HEGEL AND THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT

The Recognition of Education in Civil Society

Nigel Tubbs

IV. Hegel and Education.

A - Recognition.

Mutual recognition 177
The master/slave dialectic 186
The dialectic of subjective substance 194
Recognition, misrecognition, education 203

B - Recognizing the Teacher.

Education as domination 211
The dialectic of master and student 217
Recognition as ethical pedagogy 224

C. Recognizing Critique 237

Bildung 238
The state and relative ethical life 246
Philosophy as comprehensive state education 251

Conclusion. 260

Notes and References. 270

Bibliography. 296
Acknowledgements.

This thesis is the result of many relationships. I would like to thank my teacher, Gillian Rose, and those friends I have taught with at Patcham High School, Countesthorpe College and most importantly at Thomas Bennett Community College. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the work of sociology students, humanities students and those in the two tutor groups with whom I worked at Bennett. They have been the loss of this teacher.

Thanks are due also to Peter Hazlerigg for his patience and help in the printing of the thesis. Finally, I have to thank Icon Bennett; at their best when needed most.
This thesis develops an Hegelian philosophy of education by presenting the concept as the comprehension of the dialectic of enlightenment. It begins by examining recent critical theory of education which has employed Habermas's idea of communicative action in order to reassess the relationship between education and political critique. It goes on to expose the flaws in this approach by uncovering its uncritical use of critique as the method of enlightenment. Enlightenment as overcoming presupposes enlightenment as absolute education. The philosophical issues raised here are then substantially examined by returning to Habermas in order to trace the presupposition of critique as method in his theorizing. It is argued that Habermas also presupposes critique as absolute enlightenment, or overcoming, in both the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest and in The Theory of Communicative Action, and further, that it is this presupposition which returns as the contradiction of the dialectic of enlightenment in his work. Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment is then itself examined along with Adorno's Negative Dialectics. Here it is argued that although this work marks an educational and philosophical development over Habermas, nevertheless its authors also presuppose the identity of enlightenment, this time in the claim that the dialectic of enlightenment, and negative dialectics, are not a determinate negation. The thesis shows how Habermas and Adorno, in their respective views of the dialectic of enlightenment, repeat but do not comprehend the self-determination which is the actual in Hegelian philosophy. The final chapter of the thesis employs Hegelian philosophy to re-examine the aporia of education as method. It argues that the dialectic of enlightenment is actual when it is recognized as the self-education of philosophical consciousness, and is the identity and non-identity which is the concept. The implications of Hegelian philosophy of education as the recognition of misrecognition are then explored, first with regard to rethinking the identity of the teacher in civil society and developing the concept as ethical pedagogy; and then to recognizing critique as comprehensive education with regard to the state in civil society.
INTRODUCTION.

Hegel is not recognized as a philosopher of education. Works which are variously concerned with the history of western education, of western educational philosophy, and of educational theory and theorists, do not include Hegel's philosophy as a significant contribution. Even where Kant and Fichte are included, Hegel remains a notable absentee. [1] This thesis, however, argues that Hegel's philosophy is not only a philosophy of education, it is philosophy as education. Moreover, it shows how the key ideas in Hegel, in particular those of the concept, the actual and absolute ethical life, are themselves ideas which can only be comprehended as this (philosophical) education.

It achieves this by reading Hegel against recent Habermasian critical theory of education, and then more substantially against the interpretations of the dialectic of enlightenment found in the work of Habermas, and of Horkheimer and Adorno. It reveals how these critical theorists employ as their method an uncritical presupposition of the identity of education, or absolute education, in their own critiques of bourgeois society. [2] In exposing the social determination of knowledge, of truth and of the identity of objects, they do not recognize the social determination of the method by which they are themselves carrying out these investigations. It is in the comprehension of this presupposition of education as method that Hegelian philosophy of education is realized.
To develop Hegel's educational philosophy it is not necessary to begin with Hegel; indeed, to do so would be to misunderstand the education which is his philosophy. It differs from traditional educational philosophy in that much of his work does not immediately appear to be about education at all. Rousseau's *Emile*, for example, can easily be identified as both about education and as educational. It has a subject being educated, a clearly demarcated process which is its educational activity, and a goal which would be the result of that activity. Our reading the work is intended to be our education with regard to what education is, and what it should be. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a work whose educational import forms a large part of this thesis, is not at all clear in the same way with regard to who is being educated, how, or for what, or by whom. It is by no means clear either whether the work is intended as our education, and if so what the desired result is to be.

The differences between Hegelian educational philosophy and the more traditional presentation of educational theory are themselves part of the content which constitute the educational significance of Hegel's work. Hegel's system is concerned with education as experience, therefore, an abstract presentation of experience would not itself be the activity which is being referred to. It would be a presentation about education, but it would not be that education itself. Thus a description of what education is, is the experience for us of what education in itself is not. This contradiction is the substance of the educational philosophy of Hegel, a contradiction which, if it is to appear as our education, cannot simply be abstractly stated. The
presentation of education according to this contradiction, that is
according to its own identity and non-identity as the experience of
what education is not, is the characteristic which sets Hegel's
philosophy apart as a philosophy of education. In order, therefore, to
understand Hegel's philosophy of education to be philosophy as
education, it is necessary to begin by recreating the experience of
contradiction, to realize it for ourselves, so that its education is at
the same time our experience, and our activity. The return to Hegel can
then be made in order to comprehend that education as the movement and
result, the actuality, which is the concept.

The production of this experience is both the recognition of education
in civil society promised in the title of the thesis, and accounts for
the overall structure of the thesis. On the first point, it is
important to note that throughout the work, the terms civil society and
the state are used in a strictly Hegelian manner. Civil society is what
Hegel describes as the external state,

an association of members as self-subsistent individuals
in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence,
is only abstract. Their association is brought about by
their needs, by the legal system - the means to security
of person and property - and by an external organization
for attaining their particular and common interests. [3]

The idea of the state in the Philosophy of Right is distinguished from
civil society, or the merely external state. 'The state is the
actuality of the ethical idea', [4] or is the recognition of the self-
subsistent person and its external state as abstract. Therefore, in
this thesis, civil society refers to bourgeois private property law,
which is the abstract universality and guarantee of the rights of individual persons, and to capitalist relations of commodity production, in which persons relate to each other as things; in both, activity is abstracted from result, and appears to be a property which is inherent in the result. Thus, activity becomes unknowable, an abstraction which is reproduced by the activity itself, and which determines the identity of things and persons as they appear to natural consciousness. What is therefore a social relation or activity is dominated by the appearance of its abstract result as the external state, private property law, the person, the commodity, or analytical thought. With regard to Hegelian philosophy of education, the separation of the educational activity of both the teacher and of critique from their appearance as result in civil society is examined in chapter IV.

On the second point, that of the overall structure of the thesis, the work is divided into four chapters. The first three chapters are designed to produce for the reader the contradiction of education as it appears in recent critical theory of education based on Habermas, Habermas himself, and in Horkheimer and Adorno. In chapter IV, the comprehension of that contradiction as the educational import of Hegelian philosophy is presented. This introduction now outlines in more detail the various stages of the argument.

Chapters I - III raise the problem that the contradiction of the identity and non-identity of education noted above, is reproduced whenever education or enlightenment is presupposed as method. Education
is held to be the process by which one becomes enlightened regarding an object. But how, then, is one to become enlightened with regard to the process of becoming enlightened? There is in such an inquiry the contradiction that one uses as the method of investigation the very process that is the object of the investigation. To overcome ignorance regarding enlightenment and the identity of education, by becoming enlightened or educated, is to use education as a method in order to produce the truth of education as result. The presupposition of education as method only reproduces the experience that such a method cannot be education in itself, or unconditioned self-activity and result. The contradiction of education as method is already the experience of enlightenment as negative. It is with this experience of education as method in critical theory of education, rather than with Hegelian philosophy of education, that this thesis begins.

Chapter I examines this presupposition of enlightenment as it appears in recently developed Habermasian critical theory of education. [5]

This work is of particular importance because it seeks to reveal the relationship between education and politics in modern society, arguing that critique is the political development of a rational will, and that genuine intersubjective relations, the idea of the ethical community, result from this rational self-education. This critical theory of education has based itself on Habermas's distinction of three knowledge-constitutive interests [6] and attempts to produce a critique of the determination of education in bourgeois society. Critical theorists in education have tried to show how the technical knowledge-constitutive interest determines and distorts education, so that its
import as political development and self-formation is lost behind its appearance as a merely technical activity. Their work relates both to the political aspects of social enlightenment, and to the politics of the process of formal schooling and educational research in civil society. In this sense, it is part of a wider tradition of critical sociology of education which has been concerned to develop a critical and marxist perspective on formal schooling, curriculum knowledge and the teacher/student relationship. [7] What is specific about this critical theory of education within the tradition is its attempt to employ Habermas's emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest as the unification of both enlightenment and political activity, and to apply the theory of communicative action to educational philosophy as an educational philosophy.

However, despite the importance of this work in highlighting the relationship between politics and education, a Habermasian critical theory of education can ultimately only reproduce the contradiction of education in its presupposition of critique as the method of enlightenment. This is briefly examined in the final section of chapter I. The contradiction is manifest in the idea of enlightenment as overcoming; it employs critique as the method (and self-identity) of enlightenment, assuming that enlightenment is already known in itself to be that which emancipates the subject from the abstract and the illusory.

The contradiction of education in critical theory of education cannot be resolved internally. Each attempt to overcome the impasse of the
contradiction merely reproduces the presupposition of enlightenment as method, and repeats the contradiction that enlightenment as method is already not the identity of education as unconditioned activity and result. Consequently, critical theory of education finds that its own aporias of educational reasoning produce for it a philosophical experience, one where it has its own thinking activity as object. However, critical theory of education has not yet developed its own thinking into a philosophical self-consciousness; as such, its philosophical aporias require to be examined within a tradition in which the contradiction of education is known, and in which the relationship between education and politics is also maintained.

This task is begun in chapter II. Here the presupposition of enlightenment as overcoming is examined in Habermas's own work, from Knowledge and Human Interests to The Theory of Communicative Action. It is argued that Habermas employs the idea of overcoming as the unconditioned unity of the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest, of ideology-critique, of communicative competence, and of the lifeworld. Each of these notions contains the assumption that the identity of enlightenment as reason and interest can be known and reconstructed as the condition of the unconditioned. The unconditioned unity of this rational activity and result is the lifeworld, its conditioned appearance is discourse or communicative action.

Chapter III reads Habermas and Adorno against each other to reproduce the aporia of the contradiction of education which has been the subject of the first two chapters. Their respective contributions to critical
theory are presented here as two halves of the contradiction of education. Chapter III is therefore divided into the enlightened view of Habermas and the dialectical view of Adorno to produce an overview of the dialectic of enlightenment as a whole. For Habermas, the negative and nihilistic dangers of the dialectic of enlightenment are overcome in the emancipatory activity which is critique, and which later becomes the theory of communicative action. For Adorno, the negativity of the dialectic of enlightenment is not overcome, and enlightenment does not produce a positive result which can overcome abstract identity thinking. In both, enlightenment regarding the identity of the absolute is presupposed, a presupposition which in each case can only be made by remaining uncritical with regard to the abstract idea of education on which each relies.

The relationship between the absolute and education now becomes clear: to know the absolute, or to know that it is not known, is already to have assumed enlightenment with regard to its (non) identity. The identity and non-identity of enlightenment, or the dialectic of enlightenment, therefore both necessarily precedes and results from knowledge regarding the absolute. It is itself the activity and result which is the inquiry into, and the aporia of the knowing of the absolute. The dialectic of enlightenment is the contradiction which is the activity and result of our education regarding the absolute. The absolute is this education, and it is this recognition, of education in civil society as misrecognition, which is Hegel's philosophy of education. This is developed in chapter IV of the thesis, which is divided into three sections.
The first section of chapter IV examines the idea of recognition as it appears in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. It is shown how the master/slave dialectic is the experience of determinate negation and is the recognition of misrecognition comprehended as self-activity and result, or self-education. This education for us regarding the unity and non-unity of thought as activity and result then enables a reading of subjective substance as determinate negation; a reading in which the abstract universality of substance and the illusory independence of subjectivity in civil society are recognized as misrecognition, or as the contradiction which is the self-activity of subject and substance.

The second section of chapter IV examines the actual as it results from the contradiction of the identity of the teacher in civil society. The teacher in civil society is both the master of what is to be taught, and the presupposition that what is to be taught can be taught, or of enlightenment as method. Yet at the same time as the teacher has that knowledge, he is also required to perform it, that is to teach it for the unenlightened student. The truth of the teacher lies in his activity, not in his knowledge. The contradiction of the teacher, therefore, is that in his very person he is already the presupposition of the activity which has yet to be realized. The identity of the teacher is a self-contradiction; but one which, as in the dialectic of enlightenment, is itself educational when that contradiction is recognized as self-work.

Working with the idea of education as the recognition of misrecognition, Hegelian philosophy of education can comprehend the
contradiction of the teacher to be the self-work which is its own activity and result. The identity of the teacher as contradiction in civil society is not overcome, but that aporia is comprehended as the actuality of the teacher. The section ends by examining this actuality in Hegel's own teaching practice whilst a teacher in the Nuremberg gymnasium. The phrase *ethical pedagogy* is introduced to show how the actuality of the teacher is the re-creation of the contradiction of the teacher. His education for his students produces the experience of the negation and loss of the teacher, and at the same time the realization that it is the teacher whose truth this negation and loss is. Such a pedagogy is philosophical because it has as its 'method' the contradiction that it can only begin methodologically, or with what is abstract, that is, with the teacher, and thus not begin at all. It is ethical because it does not suppress the negation of (absolute) education, rather it has that negation as its own educational self-activity.

The final section of chapter IV examines the actual as it results from the contradiction of critique. Formal education in civil society is examined as socialization, and the experience of this for subjectivity is seen as giving rise to the (moral) self-consciousness which is active in critique. But critique, when it presupposes its own activity as realizing the unconditioned, misrecognizes the abstraction which is that presupposition. The recognition of critique as misrecognition is the unity of the concept, or what in this thesis is examined as the philosophical activity and result of a comprehensive state education.
The recognition of critique as misrecognition is traced from its immediacy in *paideia*, through the period of *die Bildung* as its own separation and division, up to its unification as the work and result which is philosophy. The actuality of the state in the *Philosophy of Right* is briefly examined before, in the final section of chapter IV, the idea of philosophy as comprehensive state education is introduced. The phrase deliberately conjoins terms which are Hegelian and educational, in an attempt to hold together the identity and non-identity of education and the state in civil society. It is developed by showing how education as socialization is merely the abstract principle of universal education, and further, that moral education can only repeat the separation of subject and substance. Critique is comprehensive, or philosophical, when its presupposition of education as method is recognized as misrecognition.
CHAPTER I - BECOMING CRITICAL OF EDUCATION

The Critique of Educational Interests.

This chapter examines the recently developed Habermasian critical theory of education. It concentrates on two works - *Becoming Critical*, by W. Carr and S. Kemmis, and *A Critical Theory of Education* by R.E. Young. The chapter shows how these works offer a critique of the determination of education in civil society.

In *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas distinguishes between the technical, practical and emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interests. Empirical-analytical inquiry has as its basis the technical interest which is concerned to inform instrumental action. It is the aspect of human work which aims to dominate nature and is characterized by measurement and calculation rather than by intersubjective relations. Enlightenment determined by this technical interest produces knowledge only in the form of control over objects, human and non-human. 'Action... is reduced to the solitary act of purposive rational utilization of means. And individualized experience is eliminated in favour of the repeatable experience of the results of instrumental action'. [1]

Alternatively, hermeneutic or practical inquiry does not see the object of knowledge to be control; it takes as its object the necessary social
presuppositions of its inquiry, and therefore has as its goal the understanding of that social object. This interest is reflective, therefore, in the sense that it is an inquiry into the determination of (the social) self. Whereas the interest in technical control dominates the object, the practical interest 'constitutes itself in a self-formative process'; [2] and whereas the technical interest has no practical self-application, because it is a methodology and therefore separated from the process of its determination, hermeneutic inquiry grasps reality 'with regard to possible intersubjectivity of action-orienting mutual understanding...'; [3] it has immediate practical import.

The identification of the technical and practical knowledge-constitutive interests reveals that they are particular to and dependent upon their social and historical context. To know these interests as socially determined is to begin to critically undermine their status as value free or independent (objective). An interest is already a value; thus the rules of the natural and cultural sciences no longer possess the status of pure transcendental rules. They have a transcendental function but arise from actual structures of human life: from structures of a species that reproduces its life both through learning processes of socially organized labour and processes of mutual understanding in interactions mediated in ordinary language. These basic conditions of life have an interest structure. The meaning of the validity of statements derivable within the quasi-transcendental systems of reference of processes of inquiry in the natural and cultural sciences is determined in relation to this structure. [4]
Knowledge for Habermas is merely a reflection of the knowledge-constitutive interest from which it originates and by which it is determined.

Critical theorists in education have recently tried to adopt this model in their own critique of the interests which have shaped educational research, and perspectives in the sociology of education. Carr and Kemmis devote a chapter to revealing the interests which underpin the 'natural scientific view of educational theory and practice' and another to the 'interpretive view of educational theory and practice', whilst Young argues that the technical interest underpins a modern educational crises.

Carr and Kemmis include in their critique the philosophical foundations of educational theory which took (technical) form as 'the passive digestion of chronologically arranged factual accounts of philosophical doctrines', [5] the behaviourist models which developed a 'technology of teaching' [6] and which applied methodologies to educational problems concerned with discipline, control, motivation and assessment, functionalist sociology of education which regarded the action of individuals (teachers) 'as something governed by invariant functional laws that operate beyond the individual actors' personal control', [7] and to positivist approaches which borrowed for educational research the aims, concepts and methods of the natural sciences, and assumed that educational practice could become based on 'objective decisions about possible courses of action'. [8] The criticism of all these perspectives from within Habermasian critical theory is that their
guiding interest is determined by a falsely perceived relationship to their object, where social mediation remains hidden from view. Carr and Kemmis have applied Habermas's insight into the presupposition of knowledge as interest to scientific perspectives in educational theorizing and not only undermined their claims to value freedom, truth and objectivity, but also revealed how the interest which motivates these perspectives is one which perpetuates the structures of human life which give rise to it in the first place. When the technical interest dominates theory and research, and when reality is defined according to this interest as a natural appearance, then 'this kind of research will always be biased towards prevailing educational arrangements and its theories will be structured in favour of the "status quo"'. [9]

Young views the empirical-analytic interest as the cause of what he sees as the modern educational crises. Positivism, characterized by a belief in value freedom, cut off from science the realms of ethical and political commitment. As a result,

positive science leant itself to the further development of an alienated culture of manipulation. In the science of education, this led to a view of pedagogy as manipulation, while curriculum was divided into value-free subjects and value-based subjects where values were located decisionistically. The older view of pedagogy as moral/ethical and practical art was abandoned. [10]

This leads Young to conclude that the crises of education 'is a product of the one-sided development of our capacity for rational management of human affairs and rational problem solving'. [11]
With regard to the hermeneutic or cultural perspectives in education, Carr and Kemmis make clear how the practical knowledge-constitutive interest is a development from the technical interest. In Habermas's own account, in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, this interest is seen to include within it the acknowledgement that its mode of enquiry cannot be merely based on the methods of the natural sciences because its object is not merely natural, but is social; and moreover is an object within which its own meanings are formed and agreed upon. This object exists as the presupposition of the inquiry, not the other way round as in the technical interest. This is an understanding of the intersubjective nature of reality, and of the necessarily intersubjective form of what is now understood as a practical (self) inquiry. It is not, therefore, an understanding which is deceived by the modern structure of human life, for it sees that meaning is collectively produced, and that inquiry is not independent of its object.

Carr and Kemmis include in this category phenomenological sociology of education which acknowledges that social reality 'possesses an intrinsic meaning structure that is constituted and sustained through the routine interpretive activities of its individual members'; [12] interpretive sociology which employs Weber's idea of *verstehen*; and recent attempts to explore the implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics for educational research and practice. [13]

In spite of noting the advance which the practical interest represents over the technical interest, Carr and Kemmis, and Young are highly
critical of it. Its advance lies in the emphasis it places on the determined nature of social reality; it is therefore not concerned to control the social, but rather to understanding the manner in which the social exerts control over human activity. It is also an advance because it lays stress on the need to understand the meanings which actors themselves have in and of any situation, and to uncover the social forms in which these meanings are produced. Its practical import consists in the understanding that what is produced by interpretive research is a self-understanding, and thus produces immanent change.

However, for Carr and Kemmis, as for Habermas, this is not change, but only reflective contemplation; it is not critique. Understanding the social context in which meanings and thoughts are produced is not an explanation of the particular shape of that social context, or of the historically specific thoughts and meanings which it produces at any one time. Thus 'the interpretive model neglects questions about the origins, causes and results of actors adopting certain interpretations of their actions and social life, and neglects the crucial problems of social conflict and social change'. [14]

In an inquiry into the social determination of meaning, a criterion by which to criticize those meanings, which was not itself also determined, would seem to be an impossibility. In the interpretive model, a correct understanding is one which is aware of its social nature, and thus any one understanding or hermeneutical enlightenment is as legitimate as any other.
Young also notes the crises of legitimation which results from the awareness of meaning as a social construction. On the one hand, education has become the tool by which both the political right and left seek to portray their own meanings as legitimate and authentic, and on the other hand, the education system is itself unable to provide a self-justification of what constitutes educational activity which can achieve legitimation over and above the crises. Young comments,

the present crises is manifesting itself as a general social crises in economic, political and motivational dimensions. It is accompanied by a sense of loss of meaning. Both the New Right and the Old Left have turned to cultural and educational management and manipulation.... The crisis is thus an educational crises because powerful groups seek to employ educational means to bring about...a satisfactory resolution...The school system is in the front line of loss of motivation and meaning. [15]

Carr and Kemmis, and Young are all critical of the inability of the interpretive perspective to deal with the transformation of the social object which they understand to be the horizon within which meaning is determined. Young points out that it is unable to 'penetrate behind the facade of the existing culture or system of meaning as a product of communal or social objectification'. [16] For Carr and Kemmis this means that the interpretive approach is always predisposed towards the idea of reconciling people to their existing social reality...Hence, although interpretive theories may be able to transform consciousness of social reality, they...remain indifferent to the need for social theory to be critical of the status quo. [17]
Redefining Educational Theory and Practice.

The third of Habermas's knowledge-constitutive interests receives little direct attention from either Carr and Kemmis or Young because it is the foundation of a more all-encompassing Habermasian theory, that of communicative action. [18] It is in the idea of rational mutual dialogue that critical theory of education is able to unite theory and practice in active self-critique, where the transformation of subject and object are one and the same process of enlightenment. It is the basis also of what Carr and Kemmis refer to as critical educational science.

In the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest Carr and Kemmis find 'a basic interest in rational autonomy and freedom which issues in a demand for the intellectual and material conditions in which non-alienated communication and interaction can occur. [19] Habermasian critical social science embodies the interest in emancipation. It is where, as Habermas points out, 'we come upon the fundamental connection of knowledge and interest'. [20] Habermasian critique is not only a critique of the determination of social reality, it is a self-critique, in the sense that it embodies and presupposes that this critique is the rational enlightenment of that predetermining social object by itself, with regard to itself. It is therefore a unity of theory and practice because what is known and what is active (or subject and object) are one and the same; and this unity itself appears in the movement of language as the mutual activity of participating individuals who seek
to obtain collective and therefore valid truth contents through critical questioning and self-reflective critique. Thus, for Carr and Kemmis,

Habermas's theory of communicative competence is an ethical theory of self-realization which transposes the source of human ideals onto language and discourse. For the purpose of Habermas's theory is to try and establish how, inherent in, and established by, everyday human speech, there is a conception of an ideal form of life in which the sort of rational autonomy served by the emancipatory interest can be realized. [21]

It is in this interest, then, that the critical theorists under review in this chapter attempt to combine critique as social theory with critique of the social determination of education.

This interest does not repeat the inadequacies of the technical and practical knowledge-constitutive interests because in communicative action the mutual or collective basis of knowledge is not only acknowledged, it is produced in the activity of dialogue which, between consenting participants, aims at the truth. The interest in emancipation is directly produced in self-reflective critique because it both acknowledges its own lack of freedom and produces this enlightened knowledge freely and as a self-determination. This is not to suggest that freedom is thereby instantly produced in the world through rational agreement produced in discourse, but it is to know that within discourse there exists the conditions of an ideal speech situation wherein distortions are overcome. It is also to understand that when actors acknowledge the truth content of a discursively produced critique of (some feature of) distorted reality, it is their
new understanding which surpasses their old one, for it overcomes the separation of knowledge and interest, and therefore constitutes validity in itself. When theory and practice are united in the emancipatory activity of rational communicative action, then, for Carr and Kemmis, a new activity is produced, critical praxis, as are the beginnings of a critical educational science along the lines of Habermasian critical social science. Its most important implication is that the unification of theory and practice in self-reflective critique is the production of an activity which is both an understanding of social relations and a transformation of society at the same time. A critical social science, founded on communicative action, embodies

a form of practice in which the 'enlightenment' of actors comes to bear directly in their transformed social action. This requires an integration of theory and practice as reflective and practical moments in a dialectical process of reflection, enlightenment and political struggle carried out by groups for the purpose of their own emancipation. [22]

The aim, then, of critical educational science, is to replace technical and interpretive perspectives in educational research with Habermasian critical theory, and to develop a praxis-based research process which has emancipatory import and whose aim is not merely to describe education but to transform it. Because it accepts the insight into the importance of the pre-existing social world as determinative, it does not treat participants in education as objects to be studied, but as participants in the critical process of overcoming the distortions produced in and by that determination. Thus it involves 'teachers, students, parents and school administrators in the tasks of critical
analysis of their own situations with a view to transforming them in ways which will improve these situations...'. [23] But critical educational science is not restricted to the transformation of schools and educational institutions. Critical theory is implicitly a social theory, and the self-reflection of participants in education establishes at the same time 'self-reflective communities' which, claim Carr and Kemmis, 'foreshadows and engenders a different form of social organization'. [24] They conclude that 'a critical educational theory prefigures a more general critical social theory'. [25]

For Young, critical theory of education based on Habermasian social theory has the same goals. It aims to enlighten those involved in education by facilitating the production of rational discourse amongst them such that consensus can be produced between the participants who genuinely seek truth. He acknowledges that Habermas, in revealing the link between communication and enlightenment, has surpassed those critical theorists who merely identified the contradictions of critique (for example, Adorno), and has provided a vision in the theory of communicative action which could lead to a higher learning level altogether. 'We are at the threshold of a learning level characterized by the personal maturity of the decentred ego and by open, reflexive communication...'. [26] He also shares the view of Carr and Kemmis that the implications of a critical theory of education go beyond the limited field of formal education, to the very core of the organization of a genuinely democratic society. In Habermas there is the insight 'that it is in the facts of human speech that the possibility of
freedom and respect for each human being's potential contribution to the experience of the species rests'. [27]

Carr and Kemmis, and Young are all convinced of the need for a Habermasian programme of reform in education not only for education itself, but because realizing this new human potential is an educational issue. Just as Habermas notes that the emancipatory interest is evident in 'the critical dissolution of objectivism', [28] so Young remarks that although 'fragments of a more mature learning level are all around us', [29] nevertheless democracy can only move beyond its present half-developed state if the level of institutionally permitted learning in society is allowed to be raised, technical questions distinguished from ethical-political ones and discursive rather than institutional or indoctrinatory learning processes allowed to take place. [30]

The activity and identity of education for critical theorists, then, is not only a matter of the social organization and content of formal learning, but is the substance of critique and of human emancipation, and of the development of rational ethical life.

It is on the basis of Habermasian critical theory, that a critical educational science is based, and from which a programme of reform emerges in the work of Young, and Carr and Kemmis. Young highlights the need for a critical reconstruction of teaching, learning, curriculum, educational research, teacher training, and the organization of education designed to bring about an 'improvement on the existing state of affairs'. [31] Carr and Kemmis, following Habermas's own comments in
Theory and Practice, distinguish three aims of critical science; true statements produced in rational discourse, the organization of (these) processes of enlightenment, and following from these the political conduct appropriate to their truth content. The following section describes the specific programmes outlined in critical theory of education by Carr and Kemmis, and Young, which differ in emphasis, but share the view that it aims at 'the transformation of educational practice, the educational understandings and educational values of those involved in the process, and the social and institutional structures which provide frameworks for their action'. [32] Such a programme, although aimed specifically at educational research, schools, teachers, curriculum knowledge and pedagogy, is in general a programme for emancipation and rational will-formation.
Carr and Kemmis centre their programme around the idea of 'action research', which they describe as 'a form of self-reflective inquiry undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own practices, their understandings of these practices, and the situations in which these practices are carried out'. [33]

Within the threefold framework of critical educational science referred to above, Carr and Kemmis examine five particular aspects of action research in education and argue that, taken as a whole, they satisfy not only the three aims of a critical science but also embody the insights upon which Habermasian critical theory is based.

The first criterion of a theory of communicative action is that it facilitates self-reflective critique amongst individuals in order that true statements can be arrived at through free and open discourse. Action research achieves this; first, because objective and empirical notions of truth are rejected in favour of an understanding of truth as socially constructed; and second, by treating teachers as subjects in research rather than objects of research, it is able to undermine empirical objectivity with the understandings and interpretations of the individuals concerned. In this way, research becomes praxis for the subjects whose work it is, and the teacher (for example) is therefore participant, collaborator and researcher. Third, action research
enables participants to see through and overcome the ideological distortions produced by society through which they have up to now understood themselves, their actions and their institutions. Technical and empirical distortions of reality are overcome by self-critique in rational discourse which produces understandings which have a truth content beyond that which previously was held to be true. Ideology-critique is just such a questioning and testing of truth content, which is the first criterion for a genuinely critical programme.

The second feature of the programme is that which Habermas, and following him Carr and Kemmis, term the 'organization of enlightenment'. Carr and Kemmis remark that it refers to 'a systematic learning process aimed at the development of knowledge about the practices being considered and the conditions under which they take place'. [34] In action research this criterion is satisfied by its ability to reveal and expose those aspects of the social order which prevent rational discourse and the rational transformation of society. This differs from ideology-critique in the sense that whilst critique is the emergence of truth, this is the application of that new understanding to the business of generating critical activity. It is specifically the organization of the production of enlightenment so that its own truth with regard to its social determination can emerge for others.

The self-critical community of action researchers... creates conditions under which its own practice will come into conflict with irrational, unjust and unfulfilling educational and social practices in the institutional context in which the action research is carried out. The organization of enlightenment in action research thus gives rise to conditions under which the organization
of action can take place as an attempt to replace one distorted set of practices with another, undistorted set of practices. Such action is always political action... [35]

The final feature of critical educational science is that it is able to offer guidance on decisions requiring action. This is achieved in action research because it is already the unity of theory and practice as critical and emancipatory interest. Its own activity is already the achievement of that unity, and in that activity truth is therefore practice. Carr and Kemmis remark that

the collaborative nature of action research thus offers a first step to overcoming aspects of the existing social order which frustrate rational change: it organizes practitioners into collaborative groups for the purposes of their own enlightenment, and in doing so, it creates a model for a rational and democratic social order. The practice of collaborative educational action research envisages a social order characterized by rational communication, just and democratic decision making, and fulfilling work. [36]

Young does not follow Carr and Kemmis's model, and indeed is cautious about adopting an action research paradigm as an exemplar of critical theory. He notes that Habermas himself expressed suspicion because some calls for an action research programme originated from behavioural scientists. Young himself points out that action research is more suited to research at the 'microscopic or face-to-face level' [37] and notes that the model of Carr and Kemmis, by not giving sufficient attention as to how action research might be applicable at a large scale level, for example in the enlightenment of organizations, 'has
contributed to the impression of an unnecessarily narrow model of method'. [38]

However, Young also offers a programme for a critical theory of education, and by again using Habermas's model of a critical social science (which Young himself does not explicitly do), it is possible to clearly identify the proposals which Young puts forward as firmly within the Habermasian critical project. He states that the purpose of the book is to present a 'programmatic outline of a possible, and hopefully coherent, Habermasian critical theory of education'; [39] its coherence is revealed when viewed as Habermasian critical social science.

Young places Habermas at the end of a process of development of critical theory of education in Germany. He notes how an originally marxist project was replaced by a hermeneutic insight in educational research, leading to a criticism of positivist epistemology in research of both the left and the right. Against those who argued at this point that critical theory of education could proceed only negatively, Young states that 'a positive moment was needed', [40] and was provided by the positive theory of communicative action developed by Habermas. Young notes, 'the lack of a clear normative basis for educational construction was finally overcome when Habermas's later work on language and validity, including normative validity, pointed the way to procedural resolution of the normative problem', [41] although he comments that the full implications of Habermas's work on language have
not yet been fully worked through in critical theory of education. His book represents a contribution to that task.

The first characteristic of a Habermasian critical social science is its capacity to criticize truth claims by the formation of its own critical theorems. Young's work includes this aspect in several ways. First, he argues that critical theory of education must criticize the appearance of truth in the lifeworld whose assumptions, values and rules are normally taken for granted and unquestioned. The truth of the lifeworld is changed through and by a critique which penetrates aspects (although not the totality) of it which are already in consciousness as problems or contradictions. This, he suggests, avoids the idealist approach which would merely replace one lifeworld with another; critique should make 'an effective job of reconstructing the already problematic parts of (their) lifeworld through communicative, problem-solving learning'. [42]

Second, he is critical of traditional theories of knowledge which present truth as 'a matter of fact' [43] and reduce ethical knowledge to 'a non-cognitive activity by which knowers may relate to their knowledge from the outside of it'. [44] These theories of knowledge then impregnate the curriculum. Thus, it becomes the task of critical theory of education to reveal this knowledge to be a social and historical product, to bring the hermeneutic and critical insight to bear. His critique of traditional knowledge in education is therefore aimed at the tendency
towards an ahistorical, value-free view of knowledge as a finished product, towards a mistaking of the contemporary surface of things for their full range of possible states and towards a view that critique is not a matter of method, but of personal and non-rational decision... All of these tendencies are reflected in the selection of what is taught and in the attitude of teachers towards this content. [45]

Third, he criticizes the interest upon which traditional pedagogy is based and argues that unless pedagogy is critical, it simply functions as a justification of the technical interest. He gives the example of the typical question/answer routine between teacher and student where the child's frame of reference (knowledge) is recontextualized from lay vocabulary to technical vocabulary, and from personal vocabulary to textbook vocabulary. [46]

Added to this is the problem that such distorted communication is often mirrored in the teachers own technical assumptions about knowledge, which tends towards a greater or lesser degree of objectivism 'with little awareness of questions of reflectivity and problems of the social independence or dependence of knowledge formation'. [47]

In these ways Young's programme for the critical theory of education fulfills the first criterion of a Habermasian critical social science; it has as its core the critique of knowledge in different aspects of the educational process such that their truth content is revealed in its dependent relationship upon its social and historical context. The modern context is such that the social dimension of knowledge and truth is masked in the process of its production; 'knowledge is a standard
commodity which you come to possess' [48] and which therefore hides the social conditions which determine it.

The second aspect of Habermasian critical social science is the organization of enlightenment, and this too, plays a large part in Young's programme. It has two dimensions, based around what he calls the 'ideal pedagogical speech situation', which is the basis upon which enlightenment can be organized in the full knowledge that what is being organized is enlightenment. The first area is pedagogical and concerns the relationship between teacher and student. He states that 'in communicative action, the claim made in a speech act may be called acceptable if it fulfills the conditions which permit the hearer to take a "yes" position on the claim raised'. [49] This intersubjective truth content is the basis of Young's ideal pedagogical speech situation 'in which the student is able rationally to assess views or, at least, come to hold them in "a manner open to rational assessment"'. [50] In this communicative pedagogical relationship, enlightenment is produced between teacher and student, not by the teacher of the student, since the truth of the relationship is mutual. [51] Thus, education is organized as enlightenment and not as indoctrination, although Young acknowledges the problem of applying an ideal pedagogical speech situation to a world which is marked by differences in knowledge, power and status between communicative participants.

There are two important implications of this ideal critical pedagogy. It overcomes the dilemma in radical educational theory of teacher control or domination because, 'in a discourse model of pedagogy, the
teacher and the pupils produce and reproduce the rules in discourse, within a framework of constraints'. [52] It also has implications for the curriculum. Young has already argued that critique should be applied to existing contradictions, and many of the aporias discussed above 'are closely related to topical issues and public debates and controversies'. [53] Indeed, he suggests that enlightenment could be organized by reflection upon the pedagogical speech situation which exists in the classroom for teacher and student. 'By speaking about the speech rules of participants and about how breaches of protocol are recognized, felt and dealt with, it is possible to recognize and change these patterns...by the introduction of specific structures designed to implement "new rules"'. [54]

The second dimension to Young's programme for the organization of enlightenment relates to institutions, which for critical theory of education are to be judged according to the kind of pedagogy and learning which they promote. For the most part organizations, even those concerned with the education of the mass of the population, are mostly dominated by technical interests, favouring bureaucratic and market solutions to the task of widening public discourse. Young is concerned that critical theory should not seek rapid and wholesale reform of institutions overnight, and his programme here is therefore less specific than when dealing with classroom pedagogy. He argues that administration needs to be decentralized so that ethical work can be freed from bureaucratic and technical interests, which themselves appear value-free and neutral. [55]
He is also critical of the perspectives of educational researchers whose own technical egocentric interests outweigh the public need for greater openness. The greatest failure, he says,

is the failure of professional discourse in the community of educational researchers. For this to be remedied, there must be a critical re-theorizing of the role of the educational academic and of the contribution of educational intellectuals, wherever situated, to reflection in schools and the public domain. [56]

This leads directly to the third aspect of Habermasian critical social science, that of the organization of action, and here Young's comments are aimed mostly at educational researchers. Critique makes clear what needs to be done, for critical reflection is already activity in which appearances of truth and knowledge have been overcome in the acknowledgement of their underlying interests. Critical research is therefore emancipatory research or is mutual activity, 'an activity in which the human species looks at itself'. [57] Thus, there is a need to reconstruct educational research along critical and communicative lines, which must therefore involve both teacher and researcher. For Young, a growth in communicative participation, in research or elsewhere, is a growth in democracy and is likely to lead to the production of valid judgements. Action research can be important here; not only does it increase the participation of teacher, student and administrator in the production of their own (self) knowledge, but this new knowledge 'can be systematically incorporated in the process of change'. [58] However, Young also expresses caution about action research. He notes that the very term is part of a positivist lexicon
of research terminology. This echoes Habermas's own concerns; 'the fashionable demand for a type of "action research" that is to combine political enlightenment with research, overlooks that the uncontrolled modification of the field is incompatible with the simultaneous gathering of data in that field'. [59]

The organization of action is not restricted to researchers. At several points, Young makes clear his view that critical theory is implicitly political precisely because its own validity rests on will-formation. He sums up the relationship between personal, social and political action embodied in critical theorizing as follows:-

the process of a critique which realizes itself immanently as changed social practice is one which involves an interaction among intellectual critique (which is the fruit of reflection), educational processes where reflection is shared and criticized, organizational structures of movements for greater public and democratic participation in discussion and decision-making and processes of personal and inter-personal reflection and critique aimed at personal development. [60]
Becoming Critical of Habermas.

The development of the relationship between critical theory and education has, as its ideal, the unity of critical self-reflective activity and the establishing of an ethical community through the enlightenment of humankind with regard to its true and genuine expression. Modernity, however, is characterized by differentiation and division. The unification of individuals in an ethical community is the task which critical theory seeks in post-enlightenment society and, for Habermas, this is undertaken as a reflective, and a self-educative activity. The unity of theory and practice in the emancipatory interest, and later in the theory of communicative action, represents an enlightenment about, and the overcoming of the abstract separation of subjectivity from activity in civil society. Through critique, a genuine knowledge of (the social) self is arrived at by a process of enlightenment about the social conditions which obscure and even prevent such knowledge, and makes further enlightenment possible, now, for others.

However, these ideas of enlightenment, of overcoming, of critique, and of the unity produced, are not themselves subjected to critique by those who employ them in education as education; and yet they are the ideas upon which the claims of Habermasian social theory rest. Indeed, it is the very idea of education itself which critical theorists of education seem least interested in, preferring simply to accept the idea of critique as enlightenment, and proceeding from there to produce
programmes employing this uncriticized educational idea. When one might expect a critical theory of education to subject the idea of education to an immanent form of critique, in order to undermine any claims to identity or unmediated independence, one finds that education as critique is the one idea which precisely is not subject to such an inquiry. It is just such an investigation which is the substance of this thesis.

Following from this observation, there are problems of internal coherence which a critical theory of education has to face if it adopts Habermasian critique as its idea of education and its critical tool for, or method of, emancipation. Of overriding concern is the absence of an immanent critique of critique itself, something which can only be carried out by returning to the philosophical roots of the debates in critical theory which Habermas was addressing.

The acceptance of critique as enlightenment immunizes this idea of education from itself. It is Habermas's claim that all objects are mediated by a social totality which then hides its influence, giving the result of that activity the appearance of independence. To what extent, then, is the idea of critique itself also an object whose appearance or identity as education, as enlightenment, is the result of its determination in and by bourgeois society?

Also, Habermas's claim that emancipatory critique represents an 'overcoming' of bourgeois distortion is a presupposition that the unity of theory and practice represents the genuine expression of
enlightenment, that is, self-produced and without external manipulation or mediation. It is a presupposition which Carr and Kemmis, and Young unequivocally accept and employ. Young, for example, remarks that critical reflection 'transcends' instrumental and hermeneutic reason, [61] that critique can 'go beyond' surface forms of reality, [62] that students can 'overcome' the undemocratic rules of classroom communication, [63] and that ideological distortions can be 'overcome' through communicative action. [64] Carr and Kemmis use the terms overcoming, enlighten, and seeing through interchangeably to refer to the emancipatory potential of Habermasian critique, again without criticism or analysis. Yet it is just such presuppositions of identity and independence as these which are the object of Habermasian critique. To what extent, then, does Habermas repeat the very form of instrumental thinking which he would overcome, in his idea of 'overcoming'?

Third, and following from these two points, it becomes a cause of concern that Habermas has produced an impasse beyond which his own social theorizing cannot proceed. By not criticizing his own claim to have established the emancipatory interest, and a theory of communicative action, as the self-identity and genuine expression of enlightenment, he has not presumably fulfilled the conditions of that interest that it be wholly immanent. Indeed, is it not a further contradiction that in using critique as a method to achieve overcoming and emancipation, he has used that which is intended to be the result of the enquiry, as the presupposed identity of the method of the enquiry?
These issues cannot be dealt with in the literature of critical theory of education alone, for they are philosophical issues regarding the identity and non-identity of the experience of critique as aporia. They are issues which refer to the experience which is the dialectic of enlightenment. Critical theory of education is as yet only the application of critical theory in education, it is not self-reflective critique of the idea of education which lies behind critical theory. What is required is the raising of its own philosophical consciousness in immanent self-reflection. Moreover, the problems raised by issues of presupposition, overcoming, critique, result, and emancipation have their roots in the philosophical tradition of critical theory, and to adopt merely a Habermasian perspective is, at the very least, to fail to recognize the determinative process by which these issues and problems have developed.

