DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A SOCIO-POLITICAL APPROACH

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Abstract

This study is concerned with the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) development administration with particular emphasis on the effect of its social and cultural features on its bureaucracy and indigenous civil servants.

The thesis analyses the U.A.E.'s political and historical background and its effects on the federal bureaucracy. It stresses that unless we understand the political and historical origins of the country, we will not be able to comprehend its administrative system.

The study examines the ecology of the U.A.E.'s public administration. It identifies socio-cultural, educational and demographic variables as the three main ecological forces that play a significant role.

The thesis provides a theoretical appraisal of the working of the federal administrative machinery in the U.A.E. It examines the administrative functions of the Federal Council of Ministers and the Federal Civil Service Council and identifies their weaknesses. The study explores the administrative problems facing the federal bureaucracy. Administrative inflation, shortage of indigenous skilled manpower, lack of job classification and the weakness of federal apparatuses in comparison to their local counterparts are the major stumbling blocks in the way of efficient administration in the U.A.E.

Through a questionnaire based survey which obtained 312 (81%) responses the thesis empirically confirms the linkage between the indigenous employees' administrative performance and the socio-cultural variables surrounding them. It reveals that most of the irrational attitudes and behaviour of indigenous employees are not solely the result of corruption but rather of the social and cultural pressures which force them to apply particularistic approaches i.e. nepotism, favouritism, etc, in order to satisfy their familial interests over their organizational interests. Accordingly, most indigenous civil servants decline to recognize the administrative obligations of their jobs as being more essential than their familial obligations.
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a study of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) civil service system with particular emphasis on the role orientation of indigenous administrators, and the expectations and pressures placed on them by their family members and others outside their work organizations. It argues that most of the irrational attitudes and behaviour of employees is not solely the result of corruption but rather of the social and cultural pressures which force them to use particularistic approaches i.e. favouritism, nepotism, etc, in order to satisfy their familial interests over their organizational interests, because if they deviated from these expectations the social consequences would be severe and intolerable for them. Thus, this thesis is an attempt to link employees administrative performance with the socio-cultural variables surrounding their organizations. It concedes that the employees' administrative behaviour reproduces the general behaviour pattern which dominates the society.

Modern effective public administration is a strategically important requirement in a society that is undergoing economic and social development. It is vitally important for developing countries where defects and uncertainties may paralyse movement towards set goals and objectives.

It has been recognized that most administrative doctrines and patterns introduced into developing countries have failed to achieve their goals and aims. Sometimes they have even achieved the opposite result to that sought although the same patterns applied in other parts of the world were extremely successful. Basically, it is a fatal mistake to neglect or ignore the crucial components of a society which can make or mar any pattern
of development. These crucial components are the social, cultural and traditional systems of the country.

Although public administration involves deliberate historical choices about the nature of administration, it must grow out of its environment. It does not work in isolation but reflects the values, norms and ills of society. It affects, and in return is affected by, these elements. Its output is regarded as an input for society and its input is conceived as an output for society. Therefore, any weakness or strength in society will be unfailingly reflected in its performance. Accordingly we have argued throughout this thesis that any administrative system must be seen and studied within the context of its own peculiar environment. The effectiveness and capabilities of an administration lie in its understanding of the external variables with which it has to interact every day. Therefore, focusing on organizational structures and procedures alone was the fatal mistake made by many of the reforming programmes suggested for the U.A.E. government. Among them was the United Nations sponsored programme to improve the federal bureaucracy in the U.A.E. in 1980.

This thesis represents a study of the development administration in the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), as a developing country and a modernizing society, with special emphasis on the effect of its social and cultural variables on its bureaucracy and civil servants. It argues that the cultural and social setting plays an influential role on both the structure and the function of its civil service and hence represents a vital set of variables affecting the effectiveness and capability for change in its administration.

Bureaucracy in the U.A.E., in spite of its simplicity and its short life, has developed very rapidly in a way that has led to a form of administrative anarchy. Lack of foresight among the developmental planners and the influx of petro-dollars to the country meant the government had to scramble to find ways to distribute these dollars among its nationals, and recruiting them into the public sector seemed the one available solution at
the time. Stavrianos has described the administration in the state of Kuwait in a way which may apply to the situation in the U.A.E. He argues:

"The citizens of the desert states are employed in sundry government service. In practice, these people are paid to do virtually nothing .... Most of the meaningful and productive work is performed by immigrant labour recruits from Egypt, Sudan, Palastine and other neighbouring countries."(1)

No doubt political considerations were uppermost in the minds of the Gulf sheikhs when they decided to depend heavily on foreigners. Clearly that was the case after the second Gulf War when the Egyptian and Syrian governments were rewarded for their roles in the war by having their subjects recruited to the public sectors of the U.A.E. and other Gulf states. Furthermore, the U.A.E. and other Gulf states are faced with the problem of how to distribute the oil revenues without disrupting monarchs' and sheikhs' personal interests and without challenging the social and traditional structure of their societies. To solve this dilemma they decided to distribute their oil wealth as broadly as possible, but to allow foreigners to carry out most of their technical services, thereby reducing the danger of structural change in their societies.

Political development in the U.A.E. over the past twenty-one years has inadvertently introduced in its wake a lowering of efficiency in the public service. When the existing seven emirates came together in one country in December 1971, this sudden political event led to the establishment of a new public service, based on other Arab experience, primarily Egyptian, which was not in tune with the prevalent social, political and economic conditions, nor with the tribal and Bedouin nature of the U.A.E. people.

Bureaucracy in the United Arab Emirates is quite unlike bureaucracy in most Arab countries. The reason lies in the tremendous accumulated resources generated from oil revenues which enables the government to build any necessary new infrastructure within a much shorter time since it does not suffer from a lack of financial liquidity. It is also different from most Gulf states in that it operates on two administrative levels, federal and local. The two systems are distinct but most of the time clash, especially since there is a gulf between the advanced local administration of Abu-Dhabi and Dubai and the more backward local bodies in the other emirates. Therefore, the problems which face the U.A.E. are significantly different from those in other in Arab countries, even from those in the Gulf Cooperation countries.

Foremost among these problems is the weakness of the federal administrative apparatus in comparison with its local counterparts. The refusal of the local governments to allow greater sovereignty to the federal institutions handicaps, if not paralyses, the federal institutions. As a result, institutions are duplicated and overlap at the emirate level and local institutions retain the real authority in their emirates, while the role of the federal institutions is severely limited. This problem, in fact, is purely an emirate one, it does not exist anywhere else in the Arab World; accordingly, the solution should come from within and from indigenous scholars, not from outsiders. Other critical problems also exist, among them the economic disparity between the constituent emirates and the reflection of this on the administration; bureaucratic inflation; lack of indigenous manpower, etc. The empirical part of this study has tackled many of these issues through an extensive survey of perceptions, values and expectations and an enquiry as to the extent civil servants perceptions are influenced by socio-cultural variables.

Throughout the study a critical approach has been used; difficulties and constraints have been identified, and where weaknesses in the U.A.E. system have been noticed these have been highlighted and criticized.
Introduction

Organization of the Thesis:

The thesis is divided into 8 chapters. Chapter 1, offers an introductory framework to the study and stresses the importance of administration as a vehicle for development. The role of development administration as a comprehensive approach to development is also discussed. Subsequent chapters focus attention on the U.A.E. as a developing country struggling towards improving its administrative system.

The U.A.E.'s historical and political background are the subject of chapter 2. The chapter seeks in particular to identify those historical and political aspects of U.A.E. society most likely to affect the administrative institutions of the country. Chapter 2 traces the U.A.E.'s early development. Unless we understand the historical and political origins of the country, we will not be able to comprehend its administrative system. The chapter sets out to examine the evolution of the country as an independent state and the problems it has encountered and identifies those who have been the major power brokers and decision-makers in the country.

Chapter 3 focuses attention on the ecology of the U.A.E.'s public administration. It highlights three main ecological forces at work in the society. These forces are socio-cultural, educational and demographic forces. Paternalism, favouritism and formalism are the results of socio-cultural variables. Lack of independent thinking and avoidance of responsibilities are the immediate outcomes of the educational system. Finally, apathy and carelessness are the consequences of demographic factors. The chapter explains how these ills are the natural product of indigenous conditions of the country.

Chapter 4 discusses the scope of public administration and the structure of the federal administrative machinery in the U.A.E. The roles of the Federal Council of Ministers and Federal Civil Service are described. The relationship between the Federal
Government and the constituent governments is fully evaluated. A comparison between two patterns of local administration (Abu-Dhabi and Ras Al Khaimah) is also discussed.

In chapter 5 problems acting as stumbling blocks in the way of modern efficient administration are identified and analysed. The effect of a loose form of federation on administration is evaluated. Administrative inflation and lack of indigenous skilled manpower are recognized as crucial problems facing the administrative system in the U.A.E.

Chapters 6 and 7 concern the methods and procedures used for the field study conducted by the researcher. Each method of field study is debated in detail. Questionnaires were designed to cover all aspects of administration in the U.A.E. and the results are discussed in detail. The main findings of the survey are that most indigenous participants declined to recognize the administrative obligations of their jobs as being more important than their familial obligations.

Chapter 8 represents an attempt to draw some general conclusions from the study and to provide some recommendations to improve the administration in the United Arab Emirates. It concedes that the process of development is a comprehensive one which, if it begins with political and educational improvement, will hopefully end in an appropriate and efficient administration.
CHAPTER ONE

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction:

Almost five decades have passed since many Western (i.e developed) governments, private enterprises and various voluntary organizations first launched development programmes aimed at eradicating the problems of poverty, malnutrition and disease from Africa, South East Asia and Latin America. Many development projects have been introduced to these countries, all of them based on the experience of the Western cultures. Gradually we have become aware that the consequences of applying their theories may be disappointing, paradoxical, and often the opposite of those intended. The gap between Western countries and the third world has increased and widened; the West constitutes 25% of the world population and enjoys about 80% of world resources, while the rest of the world constitutes 75% of the world population but enjoys no more than 20% of world resources. According to the World Health Organization census, 280 thousand babies die every week, the majority in Africa, from malnutrition. Moreover, 400 million are deprived of schooling. Significantly, the poverty level in Western countries is higher than the salary of many top officials in developing countries.

The question to be asked here is why the methods devised by the West were successful in developing their own countries while, those same methods failed to achieve similar goals in other parts of the world? Is the defect in the methods or in the recipient

countries? If the defect is in the recipient countries, is it in the political, social or economic systems?

Fred Riggs implicitly answers this question by reminding us of the old conundrum which asks: What is the difference between a woman and a diplomat? The answer is: When a diplomat says yes he means may be, when he says may be he means no, and if he says no he is not a diplomat. By contrast, of course, the lady means maybe when she says no, yes when she says maybe, and is no lady if she says yes. In other words a scheme is viable if appropriate to its context and, therefore, the developmental models and theories are contingent on the general setting in which they are to be implemented. In short, what is appropriate for General Motors is not necessarily appropriate for other firms. Do it as we have done it, or follow in our footsteps, is not always the best advice.

In the 1960's Western development administration emerged as a magic term and development administration experts were seen as magicians. All this revived hope and renewed the confidence in the ability of the Western scholars to guide the rest of the world towards prosperity and privileges.

Primarily, this chapter will review and examine the literature of development administration, its emergence as an independent set of concepts, the difference between it and comparative public administration and the nature of the problems it has to address. Finally it will examine our actual definition of development administration. For these purposes the chapter will be divided into two parts, part one devoted to the primary issues above and part two devoted to the various models of development administration: specifically, Fred Riggs' Prismatic Model, Milton Esman's Institution building and Al-Kubaisy's Sheikhocratic model will be the focus of the second part.

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Development Prescription and the Third World:

Most of us recall the fable of the six blind men with the elephant. Each of them comes up with a different definition depending upon which part of the elephant he has touched. The one who touched the leg described him as a tree, others, as a wall, rope, a spear—they all arrive at a different interpretation.

The metaphor of the blind men is very much applicable to development administration scholars. Each of them looks at development from his own angle and there is no common agreement as to precisely what is the main objective of development whether it is to increase the G.N.P. of developing countries, as the economists hope, or to increase political participation on a democratic basis, as politicians argue.

Despite the substantial concern about development in both developed and developing countries, development is still a vague and elusive concept in the current literature. It is sometimes used in its very narrow sense to mean industrialization, modernization, urbanization, westernization or secularization⁴ and sometimes refers to increasing the living standards to reach the western level. Advocates of this theory argue that the countries with a high G.N.P. and high national income may be considered to be developed.⁵

In contrast, the political approach to development argues that development means the transformation of villages or tribal-based societies into nation states. In the words of Lucian W. Pye:

"This process might also be called Westernization, or simply advancement and progress; it might, however, be more accurately termed the diffusion of a world culture based on advanced technology and the spirit of science, on a rational view

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of life, a secular approach to social relations................., and, above all, on the acceptance in the political realm of the belief that the prime unit of the polity should be the nation state."(6)

Another view is that of the humanists who see development as:
"Enhancing self-esteem and a sense of efficacy or ability to make choices about the future."(7)

From yet another perspective, Riggs argues that development is enhancing the ability and capability of the people to make collective decisions which might lead in the long run to environmental changes. For Riggs, growth, modernization, urbanization, nation building and democratization are not development, they are in fact the signs of development in the same way as a pulse in the body is a sign of life but not life itself.(8) These variations in the meaning and scope of development depend very much on the background and area of interest of the scholars involved. Basically, however, all agree that the Western model is the inevitable baseline for developing countries because no alternative model has been found to produce the same results. In other words, if the developing countries want to develop they must adopt Western values and economic and political systems to reach what West has achieved. Let's put it in rather simplistic terms. The assumption was that the defect, whatever its nature, remained with the periphery (i.e. developing countries) and the solution was always to be found in the centre (i.e. developed countries). That is, developed countries not only possessed the medicines but also happened to be the doctor. The Western prescription was therefore the only way to cure the patient. But after several decades of treatment the patient came to realize that the Western medicine was merely a pain-killer and not a genuine remedy.

Accordingly, in the 1950s scholars and practitioners in the Western world, particularly in the U.S.A. realized that what was appropriate and worked well in their own countries would not necessarily lead to the same results in other countries. What is food for one is perhaps not food for all.\(^9\) Based on that assumption, many scholars have shifted their attention to a comparative perspective and a cross-cultural approach aiming to find universal theories applicable to the various cultures and societies in the developing countries.

The theory of comparative public administration emerged as a response to this demand. What are the main themes of comparative public administration? What is the difference between it and development administration? Before we attempt to answer these questions it is essential to agree on a term which describes adequately the non-developed world.

**Third World and the Conflict of Definitions:**

There are quite number of terms in the current literature which describe the less developed countries of the world. The most familiar are 'periphery-centre', 'developing', 'less developed', 'transitional', 'non-western' and so on. Obviously, most of these terms have been coined by western scholars, based on their own personal concepts of development, and as a result there is much dispute and disagreement among them as to the most appropriate term to be used in describing third-world countries.

One group divides the world into three categories: the 'First World', which comprises the United States and the Western European countries; 'Second World', consisting of the

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9 - Fred Riggs, op. cit., p 73.
industrial countries in the former Communist bloc; and the 'Third World' which comprises the world not included in the previous two categories.\(^{10}\)

For various reasons, however, these divisions have ceased to be valid. For instance, after the decline of Communism and the huge changes in all governmental structures of the so-called 'Second World', do we still call it the 'Second World'? Furthermore, is it fair to categorize countries like the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia, which have high G.N.Ps, modern facilities and high national incomes, with countries such as Bangladesh, Somalia or Burma, where even the most basic human needs are not available?

