FOUNDATIONS OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY: ASPECTS OF THE

PROBLEM OF MEANING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to all of those people who have, in one way or another, made it possible. That it was ever written at all is a mystery that makes sense only in remembering the continual help and encouragement given to me by two people in particular; my wife Linda with her constant support, and Dr. John Heritage whose constructive advice and criticism helped to mould many a fugitive idea into some coherent shape. Of those others whose help has been invaluable, Mrs. Sheila Evans and Mrs. Evelyn Hazell deserve special mention for turning a ragged draft of this thesis into presentable form. My thanks are also due to all those with whom I have discussed aspects of my work over the course of its production, and to those others who have thought about and discussed in writing the issues with which I have been concerned. Without all of these people this thesis would have been impossible. The mistakes and inadequacies, of course, remain my own.
ABSTRACT

In this thesis I have set out to perform two interlocking, although separable, tasks. The first is to provide some insight into the philosophical and theoretical roots of ethnomethodology by investigating the work of Garfinkel and others who have in some way assimilated, borrowed from, or been influenced by his work, in a context provided by a discussion of the work of Husserl and Schutz on the one hand and that of Wittgenstein on the other. I will show the ways in which Schutz has adapted Husserlian phenomenological insights to further his own fundamentally sociological ends and how Garfinkel, borrowing only selectively from Schutz and allowing many other influences to play upon his work (here Kaufman, Parsons and Gurwitsch are important sources of ideas), transforms ideas generated in the phenomenological tradition to an extent which suggests that his writings should be seen in a context set by Wittgenstein's writings (in terms particularly of notions such as 'form of life' and 'rule' in a sense of those terms which will become apparent), rather than encumbering it with too much phenomenological baggage.

I will move on from there to investigate the writings of other ethnomethodologists, showing how some - for example Cicourel - remain more firmly within the phenomenological tradition, whilst others have taken various of Garfinkel's ideas (although few have taken them whole and undiluted) and investigated, in their various ways, their implications for the study of social order and society. In the process of this arm of the discussion I will point out some of the weaknesses and strengths of various ethnomethodological positions, suggesting in conclusion that there is important work being done and waiting to be done in the areas currently being investigated.

The second task of the thesis is less historically oriented. Here the focus will be upon theoretical issues surrounding the problem of social order and the problem of meaning, problems which will be seen to be interrelated. The chief concern here will be to show the ways in which Wittgenstein and Garfinkel struggle to present and make coherent a sense of 'meaning' which is fundamentally different from that which is espoused by phenomenologists like Schutz and by many other contemporary sociologists, and how this difference rests side by side, in Garfinkel's work, with a radically different approach to the problem of social order from that which characterises the work of Parsons and others. The thrust of this difference lies in an attempt to reconceptualise 'meaning' in a way that does not posit as fundamental the distinction between 'subjectivity' on the one hand and an 'objective' world on the other, but which instead, by emphasising the omniprevalence of 'language games' and the 'indexicality' of expressions, focuses attention on some notion of 'form of life' or of the 'formal structures of practical actions'. The effect of this shift of emphasis, I will suggest, is that 'meaning' becomes transformed from seeming to be a 'thing' of some kind contained within a 'structure' of meanings to become instead an 'embedded' phenomenon, bound up with what we do in the social world, where the things we do generate and exhibit those orderly features which make meaning possible.
CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an investigation of some of the philosophical and theoretical roots of ethnomethodology. The strategy involved will be to set the work of Garfinkel against a background provided by an unravelling of the phenomenology of Husserl and Schutz on the one hand, and the analytic philosophy of Wittgenstein on the other. The hope is that as various points of convergence and divergence emerge and are pointed out over the course of the discussion, so the motivating problems, the aims and aspirations and the general theoretical position of ethnomethodology as conceived by Garfinkel will be thrown into fresh relief.

The following chapters approach the task on two levels which although complexly interrelated can be separated for the purposes of this introduction to act as a key to reading the remainder of the thesis. The two levels can be termed the 'historical theme' on the one hand, and the 'theoretical theme' on the other. I will outline something of the sense of these in turn.

The 'historical theme' is shorthand for a concern to map some of the relationships between the work of the thinkers who are the subject of this thesis. The first set of significant relationships comes with the ways in which Schutz adapted the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl in order to make it available as a theoretical grounding for an empirical sociology. I shall argue that in fact Schutz's use of phenomenology leads him into severe difficulties which his own orientations towards social phenomena cannot resolve for him. Garfinkel's relationship with the phenomenological tradition that comes from Husserl via Schutz will also be examined, and in the process it will become
apparent that numerous other influences upon his thought - most significantly the influences of Parsons, Kaufmann, and Gurwitsch - colour his reading of Schutz in such a way that a fundamental transformation is effected in the texture of the web of problems that motivated Schutzian sociology. This transformation, I will argue, takes Garfinkel's thought in a direction which enables close parallels to be drawn between his own ethnomethodology and the type of analyses that Wittgenstein engaged in. This particular link, it will be suggested, is especially important in as much as certain Wittgensteinian concepts such as 'language games' and 'form of life' are useful in highlighting something of Garfinkel's position.

This particular clutch of 'historical' links is concerned chiefly with the germination of the ethnomethodological position as it appears in Garfinkel's work. The main figures are Schutz, Husserl, Wittgenstein and Garfinkel, with a few other philosophers and sociologists playing minor roles. There is also a second set of such interrelationships which focus on the development of the ethnomethodological perspective. Within this set, it will be argued, significant differences can be discerned between the orientations of various thinkers who are concerned to carry through, in one way or another, some of the insights into the workings of society that can be found in Garfinkel's work. These differences will be illustrated both in terms of substantive points of disagreement between writers, and by reference to the work of the sociologists and philosophers already discussed above. Thus substantive differences between the work of Garfinkel and Cicourel can be seen in terms of the different relationships that their work has to Schutz's sociology, whilst the work of Blum and McHugh on the one hand and conversational analysis on the other can be contrasted in terms of their differing approaches to problems of 'the given' and of 'structure' within the general notions of 'form of life' (Wittgenstein) and 'taken
for granted reality' (Garfinkel). The position of post-Wittgensteinian philosophers of the social sciences - specifically Winch and Louch - will also be examined briefly, and set into the overall perspective in terms of the different implications for sociology that they draw from insights in the work of Wittgenstein.

The 'theoretical theme' is focused on two main issues. These are firstly the problem of social order, and secondly a concern with 'meaning' and the way in which it is conceptualised in the social science. These two important areas of concern should not, for the purposes of this thesis, be thought of as entirely separate from one another; it will become apparent over the course of the following discussions that there are significant linkages to be made between 'order' and 'meaning'. For this introduction, however, I want to look, briefly, at each area in turn to signpost the directions of the following chapters.

The problem of order is a concern with the ways in which order in society is possible. It is concerned, in other words, with providing some account of how it is that society manages to carry on as a more or less organized whole - with the mechanisms that make society work. The problem has been solved traditionally, in a variety of different ways which include notions like 'social contract', 'conscience collective', 'power', 'norms and values' and so on. Such solutions generally posit specifically social entities of some sort, such as 'norms' or 'rules', which stand over and against the members of society and either determine, control, govern, or orient the actions of such members. Thus the more or less orderly character of their behaviour, and of society at large, is accounted for by reference to such social entities. The theories of Hobbes and Parsons, which will be discussed in a later chapter, are examples of this sort of theorizing.

Garfinkel's work, as will become apparent, is directed towards this problem. He approaches it, however, from a fresh angle. Rather than
investigate 'norms' and 'values' as Parsons does, he directs his attention towards those practices and procedures on the basis of which members of society organize the social world. Instead of looking at what people think, or at what they ought to think, or at the rules they think they follow, and so on, Garfinkel shifts his attention to what it is that people do. It is because members of society do things in certain ways that society is an orderly place, and the problem for the ethnomethodologist becomes to try to find some way of studying what it is that people do such that social order is possible. In a sense, what is being looked at is some of the practices that form what Durkheim referred to as the non-contractual elements of contract - at those practices which make any form of contract possible in the first place. In short, the problem of order in society is treated by specifying its solution in terms of particular practices and procedures at a particular level of social structure, (a level which, it will later become apparent, is bound up with 'cognition' in a special sense of that term), and by further identification of that level by empirical investigations.

The problem of order connects with the question of 'meaning' in that the possibility of 'meaningful' interaction depends upon there being a certain amount of order in the world - for example, there must be a degree of agreement about what there is in the world, and about what certain things are called - whilst at the same time social order itself is in part dependent upon people interacting 'meaningfully' - consider the way in which what is talked about in a conversation (e.g. counselling) can influence ones subsequent behaviour. This interweaving of the two areas is important because it suggests that those practices and procedures which are conceived to enable social order at a particular level of social structure, will also be important to an understanding of 'meaning'. Such practices will be seen to provide the possibility of communication in the social world, and will provide the foundation for
the 'intersubjective' realm. Thus the concern with social order will also throw light upon 'meaning' in the social world.

My primary concern with 'meaning' will be to show that the work of Garfinkel, with his emphasis upon a particular level of social structure, provides a fundamentally different approach towards 'meaning' from that which can be found in the work of Schutz, in the early work of Wittgenstein, and, by implication, in the writings of the majority of sociologists. This orientation, I will suggest, has much in common with the later work of Wittgenstein which provides a clear exposition of some of the points contained in Garfinkel's writings but from a philosophical rather than a sociological point of view. It is thus useful, for the purposes of the present thesis, as an illustration, further explication, and broadening of some of the central issues with which I will be concerned.

What is involved in this shift in perspective upon 'meaning' is a move away from the type of position that Schutz takes, in which 'meaning' is seen as somehow an independent phenomenon that is bound up with 'structures' (e.g. 'meaning structures'), and towards a view which insists that 'meaning' must be seen as 'embedded' within the practices and procedures of our daily round. To help illustrate precisely the sense of 'meaning' involved in the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein I will use four indicators which are useful to the extent that they provide a framework for the discussions of the following chapters. These are:

1. The problem of universals.
2. Language.
3. The subject object distinction.
4. The problem of intersubjectivity.

It is worth saying something, briefly, about the relevance of these indicators for the problem at hand.

Whilst each of these indicators can be seen as related in some way
or other to the problem of social order, this is particularly apparent with the problem of universals. The problem concerns, in basic terms, how it is possible to group a series of particulars - for example, chairs, games, men, etc. - under one concept such that one can say that they are all instances of the same thing. How is it, for example, that all the different activities that we call 'games' can be grouped together such that they are all seen to be games? The answers that are generally given to this question usually suggest that either all of the things that are so grouped have some thing in common - some 'essential' substance or property - or alternatively, that the sole reason why such things are so grouped is that the same concept is used to refer to them. These are the realist and nominalist options respectively.

The importance of this problem for the problem of social order, and for the general purposes of this thesis, can best be drawn out by considering that the solution given to it determines the way in which we conceptualize the possibility of 'agreement' between people about what is the case. According to the 'realist' option, for example, 'agreement' is possible because there actually is, in reality, something common to all of those things that are collected under the same term, whilst for the nominalist the possibility of 'agreement' lies in the fact that things are called by the same name. The connection between agreement and 'meaning' is perhaps obvious, but it is worth drawing out. In order for someone to 'mean' something when he speaks, and for that meaning to be understood by another, there must be some minimum of agreement between them. They must agree about what certain things in the world are called, about what certain words mean, and so on. Thus in a strong sense, the possibility of meaningful interaction depends upon the possibility of 'agreement' - i.e. upon some solution to the problem of universals.

What will emerge over the course of the thesis is that Husserl, Schutz and the early Wittgenstein conceptualize the solution to the
problem of universals in terms of 'essences' of some kind, whether that is seen in terms of an eidetic structure attainable by the phenomenological reductions, or of a structure of 'ideal types', or in terms of a picturing relationship between propositions and states of affairs. Garfinkel and the later Wittgenstein, however, think rather in terms of sets of practices within a form of life, which enable concepts to be used in a 'family resemblance' fashion - i.e. there is no one thing that all things collected under the same concept have in common, but rather there are overlapping, criss-crossing similarities, rather like the resemblances between members of the same family, which account for us collecting them under the same concept. The precise sense of this will become apparent in chapter three when Wittgenstein's work will be discussed at length. For the present it is enough to notice that there are important and significant differences to be found, here, in the way the problem of universals is approached, and this has implications for the way in which 'meaning' is conceptualized. Briefly, if this problem is seen in terms of practices and procedures, then 'meaning' will most likely be seen as an embedded phenomenon - as inextricably woven into the practices and procedures which make up our form of life.

The second indicator, language, is straightforward enough. Language is one of the most important ways we have of expressing 'meaning' - of interacting in a 'meaningful' fashion - so that the way in which it is conceptualized must inevitably reflect the orientation being taken towards meaning itself. Here the important division is between those who, like Shutz and the early Wittgenstein, see language as a 'structure' or 'calculus' which somehow contains meanings - which contains 'kernal meanings' or 'essential meanings' - and on the other hand, those like Garfinkel and the later Wittgenstein who insist that the most important thing about language is that it is used in a variety of different contexts, for a variety of different purposes, to make sense over the course of our
daily lives. Once again, by insisting that language must be seen as something used, 'meaning' is seen as dependent upon what we do in our daily lives - i.e. as embedded within practices and procedures.

Thirdly, it is important to look at the way in which the distinction between subject and object is handled. If it is seen as a fundamental distinction which must be taken into account in any attempt at understanding the status of knowledge, or theory, or science, and so on, then the type of problems that are likely to arise will be concerned with the ways in which 'subjective meanings' or 'subjective perceptions' relate to something else which is conceived to be 'objective' - for example 'objective meanings' or a 'real world'. The fundamental datum of man's existence is thought to be the opposition between his subjectivity and something that is other than it, and the problem of knowledge is one of finding guarantees that it is possible to get beyond the purely subjective. This opposition appears in Schutz's work in terms of a relationship between subjective and objective meaning contexts. In the early work of Wittgenstein, although he is careful to avoid subjectivity as such, there is none the less present a parallel distinction between 'reality' on the one hand, and something else - in this case the propositions that 'picture' reality.

The importance of this distinction for an orientation towards 'meaning' is that if 'what is the case' is conceived of in terms of a fundamental dichotomy between subject and object, then 'meaning' too will have to be conceptualised in these terms. There will be two aspects of 'meaning' at large in the world, 'subjective' meaning, which is essentially personal, particular and possibly private in some sense, and 'objective' meaning, which will be dependent not upon some particular subjectivity but upon its relationship to an 'objective' 'real world', or alternatively to its being intersubjectively available and communally validated. The task for the theorist interested in meaning will then be
to articulate these two aspects of 'meaning' in a coherent fashion.

If what is fundamental is not taken to be some distinction between subject and object, however, but something else, then inevitably the notion of 'meaning' that emerges will be different. The framework within which it is conceptualized will be different. What one in fact finds in the work of both Wittgenstein and Garfinkel is that instead of the subject object distinction being primary, a 'form of life' or a set of practices and procedures are seen to be the 'given' - as the most fundamental datum of our existence. Thus it becomes possible to see 'meaning' in a different way - as 'embedded' in a form of life rather than as something with two aspects, one subjective and the other objective. The place that the subject object distinction holds within a theory about the social world, then, is significant as an indicator of the way in which 'meaning' is being conceptualised.

The fourth and final indicator is the notion of 'intersubjectivity'. This is really an extension of the previous one, but it bears emphasising. The point here is that if what is fundamental is taken to be a distinction between subjectivities and something opposed to them - 'objectivity' - then a further problem will be concerned with the possibility of 'intersubjectivity', or communication between different subjects. This brings us back to the problem of universals and the possibility of 'agreement' - i.e. the possibility of 'agreement' about what is the case in the world is what provides for the possibility of an intersubjective world, whether that be conceptualized as a 'reality' out there or the concepts of language itself. The problem of intersubjectivity becomes, on this account, a problem concerning the transference of 'meanings' from one subjectivity to another, and the theorist must specify the conditions which make this possible.

In suggesting that the distinction between subject and object is not to be taken as fundamental, Garfinkel and Wittgenstein posit as
basic a radically intersubjective realm - i.e. it is not 'intersubjective' just in the sense that communication between subjectivities is possible for reasons x, y, and z, but rather that communication is possible is the fundamental fact about man's existence. Thus 'meaning' ceases to be something that has to be passed between subjectivities, and about which there is some problem as to how such passing is possible, but instead that a 'form of life' is meaningful becomes a fundamental fact about it. 'Meaning', once again, becomes seen as 'embedded' within the practices and procedures of our daily round.

In sum, then, the theoretical theme is focused upon two problems, concerned with social order and meaning, which are linked with one another at a particular level of social structure which is indicated by Garfinkel's work, and upon which the later writings of Wittgenstein can throw some light. What is involved at this level is those practices and procedures which make social order possible, which enable 'meaningful' interaction, and within which 'meaning' is embedded. The central concerns of Garfinkel's work are with what it is that people do that provides for the possibility of social order and of meaningful interaction. This is a concern with the mechanisms of society and social interaction, and as such it is relevant to the attempt to grasp the social world in a sociological manner. Over the course of this thesis, I will trace some of the ways in which the work of Garfinkel and ethnomethodologists differs on these important issues from that of other sociologists, and I will show some of the ways in which their empirical work illuminates and develops their particular insights into an aspect of the social world. I will suggest that in the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein can be found the beginnings of what could be a rigorous sociological approach towards some important social phenomena, and an approach that takes 'meaning' as an embedded phenomenon seriously. Over the course of the discussion, other important issues will be raised. Questions concerning
the nature of theory, of truth, of 'reality', and many more will emerge and be discussed, and some of the relevance of an ethnomethodological perspective upon such matters will be indicated in each case. At the same time, some of the implications of this position for empirical research will be examined, and some of the research that has been done will be set forward for examination.

It is perhaps worth mentioning two subsidiary themes specifically, to highlight their importance within the overall context of the discussion to follow. The first is the problem of relativism, the second the question of the nature of 'rules'. I do not want to expand at any length on either of these at the present stage, since the substance of their significance is bound up heavily with the substance of the arguments of following chapters. Suffice it to say, however, that I will suggest that a way of conceptualizing the problem of relativism such that it becomes an empirical question, rather than a purely a priori one, is provided by the work of conversational analysts, and that this is entwined with a notion of 'rule', indicated in Wittgenstein's later writings, that is to do with a 'form of life'. This important notion of 'rule', indeed, which concerns the 'bedrock' manifest in particular cases of obeying or going against the rule, will be seen to be what unites, at a deep level, the thought of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein.

Having indicated the general directions which this thesis will take, and having highlighted some of the concepts that will be of central concern to what follows, I want now to move on to look at the work of Husserl and Schutz to provide the first stages of the background necessary to an understanding of Garfinkel and ethnomethodology.
CHAPTER 2

HUSserl AND SCHUTZ

"The point is not to secure objectivity, but to understand it". (1)

The aim of both this chapter, and the one that follows it which will deal with the work of Wittgenstein, is to provide a background of philosophical and theoretical considerations in the light of which to discuss the work of Garfinkel and ethnomethodology. My main purpose will not, therefore, be to provide exhaustive accounts of the work of Husserl, Schutz or Wittgenstein and much, indeed, will remain unconsidered. For example in the present chapter, little will be said about the nature of 'evidence', 'sense data', and 'hyletic data' in Husserl's work, and the discussion of Schutz will not be concerned to explicate his notion of 'relevance'. The focus will be, rather, upon those aspects of the work of the thinkers involved which shed the most light on the themes that have been introduced in the previous chapter and which will help to throw into clear relief those same themes in the work of ethnomethodologists.

In the present chapter, I will begin by giving an account of Husserl's phenomenology, concentrating particularly on those aspects of it which seem to present promise to a sociologist interested in meaning in the social world, but at the same time pointing out some of the difficulties with which they present the sociologist. I will then move on to show how Schutz develops his own sociological position by incorporating certain of Husserl's notions but at the same time adjusting them to articulate with his sociological concerns. I will suggest that these adjustments lead Schutz into an untenable position in which a fundamental tension between 'objective' and 'subjective' meaning contexts fails to find any satisfactory resolution.
INTRODUCTION

Before giving an account of the basic method and conceptual apparatus of Husserl's phenomenology, I will discuss briefly the driving concerns and goals of the work.

Spiegelberg has written that Husserl seems to have had some idea that he had a mission set out for him under God's will. Whether or not this is the case, it is undoubtedly true that his writings show a strong sense of purpose. He saw phenomenology as being potentially a force that could transform the whole consciousness of man, as something that could enable men to see the world with new eyes and to realize the true nature of the world and its relationship to consciousness.

Phenomenology can be seen as something vocational, to which a philosopher can justifiably devote his whole life. As Husserl writes:

"Perhaps it will even become manifest that the total phenomenological attitude and the epoche belonging to it are destined in essence to effect, at first, a complete personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to religious conversion, which then, however, over and above this, bears within itself the significance of the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to mankind as such". (3)

Farber relates an incident that demonstrates this point in somewhat different fashion:

"That Husserl regarded his teaching as extending 'seeing' in philosophy and psychology may be illustrated by an incident which occurred in his Freiburg period. Upon asking the wife of a visiting scholar what she got out of listening to his technical lectures, he was told that the lessons in phenomenology gave her so many new eyes. In Husserl's opinion this aptly expressed the spirit of his undertaking". (4)

The way in which this new 'seeing' was to be brought about was by the phenomenological methods, notably the phenomenological reductions, which were to enable the phenomenologist to 'bracket' the taken for granted everyday world in which we all live, and to move reflectively in a realm of new experience.

Two questions arise at this point. Firstly, what exactly is the
nature of this world of new, and obviously important, experiences, and secondly, what is the point of finding one's way into it in the first place? I will answer each question in turn.

Although the realm into which Husserl's phenomenology is to move the meditating philosopher is not entirely unproblematic (5) it is possible to characterise it in broad terms by saying that it is that 'transcendental' realm in which lie the 'presuppositions' of knowledge. It is a realm where the 'essence' of knowledge lies. The precise sense of these terms will become more apparent later, but for the time being I will use them - as well as other technical terms like 'reduction' - simply to give an overall impression of what Husserl is attempting to do. This will serve as a prelude to more detailed discussions of what is involved in his work.

The phenomenologist moves, then, with the 'phenomenological and eidetic reductions', into the realm of 'consciousness' where he finds structures of essences which he must describe as faithfully as possible, setting out their 'intentional' nature, their relationships to one another, and their relationship to the 'stream of consciousness'. The nature of this realm is to be uncovered by the investigations themselves, but nonetheless the researcher can be sure that if he genuinely carries out the phenomenological methods then he is confronted with a genuine realm of Being - as Husserl puts it, the goal of the reduction is

"the winning of a new region of Being, the distinctive character of which has not yet been defined, a region of individual Being, like every genuine region". (6)

But what is the point of trying to win such a new region of Being? This question can be approached from two directions. Firstly there is the question of the precise nature of knowledge. Husserl believed that

"A philosophy with problematic foundations, with paradoxes which arise from the obscurity of the fundamental concepts, is no philosophy, it contradicts its very meaning as philosophy. Philosophy can take root only in radical reflexion
upon the meaning and possibility of its own scheme. Through such reflexion it must in the very first place and through its own activity take possession of the absolute ground of pure pre-conceptual experience, which is its own proper preserve; then, self-active again, it must create original concepts, adequately adjusted to this ground, and so utilize for its advance an absolutely transparent method". (7)

This being the case, it is necessary to search out the region of being where the presuppositions of knowledge lie, and to examine it in such a way that the "obscurity of the fundamental concepts" of philosophy is overcome. Husserl considered that by doing this, philosophy could be rescued from many of its uncertainties and set on a path that would lead eventually to a scientific phenomenological philosophy. He concludes his important "Logos" article of 1911 thus:

"Thus the greatest step our age has to make is to recognize that with the philosophical intuition in the correct sense, the phenomenological grasp of essences, a limitless field of work opens out, a science that without all indirectly symbolical and mathematical methods, without the apparatus of premises and conclusions, still attains a plentitude of the most rigorous and, for all further philosophy, decisive cognitions". (8)

In this way, not only could phenomenology clean up philosophy, as it were, but it could provide a firm foundation for natural scientific study by showing how any form of knowledge is possible. As things are with philosophy before the advent of phenomenology it is not even an imperfect science, "It is not yet a science at all". (9)

Husserl's second reason for wanting to approach towards the presuppositions of knowledge in the way that he does is connected with the first in that it is, equally, grounded in a determination to find a firm foundation for knowledge. It is this that leads him to attack the 'psychologism' that was so prevalent in his day, (10) and against which much of his early work is directed. As long as the laws of logic are founded on nothing more than psychological principles, Husserl considered, then there was no way that a philosopher could avoid a vicious relativism which sweeps away the possibility of any true knowledge. I will briefly
give an account of the psychologistic position, and of Husserl's response to it.

Psychologism claims that the laws of logic can be reduced to laws of psychology. This means that the necessity that seems to characterize logical laws can be accounted for entirely in terms of the expectations or beliefs of men. The distinction between inductive and deductive knowledge is thus reduced to a matter of the degree of certainty that is felt to hold in each case. Thus, for example, a deductive argument of the form "All 'A's are 'B', 'C' is 'A', therefore 'C' is 'B'" is an inductive generalization about what all men believe to be the case in the same way that "All swans are white" is, based on counting the number of instances in which this has in fact been the case, and subject to some probability of being eventually found wrong - as "all swans are white" was. The syllogism above can thus be rewritten, according to the psychologistic position, "As a matter of fact, anyone who believes that all 'A's are 'B's, and that 'C' is 'A', will believe that 'C' is 'B'". There is always the possibility that someone or another, perhaps from another planet or another culture, will not believe this to be the case and could convincingly demonstrate his case, in which case the hypothesis would be proved false. An example of just this happening is in the story of Achilles and the Tortoise, told by Lewis Carroll, in which the Tortoise simply refuses to accept the logical conclusion from the premises. (11)

Husserl, however, was not at all happy with the tenuous position in which this put logic and, by implication, the possibility of knowledge. He does not, however, go for some variant of the logical positivist 'solution' which sees the necessity of logical propositions as depending upon the fact that such propositions are 'analytic' or 'tautologous' and thus true by definition, (12) but prefers instead to seek for his solution in the 'transcendental' realm. Thus he argues (13) that "Logic
as the theory of science is (accordingly) a normative discipline". (14) Rather than it being an empirical pursuit, it is an art. "It is the business of logic to ascertain whether given sciences or methods fulfill their purpose". (15) This being the case, logic cannot be just like any other science, or based on some empirical science like psychology, since its whole essence is fundamentally different. Empirical science is based on experience - it is "real" - whereas logic is based upon the "ideal" and is a priori. Thus if there is a science upon which logic is based, then it could not be psychology - an empirical discipline - but must be upon an ideal science or a science of the ideal. Thus what is needed if one is to understand logic in its fullness, is a science of the ideal - a science of essences - which could reach to the genuine presuppositions of knowledge instead of supposing that all knowledge can be explained psychologically. It is this science which Husserl conceives phenomenology to be.

It is important to realise that Husserl always, even at the end of his life, saw himself as just beginning his task. Spiegelberg makes the point that Husserl never constructs a system of philosophy after the manner of an Hegel or a Spinoza, but that his work remains programmatic, with Husserl himself always wanting to be a "true beginner". Thus his "Crisis" (16) is yet another attempt to find a route into phenomenology and into the realm of the presuppositions of knowledge, and stands as yet another 'introduction' to his method even though it is his last major work. In spite of the considerable role that he saw for phenomenology, Husserl himself seems never to have realised its promise, continuing instead to attempt to bring others to "see" for themselves, by the use of the methods which he describes at length, the importance and potential of phenomenology. It is this, perhaps, that accounts for the difficulties that the reader has in making out the precise import of some of Husserl's remarks, and the directions in which his concepts should be taken.
Perhaps it accounts, too, for the wide variety of more or less different interpretations that have been given of Husserl's work over the course of the years since his death. (17)

Having made these few general remarks about the point of Husserl's writings, I want now, in the next section, to move on to discuss in more detail something of his method of analysis, the ways in which he attempts to bring the meditating philosopher to the transcendental realm, and something of what that philosopher will find once he gets there.

**HUSSERL'S METHOD AND THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS**

Perhaps the best way of introducing Husserl's method is to look at the remarks which he has to make about Descartes, since this provides some historical perspective upon what it is that Husserl is trying to achieve with the phenomenological and eidetic reductions. (18)

In "Ideas", Husserl claims that Descartes, in his Meditations does not do as he sets out to do - i.e. to doubt all that could possibly be doubted in order to find that which could not be called into doubt and which could therefore be used as a certain starting point for knowledge - but rather his doubting the world becomes a denial of it. (19) The reasons for Husserl's claim become clear from his discussion of Descartes in the "Cartesian Meditations" where he argues against the prejudice that

"With our apodictic pure ego, we have rescued a little tag-end of the world, as the sole unquestionable part of it for the philosophizing Ego, and that now the problem is to infer the rest of the world by rightly conducted arguments, according to principles innate in the ego." (20)

It is the case, however, that

"Unfortunately these prejudices were at work when Descartes introduced the apparently insignificant but actually fateful change whereby the ego becomes a substantia cogitans, a separate human "mens sive animus", and the point of departure for inferences according to the principle of causality - in short, the change by virtue of which
Descartes became the father of transcendental realism, an absurd position, though its absurdity cannot be made apparent at this point." (21)

In other words what Descartes did was to move from "Cogito" to "ergo sum" - an invalid step as far as Husserl is concerned - and by doing so he put the meditating ego in the real, actually existing, world of everyday life. Because of this, the only way of conceiving the world as existing, was to see it in its relationship to the mundane empirical subject - i.e. to people as actual human beings. In this way, Descartes' method of doubt can be more adequately characterized as a denial - it is the actual concrete ego as existing in the world that is denying the actual existing objects of everyday life until such a time as he can find some apodictically certain reason for admitting their existence. This reason is found in the, for Husserl unwarranted, assertion "Cogito, ergo sum". Put in another way, Husserl's claim amounts to saying that as long as the meditating ego is taken to be the real empirical ego of the everyday world then no attempt to provide a truly radical philosophy that approaches the true presuppositions of knowledge can be possible, and indeed will result only in the denial of the actually existing world of everyday life.

What is the alternative? For Husserl, the only radical way to investigate the presuppositions of knowledge, is to perform the phenomenological reduction - a concept that I will explicate later. He must "bracket" his belief in the existence of the everyday world in which we all live in a "free epoche". (22) By doing this he discovers a different Ego - the transcendental Ego which is the true origin of the world. The empirical Ego and the Empirical world remain exactly as they are, existing as we experience them in the natural attitude, yet at the same time the meditating philosopher is able to move into this new realm of experience. There, as Husserl puts it
"This Ego, with his Ego-life, who necessarily remains for me, by virtue of such epoche, is not a piece of the world; and if he says, "I exist, ego cogito", that no longer signifies, "I, this man, exist". No longer am I the man who, in natural self-experience, finds himself as a man and who, with the abstractive restriction to the pure contents of 'internal' or purely psychological self experience, finds his own pure "mens sive animus sive intellectus"; nor am I the separately considered psyche itself." (23)

What the meditating ego finds, once he is in the world characterized by the reduction, is a "transcendental Ego", an Ego without which there would be nothing:

"The Objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and always will exist for me, the only world that ever can exist for me - this world, with all its Objects, I said, derives its whole sense and its existential status, which is has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to the fore only with transcendental phenomenological epoche." (24)

In the epoche, I, as meditating ego, realize myself as transcendental principle of the world - as the "World-form". I do not need, as an empirical Ego, to deny the world as Descartes had done, for with the insights of Phenomenology and by careful use of its methods, I can discover the true presuppositions of knowledge in the transcendental Ego itself and in this transcendental realm I can uncover and describe the structures of the essences that lie there.

What, then, are these methods that provide the meditating philosopher with the means of access to this realm of the transcendental ego? What is this 'epoche' or 'bracketing' which will enable one to "see" the presuppositions of knowledge?

In the introduction to the Gottingen lectures, Husserl speaks of three steps which must be taken in order to ascend to the transcendental realm, and to produce a phenomenological analysis of consciousness. (25) I will take these in turn.

1. He begins by asking what it is that is 'given' in the process (act) of knowledge. He takes the classical distinction between 'transcendent' (i.e. existing independently of consciousness) and
'immanent' (i.e. existing within consciousness) and suggests that only that which is 'immanent' is truly 'given' to us. But this immanence is not to be taken as 'existing within me' but only as 'that which is given in the act of cognition' - in the stream of consciousness. In other words immanence is not to be taken psychologically. Thus, in an investigation of knowledge, one must make use of the 'genuinely immanent' - the adequately self-given - since that is what all knowledge is based on. To that end I must "accomplish a phenomenological reduction: I must exclude all that is transcendentally posited" (26) (i.e. all that is constituted as existing independently of consciousness). This means "everything transcendent (that which is not given to me immanently) is to be assigned the index zero, i.e. its existence, its validity is not to be assumed as such, except at most as the phenomenon of a claim to validity. I am to treat all sciences only as phenomena, hence not as systems of valid truths, not as premises, not even as hypotheses for me to reach truth with." (27)

Thus, in the first stage, we attempt to strip away the presuppositions of the natural attitude - the existence of the empirical world, the validity of scientific truths and so on - and simply stand face to face with what is given. We have performed the 'phenomenological reduction' which entails 'bracketing' our belief in the existence of the world. We have accepted only what is given - the phenomena - and have now to go about the task of describing them.

2. We now move to a higher level. We have already left behind all empirical sciences in favour of the 'pure phenomena'. We are no longer dealing with man in the world, but with pure phenomena of cognition. We can now "see" the realm of phenomena, free of preconceptions about existence and their mundane status. But so far we seem to be "seeing" only individual, unconnected phenomena. What we in fact find when we inspect what is given, is not a series of unrelated phenomena, but "inspectable universals, species, essences". (28) By eidetic abstraction - the eidetic reduction - we rise to a realm of essences. Just as we at
first saw disconnected phenomena, so we now "see" the universals - the essences - which enable us to see certain phenomena as instances of "the same" thing. Phenomena take shape as instances of the genus 'chair' and 'table' for example, instead of being unrelated shapes. In this way we are able to see that the objectivity of essences is 'given' to us in consciousness, although it is not given immanently. (29)

So far the impression may have been given that givenness is a wholly passive affair. The first, phenomenological, reduction seems to be a matter of sitting back and allowing the phenomena to simply float into ones consciousness. The givenness of essences that characterizes the eidetic reduction on the other hand is not at all a passive affair. Essences are not just beings existing in consciousness in some way; as Fink puts it

"Rather, the eidos is the correlate of an operation of thought, or of a spontaneous intellectual act. The eidos is known as the invariable element of something held fast in terms of its self-identity throughout its variation and the reflective running through of its possible modifications. Since mention of essential insight was to have indicated the manner in which a thought-intention was fulfilled (and whose meaning, therefore, was only analogous to sensory perception), the phenomenological definition of essence itself as an actual objectivity does not signify its hypostatized substantiality, but simply indicates the eidos' "categorial" existence, that is, its being engendered through spontaneous acts of thought." (30)

The emphasis is not on the passive reception of sense data, but upon cognition - upon 'acts' of consciousness. Thus the analysis of essences involves an analysis of the acts of consciousness which constitute these essences as 'objective' (although in a sense that does not, note, imply existence). The precise nature of these essences will be examined in a moment.

Thus, with the phenomenological and eidetic reductions, we are in a realm of essences - as Husserl puts it
"Thus the field is now characterised. It is a field of absolute cognitions, within which the ego and the world and god and the mathematical manifolds and whatever else may be a scientifically objective matter, are held in abeyance. Cognitions which are, therefore also not dependent on these matters, which are valued in their own right, whether we are sceptics with regard to the others or not. All that remains as it is." (31)

We have thus reached the realm where the true presuppositions of knowledge lie. The mundane world remains exactly as it is, but we, as philosophers who have moved from the natural to the phenomenological attitude, have gained access to the ultimate realm, a realm of cognitions and of essences.

3. The final stage is to look carefully at this ideal realm of essences and to describe what one sees. As Husserl puts it elsewhere

"We should and must strive in each step we take to describe faithfully what we see from our own point of view and after the most earnest consideration. Our procedure is that of a scientific traveller in an unknown part of the world who carefully describes what he finds in the trackless ways he takes - ways that will not always be the shortest." (32)

What is described is the structures of the essences, the relationships between the appearing thing and the act of cognition, between various possible acts of consciousness (perception, imagination etc.) and between essences and the stream of consciousness. Our reflections show us the ways in which things are 'constituted' in consciousness - as Husserl puts it we find

"mental processes of specific and changing structure, such as perception, imagination, memory, predication etc. and in them the things are not contained as in a hull or vessel. Instead, the things comes to be constituted in these mental processes, although in reality they are not at all to be found in them." (33)

The job of the phenomenologist is thus to describe as faithfully as possible the ways in which things come to be constituted in consciousness - the structure of acts and essences which is the presupposition of all knowledge.
It is difficult to overemphasise the importance of the methods of phenomenological reduction in Husserl's work. Without them, phenomenological analysis would become impossible, and all investigations of consciousness or of the presuppositions of knowledge would be condemned to be carried on in the mundane attitude of everyday life. Thus, without the reductions, Husserl could never have argued as he did against Descartes, the distinction between the transcendental and mundane realms of experience could never have been substantiated so graphically, and an eidetic science of a phenomenological kind could never have been suggested as a possibility. Indeed Phenomenology, to a large extent, is a set of methods - methods that carried through faithfully will enable the phenomenologist to see with new eyes the transcendental presuppositions of the world. The method of reduction provides access to the phenomenological realm, the method of description enables the philosopher to move usefully within this realm, and 'intentional analysis' (of which more will be said) provides a framework within which the phenomenologist works in his descriptions of consciousness. Husserl himself writes at the conclusion of Cartesian Meditations that he has shown "the concrete possibility of the Cartesian idea of a philosophy as an all-embracing science grounded on an absolute foundation", in terms of the development of adequate methods. As he puts it

"To exhibit this concrete possibility, to show the feasibility of such a philosophy - though of course in the form of an endless program - Means exhibiting a necessary and indubitable beginning and an equally necessary and always employable method - whereby, at the same time, a systematic order of all senseful problems is predelineated." (34)

This "endless program" is phenomenology, for Husserl. The philosopher must constantly return to the roots of knowledge using phenomenological methods in order to transform awareness of these roots. The point is not to secure worldly objectivity (35), but to understand it, and thus to prevent the naive dogmatism that threatens to hide the true origins
of the world from man. Positive science, with its mathematization of
nature, has hidden from man the true transcendental origins of the world
in consciousness, and has thus taken the world away from him. Husserl
puts it thus:

"... we must note something of the highest importance
that occurred even as early as Galileo: the surreptitious
substitution of the mathematically substructed world of
idealities for the only real world, the one that is
actually given through perception, that is ever experienced
and experienceable - our everyday life-world. This
substitution was promptly passed on to his successors, the
physicists of all the succeeding centuries." (36)

What must be done, is to recover the 'life-world' of everyday
experience, and then moving on from there, one must go back to the
transcendental origins of the world. (37) It is the phenomenological
methods that make this process possible.

The point can be stressed further by pointing out that criticisms
of phenomenological concepts that remain wholly within the "natural
attitude", cannot adequately grasp the true nature of that which they
are supposed to be assessing. Anyone who would understand the reductions
must carry them out himself, for otherwise his stance in the mundane
world will prevent him from ever coming fully to grips with their true
nature; as Fink puts it

"He (Husserl P.M.) could be satisfied with this first
and provisional account of the reduction in trusting
that the actual carrying out of the given analyses
(in "Ideas" P.M.) (and not simply their being read)
would create the disposition to set authentically the
phenomenological reduction in motion." (38)

Statements such as these make it clear that the phenomenological methods
are not only crucial to the practice of phenomenology, but also to any
adequate understanding of it. Criticism that does not itself perform the
reduction will inevitably be inadequate.

The phenomenologist who makes use of the methods Husserl lays out
for him thus brackets his belief in the existence of things in the world,
and moves from the 'natural attitude' into the 'phenomenological attitude'. 
With this shift of attitude, a new realm of experience becomes available to him and it becomes possible for him to describe the structures of essences and acts of consciousness that provide the possibility of knowledge. The question that must be answered now is what do these structures actually look like?

For Husserl, there are three basic elements in the structure of consciousness, namely the 'ego', the 'cogito' and the 'cogitatum'. I will deal with each of these briefly in turn.

The 'ego' can be seen as having three aspects. (39) Firstly there is the "human ego", the 'I' which lives in the everyday world in the natural attitude. It is this ego that is left behind when the meditating philosopher 'brackets' his belief in the existence of the world by performing the phenomenological reductions. Secondly, there is the "transcendental ego" for whom, as Fink puts it, "the world is pregiven in the flow of the universal apperception and who accepts it". (40) Finally, there is the ego which is the "onlooker" who actually performs the reductions and does the describing of the intentional structures of consciousness. The ego which is important for present purposes is the transcendental ego which has been attained by means of the reductions.

The 'cogito', or 'I think', which is also called by Husserl the 'noetic' aspect of consciousness, is the cognitive acts which the transcendental ego performs. Thus, for example, perception, imagining, remembering, judging and so on, are all noetic acts of consciousness.

The cogitatum, or 'noematic' aspect of consciousness, is the 'objective' correlate of a noetic act. This notion needs some explication. It must firstly be remembered that the 'noema' is not an object in the real world. It is not, for example, a 'tree' complete with existence as we perceive it in the natural attitude. Since what is being described is found after the reductions, then it is concerned not with actually existing objects - like trees, chairs, tables etc. - in the real world,
but with ' essences' - with the ' presuppositions ' of knowledge. Thus the noema, as correlate of a noetic act of consciousness, is to be clearly distinguished from the actually existing object in the real world. At the same time, however, it should not be thought that it is nothing but an aspect of the noetic act itself. The same noema can be the object of different acts - of perception, imagination, etc. - and thus does not depend upon any single noesis. (41) Thus the noema is both different from the ' real ' object, and independent of individual acts of consciousness. So what is it? Gurwitsch gives the following account:

"The noema, as distinct from the real object as well as from the act, turns out to be an unreal or ideal entity which belongs to the same sphere as meanings or significations. This is the sphere of sense (Sinn)." (42)

The noema, in other words, is bound up with the ' meaning ' of objects as they are perceived, imagined etc. in consciousness. It is the noema that relates consciousness towards ' objects ' - "that allows our conscious acts to be directed toward object". (43) It is bound up with the ' sense ' that the world has for us - that objects have for us - and it is a fundamental aspect of the structure of consciousness.

The relationship between the noetic act and its noematic correlate is called an ' intentional ' relationship. It must be stressed, however, that the sense of intention that is meant here cannot be related unproblematically to the normal English sense of ' intend ' as in ' I intended to cross the road '. (44) Rather, it is meant to describe the relationship between noesis and noema - it is a technical term whose purpose is this description.

With this notion of ' intentionality ' is described what is, for Husserl, a fundamental fact about consciousness - the fundamental structure of consciousness. Having performed the reduction, the phenomenologist must then describe the intentional relationships which he finds, for in
this way he can lay bare the presuppositions of knowledge. By unravelling the ways in which noetic acts and their noematic correlates are related, the 'essences' of things can be set forth and the origins of the world brought to experience. It must not be thought, however, that what is being dealt with here is a set of discrete and particular events that follow on, one after another, - noetic act after noetic act - like the tick of a clock. Rather, consciousness is characterized by Husserl in terms more reminiscent of the sweep of the second hand round the dial. It is here that the concept of the 'stream of consciousness' becomes important. Husserl himself says of the reduction

"If I put myself above all this life (i.e., the life of the natural attitude) and refrain from doing any believing that takes 'the' world straightforwardly as existing - if I direct my regard exclusively to this life itself, as consciousness of 'the' world - I thereby acquire myself as the pure stream of my cogitationes." (45)

In a sense, then, consciousness is a 'pure stream' of cogitationes, rather than a succession of discrete noetic acts following one upon the other. Consciousness is a pure stream of lived experience, undifferentiated and yet, nonetheless, 'intentional' at a fundamental level. (46) It is for the phenomenologist to unravel the precise ways in which noetic acts and their noematic correlates phase in and out of the stream of consciousness to give us our 'sense' of the world - to give the sense that the world has for us. Thus the way in which the world is 'constituted' by the transcendental ego will be described and the presuppositions of our knowledge of the world made apparent.

I have tried to give here, then, a general impression of the type of method and analysis that Husserl engages in, and which he recommends to all philosophers that they might 'see' as he has seen. Upon this notion of the intentional structure of consciousness is grounded the rest of Husserl's work. His thoughts on 'evidence', on 'intuition', on 'certainty' 'fulfilment' and 'apodicticity' and so on are all dependent
upon - indeed generated from - this fundamental notion of 'intentionality',
and are subject to 'intentional analyses'. For present purposes, the
most important of Husserl's intentional analyses is that which is found
in the "Cartesian Meditations" in which he attempts to account for
intersubjectivity, and it is to this that I want to turn next. Before
doing so, however, it will be useful to make a few observations about
the notion of 'intentional analysis' in Husserl's sense.

It should be noticed firstly, that Husserl's notion of intentionality
enables him to avoid difficulties created by problems concerned with
'illusion'. It makes no difference, as far as he is concerned, whether
a perceived (or remembered, etc.) object actually exists or whether it
is an hallucination, or a misremembering etc. Because he has bracketed
belief in the mundane existence of objects in the world, his intentional
analyses of the 'objects' of consciousness which is to unravel the
presuppositions of knowledge, does not depend upon the actual existence
of the objects perceived. Whether the object does exist, in other words,
makes no difference to the intentional structure of consciousness itself,
so that an examination of that structure need not depend at all upon the
existence of an external world. Existential, or ontological, status,
once within the reduction, is something that is conferred upon an object
by an act of consciousness - by a special act of 'positing' existence -
and not something that belongs to the object itself. Once the meditating
philosopher has placed the mundane world of the natural attitude within
brackets, it remains there throughout all intentional analyses.

Secondly, it is worth noticing that intentional analysis in Husserl's
sense depends upon a particular sort of abstraction. It is an abstraction
in the sense that by bracketing belief in the existence of the mundane
world, it abstracts from the world as we actually know it in order to
uncover the presuppositions of knowledge. The question then arises as
to what the relationship is of this abstract knowledge, gained within
the reduction, to the world of the natural attitude, to actually existing reality. Spiegelberg states the problem:

"Reduction may be ever so important for sharply isolating the sphere of those phenomena which are indubitably certain .... But if it is correct that "bracketing" means simply disregarding the question of reality, it can never be the means of deciding it. Breaking off the bridges across a stream can never be the way to determine what is on the other side,..." (47)

At the same time, however, that there is a problem here, there is also a sense in which the analyses are directed towards 'objects' which may be 'real' by virtue of the investigation of the 'noematic' component of consciousness. Although it is not necessary that the object to which the noema refers does in fact exist, in as much as a noema is bound up with the 'sense' or 'meaning' of the world it does relate to the way in which we "see" the world (where "see" includes perception, judging, etc., etc.). It provides, in a sense, the 'categories' through which the world is grasped; as Solomon puts it

"Husserl is not simply offering us a modification of Brentano's thesis, he is giving us a radical alternative to it. That radical thesis is essentially a Kantian thesis: the claim that concepts are basic not only to conceptual thought but to the most primitive perception and experience as well ... In Kantian terms, we would say that all our experience is concept-laden and meaning-full, that what we experience is "constituted" through our judgements. The Husserlian thesis is strikingly similar to this, except that he would speak of an "essence" where Kant spoke of "concept"." (48)

In short, once again, what Husserl appears to be doing with his abstraction is to provide access to the realm of the presuppositions of knowledge. Intentional analyses thus relate to the 'real' world to the extent that they uncover those presuppositions, which are the structures of essences and acts that constitute the sense of the world.

With these remarks, I want to turn now to discuss Husserl's account of intersubjectivity. The first thing that must be noticed about this is that it is an intentional analysis of the constitution of intersubjectivity in consciousness. The goal of this analysis is to
describe the processes whereby the world becomes for us an intersubjective reality rather than a mere correlate of our solipsistic perceptions.

It is, in other words, an analysis of the presuppositions of intersubjectivity, rather than a metaphysical account of its concrete reality. (49) As Husserl puts it, to find answers to all of the possible questions about intersubjectivity

"it is necessary to begin with a systematic explication of the overt and implicit intentionality in which the being of others for me becomes "made" and explicated in respect of its rightful content - that is, its fulfilment-content." (50)

Since we are dealing here with an intentional analysis, the structure of noetic/noematic relationships which is an intentional structure, is the pivot of the analysis.

Husserl's analysis of intersubjectivity is treated most fully in the fifth of his "Cartesian Meditations". There his strategy is to begin by performing a new sort of reduction within transcendental consciousness, which is to lead to the sphere of 'ownness'. He suggests that if one performs this reduction one finds a basic division between that which is particularly my own, and that which is other. By bracketing all that is other, and concentrating only on that which is mine - my own ego, my own perceptions etc. - one comes to see oneself as a monad, separated from that which is other than oneself and which has an objectivity apart from ones' own perceptions of it. The problem for the intentional analysis is now to trace the structural links between this sphere of ownness and the sphere of otherness, which contains within it other 'monads' who seem to share this sphere of otherness, and who seem to share in its constitution as 'other' and as 'objective'. Indeed it is they that make it a sphere of 'otherness' in relation to ones own monadic sphere of 'ownness', such that the whole of consciousness cannot be reduced to ownness. It is they that ensure that transcendental subjectivity is not a solipsistic subjectivity.
The relationship between the monads - between one's own monad and that of others - is described broadly in terms of 'empathy'. It is this 'empathy' that suggests the joint constitution of the world to 'Ego'. It is the basic experience Ego has of others. The whole idea of the objective world, rests upon this notion of intersubjectivity gained from the "harmony between monads" - as Husserl puts it:

"The objective world as an Idea - the ideal correlate of an intersubjective (intersubjectively communalised) experience, which ideally can be and is carried on as constantly harmonious - is essentially related to intersubjectivity (itself constituted as having the ideality of endless openness) whose component particular subjects are equipped with mutually corresponding and harmonious constitutive systems. Consequently the constitution of the world essentially involves a 'harmony' of the monads..." (51)

This basic notion of a harmony of monads, is filled out by Husserl over the remaining pages of the fifth meditation. His argument here - which, it must be remembered, is intended as an intentional analysis and not a metaphysical statement - can be summarized in a series of four points:

1. There is what Husserl calls 'analogising apperception'. His argument here bears some relationship to the usual argument for other minds from anology, except that it is stronger. The 'other', is not simply 'seen' as an animated organism similar to oneself, and then given the status of an alter ego on the basis of inference, but rather, is directly 'apperceived' as another in harmony with oneself. Just as in ordinary apperception one grasps an object in its entirety - i.e. one apperceives not only the face of a building that is turned towards you, but also the hidden sides as well - so in 'analogising apperception' one grasps the whole of alter, as another monad, with his own stream of consciousness etc.

2. The second element in the move to transcendental intersubjectivity is 'pairing' or 'association'. Pairing is:
"a primal form of that passive synthesis which we designate 'association' in contrast to passive synthesis of 'identification'" (52)

Pairing is 'seeing things as of the same kind'; it is associating two things with one another. This is part of intentional constitution, part of the mechanisms by which objectivities are constituted in consciousness. What is paired in this case, is 'alter' with 'ego'. The other is apperceived as an instance of myself.

3. 'Harmony' is a third point. We have, as 'evidence' of alter ego, the fact of harmoniousness both in the constitution of the world, and of alter with ego. This is an ongoingly present evidence, and in this sense it is unusual - i.e. most 'evidence' for the 'existence' of an object, or for the truth or falsity of a statement is of a more discrete kind. Nonetheless it "consistently verifies something indicated" (53) - which is 'others'.

4. The last point here is that there is a possibility of making myself 'other' by moving spatially (or in imagination) from my 'here' to my 'there' - which may be the others 'here'. This is a constant possibility for me - this interchangeability of my position with that of alter - and again it is a part of the 'apperception' of other 'monads'.

What Husserl has done here, then, is to take his analysis of the structure of transcendental consciousness, and extend it, via the distinction between the realms of ownness and otherness, to incorporate the intersubjective realm. It is an analysis of the way in which the idea of an objective world is possible, and it finds this possibility in an intersubjectivity which is first experienced through empathy. Objectivity is, essentially, intersubjective constitution. Intersubjectivity itself is characterized as a harmony of monads and the intentional structure of this is described in terms of analogical apperception, pairing, harmony and the possibility of interchangeability of positions between alter and ego. This whole analysis attempts to move from
transcendental subjectivity, to transcendental intersubjectivity.

In his later work, Husserl's concern with intersubjectivity led him to formulate the concept of the 'life-world', a concept that has been highly influential in the work of Merleau Ponty (54), and which is important in Schutz's writings. It seems probable that the concept was developed as another stage on the way to transcendental subjectivity - i.e. as a stage in the phenomenological reductions - rather than itself the ultimate point of a new kind of reduction which has as its goal intersubjective reality rather than the subjective consciousness that was the goal of the reduction in "Ideas", for example. I will give a brief account of the concept here.

The life-world is that world of intersubjective experience upon which all thought, all science, all knowledge etc. is based. It is not the world of the natural attitude, but is the world of basic experience, stripped of the pollutions of scientific objectivism. (55) It is an 'intuitive' world, that waits to be revealed as the experiential foundations of all science, instead of being continually hidden by the 'objective' facts of scientific theorizing. There has been a "surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substructed world of idealities for the only real world" (56) and this has hidden the fact that all science is in fact built upon the intersubjective life-world - the world of experience.

"as for the 'objectively true' world, the world of science, it is a structure at a higher level, built on pre-scientific experiencing and thinking, or rather on its accomplishments of validity". (57)

Thus, in order to truly understand science, it is necessary to investigate the life-world as that intersubjective world which makes all science possible (58) - and this leads back, once again, to an analysis of the constitution of intersubjectivity within transcendental subjectivity. In this way, the life-world links back into the notion of intersubjectivity
that I have been discussing above, and thus into the rest of Husserl's phenomenology.

HUSSERL AND SOCIOLOGY

Before going on to discuss Schutz in the next section, I want first to make a few remarks about Husserl's philosophy with a view to pointing out some of the difficulties with which it presents any sociologist who is interested in the possibility of incorporating phenomenological insights into the study of the social world. In this way, hopefully, the context of the decisions which Schutz took concerning Husserl's work will be made apparent.

The most obvious point that needs to be made is simply that Husserl was not by any means a sociologist himself, but a philosopher. His problems are philosophical problems that have troubled philosophers over the generations, and all of his writing is aimed at providing some solution to these, and not to investigating the social world. This, as I have suggested above, (59) goes as much for the later concept of the life-world as it does for his earlier analyses of transcendental subjectivity. All of Husserl's analyses are framed with transcendental intent - they are aimed at the essences of things. As Sokolowski has put it, the transcendental turn enables us

"to understand essences or eidetic structures as the anonymous conditions for the appearing of things as individuals and as facts, but conditions which in their turn can also become manifest to consciousness through essential intuition. Thus essences function in the appearing of things, and it is only when we focus on the appearing things that the status of essence becomes intelligible. The transcendental viewpoint lets us do this." (60)

It is the focus on the transcendental that makes essential structures, as the presuppositions of knowledge, become apparent to us, as meditating egos. It is a focus which provides us with access to a realm of 'immanence' where the possibility of gaining 'truth' - of achieving certainty - can be realised and thus a firm foundation for 'knowledge' provided. Husserl
was not interested in securing worldly objectivity, but in understanding what makes it possible - in the transcendental. As the quotation at the head of the chapter says "The point is not to secure objectivity, but to understand it."

The sociologist, on the other hand, is interested in the real world. It is that world - the world of the natural attitude, - in which the members of a society live and of which they are a part, which is the primary focus of the sociologist's attention. The point of departure for his analyses is various worldly problems, concerning the nature of social order, the nature of deviance and so on rather than those concerns which drove Husserl. He needs to be able to grasp, in an empirical fashion, the various objects and events of social life, and to display them in a perspicuous fashion to his fellow sociologists for their appraisal.

This being the case, what is the sociologist to make of the following remarks of Fink's, taken from an essay that is endorsed by Husserl himself?

"The unmotivated character of the phenomenological reduction (the absence of any worldly problem which could serve as its real motive) expresses the reduction's unfamiliar nature in a similar way. Because it is the suspension of the "natural attitude" it cannot appear within this attitude and it therefore must be unfamiliar. The reduction becomes knowable in its "transcendental motivation" only with the transcending of the world. This means that the reduction is its own presupposition insofar as it alone opens up that dimension of problems with reference to which it establishes the possibility of theoretical knowledge. This strange paradox of the beginning of philosophical reflection finds expression within the fundamental perplexity into which all attempts to explicate the phenomenological reduction fall. Unmotivated and unfamiliar with respect to its possibility, every exposition of the phenomenological reduction is in a unique way false. This falsity is caused by the exposition's worldly point of departure, that is, its starting upon the basis of the "natural attitude" which the performance of the reduction is to suspend." (61)

This same fact about phenomenology is also called by Fink "the paradox of the phenomenological statement". The phenomenologist must use
ordinary language to express his analyses, but this language stems from
the natural attitude and not from the transcendental.

"For this reason no phenomenological analysis, above all
the analysis of the deeper constituting levels of
transcendental subjectivity, is capable of being
adequately presented." (62)

The transcendental realm, therefore, can only be talked about in an
ideal language - and yet if an ideal language were invented for this
purpose, it too would only be, in the final analysis, another version
of the mundane language of the natural attitude. Such a language, in
other words, is impossible.

In a very real sense, then, what is uncovered by the phenomenological
reductions cannot be communicated, but can only be experienced by the
philosopher in his own carrying out of the methods provided by Husserl.

Husserl himself (to quote Fink again)

"could be satisfied with this first and provisional
account of the reduction in trusting that the actual
carrying out of the given analyses (and not simply
their being read) would create the disposition to set
authentically the phenomenological reduction in motion." (63)

The sociologist, on the other hand, cannot be so satisfied. If the
methods which form the fundamental aspect of Husserl's phenomenology
lead to a position in which all one can do is experience the transcendental
presuppositions of the world, then they can be of no use to the sociologist
investigating the empirical world and attempting to communicate the
results of his investigations. Husserl's phenomenology is a seeking
after 'truth' and 'certainty', and as Kolakowski has put it

"We gain or we imagine to have gained access to certitude
only as far as we gain or imagine to have gained perfect
identity with the object, an identity whose model is the
mystical experience. This experience however is
incommunicable; any attempt to hand it over to others
destroys the very immediacy that was supposed to be its
value - consequently it destroys certitude." (64)

It is Husserl's own concerns with the transcendental, and with providing
a sure foundation for knowledge that led him in this direction. The
sociologist, whose interests do not lie in such a direction, need not follow him through all the meanderings of his methods and reductions. He must stay in the world of the natural attitude, along with the rest of society.

At the same time, however, as the ultimate objective of transcendental phenomenology appears as wholly alien to sociology conceived of as an empirical discipline, there is still a sense in which it could, at one level, be seen to be more helpful. This possibility is best illustrated by considering the relationship between the mundane, psychological ego on the one hand, and the transcendental ego on the other. I will unravel this by examining the relationship between psychology and transcendental phenomenology.

There seem to have been two aspects to the relationship between these two different disciplines. Firstly, Husserl seems to have seen a form of psychology that examines the empirical psyche by introspectively analysing its structure in terms of basic phenomenological concepts (i.e. intentionality, noetic and noematic components etc.), as being a way into a genuine phenomenological (transcendental) analysis – as being the first step towards a transcendental reduction. Thus he writes in a footnote in the "Crisis" in a section about the struggle between "Objectivistic" and "Subjectivistic" philosophy in the history of thought, that psychology is the decisive field –

"i.e., decisive for the struggle between subjectivism and objectivism. For by beginning as an objective science and then becoming transcendental, it bridges the gap." (65)

There is a form of descriptive psychology, (66) that performs a sort of reduction that brackets the existence of beings in the world, but which does not attempt to ascend to the transcendental realm, remaining rather, in the mundane world of empirical science. However, it leads towards the transcendental:
"Thus we see with surprise, I think, that in the pure development of the idea of a descriptive psychology, which seeks to bring to expression what is essentially proper to souls, there necessarily occurs a transformation of the phenomenological-psychological epoche and reduction into the transcendental." (67)

In this sense, then, psychology is a means towards transcendental phenomenology. There is, however, another sense in which transcendental reflections are relevant to psychology. The analyses of consciousness which are performed by the philosopher within the transcendental reduction run side by side with those performed by the phenomenological psychologist within the mundane world. The difference lies in the 'attitude' taken, and in the scope of the analyses - i.e. the one uncovers the presuppositions of knowledge, the other the grounds of empirical psychology. Thus, Fink writes

"The extensive and important analyses of noesis and noema are nevertheless invested with a peculiar ambiguity, for with respect to content they are equally valid in the psychological attitude; they are, so to speak, indifferent to the distinction between phenomenology and psychology." (68)

This "disturbing indifference" (69) to a crucial distinction however, is not fatal as long as the reader realizes what is going on, and doesn't take it that the analyses are meant to be complete accounts of the empirical psyche of the mundane Ego. Thus:

"The ambiguity in terms of which the thematic analyses of the "Ideas" are to be understood (in having both phenomenological and psychological relevance) is not a dangerous one so long as one genuinely moves along with these analyses - purposely neutral with respect to this differentiation - and keeps the overall sense of the transcendental-phenomenological aim firmly in view." (70)

One must, in other words, keep in mind that there is an important distinction to be made here. As Kockelmans puts it "Phenomenological psychology hopes to expose only the foundations of empirical psychology" whilst transcendental phenomenology "reduces the already psychologically purified to the transcendental, to that most general subjectivity which constitutes the world and its "souls"." (71)
This relevance of transcendental analyses for psychology seems to open up for the sociologist, the possibility that phenomenological analyses of, for example, 'meaning' or 'intersubjectivity' could in some way be relevant to the study of the social world. Just as phenomenological psychology is conceived to offer, through an intentional analysis of the 'psychic', a framework of basic concepts which is to provide the foundations for an empirical psychology, so, perhaps, with concepts such as the 'life-world' it could provide the grounds for a systematic social science. There are, however, considerable problems here.

In the first place, it should be noticed that as far as psychology is concerned, Husserl's reflections have not been assimilated as they stand. Kockelmans puts it that

"The truth is, however, that only a very few psychologists actually use Husserl's concepts without making major modifications. Furthermore, many psychologists talk about phenomenology without stipulating precisely what is meant by the term." (72)

It may well be that, as Spiegelberg suggests, "Such partial influences may actually be more valuable than (the) total ones" (73) but it does suggest nonetheless that there may be difficulty that the empirical scientist ought to be aware of in uncovering the precise relevance of Husserl's work for his enterprise. I want to suggest something of that difficulty here.

The reduction, whether it is transcendental or merely psychological, takes the philosopher out of the physical world. It is the case, however, that the subject matter of psychology, and for that matter sociology, is not only psychical, but also physical in that the events that are investigated are happenings within the physical world. It seems to be a necessary fact about psychology that it is based not on a purely psychical foundation, but upon psycho-physical grounds - the events with which it is concerned have both psychical and physical aspects. Kockelmans puts the point thus
"In other words, the apriori of empirical psychology is not exclusively phenomenological, for it depends not only on the essence of the psychical but also upon the essence of the physical, and more particularly upon the essence of the psychophysical of organic nature." (74)

To attempt to reduce the physical aspects to the psychical, which it would be necessary to do if one were to have a purely phenomenologically based psychology whose concepts were formulated in terms of the intentional nature of consciousness, would severely limit the scope of a possible empirical psychology or sociology.

This difficulty can perhaps be reformulated as a difficulty with knowing quite what to make of Husserl's analyses in general from an empirical scientific point of view. If Husserl's main concern with psychology was, as it seems to have been, with providing another means of access to transcendental phenomenology, then it is small wonder that his analyses often seem irrelevant to the practicing scientist. Husserl himself is adamant that

"The meaning of eidetic science excludes in principle every assimilation of the theoretical results of empirical sciences." (75)

and yet one does not have to have a Baconian model of science to suggest that there is at least some interplay between the apriori presuppositions of a science and its empirical findings, at least to the extent that those presuppositions have some consciously accepted effect upon the methods and procedures of that science. Such reflections, in their turn, lead one on to wonder quite what is involved in the transcendental ego itself, as distinct from the ego that is the subject matter of psychology and that which is the mundane 'human' ego of the 'real' world. Just what is it, in the end, that the transcendental reductions give us access to? Are we really confronted with a realm of presuppositions, a world of immanence which will enable us to ground our knowledge in apodictic certainty? Or do we end up simply abstracting from the one
and only 'real' world in such a way that the abstract knowledge gained can have no relevance for real worldly concerns - for the scientific enterprise? Perhaps, as Schmitt has suggested, the whole notion of the transcendental ego is, in fact, a muddle:

"Husserl ascribes quite diverse functions to the transcendental ego and its acts. He ascribes to it the rules by which we validate series of acts, rules of formal logic and rules of evidence, and he ascribes to it the first-person statements which give last ditch support to observation statements. The former are plausibly said to be nonempirical but cannot really be said to be "mine" or "yours". The latter are clearly mine or yours, but cannot plausibly be said to be nonempirical. But both serve to validate, in different ways, my empirical claims about the world. Husserl's notion of the transcendental ego seems to confuse these two very different ways of validating empirical claims ... ......." (76)

Considerations such as these can lead easily to a situation in which the empirical scientist comes to see the whole notion of the transcendental reduction, and of the transcendental realm in general, as being an illusion of some kind, based perhaps on a category mistake, (77) and with the rejection of the transcendental much of the raison d'etre of Husserl's phenomenological psychology disappears.

In sum, then, Husserl is not himself a sociologist. His driving problems are different from those of sociology, with the result that even in places where it might seem that his analyses have something to offer the empirical scientist there are problems as to quite how to make use of them. For the empirical sociologist, working in the everyday world, the whole notion of the transcendental can come to seem superfluous - as not related at all to the problems with which he is concerned. But at the same time the adjustment of the transcendental analyses to the mundane world is not without difficulties, simply because of the reduction - the method of abstraction - which removes phenomenological findings from straightforwardly empirical concerns. If the reduction involved in phenomenological psychology is justified, in the end, as a stage on the
way to the transcendental reduction, one wonders what its justification is once the transcendental has been abandoned.

The above remarks are aimed primarily at problems that are the result of considering the differences between the transcendental phenomenological enterprise as it was conceived by Husserl himself, and the more empirical concerns of psychology and sociology. For the sociologist, however, there is another set of problems which are internal to phenomenology itself concerned with intersubjectivity. I have outlined above the way in which Husserl attempts to account for intersubjectivity in terms of empathy, by way of an intentional analysis of the constitution of the sense of the 'other' in transcendental subjectivity. It is evidently of some importance that the sociologist, who is interested in an intersubjective world, should examine this notion to assess the extent to which it can provide an adequate basis for conceptualizing the social world. Unfortunately such an examination uncovers problems.

Elliston, at the beginning of one of the few sympathetic accounts of Husserl's account of intersubjectivity, admits that "few of his (i.e. Husserl's P.M.) interpreters or critics have been satisfied with his solution." (78) Lauer expresses some of the dissatisfaction felt when he writes that

"The theory of intersubjectivity is, as it were a particular application of intentional constitution, an application which could not be avoided, as were most other applications, since the central concept of objective validity demands an objectivity recognized as binding on all possible subjects; and the very admission that other subjects are possible demands that the theory account for the constitution of such subjects - even if only as possible. Thus, it is impossible to escape the impression that the numerous pages consecrated by Husserl, in both his published and unpublished works, to intersubjective constitution add no explanation whatever to the problem of objectivity." (79)

The weakness of Husserl's account lies in the fact that 'objectivity' is, in a sense, constituted intersubjectively. It is not enough simply to analyse the subjective constitution of the other, since that does not
add anything to what has been said about subjective constitution in
gen-er- al - it does not start to unravel the peculiarly intersubjective
status that the 'objective' world has for us. A satisfactory analysis
would include all of the complex structures of intersubjective
constitution as well as an account of the constitution of 'others',
and this, evidently, would considerably complicate the analysis of the
constitution of 'others' itself.

In a sense, remarks such as these address themselves only to the
completeness of Husserl's account rather than to the possibility of
providing such an account at all. There are, however, difficulties
with the actual intentional analysis which Husserl gives us of the
constitution of the other. To what extent, for example, is it genuinely
possible to perform the reduction to the sphere of 'ownness' - to a
sphere in which all that is 'other', which must include such intersubjective
phenomena as language, cultural objects, and so on, has been excluded?
Is it, in principle, possible to uncover such a sphere of monadic
isolation, or to 'experience' it in some sense of the word, or has
Husserl suggested an impossibility as the first stage in his analysis of
the constitution of 'others' within transcendental subjectivity? To
suggest that what he tries to do here is, indeed, impossible would be to
present Husserl with in principle difficulties concerning the relationship
between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity,
and between the subjective and the intersubjective constitution of
objectivity.

For the sociologist, working with an intersubjective world, both of
these types of difficulty present problems. Any notion of 'society'
which posits more than simply a collection of atomic individuals must
contain some idea of intersubjectivity as something qualitatively distinct
from individual subjectivities, however that distinctiveness is
formulated. At the same time, it is necessary to provide some account
of the relationship between the individual members of a society and society as a whole. Thus, for example, subjective meanings must be articulated with 'social' meanings in some way, or collective representations with individual representations. Now should it prove the case that the phenomenological analyses which are to provide the foundations for sociology cannot themselves provide clarification of the relationship between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity in a satisfactory manner, then the concepts that will be made available to the empirical scientist through such analyses are unlikely to be able to handle adequately the sociologists' subject matter. The phenomenological analyses which are intended to produce clarity and a new framework for investigating the social world will end by producing confusions.

It could be argued, perhaps, that the 'life-world' concept does hold promise for the investigation of the social world in that it does contain within it the notion of intersubjectivity. Certainly it is this concept that has excited the most interest and which has been incorporated in the work of Schutz and Merleau Ponty in particular. At the same time, however, in each case what has been developed moves on from Husserl's own notion which, as I mentioned above, he saw as leading back to the analysis of transcendental subjectivity rather than as a new conceptualization of the ultimate goal of the reductions. It thus remains the case that for Husserl, at least, the matter of the relationship between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity is still important within the concept of the life-world itself. It is for those who would develop the concept to provide some solution to these problems.

In this section I have tried to give some impression of the type of problems that face the sociologist who wants to use some of Husserl's insights in the service of an empirical social science. My intention has not been to demonstrate the impossibility of carrying out phenomenology,
or to suggest that the whole of Husserl's enterprise is fundamentally misconceived. There is, indeed, much of importance to be found within both Husserl's own work and in the phenomenological literature as a whole. Rather, all I have tried to do is to demonstrate the particular difficulties which someone interested in both Husserl's writings and in sociology is likely to encounter in any attempt to marry the two into a coherent sociological theory. It is in the context of those difficulties that I want to turn now to the work of Schutz.

ALFRED SCHUTZ

The above discussion of Husserl has given some idea of the difficulties that confronted Schutz when he set about laying the foundations of a phenomenological sociology. Since Husserl's concerns were primarily philosophical, and led him towards the analysis of the intentional structures of transcendental subjectivity, it would not have been possible for Schutz, with his sociological concerns, to have taken the whole of Husserlian phenomenology as it stood and to have injected it undiluted into existing social theory. Instead, it was necessary for him to tease out the relevance of phenomenological insights for what he saw as the fundamental problems of sociology. These problems, which he distilled from the work of Max Weber, he considered to cluster round the problem of 'meaning'. He writes in the preface to 'The Phenomenology of the Social World'

"The present study is based on an intensive concern of many years' duration with the theoretical writings of Max Weber. During this time I became convinced that while Weber's approach was correct and that he had determined conclusively the proper starting point of the philosophy of the social sciences, nevertheless his analyses did not go deeply enough to lay the foundations on which alone many important problems of the human sciences could be solved. Above all, Weber's central concept of subjective meaning calls for thoroughgoing analysis." (80)

It was to Phenomenology that Schutz turned to find the machinery for this 'thoroughgoing analysis' of subjective meaning - as he put it
"Only in the work of these two thinkers, (i.e. Bergson and Husserl. P.M.) especially in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, has a sufficiently deep foundation been laid on the basis of which one could aspire to solve the problem of meaning." (81)

Schutz's work, then, is an attempt to synthesize the transcendental phenomenological insights of Husserl and the theoretical writings of Max Weber in such a way that fundamental sociological problems will be given a fresh perspective and hopefully some solution. The problems themselves are those that had preoccupied Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel and the other philosopher's and social theorists concerned with the cultural sciences in Germany at the end of the last century, (82) and the central position which he gives to the question of meaning reflects his roots within the hermeneutic tradition. His efforts at solving them, if unsuccessful in the final analysis, are nonetheless interesting and instructive, particularly to the extent that they highlight the problems that a phenomenological sociology must face.

SCHUTZ AND WEBER

Schutz sets out his intentions in the 'Phenomenology of the Social World' as follows:

"It seeks to determine the precise nature of the phenomenon of meaning, and to do this by an analysis of the constituting function. Only after we have a firm grasp of the concept of meaning as such will we be able to analyse step by step the meaning-structure of the social world." (83)

Here we have the kernel of Schutz's sociology. He is interested on the one hand in showing how 'meaning' is constituted - and this is done both within consciousness and socially - and on the other he is concerned to give an analysis of the 'meaning structure' of the social world. Where Husserl had analysed the 'transcendental' constitution of 'essences' - the intentional structures of the presuppositions of knowledge, Schutz gives us an analysis of the presuppositions of the social world in terms of the constitution of meaning and of the structures
of meanings - i.e. of the typifications that form the basis of our meaningful interpretations of the social world. The difference in perspective between the two men is immediately obvious, and makes itself felt in the initial formulation of the object of Schutz's 'phenomenological' analyses. In this section I will give some substance to the account of the social world that Schutz gives and the ways in which he draws on the work of Weber to provide himself with an entre into sociological concerns.

