historical, restricted and limited in specific ways. The emotions are in no sense universally human and timeless’ (1940, 145). Brecht is suggesting here that emotions should not be read as natural or personal experiences but as feelings which represent social and historical conditions. Brecht suggests that emotion has a class base but his argument can be extended to thinking about the ways in which feelings articulate other social relations of gender, sexuality, race or national identity. Emotion is therefore not antithetical to Brecht’s gestic inquiry. With the gestic actor, the requirement was not to feel feelings, but to show feelings, showing the ways in which feelings are active in forming the social.

The key lines of difference between the emotionalist and anti-emotionalist theories can be understood by the following oppositions:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotionalist</th>
<th>Anti-emotionalist</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor becomes character</td>
<td>Actor represents character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor feels an emotion</td>
<td>Actor shows an emotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling feeling</td>
<td>Showing feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passionately involved</td>
<td>Thoughtfully distant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensibility over intelligence</td>
<td>Intelligence over sensibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passionate</td>
<td>Rational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion as sensation</td>
<td>Emotion as signs or conventions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Effect</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emotional stimulus</td>
<td>Observable behaviour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal technique</td>
<td>External technique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bring what is inside to the outside</td>
<td>Use of the outside to indicate an inside</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actor as origin of meaning</td>
<td>Actor as mediator of meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning as personally produced</td>
<td>Meaning as socially produced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As these two set of beliefs have been reproduced in various sources, so they have come to form two opposing models of acting. These can be summarised as the model of emotional expression and the model of emotional representation. While there are differences between these two models, they both articulate emotion as the foundational source of meaning in acting. By regarding acting as fundamentally emotional, then these models are understood and contextualised by a whole body of discourses which define horizons in how emotion is understood and interpreted in society.

Brecht’s views on drama were intended to transform theatrical practice. He was attempting to find ways of producing theatre which directed an audience’s attention to reflecting on the beliefs which made drama ‘believable’, the truths which produced ‘truthfulness’, or the choice of possibles which make a scene ‘plausible’. Brecht’s was a creative practice but a critical and analytic practice of performance can also have the objectives of seeking to find what beliefs, truths and possibilities are represented in forms of drama and acting. Rather than gestic acting, a ‘gestic’ criticism and study of acting looks at the ways in which acting becomes socially meaningful and the version of the social which is produced in those meanings.
Modernity and the drama of the self

Marion Keane (1993) has criticised the work of Richard Dyer (1979) on film stars and James Naremore (1988) on film acting for failing to see how the meaning of stars and performance are understood through beliefs about identity. Keane suggests an understanding of film performance must consider issues of 'Who am I? How do I make myself known in the world and to others? What is the nature of my privacy? What do I make of my individuality?' (p.31). To answer some of these issues herself, Keane makes reference to the philosophic scepticism of Rene Descartes and Immanuel Kant as antecedents to a tradition of thought she sees continuing with Jacques Derrida and Stanley Cavell in the twentieth century. Keane regards the value of Cavell to be in how he 'investigate[s] the specific things human beings are drawn to doubt (for example, do others exist? does the world exist? do I exist?), asking, on one level, why we doubt those things, and why we doubt them in particular ways' (p.34).

While these are important questions about the beliefs we have of personal identity, a problem with Keane's use of philosophic references is that she looks for definitions of identity in a highbrow intellectual discourse which exists outside a more popular understanding of the self. The difference is between what Patrick Hutton describes as the 'history of ideas', written as a history of leading intellectual thought, and the 'history of mentalities', which 'considers the attitudes of ordinary people toward everyday life' (1981, 237). As an example of this approach, Hutton sees Lucian Febvre's work as first of all displaying a concern with 'establishing the mental horizons of an age ... as they delimit the possibilities of thought in a given historical era' (p.242). Where the history of ideas is written as a series of how individuals have offered intellectual reflections on the world, a second trend in Febvre's work is to take history beyond frameworks of reason, to consider how mentalities are formed from the passionate and emotional relationships between people and their environment. As Hutton explains, the study of mentalities requires a 'history of human sentiment' (p.243). Identity and the self cannot therefore be just understood by a study of beliefs but must also consider a history of how the self feels and is felt as an emotional being.

Raymond Williams's (1977) concept of a 'structure of feeling' sees any culture at a particular moment as experiencing contradictions between the uneven development of
residual, dominant and emergent ideologies. The term 'feeling' is chosen by Williams for how it can be distinguished 'from more formal concepts of "world-view" or "ideology"', explaining instead the 'meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt' (p.132). Williams explains further: 'We are talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and inter-relating continuity' (p.132). What Williams is suggesting is that identity is produced not just in conscious beliefs about the self but also in feeling.

Feelings seem less formally defined, 'often indeed not yet recognised as social, but taken to be private, idiosyncratic and even isolating' (p.132). In the structure of feeling, any historical epoch will experience the coexistence and conflict between newly emergent forms of feeling and those feelings which have been formalised as the institutionalised sentiments of an age. Another way of seeing this distinction is suggested by Valentin Nikolaevic Volosinov (1986), who opposed 'established ideological systems' to what he called 'behavioural ideology', 'that atmosphere of unsystematised and unfixed inner and outer speech which endows our every instance of behaviour and action ... with meaning' (p.91). Behavioural ideology includes 'all those vague and undeveloped experiences, thoughts, and idle, accidental words that flash across our minds' (p.92). These idle thoughts, feelings and actions therefore act as what Volosinov calls 'ideological scraps', fragments which are active in a practical consciousness of the self.

The growth of modern Western societies saw an increasing tendency towards conceptualising the self as an individuated, divided and internalised identity. Raymond Williams (1983) has looked at how the conceptualisation of the modern self saw a shift in the meaning of words describing the self. Modern uses of the term 'individuality', describing a unique person, arose after the break up of the social, religious and economic hierarchies of feudal society (p.163). Until the eighteenth century, the word 'personality' had two meanings, describing the state of being a person, not a thing, and also personal belongings. In this use, 'personality' was something that all people generally had. Modern uses of the term describe a specific or unique quality, a 'lively personal identity', part of a person's 'individuality'. Williams also sees personality becoming an internal quality, as 'personality ... once an outward sign, has been decisively internalised, yet
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internalised as a possession, and therefore as something which can be either displayed or interpreted' (p.235). The changing meaning of personality therefore had two effects: it distinguished some people from other people, confirming the modern sense of individuality by suggesting that personality was not generally distributed; secondly, this distinctive individuality gave personality a new value as private property, for it was not publicly owned and it was presumed to reside 'inside' the person.

Roy Baumeister (1987) has examined how transitions from traditional to modern societies in Europe and the United States were accompanied by changes in the ways in which literary texts conceptualised the self. In the late mediaeval period between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, the self was conceptualised as a unified identity, positioned by the will of God in the collective social body of feudal society. From the early modern period of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the unity of the self was progressively disrupted. Protestant beliefs in predestination lead to methods of self inquiry which looked inwards on the self to search out the possibility of self-deception. By the Romantic era of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, individuality was believed to be something which society constrained. The emergence of this modern sense of self was set against a society transformed by the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, which produced the mass society of early twentieth century thought, in which the self was read as an alienated identity. For Baumeister, the conflicts of alienation appear to be replaced in the late twentieth century by the tendency towards anxieties about the 'accommodation' of the self, in which fatalism prevails as individuals are forced to accept compromises which absorb them into the social structure. Reviewing these changing concepts, Baumeister concludes that personal identity becomes ever more problematic as questions of self-knowledge, self-fulfilment, self-definition, and an apparently irreconcilable distance between individuality and society, increasingly characterise beliefs about the self.

Concepts of the self limit the effects of identity to the realm of ideas and beliefs. Mary Douglas (1966) argues that the body is inseparable from the realm of ideas. For Douglas, the body acts as a metaphor, translating idealist abstraction into concrete form. As the modern self became an individuated, divided and internalised identity, so the body came to signify the boundaries between 'self' and 'other', 'private' and 'public', and 'inside' and 'outside'. Accounting for the place of the body in the formation of the modern self
involves consideration of how identity is produced not only as the effect of ideas or knowledge but also in forms of practice. Norbert Elias (1994) has observed how an increase in the regulation of many aspects of bodily behaviour played an important part in the long term effects of what he describes as the 'civilising process'. Through an analysis of transformations in the codes of bodily manners, Elias traces a history of the body in the increased prohibitions placed on acceptable public behaviour. For example, in Europe, acts of urination, defecation and copulation, which were publicly tolerated in mediaeval society, were over a period of several centuries gradually confined to private spaces. Although behavioural standards are imposed upon individuals, Elias emphasises that such regulations become effective as they are inculcated as habitual forms of self control. Elias therefore see the control of bodily manners as a form of both social and psychological regulation.

Elias links the body to emotion in what he sees as the advancing thresholds of shame and embarrassment produced by the civilising process. Moments of shame and embarrassment are emotional responses to the body acting in ways which transgress accepted codes of behaviour. With shame, those transgressions are of the individual's own making. Embarrassment is caused by witnessing the transgressions of 'faults' of others (Elias 1994, 495). The civilising process is therefore not just a description of physical control but also of emotional effects.

For Elias, the process of civilisation contributes to a general pacification of society. Modern nation states emerged out of the cessation of wars between the battling warrior societies of the mediaeval era. While the rise in the nation state sees a decline in the external conflicts of physical combat, the civilising process produces internal conflicts, as 'the battlefield is ... moved within ... [T]he drives, the passionate affects, that can no longer directly manifest themselves in the relationships between people, often struggle no less violently within the individual against th[e] supervising part of himself' (emphases in the original p.453). What Elias traces in the civilising process is a historical account of the Freudian 'superego', as transformations in mechanisms of self control produce divisions between impulse and restraint, as an emotional battle comes to be fought out inside the civilised self.

Chris Shilling summarises the effect of the civilising process as effecting the progressive socialisation, rationalisation and individualisation of the body (1993, 163-
167). Although Elias’s observations are drawn from changes in Western society prior to modernity, Shilling sees the processes of socialisation, rationalisation and individuation as continuing to affect the body in contemporary times (p. 167). What the civilising process describes is the long term formalisation of social manners. However, as Cas Wouters (1986) has pointed out, the twentieth century has also observed some periods where there has been an informalisation of manners. For example, the informalisation which occurred in the 1960s and 70s came to be called the ‘permissive society’.

According to Wouters, history should be seen to undergo fluctuations between periods of formalisation, informalisation and reformalisation, in which there is a movement between civilising and decivilising processes. Elias had acknowledged that societies do experience periods of informalisation and that these did not come as a complete break from formal regulation, but rather as the ‘controlled decontrolling of emotional controls’ (quoted in Wouters, 3). Informalisation does not disrupt the civilising process, for informal behaviour is seen as sanctioned by, and not separate from, formal standards. Formalisation and informalisation reproduce at the level of epochal change the tension between restraint and impulse which divides the civilised self.

Arlie Russell Hochschild (1975) argues that in modernity, emotions are seen as a point of social conflict, as the ‘release’ of the emotions is often in contrast to attempts to try and regulate or manage feeling. One way of seeing this conflict is described by Peter and Carol Stearns (1985) as the difference between the actual emotional experiences of individuals and the collective emotional standards or ‘emotionology’ of a society. There is the danger in talking about emotional standards in opposition to actual emotions that some emotions may be presumed to be an inevitable, natural force waiting to escape their repression. Emotions and emotionology are both socially determined but the standards of emotionology are formalised and articulated in discursive forms and so have the appearance of being orderly and more regulated to serve the ‘social’.

Actual emotions may break the codes of emotionology and in so doing present what is believed to be repressed. However, rather than breaking free of society, such outbursts only have significance because of their social regulation. In these cases, it is not that some emotions are a natural expression of the self but that historical transformations in emotional standards make some emotions into feelings which are understood as experiences which society represses. Any presentation or representation of those
emotions therefore has the appearance of escaping society to express personal feelings.

Charles Morgan and James Averill (1992) have discussed how displays of emotionality are frequently interpreted as a sign of individual authenticity, the condition described by the term ‘true feelings’. Morgan and Averill suggest that true feelings are distinguished by their apparent depth, intensity and passion (p.110). The ‘depth’ of true feelings should be read as a metaphor for emotions which are believed to originate from beyond the manifestly social, arising apparently from ‘some culturally-devoid, socially-immune, wellspring’ (p.111). Depth of feeling is a statement of the extent to which authentic emotion is believed to reside ‘inside’ the self and that the expression of emotion requires bringing feelings to the ‘surface’. However, as beliefs about repression regard true feelings as trapped inside the deepest depths of the self, then the intensity of returning whatever is repressed is presumed to be an experience of pain and suffering. Emotional intensity appears as a state of disorganisation, conveying a sense that ‘true feelings’ are passionately beyond the control of individuals. True feelings appear therefore to transgress the rationalisation and socialisation of the modern self. Passion and pain rise to the surface to express a self against the social.

Although passionate outbursts may represent expressions against the social, Morgan and Averill are clear that the meaning of true feelings is entirely social.

In our erroneous perception of “true feelings” as free from the impingements of social and individual purpose, we see them as natural and organic and we read into them an otherwise elusive authenticity, a stay against the fragmentations of existence. Indeed, insofar as “true feeling” experiences are self-enhancing, they foster a sense of transcendence over disorientation and disconnection of our lives, that is, a sense of seamless being.

(p.112)

Deep, intense and passionate feeling represents a sense of truth which is read as the escape from the social but true feelings can only signify a sense of impulse and authenticity because they are coded as such by the very social conditions they are presumed to transcend. Emotion can only signify something repressed for a society that believes that something has been repressed. Morgan and Averill suggest that in modern
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societies, emotional authenticity is read as a 'creative' solution to the problems of the self in modernity, as true feelings greet the individual with a sense of self-discovery (1992, 113). What true feelings would therefore seem to promise is answers to the problems of self-knowledge, fulfilment, social integration and self-definition which characterise the modern self.

Problems of self-knowledge and self-definition produce difficulties in the representation of the self to the self. Michel Foucault has looked at how the problem of knowing the self has resulted at various historical moments in the reflexive practices he calls 'technologies of the self'. Technologies of the self are defined by Foucault as the practices performed by individuals upon themselves 'for setting up and developing relationships with the self, for self-reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by oneself' (1988, 29). For Foucault, however, technologies of the self do not 'discover' the self but rather it is in the mechanisms of investigation that presumptions are formed about the ways in which the self will be known. As these technologies can be seen to change historically, the practices of seeking to know the self do not uncover an ahistorical self, but rather, as practice changes, so the self is differently known.

Foucault (1984) argues that since the nineteenth century, technologies for the examination of sexual behaviour have resulted in the presumption that sexuality is the key to the true self. While the Victorian age repressed sexual behaviour, Foucault believed that this did not lead to a silence about sexuality but rather produced a discourse on sexuality promoted by an intense interest in sexuality as something which needed to be known in order that it could be controlled. Active in the production of this discourse was the use of secular confession, which operated as a technology for knowing the sexual self, while the articulation of sexual revelations constructs the speaker as a sexual being.

It is arguable whether sexuality ever became an absolute criterion of self-knowledge but what Foucault's work does indicate is the importance of confession in the practices of knowing the modern self. Confession brings together practical action (speaking the confession) with discursive representation (what is said in the confession). Confession has a special status in the representation of the modern self, as it forms 'a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement' (p.61). The practice of confession appears truthful in the way it undertakes to reveal the reality of a
individuated, divided and internalised identity. Through the act of 'speaking out' the act of confession declares that the truth lies 'within'.

Confession involves not only the task of knowing the self but also the act of staging the self. The confession is performative: it stages a mini drama of knowing and showing the modern self. Like the emotionalist theory of acting, the confession is conditional on the person who speaks actually identifying with what they represent. In expressive acting and confession, the individual is confirmed as the source of meaning. While language may be an organised system which regulates what is said and how it is said, in the confession, speech appears to be the transparent medium of the speaker's internalised self. As the emotionalist theory of acting articulated an aesthetic of romantic individualism, in which the actor brings out into the public sphere his or her private feelings, so the confession expresses the deep secrets of the individual self against forms of social regulation which it could be believed would repress their truth. Confession is a type of performance, while the emotionalist actor regards acting as a kind of confessional.

Lionel Trilling (1972) argues that there is a qualitative difference between 'sincerity' and 'authenticity' in artistic expression. In a discussion of the literary author, Trilling argues that sincerity can be coded or 'faked', so that 'we play the role of being ourselves, we sincerely act the part of a sincere person, with the result that a judgment may be passed upon our sincerity that it is not authentic' (p. 11). Trilling argues that authenticity gradually replaces sincerity in modern literature, as literary discourse becomes concerned with proving that the discourse is the genuine expression of its author. Trilling's distinction between 'authenticity' and 'sincerity' is based on the same theories about the relationship of the individual to language as the oppositions between emotionalist and anti-emotionalist theories of acting. While sincerity can be imitated, authenticity is taken to be beyond imitation. Where discourse is read as authentic, Trilling explains that this is the effect of expressing 'much that culture traditionally condemn[s] and seeks to exclude ... accorded a considerable moral authority by reason of the authenticity claimed for it, for example, disorder, violence, unreason' (p. 11). In other words, authentic expression is savage and angry.

The problem of authentic expression also enters modern forms of drama. Significant here is the emergence of melodrama. Tragedy represented the lives of a social elite, who were usually kings and princes. Melodrama concentrated on recognisable locations and
characters who belonged to either the middle or working classes. The melodrama therefore represented more ordinary lives and individuals. Peter Brooks (1976) describes the predominant characteristics of melodrama as ‘the indulgence of strong emotionalism; moral polarisation and schematisation; extreme states of being, situations, actions; overt villainy, persecution of the good, and final reward of virtue; inflated and extravagant expression; dark plottings, suspense, breathtaking peripety’ (pp.11-12). While the dominance of these characteristics in some dramas would distinguish them as generically melodramas, Brooks is interested in how the melodramatic was not confined to melodramas alone but formed a more general dramatic form of presentation, ‘a mode of conception and expression ... a certain fictional system for making sense of experience’ (p.xiii).

For Brooks, the melodramatic mode responded to problems and anxieties in modernity over the loss of moral certainties. The emergence of the melodrama in France and England at the end of the eighteenth century is seen by Brooks to come as the conclusion of what he describes as a ‘process of desacralisation’ (p.15). Starting with the Renaissance, modernity developed secular forms of thought which challenged traditions of sacred thought. An effect of this was that universal moral principles and criteria disappeared. In the absence of such values, the individual was left alone to determine what could be morally right or wrong. Brooks sees the melodrama as a response to such a loss of moral value, representing the desire for a ‘resacralisation’ of modern societies (p.16). The melodramatic mode produces dramatic anxiety out of the loss of ethical certainties, leading to the desire in melodrama to find and represent what Brooks calls the ‘moral occult’ (p.5). The sense of loss in the melodramatic mode motivates the desire for what is out of reach, something which could be present but which is absent. It is this sense of loss which leads Brooks to a comparison with the unconscious mind, for the moral occult is ‘a sphere of being where our most basic desires and interdictions lie, a realm which in quotidian existence may appear closed off from us, but which we must accede to since it is the realm of meaning and value’ (p.5). It was the function of the melodramatic mode to imagine and stage what was lost to modernity. In so doing, the melodramatic dramatised the central problems and desires of the modern self.

This imagination was made material by the techniques of melodramatic representation. In the melodrama, the problems of the modern world and the modern self were
transformed into problems of signification. Brooks reads the struggle for the recognition of moral value in the melodrama as the struggle to make a sign of virtue (p.28). Moral clarity was therefore signified by a 'clarification of signs' (p.31). Realist mimesis was insufficient to such a task, as the melodramatic imagination required the means to transcend the 'plane of actuality, to place us in a more rarefied atmosphere where each statement is a total and coherent gesture towards the representation of the cosmic moral drama' (p.40-41). The melodramatic mode involved 'infusing' the banal and the ordinary with the excitement of grandiose conflict. ... a state where hyperbole is a "natural" form of expression because anything less would convey only the apparent (naturalistic, banal) drama, not the true (moral, cosmic) drama' (p.40). If melodramatic technique appeared excessive, or 'over the top', it was because it struggled to represent an imagination for which the conventions of realist aesthetics were plainly inadequate. Melodrama, while dealing with the problems of an ordinary reality, needed the representational means to exceed the real.

Against a realist, rational understanding of the world, melodrama posed an irrational excess.

Nothing is understood, all is overstated. ... moments provide us with the joy of a full emotional indulgence, the pleasures of an unadulterated exploitation of what we recognise from our psychic lives as one possible way to be, the victory of one integral inner force. ... The melodramatic utterance breaks through everything that constitutes the "reality principle", all its censorships, accommodations, tonings-down. Desire cries aloud its language in identification with full states of being. (emphases in the original p.41)

It was these 'full states of being' which the characterisation and acting style of the melodramatic mode attempted to represent. Stage melodramas of the nineteenth century constructed characters without multifaceted complexity or contradiction. Moral clarity was produced through opposing characters who were wholly virtuous or wholly wicked. Brooks sees the representational techniques of the melodramatic mode as working to 'lead us in a movement through and beyond the surface of things to what lies behind. ... to go beyond the surface of the real to the truer, hidden reality, to open up the world of the
spirit' (p.2). It was the understanding of that hidden reality which made emotion central to the understanding of character and the dramatic circumstances. For melodrama, truth was in feeling and feeling was the truth. The emotional imagination of melodrama was made material through the body of the actor. If modernity presented melodrama with a state in which ethical co-ordinates had become obscured, melodramatic acting made moral intentions clear by representing a fullness of moral worth and emotional commitment. Nineteenth century stage melodrama and early cinema used the formalised emotional lexicon of the histrionic code to render internal moral states entirely visible as external effects of the body. It was the function of the body in melodramatic acting to show moral truth through the depth and intensity of true feelings. If the gestures of the histrionic code appear by today standards to be 'over the top' and 'big', that is because they were representing 'big' feelings which had to go over the top. In melodrama, 'big' acting was not a mistake but an aesthetic necessity. Brooks describes the excess of melodramatic technique as 'a victory over repression', motivated by the 'desire to say all' (p.4). The voice may try to speak of desire but Brooks argues that in the melodramatic mode, physical gesture became the metaphor of 'what cannot be said' (p.11). With the regulation of the body in the civilising process, grand gestures could appear particularly resonant in signifying a release of repression.

In Europe and America, melodrama was superseded at the end of the nineteenth century by naturalist and realist dramatic forms. The arrival of those forms saw changes in acting style, including the transition which Pearson (1992) sees in the movement from histrionic to verisimilar codes. The social meaning of that change can be found in the terms which Staiger (1985a) finds in how theatre critics described the new style as acting of 'reserved force' (p.16) and how film critics and workers commented on what they saw as the 'suppressed emotion' of the new acting (p.18). The descriptions are telling, for both see unrestrained 'force' or 'emotion' opposed to its 'reserved' or 'suppressed' containment. Such terms describe a 'repression' of melodramatic emotion, 'civilising' melodramatic expressivity by the new conventions of naturalism and realism. However, the coming of realism did not see the disappearance of the melodramatic, only its transformation. Robert Lang (1989) argues that after the struggles against fate of the Griffith melodramas, American film in the thirties, forties, and fifties became increasingly concerned with how social conditions determine individuals. This view is gradually
reduced to understanding the family as the primary site of conflict in the formation of
individual identity (p.1). In so doing, the melodrama shifts from seeing the world in
terms of religious value to arrive at a sociological and psychoanalytic reading of the drama
of the self (p.7). In these developments, the melodramatic does not give way to realism
but instead becomes the means for examining and representing other kinds of reality.

In a study of the television serial *Dallas*, Ien Ang (1985) comments on how the show
produced an ‘emotional realism’ (p.45). This effect, Ang argues, was the result of ‘an
“inner realism” ... combined with an “external unrealism”’ (p.47). This can be seen as an
effect of the process of representation, as inner realism is found in, and literally inside,
external unrealism. The melodramatic mode has persisted as a means for understanding
the world through what Lang describes as an ‘ideology of emotionalism’ (1989, 7). The
melodramatic makes the real primarily emotional. The religious, social or psychological
problems of a drama are understood through feelings. As the body and voice of the actor
produce the signs which intimately link those problems to personal identity, so moving
and speaking have a special significance in revealing an emotional reality. The verisimilar
code in acting did not therefore represent the end of the melodramatic, only its
transformation. The melodramatic returns in realistic acting as small moments where true
feelings display a depth and intensity of emotion which appears to reveal the reality of the
modern self in all its dividedness and loss.

This act of revelation will often appear as a lack of control, as the verisimilar code lets
slip its ‘reserve’ and ‘suppression’. The effect of this may be that it is not only the
character’s deep feelings which appear to be released but also the emotions of the actor.
Something of this quality can be found in Richard Dyer’s (1982) study of Judy Garland
singing ‘The Man That Got Away’ in *A Star is Born* (George Cukor 1954 US). Dyer
describes Garland’s use of the voice and body as producing moments of what he
describes as ‘a rhetoric of authenticity’. The characteristics of this rhetoric are vocal
nuances and tiny gestures which suggest the absence of control and premeditation,
together with a sense of privacy. The authenticity of these effects relies on their
opposition to other meanings: ‘the truth [is] behind or beneath the surface. The surface is
organised and under control, it is worked out in advance, it is public. In terms of
performance this would mean that every detail is marked as deliberate and calculated ... This kind of performance [is] ... needless to say, just what we don’t get when
authenticity is at stake' (p.137). Although Dyer sees authenticity as signified through a lack of control and premeditation, his description of these characteristics as a 'rhetoric' recognises the conventionality which exists in these signs of unconventionality.

The melodramatic mode is not confined to the melodrama. The melodramatic appears wherever emotionality struggles to represent the private internal dramas of individuals seeking to find moral certainty or psychological truth. Against any other register of meaning, emotion communicates the problematics of an individual search for truth. In melodramatic acting, it is the voice and the body which represents those problems. It is the capacity for the melodramatic to represent, or at least attempt to represent, the personal and private truth of the modern self, which has made melodramatic performance a continuing dynamic in contemporary drama. Rather than being separate from, or exceeding, realistic forms of representation, the melodramatic is fully consonant with realist representation, for it tells of an emotional reality which is the deep truth of the drama.

Talent and symbolic power

In the Introduction to the thesis, I identified the problems of the agency and structure opposition and suggested the need to consider a reading of acting work as structured practice. Metz (1974) describes plausibility as a restricting of possibilities. Cultural codings restrict the possibilities of what will appear plausible. However, rather than seeing this cultural process as leaving actors and other cultural producers with only a single plausible possibility, cannot actors be faced with a range, albeit restricted and structured, of possibilities which they can plausibly, and even intentionally, move within? Cannot actors also direct their work in such ways that they may also chance the implausible?

In a discussion of literary theory, Alain Viala (1989) has criticised literary studies which attempt to relate literary works to the social conditions of their production. In contrast to the dangers of romantic theories of literary creation, in which a work is read as a unique expression of the author, Viala argues that sociological approaches are in danger of 'establish[ing] a mechanistic-causal relationship: social phenomena are produced;
works express them’ (p.257). In contrast to romantic or social ‘reflectionist’ theories of literary production, Viala calls for a study of the institutional arrangements which condition the ways in which objects and practices are recognised and evaluated as literature. He calls these institutional arrangements ‘prismatic effects’, ‘the mediations that make up the systems of relations between literature and other social praxes’ (p.259).

To explain this institutional mediation between literary texts and society, Viala draws on the concept of ‘field’ elaborated by Pierre Bourdieu. In order to understand the contribution which this concept can make to the study of cultural production in general, and acting in particular, it is necessary to reflect on some of the foundations of Bourdieu’s sociology. Bourdieu attempts to resolve the opposition between agency and structure in his concept of ‘habitus’: ‘conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence ... systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations’ (1990, 53). The habitus structures the possibilities of practice, and the individual agent may be disposed to act in certain ways. Equally, Bourdieu allows for agents to move within structures, contributing to the transformation and restructuring of the habitus. As the habitus structures practice, then it unconsciously determines practice. However, the agent performs actions which find ways of working and moving within limits. The concept of habitus can therefore be described as ‘negotiating’ practice.

Raymond Williams’s category of ‘practical consciousness’ and Volosinov’s ‘behavioural ideology’ have similarities with Bourdieu’s description of the habitus as forming a ‘practical sense’. In each of these categories, the effect of social relations is not just a product of belief but also of action and the body. Bourdieu describes the habitus as ‘embodied history’ (p.56). The embodiment of the habitus produces what Bourdieu calls bodily ‘hexis’, a ‘political mythology realised, em-bodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking’ (pp.69-70). This social regulation of the body bears a strong relationship to the formation of habits which Elias saw in the civilising process, and Elias also chose to use the term ‘habitus’ to describe the embodiment of culture (see Mennell 1992, 30). The place of the body in the habitus is seen by Bourdieu to have great significance for a sense of selfhood, for what ‘is “learned by the body” is not something that one has, like knowledge that can
be brandished, but something that one is’ (1990, 73). Ultimately, both Bourdieu (see Jenkins 1992) and Elias (see Shilling 1993, 173) may not escape from offering a deterministic view of practice. However, by looking to the effects on, and of, the body, both retain the possibility of practical actions negotiating determinate cultural conditions. Bourdieu sees social practices concentrated in areas of activities he calls ‘fields’.

Richard Jenkins explains the concept of field in Bourdieu’s work as

a social arena within which struggles or manoeuvres take place over specific resources or stakes and access to them. Fields are defined by the stakes which are at stake — cultural distinction (education), employment, land, power (politics), social class, prestige ... Each field, by virtue of its defining content, has a different logic and taken-for-granted structure of necessity and relevance which is both the product and producer of the habitus which is specific and appropriate to the field.

(Jenkins 1992, 84)

Struggles emerge because any field will have its dominant and dominated positions. Fields are therefore structured by hierarchies of power. Bourdieu sees the field as a structure of ‘positions’, within which the participant in the field negotiates his or her ‘position takings’. Potentially, the agent can move between positions in the field, although the power relations of the field require the agent to negotiate the resources and stakes which will allow such movement. Bourdieu finds a suitable description of this negotiating practice in the sporting analogy of a ‘feel for the game’ (1990, 66).

The resources by which positions are negotiated in any field come in the various forms of what Bourdieu calls ‘capital’. This does not mean just the familiar example of economic capital, however, as economic capital is unequally distributed, then so are other forms of capital unequally divided. Alongside economic capital, Bourdieu adds the categories of social and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986a; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 119). Social capital is the ‘network of ... institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’, what might be described as the ‘contacts’ which the agent has by virtue of belonging to a field (Bourdieu 1986a, 248). Cultural capital can take several forms. Embodied cultural capital is the durable dispositions of the mind and body
which effect the agent’s membership of a culture (p.244). Objectified cultural capital is found in the forms of cultural goods like paintings, books, dictionaries, or musical instruments, the objects which represent a capacity to know or make culture (p.246).

Institutionalised cultural capital is derived from knowledge, of which the most valuable is that knowledge validated by the field of education (p.247). Bourdieu emphasises the transferability of one form of capital into another. For example, fine art, as an example of objectified cultural capital, can be transferred into economic capital. Or, study for educational qualifications may require an expenditure of economic capital but may return economic capital if those qualifications lead to employment.

Where each of these forms of capital is turned into some type of sign, it becomes what Bourdieu calls ‘symbolic capital’. It is by symbolic capital that each of the other forms of capital becomes recognisable. For example, the status symbols of economic capital, the demonstrative relationships of social capital, and the physical actions, voiced beliefs, artifacts and qualifications of the various forms of cultural capital. As the distribution of economic, social and cultural capital produces power relations between participants in a field, so symbolic capital becomes the means for signifying those relationships. Bourdieu therefore encourages the view that signs should be seen to have a market value, a ‘symbolic profit’ (1980, 66).

For Bourdieu, the field of cultural production is the ‘space’ in which the producers of cultural goods occupy positions of power and legitimacy in relation to one another. The field not only determines what the value is of particular cultural practices and products but also regulates what will legitimately be called ‘arts’. While in the arts, the figure of the individual artist has seen the field place a high value on personal expression, for Bourdieu such beliefs obscure the work of the field.

The ‘charismatic’ ideology which is the ultimate basis of belief in the value of a work of art ... is undoubtedly the main obstacle to a rigorous science of the production of the value of cultural goods. It is this ideology which directs attention to the apparent producer, the painter, writer, or composer, in short, the ‘author’, suppressing the question of what authorises the author, what creates the authority with which authors authorise.  

(emphasis in the original 1977, 76)
Commissioners, editors, distributors, critics, are amongst the figures who have a stake in regulating the contents and participants in the field. Finally, success in the field is influenced by the consumers of culture who are themselves positioned by the field in the choices they make.

All fields have their own internal logic. In the field of cultural production, Bourdieu (1983) argues that power and value in the field is divided between the two sub-fields he calls the 'field of restricted production' and the 'field of large-scale production'. In restricted production, agents work to make innovative or accomplished works of art which meet or even extend the highest standards of the field. Large-scale production sees a more industrialised production of culture. Where in restricted production 'producers produce for other producers', in large-scale production, work is 'produced for the market' (p.39). The producers in restricted production operate independent of external interest, pursuing the artistic ideals which belong to the field, with a resulting profit in their cultural capital. Large-scale production makes culture for the market, selling to those who do not participate in the field, with the aim of accumulating the external value of economic capital. The difference between these internal and external interests leads Bourdieu to see the field of cultural production as divided by a struggle between the principles of artistic autonomy and commercial heteronomy (p.38).

Bourdieu also sees the field as hierarchicalised by the relative degrees of consecration and prestige which practitioners and products receive as the tastes of critics and consumers map out what types of production will be culturally valued. Divisions in the field are therefore produced not only by degrees of more or less economic profit but also by critical judgments of what, in the simplest terms, differentiates the 'good' from the 'bad'. Principles of profit and prestige, with prestige itself profiting cultural capital, map the relationships of the field of cultural production (see fig.1).

It is the tension between these principles which sees the field structured by a logic in which the positions of highest status belong to those producers who are recognised as following the principle of artistic autonomy. According to the tensions in the field, the artistic integrity of producers is represented in the ways they cultivate an image and practice which disavows the heteronomous interest of the commercial market. The true artist is disinterested in economic profit. Making money is posed as antithetical to making art, which, as Bourdieu suggests, makes the field an 'upside-down economic world':
The Distribution of Capital in the Field of Cultural Production

fig.1
where in other fields, the acquisition of economic capital is the condition of success and status, the field of cultural production follows the logic of an ‘anti-economy’ (p.40). Familiar oppositions therefore structure the field: beliefs about creativity and personal expression are positioned as opposed to commercial constraint and industrial mass production. Those beliefs structure the ‘habitus’ of cultural producers, so that their positions are negotiated relative to how practitioners can be seen to embody economic and cultural forms of capital. As those positions inevitably become recognisable in the cultural conventions which map the field, then negotiations are achieved through the production of a symbolic capital of signs and codes.

The field of cultural production mediates between cultural practices or artifacts and the social conditions of a period, regulating what acts or objects are recognised as cultural, and effecting what a society thinks culture is. The field therefore mediates between text and context. However, while describing the mediating role of the field, a significant limitation of Bourdieu’s concept is that he does not explore in any detail the textual forms which symbolic capital takes, or the social conditions which bear on the meaning of those texts. To read cultural forms as socially produced therefore requires integrating the study of text, field and context.

Film-making occupies several positions in the field of cultural production. David Bordwell and Janet Staiger (1985) consider how various alternatives to Hollywood film have emerged in contemporary cinema. The ‘art’ film disrupts the classic style of Hollywood narrative, cultivating ambiguity instead of certainty in narrative development (p.374) This play on form is perceived to be the work of the director, for in the art film, it does not take a critic to detect the distinctive signature of an auteur at work. Films which reject narrative causality altogether form an ‘avant-garde cinema’. Such films explore the potentials of film form which, it is believed, the emergence of narrative cinema has not adequately explored. The experimental nature of this type of film-making means that the avant-garde produces for other producers. ‘Modernist’ cinema does not reject narrative altogether but introduces formal experiments which are given as much prominence as the narrative (p.381). Considerable overlaps occur between the art film and modernist film, and such definitions can only be seen relationally rather than substantively, as the modernist film includes the narrative disruptions of art film and the formal experiments of the avant-garde.
Along with differences in the construction of the film text, these categories also have an institutional status as different cinemas. These cinemas map positions in the field of cultural production, forming sectors of production which, in simple terms, could be called 'mainstream popular', 'arthouse' and 'avant-garde', and to which can be added the non-professional sector of 'amateur' film-making (see fig. 2). Along the axis of economic capital, mainstream and arthouse sectors belong to the sub-field of large-scale production, while the avant-garde and amateur film-making are situated with restricted production. These sub-fields are then further bisected by the degrees of prestige and critical consecration accorded these productions. The term 'mainstream' is chosen to link a market definition – i.e produced for a majority – to the culturally dominant pejorative evaluation of popular cinema – i.e such films are believed to be produced without artistic innovation. Arthouse displays artistic ambition but still within the sector of a commercial market. What Bordwell and Staiger do not address is how in art cinema, and the same is true of modernist cinema, the name of the director can become a vital brand label for marketing a film. Art cinema, and to a lesser extent modernist cinema, is motivated by the commerce of artistry. Artistic autonomy and prestige is represented by the avant-garde who make films for other film-makers, or more precisely, avant-garde films for other avant-garde film-makers. Economically, there may not be much difference between the avant-garde and amateur sectors, although the former is more likely to win the institutional patronage of funding boards than the latter. Avant-garde experimentation is based on a knowledge of the conventions existing in the field. On the other hand, the amateur may try to reproduce on a shoestring budget the same conventions as the mainstream popular sector. The avant-garde and amateur sectors are therefore differentiated by the distribution of cultural capital between the artist and the hobbyist.

Each of these sectors has its actors, from the stars of the mainstream to the family and friends of the amateur sector. Movement within or between sectors is never entirely impossible, it is only that the hierarchies of the field make the negotiation of position a struggle. In the field, actors accumulate forms of economic, cultural and symbolic capital. The working knowledge of actors produces an institutionalised cultural capital of professional know-how, and when this knowledge appears to have the immediacy of 'instinct', then the practice of how to act has become embodied cultural capital. Acting styles can be read as the forms of symbolic capital which make manifest the positions
High Cultural Capital

Avant-Garde

Arthouse

Low Economic Capital

Amateur

Mainstream

High Economic Capital

Low Cultural Capital

Sectors of Film Production

fig. 2
which actors can legitimately occupy in the field. A founding principle of semiotics is that signs do not signifying in themselves but through patterns of difference (de Saussure 1974). In the context of the field of cultural production, visible variations in acting style map the hierarchical positions of the field, so that acting signs are not just producers of difference but also of distinction.

Practitioners can negotiate their status by using the voice and body in ways which signify the logic of the field. Barry King’s (1985) opposition between ‘impersonation’ and ‘personification’ can be seen to relate to the negotiation of artistic integrity versus commercial profit in the field. Both impersonation and personification are only successful to the extent that the voice and body can produce signs of transformation or continuity. Through using make-up and costuming, but also altering the behaviour of the voice and body, the actor can produce impersonatory transformations which are seen to be employed entirely for realising the artistic goal of making a believable representation. Against the differences produced by impersonation, in personification the actor emphasises the continuities between roles. In so doing, the actor produces a recognisable identity which can be traded and commodified. With personification, the actor refuses the artistic ideals of believability and truthfulness which are internal to the field and looks outside to the benefits of economic gain.

