CONQUEST AND COLONIZATION IN
THE COLOMBIAN CHOCO, 1510-1740

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During the eighteenth century, the Chocó became an area of great importance to the Viceroyalty of New Granada. The region’s sources of precious metal not only contributed to the economic recovery of the neighbouring cities of the Cauca Valley, but also enriched immensely the individual owners of the Chocó’s mines and slaves gangs, the merchants who traded with them, and the royal officials and priests who served there.

Despite the region’s economic importance, it remained badly underdeveloped: a combination of climate and terrain discouraged Spanish settlement. While Spaniards were not attracted to the Chocó for the purpose of settlement, slaves were nevertheless introduced in large numbers to exploit its gold deposits, and these were supported by the labour of the region’s native inhabitants.

This thesis will show, however, that it took the Spaniards nearly 300 years effectively to bring the Chocó under Crown control. Although the region had been known since the earliest days of conquest - Balboa, Almagro, and Pizarro had been among the first to explore the area - Indian resistance prevented the Spaniards from establishing a firm and lasting foothold in Indian territory until the 1660s. By the 1670s, a Franciscan mission had been established for the purpose of converting the Indians of the Chocó to the Christian Faith.

Even at this stage, however, Spanish control was far from secure. By the 1680s, one of the Indian groups inhabiting the region - the Citará - had rebelled against the colonists and their increasing demands, and massacred as many Spaniards as they were able to surprise.

It was the defeat of the rebel leaders which marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Chocó peoples. After the region had been finally pacified, Spaniards began to settle the area in growing numbers, the size of the slave population grew at a rapid rate, and the exploitation of gold deposits began in earnest.

But while the Spaniards had undoubtedly established control of the native peoples by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the latter continued to resist both resettlement and conversion by fleeing from their settlements and refusing to accept the teaching of Christian Doctrine. Their continuing resistance was facilitated by the ineffective methods of administration introduced in the Chocó, controlled by corrupt tenientes, corregidores, secular priests, and Franciscan missionaries.

These are the main themes that will be taken up in this study.
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INTRODUCTION

The area which now constitutes the Departamento of the Chocó is situated in the northwest corner of Colombia. On the north, it borders with Panama and the Gulf of Darién; on the south, with the Departamento del Valle. The region is separated from the interior by the Cordillera Occidental, and from the sea by the Serranía de Baudó. Two great rivers - the Atrato and the San Juan - cut through the centre of the Chocó, providing direct communication with the Caribbean and the Pacific. The region is characterized by a hot, humid climate, by heavy rainfall, and by a cover of dense tropical rain forest. Human habitation is generally limited to the banks of the hundreds of rivers that run through the forest, and that provide routes of travel from one end of the region to the other.\(^1\) In the 1820s, Gaspar Mollien observed that the Chocó contained so many rivers that "In fifteen days ... one may go [by river] from one extremity of the province to the other, or from Escuande [Iscuandé], to the mouth of the Atrato".\(^2\)


Many historians of Colombia's colonial period have recognised that, during the eighteenth century, the Chocó became an area of considerable importance to the Viceroyalty. Over the course of the century, the Chocó's gold mines contributed to the recovery of the economies of the neighbouring cities of the Cauca Valley and, consequently, to the fortunes of the New Kingdom as a whole. Yet despite its importance, the region remained very underdeveloped - the conquest of the native peoples of this area did not lead to large-scale Spanish settlement and the consequent transfer of Spanish political, cultural, and religious institutions. The region's underdevelopment is also reflected in the literature. Although in recent years interest in the Chocó's population has increased, it has focused mainly on the peoples who inhabit the region today.  

There are, however, some important exceptions to this general rule. William Sharp, the only historian ever to have written a full-length history of the Chocó, focused his attention on the eighteenth century. Sharp analysed the

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3 See, for example, Anthony McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, with special reference to overseas trade, 1739-1810" (PhD, University of London, 1977); German Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, 1537-1719 (Medellín, 1975); Cali: terratenientes, mineros y comerciantes. Siglo XVIII (Cali, 1975); and his Historia Económica y Social de Colombia. Tomo II. Popayán: una sociedad esclavista, 1680-1800 (Bogotá, 1979).

4 See the Conclusion of this thesis.

5 Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier.
development of a mining economy in the region, and examined the labour system employed by the Spaniards to exploit its gold deposits. Though undoubtedly a major contribution to the historiography of the region, Sharp was unable to provide an accurate account of the sixteenth and seventeenth century context. The shortage of serious studies of both the region’s pre-conquest population, and of the process whereby the native peoples of the Chocó were effectively conquered by the Spaniards in the seventeenth century, meant that Sharp’s section on the pre-eighteenth century period was beset with inaccuracies.

However, although it is true that very little work has been done on the region’s early history, there are, again, some important exceptions. The most notable, for the sixteenth century, are the studies of Kathleen Romoly, Robert Cushman Murphy, and S. Henry Wassen.\(^6\) The most useful studies on the seventeenth century - the period that has received the least attention from historians - are the

contributions of Sven-Erik Isacsson. Further contributions to the Chocó’s sixteenth and seventeenth century history have been made by Robert West and Patricia Vargas Sarmiento. All of these have been used extensively in the first three chapters of this thesis.

Murphy, Wassen, and Romoly based their work on a careful study of the writings of the early chroniclers, other sixteenth century documents contained in Spanish and Colombian archives, and a thorough first-hand knowledge of the region’s geography. These studies, as well as those of Isacsson, are particularly valuable, not only because they have increased substantially our knowledge of the Chocó’s native peoples, of the territories they inhabited, and of early Spanish-Indian contacts in Colombia’s Pacific lowlands, but also because they show very clearly that the situation of the Indian in the Chocó in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was significantly different from that of his eighteenth and early nineteenth century counterpart.

The point is an important one, because the picture presented by late eighteenth and early nineteenth century observers of the Indians of the Chocó is one of docility,

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mildness, and even cowardice. The Frenchman Gaspar Mollien, for instance, who travelled through Colombia in the early 1820s, paid some attention to the Indian population of the region, and remarked that the peoples of the Chocó were "very miserable". "Though very mild", he noted, the Indians were "little better than savages". They were "not brave", and had a tendency to "fly into the woods if a stranger enters their village", while the women "weep and hide their faces with their hands, when spoken to". This interpretation of the "mild" nature of the region's indigenous people is echoed in some of the reports of Spaniards travelling through the region towards the end of the eighteenth century. Don Juan Jiménez Donoso, for instance, observed in a report of November, 1780, that unlike the Indians of Río de la Hacha and Darién, the behaviour and form of expression of the Chocó Indians was "docile", "simple", and lacking in ambition. Indeed, were it not for their tendency to drink heavily, nothing more could be asked of them.

When we read these eighteenth century observations, and compare them with the accounts of historians and anthropologists who have worked on the sixteenth century,
and even with what little work that has been done on the
seventeenth, it becomes clear that the situation of the
Indian in the Chocó changed dramatically between the
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. For the sources
indicate that, at least until the end of the seventeenth
century, the Indians had been remarkably successful in
violently resisting Spanish penetrations of their land.
Relations between Indians and the few Spaniards who
attempted to set up operations in the Chocó from the mid-
seventeenth century onwards were very fluid, and the
position of the latter in the former’s territory was far
from secure. However, this thesis will show that, even
after Spanish control had effectively been established at
the end of the seventeenth century, Indian resistance to
Spanish occupation continued, albeit in a passive form.

Several years ago, Alastair Hennessy drew attention to
the fact that the experience of Spanish colonization in
frontier regions of empire differed markedly from that in
the core areas. He noted that

"The easy conquest of the Aztec and Inca empires
gives a misleading picture of the powers of
resistance of Amerindians to Spanish rule.
Miscegenation encouraged the view that there was
no Indian problem which hispanization and
christianization could not cure ... It is often
forgotten how long some of these Indians
resisted."\(^{12}\)

On the basis of the experience of Spaniards in regions
as far apart as northern Mexico and southern Chile,
Hennessy also drew attention to the differences between the

\(^{12}\) Alastair Hennessy, The Frontier in Latin American
many different types of frontier colonization in Latin America. Since then, many historians, apart from Sharp, have focused their efforts on the frontier regions of the empire. Our purpose is not to point to the similarities and differences between the Chocó and other areas, except where comparison serves to highlight a particular characteristic of Spanish colonization in the Chocó, but to provide another case study of Spanish colonization in the Americas.

Accordingly, this thesis will focus on the following main themes. Chapter 1 provides a brief outline of early Spanish exploration of the region, conducted up the Atrato from the Gulf of Darién, down the Pacific from Panama, and, from about the mid-sixteenth century, from the New Granadan interior. The chapter will show that all early Spanish efforts to penetrate Chocó territory and conquer its indigenous population met with failure. It was not until the 1570s, thanks to the cooperation offered by two of the region's Indian groups, that the Spaniards were able to found a Spanish settlement in Chocó territory. The chapter ends by discussing why these successes, too, were

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13 Ibid., pp.54-109. From an anthropological point of view, Elman R. Service also provided a theoretical framework for understanding the reasons why the native peoples of some parts of the empire were able to retain their Indian identity, while those in other parts of the empire lost theirs completely.

14 See, for example, the cases of the Llanos of Colombia and of seventeenth century Chile: Jane M. Rausch, A Tropical Plains Frontier: The Llanos of Colombia, 1531-1831 (Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1984), and Fernando Casanueva, "La evangelización periférica en Chile, 1667-1796", Nueva Historia, Año 2 (1985), pp.3-30.
temporary, and why later attempts at conquest, undertaken towards the end of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, proved equally unsuccessful.

Chapter 2 focuses on seventeenth century penetrations of the region. It examines the combination of factors—a drastic fall in Indian numbers, a change of tactics on the part of the Spaniards, and the threat of a possible alliance between these and the Noanama Indians—which enabled a small number of royal officials, miners, slaves, and missionaries to settle in the area after the mid-seventeenth century. We will also consider why, despite a growing Spanish presence in Chocó territory, the colonists were unable to make any progress in relocating or "reducing" the dispersed Indian population into permanent settlements. We will see that, as Iscasson pointed out,

"the Spanish Crown, in introducing its Indian policy in the Chocó, followed the norms elaborated during a century and more among the Andean cultures. This system presupposed [the existence of] some form of social stratification and political organization that could be used to the Spaniards' own advantage. However, it appears that we have, in the Chocó, a special case, where the conditions [necessary] for the introduction of this system did not exist."

In a similar vein, Chapter 3 looks at the establishment of a Franciscan mission in the Chocó in 1673, and at the friars' attempts to congregate the population into settlements, where the teaching of Christian Doctrine was to take place. This chapter will consider why these efforts also met with failure, and the circumstances that

15 Isacsson, "Emberá", p.25.
led some of the missionaries, within a very short period of time, to conclude that no progress would be made among the Chocó Indians until force or some form of physical punishment was applied, and others to abandon the mission altogether.

Chapter 4 focuses specifically on an entrada (expedition of entry) carried out, in 1676, by the former governor of Antioquia, Juan Bueso de Valdés. This entrada was a response to continuing reports of difficulties from Franciscan missionaries, Spanish miners, and other residents in the area. Bueso de Valdés directed his efforts on this occasion at taking measures to ensure that the labours and lifestyles of the Chocó’s indigenous population served the interests of the region’s Spanish miners. In the short term, at least, this entrada scored some successes.

Chapter 5, however, will look at the conflict which arose in 1680-81, as a direct result of the increasing demands that were made on the Indian population after the Bueso de Valdés entrada. It will also consider why, despite the implementation of measures designed to alleviate the Indians’ most immediate grievances, a major rebellion arose just three years later.

Although the pacification of the Chocó peoples after the 1684 rebellion marked a turning point for its Indian population, in the sense that no further rebellions were to occur, Chapter 6 will show that in fact, Indian resistance did not end with the Indians’ defeat. The native peoples of the region adopted a new and effective way of resisting the
Spanish colonists. Throughout the eighteenth century, hundreds of Indians repeatedly abandoned their towns to found alternative communities, or cimarronas, beyond the reach of the Spaniards.

Indian resistance to Spanish occupation took another form as well. Chapter 7 examines the reasons for the failure of nearly a century of Franciscan missionary activity among the Chocó’s indigenous population. It also examines the record of the ever-increasing number of secular clerics serving in the Chocó, and at the conflict which developed between regular and secular clergy, which paved the way for the eventual secularization of the region’s parishes.

Although the issue of Indian resistance runs through all seven chapters, linking these together, other themes are also developed in this study. We will see, for instance, that it was economic considerations in the neighbouring regions of Antioquia and Popayán that promoted repeated attempts at conquest of the Chocó. The clearest manifestation of this can be seen in the fact that the most important drives to penetrate Chocó territory coincided almost exactly with the periods of low productivity in the mining economies of the neighbouring gobernaciones. The demands placed by the Spaniards on the Indian population were intended to facilitate the task of the miners, which in turn was intended to resolve the effects of crises in the mining economies of neighbouring regions.
This thesis also examines the manner in which government developed in this frontier region, tracing the emergence of the system of administration set up by the Spaniards in the Chocó. Chapters 2 to 5 pay some attention to the extent to which Crown policy determined the way in which the region was administered in the second half of the seventeenth century. Chapters 6 and 7 examine closely the systems of civil and ecclesiastical administration of the Chocó in the first four decades of the eighteenth century, and at the reasons why early attempts to reform the most inefficient and corrupt aspects of this administration were unsuccessful.
MAP 1

NEW GRANADA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

CHAPTER 1
EARLY SPANISH EXPLORATIONS
IN THE CHOCO

Carl Sauer's pioneering study of early Spanish activity in the Caribbean and on the northern coast of South America shows that the region lying to the north of the Chocó had in fact been known since the earliest days of conquest: the Gulf of Urabá (Darién) was an area of interest to the Spaniards as early as the first decade of the sixteenth century. The works of other historians, geographers, and ethnographers working on this region of the empire show that, by the 1520s, explorations were being carried out down the Pacific coast of the Chocó, the scene of early contacts between the Indians of the region and Spanish explorers such as Diego de Almagro, Francisco Pizarro, and Pascual de Andagoya, among others. By the 1540s, the region had also become an area of interest to

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1 When the term Chocó was used for the first time, in 1540, it referred to a tribal region - the Province of Chocó, inhabited by Chocó Indians - situated between the headwaters of the San Juan and Atrato rivers, to the west of the district of Anserma, from which it was separated by the Province of Sima. When, 26 or 28 years later, the inhabitants of Anserma sought to claim the credit for discovering the Chocó, the name began to be used to refer to the entire region lying between Buenaventura and the Isthmus. See Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.12. For some theories on the origin of the word Chocó, see ibid., p.12; Wassen, "Etnohistoria chocoana", pp.10-12; and Wassen, "Apuntes Etnohistóricos", pp.5-8.
the Spaniards' who had successfully established themselves in the New Granadan interior. However, despite numerous attempts to penetrate and conquer the Chocó region, known from the very beginning of the conquest period to contain immensely rich sources of gold, the Spaniards were not even partially successful in establishing a foothold in Chocó territory until the 1570s. Indeed, even these successes proved to be short-lived. By the 1590s, the Chocó had again been abandoned.

Seventeenth century expeditions to the area were conducted principally from Antioquia and other bases in the Cauca Valley region. In the first decade of the century, Spanish efforts were directed primarily towards the regions which came to be known as the provinces of Barbacoas, Iscuandé, and Raposo, all of which lie to the south of the area covered by this study. By the 1620s, however, the Spaniards again turned their attention to the Chocó. Several expeditions were undertaken — some of them unsuccessful — which eventually resulted in the pacification of the Noanama groups of the San Juan river, and, by the 1660s, of the Indian groups inhabiting the headwaters of the San Juan and Atrato rivers, and the eastern tributaries of the Atrato as far north as the Arquía river.

The purpose of this introductory chapter is to examine the earliest Spanish expeditions to Chocó territory from all three directions. It will focus, first, on explorations conducted from the Gulf of Urabá (Darién) and
down the Pacific coast from Panama; and secondly on the Spanish advance into the New Granadan interior, which fuelled a further wave of exploration of the Chocó. We will then proceed to consider why, despite both the heavy mortality registered during Spanish penetrations of Chocó territory, and the known aggression and bellicosity of the region’s native population, the Spaniards continued to attempt their conquest. We will also examine the reasons for the initial success, and subsequent failure, of the first Spanish settlements established in the region, and at the reasons behind the last wave of explorations, begun in the 1620s. Although many references to the Indian population of the region will be scattered throughout the text, this chapter will not join the debate about the early inhabitants of the Chocó region, or about the origins of the term "Chocó" and its early uses, or indeed, about the conflicting and sometimes erroneous interpretations regarding which Indian tribes inhabited which stretch of territory during this period, except to indicate the regions and Indian groups about which there is still some discussion. Our principal purpose will be to provide a chronological outline of Spanish penetrations into Chocó territory, and to place these within the context of the Spanish advance to Panama, Peru, and interior New Granada. The crucial point for us is to link the Spaniards’ eventual occupation of the Chocó with the development of the New Granadan economy during the colonial period. For it was the problems associated with the colony’s mining economy
which fuelled repeated Spanish expeditions to the area, determined the way in which Spanish-Indian relations were to be conducted there, promoted the importation of African slaves on a massive scale, and eventually shaped the development of the region throughout the remainder of the colonial period and beyond.

**Early Spanish Reconnaissance**

The Gulf of Urabá (Darién) witnessed considerable Spanish activity throughout the first decade of the sixteenth century. The first Spanish contacts with the Indians of the area were made in 1501 by the Rodrigo de Bastidas and Juan de la Cosa expedition, undertaken under a license granted by the future bishop of Seville, Juan Rodríguez de Fonseca. Fonseca was, as Sauer explains, the "untitled minister of colonies", with responsibility for the Indies and their profit to the Crown. In 1499, as part of his attempt to limit Columbus' claims on the mainland, and to constrain Portuguese and English activities in that area, he began issuing licenses for expeditions of trade and exploration.  

Following rumours of a land of gold, pearls, and gems heard by Juan de la Cosa on a voyage made to the Guajira Peninsula with Alonso de Hojeda in 1499, this expedition

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explored the Colombian coast, reached the harbour of Cartagena, possibly came into contact with the Sinú peoples, and finally arrived at the Gulf of Urabá. In 1501, Bastidas and Cosa appear to have had only peaceful relations with the native inhabitants, but because they had discovered gold objects in the area, the next expedition undertaken by Cosa, in 1504, sacked and looted the Indian settlements of Urabá, and of Darién, situated on the opposite side of the Gulf. These attacks were justified by the Queen's order of 1503 permitting the capture of "Cannibals" who resisted the Spaniards and refused to be taught the Faith.

Despite these early Spanish contacts with the Indian inhabitants of the region, no firm attempt at colonization was made in the Gulf area until 1510. Further Spanish activity there followed a conference held by Ferdinand at Burgos in 1508, which made two territorial concessions to the east and west of the Gulf of Urabá. The region to the west was granted to Diego de Nicuesa, while the eastern section was granted to Alonso de Hojeda, with Cosa as second in command. According to Sauer, because the existence of gold in the vicinity had already been

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4 This expedition had previously ravaged Indian settlements along the coast to the east of the Gulf of Urabá. Ibid., pp.118, 161-164. See also Melo, Historia de Colombia, p.33.

5 Cosa was killed, however, at Cartagena, before arriving at Urabá. Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.166, 168-170.
established, the main purpose of the establishment of these settlements was to obtain gold, rather than to colonize. Nicuesa’s attempt proved to be a complete disaster: the expedition broke up into three parts and suffered heavy losses. Hojeda managed to build a fort and settlement - San Sebastián de Urabá - but food shortages and attack by the Urabá Indians whom the party had repeatedly raided, led to the settlement being abandoned. However, as a result of these abortive attempts, the town of Santa María la Antigua del Darién was established, in 1510, by survivors of the two expeditions. Relations between Spaniards and Indians in the region of Santa María la Antigua appear to have been peaceful at this stage, thus providing a base from which other explorations could be undertaken.

By April 1511, Vasco Núñez de Balboa had become the leader of the new Spanish community at Darién. In the three years that followed, Balboa - who became an extremely effective leader and explorer - established peaceful alliances with a number of Indian provinces situated to the northwest of the town of Santa María. Besides furnishing

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6 For an account of Hojeda’s short-lived settlement at San Sebastián de Urabá, and Nicuesa’s disastrous activities on the Central American coast, see ibid., pp.172-173, 175-176, and 218-219.

7 For an account of the Spanish transfer to the Indian town of Darién, see ibid., pp.173-175, 219. By July 1515, a bishopric had been created, with Santa María la Antigua de Darién as its base. By royal cédula of that month, Santa María was also granted the same privileges enjoyed by cities in the Kingdoms of Spain. See Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.1-4.

8 The following account is based on Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.218-237.
considerable amounts of gold, in the form of ornaments, these alliances with native provinces provided Balboa with the information, supplies, and guides necessary to carry out the crossing of the Isthmus, in 1513. Always searching for the source of the gold possessed by the Indians of the surrounding area, apparently processed and traded by the immensely rich cacique of the land of Dabeiba, in 1512 Balboa set out from Santa María to explore the region that lay to the south of the Gulf of Urabá. Balboa’s objective took him up the Atrato river — which cuts through the Chocó and empties into the Gulf of Urabá — to the point where either the River Murri or the River Arquía meet the Atrato, and possibly even as far as the vicinity of Quibdó, described at the time as the country of the "cannibals".⁹

Two further attempts were made to locate Dabeiba up the Atrato river in 1515 — this time during Pedrarias Dávila’s disastrous tenure as captain general and governor of Castilla del Oro, the name given by the King, in 1513, to the region previously under Balboa’s control. Balboa, who carried out the first of these expeditions, claimed to have reached the land of Dabeiba and to have ascertained that the source of the gold produced in Dabeiba lay at a distance of 10 days’ travel into the interior. Food shortages forced the party — which had also suffered attack

⁹ Sauer believed that the gold mining region of Buriticá was the source of the gold. See ibid., pp.222-223, and 225-229, but especially, p.228. For a seventeenth century account of some early Spanish activities in the Chocó area, see Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.83-90.
from Indians along the Atrato - to return to Darién. The second attempt was made by a businessman from Santa María, Juan de Tavira, but again the Spaniards were repulsed by Indians who were said to have blocked their route along the Atrato with canoes. Tavira and many others were drowned and the remainder of the party - under the leadership of Francisco Pizarro - returned to Darién.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{Precolombian Peoples of the Northern Chocó Region}

The identity of the Indian groups which resided along the Atrato river - especially those closest to the Gulf of Urabá - at the time the Spaniards carried out their first explorations in the area from the Gulf of Urabá is not entirely clear. Carl Sauer suggested that the Atrato basin was occupied primarily by cacicazgos of Cuevan character, kinship and speech. According to Sauer, these Cueva peoples, like their Cuevan neighbours to the north of the Gulf, disappeared during the sixteenth century due to both raids from Darién and to Spanish expeditions entering the region from the Colombian Caribbean coast and the interior. In a similar vein, Trimborn asserted that the Cueva inhabited a region stretching eastward from the Atrato

\textsuperscript{10} Sauer, \textit{The Spanish Main}, pp.258-259. With the exception of Veragua - still being claimed by the heirs of Columbus - Pedrarias Dávila was granted complete freedom of movement in the region. For an account of Spanish activities in Castilla del Oro, previously called Andalucía la Nueva, see ibid., pp.247-265, and Melo, \textit{Historia de Colombia}, pp.81-86. For the precise geographical extension of Darién and Castilla del Oro, see Kathleen Romoly, \textit{Los de la lengua de Cueva. Los grupos indígenas del istmo oriental en la época de la conquista española} (Bogotá, 1987), p.21.
river to the Serranía de Abibe and south as far as the Río Sucio. According to this interpretation, the Cueva were pushed out of this area by the northward movement of the Chocó. ¹¹

In her study of the Cuevan peoples of the Isthmian region, Kathleen Romoly examined the size of the pre-conquest population and discussed its rapid demographic decline. ¹² Moving ahead to the seventeenth century, Romoly also considered the origins of the Cuna who were to replace the Cueva in that area, and concluded that, despite the generally held belief that the Cunas are descendants of the Cuevas, the former were a completely different Indian tribe, which migrated northward from the Chocó, pushed by their enemies, the Emberá-Catio. ¹³ The important point to make is that, according to Romoly’s work, it was not the Cueva who inhabited the region to the east of the Atrato.


¹² Romoly, Los de la lengua de Cueva, pp.23-37, 40-50. As this thesis focuses on the region to the south of the Gulf of Urabá, the effects of Spanish colonization on the Cueva peoples will not be discussed. Suffice to say that the consequences for the Indian population of the establishment of Castilla del Oro were drastic. Instead of maintaining the relatively cordial relations secured by Balboa, Pedrarias Dávila and his men took to raiding, robbing, looting, and burning Indian settlements, and taking Indians as slaves. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Cuevas had virtually disappeared. See Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.248-252. and Romoly, Los de la lengua de Cueva, pp.40-41.

¹³ Ibid., pp.50-55, 91. Romoly based her conclusion on an exhaustive study of Cueva language and culture.
and south to the Río Sucio, as Trimborn claimed, but the Cuna.¹⁴

Romoly's assertion that the Cuna migrated northwards under pressure from the Emberá-Catío, however, raises other doubts, for the origins and cultural and linguistic affiliations of the Catío - who inhabited parts of Antioquia as far north as the Sinú and San Jorge rivers and may have merged with groups of Indians migrating towards that area from the Chocó - have also been the subject of some debate. While Romoly maintained that the Catío were directly related to the Emberá, Gordon argued that there were no historical, linguistic or cultural similarities between the two. Reina Torres de Arauz, however, suggested that the Chocó may have invaded and occupied Catío territory following the Spanish conquest of the Sinú region.¹⁵ Suffice to say that both the identity of the

¹⁴ The confusion may arise from the assumption that the Cunas descended from the Cueva. For the view that the Cuna are descendants of the Cueva, see Trimborn, Señorío y barbarie, p.50, and Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.238, 284.

¹⁵ Thus, the Indian group inhabiting the valleys of the Saijá river early this century, Romoly argued, shared the same language, the Chami-Catío, as the early Emberá inhabitants of the region lying to the west of Antioquia, and the southern and central Chocó. However, in focusing on the Chocó peoples who migrated to the Sinú region of Colombia, B. Le Roy Gordon argued that there is no evidence to indicate any affiliation between the Chocó [Emberá] and the Catío, despite the fact that the Catío have been listed as a subgroup of the Chocó, and that their language has been classified as a subdivision of Chocó language. Unlike the Chocó, Gordon asserts, the Catío lived in towns; early collections of Catío words show no linguistic similarity with the Chocó; their dress also differed from that of the Chocó. Furthermore, while the diet of the Chocó was based primarily on maize, that of the Catío was based on root crops. According to
Indian inhabitants of the Atrato region, and the migrations which may have occurred following contact with the Spaniards, still cause considerable confusion.

**Spanish Approaches from the Pacific**

After 1519, Spanish contacts with the Chocó increasingly moved along another axis: that of the Pacific coast. Towards the end of his cycle of activities in Castilla del Oro, Pedrarias Dávila established a settlement at Panama, in August 1519, thereby creating a base for Spanish exploration down the western coast of South America. As Robert Cushman Murphy pointed out, accounts of the voyages made down the Pacific coast in the years before the discovery of Peru are both sketchy and contradictory. Despite these obstacles, Murphy provided a chronological outline of the Spanish advance from Panama and clarified the location of several places consistently

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Gordon, the confusion derives from the Chocó's eventual occupation of Catío territory, to whom, nevertheless, they were not related. Reina Torres de Arauz included the Catío among the Chocó groups inhabiting parts of Antioquia in the 1960s, but argued that, since the accounts of early chroniclers would suggest no similarities between the two, it is likely that the former invaded and occupied the territory of the latter, following the conquest of the Sinú region by the Spaniards. See Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos autóctonos del litoral colombiano del Pacífico en la época de la conquista española", Revista Colombiana de Antropología, Vol.12 (1964), pp.265-66; B. Le Roy Gordon, Human Geography and Ecology in the Sinú Country of Colombia (Connecticut, 1977), pp.51-3; and Reina Torres de Arauz, "Aspectos históricos del grupo Chocó", Anuario de Estudios Americanos, Vol.XXIII (1966), p.1107, 1115-1117.

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16 Sauer, The Spanish Main, pp.279-282.
confused by the chroniclers and later historians. His outline is useful from the point of view of this study because it shows the first contacts made by the Spaniards with Chocó tribes along the Pacific coast.

The first expedition southward from Panama was undertaken by Pascual de Andagoya, in 1522-23. Although Andagoya has often been credited with being the first discoverer of Colombia's Pacific coast, it appears that this expedition only cruised for a short distance south of the Gulf of San Miguel, and possibly no further than Píñas Bay. A second expedition, undertaken by Francisco Pizarro in 1524, sailed beyond the coastline explored by Andagoya, entering one of the coves of Humboldt Bay in January 1525, which was subsequently called "Puerto de la Hambre", and discovering Puerto de la Candelaria in February. Although the party was held up for a time because of food shortages, by April it had arrived at an anchorage either in or near the Bay of Solano. One month earlier, Diego de Almagro had sailed from Panama in search of Pizarro, but appears to have passed him along the way. On this occasion, Almagro reached and rounded Cape Corrientes, explored the valley of the Baudó river, which he called Río Baeza, and arrived at the delta of the San

17 Murphy, "Earliest Spanish Advances", pp.3-5, 7-13.
18 Ibid., pp.10-11, 21. See also Romoly, "El descubrimiento ... de Buenaventura", pp.113-114.
19 Murphy, "Earliest Spanish Advances", pp.12, 21-22.
MAP 2

EARLY SPANISH EXPLORATIONS DOWN

COLOMBIA'S PACIFIC COAST

Source: Murphy, "Earliest Spanish Advances", p.31.
Juan river before returning northwards to Panama by way of the Bay of Solano.\textsuperscript{20}

It is important to note, at this stage, that Murphy's chronology is supplemented in this chapter with information provided by Kathleen Romoly. Romoly argued that, despite the many sources which document early Spanish discoveries along the Pacific coast, historians have mistakenly assumed that the San Juan river discovered by Diego de Almagro in 1525 was the river which cuts through the Chocó and empties into the Pacific just north of Buenaventura. According to Romoly, the river discovered by Almagro was in fact the San Juan de Micay, which is located somewhat further south of Buenaventura. The point is worth clarifying only in the context of early Spanish explorations down the Pacific coast: first, because the river gave its name to the first \textit{gobernación} established in this area, the \textit{gobernación} de San Juan, created in 1537, and secondly, because it means that the Indians whom the Spaniards came across on this occasion were not the Indian inhabitants of the Chocó's San Juan, but those of the San Juan de Micay.\textsuperscript{21} In later years, of course, Spanish interest was to shift to the other San Juan river, located to the north of Buenaventura,

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp.12-13, 22. Kathleen Romoly believed that, on this voyage, Diego de Almagro discovered the Bay of Buenaventura. According to Murphy, it was discovered by Pascual de Andagoya, but not until his second voyage, in 1539. See pp.10-11.

\textsuperscript{21} Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos autóctonos", pp.261-62; and Romoly, "El descubrimiento de ... Buenaventura", pp.113-122.
and to the region that would henceforth be referred to as "El Chocó".

By November 1526, both Pizarro and Almagro sailed down the western coast again, and, in January 1527, met at and investigated the region around the San Juan - presumably the San Juan de Micay. While Almagro returned to Panama with treasure, the pilot Bartolomé Ruiz de la Estrada continued the voyage southward, to explore the coast of Ecuador, where he obtained the first indications of the existence of the Inca empire.\(^{22}\) Having passed Cape San Francisco, towards the end of February 1527, Ruiz sighted and captured an Indian raft carrying textiles and other manufactured products, and manned by Indians who were said to be "rational", well-clothed, and wearing jewels.\(^ {23}\)

Early contacts with Indians along the Pacific coast were generally violent. In February 1525, Pizarro's party raided an Indian settlement for a few food supplies in the Humboldt Bay region. In April, the same party found a small Indian settlement two leagues inland from Puerto de la Candelaria, from where, according to Murphy, the Spaniards obtained some gold artifacts.\(^ {24}\) Proceeding south to the Bay of Solano region, Pizarro and his men came across a palisaded settlement just one league inland. On this occasion, serious fighting with the Indians broke out,


\(^{23}\) Ibid., pp.17-18, 24; and Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos autóctonos...", pp.261-62, 266.

\(^{24}\) Murphy, "Earliest Spanish Advances", p.21.
after the Spaniards stole gold ornaments and stores of food. A few Spaniards were killed and a number were wounded.\footnote{Ibid., p.22.} In July of that year, the same Indians attacked Almagro's party, which had encamped and built a palisade in their territory. The Spaniards this time responded by burning the Indian settlement, which was then named "Pueblo Quemado".\footnote{Ibid., pp.22-23.} Several other Indian villages were stormed and burned in the region of the San Juan river by the Pizarro and Almagro expedition of January 1527. Although the Spaniards obtained some treasure from the area, they also suffered many casualties. This region was probably very well populated, since the size of the native population had apparently deterred Almagro from exploring the area in 1525.\footnote{Ibid., pp.22, 24.}

We have few details to indicate, however, which Indian groups inhabited the area in the 1520s. According to Wassen, the Catrues were said to inhabit a section of the Pacific coastal area, which may have been the region around the Baudó river.\footnote{Wassen, "Apuntes Etnohistóricos", p.10.} Romoly's work on the Upper Chocó - between Cape Corrientes and Buenaventura - shows five native groups inhabiting the section of territory lying between the Pacific and the San Juan and Atrato rivers - the Moriramas, Eripedes, Orocubiraes, Cirambiraes, and
Botabiraes—while Isacsson's work on early seventeenth century *entradas* indicates that the western side of the Atrato river was inhabited at that time by several other Indian groups—such as the Membocana, the Burgumia and the Soruco. There is, however, insufficient data to indicate if any of these had contacts with Spanish expeditions of the 1520s.

Despite these early contacts, moreover, no serious attempt was made to penetrate the Chocó from the coast during these years, partly because the Spaniards had been attacked several times by the native inhabitants of the coastal region, who were determined to prevent the intruders obtaining food and water, and who were said to use poisoned arrows, which could prove fatal within four hours. The Spaniards may also have been deterred from investigating further inland by the difficulties involved in exploring the terrain. Since, as Murphy pointed out, most of the rivers between Darién and the southern Colombian coast were impossible to enter, even for the smallest Spanish vessels, all explorations had to be undertaken in canoes or on foot along the river banks.

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29 Romoly, "Las Gentes", p.29. See also Map 3.

30 Isacsson, "Fray Matías Abad", footnote 22, pp.467-68. This would also lend some support to Wassen's theory that Indians other than the Chocó inhabited the Pacific coastal region, since the Emberá language does not contain words for maritime animals. See Wassen, "Apuntes Etnohistóricos", p.13.

31 Murphy, "Earliest Spanish Advances", pp.16-17.

But perhaps the most important reason lay in the evidence found by Ruiz of the existence of a superior Indian civilization beyond the coast of Ecuador, which could not be compared with anything found in the region to the north. As Murphy's outline shows, no further stops were made along the Chocó coast for several years after 1527, as the Spaniards turned their attention further south, leading to the capture of Tumbes in January 1532, and to the subsequent conquest of Peru.33

However, the gold of Dabeiba continued to attract the interest of the Spaniards in the north. In May 1535, Alonso de Heredia - the brother of the governor of Cartagena, Pedro de Heredia - founded the town of San Sebastián de Buenavista, near the old site of San Sebastián de Urabá, for the purpose of creating a base from which further explorations in search of the gold of Dabeiba could be undertaken. At the end of 1535, or the beginning of 1536, Pedro de Heredia organized and led an expedition which again followed the course of the Atrato river. However, a combination of climate, terrain, and insects caused a considerable number of his men to fall ill, forcing this party - like so many others - to retreat back to San Sebastián. According to Fray Pedro Simón, the Indians encountered by the Spaniards on this occasion built their houses up in trees and used poisoned darts, but

showed no promising signs of riches.\textsuperscript{34} Further attempts would be made to sail up the Atrato in later years, but at the end of the 1530s Spanish interest shifted to the lands of interior New Granada.

\textbf{New Directions of Conquest}

News of the discovery of Peru, together with a growing awareness that the proceeds from the "cabalgadas" and from grave-robbing along the Caribbean coast were insufficient to maintain an increasing number of Spanish arrivals, meet the debts owed to merchants in Santo Domingo, and fund further expeditions of exploration, fuelled numerous attempts to penetrate the interior, from bases in Cartagena and Santa Marta. Underlying all these efforts was the belief, despite numerous failures, that Spanish dreams of glory and riches would be fulfilled on finding an overland route to Peru, or the source of the gold objects obtained from the Indian settlements of the coastal region. Exploration of the interior was further promoted by the groups of Spaniards who moved northwards from Quito and Peru, in search of the gold of El Dorado.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} Fray Pedro Simón, \textit{Noticias Historiales de las Conquistas de Tierra Firme en las Indias Occidentales} (6 vols., Bogotá, 1981), Vol.V, Noticia 1, Chapter XXX, p.149; Vol.V, Noticia 2, Chapter I, pp.169-70; and Vol.V, Noticia 2, Chapter IV, p.181. See also Melo, \textit{Historia de Colombia}, pp.116-118, who believes that the expedition began in December 1535 or January 1536, and lasted until April 1536. According to Simón, the party left Uraibá in April.

In April 1536, a party of 800 men left Santa Marta, under the command of Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada. Having first divided into two groups - one was to find an overland route and the other was to follow the course of the Magdalena river - the reunited forces entered Chibcha territory in March 1537, and within a relatively short space of time had conquered the centres of the Chibcha kingdoms in Bogotá and Tunja. Meanwhile, an expedition led by Francisco César left Cartagena in August 1536, explored the region of the Sinú river, reached the Cauca Valley in 1537, and returned to San Sebastián de Urabá with considerable booty and news of the existence of the Indian mines of Buriticá. At the beginning of January 1538, Juan de Vadillo left San Sebastián de Urabá with the intention of finding the producers of the gold of the interior. This expedition followed the route taken by César on his return to Urabá, crossed the cordillera central, and reached Cali in December 1538. By this time, however, the upper Cauca region was already being explored by Spaniards drawn from the south by rumours of El Dorado. The expedition which left Quito in 1536 under the command of Sebastián de Belalcázar reached the upper Cauca area and founded the cities of Popayán and Cali. From Cali, Jorge Robledo was sent to establish a settlement to the north, and in August 1539 the city of Santa Ana de los Caballeros (Anserma) was

36 For an account of Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada’s expedition, see ibid., pp.145-149.

37 Ibid., pp.118-119.
founded, to be followed by Cartago, in August 1540, and Antioquia, in November 1541.  

Colombia’s Pacific coast had, meanwhile, been explored once again by Spaniards based in Panama. An expedition organized and led by Gaspar de Espinosa arrived at the San Juan de Micay river in 1534. There are indications that, on this occasion, some seven to eight thousand pesos worth of gold was stolen from Indians in the vicinity of the river, and that many Indians were captured and enslaved. It was as a result of this expedition that Gaspar de Espinosa requested and was granted the gobernación of San Juan, which, according to Romoly, extended from the San Juan de Micay river to the Bay of San Mateo, the northern boundary of the gobernación of Perú. Espinosa died, however, before assuming control of his gobernación.  

In 1540, Pascual de Andagoya arrived to take over the gobernación of San Juan, granted to him in 1538, after Espinosa’s death. According to Murphy, this expedition sailed up the San Juan (Chocó) river, as far as the river Munguidó, but the presence of hostile Indians forced the party back to the coast. Although the mouth of the Raposo river, to the south of the San Juan, was also explored, Andagoya’s aim was not to begin the subjugation of the coast, but rather to occupy the lands of the interior

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38 Ibid., pp.125-129, 132-138. For another account of early explorations and rivalries among conquering expeditions in western New Granada, see Trimborn, Señorío y barbarie, pp.36-42.

conquered by Belalcázar. Andagoya’s attempt was unsuccessful, but his short-lived period as governor of the gobernación of San Juan resulted in the establishment of the port of Buenaventura, three leagues inland, at a site near the Anchicayá river. This port was discovered by Juan Ladrillero in 1540, while searching for a shorter route between the Cauca Valley and the Pacific than the one taken by Andagoya on his march to Cali. Four years earlier, Ladrillero had been sent by Belalcázar to find a seaport on the Pacific, but realizing the impossibility of the task on that occasion, he had returned to the Cauca Valley.40

During the first year of its existence, Buenaventura witnessed considerable activity: at times as many as 250 Spaniards were present in the port. Its prosperity was, however, short-lived. Many of the Spaniards who remained in the coastal region after Andagoya’s defeat by Belalcázar in 1541 were killed by Indians. In March 1542, Belalcázar took over Buenaventura and the area around the San Juan de Micay. For a time, and despite the difficult route linking Buenaventura and Cali, the port served as a base through which manufactures from Spain were imported, via Panama,

40 It is important to note that the river that gave its name to the gobernación was not the San Juan which cuts through the Chocó, but rather the San Juan de Micay, situated just south of Buenaventura. When originally created in 1537, the gobernación extended from the San Juan de Micay to the Santiago River, on Peru’s northern border. Andagoya’s concession, however, included the region to the north of the San Juan de Micay, thus giving him rights over Buenaventura. See Romoly, "El descubrimiento de ... Buenaventura", pp.113-118; Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.14; and Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos autóctonos", pp.261-62.
into the Province of Popayán. By the seventeenth century, however, the port’s activities had come to a virtual standstill. By 1582, only three Spaniards resided there, and these were said to live a very miserable existence. In 1597, the few remaining houses were destroyed by Indians from the Chocó. Although the port’s demise was blamed on Indian attacks and on the decline in the number of Cali’s Indians, who served as carriers, the principal cause lay in the reorientation of trade that took place as a result of changes in the location of gold production, the rise of Cartagena as the main port for European trade, and the increasing importance of Quito as a supplier of cheap textiles. From the seventeenth century, Buenaventura formed part of the province of Raposo - which lies outside the scope of this study - and by the beginning of the nineteenth century Mollien was lamenting the port’s condition: despite the importance and beauty of its situation, Buenaventura was barely inhabited.41

The discovery of the lands of the interior opened a new area through which penetrations of the Chocó could be made. The first expedition, led by Francisco Gómez

41 By the end of the eighteenth century, the port had in fact been moved to a site closer to the sea. Romoly, "El descubrimiento de ... Buenaventura", pp.117-120; and Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos autóctonos", pp.267-68. See also "Relación de Fray Gerónimo Descobar, de la Orden de San Agustín sobrel caracter e costumbres de los indios de la provincia de Popayán", in Jacinto Jijón y Caamaño, Sebastián de Benalcázar (2 vols., Quito, 1936-1938), pp.150-151, 162-164; Peter Marzahl, Town in the Empire: Government, Politics, and Society in Seventeenth Century Popayán (Austin, Texas, 1978), pp.7-8, and Mollien, Travels in the Republic of Colombia, p.299.
Hernández, left Anserma in 1540, crossed the Western Cordillera, and, following Indian trails, discovered the headwaters of a river which he thought to be the Atrato, but which Romoly believed was most probably the Andagueda - a tributary of the Atrato. The resistance of the indigenous inhabitants of the region - compounded by the Spaniards' lack of food - forced the party to return to the Cauca Valley. The Spaniards suffered one or two casualties and two of the party were injured.42 It was said, however, that Gómez Hernández had travelled across a considerable expanse of territory.43

Another expedition was planned to leave Anserma, under the command of Capitán Día Sánchez de Narváez, in the early 1550s. This expedition appears never to have been undertaken, since it was stopped by the Audiencia in 1553, in response to a royal cédula of June 1549 prohibiting further expeditions of discovery. But it is interesting from our point of view because it shows not only that the leaders and members of expeditions to the Chocó expected to derive immense benefits from the discovery of gold deposits in the region, but also intended to prevent, with its conquest, the flight of Indians from Anserma to the Chocó

42 These Indians, like those encountered by Heredia along the Atrato, were said to live in houses that were built in trees. Their means of defense consisted of darts and arrows. Fray Pedro Simón, Noticias Historiales, Vol. V, Noticia 3, Chapter I, pp.279-280; and Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.14. Melo believes that the river discovered by Gómez Hernández was probably the San Juan. See Melo, Historia de Colombia, p.133.

43 Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.5-37.
region. It was said that many Indians fled from the city to join the still unconquered Indians of the Chocó, and that some had actually returned to the city following rumours of Sánchez de Narváez’s entrada (expedition of entry). In 1557, Francisco Gómez Hernández made one further unsuccessful attempt to penetrate the region from the Cauca Valley, followed by an immediate and equally unsuccessful attempt at penetration up the Atrato. Then, in the mid-sixteenth century, Spanish interest in the Pacific lowland areas declined markedly, as richer, easier returns became available elsewhere.

Colonization in New Granada

Two main regions awoke the interest of the Spaniards who settled the lands of the interior. Although the highlands of the Eastern Cordillera contained a few placer deposits and the important emerald mines of Muzo and Somondoco, relatively few gold mines were discovered in the area. Nevertheless, the region became a focal point of

44 Apparently, Sánchez de Narváez had been ordered to conduct the campaign by the governor of Popayán, Francisco Briceño. He challenged the Audiencia’s decision not to authorize the entrada, on the grounds that, given the number of expeditions already conducted to the area, this one could not be classed as an expedition of discovery. By 1562, however, the expedition had not yet been conducted. Día Sánchez de Narváez had apparently financed the purchase of horses, arms, and supplies, and the payment of the soldiers by borrowing between four and six thousand pesos from vecinos of Anserma. Presumably, the gold obtained in the Chocó was to be used to repay these debts. See ibid.

Spanish settlement because it was inhabited by a large, dense, hierarchically organized population, which was supported by an intensive sedentary agriculture and by a system of commercial exchange with Indian tribes in other parts of the country. The existence of peaceful native groups, living within a relatively advanced social, political, and economic order encouraged the establishment of a network of Spanish towns, dedicated to the supply of agricultural products to these towns and to the mining settlements that were beginning to emerge in neighbouring regions. It was here that the Audiencia of Santa Fe was established in 1549, with its seat in Santa Fe de Bogotá.\(^{46}\)

More crucial to the future development of the Chocó was the establishment of the Spaniards in the Cauca region and the Antioquian region of the Central Cordillera. While the Indian groups discovered in these areas could not compare with the Chibchas in social and economic complexity, they, too, were relatively large, and boasted well-organized agricultural lands, and a tradition of native gold mining that led to the rapid development of a gold mining industry and the establishment of several Spanish towns in the vicinity.\(^{47}\) Indeed, during the sixteenth century, the gobernación of Popayán was the

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\(^{46}\) For an analysis of the early development of the colonial economy in New Granada, see McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New Granada", pp.2-26, especially 7, 10, 14-15. See also Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, p.32.

\(^{47}\) McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New Granada", p.7.
largest of the four provinces created by the Conquest - Santa Marta, Cartagena, the New Kingdom, and Popayán - and, until the establishment of the province of Antioquia in 1563, it also enjoyed almost complete independence from the Audiencias of Santa Fe and Perú.48

Thus, the discovery of rich and extensive gold mines in New Granadan territory marked the end of the looting and pillaging that had characterized the first three decades of Spanish colonization of the mainland, and the beginning of a more thorough exploitation of precious metals. As a result, several mining districts, based on both vein and placer deposits, were developed in the interior.49 One major mining district was established along the eastern flank of the Cordillera Central, overlooking the Magdalena Valley. This region extended from the mines of Remedios, which were later transferred close to Zaragoza and became particularly significant in the 1590s, to those of Neiva, discovered in 1543. Also included within this district were the important gold and silver deposits of Mariquita, exploited after 1543, and the gold vein mines of Ibagué, opened in the 1580s. Another mining district, situated close to the city of Pamplona, at the northern end of the Eastern Cordillera, was first exploited in 1552. To the west of the country, along the banks of the Cauca river,

48 Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, pp.17-18.

49 For a study of the development of New Granada’s mining districts, see Robert C. West, Colonial Placer Mining in Colombia (Baton Rouge, 1957), pp.9-34.
MAIN AREAS OF MINING ACTIVITY IN
SIXTEENTH CENTURY NEW GRANADA

Source: West, Colonial Placer Mining in Colombia, Map 3, between pp.10-11]
the gold-producing region of Anserma-Cartago was discovered by the Robledo expedition of 1539-1540, and included the mines of Arma and Caramanta. In the upper Cauca region, another major mining district was established in the vicinity of the city of Popayán, where mines were already being worked in 1544. Gold deposits were also discovered to the south of the city of Popayán, leading to the foundation of Almaguer, in 1551. The gold deposits of the Cerro de Buriticá, at the northern end of the Cordillera Central, were exploited after 1541, and from there Spaniards spread out to the placers of Santa Fe de Antioquia. By the 1580s, the rich gold mines of Cáceres and Zaragoza had been added to this district.50

The discovery of Cáceres, in 1576, and Zaragoza, in 1581, temporarily postponed a recession in the mining sector, caused by the exhaustion of the gold deposits discovered during the first decades of settlement in the interior, and the decline of the native population, which supplied the mining enterprises with labour. Other new deposits were also discovered within the older mining districts: in 1597, for example, an important new source was found in the vicinity of Almaguer. However, by the end of the sixteenth century, the levels of gold production registered in Cáceres, in Zaragoza, and in the recently incorporated mines of Remedios, far surpassed those registered in other regions. This increase in production was reflected in the levels of transatlantic trade, which

50 Ibid., pp.9-14, 20-34.
rose to a peak between 1590 and 1610. However, in the 1570s, the first signs of crisis also appeared in the mining sector, due to the exhaustion of the gold deposits discovered in the interior and the decline of the native population. It was at this time, prior to the discovery of the mining districts of Cáceres and Zaragoza, that a new attempt was made to locate the rich mines that were already known to exist in the Chocó, and that the first effective expedition of conquest and colonization to the Chocó was organized, in 1573.

As Germán Colmenares argued, the survival of New Granada’s mining economy depended on the continuous incorporation of new deposits to replace the exhausted mines. Productivity had to be maintained at high levels because gold fuelled commercial exchange with the metropolis, and financed both the supply of European goods to the colonists and the introduction of slaves needed to replace a rapidly decreasing native labour force. No doubt these considerations, together with the need to put an end to repeated Indian attacks against Spanish settlements in the Cauca Valley and against Spaniards travelling along the trails linking the city of Cali with Anserma and Cartago, led the Governor of Popayán, Don Gerónimo de Silva, to order Melchor Velásquez to undertake

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52 For an analysis of New Granada's mining cycles, see ibid., pp.257-276.
the pacification of the Chocó and Chanco Indians, in October 1572. Velásquez was instructed to found one or two Spanish settlements in Chanco territory and several more in Chocó territory. This decision marked the beginning of two decades of a partial Spanish occupation of the Chocó.

First Colonization in the Chocó

In fact, the territory where Velásquez was to settle was more than simply that of the Chanco and Chocó Indians. Kathleen Romoly's careful study of the sources relating to this period of more prolonged Spanish contact with native groups in the Upper Chocó - the region extending from Cape Corrientes to just beyond the mouth of the San Juan river - shows that the Chocó and Chanco Indians were only two of nineteen different native Indian groups inhabiting the region in the 1570s. Romoly's work on this period provides the first firm indications of both the number of Indian tribes inhabiting this region and of their identity.

Although the size of the sixteenth century population cannot be established with any certainty, Romoly concluded, on the basis of a thorough analysis of estimates made at the time of the first Spanish contacts with native groups and of later reports, that the total population numbered

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54 For Romoly's list of the Upper Chocó's pre-conquest tribes, see "Las Gentes", pp.27-29.
MAP 4
UPPER CHOCO: INDIAN TRIBES AND
SPANISH SETTLEMENTS, 1596

Source: Romoly, "Las Gentes", Map 1.)
between 35,000 and 40,000. Each Indian group, Romoly observed, was independent and autonomous within a limited area, and an uninhabited neutral zone separated each Indian "province" from the others. The northernmost Tootuma groups, for example, inhabited an area lying at a distance of two to three days from their nearest Chocó neighbours. However, relations between different Indian provinces were not uniform. Although, in general terms, these were characterized by distrust and by occasional warring expeditions against each other, alliances between native groups did exist. While the Chanco allied, at least occasionally, with the Chiloma and the Coponamá, a Botabirá enclave survived within Noanama territory, and the Chocó were on friendly terms with both the Tatamá and the Tootuma. The attitude of Indian groups in the Chocó to the Spaniards also varied greatly, and it was this diversity that both determined the pattern of settlement established by the Spaniards in the region and limited their expansion.

The expedition which left the town of Roldanillo in May 1573 under the command of Melchor Velásquez, a vecino of Buga, represented the first successful attempt to establish a Spanish foothold on the Pacific side of the

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56 Ibid., p.29.
57 Indeed, the Tootuma informed the Spaniards that going to war with the cacique was one of the duties of a subject. Ibid., p.32. On this subject, see also Chapter 5 of this thesis.
Western Cordillera. Between May and November 1573, the party, which was composed of 94 armed men, 2 priests, and 2 Dominican friars, founded the city of Nuestra Señora de la Consolación de Toro on the banks of the Chancos river, within the jurisdiction of the city of Cartago, explored the provinces of Yngará and Tootuma, and carried out an expedition, led by Capitán Pedro Moriones, to the province of Chocó. By December 1573, Toro had been transferred to a site within Tootuma territory. For reasons that are not entirely clear, Velásquez’s group had been amicably received by both the Yngará and Tootuma nations: in addition to being housed and fed, the intruders were provided with considerable numbers of Indians to serve in expeditions of exploration to neighbouring areas.58 Indeed, Romoly believed that the Indians who took part in an expedition to the province of Chocó in September 1575 were Yngará Indians. On this occasion, the city of Nuestra Señora del Socorro de Ocaña was established, but, due to the resistance of the Chocó, the city was abandoned three days later.59

In December 1575, a second Spanish city, Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Cáceres, was established by Francisco Redondo on the eastern edge of the province of

58 Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", pp.15-18. See also Fray Pedro Simón, Noticias Historiales, Vol.VI, Noticia 7, Chapter I, pp.234-235. Priests and friars accompanied this expedition because Governor de Silva instructed Melchor Velásquez to attempt to indoctrinate the region’s native population. See Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental.

59 Romoly, "Las Gentes", p.35.
Chanco, about 25 leagues from Toro. Although repartimientos of Indians were made in Cáceres - the sources show 25 encomenderos receiving 1,720 Indians - Romoly believed, and the subsequent history of the region would seem to suggest, that these were probably never made effective. Despite a continuous Spanish presence in Cáceres, in 1582, Fray Jerónimo de Escobar reported that the 3,000 Indians of the district remained unconquered, and that less than 20 had been baptized. Nevertheless, in 1583, it was also reported that the city had stable residents, some form of municipal organization, a parish priest, and in addition, had achieved some agricultural development.

In 1578, after having obtained the title of governor of the newly-established gobernación of Chocó, Melchor Velásquez led another expedition, from Toro, into the region occupied by the Chocó Indians. On this occasion,

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60 It is not entirely clear why Redondo was commissioned to enter Chocó territory at the same time as Melchor Velásquez was conducting his entradas. See Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", pp.19, 25-26. See also Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.75-81. A villa of Cáceres had earlier been established by Redondo within Chanco territory, but it had been abandoned.

61 Ibid., p.26. For the repartimiento that was carried out in Cáceres, see ibid., Table 1, p.27, "Relación de Fray Gerónimo Descobar, in Jijón y Caamaño, Sebastián de Benalcázar, pp.165-166. Fray Gerónimo was at that time the Procurador General of the province of Popayán. See Romoly, "Las Gentes", p.37. The right to make repartimientos de indios was granted to Melchor Velásquez under the terms of the instructions given to him by Governor de Silva. See Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental. It is unlikely, however, that these were ever made effective, given the mobility which characterized the Indians of the region.
the Spaniards appear to have been at least temporarily successful: a new Spanish settlement, the city of Santiago, was founded within the province sometime during or just after November 1578. However, Santiago does not appear to have survived for long; by 1580, the settlement had disappeared, and may indeed have met a violent end. In spite of repeated failures, Velásquez continued in his attempts to extend the territory under his control. In 1588, he carried out a final, and again unsuccessful, entrada into the province of Chocó; two years later, he organized and led an overland expedition to the province of Noanama, in which 40 Spanish soldiers were killed in an Indian ambush. Two or three months later, Velásquez's son, Melchor Velásquez - Melchor "el mozo" - led a further expedition to the Noanamas, only to find desolation, possibly as a result of a serious smallpox epidemic.

In January 1592, Velásquez resigned as governor of the Chocó, and was replaced, in February 1593, by Melchior Salazar, a vecino of Cartago. During Salazar's period as governor, Spanish mines and encomiendas in the occupied provinces suffered attacks from Chocó, Tatamá, and Noanama Indians. Upon his arrival in the Chocó, Salazar immediately sent out punitive expeditions in several

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62 Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.20; Romoly, "Las Gentes", p.34.

63 Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.20; Romoly, "Las Gentes", pp.31-2. For an account of the expeditions carried out by Velásquez between 1588 and 1590, see Fray Pedro Simón, Noticias Historiales, Vol.VI, Noticia 7, Chapter II, pp.237-240.
directions, and ordered the withdrawal of certain mining camps that had been established on the outer edge of the occupied territories, bordering with the province of Noanama. In addition, he organized an expedition, undertaken between March and May 1593, which explored the San Juan river region and discovered the Calima river. Despite violent encounters with the Noanama, this expedition returned with a booty of maize, gold, captured Indians and canoes.  

Despite Salazar's successes in the region, and despite the existence of several rich mining camps along the Yarrama, Tuturrupi, and Negro rivers, by 1595, the gobernación of Chocó had been suppressed, and the district of Toro had been incorporated into the gobernación of Popayán. The 'city' of Toro was transferred to a new site on the banks of the Cauca river and Cáceres simply ceased to exist. Although Salazar would later attempt to regain the gobernación, he was not successful. This was, it was said, the result of the divisions that had emerged between the Spanish residents of Toro. However, Spanish problems in the Chocó were undoubtedly compounded by the difficulties involved in supplying the area, due to its geographical isolation. Neither horses nor beasts of burden could be employed over sixteen of the more than

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64 Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.20. For a description of Salazar's activities as governor of the Chocó, see Fray Pedro Simón, Noticias Historiales, Vol.VI, Noticia 7, Chapter III, pp.241-244, and Chapter IV, pp.245-248.
eighteen leagues that separated Toro from Cartago. In spite of the wealth that was already known to exist in the Chocó, few Spaniards risked living there: in 1583, only 50 Spaniards resided in Toro, of which 28 were said to be encomenderos. In addition, in 1582, it was said that no priest was willing to reside there either, as two had already died en route to the town.

Indian resistance also hindered Spanish colonization of the region, as the survival of the Spaniards in Chocó territory depended on native cooperation. The establishment of the Spaniards in Toro had been possible only because they had been accorded a relatively friendly reception by the Yngará and Tootuma Indians. Indeed, according to the Dominican Fray Martín de Medrano, 1,000 Yngará Indians had been provided for the exploration of the province of Tootuma. Velásquez was able to move Toro to Tootuma territory because their presence there had been

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65 Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", pp.19, 21-22, 24; Fray Pedro Simón, Noticias Historiales, Vol.VI, Noticia 7, Chapter III, pp.242-243, and Chapter IV, pp.247-248; and Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, p.275. However, a royal cédula of 1634 noted that Toro had been abandoned because of an Indian uprising. This cédula, which authorized Don Juan Vélez de Guevara y Salamanca to undertake and entrada to the Chocó in order to "reduce" and pacify the native population and reestablish both the city and the mines of Toro stated that "the mines of Toro... are depopulated having previously been very useful to my royal treasury and their value ceased [due to] some Indians having...rebelled...". See AGI Santa Fe 357, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 27 September 1634.