A second group of scholars classify the world simply into Western and non-Western. This classification is conceptually misleading and empirically unsound. After all, there are many countries which share the characteristics and culture of the West yet remain less than fully developed, such as Portugal and the Latin American countries. In contrast, there are industrialized countries such as Japan, Singapore and South Korea which are not considered Western despite having a standard of living equal to Western countries.\(^{11}\)

A third group prefers to use the terms 'transitional' or 'developing' to refer to third world countries. These terms are also inadequate and inaccurate since all countries, including western European, the United States and the U.S.S.R, are still in a state of transition. 'Developing' also seems a vague term

"Since there is no general agreement on what a developed country ought to be like."\(^{12}\)

Finally, many scholars prefer to use 'centre-periphery' to describe third world countries.\(^{13}\) Advocates of this term divide the world from the strategic point of view.

Thus, there are countries considered to be at the centre and others on the periphery.


\(^{11}\) Amer AlKubassi, op. cit., p10.

\(^{12}\) Ibid, p 12.

'Centre' countries represent the developed world while 'periphery' describes the undeveloped. For many people this term covers most of the foregoing elements and also solves the problem of the classification of the oil-rich countries, as well as the industrialized South Asian countries such as South Korea, Singapore and others. Although this term is a bit sensitive for third world countries who experienced colonization, it does represent the real situation.

My primary purpose in stressing the importance of correct definition is to prove that any administrative model or approach applied to developing countries should take into consideration the cultural, political, and economic differences among them. The failure of one approach in one country does not mean it will fail in another. Conversely, the success of a certain approach in one country does not necessarily mean success in another. Thus, generalization is misleading and delusive.

Comparative Public Administration:

Comparative public administration emerged as a reaction to the traditional school of administration, which is sometimes referred to as rational or classic. In time, many scholars, practitioners and students of public administration began to realize that the rational or classic approach which dominated the study of public administration in the 1950s was too rigid and based on the American and European administrative experience which was largely irrelevant to third world experience. Furthermore, we may assume that one of the fundamental reasons behind the increasing interest in comparative public administration among scholars was associated with the complex of guilt towards the problems of poverty, deprivation, ignorance and illness in the developing countries. Several programmes had been launched to assist these countries in their struggle with these problems. Consequently,

there was a genuine need for a universal administrative theory which took into account the ecological, social and economic circumstances of these countries.

The cornerstone of this new approach to administration, as Nimrod Raphaeli argues, was:

"To identify the success or failure, to explain the differences in behaviour of bureaucrats and bureaucracies in different countries and cultures, and finally, to discern what changes, if any, ought to be introduced and how they can be introduced, to improve the performance of a bureaucracy."(15)

On the other hand, James D. Thompson and others argue that comparative public administration:

"Has been synonymous with cross-cultural or cross-national studies of administration, and comparative business administration has referred to business outside of the United States, or to the foreign operations of American firms"....

Despite the significance of the cultural dimension in this study, however, he concedes that comparative public administration

"Cannot be limited to cultural comparison alone." (16)

Others, describe comparative public administration as:

"The theory of public administration as applied to diverse cultures and national settings and the body of factual data, by which it can be expanded and tested."(17)

It appears to me that this definition implicitly indicates that since the concept of public administration was originated by American scholars to serve certain societies within certain cultures and national settings, its validity is limited to these societies. If this is what the definition really means it certainly casts doubt on its validity as a universal concept suitable for developing as well as developed countries.

It is essential to highlight two main factors influencing the study of comparative public administration.

First: The ideal type of bureaucracy presented by Max Weber has been central to the study of public administration in general and subsequently to comparative public administration. Weber claims that there are three types of authority: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational.\(^{(18)}\)

Second: Another major body of literature that influenced the study of comparative public administration is that of comparative politics. We think it true to say that most comparative public administration scholars have been political scientists rather than administrators. Their approach to administration has been political rather than administrative. It may be worth noting that comparative public administration was primarily originated by political scientists during the American Political Science Association Conference in 1953.\(^{(19)}\)

The Salient Stages of Comparative Public Administration:

Comparative public administration, like any other discipline, has gone through several stages (Ferrel Heady, calls them 'motivating concerns) until it has reached the final stage which we may call the declining stage (elderly).

Three salient stages will be identified and discussed.

\(^{19}\) - Ferrel Heady, op. cit., p 1.
1. **The traditional and rational stage:**

In this stage most scholars were keen to introduce theories, frameworks, approaches and models and in order to do so were compelled to borrow from other fields, such as politics, sociology, anthropology, etc.

Due to the strong necessity to expound a methodology, many scholars put forward abstract models, theories and approaches. Among them was Fred Riggs who was considered to be one of the foremost contributors in this field. As Ferrel Heady claims, Riggs is:

"Representative of theorists who have cast a wide net and have formulated comprehensive social theories."(20)

2. **The search for an arena:**

The escalating problems of developing countries, such as poverty, illness, ignorance and the like, and the demands of the assistance programmes launched by international organizations such as, the United Nations, U.S.A.I.D, Food For Peace, and other private organizations like, the Ford Foundation, have attracted many individuals to comparative administration. The substantial financial contributions from these agencies also played a part in attracting those individuals. After the frameworks and models were introduced they needed a laboratory to test their validity, and the third world countries were the ideal testing ground. The major conclusion of these tests is that administrative processes and procedures constitute the crucial element in the development plans of these countries.(21) In other words, administrative systems are recognized to be a key element of development doctrine. Accordingly, experts of this field have shifted their interest to administrative systems which

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indicates a decline in traditional schemes and the emergence of a new administrative concept to be called development administration.

3. Development administration substitutes concept:

Formerly, most studies, models and theories introduced to developing countries were based on Weberian bureaucratic principles. This meant specialization of functions, an impersonal, hierarchical structure and oppressive rules and regulations. The new tendency has been to focus increasingly on the ecological dimensions of development and administration in particular. The major difference between the early and the more recent method is summarized by Nimrod Raphaeli, who argues that,

"The former assumed cultural dimensions to be constant and consequently disregarded the effects of culture upon administration. The ecological approach (development administration), on the other hand, asserts that administrative behaviour is not random - it is an outgrowth of the interaction of cultural traits and values and administration ".(22)

In sum, comparative public administration is perceived by many writers as one way of settling the fundamental dispute between two major schools of administration theory:

First, that which is based on the assumption that:

"Each field of administration rests on unique elements, on contrasts and variables which are not merely different in degree from one field to another but are different in kind."(23)

Second, that which is opposed to this tendency and insists that administration is the same phenomenon in whatever framework.(24)

24 - Ibid, p 664.
The Evolution of Development Administration

The first interest in development administration began when scholars, practitioners and students of American public administration became involved in managing financial assistance to third world countries. Those scholars were shaken when they discovered that their academic equipment was inappropriate to the culture and values of these countries. They also realized that their public administration principles were rigid, culture-bound and extremely dogmatic. Consequently, the traditional concept of public administration was certainly not the ideal guide for third world development. Thus, there has been an urgent call for a more flexible concept applicable to non-Western cultures. The countries who suffer from corruption, over-population, poverty, ignorance and so on demand a concept which takes into account their uniqueness, a concept which respects their values, traditions and customs. The American administrative model proved totally unsuitable. Thus, development administration emerged as a new and revolutionary paradigm, hoping to reshape the whole structure of the recipient countries. Paul Meadows stresses this view, arguing that:

"Development administration, because it is prompted by the urgencies and dimensions of total change, is perhaps the most revolutionary of all the major transformations changing the face and form of societies the world over."

On the face of it development administration has arisen merely as a reaction to the classical and Weberian approach to administration. Therefore, the question to be asked here is, did development administration as a new concept emerge to overcome the negative

results of the former approach? Or is it a new fashion introduced by the West to exploit the developing countries resources? Is it just public administration in non-western countries? Fadlallah Ali argues that in order to answer these questions we have first to have what he calls a paradigmatic consensus not merely between western scholars but also between those who are going to be affected by development programmes and models, i.e. the periphery scholars.\(^{(28)}\)

In the following pages we explore in turn how different authors define development administration and how each of them stresses different aspects of the concept. It will be found that all agree that it is an effort towards an organized and planned transformation of an economy, involving not merely the administrative aspect but also the political and social aspects of the society.

**The meaning of development administration:**

Like experts in any other social subjects, those in public administration find it hard to define the exact meaning of development administration. Each of them perceives it from his own angle. Due to its recent emergence in comparison with other social sciences, some writers confuse it with administrative change, or administrative reform, or administrative development. Others believe that it refers to the administrative problems in developing countries.\(^{(29)}\)

To avoid the pitfalls of many writers, we should identify the difference between three interrelated concepts, administrative development, administrative reform and administrative change.

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Administrative development:

The administrative system is the major concern of administrative development. As William J. Siffin, argues it is the process of:

"Reshaping of entire administrative systems through direct approaches to the modification of system norms and forms."(30)

The main questions administrative development is concerned with is how do we modernize the administrative system? How do we reorganize the whole structure of administration to ease the flow of communication? How do we improve the decision making process?(31)

Administrative Reform:

The idea of reform here is comprehensive, indeed macro, due to its link with the whole of a country's administrative system and development programmes. Furthermore, administrative reform is not merely concentrated on the administrative process but its application may transcend that process to cover the whole society. Thus, the change which may occur is not accidental, it is the result of long-term planning.(32)

Administrative change:

According to Linn A. Hammergren, administrative change is:

"The spontaneous or induced transformation of administrative structure or procedures. While the primary concern here is with induced change, it should be remembered that many changes and

30 - Amer Al-Kubaisy, op. cit., p 23.
31 - Fadellah Ali, op. cit., p 32.
improvements are either the unintended by-products of other programmes or the result of unplanned events or trends".\(^{(33)}\)

In short, it is invariably accidental or unplanned.

**Development Administration:**

Contemporary administrative science is rich with definitions, approaches and themes which explore the nature of development administration. It is amazing how two such innocent words could mean so many different things to so many different writers. It is too elusive a concept to define, hence the difficulty scholars are having in resolving the precise meaning of the concept. Some writers look at the concept as a vehicle for innovative ideas, while others argue it is action oriented or goal oriented. On the other hand, some scholars claim that development administration is a political process, others argue that it is a social process associated with culture, values and norms of society, and still others see it as a political, economic and social process aimed at creating major transformation and change in state systems.

We may divide development administration scholars into three groups:

**First,** those who refer to development administration as a general concept, but do not point to any particular ways or means of achieving development.

**Second,** those who are interested in the political context of administration.

**Third,** those indigenous scholars who regard it as an instrument of Western imperialism inherently designed to exploit their countries, and who are eager to achieve their own administrative style suited to their own culture and tradition.\(^{(34)}\)

Let us discuss in some detail the different arguments of each group.

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The general concept group:

In this group is Merle Fainsod, who defines development administration as:

"A carrier of innovating values....... it embraces the array of new functions assumed by developing countries embarking on the path of modernization and industrialization".

He goes on to say:

"It ordinarily involves the establishment of machinery for planning economic growth and mobilizing and allocating resources to expand national income."(35)

Apparently Fainsod falls into the same trap many Western scholars have fallen into. He conceives of development as a process to foster industrialization, increase agricultural products, develop natural resources and enhance transportation and communication networks...(36) He views development from the materialistic point, insisting on economic growth and expansion of national income.

Edward Wiedner, however, views development administration as:

"A state of mind, a tendency, a direction. Rather than a fixed goal, it is a rate of change in a particular direction."(37)

He argues that development administration is never ended or finished; it is adaptable, it modifies its goals and objectives according to the situation. Therefore, there are no fixed or firm goals because they depend entirely on the demands of the situation. In other words,
the most developed administrative system is the one that can induce new behaviour and values in response to changes in circumstances.

To D. C. Stone, development administration is a process of developing and applying, policies, plans, projects and programmes, in order to create a change in the attitudes and behaviour of people towards life, education and work destined to achieve a progressive society through modern technology and human social relations.\(^{(38)}\)

Although I personally am in favour of many elements in this definition, most specifically the idea of the human aspect as an agent of change, on the whole I find it too vague. The writer fails to explain how the change in the attitudes and behaviour of people is to be brought about.

The political concept group:

This group of scholars have addressed themselves to the political dimensions of development administration. They argue that development is the output of the political apparatus. They assume that the more politically advanced or mature the country is, the greater the possibility of achieving development.\(^{(39)}\) According to this approach the Western countries are developed and advanced as a result of their political maturity and stability. Therefore, the heart of any development is not based on economic or administrative bodies but rather on the political system.

Joseph La Palombara is a supporter of this approach. He believes that:


"Political development is in part an independent phenomenon
which can and often has and does influence change in other
sectors."(40)

The advocates of the political context of development argue that if the political
processes are not advanced enough to enforce social and economic changes in a society,
there would obviously be shortfalls and disappointments in achieving developmental
objectives.(41)

The political approach also argues that a hierarchy of priorities has to be taken into
consideration when we plan for development. Ibraham Maslow's hierarchy of human
needs could be applicable to the social system. Fred Riggs explains how. He argues that:

"In social systems there are needs at higher levels which become
urgent only after needs at lower levels have been met......
administrative improvements are helpful, but only after certain
preconditions in government structure have been satisfied' (42)

It is worth noting that the political framework of development lacks the ability to
investigate the relationship between administration and politics. Are administrators' attitudes
and behaviour decided and determined by the nature of political doctrines? Do they differ
from one political system to another ?(43) In other words, do the roles of administrators in
capitalist states differ from communist, tribal or traditional countries?

Apparently, the advocates of this approach to development have the ability to initiate
questions and hypotheses, but their practical and empirical experience is very limited.

40 - Joseph LaPlombara, Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative
Capabilities in Emerging Nations,in Fred Riggs (ed), Frontiers of Development
41 - J. N. Khosla, Development Administration: New Dimensions, The Indian
42 - Fred Riggs, op. cit., p 82.
Therefore, significant efforts are needed in this field, especially with regard to the relationship of administration and politics in Third World countries.

**The indigenous concept group:**

The major theme of this group is that what is useful for the U.S.A. and other Western polities is of limited use in most developing countries. Indeed, the failures and dysfunctions of certain developmental approaches in these countries have supplied the evidence that this group needs to convince their people of the inadequacy of the Western approaches. Thus, they recognize development administration as a process that cannot be imported from abroad.\(^{(44)}\)

According to this approach, development is the output of the indigenous social, economic, and political systems; therefore, to ensure the success of any developmental plans the input must be suitable to the indigenous culture, tradition, and environment. Hence, successful development is that which evolves at the point of need and absorbs the indigenous environmental variables.

Another factor which has confirmed the indigenous group in its approach is the ignorance of Western scholars who seem unable to recognize the intellectual contribution and efforts of the periphery scholars unless they have first been legitimized and approved by established Western scholars.\(^{(45)}\)

\(^{44}\) Amer Al-Kubaisy, op. cit., p 26.

Development administration: the human perspective

It is our belief that because the human being is the source of all invention, innovation and achievement of any development plan. It is the quality of its human beings which distinguishes the developed country from the undeveloped. Therefore, we define development administration as the organized effort to realize latent human potential through reinforcing the confidence of indigenous people in their abilities to create and improve their own environment. This involves the inculcation of acceptable attitudes and aspirations and the promotion of skills, talent and knowledge. This definition recognizes that the vital catalyst in any nation's development is the human being, man himself. He is the heart and the centre of development and development is meaningless if he is not seen to be central to the process. Of course, we do not suggest that the realization of human potential is the only goal of development but in it lies the very essence of the exercise. According to this definition administrators are regarded as institution builders and agents of social change, not merely law and order enforcers. We look at the role of development administration, contending that lack of technical skills is not the root cause of failure to achieve developmental goals in many developing countries. Clearly the problems lie in the ability of these countries to utilize human talents and skills in an appropriate manner.