It is the link between personified continuities in acting and the commodification of the performer’s identity which King sees operating in the acting of film stars:

stars do not ... surrender their public personality to the demands of characterisation. ... the star's image (personality image) constitutes a barrier or, at least a problem for situated characterisation. In this sense, stars incarnate the principle of miscasting. What this means in terms of our normative definition of acting is that stars do not function as actors. This does not mean necessarily that a given star cannot act, but that acting is not essential to stardom.

(1986, 160)

A distinction therefore exists in the field between film performers who, by believably impersonating characters, are seen as ‘actors’, and performers who, by always appearing the same across roles, are seen as ‘stars’. The respective profits of these two
configurations are described by King in terms of character actors who represent the peak of a ‘skill hierarchy’ and stars who are high on the ‘reward hierarchy’ (p.160). Reward, in this sense, would have to be understood as economic reward, for the awards given to character actors are the rewards—of no direct economic value—given to actors for their outstanding performance as a performer.

The commodity status and low artistic prestige situates the star in the sector of mainstream production. While other sectors have their lead performers, to call them stars would be to neglect how the field structures differences between film performers. The art and films of Andy Warhol were often avant-garde reflections on the commercial culture of the mainstream. This metacritical distance meant that Warhol’s use of figures like Joe Dalessandro and Edie Sedgwick in his films as what he called ‘superstars’, missed how the field prevents the avant-garde from having stars. Warhol mistook stardom as only an effect of signification, i.e. training the camera in close-up on an individual for a long time. Dalessandro and Sedgwick were ‘meta-stars’, for they commented on stardom without being stars. By not being stars, Warhol’s performers showed that stardom is a particular range of positions in the field. Stardom is not just the effect of the image of the film actor but of how the field influences relationships to that image.

While stars belong to the mainstream sector of film production, the performers who occupy that sector are not all stars. Danae Clark argues that any discussion of stardom as a ‘system’ must take into account of the ways in which stars are only one classification in a hierarchy of film performers (1995, 5). For Clark, the hierarchy of the star system forms labour power differences. Where Clark’s argument is limited is in how she sees that hierarchy only in economic terms. Stars are known to have higher earnings than supporting actors and extras. However, according to the logic of the field of cultural production, the very wealth of the star and the effects of personification can delegitimise the claims of the star to have the same cultural status as some of his or her fellow actors.

The negotiation of positions in the field by film stars and actors will not only result from the accumulation of economic capital, or the symbolic capital of performance style, but also in how the individual performer becomes the subject of a whole image. Richard Dyer (1979) looks at how the images of stars are produced across a variety of texts, which include not only film roles but also promotional and publicity materials, critical reviews and other commentaries (pp.68-72). A star image is therefore an intertextual
construction. With stars, images can produce either a sense of a star as a specific person, or of stardom in general (p.38). Images of stars construct the performer as an object of knowledge.

Richard deCordova (1990) has suggested that the star system in American cinema was formed as different levels of discourse emerged about the people who performed in films. At the beginning of the century, the names of performers were unknown but also there was no discourse describing the work of film performance. After 1907, deCordova sees the appearance of what he calls the 'discourse on acting'. Although performers had acted in films before that date, what the discourse on acting did was 'assert and establish the "fact" that people acted in films' (p.36). The effect of this discourse was not only that the work of acting became known but also that performers in films could now be known as people who worked. By 1909, release of the names of film performers provided the label to link together performances to form the discursive construction of what deCordova identifies as the 'picture personality'. The personality was an identity drawn only from knowledge about film performances. Around 1913, however, there were the first examples of a discourse which set out to represent the private, off-screen life of performers. It is from the emergence of off-screen images for film performers that deCordova believes the star discourse was formed. Studio control of the off-screen images of stars worked to produce a unity between on-screen roles and the private lives of stars. However, incidents at the start of the twenties, like the accusations levelled at Roscoe 'Fatty' Arbuckle over the death of Virginia Rappe, saw the emergence of the star scandal discourse, which was active in representing what were believed to be the hidden private 'truths' which contradicted the on-screen images of stars.

While deCordova concentrates on stars in particular, and on a particular moment in which new forms of discourse emerged in film culture, I suggest that his categories of discourse can have a relevance for studying all film performers. The discourses of acting, personality, star and scandal, each have a different function in how they construct knowledge about film performers. De Cordova argues that the discourse on acting established

the filmed body ... as a site of textual productivity, as subject in an enunciative process; this enunciative process had been symbolised in terms of an aesthetics of
acting, thus establishing its fictional status and lending it an air of artistic legitimacy; and, finally, the actor, thus constituted, had entered into and shifted the status of film as a commodity; it had been recognised as a viable means of product differentiation, as something that could be exploited and advertised to increase business for a particular film.

(p.50)

The discourse on acting had the function of constructing the work of the actor as legitimate professional and aesthetic labour. Through this discourse, the aesthetics of acting could be commodified to differentiate films but it was the emergence of the picture personality which commodified acting as the skill of a known individual. The discourse of the star and the scandal then made connections between the on-screen image of a performer and the more general ambitions, aspirations, moral standards and ideological beliefs of a culture.

As these discourses are differently distributed between film performers, then the construction of image becomes active in locating the place of a performer in the field. The name of the personality is central to the commodification of the performer, although the performance strategies of impersonation and personification will influence if that name is respected as an actor or known as a star. Where a performer produces impersonatory transformations, while also having an image dominated by the discourse of acting, the uses of the voice and body, together with knowledge about the ways in which the performer works, will produce the image of the ‘actor’. The actor image has the function in discourse of representing the film performer as a skilled professional. Discourses of stardom and scandal produce an extra-cinematic knowledge of the performer’s off-screen existence, which can work against the believability of a star in a particular role, but even when the image of a star does appear to perfectly fit the role, the effect of the star or scandal discourse cancels out any claims to acting skill, as the star is judged to be ‘just like that anyway’.

The configurations of ‘actor’ and ‘star’ are therefore the effect of differences in performance strategies and the discursive construction of knowledge about the film performers. Evidence of these strategies and discourses will differently position film performers in the field, including the hybrid position of ‘star-actor’. While the
commercial logic of the mainstream sector of large-scale production gives the star economic power in the sector, the mainstream is not entirely inhabited by stars. The function of the name forms a hierarchy between performers known by name and those, who by their anonymity, are identified by their visual appearance as 'he/she was in ...' Performers in the mainstream sector who by their acting and image become recognised as character actors, appear to be performing and working in ways which do not follow the commercial logic of the sector, and are seen to at least partly escape the sector. Like the great directors of auteurism, popular cinema has continually had its acting greats whose craft is valued over commerce. Recognised for their dedication and accomplishments in the art of acting, such figures appear as individuals who transcend the sector they belong to, resisting the industrial logic which is presumed to compromise artistic craft. However, the image of individual autonomy, integrity and distinction, is only possible because the practitioner belongs to the sector, negotiating a position which is conditional on the structure of the field as a whole.

Achievements in acting, including film acting, are often attributed to the effects of 'talent'. Talent is regarded as a natural creative force which the actor is born with and possesses. Such individualism and naturalness obscures how the field influences the production of acting. However, the institutional conditions of the field should not be studied as a replacement for the ideology of individual talent. Instead, the conditions of the field have to be examined for how ideas of talent in acting can produce a sense of presence but also of prestige, profit and power.

Acting forms a relationship between the actor and a character. That relationship is constructed through the actions of the voice and body, which enact the process of the actor becoming the character. It is because the actor never fully becomes the character that I have adopted the convention in this study when describing specific film performances of naming both actor and character at once – actor/character – to highlight the way in which a performance is always a circulation of meanings between two identities. For example, Marlon Brando as Terry Malloy in On the Waterfront reads as Brando/Terry.
In this chapter I have developed perspectives on how the meanings and practices of the voice and body in acting are located in other contextual beliefs, discourses and conditions. Beliefs about acting include what I described as the models of emotional expression and emotional representation. While these two models of acting differently conceptualise the relationship of actor to character, both have taken emotion to be the foundation of meaning in acting. The significance of emotion in acting is related to other beliefs about the self and the body. Modern concepts of personal identity have read the self as an individuated, divided and internalised identity. In these concepts, true feelings come to have a special significance, for it is believed that deep, intense and passionate emotions represent the private, internal and repressed truths of the self. The socialisation, rationalisation and individuation of the body in the civilising process regulated physical behaviour, with the effect that the body became a sign of social control. It is this civilising control which has made the actions of the body an important medium for the signification of the deep emotional conditions which are believed to represent the truth of the modern self. In particular, melodramatic forms of representation have used the signification of the body to compensate for what are believed to be the limitations of speech. The meanings of the voice and body will be influenced by the positions which certain actors and acting styles map in the field of cultural production. For practitioners in the field, the distribution of economic, cultural and symbolic forms of capital will influence their movements within the field. The work of acting is therefore a structured practice.
Shelley Winters was playing the part of Alexandra Del Lago in Tennessee Williams's *Sweet Bird of Youth*. Finding some problems when playing the role, Winters attended workshop sessions at the Actors Studio, where she turned to the tutor Lee Strasberg for advice.

"I don’t know how to act this character. ... She’s not like me at all. She’s a movie star, and I’m a movie star, but we’re so different. I’m basing my idea of the role on a movie star like Joan Crawford, who can chew up two directors and three producers for breakfast.”...

“To help me get into the part, I’m wearing a dress of Marilyn Monroe’s, and I’m relating to Marilyn being thirty-six and her fears of getting old, just like my character has her own fight with age: she’s a star whose stardom depends on the appearance of youth.”

“Look darling, you always make things hard for yourself,” Strasberg offers. “You’ve got more of the character inside you than you think.”

“My psychiatrist says I am not the character.”

“Your psychiatrist doesn’t know as much as I do.”

(in Hirsch 1984, 126)

In the exchange, Winters talks about her personal creative problems in acting the personal identity problems of her character. To work at these problems, Winters takes the examples of other film stars as analogies for the character of Alexandra. Strasberg tells the actor that her use of other people as examples is misguided. He advises that the mixed up anxious emotions of Alexandra, could be found ‘inside’ herself if only she looked. Winters tells Strasberg that the expert opinion of her psychiatrist was that she was not
Alexandra. Strasberg tells her authoritatively that the psychiatrist is mistaken and that he knows her true identity better. This exchange represents many popular impressions of Strasberg’s work at the Actors Studio: actors are involved with the problem of trying to understand the problematised psychology of their characters, and to solve those problems, actors are encouraged to look ‘inside’ themselves to find answers.

The Method technique defines a set of practical actions in the Method discourse. Several accounts already exist about Method techniques and the environment of the Actors Studio (e.g. Blum 1984; Easty 1981; Garfield 1984; Hirsch 1984; Vineberg 1991). In these accounts, a history of influence is usually drawn between the acting techniques, known as the System, which the Russian actor and director Constantin Stanislavski developed at the Moscow Arts Theatre, and Strasberg’s Method exercises at the Actors Studio. Stanislavski did use techniques which involve actors investigating their personal experiences. However, the System related this work on the self to the analysis of the structure of the dramatic text, studying the way in which an actor’s role was integrated into an organic dramatic whole. Strasberg’s Method is frequently seen to have transformed the System, placing greater emphasis on the actor’s unique individuality and investigation of his or her own psychological problems. Critics of the Method regard this change as leading to the actor becoming preoccupied with the problems of self identity more than the staging of an ensemble drama (Blum 1984, 52).

In this chapter, my concern will not be with the relative merits of the System or the Method. The techniques of the System and the Method were all developed with the intention of helping the actor to produce his or her character. Instead of examining what acting techniques could do for the actor in the work of characterisation, my interest is in considering what different practical exercises did to the actor. That is to say, that rather than read acting techniques as a means for constructing dramatic character, my focus will be on how technique formed a discourse which defined the work of acting and in so doing characterised the actor as a type of professional person.

Stanislavski and Strasberg both argued that the exercises they used did not add up to formalised techniques. Strasberg always tried to emphasise how the content of his workshops remained uncertain: ‘Although there is no systematic procedure which is here attended to in principle – much as the people “outside” think there is – it is true that I have very definite ideas. Therefore the work in the Studio follows certain tendencies’ (Hethmon 1965, 39). It is as a set of professionalising ‘tendencies’ that I examine the
practices of the Method, however, I have retained the term 'technique' for the way it suggests more strongly that the System and the Method regulated the work of acting by certain core principles and requirements.

Histories of the Method have usually seen a linear set of connections between the Stanislavski System and the Strasberg Method. This narrative is written as a history of individuals and influence: Stanislavski develops the System at the Moscow Arts Theatre, which is taught by Richard Boleslavski at the American Laboratory Theatre during the 1920s, influencing Strasberg, Harold Clurman and Cheryl Crawford to form the Group Theatre in the thirties, after which Crawford and Elia Kazan form the Actors Studio in the late forties, where Strasberg is eventually appointed as Artistic Director in the early fifties. There are two key difficulties with this narrative as a history of an acting technique. It isolates the development of the System and the Method from other accounts of acting practice, making the tendencies in Stanislavski’s and Strasberg’s techniques appear as special cases of creative problem solving. The difficulty with this type of historical construction is that it ignores how similar tendencies could be found in advice on acting offered by other practitioners, so that the principles of the System and Method represent specific inflections of more general discourses on acting practice.

Stanislavski and Strasberg both developed their techniques in the belief that they would produce a greater sense of ‘truth’ in acting. Acting technique links the professional person of the actor with the dramatic person of the character. A second problem with a linear history of influence is that it does not begin to examine the ways in which the pursuit of truth in acting is always linked to changing beliefs about the truth of identity and the self. The history provided here therefore explores how the Method technique characterised the actor in the context of other discourses which conceptualised the self in modern American culture.

Stanislavski, the System and America

The Moscow Art Theatre was established in 1898 by Stanislavski and the playwright Vladimir Nemirovich-Danchenko. Motivated by what they saw as the errors of the Russian theatre, Stanislavski and Nemirovich-Danchenko initiated a series of reforms (see Benedetti 1989, 17). These included making the new theatre an ensemble company
without stars. 'Today Hamlet, tomorrow an extra' was how Stanislavski summarised the intention to breakdown hierarchical relationships within the company (quoted in Benedetti p.17). In its first years, the Moscow Art Theatre became a showcase for the new realist drama, including plays by Chekhov, Ibsen and Gorki. Stanislavski frequently performed in these productions and it was through this first hand experience of acting that Stanislavski came to realise some of the problems facing actors. Most actors of the time, including Stanislavski, approached a role by imitating aspects of external behaviour. By reflecting on his own acting, Stanislavski began to believe that this external approach resulted in cliched performances which restricted the creativity of the actor. The external approach to acting seemed particularly inappropriate for the demands made on the actor by a dramatist like Chekhov, where the 'truth' of the drama was produced in the psychological subtext of characters. Stanislavski conceptualised truth in acting as part of an overall realist aesthetic. Naturalism, he believed, only reproduced the surface appearance of things, where realism could represent the truth below the surface or behind appearances (pp.11-12). Dramatic truth was therefore conceptualised as a deep fact.

As the truth of characters was believed to be hidden inside of them, Stanislavski saw it necessary for actors to develop an internal technique. For Stanislavski, the actor should work towards what he described as the 'feeling of truth' (p.34). Truth in acting was understood to be something which the actor would 'feel' more than know, and in the production of that truth, the use of feeling became a fundamental component. The intimacy of feeling saw the internal technique of the System take the actor's own emotions as a source of meaning.

Must we use our own, same, old feelings ... in every kind of role from Hamlet to Sugar in The Blue Bird? What else can we do?... Do you expect an actor to invent all sorts of new sensations, or even a new soul, for every part he plays?... Where can he get one? You can borrow things of all sorts, but you cannot take feelings away from another person. My feelings are inalienably mine, and yours belong to you in the same way. You can understand a part, sympathise with the person portrayed, and put yourself in his place, so that you will act as he would. That will arouse feelings in the actor that are analogous to those required for the part. Those feelings will belong, not to the person created by the author of the play, but to the actor himself. (Stanislavski 1990, 16)
The importance of personal feelings in the System made the actor primarily an emotional professional. The System was intended to aid the emotional expressivity of the actor. Part of the anti-emotionalist challenge to expressive theories of acting is that by relying on the actor's own emotions, it becomes impossible to predictably reproduce a performance in the theatre night after night as the actor is left waiting for the wellspring of 'sensibility' or 'inspiration' to take him or her over. While still retaining an expressive theory of meaning, a central objective of the System was the development of a technique for repeating emotions. Truth in acting required the actor to have feelings and the System designed exercises which were intended to regularise the reproducibility of feeling.

Emotional expression, however, presented the actor with a basic problem. Stanislavski believed that an actor could not simply control and manage feelings by direct orders. Instead, the actor had to develop indirect means to stimulate feelings. A solution to this problem was believed to lie in the exercise known as emotional memory. The development of this technique was influenced by the psychological theory of Théodule Ribot. Ribot argued that the nervous system retains traces of experiences, the memory of which can be triggered by a smell, sound or sensation (Benedetti 1989, 31). Ribot believed these stimuli not only returned memories of what happened in the experience but also the emotions which accompanied the experience. Stanislavski adapted this theory to the problems of acting, encouraging actors to use their own emotional experiences as analogies for feelings which were presumed to accompany the drama of the character. Following Ribot, Stanislavski made emotional recall into a systematic process. The actor would at first recall the sense memories of their experience – i.e what was seen, heard, smelt or touched – in the hope that these would have the secondary effect of stimulating the recall of emotion. What may start initially as a long process of introspection would, Stanislavski believed, become a quick and immediate skill for the actor.

Emotional memory was only a part of the internal technique of the System, which Stanislavski combined with other exercises for relaxation and concentration. However, it is the centrality given to emotional memory in readings of the System which has frequently lead to the misunderstanding that Stanislavski only concentrated on internal techniques and the actor's own experience. Stanislavski always saw the actor's work on the self as integrated into a dramatic whole. To decide on the emotional content of a scene, the actor was required to be responsive to the given circumstances of the play:
the story of the play, the facts, events, epoch, time and place of action, conditions of life, the actors' and régisseur's (director's) interpretation, the mise-en-scène, the production, the sets, the costumes, properties, lighting and sound effects – all the circumstances that are given to an actor to take into account as he creates his role.

(Stanislavski 1990, 67)

The System developed and changed over time. Increasingly, the internal techniques of the actor's work became only one part of a broader set of practices. From the mid-1920s, the understanding of given circumstances developed into an analytic technique for the study of a character as part of an organic dramatic whole (Gordon 1987, 191-194). Rehearsals at the Moscow Arts Theatre began with an extended period of analytic study, in which actors divided the text into 'beats', which were units of meaning that encompassed a single psychological motivation. These units combined into larger 'objectives', which in turn combined to form the 'through-line of action' for the character across the play. At a global level, the through-line of action for any character was read as part of the overall motivation for the drama, what was known as the 'super-objective'. This analytic technique therefore encouraged the actor to see his or her work as part of a structured whole. Although the actor may work on individual experiences, analytic work on the text reflected the ensemble policy of the Moscow Art Theatre, as the actor studied his or her own role in relation to the work of others.

In the final years before his death in 1938, Stanislavski began to re-evaluate the usefulness of internal technique. Emotion, Stanislavski believed, was psycho-physical, combining internal feelings and physical actions: 'External action acquires inner meaning and warmth from inner feeling, and the latter finds its expression in physical terms' (1990, 9). It was therefore necessary for the actor to see the emotions and objectives of the drama as things to be physicalised. The later developments to the System therefore included a 'Method of Analysis Through Physical Action', a physical technique intended to complement emotional work.

Fundamentally, emotional memory was a practice for the control of feeling. Emotional memory was valued for how it gave an actor the indirect means to contact emotions and then the systematic process to reproduce feeling. Stanislavski was influenced by psychological science, and the internal technique of the System made a science of
emotion, attempting to rationalise the irrational. For the actor prepared to undertake such practices, they assumed the professional character of an emotional manager. The analytic work of the System can be likened to the procedures of structuralist narratology, developing a science of the text which required the actor to be as much an objective literary critic as an emotional agent.

Despite the refinements in textual analysis and physical technique which Stanislavski introduced to the System, internal technique was to dominate the ways in which the System was appropriated by American theatre culture. The influence of Stanislavski in America is usually linked to specific events. Christine Edwards (1966) discusses how the working practices of Stanislavski, together with reviews of Moscow Art Theatre productions, were reported in the American press from 1905. These sources acted as prior publicity for the ensemble’s first tour of the United States in 1923 (pp.217-226). The responses of American commentators to the tour praised what was seen to be the excellent ensemble playing, naturalness of the productions, and the way in which actors appeared to be ‘living’ their roles (pp.230-232). In 1924, two former Moscow Art Theatre performers, Richard Boleslavski and Maria Ouspenskaya, opened the American Laboratory Theatre, where they taught the System to American actors. Other Moscow Art Theatre actors spread the teaching of Stanislavski in America, with Ivan and Maria Lazariev opening the Gorky Studio in Chicago, and Leo and Barbara Bulgakov establishing the Westchester Repertory Company in 1931 and the Bulgakov Studio of Theatre Art in 1939 (p.241).

It was in workshops at the American Laboratory Theatre that Strasberg first learnt about the System. Boleslavski had left the Soviet Union in 1920 and so was only familiar with the internal techniques used by Stanislavski. This would influence the way in which Strasberg was to understand the System. At the Laboratory Theatre, Strasberg was joined by Harold Clurman and Stella Adler. In 1931, Clurman and Strasberg, together with Cheryl Crawford, formed the Group Theatre, which Adler joined as an actor (Clurman 1983; Hirsch 1984; Strasberg 1988). The Group was influenced by the ensemble example of the Moscow Art Theatre, and Strasberg used elements of what he had learnt about the System in his work with actors.

During a visit to Paris in 1934, Adler met Stanislavski. At the time, he was moving away from the use of internal techniques and had already begun developing the Method of Physical Actions. Stanislavski informed Alder of these developments, coaching her in the

\[ A_k \]
revisions he had made to the System (Clurman 1983, 138). When Adler returned to the Group, convinced by the changes which Stanislavski had made, she entered into a bitter argument with Strasberg over what was the ‘right’ System. Strasberg reportedly claimed ‘Stanislavski doesn’t know ... I know’ (emphasis in the original, quoted in Hirsch 1984, 79). For Strasberg, the truth of the System lay in the internal technique of emotional memory alone. This disagreement persisted and contributed to Strasberg’s resignation from the Group in 1937. Four years later, after an uneven record of successes and failures, the Group itself closed.

In 1947, Cheryl Crawford, together with former Group actor Elia Kazan and director Robert Lewis, formed the Actors Studio. The Studio was intended to provide a non-producing workshop in which actors could concentrate on developing their skills (Garfield 1984, pp.46-47). Initially, the Studio was divided into two classes: an advanced class lead by Lewis, and a beginners class which Kazan took (p.51). After a dispute with Kazan, Lewis left in 1948 (p.69). Strasberg joined the Studio, becoming Artistic Director in 1951 until his death in 1982 (p.83). It was Strasberg’s techniques which were to define the Studio as the home of the Method.

A further way in which the System was adopted in the United States was through published accounts of Stanislavski’s techniques. A series of articles by Boleslavski in Theatre Arts Monthly between 1923 to 1932 provided the first published documentation on the System for American readers. Stanislavski published several articles in Russian, and English translations of his writings emerged during the 1920s. The original publication of English translations of all Stanislavski’s major books in the United States, determined the circulation of the System in anglophone culture (Benedetti 1989, 76-79; Edwards 1966, 247-249). Little Brown Books published My Life in Art in 1924 to coincide with the tour of the Moscow Arts Theatre. Theatre Arts Books published Elizabeth Hapgood’s translation of An Actor Prepares in 1936. The Second World War delayed the posthumous publication of Building a Character until 1949. These writings concentrate mainly on internal technique, and it was not until the publication of Creating a Role in 1961, that the later developments about physical action became available. The schedule of publications therefore effected what version of the System was available to American practitioners by the fifties.
Professionalization and Personality

While the Stanislavski System did influence the internal techniques practised at the American Laboratory Theatre, Group Theatre and Actors Studio, American practitioners had debated many of the same problems which Stanislavski addressed before the System was demonstrated, taught or published in the United States. Before the tour by the Moscow Art Theatre or the establishment of the Laboratory Theatre, American practitioners were already developing internal techniques of their own in an attempt to solve the problems they encountered. The System did not therefore transform acting in America but entered into a context of existing beliefs about acting which already conceptualised the identity of the actor as an emotional manager.

The development of introspective acting techniques and the control of emotion in performance contributed to the professionalisation of acting in America. Burton Bledstein (1976) identifies the period in American history between 1880-1920 with the growth of what he calls the ‘culture of professionalism’. Bledstein argues that in this period, there was a significant increase in the number of occupations legitimated as professions. Bruce Kimbell (1992), however, has suggested that the period identified by Bledstein was not notable for any increase in professions but rather for how professions ‘idealised’ their purpose in the formation of professional knowledges which defined the core essential principles of an occupation for all actual and would-be professionals.

This change can be understood as part of the reorganisation of intellectual life that Thomas Bender (1979) regards as the transition from ‘civic professionalism’ to ‘disciplinary professionalism’ in the United States during the nineteenth century. Civic professionalism legitimated the value of occupations by reference to the service which the profession provided for a local community. The growth of disciplinary professionalism from the mid-nineteenth century saw occupations begin to idealise their identities through shared professional standards. Instead of looking outwards to public service, professional legitimacy was validated by standards which were entirely internal to the community of professional practitioners. This turning inwards saw the professions develop forms of specialist knowledge which were only intelligible to anyone trained in those specialisms. The effect of this was that the professions became what Bender calls, ‘communities of discourse’ (p.181). Specialist knowledge was central to professional life and it linked together members of a profession as a closed specialist community.
With disciplinary professionalism, working knowledge underwent a qualitative change. As Bender comments, the 'new professions were associated with a growing sense that understanding must penetrate internal qualities, processes, and structures' (p.190). Professional knowledge lay deep beyond what was empirically obvious and had to be worked for by a gradual process of acquisition through training. With disciplinary professionalism, professional knowledge became a form of cultural capital: it distinguished those who knew the complexities which determined professional activity and so knew how to work in a professional way.

This specialisation of professional knowledge made for what Bledstein calls a 'modern metaphysics' (1976, 118): the professional not only did different things to other workers, his or her actions were also guided by a view of the world hidden to others.

In contrast to the tradesman and the craftsman, the professional person defined the quality of a subject, its special basis in an exclusive and independent circle of natural experiences. The craftsman traditionally handled a series of individual objects, according to the custom of his work, varying his own specific practices by trial and error. The professional excavated nature for its principles, its theoretical rules, thus transcending mechanical procedures, individual cases, miscellaneous facts, technical information and instrumental applications.

Disciplinary professionalism displayed a modernist and scientistic concern with attempting to understand the structural principles that regularised a field of activity, seeking to 'isolate[] and control[] the factors, hidden to the untrained eye, which made an elaborate system workable or impracticable, successful or unattainable' (p.89). The intellectual boundaries which demarcated one profession from another therefore involved professionals in discovering the essential principles which could discipline their field of work.

In the arts, professional knowledge is the cultural capital of knowing what culture is and how it can be produced: it combines knowledge 'of' with know 'how'. Joseph Bensman and Robert Lilienfeld describe the working knowledge of artists as 'craft attitudes', collections of beliefs, principles and practices which, for the professional cultural producer, act as the 'generator of habits of the mind' (1973, 1). Bensman and
Lilienfeld suggest that the habitual attitude of artistic production ‘is to be at the same time highly conscious of one’s technique while concealing from the audience the fact that technique is used’, producing the effect of ‘contrivance ... merged with spontaneity’ (p.19). In the performing arts, Bensman and Lilienfeld argue that the performing artist ‘prepare[s] both his performance and his life as a performer’ (p.51). With performers, the making of performance always requires work on the self: ‘Practice, rehearsal, discipline, anticipation of the performance all govern the total structure of his way of life. He must totally subordinate his physical and psychological being to the absolute finalities of the performance’ (pp.51-52). The actor works on the self in order to become a character. That is the purpose of the actor’s rehearsals. However, an opposite effect could also be seen to be at work in the training of the actor: to be an actor, and to becomes involved in the work of acting, requires making the self into a certain kind of professional person, a person for whom the ‘habits’ and ‘attitudes’ of the profession require that he or she become a certain kind of working self. Discourses of advice and instruction on acting can therefore be read not only for the ways they describe being a character but also being a particular type of professional. In describing how to act, advice on acting also describes who the actor is.

During the nineteenth century, the conditions of employment for actors in America remained highly unstable. With short term contracts and the power of theatre managers to hire and fire as they wished, many actors could find themselves out of work for long periods, or else moving around the country in a nomadic lifestyle as they travelled between jobs or went in search of work. Due to their working conditions, the lifestyle of actors was frequently associated with drug taking, drunken debauchery, divorce and domestic discontent. The conditions of employment and the disreputable image of acting therefore disqualified any claim for the professional legitimacy of the occupation.

Benjamin McArthur (1984) sees American theatre culture experiencing several changes between 1880-1920 which lead to the professionalisation of acting. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the American theatre saw a transition from the ‘stock company’ system of provincial repertory theatres that were home to resident ensemble companies of actors, to the ‘combination system’ of touring hit shows fronted by star performers (pp.5-8). The stock system made the occupation open to nearly anybody who could persevere the unstable and exploitative conditions of work, and prior training was regarded as unnecessary. The rapid weekly schedule of the stock companies had meant
that actors had to learn on the job, with the effect that ‘theories demanding reflection upon one’s role were necessarily unknown to them’ (p.10).

A central factor in the professionalisation of acting was the movement to formalise acting instruction. Some actors received lessons in elocution at schools of speech, but these institutions were not involved with training the particular requirements for acting. The School of Expression, opened in 1877 by the actor, playwright and director, Steele MacKaye, became the first school in the United States for the training of actors (p.100). Although the School of Expression only operated for a short time, other acting schools soon followed. The Lyceum Theatre, opened in 1884, was a working professional company which received training in stage business, deportment, pantomime, vocal expression, and character study (p.101). More schools opened in the last decade of the nineteenth century, most of which were concentrated in the theatrical capital, New York, but conservatories were also established in other major cities.

As the new acting schools formalised the training of the actor, the American acting community developed its own disciplinary ‘deep’ knowledge of the mysteries of acting. MacKaye had set up the School of Expression to train actors in the elocution techniques taught at the schools of speech, which he combined with a physical training in ‘harmonic gymnastics’ derived from the theory and techniques of François Delsarte (p.100). Although MacKaye applied the Delsarte system to the training of actors, Delsarte himself had worked mainly with opera singers and musicians. Theoretically, Delsarte based his system on what he called a ‘principle of trinity’ (Kirby 1972; Roberts 1986; Stebbins 1977). According to this principle, the work of the actor could be divided into patterns of three: for example, the trinity of life, mind and soul, was mapped onto respectively the voice as the language of ‘sensitive nature’, ‘articulation the language of reason’ and gesture as a ‘language of emotion’ (Stebbins 1977, 111-112). This systematic division of functions in acting was related to a compartmentalising of the body in what were called ‘decomposing exercises’ (pp.83-86). Each part of the body was divided into three ‘zones’, with each zone representing a part of the fundamental trinity. For example, the arm was divided into the hand, forearm and upper arm, which respectively represented mental, moral and ‘vital’ zones (p.117). Movements of the body were also believed to be governed by the law of three: Motions away from the self were ‘excentric’; towards the self were ‘concentric’; anything between these two was ‘normal’ (p.113). For Delsarte, part of an actor’s learning was ‘semeiotic’ [sic], requiring learning in ‘the organic signs
by which aesthetics must study inherent fitness’ (p.135). Diagrams were used to illustrate the physical poses which signified particular attitudes.

The problem of the Delsarte system was that it produced a mannered style of acting which limited its usefulness. Roberta Pearson (1992) associates the histrionic code of early film acting with Delsartism and this style would become increasingly inappropriate as the new realist aesthetics entered American theatre at the end of the nineteenth century. Although the systems of Stanislavski and Delsarte differed in the emphasis they gave to either the internal or external work of acting, nevertheless, by trying to regularise and control the work of acting, both systems represented a scientistic tendency in concepts of acting. Despite its limitations, Delsartism was popular in the early American acting schools, as it offered the disciplinary promise of a system for understanding and controlling the work of acting, which could provide a framework by which to teach and train the actor.

The opening of the new acting schools was greeted with scepticism by many working actors who believed that acting could not be taught (McArthur 1984, 103). Arguments over whether acting can or cannot be taught still endure. The grounds for disagreement in this debate are between believers in acting as an activity which, while it may be unconsciously practised, still has rules which can be learnt and made conscious, against others who argue that the ability to act is not only unconscious but innate, and so cannot be acquired by training. In the years immediately before the 1923 tour by the Moscow Art Theatre, supporters of training for theatre actors were defending acting as a ‘science’. Writing in The Saturday Evening Post in September 1921, the actor and producer David Belasco argued that ‘acting is, like music, at once a science and an art – a science in its theory, an art in its practice. Being so, it is regulated upon definite, ascertained, enduring principles, and it is to be practised according to “those rules of old discovered, not devised”’ (p.578). In Belasco’s opinion, acting had a ‘grammar’ and ‘mechanism’ that students could learn. Minnie Maddern Fiske, celebrated for her acting ability, also defended the training of the actor. Fiske wrote of a ‘science of acting’, a phrase she credited to Ellen Terry (Fiske 1917, 585). For Fiske, the actor needed to be trained to become a ‘scientific worker’, because she believed that without controlled technical ability, actors could only produce performances of an uneven quality.

With both Belasco and Fiske, scientific technique was opposed to innate ‘genius’. Like the ‘extreme sensibility’ which Talma identified with actors of distinction, the ‘genius’ of
acting was taken to be the natural ability of any good actor. Belasco closely echoed Talma when he argued that the ability to act required ‘possession of extreme sensibility combined with quick and powerful intelligence’ (1921, 578). In advocating the training of actors, Belasco and Fiske were therefore supporting the possibility of planning and organising the control of the actor’s creative ability, what, to use Talma’s term, could be described as the development of a ‘profound intelligence’. Genius was not dismissed altogether but was regarded as subject to random intuition. Technique was valued as the trained means by which to control that innate ability, guaranteeing the regularity and reproducibility of an actor’s performance over time. As Fiske commented: ‘Genius is the great unknown quantity. Technique supplies a constant for the problem’ (1917, 585).

For Belasco and Fiske, the science of acting required the actor to work in ways which privileged technique over ‘genius’, reproduction over chance, and learning over nature. Fundamental to the science of acting was therefore the priority of control over intuition. In attempting to resolve these oppositions, Belasco and Fiske both believed that the voice and body should become the instruments of the mind. Fiske recommended that the voice be trained so that ‘it responds to your thoughts’ (1917, 585), and Belasco argued that ‘thought, of course, precedes the word, and therefore by facial expression and bodily movement you must first make your audience, as it were, see you think, and then hear you think’ (1921, 580). In Melancholy Tale of “Me”: My Remembrances, the autobiography of the actor Edward Hugh Sothern, which he wrote as a dialogue between an ‘I’ and a ‘me’, the instrumental view of the body in acting was made most clearly by likening the body to a musical instrument.

“As I remarked”, interrupted “Me”, “acting is not an art. Now, poetry –”

“The poet must have an interpreter”, said I.

“Pooh!” said “Me”. “the actor is merely the instrument, as a fiddle –”

“Precisely”, said I, “as a fiddle to the master violinist who interprets the works of the composers, so is the body of the actor to the directing mind of the actor. He executes upon himself as the violinist. the harpist, the pianist executes on his instrument. The difference is this: the musician’s instrument is made by the hand of man. the actor’s instrument by the hand of God. ... the actor’s instrument [is] himself.

(Sothern 1916, 571-72)
For Sothern, the essential work of acting is internal: "'Not from without in, but from within out,' speaks the artist. His mind informs and illuminates his medium, not his medium his mind" (p.572).

Through this dualistic division of mind over body, writers like Belasco, Fiske and Sothern conceptualised acting as essentially an internal technique. Belasco raised the issue of whether an actor must really feel in order to represent feeling. While believing that all actors must be able to feel, Belasco was firmly of the opinion that actors did not have to feel the exact emotion they represented (1921, 581). For example, if an actor was required to play Macbeth, Belasco argued that 'he cannot portray the emotions of that character unless he really feels them – and he cannot really feel them unless he first murder a trusting old king ... and a score or so of other innocent creatures' (p.581). The solution to this problem was therefore believed to be the actor's use of his or her imagination. Fiske and Sothern also prized the actor's imagination. Writing about her fellow female actors, Laurette Taylor (1914) insisted that the success of performers like Sarah Bernhardt or Maude Adams could not be explained by any quality of beauty or magnetism but came from their active imagination. Taylor regarded imagination as the quality which any actor was most in need of, helping the actor to believe in the situation he or she was playing.

For instance, take the business of dying. You must in your imagination realise not only the fact that you are dying but the effect which your death will have on every character related to your part. You know that you are not really dying and the audience knows it, but in your imagination, you must really believe you are. The business of dying becomes actual to you; also, you compel the audience to believe in you by the very sincerity of your attitude.

(p.598)

Belasco, while valuing imagination as an emotional stimulus, believed that the actor must learn to control it. He quoted Henry Irving as saying "'I never saw an actor lose himself ... who did not instantly lose his audience'" (1921, 582). Imagination was therefore believed to be a vital creative resource, but to be effective, the actor must have means for manipulating it. Belasco advised the actor to go through three stages of work when using the imagination to evoke emotion.
The imagination conceives and evokes all the emotional sensations and reactions of a special character which is to be presented, in the circumstances and situations prescribed; the sensibility experiences those sensations and reactions to the fullest extreme; the quick and powerful intelligence minutely observes their every effect and manifestation — registering in memory every inflection of voice, every play of feature, every movement of the body, every gesture — applies itself to creation of a perfect mental picture or record of them, and then to the reproduction and delicate exaggeration of them by means of all the artistic mechanism it has mastered and formulated.

(p.582)

The actor did not therefore represent real feelings but 'imagined feelings'.

Belasco's advice has similarities with Stanislavski's System. Like the System, the core of acting practice is understood to be internal work. To evoke emotion, the imagination is required to respond to the circumstances of the drama, and those responses are then committed to memory for their future reproduction. The personal reflections of the emotional memory technique are missing from Belasco's suggestions, although he still saw emotions as things which could be recalled in performance, and which could first be imagined by a reading of the given circumstances of the drama. What Belasco appeared to propose for the actor was a similar way of working to what in the System was known as the 'magic if'.

In order to be emotionally involved in the imaginary world which the actor builds on the basis of a play, in order to be caught up in the action on the stage, he must believe in it. ... This does not mean he should give himself up to anything like hallucination ... quite the contrary. ... He does not forget that he is surrounded by stage scenery and props. ... He asks himself: 'But if this were real, how would I react? What would I do?' ... And normally, naturally ... this If acts as a lever to lift him into a world ... of creativity.