What the three sets of problems mentioned above all point to, is that the notion of critique as enlightenment, and as emancipatory education and development, generates antinomies which an uncritical reception and application only repeat but do not solve. How, for example, can one learn what enlightenment is without having presupposed it beforehand in the very idea of knowing how to learn about it; that is, how does one become enlightened about enlightenment without assuming the solution to the problem before beginning it? Habermas has a dialectical theory of the production of objects, and of consciousness. This is clear in his critique of the instrumental interest. But he does not have a dialectical theory of critique itself, and cannot therefore 'overcome' the aporia which is repeated in the presupposition that Habermas is
already enlightened about critique as (the identity of) enlightenment. The expression of this aporia of (the dialectic of) enlightenment, an aporia which Habermas, and Habermasian critical theorists of education, can only repeat, is to be found elsewhere in the critical philosophical tradition; such a redirection to that work, and then beyond it, to a recognition of the contradiction of education in critical theory as misrecognition, and as the education which is philosophy, is the substance of what follows.
CHAPTER II - HABERMAS AND CRITIQUE.

From Production to Reflection.

Habermas's discussion of Marx in chapters two and three of Knowledge and Human Interests establishes the basis for the whole of his social theory written after it, including the theory of communicative action. It is significant not least because of the interaction he produces between himself, Marx and Hegel. [1] In short, he employs Marx's materialist version of synthesis as a basis for his critique of Hegel's philosophy of the identity of absolute spirit, and then uses (his own version of) Hegel's phenomenological method to present a critique of Marx's reduction of all human activity to social labour. [2] His own social theory then establishes reflective critique as communicative action, and represents an attempt to produce a critical phenomenology which achieves the unification of theory and practice.

Habermas points out that the insight which Marxist materialism gains over Hegelian idealism is that it exposes the presupposition that spirit is the absolute knowing and ground of nature. For Marx, the opposite is the case, that is, it is nature which is the ground of all human activity. But, as Habermas comments, 'this is no coarse materialism' [3] on Marx's part, for the nature which appears to consciousness as objects of experience are understood as produced by human activity and therefore historically and culturally shaped according to the level of productive capacity which has been achieved.
What idealism took as merely an object which could be known, materialism understands to be already the result of social labour. [4]

Habermas takes this to be an advance on Hegel, who was unable to disclose 'the mechanism of progress in the experience of reflection'. [5] His philosophy of identity prevented him from further historical materialist critique. Marx, states Habermas, 'does not view nature under the category of another subject, but conversely the subject under the category of another nature'. [6] This prevents him from assuming his own materialist critique to be the absolute unity of subject and nature as opposed to another appearance of the natural subject in specific historical conditions. Marx avoids the trap of absolutism because he understands social labour not only to be the means of sustaining life but also of reproducing life such that it can be known. Labour determines the shape of the object, but the object upon which labour is performed is already the embodiment of objectified forms of previous human labour. Thus the object facing man is that which man already is, and represents what man knows himself in the world to be. [7] Epistemology must therefore presuppose specific forms of social labour as its origin and production. The materialist unity of nature and human activity is achieved in production itself, and not in a consciousness which is the result of production and appears only in a particular historical formation. This unity is therefore synthesis in the Kantian sense of an a priori set of conditions which are the possibility of being known.
Habermas points out that Marx never regarded the materialist concept of synthesis 'as the foundation for the constitution of invariant meaning structures...'. [8] It was for Marx an understanding of the mechanism of historical development, and is itself 'an accomplishment relativized with regard to the sphere of world history'. [9] The synthesis could never regard itself as absolute ego or spirit, as in Hegel, because its activity is not that of consciousness but of social labour; and consciousness itself is only the result of that labour. [10] Thus it can produce no logics or structures of consciousness, as Hegel had done, but has only labour itself in which to conduct a self-reflective examination. In historicizing and undermining the identity of consciousness, historical materialism prevents the Hegelian misrecognition of a particular form of consciousness as absolute. What is revealed in materialist reflection is not an absolute subject, but the 'fundamental structures of social labour'. [11] Unlike Hegel therefore, its point of departure, says Habermas, is the economy, 'the social life processes, the material production and appropriation of products', [12] for it is here and not in spirit that synthesis is already to be found. Synthesis is 'both the empirical and transcendental accomplishment of a species-subject that produces itself in history'. [13]

In championing Marx against Hegel and revealing the advance over Hegel which materialist non-absolutism holds, Habermas at the same time exposes Marx to a different criticism, but one which results in a similar aporia of presupposition that was found in Hegel. Indeed, it is the particular strength of Marx, that is, that consciousness is
understood as a result of human activity (history), which proves at the same time to be his weakness against the Habermasian version of phenomenological reflection. The latter points out that in reducing all consciousness to the result of production, the action of production becomes unknowable to itself, and thus cannot be known as species activity. What is available to consciousness as an object to be understood is the what of production, but not the who which is the self-producer.

The dialectical content of such propositions as 'men make their own history but they do not make it just as they please', [14] and 'circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances', [15] represents more than production; they are epistemological propositions. Moreover, the insight into the dependency of epistemology upon history has to be understood in a way which makes the insight itself self-validating. If critique, in the form of historical materialism, is only realized as new productive capacities, then the dialectical relationship between man and circumstances can itself never be known. If all knowledge is reduced to production then species activity is never self-activity.

Habermas's point is that although the Hegelian critique of epistemology is present in Marx, and is improved upon, nevertheless it is not sufficiently critical of itself as result to understand its self-constitution as that critique. This leads Marx to interpret all activity as production, including the activity which itself is critical or aware of that production. For Habermas this self-consciousness of
the historicity of the species-subject is a different type of labour, one aimed not at control of nature, but at emancipation from an object formed by that interest alone.

Habermas notes that Marx does not repeat Hegel's presupposition of the identity of consciousness by absolutizing it outside of the material conditions which are its genesis. However, in order to establish this insight, Marx himself has to assume 'something like a nature in itself' [16] as existing before humanity begins to work on it. This is similar to Kant's thing-in-itself, in the sense that nature before labour can never be produced and therefore never known. 'While epistemologically we must presuppose nature as existing in itself, we ourselves have access to nature only within the historical dimension disclosed by labour processes'. [17] Man's relationship to nature in the materialist concept of synthesis is therefore one of difference, a difference which is maintained rather than overcome in this concept of synthesis. Habermas remarks that

the unity of the social subject and nature that comes into being 'in industry' cannot eradicate the autonomy of nature and the remainder of complete otherness that is lodged in its facticity. As the correlate of social labour, objectified nature retains both independence and externality in relation to the subject that controls it. [18]

Any unity brought about by synthesis 'remains in some measure imposed on nature by the subject', [19] a domination which precisely characterizes the unreflective positivist view of enlightenment, and is manifest as the technical knowledge-constitutive interest.
The problem for Marx is therefore that of a dialectic which has no way of understanding itself because, having undermined the subject, it is left with only production itself, and therefore with a 'unity' which can never be self-unification, because production is always of an other. A species-subject aware of its production in and by history has not in that awareness produced itself as synthesis, for its own historical identity appears again as an object for it.

Each generation gains its identity only via a nature that has already been formed in history, and this nature is in turn the object of its labour. The system of social labour is always the result of the labour of past generations. [20]

The insight into the dialectic of historical materialism, which Marx employed against Hegel, thus returns to undermine the identity of its own critique as synthesis or self-activity. Critique of civil society is already critique from within civil society, and it cannot claim an identity which is immune from its own determination. It thus raises the logically contradictory need for the work of critique to be known before the activity in which such knowledge is produced, an aporia which Habermas believes Marx to have failed to overcome. [21]

Habermas's own response to this failure is to return to a form of Hegelian phenomenology decapitated of its notion of the absolute, wherein he can locate a form of critique which, on the one hand, avoids reification of an (unhistoricized) subjective consciousness, and on the other, overcomes the aporia of self-reflective enlightenment. Habermas sees the reason for the aporia to lie in Marx's 'reduction of the self-
generative act of the human species to labour', [22] a Kantian standpoint where nature, unknowable in itself, appears for us only as the result of mediation. Such a "nature in itself", argues Habermas, 'is therefore an abstraction...(since) we always encounter nature within the horizon of the world-historical self-formative process of mankind'. [23] Nature is presupposed beyond that which it appears to be, and as such it is always thought of as an object encountered by the subject to be transformed. The aporia of experience, solved by Kant in the positing of pure reason as the transcendental identity of experience a posteriori, is solved by Marx in positing historical and dialectical materialism as beyond all historical and dialectical mediation. But the reflective critique of historical materialism undermines its own claims as synthesis, and is here, again, experienced as the result of historical activity. It is an insight which Habermas acknowledges in Marx as an advance over Hegel, but one which is interpreted by Marx in the 'restricted conception of the species' self-reflection through work alone'. [24]

Transformation understood solely in terms of labour cannot provide self-comprehension because labour is used as a materialistic explanation of reflection, and reflection is consequently comprehended as object, and according to the technical knowledge-constitutive interest, and not as self-reflective critique.

Habermas notes that Marx tries to accomplish two contradictory tasks in the concept of materialist synthesis. On the one hand, 'what is Kantian about Marx's conception of knowledge is the invariant relation of the
species to its natural environment, [25] whilst on the other hand, 'Marx assumes empirically mediated rules of synthesis that are objectified as productive forces and historically transform the subjects relation to their natural environment'. [26] Thus man's relationship to the object both does and does not change. Man's labouring activity upon nature is purely instrumental action, and synthesis in this sense is the application of procedures in the interest of technical control over nature. But Marx also wants to claim that this new technical knowledge becomes a new and re-formed historical consciousness, such that 'both nature, which has been reshaped and civilized in labour processes, and the labouring subjects themselves alter in relation to the development of the productive forces'. [27] Habermas points out here that there are more elements in this concept of synthesis through labour than Marx admits to, for he has fused into one activity both productive activity and critical-revolutionary activity. The result is that the latter adopts the historical form and shape of the former.

Marx has confused technical activity with social practice, and has produced a scientistic understanding of human development and activity which requires a self-critique similar to that which Marx has performed on Hegel. Habermas notes the approval which Marx registered when Capital was reviewed and evaluated as a methodology, and that he tended to see his own work as akin to the natural sciences. This, says Habermas, is astonishing. For the natural sciences are subject to the transcendental conditions of the system of social labour, whose structural change is supposed
to be what the critique of political economy, as the science of man, reflects on. Science in the rigorous sense lacks precisely this element of reflection that characterizes a critique investigating the natural-historical process of the self-generation of the social subject and also making the subject conscious of this process. [28]

Habermas is therefore critical of a materialist idea of synthesis which does not subject its own understanding of the object to critical reflection. Because of its repetition of the production of object as other, 'the philosophical foundation of this materialism proves itself insufficient to establish an unconditional phenomenological self-reflection of knowledge'. [29] Material synthesis is merely instrumental action, it is not intersubjective practice, which is the very dimension in which 'that phenomenological experience moves'. [30] Habermas concludes that Marx has conflated labour and reflection into labour only.
Marx, having identified that 'it is the development of the forces of production that provides the impetus to abolishing and surpassing a form of life that has been rigidified in positivity and become an abstraction', [31] then obscured the possibility of such transformation by reducing the moment of self-transparency to a process of labour. It is Habermas's argument that the conditions for human formation and enlightened progress, are satisfied not in a process of labour which develops technological capacities, but in a process of reflection which develops mutual awareness of the distortions inherent in that technical process. By understanding itself 'in analogy to the natural sciences as productive knowledge (It) (historical materialism) thus conceals the dimension of self-reflection in which it must move regardless'. [32] At this stage Habermas is not concerned to reveal the mechanism by which reflection overcomes mere technical labour, only the awareness that a different type of activity results from the materialist insight into social and historical dependency than mere productive activity.

This new activity, which is the substance of reflection and therefore of transformation is, however, what becomes more familiar as communicative action. [33] But such an understanding remains in Marx as no more than an 'indecisive' [34] where on the one hand, transformative activity is instrumental production, and on the other where it is the social practice of the 'real living men... who possess things and fight battles' [35] which Marx spoke of in The Holy Family.
Habermas concludes that 'unlike synthesis through social labour, the
dialectic of class antagonism is a movement of reflection'. [36]
Habermas sees the indecision in Marx, noted above, as resulting from
his working with an idea of a dialectic between forces and relations of
production which, although interdependent, 'do not converge'. [37]
Emancipation from nature and emancipation from social domination are
seen by Marx as one category of social practice. For Habermas it is
instrumental action which is directed at the first, but a different
sort of activity which aims at the second, an activity which in
reflecting on domination arrives at an ever clearer understanding both
of the distorting effects on reality of that domination, and therefore,
at the same time, of the nature of freedom and mutuality which it
prevents. This activity is 'a process of reflection writ large', [38]
and it is what Habermas calls 'communicative action'. [39] He writes

the course of the social self-formative process...is
marked...by stages of reflection through which the
dogmatic character of surpassed forms of domination and
ideologies are dispelled, the pressure of the institutional
framework is sublimated, and communicative action is
set free as communicative action. The goal of
this development is thereby anticipated: the organization
of a society linked to decision making processes on the
basis of discussion free from domination. [40]

Habermas here, has established reflective knowledge as a second
dimension of the 'self-constitution of the human species', [41] adding
to that of productive knowledge. He notes that whilst the two are
interdependent, still their interests do not converge.

Marx tried in vain to capture this in the dialectic
of forces of production and relations of production.
In vain - for the meaning of this 'dialectic' must
remain unclarified as long as the materialist concept of the synthesis of man and nature is restricted to the categorical framework. [42]

This marks the beginning of Habermas's own social theory, and he now combines Marx and Hegel to produce the self-formative activity of reflective critique. It is materialist because, in the self-reflection of class consciousness its manifestations are now 'seen as prompted by developments of the system of social labour', [43] and it is phenomenological because the critical subject knows itself 'to be involved in the self-formative process that it recollects'. [44] By exorcising the absolute from Hegelian phenomenological reflection through an understanding of consciousness as historically contingent, Habermas is now able to establish reflection as the dimension of transformation, and to claim its self-identity as synthesis not through technical labour, but as intersubjective communicative relations.

If the idea of the self-constitution of the human species in natural history is to combine both self-generation through productive activity and self-formation through critical-revolutionary activity, then the concept of synthesis must also incorporate a second dimension. [45]

This, for Habermas, is self-reflective activity, and is now manifest in the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest as 'the critique of ideology'. [46]
The Reconstruction of the Unconditioned.

The critique of ideology, understood as a transformative, reflective activity, is an activity which does not sit within the materialist model of production. [47] In Marx, the reduction of reflection upon presupposition to a technical model of production does not allow the insight thus gained to achieve an understanding of itself as the interest in which the lack of mutual social relations is rationally criticized, known, and overcome.

Reflexive social theory, where critique is transformative species activity, is embodied in the third of the knowledge-constitutive interests, the emancipatory interest, which has yet to be discussed. As will become clear, it is the interest in which a unity of theory and practice is claimed, and upon which the theory of communicative action is based.

In understanding technical and practical knowledge-constitutive interests, consciousness has achieved or realized a third interest. In knowing, first, to criticize the abstract universality of subject and substance in civil society, it follows, second, that consciousness knows the distortion is of itself, that the appearance of the subject is directly affected by its non-identity with the object. Third, in pursuing this immediately practical interest, the reflexive subject has become aware of itself as performing this critical activity, that is, has become self-conscious of itself and its activity as interested. In
this interest, by criticizing the idea which the subject had of itself at the outset, that is, the subject in civil society, it now comes to know itself differently, not as independent, but as dependent and determined. This is no longer to have an independent identity, but rather to realize dependence through self-interested work or reflection.

Habermas discusses this process or development in terms of interest as reason. Technical interest arises from the immediate desire for control; practical interest is already a rational enquiry by a social subject into the social conditions which pre-determine its existence. It is reflective activity. The emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest is the dimension of social self-enlightenment, in which the object of inquiry and the investigator learn that the one is also the other. [48]

The separation of subject and object in critique is known by the subject who realizes that critique is the unification of subject and object because it is the self-expression of reason in its attempt to produce itself as autonomous. [49] Its critique of the social is the production of the social as the mutual interest in emancipation; it is the unity of subject and object because reason, in seeking to produce itself, also performs itself. Knowledge of the separation of activity and result overcomes the separation because the (technical) interest behind that separation is overcome in and by its self-expression as the emancipatory interest. It is at one with itself when it is united against the interest which denies it that unity. Thus, this third form
of consciousness is social or mutual self-consciousness, an intersubjectivity aware of itself as the self-identity of that which seeks liberation from its abstract appearance. To know this is to have seen through the technical interest, to have understood the individual as social and historical production, and to have produced this enlightenment through its own self-activity. To produce itself in this way is to be the transformed result of reflexive self-activity, a unity achieved in the (mutual) interest for emancipation. Habermas comments

the experience of reflection articulates itself substantially in the concept of a self-formative process. Methodically it leads to a standpoint from which the identity of reason with the will to reason freely arises. In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in autonomy and responsibility. For the pursuit of reflection knows itself as a movement of emancipation. Reason is at the same time subject to the interest in reason. We can say that it obeys an emancipatory cognitive interest, which aims at the pursuit of reflection. [50]

It is only when the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest is understood by itself as its own result that the other two interests can themselves be grasped as incomplete forms of reasoning. 'We can methodologically ascertain the knowledge-constitutive interests of the natural and cultural sciences only once we have entered the dimension of self-reflection. It is in accomplishing self-reflection that reason grasps itself as interested', [51] an interest which is its own self-identity as work and result.

The import of reflection as critique now emerges. It is in the awareness of an abstract relationship between subject and object, that
a rational form of knowing develops which, in grasping this, its own
determination, achieves a self-expression in which what is known is at
one with the activity of its being known. In critique, as the activity
and result of self-reflection, 'knowledge and interest are one'; [52]
an activity which has, therefore, produced 'a new stage of self-
reflection in the self-formative process of the species'. [53]

Critique, then, is the activity which has the unity of reason and
interest as result, and is thus enlightenment as the overcoming of
their abstract separation. The result of reflection, because it is
rational self-result, can then be reconstructed into a theory of its
own becoming, and of the necessary preconditions for that becoming.
Thus Habermas distinguishes between reflection and reconstruction. On
the one hand 'self-reflection brings to consciousness those
determinants of a self-formative process of cultivation and spiritual
formation (Bildung) which ideologically determine a contemporary praxis
of action and the conception of the world'. [54] On the other hand,

what is reasoned justification within the contexts
of acts of reflection on oneself bases itself on
theoretical knowledge which has been gained independently
of the reflection on oneself, namely, the rational
reconstruction of rule systems which we have to master
if we wish to process experience cognitively or participate
in systems of action or carry on discourse. [55]

The relationship between reflection and theory reconstruction explains
why Habermas is able to claim that 'critique understands that its
claims to validity can be verified only...in the practical discourse of
those concerned'; [56] a claim that is itself based on the idea that in
the emancipatory interest, reason is unconditioned because it is a self-result, and our self-enlightenment. It is only by comprehending how the emancipatory interest is a result and a unity for Habermas, that its transition into the theory of communicative action can be seen as immanent rather than abstract reconstruction.

The result achieved in the emancipatory interest is the enlightenment which enables Habermas to believe he has overcome the illusory negativity of dialectics by becoming aware of its intersubjective precondition. In an important section of Theory and Practice, Habermas acknowledges that a social theory based on dialectical logic does not suffice as a basis for a theory which aims at political praxis and emancipation from the domination of bourgeois institutions. At best, dialectic can refer to the process of bringing to the surface previous distortions of communication, but it cannot understand its own activity, and is unable thereby to effect self-transformation. The dialectic, as Habermas has already pointed out with regard to Marx, can explicate the mechanism of emancipation, but not become it in the sense of species-activity. The dialectic cannot survive its own insight into itself because it has no ground upon which it can be itself in self-reflection, or is never comprehended as a self-result, or as unconditioned. This, as will be seen, necessitates a 'paradigm shift' from consciousness to language.

But the advance of self-understanding which the dialectic can produce, leads to and develops a self-understanding of itself in reflection. [57] In other words, it comes to understand that it is itself dependent
upon, and only possible as, the consensus of linguistic rules which
must presuppose all learning activity. Thus, the appearance of the
dialectic as mere instrumental action is overcome in the awareness of
its underlying mutuality. The search for agreement in discourse is the
emancipatory activity of reason seeking its genuine self-expression.
Habermas notes that 'in every speech act the telos of reaching an
understanding is already inherent'. [58] Behind the activity of
reaching an understanding there lies the conditions of the possibility
of that activity; 'functioning language games, in which speech acts are
exchanged, are based on an underlying consensus', [59] and this
consensus is realized as the self-generated species activity when, in
reflection, dependency becomes real as and in the search for agreement.
Thus, communicative action presupposes (consensus on) the possibility
of discursive validation of truth claims. In a phrase which is pivotal
to understanding the whole of Habermasian social theory, he remarks
that 'discourse is the condition of the unconditioned', [60] and since
for Habermas the conditioned (or the dependent) is the true expression
of the species, then the activity in which the species produces itself
as dependent upon itself, is the activity wherein the grounds for truth
emerge. Truth can only appear as itself, as the unconditioned, in an
activity which produces its own dependence, or is its own interest;
this is precisely what occurs in self-reflective discourse which aims
at ideology-critique and emancipation from systematically distorted
communication.

The unity of reconstruction and reflection is dependent upon the
phenomenological achievement whereby consciousness becomes enlightened
that its own misunderstandings are themselves dependent upon, and the result of, distortions of the same communicative relations which underpin the possibility of all discourse. Emancipation, in the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest, is not freedom from intersubjective communicative relations, rather it is emancipation from the distortions of those relations which produce the illusion that consciousness is independent of them altogether, including the illusion that enlightenment is only dialectical and never result.

The insight which self-reflection produces in its education concerns itself; it renders explicit the intersubjective preconditions of subjectivity by employing the rules of discourse which are that precondition. Self-consciousness thus does not presuppose them, rather it comes to know them as the presupposition of subjectivity itself, and moreover in this knowledge it overcomes its abstract independence from them.

By moving transformative activity from production and nature to reflection and social enlightenment, Habermas has found a notion of overcoming which does not repeat the object as other, as in materialism, but which in and by its own activity, sees through the illusion of separation and abstraction. This enlightenment is the result of rational self-inquiry, and can therefore be reconstructed into a theory which is not abstract, but is a self-comprehension.

Thus it is in the emancipatory interest that the abstract subject performs mutual communicative activity which, as an activity dependent
upon pre-existing social rules of communication, is also the realization in self-consciousness of its unconditioned necessity as intersubjectivity. 'The act of self-reflection that "changes a life" is a movement of emancipation' [61] based on the phenomenological notion of self-consciousness or self-transparency as the overcoming of abstract appearances. Just how self-critical this idea of overcoming is, and how abstract the theoretical reconstruction of reflection is, are questions which will force their own return in chapter III. It will become clear there, that what Habermas is really reconstructing in his Theory of Communicative Action is his own presupposition of the identity of enlightenment as overcoming, and not the unconditioned as self-result.
Overcoming as Therapy.

Before becoming the theory of communicative action, the idea of overcoming is further expanded upon in Knowledge and Human Interests and elsewhere, by a comparison with Freudian psychoanalysis. [62] Like Marx, Freud incorporated into his work 'an interest in emancipation going beyond the technical and practical interest of knowledge'. [63] Through psychoanalytic therapy as self-critique and self-reflection 'in the end insight can coincide with emancipation from unrecognized dependencies' [64] in just the same ways as Habermas has argued that ideology-critique is the work of the realization of, and therefore emancipation from, previously unrecognized determinations. [65]

In psychoanalysis, overcoming is achieved in the therapeutic 'discourse' between analyst and patient, and in the process reveals all the characteristics which have already been examined in relation to emancipatory critique. First, just as the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest is dependent upon distortions of communication in order to produce itself, so the patient can only partake in the 'discourse' provided it is not on equal terms with the doctor; 'the conditions for a participant in discourse are precisely what is not fulfilled by the patient. [66] Second, participation in therapy is implicit as self-reflection since what is under examination is the deception of a subject about itself, just as in ideology-critique the activity of self-reflection is species activity. The realization which
for both constitutes 'overcoming' is to become an object to itself, and
comprehended therein as the author of its own (false) identity.

In developing 'scenic understanding', [67] the analyst makes the
patient aware of scenes (from childhood) that are the origin of a
conflict which itself has been transformed to other (more recent)
scenes, and has even become a blockage to genuine self-understanding
and responsible for the neurosis. The analyst induces self-reflection
in the patient, a process whereby what has split off from the identity
of the patient and produced a 'miscarried self-formative process', [68]
becomes clear to the patient as being his own work; and who now
overcomes these mental blocks and false objectifications by seeing
through their illusory identity, and understanding their contingency
upon his authorship. Thus, 'a clarification of the genesis of the
faulty meaning is achieved...with reference to the initial
circumstances which led to the systematic distortion itself'. [69]

Third, the authenticity of the self-reflective therapy does not lie
with the analyst, but with the patient. It is his self-produced
enlightenment alone which determines the validity of the therapy; 'only
the patient's recollection decides the accuracy of the construction. If
it applies, then it must also "restore" to the patient a portion of
lost life history'. [70] At the beginning of the therapy the analyst is
as ignorant about the causes of the neurosis as is the patient.
Comprehension grows for the former to the extent that it increases in
the latter. Although at the start of the treatment there is less than
equality between analyst and patient, the success of the treatment
depends not on the interpretation of the former but of the latter. The dependency of the patient, even in seeking treatment in the first place, is the will to recovery, or to emancipation, and becomes the grounds of the validity of the exercise when the interest in recovery, the activity of self-reflection, meets itself as the knowledge which provides for the recovery. The unequal relation is itself the result of distortion, and the inequality itself disappears in the overcoming of the distortions. The 'mastery' of the analyst is an illusion which is overcome in successful therapy, and success here requires authenticity produced in and by the context of the patient who is dependent. The analyst can institute the process of enlightenment only because of the emancipatory interest of the patient, and is therefore himself dependent upon the patient for that enlightenment. Knowledge of distortion is valid only when it is enlightening for the patient, when he has worked it through and it has become his in the sense of a new self-understanding. This is overcoming as enlightenment, as self-transformative activity, in which there are only participants, and where the truth of both (analyst and patient) is a relation of mutual dependency. It is the same idea of overcoming that manifested itself earlier as the unity of theory and practice in the emancipatory interest.

For Habermas, psychoanalysis and ideology-critique both produce a unity of interest and knowledge when, because of the conditions which are lacking as a result of systematically distorted communication, the subject seeks to overcome this false existence, and finds that in doing so, it is precisely this activity which does overcome these
distortions. What was previously hidden to consciousness becomes known as origin, and its power is overcome because the knowledge of origin corresponds with the interest or activity which gave rise to it. However, for Habermas, this insight into dependency upon the object is not an absolute grounding for critique, even though the precondition of its validity is the appearance of the unconditioned. It is again based on the separation of reflection and reconstruction noted earlier. In terms of psychoanalysis the analyst is guided and justified in offering analysis in the first place because he has a theoretical preconception 'of the structure of non-distorted ordinary communication', [71] or communicative competence.
Theorizing Communicative Competence.

Habermas distinguishes between the necessary conditions of experience (a priori universals) and the particular invariant features of experience common to all cultures (a posteriori universals). The latter process is shaped by the particular society under examination, but the former are those conditions which make that process possible in the first place. It is not a particular language which is important in the theory of communicative action, but the possibility of any linguistic activity at all.

In other words, a situation in which speech, i.e. the application of linguistic competence, becomes in principle possible, depends on a structure of intersubjectivity which is in turn linguistic...In order to participate in normal discourse the speaker must have at his disposal, in addition to his linguistic competence, basic qualifications of speech and symbolic interaction (role behaviour) which we may call communicative competence. [72]

Habermas refers to such competence as 'dialogue-constitutive universals', or as that which establishes in the first place the intersubjective relation of competent speakers. This competence has to be assumed as the unconditioned necessity of all linguistic communication, that is, as the ideal speech situation, and is therefore the true nature of genuinely undistorted social relations.

Inasmuch as communicative agents reciprocally raise validity claims with their speech acts, they are relying on the potential of assailable grounds. Hence, a moment of unconditionality is built into factual processes of mutual understanding.....Once participants

- 65 -
enter into argumentation, they cannot avoid supposing, in a reciprocal way, that the conditions for an ideal speech-situation have been sufficiently met. [73]

The theory of communicative action is a social theory regarding the (condition of) free and undistorted intersubjective mutual relations which lies behind the activity of reflection and critique. Only in the emancipatory interest is this underlying consensus of competence realized, and the theory of communicative action possible, because only here is the critique of distortion unified with the knowledge that critique is itself dependent upon the potential for mutuality. The theory of communicative action is possible as the self-understanding of that possibility, but it is not absolute or truth in itself because it is known only through activity, and activity is the reflection which realizes the unconditioned, but only as its own necessity, not as its own abstract identity. Thus,

a speech situation determined by pure intersubjectivity is an idealization. The mastery of dialogue-constitutive universals does not itself amount to a capacity actually to establish the ideal speech situation. But communicative competence does mean the mastery of the means of construction necessary for the establishment of an ideal speech situation. No matter how the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding may be deformed, the design of an ideal speech situation is necessarily implied in the structure of potential speech, since all speech, even of intentional deception, is oriented towards the idea of truth. [74]

The theory of communicative action is therefore only that, a theory. But its truth is the truth of Habermasian social theory, for it is a theory of the presupposition of the unconditioned, that is, of mutual relations necessarily underpinning all claims to truth, all activities
which aim at genuine understanding over and against the distortions of
knowledge as mere technical interests. Critique is already, in theory,
the overcoming of such distortions, and is valid as self-reflection
when it realizes itself as the unity which is communicative action. The
ideal speech situation is not realized in modern society, but in
critique its truth is already anticipated, because 'with the very first
sentence the intention of a common and uncompelled consensus is
unequivocally stated'. [75]

This claim, based around the presupposition of enlightenment as result,
is the cornerstone of the political implications of Habermasian theory.
Overcoming has been seen to be achieved when a subject, in criticizing
his illusory identity of independence and autonomy, becomes aware of
his own dependence upon the unconditioned in his critical reflective
activity. This dependence is known as the unconditioned necessity of
communicative competence for all discourse, and is expressed in a
theory of communicative action which knows itself to be conditional
upon discourse; that is, it is enlightened with regard to the
unconditioned.

The theory of communicative action is thus a theory of enlightenment,
which is itself the result of enlightenment, or of having overcome the
separation of reason and interest. As such, Habermas believes, claims
of foundationalism are dissolved because in critique, the unconditioned
is an immanent result and not a presupposition. Critique is still of
the conditioned, but its own abstract appearance as mere subjective
activity has itself been overcome, and is the theory of communicative
action, or the foundation which makes critique possible. 'Participants in discourse do not have to come first to an agreement about this foundation. Indeed, a decision for the rationality inherent in linguistic understanding is not even possible'. [76]

The theory of communicative action is a theory which expresses the truth of overcoming, that is, as a theory of enlightenment which is itself the result of just such an enlightenment. It is now in a position to offer a theory of the foundations of emancipatory activity, knowing that such a theory is itself the result of just such activity. It is the fact that Habermas tries to produce a social theory where dependence emerges as a positive result rather than as a negative result, as enlightenment rather than nihilism, that is responsible for his widespread appeal in social theory. In offering the theory of communicative action as transformative political activity he is offering a positive resolution to the 'crises of the critique of knowledge' [77] which characterizes modernity.
The Theory of Communicative Action.

The two volume work carrying this title is not so much an explanation of the roots from which the theory has developed, nor a defence of the theory. It is rather a work which assumes as already in existence the critique or reflections which have produced the possibility of the (re) construction of the theory. In this sense it is the immediate result of the developments described above, culminating in a theory of communicative competence. The Theory of Communicative Action itself is a work which examines its own implications for social theory as a whole, particularly with regard to the philosophies which remain tied to the paradigm of consciousness and subjectivity, and to systems analysis which adopt a functionalist outlook. [78]

However, Habermas makes clear that the theory of communicative action is not itself a theory of communicative competence, or a prescription for the ideal speech situation. As was seen above, these are the rational implications and necessary presuppositions for a critical discussion regarding the lack of human freedom to take place at all. He notes that the ideal speech situation is needed 'in order to reconstruct the normative foundations of critical theory', [79] and that 'one should not imagine the ideal speech situation as a utopian model for an emancipated society'. [80] Rather, the ideal speech situation is 'a description of the conditions under which claims to truth and rightness can be discursively redeemed'. [81] Thus the theory of communicative action is the insight into why and how an ideal speech
situation of communicative competence became known as the foundation (at present distorted but implicit nevertheless) of that which makes agreement upon truth claims in communication possible, even with regard to the fact that this foundation is distorted. It 'provides only an explication of meaning, it does not provide a criterion'. [82]

What Habermas has arrived at in the theory of communicative action is a self-expression of the understanding of the necessity of presupposition in communication, without presupposing its 'true' form or content, but which knows that it is already the result of this necessary consensus underlying itself. It is therefore its own result, produced through its own activity and dependent upon only itself. A theory of communicative action is therefore a self-enclosed action which, by itself, produces itself and in so doing also produces or realizes the conditions which are its normative foundation. The understanding of presupposition is treated as a self-education into the intersubjective ground upon which action is dependent for its own being, and the theory of communicative action is a theory of what this self-education looks like to itself.

The two volume work is not about the process of this self-education up to a theory of communicative action, for that has already been worked out. It is an expression of an already educated communicant, one who now works not from a subjective egoistical perspective, or an objective systems perspective, but as the self-understanding of mutuality or intersubjectivity, at the level of what Habermas refers to as the 'lifeworld'. It is, therefore, an educated work, one which already has the unconditioned as result, rather than one which is (still) self-educating. It is sufficiently enlightened regarding the intersubjective...
nature of the lifeworld to know it as 'the condition under which all participants in the action may pursue their own claims'. [83] The theory of communicative action is the theory of self-activity, the self-becoming of the lifeworld, a theory which necessarily has already taken its own education regarding itself as completed. It is the knowing of itself as (its own) result which becomes the enlightened standpoint which is The Theory of Communicative Action. This section examines intersubjectivity as it appears within the two volume work.

The enlightened stance of The Theory of Communicative Action is a discourse theory of truth, one which has reflexively comprehended the dialectical relation between its activity and the rational presuppositions of that activity. In one of the interviews in Autonomy and Solidarity, Habermas argues that the core of the discourse theory of truth is characterized by three basic concepts. First, the conditions of validity, which are 'fulfilled when an utterance holds good'; [84] second, that these conditions are brought about by the raising, in discourse, of validity-claims; third, the redemption of a validity-claim, which occurs

in the framework of a discourse which is sufficiently close to the conditions of the ideal speech situation for the consensus aimed at by the participants to be brought about solely through the force of the better argument, and in this sense to be 'rationally motivated'. [85]

He concludes, 'the discourse theory of truth, then, explains what it means to redeem a validity-claim by an analysis of the general
pragmatic presupposition of the attainment of a rationally-motivated consensus'. [86]

Habermas is confident that he can show that 'a species that depends for its survival on the structures of linguistic communication and cooperative purposive-rational action, must of necessity rely on reason', [87] even though under present conditions that rationality is mostly concealed. This truth, or claims to truth, are a communicative activity which contains and produces the criterion upon which these claims gain an affirmative or negative response.

The concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based ultimately on the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective view and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld. [88]

Rationality is thus mutuality, produced and grounded in the discourse of participants aiming at the substantiating of truth claims. The theory of communicative action is the self-expression of this mutuality, not presupposed but understood as the (distorted) basis of all rational agreement. Thus, says Habermas, 'the concept of grounding is interwoven with that of learning', [89] and learning here refers to the reflexive awareness of the dependence of subjectivity upon intersubjectivity as the ground of its own truth. It is this insight which heralds the theory of communicative action as a shift from the paradigm of consciousness to language and intersubjectivity, and to the
idea of the lifeworld, which in the theory replaces consciousness as the territory upon which truth claims are both grounded and criticized.

Habermas remarks that just as communication theory was inaccessible to those brought up in the tradition of the philosophy of consciousness, so a theory of societal rationalization is impossible for those who deal with the lifeworld only as a system defined by instrumental reason, for there remains no ground on which critique is possible. For Habermas, however, 'the point of reference becomes instead the potential for rationality found in the validity basis of speech', [90] and it is the implications of communicative action for consciousness and lifeworld which structure and form the two volume work as a whole. The first of these informs most of Volume 1 and takes three main forms. The critique of consciousness is presented as a failure in self-comprehension, viz. that arguments surrounding relativism, negation and reification are all misunderstandings of communicative rationality.

This rationality has already been formulated in Habermas's previous work as the necessity of communicative reason which underlies all activity. Habermas in Volume 1 of The Theory of Communicative Action is not attempting to uncover a theory of rationality, only to reveal it as the presupposition of what he is, now, already engaged in. Argument, discussion, or any activity which aims at the truth cannot avoid the implication that a concept of communicative rationality underpins it. 'Whatever language system we choose, we always start intuitively from the presupposition that truth is a universal validity-claim', [91] and therefore 'every action oriented to reaching understanding can be
conceived of as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming at situation definitions that are intersubjectively recognized'. [92] This insight is turned against those, for example Winch, who see the necessity of presupposition as a barrier to reaching understanding, and who advance a theory of (cultural) relativism. [93] The greater a culture's understanding of these presuppositions as determinant of action, the more this signifies the new levels of learning to which a culture is rising. Indeed, as will be seen in the discussion of the uncoupling of lifeworld and system, the rationalization of social life is itself dependent upon 'the de facto recognition of validity claims that can be attacked internally, that is, shaken by critique, new insights, learning processes and the like'. [94] The greater the reflexivity of a culture, the more open it is to self-criticism, and the less it is reliant on an egoistic understanding of the world.

This understanding of falsifiability and self-critique puts an end to the idea of a universal claim to truth, but it is itself a development or a learning about the rational grounds upon which such claims are fought out, and is equally therefore the production of those grounds. Put another way, discourse is activity which both produces communicative rationality and realizes that its activity is that (self) production of mutual intersubjective relations. This universality is not a methodology for Habermas, for it is reflective and therefore 'the same structures that make it possible to reach an understanding also provide for the possibility of a reflective self-control of this process'. [95]
To know the unconditioned as communicative rationality is therefore to understand rationality as intersubjectivity, which is an enlightenment regarding the identity of mutual social relations. What was taken by Winch as the incommensurability of comparative cultural truths is turned by Habermas into an educational lesson regarding the universality that makes even a theory of incommensurability possible. 'The very situation that gives rise to the problem of understanding meaning can also be regarded as the key to its solution'. [96] The impossibility of a theory of rationality is itself therefore an enlightenment, and the insight upon which the theory of communicative action is based.

The universalist position does not have to deny the pluralism and the incompatibility of historical versions of 'civilized humanity'; but it regards this multiplicity of forms of life as limited to cultural contents, and it asserts that every culture must share certain formal properties of the modern understanding of the world, if it is at all to attain a certain degree of 'consensus awareness' or 'sublimation'. Thus the universalist assumption refers to a few necessary, structural properties of modern forms of life as such. [97]

In his critique of Lukács, Habermas argues that having employed the concept of 'reification' to explain the process of rationalization, then, in order to overcome the aporias of instrumental reason which lead to the incommensurability of truth claims and the impossibility of rational critique of bourgeois society, Lukács establishes class consciousness as the ground of authentic insight. According to Habermas's interpretation, Lukács maintains the idea, found in Hegel, of objectivity in the relation of human beings to one another and to nature, but argues, according to the model of the commodity relation,
that this reason in capitalist society establishes a 'form of objectivity' within which individuals interpret both their own identities and that of society. This distortion of social processes into a merely external objective identity is what Lukács refers to as 'reification', such that 'category mistakes are built into our understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective experiences: we apprehend them under the form of things, as entities that belong to the objective world...'. [98] The activity which is human creation has, under the influence of the commodity relation, transformed both the producer and the produced into a relation between things. Whereas for Weber, capitalist commodity exchange was only one expression of a general process of rationalization, Lukács is able to view reification and rationalization together, and takes the 'encompassing character of the societal rationalization diagnosed by Weber as a confirmation of his assumption that the commodity form is establishing itself as the dominant form of objectivity in capitalist society'. [99]

By remaining only within the sphere of instrumental action, a rationality which to him appears complete, he has, says Habermas, 'to run up against internal limits'. [100] In order to offer the critique of rationalization, which Lukacs himself has performed, he has somehow to show how he (or some form of consciousness) is not so completely reified as to make this critique impossible. This, argues Habermas, forces Lukács into a philosophical theory of knowledge, similar to that which Hegel mounted against Kant, and by which 'Lukács is presupposing the unity of theoretical and practical reason at the conceptual level...
of absolute spirit'. However, Habermas points out that even this has a 'Young-Hegelian twist', in that Lukács criticizes Hegel for remaining merely contemplative and missing the practical import of this reconciliation. It is at this point, a point made inevitable by the reliance of Lukacs solely on the paradigm of a philosophy of subjective consciousness, of instrumental action, that he has to resort to an idealist solution to the aporia of a critique of a process of rationalization which, it is claimed, is complete. It is here that Lukács, says Habermas, is forced into 'a decisive error'. By claiming that Hegel's spiritual unity is in fact the revolutionary actuality of philosophy,

...he has to credit theory with more power than even metaphysics has claimed for itself. Now philosophy has to be capable of thinking not only the totality that is hypostatized as the world order, but the world-historical process as well - the historical development of this totality through the self-conscious practice of those who are enlightened by philosophy about their active role in the self-realization of reason. [104]

As a result, Lukács is forced to supplement his theory of reification with a theory of class consciousness, a theory which 'amounts to an enthronement of proletarian class consciousness as the subject-object of history as a whole'. [105]

Just as Winch could not see that relativism resulted from the reliance in his work on the paradigm of consciousness, rather than on the form of reason which presupposes subjective action, so Lukács attempts to escape from the aporias of the critique of rationalized consciousness...
by raising one form of consciousness above and beyond reification. Enlightenment here is presumed, it is not, as in the theory of communicative action, enlightenment regarding the totality of presupposition. For Habermas, the aporias of instrumental reason 'burst the bounds of the philosophy of consciousness' [106] and cannot be self-explanatory or self-realizing.

