Imperfect competition and efficiency in lemons markets
Muthoo, Abhinay and Mutuswami, Suresh (2010) Imperfect competition and efficiency in lemons markets. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics. (Warwick economics research paper series (TWERPS)).
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This paper studies the impact of competition on the degree of inefficiency in lemons markets. More precisely, we characterize the second-best mechanism (i.e., the optimal mechanism with private information) in a stylized lemons market with finite numbers of buyers and sellers. We then study the relationship between the degree of efficiency of the second-best mechanism and market competitiveness. The relationship between the first-best and second-best mechanisms is also explored.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Information asymmetry, Competition, Imperfect, Commerce|
|Series Name:||Warwick economics research paper series (TWERPS)|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
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