66 Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.20; "Relación de Fray Gerónimo Descobar", in Jijón y Caamaño, Sebastián de Benalcázar, p.165. According to Fray Gerónimo, Toro only had 24 residents, many of whom were either mestizos or mulatos.
accepted by the Indians, who also provided the intruders with food and housing. However, despite the foundation of two cities and several mining camps, Spanish expansion in the Chocó was limited by the resistance of neighbouring Indian groups. All attempts to penetrate Chocó and Noanama territory, for instance, were fiercely resisted, and, as the attacks carried out by the Chocó, Noanama and Tatamá Indians on Spanish mines in 1593 suggest, any attempt to move beyond the boundaries of the occupied territories were met with violence. Salazar had had to order the withdrawal of the mining camps that had been established on the Tuturrupi river, which bordered with the Noanamas. It was also reported that, in 1592, one Capitán Luis Franco and two other Spaniards had been killed by Chocó Indians, for penetrating Chocó territory in search of gold. That same year, the Noanama also killed nine Indians working for Capitán Diego de Paredes, who had established an estancia on the banks of the Yarrama river, which also bordered with the Noanamas. Moreover, as Romoly pointed out, although the city of Toro was never attacked, the Chocó terrorized the Yngará for consenting to Spanish occupation, and the disappearance of the latter tribe over the following years was due more to the attacks of the former than to the effects of Spanish colonization.

68 Ibid., pp.22-23.
69 Ibid., p.22. See also Romoly, "Las Gentes", pp.32-33, 35.
It must also be said that the methods of pacification employed by the Spaniards during this period did not encourage amicable relations. The expedition sent into the province of Chocó in 1573 under the command of Pedro Moriones represented the first contact between Spaniards and Chocó Indians since Gómez Hernández's expedition of 1540, and was intended as the first step in an expected process of pacification. However, as the Dominican Fray Martín de Medrano's account makes clear, the methods adopted by the Spaniards included an attack on an Indian settlement, the capture of Indians, and the theft of gold and jewels. Similar methods were employed during the expedition to Noanama territory in 1593: houses and maize crops were burned, Indians were captured, and canoes were taken. It was not until the middle of the next century that a more peaceful approach to native groups in the region was adopted by the Spaniards. Of course, as we shall see, by that time their numbers had dwindled to the point of extinction, in the case of some Indian groups.

The Chocó in the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries

Despite the suppression of the gobernación of Chocó, Spanish interest in the region did not disappear. Fray Pedro Simón reports two expeditions up the Atrato from Urabá. The first of the expeditions, which was organized

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and led by Pedro Martín Dávila, left Santa Fe de Antioquia in 1596, and reached the Oromira (or Sucio) river in 1597, only to be forced back by hunger and sickness. The following year, the governor of Cartagena, Pedro de Acuña, sent a large vessel to sail up the Atrato. This expedition sailed for 130 leagues and passed the Oromira before encountering any Indians. The party also returned to Cartagena after six Spaniards had been killed by Indians. Even so, as Colmenares points out, the abundance of gold extracted from the mines of Toro survived in the imagination of the miners of the Cauca Valley.71

Renewed exploration focused on previously neglected areas in the lower Chocó region. From the very beginning of contact, the Spaniards had been aware of the existence of many other Indian groups in the Lower Chocó, the region extending to the north of Cape Corrientes. As we have seen, many of the expeditions undertaken from the Gulf of Urabá had had encounters with Indian groups along the Atrato. The only account of Melchor Velásquez's expedition of 1573 also mentions several native groups that were known

71 Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, p.275. See also Fray Pedro Simón, Noticias Historiales, Vol.V, Noticia 2, Chapter IV, p.181; Vol.VI, Noticia 7, Chapter V, pp.249-252, Chapter VI, pp.255-256, and Chapter VII, p.258. Other Spaniards are also mentioned in the sources as having led expeditions to the Chocó, such as, for example, Juan de Cavalla, and Cristóbal Quintero. Published documents relating to sixteenth century Spanish activities in the region also show that the Crown and the Audiencia entered into contracts with other individuals planning entradas, such as Lucas de Avila. There are very few details about these, however. See Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.67-74, 83-90.
to inhabit the western side of the Atrato between Cape Corrientes and Panama and which were thought to be enemies of the Chocó. The region lying to the east of the Atrato, at least as far south as the Río Sucio, was also inhabited by Indians, whom Trimborn thought to be Cuevas. Meanwhile, Fray Pedro Simón referred to the numerous native Indian groups whose settlements were dotted along the banks of the many rivers that emptied into the Darién (Atrato) river. It was to this region - particularly to the province of Citará - that the Spaniards would direct their attention when a new attempt at colonization was made at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Renewed attempts at expansion coincided once again with declining gold production in other areas of the colony: the prosperity that resulted from the discovery of Cáceres, Zaragoza, and Remedios, was followed by a prolonged period of recession, which began at the turn of the century and became acute by the 1630s. Although

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72 According to Fray Martín de Medrano's account, "on the other side of the River Darién and towards Cape Corrientes [and towards] Panama and Nombre de Dios it was known that there were very large numbers of Indians [who were] enemies of the Chocoes, among whom were the province of Guaxi and the province of Aguagaxi and the province of Obuesuna...the province of the Chiquytos and Cebana Indians whom the Chocoes call Mundabida which are said to be [impossible to] number and below lies the province of Perena where it is said...[is situated] the house of the Devil whom the Spaniards call Dabaybe and later the province of Peaberna and then below the province of Indian women...who are called Caciguayas who do not have men but only women". Transcribed in Romoly "El Alto Chocó", p.18.

73 See, for example, Fray Pedro Simón, Noticias Históricas, Vol.V, Noticia 2, Chapter IV, p.180, and Vol.VI, Noticia 2, Chapter IV, p.234.
regional variations in gold production did occur, the Antioquian region was particularly affected by the recession. The virtual elimination of the native population, compounded by the region’s geographical isolation and the absence of an adequate agricultural base, forced mine owners in this region to import many basic food supplies and to invest heavily in the importation of a slave labour force, raising the cost of mining operations considerably. A high mortality rate among slaves, caused by both labour in the mines and an inadequate diet, resulted in declining levels of gold production, which in turn prevented mine owners from maintaining sufficiently high levels of investment in slaves. Although other regions were less affected - Popayán was able to depend on the recently discovered mines of Caloto and on the development of agricultural activities in the province - there is no doubt that in terms of total production the colony was undergoing a serious mining crisis. For example, the decline in gold production levels in the Santa Fe mining district became very marked between 1630 and 1644. While in the five year period between 1625-29, 451,180 pesos were registered in Santa Fe, the corresponding figure for 1640-44 was only 96,910. Gold production in the Antioquia mining district, where 1,122,994 pesos were registered in 1625-29, fell to 437,414 in 1640-44. Gold production in the Popayán district fell from 179,396 in 1625-29, to 46,500 in 1640-44. Moreover, the reduction of total gold output was immediately
reflected in the levels of trade conducted through the port of Cartagena, which declined rapidly after 1610.\textsuperscript{74}

As had occurred in the 1570s, the survival of the colony’s mining economy once more had to depend on the incorporation of new mining districts, and it was during this period of crisis that several new attempts were made to occupy the Chocó, both from the Gulf of Urabá, and the Cauca Valley. The first of these expeditions, led by Francisco Maldonado Saavedra, left San Sebastián de Buenavista in February 1622. Despite the size of the Spanish force - 800 people were taken in total, including many women, children, and servants - Maldonado’s attempt proved to be a complete disaster: in addition to countless desertions, the Spaniards suffered food shortages, disease, and attack from Indians along the lower Atrato area. This was perhaps the last attempt to conquer the Darién from Urabá.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{74} As we shall see in Chapter 2, during the first decades of the seventeenth century, the Spanish inhabitants of Popayán and Cali were beginning to expand their activities to the southern region of the Pacific littoral, to the south of the port of Buenaventura. See Colmenares, \textit{Historia Económica y Social de Colombia}, pp.273-274, 315-317, 333-336, 338, 342-343. See also McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New Granada", p.18.

\textsuperscript{75} Interestingly, the Crown appears to have taken some interest in this expedition, appointing Maldonado as Governor and Captain General of the provinces of Darién - which were to be independent of both Cartagena and Antioquia - and ordering that 400 men should participate in the expedition. 250 of these were to be taken from Spain, and of these, 50 were to be accompanied by their wives and families. However, only 30 left Spain with their wives and families, and only 80 of the expected 250 Spaniards eventually took part in the expedition. See Fray Pedro Simón, \textit{Noticias Historiales}, Vol.VI, Chapters
The expedition which left Anserma in 1628 under the command of Martín Bueno de Sancho, accompanied by 12 soldiers, represented the first attempt to reach the headwaters of the Atrato river – early Spanish activity in the area was mostly concentrated in the mining region of the upper San Juan – and conquer the province of Citará. Aided by the Tatamá, and possibly the Chocó, the Spaniards reached the province of Citará and attacked an Indian settlement, capturing or killing 100 Indians before returning safely to Anserma. A second attempt, made by Martín Bueno de Sancho ten years later, ended in disaster, despite the assistance of 200 Tatamá Indians. After tempting the Spaniards on board a large number of Indian canoes with promises of aid and food supplies for an expedition to the province of "Ynbocona" (possibly Membocana), who were thought to inhabit the eastern side of the Atrato, the Indians attacked and killed the entire company, with the exception of a few women and children: it was said that the Spaniards were decapitated and that their teeth were torn out. Following the attack on the expedition, the Citará and the Tatamá retreated northwards to the Arquía river for fear of reprisals. The Spaniards, for their part, responded by sending at least two punitive expeditions to the area to avenge the deaths of Martín Bueno and his men. Capitán Fernando Osío y Salazar

LIX-LXI, pp.483-497.

76 The following account of Martín Bueno de Sancho’s entradas is based on Isacsson, "Fray Matías Abad", pp.457-62.
penetrated the region and killed approximately 80 Citará Indians; he was followed, in 1640, by Gregorio Cáspeedes y Guzmán who killed 25 Indians and captured 30.

Although very little is known about these entradas, the information that is available indicates that the methods of pacification employed by the Spaniards at the beginning of the seventeenth century were similar to those employed during earlier attempts at conquest. The native response - clearly conditioned by inter-tribal relations - had not changed either. As noted above, the success of the Spaniards' exercise in colonization in the 1570s had been based on the collaboration of the Tootuma and Yngará nations, while the failure of all further attempts to expand the region under Spanish control had been caused by the violent resistance of surrounding Indian provinces. Similarly, the Spaniards' success in first reaching, and then attacking a Citará settlement in 1628 depended on the cooperation of the Tatamá and possibly the Chocó, which suggests that Indian groups of the Chocó region were willing occasionally to ally with the Spaniards against others with whom they were at war. The same occurred in 1645, when 380 Citará Indians apparently accompanied an expedition led by Pedro Santiago Garcés to the province of Membocana, in the Baudó river region. The Membocana were said to be enemies of the Citará. However, the response of the Tatamá to the Citará attack on Martín Bueno in 1638, suggests that the Indians of the region were equally willing, and indeed likely, to ally with groups with whom
they were previously at war - it was said that the Tatamá, too, were enemies of the Citará - to either defeat the Spaniards or retreat from them out of fear of reprisals.

Despite the lack of success of these attempts to conquer and colonize the Indians of the Chocó region, its immense wealth continued to attracted the attention of the Spanish inhabitants of neighbouring regions, conditioned also by the fact that the recession in the mining industry continued unabated. If the recession was to be halted, and the gold deposits of the Chocó were to incorporated into the mining districts, the Indian inhabitants of the region would have to be pacified. By the middle of the seventeenth century, however, the task of the Spaniards' was facilitated by one crucially important factor: the resistance of the region's Indians had been badly weakened by serious demographic decline. The impact of the decline on Indian resistance, and the Spaniards' activities in the region after mid-century, will form the subject of Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 2
THE CROWN AND THE COLONIZATION
OF THE CHOCO, 1656-1674

From the mid-1660s, the Spanish Crown began to take a much greater interest in the pacification of the Chocó provinces, issuing several cédulas designed to promote the peaceful penetration of the region and the Christianization of its native population. During the first half century of the Spanish occupation of the mainland, repeated attempts had been made to penetrate the Chocó, first, from the Gulf of Urabá, and then from the Pacific coast. Following the conquest of the interior, and the establishment of a mining economy with its associated mining cycles, further attempts were made - from bases to the north and east of the Chocó - to incorporate the many rich gold deposits that were known to exist in the region within the older mining districts, in order to redress the effects of recession in the mining industry. Due to the nature of inter-tribal relations, some successes were achieved among certain tribes: the twenty-year occupation of Toro, for instance, was the result of Indian collaboration with Spanish expeditionaries. However, these successes were always short-term, and were limited by the resistance and aggression of neighbouring Indian groups.
The Crown and the Conquest of the Chocó

The Spanish Crown's growing interest in the pacification of the Chocó was a response to the recommendations of the President of the Audiencia of Santa Fe, Don Diego de Egüés y Beaumont. In November 1664, Don Diego de Egüés advised the Spanish Crown that, as the system of capitulaciones previously employed to promote penetrations to the Chocó had failed to achieve the desired results, these contracts should now be abandoned. Instead, a major effort to conquer the Chocó region, which was undoubtedly as rich as had been reported, should be undertaken jointly by the governments of the surrounding provinces - Antioquia, Panama, Popayán, and Cartagena. Once the conquest had been completed, the provincial governments would assume jurisdiction over the area each had conquered. The President argued that, while he did not favour the use of force to convert Indians to Catholicism, the military conquest of the Chocó was fully justified by the fact that its native population would not be peacefully "reduced", and was more fiercely resistant to the Spaniards than that of other regions.²

This was a notable departure from President Diego de Egüés' usual policy regarding frontier Indians in the New Kingdom, whom he considered to be "the most neglected and

¹ For examples of capitulaciones entered into by the Crown and individuals leading expeditions to the Chocó, see Chapter 4 of this thesis.

² AGI Quito 67, Don Diego de Egüés y Beaumont to Crown, Santa Fe, 25 November 1664.
backward of his subjects". Indeed, Egües, who governed New Granada between 1662 and 1664, did much to foster the missions on the colony’s frontiers, particularly in the Llanos region. In 1662, for instance, he organized the Junta de Propaganda Fide, composed of the archbishop of Santa Fe, the provisor (a cleric exercising a bishop’s judicial authority), the vicario general (an ecclesiastical judge with authority throughout the diocese), the prelates of every religious order represented in the New Kingdom, and the senior oidor of the Audiencia. The Junta, which also included Egües among its members, met once a week to discuss the work of the church in New Granada, and it was as a result of their deliberations that the Llanos region was divided into five large territories, each of which was assigned to one of the religious orders for the purpose of converting the Indian population. In addition to placing all Christianized Indians under royal protection, Egües prohibited any further armed entradas into the Llanos.3

Why the President of the Audiencia should have advised a military conquest of the Indians in the Chocó, in view of his policy towards the Indians of the Llanos frontier, can only partly be explained by their history of violent resistance to the Spaniards. Two further factors

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influenced Egües’ recommendations on the conquest of the Chocó: first, he was concerned to provide the provinces of Popayán and Antioquia with an overland route to Panama through the Chocó; secondly, and most importantly, he was acutely aware of the revenue that would accrue to the Royal Treasury following its conquest⁴ - a crucial consideration at a time of decreasing remittances to Spain. As we saw in Chapter 1, at the beginning of the seventeenth century New Granada entered a period of economic decline from which it had not recovered by the 1660s. Colmenares’ figures on gold production in Popayán, for example, show that the levels of production registered in the four year period between 1656 and 1659 were the lowest for over a century.⁵ Production figures for the district of Antioquia - which included the mines of Antioquia, Zaragoza, and Cáceres - show a similar downward trend.⁶ The quantities of gold minted in the Casa de Moneda in Santa Fe also show the same

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⁴ AGI Quito 67, Don Diego de Egües y Beaumont to Crown, Santa Fe, 25 November 1664.

⁵ From a peak of 344,825 pesos in 1595-99, levels of gold production began to decline, falling to 159,850 pesos in 1630-34, 85,400 in 1635-39, 46,500 in 1640-44, and 18,710 in 1656-59. See Germán Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, Table 22, p.316.

⁶ Levels of production, which reached a peak of 1,748,526 pesos in 1595-99, fell sharply thereafter, to 1,122,994 in 1625-29, 437,414 in 1640-44, 131,326 in 1655-59, and a mere 109,756 in 1660-64. See ibid., Table 23, p.317.
signs of crisis: less gold was minted between 1660 and 1664 than in the entire century between 1635 and 1739.\(^7\)

The potential benefit to be derived from the conquest of the Chocó contrasted markedly with that which could be expected from the pacification of the Llanos region - and it is perhaps this difference which explains Egües' contrasting policies towards the native populations of the two regions. While some sections of the Llanos - especially the Llanos of Casanare - had large sedentary Indian populations and became important sources of foodstuffs, livestock, cotton, and textiles,\(^8\) these could not compare with the gold deposits of the Chocó. Indeed, in 1668, the governor of Popayán, Don Gabriel Díaz de la Cuesta, suggested that the gold deposits discovered there would lead to the recovery of all the provinces of the New Kingdom.\(^9\) By the mid-seventeenth century, then, the conquest and settlement of the Chocó was officially

\(^7\) In the ten year period between 1650-54 and 1660-64, gold minted in the Casa de Moneda in Santa Fe fell from 4.4 million grams to 1.6 million grams. Levels of gold minted, measured in grams, would not again reach 4 million until 1720-24. Ibid., Table 25, p.323.

\(^8\) Rausch, A Tropical Plains Frontier, pp.52, 55.

\(^9\) AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Popayán, 7 May 1668, f.130. This and the following chapter draw on the documents contained in two "Testimonia de Autos", both of which can be found in AGI Quito 67. One of these was prepared by the Audiencia and the other relates specifically to the Franciscan mission in the Chocó. In order to differentiate between the two, the first will be referred to as "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", and the second as "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)". 
regarded as the key to the economic recovery of the entire colony of New Granada.

Thus, on 27 November, 1666, the Spanish Crown issued a royal cédula ordering the governors of Antioquia, Popayán, and Cartagena, and the President of the Audiencia of Panama, to begin the "reduction" of those sections of Chocó territory which bordered with their own provinces. Once the region had been pacified, each of the provincial governments would assume jurisdiction over the area whose pacification they had achieved. In this the Crown followed Diego de Egües' advice. However, its decision regarding the methods by which this "reduction" process was to proceed differed from those advocated by its president in the Audiencia of Santa Fe. The cédula directed that the pacification of the Indians was not to be achieved by military conquest. Missionaries were to be sent to the region from Spain, and while these were to be accompanied by a military escort, arms were not to be used: the Indians were to be "reduced" by preaching and good treatment alone. And, echoing its decisions regarding the reduction of Indians in other marginal parts of the empire, the Crown decreed that the pacified Indians were to come under the control of the Crown, were not to be distributed to individuals in encomienda, and were to be exempt from tribute payments for a ten-year period, unless, by rebellion, they forfeited this privilege. The cédula made one further provision that was to be significant for the future development of events in the Chocó: while the
Audiencia of Santa Fe was entrusted with the overall coordination and administration of the enterprise, which it was to assist in all possible ways, it was ordered to ensure that this assistance did not take the form of Treasury funds.  

Thus, while the cédula incorporated some of the advice of the former President of the Audiencia, it did not order a full-scale military conquest. The pacification was to be carried out, but the process was to be a peaceful one, and it was to be conducted by missionaries. The combination of interests that guided Spanish policy towards the region is reflected in the words of the fiscal of the Council of the Indies. In 1669, the fiscal noted that the conquest of the Chocó and the subsequent exploitation of the region’s gold mines would benefit the royal treasury - as well as promoting commercial activities in surrounding regions - but he insisted that the Crown’s principal objective was to achieve the conversion of the native population. In the Chocó, colonization and conversion were to go hand in hand.

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10 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 27 November 1666, inserted in Royal Cédula, Madrid, 6 June 1674, ff.1-4. Some of the provisions included in this cédula were not uncommon. C.H.Haring, for example, noted in referring to the case of New Spain, that by cédulas of 1551 and later years, the Crown ordered that dispersed Indians gathered into settlements organized by the friars were to be exempted from tribute payments for ten years, and that they were also promised that they would not be distributed in encomiendas. See C.H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York, 1975), footnote 65, p.65.

11 See AGI Quito 67, Don Benito de Figueroa to Crown, Cartagena, 2 July 1668. The fiscal’s remarks are dated Madrid, 24 May 1669.
It was to be significant for the future of the Chocó that although the Crown had instructed the governor of Cartagena and the president of the Audiencia of Panama to cooperate in this endeavour, neither participated in it. Although we have no details to indicate why the president of the Audiencia of Panama failed to make any moves towards complying with the Crown's directive, we do know why the governor of Cartagena chose not to take part in these activities. In 1668, Governor Don Benito de Figueroa y Barrantes informed the Crown of his reluctance to undertake the "reduction" of the Indian population inhabiting the area which bordered with the gobernación of Cartagena. He reported that he had received a request from the president of the Audiencia of Santa Fe to prepare 50 armed men and 4 priests for entry to the Chocó, but that he had refused to do so, given the danger involved in sending his men through Urabá and Darién, a land known to be inhabited by "wild Indians".¹² As we have seen, this region was inhabited by Cunacuna Indians, who continued successfully to resist all Spanish incursions into their territory, and it was for this reason that the governor took the decision not to risk his men in the planned entrada. Cartagena did not, then, take part in the pacification of the Chocó: in 1672, the Audiencia of Santa Fe reported that the governor of

¹² Ibid., Royal Cédula to Governor Don Benito de Figueroa y Barrantes, Madrid, 27 November 1666; and Benito de Figueroa y Barrantes to Crown, Cartagena, 2 July 1668.
Cartagena had withdrawn from the enterprise completely. Eventually, the main thrust of the drive to colonize the region was to come from Antioquia and Popayán.

Before examining the role and competition of men from these provinces in the Chocó, we will first review the character of the region's native peoples and their interaction with Spaniards in the first half of the seventeenth century. We will see that the initial resistance of the native peoples had been weakened by the many changes that had taken place there since the Spaniards' early attempts at conquest. Then, we will return to the period after the royal cédula of 1666, focusing in particular on the entradas carried out by individuals from the two gobernaciones of Popayán and Antioquia, and at the ensuing conflict between them. We will see that, because of the Crown's unwillingness to organize and finance expeditions of its own, and because of the way in which it divided jurisdiction over the area between neighbouring and competing gobernaciones, the royal cédula actually encouraged conflict among Spanish colonists, which in turn facilitated the resistance of the Indians. In the final section, we will consider the ways in which the social structure and patterns of settlement of the region's native population militated against the success of the Spaniards' pacification campaign.

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13 Ibid., Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.
The Chocó in the Mid-Seventeenth Century

The three Indian "provinces", as they are called in the documents, which came under the control of the Spaniards during the second half of the seventeenth century inhabited a stretch of territory lying between the Arquía river, a tributary of the Atrato, and the mouth of the San Juan river, as well as the eastern tributaries of both the Atrato and the San Juan, and the three rivers lying to the south of Buenaventura - the Anchicayá, Dagua, and Raposo. In geographical terms, this section of the Chocó cut across the regions which Kathleen Romoly referred to by the names of Upper and Lower Chocó - the former lying between Cape Corrientes and Buenaventura, and the latter between Cape Corrientes and Panama.

Our understanding of the pre-conquest history of the Indian population of the Chocó is limited by the fact that, although Romoly has undertaken a very careful analysis of the tribes inhabiting the Upper Chocó when the first contacts with the Spaniards took place, comparable work on the Indians of the Lower Chocó has not been carried out. Nevertheless, Romoly's studies show that 19 independent Indian tribes inhabited the Upper Chocó area alone in the pre-conquest period, and that their total population may have ranged between 35,000 and 40,000 by the last quarter of the sixteenth century. However, detailed information on the number of villages and the size of the population of the Lower Chocó is not available.

Footnotes:
of the sixteenth century. By the mid-seventeenth century, many of these Indian groups, which had so successfully subverted the Spaniards' attempts at conquest during the previous century, no longer existed, and the size of the surviving native population had declined dramatically. There are few indications to explain why certain groups disappeared during the years between the 1570s and the 1660s, and what caused the numerical decline of the remaining groups. Inter-tribal warfare probably accounted for part of this decline. As Romoly noted, the disappearance of the Yngará in the years following the establishment of Toro had been primarily due to the attacks of an Indian group to which she refers as the Chocó: the latter terrorized the former for consenting to the Spanish occupation. The Tootuma, who also collaborated with the Spaniards, perhaps disappeared for the same reason. In addition to inter-tribal warfare and warfare with the Spaniards, the diseases the latter introduced accounted for another proportion of the demographic decline. In 1590, Melchor Velásquez conducted an expedition against the Noanama, but he found only desolation in the province, as a result, according to Fray Pedro Simón, of a "cruel

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16 Romoly, "Las Gentes", pp.37-48. The 19 tribes Romoly identified as inhabiting the Upper Chocó region in the pre-conquest period are the following: Botabirá, Burgalandete, Cagacimbe, Cirambirá, Cobira, Coponama, Chanco, Chocó, Ebirá, Eripede, Guarra, Morirama, Noanama, Orocuibirá, Sina, Tatama, Tatape, Tootuma, Yaco, Yngará. See ibid., p.27.

pestilence which had overcome them one year earlier.\textsuperscript{18} Romoly also found evidence to indicate rapid demographic decline in the region to the south of Buenaventura in the 1560s and 1570s. A smallpox epidemic eliminated large groups of Indians in 1566-67, and reduced the number of Indian inhabitants of the region to a fraction of the total number inhabiting the area in the years before contact with the Spaniards took place.\textsuperscript{19}

Disease appears to have continued to strike at the region’s population well into the seventeenth century. In 1669, Francisco de Quevedo reported that, on his arrival in Poya, he came across only two Indians suffering from smallpox: the rest had abandoned the area out of fear of his entrada and of contracting the disease.\textsuperscript{20} The secular priest Luis Antonio de la Cueva also reported that his first attempt to establish a settlement and build a church for the Noanama Indians had to be abandoned "because they all became ill of a great disease which struck them".\textsuperscript{21} And, in 1672, the Spaniard Lorenzo de Salamanca referred to

\textsuperscript{18} Fray Pedro Simón, Noticias Historiales, Vol.6, Chapter 2, p.240. See also Romoly, "El Alto Chocó", p.20, and Romoly, "Las Gentes", pp.31-32.

\textsuperscript{19} See Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos autóctonos", p.269.

\textsuperscript{20} AGI Quito 67, Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph de Noanama, 15 May 1669, f.2.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", Luis Antonio de la Cueva’s declaration, f.14.
an outbreak of smallpox which had spread across the region towards the end of 1670.\textsuperscript{22}

Thus, by the mid-seventeenth century, few independent indigenous groups of the Upper Chocó, at least, had survived a century and a half of contact with the Spaniards. For reasons we have already mentioned, the impact of early contacts with the Spaniards on the native groups that inhabited the region to the north of Cape Corrientes is much more difficult to determine. We know that three Indian groups which, in 1648, were said to inhabit the territory to the west of the Atrato river - the Burgumia, the Soruco, and the Membocana\textsuperscript{23} - remained entirely outside of the Spaniards' sphere of activity for the duration of the century. However, one Indian "province" of the Lower Chocó, the Citará, came under the control of the Spanish over the second half of the century. According to the Colombian anthropologist Patricia Vargas Sarmiento, this Indian group also suffered serious demographic decline as a result of contact with the Spaniards, and a proportion of these consequently migrated

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., Auto de Oficio, Popayán, 9 May 1672.

\textsuperscript{23} The region inhabited by these three groups cut across both the Upper and Lower Chocó. According to Isacsson, the Burgumia were also known by the names of Poromea, Boromea, or Burumia. They inhabited the region between the middle Atrato and the Pacific and were enemies of the Chocó, the Citará, and the Noanama until they disappeared, apparently, at the end of the seventeenth century. See Isacsson, "Fray Matías Abad", footnote 22, pp.467-68. As we shall see in Chapter 4, in the 1670s, the authorities in Popayán and Antioquia began to consider proceeding against the Soruco, although I have found no evidence to suggest that these campaigns ever took place.
northwards, to an area considered to fall within their own territorial boundaries.\textsuperscript{24} The subsequent history of the Citará, in particular, and of two of the Indian provinces from the Upper Chocó, the Noanama and the Tatamá/Chocó, which also came under Spanish control over the same period, will form one of the main themes of this thesis.

It must be said, by way of clarification, that the Spaniards who began to enter the Chocó from the middle of the seventeenth century gave several names to the indigenous groups they encountered: Noanama, Raposo, Citará, Citaravirá, Chocó, Tatamá, and Poya are names that are often used to refer to the three principal Indian provinces of the region.\textsuperscript{25} Some of the confusion can be overcome at the outset. The province known by the name of Raposo formed part of the Noanama group: in 1678, the Jesuit, Father Antonio Marzal, who resided in the region for six years, reported that the Indians living along the Raposo river were Noanamas.\textsuperscript{26} All the Noanama formed a single language group, still known by the name of Waunana.\textsuperscript{27} These, then, will be referred to throughout this thesis as Noanama. Citará and Citaravirá were two

\textsuperscript{24} Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundación de pueblos", p.63.

\textsuperscript{25} See, for example, Bartolomé Benítez’s petition, in AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", ff.1-2; Luis Antonio de la Cueva’s statement, Sed de Cristo, 16 December 1670, in ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", ff.137-38; and ibid., Don Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph de Noanama, 15 May 1669.

\textsuperscript{26} Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.494-95.

\textsuperscript{27} Isacsson, "Emberá", p.21.
names used to refer to the same Indian group. In this thesis they will be referred to as Citará. The Citará spoke a different language from the Noanama — known by the name of Emberá. However, the confusion regarding the three remaining groups — the Chocó, Tatamá, and Poya — is much more difficult to clarify. The Tatamá and the Chocó were identified by Kathleen Romoly as independent Indian groups in the sixteenth century, but, by the middle of the seventeenth century, both Tatamá and Chocó appear to have inhabited either the same or adjoining territories, since both names were used to refer to the Indians who inhabited one region — the upper San Juan and headwaters of the Atrato. In 1676, a former governor of Antioquia, Juan Bueso de Valdés, conducted an entrada to the region, and all the reports on his activities refer to the Indians encountered in this area as Tatamá. Two years later, in 1678, Father Antonio Marzal referred to the Indians of the same area as Chocó, and stated that the Poya, too, formed

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28 Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundación de pueblos", p.59.

29 Isacsson, "Emberá", p.21, and Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundación de pueblos", pp.58-9. In 1678, Antonio Marzal reported that the Chocó and Citará "speak with little difference one same language", and, in 1713, the oidor Vicente de Aramburu noted that the language of the Noanama Indians was different from that of the Chocó and Citará, who shared one language. See Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.495, and AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa Fe, 8 September 1713.

30 Romoly, "Las Gentes", p.27.
part of the same group. In 1689, the governor of Popayán, Don Gerónimo de Berrio, referred to the Chocó, the Tatamá, and the Poya as distinct Indian groups. The Audiencia also referred, in 1672, to the Poya, Tatamá, and Chocó as different groups, while Governor García, of Popayán, distinguished only between the Chocó and the Tatamá. To confuse matters still further, these Indians shared with the Citará what was said to be an almost identical language as well as many other cultural traits. For the sake of clarity, then, and in order to enable us to differentiate between the Indian provinces with which this thesis will be concerned, and between these and the entire region known by the name of "El Chocó", the third group will be referred to as Tatamá/Chocó. Although the Poya may have been a distinct Indian group at some time before

31 In reporting on the number of Jesuit missionaries that would be necessary for the region, in the event of the order remaining there, Marzal reported that these should reside in Poya, in the province of Chocó. See Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.505.

32 AGI Quito 75, Don Gerônimo de Berrio to Crown, Popayán, 2 March 1689.

33 AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 18 June 1672, and AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel García to Crown, Popayán, 22 December 1674.

34 Isacsson, "Emberá", p.21, and Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundación de pueblos", pp.58. Vargas Sarmiento’s short study of the impact of the Spanish advance on the native population of this area after the mid-seventeenth century, in particular, groups the Tatamá/Chocó and the Citará under the term "Emberá". This division has not been adopted in this thesis because, as we shall see, the Citará’s reaction to Spanish occupation of their territory differed from that of all other Indian groups in the region.
contact with the Spaniards took place, and although they were sometimes referred to as an independent group in the documents, the overall impression that remains from a close reading of these is that, if they did survive, their numbers were insignificant by the mid-seventeenth century.

Although the information available does not allow us to establish with any certainty the precise geographical area occupied by the three different Indian provinces, we know from Father Marzal’s report that while a small proportion of Noanarna Indians lived to the south of the port of Buenaventura - along the Anchicayá, Raposo, and Dagua rivers - the largest proportion lived along the San Juan, between the mouth of that river and San Joseph de Noanama, and along the Tamaná, Sipí, Garrapatas, and Negro rivers. Marzal also reported that the province of Tatamá/Chocó began where the River Tamaná meets the San Juan. The northern limits of the Tatamá/Chocó cannot be identified clearly, but, as we shall see in this and later chapters, these Indians were to be congregated in settlements lying to the south of the Andagueda river. The region to the north of the Andagueda was inhabited by the Citaráes. The northern limits of Citará territory appears from the documents to lie along the Arquía river.

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35 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.494.

36 Patricia Vargas considered that the region surrounding the rivers Arquía, Baberama, and Negua was inhabited by an unidentified Indian group independent of the Citará. See Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundación de pueblos", p.59. This assumption probably derived from the 1671 report of antioqueño priest, Antonio de Guzmán, who
although, early in the eighteenth century, large groups of Citará Indians moved further northwards, to the Murri and the Sucio rivers, the latter bordering with Cunacuna territory.\footnote{See Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this thesis.}

The size of the population of the region is equally difficult to estimate. Although there is no data to indicate the size of the pre-conquest population of the Lower Chocó, Romoly's figures for the Upper Chocó show that that area alone supported a population of between 35,000 and 40,000 by the end of the sixteenth century.\footnote{Romoly, "Las Gentes", pp.37-48.} However, between the late the 1660s and 1678, several censuses of the native population of the region, especially of the Tatamá/Chocó and the Citará, were carried out by the Spaniards. By the latter date, according to Antonio Marzal, the province of Noanama was composed of 130 tributaries and had a total population of 650. The provinces of Chocó and Citará were each composed of 350 tributaries, and each had a total Indian population of 1,600.\footnote{Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, \textit{Los Jesuitas}, pp.494-495.} Considering that these were the three principal native groups which inhabited the area encompassing both the Lower and Upper Chocó, and that their combined total

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observed that the area surrounding the Arquía river had been inhabited by Indians known by the name of "guaracues", who suffered repeated invasions and were eventually defeated by the Citaraes. See Ortega Ricaurte, \textit{Historia documental}, p.111.
population was estimated to number no more than 3,850, it is clear that the Indians of the Chocó region had suffered a catastrophic demographic decline over the previous century.

**Spanish Advances into Chocó Territory: 1610-1660**

By the mid-seventeenth century, penetrations into Chocó territory had been made by both payaneses and antioqueños, although the former’s attempts to establish a foothold among the Noanama had been somewhat more successful than the latter’s attempts among the Citará. There are few details to indicate the extent of the Antioqueños’ activities in the region before 1650, but we do know that, in the mid-1640s, the gobernación of Antioquia began moves to penetrate Citará territory by peaceful means, and to pacify and reduce the native population of the area. In 1645, the governor of Antioquia, Antonio Portocarrero, sent two Indian prisoners from the city of Antioquia to assure the native population of his peaceful intentions. *From that year on, according to Patricia Vargas, no further armed expeditions of conquest were sent to the region from Antioquia. Instead, these were replaced by small groups of Spaniards who entered the region for the purpose of aiding their Indian allies against their enemies, and attempting to evangelize the population by means of gifts of tools, beads, and other goods. Santiago Garcés’ expedition of 1645, for example, was carried out in response to a request from the Citaraes*
for aid against the Membocana,\textsuperscript{40} who, as we have seen, inhabited the western side of the Atrato river. Antioquia's activities among the Citará, however, ended after the death of the Franciscan Fray Matías Abad in 1649,\textsuperscript{41} whose efforts to convert the population of the Atrato river region we will examine in Chapter 3.

The gobernación of Popayán focused its early activities in the region around the San Juan and Raposo rivers, and the port of Buenaventura, where it had achieved considerable successes in pacifying the native population. According to Robert West, the pacification of the Noanama had already taken place by the 1630s, although he does not provide any details to indicate how this had occurred.\textsuperscript{42} In 1678, Antonio Marzal also reported that the Noanama had been permitting Spaniards into their territory for forty years.\textsuperscript{43} And, in 1669, the governor of Popayán, Don Luis Antonio de Guzmán y Toledo, observed that the Noanama had been paying tributes to the Crown since 1663.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40} Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundación de pueblos", pp.63-65.

\textsuperscript{41} Isacsson, "Fray Matías Abad", pp.465-66.

\textsuperscript{42} West, The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia, p.93.

\textsuperscript{43} See Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.495-496.

\textsuperscript{44} AGI Quito 13, Luis Antonio de Guzmán y Toledo to Crown, Quito, 26 April 1669.
MAP 5

THE PACIFIC LOWLANDS

Why the province of Noanama - which had been one of the most violently resistant to the Spanish in the sixteenth century - should have been among the first to be pacified in the seventeenth century, remains unclear. However, it is possible that the pacification of the Noanama occurred as an extension of Spanish campaigns against the tribes that inhabited the southern section of the Pacific lowlands - the Barbacoas region, and especially the Raposo-Iscuandé regions. Little is known about the native population of these areas, or about early Spanish explorations there, but we do know that an expedition was conducted to the Barbacoas region in 1600, which reached the Telembí river and founded the settlement of Santa María del Puerto. Because of the hostility of the Indian inhabitants, and the difficulties involved in obtaining food supplies, mining activities on a large scale did not begin in Barbacoas until the last quarter of the seventeenth century, although there are indications that mining was taking place there and in the Iscuandé region before mid-century. In 1610, Francisco Ramírez de la Serna led a punitive expedition against several tribes - the Timbas, Piles, Cacajambres, Paripesos - that are thought to have inhabited the upper and middle sections of the Saija and Micay rivers: these were said to have been raiding not only the port of Buenaventura but also the gold mines in the vicinity. We also know that, on this occasion, Ramírez de la Serna came across and defeated a small "armada" of Noanama Indians who were travelling to Buenaventura. By
1630, Francisco de Prado y Zúñiga was observing that the rivers Patía, Micay, Timbiquí, and Iscuandé, were very rich in gold deposits. By 1640, suggestions were being made to open trails linking the ports of Santa María and Santa Bárbara (in the vicinity of the Timbiquí river) to Pasto and Popayán. In 1646, there were said to be mines along the Timbiquí. And in 1647, the governor of Popayán complained that the Jesuit Francisco Ruje was employing Indians to extract gold from the placers along the Telembí. Indians captured in the southern Pacific lowlands were also taken to Cali, where they were sold or given in encomienda to local families. The Ramírez party, for instance, returned with 130 captives from the Timbes tribes, and in 1630, there were said to be Indians in Cali from the lowland tribes of the Piles and Cacajambres. By 1665, mining camps had been established just south of Buenaventura, and a mining zone, known as "Minas de la Montaña de Raposo" had also been established, which included the Calima area and the streams immediately to the south of Buenaventura. As we have seen, this region was

45 West, The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia, p.94; West, Colonial Placer Mining, pp.19-20; Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, pp.325-326; and Wassen, "Apuntes Etnohistóricos", p.9. According to Romoly, the earliest attempts to colonize this area were made in the 1540s. See Romoly, "Apuntes sobre los pueblos autóctonos", p.268.

46 West, The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia, p.94.

47 For an account of early Spanish-Indian contact in this region, see the two studies by West, Colonial Placer Mining, pp.18-20; and The Pacific Lowlands, pp.94-97. See also Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, pp.274, 325-326.
inhabited by Noanama Indians, lending support, although details are scarce and confused, to the theory that their pacification may have been an extension of Spanish activities further south.

**Jurisdictional Conflict over the Chocó**

By the end of the 1650s, Popayán had established an official presence in the province of Noanama. Sometime before the end of that decade, the governor of Popayán, Don Luis de Valenzuela Fajardo, appointed the Maestro de Campo Diego Ramón as teniente, corregidor, and alcalde mayor de minas in the very ambiguously defined region encompassing the province of Noanama, the mines of Raposo, and the area surrounding the port of Buenaventura. Very little is known about Diego Ramón, except that his task was said to be to work towards the Christianization of the Indian population of the area, and that, at some time, he had had encounters with the Tatamá/Chocó and the Citará, from which he had only survived by taking refuge among the Noanama.

Following Ramón’s death, the next governor of Popayán, Luis Antonio de Guzmán y Toledo, appointed Juan López García as his teniente in the area, in November 1659, marking the

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48 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, *Los Jesuitas*, p.494.

49 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia), f.8, and Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, *Los Jesuitas*, pp.495-96. The region incorporating the province of Noanama, the Raposo River, and the port of Buenaventura was said by the Audiencia of Santa Fe to fall within the jurisdiction of the city of Cali. See AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.
beginning of almost two decades of activity for López García in the Chocó.  

Despite the apparent success of these advances, few Spaniards resided in the province of Noanaina in the early 1660s. The extent of the title and duties conferred upon López García - teniente, corregidor, and alcalde mayor de minas of the Noanama, the mines of the Raposo, and the port of Buenaventura - suggests that this was an appointment made for a barely explored region, where the governor's teniente represented the only official Spanish presence and undertook all official duties. López García's task was to further the establishment of Indian settlements in the region under his jurisdiction and to attend to the Christianization and well-being of its native population. It was expected that his presence there would not only prevent the Indians being harmed, but also ensure the security of travellers to the region.  

Over the following years, the influence of the government of Popayán gradually extended over a larger area. In 1666, Andrés Pérez Serrano was appointed teniente of the region encompassing the mines of the Raposo river and the port of Buenaventura. Two years later, it was said that Pérez Serrano still lived in the area, and he was certainly listed as one of the Spaniards who collected

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50 Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", f.8.
51 Ibid., ff.8-10.
52 This appointment was made by Governor Luis Antonio de Guzmán y Toledo in Pasto, on 7 September 1666. Ibid., ff.26-27.
tributes paid by Noanama Indians. In 1666, López García was appointed teniente of the region inhabited by the Tatamá/Chocó, and, two years later, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta extended still further the title and the territory under his jurisdiction: in that year, he became corregidor and "Justicia Mayor Capitán A Guerra de todas las dichas provincias" - which meant the entire Chocó region.

López García's method of pacification was based partly on commerce with the Indian inhabitants of the area. In 1672, the Audiencia informed the Crown that he had established a system of barter with the Indians, exchanging gold for machetes, axes, and other goods. However, in 1678, the Jesuit Antonio Marzal provided another feasible explanation for López García's success in penetrating Tatamá/Chocó and Citará territory. Marzal claimed that López García had planned to use the pacified Noanama Indians to move against the Tatamá/Chocó, and that it was as a result of the fear of a joint Spanish-Noanama attack that the Tatamá/Chocó people sought a peaceful agreement.

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53 Ibid., Certificación, Royal Officials of the Real Caja of Popayán, Popayán, 5 May 1668, f.12.
54 This appointment was also made by Governor Luis Antonio de Guzmán y Toledo in Pasto, on 7 September 1666. Ibid., ff.26-27.
55 Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Popayán, 7 May 1668, ff.131-132. See also ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", Petition presented by Bartolomé Benítez, f.2. His son, Jorge López García, was appointed deputy, in case of his father's absence or illness.
56 Ibid., Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.
with the Spaniards. According to Marzal, this was precisely what López García needed, for his purpose was to move up to the Río Negro and Sed de Cristo, in search of gold. Following the agreement reached between the Spaniards and the Tatamá/Chocó, slave gangs from Anserma gradually began to enter the region, and the Citará, who now feared an alliance between the Noanama, the Tatamá/Chocó, and the Spaniards, quickly followed suit, and opened their territory to the Spaniards, who took with them stores of Spanish goods sought by the Indians, especially tools and beads.⁵⁷

Indeed, the many petitions and declarations that were presented by residents of the region over the following years show that López García’s main aim was to set up mining operations in the area. It was said, for instance, that he had introduced a slave gang to exploit the gold mines of the Raposo river and the mining camp of Sed de Cristo, where he had made many discoveries.⁵⁸ The priest Luis Antonio de la Cueva also reported that López García had discovered rich gold mines in Toro Viejo, Sed de Cristo, Nóvita, Río Negro, and the Garrapatas and Yró rivers, whose exploitation he had begun.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.496-497.


⁵⁹ Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Luis Antonio de la Cueva, Sed de Cristo, 16 December 1670, ff.137-138.
However, López García also claimed great successes in achieving the reduction and conversion of all the native provinces of the region. In describing his activities during these years, he and his supporters repeatedly claimed that he had been responsible for conquering, reducing, and resettling the native populations of the provinces of Noanama, Tatamá/Chocó, and Citará. In 1670, the secular priest Luis Antonio de la Cueva reported that, during the eleven years that López García served as corregidor of the three provinces of Noanama, Tatamá/Chocó and Citará, he had not only kept the peace among the Indians, but also introduced secular priests for their instruction in the Holy Faith, and trained them in the payment of tributes to the Crown.60 In 1672, the bishop of Popayán also referred to López García’s activities, and noted that he had been the first person in recent times to attempt to attract and reduce the Indians of the Chocó through peaceful means. His actions, the bishop stated, had resulted in the Indians accepting preachers, the administration of the Sacraments, and agreeing to pay tributes to the Royal Treasury.61

From the end of the 1660s to the mid-1670s, however, López García’s record in the region was disputed by other Spaniards undertaking entradas to the Chocó. The principle which guided Spanish policy towards native groups in

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60 Ibid.
frontier regions throughout the colonial period was that of "congregación" - or "reducción", as the process was known in the Chocó. The congregation of small, dispersed communities into larger permanent settlements was seen as a prerequisite to their instruction in Christianity and as a means of facilitating the task of civil administration. The performance of officials in this area, at least, was measured in terms of the success of their efforts in this process.

The first stirrings of conflict over rights in the Chocó territories took place within the gobernación of Popayán, as a result of a capitulación agreed between Don Francisco de Quevedo and his uncle, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta, in response to the Crown’s royal cédula of November 1666. Under the terms of the capitulación, Quevedo undertook to carry out an entrada to the Chocó at his own expense (soldiers, provisions, arms) in return for certain privileges, among which were included the governorship of Popayán for a period of eight years and the title of Adelantado.

J.H. Elliott believes that these capitulaciones were probably inspired by the contracts agreed between the Crown and the leaders of expeditions undertaken against the Moors during the period of the Reconquista. The purpose of these

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63 AGI Quito 67, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to President of Audiencia, Popayán, 20 July 1672.
contracts was to guarantee to the leaders of such expeditions due rewards for their services, while also guaranteeing the Crown’s rights in the newly conquered territories. The hereditary title of adelantado - which conferred special military powers and the right to govern the conquered region - was often included among the rewards the expeditionary leaders might expect to receive. As Elliott points out, and as the case of the Chocó shows, the Crown had no alternative but to make contracts like these when it provided no financial assistance to these expeditions.⁶⁴

It was precisely on these grounds that the governor of Popayán justified his course of action. As the Audiencia informed the Crown, Díaz de la Cuesta had no authority to make such a contract, since the royal cédula of 1666 had placed overall control over expeditions to the Chocó in the hands of its president. But, as the governor explained, the Audiencia had been unable to provide the assistance necessary for him to carry out the entrada personally, as ordered by the cédula. The governor claimed that he had first requested 100 men, which he then reduced to 50, and then to only 50 arquebuses, but that none of these had been provided. Moreover, his request for ammunition to the Audiencia of Quito had simply been ignored. The Audiencia of Santa Fe agreed that, in effect, it had been unable to meet Díaz de la Cuesta’s request because of the shortage of

arms that existed in Popayán and Santa Fe, a result of the fact that there were many ports in the viceroyalty which had to be protected. The judges of the Audiencia reported that they could not give what they did not have. Thus, although the cédula placed the enterprise under the supervision of the Audiencia of Santa Fe, in failing to provide the means to finance expeditions, it had no alternative but to leave these to people like Quevedo or López García, who expected either to receive privileges from the Crown or large returns on their investment.

Francisco de Quevedo’s 1669 entrada to the Chocó was grounded in both his family connections, as a relative of Governor Díaz de la Cuesta, and his military experience, as a soldier who had served the Crown for many years in the Spanish armies. On 31 January, 1669, Quevedo left the city of Popayán accompanied by Don Domingo de Beitia (appointed as alférez by the governor), Don Sebastián Correa (captain), Miguel de Rizo (sargeant), and his cousin, the secular priest Don Pedro Gómez del Valle. In Cali, Buga, and Toro, Quevedo got together a company of up

65 AGI Quito 67, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to President of the Audiencia, Popayán, 20 July 1672; Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 28 July 1669; Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, 8 April 1669; Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 20 July 1672; and Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.

to forty Spaniards, and in Roldanillo, 40 Indians, 20 of whom were to serve as carriers, and 10 mules.\textsuperscript{67}

The contemporary account of Quevedo’s activities in the Chocó shows that, after travelling to the settlement of San Joseph de Noanama, Quevedo met with representatives of the principal Indian provinces – the Noanama, Tatamá/Chocó, and Citará. His intention was to secure the agreement of the representatives of the native population to the following four conditions: 1) they were to become Catholics and receive a missionary; 2) they were to recognize the king as sovereign; 3) they were to pay tributes (despite the contents of the royal \textit{cédula} of November 1666, which prohibited the collection of tributes for a period of ten years); and 4) they were to congregate in settlements. In exchange, the Indians received Quevedo’s assurance that they would not be parcelled out in \textit{encomiendas}, and that they would receive aid against their enemies, although he gave no indication of who these enemies might be. At this stage, Quevedo appears to have had few problems: the Indian representatives, who at first appeared reluctant, finally agreed to his terms.\textsuperscript{68} For the first time in a century and a half of repeated Spanish attempts to occupy the region,

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., Don Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph de Noanama, 15 May 1669.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. Quevedo was one of the few Spaniards who provided a description of Indian dress in his report on the \textit{entrada}. See ibid.
several settlements were founded in the three provinces of Noanama, Tatamá/Chocó, and Citará.69

However, as a result of this entrada, a dispute arose between Francisco de Quevedo and Juan López García. Quevedo's efforts were opposed by López García because, he alleged, the entrada had caused consternation among the Indians. He complained that he had had to assure them that Quevedo was merely continuing the peaceful and voluntary process of reduction that was already being carried out. Fearing that his title would be suspended as a result of Quevedo's entrada, López García argued that such an action would cause the Indians great distress and prevent the continuation of the process of conquest.

López García's opposition is not surprising: he had invested a great deal of work and his entire fortune in the enterprise.70 After many years of complete freedom to discover and exploit mines wherever these were discovered, López García no doubt felt that Quevedo's presence in the province threatened his own position. Antonio Marzal expressed similar thoughts in 1678, noting that while Juan López García and his son remained in the provinces, nobody else would be able to assume a position of authority in the

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69 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.498.

70 Indeed, López García alleged that it had only been as a result of his "buen modo" and peaceful methods that so many caciques and Indian parcialidades had been reduced. See AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", Petition presented by Bartolomé Benítez, f.2.
Indeed, the Jesuit reported the disputes that had arisen between Juan López García, his son Jorge López García, and Capitán Salamanca, when the latter obtained the title of corregidor of the province of Citará from the governor of Popayán. Despite the distance that separated the province of Citará from his mining camps, Juan López García hindered Capitán Salamanca’s attempts to take up his post. Marzal was of the opinion that, in the Chocó, Juan and Jorge López García were "big fish who swallow up the little ones".

However, Francisco de Quevedo’s account of his activities in the Chocó shows that, in fact, López García had made little progress in congregating the native population of the region in permanent settlements. Quevedo reported, for instance, that at the time of his entrada, Sed de Cristo was made up of only two houses. And, although the Indians of the province of Noanama had been paying tribute for four or five years, they had not been congregated in settlements, nor had they been prepared to do so until his arrival. While he was in the Chocó, Quevedo wrote that he was in the process of congregating the Noanamas in a settlement, San Joseph, on the banks of the San Juan river, which was previously composed of five uninhabited houses and a broken down church.

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71 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.505.

72 Ibid., pp.504-505.

73 AGI Quito 67, Don Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph de Noanama, 15 May 1669.
The dispute between Quevedo and López García also implicated the governor of Popayán, Gabriel Díaz de la Cuesta, and his successor, Governor Miguel García. Díaz de la Cuesta (it must be remembered that he was Quevedo’s cousin) was particularly concerned to ensure that the terms of Quevedo’s contract were honoured. He argued that this was essential to the success of Spanish efforts to establish control over the region, because in honouring Quevedo’s contract, the Crown would be encouraging others to undertake similar entradas. Thus, the governor reported that the entrada had cost Quevedo 18,000 pesos, and that he had personally contributed 4,000. Díaz de la Cuesta also claimed that Quevedo had begun to congregate the native population of the provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and Citará, that he had founded ten settlements, each with its church, and that the Indians voluntarily had agreed to pay two gold pesos to the Crown in tributes each year. Moreover, as a direct result of Quevedo’s efforts, more than one hundred black slaves had been taken from Anserma to the Chocó, and vecinos from Popayán were then preparing to take in one hundred more.74

To prove Quevedo’s success, the governor sent just over 3,692 pesos to Spain, suggesting that these were tributes collected as a direct result of the entrada. However, as the following table shows, the 3,692 pesos sent

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74 Ibid., Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to President of the Audiencia, Popayán, 20 July 1672; Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, 28 July 1669; Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, 20 July 1672.
by Díaz de la Cuesta to Spain included all the tributes collected by Popayán officials in the region since 1661. These show that the Noanama had in fact been paying tributes to the Crown since at least 1661, and that the Tatamá/Chocó and the Citará had begun to pay tributes in 1667 and 1668. The point of drawing attention to these tribute payments, however, is to show why, in 1674, Don Miguel García, Díaz de la Cuesta’s successor, and apparently a supporter of Juan López García, exposed the strategy used by the former governor to claim the credit for a reduction which García believed had taken place before the Quevedo entrada. He accused Díaz de la Cuesta of transferring from Anserma to Popayán all the tributes collected in the Chocó between May 1667 and December 1671, under the pretense that these had been collected as result of a "new reduction". Governor García claimed that no progress had been made in the province since 1666, and that Quevedo’s entrada had actually been counter-productive, bringing the Indian population to the verge of rebellion.75

We do not know how the Crown responded to the Quevedo capitulación, but we do know that Don Francisco died before the Crown accepted the terms of the contract.76

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75 Ibid., and "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)" , Popayán, 15 December 1674, f.120. See also AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel García to Crown, Popayán, 22 November 1674.

76 AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Quito to Crown, Quito, 15 June 1675.
### TABLE 1: TRIBUTES COLLECTED IN THE CHOCO, 1661-1672

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>INDIANS</th>
<th>GOLD (*)</th>
<th>SILVER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1661 (Oct.)</td>
<td>(a) Noanamas</td>
<td>109p.1t.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1665 (Jan.)</td>
<td>(a) Noanama</td>
<td>645p.</td>
<td>156pt.6r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1666 (Apr.)</td>
<td>(b) Noanama-Raposo</td>
<td></td>
<td>132pat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1667 (Feb.)</td>
<td>(a) Noanama-San Juan/ Cacique Mumia (Tatamá/Chocó)</td>
<td>199p.3t.6g</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1667 (Feb.)</td>
<td>(b) Noanama-Raposo</td>
<td></td>
<td>58p.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668 (Apr.)</td>
<td>(a,b) Noanama-Raposo &amp; San Juan &amp; Tatamá/Chocó &amp; Citará</td>
<td>387p.4t.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1669 (July)</td>
<td>(b) Noanama-Raposo</td>
<td></td>
<td>38p.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670 (Apr.)</td>
<td>(a) Noanama-San Juan &amp; Tatamá/Chocó &amp; Citará</td>
<td>550p.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670 (May)</td>
<td>(b) Noanama-Raposo</td>
<td></td>
<td>32p.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670 (Oct.)</td>
<td>(c) Noanama-San Juan</td>
<td>106p.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1671 (Oct.)</td>
<td>(d) Noanama-San Juan &amp; Tatamá/Chocó &amp; Citará</td>
<td>894p.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1672 (Mar.)</td>
<td>(b) Noanama-Raposo</td>
<td>77p.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1672 (May)</td>
<td>(c) Citaráes</td>
<td>398p.4t.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1672 (May)</td>
<td>(e) Noanama-San Juan</td>
<td>198p.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>3692p.4t.</td>
<td>288pat.6r</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: (*) Measured in Gold Dust
p.: pesos
 t.: tomines
 g.: gramos
 pat: patacones
 r.: reales
(a) Tributes collected by Juan López García
(b) Tributes collected by Andrés Pérez Serrano
(c) Tributes collected by Lorenzo de Salamanca
(d) Tributes collected by Francisco de Quevedo
(e) Tributes collected by Sebastián Correa
(Source: AGI Quito 67, Certificación. Don Bernardino de Ubillus)
Conflict over the Chocó was not limited to the gobernación of Popayán, however. Just before the governor of Popayán, Don Gabriel Díaz de la Cuesta, authorized Francisco de Quevedo to undertake his entrada to the Chocó, in 1669, the gobernación of Antioquia decided to stake its claim to parts of the area. In 1668, Governor Luis de Berrio, of Antioquia, empowered the secular priest, Antonio de Guzmán, to conduct an entrada to the province of Citará aimed at establishing settlements and congregating the native population of the area within them. Guzmán concentrated his efforts in the province of Citará, and it was this area that became the cause of a serious jurisdictional dispute between the two gobernaciones that was to last until the end of the 1680s.

Antonio de Guzmán argued Antioquia’s case for jurisdiction over Citará on the grounds that the provinces of Noanama and Tatamá/Chocó belonged to the government of Popayán because, geographically, they bordered on Popayán’s territory. The province of Citará, however, bordered on Antioquia’s territory and therefore fell within that gobernación’s government. In 1672, Guzmán observed, in support of his claim, that when he first entered the province of Citará, there were no friars, no clerics, and no sign whatsoever that Christians had traversed the

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77 See, for example, Antonio de Guzmán’s statements in Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Mina del Señor Santo Domingo, 28 September 1674, f.67.

78 Ibid., Río de Atrato, 20 December 1672, f.105.
land. The governor of Popayán, Miguel García, denied that Antioquia had any jurisdictional rights over the Citaraes: the province of Citará lay half-way between the two gobernaciones of Popayán and Antioquia, and in order to pursue their interests the Antioqueños had been causing trouble among the Indians. Indeed, Governor Miguel García also reported that Antioquia’s claims were based on the assumption that Antioqueños had, in earlier times, conducted entradas to the Chocó, but that these could not be considered to be precedents for the gobernación’s present occupation of the area, because those entradas had not been successful in reducing the native population.

Despite the claims and counter-claims, the sources show that both gobernaciones, represented by Quevedo and Guzmán, had been active in Citará: both men founded five settlements within the province, although these were situated in different locations. While Quevedo founded San Sebastián de Nigua (Nigua), San Pedro de Tacoda (the location of which is not clear from the sources), San Francisco de Atrato (where the Atrato river met the Andagueda river), San Miguel (on the Andagueda river), and San Gabriel (also on the Andagueda), Antonio de Guzmán

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79 Ibid., f.105.

80 Ibid., Governor Miguel García to Crown, Popayán, 26 June 1674.

81 Ibid., "Testimonia de Autos (Franciscans), Popayán, 15 December 1674, f.120.

82 Witnesses questioned as a result of this dispute provided the location of the settlements founded by Quevedo in Citará. See, for example, ibid., ff.52, 54,
established the following settlements, for which he also carried out censuses:

**TABLE 2: SETTLEMENTS ESTABLISHED BY ANTONIO DE GUZMAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Tributary Indians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taita (Arquía)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan Bautista (Nigua river)</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Pedro (Atrato river)</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco de Atrato (Atrato river)</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joseph</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,153</strong></td>
<td><strong>326</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Antioquia, n.p., n.d., f.95; and Río de Atrato, 20 December 1672, ff.104-106.]