(emphasis in original, Stanislavski 1990, 94)

For Stanislavski, the imagination was important because every 'movement you make on stage, every word you speak, is the result of the right life of your imagination' (emphasis
in the original, p.75). Techniques such as emotional memory, the given circumstances, or the magic if, were therefore the means for finding, reflecting on, and controlling the imagination. Writers like Belasco and Fiske identified similar problems to those which Stanislavski concentrated on and they shared the same wish to train the actor’s creativity, which they defended by the belief in acting as a science. However, unlike Stanislavski, Belasco and Fiske did not provide any extensive account of how the science of acting could be practised.

The implied reader for Belasco’s, Fiske’s, Sothern’s and Taylor’s writings on acting was always the theatre actor. Early in the twentieth century, the first manuals on film acting began to appear. These manuals take the formal differences of film and theatre media as demanding a specifically filmic way of working. The discourse of advice on film acting offers guidance on how to act for film, but in doing so, it also constructs an identity for the prospective film actor. Manuals from the late teens and early twenties conceptualised the work of the film actor around four core problems:

a) how can an actor control his or her appearance on screen
b) how may the actor form an emotional link between the actor and the imaginary emotions of the character
c) how to discipline the body as an effective performance instrument
d) how to discover if you have ‘personality’

The first problem was addressed through recommendations on how the actor could develop self-awareness of their appearance on screen. The possibilities of the close-up were continually referred to when advising the actor to become conscious of the ways in which facial expressions construct meaning. Agnes Platt (1923) advised the actor to learn how to hold expressions, standing ‘like a statue, for the camera ... to “pick up” the attitude’ (p.36). Once this technique was accomplished, the actor was encouraged to practice the holding of expressions ‘in the work of acquiring control over the face’ (p.37). In order to learn how to control facial expressions, Platt recommended that the actor should practice by looking into a mirror.
Stand before the glass, and let your thoughts turn to some incident in your own life, or something you have read or thought about which affects you deeply. Do not try consciously to let your face express those thoughts, but watch to see what expression comes of its own accord. Of course this is easier said than done, because two currents of thought are going on in the mind at the same time, namely the thought which is to produce the expression, and the thought which is lying in wait to catch and judge that expression.

(p.35)

Platt's advice is divided between two looks: an objectifying look which regards the self as an image in the mirror, catching and judging the image given to others, and a subjectifying look, which searches for thoughts or experiences which stimulate an emotional response. The mirror exercise constructed a narcissistic and objectifying look, placing the actor in a mechanism of reflexive self-scrutiny. In the exercise, the actor became both the subject and the object of the look: the actor looked to know better how he or she appeared as someone looked at. External objectification was therefore only a means to the formation of a subjective knowledge of the self. The objectified image was monitored and judged in order to produce subjective insights into the self as a visible source of meaning.

Control of emotions was believed to present a particular problem for film actors, for during the successive takes of film making, the actor was required in the words of Jean Bernique to 'register[ ] emotions to order' (c.1920, 22). Violet Hopson (c.1920) also advised the film actor to develop an objectifying look by practising his or her expressions in front of a mirror. Hopson recommended an audition exercise employed by producers to test performers new to film. The actor was offered the text to the following letter:

Dear Mary, - When we last met I was a clerk in Manfred's Store, and now by good luck and moderate endeavour I have become manager (1). I know you will be pleased to learn that my future is assured (2), but at the same time you will realise that I cannot marry beneath my station (3), and I feel that I shall be making you happy (4), by releasing you from your promise to marry me (5), although it upsets me more than I can say to do so (6), but do so I must, under existing circumstances, and this is my final word (7). My mother has matched me to a rich
dowager who is fat but very good-natured, and I must try to be worthy of her (8).

A word in time, Mary. I do not want to frighten you, but I overheard your old
flame, Harry, say if he saw you again he would murder you (9).

Yours, etc.

(pp.20-1)

When reading the letter, at each of the numbers, the actor was required to register a
different emotion: ‘(1) Surprise. (2) Pleasure. (3) Disgust. (4) Uncertainty. (5)
each attitude in these terms:

(1) Surprise – calls for a look of wonderment, wide-eyed, lips slightly apart; (2)
Pleasure – I cannot indicate more than a pleased smile; (3) Disgust – a petulant
look, corners of the mouth drooping; (4) Uncertainty – puckered brows; (5)
Indignation - brow heavily puckered, lips tightened; (6) Mollification – features
relax into a tolerant smile; (7) Rage – look up, laying letter down; and show real
anger; (8) Mirth – in this case, rather a wistful smile, and (9) Terror – as patrons
of the Turf would say “all out”.

(p.22)

Hopson saw the usefulness of the exercise to be the way in which it allowed an actor ‘to
“register” the expression you think best indicates the emotion you desire to convey’
(p.22). For Hopson, emotional control was a physiological matter of learning to know
the outward appearances of emotion.

Other manuals on film acting articulated a second major problem for the film actor, as
he or she looked ‘inwards’ for the psychological means to control what was shown in the
image and produce an emotional identification between actor and character. In a chapter
titled ‘The Mechanics of Emotion’ from their manual Screen Acting: Its Requirements and
Rewards, Inez and Helen Klumph identified the technical knowledge and control of
emotions as ‘the scientific equipment of the actor’ (1922, 125). They believed that film
made particular demands on the actor to develop an internal emotional technique.
The development in the art of screen acting is due largely to the fact that acting before the motion picture camera has become subjective, rather than objective. Actors used to move their hand and arms and make faces to portray an emotion; now the portrayal begins in their mind; they are conscious of it there, they concentrate on its mental portrayal, and the human body naturally conveys that mental conception to the audience.

(p.104-5)

The objectifying look of the camera was therefore believed to have a power to pick out the effects of the actor's internality, requiring the actor to develop a subjectifying look which prioritised internal work and took an instrumental view of the body.

Although emotional identification between an actor and the character he or she played was judged by the Klumphs to be the essential work of film acting, they recommended that the command of emotion did not require the actor to use feelings from his or her own experience:

> to portray another person's feelings ... you must portray their feelings, not your own. Making yourself cry by thinking of something that has made you unhappy is not effective. That is why a person who cries very successfully when given a screen test may fall down absolutely when playing a character who has to cry. Their crying is natural to them, but artificial for the character they are playing.

(p.194)

Mae Marsh, however, saw the use of personal emotional experiences as vital to film acting. Famous for her performances in some of D. W. Griffith's feature film, Marsh described several moments where the director had encouraged her to solve creative problems by using techniques which were strikingly similar to Stanislavski's. She writes of viewing a scene in terms of its 'given circumstances' (1921, 115), and describes some occasions where Griffith's directing had her employ an internal technique which closely resembled the emotional memory exercise. In Birth of a Nation (1915, US), Marsh had a scene where she was trapped in the cellar as the Cameron house is attacked by a frenzied mob. In her account of working on the scene, Marsh contrasted Griffith's way of directing actors to the methods of other directors.
I can hear your average director:

"Roll your eyes," he would say. "Cry! Drop to your knees in terror."

In other words, it would be the same old stuff ... that makes so many pictures positively deadly. The least that can be said about this conventional style of doing things is that, if it cannot be criticised, neither can it be applauded.

Mr Griffith, when we came to the cellar scene, asked me if there had ever been a time in my life when I had been filled with terror.

"Yes," I said.

"What did you do?" he inquired.

"I laughed," I answered.

He saw the point immediately.

"Good," he said. "Let’s try it".

It was the hysterical laugh of the little girl in the cellar, with the drunken mob raging above, that was, I am sure, far more effective than rolling the eyes or weeping would have been.

(p.117)

Griffith used the same technique again with Marsh for her work on Intolerance (1916, US).

I had to do a scene where, in the big city’s slums, my father dies.

The night before I did this scene I went to the theatre ... to see Marjorie Rambeau in Kindling.

To my surprise and gratification she had to do a scene in this play which was somewhat similar to the one I was scheduled to play in Intolerance. It made a deep impression on me.

As a consequence, the next day before the camera ... I began to cry with the memory of Marjorie Rambeau’s performance uppermost in my mind. ...

Mr Griffith, who was closely studying the [rushes], finally turned in his seat and said:

"I don’t know what you were thinking about when you did that, but it is evident that it was not about the death of your father.”...

We began immediately upon the scene again. This time I thought of the death of
my own father and the big tragedy to our little home, then in Texas. I could recall the deep sorrow of my mother, my sisters, my brother and myself.

This scene is said to be one of the most effective in “The Mother and the Law”.

(pp. 76-79)

The objectifying look of the mirror exercise conceptualised the film actor as someone who is looked at. The subjectifying look of the film actor took the actor to be someone who must feel, regardless of whether those feelings were the imagined feelings of the character or the actor’s own emotional memories.

A third problem in the discourse of advice on film acting concerned the ways in which an actor could learn to make the body an effective mechanism for expressing emotion: ‘Your body must be so well controlled that you are unconscious of it – then it will really mirror your mind’ (Klumph and Klumph 1922, 122). Ideally, the body was required to ‘be obedient to your slightest thought, so that, when you have a mental picture, your body catches that picture and makes it for the eyes of others’ (p.121). A disobedient body was regarded as compromising effective expression, and for this reason, advice on the management of the body was instrumental in character: ‘Muscular control depends upon mental control. Instructions are conveyed from the brain to the muscles, which must instantly obey’ (Platt 1923, 32). Taking up sports, fencing and the maintenance of general good health, were recommended for the actor to keep a controlled and obedient body.

In this early advice on film acting, the problems of controlling the image, the emotions, and the body, were seen as fundamental to the techniques of film acting. Technique was therefore potentially available to all, for through exercise and practice, it was believed that anybody could achieve technical control. However, manuals on film acting also included terms for discriminating between actors. After the technical control of the image, emotions, and body, were achieved, it was believed that effective acting was only possible if an actor had what was conceptualised as ‘personality’. As Raymond Williams noted, the modern sense of ‘personality’ is used to describe an internal quality and possession of the individual (1983, 235). In the discourse of advice on film acting, anybody could acquire technique, but only a few actors were believed to possess personality.
It is true that however talented you may be, you are of no use for the cinema unless you have what we call a film face... But the film face is a rare thing. It is not so much a question of beauty as of personality. However beautiful a face may be... it is of no use for continual film work unless it has the magnetic charm of individuality behind its beauty.

(Platt 1923, 126-7)

In her list of qualities which an actor must possess, Mae Marsh identified personality as the quality which 'is keen in detecting the weak or vapid' (1921 35), concluding that 'some seem to have it and some don't'(p.87). Knowing if you had personality or not was therefore presented as the ultimate problem for the subjectifying look of the film actor. The Klumphs described a common test for personality which they attributed to an unnamed casting director.

Select an advertisement in a newspaper that you think will attract many answers, and then go and apply for the job it offers. A big factory or a department store where there is a trained personnel director is best. If in a crowded room, you can attract attention without being unusually well dressed or without actually pushing yourself forward, then it is fair to assume that you have to some extent this magical endowment – personality – that is so essential on the screen.

(Klumph and Klumph 1922, 32)

While these advice manuals made reference to personality, it was never clearly defined and always remained a mysterious referent. In an article for the Motion Picture Magazine titled 'Is Personality IT?', B.T. Wilson (1926) argued that personality was most definitely the quality of sex appeal, citing the film stars Charlie Chaplin, John Barrymore, John Gilbert, Richard Barthelmess and Lowell Sherman as examples. However, the question of what is sex appeal is still left unanswered by Wilson. Early advice on film acting constructed personality as the core of performance, specifying it as the essential thing an actor needed, yet at the same time also making it the great unknown.

The problems found in the advice manuals of film acting produced four key divisions: the actor and the image; the actor and character; the obedient and disobedient body; and personality and technique. With each of these divisions, the self was required to reflect on
the ‘objects’ of external appearance, the emotions, the body and personality. The effect of the discourse of advice to film actors was not in the resolving of these problems but rather in establishing a set of problems to be resolved. To be a film actor did not require the resolution of these problems as much as a readiness to invest the self in tackling those problems. Those problems became the legitimate concerns of the practising professional. Film acting was conceptualised as a reflexive practice in which the actor was advised to continually undertake a set of practical techniques in which he or she oscillate between subject and object in a process of making the self meaningful. Together, those techniques produce an identity for the potential film actor as a narcissistic, emotional, physically controlled and individually enigmatic subject. The film actor emerged from this early advice as somebody to be looked at, who must feel, possess an instrumental control of the body, and whose success was conditional on whether they did or did not have ‘personality’.

Solving the mystery of personality by suggesting ‘it’ was sex appeal only replaced one enigma by another. Advising the actor as to the necessity of ‘personality’, acting manuals invented the object of inquiry at the same time as creating techniques for discovering it. Searching for personality therefore involved the film actor in reflecting on the self in a practice of personal inquiry. This valuing of personality was not only confined to advice on film acting. Even in the ‘science’ of acting, Belasco believed that personality provided a magical element in acting which could not be learnt by technique.

If you do not master the technique of acting, personality will never make you a true actor – though it may make you, as it often has made others, a popular success. But if you have not a personality of vivid, notable quality the most perfect mastery of stage technique will never make you a great actor or even a popular success. If you have not a message to transmit – what signifies it that your method of transmission may be perfect? ... What the artist does – and, ultimately, the manner and effect of its doing – always will be determined by what, essentially, the individual is.

(1921, 583)

Probably the strongest advocate of the necessity of personality was the writer William Gillette. In his essay ‘The Illusion of the First Time in Acting’, published in 1915,
Gillette considered the difficulties faced by actors in the new realistic drama as they tried to construct the impression of unrehearsed spontaneity. Part of the difficulty, Gillette believed, was that actors continued to use already established conventions, the 'correct' ways of performing, and that the problem of the 'first time' could be solved if an actor instead made use of 'individual habits, traits [and] peculiarities' (1915, 566).

This led Gillette to a broader defence of the actor using his or her own personality in acting. Gillette disagreed with critics who judged a 'great' actor to be someone who could play a wide variety of roles. In fine art, Gillette argued that merit was not assessed by the variety of paintings an artist could produce: the art critic was not told "'Do not consider this man's paintings, even though masterpieces, for he is only a landscape artist. Find the chap who can paint forty different kinds"' (p.567). In Gillette's opinion, all 'great' actors had a personality which they displayed in performance. 'As no human being exists without personality' he wrote, 'an actor who omits it in his impersonation of a human being omits one of the vital elements of existence' (p.566).

The advice on acting which circulated in American culture in the decade immediately before the tour of the Moscow Art Theatre in 1923, displayed some similar concerns and techniques to the Stanislavski System. It was commonly agreed that the management of emotion was the foundation to a disciplinary science of acting. This required the actor to develop a subjectifying look, which either imagined the character's emotional circumstances, or explored the actor's own feelings as stimuli for performance. The techniques used by D.W. Griffith in particular were significantly similar to Stanislavski's own emotional memory techniques. However, where some American practitioners departed from Stanislavski was in the value they placed on the enigma of personality as defining the quality of performance in the final instance. The value of personality in acting was therefore believed to belong to the ways in which the possession of personality made the presence of the individual the absolute condition of truth in acting.

**Staging the self**

Warren Susman (1979) sees the search for personality as characterising a broad based cultural preoccupation amongst modern Americans. For Susman, the United States saw a major shift in the conceptualisation of the self between the nineteenth and twentieth
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centuries. During the nineteenth century, literary sources display a concern with the moral qualities of a person's 'character', with a vocabulary of 'citizenship', 'duty', 'honour', 'reputation', and 'integrity', defining the ethical standards and ideals which the self was required to live up to (p.214). While concerns over the morality of the self did not disappear, by the early twentieth century, Susman sees the steady growth in literature on self-development, in which the identity and desires of the individual are given priority. Susman reads this literature as signifying a shift from a 'culture of character' to a 'culture of personality'. Susman does not claim the the shift from 'character' to 'personality' resulted from any new found truth about the self, but from changes in the ways in which the self was understood. Popular literature on self-realisation conceptualised personality through a language of 'fascinating', 'stunning', 'attractive', 'magnetic', 'glowing', 'masterful', 'creative', dominant' and 'forceful' (p.217). A contradiction in the culture of personality was the dual pressure to be both distinguished from, and accepted by, others: 'One is to be unique, distinctive, follow one's own feelings, make oneself stand out from the crowd, and at the same time appeal - by fascination, magnetism, attractiveness - to it' (p.220). This tension had the effect of making 'Every American ... a performing self' (p.220).

In his study of changing concepts of the self, Roy Baumeister (1987) sees the first half of the twentieth century as being dominated by concerns over the alienation of the individual in mass society. In the second half of the century, anxieties emerge about the 'accommodation' of the self, as the individual is believed to have to sacrifice individual desires so that he or she may fit into society at the expense of individuality. The emergence of the culture of personality can be seen as a response to those anxieties, not in the sense that Americans suddenly became personalities, but that personality celebrated the uniqueness of the individual against social compromises.

In the fifties, the problems of the accommodated self were addressed in an attack on what was seen to be an advancing mood of conformity in American society. In the 1950 publication, The Lonely Crowd, written by David Riesman together with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, criticised what was believed to be a spread of conformity in American society during the twentieth century. Riesman believed conformity was stifling a nineteenth century spirit of frontiersman individualism. Riesman explained this change as a transition from an 'inner-directed personality' of self-reliance and self-determination, to an 'other-directed personality' in which personal identity was influenced by the presence
of others. This vision of Riesman’s should be placed in context. The Lonely Crowd was not based on any actual psychological research but was an observational study of several changes in American society. The late forties and early fifties saw advanced growth in the consumer economy, with intensive use of advertising and marketing in an attempt to control people’s tastes. Riesman described the commercial mass media as having a pedagogic function as ‘tutors in how to consume’ (1989, 290). Believing that people increasingly formed their identities in relation to the images and products which consumerism marketed, Riesman argued that ‘the product now in demand is neither a staple nor a machine; it is a personality’ (p.46).

Seymour Lipset (1961) criticised Riesman, arguing that inner and other directions represented the contradictory values of individualism and equality which were long standing in the conceptualisation of American character. However, Riesman was not alone in his critique of conformity. Following the Second World War, the profile of work in America changed, as the white collar workforce began to dominate labour demographics. William H. Whyte studied this professional class in The Organisation Man, published in 1956, in which he concluded that the Protestant Ethic of competitive individualism which had built American capitalism had given way to a ‘Social’, ‘organisational’, or ‘bureaucratic’ Ethic. By the Social Ethic, Whyte was referring to ‘that contemporary body of thought which makes morally legitimate the pressures of society against the individual’ (1965, 11). Success in the office culture of large corporations was seen to require employees to politely co-operate as part of an interdependent team.

In White Collar, published in 1951, the sociologist C. Wright Mills argued that service-sector employment regulated the emotions of middle class employees. Politeness in business dealings resulted in the white collar workforce becoming a ‘personality market’, in which employees ‘sell not only their time and energy but their personalities as well’ (1956, xvii). Arlie Russell Hochschild (1983) has used Mills’s study to indicate a trend towards the management of emotion in contemporary working practices. Following Mills, Hochschild sees emotion becoming increasingly controlled and commodified in working relationships. Work becomes ‘emotional labour’, ‘the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display ... sold for a wage and therefore [having] exchange value’ (p.7). Hochschild argues that in emotional labour, the experience of emotion is inseparable from the act of controlling feeling: ‘Both the act of “getting in touch with” feeling and the act of “trying to” feel may become part of the
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process that makes the thing we get in touch with, or the thing we manage, into a feeling or emotion. In managing feeling, we contribute to the creation of it' (emphasis in original pp.17-18). Emotion, and the management of emotion, becomes a kind of performance, in which feelings are produced and regulated in response to others.

Modern dramatic acting, concentrating as it has on the emotional link between character and actor, is a form of emotional labour. It is not surprising therefore that Hochschild should choose to explain the management of feelings as two forms of 'acting'. 'Surface acting' involves the feigning of emotions by producing the surface appearances of feeling. With surface acting, others are fooled but not the self. Hochschild's description echoes the anti-emotionalist (i.e emotion without feeling) stance of Diderot, for the 'body, not the soul, is the main tool of the trade' (p.37). 'Deep acting' can be achieved in two ways: either feeling is directly forced, or an emotional effect is achieved by 'indirect use of a trained imagination' (p.38). With 'deep acting', a person works so hard at imagining an emotion that it becomes real. The emotions produced by 'deep acting' therefore effect the self and others.

Hochschild's study concentrated on aircraft personnel and their relationships to passengers. However, she took Stanislavski's use of emotional memory and the 'magic if' as exemplifying what was meant by the 'trained imagination' of deep acting (pp.38-42). She chooses the example of Stanislavski to define the effect which the management of emotion has on personal identity in the workplace. However, with Stanislavski, the work of imagination always kept the emotional act and the personality of the actor at something of a distance from one another. Strasberg's Method more effectively illustrates the relationship between the management of feeling and personal identity which Hochschild sees in emotional labour. Where Stanislavski had combined the internal and analytic techniques, so that the actor's emotionality was always directed towards representing the character's situation and the objectives of the play, Strasberg's Method concentrated on the internal technique. Like Stanislavski, Strasberg believed the actor's recall of emotions was a necessary part of acting. However, Strasberg's Method combined the attempts to manage emotion which were found in the System, with the reflections on individual self found in the culture of personality. Other American writers on acting, including Belasco and Gillette, had named personality as the essence of the great actor. Strasberg did not use the term 'personality', but his techniques still searched out the most private details which were believed to define an actor's personal identity.
The preferred techniques of the Method directed the actor towards reading the self in specific ways. Knowledge of the self did not look for the ‘attractive’ or ‘fascinating’ qualities of personality but searched for a most personal self in what were believed to be the repressions of the actor. Discovery of those repressions in turn became the most ‘fascinating’ part of an actor’s identity. In particular, it was the individual’s emotions which were believed to be repressed.

[An] original emotional experience can be happy or frightening or fearsome. It can be concerned with jealousy or hate or love. It can be illness or accident. It can be anything that your mind immediately goes to when you ask yourself, “Has anything strange, unusual, or exciting happened to me?” If your mind does not immediately go to such an experience, that is usually a sign that the experience has taken place but is built into the unconscious mechanism and doesn’t like to be remembered.

(Hethmon 1965, 109)

The discourse of the Method technique directed the actor to search for repressions. Even if the actor did not feel as if he or she was repressed, the Method technique could claim that the apparent absence of repression was only an effect of disavowal.

Although the actor’s emotions may be repressed, Strasberg argued that this should not stop the actor from searching them out to overcome his or her repressions.

We never permit ourselves to say, “I don’t remember”. We make the effort, because very strong things have usually happened to a person who says, “No, nothing has happened to me”. He has merely tended unconsciously to put them aside. They are often stored up in secret, but the actor must learn to face them, because it is only through himself that he can experience on the stage.

( pp.109-10)

Emotional or ‘affective’ memory was one means of bypassing the actor’s ‘superego’.

In affective memory you try to see the people that you saw. You try to hear the things that you heard. You try to touch now the things that you touched then. You
try to remember through your senses what your mouth tasted and what you wore and the feeling of that garment against your body. The emotion you try not to remember at all.

(p.110)

Strasberg admitted that such exercises were 'experiments' with no guarantee of success but which he believed would allow the actor to eventually make available a 'stock of memories' to be used in performance (p.111).

Stanislavski had suggested that actors were most 'truthful' on stage when they could convey the impression that they were being 'private in public'. Strasberg used this principle to develop the technique known as the 'private moment'.

Some actors confuse the private moment with just being alone or just being personal. That is not what we mean. When you are alone, it doesn't follow that you are private. A lot of personal things are not private. We don't mind talking about them or anybody's [sic] knowing about them. They are deeply personal, but we don't mind sharing them. ... We do private things when we are alone, and we know they are really private when we cannot continue them if somebody comes into the room. Whereas if somebody interrupts us when we are doing a personal thing, we become shy or a little embarrassed, but we go ahead and do it anyhow.

(pp.117-18)

Where Stanislavski had valued privacy for how it made the actor appear to be lost in the world of the drama, for Strasberg the private moment was a truly secret experience from the actor's private existence. Stanislavski asked the actor to be private in public. Strasberg proposed a 'deeper' search into the most private elements of privacy. It was Strasberg's belief that the private moment was of great importance to the actor because it revealed a truth which could not be fabricated: 'made-up privacy [does] not have the same results ... In the real private moment the fact that the privacy is real stirs and incites the imagination' (p.119). Private moment exercises therefore represented an intense commitment on the part of the actor to invest his or her most intimate experiences into a performance.

For the exercise, actors could first use sense memory to recall the situation, or else use
objects or furniture to help recreate private space. These sensory experiences were then intended to help the actor experience the feelings associated with the private activity. Strasberg described the transformative effects of the exercise for one actor.

One day she came in and said she had another private moment, but she didn’t know whether she’d be able to do it. I said, “Fine”. She brought in a Victrola and a Turkish record she had once used in an exercise. Then she did just a moment of being by herself. She was lying in bed in her room all alone, because she only does this when she’s by herself and in a mood everybody gets into sometimes. Then she put on the Turkish music and started to dance. You have never seen such abandon as this girl had on the stage. It was what I call hot dancing, and it was exciting, thrilling, and shocking in the sense that you just didn’t think of this kind of thing with that girl. She hadn’t seemed that kind of girl.

(p.117)

The moment was an exhibitionist scene. The bedroom location provided a private context and the dance displayed the actor’s private fantasy. Strasberg’s description of the actor’s dancing as ‘hot’ has sexual connotations. His shock was the effect of the private becoming public, the actor revealing what he did not expected of ‘that kind of girl’. Strasberg believed the exercise was of value to the actor for how it helped to breakdown her inhibitions: ‘It acted like a tonic. ... we were able to counter her long-induced habits of not expressing as fully as she could what in fact she did feel’ (p.117). In the private moment exercise, performance became a form of expressive therapy for the actor.

The concentration on the unconscious and repression in Strasberg’s Method produced a psychopathology in acting with similarities to Freudian psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic ideas became widely known in American culture during the forties and fifties. The impact of psychoanalysis was not felt in the mass consumption of Freud’s writings but in how ideas about repression, the unconscious, the family, and sexuality, became prevalent beliefs in the conceptualising of personal identity, forming a discourse of popular Freudianism. Writing in 1959, Philip Rieff regarded Freudianism as marking the emergence of ‘psychological man’. The Method technique shared with psychoanalysis the belief that repression was a barrier to expression, and that the actor, like the analysand, could only be expressive once he or she had lost their repressions. As Rieff explained,
[psychoanalytic] treatment ... has an aesthetic aim: to allow the patient an expression that has been in principle repressed. The poles of the analytic situation are repression and that which remains to be expressed. Thus the Freudian analysis is focused upon an aesthetic problem – that of expression: as if we would all be artists, if only what we have to express could be free from repression.

(1959, 347-348)

It is this dialectic of repression and expression which Michel Foucault sees in the effect of how confession appears to liberate and speak the truth. Foucault describes confessional discourse as ‘a ritual in which the expression alone, independently of its external consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him and promises him salvation’ (1984, 62). The Method technique was therefore a therapeutic and confessional practice, in which beliefs in the truth of acting were supported by beliefs about the kinds of problems which faced the expression of a true self.

Strasberg’s Method techniques were only one example of the procedures practised at the Actors Studio. Robert Lewis, who lead the advanced class at the Studio, also spoke of a ‘Method’, but in his work there was no attempt to search out truth in repressed feelings (1958, particularly 23-47). Strasberg’s techniques characterised the actor as a person with repressions, whose creativity essentially lay in the release of those repressions. Hochschild sees the management of feeling in emotional labour as leading to the alienation of self-identity, so that a sense of an authentically true self is believed to belong to what she describes as the ‘unmanaged heart’:

The high regard for “natural feeling” ... may coincide with the culturally imposed need to develop the precise opposite – an instrumental stance towards feeling. We treat spontaneous feeling, for this reason, as if it were scarce and precious; we raise it up as a virtue’. It may not be too much to suggest that we are witnessing a call for the conservation of “inner resources”, a call to save another wilderness from corporate use and keep it “forever wild”.

(p.22)

The workshop sessions at the Actors Studio were not in themselves wild, for Strasberg
assumed the authoritative position of moderator in which he controlled the proceedings and interpreted the final truth of the actor’s therapy. Strasberg’s workshops therefore provided a context for the controlled decontrolling of repression, with the Method technique introducing the actor to practices for the management of the unmanaged heart.

**A clean place**

Strasberg’s Method made the release of the actor’s repressions into the objective of artistic industry. Liberation of repression was practised as a necessary technique for producing truth in acting through a purity of self-expression. That same sense of artistic purity motivated the establishment of the Actors Studio. With the Studio, purity was conceptualised as a distance from commercial pressures, a spirit which had also influenced the establishment of the Moscow Art Theatre and Group Theatre. With the Moscow Art and Group Theatres, the formation of an ensemble company was regarded as a central principle to resist the star system of commercial theatre. ‘In spite of my admiration for individual splendid talents’, Stanislavski said, ‘I do not accept the star system; collective creative effort is the root of our kind of art. ... requiring ensemble acting and whoever mars that ensemble is committing a crime’ (Stanislavski 1990: 57). The rise of the combination companies at the end of the nineteenth century had seen the consolidation of a star system in American theatre (McArthur 1984, 5-8). The combination system was the likely reference point for Stanislavski when he observed that the ‘whole theatrical business in America is based on the personality of the actor’ (quoted in Hirsch 1984: 52). When the Moscow Art Theatre toured in 1923, the ensemble acting of the company was explained and dismissed by the reviewer John Golden in terms of national difference: ‘The ensemble work is an accident of the Russian character. ... The Russian is accustomed to an atmosphere where complete and indeed servile obedience is required from one class to another. He is willing to yield himself utterly to the director’s orders. The American actor has too much independence, too high a degree of individuality, to make this possible’ (quoted in Hirsch 1984, 54). By invoking notions of independence as inherent to the national character, Golden therefore defended star performance as a natural consequence of Americaness.

By 1850, New York had become the centre of American theatrical life, with Broadway
Alternatives to Broadway commercialism emerged with the Washington Square Players and Provincetown Players. The first performances by these groups in New York in 1915 formed the origins of what became known as ‘Off-Broadway’ (Lawson-Peebles 1993, 265). Although Off-Broadway was not intended to run on the same commercial basis as Broadway, companies could only exist by courting commercial fare. The Theatre Guild, which grew out of the Washington Square Players, produced long runs of successful plays, and also imitated Broadway by staging musicals (p.268). At the time of the Moscow Art Theatre tour, the only examples in the United States of any similar ensemble practice were found in the work of the Provincetown Players and the Guild.

It was while working for the Guild that Lee Strasberg, Harold Clurman and Cheryl Crawford first met (Clurman 1983,10 and 15). The formation of the Group Theatre is described by Clurman as a result of dissatisfaction with the dated repertory of the Guild. ‘Group’ was included in the company name to emphasise the ensemble nature of their work (p.55). Although for their first production, Paul Green’s The House of Connelly, the Group borrowed two name actors from the Guild – Franchot Tone and Morris Carnovsky – arrangements were made to prevent actors obtaining star status in the company. Salaries for Group members were not determined by the importance of the performer’s role but by ‘an actor’s general value to the Group company’, together with consideration of marital and familial circumstances (p.57). Tone and Carnovsky, still under contract to the Guild, were paid their regular salaries of $300 per week, while other members received between $30 to $140. Clurman, Crawford and Strasberg set an example, for although they were classed as directors of the Group, their salaries were set at $50 per week, with each receiving one third of the $1,500 director’s fee for any production.

Through their experience of attending the classes of Richard Boleslavski and Maria Ouspenskaya at the American Laboratory Theatre, Clurman and Strasberg were introduced to the Stanislavski system. Boleslavski was approached to set up the Laboratory by a group of wealthy patrons lead by Miriam Stockton, who had seen the Moscow Art Theatre performances in New York, and were prepared to support a venture which would introduce similar practices to the American theatre (Hirsch 1984, 59). In the bulletin published by the Laboratory for 1924-5, it was declared that the students attending had formed ‘an organic group, similar to the Guild of mediaeval times, which,
in the collective practice of its craft, has become a living theatre – that is to say, a theatre in which each actor strives to act his part, however humble, as if it were a major part in the play but harmonised toward a perfect ensemble’ (quoted in Hirsch 1984, 60). Work at the Laboratory involved actors in not only the skills of acting but also in the study of ballet, fencing, phonetics, music appreciation and, in conjunction with teachers from the Metropolitan Museum of Art, a course in great artistic movements (p.63). The Laboratory therefore provided a privately financed base for training actors, allowing actors to develop their craft guided by the principle of ensemble playing, while also learning more generally about aspects of the high arts.

Clurman argues that the emergence of Off-Broadway theatre was not widely recognised by the press until the late forties and early fifties (1983: 316). By this time, Clurman believed that the alternative to the commercial theatre which Off-Broadway originally presented was lost, becoming ‘musclebound and to a harmful extent impeded by the economic net which strangles Broadway productions’ (p.316). The Theatre Guild became in Clurman’s opinion ‘a distributing agency dependent to a large extent on other managements or “package deals”’ (p.311). This absorption of Off-Broadway into commercial theatre was to have the effect of seeing Off-Off-Broadway emerge as the sector for the staging of radical and challenging non-commercial work (Clurman 1983, 316; Lawson-Peebles 1993, 271-2).

The assimilation of Off-Broadway into commercial theatre was judged by Clurman to be not only economically damaging to the American theatre, but also indicative of a more spiritual malaise which he believed had occurred in American theatre since the ‘fervent years’ of the 30s. In that period, Clurman believed the theatre had ‘artists’ who ‘were working toward some valuable artistic, social, humanly significant goal. ... to make the production of stage plays actually mean something in the lives of the participants’ (p.304). ‘What is lacking now’, he argued, ‘is a sense of purpose, of an ideal – something to be achieved over and above a smash hit, a fat salary, rave notices, more fulsome billing and more frequent mentions in the columns’ (p.305).

Clurman echoed the discourse of conformity when he judged that after the Roosevelt years, the United States had developed a common reaction ‘which made everything that smacked of a departure from the status quo more than a little suspect’ (p.305). He was of the opinion that a ‘rebel who turns conformist is not necessarily a sorry person if what he chooses to conform to is something deeply rooted in him’, but instead society was
witnessing a general trend towards 'inconspicuous citizens, with no other thought than "to get on," no other ideal than celebrity or success' (p.306). In the theatre, Clurman believed this trend could be seen in young actors who desired stardom, which he argued would destroy the theatre which 'by its very nature is an art of collaboration or teamwork' (p.308). Clurman saw the theatre as serving to communicate understanding about the relationship between the individual and society, and in his opinion, the consequence of any self interested desire for stardom would be the fragmenting of communal bonds.

Like the American Laboratory Theatre and Group Theatre, the establishment of the Actors Studio was intended to offer actors a haven for artistic integrity outside the commercial pressures of the Broadway theatre. Elia Kazan described the Studio as 'a clean place in a dirty business' (Rice 1957a, 8). The Studio did not operate as a company but as a workshop in which working actors could participate in exercises and present short scenes as work in progress. Strasberg regarded the New York theatre world in the fifties as 'work[ing] by productions, not by companies', preventing actors from continually practising and extending their technique (Strasberg 1957, 9). The purpose of the Studio for Strasberg was to provide actors with the training opportunities which they could not obtain elsewhere. This made the Studio and its members, special participants in American theatre culture: 'What distinguishes the players who use the Studio is their sense of responsibility towards the theatre. They are not merely concerned with the glamour and the financial rewards of stardom, but with serving an ideal' (p.9).

The Studio was opposed not only to Broadway theatre but also Hollywood cinema. Seymour Peck (1956) described the Studio as a 'temple', at which 'the Hollywood star, who often becomes frozen in conventional modes of acting, anxiously seeks out ways to make his style fresh and varied' (p.26). Speaking as a Studio member and Hollywood star, James Dean argued that in Hollywood the emphasis is on externals. What angles are best for your profile and how you should stand to appear taller and what path to use for walking from here to there ... But the Studio makes you develop motivation. It makes you work from the inside out. It's just laziness if an actor tells you that pictures don't let him work truly. You've got to make personal sacrifices in Hollywood, publicity tours and all that stuff, but you don't have to compromise professionally.

(quoted in Morton 1955, 216)
Wolfe Kaufman, the Studio’s press representative, announced that the activity of the Studio was directed towards ‘Self-improvement! Work for work’s sake!’ (Kaufman 1948, 1).

The Studio’s position of artistic independence and exclusivity was negotiated in several ways. Artistic independence was taken to be conditional upon financial autonomy. Although the Group Theatre had positioned itself outside of the Broadway establishment, Cheryl Crawford claimed that the Studio held an altogether more independent position as ‘a nonprofit organisation while the Group Theatre was a commercial outfit that did hits’ (Morton 1955, 218). The headquarters on West 44th Street had cost $60,000 in 1955, with a further $50,000 for improvements, and in 1957, the annual running costs were estimated at $20,000 (Rice 1957f, 8). When out of work, members were not expected to pay for tuition, and would only pay $2 per week when in work (Kaufman 1948, 1). Other funding came by private donations from figures in show business (Gelb 1958a, 1; Peck 1956, 26; Rice 1957a, 8). Of the staff, only Strasberg drew a regular salary of $100 per week (Rice 1957a, 8). Strasberg supplemented this salary by offering private tuition outside of the Studio (Rice 1957e, 8). Possible state subsidy was of secondary importance to Strasberg, who believed it was necessary to ‘get the talent first, then talk about aid from the Government’ (Marriott 1965, 8).

Controlling membership maintained the Studio’s exclusivity. As Robert Rice reported, a ‘candidate for membership cannot get in on the basis of previous experience, financial status, distinguished lineage, personal charm or Congressional pull: he has to be a good actor, and that makes it really rough’ (1957a, 8). Members were accepted entirely on the ability they showed in audition. In rare exceptions, auditions were waived for performers who were ‘either around too seldom ... too busy, or ... simply too prominent to be required to give them’ (p.8). Marilyn Monroe fell into this category. The secrecy of the Studio’s work was also achieved by closing its doors to observers from the general public.

Most significant in positioning the Studio apart from the commercial theatre was the policy of refusing to become a producing company (Rice 1957f, 8). By not producing performances, the Studio stood outside the market altogether, making the survival of the Studio entirely free of audience demand. The Studio was reserved as a space for the actor’s work, not the audience’s pleasure. However, the Studio did stage occasional productions, starting with Kazan’s direction of Bessie Breuer’s Sundown Beach in 1948.
(Garfield 1984, 65-7). Nevertheless, training remained the primary objective for the Studio, with productions remaining a secondary activity. The Studio therefore provided a space dedicated to actors working on their professional skills, maintaining its economic independence and cultural exclusivity by private patronage, restricted membership and a policy of limited productions. By cutting itself off from outside interests, the Studio became a haven for the disinterested pursuit of pure creative endeavour.