Schutz begins his discussion of Weber with the latter's definition of the task of sociology. Thus:

"According to Weber, the task of interpretive sociology is to understand and interpret social action. Social action is that action which "by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), takes account of the behaviour of others, and is thereby oriented in its course."" (84)

The problem with this, as far as Schutz is concerned, is that the notion of subjective meaning is a difficult one to grasp within Weber's theory. As Schutz puts it:

"the subjective meaning of another person's behaviour need not be identical with the meaning which his perceived external behaviour has for me as an observer." (85)

Since sociology is defined in terms of social acts, and those social acts themselves are defined in terms of 'subjective meanings', then given the difference (or possible difference) between the observing sociologist's and the observed actor's understandings of precisely what a given action means, it seems to Schutz to be of the utmost importance to uncover just what the relationship between the two sorts of meanings is if one is to have an adequate sociology. He approaches this problem via the two notions of 'understanding' - namely 'objective' and 'motivational' - that Weber sees as relevant for the sociologist.

Weber writes:

"Understanding may be of two kinds: the first is the direct observational understanding of the subjective
meaning of a given act as such including verbal utterances.

Understanding may, however, be of another sort, namely explanatory understanding. Thus we understand in terms of motive the meaning an actor attaches to the proposition twice two equals four, when he states it or writes it down, in that we understand what makes him do this at precisely this moment and in these circumstances." (86)

Schutz argues that this distinction will not in fact hold up. He shows first of all that 'direct observational understanding' cannot in fact grasp the subjective meaning an act has for an actor since in order to see it as an act of a particular kind for which it makes sense to posit some subjective meaning, an observer must already have placed the act into some meaning context - for example it is an act of "Woodchopping", "Knob grasping" or "taking aim" - which makes sense of the act for him. Beyond this, the observer never has any guarantee that the act has the same meaning for the actor as it has for him - for example the man holding the axe may be performing a religious rite, or doing some form of meditation.

The concept of motivational understanding is also subjected to close scrutiny. The trouble here is similar to that with observational understanding. As Schutz writes

"by motive Weber understands "a complex of .... meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate (or meaningful) ground for the conduct in question"." (87)

Schutz points out that firstly, there are different kinds of motives that can appear to be grounds for my action subjectively. One can give a motive that builds on ones past experiences, (a 'because' motive) or one can project into the future, and say that the motive is to bring about some desired future state (an 'in-order-to' motive). This distinction is never made by Weber, and it is, for Schutz, crucial. Secondly, Weber has compounded here the meaning which an action has for an actor, and the meaning it has for the observer. Once again, these
two dimensions need not, by any means, be the same - the observer may
give a motive which takes account of the actor's past, whereas the
actor himself may be oriented to the future. Schutz stresses that these
distinctions must be made if the sociologist is to begin to understand
the phenomenon of meaning.

Schutz's conclusions here are stated thus:

"Indeed, Weber's distinction between observational and
motivational understanding is arbitrary and without any
logical basis in his own theory. Both types of
understanding start out from an objective meaning-
context. The understanding of subjective meaning has
no place in either." (88)

At this point Schutz moves on from his discussion of Weber and
begins to unravel its implications for his own phenomenological concerns.
He does this by pointing out that in the discussion of subjective and
objective meaning in Weber, it became apparent that the meaning of an
action always depended upon some 'objective' context of meaning in
terms of which that action could be interpreted. Thus to see an action
as 'chopping wood' it was necessary to have some idea of what 'typically'
is involved in chopping wood - why people do it, what sort of uses the
chopped wood could be put to and so on. These objective meaning
contexts are 'meaningful' whether any particular person is thinking
about them at any specific time or not. Thus

"For instance, the expression 2 x 2 = 4 has an objective
meaning regardless of what is in the minds of any or all
of its users." (89)

This sense of 'objective' meaning is different from that which
appears in the work of Weber in that it does not relate to the meanings
of an observer, but is independent of any individual mind. Nonetheless
for that, however, these objective meaning contexts are for Schutz,
'constituted' in the processes of meaning endowing acts of consciousness.
Thus it is true to say that they have a 'subjective' element - they are
constituted within consciousness. Thus:
"when we speak of subjective meaning in the social world, we are referring to the constituting processes in the consciousness of the person who produced that which is objectively meaningful." (90)

Once again, this use of the term 'subjective meaning' is considerably different from the use given to it by Weber, who saw it not in terms of 'constitution' but in terms of actual subjective meanings given to particular actions by specific actors.

Clearly, what Schutz has done here is to translate the terms that Weber uses to express his interpretive sociology, into concepts amenable to his own phenomenological analyses. With subjective and objective meaning conceptualized in this new way, it is now possible for Schutz to move on to produce a 'phenomenological' analysis of the 'constituting' functions of consciousness which make the objective meaning contexts possible, and then to progress to an analysis of the structures of the meaning-context, (as an objective constituted reality) as a social phenomena.

**SCHUTZ AND THE "PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD"

Schutz's first task is to give an analysis of the subjective constitution of meaning within consciousness. In this way he can give substance to the concept of subjective meaning as he has transformed it in his critique of Weber. His starting point is to posit a 'stream of consciousness'. This he describes as 'pure duration' and

"In "pure duration" there is no "side-by-sideness", no mutual externality of parts, and no divisibility, but only a continuous flux, a stream of conscious states." (91)

This continuous flux of experience is not in itself meaningful, but it is given meaning by the reflective glance of consciousness. The ego performs acts of attention which pluck aspects of our experience from this stream as it flows past, and in this way our experience is made meaningful by our acts of consciousness. These acts, however, can only be performed on experience that has already elapsed since while one is
actually living in the flow of duration one only experiences, and cannot reflect at the same time on the experiences actually confronting one. Immediate lived experience is something unreflective and always in the present. Thus all meaning originates in the reflective glance of consciousness.

The central sociological concept, for Schutz following Weber, is the concept of action. Action itself is meaningful so the way in which the meaning of action is constituted must be accounted for. Schutz begins his account with behaviour. Here there is little problem, since one's own behaviour can simply be plucked from the stream of experiences (one does after all experience one's own behaviour) and 'constituted' as behaviour - i.e. its 'meaning' as behaviour can be constituted - in the same way as any other item of experience. Action, however, cannot be seen in this way, since what marks it off from behaviour is precisely that it is not seen as 'action' after the event, but is oriented towards certain ends and goals in the future. It would make little sense, however, to say that there was some special glance of consciousness that looked towards experience not yet elapsed in order to make it meaningful, since often such anticipated experiences never happen. Thus Schutz suggests that the meaning of action is contained in the project which the action is to fulfill.

What characterizes action, then, is the fact that it is the fulfilment of a project. It is this project that gives 'meaning' to the action. Schutz tells us that this project is projected into the future as if it had already been accomplished - as he puts it, it is projected in the 'future perfect tense'. It is the carrying out of this project in a conscious fashion that constitutes 'action' as a subset of behaviour, where behaviour can be either 'action' that has already elapsed, or simply pure behaviour. Thus there is a radical difference between action that is already completed and action that is underway.
Schutz goes on to point out that there is an important difference between an 'act' and 'action'. An 'act' is a discrete entity, and can be either the completed act - the complete project - or specific parts of it. Action on the other hand is the fulfilment of a project, and it consists of a number of different acts. Each of these different acts, however, is given meaning because of its position in relation to the overall project. Thus the project is a 'meaning context' in terms of which specific acts can be and are interpreted. This concept of meaning context is one that Schutz develops further.

A meaning context consists of a configuration of meaning that is constituted by a series of acts of consciousness.

"We say that our lived experiences E1, E2 .... En stand in a meaning-context if and only if, once they have been lived through in separate steps, they are then constituted into a synthesis of a higher order, becoming thereby unified objects of monothetic attention." (92)

In other words, they are sets of individual acts of meaning grouped together into a single unity - in the same way that a series of acts are grouped under a single project of action. These meaning contexts can then be grouped further under an even more comprehensive synthesis, and various meaning contexts can be seen to relate to one another and to overlap and criss cross with one another. The sum of all such meaning contexts makes up the 'stock of knowledge at hand'.

The meaning contexts that are most relevant to discussion of action are the motivational contexts. These play an important role in Schutz's sociology, so I will give a brief account of them here. Basically there are two fundamentally different possible motivational contexts that action can be seen in term of. The differences revolve around whether the action is seen as a 'project', and thus as a still to be completed configuration of acts given meaning by the project, or as something that has been caused by certain antecedent factors either of the actor's
biography or of his environment. In the former case, since the action is meaningful because of the project, and since the project is essentially something that the actor himself has projected into the future in the future perfect tense, the motivational context is essentially "subjective", whereas in the latter case, the actor himself has no privileged position in respect to the explanation of his action at all, since anyone could uncover the causal sequence into which it fits. (93)

Schutz calls these two different kinds of motivational context the 'in-order-to-motive' (for the subjective meaning context that is based on the actor's project) and the 'because motive' (for the causally oriented and 'objective' context). Thus:

"Interpreting the actor's "motive" as his expectations, we can say that the motivational context is by definition the meaning-context within which a particular action stands in virtue of its status as the project of an act for a given actor. In other words, the act thus projected in the future perfect tense and in terms of which the action receives its orientation is the "in-order-to-motive" (Um-zu-Motiv) for the actor." (94)

and again

"in every genuine because-motivation both the motivating and motivated lived experiences have the temporal character of pastness. The formulation of a genuine why-question is generally possible only after the motivated experience has occurred and when one looks back on it as something whole and complete in itself." (95)

Thus the differences between the two are found in the direction of ones interest. If one wants to find out why someone did something, the answer can either be in terms of his project - which will be his subjective meanings - or in terms of causal factors. Which sort of answer one chooses to give will determine whether one places the action into a meaning context in terms of the actors 'in-order-to motives' or in terms of his 'because motives'.

Two remarks are in order about meaning contexts and the stock of knowledge at hand. Firstly, much of the stock of knowledge at hand is
taken for granted. One is not constantly aware of many of the things that one knows - things that one has learnt from experience and which one brings to bear on the decisions that must be made in the course of everyday living. Which particular aspects of the stock of knowledge one is aware of at any given time depends upon one's particular relevances - for example if one is about to bake a cake, knowledge about flour, ovens, eggs etc. will be of prime concern, and these will form the meaning context in terms of which one's activities will be directed.

Secondly, these meaning contexts are the basis of one's interpretations of experience. Once the meaning context and the stock of knowledge at hand have been constituted, they act as a frame, as it were, through which and in terms of which other elements of one's lived experience will be seen to be meaningful. Thus the reflective glance itself, looking back on the stream of experience, will tend to make that experience meaningful in terms of the meanings that it has already given to past experience which have been configured into meaning-contexts. In this way a certain amount of stability is ensured in the meaning that experience is given from one day to the next.

These considerations conclude the account of Schutz's analysis of the constitution of meaning within consciousness. The analysis is for Schutz a phenomenological one. As he moves on to his discussion of the intersubjective, he stresses that he leaves the phenomenological realm, since the complicated business of providing a genuinely phenomenological account of the constitution of the other within consciousness, and thus the move from transcendental subjectivity to transcendental intersubjectivity, is not an essential one for his purposes. He claims that instead, since all analyses performed within the reduction are equally applicable to the mundane realm, he will
simply carry on into the intersubjective realm, using the insights already gleaned from his phenomenological analyses of consciousness. (97) Thus Schutz simply sidesteps discussion of any difficulties that there might be concerning the relationship between transcendental analyses and the needs of an empirical scientist. The implications of this will be discussed later.

Schutz moves from the study of 'subjective' meaning to the world of 'intersubjectivity' by assuming that the structure of the consciousness of the other - the 'thou' - is the same as the structure of that of ego, with a stream of consciousness, and reflective glances giving meaning to aspects of it. The fundamental question is therefore not about the 'constitution' of others as meaningful, but about the 'structure' of the intersubjective world as a given phenomenon. Intersubjectivity itself is not to be subjected to scrutiny, but is simply to be accepted as a fact. (98) The first question to be asked is thus 'what is it that makes the intersubjective world possible at all?' Schutz answers this by saying that it is the simultaneity of streams of consciousness that is at the heart of the intersubjective world. Thus

"I see, then, my own stream of consciousness and yours in a single intentional act which embraces them both. The simultaneity involved here is not that of physical time, which is quantifiable, divisible, and spatial. For us the term "simultaneity" is rather an expression for the basic and necessary assumption which I make that your stream of consciousness has a structure analogous to mine." (99)

This "basic and necessary assumption", then, is the foundation of the intersubjective world. It is this that is the given.

The second question to be asked, is 'what are the bases of communication within this intersubjective world?': Schutz's account of the problems in this area begins with a recapitulation of the observation that he has already made in relation to Weber's work, that
"The postulate, (therefore,) that I can observe the subjective experience of another person precisely as he does is absurd. For it presupposes that I myself have lived through all the conscious states and intentional Acts wherein this experience has been constituted. But this could only happen within my own experience and in my own Acts of attention to my experience." (100)

Thus communication is not a matter of getting into another's mind by some kind of empathy, but rather it must depend upon my experience of the other being fitted into my own already constituted meaning contexts - or at least into a meaning context available to me as a constituting subjectivity. In other words, all genuine understanding of others is based on the explication of one's own lived experience. This is done via two means, firstly through observations of another's behaviour, and secondly through 'signs'. I will take them each in turn.

The case of observing another's behaviour which is done without communicative intent - i.e. where no 'signs' are involved - is straightforward enough. Here all we do is to "put ourselves in the place of the actor and identify our lived experiences with his". (101) In this way, we are able to understand what he is doing in terms of similar things that we have done ourselves, in terms of our own meaning contexts distilled from our own similar experiences. Thus we project an 'in-order-to motive' and a 'because motive' onto the actor and his observed behaviour, and it becomes understandable in terms of those motives.

The case with signs, however, is less straightforward, since it depends upon the prior existence of a 'sign system', which is known both to me and to the other. Schutz defines a 'sign system' as follows:

"Every sign system is (therefore) a scheme of our experience. This is true in two different senses. First, it is an expressive scheme; in other words, I have at least once used the sign for that which it designates, used it either in spontaneous activity or in imagination. Second, it is an interpretive scheme; in other words, I have already in the past interpreted the sign as the sign of that which it designates." (102)
In other words, it is a scheme of experience - a meaning context - made up of signs which both signify or symbolize something, and which can be used by me (or an other) to express some item of subjective experience. Each sign within the system has its meaning because its "significance within a given sign system is understood both for the person using the sign and for the person interpreting it". (103) Since it does not depend wholly upon my own subjectivity, but is intersubjectively available, it is an 'objective' meaning context. The most obvious example of a 'sign system' is a language.

When one comes to investigate the use of sign systems in communication and in understanding others, it becomes apparent that, because of their dual nature as both expressive and interpretive schemes, there are two aspects to any use of a particular sign. Firstly there is the 'kernel' meaning of a sign which is its essential part, and which is the same for everyone; secondly there is its 'fringe' meaning, which varies with the particular occasion of its use within some specific context. (104) Thus in using a sign system to understand an other, ego must not only relate to the sign system as a given, but must put himself in the other's position, as it were, and attribute to the other 'in-order-to' and 'because' motives to find out just what the other 'means' on the particular occasion at hand. In this way he is seen once more to be interpreting and understanding the other in terms of his own - ego's - schemes of experience. In this case, however, the process is mediated by the 'objective' meaning context of the sign system.

This is all that I want to say about Schutz's account of understanding another and his actions for the time being, although I will return to it later in the context of a discussion of the relationship between Schutz and Husserl. Before moving on to look at Schutz's descriptions of the structure of the social world, however, it is worthwhile stressing
one important aspect of his analysis of intersubjectivity.

The important point here is that there seem to be two themes in Schutz's analysis which stand in an unresolved tension with one another. On the one hand there is an insistence upon the constitution of meaning within consciousness and upon subjective meaning contexts, whilst on the other there is the notion of objective meaning contexts as already constituted objectivities, and the 'stock of knowledge at hand', both of which stand independent of consciousness. Now if the first of these notions were to be given the main emphasis, then the social world would come to be seen as a complex of subjective meanings in which any apparent objectivity in social or cultural phenomena could be reduced to these subjective meanings without remainder. If the second notion were developed, then there would be an aspect of the social world which was specifically social, and irreducible to subjective meaning contexts. (105) For Schutz to give an adequate account of the social world it would be necessary for him to show how these two types of phenomena are in fact related - how subjective and objective meaning contexts articulate with one another. The problem, essentially, is the problem of intersubjectivity in as much as its solution would necessitate some account of the intersubjective constitution of meaning contexts as opposed to both subjective constitution and descriptions of already constituted objective meaning contexts. To provide this, one suspects, it would be necessary to have an adequate account of transcendental intersubjectivity, but, as became apparent above, Schutz abdicates responsibility for producing such an account. The result is that the opposition between subjective and objective meaning contexts, and between the constitution of meaning in consciousness and meaning contexts themselves, is never resolved. The importance of this fact will become apparent later in this chapter, and will have considerable bearing on
on the discussion of Garfinkel in Chapter 4.

I want now to move on to give some idea of the ways in which Schutz describes the structures of the social world. He has already explained the processes of meaning constitution, and the way in which it is possible for actors to understand each other within the social world. He now goes on to show the implications of this for social life.

The fundamental starting point for Schutz is the 'we' relationship. Thus he writes

"The living social relationship can occur in several different forms. In its purity and fullness, as we shall show later in detail, it is tied to the bodily givenness of the Thou in the face-to-face situation. As such, it is a living face-to-face relationship or a pure We-relationship. From it derive their validity all intentional Acts of Other-orientation not belonging to the domain of directly experienced social reality, all ways of interpreting subjective meaning, and all possibilities of attending to the worlds of mere contemporaries and of predecessors." (106)

Thus the paradigm case, as it were, of a social relationship is when two actors face each other and are oriented towards each other - i.e. the intentional acts of both parties are directed towards the other, - in such a way that each tries to understand what the other means, what significance his bodily movements and his use of sign systems has for him, and thus what his 'in-order-to motives' are (what subjective meaning he gives to his acts of speech). The two parties to the interaction thus interlock, as it were, in a 'we' relationship in which the other's 'in-order-to motive' (i.e. what he is trying to express) becomes my 'because motive' (i.e. the reason for my response), and my in-order-to motive becomes his because motive and so on. (107)

In this way, within the 'we' relationship, the meaning contexts of ego and alter are brought together such that each actor experiences the other in a particularly close way.

It is not the case, however, that all relationships within the
social world are of this type. There are many 'others' towards whom ego is 'oriented', but whom he has never met. There are others whom he has met but briefly, others who have had some effect upon his life, but towards whom he is not oriented at all, and so on. All of these other alters, occupy what Schutz calls the "world of contemporaries". They are my fellow men who live at the same time as me, but with whom I do not have a 'we' relationship. What characterizes the world of contemporaries is its 'ideal typical' nature. It is peopled not by real living individuals, but by abstract types of people such as 'postmen', 'doctors', 'policemen', 'friends', 'relatives' and so on. These ideal types form a structure in terms of which I interpret my everyday experiences of the social world. Thus, for example, when riding on a train, I have certain expectations of the actions of 'engine drivers', 'guards', 'fellow passengers' and so on which enable me to predict within broad limits what will happen over the course of the journey, and which will enable me to understand and interpret the specific actions of specific actors whom I encounter on my trip. This structure of ideal types, like the sign system, is an 'objective' meaning context, held in common by the members of a society. As Schutz says

"We must be quite clear as to what is happening here. The subjective meaning-context has been abandoned as a tool of interpretation. It has been replaced by a series of highly complex and systematically interrelated objective meaning-contexts. The result is that the contemporary is anonymized in direct proportion to the number and complexity of these meaning-contexts. Furthermore, the synthesis of recognition does not apprehend the unique person as he exists within his living present. Instead it pictures him as always the same and homogeneous, leaving out of account all the changes and rough edges that go along with individuality. Therefore, no matter how many people are subsumed under the ideal type, it corresponds to no one in particular. It is just this fact that justified Weber in calling it "ideal"." (108)
Which particular abstract type I use in any given instance to interpret some action or event will depend upon my interests at the time. The problem of which type to choose Schutz calls the 'problem of relevance'. (109)

As well as the ideal typical world of contemporaries, there are two further worlds that are constructed of abstract types. These are the world of predecessors (i.e. all those who have lived before me, and who have inevitably left their mark on my own world) and the world of successors (i.e. those who will follow me into this world after I am dead). What differentiates these two worlds from the world of contemporaries, is the fact that there is no possibility of my ever meeting any of their members in a 'we' relationship. In the world of contemporaries this is always a possibility - indeed there is a gradation of abstraction from those with whom I frequently have a 'we' relationship, to those whom I meet infrequently, right through to those whom I never meet. It is the varying degrees of abstraction of the ideal types that characterizes the world of contemporaries.

It is worth noting at this point, that the stock of knowledge at hand which, as I mentioned above, is the sum total of all the meaning contexts constituted within consciousness, is very largely made up of this structure of ideal types that characterizes our knowledge of the social world. This structure of types is 'socialized' into every actor during the course of his education and upbringing. Thus much of what we take for granted is in fact social wisdom, rather than being the result of our own individual experiences. The same is true of language - as an objective meaning context it contains social experience that has been intersubjectively constituted. The significance of this fact will become apparent in the following sections.

This, then, concludes the account of Schutz's analyses of
subjectivity, understanding and the social world. In the next section I want to move on to discuss something of Schutz's view of the nature of social science, a discussion which will take us beyond Schutz's early concerns to a consideration of some of his later work. Before doing so, however, just two points must be made about the above discussion by way of emphasis and explanation.

Firstly, it should be noticed that the 'stock of knowledge at hand' is to a large extent taken for granted. This has been pointed out above over the course of discussion, but it is important enough to warrant being stressed. Gurwitsch, for example, considers this notion of a taken for granted stock of knowledge to be one of Schutz's most important contributions to social science. He writes

"With his concept of "stock of knowledge at hand" Schutz, I submit, made an important contribution toward further elucidating our specific familiarity with the world of daily experience, a familiarity that Husserl distinguished from scientific knowledge, especially in the modern sense. That the world of common sense is taken for granted - not only its existence but also the way in which it is interpreted - is a consequence and another expression of unquestioned acceptance of the "stock of knowledge at hand"." (110)

This taken for granted nature of social knowledge will become important in later chapters.

Secondly, it is worth pointing out that in his later work, Schutz develops and uses the Husserlian concept of the 'Life World' to describe the social world. By this term he does not mean to suggest, as Husserl does, another stage on the route to transcendental subjectivity, but he means rather the taken for granted world of the natural attitude. In carrying out his later investigations under the rubric of an examination of the 'life world' he is setting himself as his subject matter the taken for granted structures of our stock of knowledge at hand - the structure of meaning contexts and typifications - which provide the basis for our interpretations of our familiar everyday world. Thus
his investigations of the 'life world' are not different in status from the earlier analyses of the social world.

With these points made, I want now to turn to discuss Schutz's view of the nature of theory and of social science.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

In his early work, specifically, in the Phenomenology of the Social World, Schutz claims that

"All social sciences are objective meaning-contexts of subjective meaning-contexts." (111)

By this he intends to indicate the fact that the social scientist never encounters real people when he investigates the social world, but only already constituted ideal types. It is not the sociologist's job to become engaged in a 'we' relationship with social actors, but rather he must examine the structure of the ideal types in terms of which those actors interpret their world. These types are subjective meaning contexts that become 'objective' - as Schutz puts it

"However, we saw that the nature of subjective meaning itself changes with the transition from direct to indirect social experience. In the process of ideal-typical construction, subjective meaning-contexts that can be directly experienced are successively replaced by a series of objective meaning-contexts. These are constructed gradually, each one upon its predecessor, and they interpenetrate one another in Chinese-box fashion, so that it is difficult to say where one leaves off and the other begins. However, it is precisely this process of construction which makes it possible for the social scientist, or indeed for any observer, to understand what the actor means; for it is this process alone which gives a dimension of objectivity to his meaning." (112)

Thus it is objective meanings that the sociologist is to investigate, but objective meanings that have been constituted subjectively, and which are, therefore, subjective meaning contexts.

As his thought developed, Schutz filled out these ideas. To illustrate this, I want to look at two notions which emerge from his later work, namely 'rationality', and 'finite provinces of meaning', which are important both for the light they throw on Schutz's view of
social science, and because of the influence which they had on the
development of Garfinkel's thought. I will deal with each notion in
turn.

Schutz sums up what he considers to be the view of some major
thinkers on the status of knowledge as follows:

"All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well
as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a
set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations,
idealizations specific to the respective level of thought
organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things
as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset
facts selected from a universal context by the activities of
our mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts,
either facts looked at as detached from their context by an
artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular
setting." (113)

What the scientist does, therefore, is to grasp aspects of the world
that are relevant for his purposes, collecting facts on the basis of
his relevances, and forming them into scientific theories in accord
with certain principles. This is as true for the social scientist as
it is for the natural scientist. To decide upon what social scientific
theories are, then, one must provide the principles on the basis of which
the 'constructs' of the social scientist are built. As became evident
from the quotation above from the "Phenomenology of the Social World"
these constructs are "objective meaning-contexts of subjective meaning-
contexts" - or what Schutz elsewhere calls "second order constructs" -
built in "Chinese box fashion" one upon the other. The question is what
are the principles upon which these constructs are to be built?

Schutz specifies three "postulates for scientific model constructs
of the social world". (114) These are 1) the postulate of logical
consistency, which states that the construct must be internally consistent,
2) the postulate of subjective interpretation, which states that the
model must be fashioned in such a way that it can handle the 'subjective'
meanings of actors, and 3) the postulate of adequacy, which states that
the model must account for action in such a way that an actor in the
social world would recognize those actions as possible in terms of his common sense perceptions of the social world. These three can be summed up, Schutz tells us, in the postulate of rationality which states that

"The ideal type of social action must be constructed in such a way that the actor in the living world would perform the typified act if he had a clear and distinct scientific knowledge of all the elements relevant to his choice and the constant tendency to choose the most appropriate means for the realization of the most appropriate end." (115)

These, then, are the postulates, or principles, on the basis of which the sociologist is to form up his theories of the social world.

What it is crucial to realize here, however, is that Schutz is not arguing that actors in the social world actually do act rationally. As he puts it

"What I wish to emphasise is only that the ideal of rationality is not and cannot be a peculiar feature of everyday thought, nor can it, therefore, be a methodological principle of the interpretation of human acts in daily life." (116)

People in the social world neither act according to scientific rationalities, nor interpret the actions of others in such terms. The postulate of rationality relates only to the sociologist's constructs and not to his actual subject matter.

What emerges here, is that Schutz is working with a coherence notion of truth. He is suggesting that the criterion for the truth or adequacy of a particular sociological theory is not to be sought in its relationship with some 'reality' which stands over and against the theory and is described by it, but that instead it is the 'logical consistency', or the 'rationality' of the account, and its fit with the 'relevances' created by sociological problems that decides on its acceptance (or rejection) as 'true' or 'false'. The only relationship which the theory is conceived to have to something outside of itself is contained in the 'postulate of adequacy', but since this must admit that actors in the
social world do not in fact act rationally, then the check involved here is not with a 'reality' outside of the theory, but with the opinion of the man in the street. Since opinions tend to differ, then this postulate seems devoid of any real substance - the scientist could peddle his 'rational construct' until he found sufficient actors whose opinions articulated with his own for him to be satisfied that he was 'correct'. In the final analysis it is simply the consistency of the account which decides its truth or falsity. Schutz himself, indeed, does not seem to be unduly perturbed by this "disturbing question" (117) concerning the relationship between theories and reality. To those not satisfied by the account he has given he says

"I am afraid I do not exactly know what reality is, and my only comfort in this unpleasant situation is that I share my ignorance with the greatest philosophers of all time." (118)

Such honesty, however, does not amount to a solution to the problem.

To sum up this discussion of Schutz's handling of rationality, it is perhaps worth stating in his own words what the sociologist's actor in fact is. He suggests that the model of the actor that is built is only a puppet.

"The puppet exists and acts merely by the grace of the scientist; it cannot act otherwise than according to the purpose which the scientist's wisdom has determined it to carry out. Nevertheless, it is supposed to act as if it were not determined but could determine itself. A total harmony has been pre-established between the determined consciousness bestowed upon the puppet and the pre-constituted environment within which it is supposed to act freely, to make rational choices and decisions... The scientist succeeds, indeed, in discovering within the universe, thus created, the perfect harmony established by himself." (119)

The sociologist is thus the puppet master extraordinary.

The second notion that I want to follow through here, is Schutz's conception of 'finite provinces of meaning'. By this terms he intends to point out that there are a number of different 'worlds' which we all
confront over the course of our lives, and that these 'worlds' each have different characteristics which can be investigated. The paramount reality is that of the natural attitude, which is the world of our working life in which we act upon our environment in unproblematic fashion in the onward course of our daily lives. What characterizes this world is what Schutz calls the 'epoche of the natural attitude' (120) which is the suspension of any doubt that the world is just as it appears to be, existing, solid, manipulable, meaningful etc. etc.

There are, however, other worlds which are modifications of this and into which we can move, although the move from one to another is always accompanied by a kind of 'shock'. These experiences of shock are frequent in daily life, and there are innumerable different kinds. With each shock we move into a new 'finite province of meaning' and place the 'accent of reality' upon features of our experience in a different way. Thus there is

"the shock of falling asleep as the leap into the world of dreams; the inner transformation we endure if the curtain in the theatre rises as the transition into the world of the stage play; the radical change in our attitude if, before a painting, we permit our visual field to be limited by what is within the frame as the passage into the pictorial world; our quandary, relaxing into laughter, if, in listening to a joke, we are for a short time ready to accept the fictitious world of the jest as a reality in relation to which the world of our daily life takes on the character of foolishness; the child's turning toward his toy as the transition into the play-world; and so on." (121)

Each of these different realms is said, by Schutz, to have a distinctive 'cognitive style' which characterizes it as a distinctive province of meaning. This includes such things as the specific 'epoche' (e.g. suspension of doubt, methodical doubt etc.) and a specific "tension of consciousness" (e.g."wide-awakeness", sleepiness etc.).

The most important finite province of meaning for present purposes is that of scientific theorizing, and specifically that of sociological
theorizing. This, as with other 'worlds', is a modification of the natural attitude with a specific cognitive style which involves a 'leap' into a new attitude, i.e. the attitude of the "disinterested observer", which is

"based upon a peculiar attention a la vie as the prerequisite of all theorizing. It consists in the abandoning of the system of relevances which prevails within the practical sphere of the natural attitude." (122)

The taking of this attitude means that "theoretical thought does not gear into the outer world" (123) but is in some sense independent of it, governed only by its own relevances and its own problems. Theoretical cogitations are not "acts of working" within the mundane world, and even such things as measuring, doing experiments, handling equipment etc. are not strictly essential to them or to the theoretical life. Instead

"All these activities performed within the pertaining to the world of working are either conditions or consequences of the theorizing but do not belong to the theoretical attitude itself, from which they can be easily separated." (124)

Thus Schutz paints a picture of the scientist as disinterested observer of his subject matter, removed from mundane concerns, and from actual 'working' within the world of the natural attitude as any part of his enterprise. The finite province of meaning involved contains its own rules - where, it should be noticed, those rules are concerned, in the case of social science, with the 'postulates' which were listed above - which decide upon which scientific propositions are to be considered adequate and thus acceptable, and which are to be rejected, (125)

It is perhaps apparent, that Schutz's discussion of finite provinces of meaning have led him to the same position as his discussion of 'rationality'. He has effectively separated theorizing, and thence theories, from the mundane world of everyday life in such a way that the relationship of theories to anything outside of themselves becomes
problematic. He concludes his essay by reiterating what has already been said concerning the sociologist's actors as 'puppets', before moving on to emphasise that the finite provinces of meaning which he has been describing should not be taken to be ontologically distinct entities - "separated states of mental life" (126) with absolutely no connection with one another. Rather, he suggests, they should be seen as aspects of the same consciousness and thus as related to one another. Just as I suggested that the 'postulate of adequacy' is not a sufficient device for grounding sociological theories, however, the simple statement that there must be some link between finite provinces of meaning because they are all states of the same consciousness is not an adequate demonstration of what is involved in the interrelationships. Certainly it must be the case, if we are not to suppose that our conscious life is somehow a set of disjunctive and unrelated experiences, that finite provinces of meaning are somehow connected with one another: the question is how? This question Schutz does not even attempt to answer, except simply to state that each reality is only a 'modification' of the 'paramount reality' of the natural attitude - and that only serves to state the problem itself since the nature of the modifications and their structural interrelationships is not discussed. We are not told, for example, how theories are actually to be related to the world of the natural attitude, and one suspects that the 'disinterested observer', viewed more in terms of his relationship with the natural attitude, might come to be seen as somewhat less disinterested.

Undoubtedly the interrelationships are highly complex, but if one wants to conceive of the social world in terms of finite provinces of meaning, then the complexities must be faced, accounted for and described.

In sum, then, if one traces Schutz's view of social science through his discussions of 'rationality' and 'finite provinces of meaning' it becomes apparent that he conceives of sociological theories as governed
by coherence criteria of truth, and as somehow separated from the social reality which they set out to account for. Some of the difficulties of this position have already been indicated.

HUSSERL AND SCHUTZ: REFLECTIONS ON 'MEANING'

In the above discussion of Husserl, it emerged that there were difficulties facing the sociologist who was interested in incorporating Husserlian phenomenology into social theory. These problems centered on two aspects of his thought, namely difficulties with the notion of the transcendental and quite what to make out of it in terms of mundane scientific interests, and difficulties with the notion of intersubjectivity.

It has perhaps become apparent over the course of the discussion of Schutz that his response to both problems is effectively to ignore them, on the one hand abandoning the notion of the transcendental, and on the other positing intersubjectivity as fundamental, and as something to which a transcendental solution is not required. Schutz pays scant attention to Husserl's methods - the reductions - and is not interested in the purpose of the Husserlian enterprise which, as I have shown, is to uncover the certain presuppositions of knowledge, in order to ground knowledge on a firm footing. The purpose of this present section is to uncover some of the implications of this, and to illustrate the notion of 'meaning' that is generated in Schutz' account as a result of his handling of Husserl's work.

Schutz's use of the phenomenological methods in the 'Phenomenology of the Social World' is patchy. He does say that his analysis of "the constituting process in internal time-consciousness will be carried out within the "phenomenological reduction"", (127) but he then goes on to point out that

"The purpose of this work, which is to analyze the phenomenon of meaning in ordinary (mundane) social life, does not require the achievement of a transcendental knowledge that goes beyond that sphere or a further sojourn within the area of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction." (128)
Given the difficulties pointed out above, the question arises as to what the relationship is conceived to be between the 'transcendental' analyses of internal time consciousness, and the other analyses of mundane meaning. Schutz's answer is straightforward

"Once we have understood by eidetic description the "problem of the inner development (Zeitigung) of the immanent time sphere", we can apply our conclusions without risk of error to the phenomena of the natural attitude." (129)

Schutz has therefore supposed that there is no problem here at all: one just changes levels, from the transcendental to the psychological (or is it sociological?) in wholly unproblematic fashion. Natanson points out the difficulty

"an even deeper methodological difficulty appears when we seek to put into practice the Husserlian postulate of the correspondence of levels of phenomenological enquiry. Schutz accepts it as absolute that the correspondence holds. But that insight can be gained only from the vantage point of transcendental reduction. It would have been of enormous help to have had an account of what I have termed the isomorphism of levels instead of its being taken for granted as a principle of phenomenology." (130)

It is not enough for Schutz to be cavalier with differences between transcendental and mundane levels of analysis. Some account of the relationship is needed.

Given Schutz's stated problems, which are concerned wholly with the mundane world of the natural attitude, one might wonder why he should worry about the transcendental at all. Later in his career he does in fact abandon the whole notion of transcendental phenomenology, as is shown in his two essays "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy" and "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl", (131) and in remarks like "the empirical social sciences will find their true foundation not in transcendental phenomenology, but in the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude." (132)

So why does he flirt with transcendental notions at all?

Schutz sets up the problem that he faces himself in terms of the
constitution of meaning contexts from experience. Meaning contexts are supposed to be constituted by experience, and yet at the same time, experience is said to be interpreted in terms of meaning contexts. As Schutz puts it

"How can the interpretive scheme be in part constituted through that which is to be interpreted?" (133)

What Schutz has here is a chicken and egg problem of some importance. His solution to it is stated as follows:

"The circularity is only apparent. The appearance of circularity is caused by the fact that two fundamentally different modes of observation are confused and by the way in which the problem set up in one sphere is confronted by its mirror image in another.

The two spheres to which we refer are formal and transcendental logic. When we think of the interpretive scheme as something ready to be applied to some datum of lived experience, then we are thinking of it as an already constituted "logical objectification", an ideal object of formal logic. On the other hand, when we think of the interpretive scheme as itself something dependent upon a particular Here and Now, then we are thinking of it in terms of its genesis, in terms of its constitution, and so we are dealing with in terms of transcendental logic." (134)

Thus Schutz's solution to the problem of an apparent circularity is in terms of the distinction between the transcendental and the mundane realms. He thus needs to maintain the distinction to avoid an internal inconsistency within his account. But at the same time as he affirms the distinction, his actual practice leads to a denial of it. It is, I suggest, from this point that the problems with Schutz's sociology stem. It is this fundamental ambiguity that results from his struggle to incorporate Husserl's phenomenology into his post-Weberian sociology that in the end marks his attempt as unsuccessful.

There are two crucial places in Schutz's account where this contradiction makes itself felt, namely in the matter of the relationship between subjective and objective meaning contexts (a problem dealt with briefly above) and in regard to the 'we' relationship which is said to ground intersubjectivity. I shall look at these in turn.
To account successfully for the relationship between subjective and objective meaning contexts, it would first be necessary to account for the constitution of subjective meaning contexts. This Schutz does attempt to do, in the first sections of the "Phenomenology of the Social World", by means of a transcendental analysis. He must then account for the constitution of 'objective' meaning contexts on the same level to provide a basis for showing how the subjective and the objective interrelate. This, however, he fails to do. Thus, unable to provide an adequate account of the transcendental constitution of objective meaning contexts, he moves the transcendental analysis of the constitution of subjective meaning contexts onto the mundane level so that the two will be seen to be the same - both 'subjective' and 'objective' meaning contexts now are mundane notions and thus related to each other in that sphere. The problem is, however, that as mundane, the notion of 'subjective' constitution becomes problematic because of the circularity that was pointed out above. How is it that that which is to interpret experience is itself constituted by that experience? One or other of them must come first, the experience or the meaning context.

What Schutz in fact does, in the final analysis, is to opt for the meaning context as prior, and more than that, to suggest that it is objective meaning contexts which largely determine the content of subjective meaning contexts. Faced with the difficulty of understanding the relationship between the two, and unable to produce an adequate transcendental grounding for such an understanding, Schutz ends up stressing the social nature of knowledge - its social origins, and the fact that such knowledge is socialized into each individual actor. The problem of the subjective constitution of meaning contexts, which was originally handled in terms of the transcendental motif, becomes instead a problem about socialization and the transmission of social knowledge. In this way, the transcendental can be shown to be irrelevant for sociology
since all one needs is a "constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude" which will unravel the mechanisms involved in such a transmission, and the structures of the knowledge that is transmitted. Precisely the problem then becomes to understand just what contribution subjectivities do play in the constitution of knowledge.

The situation is similar with the notion of the 'we' relationship which is said to be the grounds of intersubjectivity. Schutz himself writes that

"Since human beings are born of mothers and not concocted in retorts, the experience of the existence of other human beings and of the meaning of their actions is certainly the first and most original observation a man makes." (135)

The problem, however, with this apparently flawless common sense statement is that precisely what is at issue in any account of intersubjectivity is the precise nature of this relationship. How is one to conceive of it? Are there pre-existing meaning contexts inside the baby's skull, or are they somehow 'constituted' out of his experiences? What is the relationship between experience and meaning contexts within the 'we' relationship? It is this, perhaps, that Natanson is complaining of when he says

"The We-relationship ... is in many respects a primordial given for Schutz, i.e. his starting point in accounting for its form and function is its indubitable and immediate presentation. From the standpoint of the transcendental attitude, it is necessary to ask, How is it possible that there is such a structure? Within the natural attitude, the We-relationship is a fact of life, but in the phenomenological attitude it is deeply problematic." (136)

It is not enough, in other words, to simply assume such structures, or to assume, as Schutz does, the intersubjective world, since to do so leaves many gaps in one's conceptual apparatus, especially when one comes to try to uncover just what is involved in the relationship between subjective and objective meaning contexts, and between subjectivities in the social world, and society. How can the social scientist construct an adequate model of the social world if much of what is
involved in his model remains unexplicated and problematic? (137)

In short, then, the contradiction entailed in considering that experience both constitutes meaning contexts and is interpreted by them, which is resolved in Schutz's early work by reference to the transcendental, leads to considerable difficulties once the transcendental motif is abandoned. Indeed the abandonment of the notion can itself be seen as the result of difficulties which Schutz had in accounting for the constitution of 'objective' meaning contexts transcendentally - a task which would have involved him in an analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity and of the intersubjective constitution of such objectivities. Husserl's own failure to give a satisfactory account of this matter generated in Schutz a conviction that the problem could not in fact be solved on this level at all, but that it must simply be accepted as a given (138) - as grounded in the 'We-relation' and the fact that man is not concocted in retorts. Such, however, is no solution, but simply a determination to ignore problematic features of important issues.

The results of these problems for Schutz position concerning 'meaning' in the sense of the term outlined in the previous chapter, are extremely interesting. Take to begin with the questions of Schutz's solution to the problem of universals, and the relationship of this to intersubjectivity. In his essay 'Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy' Schutz investigates the relationship between the empirical notion of 'type' as he has developed it, and Husserl's transcendental notion of 'eidos' or 'essence'. He argues that although Husserl considered that the meditating philosopher could, within the reduction, perform variations in fantasy upon the various components that make up the structure of essence in order to investigate the properties of essences, test their limits, and so on so that a deeper understanding of the properties of those essences would become possible, there are in fact
severe limitations upon the extent to which such 'free variation' is possible. As he puts it

"The freedom of variations in phantasy will not permit us to arrive, starting from the prototype of a colored object, at the eidos of sound." (139)

Thus the question arises as to what it is that determines the limits of this free variation. His answer is that it is the empirical 'type' that accounts for the limitations. Thus:

"Is it possible, by means of free variations in phantasy, to grasp the eidos of a concrete species or genus, unless these variations are limited by the frame of the type in terms of which we have experienced, in the natural attitude, the object from which the process of ideation starts as a familiar one, as such and such an object within the life-world? Can these free variations in phantasy reveal anything else by the limits established by such typification? If these questions have to be answered in the negative, then there is indeed merely a difference of degree between type and eidos. Ideation can reveal nothing that was not preconstituted by the type." (140)

In other words, the typification of the natural attitude is prior to the intuition of essences possible within the phenomenological reductions. Where for Husserl the transcendental structure of essences was the ultimate apriori, and the realm of the presuppositions of knowledge, for Schutz it becomes simply a shadow of the typification characteristic of the natural attitude. That this is a strong rejection of Husserl's program cannot be doubted and as such it counts as one more example of the distance that Schutz has travelled from Husserl's phenomenology. But its significance is greater than this.

The concept of 'essence' is intended as a solution to the problem of universals. Thus for Husserl, as we have seen, once within the reduction the philosopher is able to "see" that phenomena are not simply disconnected and isolated things that float before consciousness, but that they are, rather, instances of 'the same' genus – for example tables or chairs. It is consciousness that constitutes them in this way, and the phenomenologist's realisation of this gives him insight into the
world form. For Schutz, on the other hand, the solution to the problem of universals is to be found in the structure of types that makes up the body of our taken for granted knowledge within the natural attitude. Thus the reason why objects in the world are taken to be instances of 'the same' thing is that they are subsumed under the same type within an objective meaning-context. The essence of things is thus contained neither within the things themselves nor within the constituting activities of consciousness but in their status as already constituted types within the structure of a meaning-context. Essences are thus social - the solution to the problem of universals lies with society.

The interest in this becomes apparent once one considers some of its implications for the notion of intersubjectivity, and for what constitutes 'agreement' about what is the case. Once it is remembered that Schutz's notion of the 'We-relationship' is problematic, it is important to ask just what it is that guarantees intersubjectivity - intersubjective communication and interaction. Although Schutz seems to want to say that the 'We-relationship' as an immediate experience is the grounds of intersubjectivity, he leaves unexamined the whole question of how the 'We-relationship' itself is possible in the first place in as much as he ignores the problems concerning the relationship between experience and meaning-contexts. If one examines the 'We-relationship' to find out how it is that the parties to it can be said to be oriented to 'the same' world - to the same features of the environment - and thus can be said to be communicating at all, it becomes apparent that the only answer possible, in Schutz's own terms, is in terms of the 'types' within objective meaning-contexts. It is not possible to suggest that 'essences' are the grounds of 'agreement', or that 'essences' are what enable things to be 'the same' for the parties to the relationship, since such essences are mere shadows of the objective type. It thus becomes apparent that the We-relationship, which is
supposed to be the grounds of intersubjectivity, itself depends upon already constituted meaning contexts. The one conclusion possible to this is that in the final analysis intersubjectivity is guaranteed, as far as Schutz is concerned, by already constituted objective meaning-contexts.

Schutz's problem, once this is realised, is once again to account for the role of 'subjectivity' within his model. He has not accounted for the intersubjective constitution of objective meaning-contexts, nor for the relationship between meaning contexts and experience. The result is a gap in his model of social reality - a lack of articulation between the various elements that make it up with the largest chasm being between subjectivity and objectivity. Again the reasons for this seem to lie with the difficulties involved in incorporating Husserlian phenomenology into the social sciences because of the transcendental aspiration contained within it.

Schutz's view of language, equally, seems dogged by the same troubles. On the whole it is true to say that he is not particularly concerned with language at all, but certainly when he does deal with it, he sees it in terms of 'typification'. (141) Take, for example, what he has to say about language in 'The Structures of the Life World':

"The language is a system of typifying schemata of experience, which rests on idealizations and anonymizations of immediate subjective experience. These typifications of experience detached from subjectivity are socially objectivated, whereby they become a component of the social a priori previously given to the subject." (142)

And

"In short, the language can be construed as the sedimentation of typical experiential schemata which are typically relevant for a society." (143)

And again

"We can thus say that the reality to which the child gradually awakens and grows is "filtered" and consolidated by means of language, in accord with the meaning-structures of the relative-natural world view." (144)
Thus language is a sort of container, or a receptacle for 'meaning' conceived of as a 'thing' of some sort which stands over and against individual subjectivities. In the process of communication 'meanings' are somehow transferred from one party to another like counters in a game. It is the 'kernal' of a concept that is the essential part of it, and the 'fringe' meanings which vary according to the context of the word's use are not essential to the concept itself but are, as it were, necessary vaguenesses. It is not considered that in some way the fact that the word is 'used' might be essential to it, or that the ways in which a word is used might not allow for a model of language which sees meanings as 'things' to be transferred, or that language might be essentially bound up with the activities that make up everyday life. Such possibilities are not considered, but instead language is conceived of as an 'objective meaning-context', with all the difficulties which that term has been shown to involve, which "filters" our experience.

The separation of language from subjectivities and from the activities of individual subjects which Schutz's account involves can be paralleled to one involved in the finite province of meaning which the 'disinterested observer' enters as a scientist. In both cases, the activities - of the language user or of the scientist - are not considered essential to what is being discussed, i.e. language or theory. Such things are conceived to have an independent status as objective meaning contexts over and against individual subjects, but in both cases the result is a separation of the subjective from the objective which then becomes problematic since one cannot easily conceptualize how such objectivities relate to the 'real' world. Schutz never produces the analyses which would have helped us to understand this.

In sum, then, it is worth saying simply that Schutz sets up a distinction between 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' which proves highly problematic. It is not that he has posited an 'objective' world as a
'real' world of objects in any positivistic sense. Rather he makes 'objectivity' something that depends upon the social; upon objective meaning-contexts of ideal typifications which are socialized into the individual members of a society in such a way that they can 'agree' about what is objectively the case. Thus 'society', as an objective reality, stands over and against the individual members of a society as the ultimate arbiter on all issues of importance. The similarities to Durkheim's notion of 'Collective representations' are remarkable here. (145)

The result of all this is that Schutz's notion of what is meant by 'subjectivity' becomes difficult to understand. It is difficult, in the first place, to see what place it could possibly have within his system. But beyond that, even given that the notion might have some substance, it is hard to see how it could possibly be articulated with his notions of 'objectivity' in any way that did not result either in an unacceptable psychologism in which all social phenomena were ultimately reducible to individual subjectivities, (146) or an equally unacceptable reification of the social at the expense of subjectivities. What is needed, I want to suggest, is a different approach altogether which will enable a fresh perspective upon the question of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, and upon all of the difficult issues concerned with 'meaning'. In search of such an approach I want to turn now to look at Wittgenstein's work.
CHAPTER 2 - HUSSERL & SCHUTZ

5. See, for example, Schmitt, 1972, who considers some of the ambiguities in Husserl's notion of the Transcendental.
9. Ibid, p.73.
12. Something more will be said about this in the next chapter in relation to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus".
13. This account of Husserl's attack on Psychologism derives from Farber (1967).
15. Ibid, p.106.
16. Carr points this out in his introduction to Husserl, 1970 p.XV. The subtitle of this work is "An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy", which gives a clear indication of Husserl's own view of it.
17. An article like Solomon, 1977, provides a good illustration of some of the widely differing interpretations that have been given to aspects of Husserl's work. He looks at the way in which "noema" has been treated both perceptually and analytically.
18. It should be noted that Husserl's account of Descartes tends to underemphasise the role of God and the wicked Demon. Ricoeur, 1967, pp.82-85, makes some interesting observations on this.
22. Ibid, p.25.
25. The account of the reduction given elsewhere - for example, in the Cartesian Meditations - differs slightly from that given in this earlier account. However the aim is the same, and the differences are of no importance for present purposes.
27. Ibid, p.4.
29. Gurwitsch's essay (1968) on "Intentionality" is particularly useful as an account of the way in which identity throughout perspectival changes in appearances is handled by Husserl's notion of "essence".
30. Fink, 1970, p.84
35. Husserl, 1970, p.189
37. It seems most likely that the 'Life-World' is not itself considered by Husserl to be the ultimate point of some new sort of reduction, as Merleau Ponty, for example, has suggested, but that it is another step on the way to the transcendental. Cf. Kockelmans, 1967, p.194-6, and Carr, 1977, p.202.


40. Ibid, p.116

41. It is worth pointing out, here, that as Solomon, 1977, pp.171-73, has indicated, there is a difficulty in Husserl's work as to how noetic acts and their noema are to be individuated i.e. counted. The result of this is that it becomes difficult to unravel the precise relationship between noesis, noema and "real" object.

42. Gurwitch, 1968, p.76.

43. Solomon, 1977, p.177.

44. For discussions of the complex relationships between Husserl's use of "Intention" and that of analytic philosophers c.f. Solomon, 1977 and Carr, 1975.


46. As Solomon (1977, p.172) has pointed out, the relationship between noetic acts and the flux of experience is not generally handled by most accounts of intentionality. To do so would undoubtedly complicate matters considerably. Fortunately it would be beside the present point to attempt any account of the complexities involved.

47. Spiegelberg, 1968, (a) p.94.


52. Ibid, p.112.

53. Ibid, p.115.

54. Cf. note 37 above. There does seem to be a fundamental ambiguity in the 'Life-World' concept, as Roche (1973 p.25) has pointed
out, which is exploited by existentialism. My own discussion of the concept will not be concerned with existentialist versions of it, except to the extent that Schutz can be considered an existentialist (Cf. Bauman, 1973).

55. As Carr has pointed out, (1977) there is some confusion in Husserl's use of the concept. It is unclear whether 'culture' should be included as part of the Life-World or not. If it is, then the claim that it is a world of fundamental experience becomes difficult to understand - i.e. Culture appears to stand on the same phenomenological level as science, even though it is, evidently, different from science, so that one would expect it to be excluded, with science, from what is meant by "Life-World".

56. Cf. p.25 (above) for full quote here.


59. Cf. footnotes 37 and 54.

60. Sokolowski, 1975, p.213.


63. Ibid, p.106.

64. Kolakowski, 1975, p.84.


68. Fink, 1970, p.245.


70. Ibid, p.125.


72. Ibid, p.418.
75. Husserl, 1958, p.63.
80. Schutz, 1972, p.XXVII.
81. Ibid, p.XXVIII.
82. Cf. Gorman, 1977, Ch. 1 for an excellent account of this historical context.
84. Ibid, p.15.
85. Ibid, p.20.
87. Schutz, 1972, p.28.
88. Ibid, p.29.
89. Ibid, p.33.
90. Ibid, p.37.
91. Ibid, p.45.
92. Ibid, p.75.
95. Ibid, p.93.
96. Ibid, p.97.
98. This point becomes especially clear in Schutz's explicit rejection of Husserl's attempt at providing an account of transcendental intersubjectivity in his essay "The Problem of Transcendental Subjectivity in Husserl" (Schutz, 1970 a). Natanson (1970 B)
suggests that this rejection is the result of Schutz's growing awareness of the impossibility of providing a transcendental analysis of intersubjectivity.

100. Ibid, p.99.
103. Ibid, p.123.
104. Ibid, p.126.
105. Cf. Schutz, 1974, p.263 where Schutz does, indeed, insist on this irreducibility.
107. Gorman, 1977, pp.52-5 gives an excellent account of this interlocking of motives.
109. Schutz later devoted considerable space to the "problem of relevance". (Cf. Schutz, 1970 b, for example).
114. Ibid, p.43.
116. Ibid, p.79.
117. Ibid, p.87.
118. Ibid, p.88.
121. Ibid, p.231.
122. Ibid, p.246.
126. Ibid, p.258.
127. Schutz, 1972, p.43.
128. Ibid, p.44.
129. Ibid, p.44.
137. An interesting article by Zaner (1961) tries to provide an account of Schutz's "We-relationship" in terms of "openness". Whilst this makes more explicit the immediacy which Schutz conceives for the We-relationship, it fails to address the present difficulty.
138. Natanson (1970 (b), pp.116-7) suggests that Schutz was never happy with Husserl's solution to the problem of intersubjectivity and that he became increasingly convinced that no solution was possible at the transcendental level.
140. Ibid, p.115.
141. Wootton, 1975, p.96 points this out.
143. Ibid, p.234.
144. Ibid, p.250.


146. It is interesting that some commentators have stressed the psychologistic tendency in Schutz's thought, thus ignoring the ways in which this is balanced by a sociologistic bent. Hindess (1972, p.10), for example, writes that Schutz ends up with "psychologism with a vengeance". This seems to give too little weight to the tension in Schutz's own work.
"If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am included to say: "This is simply what I do". (1)

In the previous chapter, a distinctive notion of 'meaning' as that term has been specified above - i.e. in terms of a number of indicators - was seen to emerge from the work of Schutz. The later work of Wittgenstein, with which this chapter is primarily concerned, stands in marked contrast to Schutz on each of the dimensions which I have been discussing. It thus provides another lens to the philosophical spectacles - another perspective upon the central issues of this thesis from a philosophical point of view - which, by giving a contrasting view, should throw matters into broader relief. More than this, however, the distinctive approach which Wittgenstein takes towards such questions as the nature of language in his later work introduces an emphasis which will be seen to re-emerge in the work of Garfinkel and of other ethnomethodologists, and which, if taken seriously, will be seen to have profound implications for the practice of sofiology. In short, the present chapter provides both a contrast with the last, and an introduction to those which are to follow.

Husserl, it will be remembered, undertook philosophy with a sense of destiny, believing that he could somehow transform men's consciousness with his phenomenology. The driving force behind Wittgenstein's work was his quest for truth. Malcolm gives an impression of this in his "Memoire":

"Wittgenstein's severity was connected, I think, with his passionate love of truth. He was constantly fighting with the deepest philosophical problems. The solution of one problem led to another problem."
Wittgenstein was uncompromising; he had to have complete understanding. He drove himself fiercely. His whole being was under a tension. No one at the lectures could fail to perceive that he strained his will, as well as his intellect, to the utmost. This was one aspect of his absolute, relentless honesty. Primarily, what made him an awesome and even terrible person, both as a teacher and in personal relationships, was his ruthless integrity, which did not spare himself or anyone else." (2)

This search led him towards mysticism. In his private life, this tendency was apparent in periods of time which he spent away from the world of academic philosophy living as a recluse in Norway and Ireland. (3) It also makes itself visible in his writings; Russell, for example, wrote of the 'Tractatus' to Lady Ottoline in 1919:

"I had felt in his book a flavour of mysticism, but was astonished when I found that he has become a complete mystic. He reads people like Kierkegaard and Engelus Silesius, and he seriously contemplates becoming a monk. It all started from William James's Varieties of Religious Experience, and grew (not unnaturally) during the winter he spent alone in Norway before the war, when he was nearly mad." (4)

It was this intense man with a sense of the mystical who turned to philosophy for a solution to the problems which he had inherited from the Vienna of his youth. Those problems were concerned, fundamentally, with language and its limits — with what can be said and what can only be 'shown'. Toulmin and Janik argue convincingly that it was this problem more than any other that exercised Viennese intellectuals, suggesting

"that to be a fin-de-siecle Viennese artist or intellectual, conscious of the social realities of Kakania, one had to face the problem of the nature and limits of language, expression and communication." (5)

This driving concern of Wittgenstein's was widely misunderstood by many of his contemporaries. This is perhaps because when he turned to philosophy after an early training in mechanics he did so by way of the work in which Russell and Frege were engaged, on the foundations of mathematics. It was thus the essentially logical concerns which characterised this work that provided the framework for Wittgenstein's first philosophical statement, the 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'
(hereafter the 'Tractatus'), which was completed soon after the first world war. Although the point of the work was to show the limits of language - to show what language could say, and say clearly, and what could only be shown - it was taken by many to be a work of logic, notably by the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists upon whom the book had a considerable influence. Russell himself wrote of Wittgenstein's work that it

"is concerned with the conditions for accurate symbolism, i.e. for symbolism in which a sentence 'means' something quite definite." (6)

Wittgenstein's response to this misreading is shown in a letter to Russell

"Now I'm afraid you haven't really got hold of my main contention, to which the whole business of logical propositions is only corollary. The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions - i.e. by language (and what comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); which I believe is the cardinal problem of philosophy." (7)

These concerns do not disappear in Wittgenstein's later work, for as Harward has suggested

"the grammar of "seeing" of "visualizing" or "having images" (still) appears appropriate ... (as) a result of what Wittgenstein noticed as a feature of many sensible uses of language, they show features or impress features on us which are not said by either the proposition or the proposition user." (8)

The propositions of language show more than can be said. The words and sentences of a language are not things that can be isolated from their context within a 'form of life', for so to isolate them is to take away the context that gives them their sense - it detaches them from that which is not 'named' by the words of the proposition, but which is shown through it. For example

"I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a pretended one (and here there can, of course, be a ponderable confirmation of my judgement). But I may be quite incapable of describing the difference. And this not because the languages I know have no words for it. For why
not introduce new words? - If I were a very talented painter I might conceivably represent the genuine and the simulated glance in pictures.

Pretending is, of course, only a special case of someone's producing (say) expressions of pain when he is not in pain. For if this is possible at all, why should it always be pretending that is taking place - this very special pattern in the weave of our lives?" (9)

It is the weave of our lives that makes a case of pretending to be pretending, and the difference between pretending and not pretending is, equally, something that is a part of our way of life. The language of 'pretending' or 'not pretending' - the language games in which we speak of these phenomena - is a part of the 'form of life', and to separate it from this is to ignore what is 'shown' but unsayable and thus to court redundancy and confusion.

A picture emerges here, then, of an intense man, driven towards mysticism, who is concerned with problems concerning the nature and limits of language which he has inherited from his youth in 'Kakania'. It is not immediately obvious, however, that the work of such a man, immersed in philosophical problems, is at all relevant for sociology. Husserl's work, as became apparent in the previous chapter, presents the sociologist who is impressed with his insights but whose concerns are primarily empirical and not philosophical, with problems. The same is true of Wittgenstein. One cannot simply ignore the fact that, as will become apparent, some of his most important concepts are bound up with what can only be shown and not said - and thus cannot be empirically investigated. What is needed is a formulation of something of what Wittgenstein is attempting to say that captures the spirit of his work, but which is directed expressly towards an empirical investigation of the social world.

In this chapter I want to give a sense of what it is that Wittgenstein is getting at. I will then go on in the next chapter to show how the work of Garfinkel can be seen to articulate in a series of ways with Wittgenstein's thinking, but with the important difference that it
explicitly aims at empirical investigation of society. I will treat Wittgenstein's work, then, as a pointer towards an important area of social reality which demands sociological investigation, rather than suggesting that he was, in fact, a sociologist in disguise. In line with this general aim, I will make a few introductory remarks before moving on to discuss Wittgenstein's work in some detail.

What is important about the 'Tractatus' for present purposes is two things. Firstly, it provides the context in which Wittgenstein's later work is to be understood. As he himself wrote in the preface to his "Philosophical Investigations"

"Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking." (10)

By seeing his later work against the background of the earlier, its radical nature becomes more apparent. It is possible to see more clearly just what Wittgenstein is arguing against, and how his new conceptualizations transform his earlier ones.

There is, however, another and more general importance. The influence of the Tractatus on the 'Vienna Circle' of Logical Positivists has already been noted above. In this thesis, I will not be dealing explicitly with 'Positivism' as a position which contrasts with that of phenomenology, Wittgenstein's own thinking, or ethnomethodology, partly, at least, because the term is often used to cover such a variety of different positions that it is of limited use. There is, however, in the 'Tractatus' doctrines a clear impression of the type of position taken up by positivism on some important issues. This is particularly apparent in, for example, the notion of 'language' taken up - i.e. the idea of propositions 'picturing' reality, and more generally in the fundamental opposition between language and the 'objective' world. For this reason, then, Wittgenstein's early work provides a sense not only..."
of the type of position against which his own later work should be
contrasted, but also of that towards which Garfinkel's writings are
critically directed. Together with the work of Schutz it thus provides
a whole context of ideas against which ethnomethodology can be set.

Wittgenstein's later work, however, - and here I will be concerned
primarily with the 'Philosophical Investigations' since it is there
that the crucially important notion of a 'form of life' is most often
to be found - is important for entirely different reasons. It provides
a clear sense of the 'embeddedness' of meaning, in contrast to notions
of meaning as bound up with an independent structure of some kind,
which it is important to grasp if one is to understand ethnomethodology.
It thus introduces, in a perspicuous fashion, a central theme of this
thesis and begins to make explicit just what is involved in
conceptualising 'meaning' as an embedded phenomenon. It shows the way
in which 'language', 'rules', 'subjectivity', and a variety of other
concepts must be seen if this embeddedness is to be taken seriously. It
provides, in short, a philosophical analysis of precisely those areas
which are the central focus of this thesis.

With that said, then, I want now to move on to discuss Wittgenstein's
Tractatus to set the scene for a discussion of his important later work.

THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

The main theme of the 'Tractatus', as I have already pointed out, is
"the theory of what can be expressed by propositions - i.e. by language...
and what cannot be expressed by propositions." (11) The first task of
this section, then, is to account for what can be expressed in
propositions before going on to discuss what can only be shown.

Wittgenstein writes as follows:

"Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly." (12)

The question to be answered is "what is it that accounts for this
fact that anything that can be expressed in a proposition can be said clearly?" The answer lies in the nature of what the world is made up of - simple objects - and in the nature of propositions themselves in their relationship to 'objects'. So first of all, "what are Objects?".

'Objects' are the most simple components of reality. They are not the objects of everyday life such as tables and chairs, but are rather the metaphysical substance of the world. Klemke puts it that they are "peculiar metaphysical objects - objects which can never be apprehended by any experience, but which nevertheless are real, and which form the substance of the world." (13)

They are what makes language possible - they are the ultimate unalterable subsisting core of reality:

"Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same." (14)

These objects contain within themselves the possibility of being combined in states of affairs - they only exist in states of affairs. Thus to know an object is to know all of its possible combinations in states of affairs.

"If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.

(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object).

A new possibility cannot be discovered later." (15)

These states of affairs are what makes up 'reality'. They are the 'facts' that make up the world.

"The totality of existing states of affairs is the world." (16)

Any given state of affairs, in as much as it is the realization of a possible combination of objects, can either exist or not exist. Thus one can talk about both states of affairs that exist, and about possible states of affairs that do not in fact exist - that a particular combination of objects is not in fact the case.

Having decided what 'reality' and 'the world' consists of, it is next necessary to examine the structure of propositions and their
relation to objects and states of affairs. It is here that the celebrated 'picture theory' of propositions becomes relevant.

Wittgenstein's argument here is that just as a picture depicts reality by showing the relationships between the various objects that it is a picture of, so a proposition states that such and such a combination of objects - such and such a state of affairs - either is or is not the case. In other words a proposition is a picture of reality and it stands in relation to states of affairs just as a picture does to that which it depicts. Like a picture, too, it can depict a state of affairs that either does or does not exist.

"A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-existence of states of affairs." (17)

To understand this fully, and to understand the definiteness of sense that characterizes propositions, it is necessary to examine the way in which a proposition is itself built up out of elementary units which Wittgenstein calls 'names'. Firstly one needs to be clear about the relationship between 'objects' as the simplest elements of reality, and 'names' as the simplest elements of propositions.

"Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives, I can only speak about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are not what they are." (18)

Names, then, represent objects. They stand in for objects, in a proposition, not by some necessity, but because they are conventionally used to fulfill this function. The 'object' is the 'meaning' of a simple sign (name). (19) This being the case

"The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign." (20)

Thus 'names' represent objects, which are their meaning, in a particular state of affairs, "only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning." (21) Thus names appear within a proposition, representing objects in some particular state of affairs. Names have a 'meaning' because they 'mean' the objects which they 'name' within a
particular state of affairs. They do not, however, define the object fully - there will always be other possible states of affairs within which the object could be configured - thus

"So one could say that the real name of an object was what all symbols that signified it had in common. Thus, one by one all kinds of composition would prove to be unessential to a name." (22)

Names, since they name 'objects' which are not actual objects as we know them but metaphysical substance, are not, in fact names as we think of them in the real world. They are, rather, the ultimate point of analysis of a proposition, - the smallest part of a proposition. The demand that they exist at all is a purely logical one - i.e. it follows from the model that Wittgenstein is building of 'reality' and 'propositions'. (23) The next thing to examine, therefore, is the way in which these names are configured in a proposition. This is conceived of in terms of two stages.

Firstly there are what Wittgenstein calls elementary propositions. These are defined as 'concatenations of names'. They are, in other words, just groups of names, naming objects, but not yet formed in such a way that they represent a state of affairs. They can be neither true nor false, since as a string of names they do not yet picture reality. Again, like the concept of 'name', 'elementary propositions' are formal things - part of the demands of the logical model.

Secondly one moves from elementary propositions to full blown propositions. Propositions are generated from elementary propositions by a series of truth functional operations. (24) By the application of logic to an elementary proposition, a concatenation of names is given a form - i.e. the names are set in relationships with one another in such a way that a picture is produced of a possible state of affairs, and this picture/proposition is then a picture of either an existing or a non-existing state of affairs, which means that it is either true or false. Thus from a concatenation of names that can be neither true nor false, a proposition is generated which is a picture of reality, and which can
therefore be a true or a false picture.

It is not necessary to go into the precise mechanisms of this generation of propositions from a concatenation of names. (25) What it is, however, important to realise is that since all of the operations involved are truth functional, then the definiteness of sense that characterizes what can be said, and which is therefore common to all propositions, is the result of performing logical operations - truth functional operations - on a concatenation of names, which, in its turn, has a certain definiteness that is the result of the relationship between 'names' and 'objects'. Thus the 'sense' of a proposition - which is what it expresses - is something definite

"What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate." (26)

The sense of a proposition is, in fact, a state of affairs - i.e. a configuration of objects. It expresses this state of affairs by picturing it, either as existing or as not existing. Thus:

"What a picture represents is its sense." (27)

and again

"The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs." (28)

It represents these possibilities in a definite manner because of the logical nature of the generation of propositions from elementary propositions which are, in their turn, concatenations of names. It can thus be either true or false - the state of affairs which it represents can either exist or not exist.

"A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand." (29)

At this point it becomes necessary to take account of what cannot be said but only shown. The starting point here is the picture theory.

If it is the case that a proposition is a picture of a state of
affairs, then it is important to try to account for the way in which it is able to picture reality. What is it that a picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to depict it adequately? Wittgenstein's answer is that

"What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality." (30)

Or another way

"Logical pictures can depict the world." (31)

It is, in other words, logical form that enables a picture or a proposition to depict the world, since it is logical form that is common to both reality and to the picture. It is logical form that enables the relationships between objects within a state of affairs to be mirrored by the relationships between names within a proposition. As Wittgenstein puts it

"A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation.

And the connexion is precisely that it is its logical picture." (32)

The problem thus becomes one of coming to some understanding of logic, since logic has now been shown to be the key to both the world and to propositions and thus to all language and communication. Logic is, if you like, the most fundamental thing there is. Grasping it is not, however, an easy thing. This is because of the nature of propositions themselves. Since propositions picture states of affairs then what state of affairs could the propositions of logic possibly depict? The propositions of logic could not picture 'objects' in any sense since logical constants (i.e. 'and', 'or', 'if' etc.) are not 'names' of objects of any kind, but are relational words. They point to what makes pictures of states of affairs possible, and thus cannot be themselves about states of affairs.
"My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts." (33)

"All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to have content are false" (34) but that does not get one very far. The clue lies in the fact that there can be shown to be three types of apparent proposition, two of which turn out not to be propositions at all. Firstly there is the ordinary proposition which pictures reality, and which depends upon this relationship with states of affairs for its truth or falsity. Secondly there are apparent propositions that are necessarily true because of the internal relationship of its parts (e.g. "all black cats are black") which do not depend on any relationship with reality for their truth - they are 'tautologically' true. Thirdly, there are apparent propositions that are false simply because of their internal relations (e.g. "the black cat is white") and which also do not have any relationship with reality. These are called 'contradictions'. As Wittgenstein puts it

"A tautology leaves open to reality the whole - the infinite whole - of logical space: a contradiction fills the whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality. Thus neither of them can determine reality in any way." (35)

This being the case it now becomes possible to say that the propositions of logic, since they do not picture states of affairs but instead enable all picturing, are in fact 'tautologies'.(36) They are necessarily true because of their form, and they thus do not need to be related to states of affairs. It is thus true that they, like tautologies, all "say the same thing, to wit nothing." (37)

Logic, then, cannot be pictured in propositions. It can, on the other hand, be 'shown' in as much as it is the 'form' of all propositions. Propositions 'say' that things stand in such and such a relationship to one another, and they can thus be true or false, but at the same time they depend upon logical form for their very existence. They thus
'show' what cannot be said - i.e. the logical form of the world. In a similar way, the propositions of logic, although they do not and cannot 'say' what logic is, reflect in the way in which they hang together to form an interlocking whole, the form of the world. Thus

"How can logic - all-embracing logic, which mirrors the world - use such peculiar crotchets and contrivances? Only because they are all connected with one another in an infinitely fine network, the great mirror." (38)

In this way we see that what cannot be 'said' but only 'shown' is the form of reality itself. It is that which makes propositions possible, the logical form of the world which is prior to all experience of the world and which is the most fundamental fact of our existence.

"The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not an experience.

Logic is prior to every experience - that something is so.

It is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to the question 'What?'.." (39)

Our understanding of 'logic' is thus no earthly thing in the sense that our understanding of propositions is an earthly thing. We are, rather, confronted by the very essence of things in what can be shown via propositions, and in the 'crotchets and contrivances' of logical symbolism.

"Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world.

Logic is transcendental." (40)

Before moving on to make a few remarks about the Tractatus, as a prelude to the discussion in the next section of the 'Philosophical Investigations', it will be useful to expand this account of the Tractatus doctrine of saying and showing by pointing out briefly the 'mysticism' in the 'Tractatus', along with some of Wittgenstein's observations on solipsism.

I have already quoted above Russell's comments on the mystical
nature of the Tractatus. (41) Other commentators too have stressed this aspect of Wittgenstein's work (42) and have suggested that he should, indeed, be seen as a mystic. So what is it that Wittgenstein considers to be mystical? The short answer is that it is that the world exists that is mystical rather than how things are arranged in the world. It is that which is 'shown' through propositions but which cannot be said - the what of the world as opposed to the how - that is mystical. The world form itself, which we cannot even think since it cannot be put into propositions, must always be beyond our grasp and yet at the same time it is the condition for our existence. It is that which is mystical; feeling the limits of our world - the world about which we can have knowledge. Wittgenstein puts it this way

"It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole - a limited whole.

Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical.

When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words.

The riddle does not exist.

If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it." (43)

The 'answer' is in terms of the form of the world - of 'logic' - and that cannot be said but only shown. Thus the questions about the source of the world, about the nature of existence, about the ultimate meaning of life and so on, all of which would demand answers in terms of 'logic', cannot even be asked, let alone answered. One can only "feel(ing) the world as a limited whole", for even when "all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched". (44) This, indeed, stands as the final message of the Tractatus and it is one that must be grasped by means of the propositions of the book - seen through what the propositions 'show' - for it cannot be said. Once grasped, the whole work should be discarded,
like a ladder that enables one to climb to a higher level, and which then becomes of no use. Wittgenstein himself discarded the logical 'crotchets and contrivances' and the whole language of academic philosophy in order to go and teach in Austria. One wonders whether any others followed him in spirit.