Although the precise locations cannot be established with complete certainty, three of Quevedo's towns were established on the Andagueda river, while three of Guzmán's were founded on the Atrato. The different locations chosen for the Indian settlements reflected the needs of the two gobernaciones involved. This is particularly clear in the case of Antioquia. Guzmán's 1672 explanation for the choice of the location of Taita shows that his purpose was to establish Indian settlements in sites that would facilitate the entry and activities of Antioqueños. Guzmán explained that Taita was very convenient for entradas from 56, and especially 59-60.
the city of Antioquia to the province, for it was situated at a distance of five days from the sitio de Urrao, which itself was situated at a distance of three days from the city of Antioquia, where he owned houses and maize fields, and where Spaniards going in and Indians going out of the Chocó would be able to lodge. In addition, travellers going through Taita could be provided with supplies of fruits, maize, plantains, fish, hens, and pigs that were by this time being raised there. Moreover, Taita was also situated at a distance of one and a half days from the Bebará river, which served as a port: from there it was possible to travel by river to the Atrato, and from there to traverse the entire province of Citará, and the provinces' towns, by river, thus facilitating communications. A further advantage was the fact that Don Pedro Daza resided in Taita. Daza was a ladino and Christian Indian who had served as Guzmán's interpreter ever since he first entered the province.83 The other settlements, Guzmán would later inform the Franciscan Comisario, had been chosen according to several criteria: the needs of the Indians, the convenience of the doctrineros who would assist them, and the provision of the Spaniards who would enter the region with their slave gangs to work the gold mines that he knew to be both rich and

83 Ibid., Río de Atrato, 20 December 1672, ff.104-106. See also Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.107-25.
numerous. The Payaneses said less about why Quevedo chose particular locations for his towns, but trade routes seem to have been a major factor: San Gabriel, for example, was established "in the ... port of ... Dodubar because it seemed to us very convenient ... for ... the supply of the Spaniards...".

Clearly, the Spaniards intended to choose locations for their Indian settlements that were surrounded by rich mining areas, for it was the promise of rich and new sources of gold, and of new commercial opportunities, that attracted them to the region. Thus, Guzmán was very specific in indicating, in 1672, that San Juan de Nigua contained the gold mines of Nemota, Naurita, Panipani, and the port of Tutunendo; San Pedro contained the mines of Tanando and of the banks of the Atrato river; San Francisco contained the gold deposits of the Andagueda river, which according to the Indians was very rich; and San Joseph contained the deposits of the Samugrado river. Indeed, it was also well known that the mine of Santo Domingo, in the vicinity of the settlement of Nigua, belonged to him, and he personally informed the governor that he was engaged "in the discovery of gold mines which I have achieved in

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84 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Antioquia, 29 April 1674, f.90.

85 Ibid., Domingo de Beitia y Gamboa's statement, Nuestra Señora de Belén, 28 July 1674, f.60.

86 Ibid., Río de Atrato, 20 December 1672, f.106.

87 Ibid., 28 September 1674, f.67.
the said province with my own black slaves I brought to it".\(^8\)

Although the two *gobernaciones* of Popayán and Antioquia argued over the location of the Indian settlements and over who had been responsible for successfully reducing the Indian population to them - the key to explaining the jurisdictional conflict between the *gobernaciones* is that they were both concerned to defend their rights to jurisdiction over the labour of the Indians - these conflicts bore no relation to what was actually happening in the Chocó. All the settlements were abandoned by the Indians almost as soon as they had been founded. As we shall see in the next section, by the early 1670s, the Spaniards had clarified their purpose in occupying the Chocó, and finally understood that their peaceful moves to relocate the Indians to settlements which suited their interests were unlikely to be successful without a show of force.

**Spanish-Indian Relations**

By the beginning of the 1670s, the Spaniards had already recognized that slaves would have to be imported to exploit the gold mines of the region. In 1669, Francisco de Quevedo observed that San Joseph de Noanina, on the banks of the San Juan river, was situated in such an excellent location, that it could be reached by ship from both Panama and Peru. Quevedo believed that if the

\(^{88}\) Ibid., f.94.
province of Noanama was to be settled, it would be filled with slave gangs, for it was "the richest in the world". In 1672, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta argued that gold was so abundant in the Chocó that it would enrich the Crown immensely, if only slaves could be introduced to extract it, for there was, at the time, a serious shortage. Two years later, the following governor of Popayán, Don Miguel García, reported that the wealth of the Chocó was indeed considerable, for a slave was usually able to extract as much as one gold peso per day. This governor argued that the royal treasury would benefit immensely if 200 or 300 slaves - with loyal administrators - were introduced to the region.

However, the introduction of slaves posed an additional problem for the Spaniards, namely, the provision of supplies for their maintenance. As Governor García noted, the cost of importing food supplies to the region was very high, for these were usually carried over difficult terrain and long distances. This situation left only one source of provisions for the slaves of the Chocó - the Indians. Juan López García had early recognized how necessary the native population would be: in

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89 Ibid., Don Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph de Noanama, 15 May 1669.

90 Ibid., Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to President of the Audiencia, Popayán, 20 July 1672.

91 AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel García to Crown, Popayán, 22 November 1674.

92 Ibid.
requesting permission to move his slave gangs and settle mining camps within the provinces he was able to reduce, he also asked to be permitted to employ neighbouring Indian families and indeed communities for the provision of supplies for the slave gangs, although he added that these would only be Indians who voluntarily chose to be employed, and that they would receive religious instruction from the doctrinero who ministered to the slaves. Referring to the province of Noanama, the priest Luis Antonio de la Cueva reported that it would be necessary to settle Indians along with the slave gangs for the provision of foodstuffs and security from attack from still unpacified Indians.

A further crucial consideration - in view of the high cost of importing supplies - was the increasing number of Spaniards who had begun to enter the region with their slaves and who also had to be provided with foodstuffs. Many Spaniards followed López García and Guzmán into the Chocó. The priest Luis Antonio de la Cueva reported that, as a result of the efforts of Juan López García among the Noanama, several slave gangs from the city of Anserma had been introduced, such as those belonging to Lorenzo Benítez de la Serna, Francisco Díaz de la Serna, Francisco Ramírez de la Serna, Diego Manzano, Bartolomé de Espinosa, and Simón Luis Moreno de la Cruz. In 1672, the bishop of

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93 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia), Petition presented by Bartolomé Benítez, f.3.

94 Ibid., 29 May 1669, f.14.

95 Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans), f.138."
Popayán also noted that, since Francisco de Quevedo’s entrada, merchants as well as Spaniards and slave gangs had entered the region. 96 Two years later, it was reported that Antonio de Guzmán, his brother Capitán Ignacio de Guzmán, and his nephews Juan de Guzmán Jaramillo, Gregorio de Guzmán, and Juan Nuño de Sotomayor, had taken into the province of Citará more than 40 slaves belonging to them and their relatives, as well as more than sixty other people, employed, for example, as carriers and pathfinders. 97 According to Antonio del Pino Villapadierna, in addition to the 40 slaves belonging to Guzmán and his relatives, more than 80 people had entered the province since he had discovered the new mines. Antonio del Pino had also sent seven slaves and a miner into the region. 98

As a result of the jurisdictional conflict between the gobernaciones of Antioquia and Popayán, several witnesses were questioned in the early 1670s, in order to obtain information relating to the activities of Quevedo, Guzmán, and López García. Their statements provide a further source for identifying the names of Spaniards who were living or working in the Chocó at the time. In addition to

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96 Ibid., Bishop Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros to Crown, Santa Fe, 3 July 1672.

97 Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans), Petition presented by Don Francisco Mayoral de Olivos, Don Carlos de Molina y Toledo, Don Diego Beltrán de Castillo, Doctor Luis Jaramillo, and Juan Jaramillo, Valle de Aburra, 28 August 1674, f.33.

98 Ibid., ff.36-37.
those named above, thirty Spaniards were either questioned, or served as witnesses to the declarations. Thus, while it is not possible to establish exactly how many Spaniards worked or lived in the region at the time, or the precise number of slaves they introduced, the sources suggest that as many as two hundred people may have been added to the population of the Chocó by 1673 - a number that was to increase still further with the arrival of the Franciscans in that year. Moreover, according to Father Antonio Marzal, by 1678 there were at least 136 slaves across the region, and he noted that, where there were many slaves, there were also many "free men".

For the Indians of the region, the arrival of the settlers was destructive. Given the rudimentary nature of Spanish government at this time, few complaints were made

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99 The following list includes those who were either questioned directly about the activities of the Guzmán brothers, López García, and Francisco de Quevedo, or served as witnesses to the declarations of the others: Domingo de Beitia y Gamboa, Pedro de Casas, Bartolomé de Alaraz, Nicolás de Castro Travada, Sebastián García Benítez, Esteban Fernández de Rivera, Joseph de Salamanca, Lorenzo de Salamanca, Francisco Sedeño, Marcos González de Velásquez, Mateo Velásquez, Lope de Cárdenas, Lorenzo Benítez de la Serna, Juan López García, Gregorio García de Rada, Joseph García, Francisco Suárez, Gregorio López de la Peña, Juan Domínguez de Sancibrián, Manuel González Siabra, Antonio Ramírez de la Serna, Rodrigo Ortíz Diente, Agustín Ginez Fernández, Ignacio Montaño, Antonio López Pardo, Francisco Delgado Jurado, Francisco Ruiz Osorio Talaverano, Fernando de Irrutiel, Sebastián de la Parra Salamanca, Joseph de Guebara, Thomas López, Juan Nuño de Sotomayor. With the exception of Pedro de Casas, all the others were said to be resident in the Chocó. See ibid., ff.48-59, 66-67, 106, 122-129, 137-139, 148, 150-164.

100 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.495.
to the Spanish authorities, but in 1670, the Protector y Administrador General de los Naturales of New Granada petitioned on behalf of the Indians of the Chocó for the redress of one specific grievance. The Protector complained that when the Indians left their houses to cultivate their maize plots, or to carry out other tasks, such as mining for gold, they found, on their return, that their belongings, tools, gold, and food was stolen from their houses by the Spaniards, mestizos, mulattoes, blacks, and non-Chocó Indians who traversed the land. For this, the petition noted, the Indians were never paid.\textsuperscript{101}

Of course, the main purpose of the Spaniards was to bring the Chocó under the control of the Crown, \textit{in order to} obtain access to gold fields known to be exceptionally rich, and to open the area to commerce with neighbouring regions. For this to be successful, the Indians had to be settled close to the mining camps, where they would be employed in the provision of foodstuffs for the miners and slave gangs. However, all attempts to congregate the Indian population in permanent settlements met with failure. Most observers agreed that two crucial factors lay at the heart of their inability to congregate the population: their traditional pattern of settlement, and their social structure.

Although the Spaniards made little attempt to furnish information about the Indians of the Chocó, we do know that

\textsuperscript{101} AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia), Petition presented by Don Manuel de Ortega Fuenmayor, ff.19-20.
the pattern of settlement of the native population of all three provinces—Noanama, Tatamá/Chocó, and Citará—was based on small dispersed communities composed of several extended families. In 1648, the Franciscan Fray Matías Abad noted the dispersed nature of the Indian settlements of the Province of Citará. Travelling across the province from Taita, Abad described the land as inhabited by communities distant between one, two, and three leagues from each other. In 1627, the Indian Don Pascual testified that he had seen four settlements of Chocó Indians lying at a distance of more or less half a league from each other. In each settlement, Don Pascal saw eight large houses and each of these had four "hearth"s. From this information, Patricia Vargas Sarmiento infers that each "hearth" represented one nuclear family, that several nuclear families—between four and seven—inhabited each house, and that each community was composed of approximately eight houses—or extended families. But, in 1674, the Spaniard Joseph de Salamanca said of the Indians of San Francisco de Atrato that "according to the style and custom of the natives of the said province each house is composed ... of two families."

In addition to living in small communities, the Indians shifted their settlements continuously, to the

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102 Quoted in Isacsson, "Fray Matías Abad", p.463.
103 See Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundación de pueblos", pp.59-60.
104 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", San Francisco de Atrato, 18 August 1674, f.124.
areas where they cultivated their maize. In 1674, Governor Miguel García complained that no attempt at settlement would be completely successful while the Indians were left to their own devices, for they built new dwellings at the time of each harvest, in places deemed convenient for the cultivation of maize. As Isacsson noted, the humidity of the climate, together with the absence of a sufficiently long dry period, meant that a "slash-burn" method of cultivation was not appropriate for the Chocó. Instead, a "slash-mulch" ("roza de bosque") method was employed, which involved long periods during which the land could not be cultivated. This corresponds with the information provided by contemporary observers. As the Jesuit Antonio Marzal explained in 1678, this was a feature of maize cultivation in the region: a tract of land could not produce two consecutive crops. Referring to the Noanamas, Marzal claimed that although they were absent from their towns for long periods of time, this was because "where they have cultivated [maize] once they cannot cultivate it again immediately after".

In the early 1670s, the Franciscan Procurador General also complained about the distances - two to three leagues - that separated the Indians' settlements, and, in advising how to overcome this problem, he pinpointed the other

105 AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel García to Crown, Popayán, 22 November 1674.


107 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.494.
crucial factor in the Spaniards' inability to keep them in permanent settlements: the absence of Indian leaders. The Franciscan noted that, in order to congregate the Indians and administer the Sacraments, it would be necessary to impose one native person - whom they would recognize as leader - to force them to live in their settlements. More than twenty years earlier, Fray Matías Abad had reported the absence of Indian leaders in the province of Citará. Abad claimed that many had no leaders whom they obeyed: "there are only some capitanes and these are little respected". These capitanes were Indians who were respected for their success in war and their bravery, but whose authority over the Indians of their communities was conditional rather than unquestioned.

With no Indian leaders to co-opt or coerce, the Spaniards had to find other ways of forcing the Indian population to remain in their settlements. The Franciscan Procurador General suggested that a Spaniard with authority and at least thirty men under his command should be placed in a site that would be both convenient for them and safe for the Spaniards and slave gangs of the province, since the Indians "unless they recognize some authority in their own lands will return to live in those places where they used to [live] and nobody's life will be safe ... [neither

108 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", f.16.

109 Quoted in Isacsson, "Fray Matías Abad", footnote 33, p.475.
those of] the religious nor the rest". Governor García, on the other hand, believed that some show of force would be necessary: the Indians, he asserted, would not be reduced without violence or terror. Indeed, to think that the influence of the doctrinero alone would reduce them to new settlements was tantamount to "placing gates on an open field". Similarly, in 1672, the Audiencia had advised the Crown that the governors of the surrounding provinces should enter the region simultaneously, accompanied by missionaries and armed men, to terrorize the Indians, so that, finding themselves surrounded by Spaniards, they would have no alternative but to accept being reduced. To keep the Indians there, it would be necessary to found Spanish settlements, "which would help each other in any incident". Indeed, the Jesuit Benito de Carvajal considered that the only reason the Noanama had not dared to rebel was the fact that there were Spaniards in the province.

In Chapter 3, we will examine the way in which the characteristics of the Indians' social structure and settlement patterns and the resistance of the Indians to the process of "reducción" proved also to be an

110 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans), f.16.

111 AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel García to Crown, Popayán, 22 November 1674.

112 AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.

113 Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans), f.140.
insurmountable obstacle to the efforts of the Franciscan friars, who arrived in the region towards the end of 1673. Their record in the region during their first three years of missionary activity shows their complete inability to make any progress not just in congregating but also in indoctrinating the native population. As the reality of the situation became clear to the increasingly desperate friars, they too, came to the conclusion that, without some show of force and the application of physical punishment, their energies would be completely wasted.
CHAPTER 3
THE FRANCISCANS IN THE CHOCO,
1673-1676

As we saw in Chapter 2, on 27 November, 1666, the Crown issued a royal cédula which ordered the governors of Antioquia, Popayán, and Cartagena, and the President of the Audiencia of Panama, to begin the reduction of the native population of the Chocó. The cédula emphasized that this pacification campaign was to be conducted by missionaries from the religious orders - accompanied by a small but purely defensive military escort - and that the conversion of the native population was to be achieved through preaching and good treatment alone. In accordance with these plans to pacify the indigenous population through peaceful means, the Crown issued a further royal cédula, in October 1671, ordering the Casa de Contratación in Seville to pay the travel and maintenance costs of twelve Franciscan friars, one lay brother, and two servants, who were to be sent to the Chocó, Dorado, and Darién mission field.

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1 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 27 November 1666, inserted in Royal Cédula, Madrid, 4 June 1674, ff.1-4.

2 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Royal Cédula, Madrid, 30 October 1671, ff.4-5, and Royal Cédula, Madrid, 30 October 1671, ff.2-3. In referring to the mission as "Chocó, Dorado, and Darién" - a term that
The concept of peaceful pacification contained within these cédulas was neither new nor unusual. In 1573, Philip II promulgated the Ordenanzas sobre Descubrimientos, which forbade both the use of the term "conquest" - to be replaced by the words "discovery" or "pacification" - and all armed entradas and expeditions to unconquered border regions. The Ordenanzas placed the responsibility for the pacification of the native populations of border areas on missionaries from the religious orders. While these were to be accompanied, when necessary, by small military escorts, their role was to be defensive. The Ordenanzas envisaged that unconquered Indians should be kept under the tutelage of the missionaries for a period of ten years, after which the new converts were to be handed over to the secular clergy, freeing the missionaries to move one step further into the interior and thus begin the process once again.

was also used by the Franciscan Vicecomisario in approving Fray Matías Abad’s expedition in 1649 - the Crown was clearly declaring its intention to extend the pacification campaign to the Indian population of the Gulf of Darién. For the term as it was used in 1649, see Fr. Gregorio Arcila Robledo, O.F.M., Las misiones franciscanas en Colombia (Bogotá, 1950), p.19.

According to Geoffrey Parker, it was Juan de Ovando, as president of the Council of the Indies, who masterminded the Ordenanzas. See Geoffrey Parker, Philip II (London, 1988), pp.113-114.

C.R. Boxer, The Church Militant and Iberian Expansion, 1440-1770 (Baltimore, 1978), pp.71-2. According to Herbert Bolton, the common mission lands were supposed to be distributed among the Indians once the friars' task was accomplished and the mission was handed over to the secular clergy. However, on the northern frontier of New Spain, the region covered by Bolton's study, ten years were found to be insufficient
Philip II's Ordenanzas marked the beginning of what Boxer terms the "golden age" of the frontier missions in the Spanish empire, officially replacing the encomienda-doctrina system that had been employed in Mexico, Guatemala, and parts of Peru. Under the encomienda-doctrina system, the encomendero was responsible for protecting, converting, and civilizing the Indians, as well as for supporting the friars needed for their religious instruction: in exchange, he received a grant of land and the labour of the Indians under his control. In practice, however, the encomendero rarely complied with his duty to protect, civilize, and convert his charges, and the expected cooperation between encomendero and doctrinero did not materialize. While the institution of the encomienda continued to thrive in many parts of the colonies —

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Bolton, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution", p.44.

Tibesar, "The Franciscan Doctrinero", p.116; Bolton, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution", p.44. Over time, the encomienda was gradually abolished.
1690, for example, 1,819 Indians were held in both royal and private *encomiendas* in the Llanos of Casanare, in New Granada - the aim of Philip II's *Ordenanzas* was to make the mission the principal method of converting Indians to Christianity.⁹

This chapter will examine the extent to which the Crown's objectives were achieved in the Chocó. For the sources show that, during the many decades of Franciscan activity in the Chocó region, the missionaries failed miserably to make any progress in converting the native population to the Christian Faith. Some attempts were made to improve the situation as early as 1680, when, as a result of a serious conflict involving the Indians and the missionaries, as well as a recently appointed royal official, three Franciscans were expelled from the area and were sent back to Santa Fe. The *Padre Comisario* appointed to take over the mission after this dispute was resolved, Alvarez de Aviles, reported to the Governor of Antioquia soon after arriving in the region that the Indians had not learned even the most basic rudiments of Christianity."¹⁰ However, neither this second group of Franciscan missionaries nor the rest who followed were to be any more successful. In 1737 - more than sixty years after the order began its activities in the Chocó - the bishop of Popayán informed the King that the Indians were as ignorant

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¹⁰ AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, Nigua, 14 January 1681, f.60.
of Christianity as they had been before their conquest: they had no knowledge whatsoever of Christian Doctrine, and never confessed or received Communion."

Despite the bishop’s indictment of the order’s efforts, the situation in the Chocó by the eighteenth century was no more critical than it was in other frontier regions of the empire, including New Granada. In 1772, for instance, Viceroy Messia de la Cerda expressed his general disillusionment with the performance of frontier missions in the entire viceroyalty. Over the previous century, Messia de la Cerda noted, the mission effort had produced few results, and Christianized Indians were still prone to return to the wilderness and to their old pagan ways. Messia de la Cerda blamed the situation on the missionaries’ lack of evangelical fervour and dedication for a ministry which required a greater interest in the conversion of souls than in the missionaries’ own comforts. The Viceroy’s doubts about the effectiveness of the missionaries as frontier agents had a firm base in the experience of the regular orders in several parts of the viceroyalty. Thus, in the final decades of the eighteenth century, vigorous pacification campaigns were

11 AGI Quito 185, Bishop Diego Fermín de Vergara to King, Popayán, 1 December 1737.

launched against the native groups that had successfully remained outside Spanish control throughout the entire colonial period - such as the Guajiros of Riohacha and the Chimilas of Santa Marta.\textsuperscript{13} A variety of factors contributed to the decision to proceed against these groups,\textsuperscript{14} but the significance of the decision, for the religious orders, was the greater participation in these later campaigns of armed forces and white colonists, marking a change in Crown policy that shifted the emphasis away from a religious to a secular approach to the problem of unpacified Indians.\textsuperscript{15} This shift represented a growing awareness on the part of the colonial government that, in many parts of the empire, the efforts of missionaries had been insufficient to assimilate and convert the native population.


\textsuperscript{14} The factors which contributed to this decision in the case of the Guajiros of Riohacha were Spanish fears of a British attack, the close relationship which the Guajiros were said to have established with the British, and the Guajiro rebellion of 1769, which resulted in the destruction of six of eight missions. See Kuethe, "The Pacification Campaign on the Riohacha Frontier", pp.467-70. In the case of the Chimilas, the defense of the coast, the control of contraband, and the development of agricultural activities, were all factors contributing to the desire finally to pacify the peoples of the coast. See González Luna, "La política de población y pacificación indígena", p.87.

\textsuperscript{15} See, for example, Manuel Guirior's pacification programme for the Guajiros, in Kuethe, "The Pacification Campaign on the Riohacha Frontier", p.469. See also p.467.
Indian defiance of the missionaries' attempts at conversion raises questions not only about the effectiveness and commitment of the missionaries themselves, but also about the factors that facilitated the Indians' resistance. It is true that the efforts of the regulars were successful in some frontier areas of the empire - the Jesuit missions of Paraguay being the most notable. However, there were also many others - such, for example, were the Capuchin missions among the Guajiros and Chimílas of northern New Granada and the Franciscans in the Chocó - where, after more than a century of activity, even the missionaries had to recognize that progress among the Indians had been either slow or non-existent.\(^\text{16}\)

In focusing on the experience of the Franciscans in the Chocó during their first three years of missionary activity there, this chapter will address the issues raised in the preceding paragraphs. The first section provides a brief outline of earlier religious activity in the area. In the second section, we will examine both the aims with which the Franciscans arrived in the Chocó, and the pressures they were under to succeed in the process of reducing the population to permanent settlements. The third section looks specifically at the methods used by the friars to set up a mission and at the problems they faced in their dealings with the native population. This section also looks at the conflicts which arose between the Franciscans and the secular clergy, and at the extent to

\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 469-70.
which their efforts were supported by the Crown and by royal officials within the region. The fourth section will focus on the extent to which the missionaries themselves were prepared for the task, in view of the complaints made against them by Indians and other Spaniards resident in the area. The opinions and experiences of the friars’ Franciscan, Jesuit, and secular predecessors in the region are also scattered throughout the text, and serve to compare their relative performances.

The limitations of our sources should be mentioned at the outset. While the Franciscans’ writings and complaints on many of the issues brought up in this chapter will enable us to glimpse the ways in which the Indians’ patterns of settlement, social structure, and continuing resistance to Spanish occupation of their territory undermined the Franciscan’s effort to first congregate and then convert the Indians in their charge, there are important gaps in the information furnished by the friars. For instance, there are few details in the sources regarding Indian religious practices, the extent to which these contributed to their resistance to Christianity, or the extent to which these survived during the period of Franciscan administration of the mission. Until the 1730s, no attempts appear to have been made in the Chocó to identify surviving native religious practices; and the importance of learning native languages appears never even to have been considered. In this respect, the experience of the Franciscans in the Chocó did not follow the patterns
of missionary activity in other more settled areas. However, and wherever possible, the clergy’s views on native culture, settlement patterns, social structure, and resistance to Christianity have been included.

**Early Religious Activity in the Chocó**

The Franciscans who began to arrive in the Chocó towards the end of 1673 were not the first clergymen to come into contact with the native population. The expedition to the Chocó organized and led by Melchor Velásquez in 1573 counted two priests and two Dominican friars among their number, and, by 1583, it was said that the city of Cáceres had a parish priest. Clerical influence in the last quarter of the sixteenth century was slight, however. Fray Jerónimo de Escobar reported that the 3,000 Indians of the Cáceres district had not been conquered, and that only 20 had been baptized. More than half a century passed before more serious efforts to evangelize the Chocó’s Indian population began. In 1637, the bishop of Popayán, Don Diego de Montoya y Mendoza, together with his brother Don Francisco de Montoya, and his cousin, Don Ventura de Montoya, attempted to reduce the indigenous inhabitants of the provinces of Noanama and Tatamá/Chocó. It was said that the bishop had taken part in the enterprise personally, and that a settlement, Sed de Cristo, had been established as a result. This settlement,  

like so many established before, was temporary: Sed de Cristo was destroyed by the Tatamá/Chocó and the Citará a few years later.  

At the end of the 1640s a more serious attempt was made to convert one of the Indian groups of the region - the Citará. In 1648, two priests - Fray Matías Abad, a Franciscan, and Fray Miguel Romero, from the order of San Juan de Dios - left the city of Antioquia, and, after spending nine days among the Indians of the Arquía river, proceeded to the Atrato river - the most densely populated zone - to begin the conversion of the Indians settled in the vicinity. The friars, who had apparently been well received by the Indians, began the task of congregating the population in a settlement called San Francisco de Atrato, on the banks of the Atrato river. A church was built where, according to Abad, all the Indians of the vicinity willingly attended prayer. Abad believed that the Indians

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18 Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, Vol.2, p.447. See also Father Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in ibid., p.495, and AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.


21 See ibid., pp.463, 467-9, for the precise location of the settlement, which he believes to have been situated where the Andagueda River meets the Atrato.
reacted favourably to his activities there. Fray Matías requested additional missionaries to assist in the task of conversion, but his efforts were cut short by his death at the hands of the Cunacuna, in January 1649. The two priests and the lay brother who travelled to the Chocó in response to Abad’s request for assistance—Fray Bernardo de Lira, Fray Jacinto Hurtado, and the lay brother, Fray Juan Troyano—were also said to have abandoned the region after his death, but at least one of these, Fray Jacinto Hurtado, may have stayed in the area for a longer period. In the mid to late 1650s, Hurtado submitted to the Crown a report which he claimed was based on seven years of experience among the Chocó Indians.

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22 Ibid., pp.463-4. According to Arcila Robledo, Abad left the city of Antioquia accompanied by three Chocó Indians, who apparently spoke very little Spanish. This suggests that, as Patricia Vargas claims, contacts between Indians from the Chocó region and Spaniards in Antioquia were increasing, as a result of Governor Portocarrero’s more peaceful policies. Indeed, Isacsson believes that, in view of the violent resistance put up by the Citaraes over the previous decades, it must have been the peaceful policies implemented by the governor that explains the Citaraes’ warmer reception of Abad. The existence of interpreters also suggests some earlier contact. See Arcila Robledo, Las misiones franciscanas, p.17, and Vargas Sarmiento, "La fundación de pueblos", pp.64-5. See also Isacsson, "Fray Matías Abad", pp.473-4.

23 Abad and Romero, accompanied by 22 Indians, left San Francisco de Atrato to journey down the Atrato River, only to be killed, by Cuna Indians, on the coast of Urabá. Isacsson believes that although it has generally been claimed that Abad was killed by the Citará, it was in fact the Cuna who were responsible for his death. See ibid., pp.465-6, and Pacheco, La Consolidación de la Iglesia, pp.670-71.

24 Arcila Robledo, Las misiones franciscanas, pp.16-9. See also Isacsson, "Fray Matías Abad", p.474, and B.N Ms 19695, "Declaración que hizo el Padre Fray Jacinto Hurtado, franciscano, estando por morir, de algunos
There is no record of any further Franciscan activity in the region from the end of the 1650s to the early 1670s, but several secular clerics and two Jesuits were residing in the region when the Franciscan group arrived in 1673. Jesuit activity among the Indians of the province of Noanama began in 1651. In that year, a Panamanian Jesuit priest, Father Pedro de Cáceres, established two settlements and provided each of these with a church, but within a year he had left the region, apparently disillusioned by the Noanamas' reluctance to congregate in his settlements. An equally unsuccessful and short-lived attempt to organize a mission was made later by Father Juan de Santacruz. In response to a request from the bishop of Popayán, Melchor Liñán y Cisneros, in 1669, the Jesuits agreed to take over the task of converting the Indian population of the region. Thus, Father Benito de Carvajal had a short spell in the region in 1669, and returned to the area, accompanied by Father Antonio Marzal.

puntos tocantes a la conversión de los indios de la provincia del Chocó", n.p., n.d. This report was probably in or before 1658, for, in 1672, the Audiencia of Santa Fe reported that Fay Francisco Hurtado had travelled to Spain to report on the Chocó, and that his trip had resulted in the Crown issuing a royal cédula, dated 1 November 1658. See AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 18 June 1672.

25 Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.449. J.J.Borda named another Jesuit, Francisco de Orta, who had apparently been in the Chocó, but gives no further details about his activities there. Borda, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús, pp.78-9.

26 Juan Manuel Pacheco considers that the Jesuit decision was partly based on their wish to ensure the establishment of a college for the order in Popayán. Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.449, and footnote 17, p.449.
in 1672. The responsibilities of these two missionaries - both of whom arrived in New Granada with a Jesuit expedition in 1662 - extended across the entire Chocó area.\(^{27}\) Accordingly, between 1672 and 1674, Carvajal and Marzal divided between them the task of evangelizing in the Chocó. Carvajal took San José de Noanama, including the mining camps of Sed de Cristo, Nóvita, and San Agustín de Sipí, while Marzal, based in the settlement of San Francisco de Atrato, took charge of the province of Citará. Carvajal stayed only for a short time: struck by ill health, demoralized by the behaviour of the white settlers, and fearful after having been attacked by an Indian, the Jesuit left Noanama in 1674 and returned to Popayán.\(^{28}\) Marzal remained in the province of Citará until the Franciscans arrived, when he moved south to San José de Noanama and began activities among the Noanamas of the Raposo river and the mines along the Sipí river. In 1678, he was said to be accompanied by another Jesuit, Father Juan de Escuder. The Jesuits remained in the Noanama region until 1689.\(^{29}\)

The Chocó was not left entirely in the hands of the regular orders: secular clerics followed the miners into the Chocó and were present in the area from the mid 1660s. In 1664, the secular priest Simón Amigo was appointed

\(^{27}\) Ibid., pp.449-50, and Appendix 1, p.486.

\(^{28}\) AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Bishop Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros, 4 June 1672, f.82. See also Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.450.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., pp.451, 453.
doctrinero of the settlement of Poya, in the province of Chocó, and of the mining camps of Nóvita and Sed de Cristo, in the province of Noanama. Simón Amigo’s duties included missionary work in the province of Citará. There, he claimed to have built a church, and to have celebrated Mass and preached Christian Doctrine continuously for four months. In July 1666, another secular, Luis Antonio de la Cueva, was appointed priest of the provinces of Noanama and Tatamá/Chocó. His duties also included missionary work in the province of Citará. Luis Antonio de la Cueva claimed to have built a church in the settlement of San Joseph de Noanama, and to have entered the provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and Citará at the beginning of 1667, where he baptized more than 500 Indians.30

Another secular priest, Pedro Gómez del Valle, accompanied Francisco de Quevedo on his entraida in 1669, and apparently remained in the region for a little over two and a half years.31 The documents mention a fourth secular priest, Joseph Garreto, who served as doctrinero of the

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30 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", Luis Antonio de la Cueva’s declaration, 29 May 1669, ff.13-4, and Simón Amigo’s declaration, 29 May 1669, f.15. See also ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", 16 December 1670, ff.137-8; and Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.447-8.

31 AGI Quito 67, Don Gabriel Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 28 July 1669. In requesting the reward of a prebend in the Cathedral of Popayán for Pedro Gómez del Valle, Bishop Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros informed the Crown that this priest had remained in the Chocó for two years and seven months. See Ibid., Bishop Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros to Crown, Santa Fe, 2 July 1672. The bishop also requested a prebend in the Cathedral for Luis Antonio de la Cueva.
settlement of Carrapa (or Chamí), but he was said to have abandoned his parish because there were insufficient Indians to maintain him. And, of course, Antonio de Guzmán, the antioqueño cleric whose conflicts with the gobernación of Popayán we examined in Chapter 2, also served as missionary in the province of Citará. His appointment had been made by Bishop Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros in 1668.

Unlike the regular orders, the secular clergy reported considerable progress in the evangelization of the native population. Luis Antonio de la Cueva, for instance, reported that the Holy Faith was spreading rapidly and easily among the Indian population of the area. As we shall see, the experience of the Franciscans, as well as that of the Jesuits, shows that these reports were both overly optimistic and exaggerated, but they were perhaps based on the experience of the secular priests. When, in 1676, censuses of the population of the province of Citará were carried out, the Indians were asked their ages, and if they had been baptized, and if so, by whom. The censuses show that the seculars, in particular Luis Antonio de la Cueva and Pedro Gómez del Valle, had been very active in

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32 Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Fray Juan Tabuenca to Fray Miguel de Castro, Nigua, 28 November 1673, f.75.

33 Ibid., 16 January 1674, 101-2.

34 Ibid., Mina del Señor Santo Domingo, 28 September 1674, f.67.

the region, and had travelled widely, baptizing Indians in
and around all of the settlements of the province.
According to the censuses, Luis Antonio de la Cueva had
baptized a total of 334 Indians, principally in the region
of LLoró and San Francisco de Atrato. 363 Indians claimed
to have been baptized by Pedro Gómez del Valle, and the
vast majority of these came from the area around Nigua and
San Francisco de Atrato. Although the details are
unclear, it appears that, with the exception of Antonio de
Guzmán, the secular clerics either abandoned the region, or
moved south to the province of Noanama, when the
Franciscans arrived to take control of their mission.

The Establishment of a Franciscan Mission

In entrusting the work of pacification of border
gerions to the regular orders, the Crown's principal
objective was to use the missionary as an agent of the
State as well as of the Church. The Hispanization of the
Indian was to take place through his conversion to
Christianity and through his assimilation of the basic
elements of European civilization. For this to be
successful, the missionary first had to congregate the
Indians in settlements, where the task of teaching
Christian Doctrine could be carried out. Thus was born the
policy of "reducción", or "congregación". The policy was

36 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, San Juan de Nigua, 24
October and 3 November 1676, ff.75-93, 95-6; Nuestra
Señora de la Concepción de Lloró, 21 December 1676,
ff.143-54; and San Francisco de Atrato, 16 and 19
December 1676, ff.122-42.
aimed at congregating scattered, often small, Indian communities into larger, more centralized, permanent settlements, for the purpose of advancing the Indians' instruction in Christianity by the missionaries. The spiritual aspects of "congregación" - or "reducción", as the policy was called in the Chocó - were explicitly emphasized in the Recopilación de las leyes de Indias. These stated that

"the Indians should be reduced to villages and not be allowed to live divided and separated in the mountains and wildernesses, where they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal comforts, the aid of our ministers, and those other things which human necessities oblige men to give one another ... the viceroys, presidents and governors [are] charged and ordered to execute the reduction, settlement, and indoctrination of the Indians".37

For the Franciscans of the Chocó, the congregation of the Indians in permanent settlements was important for another reason as well: the missionaries' own livelihood depended on their ability to secure foodstuffs and other supplies from the Indians. The Franciscans in this mission, at least, did not receive any financial assistance from other sources. The royal cédula of 30 October, 1671, which ordered the Casa de Contratación in Seville to pay the costs of sending twelve missionaries, one lay brother,

37 Quoted in Lovell, Conquest and Survival in Colonial Guatemala, pp.75-6. According to Lovell, the spiritual aspects of the policy had already been incorporated into the Laws of Burgos (1512). See also Bolton, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution", p.44.
and two servants to the Chocó, shows the extent of the financial investment made by the Crown in the mission. Each member of the expedition was to be provided with sufficient funding to cover the cost of travel and maintenance from their place of residence to their port of embarkation - Sanlúcar de Barrameda or Cádiz - and from there to Cartagena. The costs of travel and maintenance from Cartagena to Honda were to be paid by royal officials in Cartagena, and those from Honda to Santa Fe were to be met by royal officials in the New Kingdom. Likewise, the governor of Antioquia, Don Francisco Montoya y Salazar, was ordered to pay the costs of sending the members of the expedition on to the mission, as well as to provide them

38 The following list includes the names, places of origin, and ages of the twelve Franciscan friars, the lay brother, and two servants who were chosen for the Chocó mission: Fray Miguel de Castro Rivadeneyra (Galicia, 37); Fray Joseph Marton (Zaragoza, 40); Fray Juan Tabuenca (Zaragoza, 27); Fray Francisco Moreno (Zaragoza, 25); Fray Cristóbal de Artiaga (Zaragoza, 26); Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramírez (Logroño, 31); Fray Juan Chaverri (Navarra, 27); Fray Agustín Navarro (Burgos, 26); Fray Francisco García (Logroño, 26); Fray Pedro Arbues (Zaragoza, 40); Fray Miguel de Vera (32); Fray Pablo Ruiz (Zaragoza, 25); Fray Francisco Garrido (Burgos, 32); Pedro de Villa Verde (15); Bartolomé García (15). See AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans), ff.6-8.

39 Ibid., Royal Cédula, Madrid, 30 October 1671, ff.4-5.
with chalices, missals, and church ornaments. No mention was made in this cédula of stipends for the missionaries.

No other special provisions were made during these years to assist the Franciscan mission financially - not even those explicitly made for their Jesuit counterparts. In November 1673, for instance, the Crown issued a royal cédula ordering royal officials in Popayán to provide the Jesuit doctrineros of the Chocó with an annual stipend of 50,000 maravedís. The Jesuits probably did not receive these funds - Father Juan Escuder was said to have had great difficulties in maintaining himself in the region because he could not obtain from the Indians the plantains upon which his diet was based - but the Franciscans were not even offered such support.

Instead, the cédula of November, 1666, as well as later cédulas and royal provisions, directed that the Indians of the Chocó were to be exempt from tribute payments for a period of ten years, and that no demands were to be placed on them for stipends for the clergy. It

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40 Ibid., ff.2-3. This cédula clearly followed the pattern established in the Recopilación (lib.I, tit.14, laws 4 & 6) for the sending of missionaries to the colonies. According to Haring, "Friars selected by the Orders for missionary work in the colonies were recommended by them to the Council of the Indies, which issued passports to the Casa de Contratación. Travel expenses from the monasteries to Seville was furnished by the crown, the cost of clothing and food for the voyage by the Casa, and the passage money by the royal treasury in the Indies after safe arrival". See Haring, The Spanish Empire, footnote 20, p.172.

41 The cédula was dated November 17, 1673. Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.451. By this time, the Franciscans had already arrived in the region.
was thought that, in not making financial demands of the Indians, the task of reducing and converting them would be facilitated, because they would be persuaded that the Crown was concerned only about the Indians and their interests, and not about its own. However, it was expected that the Indians of the region, while exempt from tribute and stipend payments, would provide the friars with foodstuffs. Unless further funding, in the form of charitable contributions, could be found for them, this was to be their only source of maintenance. In 1675, the Crown’s position on the matter was made clear. In that year, it was officially acknowledged that the Franciscans of the Chocó mission were facing financial difficulties, but a royal provision merely ordered the governor of Antioquia, Juan Bueso de Valdés, to do his utmost to secure charitable contributions for the missionaries in the Chocó. Should these not be forthcoming, Bueso de Valdés was permitted to make a modest contribution from royal treasury funds, although this, too, was conditional on the treasury’s situation. Principally, however, Bueso de Valdés was ordered to ensure that the friars were maintained from the

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42 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Royal Cédula, 27 November 1666; Royal Cédula, Madrid, 6 June 1674, ff.1-4, and Real Provisión, 29 April 1675, ff.13-19.
"produce of the land". There is no evidence that any treasury funds reached the Franciscans at this time.

The experience of the Franciscans in the Chocó was similar, in this respect, to that of their counterparts in eastern Peru. In 1666, the Franciscans of the Pantaguas missions, near Guánuco, complained to the King that the fifteen missionaries serving the mission had been unable to obtain an annual stipend from the viceroys, and that they only received funds from them at long and irregular intervals. They complained that they had not received any financial aid since 1660, and were not, in fact, to receive any further assistance until 1709. Even at the beginning of the 18th century, the situation had not improved. One Franciscan, Fray Francisco de San Joseph, received a payment in 1711, but had to wait for the next until 1732.

The missionaries' early enthusiasm was influenced greatly by the firm resistance they encountered in their dealings with the Indians. Their first decade of activity in the Chocó was marked not by missionary effort to convert the Indians, but by repeated attempts to congregate the population, a prerequisite to the process of conversion, and to barter with them in order to obtain food. It was

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43 Ibid., Real Provisión, 29 April 1675, ff.13-19. In 1719, Fray Diego Barroso, a member of the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe, recalled that the Crown contributed only 1,500 pesos to the sending of the missionaries in 1671, and that the Province of Santa Fe had had to contribute 4,556. AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Diego Barroso, Santa Fe, 18 November 1719.

also marked by a growing awareness that the instructions of the Crown could not be observed in the Chocó, and by a growing desperation which manifested itself not only in the number of Franciscans who abandoned the region altogether, but in the increasingly violent disputes in which the remaining Franciscans became involved.

Upon their arrival in the Chocó, in 1673, each of the Franciscan missionaries was immediately assigned to either one or two of the region’s settlements. Three missionaries were sent to the province of Tatamá/Chocó, to administer the five principal settlements: Fray Cristóbal de Artiaga went to San Francisco Ytaguri, Fray Pablo Ruiz to Nuestra Señora de la Paz de Pureto and San Pedro de Alcántara de Maygara, and Fray Francisco Moreno to Poya and Yragugu. In the province of Citará, one missionary was assigned to each of the three main settlements: Fray Francisco García went to San Francisco de Atrato, Fray Joseph de Córdoba was sent to Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de LLoró, and Fray Juan Tabuenca to Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Zaragoza, on the Nigua river. In addition, two Franciscans - Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramírez and Fray Miguel de Vera - were sent to the small settlement of Taita.45 These were the settlements

45 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Fray Miguel de Castro, n.p., n.d., f.46. According to Fray Juan Tabuenca, San Gabriel del Citará (which later became LLoró) had been burned down. Ibid., Fray Juan Tabuenca to Castro Rivadeneyra, Nigua, 28 November 1673, f.76. Three of the twelve original members of the Franciscan group - Agustín Navarro, Pedro Arbues, and Francisco Garrido - did not arrive in the Chocó, but Joseph de Córdoba, who was not included in the original list, did travel to the Chocó as part of the mission.
that the Franciscans believed to be both permanent and the most densely populated, and each was to receive the services of a Franciscan missionary.

**TABLE 3:**
PROVINCES OF TATAMA/CHOCO AND CITARA:
**DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRANCISCANS, OCTOBER 1674**

**FATHER COMISARIO: FRAY MIGUEL DE CASTRO RIVADENEYRA**

**PROVINCE OF TATAMA/CHOCO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRANCISCAN</th>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fray Cristóbal de Artaiga</td>
<td>San Francisco Ytaquri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Pablo Ruiz</td>
<td>Nra. Sra. de Pureto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Pablo Ruiz</td>
<td>San Pedro de Alcántara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Francisco Moreno</td>
<td>Poya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Francisco Moreno</td>
<td>Yragugu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROVINCE OF CITARA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRANCISCAN</th>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fray Francisco García</td>
<td>San Francisco de Atrato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Joseph de Córdoba</td>
<td>Nra. Sra. de Lloró</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Juan Tabuenca</td>
<td>Nra. Sra. de Zaragoza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascual Ramírez</td>
<td>Taita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel de Vera</td>
<td>Taita</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MAP 6

THE CHOCO: MAIN AREA OF SETTLEMENT, 1673-74

--- Area disputed by Popayan and Antioquia

However, some of the settlements, as the Franciscans were soon to realize, were more imaginary than real. For example, when Francisco de Quevedo passed through the area en route to San Joseph de Noanama in 1669, he noted the size of two of these: Poya was merely a "hamlet" made up of two houses, while Yragugu was described as a hamlet consisting of five dwellings. In 1673, Father Joseph Garreto’s settlement of Carrapa - to which a Franciscan was not sent - was said to consist of little more than the house in which he lived, a small church, and another house inhabited by one Indian. Similarly, Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Zaragoza apparently consisted of a small chapel, Fray Juan Tabuenca’s house, and the house of an Indian named Dadura. The efforts of payaneses and antioqueños in the years prior to the Franciscans’ arrival to congregate the Indians in settlements had been decidedly unsuccessful. By 1673-74, all the settlements founded by Quevedo and Antonio de Guzmán had been either burned down or abandoned. Furthermore, the churches which Guzmán had built in the settlements he founded were said to be in a sorry state: according to Castro Rivadeneyra, these served

46 Ibid., Don Francisco de Quevedo, San José de Noanama, 15 May 1669.


48 Ibid., n.p., n.d., f.47.

49 Ibid., Domingo de Beitia y Gamboa, Real de Minas de Nuestra Señora de Belén, 28 July 1674, f.60.
as hencoops and workshops for the construction of canoes.\textsuperscript{50} This claim was supported by the Spaniard Esteban Fernández de Rivera, who reported that Guzmán had built three churches, which now served as workshops for the making of canoes and arrows.\textsuperscript{51}

The reality of congregating the Indians in these settlements did not match the Franciscans' initial expectations. The Franciscan Padre Comisario, Fray Miguel de Castro Rivadeneyra, reported that, soon after arriving in the region, he had travelled to an Indian community on the banks of the Atrato river with the aim of informing its population - through an interpreter - that he had come in the name of the king of Spain to teach them to pray, to celebrate Mass, and to instruct them in the Holy Faith. In exchange, the Indians should choose the location for a town, build a church, and settle there. The Indians were said to have chosen San Francisco de Atrato as their settlement and to have agreed to build a church. But as soon as the church was completed, all the Indians abandoned the town: the Comisario tried to coax them to remain, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{52} Fray Miguel de Castro reported similar problems in the province of Tatamá/Chocó, where the Indians

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., Fray Miguel de Castro Rivadeneyra, n.p., n.d., f.44.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., Esteban Fernández de Rivera, Nuestra Señora de Belén, 27 July 1674, f.57.
had also abandoned the settlement of Nuestra Señora de la Paz de Pureto.\footnote{Ibid., f.45. See also Real Provisión, Santa Fe, 1 April 1675, in AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, ff.53-4.}

Franciscan difficulties in fixing settlement were no doubt due to native patterns of settlement, which, based on small dispersed communities composed of several extended families, moved regularly from area to area, in accordance with their agricultural needs. Their social structure, based on communities composed of small family units, meant that there were no leaders who could be co-opted by the Spaniards. The Indians did have "capitanes", but these were figures whose reputations had been made in wars against enemy Indian groups, and they had no permanent authority over the Indians of their communities. As the Jesuit Antonio Marzal observed in referring to the provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and Citará, the Indians "are a people without leaders, who do not obey or respect anyone even in war, and if they have capitanes it is not because they obey them in anything, but because they have a reputation for being brave...".\footnote{Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.501.} Thus, while the Franciscans working among the Maya of the Yucatán peninsula in the mid-sixteenth century focused their early activities on indoctrinating the children of the native nobility, who were expected to be returned to their villages to teach
their fellow Indians simple routines of worship,55 the Franciscans of the Chocó entered a quite different culture, in which they had first to create positions of leadership among the Indians. Without leaders, the Franciscans alleged, they would not be able to make the Indians obey them. In recommending ways to congregate the Indians in settlements and ensuring that the Sacraments were administered to them, the Franciscan Procurador General, Fray Lucas de Villa Vezes, noted that one Indian leader would have to imposed on the others, who would be given the task of ensuring that his fellow Indians remain in their settlements.56 For, as Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramírez noted, "no progress is made nor will be made until a way is found to make the Indians obey the religious, ordering them to attend [the teaching of] Doctrine". Fray Miguel de Vera, who in fact abandoned the settlement of Taita, observed that he had done so because the Indians resisted any form of subjection. Although he claimed that he called the Indians to learn Christian Doctrine, they not only refused to attend but in fact escaped from the settlement altogether.57

Indian resistance to Franciscan activities in their territory also manifested itself in their refusal to


56 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", n.p., n.d., f.16.

57 Ibid., n.p., n.d., f.23.
provide the friars with food supplies. Fray Miguel de Vera and Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramírez claimed that they had had to leave Taita because they had been unable to obtain foodstuffs, despite attempting to barter with the Indians with beads, bells, axes, and other goods. According to the Franciscan Procurador, the Indians expected to receive these goods for allowing the friars to live in their lands. However, in 1673, Fray Juan Tabuenca claimed that the Indians were willing to provide some foodstuffs in exchange for certain goods, particularly those made of iron, such as machetes, knives, axes, scissors, and needles, and, of course, beads - although these were not to be made of glass. Nevertheless, Tabuenca advised that all missionaries assigned to the Chocó region should take supplies of meat with them, because the land only produced plantains and maize, and these were not available everywhere and at all times.

Missionaries in the Chocó were not the only Spaniards faced with having to barter goods for foodstuffs with the Indian inhabitants of frontier areas in Spanish America. Indeed, the exchange of Spanish goods for Indian products is a feature of Spanish-Indian relations that has been identified by several historians. James Schofield Saeger, for example, indicated the extent to which the economy and

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60 Ibid., Nigua, 23 November 1673, f.77; and Nigua, 29 May 1674, ff.79-80.
society of the Guaycuruan Indians of the Chaco region underwent a significant transformation as a result of trading with the Spaniards: their subsistence-based economy gradually became an economy based on barter with the Spaniards. Consequently, their traditional diet of game, fish, and wild plants began to be supplemented with horsemeat and beef. Spanish animals became a part not only of the Guaycuruans' diet but also of their commerce: Spanish animals and horses, in addition to Spanish and Indian captives, honey, wax, and skins, were bartered for Guaycuruan captives, knives, fishhooks, iron, hatchets, beads, and clothing.61

The value of iron in general and of Spanish tools in particular were recognized by Indian groups across Spanish America from the very beginning of conquest. At the end of the sixteenth century, a Spanish soldier based in Chile reported that the Araucanian Indians looked forward to the campaigns the Spaniards launched against them: it was during those campaigns that the Indians replenished their stores of horses and stirrups, swords, knives, machetes, and especially axes.62 In the Chocó, Fray Matías Abad also recognized, in 1648, the value of these goods for the missionary effort. In writing to his Provincial, Abad


requested needles, knives, fishhooks, and beads, for these greatly facilitated the missionaries' attempts to obtain food supplies and made the Indians more willing to become Christian. However, the experiences of other Franciscans in the region show that barter could not be relied upon: by September 1674, for instance, Fray Pablo Ruiz was said to have moved to Lloró because he had not been able to obtain supplies from the Indians in the vicinity of his settlement.

Indian resistance could also take the form of violent attack against individual missionaries. In 1676, Fray Francisco Caro, President of the Franciscan hospice of Antioquia, reported an incident involving Fray Francisco García, who was attacked by an Indian whom he had called to attend prayers. The Indian apparently attempted to strangle the priest and, holding him down on the ground, lifted an axe to kill him. The intervention of other Indians saved Fray Francisco on this occasion. Indian violence against clerics was not directed only at the Franciscans, though. A few years earlier, the Jesuit Benito de Carvajal was also said to have been attacked by an Indian, and to have been saved only by the presence of

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63 Isacsson, "Fray Matías Abad", p.472.

64 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Lloró, 15 September 1674, f.113.

65 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January 1676, ff.6-8. Fray Joseph de Córdoba also reported the attack on Fray Francisco García. See AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Lloró, 15 September 1674, ff.113-14.
some Spaniards. As we have seen, it was as a result of this attack that Carvajal decided to abandon the region and return to Popayán.\textsuperscript{66} In May 1674, the other Jesuit, Antonio Marzal, reported that the Indians of Lloró had taken up arms against the Franciscan Comisario, Fray Miguel de Castro Rivadeneyra.\textsuperscript{67} In September 1674, Fray Joseph de Córdoba wrote from Lloró that the Indians had \textit{again} attempted to kill the Spaniards, and that they were planning to form an alliance to attack the Spanish.\textsuperscript{68} In fact, by January 1676, it was said that the Indians had tried to kill Fray Joseph de Córdoba. First, he had suffered an Indian ambush and then the house in which he lived was burned down.\textsuperscript{69} This fear of attack was in fact generalized, for all the Spaniards in the area, not just the missionaries, appear to have felt at risk. In September 1674, Domingo de Beitia y Gamboa, reported from Lloró that "the Indians ... every day say that they want to kill us".\textsuperscript{70} Indeed, several references were made to "disturbances" taking place in the region: Castro Rivadeneyra and Fray Juan Tabuenca, for instance, both

\textsuperscript{66} See Father Marzal's report, in Pacheco, \textit{Los Jesuitas}, p.499. See also AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Bishop Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros, 4 June 1672, f.82, and Pacheco, op.cit., p.450.

\textsuperscript{67} AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Noanama, 22 May 1674, f.80.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., Lloró, 15 September 1674, ff.113-14.

\textsuperscript{69} AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January 1676, ff.6-8.

\textsuperscript{70} AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Lloró, 16 September 1674, f.112.
reported minor "rebellions" and "uprisings" among the Indians.\textsuperscript{71} Fray Francisco Caro, of Antioquia, argued that such outrages were experienced daily by the friars, who were justifiably distrustful and fearful.\textsuperscript{72}

The missionaries' dismal experience is reflected in the Jesuit Antonio Marzal's account of his activities among the Citará Indians in the early 1670s. He recalled that, after travelling through the province of Citará over a period of 17 months, his only achievement had been the baptism of a few Indian children; he had had no success in either congregating or converting the native population of the area. In fact, Father Marzal expressed profound doubts about whether it was lawful to baptize the children. For although ecclesiastical law accepted that it was lawful to baptize the children of infidels when the parents were in the process of becoming Christians, or the children of Christians even if the parents found the practice loathsome, this could take place only when the children could be given a Christian education. This was clearly not possible in the case of the Citará children, given the resistance of the parents. Thus, Marzal concluded that he could not understand how it could be lawful to baptize the

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., n.p., n.d., f.59, and Fray Juan Tabuenca to Castro Rivadeneyra, Río de Nigua, 17 September 1673, f.74.

\textsuperscript{72} AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January 1676, ff.6-8.
children, "given the present state of the said provinces".\textsuperscript{73}

After the arrival of the Franciscans, Marzal moved down to San Joseph de Noanama and continued his missionary activities among the Indians who resided along the Raposo river and the mining camp of San Agustín. But he noted of the Indians that "if they are spoken to of God they mock us, if of ... hell they don't believe it, if of vices these are what they most love, and in criticizing their way of life, they say very clearly that we live much worse". Moreover, Marzal observed, there was little point in attempting to prevent the children leaving the settlements so as to ensure that they attended prayer and learned to become Christians, because their elders - at their "meetings of elders or drinking sessions" undid all the missionaries' efforts.\textsuperscript{74}

By 1674, just one year after the Franciscans arrived in the Chocó, some of the friars had come to the conclusion that the order should leave the mission. In May 1674, Fray Juan Tabuenca wrote to Castro Rivadeneyra and informed him that, in his opinion, the Franciscan order should abandon the region altogether: it would be to the greater credit of the order to leave the mission at that stage than to be forced to leave years later without having achieved the

\textsuperscript{73} Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.499-500.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., pp.502.
task it had been set. Others, however, had concluded that the process of "reduction" would not be successful without the introduction of some form of punishment, despite the Crown's directives. In September 1674, Fray Joseph de Córdoba - who, as we shall see, was to have a particularly difficult relationship with the Indians in the following years - claimed to have lost his patience, and seemed prepared to leave the enterprise, for the Indians "do nothing" except "through force". Even the Jesuits, who had much more missionary experience as they had been in New Granada since 1662, expressed similar doubts. In May 1674, for example, the Jesuit Antonio Marzal argued that "because they are so barbarous", no good could be expected from the Indians until punishment was used to enforce obedience. It was a mistake to think that the Indians would "understand the truth through ... spiritual means", for they were "lacking in reason" and had an excess of "malice".

The perceptions of these Franciscans and Jesuits in the mid 1670s were no different from those of another Franciscan, Fray Jacinto Hurtado, who had spent some time in the region twenty years before. Hurtado spent about

75 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Fray Juan Tabuenca to Castro Rivadeneyra, 29 May 1674, f.78.

76 Ibid., Lloró, 15 September 1674, f.113.

77 Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, Appendix 1, p.486.

78 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Noanama, 22 May 1674, f.80.
seven years attempting to reduce the Indians of the Chocó, and when, towards the end of the 1650s, he travelled to Spain, he reported to the Crown that it would not be possible to "reduce" the Indians of the region through preaching alone. Hurtado noted that the Indians could be baptized by the thousands if they were given Spanish goods, but they soon returned to their "infidelity". Fray Jacinto advocated a combination of preaching and armed force to achieve their reduction, for "it has been seen by the experience of all the conquests carried out throughout the Indies [that] ... not even the smallest town has been reduced through ... preaching, unless supported by force".79

By the mid-1670s, the Franciscans in the Chocó were certainly contravening the Crown's instructions, which they had come to regard as unenforceable. Because of the problems they faced in obtaining food supplies from the Indians they began to advocate the collection of tributes and stipends, despite explicit prohibition by royal cédula of November, 1666. In this, they received the support of the Franciscan Procurador General. Fray Lucas de Villa Vezes reported that since the Indians had been paying tributes for many years - against, of course, the wishes of the Crown - and since the friars had no financial

79 BN Ms. 1969931, "Declaración que hizo el Padre Fray Jacinto Hurtado, franciscano, estando por morir, de algunos puntos tocantes a la conversión de los indios de la provincia del Chocó", n.p., n.d.
assistance, part of the tribute, or at least a payment from the royal treasury, should be provided for them.\textsuperscript{80}

Their frustration also led them to become involved in disputes with the secular clergy and the few royal officials resident in the region: their lack of success among the Indians, they alleged, was a result of both Antonio de Guzmán's influence in the region and the royal officials' refusal to cooperate with their endeavours. For instance, they claimed that Antonio de Guzmán's presence had a deleterious effect on the native population: Castro Rivadeneyra argued that Antonio de Guzmán, and his brother Ignacio, encouraged the Indians to disobey the friars.\textsuperscript{81}

The Franciscans also levelled other, less credible accusations against the Guzmán brothers. It was said, for example, that they had told the Indians many lies, among which the most notable were that there were three kings, that the friars had not been sent by the king, and that they should therefore not be obeyed. Fray Miguel de Castro reported that the mission could only be successful if the Indians had a good concept of the missionaries.\textsuperscript{82}

The Franciscans clearly wanted Antonio de Guzmán and his associates expelled from the province, and it was for this reason that they claimed that these men undermined the

\textsuperscript{80} AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", n.p., n.d., f.16.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., Fray Miguel de Castro Rivadeneyra, n.p., n.d., f.43.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., ff.44-45; and AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Real Provisión, Santa Fe, 1 April 1675, ff.53-54.
process of conversion in the region. In fact, although in 1672 Antonio de Guzmán had been ordered to leave the province in the care of the Franciscans, the friars claimed that problems still arose because he had left his brother and other relatives there.83

These accusations should be read within the context of missionary frustration and of their decision to demand stipends from the Indians in their charge, for the Franciscans believed that the Guzmán brothers had informed the Indians that the missionaries would be maintained by the King. Guzmán himself had no need of a stipend, since he owned and operated at least one mine in the province of Citará. However, Fray Miguel complained that the Indians had agreed with Juan López García that they would make a two-peso payment twice a year: one peso in tribute, and the other peso by way of a stipend to the priest in charge of their religious instruction. According to Castro Rivadeneyra, the Indians had in fact paid this sum many times, and he concluded that, by telling the Indians that the missionaries would be maintained by the Crown, the Guzmán brothers intended to undermine support for the Franciscans.84 The problem was compounded by the fact

83 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", n.p., n.d., ff.45-46. The real provisión ordering Guzmán to leave the province in the care of the Franciscans was dated 24 December 1672. Ibid., Real de Santo Domingo, 16 September 1673, ff.66-67.