Stanislavski’s System developed techniques for the actor’s management of emotions. Emotional control became a central problem in discussions over the professional training of actors in America in the first decades of the twentieth century, with practitioners conceptualising the problems and solutions of acting in similar ways to the System. American practitioners were also reflecting on the value of individual personality in successful acting, which reflected the more general search for the truths of personal identity which had entered modern American culture during the twentieth century. Strasberg’s Method united the management of emotion and the search for personality in exercises which looked for the truth of acting in what were believed to be an actor’s private repressions. Peter Brooks finds the effect of melodramatic representation in a ‘victory over repression’ (1976, 4). Strasberg’s techniques enacted that same effect, positioning the work of the actor in a discourse of personal expression which made the Method actor a ‘melodramatic’ professional. Strasberg’s techniques introduced actors to ways of managing repression as a resource for personal and artistic expressivity. Hochschild sees the alienation of emotional labour as making the unmanaged heart into a ‘scarce’ and ‘precious’ ‘wilderness’, which is saved ‘from corporate use’ (1983, 7). Emotional release therefore appears in the context of corporate business to transgress commercial exchange value. In other words, unmanaged feelings are not profitable. However, in the upside-down economy of the field of cultural production, Strasberg’s Method represented the ‘tendencies’ which promised the actor the therapeutic effect of loosing his or her repressions, while at the same time accumulating the embodied cultural capital of a personal monopoly of feelings.
The private environment of the Studio did not prevent but attracted media interest. During the fifties, numerous articles reported on the mysteries of what went on inside the Studio and the Method. Regardless of whether these reports on the Studio were accurately representing what the teachers and members of the Studio believed they were doing, a discourse was produced which constructed an image of artistic autonomy and personal realisation. In the Method discourse, the Studio and Strasberg’s technique act as mutually reinforcing metaphors for one another: the Studio and the techniques of the Method are both gestures of liberation, freed from the ‘repressions’ of commerce and the self. Both the Studio and the technique found value in a private place, as the Studio became a closed world, an introverted artistic preserve, inside which actors introspectively investigated the innermost resources of their art.

Part of the image of the Studio was its rejection of stardom. However, as performers associated with the Studio and the Method technique increasingly formed successful careers in Hollywood, critics turned on what appeared to be the easy assimilation of the Studio’s high principles into commercial production. Robert Brustein argued that Strasberg had the same effect on commercial theatre as John Maynard Keynes had on capitalism: ‘Like the economic reforms of Keynes, the histrionic reforms of Strasberg reinvigorated a sick institution which was threatening to expire from its own fakery, inadequacy, and incompetence’ (1962, 29). Brustein saw the Method technique as limiting the possibilities for actors to become imaginatively transformed into different characters. For this reason, Method actors were in Brustein’s opinion ‘appropriate to the commercial theatre, where type casters seize on a single saleable commodity for merciless exploitation’, and for ‘the land of personality-mongers’ which described Hollywood (p.29). Brustein concluded that ‘the Actors Studio, instead of being a temple of high theatrical ideals, has come to reflect the most pernicious qualities of our theatre: the glamour and pretentiousness, the fear of risk, the lust for fame, the quick success’ (p.30). Brustein argued that the theatre was in need of a revolution which required ‘not a Keynes but a Marx’ to transform its politics (p.30). In the epilogue he added to The Fervent Years in 1957, Harold Clurman’s vocabulary invited comparison with Marxist theory when he chose to criticise the Studio for what he saw as the ‘glamour fetishism’ of the Studio practitioners (p.312). The cultural capital of the Method discourse was recognised by Robert Rice when he quipped,
Hip Hollywood press agents have discovered that the formula for announcing that a star is about to spend a month in East Coast ginmills is:

“For Immediate Release:

“Ugh Richardson, in order to use a 3-day vacash [sic] between pix to advantage, will plane to N.Y. tomorrow ayem [sic] to take courses at the Actors Studio.” (The Studio gives no “courses” and Ugh couldn’t care less).

(emphasis in original, 1957d, 8)

Rice’s imaginary press release makes ironic comment on how the image of artistic endeavour could be used to support the star system. Rather than resist the commercial sector which stardom represented, the image of self expression could actively contribute to the commodification of personal identity in film performance.
Chapter 3: Tongue-tied emotionalism

During an interview for Tulane Drama Review in 1964, Lee Strasberg was asked by Richard Schechner if Method training inevitably resulted in a Method style of acting. Strasberg responded by saying 'training the actor has nothing to do with style' (quoted in Vineberg 1991, 85). The Method technique practised by Strasberg at the Actors Studio encouraged the actor to search out and release personal repressions through acting. As the technique concentrated on the 'inner' not the 'outer', Strasberg argued that his ways of working did not cause the actor to perform in any particular style. However, during the late fifties and early sixties, several commentators were discussing what they saw as a new style of acting appearing on the Broadway stage and in Hollywood film, which they associated with the Actors Studio, Strasberg and the Method. Here, I will not be examining whether the Method technique did or did not produce a Method style. Brando's rejection of Strasberg's teaching while still exemplifying the Method style, would suggest there are problems with assuming a causal relationship between the Method technique and the style. The relationship of technique to style is an effect of discourse not causality. What I will be considering is how acting style became a part of the Method discourse, looking at the distinctive features which characterised the style and its use in examples of film acting.

The Method style

Writing in 1965, Penelope Gilliatt summarised what she saw as the main criticisms levelled at the Actors Studio:
Tongue-tied emotionalism

a) Method actors mumble and say -er;
b) they can’t manage classics;
c) they have no ear for a text;
d) they coarsen emotion into hysteria;
e) they use art as a way of flexing private neuroses.

(p.34)

Gilliatt, drama critic for The Observer newspaper, was describing these criticisms after seeing the Actors Studio production of Chekhov’s Three Sisters performed at the World Theatre Season in London. For Gilliatt, the production largely justified such criticisms. Commenting on the performance of the actor playing Irina, Gilliatt observed that she ‘mumbled and er-ed more than the most crass revue-parody, overruling the judgment of Chekhov’s repetitions with a stammering mannerism of her own that jerked through the lines like a wasp struggling up the side of a pot of jam’ (p34). Overall, Gilliatt saw the entire production as a ‘terrifying psychotic doodle’, claiming that emotions ‘were vulgarised into hysteria’ and ‘the exhibition of neurosis had a solemn field day’ (p34). Gilliatt’s description offers indications of how the performances she witnessed displayed an acting subcode: the signifiers of ‘mumbling’ and ‘er-ing’ are read as signifying the troubled psychology and emotionology of the ‘psychotic’, ‘hysterical’, and ‘neurotic’.

Although not semiotically methodical, commentaries such as Gilliatt’s can be read as describing the ‘indicating facts’ and ‘indicated facts’ of an acting subcode (Krampen 1994, 123). When read as historical texts, commentaries such as Gilliatt’s provide an account of how an acting code or subcode was seen and understood in a particular context. Gilliatt’s summary of the criticisms directed at the Method suggests that by the time of writing, the Method style had surpassed the vagaries of undercoding and was well known and recognised as an overcoded convention of the modern stage. Commentaries on acting are therefore valuable for how they link acting codes to context.

Gilliatt noted the common criticism that Method actors mumbled and her own responses to the Three Sisters production confirmed the association of the Method with a quality of vocal incoherence. Vocally, the style displayed what Tyrone Guthrie described as the ‘“humphs and grunts and inarticulate croaks which experts may identify with Method acting”’ (quoted in Alpert 1961, 179). Writing in 1960 in the Columbia
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University Forum, Theodore Hoffman argued that the effect of the Method voice was that the ‘play grips one at every moment, but seems to go on forever’, resulting from the ‘long pauses between lines’ (quoted in Vineberg 1991, 103). In a 1958 issue of Commentary, Robert Brustein described the emergence of what he called ‘America’s New Culture Hero’ in theatre and film. For Brustein, this new breed of hero was indistinguishable from a new style of acting found on stage and screen, which he associated with the Actors Studio.

In a persistent effort to find a language, vocabulary, and intonation peculiarly our own, we have come temporarily to settle for no voice at all. The stage, motion pictures, television, and even popular music are now exalting an inarticulate hero, who – for all the dependence of these media on language – cannot talk.

Of medium height and usually of lower class birth, his most familiar physical characteristic is his surly and discontented expression. His eyes peer out at the world from under bettling brows; his uncombed hair falls carelessly over his forehead; his right hand rests casually on his right hip. He is extremely muscular and walks with a slouching, shuffling gait. He scratches himself often, slumps in chairs, and almost never smiles. He is also identified by the sounds which issue from his mouth. He squeezes, he grunts, he passes his hand over his eyes and forehead, he stares steadily, he turns away, he scratches, then again faces his adversary, and finally speaks. What he says is rarely important but he has mesmerised his auditor by the effort he takes to say it. He has communicated not information but feeling; he has revealed an inner life of unspecified anguish and torment.

(1958, 123)

Brustein’s description is worth quoting at length for the detailed account of the Method actor and Method acting which it provides. The Method voice is characterised by certain paralinguistic features: ‘squeezing’; ‘grunting’. Gilliatt, Guthrie, Hoffman and Brustein each remarked on a general sense of inarticulacy in the Method voice. The Method voice was distinctive not because of what it said but how it was said. As Brustein observed, the said was less important than the ‘effort’ taken to say it.
Hoffman and Brustein regarded the Method body in slightly different terms. Hoffman saw the Method style in minute actions of the body: 'When a piece of business like lighting a cigarette or pouring a drink comes up, the play seems to stop while the actor carefully examines the cigarette to find out what brand it is or looks for germs on the glass' (quoted in Vineberg 1991, p.103). For Hoffman, the actions of the Method body involves the examination rather than manipulation of objects. Lighting a cigarette or pouring a drink are small everyday actions but Hoffman judges the Method actor as performing such acts in a way that they receive undue emphasis and attention. What Hoffman’s reading would seem to suggest is that the Method style did not make such small actions incidental—a minor collection of casual doings that arose from the dramatic circumstances—or even functional, in the sense of being performed to achieve a certain end. Instead, the Method body made pieces of business into moments which concentrated the pensive attention of the actor, making the most seemingly inconsequential behaviour into intensely meaningful action. Brando’s handling of the glove in On the Waterfront (Elia Kazan 1954, US) illustrates this tendency. Hoffman’s critical tone implied that he saw this behaviour as ‘excessive’, not in the sense that the Method style was larger than perceptions of everyday conduct, but precisely from the opposite movement towards an undue and superfluous investment of time, energy and concentration into the smallest details of the everyday. Along with the quality of vocal inarticulacy, a second characteristic of the Method style was therefore the use of small pieces of business to speak the subtexts of the drama, amplifying very small gestures so that they signified very big problems.

Brustein describes the Method body in different terms. For Brustein, the Method body was definitely male and muscular. A ‘surly’ facial expression was accompanied by various ‘slouchings’, ‘shufflings’ and ‘slumpings’. Together, these terms suggested the body appeared in a relaxed state, a loose physicality opposed to the rigid formalities of conventional manners and deportment. Yet for Brustein, the loose body had become the overcoded convention and manner of the Method style, a conventionalised lack of formal behavioural convention. Other actions like passing the hand over the forehead or scratching saw the actor producing gestures which touched his or her—although Brustein’s description would suggest most definitely his—body. Hoffman described how Method actors ‘scratch themselves, rub their arms, brush their hair, count their buttons’
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A further characteristic of the Method style was therefore the loose and informal but uneasy physicality of the whole body.

This informality in manners and the vocal inarticulacy of the Method continued the asystematic quality of Pearson’s ‘verisimilar’ code (1992). The vocal and physical characteristics of the Method style were therefore a subcoding of realist acting. However, a part of that coding was formed not only in the manners of the voice and body but in the ways in which those manners were associated with the representation of certain realms of social experience. Amongst Gilliatt’s list of commonly held beliefs about the Method was the view that the style was not suitable for classical drama. I shall be returning to this issue in the discussion of Brando in chapter 5. For now, I want to look at the type of drama which the Method was most readily associated with. Tyrone Guthrie argued that during the depression years, American drama saw a profound change in what represented the real.

In 1930, it was necessary to seek new means of expressing new ideas about people whom it was a novelty to see depicted on the stage. Until then, stage conventions had required that, with amazingly few exceptions, plays were about the Upper Orders. If members of the Lower Orders appeared at all, it was as character parts – Faithful Retainers, Roughs, Prostitutes, Little Matchgirls or, most frequently, just “Comics”. Then plays began to have as their chief figures Taxi Drivers and Boxers shown, not as the expression of natures more rough and inarticulate than their former “betters”, but as people who had been denied the privileges of the more fortunate.

(1957, 82)

Guthrie saw this new drama as requiring a new style of acting, ‘less conventional, less romantic, less elegant, but, in compensation, more “real”’, with the actor ‘unlearn[ing] a lot of fancy ways and fancy speech, which had been thought necessary in the portrayal of Grand Dukes’ (p.82). For Guthrie, the Method style continued this shift, although he was critical of how the ‘Method-ists’ by dressing in ‘blue jeans, with dirty nails and wild hair ... [were] busy proclaiming themselves Proletarian – but members of a vintage Proletariat’ (p.82). Guthrie linked the style of the Method to class representation,
believing that the Method used class to signify social reality, but also suggesting that the Method style was finding that reality in an outdated and nostalgic view of the working class.

Norbert Elias's account of the civilising process describes the long term formalisation of social manners as a crucial means for how class differences were formed in European societies (1994). The progressive refinement of manners is seen by Elias to embody the social stratifications of court society (1983). The class connotations of such processes are described by Johan Goudsblom: 'An important characteristic of the Bourgeois standards of speech and etiquette is that they generally encourage “civility”, that is, conduct, which never indulges in an open display of emotions, but conceals the actor's innermost feelings behind a restrained observance of conventional forms' (quoted in Wouters 1986, n.7, 16). Elias saw the process of formalisation continually advancing. However, Cas Wouters (1986) finds difficulties with this view, for it does not take into account historical periods where societies see an informalisation of the codes of self control. Wouters discusses how with informalisation, changes in lifestyle occur which see the working class become more bourgeois and alternatively the 'proletarisation of the bourgeoisie' (p.4). Guthrie saw this process at work in the Method style, arguing that 'isn't it just middle-class sentimentality, and a very “superior” attitude, to imagine that it is more “real” to be rough than to be genteel, more “real” to wear blue jeans than a neat Ivy League number, more “real” to look like a whore than a Junior Miss' (1957, 82).

Guthrie's views were echoed by Robert Brustein when he observed that the new American hero he described was constructed in a way that would 'indicate that the proletarian is still considered more interesting, more electric, and capable of deeper feelings than the owner of a store or the manager of a bank' (1958, 124). Guthrie argued that the 'proletariat does not speak and behave as it does, nor live where it does, from choice, but because it cannot afford to do otherwise. ... it is only eccentric “intellectuals” who are prole by choice' (1957, 82). Both Guthrie and Brustein read the Method as imagining a class reality by representing a vision of class authenticity based on the rejection of middle class civility. The image of the Method style in these accounts is therefore of an informalised and uncivilised 'proletariatness' in dress and manners which, it was imagined, represented an authentic experience that contrasted with the 'artificiality' of middle class society. As Guthrie and Brustein were very aware, the Method was not
realistically representing working class experience or behaviour but rather an uncivilised realm believed to be lost to the bourgeois sensibility. The asystematic informality of the Method voice and body therefore imagined an uncivilised reality repressed by middle class manners.

The class connotations of the Method style were only a part of its dramatic meaning. Gilliatt identified the beliefs that Method actors 'coarsen emotion into hysteria' and 'use art as a way of flexing private neuroses', as significant characteristics of the Method style (1965, 34). For Brustein, the Method voice and body appeared as symptoms of 'an inner life of unspecified anguish and torment' (p.124). A fifth characteristic of the Method style was therefore its association with the representation of an internal drama which linked emotion to psychological trauma. Robert Rice believed that actors from the Studio continually played 'crazy mixed-up characters in crazy mixed-up plays' (1957d, 8). On stage, Rice saw several cases of Method actors exemplifying this phenomenon: Brando's characterisation of Stanley Kowalski in A Streetcar Named Desire was of 'a fellow who’d as soon rape his sister-in-law as belch'; Julie Harris's performance of Frankie Addams in A Member of the Wedding was a '14-year-old who wants to participate in her sister’s honeymoon'; in A Hatful of Rain, Ben Gazzara played the 'narcotics addict' Johnny Pope; in The Rose Tattoo, Maureen Stapleton played Serafina Delle Rose who was 'a widow who keeps her husband's ashes in an urn on the mantelpiece and never combs her hair', while Eli Wallach played Alvarro Manglacavallo, 'a clownish and pathetic truck driver whose principal technique as a wooer is to get himself tattooed'; and Kim Stanley in Bus Stop played Cherie, 'a third rate stripper from the Ozarks who says she is a chanteuse' (p.8). In Rice’s view, 'these characters, whatever their differences and however they ultimately solve their problems, are almost totally self absorbed' (p.8).

These narratives of emotional and psychological disturbance produced a melodramatic component in the Method's representation of dramatic truth.

The inarticulacy, amplified business, and loose but uneasy physicality of the Method voice and body, characterised the 'symptoms' of a melodramatic style. Brustein (1958) subtitled his article on the new American hero, 'Feeling Without Words', describing what he saw in the hero's acting as inarticulacy and physical behaviour which 'communicated not information but feeling' (p.123). In Brustein’s opinion, this was detrimental to quality drama:
although the Broadway audience is relatively coherent and literate, the emphasis on our stage has fallen off the spoken word. The actor uses language only as a secondary instrument. His main purpose is to convey the mute feelings within his soul. The effect is admittedly quite explosive. The struggle within an incoherent individual trying to express his feelings can be extremely powerful, for one often has the sense that the character's stammers, mumbles, and grunts will ... erupt into violence if they continue to frustrate speech.

(p.126)

In Brustein's view, the style frustrated speech and subordinated the communication of meaning to the representation of emotion, a quality he described in the style as 'tongue-tied emotionalism' (p.125).

As dramatic forms, realism and melodrama have both dealt in different ways with the representation of the self in modern society. Christine Gledhill (1987b) explains these differences as being that the aim of realism is 'to possess the world by understanding it', whereas melodrama tries 'to force meaning and identity from the inadequacies of language' (p.33). Realism confidently assumes that society and the self are understandable and can therefore be represented, while melodrama reads society as producing problems in identity, confusing and complicating understanding in ways which challenge the means for representing those problems. Peter Brooks (1976) has argued that in melodrama, speech was rendered insufficient to the representation of the emotional problems of characters.

Words, however unpressed and pure, however transparent as vehicles for the expression of basic relations and verities, appear to be not wholly adequate to the representation of meanings, and the melodramatic message must be formulated through other registers of the sign.

(p.56)

To compensate for the inadequacy of words, melodrama used music and gesture to represent what speech could not represent. Brooks suggests that gesture was used to represent what was lost to speech: 'gesture in melodrama reintroduces a figuration of the
primal language onto the stage, where it carries immediate primal spiritual meanings which the language code ... has obscured, alienated, lost’ (p.72). In melodrama, gesture was important for the way in which it was believed to allow ‘immediacy of expression’, producing a ‘pre-language ... a direct presentation of things prior to the alienation from presence set off by the passage into articulated language’ (p.66). For Brooks, the limits of speech and uses of the body were therefore part of what he calls a ‘language of muteness’ in melodrama (p.68).

It was the ‘muteness’ of the Method which enabled the style to speak volumes in the context of the shifts which Warren Susman (1979) describes as the transition from a ‘culture of character’ to a ‘culture of personality’. Where the melodramatic style of the nineteenth century had struggled to represent the ‘moral occult’ which defined the virtue of ‘character’, in the fifties the Method enacted a ‘psychological occult’, in which the foundations of truth and value were believed to be found from digging deep into the most private problems of personal identity. Where the Method technique attempted to search out the actor’s repression, the characteristics of the Method style represented the symptoms of emotional and psychological disturbance. Strasberg’s workshops and the Method style were not related by any cause effect relationship but by how the technique and the style produced dramatic truth in a set of beliefs about the internal and divided individual self, whose most private identity was burdened with emotional and psychological problems just waiting to escape. Regardless of whether the actor was experiencing or identifying with any such personal problems, by representing ‘crazy’ and ‘mixed-up’ characters, the inarticulacy, ponderous business and listless casualness of the Method style, represented psychological problems as problems of speech and behaviour.

The uncivilised reality and melodramatic problems signified by the Method saw the style as active in the representation of particular versions of dramatic truth. However, some commentators responded to what they regarded in the Method as the overt artifice of the style. Following the Stanislavskian principle that actors should construct a sense of being private in public, Strasberg advised actors ‘to be concerned both with what you are doing on the stage and with the audience’s response’ (Hethmon 1965, 139). However, Hoffman found the Method style frustrating because of what he saw as self-indulgence on the part of the actor.
One gets the impression that a great deal is happening to the characters but one isn’t sure just what. And in the end one gets a kind of cheated feeling, as if the actors were going through all that rigmarole for their own pleasure and really weren’t the least bit interested in communicating anything to the audience.

(quoted in Vineberg 1991, 103)

Hoffman’s irritation was shared by others. After watching exercises in Actors Studio sessions, Hollis Alpert also believed that Method actors did not consider the audience: ‘The average theatre-goer would probably be bored by the scenes. Actors tend to go in for long excruciating pauses, will fidget or stare off into space, [and] don’t seem to care whether their lines are heard by others or not’ (1961, 181). In an interview with Arthur Gelb for the New York Times, Barbara Bulgakov, a former student of Stanislavski, criticised what she saw as the intense business and vocal inarticulacy of the Method style, which she believed failed to fascinate an audience: ‘“How well he buckles his belt! How well he scratches his back! ... They pay so much attention to these small realities that they mumble and forget their audience. When I see such an actor I feel like shouting, ‘For heaven’s sake, come to life and give something!’’’ (in Gelb 1958, 3).

Ignoring the audience is basic to forms of realist drama: stage actors don’t talk to the audience -- film actors don’t look at the camera. With the Method, the actor appeared to become completely drawn into the dramatic fiction, so that the actor seemed to be really feeling the character’s emotions. However, the reactions of Hoffman, Alpert and Bulgakov would suggest that the style was not altogether accepted as an authentic show of real feeling but more a display of actorly indulgence. Hoffman, Alpert and Bulgakov found that the Method made them aware of the actor’s work. They did not read this as any Brechtian distanciation technique but as the actor intensifying the inarticulacy and business of the Method so that it formed an excessively realistic style. By intensifying the vocal and physical characteristics which could represent the social and psychological realities of a character, the Method style also had the paradoxical effect of foregrounding the actor’s performance of acting real. A final characteristic of the Method was therefore how the style highlighted the work of the actor. The Method voice and body acted as the codes of social, emotional and psychological realities, and as indicators of creative labour.
To summarise, the main characteristics of the Method style were

a) inarticulacy
b) amplified business
c) loose but uneasy physicality
d) representation of an uncivilised reality
e) a melodramatic mode of emotional and psychological disturbance
f) the foregrounding of the actor's work

In the style, these characteristics were not discreet effects, but the significance of the style came from how it could produce all these effects at once.

Method moments

Red River (Howard Hawks 1948 US) was Montgomery Clift's first screen role. In the film, Clift played Matthew Garth, the adopted son of frontiersman Tom Dunson (John Wayne). At the opening of the film, Dunson is part of a wagon train travelling west. In the first scene, Wayne/Dunson leaves the train with his companion Nadine Groot (Walter Brennan) and a steer to establish his own ranch. As they roam in search of land, Wayne/Dunson and Brennan/Groot find a boy, Matthew Garth (played by Mickey Kuhn), who is wandering after his parents have been murdered. The three together establish the ranch.

Clift's first scene is as the mature Garth. Fourteen years have past. Garth has been away to 'the war' and in the meantime Dunson's stock has multiplied to several thousand cattle. This stock is worthless though unless it can be driven to cattle markets outside of Texas. Clift's acting in the scene offers some indications of the Method style in practice. A number of dissolves chart the development of the ranch before the scene opens on a medium long shot of Wayne/Dunson, Clift/Garth and Brennan/Groot. Wayne/Dunson is seated to the left of frame, Clift/Garth has his foot resting on a rock in the centre and Brennan/Groot is standing to the right with hands on hips. While Wayne/Dunson and Brennan/Groot discuss the problem of selling the cattle, Clift/Garth is silently sucking on
a piece of straw. Clift's silence and preoccupation with the straw distinguish him from Wayne and Brennan. Wayne/Dunson and Brennan/Groot speak while limiting their movements to alterations of pose. In contrast, Clift is silent while busy with small pieces of business. The straw does not perform any consequential function but becomes an index of the character's casual attitude and thoughtfulness.

As they discuss plans for selling the cattle, Wayne/Dunson and Brennan/Groot look off to the left of the frame in the direction of the herd. Their eyelines are not only a look at the cattle but also a 'vision' of the future. Clift instead looks down. He is thinking and does not share their look. Where Wayne/Dunson and Brennan/Groot are 'outward' looking, Clift/Garth is 'inward' looking. After the first cut of the scene, Clift/Garth is framed alone in medium shot. Wayne/Dunson's voice continues over the shot, describing the necessity of moving the cattle north for sale. Against this statement of action, Clift/Garth continues the business with the straw. The shot has the effect of concentrating attention of the actor's smallest actions and expressions, 'hypersemiotising' the actor's face but also intensifying the significance of the business with the straw (King 1985, 41). By cutting, the face of the actor becomes important and framed as full of meaning. It is not exactly clear what the sucking of the straw means apart from a generalised thoughtfulness. The moment is caught between a formal organisation of shots which gives Clift's business significance and the indeterminacy of what that business means.

Clift's first contribution to the conversation is a single word, 'Missouri'. As the scene cuts back to the original medium long shot of the three characters, disagreement over the best trail to take develops a conflict between Wayne/Dunson and Clift/Garth. It is at this point that Clift/Garth begins a second piece of business concerning rolling cigarettes. Clift/Garth takes the tobacco and papers from his waistcoat pocket and proceeds to roll a cigarette. While conversation with Wayne/Dunson continues, Clift/Garth frequently lowers his head to look at what he is doing. The dialogue starts to develop the narrative opposition between 'father' and surrogate 'son'. Wayne/Dunson has a stubborn forcefulness about him. He intends to drive the cattle north by the most direct route and whatever the cost. Clift/Garth wants to consider alternative routes. However, Clift's acting gives equal status to this dialogue and the business with rolling the cigarette. Clift is therefore integrated into the narrative fiction at the same time as he is offering a display of acting.
Theodore Hoffman observed how Method actors became involved in bits of business ‘even when other actors are the centre of attention’ (quoted in Vineberg 1991, 103). When the dialogue moves on to a slightly comic exchange between Wayne/Dunson and Brennan/Groot concerning whether Groot should go on the trail, Clift/Garth continues rolling. Clift could have remained static and just listened to the other actors. This is what Wayne and Brennan both do when others are speaking. However, even though he is not speaking, Clift’s business continues to show that he is acting. After Wayne/Dunson leaves towards the end of the scene, Clift/Garth introduces a further piece of business when he circles the brim of his hat in his hand. Again, acting business represents the character’s thoughtfulness, as he reflects on Wayne/Dunson’s manner and the choice of trail. In contrast to the static body positions of Wayne/Dunson and Brennan/Groot, Clift/Garth shows an excess of doing in the scene. Although each piece of business is plausibly realistic – for people really do suck straws, roll cigarettes and play with hats – Clift’s actions produce moments of histrionic display.

I have suggested that the Method style did not break from the verisimilar code but became a particular subcoding of realistic acting. Clift’s acting has similarities with that of Wayne and Brennan, as all three actors speak and move in recognisably realistic ways. However, against the economic gestures and upright stance which signifies the open confidence of Wayne/Dunson, Clift/Garth relaxes his weight on one hip and withdraws into detailed pieces of business, looking down frequently. Brennan/Groot in turn is physically lively, which not only shows his agitation about Wayne/Dunson’s decision not to let him go, but also gives him a comic quality that contrasts with Wayne/Dunson’s confident stubbornness and Clift/Garth’s thoughtful withdrawal. Vocally, Wayne’s idiosyncratic drawl contrasts with Brennan’s squawking. Clift remains silent for a lot of the scene, but when he speaks, he talks with a slow measured tone. Although not inarticulate, neither is Clift’s voice particularly articulate. Like his body, Clift’s speech could be described as relaxed.

Clift’s performance in the scene displays some of the characteristics of the Method style. However, his acting is not entirely different from that of Wayne and Brennan. Instead, evidence of the Method comes in small moments – like the pieces of business he concentrates on – which are integrated into a generalised verisimilar style shared by all three actors. It is as moments rather than as a continual style that the Method subcode
signifies its difference. In the fifties, Clift’s name was continually associated with the
Method, and that association has remained in more recent commentaries (e.g. Vineberg
1991). Clift’s acting does display some of the characteristics of the Method. However,
from empirical observation, Clift’s acting in Red River and other films only offers the
most glancing examples of the Method style. In The Search (Fred Zinnemann 1948, US),
Clift’s second film but the first to be released, he played Ralph Stevenson, an American
army officer who adopts a young concentration camp survivor Karel Malik (Ivan Jandl).
It is only in brief moments, such as a scene where he shaves as Karel learns English, that
Clift offers even the remotest indication of the Method style. The Monthly Film Bulletin
review made no comment on Clift’s acting other than to note his ‘dynamic naturalism’
(1949, 195).

Clift’s third film role was as Morris Townsend in The Heiress (William Wyler 1949
US), and although there are no indications of the Method style in Clift’s acting, the
absence of Method manners in this film still reveals aspects of the cultural codings of the
Method. First, Clift responds to the nineteenth century setting of the drama by adopting
an upright stance and physically elegant manner. The uncivilised behaviour of the Method
is therefore made implausible for the imagining of a more formalised historical past.
Secondly, at the centre of the drama is the question of whether Clift/Morris actually loves
Catherine Sloper (Olivia de Havilland). The moviegoer and Catherine are both kept
guessing as to Morris’s true intentions because no part of Clift’s acting serves to signify
moments of what the character really feels. Clift/Morris it turns out has performed
‘unauthentically’ throughout, which is of course antithetical to the emotional realism of
the Method.

Clift’s role as Robert E. Lee Prewitt in From Here to Eternity (Fred Zinnemann 1953,
US) remains one of his most famous performances while including only brief displays of
Method manners. In a speech to Lorene (Donna Reed), Clift/Prewitt explains why he will
not become a boxer for his army company. Clift/Prewitt explains that the reason he will
not fight is because he blinded a previous opponent. In the scene, Clift/Prewitt is
drinking. He starts to tell Reed/Lorene his boxing history: ‘Well ... see I used to fight ...
middleweight ... and ... I was pretty good and they knew ‘t’. Clift’s pauses break up the
sentence, and he stops speaking to study his glass, then casts aside the memories with a
‘well ... anyway’. He drinks, walks, places the glass on a side table, studies the glass
again, and turns it in his hand. Reed/Lorene asks him to continue and Clift/Prewitt returns to the speech through a series of stumbling phrases: ‘well ... thing is see ... er ... I used to work out with this guy Dixie Wells. He’s a real good friend of mine’. After some fluent sentences, Clift reaches the point where he relates hitting Wells:

Well ... one afternoon he, he and I were sparring around in the gym, you know ... kind of friendly like, and ... he must have been ... set pretty flat on his feet because ... I caught him with a ... no more than ordinary right cross ... and, er ... he didn’t get up ... he didn’t move ... hhhe was in a coma for a week and, er ... finally ... did pull out of it ... thing was that, he was blind.

Until the speech, there has been no account of why Prewitt will not box. The scene is a confessional moment, revealing Prewitt’s secret. The emotional difficulty of the memory is translated into a problem with speaking. The business with the glass replaces the act of speaking. At this moment, Clift’s Method manners have melodramatic poignancy, as the problems of speaking ‘speak’ the emotional difficulties he associates with the accident. In the context of the scene, studying the glass makes an ordinary and realistic action into a small moment of intense meaning. The action is at once realistic and dramatic. It is not clear exactly what the business with the glass means, only that in this small action, the whole feelings of the past are concentrated. In Clift/Prewitt’s confessional moment, a difficult memory overwhelms speech, so that pausing and bits of business become more resonant than words and speech.

Diana Crane (1987) has suggested that styles in the arts form communities of practitioners. Any such community will have its leading members who exhibit most of the characteristics of a style in the work, where others will be marginal members who use only a few of those characteristics (p.23). Although repeatedly associated with the Method, Montgomery Clift’s acting shows very few characteristics of the Method style. From the few glimpses of the Method style in his performances, Clift remains a marginal figure in the Method discourse. More obvious examples of the Method style are found in the acting of Marlon Brando during the fifties. In his first film, The Men (Fred Zinnemann 1950, US), Brando played Ken Wilochek, a paraplegic war veteran whose disability nearly destroys his engagement and marriage to Ellen (Teresa Wright). The
performance gives only the slightest indications of the Method, found particularly in a slurred way of speaking which disrupts clear articulation, although these were enough for critics to comment on the distinctiveness of Brando’s acting style. I shall return to this performance in chapter 5 and consider in more detail the reception of Brando’s performance.

It was Brando’s second film role as Stanley Kowalski in A Streetcar Named Desire (Elia Kazan 1951, US) which more clearly showed the characteristics of the Method and this performance remains in the Method discourse as one of the key examples of the style. Stanley and Stella (Kim Hunter) are married and living in New Orleans. When Stella’s sister, Blanche DuBois (Vivien Leigh) comes to stay, the narrative begins to examine Blanche’s psychological breakdown. Stella and Blanche are descendants of wealthy white Southern stock, which contrasts with Stanley’s Polish immigrant background. Blanche represents an excess of civilised appearances. She wears the contents from a trunk of grand but glitzy and gaudy gowns. When dating Stanley’s friend Mitch (Karl Malden), she insists on sexual propriety, as ‘a girl alone in the world, has got to keep a firm hold on her emotions or she’ll be lost’.

Along with the ostentatious costuming and moral duplicity of Blanche, the artifice of the character is represented in how Leigh’s acting oscillates between controlled civilised manners and ‘hysterical’ outbursts of emotional intensity. Leigh’s acting represents the pressures of social convention on personal conduct by showing how she works at maintaining a civilised management of external appearances. She holds herself upright, speaks with a soft Southern accent, touches herself delicately and wraps herself tightly when in the presence of men. Leigh makes civilisation a matter of maintaining an act and it is for this reason that it is through contrasts in acting style that the moral values of civilisation are shown up to be a performance. The refinement of Leigh’s civilised manners contrast with moments where she shouts, screams, waves her arms and hits out.

Brando’s Method style represents the antithesis of Blanche’s formal and civilised manners. Blanche’s first sight of Stanley is when he is fighting in the bowling alley. Later they meet at Stanley and Stella’s place. Blanche’s dress is made of chiffon, with a large collar, ruffs on the cuffs, and a flower pinned to the left shoulder. Brando/Stanley appears in loose dark trousers with a shiny bowling jacket that he removes to reveal a sweat stained t-shirt. The shirt shows his muscular chest and arms and Leigh/Blanche’s
eyeline surveys his torso. The physical spectacle of Brando/Stanley causes a tension for Blanche between decorum and desire, which she represents by bringing her hand to her chest and briefly touching her necklace. He scratches his chest and then the sweat stain on his back. As Stanley moves between the two rooms of the apartment, the camera follows him. This camera movement involves a pan to the left, set on an axis which is approximately Blanche’s viewpoint. Although not exactly a subjective viewpoint shot, the camera is still placed to look where Blanche looks. This identification of camera and character is confirmed when at the end of the pan, Blanche is located in the extreme foreground of the shot with her back to the camera. The look of Leigh/Blanche and the camera is directed at Brando/Stanley, who is pouring whiskey into a large beer glass. Although Blanche refuses ‘a shot’, Stanley’s observation that with hard drink, there are ‘some people that rarely touch it but it touches them often’, indicates how he is already reading the reality behind her act. Stanley’s lines put him in a position of seeing through the artifice and through Blanche, and that conflict is embodied in the contrast between what is seen to be the contrivance of Leigh’s manners against Brando’s uncivilised authenticity.

After downing the drink in one, Brando/Stanley places the empty glass down hard. As Brando/Stanley moves into the bedroom, the shot continues to pan to the left. He begins to change his shirt and Leigh/Blanche paces the floor of the kitchen/dining area, averting her eyes and touching her cheek to either feel or hide if she is blushing. After finding a clean shirt, Brando/Stanley turns towards Leigh/Blanche at the same moment as she finishes pacing a circuit of the floor and turns to him. His eyes look down at the shirt, not at her. She now looks at him and again, her placement at the foreground of the frame with her back to camera identifies the look of the camera with the look of Leigh/Blanche. The effect of Brando/Stanley’s body on Leigh/Blanche is signified by the way in which her chatty speech slows, pauses and ends: ‘It’s hard to stay looking fresh in hot weather. Well I, I haven’t even washed or powdered and ... here you are’. The structure of looking cuts to a shot of Leigh/Blanche looking at Stanley. Again she holds her cheek, performing her embarrassed response to what she sees. These moments in the scene produce a tension between a structure of desirous looking and a performance of embarrassed affectation. Leigh’s acting manners deny desire, while the organisation of shots indicate how that acting is precisely just an act.
Brando/Stanley is placed as the object of desire in the scene. He represents what is hidden and denied by Leigh/Blanche. In part, this is achieved by the organisation of shots and the display of Brando’s physique. It is also an effect of Brando’s acting. If the refinements of Leigh’s acting represent the social graces which Blanche feigns, Brando/Stanley represents the rejection of those civilised manners. He chews gum, sweats, scratches himself, undresses, mocks Leigh/Blanche when she is scared by squealing cats outside, and wraps his arms around his chest to push up his biceps and so emphasise his brute strength. During his meeting with Leigh/Blanche, Brando/Stanley goes to see if Stella has finished in the bathroom, and as he moves between rooms, his feet can be heard scuffing and dragging on the floor.

A recurrent characteristic of many performances by Brando is a vocal quality which fails to clearly articulate words. Blanche is an English teacher and Leigh’s voice observes polite enunciation. In his own words, Stanley never was ‘a very good English student’, and Brando’s voice rejects well formed pronunciation. As previously described, the Method style was believed to result in actors mumbling. Mumbling usually results from keeping the mouth partly closed so that the lips do not work to actively pronounce words. Brando runs words into one another, so they become indistinct, but he does not close up the mouth, and I suggest the inarticulate quality of his voice could be described more accurately as slurring rather than mumbling. Both slurring and mumbling represent a refusal to communicate clearly and so participate in the social interaction formed by speech. Physically and vocally, Brando/Stanley represents informality.