To conclude this discussion of the 'Tractatus', I want to frame a few remarks about Wittgenstein's notion of solipsism. It must be remembered that this is not the solipsism that stands as one of philosophy's favourite straw men. It is not a dualistic concept but is rather, as Pitcher stresses (45) a statement about the nature of experience. Wittgenstein is claiming that

"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world." (46)

Thus what cannot be said in language - in propositions (47) - is beyond the limits of my world. The limits of my world, however, are not the limits of the world, for there is also that which can be shown but not said. Thus it is the case that one's own experience is limited and does not embrace the whole world, and thus that one is somehow 'locked in' by the very nature of language and propositions. Therefore

"(For) what the solipsist means is quite correct: only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest." (48)

To say what the solipsist means would involve going beyond the limits of language in order to draw them - which evidently is impossible. Thus what the solipsist means simply manifests itself in the fact that there is a limit to the world. There is no 'I' within the world; it stands only as the limits of my experience (49). One cannot experience that which is doing the experiencing, for if one could, then it would be possible to get beyond the limits of one's world and thus beyond language. Only death takes us beyond our experience. (50)

Solipsism, however, is said by Wittgenstein to coincide with pure realism. (51) This is because, as Hintikka has pointed out, (52) language for Wittgenstein is not a private thing, but is rather an
entirely public affair. The implications of this are doubtless far reaching, but for our present purposes it is enough to notice that what this means is that far from solipsism being a claim about individual subjectivities being cut off from the rest of the world, it is a claim about the limitations of language itself. The nature of language and propositions limits our world. But, this world is precisely the world that the realist says is the world - and, Wittgenstein is saying, both are in fact right. This, is not, however a normal form of solipsism - as Hintikka has put it

"What is usually taken to be the claim of solipsism is the impossibility of getting 'beyond the boundaries of myself'. Wittgenstein's solipsism is based on the exactly opposite claim that all the ordinary boundaries of myself are completely contingent and hence irrelevant 'for what is higher'." (53)

The account Wittgenstein gives does, however, fit well with his general thesis about the limits of language - of what can and cannot be said.

With these remarks on solipsism I want to leave the account of the 'Tractatus'. Before moving on to discuss the 'Philosophical Investigations', however, it will be worth while to point out some of the features of Wittgenstein's early work which are of particular interest for present purposes, emphasising in particular those aspects of it which undergo radical transformation in the later position.

In the first place, it is interesting to notice some of the links between the type of enterprise that Wittgenstein is engaged in here, and that which Husserl's transcendental reductions were intended to enable. Both are concerned fundamentally with the a priori essences which provide for the possibility of our knowledge of the world. In Husserl's case, this possibility is stated in terms of the intentional nature of consciousness, whilst for Wittgenstein the 'world form' is uncovered in logic itself as that which enables propositions to picture reality, and in both men's work something of the spirit of Kant lurks
here. Just as Husserl sought to unravel the presuppositions of knowledge and to show its true nature and status, so Wittgenstein sought to account for the presuppositions of language, its nature and limitations. In both cases too the search for a priori essences led, ultimately, to that which could not be said— to the truly immanent experience of the stream of consciousness or to 'logic' as the form of the world. In a sense the paradox of the phenomenological statement (54) which Fink points out, finds a parallel in the closing statements of the 'Tractatus' in which Wittgenstein advises those who have understood his book to discard it like a ladder which has served its purpose in enabling one to climb higher, but is no longer of any use. (55) As he puts it "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence". (56) In the end, certainty and the ultimate meaning of things and the world are not things which philosophy can discuss.

To push the parallel still further, there is a sense in which what Wittgenstein was attempting to do was carried on within a transcendental reduction. The concepts he uses, such as 'object' and 'name' do not have any mundane reference, but stand apart from the everyday world. Malcolm relates the following anecdote.

"I asked Wittgenstein whether, when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at that time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter!" (57)

Where Wittgenstein differs from Husserl, however, is in the fact that he abandoned this way of thinking and attempted to forge a fresh approach to the problems of knowledge and language. He writes about his previous concerns in a passage in the 'Philosophical Investigations'

"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation; it was a requirement). The conflict
becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. - We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!" (58)

What one needs to do is to come back from the 'ideal' realm - from that place where 'conditions are ideal' - for the solution cannot be found in a situation in which there is no friction. It is of no use spinning theories that ultimately require for their expression an ideal language since such is, by its very nature, removed from our everyday concerns. It is here that Wittgenstein's concerns diverge from Husserl's.

Wittgenstein's later work, then, shows a turning away from the search for 'essences', and the development of new concepts to handle the problems which they were intended to solve. Thus 'family resemblances', 'language games', 'form of life' and so on emerge as a toolbox of concepts with which to handle the problems of language. The way in which they do so will be the subject of the next section.

It is worth stressing too, the characteristic notion of language which Wittgenstein develops in the 'Tractatus'. Here it stands in opposition to the 'reality' it 'pictures', and is able to picture simply because of logic as the form of the world. Contained in this model of language is both a correspondence notion of the truth of propositions, and a vision of language as an independent calculus. (59)

I will talk briefly about each of these in turn.

It was pointed out above that Schutz, in developing Husserl's notions to give them sociological relevance, espouses a 'coherence' theory of truth in which the truth of a proposition rests upon its 'fit' with other propositions within a body of knowledge. The notion that emerges from the 'Tractatus' stands opposed to this in that it suggests that the truth of a proposition rests upon its correspondence with 'reality'. 'Names' name 'objects', and are concatenated in elementary
propositions which are then, by a series of truth functional operations, transformed into complex propositions. Thus the 'truth' of a complex proposition depends ultimately upon whether or not the 'objects' which are 'named' do in fact exist, and whether the state of affairs (i.e. the arrangement of objects 'pictured' by the proposition) is in fact the case. It is not the relationship of a proposition to other propositions that is important in deciding its truth or falsity, but its relationship to 'objects' - to 'reality' as that which is the case.

At the same time, the Tractatus sees language as a calculus by treating it as if it is a series of signs which can be joined in various ways in order to picture some state of affairs. It is thus independent of those who would use the language, standing on its own as a structure to be manipulated. These manipulations, as far as Wittgenstein is concerned, are truth functional.

Taken together, these two aspects of Wittgenstein's early view of language suggest that two important observations are in order about the 'Tractatus'. Firstly, there is clearly a strong sense of there being an 'objective' world which stands over and against perceptions of it - over and against propositions. It is this 'objective' world which, in the end, guarantees the truth or decides the falsity of any proposition made about any matter. Secondly, - and here the above remarks on Wittgenstein's 'solipsism' are particularly relevant - it would seem that, as an independent calculus, it is language that in the end guarantees intersubjectivity simply because it is independent. Here there is a parallel to Schutz's work which is worth noticing, but which I will not develop here. In other words, the whole possibility of an intersubjective world is being made to depend upon language as something over and against the people who use it. Language, as a calculus, is being reified, and given a vast amount of work to do.

On each of the above points Wittgenstein's later work develops a
different approach. The notion of correspondence - what he calls the 'model of object and designation' - is pushed into the background, as is the idea of language as a calculus. As a result, 'intersubjectivity' comes to be seen in a different light in relation to the nature of language itself. I will now move on to put more flesh on these introductory remarks by considering the 'Philosophical Investigations'.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein himself gives an excellent account of the form of the book when he writes

"After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. - And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction. - The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings." (60)

He is not, then, interested in building a philosophical system, but rather he is intent upon putting together his ideas on philosophical matters in the form of a number of criss-crossing concepts that can be seen as parts of an overall picture. His purpose in doing this is to solve philosophical puzzles - to provide an armoury of concepts that will enable the philosopher to see the true nature of philosophical problems and their origins in ordinary language and to provide insights into them that can make them dissolve. The object of the exercise is not, strictly, to provide solutions to the problems, but to show how the problem itself is generated by a series of misunderstandings that more often than not have their origins in a misconception of the nature of language. Thus he writes that

"The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness." (61)
and again

"What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." (62)

The Philosophical Investigations, then, is an illustration of some of these concepts in use. It is an attempt to demonstrate that the concepts can be used in an interesting and fruitful way within the region of discourse that is philosophy.

It is important to realize that because of the criss-cross nature of Wittgenstein's concepts, one cannot take any one of them in isolation. They hang together to form a whole toolbox of concepts that is specially designed for the job of resolving philosophical puzzlement. Thus 'family resemblances' are linked to 'language games' and 'rules', and 'rules' themselves cannot be properly understood unless the attack on essentialism given substance in the notion of 'family resemblances' is taken into account. Most importantly, what all of these different ideas attempt to express is that one cannot understand 'languages' (language games), 'rule following', or 'sameness' (and agreement) unless it is realized that all such phenomena depend upon and are embedded within a 'form of life'. It is the realization of the embeddedness of language and so on within a form of life that is the key to showing the fly the way out of the bottle.

I will begin this account of the 'Philosophical Investigations' with a description of the notions of language games and family resemblances. The point of these concepts is stated by Wittgenstein in the following fashion.

"Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. - for someone might object against me: "You take the easy way out! You talk of all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and of language."
And this is true - Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language"." (63)

What he is trying to do with these concepts, then, is to provide an alternative account of language to the essentialist one that he himself had once espoused in the 'Tractatus' and which was the one predominantly held by philosophers. So how is this to be done?

First of all, 'family resemblances'. This concept is aimed directly at the solution to the problem of universals which is framed up in terms of essentialism. Wittgenstein's point here is that it is a mistake to presume that because various phenomena - such as games - are grouped under the same name and are seen as instances of the same thing that they must therefore have some one thing in common which provides the basis for seeing them all as 'the same'. The reason why we do presume this is that we have a craving for generality and precision which makes us try to find that which is common to things rather than looking at what presents itself to us and asking whether or not there is any one thing common to all instances of what we call the 'same'. We could just as well, he suggests, look not for the common denominator but for the differences between things of the same genus in order to see whether we might be mistaken in our assumption of similarity. As he puts it

"Consider for example the proceedings we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ballgames, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? - Don't say: "there must be something common, or they would not all be called 'games'" - but look and see whether there is anything common to all." (64)

If we do 'look and see' we find not essences, but "we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." (65)
It is these criss-crossing relationships of similarity between things that Wittgenstein refers to as 'family resemblances'. (66) The point can perhaps be made clearer by using an example that Bamborough gives. (67) He suggests that one should picture a series of features A.B.C.D. & E. which appear in objects e.d.c.b.a. in the following way:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
e & d & c & b & a \\
ABCD & ABCE & ABDE & ACDE & BCDE
\end{array}
\]

It is quite conceivable that all of the objects e.d.c.b. and a. might be called by the same name - they might all be games for example. It is the case, however, that there is nothing - no one feature - that is common to all of the objects. Rather there are a series of overlapping similarities present which account for our seeing them all as instances of the same thing.

This does not mean that all concepts are imprecise, or that we do not know what we are talking about when we use them. It means, rather, that trying to see concepts as precise things with an essential core is a mistaken enterprise, and one that threatens to disguise the true nature of language. By seeing concepts instead as being grouped according to family resemblances the way is opened up for a new perspective on language which can, perhaps, throw new light on philosophical problems. When one tries to explain a concept to someone, one is not trying to get him to see the essential core of it - one is not, as Schutz seems to suggest, transferring 'kernels' of meaning to one's co-conversationalist - but is rather teaching him how to use it with a sense in the ordinary 'language games' of our everyday life, and although sometimes it is necessary to ensure - for example within scientific discourse - that a concept is used with a high degree of precision, words and concepts are highly flexible things. They mould themselves to the uses that we have for them in the language games of everyday life. As Wittgenstein puts it
"One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. - I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I - for some reason - was unable to express; but that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is not an indirect means of explaining - in default of a better. For any general definition can be misunderstood too. The point is that this is how we play the game. (I mean the language-game with the word "game")." (68)

This brings us into the question of language games. What is a language game? The best way of answering this is with an example. Wittgenstein, in the first language game which he describes in the 'Blue and Brown Books' (69) asks us to imagine a language whose "function is the communication between a builder A. and his man B."(70) The world in which these two men live is a very simple one - it consists of A. building something, and B. bringing him the necessary building materials. These materials are "cubes, bricks, slabs, beams, columns." To facilitate their task they have a language. "The language consists of the words 'cube', 'brick', 'slab', 'column'." This is taken to be a complete language. A gets B to bring him what he wants by shouting out 'cube' or 'brick', and B dutifully obliges. If a child is to be taught this language, it could be done by pointing to an item, and saying its word and by rewarding the child if he brought the item over to the builder (or punishing him if he didn't).

This is obviously a very simple language game. It has limited objects, limited teaching methods, limited members - in fact it could hardly be more different from the complex language games that we play normally in our every day life. The point is, however, that it does illustrate, by its very simplicity, features of all languages. It suggests that language is only as complex as it needs to be for example. In such a simple game, words like 'bring me' (a slab) would be redundant - they would not have a point. To suggest that 'slab' really meant 'bring me a slab' is somehow beside the point. The language, the world
of objects, and the activities are, in this language game, inextricably linked. Language is simply a part of the activities. Thus we come to a definition of a 'language game'.

"We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) (71) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games "language-games" and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game.

And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.

I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game". (72)

The term 'language-game', then, denotes not the clever use of puns that plays on words, or some property of language conceived of as a self-contained structure standing apart from an 'objective' world which it describes, but rather it attempts to stress the fact that language is used as a part of the activities of our everyday life, and that it is used with some sort of a point - to achieve something or other. It is, in other words, an integral part of the weave of our life.

That this concept rests upon that of a family resemblance is perhaps obvious, but it bears stressing. Words and concepts, Wittgenstein is claiming, should not be seen as having some essential meaning. Rather they are used in a variety of criss-crossing ways, in a variety of language games - which are themselves related in the manner of family resemblances - in order to further the purposes that characterize our human life. In short, both notions point towards the fact that language and these meaningful things which it enables us to express, are embedded within our whole form of life - within the swim of what we do in the world.

Words are like tools that we use as we go about our business; as Wittgenstein puts it

"Think of the tools in a tool box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. - The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities)." (73)
It is no use trying to discover some ultimate meaning for the concepts that we use - their ultimate significance for;

"When we say "every word in language signifies something" we have so far said nothing whatever, unless we have explained exactly what distinction we wish to make." (74)

We may, of course, be making some point by saying this - for example we might be distinguishing words in a language from words outside it such as "lilliburelo" in songs - but then we have given the language game in which our statement is to be understood. An example of the redundant use of language is to be found in Wittgenstein's own early work -

"Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words used for now? The language game in which they are to be applied is missing)." (75)

Using language in the way in which he did in the Tractatus was to misunderstand the true nature of language. It was to withdraw words from their place within language games, and hence to make them redundant. What must be done is to bring words back home to their proper place within the weave of life.

"What we do is to bring words back from the metaphysical to their everyday use." (76)

It is useless to try to build a Tractatus type of system in order to understand the world, for by using words in this way one runs up against the limits of language. The limits of language are the limits of language games. (77) The philosopher cannot go beyond that limit without talking nonsense, and the purpose of Wittgenstein's philosophy is to uncover the ways in which such nonsense is generated

"The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of discovery." (78)

Thus far, then, I have discussed the two concepts of 'family resemblances' and 'language games', trying to show the links between the
two. This has led, however, to a crucial point in the discussion, namely the distinction between what can be said - which is limited by 'language games' - and that which can only be shown - i.e. that which goes beyond the limits of language. To unravel further this important distinction it is necessary to look explicitly at the notion of a 'form of life', a term which has been used above but which has not been provided with a firm sense. I want now to remedy this by looking in some detail at what is involved here.

It is important to stress that a form of life is not the same thing as a language game, (79) in spite of the fact that some commentators do seem to treat them as the same. (80) It is, rather, that 'agreement' concerning what is the case - about what it is that we do as a matter of course - which lies behind language games and makes them possible. It includes such things as an agreement as to the language we use which makes possible language games of which 'truth' and 'falsity' are a part - as Wittgenstein puts it:

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life." (81)

Thus the 'form of life' lies behind language games. Van Peursen puts it succinctly when he writes that:

"... behind man's language and thought, and so behind philosophy, which must be understood as a practical activity, there lies the history of man's forms of life. Not that it is hidden behind man's action and speech - it is precisely what is expressed by them. "Will" and "idea", the mystical and the logical measure, are no longer kept in watertight compartments!" (82)

In other words, it is that which can be shown but not said. It is, as Janik and Toulmin puts it, that which 'contexts' language games, (83) where language games are to be understood as the boundary of the sayable. It shows itself through the language games that we play in the course of our everyday living. It is, as Petrie puts it a
"Non-investigable language in use or set of accepted human activities which enables us to frame our investigations." (84)

The parallel here with the earlier notion of 'logic' as the 'form' of reality and of language is a significant one. Just as 'logic' was the 'form' of the world, so the new, more secular, Wittgenstein speaks of that which cannot be said in terms of the 'form of life' itself, rather than in terms of an ineffable presence that somehow has its being behind the realm of everyday existence. The 'form of life' becomes the source of all necessity (85) rather than logic. It becomes the mediator between language and 'objective' reality.

Since this is such an important notion, it will be useful to put more flesh on the concept that this brief sketch allows. I will begin here with J.F.M. Hunter's excellent account of the matter. Hunter argues for what he calls "the organic account" of forms of life. The term 'organic' here is intended to point out the fact that in the course of living our-lives we do not, as a rule, reflect upon the highly complex things that we do which make up our everyday competences as human beings, but that we do, on the contrary, just get on with it. We are able to talk, calculate, interact and so on because we have 'learnt' to do these things, but the fact that we have learnt them does not imply that we then have to consciously work back over our lessons in order to perform whatever task is at hand. It is as if, once learnt, these things simply become a part of our biological makeup - they become a part of what it is to be a human being. We just do act in this way. It is, however, difficult to see immediately the link between social competences and our biological makeup - as Hunter puts it

"We do not generally include in the biological what is overt, what is learned, what is done at will or what is intelligent, but only what goes on within us, unaware and without our direction. Yet we can move by easy stages from automatic, unwilled, not-conscious processes like nutrition, through reflex actions, many of which are learned or at least acquired, and which, though not done at will, can often be resisted"
at will; then through speaking or writing just insofar as it is forming the words with our mouths or drawing the characters on paper, where, though we may form a word at will, we do not (generally) will the physical manner of our forming it; to, finally, expressing ourselves in a certain way, where although it is generally done at will, we do not will the willing of it, and we do not know how just this form of words satisfies all the various grammatical, social, personal, and intellectual requirements of being something we "want to say". We may, by studying it afterwards find out how it satisfies such requirements (cf. para. 82), but the interesting thing is that we generally manage to say things which are just what we would say if we had the requirements in mind, but without a thought of the requirements." (86)

This extended quote makes clear the gist of the organic account. In order for language games to be possible at all, certain things must be given and "agreed" upon. Certain things must be 'learnt', the biological organism must be set up in a certain way, and these factors provide the ground within which our lives as human beings have their roots. As Wittgenstein puts it

"What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life." (87)

This ground is not, and cannot be, said in the language games that we play since to say it would itself depend upon that same ground, so that what was being said would fail to grasp its own form fully, but instead it is 'shown' in the fact that one just does things in this way. One can justify what one does in terms of rules and causes, and indeed much of one's use of language does indeed consist in doing precisely this. In the final analysis, however, it is the case that we just do do things in such and such a way, and this fact grounds any justification that we might give of our actions - as Wittgenstein puts it

"How am I able to obey a rule?" - if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."" (88)

It is this 'bedrock' - 'the given' - that is a 'form of life'. It is this form of life which accounts for the fact that when we speak we
can say more than can be said in so many words for it provides the context within which language games are to be understood. As Cavell has put it:

"We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation - all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls "forms of life"." (89)

With these remarks of Cavell's I will leave the question of what Wittgenstein meant by a form of life and move on to discuss some further features of the philosophy of the Philosophical Investigations. It must be stressed once again, however, that all of the concepts so far discussed - language games, family resemblances and forms of life - and those which I will now go on to mention - language, meaning and use, and rules - cannot be treated as distinct from one another. All of them together form an interlocking whole - a battery of concepts - that work towards the same end, showing the embeddedness of 'language' and 'meaning' within a 'form of life', and thus seeking to clear up confusion and puzzlement in philosophy. Thus the status and nature of language, which I will speak about next, must be seen against the background created by the above discussion of a form of life.

Language is learnt, according to Wittgenstein, not by the learner intuiting the essences of concepts, or guessing the true core of the concept or word which lies behind the actual examples that the teacher might give in the process of teaching someone how to use it, but rather, as Pitkin puts it

"The kind of training that is necessary to the acquisition of a natural language, Wittgenstein says, required "inducing the child to go on" in the same way, in new and different cases." (90)
I have already shown how the concept of family resemblances breaks down the notion that concepts must have essences. Rather, words are used in language games with a sense. Thus language cannot be a calculus, as it was seen to be in the Tractatus, and it cannot be learnt or used as a calculus would be. It must, rather, be learnt by us and incorporated into our makeup as human beings in such a way that we can use it without having to think, as a flexible tool that responds to the various purposes of our human conditions. In a sense one could say that one learns a 'rule' which directs the speaker to use words in such and such a way, and that the rule transcends the particular occasions of its use - but to say that is to risk falling back into a form of essentialism that makes not an intuited essence but a rule the core of a concept.

The word 'rule' is just a way of pointing out, here, that we do in fact go on in the same way in our use of words and concepts. It is a description of the way things are with language, and not an intuition of the essence of language use. As Wittgenstein puts it:

"All the steps are really already taken" means: I no longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of space. - But if something of this sort really were the case, how would it help?

No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. - I should have to have said: This is how it strikes me.

When I obey a rule, I do not choose.
I obey the rule blindly." (91)

Thus language is just something that we do - it is an integral part of our form of life. Hunter, once again, puts the point I want to make here clearly whilst talking about the language game used by the builder and his mate that I mentioned above.

"Why should I not say: 'When he says "slab!" he means "Slab"!?" He is saying something about what I have called the "self-sufficiency" of language: that it stands by itself, and needs no further explication. A person in this situation could not
say what he means by "Slab!" and yet in the ordinary sense of that expression he knows what it means. How does he know? Well, encouragement, reproof, practice, and examples have brought it about that its use is simply part of the way he functions. A living being now functions that way, as immediately and naturally as he walks or swims, and being simply part of the way a living being functions could be what is meant by being a form of life." (92)

It is no longer the case, then, that to understand language one must investigate that which it pictures - must try to understand the concepts and propositions of language in relation to that reality which they stand over and against. (93) Instead, in order to get to grips with language at all, one must look at the ways in which it is used within the context of all the other activities that human beings engage in. It is a practical activity. As Van Peursen puts it "Language does something, creates new insight and new paths for action." (94)

It is not simply a self contained structure that can be analyzed in abstraction from the language games which embody it.

"we see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another." (95) and elsewhere

"if the words "language", "experience", "world", have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words "table", "lamp", "door"." (96)

The words "language" and so on do have a use, but to presume that they denote some 'thing' that must have an essence is to make a fundamental mistake. The philosopher must look and see the ways in which "language" as a concept, and language as a human activity manifest themselves, within both language games and within our form of life.

The status of language in Wittgenstein's theory may perhaps become clearer if I can clarify what is meant in the Philosophical Investigations, by the concept of rule. There is, after all, a sense in which it could be said that learning a language is like following a rule - even if the use of the word 'rule' here is to be taken "symbolically". (97) So how
is the concept 'rule' to be understood?

The danger, when talking about 'rules' is that one immediately tries to make them that 'thing' which the word 'rule' refers to. In other words, one searches round for an essentialist definition of 'rule'. The problem with doing this is that things do not always go according to the rules that we lay down.

"The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.

This entanglement in our own rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of)". (98)

Thus, for example, philosophies become trapped in contradiction, and we are reduced to saying "I didn't mean it like that." Our own rules have gone wrong. The problem for the philosopher is to come to understand why this should be the case - what is it about 'rules' and about our use of the concept 'rule' that can lead us into such difficulties?

The first thing that must be remembered is that 'rule', as a concept, is itself a part of our language and that as such, it is used for various purposes in a variety of language games. For example

"The rule may be an aid in teaching the game. The learner is told it and given practice in applying it. - Or it is an instrument of the game itself. - Or a rule is employed neither in the teaching nor in the game itself; nor is it set down in a list of rules. One learns the game by watching how others play. But we say that it is played according to such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the practice of the game - like a natural law governing the play." (99)

All of these different cases, where we might say that a 'rule' applies to what ever is going on, denotes some use of the concept rule. The concept itself is a set of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing in family resemblance fashion. It is something used.

Wittgenstein himself uses the concept rule in order to point out that severe difficulties result from treating rules as 'things' that need
to be interpreted, and that a view of language that sees 'rules' as the 'essence' of linguistic practice will inevitably run into trouble. Take, for example, a case where someone (e.g. a sociologist) says that action A is the result of an agent X interpreting rule R. Now suppose that another actor, Y, comes along and that he also performs action A but that it is evident that he did so as a result of interpreting rule R1. At some other time, actor Y does interpret rule R, but the result in this case is not A but some other action - call it A1. Now the puzzle here is that it seems that rule R does not lead to any one action - and one can in theory imagine any action being seen as an instance of following it - and action A cannot be seen as the result of following or interpreting any one rule. This being the case, it begins to look as though the concept 'rule', if it is taken to denote some 'thing' - a rule - is in danger of becoming vacuous. It certainly could not, for example, solve the problem of order, unless problematic notions such as consensus are introduced to explain why most people do interpret rules in similar ways, and it would be of little use to the ordinary conversationalist who generally wants to use the concepts 'rule' and 'rule following' to denote a certain regularity in the behaviour being discussed. Wittgenstein puts it thus:

"This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here ..." (100)

So how is the misunderstanding to be cleared up? The first step is to realize that rules are not things that need to be interpreted. They are neither essences themselves, nor things with their own essence. What must be realized is that

"there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation but is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases." (101)
We must be careful when we use the word 'interpretation' for by thinking of rules solely in terms of interpretation we run the risk of misunderstanding them, "we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another." It is not something that people necessarily do to the 'thing' rule.

Thus People just do obey rules, and whether or not they intend to obey or follow a rule is often not to the point when one speaks about rules and rule following. I just do follow rules, just as I just do use language. I grasp rules by being taught them, not as lists in a rule book, but by way of examples, ostensions, by being told things, encouraged in what I do, having things explained to me and so on. (102) Finally I just do understand the rule - I know how to go on. (103)

An example here is to try to think of the rule we would use to teach someone how to use the concept "exactness".

"No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know what we should be supposed to imagine under this head - unless you yourself lay down what is to be so called. But you will find it difficult to hit upon such a convention; at least any that satisfies you." (104)

We (English speakers) all know what 'exact' means - we know how to use it with a sense - and we could say that its use follows a rule. The fact that it is difficult to "hit upon such a convention", or to put it another way, to give an account of the rules for the term's use, does not mean that it is incorrect to speak of following a rule here. How could we ever use the word at all if there were no rules for its use? To think that rule is the wrong word here is to misunderstand the grammar of the word/concept 'rule'. Obeying and following rules is just a part of the 'weave of life', is part of our 'form of life' - i.e. it is part of that which makes language games possible. It 'exhibits' itself in our everyday lives.

"When I obey a rule I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly." (105)
The message that emerges from Wittgenstein's account is fundamentally a simple enough one - the concept 'rule' is used, and it is used for a variety of different purposes. We use it to account for how people learn, how orderly behaviour is possible, how a game is structured etc. etc. It is a part, too, of the language of justification and moral explanation.

(106) As Wittgenstein says

"How am I able to obey a rule?" If this is not a question about causes then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "this is simply what I do". (107)

What is being pointed out here is that there is an end to the infinite regress of justifying my rule following behaviour in terms of further rules e.g. "why did you do that?" "Because of rule a". "But why interpret it that way?" "Because of rule b" "Yes but rule b can be interpreted in this way" "yes, but consider rule c" .... and so on. We do use 'rules' to justify what we do, but in the final analysis what we are doing is justifying and not providing some casual explanation of our action in terms of essential 'rules' that exist, thinglike, as the frame around which we group our actions. "This is simply what I do", and I am prepared to justify my doing it. The language games of justification which use 'rules' are, like all language games, grounded in my form of life.

The implications of this for 'language' are perhaps obvious enough. We learn language by learning rules that enable us to project a concept from the context within which it was learnt to other unfamiliar contexts. But, rules - the rules that we learn - are not thinglike; they do not constitute the 'essence' of language. As Cavell puts it, arguing strongly against Pole's reification of 'rules', "Language has no essence." (108) Rules are what is "exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases", (109) they are a part of our form of life just as language is. We just do speak and we just do follow rules.
In sum, then, there is a sense of 'rule' that does not imply 'interpretation' and which is tied up with 'what we do' - with the way in which we blindly go about our daily round. 'Rule', in this sense, is crucially bound up with the notion of a 'form of life' - i.e. with that 'bedrock' within which language, meaning and the rest are embedded. In this sense, 'rules' are 'shown' (manifest) in particular instances of obeying or going against rules. They are 'shown' as part of our 'form of life'. The concept 'rule' must be understood not as referring to things (rules) in the world, but as a concept that can be 'used' with a sense to justify, explain, etc. etc. - and the possibility of using the concept at all rests upon our form of life itself, i.e. upon what we do, as a matter of course, in various regular ways. 'Rule', like all concepts that have some meaning for us, is embedded within a form of life. Another concept that Wittgenstein discusses and which is very much to the point for present purposes is the concept of 'meaning' itself. The dangers of this notion precisely parallel those which we saw in relation to rules - namely that we presume that there must be a 'something' to which the concept 'meaning' refers. In the Tractatus, for example, the meaning of a 'name' was held to be the 'object' which that name signified. The same problems are present with the verb 'to mean'. Here it is thought that when we say that we 'mean' to say something or other, we are referring to some inner event that goes on when we perform an act of 'meaning something'. Thus 'meaning' is taken to be what is 'meant' when we say something and 'mean' something by it. It is that central core which is grasped in any act of meaning.

Wittgenstein's argument here is that once again we have allowed ourselves to be misled by the grammar of the words 'meaning' and 'to mean'. There is, he says, no reason why these words should refer to anything at all, and to suppose that they do is to become trapped by one image of the way that language works - perhaps the picture theory
"A main cause of philosophical disease - a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example." (110)

One must instead cast around - must look at the uses that the word is put to - and in doing so one finds that 'meaning', too is a concept that is used for a variety of purposes with a point. Pitkin puts this well

"In short, a verb like "to mean" is not simply a label for some recognizable inner process; it is a complex, composite tool put together out of a variety of heterogeneous parts - the various contexts and language games in which the word is used. These include feelings and actions and circumstances, phenomena to which the word can refer, but also phenomena which characterize the occasions for its use as a signal." (111)

It is important, however, not to imagine that Wittgenstein's claim here is that the meaning of a concept is in fact its use - i.e. that 'use' is being substituted for 'meaning'. If this were the case, then evidently Wittgenstein would have fallen back into the trap that he is constantly warning others of, namely the tendency to find just one essential thing that is common to all cases. I will illustrate this by making two points.

Firstly, it seems that the picture theory does not die out completely in the work of the later Wittgenstein. Harward notices this and writes that

"it is not an error... but is only misleading to focus on the picturing relation of shared logical form; the error, I think, is in isolating any one relation shared by language and reality, and not on isolating the wrong relation." (112)

and later on the same page

"The range and variety of activities we call language, and the range and the variety of uses to which we put language are so extensive as to forbid any general account of how meaningful discourse is related to reality. This is not to rule out, however, that for some set of sensible uses of language, an account of meaningfulness which is exclusively that of sharing pictorial form might not be in order." (113)

Wittgenstein himself does use the image of a 'picture' in the Philosophical Investigations to explain something of the relationship between language and reality, but it is always in such a way that the
most important question is always 'how is the picture used?' or 'what is it that brings the picture to life in actual situations of the concepts use?'. Thus

"The picture is there; and I do not dispute its correctness. But what is its application? Think of the picture of blindness as a darkness in the soul or in the head of the blind man." (114)

and again

"Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? - In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? - Or is the use its life?" (115)

This does not, however, mean that the whole idea of a picture has been discarded in favour of some idea of 'use'. Rather it says that sometimes it is appropriate to see propositions as pictures, but that one must not forget that they only come to life when they are used with a purpose. They are, in short, dependent upon a form of life, and to remember this is to lessen the danger that one will be carried away by the idea that one image - of propositions picturing - could account for the general form of all propositions.

The importance of this is that it does demonstrate a distinction between meaning and use. What is being said is that 'meaning' is complex, and that it cannot be captured in a single image - like that of a picture - but that one must always remember that pictures are used, including the picture of 'meaning' that is gained by seeing meaning as a picture. The picture theory does give us some idea about meaning - it does picture certain of the relationships between language and reality which make an utterance meaningful - but it cannot be the whole story because pictures rely on being used so that they can come alive in some language game or other. (116) The whole point of stressing the 'use' of concepts is not to substitute 'use' for 'meaning', but to insist that concepts, including the concept 'meaning', depend upon - are embedded within - a 'form of life'. To understand 'meaning' one must recognize this embeddedness.
The second point to be made draws out some of the implications of this. Pitcher, in his commentary on Wittgenstein, does in fact claim that Wittgenstein conflates meaning and use in the Philosophical Investigations. (117) As a result of this, when he comes to discuss Wittgenstein's views on private language, and the relationship between sensation statements and sensations, like 'pain', he claims that since Wittgenstein is only interested in use, and ignores meaning as something that could possibly be different from use, he is trapped into saying that; since ostensive definitions of 'pains' etc. are not possible and since sensation words cannot be 'names', then the sensations themselves drop out of consideration. In other words, the language games in which words like 'pain', 'love', 'grief' etc. occur, do not have any place in them for actual sensations. All there is is certain pain behaviour which ties up with certain linguistic uses, and we have no need to know, and no means of knowing, what the other person feels when he uses sensation words. If, indeed, meaning were the same as use, then Pitcher would be correct here, for evidently the meaning of 'pain' need never refer to any sensation since the process of teaching someone how to use the concept would always be in terms of ostensions, of showing them how to go on in the right way, and that would always be in terms of observable pain behaviour, and not in terms of private sensations. Using the concept does not demand that any sensations exist at all.

The point is, however, that Wittgenstein does not want to equate meaning and use in this way, but only to warn that using only one image of the relationship between language and reality - i.e. one that sees the 'meaning' of concepts in terms of 'pictures' - will mislead the philosopher.

This can be made clearer by considering the following passage from the Philosophical Investigations.
"Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! - Suppose everyone had a box with something in it; we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. - Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. - But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? - if so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be empty. - No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." (118)

Now Pitcher only quotes the first paragraph, here, and leaves out the crucial last phrases. He can thus say that Wittgenstein's view is that sensations do indeed drop out of consideration in the language games of which sensation statements are a part. Since it is only the 'use' of such statements that is important, then there is no place left for sensations as somehow part of the meaning of sensation terms. Cook makes it clear why Pitcher is mistaken here, when he writes that

"But so far from this being Wittgenstein's actual view, it is what he calls a "paradox" (P.I.304). It is not our actual use of sensation words that yields this paradox, but rather the philosophical picture of that use. The intention of the passage is clearly shown in the final sentence, which Pitcher does not quote: .... The "if" here is crucial, for it is not Wittgenstein's view but the one he opposes that construes the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of "object and name", and therefore it is not Wittgenstein, as Pitcher thinks, who is committed to the paradoxical consequence that in the use of the word "pain", for example, the sensation drops out as irrelevant. The point of the passage, then, is quite the opposite of what Pitcher supposes." (119)

In other words, what has happened here is that Wittgenstein is arguing that one particular picture of the meaning of sensation words - the "object designation" model - leads to a paradox, since it implies that when we use sensation words the sensations are not important.

Pitcher interprets this, in lines with his conflation of meaning and use, to mean that indeed only the use of such terms is important. By doing this, he too takes just one picture of what it is to 'mean' something,
and himself complies with (or rather claims that Wittgenstein complies with) the paradox. He becomes trapped in a picture where meaning is use. Thus Pitcher himself becomes an example of exactly what Wittgenstein is arguing against, which is the tendency to be trapped by a picture - it is worth quoting again

"A main cause of philosophical disease - a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example." (120)

'Meaning' is complex. It is wrong to imagine that the whole gamut of what is meant by the concept, or of what we mean when we use the verb 'to mean', can be distilled into a clear and precise logical formulation. What must be remembered is the embeddedness of meaning - of the concept 'meaning', and of the 'meaning' of all concepts - within a form of life. The complexity of 'meaning' is bound up with what we do, with that sense of 'rule' that does not imply interpretation, with our 'use' of language in family resemblance fashion within 'language games', indeed with the whole 'whirl of organism' that is our 'form of life'. We become caught in paradoxes if we forget this and try to uncover essentialist definitions of concept, of language, of rules and the rest, and

"The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts - which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please." (121)

and again

"What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember"." (122)

I.e. that is not a denial that pictures sometimes help in some cases.

This discussion of meaning and use concludes the account of the Philosophical Investigations for present purposes. Hopefully it has become clear the way in which the concepts - 'family resemblances', 'language games', 'rules', 'meaning' and 'use', 'language' and so on all interlock within a framework of concepts that indicate the embeddedness of all concepts - including those discussed - within a 'form of life'.
What is produced, by Wittgenstein, is not a systematic philosophical treatise but a network of concepts woven together to make a point. That point adds up to an insistence that all 'meaning' is embedded within a form of life - that to understand 'language', 'concepts' and all other meaningful phenomena, it is necessary to see them in the context of what we do. In the next section I will discuss some of the issues that this later work of Wittgenstein raises for the arguments of this thesis.

**WITTGENSTEIN AND SCHUTZ: THE CONTRAST**

I have already pointed out above some of the ways in which the enterprise which Wittgenstein undertakes in the 'Tractatus' can be seen as similar to that which exercised Husserl. In this present section I want to suggest some of the ways in which the position that Schutz's adjustments of transcendental phenomenology for sociological ends leads him into; contrasts in decisive respects with the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein which, in parallel fashion, stands as a rejection of the 'Tractatus' doctrines.

Perhaps one of the most obvious points of contrast lies in the different solutions which the two thinkers provide to the problem of universals. Schutz, as I have argued above, seems to suggest that in the final analysis it is 'ideal types' that should be seen as providing the 'essence' of a concept. Wittgenstein's solution, on the other hand, stresses instead the family resemblance nature of all concepts, this notion going side by side with the idea that words are used in a variety of different language games with a point, which in its turn relates to the form of life which enables language games in the first place. Thus, where Schutz can be seen as maintaining that the possibility of 'agreement' about what is the case rests upon the objective meaning structure of pre-constituted types, Wittgenstein conceives of that same possibility in terms of what people do - of the ways in which they use words and concepts in a family resemblance fashion within a form of life. Where
Schutz's solution is in terms of a structure of 'meanings' conceived of as 'thinglike', Wittgenstein's is in terms of what people do - their practices as they go about the business of living as human beings. In both cases there is a rejection, here, of the notion of apriori essences, so that both have moved a step beyond their initial starting points - Schutz from the Husserlian notion of 'eidos' and Wittgenstein from the notions of logic and 'objects'. Their final positions on the matter, however, could not be more different.

A similar contrast emerges when one considers the different views that the two men hold on the nature of language. Here, Schutz's view, with stresses that language is an objective meaning context standing over and against those who use it, has more in common with Wittgenstein's early view of the matter than with his later work. Where the 'Tractatus' treats language as if it were a calculus, Schutz treats it as a structure of meanings. Similarly in both cases there is some notion of 'kernel' and 'fringe' meanings, with the kernel being the essential meaning of the concept whilst the fringes are the result of particular occasions of its use. Compare, for example, these remarks of Wittgenstein's from the Tractatus to Schutz's notion as it was described above (123)

"A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. Accidental features are those that result from the particular way in which the propositional sign is produced. Essential features are those without which the proposition could not express its sense.

So what is essential in a proposition is what all propositions that can express the same sense have in common." (124)

The parallel here is evidently not at all exact, since Schutz's notion of what is essential is tied up with issues concerning 'coherence' criteria, whilst Wittgenstein's is bound to a 'correspondence' idea. Nonetheless in each case the point that is being made is that language is in some sense a 'structure' - a 'calculus' - with essential 'meanings' contained in it, these meanings being passed between conversationalists
over the course of their interactions with one another.

In his later work, as I have shown, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects this model of the nature of language, preferring instead to think of it in terms of its uses within language games. Concepts become like the tools in a tool box rather than receptacles for 'meanings'. They have uses over a wide variety of different language games and it is this that is important about them and not some hypothesised 'essence' which can be abstracted from occasions of the use of language. Language is bound up with the activities of life. It is used in various contexts in family resemblance fashion. Once again, the contrast with Schutz, here, could not be more stark.

As a result of this view of language, something interesting happens in Wittgenstein's later work, to the distinction between subjectivity and the objective world. Whereas in Schutz's work, there is some idea of there being a crucial distinction to be made between subjective perceptions and something that is more 'objective' - i.e. 'objective' meaning contexts stand opposed to 'subjective' meaning contexts - in the Philosophical Investigations, this distinction is very much secondary. In the case of language, the 'object:and designation' model is found to be inadequate if it is generalised into becoming the correct view of language, and instead the notion of 'language games' is developed to stress the way in which language is bound up with activities and purposes within a form of life. By the same token, it becomes clear that the distinction between subject and object - a distinction made by the use of language - should not be considered to be fundamental, as some sort of a priori in any talk about 'knowledge' or 'reality'. Instead, the 'given' is to be seen as a 'form of life'. It is not the case that one should conceive of man as a creature locked into his own subjective world and confronted by an objective reality which he must somehow get to know, any more than it is the case that language stands as a calculus, a structure of meanings, over and against - picturing -
something which is essentially not subjective, and which can never be fully comprehended. Instead, man should be seen as engaged with the world, as doing things which include using language, within a form of life. It is that which is the 'ground' - the 'bedrock' - and not an hypothesised 'real' world. Once again, the contrast with Schutz is obvious enough.

What this implies for the notion of intersubjectivity is that the problem itself is not to be conceived of in terms of the relationship between different 'subjective' meanings, as far as Wittgenstein is concerned, but in terms of a 'form of life'. Where Schutz seems forced to admit that the possibility of mediation between subjectivities lies in 'objective meaning contexts', Wittgenstein suggests instead that the 'intersubjective' world as we know it is grounded in our form of life. It is the fact that we 'do' certain things, and 'follow rules' (in that sense of the word that does not imply interpretation) within an 'intersubjective' (if that word is usable here, given the lack of priority of the notion of 'subjectivity') environment that is crucially important - that is the 'given'. In a sense, where Schutz attempts to posit intersubjectivity as fundamental and fails, Wittgenstein succeeds by reconceptualising what is meant by 'subjectivity' - and thus 'intersubjectivity' - in the first place. His is once again a radical move which stands in contrast to Schutz's position. Wittgenstein, by positing a 'form of life', avoids the problems with the 'life world' concept, which contains so many notions that are incompatible with a thoroughgoing 'intersubjectivity' - such as 'subjectivity', 'intersubjectivity', 'objectivity' etc. - and provides fresh insight into precisely what the notion of 'intersubjectivity' is attempting to say.

The notion of 'meaning' that emerges from Wittgenstein's later work is evidently considerably different from that which is to be found either in his own early work, or in the writings of Schutz. In terms of each of the indicators which I have suggested are crucial to an identification
of particular conceptualizations of 'meaning', Wittgenstein can be seen as providing a radically different perspective from that of both Schutz and many other writers. He is insistent that meaning is not some thing which is to be seen as contained in language, but that rather it is incarnate - that it is crucially bound up with the activities of life, with the things which we do as human beings. Meaning is not something to be handed from subjectivity to subjectivity, each time with an essential 'core' which is given by the concepts used but also with an 'accidental' subjective extra provided by the particular occasion of the words use. Thus language and meaning cannot be treated as though they were some thing or other - as though they were bound up with a calculus which could be analysed independently of its manifestation within a form of life. Things in the world are meaningful because of our form of life and not because something has been added to them - not because 'meaning', as some independent thing contained, perhaps, in language has been bestowed upon them by calling them this or that, or because 'meaning' is somehow an intrinsic part of that 'thing' itself. Thus to understand 'meaning' is to understand a form of life, is to understand that which makes meaningful language games possible - language games that mean something.

What Wittgenstein's notion suggests is that the sociologist who is interested in 'meaning' in the social world must somehow come to grips with a 'form of life'. It is not sufficient for him to formulate his subject matter in terms of 'subjective' and 'objective' meanings, since this poses as fundamental a distinction - between subject and object - which is in fact secondary to the notion of a 'form of life'. The problem, however, is how on earth is one to study a form of life? In Wittgenstein's own work it has an air of ineffability about it that should, strictly speaking, make it unsuitable for use by the sociologist. It is the 'context' for language games, (125) it stands behind man's language and
thought, (126) and is a "non-investigable language in use or set of accepted human activities which enables us to frame our investigations". (127)

This point is made by Hunter with regard to the "organic theory" which I dealt with above:

"This is important because of a possible misunderstanding which might arise from this talk about organic theory: ("this", here, refers to P.I. page 185 P.M.) one might suppose that it was being suggested that it would be appropriate to inquire into the detail of the organic processes, and thereby explain the use of language. But there is a cut-off point here. Language use may be said to be an organic process, but the interesting thing to us about organic processes is that they work, and hence to us they are simple. To describe what goes on in me when I wiggle my toes is not to further explain how I wiggle them, what I do in order to bring it about that they wiggle. That cannot be further explained. I just wiggle them." (128)

Put in slightly different fashion the point is this. A form of life is simply what I do. If I set about investigating what I do, then I will be doing something and it is what I am doing that is, strictly, manifesting my form of life, rather than the results of my investigations. The form of life itself shows itself as the foundation for my justifications, as the bedrock beyond which I cannot go, but it cannot be directly revealed by scientific (or any other) enquiry. Just as rules are just what I do - there is a sense of 'rule' that does not imply 'interpretation' - and are not 'things', so a form of life is not a 'thing'. It simply is that which grounds my life. It is not, as Hunter points out, correct to delve further into its workings to find the 'explanation' of language or of our everyday life. That would be beside the point.

It is worth stressing that this ineffability is not something that one can just disregard without doing grave damage to the whole of Wittgenstein's theory. If one were to argue simply that of course one could investigate a 'form of life', then at once several problems open up. Firstly a form of life then becomes a 'thing', and things have boundaries which can be drawn more or less precisely. Thus problems open up as to how many forms of life there are, what their boundaries are, how one mediates between them and so on. Problems such as these
are wholly alien to Wittgenstein's use of the term, and threaten to turn him into a cultural relativist where he himself would want to say that such relativism was the result of being trapped by a picture. (129) Forms of life are not things. Secondly, if a form of life is investigable, then there ceases to be any ground to Wittgenstein's own theory. He becomes trapped into saying that the form of life is not the furthest point that one can go, for there is one stage further, namely the investigation of a form of life, which will explain what was thought to be the ground. This would make not 'activity' and what is done the ground, but some form of knowledge - scientific knowledge perhaps - whereas in fact such knowledge appears to be itself grounded in a form of life as far as Wittgenstein is concerned.

By itself, then, the concept of a form of life cannot be the name for the proper subject matter of sociology. It is neither designed for that by Wittgenstein himself, nor is it directly adaptable for sociological purposes. The case is similar here to the situation faced by Schutz when he attempted to bring Husserl's transcendental meditations to bear upon the empirical study of society. Sociology is inevitably concerned with the study of society as an empirical concern. It must therefore be the case that its primary interests cannot remain in the realm of the purely philosophical or of the transcendental. Philosophical insights must be adapted, in some way, to be 'scientific' concerns of sociologists.

The concept of the 'life-world', as it is handled by Schutz, is already an empirical concept - i.e. it is taken to bear directly on the social world as the object of sociological enquiry. Its origins too, however, like the concept 'form of life', are not fundamentally sociological. For Husserl, as I have stressed above, the life-world was taken to be different from the world of the 'natural attitude' of everyday life, and to be yet another mode of entry into the transcendental realm for the meditating philosopher, this time via transcendental
intersubjectivity. Schutz's actual handling of the concept, as he transforms it from its transcendental to its mundane sense, is fraught with difficulties, that threaten to make it internally contradictory. Nonetheless for that the concept holds promise in that it suggests that society can be conceived of in terms of a set of taken for granted assumptions - a stock of knowledge at hand - that makes it possible as an intersubjective phenomenon.

Simmel once asked the question 'How is society possible?' in a famous essay of the same name. The traditional problem for sociology is to find ways in which to frame up answers to the question, which in turn involves restating the question in ways that open up clear avenues into the study of society. Thus for Durkheim and Parsons, the problem is the problem of order and the solution in terms of collective representations and central value systems. For Weber, on the other hand, the problem can be seen as that of 'control' and the solution in terms of 'meaning', authority and so on. What I want to suggest here is that the two philosophical concepts of 'form of life' and 'life-world' can be seen as clues that together suggest another, and potentially fruitful approach to this fundamental sociological question of the possibility of meaning and of society.

Wittgenstein, in effect, claims that what has to be accepted - the given - can be seen as the fact that people do things in certain ways. People just do follow 'rules'. Schutz, following on from Husserl, claims that the reason why people can function adequately is that they know certain things. Both the doing and the knowing are, for the actors on the stage of everyday life, unproblematic. They are the given, and must remain the given for any enquiry whether scientific, sociological, literary, artistic or any other into any aspect of the physical or social environment. This much is itself given by the philosophical positions which have been the subject of the above discussion.
There is no reason, however, why using this notion of the 'given' as a clue, the sociologist should not attempt to examine that which is 'taken for granted'. The doings and knowings that are taken for granted are not themselves the 'given', but the notion of that which is 'given' - that which grounds all knowledge, experience, necessity and so on - can be used as a clue to the empirical, social scientific notion of that which is taken for granted. Thus the notion of a form of life becomes an indication for the sociologist of a possible area of enquiry - indicates a possible language game, whose concern is an aspect of the social world. This language game itself will manifest its roots within a form of life and will not be investigating a form of life in Wittgenstein's sense of the term. It will, however, be following through a clue provided by the philosopher's insights. In this sense, Schutz can be seen as a pioneer who attempted to adapt transcendental insights for empirical ends, and whose reworking of the notion of the 'life-world' does itself provide significant indications into an important area of sociological enquiry.

The danger in all this, however, is that the move from the philosophical to the empirical level will result in the sorts of contradiction that bedevilled Schutz. In the next chapter I will suggest that the work of Garfinkel, which is an attempt to investigate taken for granted aspects of the social world, can be seen as pioneering empirical work into just the sorts of areas that are indicated in the work of Wittgenstein. I will argue that examining that work in terms of a framework which owes more to Wittgenstein than to Schutz throws a fresh light upon it, and shows it as a highly productive attempt to suggest directions for sociological research which offer possibilities of genuine insights into social phenomena. I will suggest that although Garfinkel begins his enquiries under the rubric of a Schutzian phenomenological sociology, many of the adaptations which he makes to that position take
him away from these roots and that this enables him to avoid the fundamental ambiguity in Schutz's work which is the result of his adaptation of the transcendental motif for empirical ends. It is the extent of this move beyond the work of Schutz that justifies interpreting Garfinkel's work in relation to a theoretical framework other than a phenomenological one.
CHAPTER 3 - WITTGENSTEIN

Note: All references to the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1961 and 1974) will be referred as "T" or "P.I." plus a paragraph number, unless otherwise stated.

4. Wittgenstein, 1974, (b) p.82.
5. A. Janik & S. Toulmin, 1973, p.117. This concern with language is, for Janik & Toulmin, the direct result of the contradictions present in Viennese culture at the turn of the century. The term "Kakania" was coined by Robert Musil. It is derived at one level from the initials "K.K." which stand for "Imperial and Royal" and refers to the Institutions of the Hapsberg Empire, and on another level to German nursery language which gives it the sense of "Excrementia" or "Shitland" (cf. footnote, Janik & Toulmin, 1973, p.13).
6. Russell's introduction to the Tractatus p.x.
11. Cf. note 7 above.
14. T. 2.027.
15. T. 2.0123. To anticipate slightly, it is interesting that this notion of objects defining all possibilities can be seen to relate to notions of "rule" which consider that rules can somehow specify precisely all of their future applications (cf. quotation from Hart in Heritage 1978 (a)) Wittgenstein's own discussion of
rules in his later work, as will become apparent, argues against this notion.

16. T. 2.04.
17. T. 2.201.
18. T. 3.221.
21. T. 3.3.
22. T. 3.3411. Wittgenstein seems here to be making a distinction between a "real name" and a "name" or "simple sign".
23. T. 3.23.
24. T. 5.
25. Pitcher gives an excellent account of this process in Chapter 3 of Pitcher, 1964.
27. T. 2.221.
28. T. 4.2.
29. T. 4.022.
30. T. 2.18.
31. T. 2.19.
32. T. 4.03.
33. T. 4.0312.
34. T. 6.111.
35. T. 4.463.
37. T. 5.43.
38. T. 5.511.
39. T. 5.552.
41. Cf. note 4 above.
42. Van Peursen (1969, p.110.), for example calls Wittgenstein a
"Logician and a Mystic". He claims that this element never leaves Wittgenstein's work, and that it is still visible in his later writings.

43. T. 6.44 - 6.5.
44. T. 6.52.
46. T. 5.6.
47. T. 4.001.
48. T. 5.62.
49. T. 5.632.
51. T. 5.64.
53. Ibid
54. Cf. above Ch. 2. p.25.
55. T. 6.54.
56. T. 7.
57. Malcolm, 1958, p.86.
59. Chapter 2 of Fann, 1969 gives a good short account of these aspects of Wittgenstein's position.

60. P.I. vii.
61. P.I. 255.
63. P.I. 65.
64. P.I. 66.
68. P.I. 71.
69. Wittgenstein gives examples of some 73 language games in the Blue
and Brown Books (Wittgenstein, 1969 (a)), some of which are repeated in the Philosophical Investigations. They are meant as means of coming to understand the ways in which language works.

70. Wittgenstein, 1969 (a) p.77.
71. (2) signifies a language game similar to that given above.
73. P.I. 11.
75. P.I. 96.
78. P.I. 119.
79. Hunter, 1971 (a) demonstrates this clearly.
80. e.g. Winch, 1969, p.8 writes "The central role which the notion of a language game, or form of life, plays in Wittgenstein's later writings enables him to overcome this difficulty", thus equating language games with forms of life.
83. Cf. note 77 above.
84. Petrie, 1971, p.150.
85. Wittgenstein's notion of necessity is not to the point here, but two excellent discussions of this are to be found in Pears, 1974, Ch. 7., and Stroud, 1970.
87. P.I. 226.
90. Pitkin, 1972, p.45.
93. P.I. 97.
95. P.I. 108.
96. P.I. 97.
98. P.I. 125.
100. P.I. 201.
102. P.I. 208 gives an excellent account of the teaching process.
103. P.I. 151.
105. P.I. 218.
106. Louch, 1972, stresses this aspect of rules. He suggests they should be seen as entitling action rather than as entailing it (p.104 ff.).
109. Cf. note 101 above.
110. P.I. 593.
111. Pitkin,. 1972, p.69.
113. Ibid, p.42.
114. P.I. 424.
115. P.I. 432.
116. Hunter, 1971 (b) points out clearly the ways in which meaning and use should be seen as closely connected but not as identical.
118. P.I. 293.
120. P.I. 593.
121. P.I. 304.
122. P.I. 305.
123. Cf. above, Chapter 2, p.45.
129. Wittgenstein himself argues against a conventionalist position (P.I. 241), and Stroud, 1970 makes out a strong case for not seeing Wittgenstein as a conventionalist. See also, on this, Phillips, 1977, Chapter 4 who stresses that Wittgenstein is not a relativist or conventionalist.
130. Simmel, 1959.
131. Dawe, 1970, suggests these two sociological problems of order and control.
In this chapter, I will suggest a reading of Garfinkel's work, against the background of the last two chapters, which documents the extent to which that work has moved away from the phenomenological sociology of Schutz and towards a position that has strong affinities with the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein. It would of course be absurd to deny that Garfinkel's roots are indeed in phenomenology, and that he was considerably influenced by the work of Husserl, Schutz and Gurwitsch - he in fact states as much explicitly on several occasions. (1) It is, however, one thing to be influenced by a school of ideas, and another to do nothing but reproduce or elaborate its established doctrines. The burden of this chapter will be to argue that it is more fruitful for an understanding of Garfinkel's work to concentrate upon the ways in which he has modified the Schutzian position rather than to emphasise the similarities and risk the danger of missing important innovatory ideas by conflating fundamentally different concepts. (2)

Before beginning to trace through some of the connections between Garfinkel's writing and its roots in the work of Parsons, Schutz, Gurwitsch and Kaufmann, it is worth saying something in very general terms about Garfinkel's ideas of what ethnomethodology actually is. These comments are to be considered as introductory signposts to the remainder of the chapter rather than as definitions of 'ethnomethodology'. The precise import of them will, hopefully, become apparent over the course of the discussion.

Garfinkel writes in the introduction to "Studies in Ethnomethodology" (hereafter "Studies") that ethnomethodological study "is directed to the tasks of learning how members' actual,
ordinary activities consist of methods to make practical actions, practical circumstances, common sense knowledge of social structures, and practical sociological reasoning analyzeable; and of discovering the formal properties of commonplace, practical common sense actions, "from within" actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those settings. The formal properties obtain their guarantees from no other source, and in no other way." (3)

It is worth stressing just three things about these remarks of Garfinkel's. Firstly, there is a concern with 'members' methods'. It is what members of a society do that is important to Garfinkel - their practices and procedures. Secondly, this concern with what members do, is focused upon the 'formal properties' of members' practices. It is not a concern with everyday activities which concentrates upon the specific 'meaningful' things that people do as such - for example "talking about the weather" or "discussing golf" - but about the formal properties of such activities. Thirdly, it should be noted that such properties should be studied ""from within" actual settings". As will become apparent later, Garfinkel is crucially concerned with the ways in which settings are 'organized' by the practices and procedures which members of a society use in a routine way. Settings are locally organized, and contain their own logic, as it were, being self maintaining, self organizing, and thus orderly and able to be talked about (accounted) in an orderly fashion. The aim of ethnomethodological studies, as Garfinkel sees them, is to unravel this 'logic' of settings which makes them orderly - i.e. the formal properties of actions.

Secondly, it is worth stressing that Garfinkel is adamant that ethnomethodology is not something peculiar

"our work is not a mysterious enterprise and we are not peddling remedies. You may not believe it now, but it is not a cult. It is not an enterprise directed to the solution of whatever it is that we think ails sociology. Last of all, is it any such pretentious thing? It is not declaring war and, even while it disturbs you, it is not even a position although that is probably the most head-scratching thing of them all." (4)

It seems, rather, to be an attempt to chase through certain insights that emerge from Garfinkel's reading of Phenomenology and sociology, and
to see just how far he can go with them, what the implications of them are for sociology and the study of society in general, and what light they throw on intransigent social phenomena. It is very much 'work in progress' (5) rather than a fully subscribed to 'school' of sociology, or a carefully worked out body of sociological theory after the fashion of that of Weber or Durkheim. It may well be the case that these insights have a profound significance for sociology more generally conceived, but it is a mistake to see ethnomethodology as first and foremost a critique of 'conventional' or 'constructivist' sociology. For this reason I have chosen, in this chapter, not to discuss 'conventional' or 'positivist' sociology as something over and against the work of Garfinkel - although there are undoubtedly fundamental differences - preferring instead to unravel the ways in which Garfinkel's thought emerges from the work of Parsons and Schutz.

That said, however, it is important not to underestimate either the distance between Garfinkel's work and that of many other sociologists, (6) or the extreme puzzlement that is felt by some sociologists in the face of what seems an entirely alien enterprise. Gold sums up some of this puzzlement when he says, addressing Garfinkel,

"I have a terrible sense of hopelessness when I think of the problems that most sociologists are concerned with and how far removed those problems are from what you are doing. I do not really see the link. When I say far removed, I am not precisely sure in what dimension I am thinking except that I know that what you are doing is a hell of a long way from what I am doing and the kind of question I am concerned with. I would like to know how in the hell an ethnomethodologist addresses himself to problem like those I have. Am I supposed to stop and wait? Is it that ethnomethodologists simply would not raise these problems? Is it that you would not ask these kinds of questions." (7)

Garfinkel simply does not address many of the traditional sociological problems, such as 'deviance', or the structure of organizations, and still less is he attempting to give a 'causal' explanation of social phenomena. His concerns are with what he sees as the fundamental problems of sociological theorizing - with the problem of social order primarily -
which must be tackled prior to investigations such as those of conventional sociologists into social phenomena. As a result, there arises what looks, at times, like an unbridgeable gulf between his concerns and those of other sociologists. Whether or not it is unbridgeable, only time and debate can tell.

With these points in mind, I want to move on to discuss Garfinkel's work in relation to that of Parsons, Schutz, Kaufmann, and Gurwitsch. My warrant for doing this lies in Garfinkel's saying of the 'Studies in Ethnomethodology' that

"The articles originated from my studies of the writings of Talcott Parsons, Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch, and Edmund Husserl. For twenty years their writings have provided me with inexhaustible directives into the world of everyday activities." (8)

Kaufmann is included mainly because he is footnoted so often throughout Garfinkel's work, and because in many of the places where he is mentioned his work is evidently being considered of some significance. That he is indeed significant to Garfinkel should become apparent during the course of the following discussion. I will attempt to show some of the ways in which Garfinkel adapts and synthesises from a range of different perspectives, both specifically sociological and primarily philosophical, and brings the considerations that emerge to bear upon the sociological problem or order. I will not, in the early sections, concentrate upon many of what could be considered the central concepts of Garfinkel's position - such as 'accounting practices', 'indexicality', and so on. Instead, I will sketch in the historical context of his position with reference to other thinkers, in order to provide some perspective upon Garfinkel's work, and to present the background for later discussions of these other, important aspects of Garfinkel's thought.

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

Garfinkel, like Parsons, (and indeed as his student) is concerned fundamentally with the problem of order. This concern emerges most
clearly in Garfinkel's discussions of the work of Hobbes, and of Parson's discussion of that work, so I will begin this section with an account of Parson's criticisms of Hobbes, and of his solution to the problems which he unravels.

Parson's concern in "The Structure of Social Action" is to illustrate "the process of emergence of a particular theoretical system, that of the "voluntaristic theory of action"." (9) This he does by isolating what he considers to be the essential components of 'action', and then tracing the ways in which these are treated in the classical sociological tradition by Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber. His investigation attempts to show that there is a gradual development of the theme of action, and that an important convergence is observable in the work of these men, particularly in the work of Weber and Durkheim, which can provide a powerful sociological perspective upon society and social action. This perspective is the "voluntaristic theory of action". The whole substance of this impressive work is not to the point for present purposes. What is important is Parson's introduction of the problems that he is dealing with, by way of the work of Hobbes as a representative of utilitarianism, and it is this that I want to go on to discuss now, via the central conceptual component of Parson's thesis, "Action".

The basic unit of the conceptual scheme which Parsons is concerned with - i.e. the "theory of action" - is the "unit act". This involves, logically, four different elements, namely

"(1) It implies an agent, an "actor". (2) For purposes of definition the act must have an "end", a future state of affairs toward which the process of action is oriented. (3) It must be initiated in a "situation" of which the trends of development differ in one or more important respects from the state of affairs to which the action is oriented, the end .... (4) there is ... a certain mode of relationship between these elements. That is .... there is a "normative orientation" of action." (10)

These different elements can be combined in a variety of ways and with different emphases. Parsons starting point is with the particular
combination that characterizes utilitarian thought.

The two crucial characteristics of the utilitarian system of thought, according to Parsons, are "atomism" and "rationality". The former of these, points to the utilitarian tendency to treat "unit acts" as isolated entities "and to infer the properties of systems of action only by a process of "direct" generalization from these." (11) The latter concerns "the character of the normative element of the means-end relationship in the unit act." (12) Parsons argument here is that the tendency towards "individualism" in theorizing about man and society which emerges with the renaissance and develops over the course of the reformation and the industrial revolution, places a stress on rational action in the choice of means towards chosen ends, and that this is at the expense of any investigation of alternative relationships between means and ends - such as, for example, the role of ritual actions. (13) The implications of these two characteristics of utilitarian thought lead to two further points. The first is that, since science is the most highly developed "rational achievement", investigation of action will be modelled after the fashion of natural science - Parsons calls this "naive empiricism". The second implication is that, because unit acts are treated empirically as isolated units, there will not be, on a utilitarian model, any investigation of the relationship between ends - i.e. an investigation of the possibility that there might be some systematic relationship between the ends of different unit acts.

The relevance of this to the study of society becomes apparent as Parsons moves on to discuss Hobbes. For Hobbes, man is essentially a selfish individual who is driven by his "passions" to seek what is best for himself. To achieve this end he must gain power over others so that his will is satisfied - as Peters puts it

"Hobbes presented a vivid picture of life as a race in which 'we must suppose to have no other goal, nor other garland, but being foremost'." (14)
The natural state of man is thus the situation in which there is a war of all against all, and in which life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." (15) For Parsons, this picture that Hobbes paints is almost a pure case of utilitarianism.

"The basis of human action lies in the "passions". These are discrete, randomly variant ends of action, "There is no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves". In the pursuit of these ends men act rationally, choosing, within the limitations of the situation, the most efficient means, but this rationality is strictly limited, reason is the "servant of the passions", it is concerned only with questions of ways and means." (16)

What Hobbes' work illustrates for Parsons, is a problem; namely the problem of order. Given this particular, utilitarian, account of the nature of 'action', how can it be that there is order in society? Hobbes' own solution to this problem is not satisfactory, and involves him in saying that

"the dispositions of men are naturally such, that except they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man will distrust and dread each other." (17)

It thus becomes "rational" for men to form a type of social contract which gives sovereignty to some absolute power for the good of all. There is a need for an all powerful state - the "Leviathan" - to which men rationally give allegiance. But, as Parsons puts it, such a conception stretches the notion of 'rationality' "beyond its scope in the rest of the theory" (18) and as Locke points out, power corrupts, so must one suppose that

"men (are) so foolish that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by polecats or foxes, but are content, nay think it safety, to be devoured by lions?" (19)

Parsons' solution to the problem involves him in abandoning the utilitarian notion of action altogether so that he can reorganize the basic elements of action in a different, and, he claims, more satisfactory manner. This solution, which is abstracted from the work of the authors he discusses over the course of the book, involves the suggestion that 'ends' are systematically related to one another within society, and
that the relationship between means and ends (i.e. the 'normative' component of action) should be seen not in terms of 'rationality', but in terms of common 'values' and 'norms'. This provides a solution to the problem of order in that it enables the theorist to posit that because actors act in terms of a set of common values and norms, they will therefore be oriented towards common goals, and at the same time will use socially legitimated means for the attainment of those goals, thus obviating the need for 'Leviathan' as a strong central source of power as the guarantor of orderly conduct. What is involved in Parsons' notion here needs a brief explication, since it is important for an understanding of the position against which Garfinkel is arguing.

What Parsons has done is to reject the notion that 'rational' action within a utilitarian framework of 'atomic' acts can satisfactorily account for social order. Instead, he has suggested that if one conceives of ends as being in some sense given by social values, and thus as systematically related to one another - i.e. there is a systematic relationship between the individual ends which individual actors pursue because such ends are given by social values - and if one realises that there are social norms and values which provide socially acceptable means for attaining those ends, then social order becomes explicable in terms of these norms and values. The system of norms and values within a society are, Parsons suggests, 'legitimate', in the sense that they are regarded as 'sacred' by the members of a society. It is this 'sacredness' which ensures compliance with the norms, rather than the threat of some coercive state. The system of norms and values is effective upon individual actors because, over the course of socialization, they are 'internalized' by each actor and thus become, in a sense, a part of his own makeup. Thus what are essentially social norms and values become socialized into individual actors, and social order is guaranteed, ultimately, by the fact that these internalized norms are regarded as
sacred by actors. Parsons sums this up as follows:

"it has been seen that the solution of the power question, as well as of a plurality of other complex features of social action systems, involves a common reference to the fact of integration of individuals with reference to a common value system, manifested in the legitimacy of institutional norms, in the common ultimate ends of action, in ritual and in various modes of expression. All these phenomena may be referred back to a single general emergent property of social action systems which may be called "common-value integration"." (20)

Thus Parsons formulates the "voluntaristic theory of action".

This brief discussion of Parsons, Hobbes, and the problem of order provides the basic material for understanding the point of departure for Garfinkel's own reflections on the problems in this area. These concerns are, fundamentally, with on the one hand rationality and the problem of order, and on the other hand, norms and the problem of order. They become explicit in two works of Garfinkel's. The first is his doctoral dissertation, the second is an unpublished manuscript which is entitled "Parsons Primer". I will follow the strategy here of using these two manuscripts to draw out and illustrate the core of Garfinkel's own solution to the problem. This I will do in two stages. Firstly, I will look at the way in which Garfinkel analyses the work of Hobbes in order to demonstrate the type of solution which Garfinkel is aiming at, and to suggest the level at which he considers the solution can be found. I will then go on to look, in the second stage, at the problems which Garfinkel finds with Parsons' solution, showing how he uses Kaufmann's work as a resource for his critique and how he turns to phenomenological writings as a source of ideas for his own solution to the problems. In this way, the second stage of this discussion will return to the same place that was reached by the first - i.e. to the type and level of Garfinkel's solution - but from a different angle which, hopefully, will clarify Garfinkel's concern with social order in a perspicuous fashion. I will then move on to illustrate some of the ways in which Garfinkel's
published work attempts to investigate empirically the theoretical solution to the problem which his reading of Kaufmann, Phenomenology and Parsons has led him to.

1. RATIONALITY AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

Garfinkel's discussion of Hobbes sets out to show both that Hobbes himself gives an inadequate account of social action and that Parsons' assessment of Hobbes account is itself wide of the mark. Parsons, Garfinkel suggests, considered that Hobbes had worked out what man, acting rationally in a utilitarian world, would actually look like. It is on this basis that Parsons is able to suggest that Hobbes' account is inadequate - it does not take account of 'ritual action' or of other alternative aspects of the 'normative' component of action, but concentrates only on 'rational' action, and it ignores systematic interrelationships between ends. Garfinkel, on the other hand, insists that what Hobbes theory actually provides for is nothing at all - it paints an impossible world which is inadequate even for the narrow illustrative purposes that Parsons gives it. The reasons for this are that Hobbes fails to fill in the relevant experiential materials that an adequate theory of rationality would require, and is misled into supposing that 'scientific' rationality can justifiably be posited of actors living their everyday lives in the social world. There is, Garfinkel claims, a world of difference between the rationality of science, and the rationality of the 'natural attitude', so that in examining the social world

"if the norm of scientific rationality is employed, the resulting social system is not chaos but inactivity - i.e. a system of uncommunicating monads." (21)

One cannot, Garfinkel points out, even have a war of all against all if the fundamental elements of action are taken to be 'rationality' and the 'passions', because actors would have no framework in terms of which to war against one another rationally. There would be nothing for them to turn their rational attention towards such that they 'rationally' knew
that what they must do to gain whatever end they desired was to gain power over others in order to ensure that one's own passions were given precedence. If, for example, men were to act rationally in terms of different perceived worlds, then they would only incidentally conflict, or communicate with one another - if indeed such contact as would come about on such a model could be termed 'conflict' or 'communication'.

What Garfinkel is getting at in these comments is that there must be some 'agreement' about what is the case - some 'normative order' - before it makes sense to talk about rational action in the first place. Men must first of all agree about the framework in terms of which they act rationally before they can war with one another in the rational pursuit of various ends. As Garfinkel puts it

"the possibility that action will exhibit the features of rationality depends on the condition of this normative order. Conversely, to take away the normative order takes away the possibility of rational features of action leaving a condition in which the actors are driven by the "unloosed" passions. The system of action in its ultimate state would not be a war of each against all but a state of confusion in which each actor strove to satisfy the passions by casting about here and there until by chance the attachment was made." (22)

Garfinkel is insistent that the problems that are involved here cannot be settled straightforwardly by reference to some 'real' world that is known in common. To do this is to ignore the well known problems of illusion, perspective, error and so on. And again, it is not adequate to overcome problems of 'illusion' etc. in terms of 'scientific' knowledge, since such knowledge is itself the result of 'rational' activity, and the problem is precisely that to act rationally, and hence to have rational knowledge, demands that some normative order exist.

The obvious implication of all this is that any attempt to ground social order on rational action, as Hobbes does with his notion of the rational acceptance of some absolute power, is bound to be inadequate, since it ignores a more fundamental question, namely how does the world
come to be known in common in the first place? The problem of order
in the world is prior to the problem of 'rational' action if the notion
of 'rational' that is involved here is 'scientific' rationality, since
the rational assessment of means and ends depends upon a prior normative
order. If the notion of 'rationality' is not that of 'scientific'
rationality, (contrary to the usage of Hobbes and Parsons) but something
else, then it cannot be presupposed in an account of social order but
must be investigated to see just what it involves. Either way, the
central task in any attempt to account for social order must be to
investigate the ways in which 'agreement' about a world held in common
is actually possible - how such agreement comes about.

What Garfinkel has done in this discussion of Hobbes, then, is to
emphasise the fact that 'rational action', 'communication', wars of all
against all, and so on, presuppose a normative order - they presuppose
some agreement about what is the case - and thus that to understand
social order it is necessary to investigate the mechanisms of agreement,
the mechanisms of that normative order. Such an investigation is
directed at the cognitive dimension of social action in the sense that
'cognition' is precisely concerned with the ways in which the world comes
to be known in the way that it is - i.e. as a world known in common
that exhibits for us a particular order. It must be stressed, however,
that this concern with cognition is not a concern with psychological
elements within subjectivity, or a concern with philosophical problems
concerning 'knowledge' if such problems are conceived of in terms of
some relationship between a knowing subject and an objective world. It
is, rather, a concern which is focused squarely upon the social mechanisms
that provide for 'agreement', and which underlie the normative order.
It is a concern, in other words, that is bound up with the problems of
social order which have been introduced above. It is important,
therefore, to remember that when the concept 'cognition' is used in
the following discussion it is to be understood in relation to questions concerning the mechanisms which enable social order. To give it any 'subjective' reference is to entirely miss the point. (23)

This, then, is the type of solution that Garfinkel is looking for to the Hobbesian problem, and the level at which his investigations are aimed. It is the level of that agreement which is presupposed by rational action and which enables communication. That this level is a level of presuppositions indicates something of Garfinkel's debt to Husserl. It should not, however, be supposed that he is looking for 'essences' in the Husserlian sense. His enterprise is not concerned with the presuppositions of 'knowledge' - a philosophical problem - but with the presuppositions of social order - a sociological problem. Consequently, although his programme is formulated in terms that might look as though they can be equated straightforwardly with Husserlian phenomenology, closer examination shows radical differences, and these will become more and more apparent as the discussion progresses. Garfinkel's interest lies in practices and procedures, not in essences, with the result that, as I shall show, the notion of 'presupposition' he develops has more in common with Wittgenstein's 'form of life' than with Husserl's transcendental structure of essences.