84 Ibid., Fray Miguel de Castro, n.p., n.d., f.44. Fray Juan Tabuenca also reported that "todas estas provincias pactaron Librementе de dar dos pesos de tributo cada Tercio". See ibid., Fray Juan Tabuenca to Castro Rivadeneyra, Nigua, 28 November 1673, f.76. See
that, as Fray Lucas de Villa Vezes, the Franciscan Procurator, argued, Antonio de Guzmán had also instructed the Indians not to provide any Spaniard with food supplies — namely, maize and plantains — without first being paid for them.⁸⁵ In fact, in 1674, Antonio de Guzmán reported that he had assured the Indians that they were only obliged to pay tributes to the Crown, and that although in time the doctrineros too would have to be provided with a stipend, this would be drawn from the tributes, and no further contributions would be demanded of them.⁸⁶

The Franciscans also believed that their efforts among the Indians of the Chocó were being undermined by the bishop of Popayán. Indeed, the bishop was said even to have disputed the Franciscans’ jurisdictional rights over the region. For instance, the Comisario, Castro Rivadeneyra, alleged that the bishop had advised him to move on to Darién — the region lying to the north of the Chocó, inhabited by the Cunacuna — because he had already appointed secular priests to administer the Chocó. Apparently, the bishop had appointed Nicolás de Lara as parish priest of the mining camp of Sed de Cristo and the Indian settlements of Poya and Yragugu, where, Castro Rivadeneyra claimed, a Franciscan missionary was already administering the Sacraments to the Indians settled there.

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also AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Real Provisión, Santa Fe, 1 April 1675, 53-54.


⁸⁶ Ibid., Antioquia, 29 April 1674, f.90.
The Franciscan Comisario also complained that, with the exception of Joseph Garrete, who ministered to the Indians of Carrapa (or Chamí), there were no other secular clerics or settled towns in the province of Tatamá/Chocó, and that, in fact, Father Garrete had decided to leave Carrapa when the Franciscans arrived in the region. In addition, the Comisario alleged that the bishop had appointed a second secular priest, Antonio de Borja, as doctrinero of the Indian settlement of San Francisco de Ytaguri, to which he had already assigned Fray Cristóbal de Artiaga.87

Although these complaints are the only ones that have been found to indicate some regular-secular tension in the Chocó, and although there is no evidence to suggest that any of the appointed priests resided in their parishes, by 1675, the governor of Antioquia, Juan Bueso de Valdés, was expressing to the Crown his doubts about whether any progress would ever be made in the region while there were secular clerics and missionaries from the regular orders in the region at the same time. While seculars and regulars remained in the Chocó together, all their time would be wasted in disputes. The governor considered that either the seculars or the regulars should be entrusted with the work of the mission, that it should be entrusted to the group that would also undertake the reduction of unconquered neighbouring Indian groups - the Soruco and the Burgumia - and that all those who were not involved in the

87 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", n.p., n.d., f.46.
"reduction" should be expelled from the area. The Governor noted that, as the Chocó would be very useful to the royal treasury, the problem required an immediate solution.  

What is clear, however, is that the bishop of Popayán, Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros, did not support the Franciscans' Chocó mission. He not only openly favoured the Jesuits, but indeed stated, in 1672, that secular priests had already been appointed to the parishes of the Chocó, in accordance with the Crown's Patronato Real. Governor Díaz de la Cuesta also preferred the Jesuits to the Franciscans, and in 1669, requested from the Jesuit Father Provincial the services of three missionaries for the Chocó. Both bishop and governor wanted the region administered by Jesuits. There is no evidence, however, of conflict between the orders, for the only Jesuit remaining in the region by the time the Franciscans arrived, Father Antonio Marzal, willingly moved to the province of Noanama, which was not included in the Franciscan mission.

Within the Chocó, the Franciscans also perceived that they were receiving little support from royal officials.

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88 Ibid., Governor Juan Bueso de Valdés to Crown, Antioquia, 12 July 1675.

89 Ibid., Bishop Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros to Crown, Santa Fe, 3 July 1672. See also "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Bishop Melchor Liñán y Cisneros, Popayán, 4 June 1674, f.83. For a description of the way in which the Patronato Real functioned in colonial Latin America, see Chapter 7 of this thesis.

90 Ibid., Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 28 July 1669.
In May 1674, Fray Juan Tabuenca reported from Nigua that the Indians had "so much freedom" that, if any attempt was made to "reduce" them, they complained to López García, or to Joseph de Salamanca, or to Domingo de Beytia, or to Luis de los Ríos, all of whom apparently served as officials in the region. Tabuenca was of the opinion that "...I do not believe that this is the [right] ... method for indoctrinating them, but for them to do with us what they please". The Franciscan believed that either they or the officials should leave the province, for, while the situation remained as it was, everybody's energies went into disputing the extent of each other's jurisdiction. He did not explain, however, what benefit the Indians derived from complaining to these officials.

The Jesuit Antonio Marzal also expressed similar concerns and gives us further evidence that there was some tension between missionaries and royal officials in the region. In 1678, Marzal reported to the Jesuit Father Visitor that the children of the Citará could not be provided with a Christian education, first, because of the resistance of their parents, but secondly, because of the complete lack of assistance the missionaries received from the secular authorities, despite the numerous official posts that had been created there. Indeed, Marzal believed that many of the difficulties encountered by the

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91 Ibid., "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Nigua, 29 May 1674, f.77.

92 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.502.
missionaries could be overcome with the assistance of the secular authorities, which had not, until then, been forthcoming.\footnote{Ibid., pp.502-03.}

The Franciscan Missionaries

The number of Franciscans who abandoned the Chocó mission field within the first few years of activity there reflects the problems they faced in their attempt to settle and convert the Indian population. Fray Miguel de Vera and Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramírez - the two missionaries who had been assigned to Taita - had left the settlement by July 1674.\footnote{AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Antioquia, 18 July 1674, f.22.} By 1676, Miguel de Aguinaga, the new governor of Antioquia, claimed that four of the missionaries who had been sent from Spain to the Chocó were residing in the city of Antioquia, despite the fact that the Chocó was short of clergy.\footnote{Antioquia, 30 December 1675, in AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, ff.5-6.} In fact, by 1676, only three Franciscans remained in the entire Chocó region: Fray Joseph de Córdoba continued to serve the settlement of Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de LLoró, in the province of Citará, and Fray Francisco Moreno and Fray Pablo Ruiz between them served the settlements of Tadó, San Juan de Yró, and Santa Cruz de Yragugu, in the province of Tatamá/Chocó. As many as four of the original settlements to which the Franciscans had been sent in the province of Tatamá/Chocó - Poya, Nuestra
Señora de Pureto, San Pedro de Alcántara, San Francisco Ytaguri - had either ceased to exist or had been abandoned by the missionaries. And, if only Lloró, in the Province of Citará, enjoyed the services of a priest, the other two settlements of the province - San Juan de Nigua and San Francisco de Atrato - clearly had also been abandoned. In 1676, Fray Francisco Caro, of the Franciscan hospice in Antioquia, justified the missionaries’ absence on the basis of the Indians’ continuing defiance.\footnote{AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January 1676, ff.6-8.}

However, one should beware of placing all the blame for the friars’ difficulties and disillusion on the situation in the mission field. Some of the Franciscans who had been sent to the Chocó - Fray Agustín Navarro, Fray Pedro Arbues, and Fray Francisco Garrido - never actually arrived, and at least one other - Fray Joseph Marton - left the area before he had even been assigned to any of the settlements, making his way to Antioquia and then to Cartagena.\footnote{AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", f.99. According to a petition presented by a group of Antioquia residents, Fray Joseph Marton and Fray Miguel de Vera had left the region within one and a half months of arriving there. See the petition of Francisco Mayoral de Olivos, Don Carlos de Molina y Toledo, Don Diego Beltrán de Castillo, Don Luis Jaramillo, and Juan Jaramillo, Valle de Aburra, 28 August 1674, in ibid., f.33.} Thus, out of a total of twelve Franciscans who formed part of the original expedition, only eight remained in the Chocó at the end of 1673,\footnote{AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January 1676, ff.6-8.} a number that
had been reduced to three by 1676. Fray Juan Tabuenca was among the last of the Franciscans to desert. As we have seen, he had decided by May of 1674 that the order should leave the Chocó mission. But in fact, as early as November 1673, Tabuenca had informed the Comisario that it was pointless even to attempt to make Christians out of "these barbarians", since he could find no way of teaching people who could not understand him.\footnote{AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Fray Juan Tabuenca to Castro Rivadeneyra, Nigua, 28 November 1673, f.77.} As we have already noted, no consideration was ever given to the learning of native languages.

Although we do not know what became of those Franciscans who do not appear in the list of friars sent to the region's settlements, Pedro Borges Morán's study of missionary expeditions sent to Spanish America during the colonial period shows that missionary desertions were not at all rare. Some missionaries died en route to the colonies. Others deserted their expeditions at various ports before arriving at their intended destinations, and there were also those who preferred to opt for the easier life offered in some other area of the colony to which they had been sent. Another proportion did go to the missions to which they had been assigned, only to abandon their respective mission territories after only a short spell of activity there. Borges Morán cites several examples to illustrate this feature of missionary activity, and shows that, from the sixteenth century, royal orders were
repeatedly issued in an attempt to prevent further desertions. 100

Moreover, many complaints were made against the Franciscans for the methods they employed to settle the Indians and to obtain stipends from them. Some of these complaints were made by the Antioqueños and by the secular priest Antonio de Guzmán, and thus, like those made by the missionaries against Guzmán, should also be read cautiously. These clearly had more to do with the jurisdictional dispute between the gobernaciones of Popayán and Antioquia, to which we have referred in Chapter 2, than with the reality of what was occurring among the Indians of the Chocó. For example, Guzmán opposed the methods used by the Franciscans to congregate the native population. He reported that the friars had attempted to reduce the number of settlements existing in the province of Citará from five to three, and that these attempts had caused disturbances among the native population. Guzmán claimed that he had founded the five settlements, and that he had chosen locations suitable for the cultivation of maize and other produce. 101 His brother-in-law, Antonio del Pino Villapadierna, also complained that the Franciscans had attempted to resettle the Indians in different places, forcing them to leave the five settlements founded by

100 Pedro Borges Morán, _El envío de misioneros a América durante la época española_ (Salamanca, 1977), pp.544-65.

101 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Juan de León Castellanos, n.p., n.d., f.86.
Guzmán, which had been the only way that had been found to make the Indians come out of their retreats to be indoctrinated. In 1674, a group of vecinos of Antioquia also reported that in the six months since the Franciscans had been in the province of Citará, "troops of infidels" had travelled to Antioquia to complain that the Franciscans compelled them to congregate in different settlements and leave the ones that Antonio de Guzmán had founded in places they deemed to be convenient for agricultural purposes.

Antonio de Guzmán also argued that, despite the fact that the Franciscans had tried to discredit him and blame him for the problems which had arisen with the Indians, it was they who had caused them, for having demanded from the Indians 300 pesos in payment of their stipends. It was also said that one of the friars had beaten and badly injured an Indian - one capitán Cupamay, who was apparently well respected by the native population of the area.

While some of the accusations may well have been false - we have already seen that Guzmán's attempts to congregate the native population in permanent settlements were as unsuccessful as those of Quevedo, the Jesuits, and the Franciscans - repeated complaints were certainly made.

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103 Ibid., Francisco Mayoral de Olivos, Don Carlos de Molina y Toledo, Don Diego Beltrán de Castillo, Doctor Luis Jaramillo, and Juan Jaramillo, 28 August 1674, f.33.

104 Ibid., n.p., n.d., f.87.

105 Ibid., Antonio and Ignacio de Guzmán, Mina del Señor Santo Domingo, 15 July 1674, f.41.
against the missionaries over the payment of stipends, and about the ill-treatment the Indians received for refusing to pay these. In 1674, Ignacio de Guzmán reported that Capitán Bolivar and other Indians had complained that the beating one of the Franciscans had given Capitán Cupamay had been a result of his refusal to make the payments.106 That same year, the governor of Antioquia, Don Francisco de Montoya y Salazar, reported to the Crown that the missionaries insisted upon receiving a one-peso stipend from the Indians, in addition to the one-peso they paid in tribute to the royal treasury. Moreover, the tributes that had been collected to be sent to Antioquia on the last occasion these were due, had been taken by the friars, who insisted that tributes should be paid in Popayán, and not in Antioquia.107 Two of the friars—Fray Joseph de Córdoba and Fray Pablo Ruiz—appear to have had a particularly difficult relationship with the Indians. Complaints against them reached the Audiencia of Santa Fe. Although the Franciscan Father Provincial, Fray Pedro de Soto, was asked to order their return to Santa Fe,108 Córdoba and Ruiz remained in the mission. As we shall see

106 Ibid., Mina del Señor Santo Domingo, 15 July 1674, f.41. See also the petition presented by Francisco Mayoral de Olivos, et.al., ff.32-35.

107 Ibid. Don Pedro de Salazar Betancur also complained that two of the friars—Fray Joseph de Córdoba and Fray Pablo Ruiz—ill-treated the Indians. See ibid., Anserma, 10 December 1674, f.119. The corregidor Lorenzo de Salamanca complained about the same two missionaries whom, he claimed, had stolen money from him. See ibid., Anserma, 4 March 1675, ff.168-69.

108 Pacheco, La Consolidación de la Iglesia, p.673.
in Chapter 5, the Franciscan Provincial's failure to withdraw these two missionaries was to have serious consequences, during the following decade, for both the Franciscans and all other Spaniards resident in the region.

In addition to the specific grievances that the Antioqueños had against the Franciscans, other more general issues were raised as well, which suggest that they believed the missionaries to be unprepared for the task they had been set in the Chocó. These interpretations of the Franciscans' lack of ability are particularly revealing, for they also allow us a few glimpses of the Spaniards' attitudes towards the Indians and also of the Antioqueños opinion of missionaries sent from Spain. In complaining about the friars' ill-treatment of the Indians, a group of men from Antioquia noted that as the friars were "chapetones" who had just arrived from Spain, they had no experience in dealing with or understanding the Indians. The Indians were not only "rustic" and "bellicose", but the vast majority did not understand or speak the Spanish language. Indeed, there was at best only one Indian in each settlement who could serve as interpreter, and these could not be present at all times. According to the Spaniard Antonio del Pino, the Indians were "barbarians incapable of reason ... a people recently reduced after having been accustomed to treacherous [acts] ... which the

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109 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Petition presented by Francisco Mayoral de Olivos, et.al., 28 August 1674, ff.34-35.
religious are ignorant of, as they are chapetones recently arrived from ... Spain".\textsuperscript{110}

Similar doubts about the Franciscans' abilities were voiced by the Audiencia of Santa Fe, and even by Fray Juan Luengo, General of the Franciscan order. In reply to a royal cédula of 24 August 1674, requesting information about whether more members of the regular orders would be required for missionary work, the Audiencia replied that they would not, for the results expected from those who were already there had not materialized. The Audiencia reported that the Franciscan friars who had been sent did not have the necessary wisdom. Thus, at least for the moment, the Audiencia argued, the sending of missionaries could be suspended.\textsuperscript{111}

The Audiencia's reply was passed on to Fray Juan Luengo. Luengo agreed - on the basis of reports he had received from Santa Fe - that no results had been obtained from that mission, but pointed towards the friars' inability to maintain themselves in the region as the reason for its lack of success: the region was sterile, and all the Indians were "cimarrones" who had no houses in which to live. For this reason, some of the friars had abandoned the region, and some had been recalled. Luengo added, however, that the mission was accepted against the better judgement of the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe,

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., n.p., n.d., ff.36-37.

\textsuperscript{111} AGI Quito 67, Audiencia of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 17 June 1675.
which had previously and unsuccessfully attempted the task of reduction in the area. As for the Franciscans who had been sent to the Chocó, these were no more than inexperienced young men, faced with a difficult terrain, intractable Indians, and hunger. Luengo contrasted the Franciscan record in the Chocó with the activities of some of the friars in the Llanos, where the number of ‘infidels’ was greater, but where they also had settlements, and results were already being experienced.¹¹²

Undoubtedly, all these factors contributed to the failure of the Franciscans. But the failure to convert and discipline the Indians was not due only to the fact that the Franciscans were unprepared for the task, or to conflict between the two gobernaciones, or to disputes between seculars and regulars, even though they blamed each other for the situation. While the Indians did have specific grievances against the Franciscans - to do with tribute payments, stipends, ill-treatment - the crucial reason for their refusal to settle in the Franciscan towns had more to do with their traditional lifestyles, agricultural methods, social structure, and general resistance to the Spaniards than it did with the missionaries themselves. We also saw in Chapter 2 that the area over which the Franciscans and Antonio de Guzmán

¹¹² Ibid., Fray Juan Luengo to Don Francisco Fernández Madrigal, 23 April 1676. Luengo did not expand on the reasons why some of the missionaries had been recalled, nor did he give any indication about which of the Franciscans he was referring to. For an account of the activities of all the orders in the Llanos region, see Rausch, A Tropical Plains Frontier.
conflicted was only a small part of the Chocó region - the province of Citará. Yet the same problems identified by the missionaries working among the Citará in the 1670s were also evident there in previous decades, as they were in the provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and Noanama during the same decade, and, as we have seen, much of this evidence was provided by the Jesuits. Indeed, in 1688, the Governor of Popayán, Don Gerónimo de Berrio, felt it necessary to urge the Jesuit order not to abandon its mission in the Chocó. By this time, the Jesuits theoretically controlled three Indian settlements in the province of Noanama - San José de Noanama, with 50 tributaries; San Ignacio de Loyola, with a total population of 10 or 12 Indians; and San Francisco Javier, with 50 tributaries. But even the Jesuits, who had almost twenty years of work in the area, and concentrated their activities after the arrival of the Franciscans among Indians who were supposed to have been finally pacified in the 1630s, had had virtually no success in either congregating or converting the native population. In 1689, the Jesuit order finally abandoned its activities among the Noanama in favour of their mission in the Marañón river region. In October of that year, the General of the Jesuit order, Tirso González, wrote that the mission among the Chocó and Noanama had not had a missionary for more than four years, and that he felt it would be wiser to

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113 Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, footnote 31, pp.452-53.
leave the area, for little progress and few results could be expected from the peoples of the Chocó.\textsuperscript{114}

The process of congregating and converting small, dispersed and very mobile Indian communities was unlikely to be successful without some show of force on the part of the Spanish. The peaceful approach had been tried and had failed. Within a very short time after their arrival, the Franciscans of the Chocó mission came to the conclusion that some form of physical punishment would have to be implemented to punish recalcitrant Indians, while other members of the order, such as Fray Lucas de Villa Veces, the Procurador General, had concluded that the missionary effort was doomed to failure unless a force of Spanish armed men were sent to the area to force the Indians to remain in their settlements. Villa Veces advised that at least thirty armed men should be sent to the Chocó to prevent the Indians returning to the retreats: should this not be possible, he argued, all Spanish lives in the region would be at risk.\textsuperscript{115} Although we do not know whether this advice was taken seriously, by 1675, the governor of Antioquia had ordered Juan Bueso de Valdés, former governor of the gobernación, to lead an entrada to the region. It is Juan Bueso de Valdés' entrada, carried out in 1676, which will form the subject of Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{114} Quoted in ibid., p.453.

\textsuperscript{115} AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", n.p., n.d., f.16.
CHAPTER 4
JUAN BUESO DE VALDES' ENTRADA
TO THE CHOCO, 1676-1677

By 1676, the reduction of the Chocó had come to a virtual standstill. All but three of the original group of Franciscans had left the province, blaming the lack of assistance from the secular authorities, the continuing conflict with the Guzmán brothers, and the increasing defiance of the Indians, which had caused considerable fear and distrust among the missionaries.¹ The Indians had continued to resist all efforts on the part of the Franciscans to congregate them in permanent settlements, and to teach them Christian Doctrine. They continued also to refuse to provide them with foodstuffs, unless they were paid, and sold their produce at prices deemed excessive by the miners. While several miners stayed in the area, the withdrawal of the Franciscans left the region without the assistance of those who were principally responsible for the pacification and conversion of the Indian population. Furthermore, their desertion rendered less likely any expansion beyond the area already known to the Spaniards -

¹ AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Fray Francisco Caro, Antioquia, 3 January 1676, ff.6-8; and Real Provisión, Santa Fe, 1 April 1675, ff.51-3.
the region inhabited by the Tatamá/Chocó, Citará, and Noanama.

This was a matter of particular importance, at a time when plans were being considered for further pacification campaigns against Indian groups thought still to remain outside the reach of the Spanish. As we shall see, the gubernación of Antioquia was beginning to consider extending its influence northwards towards the Gulf of Darién, the region inhabited by the Cunacuna. Meanwhile, the gubernación of Popayán, already well-entrenched in the province of Noanama, was particularly concerned to achieve the pacification of the Soruco, an Indian group which inhabited an ill-defined territory and remained oblivious to the presence of the Spaniards in the region. There were two reasons why the Spaniards of Popayán decided to proceed against this group: first, according to Governor Díaz de la Cuesta, because the Soruco were continuously at war with the other Indians of the region, "infesting [the land of] the Chocoes killing their people and destroying their maize fields in ambushes...";² and secondly, because their pacification was seen as a prerequisite to the establishment of an overland route linking the Chocó to Panama and Portobelo.³ There was one further factor which contributed to these plans to penetrate Soruco territory:

² AGI Quito 67, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 20 July 1672. See also AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 2, Tadó, 4 December 1676, f.49.

³ AGI Quito 67, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 8 April 1669.
Spaniards in the \textit{gobernaniones} of Antioquia and Popayán, both of which were still in the grip of a mining recession, believed that the land inhabited by the Soruco was rich in gold, and that continuous warfare prevented them from exploiting their mineral wealth.\textsuperscript{4} The importance of this factor cannot be underestimated: in the mid-1670s, gold production in Antioquia and in Popayán remained at very low levels. Although quinto figures for Popayán in the 1670-74 quinquennium show a slight improvement relative to the previous five years - 24,000 pesos in 1670-74, compared with 20,705 in 1665-69 - gold production in Antioquia, as measured by fundición figures, reached an all time low in 1673 and 1674 - a mere 4,461 and 4,053 pesos respectively.\textsuperscript{5}

Although the pacification of the Soruco was considered to be a matter of utmost importance, the location of the territories they inhabited and the size of the Indian population was much less clear. In 1669, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta reported to the Crown that the Sorucos' territory lay close to the Gulf of Darién, and that they were estimated to number some 5,000 in total - excluding women and "chusma".\textsuperscript{6} By July of the same year, however, the

\textsuperscript{4} AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel García to Crown, Popayán, 22 November 1674. See also AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 30 June 1677, ff.189-90.

\textsuperscript{5} Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, Tables 22 & 27, pp.316, 327; and Ann Twinam, Miners, Merchants, and Farmers in Colonial Colombia (Austin, Texas, 1982), Table 1, p.28.

\textsuperscript{6} AGI Quito 67, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 8 April 1669, and Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 24 April 1669.
governor informed the Crown that the Soruco were estimated to number 3,000 adult men. By 1672, no further progress in the pacification of the Soruco had been reported. Instead, the Spaniard Lorenzo de Salamanca noted that these were "such warlike Indians that they never let go of their arms. They continuously and without pause organize wars attacking the peaceful Indians [who are] reduced to the Royal Crown ... on several occasions they have burned many houses and caused the death of many Indians".

Reports on the Soruco's "warlike" nature, and the immense mineral wealth to be found in their territory continued for several years into the 1670s. In November 1674, Díaz de la Cuesta's successor, Governor Miguel García, who also began to consider moving against the Cunacuna of the Darién region, informed the Crown that the reduction of the Soruco was indeed desirable, given their large numbers and the many gold deposits they allegedly possessed. By 1676, Juan López García, too, was advising the Crown that the Soruco should be reduced without delay. Soruco territory, López García observed, was situated between the provinces of Noanama, Tatamá/Chocó, and Citará, and the Indians were so "bellicose" that they had caused considerable anxiety among "the natives of these

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7 Ibid., Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 28 July 1669.

8 Ibid., Auto de Oficio, Popayán, 9 May 1672.

9 AGI Quito 16, Governor Miguel García to Crown, Popayán, 22 November 1674, and AGI Quito 67, Governor Miguel García to Crown, Popayán, 26 June 1674.
provinces", because of the numerous deaths they had inflicted some three months earlier. The same applied, López García claimed, to the Burgumia — another Indian group remaining outside the Spaniards' control, whose lands were said to border on those of the Soruco.\textsuperscript{10} Although, by 1677, no further moves had been made to proceed against the Soruco or the Burgumia, we do have some clearer indications about the location of the lands inhabited by the latter group, at least. In June of that year, it was reported that Burgumia territory was situated between the province of Soruco and the Pacific, close to the river Bojaya and the Panamanian border. It was also said that Dominican and Mercedarian friars, as well as other Spaniards, resided in Burgumia lands, and that some of their number, captured and imprisoned by Chocó Indians, knew a few prayers in Spanish.\textsuperscript{11}

Notwithstanding all these indications of the existence of large unconquered Indian groups within Chocó territory, it has to be said that one of the most surprising aspects of the documents dealing with this period of Spanish activity in the region — from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century — is that, for some inexplicable reason, the Soruco and the Burgumia disappeared completely from official documents after the late 1680s. In the 1710s, one other Indian group, the Oromira, who were

\textsuperscript{10} AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 2, Tadó, 4 December 1676, f.49.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., Ramo 1, Antioquia, 30 June 1677, f.190.
thought to inhabit a stretch of land bordering on Cunacuna territory, began to attract the attention of Spaniards in Antioquia. In this case, as in the case of the Soruco and the Burgumia, Spanish interest was short-term, and the Oromira, too, ceased to be an issue in later documents.

Nevertheless, in the 1670s, the existence of unconquered, unpacified Indians in regions bordering those officially under the control of the Spaniards was a matter of some importance, not just for royal officials, but also for the Crown. In June 1674, a new royal cédula was issued, which essentially repeated the instructions contained with the cédula of November, 1666. The governors of the surrounding provinces were once again instructed to attend to the pacification and "reduction" to the Holy Faith of both the Indians of the Chocó and those inhabiting neighbouring areas. However, in 1674, the Crown remained as unwilling as it had eight years earlier to commit any financial resources to the pacification. While the Audiencia of Santa Fe - still in overall control of the Chocó region - was expected to assist in the process, it was, once again, ordered to ensure that this assistance did not take the form of treasury funds.12

The absence of royal funding for expeditions of pacification to the Chocó did not hold up the process of Spanish penetration of the region. In the case of the Chocó, the interests of the Crown and royal officials on

12 Ibid., Ramo 1, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 6 June 1674, ff.1-4.
the one hand, and those of individual organizers, leaders, and financiers of expeditions of pacification coincided perfectly. In Chapter 2 we saw how the royal cédula of November 1666 led several individuals, authorized by the governors of Popayán and Antioquia, personally to finance and conduct entradas to the Chocó, all of which were aimed at reducing the native population and preparing the ground for the entry of Spanish miners and slave gangs to work the region’s gold deposits. The cédula of 1674 also led to the organization of a new entrada, to be financed and conducted by the former governor of Antioquia, Juan Bueso de Valdés.

Juan Bueso de Valdés’ entrada, which took place between September 1676 and January 1677, will form the subject of this chapter. First, we will consider the interests which guided Spanish policy towards the Chocó region during the last quarter of the seventeenth century, through the instructions which the governor of Antioquia gave to Bueso de Valdés. In examining how the campaign was organized, staffed, and financed, we will also consider what motivated so many individual Spaniards from neighbouring regions to continue to risk death and financial ruin in the Chocó enterprise. Secondly, we will take a closer look at how far the pacification had progressed by 1676, analysing the performance of the Franciscan missionaries over the previous three years, establishing the extent to which the Spaniards had assumed control over the indigenous population, and examining the specific problems faced by miners and missionaries in the
Finally, we will focus on the measures which Bueso de Valdés took to solve the problems of the Chocó, and at the extent to which these were successful.

This chapter will show that, in spite of a continuing and perhaps growing Spanish presence in the region, by the mid-1670s, Spanish control over the Indian population of the Chocó remained extremely weak. Juan Bueso de Valdés’ entrada was aimed primarily at increasing the level of control exercised by the Spaniards over the indigenous population, and it is for this reason that the expedition should be examined in detail. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the decade of the 1680s was a period of intense conflict between Spaniards and Indians in the Chocó, but since the sources are very rarely specific about Indian grievances, our only route to ascertaining the causes of a conflict which resulted in the massacre of most of the Chocó’s Spanish residents lies in establishing the demands the Spaniards had begun to make on the Indian peoples of the region in the years before 1680. Indeed, the measures implemented by Juan Bueso de Valdés show very clearly that the purpose of the Spaniards in reducing the native population of the Chocó was to ensure a steady source of supply of foodstuffs for the Spaniards in the region, and at facilitating the entry of miners and slave gangs to exploit its sources of precious metals.
Organizing the Entrada

The interests which guided official policy towards the pacification of the Chocó are particularly clear in the case of the *entrada* of 1676-77, for one important reason: the instructions Bueso de Valdés received were explicit and specific because the order to conduct and finance the expedition came directly from the governor of Antioquia, Miguel de Aguinaga. The governor’s instructions dealt with three major issues of interest to the Crown. Bueso de Valdés was ordered, first, to inform the native population that they should obey the missionaries and provide them with sufficient supplies to maintain themselves and to enable them to expand their activities to neighbouring regions. The missionaries were to be employed as a vanguard force in the pacification of the Indian groups still outside Spanish control, while the Indian population of the territories being occupied by the Spaniards were to provide the resources to enable them to fulfill this role. Secondly, Bueso de Valdés was instructed to undertake a reconnaissance journey down the Atrato to the sea: he was to establish whether the river was navigable, identify the Indian groups inhabiting the riverbanks, locate and identify the rivers which flowed into the Atrato, and acquire some sense of the distance separating the territory occupied by the Chocó Indians and the sea. As Governor Aguinaga informed Bueso de Valdés, if the Atrato river was found to be navigable, supplies could be introduced from

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13 Ibid., Antioquia, 8 January 1676, f.9.
the coast, by river, to the Indian settlements. The river would not only greatly facilitate the introduction of supplies and the entry of missionaries, and armed men, should these be necessary, but it would also be of great benefit to the royal treasury. Thirdly, and most importantly, Bueso de Valdés was instructed to inspect the provinces' mineral deposits and the extent of the sources of precious metals existing in neighbouring areas. It is clear that the benefits that would accrue to the royal treasury from a successfully pacified region were uppermost in the governor’s mind.¹⁴

It should be mentioned at the outset that, although the entrada was to extend across two of the Chocó’s provinces, it was somewhat limited in its geographical scope. Governor Aguinaga’s instructions to Bueso de Valdés covered the province of Citará, the area over which the gobernación of Antioquia believed it had a legitimate case for jurisdiction, and the province of Tatamá/Chocó. But the province of Noanama fell clearly within the jurisdiction of the gobernación of Popayán. Governor Aguinaga made no reference to this region in his instructions, and Bueso de Valdés made no attempt to penetrate that stretch of territory claimed by the payaneses.

There were several reasons why Bueso de Valdés was chosen to lead the expedition. Whilst serving as governor of Antioquia, the Audiencia of Santa Fe had, in 1675, ¹⁴ Ibid., Antioquia, 8 January 1676, ff.9-13.
appointed him Juez Auxiliador Superintendente - or Assistant Superintendent - of the Chocó mission for the gobernación of Antioquia, and in this capacity he was entrusted with promoting the interests of the mission.  

In April of the same year, he was also authorized by the Audiencia to conduct an entrada, in response to continuing reports of conflict between the Franciscans and Antonio de Guzmán. Since Bueso de Valdés was ordered to investigate and report on this matter, to assist the Franciscan missionaries, to ensure that they were maintained from the "produce of the land", and to enforce the provisions of the royal cédulas of 1666 and 1674 which concerned the Indians' exemption from stipend and tribute payments, he was clearly the favoured choice of the Audiencia of Santa Fe. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Bueso de Valdés was also in a position to contribute considerable sums of money to the Chocó enterprise. When, a few years earlier, the city of Cartagena was threatened by invasion, he had offered to meet the costs of sending 100 men to defend the city. As the expected invasion did not take place, Bueso de Valdés left his offer open until such time as the need for his assistance arose again. This, clearly, was considered to be the right time to call on his services.

15 AGI Quito 67, Governor Bueso de Valdés to Crown, Antioquia, 12 July 1675. See also AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Real Provision, 1 April 1675, ff.58-59.

16 Ibid., Real Provisión, Santa Fe, 1 April 1675, ff.51-59; Real Provisión, Santa Fe, 29 April 1675, ff.13-19; and Real Provisión, Santa Fe, 24 February 1676, ff.25-26. See also Fray Francisco Caro to Governor Aguinaga, Antioquia, 3 January 1676, ff.6-8.
Thirdly, Bueso de Valdés had endeared himself to the Franciscan order because of his willingness to provide financial support to the Franciscans living in Antioquia as well as those working among the Indians of the Chocó. In a 1674 letter to the Franciscan Comisario, Fray Miguel de Castro, Bueso de Valdés promised to provide sufficient funds to prevent the friars abandoning the mission, and to pay the costs of sending back those friars who had already left the region but wished to return. The Franciscans clearly trusted Bueso de Valdés: Fray Francisco Caro, president of the Franciscan monastery of Antioquia, informed Governor Aguinaga that the missionaries who were then resident in the city would willingly return to the Chocó if accompanied by Bueso de Valdés, as he was known to be a person who would support them.

While we can understand why Bueso de Valdés was seen as a likely leader for the entrada, his own willingness to finance it raises important questions not only about why he was prepared to do so, but also about the factors which drove so many Spaniards to risk their fortunes in this enterprise. In the early decades of the seventeenth century, the capitulaciones - or contracts - agreed between

17 Ibid., Antioquia, 8 January 1676, ff.9-13, and 14 July 1677, f.205. See also ibid., Real Provisión, 1 April 1675, ff.51-60. Bueso de Valdés had in fact already given considerable financial help to the Franciscan mission in the Chocó. See ibid., Antioquia, 7 January 1676, f.9, and AGI Quito 67, Governor Bueso de Valdés to Crown, Antioquia, 12 July 1675.

18 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 3 January 1676, ff.7-8. In 1676, Bueso de Valdés was an "alcalde ordinario" of the city of Antioquia. Ibid., f.19.
the Crown and individuals who led and financed expeditions to the Chocó included not only the obligations of the expeditionary leaders but also the privileges which they could expect to receive upon completing their campaigns successfully. For example, a royal cédula of November 27, 1634, set out in detail the privileges that Don Juan Vélez de Guevara would receive in return for carrying out an entrada intended to achieve the pacification and conversion of the Indians of the Chocó, and the re-establishment of the city and mines of Toro, abandoned, the document said, as a result of an Indian uprising. In addition, Vélez de Guevara proposed to found two further cities in the region - each with at least 50 vecinos - within three years of entry. He was to pay all expenses - soldiers, missionaries, supplies, defense - at an expected cost of 30,000 pesos. In return, Vélez de Guevara would receive several privileges, among the most important of which were the governorship of Antioquia for a five-year period, once it became vacant; the governorship of the Chocó, once the region was pacified; the title of Adelantado of the Chocó; an encomienda; a repartimiento within the district of each Spanish town founded; and a reduction of the royal quinto to one-tenth of all metals mined in the region.

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19 "de a ocho Rs en plata doble".

20 AGI Santa Fe 357, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 27 September 1634.
Before 1630, another hopeful leader of an expedition to the Chocó, Don Antonio Maldonado de Mendoza, proposed to carry out an entrada aimed at achieving the pacification of several Indian groups in the Chocó region within six years of taking up the governorship of the Chocó - this was one of the privileges he requested from the Crown in return. In addition, he proposed to resettle the mines of Toro, to open a trail to the Chocó, in order to facilitate the resettlement of the slave gangs which were then said to be idle in the gobernación of Popayán and the Audiencia of Santa Fe, to establish a fort for the protection of Spanish residents within the district of the Toro mines, to found three further Spanish cities in the region, and to lead an expedition every summer, composed of 140 armed men, until such time as the region was completely pacified. In addition to the governorship of the Chocó, Maldonado de Mendoza requested several other privileges, such as the governorship of Popayán, the title of Adelantado, and the right to a repartimiento in each town he founded.

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21 This document must have been written before 1630, because, in a letter of April 1669, the governor of Popayán, Don Gabriel Díaz de la Cuesta, referred to a royal cédula of 7 March 1630, which ordered the cabildo of Popayán to report on Don Antonio Maldonado de Mendoza's capitulación. See AGI Quito 67, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 24 April 1669.

22 B.M. Add.13,992, No.45, ff.357-9: "Papel Original de don Antonio Maldonado de Mendoza, sobre la pacificación de los indios Chocos, Noanamas, y Cirambiraes y población de las minas de Toro". There are, in fact, many examples of capitulaciones for expeditions to the Chocó. In July 1574, for instance, Lucas de Avila requested the governorship of the Chocó for a period of 20 years, the reduction of the royal quinto to 5% of gold extracted the region, the right to bring from Spain, free
However, with the notable exception of Don Francisco de Quevedo, by the second half of the seventeenth century the Crown no longer offered such extensive privileges to individuals undertaking entradas to the Chocó. Quevedo was an exception only because Antonio Maldonado de Mendoza’s 1620s capitulación served as the basis for the agreement he reached with his cousin, Don Gabriel Díaz de la Cuesta, the governor of Popayán.\textsuperscript{23} The privileges that Quevedo was to receive for funding the expedition - at a cost of 18,000 pesos, according to the Governor - included the title of Adelantado and the governorship of Popayán for a period of eight years.\textsuperscript{24} As we have seen, Quevedo undertook the entrada but died before the Crown accepted the terms of his contract.\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{itemize}
  \item of duties, 300 slaves who were to be introduced to the Chocó, a salary of 3,000 gold pesos per year, to be paid out of quinto revenues, the title of Adelantado, the right to appoint the first treasury officials in the region, who were to be paid 1,000 gold pesos per year, and a repartimiento in each settlement, town, or port founded by him. In exchange, Lucas de Avila proposed to finance the entrada, including the cost of supplies, to found as many Spanish settlements as could be sustained there, to introduce 200 slaves, in addition to the 300 brought from Spain, at his own expense, to work the region’s mines, and to fund the entry of as many priests and friars as deemed necessary. See Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, pp.56-66, and also pp.67-74. Other examples of capitulaciones include those of the governor of Popayán, Bermúdez de Castro, in 1630. See Colmenares, Cali, pp.133-34.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{23} AGI Quito 67, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 24 April 1669.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 20 July 1672.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., Audiencia of Quito to Crown, Quito, 15 June 1675.
On the whole, by the 1660s, Spaniards who risked their lives and fortunes in the Chocó did so without expecting privileges from the Crown in return - or at least, not in the short term. Indeed, according to the royal cédula of 27 November 1666, in theory these individuals could no longer expect to receive an encomienda or even to benefit from the collection of tributes: the cédula made it quite clear that pacified Indians were not to be distributed in encomienda, nor were they to pay tributes for a period of ten years following their reduction.²⁶ Of course, some of these individuals, principally those who were already employed in the service of the Crown, may well have expected special consideration in future dealings with the Crown. This, no doubt, was why Governor Aguinaga promised Bueso de Valdés that he would "inform His Majesty so that he might bear you in mind and remunerate you with the posts you can expect from His Royal Hand".²⁷ Other Spaniards planning to lead expeditions to the Chocó were more direct in requesting favours in return for services. In 1669, for instance, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta offered to undertake and finance an expedition to the province of Soruco, in exchange for the post of "Consejero de guerra".²⁸

²⁶ AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Royal Cédula, Madrid, 27 November 1666, inserted in Royal Cédula, Madrid, 4 June 1674, ff.1-4.
²⁷ Ibid., Antioquia, 8 January 1676, f.13.
²⁸ AGI Quito 67, Governor Díaz de la Cuesta to Crown, Popayán, 24 April 1669.
The prospect of receiving preferential treatment from the Crown may also have been the reason why Spaniards never failed to report the financial contributions they had made to the pacification of the region. In 1675, Bueso de Valdés informed the Crown that he had contributed a significant portion of his fortune to financing Franciscan missionaries.\(^\text{29}\) In 1669, the former governor of Popayán, Don Luis Antonio de Guzmán y Toledo, reported that his activities in the Chocó - amongst which he included the pacification of the Noanama - had not cost the Crown "one single maravedí of any branch of the royal treasury ... I have provided all at my own expense...".\(^\text{30}\) A few years later, the antioqueño priest Antonio de Guzmán reported that, although the sending of the Franciscan missionaries had cost the Crown 20,000 patacones, his activities had not involved the King in any expense.\(^\text{31}\) In 1672, he reported further that he had personally financed the opening of a trail linking the city of Antioquia and Urrao.\(^\text{32}\)

However, the prospect of preferential treatment alone is unlikely to have been a sufficient incentive to lead so many Spaniards to undertake or participate in expeditions to regions as inhospitable as this. Nor did the Spaniards

\(^{29}\) Ibid., Juan Bueso de Valdés to Crown, Antioquia, 12 July 1675.

\(^{30}\) AGI Quito 13, Luis Antonio de Guzmán y Toledo to Crown, Quito, 26 April 1669.

\(^{31}\) AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Juan de León Castellanos, f.87.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., Río de Atrato, 20 December 1672, ff.104, 106.
ever expect to settle the Chocó. This region was never an attractive place of residence for the Spaniards who lived in neighbouring areas: long after the native population finally had been pacified, the Chocó remained badly underdeveloped. For example, in 1731, more than fifty years after Bueso de Valdés conducted his entrada, the oidor of the Audiencia, Martínez Malo, described the settlement of Nôvita in the following terms:

At present, this settlement or mining camp has fewer than twenty dwellings, made of wood and straw ... there are no vecinos or other people to introduce order and form república, for its inhabitants are travellers without residence here, and only those who work as miners reside in their mining camps, and these are composed of one or two houses of the same materials..."^33

Indeed, throughout the eighteenth century, no town in the Chocó was large enough even to merit the establishment of a cabildo, and the white population was always very small. Owners of large mines usually employed miners and overseers to manage and administer their mines and slave gangs, while they continued to live in the more developed cities of the interior, such as Popayán, Buga, and Cali.\(^34\)

It was the gold of the Chocó that attracted wealthy Spaniards from the neighbouring areas of Popayán and Antioquia to conduct, or finance, repeated expeditions to the region. The pacification of the Chocó’s indigenous population was a prerequisite to the introduction of slave gangs and miners, which in turn was a prerequisite to the

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33 Quoted in Colmenares, Popayán, p.31.
continued financing of lifestyles which, given declining levels of gold production in both gobernaciones, appeared under serious threat. For some people, including Juan Bueso de Valdés, the investment paid off. By 1684, he was an important mine and slave gang owner in the Chocó, holding his slaves in partnership with Domingo de Veitia, who had entered the region with Francisco de Quevedo’s expedition of 1669.35

For the benefits which he later enjoyed, Bueso de Valdés made a very large initial investment: the entrada of 1676 was expected to cost approximately 4,000 gold pesos.36 This figure was to cover the cost of supplies and of employing the soldiers who were to join the expedition, together with 32 Indian carriers to take the supplies as far as the Port of Chaquinindo.37 In order to reduce his

35 AGI Quito 67, Don Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph de Noanama, 15 May 1669; and AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Mateo’s statement, Lloró, 16 October 1684, f.26.

36 See Appendix 1, for a breakdown of the way the money was spent.

37 Ibid., Ramo 1, Petición, Juan Bueso de Valdés, n.p., n.d., ff.19-21, and Petición, Juan Bueso de Valdés, Antioquia, 4 May 1676, ff.26-27. On 12 August 1676, Governor Aguinaga issued instructions on the way in which the Indians were to be paid: each carrier was to be paid 10 gold pesos per month - 6 pesos in advance and the balance on their return. See ibid., ff.44-45. The following list includes all the Spaniards who took part in the expeditions: Juan Bueso de Valdés, Alexos Rodríguez, Joseph de Lescano, Cristóbal de Viñola, Juan Antonio Velásquez, Joseph Rodríguez, Gerónimo García, Juan de Muriel, Juan Ramírez Osorio, Laureano de Benalcázar, Francisco Antonio de la Cruz, Pedro Pablos Moreno, Francisco Degois, Alejandro de la Cruz, Gaspar Francisco de la Cruz, Pedro Ordoñez, Pablo Ordoñez, Roque Ordoñez, Gregorio Ordoñez, Pedro Ordoñez, and Simón de Betancour. See ibid., f.61.
costs, Bueso de Valdés attempted to include among his company of men "those who for their crimes have been sentenced to enter the Chocó at their own expense...". These, however, apparently escaped from Antioquia at the prospect of being taken to the Chocó.

While these "delinquents" may have fled at the prospect of being sent to the Chocó, another group of men actually volunteered their services. Alexos Rodríguez de Manzanos and Joseph Lescano, for example, both volunteered their services and that of a second soldier, at their expense, in order to further the services of their forefathers, who had been among the first conquerors and settlers of the province of Antioquia. Cristóbal de Viñola y Burgos volunteered in order to be employed in the services of the Crown. All or some of these may have expected to benefit financially from the entrada, or to improve their standing in future dealings with the Crown.

Other factors induced a second group of volunteers to offer their services. The case of the Ordoñes men illustrates the types of privileges that could be expected in return for participation in expeditions of this sort. Pablo, Pedro, Gregorio, and Pedro Ordoñes petitioned in their own name and that of their absent brothers - Gabriel and Joseph - to be included in the Bueso de Valdés

38 Ibid., Antioquia, 4 May 1676, ff.26-27.
39 Juan Bueso de Valdés to Governor Aguinaga, 10 August 1676, in ibid., ff.43-44.
40 Ibid., ff.31-3.
expedition. They claimed that their uncles, Pedro and Lázaro, had served the King as soldiers in previous entradas to the Chocó, and that, in recognition of their services, they and their descendants were granted freedom from paying tribute, a privilege that they continued to enjoy. In exchange for serving in Bueso de Valdés' entrada, they asked to be granted the right to carry swords.\footnote{Ibid., ff.29-32.} Their petition was accepted and the privilege was granted.\footnote{Antioquia, 2 June 1676, ff.30-31.} These men, all of whom claimed to be legitimate children of mestizo women, saw service for the Crown as a way of improving their own social standing.

Thus, those who chose to join expeditions such as this did so for a variety of reasons. Some, in particular those already serving as Crown officials, expected to be favoured by the King in his appointments; others may have joined simply to receive the salaries paid to its members; a third group - the case of the Indians - expected to receive privileges reserved for those who were employed in the service of the Crown; but a fourth group clearly expected to benefit from the great wealth that was known to exist in the Chocó. The absence of a strong secular government meant that there were few controls on the Spaniards who set up operations there. This lack of control manifested itself in several areas. The royal cédula of November 1666, for instance - which expressly prohibited the collection of tributes and stipends from the

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41 Ibid., ff.29-32.

42 Antioquia, 2 June 1676, ff.30-31.
Indians - was repeatedly flouted: payaneses, antioqueños, and Franciscans were locked in conflict precisely over this issue. In addition, as Bueso de Valdés reported after returning back to Antioquia from the Chocó in 1677, quintos were not being paid on the output from the mines which had already begun to be exploited in the region. Bueso de Valdés observed not only that some small slave gangs were employed in the extraction of gold from deposits in the vicinity of Nigua, from which the royal treasury had derived little benefit, but that some of the gangs were withdrawn from the area when it became known that he was to conduct the entrada. This, he believed, was because the miners feared that he would investigate the matter.43

While there were clearly advantages in setting up operations in regions where the authority of royal government was weak, there were also considerable disadvantages. Conflicts could remain unresolved for long periods of time, to the detriment of all concerned. And, of course, as the next section will show, Spaniards in the Chocó had considerable difficulty in controlling the Indian population. It was not just that they resisted congregation in permanent settlements and indoctrination in the Christian Faith; they also refused to provide the Franciscans with foodstuffs unless they were paid, and, according to the miners, set excessive prices for their produce. It was problems such as these, which can be interpreted as a deliberate ploy on the part of the Indians

43 Antioquia, 30 June 1677, ibid., f.185.
to make life difficult for the Spaniards in the Chocó, that Bueso de Valdés’ entrada was intended to solve.

**Indian-Spanish Relation in the Chocó: 1676**

The party that Bueso de Valdés led from Antioquia on 31 August 1676, was composed of two missionaries, Fray Esteban de Iruñela and Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramírez, and twenty armed soldiers, apart from Bueso de Valdés. Thirty-two Indian carriers, armed with machetes, lances, and arrows, accompanied the expedition as far as the Port of Chaquinindo, from where the rest of the group continued the journey alone. The expedition took the route followed on many previous occasions by Antonio de Guzmán: from Antioquia to the sitio de Urrao, and from there to Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria de Taita, the first Indian settlement of the province of Citará. From Taita, the party continued on to the other three principal settlements of the province - San Juan de Nigua, Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Lloró, and San Francisco de Atrato. Bueso de Valdés did not visit each settlement in the province of Tatamá/Chocó - an injured foot (perhaps a diplomatic ploy to avoid confrontation with the gobernación of Popayán) apparently prevented this - but he did travel to the town of Tadó, where he was said to have called before him the principal capitanes of the province.45 The fact that Bueso de Valdés did not visit every settlement in the province of

44 Ibid., f.60.

45 Tadó, 26 November 1676, ibid., f.101.
Tatamá/Chocó is reflected in the documents, insofar as fewer details are provided about this region. However, we do know that many of the problems identified by the missionaries and miners of the province of Citará were also identified in the province of Tatamá/Chocó, and that the measures Bueso de Valdés took during the *entrada* applied to both provinces.

By 1676, four permanent settlements had been established in the province of Citará: Taita, Nigua, Lloró, and San Francisco de Atrato. The latter three were the largest settlements, and they all contained a few houses and a church. The province of Tatamá/Chocó was composed of eight settlements: Tadó, San Juan de Yró, Santa Cruz de Yragugu, Poya, San Lorenzo de Maygara, Santiago de Ytigusu, San Francisco de Ytauri, and San Juan de Carrapa (Chami). The confusion about the location of the settlements that had characterized the first few years of Franciscan activity in the region (the result of the jurisdictional conflict between the *gobernaciones* of Popayán and Antioquia, which had led to the foundation of at least ten different Indian settlements in the province of Citará alone), had evidently been clarified by the time Bueso de Valdés arrived in the region.

Although the Indian population of both the provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and Citará continued to resist the process of *reducción*, greater and more continuous contact between Spaniards and Indians in these two provinces, and perhaps some expansion of Spanish activities to outlying areas,
meant that, by 1676, some firmer estimates about the size of the native population were provided. As the following table shows, the censuses carried out by Bueso de Valdés in the province of Citará towards the end of that year showed a slightly larger Indian population inhabiting Citará territory - 1,663 - than had been estimated by Antonio de Guzmán in 1672 - 1,153. This apparent increase in the size of the native population does not, however, permit us to draw any conclusions about population growth. As we shall see, the sources suggest that the increase can be accounted for more by Spanish expansion to areas inhabited by Indians who had previously had no contact with Spaniards, than by growth.

46 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Antioquia, n.d., f.95; Río de Atrato, 20 December 1672, ff.104-5.
TABLE 4: TOTAL POPULATION, PROVINCE OF CITARA, 1676

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taita</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigua</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloró</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco de Atrato</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,663</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1: Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria de Taita, 18 September 1676; San Juan de Nigua, 24 October 1676 and 3 November 1676; Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Lloró, 21 December 1676; and San Francisco de Atrato, 16 and 19 December 1676. See ff.63-4, 75-93, 95-6, 143-54, 122-42.]

Bueso de Valdés did not carry out censuses as detailed as this in the province of Tatamá/Chocó. Instead, he relied on the information provided by the Franciscans Fray Pablo Ruiz and Fray Francisco Moreno, and by the Spaniards Juan and Jorge López García. Here, it was the number of Indian tributaries that was of greater importance to both the missionaries and the representatives of the civil authorities. The instructions of the Crown - that the Indians should not pay tributes for a ten-year period following their reduction - had clearly not been enforced.
TABLE 5: TOTAL TRIBUTARY POPULATION, PROVINCE OF TATAMA/CHOCO, 1676

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>TRIBUTARY POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tadó</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yró</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yragugu</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poya</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maygara</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ytigusu</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ytauri</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrapa (Chamí)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>261</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Tadó, 2 December 1676, ff.116-19.]

It is difficult to estimate the total population of the province of Tatamá/Chocó on the basis of the size of the tributary population, because we do not know with any certainty what the ratio of tributaries to non-tributaries was in the Chocó region. In 1672, Antonio de Guzmán reported that, out of a total population of 1,153 for the

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47 There was not complete agreement on the number of tributaries inhabiting each settlement. In the case of Tadó, administered by Fray Pablo Ruiz, all the witnesses questioned agreed on the figure of 34 tributaries. There was also agreement on the number of tributaries inhabiting the settlements of Maygara and Ytiguso. Fray Francisco Moreno served as doctrinero of Yró and Yragugu, so his figures have been used for those two settlements. In the cases of Poya, Ytauri, and Carrapa (Chamí), Fray Francisco Moreno, Jorge López García, and Juan López García agreed on the number of tributaries - their figures have been used to draw up this table. See AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, 2 December 1676, ff.116-19.
province of Citará, 326 were tributaries – a ratio of 1:3.5. In 1678, the Jesuit Father Antonio Marzal reported that the provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and Citará both had a total Indian population of 1,600, of which 350 were tributaries – a ratio of 1:4.6.48 If we apply these ratios to the province of Tatamá/Chocó, we can tentatively estimate that, in 1676, the total population of that province was estimated at between 913 and 1,200.

The figures contained in these tables do not, however, reflect the success of the process of reducción, nor do they reflect a systematic effort on the part of the Franciscan missionaries to convert their Indian charges. Indeed, at least in the province of Citará, very little religious activity appears to have taken place since their arrival. In Taita, Bueso de Valdés was informed by the Indian Don Pedro Daza that the Franciscan Joseph Marton, and Miguel Devera, a Jesuit lay brother, had resided in the settlement for two and five months respectively,49 and that they had celebrated Mass and prayed with them daily; he also claimed that Antonio de Guzmán always stopped for a day, to celebrate Mass, on passing through Taita. But the number of Indians who claimed to have been baptized in Taita suggests that very little effort had in fact been made to convert the Indians of this settlement: only 15

48 AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Antioquia, n.d., f.95; ibid., Río de Atrato, 20 December 1672, ff.104-106; and Father Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, pp.494-5.

49 In Chapter 3 we saw, however, that Joseph Marton left the Chocó region almost immediately.
Indians, out of a total population of 66, had been baptized by 1676.\textsuperscript{50}

The picture did not look as bad in the other three settlements of the province of Citará. In Nigua, 295 Indians out of a total population of 474 - 62.2\% - had been baptized before Juan Bueso de Valdés' arrival in the Chocó region. In Lloró, the percentage of Indians who claimed to have been baptized before the entrada took place was even higher - 68\%, or 293 out of a total population of 430. The corresponding figure for San Francisco de Atrato was 69\% - or 478 out of a total population of 693.\textsuperscript{51} But the interesting feature of the data is not so much the number of baptized Indians, but the number of Indians baptized by the Franciscans who formed part of the group sent from Spain to the Chocó for the specific purpose of converting the Indian population. As the following table shows, the number was remarkably small:

\textsuperscript{50} AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria de Taita, 18 September 1676, ff.63-65.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., San Juan de Nigua, 24 October and 3 November 1676, ff.75-92, 95-6; Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Lloró, 21 December 1676, ff.143-54; and San Francisco de Atrato, 16 and 19 December 1676, ff.122-42.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRANCISCANS</th>
<th>Taita</th>
<th>Nigua</th>
<th>Lloró</th>
<th>Atrato</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fray Miguel de Castro Rivadeneyra</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Joseph Marton</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Juan Tabuenca</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Francisco Moreno</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Francisco García</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Pablo Ruiz</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fray Joseph de Córdoba</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1: Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria de Taita. 18 September 1676; San Juan de Nigua, 24 October 1676 and 3 November 1676; Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Lloró, 21 December 1676; and San Francisco de Atrato, 16 and 19 December 1676. See ff.63-4, 75-93, 95-6, 143-54, 122-42.]

If we take these census figures at face value - and there appears to be no reason for us not to, since the Franciscans made no objection to the numbers and indeed carried out hundreds of baptisms while the censuses were being carried out - we may conclude that in three years of missionary activity in the province of Citará (between 1673 and 1676), the Franciscans had baptized a total of 51 Indians, out of a total population of 1,663. In fact, most of the Indians who claimed to have been baptized had been
baptized by the secular clergy, in particular by Pedro Gómez del Valle and Luis Antonio de la Cueva.\textsuperscript{52} An equally interesting feature of the census data is the relatively small number of Indians baptized by Antonio de Guzmán: a mere 73 individuals, after many years of activity in the region.\textsuperscript{53} As we have already noted, Bueso de Valdés did not carry out detailed censuses in the province of Tatamá/Chocó, and it may be that the Franciscans who administered the settlements of that province - by 1676, only Fray Pablo Ruiz and Fray Francisco Moreno remained there - had attempted to convert more Indians. However, given that the problems which they claimed to have had in congregating the population were the same as those of the Franciscans in the province of Citará, this is unlikely.