Everything in Brando’s acting works at representing him as what in Stanley’s words is described as 'the unrefined type'. The uncivilised realm which Brando/Stanley represents is summed up by Leigh/Blanche when she describes him as ‘common’ and an ‘animal ... he’s an animal’s habits’, as ‘subhuman’, a ‘survivor of the Stone Age’. Leigh/Blanche contrasts Brando/Stanley’s primitive world with ‘such things as art, as poetry, as music’ and how ‘in some [other] kinds of people, some tenderer feelings have had some little beginning’. The acting of Leigh and Brando contrasts the vocal with the physical, opposing ‘culture’ to the Method’s representation of what becomes, in relative terms, the ‘natural’ or ‘primitive’. Such distinctions are culturally determined and Brando/Stanley’s Method manners only appear as naturally instinctive and spontaneous when contrasted with the kind of control and premeditation which Leigh/Blanche’s acting shows.
Stanley could have been performed in several different ways but what Brando's performance does is represent an uncivilised character through the uncivilised manners of the Method style. The breakdown of formal conventions in speech and physical behaviour characterised the Method style, with the voice and body rejecting the manners of civilised society. For this reason, Blanche could not be effectively acted using the Method style, as this would make impossible the social refinements she uses to hide her desires. Kim Hunter and Karl Malden were both Actors Studio actors but in *A Streetcar Named Desire* their acting displays no traces of the Method style. Hunter's and Malden's roles as Stella and Mitch are removed from the brutishness of Stanley. Had Hunter, Malden and Leigh performed in the Method manner, acting style would have confused the ways in which the narrative opposes the refinements of culture to the destructiveness of desire.

Reviewers noted the differences in performance style of Leigh and Brando.

Though Vivien Leigh's mannerisms and artificiality do suggest the decadence and fragility of Blanche, her performance is too exterior, too synthetic, for pathos. As a creation of character, it never properly becomes real: close-ups can be merciless in exposing theatricality, and they are here. ... Brando ... gives a superbly dominating, vigorous and primitive performance.

*(Monthly Film Bulletin 1952a, 34)*

Vivien Leigh's Blanche is a polished, professional performance, over-calculated, lacking inner compulsion. ... Marlon Brando creates a figure of frightening power, wonderfully enlarged by his genuinely affecting moments of tender, infantile charm.

*(Karel Reisz 1952, 171)*

Notable here are the criticisms of Leigh for being too 'exterior', 'synthetic', 'theatrical', 'polished', 'over-calculated'. With Brando on the other hand, these reviewers display no consciousness of performativity in how he represented Stanley. The characteristics of Blanche and Stanley were mapped onto judgments about acting, as Leigh's performance was read as obviously performative, where Brando was accepted as transparently natural.
However, the reviewer for *Variety* did note the mannered quality of Brando’s acting.

Marlon Brando at times captures strongly the brutality of the young Pole but occasionally he performs unevenly in a portrayal marked by frequent garbling of his dialog. It is to be granted that as a common labourer, he wasn’t expected to project with an Oxonian accent; yet, Brando overdoes it somewhat.

(1951)

It is noted here that Brando’s inarticulacy, a central characteristic of the Method style, was plausible for the purposes of realist representation, but that the actor had amplified that quality to the point where it surpassed believability. The *Variety* reviewer was therefore noting in Brando’s performance the paradoxal of combination of realistic and actorly effects which characterised the Method style.

In the fifties, Brando’s Method manners reached a peak with the role of Val Xavier in *The Fugitive Kind* (Sidney Lumet 1959, US). Adapted from Tennessee Williams’s stage play *Orpheus Descending*, *The Fugitive Kind* has Brando as a guitar playing drifter. In the pre-credits scene, Brando/Xavier is in custody following a fight in a New Orleans club. He is released from the cells to appear before the judge. The whole scene is shot in a single long take. The camera tracks from the cell to the courtroom. The judge is located out of frame and only his voice is heard in the scene, while the court clerk and a police officer remain at the edges of the room. Half way through the scene, the camera lowers and moves into a medium shot to leave Brando alone in the frame. Apart from occasional questions from the judge, the entire scene is a four minute speech by Brando/Xavier about how he took the job in the club so that he could retrieve his guitar from a pawnbroker. The absence of editing, minimum of camera movement and Brando’s central positioning, concentrate the look on an uninterrupted display of acting, as the whole scene is focused on Brando’s uses of the voice and body.

Brando is first seen in the cell, with his back turned to the camera, probing his right ear with a finger. After he is lead into the courtroom, the judge asks him about the circumstances of his arrest. Throughout the speech, Brando’s voice remains at a low volume, never rising to a shout or dropping to become inaudible. The rhythm of speaking is moderately slow. Sentences are broken and punctuated with ‘um’s and ‘er’s. The
speech starts 'well ... um ... my er ... my guitar was in hock'. Brando looks off left, looks down, pats his hair, looks up at the ceiling, briefly looks at the judge, and makes a sweeping gesture with his right hand. When asked by the judge if he is drunk, Brando/Xavier takes a long pause before responding 'no just ... tired', sighing and relaxing his body weight back onto his left foot. Throughout the speech, Brando takes pauses, breaks up sentences and looks off left, down, and up, only making intermittent eye contact with the judge. Brando's halting speech presents the actor/character struggling to find the words necessary to express what he wants to say, a struggle which occasionally requires gestures to replace words. For example, when he attempts to describe the 'bad feeling' he had from losing his guitar, the line 'I can't explain it to y' is followed by a gesture of circling his right hand as he tries to tell how 'everybody has somethin' that's very important to them and with me its ... my guitar'. When relating how he was offered the job at the club, Brando/Xavier scratches his forehead and clicks his fingers to recall his employer's name, Charlie Cinq. Before describing what he was required to do, he lightly strokes his chin with his right hand, and then continues 'he asked me too er ... well he wanted me to entertain at this ... party, and I told h, him my guitar 's in hock. He says it doesn't matter. You don't need your guitar ... and er ... he say all you gotta do is jus' ... you know ... be part of this ... you know, party'. The speech concludes with Xavier explaining how 'I just thought, I was fed up ... I was disgusted ... I was sick, and er ... I felt like my whole life was er, something sick on my stomach and ... I just had to throw it up ... so I threw it up' and 'bust up the joint'. Brando's pauses, broken sentences and casual gestures, combine to produce a sense of improvisation in the scene. The improvisatory quality of the speech constructs the impression that the actor's performance lacks premeditated control. Even if the scene was rehearsed and repeatedly recorded before the chosen take, the scene still appears to represent the actor making it up as he goes along.

The improvisatory style of the Method had an important effect on the relationship between the individual actor and the drama he or she performed in. Although Williams provided a script for the scene, stopping the speech by pausing or breaking a sentence shows the actor producing effects which cannot be attributed to Williams's writing. The scene illustrates the tendency which Brustein (1958) criticised in the Method's ability to subordinate the work of the writer to that of the actor. Everything in the scene combines
to make the speech a moment of personal expression. Xavier's speech describes events which have happened to him and his visceral response to those events. Brando's Method manners then appear to improvise around the speech, so that the scene comes to 'belong' to the actor. The scene therefore demonstrates the merging of actor and character which Richard Dyer (1982) observes in what he calls the 'rhetoric of authenticity'. Actor and character both appear to be really feeling the content of the speech.

Although the improvisatory style signifies spontaneity and a lack of control, it also gives the actor the power to control the overall effect of the scene. Strasberg's Method technique attempted to turn the practice of acting into a performance of personal expressivity. Likewise, Brando's Method style places the identity of the actor at the centre of the filmic discourse. On the one hand, Brando's acting is highly realistic and melodramatic, for the feelings of the character appear to be really the actor's feelings. On the other hand, to achieve that emotional quality, the actor displays his absolute liberty to control the scene by his voice and body.

As usual with Williams, during the narrative the network of relationships between characters reveals a number of social and sexual tensions. Xavier moves on to a smalltown where he is offered the job of running the local store by Lady Torrance (Anna Magnani). Lady is married to Jabe (Victor Jory), owner of the store. Jabe's cancer keeps him confined to a bed above the store. Carol Cutrere (Joanne Woodward), the daughter of a local wealthy family, used to be a 'church bitten reformer', protesting against the racial injustices of the region, before she turned to drink and life as a 'lewd vagrant'. Xavier, who is sometimes referred to as 'snakeskin' because of the snakeskin jacket he wears, is desired by Carol and Lady. After starting work, he begins to perform what he calls 'double duty' as storekeeper and sexual partner for Lady. One night, Lady takes Xavier to some ruins outside the town. As she explains, it was here that her father set up a wine garden for entertainment and drinking. After her father served 'liquor to negroes', the vigilantes of the county set fire to the garden and her father died fighting the flames. Lady now regards the men of the town with hatred, for she suspects them of responsibility for her father's death. Jabe admits without regret to his part in the burning of the garden. For Lady, the wine garden was a symbol of desires and dreams which cannot be realised in the town. She now intends to build at the back of the store, her own garden, a 'confectionery' which will replace the desires which the town has punished.
Xavier’s participation in the construction of the confectionery associates him with the desire and fantasy which the garden represents. His outsider status sets him apart from the hatred of the community, a role confirmed by his arriving from out of town. It is Xavier’s otherness which makes him an object of desire. The men of the town repress desire. It is the women of the town who are the ones who desire. Shortly before the confectionery is to open, Lady learns she is pregnant by Xavier, offering hope of a product of her desires. These hopes are only short lived though. Jabe burns the confectionery and shoots Lady. The hatred of the town claims another victim when Xavier is forced back into the burning confectionery by the men who come to fight the fire. With these concluding actions, the film concludes with Williams’s familiar theme of desire destroyed by brute hatred. In the final scene, Carol finds Xavier’s snakeskin jacket in the burnt out store. The object of desire has shed his skin, and taking up the jacket inspires Carol to let ‘the fugitive kind follow their kind’.

The otherness of Xavier is not just an effect of his narrative function but also Brando’s acting. He enacts what is other to the social and sexual repressions of the town. The casualness which dominates his opening speech produces a laidback attitude and continues throughout to combine with Xavier’s nomadic existence and bohemian lifestyle in representing sensuality and the freedom of the body. Brando/Xavier’s physical looseness is remarked on in the dialogue, as Magnani/Lady asks him:

Lady: Why do you move that way, hmm? Why do you walk that way?
Xavier: What way? ... What way?
Lady: Everything you do its like ...
Xavier: What?
Lady: You ... You know what I mean.
Xavier: Yeah, I know what you mean.

Throughout the film, the cool sensuality of Brando/Xavier’s physical looseness is paralleled by his slow, slurred speech. In the context of the film, it is the general sense of easiness produced by his acting which makes Brando/Xavier an embodiment of desire.

During the first extended duologue scene between Brando/Xavier and Magnani/Lady,
dialogue and acting style come together in representing Xavier as a free spirit of desire. Brando/Xavier describes his philosophy of how the world is divided between people who buy and people who are bought. A third type of person he likens to a rare type of bird he claims to have seen, which has no legs and lives its whole life ‘on the wing’, only touching ground when it dies. The vision represents the sensitivity of Xavier against the viciousness of the other men in the town. In his otherness, Brando/Xavier embodies the promise of escaping the brutality of the town. Brando’s acting during the speech integrates elements of the Method style with some high histrionics. He continually pauses, lowers his eyelids and strokes his chin, which suggest that the narrator is ‘feeling’ the spirit of the tale. At other points, he adopts a style which illustrates the content of the story, making gestures which suggest he is holding the small and delicate bird in his hands, and staring upwards towards the sky to imagine the sight of the bird.

The speech therefore combines the improvisatory quality of the Method with the rhetoric of the storyteller, so that the speech becomes at once personal experience and mythical story. Other acting styles could have been employed in the scene but the improvisatory freedom of the Method reinforces the fantasy which the speech represents. Brando’s Method manners bind the actor and the character into the story, so that the bird becomes a metaphor not only for Xavier’s bohemian lifestyle but also the improvisatory liberty of Brando’s acting.

Reviewers found Brando’s Method manners a noticeable feature of the film. The reviewer for the Monthly Film Bulletin judged Brando’s style to be appropriate for the dramatic material.

Marlon Brando’s familiar habit of long eloquent silences provides the film with some unexpectedly luminous moments, equalled only – as far as the writing is concerned – by his intensely affecting rendering of the “bird that don’t have legs” speech. Sandwiched between so much that is distasteful, constrained and remote, the effect of this beautiful speech is actually human, and so not a little sad.

(1960, 91)

Variety, however, was more critical, claiming that ‘Brando [is] back to mumbling with marbles in his mouth’ (1960). Brando’s Method manners could be read as either
believably representing his character’s experiences, or showing the contrivances he personally employed in his acting to construct a believable effect.

Brando’s performances as Stanley in *A Streetcar Named Desire* and Xavier in *The Fugitive Kind* show how the Method voice and body were capable of representing different relationships to desire. Where Stanley punishes desire, Xavier represents the desire to escape from the brutality of the town. As Stanley, Brando’s Method manners represented an uncivilised brutishness which destroys desire. In *The Fugitive Kind*, the Method style signified Xavier’s otherness, making him the embodiment of desire. In *A Streetcar Named Desire*, the Method voice and body represented a desirable but destructive primitiveness, which is antithetical to ‘such things as art, as poetry, as music’. In *The Fugitive Kind*, it is precisely the possibility of art, poetry and music which the loose flow of Brando’s speech and movement performed.

The characteristics of the Method style represented a range of meanings. With the Method style, the actor appeared to resist the civilising effects of social regulation. At one level, the style signified an informality in codes of behaviour. At another level, the Method style mirrored Strasberg’s Method technique by representing liberty from repression. The uncivilised freedom which the Method style signified also effected the status of the actor. In the previous chapter I discussed how the Method technique produced the cultural capital of a monopoly of private feelings. Although not causally linked to the technique, the Method style provided the actor with a form of symbolic capital with which to show that he or she was really feeling the emotions of the drama. At the same time, the pausing, business and improvisatory quality of the style foregrounded the artistic freedom but also the actorliness of the Method actor. A paradox in the style was in how it presented the actor as both acting real (i.e. believably experiencing and expressing the content of the drama) and acting real (i.e. highlighting the labour involved in producing realistic feelings).
Chapter 4: Feeling for father

In his observations on the new hero in American post-war culture, Robert Brustein described this figure as an 'outcast' or 'rebel' (1958, 127). For Brustein, the rebel hero was most definitely male, with actors such as Marlon Brando, James Dean, Paul Newman, Ben Gazzara, John Cassavetes and Montgomery Clift exemplifying the type (p.123). What united these actors was their 'identification with sex, violence, and incoherency' (p.123). With the rebel hero, the dramatic problems of the narrative centred on how social factors produced a crisis of identity. In particular, those problems frequently focused on the problems of how to be a man. As the rebel narrative understood the crisis of the hero in psychological and emotional terms, the masculine anxieties of the hero became a melodramatic problem. These rebel heroes therefore belonged to the types of narrative which Jackie Byars describes as 'male-orientated melodrama' (1991, 217), or what Thomas Schatz calls 'male weepies' (1981, 239).

For Peter Brooks (1976), melodramatic forms are based on lack. As social conditions deny or problematise certain forms of existence, melodramatic form struggles to represent what is lost or repressed. The melodramatic therefore compensates for lack by presenting a fullness of feeling. Emotion is used to represent the missing, unrepresentable qualities, which society has lost. Brustein’s description of the new hero was linked to his observations on the Method style. He saw the Method style as representing the rebellious attitude of the new hero. In the previous chapter I suggested that the distinctive characteristics of the Method style were vocal inarticulacy, amplified business, loose but uneasy physicality, uncivilised manners, a melodramatic concern with emotional and psychological expressivity, and the foregrounding of the actor’s work. With any Method performance, the Method style represents moments which are usually of particular emotional intensity. In the rebel narrative, it was in those moments that the hero revealed what Brustein described as 'an inner life.'
The Method style produced moments which articulated the rebel’s anxieties over the lack or loss of masculinity.

In this chapter, I will contextualise the conflicts and emotional drama of the rebel heroes of the fifties by looking at how social changes in that period were believed to present a challenge to American masculinity. As part of that context, I shall also examine the ways in which the period saw the introduction of a new emotionology for the American male. Finally, I will be studying in detail moments from some of the rebel narratives of the fifties, examining the ways in which those moments display the Method voice and body as dramatising masculine anxieties.

Conformity and the management of male feelings

In the late forties and early fifties, the United States experienced a period of intense economic growth. To meet the demands of the Second World War, major industries had expanded production to support the war effort. After the war, those industries survived intact and returned to peacetime production. For 1946, the gross national product was measured at $320 billion, rising to $425 billion in 1953, and by the end of the fifties had reached $500 billion. Although the removal of controls on inflation saw rising consumer prices, there was also a dramatic increase in the average income per capita (Finklestein 1992, 65). By the mid-fifties, nearly 60% of the population had incomes of between $3,000 to $10,000 (Chafe 1991, 112). The disposable income of this growing middle class, together with an industrial infrastructure capable of enormous surplus production, saw a turn in the United States from an economy based largely on production to an economy of consumption. New domestic technologies, such as televisions and washing machines, were no longer exclusive luxuries but became affordable for the majority of families (p.112).

After Congress passed the Servicesmen’s Readjustment Act, otherwise known as the GI Bill of Rights, benefits and loans were made available for many war veterans to buy homes, set up business, or go into farming (Finklestein 1992, 52). A loan from the Veterans Administration could enable easy access to a mortgage from the Federal Housing Authority, which stimulated an increase in home ownership and lead to the
building of huge suburban developments. During the fifties, 11 million homes were built in suburban areas. By 1960, a quarter of the population lived in suburbia (Chafe 1991, 117). Benefits to veterans also granted tuition fees to enter college, investing in the education and training of a skilled workforce to drive the new economy (p.113). The growth in national wealth, along with the increase in personal wealth and a better standard of living, therefore made the fifties a period of affluence and abundance for many Americans.

However, despite the economic confidence and comforts of the post-war society, fifties America also experienced many social tensions. In work, technological developments led to automated systems in manufacturing, and as a consequence of the consumer economy, the American labour force saw a decrease in the number of jobs in the industrial sector, accompanied by an increase amongst jobs in the service sector. In 1956, as the number of white-collar employees came to out number blue-collar workers for the first time, the United States shifted from an industrial to a post-industrial economy (p.114). Instead of the factory, the office and the sales room came to define the locus of modern labour. Corporate bureaucracy produced a workforce of managers, clerks and secretaries. With the rise of the consumer economy, the advertising and marketing professions grew, and sales men and women became essential to serving the nation. In the new service economy, people did not manage things but rather other people.

Along with the growth in home ownership and suburban planning, changing patterns in marriage and the profile of the family transformed the domestic realm. In 1940, 40% of women between 18-24 years were married, but by 1950 that figure had risen to 60% (Chafe 1991, 123). Along with an increase in the number of newlyweds, social trends showed a lowering in the average age at which couples married. In the century before the 1950s, on average men had married in their mid to late twenties, while women married in their early to mid twenties. During the fifties, the average marital age dropped to 22 years in men and 20 years in women (Mintz and Kellogg 1988, 179). The marriage boom was accompanied by a rising birthrate, and between 1940-60, the number of third children was doubled, and the number of fourth children tripled (Chafe 1991, 123). Post-war society therefore saw not only an increase in the number of families but also in the size of families. One indicator of the new family ideal was the change in advertising from images of the two child family to the family with three or four children (p.123). Once married.
divorce statistics for the period also showed that couples were more prepared to stay
together than in previous decades (Mintz and Kellogg 1988, 179).

Suburban society represented the ideal fulfilment of wartime promises. The willingness
of more women and men to marry, and to marry early, along with increases in the
birthrate, saw the nuclear family become the defining unit of the post-war social
consensus. However, despite the image of domestic contentment which the nuclear
family represented, the period also experienced several signs of dissatisfaction with these
new aspirations. In its ideal image, a traditional sexual division of labour supported the
suburban vision of post-war society, as husbands left the home in the morning to
commute to their offices in the city, while wives worked to maintain the home and raise
the children. Unhappy with the isolation of staying at home and the lowly status of
domestic labour, in the post-war year more wives and mothers began to enter work than
had ever done so previously (Banner 1974; Chafe 1972; Evans 1989; Kaledin 1984).

Commenting on the suburban ideal, the social critic Lewis Mumford saw ‘a multitude
of uniform, unidentifiable houses, lined up inflexibly, at uniform distances, on uniform
roads, in a treeless communal wasteland, inhabited by people of the same class, the same
income, the same age group’ (quoted in Chafe 1991, 117). This criticism of conformity
was also found in David Riesman’s (1989) attack on what he described as ‘other-directed
personality’ and William H. Whyte’s (1961) analysis of what he described as the new
‘Social Ethic’. Riesman and Whyte based their criticisms on observations about the
emergence of a new managerial middle class, while also suggesting that the trends they
observed were characterising the identities of Americans more generally. However,
Barbara Ehrenreich (1983) has suggested that Riesman and Whyte’s analyses were
limited by matters of sex and gender. Ehrenreich argues that ‘other-directedness [i]s built
into the female social role [of] wives and mother’ (p.34). If the United States saw a drift
towards other-direction in the fifties, then it is Ehrenreich’s contention that this was a
‘characterlogical transformation [that] looked like nothing so much as the feminisation of
American men’ (p.34). Riesman and Whyte’s observations may or may not have
described actual changes in the character of Americans. Even so, regardless of the
veracity of those observations, Ehrenreich argues that the criticism of conformity was
symptomatic of anxieties over the meaning of masculinity in the period. What was at
stake in those criticisms was not so much the Protestant Ethic but what Ehrenreich calls
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the ‘breadwinner ethic’ (p.11). If social conformity was believed to result in a loss of individuality and independence, from Ehrenreich’s perspective, those anxieties represented concerns over the status of American masculinity in the period.

During the fifties, articles in the popular press directly related the problems of conformity to problems of masculinity. For example, Look magazine explored masculinity in a series of articles, with titles which asked of the American male ‘Why do women dominate him?’ ‘Why is he afraid to be different?’ and ‘Why does he work so hard?’. Men were seen to be the victims of an organised conspiracy of scientific experts who advocated that ‘The Group was always right’ and that the ‘individual had his single duty: Adjust’ (Leonard 1958, 97). Group pressure was regarded as producing anxieties about public opinion, economic status, the need to be seen to have ambition, and how wives expected husbands to provide the means ‘to keep up with those Joneses who always seem to be living next door’ (Attwood 1958 73).

Indeed, the understanding of many of the problems facing the American male were formed through reference to the demands of women as wives. In particular, the sexual demands of women were regarded as having a major effect on the American male (Moskin 1958 78-79). Men were believed to be fatigued from working hard to meet the consumer demands of wives, only to be greeted at home by an unexplained intensification of the sexual demands of their spouses. While women had previously been constituted as the primary group of consumers, the expanding consumer economy was observed to also be directed at turning men into the consumers of fashion items and toiletries. This was interpreted as creating a passive sensibility in which men ceased to be the ‘aggressors’ in sex and became the ‘receivers’ (p.78). Women’s sexual demands were also read as bringing about anxiety if not impotency (p.79). If consumerism, domesticity and corporate bureaucracy had challenged the independence of the American male, then the cause of these problems was made apparently clear and intelligible as they were combined in a discourse which found their origins in the demands and desires of women.

Sex and gender distinctions were also to be found in the emotional standards, or emotionology, of the period. Carol and Peter Stearns (1986) have shown how in the forties and fifties, new emotional standards emerged in American society. In the workplace, the rise of the corporate bureaucracy and the increase of service occupations saw an increased concern over the effect on production of the emotional ‘morale’ of the
workforce. The management of emotions at work became a significant part of the process which Arlie Russell Hochschild (1983) describes as 'the commercialization of feeling'. Anger in particular was regarded as counter-productive, and this lead to developments such as the growth of personnel departments, counselling services, personality testing, and training in human relations skills as mechanisms for attempting to control anger at work (Stearns and Stearns 1986). For example, Sensitivity-training groups ('T groups') emerged in the fifties, intended to provide a forum in which managers were encouraged to discuss their emotions in the belief that such confessions would be therapeutic in themselves or would enable more 'positive' attitudes to be formed (p.137). This trend was reflected in the home, where children, parents, and married couples were encouraged to recognise that anger was inevitable but was 'bad' and in need of careful handling. The management of anger was therefore an example of how the shift to a service economy, combined with the ideology of domestic and marital happiness, had significant effects on the civilising process of post-war American society, as large patterns of social reorganisation were accompanied by new standards of emotional control.

The Stearns express caution in not reading the discourse of emotional standards as evidence of actual emotional conduct. In their research, the Steams suggest that ambivalence more often characterised the relation between ideal standards and actual feelings in American society. Also, they do not suggest that the standards for anger control were directed at the whole of society but rather presented concerns over polite behaviour which were more likely to have effects for the white collar professions and the white middle class family.

Peter Stearns (1992) has further argued that the new emotional standards in post-war America should also be read for how they contributed to a redefinition of gender in the period. As America entered its first industrial age in the late nineteenth century, work and home were divided as separate spheres which constituted the gendered spaces of the masculine world of work and the feminine world of the home. Stearns argues that in this context, a sharp division was drawn between the emotions which men were entitled to express in the workplace and those which women were granted in the home. Anger at work was regarded as having a positive effect if it could be 'channelled' to improve production and skilfully employed in gaining a competitive edge in the market. At home, women were discouraged from showing anger as it was felt this could have a harmful
effect on the unity of the family. From the twenties, Stearns sees a gradual closing of the division between gendered emotional standards, which effected the masculine emotionology, as limits were placed on the channelling of anger at work. Men at work were encouraged to adopt the same emotional standards as women in the home. Stearns regards this shift in the gendered emotional culture as prefiguring the service economy and domestic ideology of the post-war years, while also establishing the terms for the regulation of anger in post-war society.

What Stearns describes is a de-differentiation of gendered standards in the management of emotions, which can be seen as a part of what Ehrenreich refers to as the ‘feminisation’ of American masculinity in the fifties (1983, 34). The discourse of emotional standards may not have reflected the actual emotional experience of American men and women. However, it would nevertheless contribute to a sense of what masculinity should feel like in the new conformist society.

Rebellious feelings and male melodrama

Looking at the male rebels of fifties cinema, Brustein (1958) criticised what he saw as the conservatism of such figures. While appearing to be against society, Brustein argued that the rebel was usually seeking his integration into society:

although the hero is a rebel against established authority, he is not necessarily identified with the lawless elements of society. ... Society itself is viewed as the outside of a prison, mechanical, forbidding, inhibitive, and repressive; but curiously enough the hero is trying to enter this prison, for it offers warmth and security on the inside.

(p.128)

It was Brustein’s view that what appeared to prevent the rebel from entering society was his own rebelliousness, and before the rebel could enter society, his rebellion had to be punished. A convention of the rebel narrative was that the hero ‘must get involved in violence ... he must ... be beaten up. ... In order to win – to be accepted – he first must
lose (p.128). Rather than social criticism, the rebel narrative was therefore read by Brustein as desiring the reproduction of dominant social forces, for the young male stood apart from society while wanting to be a part of society, and with the punishment of his rebelliousness, the rebel achieved a satisfying sense of belonging.

Richard Dyer (1979) also sees the young rebel as a conservative figure. By linking rebellion with youth, Dyer argues that rebellion could be represented as a ‘passing phase’, something which was inevitably part of growing up and which the hero would eventually grow out of (p.60). Dyer also suggests that the discontent of the rebel was not seen to arise from how society produces organised power structures of race, gender or class, but from how the rebel was just an individual who did not ‘fit in’. Rather than promote rebelliousness and reveal the social discontents which motivated those anomic feelings, the rebel narrative, as Dyer suggests, recuperated rebellion (p.60).

The rebel narrative of the fifties belonged to a whole wave of films which targeted youth audiences in the period. The growth in this market arose as a consequence of the ‘invention’ of teenagers as a generational group. Thomas Doherty (1988) argues that the discovery of the teenager in the fifties was a consequence of three factors. An increase in the birth rate during the thirties resulted in more young men and women reaching teenage years during the fifties. Secondly, the growth in the consumer economy of the United States gave rise to the formation of marketing directed specifically at teenage consumers. Finally, and most decisively, the discursive construction of teenage years as a specific life stage, constructed amongst youth and other generations a knowledge of what it meant to be teenage (pp.45-6).

The common image of the rebel was the young male who fought with his parents. Gangster films in the 30s had also dealt with conflicts between individuals and social law, but where those films located the formation of the gangster’s lawlessness in the public world of work and business, teenage rebellion was rooted in the private world of the family. If teenage rebellion was a problem for society, its origins were believed to lay in the family, so that conflict in the home served to signify a wider social crisis. By investigating conflicts in the home and the problems of realising identity in the confines of the family, the rebel narrative belonged to the tradition of family melodrama. In the family melodrama, conflicts between characters are representative of conflicts between the social roles of mother, father, daughter and son. Characters fight because those roles determine
relationships of power in the family. Equally, the conflicts of the family melodrama were not just the effect of battles between characters but also of the difficulties which individuals find with fulfilling or being fulfilled, so that individuals battle with themselves over the social role they occupy in the family structure. These dramas of domestic life found conflict in the ways in which the family as a social institution prevented individuals from fully realising their desires. However, the family melodrama usually found the solution to those problems in the reconstruction of the family. The melodrama therefore criticised but also affirmed the value of the family unit.

In the rebel narrative, familial conflict was usually enacted in a battle between a son and a literal or symbolic father. Brustein described this dramatic relationship as 'the Freudian protest' (1958, 129), and Docherty finds in these familial dramas what he calls a 'suburban Freudianism' (1988, 122). Film studies has used Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis as a metacritical framework to study the ways in which narrative cinema constructs gender and sexual difference. Usually such analysis involves reading an apparently 'innocent' surface narrative to see the ways in which, at a deeper level, the narrative reproduces a patriarchal unconscious. In the simplest of terms, the film is then seen as the 'symptom' of unconscious desires. With the rebel films of the fifties, Freudian ideas can inform a reading of the films, not because they are the reflection of deep, hidden meanings, but because the Freudian structure is upfront and has become the very 'surface' of the film. As I discussed in chapter 2, Freudian ideas were popularised in American during the forties and fifties. Freudianism was just one response to the questions of individual identity which Warren Susman (1979) sees in the emergence of the 'culture of personality' in the United States during the twentieth century. One indicator of the popularity of psychoanalytic discourse was the appearances of psychoanalysts as characters in Hollywood films of the forties and fifties (Walker 1987).

As Freud had taken the family as the primary nexus of social relations, so the Freudianism of the rebel narrative believed that the real was to be found in the family. In the rebel narrative, an Oedipal conflict between son and father became the central dramatic problem of the film. In Freudian discourse, the Oedipal structure represents the male child who must accept the authority and law of the father, signified by the father's possession of the phallus, or else face punishment and 'castration'. Identification with the law of the father therefore places the male child in an order of patriarchal power. To
identify with the father’s authority, the male child must break his bond with the mother. Freudian psychoanalysis argues that a mature masculine identity requires the male child to repress his ‘immature’ bond with the mother. Along with the construction of gender difference, the male Oedipus also produces sexual difference, as repression of love for the mother is believed to result in a lack which motivates the desire of the male child to seek a female partner.

Brustein’s reading of the rebel hero was written in heavily Freudian tones. In the rebel narrative, Brustein argued that the ‘antagonism which the boy feels towards society, convention, law and order is, of course, merely an extension of hostility towards his father’ (Brustein 1958, 128). The father represented the social order which the rebel son stood apart from. As the rebel wished to belong to society, so he recognised that social approval was conditional upon recognition of and by the father, and the social authority represented by the father: ‘The boy’s acceptance by society at the end of these films is usually a symbol of filial reconciliation. The greatest reward the hero can achieve is acceptance by the group and the love of his father’ (p.128). The recuperation of rebellion therefore involves the son’s reconciliation with the masculine authority which the father represents.

What was missing from Brustein’s reading is how the rebel narrative did not just problematise the son’s formation of a mature masculine identity but also showed the father as failing to embody paternal authority or, in more Freudian terms, represented the father as ‘castrated’. The problems of the son were not seen as a reaction against the authority of the father but rather as a response to the absence of a masculine role model. In the context of the fifties, the rebellious spirit of the male-orientated melodrama therefore shared with the discourse on conformity, anxieties over the loss of a strong, independent and confident masculinity.

In Rebel Without a Cause (Nicholas Ray 1955, US), James Dean played Jim Stark, the only son of a family who have recently moved to the suburbs of Los Angeles. Jim is a problem. In the opening of the film, he is picked up by the police for drunkenness. At the police station, another teenager, Judy (Natalie Wood), is detained after she was found ‘wandering around’. Judy has the first major speech of the film. She explains her actions as the result of her father failing to love her, which lead to her running from her house. Also at the station is John Crawford, otherwise known as ‘Plato’ (Sal Mineo), who is
detained for shooting puppies with a gun belonging to his mother. Plato is accompanied by the housekeeper (Marietta Canty) because his mother is staying away on one of what is understood to be her frequent trips to Chicago. Plato's father hasn't been seen for a long time. The arrival at the station of Jim's father (Jim Backus), mother (Ann Doran) and grandmother (Virginia Brissac), who constantly bicker between themselves, completes the picture of the fractured middle class family.

Jim is questioned by Ray (Edward Platt), a detective with the juvenile division, who wins the teenager's respect by understanding his problem. In Jim's view, the problems of the family would be corrected if 'he [the father] had guts to knock mum cold once, then maybe she'd be happy and then she'd stop picking on him, because they make mush out of him'. From his perception of his father's weakness, Jim is scared of being called 'chicken'. Ray's understanding provides Jim with the paternal guidance he wants but does not receive from his own father. The police station scenes establish how each of the teenagers has a problem and links that problem to the family. With each case, the cause of rebellious problems is seen to be the outcome of the failures of parents to assume their symbolic responsibilities: Fathers are either absent or too weak; Mothers are uncaring or seen to be too strong.

Dean's performance in the film shares the vocal and physical qualities of the Method style. Like Brando, Dean constantly slurs his lines and is physically relaxed. Brustein saw the disruption of language as an important device for producing the rebellious attitude: 'Inarticulacy is a symptom of ... anarchy because speech is an instrument of control' (p.129). This linking of language with control reflects the view in psychoanalysis that language structures society in ways which regulate and repress desire. In the Lacanian version of psychoanalytic discourse, the Oedipal identification with the law of the father and repression of love for the mother coincides with the child's entry into the formal structures of language, the 'Symbolic order', in which meaning is produced. Entry into the Symbolic is therefore marked by repression and desire and it is through the structures of language and meaning that sexual difference is reproduced. To be outside of the Symbolic, or to disrupt the structures of language, is then, in the Lacanian view, to disrupt the relations of difference which language represents.

Influenced by Lacan, Julia Kristeva has claimed that the disruption of language structures in a kind of 'babble', which destabilises gendered and sexual difference to reclaim a
feminine realm of meaning which the Symbolic represses.

Brustein sounded very Lacanian in his reading of how speech was related to identity in the rebel narrative.

To teach children to speak is to teach them to frustrate their sexual and aggressive desires. To accept this speech is to accept all the difficulties as well as all the glories that speech entails: the teachings of the father, the complexity of the world, the discipline of a developing intelligence, the gifts of tradition, history, science and art. To reject it is to find consolation in raw feeling, in mindlessness, and in self-indulgence, to seek escape in sex and violence. In the hero's inarticulacy, we find represented the young American's fears of maturity, for to speak out – to be a speaker – is to be a man. It is to replace his father, to take the consequences of his hostility toward him, symbolically to kill him.

(p.129)

Speaking represents the acceptance of language and the patriarchal law by which it is structured. For Lacan and Kristeva, disrupting language refuses the law of the father. Following this reasoning, for the young male rebel to not speak, or to not be articulate, is to reject patriarchal authority. This would not, however, explain the significance of the Method style in representing the problems of masculinity. For Dean/Jim, his problem is not how to symbolically kill the father. Dean's Method manners disrupt structured language use and the civilised disciplining of the body, signify the deep emotional problems of Jim, but what they articulate is the rebel's desire for a reinstatement of the father's authority in the family. Instead of representing rejection of the father's symbolic authority, what Dean/Jim's rebellious 'babble' says is that it is the return of a strong father which he desires.

For example, a test of Jim's masculinity comes when after the first day at his new school, he is challenged by the gang leader Buzz (Corey Allen) to a 'chickee run' (racing cars at a cliff edge to see who has the nerve to jump last). Before the run, fear of the test sees Jim turn to his father for advice. The masculine anxieties of the scene produced some of Dean's most concentrated use of Method manners. Dean/Jim arrives home and finds Backus/Frank unstairs on his hands and knees clearing up the mess from a dropped
supper tray. He is quickly and quietly tidying, hoping to avoid any reprisal from the mother for his clumsiness. In the performance of these domestic services, Backus/Frank wears the mother’s apron over the standard grey suit of the corporate organisation man, producing a bluntly direct comment on the crisis of the breadwinner ethic. Dean/Jim grabs the apron and pulls Backus/Frank up to his knees. What Jim wants to say he cannot say. He looks, feels the apron strap, begins ‘dad ...’, blinks, looks down, ‘don’t’, feels the apron strap, moves his mouth without words coming out, looks up, looks down, looks up, continues ‘I mean, you shouldn’t, don’t’, turns away, gives a frustrated wave of the hand, turns back, audibly takes an intake of breath, grabs a towel from Backus’s hands and throws it down, looks at his father, looks down, looks up, looks down, looks up, looks down, moves his mouth to say ‘w’ but without vocalising anything before ‘what’re you’ comes out, moves his mouth without saying anything, pulls his head away, and walks off. The difficulty of speaking resonates with the son’s feeling over the broken spectacle of the father.

Dean/Jim retreats to his bedroom, wrapping himself in bedsheets, covering his head, and hiding in the dark. When Backus/Frank enters, Dean/Jim looks out from under the covers. Although he does not explain the exact circumstances, Dean/Jim seeks advice from his father on what to do when confronted with a situation which is dangerous but also ‘a matter of honour and you have to prove it’. The difficulty he is facing is summed up by the question ‘what can you do when you have to be a man’? Jim’s question combines a search for moral guidance with an issue of masculine identity. The inability of Backus/Frank to provide an answer leaves the son without the ethical and gendered co-ordinates to find his way in the world. At this point, Dean/Jim grabs his red Harrington jacket, an emotional signifier which externalises the anger of the character’s confusion. The jacket is thrown down the stairs before Dean/Jim storms out of the house. Throwing down the towel, throwing down the jacket, and crashing the door of the house, each end scenes as the only possible actions when dialogue has failed to answer the rebel’s uncertainties. When rational solutions seem impossible, anger is shown as the inevitable response to the gendered and social insecurities which the rebel son confronts. Anger does not solve problems but becomes the ultimate expression of the rebel’s difficulties in attempting to form a secure masculine identity. It is anger which conveys the emotional reality of the male melodrama, as aggressive feeling responds to what is found lacking in
the family and society. In the context of the 50s, the rebel’s anger broke the new masculine emotionology, but in its aggression, the angry outburst longed for former, more forceful, male feelings.

Allen/Buzz dies in the chickee run. Buzz’s death motivates Jim to look further for guidance from his father. It is late at night when Dean/Jim returns home. Frank Stark has waited up for his son and is asleep in an armchair. Dean/Jim enters the living room carrying a milk bottle. Use of the bottle becomes a small piece of business which amplifies the rebel’s desperation. After drinking from the bottle, Dean rolls it across his forehead. In the circumstances, it would be probable that the milk, fresh from the refrigerator, cools and calms him. However, Dean turns the use of the bottle into a larger emotional drama. After drinking, he closes his eyes, tightens his lips, and brings the bottle down to his right cheek, pressing the bottle against his flesh. He briefly opens his eyes and looks down, before snuggling up against the bottle more. The bottle becomes an object of emotional comfort, and given the narrative’s Freudian indulgences, the infantile and maternal connotations are not lost. Dean/Jim blinks several times and then looks off frame right. A cut reveals Backus/Frank in pyjamas and dressing gown slumped asleep in an armchair. The reverse cut returns to Dean/Jim staring in his father’s direction and clutching the bottle. Editing here constructs space so it is clear that Jim is looking at his father, which in the narrative circumstances assumes the more significant meaning as he is looking to his father for help.