Horkheimer and Adorno no longer trusted Hegelian logic in the way Lukács did. But their view in the Dialectic of Enlightenment that reason and enlightenment were only possible indirectly through continual self-negation, is still dependent upon the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness. It is Habermas's point that they fail to acknowledge the rational lesson which is implicit in their work and of which that work is itself a result. In a lecture in 1982, Habermas stated that the Dialectic of Enlightenment 'must make use of the same critique which it has declared false'. [107] He follows the thread of their argument through the idea of the 'decentering' of the world view, noting that the external world of things and norms becomes separated from the experiencing subject, and that this is precisely the process of critical enlightenment. He agrees with Horkheimer and Adorno that it is at this point that enlightenment becomes reflexive because it reflects upon its own genealogy, as the result not of truth but of power. 'The critique of ideology furthers the process of Enlightenment by unearthing a category mistake which stems from the fusion of declared validity claims with hidden power claims', [108] but then undermines itself by revealing its own genealogy also to lie in power. Thus, 'critique becomes total', says Habermas, 'and opposes not only
the ideological function of the bourgeois ideals, but rationality as such...'. [109] But by working only within the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness, their presentation 'is incomplete and one-sided', [110] and fails to do justice to 'the internal theoretical dynamic which constantly propels the sciences...beyond the creation of merely technologically exploitable knowledge'. [111] By remaining fixed within the paradigm of individual subjective consciousness they are forced to posit the rationalization of the lifeworld as merely the totalitarian domination of instrumental reason, which reproduces culture as reification. Their 'myopic perspective', says Habermas, makes them 'insensitive to the traces and the existing forms of communicative rationality'. [112] Because truth is seen to lie at the level of consciousness, and because consciousness is dependent upon an object which has become completely dominated by instrumental self-interest, then criticism of that process by consciousness becomes an impossibility. If Horkheimer and Adorno 'do not want to give up the goal of an ultimate unmasking and want to carry on their critique, then they must preserve at least one standard for their explanation of the corruption of all reasonable standards'. [113] Labour and thought are both reduced to the role of function of the system, and rather than reify a particular 'moment' as over and above this process, as Lukacs had done in his 'enthronement of proletarian class consciousness', [114] they remain resigned to the loss of critical reason. Habermas is complimentary, however, that at least 'in the twenty five years since the completion of the Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno has remained faithful to his philosophical impulse and has not evaded the paradoxical structure of thinking engaged in totalized critique'. [115]
The theory of communicative action, based as it is upon the understanding of itself as dependent upon (distorted) communicative rationality, therefore requires only to make the straightforward criticism of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that it is forced into the paradoxical situation of a theory which renders itself impossible. To do so is also to be communicatively active in registering the truth claim of the impossibility of truth claims *per se*. Thus, the comments aimed at Winch apply equally here, that the situation which gives rise to the problem is, in its being communicated, already dependent upon structures (of consensus) which are the key to its overcoming. What is therefore required to overcome the aporias of the negative dialectic is a shift from the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness, which finally exhausted itself in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, to the theory of communicative action, a change in direction from instrumental (solitary) action to communicative (mutual inter) action. This is to give up

- a subject that represents objects and toils with them
- in favour of the paradigm of linguistic philosophy
- namely that of intersubjective understanding or communication - and put the cognitive-instrumental aspect of reason in its proper place as part of a more encompassing communicative rationality. [117]

What Horkheimer and Adorno miss is the lesson of their own dependence upon a form of reason which is prior to their knowledge of dependence upon the social object. What is paradigmatic for the theory of communicative action

is not the relation of a solitary subject to something in the objective world that can be represented and
manipulated, but the intersubjective relation that speaking and acting subjects take up when they come to an understanding with one another about something. [118]

Such a shift in paradigm from consciousness to language enables Habermas to reconstruct a theory of the rationalization of modern society which, he believes, does not repeat the aporias noted above of relativism, reification and negativity. Behind the knowledge of rationalization there always lies that which makes possible that (critical) knowledge. This necessary presupposition of discourse is the communicative rationality upon which discussions surrounding rationalization are all dependent. It is this insight into the necessity of mutual consensus for the possibility of any subjective action which prevents the need to remain within the paradigm of consciousness, and its consequent aporias. This insight into the background rationality of all discussions on (a dominant form of) rationality was seen in earlier work as the unity of the emancipatory interest, as the possibility of theory formation, as implicitly the possibility of an ideal speech situation, and as explicitly the necessary presupposition of communicative competence. In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas now unites all of these ideas into the one idea which he calls the 'lifeworld', and which is used in Volume 1 to oppose the ideas of a completely rationalized social totality which denies consciousness the possibility of critique, and in Volume 2 is itself examined so as to develop a theory of modernity and rationalization which does not repeat the aporias of the philosophy of the subject.
The idea of the lifeworld embodies the insight which Habermas has gained elsewhere that 'a telos of mutual understanding is built into linguistic communication'; [119] that is, that intersubjective consensus is the necessary background of all attempts to produce agreement on validity claims. To agree, or even to try and reach agreement, is already to be part of an intersubjective relation and not simply a subjective action. The lifeworld, says Habermas, 'stands behind the back of each participant in communication...in the distinctive, pre-reflexive form of background assumptions, background receptivities, or background relations'. [120] In any communicative action, 'each actor draws from a common stock of knowledge which is provided by a cultural tradition shared with others. It is this background-knowledge which represents the context/the lifeworld'. [121] Thus the idea of an ideal speech situation now becomes the condition that a lifeworld must satisfy if a 'rational conduct of life is to be possible for those who share such a world view', [122] and anticipates, therefore, social relations determined through common will formation. But the lifeworld itself is not something that can be known in the same way as other experiences of self and the world, just as communicative competence itself presupposes a theory of communicative competence but cannot be known except as result. That which can be experienced are the objective world, the social world and the subjective world, but behind all three lies that which exists as the possibility of each of these as facts, that is, the unproblematic background conditions which constitute the lifeworld. Communicative action reproduces the lifeworld, and in that sense (of mutual intersubjective consensus forming activity) is primarily 'a principle of sociation'. [123]
Discussions with regard to world concepts, or processes of rationalization of the social world and individual consciousness form the 'categorial scaffolding that serves to order problematic situations...(but) in a lifeworld that is already substantively interpreted'. [124]

The phenomenological aspects of Habermas's work would dissolve if the theory of the lifeworld became an object which could be transformed in order to produce mutual relations, for that would imply communicative rationality was not intersubjective at all, and the grounding of critique, but merely another object known by a consciousness which did not recognize its own necessary (communicative) preconditions. Subjects cannot refer to 'something in the lifeworld' in the same way as they can to facts, norms or experiences. The structures of the lifeworld lay down the forms of the intersubjectivity of possible understanding...(it is) the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social or subjective) and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements. In a sentence: participants cannot assume in actu the same distance in relation to language and culture as in relation to the totality of facts, norms and experiences concerning which mutual understanding is possible. [125]

It is precisely this distance, which enables The Theory of Communicative Action to raise the theory of modern societal rationalization outside of the strictly limited bounds of the paradigm of instrumental reason. Whereas Lukacs, Horkheimer and Adorno are forced to assume that it is the lifeworld itself which is reified, Habermas can now explain that in the critique of rationalization
another form of rationality appears, one upon which critique itself
depends but in which, equally, is realized. This self-education is
therefore of the mutual and communicative rationality which underpins
the critique of another form of rationality, that is, instrumental
technical reason. The aporias produced in a concept of reification thus
do not appear, for it is not the communicative rationality that is
reified, rather it is the world as experienced. This is not to say that
the structures of the lifeworld are not themselves distorted, it is
rather to say that in critique this distortion is realized and overcome
in the critical communicative activity. Nor, then, is this a
presupposition of what mutual relations should look like, or which
historical agents they appear to. It is merely to acknowledge that the
distortions of mutual relations are known in the necessary
presupposition of the mutuality which is critique.

The theory of communicative action operates on an intersubjective
level, but to present his revised theory of rationalization and
modernity on such a level requires Habermas to offer first, a critique
of the aspect of sociology which is normally associated with such
thought, namely functionalism. In Volume 2 of The Theory of
Communicative Action, he tries to show how this shift from instrumental
action to communicative action, or from subject and object to
intersubjective thought was prepared for by G.H. Mead and Emile
Durkheim, but is in their work an incomplete project due to the one-
sidedness of their 'functionalism'. Habermas argues that in a theory of
communicative action it is necessary to understand that the lifeworld
is not the same as the social system. This does not have to be assumed,
it is already known and presupposed as the critique in Volume 1 and as
theoretical foundation of the theory of communicative action
itself. As early as 1971 in _Theory and Practice_, Habermas has noted
that the emancipatory interest 'can only develop to the degree to which
repressive force, in the form of the normative exercise of power,
presents itself permanently in the structures of distorted
communication - that is, to the extent that domination is
institutionalized'. [126] Just as the young Marx was faced with the
actual economic fact of the alienation of worker and product, [127] so
the theory of communicative action begins with the 'fact' of reflection
upon the social world. Mead and Durkheim exemplify for Habermas the
growth of this reflection.

Reflection is itself dependent upon what appears to be the separation
of subject and object - this is the appearance for those who work
within the paradigm of consciousness. But for the theory of
communicative action, which already understands that critical
reflection as discourse is based on intersubjective rationality or the
lifeworld, this separation is the uncoupling of that lifeworld from the
social system, or the uncoupling of communicative rationality and the
structures which (now do not) embody it. [128] For Habermas, 'the
uncoupling of system and lifeworld is experienced in modern society as
a particular kind of objectification: the social system definitively
bursts out of the horizon of the lifeworld (and) escapes from the
intuitive knowledge of everyday communicative practice'. [129] Thus a
theory of rationalization emerges which is based on the intersubjective
acknowledgement that its own existence is now distorted, and separated
from the world which could reflect its own authentic expression of communicative rationality. Even though the system is uncoupled from the lifeworld, nevertheless Habermas sees the critique of this separation, through communicative action, as the self-activity of the lifeworld, or as the implicit activity of (absolute) ethical life.

Habermas is making a phenomenological point about the 'always already' character of the critique of the uncoupling of system and lifeworld. The colonization of the lifeworld is the increasing distortion of intersubjectivity by the technical, organizational and instrumental rational interests of power and money. These latter operate as the agents of the interest in control, even of control over those whose agents they are. Habermas seeks to claim that, by performing critique in terms of colonization rather than reification, and comprehending critique as 'always already' the activity of the lifeworld (that is, as communicative action), he can escape the contradictions of the dialectic of enlightenment in Marx, Weber, Lukacs and Horkheimer and Adorno. Because it is no longer operating on the level of consciousness, Habermas is able to replace ideology and reification with 'steering media' (based on Parsons theory of media), which operate at the level of the separated system, and colonize the lifeworld, but do not abolish it or dominate it to the extent that critique becomes completely impossible. Habermas states, 'I sharply distinguish between the more or less differentiated or "rationalized" lifeworlds that are reproduced by way of communicative action and, on the other hand, formally organized systems of action based on steering media'. [130]
The very existence of critical reflection is evidence of a rationality which understands its distortions, and is already therefore the education of consciousness beyond technical and instrumental ideas of subjective action. 'The analysis of the lifeworld is a self-referential enterprise'; [131] it is always already a self-referential enterprise. It is the self-reflexive interest in emancipation which characterizes modernity and enlightenment, but is possible only as the self-critique, in communicative action, of the lifeworld. With regard to these steering media, Habermas notes that 'money and power - more concretely, markets and administrations - take over the integrative functions which were formerly fulfilled by consensual values and norms, or even by processes of reaching understanding'. [132] These steering media replace communicative action as the immediate principle of sociation, and reflect not intersubjectivity, but the objective nature of a social world detached from the (control of) rational will. They give rise to new institutions which transfer the sovereignty of the lifeworld to instrumental action, to efficiency, and to technical control. Habermas is optimistic, however, that there are increasing signs of a legitimation crises where these steering media are trying to usurp areas 'which are demonstrably unable to perform their tasks if they are removed from communicatively structured domains of action', [133] and he cites as evidence the growth of new protest movements. 'I would not speak of "communicative rationalization" if...a piece of "existing reason"...were not...recognizable...today in feminism, in cultural revolts, in ecological and pacifist forms of resistance, and so forth'. [134]
The aim behind the theory of communicative action as a whole is to explicate a concept of reason which 'stands against Adorno's negativism' [135] and 'frees historical materialism from its philosophical ballast'. [136] Habermas attempts to preserve the element of critique in Hegel's phenomenological method whilst relieving it of the pretentious burden of the absolute. This he does by understanding the result of such critique to be the necessary precondition for communicative action of the lifeworld. As such, for Habermas, the absolute cannot be known in a way which is beyond the possibility of its own falsifiability, but the conditions in which validity claims are grounded is increasingly understood. It is the knowledge of the necessity of presupposition which, in critical reflection, is also the realization of the intersubjective relations which constitute that presupposition, at least to the extent that it can become the basis of a theory. Reason is not therefore abandoned to the form of instrumental rationality which dominates under certain historical conditions, rather it is the critical awareness of that domination which is in itself taken as proof that reason, and hence the enlightenment project, is still active. 'Horkheimer and Adorno', concludes Habermas, failed to recognize the communicative rationality of the lifeworld that had to develop out of the rationalization of worldviews before there could be any development of formally organized domains of action at all. It is only this communicative rationality, reflected in the self-understanding of modernity, that gives an inner logic - and not merely the impotent rage of nature in revolt - to resistance against the colonization of the lifeworld by the inner dynamics of autonomous systems. [137]
It is investigations at this level, rather than in the philosophies of consciousness, which now represent for Habermas the tasks which lie ahead for critical theory.
A - ENLIGHTENMENT

The Need For Self-Reassurance

For Habermas, the dialectic of enlightenment represents the crisis which is 'modernity'. The Enlightenment brought forward a subject who no longer required the past, in the form of traditions, or dogmatic truths based on faith, in order to provide normative orientations in and for the world. But this development of the reasoning powers of an autonomous subject was double-edged. It does possess, notes Habermas,

an unexampled power to bring about the formation of subjective freedom and reflection and to undermine religion, which heretofore has appeared as an absolutely unifying force. But the principle of subjectivity is not powerful enough to regenerate the unifying power of religion in the medium of reason... The demotion of religion leads to a split between faith and knowledge which the Enlightenment cannot overcome by its own powers. [1]

This modern self-imposed separation of subjectivity and knowledge, or of activity and result, is itself the result of enlightenment, for the rational subject now has itself as object. The task of repairing the separation is carried out by that which has already led to the separation. This is the aporia of the dialectic of
enlightenment, where unification is logically contradictory to the method of unification. Habermas notes that this 'marks the entrance into a modernity that sees itself condemned to draw on itself for its consciousness of self and its norm'. [2] For those who remain tied to this dialectic of enlightenment solely through the paradigm of consciousness, then, says Habermas,

modernity's form of knowledge is characterized by the aporia that the cognitive subject, having become self-referential, rises from the ruins of metaphysics to pledge itself, in full awareness of its finite powers, to a project that would demand infinite power. [3]

The negativity which inheres in this view of the dialectic of enlightenment has given rise to a form of thought whose only 'achievement' is to acknowledge the impossibility of an enlightenment beyond its negativity. Such a negative viewpoint, for Habermas, does not take account of the conditions which are necessary for its own articulation, and he is dismissive of it beyond the insight that truth and knowledge are fallible. This, he remarks, was pointed out by Hegel nearly two hundred years ago, and 'nothing has changed since then'. [4] The philosophical discourse of modernity has rather 'made a drama out of something which should be trivial by now'. [5]

Habermas praises Adorno in particular as being the only philosopher 'to develop remorselessly and spell out the paradoxes of...the dialectic of enlightenment that unfolds the whole as the untrue'. [6] But even this work, which greatly influenced the young Habermas,
only revealed that 'one must go back to a stage before the dialectic of enlightenment because, as a scientist, one cannot live with the paradoxes of a self-negating philosophy'. [8]

Habermas's own reception of, and reaction to, the dialectic of enlightenment informs his interpretations of others reactions to it. As one who 'cannot live with the paradoxes of a self-negating philosophy' his unavowed aim throughout his work has been 'to explicate a concept of communicative reason that can stand against Adorno's negativism', [9] in order to arrive at 'forms of living together in which autonomy and dependency can truly enter into a non-antagonistic relation, that one can walk tall in a collectivity that does not have the dubious quality of backward-looking substantial forms of community'. [10] This desire, or Sollen, which underpins his philosophical enterprise is then transferred onto Hegel, in an attempt to account for, what for Habermas, is the fundamental flaw in the former's philosophy, the positing of the absolute.

Habermas's own desire to overcome the implications of the dialectic of enlightenment through, in his case, a communicative unification of reason and subject, becomes the desire by which to explain all other attempts at unification, attempts which are less successful than his. Thus, he is able to explain Hegel's philosophical system in terms of the 'crises of experience' [11] which it is claimed Hegel was living through at the turn of the nineteenth century, and which (in keeping with Habermas's own aims) were at the root of 'the
conviction that reason must be brought forward as the reconciling power against the positive elements of an age torn asunder'. [12] Habermas concludes, 'what encourage[d] Hegel to presuppose an absolute power of unification, therefore, are not so much arguments as biographical experiences'. [13] The crises of modernity becomes, here, a crises of Hegel's own self-reassurance. This misreading of Hegel's system as Sollen, which lies at the heart of the aporias of Habermas's reading of Hegel, is a reading formed in and by an understanding of the educational import of phenomenology and absolute knowing as abstract methodologies. As Rose has pointed out, there is a Sollen in Hegel's philosophy, but it is one which lies within philosophy itself. [14]
Enlightenment as the Overcoming of Dialectic.

There are two aspects of particular importance in examining Habermas's reworking of Hegelian phenomenology as the basis of his social theorizing as a whole. First is his critique of Hegel's presupposition of the absolute as lying within the philosophy of subjective consciousness. Second is the misunderstanding that Habermas himself has of phenomenology, which leads him to reproduce it as a methodology with a beginning and end, rather than as self-movement.

Habermas's view of the absolute in Hegel remains constant from Knowledge and Human Interests, first published in 1968, to The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, published in 1985, and is the theoretical foundation to the development of, and the exposition of, the theory of communicative action. As was seen above, Habermas's presupposition of enlightenment as overcoming is the central idea behind the theory, for it is with this notion that the subject both realizes his dependency, and therein becomes aware of the necessity of intersubjective communicative consensus. This thesis argues, however, that the idea which Habermas has of overcoming is the result of his misreading of Hegelian phenomenology, and misrecognition of determinate negation and dependency.

Knowledge and Human Interests begins with praise for Hegel who, says Habermas, 'replaced the enterprise of epistemology with the phenomenological self-reflection of mind'. [15] The problem for a
critical philosophy is that, in trying to understand the a priori conditions for the possibility of self-validating reason and reliable knowledge, it has at its disposal for this task only that which is the subject of the investigation, namely, the faculty of (rational) knowledge. 'Every consistent epistemology', says Habermas, 'is caught in this circle from the beginning'. [16] Indeed, Habermas goes as far as to state that 'Hegel's argument is conclusive...[f]or the circle in which epistemology inevitably ensnares itself is a reminder that the critique of knowledge does not possess the spontaneity of an origin'. [17] It is this insight which, when turned on the theory of communicative action, reveals the latter to have presumed precisely just such a beginning.

With these comments in mind, there appears to be little disagreement between Hegel and Habermas on the phenomenological necessities of philosophical enquiry. When thought examines itself, it appears 'after the fact' as Habermas puts it, [18] but equally is aware that the work on which it is dependent for this appearance is its own. In Communication and the Evolution of Society, Habermas enthusiastically refers to K.O. Apel's use of the phrase 'always already' (immer schon) to describe the necessity of this dependence. He notes that Apel draws attention away from the outlook of an observer, to the more immanently reflective content of 'what we must necessarily always already presuppose in regard to ourselves and others as normative conditions of the possibility of understanding'. [19] This movement, therefore, is the experience of reflection, and can be known only as self-reflection. Hegel states in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit that
'this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called experience'. [20] However, Habermas's interpretation of phenomenological experience as a result of and for consciousness differs from that of Hegel; and it is from here that the fundamental misreading of Hegel by Habermas stems.

Habermas argues that the result of this experience of reflection by consciousness teaches that (self) knowledge exists only in a dependent relation and cannot therefore justify a priori claims to a knowledge of conditions which exist pre-reflection. He then takes this to be a positive result for us, one which can be known, and can be confidently known, precisely because it is its own result. The critique of epistemology has, in this experience of the dialectic of enlightenment, 'cast off its false consciousness by being turned against itself in metacritique'. [21] The authenticity of the result lies in the fact that it has received no external input, presupposed nothing, but has merely resulted from itself, from the work which is its own self-inquiry. There is no reason to doubt this result, for such doubt would require to be brought to the situation from outside, since doubt does not inhere in the result that is achieved. This authenticity, then, is taken by Habermas unconditionally to be the self-identity of critique, arrived at through its own phenomenological (self) movement and known by those whose (self) interest it is. From this self-production emerges an understanding that this self-identity is a new 'level of learning', [22] higher than knowledge that is unreflective and not self-conscious of its origins. What is therefore to be retained from Hegel's
phenomenological critique of epistemology is that it 'brings to light a series of implicit presuppositions of a critique of knowledge that claims to be free of presupposition'. [23] What is disagreed on between the two is precisely the place of this insight within the dialectic (of enlightenment) which has produced it.

For Habermas, by becoming aware of dependency (through self-reflection) consciousness has achieved an understanding of itself which has overcome its previous condition of unenlightenment regarding its origins and independence. It now understands itself in a way which previously it did not. In overcoming that shape of consciousness it has learnt about itself, and this education has, moreover, been achieved by itself. Indeed, as was seen in the previous chapter, what has in fact been overcome, for Habermas, is subjectivity itself. A knowledge of the pre-conditions which make subjective reflection possible enable the reconstruction in theory of those preconditions. They are the intersubjective communicative consensus upon which subjectivity is dependent. Thus it is from the idea of reflection as overcoming, found in but misunderstood by Hegel, which is the dynamic behind a paradigm shift from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of communication.

What Habermas is critical of in Hegel's interpretation of phenomenology is that rather than remain with this positive result, that is, the education of consciousness regarding its own communicative presuppositions, Hegel takes this to be a negative result. Consciousness, instead of gaining self-transparency, assumes that what
it has learnt regarding itself makes a result an impossibility. The inability of consciousness to exist without presupposition leads to Hegel 'abandoning the critique of knowledge itself', [24] because, rather than accept what reflection teaches, he presupposes that this too must be doubted in the same way that unreflected consciousness was. Hegel therefore imports to the knowledge arrived at in self-reflection a method of unconditional doubt which, for Habermas, is not justified by the result which has been attained. Why should the reflective critique itself be reflected upon as if it were not already the result of such reflection?

The positive result of the dialectic of enlightenment for Habermas, the knowledge of dependency as the self-identity of critique, Hegel would see 'as a sign of the untruth of the critical philosophy as such'. [25] Hegel must, therefore, have known the appearance of truth before phenomenological inquiry if he is now so sure that what has been arrived at is not truth. Habermas states,

he (Hegel) sees through the absolutism of an epistemology based on unreflected presuppositions, demonstrates the mediation of reflection by what precedes it, and thus destroys the renewal of First Philosophy on the basis of transcendentalism. Yet in doing so he imagines himself to be overcoming the critique of knowledge as such. This opinion insinuates itself because from the very beginning Hegel presumes as given a knowledge of the absolute... [26]

Thus what should have been an immanent inquiry, the Phénoméno\n\ology of \nSpirit, is flawed because the result was already presupposed before the enquiry even began. Absolute knowledge which, says Habermas, 'in
accordance with the approach of phenomenological investigation' [27] ought to result from the enquiry, can now be viewed in the Phenomenology of Spirit as a result which is itself dependent upon its being presupposed at the start. Thus, 'the apparent dilemma (Aporie) of knowing before knowledge...now returns in Hegels thought as an actual dilemma: namely, that phenomenology must in fact be valid prior to every possible mode of scientific knowledge'. [28]

This misunderstanding has not changed throughout Habermas's writings. His recent Philosophical Discourse of Modernity reveals the same debt to Hegel that is apparent in Knowledge and Human Interests, and the same criticisms of him. As a modernist Hegel was inspired, argues Habermas, to overcome the separation of knowledge and truth, subject and object produced in the dialectic of enlightenment, but only by the use of reason's own self-understanding. In order to ensure the stability of the recently shattered identity of the modern, Hegel's critique could

make use of no instrument other than that of reflection which it encounters as the purest expression of the principle of modern times. If modernity is to ground itself, Hegel has to develop the critical concept of modernity through a dialectic residing in the principle of the Enlightenment itself. [29]

It is therefore Hegel's own modern credentials which undermine his immanent critique, for even before he has seriously begun to examine the modern dilemma, he has decided upon a notion of the absolute which serves as 'the power of unification'. [30]
He treats the concept of the absolute...as a further presupposition under which alone philosophy can resume its business. With it, philosophy can make sure of its goal from the outset - the goal of exhibiting reason as the power of unification. [31]

The target of Habermas's criticism this time is not the method of unconditioned doubt by which the (presupposed) absolute directs the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is now Hegel's early writings, and their presupposition of an ethical totality from which the modern separation of individual and social can be explained. [32] Again the discussion is in terms of Hegel's 'motives'. [33] He has, according to Habermas, to project reason as 'a force that not only differentiates and breaks apart the system of life-conditions, but also reunites them'. [34] This is achieved in the Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, where a presupposed ethical totality is posited as the life which is known as lost by 'the experience of the negativity of divided life'. [35] Habermas sees in this early work the possibility of a theory of communicative action, for the ethical totality represents the intersubjective preconditions which are necessary for subjectivity and reflection. But by not pursuing any further 'the traces of communicative reason that are clearly to be found in his early writings', [36] Hegel places himself in an aporia which he is unable to resolve. By remaining within the philosophy of the subject, 'he fails to achieve the goal essential to the self-grounding of modernity: thinking the positive element in such a way that it can be overcome by the same principle from which it proceeds - precisely by subjectivity'. [37] It is only his presupposition of a concept of the absolute which
enables him to believe that such a reconciliation is possible within reflection.

For Habermas, the result is a failure by Hegel to unify subject and object, and a failure to overcome the identity crises of modernity. A concept of the absolute which resides in the (absolute) power of subjectivity has only reproduced the dialectic of enlightenment, it has not learnt from it. He has carried the dialectic to the point of exhaustion, to a position which, having presupposed unconditional doubt, requires an all-knowing subject in whom reconciliation is achieved. The impulse which originally set critique in motion, having attained its goal, is therefore finished. The insight into fallibility is spent, and merely reproduces itself. What is missed is the education which is implicit in the dialectic of enlightenment but never recognized by philosophies which remain tied to subjectivity, and never become enlightened regarding the intersubjective conditions upon which they themselves are dependent.

The lesson of modernity for Habermas is that the crises in modernity, the separation of subject and object, and the impulse for unification, are themselves dependent upon, and reliant upon, a communicative consensus. Thus, in Habermasian critique the identity of mutual dependence is arrived at through reflection, and can be reconstructed in theory, and employed in practice. In this move, the subject has deduced the a priori necessary and universal conditions for intersubjectivity and absolute ethical life. These conditions are reconstructed in the theory of communicative action which now,
therefore, provides for the future possibility of authentic and absolute ethical life.

Having seen how Habermas overcomes Hegel's presupposition of the absolute, and turns the negative implications of a dialectic of enlightenment into a positive educational result, it is now possible to understand the central importance which this idea of overcoming has for the whole of Habermasian social theory; indeed, it is only the idea of phenomenological experience as overcoming which enables Habermas's work, from the critique of positivism to the theory of communicative action, to be understood as an internally coherent project. Overcoming, presupposed as the identity of self-enlightenment and emancipation, is the substantial ground upon which Habermas proceeds to construct ideology-critique, psychoanalytic models, a theory of communicative competence, and finally, as the self-expression of consciousness which has overcome subjectivity, a theory of communicative action and lifeworld.

In his later work there is much less emphasis on the ideas of critique, of emancipation, of overcoming, because he is more concerned to work at the level of the result itself, of the lifeworld, than the process by which it has been arrived at. [38] This is often referred to as the linguistic turn in his work, but what is overlooked in such interpretations is that the move to language is itself the result of, and requires, the notions of critique and overcoming which make the appearance of the intersubjective possible in the first place. [39]
A theory of phenomenology as overcoming, as a process of learning and enlightenment, is therefore the key to understanding the totality of Habermas's work. It can be summarized as consisting of the idea that instrumental distortions of genuine communicative rationality are overcome in the critical activity of a subject seeking to comprehend the separation of activity from identity. The overcoming is achieved because the will to emancipation is at one and the same time the unity of activity and result, or intersubjectivity, in communicative action. The result of this overcoming is therefore the possibility of reconstructing a theory of intersubjectivity, which is a theory of the truth of intersubjectivity produced by those whose truth it is.

The final point which remains to be made here is that Habermas's notion of phenomenology as overcoming infact fulfills the Sollen or desire which, as was seen above, lay behind his work. A theory of communicative action which establishes that 'the goal of coming to an understanding is the process of bringing about an agreement that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understandings, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another', [40] is also a social theory of non-domination. By overcoming the 'I' or the individual in society, the theory of communicative action is able to claim itself as a theory of intersubjectivity, of autonomy and solidarity, and of genuinely free relations between communicative partners. In this sense, then, it is a theory of absolute ethical life, of the possibility of mutual recognition and mutual social relations in which the abstractions of civil society are seen through and overcome. It is a theory, finally, which achieves the
restoration of a rational society as a positive possibility against the melancholy science of reason as negation.

The idea of communicative competence is a theory of absolute ethical life. Because each has linguistic competence and shares a set of symbols which are mutually understood, then what appears as an exclusivity of one individual against another in dialogue is in fact the reproduction of that which they have in common. From the discourse of the two individuals, a 'we' is produced which is their understanding of their common situation. Habermas makes this point in the following way;

the relation between I (ego), you (alter-ego), and we (ego and alter-ego) is established only by an analytically paradoxical achievement: the speaking persons identify themselves at the same time with two incompatible dialogue roles and thereby ensure the identity of the I (ego) as well as of the group. The one being (ego) asserts his absolute non-identity in relation to the other being (alter-ego); at the same time however, both recognize their identity in as much as each acknowledges the other as being an ego, that is, a non-replaceable individual who can refer to himself as 'I'. Moreover, that which links them both is a mutual factor (we), a collectivity, which in turn asserts its individuality in relation to other groups. [41]

Thus, the theory of communicative action is self-knowledge of (the possibility of) this 'we', and is, therefore, a theory of free and undistorted ethical life. Abstraction is overcome when its effects become an object of critical reflection. For that which is now the reflecting subject is no longer abstract, but aware in its own activity of itself as part of a 'we', an ethical totality, whose genuine expression can be reconstructed in theory. The enlightenment produced in critique regarding dependency is also the production, through
critical discourse, of dependency, which is in turn, for Habermas, the identity of mutual, intersubjective social relations.

Overall, Habermas has missed the educational import of phenomenology and replaced it with an idea of education that is as instrumental as the forms of reason which it was used to overcome. It is by presupposing this critique of dialectic to be the identity of enlightenment as overcoming, that Habermas repeats the aporia which is not dialectic as enlightenment, but the dialectic of enlightenment. The remainder of this chapter subjects this educational presupposition to the very critique which it claims as its own self-identity, and realizes the immanent negation which has as result only the dialectic of enlightenment.
Beginnings and Ends.

A theory of modernity which, like the theory of communicative action, has the notion of 'result' as central to the identity of enlightenment, implicitly also relies on a notion of 'beginning'. If overcoming is achieved as the result of critique, then critique as method can be begun, with a view to this eventual success. The fact that critique can be begun underlies Habermas's theory reconstruction, both in therapy and the organization of enlightenment. The understanding of that beginning, that is, of its nature and structure, is the theory of communicative action and, which is the same, is Habermas's idea of mutually interdependent social relations. The phenomenology therefore, of Habermasian social theory is that through critique one arrives at a (social) self which has overcome its appearance in civil society, and from which one can comprehend one's true nature in the theoretical reconstruction of the communicative mutuality which is the beginning, the possibility of, all that has occurred. Thus, the understanding of the intersubjective beginning can only be arrived at as the result of critique, and not presupposed beforehand.

In this analysis there is no disagreement between Habermas and Hegel; indeed, Habermas has employed (one half of) the phenomenological movement of the Phenomenology of Spirit in a strictly Hegelian way. Where their disagreement arises, and where Habermas's phenomenology becomes logically unsustainable, is in their understanding of what the result of phenomenology is. Habermas, having criticized the identity of
objects as they appear in civil society and in the technical interest, then presupposes the identity of the result of phenomenology as providing a view of subject and object which expresses its genuine and authentic social relationship. Why is this identity not subject to the same critique as the previous identity? To do so, as was seen above, Habermas would argue, involves a method of unconditional doubt which is not immanent in critique, for it is to ignore the result which has been produced. Therefore the difference between Habermasian critique and Hegelian phenomenology is that for the former, critical reflection can be trusted to educate itself correctly, providing no need to distrust its results, whereas for Hegel, seemingly, phenomenological reflection does not even trust itself and doubts everything. In reading Hegel according to 'motives', Habermas sees that the nihilism which would be the logic of such a phenomenology is only avoided by the presupposition of the absolute. This is, in Habermas's view, to act in a very unphenomenological way, slipping in as explanation precisely what is to be explained. 'He (Hegel) ought first to demonstrate, and not simply to presuppose, that a kind of reason which is more than absolutized understanding can convincingly reunify the antithesis that reason has to unfold discursively'. [42]

However, to see Hegelian phenomenology as a method of unconditional doubt is to misread it in the most fundamental fashion. Habermas, in seeking a unity of theory and practice in the self-activity of critique can only claim the knowledge of this achievement by resting on a position which is not that of critique. The negative results of philosophical doubt produce insufficient substance for a theorist whose
aim in critique is precisely to overcome the world as it is for the possibility of another, better one. In order therefore to improve, for example, on Adorno, Habermas requires more than critique. He needs a form of critique which is successful in overcoming this world, and from which the possibility of another clearly emerges as rational and self-produced. It is this need which is responsible for him viewing critique in a way which is more than can be claimed for it, and it is in so doing that he reduces the phenomenological insight which appeared in the emancipatory interest as result, to a methodological presupposition that the nature of result can be positively grasped and employed. It is the presupposition that the activity of doubt (or of philosophical consciousness) has resulted in something other than philosophical consciousness. Doubt becomes (reconstructed as) the certainty and truth of enlightenment as result in the theory of communicative action. It is Hegel's phenomenology alone here which investigates doubt, or critical reflection, according to itself, or strictly as self-identity, and not according to the desire which it can fulfill by performing a particular emancipatory task. Several points can be made here, which draw out the misunderstandings of Hegel in Habermas's work, and which mark the reappearance in the latter of the aporias which it was designed to overcome.

Hegel does not need to adopt reflection as a method, nor to impute to it qualities regarding its dependence or unconditionedness. Doubt in Hegel is not a methodology for it does not produce the manner of result which allows it to become anything other than what it already is. What happens in a phenomenology 'is not what is ordinarily understood when
the word "doubt" is used', says Hegel, [43] referring to those for whom doubt is a critical and analytical tool by which to examine the world in such a way that nothing really is at stake and nothing really changes. To employ doubt in such a way is to render it impotent of all critical import. The doubt which characterizes phenomenology is 'the way of despair', [44] a way which is immanently committed as the movement of doubt, and which changes the doubter along the way with each new insight. It is not a method for it can only be known after its movement, since what it comes to know is the result of reflection. There is no point on the way of despair at which consciousness can resist this movement of reflection in order to ensure that any knowledge secured is not itself immediately also the result of further doubt and reflection. It is precisely this destruction of the possibility of a result which can resist its own phenomenological movement, which characterizes it as a way of despair. It is not, as Gillian Rose points out, 'a path of self-enlightening doubt' [45] which can be methodologically set out upon.

'The series of configurations which consciousness goes through along this road is, in reality, the detailed history of the education of consciousness'. [46] The result of this phenomenology is the absolute insight that there can only ever be achieved another result. It is an insight therefore whose negativity undermines itself precisely at the same time as it proves its substance. The truth of phenomenology is negative, and therefore is only true in the negation also, of its own truth. But Habermas has taken the insight into dependency as a result which is not self-negating, and can resist its own truth with regard to
itself. Habermas has taken this result, the knowledge of self-
education, to be the positive result of critique, and in doing so lifts
himself off the pathway of despair to a position from which that
pathway can be known, and is therefore not despair. It is not enough to
claim from this position that what is known is that all knowledge, even
this knowledge, is fallible. The understanding that knowledge could be
fallible is not a phenomenological result, for it is no longer the
self-movement of doubt, or the self-identity of critique, it is the
movement of doubt as method. Habermas, who criticizes Hegel for
imposing unconditional doubt as a method, in fact imposes a
methodological doubt which is conditional only upon his own
presupposition of what critique is.

In Habermas, then, such reflection becomes the instrument by which
abstraction can be understood and criticized, but the identity of the
instrument has to be presupposed beforehand. If doubt is a self-
activity, as Habermas claims in the emancipatory interest, how is it
possible that it can produce anything other than itself? The fear that
doubt will only produce itself precisely underlies modernity's need for
self-reassurance noted above, for in this fear is already contained the
view, the prejudgement, that the instrument alone is incapable of
producing a positive result. [47] Habermas's view of overcoming has its
origins in this prejudgement, and his response to it is to force onto
reflection a result which is other than itself. In so doing he has
repeated the aporia of modernity's separation of subject and object
which, precisely, was that which it was intended to overcome.

Unconvinced and unsatisfied by the negative education which is the
pathway of despair, Habermas replaces it with his own idea of critical education, one which whilst claimed as the self-identity of enlightenment, in fact is other than that critical movement itself.

Hegel views any attempt to know more than the instrument employed in philosophy can actually produce, as another lesson in the education of consciousness on the way of despair, asking 'should we not be concerned as to whether this fear of error is not just the error itself? [48] It is mere subjective caprice to suppose that the negativity of phenomenology is not sufficient to grasp the nature of truth, and it is a presupposition which lies outside of phenomenology itself. This is Habermas's view of the dialectic of enlightenment and accounts for the Sollen which underpins his work.

Hegel comments that in general such presuppositions take for granted certain ideas about cognition as an instrument and as a medium and assumes that there is a difference between ourselves and this cognition. Above all, it presupposes that the absolute stands on one side and cognition on the other...in other words, it presupposes that cognition which, since it is excluded from the absolute, is surely outside of truth as well, is nevertheless true, an assumption whereby what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of the truth. [49]

Habermas's critique of instrumental reason is phenomenological in the sense that it is immanent, but his theory of communicative action is less than phenomenological for it removes the movement of critique from the path of despair and onto a ground which, beyond doubt, knows its true origins or beginnings. The claim embodied in the theory, that
critique knows its true self in mutual communicative relations, is forced into the aporia that it is both still critical reflection, and yet not, at the same time. Habermas's assertion that this is still a relation of dependence, and not a theory constructed in abstraction, can only repeat the aporia that the claim itself is not critique, and thus undermines the very criterion of authenticity upon which it rests.

The dialectic of enlightenment is the dialectic of immediacy and mediation, and the problem it poses is that the instrument used in philosophical enquiry is also the object of that enquiry. The fear of error which arises here, regarding the capacity of consciousness as an instrument with which to grasp the true, is itself the immediate outlook of natural consciousness, which has objects for it, but does not have itself for object. Reason as it immediately appears on the scene takes itself to be the universal category by which the truth of all objects can be known. The object lies before it as something which enjoys an objective existence, unhindered by transcendental or metaphysical interference, or by subjective whims and fancies. However this idealistic satisfaction of natural consciousness is disrupted by its own activity. Natural consciousness cannot therefore remain a pure identity, for it becomes as much an object in the world as those objects which it took as proof of its own being. When reason becomes an object for itself, it cannot escape the fact that consciousness now has a previous shape of consciousness known to it. In Hegelian terms, natural consciousness has become an object for philosophical consciousness. The result is that the truth of natural consciousness has been lost because it is no longer an immediate certainty, but
rather is mediated by the consciousness for which it is an object, and which acts as the instrument through which it is known. The fear of error is therefore the fear of natural consciousness's own death; since it takes itself to be real knowledge, then this mediation has 'a negative significance for it...(and) counts for it rather as the loss of its own self'. [50] In reflection, thought 'entangles itself in contradictions, i.e. loses itself in the hard-and-fast non-identity of its thoughts, and so, instead of reaching itself, is caught and held in its counterpart'. [51]

Natural consciousness, the outlook of empirical and technical reason in Habermas, is therefore lost to philosophical consciousness on each and every occasion that it proclaims its certainty of identity. There can be no reason without mediation, and there can be no natural consciousness which is not also for philosophical consciousness. Since natural consciousness and philosophical consciousness are two aspects of the same consciousness, then it can be seen that consciousness suffers violence at its own hands: it spoils its own limited satisfaction. When consciousness feels this violence, its anxiety may well make it retreat from the truth, and strive to hold onto what it is in danger of losing. But it can find no peace... thought troubles its thoughtlessness, and its own unrest disturbs its inertia. [52]

This describes both the dialectic of enlightenment and Habermas's response to it. It is his hope that the negativity which is implicit in philosophical consciousness can be overcome and that a form of (communicative) reason be found which is both self-mediated and yet
more than the consciousness of a (particular) reflecting subject. He is well aware that in the negative 'reason remains a restless searching and in its very searching declares that the satisfaction of finding is a sheer impossibility', [53] but is not content with this. Against the seeming inevitability of the endless mediation of objects, including consciousness, by (self) consciousness, Habermas posits a still point of immediacy [54] as that which understands how mediation or reflection is made possible in the first place. Rather than 'looking the negative in the face' [55] he has avoided its gaze in order to gain an undistorted snapshot. To this very problem Hegel comments, 'to see that thought in its very nature is dialectical, and that, as understanding, it must fall into contradiction - the negative of itself - will form one of the main lessons of logic'. [56]

What Habermas has not comprehended here is that the division between consciousness and object is not optional, even in describing its being non-optional. 'There is nothing,' notes Hegel,

nothing in heaven or in nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity. [57]

Therefore a theory which attempts to get behind mediation to look for the origins of its possibility, in the very act of producing itself, is also, already, an object for that which knows it. The universality of mediation cannot be explained (away) in any terms other than the
movement which it is, and which presupposes all such attempts at explanation.

This leads to the second point regarding the differences between the phenomenologies of Hegel and Habermas, namely that Habermas, in claiming the self-identity of critique as phenomenological result, is also claiming a self-understanding of origins and beginnings. Since movement itself is avoided in such a claim, then from the position of rest it is possible to view the whole process of becoming from beginning to end. Such a model of enlightenment, however, which denies movement to itself, never becomes, and thus denies itself the result from which its beginnings can therein be reconstructed. The path of despair which Habermas wishes to invoke as radical critique is its own truth only when it is known as itself. If its result is itself, viz. doubt, how is it ever to arrive at a result which can produce the overcoming, the explanation of itself, that Habermas assumes in the emancipatory interest? Put another way, if the result of doubt is not presupposed as a method of enlightenment, then its result is always itself. The question then is, what manner of result is doubt, and can it ever provide a self-explanation of an unconditioned beginning?

Whereas Habermas's answer, in order to provide for modernity's self-reassurance, is a positive Yes, Hegel's philosophical system attempts to comprehend the aporia of an unmediated beginning according to its contradictory nature, and not by importing external Sollens as guides to what the solution should be.
Habermas, having criticized the absolutism inherent in attempts to produce a first philosophy, himself mistakes the nature of mediation, and its movement as phenomenology. By seeking to reveal the rational origins of mediation, of a reflecting consciousness, he is also arriving at a first point upon which that consciousness is itself dependent, and is therefore a first point which marks the possibility of the beginning of a theory of communicative action. Because, he argues, it is arrived at as result, it is not a presupposition. Yet what he has presupposed is precisely that this is a result produced according to itself, and representing the self-identity of critical reflection.

Habermasian critique presupposes the identity of mediation itself, and therefore claims enlightenment regarding the mediation of subjectivity in civil society. To know this result as the identity of critique as enlightenment and overcoming, is to presuppose as method that which is claimed as result. The knowledge which has been gained relies in advance on knowing what the method for gaining valid knowledge, or enlightenment, is. It must presuppose what a result, or enlightenment is. This involves Habermas having the result before it has appeared as result, and it cannot therefore be the unpresupposed identity of result which he claims it to be.