I want now to move on to the second stage of this discussion, and to look at the ways in which Garfinkel analyses Parsons' work. Over the course of this discussion more substance will be given to the account of Garfinkel's fundamental concerns.

2. PARSONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

An initial task for Garfinkel was to find an account of the nature of "theory" and of "truth" and "adequacy" that would provide him with the necessary resources both for his reading of the work of Parsons, and for the development of his own approach towards the social world. Here Kaufmann's book "Methodology of the Social Sciences" provides a key
to Garfinkel's position, so I will give a brief account of it before moving on to show its significance for Garfinkel's treatment of Parsons' work.

Spiegelberg writes of Kaufmann that he was

"The only member of the Vienna Circle who also had a live interest in Husserl's phenomenology." (24)

Kaufmann states his own motivating problem by saying that he found that he could not accept Dewey's theory of meaning and that

"This led to a reconsideration of the problem how the logical analysis of scientific procedure (methodology) is related to deductive logic. I came to the conclusion that methodology must be clearly distinguished from deductive logic and recognized as an autonomous discipline." (25)

It is a stress on 'scientific procedure' - on methodology - that characterises Kaufmann's work, and it is this that Garfinkel makes the most use of. The way in which Kaufmann unravels the importance of methodology in relation to questions of the nature of scientific theory and of truth is the central consideration here.

Kaufmann's starting point is to state quite categorically that any attempt to base an account of empirical science on some notion of ultimate grounds, conceived of in terms of self-evident truth, will inevitably be inadequate. (26) He, therefore, is looking for an account of the matter that grounds 'truth' elsewhere than in the absolute. He finds it in terms of 'rules of procedure'. (27) He writes that

"a specific science, say physics, should be defined in terms of rules of procedure rather than as a system of propositions representing our knowledge at a given time." (28)

It is thus necessary, he says, to distinguish between

"the structure of a science as defined in terms of rules of procedure and the corpus of a science at a given time." (29)

It must not be forgotten, however that

"since the corpus of a science is selected in accordance with these rules, it cannot be taken to determine a science without reference to them." (30)
Thus what Kaufmann is recommending is that any body of knowledge be viewed \textit{not} in terms of either its correspondence with some hypothesised 'real world' that stands over and against the theory as the criterion of its 'correctness', or in terms of its internal consistency, but rather in terms of the rules of procedure that have led to the 'corpus' of knowledge being what it is. In this way it becomes unnecessary to posit some absolute truth - some absolute standard - against which any body of knowledge must be measured, and instead becomes possible to realise that

"concepts such as "correct", "grounded", "control", "confirmation", are relational concepts presupposing a system of procedural rules ..." (31)

The question arises as to what these rules are - what their nature is. Kaufmann considers two kinds which he calls 'basic rules' and 'preference rules' respectively. The first of these - basic rules - are the rules which define correct empirical procedure. It is in terms of these rules that truth and falsity, correctness and error, objectivity and subjectivity are to be understood. Thus

"every complete question regarding the correctness of a scientific decision \(d\) has the following form: \textit{is \(d\) correct in terms of a system of rules \(R_1 R_2 \ldots R_n\) in a given scientific situation?} If so, a proposition \(P\) verified by \(d\) may be called 'objectively valid'." (32)

The second set of rules, - preference rules - concern the path toward the solution of some scientific problem. They specify which procedures are relevant to the solution of some problem or other, and which are not. For example

"Today, a scientist would be criticized as having chosen an inappropriate approach toward solving the problem of explaining the origin of infantile paralysis if he collected statistical data concerning the relation between variations of temperature and the incidence of this disease because he wanted material in support of the hypothesis that infantile paralysis is caused by fluctuations in temperature." (33)

It is not that such a scientist has violated basic procedural rules, since he is collecting data in the correct fashion, but rather that the data
he is collecting is considered not relevant in the light of certain preference rules. "The criteria of presumably relevance are preference rules of scientific procedure". (34) Basic and preference rules together, then, provide the grounds of the scientific perspective and its procedures. Before moving on to discuss Garfinkel's analysis of Parsons' work, it is worth making a few more detailed points concerning Kaufmann's discussion of 'truth', since, as will become apparent, Garfinkel refers to this specifically.

Kaufmann considers two theories concerning criteria for 'truth'. The first, the 'correspondence theory of truth' simply cannot, he claims, be adequate. He states his case thus:

"If a correspondence theory proposes as a criterion of the truth of a synthetic proposition its agreement with things as they are in themselves, then it offers a criterion devoid of procedural significance. If, however, agreement between synthetic propositions and percepts is taken to be the criterion, then it is not clear how truth can be regarded as objective." (35)

The second theory, however, the 'coherence theory of truth', fares somewhat better. The coherence theory states, briefly, that the criterion for the truth of a proposition lies not in its supposed correspondence with some hypothesised external reality, but in its relationship to other already accepted propositions. It is its fit within the general structure of 'true' propositions which determines a propositions acceptance as 'true'. (36) Kaufmann, however, gives this notion a twist of his own. This body of knowledge - the structure of true propositions - must be seen not as somehow self contained, with no relationship to anything beyond themselves, but should instead be seen as a 'corpus' which has been constructed according to rules of procedure. Thus

"Explication of the meanings of 'coherence' or warranted assertability leads to the formulation of the rules of empirical procedure discussed in previous chapters. This has been almost generally disregarded because of the still prevailing erroneous view that truth and falsity are somehow 'contained in' the propositional meanings." (37)

Truth itself must be seen in terms of rules of procedure, and of
methodological considerations rather than as something over and against the things that scientists - or anyone else for that matter - actually do. A body of knowledge should be seen as a 'corpus'.

Garfinkel turns to Parsons' work, I want to suggest, with notions of the nature of 'theory' and of 'truth' which owe much to Kaufmann. He does not see 'theory' as, for example, Schutz does in terms of an 'objective meaning context', but rather as a 'corpus' of knowledge which must be understood in terms of rules of procedure. Thus, in criticizing Parsons' general theoretical position, and in particular his solution to the problem of order, Garfinkel's concern is focused on the 'rules' for doing sociology which Parsons' can be seen as recommending to the sociologist and the implications of those rules for such questions as the nature of sociological description, rather than upon the specific 'findings' of his work. With this in mind, then, I want to turn now to Garfinkel's discussion of Parsons.

Garfinkel writes that "the concept of the problem of social order is equivalent in all respects to the procedural concept, structural analysis". (38) Given a conceptualization of social science in terms of rules and procedures it thus becomes the case that

"Procedurally speaking, therefore, any theorist by putting forward his theory presents the inquirer a conception of "correct structural analysis". It is the investigator's task in electing one solution as compared with the next to learn what its actual rules of procedure consist of and what its consequences consist of for the depiction of a possible society and the ways in which actors by their actions assemble that society." (39)

There are two important parts to this statement of intent which heralds Garfinkel's discussion of Parsons. The first is that "any theorist ... presents the inquirer a conception of "correct structural analysis" which must be investigated by someone interested in the theory proposed. This much can be seen as derived directly from Kaufmann's work. The second part is a peculiarly sociological one in that it specifies that the implications of the theorist's rules must be
investigated as they have bearing upon "the depiction of a possible society and the ways in which actors by their actions assemble that society". Now what Garfinkel is suggesting here is that, just as the scientific theorist should be seen as following rules in order to construct a 'corpus' of knowledge, so the 'actor' should be seen as following rules in "assembling" society. This point is crucially important, and I will expand upon it briefly.

Garfinkel mentions many times that he has been profoundly influenced by two essays in particular of Schutz, namely an essay "On Multiple Realities", (40) and another on "Rationality". (41) Taken together, these two papers suggest that the "reality" of scientific theorizing is not something special, in the sense that it might be conceived of as giving extraordinary access to "truth", but that rather it is a particular modification of the attitude of everyday life - the 'natural attitude' - which is characterized by rigorous standards of 'scientific' rationality. I have already mentioned above in the discussion of Garfinkel's critique of Hobbes that Garfinkel considers that, in investigating social life and the action of members of a society, one cannot presuppose that they act in terms of 'scientific' rationality, but must investigate that 'agreement' which makes rationality possible in the first place. Now given that scientific theorizing is a particular modification of the natural attitude - a particular "reality", or "finite province of meaning" as Schutz calls it - and that it is a particular set of basic and preference rules which enable that reality to be what it is (this follows from Kaufmann), then it is a short step to suggesting that all realities, including the reality of the natural attitude, are in some way bound up with characteristic sets of basic and preference rules. Therefore, in order to investigate the world of everyday life - the everyday social world - which is characterized by the natural attitude, and in order to unravel the nature of the 'agreement' which underlies rational action, communication etc., it becomes necessary to investigate the rules and procedures on the basis of which members of society assemble the 'corpus' of their everyday knowledge about society. In other words, not only does the theorist work in terms of rules and
procedures, but also the actors in the social world do.

Thus what Garfinkel must do is to investigate not only the rules and procedures which Parsons is recommending to the sociologist, but he must also examine the implications of them for the notion of actors' rules and procedures, and thus for the "depiction of a possible society" which results. Garfinkel's discussion of Parsons can thus be seen as a two pronged approach which comes at both the level of theoretical procedures and the level of the actor's rules and procedures. I will deal with each of these aspects in turn.

At the level of the theorist's procedures, Garfinkel has the following to say:

"Parsons' entire theory of action as well as the particular parts of it - as the social system is a part of it - consists of a set of procedures for idealizing, abstracting, selecting, relating those features of a social world that is to begin with known in any manner and that has any status of warranted knowledge about the society that sociologists might be expected to subscribe to as matters of fact and of producing a description of the society as a product of the transformation performed upon this knowledge." (42)

Put another way, Parsons' theory of action is seen as a series of rules for sense transformation which allow the sociologist to transform descriptions of society (as opposed to, for example, raw sense impressions) supplied from either sociological or non-sociological sources, into 'correct' sociological descriptions of society. These rules both allow the theory - as the transformed description - to be subjected to empirical test, and involve the rule user/theorist in a set of rigorous procedures which must be carried out if his account is to be considered adequate.

It is important to realise that a crucial aspect of these rules for sense transformation that Parsons proposes is that they are formulated in terms of scientific rationality. Garfinkel has already argued against Hobbes that it is not adequate to posit rationality of actors in the social world, and he now goes on, with his discussion of Parsons' work,
to extend this critique of the use of scientific rationality in social science to include its use as a theorist's device. If it is not possible to say that actors act 'rationally' in the strong sense, then for the theorist to produce descriptions of their actions in terms of 'rationality', as a standard, will inevitably result in a distortion of the actor's actual actions. Thus, because of this imposition of scientific rationality upon social action - because of the attempt to see all action as translatable into the terms of 'rational' action by the social theorist - the sociological 'descriptions' which Parsons' theory would be able to produce could not describe action as it is actually carried on in the social world. Instead, by bringing a standard from outside of the settings of everyday life - the standard of scientific rationality - it inevitably distorts actually observable social action.

Be that as it may, Parsons' solution to the problem of order is to be read, according to Garfinkel, as a series of rules for sense transformation; the whole purpose of which is to enable the sociologist to produce 'correct' sociological descriptions of society, and these descriptions are in terms of social structures. This last - that the descriptions will be in terms of social structures - follows from the fact that the problem of social order is concerned entirely with structural analysis.

What is the nature of these social structures on Parsons' account? Garfinkel answers

"a) The social structures consist of institutionalized patterns of normative culture; b) the stable features of the social structures as assemblies of concerted actions are guaranteed by motivated compliance with a legitimate order." (43)

The social structures are the result of sense transforming operations by the sociologist, they are the sociologists' description of the social world, and they consist of institutionalized patterns of normative culture, the stable features of which are guaranteed by "motivated
compliance with a legitimate order". Put in slightly different fashion, this means that the sociologist's description of the social world maintains that social order is guaranteed by the fact that social norms are regarded, by the social actor, as 'sacred'. This 'sacredness' of norms and the relationship of this to social order on Parsons' account, has been discussed above in relation to Hobbes.

At this point, then, the question of the rules and procedures which the actor is conceived to follow emerges as central. Using game theory as an illustration, Garfinkel suggests that Parsons' actor can be seen as confronted, within the social system, by a set of basic and preferred rules of play. It is the rule following behaviour of the actor that results in the patterns of normative culture that are social structures. By performing sense transforming operations, the sociologist produces a description of social actors following 'sacred' rules in such a way that patterns of normative culture result. At this point, difficulties begin to become apparent with Parsons' account as Garfinkel has described it, and they concern the relationship between the sociologists' description, and the social world that it is intended to describe.

Garfinkel argues that on Parsons' account, in order to describe something that happened in the social world the theorist would have to assume that the actors acted the way they did, and made the choices that they did because the choices made available to them by the theorist were available. The theorist is limited to saying that the player played as he did because the basic and preferred rules provided the players with a set of legally possible moves. (44) It is mutual orientation to these rules that accounts for actual play. Now the problem is this: there are many contingencies that are not covered by the rules of the game, not the least of these being the commitment of the players to play by the rules. Other contingencies might include how hard one plays, the degree of concentration used, an agreement not to distract ones opponent and so on. However full these rules are made, they will never be able
to cover all contingencies - for example, how often may one scratch ones head during a game of chess?

What these considerations suggest is that what is supposed to be a description of order in the social world, begins to look more like a normative account. Rather than describing what it is that actors do in producing social order, i.e. how social order is possible - it suggests what they ought to do if social order is to persist. The sociologist's account thus produces a set of prescriptions instead of descriptions.

Parsons' solution to this problem as we have seen, is to posit "motivated compliance to a legitimate order". In other words, the actors do follow the rules because they are in some way sacredly regarded. This, however, is nothing but a formal solution to the problem. It does nothing to ensure that the sociologist, in transforming his data to produce sociological descriptions, will not in fact be producing only 'normative' descriptions. It fails to account, for example, for the actor who in some way "sees through" the system and refuses to accept its legitimacy, or who manipulates the 'legitimate norms' in Goffmanesque fashion in pursuit of various ends. The result is that the sociological descriptions stand in a problematic relation to what it is that is being described. Because what is produced is a 'normative' account, then the question of the choice between competing theories or descriptions of the social world cannot be answered on the basis of empirical data, but must be premised on some other grounds, and these grounds are never specified. In short, the claim which Garfinkel suggests Parsons is making to provide rules and procedures for transforming sociological data to produce sociological descriptions of the social world cannot be maintained because the ways in which the actor is conceived to act, in terms of 'sacred' rules, can only result in 'normative' accounts which stand in a problematic relation to the social world being described.

It is this situation that provides Garfinkel's problem. What he
wants to do is to find some way of describing the social world, and of accounting for social order, which does not, on the one hand import standards of rationality from outside of the settings of social life, and on the other hand does not provide the possibility of only 'normative' accounts, since both of these aspects of Parsons' account result in distortions of social life which remove the 'descriptions' from that which they are intended to describe. The solution which Garfinkel is aiming for is at the level of 'agreement' which precedes rational action - it is that 'cognitive' level which has already been mentioned above. By concentrating upon this particular level of social reality, it becomes possible to see 'norms' as not the explanation of social order, in the way that Parsons suggests, but as manifestations of it which themselves depend upon a more fundamental set of 'rules and procedures' which enable all social order. Norms become recognizable regularities of social life rather than the necessary presupposition of it. The question becomes: how is one to gain some purchase, both theoretically and empirically, on this particular aspect of social reality? The answer lies with the work of Schutz and Gurwitsch.

SCHUTZ AND GURWITSCH: TOWARDS A SOLUTION

Garfinkel writes that the

"Researches of analytical philosophy, most particularly those of Alfred Schutz, have furnished researchers a clarification of the meanings and uses of the critical conceptions of sociological theorizing that are relevant to Parsons' argument." (45)

Garfinkel does not, however, take over the whole of Schutz's position lock, stock and barrel, but rather he is interested in it because he sees potential there for some sort of solution to his own problems. His reading of Schutz, like his reading of Parsons, owes much to Kaufmann's work, and the picture of Schutz that emerges from Garfinkel's writing seems at times to rest more upon what Garfinkel needed Schutz to say rather than on what actually is to be found in
his work. Schutz, in other words, seems to have provided Garfinkel with material to think with - with directives - rather than with a set of ready formulated theoretical solutions to his problems. The task here, then, is to unravel the ways in which Garfinkel considered that Schutz could help him.

The best way to proceed will be to look at some of the fundamental differences which Garfinkel perceived to exist between the approaches of Schutz and Parsons towards social phenomena. I will base the discussion on two sources. Firstly an unpublished paper entitled "A comparison of decisions made on four "pre-theoretical" problems by Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz", and secondly a slightly fuller treatment of the same materials which makes up chapter five of Garfinkel's thesis. (46)

Garfinkel compares the work of these two men on a number of different counts. The most significant one for the purposes of the present discussion is the "theory of objects" that they espouse. Their positions on this are stated in Kaufmannian terms. Parsons is considered to hold to a correspondence theory of reality (47) whilst Schutz is said to espouse a "congruence theory", by which Garfinkel means (as he says in a footnote) Kaufmann's adequate coherence theory which sees the truth of propositions not as somehow contained within the proposition themselves, or in the relationships between proposition, but which emphasises the role of rules and procedures in forming up a 'corpus' of knowledge. For Parsons, therefore, the theorist is conceived to stand over and against some 'real world' of objects, building his ideal types in order to approximate that 'reality' which he glimpses through perspectival appearance. As Garfinkel puts it

"The correspondence theory makes a separation between the real world and the subjective interpretation of the real world. The separation is such that there are on the one hand the concrete objects in all their fullness and on the other hand the conceptual representations of these objects."
Such representations in abstracting as they do certain features from the concrete object present the scientist with a faded reproduction." (48)

Schutz, on the other hand, sees the "perceived object" and the "concrete object" as the same. As Garfinkel puts it:

"Rather than there being a world of concrete objects which a theory cuts this way and that, the view holds that the cake is constituted in the very act of cutting. No cutting, no cake, there being no reality out there that is approximated since the world in this view is just as it appears." (49)

The consequence of these different conceptualizations of the nature of reality are several. The status of "ideal types", for example, must be different on the two accounts: for Parsons they are a way of grasping some aspect of perspectival appearance of an actually existing reality over and against the theorist, whilst for Schutz they are what is meant by 'the world' and 'reality'. There is nothing that an ideal type could 'correspond' to - it is what is the case. Again, the relationship between the sociological observer and the social world of 'actors' is different. For Parsons, a theory must be constructed that will provide a standard - in terms, as we have seen, of 'scientific rationality' - in terms of which the social world is to be seen and assessed. In the light of this theory and its standards an actor's perceptions of his situation, of his actions, and so on are judged and found to be either adequate or in error. For Schutz, on the other hand, no standard needs to be brought from outside. The sociological observer does not stand in the type of relationship to the actor in society which would require this, but instead must examine the social world as he finds it to uncover its own standards and its own logic.

In other words, Garfinkel is claiming that Parsons' theory of objects results in his presupposing the nature of the object of social science - i.e. the social world - in such a way that theories about it are conceived of as faded reproductions of a real world. This enables him to ignore the problem of the nature of the object itself. Schutz, on
the other hand, leaves himself with the problem of describing the
structures of the object itself without benefit of standards that are
presupposed and which are external to the object itself. Garfinkel puts
this point thus:

"In Parsons' usage, the empirical construct stands to the
object as a set of specifications abstracted from the
concrete object in accordance with the actor's interests.
Schutz' usage provides that the object is itself
constituted according to the actor's interests, with nothing
left over .... There is therefore a problem involved for
Schutz in describing the object that is not a problem for
Parsons. This problem is that of describing the structural
organization of the object, i.e. its organizational
properties as a unity of meanings." (50)

What Garfinkel has done here is to claim that Schutz has broken
down the distinction between "subject" and "object". The world that the
actor faces is the world that he perceives with nothing left over, just
as the world that a theory describes should not be conceived of as
standing over and against the theory itself, but as bound up with the
rules and procedures which enable the construction of a 'corpus' of
knowledge. It is not the case, however, that Garfinkel is claiming on
Schutz' behalf that all reality is somehow "subjective" - that all there
is is subjective perceptions. The claim is more radical than that and
has affinities with what I have suggested in the previous chapter
should be seen as Wittgenstein's position. His suggestion is that man,
as actor or sociologist, just is in the world and that that is what must
be accepted as the given. It is man's situation in the world of everyday
life - in the world of the natural attitude - that is fundamental, and
not some notion of "subjectivity" in relation to an "objective" world.
As Garfinkel puts it

"In a word, then, the congruence theory puts both actor
and observer into a setting as the organizers of that
setting and keeps them there." (51)

It is the setting, within everyday life, which is fundamental, and not
'subjectivity'. It is this that Garfinkel sees as the crucial contribution
of Schutz to social science, to the problems which he has uncovered in Parsons' work, and to his own attempt at finding some solution to the problems.

It is, however, doubtful whether Schutz in fact intended to propose the type of position which Garfinkel paints for him. It is significant that Garfinkel concentrates upon only a few of Schutz's essays for the purposes of his account - for example the essay on multiple realities which has been mentioned above. Much, however, is left out. There is no mention, for example, of Schutz's distinction between the 'subjective', constituting aspect of consciousness on the one hand, and 'objective meaning contexts' on the other. Whilst it is certain true that this distinction does not involve Schutz in positing a 'real' world in the sense that Parsons does, it is still the case that 'subjectivity' is being opposed to something other - to a structure of 'objective meaning' - which stands over and against it and, as I showed in chapter two, in a problematic relationship to it. It is these objective meaning contexts that solve, for Schutz, the problem of universals, and which account for the possibility of intersubjectivity - two jobs which indicate their importance to Schutz's position, and which suggest that an assessment of his thought which ignores them will not adequately characterize his conception of sociology and society. There is, indeed, evidence to suggest that Schutz himself was somewhat wary of the interpretation which Garfinkel gives of his work, and remarks that he makes seem to indicate that he did not in fact see his writing as proposing a position fundamentally different from that of Parsons. He seems to have preferred instead to see the contrast in terms of a shift in emphasis, or a change of levels of analysis. (52) His writing itself, as I have already pointed out, leads one to suspect that Schutz espoused what Kaufmann (and of course Garfinkel) considered to be the erroneous version of the coherence theory. He is much more concerned
with objective meaning contexts than with rules and procedures, and it is Garfinkel's own concerns, informed as they are by Kaufmann's work, that seeks to emphasise 'rules and procedures'.

I will have more to say about the relationship between Schutz and Garfinkel in a later section. For the time being it is important to understand just what Garfinkel is getting at with this account of Schutz, and why. The clue lies in the work of Gurwitsch and gestalt psychology.

Gurwitsch's influence on Garfinkel is particularly apparent in Garfinkel's thesis. Garfinkel's discussion of Husserl's notion of intentionality, (53) and of the noetic/noematic structures of consciousness, both references Gurwitsch and shows the distinctive structural and perceptual slant of his interpretation of Husserl's concepts. (54) To make this influence more explicit I will examine briefly, the thrust of Gurwitsch's position.

The important point here concerns the question of the relationship between subject and object. In his essay 'Some aspects and developments of gestalt psychology' (55) Gurwitsch recounts the history of the development of gestalt psychology. He sees this in terms of a gradual abandonment of a sensationalist position, where different perceptions are considered the result of different sense data, in favour of a position that dissolves the distinction between reality and appearance altogether, preferring instead to treat only the 'phenomena' themselves and to try to find out what the structural relationships are between them. This shift of position, Gurwitsch suggests, is the result of difficulties caused for the sensationalist position by optical phenomena such as the Neckar cube, which is a picture of a cube in which the lines are drawn in such a way that at one moment one surface will appear to be at the front of the picture, whilst at the next another surface will seem to be in front, depending upon how one looks at it. A similar situation occurs with Wittgenstein's duckrabbit, which can look like a duck or a rabbit
depending upon how one looks at it. (56) The point of this is that although one 'sees' something different, the actual shape one is looking at - the arrangement of the lines - and thus the 'sense data' remain exactly the same. Thus to try to account for such visual phenomena in terms of a distinction between the real object and the perceived object seems bound to be inadequate. Instead, gestalt psychology prefers to say that the two different things that one sees - the duck and the rabbit - are thoroughly different i.e. they are different phenomena, just as the different perspectives that one has of, say, a table (it is small from a distance, large when seen close up) are also different. Thus

"In the domain of consciousness no distinction between reality and appearance can be admitted; it is even the essential characteristic of this domain that the distinction mentioned is utterly alien to it." (57)

This means that the job of the psychologist then becomes that of uncovering the relationships between the different distinct perceptions - of discovering the laws on the basis of which we see the world as it is.

"Accordingly, the task arises of specifying the conditions in which a certain perception occurs and of establishing the laws which govern the transformations of one kind of perception into another - especially if these transformations ensue from the variation of internal conditions alone." (58)

Gurwitsch's essay is designed to point out the similarities between phenomenology and gestalt psychology. Phenomenology, for Gurwitsch, does dissolve the distinction between the subject and an object world, and it is because of this that it can contribute to an empirical psychological discipline. Reality should be conceived not in terms of a subject perceiving objects, but in terms of 'gestalt contextures' which are the structural relationships between perceptions on the basis of which we differentiate 'real objects' in the 'real world' from one another. There is no Schutz like 'objective meaning context' doing duty as longstop. There just are these structures. Zaner, for example, has the following to say about 'embodiment', arguing that mind body dualism and the problems involved with it, can be re-conceptualized in terms of
'gestalt contextures'. Thus

"As Gurwitsch shows, the most elementary phenomena apprehended by sensory perception are such contextures, (i.e. gestalt contextures P.M.) and only subsequent analysis introduces divisions, separations, etc. To the extent that perception is this way, however, so must the animate organism itself be a contextual phenomenon." (59)

The thrust of Gurwitsch's position for present purposes, then, lies in his insistence that one cannot allow of a distinction between subject and objective world, and that the important subject matter for psychology is the structure of the 'gestalt contextures' which form the basis of all perception. The given, so one might say, is 'gestalt contextures'.

Given this, it seems reasonable to suggest that Garfinkel's account of Schutz as holding to the 'congruence' theory of 'reality' has superimposed notions that are gleaned from Gurwitsch onto a limited selection of Schutz's work. Since Gurwitsch was interested primarily in psychology, his work was not directly relevant to Garfinkel's purposes which were focused upon problems concerned with social order and with social structures of some sort rather than with 'gestalt contextures' as the subject matter of psychology. Schutz's essay on multiple realities, for example, provides Garfinkel with insights into the structures of the natural attitude and suggests that modifications of that attitude - for example the modification which enables 'scientific theorizing', or the modification involved in entering the 'world' of imagination - are possible. It provides some idea that the 'structure' of the natural attitude - just like the 'structure' of a gestalt contexture - is modified, and that this structure can be conceived of in terms of rules and procedures, just as Kaufmann conceives of the scientific realm as characterized by rules and procedures. In short, Garfinkel's account of Schutz as holding to a congruence theory of reality as opposed to Parsons version of the correspondence theory is an expression of Garfinkel's own position rather than being a faithful
representation of Schutz's work, and it is a position which has
gathered from a variety of sources, and which is aimed fundamentally
at resolving problems that result from Parsons' handling of social
order.

What emerges here, then, is that Garfinkel is suggesting as a
solution to Parsons' problems that the sociologist must investigate
the structures of the rules and procedures within the world of the
natural attitude which enable objects in the social world to be what
they are. In other words, he must investigate the structures which,
at the 'cognitive' level, provide for agreement about what is the case,
and which therefore stand as the presuppositions of 'rational action',
'communication', 'wars of all against all' and indeed of any form of
'meaningful' interaction whatsoever. Such structures are conceptualized
as the presupposition of all meaning, and as holding the key to social
order. The crucial question for the sociologist thus becomes: What are
the structural conditions on the basis of which actors identify aspects
of their social environment, and perceive social objects, within the
natural attitude?

At this point, then, that same level of structure has been identified
which emerged from the earlier discussion of Hobbes and the problem of
order. It is a level which is both structural and non-normative in
the sense that it provides the presupposition for the normative
orientation of action, and that as such it offers the possibility of
being described in a way that does not result in only normative accounts.
To describe such structures it should not be necessary to specify how
actors should act to maintain social order. Instead it should be possible
to describe the structural mechanisms which are prior to 'meaning' in
the social world, which provide for 'agreement', and which ground social
order. This is not, of course, to claim that some direct access to the
'facts' can somehow be achieved, or that the place of 'theory' in
description can somehow be eliminated - as I will show in the next section, the contextedness of any description, including an ethnomethodological one, is an essential tenet of Garfinkel's position. Rather, the claim concerns the type of description that sociology can and ought to be engaged in, and this depends upon the contrast between 'normative' descriptions of social interaction which Parsons provides, and the 'non-normative' descriptions of a particular level of social structure which Garfinkel is pointing towards. The problem for Garfinkel thus becomes how to gain some empirical purchase upon the level of social structure that he has identified at a theoretical level.

THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF SOCIAL ORDER

Garfinkel's chief problem is that it is of no use to ask members of society what the structure of their rules and procedures at the cognitive level is, since this structure is the presupposition of 'meaning' and of all discourse. The answers to such a question would almost certainly produce 'normative' accounts about the 'meaningful' rules that were 'actually' followed in the daily round - i.e. 'sacred' normative rules of the type specified in Parsons' theory. As presuppositions, such rules as Garfinkel is interested in will be hidden and taken for granted - they will be, in Schutz's sense, part of the taken for granted stock of knowledge at hand. Garfinkel's well known 'experiments' can be seen as an attempt to find some way of gaining access to the phenomena that he is interested in. I want now to move on to discuss some of Garfinkel's empirical work in order to try to show how it is directed towards gaining insight into the phenomena that interest him. I will begin with a brief account of some of his early papers and his thesis, before going on to look at his paper on "Trust" as a good illustration of the way in which his thought develops and of the directions he takes. This will provide a useful background to a discussion in the next section of his more recent work, and of his
conception of "The formal structures of practical actions" which seems to articulate in a perspicuous fashion just what it is that the earlier work has been attempting to unravel. As a prelude to this account of the empirical work, I want to make one or two comments of a theoretical nature as pointers to the discussion.

It is quite clear that Garfinkel's early work is generated from phenomenological concerns. The influence of Schutz, Gurwitsch and Kaufmann all point in some way or another to the work of Husserl, and it is clear from Garfinkel's discussion of Husserl in his thesis that he considered his stress upon the level of presuppositions to be a valuable contribution to modern thinking. At the same time, however, it must not be forgotten that there are concerns of Garfinkel's which are not at all phenomenological in origin. The concentration upon the problem of social order, his concern with the precise nature of sociological description, and his determination to investigate social phenomena in an empirical fashion are all inputs into the phenomenological aspect of his thought which provide significant potential for the transformation of his early concerns. I have already suggested that his concerns with Parsons' work lead him to modify Schutz's position. This process in fact continues over the course of his work and, as will become apparent in the next section, gradually evolves towards a stance which has more in common with the work of Wittgenstein than with that of Husserl or Schutz. In assessing Garfinkel's empirical work, then, it must be remembered that it represents an attempt to come to grips with a particular level of social reality, identified theoretically but not yet specified in such a manner that rigorous empirical work is possible. It could well be that the attempt to provide empirical evidence for his claims played a major part in changing Garfinkel's position, suggesting complexities in the phenomena he investigates which were, perhaps, unforeseeable on the purely theoretical level. With this in
mind I will look at some of Garfinkel's early work.

The reasoning which seems to lie behind the early essays and experiments can be seen as follows: the structures which provide for 'agreement' as to the nature of social objects are structures of rules and procedures. Normally they operate in an unproblematic way and are thus effectively invisible. To study such procedures it is necessary either (1) to make them visible, or (2) to find situations in which they are observably being used - i.e. situations in which 'agreement' is in some way or other problematic. Thus, ways must be found of making them visible, and situations found where some sort of transformation is apparent in the agreement as to what some social object consists of.

(1) In order to make the structures visible, Garfinkel performs experiments such as those in his thesis. I will give a brief account of this. Garfinkel takes as his subjects a group of medical school applicants, and attempts to assess their changes in attitude towards a (fake) interview for medical school (which he plays to them on a record) when he provides them with further information about the interviewee. After a first listen to an aggressive and boorish applicant, the subjects were asked their opinion of the man, and of the way he had handled the interview situation. They all agreed that he was an unpleasant character, and should not be accepted for a place at medical school. Garfinkel then fed them the false information about the interviewee which was said to come from a group of professional assessors of candidates - such as that he had excellent grades, and had been accepted and was doing well etc., etc. - before playing them through the recording a second time. The result was that on the second hearing, the majority of the subjects entirely revised their opinions about the interviewee, and about the interview itself, and aligned their opinions with the groups of professional assessors. Thus Garfinkel was able to produce, experimentally, a change in attitude towards a 'social object' amongst a group of people.
What interested Garfinkel about this was not the actual substance of the attitude change, but the structural conditions which made it possible. As he puts it, his experiment revealed an important problem, and that is

"What are the conditions under which one can effect the change in the actor's perceptions of the same temporal patterning of signal material? Or, put otherwise, what are the things that condition hypothesis formation and the nature of the tests that the perceiver will effect upon his judgements of the other person when he, the perceiver, operates according to the rules of the natural attitude? And what are the rules that govern these tests?" (60)

Garfinkel's analysis of these 'conditions', 'rules' and 'tests' in his thesis does little more than to suggest directions for his own future research. He gives an impression of what it is that he is trying to do, but without providing any substantive sense of the precise structures that are involved.

(2) The 'situations' in which 'agreement' about the nature of a social object is in some sense problematic include, in early papers, discussions of inter and intra-racial homicides (61) - the ways in which juries assess and constitute the crime and the offender - and degradation ceremonies. (62) What is at issue here is a situation in which a social identity is being transformed by sets of procedures which not only ensure that a change is accomplished from, for example, an 'ordinary citizen' to a 'criminal', but also that the change is made smoothly and in an orderly fashion such that the 'normal', 'orderly', nature of the events involved is unquestioned and thus 'social order' at this level is maintained. What is at issue, in other words, are the 'cognitive' mechanisms - structures - which enable social order to persist in the face of the threat to it which transformations of social identities - i.e. changes concerning 'agreement' as to what is the case - can be seen as exposing it to. I will mention briefly something of what Garfinkel has to say about 'motive' in his paper on degradation ceremonies.
In line with Kaufmann's discussion of 'rules and procedures', Garfinkel points out that there are "socially valid and institutionally recommended standards of "preference"" on the basis of which, as grounds, an actor decides upon distinctions between "appearances and reality, truth and falsity, triviality and importance, accident and essence, coincidence and cause". (63) Such grounds can be used in order to effect a change of identity in a person. What must be done is to provide a different motivational scheme, as a different set of "standards of preference", in which to fit that person's conduct. To effect a status degradation over the course of a degradation ceremony one substitutes a new motivational context. Thus

"It is with reference to this substituted, socially validated motivational scheme as the essential grounds, i.e. the first principles, that his performances, past, present, and prospective, according to the witnesses, are to be properly and necessarily understood. Through the interpretive work that respects this rule, the denounced person becomes in the eyes of the witnesses a different person." (64)

By investigating degradation ceremonies, then, as situations in which identity transformations take place, Garfinkel is able to suggest that part of what is involved in maintaining the normal, orderly character of the social is sets of rules and procedures, bound up with alternative motivational contexts, which enable, at a structural level, the smooth transition from one social identity to another. But, just as his experiment with medical school interviewees is more suggestive than substantive, so his investigations of specific situations - court rooms and ceremonies - remains only as a pointer to future promise.

It is important to notice here the way in which Garfinkel's treatment of these matters has transformed Parsons' notion of a 'norm'. Where for Parsons norms explain social order, in that they are internalized and account for the orientations of actors, Garfinkel is suggesting that the 'normal' is to be conceptualized as both the result of and the condition for orderly social practices. 'Norms' are the standards in terms o
which actors assess each others actions and behaviour - i.e. there
are 'normal' motivational schemes available - but at the same time,
that there are such 'normal' schemes rests upon the rules and procedures
which enable social order in the first place. What is thus important
about 'norms' in this sense which implies 'normality' as the
achievement of actors, is that they are **used** as standards. It is the
practices and procedures that are conceived to be fundamental, and not
'norms' as such. This point will become clearer in relation to
accounting practices which will be discussed below.

The development of Garfinkel's concerns leads him to consider more
and more what is involved in the taken for granted stock of knowledge
at hand, and the structure of the natural attitude as he has taken that
notion over from Schutz. As the work with these concepts progresses,
the thrust of Garfinkel's intentions becomes more apparent whilst at
the same time a clear picture emerges of the way in which his position
is being articulated in contrast to the work of Parsons. I will
illustrate this by reference to an important paper "A Conception of,
and Experiments with, "Trust" as a Condition of Stable Concerted
Actions", (65) hereafter referred to as the "Trust" paper.

Garfinkel begins his discussion with a consideration of the rules
of games. He takes games because in a game

"the basic rules of play serve each player as a scheme for
recognizing and interpreting the other players' as well
as his own behavioural displays as events of game conduct.
The basic rules of a game define the situations and normal
events of play for persons who seek to act in compliance
with them (a **player**)." (66)

The first thing that needs to be known about the rules of a game is
how does one identify those that are the 'basic rules' as opposed to,
for example, those that are merely 'preferred rules' of play? What is
it that makes a basic rule basic? Garfinkel's answer here is that
such rules have specific properties which set them off from all others,
namely the 'constitutive expectancies'. These are given as
"1) From the standpoint of a player, out of alternative territories of play, numbers of players, sequences of moves, and the like, they frame a set that the player expects to choose regardless of his desires, circumstances, plans, interests or consequences of choice either to himself or to others.
2) The player expects that the same set of required alternatives are binding upon the other player as are binding upon him.
3) The player expects that, as he expects the above of the other person, the other person expects it of him." (67)

Garfinkel talks about these expectancies, as they are attached to sequences of moves, players, etc. as giving the 'constitutive accent' to such moves or players. If this 'constitutive accent' is moved from one set of rules to another, then the game changes - the expectancies are attached to different rules, so that a different set of 'basic rules' defines the 'situations and normal events of play'.

In the case of a game, then, it is not 'sacredness' that characterizes the basic rules, but the 'constitutive expectancies'. These give to the game a 'constitutive structure' - i.e. a structure of basic rules that defines the events that are 'relevant' in the game and provides an exclusion principle for irrelevant events such as head scratching. The significance of this is stated by Garfinkel thus

"The conception that constitutive structures are integral to all game events differs from currently used sociological conceptions of the rules of action. According to current sociological usage, the rules of action classify actions as disjunctive sets. For example, the events of conduct depicted in the incest rule are members of the "mores". The rules that prescribe allocations of duties in the household are members of the "folkways". The instructions that accompany a radio kit are technical rules. Emily Post has written the rules of etiquette.

As a consequence of such usage, current conceptions of the conditions of social order stress in common as a critical condition of a stable social order the extent to which rules are sacredly regarded. But should it turn out that the constitutive properties of events are not confined to games, one would then have to suppose that the uniformities of events depicted in the mores, the folkways, and the like are constituted through a set of "more fundamental" presuppositions in terms of which behavioral instances are attended by actors as instances of intended actions that a group member assumes "anyone can see"." (68)
The reference here to Parsons' conception of rules as sacred as Garfinkel has described them is unmistakeable, as too is the determination to develop an account of social order that does not depend upon such a conceptualisation, but which unravels the set of "more fundamental" presuppositions underlying social order. It remains for him now to show how such a revised sense of the concept 'rule' can actually generate a theory about the social world.

Garfinkel notes at some length that games are not to be directly paralleled to the social world. As he puts it "Game events are not structurally homologous with events of yesterday life". (69) Nonetheless for that, Garfinkel proposes that "the three properties that are definitive of the basic rules of a game are not particular to games but are found as features of the "assumptions" that Alfred Schutz, in his work on the constitutive phenomenology of situations of everyday life (1945, 1951), has called the "attitude of daily life"." (70)

Just as there are 'constitutive expectancies' that stand as properties of the basic rules of a game which define what is a game event and what isn't, so the assumptions that underlie our everyday life - which are the attitude of everyday life - have these same expectancies as 'features' of them. Just as the basic rules, by virtue of the constitutive accent, enable recognition of what is 'normal' or 'typical' play, so in daily life it is the constitutive expectancies, as features of the 'attitude of daily life', that define what is 'normal' and 'typical' - i.e. that which is 'orderly'. For example, one expects that ones assumption that 'objects' in the world are as they seem to be, or ones assumption that ones actions can effect another, both holds for others (i.e. one expects that the other will also so assume) at the same time as the other expects it to hold for you (i.e. one expects that the other will expect you also to so assume).

By integrating Schutz's "assumptions" with the constitutive expectancies, Garfinkel produces a list of eleven features which he says are definitive of events which are members of the commonsense
environment. In other words, if these features are assigned to an actual event, then it will be an event in the common sense environment.

It is not "what an event exhibits as its distinctive determinations" (71) that makes it a member of the commonsense environment, but whether or not it is assigned these 'constitutive features'. Thus if "All Jews are rich" or "If you jump in the water you'll get wet" are members of the common sense environment, then this is because they exhibit the eleven features. I will list these eleven features to illustrate the way in which Garfinkel conceives of the structures which he is investigating at this time.

"1. The determinations assigned to the event by the user are, from his point of view, assignments that he is required to make; the other person is required to make the same assignments; and just as the user requires the same assignments to hold for the other persons, he assumes that the other person requires the same of him.

2. From the user's point of view, a relationship of undoubted correspondence is the sanctioned relationship between the-presented-appearance-of-the-intended-object and the-intended-object-that-appears-in-this-presented-appearance.

3. From the user's point of view, the event that is known, in the manner that it is known, can actually and potentially affect the knower's actions and circumstances and can be affected by his actions and circumstances.

4. From the user's point of view, the meanings of events are the products of a standardized process of naming, reification, and idealization of the user's stream of experiences, i.e. the products of the same language.

5. From the user's point of view, the present determinations of the events, whatever these may be, are determinations that were intended on previous occasions and that may be again intended in identical fashion on an indefinite number of future occasions.

6. From the user's point of view, the intended event is retained as the temporally identical event throughout the stream of experience.

7. From the user's point of view, the event has as its contexts of interpretation:

   (a) a commonly entertained scheme of communication consisting of a standardized system of signals and coding rules,

and

   (b) "What anyone knows", i.e. a pre-established corpus of socially warranted knowledge.
8. From the user's point of view, the actual determinations that the event exhibits for him are the potential determinations that it would exhibit for the other person were they to exchange positions.

9. From the user's point of view, to each event there corresponds its determinations that originate in the user's and in the other person's particular biography. From the user's point of view, such determinations are irrelevant for the purposes at hand of either, and from the user's point of view both have selected and interpreted the actual and potential determinations of the event in an empirically identical manner that is sufficient for all their practical purposes.

10. From the user's point of view, there is a characteristic disparity between the publicly acknowledged determinations and the personal, withheld determinations of events, with this private knowledge held in reserve. From the user's point of view, the event means for both the user and the other more than the user can say.

11. From the user's point of view, alterations of this characteristic disparity remain within his own autonomous control." (72)

In this way, then, Garfinkel attempts to demonstrate that just as the basic rules define game events, so the assumptions of everyday life define events that are members of the common sense environment. What this means is that if the sociologist is to understand and describe the agreement about the object world that is the presupposition of social life and the grounds of social order - and thus avoid 'normative description' - then he must describe these assumptions. Thus he will be able to avoid positing that the 'rules' or 'norms' that actors act in terms of are 'sacred', in favour of a more rigorously descriptive approach.

It is worth noticing at this point that although Garfinkel seems to have considered these 'assumptions' and 'expectancies' to be specific enough to be 'breached', so that he considers that it is a worth while enterprise to set up experiments - which I will give an account of in a moment - which will breach them, and thus make them visible, there is nonetheless a tension in his approach to them. On the one hand they are intended to be empirically identifiable and describable as structural features of settings whilst on the other hand his only means of actually
identifying them is by specifying them on a purely theoretical level and then claiming that the empirically observable confusion which he is able to introduce into a setting is the result of his having breached these presupposed assumptions. In other words, what he is able to describe in fact is confusion, and this is taken to illustrate that there are indeed the assumptions which he claims to be available for description in the setting. What he is unable to do, however, is to describe the assumptions themselves in an empirical fashion. (73)

That Garfinkel himself was not unaware of this problem is perhaps suggested in his insistence that his experiments should be taken not as evidence for his theory in the usual sense of the word, but that they are simply "aids to the sluggish imagination". (74) Thus, in spite of the fact that this paper represents a more clearly defined approach towards the level of structure which he seems to have been aiming at, it is still the case that, like his early papers, it is more programmatic and suggestive than it is substantive. Again, the level of structure which he is aiming at is given further elaboration, but its precise nature remains somewhat mysterious from the point of view of empirical investigation. That said, I want now to look at the way in which Garfinkel's experiments in the "Trust" paper build on the Schutzian notion of 'taken for grantedness' in an attempt to unravel the complexities of social order at the 'cognitive' level.

Garfinkel writes during the "Trust" paper that

"If these constitutive properties extend to everyday events, then with respect to the problematic relationship between the normative regulation of action and the stability of concerted action, the critical phenomenon is not the "intensity of affect" with which the "rule" is "invested", or the respected or sacred or moral status of the rule, but the perceived normality of environmental events as this normality is a function of the presuppositions that define the possible events." (75)

This "normality of environmental events" is such that the presuppositions on the basis of which they are seen as normal remains entirely unnoticed.
Just as in a game the rules are not, as a rule, 'before ones mind' as it were, but only lie there as the necessary presupposition for ones' seeing the game events in the way that one does, so with the presuppositional assumptions of everyday life:

"These attributions to the field of events inform the ticktacktoe player about any particular event of play but without being a conscious part of his deliberations. Similarly for the person in everyday environments. And just as it holds for the game of ticktacktoe that such attributions are demonstrably relevant to the player's judgements but are rarely problematical, so does it hold for the events of everyday life. Such attributions are features of witnessed events that are "seen without being noticed"." (76)

That they are "seen without being noticed" means that it would be of no use to ask some member of society what these assumptions were - and any way, as I pointed out above, to do so would be likely to result in normative description. Instead, some way must be found of making what is taken for granted visible, and thus amenable to investigation. If a way could be found to do this, then perhaps a way would be found of describing the foundations of social order without resorting to purely 'normative' accounts.

Garfinkel's solution to the problem of making such assumptions visible at this time, is to breach them, and thus to force people to reassess the 'normality' of their everyday social world. The trick, as far as he is concerned, is to breach these assumptions in such a way that the person whose expectancies have not been fulfilled is not able to 'leave the field' - i.e. leave the world of the 'natural attitude' whose assumptions are being breached and move into the world of 'play', or 'joke', or 'imagination' etc. In other words, the subject must not be allowed to move the constitutive accent. If, for example, one were to attempt to breach someone's assumption that the table which he can see is also seen by you by saying "What table?" when, in the midst of a conversation, he referred to the coffee table upon which both of you had had been placing glasses over the course of an evening, the only result
would be a laugh, or a joke, or a questioning of your eyesight etc. The breach would not result in making anything visible, since the other person would simply 'leave the field', abandoning the natural attitude for some other 'reality'.

It is this - the intention of making visible the assumptions and constitutive expectancies of the natural attitude by breaching them - that underlies the experiments at the end of the essay on "Trust", and which is the motivation for many of the demonstrations that appear in "Studies in Ethnomethodology". Since 'normality' of events, and 'taken for grantedness' are the trademarks of such assumptions, then it is those aspects of the perceived environment that must be manipulated if the grounds of 'agreement', the 'rules' of the natural attitude, the procedures for ensuring that, in the normal course of events, 'normality' remains unproblematically visible and order is maintained, are to be investigated. By multiplying "the anomic features of a person's situation", confusion is produced, and the ways in which that confusion is managed can be studied, at the same time that the procedures used to produce confusion suggest what aspects of a person's environment take the constitutive accent.

The actual experiments that Garfinkel uses to produce confusion - to breach the assumptions that characterise the attitude of daily life - are well known. They include such things as getting his students to act as borders in their own homes, getting students to treat fellow customers in a store as though they were store clerks, and the fake medical interview which I have already described briefly above. In each case what was observable was confusion, anxiety, annoyance, bad feeling, awkwardness and so on, along with attempts to normalise the situation in some way in the face of blatant contradiction, breach of expectancies etc. Alongside these 'breaching' experiments, in "Studies", there are several other investigations which, although not directly parallel to the confusion producing demonstrations, are nonetheless directed towards
the same end. Thus, for example, the study of Agnes, (77) who was born male, but who, over the course of adolescence developed breasts as well as a normal penis, and who felt herself to be a girl, is directed towards uncovering the ways in which a person in such a non-normal situation is able to establish herself as normal. Agnes had to learn how to "pass" as a girl, which involved "the work of achieving and making secure her rights to live as a normal, natural female while having continually to provide for the possibility of detection and ruin, carried on within socially structured conditions". (78) In other words, in this instance, the assumptions of the natural attitude about "sex", and about the position of "male" and "female" in society cannot be simply taken for granted, but must be "managed" in a conscious way and because of this they become visible. Similarly with the activities of jurors. (79) Here it is the case that the juror finds himself in an unknown environment where different 'rules' apply. He must make his decision on the basis of legal precedent, and not simply on the grounds of his usual assumptions in daily life. It is the strangeness of his situation, and the fact that he must manipulate it in a more conscious way than usual that makes the juror of interest to Garfinkel.

In the last few sections I have tried to give some idea of the underlying problems which generate Garfinkel's work as they emerge from Parsons' account of the problem of order. I have tried to show how Garfinkel approaches the problems both theoretically and empirically, how he conceives of the solution to them in terms of a particular level of structure which is the presupposition of 'rational action', 'communication', etc., etc., and how this approach has been influenced by a variety of different thinkers. In the next section, I will turn to discuss the way in which these early formulations of the problem and its intended solution generate an interest in 'language' which provides the distinctive features of Garfinkel's more recent work, and which - as
will become apparent in a later chapter - links Garfinkel's work to that of the conversational analysts such as Harvey Sacks.

**THE CONCERN WITH LANGUAGE**

I suggested above that the 'experiments' which Garfinkel performs in an effort to 'aid the sluggish imagination' can be seen as one of the contributory factors in the development of his own thoughts about social order. They provide a sense of the complexities of the phenomena with which he is dealing which generates fresh insights into the types of procedures which members of a society use in order to make the settings in which they find themselves 'orderly', 'normal' affairs. Not only do members of a society 'assume' that the settings of every day life will be orderly in the way that Garfinkel suggests in the "Trust" paper, but acting upon that assumption they bring a barrage of procedures to bear upon what happens in some particular setting in order to 'see' it as orderly, and to ensure that its orderly properties are maintained. It has already been shown above that over the course of a degradation ceremony there are ways of ensuring that the person being degraded is processed, as it were, in such a manner that the threat to social order which a change of social identity - of 'agreement' - could present is minimised and the 'orderly', 'normal', status of the everyday world can go on undisturbed. But the procedures involved in maintaining order are more complex than that, and it is this that becomes apparent through Garfinkel's experiments. The most significant complications in the structure of order maintaining procedures are the direct result of considering the role of language. As will become apparent, language both organizes settings and depends for its sense upon the orderly character of the setting itself. It is the complexities concerned in the relationship between language and the settings of everyday life that I want now to discuss.

The connection between language and social order can best be
introduced by considering an 'experiment' that Garfinkel presents as an illustration of the 'documentary method'. (80) In this experiment, a series of subjects were told by the experimenter that they were to be given a new type of student counselling. They were sat in a room alone with a loud speaker and a tape recorder, and told to ask the 'counsellor' questions about matters upon which they wanted advice. They had to form up the questions in such a way that a one word answer - either 'yes' or 'no' - could be given. Having asked the question, and having received an 'answer' to it from the loudspeaker, they were then told to turn on the tape-recorder and to comment on what they thought of the 'answer' that they had been given.

There was, however, a catch. The 'answers' that they were given were in fact nothing but a random sequence of 'yeses' and 'noes' which bore no relation to what they had asked the counsellor. Thus the 'environment' or 'setting' in which they found themselves, and in which they thought that they were receiving 'advice' in the form of answers, in a real sense lacked 'order'. What was interesting, however, was that in spite of what were often contradictory 'answers', the subjects continued to search around for some pattern underlying them. In the face of potential disorder, they struggled to see what was being 'said' as 'normal' and 'orderly' - i.e. as 'answers' to their questions. As Garfinkel puts it

"Through the work of documenting - i.e. by searching for and determining pattern, by treating the adviser's answers as motivated by the intended sense of the question, by waiting for later answers to clarify the sense of previous ones, by finding answers to unasked questions - the perceivedly normal values of what was being advised were established, tested, reviewed, retained, restored; in a word, managed." (81)

In other words, the subjects just would not allow the normality and typicality of the setting in which they found themselves to slip away. They actively managed the situation in order to keep it coherent,
sensible and orderly.

Garfinkel calls this method of maintaining order in events the 'documentary method of interpretation', following the usage of Mannheim. He defines it in the latter's words as

"the search for "... an identical homologous pattern underlying a vast variety of totally different realizations of meaning".

The method consists of treating an actual appearance as "the document of" as "pointing to", as "standing on behalf of" a presupposed underlying pattern." (82)

Thus the documentary method involves presupposing a pattern in the events being observed, and then treating the events themselves as evidence for the supposed pattern. The events themselves thus 'prove' that their own explanation lies in their underlying pattern, Parsons' 'normative' theory is a sociological example of the use of this method.

This 'experiment' of Garfinkel's, and the formulation of the 'documentary method' which it illustrates, is important for the present purposes for the following reasons. Firstly, it is evidently a 'method', or a 'procedure', which is used by members of a society living in the natural attitude to find that a particular setting, or set of events, is indeed orderly. In the normal run of events, we do search the words spoken by another for their 'orderly' character and it is that searching which enables us to find 'sense' in what has been said. Similarly, we seek out the 'orderly' character of another's actions to make sense of whatever it is that he is doing. Sometimes, it is true, we are wrong: we misunderstand what someone is saying, or misunderstand what they are doing. Nonetheless, our mistakes are the result of our searching for some order - we just end up with the wrong order on this occasion.

Secondly, this use of the documentary method rests on our 'assumption' that others are also orienting towards the setting as an orderly set of events, and that they too are attempting to make that setting orderly. Thus in a situation where there are 'questions' and 'answers' we assume
that what sound like 'answers' to our questions have in fact been produced as the result of someone's treating our question as 'orderly' - i.e. by their use of the documentary method - and that we can thus treat their 'answer' as orderly in relation to a setting in which questions and answers are being formulated as part of the same orderly sequence of events. In other words, we assume that there is 'agreement' about the nature of the setting (i.e. that it is an orderly sequence of questions and answers), and that 'agreement', plus the assumption that it exists, is the precondition for 'communication' between the parties in the setting.

Thirdly, from the above two points, it should be clear that the structure of practices at the 'cognitive' level (which is concerned with 'agreement') which is the presupposition of 'meaning', is now being approached from the point of view of 'assumptions' and 'procedures' which include, as a part of them, a dimension concerned with language. Order in a setting is being connected to the ways in which language is used and understood by parties to conversations. The level at which the enquiry is being aimed has not changed, but an added dimension has been made apparent - the role of language. To illustrate this further I want to look at what Garfinkel has to say about 'glossing practices'.

The term "glossing practice" refers to the fact that in the course of speaking, members of a society are able to say more than can actually be said in so many words. The best illustration of this point is provided by an 'experiment' that Garfinkel recounts in which he asks his students to write down the actual words of a conversation which they have had with someone. They then have to write down next to it exactly what they meant by the phrases they used such that anyone not familiar with the indexical particulars referred to would be able to understand what was being talked about. Garfinkel puts the results of the experiment thus
"Students filled out the left side of the sheet quickly and easily, but found the right side incomparably more difficult. (Note: the left side is the actual conversation, the right is "what they were talking about" P.M.) When the assignment was made, many asked how much I wanted them to write. As I progressively imposed accuracy, clarity and distinctness, the task became increasingly laborious. Finally, when I required that they assume I would know what they had actually talked about only from reading literally what they wrote literally, they gave up with the complaint that the task was impossible." (83)

It was, in other words, impossible for them to eliminate their dependance in what they were saying upon certain tacitly understood features of the environment that they shared with their co-conversationalist. Whatever they actually said, they were always saying more than they were actually putting into words. They were using "glossing practices" in order to make sense to their co-conversationalist, and there was no way in which they could avoid doing this. Thus the speaker means something different from what he says in so many words. However

"The idea of "meaning differently than he can say in so many words" requires comment. It is not so much "differently than what he says" as that whatever he says provides the very materials to be used in making out what he says." (84)

In other words, once again, just as with the 'yes' and 'no' answers, hearers of some piece of conversation are using certain procedures - bringing to bear some sets of competences and methods - in order to make out of what is said some sort of 'orderly', 'sensible', conversation. At the same time, the person producing the 'gloss' is doing so in such a way that what is said can be inspected for its 'orderliness' and thus be seen to make sense.

Besides these two, a clutch of further practices and procedures emerges from Garfinkel's studies of the U.C.L.A. Outpatients Clinic. In this study he attempts to glean from the official clinical records an answer to the question "By what criteria are its applicants selected for treatment?" (85) Here it becomes clear that the graduate coders, in order to extract the necessary information from the files, were having
to rely on background knowledge of the workings of the clinic to make sense out of what was written there. They were not able to simply read off from the folders the necessary information, but were having to use unexplicated procedures of some sort in order to translate what was in the records into the information that was required by the sociological study. The question is "Via what practices had actual folder contents been assigned the status of answers to the researcher's questions?" (86) Garfinkel's reply to this is that

"We soon found the essential relevance to the coders, in their work of interrogating folder contents for answers to their questions, of such considerations as "et cetera", "unless", "let it pass", and "factum valet" (i.e. an action that is otherwise prohibited by a rule is counted correct once it is done). For convenience let me call these "ad hoc" considerations, and call their practice "ad hocing"." (87)

Thus, a further set of practices is identified, which enable sense to be made out of what is written in the official records - which make of them something 'orderly'.

Leading on from this, Garfinkel is able to suggest that what one is dealing with in the clinical records is not some set of words that somehow 'correspond' to the 'realities' which they report - i.e. the 'realities' of doctor client interactions or some such - but that rather the records themselves are a part of the ongoing flow of clinic life. They are the result of practical concerns, and are meant to be read by someone with similar orientations. What is interesting about them thus becomes the ways in which they are produced on the one hand, and used on the other, where that production and use is conceived of in terms of sets of taken for granted practices and procedures which provide the records with their 'normal', 'orderly' character - i.e. 'glossing', 'documentary interpretation' and so on. The document itself, to stress the point, is thus conceived to be embedded within a context of practical concerns and taken for granted practices and procedures, and not as a set of words in correspondence with some reality outside of themselves.
To sum up, then, language as it is used in conversation, and as it appears in written texts, can be seen to depend upon practices and procedures which relate it to the general problem of social order at the cognitive level. To trace through this connection to its full extent in Garfinkel's work, it is necessary to consider three important areas that are of central concern to him. The first relates to the nature of language itself: here the question is "what is the nature of language that it exhibits these properties when looked at in relation to this level of social order?" The second, is concerned with sociological description: here the question is "if language is this type of thing, then what does this imply for description and for the sociological enterprise?". The third provides a collecting of Garfinkel's conclusions concerning the nature of language, the nature of description, and the relation of these to social order in terms of "accounting practices": here the question is "how can the relationship between language and the organization of a setting be expressed shortly and perspicuously?". I want to deal with each of these three points in turn.

The first question, concerning the nature of language, is handled by Garfinkel in terms of the notion of 'indexicality'. This concept is developed from Bar-Hillel's now famous article on indexical expressions (88) in which he made the relatively simple point that there is a class of expressions which only have a reference within a 'pragmatic context'. In the case of an utterance such as "I am hungry", for example, (Bar-Hillel calls this a 'sentence token') one cannot do without the context of the utterance

"the pragmatic context is essential and its omission leaves the token without reference, (and thus) we have before us an essentially triadic relation between token, context, and proposition." (89)

Bar-Hillel's point in writing the article seems to be to point out that the properties of such expressions have never been examined, since most philosophy is concerned solely with objective expressions
and thus feels free to ignore indexicality and "pragmatic context" - a term which remains vague throughout the paper (90) - and that this state of affairs ought to be remedied.

Garfinkel, in a sense, takes up the challenge but, as with many other concepts, transforms the sense of indexicality in the process. (91) The sense of the transformation, however, can be seen as the result of a more thorough concept of 'pragmatic context' than that used by Bar-Hillel rather than as some mischievous adaptation.

What Garfinkel does is to take the notion of 'pragmatic context' and to fill it in with the notions of 'taken for granted assumptions' and 'taken for granted procedures' in such a way that indexical expressions become apparent in any conversation, any description - indeed anywhere where language is being used. He puts it thus

"A sign correctly corresponds to a referent in terms of the assumed constitutive order that itself defines "correct correspondence"." (92)

To understand what is involved in 'indexical expressions', he is claiming, it is necessary to understand the basic assumptions, rules and procedures - which will include 'glossing practices' and 'the documentary method' - which enable sense to be made in the various settings in which co-conversationalists find themselves. It is a general property of language, as it is used, that there are sets of assumptions, rules and procedures which enable sense to be made with it, and these assumptions, rules and procedures provide for the 'pragmatic context' in which 'indexical expressions' are to be understood. They provide, through glossing practices, that aspects of the held in common environment that are 'agreed upon' by the conversationalists will be taken as given over the course of some conversation such that 'what is meant' in the use of indexical expressions will be 'made out' by the hearer - will be heard as orderly and thus as making sense.

In other words, 'indexicality' is used, by Garfinkel, as a term
which refers to a general property of language - that it is used - rather than to refer to the contextedness of the 'reference' or 'meaning' of expressions as such. Where Bar-Hillel intends only to point out that the context of the use of certain expressions is needed for their reference to be apparent, Garfinkel is saying that the 'context' of the use of any expression is one in which taken for granted procedures, methods, and assumptions play an essential part in providing that expression with sense. The organization and order of the setting is necessary for the sense of expressions - i.e. an "assumed constitutive order" defines "correct correspondence" - and this order is the result of the practices and procedures used by members of a society in the settings of everyday life.

It is perhaps worth noticing briefly at this point, the affinities between this notion of Garfinkel's which maintains indexicality as an essential property of language as it is used within the settings of everyday life, and Wittgenstein's concentration upon the fact that language is used within language games. I will return to this in more detail in a later section; my present purpose is simply to alert the reader to an obvious point of similarity between the two thinkers.

The second important point that I want to investigate here concerns the nature of description. As I have shown above, Garfinkel considers 'description' to be a question of fundamental concern to sociologists (93) and it is problems in this area which he finds most problematic in Parsons' theory of the social world. It is important, therefore, to consider the way in which his notion of the nature of language relates to his conceptualization of the nature of description.

The first thing that must be noticed about the way in which Garfinkel uses terms like 'description' and 'literal observation' is that they always feature as 'contrast' terms. In the Parsons' Primer, for example, as I have shown above, 'description' is opposed to
'normative' accounts. In "Studies" it is contrasted with the 'documentary method of interpretation', and it is this contrast that I will use here to illustrate what Garfinkel means by 'description'.

In spite of misapprehensions to the contrary (94) Garfinkel's concern with description is not one that leads him to claim for himself some sort of privileged access to social phenomena, or some exemption from the indexicality of language. He does not see the solution to Parsons' problems, as he has described them, in terms of the possibility of the substitution of some neutral observation language for the essentially indexical and context bound accounts that everyone else produces. The nature of language is such that indexical expressions, glossing practices, etc. are an essential part of it and thus any description will contain indexical features. It is nonetheless the case that in any actual sociological account there are parts that one could say are descriptive in that they are not normative or documentary - for example, there can be "literal description of physical and biological properties of sociological events". (95) There is, in other words, a useful distinction to be made here within our sociological language games. The fact is that in choosing to 'literally describe' such features, sociological relevance is often lost and what one is left with is a set of statements about, for example, somebody's height or weight, that can stand as 'literal descriptions' in some sense, but which need to be fitted back into the framework of a normative sociological theory (as, for example, an explanation of actions of some sort) to be sociologically relevant. The problem, as Garfinkel sees it, concerns the "choice" that must be made between being 'descriptive' and not sociologically relevant, or using the documentary method to attain relevance. As he puts it

"The choice has to do with the question of the conditions under which literal observation and documentary work necessarily occur. This involves the formulation of, and solution to, the problem of sociological evidence in terms
that permit a descriptive solution. Undoubtedly, scientific sociology is a "fact" but in Felix Kaufmann's sense of fact, i.e. in terms of a set of procedural rules that actually govern the use of sociologists' recommended methods and asserted findings as grounds of further inference and inquiries. The problem of evidence consists of the tasks of making this fact intelligible." (96)

To understand that "choice", it is necessary to come to some understanding of the "conditions" under which "literal observation" on the one hand, and "documentary interpretation" on the other actually occur, and to understand that, it is necessary to investigate practices and procedures.

Garfinkel himself looks for the solution of these problems to the work of Schutz, Gurwitsch and Kaufmann, as I have shown above. His suggestion is that by investigating that level of social structure which he has indicated and which is concerned with 'agreement' rather than with the 'meanings' of everyday life, or the 'meaningful' rules that actors are conceived to follow, it is possible to avoid producing only 'normative' accounts of the social world. Not only that, but by investigating the social world at this level a "descriptive solution" to the problem of "the conditions under which literal observation and documentary work necessarily occur" becomes a possibility because of the fact that what is being investigated is the practices and procedures which enable language to be used descriptively, or to produce 'normative accounts', and so on. Most sociology simply takes for granted 'agreement' about the social world, and ignores the ways in which such agreement is reached - as Garfinkel puts it

"textbook and journal discussions of sociological methods rarely give recognition to the fact that sociological inquiries are carried out under common sense aspices at the points where decisions about the correspondence between observed appearances and intended events are being made." (97)

What must be investigated is the structural mechanisms underlying 'agreement' - underlying "decisions about the correspondence between observed appearances and intended events". In this way something of what is involved in "description" will perhaps be made visible.
Before leaving the question of sociological description to talk about "accounting practices", it is worth stressing again that Garfinkel does not consider that he can in some way avoid 'indexicality', or can forget that language is 'used' and claim for his own descriptions some special 'correspondence' with the phenomena. It is the case for his descriptions, as for anyone else's, that an "etc. device" is appended to them. What the "etc. device" says is that the words used in the description do not, and cannot, formulate 'literally' what the producer of the description is saying, but must be used by the hearer/reader to make out what has been said. The etc. device, in other words, simply states that for any description, the describer is saying more than he can say in so many words, and that this must be accepted by the recipient of the description. In Garfinkel's case there is a whole barrage of theoretical background which has to be acknowledged if his descriptions are to be understood, and the 'etc. device' appended to those descriptions signposts this fact. In a sense, what this thesis attempts to do is to fill in something of what is involved in that 'etc'. The whole point of Garfinkel's contrast is directed towards differentiating 'normative' descriptions, or 'documentary interpretations' from something else which he calls 'literal description'. Both sides of the contrast involve practices and procedures, but at the same time Garfinkel does want to assert that there is a crucial distinction to be made here. The problem is to understand the nature of that distinction, and that, he claims, is an empirical matter.

I want now to move on to discuss 'accounting practices'. What is contained in this central concept of Garfinkel's is a collecting, in one phrase, of the relationship between language, settings, and the problem of order. It is thus important to try to grasp just what is involved in the notion.

The best way of tackling what is involved in "accounting" is to consider these remarks of Garfinkel's on the purposes of ethnomenodology,
found in "Studies".

"the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with members' procedures for making those settings "account-able". The "reflexive" or "incarnate" character of accounting practices and accounts makes up the crux of that recommendation." (98)

It is not easy, at first gasp, to see precisely what Garfinkel has in mind here. The following considerations should make it somewhat clearer.

Garfinkel's central thesis, as I have shown, is that to understand the order that is observable in social reality, one must look at the constitutive structure - at taken for granted procedures and assumptions, on the basis of which members of a society organize the everyday settings in which they find themselves. In other words, there are recognizable members methods for making settings exhibit order. Now once a setting in everyday life is an ordered one, it becomes possible 1) to recognize that order and 2) to talk about the setting as an organized, 'rational' affair. Without that order, there would be nothing but chaos such that the setting would not be recognizable as a setting, and thus the setting itself would not be 'account-able' i.e. able to be accounted. It thus follows that in the process of making a setting orderly, members also make it an accountable phenomenon - something that can be recognized as orderly and talked about.

At the same time, however, "accounting practices" themselves, as practices, are devices for making a setting orderly. In other words, one of the tasks to which language is put is that of naming, categorizing, ordering, and in general organizing aspects of the environment. Thus as account is not only, as it were, a reflection of the order in a setting, but, as an integral part of the setting itself, it helps to do the ordering which it accounts. In this way it can be seen that accounting practices are embedded in the settings that they account. They are, in Garfinkel's terminology, 'reflexive' and 'incarnate'. 
What this formulation of accounting practices effectively does, is to emphasise the essential indexicality of language by stressing the embeddedness of any account, be it a description, theory, poem or anything else. Garfinkel sums up in this way:

"In short, recognizable sense, or fact, or methodic character, or impersonality, or objectivity of accounts are not independent of the socially organized occasions of their use. Their rational features consist of what members do with, what they "make of" the accounts in the socially organized actual occasions of their use. Members' accounts are reflexively and essentially tied for their rational features to the socially organized occasions of their use for they are features of the socially organized occasions of their use." (99)

Thus 'rationality', for example, is something that is recognizable by members within an actual setting whilst at the same time being something that is the result of their own practices and procedures for organizing the setting and making it accountable. Rational action is an "accountable" feature of a setting - it is a part of the organization of a setting - and not some absolute standard that stands over and against all settings, and which needs to be imported into them, as an analytical tool, by the theorist. Garfinkel's own paper on rationality (100) lists fourteen different senses of the term 'rationality' as it appears in different settings within the social world. 'Rationality' and 'rational action', in other words, are terms that people use, in settings, to account for features of them, as well as being a recognizable property of a setting and, as reflexively related to the setting within an account, a way of organizing the setting itself.

Some of the connections between this notion of accounting practices and their incarnate character, and Wittgenstein's notion of language as a tool that is used in actual contexts - within language games - are once again apparent. Again, however, I will make no attempt to follow through these links, preferring to leave this task for a later section of this chapter. It is a point worth noting, however, that 'language' used in this sense is a long way from Schutz's objective
meaning context of 'typifications'. (101)

In sum, then, to understand what Garfinkel means by terms like 'indexicality', 'description', and 'accounting', it is necessary to recognize that they are used in the context of the relationship between 'language', conceptualized not as an 'objective meaning context' but as something 'used', and the order and organization of the settings of everyday life. This relationship in its turn, as I have stressed throughout this section, is itself tied up with the procedures and assumptions which, at the structural level of 'cognition', enable 'agreement' about what is the case in the social world. To try to separate out aspects of Garfinkel's overall framework of thought and treat it in isolation is to take it out of context and to risk severe misunderstanding. Thus, for example, to see 'indexicality' on Garfinkel's account as concerned with the 'correspondence' theory of 'reality', or to see 'literal observation' as concerned with a 'neutral observation language' is to ignore the ways in which these terms are actually being used.

With these points in mind, I want now to move on to suggest what status ethnomethodological accounts should be seen as having on Garfinkel's account of the matter, and to show how the formulation of 'formal structures of practical actions' which appears in a paper by Garfinkel and Sacks, provides a statement of both the level and type of structural account that Garfinkel is aiming at, and of the status of ethnomethodological accounts.

THE STATUS OF ACCOUNTS, AND FORMAL STRUCTURES

Garfinkel, when asked what the rules of procedure were for ethnomethodology replied

"What you are asking is, "what is the nature of your own concern for the character of an adequate demonstration?" If you want me to answer in twenty minutes, I will. I guarantee that such an answer will not satisfy you." (102)
Harvey Sacks, in similar vein, when asked "Could you tell us without reference to the subject matter what the structure of a demonstration would be?" replied

"Do you know what that is asking? You are asking, "Could you tell me, without knowing what kind of world we are in, what a theory would look like?" (103)

In each case the question asked for a reply in terms of abstract, theoretical criteria for the adequacy of an ethnomethodological description, stated in the terms of more well known forms of sociological theorizing. Had they answered, for example, that it was the consistency of the account, or its correspondence with reality, or its relationship with the meanings of actors in the everyday world, then the inquisitors would perhaps have been content with the reply. As it was, however, the questioners demonstrate considerable dissatisfaction with the replies. They felt that the question had not been answered and that something must be up for such evasive answers to be given.

Reflection on the ethnomethodological concept of 'accounting practices', however, might help to clear up just what is going on here. As I have shown, accounts are "incarnate" - i.e. they are embedded within the context of their production such that they both organize the setting and depend upon it for their sense. This must be as true of sociological accounts as it is of anyone else's. The fact is, however, that the task of much sociology is seen as being to create accounts of social phenomena that are peculiarly 'sociological' in that context bound descriptions of the social world can be translated into a series of 'objective' expressions. In Garfinkel's terms, it attempts to "remedy" the indexicality of naturally produced accounts. (104)

The production of supposedly context independent criteria of adequacy, and indeed of the whole of the generalizing and abstract theory of sociology, is directed towards this end of producing context independent sociological descriptions of the social world. What Garfinkel and Sacks attempt to
do by replying to the questions put to them as they do, is to refuse to go along with this generalizing enterprise in favour of keeping the whole of the concept formation, description, and so on of their chosen sociological task, tied firmly to both the data being investigated and to the ways in which it is analyzed.

To put this another way, Garfinkel is saying that he just does get on with the work he does, analyzing the data and providing description of the practices and procedures underlying social order, and that as he begins to understand more the subject matter he is studying, so he comes to understand better what it is that he is doing. As he begins to uncover what is involved in describing some social phenomena, he comes to understand how it is that he himself describes the social world and he feels no need to specify before the task is completed what it is that he is doing in abstract terms. If he were able to do this, then either he would preempt his own investigation - he would know in advance what he would find out about the practice of describing - or else he would be in a fools paradise in which all he could possibly find out would be what he had already decided to be the case by theoretical fiat. Either way, when investigating the structures of practical actions, it can make no sense to decide on what it is that you are doing in abstract theoretical terms beforehand.