Dean/Jim does not wake Backus/Frank but moves across the room and lies down on a sofa with his head hanging over the edge. The following shot is taken upside down as Jim’s subjective viewpoint. In the shot, Jim’s mother comes down the stairs and over to her son. This peculiar angle produces an expressionistic scene to convey the emotional disturbance of Jim, which in the terms of the drama, condenses the ‘upside down’ problems of the suburban family. The presence of the mother in the shot also passes judgment on her role in the family and its consequences for the young rebel. Four mothers are seen or made reference to in Rebel Without a Cause: Mrs Stark, Jim’s grandmother, Judy’s mother (Rochelle Hudson), and Plato’s mother. Nina C. Leibman argues that these four characters work in the film to collectively represent mothers as ‘rotten, useless or absent’ (1988, 27). Mrs Stark is overbearing, intimidating her husband, and the grandmother is seen to be much the same. Part of Jim’s anxieties are
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seen to be the effect of having a mother who is too assertive. Judy's mother is just seen as ineffectual. As Judy's first speech had indicated, it is the love of the father she wants. When in an earlier scene, Judy's father tells her off for wanting to give him a welcome home kiss, the mother remains uninvolved. Judy's mother is not seen to do anything to cause Judy to rebel, nor is she capable of intervening in the daughter/father conflict.

If Judy's mother is a nobody, Plato's mother is literally absent from the location of the drama. Apart from her trips to Chicago, the only other details which are learnt about Plato's mother come when in a later scene, the son storms into her bedroom to take a gun from under her pillow. The bedroom is expensively decorated and seductively lit. Liebman reads the opulence of the mother's bedroom as 'suggest[ing] a highly libidinous woman', which together with her visits away, make 'her transgressions ... responsible for her divorce ... accountable for deserting her son and leaving him with a gun, in addition to her original sin of expelling the father' (p.28). Beside the bed, Mineo/Plato finds an envelope addressed to his mother. Tearing it open, he finds a cheque from Norman Crawford, his father, together with a memo slip with the impersonal typed message 'For support of son'. This funding is presumably regular but is a surprise to Plato. In the later scenes at the deserted house, Mineo/Plato tells Wood/Judy his father is dead but was a 'hero in the China Sea'. This tale is contradicted by Dean/Jim reminding Mineo/Plato that he had previously explained that his father was 'a big wheel in New York'. By mythologising the father, Mineo/Plato redeems his absence against the errors of the mother.

In each case, the fathers of Jim, Judy and Plato are seen to be essential to organising patriarchal authority, the absence of which, it appears, causes youth to rebel. In Jim's and Plato's cases, the failure or absence of the father is not seen as the responsibility of the male parent, but a consequence of the mother's actions. With Mr Stark and Mr Crawford, it is the behaviour of the mother which is seen to prevent Jim and Plato from finding the masculine role models they wish for. With Judy, the mother has no significance for the daughter, so she cannot and does not displace the authority of the father. Judy's love shows her ready to accept the authority of the father if only he'd notice her. The problem of the father is seen to be that he therefore needs to recognise and accept his importance.

In the milk bottle scene, Jim turns only to his father for guidance. Dean/Jim stumbles through his account of the events that night and how-it was 'a matter of honour'.
Explaining the dilemma of the chickee run sees him fidgeting on the stairs and hanging his head. When he has to say that Buzz died, words fail him as he pauses, says almost inaudibly ‘killed him’, and then coughs, clearing his throat and the emotional intensity of the moment. As he continues to try to tell his father how ‘I ... I ain’t never done anything right’, he shakes his head and clenches the fingers of his right hand, not tight enough to form a fist, but closed to show a hand holding nothing.

Jim relates to his father the difficulty he sees in producing a masculine identity when he says ‘you can’t just go around proving things and pretending like you’re tough’. As he speaks, the difficulty of speaking sees Dean circling his hands and pointing towards his own body, making a vocal struggle into a bodily struggle. During Dean/Jim’s speech, Backus/Frank looks on, nodding his head and repeatedly uttering ‘that’s right’. The distance between the son’s confession and the father’s ineffective advice produce Dean/Jim’s emotional explosion, ‘you’re not listening to me’. Anger overtakes argument, and Dean/Jim turns his back on the camera, leaning against a window and burying his head in his arms as his parents express their concerns with regard to whether anyone can identify him at the scene of Buzz’s death. Jim is searching for the course of moral action which will allow him to ‘do something right’. His mother is strongly opposed to Jim’s intentions to go to the police because of the trouble it would cause for the family. When the father can offer no advice and refuses to contradict the mother, Jim grabs his father, shouting ‘stand up’, before wrestling him to the floor and making to strangle him. After the mother has dragged him away, Dean/Jim makes to exit by the French windows, but before he does so, he kicks a painted portrait of a woman which, though this is not clear, could be a painting of his mother. Again, the problems of the scene build to an eventual angry, and in this case, violent conclusion. Angry action is therefore seen to express what was impossible through speech. Although not unique to the Method, anger was a part of the emotional range signified by the Method style, and in the rebel narrative, it was the anger of the male hero which disrupted speech and overtook the civilised control of the body, producing an explosive melodramatic response to the problems of becoming a man.

Jim looks for but cannot find Ray at the police station. Returning home, he meets Judy. Dean/Jim tentatively kisses Wood/Judy and they become a couple. They leave together for a deserted house which Plato has described to Jim. Mineo/Plato also arrives
at the house after he discovers his father’s cheque and takes his mother’s gun. At the house, the three enter into a kind of play. Dean/Jim and Wood/Judy pretend to be newlyweds looking to rent the ‘castle’ from the owner, Mineo/Plato. This act produces a performance within a performance, a metaperformance, in which Dean/Jim and Wood/Judy play at being a future father and mother. Conversation takes in wealth, work and the need to keep children out of sight. This vision of the family represents adults as selfishly indulgent, obsessed with material gain and neglecting the care of children. To represent this vision, Dean/Jim, Wood/Judy and Mineo/Plato each use turns of phrase and highly refined ways of speaking. Here, performance style shows the inauthenticity of civilized familial manners. Although obviously performed, the metaperformance is not showing the family in general as a constructed and arbitrary social institution. Rather, the performance shows that this particular vision of the family is something false which does not represent what the family truly is or should be. The caricaturing of civilized manners is used to represent the flaws of the dysfunctional family. If this family seems stiff and hypocritically polite, it is because it lacks the love required of a real or true family.

The formation of a couple by Dean/Jim and Wood/Judy makes the future roles of father and mother almost inevitable for them. It is equally clear that by poking fun at the uncaring father and mother, Dean/Jim and Wood/Judy will not be like them. The possibility that conflict may be inherent in the family structure is displaced as the foundations for a real family are put in place. Wood/Judy tells Dean/Jim that after looking for so long, she has found in him someone to love. The moment is a significant stage in Jim producing a mature masculine and sexual identity. His final test comes when Mineo/Plato is chased by police into the observatory after shooting a member of Buzz’s gang. Dean/Jim finally gets to do something right, becoming a ‘father’ as he provides Mineo/Plato with the paternal advice to give himself up. Although Mineo/Plato is mistakenly shot and killed by police, Dean/Jim still proves his moral worth.

Backus/Frank, who has arrived at the scene with his wife and Ray, tells his son, he ‘did everything a man could’. In these concluding moments, as he finally becomes a man, Dean/Jim performs a mixture of emotions, weeping over the body of his dead ‘son’, Mineo/Plato, at the same time as affectionately laughing at the dead boy’s different coloured socks. Crawling from the body, Dean/Jim clings to Backus/Frank’s legs, crying ‘help me’. a gesture which summarises the whole gender and sexual drama of the film. A
short speech by Backus/Frank indicates that Jim will now get the father figure he was wanting: ‘You can depend on me. Trust me. Whatever comes we’ll, we’ll face it together. I swear it. Now Jim, stand up. I’ll stand up with you. I’ll try and be as strong as, as you want me to be’. The son’s reconciliation with the father is therefore paired with the father’s recognition of his own masculine responsibilities. Dean/Jim introduces Wood/Judy to his father and mother, a union which will see the continuation of the family. The reassembly of the patriarchal family is completed when the mother’s objections or concerns over the young couple are immediately silenced by the father. Finally he has shut her up, and the knowing smile they then share suggests that things are likely to continue that way.

Rebel Without a Cause enacted a drama of becoming masculine. Jim Stark’s problems are represented as the result of the father’s inadequacies. Across the film, both son and father are seen to be made as men. Throughout the film, Jim searches for how to ‘do something right’, a search which is consistent with the space left in melodrama by the ‘moral occult’. However with Jim, moral action is also mixed up with questions of gender and sexual difference. In Rebel Without a Cause, and more generally in the rebel narrative and the male melodrama, dramatic conflict emerges from problems with the loss or confusion of gender and sexual difference, producing not only a moral crisis but also a ‘masculine occult’, as the narrative longs for the return of paternal authority to stabilise the family. The vocal and physical conventions of the Method style signified an emotional response to that paternal loss. Dean/Jim’s stumbling speech and emotional outbursts, particularly his anger, represented the male rebel’s frustration with the failure of the family to provide clearly identified co-ordinates for masculine action. His anger represented his distance from a secure masculine identity and the desire to find and form such an identity. Dean’s Method manners represented the problems of male identity in problems of speaking and acting. The difficulties of finding what to say and how to say it signified Jim’s difficulties with discovering ways to be masculine.

Dean’s first film, East of Eden (Elia Kazan 1954, US), saw a conflict between Cal Trask (Dean) and his puritanical father, Adam (Raymond Massey). Cal’s brother, Aron (Richard Davalos), is the father’s favourite, for his polite ways and loving relationship with Abra (Julie Harris) are consistent with the father’s strict morality. Although his moral righteousness makes the father authoritarian, this strength is seen to actually be
Adam's greatest weakness. Adam's moral highground makes him cold and austere, so that he lacks the love and compassion which Cal wants from him. It is for this reason that Cal rebels against the father, although throughout the film, the son is forever searching for acceptance by the father. Cal defys Adam because he is jealous of the pride and affection the father has for Aron, and he desperately wants to be accepted and loved in the same way.

The moral and familial conflicts of the film are established in an early scene when the father and his sons sit at the dining table reading the bible. Dean's voice is thin, and like Brando's, he tends to slur words. This way of speaking contrasts with Massey's resonant tones, which represent his commanding authority. Massey/Adam and Davalos/Aron sit upright at the table, while Dean/Cal is slumped in his chair, turned away from the others, with his head propped up by an arm he has resting on the table. In terms of the positioning of the camera, Dean/Cal has also turned his back on being seen. When Massey/Adam demands that Dean/Cal read from the bible, Dean/Cal initially does not move, ignoring the book on the table. He then slowly turns and begins to read with his head heavily bowed. The bowed head was a distinctive characteristic of all Dean's acting. He positioned the head in such a way that he frequently has to peer up at other characters. This pose casts the body as turning away from the immediate situation, retreating from fully occupying the space and signifying a lack of confidence and assurance. It has the appearance of 'hiding' from society and suggesting a realm of private emotional insecurity. In the context of the bible scene, it also becomes a way of using the body to convey his resistance to the father's commands. This characteristic element of Dean's performance style therefore enacts the rebellious attitude in a combination of sensitivity and insubordination. He is vulnerable while also aggressive.

It was Adam's moral rectitude which led Cal and Aron's mother, Kate (Jo Van Fleet), leaving when the boys were very young. She now runs what is suggested to be a brothel in a neighbouring town. It is the similarity of their relationship to the father which associates Dean/Cal with Van Fleet/Kate. Both are 'bad', where Adam and Aron are everything which is 'good'. However, this does not result in a strong maternal bond between Cal and his mother. In an attempt to win the affection of the father, Cal goes into farming to earn enough to help his father after the failure of a previous business enterprise. The gesture is intended to 'buv' the love of the father. To start up his
business, Dean/Cal visits Van Fleet/Kate to ask for a loan. Van Fleet/Kate cannot provide the genuine loving affection which Dean/Cal longs for because, as Jackie Byars point out, Kate is in the business of selling love (1991, 219). Again, the rebel son's love of the father requires his renunciation of any maternal bond.

With America's entry into the First World War, Cal profits from his crop of beans. On Adam's birthday, Cal intends to present his father with a gift of the money he lost. The birthday party and the money are intended to declare the love of the son for the father. However, Davalos/Aron steals Dean/Cal's glory by announcing his engagement to Harris/Abra. The ultimate rejection for Dean/Cal comes when Massey/Adam refuses the present of the money because he does not want to be seen to profit from war. Dean's acting in this moment produces an explosion of emotional excess. He attempts to hand the money back to Massey/Adam who refuses it again. Dean says 'I'll keep it for y'. I, I, I, I'll wrap it up and, w w we'll just keep it in here, and then ...'. His face screws up in a pained expression. He bows his head and slumps on the table. Massey/Adam holds Dean/Cal across the shoulders, telling him 'Son, I'd be happy if you'd give me something like, well, like your brother's given me, something honest and decent and good'. With his face obscured from the camera, Dean/Cal can be heard crying. He rolls onto his side on the table. As he begins to rise, the editing cuts to a medium shot set at a diagonal, using angular composition to suggest dramatic conflict. Dean/Cal grabs Massey/Adam by the lapels of his suit jacket, pushing him back towards the wall and uttering repeatedly 'uh'. As words have now deserted the rebel hero, the only way he can represent his deepest desires is by hugging his father close to him. Massey/Adam's evident discomfort with this emotional and irrational display is conveyed by keeping his arms firmly by his sides, pulling his head back and admonishing his son by barking 'Cal'. When gestures have said as much as they can say, the only action left for the rebel is to leave, swaying across the floor and crying loudly, before bumping into the table and crashing out through the door. As with Dean/Jim in Rebel Without a Cause, the angry exit marks the rebel hero's ultimate emotional statement on the familial tensions he confronts.

The father's rejection of the son now leads to a multiplication of dramatic agonies. Dean/Cal's tears continue out in the garden where he happens to hide under a weeping willow tree. When Harris/Abra goes to comfort him, Davalos/Aron tells his brother to
never touch her again. It is at this point that Dean/Cal takes revenge. Davalos/Aron believes his mother is dead and has always idealised her as 'heaven's youngest angel'. Dean/Cal takes him to see the living reality. As a consequence, Davalos/Aron goes off to fight in the war, something he swore he would never do, and Massey/Adam has a stroke from the shock of seeing his son leave.

For the final scenes of the film, Massey/Adam lays paralysed in bed. Harris/Abra tells the helpless father that for Cal 'you have to give him some sign that you love him, or else he'll never be a man, he'll just keep on feeling guilty and alone unless you release him'. Only by the father's forgiveness will Cal become, in Abra's words, 'whole and strong'. Massey/Adam's request to his son to look after him therefore concludes Dean/Cal's passage to manhood. For his final lines, Massey's resonant voice is replaced by a broken frail whisper. His request to Dean/Cal is actually unheard, being inaudibly whispered into Dean/Cal's ear. This new found duty becomes the occasion for Dean/Cal to fully kiss Harris/Abra and form the pairing which completes his passage to a full masculine future.

Like Jim in Rebel Without the Cause, Cal in East of Eden is searching for the father who will allow him to realise his own masculinity. In these dramas, Dean's Method manners represent the anxieties and emotions of not being quite masculine. The Method voice and body present a wealth of disorganised signs, which refuse the conventional structures of articulate communication and the formal manners of civilised behaviour. In the gender drama of the rebel narrative, the inarticulacy and casualness of the Method style place the son outside the Symbolic order in which he could be a man. Reflecting on East of Eden, Brustein saw the concluding silence of the father as opening a possibility for the son to speak: 'Only ... when the parental authoritative voice of the father is quiet, when there can be no interruptions from him, when the fear he has instilled has been dispelled by his powerlessness, only then can the boy speak truly, coherently, and clearly, and effect understanding and reconciliation' (1958, 129). The rebel narrative ends at this moment of reconciliation with the father and the son's entry into manhood. Until this point, the Method's inarticulacy has represented the agonies of not being a man. It could be asked therefore, whether, supposing the film were to continue, the mature hero would still be a rebel, and if not, would he still be represented using the Method style.

With the rebel narratives, such questions are hypothetical, for as Brustein pointed out, 'the hero is never seen in a mature action' (p.129). It is precisely because he is seen in the
mature stages of life that Dean’s performance as Jett Rink in Giant (George Stevens 1956 US) is interesting for the tensions it forms in the Method’s representation of masculinity. Dean’s narrative status in Giant is different from that of Rebel Without a Cause and East of Eden. He is not the central character, and although Dean plays a rebellious character, Giant is not a rebel movie. The drama opens in the 1920s and covers a twenty five year period. Jordan ‘Bick’ Benedict (Rock Hudson), a Texas ranch owner, marries Leslie (Elizabeth Taylor), the daughter of a Maryland doctor. Hudson/Bick is part of the Texan aristocracy, the inheritor of land and wealth profited from the family trade in cattle. Giant is an example of what Thomas Schatz calls the ‘family aristocracy variation’ of the family melodrama (1981, 235-6), and what Jackie Byars describes as ‘dynastic melodramas’: ‘Dynasties grown old have weakened, and patriarchs search for the strength that will assure their families of immortality’ (1991, 227).

The dramatic conflicts of the film are concerned with how Hudson/Bick sees the Texas he has known gradually replaced by new social values and avenues of trade. This new Texas will confront Hudson/Bick from two directions. In his family, Taylor/Leslie directly confronts the sexist and racist culture of the old Texas. The son, Jordie (Dennis Hopper), not only refuses the masculine inheritance of becoming Reata’s future heir by training as a doctor, but he also marries a Mexican woman in a state where it is still common to refer to ‘those people’ as ‘wetbacks’. Leslie’s challenge to domestic relations, together with Jordie’s rejection of his father’s expectations, see a redefinition of the gender and racial values of the old Texas.

Jordie will not own Reata, but in the new Texas, there may very well be nothing for him to own anyway. The second challenge to Bick’s power comes in the world of business. Jett Rink (James Dean) works as a ranch hand at Reata. With no family of his own, Bick’s sister Luz (Mercedes McCambridge) acts as a surrogate mother to him. McCambridge/Luz’s hardy disposition embodies the old Texas possibly more than her brother does. Her death while riding a wild stallion on the open range is itself a sign of a disappearing Texas. From Luz’s will, Jett stands to inherit a small plot of land within the boundaries of Reata. To maintain the family territory, Bick tries to buy the land. Jett’s refusal is the first serious challenge to the Benedicts’ territorial dominance. The refusal proves fortuitous, for Jett strikes oil on the land, and aggressive business practice produces massive profits which allow him to purchase Reata within a few years. In Jett.
Texas faces a transition from an economy based on cattle and family inheritance, to the corporate growth of the oil industry.

For the first half of the film, Dean/Jett remains the young male rebel. Dean’s Method style appropriately represents Jett’s rebellious antagonism towards Hudson/Bick. He is seen frequently lurking in the background, turning his back on the camera, which together with Dean’s thin, slurred speech, and bowed head, signify his withdrawal from the landowning aristocracy. Dean’s acting contrasts with that of Hudson, who confidently strides through a Texan society where men speak boldly, stand tall, heads held high, and chests thrust forward.

Choosing between the land bequeathed by McCambridge/Luz or the money offered by Hudson/Bick is a crucial moment in Jett’s narrative. Dean/Jett is seated in Bick’s office, surrounded by the mature males who represent the legal interests of Bick’s estate. Dean/Jett sits forward with his head bent down and then leans back in the chair and slumps low down between its arms. Throughout the scene, he fiddles with a piece of rope which he carries curled in his hands. As a prop, the rope relates to his work as a ranch hand, but Dean’s business with the rope also signifies Jett’s uncertainty over the circumstances he finds himself in. When offered the money, his response is to whistle, say ‘boy’, and shake his head. Dean’s fidgeting and uncomprehending utterances, signify his lack of the necessary maturity to face or understand the decision confronting him. As others advise him that the money offered amounts to more than twice what the land is worth, Dean/Jett looks down, playing with and picking at the heel of his boot. Hudson/Bick places the money on the corner of the desk but Dean/Jett just looks at it while fiddling with the rope. When one of the men asks him what he intends to do with the money, Dean/Jett just rolls his head to the side. When another tells him ‘you’re in the chips now boy’, he turns, winks and chuckles. These little actions sum up his first full sentence of the scene: ‘Don’t know what to say’.

It takes further pausing, stuttering and scratching, before Dean/Jett makes his decision to ‘gamble along’ with the land given to him. The moment is confrontational and Dean’s performance maintains the same withdrawn quality: he stands, puts on his Stetson hat, pulls it down to fully shadow his face, and swings a weight which hangs on the end of the rope. As he tells Hudson/Bick that he may intend to set up his own ranch in the future. Dean/Jett looks down at the rope and weight. With the rope, he performs a trick of
flicking the weight so it loops and forms a sort of noose. This action serves several meanings. Looping the rope is presumably an actual rope skill used by ranch hands to snare cattle. The piece of business also shows the actor mastering a skill which belong to the type of character he is trying to represent. The trick is realistically plausible, and in true Method fashion, Dean has learnt how to perform the trick so as to make his acting realistic. Finally, the action also has a narrative significance, as it implies that Dean/Jett has ‘caught’ Hudson/Bick.

In the scene, Dean uses the Method style to represent Jett’s childish inability to fully comprehend the implications of the deal and his indecisiveness over the right course to take. At this point in the narrative, Dean/Jett is poised between his ‘immature’ dependency on Hudson/Bick as his employer and an inheritance which would require him to take ‘mature’ independent responsibility. The moment of adopting responsibility is usually the end point of the rebel narrative, as the son finally grows up to occupy the place signified by the father. In the rebel narrative, as the manners of the Method represented the problems of becoming a man, then the final reconciliation of son and father would suggest that the solving of those problems would see a cessation of the rebel’s awkward manners. The conclusions of Rebel Without a Cause and East of Eden leave that possibility open to speculation. However, in Giant, Jett accepts the land, and the narrative continues into his middle aged years.

This narrative development provides a possibility to assess the effect of the Method style in representing the mature male. Dean/Jett’s business progress is charted episodically as isolated scenes mark the aging of Dean/Jett. A major temporal ellipsis is achieved through a montage of shots showing Dean/Jett working his land and raising more oil rigs. At the start of the montage Dean/Jett is still the same fresh faced youth but by the end of the sequence he displays signs of aging, the most noticeable of which is his moustache. The short lengths of the scenes in this montage do not provide the space to assess whether Dean’s acting shows any marks of transformation. Hudson/Bick and Taylor/Leslie have also visibly aged after this sequence and their next scene sees them with greyed hair and surrounded by their three teenage children, Jordie, Judy (Fran Benedict) and Luz junior (Carroll Baker).

Following his success in business, Dean/Jett visits Hudson/Bick to offer a deal for buying Reata. In the scene, the tone of Dean/Jett’s voice and manner of his body remain
similar to the young Jett. All that has changed is that he can now talk more directly about business. Even so, his childish ways are seen to remain, as Dean/Jett produces a toy one armed bandit from his pocket which he uses in a piece of playful business when approaching the deal. Dean's performance style retains the boyish quality of Jett even as he is seen to visibly age. In Brustein's view, the performance in Giant showed that 'when James Dean grows to middle age ... he merely has some powder added to his hair' (1958, 129). Dean's performance as the older Jett produces a tension between his 'mature' business enterprises and his 'immature' performance style. The effect of this is that although Jett ages, he does not seem to grow up.

Dean/Jett's narrative ends with the formal opening of the Jett Rink Airport and Hotel Emperador. Dean/Jett's hotel is represented as cold and trashy and his wealth is seen to be personally unsatisfying. Although it remains a very undeveloped strand of the narrative, subtextually, the reason for Dean/Jett's antagonism towards Hudson/Bick is related to his desire for Taylor/Leslie. As he can't have her, Dean/Jett begins a relationship with the daughter, Baker/Luz Jr. She is drawn to Dean/Jett despite her father's disapproval. Dean/Jett and Baker/Luz Jr. share a scene together alone in the hotel restaurant. In Jett's final scenes, he gets progressively more drunk, which intensifies the slurred quality of Dean's voice. The scene begins a gradual struggle with speaking, which will lead to Dean/Jett's final demise. Although the problems of speech are the result of drink, Dean/Jett's slurring increases the inarticulate characteristic of the Method voice to the point where he can speak no more. Dean/Jett stumbles from the restaurant and returns to his hotel suite. Surrounded by advisors, he struggles to read and articulate the speech they have written for him. At the ceremonial dinner, in front of a large assembly of the Texan aristocracy collectively singing 'The Eyes of Texas are Upon You', Dean/Jett hits Hopper/Jordie and argues with Hudson/Bick, eventually passing out before he can start his speech. At the very moment where the voice could have integrated him into the powerful order of Texan society, Dean/Jett is ultimately alienated from language.

Only after he has lost the respect of the aristocracy can he begin to speak. Alone in the empty conference hall, he drunkenly begins reciting his speech. Here, Dean's performance could be described as drunken oratory, for he is using the rehearsed rhetoric of public speaking modified by a drunken slur. On the announcement 'this is a man', his
legs give way and he sits doubled over in his chair. At this point the speech changes. From drunken oratory, the speech is transformed into the Method’s investigation of the private and psychologically problematic. Dean/Jett does not follow the speech written for the public event but begins to sob uncontrollably:

Poor Jett ... thank you for what is good ... Lucky ... Lucky for Bick Benedict ...
Her husband ... Poor Jett ... Poor, pretty Leslie ... Pretty Leslie ... Pretty Leslie, wonderful, beautiful girl bride ... Poor boy ... Rich, rich Mrs Benedict ... She’s beautiful ... Lovely ... (Shouting) The woman a man wants ... (Shouting louder) The woman a man’s gotta have too.

He is alone in the hall and is unaware of anyone else, although he is watched by Baker/Luz Jr. through a crack in the door. This solitary confession acts as Jett’s ‘private moment’ as he attempts to articulate his previously unarticulated personal desires and anxieties.

The fragmentation of the speech is partly an effect of the narrative circumstances of drunkenness but the incoherence also shows the difficulty of finding the language to express what he wants to express. When words cannot express Jett’s desire, emotional display overtakes language to communicate his loss. Dean/Jett’s incoherence is more the effect of an excess of feeling than an excess of alcohol. His attempt to speak sees him struggle with expressing what he has lost but results in his losing Baker/Luz Jr., the woman who wants him. Dean/Jett’s final ‘babble’ denies him a legitimate position in Texan society. Despite his wealth, Dean/Jett is left without the status or partner which would complete his entry to mature masculinity and the dominant social order.

Giant does not see the final reconciliation of the rebel ‘boy’ with a mature masculine identity. In Rebel Without a Cause and East of Eden, the Method style represents the rebel male’s problems with finding the terms by which to construct his own masculinity. The failures of the father produce those problems, and to resolve those problems, the narrative may require a remaking of the father but it can only effectively conclude with the young rebel assuming the symbolic place of the father. In that narrative pattern, the vocal and bodily characteristics of the Method style represent the hero as not being, but wanting to be, a man. In Giant, Dean’s Method manners form a tension in the performance of the
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older Jett, for while he is in a position of power, his voice and body continually signify his powerlessness. Although Jett ages, he still behaves like a boy.

Alongside James Dean, Brustein regarded Marlon Brando's performances as Terry Malloy in On the Waterfront (Elia Kazan 1954, US) and Johnny in The Wild One (Laslo Benedek 1953 US) as further examples of the rebel hero. Byars (1991) identifies Rebel Without a Cause and On the Waterfront with the 'social problem' film of the 50s. Richard Maltby quotes Will Hays as describing social problem films as 'motion pictures with a message' (quoted in Maltby with Craven 1995, 383). Rebel Without a Cause dealt with problems of juvenile delinquency, a concern shared by The Wild One. On the Waterfront made the problem of union corruption into a drama of the individual against the collective. Maltby argues that the social problem film had a cultural value for Hollywood cinema in the period as it has enabled an industry of popular entertainment to show serious responsibility in the representation of social and political issues (p.383).

Unlike Dean's films, the terrain of Brando's rebellious conflicts existed outside the family. Brando was older than Dean when he made his rebel movies, however, irrespective of actual age, Brando's rebels appear older than Jim or Cal in Dean's films because Terry and Johnny have moved beyond the family, becoming more independent. Even so, Brando's rebels still enact problems in the realisation of their masculinity. In Brando's rebel narratives, the immediate associates of the male hero still represent familial roles, although not in literal but symbolic terms. With On the Waterfront and The Wild One, the discontent of the rebel hero is dramatised through his relationship to a father figure or representative of paternal authority. The source of conflict in these films therefore remains the problem of the rebel forming his masculinity in relation to patriarchal power.

In On the Waterfront, Terry Malloy is an ex-prize fighter. Brando/Terry is involved with the theft and intimidation on the waterfront piers, organised by the corrupt union boss Johnny Friendly (Lee J. Cobb). Unwittingly, Brando/Terry lures an informer, Joey Doyle, to his death at the hands of Cobb/Johnny's henchmen. Brando/Terry follows Cobb/Johnny's orders without question. Throughout the film, Brando's inarticulate voice represents Terry's simple-mindedness. Although nearing thirty, Brando/Terry is still characterized as boyish. Cobb/Johnny refers to him as 'kid' and his only friends seem to be two boys who belong to the Golden Warriors. a gang which Brando/Terry formed
when he was a teenager. Brando/Terry’s simple mindedness is therefore related to his immaturity.

After meeting Joey’s sister Edie (Eva Marie Saint), Brando/Terry experiences the guilt which will eventually lead to his informing on Cobb/Johnny. Brando/Terry’s guilt over his part in the killing motivates him to break from Cobb/Johnny’s paternal hold. However, Brando/Terry’s rebellion cannot be seen as a rejection of patriarchal identification. By breaking with Cobb/Johnny, Brando/Terry rejects a ‘bad’ father. At the same time, he finds a ‘good’ father in the priest Father Barrie (Karl Malden). It is to Malden/Barrie that Brando/Terry first confesses his involvement in the killing of Joey. After Terry’s brother Charlie (Rod Steiger) is killed on Cobb/Johnny’s instructions, it is Malden/Barrie’s advice which brings Brando/Terry to seek revenge by the legal means of testifying against Cobb/Johnny in court. This moral responsibility is central to Brando/Terry’s breaking with Cobb/Johnny, not only because he does the lawful thing, but also because he marks his independence as his own man.

In On the Waterfront, Brando/Terry rejects his surrogate father to eventually come to occupy the very position of dominance which Cobb/Johnny once held. Although the court will punish Cobb/Johnny, Brando/Terry’s maturation and independence is only complete when the law is exercised by the rebel hero himself. In keeping with Brustein’s observations on the rebel, Brando/Terry inevitably confronts violence, physically fighting with Cobb/Johnny on the waterfront. Brando/Terry defeats Cobb/Johnny but is then severely beaten by Johnny’s henchmen. It takes the encouragement of Malden/Barrie to make Brando/Terry walk to final victory by leading the longshoremen into work, breaking the hold of the union over the piers. Brando/Terry rejects a patriarchal order which punishes him, for an order which he can control and so, in effect, be.

The death of Brando/Terry’s father at a young age lead to Cobb/Johnny becoming his surrogate father. In a bar, Brando/Terry delivers a speech in which he tells Saint/Edie that after his father was ‘bumped off’, he and his big brother Steiger/Charlie were put in a children’s home. Terry explains that he entered boxing when he ran away from the home and began fighting in clubs, which is how Cobb/Johnny came to ‘buy a piece’ of him. During the speech, Brando/Terry chews on a nut, throws the shell on the floor, looks past Saint/Edie, and continually shrugs. A contrast is constructed between the difficult experiences of Terry’s childhood and Brando’s acting style. Brando’s Method style
signifies a casual attitude to speaking about his difficult past. However, Brando/Terry’s excessive casualness is a masculine facade, constructing a nonchalant front to deny the emotional difficulties of Terry’s memories. While the speech could reveal a painful past, Brando’s acting constructs appearances to suggest that such matters are behind him and of no consequence. Even in performing a surface of casualness, the detailed business of the Method style functions as an index of deep problems. For a character who is still boyish, this facade is produced to make him appear mature and in control. Brando/Terry’s bits of business signify both the hero’s performance of self-assurance and his deepest anxieties.

Johnny in *The Wild One* is the leader of a biker gang, the Black Rebels Motorcycle Club. The gang take over and terrorise the inhabitants of a small town. As the gang congregate in Frank Beeker’s (Ray Teal) bar, a women from the town asks Brando/Johnny ‘what are you rebelling against’, to which his famous response is ‘whadaya got?’. The words of the line suggest the aimlessness of Johnny’s rebellion but what is also important in this moment is how Brando’s Method manners convey a rebellious attitude. The moment constructs rebellion not only as a statement of words but in how those words are spoken and the way in which the body is organised. Brando brings to the role his slurred way of speaking. A jukebox is playing jazz and Brando is slumped against the box and using his hands to play imaginary tom tom drums on the top. Brando/Johnny’s slurred voice and relaxed body add to the aimlessness which the line communicates. He is not offering any missionary vision and his way of speaking and moving is uncommitted to what he is saying. This lack of commitment does not require him to be physically or emotionally moved. He just stays with the rhythm of the music.

With Brando/Johnny, the social discontent of the rebel is not directly mapped onto a conflict with the father but with the representative of law enforcement in the town, Harry Bleeker (played by Robert Keith). Brando/Johnny’s relationship with Kathie (Mary Murphy), Keith/Harry’s daughter, will begin to separate him from the gang. It is the ineffective policing of Keith/Harry which allows the biker gang to run amok. Keith/Harry’s conciliatory approach to dealing with the gang shows his weakness in instilling the law. Keith/Harry’s weakness will lead to the men of the town, headed by Charlie Thomas (Hugh Sanders), capturing Brando/Johnny and beating him. When Brando/Johnny’s escape results in the accidental death of the barman Jimmy (William
Vedder), the law is reinstated with the arrival of Sheriff Singer (Jay C. Flippen).

In the scene where Flippen/Singer tells Brando/Johnny that he is cleared of Vedder/Jimmy's death, the inarticulacy of the rebel dominates the drama. Brando/Johnny remains silent, refusing to answer any of the questions he is asked, and just shrugs. The scene could have been the moment where the rebel admits to the error of his ways and vows never to do it again. Instead, Brando/Johnny's silence represents a refusal to communicate and abide by the laws of society. This leaves the film ending on an ambiguous note. After the gang has left the town, Brando/Johnny returns to leave Murphy/Kathie with a racing trophy he has stolen, before he rides off alone. Is he returning to the gang, or has Murphy/Kathie made him see what he could have if only he gave up his biking ways? In terms of the film's condemnation of the gang's outlaw anarchy, then the latter would appear to be the preferred reading. However, the film provides no definite conclusion and Brando's contemptuous silence provides no clear indication of the rebel's final attitude. He is clearly against the law but there is no specification of the character's reasons or reasoning for being that way.

A moment from an earlier scene seems like an ironic comment on Brando's Method manners. In the bar, the elderly Jimmy tells members of the gang that 'Everything these days is pictures, pictures and a lot of noise. Nobody even knows how to talk. Just grunt at each other'. With Dean, the problems of articulation in the Method style worked at representing the problems of becoming a man. With Brando's acting in The Wild One, it is less clear what the Method style means. Certainly the breakdown of clear articulation can be read as a refusal to be integrated into the relations of social discourse and the values that entails. However, Brando's manners do not seem to be suggesting any further psychological problem or desire. No detailed explanation is offered in the film as to why Johnny is the way he is. Only when he is beaten by Sanders/Thomas and the men of the town is the slimmest of reasons given. Brando/Johnny responds to his attackers with 'my ol' man used to hit harder than that'. While the moment can imply the 'castrating' power of the father, nothing else in Brando/Johnny's narrative develops this explanation further, and it maybe overestimating the importance to the moment to take it as providing an adequate Freudian answer for the rebel's rebelliousness.

The anti-social attitude of Brando's Method manners does not appear to be anchored by any definite problem or difficulty. Brando's character is seen as a social problem and
Johnny clearly finds society a problem. However, Brando's Method manners only signify that there is a problem and they do not in any way explain exactly what the problem is, or why there is a problem. He just constructs a surface of rebelliousness without any indication of its cause. Brando's Method manners make rebellion into a style: the inarticulacy and casualness of the voice and body, along with the iconography of motorcycles, boots and leather, turns male rebellion into a surface of signifiers without any deep motivating problem. As Johnny, Brando's performance shows that being a man just requires acting tough.

In the fifties, the discourse on conformity believed that American society was experiencing changing conditions which problematised masculine identity. The rebel films of the period saw the hero searching for the terms by which to define his own masculinity. In these films, the father is either seen to have failed in his own symbolic role, or as representing a castrating force, which, if the rebel hero is to effectively to define his gendered identity, will require him to finally come to occupy the role of the father. It was through the troubled manners of the Method style that the rebel hero tried to articulate these emotional and psychological problems. Anger appeared as the most authentic expression of the hero's agonies. The sense of male crisis found in the discourse of conformity was therefore also echoed in the melodramatic manners of the Method voice and body.

One of the conventions which Brustein observed in the rebel narrative was how the hero's eventual incorporation into society was always aided by 'the girl who loves him' (1958, 128). As examples, Brustein names Julie Harris, Natalie Wood, Eva Marie Saint and Elizabeth Taylor. Any viewing of either Harris's performance in East of Eden, Wood in Rebel Without a Cause and Saint in On the Waterfront, would make this role apparent, although in Giant, it is not Taylor but Carroll Baker who occupies the role of standing by the boy rebel who never succeeds in growing up. The cases of Harris, Saint and Baker are interesting, as each were members of the Actors Studio and they all worked with Elia
during the fifties, none can be seen to act at any moment in a manner which resembles the Method style. Brustein described the role of the rebel’s girlfriend as ‘frequently an adolescent and invariably virtuous and understanding’ who unlike the hero ‘speaks coherently (and interminably), attends school regularly, gets good grades, and is accepted from the outset by her family and friends’ (p.128). The role of the girl required her not to share in the hero’s problems but to provide the support which would enable him to see his way to achieving his eventual reconciliation with the father. For this role, the emotional traumas signified by the Method would seem inappropriate.