The questions to be asked here are how can one locate, identify, and stimulate these potentials, strengthen and utilize them to fulfil development goals and consolidate them as a nucleus of development so that they become the firm basis of a modern society. To me administrators in developing countries are the conduit to development. Once their needs have been fulfilled, their work conditions improved and the social pressure on them eased, their commitment to development goals will ultimately increase.
Handicaps of development administration:

Development administration is like any other new concept faced with various weaknesses which disable and handicap it in the pursuit of its ultimate goals and objectives. Some of these weaknesses may be inherent in the concept itself (e.g., theories, approaches and models), others may be attributed to the scholars and practitioners and finally others may lie within the environmental conditions (e.g., physical, human and cultural). Due to the significance of environmental conditions in development administration, we would prefer to start with them.

(1) The environmental conditions:

Fred Riggs, one of the pioneers, in the field of development administration, argues that environmental conditions are the fundamental problems which may disrupt the functions of development administration. So what are these conditions? Riggs suggests three conditions crucial to the success of development administration: these are, physical, human and cultural.

(A) The physical environment:

Riggs argues that the location of a country dictates administrative doctrines appropriate to its environment; in other words, the problems of countries located in temperate zones are different from those of others located in the tropics. Certain environments present considerable impediments and obstacles to an undeveloped system and mean that the probability of that systems changing or adapting is very low. By the same token, developed systems are more amenable to change and modification because of the favourable nature of their physical environments.

47 - Ibid, p 97.
(B) Human environment:

Three decades ago many social scientists believed that there were quite distinctive differences between the various races. They claimed that certain races, particularly those which were white, had a special superiority over other races, specifically those which were coloured or black. They insisted that the former were capable of learning and achieving goals and objectives while the others were the opposite. In other words, Western administrative doctrines were seen as helpful and beneficial because they were mastered and put into practice by other than coloured or black races, i.e whites.

Others regarded lack of skills, experience and knowledge as the major impediment to development administration in developing countries. Therefore, they suggested intensive educational programmes to speed up the training of persons in the requisite knowledge and skills.(48)

(C) Cultural environment:

Language and religion are two of the basic elements in the cultural environment, and as such are the subject of extensive study and research. As with the physical environment argument, many writers claim that certain languages and religions could be obstacles to development and that those who happen to speak an appropriate language e.g, English, French, Germany, etc, are more likely to develop and utilize scientific terms, whereas, those who speak an inappropriate language are less likely to develop and advance.

Similar arguments have been used about religion to explain the backwardness of many societies. Some writers argue that religion may be another obstacle to development, among them Max Weber who believed that Protestantism was the appropriate religion for

48 -Ibid. p 101.
development while those who are non-Christians have only a very small possibility of achieving development and civilization.\(^{(49)}\)

Actually the foregoing argument about religion and language being obstacles to development has no basis in empirical fact. It is an extremely weak argument which does not stand up to close scrutiny. Furthermore, history proves that many languages which are today regarded as dead dominated the field of knowledge in the past. On the other hand, currently there are many countries in Asia and Africa who have liberated themselves from their culture and language thus losing their identity but have failed to achieve development. In contrast, we find that countries which grasped and attached themselves to their own language and culture have often reached high levels of development and advancement (e.g. Japan, Korea and Taiwan).

(2) Conceptual Weakness:

The most frequent complaints about this new concept is that it lacks a clear paradigm to render it valid as a basis for a field study. It faces what we may call an identity or intellectual crisis. Meanwhile, the intellectual gap between developed and developing countries has widened instead of shrinking and narrowing. O.P. Dwivedi and J. Nef argue that development administration has caused:

"Instead of development and nation-building, turmoil and fragmentation throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America."\(^{(50)}\)
(3) Scholars Pitfalls:

Scholars of development administration are criticized for their lack of empirical research. They stay in their ivory towers away from the practical field. They fail to narrow the gap between academic and the real world. Theory is important but it has to be tested and grounded empirically to prove its validity. Most scholars ignore the dictum "facts first, theories second". (51)

A second criticism is that most development administration scholars are politically oriented, indeed are political scientists first and administrative scientists second, and few of them have had extensive administration experience. Because most of them are pure politicians there is little they can offer in the field of administrative science.

Finally, Garth Jones, argues that in order to understand a society to the degree which enables one to write about it, it is essential to understand its language, culture and values. He asks how many scholars have become deeply immersed in the cultures about which they write? He believes that most scholars:

" wrote about the new societies in which they lived, but scarcely took the time to learn the language and other important cultural aspects ". (52)

Development Administration Models: theory and Practice

Models can never embody the whole picture or reality but, by providing a significant version of reality, they do enable the researcher to understand the phenomena he intends to study. They are systemic ways of looking at things. The significance of a model is that it

51 - Carth N. Jones, op. cit., p105.
52 - Ibid, p104.
Chapter one provides a conceptual framework within which we may view complex phenomena in a more simple way.\(^{(53)}\)

According to Fred Riggs, a model is:

"Any structure of symbols and operating rules which we think has a counterpart in the real world"\(^{(54)}\)

No matter how sophisticated or complete a model is, the real world is always different. Bearing this in mind we would like to devote this part of the chapter to examining three distinguished models which have been introduced to developing countries and which are varied in their analysis, paradigms and approach to development. Two have been introduced by Western scholars with long experience in developing countries, namely Fred Riggs (prismatic theory) and Milton Esman (institution building); and the third model by Amer Al-Kubaisy a well known Iraqi scholar who is the author of several studies in development administration and specializes in the particular culture and political system of the Gulf States. He calls his model "Sheikhocracy".

Before we discuss these models, it is essential to identify and review the theoretical framework, conceptual guidelines and strategies they have followed. In fact, there are two broad schools of thoughts to development administration and each school has two alternative strategies. Warren F. Ilchiman has called the first "administrative systems strategies" and the second, "the social systems approach".\(^{(55)}\)

(1) Administrative system approach:

The two alternative strategies arising from this school are:

\(^{53}\) Nimrod Raphaeli, op. cit., p 7.
(A) The balanced administrative growth strategy:

This strategy suggests that piecemeal changes in bureaucracy are inadequate and have negative results on the administration. Its emphasis is on the whole administrative structure. Accordingly, the changing process has to cover the whole body of administration and this includes personnel, financial, planning and communication systems.

(B) The unbalanced administrative growth strategy:

The advocates of this strategy argue that if a country is equipped with the skilled administrators and financial resources to create a modern administrative system, as the former strategy suggests, then it would definitely not be regarded as undeveloped at all. Therefore, it criticizes the comprehensive view of all aspects of an administrative system having a common origin. It argues that change or improvement in one administrative area would ultimately impose a demand on other parts. The advocates of this strategy insist on the administrative aspect as the concrete prerequisite of any development plan. In other words, the improvement of the administration would automatically mean improvement in other sectors.\(^{56}\)

(2) The social system approach:

Representatives of this approach view society as composed of interdependent subsystems and therefore any change which may occur in one part of society ultimately influences the other parts. The two strategies in this approach are:

\(^{56}\) Ibid, p 316.
(1) The balanced social growth strategy:

This strategy views a society as an organic system and believes that a change or improvement in one subsystem ultimately brings change in others. Therefore, to create and establish a modern administrative system supported by other independent organizations would gradually improve the whole social system whereas, without an effective administration resources would be misallocated and wasted. It also argues that independent institutions urgently need to assist bureaucracy in dealing with increasing public demands.

(2) The unbalanced social growth strategy:

Warren Ichman argues that this strategy:

"Assumes the interrelationships of various factors of society but seeks empirically and inductively to discover how different configurations affect the type of bureaucracy...... The proponents of unbalanced social growth are interested, not in abstract administrative improvements, but in more effective ways for the public sector to produce tons of steel, fertilizer, and food grains, to generate electricity, to improve seeds, and to bring more children and more teachers to schools."(57)

Riggs' Prismatic Theory:

Fred Riggs has actually been one of the advocates of the balanced social growth strategy. He believes the improvement of administration in developing countries would ultimately improve the other parts of their social system. Therefore, he considers administration to be the sector which development planners should make their first priority. He assumes that in order to understand the administration of developing countries we

57 -Ibid, p 318.
should first understand the environmental conditions this administration will have to deal with. Therefore, he views administration as an outcome of society, affecting it and in return being affected by it. Based on this assumption he argues that many Western models and techniques have proved effective in their environment (Western), but have failed to achieve the same results in other environments. His analysis of this situation led him to develop a new theory he has called Prismatic Theory. His work is an attempt to replace the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy which influenced most Western scholars' studies, by demonstrating its invalidity as a theoretical framework within which to study administration in developing countries.\(^{(58)}\)

He assumes, therefore, that most Western intellectual patterns have been based on American and European institutions' values which are described by Riggs as highly diffracted functions.

Believing in the balanced social growth strategy, Riggs has launched his prismatic theory based on the assumption that many transitional societies depend on a mixture of values and behaviour, the old inherited and the modern imported, and that this may be one of the distinguishing characteristics of these societies. We may differentiate between things by looking at their opposing traits. Accordingly, Riggs posits three ideal types of society: diffracted, fused and prismatic, using physics terminology and the analysis of light to distinguish between them.

In the first, structures are highly specific and specialized. The modern industrialized societies occupy this category. The major distinguishing characteristics of diffracted system are: universalism- achievement orientated - functional specificity. In the second, the fused society structure is functionally diffuse. A single structure performs all functions which are necessary to the existence of the society. For example, a tribal leader may perform all the functions: political, economic, religious, social, administrative, etc. The fused model

\(^{(58)}\) Fadlallah Ali, op. cit., p 64.
represents the pre-modern or agricultural societies their main distinguishing features are: particularism- ascription- functionally diffused. In the middle of this scale comes the prismatic societies which combine the features of the other two. Most developing countries correspond to some extent to this type. Riggs argues that the most important distinguishing feature of this society is formalism which is a difference between reality and appearance, between theory and practice, authority and control. This is a key to understanding prismatic societies.\(^{(59)}\)

**Endogenous vs. exogenous change:**

Fred Riggs suggests that changes in the diffracted societies have grown largely from within. The process of innovation has been encouraged and developed by internal or endogenous forces. By contrast, other societies have been either influenced by the diffracted model or pressurized from within to imitate those societies. Thus their process of change has been based on exogenous forces.

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Figure 1-1

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The horizontal axis measures the strength of endogenous pressures favourable to diffraction; the vertical, represents the strength of exogenous forces. Curve 1 is considered an advanced stage of diffraction, 3 a very low stage of diffraction, and 2 an intermediate stage (prismatic). England perhaps represents point 1 in the scale by virtue of its strong endogenous forces. Society 2 lacks internal forces for diffraction but by virtue of external pressures it might become highly diffracted. In society 3 a mixture of endogenous and exogenous forces promote a high stimulation for diffraction; the best example is Japan. Societies might become prismatic either by exogenous forces, as at point 5, or by endogenous forces, as at point 4. Finally point 6 represents a fused society which because of the weakness of external influences is bound to remain in this category.\(^\text{\textsuperscript{60}}\)

**The distinctive characteristics of a prismatic society:**

Formalism: this represents the general central distinguishing feature of a prismatic society. To Riggs it means the gap between authority and control, between reality and appearance, between theory and practice, between what is written in papers and what is applied in the field. In other words, a prismatic society is a two-faced society. To illustrate this situation Riggs invented several novel and difficult terminologies. Among them are:

(1) The bazaar-canteen:

The prismatic economic is an economy in which social, political and religious prestigious forces play very influential roles. On the face of it, it looks like a market in which money is the basis of dealing, but in reality power, prestige and bargaining skills oil the wheels. Riggs argues that there is no term fit to describe this situation except bazaar canteen. The most general phenomenon of bazaar-canteen behaviour is price indeterminacy. Riggs suggests that it is power, prestige, bargaining skills which determine the price of

\(^{60}\) Ibid, P 41.
goods and services. In fact, this phenomenon is quite general in any society insofar as the salary or wage is determined according to qualifications or market power.\(^{(61)}\)

(2) Agglomeration:

This refers to a method of elite recruitment to positions of eminence exercised by a certain elite group which imposes its domination and superiority.

(3) Intrusion:

Riggs argues that in the prismatic model entrepreneurial access to the market is often through intrusion. In order for a businessman to be allowed to enter the market he has to pay the `elite, hence he is always at the mercy of the `elite who never give him secure legal status.\(^{(62)}\)

(4) Clects:

These represent the interest groups of the prismatic society. Formally their functions seems relatively specific, but in reality their latent functions dominated their behaviour. There are various types of clects. Those with economic interests might be called guilds, or if their primary goals are religious, sects; if mainly educational, academics; if formed to improve and promote labour welfare, syndicates; if to increase social activity, clubs.\(^{(63)}\)

(5) Status-contract nexus:

This describes the operating rules and regulations of the prismatic society where the contract would seem to be a legitimate form of authority, but where status remains the most

\(^{62}\) Ibid, P 146.
\(^{63}\) Ibid, P 172.
effective qualification for wielding power. In the prismatic society, in order to exercise full control over property a businessman has to seek the benefit of the status- based protection which is usually provided by ruling class.\(^{64}\)

(6) Double talk:

In the prismatic society laws, regulations and rules formally appear to dictate standards of behaviour but unofficially permit a wide range of choices to further the aspirations and ambitions of the officials who enforce them. In other words, it says one thing but means another.\(^{65}\)

(7) Dependency syndrome:

Since power is the central element of a prismatic society and prevails over wealth and learning, it is essential to investigate the various aspects of power in this model. As we have said earlier, Riggs prefers to use novel and difficult terminologies. Among these is his term for a syndrome, which he refers to as "a set of symptoms which recur in association with one another".\(^{66}\)

He argues that the chief symptom in the dependency syndrome is the fact that the lion's share of the total national product is consumed by only a small proportion of the population, i.e. the `elite, who themselves do not efficiently contribute to the national economic scheme. Dependency to Riggs means those who spend more than they earn. He argues that in the prismatic society there are certain segments or groups who take more out of society than they put in. In other words, they eat what others produce.

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\(^{64}\) Ibid,P193.  
\(^{65}\) Ibid,P 201.  
Prismatic Public Administration "The Sala Model"

In his model, Riggs attempts to explain the complex interrelationship between cultural values and administrative and economic problems. He argues that 'bureau' is a typically diffracted term since it means a functionally specific institution, devoted to administrative functions. In contrast, the suitable term for the prismatic bureau is sala which means in Arabic as well as in Spanish a big room, prayer room or lounge. We believe he selected this term to refer to the special relationship between a worker's values and attitudes and the bureau.

The salient characteristics of Sala model:

(1) The bazaar- canteen and price indeterminacy:

Formally every citizen in the prismatic society is entitled to certain services, regardless of his religion, class or status. But under price indeterminacy rule, there is discrimination according to the social status and influence of each client or employee. Furthermore, with price indeterminacy, wages and salaries of workers and officials are determined not according to their qualifications or knowledge but according to their social status and personal influence and the class to which they belong.(67)

(2) Recalcitrant clienteles and obstructed administration:

In the Sala model the relationship between client and administrator is often unsatisfactory and this encourages sala man to break the law rather than comply with it, especially when the law represents the quite arbitrary rulings of the 'elite, always in their

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own favour. In this model, official positions are usually looked upon as a unique opportunity for quick wealth and privilege.\(^{(68)}\)

(3) Bureaucratic and elite recruitment:

In the Sala bureaucracy, although recruitment is based on examinations, the characteristic result is still dictated by nepotism and favouritism. Family ties, kinship and nepotism are the dominant features of a Sala recruitment system. In other words, candidates are chosen for their loyalty to their superiors rather than to their knowledge, skills and qualifications.\(^{(69)}\)

(4) Communalism and clects:

Communalism: means simply discrimination against minority groups. It may be used in the recruitment to the Sala offices. Clects: a bureaucratic term which means a sector or branch of a bureaucracy, all of whose members are recruited from a specific community, determined to serve communal interests, prevent rival members from entering the Sala.\(^{(70)}\)

(5) The disengagement of authority and control:

Due to the relation between formal and effective power, the separation of authority and actual control is great in the Sala model. Therefore, power in the Sala model is neither centralized, nor localized, nor dispersed, but highly equivocal.\(^{(71)}\)

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\(^{(68)}\) Ibid, p 272.  
\(^{(69)}\) Ibid, p273 .  
\(^{(70)}\) Ibid, p 275 .  
\(^{(71)}\) Ibid, p 281.
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Critique of Riggs’s Prismatic Model:

Despite the value and the usefulness of the prismatic theory in understanding the interrelationship between ecological forces and the administration in developing countries, it is not free of criticism. Edward Weidner claims that this theory has a limited effect in development and makes:

"Inadequate provision for social change; characterizes modern bureaucracy in very inaccurate ways; is unduly comprehensive, all-inclusive and abstract; and fails to take account of the differences in administration that may be related to the goals that are being sought.”(72)

Warren Ilchiman is among those who criticize Riggs’ prismatic theory. We may summarize his criticisms as follows:

In an attempt to handle the political elements usually investigated in political science, Riggs treats ‘elites in prismatic society as a collective entity. In other words, he fails to highlight what social and ecological factors affect various types (merchants, intelligentsia, etc., ).