This "work in progress" aspect of the ethnomethodological enterprise, and the highly "reflexive" nature of the investigations and descriptions that are produced, can be made clearer, perhaps, with a quotation from Garfinkel and Sacks where they are trying to describe the omni-prevalence of indexical expressions.

"Any actual occasion may be searched for indexical terms, and will furnish indexical terms. Whatever is the number of terms in an actual text, that text will furnish members. An actual occasion with no text will furnish members. Any member of the list of indexical terms can be used as a prescription to locate replicas. Listing any replica of a member of the list is an adequate procedure for locating another member. Any procedure for finding a member is
adequate for finding for all terms of a language that they are members, which includes "all" - which is to say that in finding for all terms of a language that they are members we are exploring and using the members' use of "all". "A one", "any one", and "all" lists of indexical terms exhibit the same properties as the particular members of "a one", and "all" lists." (105)

This is not just a complex way of saying that all the terms in a language are in fact indexical, but it is rather a way of pointing out the reflexivity of their own enterprise. A concept like "all" is itself an indexical term, and it is a term that members of a society use all the time to make certain points with. The object of the ethnomethodological studies is to study the formal properties of indexical expressions - the ways in which members of a society actually use such expressions, and manage to make sense with them for all practical purposes, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the constant necessity of the 'etc!' assumption tagged on to any utterance. In studying these properties, ethnomethodologists themselves make use of indexical terms like 'all', and thus they must, necessarily, be investigating their own use of the term alongside its use by the members of society. In fact they do not even want to say that "all" the terms in a language are indexical, in a sense, since it is enough to have a method (in common with other members) for identifying indexical expressions in order to furnish themselves with their subject matter. They do not need to make abstract claims about the totality of expressions.

This very real reflexivity of ethnomethodological accounts is the direct result of the position that the ethnomethodologist takes up in relation to his subject matter. The possibility of his being able to do the studies that he does depends entirely on the fact that he is himself a member who uses the rules and practices that he is studying. As Garfinkel puts it

"We, in fact, are intellectual persons doing the work of categorization from inside the group. That is the change. That is the claim as well. That is the problem as well. That, we think, is the phenomenon." (106)
By studying the practices and rules of any member of a society, they are studying their own, and the warrant for studying such rules and practices is that they are their own. It is that fact that enables them to recognize such practices for what they are, and that thus provides the data for study, and there is no attempt to pretend that they can transcend the world of the ordinary member of society and transform ordinary everyday accounts into "correct" sociological descriptions. Garfinkel, when asked "whether (his) concern is that of an outsider studying folk wisdom" replied

"No! Once and for all, no! We are not studying folk wisdom in an ironic way. I am not saying that I know better. I am not armed with resources that would permit me to say, no matter how discreetly, "look, does the botanist believe there are salt water fish in a fresh water lake? Get that!" Nor am I saying things like, "The Catholics believe that whatever it is; the Jews have the inside track on that one". There is no irony." (107)

To study folk wisdom "ironically" would be to bring some standard from outside - such as rationality for example - in order to see what is "really" going on. It would involve rules for sense transformation of the type that Garfinkel claims Parsons puts forward in his theory of action which result in "normative descriptions" which enable the sociologist to over-ride the ordinary members accounts of what he is doing in terms of social scientific knowledge of the situation. He could, for example, take the action of a voter who claims that he votes Labour because he prefers their policies, and show that in fact what he is doing is demonstrating his class position. In this way the voters account of the matter is "ironized" in favour of the sociologist's greater wisdom on social matters. Garfinkel is not involved in 'ironizing' 'folk wisdom' - indeed he is not interested in 'folk wisdom' as a source of raw data to be transformed into 'sociologically adequate' accounts at all, but in the practices and procedures which provide the possibility of folk wisdom, as well as its stability and effectiveness, in the first place.
Put in slightly different fashion, what Garfinkel is claiming is that the sociologist ought to investigate social practices as the 'topic' of enquiry, rather than simply using them as an unexamined 'resource'. As he puts it:

"What we are proposing the vague programmatic recommendation, is that the whole damn thing is not to be taken as common-sense knowledge of practical reasoning being available as both a topic and a resource of professional sociological inquiry. What we are engaged in is trying to deal with common-sense knowledge, practical reasoning, and the rest as exclusively, only, and entirely a topic of inquiry. The big question is, "If you try it, what in the hell does it look like?"." (108)

Garfinkel is trying to avoid producing only 'normative' accounts of social phenomena - to avoid using 'practical reasoning' about 'sacred' rules and social structures in order to solve the sociological problem of social order in such a way that all that is produced in the sociological account of the social world is built upon the unexamined procedures which enable that order. His problem, as I have shown, is to find a way to unravel the structure of such procedures.

Perhaps the clearest formulation of Garfinkel's notion of this structure to date is contained in a paper which he wrote with Sacks entitled "On the Formal Structures of Practical Actions". What is most interesting about this notion of 'formal structures' is that it incorporates both a sense of the status of the ethnomethodological enterprise which I have just been discussing, as well as attempting to identify the important level of social structure involved in Garfinkel's solution to the problem of order.

Consider the definition:

"by formal structures we understand everyday activities (a) in that they exhibit upon analysis the properties of uniformity, reproducibility, repetitiveness, standardization, typicality, and so on; (b) in that these properties are independent of particular production cohorts; (c) in that particular-cohort independence is a phenomenon for members' recognition; and (d) in that the phenomena (a), (b) and (c) are every particular cohort's practical, situated accomplishment." (109)
The sense of this is perhaps already apparent, but it is worth emphasising. In the first place, formal structures are everyday activities that exhibit upon analysis the property of order. Here the "upon analysis" emphasises both that the orderly nature of social settings is available as an accountable matter for members of a society within those settings, and that because of that fact it is also available, upon analysis, to the sociological analyst who is himself a member of society. Following on from this, the properties of this order must not be seen as dependent upon any particular production cohort - some particular group of members of society - but should be seen, rather, in terms of the 'cognitive mechanisms' which enable 'agreement' about what is the case in the social world. It is not the case that a group of people get together to define what the social world looks like, but rather that there are various taken for granted practices and procedures which ensure that the social world is and remains an 'orderly' place with the properties of "uniformity, reproducibility, repetitiveness, standardization, typicality, and so on". Thus, the 'normality' and 'order' in the social world is recognized, by members of a society, to be something that is 'independent' of them. It is just 'what is the case' in the world - i.e. the social world for them is 'taken for granted' as an orderly place. At the same time, however, that they orient their activities to the 'orderliness' of things - to the assumption that there is order, and that it is readily perceivable - the members of a society do have a whole barrage of procedures and practices which ensure that that order is maintained. They use "accounting practices", "documentary method" and so on to ensure social order. Thus order in society, its independence from particular groups of members, and the fact that the order is recognizable, is the "accomplishment" of the members of society themselves within the settings of everyday life.

Contained in this notion of 'formal structures', then, is a concise
statement of the position that Garfinkel has developed over the course of his investigations of daily life. In it is the concern with social order, and the concern with the practices and procedures which make that order possible, including accounting practices, glossing, etc., let is pass, and so on. It thus incorporates the more recent concerns with language as well as stating, in a more precise form, just what it was that his earlier work was attempting to say. 'Formal structures', as a concept, identifies that level of structure, which is concerned with the cognitive mechanisms underlying agreement, that has been the constant focus of all Garfinkel's work. With this statement of 'formal structures' standing as a summary of Garfinkel's position, then, I want to move on now to consider the way in which that position relates to the work of Schutz and Wittgenstein.

GARFINKEL IN A CONTEXT

Over the course of the above discussion various points of similarity have been pointed out between the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein and some of the points of contrast indicated with that of Schutz. In this section I want to make these points of similarity and contrast more explicit in a systematic fashion in terms of the various indicators of an approach towards 'meaning' that have provided a focal point for the discussions of the last three chapters. In this way, the extent of Garfinkel's move away from his phenomenological roots will become apparent and some of its implications drawn out.

In the first place it is evident that Garfinkel's work does not contain the type of solution to the problem of universals that characterises Schutz's position. Where Schutz, as I have shown, rejects Husserl's notion of 'eidos' - of apriori essences - and claims instead that the empirical 'type' within the objective meaning structure is prior to essence, Garfinkel conceives of the matter in terms of practices and procedures. He has the following to say about the nature of 'agreement':
"Shared agreement" refers to various social methods for accomplishing the member's recognition that something was said-according-to-a-rule and not the demonstrable matching of substantive matters. The appropriate image of a common understanding is therefore an operation rather than a common intersection of overlapping sets." (110)

Thus what provides for the possibility of 'agreement' about what something or other is, is neither an essence contained in language or in the thing itself or an empirical ideal type, but "various social methods". Just as Wittgenstein argued that it is a mistake to look for what is common to all 'games' - or indeed to all instances of anything collected under the same concept - but that rather one must look at the ways in which a particular concept is 'used' in family resemblance fashion to make sense in various language games, so Garfinkel is suggesting that it is not what things have in common - "a common intersection of overlapping sets" - that enables "agreement" but various methods people use. The point being made here by both men is the same, and it stands in contrast with Schutz's position. Both are insisting that a search for essences cannot solve the problem of universals but that what must be looked at is the ways in which people actually do solve the problem in particular instances, within particular language games, using particular methods, using language in a family resemblances fashion and so on. The emphasis, in other words, is on what people do.

It follows from this that the notion of language that Garfinkel is using also contrasts with that of Schutz. Where the latter conceives of it in terms of "the sedimentation of typical experiential schemata" (111) and suggests that it is "The typifying medium par excellence by which socially derived knowledge is transmitted", (112) Garfinkel insists that

"Characteristically, formal investigations have been concerned either with devising normative theories of symbolic usages or, while seeking descriptive theories, have settled for normative ones. In either case it is necessary to instruct the construing member to act in accordance with the investigator's instructions in order to guarantee that the investigator will be able to study
their usages as instances of the usages the investigator has in mind. But, following Wittgenstein, person's actual usages are rational usages in some "language game". What is their game? As long as this programmatic question is neglected, it is inevitable that person's usages will fall short. The more this be so the more are subjects' interests in usages dictated by different practical considerations from those of investigators." (113)

Language, in other words, is not to be seen as a structure of meanings or a calculus, but as something that is used with a sense within the language games of everyday life. In other words, language is essentially an indexical phenomenon. The connection with Wittgenstein is made quite explicitly by Garfinkel himself in the above quotation, and the contrast with Schutz is obvious. Language is to be conceived of as an embedded phenomenon - as part of the flow of daily life - and not as something that stands over and against what people do, and against the 'real' world. Meanings are not to be seen as 'things' that are handed from one party to another over the course of communication, but as a part of our 'form of life', and as tied up with what people do. The point can be made stronger here by considering that just as Wittgenstein drops the model of 'object and designation' (the picture theory) in his discussion of language, so Garfinkel suggests that the notion of "sign" and "referent" can be dropped:

"Although it may at first appear strange to do so, suppose we drop the assumption that in order to describe a usage as a feature of a community of understandings we must at the outset know what the substantive common understandings consist of. With it, drop the assumption's accompanying theory of signs, according to which a "sign" and "referent" are respectively properties of something said and something talked about, and which in this fashion proposes sign and referent to be related as corresponding contents. By dropping such a theory of signs we drop as well, thereby, the possibility that an invoked shared agreement on substantive matters explains a usage.

If these notions are dropped, then what the parties talked about could not be distinguished from how the parties were speaking." (114)

Once again, the emphasis is on what people do with language, with their linguistic practices and procedures which will include 'accounting practices', rather than with language as a structure or calculus. Once
again the emphasis is in line with Wittgenstein and contrary to Schutz.

If language is being described in such a way that it becomes a mistake to see it as somehow opposed to an 'objective' world to which it refers - i.e. if a correspondence notion is being rejected - then one would expect that the parallel distinction between subject and object would also be reconsidered. This is, indeed, precisely what we do find. Garfinkel does not refer at all to 'subjective meanings' in the way that Schutz does, or to anything other than subjectivity which might be called a 'real', or 'objective' world. The distinction which Schutz makes, and which, as I have shown, gets him into considerable difficulties, between subjective and objective meaning contexts is alien to Garfinkel's position in that what is fundamental for him is what people do - structures of practices and procedures - and not either an objective world or subjective perceptions of it. Just as for Wittgenstein it is a 'form of life' that is fundamental, and thus prior to any distinction between subject and object - a form of life is the given - so for Garfinkel it is the methods used by members of a society during their daily round that is central. The 'congruence theory of reality', as he understands it in relation to Kaufman's work, "puts both actor and observer into a setting as the organizers of that setting and keeps them there," (115) and it is this theory that he wants to maintain.

In the process he once again comes close to Wittgenstein and moves away from Schutz.

As with Wittgenstein, Garfinkel can be seen to have transformed the sense of what is meant by 'intersubjectivity' by refusing to accept the subject object distinction as primary. What is meant by the 'problem of intersubjectivity' - what that problem is getting at - does not concern the mediation between different subjectivities as Schutz considered that it did, and thus it does not demand a solution in terms of 'objective meaning contexts' or 'ideal types'. Rather,
the problem concerns the practices and procedures - what it is that we do in Wittgenstein's sense - which enable 'agreement' about what is the case in the social world; which is a concern not with mediation between subjectivities but with the structural mechanisms which enable the organization of the settings of everyday life. The problem for the sociologist, as far as Garfinkel is concerned, thus becomes to understand how it is that social life is an orderly affair. The problem of social order is not the same thing at all as the problem of intersubjectivity - it requires the investigation of practices and procedures and not of 'essences', 'ideal types', 'meanings', 'internalized norms', etc., etc. What is meant by the problem stated in terms of intersubjectivity is in fact a concern with the structural mechanisms which enable meaningful interaction within the social world, which in its turn is a concern with the ways in which the settings of social life are able to exhibit order. None of this demands that the sociologist engage himself with subjectivities as such, and thus to state the problem as one of 'intersubjectivity' is to misrepresent it.

It is clear, then, that on this point, as on all of the others raised above, Garfinkel has moved away from the position espoused by Schutz, and towards that which Wittgenstein's later work develops. It is clear too that the approach towards the nature of 'meaning' which emerges from Garfinkel's work is equally far removed from that of Schutz, in that it refuses to accept that 'meaning' can somehow be abstracted from the 'form of life' within which it is embedded, and treated as that 'thing' which is passed between conversationalists over the course of interaction, or which is attached to objects in the social world. There are not 'subjective' or 'objective' meanings which are somehow contained in 'language', or in 'ideal types' independently of the things that people do with words and concepts during the daily round, or independently of the practices and procedures which enable
words to be used and understood as meaningful, or which enable action to be recognized as action rather than mere behaviour. People actually use words and concepts within language games over the course of daily life, and it is this that is important and that must be grasped if 'meaning' is to be understood. As Garfinkel puts it

"Persons cannot be nonconsequentially, nonmethodically, nonalternatively involved in doing (saying in so many words what we are doing). They cannot be engaged in nonconsequentially, nonmethodically, nonalternatively saying, for example, "This is after all a group therapy session", or "With respect to managerial roles, the size and complexity of organizations is increasing and hence the requirements necessary for their successful management also." (116)

The meaning of such phrases simply does not exist in a vaccuum, but is bound up with the whole context in which they were uttered, and to ignore that fact - to ignore the language games within which they occur - is to distort what was said, and to misunderstand the whole nature of language and 'meaning'.

That being the case, the problem at once arises of how to get to grips with 'meaning'. How is one to understand it? Whilst discussing Wittgenstein it became apparent that to gain some traction on the phenomenon of 'meaning' it would be necessary to unravel the 'form of life' which enables it, and of which it is a part. The problem, however, is that as the 'given', a form of life is not itself investigable, but can only stand as a 'clue' to the sociologist, pointing towards a possible subject matter - to a possible object of research - but not itself being that object. What I want to suggest here is that if one examines Garfinkel's notion of 'formal structures of practical actions' one will find interesting and useful parallels with Wittgenstein's notion of a 'form of life', whilst at the same time the notion is formulated in such a way that it invites empirical research rather than discouraging it.

Consider the way in which Wittgenstein's notion of 'rule' in the sense that does not imply 'interpretation' articulates with Garfinkel's
statement that "formal structures" are "everyday activities (a) in
that they exhibit upon analysis the properties of uniformity,
reproducibility, repetitiveness, standardization, typicality, and so
on". (117) With this notion of 'rule', I suggested, Wittgenstein
indicated that the bedrock is simply what people do. It is stated in
terms of 'rules' to indicate that it is "exhibited in what we call
"obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.". (118)
Now 'rule' in this sense, does not indicate some reified 'thing' in
the world, but instead suggests what it is that makes our talk of
'rules' and of 'rule following' possible in the first place. It is
the fact that people do things in certain ways that makes it possible to
speak about them following a rule on some particular occasion. Now
precisely the same is true of Garfinkel's notion as it is expressed
in terms of 'formal structures'. They simply are the orderly ways
that people do things and which upon analysis are recognizable as orderly.
It is this orderly way of doing things that provides for the possibility
of 'accounting' - which makes the settings of daily life 'accountable',
'analysable' and so on. It is not the case that, at this level, it
makes sense to talk about actors as 'following rules' if that is taken
to imply that they consciously 'interpret' some given rule, since the
observable order is "independent of particular production cohorts" - it
is dependent, in other words, upon taken for granted practices, procedures
and assumptions, or, in slightly different terminology, upon the
cognitive mechanisms that enable 'agreement', 'rational action',
'meaningful interaction', and so on. The bedrock, to say it again, is
simply what people do.

The parallel between the two notions of 'form of life' and 'formal
structures' is important because it suggests that in order to gain some
empirical leverage upon 'meaning' as it is conceptualised by Wittgenstein
and Garfinkel, the place to start is with 'formal structures'. Meaning
is embedded in the activities of our daily lives, and is made possible
by what we do - by our various practices and procedures. To understand how it is possible that we do in fact mean things by the words we use, and how it is possible that the furniture of our daily lives is 'meaningful', what must be investigated is the structures of practices that enable us to 'mean' anything at all, and that provide us with an 'orderly', 'meaningful' environment. Thus, problems about the transformations of social objects - as for example in a court room where a man becomes a 'criminal' - and about the practices which enable description, or enable meaning to be gleaned from a description, and so on become crucial to our understanding of what it is that is involved in the phenomenon of 'meaning' itself. If such practices are ignored, then meaning becomes, once again, a 'thing' of some sort, with all the difficulties which this implies in terms of 'correspondence', 'subjective' and 'objective' meanings, and the rest which have emerged over previous discussion of Schutz and of Wittgenstein's early work.

In short, then, the notion of 'formal structures' can be seen as recommending an investigation of the structures of practices and procedures which enable 'meaning' and 'meaningful' interaction and discourse within the organised settings of everyday life. Only in that way will it be possible to grasp the embeddedness of meaning within the activities of the daily round. Precisely the problem, however, is to find some way of doing this - as Garfinkel graphically puts it, "If you try it, what in the hell does it look like?". (119) Garfinkel's own work gives all sorts of pointers, and his experiments are indeed useful as 'aids to the sluggish imagination', but in the end one is left with a sense of not knowing quite what to make of what he has said. He insists that empirical work is important, but how does one set about doing it? It is all very well suggesting that there are 'glossing practices', 'etc. assumptions', 'ad hocking practices', the 'documentary method' and so on, but where does one go from there? Is that all that
can be said, or are there further routes to be travelled which will unravel 'formal structures' in a more perspicuous fashion? It is interesting that the work of other ethnomethodologists that has drawn upon Garfinkel's insights has not at all moved in a single direction. The work of Cicourel, Weider and Zimmerman, Blum and McHugh, Sacks and Schegloff, Pollner and Coulter and so on has pursued a variety of different possible lines of enquiry which have led them to produce significantly different kinds of analyses. In the remaining chapters, I want to trace through some of the ways in which Garfinkel's work has been used, at the same time showing how it has been adapted, pointing out areas of comparison and contrast, and thus both highlighting aspects of Garfinkel's own work and showing some of its promise. In the process, ways of carrying on a sociological investigation of the social world which accepts the account of the nature of 'meaning' which has emerged from the work of Wittgenstein and Garfinkel will become apparent.

Before moving on one more point needs to be made by way of conclusion to the present chapter and introduction to those that follow, concerning, once again, the status of ethnomethodological investigations. Given the links which I have suggested can be seen between Wittgenstein and Garfinkel, it is useful to conceptualise the whole ethnomethodological enterprise in terms of 'language games'. This can be illustrated as follows.

The object of ethnomethodological studies is to describe the 'formal structures of practical actions', whatever that might turn out to mean in concrete terms. Now given the necessity of the 'etc.', which is appended to any description and, the need for 'glossing practices', 'let is pass', 'factum valet' and so on, it could make no sense to suppose that one could somehow positivistically identify such structures and unequivocally categorize them. That there is orderliness in the activities of daily life suggests that there is an 'object' for study
that is worth sociological investigation and description, but at the same time what is involved in 'description' is not the production of a set of descriptive propositions that stand, somehow, in a relationship of 'correspondence' with that which is described. There are sets of practices which enable description, and which enable descriptions to be understood once they have been formulated, and an investigation of 'formal structures' would hope to make visible in some way what those practices were. That process of making visible, however, is possible only because of those same descriptive practices, which are themselves part of the mechanisms for making the settings of everyday life 'orderly'. Thus, 'describing', 'identifying', 'making visible' and so on these 'formal structures', is something done, and done so as to make the 'object' of study exhibit orderly features. In other words, the investigation of the formal structures of practical action is itself a 'language game' with all that that concept implies about the interrelationship of words, concepts and activities.

To suppose that ethnomethodologists think that they can somehow avoid using indexical expressions, or can avoid the practices which enable description and so on is, I think, to miss the 'language game' nature of any enterprise whether scientific or some other, which follows from Garfinkel's insistence, following Kaufmann, that 'knowledge' should be seen in terms of the rules and procedures which produce it and make it possible. A body of knowledge, in other words, is a 'corpus' in Kaufmann's sense of the term. I stress this here both to highlight another link between Garfinkel and Wittgenstein, and because in the next two chapters, especially when discussing conversational analysis, it may clarify the nature of the work under discussion to think of it in terms of language games, rather than seeing it in positivistic terms as an attempt to produce descriptions that 'correspond' to the 'real world'. The one exception to this is, as will be seen, Cicourel whose work represents a move away from Garfinkel and back towards Schutz.
with the result that his handling of questions of 'meaning' suffers from many of the defects of Schutz's work. With this point made, I want now to turn to look at some of the work that has been influenced by Garfinkel.
CHAPTER 4 - GARFINKEL

1. See, for example, the preface to Garfinkel, 1967, p.IX.

2. Filmer, for example, in Filmer et al, 1972, Chapter 9, seems to presume that Garfinkel and Schutz are merely sides of the same coin with the result that Garfinkel's notion of language (among other things) is misrepresented.


5. Hill and Crittenden (1968) stress the "work in progress" aspect of ethnomethodology in their conclusion to the symposium.


10. Ibid, p.44.


12. Ibid, p.56.


22. Ibid, p.75.

23. These remarks do not hold for all ethnomethodologists. Cicourel,
for example, does use the concept "cognition" in a way that implies subjectivity, and, as I will show in the next chapter, lands himself in difficulties.

25. Kaufmann, 1958, p.vII.

27. It is interesting to notice, here, the links between Kaufmann and versions of logical positivism that emphasise rules. He exploits the notion of 'rule', in his attempt to synthesise Positivism and Phenomenology, cf. here Kaufmann, 1968.

29. Ibid, p.42.
33. Ibid, p.70.
34. Ibid, p.71.
35. Ibid, p.97.

36. This, as we have seen, is the account of truth which Schutz appears to hold.

38. Garfinkel, (D), p.76.
39. Ibid, p.76.
42. Garfinkel, (D), p.23.
43. Garfinkel, 1962, p.189. This definition occurs throughout the Parsons Primer.
45. Garfinkel, (D), Chapter on Values, p.112.
46. Garfinkel, (C), and 1952.
47. Garfinkel does talk about theories of "reality" here, and not "truth", presumably because his discussion is about a theory of objects and not of knowledge. This shift in terminology is the root of some of the confusions between Goldthrope (1973 & 1974) and Benson (1974).


49. Ibid, p.95-6.


51. Ibid, p.98.

52. Garfinkel (and Schutz) (B).

53. Garfinkel, 1952, Ch.14. It is interesting to notice, in this context, that Bauman's suggestion (1978, p.174) that Garfinkel has never read Husserl is mistaken. Garfinkel references Husserl's "Ideas" extensively, (and also other works are mentioned) in his thesis.


55. Gurwitsch, 1966. This essay was published after Garfinkel's examination of Parsons & Schutz, and hence, obviously, could not have directly influenced Garfinkel. However it does give us an insight into a crucial feature of Gurwitsch's thinking, and it is his orientation that, I am suggesting, influenced Garfinkel, rather than specific essays.

56. Wittgenstein, P.I., p.194e.


63. Ibid, p.420.
64. Ibid, p.422.
68. Ibid, p.198.
70. Ibid, p.209.
73. It is interesting to notice that this tension in Garfinkel's account seems to have caused difficulties for Cicourel. In Cicourel, 1973, this paper on "Trust" is referenced several times, but its message is translated into notions of "surface" and "Interpretive" rules - which, I will argue in the next chapter, leads Cicourel into difficulty.
76. Ibid, p.217.
77. Garfinkel, 1967, Ch.5.
78. Ibid, p.137.
79. Ibid, Ch.4.
80. Garfinkel, 1967, Ch.3.
81. Ibid, p.94.
82. Ibid, p.78.
86. Ibid, p.20.
89. Ibid, p.364.
90. Ibid, p.371.
91. Heap, 1975, notes this transformation, although his account of its nature differs from mine.
93. Cf., for example, Garfinkel (A).
94. For example, Phillips, 1977, p.201 considers that ethnomethodologists claim for themselves some privileged access to the social world.
96. Ibid, p.103.
97. Ibid, p.100.
100. Garfinkel, 1960, reproduced in Garfinkel, 1967, Chapter 8. It is interesting to notice some of the differences between the original article and its version in "Studies" where several changes are made. The changes seem to add up to a shift away from an explicit dependence on Schutz.
101. It thus seems wrong to presume, as Filmer (1972) does, that Garfinkel sees language as an interpretive scheme of interpretations.
103. Ibid, p.41.
107. Ibid, p.28.
108. Ibid, p.120. Further discussion of the topic resource issue can be found in Zimmerman and Pollner, 1971.
111. Schutz, 1974, p. 234.
114. Ibid, p. 28.
117. Cf. note 109 above (p. 58) for full quotation.
118. Wittgenstein, P.I. 201. Stress is added.
119. Cf. note 108 above.
CHAPTER 5

SOME COMPARATIVE AND CONTRASTIVE APPROACHES

In this chapter I want to look at the work of sociologists who have, in one way or another, been influenced by the phenomenological tradition (chiefly in the form of Schutz), Garfinkel, Wittgenstein, or some combination of these three. The object of the discussion is twofold. Firstly, I want to illustrate that it is not the case that all of those writers who term themselves 'ethnomethodological' (or who are foisted with that label in spite of protests, such as Blum and Mchugh) or 'Wittgensteinian' can be treated unreflexively together. To treat Cicourel, for example, as though he were Garfinkel's shadow, is to do both men an injustice, and to miss the point of what is is that both are trying to do. A second purpose is to illustrate, by using contrast, some of the points that were made in the previous chapter with regard to Garfinkel. Thus the particular level at which Garfinkel's notion of 'structure' as it emerges in 'formal structures' is aimed, can be seen in relation to the different ways in which Weider, Winch and Cicourel conceptualise 'rules'. Similarly, the way in which 'meaning' is dealt with by Cicourel throws into relief both the extent to which Garfinkel has rejected a Schutzian notion, and the way in which his approach to language, essentialism and subjectivity and objectivity, shapes his approach to the study of society.

I will divide the chapter into two main sections, each with sub-sections. In the first section the focus will be on writers who have been influenced chiefly by Garfinkel and Schutz. The work of Cicourel and Weider will be discussed in this context, with occasional references to the adjacent concerns of Douglas, Zimmerman, and Sudnow. The second section will look at the work of thinkers influenced by Wittgenstein,
or Wittgenstein and Garfinkel. Here the interest will be chiefly in the work of Winch, Louch, Blum and McHugh, Pollner and Coulter. I have, of necessity, limited the scope of the discussion in line with the general aims of the chapter. Thus 'reflexive' sociologists, such as O'Neill (1), and Mehan and Wood (2) have not been considered, and no attempt has been made to cover the whole literature of either Wittgensteinian approaches to the social sciences - for example the work of Pitkin (3), Von Wright (4), and Phillips (5) come immediately to mind under this heading - or phenomenological sociology - here the most notable absence is the work of Berger and Luckmann (6). I have not ventured, either, into existential sociology (7) which is why the work of Douglas for example has not been looked at in any depth. (8) Instead I have adopted, as a strategy, the policy of looking, in a degree of depth, at the writings of theorists whose work can be seen as contrasting in illuminating ways with that of Garfinkel. The hope is that in that way the core of Garfinkel's position, and of its relationship to concerns that share something with it, will be illustrated more persuasively than would be possible if the net of the chapter were cast wider.

1. GARFINKEL AND SCHUTZ AS INFLUENCES. a) THE PROBLEM OF MEASUREMENT

Concerns with problems of 'measurement' derived from a broadly ethnomethodological perspective have taken the form of an attack on the use of official statistics as the raw data of sociological accounts of the social world. The argument, in very broad terms, is that these statistics cannot be taken unproblematically as representations of social trends, social phenomena, social facts, etc. This is because 1. They are themselves meaningful social data that have been collected by members of a society who recognise that meaningfulness, 2. that they are the result of considerable interactional work on the part of both those to whom the statistics refer, and of those who have assembled
them as statistics, and 3. that therefore, such statistics cannot be
understood unless this assembled and meaningful aspect of them is taken
into account. Sudnow's account of 'normal crimes' (9), for example,
documents the way in which 'criminals' are assigned to some particular
category of offence on the basis of considerable negotiation between
lawyers and the offender, in such a way that someone relying on the
penal code categories for an understanding of rates of crimes of various
sorts would not get at all an accurate picture of what was going on.
Similarly the study of suicide by Douglas (10) casts doubt upon the
usefulness of officially compiled statistics of self inflicted death,
while Cicourel's classic study of juvenile crime (11) casts statistics
concerning young offenders in a completely new light.

The purpose of this section, however, is not to follow through the
substance of these critiques in detail, but rather, in line with the
general aims of the chapter, to look at the ways in which the studies
generated by a concern with measurement have differed in significant
and highly instructive ways from the work and perspective of Garfinkel.
I will concentrate chiefly on the work of Cicourel, but many of the
remarks that will be made will also be relevant to Douglas's book, and
I will try to indicate when this is the case.

Cicourel states his driving concerns and problems in his first
major solo work, "Method and Measurement in Sociology". Here he makes
it clear that

"measurement presupposes a bounded network of shared
meanings, i.e. a theory of culture. The physical scientist
alone defines his observational field, but in social science
the arena of discourse usually begins with the subjects
pre-selected and pre-interpreted cultural meanings." (12)

This means that the social scientist who wants to measure social
phenomena has a particular problem in that he must design techniques for
investigating and measuring social phenomena that take account of the
"subjects preselected and pre-interpreted cultural meanings", otherwise
he will end up forcing the social world into inadequate categories with
the result that he will misunderstand his subject matter. It is inevitable, Cicourel claims, that "Measurement in sociology - or more appropriately, observation, classification and labelling - is rooted in the "common body of understanding" and "common understanding of the language" in everyday life", (13) but this does not mean that such common understandings should, therefore, be simply taken for granted and left unexamined, as is so often the case in sociology. To do so results in an unwarranted reification of the events under study and a consequent distortion of social life - the sociologist ends up achieving only "measurement by fiat" (14) rather than providing an adequate picture of the social world. Cicourel suggests that, in the light of this,

"The problems of measurement, therefore, can be viewed from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge: the world of observables is not simply "out there" to be described and measured with the measurement systems of modern science, but the course of historical events and the ideologies of a given era can influence what is "out there" and how these objects and events are to be perceived, evaluated, described and measured." (15)

The problem for the sociologist becomes one of finding ways of producing sociological accounts of social phenomena that takes account of the effect of 'meanings' upon his observations and measurements of the social world. Somehow, he must confront these difficulties so that his studies do not simply produce "measurement by fiat". The question is, how?

The difficulties which Cicourel faces are considerable. Not only is it the case that actors in the social world all have different 'meanings', but also the sociological observer himself has his own perspective on things, which will inevitably colour and modify the description which he gives of social phenomena. At the same time, the particular era in which the sociologist happens to be born adds a further dimension of difficulties in terms of ideologies and historically specific 'meanings'. Cicourel has formulated his problem in such a way
that all of these different factors must somehow be taken into account.

It is perhaps evident already, that the strong concern with 'subjective' meanings is not at all compatible with Garfinkel's stress on the mechanisms that enable social order at the cognitive level.

Cicourel himself recognises that he may diverge from Garfinkel in the following remark in the preface to "Method and Measurement"

"The present work began after my association with Garfinkel and may depart significantly from his ideas about the same or similar topics." (16)

At the same time, however, the association with Garfinkel is reflected in Cicourel's concern for everyday life. His concern with 'meaning' leads him to consider that the only possibility of going beyond 'normative' accounts of social phenomena such as those that structural functionalism tries to pass off as science under the guise of statistics, is to look at the way in which members of a society order and organize their world by means of practices and procedures. Just as Garfinkel is looking for the formal structures that enable sense to be made out of indexical expressions, so Cicourel turns to study the ways in which statistical data come to be assembled, such that they give some order to the disparate elements of everyday life; how it is that such figures are interpreted by members of a society and sociologists alike in terms of background assumptions. Both Garfinkel and Cicourel, in other words, are interested in the fact that what appears to be unproblematically order in the social world, whether as calculated statistical regularities or as the observable regularities of behaviour in the social world, is treated by sociologists as if it had an independent ontological status of its own over and against the actors involved, who become simply 'cultural dopes'. In contrast they seek to understand such orderly properties by investigating the practices and procedures that maintain them over the course of everyday interactions. It is the concern for the everyday that unites the work of the two men more than any other factor.
That said, however, the considerable differences between their approaches are important, and they stem, I want to suggest, from the different notions of 'meaning' espoused by the two men. Where Garfinkel insists on the 'embeddedness' of 'meaning' within the practices, procedures, rules, etc. of daily life, Cicourel insists on maintaining a Schutzian notion in which 'meaning' is somehow 'contained' in meaning structures within the social world. To make this fact apparent, I want first of all, with the aid of remarks by Hindess, to pinpoint a fundamental source of tension within Cicourel's programme. With this as a base, I will then discuss "The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice" to show how Cicourel goes about investigating the social world empirically and to illustrate something of the way in which he treats 'meaning', before going on to unravel in some detail the specific differences between Garfinkel's and Cicourel's conceptualizations of 'meaning', indicating how this effects the sense of various of the terms which they use - for example 'indexicality'.

Hindess indicates the area of difficulty when he points out that both Cicourel and Douglas seem to hold to a correspondence theory of truth. He argues that their approach to official statistics suggests that what is really at issue for them is the amount of correspondence between the statistics and the real world that they are taken to represent. Thus he writes:

"It would seem that what is at stake in these arguments is the failure of the tabulations given in official statistics to correspond to observable differences and distinctions between 'real-world' objects." (17)

The reasons why this would create problems for Cicourel is simply that if his central thesis is that there are always, in any measurement of social phenomena, biases present that are the result of the 'meanings' of actors or observers, and if it is never possible for any sociologist to transcend such meanings in principle - and this is indeed what Cicourel does seem to be saying - then problems about the relationship between sociological measurements and the real world will always be
present whatever one does, and no amount of ethnomethodological study could help the situation. Studies by the ethnomethodologist, just as much as those by other sociologists, will be subject to the same biases and problems that beset any observer of social phenomena. It could not, in principle, be possible to solve the problems of the reference of sociological measurements and observations by further supposedly more adequate (although in reality just different) sociological observations and measurements. The problem, here, is a serious one. Hindess sums up

"Unless the sociologist is to be accorded the capacity denied to ordinary mortals, to describe objects and events without the intervention of background expectancies or of tacit knowledge, then his accounts must be subject to precisely the same type of limitation as those of other observers. In that case his remarks cannot be 'taken on faith as an accurate portrayal of "what happened"' ("Social Organization of Juvenile Justice" p.6.). For every sociologists' account we require a second account of how his background expectancies affect his account. This second account requires a third, and so on. The circularity of the prescribed procedure is obvious. We are faced with an infinite regression at no stage of which is it possible to escape the determination of seen but unnoticed background expectancies. These positions, therefore, lead to a complete relativism and to a necessary agnosticism with respect to the possibility of an objective knowledge of the world." (18)

Thus, Hindess claims, Cicourel, since he 'really' wants to talk about a 'real world', is caught in a vicious circularity.

Whilst it is undoubtedly true that Cicourel does speak about the 'reference' of statistical data, as I shall illustrate in discussing "The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice", it is not clear that this is his fundamental concern or that it should be read in terms of 'correspondence'. His central interest lies in the phenomenon of 'meaning' itself. Thus what one would expect is that what looks like a problem of correspondence will turn out to be a problem concerned with meaning in some way or another. What I want to show is that this is indeed the case, and that it is the extent to which Cicourel remains interested in Schutz's notion of meaning which creates his most serious problems.
In his classic study of "The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice", then, Cicourel sets about an empirical investigation which will not take social meanings as 'given', but will treat them, as well as official statistics, as the object of study. To this end he examines the set of relationship between juveniles who, for some reason, come into contact with the police, the police themselves, the probation officers, the courts, and the statistics which were produced by the different official bodies. Rather than simply take delinquency as given - as something to which statistics on delinquency are taken to refer - he is interested in the processes of negotiation that go into deciding what is the 'just' thing to do for some particular offender. How is it, in other words, that someone becomes 'delinquent' rather than 'high spirited', and what part do background assumptions - taken for granted 'meanings' - play in the process?

His study is of two cities in California. In city A., Cicourel claims, there is very little corruption, whilst in city B. it is rife. It is not only the level of corruption that is different between the two cities, however, and Cicourel goes on to give an impressionistic account of the law enforcement agencies of them both as a prelude to an examination of the statistics of juvenile delinquency that they have generated. City A. has a "professionally oriented" police force, that has a well defined bureaucratic structure for promotion, that is not closely tied to the political side of the city's life, that does not encourage policemen to take other work during non-duty hours, and so on. City B., on the other hand, has a police force that is closely tied to political considerations. The police chief is appointed in terms of patronage. Many policemen are politically involved in one way or another, and many of them take other work out of hours - security work for example. In sum

"The two departments studied provided both a professionally oriented organization (city A) and one more or less patterned
after the model of the corrupt big city force (city B),
imimately associated with political and criminal

graft and corruption, vividly illustrating the conflicting
orientations the police employ." (19)

There are, however, similarities between the two cities in the ways
in which juveniles were dealt with. Cicourel lists several important
considerations (20) which include the observations that "the procedures
of criminal law (adult arrest, and search and seizure rules) are
seldom followed", that suspects were seldom advised of their
constitutional rights, that the family are often involved in the case by
the police and probation officers, that the right to counsel is seldom
considered seriously, and that the court procedures are often more like
a ritual ceremony than a genuine trial, since "the probation officer,
his supervisor, the offender and his family, and the court referee or
judge" have generally sorted things out beforehand. The general
impression Cicourel gives is that the treatment of juveniles is intended
to 'help' the offender, so that the procedures governing the handling
of adults would be out of place in a juvenile setting.

Cicourel next goes on to examine statistics concerning the
delinquency rates in the two cities in the light of the above. These
figures have been collected using standard sociological procedures, but,
and this is the main point that Cicourel wants to make

"I want to underscore how their interpretation necessarily
presumes a knowledge of the impressionistic descriptions
given in this section. Yet it is common for social scientists
to utilize delinquency rates from local, state, or national
sources and construct inferences that never clarify what is
presumed about community and law-enforcement organizations." (21)

In other words, in order to interpret the lists of figures that are
given of the rates of delinquency in the two cities, one must presume
considerable background knowledge about the way the police departments
in them are run, and about the ways in which juveniles are handled. To
take just one example, the figures are given for the age at which young
offenders first come into contact with the police in the two cities. They
suggest, on the face of it, that delinquency starts earlier in city A.
Cicourel suggests, rather, that

"The number of offenders making first contact with the police in elementary school is not trivial in City A, suggesting, (once again,) that efficiency in police operations would reveal a more general problem of delinquency or juvenile "problems" as a routine feature of community life." (22)

Cicourel's main point here is not that the 'at first sight' interpretation is wrong whereas his is right, but rather he wants simply to point out that to make any sense out of the figures at all demands considerable background knowledge. The figures just do not and cannot speak for themselves, and to suppose that they somehow reference in unproblematic fashion some objective fact of social life, is to misunderstand the extent to which taken for granted knowledge plays a part in any statistics.

Not only is this the case, but at the same time there are all sorts of problems with the way particular happenings are 1. placed into some specific category in the first place - e.g. the policeman must make a choice between - calling an event 'grand theft auto' or 'joy riding', and which of these he choses effects whether it is a 'serious' crime or not, and 2. recoded by the statistician in such a way that what he wants to find out from the material becomes available to him. On this second point, Cicourel goes into some detail concerning the difficulties which his graduate coders had in analysing the police files to unravel whatever they had to offer. (23) Constantly they were having to make decisions as to which category to fit some particular piece of information into, and often they were forced to make entirely arbitrary decisions on the matter, or to invent a new category altogether. All of this is usually covered over in standard statistical studies with the result that quite what they refer to becomes problematic:

"the "findings" obtainable from police records become the basis for posing questions about structural and attitudinal conditions that can be cross-tabulated conveniently, but the referents for such findings remain obscure." (24)
At this point Cicourel's concern with 'reference' becomes apparent. What this concern seems to amount to, however, is not to do with the relationship between 'findings' and the 'real world', but rather a more general epistemological issue is being raised concerning the relationship between 'findings' and 'background assumptions' - 'meanings' - and between 'findings' and 'procedures for assembling findings'. Atkinson makes the point I am after here in relation to Douglas's work:

"critics have been able to respond by confusing the problems of accuracy and reliability with the broader problems of epistemology (which) can be seen as a consequence of the way Douglas presents his case on official statistics. That is to say, there is an important sense in which Douglas himself fails to make a clear distinction between the two sets of issues he deals with." (25)

Just as Douglas fails to separate out questions of epistemology from those of reliability, so that at one moment he seems to be talking about the 'real world' that statistics ought to measure, whilst at the next he is making sophisticated points about the 'meaning' of the concept 'suicide', so Cicourel does not make it clear that his primary concern is with 'meanings' and their relationship to statistics and not with some ontological presupposed 'deviancy' which statistics ought to measure. As will become apparent later, this is the result of the way in which he conceptualizes 'meaning' itself.

Cicourel attempts to handle the problems which he has outlined, concerning the relationship between meanings, statistics and procedures, by carrying out an ethnomethodological study designed to uncover the ways in which members of a society, who in this instance are the police and probation officers, actually make the system (of juvenile justice) work over the course of their everyday activities. How is the information produced that goes into an official file on the delinquent? What are the rules and theories involved in the officials' stock of knowledge at hand? What are the everyday categories on the basis of which something is recognised as an instance of such and such a thing, or is seen as being
strange or out of place? It is these questions that Cicourel wants to answer in his study, for in that way a clearer picture will emerge as to what is involved in the statistics that are given of juvenile delinquency.

I could not hope to capture the host of detailed ethnographic material that Cicourel gives over the course of the last 200 or so pages in pursuit of his study. He documents the negotiation which goes on between police officer and offender and points out the fact that none of this ever goes on to the official record of what was said at some particular interview. (26) He shows the ways in which some offenders, who on the face of it have committed similar offences, are treated in entirely different ways by police and probation officer, (27) and how the juveniles 'attitude' is such an important factor in the treatment he receives. He shows how different people involved in the case, including the juvenile, all have different points of view about the matters concerned, and that

"there is no objectifiable common set of referents from which the different perspectival views are generated in the different community agencies and the juveniles family or neighbours." (28)

He shows, too, the ways in which political power or influence applied by the parents, even in a case as serious as one in which the victim was beaten to death, can result in the offender being treated very leniently. (29)

In short, what Cicourel does is to document the incredible variety in the everyday life of law enforcement agencies, with all its negotiation, prejudice, taken for granted knowledge, points of view and so on, that has to be condensed into a few lines of the official report. He shows how much of what goes on just could not possibly be included in files, and that anyway many of such matters are so much a part of everyday routine for those writing the report that they are unnoticed, and virtually unnoticable, background features. In sum
"The P.O. (and the police) employ theories in their practical reasoning about the particulars of how events occur, or how members accomplish tasks or general activities, but to terminate cases they must utilize organizational criteria and legal propositions to provide truncated and idealized or general policies and rules about the nature of behaviour." (30)

What Cicourel has done, then, over the course of his study of police and probation officers, is to give substance to his more theoretical claims about the difficulties with statistical data by describing in considerable detail the actual practices of law enforcement agencies. He sums up his case by saying that

"Organizational policies and their articulation with actual cases, via the background expectancies of officers differentially authorized to deal with juveniles, directly changed the size of the "law-enforcement net" for recognizing and processing juveniles viewed as delinquent, and determined the size and conception of the "social problem". The sociologist, therefore, cannot take community or law-enforcement definitions of deviance and their routine organizational processing, as "obvious" in his description and analysis of "social problems"." (31)

It is not the case that there is some ontological 'deviancy' to which statistics compiled by the police refer, but on the contrary, how the label 'deviant' comes to be ascribed is a complex process involving police and probation procedures, background knowledge etc., etc. If sociology is ever to come to terms with the social world in some 'objective' way, then it must recognise all of these aspects of statistical data.

This concludes the present discussion of Cicourel's work on juvenile justice, which has given a sense of the type of work that he is engaged in. Against this background, and with the remarks that have been made about Cicourel's concerns with 'meaning' in mind, I want now to go on to talk in more detail about the ways in which this notion of 'meaning' can be seen as the underlying reason for the tension in his work which Hindess identified in terms of correspondence. I will do this by focusing on three areas of concern which will both highlight Cicourel's problems and illustrate fundamental differences between his work and that
of Garfinkel. These will be concerned with questions of 'meaning' and 'use' in relation to language, the distinction between subjective and objective meaning, and finally the notion of 'rule'. Against this background I will suggest that the ways in which Cicourel uses such concepts as 'indexicality' are fundamentally different - have a different import - from the ways in which Garfinkel uses them.

1. Meaning and Use. The clue to Cicourel's view of language lies in his "Method and Measurement". In this work, he discusses Wittgenstein, and it is worthwhile pointing out three things about this discussion that suggest that Cicourel's reading of the 'Philosophical Investigations' differs from that given in chapter 3 above in that it does not place stress on the fact that language is used, but remains wedded to a notion of 'meaning' as somehow contained in the structure of 'la langue' - as he writes

"Langue, as a system, can be studied for its structural features and its potentialities for discourse. It is a repository governed by rules that can be highly formalised." (32)

Cicourel is insistent throughout that this structural aspect of language must be allowed for.

The first point of interest is that when Wittgenstein's work is introduced, it is with the idea that "the meaning of a word is to be understood through its use, where meaning is use." (33) The idea is immediately qualified, however, with the remark that "Ziff's analysis provides balance in this discussion .... (he) stresses the importance of both syntactic structures and situational conditions which alter meaning". In other words, Cicourel is making it clear that he thinks that the equation which he considers Wittgenstein to be making between meaning and use must be tempered with some notion of the structural aspect of language.

The second point is concerned with the interpretation that Cicourel gives to a remark that he quotes from Wittgenstein. I will give the quotation:
"If we look at the example in §1, we may perhaps get an
inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of a word
surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes
clear vision impossible. It disperses the fog to study the
phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which
one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the
words." (34)

If the interpretation of Wittgenstein's work that was given above in
Chapter 3 is to the point, then what this short quotation is about is
the fact that a particular notion of meaning - i.e. the object and
designation model - which is espoused by St. Augustine (this quotation
comes at the end of a discussion of Augustine's view of language) leads
to confusion about just how language does work. Thus, Wittgenstein
is suggesting, it helps to examine primitive language games - such as
the one in which the builder calls to his mate for 'slabs', 'beams', etc.
- to start to understand the way in which language is used within the
context of all sorts of actions and purposes.

What Cicourel says about this passage, however, is far from this,and it is highly revealing. For him it is an example of the fact that
Wittgenstein claimed that one should study everyday life if one is to
understand language. Thus:

"The "rules" governing everyday life are discussed in much
of Wittgenstein's work and his discussion of them underlines
Schutz's insistence that the study of categories employed
by the man in the street should be the first task of
sociology." (35)

In other words, the whole thrust of Wittgenstein's point about a
particular model of the 'meaning' of concepts is lost in Cicourel's
interpretation of this piece. Instead he finds Wittgenstein urging us
to examine the everyday categories of the man in the street, which
presumably implies the 'meanings', or 'typifications' that make up the
"real" substance of the words.

Finally, it is interesting to note the way in which Cicourel
equates the work of Wittgenstein and Schutz. I have already suggested
the extent of the differences between the two men and will not labour
the argument further at this juncture. What Cicourel's conflation here
here suggests, once again, is that he considers language to be a structure of meaning that is used, but where the use is always subsidiary to, and must be balanced by, some notion along Schutzian lines of a structure of ideal types— an objective meaning structure of some kind.

The contrast with Garfinkel on this point is perhaps obvious enough. Where Garfinkel's concern is with the ways in which language is used in accounting practices as part of the machinery for bringing order to everyday life, Cicourel is concerned not to relinquish the notion that there is a structure of meaning contained in language. The contrast will become more apparent as the discussion progresses.

2. Subjective and objective meaning. That Cicourel has a notion of subjective meaning becomes evident fairly quickly over the course of a reading of any of his work. The concept of subjectivity that he seems to hold, owes much to Schütz, and is often stated in terms of 'subjective meaning structures'— for example

"The researcher cannot assume that he and the actor enjoy the same community of subjective meaning structures for assigning cultural significance to an event or object." (36)

Thus, opposed to the structure of meaning that is to be found in language, (37) is the subjective meanings of the people actually living in the everyday life-world. What it is important to notice is that it is the omni-prevalence of subjective meanings that Cicourel sees as one of the chief problems for an adequate social science, and it is to the solution of this problem that his work is addressed.

The contrast here with Garfinkel is once again evident. Where Garfinkel considers "subjectivity" to be a secondary phenomenon, for Cicourel it is a central concern. The fact that different people perceive things in different ways in the social world, and that thus there is never any guarantee that either the actors, or the actor and the researcher, will 'mean' the same thing, or will give the same meaning to some social or physical phenomenon, is what gives the sociologist most of his headaches.
3. Rules and interpretive procedures. It is at this point that the nub of Cicourel's position becomes apparent. Cicourel introduces the way in which he is interested in the notion of rule in "Method and Measurement" in the context of a discussion of meaning. The social scientist, if he is to go beyond folk sociology to make more scientific pronouncements, must first of all recognize the differences (or potential differences) between the actors' perceptions and meanings, and his own. He goes on

"The next step requires some specification of the "rules" which orient the actor's perception and interpretation of his environment." (38)

In other words, the differences in meaning - in subjective meaning- are the result of differential perception and interpretation of the social scene, and what must be done is to uncover the "rules" that govern the ways in which these meanings are assigned to things. These rules are conceived to be 'invariant'. Thus

"My discussion is concerned not with the assignment of meanings to specific events or objects in particular situations but rather with the general or invariant properties which can be said to characterize the "rules" or "standards" whereby meanings are assigned to events or objects." (39)

This idea, as Cicourel makes clear, (40) owes a lot to Garfinkel's paper on trust where what is asserted is that what the sociologist should look for is not the 'sacred rules' of the game of social life - i.e. the structure of norms and values - but the 'constitutive structure' which grounds such rules. As I stressed in the previous chapter, however, the precise import of Garfinkel's notion of rule as developed in this paper is not wholly unambiguous and it is necessary for Cicourel to interpret the concept in some way that clarifies it. This interpretation is based on the work of Schutz (41) and is perhaps most clearly worked out in the collection of essays "Cognitive Sociology".

In an essay on the concept of 'role' Cicourel draws a sharp distinction between what he calls 'surface rules' on the one hand, and
'interpretive rules' on the other. 'Surface rules' are what the sociologist usually thinks of as 'norms', and they provide a sense of 'consensus' in the social world, whilst the interpretive rules allow for the possibility of differential interpretation of norms by actors in society. Thus

"The distinction between interpretive procedures and norms is tied to the difference between consensus or shared agreement and a sense of social structure. Interpretive procedures provide the actor with a developmentally changing sense of social structure that enables him to assign meaning or relevance to an environment of objects." (42)

Thus Garfinkel's constitutive structure has become a set of 'interpretive procedures', conceived of as invariant, that provide the actor with a 'sense of social structure' in that they enable him to interpret social norms and values and to act in a manner that is socially acceptable. At the same time they are the rules on the basis of which he assigns meaning to the objects in his environment - i.e. they are the rules that determine the ways in which he will perceive his world - and as such they underlie the phenomenon of 'subjective meaning' in society.

The actual interpretive procedures that Cicourel specifies - and he does not consider this list to be exhaustive - are based on Schutz's "Phenomenology of the Social World". They are:

1. The reciprocity of perspectives
2. The etc. procedure
3. The idea of normal form typifications. (43)

These interpretive procedures interact with the surface norms, and the result is the social world which we observe.

With this notion of 'interpretive procedures' is reached the heart of the difficulties with Cicourel's work. What it is designed to do is to allow room for both 'objective' (kernal) meanings in Schutz's sense, that are contained, somehow, in language and social norms and values, and 'subjective' meanings which each individual has, and which cause so much difficulty for the sociologist on Cicourel's account. He has not
taken the route which Garfinkel takes, towards seeing 'meaning' as embedded in practices and procedures, but instead insists that it is a 'thing' of some sort which it makes sense to think of as being contained in language. Thus agreement is not seen in terms of sets of practices, as it is by Garfinkel, but in terms of 'norms' or 'surface rules' which are 'meaningful' aspects of the social environment. Unlike Parsons, however, he does not consider that it is the internalization of these 'legitimate' norms which accounts for social order, but the 'invariance' of the interpretive procedures on the basis of which 'subjective meanings' are assigned in the social world. Thus, all the different subjective meanings have something in common - i.e. they are all the result of the same interpretive procedures - and therefore total anarchy does not result in spite of some differences in perceptions of the social world. With this model, Cicourel thinks, it is possible to allow for both consensual norms, and differential interpretations of them - for 'objective' meanings and 'subjective' meanings in Schutz's sense - and to explain how it is that people can communicate. He thus defines 'ethnomethodology' in terms of these 'interpretive rules':

"By ethnomethodology I mean the study of interpretive procedures and surface rules in everyday social practices and scientific activities." (44)

It is here that the sense of a possibility of definite 'objective' knowledge, which Hindess interprets in terms of a 'correspondence' theory of truth, has its roots. What Cicourel is suggesting, however, is not that it would ever be possible to produce correspondence between sociological measurements and observations, and some 'real world', but rather that by identifying the invariant interpretive procedures and surface norms, it would be possible to understand the phenomenon of 'subjective meaning', and thus to understand what is involved in 'objectivity' and 'reference' - i.e. to know just what 'objectivity' and 'reference' actually is, in relation to 'subjectivity'. The problem
is, however, that it turns out that this is not possible any more than it is possible to produce statistics that correspond to social reality. In the first place, any attempt to identify 'invariant procedures' will be subject to the constraints that 'subjective meanings' impose on any investigation. In order to know whether or not one's findings with regard to such procedures were 'objective' or not, one would need to know what 'objectivity' was in the first place - which would require knowledge of the very interpretive procedures that are being investigated. Thus, to gain the 'objective knowledge' of interpretive procedures which it is necessary to have in order to understand 'subjective meanings' and thus the principles of 'objective knowledge', one needs already to know what the interpretive procedures are - which evidently is circular and impossible. Thus on a purely theoretical level Cicourel's programme is impossible. It is worth stressing, here, that Garfinkel is not caught in the same circularity at all. His interest is not tied up with subjectivity in this way, but is directed towards investigation of social mechanisms. The status of his accounts should be seen in terms of language games, as I have suggested, and not in terms of subjectivities confronted by an 'objective' world however 'objective' might be interpreted. Meaning is to be seen as embedded within a 'form of life', and not as the result of surface rules, or interpretations of rules. It is the concern with 'subjectivity' that creates Cicourel's problems here.

Secondly, on an empirical level, it is unclear how, precisely, one is to go about the business of studying interpretive rules. Crucially, they are tied to the notion of 'norm' or 'surface rule', and yet it is not clear how these are to be discovered either. If the action that is observed is the result of actors using these interpretive procedures to activate, as it were, some item in the surface rules, then it would be necessary to identify both in order to trace the interaction between
them. The problem is, that Cicourel himself does not want to suggest that surface rules are to be seen as reified 'things' of some sort, so that he stresses that it is not possible to identify "rules" in any very definite way, but that they must remain "fuzzy" round the edges. (45) This indefinite state of "rules" - and he places the world in inverted commas to stress just this - means for him that it is not possible to measure the social world using two valued logic, and that one should not try to force the social into narrow boxes by using an analysis that looks only to 'denotative' (kernal) meanings, and ignores the fringes. (46) The problem is, however, that by setting up both surface rules and interpretive procedures as mutually dependent in the way that he does, and then by stressing the difficulty of identifying "rules" at all, it becomes difficult to see what the sociologist is left with.

The actual studies that Cicourel has done himself, (beside the work on 'delinquency'), which are involved with class-room interaction and with deaf-and dumb sign language, (47) tend to add little to the theoretical observations that he has already made without the benefit of empirical work. Thus, for example, he reports that if one takes a video tape of a classroom setting and then asks the teacher and the children to say what it was that they considered to be going on when they were actually living through the situation captured on film, they will often give very different accounts from one another. Not only this, but if one shows the same film some time later, the interpretations by the same persons will often change. Thus, Cicourel argues, one can demonstrate the ways in which the world is continually being formulated and reformulated - how different meanings are being imposed on the same data. He calls the method for gaining this information 'indefinite triangulation', and sees this as a useful source of data. (48)

The problem is that like Garfinkel's experiments, such methods do not actually prove anything. They simply illustrate something that
is already contained in the theoretical position that generated the research in the first place. Like Garfinkel's early attempts at formulating a notion of rule in terms of constitutive structures, Cicourel's notions seem to lack direction. There is no precise handle on quite what an interpretive procedure could look like empirically. The same is also true of his study of probation officers and police where he attempts to uncover their procedures. Certainly amidst the welter of ethnographic data there is a sense that comes across that there are invariances in the procedures they use to draw up their official reports, but quite what they are, and how one can formulate them remains elusive.

For the purposes of this thesis, however, the main interest in Cicourel's work lies not primarily in its shortcomings, but in the ways in which it highlights aspects of Garfinkel's thought by contrasting with it. In the final analysis, the contrast is the direct result of an attempt to maintain a Schutzian notion of 'meaning' side by side with some of Garfinkel's thoughts on practices and procedures, and it is this that creates many of the difficulties. To conclude this discussion of Cicourel, then, I want to draw out more of the meat of the contrast between the work of the two men.

The social world, as far as Cicourel is concerned, is made up of a number of actors, all of whom have subjective meanings - i.e. they all have subjective meaning structures after the Schutzian model - so that in studying them in the social world the sociologist must always take account of the fact that they differentially perceive and interpret phenomena. This comes across quite clearly in the "Social Organization of Juvenile Justice" where he spends much time stressing the ways in which different background assumptions result in different interpretations of statistical data, and how different officers and agencies perceive delinquents in different ways such that there is no sense in which one could speak of a common referent for all of the different 'meanings'
'deviancy' and 'deviants' generate. The world is thus a place in which difficulties of communication, differences of meanings, misunderstandings, and the threat of solipsistic isolation are constantly present, and must be accepted as the rule rather than the exception.

For Garfinkel, on the other hand, the social world is fundamentally intersubjective. As a matter of fact people do make sense to each other over the course of a conversation, and it is actually an accountable matter - "you don't understand? Oh sorry I'll try to make that clearer for you" - when misunderstanding does take place. For example Garfinkel's 'experiment' in which he asked people to write down 'what they really meant' in a particular conversation, demonstrated that they simply meant what they were saying - i.e. they were unable to specify in any more satisfactory form what they meant, because they had said what they meant in the first instance, and 'for all practical purposes' that was good enough. (49) It is not the case, for either Garfinkel or Wittgenstein, that words and concepts convey some essential 'meaning' which is somehow the misty 'haze' which must be grasped by a hearer and which will often remain elusive behind the words. Language is not like that.

Cicourel's problem is to account for the different subjective meanings in the social world in such a way that it becomes understandable that people do communicate. Like Schutz he insists on there being some structure of common meanings which give an element of 'consensus' to the social world. This structure is seen to consist in both the 'kernal' meanings of concepts, and in the 'norms' of society. It is not the case, however, that these norms and meanings are just internalised over the course of socialisation as Parsons would like, and as Schutz seems to suggest, for to suppose that this is the case would be to ignore the role of subjective meanings and to become unable to account for the differential perception and interpretation of norms. Thus, Cicourel
suggests, what is needed is some notion of invariant interpretive procedures. They are 'interpretive procedures' to account for differential interpretation and perception, and 'invariant' to account for the fact that there is not total anarchy in the social world.

Garfinkel, however, is not interested in the particular problem of the mediation between subjectivities, but in the general problem of how meaning is possible at all. He is not interested in the ways in which people interpret the social world and thus generate subjective meanings, but in the structures of the social world that make any interpretation possible. He is not interested in how 'meanings', conceived of as that which concepts convey, are passed from one person to another, but in how it is that what we call 'meaning' can actually be an accountable phenomenon in the social world. He is not interested in the difficulties of objectivity and reference which questions about the nature of 'meaning' generate, but in the ways in which language is used within the ongoing flow of daily life to make sense of what is going on.

The upshot of these significant differences between Garfinkel and Cicourel is that concepts that appear to be used by the two men in the same way, and which give an appearance of similarity to their work, turn out in fact to be performing an entirely different sort of function. The notion of 'indexicality' for example, is used by Cicourel to illustrate that there is a problem of reference caused by the fact that phrases 'index' a whole host of past experiences for some particular speaker, and that therefore they "require the attribution of meaning beyond the surface form", (50) if they are to be understood. For Garfinkel, on the other hand, 'indexicality' is a feature of language that suggests that there is no problem of reference, because it leads one to abandon the model of 'sign' and 'referent' (51) which sees it as a problem, in favour of a view of language as 'used'. For Garfinkel it is evident
that people use language perfectly well - the question is 'how?'.

A similar disjunction becomes evident if one looks at the way in
which the two men treat 'separate realities'. Once again Cicourel's
interest in Schutz's notion is in the way in which it illustrates
problems of reference and subjectivity, (52) whilst for Garfinkel, as
I illustrated in the last chapter, the interest is in the possibilities
it offers for digging behind 'meaning' to the structures of
transformations of social objects and thus to an understanding of how
meaning is generated - the mechanisms involved in organizing the social
world.

Cicourel's concern with measurement, then, is a concern with
'meaning'. It is a concern with the fact that there are a multitude of
different subjective meanings in the social world, and that somehow a
sociological study of statistics must illustrate the way in which
subjective perceptions have influenced both the compilation and the
interpretation of the data. People 'interpret' what they experience in
different ways, and this fact must be incorporated into an understanding
of the social. His hope is that by uncovering 'invariant' procedures
for interpretation, he will be able to cast light upon the complex
problems of objectivity and 'reference' that the omnipresence of
subjective meanings results in. In this way, the measurement of social
phenomena will be founded on a more adequate theoretical base than is at
present the case in studies that ignore 'meaning' and 'interpretation'.

Garfinkel's concern with measurement, on the other hand, is not
fuelled by such interests, but by a desire to examine the structure of
practices and procedures involved in a 'corpus' in Kaufmann's sense.
Such an examination is not directed towards problems of objectivity and
'reference', but to uncovering something about the 'formal structures
of practical actions', and thus it constitutes an attempt to understand
what is involved in the phenomenon of 'order' in society.

In sum it would appear that there are considerable differences
between Cicourel and Garfinkel which centre on the way in which 'meaning' is dealt with. For Cicourel, following on from Schutz, language is a structure that somehow contains consensual meanings which are given variety within individual subjectivities so that 'subjective meaning' becomes a central focus for sociological analysis, whilst for Garfinkel language is 'used', so that the problem of 'meaning' is to find the mechanisms that enable it to be used with a sense. In the final analysis, it would seem that Cicourel's position is dogged by the fact that he is caught ambiguously between Schutz and his notion of meaning on the one hand, and Garfinkel and his notion of procedures and rules on the other. The result is that, as I have suggested, the social world becomes a highly tenuous thing, barely strung together by invariant interpretive procedures and norms, and the sociologist's entre into the midst of this world is seriously hampered by on the one hand a difficulty with quite how to identify either the procedures or the norms, and on the other by the fact that, theoretically, he is confronted by severe problems of objectivity, reference and subjective bias. Whether these problems are soluble seems doubtful, and perhaps the only possibility of any solution to them lies in the abandonment of one of the positions which is at the root of the ambiguity that caused them.

REFLEXIVITY AND EMBEDDEDNESS

Where Cicourel, in trying to make out of Garfinkel's thoughts something that would provide him with leverage upon social phenomena, thus formulating his concerns in terms of 'meaning' and 'interpretive procedures', Weider and Zimmerman concentrate instead on providing ethnographic illustrations of some of Garfinkel's main points concerning the 'embeddedness' and 'reflexivity' of accounting practices and 'rules'. Their chief interest centres on the ways in which 'rules' are formulated in the settings of everyday life to organize them - i.e. their focus is
upon the ways in which 'social order' is maintained in daily life. Thus their handling of the concept 'rule' stands in contrast with that of most sociologists, and in line with the general theoretical position that Garfinkel has outlined. The following remarks make this clear:

"the actual practices of using rules do not permit an analyst to account for regular patterns of behaviour by invoking the notion that these patterns occur because members of a society or some organization are following rules. Instead, (these studies show that) the ways that members employ rules requires that they continually develop what a rule means when they come to treat actual cases and when they find that they must defend the rationality of their choices. By invoking rules and elaborating their sense for specific cases, members are able to describe their own courses of action as rational, coherent, preceded, and the like "for all practical purposes". The work of making and accepting such descriptions of conduct makes social settings appear as orderly for the participants, and it is this sense and appearance of order that rules in use, in fact, provide and that ethnomethodologists in fact, study." (53)

Rules should not be seen as 'things' of some sort that people follow, but rather the ways in which 'rules' are used, within the settings of everyday life, to account for, describe, and maintain social order must be made an object of sociological investigation.

The effect of treating rules in this way is that actual studies of rule use take on the feel of one of Garfinkel's 'experiments' ("aids to a sluggish imagination"). Rather than overcoming the difficulties involved in the normative 'description' of social phenomena Weider and Zimmerman's analyses of social life stand as clear and convincing documentation of why it must be that a sociological account of social order in terms of 'rules' is necessarily a 'normative account'. The way in which rules are embedded within the situations in which they are invoked is shown in detail, and the ways in which this provides a sense of order to the situations described - the ways in which by using the language of 'rule' people show that what they did was the 'rational' or the 'right' thing to do - comes across strongly over the course of their descriptions. To illustrate the way in which their approach generates a picture of the social world, I will look at Weider's study of the
telling of the 'convict code', "Language and Social Reality".

Weider's study is of a 'half way house' in which former drug offenders who had spent a period of time in prison, could stay for a few months to help them to rehabilitate to living in civilian life. The inmates were expected to find work, to attend therapy sessions, help with the general running of the house, and to demonstrate that they were 'reformed' by not taking drugs or indulging in excessive consumption of alcohol. The official goal of the house was to ease the shock of a sudden return to 'real' life after the more artificial environment of prison life, since this shock was considered to predispose previous offenders to a return to drug taking. By providing a semi-structured environment for offenders which gave some security and provided support in conjunction with that given by the parole officer, it was hoped that the high rate of recidivism would be reduced.

In fact, the official goals and hopes were not fulfilled. It was still the case that a high number of the inmates continued to use drugs, that they displayed no interest in the official goals of the house and refused to co-operate unless coerced, and that many of them were committed to prison again and again. Weider went into this situation as an ethnographer with a "considerable intellectual debt to Professor Harold Garfinkel". (54)

His chief interest as expressed in his book, was in the 'convict code' which is

"the classical or traditional explanation of those forms of deviant behaviour engaged in by inmates, convicts, or residents of rehabilitative organizations. In traditional analyses of deviant behaviour, some subversive or contra-culture normative order is searched out by the analyst and utilized by him as an explanation for the behaviour patterns he has observed. In the case of prisons and related organizations, the 'convict code' is typically encountered by the researcher and employed as such an explanation." (55)
Thus, traditionally, the convict code is seen as the 'cause' of the deviant behaviour encountered in institutions, the reasoning being that the deviance exhibits orderly properties, order is the result of shared norms and values which are internalised and acted in terms of, and so therefore the order in the observed behaviour must be the result of a system of norms and values. This system is identified as the 'convict code', and so, it is claimed, this code explains the behaviour and is the 'cause' of it.

Weider, as a student of Garfinkel, sees the code through different eyes. Social order is not the result of internalised norms and values, but is accomplished by members of a society over the course of their interaction with one another. Thus the code cannot be simply the indicator of a normative order which can be seen as causally effective in establishing the orderly character of the deviant activity. Although he is able to identify the code operating within the halfway house - and indeed his identifying it was considerably facilitated by the fact that it was pointed out to him by inmates and staff alike - his interest focuses upon it not as a normative order, but as an accounting practice. In other words what interested him was the fact that the code was used by inmates and staff at the halfway house to explain their own behaviour, so that had he produced a sociological account in terms of the code, as other researchers had done, he would have been doing nothing more than was being done by the people he was studying. What he wanted to do instead was to look at the ways in which the code was actually used by those connected with the halfway house, in order to see how order and 'rationality' were attributed to actions and events in terms of it. As he puts it:

"the convict code could be examined as something like a language event that inmates or residents, staff and researchers employ to interpret conduct." (56)

Essential to this task of investigation was the fact that the code
was told within the context of the ongoing life of the halfway house. Its telling was firmly embedded within this setting and was reflexively tied to it. Thus

"The code was not encountered 'outside' the scene it was purportedly describing, but was told within that scene as a continuous, connected part of that scene by being manifested as an active consequential act within it." (57)

This meant that it could not be somehow abstracted from its setting in the house and used as an explanation of what was going on, since to treat it in that way would have been to have missed the point. The accounts given of behaviour in terms of the code were seen as what they were because of the use of the code, and the code was what it was because of the behaviour, and both worked together to display order in the everyday activities of the halfway house. An example of the precepts which the code embodied and of the ways in which it was used may perhaps help to make these points clear.

Weider identified a set of eight maxims which were suggested to him on various occasions by inmates and staff at the halfway house. These were

1. Above all else, do not snitch.
2. Do not cop out.
3. Do not take advantage of other residents.
4. Share what you have.
5. Help other residents.
6. Do not mess with other residents' interests.
7. Do not trust staff - staff is heat.
8. Show your loyalty to the residents.

It is fairly easy to see how this could be treated as a set of normative prescriptions within a cultural sub-system and Weider shows what such an account of the matter would look like. (58) Weider's interests, however, lie elsewhere, and he is able to show convincingly the ways in which the precepts are used. Thus,
"In group and in private encounters, staff was told by residents that, for example, "I can't tell you that; that would be snitching". And, for example, when one resident was asked to find another (his friend) who was absent from the house, he replied, "It's not safe for me to interfere with someone's life; I can't be my brother's keeper". When a staff member suggested that a resident organize a pool tournament, the resident answered, "You know I can't organize the pool tournament, because it would look like I'm kissing ass!" (59)

In this way, telling the code re-established and formulated the relationships between inmates and staff, and did so in such a way that the orderly character of those relationships was made apparent. The code was used by inmates to get out of difficult situations, or to avoid answering the staff's questions. It was a device for legitimately declining an order, changing the topic of conversation, urging or defeating some suggested course of action and so on. (60) In other words, it was a consequential and persuasive part of everyday life.

Not only was the code used in this manipulative sort of fashion, however, but it was also used as a guide to the perception of the events that took place at the halfway house. Weider was able to understand what was going on at the house only because he had gleaned, over the course of his stay there, the substance of the convict code. As he points out, (61) had he been deprived of either the talk (the telling of the code) or the behaviour at the house, he would not have understood what it was that was going on in the events that he observed. He gives as an example the case of a group meeting at which a member of staff asked a resident to organize a baseball game. The response from the resident was simply "You know I can't organize the baseball team", at which the staff member nodded agreement. This remark by the resident, Weider suggests, should be read in the context of the underlying rule 'show your loyalty to the residents' - i.e. the resident is 'telling the code'. Out of context, however, the remark could mean any number of things; perhaps it could relate to some physical deformity known only to the resident and member of staff involved, or perhaps it could
refer to the fact that the resident knew his own limitations, and that
he couldn't organize anything. As it was, however, Weider - and other
spectators to that snippet of interaction - were able to perceive what
was going on in terms of the code. The actual event itself depended
for its status as an event of the sort that it was upon the whole
context of the house and upon the telling of the code that was an
integral and essential part of that context. What Weider had done was
to transform the resident's remark into a statement of a rule, thus
making it understandable, and his ability to perform that transformation
depended upon the whole complex of language and behaviour that he had
observed at the halfway house.