Habermas's problem lies in the nature of mediation, for it does not 'allow' a beginning or an end. Since it is movement, everything that is known is already mediated and negated. Thus to claim that the result of critique is the self-identity of movement, a movement which moves all content on again, must exempt itself from another movement acted upon its own identity. Habermas's result of mediation is assumed as post-
mediation, as an overcoming of the separation of subject and object, whereas precisely by becoming an object for consciousness this claim is itself overcome, ceasing to be a result and becoming again another activity.

This problem of the seeming impossibility therefore of a beginning or an end for critical reflection, and therefore of the impossibility of result at all, is the aporia of the dialectic of enlightenment which Habermas is seeking to overcome. What is immediate is (already) known as object and therefore mediated, and the knowledge of this mediation is again already another (immediate) object. Given the nature of this dialectical circle 'it seems as if it were impossible to make a start at all'. [58] Neither immediacy nor mediation exist without the other, and cannot therefore serve as a 'moment' with which to begin. And yet by acknowledging the problem of a beginning, a beginning has already been made. In this insight alone, the dialectic of enlightenment provides the awareness that this activity regarding the problem of beginning is already a beginning. 'Through this progress, then, the beginning loses the one-sidedness which attaches to it as something simply immediate and abstract; it becomes something mediated, and hence the line of the scientific advance becomes a circle'. [59]

This circle is the comprehension that the dialectic of enlightenment, in order to produce the negative as result, has already begun. Logically, therefore, even according to Habermas's own recognition of the circular nature of all 'consistent epistemology', [60] a phenomenology characterized by movement, and which is self-identity as
movement, denies itself the possibility of beginnings and ends. The theory of communicative action therefore denies its own becoming by positing the lifeworld as the a priori condition of the separation of subjectivity and knowledge, a separation which is its own becoming. Without the movement of becoming it cannot achieve the self-knowing which is claimed for it. It is an aporia noted by Habermas himself - 'the lifeworld is that remarkable thing which dissolves and disappears before our eyes as soon as...it becomes explicit knowledge' [61] - but it is an aporia which he can claim to have overcome because he has presupposed beforehand the (unmediated) identity of overcoming as the identity of enlightenment.
Habermas's contribution to critical theory has been to draw attention to the dominance which technical reason has established in modern society, even to the extent of replacing communal discourse on political and social matters with an instrumental interest based on control and manipulation. In *Legitimation Crises*, Habermas argues that bourgeois ideologies can assume a universalistic structure and appeal to generalizable interests because the property order has shed its political form and been converted into a relation of production that, it seems, can legitimate itself...This does not diminish the socially integrative significance of this new type of ideology in a society that no longer recognizes political domination in personal form. [62]

If one adds to this his comment that positivism 'assumes the prohibitive function of protecting scientific enquiry from epistemological self-reflection', [63] then one has in view the two major targets of Habermas's work.

Positivism and commodity production, for Habermas, distort rational activity. Both mask the processes of human mediation and manufacture, and both view their respective objects as independent of process. This form of reasoning is what Habermas unites under the term instrumental technical interest, an interest characterized by a will to dominance which is facilitated by maintaining the object as separate. Positivism
and commodity exchange both 'own' their respective objects through this domination - positivism explains and manipulates the natural and social world, commodity exchange controls and manipulates the distribution of goods and services. Both manifest the domination which is the universality of the logic of non-contradiction, and the abstract universality of civil society. Positivist techniques offer the bourgeois state feedback knowledge which increases its control over and separation from subjectivity. Habermas's concern throughout his work has been to replace the non-reflective dimension of positivism and commodity fetishism with a reflective form of communicative rationality, grounded in the idea of critique as enlightenment and overcoming. Positivism and commodity production restrict the learning capacity of mankind as a whole, and therefore 'not learning, but not-learning is the phenomenon that calls for explanation'. [64]

How to learn about not-learning was the problem, then, that Habermas set himself. The task is already contradictory, for it requires as method that which is not yet known, that is, the object in question. It is the same aporia which is modernity's dialectic of enlightenment, and a task which already contravenes the law and logic of identity and non-contradiction. What was required was a critique of not-learning (of identity thinking) which was not itself also not-learning (also identity thinking). It required an understanding of, and an enlightenment regarding abstraction which was not itself also abstract, that is, an activity which was itself the overcoming of abstraction. But the task is already a contradiction which can only repeat identity thinking. To seek to overcome abstraction is already to repeat the
movement of separation. Overcoming, seen as the result of enlightenment critique, is already the presupposition of the identity of enlightenment as self-activity or method and thus already requires and repeats the separation of activity and object in the presupposition of the identity of enlightenment.

Habermas contradicts his own stated criterion of critique as presuppositionless enquiry by presupposing its independent identity to lie outside of process and activity, in the a priori intersubjectivity of the lifeworld. As a critical theorist of all forms of bourgeois domination, he has exposed the one-sidedness of the technical interest in which man's autonomy and independence is embodied by his ever increasing control over the natural and social worlds. He has not, however, subjected the idea of what constitutes the identity of enlightenment to that same critique, with the result that he works with a notion of education which is as determined by the technical/instrumental interest as those positivist visions of social evolution and enlightenment which he has opposed throughout. Habermas's enlightenment about the dialectic of enlightenment returns to the dialectic itself, and reveals the positivism and instrumentalism which is inherent in his work.

In political terms, Habermas has been unsuccessful in his attempt to overcome the separation of subjective activity and political object because his own idea of overcoming repeats that division as the separation of subject and substance. In attempting to explain the universality of abstraction in civil society he has excluded his idea
of critique from that universality, and has therein already repeated
the separation of activity and result according to the law and logic of
non-contradiction and identity. His work is therefore in the dialectic
of enlightenment precisely in the presupposition that his work
overcomes it. Enlightenment posited as overcoming is a repetition of
the domination of an object by an enlightened subject, and always
therefore a repetition of the separation of activity and object.
Habermas has not solved the problem of knowledge and enlightenment as
domination, and has not removed himself from a technical instrumental
view of education as a tool of domination. For him, overcoming
communicative distortion means a theory of communicative autonomy, an
autonomy that can only exist, or be known, as an overcoming of, and
therefore a domination of, dependence and mediation. The knowledge of
the universality of mediation and dependence is separated from the
movement which has produced its truth. Enlightenment therefore ceases
to be reflective, immanent and phenomenological, and becomes a method
which is then used to produce itself. But method is not self-movement,
and is therefore no longer educational according to its own stated
criterion of immanent self-activity. Rather, it is objectified as
method and known in a way which replaces movement and activity with
stasis. Habermas's notion of education is therefore less than the
critical activity of which it is claimed to be the self-generated
result. He employs an abstract notion of education to overcome the non-
learning in civil society, and thus can only repeat this education as
another domination of identity over activity.
Habermas, having criticized Hegel as a 'master thinker' [65] who assumed for himself the highest philosophical vantage point, now appears himself as the thinker who presents himself as master over that which is his becoming. Habermas has to presuppose the universality of abstraction for everything except his notion of overcoming and yet that notion too, is itself determined within the law and logic of non-contradiction (or non-learning). An explanation of domination in civil society is no less a form of domination; to claim otherwise is precisely to fetishize its identity and separate it from its being known. A theory of intersubjectivity and ethical life which claims its identity to be its overcoming of abstraction as a self-activity, is always already the negation of that knowledge due to its own separation from the movement which produced the activity.

The aporia which overcoming was intended to overcome remains. To claim as phenomenological result the self-identity of critique and therein intersubjective mutual relations or absolute ethical life, is to be absolute ethical life. If Habermas, and the theory of communicative action is any less than absolute ethical life, then it is less than autonomous self-identity, and merely particular. The very act of claiming critique as overcoming is not an overcoming. Indeed, the movement which is held to be the identity of critique reasserts itself by undermining the claim. Critique repeats its own law of non-contradiction even to undermine itself.

In epistemological terms, Habermas has interpreted phenomenology in a positivist way because he has employed it as an instrument to
understand and explain his own assumption that the path of despair, which is phenomenology, has been overcome. He takes and uses precisely that which is not overcome, activity, as the method and identity of overcoming. The educational import of phenomenology for Habermas lies in its instrumental value of being able to overcome the non-learning in civil society regarding man's mutual and intersubjective communicative relations. It is the instrument by which intersubjectivity realizes itself, but its use as an instrument is not immanent phenomenological activity. It is, rather, the goal directed activity of a consciousness which seeks to achieve knowledge about an object. Habermas claims that the theory of communicative action is the result of its own activity – critique – and yet it is critique which he uses as the instrument to produce this result. By a sleight of hand, Habermas has turned education as self-activity (phenomenology) into self-reflective communicative action as self-activity. What is crucial here, is that a theory of communicative action replaces the path of despair because the former is the certainty of itself as the result of, and therefore the identity of, the latter. Certainty is that which is lost, not found, on the path of despair. Habermas's aporia lies in his having presupposed the presuppositionless character of phenomenological inquiry, a move which renders it self-contradictory.

In so doing, Habermas has turned Hegel's phenomenology on its head. A self-generated movement of uncertainty and mediation on the path of despair has become, in the theory of communicative action, the certainty of that movement. The movement has become the knowledge of the movement, or precisely non-movement. The immanent
presuppositionless character of this movement has become presupposed as a methodology and an instrument. The self-generated dependency and uncertainty of phenomenology has become an independent self-knowing certainty of that dependence. In all of these formulations the dialectic of enlightenment returns, such that the truth of the former is sacrificed in the formulations of its truth in the latter.

To invoke phenomenology as a tool for emancipation is to remove that which is educational from phenomenology, or to remove the movement which is education from itself. Habermas removes the result of phenomenology from the realm of result, from the dialectic of enlightenment, by claiming the result as the identity of self-knowledge. Yet for phenomenological result to be itself it must be comprehended as it is, and as it is known by itself. This Habermas does not do, but it is what Horkheimer and Adorno attempted to do in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, a book which preceded Habermas, but to which his work inevitably returns. Rather than base his work on an illegitimate presupposition, Habermas has presupposed the absence of all presupposition - which is to presuppose in the beginning that which is intended to be arrived at and proved as result. All beginnings are abstract and thus determinate. Having understood that in critique there are only participants, Habermas employs this result for his own purposes, rather than remain tied to the implication of the result, that he can only continue to participate in the movement of the dialectic of enlightenment, and not abstract this participation as a method for the organization of enlightenment.
Hegel is labelled by Habermas as a 'master thinker' [66] because his assumption of the absolute enables him 'to witness the genesis of the structures of consciousness'. [67] But it is Habermas's assumption that the dialectic of enlightenment, the return of mediation, is not absolute, which infact enables him to posit the existence of the unconditioned as the lifeworld, a world which he nevertheless admits cannot be known in-itself and 'is present only prereflectively'. [68] To posit the lifeworld of intersubjective mutual consensus as a world which is known as not-known is self-defeating and exactly repeats the aporia of the dialectic of enlightenment. In being known, the lifeworld is no longer known, and is therefore never the identity which is claimed for it. [69] The dialectic of enlightenment is this contradiction. Habermas, in arguing that 'the theory of communicative action regards the dialectic of knowing and not-knowing as embedded within the dialectic of successful and unsuccessful mutual understanding', [70] has turned the truth of phenomenological movement and despair into a truth about that movement and despair. The theory of communicative action thus represents enlightenment without dialectic, and is itself based on an uncritical and unreflective (abstract and positivistic) notion of education as phenomenological result.

In his contributions to the positivist dispute in german sociology, Habermas notes the inevitability of movement and presupposition which precedes all attempts at absolute knowing. Having exposed how Habermas himself employs a positivistic idea of education as method in his notion of overcoming, it seems appropriate to read the critical
Habermas against himself, in order to enable the dialectic of enlightenment its own immanent return in his work.

In his support of dialectical theories over scientistic positivistic research methods, he notes that the former 'incorporate reflexively the fact that they themselves remain a moment of the objective context which, in their turn, they subject to analysis'. [71] The result of this, he says, is that they establish themselves as a concept which is 'appropriate to the object itself', [72] by recognizing that their inquiries are themselves dependent upon the insight that 'there is no such thing as immediate knowledge. The search for the primary experience of a manifest immediacy is in vain'. [73]

He employs dialectics against Popper's brand of positivism, arguing that Popper, in his critique of all primary knowledge, fails to realize that such a critique is itself a socially produced activity and can itself 'only be grounded by recourse to at least one of the sources of knowledge' [74] which he has previously ruled out as presuppositions. This form of doubt is itself based on a tradition of hypothesis testing and experimentation for its validity. It is already a presupposition. And yet this is not an insight which Habermas employs against his own idea of enlightenment as overcoming. Just as Popper has assumed facts and objects and then tested them against theories, so Habermas has presumed that he knows what an education consists of, and has then tested the idea against that presupposition.

Habermas's criticism of Popper is that his work
presupposes that 'facts' exist in themselves, without taking into account that the meaning of the empirical validity of factual statements...is determined in advance by the definition of the testing conditions...

One would thus recognize the concept of 'facts' in positivism as a fetish which merely grants to the mediated the illusion of immediacy. [75]

An immanent dialectical critique of the theory of communicative action, based on this same logic, would therefore read as follows; the theory presupposes that critique exists in-itself, without taking into account that the meaning of the communicative validity of critical-reflective insights is determined in advance by the definition of the instrument as an enlightenment in-itself. One would thus recognize the concept of critique as overcoming as a fetish which merely grants to the mediated the illusion of immediacy.

Habermas's attempt to produce enlightenment as result from the dialectic of enlightenment has only returned enlightenment to its self-destructive, contradictory, dialectical movement. Knowledge of mediation is not an overcoming of mediation such that the necessary and universal conditions of determination and dependency, and of absolute ethical life, can be understood and reconstructed in the lifeworld.

That which Habermas takes to be the self-produced identity of enlightenment - activity as overcoming - is active also against that presupposition of identity, and negates it. The failure to produce such a result is dealt with by Horkheimer and Adorno in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, and it is in that work that the aporia of Habermas's attempt to claim critique as enlightenment and enlightenment as critique, finds expression.
CHAPTER III - DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.

B - DIALECTIC.

From Enlightenment.

There is, then, in Habermas, a notion of enlightenment separated from the dialectical movement which is its becoming, and from which it results. By working through Habermas's social theory it becomes clear that the task of replacing modern negative consciousness with a positive modern discourse has only in fact reproduced the former. A theory which claimed all knowledge as movement, or as determinate, and then claimed a status for that knowledge beyond its own stated self-truth, is proved correct only when it is itself negated by the truth of its own declared insight. The dialectic of enlightenment proves its own truth by refusing that truth. An enlightenment regarding dialectic ceases to be dialectical, and immediately therefore is subject to the dialectic, and is experienced as loss. The appearance of this new object, arising behind the back of Habermas's theory of communicative action, is therefore experienced as the loss of this theory, and for the identity of critique is 'the loss of its own self'. [1]

It is in this failure of Habermas that the intention behind his work is continually realized, that is, to present all knowledge as movement. His own theory of communicative action is unable to realize this
movement as its own truth, for the result referred to here is negative. His attempt to reveal the true nature of the dialectic of enlightenment as result in fact has as result only the totality of repetition described by Horkheimer and Adorno some 34 years before the theory of communicative action. [2] In this work, the dialectic of enlightenment is presented as movement; enlightenment becomes not a position or an identity but a totalitarian self-completing circle, a logic of non-contradiction which Habermas in attempting to overcome only repeats.

It would be easy to posit Habermas's view of the dialectic of enlightenment as antithetical to that of Horkheimer and Adorno, and certainly the former's stance against their road to 'nowhere' [3] lends weight to such a view. However, this interpretation misses the import of Horkheimer and Adorno's description of the dialectic, and misunderstands the nature of Habermas's failure. It is the truth of Habermas's phenomenology which produces its untruth, a movement understood by Horkheimer and Adorno, but it is a truth which none of them even taken together recognize as actual. The 'positions' of Habermas and Horkheimer and Adorno when taken together represent the actuality of the dialectic of enlightenment, a totality referred to later in this chapter as 'the broken middle', and recognized in Hegelian philosophy as misrecognition. It is the argument of this thesis that Habermas represents enlightenment without dialectic, and Horkheimer and Adorno dialectic without enlightenment, and that Hegel's system is the comprehension and self-identity of precisely the aporetic nature of the dialectic of enlightenment which they re-present in their opposition.
**Will to Enlightenment.**

*Dialectic of Enlightenment* presents a reading of modern consciousness centred around the authors' interpretation of Nietzsche's idea of will to power. There is, for them, no form of thought available to modernity which can be used as critique of modernity which is not already determined by the principle of equivalence and non-contradiction, and is not already mediated within the universality of bourgeois property law, commodity production and identity thinking. The aporetic nature of enlightenment as dialectic, seen above as the repetition of the negative in Habermas, is here described by Horkheimer and Adorno in its totality as return; as a circle in which modern consciousness is enmeshed to the extent that any and all attempts to 'overcome' it can only repeat the will to enlightenment which is the very form of thinking in which domination is maintained through the separation of subject and object.

'Enlightenment is totalitarian'. [4] Its own rationale is to extinguish all forms of thought, all powers of reasoning, all explanations which are not its own. Anything which is not the result of 'formal logic', 'calculability' and 'equivalence' [5] is myth, and can be discarded as the irrational musings of unenlightened subjectivity. 'To the enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to the one, becomes illusion; modern positivism writes it off as literature'. [6] Thus the will to enlightenment is the will to control and master nature by explaining it 'without any illusion of ruling or
inherent powers, of hidden qualities'. [7] The more opposition it encounters, the stronger it becomes; the greater the number of mythical interpretations it can reveal to be illusory and irrational, the more dominating as a form of power it becomes. Indeed, and here lies its totalitarian nature, the more it is opposed by forms of thought which are subjective, the more substance is available for it to overcome and thus grow progressively stronger. This is precisely the insight which Habermas notes as the implicit negativity of Horkheimer and Adorno's dialectic of enlightenment, that to portray technical, objectivistic and commodified thought as total left no possibility at all of critique as positive enlightenment. Yet what was seen to result for Habermas is no less than that which is here described by Horkheimer and Adorno.

Every spiritual resistance it (enlightenment) encounters serves merely to increase its strength...whatever myths the resistance may appeal to, by virtue of the very fact that they become arguments in the process of opposition, they acknowledge the principle of dissolvent rationality for which they reproach the enlightenment. Enlightenment is totalitarian. [8]

Horkheimer and Adorno reconstruct the genealogy of civilization as the movement of the self-preservation, and by implication extension, of enlightenment over myth, up to the modern condition where reason replaces god as the totality of explanation. This is the victory for enlightenment which ensures its totalitarianism, and in which it achieves its own dialectical circularity through the domination of its own logic of non-contradiction. Horkheimer and Adorno state this victory succinctly as the self-movement in which 'myth is already enlightenment: and enlightenment reverts to myth'. [9]
The first half of this formulation is a Nietzschean form of genealogical uncovering of the origins of knowledge as lying in power and domination. For the primitive, terror of the unknown was terror of that which could not be dominated, and becomes that which is outside of human control, viz. the sacred and the supernatural. The inability to explain is the origin of human fear, 'the echo of the real supremacy of nature in the weak souls of primitive men'. [10] This fear, or lack of power, is the first separation of subject and object, that is, when a symbol becomes a representative of that which is other than the subject; thus, that which is not subject is now other. Equally, the element of contradiction has entered language, for the symbol when spoken of is that which is known as not-known. This contradiction is 'the cry of terror' [11] reproducing itself; that which would overcome the fear only repeats it in its being (not) known when spoken. However, even in this terror, man is already learning about his ability to control and dominate that fear. Language is the medium through which terror controls itself. The unknown is known by being named, and the user or controller of this medium is the person who begins to become aware of this power.

When Horkheimer and Adorno state that 'language is required to resign itself to calculation in order to know nature', [12] they are not inferring that the result for language is negative. The rituals and rites which developed because of the terror of that which could not be explained served as an explanation and the names which were given to the unknowable became the (known) identities of the unknown. 'When language enters history its masters are priests and sorcerers... Soon
the magicians peopled every spot with emanations and made a multiplicity of sacred rites concordant with the variety of sacred places. They expanded their professional knowledge and their influence'. [13] Thus did the many become subject to the domination of the power over the unknown which lay in the 'professional' hands of the few.

Neither the resignation of the shaman to language, nor the sacrifices or gifts offered in fear of the unknown during rituals are what they appear. The resignation of the shaman is in fact only to his domination over the (fear of) the collective; and it has its basis in the very transaction which is his ritualistic activity, that is, the offerings made to the other. The overcoming of myth by enlightenment is present here even in its most primitive outpost, because the offering is no more than a rational calculation of the amount of gift of which this 'other' is worthy, or which represents its worth. Enlightenment is at work here because the offering represents the knowledge of the other, and is the use of that knowledge as control. The gift, formed by the terror of the unknown, is already equivalent to, and thus a knowing of, the unknown.

If barter is the secular form of sacrifice, the latter already appears as the magical pattern of rational exchange, a device of men by which the gods may be mastered: the gods are overthrown by the very system by which they are honoured. [14]
By virtue of the totality of the dialectic of enlightenment, sacrifice becomes control, non-identity becomes identity, and myth becomes enlightenment.

From the genealogy of knowledge as power, based on equivalence and calculability, Horkheimer and Adorno can now state that the principle of enlightenment, of its self-preserving, calculating rationality, is that 'man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything unknown', [15] and thus it is this genealogy which is now understood to determine the course of demythologization. 'The awakening of the self is paid for by the acknowledgement of power as the principle of all relations'. [16] Enlightenment at every opportunity overcomes myth because 'nothing at all may remain outside, because the mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear'. [17] Horkheimer and Adorno conclude that,

myth turns into enlightenment, and nature into mere objectivity. Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise their power. Enlightenment behaves towards things as a dictator toward men. He knows them insofar as he can manipulate them. [18]

However, when enlightenment becomes the basis of control not only of the natural world but also as the sole legitimate form of reasoning over the government of the social world, then man becomes an object to himself, an object which requires controlling. This process of demythologization reaches its zenith in bourgeois society which is 'ruled by equivalence'; [19] the death of god announced by Nietzsche's Zarathustra, not known or understood by those in the market place, in
fact produces the market place itself as the embodiment of enlightenment. The identity of the object, whether bourgeois individual or commodity, is guaranteed in the fact that everything is the equivalent, or can be calculated as such, of everything else.

Men were given their individuality as unique in each case, different to all others, so that it might all the more surely be made the same as any other...The unity of the manipulated collective consists in the negation of each individual. [20]

This sameness refers to the equivalence of persons in bourgeois private property law. Equivalence (and consequently identity) embodies the dominance of the logic of non-contradiction which guarantees identity by holding apart the separation of object and activity. Its domination, however, is masked by the mediation of subjectivity in bourgeois property law because the independence and identity of subjectivity is what appears to be guaranteed by the state in civil society. Bourgeois individuality, as the equivalence of persons, masks its domination of the relation which is the state by guaranteeing that identity in (abstract) universal legal relations.

The second half of the formulation of the dialectic of enlightenment states that enlightenment reverts to mythology. It is in this movement that the negative implications of the enlightenment project are realized. 'Just as the myths already realize enlightenment, so enlightenment with every step becomes more deeply engulfed in mythology'. [21] The will to enlightenment is the will to explanation; to providing a world view in which all else is contained, categorized
and therefore controlled as knowledge. But the will to enlightenment is repetitious, to the extent that the increasing demythologization of the world serves only to replace one myth of total explanation by another. The enlightenment 'receives all its matter from the myths, in order to destroy them', remark Horkheimer and Adorno, but 'even as judge it comes under the mythic curse'. [22]

The principle of repetition which enlightenment employs as its rational will is the instrumental viewing of mythical knowledge as having its origins in man, and not in the objects which are created to explain man. As with Habermas, man's increasing rationality is also man's increasing dependence upon his own activities for explaining the natural and social world. Enlightenment wins out over faith because enlightenment is repetition, and this repetition is contained precisely in the contradiction which arises whenever knowledge claims an other to itself which is not known. The repetition therefore is of itself, by itself. It is its own thinking activity. Enlightenment must always return to itself, and in doing so each time it destroys the myth which previously was held as other to thought. But whereas for Habermas this knowledge of return ultimately marks enlightenment in itself, for Horkheimer and Adorno even this overcoming, or enlightenment in itself, is only another repetition. It cannot avoid the implication that even its own thought must inevitably become an object for it, separated from it, and thus mythical. It is the 'relentless' [23] advance of enlightenment, its never ceasing will to explanation, which not only destroys all other myths, but recreates itself as myth and is forced to destroy itself.
'The principle of immanence, the explanation of every event as repetition, that the Enlightenment upholds against mythic imagination, is the principle of myth itself'. [24] It cannot hold out against the all-encompassing logic of non-contradiction which is its own instrument and rationality. What became a rational advance over forms of mythical thought which did not acknowledge their origins in human activity, becomes a rational impasse when that activity seeks to assert itself as more than myth. The totality of myth which enlightenment undermines becomes the myth of the totality of enlightenment.

That arid wisdom that holds that there is nothing new under the sun, because all the pieces in the meaningless game have been played, and all the great thoughts have already been thought, and because all possible discoveries can be construed in advance and all men are decided on adaptation as the means to self-preservation - that dry sagacity merely reproduces the fantastic wisdom that it supposedly rejects: the sanction of fate that in retribution relentlessly remakes what has already been. [25]

This is the path of despair which Habermas ultimately refused to follow. It is the path where thought returns to trouble any positions of rest or complacency in identity and it is a negative path because the very principle of the path itself - that thought is already the origin of the object - makes that origin impossible to grasp since it is 'always already' a moment lost. [26] The pathway of despair is self-expression when it cannot even know itself except as lost. The identity thinking of enlightenment, that human reason is independent, is at the same time, and against itself, the realization that this source remains always other than the activity which knows it. Thus in the dialectic of
enlightenment as outlined by Horkheimer and Adorno there is only movement, there is only the repetition of the logic of non-contradiction against itself as enlightenment. 'The identity of everything with everything else is paid for in that nothing may at the same time be identical with itself'. [27]

There is no overcoming in this dialectic, because there is only the repetition of overcoming, and thus no rest from which a judgement can be made regarding a completed enlightenment or rational critique. Enlightenment as will to explanation through the self-power of contradiction has dissolved 'the injustice of the old inequality - unmediated lordship and mastery - but at the same time perpetuates it in universal mediation...'. [28] It is this universal mediation which describes the repetition of the dialectic of enlightenment, a mediation which returned even in Habermas's attempt to proclaim it according to itself. As was seen, a successful attempt to give mediation self-expression as anything other than another negation must fail - and precisely the failure is that self-expression. The negativity of the dialectic of enlightenment which reduces modernity to its crises of a lack of self-reassurance is understood as negative by Horkheimer and Adorno, and their book is not, therefore, an attempt to overcome that negativity. Unlike the theory of communicative action it is, rather, an attempt to mount an internal negative critique of enlightenment by exposing both the necessity of negativity, and the implications for freedom of a society wherein that necessity, as a critique of enlightenment, is unsustainable and only serves to strengthen that which is the object of the critique.
The Impossible Critique of Bourgeois Society.

It is in the sense of repetition, then, that enlightenment is totalitarian. It dominates everything, including itself, to the extent that it is a totality of thought. Its dialectic is that 'myth is already enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts to mythology'. [29] It is therefore mediation without repose. Each explanation of (the contradiction of) myth re-establishes the domination of enlightenment, including the thought of its own self-contradiction. It is in the ability of enlightenment to negate its own negation that it continually scores absolute victory over all forms of critique. If bourgeois society was the most complete form of enlightenment domination over myth, its power of rational domination is increased in the repetition of enlightenment which, in reverting to myth as subjective critique, is already again the domination of the rational over the irrational. This understanding of the dialectic of enlightenment accounts for the pessimistic reception of the book, for in describing the domination of enlightenment as total, they are implicitly arguing that there cannot be an overcoming, or successful critique, of bourgeois society. They raise the spectre that a critical theory of society is no longer possible. 'It is characteristic of the sickness that even the best-intentioned reformer who uses an impoverished or debased language to recommend renewal, by his adoption of the insidious mode of categorization of the bad philosophy it conceals, strengthens the very power of the established order he is trying to break'. [30]
In offering their own critique of bourgeois domination they do not offer emancipation from domination, as Habermas does, but only a release from 'blind domination'. [31] Unlike Habermas, it is not their argument that to know domination is to produce a unity of knowledge and interest in freedom, but only again to know the loss of that unity in another domination or rather as the repetition of the same one. In the description of the domination of bourgeois society in Dialectic of Enlightenment, the contradiction that the critique is itself negated and results in a strengthening of that very domination is already acknowledged. Nevertheless, in offering the critique in the full realization of its self-destruction, Horkheimer and Adorno do hold out the hope that the truth of enlightenment as dialectical and negative will enable its more overtly totalitarian positive expressions to be subjected to criticism and lose the power held in and by a lack of self-reflection. The dilemma is summed up in the following way: 'there is no longer any available form of linguistic expression which has not tended toward accommodation to dominant currents of thought'. [32] Nevertheless, 'we are wholly convinced...that social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought'. [33] Critique is necessary because 'if enlightenment does not accommodate reflection of (its) recidivist element...if consideration of the destructive aspect of progress is left to its enemies, (then) blindly pragmatized thought loses its transcending quality and its relation to truth'. [34]

Therefore, the aims of Habermas and Horkheimer and Adorno are not so different here. Both wish to undermine the positivist conceptions of modern enlightenment thought, one by overcoming repetition, the others
precisely by not overcoming repetition. Where Habermas found a will to emancipation, Horkheimer and Adorno express the totality of enlightenment which is already an acknowledgement of enlightenment as myth. In the consciousness of 'actual life', [35]

the dutiful child of modern civilization is possessed by a fear of departing from the facts...; his anxiety is none other than the fear of social deviation....Since that notion (of enlightenment) declares any negative treatment of the facts or of the dominant forms of thought to be...alien, and therefore taboo, it condemns the spirit to increasing darkness. [36]

It is precisely to lift this darkness, to prevent fear of subjectivity becoming petrified as unmediated or unreflective enlightenment, that Horkheimer and Adorno offer their analysis. It is intended 'to prepare the way for a positive notion of enlightenment which will release it from entanglement in blind domination'. [37] Such an aim should not be read as anything other than to ensure the universal mediation of the dialectic of enlightenment against its reverting to stasis, objectivity and unreflectiveness. The point is that 'the Enlightenment must examine itself'. [38]

The particular features of bourgeois society which Horkheimer and Adorno offer up for reflection range from the culture industry to fascism, and from the increasing pliability of the masses to the genocide of the unassimilated other. All have their roots in the positivist enlightenment concerning the calculability of all things, and the equivalence of all things under one objective measure. As was seen above, bourgeois private property law embodies the objective
measure of the equivalence which is all legal persons. The bourgeois social whole establishes itself as an abstract collectivity, one whose 'unity' is based on the repression of the ethical relation which is the recognition of that unity as misrecognition, and which is grounded in the legal identity of the person in civil society. 'It is this unity of the collectivity and domination, and not direct social universality, solidarity, which is expressed in thought forms'. [39]

The production of objects as commodities reproduces this domination. The social relation is masked by the illusion of the independence of objects from the activity which is their becoming. The value of Marx's theory of commodification for Horkheimer and Adorno is that it comprehends not only that men appear related to each other as to things, separated from and alienated from mutual activity as ethical relation, but more importantly that 'a relation between men appears in the form of a property of a thing'. [40] Activity or work appears as a property of the thing which is the result of activity or work, and not as the self-activity of the producer. Social labour is identified as the exchange-value of the object, and similarly a theory of reification has its identity in the exchange of values in the political market place, not as a unity of theory and practice. 'In capitalist society, reified concepts are the only form in which non-reified properties can appear'. [41] Thus reification and exchange-values are already social activities. Reification, like commodity production, 'is a social category. It refers to the way in which consciousness is determined'. [42] The domination, therefore, of bourgeois society is the repetition of its own abstract universality as the identity and knowledge of
subjectivity and human activity and this abstraction of the universal from activity is the fetishism of objects, including the state in civil society. Fetishism is mediation as identity, where activity becomes repetition and conformity. Fetishism therefore

has extended its arthritic influence over all aspects of social life. Through the countless agencies of mass production and its culture, the conventionalized modes of behaviour are impressed on the individual as the only natural, respectable, and rational ones. He defines himself only as a thing... (and) his yardstick is self-preservation, successful or unsuccessful approximation to the objectivity of his function... [43]

Positivism represents the fetishism of enlightenment as method or non-activity, where 'reason itself has become the mere instrument of the all-inclusive economic apparatus'. [44] Its principle of non-contradiction is the immanent movement of its own self-preservation, and there is therefore no longer a form of thought available with which to rebel against repetition. To challenge it is already to employ the very logic which is the instrument of domination, and positivism ensures that this instrument 'ratifies in the lecture room the reification of man in the factory and the office'. [45]

The dialectic of enlightenment is therefore not only the repetition of enlightenment as rational thought, but it is equally a sociological explanation of power and domination tied to a specific production process. [46] The static identities resulting from processes of objectification which mask the movement behind their appearance, a movement which is their becoming and to which their identities
inevitably return, dominate both subject and object, ensuring their eternal separation, precisely through the work carried out by the unknowing creators or movers who produce these identities. [47]

It is with this in mind that Horkheimer and Adorno describe culture as an industry whose product is illusory and deceives, by the very fact that it has been produced, those who are its movement and becoming. The cultural product, like the commodity, is already the equivalence of all subjectivity, 'not merely because of the standardization of the means of production', [48] but also because the individuality 'on show' [49] transforms the particular into generality.

It is also with this sociology of domination in mind that Horkheimer and Adorno present enlightenment as a 'half-education' which 'hypostatizes limited knowledge as the truth'. [50] It is precisely the concealment of domination in production which, they argue, is the economic reason behind bourgeois anti-semitism. [51] Jews are made the scapegoats for the economic injustice faced by a whole class, by personifying that which is concealed in the production process in the person of the Jew. The fact that the Jews 'could not be absorbed into the European nations' [52] ensured that the rulers could maintain the Jews so that they could be placed as intermediaries between the oppressor and the oppressed.

The productive work of the capitalist, whether he justifies his profit by means of gross returns as under liberalism, or by his director's salary as today, is an ideology cloaking the real nature of the labour contract and the grasping character of
the economic system. And so people shout: Stop thief! — but point at the Jews. [53]

This role of mediator turns the clinical objectivity of the production process into an exploitative relation based on the will of those whose greed can now be seen. Nationalist anti-semitism is more a manifestation of the desire for revenge by the dispossessed masses, generated and encouraged in an atmosphere where rule is not a matter of equality, and where the visibility of the Jew as non-legitimate ruler makes him a target for that revenge. In an atmosphere of objectivity, conformity, and non-questioning, subjectivity becomes taboo as that which is alien. In this half-education, race as identity becomes defined according to the 'self-assertion of the bourgeois individual within a barbaric collective'. [54] Just as enlightenment overcomes fear of the non-identical by destroying it, so does nationalist anti-semitism. 'Anti-semitic behaviour is generated in situations where blinded men robbed of their subjectivity are let loose as subjects', [55] but as subjects whose personalities represent the law of the barbaric culture whose universality they are. At the time of their exile, Horkheimer and Adorno could conclude that 'finally under the conditions of modern capitalism, half-education has become objective spirit'. [56]
Men are robbed of their subjectivity in and by the totalitarianism of enlightenment. It keeps subject and substance strictly separated by excluding from reason the 'middle' which is the reflective movement in which that separation is itself generated. The 'middle', as movement, cannot be known without again already being enlightenment, as was seen with the theory of communicative action, which attempted to reconstruct the middle before or prior to separation. The domination of the logic of non-contradiction denies the middle a non-identity, and therefore keeps it permanently inactive. 'That an individual consciousness is one applies only on the logical premise of an excluded middle - that it shall not be able to be something else'. [57] Reflection, and activity which is other than identity thinking, is negated by the domination of a self-completing form of thought whose power lies in the return implicit in contradiction. Not only is thought suspect which 'does not conform to the rule of computation and utility, [58] but criticisms of the logic of non-contradiction are forced, in the very activity of critique, to repeat that logic, and thus domination is total.

However, faced with the seemingly secure victory of enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno do offer the Dialectic of Enlightenment as critique. It is their aim to make explicit what enlightenment prefers to remain hidden, namely, that behind identity thinking, behind the independence of facts, and behind the principles of equivalence and calculation, there is a dialectical movement; and a movement which at
one and the same time both grounds the identity of objects and undermines that identity. Against the logic of disintegration, by exposing the dialectic of enlightenment, they are trying to keep open the possibility of subjectivity, of non-identity. Even though mediation returns to enlightenment, nevertheless it may be possible, by concentrating on mediation and movement rather than on result, to undermine all identity, including that of critique. It is no longer a question of taking sides for or against rational claims, but of undermining all such claims by exposing the movement from which identity both originates and returns. By concentrating enlightenment on its dialectic rather than on its knowledge, on the movement of return rather than that return as result, then the mythical is at least present as reflection, and domination as total can enjoy no rest. Even though this domination 'allows of no truth against which it could be measured, the truth appears negatively in the very context of the contradiction'. [59] Thus, by concentrating on the negativity of the dialectic of enlightenment, the critical potential of reflection is kept alive. 'Enlightenment which is in possession of itself and coming to power can break the bounds of enlightenment', [60] but only negatively, and this, as Rose points out, requires 'a changed concept of dialectic', [61] one which makes possible the impossibility of the (non) identity of self-destructive mediation and return.

Adorno's work after *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is largely concerned with this problem of developing an idea of dialectic which has the negative as (non) result. Since critique lies in the movement of contradiction, and not on one side of a proposition or the other, he
attempts to develop a style which can reveal the contradiction of identity, and at the same time reveal the hidden mechanisms of bourgeois domination. He arrives at an 'immanent method', a way of allowing the contradiction of identity to speak for itself without being resolved. Its immanence lies in the fact that it enables the genuine self-expression of negativity, and of the social mediation of individual objects and identities. Rose states,

Adorno's philosophical ambition was to redefine the subject and the object, and their relationship, without presupposing their identity, and to show that this can only be accomplished if the subject and object are understood as social processes, and not as the presuppositions of pure epistemology. [62]

This immanent method is therefore the activity which, carried out within and as the dialectic of enlightenment, can 'break the bounds' of enlightenment from within. By inducing thought to contradiction, Adorno is using enlightenment against itself to reveal its own mythological character. The only result of such critique is no result, but a lack of result is the critique of identity thinking. The very conditions of repetition which contain the totality of enlightenment are also the conditions which imply 'at the same time the objective possibility of overcoming it'. [63] Whereas Habermas has assumed the theory of communicative action as the identity of critique, Adorno is concerned to preserve the critical movement of critique by precisely not presupposing its identity. 'Thinking, which teaches itself that part of its own meaning is what, in turn, is not a thought, explodes the logic of non-contradiction'. [64]
This immanent method expressed itself as Adorno's style. Rose notes, 'it is impossible to understand Adorno's ideas without understanding the ways in which he presents them, that is, his style', [65] and further that 'criticism and composition in Adorno's work are inseparable'. [66] His idea is to write in such a way as to create the movement of contradiction, the dialectic of enlightenment, in the reader, and thereby refuse static identities to concepts. Non-identity is induced by the use of chiasmus where statements are made in an antithetical, logically contradictory fashion such that the identity of A is also claimed to be the identity of B. [67] Since the dialectic of enlightenment lies in the immanent return of contradiction on itself, this movement can be generated by bringing to view the lack of identity implicit in enlightenment thinking. Where the aporias of contradiction are resolved, there is bourgeois domination; when the aporias are unresolved then, in that reflection, bourgeois domination is known but is not identity as result. Thus 'Adorno presents whatever philosophy he is discussing so as to expose its basic antinomies. [68]

Rose comments that Adorno's works are 'exemplars of negative dialectic', [69] written and presented in such a way as to reveal the previously hidden window of truth; and yet she also comments that his decision to write the book Negative Dialectics, could be considered 'an admission of failure'. [70] His problem is that the logic of self-destruction may well have overcome the negativity which is now the title of the book and available in the market place. Adorno himself acknowledges that 'no theory today escapes the market place. Each one is offered up as a possibility among competing opinions; all are put up
for choice', [71] so it could also be claimed that such a book is another methodological attempt to induce the non-identity of his own work.

In *Negative Dialectics*, the dialectic of enlightenment is given a more objective treatment as the logic of non-contradiction, and of identity and non-identity, and the liberating or educational potential of the negative as (non) enlightenment. Equally, however, the totality of mediation as negative dialectic is offered against Hegel. Just as Habermas criticized Hegel for presupposing the non-identity of phenomenological critique, so Adorno criticizes him for presupposing its identity.

The dialectic of enlightenment is what is referred to in *Negative Dialectics* as simply dialectics, and enlightenment alone as identity thinking. Just as the theory of communicative action presupposes the self-identity of critique, so *Negative Dialectics* can be read as an explication of the changed concept of dialectic. Nevertheless, it is Adorno's aim to maintain the immanent method in the work, and therefore it demands to be read according to that changed concept, that is, to be understood negatively. 'The idea of a changed philosophy would be to become aware of likeness by defining it as that which is unlike itself'. [72] The contradiction involved in such a reading is the immanent method.

Adorno explains that 'I have no way but to break immanently, in its own measure, through the appearance of total identity', [73] and this can
only result in the contradiction of non-identity. 'Totality is to be opposed by convicting it of non-identity with itself', [74] not by a method which presupposes another result, or is another will to enlightenment, but immanently by exposing the self-contradiction which is already involved in a claim to total identity. 'Dialectics is the consistent sense of non-identity. It does not begin by taking a standpoint. My thought is driven to it by its own inevitable insufficiency...'. [75] Thus, Adorno concludes, 'dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things'. [76]

Equally, the totalitarianism of identity thinking, which is reproduced even in critique, can perhaps be held up to view as an education for others regarding the excluded middle of activity and mediation. At the very end of the work Adorno comments that 'it lies in the definition of negative dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total. This is its form of hope'. [77] This hope, the prison window, is kept alive and reproduced in the idea of negative dialectics by its continual inducement to contradiction. The movement which is contradiction is also the movement which is critique, a negation which will not even allow its own identity, as, for example, a theory of reification. 'We can no more reduce dialectics to reification than we can reduce it to any other isolated category'. [78]

The truth of negative dialectics lies therefore in its educative character. Negation undermines the independence of objects, and a negative dialectics undermines all independence per se. Thus the subject, previously disinfected of subjectivity, reclaims self-truth as
non-identity, an identity which exists as loss, and is never regained. But the nothingness of this result is, for Adorno, at least a method of destroying the self-destructive logic of enlightenment, by retaining for us that process of self-destruction. Precisely because 'objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder', [79] there is always a lack of identity, and therefore always the window of hope in the prison wall. The excluded middle is always returned to, but only known as fragmented, as not the middle. It is by inducing the return, however, that the possibility of its (re) unification is kept alive. This is the educational import of negative dialectics. 'The power of the status quo puts up facades into which our consciousness crashes. It must seek to crash through them...Where the thought transcends the bonds it tied in resistance - there is freedom'. [80] Dialectics exceeds the logic of identity at the same time as reproducing it because it knows that it is reproducing it. Even though this is not a victory over enlightenment, nevertheless in forms of non-identity thinking 'it is possible to think against our thought, and if it were possible to define dialectics, this would be a definition worth suggesting'. [81]

The negative as a method of return is not a programme, for a programme and a method cannot be immanent. Thus even if negative dialectics is read as such, its untruth will exceed the reading. The truth of Adorno’s work is precisely the criticism which Habermas levels at it, that nothing positive can result, including itself, which is not a distortion and therefore also untrue. 'In dialectics', remarks Adorno, 'it is not total identification which has the last word, because
dialectics lets us recognize the difference that has been spirited away. Dialectics can break the spell of identification without dogmatically, from without, contrasting it with an allegedly realistic thesis'. [82] And he might have added against Habermas that concerns regarding the aporetic nature of non-identity are precisely based on the form of identity thinking which is to be overcome.