He fails to predict the impact of the various types of ‘elite on the procedure of diffraction. Prismatic theory could be an explanation for the ecology of Thailand and the Philippines, but we may find it relatively difficult to apply it to China and Cuba. In short, Riggs’ theory fails to deal adequately with the ideological differences among countries.(73)

Robert O. Tilman has questioned Riggs' optical analogy and argued that the prismatic theory is optically inaccurate. He feels that one can not borrow concepts from the physical sciences and apply them to public administration. While the concepts are appropriate for its ecology or environment they are not necessarily useful in other fields, like public administration.\(^{(74)}\)

Another problem with Riggs' prismatic theory, suggested by Richard A. Chapman, is that inventing new terminology or giving words new meanings is bound to cause confusion and misunderstanding. Thus, the book is full of strange terminologies which are open to misinterpretation.\(^{(75)}\) Another criticism for Riggs' theory comes from Subramanian, who argues that the weakest point in Riggs' prismatic theory lies in ignoring the prismatic features of Western administration.\(^{(76)}\)

Finally, we would say that the accuracy of any model or theory is determined or measured by its ability to be implemented. In other words, the field is the real indicator of the usefulness of any model - once it has been approved empirically it is possible to be valid theoretically.

**Al-Kubaisy's Sheikhocratic Model:**

The main aim of this study is to analyse and understand administrative behaviour, attitudes and norms in the Gulf in order to create an administrative model useful to the Gulf States. Assuming that these states share the same social, economic, political and environmental settings Al-Kubaisy has introduced a model applicable to all of them.

The sheikhocratic model is based on Fred Riggs' prismatic theory and according to the writer starts where Riggs leaves off. Sheikhocracy refers to the intermediate stage between tribal and modern or bureaucratic administration. This model attempts to stress the peculiarity of the Gulf states' environment in comparison with those of other third world countries.

Sheikhocracy as an Intermediate stage between tribalism and modernization:

Sheikhocracy is a heuristic term representing the behavioural pattern that many managers and high officials in the bureaucracy of the Gulf have adopted or pretended to adopt. This type of behaviour has become a common feature, if not a prerequisite, of the conduct of high Gulf officials. Sheikhocracy as it is presented here is considered to be an adaptive administrative style which has emerged as a result of the rapid economic and social development which has taken place in the Gulf since the discovery of oil. Suddenly the tribal chief has become the country's president, his tribal assistants have become ministers and the tribal forces have become country's army. In fact, this sudden change and the lack of indigenous administrative skills and experience have led to the importation of thousands of foreign employees from various administrative backgrounds. The interaction between these foreign employees with their own bureaucratic pattern and the indigenous civil servants has given rise to the system called sheikhocratic. This administrative pattern is not bureaucratic nor tribal but a combination of the two.

Al-Kubaisy explains why the Gulf States should select the sheikhocratic administrative model. He argues that there are only three administrative alternatives available in the contemporary administrative art for these states to choose among.

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78 - Ibid, p 36.
Chapter one

The first alternative is to maintain the tribal administrative pattern in which the tribal chief has the ultimate and absolute authority and tribal values and behaviour prevail in the administration. Suffice it to say here that this alternative has been tried by two leaders in the region, Sheikh Shakboot of Abu Dhabi and Said Bin Taymoor of Oman, and has proved unsuited to the 20th-century world which because of the communication revolution has virtually become a small village.

![Diagram of Direction of Bureaucratic model and Internal & environmental variables](image)

Figure 1-2

The second alternative available to them is to adopt the Western bureaucratic model which neglects the informal relationship and replaces it with a bureaucratic one. The adherence of these states to their common values and traditions makes the bureaucratic model unacceptable and useless to them.
Chapter one

The third alternative is sheikhocracy which combines the best doctrines and techniques of the two former models. This is believed to be the most appropriate administrative model for these societies.\(^{79}\)

**The major characteristics of sheikhocracy:**

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**Figure 1-3**

The diagram illustrates the shiekhocratic model in which the characteristics of bureaucratic and tribal behaviour are combined to produce a third type of behaviour.

The marriage between tribal and bureaucratic administrations engenders intermediate characteristics different from both (such as the prismatic characteristic in Riggs' model). According to Al-Kubaisy sheikhocratic administration creates two alternatives for the client. He either goes through the official (bureaucratic) procedures to finish his work which normally takes quite a long time, or he avoids delay by contacting the sheikh to get his approval without going through bureaucratic procedures.

Thus, he has a choice—something not available either in bureaucratic or in tribal administrations.

\(^{79}\) Ibid, p 38.
Prestige, power and social status are also considered valuable in the sheikhocratic model. They are the conditions which determine the services, promotion and salary that employees get. This is the equivalent of Riggs' price indeterminacy.

The hierarchical structure in the sheikhocratic administration is merely there to distribute responsibilities to lower employees and concentrate the ultimate authority in the hands of sheikhs and ministers who are usually sheikhs or those loyal to them.\(^{(80)}\)

**Sheikhocratic leaders:**

Sheikhocratic behaviour is a common feature in the administration of the Gulf. It is much in evidence in the higher administrative echelons which are usually occupied by the sheikhs, and amirs or those loyal to them. Ministers and other high officials in the Gulf are very keen to attach to their names titles, such as Sheikh, Prince, or highness and so on. They constitute the elites of the Gulf societies to use Riggs' term. Formally they behave like modern bureaucrats, but effectively their latent functions as sheikhs and amirs dominate their behaviour. In other words, they have dual characters, bedouin and modern, and these combined together produce sheikhocratic behaviour. It is common one day to see a sheikh in traditional robes watching a camel race and dancing traditional dances and the next day to see him change his skin and become a modern man, speaking foreign languages, wearing a suit and using the most advanced technology.\(^{(81)}\)

**Sheikhocratic institutions:**

The Gulf institutions have inevitably adopted the sheikhocratic behaviour which has been transferred to them by high administrative officials. As a result, we may notice that the laws and regulations which control these institutions are designed to serve those officials'\(^{80}\) Ibid, p 41.\(^{81}\) Ibid, p 42.
interests. For example, all civil service rulings end with this flexible statement "and the minister or his deputy is empowered to or has authority to........... ", and via this flexible statement various unlawful decisions have been passed and implemented. It is no secret that many Gulf employees are recruited on the basis of loyalty rather than qualifications, skills or knowledge. Consequently, public positions are filled by unqualified, unskilled or even disabled and elderly employees. Laws and regulations can be reversed by a letter or even a verbal order from the sheikh.

Dual behaviour is another feature of sheikhocratic institutions. The obvious example would be in the area of hospital treatment. There are certain groups in society who enjoy special treatment, having special facilities provided for them such as huge private rooms equipped with T.V, telephone and video, in addition to kitchens, and other rooms for their servants, etc.(82)

Remarks on Sheikhocratic Model:

A sheikhocracy provides us with an essential, unique and valuable focus for the study of the interrelationship between ecological variables and administration, and how these variables affect the behaviour of bureaucrats. It supplies new and crucial insights which explains the pathological phenomena of Gulf administration in a more systemic way. However, there are three remarks of reservation apropos the sheikhocratic approach.

First Al-Kubaisy has spent great intellectual effort in studying and identifying the impact of environmental variables on the Gulf administration. Using Riggs' prismatic model as a guideline he has succeeded in his work. But explaining any phenomena in a scientific and systemic way and diagnosing a problem and determining its roots does not necessarily mean the disappearance of the problem. The determination of the nature of the problem is the first step, identifying the alternatives is the second step and selecting the appropriate

82 - Ibid,p 43.
alternative and implementing it is the third step and evaluating the result is the final step. It appears to me that Al-Kubaisy has not even reached the second step. He has simply determined the problem and explained it in a systemic way. Although he claims that sheikhocracy is a new alternative for the Gulf states, it appears to me he has described phenomena rather than provided an alternative.

Second, Warren F. Ilchiman, criticized Riggs prismatic model in a way that may be applicable to sheikhocracy, since Al-Kubaisy has used it as guide-line for his study. Therefore, he has inherited the same problems Riggs' model suffers from. Among these is, the view that administrative effectiveness is subordinate to other aspects of society. According to this view, any developmental effort and plan should be focused on social and environmental systems rather than on administration, because administration is the outcome of the former systems; administrative reformers are either "selected out or capitulate to the system."(83)

Thirdly, the sheikhocratic model seems suited primarily to the environment of the United Arab Emirates (more obviously Abu-Dhabi), Oman and Qatar. Therefore, we found it quite difficult to apply it to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, where political structures and educational levels are rather different.

In conclusion we would say that the first requirement of any intellectual effort, particularly in a conservative society, is that emphasis should be put on the way that the effort is presented and explained. Furthermore, the writer has to be aware of any offensive term which might undermine the whole effort. If we apply this to Al-Kubaisy's work we notice that he uses a very offensive term (sheikhocracy) which probably makes his approach impossible to implement in these states, at least without a change of terminology.

Institution Building Approach:

The main theme of this model is that development in any country depends entirely on the creation of a network of institutions which are designed to bring about changes in society. These institutions represent a channel by which to transfer the innovative values which normally transcend technical considerations to the attitudes and behaviour of the people.

Institution building is an organized and deliberate effort to bring about changes in society through the vehicle of institutions. Therefore, institutions are regarded here as an open system consisting of a number of components interacting with each other and having a certain influence over others. Furthermore, the interaction between these components goes beyond the boundaries of the organization to influence the external environment which in return influences the organization. Thus, it is a mutual relationship in which the outputs of environment constitute the inputs of organization and the outputs of organization constitute the inputs of environment. Nevertheless, institution building advocates argue that the organization's influence on environment is more effective and more substantial to the extent that the former is entitled to induce changes in the latter.

Saul Ketz argues that in the institution-building approach the organization has two main aspects:

"The organization needs to be established for persistence in the existing environment. This includes not only the ability to survive, but also the ability to carry on its innovative functions. The organization needs to be capable of persisting in the face of changes in the environment and, particularly, of continuing its innovative activities, albeit in modified form"(84)

Believing in a balanced administrative growth strategy, Milton Esman argues that the institution building model is:

"A perspective on planned and guided social change. It is concerned with innovations that imply qualitative changes in norms, in behaviour patterns, in individual and group relations, in new perceptions of goals as well as means"\(^{(85)}\)

He defines institution-building as designing, structuring and establishing an organization which would be able to induce changes in society and able to protect and obtain these changes by establishing concrete relationships with the external environment.\(^{(86)}\)

Institution Building Variables:

The institution building model stipulates three major variables in the establishment of an innovative organization. Some of these variables are linked with the organization itself and are called institution variables, others are linked with the external environment and called linkages and the intermediate variables are called transactions.

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\(^{86}\) Ibid, p 22.
(1) Institution variables consists of five variables which are:
   - Leadership
   - Doctrine
   - Programme
   - Resources
   - Internal structure

(2) Transactions are the connecting link between institution variables and linkages.

(3) Linkages:
   - Enabling linkages
   - Functional linkages
   - Normative linkages
   - Diffused linkages.

Institution variables:

These are essentially concerned with the organization itself. Each variable has its own features which distinguish it from the others. The interaction between these variables is regarded as the attitude of the organization.

(1) Leadership:

The leadership is the most essential element of any organization. It is especially vital if the organization aims to induce changes and innovations rather than maintain the status quo. The Leadership is defined here as the group of people committed to initiating plans and programmes and directing them to fulfil the organization's aspirations. Thus, effective leadership means effective organization and to become effective the leadership

87 - Ibid, p 22.
must be equipped with certain skills, knowledge and a high commitment to organization doctrines and programmes. It also requires unequivocal relationships with both the internal and external environment. The leadership group does not only comprise the holders of official leadership positions, but also includes those who exercise influence over the organization's programmes and activities.

(2) Doctrine:

This is the most elusive variable of the organization. It defines what the organization hopes to achieve and what methods and ways it is going to adopt. Its formulation is considered the most difficult task of organization. Esman defines it here as:

"The specification of values, objectives, and operational methods underlying social action". (88)

The cogent exposition of doctrine may develop and increase consensus on common goals among members of the organization, enhance the communication network, improve cohesion and, consequently, develop job satisfaction among employees and increase the capability of the organization to deal with environmental variables. It is essential to modify and change doctrines from time to time according to the situation and circumstances.

(3) Programme

The programme is the translation of doctrines into concrete action. It must be designed and formulated in accordance with environmental needs and requirements. Programmes if they are to be accepted in society have to respond to the needs and desires of both the internal and the external environment. (89)

(4) **Resources:**

These include the financial, physical, human, technological and informational potential of the organization. They consist of inputs that the organization converts into services and goods. The most crucial resource of the organization is its staff. Therefore, improving this resource and utilizing it in an efficient way increases the commitment toward the organization's doctrines and goals.

Information also constitutes an essential input to the organization, particularly that concerned with the external environment. Information must be collected, analysed and stored so that it may be accessed at the appropriate time. The environment must be scanned and searched for signs of change.\(^{(90)}\)

(5) **Internal structure:**

The internal structure may be defined as:

"The structure and processes established for the operation of the institution and for its maintenance"\(^{(91)}\)

It is the organizational hierarchical structure which distributes responsibilities within the organization.

**Linkages:**

These are related mainly to the external relations that the organization has to establish and develop with certain sections of the society.

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\(^{(90)}\) Ibid, p 31.

\(^{(91)}\) Ibid, p 23.
(A) Enabling linkages:

These are the linkages between the organization and the group of persons which controls the financial resources needed by the organization. These linkages are considered essential to the organization, particularly in its early stages.

(B) Functional linkages:

These are the linkages between the organization and other organizations in society which sometimes perform almost the same functions and sometimes complement each other, and which provide the organization with the needed inputs and consume its outputs. Also in this category are those who compete with the organization. The organization seeks in its interaction with other organizations to achieve complementarity. Through this complementarity the organization would be able to spread its innovative values.\(^{(92)}\)

(C) Normative linkages:

These are the linkages between the organization and other organizations which share similar norms and values (positive or negative) which are applicable to the organization's goals and objectives. In fact, the existence of these linkages may reduce hostile action by competing organizations and encourage cooperation and coordination.\(^{(93)}\)

(D) Diffused linkages:

These are relationships between the organization and society in general (groups or individuals who are not in an official organization but are capable of influencing the position of the organization in society.)\(^{(94)}\)

\(^{92}\) Ibid, p 23.
\(^{93}\) Ibid, p 24.
\(^{94}\) Ibid, p 24.
The leadership is required to take into account the network of linkages which affect the output of the organization. It is essential to recognize the significance of these linkages and be able to benefit from them. Although the significance of these linkages varies from one to another and from one situation to another, they all remain crucial variables which determine the success or failure of the organization. Therefore, an effective leadership is one which assesses, identifies and develops useful strategies for dealing with each of them.\(^{95}\)

Since the institution building model is innovation oriented and aims to bring about changes in society, it inevitably encounters resistance, both positive and negative. The changes may be perceived by people as damaging and threatening to their culture, values or even to their material interests. In fact, those who resist change and innovation are not necessarily only the 'elite, the upper classes or the illiterate poor; they may also be found among the educated classes and may be professors, teachers or even civil servants. It is in the nature of the human being to fear change since he does not know what the outcomes of change will be.\(^{96}\)

The assumptions of the institution building approach:

This approach makes several assumptions about the environment, the organization and the processes of institutionalization.