In sum, then, Weider shows that the convict code is an integral part
of the onwarding life within the halfway house, and not something that
can meaningfully be abstracted from it or used to explain it. As he
puts it

"Each utterance upon which my analysis of the code was
based was meaningful in the ways that it was said-socially-
in-a-context. Each utterance gave sense to the context and
obtained sense from its place in that context in exactly
the same way that a part of a gestalt-contexture (e.g. the
left-hand member of a pair of dots) obtains its sense
(e.g. as a left-hand member rather than as an isolated dot)
by its perceived relationship to the other parts of the
contexture (e.g. the right-hand member) while giving those
other members their sense through their perceived relation
to it." (62)

The convict code is a set of rules. It is embedded in the context
in which it is used. It makes that setting/context understandable. It
exhibits the orderly character of actions within that context. It is
used for a variety of purposes within the setting: to formulate,
describe, explain, assess, recognise, understand, etc., etc. All of
these things Weider's account demonstrates, and all of these things fit
well with Garfinkel's notion of 'accounting practices'. One also gets
the sense that Weider has added something to Garfinkel's notion by
showing how such practices can generate what could almost be called an
ideology, and one that is, to an extent, enforced upon the various occupants of the halfway house, staff and residents alike, by the community as a whole. Thus the code is tied up with 'power' in some way and ought not to be seen in terms of internalized norms. Be that as it may, this aspect of the code is not explicitly examined by Weider, and is not of central concern to the present discussion, so rather than dwell on it I want now to make a series of three points which illustrate some of the ways in which Weider's work articulates with Garfinkel's thinking.

1. It is certainly the case that Weider's stress on the fact that rules cannot be seen as 'things' which are usable as explanatory devices for the purposes of a sociological solution to the problem of order, articulates well with Garfinkel's insistence that standards imported from outside a setting cannot be used to account for the order within it. Weider demonstrates just why it is that an account of social order in terms of 'rules', such as that of Winch for example, is beside the point when he shows that people themselves, acting within the everyday world, do account for what they do in terms of rules. The way in which they use rules to organise what they do, to make it 'accountable' and 'rational', shows that they themselves 'theorise' about the social world in just the same terms as the sociologist, and yet their accounts of the matter are not considered to have 'scientific' status, but are seen to be what they are - ways of organising their social environment. The sociologist himself, as Weider discovered, needs some working knowledge of the 'rules' if he is to understand what it is that is going on - what it is that he is looking at. For him to then reproduce these rules, and to claim that they somehow 'explain' the action he observed would be to misunderstand the way in which the rules were used. 'Rules' are not 'things' that are abstractable from the context in which they are embedded and upon which they reflexively rely.
2. It is worth noting too, that by carrying out the sort of analysis that he does, Weider demonstrates that the concept 'rule' is one that can be used for a variety of purposes. He demonstrates that there is no 'thing' to which the concept 'refers', and thus in a roundabout way, makes a Wittgensteinian point about the 'use' of language, and one which fits well with Garfinkel's rejection of the 'sign and referent' model of language. 'Rule' and 'code' are ways of talking about that which is seen to order the world, and should not be taken to point to some 'existing' causally efficacious entity in the world which can provide the raw material for a general social theory. To suppose that 'rule' is that sort of concept - to suppose that there must be something to which it refers - is to miss the point. 'Rule' is a way of identifying 'order'.

3. Weider accepts that what he did over the course of formulating for himself the substance of 'the convict code' was to engage in the 'documentary method of interpretation'. (63) This involved piecing together bits and pieces of information - the code, the behaviour, background knowledge - in order to form a pattern that made sense of what was going on. His account of the convict code is thus an excellent example of the workings of that method self consciously employed. Because of this it provides considerable illustrative material for making out what Garfinkel was getting at in his discussion of that method in the 'Studies'. To this extent, as I mentioned before, it is rather like an extended version of one of Garfinkel's experiments. It also self consciously accepts that it is itself nothing but another telling of the code, and not a 'scientific' account of behaviour in the halfway house. Thus

"What sociologists describe as the convict code in their writings is one further instance of the product which results from the practices of 'telling the code'." (64)
Weider's account thus accepts its own 'normative' status. It accepts that it is not literal description in the sense necessary for a deductive theory of society. In this sense too, then, the account stands chiefly as an illustration of Garfinkel's position.

There are, however, aspects of this work that lead one to feel somewhat uneasy. In the first place, Garfinkel's experiments, as Garfinkel himself seems to acknowledge by calling them aids to the sluggish imagination, do not prove anything. They do provide a different perspective on the ethnographic detail of the social world from that which is given by other sociological positions by showing how 'rules', for example, are used in the settings of everyday life. They also provide a sense of what the social world looks like once the solution to the problem of order which Garfinkel proposes is accepted as reasonable. They do not, however, either prove that the solution is correct, or provide the definitive account of what the settings investigated have to offer by way of sociologically interesting material - and indeed Weider would not suggest that they did. There is thus a sense in which the type of study which Weider's investigation illustrates, fails to generate interesting results - it simply colours in details in a picture which Garfinkel's writings have already sketched out, rather like painting by numbers.

Secondly, and allied to this point, is a feeling that if this is all that can be done with Garfinkel's insights, then they do not hold out as much promise for continuing sociological investigations as one might at first have imagined. One or two studies of the type that Weider undertakes can, it is true, provide useful new angles from which to view social phenomena, and stimulate further thought. But to simply carry out more and more of that type of study would, in a very short while, cease to be productive of new insights. There seems to be no way in which such work could develop or accumulate.
What these two considerations seem to suggest is that the type of study which "Language and Social Reality" illustrates does not provide a solution to the problem of what to make out of Garfinkel's work or of what directions should be taken in following through his insights. If there are important insights contained within Garfinkel's work, and it is difficult to ignore the fact that he does deal with important problems concerning, for example, the indexicality of expressions, which are not treated by the majority of sociologists, then it would seem that for them to be developed something more must be made of them than is done by Weider. The question is, "What?". In the next section, I will examine two further directions in which Garfinkel's work has been taken, this time with the added influence of Wittgenstein's later work as a dimension. The work of Blum and McHugh in particular, can be seen as an attempt to give substance to Garfinkel's insights which does not simply reproduce his 'experiments' in the way that Weider's seem to do.

2. GARFINKEL AND WITTGENSTEIN AS INFLUENCES. a) THE POST WITTGENSTEINIANS

In the previous chapter, several parallels were pointed out between the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein which, it was suggested, provided potentially fruitful grounds for research into social phenomena that looked to both thinkers for clues. In this present section I want to look at the work of writers who have been influenced by both Garfinkel and Wittgenstein and who have self-consciously drawn parallels between the work of the two men. By way of a prelude to this, I will discuss the work of Winch and Louch which tries to show some of the ways in which Wittgenstein's later philosophy can be seen as relevant to the social sciences. At the same time as this will provide a perspective within which to view the work of Blum and McHugh on the one hand, and Pollner and Coulter on the other, it will also serve some purpose in the general theme of the chapter in that parallels and
differences between their approaches to the social world and that of Garfinkel, can be seen to highlight the latter's concerns.

Karl-Otto Apel writes of Winch that it must be remembered that his "interpretation of Wittgenstein, which is inspired by Collingwood and M. Weber, strongly differs from the Wittgensteinian philosophy as pursued in Oxford and Cambridge today. We could call Winch's interpretation a thinking with Wittgenstein against Wittgenstein." (65)

That these remarks are to the point becomes clear if one considers the way in which Winch treats the concept 'rule'. The purpose of the present discussion is to illustrate the ways in which Winch's notion of 'rule' differs from the one which I have suggested that Wittgenstein is holding, and which, in the sense of 'rule' that does not imply interpretation, can be seen as related to formal structures of practical action.

Winch's central focus upon Wittgenstein's work is upon the notions of language game and form of life, terms which he uses as though they were equivalent. He uses these notions to convey what he considers to be a very close relationship between - a complex interweaving of - language and concepts on the one hand, and the relations between men on the other. As he puts it

"A man's social relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about reality. Indeed, 'permeated' is hardly a strong enough word: social relations are expressions of his ideas about reality." (66)

whilst at the same time:

"Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language that we use. The concepts we have settle for us the form of the experience we have of the world." (67)

In line with the spirit of Wittgenstein's later work, then, Winch places man, language and concepts, and the swim of the relationships between men, firmly in the same world. He is not interested in distinctions between subjectivities and the objective world, or in attempts at uncovering criteria on the basis of which objective 'truth',
in some transcendent sense of the term, can be divined. The crucial thing about the world is that it is made up of language games or forms of life which are a complex mix of activities, concepts, and social relations. If one is to see the world aright, then it is necessary to analyse it as a set of language games - and this holds whether one is a philosopher interested fundamentally in epistemological questions, or a social scientist with interests directed towards social phenomena. Either way, the crucial thing to remember is the interweave between language and activities - between concepts and reality, ideas and social relations. He states the matter thus

"the social relations between men and the ideas which men's actions embody are really the same thing considered from different points of view." (68)

and again

"Our language and our social relations are just two different sides of the same coin." (69)

This emphasis evidently places Winch's work in a close relationship to that of Garfinkel on important dimensions along the grid of 'meaning'. Both men stress the fact that language is used, that the distinction between subject and object is not to be considered a fundamental one, that therefore the problem of mediation between subjectivities is not fundamental, and that language and activity are closely interwoven. The differences, as I suggested above, begin to become apparent once the notion of 'rule' is examined in Winch's work.

'Rules' do a lot of work within Winch's theory - indeed they appear as the most fundamental part of the world, cementing together both 'ideas' and 'reality', and the social relations between men. They provide, in fact, all of the crucial links between the various components of the world - men, reality, ideas, relations, language, etc. - and can thus be seen, in a very real sense, as the 'essence' of reality. Winch establishes this position by arguing that in order to
understand the fact that a concept can be used to refer to 'the same' object on different occasions of its use, it is necessary to unravel precisely what is involved in the concept of 'the same'. What is it that establishes the fact that the word or concept is used in 'the same' way? Winch answers that

"It is only in terms of a given rule that we can attach a specific sense to the words 'the same'." (70)

Thus the problem of adequate reference is really a problem about what is involved in following a rule. In this way the link between 'ideas' and 'reality' is established.

This, in turn, leads one to speculate about rules. It is necessary to uncover whatever it is that characterises a 'rule'. Winch's answer here is that

"the notion of following a rule is logically inseparable from the notion of making a mistake." (71)

Thus the defining characteristic of a rule is that behaviour that is intendedly in-accord with it must, in principle, be able to be shown as 'mistakenly' following the rule. It must be possible that a rule follower, whilst intending to follow the rule, does not in fact do so. This leads on to a consideration of what is involved in the notion of 'making a mistake'. Winch's point here is that

"if I make a mistake in, say, my use of a word, other people must be able to point it out to me. If this is not so, I can do what I like and there is no external check on what I do; that is, nothing is established. Establishing a standard is not an activity which it makes sense to ascribe to any individual in complete isolation from other individuals." (72)

What Winch is trying to demonstrate here is that the whole notion of making a mistake, which is in turn critical in understanding the nature of rules, is dependent upon the social relations between men. Rules, he is saying, are essentially social phenomena - they cannot be conceived of apart from a context within society. It is thus the case that the social relations between men account for the ideas which we
have about reality in as much as 'concepts' depend upon 'rules' of correct use in order that they be used in the 'same'-way, and those rules, in their turn, depend upon the social relations between men. At the same time, the social relations between men depend upon the ideas that men have about reality — indeed "social relations are expressions of his ideas about reality". (73) The whole that Winch is suggesting the world should be seen as, is thus a neatly interlocking circle of elements knitted together by rules.

The first point of interest for the present discussion is one made, in a different context, by Apel. (74) He points out that for Winch, rules are the a priori presupposition of meaning and understanding in the social world. He quotes the following passage to make the point

"The behaviour of Chaucer's Troilus towards Cressida is intelligible only in the context of the conventions of courtly love. Understanding Troilus presupposes understanding those conventions, for it is from them that his acts derive their meaning." (75)

Thus the presupposition of 'meaning' is to be conceived of in terms of 'rules'. This becomes more clearly evident if one considers the relationship between concepts and reality in terms of rules — i.e. the meaning of the concept itself depends upon the rules of its use.

It should not be thought, however, that the sense of presupposition that is involved here is the same as that which characterizes Garfinkel's work. For Garfinkel the presupposition of 'meaning', of 'rationality', and so on is conceptualised in terms of the assumptions, practices and procedures which enable social order. His notion of 'formal structures' is directed towards that level of social structure which enables 'agreement' about what is the case, and this is to be seen as prior to the 'normative', 'meaningful' rules which we encounter within our social environment and which Parsons suggests should be seen as providing a solution to the problem of social order. Winch, on the other hand, sees 'rules' as the presupposition of 'meaning' because they
directly determine what is to be considered 'correct' or 'incorrect',
'meaningful' or 'non-meaningful' behaviour or action, for actors in
the social world. Such rules are themselves 'meaningful' objects
within the social world, and it is this that enables them to be the
presupposition of 'meaning'. The level of social structure which
Garfinkel's concept is directed towards is not considered, and, indeed,
that level is the presupposition of the 'meaningful' rules that Winch
does consider. This point can be made more precise by looking in more
detail at Winch's concept of 'rule'.

In spite of the fact that Winch's rules do so much work within his
system, he makes no attempt to differentiate different senses of the
concept. Social conventions, rules for deciding adequate reference, the
rules of science, the rules of religious practice and so on are all
essentially similar in as much as their defining characteristic is that
one can be mistaken in following them. It is their social character
that makes them rules.

It is at this point that Winch's conflation of 'language game' and
'form of life' becomes significant. According to Winch, there are a
lot of different forms of life - a religion, for example, is a form
of life - and these each have their own language games. The two
concepts are the same in as much as both should be seen in terms of
'rules', and such rules are all of the same type. What the precise
relationship between language games and forms of life is, is not
discussed, one presumes, because of the identity between them.

What these two points add up to - the conflation of language game
and form of life, and the sameness of all rules - is that the sense
of 'rules' that does not imply interpretation, which Wittgenstein
speaks about, is not examined. Wittgenstein's remarks are worth
reproducing again here

"This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined
by a rule, because every course of action can be made out
to accord with the rule ..... What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases." (76)

This sense of rule, I have argued, is connected with Wittgenstein's notion of bedrock which in turn is related to a 'form of life' as that point at which justification stops and the spade is turned. It is related to that stage of justification at which we simply say "this is what we do".

That Winch is not interested in this sense of 'rules' becomes apparent when he insists that there must always be the possibility of 'reflection' upon a rule since

"Without this possibility we are dealing not with meaningful behaviour but with something which is either mere response to stimuli or the manifestation of a habit which is really blind." (77)

That this possibility of 'reflection' means that the rule must be able to be interpreted is demonstrated when he says of people who, in times of intense social change or who find themselves in foreign environments, that

"questions of interpretation and consistency, that is, matters for reflection, are bound to arise for anyone who has to deal with a situation foreign to his previous experience." (78)

In other words, the whole notion of 'making a mistake' in following a rule which is the defining characteristic of 'rule' is at the same time bound up with the fact that 'rules' are 'followed', or at least can be followed, intentionally. This means that rules can be, and must be, interpreted in some way by an actor if that actor is to behave 'meaningfully'. The 'meaningfulness' of the behaviour depends upon the fact that the actor is following/interpreting 'rules', and in terms of the rules that he is following/interpreting his behaviour can be understood as meaningful by an observer. The trick, for the sociologist or for anyone else who would understand someone's actions, is to grasp
the rules in terms of which an actor is acting.

The fact that Winch chooses to treat rules in this way means that he is involved in denying the sense of 'rule' that does not involve 'interpretation'. The result of this is, as Wittgenstein pointed out, that since all behaviour can be shown to be in accord with several different rules, and since the same rule can be 'correctly' interpreted such as to yield entirely different actions, the notion of 'rule' itself, as a key to understanding and explaining action, becomes of dubious value. An account of human action at this level can only be - as Garfinkel points out at length in relation to Parsons - a 'normative' account, a point which, as I will go on to show in a moment, Louch takes up and develops.

If this notion of rule is translated back, for a moment, into the terms of Garfinkel's concerns as they emerged in the previous chapter, it becomes apparent that if Winch were to attempt to account for social order in terms of his notion of 'rule', he would be committed to saying that such order is the result of actors following 'rules' - which are social conventions etc. - in "the same'way. Presumably they would do this either because the rules were 'sacredly regarded', or because 'making a mistake' was a sanctionable matter. The problem of "agreement" about objects, which Garfinkel sees as the most fundamental problem, is also handled in terms of these 'rules' in as much as the problem of the adequate reference of a concept is treated with reference to 'rules' and to social relations between men. The level of structure that Garfinkel aimed at, characterised as it is by concerns with taken for grantedness, normality, constitutive expectancies and so on, is just not present, and could not be present given the notion of 'rule' that Winch is working with, and the fact that 'forms of life' have become synonymous with 'language game'. There is no room for a notion of 'rule' that does not involve 'interpretation'.

From this it becomes clear just what the difference is between the
sense in which Winch's rules are the presupposition of meaning, and
the sense in which Garfinkel's constitutive structure is. For Winch
they are the presupposition of meaning because they are themselves
'meaningful' in the sense that they can in principle become the object
of reflection, and thus can be interpreted either rightly or wrongly.
They are, as it were, meaningful 'things' that sit within a culture
and provide the focal points on which actors can hand their understandings
of behaviour and in terms of which they orient their actions. For
Garfinkel, on the other hand, the constitutive structure is the
presupposition of meaning and of rational action because some agreement
about 'objects', and some degree of 'normality' is a necessary precondition
for any meaningful action, including the following and interpretation
of rules. At the level of structure at which Garfinkel is aiming, it
makes no sense to say that the rules are, even in principle,
interpretable. Rather, the sense of rule with which he is engaged is
that which does not involve interpretation - which is simply 'what we
do', i.e. the bedrock.

Although there is no space to go into the question here, it would
seem that many of the difficulties concerning "relativism" that have
been pointed out in Winch's position stem from precisely his failure
to consider a sense of rule that does not involve 'interpretation'.
For example, the possibility of mediation between language games or
forms of life, as Winch uses the terms, becomes problematic precisely
because what grounds those games is never considered. (79) If, for
example, constitutive expectancies are common to all games, as Garfinkel
claims, and if some way could be found to describe the constitutive
structures or formal structures of practical actions, then an insight
might be possible into the relationships between language games,
cultural groups, and even cultures. Whether or not this proves
possible or not is, evidently, an empirical matter. On a theoretical
level, however, the acceptance of 'form of life' as distinct from 'language games', and the positing of a sense of 'rule' that does not involve 'interpretation', can be seen as not ruling out the possibility for mediation between cultures on a priori grounds, but, on the contrary, as inviting the possibility of an empirical investigation into what is involved in it. Formal structures, in a much as they are the presupposition of meaning, are not necessarily tied to the specific meanings of any particular culture, (although some of them may turn out to be). The challenge is to find a way of making such formal properties of interaction visible in different cultural settings independently of specific meanings, and to see to what extent similarities and differences obtain. (80) The result could well be insight into both the possibility of cross cultural communication and into some of the reasons for its breakdown in specific instances.

With these remarks I want now to leave the work of Winch and move on to look at Louch's writing. His work has far more in common with the interpretation of Wittgenstein put forward in chapter three above than does that of Winch. Nonetheless for that his vision of sociology, and the premises upon which that vision are based, differs in important and revealing ways from that of Garfinkel.

Louch puts forward his thesis thus:

"The thesis I shall advance ... is simply this: when we offer explanations of human behaviour, we are seeing that behaviour as justified by the circumstances in which it occurs. Explanation of human action is moral explanation". (81)

The thrust of his argument is aimed against the craving for generality which leads one to believe that human behaviour can be explained in terms of general laws and theories. Such a model of explanation, he claims, imported as it is from theories of explanation in physics and natural science, is quite inappropriate when applied to the study of human action, where what is being studied is inherently meaningful. The very fact of identifying an action as an action means that we have
already begun to engage in 'moral explanation' since to see behaviour as action involves placing it within some context - a moral context of intentions, motives, etc. - in order to make sense of it. The social scientist is not confronted by inert, atomistic data, and to suppose that he is, is to mistake the whole thrust of social life and the moral texture which makes it what it is. Thus to try to treat social action in terms of general laws - to give in to the craving for generality - is to miss the fact that any explanation of human action, whether by a member of society or by a professional social scientist, is a matter of presenting "features of the background as justifying or providing grounds for the action." (82)

Louch reaches this position by emphasising the anti-essentialist 'family resemblances' notion in Wittgenstein's work without getting caught up in the sorts of concerns with language games and forms of life which characterise Winch's work. That is not to say, however, that the notion of 'language game' is not important to Louch, since it does indeed hold a central position in as much as his interest focuses upon the ways in which concepts are used within different contexts. Nonetheless his concern with such 'games' is with the way in which they illustrate the immense variety of uses a concept or word can be put to, rather than with suggesting that the social scientist should be engaged in investigating the 'rules', embedded within language games/forms of life, which provide the 'essence', as it were, of the social world. Where Winch seeks out the rules that cement ideas, reality, social relations, language etc., together, Louch sets out to question any such cement: the concept 'rule' does not refer to 'things' in the social world, but it is a word that is used with a sense within different contexts. Just as Wittgenstein argues that it is of no use to look for the essence of the concept 'game' since the word is used with a sense in a variety of ways, so Louch is suggesting that the social scientists' search for the essence of human action in terms of general
laws, rules, motives, desires, intentions, causes and the rest, is a misbegotten enterprise. Action is always explained within some context or other, he claims, and the form of the explanation is 'moral' - i.e. a process of providing grounds that can be seen as justifying the action, and which 'entitle' the actor to act as he did. There are neither causal nor logical stories to be told about actions.

What is of interest about Louch's position here, for our purposes, is not any of the host of things which Gellner found so offensive, (83) but the ways in which his view of social science articulates with Garfinkel's views on the 'normative' nature of most sociology. This can be shown by looking at Louch's account of 'functionalism'.

Louch claims that just as Wittgenstein recommended that the philosopher should ask not for the meaning but for the use of a concept, so the anthropologist (and by implication sociologist (84)) should look at the uses of social institutions. This, he suggests, would generate a sort of functionalist analysis within sociology which, like the functionalism of Malinowski, placed social institutions within the context of the whole culture and which did not, therefore, make the mistake of unwarrentedly treating social phenomena as isolated from one another. Admittedly, he says, functional analysis is a 'normative' enterprise in the sense that it is bound up with particular perspectives upon the society or institution being studied, but then "anthropology is a normative discipline" (as he puts it),

"in the sense that its inquiries are shaped by concepts like convention and procedures like the tracing of grounds for action." (85)

There will be more than one way to trace grounds for action, and more than one convention that explains the function of an institution, and which ones one uses to describe a given society will depend upon many factors. But these are just things that the anthropologist must learn to live with. It is inevitable in examining human action and institutions, which are already meaningful before the sociologist comes
along to study them, that one will use moral terms over the course of describing them. "Talk about human institutions and practices is already a moral cutting of the empirical cake" as Louch puts it. (86) This, however, is no problem in itself. It only becomes a difficulty once the social scientist tries to pretend that his 'scientific' ways of dealing with social phenomena somehow overcome the necessarily moral nature of his description of society, since at that point he becomes involved in self deception.

What is most interesting here is that Louch has reached, from a Wittgensteinian position, the same conclusions about social science as it is practiced, as Garfinkel does in the Parsons Primer starting from more or less phenomenological background. Both are insistant upon the essentially normative status of any description of meaningful social action or of meaningful social institutions. The directions in which the two writers go from there, however, are radically different. Where Garfinkel, as a working social scientist, sees this as a fundamental problem for sociology which precludes the possibility of ever finding an adequate descriptive solution to the problem of social order unless or until someone comes up with an alternative way of handling social phenomena, Louch, as a philosopher, is content to provide an account of the status of sociological explanation as he sees it and as it already is. Where Garfinkel is interested in unravelling just what the implications of these problems of description are for the empirically oriented social scientist, Louch seeks to prevent sociologists from attempting to program people into becoming fit material for Walden Two (87) since they will realise that social scientific knowledge is not of the kind that will enable this to be done. (88) Put in another way, what Louch does is to provide an excellent account of some of what Garfinkel sees as being the matter with contemporary sociology.

Louch, then, focuses his attention on problems, of 'meaning' in the
social sciences, and provides a model of explanation of action at that level which he considers to be adequate for social phenomena. The possibilities contained in the notion of a 'form-of life' remain unconsidered on his account so that the area which Garfinkel sees as potentially useful in the study of society is not investigated at all. It is here that the fundamental difference between Louch and Garfinkel becomes apparent.

That said, however, there are undoubtedly strong affinities between the two writers. Garfinkel's insistence upon the work in progress nature of ethnomethodology, his stress upon the indexicality of expressions, of the situated character of talk, of the essential reflexivity of accounts and so on are all reflections of his view of the nature of language - as something used with a point - and that view, as I have shown above, squares well with the aspects of Wittgenstein's thinking which Louch gives the most weight. The way in which both Garfinkel and Louch conceptualise 'meaning' and 'language' are fundamentally the same - the difference comes once the implications of this are drawn for the study of social life.

In this section I have examined the work of two philosophers who have drawn upon the work of Wittgenstein in one way or another. I have tried to show how the ways in which they interpret that work results in very different conceptualisations of sociology with Winch's concentration upon 'language games' as 'forms of life' generating a focus upon 'rules', whilst Louch's radical attack upon the 'craving for generality' leads him to suggest that functionalist explanation is the most appropriate one for the social sciences. Whilst they differ from each other, they also diverge in interesting and illuminating ways from the position that Garfinkel takes up. At least in part this divergence should be seen as the result of philosophical concerns taking precedence over more specifically social scientific interests.
which focus more upon the possibility of empirical investigations of social phenomena. The influence of Wittgenstein's work is not, however, confined to philosophers of the social sciences, and I want now to move on to examine some of the work that has been done by sociologists that builds upon the work of both Wittgenstein and Garfinkel in an attempt to come to grips with the social world. I will look first at the work of Blum and McHugh.

b) CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The interest of the work of Blum and McHugh for present purposes is two fold. In the first place, they can be seen as attempting to develop a form of sociology which builds upon Garfinkel's insights, but which does not leave itself as impotent as the type of work which Weider and Zimmerman have engaged in. Rather than simply reproduce Garfinkelian conceptualizations in ethnographic studies, they develop other aspects of Garfinkel's thought, particularly the notion that the fundamental consideration when thinking about society is to give due weight to presuppositional practices and procedures, and develop them into a moral critique of 'positivism' and the society which makes positivism possible as a way of life. Thus, in a sense, their work is a reaction against a particular version of what to do with Garfinkel's thoughts, and one which seeks to enable the sociologist to commit himself to a critique of society rather than simply describing aspects of it as it already is.

This work is also interesting in that it develops Garfinkel's notions in a direction which articulates them with Wittgenstein's notion of a 'form of life'. Garfinkel's practices and procedures are conceptualised directly in terms of a form of life, thus making explicit a link between the work of the two men that has been suggested above. The way in which this link is exploited, however, seems to lead to a position which Garfinkel himself would not want to espouse, in
which empirical work becomes a subsidiary enterprise within the overall conceptualisation of sociology as 'theorizing' rather than as a fundamental task of the sociologist. I will suggest that to develop Garfinkel's ideas in this direction results, ultimately, in an unsatisfactory position.

The early work of Blum and Mchugh is characterised by a dual focus. On the one hand there is a concentration upon some of the themes that exercise Garfinkel — namely an analysis of social phenomena from a point of view that looks for the ways in which they are related to taken for granted background knowledge, and to the practices, procedures and activities that make up everyday life. On the other hand there is a concern with 'theorizing', as an activity engaged in by members of a society, which seeks to investigate what makes it possible as a practice. It is the interpenetration of these two concerns that leads towards the distinctive form of theorising that characterises some of their most recent work. I will illustrate each of the two themes in turn before directing attention towards the approach to social phenomena that emerges from "On the Beginnings of Social Inquiry", (hereafter "Beginnings") a characteristic recent work.

The concern with practices and procedures, and with the rules in terms of which these are oriented, is readily visible in the studies which Blum and Mchugh carry out into deviancy. Here they argue against a view of deviancy that sees it as some 'thing' which can be studied in isolation from the way in which the label 'deviant' is attached to some particular person. It is not, for example, the fact that deviancy has 'effects' in the world — it may cost a lot — that accounts for it being 'deviance'. As Mchugh points out

"Criminality as deviance does not depend on costing a fortune; it could occur and be so designated whether it cost much or little. Members do not treat deviance pragmatically, according to what are thought to be its consequences. In this regard deviance is typically a moral matter." (89)
Neither is it the case that there is some set of isolable criteria that could be listed as the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of some deviant act. With 'mental illness', for example, behaviour that is perfectly acceptable in one situation — for example 'raving hysterically' at the news that one's family has just been killed in a car accident — may in another context be considered a symptom of illness — for example 'raving hysterically' in phone boxes outside of Columbia University. (90) If one is to come to some understanding of deviance, then what must be investigated is not some 'thing', but the ways in which deviance as a label, is actually ascribed to some person or act. It is the ways in which members of a society 'constitute' an act as deviant that is important — as Blum puts it in the case of mental illness:

"mental illness is possible because members, in very small and ordinary ways, treat certain behaviour as "mentally ill" and collaboratively develop systematic ways of recognizing, categorizing, and acting upon such behaviour. Mental illness is also possible because those who produce such behaviour learn methodically to produce treatments of themselves and others that confirm such categorizations. As sociologists, our task is not to accept such actions as "givens", but rather to describe how they are possible." (91)

The object of the study of deviance, then, is to describe those practices of recognizing, categorizing, and so on, which make, for example, mental illness possible rather than simply accepting that there is some 'thing' which is deviance, which would yield to investigation, if only one could develop criteria of recognition and methods for studying it.

It should be noticed that at this early stage, the possibility of empirical investigation of 'members' methods' is considered to be important. Blum, for example, stresses that the questions he is raising concerned with 'mental illness' should not be seen as purely theoretical issues.
"These are not philosophic questions; rather, answers to them can be achieved only through research." (92)

Mchugh, similarly, in his earliest published book "Defining the Situation" is involved in trying to give empirical descriptions of the practices and procedures that members of a society use when they define a situation such that it comes to have some 'meaning'. As with Garfinkel's work, he is interested not in the specific meanings that some particular member of society may give to some particular event or set of events, but rather in the ways in which they manage to give meaning to a situation at all. Thus he sums up what he has tried to do in the book by saying:

"I have attempted to show that although different actors may construct substantively different particular definitions, they proceed by invoking the same devices, mechanisms, and so on, and this leads to recognizable contours of definition even among subjects who are talking about grossly different things." (93)

It was an attempt to show just this that motivated the complex laboratory experiment - which, by the way, is the same one which Garfinkel reports in Chapter 3 of "Studies" in relation to his remarks on the documentary method of interpretation - that provides the main substance of the book, as well as the material for detailed and insightful descriptions of members' practices and procedures.

In spite of the focus upon member's practices and procedures, however, the work of Blum and Mchugh does not simply copy Garfinkel's orientation towards social phenomena. Where Garfinkel's concern is with describing the constitutive expectancies and assumptions that make up the natural attitude, conceiving of practices and procedures in the light of this concern, Blum and Mchugh move instead to Wittgenstein and to the concept of 'form of life' to provide the framework for their work. Thus, where Garfinkel describes his own enterprise in terms of 'breaching assumptions' or in terms of 'familiarity', 'normality', 'typicality' and so on - Blum and Mchugh
consider themselves to be describing or investigating a 'form of life'.

There is a quite conscious use of Wittgenstein's work which merges it with some of Garfinkel's ideas about social life. Take, for example, the following quotation from Mchugh's "Defining the Situation", where he is setting out his purpose in the study in terms of describing a form of life, or the 'bedrock'.

"This is not so metaphysical as it seems if by bedrock we mean some content which helps solve the problem of a discipline - in sociology if it connects with the problem of social order. It is then not to be explained by some other notion, but rather only to be described because it is an element of social order and requires no further justification. It is in this sense a form of life, a rendering of an event that needs no further grounds. To explain a form of life in terms of something else is to revise the question it was intended to answer, with the result that the description is not the same answer either. One is playing a different game." (94)

Thus, the practices that are to be described should be conceived of in terms of forms of life, where 'form of life' refers to the 'grounds' or 'bedrock'. The concern is not with 'assumptions' or with the natural attitude, but with 'grounds' - with that which is the bedrock, and which cannot be explained in terms of something else. To solve the sociological problem of order, which, in common with Garfinkel, they see as of central importance, these grounds must be described.

That this difference in emphasis is not inconsequential can be illustrated by looking at Blum's discussion of 'mental illness' - which also, it must be emphasised, uses the concept of 'form of life' extensively. The section which is most interesting here, is one in which he is attempting to investigate the ascription of 'mental illness' by looking at the ways in which verdicts of 'not guilty by reason of insanity, are reached by jurors in court room situations.

His argument, which draws on Cavell, is that when someone makes a statement to the effect that someone is 'not guilty by reason of insanity', it is not the case that such a statement stands on its own, without anything else being implied. By saying that someone is 'insane'
one implies a host of things about the social organization which enables certain people to be so labelled. Each 'rule' that one uncovers on the basis of which a 'not guilty by reason of insanity' verdict is reached, ramifies out, having implications for the rest of society. As Blum puts it

"Each rule that we locate specifies a different set of implications of saying that the defendant is NGI: such implications are not consequences or results, but rather, each constitutes a different culturally accredited set of grounds for producing such a statement. The quasi-necessary relation between grounds and designation is described in a rule (like a rule of usage) which says: you cannot legitimately call the defendant NGI without implying that you conceive of him in such and such a way." (95)

Where Garfinkel's concentration upon assumptions, expectancies, rules and practices leads him eventually to formulate the notion of the 'formal structures of practical action', which seeks to abstract formal elements from typical, normal everyday orderly life, in order to solve the problem of order, Blum's attention turns instead to the fact that any rule that is uncovered, however abstract and formal, has implications for the whole organization of society. Any statement, any rule, any practice is possible only because of the 'form of life' of which it is a part, and thus those statements, rules, and practices, imply that form of life, and in turn are made possible by it.

In this the first of the two themes that can be found in Blum and McHugh's early work, the, the notion of practices, procedures and rules which owes much to Garfinkel's influence, is set against a different backdrop with the Wittgensteinian notion of a form of life. The effect of this is to direct attention towards 'grounds' and 'bedrock', and to the interconnectedness and mutual dependence between grounds and whatever those grounds make possible - for example deviancy. Thus what it is that they consider themselves to be investigating is, in the final analysis, a form of life. The object of sociology is to describe that. Where Garfinkel's interest focused by a concern with assumptions,
expectations and the problem of order, moves towards seeing practices and procedures in abstraction, Blum and Mchugh insist upon the connectedness between all social phenomena.

The second concern of the two men is with 'theory' and 'theorising'. Here the central considerations are generated from their insistence that 1. knowledge is socially organised, and 2. that there are no context independent criteria for 'truth'. I will deal with these points briefly in turn.

A focus on the 'social organisation of knowledge' is a way of stressing the fact that all knowledge depends upon the rules and procedures on the basis of which it is constituted as a body of knowledge. The point is the same as Kaufmann's - knowledge, in the sense of a body of knowledge, is to be considered a 'corpus', and not as a set of more or less independent propositions, each of which gains its validity from the fact of its correspondence with some hypothesised 'reality'. Blum puts the point thus:

"We intend "social organization of knowledge" in this sense: that knowledge is organized and assembled methodically by actors acting under the auspices of some conception of an adequate corpus of knowledge as a maxim of conduct." (96)

What would normally be considered 'criteria' of 'adequate knowledge' - for example 'correspondence', or 'consistency' - are nothing more than 'maxims of conduct'. The 'objectivity' of knowledge cannot be guaranteed by such criteria since a 'corpus' is not some 'thing' that stands in relation to some other 'thing' - reality - but is the result of methods and procedures, and should be seen as such. Knowledge is something that is done.

The second point - that there are no independent criteria for truth - is well brought out in Mchugh's discussion of positivism. Here he looks at various accounts of what 'truth' is in terms of correspondence and coherence theories of truth. His point is made thus:
"We must accept that there are no adequate grounds for establishing criteria of truth except the grounds that are employed to grant or concede it - truth is conceivable only as a socially organized upshot of contingent courses of linguistic, conceptual, and social courses of behaviour." (97)

Truth is not something 'substantive' - a 'something' which one strives for - but rather it is "an institutional grammar" (98) where "grammar" is intended to highlight the fact that "an event is transformed into the truth only by the application of a canon of procedure, a canon that truth-seekers use and analysts must formulate as providing the possibility of agreement". (99) Truth, as with 'knowledge', is thus 'socially organized' and not an independent 'something'.

The thrust of this view of 'truth' and 'knowledge' is not far from that which characterises Garfinkel's work. Like Garfinkel, for example, Blum and Mchugh at this stage consider that a sociological theory should be seen as a sense transforming operation. Thus

"The possible society is a procedure for imposing a sense upon the materials available to us; the "possible" character of the society consists in the fact that it is the product of a sense-transforming operation." (100)

The way in which the implications of this are drawn out in relation to theorizing, however, departs once again from Garfinkel's position, and again because of the relationship of 'theorizing' to a 'form of life'.

Blum states the "main thrust" of his essay of "Theorizing" by saying that it is

"directed to proposing that an understanding of theorizing is an understanding of a form of life, and that this form of life constitutes a particular method for treating and reconstructing one's biography as a practically conceived corpus of knowledge." (101)

There are two aspects to this notion of theorizing. On the one hand, there is the assertion that theorizing is crucially tied to a 'form of life' in as much as the kind of theorizing one engages in 'displays' ones form of life. In the same way that it was noted above that a statement that ascribes 'insanity', for example, implies that which grounds
and makes possible that statement, so with theorizing - any actual theorizing displays and is dependent upon the form of life which grounds it. On the other hand, a second aspect of theorizing is that it provides a perspective for 'seeing' whatever it is that is being theorized. For example, if one is theorizing about 'society' then the 'possible societies' that one delimits with ones theorizing provide possible ways for "seeing" what is experienced as 'society'. There are no criteria for the 'truth' of ones vision - theorizing, Knowledge and truth are not the kind of 'things' for which that would be possible.

There is, then, a dual nature to 'theorizing'. It both displays the form of life which makes it possible, whilst at the same time providing a perspective upon that same form of life which enables it in the first place. It both 'expresses' the form of life, and at the same time 'organizes' it. It is, crucially, grounded in the form of life, which makes it possible. Once again, this view of theory has moved away from that of Garfinkel, whose central concerns are with the rules, practices and procedures which, in relation to the problem of order, generate a theory, rather than with the 'form of life' as a whole of which those practices and procedures are considered, by Blum and Mchugh, to be a part. Once again, Blum and Mchugh have gone one stage further than Garfinkel by using the form of life concept to point out the interdependence between practices, grounds, rules, theories, statements and so on. Where Garfinkel wants to uncover the 'rules' that underlie theories, treating such rules, practices and procedures as more or less identifiable and discrete in the sense that 'formal structures' can be analysed empirically by the social scientist, Blum and Mchugh emphasise that what grounds theories cannot be treated in this way, but that the complexity of the 'forms of life' is in the interpenetration of theorizing and form of life; that is an inescapable feature of all theorizing.

This, then, is the position that characterizes Blum and Mchugh's
early work, and it provides the conditions for the development of
their perspective. The motivation behind this development can be seen,
I think, in terms of the following considerations.

Firstly, it is evident that on their own account, all theorizing,
and all speech is grounded in some form of life. This form of life
is a unity, in the sense that any particular statement or ascription -
of deviancy or mental illness for example - implies a gamut of social
organization and practices. Thus any speech, theory, theory about
theory, statement etc., etc. is made possible by the unity which is
the form of life which grounds it. Thus, in order to investigate some
particular version of theorizing, for example the "Positivist" version,
it is necessary to examine the form of life, as a unity, which grounds
it, and which is displayed in that theorizing. Their concern with
'grounds' is reflected in the following remarks about their new
position

"In contrast, we are currently interested in grounds of
clarity or language as they become disclosed through any
method or speech, whereas these grounds themselves are not
the end (as if a determinant solution) but the beginning
which authorises the very problem of motive, or method,
or whatever." (102)

Not only are the solutions to a theoretical problem, as theories,
grounded in a form of life, but the concern with just these problems,
as opposed to some other possible problems, is also so grounded. In
other words, the whole possibility of speech is grounded in a form of
life.

Two further points flow from this. In the first place, it is
evident that their own speech is itself grounded in some form of life,
which makes it possible. This means that their own form of theorizing
displays their form of life, in the same way that positivist theorizing
displays the form of life which makes it possible. Thus, to be true to
their own position, they must use speech reflexively, in the sense that
they must be aware of displaying their own grounds and must constantly question their own 'auspices'. They express this in relation to their earlier paper on 'motive' thus

"In that paper we exempt our own talk from the same consideration - as speech requiring some relation to language - by absorbing it under notions of rule, grammar etc. Rule, grammar, theoricity, and other dimensions used in the paper are descriptive versions of auspices, whereas the question we might now ask is what kind of world would make motive talk intelligible and interesting? That question would require that we address our own interest in motive talk, that we address the fact that we find such talk interesting." (103)

This dialectical element to the kind of theorizing they are interested in - a form of theorizing which is aware of its own grounds - is central to their book "Beginnings".

The second point which is generated from their concern with grounds, concerns the relationship between different forms of life. In their earlier work, as I have pointed out, they are crucially concerned with the social organization of both knowledge and truth. The upshot of these concerns is that it makes no sense to think in terms of knowledge or truth as somehow distinct from the practices and procedures which provide for it. This, evidently, means that the form of life which they display in their theorizing cannot be held up as somehow containing a 'truth' which alternative modes of theorizing have not grasped. 'Truth' is internal to some particular form of life. At the same time, however, their early concern with the fact that 'deviance' is constituted by rules and practices within society, and that these rules and practices themselves implicate the whole of a form of life, means that any attempt to solve problems such as deviance must involve changing the form of life which makes them possible. A concern with deviance, or with any other aspect of society which is in some way undesirable, is transformed by the concern with grounds into a question about the form of life which makes it possible at all. Thus, in spite of the fact that a critique of the 'positivist' form of life which makes these things possible cannot
be held up as 'truth' in some transcendent sense of the word, such a
critique is nonetheless necessary and desirable simply because it is
a way of providing an alternative to the existing form of life. Heritage
has made this point well when he writes that

"the work of Mchugh and his collaborators implies a timeless
moral critique which must penetrate to the very foundations
of social life, and which must ask such questions as: Is a
society which is capable of creating deviance worth living
in? Or: Is a society which does not create deviance
possible? It is thus no surprise to find that analysis
and moral questions are inextricably intertwined in the studies
under review." (104)

What Blum and Mchugh do, then, is to set up the relationship between
their own form of theorizing and that of the 'positivist' form of life
which makes, among other things, 'deviance' possible, in terms of a
'commitment' to a form of life. Anyone who speaks must be committed
to some form of life - there is some grounds for the way he speaks and
theorizes - and their intention is to display an alternative form of
life as alternative grounds, and to recommend commitment to that as
an alternative to positivism.

It is important to emphasise the extent to which these new
conceptions have moved away from 'ethnomethodology'. Their concern
with 'grounds' as opposed to members' practices and procedures have
taken them a long way from the sorts of studies that Garfinkel, for
every example, is engaged in. They state the position themselves thus:

"Ethnomethodology seeks to 'rigorously describe' ordinary
usage, and despite its significant transformations of
standards for conceiving of and describing such usage, it
still conducts its inquiries under the auspices of a
concrete, positivistic conception of adequacy.
Ethnomethodology conceives of such descriptions of usage
as analytic 'solutions' to their tasks, whereas our
interest is in the production of the idea which makes any
conception of relevant usage itself possible." (105)

Blum and Mchugh have thus abandoned their earlier concern with
description, and at the same time have come to see empirical research
of any kind as nothing but a reflection of positivist grounds. To carry
out empirical work is to display ones commitment to positivist auspices -
to be committed to analysis is to reject such commitment.

I want now to turn to their book "On the Beginning Of Social Inquiry" to illustrate the way in which they actually go about analyzing the positivist form of life. By way of an introduction to this discussion it is worth while to consider the way in which the book was written.

In order to ensure that the reflexivity and awareness of grounds which their form of dialectical theorizing demands is actually realized, the book is written as a collaborative enterprise. In order to speak at all (or in this case to write) it is necessary to forget the grounds which make it possible. Those grounds are displayed in the speech, but are not, and cannot be, captured by it. What is written is thus, in their terms, an 'inadequate' representation of its grounds, and since it is grounds that they are interested in, their speech must always fail to reach that which it is aimed at - i.e. its own grounds. Therefore, a second paper is written about the first which shows the way in which the first paper misses its own point - as they put it, the collaborators

"serve to formulate for us the inadequacy of our speech by showing how it is a surface reflection of our auspices. By formulating our speech they allow us to be committed both to speaking and to the reflexive character of analysis. Collaborators remind us of that which we have to forget in order to speak." (106)

Without such collaborators they would not be able to say anything at all, since what they were trying to say would be 'forgotten' in the writing of it.

As well as being a collaborative enterprise, the book is not considered to be a statement as such. Because any statement is, for them, a display of its own grounds, then for them to treat their work as a statement would be to 'forget' that it is a 'display' and would thus negate the reflexive character of their theorizing, and loose the point of their speech. Thus the reader is asked to treat the work as a
display of the auspices which made it possible - i.e. their form of life. This means that the reader himself is a 'collaborator' in their enterprise in the sense that just as those who collaborated over the writing of the book were engaged in uncovering the grounds of whoever wrote the first paper, so the reader is to engage himself with uncovering the grounds of the result of the collaborative enterprise. They put it thus

"The papers in this book should be conceived of as displays which require alters. This is where readers come in. Readers are asked to treat our papers reflexively. They are asked to become our collaborators. This is our version of how to read." (107)

The book should not be treated as a dead 'thing', then, but must be participated in so that that which it attempts to display can be grasped. To give some idea of the feel of the sort of analyses that the book contains, I will give an account of their analysis of the "deep structure" of 'bias'.

They set out their own purpose in writing about bias as follows

"A central question will be: what form of life can we formulate such that it generates for social scientists their organisation of intelligible and concerted speech about bias? Further, how do the resonances of bias alert us to that which social scientific use shares with all use? Finally how does this examination itself generate as a possibility the image of a dialectical engagement in the question of grounds, and how does such an image make reference to our conception of analysis?" (108)

Their analysis is thus seen to have, essentially, a dual focus. On the one hand it is aimed at uncovering the grounds which make 'bias' possible - i.e. the positivist form of life - whilst on the other hand it seeks to display the grounds of their own version of dialectical theorizing, which is an alternative form of life. Thus the first question is 'what is the form of life which makes bias possible?'. They answer

"This is a form of life where the speech which you concretely perform is analytically a speech of any man, so when bias is charged, you are being accused of identifying the concrete (your own speech) with the analytic (any man's speech)." (109)
What does this mean? Their point is that positivist speech is held to be authored by nature. It is not the concrete individual who speaks - the scientist is not considered to be an individual - but rather it is nature who speaks through him. Positivist speech is the speech of 'anyman' since nature can speak through anyman; anyman can be nature's mouthpiece. Thus bias is a charge that can be brought against anyone who fails to take a back seat to nature, as it were. The true positivist is the man who is committed, along with the community of positivists, to speaking only as a mouthpiece of nature. He considers that the 'grounds' of his speech are in fact 'nature' - nature authors his speech.

It is perhaps best to look at what is wrong with this, the positivist's version of what grounds his speech, in two stages. Firstly, it becomes apparent through Blum and Mchugh's analysis that although the idea of 'bias' rests upon some notion of 'nature' speaking through the scientist, - i.e. upon the possibility of anonymous, anyman speech - it at the same time affirms the contrary. That is, it sets up the idea that there is some 'thing' called 'nature' on the one hand, and another 'thing' called 'man' on the other, and the former 'speaks through' the latter. There is, however, a natural tension between these two 'things', a tension which is recognized in the very notion of 'bias' itself - i.e. the charge of 'bias' is the charge that the 'thing' 'nature' did not in fact author the "biased" speech, but rather the 'thing' 'man' did. Because of this, it becomes necessary for the positivist community to find ways of ensuring that nature has indeed been allowed to speak, and this it does by means of 'methods', which, if properly followed, guarantee that the speech is the speech of nature. Thus, in order to avoid the charge of 'bias', the good positivist must be 'committed' to the methods which ensure that nature has been allowed to speak. The good positivist is a committed positivist, and his commitment is to himself remain the anonymous mouthpiece of nature. However
"The recognition of the omnipresence of bias is a symptom of the uneasy recognition that the very standard of anonymous speech can be seen to deny itself on any occasion of its accomplishment because of the essential humanity of language." (110)

On the one hand stands the positivist ideal of anonymity, and on the other the reality of language, which is spoken by men. The positivist program is self-defeating because the commitment that it demands is to a forgetting of the "human parameter" - to forgetting that it is man that is doing the science. It tries to do the impossible and pretend that 'no-one' does science. The positivist must "show commitment to non-commitment and this commitment is unquestionable", (111) and one of the mechanisms for ensuring this commitment is the charge of 'bias' against all who should question it. The problem is, however, that such a commitment threatens to deny its own possibility.

The same point can be reached from another direction by a consideration of 'grounds' and what is involved in them. Blum and McHugh's analysis has attempted to show that the grounds of positivism as a way of life are in fact bound up with a central paradox, caused by a tension between the speech of 'man' and 'nature'. Positivism itself, however, is not concerned with grounds, considering that it simply does speak for nature - for 'nature' as a 'thing' over and against the speech of men - and thus it hides its own grounds and the paradox within them. The way in which it does this is by the use of concepts such as 'bias' which enforce the demand for commitment to non-commitment in an unquestioning fashion by ensuring that any speech that does not conform with the methods that guarantee a 'non-biased account' will be disregarded - it will be called 'biased' and thus will not be 'good' work that is the speech of nature and worthy of serious consideration. Thus 'bias' is a way of covering up the grounds of positivist speech and ensuring commitment to those grounds. In this way the tension that lies in those grounds remains unexamined, and the body of positivist knowledge
soldiers on unchallenged by any threat that commitment might be moved elsewhere, that the 'human parameter' might be rediscovered, or that moral considerations might become significant to the scientific enterprise.

A commitment to analysis, on the other hand, and to the enterprise of investigating grounds, would show people that 'grounds' are not 'things' in the way that nature is considered to be a 'thing' on the positivist account of the matter. As they put it

"The grounds of speech - whether bias speech or any other - are not a thing (are no-thing) because grounds are not things. Commitment to grounds is an attachment to no-thing (but not to nothing). It is a commitment to something that is not a thing, to the foundation of Reason which is not itself another thing." (112)

The fundamental mistake that positivism makes is to become attached to some specific image of what grounds their speech - i.e. nature as a 'thing' - for the result is that the reification distorts speech. Speech itself becomes seen as a 'thing' that exists other than man - as something in relation to the 'thing' nature - and hides its true nature from man. Speech hides man's grounds from him by seeing itself and its grounds as 'things' other than man.

Put in slightly different fashion, the point that is being made here is that a 'form of life' can only be 'displayed' in the speech of which it is the grounds. This means that any attempt to 'define', in some way, what it is that 'grounds' some particular form of speech in reified terms is to treat grounds as what they are not. It is to pretend that 'grounds' or a 'form of life' can be defined as a 'thing' of some sort, which is to lose the whole essence of grounds - i.e. they are the possibility of speech which is displayed in the speaking rather than some thing that stands over and against 'speech' itself. If a form of life is identified with some concrete image, then ossification and reification set in, and the result is that man forgets his true position in the wheel of things. To treat grounds as some-'thing' is to
participate in a lie.

The authors sum up their chapter on bias with a statement of what it is that they have done. It is an excellent summary of their intentions, and is worth reproducing in full. They have, they say, analysed bias, and shown the possibility of an alternative form of life "which enabled our analysis of their usage". They go on

"In this way, the attention of others is re-directed from a concern with the facts and details to which their talk is oriented - the question of practical decisions and constraints - to a concern with the commitments underlying all speech and with their rational and moral status. We have tried to make the commitment underlying bias speech show itself intelligibly as a concern to protect this very question (the question of commitment) from being explored. In this sense, we have asked whether such a life is worth living, whether such a world is worth our commitment, and we have brought an alternative world to view." (113)

The pattern of analysis which I have attempted to give the feel of here, is repeated over the course of the book, using different themes - evaluation, snubs, travel etc. - as the occasions for theorizing and for analysing the grounds of positivism. At each investigation, positivism is shown to be grounded on a paradox, and the alternative form of life which McHugh et al display, is offered for the readers acceptance. This alternative is, ultimately, a 'community' in which the disjunctions that characterize the positivist form of life are transcended by an awareness of the fact that 'speech' is grounded in ones form of life, thus presenting the possibility that life will be lived in a reflexive awareness of its own origins - of the communally generated nature of all the realised possibilities that constitute our everyday world. Precisely this same theme provides the thrust of their other most recent work. (114)

What is most interesting about the work of Blum and McHugh for present purposes, is the way in which their concern with the socially constituted nature of social phenomena such as 'deviance', and an initial concern with the practices and rules on the basis of which such constitution
is effected, has led them in a radically different direction from Garfinkel's work. Where Garfinkel's thinking has led him to a position where 'formal structures of practical actions' can be formulated as some sort of solution to the sociological problem of social order, and where such structures are, at least in principle, describable and empirically investigable, Blum and Mchugh have concentrated upon the connectedness of any such more or less discrete practices with the rest of the 'form of life' of which they are a part. It is of no use, they effectively argue, to attempt to investigate such practices in an empirical 'positivist' fashion, since the grounds which enable that investigation can never be approached in that way. The description of discrete practices can only ever be part of the story, and one must attempt to uncover the whole - the form of life as grounds - of which they are a part. It is not just discrete practices that account for the socially constituted meaningful social world. Meaning is grounded in a form of life as a whole, and to understand the meanings that a society gives to phenomena it is necessary to make visible the grounds which are displayed in those meanings. By making such grounds visible, one opens up the possibility of a moral choice as to whether one's commitment to those grounds is indeed worthwhile, or whether, perhaps, one ought to look to some alternative way of life.

The problems that result from such an approach, however, seem to be serious if one is interested in an 'empirical' social science. The 'grounds' which are to be investigated by analysis, are conceived of as ineffable in the sense that they are only ever able to be displayed and can never be defined by speech. Blum and Mchugh's analysis of the grounds of positivism is only possible as an attempt to make explicit what is covered up by positivist speech, but such an attempt cannot be a description. It cannot in fact be anything else than a display of their own auspices. What is displayed is their own moral commitment.
to a form of life other than that of positivism, and such a commitment is manifest in the moral stance which they take up towards the attitudes, practices, procedures and so on which are the outward manifestations and only means of entry to the positivist 'grounds' which such practices, procedures, etc., display. In spite of being the only means of entry to such grounds, however, they are not themselves considered important but stand only as images or symbols of the ineffable form of life which they display. The art of analysis is to uncover that which such symbols stand as symbols for. The symbols themselves, as mere surface representations, are not interesting in their own right, and any empirical descriptions of them, such as those of ethnomethodologists which seek to describe members' practices and procedures, must inevitably miss the point.

To the extent that the world is made up of people doing things, and to the extent that we only know what it is that people are committed to by seeing what it is that they do, it seems hard to accept that an investigation of what it is that they do is unimportant to an understanding of their commitments. To treat what they do as 'mere' symbols of their grounds, whilst it opens up the possibility of a consideration of the moral question of commitment, seems at the same time to close down the possibility of debate about the relationship between grounds and commitment, and what people actually do in the world, which is, in part, an empirical question. Put another way: by treating 'actualities' in the social world as simply an occasion for investigating 'possibility' - the grounds of the actual - the relationship between possibility and its realizations (where those realizations are empirically investigable matters) remains unconsidered. The result of this is that any empirical matter that might be cited in a discussion of Blum and McHugh's position can only be relevant to the extent that it reveals that which makes it possible, and not as something worthy of comment in its own right, or
as something worthy of 'investigation' in a sense that is not 'analysis'.

The effect that this irrelevance of empirical matters has is to turn the type of analysis that Blum and McHugh engage in into an impregnable, self enclosed fortress of concepts. Instead of using 'bias' as a device to ensure commitment to their 'form of life' in the way that they show positivism does, they use the notion of 'commitment' itself, along with all its moral implications, to direct attention away from the empirical world which could provide for the 'possibility' that their own 'grounds' could be questioned. The grounds of 'analysis' cover themselves over by denying the empirical world which is the realisation of all grounds. Thus Blum and McHugh ensure commitment to their grounds, as a way of life worth living, by relegating the status of all that could possibly count against it to that of 'mere' symbols of the grounds which they display. (115) Just as Blum and McHugh argue that Positivism makes itself immune from any questioning of what makes it possible, so 'analysis' too cuts off any line of attack on itself, and thus any questioning of commitment to its grounds, by directing attention away from any empirical matter which could serve as ammunition for the attack. The only possible recourse for those who consider the empirical world to be a place worth living in and investigating is to remain silent in the face of 'analysis' and to refuse to live the life which it offers - refuse commitment to its grounds. Perhaps one reason for refusing such a commitment could be a determination not to remain silent about empirical concerns.

C) MIND AND SUBJECTIVITY

This final section of the chapter differs from the majority of those above in as much as in it I will not try to illustrate Garfinkel's position by way of contrast with some alternative to it, but rather will seek to show the way in which the work of Coulter and Pollner on questions concerned with 'mind' and 'subjectivity', can be seen as
a development in line with the spirit of both Garfinkel's and
Wittgenstein's thought. The 'illustration' is thus more by way of
example than of contrast. To this end, I will concentrate on a strictly
limited, although not unrepresentative, portion of Coulter's and
Pollner's work, looking specifically at 'reality disjunctures',
'interpretive assymetries', and 'knowledge and belief'.

I want to begin by looking at the way in which Coulter conceptualises
the work that he is involved in. He writes in a recent unpublished
paper that

"The aim of the sort of analysis provided above is to
reformulate the analytical problems in such a way that,
although still tied to the concrete particulars of
social interaction, they do not confuse social problems
with sociological problems and they are not restricted to
position-taking within the commonsense world of normative
affairs." (116)

His concern is to provide analyses of social interaction which avoid
what Garfinkel refers to as 'normative description'. He is not
interested in producing an account of the social world which investigates
the specific 'meanings' which are given to the events which take
place in the social world, but in looking at the practices and procedures
which enable 'meaning' of any sort. In this way, the level of analysis
of social phenomena which depends upon 'position taking' over specific
social problems - for example with position taking over the causes of
poverty or deviance - is transcended, and an approach to the social
world is made possible which investigates 'meaning' itself as a
phenomenon. As a resource for this investigation, Coulter uses
conversational data. (117) His attitude towards the analysis of such
data is interesting, and is worth recording:

"A sound piece of analysis seems to be one that renders
transparent some aspects of reasoning and communication
in a logically coherent and parsimonious manner for some
materials. Discerning connections and conventions hitherto
known-but-unn noticed, and oriented-to but inexplicit, is a
matter of observational acuity and conceptual skill, neither
of which can be made available in formulaic terms." (118)
His analyses, then, are intended to be both illuminating - in Garfinkel's terms, to promote reflection on an obstinately familiar world - and non-normative. Thus far, his enterprise is stated in terms that articulate well with Garfinkel's concerns, and which point to the level of social structure formulated as the 'formal structures of practical actions'. I want now to turn to the way in which Coulter carries out this program in relation to the study of 'subjectivity'.

Coulter's approach to the study of subjectivity is firmly grounded in the work of the linguistic philosophy of mind which stems from the work of Wittgenstein and Ryle (119). His argument is, very briefly, that a 'mentalistic' approach to 'mind' and 'subjectivity' condemns investigation of mental phenomena to a search for shadowy mental objects and processes, whilst a behaviourist approach deals with 'operationalisations' of such allegedly 'inner processes' as intending, understanding, and the rest" (120) which shows a tacit acceptance of such objects or processes. Either way, an analysis of 'subjectivity' or 'mind' is severely complicated by the supposed essentially hidden and private nature of the phenomena to be investigated. Wittgenstein, however, as I showed in a previous chapter, suggests that this whole account of mental phenomena as mysterious, hidden objects, in fact rests on a misunderstanding concerning the nature of language - it rests on the fact that we view all concepts after the model of 'sense' and 'referent' so that a mental predicate such as 'pain' is wrongly supposed to 'refer' to some 'mental object'. Since such mental objects are not visible, then we give them shadowy, mysterious status which then compounds the difficulties that we have in understanding 'subjective' phenomena. Wittgenstein's solution is to see language as 'used', thus abolishing the sense reference model.

Coulter's point is, essentially, that if Wittgenstein's point is sound, then the way to come to grips with subjectivity as a social
scientist is not to see it as somehow a repository for private objects, but rather to investigate the ways in which mental predicates are ascribed. 'Understanding', for example, is not some mysterious process that goes on in the mind, but a way of saying something about the fact that someone has grasped a point, or has learnt to do something. It is at this point that Garfinkel's work becomes important again. His focus upon the problem of order suggests that mentalistic concepts could well be used by the members of a society to 'account' for certain phenomena in such a way that they exhibit an 'orderly' character. Concepts such as 'pain', 'understanding', 'love' and the rest are all ways of organizing and bringing order to the settings of everyday life. This being the case, it becomes possible to suggest that subjective phenomena are not fundamentally unresearchable because they are in some sense 'inside' the skull of actors, but that they are 'transparent', and available to anyone investigating social order. To suppose otherwise rests on a misunderstanding of both language and the status of subjective phenomena. We can gain valuable insight into the phenomena of subjectivity by investigating the ways in which mental predicates are used, and by seeing their structural underpinnings and ordering capacities. A sociological approach to 'subjectivity' thus becomes possible. Coulter sums up the gist of his approach as follows:

"Members' practical employment of mental categories in their routine affairs testifies to the transparency of mind in the only terms that preserve the integrity and intelligibility of our reasoning - intersubjective and conventional terms. We lose our bearings when we detach our questioning about psychological phenomena from their anchorings in the mundane world of everyday interaction and its organization." (121)

Mind thus becomes 'transparent' for the sociological analyst.

To introduce the way in which an empirical investigation of the social world based on this type of approach can actually be carried out, I want to look first of all at the way in which Pollner develops the concept of a 'reality disjuncture'. (122) This will lead on, in turn,
to an account of Coulter's study of 'interpretive asymmetries', which extrapolates from Pollner's notion.

We all assume, Pollner points out (in common with Garfinkel) that we live in an intersubjective world, and that this is guaranteed by a 'reality out there' about which agreement can always, in principle, be reached in the event of disagreement about 'what is the case', or about 'what really happened'. It is a fact, however, that 'Some persons see what other persons do not'. (123) These "contradictory experiences of the world" Pollner calls 'reality disjunctures'. In the normal run of events, it is often the case that given two contradictory accounts of some 'objective' feature of the world, the perceptual experience leading to one of those accounts will be 'ironicized' in favour of some 'definitive' version of that feature. For example, in cases of 'delusion' or 'illusion', the faulted experience is 'ironicized' in favour of what 'really' happened, or what 'really' is the case according to some more 'objective' account of the matter. As Pollner puts it

"the ironicizing of experience occurs when one experience, tacitly claiming to have comprehended the world objectively, is honoured as the definitive version of the world intended by the first." (124)

This possibility of ironicizing experience is one aspect of the problem of 'subjectivity' in the sense that the merely 'subjective' version of events is the one which is 'ironicized' in favour of an 'objective' account. Such ironicization can be effected by ones own continuing experiences - for example, if one sees a puddle on the road up ahead on a hot day, and then as one gets closer the realisation dawns that it was really a 'mirage'. Equally it can be effected by ones own continuing experiences - for example if one saw a 'fuzzy' road sign one would doubt ones own perceptions, and not the sign writer's ability - and so on. In each case ones subjective perceptions are 'ironized' in favour of a more 'objective' account.

In the light of this notion of irony, Pollner defines 'reality
disjunctures as follows:

"A reality disjuncture is, in effect, a yet-to-be completed ironicization of experience. It is a yet-to-be complete ironicization in that a choice is yet to be made as to which of the competing versions of the world will prevail as definitive of that world. The choice may be deeply problematic. In principle either of the competing experiential versions may be chosen and treated as the definitive version in terms of which all manner of counter-experiences and counter-claims may be examined for their specious or otherwise inadequate character." (125)

Pollner goes on to point out that there are practices for both perpetuating and resolving these disjunctures. In the first case, such disjunctures can be maintained by each explaining away the others account of his experience, with neither accepting that his is a mistaken account. Pollner gives the following example, quoted from Milton Rokeach, of an interaction between a mental patient who thought that he was Jesus Christ, and a psychologist.

"Through bilocation he could be in two places at once and through translocation he had the power to go instantaneously from one place to another. Leon also claimed to be able to perform miracles. He had once commanded a table to lift itself off the floor - and it had obeyed. When I expressed disbelief, he volunteered to repeat the miracle for me. He went into the recreation room and picked out a massive table. He then turned his back to it and, in a loud affirmative tone, commanded it to lift itself.

- I don't see the table lifting. -

'Sir, that is because you do not see cosmic reality'." (126)

It is not only in cases of mental illness that such disjunctures are maintained. In court room situations, for example, it is often the case that a witness or defendant will disagree with the police account of certain events, and will bring various practices to bear in order to maintain their version of what happened. In everyday life, too, such disjunctures are often visibly maintained when neither party will allow that his account is faulty, and both seek to ironize the perception of the other.

At the same time, however, there are procedures for resolving the disjunctures. Such a resolution requires that we make some sort of
choice about which is the definitive version of what is the case. This does not, in the normal run of events, require conscious deliberation since our common sense practices are such that these problems are managed in a routine fashion. For example "We have made a choice, we have encountered an ironicized experience when we characterize as 'overlooking' the course of activity in which we point to the pen on the desk only to hear the searcher say that he does not see it." (127) It is not me that is seeing things, but you that has 'overlooked' what I see. The alternative choice is also possible - consider "no, that's not it, it's just the shadow of the chair'.

What is being dealt with here are the practices and procedures used by members of a society to maintain the orderly character of the intersubjective world. As with the work of Garfinkel, it is not necessary to posit an 'objective world' opposed to 'subjective experiences' of it. The mechanisms required to account for the maintenance of a 'typical', 'normal' environment of objects are not 'inside the skull' of members of a society, but are visible for any researcher to see. Other common practices for resolving such disjunctures are those of reporting one of the accounts of the contradictory experiences as 'lying', 'joking', or 'metaphor'. As Pollner puts it

"Such solutions declare, in effect, that intersubjective validation of the world would obtain were it not for the exceptional means and methods of observation, experience or reportage of the persons identified as employing them." (128)

The major part of Pollner's paper is taken up with investigating actual cases or reality disjunctures that are not resolved in these straightforward, everyday taken for granted ways. Thus he looks at cases of 'mental illness', at courtroom situations, and at some cases where sociological accounts of some matter 'ironicized' those of the people being studied without convincing the 'members' themselves. In this way he is able to illustrate more graphically the thrust of his concept of 'reality disjunctures'. In order to investigate the type of
phenomena and practices involved here further, I want to turn now to Coulter's notion of an 'interpretive asymmetry', keeping in mind the whole time the ways in which his study relates to questions of 'mind' and 'subjectivity'.

It is often the case that "some member-independent ('objective') phenomenon or state of affairs is acknowledged by interlocutors" (129) but they do not agree on what it is that they are perceiving. These occasions Coulter calls 'interpretive asymmetries'. They differ from straightforward 'reality disjunctures' in that agreement is already present about there being some 'phenomenon' to be explained or accounted for: the disagreement is about how it is to be interpreted. If an interpretive asymmetry is found, then a reality disjuncture will have been avoided or resolved.

Coulter's interest in such occasions lies in the fact that they are, clearly, able to be described in terms of 'subjectivity' and 'objective reality'. One could say that those members of society involved had different 'subjective' perceptions of the same 'objective' phenomenon, and that thus one could show that 'subjectivity' has somehow mediated between the 'real' object and what is actually perceived. It is this sort of occasion which the famous 'wood chopper' who appears in the work of Weber and Schutz illustrates well. (130) The problem for the sociologist, given these asymmetries, is how to deal with them. If he is presented with, say, two different accounts of some matter is he to back one or the other of them, reproduce both of them, or attempt some synthesis of the two which attempts to define what 'really happened'? In this sort of situation, 'subjectivity' becomes a considerable barrier to 'objective' research, and one to which the only solution seems to be to take the side of one of the account producers or construct a 'more objective' scientific account. This is precisely the situation which Garfinkel sees as the result of 'normative
description' in sociological theorizing.

Coulter's aim is to find a way of dealing with such situations which avoids normative description but which enables insight into social interaction and upon problems of subjectivity. To do this, Coulter takes a conversation between a mental welfare officer and a former mental patient, in which the patient is complaining of being 'knocked up' at night by his neighbours, with the result that he is unable to sleep properly. The patient is insistent that he is indeed being 'knocked up', and it is not the case that he is having 'delusions' - which is what the nurses at the hospital he was at had told him, he thought in order to cover up for the fact that they too were 'knocking him up' to make him lose weight. The medical welfare officer does not simply dismiss his account as a delusion, as the nurses had done, but accepts that there was indeed something wrong but that the patient's interpretation of what was happening was inadequate. Thus a 'reality disjuncture' is avoided. The text of the interview between the medical welfare officer and the mental patient is worth recording here to ground this discussion.

"Patient: /you said that that err, that I assume so and you ( ) that it wasn't so did ya not like.
M.W.O: Yeh, ye: :h
Patient: You put it that I didn't more or less that I did not err ...
M.W.O.: Well I-I-I said that it - it was prob'ly the - best explanation you could give for perhaps/
Patient: /under the circumstances/
M.W.O.: /yea under the circumstances, for - variations in your sleep pattern
Patient: Yes
M.W.O.: And err, in that sense you know it seemed fairly logical that you would do this". (131)

Thus the patient's 'knocking up' becomes the M.W.O.'s 'variations in sleep patterns'. There is an agreed upon "member-independent ('objective') phenomenon or state of affairs" which both the patient and the M.W.O. are interpreting, but their accounts of what that phenomenon is, are
radically different. What has happened here, however, that makes it an interpretive asymmetry and prevents a reality disjuncture, is that the practices and procedures for maintaining one's own account in the face of contradictions have not been brought into play. The mental welfare officer is not dismissing the patient's account as a 'delusion', as the nurses had done, so that he has not attempted to maintain his own account as the definitive one by claiming that the other is just a nut case who would be expected to say that sort of thing. At the same time the patient, since he is not faced by a straightforward rejection of his perception of the situation, does not bring procedures to bear to maintain his account as the correct one - by saying, for example, that the medical officer could be expected to say that the neighbours were not knocking him up, because he was on their side - or perhaps he could claim that the medical officer could not perceive cosmic reality, or some other similar device. In short, the mental welfare officer's approach avoids bringing into play the practices and procedures which would result in the creation and maintenance of a reality disjuncture, and results instead in an interpretive asymmetry, in which neither account is directly ironized in favour of the other, but some 'member independent' reality is acknowledged by both.

There is, here, then, a situation in which the same occasion is being perceived in different ways. The patient sees it as 'knocking up', the nurses as 'delusion' and the mental welfare officer as 'variations in sleep patterns'. If we were to take a subjectivistic approach to this state of affairs, as, for example, Schutz or Cicourel might do, then we are confronted with three different 'subjective realities'. If, on the other hand, we take an 'objectivistic' view, then we are left with the difficulty of deciding which account is 'in fact' correct, and we must justify our choice - for example in terms of scientific or medical knowledge. Coulter, however, sets out to produce an account
that accepts neither view. Instead he wants to know how it is that the total confusion which a subjectivist plurality of worlds would lead to is avoided in practice by members of a society whose interpretations differ, and how the problems involved in proposing just one 'objective' account, and the necessity of justifying that account, are actually handled in practice. In other words, what are the practices and procedures that members of a society use to handle situations such as these, and maintain the orderly character of everyday settings.

In the essay that I am looking at here, Coulter deals with just one device for handling such problems, namely the assignment of faults to one of the perceivers in such a way that his competence as a perceiver whose account is to be believed is called into question. Such devices are commonly used, and as with those for resolving reality disjunctures, are taken for granted and unnoticed. Examples from everyday life include such things as "you must be going deaf, he never said that!" or "No it was definitely a kestral - you need your eyes tested". Coulter lists six assignable faults (not, he insists, an exhaustive list) which is worth reproducing here.

" (i) The literal status of the account.
(ii) The perceiver as a physical organism.
(iii) The perceiver's perceptual aids.
(iv) The perceiver as a cognitive processor of his perceptions.
(v) The perceiver as a person with 'special motives' to make his false perceptual claims.
(vi) The perceiver as a socially-located person with restricted entitlements to (claim to) have 'seen' (or heard, etc.) what he reports." (132)

On this list, 'delusion ascriptions' come under number (iv) (and sometimes (ii)) whilst the medical welfare officer's account of the 'knocking up' can be subsumed under (i).

Coulter goes on to point out that 'fault ascriptions' are not made on a random basis, but that there is a certain structural warrant for the fitting of an ascription to some particular person. As he puts it there is a preference
"to inspect the implicativeness for the intended hearer of the relationship between the usable fault-category and the membership-category of the hearer." (133)

Thus, for example, there would be a 'preference' for ascribing faults under (ii) above, concerned with the perceiver as a physical organism, to old or in some way disabled people rather than to a young twenty year old in sound physical condition, unless the remark was made in jest, or irritation, or some such. On the other hand, one is more likely to ascribe faults concerned with the literal status of the accounts to a second hand car salesman than to a priest. Thus there is a tie between the way in which an account producer is categorized by the fault ascriber, and the type of fault that is likely to be ascribed. Certain descriptions which include such ascriptions are more likely to be 'heard as correct' - as possible correct descriptions - than others. (134)

Put in slight different fashion, some descriptions containing fault ascriptions will be heard as more 'normal', 'typical', 'orderly', etc., than others, and thus will preserve the sense of 'order' in the world.