Yet to have the negative as result, is in truth to have no result; but it is to hope that the movement which is critique will not rest and thereby cease to be critical. 'The individual is both more and less than his general definition...he will experience this "more" as his own negativity'. [83] That is, as where the more is less and the less is more. To expose identity thinking as domination, as an exclusion of the middle, is all that is possible for Adorno in civil society. Negativity, as the true (non) identity of enlightenment is therefore a political education about the illusions of the political, but one which steadfastly refuses to succumb to an identity as that will to enlightenment.

This refusal is not passive or resigned, it is strong and active in destroying the logic of disintegration which robs man of his subjectivity and of the possibility of realizing his ethical relation. 'While praxis ultimately is to affect the life of each and every individual it must be recognized that life itself is mediated by aspects of the social totality which determines it. The forms of mediation have to be understood before praxis is really possible'. [84] The experience of hope as negativity proves too much for those who,
faced by the truth of contradiction, cling 'to the idea of something beyond contradiction'. [85] The disintegration, through negative dialectics, of the logic of disintegration, means 'philosophy must do without the consolation that truth cannot be lost'. [86] It is not in negativity that resignation is to be found, but rather in all non-negative forms of thought and production; 'the individual life is made easier through capitulation to the collective which he identifies. He is spared the cognition of his impotence....it is this act, not unconfused thinking, which is resignation'. [87]
A Changed Concept of The Negative.

Negative Dialectics has Hegel as adversary. Whilst Habermas claimed that Hegel had not learnt from phenomenology that the will to emancipation is the activity of self-critique, Adorno argues that Hegel has not learnt from phenomenology that the will to enlightenment is not absolute identity.

Despite being the first to envisage the modern contradiction between experience and object, [88] Hegel fails to do justice to this insight into the dialectic of enlightenment. 'Hegel does not carry out the dialectics of non-identity to the end'. [89] He does not 'put his trust in dialectics, does not look upon it as the force to cure itself'. [90] His version of non-identity, of the movement which is mediation, is turned into a principle of identity. 'There is truly no identity without something non-identical', an insight Adorno concedes to Hegel, but 'in his writings identity, as totality, takes ontological precedence'. [91]

Adorno is critical not of Hegel's understanding of the negative, but of his commitment to it. Having acknowledged that mediation moves everything, including the idea which it gains of itself, Hegel still produces from this a system wherein absolute identity is claimed. For Adorno this is to fail to see that the truth of what is claimed as absolute applies equally to itself, and it is Adorno therefore, not Hegel, who unhesitatingly follows the path of despair, and it is Adorno
who remains with the force of thinking which shatters all identity
thought, including its own. Non-identity, the repetition which is the
dialectic of enlightenment, cannot enclose itself within a system, for
its own truth is anithetical to closure. Therefore Hegel's system
negates itself, for,

\[
\text{no matter how dynamically a system may be}
\]
\[
\text{conceived, if it is intact to be a closed system,}
\]
\[
\text{to tolerate nothing outside its domain, it will}
\]
\[
\text{become a positive infinity - in other words,}
\]
\[
\text{finite and static. The fact that it can sustain}
\]
\[
\text{itself in this manner, for which Hegel praised}
\]
\[
\text{his own system, brings it to a standstill. Bluntly}
\]
\[
\text{put, closed systems are bound to be finished. [92]}
\]

Once again the idea arises that Hegel has presupposed the absolute.
[93] For Habermas the presupposition concerned the identity of the
positive, unconditioned absolute identity, for Adorno it concerns the
identity of the negative or of non-identity. The result is seen as the
same by both, that is, an untenable position according to the process
of phenomenology upon which Hegel's claims are based. Hegelian logic
escapes the abyss of non-identity because it has 'advance assurance of
what it offers to prove'. [94] This is then achieved in the system by
an idea of synthesis as the instrument of dialectics. This synthesis is
used to preserve that which is lost in mediation to produce an all-
knowing identity, of both immediacy and mediation, both substance and
subject. It is a claim to have grasped the identity of that which
denies and destroys identity - 'the non-identical is not to be obtained
directly, as something positive on its part, nor is it obtainable by a
negation of negation...To equate the negation of negation with
positivity is the quintessence of identification'. [95]
The problem that such an interpretation raises for Adorno is that it appears now as if it is he, rather than Hegel, who seeks to protect the negative from his own idea (presupposition) of its true appearance. If Hegel's system, based around the identity of the non-identical, contradicts the very idea of such a notion, then in that contradictory movement it is more at one with the negative than Adorno's protectionism. 'To negate a negation', says Adorno, 'does not bring about its reversal; it proves, rather, that the negation was not negative enough'. [96] But to know that a negation is not a negation is a judgement that can only be based on an already to hand notion of what the genuine self-identity of the negative is. Whereas Adorno claims that Hegel makes a fetish out of the positive, it is perhaps more clear that Adorno has made a fetish out of the non-identity of the negative. By insisting on the impossibility of the absolute as the identity of non-identity, by insisting on repetition without determination, Adorno has removed negative dialectics from the dialectic of enlightenment and identified it as absolutely the not-absolute. By the end of Negative Dialectics, Adorno has claimed that 'it lies in the very definition of negative dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total'. [97] Indeed, this is precisely where the window of hope is to be discovered. And yet it is 'the very definition of negative dialectics' which is the problem here.

Adorno, having argued for a changed notion of dialectics, works with a traditional (enlightenment) notion of negation. This version of the negative is exclusive to and from the positive. It thus has its identity when it is non-identity. As Horkheimer and Adorno noted back
in 1947, the will to enlightenment ensures 'the distance between subject and object' [98] such that the identity of the latter is gained at the expense of the former. Adorno has repeated the dialectic of domination in the very attempt to hold onto the negative, for he has to assume an identity for negation where its distance and exclusivity from the positive is guaranteed. Where Habermas presupposes the identity of enlightenment and critique as overcoming, Adorno presupposes the identity of the negative as not-overcoming, or as non-enlightenment. Both repeat the separation of activity from object - Habermas by presupposing the identity of the positive in critique to be non-activity, and Adorno by presupposing the identity of the negative in critique to be non-objective. Both versions of the dialectic of enlightenment, of its identity as overcoming and non-overcoming, presume an already accomplished enlightenment regarding the identity of critique as self-activity, and presuppose the identity and non-identity of the unconditioned.

Just as the theory of communicative action is based on a misreading of the (absolutely) positive in Hegel, so negative dialectics is based on a misreading of the (absolutely) negative in Hegel. It is precisely by insisting on an identity for negation which is not absolute, that a self-identity for the negative becomes impossible. 'To proceed dialectically means to think in contradictions (and to be) suspicious of all identity' remarks Adorno. [99] Yet a changed concept of dialectics without a changed concept of negation is no change at all. Dialectics remains external to the logic of destruction when its identity is presupposed as not its own, and negative dialectics remains
immanent critique of all identities except its own, which it presupposes and thus establishes. Adorno rejects the absolute identity of negation because it contradicts the idea of what the negative is. For Adorno, negation which is absolute is not 'itself', whereas for Hegel, determinate negation which is absolute is 'not-itself'; only the latter, with a changed concept of negation, is immanent, not presupposed, and true according to its law and logic of non-contradiction. Having accused Hegel of making his dialectics a principle of identity, Adorno now emerges as having made the negative his own principle of identity. He has a negative dialectic but not a dialectic of absolute negativity.

In denying the notion of positive negation, Adorno also denies the notion of determinate negation. It was his aim, having exposed the dialectic of enlightenment as a totalitarian circle which destroyed both non-enlightenment myth and enlightenment self-critique, to keep the circle in motion, in order that the movement behind domination could at least be kept in view. But in so doing, Adorno lost sight of the subject he was intending to protect from the logic of disintegration. Unless the subject is destroyed there is no movement. That the subject requires to be mediated, and therefore to become object, is a prerequisite for the appearance of non-contradiction as movement. Indeed, they are one and the same. Thus the protection of subjectivity from objectification, by inducing the repetition of non-contradiction, is to concentrate on only one side of the totality of the dialectic of enlightenment. With Adorno it is all dialectic and no enlightenment. The subject never actually realizes himself beyond his
repetition as non-identity, and therefore is continually required to forget that which is lost in each contradiction. It is the destruction of subjectivity which determines non-identity by the very fact that it is destroyed. By presupposing the dialectic of enlightenment to be not enlightening, return is protected from itself.

Adorno charges Hegel with attributing dialectics 'to the subject alone', [101] and thus ultimately removing the subject from contradiction. This is a misreading of Hegel which, if it were the case, would deny the subject any form of self-knowledge. This is precisely, however, what Adorno has done, because in negative dialectics there is only one negative movement after another, and no subject which can recognize itself in any of them, that is, no subject with any substance. For Hegel, the dialectic does not only move, it is also known as movement; for Adorno this knowing is not self-knowing, and thus subjectivity becomes an abyss, without meaning, without substance and only always more nothingness. When the principle of mediation 'is employed by the understanding separately and independently...(then) dialectic becomes scepticism; in which the result that ensues from its action is presented as mere negation'. [102] By denying non-identity a self-truth, Adorno reduces the dialectic of enlightenment to this empty result, a denial which has to be forced onto the negative in a relationship of dominance over it. Non-identity is itself. If it were not then it would have no use for Adorno as critique of identity thinking. It is identity thinking which demands that non-identity be nothing, a non-result. It is speculative thinking which recognizes that non-identity, as itself, is result and
moreover an immanently determinate one, defined by itself. Non-identity cannot be nothing, for that would be an identity independent from the movement which is its own becoming.

To be itself it cannot be itself. That is genuine dialectical thought and a negative dialectic allowed immanent development. The contradiction of the logic of non-contradiction is the third stage of the Hegelian system.

In contradistinction to mere scepticism, however, philosophy does not remain content with the purely negative result of dialectic. The sceptic mistakes the true value of his result, when he supposes it to be no more than a negation pure and simple. For the negative which emerges as the result of dialectic is, because a result, at the same time positive: it contains what it results from, absorbed into itself, and made part of its own nature. 103]

Thus the result which Adorno denies on behalf of the negative is in fact the self-result of the negative, and in Hegel's system is the third moment of phenomenology, the speculative moment of reason as self-produced. [104]

This, for Hegel, is the concept. The principle of the concept is the same as that which, for Adorno, was the principle of dialectical non-identity thinking. But for Hegel the concept is the identity of the non-identical as non-identical, a self which Adorno presupposes to be impossible because he presupposes already that the negative has no identity. The concept is the only possible logical result of the dialectic of enlightenment, even according to Adorno's own logic of
disintegration and contradiction. A contradiction is a negation of something. When the negation is of contradiction itself, then it is also a negation of something, and at the same time, because it is a self-contradiction, it is its own result. This is the identity of contradiction and non-contradiction, the concept, without which Adorno's negative dialectic cannot be known as negative, because of its assumed identity of non-identity. The contradiction of this assumption is the concept, because 'the result essentially contains that from which it results: which strictly speaking is a tautology', [105] and is known as the negation of the negation, that is, as self-activity.

Adorno's criticisms of Hegel with regard to his lacking faith in the dialectic and opting out of its movement in fear of its negative implications can now be turned back on Adorno. The fear of the negative is really Adorno's. It is he who cannot bear the idea of the negative as the true and therefore turns away from the absolute nature of negative dialectics. He is left without a concept of negation which is critical with regard to itself, manifested precisely in his claims that it is not protected from itself and therefore is also a non-identity. The refusal of identity for negative dialectics is the presupposition of the identity of the negative. When negative dialectics turns on that thought, then the contradiction produces in thought, the negation of (thought as) negation. For the speculative to emerge as the result of this negation of such ideas, 'the only thing needed is that they be thought'. [106]
This activity is determinate negation. It is the negative which has its own movement not only as an object for it, but equally as that which has given rise to itself. 'What is thus separated and non-actual is an essential moment' of the concept, [107] or of self-movement. The logic of non-contradiction when turned on itself (in/as philosophy) determines itself as philosophical consciousness, and philosophical consciousness, or the concept, is the identity of that non-identity. Adorno would not allow the subjectivity of negation a substance on the assumption that the negative had to remain uncontradicted by itself, and thus immune from its own logic. Thus critique became impossible. The concept is the recognition that the logic of non-contradiction is precisely the substance of the subject which it has produced through its own activity and thus is its own self. All presuppositions of mediation either as true or not true are only one side or the other of the logic of non-contradiction, and both inevitably remove the absolute from its immanent self-activity.

Consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the true, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. Since both are for the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison; it is for this same consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not. [108]

As the concept, what it discovers is that only philosophical consciousness corresponds to the immanent self-production which is (the logic of) non-contradiction.
Thus philosophical consciousness is absolute knowing. When Hegel says that 'the true is the whole' [109] it is a speculative statement, which is therefore not only the result of itself, but is also and at the same time the production of that result as its own truth. In the concept, movement and result are a unity, [110]

the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself. [111]

Where Habermas presupposed an end and a beginning of mediation, and Adorno presupposed their impossibility, for Hegel it is the absence of beginning and end which is the result which Habermas was forced to posit in advance, and which Adorno was forced to refuse. Philosophical consciousness, when it fully comprehends its subjectivity and its substance as the movement of self-contradiction, comprehends itself as 'the circle that presupposes its end as its goal having its end also as its beginning'. [112] This circle consists of the fact that the concept is actual only as self-result and self-activity, or that philosophical consciousness is actual as the movement which is the result of and the determinant of its own being-in-and-for-itself.

The Phenomenology of Spirit describes the education of consciousness to this comprehension of itself as self-result. It is the journey of consciousness along the path of despair 'from the first immediate opposition of itself and the object to absolute knowing. The path of this movement goes through every form of the relation of consciousness
to the object and has the notion of science for its result'. [113] It is therefore a process of self-enlightenment which Hegel describes as 'the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of science'. [114] The Science of Logic is the attempt by philosophical consciousness, or the concept, at self-expression, that is, to describe itself according to the circle which is its becoming.

Pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness...As science, truth is pure self-consciousness in its self-development and has the shape of the self, so that the absolute truth of being is the known notion and the notion as such is the absolute truth of being. [115]

By denying the absolute an actuality, Adorno suffers his own dialectic of enlightenment, for he denies actuality altogether. [116] Without the concept, Adorno has no way of comprehending what is actual and yet actuality is the unrecognized result of negative dialectics. By misreading the nature of the concept in Hegel, and not recognizing it as the substance of his own claims for the impossibility of negative self-identity, Adorno makes criticisms of Hegel which, for Hegel, are actual statements regarding the concept. Adorno writes, 'the power of the self-realizing universal is not, as Hegel thought, identical with the nature of individuals in themselves, it is always contrary to that nature'. [117] This is an accurate description of the concept as the identity of contradiction, and therefore of the movement between identity and non-identity. What Adorno reads into the concept as identical is underpinned by his own lack of a dialectic of negation, and his presupposition of the identity of non-identity. Further, he states that 'the principle of absolute identity is self-contradictory'.

- 166 -
[118] Intended as a criticism of Hegel, it is in fact an actual formulation of the concept.

When Hegel says that 'what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational', it is a speculative statement regarding the movement which is the dialectic of enlightenment. 'When thought grows hopeless', says Hegel, 'of ever achieving, by its own means, the solution of the contradiction which it has by its own action brought upon itself, it turns back to these solutions of the question with which the mind had learned to pacify itself...'. [119] For Habermas what is rational is not what is actual, but rather is the prior existence of the lifeworld; and for Adorno what is actual is not rational because it is self-contradictory and is the moving repetition of enlightenment and myth. But according to the concept, both of these views have their truth only in a unification.

Actuality is the non-identity of the subject and object (the individual and the external world), but it is the result of the mediation of consciousness knowing the truth of the world to be (self) contradictory. Thus what is rational is actual because the logic of non-contradiction results in having itself for object - that is its actuality - and what is actual is rational because the result is self-valid - that is its (self-produced) rationality. Without the concept, actuality cannot be comprehended according to itself as the movement of philosophical consciousness, that is, of the self-consciousness of its becoming as both loss and gain, which are for it one and the same. To comprehend the world as it appears in actuality is neither to
abstractly defend it nor abstractly reject it, but to recognize our own position in the world as the self-work of that which Adorno has called the 'excluded middle'. Actuality is the determinate negation of enlightenment, and contains all the contradictions of identity and non-identity which Adorno sees Hegel as overcoming. Actuality is thus the educational idea which Habermas and Adorno have refused, in their different ways, as the self-identity of critique. To comprehend actuality, or what is, is not only the task of philosophy, it is the actuality of self-education, or the identity of self-critique which both Habermas and Adorno in claiming to possess or not to possess have once again re-moved from the middle. Actuality in Hegel is not an alternative to the dialectic of enlightenment, it is the re-cognition of this re-moving, through a changed (educating) concept of negation.

The standpoint which refuses the actual as absolute recognition of self-movement is therefore one which repeats the identity thinking of the middle as excluded. Adorno's refusal of the absolute is based on a calculation of the identity of the negative. It is the abstract thinking of natural consciousness, the very form of identity thinking which he attacks as one-sided, uneducated, positive and bourgeois. Just as Habermas presupposed the identity of critique to be grounded in the movement of consciousness, and therefore as other than, outside of, mediation itself, so Adorno also presupposes that the movement of consciousness cannot be the criterion of the absolute, and that the dialectic of enlightenment is other than truth. Habermas replaces the non-identity of mediation with the identity of critique as communicative action. Adorno retains and repeats mediation as the non-
identity of critique. Both separate cognition and truth on the presupposition that one is not the other. But this is merely a repetition of bourgeois identity thinking, that is, of the determination of objects as independent from the movement which lies behind their appearance.

To assume that truth is movement in itself (Habermas) and is not movement in itself (Adorno) is in both cases to see consciousness only as a medium through which truth (as other than consciousness) can be known. To have mediation as any form of result is to presuppose a method which is not itself also movement. The fear of error noted in regard to Habermas is equally relevant here to Adorno, as an assumption in natural consciousness of the absolute as an identity independent from its being known. Adorno's case is the more oblique because his assumption is a negative one, unlike Habermas. Nevertheless, to assume that the negative is not the self-truth of consciousness is already somehow to know the totality of consciousness in a less than negative fashion.

The non-actuality of negative dialectics thus undermines Adorno's attempts to release enlightenment 'from entanglement in blind domination' [120] by not recognizing this activity as actual. Only a negative dialectics which recognizes its own non-identity as its own truth can become more than blind domination, and transgress the logic of non-contradiction which holds enlightenment within the limits of its own impasse. Without the concept, and a changed notion of the negative, Adorno can only maintain and impose those limits.
Habermas and Adorno represent the two sides of what the latter presupposed as an excluded middle, and the actuality of which Gillian Rose has termed 'the broken middle'. [121] In both expressions, the middle which is absent is absolute ethical life. The experience of this absence is the dialectic of enlightenment, and its two halves are not merely the separation of activity and object, subject and substance, but rather the positive possibility and negative impossibility of their reconciliation as absolute ethical life. The broken middle, or actuality, however, is the recognition of the dialectic of enlightenment as itself a misrecognition of determinate negation. The dialectic of enlightenment is already itself the possibility and impossibility of education as self activity. It determines its own interpretation according to the logic of non-contradiction, by always presenting itself to itself after its activity, and thus as separation. It is as this misrecognition that the presuppositions of the identities of enlightenment and dialectic in Habermas and Adorno are grounded.

For Habermas, to know the middle as broken is the unity of interest and knowledge where the separation (of activity and object) is overcome, and where, once it is known as overcome, the absence can be reconstructed in a theory of communicative action. For Adorno, the broken middle is not overcome, but again, what is excluded is what is presupposed by Adorno, this time as the certainty that it is not repaired.
Education as either overcoming or not-overcoming is already the misrecognition of the actuality which is the broken middle.

The separation of activity and object is, as was seen above, the crisis of modernity which for Habermas is the basis of its need for a self-reassurance. The dialectic of enlightenment, however, threatens all attempts at such reassurance because once the middle is broken and becomes its own object (in critique or as philosophical consciousness), then a paradox is produced which suggests that reunification is logically impossible. The broken middle, self-consciously realized in critical thought and through the critical sociological and philosophical traditions, reveals the logic of separation to be the logic of non-contradiction and repetition. For Habermas and Adorno, the crisis is the same one. A consciousness which has truth as its object is already aware of the absence of the middle, or the middle as broken. The middle is actual as the problem of its own absence. Reflection is always the absence of the middle, and consciousness is left with only the contradiction that subjectivity is 'always already' not ethical substance. Activity and object are always already separated, and thinking is never, therefore, the work which repairs the broken middle. Attempts to do so only repeat the separation, an aporia which is experienced as the dialectic of enlightenment.

Thus the dialectic of enlightenment becomes a problem of mediation and dependency. Human activity is always already faced by the middle as broken, and is therefore already a repetition of relative ethical life, or civil society. The middle thus appears in social and political
thought as something to be repaired by overcoming the separation. What Habermas and Adorno share up to a point is the view that such an overcoming can only be achieved as reflection, or as critique, for only in reflection can the subject work upon an object which is not wholly other than itself. In critical theory, reflection is self-reflection, and critique is self-critique. Both therefore see the overcoming of the dialectic of enlightenment as an educational issue. Equally, both agree in principle on the totality of mediation. Habermas aligns himself with phenomenology because of its victory over all forms of first philosophy, and, for Adorno, the dialectic of enlightenment is that totality.

For critical theory, and critical theory of education, it is in the idea of critique as educational activity and result that the two halves of the broken middle, subject and substance, are to be unified. What is to be overcome is the form of uneducated and unenlightened thought which presupposes the identities of objects by remaining unaware of the fact that objects are for-us and therefore already mediated. Presuppositions of identity repeat the abstract universality of civil society by ignoring the mediation which has already produced identity as result. In identity thinking, substance is always separated from the subject which is its activity. In their own ways, Habermas and Adorno share the view of critique as non-identity thinking. The instrumental interest, by treating objects as independent, repeats the abstract universality of identity; and of course for Adorno, all enlightenment does this. For both, critique is the weapon which undermines
instrumental and identity thinking by revealing the necessity of (social) activity behind such identities.

Where they differ, and yet where they ultimately remain the same, is in their view of the possibilities of self-education which critique can perform. For Habermas, the insight into the universality of activity is itself an enlightenment regarding unconditional reason. It is the result of critique and therefore an overcoming of the separation of activity from result. For Adorno, the insight into the universality of activity is also an insight into the totalitarianism of enlightenment, or identity thinking and the impossibility of a result for critique which is anything other than a repetition of abstract knowledge.

In Habermas, then, the result of critique as an overcoming of abstract thinking through the comprehension of its communicative and intersubjective origin, is the claim to the self-identity of critique. But this claim involves the idea that enlightenment as overcoming is itself outside of the dialectic of enlightenment, an explanation of the broken middle, and therefore another fracture, rather than a comprehension of its actuality, or the work which is subjective substance. It is a presupposition which is returned to the dialectic of enlightenment and thus the idea of overcoming becomes something to be overcome. In Adorno, the impossibility of a result of critique which is other than further repetition (further identity thinking), when employed as a critique of the absolute in Hegel, is taken as the self-identity of non-identity thinking, or the impossibility of overcoming. This, again, is a presupposition of the identity of that which in the
broken middle is precisely claimed to be excluded, a unity of activity and result which is not also abstract. Where they differ, then, is that Habermas presupposes the identity of enlightenment as overcoming, and Adorno presupposes the identity of dialectic as not-overcoming. Habermas 'overcomes' movement or return, Adorno does not. Where they remain the same is in their misrecognition of the actuality of separation as activity and result. This misrecognition determines the separation of educational activity from result which is embodied in their respective presuppositions of education as method.

Thus, with regard to the educational import of the dialectic of enlightenment, Habermas and Adorno are two halves of the broken middle or subjective substance. Habermas's theory of communicative action is a theory of ethical substance which lacks the movement or subjectivity of self-identity. Adorno's theory of negative dialectics is a theory of the return of subjectivity and the consequent impossibility of a unification with ethical substance. In Habermas there is substance without subject; in Adorno there is subject without substance. In neither is the broken middle comprehended as work and result. The dialectic of enlightenment encloses both within itself - Habermas is undermined by the universality of mediation, Adorno is undermined by the universality of non-result. Or, again, Habermas's substantial and determinate result of negation is undermined by the universality of mediation, and Adorno's universality of mediation is undermined by the determinate and substantial result of negation. The dialectic of enlightenment is both of their 'moments' or identities, the positive and the negative. But this absolute recognition is found in neither,
and both, by giving priority to one of the halves of the broken middle over the other, repeat its fragmentation but do not comprehend the actuality which is that repetition.

To overcome and not to overcome the dialectic of enlightenment, Habermas and Adorno respectively have presupposed the identity of the dialectic of enlightenment as the identity of critique as enlightenment, and as the non-identity of critique as enlightenment. Both are one sided, both exclude the other, neither comprehend the dialectic of enlightenment according to itself. The presupposition of education as method is the invention of a third aspect to the dialectic, one which solves the problem of the dialectic of enlightenment either positively (Habermas) or negatively (Adorno). But this third is what is actual: it is what is, or the broken middle. The experience of contradiction which both produce is the whole which is the broken middle. It is both our object and our experience. Their contradiction is our actual education regarding the relative ethical life of civil society.

The concept is this identity and non-identity of the dialectic of enlightenment. But neither Habermas nor Adorno realize this education regarding the actual because they do not comprehend the concept, the broken middle, according to itself as the movement which is fragmentation and unification. Enlightenment in Habermas has no actuality because it is not also immanently known as destroyed or lost. Dialectic in Adorno has no actuality because it is not also known as a self-produced activity and determinate result. Result in Habermas lacks
return, return in Adorno lacks result. Both interpret the movement which is the broken middle according to presuppositions regarding the identity of educational self-activity, presuppositions which always separate activity from result, and remove education from the path of despair. The idea of education in civil society as overcoming or non-overcoming is already abstract. The experience of this is itself understood only by employing the same idea of education of which it is a critique. Thus the dialectic of enlightenment is understood according to the abstract idea of education which it undermines. In critique, and in critical theory of education, what is criticized about education, the separation of activity from result, is precisely what is presumed as already overcome, and thus repeated, as critique.

This movement has to be recognized as loss and gain, as negation and determination, if it is to avoid presupposing enlightenment as result, and denying us the educational import of our own misrecognition. It is the idea of recognition of misrecognition which is this education for us in Hegel, and which is the concept's own self-production. It is to an examination of the implications of recognition of misrecognition as the self-identity of education which the final chapter now turns to. It reads the idea of education in Hegel against, or as the recognition of the misrecognition of education in Habermas's and Adorno's work on the dialectic of enlightenment and in critical theory of education.
It is the work of the last three chapters, in comprehending the
dialectic of enlightenment as the absolute knowing of enlightenment as
dialectic and dialectic as enlightenment, that enables this chapter to
present the recognition of misrecognition in Hegel as the self-work of
that educational experience, or its educational import for us whose
experience it is. What follows, then, first examines recognition in the
Phenomenology of Spirit with regard to the dialectical relationship of
independence and dependence in the master/slave relationship, and in
subjective substance. Recognition of misrecognition, comprehended as
the movement and result which is education, or the concept, is then
presented as the actuality of two educational relationships in civil
society, that of the teacher and the student, and of critique and the
state.

Mutual Recognition.

In Hegel Contra Sociology, Gillian Rose notes that in Hegel's early
work it was not the idea of recognition which was used to try and
describe knowing which, as she puts it, 'does not dominate or suppress
but recognizes the difference and sameness of the other'. [1] Rather it
was the idea of 'seeing into'. However, such a 'reflective' idea
repeated the dialectical movement of subject and object, but did not adequately express the third moment of 'seeing into', that is, the determinate result where both comprehend their mutuality in and as the movement of the dialectic. 'Seeing into', 'has the semantic disadvantage of sounding too immediate, too pre-critical, too successful', notes Rose. [2] Its implicit finality was precisely not the nature of the result; whereas '"re-cognizing" emphasizes the lack of identity or difference', [3] a lack which is known and therefore is result.

The insertion of the hyphen into the english term recognition, to become re-cognition communicates successfully the mediation or movement which is another, or re-knowing, and the fact that it is known, re-known. The two parts of the term produce a unity of movement and knowing, or determinate negation, which is the third movement, or the actuality of enlightenment. Rose summarizes this as follows.

'Recognition' refers to the lack of identity or relation which the initial dichotomy between concept and intuition, or consciousness and its objects, represents. But it also implies a unity which includes the relation or lack of identity. This unity mediates between the poles of the opposition and is hence triune. 'Recognition', 'concept' and 'spirit' all have this triune structure. [4]

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, recognition replaces 'seeing into' as the educational self-movement and self-production which is spirit. The movement of recognition, whilst the result of the Phenomenology of Spirit as a whole, is dealt with in three different ways by Hegel. The
first is an explicit and abstract exposition of mutual recognition, another is the dialectic of domination and dependence as it is manifested in self-consciousness, and another is the actuality of recognition as misrecognition in moral self-consciousness, and as absolute knowing.

Mutual recognition is absolute ethical life. It is the self-expression of mutual social relations and intersubjectivity which Habermas presupposed in the idea of communicative competence and later as the lifeworld and which Adorno presupposed as unknowable by denying the absolute an actuality, or the negative a self-negation.

Hegel's discussion of mutual recognition is placed before the exposition of self-consciousness. However, in keeping with the remarks made regarding beginnings and ends in chapter III above, this is not a presupposition on Hegel's part of what is to follow, and what will result. It is itself a result of that which follows. Moreover, the idea of mutual recognition described here is not the actuality of recognition at all, it is the abstract statement of the identity which, as actual, must be realized and therefore also lost. The pure process of mutual recognition precisely outlines that which is not achieved in actuality, and which, therefore, is the actuality of recognition.

Recognition is social. When the object or other of immediate desire (immediate need or self-gratification) is life itself, or the preservation of life, then the only certainty which can be gained is also immediate. There is no self-differentiation for natural man (to
use Rousseau’s term) because there is only the self-certainty of that whose needs are temporarily satisfied. The object of its desire has no independence of its own, it is simply a means to the end of satisfaction for desire, and thus the relation of desire to the object is a never-ending one. The independence of desire is the total destruction of the other, and therefore there is no relation with it which would negate its complete independence. 'The simple I', as Hegel calls it, [5] is undifferentiated.

However, desire is not in such a state of nature. When its object is another like itself, then by the very fact that it has an object of desire, the independence of that object from it (from desire) becomes apparent, as does its own independence from the object. Desire is the origin of the social, and yet, as desire, it is already social. It is immediately the loss of desire (i.e. of itself) as absolute independence, because it is now of another like itself. Consciousness of the other is therefore at the same time self-consciousness. This relation of one to the other is the repetition of desire, for it reproduces both desire and the other as independent. 'Thus, self-consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, is unable to supercede it; it is really because of that relation that it produces the object again, and the desire as well'. [6] This dialectic has been seen before in this work as the inescapable logic of the idea of enlightenment as overcoming which, by presupposing its own identity within the law of non-contradiction, is already separated from the object, and thus ensures its own failure. Desire, which would destroy the other for its own self-satisfaction and certainty, ensuring its own
domination and independence, finds that in the very act of desire, in the very act of seeking to overcome, the separation between itself and the other is reproduced. What is destroyed in the desire for independence is the possibility of independence, for desire becomes dependent upon, and the repetition of, the (independent) other. Just as in the dialectic of enlightenment, that which would overcome its object ensures its own failure in and by the necessity, inherent in the activity, of its already being separated from the object.

But this failure is a lesson for us, or for desire, because the loss of its certainty, and repeated loss, is the truth of desire itself. According to the logic of identity and non-contradiction, a satisfied desire is not desire. But comprehended as result, a satisfied desire is not-desire. Unsatisfied desire is the truth of desire, its self-identity as the contradiction of its immediate appearance. It is in the contradiction of desire - where its satisfaction is its unsatisfaction - which is its truth. Hegel states, 'it is in fact something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of desire', [7] something which it must experience as itself in the loss of itself. Since desire is 'always already' negative, then in the recognition of this as its own (non) identity, it achieves satisfaction, but in and as the contradiction, or the movement which is the loss.

The question remains as to what this 'other' is, which is the essence of desire, for if recognition is only subjective, then no 'other' than self-consciousness has in fact resulted. Recognition must be brought about by both subject and object who are respectively also object and
subject for the other. The independence of one is generated by its being object for another, and the dependence of each is already brought about in the desire for self. Each is both subject and object, and each is independent and negative, or the self-identity of dependence. 'A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness' [8] but neither is in-itself without the other. Their recognition is a relation, and their negativity is the result of self-activity on both parts.

This action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well... Thus the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as it does... it is indivisibly the action of one as well as of the other. [9]

This relation, then, is the result of mutual activity, and mutual (self) negation. It is the relation in which 'a self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much "I" as "object". With this', says Hegel,

we already have before us the notion of spirit... this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence. [10]

Recognition, therefore, abstractly comprehended according to itself by itself, is the concept of spirit. It is also what Hegel calls mutual recognition, or the middle which lies between, and is the unity of, the separated individual self-consciousnesses.
Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself and for the other an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another. [11]

This middle, then, is the identity of pure dependence or of the negative which is the true essence of self-consciousness or desire. It is the identity of the contradiction of the negativity of desire, and when recognized by both is the intersubjective relation of mutual freedom, or the independence of dependence. Thus, in mutual recognition, is contained the idea of absolute ethical life, or of the middle which is no longer broken. Put another way, ethical life is now comprehended as the relationship of mutual recognition, a relationship which is the education and enlightenment of both subject and object.

Both Habermas and Adorno share the idea that absolute ethical life, as envisaged in mutual recognition, is the purpose or goal of critique, but both, in their own terms, would argue that it does not exist, and has not yet existed in history. Hegel shares this view, but the abstract interpretation of the absolute in his work by commentators removes it from its actuality, and sees it as complete in the sense of finished, and therefore of history as already having culminated in the idea of freedom on earth as the state. Such interpretations take no account of the necessity of movement and contradiction which prevents completion in the sense of finished, and yet is the truth of self-consciousness in terms of self-realization. Indeed, as Rose points out, there are occasions when Hegel does not hide his despair at the
seeming impossibility of an ethical unity, or of mutual recognition. [12]

What such interpretations again misread is Hegel’s meaning of actuality. Just as desire is already separated from its object, so self-consciousness is already separated from its other. Their unity cannot be presupposed outside of the mediation which is this experience, and thus unity is ‘always already’ separation in being known. To assume that somehow mutual recognition is anything other than actual, is to presuppose absolute knowing or the pure concept in logic as other than its own result, or, put another way, to dominate the absolute. The absolute, in Hegel, contains the lack of absolute ethical life as its result. The comprehension of mutual recognition is precisely not mutual recognition. The contradiction, or negativity, is its truth, and philosophical consciousness, or the concept, is recognition of its own self in the negativity which is not mutual recognition, and is its actual realization. To say that the comprehension of actuality is not mutual recognition is to express the experience which is the truth of mutual recognition.

Hegel’s description of mutual recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit is the acknowledged Sollen in his work. It is a statement of unity abstracted from its own work and is not, therefore, an exposition of the actuality of recognition as education. The remainder of the Phenomenology concerns mutual recognition as it is actually realized by the subject, or by self-consciousness. What in mutual recognition is abstractly presented as ‘the double movement of the two self-
consciousnesses', [13] becomes, as misrecognition, 'the inequality of the two, or the splitting-up of the middle term into the extremes which, as extremes, are opposed to one another, one being only \textit{recognized}, the other only \textit{recognizing}'. [14] The loss of the middle, or self-consciousness, is therefore already educational work, and it is this self-work which is comprehended in the master/slave dialectic as the misrecognition of the slave, and the determinate result which \textit{is} the slave as work \textit{and} result.
The Master/Slave Dialectic.

Written in the 'pure' terms of domination and dependence, the master/slave dialectic recognizes the educational movement wherein the relation which is dependence realizes itself according to itself. In line with its own nature as dependent, its self-identity cannot enjoy the power of domination. A self-identity of dependence requires a complete lack of domination as its own autonomy. That is again the contradiction of rational identity which is not recognized as actual by the logic of non-contradiction. The contradiction is essential if its negation is to be determinate, and if its determination is to be negative.

A reading of the master/slave dialectic which has recognition as result, and is not taken to be a struggle for recognition, but for independence, is one which does not resolve the contradiction of dependence. It is in just such a reading, also, that the master/slave dialectic reveals itself as the immanent educational import of the dialectic of enlightenment. With the master representing enlightenment, independence and domination, and the slave representing myth and dependence, Hegel has already laid the foundations for 'recognition' as the self-educating critique of modernity, and as the comprehension of the actuality of, and the educational import of, the dialectic of enlightenment.
The master/slave dialectic has already begun as desire, and yet that beginning can only be comprehended as the concept, or the truth of philosophical consciousness. This contradiction, of the beginning only being comprehended as the end and the end as the work of the beginning, is the truth of phenomenology and belies any simple chronological reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Self-consciousness, in seeking its own certainty and independence by the supercession of the other, has already entered a 'social' relation with this other. Not only must self-consciousness prove to itself that the other is unnecessary for it, but equally it seeks to confirm its own independence from any objective existence or being for the other. Thus independence would be gained in one of two ways, either by overcoming the other, or by being overcome, since death would also be an independence from the specific existence which produces this experience of non-universality, that is, from life. Self-consciousness, then, enters a life and death struggle where, in seeking the death of the other, it also stakes its own life. This is not a struggle for recognition, for that would be to concede a relation with the other. Each combatant does not enter the struggle to give up that which it is fighting for, but rather to achieve non-relation at any cost. Nor is it a struggle for mutual recognition, since it does not as yet admit the other to be like itself. The life and death struggle is not political or ethical for the combatants, although it is so for us who already know of the reciprocity of the struggle. That political and ethical aspect has itself to be comprehended by them as the result of the struggle, not its precursor. [15]
In risking its life, self-consciousness learns two things. Firstly it learns that it can be independent of life, it can die. Secondly, however, in becoming aware of that independence, it also realizes that there is nothing within it which could not simply vanish. The first lesson produces for self-consciousness the independence of lordship or domination. Pure being-for-self (death) is absolute independence from life, and is the autonomy which desire seeks for itself as its own self-identity. But such an identity is contradictory, for to be absolutely independent, the master must literally not be itself, it must be unmoving, unmediated, and dead. If the master is alive, then he is not independent.

Independence in death is a contradiction which the identity of the master cannot survive. But this loss, or this contradiction, is the second lesson produced in self-consciousness by the life and death struggle. [16] This consciousness knows (or is the knowledge) that the master, or independence, cannot survive death in order to be independent. The contradictory claim of independence by the master is known by the slave. The awareness of (the) death (of the master as independent) is the condition upon which the slave depends for its own existence. The master, on the other hand, simply because he is not dead, is therefore not self-identity or independent, and remains unsatisfied.

The slave exists as the consciousness which is of death, [17] whilst the master vanishes into the contradiction that it cannot master death and yet remain determinate or knowing. The truth of the master
is the contradiction of the dialectic between independence from life and the dependence upon life which is 'always already' apparent in a struggle for independence. Consequently, the truth of the master is dependence, or the slave. His struggle for independence from life has repeated itself as the contradiction of the necessity of dependence upon life, and 'the object in which the lord has achieved his lordship has in reality turned out to be something quite different from an independent consciousness. What now really confronts him is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent one'. [18]

What, in the dialectic of enlightenment was the totalitarian movement of enlightenment, is here the desire of the master for independence and self-identity. Just as enlightenment reverted to myth, so the master becomes slave. However, this has been looked at only from the point of view of the master, and consequently is interpreted only as loss, destruction and despair. Independence, from the master's perspective, is always other than that which is the truth of independence, that is, the slave, or being which has (the loss of) its self for object. The contradiction of independence results in being-for-self, a movement which (interpreted according to Habermasian critique) reveals the slave to be the true identity of dependence, and thus the determinate result of critique. But a slave which is master is not, therefore, only a slave. If the truth of the slave is the destruction of the master in self-contradiction, and the master represents 'true identity', then the slave has no enjoyment of self, only loss of self. For Adorno, the slave is
absolutely not master, since it is always already the destruction of independence as the critique of identity thinking. Yet the slave consciousness is granted freedom from dependence by Adorno in the presupposition that the slave is not its own absolute identity.

Recognition of misrecognition is thus only possible as the slave. In the discussion of mutual recognition it was seen that the middle is established only when each is also the other, which requires action by one to be reciprocated by the other. The master does not negate life for he alone performs no work upon it. His consciousness is not of death, it is only the enjoyment of life itself, and thus is not the independence he hoped to gain. There is, therefore, no mutual negation of master and slave. The master is not negated, and thus he does not recognize the other to be also himself. Such a recognition is possible only for the slave.

The slave is the consciousness of death. In seeking to supercede the other, this life was also at stake, and yet no independence resulted from the life and death struggle. This trial by death 'does away with the truth which was supposed to issue from it, and so, too, with the certainty of self generally'. [19] The loss of certainty is the slave consciousness, for it, and not the master, is the consciousness which knows that 'there is nothing present within it which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is only pure being-for-self'. [20] To know of death is not to be dead. Therein lies the dependence which is the slave. The slave is dependent upon death, for it is the knowing of that which is not
itself, that is, not life. 'Its whole being has been seized with
dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute lord'.
[21] It is not life which is object and other for the slave, but
death. Death is his absolute lord. It is what he will always be
dependent upon, and he is forever bound to (the experience of) death
for his own existence. But the slave, therefore, is pure negativity
and has absolutely no existence of its own, for it is wholly and
completely and always for another. Without the other, it has no
being. Thus, its existence is as fear, or the experience that it has
no stability, no identity of its own, and is totally dependent upon
the absolute sovereignty of death.

Here, then, the slave consciousness appears to be as contradictory
as that of the master. How can the slave be a slave? Is not the idea
of the identity of a slave a paradox, since if a slave is only and
always a slave, then seemingly it can only ever be itself when it is
not itself, or has no identity of its own? This is exactly the
contradiction which faced critical theorists of education, and
Habermas, in trying to assume critique as the identity of
enlightenment. Both critique and the slave are negative in character
and give rise to an aporia of reasoning that in order to be true
must also be false. Whereas Habermas took critique to be the truth
about that which was false, and Adorno took non-identity thinking to
be not true about that which is false, the slave, through
recognition, finds his own identity precisely in and as the work
which is the contradiction. This is the educational import of the
master/slave dialectic for the dialectic of enlightenment.
The slave does not just have his own negativity implicitly within him, as fear of nothingness, he also has it explicitly before him as the master, for the master, as independence, is absolute nothingness. Because the slave works on the object, or is activity, the object has independence from it. It is his own work which creates his dependence. The slave exists as the will to independence or as desire. But the will to independence is already dependence and has freedom or independence as its object. And yet, in the experience of death, and in the contradiction of the master, the slave has before it the truth of its own nature. Death is absolute negation, and fear is of absolute negation. Thus, being-in-itself or the independence of negativity, and being-for-self, the dependence of negativity, are now the work and activity of one consciousness.