1. **About environment:**

   It assumes that the environment is not a closed or static system but is rather dynamic and always in change. Thus, it is essential for agents of change to assess and anticipate the environmental realities and identify the changes before they occur. Change agents are

\(^{95}\) Ibid, p 33.
\(^{96}\) Ibid, P 24.
required to scan the environment in order to identify obstacles and formulate plans to overcome these obstacles. The integrity of the organization depends on this primary stage.\(^{(97)}\)

2. **About organization:**

   The approach assumes also that organizations have substantial abilities to induce and foster changes in society. The organization can be a dynamic vehicle through which change agents can impose their innovative values on people both within the boundaries of the organization and in the external environment.\(^{(98)}\)

3. **About change processes:**

   It assumes three main change processes:

   1. Cultural: which depends on efforts to change human beings' values, attitudes and behaviours.
   2. Technological: which relies on new strategies and tactics to induce new ideas and patterns and increase commitment to change.
   3. Political: which requires a redistribution or redefinition of power and authority to produce or foster changes in society.\(^{(99)}\)

**About institutionality:**

Esman argues that the major principles are that:

"New norms and action patterns must be established both within the organization and in its relevant environment, and both the

\(^{97}\) Ibid, pp 26,27.
\(^{98}\) Ibid, p 27
organization and the innovation for which it stands must become institutionalized, prized in the environment." (100)

Critiques of the Institution Building Model:

Ivan Lilich discusses in his controversial book Deschooling Society the new concept of modernization and development. He argues that the institution building model has confused us to the extent that we perceive things through institutions. In other words, we have come to believe that if there are no schools, there will be no education; if there are no hospitals, there will be no health care; and if there are no police stations, there will be no security. The existing institutions have been considered by many as a goal in themselves, rather than a means to achieving goals. We have become preoccupied with the notion that school is the only way of obtaining education. We forget the other means of teaching such as parents, friends, street, market, family, etc. Each of us is evaluated by the number of certificates he holds, not by the knowledge he may have accumulated. Certificates come first, then knowledge. When John Major was elected prime minister the media and the political commentators kept reminding the public at every opportunity about his humble (from the institutional point of view) educational background. It is true that he does not hold certificates but that does not mean he is uneducated or unable to lead this country.

Insisting on this point Ivan Lilich argues that:

"Rich and poor alike depend on schools and hospitals which guide their lives, form their world view, and define for them what is legitimate and what is not."(101)

Further critical remarks on institution building are presented by William Siffin who claims that this model offers little in the way of new ideas: however, its uniqueness lies in

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the way it links conventional and familiar ideas together in a useful and appropriate style. Siffin goes on to describe the model as static, and unoriented.

Static:

It is static in the sense that it recognizes and identifies all variables which affect the outcomes of the organization without indicating how they interact or are interrelated, in other words how each affects the others; in short, the model deals with the "implicit categorical imperative."(102)

Disoriented

It may seem disoriented in the sense that it does not specify the conditions of its applicability, but what is the limitation of its pretence? It is applicable to all organizations, including voluntary, private, religious and financial ones.(103)

Finally we would say that the institution-building model seems very broad and general. There are many questions which need to be asked regarding applicability of this model. Among these are: How can administration change the behaviour and attitudes of its staff? What are the strategies and tactics to be used in applying this model? How does the model deal with ideologies? Is it applicable to any culture or tradition?

In conclusion, development is an elusive and vague concept. There is no common agreement as to precisely what is the main objective of development: whether it is to increase the G.N.P. of developing countries, as the economists believe, or to increase

103 - Ibid, p 52.
political participation on a democratic basis, as politician argue. The disagreement on the meaning and scope of development depend very much on the background and area of interest of the scholars involved. Although all agree that the Western model is the inevitable solution for developing countries because no alternative model has been found to produce the same results, they disagree on the appropriate framework within which to apply this model.

Among the many approaches, models and theories which have been introduced was the cultural approach which focused on the ecological dimensions of development in general and administration in particular. This approach was developed after Western scholars discovered that their academic equipment was inappropriate to the culture and values of developing countries. Thus, development administration emerged as a new and radical paradigm, destined to reshape the whole structure of the Third World. The most distinguished theories in this area were Riggs' prismatic model, Esman's institution building and Al-Kubaisy's sheikhocratic model.

Various elements and components of the three models will be used in the subsequent chapters to explain and analyse the administrative system of the United Arab Emirates. Prismatic and sheikhocratic models will help towards an understanding of the complex interrelationship between the U.A.E.'s indigenous cultural values and its administrative variables. How cultural values influence the performance of the indigenous employee at the expense of organizational values will be dealt with specifically in chapter seven.
Introduction:

Many countries in the modern world could be said to owe their stability and prosperity to the federal system of government. Countries with multi-ethnic populations, such as Switzerland, Canada, India and Nigeria, would not be in a good shape today had they adopted any other form of political system. Federalism has proved to be a solution wherever there has been a need to draw together diverse elements into one harmonious society, and as a result the concept has attracted the professional interest of politicians and political scientists around the world as the apparently most successful means of bringing together people of different background, language and tradition.

The first part of this chapter examines the various definitions of, and approaches to, the concept of federalism. The second part of the chapter looks at the experiences of the federation in the Gulf States (the Nine-member Federation and the Federation of the U.A.E.) and analyses the difficulties they faced.

The definitions and approaches of federalism:

The idea of bringing people together to solve their common problems in more effective ways, and at the same time to gain some mutual benefit, is not a new one. It is ingrained in the culture of many ancient societies. Indeed, long before the politicians began to use the word federal, many human communities, such as tribes, clans, extended families and so on, entered into agreements, arrangements, alliances - in short, federation of one sort or
another in order to defend themselves from external enemies and also share other social and economic advantages.

An exact definition of the term federalism has always presented problems to writers on the subject, although it is relatively easy to describe various aspects of federalism in operation. The thing that is so difficult to pin down is the "essence" of federalism.

Every commentator has his own point of view and there is no universal agreement on what federalism actually means. Writers such as Wheare (1963) claim that the constitution is the independent variable while the social results constitute the dependent outcome. Others, like Riker (1966) believe the party system is the crucial federating factor, while Livingston (1963) considers that social drive is the independent variable and the political system the dependent variable. (1)

Kenneth Wheare, in his classic definition of federalism, focused on the legal and constitutional aspects of federation, and, taking the American model as the ultimate example of federation, concluded that:

"The essential point is not that the division of powers is made in such a way that the regional governments are the residuary legatees under the constitution, but that the division is made in such a way that, whoever has the residue, neither general nor regional government is subordinate to the other." (2)

According to Wheare, federation is a political and legal framework within which the central (federal) and constituent units are co-ordinated in such a way that neither is subordinate to the other. The governmental duties are divided between the two major authorities; the federal (central) government is responsible overall for national defence,

foreign affairs, taxation and so on, whereas the regional governments, regulate matters within their own territories.(3)

Certain other writers argue that federalism should be seen as the process of bringing different political bodies into:

"Arguments for working out solutions, adopting joint policies, and making joint decisions on joint problems, and, conversely, also the process by which a unitary political community becomes differentiated into a federally organized whole"(4)

In 1963 an American writer called W. S. Livingston introduced a new concept of federalism, criticizing the emphasis being placed on the legal and constitutional aspects of the system at that time and asserting that it is a sociological phenomenon, the product of social drive. He defines federalism as being: "a function not of constitutions but of societies",(5) and government based upon it as being "a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected."(6) The major weakness of such a definition is that it may be applied to any country containing more than one ethnic group and organized along territorial lines. (7)

David Nice, on the other hand, describes federalism as a governmental system functioning on at least of two levels, where each level has the authority to take independent

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decisions. However, the degree of their independence may vary and is not in itself an accurate measurement by which to distinguish federal countries from others.

Recently, Donald Smiley has claimed that in federated sovereign state:

The constitution is the backbone of a federation, safeguard of the federation and lays down the rules which govern the distribution of power;  
The terms of the constitution are not amendable by the action of the central or regional governments;  
And the people of the federation are subject to the regulations of two level of governments, i.e. central and regional.

This definition claims that the basic element of federation is the constitution. Thus Smiley emphasizes that the legislative framework of federation is essential for its success and in this he is in almost total agreement with K. C. Wheare.

The Prerequisites of Federation:

Many writers claim that federal government requires more pre-conditions than most forms of government and for complete success demands a combination of circumstances which do not often exist.

Various factors, either artificial or natural, contribute to the survival or collapse of any federation, and these factors themselves differ from country to country. What may be considered a disunifying factor in one country may be the opposite in another and therefore it is impossible to make generalizations.

10 - K. C. Wheare, op. cit., p. 35.
For the purposes of this study, we address the crucial implications of psychological, social and political factors for the success of federation.

**Psychological Factors:**

It goes without saying that one of the most essential prerequisites of any federation is the desire and willingness of leaders and people to be part of a single independent state. Both leaders and people must identify themselves as one group with common interests and common goals.\(^{(11)}\)

The survival of a federation depends on the strength of this desire and in its absence many federations have collapsed. The obvious examples are the federations of West Indies 1957-1962 and that of Egypt and Syria (1958-1961). In contrast, the presence of this factor certainly strengthens and enhances federation. Indeed, the desire of American leaders and people to come under a single government was the major factor behind the uniting of the States. The same will to combine lay the success of many other federations such as Nigeria, Germany and Australia.

Experts argue that the desire to come together under a single government is not enough. The separate governments must retain some powers and authority, at least over certain matters in their regions, or the system will be unitary rather than federal.\(^{(12)}\)

**Social Factors (Race, Religion, and Language)**

Numerous Western writers have concluded that social factors are not central to the issue of federation. The sharing of a common culture may be useful but is far from essential. They have pointed out that many communities have shared all of the social factors

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\(^{(12)}\) K.C. Wheare, op. cit., p 36.
but have still failed to establish a federal system. (e.g. the Central American Federation and the Pan Arab Movement).\(^{(13)}\)

On the other hand, many successful federations in the world have demonstrated the irrelevance of social factors in their creation. In spite of differences of language and race in Canada (French and English) and Switzerland (German, French, Italian and Romansch) the desire to be under a central independent government has proved paramount.\(^{(14)}\)

Most writers on the subject take the Western point of view which plays down the significance of religion and race in the formation of any union. They concentrate instead on matters of national economy and defence as being crucial conditions of federation.

However, although social factors may have less and less significance in the Western World, where people have been in the process of divorcing themselves from religion and tradition ever since the Industrial Revolution, they continue to be of considerable importance in other parts of the world. (e.g. Yugoslavia).

The separation of Pakistan from India in 1947 and the separation of Malaysia from Singapore in 1962 are both examples of the divisive effect of religion on federation in less developed countries.

**Similarity of Political Ideology:**

A common political ideology is a *sine qua non* if communities are to be united. Indeed it is this which often brings together developing countries where standards of administration and education may be low or corrupt. With the proliferation of different ideologies in the contemporary world, this factor is taking on a new significance.


\(^{14}\) K. C. Wheare, op. cit., p 38,39.
Suffice it to say that the more regimes are politically alike the greater is the possibility of federation. Differences in political thinking have been behind the collapse of many federations. For instance, it was for ideological reasons that Jamaica decided to withdraw from the West Indies Federation.(15)

The Federation of the Nine:

The notion of the political integration of the Arab World was uppermost in the minds of many national governments at the beginning of this century. Federal and quasi-federal ambitions dominated the political arena in the Arab World, in particular during the period of the Arab Nationalist Movement. In the early period of Pan Arab Nationalism, several significant federal or quasi federal initiatives were attempted. Among these were the Hashami Federation involving Iraq and Jordan in 1942, and the union of Egypt and Syria during the Nasser era between 1959 and 1961. Elsewhere in the Arab world, the South Arabia Federation (1959-1967) was created and encouraged by the British colonial power.(16) Finally, an attempt was made to unite the Trucial Emirates, i.e. Abu-Dhabi, Dubia, Qatar, Bahrain, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Umm al-Quaiwain, Ajman and Fujerah, in a federation in 1968. Surprisingly, none of these ideas were eventually implemented. All of the plans remained on paper and never took any practical form.

It is the last of these attempts with which this study is concerned i.e. the Trucial States Federation. We will be emphasizing the various circumstances associated with its creation and the factors leading to its collapse. But before we go forward to discuss the Nine-member Federation, we are obliged to discuss the first step on the federation road, which was the backbone of the Nine federation: the Abu-Dhabi- Dubai Agreement.

Abu-Dhabi-Dubai Federal Agreement:

The announcement by Harold Wilson's Government in 1968 of its intention to withdraw from east of Suez, and specifically from the Persian Gulf region, by the end of 1971, promoted the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast to get together to consider a possible political arrangement to their mutual advantage. As they were only too well aware other powers (i.e. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Dhofar Communist Movement in Oman which was supported by Aden) had great ambitions to fill the vacuum which would be caused by the British withdrawal,(Iran immediately after the British withdrawal captured three strategic Islands belonged to Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah) and these tiny emirates found themselves with just two choices: either they form an alliance or stay isolated and become a prey to these external forces.

Accordingly, the Sheikh of Abu-Dhabi paid a visit to his neighbouring emirate Dubai, to discuss the idea of integration between their two emirates, the largest in the region. Bearing in mind the dangers of isolation, the two Sheikhs reached an agreement on 18 February 1968 to establish a joint federation. The final Communique stipulated that the federation should be created under one flag and responsible for the following matters:

A- Foreign Affairs.
B- Defence Affairs.
C- Medical and Educational services.
D- Citizenship and Immigration.(17)

Furthermore, the Communique encouraged the other five Trucial Emirates i.e. Sharjah, Ras Al Kakaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujarah, to join the federation and

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extended an invitation to Qatar and Bahrain "to discuss the future of the area in order to reach a united stand in this regard".\(^{(18)}\)

There was no preparation or consultation prior to the agreement between the two Sheikhs. A month after the British announcement of withdrawal the two Sheikhs met and signed the agreement. It is obvious that the agreement was a personal one between the two Sheikhs of the emirates rather than between the two Sheikhdoms. Moreover, nothing was mentioned in the agreement about the distribution of power, federal institutions, or even what the official name of the federation would be.\(^{(19)}\) In short, the agreement amounted to no more than a traditional tribal treaty. One question that immediately springs to the mind of any student of the Gulf affairs is why the federation was limited to these two Sheikhdoms when both emirates were members of the Trucial States Council which was founded in 1952 by the British colonial power. This council was composed of the seven rulers of the Trucial emirates and was presided over by the British Political Agent. Abdullah Taryam, an ex-Minister of Education in the U.A.E, suggests that the two Sheikhdoms perhaps have seen the council as:

"Nothing more than a reconstruction and development board, falling short of a fully-fledged political council. Moreover, ties and kinship between the two, their geographical proximity and similar economic positions were helpful factors for union in addition to Dubai's keenness to settle the border issue."\(^{(20)}\)

In spite of all the encouraging factors, the Abu-Dhabi-Dubai Agreement came to nothing but it did prepare the ground for another federal endeavour in the region, the Federation of the Nine.


The Federation of the Nine:

Following the official invitation from the rulers of Abu-Dhabi and Dubai to the other rulers in the region, a flurry of contacts and consultations began and resulted in a meeting between the nine Shaikhs (Qatar, Abu-Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujerah), which was convened in Dubai on 25 February 1968.