Thus, not only is it the case that a 'fault ascription' is one way of handling 'interpretive asymmetries' - one taken for granted practice for maintaining the orderly, normal, typical nature of our everyday world - but also the procedure of 'fault ascription' itself draws upon that orderliness in the sense that which fault ascription is appropriate for which account producer is not a random matter but rests on a structural warrant - rests upon what is 'normally the case'. The orderliness of the everyday world is thus preserved from two directions at the same time. On the one hand the problems that disjunctive perceptions or interpretations could create for an intersubjective reality are resolved by a set of common, taken for granted practices, whilst at the same time that very resolution reinforces a sense of what is 'normal' by ascribing faults in line with certain 'preferences' which rest upon taken for granted background
knowledge concerning what faults are 'typically' ascribable to what categories of people.

What Coulter (and Pollner in his paper) are doing, then, is to describe the ways in which 'interpretive asymmetries' and 'reality disjunctures' are actually handled in daily life, and handled in such a way that order is maintained. They are, in a sense, looking at the structures which enable mediation between different subjectivities - although such language, to the extent that it implies that the distinction between 'subjectivity' and 'objective reality' is a fundamental one, must be treated with care. They are not denying that people do indeed have different perspectives on the same things, or that such perspectives can usefully be referred to as 'subjective', or that it is often the case that some particular person's account can be convincingly demonstrated to be wrong. Coulter puts the point as follows:

"The sociologist's task, where he is interested in subjectivity, is to demonstrate how our given commonsense devices for conceptualizing and coping with subjectivity as a feature of everyday life get organized and used in and through orderly communication. There is no other 'medium of access'. Common language-users and practical reasoners are not trying to be telepaths and failing any more than witches doing witchcraft are trying to be scientists and failing." (135)

These ways of 'coping with subjectivity' include the use of categories such as 'mental patient', and the faulting of accounts that are in some way disjunctive by use of various available faulting procedures. It is not the case that the sociologist must somehow get into the minds of members of a society to tease out their 'subjective meanings', as though these were objects lying around in their brains, since 'subjectivity' is not that sort of thing. Rather, 'subjectivity' is itself bound up with all of the problems that are faced with disjunctive perceptions and the ways that are available to handle these. 'Intentions', 'motives', 'meanings', 'understandings' and 'misunderstandings
are not the names of peculiar mental objects, but are some of the concepts available to be used in the organisation of the daily round, a round which includes agreements and disagreements about what is the case.

Coulter's approach to 'knowledge and belief' has much in common with this attempt to come to grips with problems of 'mind'. Once again, he is not interested in investigating what knowledge is, as if it were a 'thing' of some sort, nor in discovering the criteria which provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 'true' knowledge claim. Rather, he is interested in the ways in which 'knowledge' and 'belief' are used in the organisation of everyday order. Thus, for example, he points out the way in which a claim to 'believe' something to be true is often a way of softening an assertion where to say that one 'knew' would be to get saddled with all sorts of burdens of proof, evidence and so on. Similarly:

"We may propose, (then), that the ascription of belief to someone who makes a knowledge-claim hearably downgrades that knowledge-claim and articulates an assymmetry between the ascriber and the person(s) to whom belief is being ascribed. Belief-ascription can be a method for expressing one's reservations about the truth-value of someone's assertion(s)." (136)

It is in this way that anthropologists often express their reservations about some particular native custom, as, for example, in a case where a rain dance is reported in terms of the natives 'belief' that it will bring rain even though the natives might well 'know' that it will. Thus information is reported, and understood, in terms that ensure that the anthropologist will not be locked up, or have his competence questioned because he himself 'believes' something that his readers 'know' is not the case. Coulter states the relationship between these two terms in the following way:

"At the level of the social organisation of their use, we can speak of the categories "belief" and "knowledge" as forming a disjunctive category-pair ......... Other such
pairs would include vision/hallucination; telepathy/trickery; ghost/illusion; flying-saucer/UFO; and ideology/science." (137)

Thus one can use such pairs of terms to upgrade or downgrade, take seriously or denigrate etc.

It is not, it must be stressed, that Coulter is here claiming that no-one has, or ever can, justifiably claim to 'know' something. He is not engaged in that sort of enterprise at all, just as he is not involved in denying that people 'mean' things when they talk, 'see things differently' etc., etc. Rather he is seeking to illuminate knowledge claims by investigating "the social organisation of their use". He is investigating the structural level of 'what people do' which makes claims to 'know' something intelligible in the first place. As Wittgenstein put it, it is not agreements of opinion that makes something true or false, but on the contrary it is what they say that is true or false and they agree in the language they use - which is agreement in form of life, not opinion. Coulter is, in a very strong sense, investigating the language which they use, and which through agreement to use it, makes claims to knowledge, as well as claims to 'objectivity' in the face of 'interpretive assymmetries' and 'reality disjunctures', both possible and intelligible. Coulter puts it thus:

"The success or failure with which members make and handle perceptual claims is very much contingent upon at least some of the devices and procedures of reasoning described here. This is not to argue that such a contingent basis should subvert our ordinary claims to certainty and knowledge where ordinary methods of warranting are available or relevant. Rather, it is to show how such certainty and knowledge can be socially generated." (138)

The interesting thing about the type of work that Coulter and Pollner engage in, and the type of orientation towards social phenomena which it displays, is that it uses insights germinated in the thought of both Wittgenstein and Garfinkel, but without taking the direction towards moral concerns with 'commitment' which characterises the work of
Blum and McHugh. At the same time, however, it does not pursue the types of interest which I have shown in the work of philosophers of the social sciences such as Winch and Louch. Their work, on the contrary, accepts the importance of empirical investigation in the social sciences, and attempts to produce descriptions of social phenomena which avoid the normative description which is often seen as the only possible form of sociology.

The influence of Garfinkel is evident enough. The concern with the way in which taken for granted practices and procedures organize and order the everyday social world in such a way that its 'normality', 'typicality' etc., etc., are ensured and maintained. The concern with the fact that language should be seen as something used with a point over the course of interaction. An approach to questions concerned with 'meaning' which looks not at the specific meanings that members of a society give to specific social phenomena but at the practices and procedures which enable 'meaning' of any sort. An approach to questions of 'subjectivity' and 'mind' which follows the advice that there is nothing of interest inside the skull of a man as far as the sociologist is concerned - all there is is brains - so that the sociologist must investigate social mechanisms, not supposedly private mental objects.

At the same time, the influence of Wittgenstein is evident, especially in Coulter's work, in a concern with the uses to which particular concepts can be put within particular language games. His concern with the games that can be played with 'knowledge' and 'belief', for example, reflects an interest in language games themselves which, whilst compatible with Garfinkel's work, is not explicit in it. The influence of Wittgenstein thus provides a new dimension to the approach to social life generated by Garfinkel's ethnomethodology as it appears in Pollner and Coulter's approach to questions of 'subjectivity' and 'mind', in the sense that it directs attention towards particular ways
in which language and concepts are 'used' in relation to specific areas of the organization of social life. Where Garfinkel's concerns lead him to investigate general practices - such as the documentary method, or coding practices - Coulter and Pollner show the workings of more particular practices in relation to specific problems such as the resolution of a 'reality disjuncture' or the handling of an 'interpretive asymmetry'. At the same time, however, the concern with the problem of social order is not lost sight of, and a sense is gained of the way in which accounting practices, together with specific sets of concepts, are able to solve problems caused by situations which could, potentially, provide a threat to the maintenance of normality, typicality, and the rest.

What this work illustrates, then, is two things. Firstly it demonstrates the way in which the affinity between Wittgenstein and Garfinkel can be exploited in the interests of sociological research. In this regard, Coulter's work especially is a working illustration of one of the main themes of this thesis - namely that a considerable number of parallels can be drawn between the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein to the advantage of ethnomethodology. Secondly, it shows the way in which Garfinkel's approach to 'subjectivity' and 'mind' can, in practice, be given empirical content. By refusing to be drawn into the subjectivism of a Schutz or a Cicourel, or into a realism which naively posits a 'real world', they draw out some of the implications for research into 'subjectivity' which the dissolution of the subject/object distinction and a consequent refusal to accept an object and designation model of language, can be seen to generate. In this sense, the concerns of Garfinkel which I have shown to stem from his reading of Gurwitsch, are given more body, and a thrust which takes them towards issues which are centrally important for sociology as a whole.
CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have presented the work of some of the best
known writers who have been influenced by Garfinkel and Wittgenstein,
and in the case of Cicourel in particular, by Schutz as well. I have
tried to show some of the ways in which the seminal ideas contained in
Garfinkel's approach to social order have been interpreted and
developed, often in ways that seem to bear only an incidental relationship
to the initial formulation of the ethnomethodological position. In
the process, I hope that I have been able to show more clearly what is
involved in Garfinkel's approach to the social world both by illustrating
in more depth what certain aspects of it look like in practice - as,
for example, with the work of Weider, Coulter and Pollner in particular
- and by showing something of what he does not mean by contrasting
his position with that of others - here Cicourel's subjectivism, and
Blum and McHugh's idealism are the main contrasting themes.

Whilst it is true, however, that there are many writers who have
been influenced by Garfinkel, it is also the case that there are none
who have not developed his ideas or their implications in such a way that
certain aspects of it are emphasised whilst others are left either
implicit or are left out of account. Thus Weider does not consider in
any depth what is implied in the notion of an underlying structure
of practices in his work on the halfway house, whilst Coulter,
by integrating aspects of Wittgenstein's thought into his studies,
provides a different focus for broadly ethnomethodological themes.
As the position as a whole develops, it seems likely that this process
whereby aspects of it are followed through to find what light they can
throw on social phenomena will provide the main interest. Garfinkel's
work itself does not provide programmatic statements about the type of
research that ought to be undertaken, but instead produces insights and
suggestions which stimulate thought about the social world. It is this
generative character of his work, rather than its qualities as a completed system of sociological theorizing, which is its strength and which makes it important for students of social life.

This is not to say, however, that there are no central themes which one can say are specifically developed in Garfinkel's work. As I have shown, his attitude towards 'meaning', towards practices and procedures, towards 'rules' and the 'formal structures of practical actions', and so on, all of these things are central to the position which Garfinkel is proposing. Such concerns can be seen as contrasting with those of other sociologists, and even with those of some who have been influenced by his thought. He is attempting to define a distinctive perspective on social phenomena. What the implications of it are for social researchers becomes apparent only in the work done.

In the next chapter, I want to look at what is currently the most productive line of empirical work to have been influenced heavily by Garfinkel's perspective, namely conversational analysis. The emphasis in this work, which was pioneered by Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff, is upon the conversational structures which enable indexical particulars to be used over the course of some specific conversation in such a way that sense is made for all practical purposes. These structures are themselves 'practices' - they are the 'normal', 'typical', 'taken for granted' practices and procedures which enable any conversationalists to make sense and understand one another. What this structure of practices looks like, the way in which it is analysed, and the precise status of the descriptions given of it are the subject of the following discussion.
CHAPTER 5 - SOME COMPARATIVE AND CONTRASTIVE APPROACHES

1. O'Neill, 1972 and 1975, for example.
2. Mehan and Wood, 1975 (a) and 1975 (b) for example.
8. It should be noted that Douglas is not, despite some misapprehensions to the contrary (e.g. Hindess, 1973), an ethnomethodologist. Garfinkel and Sacks (1969, p.339 - 40) make it clear that they do not consider his work representative of their aims, and Douglas himself, in his introduction to Douglas & Johnson, 1977 refers to himself as an "Existential Sociologist". For this reason I will not consider his work here. For an enlightening discussion of his best known work on suicide (1967) from an ethnomethodological perspective, see Atkinson, 1978.
15. Ibid, p.38.
18. Ibid, p.11-12.
22. Ibid, p. 82.
27. For example, the contrast between Mark and Smithfield, summed up Ibid. p. 239-241.
32. Cicourel, 1964, p. 179. "La Langue" is de Saussure's terms for the structural aspect of language. It is contrasted with "La Parole" which, roughly, is "speech" - i.e. language as spoken. "La Langue" and "La Parole" together make up "Le Language".
34. Wittgenstein, P.I. 5.
37. It is significant, here, that Cicourel, in tracing his philosophical roots, claims to have a similar notion of meaning to that of Husserl who, he says, has "a variant of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in his work", (1964, p. 218). This interesting suggestion certainly reflects Cicourel's position, but seems to owe more to Schutz than to Husserl.
38. Ibid, p. 199.
40. Ibid, pp. 203-209.
44. Ibid, p.51.
47. Cf., for example, Cicourel (et al) 1974, and some articles in 1973. Also, for a more theoretical account of Language Acquisition, Cicourel 1971.
54. Weider, 1974, p.5.
55. Ibid, p.113.
56. Ibid, p.130.
57. Ibid, p.166.
58. Ibid, p.118-120.
60. Ibid, p.175.
62. Ibid, p.188.
64. Ibid, p.223.
67. Ibid, p.15.
68. Ibid, p.121.
69. Ibid, p.123.
70. Ibid, p.27.
71. Ibid, p.32.
72. Ibid, p.32.
73. Ibid, p.23.
75. Winch, 1958, p.82.
76. Wittgenstein, P.I. 201.
77. Winch, 1958, p.63.
78. Ibid, p.64.
79. Phillips, 1977, for example, has suggested that form of life
    should be considered as referring to all mankind - as "co-terminus
    with the general facts of nature" (p.131).
80. Cf., for example, Urmston Philips, 1976, on differences between
    Anglo and Indian speakers.
81. Louch, 1972, p.4.
83. Gellner, 1975, Cf. also Louch's (1977) reply.
84. Louch, 1972, p.171.
85. Ibid, p.171.
86. Ibid.
87. B.F. Skinner, 1962. This is a novel which portrays Skinner's
    behaviourist paradise - or nightmare depending upon one's point
    of view.
88. Louch, 1972, Chapter 10.
90. The examples are from Blum, 1970 (a).
91. Ibid, p.38.
92. Ibid, p.49.
95. Blum, 1970 (a) p.42.
96. Blum, 1970 (b) p.333.
98. Ibid, p. 334.
106. Ibid, p. 4.
108. Ibid, p. 49.
109. Ibid, p. 68.
110. Ibid, p. 73.
111. Ibid, p. 74.
112. Ibid, p. 72.
113. Ibid, p. 75.
114. Cf., for example, Alan Blum, 1974.
115. A good example of this was when, after a recent (1978) lecture on "Upbringing" given at Sheffield University, someone asked a question concerned with an empirical aspect of socialization. Blum replied that that the questioner could ask such a question at all showed that he was himself part of the problem they were fighting. In other words, his question was not taken in the spirit it was asked - as about empirical fact - but as a display of the questioner's grounds.
117. It should be noticed, here, that Coulter has not, in any published work, concerned himself with conversational analysis in the style of Sacks and Schegloff. He uses conversational materials as
illustrative of his points rather than as the primary focus of attention.

118. Coulter, Unpublished mimeo, p.22.

119. His intellectual debt is particularly apparent in his recent article (Coulter, 1977).

120. Ibid, p.322.


133. Ibid, p.390.

134. The notion of "hearably correct descriptions" will be dealt with in the next chapter in relation to Sacks' "Membership Categorization Device".


137. Ibid, p.16.

In the context of a discussion about the relevance of phenomenology for sociology, Garfinkel says the following:

"In my own experience there are several ways in which I have been pedagogically interested in the relevance of phenomenologists' writings for sociology. I'll add that under the example of Sacks, Schegloff, and their colleagues in conversational analysis, I am increasingly uncomfortable with such interests, and discourage those interests in my students." (1)

What is principally reflected in these remarks is Garfinkel's continual insistence that empirical investigation of the social world is essential to sociology. This insistence is characteristic of all of Garfinkel's published writings, in nearly all of which the theoretical points that he is making are supplemented by a report of some empirical investigation or other, and it is very strongly present in even his earliest work - out of the six hundred or so pages of his doctoral dissertation, a third are devoted to empirical work. Thus the work of conversational analysts, which places considerable emphasis upon empirical studies, can be seen as articulating with Garfinkel's concern to relate theoretical considerations to empirical description of social phenomena. The links here, however, are more substantial than that. In purely historical terms, Garfinkel seems to have worked closely with Sacks, until the latters untimely death in 1975, a fact which is testified to by the paper "On Formal Structures of Practical Actions" which they joint authored, by their common focus as it emerges in the discussions which make up the Purdue Symposium on ethnomethodology, and by Coulter's remarks to the effect that the two men could be seen, in discussions, to work well together. (2)
It would seem, then, that there is warrant for attempting to trace quite strong links between conversational analysis and Garfinkel's writings, and over the course of this chapter I hope to do just this. I will investigate congruences between the approaches to problems of description of Garfinkel and Sacks, and similarities between the ways in which the problem of social order is conceptualized. In the process, various other affinities will emerge, for example in the approach to 'structure', 'language', and 'correspondence'. It will also become apparent that the link between the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein which I have discussed above, parallels that between conversational analysis and Wittgenstein. Thus the notion of 'bedrock' or 'form of life' can be shown to relate strongly to the conversational structures which conversational analysts describe.

In the first section I will deal with some of the affinities between Garfinkel and Sacks on a theoretical level. I will then move on, in the remaining sections, to discuss the substantive work that has been done by conversational analysts, and to say something about the status of the description which they provide of conversational structures. I will conclude by looking at the enterprise as a whole, particularly in relation to some remarks by Goffman in a recent paper.

CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS AND GARFINKEL

A first obvious point of convergence between the work of Garfinkel and Sacks is in their common interest in description. For both of them, the interest lies not in the substance of actual descriptions, but in how description is done. Sacks puts it thus:

"Even if it can be said that persons produce descriptions of the social world, the task of sociology is not to clarify these, or to 'get them on the record', or to criticize them, but to describe them. That persons describe social life (if they can be conceived as doing so) is a happening of the subject quite as any other happening of any other subject in the sense that it poses the job of sociology, and in contrast with it providing a solution to sociology's problem of describing the activities of its subject matter." (3)
The sociologist must, in other words, find ways of describing what it is that members of a society do when they describe the social world — he must investigate what it is to describe social life, rather than rely unreflectingly on already formulated descriptions of social life to provide him with his subject matter. His job is not to provide further, 'normative' descriptions of the social world which stand side by side with those of members of a society as competing accounts whose purpose is to 'ironize' them, but rather he must seek to unravel the practices and procedures which enable any (including sociological descriptions) of social life in the first place. Like Garfinkel, Sacks insists that descriptions do not simply 'correspond' to some 'reality', but that 'etc.' procedures are needed to produce and understand an adequate description. The sociologist's problem is to begin to understand that fact — to unravel what is involved in 'describing' in the face of that 'etc.'.

The problem, then, is identical to that which exercised Garfinkel, and which he discusses at length in his critique of Parsons which was outlined above. The nub of the problem concerns the subject matter of sociology — what is the 'object' which sociologists ought to be describing, the practices and procedures which enable description, or the substance of 'meaningful', already formulated descriptions of the social world? — and this problem in its turn concerns the relationship between sociology and common sense knowledge of the social world. Sacks puts it thus

"The emergence of sociology will take a different course (when it emerges) from that of other sciences because sociology, to emerge, must free itself not from philosophy but from the common-sense perspective. Its predecessors are not as Galileo had to deal with, but persons concerned with practical problems, like maintaining peace or reducing crime. The 'discovery' of the common-sense world is important as the discovery of a problem only, and not as the discovery of a sociological resource." (4)
The importance of the descriptions which members of a society produce is that they provide a problem for the sociologist - namely, how are such descriptions possible? - and it should not be thought that they somehow define what actually is the case in the social world. To suppose that they do is to mistake the relevance of such descriptions for sociology.

From this point, as I have shown, Garfinkel turns to the work of Schutz, Gurwitsch and Kaufmann to provide him with theoretical access to that aspect of the social world which he considers must be investigated. Thus he formulates that level of social structure - the 'cognitive' level - which is concerned with 'agreement' in terms of presuppositional assumptions, practices and procedures. Sacks, working within the framework outlined by Garfinkel, turns his attention towards conversational materials in an attempt to develop a "naturalistic observational discipline that could deal with the details of social action(s) rigorously, empirically, and formally." (5) This is not, it should be emphasised, because of any idolization of conversation - Sacks makes it clear that he is interested in all interaction - and recent work by Schegloff has begun to investigate gestures in a fashion similar to the analyses of conversation that he and Sacks previously engaged in. (6) The point, rather, is to find ways to describe, in a rigorous fashion, the practices and procedures which enable meaningful interaction in everyday life, and one aspect of such interaction is conversation - as Sacks puts it

"What one ought to seek to build is an apparatus which will provide for how it is that any activities, which members do in such a way as to be recognizable as such to members, are done, and done recognizably." (7)

The point, therefore, is to describe what it is that people do, in a rigorous fashion.

Sacks' interest in description, then, is a concern with that same level of structure which characterizes Garfinkel's work, and as with
Garfinkel it is a concern which is interwoven with a particular view of the nature of language, and of the problem of order. Language should not be seen as a structure which contains 'meanings', and which somehow 'corresponds' with 'reality', but rather the 'etcetera problem' must be faced up to and its implications accepted. (8) Instead of viewing language as a calculus, it must be recognized that it is used, in settings, for a variety of purposes, to make sense, and that this essential 'indexicality' of language is an inescapable feature of it for actors and sociologists alike. What must be done is to look at the ways in which language is used to produce descriptions that are actually understood, at the sequential placement of descriptions within conversations and the tasks they perform - in short at the whole battery of practices, procedures and assumptions that enable language and descriptions to be used/formulated and understood, where such practices etc. are conceived to be taken for granted and the presupposition of orderly conversation, which is itself an aspect of social order in general. In line with these concerns, and again in parallel with Garfinkel, distinctions between subjectivity and some objective world, and a concern with 'essences' - with essential meanings - are not present in Sacks' work or in the body of the conversational analysis literature. The central task is conceived to be an investigation of that 'intersubjective' form of life - that structure of practices and procedures - which is the presupposition of observable order in the social world, and of meaningful interaction.

To illustrate these points further, and in the process to indicate in more depth the congruences between Garfinkel and Sacks, I will make a few remarks about Sacks' view of language, and about the relationship between conversational analysis and the problem of order. I will deal with each in turn.

The concern with language as used is particularly apparent in an article by Sacks entitled "Everyone Has to Lie" in which he produces an
analysis of the way in which the word 'everyone' is used. He writes that

"it is not at all obvious that a statement with the subject term everyone names a larger population than a statement with, e.g. the subject term doctors or men etc." (9)

In order to determine the truth of a statement with the subject term 'everyone' it is not the case that one must always look around to see if indeed all of the people in the world are doing or being whatever it is that is being predicated of 'everyone'. If a little girl says "everyone's going, can I go?", although in some particular context what she means, and who she is indicating by 'everyone' might be quite clear, she need not at all be referring to a great number of people - it may be her friend at school that she means. The point is, however, that this does not mean that in this case the word is being used wrongly, or that this is an idiosyncratic use of the term or even that the dictionary definition of the word is in some way wrong or inadequate in that it does not cover this case. Rather the mistake is to have considered that 'everyone' must somehow have some fixed referent - to ignore the fact that words are used with a sense in a context and to try to find some 'essential' meaning for the word. As Sacks puts it

"It may be the case that a determination of what "everyone" refers to turns on the utterance and the occasion of its use. Some readings were suggested - such as that "everyone" can be used programatically, can be used for a rather small set population, can be used for categories. By use of these, an approach that seeks, as ours does, to find how the statement might be possibly true seems not necessarily burdened with what might appear to be a more attractive approach - that is, to find that it could not be true (i.e., to formulate such a sense of "everyone" as permits the ready location of falsifying evidence)." (10)

To simply take a definition of "everyone" and show that people use it incorrectly would simply not tell us very much.

At this point the connection with the problem of order begins to become apparent. Given that language is used in this way in contexts, the problem for the conversational analyst becomes not to specify what
it is that people in a specific encounter actually mean by what they say to one another, but rather to unravel how it is that, in the face of so many different potential contextual determinations, they can use indexical expressions to make sense to one another - to describe, understand, curse, enlighten, question, etc., etc. In other words, what must be done is to describe the mechanisms - the structures of practices - that enable members of a society to move from one conversational context to another, and to use language in an orderly fashion such that what they mean is generally quite clear and adequate for the purposes at hand. Such a structure must be both context free in the sense that it bridges all contexts, and yet it must be context sensitive in that it must enable sense to be made, using language, in any context. (11)

It is of no use to try to make some structure of 'meanings' mediate across contexts, as Schutz tries to do, since at once problems of 'subjective' and 'objective' meaning begin to arise, problems of 'context' and 'indexicality' tend to be pushed into the background, and one is left with all of the difficulties created by the 'etcetera problem' for the nature of 'description' and its 'correspondence' with reality. Instead, what is needed is to unravel the structure of practices, within a form of life, which enable any meaningful conversation.

This can be put in slightly different fashion to make the connection between analyses of conversation directed towards these conversational practices, and the problem of order, more explicit. These conversational structures are conceptualized as at that same structural level which Garfinkel indicates in his work. The interest is thus not in 'subjective meanings', or in a structure of 'ideal types', or in a structure of Winch type 'rules', or in Clicourelian interpretive 'rules', or in the structure of a 'cultural system', but rather in the presuppositional rules, assumptions, practices and procedures which enable rational action, or meaningful interaction, and thus which enable social order.
of which conversational order is a part. The possibility of holding meaningful conversations depends upon the practices and procedures which enable conversations to be orderly affairs. Thus to examine such practices and procedures is to examine something of what makes social order possible.

Before concluding these introductory remarks it will be useful to look briefly at the way in which it is the practices and procedures that analysts share with the conversationalists whose talk they are analysing, that enables them to provide the descriptions of conversation that they do. This will both highlight the relationship between the structure of conversational practices and social order, and will place the account of the substantive work of conversational analysts, which is the subject of the next section, in correct perspective.

In the Purdue Symposium, Garfinkel remarks that ethnomethodologists are in fact 'members' performing the task of analysing society from within. (12) The possibility of performing an ethnomethodological analysis of conversation rests upon the fact that those analysing the conversational data are themselves competent conversationalists, and that they can therefore identify what it is that is being said over the course of some given stretch of talk. Put another way, the structures of practices which enable co-conversationalists to use and make sense of indexical expressions in a variety of contexts, (and thus to maintain the "orderliness" of conversations) is common to both co-conversationalists and the conversational analyst. It is therefore the case that the analyst recognizes orderliness in a conversation because he shares certain competences with those whose conversations he is analysing. By the same token, the orderliness which he recognizes in the conversation is also recognizable to the conversationalists. Schegloff and Sacks put it thus

"We have proceeded under the assumption (an assumption borne out by our research) that in so far as the materials we worked with exhibited orderliness, they did so not only to us, indeed not in the first place for us, but for the co-participants who produced them." (13)
The problem for the analyst, therefore, becomes to find a way of describing in a non-normative fashion this order which is visible within conversation, and to do so in such a way that the various members' competences which enable both analyst and co-conversationalists to generate and recognize that order, are made apparent. The crucial question becomes "how is the order that is visible within this conversation made possible?". To answer this question, the analyst must explicate and describe the structure of practices - the competences - which he shares is common with other members of society.

What the analyst must not do, however, is to impose some structure from without upon the conversational data. His analysis must stand as a description rather than a 'normative' account of the data. Since the order is recognizable to members of a society, he must use that fact as his base line, in the sense that his description must investigate how they recognize the order - must describe how this is possible - rather than organizing the data in terms of some set of criteria imported from elsewhere - for example 'rational categories', or 'norms and values'. Sacks and Schegloff state this aim as follows in relation to closing a conversation:

"These basic features of conversation, the problem of achieving their co-occurrence, and the turn-taking machinery addressed to the solution of that problem are intended, in this account, not as analyst's constructs, but as descriptions of the orientations of conversationalists in producing proper conversation." (14)

The analyses are intended as descriptions of what is going on in the data, warranted by the data, and able to 'give back' that same data. It is not good enough to simply produce an analysis which has counted the number of occasions on which a particular feature of a conversation occurs (for example a question) and the number of times on which a certain other feature follows it (for example an answer) and then to give an account of their relationship in terms of 'probability'. What must be done is to find a description of the data which accounts for every
occurrence. As Schegloff puts it

Not number of occurrences, but common subsumption
under a more general formulation is what matters." (15)

The analyses are not inductive. Rather the point is to describe the
structure of the utterances observed. There is no place for deviant
case analyses - indeed if a 'deviant' case were found then the analysis
would either have to be changed to incorporate it, or it would need to
be rejected as inadequate. The analyses are beholden to the data, and
stand or fall according to whether or not they are able to describe it
- whether or not they can handle all instances of some particular feature
of conversation practice. Schegloff again makes the point in relation
to a discussion of the opening of a conversation

"Rather than developing a deviant case analysis we set out
to try to deepen the formulation (.............) so that it
would encompass with equal ease the vast majority of cases
already adequately described and the troublesome variant." (16)

The task for the analyst of conversation, then, is rigorous and demanding
and stands in a relationship to the data such that it can, in principle,
be mistaken. In this way, the hope is that purely 'normative'
descriptions can be avoided.

In this section, then, I have tried to give some indication of
the rationale of conversational analysis by relating it to the work of
Garfinkel, drawing out the ways in which it attempts to describe that
structural level which is concerned with the practices and procedures
that are the presupposition of meaningful interaction and of social order.
I have shown also, how it is the fact that the analyst shares certain
competences with other conversationalists that enables him to do the work
of description that he does. Having provided this background, I want
now to move on to discuss in some detail the substantive work that has
been done by conversational analysts.
CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURES: 1) MEMBERSHIP CATEGORIZATION DEVICES

In this section, I will look at membership categorization devices to show how Sacks, in some of his earliest work, sets about the problem of providing descriptions of the structures of rules and practices which enable conversation - which enable indexical expressions to be used with a sense in a wide variety of different settings. This particular notion is, in fact, largely abandoned by Sacks (although not by many other analysts) as his work progresses, in favour of a concern with sequencing in conversation. Nonetheless it remains an interesting and potentially productive notion, and one which provides a vivid illustration of the type of enterprise that conversational analysts are involved in.

Sacks' early interest in the categories that members of a society use over the course of their interactions is seen in his analysis of telephone calls to an emergency psychiatric clinic in Los Angeles which dealt largely with calls from potential suicides who were looking for some sort of help. This work formed the core of his Ph.D. Thesis, and is reported in two articles - "An Initial Investigation of the Usability of Conversational Data for Doing Sociology", and "The Search For Help". (17) Probably the clearest expression of this aspect of his work is in an analysis of a story told by a two year old child, so I will look at this essay and the way in which a structural mechanism is developed to describe the categorizing work done by members of a society.

The basic concept here is that of a membership categorization device (M.C.D. for short) which is defined as follows:

"any collection of membership categories, containing at least a category, which may be applied to some population containing at least a member, so as to provide, by the use of some rules of application, for the pairing of at least a population member and a categorization device member. A device is then a collection plus rules of application". (18)

The sorts of thing that Sacks has in mind here are devices such as 'sex', which has two member categories, 'male' and 'female' which go together
to form a set, and which can be used to describe someone. Other possible devices are those such as 'family', which contains the categories 'mother', 'father', 'baby', 'children' etc., 'stage of life', which contains the categories 'baby', 'adult', 'child', etc., and so on. Many M.C.D.'s are what Sacks calls 'duplicatively organised' which means that

"when such a device is used on a population, what is done is to take its categories, treat the set of categories as defining a unit, and place members of the population into cases of the unit." (19)

What Sacks does is to take a story told by a child, and to analyse it in such a way that this basic concept - the 'membership categorization device' - its features, and the ways in which it is used (with the help of a few rules which I will mention in a minute), are illustrated and a general structural point is made about the organization of conversation. The story is "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up.".

The first thing that Sacks points out about this two sentence story is that both he and the majority of native speakers of English, would hear the 'mommy' that is mentioned, as the mommy of the 'baby'. This fact is not stated in the story, but nonetheless most people would, without any thought, consider that the baby and the mommy were related. Sacks' question is, how is this possible? How is it that this relationship is established and how might it be possible to describe the way in which a simple account of such a simple scene can be done in such a way that so much actually left unsaid is in fact understood?

The answer is given in terms of M.C.D.'s with the rules of application. It is first of all evident that the category 'baby' belongs in both the device 'family' and the device 'stage of life'. It is also clear that 'mommy' belongs to the device 'family'. There are a set of rules that govern the application of such devices. The first of these is that a person can be heard as doing 'adequate reference' if he uses just one category from a particular device. It is not, for example, necessary for him to say, every time he wants to identify a mother, something like
"the mother who is related to the father with whom she had a baby which is their baby, and that baby is the sister of another baby who is also related to the father and mother etc. etc.". All he needs to say is 'mother', and enough has been said because of the way in which M.C.D.s are organized. This rule Sacks calls the 'economy rule'.

There is another rule - the 'consistency rule' - which says that if a category from some particular device has been used for one member of a population, then other categories from the same device may be used for other members. Thus, for example, if one has already referred to someone as a 'husband', then one may refer to someone else as a 'wife', rather than as, say, a 'woman'. As a corollary of this, there is a hearer's rule which states that "if two or more categories are used to categorize two or more members of some population, and those categories can be heard as categories from the same collection, then: hear them that way.". (20)

One further term is needed before going back to the original story to show how the apparatus that Sacks has developed accounts for the way in which it is heard. This is the notion of category bound activities. Briefly, the idea is that there are certain activities that go with certain categories. Thus, for example, 'crying' is category bound to 'baby' within the device 'stage of life'.

If one brings all this to bear upon the story "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up" it becomes possible to account for why it is that we hear the mommy as the mommy of the baby. Thus

1. By the 'economy rule' we know that both Mommy and Baby do adequate reference to members of the population.

2. The term 'baby' is contained in the two devices 'stage of life' and 'family'. However the category bound activity 'crying' relates the baby in the story to the device 'stage of life'.

3. The 'consistency rule' (and the hearer's rule that is its corollary) suggests that the 'mommy' in the second sentence should be heard as from the same device as the 'baby' in the first. The device which they share
4. The device 'family' is 'duplicatively organized' which means that when it is used, its categories are to be understood in terms of the unit of which they are a part - e.g. daddy, mommy, baby, etc. as parts of the 'family'.

5. Thus the 'mommy' and the 'baby' in the story are both collected by the duplicatively organized device 'family', and are to be heard as going together - as from the same unit.

6. Since the mommy is the mommy of the baby, and since mommies of babies that are crying, according to common wisdom, pick them up, then the story is heard as a perfectly 'normal' and 'correct' one.

This brief account does not at all do justice to Sacks' analysis, but it does provide a basis upon which to form a few comments. Firstly, it is clear that the findings of the analysis are highly general in that 'membership categorization device' is a concept that can be used on any number of different instances of categorization, in any number of conversations, in order to describe what it is that is being done, how it is that some particular categorization is heard as it is, and so on. Sacks gives an example of this further applicability of the model

"it permits us to predict, and to understand how we can predict, that a statement such as 'The first baseman looked around. The third baseman scratched himself' will be heard as saying 'the first baseman of the team of which the third baseman is also a player' and its converse." (21)

Such hearings are provided for by the machinery contained in the notion of a membership categorization device: in this case the relevant device is 'team' of which 'baseman' is one category. The fact that one can predict the way in which these phrases will be heard on the basis of the descriptive apparatus testifies to the adequacy of the description. Further examples of the use of the concept M.C.D. can be found throughout the conversation analysis literature, and the descriptions that result are often highly insightful. A good example of this is a recent article
by Paul Drew which examines the cross examination of a policeman giving
evidence to the Scarman Tribunal. (22)

Secondly, the machinery that Sacks develops provides some insight
into the ways in which words like 'baby', or 'man' can be used to insult
or praise, or to impute blame. For someone to refer to a fully grown
man as a 'baby' because he is crying, is to insult him by using the
categorization device 'stage of life', i.e. to use the category bound
activity 'crying' to relate the man to that membership category to which
'crying' is bound - namely 'baby' - when he should normally be described
by the category 'man' from the same device. Similarly, for a mother to
refer to her young son, who has just finished some useful task about the
house, as her 'man', reverses the procedure, placing the child in a
position within the device 'stage of life' by means of the category 'man'
to which he is not yet entitled. In this way he is praised for his good
work. It is, in other words, the fact that categories are collected within
devices, and are recognized as being so collected, that makes it possible
to use terms (membership categories) over the course of interaction to do
work that is not 'descriptive' in the strict sense, but which could more
adequately be characterized as 'praising', 'blaming', 'insulting' and so
on.

Thirdly, it is worth noticing that Sacks himself, in the article
examined above, draws out the implications of his analysis to include the
ways in which 'descriptions' are done adequately, and heard to be adequate
by whoever hears them. This he does by way of a 'viewers' maxim':

"If a member sees a category-bound activity being done,
then, if one can see it being done by a member of a
category to which the activity is bound, then: See it
that way." (23)

In other words, if one could see either that a 'male' cried or that a 'baby'
cried, (it being a male baby) then one would, if possible, see that a
'baby' cried. Thus in deciding whether or not a description of some
event is adequate or not, one applies the viewers' maxim so that 'the
male cried', said of a baby, is seen to be an 'incorrect' - or a least improper, or ironic, or bizarre etc. - description of the event. It is thus the case that 'correct' or 'possibly correct' descriptions are recognisable.

Now the interest of this is twofold. Firstly it does enable us to describe something of what is involved in producing and understanding a correct possible description of some event or other. It is necessary to align category bound activities with their categories, and to use categories in relation to their devices. (24) But further than this, secondly, the fact that categories are used in this way demonstrates something about perceived 'normality' and 'order'. The fact that one is able to hear 'the baby cried' as correct depends not only upon the categorization device itself (with its rules) but also upon the recognition that it is 'normal', in our society, for babies to cry, but not so much for men. This norm is what is used, as a resource, for discovering that 'the male cried' could well be an incorrect description of what was going on. By the same token, however, the categories themselves - the relationship between them and the ways in which they are used - together with the viewers' maxim, are used by speakers and describers in an orderly fashion to describe whatever is happening as an ordered, 'normal' event. At the same time, the hearers' maxims work to ensure that descriptions will be heard as normal.

What is most interesting about this is that it leads Sacks to rewrite the sociological notion of 'norm'. Consider the following:

"Via some norm two activities may be made observable as a sequentially ordered pair. That is, viewers use norms to explain both the occurrence of some activity given the occurrence of another and also its sequential position with regard to the other, e.g. that it follows the other, or precedes it. That is a first importance. Second, viewers use norms to provide the relevant membership categories in terms of which they formulate identifications of the doers of those activities for which the norms are appropriate." (25)

Thus, for example, it is the 'norm' which says that babies cry, whilst in
general men do not, which enables us to hear that 'the baby cried' is a possibly correct description where 'the male cried' leaves us wondering. Our sense of what is 'normal' in our society provides us with sets of assumptions and preconceptions which enable us to differentiate between events, to explain them, to see them as instances of this kind of thing and thus as warranting the use of a specific category for its description etc. etc. Thus what is 'normal' - that which is organized in terms of taken for granted practices and procedures in an 'orderly' fashion - serves to orient the member of society. Sacks characterizes the alternative sociological position as he sees it:

"In the sociological and anthropological literature, the focus on norms is on the conditions under which and the extent to which they govern, or can be seen by social scientists to govern, the relevant actions of those members whose actions they ought to control. While such matters are, of course, important, our viewer's maxim suggests other importances of norms, for members." (26)

Here in Sacks' account, the approach to social order that Garfinkel gives is once again apparent. 'Norms' are not to be thought of as simply constraining - although it may well be the case that they are in some sense - but rather the way in which they are used by members of a society to organize their environment must be investigated. It is 'normality', 'typicality' etc. itself, and the ways in which this is maintained which must be investigated if the ground floor of social order is to be uncovered, and this order itself provides materials for its own maintenance. By 'accounting' for phenomena in terms of orderly, organized categories, that order is itself reinforced by 'members' - 'norms' need not be seen as causally effective mechanisms to account for order in society.

Sacks' early concerns with conversation, then, focused on problems of categorization. Over the course of his work, however, his attention shifted towards an examination of sequential issues in conversation, and it is this that I want to move on to look at now.
CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURES: 2) SEQUENCING AND THE TURN TAKING MACHINERY

It seems probable that there were two main reasons for Sacks' shift of emphasis. Firstly, in any examination of categorization, it becomes apparent that the sequential placement of a particular category is often important to the way in which it is understood. Thus, for example, the categories 'husband' and 'wife', heard in adjacent utterances in a conversation, are more likely to be heard as relating a husband to a wife through the duplicatively organized device 'family' than the use of the same categories used several utterances apart and after a change of topic in the conversation. To account for this - to describe the fact adequately - it becomes necessary to look at the relationships between adjacent utterances, at the relationship between talk about different topics over the course of a conversation, and about the organization of talk about the same topic over the course of several utterances - i.e. to become involved in issues of 'sequencing' in conversation. Secondly, it is possible to gain far more precision when examining sequential issues than it is when treating M.C.D.s. As I shall show, the former can be analysed in a highly general and abstract fashion. The latter, however, seem almost inevitably to depend upon fairly specific categories - on the investigation of specific M.C.D.s - for the development of the basic ideas that are involved, which militates against the demand for general, context independent, descriptions of the data. I will start this discussion of sequencing by looking at 'turn taking'. In an important paper on turn taking, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson discuss the kind of model that they have built to describe their data. It is, they say

"a local management system, and ...... it is an interactionally managed system". (27)

What does this mean? The 'local management' of turn taking in conversation means that the allocation of turns is not done in terms of some broad over-arching plan which decides in advance precisely when and how some particular conversationalist should have a turn at speaking - as
for example would be the case in a ceremony - but rather it is organised
on a turn by turn basis. In other words the allocation of turns is managed
'locally' within the conversation as it moves on from one utterance to
the next. What the model that Sacks et al build does is to provide
'rules' which account, in a structural fashion, for the transitions from
one turn to the next, from that next turn to another next and so on. It
does not attempt to predict the course of some possible unit 'whole
conversation', but is content to provide only for moves from one turn to
the next.

The model that they build is also, they claim, interactionally managed.
The fact that the formal apparatus is locally managed - and not
predetermined over its course - means that the parties to the conversation
can themselves control the conversation in its course. Thus

"The character and organization of the rules that constitute
it as a local management system themselves determine its
more particular organization in not only allowing and/or
requiring turn-size and turn-order to vary, but in
subjecting their variability to the control of the parties
to any conversation. It is, therefore, among local
management systems, a "party-administered" system." (28)

In other words, the formal descriptions of turn taking in conversation are
such that the structures - the machinery - which is their substance
contains as an essential feature, management by the parties to the
conversation. The order in the conversation is not described as being
the 'result' of some set of structures which are causally effective over
the course of the conversation, but it is rather the result of management
by co-conversationalists. It is the structure of members of society's
practices and procedures for organising conversation that is being
described, and not the structures of some given and formal whole 'a
conversation', and thus to describe conversation is to describe the
interactional work that goes into it.

It is worth pointing out in passing here, before going on to describe
the components and rules of the turn taking system, the ways in which this
formulation of turn taking articulates with Garfinkel's thoughts on the problem of order. It is the conversationalists themselves - their practices and procedures - who are seen to be organizing the 'order' in the conversation. The notion of 'recipient design' makes this even more apparent:

"By 'recipient design' we refer to a multitude of respects in which the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the co-participants. In our work, we have found recipient design to operate with regard to word selection, topic selection, admissibility and ordering of sequences, options and obligations for starting and terminating conversations, etc., as will be reported in future publications." (29)

It is not just the allocation of turns that shows co-conversationalists engaged in the management of conversational order, but a host of other features of talk. Further, these conversations themselves are part of a whole field of interaction which is being organised in its course, and underlying all of this too is a structure of rules, practices and procedures, all waiting to be described in the course of understanding 'order' in society.

To return to the turn taking system itself, Sacks et al write that

"The turn-taking system for conversation can be described in terms of two components and a set of rules ...." (30)

The two components are 1. the turn-constructional component, and 2. the turn-allocation component.

The turn-constructional component concerns the units out of which a turn at talking is built. There are two considerations. Firstly, "sentential, clausal, phrasal, and lexical" unit types are amongst those that can be used in order to construct a turn. Anything from a long monologue to a 'mm..' or a shake of the head (31) can constitute a turn over the course of some conversation, and the turn itself is made up of anything from one to several such 'unit types'. Secondly, at the completion of every such unit - and each speaker is initially entitled to only one such - it becomes possible for another speaker to take a turn.
Put another way "The first possible completion of a first such unit constitutes an initial transition-relevance place.". (32) Further, "Transfer of speakership is coordinated by reference to such transition-relevance places, which any unit-type will reach.". (33)

The second component is the turn-allocation component. This governs who it is that is entitled to speak (or obliged to in some cases) at the completion of a unit. There are two possibilities, namely the current speaker can select someone, or else someone can 'self select' to take the next turn. Which of these possibilities in fact ensues is governed by a set of rules. These rules are (and I will simply reproduce them here)

"1. For any turn, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turn-constructional unit:
   a) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to involve the use of a 'current speaker select next' technique, then the party so selected has the right and is obliged to take next turn to speak; no others have such rights or obligations, and transfer occurs at that place.
   b) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then self-selection -for next speakership may, but need not, be instituted; first starter acquires rights to a turn, and transfer occurs at that place.
   c) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then current speaker may, but need not continue, unless another self-selects.
2. If, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turn-constructional unit, neither la nor lb has operated, and, following the provision of lc, current speaker has continued, then the rule-set a-c re-applies at the next transition-relevance place, and recursively at each next transition-relevance place, until transfer is effected." (34)

This basic machinery is able to describe the phenomenon of turn taking in conversation. Sacks et al move on, in the article under discussion, to show the ways in which it handles such obvious conversational phenomena as that speaker change recurs (or occurs), that turns at talk are of different lengths, that only one speaker talks at a time except for brief overlaps (which are also accounted for) that the length of the conversation, its actual content, and the content of specific turns are not specified in advance, and so on. It stands, in other words, as a structural solution
to the problem of how to ensure a certain order over the course of some particular conversational interaction, and it does so in terms of a model that is, as I have shown above, a local management system that is interactionally managed.

The turn taking system is, as it were, the ground floor of the concern with sequencing, and many further analyses presuppose this and work to produce fuller accounts of aspects of the transition from one turn to another within the overall structure of a conversation. I want to go on to look at some of the ways in which the concern with sequencing is developed by examining the paper by Sacks and Scheglof entitled "Opening up Closings" in which several interesting features of conversational organization become apparent.

CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURES: 3) SEQUENCING AND THE PROBLEM OF CLOSINGS

The first thing to notice about Sacks' and Scheglof's discussion of closing a conversation is that, like the discussion of turn taking, it is formulated in terms of structures, which are, again, structures of conversational practices. They look for a structural solution to the problem of 'closings' for reasons that have been mentioned in a previous section, but which it is worth re-emphasising here, namely that the solution must be at once context-free and context-sensitive. It must account for the closing of conversations in such a way that the particulars of specific conversational interactions - i.e. the specifics of what was spoken about, the specific parties to the conversation, the specific context of the conversation etc. - do not appear as essential parts of the description of 'closings'. This must be done simply because closing a conversation is something done in many conversations, by many different conversationalists, in many contexts - it is a trans-contextual phenomenon - so that the analyst must describe the structure of the phenomenon independently of specific manifestations of it. At the same time, however, it must be possible for the structural machinery to be sensitive to
specific contexts, in that it is manifest in specific conversations on particular occasions. It must be a structure that accounts for the fact that this, particular, conversation is brought to a close - it must describe what it is that people do, in general, to close a conversation whilst at the same time it must show how these particular conversationalists closed this conversation on this specific occasion. Should the analysis fail to do both of these things, then it will be inadequate, since it will not describe the structure of practices which enable conversationalists to organize - order - their talk in such a way as to bring it to an end.

With this in mind, then, I want to turn now to the paper "Opening up Closings". There the initial problem is stated thus:

"how to organize the simultaneous arrival of the co-conversationalists at a point where one speaker's completion will not occasion another speaker's talk, and that will not be heard as some speaker's silence." (35)

The same thing can be put in the language of the model for turn-taking:

"how to coordinate the suspension of the transition relevance of possible utterance completion". (36) In order to see how this problem is solved it is necessary, first of all, to look at the organization of certain special pairs of utterances called 'adjacency pairs'.

Adjacency pairs are

"sequences which properly have the following features; (1) two utterance length, (2) adjacent positioning of component utterances, (3) different speakers producing each utterance." (37)

In other words, they are pairs of utterances that 'go together' in some way, such as questions/answers, Summons/answers, Greetings/greetings, etc., etc. What is special about these particular pairs is that the 'first pair part' (i.e. the first utterance of the two) has a more constraining effect upon the utterance that follows it (the second pair part) than is the case with the normal run of any two utterances that can be found over the course of some conversation. In other words, the constraints that are built into conversation by virtue of the turn taking machinery are strengthened in
the case of an adjacency pair sequence. This 'going together' of pairs of utterances is described by the term 'conditional relevance'. Schegloff defines the term thus:

"By conditional relevance of one item on another we mean: given the first, the second is expectable; upon its occurrence it can be seen to be a second item to the first; upon its non-occurrence it can be seen to be officially absent - all this provided by the occurrence of the first item." (38)

This conditional relevance of second pair parts upon the completion of a first pair part is significant for a number of reasons, and it is worth mentioning two here to illustrate the point. Firstly, someone listening to a conversation, or taking part in one, will, on the occurrence of a first pair part, expect that a second pair part will be forthcoming. This means that he will try to hear the next utterance as, for example, an answer to the question asked, and the fact that they expect to be able to hear it that way will mean that if they are unable to do so, then what they will hear is someone being evasive, rude, stupid etc. (39)

By the same token, secondly, a speaker whose lot it is to produce a second pair part, is in a position where the structure of conversational practices is such that he must produce, say, an answer to the question asked, otherwise he risks being thought of as evasive, rude, stupid, etc. Conditional relevance, in other words, provides both hearers and speakers with a particular motivation for listening or speaking in a certain way in relation to an utterance that is produced as a first pair part of an adjacency pair sequence.

It is now time to return to the problem of how to lift 'transition relevance' in order to finish a conversation. In order to do this it is necessary to notice one further property of adjacency pairs, namely that because of the tie between the first and second pair parts they can be used to ensure that something or other that is desired to be done in the conversation, actually gets done. For example, if someone wants certain information, then it makes sense to use a question which, as the
first pair part of an adjacency pair sequence, can constrain one's co-conversationalist to produce an answer. Without the use of such 'devices, there is no guarantee that what one wants done - the information that one wants - will ever get done.

In the case of closing a conversation, it is evident that both parties want, at some point or other, to stop the conversation. Thus an adjacency pair solution to the problem looks ideal, since it can provide a close ordering of the turn taking machinery in order to bring about the desired event - an end to the conversation. At the same time the very nature of the adjacency pair format is such that both parties to the conversation can show that they want to close it, and that they understand that the other wants to close as well. This is provided for by the need to produce the second pair part that is conditionally relevant upon the occurrence of the first, and by the fact that a failure to do so will be taken as a lack of understanding, or a reluctance to close, or as being boring etc.

Thus Sacks and Schegloff are able to describe the way in which conversations are brought to an end in terms of a 'terminal exchange', which is something like, for example, A. Goodbye. B. Goodbye., or A. See you soon. B. Yea. So long., where a terminal exchange is an instance of a more general class of paired utterances: 'adjacency pairs'. The closing of a conversation can thus be seen in terms of and described by a highly general, formal, structural apparatus. They sum up thus:

"if where transition relevance is to be lifted is a systematic problem, an adjacency pair solution can work because: by providing that transition relevance is to be lifted after the second pair part's occurrence, the occurrence of the second pair part can then reveal an appreciation of and agreement to the intendedness of closing now which a first part of a terminal exchange reveals its speaker to propose." (40)

So far in this discussion of the sequencing aspect of conversation analysis, I have not looked beyond the problem of the relationship between one utterance and the next, and the way in which this is organised. In
order to get the full flavour of the work that is being done, however, it is necessary to consider broader issues concerned with sequencing which relate to the structure of the conversation as a whole in as much as there are ties between different parts of the conversation. I will do this primarily in terms of Schegloff and Sacks discussion of the placement of the first pair part of a terminal exchange in the essay which I have been discussing above, before moving back to concerns adjacent to 'conditional relevance' in a brief discussion of 'preference'. I will then move on to discuss the question of the status of the structures that form the substance of the analyses of conversation.

Two further features of conversational structure are relevant to a description of 'closings', namely 'topic' and 'pre-closings'. I will look at each of these in turn.

Over the course of a conversation, there are various 'mentionables' that co-conversationalists want to talk about. These mentionables may become the 'topic' of conversation. For the description of conversation to be adequate, it needs to show how it is that 'mentionables' become 'topics' of conversation, and how it is that the structural machinery allows several topics to be mentioned over the course of any one conversation, rather than, for example, the number of topics being specified in advance. How is it possible to move from one topic to another? Very little work has been done on this organisation of topic talk, but a few remarks have been made by Sacks and Schegloff in relation to 'closings'. Here they point out that there seems to be a preference within conversation for people to place certain mentionables in 'appropriate' places rather than just putting them anywhere. For example, it is not always politic to put some mentionables in 'first topic' position - such as some sorts of bad news - so that a conversationalist may wait until he is given an alternative and appropriate opportunity to say what ever it is that he wants to talk about.
This being the case, if the conversational structure were such that conversations were closed down with a bang at the end of a topic, then there would be a danger that unmentioned mentionables would not be given the chance to become the topic of conversation. Closing a conversation, then, must allow for the possibility of there being further topic talk - it must allow a space for so far unmentioned mentionables to be spoken about. It is at this point that the notion of 'pre-closings' becomes apposite.

A pre-closing is an instance of a general class of pre-sequences which includes pre-announcements, (41) and pre-invitations. (42) They are "heard via their sequential placement, but as placed not after some utterance, but before one." (43) Within the overall structure of a conversation, they, as it were, 'cue' certain following utterances. Thus a pre-invitation such as the following makes it highly likely that an invitation will follow, and the listener will hear the phrase as leading to an invitation and will respond to it accordingly - e.g. A: Oh. I'm washing my hair, will put off the invitation, by providing an excuse in advance of it being given.

Now pre-closings have, as pre-sequences, similar features, in that they act as a prelude to an actual terminal exchange. They are such utterances as A: O.K. B: O.K. or A: We-ell., which signal the end of a topic, and make it possible to place the first pair part of a terminal exchange in the next slot - as the next utterance - in the conversation, and thus close the conversation. The pre-closing, then, signals that the conversation could end at this point. The pre-closing, plus the terminal
exchange are called the closing 'section'. An example of this would be

A: O.K.
B: O.K.
A: Goodbye.
B: Goodbye.

This issue of pre-closings relates back to what has been said above about topic talk. It is evident that over the course of a conversation, it is not the case that everytime a speaker says something like 'we-ell' at the end of talk about some particular topic, the conversation moves on mechanically to its close. Although it would be possible to close the conversation at that point, it is often the case that another mentionable is made the topic of conversation at that point. In other words, by cueing a possible end of the conversation, it becomes possible for someone to insert another topic before it is too late. Thus a 'pre-closing' is only such after the closing section has been completed. At Utterance such as 'we-ell' which is followed by further talk is only a 'possible pre-closing' - i.e. it signals that the conversation could end at this point, and opens up the possibility for the introduction of further mentionables into the conversation.

The machinery developed to describe the closings of conversations, then, illustrates the considerable flexibility that there is in the structure of conversation. It shows some of the ways in which conversational order is organised by the parties to the conversation, in that it suggests

"that a closing section is initiated, i.e. turns out to have begun, when none of the parties to a conversation care to choose to continue it." (45)

These points are extended further by Sacks and Schegloff. They point out, for example, that possible pre-closings can take a very wide variety of forms - for example in a telephone conversation, "this must be costing you a lot of money" stands as one. They point out that material that
has come up over the course of the conversation itself can be used as a warrant for closing the conversation - again for a telephone conversation, "I'll let you get back to your work" can stand as a possible pre-closing, especially after the work was part of the substance of the telephone call. They point out also that the material for such possible pre-closings can be introduced early in the conversation, often before the first topic has been addressed - as when, for example, a telephone call begins with "I'm sorry to have dragged you away from your work". In fact all sorts of information, on all sorts of different occasions can be, and is, used by conversationalists to bring about what at first sight looks like a very simple task - namely ending a conversation - and their methods for doing so are described in structural terms with the concepts that I have been examining above.

The extreme flexibility of the conversational machinery is emphasised by the fact that even after a closing sequence has been completed, it is possible to bring up a further topic. What is particularly interesting about this type of case is that conversationalists can be seen to orient to the fact that in doing this they are in fact breaking the 'rules' for correct conversation. They do this by using 'misplacement markers' to indicate that they recognise that they have done something that is, strictly, out of place. Such utterances as 'oh by the way', or 'just a minute', are used in this way. Sacks and Schegloff say this about them

"Misplacement markers, thus, display an orientation by their user to the proper sequential-organizational character of a particular place in a conversation, and a recognition that an utterance that is thereby prefaced may not fit, and that recipient should not attempt to use this placement in understanding their occurrence." (46)

The flexibility in the sequential machinery, then, is such that considerable interactional leeway is allowed to co-conversationalists, with the result that the ways in which people use language to organize and facilitate their everyday social affairs - for example to commence
or to cease some particular interaction, or to convey certain information - is carried on against a structural background that provides many open ended possibilities. Sacks and Schegloff write of closing sections:

"to capture the phenomenon of closings, one cannot treat it as the natural history of some particular conversation; one cannot treat it as a routine to be run through, inevitable in its course once initiated. Rather, it must be viewed, as must conversation as a whole, as a set of prospective possibilities opening up at various points in the conversation's course: there are possibilities throughout a closing, including the moments after a 'final' good-bye, for re-opening the conversation. Getting to a termination, therefore, involves work at various points in the conversation's, and the closing section's, course: it requires accomplishing." (47)

It is this extreme flexibility of conversational practices that makes it such a powerful tool in the service of social interaction and in the maintenance of social order.

In recent years, a considerable amount of work has been done on the sequential aspects of conversation. Sacks, for example, has shown some of the ways in which jokes (48) and puns (49) have both a proper sequential position within the structure of a conversation, and at the same time have various jobs to do and certain sequential implications. Puns, for example, at the end of a story or a description, can demonstrate understandings of the story, whilst laughter at the end of a joke can illustrate that one has (or has not) a sense of humour. I cannot cover all of this ground here, and will not attempt to. Instead I will look at two areas concerned with sequential issues which illustrate something further about social interaction. I will begin by considering 'breaches' of the conversational structure. I will then move on to consider the issue of 'preference'.

CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURES: 4) STRUCTURE AND INTERACTIONAL CONTEXT

By a consideration of what is involved in 'breaching' conversational order, it is easy to see how a notion of 'interruption' can be developed. Given the two components and the rules which provide for turn transition in conversation, it becomes possible to see 'interruption' as a breach of
correct order in that it prevents the current speaker's turn from reaching a transition relevance point. This breach of conversational order then becomes as all breaches do, an accountable matter and it becomes possible to see the interrupter as 'rude' or 'aggressive' and so on purely because he has failed to maintain 'correct' conversational order, and has, in terms of the model, 'broken the rules'. It is interesting to note, for example, that Moerman's students, analysing a tape of Lue conversation, were able to develop some notion of 'interruption' in spite of the fact that they did not themselves speak Lue, (50) a fact which suggests that breaches of 'correct practice' may perhaps be recognisable even cross culturally at this structural level, and that they will always be something 'noticeable' and 'accountable'.

This accountable nature of breaches of correct conversational order is illustrated in an article by Zimmerman and West which seeks to throw light on the question of the relationship between the sexes as it is reflected in language. (51) Their approach is to measure the number of interruptions in conversation between members of the same sex, and between members of the opposite sex. The results suggest that in fact there are more interruptions in opposite sex conversations, and that most of them are done by the men. They suggest that this is some indication of the inequality between the sexes in ordinary interaction. What is interesting here from the point of view of the conversational structures is not so much whether or not such results are valid or not, (although that too is an important and interesting question) but the sheer fact that visible breeches of the turn-taking system should be so noticeable and accountable in this way.

Another interesting interactional spin off is that it becomes possible to suggest why it is that 'silences' in a conversation are heard as belonging to someone rather than, in general, being simply lapses in the conversation. (52) A silence will always come at the end of someones
turn at talking, and thus at a transition relevance point. The rule set for the allocation of turns, which I set forward above, then comes into operation and depending upon which rule is relevant, some person will be heard to be silent if no one actually talks. Once again the result is that this breach in the correct order becomes an accountable matter, and someone can be 'heard' to be evasive, rude, not paying attention, etc., etc., without actually having said a word. The power of the conversational structures becomes apparent in that even 'absences' become noticeable in terms of it, and this fact is describeable too in terms of the model for turn-taking.

This accountability of silences, absences and interruptions is also important in as much as it provides a particular motivation for parties to an interaction to talk, and to do so in such a way that they will not be judged unfavourable. It provides them with an impetus to maintain the orderly, typical, character of the everyday conversational world, since consistent failure in these matters can result in isolation, confinement in mental institutions, or simply in a 'bad character'. Even occasional breaches of correct order can send ones co-conversationalists in search of some motive or other for ones errant behaviour. Thus conversational order - and in as much as this is connected to the general problem of order, social order in general - can be seen as self maintaining. It has built into it mechanisms for its own survival - it is self policing - so that it becomes unnecessary to posit 'sacred' norms and values to explain social order at this level. The structure of conversational practices takes care of itself.

In the same vein, it is interesting to note that there are differences in the degree of constraint which inheres in the relationship between different types of utterances. Consider, for example, the differences between summons/answer sequences and question/answer sequences. Both are, broadly, adjacency pairs. But, in the case of the first, the person
summoned is expected to reply fairly rapidly, and it is incumbent upon the summoner to speak again once the summons has been answered, (53) whilst in the case of the latter, quite long delays are possible between the asking of the question and the giving of an answer, and once given an answer, the asker of the question has no more *obligation* to speak again (although he does have the *right*) than is provided for by the normal workings of the turn-taking machinery. Thus although both can be described in terms of 'adjacency pairs', their sequential implicativeness, and thus their implications for interaction in so far as absences and breaches are accountable matters, is different. The implications of this for interaction become even more interesting when one begins to consider cross cultural variations in degrees of the conditional relevance of utterances upon one another. Warm Springs Indians, for example, appear to find the question/answer sequence less constraining than English speakers do. (54) It could well be that this apparently insignificant detail has had a profound bearing upon the ways in which the Indians have been seen by the American settlers, and conversely, upon the ways in which the settlers were seen by the Indians. Such differences, as with absences and silences, are accountable matters.

A good example of an analysis of conversation that draws out some of the degrees of constraint that are apparent in conversation, and which shows in some detail certain aspects of the interactional relevance of the structure of conversational practices with reference to such constraint, is a study of the 'preference' structure of 'second assessments' by Anita Pomerantz. The concept of 'preference' itself is addressed to the fact that certain types of utterances - 'seconds' - follow certain types of other utterances with considerably more regularity than possible alternative types of utterances, and at the same time, when the 'dispreferred' alternative is used, it tends to have distinctive structural features which mark it as dispreferred. The best way to illustrate the
precise sense of the notion is with reference to Pomerantz's thesis. (55)

Pomerantz writes:

"Participants in conversation have orderly procedures to show that prior talk units have been received/not received, understood/misunderstood, appreciated/disappreciated, agreed with/disagreed with, etc. Assessments are systematically used for such purposes." (56)

Specifically, what she looks at is 'second assessments' which are "assessments produced by 'recipients' of prior talk". (57) The sort of utterances involved here are such things as the following:

1. J: It's - tsuh beautiful day out isn't it?
   L: Yeh it's jus' gorgeous ....
2. A: But gee, he has some beautiful things.
   B: Well isn't that nice." (58)

The second utterance of the pair, in each case, is a second assessment.

What the data that she analyses shows is that in the vast majority of cases, second assessments are in fact agreements. As she puts it

"Massively throughout conversational materials, agreements are organized as preferred activities and disagreements as dispreferred activities." (59)

The fact that disagreement is dispreferred is apparent not only from the fact that they appear less frequently over the course of conversations, but also from the fact that the way in which disagreements are structured is different. Thus, for example, disagreements are often prefaced by words such as 'well' - words which she calls "turn initial pre-disagreement components" - as in

"A: She doesn't usually come in on Friday, does she.
   B: Well, yes she does, sometimes." (60)

or by agreements, as in "Well yes, but...", or sometimes just by periods of silence that, equally, preface the disagreement.

It thus appears that in second assessments, agreements with the prior 'first' assessment are 'preferred' and disagreements 'dispreferred'. Both the distribution and the structure of these utterances is described by the structural term 'preference'. Similar features have been noted
for sequences of invitations/rejections-acceptances, where rejections
are dispreferred, and the structural features of rejections is similar to
that of disagreements. (61)

The interactional relevance of this notion of a preference structure
becomes apparent once its nuances are investigated. It is not the case
that this is an unwieldy structure, wholly insensitive to various
different contexts of interaction, that simply plays itself through
invariantly. Rather, given certain settings, and certain types of
utterances, the structure itself is transformed in the service of
interaction. Consider the following sequence -

"L: ...I'm so dumb I don't even know it. hhh! --- heh!
W: Y-no, y-you're not dumb, ...

G: but it's not bad for an old lady.
C: You're not old, Grandma ...." (62)

Here there is a first assessment, followed by a disagreement, but without
the usual structural features one would expect. There is no preface
- for example an agreement like 'yes ... But don't you think', or 'Well
yes ... but' and so on. Instead second assessments as disagreements
"occupy the entire second-to-self-deprecation-units". (63) The point
here is that what this illustrates is a different preference, namely that
if the first assessment is a self deprecation, then the preferred second
will be a disagreement. This can be seen, again, both in the distribution
of disagreements after self deprecations, and in the structure of
agreements. Thus, where agreements do occur, they will generally be
'weak' agreements, or will include laughter (laugh tokens) to soften the
agreement or perhaps will be delayed slightly by a pause. As Pomerantz
puts it

"If self deprecations are agreed with, i.e., have agreement
components in second position, they tend to be single,
unexpanded, weak components." (64)

Thus the structure of disagreements after self deprecations, is similar
to that of agreements after the majority of other first assessments in that it is a 'preference' structure, the difference in this case being that it is disagreements that are preferred, and agreements dispreferred.

Similar observations are possible concerning seconds to 'compliments'. Here the point is that the recipient of a compliment has to provide a response to a first assessment which is a favourable assessment of himself, and yet at the same time, self praise is a dispreferred activity. Thus he cannot simply agree with the first assessment or he will be thought conceited or vain. So, therefore, the second to a compliment does not conform to the structure of seconds to most other assessments, but takes the form of a disagreement, or a return compliment, or an appreciation of the compliment and so on. (65)

Pomerantz does give considerably more depth to her analysis of preference structures than it has been possible to present here, and I could not hope to cover all of the different points that she makes. However, the above discussion does provide the basis for a few further remarks about the relationship between the structures of conversational practices, and specific contexts of interaction.

Firstly, the fact that preference structures can be described in this way, and that transformations of those structures can be illustrated, shows the way in which they are sensitive to particular interactional settings. The transformation of preference structures that takes place between settings in which an assessment of, say, an ancient monument on the one hand, and a self deprecating assessment on the other, is being given is such that a different type of second becomes expectable in each case. That this is the case means that 'agreement' and 'disagreement' in the two types of settings has a different relevance in interactional terms - there are situations in which one is expected to disagree, and not to do so can give offence. There is, in other words, constraint built into this structure of preferences, and this manifests itself in specific conversational interactions. The preference structure unlocks something
of what it is that we do - that sense of rule that does not imply interpretation, but is manifest in particular instances of complying with or going against the rule. There is not some hard and fast structure of invariant rules which it makes sense to try to identify as the 'things' which govern our interaction, but instead there are subtle structures of practices, which can be seen to be transformable according to the specifics of interactional settings, and these can become the object of sociological investigation. It is possible, in other words, to produce descriptions of conversational structures in terms of a machinery that is both context sensitive and context independent, which does not deal with invariance but with structures of transformations, and which gives a sense of the constraint which is inherent in 'what we do'.

Secondly, it is worth mentioning some of the specific interactional relevance of the notion of 'preference'. Consider, for example, the following.

1. Courtroom situations, where the prosecuting lawyer forms up his questions to a witness or suspect in the form of assessments of a situation with which the witness must either agree or disagree. Consider the jury's reaction. (66)

2. Interview situations where someone is being grilled by an antagonistic interviewer. Consider the uses the 'preference' structure could be put to by the interviewer. (67)

3. How it is possible to be considered unreasonable, aggressive, contrary, etc., etc., by continually disagreeing, even if the occasion apparently legitimises it. (68)

A third point, not strictly concerned with the interactional relevance of conversational structures, but with conversational analysis itself, is that this analysis of 'preference' illustrates the cumulative nature of the enterprise as a whole. What 'preference', as a concept, actually does is to build upon the groundwork concepts made available in the turn taking
machinery, in investigations of 'openings' and 'closings', 'adjacency pairs' and so on, and to generate more precise tools for both the analysis and description of the conversational data. It stands in a relationship of mutual dependence to other work done by conversational analysts, and as the work progresses, more and more scope and precision in the descriptive apparatus becomes available for use. Thus the formal structural basis of conversational order is unravelled in a systematic fashion.

Over the course of the last few sections, then, I have tried to give some idea of the type of analyses that are being done by conversational analysts, and to show some of the ways in which they can be seen to have relevance for the sociological understanding of social interaction. The structures which I have been discussing are structures of the practices which members of a society use in the course of organizing their social environment in an orderly, normal, typical fashion. They use, for example, adjacency pair sequences to open or close a conversation, or to ensure that other desired events actually get done over the course of a conversation. That is not to say, of course, that such uses - such practices - are in some way 'intentional', even though in certain situations such as courtrooms, some skilled users of conversation do seem to deliberately manipulate the possibilities inherent in the conversational structures. Rather, such practices and procedures are 'taken for granted'. They provide the basic tools which are needed for an engagement in meaningful conversation in which 'intentional' matters can be discussed. They enable the orderly, typical character of social life to be maintained both by providing the motivation, via the accountability of absences and breaches of correct order, and the necessary structural machinery for its continuance. By ensuring that social order, at this level, is maintained, this structure of practices and procedures provides for the possibility of 'meaning'.
It is worth noticing in this context the way in which the conversational structures relate to questions of 'understanding'. The relationship is complex, and I will not attempt to unravel all of the strands here, although a few brief remarks are in order. Firstly, to the extent that the sequencing of utterances provides some motivation for 'hearing' certain utterances in a certain way - e.g. as 'answers' - it also provides motivation for 'understanding' in a certain way. In other words, an 'answer', for example, will be understood as such because of its sequential placement within the conversation. Thus, what was said will be understood in a certain way. Secondly, it is evident that to the extent that conversational structures enable 'meaning', then they also provide the possibility of 'understanding'. What is understood is 'meaningful' - the two terms cannot be separated from one another. It would seem, therefore, that to investigate what is involved in 'understanding', in either everyday life or in social science, must involve some consideration of the structures of practices which make 'meaning' possible.

With these few summary remarks, I want now to move on to consider the status of these conversational structures.

CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURES: 5) STATUS

I have already pointed out in the introductory section of this chapter, that conversational analysis should be seen primarily as a descriptive enterprise, and as theoretically grounded in the work of Garfinkel in relation to the problem of order. In the last sections I outlined what some of these descriptions of conversation actually looked like, illustrating in passing some of the ties between them and Garfinkel's work. I now want to move on to look at the type of analyses that these are by investigating something of the nature of 'rules' as they emerge from the structural mechanisms posited of conversation. I will then supplement this by looking at the ways in which the concepts generated by these highly abstract 'rules' can be, and are being,
used within specific areas of sociological concern, pointing out that such analyses have both a different emphasis and illustrate a different perspective from those undertaken by Sacks and Schegloff.

To provide a basis for this discussion I want to reproduce two quotations which have already appeared over the course of this thesis, but which have bearing upon the question that is the concern here. The first is the definition of the 'formal structures of practical action' and the second is a remark by Schegloff to the effect that the object of conversation analysis is to provide general rules. Thus the first is about 'structures' and the second about 'analysis'.

1. "by formal structures we understand everyday activities (a) in that they exhibit upon analysis the properties of uniformity, reproducibility, repetitiveness, standardization, typicality, and so on; (b) in that these properties are independent of particular production cohorts; (c) in that particular cohort independence is a phenomenon for members' recognition; and (d) in that the phenomena (a), (b), and (c) are every particular cohort's practical, situated accomplishment." (69)

2. (talking about openings) "The distribution rule is but one, if indeed a most typical, specification of the formulation to follow, and the deviant case is another specification. As Michael Moerman has suggested, the distribution rule is no less a 'special case' for having many occurrences, nor the latter more so for having only one (in my corpus of materials). Not number of occurrences, but common subsumption under a more general formulation is what matters." (70)

Firstly, formal structures. A main interest in this notion lies in the fact that it was formulated in a paper written by Garfinkel and Sacks together. For this reason, it seems reasonable to suppose that it in some way articulates the structural concerns of both men. I have already tried to give some idea of the ways in which Garfinkel's solution to the problem of social order can be seen in terms of 'formal structures'. I want now to look at the relationship between 'formal structures' and the structures of conversation.

Formal structures are everyday activities. They are, in other words, what people do over the course of their daily round. Thus, in conversational terms, they ask questions, tell jokes, etc., etc. Upon
analysis these activities exhibit uniformity, reproducibility, and the rest. Again, in terms of conversation, 'analysis' is able to produce structural machinery which 'gives back' the conversational data which is precisely the point that Schegloff is making above. This machinery uncovers an order in the data, and describes it in terms of 'adjacency pairs', 'preference', 'pre-sequences' and so on. This order is 'independent' of particular production cohorts in the sense that, for example, the orderliness of an adjacency pair sequence does not depend upon some 'intentional' act by the members of a society. It just is the way things are done - something taken for granted and 'normal'. At the same time, however, this orderliness is recognizable to members, a fact which can be seen as soon as the orderliness is 'breached' in some way - breaches, silences and the rest are recognized and are accountable matters. At the same time that everyday activities are orderly, and that order is independent and recognizable, it is also the case that it is members' practices which maintain that order. Thus, for example, the orderly closing of a conversation, or the orderly production of a description, is something that depends upon the practices of members of society themselves. Their practices actually maintain and produce conversational order on every occasion on which an orderly conversation actually takes place.