It is through work that desire is negated, and therein recognizes its own truth to be negative. Its activity is also its identity. The master/slave dialectic, therefore, describes and is the work of the recognition of misrecognition. It is an educational process or the comprehension of self-consciousness regarding its own self-identity in the experience of its own negation. In the slave, self-consciousness has the awareness that it is not independent and that the slave is the result of the struggle for independence. Thus the struggle for independence produces the recognition that self-consciousness is not-independent. It learns what it is, by doing what it is. Recognition is the recognizing of self through work, as work, or as misrecognition. The result is an education of self-consciousness regarding itself. Precisely because what it learns is
that it is work or activity as self, that is not a completion. The
identity of self-consciousness, or desire, only is when it is not
independent and risks itself to attain it. Thus, although 'fear of
the lord is indeed the beginning of wisdom...(it is only) through
work, however, (that) the bondsman becomes conscious of what he
truly is', [22] and he only recognizes what he truly is when he
works. Thus, contradiction is contained here in the idea of
recognition. Recognition of self is only possible as loss of self,
for what is recognized is (the identity of) dependence by itself as
misrecognition. Activity comes to know itself through what it does;
this is the truth of philosophical consciousness. The identity is
not that of slave, but of the identity and non-identity of the
slave, or put another way, recognition is of the mastery of being
non-master, or the non-dependence of being absolutely dependent.

The dialectic of master and slave is the dialectic of desire and
work. Desire seeks independence, and in so seeking it, is already
the work which risks life, knows death, and is negative. The slave
is the identity of the negative as misrecognition. Work is therefore
what desire is, and desire is (or does) only as self-work. The work
which is already the identity of the slave is now recognized as a
self-activity, and misrecognition is recognized as self-production.
This activity is the work which is recognition of misrecognition,
and is the (self) education of self-consciousness. It is this
movement as actuality which is the educational and political import
of Hegel's philosophy.
The Dialectic of Subjective Substance.

The master/slave dialectic only represents the process of recognition as an internal affair. What lies ahead in the Phenomenology is the recognition for individual self-consciousnesses of their mutual non-identity as subjective substance. The whole movement of which the person in civil society is the result depends upon the other which faced it in the life and death struggle. This abstract independent personality now faces its own contradiction that its own independence, and that of all other persons, is mutually dependent upon each other. The free individual is not free, and the dialectic of independence and dependence begins again, [23] this time as the dialectic of subject and substance.

The logic of non-contradiction becomes universal reason when consciousness takes itself to be all reality, and 'discovers the world as its new real world...for the existence of the world becomes for self-consciousness its own truth and presence'. [24] Enlightened consciousness becomes self-certainty. However, this self-certainty is merely abstract, and on reflection, returns to the dialectic of enlightenment and to the uncertainty which has already been examined above. The enlightenment of self-consciousness as universal reason, as pure substance, holds 'an irresistible authority' [25] over myth, faith, and the irrational, because it is the awareness that thought of myth, of faith, of the irrational is always already the activity of consciousness. 'In the believer's own consciousness, are found the very
moments which enlightenment has established as valid'. [26] The nature of enlightenment's victory is that by establishing the universality of the logic of non-contradiction as its own self, faith 'has been expelled from its kingdom; or, this kingdom has been ransacked, since the waking consciousness has monopolized every distinction and expansion of it and has vindicated earth's ownership of every portion of it and given them back to earth'. [27] Yet the logic of non-contradiction, or abstract universal reason, bears within it a 'blemish of an unsatisfied yearning', [28] namely that it cannot overcome its own internal contradiction that its own validity rests on the presupposition that the 'test' of validity is its own self. This presupposition of validity is thus the domination of reason, and is itself only formally rational.

Reason as activity reveals its self-contradiction. The unsatisfied enlightenment is the dialectic of enlightenment, that is, the contradiction which the logic of non-contradiction produces for self-consciousness. When enlightenment is pure immediate certainty, and is not reflective or dialectical, and is not mediated, then it is the violence of absolute freedom. In such circumstances, universality is merely a formal principle, it has no self, and is domination over any and all that are not itself, i.e. over everyone. This is the principle of civil society, but not its actuality. Reflection is the antithesis of this violence, and as will be seen below, recognition of misrecognition is the actuality of ethical life.
What Hegel refers to as 'the spiritual animal kingdom' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* [29] has this formal universality in law, such that law is the universal formally existing in the world. The universal, as the law of identity or independence (non-contradiction), is the truth of all who have an identity or are independent. Its substance is the establishing of the independence (and non-contradiction) of each person as separate from and differentiated from every other. Law is substantial because it applies equally to all. That is its universality, its non-contradictory and hence rational character. It is the universality of all persons, or is their community, but since the universality it provides for them is only formal independence, then it is merely the spiritual animal kingdom where each person 'starts afresh from itself, and is occupied not with an other, but with itself'. [30] Not only is this kingdom the (contradiction of a) community of persons, presenting itself as the middle term which is their unity, or the ground of intersubjectivity, but each person is at the same time the substantial truth of the law of non-contradiction. Thus, the person, simply by being itself, and having reason (law) for its object, already embodies this universality as itself. Thus law is both universal (or community), and the principle of the universal or community. The nature of this kingdom of formal independence is thus one of tautology and lack of substance, because its activity is merely implicit. The spiritual animal kingdom is the merely external state which is civil society.

The abstract law of this kingdom employs its own self-nature as the criteria of universality and is able to prove its truth by employing
itself also as the measuring instrument or criterion by which it is to be judged because it is already (determined as) separated from that which is merely particular. This is tautological because

individuality is in its own self actuality' (i.e. merely implicitly actual)'. Action has, therefore, the appearance of the movement of a circle which moves freely within itself in a void...and is perfectly content to operate in and with its own self. [31]

Substance is only formal universality, indeterminate because of a lack of negation, a lack of the subject as its own self-activity. Just as the dialectic of enlightenment produces the tautology of enlightenment dominating myth by testing it according to itself as criterion of universality, so reason as (the) law (of non-contradiction) produces the tautology of reason as merely the testing of laws. The domination inherent in the tautology is masked precisely in the illusion of its universality, which appears because mediation is always already formal and abstract.

Similarly, just as the dialectic of enlightenment revealed the self-contradiction of reason which itself reverted to myth, so abstract law produces its own self-contradiction. Enlightenment, in realizing its tautology, could not avoid self-enlightenment and thus negation. The universality of the spiritual animal kingdom is realized as also undermining itself by those whose independence it guarantees. Whereas the problem for enlightenment was caused when activity was realized already to be reflection, and thus for it or negative, so, here, the subject realizes that his own (actual) existence already contradicts...
the universality of the 'community' because that community, that law, is that upon which his independence is already dependent. Universality, or the independence of each in the community, is thus determinate and dependent upon what is now known as an abstract universality or community. Independence now is not, and independence becomes an object for that subjectivity which now realizes its dependence upon that which it is not, viz. the community. Subjectivity, in the dialectic of enlightenment (and in the master/slave dialectic), and now in the dialectic of subjective substance, is only negative. However, this loss of certainty is already the experience of ethical substance. What lies ahead for subjectivity is the recognition of its negativity as the self-identity of that substance, or as spirit. The loss of the community is the work and actuality of ethical life in civil society.

The legal recognition of the independence of each person establishes the contradiction of law in civil society. The law, as universal, recognizes each particular individual as a non-contradiction, an identity. Yet the very fact that this applies to all individuals, and requires their individuality for its own independence, it also establishes this independence as dependent. Law which guarantees the universal and non-contradictory nature of each person also produces the activity which knows the dependency of each person upon that law, and thus upon each other. The state in civil society is always misrecognition.

The same contradiction arises in the law of private property. The independence of each person, guaranteed by their right to exclusivity
in overcoming (possessing) objects, masks the social determination of
this merely formal ethical tie. Ownership, or independence, requires
and is dependent upon others to whom an object does not belong. Whether
law recognizes the right of possession or identity (and identity is
only self-possession), it contradicts its own abstract universality by
the totality which is its own mediation.

The experience of this mediation is the dialectic of subjective
substance, and its constituent movements are duty and conscience. Just
as desire was already dependent upon the other, so subjectivity is
already dependent upon the universal. Subjectivity, as dependence, is
already subjectivity which reflects upon universality as a loss, and
hence is, as Habermas puts it, in need of self-reassurance. The
reassurance it takes from this crises, where law or the universal is
other than the negative existence of self, is precisely a self-
reassurance. It takes its own negativity, its own dependence, to be its
true existence, and conforms to the universal as duty. But duty is only
the immediate self-expression of dependence. Duty, in being performed,
is again an activity which only repeats the universal as abstract,
since the activity is performed by a subject who still has law over
against itself. The 'master' consciousness of duty, that which takes
itself to be independent and at one with the universal, is known by the
'slave' consciousness of duty to be the action of the subject and
therefore not substance. This latter consciousness has conscience as
its own truth, for it is the acknowledgement, like the slave, of its
own unsubstantiality. It is 'pure duty', [32] the self of duty. As
such, it has only itself as judge and jury, and in each self-activity

- 199 -
finds itself guilty of being not universal, or not the communal good, because it realizes its actions to be always selfish, always based on self and not on substance. Just as the slave appeared eternally shackled to the absolute lord, never to be free, so conscience appears eternally guilty, destined always to realize that it is always activity for self, and never for all (or in itself). 'It is itself in its contingency...and knows its immediate individuality to be pure knowing and doing...'. [33]

Such a society is a moral rather than an ethical order. The subject is seen as both responsible for the good, and yet at the same time it conscientiously acknowledges that it is also the impossibility of the good. The good has to be done, but it cannot do it. The separation of the subject from community - something brought about as the self-activity of the state but which is yet to be recognized - is taken by the subject to be an individual matter concerning the individual's own action in regard to others. Thus, the subject misrecognizes mediation, and takes the separation to be the result of its personal action rather than the self-division of the universal. This identity of reflective self-consciousness as being-for-self and as always already not being in itself, is an illusory identity. The failure of critical social theory to re-cognize subject as the work of substance is due to its remaining uncritical about the identity of dependency itself, and the actuality of critique as educational self-activity. Both Habermas and Adorno repeat these notions as abstractions in the very fact that they attempt to overcome them, or protect them from being overcome.
The re-cognition of this illusory being is the recognition that the negativity of the subject who is not universal is also the substance of ethical life which is not-independent. The activity of the latter is the becoming of the former, although it appears to natural consciousness that the activity is its own or solely that of the former. The contradiction of the universal, that its activity is particular and undermines itself, is also the contradiction of the subject whose activity (in the sphere of morality) repeats its non-identity with substance. But subjective substance re-cognizes itself only through the work or activity which is both of them.

In the discussion of the dialectic of enlightenment in chapter III, dialectic and enlightenment were re-cognized as the absolute truth of philosophical consciousness in its own activity. Their separation was the negation of the absolute, and also a determinate negation by the consciousness which produced its own dependent and negative self as its independent and positive identity or substance. Philosophical consciousness is recognized by itself to be self-educating work which is as the (identity of the) contradiction between reason and thought.

Similarly, in the discussion of the dialectic of lordship and bondage earlier in this chapter, the master and slave, or independence and dependence, were re-cognized as the absolute truth of self-consciousness in its own self-educating work as desire. The separation of master and slave was the realization of independence and the loss of independence, but this loss was recognized by self-consciousness to be determinate, since what was for it (independence) was also the essence
of being-for-self, or what it had become. Self-consciousness is thus recognized by itself to be that which produces itself at the same time as it loses itself. It is re-recognized as the identity of the contradiction of dependence and independence, where contradiction and its movement is its own work and becoming.

Finally, then, the dialectic of subjective substance is active in the same way, through the recognition of itself as spirit. The separation of person and community was the realization in both of the loss of independence, a loss brought about by the same activity, that of activity which aimed at universality and resulted in its opposite. The person, as not-independent, is the result of its having community as object; whilst the community as not-independent is the result of its having only each particular person as its self or subject, or activity. But the work or activity of separation produces as result the consciousness which knows and has dependence as both its subject and its substance. What is realized through the work of universal activity is the true nature of the universal as activity. The subject recognizes itself in its negativity as ethical substance, and ethical substance recognizes itself in its negativity as subject. They are for the same consciousness which knows them, and they are that consciousness, which is their absolutely true state of mind. Recognition here is the work of spirit, or the middle term, realizing itself as that which becomes or is actual, or absolute, when and in the work which destroys its immediate appearance. It is this work and activity, which appears in all three examples, which is recognition of misrecognition, or actuality as self-education.
Recognition, Misrecognition, Education.

In the analyses which have so far been presented, of Habermas, Adorno, of the master/slave dialectic, and of spirit, the experience of the logic of non-contradiction for us has been found to be the dialectic of subject and substance, or the movement of dependence and autonomy. Whether the critique of the dialectic of enlightenment is seen as overcoming (Habermas) or as not-overcoming (Adorno), the aporia of education as method is not overcome. Yet in Hegelian phenomenology it has been seen that this contradiction can be understood according to itself, such that the 'choice' of positive or negative as result/non-result becomes part of the movement itself. For Hegel, thought which comprehends contradiction as negative, also comprehends the movement of contradiction to be its own result, brought about by its own activity. This comprehension is the recognition of misrecognition as the movement of self-education. The experience of the logic of non-contradiction, which determines the idea of education as method, is therefore a self-education for us.

Education, now, is comprehended as the self-activity which is the recognition of misrecognition or as determinate negation. Such an education is both activity and result, and this is precisely its import as a 'critique' of civil society. It is the recognition that the broken middle is the actuality of ethical life in civil society. The middle is (always) broken. The Phenomenology of Spirit does not culminate in mutual recognition, because the Phenomenology is in history and is
itself not an overcoming of the broken middle of social relations. But as a phenomenology it does realize absolute knowing. Absolute knowing is the work which realizes itself as the re-cognition of its own self as misrecognition. This work is the activity and the result which is subjective substance, or self-education. It is the work which knows itself as not absolute ethical life, and has this negation as its own absolute identity.

Recognition of misrecognition as educational self-activity is misrecognized by Habermas because enlightenment as overcoming is never realized as the self-work of subjective substance. As long as misrecognition is not ours, then critique is not immanently reflective or a phenomenology; the result is a theory of overcoming, (for example, the theory of communicative action) which repeats misrecognition of subjectivity by explaining its determination as the activity of an unknowable lifeworld. There is no re-cognition in Habermas because the idea of the lifeworld dominates the actual, or the broken middle of social relations, by presupposing that it is overcome in and as the self-result of communicative action; the lifeworld represents a middle which is known as unbroken. As a domination of the actual, therefore, it can only produce the dialectic of enlightenment, or the broken middle, as our experience of the loss of the lifeworld.

Adorno does not recognize misrecognition as self activity and thus denies the actuality of the determination which he therefore misrecognizes, again, to be indeterminate. Critical theory is the acknowledgement of subjective determination and dependency, but it is
not also its actual realization as the totality of that determination and dependency. Man is known as result, but is never his own result. The experience which is for us is never comprehended, it is only dominated by the presupposition of its truth or untruth, or by its reduction to methodology. Misrecognition is known but it is not recognized as absolute knowing, and thus critical theory, which seeks to educate subjectivity as misrecognition, itself misrecognizes the very activity which is that education.

Recognition is only possible as misrecognition. 'Recognition is, by definition, re-cognizing of non-identity', [34] a non-identity which is now the self-work of philosophical consciousness which knows that absolute ethical life is lost, or not attained. This is what is recognized, and this is also the truth or absolute knowing of the self-identity of subjectivity. It is as this education, therefore, that dependency, non-domination and absolute ethical life are realized but not presupposed. This unity of activity and knowledge, the determinate result which is recognition, is what is actual. Recognition is the self-work and result which loses the certainty and independence of non-contradiction (as critique), and loses the uncertainty and dependence of contradiction (as the dialectic of enlightenment) to re-cognize itself as the newly produced result of that contradiction for us. Actuality is education and politics as one activity and result.

Absolute knowing, then, is absolute self-critique, or the realization of subjective substance as it is (misrecognized) in civil society and it is only genuinely educational, or absolute, as recognition of
misrecognition. Education in Hegel is both immanently critical and immanently political. To comprehend what is, is to recognize ethical life as actual or as the broken middle but at the same time, not to replace this loss with further domination. 'Absolute ethical life is a critique of bourgeois property relations. It may be elusive, but it is never dominant or pre-judged'. [35] Thus the broken middle is our education. Mutual recognition has yet to appear in history, but its truth has already appeared for us who experience it as loss, and who recognize the loss as our own education and self-work. The actuality of ethical life is (becomes as) self-realization. Ethical life is not dominated (and thus is itself) only when recognized as actual, and when that actuality is recognized as the activity or realization of subjective substance. Thus, absolute ethical life is only realized in our continually active self-education.

This self-education is the concept. It has its own self-expression as self-education in the Science of Logic, for there it presents itself according to its own inner logic and development, as the determinate result of the dialectic of domination and freedom. But, as Rose notes, 'Hegel did not believe that freedom could be achieved in the pages of the Logic, nor did he have the ambition or vocation to impose it'. [36] Ethical life is as abstract in the Logic as it is negative and actual in spirit, for that is the unity of contradiction which is ethical life for us. The Logic has no natural beginning or utopian end, because ethical life for us is the broken middle or actuality. Science, as the expression of absolute ethical life, would be less than absolute and mere domination, if it were only (pure mutual) recognition. It would
lack substance as misrecognition, or movement, if it were not also abstract. Habermas presumed communicative action as a beginning of mediation and thus 'overcame' mediation. The Science of Logic does not presuppose a beginning or an end for it is already result, and since mediation has not been 'overcome', and since that is the truth of the concept, then, unlike Habermas, the beginning and end must be abstract. Rose states, 'Thus the beginning and the end of the system are abstract. The end is both result, and it is just the same as the beginning: an abstraction...He (Hegel) recognized the continuing domination of formal law and that his recognition was not enough to change it'. [37]

Thus the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic re-cognize the continuing domination of the abstract universality of the law and logic of non-contradiction and identity. This recognition is already critical because that universality is only for us. To preserve its critical import, and to express the absolute nature of mutual dependence as absolute ethical life, requires that the reflecting subject recognize that even reflection, which appears critical and dialectical, is uncritical with regard to its own determination by that upon which it reflects. Recognition of this misrecognition is philosophical consciousness which has its own negativity as determinate result.

To comprehend the actual is to retain both the critical import of the activity and its educational import as recognition. Comprehending determination is therefore immanently political activity when it is
realized in and as self-education. Recognition of misrecognition is the idea of enlightenment sought by Habermas in overcoming, and of non-enlightenment by Adorno as non-identity thinking, but is realized, and is genuinely self-critical only as absolute knowing. Thus, 'thinking the absolute is the basis for the critique of different kinds of property relations, and for the critique of different kinds of law, for the social import of this philosophy'. [38]

Can recognition, then, be described as a means, an educational tool or strategy, by which to realize absolute ethical life, in the way that critical theorists of education have recently employed communicative action? Put another way, should philosophical consciousness be the goal of an education which seeks to realize absolute ethical life? To ask the question is to misrecognize, again, the nature of absolute knowing. Subjective substance is actual, and therefore subject is separated from substance. That is the actuality of the question. Only in the recognition of misrecognition is actuality realized in and as philosophical consciousness. Philosophical consciousness is only absolute in that dependent relationship. To seek to realize absolute ethical life in any way which is not a self-determination is another domination of the broken middle. To presuppose education as a method separated from (itself as) result is to misrecognize and presuppose (the idea of, the identity of) education, and results in theories of overcoming and non-overcoming. Education is not a tool or a formal means by which to produce absolute ethical life. Education is the activity, the only activity, which realizes a sustainable critique of domination, and which does not dominate its realization as actual.
If education or philosophical consciousness are not methods, then of what 'use' are they as 'critique' at all? What instructions can philosophical consciousness give on how the world ought to be when 'philosophy in any case comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already there, cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed'. [39] Philosophical consciousness, as result, cannot give advice on how the world ought to be, it can only comprehend the world as it is. What has then to be recognized is that by comprehending what is, and comprehending it as actual, philosophical consciousness is already more than that which has been only abstractly understood. 'To comprehend subjectivity as determined is to go beyond subjectivity. It is to acknowledge determination: that we are determined and that the determination is ours'. [40]

To comprehend actuality is to comprehend determination, and still to be determined. Actuality is not a method, it is rather the impossibility of education and critique as method, and has that impossibility as its own determination. Actuality is not an option, for 'the day of philosophy, of freedom, has not yet come...'. [41] Philosophy cannot be imposed as absolute ethical life, for that is not the truth of philosophy, nor the education which is actuality. Domination always rebounds in a dialectic of enlightenment which undermines such domination. Philosophical consciousness is our education about the truth of non-freedom, not a substitute for that education, or an immediate 'solution' to the non-freedom of civil society. Education or philosophy, taken as a task or a tool for
something other than itself, 'would be to turn ethical life into an abstract ideal, an autonomous prescription, a Sollen, which would be completely "unjustified" because not implied by the contradictions between political consciousness and its social and historical bases'.

[42] The last two sections of this thesis, then, examine the actuality of education as method in civil society, first with regard to the identity of the teacher, and the misrecognition of education in the teacher/student relationship; and second with regard to the identity of critique, and its misrecognition of the state. Critical theory of education attempted to unite education and critique by using communicative action. These last two sections recognize both education and critique as misrecognition in civil society, and shows how the unity which is sought is actual as the concept.
B - RECOGNIZING THE TEACHER.

Education as Domination.

The programmes which Carr and Kemmis, and Young have produced for reforming educational practice and organization in modern society, as outlined in chapter I, dominate the idea of absolute ethical life which they aim to attain. Carr and Kemmis presuppose action research as the self-reflective method which is both comprehension and overcoming. It not only serves as ideology-critique for those in education, but 'envisages a social order characterized by rational communication'. [1] But their enlightenment regarding action research is only their enlightenment for us and therefore not the unity and liberation which was hoped for. This presupposition of action research, and its being put forward as a programme for the organization of social enlightenment, is already separated from the activity in which its truth emerges. Thus the truth of action research is its non-truth as the self-identity of educational activity and result, and produces again the contradiction of education as method.

Presupposition of the identity of education as method dominates the experience and activity which is education. The separation of enlightenment as knowledge from activity or learning is not overcome in action research. It is reproduced in the form of the teacher and the student, because learning is again separated from those who are already

- 211 -
enlightened. The action in action research belongs to those who have already done the research, and can claim it as result or identity. Carr and Kemmis, by presupposing critique, in the form of action research, as overcoming, only repeat the impasse of the dialectic of enlightenment, and reproduce it for those involved in educational practice, theory and research. Their enlightenment dominates those in education whom precisely they seek to liberate from education as domination. Just as for critical theorists in general with regard to critique, a presupposition of the identity of enlightenment as overcoming is necessarily the claim to be enlightened, to have overcome. In order to negate the abstract authority of education as domination, and its representative - the teacher, they have to presuppose themselves as just such an authority, or as teacher.

Young's programme suffers the dialectic of enlightenment in the same way. Based much more directly on the application of the theory of communicative action to the practice of teaching, Young claims that the former provides 'a clear normative basis... (and) normative validity' for critical education. [2] It undermines the illusion of educational authority or validity as grounded in the school, the curriculum and its teachers, and reveals the determination of the idea of (technical and practical) education and enlightenment in and by particular social and historical circumstances. But, as with action research, communicative action as a programme for reform in education only repeats itself as a domination of the education, the activity, which it seeks to realize. A teacher who seeks to produce what Young calls the 'ideal pedagogical speech situation' [3] has already presupposed enlightenment as (his
own) result, and thus can only impose it upon those, in this case the
students, who have yet to become enlightened. Overcoming, in the form
of this critical Habermasian pedagogy, dominates those whose
enlightenment it is not and to whom education can only be understood
now as conformity or disobedience to it. This is precisely the aporia
of teaching which faces teachers wishing to produce in their students
critical reflection regarding domination in bourgeois society. The
teacher has to impose knowledge upon those who are unenlightened - even
if the lesson is about this domination itself - and thus is
contradictory and negates its own goal. Young's suggestion that
teachers can create critical reflection in students by rendering
explicit the rules of classroom communication as a determination of
both student and teacher, and the setting up of democratically arrived
at 'new rules', will only repeat the aporia of the dialectic of
enlightenment. It was still necessary for the teacher to impose this
lesson upon the unenlightened as their (as yet unrealized) truth, and
the new rules will therefore only reproduce the success of that
domination over the students.

Habermas's two volumes of The Theory of Communicative Action are
themselves work in which the identity of the teacher is presupposed,
for in communicative action there is contained the necessary condition
that what is to be known (or is being taught by Habermas) is already
known (by the enlightened teacher). It is his enlightenment regarding
the unconditioned which is his own authority to teach, an enlightenment
which, as has been seen, is abstract and not actual.
The problem for critical theory is to find a way of teaching about domination which does not itself reproduce domination. Put another way, how can critical theory negate the (abstract) authority of the teacher, or of those who are enlightened, without having to presume for itself just such an identity? The dialectic of enlightenment is the contradiction which faces those who would practise critique with a view to enlightening others about domination. To be the teacher of critique is to presume enlightenment, even if the subject matter is the negation of enlightenment, or the dialectic of enlightenment itself. The teacher is already a domination over those they would teach, including those whose teaching is critical, dialectical and negative, and whose content is critique. The aporia of the critical teacher becomes the impossibility of critical education or critique in modern society, or the plight of Adorno's 'best-intentioned reformer who...strengthens the very power of the established order he is trying to break'. [4]

Critical education presumes enlightenment regarding its own identity, and repeats the separation of activity and result in the form of teacher and student. To produce (critical) enlightenment, or to teach, is already to separate the enlightened as result from the activity which is the becoming of enlightenment. Teaching is not, therefore, a unity of activity and result because it is already their separation into that which is to be taught and by who.

Action research or critical pedagogy, as the teaching about domination, are always already a separation of themselves from the activity they claim as their own educational unity, their own unconditioned activity
and result. Critical theorists of education necessarily presume themselves as teachers when they seek to organize enlightenment for others, but they are already that result for their students. Thus, they are not the unity of activity and result which they claim. This separation is not overcome for the student in communicative action, because its stance or position is already the determination of the student, or the experience which is the student. It lies ahead for the teacher to recognize this negation of himself as that education. The question for critical theory of education is how can one be a teacher and yet at the same time not dominate the activity of education if the teacher is already the presumption of education for others. How is the teacher to teach except as domination?

To teach about enlightenment as domination would appear to be a self-contradiction. The teacher represents the identity of enlightenment in civil society, but as has been seen, such an identity only repeats the contradiction of education. The contradiction of the teacher is the experience for us of the dialectic of enlightenment. This is the same dialectic of independence and dependence that has been examined in the previous section, and which is actual as recognition. It is therefore possible to comprehend the contradiction of the teacher as the movement which is our education, or as the educational identity of activity and result which is the concept. The concept is the self-identity of the critical teacher, and self-negation is that work. It is the negation of the teacher which is our education regarding domination, and for the teacher this can only be actual as self-loss realized through the recognition of his 'position' as misrecognition. Without the loss of
the teacher, there is no negation. The question remains: can this loss be realized as the substantial work of the teacher. This is to ask whether the critical teacher is possible in civil society.

The next two sections examine the teacher/student relationship as the movement of the recognition of misrecognition. The first section deals with the identity of the teacher in the pure terms of master and student, that is, as the internal dialectic which is the contradiction of the teacher. The second looks at the actuality of the teacher/student relationship in civil society as ethical pedagogy. It is a method of teaching which is ethical precisely because its own methodological stance as the teacher is negated, and the teacher is realized through its own work, and not merely presumed as the abstract authority of the identity of the enlightened.
The Dialectic of Master and Student.

This section examines the contradiction of the teacher as domination which critical theory of education reproduces. The teacher is both the result of enlightenment, that is his identity, and yet he is also aware that his truth as result is produced through the unity of activity and result. This awareness is already the separation of result from activity in the teacher. Whereas for self-consciousness this dialectical self-movement was played out in the characters of master and slave, here the self-education of the teacher with regard to his own identity is played out as master and student. These terms reveal the import of Hegelian philosophy for those whose work is education.

Hegel notes that abstract formal education or enlightenment has resulted in the idea that,

especially in pedagogy, one is not so much to be instructed in the content of philosophy as to learn how to philosophize without any content. That amounts to saying that one is to travel endlessly without getting to know along the way any cities, rivers, countries, men etc. In the first place, one who gets to know a city and then comes to a river, to another city, and so on in the process also learns to travel. He not only learns to do so but indeed really does so. Thus in learning the content of philosophy one not only learns to philosophize but indeed really philosophizes. [5]

This view of education as the separation of result and activity applies to both the contradiction of the teacher as domination in critical theory, and to the teacher/student relationship in civil society. The
former is examined here, the latter, as ethical pedagogy, in the next section.

The contradiction of the teacher is that he is both the identity in himself of enlightenment as result, and also the non-identity of enlightenment in that this result is only for him. The teacher contains these two movements, of identity and activity, as his own uncertainty. His identity is always also his despair that the identity has to be performed (or lost). This relationship of identity and activity produces in the teacher the dialectic of the master and the student, a dialectic which will be recognized as the self-work which is teaching.

The master is the consciousness of being the identity of the teacher, and includes as his independence the knowledge which is to be taught, and his being known as already the result of enlightenment; that is, he is educated in regard to what is to be taught. The master is the abstract independence of the teacher, abstracted from the activity which is his becoming, and which is his teaching.

The identity of the teacher as master is an abstraction which the teacher cannot survive. The truth of the master lies not in what he is, but in what he does. This consciousness in the teacher is that of the student. It is the consciousness which has enlightenment not as identity but as an activity or an object for it. The truth of the master as identity is always lost as result precisely because its truth has to be known as enlightenment by the student. The master is therefore only for the student who knows him through his own activity,
and is not therefore the master's own independent self-identity. The master cannot be education in itself for he does not realize that education, he is only the presupposition of its completion as his own identity. Since the master is never a self-activity, but only ever an education dependent upon its being enlightenment for another, then the master is never independent. Indeed, his truth is that his independence vanishes in a relation of dependence upon the student or upon the activity which is not-enlightenment.

The student is therefore the experience of the loss of the teacher as master, and appears to be the impossibility of the teacher as identity. The implications of this are that teaching could never be a self authority, or self-activity, because in order to teach, the master has to be presupposed. Without the master, there is nothing to teach, no method which is the truth of the teacher, and thus no teacher, or no enlightenment, at all. However, the loss of the teacher has only been looked at from the point of view of the master. It remains to be seen how the consciousness of the student performs work which realizes the teacher as both the student and the master, or as the self-identity which is education.

The student is non-result when compared to the master. But,

just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so servitude (the student or activity) on its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is; as a consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly independent consciousness. [6]
The student has experienced the master in a relation of complete
dependence. What the student is, and does, is determined by his
relation to the master. The student owes his existence to the master,
for the unenlightened is dependent upon and defined in relation to the
enlightened. However, it has already been seen that the master, the
teacher who simply dominates as knowledge, produces a contradiction
that it cannot survive, and produces a consciousness, the student, for
which it always object and less than the identity of the teacher.
Because the truth of the teacher is always lost to the activity which
has enlightenment as object, the truth of the master can now be seen as
his dependence upon the student. The impossibility of the master, or
the contradiction of the teacher in critical theory, is not only the
work which is the student, it is also the identity of the student. The
student has the teacher as identity for it, and is itself the pure
activity which is non-enlightenment, or non-teacher. The student is
therefore both the work in which the master vanishes, and is the
identity of that which is the contradiction of, or is not the teacher.
The contradiction of the teacher as identity reveals the dependence of
the teacher upon the activity which is its own loss, or its being (its
own) student. The student now recognizes that the truth of
enlightenment as dependence is also his own being-for-self, and
moreover is produced as his self-work and identity.

The contradiction of the teacher in critical theory, as identity and
activity can now be comprehended as the self-activity which is the
teacher as self-taught. The contradiction is recognized as the work and
result which is the consciousness of the student. The student has, as
its own existence, the knowledge that his own identity requires the loss of the master, something which his own work (his own self-teaching) brings about. This is its absolute lesson regarding its own negative self-truth, and the negative self-truth of the teacher who knows his own identity as domination and independence. Precisely because the student works on the master, that is, has the identity of the teacher as the loss of the teacher, the master can never be the truth of the teacher. Thus, the lack of self-truth (or the self-doubt) of those who would be teacher, and the lack of self-truth which is the student, or the work of that doubt, are the same self-education of one consciousness, that is, of the teacher. The teacher as self-taught, and (therefore) as an educational (self) authority, is dependent for that education upon its own loss. The negation of the teacher is the self-work of the teacher whose self-activity is education, and not domination. The student is both the negation of the teacher and is the activity which is the production of the teacher who comprehends himself to be self-taught. The student therefore, through his work on the teacher, and his dependence upon it, is both the subjective activity and the substantial knowledge which is the recognition of the teacher as misrecognition. It is in the student that educational activity and enlightenment are united as a self-production, and also where the contradiction of the teacher is recognized as a determinate education in-itself,

as much as philosophical study is in and for itself self-activity, to that degree also is it learning; the learning of an already present, developed science. This science is a treasure of hard-won, ready-prepared, formed content. This inheritance ready at hand must be earned by the individual, i.e. learned. [7]
Habermas misrecognized the student as master by assuming that the awareness of dependence or non-enlightenment overcame itself. Thus, in Habermas, the education of the student overcomes the student and reproduces the domination and contradiction of the master. Adorno misrecognized the student as not also the master by presupposing that the awareness of dependence or non-enlightenment was not the self-work of the teacher. Whereas the contradiction of the teacher as result and activity, comprehended according to itself as recognition of misrecognition, shows how in the work which is studentship or learning, what is taught, and the activity of its being taught, are one and the same, or the teacher who is master and student.

The aporia of modernity, of becoming enlightened about enlightenment, is the impossibility of the critical teacher in civil society. This aporia is now re-cognized and realized as an education. Recognition is the self-education of the teacher producing himself as both knowledge and activity. The truth of the teacher as master and student is the concept, and requires the loss of the teacher in and as his own self-work because the concept is that which is the activity of education as self-production and self-knowledge. Recognition is the truth of that activity as education, and is for self-consciousness the self-negation of the teacher.

It remains to be seen, then, how recognition of misrecognition can be the self-education which is actuality, or how the teacher as misrecognition in civil society can be a self-education for both the master and the student whom he would teach. How can the domination of
education as method itself be an education, and how can the contradiction of education be actual as self-work and self-result without presupposing the result of that which is to be achieved? In answer to the question: how can the critical teacher overcome the contradiction that to teach is to dominate, this section has now changed the approach that can be taken to this problem. The relationship of the teacher is a relationship of domination. If there is equality between master and student, then there is neither master nor student - there is no relation which is the teacher. The teacher is already a relationship of domination and dependence, but as has been seen, is only truly educational when it is a self-domination, and when the teacher is a self-education. What remains to be seen in the next section is how the teacher in civil society can teach in order to produce his own negation, and to realize that loss as education. This final section examines Hegel's own teaching method - his ethical pedagogy; ethical because the dialectic of enlightenment, or in this case the contradiction of the teacher, is recognized as the actuality of the teacher/student relationship in civil society, a recognition which comprehends the teacher as misrecognition and produces the truth of that negation as his own activity.
A pedagogy which realizes the teacher by negating him, can only make a beginning with the abstract authority of teacher as master, or the teacher as misrecognition in civil society. To incorporate this contradiction into pedagogy is to realize the unity of educational theory and practice. Hegel himself struggled with this problem whilst Rector of the Nuremberg gymnasium between 1808-1816, and developed an ethical pedagogy as the actual activity of the speculative system. His teaching 'method' enjoyed as its truth the unity of the contradiction between the teacher as abstract authority and the negation of that authority (by the teacher).

It would be a mistake to think that Hegel's career as a school teacher was less important to his work than his later years as a professor at the Universities of Heidelberg and Berlin. It was as a school teacher that he was forced to reflect upon the pedagogical demands of philosophy, and to work out a way of teaching philosophy which realized the unity of subject and substance. As he himself noted in 1816, his years as a lecturer in Jena were spent, bound to the letter of my notebook. However, eight years practice in gymnasium instruction at least has helped me gain a freedom in my lecturing that probably can be attained nowhere better than in just such a position. It is an equally good way of attaining clarity... [8]
Nor would it be correct to think that Hegel thought less of school teaching than university teaching. Although hard pressed by dreadful working conditions, and with paperwork which fought for attention with his own work - he wrote the *Science of Logic* during this period - nevertheless he noted that eight years teaching in the gymnasium 'perhaps provides a more effective opportunity for acquiring freedom in delivery than even the university lecture hall' [9] and is in this respect 'more advantageous to me than even a university professorship'. [10]

Since education is realized in negativity, that is, as the unity of the subject which is not substance recognized as substance, then a pedagogy which simply stated this, would not have achieved it, or produced it as recognition. Hegel had to teach philosophy such that its own self-truth appeared, or so that the truth of enlightenment as the work of the student could be brought about, but not presupposed as already carried out. Thus Hegel developed a pedagogy which did not abstractly teach philosophy and impose the concept as knowledge, but rather produced its substance and subject in the experience of educational movement and contradiction. Within this, he developed a pedagogy which realized the movement of the recognition of misrecognition as its own activity, a pedagogy which was therefore, actual as self-work, a unity of content and method. This was realized both in how he taught and what he taught. His relationships with students and the content of his courses are both active as the movement of contradiction. His ethical pedagogy is this unity of content and method.
In today's language, Hegel could perhaps be described as a teacher advocating 'experiential' learning, and in one very important sense this is the case. The concept is realized only when it is experienced and knows the experience to be of itself and produced through its own work. [11] Thus the experience is the work, and the truth of the concept is realized in and as that activity. What Hegel is not advocating, however, is what might be generalized as a 'child centered' approach. That would be merely a one sided method of education, one determined by the child and not by the concept.

It has become the prejudice not only of philosophical study but also — and indeed even more extensively — of pedagogy that thinking for oneself is to be developed and practised in the first place as if the subject matter were of no importance, and in the second place as if learning were opposed to thinking for oneself. [12]

The activity of thought, left to the child and determined solely according to their particular fancies or sensory experiences, is not an ethical education. 'The unfortunate urge to educate the individual in thinking for himself and being self-productive has cast a shadow over truth'. [13] It fails to take upon itself the responsibility of the concept, and of the truth of the (child's) dependency which is spirit, and is therefore an education purely in terms of abstract independence.

Hegel, as an 'experiential' teacher, seeks to ensure that what is experienced is not left to chance, but is rational and part of the systematic whole which is philosophy. The student does not, yet, experience freedom, but rather its lack. This aspect of Hegel's
pedagogy, its discipline, has to be seen as the discipline of the concept, not of Hegel himself. So, in his school address of 1810 he explained that, 'For those who attend our school we expect quiet behaviour, the habit of continuous attention, respect and obedience to the teachers and proper and seemly conduct both towards these and their fellow pupils'. [14] He also introduced military drill for his students, and discouraged duelling, fighting and smoking. [15]

The contradictory nature of Hegel's gymnasium gives rise to both a traditional and a progressive interpretation of his pedagogy. [16] On the one hand, he can be seen as not allowing his students any personal expression or development, little freedom within the institution, certainly no participation in the running of the school, and as perpetuating the domination of, and conformity to, the state regime over the individuality of his students. On the other hand, he attached great importance to education as an activity, and criticized all forms of education which separated knowledge from the learning process. [17] He reproaches the District School Councillor because 'his only concept of educating the young is the misery of endless inculcating, reprimanding, memorizing - not even learning by heart but merely the misery of endless repetition, pressure and stupefaction, ceaseless spoonfeeding and stuffing'. [18] Against traditional views of education as the uncritical and unreflective transference of (social) knowledge from one generation to another, he is concerned to ensure that his students are critical and reflective. What is crucial here is his recognition that critique and reflection also require their own
discipline, and that within this contradiction of domination and reflection (master and student) the actual is realized.

He acknowledges the duality of his teaching method.

To regard study as mere receptivity and memory work is to have a most incomplete view of what instruction really means. On the other hand, to concentrate attention on the pupils own original reflections and reasoning is equally one sided and should be still more carefully guarded against...Like the will, thought must begin with obedience. But if learning limited itself to mere receiving, the effect would not be much better than if we wrote sentences on water; for it is the receiving but the self-activity of comprehension and the power to use it again, that first makes knowledge our own possession. [19]

That Hegel is not running the gymnasium with abstract, merely formal discipline can be seen in his very progressive attitude towards the welfare and development of his students. Abstract authority maintains the identity of knowledge, and of those who have that knowledge, as legitimate domination of the unenlightened. Ethical life demands the critique of that abstraction in the actual recognition of the authority of education itself, or the concept. Discipline outside of the educational (self) relationship of master and student, that is, the (non) relationship of the master only, is uneducational, fixed, dogmatic, and hence totally lacking in ethical substance. 'A society of students cannot be regarded as an assemblage of servants,' Hegel noted in his third school address, 1811,

it has ceased to be the custom in the family, as in the school, to induce in children a feeling of subjection and bondage - to make them obey another's will even in unimportant matters - to demand absolute
obedience for obedience's sake, and by severity to obtain what really belongs alone to the feeling of love and reverence... [20]

However, since education is the self-activity of the dialectic of independence and dependence, subjection and obedience are integral to an ethical pedagogy. When he notes that 'a young mind must in fact behave independently' [21] if it is to become educated and fully developed, the independence he refers to is not the abstract and unspiritual independence of the legal person whose freedom is misrecognition, but the independence of spirit where freedom is actual. The independence produced here is that of subjective substance, or the recognition of dependence as misrecognition. But it can only result from being dominated, and from the experience of loss of substance. Thus, an ethical pedagogy whose authority is the concept, demands the experience of dependence as its own substance, which can then be recognized as the truth of its becoming known. A pedagogy which seeks to educate natural consciousness to philosophical consciousness has to contain within it the unity of knowledge and learning, of content and activity, in order not to dominate the educational process with its own (presupposed) stance on the result which is to be achieved. It is the development of such a (negative) ethical pedagogy which Hegel established whilst Rector.

Hegel knew that he had to combine in his teaching the substance of philosophy and the realization of the concept in such a way that did not give a one-sided presentation of the absolute, either as knowledge or as activity. Since the concept was the unity of content and
becoming, he needed a way of teaching which would realize that unity: he required a pedagogy which could unite what was taught, with its own educational activity, and not merely separate education into its dialectical components of domination and subordination (knowledge and learning). Philosophy had to be taught in such a way that it was its own education, and realized as such. Thus, Hegel's ethical pedagogy set about imposing the discipline of the concept upon his students, to ensure that knowledge became for them, and thus not theirs, so that the experience of thought (the truth of philosophy) would be theirs, and education would be their self-work, and not the formal property of the teacher. [22]

In the spirit of contradiction, then, Hegel set about designing a curriculum which would teach the concept by not teaching it. By separating activity or experience from content in his curriculum planning, he was able to realize their unity as educational result. The process is that through which consciousness passes in the realization of the concept, or as recognition of itself as misrecognition. The first stage is abstraction or immediacy, merely formal content, unreflective, fixed and non-contradictory. The second stage is mediation or the dialectical, where content is known as an object for consciousness, and therefore as separated from consciousness. The dialectic of the independence of each from the other, and the dependence of each upon the other, occurs here. This is the moment of both the loss of independence and of dependence. In educational terms it is the contradiction of the dialectic of enlightenment. The final stage is the speculative or philosophical stage, 'and it alone is
really philosophical'. [23] This movement from abstraction to unity in philosophical consciousness is the movement which is education or enlightenment; the third stage is the unity of the difference of immediacy and mediation because it is the self-activity which knows (produces itself as the knowledge) of that difference as its own identity. The speculative stage is the stage of the recognition of misrecognition, or that which is as the work of contradiction and non-contradiction. The speculative is therefore the goal of the teaching of philosophy, a goal which Niethammer had set for gymnasiums in Bavaria in his Directive of 1808.