Once again there was no preparatory meeting. Almost a week after the Abu-Dhabi-Dubai Agreement the Nine Sheikhs met in Dubai and the federation was formed. We must bear in mind that each emirate of the federation was ruled by a different family and that these families had historic rivalries in addition to tribal and territorial conflicts. It is no exaggeration to say that almost all the nine emirates had border disputes with one another (e.g. Qatar had a border dispute with both Abu-Dhabi and Bahrain; Ras Al Khaimah with Fujerah, Sharjah with Dubai and Umm al-Qaiwain).

Accordingly, the first sign of dissension surfaced when Qatar proposed instead a federation of the small emirates (i.e. Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujerah) to be the called United Arab Coast and to constitute a first step towards a wider federation to include the big emirates of Qatar, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Clearly, Qatar's intention was to forestall any plan on the part of Abu-Dhabi to lead the proposed federation by creating a separate political body, probably to be led by the Al-Qawassim Front (the ruling families of Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah, who had an historic conflict with the Abu-Dhabi Front), with which Qatar had good relations. Eventually, however, the proposal was rejected by the smaller Sheikhdoms who saw it as belittling them in comparison with other Sheikhs which they believed were equal in power and privileges.

Despite these initial differences, the meeting achieved its purpose and the federation of the nine was declared. It was to be called the Union of Arab Emirates.(22)

The final Communique of the meeting defined the four main goals of the federation:
- To enhance relations and foster cooperation between the member states.
- To respect each other's sovereignty and independence.
- To unify foreign affairs.
- To organize a common defence policy to maintain the security of the federation.(23)

The Federal Authorities:

The Supreme Council:

Composed of all nine rulers, the Supreme Council was to be the highest authority in the federation. Voting had to be unanimous. Its main responsibilities were:

1- To draft a permanent constitution for the union.
2- To formulate a common foreign policy and defence strategy and coordinate economic and cultural affairs, issuing federal degrees.

The presidency of the Council would pass from ruler to ruler on an annual basis. (24)

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Federal Council: (Executive Apparatus):

The federal Council was to assist the Supreme Council in handling the various matters of the federation. The Council's decisions would not be effective without the Supreme Council's approval.

The Supreme Court:

The composition of the Supreme Court and the scope of its powers were to be defined by a law, passed by the Supreme Council. (25) In the event, the final Communique failed to determine the scope and organization of this crucial federal apparatus and in so doing hindered the work of the entire federation in the future.

The Federation of the Nine in Operation:

Once the federation was established, such a chain of stumbling blocks stood in the way of any agreement on federal matters that the apparatus was unworkable and the death of the federation inevitable. Differences among the federation members surfaced at the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee which was held on 18-19 May, 1968 in Abu-Dhabi to prepare the agenda items for the first Supreme Council meeting which was to be held in Abu-Dhabi on 25 May 1968. According to protocol, Abu-Dhabi, as the host emirate, had the right to prepare the agenda. This meant that Abu-Dhabi was in a position to guide the approach to permanent federal constitution and select the constitutional law expert to draft this constitution. Qatar immediately opposed Abu-Dhabi's agenda and proposed an agenda of its own, containing the following items:

- Election of the first president.
- Location of the permanent capital.

Chapter two

- Design of the federation flag, anthem and official newspaper.
- Establishment of a federal council and determination of its composition and scope.
- Establishment of federal ministries.(26)

The dispute over the agenda was a symptom of deep differences between the two main emirates behind which lay in not only their ancient border dispute but also a general clash of interests. It also indicated a lack of mutual confidence among the emirate's representatives based on different interpretations of the Abu-Dhabi- Dubai Agreement.(27) At the meetings they fell into two distinct camps- those who supported the leadership of Qatar and those who were behind Abu-Dhabi. The Qatar camp consisted of Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah, while the Abu-Dhabi camp consisted of Bahrain and the rest of the emirates. Ultimately, the Qatar agenda was defeated at committee stage.

The First Meeting of the Supreme Council: (Abu-Dhabi, 25 May and 6 July 1968):

The first rulers' meeting was held in Abu-Dhabi to discuss the preparatory committee's agenda and to take action on its proposals but failed to bridge the differences between the two camps. Ancient revelries combined with an increasing concern among the members for their personal interests meant that the summit ended in failure which disappointed the optimistic view on the future of the federation. During the meeting Qatar insisted on its former demands despite their previous rejection by the preparatory committee. Moreover, Qatar demanded the Supreme Council consult the reports of two distinguished constitutional experts, a Frenchman, Shari Roso, and an Egyptian, Waheed

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Rafat (a Kuwaiti Government legal Adviser) who had been selected to study its proposed agenda.\(^{(28)}\)

As a result of the failure of the meeting the representatives of Qatar, Bahrain and Abu-Dhabi toured both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to gather support for their proposals and explain the reasons behind the failure of their points of view.

Kuwaiti and Saudi conciliation efforts succeeded in a temporary healing of the rifts and the Supreme Council resumed its meeting in Abu-Dhabi on 6 July 1968. The results of that meeting were encouraging. Several crucial resolutions were passed, among them following:

1. Dr Abdul Razzag Al Sanhuri, an Egyptian expert on Constitutional law was to be appointed to draw up a draft for the federal constitution within a period of six months.
2. Members of the Supreme Council should elect a chairman from among their member on a rotational basis.
3. A new provisional Federal Council with a clearly defined task was to be created.
4. The Deputy Ruler of Qatar was to be Chairman of the provisional Federal Council.\(^{(29)}\)

Despite eventual agreement on these resolutions, the discussions at the meeting reflected a crisis of confidence, a strong element of self interest and lack of vision among all conferees. In these circumstances the question of drafting a federal constitution presented something of a problem. Bahrain had nominated Abdul-Rahman Bazzaz, a former Iraqi Prime Minister, to take on the task but, Qatar had immediately rejected the Bahraini

\(^{28}\) Waheed Rafat, op. cit., p 17.
\(^{29}\) Ibid, pp 24,25.
nomination and nominated instead its own legal adviser, Dr. Hassan Kamil. Abu-Dhabi, in an attempt to reach a compromise, had nominated Abdul Razzag al Sanhuri, the legal expert who had drafted the Kuwaiti Constitution and he was accepted. The conflict between Qatar and Bahrain had flared again when the former nominated its Deputy Ruler for the presidency of the proposed Federal Council. Bahrain immediately rejected this nomination on the grounds that any president of the Council should devote all his time to this position. Once again Abu-Dhabi mediated and Bahrain shelved her objection and accepted Qatar's candidate. (30)

Further differences emerged as time went by. During a private visit to London, Sheikh Zaid, the President of the Federation and Ruler of Abu-Dhabi was interviewed by The Times and asked about the Nine member Federation. He said:

"The federation has made little progress so far, there being no agreement on defence, a constitution or the seat of government." (31)

Although he strongly favoured a close union, to include all nine states ideally, a single foreign policy should be the first aim. If it should prove impossible to work out a close union of all nine states for the present, then he would support a union of the seven Trucial Sheikhdoms alone, or failing that, a union of Abu-Dhabi with three or four of them as the nucleus of something bigger. (32)

Some people interpreted Zaid's statement as a clear sign of the failure of the Nine member Federation and an indication that Abu-Dhabi favoured a smaller federation, comprising of the Trucial States. (33)

32 - Ibid.
33 - Waheed Rafat, op. cit., p 44.
The Second Meeting of the Supreme Council (Qatar 20-22 October 1968)

On 20 October 1968 the Supreme Council's second meeting was held in Qatar. The Sheikh of Qatar was elected Chairman of the session. The Qatari agenda was unanimously approved.

The collective defence policy was the major issue discussed in the meeting. After a heated discussion between the conferees, particularly between Qatar and Bahrain, the Rulers agreed that the:

"Federation should have armed forces, including an army and air and naval forces, with unified training and command, and that member emirates should also have the right to establish local armed forces"(34)

The council agreed to consult with the British Government concerning this matter and as a result the British Government nominated Major General Sir John Willoughby to lead a team of military advisers.

There was some controversy as to why the Council had asked for British help in establishing the federation's armed forces when Saudi Arabia or Kuwait could have been granted this sensitive task. But Britain's presence in the Gulf for more than a century had resulted in a historic relationship which virtually committed Britain to maintaining peace and security in the region. To this end the British played a major role in creating and funding the Trucial Oman Scouts, a task force designated to settle any interstate dispute's arising in the region. Furthermore a close relationship existed between the British and many of the Shaikhs whose rule they endorsed and who had often come to power with their help.

Accordingly, it was not surprising for the Sheikhs of the region to ask the British troops to stay. In an interview with *The Times* Sheikh Rashid of Dubai, replying to a question as to whether he would like British troops to remain in the Gulf, said

"Who asked them to leave? ..... Abu-Dhabi and Bahrain, and in fact the whole Coast, people and rulers, would all support the retaining of British forces in the Gulf." (35)

This was an attitude very much echoed by Abu-Dhabi, to the extent that it was willing to cover all the British troops' expenses if they agreed to remain in the region.(36)

The other sensitive issue discussed at the second meeting was the Bahrani offer to host the next meeting in Manama, Bahrain's capital, in a bid to gain the recognition of the Arab (and the wider) world of the injustice of Iranian claims to its territory.(37) Other emirates' response was disappointing to Bahrain, especially as they rejected the invitation on the grounds that acceptance might cause them problems with Iran, with whom many of them had good relations.

The Third Meeting of the Supreme Council (Qatar 10-14 May 1968).

The third meeting of the Council, also convened in Qatar, took place on 10 May 1968. The Sheikh of Qatar was re-elected as Chairman of the session and various delicate matters were discussed. Among the most essential of these were:

1- The federal presidency.

2- The selection of a federal capital.

Chapter two

3- The appointment of a prime minister.
4- The establishment of a consultative assembly.\(^{38}\)

As usual there was disagreement over the agenda. Bahrain objected to the agenda on the grounds that it was prepared by Qatar, and demanded that an \textit{ad hoc} committee prepare a new agenda. The Abu-Dhabi representative supported Bahrain's demand. After a heated debate the proposed committee was set up. Not surprisingly, little else came out of the first sitting of the meeting.\(^{39}\)

The crucial point discussed at the next sitting was the appointment of a council of ministers. It was to be comprised of thirteen members, including the prime minister and deputy prime minister. Bahrain, predictably, opposed the appointment of Qatar's Deputy Ruler as president of this council on the grounds that it was a full-time job and he would be unable to give it his undivided attention.

The establishment of the National Assembly was the most divisive matter in that meeting. Bahrain demanded free elections and proportional representation in the Assembly, aware that as the most populous state in the region (with a total population of 216,000) this would be very much to her own advantage. The demand was rejected by all the other states, most of whom supported the principle of equal representation.\(^{40}\)

It was obvious that Bahrain's demand for free elections for an Assembly was not based on a keen democratic impulse but, rather on a determination to embarrass Qatar as a contender for the leadership. In keeping with its plan, Bahrain declared its independence in 1971 and exactly two years later, on 30 November 1973, the first elected National Bahrain Assembly was established. Most people were impressed with this show of democracy but,

\(^{38}\) A. O. Taryam, op. cit., p 110.
\(^{39}\) Ibid, p 120.
\(^{40}\) Ibid, p 121.
unfortunately, 21 months later their confidence was dashed when the Sheikh of Bahrain dissolved the elected Assembly and the Council of Ministers took over.\(^{(41)}\)

**The Fourth Meeting of the Supreme Council (Abu-Dhabi, 21-25 October 1969)**

At the fourth meeting four major resolutions were arrived at:

1. Sheikh Zaid of Abu-Dhabi was elected president of the federation and Sheikh Rashid of Dubai was unanimously elected vice president for two years. Significantly, neither Bahrain nor Qatar succeeded in securing either of these positions.

2. It was agreed that the town of Abu-Dhabi would be the provisional capital of the Federation until a new capital could be built on the frontier between Abu-Dhabi and Dubai.

3. A National Consultative Assembly was to be established in which each of the emirates would be equally represented by four members.

4. The Deputy Ruler of Qatar was elected Prime Minister.\(^{(42)}\)

Differences arose when it came to the distribution of federal positions. The Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah demanded either the defence portfolio or the interior portfolio for his emirate.\(^{(43)}\)

On the morning of 25 October 1969, the British Political Agent in Abu-Dhabi, James Treadwell, attended the meeting to convey a British Government message to the conference. The message urged all the sheikhs to do their utmost to overcome their problems. After delivering the message he withdrew from the meeting, leaving it in some disarray.\(^{(44)}\)

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\(^{(43)}\) A.O. Taryam, op. cit., p 133.

\(^{(44)}\) Ibid, p 135.
fact, the British interference was the straw which had broken the Camel's back. Apparently, some Sheikhs were looking for any excuse to withdraw from the meeting. Consequently, the Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah left the meeting immediately, refusing to sign the final communique. He was followed by the Ruler of Qatar, who blamed Britain for the failure of this meeting.\(^{(45)}\)

As soon as the Sheikh of Ras Al Khaimah arrived back in his emirate, he issued a communique accusing Britain of interfering in the internal affairs of the emirates.\(^{(46)}\) Thus, the fourth meeting ended abruptly and the discussion of other matters was indefinitely postponed. The four resolutions remained on paper, unsigned.

The failure of this meeting marked the death of the infant federation, which had been born prematurely. Various internal and external factors contributed to the collapse of the federation and are the concern of the next section.

The Major Reasons for the Collapse of Nine member Federation:

The failure of the federation was brought about by a combination of self interest, a general lack of confidence and tribal, political and economic rivalries between the Sheikhs.

The role of the Rulers:

The emirates were tribal societies and absolute power and authority was concentrated in the hands of the sheikhs. Needless to say, any attempt to force them to relinquish their privileges and their personal power would inevitably be firmly resisted.\(^{(47)}\)

\(^{(45)}\) Ali, M. Khalifa, op. cit., p 32.
\(^{(46)}\) A. O. Taryam, op. cit., p 135.
In addition, there existed deep-rooted historical conflicts between the rulers and personal antagonism was clear at the negotiating table. Some writers even went so far as to blame the four major emirates for engineering the collapse of the federation (i.e. Qatar, Bahrain, Abu-Dhabi and Dubai).(48)

Certainly, a major share of the blame should go to the sheikhs of Qatar and Bahrain who, because of ancient tribal and dynastic rivalries, were incapable of reaching consensus on any matters discussed in the meetings. As one writer put it:

"They apparently were talking the same words but with different meanings. Their words and concepts seem to have lacked the requirement of operational definitions."(49)

The Role of the Rulers' Legal Advisers:

The Legal Advisers did nothing to promote the success of the federation. It is my belief that they played a positively destructive role in trying to serve the individual and dynastic interests of their Sheikhly employers. Bearing in mind that most of them were non-natives with different nationalities and background it was obvious that their main priority was not going to be the interests of the ordinary citizens, but of their employers, the sheikhs.

Some writers specifically blame Dr. Hassin Kamel, Qatari Legal Adviser, for the failure of the Nine member Federation. They claim that he was:

"In the habit of burdening committee meetings with a continual flow of memoranda, statements, resolutions, protests, etc., sometimes by unilateral initiative."(50)

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Chapter two

The Main Bones of Contention: Site of Permanent Capital, National Assembly and Distribution of Ministerial Positions:

1- The Location of the Capital of the Federation:

A topic of heated debate at all four meetings was the location of the federal capital. Bahrain was in favour of selecting a town in one of the emirates to be the capital, while Qatar wanted to create a new capital on its border with Abu-Dhabi.

2- The National Assembly:

It was agreed that the assembly was to be a consultative body, but its composition was such a thorny issue that it had remained unresolved at the end of each previous meeting.

3- The Distribution of Cabinet Posts:

The dispute over the distribution of ministerial posts in the future of the federation was the real reason for the abrupt failure of the fourth meeting, although some of the Rulers pretended that the British interference had been responsible.