The Franciscans' poor performance also manifested itself in the state of the region's settlements. It was said, for instance, that although there were 10 houses in Nigua, 10 in Lloró, and 19 in Atrato, most of these were uninhabited. And although all three settlements contained a church, Mass could not be celebrated in Nigua because its church was in ruins; the church of Lloró was too small and needed enlarging; and the church of San Francisco de Atrato was considered to be virtually unusable.\textsuperscript{54} Indeed, the church of Lloró was said to have been used before the

\textsuperscript{52} 363 and 334 respectively. See Sources Table 1.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Nigua, 5 October 1676, f.66; Lloró, 15 November 1676, f.97; and Antioquia, 30 June 1677, f.184.
arrival of the Franciscans for the construction of canoes.\footnote{See, for example, the statement made by Sebastián García, Nigua, 24 October 1676, in ibid., f.168.}

Despite Bueso de Valdés' findings, the Franciscans of the Chocó refused to accept any responsibility for the fact that very little progress had been made in the reducción process. They maintained that, since they had put all their efforts into carrying out their duties, shortcomings could not be blamed on them. Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramírez explained, for example, that there were many Indians who were supposed to form part of Lloró, but that they did not reside there because their dwellings were located at distances of up to four to five leagues from the settlement. Fray Esteban de Iruñela added that many of the Indians who theoretically formed part of San Francisco de Atrato lived at distances of one or two days from the settlement. Both these Franciscans agreed that unless the Indians were settled, they could not be taught Christian Doctrine.\footnote{Ibid., Lloró, 14 November 1676, f.97; and San Francisco de Atrato, 18 November 1676, f.98.}

These friars' statements were supported by Fray Joseph de Córdoba, who noted that many of the Indians of the province of Citará lived along the Baberama river, at a distance of three days' travel from Nigua, and that more than 50 lived along the Ychó river. In addition, along the headwaters of the Tutunendo river, in a place called Burebara, there lived a community of Indians which had not
yet had any contact with Spaniards. The Indians had not received any instruction in Christian Doctrine, and the children had not been baptized. There were also other Indians who, at least in theory, formed part of LLoró and San Francisco de Atrato whom Fray Joseph had not been able, despite all efforts, to reduce to their settlements. 57 Bueso de Valdés confirmed these statements and added that many Indians also lived along the Nigua and Naurita rivers. 58 The same problems were said to exist in the province of Tatamá/Chocó, where all the witnesses agreed that the Indians of the settlements not served by a doctrinero lived in their "retreats". According to Fray Pablo Ruiz, this was because there was nobody in the settlements with the authority to oblige them to remain. 59

We have already seen why the friars had such difficulties in congregating the Indian population, which lived dispersed in small communities at considerable distances from the main settlements of the province. The Indians' social structure, patterns of settlement, and resistance to Spanish occupation of their territory led some of the missionaries to conclude, within months of their arrival, that there was little point in persevering in the conversion of the Chocó's Indian population, and many soon abandoned the task. Consequently, by 1676, only three missionaries remained in the entire region.

57 Nigua, 20 October 1676, in ibid., f.73.
58 Nigua, 5 October 1676, ibid., f.66.
59 Tadó, 2 December 1676, ibid., ff.116-119.
encompassing the two provinces of Citará and Tatamá/Chocó, which consisted of twelve settlements and together accounted for an estimated known total Indian population of between 2,576 and 2,863. According to Bueso de Valdés, in spite of the shortage of priests in the Chocó, three of the missionaries from the original group of twelve remained in the city of Antioquia and another lived in Anserma. As Bueso de Valdés noted, they had no particular duties or occupations there, and although he offered to finance their re-entry into the province, they had refused.\(^{60}\)

There were two main reasons why these Franciscans refused to return to the Chocó mission. The first was that they had faced severe shortages of both food and money to buy other necessities. Fray Joseph de Córdoba insisted that, unless he could assure his fellow Franciscans of their maintenance and a source from which to acquire wine, tallow, and hosts for the celebration of Mass, he could not justifiably ask them to return to the mission. Indeed, if the remaining friars did not receive this assurance, and if they were to suffer further shortages, the mission would be abandoned completely, for the Indians demanded payment even for a bunch of plantains: "and if they give us something, however small it might be, they expect us to give them something ... [which is] impossible because of our poverty...".\(^{61}\) Iruñela and Ramírez, the two Franciscans who had returned to the Chocó with Bueso de Valdés, were

\(^{60}\) Nigua, 24 December 1676, ibid., ff.120-21.

\(^{61}\) Nigua, 20 October 1676, ibid., ff.72-3.
also concerned about their maintenance, given how badly they were assisted in this by the Indians.\textsuperscript{62}

The second reason the Franciscans' refused to return was that they believed they had not had sufficient assistance from the secular authorities. According to Fray Joseph de Córdoba, "this is not because of a shortage of corregidores because there are many".\textsuperscript{63} The question of royal officials and their lack of support for the missionary effort in the Chocó is an issue of some interest to us, because it is clear that, by the 1670s, no attempt had been made by either the gobernación of Popayán or that of Antioquia to introduce an efficient system of royal administration in the region. Indeed, the men to whom the Franciscans referred as royal officials - or corregidores - in the 1660s and 1670s, were invariably miners whose principal objective was the pursuit of their own interests - that is, the search for mines in which to place their slave gangs.\textsuperscript{64}

Although there are few details to indicate how many royal officials there were in the region by the 1670s, who their appointments had been made by, or what their duties were supposed to be, we do know that Juan and Jorge López García both served as corregidores in the Chocó, as did

\textsuperscript{62} Lloró, 14 November 1676, and San Francisco de Atrato, 18 November 1676, ibid., ff.97-8.

\textsuperscript{63} AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Lloró, 15 September 1674, ff.113-14.

\textsuperscript{64} AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Nigua, 20 October 1676, f.71
Ignacio de Guzmán, brother of the antioqueño priest Antonio de Guzmán. We have discussed the mining activities of all three in Chapter 2. One other name crops up in the documents: Domingo de Beitia y Gamboa, who later held a mining company in partnership with Bueso de Valdés, was also said to have served as corregidor in the Chocó. The duties of corregidores in the region during what can only be called a transitional period of Spanish colonization in the Chocó are difficult to determine, but they appear to have been limited to the collection of tributes. This activity, too, was unsystematic and infrequent.

The effects of such an inefficient system of administration - controlled by officials whose interests in the Chocó region were largely personal - became clear not only to the Franciscans but also to the Jesuit priest, Antonio Marzal. The Franciscans focused their objections on the reluctance of the authorities to punish Indians alleged to have mistreated individual friars. As Fray Joseph de Córdoba complained, when Fray Francisco García was ill-treated by the Indian Juan Papayo - who was said to have grabbed the friar by the hair and dragged him on the ground - Ignacio de Guzmán, then serving as "juez" in the province of Citará, offered no assistance. Nor were the Indians punished for their attitudes towards the friars. According to Córdoba, this was the reason why, when the

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65 See, for example, AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", ff.61-2, 152-3, 154.

66 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Nigua, 24 December 1676, ff.121-2.
missionaries called on the Indians to pray, they "respond very rudely". However, the Jesuit Antonio Marzal, a far more shrewd observer, understood that while miners served as royal officials in the Chocó, the missionaries were not only unlikely to find any support or assistance from that source, but were in fact more likely to be undermined by it. Thus, Antonio Marzal reported to his Father Visitor in 1678 that, instead of supporting the aims of the friars, these officials actually sent the Indians away from the settlements to cultivate maize, unconcerned about the progress of their instruction in Christianity. The effects of these actions were clear: ten months of every year were taken up with cultivating and harvesting maize, during which time the Indians were absent from the settlements. The rest of the time was taken up in making canoes. As Marzal observed, this was a necessary and indeed inevitable effect of the presence of Spaniards and slaves in the region: if the doctrinero attempted to prevent the Indians working on their maize plots, a shortage of maize for the mines would immediately follow.67

Although Antonio Marzal pinpointed what was and would continue to be one of the principal obstacles to the successful instruction of the Indians well into the eighteenth century, his observations should not be read as indicating that miners and miner/officials in the Chocó in the 1670s had had any success in establishing for the

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67 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.502.
Indians the role they would assume in later decades. The miners, for instance, complained of the considerable difficulties they faced in their attempts to obtain from the Indians foodstuffs for themselves and their slave gangs. For example, Don Bartolomé de Borja, Juan Nicolás Nuño de Sotomayor, Jacinto Roque de Espinosa, and Luis de Acevedo Redez were miners who claimed to have spent four years in the Chocó region, where they had been engaged in the discovery of mines with their slave gangs. They reported that, despite the length of time they had spent in the area, they had not made any financial gain, because of a shortage of supplies, and because those that were available were sold by the Indians at arbitrary prices. Although maize and plantains were abundant in the province, the Indians sold a fanega of maize to the miners at between 5 and 6 gold pesos; a bunch of plantains cost between 6 tomines and 1 peso. In view of these problems, the miners claimed, they had made little progress in exploiting the region’s gold mines. Many miners had been forced to withdraw their slaves, and many others had been dissuaded from setting up mining operations in the area.68

The cost of supplies purchased from the Indians was not the only concern of the miners. As the following example suggests, by the mid-1670s, Spanish miners in the Chocó were equally concerned to establish for the Indians a role in the emerging mining economy of the region. Thus,

68 Bartolomé de Borja et.al. to King, Nigua, 30 October 1676, in AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 2, f.225.
two Spaniards engaged in mining in the province of Tatamá/Chocó, Simón Luis Moreno de la Cruz and Agustín Ginés Fernández, reported that the Indians did not in fact produce enough maize to maintain them and their slave gangs, because "they only cultivate once each year". They requested that all the natives of the Chocó, and in particular those of the San Juan and Yró rivers (where, presumably, these miners had placed their slave gangs), should be forced to harvest maize twice each year, and that they "should give maize generally to all the slave gangs there are [here now] and might be [here in the future] ... threshing the maize and basketing it and taking it in their canoes to the mining camps or warehouses assigned for the purpose", in the same manner as the native population of the province of Noanama had been doing ever since slave gangs were introduced to the mining camps of Sed de Cristo, Nóvita, Río Negro, and San Agustín. The Indians of the province of Noanama, the Spaniards claimed, were paid one gold peso for each basket containing six almudes of maize.⁶⁹

Thus, the true nature of the Spaniards' interest in the Chocó region is obvious enough: gold and the means of obtaining it were their primary preoccupations. Should this need any illustration, we have only to turn to Bueso de Valdés, to examine the way in which he carried out the instructions of Governor Aguinaga and the Audiencia, and the detailed instructions he gave the native population

concerning the quantities and prices of supplies they were to provide the Spanish settlers. The entrada shows very clearly that the activities of the indigenous population of the Chocó were to be directed towards meeting the needs of the Spaniards.

**Measures to Control the Native Population**

As a result of his findings during the entrada, then, Bueso de Valdés proceeded not only to act on the instructions of Governor Aguinaga and the Audiencia, but also to implement measures designed to facilitate the activities of Spanish miners in the Chocó, and the control of the indigenous population. As we saw in the second section of this chapter, Aguinaga had instructed Bueso de Valdés to secure the maintenance of the Franciscan friars, to conduct a journey down the Atrato, and to determine the value of the region's sources of precious metals, while the Audiencia had ordered him to ensure that the native population was aware of the Crown's directives regarding their exemption from tribute payments.

With few exceptions, Bueso de Valdés' reports on the way in which he carried out the instructions of Governor Aguinaga were couched in the language of a Spaniard whose principal interest was to facilitate the exploitation of the Chocó's sources of mineral wealth. Thus, an otherwise uneventful journey down the Atrato - during which Bueso de Valdés, accompanied by two missionaries and five canoes of
Indians, had a minor skirmish with Cunacuna Indians\textsuperscript{70} - became a means of advising the governor of Antioquia of the advantages of utilizing the river for the introduction of goods to supply the region’s gold miners. This would benefit not only the miners of the region, whose profits were much diminished by the cost of introducing supplies overland, but also the vecinos of Cartagena, and, indirectly, the Crown. Merchants in Cartagena would be much attracted to commerce with the Chocó’s miners, and the ships which brought in the supplies could also transport however many missionaries became necessary, thus cutting the costs to the royal treasury. Equally, the pacification of the Cunacuna was seen as prerequisite to the successful implementation of these plans, and of course, there would be one other major advantage: the Spaniards would thus be able to enjoy "the immense wealth of their [the Cunacunas’] lands".\textsuperscript{71}

Bueso de Valdés was very clearly impressed by the potential wealth of the Chocó’s gold deposits, although he reported that, at that stage, very few slave gangs were employed in the exploitation of the region’s mines.\textsuperscript{72} For

\textsuperscript{70} See ibid., Nigua, 23 December 1676, ff.155-6; Nigua River, 15 January 1677, ff.157-8; Río Darién, 25 January 1677, ff.158-9, 163-6; and Antioquia, 30 June 1677, f.190.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., f.192.

\textsuperscript{72} It should be noted, however, that these observations referred only to the provinces of Citará and Tatamá/Chocó, and that much more mining activity was taking place, at least by 1678, in the province of Noanama. In that year, the Jesuit Antonio Marzal reported that two slave gangs (30 slaves in total) were exploiting
example, he observed that, in 1677, there were a few slave gangs — amounting to no more than about 30 slaves — employed in the extraction of gold from deposits along the Mungarra river, in the vicinity of the settlement of Tadó. However, after closely examining the potential of that river alone, he concluded that there was sufficient gold to justify employing as many as 200 slaves.\footnote{AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 30 June 1677, ff.186-7.}

The success of Spanish activities in the Chocó, however, was dependent on several factors, one of which involved the supply of foodstuffs to the miners. On this point, Bueso de Valdés issued two sets of instructions. The first dealt with the cost of foodstuffs — namely, maize, plantains, and hens — which the miners had informed him were both arbitrary and excessive. On some occasions, a fanega of maize could cost 6 pesos, and on others 4 or less. This situation was prejudicial to the Crown, first, because the mineowners found that the profits from their mining operations were consumed by the cost of supplies, and secondly, because it dissuaded Spaniards from increasing the size of their slave gangs. In order to prevent further anomalies, Bueso de Valdés set a scale of

\begin{itemize}
  \item gold deposits along the Raposo river; another two gangs (a total of 30 slaves) were employed in the mines of San Agustín, along the Sipí river; and five slave gangs (36 slaves) were employed in the mines of San Gerónimo de Nóvita and Sed de Cristo. Marzal also observed that some twenty slaves were employed in extracting gold from deposits along the Nigua and other rivers, in the province of Citará. See "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.495.
\end{itemize}
prices for the sale of Indian produce: two gold pesos for each fanega of maize; two tomines for each hen; and between one and two tomines for each bunch of plantains, depending on its type. Furthermore, weights and measures were to be rationalized in each of the region’s settlements, in order to prevent "fraud".  

The second set of instructions was issued in response to the petition of the miners from the province of Tatamá/Chocó. In the settlements of that province, Bueso de Valdés ordered the Indians that, henceforth, they should harvest twice each year. As the former governor explained, a more abundant supply of maize would be advantageous to the sustenance of the slave gangs.

The Indians’ willingness to supply the Spanish settlers with maize and other produce, however, was also dependent on an additional factor. Thus, Bueso de Valdés reported that the settlements of the region should be rebuilt and that doctrineros should be provided for each of these. This was necessary, he said, "not only to achieve the principal aim [which is] the wellbeing of the souls of their natives [but also] so that they will become more docile and [willingly] provide maize for the maintenance of

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74 Ibid., Nigua, 12 October 1676, ff.69-70; Lloró, 15 November 1676, f.97, and San Francisco de Atrato, 19 November 1676, f.99.

75 Ibid., Tadó, 27 November 1676, ff.115-16, and 29 November 1676, ff.101-02.
the mines which they [presently] lack because such order [has not been introduced].

Given these interests, it is clear that, in instructing the Indians that they were to provide their missionaries with food supplies, Bueso de Valdés recognized that the survival and continuing presence of the missionaries would also facilitate the activities of the miners. In order to avoid the problems which the Franciscans claimed to have had in obtaining supplies from the Indians, the former governor introduced a set of guidelines to ensure that each Indian made an equal contribution to the priests' upkeep. Thus, each gandul - male over the age of 15 - of every settlement was ordered to provide his priest with half a fanega of maize - or one colado, an equal measure - per year. As Bueso de Valdés observed, such a quantity would not cause the Indians any difficulty, given the large amounts that were harvested and the fertility of the land. Nothing could be done, however, about the missionaries' other needs - such as wine, tallow, and clothing. As Fray Joseph de Córdoba noted, this problem could be overcome if the Indians were obliged to pay a one-peso stipend, in place of the colado of maize, thereby allowing the friars to remain in the

\[76\] Ibid., Antioquia, 30 June 1677, ff.186-88.

\[77\] Ibid., Taita, 17 September 1676, f.63; Nigua, 7 October 1676, f.67; Nigua, 23 October 1676, f.75; Lloró, 15 November 1676, f.97; San Francisco de Atrato, 19 November 1676, ff.98-99; and Antioquia, 30 June 1677, ff.184-85.
mission in comfort. While Bueso de Valdés turned down the request on this occasion, on the grounds that his orders had to be observed, he did in fact recognize that the missionaries suffered shortages of wine, wax, clothing, and other foodstuffs, and he believed that an annual stipend of two pesos per Indian was necessary, especially since the easily accessible mines meant that they were able to acquire gold easily. Clearly, he recognized that the comfort of the Franciscan missionaries was of crucial importance to the future of Spanish operations in the region - their role was to ensure the continued presence of the Indians in their settlements.

Bueso de Valdés also made several provisions on the issue of Indian settlement. For instance, the Indians of Nigua were informed that, henceforth, they should have large houses in the settlements, for habitation, and small ones in their fields - "to keep the maize while they harvested it and brought it to the towns". Similar instructions were issued in Lloró and San Francisco de Atrato. The Indians of Lloró were also ordered to begin the job of lengthening the church. The case of the town of Nigua shows the distance that separated the settlements from the Indians' own retreats. Those who lived along the

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79 Ibid., Nigua, 24 December 1676, f.155; and Antioquia, 30 June 1677, ff.184-85.

80 Ibid., Nigua, 7 October 1676, f.68; Lloró, 15 November 1676, f.97; San Francisco de Atrato, 19 November 1676, ff.98-99.
Baberama, Nemota, and Ychó rivers were to be brought to Nigua to settle. So, too, were the Indians of Barebara (whom Córdoba had reported had never had any contact with Spaniards). It was said that these retreats lay at distances of 2 or 3 days from Nigua - an indication of how far the Indians were to be moved from their own communities. The process was to be systematic, for, as Bueso de Valdés noted, following their example others returned to their retreats.81

That Bueso de Valdés was guided by very specific interests becomes clear in the case of the settlement of Taita. Lying half-way between the departure point of Urrao and the town of Nigua, Taita had a small population and does not appear to have had any particular attraction for the Spaniards. Described as "abundant in the produce of the land", its importance lay precisely in its half-way location: although at first Bueso de Valdés considered adding its population to that of another of the settlements of the province, he decided that Taita was a necessary resting place for those who travelled in and out of the Chocó from neighbouring regions.82

The provinces left by Bueso de Valdés in January 1677 had clearly changed considerably, and, at least in the short term, the entrada was undoubtedly a great success. One marked change was in the settlement of the Indians.

81 Ibid., Nigua, 5 October 1676, f.66; 7 October 1676, f.68; 20 October 1676, f.73; 23 October 1676, f.94.

82 Ibid., Antioquia, 30 June 1677, f.183.
Nigua, which had contained 10 uninhabited houses at the time of his arrival, contained, by the end of the entrada, 29 houses, a church, and a sacristy. By the beginning of January, 20 houses had been completed in the settlement of San Francisco de Atrato, and a further 5 houses were in the process of completion. In Lloró, 10 houses had been completed, and a further 4 were in the process of completion. An additional consequence of the entrada was the baptism of a large number of Indians: Ramírez stated that he had carried out 117 baptisms in Lloró, while Iruñela carried out 187 in San Francisco de Atrato. Furthermore, all three friars stated that the Indians of the towns attended Doctrina punctually, according to Córdoba, with an obedience never before experienced in the four years he had spent in the province. The miners, too, reported considerable progress. The Indians sold their maize at 2 pesos the fanega, as they had been ordered to do, and prices were fixed on all other produce.

One important point should be emphasized within the context of the measures taken by Bueso de Valdés during his entrada. The Indians of the Chocó region were said to have reacted peacefully to the entraña, and to have accepted wholeheartedly the instructions they received from Bueso de Valdés during his entrada.

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84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Bartolomé de Borja, et.al., to King, Nigua, 30 October 1676, in AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 2, f.225.
Valdés. One possible explanation for such behaviour among these Indians, who had successfully resisted the Spaniards for more than a century, was provided by the former governor himself: he reported that the Indians' obedience was a result of "the fear they had of my entrada" - apparently due to rumours which had preceded the arrival of the expeditionary force. As the Indian Pedro Daza, from the settlement of Taita, explained, they had been informed that Bueso de Valdés was to be accompanied by "many armed men". This indicates clearly that, as many observers from Popayán and Antioquia had been suggesting since the late 1660s, only force or the threat of force was likely to make any impact on the region's native population.

There are no details to indicate what happened in the Chocó over the following three years, but it is clear that, by 1680, Juan Bueso de Valdés' entrada had at least begun to achieve the desired results: the number of miners and other Spaniards residing in the region, as well as the number of mining operations, had increased considerably. The demands made by the Spaniards on the Indian population increased apace. So, too, did Indian grievances, and the protests of the Indians of the province of Citará, limited to a few individual Spaniards at the beginning of the decade, had become violent confrontation by 1684. It is that five year period in Indian-Spanish relations in the province of Citará which will form the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5

PROTEST AND REBELLION:

THE PROVINCE OF CITARA, 1680-1687

Despite the apparent success of Bueso de Valdés' entrada in 1676-77, by 1684, a mass Indian rebellion had occurred in the province of Citará. The uprising, which began on 15 January in the settlement of Nigua, resulted in the massacre of most of the Spanish miners and all of the Spanish missionaries resident in the province,1 as well as mestizos, mulattoes, Indian carriers, and "tratantes" - or traders.2 More than 100 people were killed in the violence,3 which involved hundreds of Indians and spread rapidly throughout the province, although some Indians remained loyal to the Spaniards,4 and many others were

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1 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Francisco Onofre's testimonies, Río de Murri, 11 August 1684, f.2; and Lloró, 17 October 1684, f.31.

2 Ibid., Esteban Fernández de Rivera's testimony, Lloró, 16 October 1684, f.28.

3 Ibid., Francisco Onofre's testimony, 17 October 1684, f.32. A close reading of the statements made by both the survivors and the captured Indians shows that at least 112 people were killed. However, in 1689, the Governor of Popayán reported to the Crown that in one day the Indians killed more than 126 Spaniards - this figure appears not to include the slaves and Indians who were killed. See AGI Quito 75, Don Gerónimo de Berrio to King, Popayán, 2 March 1689.

4 Don Rodrigo Pivi and Don Juan Mitiguirre were among the loyal Indians, and Don Rodrigo Pivi was in fact entrusted with "reducing" those Indians who were released back to their towns. See AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, 13 August 1684, f.8.
thought not to have participated actively. The Indians who did rebel, however, also burned down their settlements and churches, took church ornaments and stole the property of Spaniards. In the settlement of Nigua, for example, all the Spanish and mestizo inhabitants were killed - of 11 bodies found in the town, 4 had been decapitated and the Franciscan Padre Comisario's body had been burned - and all the Spaniards' belongings were taken.6

Six Spaniards survived the rebellion, for they had been warned that the uprising had occurred and had been able to take refuge - along with more than 70 other slaves and "free people" - at one of the mining camps of the province.7 Despite the fact that approximately 300 Indians returned to attack the survivors twelve days after the rebellion occurred, the Spaniards remained in Juan Bueso de Valdés' mine of Naurita - aided and fed by the loyal Indians - until 24 July 1684, when Jacinto de Benalcázar arrived from Antioquia with arms and ammunition sent by Bueso de Valdés, and Juan de Caicedo Salazar arrived from Popayán with six soldiers and canoes, and led them to the

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5 Ibid., Cabeza de Proceso General, Río de Murri, 15 August 1684, ff.8-9

6 Ibid. See the testimonies of Don Juan Joseph Azcárate de Castillo, Lloró, 14 October 1684, ff.22-23, and Esteban Fernández de Rivera, Lloró, 16 October 1684, f.27.

7 Ibid. See the testimonies of Don Juan Joseph Azcárate de Castillo, f.22, and Francisco Onofre, Lloró, 17 October 1684, f.31. The six Spaniards who survived were Juan Joseph Azcárate de Castillo, Juan Nuño de Sotomayor, Sargento Pedro Blandón, Francisco and Cristóbal Rodríguez, and Esteban Fernández de Rivera. See ff.22-3, 27.
settlement of Lloró. Two separate expeditions were sent to rescue the survivors, pacify the population, and punish the leaders of the rebellion. One came from Popayán, the other from Antioquia, the *gobernaciones* which claimed jurisdiction over the province of Citará. From Antioquia, Bueso de Valdés led a company of 40 armed soldiers, 8 "aventureros", and more than 40 Indians. From Popayán, a force was sent under the command of Juan de Caicedo Salazar, consisting of more than 100 armed men, and aided by 130 Noanama Indians and 30 Indians from the town of Tadó. In return for cooperation in putting down the Citará revolt, the Noanamas were promised exemption from tribute payments for a period of ten years. A second, even larger force from Popayán followed, led by Cristóbal de Caicedo and consisting of 200 Spaniards and 200 Indians.

Following the rebellion, all but the loyal Indians fled in several directions. Some were known to have

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9 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 5, Auto, Don Diego Radillo de Arce, Antioquia, 9 May 1684, ff.1-2. See also the lists of Spaniards and Indians who accompanied Bueso de Valdés, Antioquia, 14 May 1684, ff.4-5. Bueso de Valdés had "juridiccion civil y criminal". AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, f.1.

10 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 7, Auto, Bueso de Valdés, Lloró, 8 October 1684, f.3, and Auto, Bueso de Valdés, Lloró, 12 November 1684, f.11.

11 Auto de exhorto, Lloró, 7 October 1684, in ibid., f.1.

12 AGI Quito 75, Don Gerónimo de Berrio to King, Popayán, 2 March 1689.
retreated to the hills in the vicinity of Lloró, while others - Don Pedro de Bolivar, Don Juan Chigre, and Don Fernando Tajina, for example - retreated further away, westward across the Atrato river to the Bojaya river, to the region thought to be inhabited by the Burgumia, and northwards to the Murri river.  

Between the months of July and October 1684, Bueso de Valdés conducted what were known as "correrías" - expeditions to capture the Indians in their retreats - in the regions of the Murri and Bojaya rivers.  

Meanwhile, Juan de Caicedo Salazar and his men were occupied in building a fort and conducting further "correrías" in and around Lloró. A large number of Indians were captured during the campaign, all of whom were questioned about their role in the rebellion. As we shall see, punishment was administered on the basis of the Indians' own confessions.  

However, although many Indians were captured soon after the arrival of the expeditions from the interior, a large number - there is no evidence to indicate how many - held out until 1687. In that year, the head of the Indian Quirubira - who was thought to have been the main leader of the rebel Indians - was sent to the king.

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13 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 5, Auto, Bueso de Valdés, Rio Bebara, 30 July 1684, f.30.

14 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 7, Auto, Bueso de Valdés, Lloró, 8 October 1684, ff.2-3.

15 Ibid., Auto, Juan de Caicedo Salazar, Lloró, 7 October 1684, f.1.
as proof that these finally had been defeated, after a war lasting from 17 January 1684 to 31 August 1687.\textsuperscript{16}

In this chapter we will present an account of the rebellion itself and examine the background to the events that occurred in 1684, for the possibility that a large-scale rebellion might occur in the province of Citará had been considered just a few years earlier, in 1680. We saw in Chapter 4 that, for a variety of reasons, the population of the province of Citará reacted favourably to Bueso de Valdés' entrada of 1676, and that, by the time he left in 1677, the province had changed considerably. The three Franciscans who were left in charge of the settlements reported, for instance, that the Indians attended the teaching of Doctrina punctually, according to one of them, with an obedience never before experienced in all the time he had spent in the region.\textsuperscript{17} In 1679, however, a serious conflict developed in the province of Citará, between the Indians of the province and a sizeable number of Spaniards on the one hand, and a recently appointed royal official and the few remaining missionaries on the other. On this occasion, the protest mounted by the Indians resulted in the imprisonment of the royal official and the expulsion of the Franciscans. But despite the willingness of the

\textsuperscript{16} AGI Quito 75, Certificación, Don Carlos de Alcedo Lemus de Sotomayor, n.p., 21 September 1687; and Don Gerónimo de Berrio to King, Popayán, 11 March 1689.

\textsuperscript{17} AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Certificación, Fray Joseph de Córdoba, Nigua, 24 December 1676, f.160; Certificación, Fray Bernardo Pascual Ramírez, Lloró, 9 January 1677, f.162; Certificación, Fray Esteban de Iruñela, San Francisco de Atrato, 5 January 1677, f.161.
authorities in the *gobernación* of Antioquia to meet the demands that the Indian population made then, a full-scale rebellion broke out only four years later.

While the account of the events that occurred over that five year period will necessarily be descriptive, it will nevertheless allow us to look a little more closely at Spanish-Indian relations in the province of Citará during that period, and ascertain the extent to which these contributed to the outbreak of rebellion in 1684. The account will also allow us to see how far the province had changed by the early 1680s: we will see that the number of outsiders residing in Citará territory had increased considerably—miners, slaves, traders, blacksmiths, *pajes*, some women, are all mentioned in the list of those who died during the rebellion. The conflict of 1679-80, and the response of the appointed officials will show how, alone in the region, the representatives of the Crown could act with absolute impunity. This lack of overall control—the consequence of the Crown’s policy to divide jurisdiction over the area between neighbouring *gobernaciones* under the overall control of the *Audiencia*—led to all sorts of abuses, and meant, first, that no systematic policy for administering the region had been put into effect, and secondly, that any intervention in the affairs of the Chocó had to await the authorization of the *Audiencia* of Santa Fe.

The confessions of the captured Indians will also allow us to look a little more closely at Indian values,
and more specifically, at the importance of war in the culture of the Citará. These confessions are particularly valuable because they enable us not only to establish the sequence of events but to examine the role of the Indian capitanes in organizing the rebellion, and to understand why the Indians, for whom success in war was a sign of bravery, confessed to the crimes they had committed. We will also see that, in informing Bueso de Valdés of exactly who had been responsible for the deaths that had occurred, the Indians in fact facilitated the immediate task of pacification, and saved the Spaniards the time and effort that would have been required in a long drawn out process of identifying those responsible. The process of pacification was also made easier by the existence of a small group of loyal Indians, who informed Bueso de Valdés of the location of the retreats used by the rebel Indians, thus facilitating their capture.

Indeed, the rebellion of 1684 marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Indian population of the Chocó, in particular of the Citará. Despite repeated attempts to conquer the Chocó from the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Citará tribe in particular had violently resisted all intrusions into their territory until the second half of the seventeenth century. The conflict and lack of coordination that characterized relations between the disparate groups of Spaniards that began to enter the region in growing numbers from the 1660s facilitated the Indians' continuing resistance to the process of reduction,
which manifested itself in their refusal to live in the settlements established by the Spaniards, to maintain the friars and attend the teaching of Christian Doctrine, and sell their produce to the miners at prices deemed reasonable by the Spaniards. For their part, the Spaniards - limited by continuing disputes - were unable to mount a concerted campaign to force the Indians' compliance. Despite the presence of the Spaniards, their hold over the population was far from secure. The rebellion of 1684 changed all this. Following the pacification campaign, a more concerted and more successful effort was made to bring the Citará under the control of royal authority, represented by officials from the gobernación of Popayán alone, and as a result, the position of the Indians changed dramatically.

This chapter, like the previous one, will be based almost entirely on the documents relating to the activities of the antioqueños in the province of Citará, because it is only in looking closely at these that we are able to get a view of events in the region over the period between 1676 and 1684. There are three reasons for this: first, because Juan Bueso de Valdés' 1676 entrada was an Antioquia initiative; secondly because, when conflict erupted in 1679-80, the Indians of the Citará region appealed to the governor of Antioquia for assistance against the Franciscans and the teniente appointed by the governor of Popayán, leading to Bueso de Valdés' return to the region; and finally, because of Bueso de Valdés' involvement in the
pacification of the native population following the rebellion of 1684.

**Indian Protest, 1680-1681**

The first indications of conflict in the province of Citará came in September 1679, when a group of seven or eight Indians appeared before the governor of Antioquia and complained about the ill-treatment received by the Indians of the province at the hands of Fray Joseph de Córdoba and Fray Pablo Ruiz - the two friars whom the Audiencia had asked had the Franciscan Father Provincial to recall to Santa Fe in 1675. Between April and October 1680, the governor of Antioquia received further complaints, not just about Fray Joseph de Córdoba, but also about Lope de Cárdenas, the official - or teniente de gobernador - appointed to the province of Citará by the governor of Popayán. The complaints of the Indian inhabitants of the three main settlements of the province of Citará - Nigua, Lloró, San Francisco de Atrato - were rarely specific: these usually referred simply to the extortions suffered at the hands of Lope de Cárdenas and the ill-treatment received from Fray Joseph de Córdoba. However, the

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18 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, Antioquia, 7 August 1681, ff.1-2.


20 Lope de Cárdenas probably began his activities in the Chocó region as a miner. In 1674, he was said to be a resident in the region, and to have arrived there in 1671. See AGI Quito 67, "Testimonio de Autos (Franciscans)", Nigua, 14 August 1674, f.154.
Spaniard Jacinto Roque de Espinosa claimed that Lope de Cárdenas - "a poor man, servant of the said father" - was hated by the Indians because he had killed one of their number.\(^{21}\) In addition, the Indians of two of the smaller settlements of the province, Taita and Guebara - this latter settlement had not been mentioned before in the documents - had other quite specific grievances against him.

We saw in Chapter 4 that one important consequence of Bueso de Valdés' entrada of 1676 had been the reduction of a substantial proportion of the native population of the province of Citará to three settlements in the Atrato area: Nigua, Lloró, and San Francisco de Atrato. We also saw that, during the entrada, Bueso de Valdés had considered adding the population of Taita to that of one of the other settlements, but, in 1676, Taita remained intact due to its half-way location between the departure point of Urrao - in the province of Antioquia - and Nigua: its value as a resting place for those travelling in and out of the Chocó from Antioquia outweighed other considerations.\(^{22}\) By 1680, however, tension was mounting among the Indians of Taita and the other settlement of Guebara because an attempt was being made to move their populations to another of the settlements on the Atrato river. For the Indians of Taita and Guebara this meant being moved to an area located at a

\(^{21}\) Pacheco, La Consolidación de la Iglesia, p.673.

\(^{22}\) AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Antioquia, 30 June 1677, f.183.
distance of four days from their maize fields and plantain groves. Moreover, the Indians claimed that, in order to force them to move, their axes had been confiscated and their pigs had been slaughtered. The fear that their maize and plantain fields would be cut down, so that they would be forced to move, added to the general climate of suspicion. The Indian Bogasaga, from the settlement of Taita, claimed that Fray Joseph de Córdoba had actually ordered that their maize fields and plantain groves should be cut down, and he referred very specifically to those who planned to move the Indians as "people from Popayán". Another factor contributing to the tension, however, was the rumour spreading through the province that the governor of Popayán, Don Fernando Martínez de Fresneda, was about to embark on the conquest of the Soruco nation - a conquest that was supposed to take place with the aid of the Citará Indians.23 Finally, complaints were also made to the effect that Fray Joseph de Córdoba "has ... a stick", to use as punishment against the Indians.24

The gobernación of Antioquia did not have an official presence in the province of Citará after Bueso de Valdés conducted his entrada in 1676-77. In 1679, Don Diego Radillo de Arce, who had replaced Aguinaga as governor of Antioquia, commented that there had not been an official representative of the gobernación of Antioquia in the

23 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, Antioquia, 5 April 1680, ff.4-5. See also the statements of Gregorio Bogasaga, ff.7-8; and Antonio Quintana, ff.5-6.

24 Ibid., Gregorio Bogasaga’s statement, f.7.
Citará region for three years, despite the fact that Juan Bueso de Valdés had been appointed "assistant superintendent ... with considerable authority" by the Audiencia of Santa Fe.25 The absence of an official antioqueño presence in the region effectively meant that Lope de Cárdenas was the only official in the entire region encompassing the two Indian provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and Citará. Consequently, the governor of Antioquia's advice on dealings with the Indians were ignored. Limited by the fact that the Audiencia of Santa Fe had overall control of the entire Chocó region, the governor could do no more than wait for further instructions from the president and issue a "request" to Lope de Cárdenas to the effect that "the said Chocó Indians shall be maintained and protected in their settlements and shall not be removed from them". In addition, the Governor urged "that the said Indian capitanes and their parcialidades be treated and protected in the same peaceful [manner] in which they have lived for more than ten years". He also ordered the return of the Indians' confiscated tools and other belongings and the repayment of the value of all the slaughtered hens and chickens.26

But the issue of jurisdiction again emerged at the beginning of this dispute. While the governor of Antioquia claimed authority over Lope de Cárdenas on the basis of the fact that the settlements had been founded by Antonio de

25 Ibid., f.2.
26 Ibid., ff.8-11.
Guzmán, on the authority of the Audiencia of Santa Fe, Lope de Cárdenas retorted that Antioquia had no jurisdictional rights at all over the province of Citará. According to Cárdenas, the reduction of the province had been achieved thanks to efforts of the payaneses alone: that is, Governor Luis Antonio de Guzmán; Governor Díaz de la Cuesta, who ordered Francisco de Quevedo to undertake his entrada; and finally, Governor Miguel García, who appointed Don Juan Joseph Azcárate to replace Juan López García.

In spite of his refusal to comply with any instructions, Lope de Cárdenas nevertheless justified his position before the governor, and denied all accusations that the Indians had been ill-treated, as indeed he denied plans to take the Indians to the conquest of the Soruco. Although he admitted that the governor of Popayán was planning to proceed against the Soruco, they would only be taking Indian "volunteers". The Indians' complaints, Lope de Cárdenas stated, should not be taken seriously, as he had never "molested nor harassed" the native population. However, on the question of Taita, Lope de Cárdenas did report that the two dwellings of Taita - it must be remembered that these housed several families - could not form a settlement, and that, therefore, it would be advantageous to bring the Indians to Nigua. The same applied to the three or four other Indian "places",

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., f.16.
probably including Guebara, which consisted of only two dwellings and lay at distances of three or four leagues over difficult terrain. The Indians who inhabited these places were dangerous, Cárdenas claimed, as they had killed a mulatto slave of Ignacio de Guzmán who was travelling to Antioquia with gold. In fact, Lope de Cárdenas and the "people from Popayán" wanted the Indians moved to one of the other settlements simply because they were of no use to the payaneses where they were. Bueso de Valdés deliberately kept the Indians of Taita in their settlement because he recognized the value of a resting place for antioqueños travelling in and out of the province from Urrao. This was not the case for the payaneses, who travelled over different routes, via Anserma and Popayán, which were located somewhat further south.

Like Lope de Cárdenas, the missionaries defended their position and denied all accusations against them. Fray Cristóbal de Artiaga, for instance, claimed not only that the reports received by the governor were "sinister" and "false", but also that his assumption that the Indians had been pacified for many years was incorrect. Fray Cristóbal suggested that the governor should consult with other residents of the province, who would make him aware of the fact that the Indians had taken up arms on numerous occasions. Indeed, Artiaga claimed that his only desire was to teach the Indians Christian Doctrine, but explained

29 Ibid., Lope de Cárdenas to Governor of Antioquia, ff.15-17.
that although the governor might consider the Indians to be "lambs", he had learned that it would be "easier to reduce the wildest of beasts to communication with and subjection to man".\(^{30}\)

The missionaries' frustration at the Indians' resistance to their efforts to teach them Christian Doctrine almost certainly led them to adopt corporal punishment as a form of coercion. Indeed, Fray Joseph de Córdoba was not the only missionary to have become convinced of the need to introduce some form of punishment, on the assumption that "the Indians do nothing except through force". Even the Jesuit Antonio Marzal concluded that the Indians "will never do anything good until punishment is applied".\(^{31}\) One specific incident, involving Fray Cristóbal de Artiaga,\(^{32}\) shows that, by 1680, the Franciscans were using corporal punishment to punish Indians who disobeyed them.

The incident occurred in Nigua, when a few Indians from the town were putting a roof on the house of the Indian Batassa. According to Fray Cristóbal de Artiaga, the Indians were called for Mass, a call which they apparently ignored and continued with their work. Artiaga claimed that, as he lightly struck Batassa on the leg - "he

\(^{30}\) Ibid., ff.14-15.

\(^{31}\) AGI Quito 67, Testimonio Franciscans, Lloró, 15 September 1674, ff.113-114, and Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, Appendix 1.

\(^{32}\) Fray Cristóbal was not living in the Chocó when Bueso de Valdés conducted the entrada of 1676.
gave him a light blow on the leg with a small stick" - his son exploded "like a wild beast" and the friar was thrown to the ground and beaten by the Indians. Had he not been helped by some other people, he asserted, he would have died at the hands of "those barbarians".\textsuperscript{33} The Indians' story is a different one. According to Bogasaga, when the Indians had replied that they would go to Mass in a moment, as they had almost finished putting the roof on Batassa's house, the friar reacted by beating and then apprehending Batassa and his son Garaupa. They claimed not to have harmed Artiaga at all.\textsuperscript{34} Lope de Cárdenas also referred to the incident, and claimed that the only punishment the Indians received for their attack on the friar was "to be placed in irons for an hour".\textsuperscript{35}

However, it was not only the Indians of the region who reported their grievances against Lope de Cárdenas and the Franciscans. Indeed, one of the interesting features of the events of 1679-1680, which differed markedly from those of a few years later, is the fact that many Spanish residents of the province found common cause with the Indians against Cárdenas and the missionaries, to the extent that the complaints received by the governor of Antioquia culminated with reports that Cárdenas had executed three Spaniards and imprisoned many others.

\textsuperscript{33} AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, f.15.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., ff.17-18.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., f.16.
As early as 4 April 1680, two vecinos of Antioquia, Antonio Quintana and Sebastián Velázquez, appeared before the governor of Antioquia to complain that their fear of Cárdenas and Córdoba had forced them to abandon the discovery of mines in the region, which they had been employed to do by a number of other vecinos of Antioquia. Quintana and Velázquez were not the only two Spaniards to complain to the governor. During 1680, as many as 20 Spaniards either wrote letters, signed petitions, or travelled to Antioquia to report to the governor in person, and Francisco de Borja advised Radillo de Arce that unless Cárdenas was replaced, all the Spaniards would abandon the region.

The absence of precise dates in the documents makes it impossible to establish the exact sequence of events. But what is clear is that, after July 1680, the situation became more explosive and more violent. Conflict - which at first had taken the form of letters and petitions for the removal of Cárdenas and Córdoba - became confrontation. In July and August 1680, two events took place which led

36 Ibid., ff.5-6.

37 Ibid., f.10. The following list includes all of those who reported their complaints to the governor during 1680: Antonio Quintana, Sebastián Velásquez, Don Francisco de Borja, Cristóbal de Viñola y Villegas, Juan Nuño de Sotomayor, Sebastián García Benítez, Jacinto Roque de Espinosa, Diego Díaz de Castro, Francisco González Vaidés, Bartolomé García, Nicolás de Murcia, Miguel Fernández, Rodrigo Blandón Jaramillo, Juan de Dios, Salvador Vidal, Francisco Onofre, Manuel Quintero Príncipe, Manuel de Burgos, Joseph Enrique, and Alonso de Baca. See ibid., ff.4-7, 10, 13, 19-20, 22-4, 27-8, 31, 36-9, 45-6.
Lope de Cárdenas to seek the aid of the teniente de gobernador of the province of Noanama - Santiago de Arce Camargo - to act against the Spaniards. For, taking advantage of Fray Joseph de Córdoba's absence from the province, allegedly to seek aid in Popayán, some Indian capitanes decided - apparently in consultation with others in the province - to prevent the friar's return to the settlement of Nigua. According to some of the Spanish residents of the province, two Indian capitanes, Don Rodrigo Pivi and Don Pedro de Bolivar, warned that if Córdoba returned to Nigua, he would be killed. The Spaniards claimed that, because they recognized the risk to all the Spaniards and slaves in the region, since few Indians were unarmed and Pivi's parcialidad had been seen "that they were ready for war", they persuaded Córdoba to leave the province, which he did with the other missionaries. Their departure was said to have quietened the Indians. 38

The second incident involved Lope de Cárdenas. On this occasion, again according to the evidence presented by the Spaniards, this official had without cause attempted to "garrotte an Indian". Believing that all the progress made would be lost and that all the Spaniards would be killed, they took the decision to deprive him of his office, because "that is what was requested by the said Indians,

38 Ibid., Sebastián García, Juan Nuño de Sotomayor, Jacinto Roque de Espinosa, Rodrigo Blandón Jaramillo, Diego Díaz de Castro, Cristóbal de Viñola y Villegas, Francisco González, Joseph Enrique and Juan de Dios to Governor of Antioquia, 21 July 1680, ff.22-23, 24.
whom they feared...". It was for this reason that Lope de Cárdenas sought the aid of the teniente of the province of Noanama.

To punish what was considered an act of treason, Santiago de Arce Camargo set off for the settlement of Tadó – in the province of Tatamá/Chocó – where he met up with Córdoba and the other missionaries who had been forced out of the province of Citará. In Tadó, Arce Camargo enlisted 30 armed men, with whom he arrived in the settlement of Nigua on 28 August, accompanied by the Franciscan missionaries. In Nigua, Arce Camargo arrested Diego Díaz de Castro, the Spaniard who had been most responsible for the incident, placing his feet "in two irons and his hands in handcuffs...". His property was also embargoed. Soon after, Diego Díaz de Castro was executed and quartered.

In sentencing Diego Díaz de Castro to death, Lope de Cárdenas ordered that "after he has been garrotted ... he shall be quartered and [each quarter] shall be hung on the accustomed paths and his head shall be placed ... in this

39 Ibid., Juan Nuño de Sotomayor, Sebastián García, Jacinto Roque de Espinosa, Rodrigo Blandón Jaramillo, Cristóbal de Viñola y Villegas, Diego Díaz de Castro, Francisco González, Joseph Enrique, and Juan de Dios to Governor of Antioquia, Nigua, 25 June 1680, f.19.

40 Ibid., Auto, Santiago de Arce Camargo, 29 August 1680, ff.66-68.

41 Ibid., 29 August 1680, ff.67-8. According to Arce Camargo, several Spaniards (Diego Díaz, Sebastián García, Nicolás de Murcia, Cristóbal de Viñola, and some other "mozos" forced Cárdenas to relinquish the title granted to him by Governor Martínez de Fresneda, took his "bastón", and declared that he should no longer be recognized as teniente of the province.
town of San Sebastián de Nigua for his own punishment and as an example to others".42

Other Spaniards were imprisoned and lost their property. Fearing for their lives, a number of Spaniards fled from the province: Jacinto Roque and Francisco González left for Antioquia; Sebastián García and Nicolás de Murcia retreated "to the protection of the Indians of Guebara". Others were less lucky: Juan Nuño de Sotomayor and Alonso de Baca were imprisoned "with handcuffs on their hands and irons on their feet". These were later freed but exiled from the province for ten years, together with Capitán Manuel Quintero Príncipe. Others, too, were captured and later released - among them, Rodrigo Blandón, and the blacksmith Santiago Ruiz. The silversmith Joseph Enrique was also released, but Córdoba ordered that he remain in Nigua as his servant.43

The decision of the Spaniards, in particular Díaz de Castro, to force Cárdenas to relinquish his staff of office led the latter to act with considerable violence towards the former. Although those who were captured and later released were spared their lives, they nevertheless lost their property: Manuel de Burgos reported "the confiscations of belongings, mines and slaves" which took place. Juan Nuño de Sotomayor reported that Cárdenas "appropriated ... Capitán Juan de Guzmán's mine which he operates in partnership with Jacinto Roque and they

42 Ibid., 29 August 1680, f.71.
43 Ibid., ff. 27-8, 37-8, 38-9, 45, 46.
appointed a miner for the blacks" - the gold thus extracted was taken by Fray Joseph de Córdoba.\textsuperscript{44}

Cárdenas and Fray Joseph de Córdoba proceeded quite ruthlessly against the Spaniards, and appropriated all their belongings. All of Diego Díaz de Castro's property - letters, clothing, papers, a bed, one male slave and one female slave - was taken.\textsuperscript{45} Jacinto Roque lost a female slave, gold, and clothing. Don Alonso de Baca lost 100 gold pesos. Francisco González lost his clothing; Francisco Onofre, too, lost his clothing, his bed. It was said that Cárdenas and Córdoba were personally carrying out these errands, "collecting the debts owing to the above named [Spaniards]".\textsuperscript{46} Quintero Príncipe claimed to have lost his clothes and 150 gold pesos in the town of Nigua.\textsuperscript{47}

Most of these Spaniards were not the important mineowners who would begin to enter the region, principally from the cities of the gobernación of Popayán, a few years later, bringing with them relatively large slave gangs. Diego Díaz's belongings, for example, amounted to little more than two slaves and a bed, although he was referred to as an "owner of slaves". Jacinto Roque, who worked a mine in partnership with Juan de Guzmán, was also referred to as an "owner of slaves", but there is no indication of how many slaves he owned. Juan Nuño de Sotomayor was simply

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., ff.39, 45.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., f.72.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., ff.37-38.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., f.45.
referred to as a miner. Some may have been merchants trading in the region: Alonso de Baca, for example, lost "eight jars of wine from Peru", which were said to be worth 50 pesos each in the Chocó. Antonio Quintana and Sebastián Velásquez claimed to be engaged in the discovery of mines, and to have been employed by vecinos of Antioquia. Rodrigo Blandón Jaramillo was a miner employed to oversee the slaves belonging to Diego Manzano. Joseph Enrique was said to be a silversmith, and Santiago Ruiz was said to be a blacksmith. Others were referred to as "mozos". While Antonio Quintana, Sebastián Velásquez, and Juan Nuño de Sotomayor all claimed to be vecinos of Antioquia, Cristóbal de Viñola was said to be a vecino of Mariquita, and Jacinto Roque de Espinosa and Diego Díaz de Castro were both said to be vecinos of Anserma.48

Nevertheless, the violence with which Cárdenas and Córdoba - with the aid of Arce Camargo - proceeded against the Spaniards proved to be counter-productive, and led, just a few months later, to their expulsion from the province. Their arrival set off another series of reports about their conduct and resulted in the retreat of the Indians from their settlements. In addition, the trails from Anserma and Popayán into the Chocó were closed, and the settlement of Lloró was burned down. There were, in fact, many reports of damages done to the Indians by

48 For the names, occupations, or places of origin of those involved in the dispute with Cárdenas and Córdoba, see ibid., ff. 4-7, 10, 13, 19-20, 22-4, 27-8, 31, 36-39 45-46.
Santiago de Arce’s expedition. In addition to the fear that had caused the Indians’ retreat, Don Juan Mitiguirre complained that the two tenientes - Cárdenas and Arce Camargo - and their men ate the Indians’ maize, plantains, hens, and pigs, and that, as a result, the Indian children were dying of hunger in the hills.\(^{49}\) The Indians demanded that Cárdenas and Córdoba - who were said to be in Nigua "extracting gold with the slaves belonging to the Spaniards" - should be replaced by a new teniente and a new doctrinero from the gobernación of Antioquia, and that Cárdenas should be forced to pay the Indians for what had been stolen from them. Interestingly, they also demanded that the priests should have neither arms nor dogs. Their demands were now accompanied by a threat: unless these were met, the Indian population of the province would retreat to the still unconquered Soruco nation, with whom they claimed to be at peace.\(^{50}\) Initially, the Indians had appealed to the governor of Antioquia for justice, but since his strategy had amounted, as late as September 1680, to no more than sending letters to the official and friars concerned, "in which they are entrusted with the protection and calm of those natives and other people who reside there and the avoidance of the inevitable incident which is feared",\(^{51}\) they were now prepared to take direct action.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 14 October 1680, ff.39-40.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., ff.41-2.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., Antioquia, 20 September 1680, f.32.
However, by October 1680, the possibility that the province would be deserted, and that all that had been achieved in terms of its pacification would be lost, led the governor to send Bueso de Valdés to the region immediately. He was to attempt, by peaceful means, to return calm to the province, and the Indians to their settlements. In addition, he was to deal with the friars Córdoba and Ruiz - who were, in any case, about to be replaced - and ensure that Lope de Cárdenas should refrain from becoming involved in matters over which he had no authority. The Indians were to be compensated for all the damage suffered, and the Spaniards whose property had been confiscated were to be allowed to give testimony in this regard.\(^{52}\)

By November 1680 - just before Bueso de Valdés' arrival in the province\(^{53}\) - two more Spaniards, Nicolás de Murcia and Sebastián García, had been killed by Lope de Cárdenas.\(^{54}\) It was this final event that led Bueso de Valdés to detain Lope de Cárdenas, and take him to Nigua, where he was put under guard.\(^{55}\) Bueso de Valdés reported of Lope de Cárdenas that "it is difficult to explain the

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\(^{52}\) Ibid., Antioquia, 17 October 1680, ff.47-8. Bueso de Valdés still held the title of "juez superintendente auxiliador por lo que toca esta provincia de Antioquia de dha miss.n del choco".

\(^{53}\) Bueso de Valdés left Antioquia on 9 November, accompanied by 9 men and 15 Indian carriers. See ibid., ff.49-50, 55-6.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., Bueso de Valdés to Governor of Antioquia, Port of Chaquinindo, 1 December 1680, ff.57-58.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., Nigua, 14 January 1681, f.59.
violence and harm he had done ... and the clamourings of Indians and Spaniards". Due to his departure, however, "the Indians with their families and the Spaniards have come out from the hills".\(^{56}\) In addition, three friars - Córdoba, Ruiz, and Moreno - were arrested, and sent to Santa Fe de Bogotá to appear before the Father Provincial.\(^{57}\) The new friars who had been sent to replace them - the Padre Comisario Esteban Alvarez de Aviles, the Padre Presidente Fray Dionisio de Camino, and the lay brother Fray Joseph Flores - were left with the task of reconstructing the towns and churches, the teaching of the Indians, and their reduction to town life.\(^{58}\) It was clear to the new group of Franciscan clergy that little progress had been made in the conversion of the native population. The new Padre Comisario reported to the governor of Antioquia that he had found that the Indians were unable even to "cross themselves".\(^{59}\) Earlier that year, the Spaniards of the province had also claimed that the Indians

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\(^{56}\) Ibid., f.60.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., f.60. Fray Joseph de Córdoba did not cease to cause trouble in the Chocó. In 1690, it was said that Córdoba continued to travel in and out of the region, and that his presence there had led to many complaints being made against him. And, in the early 1720s, it was suggested that Córdoba had been accused of opening a trail to facilitate the entry of the "enemies of the Crown" to the Chocó region. The Franciscans, however, denied these charges against him. See AGI Quito 75, Don Rodrigo Roque de Mañosca to King, Popayán, 16 May 1690; and AGI Santa Fe 403, Fray Diego Barroso, Santa Fe, 18 November 1719.

\(^{58}\) AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, Antioquia, 1 February 1681, f.61.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., f.60.
had not been taught Christian Doctrine by the missionaries, as could be seen from the fact that "they do not yet know how to cross themselves after so many years of peace". According to Don Antonio de Legarda, brother-in-law of the Indian Don Rodrigo Pivi, "their children do not know how to pray because the priests were occupied in collecting money for the clothing they sold".  

Indian Rebellion, 1684-1687

Despite the fact that, in 1680, the governor of Antioquia and the Franciscan Father Provincial agreed to the demands made by the Indian population of the province of Citará, a large-scale rebellion occurred just three years later. This time, there was no cooperation between Spaniards and Indians for the removal of the offending officials or priests. The Indians killed as many Spaniards as they were able to surprise, as well as all those associated with the Spanish presence - slaves, servants, women, children, itinerant traders. The absence of specific reasons for the rebellion in the Indians' statements makes it difficult to identify their immediate motives for revolt. But it is clear from the statements made by the Indians after their capture that the rebellion was not a spontaneous act, but had been well-planned, involved widespread Indian participation, and ended quickly and successfully.

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60 Ibid., f.44.
On 15 January 1684, the day the rebellion began, the Indians of Nigua surrounded the houses of the Spaniards of the settlement and killed them and the Padre Comisario. Spanish miners and missionaries were also killed in the settlements of Lloró and San Francisco de Atrato. The rebellion spread outside the settlements as well. Other Spaniards were killed in Joseph Díaz's mine, in the mine of Naurita, in Domingo de Veitia's mine and house, in the mine of Ingipurdú, along the beach of Guacogo, by the mouths of the Quito, Cavi, and Bebara rivers, along the Andaguera and Atrato rivers, and at the port of Dodubar. The Spaniards who survived listed 59 people who had been killed. There were many others who were also said to have died: witnesses mentioned 12 slaves belonging to Bueso de Valdés and Domingo de Veitia, many Indian servants and "pajes", Indian carriers, slaves, mulatto slaves, female slaves and one child, others who were referred to as mulattoes, Indians, or "mozos". Suffice to say that as many as 112 people may have been killed during the rebellion. The fact that this was a surprise attack prevented a Spanish response: only six Spaniards, and 70 mestizos, mulattoes, and slaves

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61 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Udrapagui's statement, Río de Murri, 15 August 1684, f.9.

62 Ibid., ff.24-5, 30-32, 32.

63 It must be remembered, however, that these were mentioned by the survivors from memory, and may thus be inaccurate.
escaped the massacre, and there are no reports of casualties among the rebel Indians.\footnote{AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6. See the following statements: Ygaragaida, ff.3-4; Udrapagui, f.9; Capitán Francisco Ignacio Betu, f.10; Capitán Tajina, ff.11-12; Guaguirri, ff.14-16; Don Juan Joseph Azcárate de Castillo, ff.24-25; Esteban Fernández de Rivera, ff.30-31; Francisco Onofre, f.32; Soberano, f.43.}

Indeed, the Indian Miguel Baquera's statement indicates that the rebellion had been planned well in advance, and had been organized by a small group of Indians, most of whom are referred to throughout the documents as "capitanes". Miguel Baquera claimed that many days before the rebellion occurred, Don Fernando Tajina went to see Don Pedro de Bolivar in Nigua and informed him that he, Capitán Chuagra, Capitán Aucavira, and Chaguera had decided to kill all the Spaniards, and reminded him that he had also decided on that course of action months earlier. Tajina was accompanied by Capitán Chevi, who informed Juan Chigre and Cecego. According to the Indian Nicolás Yapeda (he had been brought up among Spaniards and tried to warn them of the rebellion), several Indians - Capitán Chuagra, Biva, Capitán Aucavira - went to the settlement of San Francisco de Atrato to ask all the Indians who inhabited the river to join with them to kill all the Spaniards resident in the province. Mateo, a mulatto slave belonging to Domingo de Veitia, who was killed in the rebellion, reported that when the uprising occurred, he was in the mine of Ingipurdú with his companions, part of his slave gang, and Ambrosio, Mateo,
and Pedro Carrasco. Four Indian capitanes - Manzana, Gongera, Tevasa, and Chuagra - arrived in the mine accompanied by a large group of Indians, took some of the slaves, killed 12 others, and also killed Pedro, Mateo, and Ambrosio Carrasco.65

From the declarations made by the captured Indians it is possible to ascertain who the leaders of the rebellion were, for the following Indians, mostly capitanes, are repeatedly mentioned in the documents: Capitán Quirubira, Juan Chigre, Capitán Pedro de Bolivar, Tajina, Capitán Manzano, Dechegama, Capitán Tavachi, Capitán Chuagra, Capitán Chuaru, Capitán Aucavira, Capitán Gongera, Capitán Miarri, Devanado, Parimendo, Capitán Tevasa, and Pidigara.66 Many of these - and others, including Capitán Dequia, Don Pedro Paparra - were later recognized by the Spanish survivors at the Naurita mine.67 Although we do not know from which towns all the leaders originated, it is possible to establish, from the Bueso de Valdés census of

65 Ibid. See the statements made by Miguel Baquera, f.33; Nicolás Yapeda, ff.34-5; and Mateo, f.26. The slaves who were killed were said to have belonged to Juan Bueso de Valdés and Domingo de Veitia.

66 Ibid. See the following statements: Ygaragaida, ff.3, 5-6; Udrapagui, f.9; Francisco Ignacio Betu, f.10; Capitán Tajina, ff.11-12; Miguel Baquera, f.33; Don Pedro Paparra, f.41; Soberano, ff.42-3.