Hegel had great trouble interpreting the instruction for 'practical exercises in speculative thinking' [24] which he was instructed by Niethammer to perform. The process set out above was its own content, but was not the immediate content of natural consciousness. The problem Hegel therefore had was, with what should a speculative education begin, given that it could not begin with itself, since its own truth and content were realized only as result? Hegel noted in 1813 that his whole philosophy is 'nothing but a struggle against the beginning, and annihilation and refutation of (my) starting point'. [25] In keeping with this, he had to learn how philosophical education could be begun, or was possible, and at first he followed the instructions of the Directive to the letter and began straight away with philosophy as if it were 'shot from a pistol'. [26] He wrote to Niethammer that in his early years, 'I made a beginning with the basic concepts of logic,' adding bluntly, 'I have not repeated the experience'. [27] This failure prompted a reassessment of the content which was required to complement
each stage of the educational process, and of the overall aim which the
theory of philosophy in a school could hope to achieve.

With regard to the teaching of speculative thinking, Hegel faced the
contradiction of subjective substance, or spirit. It became clear to
him that the teaching of philosophy could not begin with philosophy.
'Abstract thinking, the understandable abstract concept in its
determinateness, can or must precede speculative thinking; but the
series of such concepts is once again a systematic whole. Gymnasium
instruction might be limited to this'. [28] He further noted that
'there is probably already too much philosophy taught in the
gymnasiums', [29] and suggests later that perhaps the teaching of
philosophy at this early age is superfluous. But this is not to say
that he was not deeply concerned with encouraging students to think
philosophically. His recommendation that philosophy itself should not be
taught is balanced by a full curriculum designed to produce in students
philosophical activity and education. He replaces 'practical exercises
in speculative thinking' with content which is itself genuinely
philosophical. Hegel's pedagogy unites content and philosophical method
in a curriculum which is the actual unity of the theory and practice of
enlightenment. The content outlined below is chosen specifically
because it is already determinate philosophical content, but it is
taught according to the stages of its own development, stages which are
commensurate with the educational process which is recognition, and
constitutes the concept. His pedagogy is a constituent part of the
'systematic whole' which is philosophy as (self) education.
Hegel begins his philosophical teaching with abstractions. Indeed, he can begin nowhere else but with what immediately is (and is not). Actuality has to be recognized and thus the beginning must be abstract. He begins his teaching in the lower year with law, morality and religion. [30] They are practical ideas which are commonly applied in daily life, and yet simple enough to be accessible for the lower age group. But they are also determinations of the concept. They are actual and spiritual, although not as yet to the young mind which is not 'at home in thought'. [31] Hegel notes that with 'these doctrines a beginning will in fact be made', [32] one which is in perfect congruence with the abstract nature of all philosophical beginnings. Education will result from the contradiction of this abstraction, and is therefore a necessary abstract starting point. 'Inasmuch as the pupils grasp these concepts in their determinateness, formally speaking they obtain training in abstract thinking, though I cannot yet call this speculative thinking'. [33]

The second stage of philosophical development, the dialectical, cannot be taught abstractly. This is precisely the misrecognition of education that critique, and critical theory of education, work from. Yet also, the dialectic can only be taught abstractly, because the dialectic is always already self-movement. The dialectic requires not to be known as movement, not knowledge of movement. Its truth is not the grasping of abstractions, but of the loss of these abstractions, the work of studentship, and thus its educational lesson is negative not positive. This is not achieved in teaching the dialectic as a moment of logic, for that is not yet the experience of the negative. Hegel notes that
the Kantian antinomies [34] 'constitute all too poor a dialectic. Nothing beyond tortuous antithesis'. [35] The danger with the dialectical stage of education is that contradiction becomes a formula rather than movement or actual education. In some cases, education is reduced to a compendium containing 'a few universal formulas that were supposed to contain all'. [36]

Hegel is scathing in his condemnation of those who teach 'the critical and sceptical path which possesses in material present at hand the element enabling it to proceed, but which incidentally arrives at nothing but the unpleasantness and boredom of negative results'. [37] The movement of the negative has to be experienced, not simply described. This dialectical stage has to be what it is - educational movement. It is the education wherein the student 'must first die to sight and hearing, must be torn away from concrete representations, must be withdrawn into the night of the soul and learn to see on this new level, to hold fast and distinguish determinations'. [38]

The unique educational character of the dialectic is noted by Hegel as that which cannot be begun, requiring no introduction, and cannot be dominated in the sense of presumed or finished. Dialectical reason is dependent upon abstract content if it is to appear as the mediation and contradiction of that content. It does not appear on its own except as the movement of logic in science. It arises as the activity of thinking, and can therefore be taught 'more through the deficiency of this or that thought determination than according to its real nature...'. [39] This is the critical import of Hegel's pedagogy and
educational philosophy. The dialectic 'is the movement and confusion of fixed determinateness; it is negative reason'. [40] His insight into education as movement, and pedagogy as actual education, lies in his comprehending that the dialectic is education when it is experienced or realized, and not when it is abstractly taught. 'Since every new concept in a systematic whole really arises from what precedes by dialectic, a teacher acquainted with the nature of philosophizing everywhere enjoys as often as possible the freedom to advance the enquiry by means of dialectic'. [41] Hegel allows the contradiction to emerge on its own account, by employing contradiction as his pedagogical method. It is by not teaching the dialectic that dialectical movement is realized. In this way education is not domination or presupposition, but immanent self-development. [42]

Equally, by not presupposing education, its truth, or the third stage of ethical/philosophical education, can be realized. With the self-contradiction of ethical pedagogy, 'dialectical (reason) introduces itself...on its own; and within it - insofar as what is positive in (negative) dialectical (reason) is apprehended - lies speculative (reason)'. [43] It appears in two forms: first, as representations of the imagination, for example as God; second, speculative knowledge is present as the concept, which is realized in the re-cognition of the dialectic. However, 'this can be only scantily present in the gymnasium. It will be generally apprehended only by the few...'. [44] The third stage is the self-movement of education itself, for it is the recognition of the misrecognition of the dialectic as loss and negativity. The negative comes to be known as the work of the whole...
process of knowing, and the separation of thought and object to be the work which is its own self-realization. The teacher here is recognized as misrecognition, and the school master is merely the servant of this movement, or the truth of its (self) work.

In Hegel's (contradictory) ethical pedagogy, the totality of the determination of the teacher in civil society as contradiction is itself the actuality and the educational self-work which is that pedagogy. The content and method are a unity of educational movement, or one could say of educational theory and practice. It is a pedagogy which does not repeat the domination of the teacher as master precisely because it recognizes it as misrecognition. That is the lesson which is the education of ethical pedagogy and its education is actual because the work of the teacher is a self-negation, rather than a repetition of the presupposition of his independence.

The key to Hegel's pedagogy, therefore, is that it contains 'no talk of the absolute...Quite generally, the aim should not be to teach youth at this age the absolute standpoint of philosophy'. [45] To have done so would have necessitated treating the absolute as other than self-movement, and to have presumed for oneself the standpoint of the teacher. Not to be teacher, but rather to have one's educational identity as the negative of education as method, is the true achievement and critical import of ethical pedagogy. It is in the contradiction of ethical pedagogy that the domination of the teacher in civil society is itself actual as education.
C - RECOGNIZING CRITIQUE.

This chapter has so far presented the recognition of misrecognition as the self-work which is education as activity and result. It has examined the self-work and the self-result which is subjective substance, and which is the self-education of the teacher, and it has explored the actuality of the teacher in civil society in an ethical pedagogy which has the contradiction of education as method for its own form and content. In this final section, what is examined is the educational content of critique as political education, the other half of the broken middle in critical theory of education. The actuality of critique as education is the recognition of the state, and therefore of its own activity, as misrecognition. This actuality is termed here comprehensive state education in a deliberate attempt to combine ideas from politics and education, and to offer a critique of the idea of 'comprehensive' education as it is abstractly formulated in civil society. It is argued that critique, in seeking to unify education and politics, repeats the separation of education as activity from politics or ethical substance as result, which is the misrecognition of both education as method and misrecognition of the state as abstract. Comprehensive state education is therefore the recognition of critique as misrecognition of both education and the state in civil society, or the actuality of critique as the self-education which is philosophy.
In the notes which accompany Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bildung is described as 'a more or less untranslatable term. It means the actual process of education and at the same time the cultured state of mind arrived at through education'. [1] The duality of Bildung, as it appears in Hegelian philosophy, is the same duality that has been examined in this work between the subjective activity of education and the substance or truth of that activity; that is, between movement and result. In Bildung, as in phenomenology, that duality is itself educational. Bildung refers to both the development of the state in history and to the comprehension of that development in the philosophy of history. The philosophy of history is arrived at through the self-education of the state up to itself, and is still self-educating as philosophy because it is now what is actual, or a self-activity and result. Thus, critique is itself already the result of the self-education of the state, and is the activity which is the self-reflection of the state into the nature of itself as result. In this sense, Bildung contains the same contradictions of activity and result as does the dialectic of enlightenment, subjective substance and ethical pedagogy.

The problem, therefore, that obstructs a comprehension of Bildung is that it describes and refers to the duality which is one educational process. It refers to both the educational movement and transformations of the state in history before it is known to itself, or rational, and
to the realization which is that self-knowledge in philosophy. Just as the education of self-consciousness involved the loss of itself into the contradiction of the master and slave before its educated return to itself in recognition, and similarly just as the identity of the teacher was lost in the contradiction of the dialectic of knowledge and activity before re-cognizing that activity as its self-identity, so the state as self-activity also loses itself before it re-cognizes itself. This is its period of self-alienation or culture where subject and substance are separated from one another, and where there is no unification because the divide is not realized as self-work. This period in history therefore represents the development of ethical life, but not its actuality as self-work.

Prior to the stage of culture, the educational activity of the state consisted of 'the beauty of ethical life', [2] or the immediate unity of law and morality as custom. This undivided educational activity was that of paideia. It was both culture and the cultural development of an individual. In it were united both the truth of the community and the (re)production of the community. Culture was not external to those whose education it was. Indeed, in paideia there is no division between internal and external, or content and activity. Paideia knows no dialectic of enlightenment, has no separation of subject and substance, and was simply a pure education. Its content and its activity were Greek culture, performed through songs, poems and orations. Greek literature 'was the expression of the process by which the Greek ideal shaped itself', [3] and the stories of the heroes provided both the ethics of custom, and custom as ethics. Through the educational
activity of paideia, 'individuals are simply identified with the actual
order (and) ethical life appears as their general mode of conduct, that
is, as custom, while the habitual practice of ethical living appears as
second nature...'. [4]

The unity of paideia was disrupted by the time of the fourth century,
because the activity became self-consciously practised. When Jaeger
notes that the Greeks became 'the teachers of all succeeding
generations', [5] the truth of the statement lies in the development of
the individual self-consciousness, the person, for whom independence
meant separation from ethical substance. Jaeger notes that by the
fourth century the spirit of paideia 'was dangerously separated from
society, and suffered the fatal loss of its function as a constructive
force within the community'. [6]

Education began its self-activity and development to rational state
education with this separation of custom into law and morality. Hegel
reminds that it was in Socrates that educational activity began its
self-division.

Socrates is celebrated as a teacher of morality, but
we should rather call him the inventor of morality.
The Greeks had a customary morality; but Socrates undertook
to teach them what moral virtues, duties, etc were. The
moral man is not he who merely wills and does that which
is right - not merely the innocent man - but he who has
the consciousness of what he is doing. [7]

It is from this that the period of die Bildung begins.
The period of die Bildung in the Phenomenology of Spirit is spiritual self-alienation, the necessary educational precursor to the absolute education which is recognition. For the single self-consciousness, this alienation is the unhappy consciousness which is 'the consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory being'. [8] The contradiction appears in the separation of real consciousness from pure consciousness, the cultural world opposed to a world of faith. Spirit here, 'breaks up into two. The first is the world of reality or of its self-alienation; but the other is that which spirit, rising above the first, constructs for itself in the aether of pure consciousness'. [9] The self-alienation of spirit is manifest as the Christian religion. Subjectivity, or the legal person, is therefore opposed to spirit as universal, but acquires for itself the character of universality in its own world. The advice to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's, not only acknowledges the separation of subject and substance, but acknowledges the right of each to have authority in its own world. But the second world, the world of God, is not the world of actual consciousness; since 'thought is in the first instance (only) the element of this world, consciousness only has these thoughts, but as yet it does not think them, or is unaware that they are thoughts'. [10] Thus, the contradiction between Caesar and God is not God's, but ours, it belongs to the world of culture. The heavenly kingdom 'is for that reason not free from it', [11] and is known as the act of faith, not the self-action of absolute being in and for itself.

The worlds of culture and faith are antithetical to one another, but the latter is always in a relation of dependence to the former because
thoughts of the other world always emanate from this world. Thus, the relationship is educational but this is not realized, or known as the self-activity which is Bildung, until its own (self) enlightenment. The educational relationship between faith and culture is the period of die Bildung in history, the development of the rational state, but not then realized as such. It is the antithesis, the dialectical movement, between the two worlds which is die Bildung. The period from Roman property law to the Enlightenment has been, notes Rose, 'the culture of formation, die Bildung, of the Christian religion and the state, ethical life. It has been a series of formative experiences in which religious and political consciousness' definition of itself comes into contradiction with its real existence'. [12]

This period of die Bildung or contradiction of state and religion comes to an end with the Reformation. The self-alienation of subject and substance is characterized by the separation of the absolute from its being known. The dependence of the unchangeable upon this world as the activity which is its being known, is realized as the world of the Reformation. Indeed, what is re-formed is precisely the personal relation of man to the unchangeable, for the relationship is itself acknowledged and becomes object. The objective relationship on earth of person to God replaced the myth of the priest as mediator. Through the moments of surrender by the church of its property, its right to legislate on the universal, and its own identity as the pure world of faith, religion achieves the beginning of its own rational identity within the state. 'Only through this actual sacrifice could it demonstrate this self-renunciation'. [13] Thus, it now has 'the
certainty of having truly divested itself of its "I". [14] Elsewhere, Hegel notes that the harmony 'which has resulted from the painful struggles of history, involves the recognition of the secular as capable of being an embodiment of truth; whereas it had been formerly regarded as evil only...'. [15]

The (absolute) substance of the Reformation is, however, ethical life. The state can become the kingdom of heaven on earth because man's rational will, rather than God's will, is now sovereign on earth, and man's self-activity is also self-truth. Thus, 'consciousness turns from fighting lawlessness (on earth) to becoming a law-giver (on earth)'. [16] Rational moral man overcomes superstitious and unessential man, and is now his own law and conscience. Commensurate with this increasing rationality is the awareness that the truth of the movement of reason is (our) rational education (or enlightenment), and is itself a human and not a heavenly activity. In the period of formation, the self-activity of thought gradually lost its dependency upon an exclusively religious other, by realizing that this self-abasement and renunciation (of the unessential consciousness) was its own work. As the heavenly world gradually lost its influence over earthly matters, as the power of faith was eroded by reason, and its representatives lost their influence as mediators, so faith became known as a personal activity, and the rationale was created for persons to become equipped with the tools of reason in order to practice faith.

Both sides, Catholic and Protestant, began to give considerable attention to the problem of how education could be used as an instrument for securing their particular religious persuasions....In essence, the acceptance of a personal god, guaranteed by the
incarnation, along with the belief that the way to education and a heightened vision is potentially available to all, was a radical departure. [17]

Education therefore becomes the means to re-forming the relationship between God and man, and education itself becomes defined as rational, earthly and purposive activity. Reason became not only the authority of earthly government and law making, but that which constituted education. Reason as testing of laws also became reason as the self-expression of the universality of the state.

The period of die Bildung does not result in absolute ethical life on earth as a unification of law (state) and morality (religion). The harmony between 'state and church has now attained immediate realization' [18] but that immediate unity is re-formed by the very determination which is its own (immediate) truth. The satisfaction of the reformation is lost because conscience is only self duty, and the unsatisfaction of the Enlightenment as abstract universality can be satisfied only as subjective activity, or through the activity of those individuals whose independence from itself it has rationally guaranteed. Thus, says Rose, 'the abstract spiritualism of the German Enlightenment and the abstract materialism of the French Enlightenment both continue to deny and not to re-form ethical life. They are themselves re-formed by the ethical life which they fail to acknowledge...'. [19]

The period of formation, although it ends with the Reformation and the Enlightenment, the 'grandest and the last' cultures, [20] is not,
however, the end of formation. Education or activity begins again here, (as philosophy) this time aware that it is its own spiritual work, and not an activity which merely divides, separates and alienates. Cultural formation, the separation of the absolute consciousness from the activity of its being known, is replaced by philosophy as the recognition of Bildung as determinate negation. Philosophy is now both the activity and the result which is the development of the state in civil society, a unity which is misrecognized in critique. It is now philosophy which has the aporia of education as activity and result as its own self-experience, because the separation of satisfaction and subject in the last great cultures is now philosophy's own work, or comprehensive as state (self) education. As the result of die Bildung, philosophy is the self-formation which is the philosophy of history; this has been described above. As the activity of Bildung, philosophy is now the work of the state in civil society, but it is an activity which is itself already the separation of itself as critique from itself as determinate result. It is the recognition of critique as the misrecognition of the state which is here referred to as the philosophical self-activity of comprehensive state education. Education does not cease with the state, for the state only is as the comprehension of its own education. 'The final purpose of education, therefore, is liberation and the struggle for a higher liberation still', [21] and is the struggle, the continuing education which, as philosophy, 'reveals education as a moment immanent in the absolute'. [22]
The State and Ethical Life.

The state, as it appears in the Philosophy of Right, cannot be comprehended except as the educational movement which is recognition of misrecognition. Absolute ethical life (mutual recognition) is realized only as determinate negation; and the state, as the 'actuality of the ethical idea', [23] is the result and education of the determinate negation of absolute ethical life and is actual as the broken middle. The state is a logical category within the science of philosophical consciousness, and requires to be comprehended according to its place within the system as a whole. The state has actuality 'as something thought'. [24]

Ethical life is the identity of morality and law, which, it has already been shown, is not an identity in civil society. Thus, absolute ethical life is realized as contradiction or as relative ethical life, as less than itself, and the external state becomes the object of critique. Absolute ethical life is actual as the broken middle, a self-work and result which is the concept in philosophy. Its moments belong to science, and 'the details of such a transition of the concept are made intelligible in logic'. [25] Ethical life is presented in the Philosophy of Right according to its own internal logic as philosophical consciousness, or as the movements which are the whole, the movement and the becoming of the concept. The state is the unity and non-unity of the movements which make up the concept of ethical life. It is the determinate negation of the loss of abstract and
immediate unity (the family) to the division of individual subjectivities from the substance which is the collective. The state does not replace civil society, it results from its contradictions, and is itself the non-truth of those contradictions. To desire the state to replace civil society is to misrecognize and reproduce the divisions of civil society in a way which is uneducational, and a way which precisely does not realize ethical life as the broken middle, or absolute ethical life as relative ethical life. Hegel is at pains to point out that in presenting ethical life in the Philosophy of Right, he is 'dealing exclusively with the philosophic science of the state'. [26] Thus, 'the philosophic proof of the concept of the state is this development of ethical life from its immediate phase through civil society, the phase of division, to the state, which then reveals itself as the true ground of these phases'. [27] The state cannot be comprehended except as the self-education which comprehends the absence of absolute ethical life. Ethical life, presented as philosophical consciousness, is therefore 'poles apart from an attempt to construct a state as it ought to be. The instruction which it may contain cannot consist in teaching the state what it ought to be'. [28]

Civil society is only the 'appearance' of the state as ethical life. [29] It is an external state,

an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system - the means to security of person and property - and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests. [30]
But these 'common' interests are not 'common' at all in the sense that
the universality provided by and embodied in the external state is the
independence of each subjectivity from another. What is common, mutual
dependence, is dominated by the universality of difference and the
autonomy of each subject with regard to others. 'Common interest' in
civil society is merely particular interest abstracted as a principle,
but lacking therefore precisely the activity or self-work which would
make it common. The transparent ethical relation of domination, which
is apparent in the activity of mere possession, is abstracted and
hidden by the formalizing of that relation in bourgeois property law.
The work which is the identity of the subject is appropriated by and
lost to the external state which claims itself to be the identity of
all persons. Thus the ethical relation, or human social interaction and
dependency become antithetical to a universal law of separation and
independence. The security (identity) of each person, by law, is also
the security of their right to own property, because it is universal
bourgeois property law which separates the activity of subjectivity
from the identity of subjectivity as result. The domination of
bourgeois property relations lies precisely in the fact that domination
appears to be overcome by the legal recognition of the (abstract)
equality of all men.

The appearance of bourgeois property law to have overcome domination by
recognizing the equality of subjects has, in the presupposition of law
as overcoming particularity, only repeated a domination of subject, and
determined it externally, without the work which is self-activity. A
person is already an individual who enjoys (bourgeois) property rights,
and (bourgeois) property rights are already the separation and independence of all persons with regard to each other. Dependence (subject as activity or work) cannot be achieved under bourgeois social relations because it is always already overcome. It is as misrecognition that all political and social theorizing, including critique, has to 'begin', and it is the comprehension of this failure to begin which is the theme of this thesis.

Recognition of misrecognition is implicit in Hegel's treatment of the state in the Philosophy of Right. In a 'philosophy', actuality is already comprehended. Its presentation therefore appears abstract, but the movement and mediation which negate it are contained in the presentation. Equally implicit in a philosophical presentation of the state, is that the state is already known, and can only be known, as separated from the activity which is that knowing. The state does not relieve us of the contradictions of civil society, but its actuality is our comprehension of the state as misrecognition, and of education as misrecognition. The state is only realized from civil society; that is the actuality of the state, and that is the critical import of Hegel's educational/political philosophy.

Only a comprehensive state education is the truth of critique as actuality, and the non-domination of the broken middle by any presuppositions of absolute ethical life. The state as it appears in the Philosophy of Right is not a demand for the status quo because in the presentation of the state as actual, the status quo has already been transformed, worked upon. Bourgeois law is transformed in being
known because its self-contradiction moves its abstract truth into untruth. The recognition of the state as misrecognition does not replace civil society, it is not another abstract imposition like bourgeois property law. It is precisely the comprehension of mediation which is the self activity and result of the actual, and which is therefore the critical import of philosophy. Actuality is our knowing of the untruth of bourgeois property law, and the state has that untruth as self-knowledge, or its own comprehensive development and education. Absolute ethical life cannot be imposed in civil society, but its absence can be realized within it, as critique, and that is Bildung as self-work, or the recognition which is comprehensive state education. This education is critical because it does not reproduce civil society, the society of domination, by further domination, but rather re-cognizes that domination and transforms it into the determinate negation which is the state as self-activity and result. The truth of critique is movement, not solution; the recognition of critique as misrecognition is examined in the final section.

A philosophy of critique, a self-examination which is movement and result, is only possible because the period of die Bildung or of alienation is behind us. Bildung is now known as its own movement, and critique can be comprehended. The day of philosophy has not arrived, but its non-arrival is now recognized. 'The owl of Minerva has spread her wings...we may now be prepared and readied for comprehension'. [31]
Ethical life is the self-work of subject and substance. This unity, however, falls within the work of thought, for ethical life has to be known, in the sense of realized. How it is to be known, is the educational import of Hegel's (political) philosophy, and the political and ethical import of the crises of modernity which is the dialectic of enlightenment. The state is not an immediate representation of ethical life, a Sollen, it is rather the actual thought of ethical life, and results from, and as, the contradiction which is civil society. The state is not actual in critique for it is only and always presupposed as independent of its being known.

In this last section, philosophy as self-activity is examined as comprehensive state education. This involves the same movement of the recognition of misrecognition which has already been examined with regard to the master/slave dialectic, subjective substance and ethical pedagogy, but in this case it refers to the separation of the state as object from the (moral) subject whose universality it is not, and for whom the state is therefore an object for critique. It is argued that critique is comprehensive when it is the self-activity which is the recognition of the state, and therefore of subjectivity, as misrecognition. The very term comprehensive can only apply to an education which is the totality of activity and result, and which in this case, refers to the comprehension of critique as determinate negation, or the activity and result which is the broken middle, or
what is actual. Recognition of misrecognition is comprehensive because it is that self-work, whether as ethical pedagogy or as political education. Both contain the impossibility of education as method as their own self-work and result, and both are therefore actual/ethical education.

Comprehensive state education is the determinate result of the contradiction which is the separation of the external state from the subjectivity whose universal authority it appears as. This division is no longer self-alienation for it is now known, or grasped philosophically, and its being so comprehended is already the self-activity (the self-education) of the state. What remains to be seen here, then, is how comprehensive state education is misrecognized in critique as moral self-consciousness; and how, and when, it is actual as the work of subjective substance.

The idea of critique become possible with the comprehension of the state as the authority or self-government of enlightened and rational individuals. It is possible as an idea only when reason grasps itself as 'all reality', [32] and establishes itself as the self-produced authority and self-identity of the will. The authority of reason is grounded in the formal notion of itself as the universal self-activity of thought. Therefore a relationship between reason and the authority of (self) government is established. The rational state required a better educated, increasingly enlightened populace; and here, better educated meant the growth of individuals' powers of reasoning. To 'dare to know' [33] became the educational mission of rational societies. A
well-ordered and rational state required individuals to understand the state as its legitimate authority, and to train to perform functions which would serve the state. Education satisfied both requirements since it was provided by the state, and for the state. [34] The idea of 'state education', therefore, replaced the control which religious authorities had previously enjoyed over the provision of education.

Rational education, or education as the result of the Enlightenment, and the development of further enlightenment, overcame the mythical and merely superstitious religious education, and replaced it with education as the maintainance of, and improvement of, mans own self-government. It needed no external authority, for state education was reason's own activity.

However, education by the state for the state is merely an abstract education. The right of all individuals to universally available and free state education is only an abstract (educational) universality as duty. As the formal law of compulsory schooling, state education is measured against reason as the logic of non-contradiction, and its universality becomes merely a matter of numbers rather than substance. Abstract reason regards state education in civil society to be universal provided it is a right for all, and none are excluded from its provisions, and that it has as its goal the rational development of each individual subject. Its authority is this (formal) universality, and this universality is its authority.

What is not understood in this merely abstract justification of formal state education in civil society is the way in which it repeats the
separation of teacher and student from each other, thus reproducing education as misrecognition, and how it abstracts the process which is state education from its social determination. With regard to the former, the separation of knowledge from activity in civil society provides abstract identities for teacher and student, which masks the educational relationship which is both of them. In the latter case, the activity of state education - formal schooling in civil society - does not recognize its own social determination. It fails to comprehend how it is the result of a particular set of social and historical circumstances, and how its activity is already education as misrecognition. It is precisely this experience which gives rise to critique as the rational examination of a state which is not rational, not the truth of subjectivity which it immediately appears to be. The development of this experience itself consists in the movements of ethical life which are detailed in the Philosophy of Right, from the abstract ethical beauty of family education, to its destruction within civil society and the moral consciousness which knows the social as object, and has self-consciousness as its own authority and as the self-activity which is conscience. It is the recognition of the activity of critique as misrecognition (or moral self-consciousness) that philosophy is comprehensive state education, or actuality.

The immediate unity of family education is disrupted by the incursion of the external state into the child's world. [35] It is a stage of the state's own development that subjectivity comes to have the state as an object for it, for the state has to reveal itself as the universal authority of (or over) each individual. Schooling is the earliest
manifestation of the state as object for the individual, for it is a requirement of 'state education' that it be a social activity. Since the state is the rational authority of all, then its truth cannot be left to the non-social, purely immediate unity of the family. The right of state institutions over the family in the matter of education as in all other state functions, is already the determination and mediation of subjectivity in civil society. The independence of the child's world is lost to the universality of the adult world. It is, to use a more recent term, the period of socialization, and it is (for us) where subject has substance as object, and therefore as lost. Thus, 'civil society tears the individual from his family ties, estranges the members of the family from one another, and recognizes them as self-subsistent persons...Thus the individual becomes a son of civil society'. [36] As the authority of rational (social) education, 'civil society has the right and duty of superintending and influencing education, as much as education bears upon the child's capacity to become a member of society. The right of society here is paramount over the arbitrary and contingent preferences of parents...'. [37]

What does result from formal state education is the contradiction which is moral activity or education. The abstraction of ethical substance as law from activity produces for consciousness the dialectic of duty and conscience. The dialectic is itself, however, an educational issue. The abstraction of state education in civil society produces for consciousness the aporia of education as socialization - the immediate unity of state education - and education as individual self-awareness of the social as object - the separation of subject from substance. It
is here that education becomes therefore a matter of critique, where the object is now comprehended as the imperfect formation of the activity which now examines it. Education becomes the question of the moral self-consciousness with regard to duty and conscience.

Moral self-consciousness makes 'the person into a subject' [38] but this 'subjective will, directly aware of itself and distinguished from the principle of the will, is therefore abstract, restricted and formal'. [39] 'At the standpoint of morality, subjectivity and objectivity are distinct from one another, or united only by their mutual contradiction'. [40] Thus morality, and moral education, are characterized as 'mere appearance'. [41] Although their mutual contradiction is known (for example, as the dialectic of enlightenment) it is not comprehended according to the concept and thus is not comprehensive. Morality, as activity, reproduces the separation of subject and substance without determinate result, thus refusing substance any ethical activity, and moral activity any substantial content.

Enlightenment education sought to produce the perfect state and the perfect citizen; the two conditions were seen as mutually dependent. But a state education which merely taught of itself as its own truth, became object for those whose education it was. What was intended as self-education by the state became education about the state for the individual. The latter used his powers of reason to know that education, now, as object. Formal state education is therefore experienced as contradiction. The two moments which constitute this
movement are those of education as communal duty, transmission of social values, beliefs and traditions; and, education as individual development and reflection upon values, beliefs and traditions.

This experience constitutes the dichotomy in the sociology of education, and sociological theory, between social function and individual interpretation. It is one of the key questions in sociological theorizing, and in critical sociology of education, as to whether thought determines the social or the social is determinative of thought. Sociology, however, as the consciousness which has the social as object, makes no progress in this regard whilst it fails to recognize that the question itself is already determined within the broken middle, and is already therefore a misrecognition of the dialectic of enlightenment. An idealistic solution does not contain the half of this broken middle which is immanent negativity and determinateness; a structural solution does not contain the other half which is experience and activity. Sociology's treatment of the question of social determination, and of the duality of actor (subject) and structure (substance), is not itself recognized as misrecognition. Sociology, as critique, is therefore a form of moral education and activity, in that the contradictions of subject and substance constitute its subject matter, but sociological resolutions of this aporia 'can be no more than relative' [42] because the dialectic of enlightenment returns as social determination to grant them only a negative and dependent status. It is with this problem that critical theory of education, and Habermas 'begin'.

- 257 -
Moral education therefore consists of reflection upon the good by individuals who, in the activity of reflection, have the good as object and thus as not-themselves. But since they know that the good requires activity, education becomes a matter of conscience over duty. The result of moral education can therefore be duty or non-conformity, but the principle of education as the self-activity of the individual conscience, and its overcoming of the separation through its reasoning, remains the same in both.

It is this activity which is the dialectic of enlightenment, that is, of experience and object, and its truth as movement is the realization of ethical life as actual. But moral education does not recognize this, its own truth. Moral education remains within the dialectic of conformity and non-conformity, of duty to the community and duty to self. Conscience can take the form of critique or piety, but both are misrecognition of the (non) identity of dependence. As critique, conscience demands the untruth of state education be overcome by the activity which is self-authority, or by critique itself. This is already, therefore, the presupposition of critique as overcoming, which is where critical theory of education and this thesis began. The demand, or Sollen, for critique as the unity of education and politics is already a separation of subject and substance. As piety, conscience accepts responsibility for the untruth of the good but like critique, this new understanding only repeats again the separation. Neither critique, nor the piety of the beautiful soul, can realize an ethical education, for their education rests in the impasse of dialectic, and
fails to recognize this dialectic (of enlightenment) as the self-activity which is our philosophical consciousness.

The dualistic nature of moral education can be seen in Hegel's own teaching, for his pupils received lessons both in duty and in independent thought. For Hegel, what was important was the education which is this contradiction. It is in the recognition of the dialectic of moral education as the ethical education which is the dialectic of enlightenment, that state education (critique) is actually realized. Critique is comprehensive when it has itself for its own object, and comprehensive education is actual as the recognition of the misrecognition of education and the state in civil society.

Philosophy as comprehensive state education does not overcome the separation of state from subjectivity in civil society. Rather, that separation is comprehended as the effective critique of the absence of absolute ethical life. The actuality of that separation is the continued domination of bourgeois private property law known and comprehended as not overcome. It is this self-education regarding the domination of ethical life which is philosophy as comprehensive state education, and which is itself actuality, or subjective substance.
CONCLUSION

There are two educational activities developed in this thesis. One is the negation or critique of natural consciousness, and of subjectivity which is abstracted from its own determination, the other is the comprehension of that negation or critique. In the former activity natural consciousness is experienced as lost; in the latter, this experience of loss is comprehended as the education of our philosophical consciousness. The first three chapters of the thesis examine the educational activity of critique and negation as contradiction, the last chapter examines the comprehension of that contradiction as self-activity or as education. It is the comprehension of the relationship between natural consciousness and philosophical consciousness which is the import of Hegelian philosophy of education, because this self-determining activity - the concept - is the identity of education as both activity and result.

The first education explores the idea of critique as it appears in Habermasian critical theory of education, in Habermas, and then in Horkheimer and Adorno. In critical theory of education, Habermas's theory of communicative action is employed in an attempt to unify educational and political activity as critique. The object of its critique is the abstract and unreflective notion of education which pervades educational research, the educational disciplines, and the activity of education in various institutions including schools. It is argued within this critical theory that in communicative action the
determination of education as an abstract identity in civil society is no longer abstract. The comprehension of determination is seen as an overcoming of the abstraction, and is produced in communicative action. In Habermas's theory of communicative action this reflection is intersubjective or social activity, and not abstract, because it is reason's own work which realizes its own dependence upon, and truth in, the lifeworld.

However, the idea of critique in critical theory of education was shown to repeat a contradiction in its reasoning which it could not resolve. In criticizing education as abstract, critical theorists employed an educational method which had to be presumed as not itself also abstract. To know education as mere abstraction is to be educated in regard to this appearance; but in order to achieve this enlightenment it was necessary to presuppose that the identity of non-abstract education was already known, so that it could be used as the method and the criterion by which non-abstraction was realized. Without the presupposition of enlightenment as result, or as already known, there is no method available by which to criticize education which is not itself also abstract. Critique viewed as overcoming is this presupposition. Critique as method already presupposes itself as the result which it is intended to achieve in its activity, and is therefore a presupposition of (absolute) unconditioned unity.

The issues raised here for a critical theory of education necessitate that it return to the critical theory on which it is modelled, to try and discover the source of the contradiction which critique repeats,
and to better understand the activity of negation. A return to Habermas in chapters II and III for this purpose, revealed that the same presupposition of critique as enlightenment and overcoming is found throughout his work, and is the basis for the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest, for ideology-critique, for communicative competence and ultimately for the theory of communicative action.

Habermasian critique aims to reveal how the negation of abstract thinking is an overcoming of that thinking. In the theory of communicative action, the abstract identity of subjectivity is overcome in the realization of its social and intersubjective dependence upon the lifeworld. Philosophies of consciousness have taken for granted the appearance of the subject in their critiques of the subject, and this, says Habermas, is to fail to grasp how critique, or self-enquiry, is already more than the work of an abstract subject. Dialectic of Enlightenment is just such an example, presupposing abstract subjectivity in order to claim that nothing positive can be learnt which is not already abstract. What Habermas does not do, however, is to apply this insight precisely to the method by which he arrives at this conclusion. His critique of philosophies of consciousness also repeats the abstraction of the subject from the process by which subjectivity is claimed to be known, because critique as overcoming presumes an enlightenment regarding abstraction which is itself not abstract. The basis of critique as overcoming is that the theory of communicative action is already enlightened with regard to the identity of non-abstraction, something which it then, from this enlightened position, claims can only be achieved in the intersubjective self-
activity of discourse. Critique is therefore the presupposition of enlightenment as the method by which the unconditioned unity of activity and result, or the absolute, is known. But it is this presupposition which repeats the subject as abstract rather than overcoming it, for presupposition is already not the unconditioned activity which is claimed as its own unity.

It is when the idea of critique as method is examined in Habermas that his relationship to Horkheimer and Adorno emerges. This relationship was examined in chapter III. The contradiction which lies at the heart of Habermas's work is that the separation of knowledge from activity, and of subjectivity from critique, is repeated even when the separation itself is known. Habermasian social theory repeats this contradiction in its own critical activity, and the result appears as an impasse and an aporia which prevents subjectivity an emancipation from its abstract identity in bourgeois legal relations and capitalist relations of production. This impasse is what is explored by Horkheimer and Adorno in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. They show how activity or critique is always enlightenment and how enlightenment reverts to non-result, or to activity. Horkheimer and Adorno do not seek to avoid or overcome the contradiction of the dialectic of enlightenment, they seek only to expose it as the totality of reason. The implications for critical theory of education of the dialectic of enlightenment, are therefore no more than have already resulted from the critique of Habermas's educational method; but Horkheimer and Adorno reveal the import of this contradiction as a self-critique of critical theory, an activity which
Dialectic of Enlightenment comprehends that the issue of education in civil society lies at the heart of critique, and it is therefore a more appropriate source for the development of a critical theory of education than The Theory of Communicative Action. Whilst Habermas employs presuppositions of enlightenment in order to explain and thus overcome the separation of subjectivity and activity, Horkheimer and Adorno investigate the nature of that repetition, and correctly identify its source to lie in the contradiction of education. A critical theory of education which employs Habermasian theory has not yet understood that Dialectic of Enlightenment represents an educational advance on Habermas, one which comprehends that even having the dialectic of enlightenment as object is only another abstract identity, and not an overcoming of it. Horkheimer and Adorno identify that the contradiction of critique is a problem of education as method. To become enlightened is already to presume the identity of educational activity and result in itself, and to criticize this is only again to repeat the presumption of enlightenment regarding its non-identity. Education as method cannot be subjective self-mediation, or subject as activity and result. This is the educational advance in critical theory which Horkheimer and Adorno make, but which critical theory of education has yet to realize.

For Adorno, the totality of the dialectic of enlightenment means that critique is only possible as negative dialectics; that is, as the
understanding that non-abstraction is not possible, and that identity thinking is total. This impossibility of knowing activity in itself is precisely what ensures that critique remains negative. Since the unity of activity and result cannot be known as a totality outside of the contradiction of the dialectic of enlightenment, critique is not presupposed as an overcoming. The negative, for Adorno, is the movement of the dialectic of enlightenment, a movement which undermines all identities, including its own, at the same time as it knows and repeats identities. The negative, therefore, as a critical education, is developed in Adorno, but not in Habermas. Negative dialectics awaits critical theory of education as the work which takes up the importance of education in and for critical theory, and begins precisely with the impasse that critical theory reaches with the theory of communicative action.

In keeping with the nature of critique as the negation of identity, of abstraction, Adorno would not claim that negative dialectics represents an advance over the theory of communicative action, only a negation of it. Negation is not an advance for Adorno because that would be to credit the negative with an identity which would abstract it from itself as movement. It is as if, therefore, the first education of this thesis, in chapters I - III, is not an education at all. Nothing has been learnt which would enable the comprehension of the subject in a way which did not reproduce their separation as activity and result. But this is exactly the problem which critical theory of education and Habermas set out to overcome. Although Adorno's work is an educational
advance on communicative action, it is not where the import of critical education is to be found.

The second educational activity in the thesis, the work of chapter IV, is the comprehension of the experience of the first educational activity. By tracing the abstract presuppositions of enlightenment in critical theory of education and in Habermasian critical theory, an experience is created for us, the reader, regarding the contradictory claims of critique as education. The question which therefore remains for us is how this second education can be comprehended according to itself, as dependent upon the object, in a way which does not remove it from the relation of dependence which has produced it, and which is its self-activity? How can this new consciousness know itself without losing itself at the same time? Put another way, the question is, how are we ever to know the absolute without presupposing its unconditioned unity. To know the absolute is already to have employed that presupposition as the method of inquiry. It is in response to these problems, and as the comprehension of the impasse of the first education noted above, that Hegelian philosophy of education is developed in the second part of the thesis.

The first educational experience in the thesis, of critique, can now been seen to be the experience of the loss of natural consciousness. Natural consciousness, when it is known as object, or abstract subjectivity when it is known as abstract, are both an experience of loss. What is lost is the consciousness which is experienced. Natural consciousness therefore cannot appear for us except as experience or
our object. Natural consciousness is always separated from itself in experience and thought becomes despair at its own inevitable loss and negation. However, that loss is at the same time always an object for the new consciousness which knows the loss. Each loss of natural consciousness is accompanied by the new consciousness; therefore, the loss of (natural) consciousness is also the development of another consciousness, the consciousness which results from the activity of thought, or philosophical consciousness.

The one characteristic of philosophical consciousness which is known, then, is that it is dependent upon activity. But if philosophical consciousness is known as dependent, then is it not an identity and a result, something known independently from the activity which has produced it? How can philosophical consciousness be comprehended as dependent without dominating its dependence. The answer to this question in this thesis is that philosophical consciousness requires to be comprehended according to the movement and result which is education or the absolute in Hegel.

The idea of the absolute as (self) education, including the notions of ethical pedagogy and comprehensive state education, is itself a critique of, and a recognition of education in civil society. Its education is a critique of all education. It does not avoid or escape the contradiction that education as method renders the absolute as unknowable, it is rather the comprehension of the contradiction as its own dependency, and its own identity and non-identity. Philosophical consciousness does not appear as object or subject because it is itself
the relation of knowing (the unity) by which they are already separated. To know them as separated is already to have performed the work which is their separation and their unity. It is for this reason that critique, sociology, philosophy or any social reflection cannot begin except with the work which is already itself, or already appears as reflection (or illusory being). All such activity is already dependent upon the experience of the separation of subject and object, a separation which appears abstract to our natural consciousness but is an education in itself for the consciousness which recognizes the work as misrecognition.

What is actual is what is for us already the broken middle of subject and substance. It is the totality of mediation and immediacy. Actuality is therefore the educational and political import of the second education in this thesis, for it is the comprehension of the dialectic of enlightenment as subjective substance, or our absolute self-work and result. The second education is an education precisely because its activity and result are not presupposed, but are immanent in the contradiction which is our education regarding the unconditioned. What we learn, therefore, is that actuality is our education regarding the separation of subject and substance, for the activity of negation is ours, and the result is a consciousness which is result as that activity. The key to education as identity, or as the concept, is that only in being performed, in being done, is it actual. Education requires self-loss as its activity if it is to be our education. This is the most important insight contained in Hegelian philosophy of education, and one which critical theory of education will, as its own
education, be forced to contend with. Ethical pedagogy and comprehensive state education both contain that loss, of the teacher and absolute ethical life respectively, as the truth of their educational activity. They therefore represent a beginning to the task of recognizing education in civil society, and re-forming critical theory of education.