Even in a scene like the moment in East of Eden where Harris/Abra tells Dean/Cal of her feelings of anger when her father began a relationship with a woman she didn’t like, Harris’s acting still seems curiously peppy and above all fluent and coherent. Harris’s acting serves to contrast her with the emotional agonies of the male hero, so that her performance style becomes the sign of her ultimate virtue. Likewise, Saint in On the Waterfront plays the role of the convent girl in a polite and subdued manner. Only in A Hatful of Rain (Fred Zinnemann 1957, US), where she plays Celia Pope, the dutiful wife supporting her drug addicted husband Johnny (Don Murray), does Saint display any of the characteristics of the Method style. In one scene, she confesses to Murray/Johnny about her desires for another man. This scene stands apart from the rest of the narrative and the overall manner of Saint’s performance, as the drama concentrates on Murray/Johnny’s problems. Carroll Baker came to fame in Baby Doll (Elia Kazan 1956, US). In her role as Baby Doll, teenage wife of Archie Lee (Karl Malden), Baker’s performance required her to play a range between temperamental petulance and coy flirtatiousness, as Silva Vacarro (Eli Wallach) attempts to seduce her. The comic tone of the whole drama makes the agonies of the Method style unsuitable not only for Baker, but also for Malden and Wallach, who were also Actors Studio performers.

When discussing the working practices of the Actors Studio, Frederic Morton (1955) described the Studio as ‘the West Point of drama schools’ (p.218), and quoted James Dean as likening the work of the Studio to the training of boxers at Stillman’s Gym (p.216). These testing grounds of tough masculine disciplinary training may suggest the gendered identity of the Studio and its methods. Although the training and style of the Method discourse were never explicitly gendered, the use of the Method style did become associated with the playing out of exclusively male agonies.
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Chapter 5: Negotiating Brando

In *The Band Wagon* (Vincente Minnelli 1953 US), Fred Astaire plays Tony Hunter, a 'singing, dancing fella' star of the movies who, in his own words, finds he's become 'a has-been'. At the start of the film, Tony travels from the movie world of California to New York to take his first theatre role for years in the stage musical 'The Band Wagon'. A musical version of *Faust*, 'The Band Wagon' is the masterwork of producer, director and star Jeffrey Cordova (Jack Buchanan). Through the staging of 'Band Wagon' the show, *Bandwagon* the film examines the structure and positions of the field of cultural production. Cordova's domain is classical drama but he intends the new show to cross barriers between highbrow art and the popular musical. In a sarcastic tone, Tony comments 'it will have stature; importance'. Buchanan/Jeffrey answers these reservations by persuading Astaire/Tony that the show will rejuvenate the latter's career. Buchanan/Jeffrey's suggestion that the role will mark a departure from 'the old trademark, with the top hat, tie and tails', summarises Tony's image but also reflects on Astaire's own stardom. For Tony and Astaire, crossing over to the highbrow aspirations of 'The Band Wagon' represents a departure for both character and actual star from his familiar popular position in the field. Buchanan/Jeffrey insists the role promises to show 'a great artist at the peak of his powers'. Astaire/Tony has the more humble view of himself as 'just an entertainer'.

Astaire/Tony's co-star is Gabrielle Gerard (Cyd Charisse), a ballerina whose name, if not her accent, suggests vaguely French cultural pretensions. Tony and Gabrielle represent the two sectors of cultural production which the show is attempting to resolve: Tony's popular entertainment tradition represents the sub field of commercial success but low cultural prestige; Gabrielle's 'art' represents the triumph of prestige over economic capital. However, these positionings produce tensions in rehearsals for the show, resulting in the expression of professional differences and a clash of performance styles.
When the restricting conventions of classical ballet frustrate Astaire/Tony's dance instincts, he explodes at Buchanan/Jeffrey, shouting 'I am not Nijinsky. I am not Marlon Brando. I am Mrs Hunter's little boy, Tony. Song and dance man. I'm supposed to have entertained millions of people in my time'.

This speech maps Tony and Astaire's position in the field of cultural production. Tony and Astaire, both experienced movie stars, belong to traditions of popular entertainment. The speech voices the musical film star's difference from the cultural distinction of Gabrielle and Nijinsky's theatrical artistry. The reference to Brando is significant for how the speech also maps distinctions in film stardom. Those distinctions can be understood from the different conditions of stardom with which Astaire and Brando negotiated their careers. Astaire's stardom was established in the studio system, working for RKO in the thirties. When Brando entered films in the fifties, he publicly voiced his opposition to the Hollywood star system which had produced performers like Astaire. Brando's image in the 50s was representative of what Alexander Walker (1970) has called 'anti-stars', film performers who profess 'reluctance ... to regard themselves as stars in the accepted sense. ... labour[ing], sometimes with suspicious ostentation, to make it plain that they reject the old styles and appearances of Hollywood stars' (p.369). The oppositional character of the anti-star can be understood in two ways. The popularity of stars is frequently conditional on their images representing a dominant consensus of ideological values. The image of the anti-star represents a rebellion against those dominant values, often conceptualised roughly as the 'establishment'. With the anti-star, rebellion against the dominant ideological values of society is combined at a secondary level with a rebellion against the dominant positions in the field of cultural production and the values ascribed to legitimate culture. Economically, this rebellion can be understood as a refusal to play, or at least willingly play, by the patterns and conventions which appear to offer the best possible chances of seeing profit in commercial large-scale production. Culturally, the hierarchical positions of legitimate prestige are rejected for being equally convention bound and stifling the cultural producer's artistic autonomy. Economically and culturally, the anti-star stands as a strike for creative expression freed from the commercial popularity which positions the star. However, Walker's choice of the term 'anti-star' can be read in two ways. It either describes a performer who cultivates the image of being against stardom, or can also imply that the performer has become a star.
precisely by cultivating the image of opposing stardom.

In chapter 2, I discussed the ways in which the Actors Studio established institutional arrangements for acting practice based on a desire to resist the commercial culture of Broadway theatre and Hollywood cinema. These institutional arrangements were seen as necessary for actors to practice technique and perfect their craft independent of external economic interests. Establishing the Studio as a non-profit making workshop was central to removing the work of Studio actors from the market. Although closed to a general public, the internal activities of the Studio and the introspective techniques of the Method became publicly known, as articles and reports produced an image of the Studio which positioned institution and technique as representing a state of artistic autonomy.

Brando was a member of Robert Lewis’s advanced class when the Studio first opened in October 1947 (Garfield 1984, 52). At the time, Brando was already rehearsing the stage production of A Streetcar Named Desire with Kazan, which would open in December of that year. Through interviews with participants at the Studio, Peter Manso (1994) portrays Brando as taking a noncommittal and ambivalent attitude to the work in the months he attended sessions at the Studio (pp.263-6). Although the Method discourse frequently links the practices of the Studio with the Method style and Brando’s stardom, Brando has continually identified Stella Adler as the major influence on his early career (Brando with Lindsey; Manso: pp.105-6). On Strasberg’s influence, Brando is very direct.

After I had some success, Lee Strasberg tried to take credit for teaching me how to act. He never taught me anything. ... He was an ambitious, selfish man who exploited the people who attended the Actors Studio, and he tried to project himself as an acting oracle and guru. ... To me he was a tasteless and untalented person whom I didn’t like very much. I sometimes went to the Actors Studio on Saturday mornings because Elia Kazan was teaching, and there were usually a lot of good-looking girls. But Strasberg never taught me acting. Stella did — and later Kazan.

(Brando with Lindsey 1994, 85)

However, it is an effect of the Method discourse that despite problems with assuming
causal links between the Studio technique and Brando’s acting, it has become commonplace to view Brando as representative of the Studio’s work. For example, David Garfield (1984) sees Brando’s performance in the stage and film versions of *A Streetcar Named Desire* as ‘a performance that would become emblematic of The Actors Studio approach to acting’ (p.49).

While Brando’s denunciations problematise the link between the Studio and the actor, Garfield’s comment sums up the function which the Brando image has in the Method discourse: Brando is emblematic of the Studio and the Method technique and style. Questions of whether Brando was or was not influenced by the Studio or the Method cannot detract from the discursive effect which the Brando image has had in representing the image of the Studio and the Method. Whether influenced by the Studio or not, Brando has come to stand as the Method actor *par excellence*, his image functioning to represent the Method discourse as a particular individual. In other words, the function of Brando in the Method discourse is that his image has come to *personify* the meaning of the Method. With Brando, the introspective techniques of the Method and the private masculine dramas of the Method style, found their significance in the image of an individual self. In a discourse which includes a practical technique and style of acting which concentrate on being someone, Brando is the Method. This chapter will therefore look at how the Brando image produced an image for the Method. By examining the connections between stardom and the Method, I want to consider how Brando’s image and performance style negotiated a position in the field of cultural production and, more specifically, the changing conditions of film production and stardom in fifties Hollywood.

**Against civilisation**

Reports on Brando in the fifties continually presented an unusual image for the performer. Brando was described as behaving eccentrically or refusing the conventional trappings of Hollywood stardom. Several common stories circulated in newspaper articles at the time. It was rumoured that when a woman told Brando at a party that he ‘looks just like everybody else’, he responded by, depending on the version of the story, either standing on his head, hiding in a corner, or crawling upside down across the room.
Negotiating Brando

(Coe 1955a, 2; Martin 1955, microfiche; Zolotow 1957a, 29). Many references were made to Brando's supposedly uncivilised manners. Shortly after the release of Brando's first feature, The Men (Fred Zinnemann 1950 US), Elsa Maxwell (1950) wrote an article for Photoplay called 'That Mad Man Marlon', in which she described how Brando liked to 'shock people with bad words' and preferred to use 'his left hand as a “pusher” for food that doesn’t easily accommodate itself to his fork' (p.41). Pete Martin (1955a) remarked on how 'regardless of the company in which he found himself', Brando 'scratched himself like a monkey in a zoo' (microfiche). Vocally, Brando's uncivilised image extended to descriptions of his speech as 'thick' (Maxwell 1950, 88; Observer, microfiche). Maurice Zolotow (1957a) commented on how in interview, Brando talked 'in a low, deep voice, with the syllables slurred and the sentences forced out as if it were a considerable effort to find the right phrases to express what he wants to say', which Brando was quoted as describing as “sound[ing] like I'm talking through wet tissue” (p.13).

These uncivilised manners fitted with what were seen to be Brando's informal dress codes: 'He will walk into a restaurant', Maxwell reported, 'in whatever he happens to be wearing and usually it's old dungarees and a T-shirt' (150, 41 & 88). Zolotow (1957a) wrote about how Brando 'dressed like a plumber's helper' in a 'favourite ensemble [of] sneakers, blue jeans and a T-shirt', representing 'what might be called his Blue – or Blue Jean – Period' (p.13). Maxwell's observations come early in Brando's film career, shortly after he had played Stanley Kowalski in A Streetcar Named Desire on stage. The selective observations of Maxwell, Zolotow and others on Brando's physical behaviour, speech and dress, constructed an off-screen image of the star which reflected the Kowalski performance. The chosen details in these descriptions of Brando therefore provide associations between off- and on-screen images. Brando recognised but objected to the presumption that like Kowalski, he was 'a no-good bum, an overgrown child' (Miller 1955, 30). However, the association can be seen as an example of what Richard Dyer (1979) calls the 'perfect fit' in some star images, where on-screen roles appear to fully reflect all the aspects of a star's image (p.145).

Although Brando did not associate himself with the Actors Studio or the Method technique, the perfect fit between the off- and on-screen aspects of the Brando image produced the same closing of self and role which the Method training attempted to
achieve. The perfect fit of actor and role could produce a realism in Brando's acting, for Brando appeared to be Kowalski, and Kowalski appeared to be Brando. This perfect fit between actor and role was not just the effect of off- and on-screen images reflecting one another. As I discussed in chapter 3, the manners of the Method style gave acting the appearance of personal expression, signifying that the actor was 'acting real'. With any actor, the manners of the Method could intensify the link between actor and role. However, in Brando's particular case, star image and acting style seemed to perfectly fit one another, for the informal manners of the Method voice and body could embody the uncivilised image of the star. On-screen, he acted like an animal, and off-screen, he, well, acted like an animal.

This uncivilised performance was not only identified with the single role of Stanley Kowalski. Louis Berg linked Kowalski to the role of Ken in The Men (1953, 9), to which Richard L. Coe added the 'young tough' roles of Zapata in Viva Zapata! (Elia Kazan 1952, US), Terry in On the Waterfront (Elia Kazan 1954, US), and Johnny in The Wild One (Laslo Benedek 1953, US) (1955d, microfiche). These roles provide the most obvious examples of Brando's Method manners. Lifestyle, acting style, and selected roles, produced a unity in Brando's image, constructing the image of the rebellious, non-conformist, unsophisticated, rough but sensitive male.

These meanings and characteristics have continued to define the Brando image in subsequent decades. However, other roles and performances from the fifties significantly departed from this image: for example, Marc Anthony in Julius Caesar (Joseph L. Mankiewicz 1953 US), Napoleon in Désirée (Henry Koster 1954 US), the suave and cool Sky Masterson in Guys and Dolls (Joseph L. Mankiewicz 1955 US), the wily Japanese translator, Sakini, in the film version of The Teahouse of the August Moon (Daniel Mann 1956 US), the racially aware Major Lloyd Gruver in Sayonara (Joshua Logan 1957 US), and the disenchanted Nazi, Christian Diestl in The Young Lions (Edward Dmytryk 1958 US). At this stage, I just wish to note these other performances and I shall return to them later. What can be noted however, is that in the fifties, the unity of Brando's rebel hero image is only possible by ignoring many of the other roles he performed during the decade.
Brando's rebel image was only partly constructed around his rejection of polite, civilised society. He also had the image of being a rebel against the American film industry. During the fifties, Brando was continually quoted as stating the disgust he felt for Hollywood and the protocols of the star system. Social rebellion was therefore combined with the image of rebellion against the culture and commerce of Hollywood.

Reporters noted how Brando had no desire for the usual big houses and swimming pools enjoyed by stars. Zolotow reported that Brando 'lives in a modest three-bedroom ranch house in Pacific Palisades, a not-too-expensive neighbourhood of Los Angeles. ... a rented house -- without swimming pool or expensive grounds. He does not have servants. Servants make him feel uneasy. He does his own cooking' (1957a, 13). Rejecting stardom was therefore represented as a rejection of the class status of stars.

This opposition to the wealth or economic capital of stardom was also configured through his choice of cultural consumption. Against the materialistic consumption of expensive lifestyles, it was frequently observed that Brando choose to consume philosophical writings. Hedda Hopper reported that when Brando arrived in Hollywood in 1950 to film The Men, his personal belongings amounted to 'two pairs of blue jeans, four T shirts, two pairs of socks, and the works of the philosopher Spinoza', who she defines as 'teaching that everything is decreed by God and is therefore necessarily good' (1963, microfiche). Richard L. Coe described Brando as a reader of Nietzsche, Lao-tze and Freud (1955c, microfiche).

Brando's book collection constructed an intellectual image through an accumulation of high brow cultural capital. This negotiation of cultural capital did not involve just consuming the accepted canons of legitimate taste. Whether or not Brando actually read Nietzsche, Lao-tze or Freud, the association with such writers was important for how it linked the star with other gestures outside of dominant cultural orthodoxies. The Brando image had an indirect association with the beat culture of the fifties. Douglas T. Miller and Marion Nowak describe how during the fifties, the literary experimentation of the beats was widely attacked amongst the representatives of legitimate cultural consecration (1977, 384-390). Beat literature did not set out to oppose legitimate culture but rather, as Miller and Nowak suggest, 'restore literature and the arts to the people. to bring literature back
from its dull sleep of obscure academic poems and alienated, apathy-inducing novels' (p.384). The poetry of Allen Ginsberg, and the 'cut up' novels of William Burroughs, experimented with conventional literary forms in the same way as the improvisatory quality of the Method style fractured dramatic flow. Due to the experimental character of much beat writing, it was not sold or distributed in the established market, and Lawrence Ferlinghetti's City Lights Bookstore in San Francisco came to represent the artistic autonomy of the beats. Jack Kerouac's 1957 novel, *On the Road*, exemplified the culture of individual freedom which the beats held as sacrosanct. Kerouac's novel followed a tradition of existentialist thought that had recently been given a public profile by French left bank intellectuals like Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, who owed their philosophic credentials to the likes of Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard. Like Brando, Kerouac's heroes Dean Moriarty and Sal Paradise shunned material comforts for a jeans and T shirt existence, travelling across the United States with a few meagre possessions in a bag (Kerouac 1972). Kerouac's writing popularised a philosophy which made him a literary star, and Sartre was a philosopher who became a celebrity. Brando's 'beat' image was important to his cultural position, for he became a star who appeared 'philosophic'.

A further connection between beat culture and the Brando image was the shared association with jazz. Although Zolotow believed that Brando could afford to collect 'paintings by Matisse, Cezanne, Seurat, Gauguin and other masters of modern French painting, as do some of the less sportingly inclined actors in Beverly Hills', he noted that 'he collects nothing more expensive than records of cool jazz and hot Latin-American music' (1957a, 13). Likewise, for evening entertainment, Brando was observed to shun the chic nightclubs of Hollywood society in favour of jazz clubs (Marshall 1955, microfiche; Zolotow 1957a, 13). In the jazz world, the fifties saw the older swing tradition become replaced by what was known in the black community as 'bebop' and by whites as 'progressive'. Lewis A. Ehrenberg (1989) sees this transformation as 'a protest against the failed expectations of the past, particularly those embodied in swing.... a criticism of the failure of swing's ecstatic hopes for a modern America rooted in pluralism and individualism' (p.237). Swing had improvised on dance melodies, where bop improvised the chord patterns of popular songs, with the effect that 'unexpected qualities removed familiar signposts, making the sound unstable and the world of the listener anxious and restless' (p.240). Brando was therefore 'more abstract and less
representational’, which Ehrenberg argues made it ‘more a “head,” or listening, music’ (p.240). In Brando’s stardom, the meanings of existentialism, beat culture and jazz, were combined in an image of intellectualism, freedom of being and a freedom of artistic form. These associations contributed to Brando’s anti-stardom, for the star appeared to be either not quite a star, or something more than ‘just’ a star. That something else was constructed in how the highbrow position of philosophy, beat culture and jazz experimentation, represented interests within the field of cultural production, but outside and beyond the commercial sector of the sub-field of large scale production. Instead of bourgeois cultural prestige, which Bourdieu (1983) identifies as the dominant sector in the sub-field of large scale commercial production, Brando’s taste was positioned with the prestige of intellectual culture, the dominant position in the sub-field of restricted and autonomous production.

Bebop jazz represented an innovation in black popular music. The intellectual significance of bebop was a result of the ways in which a movement like the beats, appropriated and rarefied the innovations of bebop for a white highbrow culture. Like the beats, Brando’s identification with jazz marked a rejection of white music traditions. In contrast to the sophistication of Hollywood society, jazz represented a racially imagined other. As the melodramatic manners of the Method style used the voice and body to show an emotional truth lost by the division of the self in modernity, so jazz played with conventional white melodies to convey the vibrancy and sensuality which it could be imagined were lost to white civilised society. In Brando’s image, the moral occult of the true self was therefore linked to a racial occult, which opposed white ‘civilised’ unauthenticity to the authenticity of black ‘primitivism’.

This exploration of racial otherness forms an important aspect of Brando’s image. Zolotow reported that Brando was ‘a passionate admirer of Afro-Cuban rhythms and dance forms – like the rhumba and the mambo [and] once studied drumming and primitive dancing’ (p.13). Some of this dancing skill is displayed during Brando’s performance as Sky Masterson in Guys and Dolls. One scene requires Brando to dance the mambo. This scene alone could be seen as representing the racial occult of Brando’s image. Acting on a bet, Sky takes Sarah Brown (Jean Simmons), a prim and proper Salvation Army woman, who is repressed by her rigid morals, to Cuba. Brando/Sky and Simmons/Sarah dine at a smoky club against a background of Cuban rhythms. During the
When playing Sakini in *The Teahouse of the August Moon*, Brando's dieting and make-up was reported as making him indistinguishable from the Japanese extras in the cast (p. 13). In *Sayonara*, Brando played a racist airforce officer, Lloyd Gruver, who confronts his own prejudice. Following the tragic marriage of his friend Joe Kelly (Red Buttons) to a Japanese woman, and his own love for a Japanese dancer, Hana-Ogi (Miiko Taka), Gruver comes to admire the Japanese and criticise American bigotry. When making the film, Brando was reported in interview as saying that ‘East is West today ... I realise the higher obligations dictated by the times we live in. I want to contribute to the betterment and understanding of these people’ (Raymond 1957, microfiche). His international concerns were also seen to include Indonesia and Russia (Gold 1959, microfiche). Brando’s opposition to legitimate forms of white culture was therefore combined in his star image with a politics of white liberalism.

The image of the racially conscious and politicised star would further develop in Brando’s career. In the sixties, he championed the civil rights movement, and during the 70s participated in demonstrations by native Americans for their territorial rights (Manso 1994). Film roles such as the U.S ambassador Harrison Carter MacWhite in *The Ugly American* (George Englund 1963, US), the German spy Robert Crain in *Morituri* (aka *The Saboteur, Code Name – ‘Morituri’*) (Bernhard Wicki 1965, US), Sir William Walker in *¡Queimada!* (a.k.a *Burn!* ) (Gillo Pontecorvo 1968 IT/FR) and Colonel Walter E. Kurtz in *Apocalypse Now* (Francis Coppola 1979, US), together with his first television role as George Lincoln Rockwell, leader of the American Nazi party, in *Roots: The Next*
Generation (1979 US), each show Brando representing characters who in various ways provoke or combat racism. By appearing in roles which to various degrees are socially conscious, Brando was distinguished from other stars and film performers for his interests appeared to extended beyond the field of cultural production. He appeared disinterested in the power relationships in the field and more interested in the relationships of power which operated outside the field.

Along with rejecting the lifestyle and cultural status of stardom, reporters continually noted how Brando opposed the financial rewards of Hollywood success. In interview, Brando defined Hollywood as a financial trap for performers and described what he saw as the insincerity of the film business community.

> People are trapped by their wealth. Hollywood has to ring up dollars like a cash register. ... When I first came out here I got $40,000 a picture. The smiles people gave me showed two teeth. Then I was paid around $125,000. I get both uppers and lowers, but they're locked together. The mouth goes up at the corners but the teeth are set.

(Martin 1955a, microfiche)

Brando linked the financial wealth of stars to the tendency of studios to typecast performers: 'I'll never get the big fat grins that go with $250,000 a picture. They only pay that kind of money to cowboy stars. Each month I'm sent a couple of cowboy scripts, several hunt-and-poke-around-and-chase-'em-in-the-dark movies and other mongrel literature. I send them back promptly' (microfiche). Several of Brando's performances in the fifties would provide him with some of the highest fees paid to film performers in the period. However, the image of Brando constructed a distance between him and economic capital. Reporters drew attention to how it was rumoured that Brando handed over all his income to his father to manage, receiving a weekly allowance of only $150 (Maxwell 1950, 88; Zolotow 1957a, 12). He was portrayed as failing in financial management, spending the allowance in a day, and then borrowing from friends and acquaintances (Martin 1955a, microfiche).

His accumulated wealth was represented as a means to an end. His father, Marlon Brando Sr. set up the company Marsdo (short for 'Marlon's dough'). investing in the
ownership of a cattle ranch in Nebraska (Lewin 1954, microfiche; Martin 1955a, microfiche). In a further gesture of economic disinterest, Brando rejected any suggestion that these business dealings were established for the purpose of enterprise. He described the ranch as 'the result of a long term plan. ... a nest egg for myself', which would allow him to retire from films and return to stage acting (Cheney 1953, microfiche). Specifically artistic reasons were given for wanting to work in the theatre. After the censorship outcry which had greeted the releases of A Streetcar Named Desire and The Wild One, Brando believed theatre allowed for creative freedoms which could not be obtained in cinema.

Ambivalence towards the accumulation of economic capital was not therefore portrayed as cutting the performer off entirely from financial reward, but economic gain was seen as only secondary to artistic priorities. Brando described this attitude in moralistic terms: ‘Most of the successful Hollywood people are failures as human beings ... It’s not that I consider making money sinful. It’s only immoral when it gets you instead of your getting it’ (Martin 1955a, microfiche). He explained his obvious economic power as a weakness, saying of his presence in Hollywood that ‘”I’m only here because I don’t have the moral strength to turn down money”’ (Coe 1955a, microfiche). The image of economic disinterest complemented Brando’s philosophic image. He appeared as a star who would sooner embrace the cultural capital of intellectual thought than the economic capital of Hollywood stardom.

Brando in business

Alexander Walker’s (1970) description of the ‘anti-star’ would seem to implicitly refer to Brando’s image:

[Anti-stars] do not live in Hollywood: more important, they do not invariably make their movies in Hollywood studios, or, indeed, in any studio if need be. They take on the colouration of a non-Hollywood background both at work and between pictures. They do not go in for conspicuous glamour, though they do go in for conspicuous casualness. They often dress the role of rebels as well as play it. They are immune from the fear of scandal...because they often sanction and
set the style for the permissive behaviour of their audiences.

(p.369)

The Brando image did contrast with the images of performers like Fred Astaire who had become stars in the studio system of the thirties and forties. The oppositional stance of the Brando image did therefore represent a form of anti-stardom against that model of Hollywood production. However, Brando’s entry into films during the 50s occurred at a time when the Hollywood industry was undergoing significant changes which would effect the economic and cultural conditions of film stardom. When considered in those changing conditions, Brando did not represent an opposition to stardom, but rather the new conditions of stardom.

Until the late forties, film production in Hollywood was dominated by five major studios: Loew’s (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer), Warner Brothers, RKO, Paramount and Fox. These five majors maintained their power by ownership of production resources, distribution networks and chains of first run cinemas. This control of production, distribution and exhibition enabled the majors to sustain a ‘vertically integrated’ system through the thirties and forties. Although Universal and Columbia operated as producer-distributors, and United Artists distributed films produced by independent companies, these smaller studios depended on theatre chains owned by the majors to exhibit their films.

Control of distribution allowed the majors to force restrictive trade practices such as ‘block-booking’, ‘blind buying’, ‘designated play dates’ ‘clearance’ and ‘zoning’ to control the supply of films to independent exhibitors (Huettig 1944, 116-26). These trading practices severely limited the available market for independent production companies. Rather than compete between themselves, the major studios would show films by the other studios, preventing independent producers and exhibitors from actively competing in the film trade. In this way, the major studios could consolidate an oligopolistic control of the American film industry in the thirties and forties (Balio 1985b).

The power of the major studios enabled the heads of the studios to practice despotic power over the careers of the stars they employed. The power of the studios over the stars in the thirties and forties has been widely documented (e.g Clark 1995: Davis 1993:
Negotiating Brando 165

Collaboration between the studios prevented stars from stepping outside of the system to find work in the independent sector, or to set up their own independent productions. In the studio system of the thirties and forties, leading performers were hired by the studios on contracts lasting seven years. While the studios retained the option to terminate a star’s contract if they so wished, the star had no legal right to break the contract (Clark 1995, p.23). For the period of the contract, the studio effectively owned the star, having the power to determine the performer’s salary and controlling decisions over which productions the performer would appear in (Huettig 1944, 93-4). In matters of casting, studio management had the contractual power to plan which, and how many, roles a star should play (Walker 1970, 252). Performers were loaned between studios, with the renting studio paying the performer’s salary plus 75 percent to the studio lending the performer (Huettig 1944, 94; Staiger 1985c, 323). This trade in stars confirmed the economic importance of lead performers and was one of the ways in which the majors collaborated to maintain the oligopoly, as the high costs of loaning performers excluded independent companies from the market (Huettig 1944, 93).

Any star who showed dissent over the roles they were offered, or who refused to be loaned to another studio, faced the threat of suspension without pay. After suspension, a star could expect to be offered less desirable roles at a lower salary (Clark 1995, 23). The period for which a star was suspended was also discounted from the term of the contract, so that the suspended period could be added to the duration of the contract, lengthening the total term for which a star was effectively owned (Gaines 1992, 152). An alternative way of ‘punishing’ a star was to lend the star to an independent production which it was presumed would be unlikely to succeed, what Mae Huettig called ‘the Hollywood equivalent of Siberia’ (1944, 93).

The term contract represented a negotiation over the economic capital of the film performer but it also operated as a legal mechanism for the construction and distribution of the symbolic capital of the star’s image. Control of casting allowed the studios to typecast, unifying the on-screen image of the star by offering similar roles to a performer (Clark 1995, 23). During the twenties, morality clauses were included as part of the personal services contract to bring the private lives of stars under the legal control of the studios (Gaines 1992, 146; Walker 1970, 245). Control of typecasting could therefore
produce a stable on-screen image for the star, while the morality clause attempted to close any differences between on-screen and off-screen lives.

Independent producers and exhibitors continually contested in court the legality of the power which the majors held over the film industry. Antitrust actions particularly called for the divorcing of theatre holdings from the studios's production and distribution interests (Bourenman 1951). After a series of failed actions, in December 1946 a decree was passed to make the ending of admission prices, clearance and block booking compulsory (Conant 1981, 540). A further stage in the dismantling of the studio system came when in May 1948, the Supreme Court ruled that Paramount should divorce its theatres from their production-distribution interests. The order to divorce production and distribution from exhibition effected all the majors, but they did not all respond immediately to the decree, and elements of the vertically integrated system remained throughout the fifties.

Control of distribution and exhibition had provided the majors with a guaranteed market for all the films they produced. Accordingly, production did not concentrate on single film projects but on the mass production of a continuous supply of new releases. Following divorcement, production in the studios was reorganised during the fifties. Films could no longer be sold in blocks, and any one film could only succeed in the market depending on its own merits. Instead of mass production, the studios began to produce films as individual deals, involving a producer 'packaging' various creative and technical personnel for a single feature. Pre-production in the 'package-unit' system saw the combination of a writer, with a script, together with one or two stars and a director (MacCann 1962, 55). Package-unit production resulted in a decline in the quantity of films produced and larger sums were invested in single projects. Production costs were raised as the difference of any single film in the market was signified by the quality of production values and big star names. Promotional costs were also to increase as campaigns had to be organised to sell a single title.

With fewer films in production, the studios leased their physical plant and some technical departments to independent producers. The majors also went into co-production with the independents, or else acted as distributors for independent productions (p.55). To cut overheads, the studios laid off contracted labour. This was to have an impact on the employment of stars and all film performers. The conditions of the seven year term
contract had severely limited the power of stars and performers to control their own careers. Freed from the term contract, star names were in a particularly advantageous position to make their own career decisions. In the late forties, Louis B. Mayer had offered Brando $3,000 a week to sign to MGM on a seven year contract. Peter Manso (1994) suggests that this and other offers were rejected by Brando following advice from Stella Adler (p.180). Turning down the term contract retained Brando’s autonomy, and after he’d entered films, most of Brando’s work in the 50s would be contracted for single film deals.

If the single film contract provided Brando with economic independence, the choice of *The Men* as a first film represents a gesture to negotiate work of cultural value. *The Men* offered a caustic view of the effects of war, concentrating on how Brando’s character, Ken Wilochek, comes to terms with his paraplegia after being wounded in action. Made only five years after the Second World War, the film displays its consciousness of real life dramas. Although Ken’s problems are represented as a melodrama of masculinity, the film and Brando’s performance position producer and performer with the autonomous interest of producing socially conscious drama rather than commercial entertainment. Stanley Kramer, producer of *The Men*, ran his own independent production company, and he and Brando would work together again on *The Wild One*, which also set out to confront contemporary social problems.

The choice of *The Men* also became an occasion for Brando to display his commitment to artistic endeavours. Newspapers reported that Brando had prepared for the role by spending four weeks in a wheelchair on a paraplegic ward at Birmingham Veterans’ Administration Hospital (Maxwell 1950, 88; Observer 1954, microfiche). Such stories formed a link between topical issues and the discourse of acting: the work of acting was represented as the labour of disciplinary integrity in the service of artistic responsibility, as the seriousness of Brando’s work paid tribute to the seriousness of the film’s subject matter. Apart from his slurred speech, Brando’s performance displays little of the characteristics of the Method style, yet knowledge of Brando’s preparations forms the image of the actor personally investing self experience into performance, a central component the Method’s confessional technique.

To launch the new performer, United Artists’ press releases for the film promoted the image of Brando rejecting economic interests as part of an anti-star lifestyle (United
Artists 1950a, 1950b and 1950c). The image of rebellious individuality was therefore immediately used to market Brando. Although the Method discourse produced in Brando’s image the sense of the performer working to stage the self against the commercial pressures of stardom – investing his energies in the production of truth in art, not profit – the marketing of Brando circulated that image to seek profit in the selling of a star self.

The single picture deal gave Brando the independence during the 50s to make films as diverse as *Julius Caesar*, *Guys and Dolls* and *The Teahouse of the August Moon*. However, that independence was challenged when in 1952 he signed to Twentieth Century-Fox to make *Viva Zapata!*. In return for the $100,000 demanded by Brando, Fox’s head of production Darryl Zanuck succeeded in obtaining a multi-film option on the star’s services (Manso 1994, 306). The second film in this deal was intended to be an adaptation of Mika Waltari’s novel *The Egyptian*. Delays with the final weeks of production for *On the Waterfront* saw Brando absent from the set at a cost of $10,000 per day for Fox. These difficulties were exacerbated when on his first available day, Brando failed to show up. Rumours circulated about Brando’s lack of enthusiasm for the project, but the preferred explanation for the star walking out came in reports that a telegram was sent to Fox from the New York psychoanalyst Bela Mittelmann, who after seeing Brando diagnosed him as a “‘sick and mentally confused boy’” (quoted in Muller 1954, 18).

Reporting of the incident is significant for how professional recalcitrance was linked to implied mental instability. The incident not only initiated the image of Brando as a difficult and expensive star but also appeared to expose a ‘sick’ and ‘confused’ private truth. The incident opposed big budget corporate production to ‘mad’ artistic individualism. The eccentric behaviour and casual dress sense which signified Brando’s anti-stardom was explained by reference to “‘his inherent feeling of insecurity mak[ing] him misbehave to gain attention’” (quoted in Martin 1955b, microfiche). The image of Brando was therefore read through a pathology of performance: rebellious style and anti-star status were interpreted as the result of a deep insecurity which made Brando ‘show off’. Reference to psychoanalysis identified the actor with a practice in search of a private self. Popular Freudianism mirrored the introspective investigations and therapeutic techniques of Strasberg’s Method technique, and the reporting of Brando’s psychoanalysis appeared to confirm the suspicion that Method acting and actors revelled
in a kind of ‘madness’. The Method technique encouraged the actor to search for experiences which were hidden but which through their release could bring truth to performance. Brando’s analysis appeared to reveal a world beyond rational thought and managed feeling, representing a private truth outside rational social control. As the Method technique ‘rebelled’ against repression, so Brando’s ‘madness’ did not contradict but rather assured the truthfulness of his rebellious image.

Single film deals put stars in the position of bargaining over the personal monopoly of their image and talent with each new contract. For stars who were in demand, this enabled the negotiation of ever higher salaries, with many stars opting to include a share of profits as part of their deal (MacCann 1962, 53-4). For The Men, Brando received $40,000, but his fee soon escalated to $75,000 for A Streetcar Named Desire, and Twentieth Century Fox agreed to $100,000 for Viva Zapata! in return for the multi-film option. The Fox deal was to briefly weaken Brando’s bargaining position. After he walked out of The Egyptian, Fox filed a suit against him of $2 million for costs incurred from delays to production. To avoid being sued, Brando agreed to take the role of Napoleon in Fox’s production of Désirée (Manso 1994, 384). The contractual commitment provided Fox with the means to force Brando’s fee down to $50,000 for The Young Lions (p.445). Brando’s dealings with Fox illustrated the residual power of studios to exercise considerable control in bargaining with the newly independent stars.

As the majors responded to divorcement, growth could be observed in the independent sector. The studio contracts had prevented stars from also becoming producers, but as more stars were freed from term contracts, many began to use their name to form independent companies. By forming their own company, stars could capitalise further on their growing fees, for income could be counted under capital gains rather than personal salary (MacCann 1962, 54). Although independent production did provide stars with more active control in creative decision making, the dependency of the independents on the majors to distribute their work prevented the possibility of limitless artistic freedom and, in Richard Dyer MacCann’s opinion, the studios could retain a conservative control over which subjects and scripts would be supported for production (p.60).

By investing in Marsdo Inc., Brando diversified into business outside of films. However, the reporting of Marlon Brando Sr’s allowance of $150 per week for his son still produced the image of the star as independent of commercial concerns. Brando
followed the trend for star based independents by forming Pennebaker Productions in 1956. His father, Marlon Sr, and a friend, George Englund, became partners in the company. They were joined by George Glass, who had been associate producer on *The Men*, and Walter Seltzer, who brought with him his experience of working for MGM, Warners, Columbia, and another star based independent, Hecht-Lancaster (Manso 1994, 413).

With *Sayonara*, Pennebaker's first film, the financial advantages of independence were immediately felt: Brando claimed a fee of $300,000 for his performance, while also opting for 10% of the gross (p.422). Adapted for film from an already successful novel and stage play, it was unsurprising that *Sayonara* grossed over $10 million. The combination of fee and percentage made *Sayonara* Brando's most personally profitable film until his appearance in *The Godfather* in 1972 (p.422). With *The Young Lions* in the following year, Fox drove down Brando's price. However, on *The Fugitive Kind* (Sidney Lumet 1959, US), co-produced by Pennebaker together with Martin Jurow and Richard Shepard's Jurow-Shepherd Productions, Brando became the first star to reach the $1 million mark for a single performance (p.500).

Talent agents achieved a new importance in the package-unit system. Alongside performers and writers, top agencies represented directors and producers. With the reorganisation of the studios, a larger body of freelance labour became represented by such agencies. Agents took responsibility for initiating and managing the packaging of a project, bringing together star, writer, script and director (MacCann 1962, 54). In production planning, the power of the agents therefore began to equal if not replace that of producers and studio executives. This power was evident in how some agents began to assume the role of producer. Ben Hecht, agent for Burt Lancaster, joined his star client in 1953 to form Hecht-Lancaster, the first agent-star independent. By acting as producers, agents became both the managers and representatives of labour. In 1939, the Screen Actors Guild had restricted such a conflict of interests by prohibiting agents from producing films (Prindle 1988, 78). However, in the early fifties, the Guild saw its place in Hollywood weakening as more performers began to find work in television and switching membership to the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA). Responding to pressure from agents, the Guild passed a waiver in 1952 which could allow agents to produce, opening the door for the agent-star independents (n.80).
Music Corporation of America (MCA), the largest of the talent agencies, was instrumental in negotiating for the waiver. Along with other major agencies like William Morris and Famous Artists, MCA packaged talent for film production. MCA illustrates how the power of agencies allowed creative management to diversify. From the talent agency MCA Artists Ltd grew not only MCA-TV which distributed television films, but also Management Corporation of America, which packaged live television shows, and Revue Productions, a large producer of television films including Wagon Train and Alfred Hitchcock Presents (Canby 1959, 23). The power of MCA also extended into ownership of studio resources. In 1958, $35,000,000 was paid for Paramount's library of 700 pre-1948 films, and in 1959, $11,250,000 bought the production plant of Universal. Seeing how powerful MCA had become in Hollywood, and regarding their own actions as complicit in this rise, in 1961 the Screen Actors Guild retracted its waiver, and in July 1962, after anti-trust proceedings, MCA signed a consent decree to divest itself of the talent agency and retain its production resources (Prindle 1988, 89-90). This example was followed by many other former agents who, faced with a choice, regarded production as a more lucrative enterprise than representing clients.