67 The following Indians were also recognized by the Spaniards of the Naurita mine: Guebara, Aycerama, Yciguma, Tabugara, Capitán Anugama, Sadragama, Dami, Jerupueda, Guasarapi, Cecego, Legarda, Capitán Sanjua, Ganjua, Baragoia, Chaquera, Ysapu. See ibid., Don Juan Joseph Azcárate de Castillo, op.cit., f.24; Esteban Fernández de Rivera, op.cit., f.27; and Francisco Onofre, 17 October 1684, f.32.
1676, that the leaders came from the three principal settlements of the province. Juan Chigre, Don Pedro de Bolivar, Devanado, and Tavachi are listed in the census as inhabitants of the settlement of Nigua; Capitán Miarri, Tevasa, and Don Pedro Paparra are all mentioned in the census of San Francisco de Atrato; and Capitán Dequía figures in the census of Lloró. The distribution of the leaders suggests that the rebellion was not limited to any one these settlements, but involved the population of the entire province.

The rebellion was not limited, however, to the Indian capitanes, for many Indians willingly joined in the massacre of the Spaniards. In his declaration, the Indian Guaguirri claimed, for example, that he was on the Bebará river when the rebellion occurred, and that he received orders from Quirubira, through Ubira, to kill the Spaniards who were on the Bebará river. He, together with some other Indians, went to the house of Francisco de la Carrera, where they found him and another man called Antonio. Other Indians went in search of Bejarano, Bernardo, and another Spaniard to a mine they were working. Each of the Indians killed a Spaniard. This group of Indians also went after Juan de Guzmán and his companions to a ravine known by the name of Tabusido. Noquia confessed that when he was in the house of Tomás on the Andaguera river, Guagone arrived to

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68 Dami, Cegeco, Baragoia, and Ysapa are also listed as residents of Nigua and Legarda is listed as a resident of San Francisco de Atrato. See AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, ff.75, 76, 79, 85, 87, 90, 131, 132, 134, 141, 143.
report that the Spaniards were being killed, and that they were to do likewise. He, together with a large group of Indians, went after three people whom he referred to as a mulatto, a mestizo, and a mestiza. The two men were killed on the Quito river, and the Indian Baragoia captured the mestiza. Noquia stated that he had been told by Masupi that, if there were any Spaniards, each Indian was to kill one. Juananui claimed that Yvagone went to the Andaguera river and informed him and his companions that Spaniards were being killed, and that they were to deal with the Spaniards from Anserma who were due to arrive at the Port of Dodubar. A group of Indians went to the port and killed the Spaniards and four Indian carriers.  

The Indians, however, had few arms: Ygaragaida stated that Quirubira killed the blacksmith's lad with a machete; Guaripua confessed to killing Francisco de la Carrera with an axe and Juan de Guzmán's son with a dart; Chaqueranvido claimed to have drowned an Indian; and Soberano confessed to beating two slaves to death.

Two important issues arise from the statements made by the captured Indians. First, that it was because of this widespread participation, despite the shortage of arms, that so many people were killed over such a wide area and

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69 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6. See the following statements: Guaguirri, ff.14-16; Noquia, f.44; and Juananui, f.47.

70 Ibid. See the statements of Ygaragaida, f.5; Guaripua, f.19; Chaqueranvido, f.38; Soberano, f.43. Ordinary sticks were also used as arms: see Esteban Fernández de Rivera's statement, f.28.
very few survived. The Indians who lived along the many rivers that cut through the region quickly joined the rebellion, and ensured the elimination of all the Spaniards scattered across their territory. Secondly, the number of people who died, added to those who survived in the mine of Naurita, suggests that a large number of outsiders, many more than at any other time during all the years of contact between Spaniards and Chocó Indians, lived in Citará territory by 1684. The fact that the Spaniards were scattered over a wide area, and the mention of so many mines also suggest that mining operations had increased considerably.

However, it is also true that many Indians claimed to have participated in the rebellion not to kill, but to steal. The Indians stole slaves, church ornaments, and the belongings of dead Spaniards. According to Ygaragaida, the Indian Dami took the Padre Comisario's cook and the Indian Ybicua took a slave belonging to Capitán Domingo de Veitia. According to Capitán Tajina, four female slaves were taken from Capitán Domingo de Veitia's mine. Biramia claimed that his uncle Umia had taken a female slave from the mine of Yngipurdú. Ygaragaida reported that Juan Chigre had taken Fray Esteban's "jewels" and ornaments, and that Pidigara had taken the chalice from the church of Nigua. Ygaragaida was himself found to be in possession of a paten when he was captured, which he claimed had been given to him by Bidigama. Guaguirri confessed that he and three other Indians divided the clothing and "jewels" found in
Francisco de la Carrera’s house, which he still had the day he was captured. The group that went after Juan de Guzmán divided the tasks between them: while some killed the Spaniards, the others gathered the victims’ clothing and "jewels". Noquia confessed that the Indian Natucama stole a chest, while he and his father Pichorre took some articles of clothing. Guaripua, who confessed to killing Francisco de la Carrera, claimed that they also divided the gold among themselves: Guaripua’s share amounted to 20 pesos, which he used to buy axes.\footnote{Ibid. See the following statements: Ygaragaida, ff.3-5; Capitán Tajina, f.12; Guaguirri, ff.14-16; Guaripua, f.19; Biramia, f.41; Noquia, f.44.}

It is clear from the statements that many Indians were only interested in taking the Spaniards’ belongings. Beruga claimed that the Indian Caguera had informed him that "the Spaniards are to be killed, let’s go and take their things". Manigua, too, stated that he had been informed that the Spaniards of Nigua were to be killed and that they should go in order to take their belongings. Umia said that he was in his house on the Samugra river when Meachama arrived and asked him to go to the mine of Ingipurdu, for, as the Spaniards were to be killed, it was possible that "they might give them some [of their] belongings". Soberano also claimed that he had been told to "gather the belongings of the Spaniards".\footnote{Ibid. See the following statements: Soberano, f.43; Manigua, f.45; Beruga, f.46; Umia, f.48.} Indeed, among the contents of the canoes of the Indians captured by
Bueso de Valdés' men on the Murri river in August 1684, were church ornaments, bedclothes, hammers, machetes, axes, steel, and salt. When Minguirri's family was captured in September 1684, they were found to be in possession of 16 axes, machetes, a relic on a chain, three pesos in gold dust, and old clothing, among other things. Ygaragaida confessed that, although he had not taken up arms against the Spaniards, he went to the town of Nigua "as he saw that the Spaniards were to be killed and that they had a lot of salt which he came to take for him to eat". The taking of slaves, however, appears to have been a Citará custom, for the censuses carried out by Bueso de Valdés in 1676 show a large slave population in the settlements, made up of Indians captured in war from other Indian groups.

Despite such widespread participation, it is important to note that not all Indians were involved in the rebellion. Indeed, a core group of Indians remained loyal to the Spaniards throughout the events of January 1684, and some appear to have been out of the province at the time the Spaniards were killed. According to Azcárate de Castillo, two of these - Don Pedro Tegue and Capitán Pancha - were away when the rebellion occurred, apparently building canoes. Although the number of Indians who supported the Spaniards was very small, they were,

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73 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 5, Declaración, Lucas Rodríguez et.al., Río de Murri, 9 August 1684, f.34; and Auto, Juan Bueso de Valdés, Río Bebará, 25 September 1684, ff.50-51.

74 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Ygaragaida's statement, f.5.
nevertheless, crucially important to their survival. Don Rodrigo Pivi took letters from Antioquia to the Naurita mine, and Mitiguirre, Don Pedro Tegue, and Taichama all took letters requesting help to the province of Noanama. Don Rodrigo Pivi and Don Juan Mitiguirre also advised the Spaniards on the defense of the mine. In the immediate aftermath of the rebellion, Pivi provided the survivors with baskets of fruit and canoes full of plantains, for which he received no payment. The Spaniards did, however, have to pay for supplies provided by other loyal Indians, particularly Capitán Pancha, who was paid for all his services. Capitán Pancha was paid 9 gold pesos, for example, for returning to the Naurita mine three female slaves who had belonged to Capitán Domingo de Veitia, and an Indian woman. Capitán Taichama and Capitán Certeguí were also among the Indians who offered aid to the survivors.73

In addition, Don Rodrigo Pivi and Don Juan Mitiguirre provided Bueso de Valdés with information which facilitated the capture of rebel Indians. Bueso de Valdés reported that Pivi and Mitiguirre had informed him that many Indians had retreated to the Murri and Bojaya rivers, and that there were, among the Indians who were hiding there, many who had taken no part in the violence and had retreated for

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73 Ibid. See the statements of Don Juan Joseph Azcárate de Castillo, ff.23-24; Esteban Fernández de Rivera, f.27; and Francisco Onofre, f.32.
fear of the rebels. Don Rodrigo Pivi also turned in to the Spaniards at least one Indian, and Mitiguirre turned in another, referred to as a "delinquent". According to the Spaniard Fernández de Rivera, Quirubira had since been the enemy of Pivi, Mitiguirre, Pancha, and Tegue, and it was said that Quirubira had attempted to kill the loyal Indians. Indeed, Pivi claimed that his wife had been taken by the rebels, and that his belongings had been stolen from his house.

What is not entirely clear is why this small group of Indians supported the Spaniards, since they originated from the same towns as the rebels: in the census of 1676, Don Rodrigo Pivi and Don Juan Mitiguirre are listed as residents of the settlement of Nigua, while Capitán Pancha and Don Pedro Tegue are listed in the census of San Francisco de Atrato. Even more surprisingly, some of the loyal Indians had been directly involved in the conflict with Lope de Cárdenas and Fray Joseph de Córdoba just a few years earlier. It had been Pivi’s Indians, for example, that had been seen to be "ready for war", and it was Pivi himself who had threatened, together with Don Pedro de

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76 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 5, Auto, Juan Bueso de Valdés, Río Bebara, 30 July 1684, f.30; and Río de Murri, 11 August 1684, f.35.

77 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6. See Juananui’s and Sadragama’s confessions, ff.46, 54.

78 Ibid. See the statements of Esteban Fernández de Rivera, ff.28-29, and Don Juan Joseph Azcárate de Castillo, f.24.

79 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, ff.76, 87, 122, 126.
Bolivar, to kill Fray Joseph de Córdoba if he returned to Nigua. Don Antonio de Legarda, Pivi's brother-in-law, had reported to the governor of Antioquia that the Don Pedro Tegue was planning to burn down the church of Lloró, and it was Don Juan Mitiguirre whom the governor had tried to appease by promising that three Franciscans were on their way to the Chocó to replace the other missionaries.\textsuperscript{80} One possible explanation derives from a reference made by Bueso de Valdés in 1684 to the Indians who had been honoured by the governors of Popayán and Antioquia with the titles of "governors" of the Indian towns.\textsuperscript{81} Although there is no evidence to indicate whether all the Indians who remained loyal had received titles of "governors", we do know that at least one of these - Don Rodrigo Pivi - was later made hereditary cacique by the Spaniards for his role in assisting the pacification process.\textsuperscript{82} Of course, it is also possible that a small group of Indians preferred to maintain good relations with the Spaniards for the benefits that this could bring. As we have seen, some Indians sold food supplies to the Spaniards at the Naurita mine, while Capitán Pancha was paid for all the services he provided. As early as 1674, Capitán Pancha was said to be a friend of the Spaniards, and he, together with Don Pedro Tegue, were among the Indians who accompanied Bueso de Valdés on his

\textsuperscript{80} AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 3, ff.22-4, 41-2, 44.

\textsuperscript{81} AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Cabeza de Proceso General, Rio de Murri, 15 August 1684, ff.8-9.

\textsuperscript{82} Isacsson, "Emberá", p.31.
journey to Darién. Indeed, Don Pedro Tegue had had fairly close relations with the Spaniards since 1668. In that year, the Spaniard Juan López García reported that Tegue was prepared to negotiate Indian resettlement and tributes with the Spanish. Tegue was also one of the Indians who had agreed to meet the conditions laid down by Francisco de Quevedo in 1669.

Although Bueso de Valdés was aware that many of the Indians captured had played no part in the rebellion, a considerable number clearly had participated - certainly a sufficient number to prevent the Spaniards mounting any form of defense or fleeing the province. While there is no evidence to indicate exactly how many Indians were involved, the survivors estimated that, in the days following the rebellion, 300 Indians went to the Naurita mine. In October 1684, Bueso de Valdés noted that 600 Indians had been captured, leaving 900 - out of an estimated total population of 1,500 - still to be "reduced"

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83 AGI Quito 67, Testimonio Franciscans, Domingo de Veitia y Gamboa, Sitio y Real de Minas de Nuestra Señora de Belén, 28 July 1674, f.62; and AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, Nigua River, 15 January 1677, f.157.

84 Ibid., ff.112-13; AGI Quito 67, Don Francisco de Quevedo, San Joseph de Noanama, 15 May 1669; and "Testimonio de Autos (Audiencia)", 5 May 1669, f.7.

85 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 5, Auto, Río de las Piedras, 23 August 1684, f.39.

86 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Francisco Onofre's statement, f.32.
and punished, although he was clearly aware that not all of these had been participants in the uprising.

There are several possible motives for the rebellion. According to one of the surviving Spaniards, Azcárate de Castillo, after the rebellion, the Indian Quirubira admitted to having killed Capitán Domingo de Veitia because they had been told that Veitia planned to kill all the Indian capitanes. Quirubira added that the Spaniard Martín de Ardanza had killed an Indian and wounded another. And although some of the captured Indians affirmed that they joined the rebellion because other Indians were killing Spaniards, and others claimed not to have been involved in the violence but confessed to going to the towns to steal, it is clear that the Indians' intention was to eliminate all traces of the Spanish presence in their territory, hence the killing not only of Spaniards but all those associated with them - mestizos, mulattoes, slaves, and Indian carriers from the interior. The most probable explanation for such violent and widespread discontent among the native population is that the changes they had earlier brought about through negotiation with the governor of Antioquia failed to lead to any real improvement in the behaviour of the region's Spanish residents. No doubt this was why, following the rebellion, the rebels went to the Naurita mine, and offered the survivors canoes and food.

87 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 7, Auto, Bueso de Valdés, Lloró, 8 October 1684, f.4.

88 AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, Don Juan Joseph Azcárate de Castillo's statement, ff.23, 25.
supplies to enable them to leave the province, for they wanted no more war. ⁸⁹

In the months between August 1684 and March 1685, the captured Indians were closely questioned about the rebellion. ⁹⁰ Particular attention was to be paid to identifying the rebel leaders and the Indians who remained loyal to the Spaniards. ⁹¹ Punishment was administered on the basis of the evidence provided by the captured Indians themselves, and could be one or a combination of the following: 100 lashes, confiscation of belongings, personal service for 10 years (wives and children over the age of 17 were also to provide personal service for the same period of time), or death (in the event of which, wives and children over 17 had to provide personal service for 10 years). Bueso de Valdés did not intend to use the death sentence widely, however: his policy was to use death as a punishment only for the leaders of the rebellion and for those who admitted to having been personally involved in the killings. ⁹²

⁸⁹ Ibid., f.23.

⁹⁰ Joseph de Perianes acted as "defensor" of the Indians between August and October 1684, when he was replaced by Diego de Galvis. See ibid., Auto, Bueso de Valdés, Río de Murri, 11 August 1684, f.3, and Lloró, 12 October 1684, f.22.

⁹¹ Ibid., Cabeza de Proceso General, Río de Murri, 15 August 1684, f.9.

⁹² Ibid. See the following sentences: Capitán Tajina, ff.13-14; Guaguirri, f.17; Minguirri, f.21; Udrapagui, f.40; Guatupue, Dane, and Chaquiranvira, f.40.
An interesting feature of the Indians' statements was their willingness to confess to their crimes and an equal willingness to inform on their relatives who were personally involved in, or present at, the massacres. Thus, Guaripua confessed to killing Juan de Guzmán's son and one of Bueso de Valdés' male slaves. Tajina confessed to killing two people in Nigua - Leandro, and Perucho, a servant of Don Juan Joseph de Azcárate. Minguirri confessed to killing Francisco de la Carrera's servant Antonio, and Guatupua confessed to killing an Indian boy who accompanied Manuel de Borja. Dare confessed to killing a mulatto boy called Bernardo while Soberano claimed that he had killed two slaves. In addition, Guaguirri informed Bueso de Valdés that his son Guaripua helped to kill Capitán Juan de Guzmán, while Guripua confessed that one of his brothers, Bequigui, had killed Bernardo de Mafla, and that another of his brothers, Ubira, killed Bejarano. Don Pedro Paparra confessed that his brother Soberano killed Carrasco and a slave belonging to Bueso de Valdés. Others, however, only confessed to being present when the killings took place.

The reasons why they should be willing to confess may reside in the importance attached by their society to the capture and killing of the enemy. This was a feature of Indian society identified by the Jesuit, Father Antonio

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93 Ibid. See the following statements: Capitán Tajina, f.11; Guaguirri, ff.14-15; Guaripua, f.19; Minguirri, f.20; Guatupua, f.36; Dare, f.37; Don Pedro Paparra, f.42; Soberano, f.43.
Marzal, in 1678: in reporting that there were no leaders or figures of authority among the Citará, Marzal observed that if they have capitanes it is not because they are obeyed in anything but because they are considered to be brave ... they go to war out of the vanity of being considered brave ... for he who kills the most is considered the most brave...

Thus, in his confession, Don Fernando Tajina informed Bueso de Valdés that he was a capitán "because he has killed five Cunacunas and Burgumias". Guaguirri referred to his occupation as "cultivating maize to maintain his children and to go to war". Indeed, the Spaniards recognized that the Indians rarely left their houses unarmed. When Juananui claimed that he was not armed during the rebellion, he was asked how had he gone to the settlement of Maygara and returned to Dodubar without arms, since the two places were separated by a distance of two days, and the Indians were known never to leave their houses unarmed even to travel short distances. In sentencing the Indians, Bueso de Valdés noted the inherent truthfulness of the Indians: "these Indians very rarely deny what they have done". The defensor Diego de Galvis considered it advisable to believe the witnesses because "they are so

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94 Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Los Jesuitas, p.501.

95 See Don Fernando Tajina’s and Guaguirri’s statements, in AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 6, ff.11, 14.

96 Ibid. See Juananui’s statement.

97 Ibid., Juananui’s and Dare’s statements, ff.46, 37.
truthful that none denies having committed a crime knowing from experience that they are to be killed".\textsuperscript{98}

In seeking to understand the reasons for the Indians' behaviour, Diego de Galvis, appointed as "defensor" of the captured Indians, provides some of the very few existing indications of Spanish attitudes towards the Indians of the Chocó. Diego de Galvis considered that the Indians' willingness to confess their crimes demonstrated their natural tendency to kill and steal. In his defense of the Indian Udrapagui, Galvis reported that he should not be held directly responsible for the death of the blacksmith Guina, for "he was driven only by the curiosity of seeing people killed due to this nation's natural tendency towards anything related to war". In his defense of Birramia, Noquia, Manigua, Barruga, Juananui, and Bumia, Diego de Galvis noted that their involvement in the rebellion was a result of "their interest in gathering the belongings of the Spaniards", for the Indians were "greedy" and "attracted to anything novel". In his defense of Dane, Guatupua, and Chaquiranvira, Diego de Galvis tried to explain what he called "the propensity that these Indians have to [become involved] in war", noting that "they spend all their lives in this exercise killing and capturing [Indians] of different provinces and nations situated among these hills". He also spoke of their "stupidity", their "misery", and their "tendency to kill" which was "not seen

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., Petición, Defensor, f.53.
as a crime". Meanwhile, Bueso de Valdés appeared not to understand what had sparked these events, reporting that the Indians had no cause to rebel, "for they lived ... without ... tributes".  

Some of the Indians captured by Spanish forces in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion were killed for their participation in the revolt. Don Fernando Tajina, for instance, one of the first capitanes to have rebelled, was sentenced to death - to be publicly hanged, in fact - and his belongings were to be distributed among the soldiers, while his children were to provide personal service to the Spaniards for a period of ten years. The same sentence was passed on Guaguirri - "for his own punishment and as an example to the others". Others had their property taken, or were lashed, or were ordered to provide personal service to the Spaniards. For example, Guatupue, Dane, Chaquiranvira, Minguirri, Guaripua, and Soberano were all sentenced to the loss of their property and to provide personal service for a period of ten years. Many others - Ygaragaida, Birramia, Umia, Manigua, Noquia, Barruga, Juananui, Cadragama, Don Thorivio Chivadomia, Pedro Paparra - were sentenced to a combination of 100 lashes and personal service.

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100 Ibid., Culpa y Cargo, Bueso de Valdés, ff.12-13.

101 Ibid., ff.7-8, 13-14, 17, 20-21, 40, 49, 51, 53-54, 56.
However, it is significant that, with the exception of Don Fernando Tajina and Don Pedro Paparra, none of the Indians whom the survivors of the Naurita mine recognized as rebel leaders were among those captured in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion. According to the governor of Popayán and Don Carlos Alcedo Lemus de Sotomayor (appointed by the Audiencia to take overall control of the pacification campaign), at least seven of the rebel capitanes had retreated to a region 150 leagues distant from the province of Citará, from where they continued to attack Spanish forces. The appointment of Alcedo de Sotomayor, and his subsequent assurance to the rebels that all Indians who surrendered to the Spaniards would not be punished, were said to have created divisions among the rebel group. Many Indians, such as the group led by Anugama, turned themselves in; others, led by Capitán Aucavira, retreated to the Soruco nation; Capitán Chuagra’s men moved further north towards Cunacuna territory, where they were all said to have been killed; and Sesego and Tabugara and their men were said to have split off from the main group, led by Quirubira, and to have set up their own fortification to defend themselves from the Spanish attack. Once the Indians had divided and disbanded, the process of defeating the individual groups was completed swiftly. By 31 August 1687, Quirubira and Sanjua had been killed, and
the four Indian *capitanes* who continued to resist the Spanish advance were killed soon after.¹⁰²

The rebellion of 1684 and the subsequent pacification campaign marked a turning point for the history of the Indian population of the Chocó, in several respects. In 1689, the governor of Popayán, Don Gerónimo de Berrio, informed the Crown that the serious jurisdictional disputes which had arisen during the pacification process as a result of the clash between the two *gobernaciones* of Popayán and Antioquia, represented by Don Cristóbal de Caicedo¹⁰³ and Juan Bueso de Valdés, respectively, had led the Audiencia of Santa Fe, officially in overall control of the activities of both *gobernaciones* in the Chocó, finally to endorse the claims of the *gobernación* of Popayán over those of Antioquia. In the short term, the Audiencia’s decision led to the appointment of Don Carlos de Alcedo Sotomayor as "governor of the conquest";¹⁰⁴ in the longer term it meant that, henceforth, the Chocó region was to be administered by *tenientes* appointed by the governor of Popayán. Don Rodrigo Roque de Mañosca, who had, by May 1690, replaced Gerónimo de Berrio as governor of Popayán, proceeded with the appointment of *tenientes* to all the

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¹⁰² AGI Quito 75, Don Gerónimo de Berrio to King, Popayán, 2 March 1689; and "Certificación", Don Carlos de Alcedo Lemus de Sotomayor, n.p., n.d.

¹⁰³ Don Juan de Caicedo had been killed by the Indians.

¹⁰⁴ AGI Quito 75, Don Gerónimo de Berrio to King, Popayán, 16 May 1690.
Chocó's provinces, thus introducing, finally, the system whereby the region was to be administered until a separate, independent governor was appointed to the Chocó in 1726.

The defeat of the rebels was the last attempt on the part of the Indians to rid themselves of the Spaniards by force. Although, in 1690, a small group of six Indians were said to have planned a conspiracy to kill the Spaniards, the incident was averted by the teniente of the province of Citará, Don Antonio Ruiz Calzado, who proceeded ruthlessly against the Indians, detaining eighty and sentencing four to death. It was, moreover, at this time that the Indian population of the province of Citará adopted flight as the only method of resistance to the Spaniards: all the Indians of Nigua, for instance, abandoned their settlement out of fear of Ruiz Calzado.

The pacification marked a turning point in another sense as well. By 1690, the Spaniards of the gobernación of Popayán had begun to move their slaves to the Chocó: in that year, four of Popayán's principal slaveowners sent slave gangs, accompanied by a large group of Spanish

105 Ibid., Don Rodrigo Roque de Mañosca to King, Popayán, 16 May 1690.

106 Ibid., and Lorenzo de Salazar's statement of 24 September 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", ff.81-2.

107 Ibid.
miners, to set up operations in the region. The number of miners and slaves in the Chocó began to increase at a very rapid rate, and the Indians of all three provinces were rapidly drawn into the mining economy, as builders of dwellings and canoes, as transporters of goods, and as suppliers of foodstuffs. The problems that arose in the Chocó as a result of the system of administration introduced after the rebellion had been quelled, and the situation of the Indian in the economy which developed in the region, centred around gold deposits mined by a slave labour force, will form the subject of the next chapter.

108 AGI Quito 75, Don Rodrigo Roque de Mañosca to King, Popayán, 16 May 1690.
CHAPTER 6

SPANIARDS AND INDIANS IN
THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In the early 1720s, Don Agustín de Morales y Mendoza, who referred to himself as a "natural" of the New Kingdom of Granada, sent a letter to the Crown in which he proposed to undertake the reduction of the Indians of the Chocó, at his own expense, in exchange for the governorship of the region for a period of ten years. This proposal received considerable attention in the Council of the Indies, but, by the second decade of the 18th century, it was not because a region known to be rich in gold remained unexplored by Spaniards fearful of Indian resistance, as had been the case half a century before, but because a large proportion of the Indians of the area, who had been so violently rounded up after the rebellion of 1684, had

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1 See AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Agustín de Morales y Mendoza to Crown. Don Agustín de Morales' letter is not dated, but the Council discussed its contents between May and November 1724. Later in this chapter we will see that Don Agustín de Morales y Mendoza requested the governorship of Popayán because, in his attempts to improve the efficiency of royal administration in the New Kingdom, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero appointed a Superintendente to administer the provinces of Nóvita, Citará, Tatamá/Chocó, and Raposo. This Superintendente was to be independent of the Governor of Popayán, who had, since the pacification campaign of the late 1680s, assumed complete jurisdiction over the region. See ibid., Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721.
adopted another form of resistance to the Spaniards - flight.  

As we shall see throughout this and the following chapter, this latest form of resistance was a response to ever-growing Spanish demands on the Indian population of the Chocó. The number of Spaniards residing there had not increased significantly: in 1711 there were only 48 miners owning slave gangs in the entire region, and by 1778, the number of white residents had reached only 332, including royal officials and priests. However, the presence of the Spaniards began to be felt as never before, for mining operations began in earnest once the rebellion of 1684-88 was finally quelled. The number of slaves increased accordingly. William Sharp's population estimates for the Chocó show that their numbers rose to 600 in 1704, 2,000 in 1724, almost doubled, to 3,918, by 1759, and that they continued to rise at a steady pace until 1782. By this

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2 In his letter, Don Agustín de Morales observed that the number of Indians who had fled from their towns was larger than the number who remained there. See Ibid., Don Agustín de Morales y Mendoza to Crown, n.p., n.d. This phenomenon was also said to be occurring in the Barbacoas region. In 1691, the governor of Popayán informed the Crown that the encomenderos of the province of Barbacoas were making very little profit from their encomiendas, because of the large number of Indians who were absent and whose whereabouts were unknown. See AGI Quito 75, Don Rodrigo Roque to Crown, Santa María del Puerto de Barbacoas, 16 March 1691.

3 See Colmenares, Popayán, p.73; and Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, Table 7, p.199. Although the number of miners owning slave gangs amounted to no more than 48 by 1711, the sources indicate that there were also many other Spanish residents in the Chocó.
time, the number of free people of colour was also very large, reaching 3,899 in 1782.4

The growth of the slave population reflected a very significant expansion in mining activity in the Chocó, giving rise to what Germán Colmenares termed a "new gold cycle in New Granada’s economy". Figures on the Chocó’s registered output after 1724 show a significant upward trend which continued until mid-century: the value of gold declared per average year rose from 113,064 castellanos in 1724-25, to 165,022 in 1741-45, falling slightly, to 161,604, in 1746-50.5

The expansion of the mining sector during the first half of the eighteenth century was mirrored in the growing prosperity of the cities of the Cauca Valley, whose fortunes were linked to the mining operations of the Chocó in two ways. First, the expansion of mining in the Chocó

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4 The number of slaves increased to 4,231 in 1763, 5,756 in 1778, 5,916 in 1779, 6,557 in 1781, and to 7,088 in 1782. Thereafter, the number of slaves began to fall, to 4,968 in 1808. See ibid., Table 7, p.199. It appears that the size of the slave population grew dramatically after the turn of the century. In 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo reported that, when he first entered the Chocó 21 years earlier, there were only 30 slaves in the region. By the time of writing, the number had risen to 2,000, and these were divided between some fifty to sixty cuadrillas, or slave gangs. See AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July 1724. According to Colmenares, the slaves working in the Chocó at the beginning of the century had been moved there either from abandoned mining operations in Popayán, or from agricultural activities. See Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, p.327.

5 Colmenares, Cali, p.136. See also Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, Table 9, p.201, and McFarlane, Anthony, "Economic and Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New Granada", pp.84-5, 88, 90.
was organized largely by the leading families of the Cauca Valley, principally Cali and Popayán; and secondly, many of the cities — Buga, Cali, Popayán — carried on an important trade with the region, supplying the mines with many products, such as dried and salted meat, sugar products, wheat, and tobacco.⁶

However, although the fortunes of the gold mining sector in the Chocó after the mid-1720s and the resulting prosperity of the cities of the Cauca Valley have been examined in several studies of the eighteenth century,⁷ little is known about Spanish activities in the area during the first thirty years of the century or about the impact their operations had on the native population during that period. While we know that gold output increased markedly after 1724, we do not know, for instance, why so little gold was declared before then. Yet there can be little doubt that gold production was very significant before the mid-1720s. Indeed, the evidence suggests that this was the case even before the end of the seventeenth century. William Sharp studied the profitability of one such mining operation, belonging to Francisco de Arboleda Salazar, over a six month period in 1690. His mine was in fact the most profitable of the twelve whose records Sharp analysed,

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⁶ Ibid., pp.90-1. See also Colmenares, Cali, pp.153-5.

⁷ See, for example, Sharp, Colmenares, and McFarlane.
eleven of which correspond to the eighteenth century. Arboleda Salazar was not, moreover, the only miner who was closely involved in mining in the Chocó. In 1708, the Mosquera family, from Popayán, was embroiled in a long dispute with the teniente of the province of Nôvita over access to Indian labour for the upkeep of their mines on the Iró river. We also have a clear indication of the existence of several mines in the province of Noanama at the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century: in 1709, the fiscal of the Audiencia of Santa Fé petitioned on behalf of the Indians of Tadó, Los Brazos, Noanama, and San Agustín that they should not be forced to travel to mining camps located at long distances from their own settlements and that they should, instead, be assigned to those situated closest to them.

By 1721, it was said that the Chocó was the "jewel" of the colonies, and that not only large numbers of black slaves were involved in mining, but also mulattoes, mestizos, zambos, freedmen of colour, and many whites. Three years later, Fray Manuel Caicedo said of the land that it was "the richest ... ever discovered", not only because of the large number of mines there, but because of

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8 See Sharp, *Slavery on the Spanish Frontier*, pp.179-80, and Table 15, pp.204-05. Arboleda is said to have been the only miner to declare any of the gold extracted from the mines of the Chocó between 1670 and 1690. See Colmenares, *Historia Económica y Social de Colombia*, p.327.

9 Colmenares, Germán, et.al. (eds.), *Fuentes Coloniales para la Historia del Trabajo en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1968), pp.128-141.
the high quality of the gold extracted. He added that gold mining was the only occupation in which its inhabitants were engaged. And, in 1729, the former president of the Audiencia, Don Antonio Manso, observed that the gold of the Chocó was extracted not by the arroba, but by the "load". The amounts of gold extracted from the Chocó's mines must have been very high, for, over the course of one year between 1718 and 1719, a single conscientious royal official collected 4,000 gold pesos in quinto payments in the province of Citará alone. And when, in the following year, Don Luis de Espinosa served as superintendente of the Chocó, he was said to have collected and sent to Santa Fe three arrobas of gold, worth 7,400 pesos.

Certainly, mining operations in the Chocó in the first two decades of the eighteenth century must have been sufficiently profitable to justify high expenditure on slaves, whose numbers were, as we have seen, increasing rapidly, particularly after the regularization of the slave trade under the foreign asiento companies, and the

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10 AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July 1724.

11 "Relación hecha por el Mariscal de Campo D. Antonio Manso, como Presidente de la Audiencia del Nuevo Reino de Granada, sobre su estado y necesidad en el año de 1729", in E.M.Posada & P.M.Ibáñez, Relaciones de Mando: memorias presentadas por los gobernantes del Nuevo Reino de Granada (Bogotá, 1910), p.4.

12 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720.

13 Ibid., Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721, and AGI Santa Fe 693, Don Luis de Espinosa to Don Antonio de la Pedrosa, Nóvita, 21 September 1719.
establishment of the South Sea Company's asiento in 1713 offered the miners access to a larger supply of slave labour. They must also have been sufficiently profitable to enable miners to keep large numbers of slaves in the region despite the high cost of foodstuffs, tools, and other products imported from Cartagena and the cities of the interior. In 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo stated that many products, including iron and steel for tools, brought from Cartagena and other cities, had to be carried over long distances to supply the Chocó because of the prohibitions on navigation along the Atrato and San Juan rivers, which increased the cost of supplies immensely. Because of the prohibitions, each quintal of iron cost 50 gold pesos and each quintal of steel 80 pesos. If brought in from Cartagena through the Atrato, iron would cost no more than about 20 pesos the quintal, and steel would be sold for no more than 30 pesos the quintal. Some basic foodstuffs - such as salt, sugar, meat - also had to be imported, as did clothing and tobacco, and all of these fetched exceptionally high prices. Although Fray Manuel Caicedo claimed that the high cost of supplies prevented the miners from making large profits, he nevertheless observed that each slave working in the mines or along the river banks left his master one gold peso every day.

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14 McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New Granada", pp.84-5.

15 According to Fray Manuel, each arroba of meat cost six gold pesos, except for pork, which cost 12 gold pesos. Each head of cattle fetched 14 gold pesos. The price of salt was also exceptionally high: three gold
Much of the output from the mines of the Chocó during these years disappeared without trace. Vicente de Aramburu reported in 1713 that neither the miners, the merchants nor the traders ever declared the gold dust obtained from the region's mines. The value of gold declared in Popayán increased in 1680-85, due to the expansion of mining activities in the southern Pacific lowland areas of Dagua and the Raposo (a region apparently unaffected by the rebellion of 1684-88), and again after 1720, due to rising production in the Chocó mines. But much of the gold extracted in the intervening years cannot be accounted for because of the widespread fraud in which the miners of the region were involved.

In this chapter, we will examine more closely the state of the province in the early years of the 18th century, focusing particularly on the system of administration introduced to control the native population, and at the role the Indians were assigned within the structure established by those who had control over them. We will see that the system of royal administration was characterized by a high degree of corruption, and that it is this corruption which accounts for the low levels of

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\text{pesos the arroba when there was a plentiful supply, but the price rose astronomically in times of shortage. See AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July 1724.}
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\[16\] AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa Fe, 24 September 1713.

\[17\] Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, p.327.
gold declared and for many other "scandals" that were said to be leading the Chocó to ruin. Specifically, we will consider the reports made by several royal officials from Bogotá, Cartagena, and Spain, and the recommendations they made to resolve the problem. This chapter will also focus on the Indian response to the demands of the Spaniards, in particular, at their efforts, in the 1710s, to obtain authorization for a new settlement along the Murri river, independent of the gobernación of Popayán and under the authority of the gobernación of Antioquia. Finally, this chapter will consider the way in which the treatment of the Indians served as an excuse for the old conflict between the gobernaciones of Popayán and Antioquia to surface once again. We will see how the gobernación of Antioquia used the grievances of the Indians as a means of attacking the gobernación of Popayán and gaining approval for the relocation of the Indians to a region under its own jurisdiction. We will end by discussing the extent to which the Indians actually benefitted from this relocation.
THE CHOCO: MAIN AREA OF SETTLEMENT

IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Source: Robert C. West, Colonial Placer Mining in Colombia, Map 5, between pp.16-17.
Miners and Government

As a consequence of the Audiencia of Santa Fe's decision finally to entrust the pacification of the Citará rebels to the gobernación of Popayán, the gobernación of Antioquia lost all jurisdictional claims over the province of Citará. From the end of the 1680s, then, the entire region under Spanish control began to be administered by tenientes appointed by the governor of Popayán. The confusion about the number and names of the provinces of the Chocó, to which we have referred in earlier chapters, continued for some years into the eighteenth century. During the first three decades of the century, the provinces of Noanama (now often referred to as Nóvita), Citará, and Tatamá/Chocó, were considered as separate entities, and each was governed by a teniente. By the 1730s, and for the remainder of the century, only two of these - Citará and Nóvita (previously Noanama) survived as separate regions.

In the early years of the 18th century, the tenientes who governed the Chocó provinces were usually members of the leading families of the cities of the Cauca Valley - in particular Popayán - and also leading mine and slave owners. Thus, at the beginning of the century, the Mosquera brothers, Francisco de Arboleda, Bernardo Alfonso de Saa, Miguel Gómez de la Asperilla, and Agustín de Valencia were all active in the Chocó region. These men, all of whom were well known in Popayán, exercised the
government of one of the Chocó provinces in turn. The influence of the families of the Cauca Valley was also recognized in the province of Raposo. The Raposo region falls outside the scope of this study, but suffice to say that the Caicedos, from Cali, were extremely influential there, and that, between 1706 and 1709, several members of the family were appointed as tenientes in that province.

In 1711, another family member, Don Francisco de Caicedo, served as teniente of the province of Citará. Several important families were also represented in the Chocó in another capacity: that of priests, or doctrineros, of the Indian settlements. In 1720, the Caicedos, the Arboledas, and the Hurtado del Aguilas, all had members of their

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18 See Colmenares, *Historia Económica y Social*, pp.327-28. See also Colmenares, et al. (eds.), *Fuentes Coloniales*, p.142. Since the mines belonging to most of these men were located in the province of Nóvita, they most likely served as tenientes of that province. However, one member of the Mosquera family - Don Jacinto de Mosquera - did serve as teniente of the province of Citará. See Footnote 23.

19 Colmenares, *Cali*, p.142.

20 See, for example, Lorenzo de Salazar’s statement, Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno ... sobre la entrada al Río Murri, y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro", f.81. The influence of the Caicedos in the Chocó went back to the pacification campaigns of the 1680s. Two members of the family - Don Juan and Don Cristóbal - led campaigns against the Indians during that decade. See AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 7, "Autos obrados por ... Juan Bueso de Valdés sobre la retirada de ... Don Juan de Caicedo"; and AGI Quito 15, "Traslado de los Autos de ... Don Cristóbal de Caicedo Salazar ... sobre los servicios hechos ... en la reducción y pacificación de los indios rebeldes de la provincia del Citará". 
families serving parishes or doctrinas in the Chocó.\textsuperscript{21} And, in 1711, the Caicedos were actually represented in two capacities in the province of Citará: while Manuel Caicedo served as doctrinero of the settlement of Quibdó, Francisco Caicedo took up the post of teniente of the province.\textsuperscript{22}

The influence exercised by the tenientes of each of the provinces of the Chocó derived from their relationship with the governor of Popayán and extended beyond their own post to that of the corregidores of the Indian settlements, whom they appointed. According to a 1713 report, sent to the Crown by the oidor of the Audiencia of Santa Fe, Vicente de Aramburu,\textsuperscript{23} the tenientes bought their posts from the governor of Popayán for a sum which varied between five and six thousand pesos, and the tenientes, in turn, sold the post of corregidor in the Indian settlements. In exposing the corruption of royal administration in the Chocó, Aramburu observed that the effect of such actions was the proliferation of tenientes and corregidores in that region. The area to which he mistakenly referred as province of Chocó but would later be called the province of

\textsuperscript{21} See AGI Quito 185, "Autos sobre la opresión en que tienen los jueces seculares a los indios de las provincias del Chocó ... Año de 1720".

\textsuperscript{22} Lorenzo de Salazar, Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno ... sobre la entrada al río Murri y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro", f.81.

\textsuperscript{23} Aramburu had been sent to the Chocó to investigate rumours about illegal commerce along the Atrato and San Juan and to establish a "caja real de fundición para las provincias del Chocó y Citará". AGI Santa Fe 362, Testimonio de Autos, Quibdó, 16 June 1726, f.12.
Nóvita, was composed of only five settlements (Tadó, Las Juntas, El Barranco, San Joseph de Noanama, and San Agustín) but was governed by one teniente and five corregidores. The province of Citará, composed of only three settlements in 1713 (Quibdó, Lloró, and Bebará), was governed by one teniente and three corregidores.24

Aramburu’s appears not to have been an idle accusation. In 1720, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona, who had been sent to the province of Citará two years before to detain and imprison the teniente Don Luis de Acuña y Berrio for the death of one Don Gaspar García Pizarro, reported to the King on the effects of the sale of the tenencias. Alcantud y Gaona informed the King that the four provinces of the Chocó, among which he included the Raposo, were each administered by a minister or teniente de gobernador whose duties were to administer justice and to collect the taxes due to the royal treasury. The post was not accompanied by a salary: indeed, it was the governor who was paid between four and six thousand pesos for the job, and the tenencia of the province of Nóvita had, in fact, recently been sold for as much as eight thousand pesos. The sums paid for the posts, combined with the high

24 AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa Fé, 8 September 1713. The settlement of Bebará was founded by Don Antonio de Veroiz y Alfaro, in 1693, on the banks of the river Bebará. See Ortega Ricaurte, Historia Documental, pp.149-52. The settlement known by the name of Quibdó in the eighteenth century was known by the name of Nigua in the seventeenth. See Lorenzo de Salazar, Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno ... sobre la entrada al río Murri ...", f.81.
cost of food supplies in the region, meant that, once appointed, these ministers had to recover the amounts paid to the governor and make a profit. Clearly, since they did not receive a salary, the tenientes could only recoup their investment from either the King's coffers, or his vassals, or indeed, from both. It appears, moreover, that these tenientes had to recover their investments very quickly, for they served for only short periods of time. In 1711, Lorenzo de Salazar, who claimed to have resided in the province of Citará for the previous 24 years, informed the governor of Antioquia that, during that period, he had known 14 tenientes, excluding the latest to take up the post, Francisco Caicedo, and that one of the 14 had served twice. Of course, as Fray Manuel Caicedo observed in

25 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco Alcantud y Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720. As examples of the high cost of food supplies in the Chocó, this official reported that fresh meat was sold for 4 patacones the arroba, and that salted meat went for 12 patacones. On the subject of the sale of the tenencias, see also AGI Quito 185, Bishop Juan Gómez Frías to King, Popayán, 6 November 1723. However, it should be noted that one man who served as teniente of the province of Citará in the early eighteenth century, Don Bartolomé de Borja y Espeleta, claimed that these officials did receive a stipend. According to Borja y Espeleta, the Indians of the region paid 2.5 pesos in tributes twice a year: 1 peso was paid to the doctrinero, 1 to the King, and the other half peso was paid to the teniente. See AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri...", Antioquia, 4 January 1712, ff.144-45.

26 According to Lorenzo de Salazar's declaration, between 1687 and 1711, the following men served as tenientes of the province of Citará: Don Antonio Beroyes, Don Antonio Ruiz Calzado, Don Juan Triunfo de Sosaya, Don Manuel Herrera (twice), Don Jacinto Mosquera, Don Joseph de Castillo, Don Antonio Oredoñez de Lara, Domingo Meléndez, Don Francisco de Soto, Cristóbal Quintero, Don Francisco Clemente de Olivares, Don Bartolomé de Borja, Don Vicente Gaspar Rugero, and Don Joseph de la Cuesta,
1724, there was one further and very damaging effect of the sale of the tenencias: since the men who served the posts were not career bureaucrats, they had no incentive to honesty or integrity. As they did not expect their record in the Chocó to affect their future career prospects, they had no reason to dedicate themselves to serve the King loyally, and much less to collect his taxes.27

The authority exercised and the freedom enjoyed by officials in the Chocó suited the governors of Popayán because, it was said, they not only sold the tenencias, but also engaged in selling merchandise to the Indians of the region through the corregidores. Furthermore, as Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona reported in 1720, when the governors conducted visits of inspection to the region, these amounted to little more than card-playing expeditions. The crimes and excesses committed by the royal officials remained unpunished.28 In 1711, Lorenzo de Salazar informed the governor of Antioquia that, on his recent visit to the Chocó, the governor of Popayán was accompanied by 23 Indian carriers: eight of these carried the governor's supplies, and the other fifteen carried clothing, half of which was later sold to the mine owners who was replaced by Don Francisco de Caicedo. See Lorenzo de Salazar, Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, in ibid., f.81.

27 AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July 1724.

28 Ibid., Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720.
while the other half was distributed between officials.29 And, in 1721, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero, who had been sent to Santa Fe with orders to erect the first Viceroyalty of New Granada and undertake the reform of any abuses in need of correction, reported that evidence of the corruption of the governors could be found in the immense profits they made from their five year terms of office. All the governors, he claimed, finished their terms with incomes many times the amounts paid to them in salaries during that period. Thus, a governor on a salary of 2,750 patacones per year, which amounted to 13,750 patacones over five years, could leave Popayán with savings of between 150,000 and 200,000 pesos. Pedrosa y Guerrero was in no doubts that such fortunes could only be made through fraud and through the "sweat" of the king's vassals.30

**Formal and Informal Government**

The circle of corruption involving the governors of Popayán, the tenientes who bought their posts from the governors, and the corregidores who bought their posts from the tenientes resulted in a complete absence of government in the Chocó. Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona noted that

29 See Lorenzo de Salazar, Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, in "Cuaderno ... sobre la entrada al Río Murri...", ff.84, 87.

30 Don Antonio de la Pedrosa also referred to the sale of tenencias, reporting that these were publicly sold to the highest bidder, and that the amounts for which they could be sold depended on the profits the tenientes could expect to make from each region. AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721.
the rest of the Spanish residents of the region - most of whom were mine owners and merchants - were not subjected to any form of government, and consequently, they neither paid quintos, nor alcabalas, nor any other duties.31

Much of the output from the mines of the Chocó, it was said, was destined to the ships of foreign nations anchored in Portobelo. In 1721, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa reported that all the gold of the region was taken to Panama via the San Juan and Atrato rivers. This gold served as payment for the slaves, clothing, and other products which were illegally introduced into the Chocó through the Atrato and San Juan.32 Pedrosa y Guerrero was concerned about the illegal commerce taking place via the Atrato and San Juan rivers, because he believed such commerce to be detrimental to the interests of the Crown, for four reasons: first, because these products were introduced illegally; secondly, because no duties were paid on the trade; thirdly, because no taxes were paid on the gold extracted from the Chocó that was used in payment for the goods obtained; and finally, because the gold so extracted landed in the hands of foreign nations.33 Nevertheless, in 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo informed the Crown that despite the prohibitions on

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31 Ibid., Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720; and AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa Fe, 24 September 1713.

32 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721.

33 AGI Santa Fe 693, "Nombramiento de Superintendente del Chocó hecho por el Dr. Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero...en Don Luis de Espinosa y Galarza...", Santa Fe, 14 November 1719, f.2.
navigation along the two main rivers, many of the goods sold in the Chocó were introduced in precisely this way. This, Fray Manuel noted, occurred because the tenientes were bribed.\textsuperscript{34} The governors, too, appear to have received bribes. In 1711, Lorenzo de Salazar informed the governor of Antioquia that, in the period he had spent in the Chocó, many vessels had entered the Atrato illegally, and that on one occasion when the governor of Popayán, Don Bartolomé Pérez de Vivero, made moves to confiscate the contents of a particular vessel which had entered the region illegally, he was bribed 400 pesos, and the owners were not punished. Goods imported in this way were paid for in gold dust, Salazar reported, because there was not a fundición in the Chocó.\textsuperscript{35}

It was clear to many contemporary observers that the absence of a smelting house - or fundición - in the Chocó was one of the main reasons why so much of the gold extracted from the mines left the region before duties were paid, for it was in the fundiciones that gold was supposed

\textsuperscript{34} AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July 1724.

Salazar claimed that he knew of some 18 to 20 vessels that had entered the region illegally since 1691. See Lorenzo de Salazar, Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno ... sobre la entrada al Río Murri...", f.89. In proposing his entrada to the Chocó, Don Agustín de Morales y Mendoza also noted that it would be to the benefit of all if trade from Panama to the mouth of the San Juan River and from Cartagena through the Atrato was ended. He noted that payment for the goods and slaves introduced illegally through these two rivers was made in gold dust, on which quintos were not paid. See AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Agustín de Morales y Mendoza to Crown, n.p., n.d.
to be melted into bars and taxed. In 1720, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona reported that because there was not a smelting house in the Chocó, the Crown lost the profits it should have obtained from the gold dust extracted from the region. In 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo informed the Crown that, as gold dust was the only medium of exchange in the region, it was inevitable that the dust should leave the region without payment of the royal fifth. And, in 1721, the governor of Popayán reported that, since the miners had no currency other than gold dust with which to pay for their supplies, it was in fact the merchants who made the largest profit and defrauded the treasury in the process.

Of course, the existence of a fundición in any colonial city did not necessarily mean that taxes on gold production were paid promptly and in full. Ann Twinam’s study of gold production in Antioquia in the eighteenth century shows that, even within Antioquia, a large proportion of annual gold production escaped the fundiciones: some of the gold dust was used in payment for goods bought from merchants, and some was smuggled out of the region prior to melting and taxing. Furthermore, miners often kept false and inaccurate production records, making taxation extremely difficult. As Twinam points out, the efficacy of royal laws regarding the production of gold

36 Ibid., Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720, and Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July 1724.

37 Ibid., Governor of Popayán to Crown, Barbacoas, 16 January 1721.
were "directly proportional to the crown's ability to enforce them". This being the case, it is very unlikely that the existence of a smelting house in the Chocó in the early eighteenth century would have made much difference to the amounts of gold declared by the region's miners.

However, it should not be assumed that the control exercised by these individuals and the freedom enjoyed by all Spaniards in the region was translated into some form of real unity between them. For, as we shall see, disputes did arise between miners, between miners and clergy, between regular and secular clergy, and between royal officials, miners, and clergy. Instances of conflict between Spaniards in the Chocó during the first three decades of the eighteenth century are numerous: in 1729, the first governor of the Chocó provinces, Don Francisco de Ibero, observed that the residents of the Chocó "do not know how to live without disputes and quarrels".

In 1708, for example, three members of the Mosquera family, together with Don Francisco de Arboleda Salazar and Don Bernardo Alfonso de Saa, came into conflict with the newly appointed teniente of the province of Nóvita, Tomás Romero Donoro. There were three reasons for the dispute. First, the miners claimed that Romero Donoro refused to provide them with sufficient Indians for the transportation of the maize and plantains with which they maintained their...

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38 Twinam, Miners, Merchants, and Farmers, pp. 22-6.

39 AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Francisco de Ibero to Crown, Nóvita, 29 October 1729.
slave gangs, and for the construction of the dwellings in which their slaves lived. Secondly, they claimed that the teniente forbade them to buy maize or plantains directly from the Indians, and that, instead, they were forced to buy their supplies from the merchants whom they believed did deal directly with the Indians, although, as we shall see, the merchants' dealings with the Indians were also conducted through the corregidores. Finally, they complained that although the Audiencia of Santa Fe had agreed that the 100 Indians of Tadó should be employed only in the mines of Iró and Mungarra - which belonged to these miners - the teniente had redirected the Tadó Indians to the mines of Nóvita and Río Negro, which were already served by 240 Indians. The miners implied that Romero Donoro had carried out these actions because he had mining interests of his own in Nóvita and Río Negro. In fact, Romero Donoro appears to have represented a clique or faction of miners competing with another represented by the Mosqueras. In this case, Romero Donoro was allied with Don Miguel de la Asperilla and Don Luis de Acuña y Berrio. Two

However, it should be noted that, in 1709, the Protector de Naturales, in Santa Fe de Bogotá, reported that the service of the 100 Indians the Mosqueras claimed had been granted to them by the Audiencia had in fact been granted to them temporarily. The Mosqueras had requested the labour of 100 Indians to assist them in preparing for the cultivation and irrigation of plantain groves and maize fields, but they had been granted the service of only six Indians for maintaining these. Because of their positions as tenientes, the Protector argued, they had completely ignored the Audiencia's directive. The documents pertaining to this case are included in Colmenares, et.al. (eds.), Fuentes Coloniales, pp.130-48.
clerics - the Franciscan Fray Manuel Caicedo, and Fray José de Santa Teresa - were also involved in the dispute on Romero Donoro's side, and one - Nicolás de Inestrosa - was allied with the Mosqueras. At least two of these clerics had mining interests of their own in the Chocó. In 1709 Nicolás de Inestrosa appears not to have been directly involved in mining (he would be at a later date), but he did request the support of the Mosqueras in his attempt to obtain a parish in the province of Nóvita. By 1720, Nicolás de Inestrosa was serving as the bishop's visitador to the Chocó and as priest of the Mosquera's mining camps of Iró and Mungarra. Fray José de Santa Teresa did have mining interests in the region: he travelled to New Granada in the company of the bishop of Popayán, Fray Mateo de Villafañe, and bought a mine in the Chocó, apparently to support his order, Nuestra Señora del Carmen, in Spain. And, in 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo informed the Crown that, in the 21 years he had spent in the Chocó, he had been involved in mining as well as in serving several parishes. However, Fray Manuel's opposition to the Mosqueras went back to 1706, when he first arrived to serve as priest of the Indians of the town of Tadó. In 1709, the Protector de Naturales reported that, at that time, Fray Manuel came into conflict with the then teniente, Nicolás

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41 ibid., pp.137-39. See also AGI Quito 190, Fray Francisco Montiel de Fuentenovilla to King, n.p., n.d.; AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July 1724; and AGI Quito 185, "Autos sobre la opresión en que tienen los jueces seculares a los indios de las provincias del Chocó...".
de Mosquera, because the Indians had been removed from the town of Tadó and relocated along the Iró river, where they served the Mosquera’s mining operations continuously, and that, as a consequence, Caicedo had resigned as doctrinero of the settlement. However, Caicedo was not the only cleric to become embroiled in disputes in the Chocó during these decades. Indeed, the clergy provide us with an important source of information on the treatment of the Indians in this period, particularly by the secular authorities whose duty it was to protect them.

**Indians and Corregidores**

From the beginning of the eighteenth century, and especially after Bishop Juan Gómez Frías took possession of the diocese of Popayán in 1716, the ecclesiastical authorities began to assert their episcopal jurisdiction over the Chocó region, despite the presence of the Franciscans in the province of Citará, who continued officially to administer the Chocó mission. As early as 1701, Bishop Mateo de Villafañe informed the King that he was about to conduct a visita to the Chocó - the first ever conducted by a bishop - where, he reported, the secular authorities and the clergy blamed each other for the lack

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42 Colmenares et.al. (eds.), *Fuentes Coloniales*, p.142.

of religious instruction being provided to the Indians.\textsuperscript{44}

In 1720, Bishop Juan Gómez Frías sent a much fuller report to both the Council of the Indies and the Audiencia of Santa Fe relating the extortions suffered by the Indian population of the Chocó at the hands of the secular authorities. The bishop’s report was based on the information gathered by two visitadores - Nicolás de Inestrosa and Fray Manuel de Abastos y Castro - who had been ordered to ascertain the source of the extortions and the extent to which Indians had received religious instruction from the priests in charge of their indoctrination. Because of the nature of the visita - all of the clerics interviewed were determined to place the blame for the Indians’ lack of instruction on the secular authorities - the following evidence has to be treated with some caution.

The bishop’s report shows that the corregidores of the Chocó region had carved out for themselves a commercial empire based on the labour of the Indians in their charge. The Indians were employed continuously in the transportation of goods brought in by the merchants. The merchants paid the corregidores, not the Indians, for the labour. The corregidores pocketed the fees, and paid the Indians in goods, principally clothing and aguardiente, which they had actually bought from the same merchants for resale in the Chocó. This operation was made all the more

\textsuperscript{44} AGI Quito 185, Bishop Mateo de Villafañe to Crown, Popayán, 7 June 1701. The sources do not indicate whether the bishop conducted this visita.
profitable by the fact that the value attached to the goods given in payment to the Indians was decided by the corregidor. Invariably, this value was higher than the price the corregidor paid the merchants for the goods, and higher, of course, than the Indians would have had to have paid had they purchased these goods directly from the merchants.45

Other ecclesiastics in the region echoed the bishop’s complaints. In 1730, the Franciscan Father Provincial, Fray Dionisio de Camino, reported to the oidor of the Audiencia, Martínez Malo, that the Indians were often forced to sell the goods received from the corregidor in payment for their labour - which they rarely needed - to buy other badly needed supplies. In order to sell these goods, the Indians had to offer them at prices lower than those at which they had received them.46

Other reports show that the corregidores were allied with the tenientes in the running of this system. In 1723, Bishop Gómez Frías observed that, because the tenientes sold the posts of corregidor in the Indians’ settlements,

45 Auto, Bishop Juan Gómez de Frías, Popayán, 8 July 1720, in ibid., "Autos sobre la opresión...". See also the comments of a later bishop, Diego Fermín de Vergara, on the methods by which the corregidores paid the Indians for their work, in ibid., Diego Fermín de Vergara to Crown, Popayán, 1 December 1737.

they had no choice but to allow the corregidores a free hand in recovering their initial investment. In 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo observed that, when the miners requested the assistance of Indians for a task, they not only had to pay for the labour of the Indians, but also had to pay the teniente for providing the Indians. And, as Don Antonio de la Pedrosa reported, personal service was tolerated and encouraged because all parties benefited. The tenientes were bribed, and the miners obtained access to the labour of the Indians: they all "give each other a hand". The governors, moreover, were unable to stop the practice, because, in being paid for the tenencias, they lost the freedom to prevent and punish such "disorder".

Not all the Indian population of the Chocó suffered the same fate. The sources suggest that the Indians of the Tatamá/Chocó province were particularly ill-treated because of a combination of factors: the terrain they inhabited had fewer rivers, the area was poorer in gold deposits, and it was also closer to the cities of the Cauca Valley. Bishop Juan Gómez Frías' 1720 report indicates that the work carried out by the Indians of this area was heavier and

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47 AGI Quito 185, Bishop Juan Gómez Frías to Crown, Popayán, 6 November 1723.

48 AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July 1724.

49 Ibid., Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721. Pedrosa y Guerrero also noted that, in carrying out their visitations to the Chocó, the governors took merchandise to sell. Duties were not paid on these goods, and quintos were not paid on the gold received in payment for them.
more continuous than that carried out by other Chocó Indians, because merchandise had to be carried overland, and because, as the number of Indians was small, even the children were used to carry food supplies.50

A few years earlier, in 1713, the oidor Vicente de Aramburu had made similar observations regarding the Indian population of the same province. He, too, reported to the Crown that because the area did not have important gold deposits, its Indian population was employed solely in the transportation of goods for the merchants and traders travelling into the region with supplies from the cities of Anserma, Cartago, Buga, and Toro, among others. There were only three settlements in the province - Chamí, San Juan, and Mombú - to provide Indians for transportation duties, and these carried exceptionally heavy weights - between three and four arrobas - for the eleven days it took to travel overland from the settlement of Chamí to the port of Dodubera, on the Atrato, from where supplies were later taken by river to the province of Citará.51 In November, 1720, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona further reported that the population of the province of Tatamá/Chocó amounted to no more than 100 tributary Indians, and that,

50 Certificación del notario de visita, Popayán, 9 July 1720, in AGI Quito 185, "Autos sobre la opresión..."

51 AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa Fe, 30 September 1713. See also Arcila Robledo (ed.), "Representación...", op.cit., pp.242-3.
because of the heavy weights they carried, the life expectancy of the male population was very low.\textsuperscript{52}

While the Indian population of the three settlements of the province of Tatamá/Chocó took the lion's share of transportation duties, the province of Nóvita - which consisted of five settlements in 1729 and had a tributary population of about 280 - had the largest proportion of slaves: more than 3,000 by 1729. Since Nóvita was the more important mining province, the Indian population of that area must have taken the lion's share of the responsibility for supplying the slave gangs with maize and plantains. The province of Citará, which was composed, by 1729, of five settlements (Quibdó, Lloró, Beté, Bebará, and Bojaya), had the largest number of Indian tributaries - 550 - but only 550 slaves.\textsuperscript{53} According to the first governor of the Chocó, Don Francisco de Ibero, the province had sufficient deposits of gold to justify employing as many as nine or ten thousand slaves, but supplies were too expensive for the miners to set up operations in that area.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720.

