Leech, Dennis and Leech, Robert, Dr. (2009) Reforming IMF and World Bank governance : in search of simplicity, transparency and democratic legitimacy in the voting rules. Working Paper. Economics Department, University of Warwick: University of Warwick. (The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)).

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Abstract

We discuss the reform of the voting rules at the heart of the governance of the IMF and World Bank (the BWIs) in terms of three principles that we suggest ought to be fundamental: simplicity, transparency and democratic legitimacy. By simplicity we mean that the rules should make sense in terms of the purposes of the BWI and be easy to understand. By transparency we mean that the rules mean what they appear to mean in the sense of leading to the same distribution of voting power as the institution's designers intended. We show using voting power analysis that the inequality in the distribution of voting power among countries is greater than that of their voting weight. By democratic legitimacy, we consider whether we can reconcile weighted voting with democracy. Our conclusion is that the voting rules as they currently exist are far from satisfying any of these criteria and that recent reform proposals do not lead us to change this conclusion.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Election law, International Monetary Fund -- Elections, World Bank -- Elections
Series Name:	The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
Publisher:	University of Warwick
Place of Publication:	Economics Department, University of Warwick
Date:	2009
Volume:	Vol.2009
Number:	No.914
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Leverhulme Trust (LT)
Grant number:	F/07 004/AJ (Leverhulme)
References:	Banzhaf, J.F. 1964. Weighted voting doesn't work: A mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review, 19, 317. Beisbart, C., Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S. 2005. A utilitarian assessment of alternative decision rules in the Council of Ministers. European Union Politics, 6(4), 395. Bini Smaghi, L. 2004. A single EU seat in the IMF. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(2), 229-248. Buira, Ariel. 2003. Challenges to the IMF and World Bank: Developing Country Perspec- tives. London: Anthem Press. Buira, Ariel. 2005. Reforming the governance of the IMF and World Bank. London: Anthem Press. Felsenthal, Dan, & Machover, Moshe. 1998. The Measurement of Voting Power. Chel- tenham: Edward Elgar. Felsenthal, D.S., & Machover, M. 2001. The Treaty of Nice and quali�ed majority voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 18(3), 431-464. Felsenthal, D.S., & Machover, M. 2003. Analysis of QM rules in the Draft Constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention. Social Choice and Welfare, 23(1), 1-20. IMF. 2008 (March). Reform of Quota and Voice in the International Monetary Fund| Report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors. Tech. rept. International Monetary Fund. Leech, Dennis. 2002a. Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union. Public Choice, 113(3), 437-464. 25 Leech, Dennis. 2002b. Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund. Annals of Operations Research, 109, 373-95. Leech, Dennis, & Aziz, Haris. 2009. The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union: An Appraisal using Voting Power Analysis. In: S lomczynski, Wojciech, & Zyczkowski, Karol (eds), The Distribution of Voting Power in the EU. Ashgate. Leech, Dennis, & Leech, Robert. 2006. Voting Power in the BrettonWoods Institutions. In: Paloni, Alberto, & Zanardi, Maurizio (eds), The IMF, World Bank and Policy Reform. Routledge. Mikesell, Raymond F. 1994. The Bretton Woods Debates: A Memoir. Essays in Interna- tional Finance. Penrose, Lionel S. 1946. The elementary statistics of majority voting. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 109, 53-7.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/3555

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