Ras Al Khaimah was insisting on the the ministry of defence or, as a compromise, the ministry of interior. Qatar, on the other hand, wanted the prime-ministership although this was something Bahrain would never allow. These were differences which eventually proved impossible to resolve.\(^{51}\)

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4- The Dubai-Abu-Dhabi Agreement

The Dubai-Abu-Dhabi Agreement of 18 February 1968, had specifically invited the Trucial emirates (i.e. Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain and Fujerah) to "discuss and participate in this agreement", while the two remaining emirates (i.e. Qatar and Bahrain) were only called upon to "discuss the future of the area in order to reach a united stand in this regard."(52)

Obviously, the two Sheikhs of Abu-Dhabi and Dubai were reluctant to include Bahrain and Qatar in the agreement but were asking for cooperation between the proposed federation and these two emirates. The Ruler of Abu-Dhabi, replying to a question in an interview with The Times about the proposed union of the Arab emirates, said:

"If it should prove impossible to work out a close union of all nine states for the present, then I would support a union of the Seven Trucial Sheikhdoms alone, or failing that, a union of Abu-Dhabi with three or four of them as the nucleus of something bigger."(53)

We may gather from this speech that the Ruler was not enthusiastic about widening the scope of the federation beyond the Trucial Oman emirates. On the other hand he had no objection to federation with Dubai as the ruling families of both emirates belonged to the same tribe, the Bani Yas.(54)

The Federation of the United Arab Emirates and its Political Structure:

The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E) is the only British-created federal system of Arab states which survives. It came into being in December 1971, after approximately four years of intensive negotiations and consultations between the rulers of prospective member states.

53 - The Times, 9 October, 1968.
54 - Ali, M. Khalifa, op. cit., p 35.
On 18 July 1971, the rulers of the seven Trucial Emirates (ie. Abu-Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Umm al Qaiwain, Ajman and Fujairah) met in Dubai to negotiate the possibility of creating an independent political entity, consisting of all seven emirates and to be called the United Arab Emirates. On 2 December 1971, six of the rulers met again in Dubai and officially declared the establishment of the United Arab Emirates. The ruler of the seventh emirate, Ras Al Khaimah, had withdrawn from the meeting asking for time to reconsider. In spite of this, the remaining six rulers decided to go ahead with the declaration. The constitution which had been worked out for the nine-member federation was adopted with only a few amendments to suit seven members rather than nine.

Ras Al Khaimah's last minute withdrawal was interpreted as a political manoeuvre to acquire equal veto powers in the Supreme Council, like those of Abu-Dhabi and Dubai. Moreover, the Sheikh of Ras Al Khaimah was hoping to discover oil in his territory which would justify his demand for greater power in the Supreme Council. It may have been, however, that, as a pre-condition of its joining the federation, the emirate wanted a settlement of its dispute with Iran over the two Tumbs Islands in the Gulf which belonged to the emirate but which were occupied by Iran.

Whatever the reasons for the delay, Ras Al Khaimah finally decided to join the federation without any pre-conditions and on 11 February 1972, became the seventh member of the federation. As such, it was granted six seats in the National Council and its ruler became a member of the Supreme Council.

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Chapter two

The Major Difficulties Encountered by the U.A.E. since its Establishment:

The Three - Islands Dispute:

One of the critical matters that the United Arab Emirates' government had to deal with very diplomatically was the dispute with Iran over the island of Abu Musa, belonging to Sharjah, and the islands of Greater and Lesser Tumb, belonging to Ras Al Khaimah (which caused some trouble to the federal government in its initial stages.) In fact, Iran laid claim to these islands immediately after the British announced their intention of withdrawing from the region. The Iranians officially notified the British Envoy to the Gulf, Sir William Luce, that they intended to occupy these islands and to oppose any:

"Federation that includes Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah until these two states have handed over the three islands to which Iran lays claim."(59)

Iran's troops landed on the islands on 30 November 1971. The landing on Abu Musa was made in accordance with an agreement reached on 29 November 1971, between the Ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Khalid Al Qassimi, and Iran, which was reached as a result of Sir William Luce's efforts to settle this matter before the British withdrawal. In the case of the two Tumbs, however, the Sheikh of Ras Al Khaimah refused to negotiate with the British envoy regarding this matter and resisted the Iranian landing on his islands. A number of fatal casualties resulted from the engagement.(60)

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60 - Brown, Neville, "Britain and Gulf: Don't go just yet please " The wisdom of withdrawal reconsidered, New Middle East, No. 24, 1970, p 44.
Chapter two

The First Sharjah Crisis:

A little more than seven weeks after the islands crisis, the United Arab Emirates federal government was confronted with a further bitter ordeal which almost brought it down. On 24 January 1972, the ex-ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Saqer Bin Sultan AlQassimi, with two dozen of his supporters and backed by Ras Al Khaimah, succeeded in entering the ruler's palace and assassinating the ruler Khalid and other members of his family. The federal government realized its credibility would be judged by its ability to deal with this crisis and that here was an opportunity to gain some credit at an early stage. Accordingly, in a collective effort federal troops and the Abu-Dhabi Guards managed to crush the coup and bring about the surrender of those responsible.(61)

The Second Sharjah Crisis:

The second attempted coup in Sharjah was on 17 June 1987 when the Commander of the Sharjah Guard, Sheikh Abdul Aziz, the elder brother of the ruler, took advantage of his brother's absence in London to seize control of the ruler's palace and the government headquarters demanding to be recognized as the sole legitimate ruler. Again the federal government had to respond in this crucial matter, but this time the Supreme Council was able to put an end to the attempted coup by means of peaceful negotiation.

During the period of the crisis the Supreme Council remained in session until the problem was solved and, in the face of its absolute refusal to recognize the use of force as a legitimate way of transferring power, the insurgents were forced to negotiate and accept the return of the legitimate ruler, Sheikh Sultan Al Qassimi, to power.(62)

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In crushing the two coup attempts, the United Arab Emirates federal government was able to demonstrate its ability to deal successfully with crucial problems of this kind and survive any such major threat to its internal authority and, despite all subsequent difficulties and obstacles, this it has continued to do for the last nineteen years.

The United Arab Emirates Political Structure:

The organization of the various decision making bodies is of crucial importance in the setting up of a federal system. Most federal constitutions lay down the necessity for an executive body, a legislative body and a judicial body. However, the United Arab Emirates provisional constitution, went further in adopting a method uniquely its own and providing for five federal bodies, four of which would combine the executive and legislative functions, while the fifth was designated to the judicial function.

Before we examine the different aspects of the United Arab Emirates political structure, three general points are relevant:

1- The United Arab Emirates constitution does not apply the principle of separation of powers, particularly the executive and legislative functions.

2- The single constitutional function is implemented by more than one federal body.

3- The federal authorities have direct jurisdiction over the whole population of the federation, irrespective of emirate. (63)

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Chapter two

The Provisional Constitution divided the federal authorities into the following:

1- The Federal Supreme Council.
2- The President and his Deputy.
3- The Federal Council of Ministers.
4- The Federal National Council.
5- The Federal Supreme Court.

The Federal Supreme Council:

The Federal Supreme Council is the highest authority in the federation. It consists of the seven Rulers of the emirates. The Provisional Constitution's guidelines do not confine the Council to being either an executive or a legislative authority. Article 46 of the constitution just describes it as the highest authority in the Union. (64)

Even though the Council may be the highest authority in the country, it reflects the independent status of each emirate and does not reflect the notion of amalgamation or integration since each member qualifies on the basis of being the ruler of his emirate alone, and may not even have the consent of his people. (65)

In the circumstances, the individual council members are bound to be unenthusiastic about increasing the authority of the federal apparatus at the expense of the individual emirates. In other words, an increase in federal powers would mean a decrease in their own domestic powers. (66)

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Chapter two

Constitutional flexibility allows the Supreme Council both legislative and executive powers.

**Major executive Powers:**

1- Formulation of general policy in all matters invested in the federation by the constitution and consideration of all matters conducive to the achievement of the goals of the federation. (Article 47)
2- Supreme control over the affairs of the federation in general. (Article 47)
3- Approval of the appointment of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and authority to accept his resignation and remove him from office at the request of the President of the federation. (Article 47).
4- Acceptance of a new member into the federation. (Article 1).
5- Approval of the appointment of the president and judges of the federal Supreme Court, acceptance of their resignations, and their dismissal in circumstances stipulated by the constitution. (Article 47)

**The Legislative Powers:**

The Supreme Council is the ultimate authority, with the power to approve or reject proposed legislation which has successfully passed through four previous stages.

1- The Council of Ministers initiates the bill.
2- The federal Council discusses the bill.
3- The bill is approved by the Council of Ministers.
4- The president channels the bill to the Federal National Council which pronounces the final decision. (67)

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FIGURE 2.1
THE U.A.E. POLITICAL STRUCTURE

THE SUPREME COUNCIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abu-Dhabi</th>
<th>Dubai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umm-al-Qaiwain</td>
<td>Ras Al Khaimah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajman</td>
<td>Sharjah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President

Prime Minister

Federal National Council

Federal Council of Ministers

Supreme Court (5 Judges)

| Elected | Appoints | Subject to | Vetoes Power |

Source: This figure has been adopted from Hassan al-Alkim, The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates, London: Saqi Books, 1989, p. 22.
Chapter two

The President of the Federation and his Deputy:

The posts of president and deputy president carry legislative and executive power.\(^{(68)}\) Indeed, in his role as president of the Supreme Council the president plays a significant role in the distribution of job offices throughout the federation.

The president and his deputy are elected by the Federal Supreme Council for a period of five years, and at the end of that time are eligible for re-election.\(^{(69)}\) In addition to their federal responsibilities, they still have essential duties to perform on a local level as rulers of their emirates. It is a situation in which they must guard against putting the interests of their emirates above those of the federation as a whole.\(^{(70)}\)

The salient responsibilities of the President and his Deputy are:

1. Presiding over the Supreme Council and directing its discussions.
2. Calling the Supreme Council into session.
3. Signing federal laws, decrees and decisions which the Supreme Council has sanctioned.
4. Supervising the implementation of federal laws, decrees and decisions through the Council of Ministers.
5. Representing the federation in national and international relations.\(^{(71)}\)

\(^{(68)}\) - Mi M. Khalifa, op. cit., p 44.
The Federal Council of Ministers:

The Federal Council of Ministers comes immediately below the President and the Supreme Council and exercises executive powers under their supervision. Once again the wealth and the size of both Abu-Dhabi and Dubai has been acknowledged not only in the distribution of ministerial seats but also in the most essential and prestigious posts in the Council. Accordingly, the key ministries are divided between these powerful emirates. Abu-Dhabi holds the ministries of the Interior, Petroleum, Media, and Public Works, while Dubai holds the ministries of Defence and Finance.

Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah, which rank next in importance in the federal hierarchy, are each entrusted with the running of three ministries, while the rest of the emirates are granted one ministry each. In short, representation is proportional to federation in the Federal Council of Ministries.

Although Article 56 of the constitution specifies that the ministers

"Shall be chosen from among citizens of the Union known for their competence and experience"

the distribution of cabinet portfolios is based on the traditional method, by which the ruling families get first priority, followed by those influential by virtue of their loyalty or wealth.

Interestingly enough, although Article 56 specifically lays down that the ministers be chosen from among the citizens, it makes no such stipulation in the case of the Prime-Minister and his Deputy. The absence of prerequisites for these key positions implies that they are deliberately reserved for the ruling families. Indeed, since the establishment of

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72 - Enver M. Koury, op. cit., p 89 .
73 - Yahya Al-jamal, op. cit, p 597 .
Chapter two

the United Arab Emirates the Prime-Minster and his Deputy have all been members of the Abu-Dhabi and Dubai ruling families.

The essential responsibilities of the Council are laid down by Article 60 in the Provisional Constitution. They include:

1. Following up the implementation of the general policy of the federation.
2. Initiating drafts of federal laws and submitting them to the federal National Council before they are passed to the President for presentation to the Supreme Council for sanction.
3. Drawing up the annual general budget of the federation and the final accounts.
4. Appointing and dismissing federal employees in accordance with the provisions of the law, provided that their appointment and dismissal do not require the issue of a decree.
5. Controlling the running of government departments and public services and monitoring the conduct and discipline of federal employees in general.\(^{74}\)

Major weakness of the Council:

Although the Council plays a fundamental role in the Federation, it is seriously handicapped and sometimes even paralysed by certain drawbacks. For instance:

1. All political decisions are ultimately taken by the Supreme Council when they should be seen as an essential function of the Council of Ministers.
2. The Prime Minister is not empowered to choose his cabinet.\(^{75}\)

\(^{74}\) - Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Emirates, Article 60, 1971.
\(^{75}\) - A.O. Taryam, op. cit., p 206.
3. All senior posts in the Council are in the hands of the oil rich emirates and as a consequence Council decisions are mistrusted by the poor emirates as not being necessarily in their best interests.

The Federal National Council:

During his visit to the region in 1970, William Luce, the British envoy to the Gulf, in his efforts to help the members of the Union of Arab Emirates (i.e. the nine member Federation) reach agreement regarding representation in the National Council suggested:

"The National Council shall consist of 41 members which are proportionally distributed among the emirates, in which the big four emirates, i.e. Abu-Dhabi, Qatar, Bahrain and Dubai allot 6 seats each, and 4 seats for Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah, and three seats for Umm al Qaiwain, Ajman and Fujerah."(76)

In the event, the United Arab Emirates has taken up the above suggestion, making some amendments to suit a seven member federation. Accordingly, the current U.A.E. National Council consists of 40 members which are proportionately distributed among the emirates. The distribution of seats in the Council was based on the wealth, population, size and power of each emirate. Accordingly, Abu-Dhabi and Dubai were allotted 8 seats each, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah 6 seats each, and Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain and Fujarah, 4 seats each.

The method of selecting members for the legislature differs from country to country. For example, in the U.S.A. and Australia, representation in the Upper House is distributed equally among the states, while in other federal states, like India, the seats of the Upper House (Rajja Sabha) are distributed on the grounds of one seat for every million inhabitants.(77) The method of choosing members for the Federal National Council in the

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76 - Waheed Rafat, op. cit., p 152.
U.A.E. is left vague. The Provisional Constitution does not state explicitly on what grounds members should be selected.

Article 69 states that:

"Each emirate shall be free to determine the method of selection of the citizens representing it in the Union National Assembly".

Consequently, as a result of not being tied to a specific method of selection, the seven rulers tend to appoint members from among influential and merchants families known to be loyal. Inevitably, a member thus appointed will be inclined to put the interests of his patron before the federal interest.\(^{(78)}\)

Theoretically, the Federal National Council is the legislative branch of the government, but only to a certain extent is this actually the case. The legislative process involves four stages: initiative, debate, ratification and publication. The National Council is concerned with the second stage (that is, the general debate) once the Council of Ministers has originated the bill. Therefore, the National Council's power is limited to deliberation and recommendation. In other words, its role is primarily consultative. Furthermore, the Council is not empowered to interrogate any member of the Council of Ministers and cannot debate any subjects without the approval of the latter.\(^{(79)}\) Moreover, the Federal Council cannot question the authority of the Council of Ministers or any individual minister.

The Supreme Court:

By definition, the Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority in the federation. The U.A.E. Supreme Court is a constitutional court comparable to the Bundesverfassungsgericht

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of the Federal Republic of Germany.\textsuperscript{(80)} It consists of a president and a number of judges, not exceeding five in all, are each appointed by a decree, which is issued by the president of the federation after being approved by the Supreme Council.\textsuperscript{(81)}

Representing as it does the interests of all the member states, this judicial authority is in a particularly strong position to promote, through its rulings, increased unity and integration within the federation.\textsuperscript{(82)} Certainly the Supreme Court's responsibilities offers this possibility.

1. It deals with disputes between member emirates or between an emirate and the federal government in public or constitutional matters. Its rulings are mandatory.