I suggested in chapter 4 above, that there were useful links to be made between the ways in which the notion of 'formal structures' is formulated, and the Wittgensteinian notion of a 'form of life'. With the new dimension added to the idea of 'formal structures' by considering conversational structures it becomes possible to view this connection too in a new light. Consider the following.

"How am I able to obey a rule?" - if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say:
"This is simply what I do." (71)

Or, again from the Philosophical Investigations: (notice that the first sentence is in the mouth of an objector - it is the point that Wittgenstein is arguing against).

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life;" (72)

Thus beyond justifications in terms of rules of what it is that I do, lies a bedrock of "what I do" - a bedrock of 'everyday activities' as Garfinkel and Sacks put it. This sense of 'rule' - this sense of "what I do", a sense of rule that does not imply interpretation - links up, I have argued, with a 'form of life'. A form of life is that agreement about "what I do" that includes the language we speak, which precedes 'truth' and 'falsity', and which comes before 'intentional', 'meaningful' action. Only that which has meaning can be true or false - truth and falsity are not to do with what people do as such, but are about descriptions of what people do. Yet at the same time, what people do is the necessary precondition for there being any truth or falsity, in that it is their sharing of a 'form of life' which makes possible the meaningful descriptions which can be true or false.

Wittgenstein, however, stops at this point. He is not interested in an investigation of a 'form of life' since it just is what is the case - the precondition for meaning, justification, truth and falsity, etc. - and as such it is 'shown' in what we do rather than being something that must be described. The empirical social scientist, however, has as a possible subject for sociological description, "what people do" - the formal structures of practical actions. Amongst these formal structures are those which the descriptive machinery of conversational analysts such as Sacks have made available. Concepts like 'adjacency pair' and 'conditional relevance' do describe "what people do" - they just are the
ways in which conversationalists go about producing orderly sequences of talk over the course of their interactions with one another.

Conversational analysis, then, should be seen as uncovering the structure of the practices which enable meaningful, orderly conversation. The descriptions which they give of the conversational data provide a context free/context sensitive machinery which provides insights into the ways in which it is possible to use indexical expressions across a wide range of contexts. The conversational structures in their turn, can be seen as related to Garfinkel's concerns with the problems of social order, a fact which is reflected in the notion of the 'formal structures of practical actions'. As I have already argued above, these 'formal structures' can be seen as a statement of something of what is intended in Wittgenstein's notion of a form of life, but as a statement which, unlike that in the 'Philosophical Investigations', points towards and enables empirical research. It is that research which conversational analysts are in fact engaged in.

It is in the light of this that the claim of conversational analysts to be describing 'members' problems', rather than building analysts constructs, should be read. (73) The claim is not that members of a society have constant problems over the course of their daily lives if 'problem' is taken to mean 'difficulty' or to involve conscious reflection of the 'what on earth am I to do next' type. Rather, the point is to describe how it is that the commonplaces of interaction that are done in a taken for granted fashion, and which by being done oil the wheels of social order, actually are done. How do conversations get begun and ended in a 'normal' fashion? How do we ensure that everyone gets at least the chance to say his piece?

It is worth remarking, here, that links can be (and have been) drawn between the way in which ethnomethodologists treat the social world, and the way in which Husserl insists upon the phenomenological and eidetic reductions as a prelude to any radical philosophy. (74) In both cases,
the level at which analysis is to be carried out requires an abstraction from the world of the 'natural attitude'. For Husserl, this abstraction, as I have shown in chapter 2, requires that one bracket ones belief in the 'existence' of objects in the real world in order to be able to examine the 'intentional' essences which provide the presuppositions of all knowledge of the world. For ethnomethodology, on the other hand, what is bracketed is a concern with whether or not specific 'meanings' which are given to social phenomena are 'true' or 'adequate'. (75) The object of the exercise is not to 'ironize' 'member's accounts', but to describe accounting practices themselves, and to this end the adequacy of such accounts need not be considered. The point is not to produce 'normative' accounts of social phenomena, but to investigate that structural level of practices and procedures which is the presupposition of social order, and thus of 'meaning' in the social world. It is dangerous, however, to push the parallel that is apparent here too far. Even a cursory consideration of the matter reveals that intentional essences, uncovered within consciousness, are by no means the same thing as structures of practices and procedures uncovered by empirical investigation of social phenomena. And again, the presuppositions of knowledge are not the same thing at all as the presuppositions of social order. Indeed, if the parallel is given any weight other than that of a point of passing interest, important aspects of the ethnomethodological position begin to become obscured. For example, the danger once again arises that Garfinkel and Sacks will be thought of as 'subjectivist' and concerned only with matters of 'subjectivity' rather than, as I have argued above, them being involved quite deliberately in dissolving the distinction between 'subject' and 'object'. Similarly, Garfinkel's concerns with the fact that language is 'used', which is also reflected in conversational analysis, threatens to become obscured if a more phenomenological approach to language is foisted on ethnomethodology.
Husserl was not centrally concerned with matters of 'indexicality', or with problems of 'context', nor, indeed, with the majority of the concerns which provide the motive force for Garfinkel's thought about the social world. These concerns, as I have argued at length, have much in common with the work of the later Wittgenstein, and for this reason it seems a more useful exercise to explicate these links, and to see what the two positions can offer each other, rather than to insist upon the historical link to Husserl.

That said, however, it is important to realise that the descriptions that conversational analysts give of conversations are indeed achieved by abstracting from particular instances of meaningful interaction in the social world. It is this abstraction which both enables the 'formal structures' to be identified and described apart from specific social contexts and meanings, and which at the same time gives the context free/context sensitive status to those descriptions, thus giving a high degree of generality to the findings of the analyses. This important point is perhaps best illustrated by considering the 'if/then' character of the descriptions given of conversational structures.

Take, for example, the description given of closing sequences which I outlined above. The pre-sequence which heralds a closing should not, the way Sacks and Schegloff describe it, be taken as a point in the conversation at which a close becomes inevitable. For that reason, it is called a "possible pre-closing" to denote the fact that it represents only the possibility that a terminal exchange will follow. It only becomes a 'pre-closing' in retrospect, after the terminal exchange has actually taken place. Thus, the form of the description is 'if this possible pre-closing sequence is heard as/taken as a pre-closing - i.e. if this warrant for initiating a terminal exchange is taken up - then what will follow will be a terminal exchange which will bring about the close of the conversation'. Similarly with adjacency pairs - 'if this
utterance is heard as a first pair part then upon its completion, a second pair part becomes conditionally relevant. Added to each such description is a clause which says something to the effect of: 'if this does not happen, and its not happening is visible to the conversationalsists, then it will be an accountable matter.'

What all this adds up to is that the descriptions given are not at all intended to demonstrate some predetermination of a particular conversation over its course; but instead they recognize the necessity of providing for the 'members' role' in all conversations. This means that a particular sort of abstraction, which treats the conversational data as a set of possibilities, is needed if the data is to be adequately described. The descriptions are not concerned with the specifics of some particular conversational interaction, but with what the particular occasion being analysed can be shown to contain in general, formal structural, terms. This is done by considering the conversational structures in an 'if/then' fashion. The formal structures of practical action, as with a 'form of life', are conceptualised as enabling meaningful interaction, and not as determining it. Thus the form of abstraction which enables such structures to be analysed and described must be of a particular kind.

The descriptive power and generality of the structural machinery that is built by conversational analysts to describe interaction, then, is the result of this particular kind of abstraction from specific conversational interactions. It is an abstraction that searches out structures that do describe all instances of a particular conversational phenomenon without remainder, and it seeks to do so at the level of the 'formal structures of practical actions'. The process of abstraction and description recognises from the start that members of society are not automata, but can be seen to make choices, to manipulate the conversational structures to further interactional ends, to misuse 'correct form', (76) and so on. The analyses cannot simply find a pattern and impose it on
the conversational data as though some inevitable sequence could thus be produced and a universal law discovered. Instead, descriptions of the data must have built into them an 'if/then' character to capture the conversational interactions from which they are an abstraction. The alternative is a host of 'deviant case' analyses.

This abstract level is not, however, the only one at which ethnomethodologists who have analysed conversation have produced descriptions of social phenomena. Some, like Turner, instead of concentrating on producing general descriptions from particular conversations, have used the general descriptive vocabulary and concepts that have been developed by the abstract analyses, in order to throw light on more specific interactional events, - such as, for example, courtroom interaction - or on specific interactional phenomena - such as snubs. I want now to look in some detail at this type of analysis, and at some of its implications for the conversational analysis enterprise.

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH

A clear example of the type of analysis that I want to look at here is Turner's analysis of 'snubs', so I will give an account of this before going on to point out those features of it that are important for the purposes at hand. Turner begins with a transcript of a piece of talk between a former mental patient 'Bert', a group of other former mental patients (Rob, Art and Jake) and a counsellor. The subject under discussion is an encounter that Bert had with another former mental patient in which he claims to have been 'snubbed'. I will reproduce the transcript in full, in spite of its length, because it will make it easier to see the point of the analysis.

"BERT. Yea, Yeah, that's correct. I uh uh really did know him and uh he was with me in the Alexander Psychiatric Institute in in Alexander, Western Province. I don't remember his name but we uh we always buddied around together when uh we were at the hospital and we always (( )) French. And uh I saw him out at Western City about three weeks ago, and I said to 'm, 'Hello, howarya doing?' He said 'I don't know you - who are you?' 'Well, lookit', I said, 'You must
know me'. He says, 'No, I don't know you'. Now he was with another fellow there too - waal he didn't want to admit that he was in a mental hospital uh in a hospital - he didn't want to admit it to the other fellow that was with him. So he just walked off and that was it. He wouldn't say hello to me. He wouldn't say nothin!

ROB. What was you view there? Do you have your own views on that? A touchy point.

BERT. Uh.

?: (())

JAKE. Perhaps he didn't like the idea of being in that place. Maybe he didn't want/

BERT. Well no he had to say it - there was another fellow with him you see/

JAKE. Well he didn't want to admit/

BERT. Who hadn't been in a mental hospital probably, and he was in the hospital. He didn't want him to know.

ART. You mean he

?: this other guy

COUNS. But he

BERT. Oh, oh never been in a hospital

BERT. He didn't want to know his friends." (77)

Turner's question about these materials is "how might they be analysed in a sociologically relevant way - that is to say, as a demonstration of their orderliness?" More specifically; he claims that Bert's first utterances in the transcript are a complaint, and that they can be recognized as a complaint by any competent member of our society. What he wants to find out is how Bert manages to bring these utterances off as a complaint - "I now want to look at the production of a recognizable complaint in some detail, to look at the resources and components of Bert's complaint." (78)

Bert's complaint is that he was 'snubbed', so the first thing to do is to find how it is that he describes the events in question so as to make it clear that he was, indeed, snubbed. He does this by insisting that he did know the snubber, and that the snubber knew him, because they had been in the mental hospital together, but that still his greeting was not returned. The point here is that upon the completion of a greeting, a return greeting becomes conditionally relevant - the
sequence is an instance of an adjacency pair. Turner sums up

"So far, then, all we have seen is an account of a breached norm, the norm that requires acquainted persons to acknowledge one another upon meeting face-to-face. This component of the account constitutes the occurrence of a 'trouble', in this case, a snub." (79)

The next thing Turner wants to investigate is to see how Bert's explanation of why he was snubbed actually works, this being an important part of the 'complaint' itself. Bert's explanation is "Now he was with another fellow there too - waal he didn't want to admit that he was in a mental hospital uh in a hospital - he didn't want to admit to the other fellow that was with him. So he just walked off and that was it". (80) The question is, Turner claims, why should the former patient have to admit that he had been in a mental hospital? and why should it be evident to Bert's listeners that he could well have to admit this? There are two possibilities here, both structural, and both drawing on the work of Sacks and Schegloff.

Firstly, if all he had done was to return the greeting and move on, then his companion could well have asked "who was that guy you spoke to?" - which as a question, would make some answer conditionally relevant, and could well have led, even if he had lied about it, to further talk about his answer since the questioner has rights to speak again (perhaps with another question) once the answer is complete.

Secondly, it would be quite possible that he would not get away with just a greeting. As Turner puts it, Schegloff has pointed out that "within the structure of a telephone call the caller may select the first topic for talk." Now in face-to-face interaction it may be that a conversation will cease after the exchange of greetings (option 1 above).

"However, it further appears to be the case that the initial greeter has the right to talk again when a greeting is returned, and that he thus becomes a 'first speaker' with respect to rights to topic selection. If this is the case, then (as I take it Bert and his listeners could see), to acknowledge a greeting by returning a greeting is to open oneself up to the initial greeter's developing a conversation and to his initiating a topic." (81)
If one couples this to the fact that the meeting takes place many miles from the hospital, and that it is the first meeting since they have left the hospital, then 'as anyone knows' the chances are that 'first topic' would have been 'mental hospitals', with Bert's former fellow-patient having little chance to steer the conversation some other way, not being in a position to choose first topic. In other words, the structural features which Turner has drawn out of the situation, plus the situation, plus what everyone, (including Bert and his listeners) knows (i.e. certain background knowledge) come together to make Bert's explanation of why he was snubbed actually work.

There is one further aspect of the complaint that Turner investigates. This is that he takes it that the substance of Bert's complaint is not just that he has been snubbed, but that he has been snubbed because he was a former mental patient. In other words "for Bert the complaint-worthy item is presumably that he sees that he himself had been identified as a 'former mental-patient'; the snubber's own problems stemmed from Bert's former-patient status". (82) This being the case, then Bert's complaint is special in being a "category - generated activity" - i.e. it is such that it provides "for any members of the category (such as Bert's hearers) to see that 'what happened to him' could happen to 'us'". (83) This again is a structural notion, which seems to owe much to Sacks' notion of a 'membership categorization device'. What Turner is suggesting is that the noticeable absence of a return greeting is being accounted for in terms of the category incumbancy of the snubbed person - i.e. 'Bert'. Thus the way in which Bert has been categorized (or perhaps has categorized himself) by means of a device which includes as members 'mental patients', 'former mental patients' and 'non-mental patients' is seen as the structural basis for his accounting for the snub in the way that he does, and thus as the root of his problems. Once again, then, Turner brings formal structural insights to bear upon the particular
situation he is analysing in order to produce a description of it.

Turner brings the whole of the analysis, including all three of the structural aspects that he has investigated, to make a point about 'former mental patients'. The category 'former mental patient' itself, he argues, is used by both former mental patients and others to account for aspects of everyday interaction in such a way that, although perhaps bizarre or unfortunate by 'normal' standards, they become structured and organized. By the same token, the category can be used as a resource for finding or discovering that some particular behaviour is bizarre or non-normal. These points are simply specific instances of Garfinkel's insistence that 'accounting practices' are members' methods for producing and making visible, social order - a point dealt with at length in chapter 4. Turner sums up

"What I want to note, then, is that a plausible view of at least one class of 'problems' of 'former mental patients' is that such problems are generated out of the same raw materials that provide for 'normal' interactional routines, in particular, the invocation of norms governing such matters as meeting an old friend. It is in finding that such norms may be breached systematically, and the breach accounted for by the identification 'former mental patient', that Bert is able to propose that 'what happened' constituted a complaintworthy event." (84)

Put in slightly different fashion, Turner's point is that the formal structures of practical action are such that 'breaches' of the normal order of things is an accountable matter. These accounts that result from breaches are meaningful aspects of social life generated from structural conditions. 'Snub' is a way of accounting for one such breach, and the category 'former mental patient' another. What the analyst must do is to show this interrelationship between 'structures' on the one hand, and specific categories and accounts on the other. In the process the analyst must make use of the taken for granted knowledge that he holds in common with his fellow members of society to fully explicate his data, and his task is to unravel and display that knowledge as the analysis proceeds.
The result of all this is that Turner's analyses have the feel of a complex interweaving of structural considerations, concrete accounts of the social world, and taken for granted knowledge, in the pursuit of substantive insights into particular concrete conversational interactions that can shed light on substantive sociological concerns - such as the problems of former mental patients. His is not the almost austere formal purity of Schegloff who writes, in the course of a discussion of the ways in which members of society talk about and describe places - e.g. 'the pub down the road' - that he is not interested in specific 'members' geographies', but only in structures:

"Such geographies are a cultural fact to be discovered and perhaps subjected to a sort of "componential analysis" of place terms, but have no necessary further consequences for the analysis with which we are concerned here." (85)

This same contrast can be brought out further by noticing that Turner is quite happy to insist that the analyses he does are fundamentally ethnographic. It is not to the point, he argues, to have as one's goal in analysis the purification of the data from its ethnographic roots (86) but rather those roots must be made explicit. (87) By making it clear what background knowledge one shares with one's fellow members of society, structural and otherwise, then the texture of society against which and in terms of which 'complaints' and so on are done, can be made visible. There will always, for Turner, be the possibility of alternative ethnographic accounts of one's data, and it is the proposers of the accounts who must argue for their interpretations. He is content to provide insightful accounts of specific, ethnographic, conversational data which might have wider implications for other similar settings - for example other situations in which mental patients are talking about their troubles - but which are not aimed fundamentally at producing general, formal structural, descriptions of conversational data by abstracting from ethnographic detail itself.

What Turner has effectively done, then, is to invert the concerns of
Sacks and Schegloff. Instead of abstracting from the particular to produce general descriptions, he uses the language and concepts of the abstract analyses to cast light on particular conversational materials.

I want now to go on to discuss some of the implications of this difference in order to highlight further something of the status of these two ways of handling conversational data. I will begin by considering the relationship between the analyst and the co-conversationalist whose conversation is being described. Goffman provides a useful point of entry into the questions that arise in this area: (88)

"Observe now that, broadly speaking, there are three kinds of listeners to talk; those who overhear, whether or not their unratified participation is inadvertent and whether or not it has been encouraged; those who are ratified participants but (in the case of more than two-person talk) are not specifically addressed by the speaker; and those ratified participants who are addressed, that is, oriented to by the speaker in a manner to suggest that his words are particularly for them, and that some answer is therefore anticipated from them, more so than from the other ratified participants." (89)

The analyst of a conversation is almost invariably an overhearer in Goffman's terms. Now the problem is this: the sense of some particular utterance may be perfectly clear to the co-conversationalists themselves whilst being crucially ambiguous to the overhearer because of information which the speakers have which is denied to the outsider. This means that on some specific occasion, it may not prove possible to decide just what structural features an utterance actually has for the participants to the conversation. Thus, for example, something that looks like a question to an analyst may not be heard as such by the co-participants and thus, although an answer is not forthcoming, that fact may not, for the participants, be an occasion for comment - a breach may not have taken place. By the same token, what does not look like an answer to a question may, for the conversationalists, in fact be a quite adequate response to what was asked. It is not good enough to say that one must simply wait to see what the conversationalists do - how they orient to the matter - to decide the structural features at issue,
since it may well be that the data, on some specific occasion, does not legislate one way or the other.

For all this, it must still be the case that for the majority of cases, the overhearer is at no such disadvantage. If this were not the case, then the whole possibility of conversational interaction would collapse since conversationalists in general would not have enough in common - in terms of common structures of practices - to be able to ground their talk with one another. There would be no common 'form of life'. Nonetheless for that, such considerations do illustrate an important point about the difference between what might be called the 'ethnographic' and the 'formal' approaches to the analysis of conversational data. I will deal with each approach in turn.

For Sacks and Schegloff, the fact that on some particular occasion it may be impossible to legislate unambiguously as to what structural features are present in the data provides no serious difficulties. The particular utterance under review can be described by saying that "if it is heard as x then the following utterance is y, whilst if it is heard as A then the following utterance is B". The fact that in this particular instance it is not possible to make a decision between x and A does not preclude the possibility of a description that points out the ambiguity in the data for the overhearer, and suggests what the possibilities are. Such ambiguities could only become 'in principle' difficulties with epistemological implications under some such hypothesis as "on all those occasions, and only on those occasions when the conversational data is ambiguous for the overhearer/analyst, the conversations from which the data are derived do not show for the participants the orderly properties described by the structural machinery.". What is being analysed by Sacks et al is the formal structural machinery which they, as analysts, share in common with the co-participants to the conversations analysed. It is that which, in the majority of cases, enables them to understand and
analyse their data. That they sometimes are unable to produce an adequate analysis/description is put down as due not to the failure of this held in common structure of practices, but to the analysts' lack of art, omnipotence, knowledge, etc., etc.

For Turner, on the other hand, the situation is different. Because the aim of his analysis is not to produce formal structural descriptions by abstracting from the particular contexts of the conversations analysed, but to bring the formal structural machinery to bear upon the specific instances of interaction to illuminate that setting, then it is important that the applicability of some particular structural feature be established more or less unambiguously. If it is possible to show, on some particular occasion, that his attribution of a particular structural feature to some particular aspect of a conversation is ambiguous, for whatever reason, then the insight into that piece of interaction that is gleaned from that attribution is cast into doubt. It is no use for Turner to say 'if x then y' since such descriptions cannot generate the news from the particular setting that an ethnographic approach to the data, which seeks to throw light on the context of the interaction, needs if it is to succeed. A particular feature, say a snub, must be able to be identified in a more or less definite manner on the particular occasion.

This discussion of problems with the relationship between analysts/overhearers and the co-conversationalists illustrates two important differences between the sort of analyses being done by Sacks et al on the one hand, and Turner and others like him on the other. In the first place, there is an obvious difference in perspective upon the particulars of interaction. For the more formal approach of Sacks the particular is to be analysed for what it can yield in terms of general descriptive information, whilst for Turner it is something to be treated as important in its own right, and as something that all sorts of information, (structural, ethnographic, etc.) should be brought to bear upon. (90) The second point of contrast lies in what is to count as an adequate
analysis: for Sacks, the object is to produce a descriptive machinery which will 'give back' the data - a set of rules which will enable him to fully describe the conversational materials analysed. (91) For Turner, on the other hand, the adequate analysis must cast insight into some corner of the everyday world in which we live.

The main thrust of the contrast can be stated as follows: Sacks and Schegloff attempt to uncover and describe something of what is meant by the 'formal structures of practical action' in relation to the theoretical problem of social order, thus giving empirical substance to the solution to that problem, as it has been formulated by Garfinkel, by generating abstract descriptions of the practices and procedures used by members over the course of conversation. Analysts like Turner, on the other hand, attempt to show how this solution to the problem of order, can be seen to be relevant to the analysis of specific interactional contexts, thus generating descriptions that are tied to specific areas of concern, rather than having the abstract status of the work of Sacks et al.

It would be wrong, however, to see the two concerns as somehow contradictory. Although there are, indeed, significant differences between the two approaches, they both stand in a close relationship to the same solution to the problem of social order. Both are intent to emphasise the essential indexicality of expressions, the fact that language is used, and the importance of considering in some way or other that level of social practices which is indicated by 'formal structures'. In a sense the two approaches are sides of the same coin, with the abstract formal approach providing the concepts and vocabulary which can be used to throw fresh light on specific areas of social life. (92)

That said, however, there is an important issue underlying the relationship between these two approaches, and it is to this that I now want to turn.
FORMAL STRUCTURES AND MEANING

I have suggested that the structures of conversational practices which Sacks and conversational analysts describe should be conceptualized in terms of 'formal structures of practical actions'. This concept in its turn should be seen as indicating something of what Wittgenstein intended by a 'form of life', but formulated in such a way that it invites empirical investigation of a certain aspect of social structure. This aspect is conceptualised as that level of social structure which is the presupposition of social order and of 'meaning' in the social world, where 'meaning' is to be seen as an embedded phenomenon and not as part of a 'calculus' of some kind. The important point that I want to raise here is this: given that this structure of practices is to be seen as the presupposition of meaningful interaction in the social world, how is one to articulate the relationship between these presuppositions and the ethnographic detail of everyday life? One way, as I have shown, is to perform the type of analyses that Turner engages in. The difficulty here, however, is that what emerges from this type of work is not a general solution to the problem of what such a relationship looks like, but the piecemeal application of concepts generated at a structural level to particular interactional contexts. Turner, in other words, inverts the relationship between the particular and the general rather than providing a satisfactory account of the ways in which these two aspects of social reality, identified by analysis, interpenetrate.

It is important that the nature of this relationship is made clear. If meaning is to be satisfactorily treated as an embedded phenomenon, then it is imperative that the relationship between the structure of practices which enables meaningful interaction, and that interaction itself, be somehow specified. The alternative is that one is left with only half of the picture. I am not suggesting, it should be stressed, that existing analyses of conversational data do not provide insight into an important area of the social world. That is not the problem.
Rather the issue concerns the way in which the insights into this particular aspect of social life relate to other aspects of it. In order to specify more clearly what is at issue here, I want to discuss a recent paper by Goffman entitled "Replies and Responses". (93) With this as background, it will be possible to formulate some comments which might throw light on this difficult area.

In his paper, Goffman seeks to uncover ways in which the apparatus developed by conversational analysts can be seen to have some relevance for his own work, and could be used to amplify in a structural fashion some of the insights into interaction that have provided the substance of his books over the last twenty five years. What this exercise essentially consists of is the expansion of the concept of 'adjacency pair' via Goffman's notion of a 'ritual exchange', a critique of this expansion followed by a reformulation of the original notion in terms of 'moves' in the game of 'interaction' of which Conversation is a part.

Goffman states this conclusion thus:

"It follows, then, that our basic model for talk perhaps ought not to be dialogic couplets and their chaining, but rather a sequence of response moves with each in the series carving out its own reference, and each incorporating a variable balance of function in regard to statement-reply properties. In the right setting, a person next in line to speak can elect to deny the dialogic frame, accept it, or carve out such a format when none is apparent. This formulation would finally allow us to give proper credit to the flexibility of talk." (94)

One should construct one's apparatus to take account of the fact that conversation is interactional and contexted. It is worthwhile setting out here some of Goffman's reasons for coming to this conclusion since they are highly instructive in the present context.

Firstly, Goffman points out that a response to a particular statement (he uses 'response' and 'statement' to signify the relationship between adjacent 'utterances' conceived in a broad sense) need not be linguistic. Thus a shake of the head will do, or a 'getting up' in reply to an order to stand. Not only that, but the original 'statement' itself may not be
linguistic. One is not dealing, he suggests, with

"the statement of a speaker which his respondent addresses,
not even a statement, but rather anything the speaker and the
other participants will accept as a statement he has made." (95)

He gives an example

"A. (enters wearing a hat)
B. (shaking head) 'no, I don't like it'." (96)

Thus it becomes the case that, confronted with the conversational data,
one only has part of the story, and the possibility of doing an adequate
analysis of what actually took place in the interaction sequence is
thrown into serious doubt. The conversational data, Goffman argues,
needs to be seen in a broader context of interaction.

A second point he raises concerns the fact that a response need
not relate to the previous utterance, but can relate back to the
conversation as a whole, or to some utterance prior to the last utterance,
or even to some utterance of a prior conversation. What an utterance
means, may not be obvious from its sequential placement after some prior
utterance but may depend upon the context of the conversation as a whole.

Thirdly, Goffman suggests that in the case of a 'greeting sequence',
which as I have suggested above, is seen by conversational analysts as
an example of an adjacency pair sequence, it makes more sense to see the
whole sequence as itself a response to "the sudden availability of the
participants to each other". (97) The term 'adjacency pair', Goffman
suggests, does not capture adequately all of what goes on over the course
of a greeting.

A fourth and final point that is extractable from Goffman's account
is that how a particular utterance is, in fact, taken, may well depend
upon the context of the utterances in which it is found. Thus, for
example,

"Two out of three or more co-participants can enter a
jocular, mocked-up interchange in which each loyally plays out
his appropriate part, ostensibly providing appropriate
statements and ostensibly responding with appropriate replies,
while all the while the other participants look on, prepared to enter with a laugh that will let the jokesters off the hook, assuring them that their set piece was appreciated, and with this tactful appreciation provide a response to a statement which is itself an unserious dialogue embedded in a less lightly toned encounter." (98)

In this way, the joking utterances need to be seen in their context for their sense to be apparent, whilst the 'hearers' responses respond not to any one utterance, but to the whole sequence of them.

Goffman does make further points, mainly in terms of detail, but those above provide enough of a framework for the gist of his argument to be apparent. Before dealing with each of these four points in turn, I want to make two general points about Goffman's argument here. Firstly, it is important to realise that all of the points he makes are firmly contexted by the concerns of his own work. Thus, for example, the argument that 'move' is a more useful term than, say, 'adjacency pair', reflects his own concerns with the dramaturgical analogy and with games as useful heuristics in the analysis of the social world. What Goffman seems to be attempting to do in this article is to incorporate conversational analysis' insights into his own concerns by taking those aspects of them that he feels he can use. The result of this is that a rather narrow conception of what conversational analysis is trying to do emerges from the article. This leads to the second point, which is that Goffman seems to consider that conversational analysis is concerned entirely with adjacency pairs, and with adjacent utterances. As I shall show, most of his objections to the enterprise prove to be void once this misapprehension is put aside.

Goffman's first concern is with non-linguistic elements of conversation. It is worth making two points here. Firstly, much of the work done by conversational analysts has been done on telephone conversations (99) precisely because of this difficulty. In a telephone conversation, the analyst is confronted with a set of data which is not complicated by hand wavings, head noddings, and the rest, so that he is
able to ignore the non-linguistic elements and produce descriptions of
the data which can legitimately ignore what, in face to face interaction,
is indeed a contributory aspect of the overall conversation. The hope is,
that by starting with this simplified data a general structural machinery
can be produced to describe telephone conversations which can then be
elaborated upon for the purpose of describing face to face interaction.
Secondly, work has already been begun, by conversational analysts, into
the use of gestures in conversations, (100) although it is still at
an elementary stage. The difficulties that are confronted here are
perhaps obvious, but they include developing a vocabulary of concepts
in which to talk about gestures, as well as the fact that such work is
done with the aid of video tapes which cannot, at present, be reproduced
for easy publication. In short, the reason why much of the published
work on the analysis of conversation does not deal with non-linguistic
aspects of conversational interaction seems to be due more to the complexities
methodological and technical, involved in including them, than in any
deliberate exclusion of such phenomena from consideration.

Goffman's second point, which concerns the relationship of some
particular utterance to the conversation as a whole, illustrates what was
said above concerning what seems to be Goffman's impression that
conversational analysis deals only with adjacency pairs. In the account
which I gave of the closings of conversations, it became apparent that
Sacks and Schegloff were concerned to point out that 'pre-closings'
could indeed, in many cases, be seen to relate back to previous
topics of conversation, and that this, which is related to the organization
of topic talk, was an important feature in the descriptions of closings.
Similarly, pre-sequences in general do not slot neatly into an adjacency
pair format. Perhaps one of the best analyses which attempts to describe
these broader relationships between elements of a conversation, is a paper
on 'formulations' by Heritage and Watson, (101) which, among other things,
describes the way in which co-conversationalists 'formulate' what the 'conversation so far' has been about, and orient their continuing talk to that formulation.

The third point concerns what might be called pre-greeting sequences. The problem here is that the "sudden availability of the participants to each other" is a non-linguistic phenomenon, and thus, as far as analysis and description goes, presents the same difficulties which I mentioned above in discussing Goffman's first point. Undoubtedly there are, in fact, all sorts of things that go on over the course of two people meeting, including facial gestures, changes in posture and so on, and it would seem at least likely that it would be possible to produce formal structural descriptions of such phenomena - i.e. that 'upon analysis' the ways in which people greet one another, both linguistically and non-linguistically, would be shown to have orderly, typical, repetitive etc. characteristics. Precisely the problem is how to describe this - and I personally doubt whether referring to it as the "availability of the participants to each other" helps much in solving these difficulties. Nonetheless for that, the general point which Goffman is making here - that there is more to greeting that saying "hello" - does raise important questions which I will discuss later.

The fourth and final point - that joking utterances can only be understood in their context - is not a question about 'formal structures', but addresses the 'meaning' of utterances. It is presumably the case that in order to bring off the 'mocked-up interchange' that Goffman describes, the participants' actions - i.e. the way in which they were speaking - would have to exhibit 'formal structures' that were the same as those already described in terms of the conversational machinery, otherwise their remarks would have been unintelligible to anyone, and not just to the analyst. It might be the case that the analyst would not understand the precise import of the remarks on this occasion, but, as I have argued above in relation to ambiguities, this is not an in principle
difficulty for the analyses Sacks and Schegloff undertake.

What these rejoinders to Goffman's criticisms amount to is a suggestion that with his first and third points he takes too narrow a view of the aims of conversational analysis, and of the possibilities contained within it, that in his second point he shows a lack of awareness of some of the work, (other than that done on adjacency pairs sequences) which has been undertaken by analysts, and that in his fourth point he illustrates that he has not grasped the presuppositional level at which the analyses are aimed. Goffman's problems in other words, can be answered by saying that he has missed the point of conversational analysis in a variety of ways, and that the actual focus of that work is such that it can be shown to be immune from such criticisms. Such a response, however, is too simply. It does not address what seems to be the fundamental point that underlies Goffman's remarks, and which is the present subject of discussion, namely the relationship between conversational structures, and the broader interactional context. Each of Goffman's points is aimed at this question in some way or other. He is not arguing against the enterprise as a whole - he sees a place for formalistic analyses, as the following quotation shows.

"I do not mean to argue against formalistic analysis. However tortured the connection can become between last person's talk and current speaker's utterance, that connection must be explored under the auspices of determinism, as though all the degrees of freedom avilable to whomsoever is about to talk can somehow be mapped out, conceptualized, and ordered, somehow neatly grasped and held, somehow made to submit to the patterning-out effected by analysis." (102)

What he does seem to be attempting to do, is to broaden the scope of such analyses. His own efforts at formulating a way of doing so, however, whilst instructive, are not, in the final analysis, adequate. I want to look at this formulation critically before moving on to suggest an alternative direction of approach.

The elements of Goffman's solution are two concepts: 'system
constraints' and 'ritual constraints'. The former are those constraints which impose themselves on conversationalists as a direct result of the conversational system conceived of entirely in terms of the sequencing of utterances and the rules for that sequencing. Goffman considers that conversational analysis, to the extent that it focuses upon adjacency pairs, is concerned with these system constraints. Ritual constraints, on the other hand, are concerned with 'good form' and 'good manners'. Goffman puts it that they are:

"constraints regarding how each individual ought to handle himself with respect to each of the others, so that he not discredit his own tacit claim to good character or the tacit claim of the others that they are persons of social worth whose various forms of territoriality are to be respected." (103)

He points out the difference between the two as follows:

"Observe that although system constraints might be conceived of as pan-cultural, ritual concerns are patently dependent on cultural definition and can be expected to vary quite markedly from society to society." (104)

Both system and ritual constraints have some part to play in "Keeping conversational channels open and in good working order", with ritual constraints coming in to decide how long a conversation will be, ensuring that an offer to open a conversation in the first place will in fact be taken up, and so on.

The importance of this distinction for the issue under review is stated by Goffman as follows:

"The notion of ritual constraints helps us to mediate between the particularities of social situations and our tendency to think in terms of general rules for the management of conversational interplay. We are given a means of overcoming the argument that any generalization in this area must fall because every social situation is different from every other. In brief, we have means of attending to what it is about different social situations that makes them relevantly different for the management of talk." (105)

The notion of ritual constraints is thus seen as in some way bridging the gap between the general structures of conversation, and the particular occasions of their manifestation within specific interaction situations.

It is important to recognize that the distinction that Goffman is
making here is one that straddles the notion of 'formal structures' as that notion has been uncovered in terms of conversational practices over the course of this chapter. Neither the notion of 'ritual constraint' nor that of 'system constraints' articulates the sense of those structures which are described by conversational analysts, but rather both terms capture a part of what is meant. Consider what he has to say about 'system constraints'.

"We can, then, draw our basic framework for face-to-face talk from what would appear to be the sheer physical requirements and constraints of any communication system, and progress from there to a sort of microfunctional analysis of various interaction signals and practices. Observe that wide scope is found here for formalization; the various events in this process can be managed through quite truncated symbols, and not only can these symbols be given discrete, condensed physical forms, but also the role of live persons in the communication system can be very considerably reduced .... It is assumed that the participants have jointly agreed to operate (in effect) solely as communication nodes, as transceivers, and to make themselves fully available for that purpose." (106)

Gone, in this account, is any sense of 'members' practices'. Gone is the 'if/then' form of the descriptions. Gone is any sense of the organization of conversational order by the conversations participants, or the connection between conversational structures and the general sociological problem of order, or the notion of 'accounting practices', of 'glossing', or 'formulating', etc., etc. Gone too is the type of notion that is captured in the idea of a 'preference' structure, where quite explicit comparisons are made between that notion and Goffman's own 'supportive rituals' - "compliments may be seen as 'supportive rituals'", (107) a concept which is concerned not with 'system constraints' but with 'ritual constraints'. In short, Goffman's notion is too thin to capture what is contained in the conversational analyst's formulation of conversational practices.

If Goffman's notion of 'system' differs substantially from conversational analysts' notions of 'structure', so too does his notion of 'ritual constraints'. I argued above that one of the most important
characteristics of the 'formal structures' was that they incorporated what Wittgenstein refers to as that sense of 'rule' that does not imply interpretation. They simply are 'what people do', and it is as such that they enable meaningful, rational interaction. This is not, however, the case with 'ritual constraints'. Consider, for example, the ritual demand that 'proper' dress be worn at certain functions. It is not the case that this 'constraint' simply reflects 'what people do'. It is, rather, a demand that requires interpretation according to all sorts of social conventions. What is actually worn is the result of interpreting the demands of the ritual constraint in this way or that - albeit within limits, but nonetheless the result of an interpretation. Precisely the same is true of ritual constraints within a conversation. There is a constraint to say something, and what that something is is constrained by all sorts of social conventions, but eventually something is said which is the result of interpreting the ritual demands of the situation in such and such a fashion. It is not that some conscious, intentional act is necessarily involved, but rather that the carrying out of a ritual demand is not just 'what people do'. It implies that whatever was in fact done was done 'in the light of', or 'as a result of interpreting', some convention or other, and should be seen in terms of that fact.

Put in slightly different fashion, the point is this: 'formal structures' is primarily concerned with 'how' something was said or done, with 'how' some particular piece of conversational action was managed in an orderly fashion, and to that end it seeks out the structure of the practices which enabled it. Goffman's 'ritual constraints', on the other hand, are concerned with 'what' was said in a conversation and the relationship of what was said to 'why' it was said. The notion of 'ritual constraint' addresses the substance of a conversational interaction in as much as it looks to the social conventions which surround it and account for the particular 'polite' or 'impolite' utterances which actually
ensue on some occasion or other, rather than the formal structural organization which enabled the conversation itself.

The relationship between system and ritual constraints is stated by Goffman thus:

"insofar as participants in an encounter morally commit themselves to keeping conversational channels open and in good working order, whatever binds by virtue of system constraints will bind also by virtue of ritual ones. The satisfaction of ritual constraints safeguards not only feelings but communication, too." (108)

The ritual constraints thus work alongside the system constraints, and reinforce them in the cause of better communication. At the same time, however, they extend the scope of the purely formal system by incorporating a further dimension of social conventions into the picture. It is this further dimension that gives the possibility of some articulation of the formal structures with the particulars of meaningful social interaction.

It is fairly easy to see, I think, how one could develop onwards from the notion of ritual constraint, by bringing in more and more social conventions, in such a way that the particular interaction is initially sketched in, then done in ink, and finally coloured with oil paints. Something of this sort seems to be in Goffman's mind when he speaks about investigating the connection between utterances in a conversation, saying that "However tortured the connection can become ... that connection must be explored under the auspices of determinism, as though all the degrees of freedom available ... can somehow be mapped out ...". (109)

The analyst must start from system constraints, then investigate ritual constraints as these bear on the former, and then move on to look at whether or not the utterances are 'joking', 'ironic' etc. and explicate the context for that, all of the while incorporating both utterances and gestures, including distinctions between different kinds of speech acts, (110) including the nuances of meanings that each context throws up, and so on and so forth. Each aspect thus a part to play in the
description of what is going on in the particular setting, and so each aspect must be made to submit to formal analysis and description "under the auspices of determinism". By formulating 'system constraints' as thinner than 'formal structures', and 'ritual constraints' as more context specific, related to the general constraints of politeness and good manners which characterise social life, he is able to give an account of conversational structures which, as part system and part ritual, fit snugly into the whole context of meaningful social interaction. Thus the bridge is built between some sort of formulation of conversational structure and specific interactional contexts.

The problem is, however, that too much comes over the bridge. If one's intention as a sociologist is to describe in a rigorous fashion social phenomena - and as I have shown, this is the aim of the work of both Garfinkel and Sacks - then it is necessary to provide some sort of theoretical focus on the area of social life with which one is concerned. It is necessary to delimit, in some way, an area of interest. The alternative is an approach which tries to take on everything - the whole complexity of social life in its entirety - with no systematic focus to provide a coherent perspective. What Goffman's two concepts do is to formulate a structural focus on conversation which seems to owe something to the work of conversational analysts, and then to ignore the theoretical position which gives it sense as a phenomenon worthy of interest. The object of the structural analysis thus becomes lost, and the whole of social reality, with all of its nuances of meanings, its conventions, its subcultures and contexts, and so on, are seen to be equally relevant to the problem of providing a structural description of the social world. The analyst thus becomes confronted with such a mass of 'relevant' data that it becomes difficult for him to know where to start.

Goffman, in other words, ignores the particular relationship of these
structures to the problem of social order, and fails to realise that what is being dealt with is the presuppositions of that order and of meaningful interaction, yet it is these concerns that focus the work and provide its raison d'etre. The danger thus becomes that the sociological investigator will search about this way and that for regularities to describe in structural terms, but with no precisely formulated idea of what it is that he is doing. Such unsystematic investigations of social phenomena run the risk of becoming peculiarly elusive in the way that much of Goffman's work does - one feels that significant insights into social interaction have been gained, but quite how to capitalise on them remains beyond one's reach, and the structures unravelled seem somehow irrelevant amidst the mass of rich ethnographic detail.

In sum, the route that Goffman takes in order to handle the problem of the relationship between the structure of conversational practices and specific contexts of interaction is not adequate because it removes the reason for focusing upon such phenomena in the first place, and because, by doing that, it leaves the sociologist with no perspective for handling the great mass of interactional data that confronts him as he stands before the complexities of the social world. The question remains, then, of how, precisely, an adequate solution to this problem can be formulated. Over the remaining paragraphs of this chapter I want to make one or two points that are relevant to the issues involved here.

The clue here, I want to suggest, lies in the notion of 'presupposition'. Over the course of the last few chapters several different attempts at formulating a sociological approach towards the presuppositions of meaningful social interaction have been discussed, all of them derived in some way from the work of Wittgenstein and/or Garfinkel. All of them, however, have been shown to be inadequate for one reason or another. Thus the approach of Blum and Mchugh in terms of grounds, seems to lead to a situation in which empirical research becomes either impossible, or at least very much secondary, because of an emphasis upon the connectedness
of all aspects of a 'form of life', conceived of as a totality. Winch's handling of the matter, on the other hand, suffers from the fact that he does not differentiate between different senses of 'rule', but sees all rules as 'thinglike', and essentially meaningful objects in the social environment. In the present chapter it has become apparent that the notion of a structure of conversational practices developed by conversational analysts to investigate this same presuppositional level, is formulated in such a way that descriptions of them tend to become so highly general that it is difficult to conceptualise how they articulate with specific interactional contexts.

What is interesting about the ways in which Garfinkel and Wittgenstein themselves approach this presuppositional level is that they both fail to specify in precise terms just exactly what it is that they are trying to say. The notion of 'form of life', for example, is not at all a clearly defined notion and its sense has to be gleaned from Wittgenstein's remarks on the clutch of issues that surround this area of concern - as he puts it "I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again: now her spectacles, now her keys." (111) Garfinkel's work, as has been seen, specifies the level of structure at which he is aiming, but performs experiments that are 'aids to the sluggish imagination' rather than clear indications of precisely what phenomena he intends to indicate. Thus although he is insistent that empirical research is crucially important, and that the structure of practices and procedures must somehow be investigated, his actual 'findings' tend to be more suggestive than substantive, with, for example, the procedures of 'etc.' 'factum valet', 'let it pass' and so on lacking the type of precision that one would need for rigorous investigation and description of social phenomena.

This lack of a clear direction in the work of the seminal thinkers is significant, I want to suggest, for two reasons. In the first place,
it is reasonable to assume that it is this that has led to the wide variations in attempts to formulate in more precise, and sociologically significant, terms just what is involved at this level of social reality. More than this, however, the lack of clear definition here can be exploited to suggest that the difficulties with the particular formulation of 'formal structures' provided by conversational analysis are the result of their taking too narrow a view of what is involved at the presuppositional level. The suggestion here is, that what is needed is some attempt to articulate conversational structures, which are taken for granted practices and procedures, with other aspects of presupposed and taken for granted background knowledge and assumptions, as that knowledge is displayed in what people do over the course of their daily round.

The result of doing this would be that a sense of particular interactional contexts would be made apparent in analyses in as much as particular presuppositional knowledge would be mobilised on particular occasions. The problem thus becomes to illustrate the interrelationships between conversational structures, as aspects of formal structures of practical actions, and a wider context of presupposed knowledge. I could not hope to give anything like a full account of this matter at the present time, but it is worth indicating just some of the directions in which such an investigation could progress.

It is important to recognize, as a preliminary, that this approach has the advantage over Goffman's attempted solution of not requiring the sociologist to move away from the presuppositional level to give an account of the 'rules' which actors are conceived to actually follow or interpret. It thus restricts the scope of analysis, and maintains a clear focus on a specific aspect of social phenomena rather than letting in the whole of social reality as relevant to the analysis. The difference here can be illustrated quite clearly if one considers the difference between the notion of 'ritual constraint' on the one hand, and that of
'preference' on the other. Where the former notion implies 'interpretation' and 'rule following', and leads towards what Garfinkel would term 'normative description', 'preference' remains firmly a term that describes the structure of conversational practices. At the same time, however, there is contained within the notion of 'preference' something of what Goffman seems to intend by 'ritual constraint'. Thus, for example, Pomerantz's description of the ways that 'second assessments' which follow on from 'self deprecations' are formulated gives a structural insight into what Goffman might term a 'ritual constraint' to the effect that it is impolite to agree with somebody who is running himself down. The description is formulated in such a way, however, that all of the overtones of 'interpretation', and of there being some sort of identifyable 'thinglike' social convention which actors are assumed to follow, is avoided. The description remains firmly tied to a particular structural level.

That said, however, the problem still remains of how precisely these further dimensions of presupposed knowledge are to be handled in a structural fashion rather than in an ad hoc way, and how they are to be seen as related to practices. Turner, for example, as has been shown above, does insist that it is necessary, as an analyst, to explicate background knowledge, (112) but the ways in which he goes about this do not appear to be structured, and consequently it becomes difficult to see how it would be possible to systematically relate analyses of conversational structures to the somewhat impressionistic insights that are given into taken for granted background knowledge. It is to this problem that I want now to turn.

In the first place, there are clues in Garfinkel's work. In spite of the fact that, in the final analysis, it is difficult to know precisely what directions Garfinkel's work suggests, his attempts to specify 'constitutive expectancies' and the features which define an object as
a member of the common sense environment seem to be aimed at precisely
the kind of problem that is at issue here. It is an attempt, in other
words, to make precise points about the characteristics of taken for
granted knowledge - the assumptions underlying it - which can then be
seen as articulated with the practices and procedures which members of
a society use in the maintenance of social order. The ways in which
these two aspects of the presuppositional sphere interrelate is
illustrated, in empirical terms, in studies such as that of Agnes, (113)
which looks at the ways in which Agnes was able to pass as a female -
how she learnt to act like a female in spite of having been born male
- whilst at the same time illustrating that she had to bring into play
a considerable amount of knowledge about, for example, sex roles, in order
to bring off her own role successfully. Such work, however, whilst
suggestive, by no means provides a solution to the problem.

A second line of approach is suggested by the notion of a
'membership categorization device', which does incorporate a sense of taken
for granted knowledge of what is the case. Thus to investigate the
categories that are used to describe the social world, is simultaneously
to investigate something of what it is that people take for granted about
it. The relationship between 'babies' and 'mothers', for example, is a
case in point here, as is the relationship between 'crying' as a
category bound activity, and 'baby' on the one hand and 'man' on the
other, where 'everyone knows' that 'men' don't cry, but 'babies' do.
Presuppositional knowledge about what is the case in the world is displayed
in the ways in which categorization devices are used - i.e. 'norms', in
the revised sense that Sacks gives to that term, become apparent. (114)
At the same time, however, it is difficult at the present moment to see
how membership categorization devices could be handled with any precision,
or could be made to yield to precise structural analysis. It is perhaps
for this reason that Sacks abandoned the term.
Thirdly, the type of analysis that Zimmerman and West have done on the number of 'interruptions' in same sex and opposite sex conversations do give a sense of particular, taken for granted knowledge, being used in specific interactional settings. The fact that in cross sex conversations there were more interruptions than in same sex conversations, and that these were mostly done by men, suggests something about what we 'know' about the relationship between sexes. A sense that, perhaps, men 'know' that they have some sort of dominant position in relation to women, and this is manifest in the way they talk to them. It is the combination of this knowledge with the structure of conversational practices (in this case, their breach) that on the specific occasion provides for an 'interruption'. In other words, such interruptions are a reflection of our 'form of life'.

Fourthly, and finally, the type of analyses which Coulter undertakes, in which he investigates the ways in which concepts, such as 'knowledge' and 'belief', are used, again provides access to what it is that we 'know' at a presuppositional level. For an anthropologist to use the term 'belief' to describe some set of native customs says as much about what he 'knows' to be the case, and about what he is prepared to accept as 'fact', as it does about the native custom. The problem, once again, however, is that much work would need to be done to show the relationship between the structures of the use of such terms as they appear in language games and the structures of conversational practices, before it would be possible to generate any precise sense of the ways in which both contribute to particular interactional contexts. Nonetheless, to the extent that the ways in which such concepts are used do reflect what it is that we presuppose, it seems reasonable to assume that an investigation in this area could produce results which would be useful for the problem under review.

It has to be admitted, however, that none of these approaches provides
any final solution to the problems involved here, and much work needs to be done in this area. Nonetheless for that, if such a broader notion of presupposition could be developed, then it might become possible to produce structural descriptions that were not only highly general, but which gave a more definite sense of particular interactional contexts by including not only knowledge of 'how' to perform an action as a competent member of society, but also something of the knowledge 'that' is presupposed, as a resource, in the production and interpretation of such an action. Such an analysis must not, of course, treat such knowledge as a 'calculus', or as a structure of 'meanings' of some sort, but must instead see it as 'displayed' in what people do. Like that sense of 'rule' which is manifest in specific instances of obeying or going against a rule, it must be conceptualized as manifesting itself in the language games that people in the social world actually engage in. This presents indeed a difficult task.

Were it to be done in spite of the difficulties, then what would be produced would be a model of the presuppositions of social order and of 'meaning' in the social world which would enable sociologists to understand 'meaning' as embedded in a whole context of taken for granted practices, procedures, assumptions, knowledge and so on. Such a model could not, of course, exhaust all of the ethnographic detail of particular settings, but it could enable us to understand the mechanisms which make them possible as orderly, meaningful affairs, showing how particular practices, assumptions and knowledge were brought to bear on this occasion whilst others account for that. If all of this could be handled in a rigorous, structural fashion, then perhaps some, at least, of the mysteries of social interaction would be made available for sociology.
CHAPTER 6 - CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS


2. Coulter, 1976


4. Ibid, p.11.


6. This work was reported in a paper given at Oxford (1978).


10. Ibid, p.64.


12. Cf. Chapter 4, note 106.


24. Drew's account (1978) brings out clearly the way in which descriptive work using carefully chosen M.C.D.'s can effect considerably the ways in which the described event is "heard" to have happened.


31. As I mentioned above, work is now going on into the place of gestures in conversation. This is still, however, a largely unexplored area.

33. Ibid, p.703.
34. Ibid, p.704.
37. Ibid, p.238.
39. Cf. Heritage, 1978, (b) for some further reflections on this in relation to news interviews.

43. Ibid, p.110.
46. Ibid, p.258.
47. Ibid, p.262.
48. Sacks, 1974, (b), and 1978.
49. Sacks, 1974, (d).
50. Moerman, 1972, p.205.
57. Ibid, p.viii.
59. Ibid, p.66.
60. Ibid, p.66.
61. Ibid, p.70.
63. Ibid, p.92.
64. Ibid, p.104.
65. Pomerantz gives a whole series of examples of different types of seconds to compliments in chapter 5 of her thesis.

70. Schegloff, 1972, p.382.
73. Schegloff and Sacks, 1974, p.236.
74. Cf., for example, Heap and Roth, 1973.
75. This is what is meant by ethnomethodological indifference. It is not a claim to be able to gain direct access to social phenomena independently of theory (cf. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1969).
76. Schegloff puts this point well when he writes that "the path from linguistic questions to interactional ones (is) not a straight line" - Schegloff, 1977.
77. Turner, 1974, p.204-5.
78. Ibid, p.206.
82. Ibid, p.211.
83. Ibid, p.211.
84. Ibid, p.212.
86. Cf., for example, Turner's (1977) review of Wootton (1975) where Turner is quite happy to assimilate his own enterprise with ethnography.
87. See, for example, Turner, 1974, p.205.
88. Schegloff points out the same difficulty in a different fashion (1977).
90. Turner, 1974, p.204-5.
91. See the remarks by Sacks and Hill and Crittenden (eds.), 1968, pp. 41-42.
92. Recent work (Drew and Attkinson (in press), Heritage (1978), Drew (1978) for example) has investigated such areas as court rooms and news broadcasters, in the light of the structural findings of conversational analysis.
93. Goffman, 1976. This paper by Goffman seems somewhat ambiguous in its evaluation of conversational analysis. It both criticizes it, and calls for more investigations of the type it undertakes. My remarks on it here are therefore somewhat tentative since I am not entirely sure precisely where to aim them.
95. Ibid, p.290.
96. Ibid, p.290.
99. The work by Sacks and Schegloff reported above, on the opening and closing of conversations, was all carried out on telephone conversations.
100. Cf. Note 6 above.


103. Ibid, p.266.


109. Cf. note 102, above.

110. Ibid, p.304.


113. Garfinkel, 1967, Ch. 5.

114. Cf. pages 31-32 above.
It is difficult to understand the thrust of Garfinkel's work, and of ethnomethodology in general, if the presupposition which guides ones reading of it is that it represents unproblematically a continuation of the phenomenological tradition. (1) It is undoubtedly the case that Garfinkel read and was influenced by the writings of Husserl and Schutz and Gurwitch, and that these influences are visible in his work. Once one begins to look carefully at the ways in which this aspect of his intellectual heritage is worked out within his writings, however, it becomes necessary to ask whether it might not be more useful to read Garfinkel's work against a different background. The influence of Parsons and Kaufmann turns Garfinkel away from concerns with a priori essences of knowledge, or the ideal typical structure of the meaning contexts of the life world and towards a consideration of the problem of social order and the practices and procedures which enable such order in everyday life. True, the orientation towards the social world that results from the assimilation of these different positions into a single perspective does concern itself, crucially, with the level of 'presuppositions' - not of knowledge but of social order and meaningful interaction - which suggests a debt to Husserl, but then there are many ways of conceptualizing what it is that is presupposed, and Garfinkel's formulation seems to have far more in common with Wittgenstein's notion of a 'form of life' than it does with Husserl's eidetic structure of consciousness. It is for this reason that I have suggested, over the course of this thesis, that it is more useful to see what Garfinkel is attempting to do against a background provided by Wittgensteinian philosophy than to insist upon the historical link to phenomenology as the context in which to read
his work. To round off this argument I will firstly retrace the steps of the 'historical theme' of this thesis before restating the thrust of the more theoretical points that have been made, emphasising something of their importance and suggesting a few of the difficulties and unclarities which require further work.

The primary focus of Husserl's work was upon the transcendental. The phenomenological and eidetic reductions were designed to enable the meditating philosophers to enter a new realm of experience in which the presuppositions of all knowledge would be available for description.

When Schutz came to this work, his concerns were sociological and not philosophical so that he had to make adjustments which would fit it for his own purposes. Thus, over the course of his writings, he gradually came to abandon the transcendental motif altogether in favour of a purely mundane analysis of the structures of the life world. He was left, however, with difficulties that revolved round the relationship between subjectivity and the intersubjective life world - between subjective and objective meaning contexts - which he was never able, satisfactorily, to resolve. His orientation to 'meaning' is thus problematic since by conceptualizing it as somehow contained in meaning contexts - as bound up with a structure of types - he was unable to account for the contribution of 'subjectivity' towards it. Although his early work stressed the 'transcendental constitution' of meaning in the reflective glance of consciousness, his abandonment of the transcendental motif as his work progressed, cut off this line of enquiry, whilst at the same time his account of the 'we-relationship' as the fundamental datum of the life world remained unconvincing as an alternative simply because the structure of this is left largely unclarified and fails to address the problems concerning the relationship between subjective and objective meaning contexts within the 'we-relationship'. Indeed such problems could, perhaps, only have been resolved by a transcendental analysis of
intersubjectivity, which Schutz considered to be impossible.

Schutz's conceptualization of 'meaning' in terms of an objective structure of types, is broadly paralleled by the early Wittgenstein's treatment of language as a 'calculus' which somehow 'pictures' 'reality'. In both cases 'meaning' is seen as in some sense an independent phenomenon which it makes sense to investigate independently of particular occasions of its manifestation. Unlike Schutz, however, Wittgenstein comes to abandon this formulation in favour of one which insists that 'language' and 'meaning' should be conceptualized as embedded within language games and within a 'form of life'. The result of this shift of emphasis is that rather than seeing 'subjectivities' opposed to some 'objective' reality, and thus conceptualizing 'meaning' in terms of this opposition, the distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' is taken to be secondary to a 'form of life' which is a radically intersubjective sphere and the presupposition of language games, and thus of any meaningful interaction. Thus it becomes possible to see a resolution of the problems with Schutz's work in terms of a reconceptualization of the basic concepts with which he formulates his orientation towards the social world. His problems are the result of clinging to the notions of 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' which are part of his phenomenological heritage.

Garfinkel's work synthesises a number of different influences and moulds them into a perspective which is very much his own. A concern with the problem of social order he takes from Parsons, an emphasis upon rules, practices and procedures from Kaufmann, an insight into the possibility of dissolving the distinction between subject and object from Gurwitsch, notions of 'separate realities' and 'taken for granted knowledge and assumptions' stem from Schutz, and a concern with presuppositions from Husserl. Doubtless there are many more thinkers who have made some mark upon his thinking, but it is possible to see in the work
of those listed above the germ of some of his most important insights. The result of his synthesis of these ideas is a position which insists that what is fundamental about the social world is not 'subjectivities' or 'objective meaning contexts' but the structures of rules, practices, procedures and assumptions which enable social order and meaningful social interaction. Together with Wittgenstein he stresses the essential indexicality of language - that language is used within language games over the course of daily life - and that 'meaning' should be seen as an embedded phenomenon and not as something to be treated as a calculus or in terms of an objective structure of types. This emphasis suggests that the notion of presupposition which is developed over the course of his writings should be seen as having much in common with Wittgenstein's notion of a form of life, in spite of the fact that the impetus to investigate this particular level of social reality was probably triggered by his reading of phenomenology. In short, the orientation which emerges in the work of Garfinkel towards social phenomena can usefully be seen as having links with Wittgenstein's philosophical position, with the important difference that Garfinkel's work is formulated specifically to provide for the possibility of empirical investigation of the social world.

Other ethnomethodologists have taken up the task of investigating the social world in a variety of different ways which owe something to the seminal work of Garfinkel, occasionally with the explicit incorporation of insights gleaned from Wittgenstein's work. Thus Weider, for example, investigates the embeddedness of meaningful phenomena such as 'rules', Coulter and Pollner analyse the mechanisms involved in maintaining or resolving disparate perceptions of reality, Blum and McHugh unravel further dimensions of what is involved in a 'form of life' and so on. Such approaches are distinctively ethnomethodological in as much as they do aim at that level of social structure which Garfinkel indicates in
his work, and which finally becomes formulated as the 'formal structures of practical actions'. This distinctiveness can be seen by comparing the type of work done here with that of some of the Wittgensteinian philosophers of the social sciences, which differs in important respects from ethnomethodological studies, even though having something in common with them.

Probably the most productive branch of ethnomethodology is conversational analysis. By concentrating on structures of conversational practices they provide rigorous empirical descriptions of an important aspect of that level of social structure which Garfinkel's work has indicated as the presupposition of social order and of meaningful interaction. As the work progresses it is to be hoped that it will broaden the scope of its enquiry to encompass more of what is contained in Garfinkel's original notion than it has so far been able to do. To what extent this will prove to be possible, however, remains to be seen.

Whilst the tracing of historical themes of development and convergence has been a central concern of this thesis, it has not been the only one, and I want now to indicate briefly, something of the importance of the theoretical points that have emerged over the course of the discussion. The first of these concerns the problem of social order.

The problem of understanding what it is that holds society together in one that has exercised theorists over the centuries. Solutions to the problem have included some notion of a social contract, theories about the role of the state, theories about religion or a 'conscience collective', internalized norms and values, and so on. If one is, as a sociologist, to come to some understanding of what society is and of how it works, then it is difficult to see how one can fail to attempt some solution or other to the problem of social order, and how ones solution is formulated determines to a large extent the way in which one will conceptualize the relationship between members of a society and society as a whole. I have shown this above in relation to Garfinkel's
criticisms of Parsons where the latter's social actor is seen to be incapable of 'seeing through' the 'sacred norms' - he becomes, in Garfinkel's words, a 'judgemental dope'. (2)

What is most interesting about Garfinkel's account of this important matter is that it both provides for the possibility of a structural solution to the problem, whilst at the same time giving due weight to the role of members of society in the maintenance of order. It does not posit structures that have some peculiarly other worldly existence, and which somehow control what it is that members of a society do when they act, but instead formulates the structural level in terms of what it is that people do. The structures are structures of practices, and these structures enable the social world to be an orderly place. It is the fact that people do things in a certain way that both manifests social order and at the same time enables it. Thus, for example, it is the fact that the 'etc.' procedures, or the 'documentary method' are used that enables a particular setting to be orderly, and to be seen as orderly. It is the structure of such practices and procedures, together with taken for granted assumptions, that enables any setting to be an orderly affair. To put the same thing in terms of conversational structures, it is the fact that sequences such as adjacency pair sequences are used over the course of a conversation that enables the conversation to proceed in an orderly fashion, and at the same time, the structures that are describable in the conversational data are the result of the fact that people do carry on conversations in this fashion. The structural description is part of what it is that people do.

Conceptualizing social order in these terms has two important aspects. In the first place, it provides the theoretical warrant for an empirical investigation of the mechanisms involved in the organization of society at this level. It directs the sociological investigator towards a set of phenomena which it is possible to describe in a more or less rigorous
fashion, and which provide insight into the workings of the social world. By continuing to look at such practices it may be possible to uncover in a systematic fashion something of what accounts for social order without having to be satisfied with vague generalizations about social norms, or thinglike 'rules' which social actors are conceived to interpret and follow. It provides, in other words, the possibility of producing a model of the taken for granted practices that enable the orderly character of our everyday lives, and such a model would greatly clarify our understanding of social interaction and its relationship to social mechanisms.

A second important point is contained in the notion of 'bedrock' that is implicit here. What Garfinkel's formulation suggests is that the 'bedrock' of the social world should be conceived not in terms of biological properties, or the human capacity for 'rationality', or in terms of psychological factors, but in terms of social mechanisms at a particular level of social structure which is not independent of the ways in which members of a society go about their business. It is a statement, in other words, that does not demand that the sociologist must look for a solution to the problem of order in terms of some principle beyond the domain of his subject matter - the study of society - or in terms of some theoretical entity such as a 'norm' or a 'rule' that is conceived to exist over and against members of a society and which holds some unspecified status as a 'social' object. The bedrock of the social is available at the level of what people do. Thus to understand social order it is necessary to look at what people do, and not at their brains, or into their minds, or their psyches, or at the rational categories in terms of which they are conceived to act. This is not to say that investigation of social phenomena other than those indicated by Garfinkel is in some way invalid. It is, rather, to suggest that investigation of society could not be complete without taking some account,
at least, of this 'bedrock' which Garfinkel has pointed towards.

It is interesting to notice that many critics of ethnomethodology have either ignored or failed to grasp the fundamental fact that it is concerned with social order, and as a result have considered that it has nothing at all to offer a study of society. Worsley, for example, refers to ethnomethodologists as

"a new generation of sociologists, who, unlike the positivists they scorn, actually know little about society because they do not wish to know." (3)

and Mayrl has referred to ethnomethodology as "Sociology Without Society" in a recent article. (4) The problem here seems to be that the majority of sociologists already have some presupposition or other as to what it is that makes society work, whether it be power, authority, norms, values and so on, and in the light of such presuppositions it is evidently the case that ethnomethodology can, indeed, say nothing about society. The possibility that there might be important phenomena to be uncovered at the structural level at which Garfinkel directs his attention does not fit straightforwardly with the already formulated picture of what society actually is that such critics are working with, and the result is that what could be important insights into 'society' are rejected out of hand as insignificant. Many critics even go so far as to suggest that not only is the intellectual position that is espoused here wholly unacceptable, but that its proponents are themselves socially unacceptable to right thinking sociologists. Thus they are dubbed 'hippies', or accused of forming a 'cult'. (5) It seems to me, at least, that such intellectual and social exclusion of ethnomethodology and its proponents on the basis of preconceptions as to the 'true' nature of society, cannot but militate against the possibility of rational debate within the discipline as a whole, and against the development of our knowledge about social phenomena.

The second important theoretical point that I want to emphasise here concerns 'meaning' as a social phenomenon. I have suggested over
the course of this thesis that in terms of a series of indicators designed to highlight the orientation towards 'meaning' which the various theorists that have been discussed have taken up, Garfinkel and the later Wittgenstein can be seen as proponents of a fundamentally different position from that of Schutz and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. The heart of this difference lies in the fact that they treat 'meaning' as inextricably embedded within a 'form of life', or a structure of practices, procedures and assumptions, rather than as something which it makes sense to investigate in terms of an independent structure or calculus. Not only is this way of conceptualising 'meaning' different from that of Schutz, but it also stands opposed to that which the majority of sociologists hold to.

The chief advantage of treating meaning in this way is that it becomes possible to make sense out of the fact of indexical expressions, and in general of the context dependent nature of any communication. It enables one to understand Garfinkel's observation that, in a conversation, one says more than can be said in so many words. It also gives us a means of understanding the problem surrounding the 'correspondence' of concepts with 'reality' which the theory dependent nature of facts poses for a theory of knowledge, in that it suggests that the problem itself is the result of a misunderstanding concerning the nature of language and the 'meaning' of concepts. It is a problem, in other words, that stems from trying to find the 'essence' of a concept, or of looking for 'kernal' meanings, rather than recognizing that language is used, in family resemblance fashion, to make sense within language games, and that 'theories' and 'facts' should be seen in the light of this. In short, treating 'meaning' as an embedded phenomenon provides a perspective which can throw fresh light on some features of language, concepts, and theory which are very puzzling as long as one continues to think in terms of such things being somehow independent phenomena that stand
over and against, and in some relationship to, a 'real world'.

The important point here is that ethnomethodology does seem to offer a means of entry into social phenomena that takes this notion of meaning seriously. By investigating the practices and procedures within which 'meaning' is embedded - which enable meaningful interaction - in a rigorous fashion it begins to unravel just what is involved in something being 'meaningful'. It offers the possibility of producing a model which accounts for the phenomenon of meaning in the social world. By the same token, it offers the possibility of investigating some of the social mechanisms which enable one to 'understand' meaningful phenomena.

Thus, to take an example from conversational analysis, the structure of an adjacency pair sequence, with the conditional relevance of the second pair part upon the completion of the first, is a mechanism that provides that, if possible, the utterance following a question will be understood as an answer. The utterance, in other words, will be heard and understood in terms of its sequential placement within the conversation. The hope is that as investigations of such structures continue, it will be possible to build more complex models which provide significant insights into these processes of producing and understanding meaningful utterances, and of meaning in general as an embedded phenomenon.

It is interesting to notice, here, that on this point too the aims of ethnomethodology seem to have been widely misunderstood. This is reflected particularly in the mass of criticisms of ethnomethodology's 'subjectivism'. Such criticisms seem to depend, at least in part, on placing Garfinkel's work unreflectingly within the phenomenological tradition, presuming that he can be criticized as an appendage of Schutz. (6) Thus, Mayrl, for example, writes that ethnomethodology's subjects are

"essentially solitary individuals coping with definitions in a world wherein Others are relegated to the status of settings' features." (7)
Or again McSweeney suggests that there is an
"extreme subjectivism which is largely implicit in the
work of Garfinkel and Sacks, and finds expression in
varying degrees of explicitness in other writings." (8)

And again Bauman writes that
"ethnomethodology shares some of the most pernicious
difficulties of the early existentialism. Having located
the only admissible foundation of the social world in the
field of the subjective, ethnomethodology must face, on
the cognitive plane, the same insoluble dilemma which
crucified early existentialism on the moral one." (9)

Such remarks miss the mark, once again, because it is presupposed that
the only possible way to conceptualise knowledge is in terms of
subjectivities opposed to a 'real world' which they have, somehow, to
grasp. Thus, since there is no apparent tendency towards realism or
positivism in ethnomethodological writings, then it must be the case that
they are subjectivistic. The point is, however, that what both Garfinkel
and Wittgenstein seem to be attempting to do is to radically reconceptualise
the nature of theory, knowledge, meaning and the rest. They are claiming
that what must be accepted, the given so to speak, is a form of life, or
a set of practices - what people do - and this is not at all a
subjectivistic formulation. Ethnomethodology is not concerned with
'subjective meanings' in any sense at all, but with meaning as embedded
within what we do over the course of our daily lives. To realise this
is to begin to grasp the importance of Garfinkel's work and of those
who have used it as a resource.

One final theoretical point is in order at this juncture concerning
'relativism'. The danger with conceiving of 'meaning' as embedded within
a form of life is that it becomes difficult to account for communication
between different cultures, since it seems natural to equate 'form of
life' with 'culture'. If different cultures have different customs and
different ways of going about things, and given that 'meaning' is
dependent upon what it is that people do, then it would seem that what
is meaningful in one culture would not be understandable in another because
the context which gives it its sense would be missing. Thus how it is possible for anthropologists, missionaries or travellers to communicate with members of another culture which is very different from their own becomes something mysterious.

What is interesting about ethnomethodology, and particularly I am thinking here of conversational analysis, is that the approach it takes to 'meaning' enables the problem to be treated as an empirical one. It becomes possible to suggest that at the bedrock level at which their analyses are directed it is similarities between the practices and procedures which members of different cultures use in making sense to one another that accounts for the possibility of cross cultural communication, and by the same token, that it is dissimilarities that account for some of the difficulties. Such differences and similarities can be studied and described, and could well provide considerable insight into what is an important area.

With these remarks on relativism I come to the end of this summary of the theoretical themes of this thesis. I do not want to claim that any of the issues that have been raised have somehow been settled once and for all, or that a definitive perspective on the social world is provided by ethnomethodology. Although it does seem to me that the position I have tried to outline over the course of this thesis does have merit, and can throw considerable fresh light into some of the murky corners of the social world, it should be remembered that it is still very much work in progress that is struggling to put flesh onto what could well be proved to be important insights.

The difficulties which I pointed out at the end of the previous chapter on conversational analysis are the type of problem that has to be faced, where the difficulty is one of clarifying precisely what is involved at the particular structural level that is being analysed and described. In Garfinkel's work, for example, the precise structural
relationships between assumptions, practices and procedures, rules and taken for granted knowledge need to be examined and specified, whilst in conversational analysis the same difficulty takes the shape of a need to articulate conversational practices with broader aspects of taken for granted knowledge at the presuppositional level. There seems, however, to be no a priori reason why this should not be a possible task, and one that, if undertaken, could provide a clearer formulation of the purpose and subject matter of the ethnomethodological enterprise than is currently available.

Another area of problems concerns the precise sense of the distinction between normative and literal description. It is clear that this is a distinction to be made within the sociological language game itself, and that it is not to be paralleled to the difference between a neutral observation language and theory laden facts. It would seem, also, that there is an important distinction to be made here - for example there does seem to be a difference between the moral description of an action (perhaps 'losing ones temper') and the non-moral describing of some aspect of the purely physical world (perhaps a 'brick wall'). The descriptions that can be given of conversational practices seem to come part way between these two, in as much as the analyst needs to be able to identify particular actions - for example, 'asking a question' - in the first instance, but then goes on to describe what happens in non-moral terms - as a 'first pair part'. The problem concerns, I suspect, the relationship between common sense and sociological knowledge and interests in the subject matter, and this is a difficult question indeed for any form of sociology. Once again, however, there seems to be no reason why such relationships could not be clarified and a coherent account of the matter provided which specified "the conditions under which literal observation and documentary work necessarily occur". (10)

Although there are, undoubtedly, problems that must be faced, and
although it is possible that the solution to some of these may, in time, transform the whole nature of the ethnomethodological enterprise, it is not enough to consequently discard the entire ethnomethodological corpus as inadequate. There is no sociological position that is without difficulties, and if sociological research and thinking over the years have shown nothing else, they have certainly provided ample evidence of the complexity of society and its peculiar resistance to satisfactory systematic investigation. What ethnomethodology offers to the body of sociological knowledge is a perspective upon a certain level of social structure concerned with the practices and procedures which enable social order, which provide for the possibility of meaningful interaction, and within which 'meaning' is embedded. Should it prove possible to construct models of this level of social structure then our knowledge of society would be greatly advanced. It would become possible to grasp something of what is involved in 'understanding', 'meaning', 'communication', 'intersubjectivity', and so on, from an entirely fresh perspective that could cast light into some of the more murky corners of such phenomena. In short, there is much of promise in the corpus of ethnomethodological writings that ought to be exploited in the interest of furthering understanding of society.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

1. Pivcevic, 1972, argues convincingly that a genuinely phenomenological sociology is an impossibility.


6. One example of this tendency is furnished by Baumann, 1978, Chapter 8, which lumps together Schutz, Garfinkel, Blum and McHugh, Cicourel and Wittgenstein without giving any indication that there might be differences between them.


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