MCA's capital of stars provided the agency with significant bargaining power in Hollywood, and it was the power of MCA which enabled Kanter to negotiate Brando's escalating salaries in the fifties. Brando's star power was conditional upon the power which MCA held in film and, increasingly, television production. However, agencies did not have absolute power to bargain over the economic capital of stars. The Fox production. The Young Lions. packaged Brando with other MCA clients. Clift and
Martin. As Brando was still tied by the multi-picture commitment to Fox, his fee was driven down to $50,000, while Clift was rumoured to earn $750,000 for his performance (Manso 1994, 445). Dean Martin, suffering a career slump after splitting with Jerry Lewis, settled for $25,000 (p.448). MCA were also active in setting up independent production companies for several of their star clients, including Pennebaker for Brando (p.412). For the agency’s involvement in negotiations between Pennebaker and the studios, MCA took a 10% cut from budgets paid by the studios (p.416).

While the post-studio climate provided many advantages for star performers, it had its disadvantages for some stars and other actors. Although the seven year contract exploited performers, those who held such contracts could count on relatively stable employment compared to working in theatre. A decline in the quantity of films produced, combined with rising costs, reduced the potential employment opportunities for many film performers. Television became the venue for some of the less popular stars, while others maintained their careers by choosing to remain under multiple-year or multiple-picture contracts with the studios (Kindem 1982b, 89). Brando therefore succeeded in negotiating his position as part of an aristocracy of film performers.

Although the Brando image rebelled against stardom, Brando can be seen as negotiating a position in the post-studio environment which was representative of many of the main trends in the new conditions for stardom. The single film deal, the negotiation of inflated salaries, and percentages on top of salaries, along with his own production company, showed Brando exemplifying rather than rejecting the economic possibilities which became available to Hollywood stars in the fifties.

**Method manners and stardom**

By the end of the 50s, the business dealings of Brando would put him in the position of directing his first and only feature, *One-Eyed Jacks* (1960, US), produced by Pennebaker and Paramount. Brando’s inexperience soon showed, as in pre-production and production, the film went massively over budget. Possibly the most costly element of the production was Brando’s directing approach, which involved allowing actors unlimited improvisation while shooting (Schumach. clipping). What is significant about *One-Eyed Jacks*...
Jacks was not the question of whether Brando was a good director or not, but of how a free wheeling artistic approach was linked to a consolidation of economic and creative power.

Writing in the *Herald Tribune* in 1956, Joe Hyams reported the discontent of an informal group calling itself Actors Fed up With Actors Studio Graduates (AFWASG). Several actors were quoted as protesting against the 'unfair practices' of Actors Studio performers when working on film. One 'famous comedy star' was reported as saying that 'Actors Studio people never give anything of themselves in a scene ... they just play the scene as if they're the only ones in it and it's impossible for another actor to get a reaction he can play to. They force you to play to them' (microfiche). A 'top box office star' said that in rehearsal, Actors Studio actors 'don't stick to the lines. ... They say anything that comes to mind leaving you to try and find your cues by guesswork' (microfiche). A similar criticism was offered by another actor, who at the time was working with 'a prominent Studio graduate', and found difficulties in rehearsals because '[the Studio graduate] gives nothing - just mumbles. He doesn't even attempt to project. But during the performance he blasts and throws every one else off' (microfiche). Criticising the earnestness of Studio graduates, a 'young film star' complained she was tired of 'serious introverts who think so highly of their talents that they knock you over reaching for the salt rather than using words to ask for it' (microfiche). Hyam's 'famous comedy star' and 'top box office star' both suggest that the Method distracted from ensemble playing.

In the fifties, the improvisatory style of the Method co-existed with other movements which associated the disruption of form as necessary for contacting the authentically real. This freedom of improvisation was found in the beat poetry and stream of consciousness writing of Allen Ginsberg for example. A similar play with poetic form and convention was also championed by Charles Olsen and the so-called Black Mountain poets, who saw
the disruption of form as liberating language from a representational function, to produce an anti-rationalist discourse which broke through the unauthenticity of modern existence (Bertens 1995, 20-1). In this period, a similar spirit also motivated the paintings of Abstract Expressionism, particularly the ‘action painting’ of artists like Jackson Pollock, Clyfford Still and Franz Kline. Pollock improvised by dripping paint onto canvas, letting chance take its course so that he felt ‘I’m not aware of what I’m doing ... there is pure harmony, an easy give and take, and the painting comes out well’ (quoted in Oliver 1993, 296). The similarities between the beliefs which Abstract Expressionism represented and the meaning of the Method are suggested by this assessment of Pollock’s paintings by John Berger (1958), which could be mistaken for describing the Method itself.

He would want to express his ideas and feelings ... but he would lack any vocabulary of seen or remembered visual images with which to do so. He would have nothing more than the gestures he could discover through the act of applying his coloured marks ... These gestures might be passionate and frenzied ... the tragic spectacle of a deaf mute trying to talk.

(p.722)

The connections did not escape Berger, for he made direct reference to the Method when discussing Pollock: ‘Having the ability to speak, he acted dumb (Here a little like James Dean)’ (p.722). It was the individual freedom signified by Abstract Expressionism which enabled it to be co-opted by the C.I.A. sponsored Congress for Cultural Freedom to represent the creative liberties of the United States during the Cold War, and was also integral to the formation of a distinctively American avant-garde (Crane 1987; Guilbaut 1983).

While Brando’s Method style also disrupted formal aesthetic convention, there are difficulties with seeing Brando’s improvisatory style as part of an avant-garde in film acting. At the level of representation, the manners of the Method did not seek to disrupt realist representation in search of a more authentic aesthetic. Instead, the Method style became a refinement of realist representation. A second difficulty with seeing Brando’s Method manners as in anyway avant-garde arises from the star’s positioning in the sub-field of large scale commercial production in which his Method manners became integral
to the construction of stardom and not radical aesthetics. Lez Cooke (1986) argues that the emphasis on the individual in Method training allowed it to be easily integrated into Hollywood stardom (pp.21-2). Richard Maltby and Ian Craven (1995) also link the Method style with star status. They suggest that as the Method style could appear to 'abolish the distinction between the actor and the role', the 'truthfulness' or 'authenticity' of the act 'created a pure presence of character unadulterated by any sense of the performer’s separate identity' (p.258). They argue that this sense of presence and 'authenticity' could distinguish the Method actor from other actors by casting 'the artificialities and histrionics of other acting techniques ... as insincere' (p.258). The style differentiated the Method actor from the ensemble, giving that actor star presence.

I have already suggested that Brando’s performance in The Men has only the merest details of the Method style. However, on release of the film, critics nevertheless drew attention to what they saw as the distinctiveness of Brando’s style. Reviewing the film for the New York Times, Bosley Crowther saw Brando’s performance to be both realistic and idiosyncratic:

His face, the whole rhythm of his body and especially the strange timbre of his voice, often broken and plaintive and boyish, are articulate in every way. Out of stiff and frozen silences he can lash into a passionate rage with the fearful and flailing frenzy of a taut cable suddenly cut. Or he can show the poignant tenderness of [a] doctor with a child.

(1950, 15)

Red Kann, writing for the Motion Picture Herald, mentioned how Brando ‘attracted attention along Broadway for his rather personalised and unique performance in “A Street Car [sic] Named Desire”, and found his performance in The Men to be ‘also stylised somewhat’. This uniqueness made Kann uncertain as to the success of the performance and Brando’s future as an actor: ‘It is difficult to conclude what his public acceptance will be. The impression is that he will appear more comfortable before the camera when he becomes more accustomed to it’ (1950, 301). The Variety review for The Men also noted the distinctiveness of Brando’s style, again linking the style to Brando’s previous theatre performances, but judged the style as disrupting the realism of his first film performance:
Brando fails to deliver with the necessary sensitivity and inner warmth which would transform an adequate portrayal into an expert one. Slight speech impediment which sharply enhanced his “Streetcar” role jars here. His supposed college graduate depiction is consequently not completely convincing. (1950)

Reviewers therefore considered Brando’s style as individually distinctive while taking different views over the relative realism of the style: Crowther sees the style as adequately representing the traumas of Ken Wilochek, where the Variety review interprets the distinctiveness of personal style as overriding the representation of character.

Brando’s performance in The Men provides only a slight example of Method manners. As the reviews of The Men noted, the distinctiveness of Brando’s style was already known from the stage production of A Streetcar Named Desire. Brando’s film performance in the role can be seen as a more fully blown example of a ‘high’ Method style. The uncivilised manners of the Method style appeared ideally suited to the animalistic vulgarity of Stanley Kowalski, producing what Gavin Lambert referred to in the Monthly Film Bulletin as ‘a primitive performance’ (1952, 33). The same high Method characteristics are also to be found in Brando’s performances in On the Waterfront and The Fugitive Kind. Variety took the ‘groping for words, use of the vernacular... pugilist’s walk and gestures’ in Brando’s performance as Terry Malloy, as ‘highlights of a beautiful and moving portrayal’ (1954b, 18). For Steve Sondheim in Films in Review, ‘Brando is Brando, which in this case is good’ (1954, 360), implying that the performance was seen as a unity of star, style and character. I have previously discussed Xavier’s speech at the opening of The Fugitive Kind as probably the most concentrated and condensed display of Brando’s Method manners in any of his films from the fifties. ‘Brando is back to mumbling with marbles in his mouth too often’, was how the Variety critic described the performance (1960).

Brando’s performances in The Wild One, A Streetcar Named Desire, and On the Waterfront, have become the most frequently cited examples of Brando’s acting in the fifties. These performances serves to construct a unity for the star’s image, linking rebellious characters and the uncivilised rebellious manners of the Method style with the rebellious anti-stardom of Brando’s lifestyle image. As character, style and lifestyle
merge in the image of the rebel, on-screen performances appear as an extension of the star’s off-screen self. Brando was constructed as the Method actor in public and in private.

Earlier, I suggested that the unity of this image depends on excluding many other performances which Brando produced in the fifties. Zapata in *Viva Zapata!* is a rebel, but the historical context and Mexican setting are removed from the contemporary, urban American rebellion of Stanley Kowalski, Johnny, and Terry Malloy. In fact, the periodisation and nationality of the familiar Brando rebel figure is significant in demarcating performances which appear to fit the unity of the Brando image and those which disrupt that unity and are rendered largely absent from the star’s image.

Brando’s performance as Zapata provides the merest glimpses of the Method style. Only in the pausing, looks off screen, and slurring of words during Zapata’s first speech to General Diaz (Fay Roope), does Brando present any elements of the Method style. As the scene places Brando alongside several Mexican actors, what is most noticeable about the performance is the choices which the star has made to signify Mexicanness: darkened hair, eye make-up, thick moustache and brief hints of an accent. In *Films in Review*, Henry Hart remarked on how ‘the role was often beyond [Brando]. His techniques are still too few. His limited resources often obliged him to play wholly dissimilar scenes in exactly the same way. And his face is too young – despite a curious make-up which Orientalised his eyes’ (1952, 134).

The national and racial limits of the Method can also be seen in Brando’s performances as Napoleon in *Désirée*, Sakini in *The Teahouse of the August Moon*, and Christian Diestl in *The Young Lions*. There is no evidence in these performances of Method manners. Significant differences are produced between these performances, the most obvious of which are the choices to adopt an accent for each character. Although the Method voice was always American, the differences of these accents from the Method voice is not just a matter of imitating national dialects. For Napoleon and Diestl, Brando’s voice is noticeably more fluent and coherent than his slurred Method speech. In *Désirée*, the coherence of the voice signifies weight and gravity, suggesting not only the pomposity of Brando’s characterisation of Napoleon but also, despite the film’s negligent approach to historicity, solemn historicism. Brando’s clipped tones in *The Young Lions* play on familiar Teutonic tvnage to signify the disciplinarvty of Diestl’s Arvan beliefs.
As Sakini in *The Teahouse of the August Moon*, Brando's voice and physical actions have a buoyancy and liveliness which are missing from the casual attitude of the slurred Method voice and loose, relaxed body. Make-up is used to transform Brando's appearance, but in terms of performance style, Brando's acting seems to be as much determined by the conventions of comedy performance as it is by national typage. Bosley Crowther found this departure from type particularly problematic: 'Mr Brando's appearance as Sakini', said Crowther, 

is ... broad and bounding, shot through with japes, but somehow it lacks the warmth and candour that are called for ... Mr Brando looks too synthetic. A conspicuous make-up of his eyes and a shiny black wig do not imbue him with an oriental cast. And his manner of speaking broken English, as though he had a wad of chewing gum clenched between his teeth, is not only disconcerting but also makes him hard to understand.

(1956, 19)

It is not only national and racial difference which is seen to problematise the plausibility of Brando in the role but also his style of performance. Brando's performance as Sky Masterson in *Guys and Dolls* also represented a departure from the Method. Again, the conventions of comedy performance make the melodramatic intensity of the Method inappropriate, but also requirements for Masterson to dance and sing at points, dictate a rhythm for performance which could not be transformed by the improvisatory effects of the Method voice and body. Taking into account performances such as Napoleon, Diestl, Sakini and Masterson, it is legitimate to make a distinction in Brando's acting during the fifties between his Method and non-Method performances.

I suggested in chapter 3 that the pauses and business of the Method style made a show of the actor's work which exceeded the words of the script. What is at stake in such actions is the authorship and control of the performance. The actor's voice and body produce signifiers which are solely of his or her making, controlling the rhythm and flow of the entire performance in these minute actions. Brando's first speech in *The Fugitive Kind* is staged with the actor alone in frame, without edits or music, and his voice and body produce the pauses, repetitions, and idle gestures which control the scene. These
actions have the plausibility of acting real but also become excessively mannered, showing the actor is really acting. The uses of the voice and body in the scene therefore have effects of power. Brando appears to have artistic control, as the scene moves at a pace purely dictated by Brando’s voice and body. The broken speaking and leisurely gestures of Brando have allowed him to wrestle some time and space for his performance alone, and the improvisatory quality of the speech gives the impression of the actor having complete control over production for that moment. When it is considered that the performance also brought Brando a $1 million fee, then the scene can also be read as a moment in which the power of the symbolic capital of acting style was transferred into economic capital.

In his criticisms of the Method, Robert Brustein (1958) argued that the improvisatory style had effected the relationship between the work of the actor and the writer. He suggested that the ‘consequence of this style of acting...[is] an actor’s theatre. The actor has taken precedence over the playwright; the play has receded before the performance’ (p.126). What Brustein’s argument implies is that the words of the writer confront the voice and body of the actor in a struggle over the authorship of performance. In the case of The Fugitive Kind, Brando’s voice and body win the struggle against Tennessee Williams’s words. The Method style therefore saw Brando using the voice and body to negotiate his star status and power.

**National culture and the limits of the Method**

While the Brando image enabled the actor to negotiate a position of power in Hollywood during the fifties, that image, and the characteristics of the Method style, also restricted the possible positions which the actor could legitimately occupy in the field of cultural production. Brando’s non-Method performances in Desirée, The Teahouse of the August Moon, The Young Lions, and Guys and Dolls, show the limitations in the signifying power of the Method’s manners. Cultural conventions of national typage, and the theatrical conventions of comedy and the musical, restricted the plausible distribution of the Method’s cultural and symbolic capital. These restrictions saw Brando confronting barriers to cultural legitimacy as he negotiated his career trajectory during the fifties.
Part of the Method’s image in the fifties was formed by how the style was understood to be distinctively American. Tyrone Guthrie saw the Group Theatre as belonging to a political avant-garde in the depression era, part of a ‘literary and theatrical movement [which] was an earnest and conscious expression of American nationalism’ (1957, 23). Likewise, the Actors Studio was believed to have ‘literally given birth to the clearest, most carefully defined, most virile approach to the player’s craft that the American theatre has produced’ (Kerr 1956, 1). Against those critics who saw the Method style as limiting and constraining the actor ‘to a naturalistic, shuffling, mumbling, itching and scratching imitation of Marlon Brando’, national identity and cultural tradition was used to defend how ‘The Method will in fact help [actors] to find a new, marvellous, American way of playing the classics, that will be right for our country and our times’ (Peck 1956, 48).

Usually the Americanness of the Method was presented in opposition to other national theatrical traditions. In 1964, Harold Clurman compared American actors to the differences he saw in English and French acting, quoting the British theatre director Peter Brook description of the distinctions:

“English actors find it difficult to externalise. They want to, but they retreat. One must ‘open them up’. ... it is no easy matter to make the English actor express emotion.

The contrary is true of French actors. The moment they read a script, bing-bang, they begin to “emote” – spontaneously but superficially”.

(quoted in Clurman 1964, 18)

For Clurman, the main difference came from how the ‘British actor aims chiefly at making the dramatist’s intentions clear. ... tend[ing] to remain impersonal’ and ‘rarely seek[ing] to expose his own soul’, where the American actor ‘especially in recent years – seems hell-bent on doing so’ (p.18).

In Clurman’s opinion, these differences were not just a matter of style or training but of social conditions and culture. Clurman links the class structure of British society to the control of manners in a way which closely echoes Norbert Elias’s accounts of the ‘civilising process’ and the refining of behaviour in court society.
For hundreds of years, English society has been built around a relatively fixed class structure. The court and the aristocracy have set the tone for behaviour. Education has fashioned a decorum which makes restraint, even repression, of outward shows of strong feeling a prime objective. Understatement has become a recognised feature of British address, and the "stiff upper lip" an almost traditional trait. The standards thus established by the ruling class have left their mark on members of all classes. The imprint of this education is on the British actor, even when he is determined or led by circumstances to cast it aside.

(pp.18-19)

Clurman asked if the common perception that, in comparison to British actors, American actors appeared to be more 'natural' and 'vital', are 'concomitants of a new, open, democratic and increasingly "classless" society?' (p.19). American acting, including the improvisatory liberty of the Method style, was therefore read as the reflection of a tradition of democratic freedom.

It is this national and artistic freedom which Clurman argues lead the American actor to perceive the 'refinement of speech or carriage' of classical drama 'as "conventional" and convention is what he has gone into the theatre to escape' (p.64). This turn in argument maps national difference onto positions in the field of cultural production: the 'freedom' of American acting does not fit with the high brow culture of classical drama, for which the 'refinement' of British acting is taken as ideally suited. In an earlier article on national differences in acting style, Clurman argued that British acting held a higher cultural status than American acting:

one of the reasons the English actor is attracted to Shakespearean repertoire is not only the fact that these great plays present the actor with the greatest challenge but that box-office success alone does not, in the English view, confer the same prestige as that which comes to the actor who has played Shakespeare well.

(1952, 34)

Clurman recognised the symbolic and cultural capital of acting styles: 'Standards in acting, as in the other arts. are created by the ability to differentiate. to compare. to
remember and to distinguish degrees and qualities of excellence' (p.34). British acting therefore signified not only 'refinement' or 'convention' but also a standard of cultural distinction in the internal relations of the field of cultural production.

It is these oppositions and standards which make Brando's performance as Marc Anthony in *Julius Caesar* so central to understanding the cultural status of the Method style and Brando's stardom. The performance represents a negotiation of the symbolic, cultural and economic capital of the Method style and Brando's image. Symbolically, the improvisatory freedom of the Method style is displaced by the disciplined rhythm of the Shakespearean text. As Brando remarked when preparing for the role:

> I accepted this role because I thought it would be good experience for me — and good discipline, too. My kind of acting has always been very free. I always like to be easy and uninhibited in the characterisations I do. But it's a different matter when you do Shakespeare. You immediately have certain bounds and limits beyond which you cannot go.

(quoted in Manso 1994, 323)

Brando's comments support Clurman's contention that the American actor greeted classical drama as 'conventional'. Performing Shakespeare is seen to limit the power of the actor's symbolic capital, subsuming the actor's control of the voice to the rhythm of the writing. Brando/Anthony is first seen outside the arena as Caesar (Louis Calhern) passes in a parade. In response to the superstition that such gestures will cure infertility, Calhern/Caesar asks Brando/Anthony if he will touch Calphurnia (Greer Garson) during his race in the arena. It clear from the moment that Brando/Anthony responds with 'When Caesar says "Do this"', it is perform'd', that his fluent speech, firm and positive reply, steady and erect body, and direct eyeline, will not make this a Method performance. This change in acting style demonstrates a transformation in the symbolic capital of vocal and physical actions, which signifies, or more accurately, profits, the cultural capital of literary and theatrical prestige. If the uncivilised realism of the Method signified a kind of 'primitivism', Brando's non-Method classical rhetoric in *Julius Caesar* gives to the voice and body the symbolic power of legitimate literary tradition. In contrast to the improvisatory looseness of the Method style, Brando's performance as Anthony displays
the voice and the body as controlled by the renowned dramatic text, subsuming the 'great' actor to the 'great' writer.

Brando's cultural capital was not only negotiated through the association with Shakespeare but also by performing with the largely British cast, including the respected classical actor John Gielgud. Peter Manso (1994) has discussed in detail the cultural negotiations and responses involved with Brando taking the role: stories of producer John Houseman's first choice of British classical stage actor Paul Scofield for the role of Anthony; director Joseph Mankiewicz's alternative story that Houseman and MGM head of production, Dore Schary, originally cast MGM contract player Stewart Granger; Brando buying recordings of classical actors reading Shakespearean soliloquies and then slavishly practising Anthony's speeches into a tape recorder by imitating classical declamation; Schary's disbelief that it was Brando performing when he first heard those tapes; Brando's anxieties over matching the performances of other members of the cast like Gielgud and James Mason; Sid Caesar and Jerry Lewis performing comedy routines on television which involved impersonations of Stanley Kowalski speaking the 'Friends, Romans, countrymen' speech (pp.320-3).

Each of these tales can be read as describing how the field of cultural production presents practitioners with structured patterns of possible positions, and of the difficulties entailed with attempting to renegotiate the taking of a new position in the field. Sid Caesar and Jerry Lewis's popular comedy take on Brando in classical drama, indicates that the difficulties of renegotiating a position in the field are not only regulated by the representatives of legitimate culture. For Bourdieu (1983), the structuring of the field as an 'anti-economy' or 'upside-down economic world' is integral to determining the cultural status of practitioners (p.40). In attempting to take a position of high brow dramatic artistry by playing Marc Anthony, Brando profited to gain in cultural capital at the cost of a significant fall in his salary. Brando's previous role as Zapata had earned him $100,000, but for Anthony, he would receive only $40,000, together with top billing. Manso suggests Brando accepted this drop 'moved by the prospect of high art as well as the fact that Gielgud was getting only $20,000' (1994, 322).

Brando's casting as Anthony lead to considerable speculation and scepticism amongst critics about his success in the role. Prior to the release of the film, Louis Berg reported in This Week that Brando had 'drooped the deliberate Kowalski vulgarisms'. but that he
hadn’t ‘quite achieved the dignity of a Gielgud’ (1953, 9). In Berg’s opinion, the performance was judged to be reasonably successful. American critics judged the performance to be a significant achievement for Brando. Bosley Crowther, a frequent defender of Brando, wrote that ‘Mr Brando’s diction, which has been guttural and slurred in previous films, is clear and precise in this instance’ (1953, 19). The Variety critic took the performance to be a ‘compelling portrayal ... in which [Brando] turns in the performance of his career’ (1953).

British critics, however, were more defensive of national cultural distinction. In Sight and Sound, Gavin Lambert praised the performance while also implying that it failed to meet an unspecified aesthetic standard:

It would ... be absurd to expect, from a voice only recently trained to verse-speaking, a range and tone equal to Gielgud’s: but though in this respect it has its limitations and rough edges, the performance is an electric one. Physically it has the glamour desirable but seldom found for the part ... In short, his playing can academically be faulted, and one can say that Brando isn’t really a Shakespearean actor, but as a piece of dramatic interpretation it shows a rare, exciting talent.

(1954, 90)

The Monthly Film Bulletin saw similar difficulties.

Marlon Brando suffers from certain natural limitations: a thuggishness of appearance, and a lack of the easy, contemptuous elegance which should cloak the man’s innate ruthlessness. Nevertheless, however unlikely Brando’s Anthony may seem socially, he plays the part with such furious compulsion that the effect of authority, power and aristocracy which Brando cannot encompass is, of course, the effortless achievement of John Gielgud, whose Cassius is the film’s best performance and perhaps its proudest boast.

(1953, 173)

These mixed reviews do not uniformly accept or reject Brando’s negotiation of position. That a pattern can be traced between American and British responses offers a small
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indication of the cultural presumptions and defences which extend the power relationships of the field of cultural production across national boundaries. What is significant in the negative criticisms of Brando as Anthony is the readings of the star’s image and familiar acting style, and how these are taken as conflicting with what is believed to be the requirements of acting in British classical drama. The ‘failure’ of Brando in the role was explained as the effect of ‘rough edges’ and ‘thuggishness’, which prevented Brando from signifying the ‘elegance’, ‘authority’ and ‘aristocracy’ which the Monthly Film Bulletin critic believed the role demanded. In such judgments were mapped a range of oppositions: uncivilised verses civilised manners; America and Britain; film verses theatre; barbarity verses refinement. It is these opposed meanings which defined but also limited the meaning of Brando’s stardom and acting. Although not a Method performance, the case of Brando in Julius Caesar is significant for what it reveals about the cultural and symbolic capital of the Method style. Brando’s status as Method star can therefore be seen as influencing, but also restricting, the plausible positions which he could legitimately occupy in the field.

Brando’s image and stardom influenced the Method discourse in the fifties. Although only tenuously connected to the Actors Studio, Brando’s acting came to stand for the type of acting which the Studio was presumed to produce. As actor and star, the image and work of Brando effected the status of the Method style as symbolic and cultural capital. Equally, the manners of the Method style effected the status of Brando in the field of cultural production. Bourdieu represents the field as in a constant flux of positions and position takings, in which the movements of practitioners continually redefine those positions and the field. As a film actor, working for the studios and the studio financed independents, Brando belonged in the sub-field of large scale production. The image of anti-stardom constructed a profile of the actor as against Hollywood, a portrait of disinterest in the sub-field of economic interest. Brando’s escalating salaries and outside
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signified artistic autonomy, but autonomy only in as much as Brando signified rebellion inside and not outside commercial production.

Brando occupied a middle ground position in the sub-field of large scale production. He was not Fred Astaire but neither was he John Gielgud: his Method manners were more dramatically 'serious' than Astaire's carefree dance but lacked the 'refinement' of Gielgud's classical delivery. Brando signified the image of anti-stardom while in every way fitting the economic conditions of stardom in the post-studio Hollywood. As Brando's Method manners were read as a personal ideolec, then acting style entered into the commodification of Brando as a star-actor. The Method style therefore became the means by which Brando's image of anti-stardom was reconciled with the business of stardom. The improvisatory freedom of the Method signified the disinterested pursuit of art rebelling against commercial constraint, while the personal mannerliness of the style produced a distinct individual identity which could be effectively marketed. Brando's non-Method performances, in particular Anthony in Julius Caesar, can be seen as attempts to break with conventions of role and performance style, extending his range so as to appear more actor than star. Yet the weight of the Brando image made such a renegotiation of position problematic if not impossible.

The variety of roles and changes in performance style which Brando undertook in the fifties actually fitted rather than challenged the changing conditions of stardom in the post-studio Hollywood. Barry King (1986) has argued that the reorganisation of the Hollywood film industry in the fifties transformed the possibilities of star acting. This transformation can be understood as a transition from, in King's (1985) own terms, 'personification' to 'impersonation' in star acting. In the studio system, as studio executives controlled the casting of stars, continuities would be formed across roles to produce a stable star image. This required the star to assume similar roles while acting in similar ways. The star therefore 'personified' the role by appearing to fill a single performance with a distinctive identity carried across films, and was suited to the mass production and block booking of films under the studio system. Producing such a recognisable star image was in the interests of the studio but, as King suggests, it also served the star's purpose by signifying their irreplaceability (1986, 168).

Personification seems basic to all star acting. King, however, argues that with the reorganisation of Hollywood production around the single film deal. stars were
confronted with the need to make each role an exhibition of quality performance. Star acting therefore had to adapt the star’s image more to the individual role.

The rise of independent production and a picture-by-picture system of contracts ... produce[d] a contradiction at the heart of stardom: there is a need to reproduce the distance between star image and character since the potential for failure remains. But at the same time character becomes an integral variable in its own right, no longer collapsible into star image.

(p.169)

King suggests that the effect of this for star acting was ‘a relaxation of the strategy of control by means of a univocal emphasis on star image and a corresponding emergent emphasis on the projection of character’ (p.169).

For King, this leaves the star with two alternative means for performing in their own interests. One option is for the star to confront the need to be similar but different between roles by forming ‘a star image that indicates the “social” issues indicated by carefully selected narratives since these issues transcend particular films’ (p.169). James Cagney, in the depression era, in the gangster movie, would suggest that there are difficulties with too easily periodising such a phenomenon. Brando’s liberal consciousness and championing of political causes would certainly integrate his image into a wider currency of beliefs in the late sixties. In the fifties though, Brando’s image as the rebel in selected films, and his antipathy towards the industry of film-making, linked to a broader mood of youth rebellion. As that rebellion represented a rejection of conformity, then the Brando image was also confronting some of the anxieties which the American male was believed to be experiencing in the period.

King suggests that a second strategy is for the star to ‘develop an “actorly” image’, claiming ‘technical excellence as the basis of reputation’ (p.169). Such an image could be formed by the star associating with other respected actors, such as Brando did by acting opposite Gielgud in Julius Caesar. However, as technical excellence in acting is judged across the relationship of actor to character, a more significant display of actorliness is achieved by the use of the voice and body to produce the differences which show the actor ‘becoming’ a character. For star acting, this requires the ability to produce
Negotiating Brando differences of ‘impersonation’ at the same time as retaining continuous personified features of the star image. In the case of Brando, this tension between impersonation and personification was possible within his Method performances, and also between those performances and his non-Method performances. Method performances could produce an effect of difference and similarity, for the performer was immersed in the emotional drama of a specific character, authentically ‘impersonating’ the role at the same time as producing an excess of style which displayed the craft of acting and ‘personified’ Brando’s idelectic mannerisms. At a further level, those performances could be differentiated from the non-Method performances, with the accents used in Désirée, The Teahouse of the August Moon, and The Young Lions, signifying specific responses to individual roles. When reading the ways in which Brando negotiated a position in cultural production during the fifties, the relative success of his performances in these films is less significant than the work of attempting such transformations.

The balance between personification and impersonation in star acting can therefore be understood as performing in ways which retain the construction of a unified star image while also strategically acting in ways to break that unity. King is careful not to assume an absolute split between studio system personification and post-studio impersonation. For example, as Alexander Walker (1970) suggests, Paul Muni built an image in the thirties based on his ability to transform himself between roles. However, as Walker points out, Muni did not occupy the same star status as his contemporaries like Cagney. Walker interprets Muni’s show of acting skills as ‘a kind of defiant anti-stardom, since it involved sinking his identity untraceably into a character and projecting his own personality only when it was a means of clarifying a dramatic point’ (p.258). The same description could quite easily apply to Brando’s acting in the fifties. What appears to be significant about Brando’s acting is that the paradoxical meanings of the Method style provided effective means for negotiating between stardom and actorliness to strategic effect in the changing conditions of Hollywood stardom.
Conclusion

Film acting presents historical and critical studies of cinema with the problems of finding ways for discussing how acting operates as signification and practice. Here I have suggested that to understand acting as signification requires the reading of the codes of film acting, together with exploring how the meaning of those codes is related to other beliefs about acting and to cultural concepts of the self. Central to the meaning of film acting is the representation and management of emotion. It is emotion which links film acting into a wider currency of beliefs about personal identity. The significance of film acting is regulated by the positions which structure the field of cultural production. In the field, the voice and body become symbolic resources by which the film actor negotiates his or her position. The field situates the practice of film acting.

The Method discourse of the 1950s integrated beliefs about techniques for producing truth in acting with a characteristic style and image of film stardom. Strasberg’s Method technique combined the management of emotion with an examination of the actor’s own private personality. This mechanism of self inquiry belonged to a wider cultural trend in modern America, which was concerned with the examination of personal identity. Emotion and personality were united in the Method technique by exercises such as emotional memory and the private moment, which led the actor to search for, and attempt to release, personal repressions. In the Method technique, repressed feeling formed a cultural capital of personal experiences and emotions, which, it was believed, could provide the actor with the expressive resources to produce the quality of truth in acting.

The Method style was not a causal effect of the Method technique, but the inarticulacy, amplified business and physical looseness which characterised the Method voice and body, were coded as representing the authentic feelings of the character and the actor in ways which reflected the preoccupation in the Method technique with the liberatory
conformity was undermining American masculinity, the Method style appeared in the rebel narratives of the period, to articulate the male hero's anxieties over discovering his own masculinity. Frequently, the rebel could not articulate his problems and wishes, and when words failed him, his anxieties resulted in an explosion of anger. While there was nothing innately masculine about the Method style, its use was particular evident in male melodramas.

Marlon Brando adds to the Method discourse the image of rebellious anti-stardom, representing a private lifestyle which resisted both social convention and the system of Hollywood stardom. However, Brando negotiated a position of power in the changing conditions of the Hollywood film industry, with his Method manners providing the symbolic capital to make his acting into an assertion of his star status. The Brando image is significant in the Method discourse for the way in which it unifies a whole range of meanings about stardom, acting, the self, America, rebellion, Hollywood, society and masculinity. It is the combination of these meanings which made Brando the Method star. Brando's non-Method performances partly disrupt the coherence of the Brando image and these performances indicate the cultural limits of the Method discourse.

In a scene from Bells Are Ringing (Vincente Minnelli 1960, US) Ella Peterson (Judy Holliday) visits Mike's Lunch Room, a bohemian cafe frequented by young followers of beat culture. The narrative of the musical concerns how Holliday/Ella anonymously solves the personal problems of the subscribers to the answerphone service she works for. For down on his luck playwright Jeffrey Moss (Dean Martin), Holliday/Ella provides the ideas for a new drama, The Midas Touch. Speaking on the phone to the producer of the show, Larry Hastings (Fred Clark), Holliday/Ella passes on the message that the actor Blake Barton (Frank Gorshin) is inquiring if there is a part for him in the play. Hastings rejects the inquiry immediately: 'I'm sick of actors who won't wear suits and who sound as if they've got a mouth full of marbles'. When Holliday/Ella passes the message on to Gorshin/Blake, he tells her in his thick slurred voice of how he recently failed at an audition: 'they didn't dig my action ... t,er ... No, they said they were looking fur a ... Rex Harrison type. English. So I said what's wrong with me, I speak English ... t,er'. It is Gorshin/Blake whom Holliday/Ella is searching for when she arrives at Mike's. The clientele are all dressed in black and are seated at tables drinking coffee and reading under the shadow of posters for stage productions of A View from the Bridge, Cat on a Hot Tin
Gorshin/Blake, dressed in white T-shirt and blue jeans, is telling some of the assembled customers about a recent acting workshop he attended: ‘Well, so they wanted things like love, hate and anger. So for my acting exercise I picked this part see ... and innit, I'm supposed to be like this er ... you know er ... frustrated guy’. During the speech, Gorshin/Blake wrings his T-shirt between his hands. Holliday/Ella approaches him, catching his attention with ‘uh ... uh ... I said uh’. She suggests that he did not get a part in The Midas Touch because of what he was wearing and that he should think of trying a suit, spelt ‘s, u, t’. Gorshin/Blake responds by saying ‘Whataya think I am, a fake. A suit. We gotta name for actors who wear suits’. He slouches back, resting his weight on one hip. Holliday/Ella points out the problem he is having at auditions: ‘Do yer punk imitation the rest of your life. I’m tellin’ yer. You want the job, you gotta cut the blue jeans action. You know whatta mean er, er, er, er, er, er. Look around yer. Yer a glut on the market. Like man. Like dig. Like, like, like, like. Yer nuthin’…’. A jazz record on the jukebox drowns out the rest of their conversation.

Blake gets a suit and a job in The Midas Touch. By the end of the film, he describes how his role involves him playing a dentist who wants to be a composer (a comic reference to one of the other characters in the film, Dr Kitchell, a dentist who write songs). Central to Blake’s role is the character’s conflict with his father, who is preventing him from realising his ambition to compose. The parodic comedy of the scenic indicates the ways in which by the conclusion of the fifties, the technique, style, gendered drama and anti-star image of the Method, had become a familiar collection of meanings in American culture. The private worlds of the Method had become common public knowledge.

The researching of a thesis never reaches a satisfactory end point but is always, like any performance, in a process of still becoming. Time and space have prevented me from addressing some areas of discussion. The brief points made at the end of chapter 4 on the women who attended the Actors Studio would suggest further work on the gendered limits of the Method discourse. Other Actors Studio women, such as Lee Remick and Joanne Woodward, established prominent careers during the fifties. Any further work would have to consider how they negotiated their image and work in the context of Hollywood film. Another area to address is the historical development of the Method after the 50s, looking at how the technique, style and star image of the discourse has been developed and transformed.
Possible directions for future research on film acting may include some of the following: textual analysis of other acting codes and subcodes; reception analysis of the terms used to interpret and evaluate film acting; examination of the inter-relationships of the economic, cultural and symbolic capital of film actors, and how those resources map positions in cultural production; critical legal studies of the ownership of the film actor's voice and body; ethnographies of the working practices of film actors; study of the inter-relationships between acting and actors in film and other media; and the exploration of alternative ways for documenting research on film acting.
Preparation of the bibliography followed the Harvard referencing system as outlined in the ‘Guidelines for the Writing of Essays’ provided in the Department of Film and Television Studies’s Postgraduate Handbook for 1996-1997.

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**Bells Are Ringing.** Dir. Vincente Minnelli, Prod. Arthur Freed, Prod. co. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, USA, 1960. Main cast: Judy Holliday (Ella Peterson), Dean Martin (Jeffrey Moss), Larry Hastings (Fred Clark), Jean Stapleton (Sue), Eddie Foy (J. Otto Pranz), Frank Gorshin (Blake Barton).

**The Birth of a Nation** (a.k.a. The Clansman). Dir. David Wark Griffith, Prod. David Wark Griffith and Harry E. Aitken, Prod. co. Epoch Producing Corporation/David W. Griffith Corporation, USA, 1915. Main cast: Henry B. Watthall (Benjamin Cameron), Miriam Cooper (Margaret Cameron), Mae Marsh (Flora Cameron), Lilian Gish (Elsie Stoneman), Ralph Lewis (Hon. Austin Stoneman).

**Désirée.** Dir. Henry Koster, Prod. Julian Blaustein, Prod. co. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, USA, 1954. Main cast: Marlon Brando (Napoleon), Jean Simmons (Désirée), Merle Oberon (Josephine), Michael Rennie (Bernadotte), Cameron Mitchell (Joseph Bonaparte).

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**From Here to Eternity.** Dir. Fred Zinnemann, Prod. Buddy Adler, Prod. co. Columbia Pictures Corporation, USA, 1953. Main cast: Burt Lancaster (Sgt. Milton Warden), Montgomery Clift (Robert E. Lee Prewitt), Deborah Kerr (Karen Holmes), Frank Sinatra (Angelo Maggio), Donna Reed (Lorene), Philip Ober (Capt. Dana Holmes), Ernest Borgnine (Sgt. 'Fatso' Judson).


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