\textsuperscript{53} By 1729, the population of the province of Tatamá/Chocó was said to number 133 Indian tributaries, in two settlements, Chamí and San Juan. See AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Francisco de Ibero to Crown, Nóvita, 29 October 1729. According to Sharp, most of the largest cuadrillas were employed in the province of Nóvita, and although the province of Citará also contained some important mining centres and several smaller mines, the number of mines and slaves could not compare with those found in Nóvita. See Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, p.17.

\textsuperscript{54} Don Francisco de Ibero also informed the Crown of the exceptionally high cost of supplies sold in the region: "un tercio de harina cuesta cincuenta reales de a
Although the Indians of the Chocó were not systematically employed in mining, there do appear to have been cases, at least in the first two decades of the eighteenth century, in which they too were forced to work in the mines. In 1711, three Indians from the settlements of Bebará and Lloró informed the governor of Antioquia that one of the main grievances of the Citará Indians was that the teniente, Don Joseph de la Cuesta, and the corregidor of the settlement of Bebará, Manuel de Vargas, rented them out to the miners for work in the mines, without providing tools. Also, they complained that the miners paid the teniente for the Indians' labor, and that they were paid only a fraction of this amount. On the whole, however, the Indian population was utilized principally for transportation, and to provide foodstuffs and construct dwellings and canoes for the miners and the slave gangs of the region, although, as Don Francisco Alcantud y Gaona noted in 1720, "each one of the inhabitants of [the provinces] ... even if he is mestizo, mulatto, or black, believes himself to be master of these poor wretches, and

See the statements made by Esteban Fernández, Joseph Veragone, and Bonifacio Ticaina, Antioquia, 10 March 1711, in Ibid., "Cuaderno ... sobre la entrada al río Murri...", ff.55-60.
as such he treats them".\textsuperscript{56} No distinction was made between Indians. As Vicente de Aramburu complained in 1713, Indian caciques and governors were all drawn into personal service for the corregidores.\textsuperscript{57}

**Indian Resistance and Resettlement**

Several contemporary observers reported the damage done to the native population by intolerably hard work and injustice. In fact, many of the Indians of the region resisted the Spaniards' ill-treatment in ways which, at various times during the first three decades of the eighteenth century and beyond, caused them considerable concern. In 1710, Antioquia's *Protector de indios*, Rafael de Oquendo, reported that Citará Indians had been abandoning their settlements in large numbers for many years and that the number who had left was so large that the province was virtually uninhabited. And, in 1711, one Indian from Bebará, Joseph Veragone, claimed that not only had the Indians of the province been deserting their settlements for many years, but also that several *cimarronas* - illegal and unrecognized settlements - had been in existence in the region since the rebellion of the

\textsuperscript{56} AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco Alcantud y Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720.

\textsuperscript{57} AGI Santa Fe 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa Fe, 24 September 1713. It is clear that, despite the elimination of the Indian leaders after the rebellion of the 1680s, other leaders emerged to take their place. As we shall see in the next paragraphs, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Indians of the region continued to be represented by their caciques, governors, and "indios principales".
1680s. That same year, Pedro Hato de la Banda, a Spaniard who had spent the previous two years in Quibdó and Bebará, informed the governor of Antioquia, Don Joseph López de Carvajal, that "since the uprising many cimarroneras have been formed consisting of a large number of Indians".58

However, in 1710, a very serious attempt was made by the Indians of the province of Citará — represented mainly by Don Joseph Sagito, of Bebará — to negotiate with the authorities in Antioquia for relocation to a new settlement in the region of the Murri river, which, for reasons that remain unclear, was considered to fall within that gobernación’s jurisdiction.

Such negotiations became possible because, in 1708, the governor of Antioquia, Don Joseph López de Carvajal, became interested in expanding his gobernación’s mining activities to the Murri river region, in the northernmost section of Chocó territory.59 According to López de Carvajal, Antioquia’s miners no longer had any gold deposits to work, and the gobernación was in a state of

58 AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno ... sobre la entrada al río Murri...": Petición, Rafael de Oquendo, n.p., n.d., ff.24-6; Joseph Veragone’s statement, Antioquia, 10 March 1711, f.59; and Pedro Hato de la Banda’s statement, Antioquia, 14 March 1711, f.61. Although the province of Citará again appeared to be the most affected by these incidents, the problem was common to all parts of the Chocó: in 1713, for example, Vicente de Aramburu informed the Crown that many of the Noanama Indians of Nóvita — in particular those settled in San Joseph de Noanama and San Agustín — had deserted the province and retreated to the hills, away from all contact with the Spaniards. See AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa Fe, 8 September 1713.

59 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Joseph de Carvajal to Crown, Antioquia, 13 June 1708.
ruin. This interpretation of Antioquia's fortunes was the result of the considerable fluctuations which had characterized mining in the region since 1670, as measured by fundición entries. The lowest levels, of just over 4,000 pesos, were recorded in 1674 (which coincides with Juan Bueso de Valdés entrada to the Chocó). Fundición entries covering López de Carvajal's period in office - 1708 to 1713 - show fluctuations ranging from 16,000 to nearly 29,000 pesos. Entries for the following three years - 1714 to 1716 - show even lower levels of production, ranging between 9,746 to 11,448. Indeed, in 1713, López de Carvajal's successor, Don Joseph de Yarza, explained to the Crown that it was because there were no longer any gold deposits to work that the cities of the gobernación - Antioquia and Medellín in particular - were in a state of ruin, and that cities such as Zaragoza and Cáceres were too poor even to pay for the services of a parish priest.

When news of López de Carvajal's plans to conduct an entrada became known in the province of Citará, representatives of the Indian settlements travelled to Antioquia to present their grievances to the governor and

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60 The governor noted "la miseria y calamidad en que se halla dicha ciudad y la provincia a mi cargo...por no haber en dichas partes ya minerales que laborear...". See Don Joseph de Carvajal to Audiencia of Santa Fe, Antioquia, 15 May 1708, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri...", ff.1-2.

61 Twinam, Miners, Merchants and Farmers, 27-29.

62 AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Joseph de Yarza to Crown, Antioquia, 2 April 1713.
ask for his protection.\textsuperscript{63} These attempts at negotiation coincided with mass desertions in all the Indian settlements of the province of Citará. In 1710, Don Ignacio Bernardo de Quirós and Esteban Fernández both stated that only ten or twelve families remained in the settlement of Bebará, although there had previously been thirty-six or thirty-eight, and that similar desertions were occurring in the other settlements of Quibdó and Lloró. The Indians, Quirós and Fernández claimed, were leaving for the river Murri.\textsuperscript{64} Esteban Fernández further reported that every day more and more Indians were leaving to join a cimarrona located on the banks of the Sucio river, "and that also ... in many other parts ... many of which fall within the jurisdiction of this province there are other cimarronas".\textsuperscript{65}

The Indians' attempts to negotiate a relocation suited the governor of Antioquia's own plans perfectly, and his interests in the case are clear. To regain a foothold for Antioquia in a region that was clearly producing great wealth for its Spanish inhabitants, the governor intended to conduct an expedition to the area of the Murri river.

\textsuperscript{63} Although the teniente of the province of Citará, Don Joseph de la Cuesta, and many witnesses questioned on the case claimed that the Indians had been encouraged to desert their settlements by Bernardo de Salazar, a mulato from Antioquia, and Juan Montaño, also from Antioquia. See, for example, ibid., "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri...", Bebará, 5 \\& 6 December 1710, ff.43-7.

\textsuperscript{64} Bebará, 7 December 1710, and Bebará, 9 December 1710, in ibid., ff.47-9.

\textsuperscript{65} Esteban Fernández, Antioquia, 10 March 1711, ibid., f.56.
His aims were to both ascertain the nature and extent of the gold deposits existing there, and to reduce and pacify the fugitive Indians from the province of Citará. These, he hoped, would assist him in the reduction of one other Indian group, the Oromira, who were still thought to inhabit the northern stretch of the region's territory, south of the gulf of Darién.66

In earlier chapters we have seen that, in the seventeenth century, the Spaniards believed there to exist in the Chocó several large unconquered Indian groups - the Soruco, the Burgumia, the Membocana - and that, at various times, plans were made to proceed against them. No indications have been found, however, to suggest that anything came of these plans. This is also the case as far as concerns the Oromira, thought to be a very large and extremely wealthy Indian group. In 1711 it was suggested that these Indians inhabited a territory surrounded by the Cunacuna, and that this would make any attempt at conquest extremely difficult.67 It is not clear, however, whether the Oromira had been absorbed by the Cunacuna.

Nevertheless, the governor's interest in the matter of the conquest of the Oromira - and of the Indian "fugitives"

66 AGI Santa Fe 362, Joseph López de Carvajal to Crown, Antioquia, 13 June 1708; Auto, Antioquia, 2 January 1710, and Auto, Valle de Urrao, 27 September 1710, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri...", ff.11-12, 21.

67 Ibid., 24 October 1711, ff.120-1. Indeed, in 1712, it was said that despite efforts to locate the Oromira, no traces of this Indian group had been found. See AGI Santa Fe 362, Testimonio de Autos, Petición, Rafael de Oquendo, f.18.
from the province of Citará - suited the Indians, too, and served as a negotiating tool. The Indians promised to guide the governor to the settlements inhabited by the "infidel" Indians - the Oromira - as well as to a large settlement along the banks of the Sucio river which they claimed was inhabited by fugitive Indians. According to the Indian representatives of the settlement of Quibdó, more than 500 fugitive Indians then lived along the Murri river alone. Furthermore, these "offer to provide information and discover very rich mines located within the boundary of this land". According to Don Joseph Sagito, of Bebará, there were in the area "many and very rich mines some already discovered and others still to be discovered".  

In negotiating their agreement with the governor, the Indians requested that they should be allowed to remain in the Murri river area, and that they should be permitted to establish a permanent settlement there. In addition to their promise to guide the governor to places where there were Indians to reduce and gold deposits to work, the Indians committed themselves to becoming Christians, and to allow a priest to live among them to teach them Christian Doctrine. They would obey all ministers appointed to govern them, and pay their tributes.

The extent to which the Citaraes actually absorbed Christianity is a matter to which we will refer in the next  

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chapter. For the moment, the important point to make is that Indians who had fled from the Spaniards were regrouped in an area where, it was hoped, new mining camps would soon emerge. Indeed, in 1711 and 1712, Indians and governor cooperated in the process of conducting the entrada, of establishing a mining camp, San Mateo, and a settlement, Murri, in the vicinity of the Murri river, and in bringing out hundreds of fugitive Indians from small settlements scattered across a large expanse of territory stretching from the Murri to the Bojaya rivers.

López de Carvajal and the Murri River Settlement

Unlike Bueso de Valdés in the 1670s, the governor of Antioquia was virtually alone in organizing and in carrying out his expedition. He met most of the costs, and was accompanied by only two Spaniards, Don Joseph Matorel y Balvasil, a vecino of Mariquita, and the secular priest, Don Francisco Solano de Salazar Beltrán. However, again

69 The expedition left the city of Antioquia on 4 September 1711. See ibid., Don Joseph López de Carvajal to King, Antioquia, 28 April 1712.

70 AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri...", Auto, Antioquia, 21 August 1711, and 4 September 1711, ff.70-71. Although several vecinos of the gobernación of Antioquia offered to make contributions to the cost of the entrada, very few actually did so. The following list includes all those who made contributions and what these amounted to: Dr Don Nicolás Antonio del Pino y Guzmán (half the cost of the arms taken), Capitán Antonio Muriel (4 fanegas of maize), Patricio Felipe Pérez (4 pesos), Don Salvador López de Usagre (3 pesos), Martín Hidalgo (3 pesos), Antonio Angel (2 pesos). See ibid., Antioquia, 28 June 1709, ff.3-4; 15 and 17 July and 1 October 1709, ff.4-6; 18 December 1709, ff.9-10; and 28 April 1712, f.160.
unlike previous entradas to the Chocó, this expedition was led by 13 Indians, including Don Joseph Sagito. As a result, the entrada was short and extremely successful.

On 20 September 1711, the mining camp of San Mateo was founded, in the vicinity of the Murri river. By 26 September, the settlement of Murri was formally founded and a chapel was built. Between September and November, the governor's Indian allies travelled from cimarrona to cimarrona bringing out hundreds of Indians to the new settlement of Murri and, on occasion, the governor himself was led to the places where fugitive Indian resided. By mid-November, 205 Indians had gathered in the new settlement. The census taken of the Indian settlers shows that they originated from all three towns of the province: of the total 205 Indians, 68 came from Bebará, 93 from Quibdó, and 42 from Lloró. 142 of the total 205 were women and children, but of the 56 men who were questioned about their origin and about the length of time they had been living in the cimarrona, 33 claimed to have left their settlements within the previous year. The fact that such a large proportion of this group of Indians had only recently left their settlements supports the oidor Aramburu's claim that Manuel de Vargas, corregidor of

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71 See ibid., 4 September 1711, f. 71; 21 September 1711, ff. 78-9; 26 September 1711, f. 94; 28 September 1711, f. 95; 1 October 1711, f. 103, and 12 November 1711, ff. 124-7.

72 Ibid., 1 October 1711, ff. 97-102; 9 October 1711, ff. 114-15; 24 October 1711, ff. 119-20; and 12 November 1711, ff. 127-8.
Bebará, was the immediate cause of the Indians' flight, and that it was his imprisonment and harsh punishment of Don Joseph Sagito that sparked their defiance.\(^7^3\)

According to the Franciscan doctrinero of the settlement of Bebará, Fray Joseph Forero, the establishment of the new settlement of Murri led an even larger number of Indians to abandon the province of Citará. The Franciscan claimed that Indians from Bebará, Quibdó, and Lloró left their settlements and moved to the Murri pretending to be part of the first group of fugitives, in order to receive the governor of Antioquia's protection. Indeed, Fray Joseph claimed that the Indians already settled in the Murri river actually sent messengers to the province of Citará to encourage the others to follow suit.\(^7^4\)

The mass desertions coincided with the oidor Vicente de Aramburu's visit to the Chocó. By mid-June 1712, the oidor claimed that only three Indians then remained in Bebará - Miguel Mateaso, Pablo Chever, and Juan Bosoro. Aramburu in fact attempted to attract the Indians back to their settlements with a promise to end the ill-treatment suffered by the native population, the personal service demanded of them by corregidores and tenientes, and to ensure that they should be allowed sufficient time to

\(^7^3\) AGI Santa Fe 362, Testimonio de Autos, Quibdó, 16 June 1712, f.12. Others also claimed that the immediate cause of the Indians' desertion was the punishment meted out to Don Joseph Sagito. See, for example, AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri...", Petición, ff.24-8.

\(^7^4\) Ibid., Antioquia, 5 January 1712, ff.148-9.
cultivate their fields and the freedom to work for whosoever they chose. Furthermore, he promised that the post of corregidor would be eliminated - Manuel de Vargas was to be imprisoned and sent back to Santa Fe - and that the Indians would be allowed to appoint their own caciques, governors, alcaldes, and capitanes. Clearly sympathetic to the Indians' plight, Aramburu was extremely concerned about the future of the province of Citará. His attempt, however, was said to have caused the Indians of Murri some disquiet and that they had absolutely refused to return.

Despite the promises of the oidor and the protestations of the teniente of the province of Citará and the governor of Popayán - both of whom demanded that the governor assist them in returning the fugitive Indians to their places of origin - the governor of Antioquia used the Indians' grievances as a way of attacking the gobernación of Popayán's record in the Chocó and justifying the relocation of the Indians to the Murri river. While the Indians' complaints served as one justification for the relocation, and the prospect of the discovery of new gold deposits and unconquered Indian groups as another, the governor argued that there was a third reason why the new settlement should be maintained. López de Carvajal argued

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75 Quibdó, 16 June 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 362, Testimonio de Autos (Rafael de Oquendo), ff.12-14.


77 See, for example, Quibdó, 15 February 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri...", f.38.
that the Murri river was a better location for a settlement because it was closer to the mouth of the Atrato river and would serve better as a defence against enemy incursions into interior New Granada. Possible enemy incursions had become a cause of concern for the Spanish authorities. It was said that, in 1703, 300 English had penetrated the Chocó region through the Atrato, and that they had reached the settlement of Bebará, from whence they intended to proceed to the province of Antioquia. On this occasion, they were prevented from doing so by the Citará Indians, who attacked and defeated them.78 But while these were issues which served to justify the choice of the location for the new settlement of Murri, it is clear that Governor López de Carvajal was principally concerned with preventing the Indians' return to the province of Citará because, without them, the discovery of new gold deposits and unconquered Indian groups would cease.79

Over the following year, the number of Indians settled in Murri increased steadily. A proportion of those Indians brought out of the cimarronas had in fact been living - as many of the Chocó's Spanish inhabitants claimed - in that part of the Chocó for a considerable time. In May 1712, 13 Indians joined the new settlement in Murri. At least 11 of these were fugitives from the settlement of Quibdó. Three

78 Ibid., Río de Murri, 13 November 1711, f.129. See also AGI Quito 143, Vicente de Aramburu to Crown, Santa Fe, 8 September 1713.

79 Auto, Antioquia, 13 August 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 362, Testimonio de Autos, f.22.
were children who must have been born in the cimarrona, and, of the other 10, 7 had been living there for 10 years, and one for 8 years.\textsuperscript{80} Between July and September 1713, 50 more Indians moved to Murri. 36 of these were women and children, but, of the 14 men who were questioned about their origin, two - aged 25 and 26 - claimed to have been born in the cimarrona and to have lived there always. Two of the other twelve had been living in the region between 10 and 12 years, 3 had been there for 8 years, and another 3 had been there for 4 years. 10 of the 12 men came from the settlements of Quibdó and Bebará, and one came from Tadó, in the province of Noanama.\textsuperscript{81} In October, 1713, Governor López de Carvajal informed the King that approximately 500 Indians were then living in the new settlement of Murri, and that a large proportion of these were Indians who had never before seen white men, having been born in the cimarronas.

The subsequent history of Murri is obscure. In 1719, the Council of the Indies decided to support López de Carvajal’s efforts and encourage him to continue with his activities in the Murri river region,\textsuperscript{82} despite the fact that he no longer served as governor of Antioquia. In 1713, López de Carvajal had been replaced by Don Joseph de

\textsuperscript{80} Discreción de los indios, 28 May 1712, in ibid., f.6.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., Lista, Discreción y Matrícula de los indios..., 16 July 1713, and 23 September 1713.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., Joseph López de Carvajal to Crown, 1 October 1713, and decision of the fiscal and the Council of the Indies, Madrid, 16 August 1719.
Yarza, who claimed that the promised new sources of gold in the vicinity of the Murri river had never actually materialized and that the gobernación had not benefitted from the relocation of the Indians to the Murri river.83

Although the settlement of Murri did survive, it appears that most of the Indians from Murri were taken back to the province of Citará before the end of the decade. In 1729, the first governor of the Chocó, Don Francisco de Ibero, reported that the province of Citará had an Indian tributary population of 550, distributed between the five settlements of Quibdó, Lloró, Beté, Bebará, and San Joseph de Bojaya. Given that, in 1712, Aramburu reported that only three Indians remained in Bebará, and the censuses taken in Murri show that many of the Indians in the cimarronas also came from Quibdó and Lloró, those 550 tributaries must have been the same Indians who had fled northwards in the 1710s.84 What is also certain is that Murri proved not to be as profitable as López de Carvajal had anticipated. In 1782, the total Indian population of Murri amounted to no more than 279, as compared with 1,533 in Quibdó, 1,119 in Lloró, and a total for the province of Citará of 4,545. Even more significant is the size of the slave population of Murri: in 1782, only 20 lived in the settlement. This figure compares with a slave population

83 AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Joseph de Yarza to Crown, Antioquia, 2 April 1713.
84 Quibdó, 16 June 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 362, Testimonio de Autos (Rafael de Oquendo), ff.12-14, and AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Francisco de Ibero to Crown, Nóvita, 29 October 1729.
of 818 in Quibdó, 609 in Bebará, and a total for the province of 2,156.\textsuperscript{85}

While the Indians who escaped to Murri in the decade of the 1710s might have been forced back to their original settlements, the problem of Indian flight did not end with this incident. In 1723, 12 years after the Indians first requested the governor’s protection, the bishop of Popayán advised the King that the extortions, ill-treatment, and injustice suffered by the Indians led them to flee their towns and return to the hills. On this occasion, the bishop referred to the case of the corregidor of Noanama, one Don Francisco Laja, who kept the Indians continuously at work on his fields, which were said to be very extensive, and thereby prevented the Indians from cultivating their own plots.\textsuperscript{86} The effects of his actions were clear: Noanama had 148 tributary Indians when the last priest arrived to take charge of the settlement, but by 1723, only 60 remained.\textsuperscript{87} In 1730, the Franciscan Father Provincial reported, after having visited the Chocó, that the ill-treatment accorded the Indian population of the settlement of Mombú - which amounted by that year to no more than 12 tributaries - had led them all to abandon the

\textsuperscript{85} Sharp, \textit{Slavery on the Spanish Frontier}, Tables 4, 5, 6, & 7, pp.197-99.

\textsuperscript{86} AGI Quito 185, Bishop Juan Gómez Frías to Crown, Popayán, 6 November 1723.

settlement. No Indians then remained in Mombú. In 1737, Bishop Diego Fermín de Vergara informed the Crown that, oppressed and over-worked, the Indians continued to retreat from their towns, losing the King his vassals and his tributes, and losing the Indians their souls. And, in 1751, Don Miguel de Santisteban, who reported on Viceroy Eslava's term of office, referred to the "excessive number of Indians" who had, in 1743, been brought out from the cimarronas, where some had been living for twenty years. Despite the efforts of the teniente of the province of Citará on that occasion, by 1744, many had again fled from their settlements. The governor of the Chocó, Don Bartolomé de Montes, was ordered to ensure their return: 342 Indians, of all ages, were subsequently transferred back to the settlements of the province of Citará.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the problem of Indian flight had forced the Spanish authorities, on at least two occasions, actually to found new settlements to accommodate Indians who had fled from their own towns. An anonymous Descripción of 1777, for instance, noted the recent foundation of a town in the vicinity of the Sucio river, for the specific purpose of settling the Indians of

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88 Arcila Robledo (ed.), "Representación hecha por...Fr. Dionisio de Camino...", op.cit., p.243.

89 AGI Quito 185, Diego Fermín de Vergara to Crown, Popayán, 1 December 1737.

90 "Relación sobre el gobierno del virrey Eslava", Santa Fe, 1 October 1747, in Posada & Ibáñez, Relaciones de Mando, pp.30-31.
the cimmaronas located in that area. In 1780, Don Juan Jiménez Donoso referred to the settlement of Pabarandó, which had also been created for the purpose of settling the Indian "fugitives" of the vicinity. The settlement of Cupica had been founded for the same reason. Even these measures failed to stop the problem. By 1789, Francisco Silvestre was reporting the Indians' continuing tendency to retreat to the hills. Indeed, according to Silvestre, it was to the Indian retreats that the corregidores travelled when they needed to employ the Indians or collect their tributes.

Abortive Attempts at Reform

The Indians' mass desertion of the province of Citará at the beginning of the eighteenth century made no long-term impact on the authorities in the Chocó and had no effect on their treatment. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, in the early 1720s, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona and Don Antonio de la Pedrosa both reported that the system of administration introduced in the Chocó was corrupt, and that the Indians - as well as the royal

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93 Francisco Silvestre, Descripción del Reyno de Santa Fe de Bogotá (Bogotá, 1968), p.42.
treasury - suffered as a result. Pedrosa had attempted to introduce some changes into the way the Chocó was administered. As part of his campaign to reform the most obviously inefficient aspects of royal administration in the colony, in this case the corruption of local officials, Pedrosa y Guerrero appointed a superintendente to the Chocó. Under the terms of this measure, the governor of Popayán formally retained his jurisdiction over all four of the region’s provinces, which meant that, with the exception of the superintendente, the governor retained his right to make and confirm all other appointments. The superintendente, however, was to be independent of the governor and answerable only to Santa Fe. His principal duties were to collect tributes and taxes, to ensure that no illegal commerce was conducted via the San Juan and Atrato rivers, and to prevent the ill-treatment of the native population and their employment in the service of the secular authorities.

Despite the continued complaints of royal officials and the bishop of Popayán, the Crown issued a royal cédula, in June 1721, revoking Pedrosa y Guerrero’s measure and confirming the governor of Popayán’s jurisdiction in all

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94 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1720, and Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721. See also AGI Santa Fe 693, "Nombramiento de Superintendente del Chocó...", ff.2-4.

95 AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana, Madrid, 8 March 1721.

96 AGI Santa Fe 693, "Nombramiento de Superintendente del Chocó...", f.6.
matters in the Chocó. Nevertheless, by the mid-1720s, the Crown decided to take seriously the advice and recommendations of its officials - in particular Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero - that the Chocó region should be separated from the gobernación of Popayán. By royal cédula of 28 September 1726, the Chocó was segregated from the gobernación and a governor, Don Francisco de Ibero, was appointed. Ibero took up his post in January 1729.

Significantly, the creation of the post of superintendente made little difference to the way the Chocó was effectively administered. The collection of royal taxes did improve: Fray Manuel Caicedo noted, in 1724, that quinto revenues had risen and information on gold declared also shows an increase in the years following this appointment. Between 1720 and 1748, an average of some 80,000 gold pesos were registered annually in Nóvita and

97 In May 1723, Viceroy Villalonga wrote to the King informing him that the had suspended the implementation of the cédula because, since the post of superintendente had been created, the Chocó had made significant contributions to the royal treasury. In 1724, however, the Council of the Indies decided to uphold the previous decision. See AGI Santa Fe 362, Viceroy Villalonga to Crown, 19 May 1723. The Council's decision is dated Madrid, 8 March 1724.

98 See, for example, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa's and Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona's letters, and Fray Manuel Caicedo's report, op.cit.


100 See AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Francisco de Ibero to King, Nóvita, 29 October 1729.

Citará. Furthermore, the participation of Anserma and Popayán in total quinto revenues, and in the minting of gold in the Casa de Moneda of Santa Fe, increased markedly.\(^{102}\)

However, this appointment did not lead to the elimination of the tenientes. Instead, tenientes and superintendentes continued to coexist side by side. In 1720, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona observed that the superintendentes had in fact been empowered to appoint their own tenientes, and that, because the post of superintendente was also unpaid, the measure had effectively only prevented the governor of Popayán from profiting from the sale of the tenencias, leaving the superintendente to do so in his place.\(^{103}\) In addition, all attempts to prevent the inhabitants of the Chocó introducing goods illegally through the Atrato and San Juan rivers appear to have failed miserably. As William Sharp observed, the sheer repetition of cédulas issued to prohibit navigation of these rivers (1730, 1733, 1734, and 1736) suggests problem of enforcement.\(^{104}\) Indeed, in 1758,

\(^{102}\) Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, p.328.

\(^{103}\) AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to Crown, Cartagena, 15 November 1729. It is not clear whether this was a paid post: under the terms of the appointment, the superintendente was to receive the salary previously paid to the corregidores and tenientes. Since these two were not paid posts, it is possible that the superintendente did not receive a salary either. See AGI Santa Fe 693, "Nombramiento de Superintendente del Chocó...", op.cit., f.5.

\(^{104}\) Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, p.10.
the city of Buga informed the Crown that the trade which the city had had with the Chocó region ever since its first discovery had virtually ceased, because whatever goods were needed in the provinces of Raposo, Nóvita, and Citará were supplied by vessels entering the San Juan river from the port of Buenaventura. This, the city of Buga claimed, would ruin not only that city, but also those of the entire gobernación of Popayán.105

While the separation of the Chocó from Popayán and the appointment of a governor may have eliminated the problem of the Chocó being governed by an unsalaried official, it did not improve the quality of the region's administration. Indeed, the old system of administration remained virtually intact. When he arrived in Nóvita in January 1729, the governor, Don Francisco de Ibero, proceeded to appoint his own tenientes and, of course, corregidores.106 Indeed, in 1730, the oidor of the Audiencia, Martínez Malo, actually dismissed the first governor of the Chocó, Don Francisco de Ibero, for complicity with the contrabandists.107 Furthermore, there are indications that the corregidores, at least, continued to pay for the privilege of occupying the post. In 1730, Fray Dionisio de Camino reported that although the settlement of Bebará was composed of only

105 AGI Quito 139, City of Buga to Crown, Buga, 20 January 1758.

106 AGI Santa Fe 307, Don Francisco de Ibero to Crown, Nóvita, 29 October 1729.

107 Colmenares, Historia Económica y Social de Colombia, p.331.
twenty tributaries, the corregimiento had recently been sold for 500 pesos; the corregimiento of Beté, composed of 43 tributaries, had been sold for 800 pesos; the corregimiento of Bojaya had gone for 700 pesos; and that of Chamí, for more than 1,000. This amounted, the Franciscan argued, to the formal sale of the town and its Indians.¹⁰⁸

Later documents show that both tenientes and corregidores continued to enjoy the fruits of the Indians labour well into the 1740s, and that their presence in the Indian settlements continued to be a main source of grievance to both the Chocó's native inhabitants and, sometimes, to the clergy. In 1749, the doctrinero of the settlement of Murri, Fray Juan Joseph de Salazar, informed Viceroy Eslava that, despite the fact that the protection of the Indians and their instruction in the Catholic Faith was his first obligation, he was unable to carry out his duties because the corregidor kept the Indians continuously at work in sowing maize and constructing canoes, which resulted in the Indians frequently being absent from the town and thus unable to achieve any progress in their instruction. Salazar demanded prompt and effective measures to prevent the absence of, and moderate the work imposed on, the Indian population of Murri, and guidelines for the corregidor, the teniente, and other officials regarding when and how they could employ the Indians. He also demanded that they should be ordered to pay the

¹⁰⁸ Arcila Robledo (ed.), "Representación hecha por...Fr. Dionisio de Camino...", p.247.
Indians in full for their work. Significantly, Salazar reported that there were many fugitive Indians in the region who had threatened to found a new settlement on the banks of the river Giguamiando, which, the Franciscan believed, would set a bad example for other Indians to follow, and lead, in a very short time, to the complete depopulation of all the towns of the province.  

The Viceroy's decision on the matter is very significant, not for its content, since he merely ordered that the corregidor of Murri was not to deprive the Indians of time to cultivate their fields and that he was not to employ them in his own fields, but because it was addressed to the teniente de gobernador - the only change in the administration of the region was that these tenientes were now deputies of the governor of the Chocó rather than of the governor of Popayán. It is also significant that, despite Indian protestations, in the 1710s, about the ill-treatment they received from the Franciscan doctrineros, and their refusal to return to their settlements while the Franciscans remained there, it was yet another Franciscan who administered Murri in the late 1740s. Although Fray Juan Joseph de Salazar undoubtedly appeared concerned about the welfare of the Indians in his charge, his presence raises important questions about the influence exercised by the Franciscans in the Chocó in the early eighteenth  

109 AGI Santa Fe 290, Testimonio de la instancia movida en el Tribunal del Superior Gobierno del...Virrey de este Reino, por el R.P.Fray Juan Joseph de Salazar...". 
century, and about why they remained there despite continued complaints, from the Indians, from other Spaniards, and even from the diocesan bishops, about their conduct and behaviour. These questions will be addressed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7
REGULAR-SECULAR CONFLICT IN
THE CHOCO

In 1736, Diego Fermín de Vergara, bishop of Popayán, arrived in the Chocó on the first leg of a pastoral visit that was to take him across a large part of his diocese.¹ Like all pastoral visits conducted by bishops - or by the visitadores they appointed² - the purpose of this one was to inspect the state of the parishes of the diocese, focusing specifically on the performance of the clergy, the

¹ No information has been found to indicate the precise extension of the diocese of Popayán. However, it appears that, at the time the bishopric was erected in 1546, its boundaries corresponded almost exactly to those of the gobernación of Popayán: only Pasto, Chapanchica, and Agreda fell within the jurisdiction of the bishop of Quito. The region northward to Antioquia also formed part of the diocese of Popayán. When Antioquia was separated politically from Popayán in 1576, most of the new gobernación - with the exception of six parishes - remained part of the diocese of Popayán, until a new bishop was appointed for Antioquia at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Chocó region was also included within the boundaries of the diocese, although Barbacoas fell within the jurisdiction of the bishop of Quito. See "Informe del Virrey Espeleta al Gobierno real de la Península, sobre la necesidad de la creación de un obispado en la Provincia de Antioquia", Antioquia Histórica, Nos.27-31 (1929), pp.462-467; and "Relación de Fray Gerónimo Descobar", in Jijón y Caamaño, Sebastián de Benalázar, pp.149-76. See also B.M. Ms Add. 15,740, "Descripción Histórica Geográfica Política Eclesiástica y Militar de la América Meridional...1796".

² For a discussion of the authority and duties of the bishops and of the apparatus of ecclesiastical government over which they presided, see Marzahl, Town in the Empire, pp.137-41.
state of the churches, and, in the case of the Chocó, on how far the clergy had progressed in converting the native population to the Christian faith.³

The bishop’s report on the Chocó region was very critical. The Indian inhabitants were as "Heathen" as they had been before their conquest. They neither confessed, nor received Communion, and were extremely ignorant of Christian Doctrine. The churches were also in a very sorry state. The church of Nóvita - the principal town of the province and residence of the governor - was infested with snakes, frogs, and other "filthy creatures", and, since it served to house the animals brought in by the merchants who travelled to the region, it was no more decent than a "cattlepen". The church of Noanama and its annexe San Agustín was made of straw and reeds, and contained little more than one paper image of a saint. The church of Los Brazos was as "indecent" as the others, while in El Cajón a hut served as chapel, and in Író there was no church.⁴

Some of the settlements of the Chocó region were, in the 1730s, administered by the secular clergy. As we saw in Chapter 3, on arriving in the region in the 1670s, the

³ The bishop prepared a report on each of the parishes inspected during his pastoral visit. All of these can be found in AGI Quito 185.

⁴ Ibid., Diego Fermín de Vergara to Miguel de Villanueva, Medellín, 30 February 1737; Diego Fermín de Vergara to Crown, Popayán, 1 December 1737; and "Certificación de la visita de Nóvita". The bishop’s comments on the state of the churches has to be put in the context of the lack of any attempt, on the part of the Spaniards, to foster the development of the region. See, for example, Martínez Malo’s observations on Nóvita, cited in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
Franciscans took control of only the two provinces of Tatamá/Chocó and Citará, Noanama perhaps being left for the secular clergy who had already established a presence there and for the Jesuits, who did not abandon the Noanama region until 1689. Thus, the settlements whose churches the bishop found so appalling in the 1730s - all of which formed part of the province which by that time had become known by the name of Nôvita - were controlled by seculars: in 1720, Joseph Joaquín Hurtado del Aguila and Melchor Jacinto de Arboleda Salazar served as priests of Los Brazos and San Joseph de Noanama, respectively. Iró was administered by the secular priest Nicolás de Inestrosa, who was replaced, in the mid-1730s, by another secular, Agustín Roso de Villalba, although the secular clergy's control of this parish was hotly disputed by the regulars. In the mid-1720s, the Franciscans administered only one of the settlements of the province of Nôvita - Tadó - but

5 See Chapter 3.

6 AGI Quito 185, "Informe del cura de Nôvita", in "Autos sobre la opresión en que tienen los jueces seculars a los Yndios de las Provincias del Chocó, que por testimonio se remite al Real y Supremo Consejo de las Indias por el Obispo de Popayán. Año de 1720".

7 AGI Quito 144, Nicolás de Inestrosa to Crown, n.p., n.d. This letter was discussed by the Consejo in October 1731. See also AGI Santa Fe 406, Agustín Roso de Villalba to Crown, n.p., n.d., and AGI Santa Fe 408, Fray Joseph Antonio de Oliva to Crown, n.p., n.d. Later in this chapter we will look closely at the dispute between seculars and regulars over control of the mining camps of Iró and Mungarra.

8 The Franciscans administered this settlement because, in the seventeenth century, Tadó had formed part of the province of Tatamá/Chocó.
they controlled all the settlements of the other two provinces: Franciscans served as doctrineros of Quibdó, Lloró, Beté, Bebará, and Bojaya, in the province of Citará; and Chamí, San Juan de Aguita, and Mombú, in the province of Tatamá/Chocó. By the mid-1730s, the order had also taken control of the new settlement of Murri, composed, in 1736, of some sixty to seventy Indians. And, after a lengthy dispute with the secular church, the order also retained the right to present a priest for a new parish established in Citará for the whites, blacks, mestizos, and mulattoes of the region.

Despite the fact that secular clerics served as priests of some of the region’s settlements, Bishop Diego Fermín de Vergara - a member of the Augustinian order - was especially critical of the Franciscans. In this, he was following the example set by the previous bishop of Popayán, Juan Gómez Frías, a secular, who had repeatedly clashed with the Franciscan order. Several factors

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9 See Fray Domingo Calderón’s statement, Quibdó, 26 October 1736, in AGI Quito 185, "Testimonio de la visita del Citará".

10 AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Dionisio de Camino to Crown, n.p., n.d. The Consejo discussed this letter in May 1727.

11 Bueno y Quijano, Historia de la diócesis de Popayán, p.158.

12 Three other bishops were appointed to the diocese of Popayán between Juan Gómez Frías and Diego Fermín de Vergara, but none of these ever arrived in Popayán. It is not clear why Juan de Lacieca Alvarado, bishop of Tucumán, did not take possession of the diocese, but both Fray Francisco de la Trinidad Arrieta and Don Manuel Antonio Gómez de Silva died before they did so. See ibid., pp.157-8.
contributed to the bad reputation of the Franciscans in the Chocó: they were said to have been unsuccessful in their duty to convert the Indian population, they were accused of corruption, and they were also said to have been the cause of very grave scandals within the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe.\[^{13}\] Thus, this chapter will examine the allegations made against the order, focusing specifically on the extent to which the native population had absorbed Christian practices by the beginning of the eighteenth century, on the activities of Franciscan doctrineros in the region, and on the reasons why the order became divided over the problem of the Chocó mission. Where possible, we will also consider the activities of the secular clergy, whose performance appears to have differed little from that of their regular counterparts: the results of the evangelization effort in Nóvita were as poor as those in the Franciscan provinces of Citará and Tatamá/Chocó, and some of the allegations made against the Franciscan doctrineros could equally have applied to the secular clergy.

Against the background of a comparison between the activities of regular and secular clergy in the Chocó, this chapter will also attempt to ascertain the real causes of the conflict which arose in the 1720s between Bishop Juan Gómez Frías and the Franciscan order. We will see that, in

\[^{13}\] See, for example, AGI Quito 185, Diego Fermín de Vergara to Miguel de Villanueva, Medellín, 30 February 1737, and Diego Fermín de Vergara to Crown, Popayán, 1 December 1737.
the same way that the Crown's senior officials in the colony sought to increase royal control over the region's political administration in this period, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, represented by the bishop, sought to increase its authority over the religious administration of the region. The independence of the Franciscans was a major obstacle to the achievement of this aim. However, as the conclusion of this chapter will show, because the secular and ecclesiastical authorities failed to agree on this course of action, the bishops' efforts met with no success.

Of course, the conflict between Bishop Juan Gómez Frías, in particular, and the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe has to be considered in the context of a trend, evident in many parts of Spanish America during the first half of the eighteenth century, whereby the diocesan bishops attempted to challenge the autonomy and independence of the regular orders in the doctrinas they administered.  
Partly for this reason, and partly because of the conflicting reports reaching Spain about the activities and integrity of the Franciscans in the Chocó, it is virtually impossible to determine the veracity of the allegations made against them. However, the analysis of events in the Chocó during this period, for which we will focus principally on the dispute between the Franciscans and

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Bishop Gómez Frías, highlights not only how unsuccessful the regulars had been in their efforts to convert the native population of the region, and the concerns which had arisen in the order regarding the conduct of its members in the Chocó, but also the methods which bishops in Spanish America could employ to discredit the regular orders in Spain and curtail their influence in the colonies.

Christanity and the Indian Population

The Chocó Indians' ignorance of even the most basic rudiments of Catholicism attracted the attention of many observers from the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1700, the bishop of Popayán, Fray Mateo de Villafañe, wrote to the Comisario of the Franciscan Order in Perú, Father Miguel Mora, to complain about the lack of religious instruction being provided to the Indians by the missionaries.15 In 1711, the secular priest Don Francisco Solano de Salazar, who accompanied Governor López de Carvajal's first expedition to the Murri river, observed of the Citaraes that

...having examined ... [those] who are presently settled on the banks of the Murri river, from the cacique down, I have found that neither the cacique nor the other Indian men, women, or chusma have been educated in Christian Doctrine nor instructed in the principal mysteries of our Holy Catholic Faith [to the extent that] they do not know how to cross themselves and much less

15 Pacheco, La Iglesia Bajo el Regalismo de los Borbones, pp.357-8.
their daily prayers ... many children have not been baptized and I have found that many are married according to their old customs ... believing the women to be their legitimate wives without need for further ceremony.'

Other witnesses testifying in the case of the Citaráes' resettlement in Murri voiced similar views. According to Lorenzo de Salazar, "the Indians of the ... province do not attend Doctrine continuously ... for none know their daily prayers". Of course, López de Carvajal was preparing a case against both the secular authorities of the gobernación of Popayán and the regular clergy to justify his decision to offer protection to the Citará Indians of Murri. But the conclusions of the antioqueño priest, Solano de Salazar, regarding the Citaráes' lack of knowledge of Christianity were echoed by the governor of Popayán in referring to the Noanama Indians of the province of Nóvita: in 1729, the

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16 Murri River, 1 October 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", ff.95-6. According to Isacsson, the presence of Indians referred to as caciques by the beginning of the eighteenth century can be explained by the fact that the Spaniards had, after the rebellion of 1684 had been put down, created hereditary cacicazgos to reward the Indians who had remained loyal to the Spanish. See Isacsson, "Emberá", p.31.

17 Real de minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, in ibid., f.85. See also AGI Santa Fe 362, Joseph López de Carvajal to Crown, Antioquia, 28 April 1712.

18 In 1713, López de Carvajal appointed the secular priest Gregorio de Salazar y Santillana to administer the new settlement of Murri, but he was concerned that others (meaning the Franciscans) would demand to take control of the settlement as soon as maize fields were planted and gold deposits began to be mined. See ibid., Joseph López de Carvajal to Crown, n.p., 1 October 1713.
governor informed the Crown of his distress at finding that the vast majority of the Indians of Nóvita had no knowledge whatsoever of the Christian faith.\textsuperscript{19} So, too, were they confirmed by the Franciscan Father Provincial, speaking on behalf of the Franciscans of Citará and Tatamá/Chocó. In 1730, Fray Dionisio de Camino informed the \textit{oidor} Martínez Malo that, despite the many years that had passed since their reduction, the Indians of this region continued to practice many of their old customs, and that the teachings of the missionaries had been insufficient to implant Catholic practices among them. Indian "sorcerers" continued to influence the lives of ordinary Indians, preaching against the beliefs of the Christians which, they claimed, served only to turn Indians into slaves. Fray Dionisio asserted that, for instance, the Indians did their utmost to avoid Confession, believing that it would lead to their death. When they were sick, they turned for assistance to their own "medicine men", and when they died, their families buried them with their tools and other belongings, for these were believed to be necessary for cultivating the bountiful land awaiting them in the afterlife.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} AGI Quito 137, Governor of Popayán to Crown, Popayán, 26 August 1729. The Governor claimed, however, that this deficiency was particularly marked in the parishes administered by the secular clergy.

Several factors were said by the clergy to have contributed to the poor results of the missionary effort, among which one of the most important was the resistance of the native population to Christian beliefs. Indian religious practices in the Chocó did not coexist alongside Catholic ones: the observations made by the Jesuit Antonio Marzal in the late 1670s could well have applied to the Indians inhabiting the region in the first half of the eighteenth century. In 1678, Marzal reported to his Father Visitor that despite all his efforts among the Chocó, he had concluded that there was little point in attempting to instruct even the Indian children in the Christian faith, for their elders - at their "meetings of elders or drinking sessions" - undid all the missionary's teaching. Throughout the first four decades of the eighteenth century, both regular and secular clergy repeatedly emphasized how important a factor the Indians' resistance was to the lack of success of any form of Christian instruction. When, in the early 1710s, the Citaraes fled en masse from their settlements, the Franciscan doctrinero of Bebará, Fray Joseph Forero, informed the governor of Antioquia that the only purpose of the Indians in fleeing was "to retire from and refuse the teaching of ... Christian Doctrine...". In 1720, Francisco Marquez de

21 Father Antonio Marzal, "Informe sobre el Chocó", in Pacheco, Juan Manuel, Los Jesuitas, p.502.

22 Antioquia, 5 January 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno sobre la entrada al río Murri...y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", ff.148-49.
Ayala reported that the Indians' resistance to Christianity manifested itself in the dislike they showed when attending instruction in Christian Doctrine. That same year, the two secular priests Joseph Joaquín Hurtado del Aguila and Melchor Jacinto de Arboleda Salazar also referred to the Indians' attitudes: they were not only "incredulous" and very "far from God", but also "very hostile" to Christianity. In 1730, the Franciscan Provincial, Fray Dionisio de Camino, informed Martínez Malo that the Indians' hostility was such that the boys even celebrated reaching the age of becoming tributaries because that status absolved them of attending the teaching of Doctrine - the education of the children being the main responsibility of the Chocó's clergy. And, in 1736, the doctrinero of El Raposo claimed that the Indians actually preferred to be employed by the corregidores than to remain in the settlements subject to religious education.

While Indian resistance to Christianity served as one justification for the clergy's poor performance, the independence and power of the corregidores served as another. Thus, the clergy argued, their own shortcomings

23 Popayán, 9 July 1720, in AGI Quito 185, "Autos sobre la opresión...". Francisco Marquez de Ayala took part in the visita conducted by Inestrosa and Abastos y Castro.

24 "Informe del cura de Nóvita", ibid..

25 Arcila Robledo (ed.), "Representación hecha por...Fr. Dionisio de Camino...", pp.245-7.

26 AGI Quito 185, "Certificación de la visita de Nóvita".
were not the result of lack of effort, but of the control exercised by these officials over the native population. In 1730, the Franciscan Provincial, Fray Dionisio de Camino, reported in support of the members of his order that, because the corregidores had to pay such large sums of money to buy their posts, they had no alternative but to keep the Indians employed throughout the year: no profits would be made if the Indians were allowed to behave like Catholics, instead of slaves. Because the Indians were continuously employed in other activities, they did not have the time to be instructed in Christian Doctrine. The priests had no power to challenge the corregidores: if they objected to the situation, they were told their authority did not extend beyond the church. But this authority, too, was undermined by the corregidores, because even the children could be taken away from the priests' care when they were required to tend to the maize fields. Furthermore, the Provincial added, since it was in the church that the corregidores distributed jobs among the Indians, it was not surprising that these avoided it at all costs.27

27 Arcila Robledo (ed.), "Representación hecha por...Fr. Dionisio de Camino...", pp.242-3, 247-8. A similar allegation about the corregidores was made by Lorenzo de Salazar in 1711: he informed López de Carvajal that the Indians "are not free [even on] feast days for the church only serves [for them to be] to take out of it and taken to the house of the teniente or corregidor from which they are hired....". See AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, f.83.
The secular clergy, too, supported the claims of the Franciscans. In 1720, Joseph Hurtado del Aguila and Melchor de Arboleda Salazar informed the bishop of Popayán that, with the exception of the Indian children, they had no authority over the native population beyond the doors of the church. Arboleda Salazar further reported that his attempts to force the secular authorities to bring the Indians out from their retreats, and subject them to the settlements where they might be instructed in the Catholic Faith, had been unsuccessful.  

Subsequent bishops of Popayán - from Juan Gómez Frías' predecessor, Fray Mateo de Villafañe, to Diego Fermín de Vergara's successor, Don Francisco de Figueredo y Victoria - recognized that the way in which the region was administered militated against the success of the evangelization effort. In 1720, for instance, Bishop Juan Gómez Frías informed the Crown that because the corregidores kept the Indians continuously employed in transportation duties, they were denied the time to attend Church, learn Christian Doctrine, and be instructed by the priests. This, the bishop argued, was why the Indians remained ignorant of the mysteries of the Catholic Faith. In 1736, Bishop Diego Fermín de Vergara also recognized

28 AGI Quito 185, "Informe del cura de Nóvita", in "Autos sobre la opresión...". See also "Informe del cura de Quibdó" and "Informe del cura de Lloró", ibid.

29 See ibid., Fray Mateo de Villafañe to Crown, Popayán, 7 June 1701, and Auto, Don Francisco Joseph de Figueredo y Victoria, Nóvita, 12 September 1742.

30 Ibid., Auto, Popayán, 8 July 1720.
that the secular authorities were at least partly responsible for the disappointing state of affairs in the Chocó. He, too, reported that as the Indians were continuously occupied in transporting goods for the corregidores and the governor - the appointment of a governor having made little difference to the way the region was administered - the Indians neither attended Mass nor carried out their duties as Christians. Indeed, the bishop called the corregidores "great thieves", whose houses were like warehouses stocked full of "rotten clothing" and other "ridiculous goods" with which they claimed to pay the Indians.31

The Franciscan Missionaries and the Secular Clergy

There was one other factor which many observers, including the Indians, believed contributed to the native inhabitants' reluctance to accept the teachings of the clergy. In general terms, it was said that the endeavours of the Franciscan clergy had been unsuccessful because they exploited the Indians, failed to administer the Sacraments to them, and in fact forced them to escape to the hills and to die without receiving a single Sacrament.32 In 1712, Rafael de Oquendo informed the Crown of the "abhorrence and

31 Ibid., Diego Fermín de Vergara to Crown, Popayán, 1 December 1737.

32 These were the allegations which the Franciscan Fray Francisco Seco claimed were made against his order. See AGI Santa Fe 404, Fray Francisco Seco to Crown, n.p., n.d., but dated by the Consejo de Indias in February 1724.
hate ... felt by the Indians towards the regular priests, because the ill-treatment they receive from these is outrageous.". For their part, the Indians of Bebará, represented by the Indian Don Joseph Sagito, claimed of the Franciscans that "preferring ... their own business than the teaching of Doctrine ... they only attend to the personal service of the chusma...", while the Indians of Quibdó complained that "they and their children ... are ... punished and oppressed by the priests...". As Governor López de Carvajal informed the oidor Vicente de Aramburu:

...if the ministers, tenientes and corregidores have been so distressing and hateful for the Indians ... the priests have been no less so, not only for their dealings with and assistance provided to royal officials but because they themselves have inconvenienced and upset [the Indians] in the same way, and have completely omitted to teach ... Christian Doctrine ... I did not see one adult Indian who knew how to cross himself or understood the error of his ways..."

Although the documents do not provide any specific examples of exploitation on the part of the Franciscans, there are some indications that they did punish the Indian children, at least. In 1730, Fray Dionisio de Camino complained that the corregidores objected to the priests striking the children for not learning their prayers, and

33 AGI Santa Fe 362, Rafael de Oquendo to Crown, Antioquia, 20 September 1712.

34 AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", ff.25, 34.

35 Don Joseph de Carvajal to Vicente de Aramburu, Antioquia, 14 August 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 362, "Testimonio de Autos", f.25.
added that children only learn from fear. As for the other allegations regarding Franciscan involvement in non-religious activities, Bishop Gómez Frías, in particular, asserted that much of the responsibility for the Indians' lack of knowledge of Christianity had to be placed on the members of the Franciscan order, due to their misconduct and involvement in affairs alien to their ministry. In 1720, this bishop informed the then Father Provincial, Fray Francisco Antonio Felices, of the disorderly conduct of some of the Franciscan doctrineros in the Chocó, whose behaviour, involvement in mining, and lifestyles not in keeping with their Christian obligations and the poverty which they preached, had "scandalized my flock". As the fiscal of the Council of the Indies' discussion of the bishop's letter shows, the term "disorderly conduct" referred to the behaviour of three of the Franciscans then serving as doctrineros of Indian settlements in the region - Fray Manuel Caicedo, Fray Matías Méndez, and Fray Juan Caballero. These, the fiscal noted, had been removed by the Franciscan Father Provincial, Fray Francisco Antonio Felices "for their bad behaviour ... [and their activities] as ... miners ... merchants and other vices".

36 Arcila Robledo, op.cit., "Representación hecha por...Fr. Dionisio de Camino...".

37 AGI Santa Fe 287, Juan Gómez Frías to Crown, Popayán, 18 April 1720.

38 Ibid., Fiscal to Consejo, n.p., n.d. On returning from New Granada, Pedrosa y Guerrero had recommended that the friars should not be permitted to operate mines, even through intermediaries. See AGI Santa Fe 362, Don Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero to Don Francisco de Arana,
Undoubtedly, some of the Franciscans in the Chocó were involved in mining activities: Fray Juan Caballero was said to have administered a mine owned by his mother in the region, and in 1724, Fray Manuel Caicedo admitted in a report to the Crown that he had spent 21 years in the region, as both miner and priest. As Lorenzo de Salazar informed the governor of Antioquia in 1711, the Franciscans "only attend to their own businesses and those of their relatives occupying themselves in the mines." However, although there is evidence to indicate some Franciscan involvement in these activities, there is also evidence that at least one other religious order and several secular clerics were actively involved in mining in the Chocó region.

In the early 1720s, Fray Francisco Montiel de Fuentenovilla, Father Provincial of the order of Nuestra Señora del Carmen de la Antigua, in Valladolid, wrote to the Crown about the case of Fray Joseph de Santa Teresa, a lay brother from his convent. Having been granted the permission of the Crown and of the prelates of his order, Fray Joseph de Santa Teresa travelled to New Granada with

Madrid, 8 March 1721.

39 AGI Santa Fe 286, Jorge de Villalonga to Crown, Cartagena, 15 March 1721.

40 AGI Santa Fe 362, Fray Manuel Caicedo, Madrid, 24 July 1724.

41 Real de Minas de San Mateo, 24 September 1711, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", f. 83.
Bishop Fray Mateo de Villafañe, for the purpose of collecting alms with which to buy lands, the proceeds of which would serve to support the order in Spain. This lay brother was said to have purchased lands on the banks of the San Juan river, consisting of mines and plantain fields, and to have died intestate while administering the property. The lands were then sold for 896 pesos and 6 reales, which were forwarded to the order in Spain.  

When the Council of the Indies discussed the case of Fray Manuel Caicedo, in the early 1720s, it was said that although he had been pulled out of the Chocó, he had left his nephew, the secular cleric Roque de Caicedo, also a miner, to administer his mines. Although there are few details, it is clear that at least some of the mines held by secular priests were far more valuable than the modest holding held by Fray Joseph de Santa Teresa - valued at only 896 pesos. Nicolás de Inestrosa, who, in 1708, became embroiled in the dispute between the Mosquera brothers and other miners in the province of Nóvita over access to Indian labour, later became priest of the mining camps of Iró and Mungarra, where he also purchased a mine. When he died in 1759, he left a fortune in slaves and mines, valued

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42 Montiel de Fuentenovilla reported that the money had been held up by the Casa de Contratación in Cádiz, pending an investigation into the claims of another member of the order, from Andalucía, who claimed the money belonged to him. The Provincial requested the return of the money in question. See AGI Quito 190, Fray Francisco Montiel de Fuentenovilla to Crown, n.p., n.d. The Consejo requested a report on the matter on 15 June 1723.

43 AGI Santa Fe 287, Fiscal to Consejo, n.p., n.d.
at 60,000 patacones, to the Franciscan college of Cali.44

The secular cleric who replaced him as parish priest of Iró and Mungarra in the early 1730s, Don Agustín Roso de Villalba, was also undoubtedly involved in mining in the province of Nóvita. In a 1750s census of the Chocó’s mining camps and their slave population, Roso de Villalba was listed as the owner of the mining camp of San Joseph de Piedra Piedra, and of 11 male working slaves and 5 female working slaves. This same census also indicates the size of Inestrosa’s holding, Santa Lucía del Calabozo. Inestrosa was listed as the owner of 46 male working slaves and 32 female working slaves [See Appendix 2].45

We also know that, later in the century, other secular priests both purchased and ran mining companies in the Chocó. William Sharp studied the records of one mine owned by the cleric Juan de Bonilla y Delgado in partnership with Francisco de Rivas. These two men formed a company, in 1752, to exploit mines in the province of Nóvita: expenses and profits were to be shared out equally between both partners. The company was started with 33 slaves, costing 12,645 pesos, and 12,645 pesos worth of equipment and cash.

44 Colmenares, Cali, pp.138-9, 149.

45 AGI Santa Fe 733, "Descripción del Gobierno del Chocó, en la jurisdicción del Nuevo Reino de Granada, que se presenta, con Memorial, a S.M. por Don Pedro Muñoz de Arjona, hijo del Coronel Don Alfonso de Arjona". Although this document is undated, it certainly corresponds to the 1750s. It not only includes the mining camp belonging to Inestrosa, who died in 1759, but also that of the cleric Don Juan de Bonilla, who formed his company in 1752. Pedro Muñoz’s father, Don Alfonso de Arjona, sent the Crown a map of the Quibdó region in 1753, which is also included in this thesis.
By 1759, Rivas and Bonilla y Delgado owned 98 slaves, and in 1768, the year Rivas died, the property was valued at 78,980.1 pesos. By this time, the two men owned 212 slaves.\footnote{Sharp, \textit{Slavery on the Spanish Frontier}, p.182, and Table 5, pp.204-05.}

Such activities were prohibited by the \textit{Recopilación de Leyes de Indias},\footnote{According to the \textit{Fiscal of the Consejo}, "la libertad y beneficio de las Minas...les está prohibido por varias cédulas y en especial por la 4. tit.12 Lib.1 de la recopilación de indias". See AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Dionisio de Camino to Crown, n.p., n.d., and Dictamen del Fiscal, Madrid, 22 May 1727.} and, by royal \textit{cédula} of June 1727, the Crown tried to enforce these provisions, further prohibiting clerics from owning or operating mines.\footnote{Osorio, C.L., "Prohibición de los Reyes Españoles a los Eclesiásticos sobre propiedad y beneficio de minas", \textit{Boletín Histórico del Valle}, Vol.31 (1936), p.329.} However, as Nicolás de Inestrosa’s case shows, exceptions could and were made. In 1730 or 1731, Inestrosa appealed to the Crown to allow him to retain control of his mine, in the discovery and operation of which he had invested a considerable sum of money and much effort, and in which he employed his own black slaves rather than Indians. He asked to be exempted from this ruling because the only purpose of the mine was to enable him to maintain his orphaned sisters, especially the widow with five children. Moreover, Inestrosa claimed, he did not administer the mine
in person, but instead employed a miner. In November, 1731, the Crown asked the bishop of Popayán for a report on the matter, and, since witnesses favourable to Inestrosa—including one relative, Nicolás de Caicedo Inestrosa—were called to give evidence that he properly fulfilled his priestly duties, did not live in the mining camp, did not employ Indians in it or as suppliers of foodstuffs to it, and paid all quintos in full, we may assume that he was officially permitted to keep his mine.