Education as self-loss is the reason why the development of Hegelian philosophy of education did not begin with Hegel. The first three chapters produce the work which is the loss of enlightenment and are therefore this development of philosophical education as our work. It is that experience which is the subject and substance of philosophy as education in chapter IV. Hegel's philosophy of education has no import if it is not performed.

Hegelian philosophy of education is therefore the import of Hegelian philosophy as a critique of presuppositions of the absolute which appear as methodologies for overcoming or not overcoming the contradiction of knowing the absolute. The contradiction produced in our trying to know the absolute is the dialectic of enlightenment. This contradiction is already the critique of enlightenment as a method for understanding the absolute. Thus, not knowing the absolute is our education regarding the absolute. The absolute is our education. This is Hegel's critique of both relative ethical life and the dialectic of enlightenment. It is also the recognition of education in civil society.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

A full reference is given to a work when it is first acknowledged; subsequently, the publisher is omitted. Full references are also given in the bibliography.

INTRODUCTION


2. D. Sayer notes that the term "bourgeois society" translates either as "bourgeois society" or "civil society", and characterizes what is called "modern society"; Sayer, D. (1991), Capitalism and Modernity (London: Routledge), pp. 2-3. These terms are used interchangeably in this thesis.


4. ibid., p. 155.


6. These are discussed at length in both chapters I and II of this thesis.

7. In some ways this thesis is the result of my experience of this tradition, and of its consistent philosophical inadequacies and omissions. Although this tradition is not itself referred to again in the thesis, nevertheless one of the intentions behind the thesis is to move that tradition into philosophy and to reveal that the contradictions of a critical theory of education are already (Hegelian) philosophy as education. Chapters I - III explore the abstraction of education from activity in civil society which the tradition seeks to overcome; chapter IV begins to try and show how the tradition could rethink its whole approach to these problems. The sorts of work to which I am referring here as belonging to the tradition of critical education are those which centre around the issue of education as ideology and domination - whether as the process of formal schooling, curriculum knowledge or in the person of the teacher. Examples include Apple, M. (1979), Ideology and Curriculum (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul); Giroux, H. (1981), Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling (London: Palmer Press); Giroux, H. (1988), Schooling for Democracy (London: Routledge); Young, M.F.D. (ed.) (1971), Knowledge and Control (London: Collier Macmillan); and Freire, P. (1972), Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Penguin Books). Freire is of particular interest because he employs Hegel's dialectic of master and slave as a model for pedagogy. He does not, however, read the master/slave dialectic, or the master/student relationship, according to their unity in the concept as the recognition of misrecognition. This is performed in this thesis in the middle section of chapter IV. The aims of the tradition have recently been summarized as 'to make the political more pedagogical and the pedagogical more political' - Giroux, H. and Freire, P.
CHAPTER I. BECOMING CRITICAL OF EDUCATION.

2. ibid. p. 195.
6. ibid. p. 57.
7. ibid. p. 59.
8. ibid. p. 76.
9. ibid. p. 79.
11. ibid. p. 23.
13. An example of this approach can be found in the recent work of John Elliott. He employs Gadamer's reading of Aristotle to argue that the separation of education and the political is overcome as phronesis, for phronesis is both a reflection on ethical values and at the same time a changing of the meaning of the political horizon of one's consciousness. In phronesis, Elliott claims, the political and the educational are one activity. He writes, 'In judging how a value is to be translated into practice in a particular situation one is making an interpretation of what that value means as well as what the situation means. The form of action chosen constitutes an articulation of both the meaning of the situation and the meaning of the value to be realized in it. Phronesis co-determines the means and the ends together by reflecting on the former in the light of the latter and vice versa. The outcome of such reflection - a concrete form of practice - constitutes an achievement of understanding in which both interpretation and application have been integral features of the process'; Elliott, J. (1987), 'Educational Theory, Practical Philosophy and Action Research', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. xxxv, no. 2, p. 162. However, phronesis shares with Habermasian ideology-critique the presupposition that its own activity is the identity of enlightenment as overcoming. Neither hermeneutical educational theory, nor critical educational theory examine the contradiction of education which is reproduced as their method.
16. ibid. p. 33.
18. This argument is developed in chapter II of this thesis.
22. ibid. p. 144.
24. ibid. p. 185.
25. ibid. p. 207, my emphasis.
27. ibid. p. 22.
30. ibid. p. 42.
31. ibid. p. 82.
33. ibid. p. 162. The term 'action research' is taken from social psychology. It is the idea of educational research as reflective self-examination undertaken by the participants themselves, such that their interpretations of the social world are at the same time transformative of that world. Learning in action research is a transformative activity. Both hermeneutical and critical theories of education claim action research as their own method. The latter is expanded upon in this chapter of the thesis. See also, Elliott, J. (1991), Action Research for Educational Change (Milton Keynes: Open University Press); Winter, R. (1989), Learning from Experience: Principles and Practice in Action Research (London: Falmer Press); and Brock-Utne, B. (1980), 'What is Educational Action Research?', Classroom Action Research Network, no. 4, summer. pp. 10-15.
34. ibid. p. 146.
35. ibid. p. 197.
36. ibid. p. 200.
38. ibid. p. 151.
39. ibid. p. 56.
40. ibid. p. 57. Young offers a brief discussion of the development of a critical theory of education in Germany on pages 56-61. Adorno is singled out as producing work on education which gives critical theory of education 'the suspicion of negativeness' - p. 61.
41. ibid. p. 59.
42. ibid. p. 71. Habermas's idea of the lifeworld is discussed in chapter II.
43. ibid. p. 71.
44. ibid. p. 71.
45. ibid. p. 82.
48. ibid. p. 96.
49. ibid. p. 104.
50. ibid. p. 107.
51. This interpretation of the relationship between teacher and student is based on Habermas's work regarding the relationship of therapist and patient. A criticism of the latter can be found in chapter II of this thesis, an alternative to the former is put forward in chapter IV.
53. ibid. p. 133.
54. ibid. p. 113.
55. ibid. see p. 152.
56. ibid. p. 135.
57. ibid. p. 145.
58. ibid. p. 158.
61. ibid. p. 36 and p. 75.
62. ibid. p. 79.
63. ibid. p. 113.
64. ibid. p. 113.
CHAPTER II. HABERMAS AND CRITIQUE.

1. A similar point is made by Wellmer who argues that Habermas's great achievement is to bridge the gap 'between a "Hegelian" perspective on the differentiation processes of modern societies, on the one hand, and the utopian perspectives of Marx's critique of political economy on the other', thus unifying 'the negative dynamics of progress in present day capitalism and an emancipatory historical agent in the Marxian sense'. See Wellmer, A. (1985), 'Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment', in R.J. Bernstein (ed.) Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 58.

Also, Kortman argues that Knowledge and Human Interests 'may be regarded as an attempt to write a new Phenomenology of Spirit on a different foundation'. Kortman, G. (1980), Metacritique: The Philosophical Argument of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge University Press), p. 30. See also R.J. Bernstein, (1976), The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), pp. 185-225. One commentator has noted that 'Habermas is a Hegelian insofar as he is reconciled to the basic cognitive and normative advances of modernity', but goes on to argue that this might produce 'Hegelianism in the bad sense, namely a complacency toward the status quo rationalized as a theory of modernity'. See Whitebook, J. (1988), 'Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Utopianism after Habermas', Praxis International, Vol. 8, no. 1, p. 73. This thesis challenges this and similar interpretations which view Hegel's philosophy as conservative and quietistic.

2. Bernstein has written that Knowledge and Human Interests could only have been written by 'someone who had Hegel in his "bones"'. R.J. Bernstein, (1980), 'The Relationship of Habermas's views to Hegel', in D.P. Verene (ed.) Hegel's Social and Political Thought: The Philosophy of Objective Spirit (Sussex: Harvester Press), pp. 234-235.


5. Habermas, J. (1987), Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 43.

6. ibid. p. 32.

7. Such a process characterizes the fetishism of commodities. It is social determination (social labour) masked by the appearance of things (commodities) in the world. See Marx, K. (1976), Capital (Penguin Books), Vol. 1 pp. 163-177.


10. For a discussion of labour in Marx, Hegel and Habermas, see Honneth, A. (1982), 'Work and Interaction', New German Critique, no. 26, pp. 31-54. He states that 'the historical basis upon which Marx supposes that there is a connection between social emancipation and social labour has changed so much since the nineteenth century that practically none of the critical social sciences of this century continues to place any confidence in the liberating, consciousness-building potential of the social labour process', (ibid. p. 46).


12. ibid. p. 31.

13. ibid. p. 31.


16. Habermas, J. (1987), Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 34.

17. ibid. p. 34.
18. ibid. p. 33.
19. ibid. p. 32.
20. ibid. p. 39, my emphasis.
21. A similar critique of Marx can be found in Waller, A. (1971), Critical Theory of Society (New York: Herder and Herder), who notes that 'the union of historical materialism and the criticism of political economy in Marx's social theory is inherently contradictory', (ibid. p. 74).
23. ibid. p. 34.
24. ibid. p. 42.
25. ibid. p. 35.
26. ibid. p. 35.
27. ibid. p. 36.
28. ibid. p. 46.
29. ibid. p. 42.
31. ibid. p. 43.
32. ibid. p. 50.
33. This is often referred to as Habermas's 'linguistic turn'. See, for example, Honneth, A. (1979), 'Communication and Reconciliation; Habermas's critique of Adorno', Telos 39, pp. 45-61, and Heller, A. (1982), in Habermas: Critical Debates.
34. ibid. p. 52.
36. ibid. p. 58, my emphasis. This again encouraged much criticism against Habermas, for it was argued that reason replaced the working class as the creative historical agent; see especially Heller in Habermas: Critical Debates, and Bernstein's discussion in The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, pp. 185-225. Habermas responded to this by noting that 'the destruction of the historic-philosophical certainty that the industrial working class and European labour movement were targets for possible, theoretically induced processes of enlightenment and bearers of a politically pursued, revolutionary transformation is not, in my view, entirely a disadvantage'. See Habermas, J. (1982), 'A Reply to my Critics', in Habermas: Critical Debates, p. 222. More recently White has argued that Habermas's theorizing is aimed at a new audience. 'Its initial addressee', he says, 'are the new social movements' and Habermas's work is aimed 'at helping to orient the self-understanding of these groups...'; White, S.K. (1988), The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge University Press), p. 142.
38. ibid. p. 61.
39. ibid. p. 53.
40. ibid. p. 55.
41. ibid. p. 55.
42. ibid. p. 55.
43. ibid. p. 61.
44. ibid. p. 61.
45. ibid. p. 55.
46. ibid. p. 62.

47. For discussions regarding the concept of 'ideology', see Lorrain, J. (1979), The Concept of Ideology (University of Georgia Press), and Gauss, R. (1981), The Idea of a Critical Theory (Cambridge University Press).

48. Jay notes the inequality of the relationship between the three knowledge-constitutive interests, commenting that the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest 'was ultimately derived from the other two'; see Jay, M. (1984), Marxism and Totality (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 479.

49. An analytical/realist critique of this view can be found in Keat, R. (1981), The Politics of Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell). He writes, 'it is a mistake to construct an epistemological account of critical social theory that ties its criteria of validity to the successful realization of emancipatory values', (ibid, p. 167).

51. ibid. p. 212.
52. Habermas, J. (1966), 'Knowledge and Interest', Inquiry, ix; this is reprinted in Emmet and McIntyre (eds.) Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis (London: Macmillan).
53. Habermas, J. (1967), Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 213.
55. ibid. p. 22.
56. ibid. p. 2.
57. A development Habermas describes in chapters 4-8 of Knowledge and Human Interests.
60. ibid. p. 19.
61. ibid. p. 212.
64. ibid. p. 9.


75. Habermas, J. (1966), 'Knowledge and Interest', in Emet and MacIntyre (eds.) *Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis*, p. 50.


77. This is the title of part 1 of *Knowledge and Human Interests*.


80. ibid. p. 90. Dews himself argues that Habermas retreats from the ideal speech situation.


82. ibid. p. 163.


85. ibid. p. 162.

86. ibid. p. 162.

87. ibid. p. 51.


89. ibid. p. 18.

90. ibid. p. 339.

91. ibid. p. 58.

92. ibid. pp. 69-70.


95. ibid. p. 121.

96. ibid. p. 120.


98. ibid. p. 356.

99. ibid. p. 360.

100. ibid. p. 361.


102. ibid. p. 362.

103. ibid. p. 364.

104. ibid. p. 364.


108. ibid. p. 20.
109. ibid. p. 22.
110. ibid. p. 18.
111. ibid. p. 18.
112. ibid. p. 30.
113. ibid. p. 28.
116. A criticism echoed by Benhabib who remarks that 'if the plight of the Enlightenment and of cultural rationalization only reveals the culmination of an identity logic constitutive of reason, then the theory of the dialectic of enlightenment, which is carried out with the tools of this very reason, perpetrates the very structure of domination it condemns'. Benhabib, S. (1986), Critique, Norm, and Utopia (New York and London: Columbia University Press), p. 169.
118. ibid. p. 392. For many commentators, Habermas's critique of the Dialectic of Enlightenment is his most important contribution to critical theory. Jay argues that Habermas offers a 'way out of the cul de sac' of earlier negative critical theory, see Jay, M. (1984), Marxism and Totality, p. 463. Honneth has noted that Habermas represents 'a change of paradigm within critical theory', arguing that whereas Adorno's philosophy abandons classical theory's claims because it cannot provide a rationality immune from reification, Habermas's theory reconstructs in terms of reification a notion of rationality which can reinstate the claims abandoned in critical theory's process of self-reflection'; see Honneth, A. (1979), 'Communication and Reconciliation', Telos 39, pp. 45-61. (Quotations above are from pp. 45 and 49 respectively). This has the result for Honneth that in the theory of communicative action, 'the systematically-independent organizational complexes - in which Adorno and Horkheimer could only see the final stage of a logic of the mastery of nature - now prove to be the social products of a rationalization of the social lifeworld'; Honneth, A. (1987), 'Critical Theory', in A. Giddens and J.H. Turner (eds.) Social Theory Today, p. 375.
120. ibid. p. 109.
123. ibid. p. 337.
125. ibid. p. 126.
128. The fact that this is already known, or is for consciousness, is the reason that Habermas has not escaped from the philosophy of consciousness. This point is discussed in the following chapter.
130. Quoted in Dews, P. (1986), Autonomy and Solidarity, p. 112. Just as the separation of labour and interaction generated much discussion with regard to Knowledge and Human Interests, so the separation of system and lifeworld is set to do the same. Indeed, Honneth argues that 'the outcome of the discussion which has been sparked off by this problem will determine the future of critical theory'; Honneth, A. (1987), 'Critical - 278 -

133. ibid. p. 112.
134. ibid. pp. 184-185.
135. ibid. p. 108.
137. ibid. p. 333.
CHAPTER III. DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.

A - ENLIGHTENMENT.

3. ibid. p. 177.
5. ibid. p. 204.
6. ibid. p. 97.
7. ibid. pp. 77 and 96.
8. ibid. p. 98.
10. ibid. p. 125.
12. ibid. p. 22.
17. ibid. p. 8.
18. ibid. p. 8.
25. ibid. p. 10.
27. ibid. p. 20.
30. ibid. p. 23.
31. ibid. p. 21.
32. Making a similar point, Cullen notes that by the turn of the nineteenth century 'Hegel had come to feel more and more acutely man's inability to feel at one with himself and his world; the ideal of his youth seemed unattainable', Cullen, B. (1979), Hegel's Social and Political Thought (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan), p. 49.
33. Habermas, J. (1987), The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 27.
34. ibid. p. 27.
35. ibid. p. 29.
36. ibid. p. 31.
38. i.e. at the level of examining the lifeworld itself rather than continually deducing its a priori necessity. The former assumes the latter to have already been shown.
39. Benhabib offers a different explanation of the presupposition of intersubjectivity in Habermas's theory of communicative action. She writes that 'when communicative ethics and the perspective of moral autonomy and community it entails, are presented
as if they were the logical and inevitable outcome of a normal sequence of development, only carrying to its conclusion what is implicit in the process itself, one reverts back to the philosophy of the subject....This shift to the language of an anonymous species-subject preempts the experience of moral and political activity as a consequence of which alone a genuine "we" can emerge'; Benhabib, S. (1985), 'The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics', New German Critique, 35. pp. 95-96. She discusses the relationship between critique and the philosophy of the subject in Critique, Norm and Utopia.

44. ibid. p. 49.
47. i.e. the prejudice that knowledge a posteriori is not absolute.
49. ibid. p. 47. Kortian argues that this fear of error when turned against itself is 'metacritique' or critique become radical. However, his move above or beyond critique, because a "critique of critique"....would simply involve the contradictory demand that critique....make good its own defect', is itself error as a fear of this contradiction, (Kortian, G. (1980), Metacritique, p. 28.). This thesis presents the case that phenomenology is always already critique; metacritique is therefore always a misrecognized phenomenology. Metacritique claims itself as the result of critical insight into determination, a result which, for Hegel, is the concept, and which alone contains the aporia of determination as its own activity. Rose has drawn attention to the metacritical characteristics of any sociology which is critical of social determination; 'when it is argued that it is society or culture which confers objective validity on social facts or values, then the argument acquires a metacritical or "quasi-transcendental" structure....The status of the precondition becomes ambiguous: it is an a priori, that is, not empirical, for it is the basis of the possibility of experience. But a "sociological" a priori is, ex hypothesi, external to the mind, and hence appears to acquire the status of a natural object or cause. The status of the relation between the sociological precondition and the conditional becomes correspondingly ambiguous in all sociological quasi-transcendental arguments', Rose, G. (1981), Hegel Contra Sociology, p. 14. This thesis argues that critique already contains this ambiguity as the dialectic of enlightenment.

53. ibid. p. 145.
54. T.S. Eliot captures the contradiction when talking about 'the still point of the turning world', see Eliot, T.S. (1969), The Four Quartets (London: Faber and Faber), from 'Burnt Norton'.
Publishers), Part 1, pp. 3-41. Lamb offers a somewhat hermeneutical explanation of the absolute in Hegel, arguing that 'the presentation of the various shapes of consciousness cannot lead up to absolute knowledge, since the absolute is relative to each presentation'; (ibid. p. 40.) this, for Hegel, he then states, 'is the recognition of the ultimate partiality of truth' (ibid. p. 41) and is his 'death-blow to the quest for foundational certainty'. (ibid. p. 41.) Lamb maintains that knowing the conditioned and contingent nature of the absolute is a philosophical comprehension of the absolute because each presentation 'must be seen to be complete in itself possessing its own expression of absolute knowledge'. (ibid. p. 41) Such an interpretation is not, however, a recognition of the truth of the phenomenological circle of the dialectic of enlightenment, but only another 'bare assurance' of its ultimately unknowable character.

60. Habermas, J. (1987), Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 7.
64. Habermas, J. (1976), Legitimation Crises, p. 15.
66. ibid. p. 5.
67. ibid. p. 5.
69. This aporia has been noted by Dallmayr, who points out that the rationality of the lifeworld can only be known by us as non-reason. Using educational language, he remarks that 'while acting as teacher and taskmaster, reason is not in turn perceived as a pupil exposed to the lessons and learning experiences of the lifeworld'; Dallmayr, F. (1991), Lifeworld, Modernity and Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 151.
72. ibid. p. 136.
73. Habermas, J. (1976), 'A Positivistically Bisected Rationalism', in T.W. Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, p. 201.
74. ibid. p. 203.
75. ibid. pp. 203-204.
CHAPTER III. DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.

B - DIALECTIC

2. Habermas first read *Dialectic of Enlightenment* in 1955, but saw it as leading to nowhere; see Dews, P. (1986), *Autonomy and Solidarity*, p. 90. However, he does acknowledge the influence it had upon him, ibid, pp. 77 and 96.
3. ibid. p. 90.
5. ibid. p. 7.
7. ibid. p. 6.
8. ibid. p. 6.
9. ibid. p. xvi.
10. ibid. p. 15.
11. ibid. p. 15.
12. ibid. p. 18.
13. ibid. p. 20.
14. ibid. p. 49.
15. ibid. p. 16.
17. ibid. p. 16.
18. ibid. p. 9.
21. ibid. pp. 11-12.
22. ibid. p. 12.
23. ibid. p. 20.
25. ibid. p. 12.
26. This is misunderstood, for example, by Connerton. He criticizes Horkheimer and Adorno for failing to take note of the fact that 'identity formation also receives a positive aspect from the intersubjective context which alone makes it possible'. Connerton, P. (1980), *The Tragedy of Enlightenment* (Cambridge University Press), p. 76. However, it is precisely because Horkheimer and Adorno recognize the dependency of identity formation upon the 'intersubjective', that they are unable to claim the idea of intersubjectivity as itself any less dependent. When Connerton remarks that, 'the critique which (they) present is a further symptom of the disease which it seeks to diagnose' - ibid, p. 79. - he is right, but he is offering this as their basic weakness rather than as their insight into the totality of the dialectic of enlightenment.
29. ibid. p. xvi.
30. ibid. p. xiv.
31. ibid. p. xvi.
32. ibid. p. xii.
33. ibid. p. xiii.
34. ibid. p. xiii.
35. ibid. p. xiv. A discussion of actuality can be found later in this chapter of the thesis.
36. ibid. p. xiv.
37. ibid. p. xvi.
38. ibid. p. xv.
39. ibid. p. 22.
41. ibid. p. 47.
44. ibid. p. 30.
45. ibid. p. 30.
47. The Homeric tale of Odysseus' encounter with the sirens is employed by Adorno and Horkheimer to illustrate this 'entanglement of myth, domination and labour', (Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 321)
49. ibid. p. 154.
50. ibid. p. 196.
54. ibid. p. 169.
55. ibid. p. 171.
56. ibid. p. 197.
59. ibid. p. 208.
60. ibid. p. 208.
61. This is the title of chapter 4 of Rose, G. (1978), *The Melancholy Science*.
62. ibid. p. 56.
64. Adorno, T.W. et al. (1976), *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, p. 24.
66. ibid. p. 12.
67. see chapter 2 of *The Melancholy Science* for a discussion of style in Adorno.
68. ibid. p. 54.
69. ibid. p. 11.
70. Rose, G. (1976) 'Review of Negative Dialectics', *American Political Science Review*, 70, p. 598. Jameson makes a similar point with regard to Adorno's work overall; 'it is certain', he says, 'that in denouncing philosophical system, in proposing some radically unsystematic dialectics, in arguing against "system" itself, Adorno retains the concept of the system and even makes it, as target and object of critique, the very centre of his own anti-systematic thinking', Jameson, F. (1990), *Late Marxism: Adorno or The Persistence of the Dialectic* (London: Verso), p. 27.
72. ibid. p. 150.
73. ibid. p. 5.
74. ibid. p. 147.
75. ibid. p. 5.
76. ibid. p. 11.
78. ibid. p. 190.
79. ibid. p. 5.
80. ibid. p. 17.
81. ibid. p. 141; my emphasis.
82. ibid. p. 172.
83. ibid. p. 151.
84. Quoted from 'Introduction to Adorno' - Telos 19, p. 3.
86. ibid. p. 34.
89. ibid. p. 120.
90. ibid. pp. 337-338.
91. ibid. p. 120. Dews makes a similar point: 'identity-thinking, even in its Hegelian form, defeats its own purpose, since by reducing what is non-identical in the object to itself, it ultimately comes away empty handed', Dews, P. (1989), 'Adorno, Poststructuralism and the Critique of Identity', in A. Benjamin (ed.) The Problems of Modernity (London: Routledge), p. 14. He adds that, 'for Adorno, the experience of this contradiction sparks off a further movement of reflection, to a position in which the non-identical is no longer viewed as the isolated particular which it is forced back into being by identity thinking'. (ibid. p. 14, my emphasis) Dews concludes, on Adorno's behalf, that 'identity can only become adequate to its concept by acknowledging its own moment of non-identity'. (ibid. p. 14) This section of the thesis challenges this interpretation, and argues that it is precisely this idea of a moment of non-identity which is presupposed as the identity of negative dialectics, and thus denies its actuality. Discussions of the relation of Adorno to Hegel can be found in Dallmayr, F. (1991), Lifeworld, Modernity and Critique, chapter 3; Rosen, M. (1982), Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism (Cambridge University Press), pp. 153-178; and in Benhabib, S. (1986), Critique, Norm, and Utopia, particularly chapter 5.
93. An interpretation endorsed by Dews who comments that 'the dialectical mobilization of the relation between subject and object in Hegel does not entail the abandonment of the principle of identity....(because) the movement from standpoint to standpoint is oriented towards a predetermined goal (the absolute), Dews, P. (1989), in 'Adorno, Poststructuralism, and the Critique of Identity', op. cit., p. 5.
95. ibid. p. 158. Benhabib argues that 'Adorno transforms immanent critique into negative dialectics precisely in order to undermine the speculative identity of concept and object, essence and appearance, possibility and necessity, which Hegel postulates'; Benhabib, S. (1986), Critique, Norm, and Utopia, p. 173.
100. ibid. p. 34.
103. ibid. p. 119.
104. S. Rosen provides a hermeneutical reading of the result of the contradiction, one which does not realize the concept. He states that in Hegel, 'contradiction is the
structure of positionality, since A can be posed only as opposite to -A. Which counts
as positive and which as negative depends upon one's position'; Rosen, S. (1974),
G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom (London: Yale University
Press), p. 121. It is no surprise, therefore, that Rosen concludes that 'the negation
of negation leads to no development'. (ibid. p. 276.)
106. Hegel, G.W.F. (1975), Hegel's Logic, p. 120.
108. ibid. p. 54.
109. ibid. p. 11.
110. M. Rosen offers an unphenomenological interpretation of the speculative experience
when he separates science as movement from science as result, and argues that it is
only open to the critic 'to characterize the experience'; Rosen, M. (1982), Hegel's
Dialectic and its Criticism, p. 92.
112. ibid. p. 10.
116. Benhabib notes approvingly that 'negative dialectics becomes a dialectics of pure
negativity, of a perpetual defiance of the actual', Benhabib, S. (1986), Critique,
Norm, and Utopia, p. 173; but it is precisely enlightenment regarding pure negativity
which is at stake here. The dialectic of enlightenment is itself actual in defying
(negating) this 'perpetual defiance'.
118. ibid. p. 318.
CHAPTER IV. HEGEL AND EDUCATION.

A - RECOGNITION.

2. ibid. p. 71.
3. ibid. p. 71; my emphasis.
4. ibid. p. 71.
8. ibid. p. 110.
10. ibid. p. 110.
11. ibid. p. 112.
15. This interpretation therefore stands in opposition to that of three of the most influential readings of the master/slave dialectic. Hyppolite, Kojève and Taylor all argue that the master/slave dialectic in the Phenomenology is a struggle for recognition. Hyppolite writes, 'the fight of all against all is a fight not only for life but also for recognition', Hyppolite, J. (1974), Genesis and Structure of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit', trans. S. Cherniak and J. Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), p. 169. Kojève sees the life and death struggle as 'a fight to the death for recognition'; Kojève, A. (1969), Lectures on the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' (London: Basic Books), p. 7. And Taylor states 'the contradiction arises when men at a raw and underdeveloped stage of history try to wrest recognition from one another without reciprocating', Taylor, C. (1975), Hegel (Cambridge University Press), p. 153. However, at no point in the Phenomenology is the master/slave dialectic described as a struggle for recognition. The life and death struggle is the attempt to destroy the other, not to seek recognition from it, which would entail the necessary survival of that other. The interpretations of Hyppolite, Kojève and Taylor are based on two misunderstandings. First, recognition is the experience of the lack or absence of mutual recognition; it results from the life and death struggle as the question of (but equally the necessity of) social existence. To see this as a struggle for recognition is to credit the participants - those men in a raw and underdeveloped state - with a sophisticated understanding of the need for the social. Second, all three interpretations are presumably influenced by the account of recognition found in the Philosophy of Mind, the third part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia. But this account is written from a different viewpoint. This is no longer a presentation of the experience of the other; rather, it is an account of that experience as result. It is our knowledge of the rational emergence of the social. It is known to philosophical consciousness as a struggle for recognition because it is now comprehended as the activity of reason (state) over force (nature), i.e. the struggle is already recognized as men’s political formation or education. But the combatants in the Phenomenology are in no position to comprehend this. The comprehension of recognition implicit in the Encyclopaedia cannot be grafted onto the account of the life and death struggle in the Phenomenology, because the latter is the development of philosophical consciousness, not its encyclopaedic presentation. Recognition in the Encyclopaedia is comprehended by and as philosophical consciousness; recognition in the Phenomenology is always misrecognition, for it is the development of philosophical consciousness.
16. Again, here, Hyppolite, Kojève and Taylor read the master and slave consciousness as actors in the historical struggle for recognition. But whilst they are historical characters in the Encyclopaedia, representing the victor and the vanquished, in the Phenomenology they are not the participants of the life and death struggle; they are the dialectical activity in each self-consciousness of the experience of being for another. The master/slave dialectic in the Phenomenology is the self-experience of recognition; they are not doing the recognizing, they are the dialectic which is recognition, and whose movement of independence and dependence is what is finally comprehended as the concept. The position of the master/slave dialectic in the text of the Phenomenology is necessarily ambiguous; its truth as subjective substance is only realized in absolute knowing, and absolute knowing then has the master/slave dialectic as its own truth. Only then can the Phenomenology be written! The master/slave dialectic is not a history in the way that the rest of the Phenomenology is, because it is the self-movement and self-identity of absolute knowing, of the concept, and of spirit.

17. Not, as Hyppolite maintains, as 'of life', Hyppolite, J. (1974), Genesis and Structure of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit', p. 173. Hegel writes that the essential nature of the dependent consciousness is 'simply to live or to be for another'; Hegel, G.W.F. (1977), Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 115. But the slave is not consciousness of life, it is the consciousness which lives as of death. It is pure being-for-self, pure dependence, pure result. To see the slave as 'of life' is to turn the slave into the master. Kojève writes, 'he became a slave because he did not want to risk his life to become a master'; Kojève, A. (1969), Lectures on the 'Phenomenology of Spirit', p. 22. But the whole import of the slave consciousness is that he has no life to risk; that is precisely the truth of his dependence and what makes recognition of (the) misrecognition (of independence) possible.

21. ibid. p. 117.
22. ibid. pp. 117 and 118.
23. Or begins for the first time since, as noted above, the master/slave dialectic as the activity of recognition, is itself the final thing to be recognized, and the result of all that follows it in the Phenomenology.
25. ibid. p. 348.
27. ibid. p. 349.
28. ibid. p. 349.
29. ibid. p. 237.
30. ibid. p. 237.
32. ibid. p. 384.
33. ibid. p. 384.
35. ibid. p. 91.
37. ibid. p. 187.
38. ibid. p. 204.

- 288 -
41. ibid. p. 203.
42. ibid. p. 51.
CHAPTER IV. HEGEL AND EDUCATION.

B - RECOGNIZING THE TEACHER.

8. ibid. p. 331.
9. ibid. p. 351.
10. ibid. p. 332. Harris, in his essay on Hegel's Life from 1770-1801, has remarked that even at school, 'this very serious young student is deeply interested in educational theory and practice; he is especially concerned about the social function and duties of professional scholars and teachers because he means to become one or at least make his education effective in some way calculated to lead to an increase in general enlightenment'; Harris, H.S. (1972), Hegel's Development - Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801 (Oxford University Press), p. 43. Also, the editors of the recently published Philosophical Propaedeutic (see note 24 below) note that Hegel spent approximately fourteen years as a school teacher and private tutor before accepting his first full time salaried academic post in Heidelberg at the age of forty five; see, Hegel, G.W.F. (1986), The Philosophical Propaedeutic, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Blackwell), eds. M. George and A. Vincent, p. xiii. Hegel's appointment as Rector of the Gymnasium at Nuremberg was largely due to the influence of Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer (1766-1848) who was in charge of the reorganization of Bavarian schools at that time. Interestingly, Hegel and Niethammer had participated in the disputation of Hegel's Habilitationsthesen on opposite sides, at the University of Jena; see Naszek, N. (1987), Hegel's Habilitationsthesen: A Translation with Introduction and Annotated Bibliography', in D. Lamb (ed.) Hegel and Modern Philosophy (London: Croom Helm). An alternative examination to the one presented in this thesis of Hegel's pedagogy, and of the relationship between it and Niethammer's educational philosophy, can be found in Smith, John H. (1988), The Spirit and Its Letter (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), chapter 5.

11. It is important to note here that the experience which is modern education is, for Hegel, different from the experience which was the education of the ancients. In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit he notes that, 'the manner of study in ancient times differed from that of the modern age in that the former was the proper and complete formation of the natural consciousness. Putting itself to the test at every point of its existence, and philosophizing about everything it came across, it made itself into a universality that was active through and through. In modern times, however, the individual finds the abstract form ready-made...'. (p. 19) The difference is that for the ancients, activity never realized itself as substance, whereas in modern education the task is 'just the opposite, in freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity (identity!) so as to give actuality to the universal and impart to it spiritual life'. (p. 20.)

13. ibid. p. 279.
15. Hegel's educational theory is discussed in the introduction to The Philosophical Propaedeutic by the editors of that volume, pp. xiii-xvii.
16. The contradictory nature of Hegel's educational philosophy also gives rise to interpretations which seek to link it with the educational philosophies of national socialism, see, for example, Kellner, G.F. (1941), The Educational Philosophy of National Socialism (Yale University Press).

17. Even as a pupil Hegel had criticized non-experiential forms of education. In a school essay of 1788 entitled "On Some Characteristics Which Distinguish Ancient Writers (From Modern Ones)", he notes that whereas the ancients learnt from direct experience, modern education consisted of "the cold book-learning,...(by which) we learn from our youth up, the current mass of words and signs of ideas, and they rest in our heads without activity and without use", taken from Harris, H.S. (1972), Hegel's Development - Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801, p. 37.


20. ibid. p. 174-175.


22. There is a danger, therefore, in viewing the recently published Philosophical Propaedeutic as the 'content' of Hegel's courses in philosophy in the Gymnasium. Whilst the Propaedeutic does contain the philosophical knowledge which Hegel introduced to his students, it does not give any idea of the experience by which this substance becomes subject. Simply to teach the Propaedeutic as a course in philosophy, abstracts the content from its truth as result. It is important, therefore, in reading the Propaedeutic to also bear in mind the pedagogy by which its content becomes the actual education of the students; it is this pedagogy which is examined in this section of the thesis. This problem is relevant to any course which teaches Hegelian philosophy, for to teach a course on the system is not itself to produce the truth which is the system, which requires recognition in and as the experience of the student. It is in this respect that the dialectic of enlightenment is its own pedagogy. Despite the hopes of the editors of the Propaedeutic that it provides an introductory text 'in accord with Hegel's own spirit and intentions', (p. xii.) it is important to keep in mind that Hegel himself never wrote an introductory textbook. He was unsure for a number of years about whether to write a logic for gymnasium or university students, deciding finally upon the latter. The danger of offering the Propaedeutic as the textbook which Hegel did not write is highlighted by his comment to Niethammer (1808) that, 'a new science cannot be taught in a textbook for gymnasiums. The teachers cannot be handed a book which is as unfamiliar to them as to the students and which, as a compendium, could not contain the developments necessary for complete insight'. (Hegel: The Letters, p. 175, my emphasis.)


24. ibid. p. 263.

25. ibid. p. 293.


28. ibid. p. 263.

29. ibid. p. 263.

30. The content which constitutes this course of study is outlined in the Philosophical Propaedeutic, pp. 1-54 (see note 24 above). Such material would today best be exemplified by courses which integrate humanities disciplines into a broad field of study, an approach which is under threat from the 1988 Education Reform Act.


32. ibid. p. 276.

33. ibid. p. 264.


38. ibid. p. 280.
40. ibid. p. 280.
42. This course, as outlined on pp. 55-64 of the Propaedeutic, is therefore only a description of the experience of dialectic which Hegel is seeking to realize. To restrict students to merely learning this content would be to fail to recognize that content as misrecognition. This would then render the courses for the higher years on logic and the concept merely abstract, and not, therefore, the recognition of the truth of the preceding course. (These last two courses are found on pp. 65-123 of the Propaedeutic.
44. ibid. p. 282.
45. ibid. p. 264.
CHAPTER IV. HEGEL AND EDUCATION.

C - RECOGNIZING CRITIQUE.

1. Hegel, G.W.F. (1967), Philosophy of Right, p. 315; this remark is made by the translator of the volume, T.M. Knox, who is quoting from Aris, History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789-1815, p. 144. The term Bildung is obviously central to any educational reading of Hegelian philosophy, and discussions of this term can be found in Royce, J. (1964), Lectures on Modern Idealism (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press); Sall, I. (1972), 'Hegel as a Philosopher of Education', Educational Theory, Vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 26-33, and most recently in Smith, John H. (1988), The Spirit and Its Letter; the last two refer to the point made by Royce that the Phenomenology was a Bildungsroman in the style of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister. This thesis uses the term Bildung to refer to the development of the state, in order to separate it from the development of the educational self-identity of the concept. Bildung and phenomenology are the same movement and result; they consist in the experience of contradiction and return. What is lacking in the commentaries upon the educational in Hegel is any examination of how it is recognition which is the educational import of both phenomenology and Bildung. The lack of this recognition renders interpretations of both terms merely abstract, and lacking as self-content the very process they hope to describe. Without recognition of Bildung and phenomenology as misrecognition, each tends to be explained in terms of the presumed identity of the other, but neither, therefore, contain the duality which is their contradiction and movement. It is the duality of phenomenology as movement and result which has been re-cognized so far in this thesis, and it is the duality of Bildung as the development of the state and its realization that is now examined in this last section.

Smith’s interpretation of Bildung in Hegel differs from that found in this work. He argues that ‘his concept of Bildung reflects differing facets of rhetoric’ such that Hegel ‘transforms a traditional concept of rhetorical Bildung into a philosophical concept’, Smith, John H. (1988), The Spirit and Its Letter, p. x. He states that ‘Hegel’s interest in a proper mode of depicting truth ‘philosophically’ cannot avoid rhetorical criteria for dealing with the question of expression....The parameters preestablished for all discourse by the ans rhetorica still hold in a philosophical discourse that would dispense with them’ - ibid. p. 4. - and that therefore, ‘thanks to their rhetorical Bildung, both the individual and philosophy, regardless of their anti-rhetorical stance, have no other truth than the effective reality of their rhetorical self-presentation’, ibid. p. 277. However, Smith’s argument rests upon the idea that Bildung, as dialectic (p. 258), and as a ‘paradox’ (p. x) of activity and movement is forced to adopt a style of re-presentation which captures its own essence as movement whilst acknowledging that the re-presentation is all that can be known. My reading of Smith is that he has performed a postmodern interpretation of Bildung in Hegel, along the same lines as Adorno’s critique examined earlier in this work, which sees rhetoric as the expression of the negative which is mediation. Rhetoric as method therefore overcomes actuality as result; and is the presupposition, found in Adorno, of the separation of the content of the absolute from its ‘necessary’ representation as activity. Smith does not translate Wirklichkeit as actuality, but as ‘effective reality’, and argues that it is the paradox created by rhetoric in presenting philosophical concepts which has the ‘effective reality’.

The interpretation of Bildung in Hegel as rhetoric is itself a misrecognition of separation and of its actuality as determinate negation. Such an understanding of paradox and contradiction (i.e. of movement) is neither ‘effective’ nor ‘real’ with regard to its own activity. Whereas Smith presupposes the negation of actuality in rhetorical representation, this thesis recognizes the (presupposed)
non-actuality of rhetoric as result, or as Bildung itself.

6. ibid. p. 10.
14. ibid. p. 137.
22. ibid. p. 126.
23. ibid. p. 155.
24. ibid. p. 165.
25. ibid. p. 130.
26. ibid. p. 156.
27. ibid. p. 155.
28. ibid. p. 11.
29. ibid. p. 122.
30. ibid. p. 110.
34. Such a view can be found in the work of a recent philosopher of education, R.S. Peters, who notes that the teacher performs this dual role on behalf of the state. 'His job is to initiate others into what is regarded as worthwhile in itself. On the other hand he is also appointed to train people for some occupation and to act as an agent of selection in the competition for jobs and for higher education' – Peters, R.S. (1966), Ethics and Education (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 253. This view of the teacher as agent or functionary is a misrecognition of the relationship between master and student which is itself education, and which has been examined
earlier in this chapter.


37. ibid. p. 75.

38. ibid. p. 76.

39. ibid. p. 78.

40. ibid. p. 76.

41. ibid. p. 76.

42. ibid. p. 78.

43. For example, one philosopher of education has categorized the dichotomy as the 'indoctrinatory' and the 'isolationist' approach. The former implies 'the training of children to think and act in accordance with some first-order norm...the accepted public standards of contemporary society'; Wilson, J. (1967), Introduction to Moral Education (Penguin Books), p. 20. Whereas members of the "isolationist" group reject "moral education" chiefly because it seems to them to imply this view, and to involve indoctrination and other suspect of illegitimate modes of training for conformity', (ibid. p. 20).

An interesting example to note here is Durkheim's work on moral education. For Durkheim, morality is society, and moral education is socialization; but his work does not simply reduce to a crude theory of social reproduction. There is a sense in Durkheim in which obligation is related to the activity which is science, or sociology. The more one understands the truth of the social as the truth of individual existence, the more the individual conforms 'enlightened allegiance' to society, Durkheim, E. (1961), Moral Education (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe), p. 115. For Durkheim, sociology was education regarding the truth of totality; 'we liberate ourselves through understanding' the moral order which is society. (ibid. p. 116) This is not 'passive resignation' (ibid. p. 115) or functional reproduction, for it has as its cornerstone the idea of education as a realization of totality, a realization of obligation as activity rather than a merely abstract conformity to it. Sociology as active self-education is often overlooked in interpretations of Durkheim's work. One such recent interpretation can be found in Carr, D. (1991), Educating the Virtues (London: Routledge), who argues for individual moral consciousness over the experience of dependency which is Durkheim's sociology as active education. The criticism of Durkheim's approach that he identified the good with the social, to the exclusion of criticism, does not take sufficient account of the fact that for him sociology was already critical of the appearance of the individual in society. Sociology, for Durkheim, is an education regarding dependence. However, he is forced to presume the identity of dependence in the method of sociological moral education because he does not comprehend the contradiction of education regarding the truth of totality; the actuality of a sociological education lies further down the path of despair than Durkheim allows for.
The bibliography is divided into three sections. The first section lists Hegel's own works, and commentaries upon them which are referred to in the text and notes. The second section contains references to critical theory and includes the works of Habermas and Adorno which appear in the main text. The third section contains work on education which is specifically mentioned in the thesis, and is not in any sense a comprehensive bibliography of work in the sociology and philosophy of education which is relevant to this thesis.

HEGEL


Cullen, B. (1979), Hegel's Social and Political Thought (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan).


Harris, H.S. (1972), Hegel's Development - Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801 (Oxford University Press).


**CRITICAL THEORY.**


Habermas, J. (1966), 'Knowledge and Interest', Inquiry, ix.


Habermas, J. (1976), Legitimation Crises, trans. T. McCarthy (Heinemann).

Habermas, J. (1980), 'On the German-Jewish Heritage', Telos 44.


Lorrain, J. (1979), The Concept of Ideology (University of Georgia Press).


EDUCATION


Bruce, G.M. (1979), Luther as Educator (Connecticut: Greenwood Press).


Kellner, G.F. (1941), *The Educational Philosophy of National Socialism* (Yale University Press).