Thus, Bishop Gómez Frías' allegations regarding the mining activities of some of the members of the Franciscan order have to be placed in the context of what appears to have been an occupation common to both branches of the clergy serving in the region. Indeed, as we shall see, when Bishop Gómez Frías was faced with the problem of dealing with unbenefficed clerics who were said to be living in the Chocó, he only ordered that those who were not serving a parish or administering a mine should leave the region. But the point of focusing on the charges Bishop

49 AGI Quito 144, Nicolás de Inestrosa to Crown, n.p., n.d. The Consejo discussed this letter in October 1731.

50 The Cathedral Chapter dealt with this request. See Osorio, "Prohibición de los Reyes Españoles", pp.329-35. Don Ignacio de Piedrahita, one of the witnesses called to give evidence on Inestrosa's behalf, stated that he had earlier owned another mine, El Bordo, but that this one had been abandoned because platinum had been found in the gold extracted.

51 "Decreto", Juan Gómez Frías, Popayán, 9 June 1721, in AGI Santa Fe 405, "Despacho Circular que se remite a las provincias del Chocó para que los Vicarios de ellas compelan a los clérigos y regulares salgan de aquellas provincias y ejecuten lo demás de su contexto. Año de
Gómez Frías made against the regular doctrineros is that, if their activities in the Chocó were so little different from the activities of the secular clergy, and if both regulars and seculars agreed that the authority of the corregidores and the tenientes, and the resistance of the native population to all forms of Christian instruction were the main obstacles to the success of the evangelization effort, why then was the bishop so fiercely critical of the Franciscan order?

**Bishop Juan Gómez Frías and the Franciscan Order**

Two factors may have contributed to Bishop Gómez Frías’ opposition to the Franciscans’ control of the doctrinas of the Chocó. One was that, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, unemployment among the secular clergy was rising in the diocese of Popayán. As Peter Marzahl noted, opportunities for employment in the diocese were not keeping pace with the increase in the number of ecclesiastics. While in 1701 there were 19 priests without a benefice in Popayán, by 1706, their number had risen to 25.\(^{52}\) This phenomenon was also found in other parts of Spanish America. In Guatemala, for instance, the number of young ecclesiastics grew steadily between the 1630s and 1730s, while the number of benefices increased only marginally.\(^{53}\) Although we have no details to indicate the

\(^{52}\) Marzahl, *Town in the Empire*, p.139.

\(^{53}\) Van Oss, *Catholic Colonialism*, p.133.
extent of clerical unemployment in the diocese of Popayán by the early 1720s, there are indications that many unbefriended priests went to the Chocó. In 1721, the Promotor Fiscal of the diocese of Popayán, Don Miguel Chacón de la Enzina, reported to the bishop that there were, in the Chocó, many clerics who neither served a parish nor administered a mine, and since the only other way of making a living there was through commerce, there could be no doubt that these clerics were involved in commercial activities. And, even if they were not detained there for a legitimate purpose and were not involved in such an "indecent" occupation, nevertheless "the common people accuse them of being merchants and traders". Following this report, Bishop Gómez Frías issued a decree, in June 1721, to the effect that all secular and regular priests in the Chocó who were not detained there for the purpose of administering a mine or a parish - both of which he considered to be "legitimate" occupations - should leave the region within fifteen days of the notification of this order. In addition, those resident in the region without license from the bishop, should be denied the use of churches, chapels, and altars to celebrate Mass. Despite this decree, and a royal cédula of 29 October 1722

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54 Don Miguel Chacón de la Enzina to Bishop, Popayán, 9 June 1721, and "Decreto", Juan Gómez Frías, Popayán, 9 June 1721, in AGI Santa Fe 405, "Despacho Circular que se remite a las provincias del Chocó para que los Vicarios de ellas compelan a los clérigos y regulares salgan de aquellas provincias y ejecuten lo demás de su contexto. Año de 1721".
confirming the bishop’s order, the problem of wandering clerics in the Chocó continued to disturb the Franciscans in the mission. By the mid-1720s, Fray Dionisio de Camino complained that, in the doctrinas and mission towns of the province of Tatamá/Chocó, Citará, and Nóvita (the settlement of Tadó), the Franciscans were unable to maintain any calm, because of the "disturbances" promoted by some secular clerics who went to the Chocó, and especially to the province of Citará, "to conspire with the inhabitants ... to make reports against the religious". He believed, with good cause, that their motive was to take over their doctrinas.

This situation arose because, in the sixteenth century, the Crown placed the responsibility for the pacification of the native populations of border areas on the missionary orders. There were, at that time, specific reasons for the Crown's decision: the regulars were greater in number, they were thought to be more manageable, more zealous, and more morally reliable than the secular clergy. Nevertheless, the Crown only intended the regular orders to assume control of unconquered Indians for a period of ten years, after which it was envisaged that the new converts

55 Royal Cédula, 29 October 1722, in AGI Santa Fe 404, "Testimonio de Autos".

56 AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Dionisio de Camino to King, n.p., n.d. The fiscal of the Consejo discussed the contents of this letter in May 1727.
were to be handed over to the secular clergy.\textsuperscript{57} In practice, however, the process of conversion took a great deal longer - in some cases it was not achieved even by the end of the colonial period - and the parochial and diocesan method of administration that should have been established - that is, parishes administered by secular clerics under the direct control, jurisdiction, and correction of the diocesan bishops - had not properly been put into effect even by the middle of the eighteenth century. Consequently, the regular orders continued to enjoy the extensive privileges and exemptions - save for those acts requiring episcopal consecration - which were granted by the papacy during the period of pioneering missionary work,\textsuperscript{58} and which originated in the Crown's decision to resort to the regular orders to carry out the immense task of conversion in the New World.\textsuperscript{59} However, once the zeal and moral integrity of the regulars came into question, and the number of secular clerics began to increase at a faster rate than the number of available benefices, it was inevitable that the privileges of the orders would clash with the jurisdictional claims of the bishops.

Indeed, the observations of Gómez Frías' successor, Diego Fermín de Vergara, provides further evidence that the


\textsuperscript{58} Boxer, The Church Militant, pp.65-6.

\textsuperscript{59} ibid., and Barnadas, "The Catholic Church"
root of the problem between the Franciscan order in the Chocó and the bishops of Popayán lay precisely in the clash of interests between the independence of the former and the jurisdictional claims of the latter. In 1736, Diego Fermín de Vergara claimed that the religious state of the region would not have been as disastrous had the secular clergy taken control of the settlements of the Chocó. The bishop argued that, unlike the secular clergy, who were subject to the vigilance of the bishop, the Franciscan order formed a "formidable regiment" of clerics who were not subject to any form of discipline. And, most significantly, he complained that the Franciscans recognized their Father Provincial, and never the bishop, as their superior.60

It was precisely this independence of the Franciscan order which Bishop Gómez Frías had tried to undermine, using a variety of tactics. For example, the allegations which the bishop made about the conduct of Franciscans in the mission field, and about the "scandalous" divisions which had arisen within the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe, related specifically to the election of a new Father Provincial to replace the outgoing Provincial in 1723, were used to damage the reputation of the Franciscans and the support they enjoyed in the royal court.

Thus, in 1720, Bishop Juan Gómez Frías informed the Crown that the dispute which had divided the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe had arisen because of the forthcoming

60 AGI Quito 185, Diego Fermín de Vergara to Miguel de Villanueva, Medellín, 30 February 1737, and Diego Fermín de Vergara to Crown, Popayán, 1 December 1737.
appointment of a new Father Provincial to replace the outgoing Provincial, Fray Francisco Antonio Felices. The bishop explained that these internal problems had been caused by the emergence of a faction, led by Fray Diego Barroso, which opposed the election of the candidate, Fray Manuel de la Prada, supported by the outgoing Father Felices. According to the bishop, Fray Diego Barroso was putting pressure to bear on members of the order to ensure the election of his candidate, Fray Dionisio de Camino.

Bishop Gómez Frías alleged that these opposing groups emerged for two reasons. The first was that Father Felices had begun a reform of the order, which involved not only the removal, for reasons of misconduct, of the Franciscans Caicedo, Méndez, and Caballero from the doctrinas they served in the Chocó, but also the abolition of the contributions that Franciscan doctrineros were expected to make towards the upkeep of the order - contributions which, the bishop alleged, were responsible for the Franciscans in that region becoming involved in commercial activities. The second reason was that Father Felices represented a group of Franciscans who believed that the order should abandon the Chocó region completely. As Fray Manuel de la Prada was expected to continue the reform initiated by Father Felices, and to continue to work towards withdrawing the Franciscan doctrineros from the mission, the second faction - opposed to both the reform and the order's withdrawal from the Chocó - had mustered up considerable
support to ensure that he was not elected.\(^{61}\) In reporting the divisions within the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe, the bishop’s purpose was not only to declare his support for the Felices faction, but also to discredit the opposing Barroso faction, by alleging that Fray Diego Barroso had caused much conflict in the order "for appointing favoured doctrineros, guardians, and other officers" and for endorsing the candidature of Fray Dionisio de Camino for the post of Provincial of the order, a man of "no religious qualities".\(^{62}\)

The reasons for the division within the Franciscan order are documented in government papers. In 1719, Fray Joseph Palos, Father Provincial of the Franciscan Province of Chile and Visitor General of the Province of Santa Fe, presented a motion for discussion relating to whether the order should retain its mission in the Chocó or withdraw completely from it. Father Felices, then Provincial, argued in favour of abandoning the mission, on the grounds that despite the fact that the order had held on to the mission continuously for more than forty years, very few results had been obtained. Father Felices based his argument on two main points. First, that the order was unlikely to make any further progress among the Indians, not only because the secular authorities and miners in the region kept them continuously employed in other

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\(^{61}\) AGI Santa Fe 287, Juan Gómez Frías to Crown, Popayán, 18 April 1720.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., Fiscal to Consejo, n.p., n.d.
occupations, but because the Indians themselves were all "indomable brutes, involved in their idolatrous [practices]...". And, although he had recently received confirmation from Fray Juan Domingo Calderón that the Sacrament of Penitence had been administered to some sixty Indians and that of Communion to a few others, it had to be said that this was not much of an achievement after forty years of missionary activity. Secondly, Father Felices believed that the order's principal responsibility was towards its own members. Clearly concerned about reports regarding the behaviour of the Franciscans in the field, he added that the vow of poverty taken by the members of his order was in danger of being broken in the Chocó, "for since the Chocó is where gold is continuously extracted from, where greed, self-interest ... rule, who can deny that, in that place, a Franciscan would be in grave danger, due to interests alien to our status...". And while he acknowledged that many of the allegations made against the Franciscans were probably untrue, and the result of the lawlessness which characterized life in the region, he concluded that a "tree which bears no fruit is best cut down...". 63

The second faction - led by Fray Diego Barroso - argued that the order could not abandon the mission, for three reasons: first, because it would be failing in its duty to the King, who had entrusted the mission to the

63 AGI Santa Fe 403, Fray Francisco Antonio Felices, Santa Fe, 13 November 1719.
Franciscans; secondly, because the Chocó mission was the most honourable branch of the order in the Kingdom, given the Franciscan blood that had been spilled in the process of its establishment; and thirdly, and most significantly, because it would be wrong to abandon a mission that had, only since 1707, been producing an income for the order in excess of that necessary to maintain the priests in the field. The Franciscans' withdrawal from the Chocó would mean that the mission would be handed over to priests who had played no part in its establishment. And, as far as the allegations about the conduct of the Franciscans were concerned, Father Barroso believed that these were the result of the doctrineros' refusal to allow the inhabitants of the region to have their own way with the Indians, and their continued defense of the Indian against ill-treatment. It was for this reason that unsustainable charges were made against the friars, and if these were to be punished on the basis of accusations alone, they would all have to be punished.  

In the event neither candidate won the election. The order elected Fray Buenaventura de Vega, a friar believed by Viceroy Villalonga to be sufficiently unconcerned about worldly matters to put some order back into the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe. But the point of this discussion

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64 Ibid., Fray Diego Barroso, Santa Fe, 18 November 1719.

65 AGI Santa Fe 287, Viceroy Villalonga to Crown, Santa Fe, 8 February 1723. Francisco Antonio Felices was said to have been supported by only one like-minded member of the order, Fray Tomás Guerrero. See AGI Santa
about the arguments put forward by Fathers Felices and Barroso is that they highlight two important issues. The first is that Bishop Gómez Frías supported the Felices faction precisely because it was in his interests to do so: Father Felices was in favour of abandoning the mission and transferring the Franciscan doctrinas to the secular clergy. Indeed, the bishop’s determination to displace the Franciscans from the doctrinas in the Chocó actually led to allegations being made about his own integrity. In 1721, Viceroy Jorge de Villalonga informed the King that the reports about the Franciscans in the Chocó had to be treated with some caution, because it was said that Father Felices and Bishop Juan Gómez Frías had struck a bargain whereby the bishop would support Felices in exchange for his efforts to convince the order of the wisdom of transferring the Chocó doctrinas to the secular clergy.  

The second point highlighted by the cases put forward by Barroso and Felices is that the Franciscan order had begun, from the turn of the century, to benefit financially from the mission, and that this is most likely explanation for Father Barroso’s determination that the order should remain in the Chocó. Father Barroso and Fray Dionisio de Camino, the candidate whom he endorsed for the election of Provincial, had in fact also been accused of corruption by Viceroy Villalonga. In 1722, Villalonga reported to the

Fe 404, Fray Francisco Seco to Crown, n.p., n.d., and Dictamen del Fiscal, 4 February 1724.

AGI Santa Fe 286, Jorge de Villalonga to Crown, Cartagena, 15 March 1721.
Crown that Fray Dionisio de Camino had been detained in the port of Honda, with ten boxes and two trunks containing contraband goods.\textsuperscript{67} Furthermore, it was because the order was benefiting financially from the mission that Bishop Gómez Frías accused the order of imposing contributions on its members serving in the field, and that Diego Fermín de Vergara alleged that the Franciscan Father Provincial had carried out two visitations to the region over the course of one single year, which had amounted to nothing more than stealing as much as possible from the Franciscan doctrineros.\textsuperscript{68}

We have few details regarding the method of payment of Franciscan doctrineros in the Chocó, save for one statement taken by the governor of Antioquia, Don Joseph López de Carvajal, in 1712. In January of that year, Don Bartolomé de Borja y Espeleta - former teniente general of the province of Citará - informed him that, of the five peso tribute paid annually by the Indians of the province of Citará, two pesos were paid in stipend to the doctrinero of each settlement.\textsuperscript{69} The doctrineros appear not have kept the whole of their stipends for themselves: in the early

\textsuperscript{67} AGI Santa Fe 286, Viceroy Villalonga to Crown, Santa Fe, 9 August 1722. The Viceroy reported that those responsible were Fray Diego Barroso and Fray Dionisio de Camino.

\textsuperscript{68} AGI Santa Fe 287, Juan Gómez Frías to Crown, Popayán, 18 April 1720, and AGI Quito 185, Diego Fermín de Vergara to Miguel de Villanueva, Medellín, 30 February 1737.

\textsuperscript{69} Antioquia, 4 January 1712, in AGI Santa Fe 307, "Cuaderno...sobre la entrada al río Murri y descubrimiento de nuevos minerales de oro...", ff.144-45.
1720s, Fray Francisco Seco stated that it was true that the order had, since 1702, taken whatever money was left after the doctrineros' own needs had been met. This money was applied to the Divine Cult, the promotion of studies, and the needs of the monasteries.⁷⁰

Making allegations about the behaviour of the doctrineros and bringing the internal problems of the Franciscan Province of Santa Fe to the attention of the Crown was a tactic employed by the bishop to discredit the order. At the local level, the bishop used a variety of other tactics to undermine the activities of the Franciscans in the Chocó - tactics which involved a strict interpretation of the Spanish Crown's Patronato Real. Under the terms of the Patronato, the Spanish Crown assumed the responsibility for protecting and maintaining the church in the newly conquered territories and for promoting the conversion of the native inhabitants to the Catholic Faith. In exchange for its services in promoting the Faith, and in accordance with the concessions granted by the papal bulls of Alexander VI (1493 and 1501), Julius II (1508), and Hadrian V (1523), the Crown was granted not only the right to collect and administer the tithes on agricultural and livestock production, the proceeds of which would be used to pay salaries, and build and endow cathedrals, churches, monasteries, and hospitals, but also to present candidates for all ecclesiastical appointments.

⁷⁰ AGI Santa Fe 404, Fray Francisco Seco to Crown, n.p., n.d. The Consejo discussed this letter in February 1724.
The Crown took upon itself the privilege of presenting candidates for appointment to higher level ecclesiastical positions. Its nominations for archbishops and bishops in all the archdioceses and dioceses of Spanish America were sent to the Pope, who confirmed and formally instated the nominees in office. The Crown, or the Council of the Indies, also nominated members of the cathedral chapters, although in these cases, it was the local bishops who installed the candidates in office. Nominations for lesser benefices were also taken care of at the local level: candidates were presented by the local prelates for the approval of the viceroy - or the provincial governors - acting as vicepatrons, and the nominees were formally installed by the local bishops or archbishops. The creation of archdioceses, dioceses, and parishes also formed part of the privileges granted by the Patronato Real.71

In the Chocó, Bishop Gómez Frías refused to cooperate with the Franciscans by invoking the rights and privileges of the diocesan bishops under the terms of the Spanish Crown’s Patronato. The following specific examples of conflict over the erection of new parishes and doctrinas and over the presentation and appointment of doctrineros, shows the many ways in which the bishops could - and in this case, did - curtail the independence of the regular

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71 See, for example, France V. Scholes, "An Overview of the Colonial Church", in Greenleaf (ed.), The Roman Catholic Church, pp.21-3; Barnadas, "The Catholic Church", pp.512-13; and Haring, The Spanish Empire, p.167.
orders in frontier regions which, once entirely Indian, had become promising regions where Indian settlements existed alongside a growing Spanish population - a perfect environment for the erection of secular parishes. However, these examples also show how a bishop's attempts to displace the regular orders could be thwarted if the prelate failed to secure the support of the vicepatron, whose agreement to any ecclesiastical appointment or the erection of any parish within his jurisdiction had to be obtained before these could take effect. Indeed, in the case of the Chocó in the early 1720s, the vicepatron's support of the Franciscan order proved to be the crucial factor in the complete failure of the bishop to make any changes in the way in which the region was administered by the regulars, and led, in the medium-term at least, to the Crown deciding to favour the Franciscans and protect their doctrinas.

In 1719, Bishop Gómez Frías appointed the secular cleric Nicolás de Inestrosa as parish priest of the mining camps of Iró and Mungarra, in the province of Nóvita, on the grounds that the spiritual needs of the miners, slave gangs, and other people who lived in the camps could not be met by the Franciscan doctrineros of the settlement of Tadó because of the great distances which separated the Indian settlements from the mining camps. The basic premise upon which this appointment was based was that Iró and Mungarra

72 See, for example, AGI Santa Fe 286, Viceroy Villalonga to Crown, Cartagena, 15 March 1721.
had always been a separate curato - as opposed to a doctrina - and that it had never been administered by the Franciscans.73

The Franciscans, appealing to the viceroy and later to the Crown, based their opposition to the bishop’s action on their understanding that the mining camps of Iró and Mungarra were annexes of the doctrina of Tadó - which they served - and that, therefore, a Franciscan had to be appointed as priest for the miners and slaves of the camps.74 On 7 October 1720, the viceroy - acting a vicepatron - decreed that there were no grounds for the bishop’s appointment of Inestrosa, for such an action would transform the mining camps - annexes of the Franciscan doctrina of Tadó - into a curato administered by the secular clergy. The viceroy agreed that the Franciscans alone could present candidates for appointment as priests to the mining camps.75

The bishop either failed or refused to enforce the viceroy’s decision, and because Inestrosa remained as priest of the mining camps of Iró and Mungarra, the Franciscan order appealed to the Crown, and claimed that not only these mining camps, but all the annexes of their

73 AGI Santa Fe 411, "Testimonio de información recibida por el Dr. Dn Nicolás de Inestrosa como visitador de las Provincias del Chocó", ff.1-20.

74 AGI Santa Fe 408, Fray Joseph Antonio de Oliva to Crown, n.p., n.d.

75 AGI Santa Fe 408, Fray Joseph Antonio de Oliva to Crown, n.p., n.d. This letter was received by the Consejo in October 1750.
doctrinas in the region were slowly being stripped from them. Although by royal cédula of 12 November 1724, the Crown ordered that all annexes of Franciscan doctrinas in the Chocó should be restored to the Franciscans, the bishop flatly refused to enforce this ruling in Iró and Mungarra on the pretext that these mining camps had not been mentioned specifically in the cédula.76

Despite the promulgation of the cédula, the case dragged on until 1735, and in that year the Audiencia of Santa Fe - after a lengthy investigation - declared that Inestrosa's presentation for appointment as priest of the mining camps of Iró and Mungarra was not valid, and that these should be restored to the Franciscans. By this time, however, Iró and Mungarra was administered by the secular priest Don Agustín Roso de Villalba, who also appealed to the Audiencia - which upheld its decision of 5 December 1735 in favour of the Franciscan missionaries - and then to the Crown.77

To make their point that the mining camps of Iró and Mungarra either were or were not annexes of the doctrina of Tadó, both parts based their cases on historical documents. For the Franciscans, these went back to 1649 - Fray Matías Abad's expedition to the region; for the seculars, to 1669 - Quevedo's expedition and the later appointment of the

76 AGI Santa Fe 408, Fray Joseph Antonio de Oliva to Crown, n.p., n.d.
77 Ibid..
secular priests Simón Amigo and Luis Antonio de la Cueva.78 The poor record of regular and secular clergy in the region meant that both sides could only use "historical precedent" as an argument to justify their claims to the mining camps. Neither side, for example, based their claims on the moral superiority of one branch of the clergy over the other, or, in the case of the Franciscans, on their superior knowledge of the Indians' languages or customs. These were the arguments put forward by the regular orders of Guatemala, for instance, when threatened with the secularization of their doctrinas. However, as Van Oss pointed out, the regular orders of Guatemala put immense efforts into learning the "multitude of dialects" spoken by their indigenous parishioners, to the extent that, in 1744, it was suggested that the regular doctrineros forbade the Indians to speak Spanish "in order to make themselves indispensable in their doctrinas".79 No such justifications were ever used in the Chocó, since the moral integrity of the Franciscans and the secular clergy was a matter of growing concern to many observers, while the study of Indian language and customs was never mentioned and apparently never taken seriously by either regulars or seculars in this region.

78 See, for example, AGI Santa Fe 406, Agustín Roso y Villalba to Crown, n.p., n.d. This letter was written in response to the Audiencia's rulings of 1735 and 1737 that Iró and Mungarra were annexes of Tadó.

79 Van Oss, Catholic Colonialism, pp.126-30.
These differences notwithstanding, the Crown responded to Roso y Villalba’s appeal with a royal cédula, of 30 August 1738, ordering the Audiencia to reinstate the secular priest to the parish – or curato – of Iró and Mungarra. At the same time, the cédula ordered the Audiencia to investigate the claims of both sides and to ascertain whether or not Iró and Mungarra were annexes of the doctrina of Tadó. By June, 1748, the Audiencia had concluded that Iró and Mungarra were annexes of Tadó, and that the secular clergy should restore the mining camps to the Franciscan order.° The dispute over Iró and Mungarra had taken 30 years to resolve.

The erection of a new parish for Spaniards, slaves, mestizos, and mulattoes in the province of Citará became the subject of another lengthy dispute between the bishop and the order over who the new parish was to be administered by. A royal cédula of 25 April 1722 – issued in response to the bishop’s request for authorization to erect a new parish for the miners who claimed that their religious needs could not be served by the doctrinero of Quibdó, and who committed themselves to build a decent church and pay the priest’s stipend – ordered the viceroy, as vicepatron – to proceed with the erection and to give his consent to the appointment of a secular priest,

° AGI Santa Fe 408, Fray Joseph de Oliva to Crown, n.p., n.d. Father Oliva asked that the Audiencia’s decision of June 1748 be confirmed by royal cédula.

¹ AGI Quito 185, Juan Gómez Frías to Crown, Popayán, 26 November 1720.
as requested by the bishop. By November 1724, a second royal cédula had been issued, in response to a letter from Viceroy Villalonga suggesting that if the new parish was proved to fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the Franciscans' mission, their right to present candidates for the appointment of a priest could not be waived. Following the Council of the Indies' decision that the new parish did indeed fall within the jurisdiction of the Franciscan mission, this second cédula ordered that a Franciscan was to be appointed to the new parish. By the end of 1725, however, the Franciscan Fray Dionisio de Camino was reporting to the King that the cédula of November, 1724, had been challenged by the bishop, on the grounds that a secular priest had already been appointed and that the enforcement of the Crown’s directive would involve divesting the priest of his curato.82

While on the one hand Bishop Gómez Frías sought to curb the authority of the Franciscans by erecting new parishes for Spaniards and slaves and appointing secular priests to serve them, on the other he sought to prevent the order increasing its sphere of influence in the region by refusing to authorize the erection of new doctrinas for the Indian population. On 19 January 1720, Viceroy Villalonga presented a Franciscan - Fray Juan de Ayala - for appointment as doctrinero of the recently founded

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82 AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Dionisio de Camino to Crown, n.p., n.d. See also the fiscal's discussion, dated 22 May 1727, and AGI Quito 127, Jorge de Villalonga to Crown, Santa Fe, 13 November 1723.
Indian settlement of Beté, Negua, and Nemota, in accordance with the terms of the Patronato Real.\textsuperscript{83} Juan Gómez Frías, however, objected on two grounds. The first was that the doctrina of Beté, with its annexes of Negua and Némota, had not been erected in accordance with Canon Law.\textsuperscript{84} It was the bishop’s privilege to approve and erect doctrinas and curatos, with the consent of the vicepatron and in accordance with Canon Law and the terms of the Patronato Real. As these preconditions had not been met, the benefice could not be considered lawfully erected, and the candidate presented for appointment could not be installed.\textsuperscript{85} As the Promotor Fiscal, Miguel Chacón de la Enzina, concluded, the erection of the doctrina and the aggregation of its annexes by the Franciscans in this case amounted to a usurpation of the privileges of the bishop of the diocese. In the establishment of a doctrina, the consent of the vicepatron follows, and does not precede, the inspection and approval of the bishop.\textsuperscript{86} While jealously guarding his authority against intrusion by the Franciscan order or indeed the viceroy, Juan Gómez Frías

\textsuperscript{83} Presentación sin fundación, Santa Fe, 19 February 1720, in AGI Quito 185, "Testimonio de los autos obrados sobre la erección de curato en el Citará Provincia de las Chocó y informes de los curas sobre el maltratamiento que los índios reciben de los jueces eclesiásticos, de que hace remisión al Real y Supremo Consejo de las Indias el...Obispo de Popayán. Año de 1720".

\textsuperscript{84} Diligencia de Protocolos, 11 September 1720, ibid.

\textsuperscript{85} Decisión, Popayán, 12 September 1720, ibid..

\textsuperscript{86} Respuesta del Promotor Fiscal, Popayán, 12 September 1720, ibid.
constructed a case against the erection of this new doctrina. According to the bishop, Nicolás de Inestrosa and Francisco Marqués de Ayala had only recently carried out an ecclesiastical visitation to the Chocó region, and at that time, the settlement of Beté had been found to consist of little more than three or four families who had been captured in Murri, five or six houses, and a straw covered church which contained neither an altar nor adornments. Moreover, Beté had not been and could not be established as a doctrina or a benefice because the time granted to the Indians to settle in the town without having to pay tributes had not yet passed, and therefore there was no source from which the priest's stipend could be paid. Furthermore, there was no evidence to indicate that the Spanish mining camps and settlements of free people of Negua and Nemota - claimed by the Franciscans to form part of the new doctrina of Beté - were annexes of the settlement.87 However, we may assume that the bishop's decision in this case, too, was overridden by the Crown, for, by the mid-1720s, Fray Dionisio de Camino reported that Beté was one of the doctrinas administered by the regulars in the region.88

Finally, the bishop tried to curb the authority of the Franciscans by denying his consent to the candidates

87 Certificación del Secretario, 11 September 1720, and Certificación Fiscal, Popayán, 11 September 1720, ibid.

presented by the order for appointment as doctrineros of the Indian settlements. In this the bishop based his case on royal céédulas - that of 20 June 1720, for instance⁸⁹ - which ordered that doctrineros were not to be removed from their doctrinas each time a provincial chapter was celebrated. As he informed the Crown, the frequency with which the priests were transferred meant that they were not encouraged to apply themselves properly to the fulfillment of their ministry. Instead, secure in the knowledge that they could be transferred at a moment’s notice, they completely neglected their duties, since, after all, they were unlikely to be asked to justify their activities.⁹⁰ Thus, when the viceroy presented the Franciscan Fray Andrés Bermudes for appointment as doctrinero of Lloró, the bishop refused to confirm the appointment on the grounds that another Franciscan - Fray Joseph de Tapia - had been

⁸⁹ This céédula was discussed by the Consejo, in February 1724, in the context of the letter sent to the Crown by Fray Francisco Seco. See AGI Santa Fe 404, Fray Francisco Seco to Crown, n.p., n.d.

⁹⁰ Ibid., Fray Dionisio de Camino to King, n.p., n.d. This letter was discussed by the Consejo on 28 November 1724. The frequent transfer of friars in the doctrinas controlled by the regular orders appears to have been a characteristic of all the religious orders in many parts of New Granada. In 1646, the Archbishop of Santa Fe complained of the orders' propensity to transfer friars from their doctrinas at two year intervals, and without informing the Archbishop, a precondition laid down under the terms of the Patronato. The Archbishop believed that this policy prevented the friars from becoming closely involved with their parishes, and it also prevented the Archbishop from effectively correcting any problems in the parishes, because every time a visita was conducted the parishes were administered by different friars. See AGI Santa Fe 227, Archbishop of Santa Fe to Crown, Santa Fe, 28 November 1646.
serving as doctrinero of the same settlement for the previous year and had fulfilled his duties satisfactorily. Although this dispute ended with the timely death of Fray Andrés Bermudes, the case shows the way in which the bishop sought to impose his own authority in the diocese even if it meant coming into conflict with the vicepatron. By law, Gómez Frías claimed, the bishop had to approve the candidates presented by the prelates of the orders before the vicepatron could present them for appointment.\(^9\) While it is not clear whether the bishop did have a legal basis upon which to make this claim, his actions led the Franciscan order—without success—to request the Crown's permission to override the rights of the diocesan bishop and to present their candidates for appointment to the Archbishop of Santa Fe.\(^9\)

Despite the fact that Bishop Juan Gómez Frías was unsuccessful in his attempts to undermine the authority of the Franciscan order, to damage its reputation, and to challenge its right to administer the doctrinas of the Chocó, since the Crown chose to support the Franciscans' efforts in the region, this chapter has shown how the Chocó mission became another of the frontier areas of the empire repeatedly disputed by secular and regular clergy during the first half of the eighteenth century. The Franciscan

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\(^9\) AGI Santa Fe 185, Juan Gómez Frías to King, Popayán, 6 November 1723.

\(^9\) AGI Santa Fe 404, Fray Francisco Seco to Crown, n.p., n.d. This letter was discussed by the Consejo in February 1724.
order found itself challenged on many fronts during this period, not only within New Granada but also in many other parts of Spanish America. In Cartagena, for instance, the same Franciscan Province of Santa Fe came into conflict with two bishops and the cathedral chapter over the secular clergy's appropriation of four doctrinas in the Urabá/Darién/Sinú area, during exactly the same period. In the mid-1720s, Fray Dionisio de Camino reported to the Crown that four Indian settlements administered by Franciscans in that region - San Pedro de Alcántara, Jesus, María y Joseph, Guadalupe, and San Sebastián - had been transferred by the bishop of Cartagena to the secular clergy. Despite a cédula of September 1725 directing that the settlements should be returned to the control of the order, two subsequent bishops and the cathedral chapter had all refused to do so, on the grounds that they had already been erected as secular parishes served by secular priests.  

In New Mexico, jurisdictional conflicts between the bishops of Durango and the Franciscan friars over that mission territory lasted until the end of the eighteenth century. The dispute between the bishops of Durango and the Franciscans over the New Mexico mission differs in some respects from that between the bishop of Popayán and the order in the Chocó, in the sense that, unlike the Chocó,

93 AGI Santa Fe 405, Fray Dionisio de Camino to Crown, n.p., n.d. The Consejo discussed the letter in August 1727 and concluded that the Franciscans were to be reinstated as doctrineros of the settlements.
which formed part of the diocese of Popayán, the New Mexico mission did not form part of the diocese of Durango, and the Franciscans defended their ground by challenging any attempt by the bishop to interfere with their affairs or even carry out an episcopal visitation to the region. However, the New Mexico case, like the dispute between the order and the bishops of Cartagena, indicates that the Chocó dispute formed part of a broader movement on the part of the ecclesiastical authorities in many of the Spanish colonies to assert their episcopal authority over, and perhaps even displace altogether, the independent missionary orders.

At least until after mid-century, with the advent of the Bourbons and the subsequent reform of the ecclesiastical establishment throughout the Spanish empire, the regular orders won a reprieve. In the Chocó, as in other areas of Spanish America, the Crown first responded in an ambiguous and confused manner to the reports from the bishop and the Franciscan order, supporting one side and then the other. Finally, the dispute was resolved in favour of the Franciscans: for instance, early attempts by

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94 Like the Franciscans in the Chocó, the New Mexico friars also became the subject of attacks about their administration of the mission and serious charges were said to have been made against them. See Adams, "Jurisdictional Conflict in the Borderlands", pp.225-228.


96 Boxer, The Church Militant, p.66.
the Crown to put a stop to Franciscan misconduct by demanding that Fathers Barroso, Caicedo, Méndez, and Caballero be sent to Spain, were followed by the Fiscal of the Consejo recommending that these negative reports should be ignored: there was no need for these friars to appear in Spain. Indeed, in 1724, the Crown even asked Fray Manuel Caicedo, already in the peninsula, to report on whether he thought that the Chocó region should be separated from the gobernación of Popayán.

As we saw from the pastoral visit of Bishop Diego Fermín de Vergara, with which we opened this chapter, the Crown's decision to maintain the status quo meant that no changes were to take place for some time. Diego Fermín de Vergara, like Juan Gómez Frías, complained at length about the Franciscans and about the corregidores. But, despite his complaints, this bishop made no attempt to challenge the order's control of the doctrinas of the Chocó. Instead, his pastoral visitation was directed mainly at establishing cofradías, carrying out confirmations, preaching Christian Doctrine, urging the faithful to live as true Catholics, and ordering the building of new parish churches. He also, of course, urged the corregidores and

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97 Royal Cédula, 29 October 1722, in AGI Santa Fe 404, "Testimonio de Autos".

98 See the Fiscal's discussion of Fray Francisco Seco to Crown, in ibid., February 1724.

the priests to allow the Indian population to attend Mass and instruction in the Christian Faith.  

Bishop Diego Fermin de Vergara's measures, however, had little effect. When Bishop Joseph de Figueredo y Victoria conducted his pastoral visitation, in 1742, to the settlements of San Joseph de Noanama and San Agustín de Sipí, both of which were secular-controlled settlements in the province of Nóvita, he found that the Indians...

...after so many years [since] their reduction and conversion are as ignorant as they were in the beginning ... persevering in the errors of their heathenism. And in ascertaining the root and cause of so much wrong and of the loss of so many souls, the priests excuse themselves [by blaming] the corregidores ... stating that these keep [the Indians] occupied all year in their own activities and businesses, sometimes in the canoes, in the transportation of goods for sale, and others in cultivating ... maize ... [which results] in the priests not being able to keep them settled ... to instruct them ... and explain the Holy Gospel...

The Indians' lack of knowledge of Christianity continued to concern crown officials even at the beginning of the nineteenth century, by which time, the regular clergy had disappeared completely from the Chocó, leaving all parishes in the control of the seculars.

The Franciscans apparently began their retreat from the Chocó region in 1753. In that year, the bishop of Popayán, Don Diego del Corro, refused to appoint a Franciscan presented for the doctrina of Quibdó, Fray Pedro

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100 AGI Quito 185, "Certificación de la visita de Nóvita".

101 Ibid, Auto, Don Joseph de Figueredo y Victoria, San Gerónimo de Nóvita, 12 September 1742.
Ramírez, on the grounds that he had already received a royal cédula ordering the secularization of all regular doctrinas in the region once they became vacant. The number of Franciscans serving doctrinas in the Chocó certainly dwindled after the mid-eighteenth century. In 1777 and 1780, one regular priest served the town of Murri. By the latter date, two other regulars were present in the town of Quibdó, although they shared the administration of this parish with three secular clerics. All the remaining parishes of the Chocó region were, however, administered by seculars, of which there were a total of 20.

The numbers of ecclesiastics in the region fell over the following decades. In 1789, Francisco Silvestre noted that the 15 towns and all the mining camps of the region - inhabited by a total population of 15,286 - were served by only sixteen secular clerics and three regulars. By 1807, the governor of the Chocó, Don Carlos de Ciaurriz, reported that many of the Chocó's towns were not actually served by a priest. The post of parish priest of El Cajón, for instance, had been vacant for several years, and no candidates had been presented to fill it. And although the

102 The cédula was dated 1 February 1753. See Pacheco, La Iglesia Bajo el Regalismo de los Borbones, pp.368-9.


104 "Relación del Chocó ... en que se manifiesta su actual estado...", in Ortega Ricaurte, Historia documental, p.212.

105 Silvestre, Descripción, p.42.
priest of Nóvita was supposed to serve the parishioners of El Cajón while they did not have a priest of their own, this was hardly possible, given that he also had to serve the parishes of Las Juntas and Baudó, situated at distances of two and four days from Nóvita. The towns of Chamí and Tatamá, in the province of Citará, were also in need of the services of a priest - particularly since these towns together had an Indian population of 1,128. In addition, by 1807, Murri had lost its regular priest. Ciaurriz noted that the 115 Indians of the settlement were then served by the priest of the tow settlements of Beté and Bebará, which were at a distance of two days from Murri.¹⁰⁶

The seculars, like their Franciscan predecessors, clearly failed to make any impact on the religious lives of their Indian parishioners. Francisco Silvestre, for instance, observed that progress among the Indians had been very slow. Although the Indians were taught Christian Doctrine in childhood, this was forgotten no sooner had they become adults.¹⁰⁷ In 1807, Governor Don Carlos de Ciaurriz confirmed that the Indians of the Chocó region had not learned even the most basic rudiments of the Catholic Faith. As a result, they continued to live "possessed by superstition", and although they had all been baptised,


¹⁰⁷ Silvestre, Descripción, p.42. See also p.74.
they still referred to "the God of the Christians" - one which formed no part of their own religious experience. 108

Both Silvestre and Ciaurriz pointed to one factor which they believed contributed to the Spaniards' inability to make any headway in implanting Christian concepts among the Indians. While Silvestre observed that there were very few Indians who had any knowledge of the Spanish language, Ciaurriz focused on the fact that, because little effort had been made to provide the children with a basic education, the Indians of the Chocó continued to speak their own native languages, making comprehension of Christian Doctrine and the mysteries of the Catholic Faith extremely difficult.

These, of course, are factors that would have been affected by the size of the white population. As we saw in the Introduction to this thesis, the number of white settlers in the region was always very small. Despite the fact that the Chocó's mines provided immense quantities of precious metals for their owners and administrators, for the traders and merchants who supplied them, for the royal officials and the priests who served in the region, the Spaniards who worked in the Chocó never made any attempt to settle permanently there. Instead, they introduced thousands of African slaves to work the mines, and structured the lives of the Indians in such a way as to ensure that their labours were directed towards the

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108 Bedoya, "Visita del Gobernador ... Don Carlos de Ciaurriz...", p.158.
maintenance of the slaves and the upkeep of the mines. The type of society which was created as a result is the final subject that will concern us as we conclude this study.
CONCLUSION

By the end of the eighteenth century the Colombian Chocó had been thoroughly transformed. A region which until the mid-seventeenth century had been inhabited by Indians who successfully resisted Spanish incursions into their territory had become a rich gold mining zone inhabited mainly by blacks. Despite the difficult terrain, the insalubrious climate, and the bellicosity of the native population, from the beginning of the sixteenth century Spaniards from neighbouring provinces - lured by the promise of immensely rich sources of gold - made numerous attempts to penetrate the region. But it was not until after the rebellion of 1684 was quelled that the native population was finally brought under the control of the Crown. From that point on, an increasing number of Spaniards began entering the region with their slave gangs, and the exploitation of gold deposits began in earnest.

The effects of the rapid expansion of gold production in the Chocó during the eighteenth century were felt throughout the viceroyalty, but particularly in the cities of the Cauca Valley, most notably in Popayán. Indeed, this expansion was largely organised by members of the leading families of the Cauca region, who also became the Chocó’s principal slave and mine owners. The towns of the Cauca Valley were linked to the gold mining economy in another way as well: certain towns - Cali and Buga, for example -
developed an important trade with the Chocó, in goods such as dried and salted meat, tobacco, wheat and sugar products, which could not be produced locally. Thus, the prosperity of the province of Popayán from the early eighteenth century rested largely on the development of the gold mining economy in the Chocó. The expansion of gold mining in the coastal sub-provinces of Popayán - namely, Raposo, Iscuandé and Barbacoas - also contributed greatly to the prosperity of the province of Popayán.¹

In addition to contributing to the economic well-being of the viceroyalty as a whole, the gold of the Chocó also enriched greatly the individual owners of the region’s mines and slave gangs, the merchants who legally and illegally exchanged goods for gold, and the royal officials and priests who served in the region. However, in spite of the wealth generated by the gold mines, the Chocó remained badly underdeveloped throughout the colonial period. For example, although the two provinces of Nóvita and Citará contained a large number of settlements and mining camps,² none of the chocoano towns had a sufficiently large white

¹ Anthony McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, with special reference to overseas trade, 1739-1810" (PhD, University of London, 1977), pp.84-87, 90-91. See also Germán Colmenares, Cali: terratenientes, mineros y comerciantes. Siglo XVIII (Cali, Colombia, 1975), and Germán Colmenares, Popayán. The area to the south of the port of Buenaventura does not, however, form part of this thesis. For an overview of the history of this region, see Robert C. West, The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia: A Negroid Area of the American Tropics (Baton Rouge, 1957), pp.94-96, 100, 102-104, 106, 108, 110.

² See Appendix 2.
population to merit the creation of a cabildo. Early nineteenth century travellers were also struck by the backwardness of the region's social development. When Charles Stuart Cochrane visited the Chocó in 1824, he observed that the two principal towns of the area - Nóvita and Citará (Quibdó) - were very "miserable". Cochrane described the white inhabitants of Nóvita as "miserably ignorant" and "sallow". And although the town of Citará was "far superior to Nóvita", he thought it to be lacking in "society or amusement" and "almost destitute of the positive requisites of life". The "respectable portion" of Citará society he described as lacking in "education and manners".

The lack of political and social development identified by visitors to the region was a reflection of the society that the Spaniards created in the Chocó following the final pacification of the region at the end of the seventeenth century. As William Sharp pointed out,

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1 Sharp, Slavery, p. 14. On the absence of a cabildo in the Chocó region, see also AGI Santa Fe 693, Expediente No.8, f.22.


the terrain, climate, and isolation which the colonists found in the Chocó made it a very unattractive region for settlement. These topographical and climatic factors account for the fact that the region's resident white population was very small. When the first major census was completed in 1778, only 332 people out of a total population of 14,662 (2.3%), were classified as white. Thirty years later, the number of resident whites had risen to 400, but by this time the total population had also risen, to 25,000, which meant that whites now represented an even smaller proportion of the population (1.6%) than they had in 1778. Of course, it was for these residents that all important posts were reserved. Whites served as crown officials, priests, merchants, mineowners, or overseers of the larger mines belonging to absentee proprietors from the cities of the interior.

Whilst serving as a disincentive to settlement, the climate and terrain of the Chocó did not discourage Spanish penetration and colonization. The Chocó's sources of precious metal could not be ignored by the people of other regions - principally the Cauca Valley - repeatedly beset by crises in their own mining economies. Spaniards did not enter the region to settle, but to organize and direct all activity in the Chocó to their own benefit. Thus, while the number of whites who entered the region remained small, the number of slaves introduced to work the mines increased at a dramatic rate from the turn of the eighteenth century.

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6 Sharp, Slavery, p.4.
The development of mining, and the growth of the slave population, meant that, at the same time, the labour of Indians had to be directed towards the support of the mining economy. Indians were employed in transportation, construction, and principally in food production.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the labour system adopted by the Spaniards to exploit the Chocó’s sources of precious metal had combined to produce the peculiar racial composition which characterised the region at the end of the colonial period. The censuses of 1778 and 1808 show very clearly that, by this time, Indians had been outnumbered quite considerably by blacks. In 1778 the 5,414 Indians of the region made up only 36.9% of a total population of 14,662. By 1808, the size of the Indian population had fallen still further - to 4,450, or 17.8% of a total of 25,000.

In 1778, slaves were the largest single sector of the region’s population - 5,756, or 39.2% of the total. This compares with an average for the New Kingdom as a whole of 7.6%. Only in Tumaco and Raposo did slaves make up a larger proportion of the population (63% and 70%, respectively) than in the Chocó. Everywhere else, the slave element in the population was considerably smaller. In the province of Tunja, for example, slaves were only 2% of the population; in the province of Santa Fe, only 1.5%. In the southern province of Pasto, the proportion of slaves in the total
population was even smaller - 0.7%. Although by 1808 the size of the slave population had also fallen, to 4,968 (19.8%) of the total, the black population continued to grow at a dramatic pace.

As a consequence of the introduction of a large slave labour force, there had emerged, by the end of the colonial period, a large libre group - the freedmen. In contrast to other regions of the viceroyalty, where mestizos (people of mixed race, principally Indian/white) made up the fourth important population category, in the Chocó, the place of the mestizos was taken up by the libres, who were predominantly black and mulatto. In 1778, there were 3,160 libres in the Chocó - accounting for the remaining 21.5% of the region's total population of nearly 15,000. By 1808, the number of libres residing in the region had increased to 15,184 - a staggering 60.7% of a total of 25,000 people.

The emergence of a libre group did not, however, promote any form of integration. As Peter Wade points out, the freedmen - both black and mulatto - were not assimilated by the colonial system. Feared because of the influence they might have on the slaves, libres had few

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8 According to Peter Wade, the region's present racial make-up suggests that the libre group was made up chiefly of blacks and mulatos rather than mestizos. Wade, "Patterns of Race", p.4.
opportunities for employment. Although some worked as free labourers in the mines, and others bought their own slaves, or joined the army in segregated regiments, most retreated to inaccessible areas to pan for gold with which to buy the few goods they needed.9

Non-integration was also reflected in a marked hostility between racial groups, but particularly between blacks and Indians. When the Frenchman Gaspar Mollien travelled through Colombia in 1822 and 1823, he remarked on the Indians' "violent antipathy" to the blacks - whom they nevertheless gave the title of "master" - and their dislike and fear of the whites, with whom they never sought to form alliances.10 One hundred years later, in the 1920s, Erland Nordenskiöld described the way in which the expedition’s Indian guide, "the great medicine man" Selimo, "was always superciliously and often insultingly treated by our more or less black servants". He also described how Selimo eventually asserted himself by deliberately placing a venomous snake among the clothing of the expedition’s black steersman.11 In 1939, Robert Cushman Murphy remarked on the Chocó Indians' "strong sentiment against miscegenation", to

9 Ibid., pp.6-7.

10 Gaspar Mollien, Travels in the Republic of Colombia in the Years 1822 and 1823 (London, 1824), pp.306-307. In 1807, the governor of the Chocó, Don Carlos de Ciaurriz, also noted the Indians' antipathy towards the blacks, although he observed that they liked the whites. See Bedoya (ed.), "Visita del Gobernador del Chocó, Don Carlos de Ciaurriz", p.159.

the extent that "they became intolerant of association with either negroes or half-breeds". In the 1970s, Sven-Erik Isacsson drew attention to the fact that the Indians of the region - now reduced to a mere 7% of the total - have gradually been pushed towards the headwaters and upper reaches of the Chocó's many rivers, separated completely from the black population except for "accidental commercial transactions".

From a historical point of view, the capacity of the Indians of the Chocó to retain their racial identity is one of the most interesting features of the Chocó's development since the colonial period - one that refutes Elman Service's theory that those people in the marginal areas of the empire with the weakest social and political organizations were the least likely to retain their racial integrity.

The Indians' success in this regard notwithstanding, it is clear that this has not brought any benefits. Today, blacks and Indians in the Chocó share the neglect which has characterised the region since the earliest days of Spanish occupation. Despite the growing interest and concern of many Colombian academics, blacks and Indians in the Chocó

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13 Isacsson, "Emberá", p.22.

also share the effects of such neglect - low life expectancy, high infant mortality rates, and levels of education and health care which do not compare with those available in the rest of the country. There can be little doubt that these features which now characterise the Chocó derive directly from the fact that the pacification of the native peoples and the introduction of slaves on a massive scale was not followed by Spanish settlement.

\[15\] On this subject, see Alexander Cifuentes, "Introducción", in La participación del negro en la formación de las sociedades latinoamericanas (Bogotá, 1986), pp.13-42.
APPENDIX 1:
GOODS AND SERVICES PURCHASED BY
BUESO DE VALDES FOR THE
ENTRADA OF 1676-1677

GOODS

Arms and Ammunition 222 pesos, 4 tomines
Copper and Lead 55 pesos, 6 tomines
Axes 30 pesos
Canoe 10 pesos
Rope 25 pesos
Flasks 6 pesos
Flag 4 pesos
Petaicas 60 pesos
Paper 8 pesos
Beads, etc. 300 pesos
Fishhooks 30 pesos
Wax and Tallow 78 pesos
Blankets 50 pesos
Alpargatas 75 pesos
Shoes 64 pesos
Cloth 222 pesos, 4 tomines
Tobacco 25 pesos
Wines and Aguardiente 116 pesos
Maize 37 pesos, 4 tomines
Sugar 12 pesos
Salt 10 pesos
Cacao 24 pesos
Spices 19 pesos
Pigs 75 pesos
Other Foodstuffs 121 pesos, 4 tomines
Other Goods 126 pesos
SERVICES

For the construction of canoes 36 pesos, 4 tomines
For the preparation of meat 5 pesos
For the payment of the soldiers 383 pesos, 2 tomines
For the payment of Indian carriers 381 pesos
For the rent of mules for the journey 194 pesos

TOTAL COST 2,806 pesos, 4 tomines

[Source: AGI Santa Fe 204, Ramo 1, ff.36-43, 46, 175, 177-178, 180-181].
APPENDIX 2

THE CHOCO:

TOWNS AND MINING CAMPS (c.1753)

TOWNS - PROVINCE OF NOVITA:

San Gerónimo de Nóvita is the principal town of the province of Nóvita. It is here that the governor and his teniente reside. San Gerónimo contains a public jail, a church, and 65 houses — including the residence of the governor and the teniente. The remaining houses are used by the merchants who come to the province to sell their wares. With the exception of four miners, there are no other residents in San Gerónimo de Nóvita. The Indian population inhabits the province’s other five towns. The province’s mining camps are divided into four partidos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Spanish Officials</th>
<th>Indian Officials</th>
<th>Priests</th>
<th>Total Number of Tributaries</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Las Juntas</td>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>Cacique</td>
<td>Served by priest of Nóvita</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capitán</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alcalde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Brazos</td>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>Cacique</td>
<td>Served by priest of Nóvita</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capitán</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alcalde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sipí</td>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>Cacique</td>
<td>Served by its own priest</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capitán</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Alcaldes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadó</td>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>Cacique</td>
<td>Two priests</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Capitanes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Alcaldes</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noanama</td>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>Cacique</td>
<td>Served by priest of Sipí</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Capitanes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Alcaldes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for Province of Nóvita</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>296</strong></td>
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</table>
TOWNS - PROVINCE OF CITARA:

This province is composed of seven Indian towns, two of which used to form part of the province known as Tatamá/Chocó.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Spanish Officials</th>
<th>Indian Officials</th>
<th>Priest</th>
<th>Total Number of Tributaries</th>
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<tr>
<td>Quibdó</td>
<td>Teniente</td>
<td>Cacique</td>
<td>Served by its own priest</td>
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<td>3 Capitanes</td>
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<td>2 Alcaldes</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>Cacique</td>
<td>Served by its own priest</td>
<td>220</td>
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<td>3 Alcaldes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Beté</td>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>Cacique</td>
<td>Served by its own priest</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>1 Alcalde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Bebará</td>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>Capitán Alcalde</td>
<td>Served by its own priest</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Murri</td>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>Cacique Capitán</td>
<td>Served by its own priest</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>Cacique</td>
<td>Served by its own priest</td>
<td>97</td>
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<td>2 Alcaldes</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatamá</td>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>Cacique Alcalde</td>
<td>Served by its own priest</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total for Province of Citara</td>
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<td>Mining Camp</td>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>Male Working Slaves</td>
<td>Female Working Slaves</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Concepción del Playón y San Antonio del Remolino</td>
<td>Don Salvador Gómez de la Asprilla y Novoa</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>La Concepción del Salto</td>
<td>Don Francisco Gómez de la Asprilla y Novoa</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Bárbara</td>
<td>Don Juan Bautista y Barquén</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>La Concepción del Salto</td>
<td>Don Tomás de Rivas</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>San Felipe de Tamaná</td>
<td>Don Felipe de Valencia y Estrada</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuestra Señora del Socorro y Sitio del Milagro</td>
<td>Don Lucas de Estaio y Fortún</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuestra Señora de la Soledad y Pie del Salto de Guarabal</td>
<td>Don Gerónimo Antonio de Cabrera</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sed de Cristo</td>
<td>Don Juan de Bonilla y Delgado</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuestra Señora de Chiquinquirá del Caucho</td>
<td>Don Manuel Villa de Moros</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio del Peñón y Aguacalera</td>
<td>Don Tomás Francisco de Urrutia</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Nuestra Señora de la Soledad de Opogodó</td>
<td>Don Cristóbal de Guzmán</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuestra Señora de Chiquinquirá de Tajuatu</td>
<td>Agustín Leuro</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Rita</td>
<td>Don Bernardo García de la Granda</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Lorenzo de los Brazos</td>
<td>Don Joseph López García Aníbal</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>556</td>
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### MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OF NOVITA

#### PARTIDO DE TADO

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<th>Mining Camp</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Male Working Slaves</th>
<th>Female Working Slaves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio y Santa Lucía</td>
<td>Don Francisco Gómez de la Aspilla</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Nuestra Señora de la Soledad</td>
<td>Don Santos de Obregón</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Santa Lucía del Calabozo</td>
<td>Don Nicolás de Inestrosa</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papagayo</td>
<td>Miguel Durán</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Rosa de la Platina</td>
<td>Don Agustín de Perea y Salinas</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Nuestra Señora de los Dolores</td>
<td>Don Marcos de Perea</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joseph de Piedra Piedra</td>
<td>Don Agustín Roso de Villalba</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Bárbara de Iró</td>
<td>Don Cristóbal de Mosquera y Figueroa</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Don Joseph de Mosquera y Figueroa</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>Santa Rita de Ibordó</td>
<td>Francisco Perea y Salinas</td>
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<td>San Miguel de Tadolito</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purdo Jondó</td>
<td>Joseph Perea Salinas</td>
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### MINING CAMPS – PROVINCE OF NOVITA

#### PARTIDO DE SAN AGUSTIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mining Camp</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Male Working Slaves</th>
<th>Female Working Slaves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santa Rosa y Santa Lucia</td>
<td>Don Juan de Argomedo</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuestra Señora de la Honda</td>
<td>Don Juan Antonio de Nieva y Arrabel</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Señora Santa Ana</td>
<td>Belongs to the Holy Souls. Administered by Don Ignacio de Moia y Torres.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio Bosiradó</td>
<td>Don Francisco Gerónimo Mondragón</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio de las Simarronas</td>
<td>Don Francisco Gómez de la Asprilla y Novoa</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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### MINING CAMPS – PROVINCE OF NOVITA

#### PARTIDO DEL CAJON

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<th>Owner</th>
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<th>Female Working Slaves</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>San Joseph</td>
<td>Don Pedro de Arboleda</td>
<td>42</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Cayetano</td>
<td>Doña María Rosa de Vergara y Daza</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Bárbara de la Bola</td>
<td>Doña María Josepha de Arboleda</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Santa Bárbara de Arriba</td>
<td>Manuel Morillo</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio de Torrá</td>
<td>Doña Antonia Gómez de la Asprilla y Novoa</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jesús, María y Joseph de Taparal</td>
<td>Diego de Tovar (free black)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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### MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OF CITARA

#### PARTIDO DE QUIBDO

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<th>Owner</th>
<th>Male Working Slaves</th>
<th>Female Working Slaves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ydípurdú Pequeño</td>
<td>Doña Josepha de la Cuesta</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipurdú Grande</td>
<td>Doña Balthasara de la Cerda</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negua</td>
<td>Don Diego Palomeque</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negua de la Concepción</td>
<td>Doña María Clemencia de Caicedo</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quebrada de San Antonio</td>
<td>Miguel Velasco</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ychó</td>
<td>Don Carlos de Andrade</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>Ychó de Merodó</td>
<td>Don Francisco Javier de los Santos</td>
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<td>Quebrada de Duata</td>
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### MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OF CITARA

#### PARTIDO DE BEBARA

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<th>Female Working Slaves</th>
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<td>Bebará</td>
<td>Don Miguel de la Cuesta</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bebará</td>
<td>Doña Ignacia de Borja</td>
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<td>Bebará</td>
<td>Don Toribio Sánchez de Arroyo</td>
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<td>Gualaza</td>
<td>Ignacio de Quesada</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baberama</td>
<td>Cristóbal de Torres</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## MINING CAMPS - PROVINCE OF CITARA

### PARTIDO DE LLORO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mining Camp</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Male Working Slaves</th>
<th>Female Working Slaves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Llave</td>
<td>Don Antonio de la Torre</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andagueda</td>
<td>Don Francisco de Maturana</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andagueda</td>
<td>Don Antonio Patiño</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andagueda</td>
<td>Don Francisco Martínez</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bartolomé de Andagueda</td>
<td>Don Francisco de la Torre</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
<td><strong>82</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: AGI Santa Fe 733, "Descripción del Gobierno del Chocó, en la jurisdicción del Nuevo Reino de Granada, que se presenta, con Memorial, a S.M., por Don Pedro Muñoz de Arjona, hijo del Coronel Don Alfonso de Arjona, n.p., n.d.]
The vast majority of the primary sources used in this thesis come from the Archivo General de Indias, in Seville (AGI). Some primary sources were also found in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid (BN) and the British Museum in London (BM). Documentation on the Chocó in the AGI tends to be clustered in only a few legajos. Because jurisdiction over parts of the gobernación of Popayán, in some areas of government, was divided between the Audiencias of Santa Fé and Quito, the legajos containing documents on the Chocó in the AGI are evenly divided between the Audiencias of Santa Fé and Quito. Among these, there were some that were particularly valuable. Quito 67, for instance, contained a very large number of papers dealing with the pre-1670 period. Santa Fe 204 was made up entirely of collected documents on the 1676-88 period. Santa Fe 307 and 362, and Quito 143 contained a large number of papers relating to the first two decades of the eighteenth century - the period covering Pedrosa y Guerrero's attempts to reform the Chocó's administration, and López de Carvajal's effort to resettle the Indians of the provinces in the region of the Murri river. Quito 185 was full of ecclesiastical material - the papers sent to the Crown by the bishops of Popayán, in particular Don Juan Gómez Frías, and the reports on the pastoral visit conducted by Fray Diego Fermín de Vergara. The countless letters sent by the Franciscans of the Province of Santa Fe, and most of the documents referring to the divisions within the Franciscan order were dispersed in Santa Fe 403 to 408. Many other legajos also contained valuable and interesting documents on the Chocó's seventeenth and early eighteenth century history.

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Quito: 13, 15, 16, 67, 75, 127, 137, 139, 143, 144, 185, 190.

Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid (BN)

BN Ms.19699

British Museum, London (BM)

Ms.Add. 13,992, No.45, ff.357-59; and Ms.Add. 15,740.
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