2. It has the power to question ministers and senior officials of the Union appointed by decree.

3. It deals with crimes directly affecting the interests of the federation.

4. It interprets the provisions of the constitution.\textsuperscript{(83)}

The Prerequisites of the United Arab Emirates Federation:

Many political writers have tried to identify certain factors essential to successful integration between countries or states and all of them have recognized the conceptual problems of generalization. In short, there is no universal condition the violation of which means the inevitable collapse of federation.

\textsuperscript{80} Franke Heard -Bey, From Tribal States to the United Arab Emirates, London : Longman ,1984,P 378.
\textsuperscript{81} Provisinal Constitution of the U.A.E. Article ,96, 1971.
\textsuperscript{82} Yahya AL-Jamal, op. cit, p. 600.
\textsuperscript{83} Provisinal Constitution of the United Arab Emirates ,Article 99, 1971.
There are, however, certain conditions considered to be helpful in establishing a federal system, but they are by no means a guarantee of success. Among these are:

1. Consent to a common defence policy.
2. Common desire to liberate the country from foreign powers, and a recognition that the only way to achieve this is by federation.
3. Expectation of financial advantages from federation
4. Existence of a political association prior to their federal union.
5. Geographical contiguity.

In the case of the United Arab Emirates, four factors point to the wisdom of federation:

1. Racial homogeneity.
2. Common history.
4. Goodwill among the ruling sheikhs.

These factors do not necessarily work at one level, nor do they affect the process of amalgamation to the same degree, but they have all, in one way or the another, contributed effectively to the creation of the United Arab Emirates and still are acting as positive elements in the federation's political development.

84- Thomas m. Franck, op. cit., p 171.
Racial Homogeneity:

The citizens of the United Arab Emirates, all share the similar cultural orientation, tribal background, linguistic practices, everyday lifestyle, family traditions and moral values and, above all they have spiritual unity.

Even though the people may come from a variety of tribal and dynastic roots, "Those tribes or dynasties are nonetheless part of one national heritage"(86)

Surely the absence of these factors, so overriding in the United Arab Emirates where tribe and religion play a crucial role, would in general work against federation. On the other hand, the existence of such factors would reinforce the structure of any union.

The Common History:

It has been said that the past is not behind us but all around us. The past, indeed, determines the future, and the one who does not have a past, probably will not have a future.

The shared historical experience of the seven emirates has acted as an integrative force in the creation of the United Arab Emirates. Each emirate is headed by a different family but in some cases the families may come from the same tribe. For instance, the al-Bu Falah and the al- Bu Falasah who rule Abu-Dhabi and Dubai are two different clans of the same tribe, the Bani Yas.(87) Ras Al Khamaih and Sharjah are governed by one tribe the Al Qasimi. Although the three remaining emirates are ruled by families from different tribes, the families are linked by intermarriage.

The common colonial heritage has also created a bond between these emirates. Indeed, the colonial power was responsible for two institutions which have contributed enormously to preparing the minds of the rulers for the fact of federation. These institutions were founded by the British in the early 1950s and are the Trucial Oman Scouts and the Trucial States Council.

The Trucial Oman Scouts (1951):

The main duties of this forces were the maintenance of intra and inter-state peace and security and the protection of the British oil survey groups against tribal attack. In 1972, the Trucial Oman Scouts was converted to be a federal army of the United Arab Emirates.

The Trucial States Council (1952)

This was a council composed of the seven rulers of the Trucial emirates headed, until 1960, by the British Political Agent. At the end of 1960 the chairman was permitted to be whomever the rulers might choose among themselves to hold that position. The Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah was chosen as the first native chairman of the Council. (88)

Both these institutions contributed over many years to the shaping of common approaches and perspectives. Moreover, it broke down the psychological barriers between the seven rulers and created a favourable atmosphere in which to exchange opinions and ideas regarding their emirate's interests and ambitions.

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Chapter two

The Common Security Problem:

Many political writers and scholars point out that the presence of an external threat can be a very positive factor in bringing groups together to form a single entity in order to repel that threat. Gordon Allport writes:

"There is no denying that the presence of a threatening common enemy will cement the ingroup sense of any organized aggregate of people."{(89)

Goodwill Among the Leadership:

History has witnessed the collapse of many unions for want of goodwill and enthusiasm at the level of the leadership. A spirit of goodwill is essential to the formation of any union, but even more so in the creation of a federal system in a tribal society, where the Shiekhhs have absolute power and the people's views and ideas, if they exist at all, are ignored and neglected. Goodwill among the sheikhs is the very backbone of the United Arab Emirates Federation; without it the union would not have seen the light.

Special mention must be made of the Sheikh of Abu-Dhabi who, as president of the Federation, has played a positive role in bringing about the union. The compromises he has devised in order to bridge the differences between the Sheikhs have made him the very symbol of unity. Therefore many U.A.E. citizens believe that the existence and strength of the Federation depends on his continued presence.

The Distinctive Features of the U.A.E. Federal System:

The emergence of the U.A.E. Federation in a region where the people have for centuries led a predominantly tribal existence has added a special flavour to the U.A.E. federal experience. Bedouin culture, traditions and values, combined with Islamic principles, have

conferred on the U.A.E. Federation a unique character by which it differs from any other federation in the world.

The uniqueness of the United Arab Emirates Federation resides in:

1. Its historical background.
2. The nature of its Constitution.

The Historical Background:

Until recently, the societies which constitute the U.A.E. had lived a predominantly bedouin life in which loyalty was owed primarily to the tribe and its sheikhs. The modern concept of government was unknown until very recently when the British determined the territory of each tribe and granted certain Sheikhs special authority over others.\(^{(90)}\)

Inevitably, the political loyalty in the United Arab Emirates remains a tribal one in which the loyalty to the tribe comes first, secondly the loyalty to the local emirate and lastly, loyalty to the federal government. Furthermore, political authority within the tribe has traditionally been bestowed on a particular individual who, surrounded by his tribal elders and religious scholars, has governed according to the Islamic holy book the Quran.

In fact, the U.A.E. federal experiment is unique in that the tribe is still considered to be the backbone of the political system and power and authority is distributed according to ancient principles. The emirates' tribal pattern does indeed make the U.A.E. different from all the other federations in the world.

The Nature of the Constitution:

Since the establishment of the United Arab Emirates in 1971, the constitution has remained provisional, which makes it the only federal country in the world without a permanent constitution. Article 144 in the constitution states that:

"This constitution shall apply for a transitional period of five years."

In 1975, the federal government formed a committee to prepare the bill for a permanent constitution. Nine months later the bill was ready to be submitted to the Supreme Council at its meeting on 12th July 1976. Unfortunately, the bill was rejected and the term of the provisional constitution had to be extended for another five years.

This disagreement over the permanent constitution is a symptom of the true state of affairs within the federation in which differences among rival sheikhs are considered a fact of life which the country has to learn to live with. The reasons for continued rejection of the permanent constitution would seem to be:

1. It would weaken the emirates' authority and strengthen the federal authority. This implies a danger that the federal government would extend its control over the military forces, education, immigration, customs, health and economic affairs. Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah are particularly opposed to this tendency.

2. It would increase each emirate's contribution to the federal budget, the bulk of which has been paid by Abu-Dhabi.

The constitution was not put to a popular referendum, nor did it come about as a result of a constituent assembly, nor is it in the form of a contract between the people of the U.A.E.

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91 - M. Al-Rokn, op. cit., p 52.
92 - Keesings Contemporary Archives, Oct,8,1976,27985.
and their rulers. The first section of the provisional constitution illustrates how it has the appearance of being a gift from the rulers. It begins: "We the Rulers of the Emirates of Abu-Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain and Fujairah .." Whereas, in most federal countries, the first section of the constitution begins: "We, the people of." (e.g. the U.S.A. or Canada, etc).

As it stands, the constitution seems to have been designed to serve the rulers' desires and purposes rather than the federal government's aspirations and interests. Thus, the permanent constitution has so far been rejected on the grounds that it would jeopardize their interests.

In conclusion, the collapse of the proposed nine-member federation and the withdrawal of Qatar and Bahrain pushed the seven remaining emirates to establish a smaller federation in 1971 to be called the United Arab Emirates.

Four major internal factors pointed to the wisdom of federation. These were: racial homogeneity, in that the inhabitants shared the cultural and tribal background; common history in which each emirate is headed by ruling family; the common external threat and goodwill among the emirates' leadership.

The most distinctive feature of the U.A.E. federation that its constitution, in which it adopted a method uniquely its own in providing for five federal bodies, four of which would combine the executive and legislative functions, while the fifth is designated to the judicial function. Furthermore, the constitution did not apply the principle of separation of powers, particularly the executive and legislative functions.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE ECOLOGY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE U.A.E.

Introduction:

Although public administration involves deliberate historical choices about forms of administration, it grows naturally out of its environment. It is a child of the society, born and reared to absorb its values and norms. Therefore, any attempt to divorce it from its natural context undermines its efforts and spoils its plans and programmes. Transplantation to a strange climate, regardless of the nature of the receiving soil, is bound to cause problems which may be serious enough to lead to collapse.\(^1\) In short, the political, social, economic and historical variables with which public administration interacts shape the nature and scope of its activities. It does not work in isolation but reflects the values, norms, ills and goods of society. It affects and in return is affected by these elements. Its output is regarded as input for society and its input is conceived as output for society. It is a mutual relationship in which society has the upper hand and ultimate power. Therefore, any weakness or strength in society will be unfailingly reflected in its performance. In other words, it is an organic relationship and a defect in any part of it will cause a problem for the whole system and an improvement to one part means improvement to the others.

Based on this argument, any administrative system must be seen and studied within the context of its own peculiar environment. The effectiveness and capability of administration lie in understanding the external variables with which it has to interact every day. Unfortunately most programmes and efforts to improve administration in developing countries have ignored these elements and therefore the results have been disappointing. Such efforts have been superficial, in that they have focused on organizational structures and procedures and have been inclined to put the emphasis on the internal mechanism of

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\(^1\) Jamil E. Jreisat, Administrative Reform in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective, Public Administration and Development, Vol.8, 1988, p. 93.
administration (i.e. personnel regulations, chains of command and so on), failing to recognize the significance of external influences. Fred Riggs warns administrative scholars and practitioners not to fall into the trap of seeing only organizational structures and procedures. He points out that even after:

"A change in the law, a reorganization, a re-definition of positions and duties, etc, probably no effective change in behaviour will follow in norms and prescriptions."(2)

Although, such efforts may yield some marginal improvements in the system they are necessarily superficial and secondary improvements. The essence of improvement lies in the behaviour and attitudes of administrators, how they perceive development, how committed they are to development and how far the social and cultural components influence their performance and productivity in administration.

Many scholars have become convinced that:

"The administrative culture is an extension of the greater social culture. It has become conventional to assume that cultural characteristics, widely socialized and reinforced through primary groups (particularly the family), play a large role in determining administrative performance through the behaviour of individuals."(3)

Stressing the same point, Rosamund Thomas, suggests that bureaucratic systems in most third world countries are merely facades behind which the latent functions prevail over the manifest functions. In other words, the old traditional principles are still active and predominant in these societies.(4) Osama Abdul Rahman rightly argues that the attempts of many developing countries to transplant administrative doctrines, concepts and methodologies from Western countries, depending on imitation and neglecting the

indigenous circumstances (social, political and economic) which have far-reaching effects and influences on any administration and also ignoring the distinguishing components of the prevailing administrative system, can neither be realistic nor mature.\(^5\) Therefore, the success of any efforts aimed at improving a given administration lies in understanding the social and political context in which it must function.

In the Gulf states in general, and in the United Arab Emirates in particular, ambiguity and lack of vision are the main features of the administrative system, both on a federal and a local level. This, in my view, is no more than the result of unsuccessful imitation of other administrative systems, notably the Egyptian, which are not in tune with the social, political and economic conditions, nor with the tribal and bedouin nature of the people.

We find that development and development administration concepts are absent from or vague in the minds of U.A.E decision makers, some of whom feel that development is simply a matter of transplanting alien doctrines into the country regardless of national peculiarities and circumstances. Consequently, the developmental tendency has been to concentrate on the building of prestigious projects such as airports, skyscrapers, hospitals, palaces, schools, government building and sport clubs and importing luxury consumer goods such as cars. Millions of dollars are spent each year on these things with only marginal benefits. Fred Riggs suggests that all these things are superficial signs of development but not the substance of development just as a movement in the body is a sign of life but not life itself.\(^6\) This has created various problems in this country of which the most critical are the dependence of locals on others to do their jobs and their unwillingness to work (apathy) except in the most undemanding and prestigious of posts. Inevitably there is a growing dichotomy between appearance and reality. In other words, the U.A.E may

appear to outsiders to be a modern society with up-to-date facilities, but the reality is that backwardness and stagnation are the prevailing characteristics.\(^{(7)}\)

Although the bureaucracy in the U.A.E. is still in its infancy it is burdened with almost all government development activities and plans. It is regarded as the vehicle of development and the administrators, as the agents of change, are the drivers. Thus, being the spearhead in all socio-economic development, it is the single most essential factor in shaping and influencing the emerging state.\(^{(8)}\)

The United Arab Emirates is what economists refer to as a rentier state, that is a state whose economy is dependent on one source of income. Its revenue is entirely contingent on the extraction of a natural resource, i.e. oil. Without it the country would collapse. In such a state there is only a limited participation of the private sector in the development process and the bureaucracy is burdened with the responsibilities of planning, regulating, implementing and maintaining its economic policy. Therefore, any defect in its internal system means a defect in development itself.\(^{(9)}\)

**Alternatives for the U.A.E. Development Administration**

It seems to me that there are two possible alternatives among the remedies available in the modern administrative sciences for the United Arab Emirates' development administration to resort to. They differ in their approach and doctrine.

\(^{(7)}\) - Osama Abdul Rahman, op. cit., p 40.
Conventional Alternative:

The first alternative is the conventional one which concentrates on structural change or improvement accompanied by procedural change. The emphasis is on organization, rules, regulations, procedures and hierarchical authority. It is the Weberian approach to administration and is favoured by the majority of practitioners in the United Arab Emirates administration because of the influence of Egyptian and Sudanese expatriates who have served as administrative advisers to the civil service council and who have played a substantial role in the formulation of civil service law and other regulations in the administrative system. Most of these expatriates have retired to their own country having contributed to the spread of conventional methods in a country young enough to have blazed a new trail.\(^{(10)}\) Suffice it to say that this school is inappropriate to the U.A.E. since it neglects and belittles the informal relationships and social variables which are regarded by U.A.E society as crucial. In short, the application of this approach in the U.A.E. has resulted in various administrative ills, such as over-employment, centralization, lack of motive to work, over-emphasis on law and regulations, etc. Furthermore, it has created an atmosphere in which workers and administrators alike are reluctant to accept every policy, whatever its nature and potential effectiveness, which has been handed down from the top.

Behavioural and Ecological Alternative:

The second alternative is the behavioural-ecological approach. The essence of this approach is that it perceives human beings (the administrators) as being the agents of change, the axes or vehicles of development. Therefore, the efforts of development administration should be directed towards improving their performance and increasing their productivity, effectiveness and efficiency through identifying the elements of strength in

their behaviour and allocating them to suit the development administration purposes.\(^{11}\) Since administration does not function in a vacuum, the local ecology has an undoubted effect on administrative behaviour, colouring and determining attitudes either positively or negatively. Ibrahim Ziyani is one of the advocates of this approach. He argues:

"The development of the administrative apparatus does not stop at knowing the internal mechanism of this apparatus, but requires, in addition to that, a thorough knowledge of the external environment in which it operates. This means acquaintance with customs and traditions and also the socio-cultural characteristics of the population which have had any noticeable impact on the administrative apparatus."\(^{12}\)

Thus the study of administrative behaviour isolated from its administrative ecology (social, political and economic) is invalid. This enlightened approach argues that the only available means of understanding administrative behaviour is by linking it with its broader environment. This is believed to be the most appropriate form of development administration for the United Arab Emirates, since it associates administrative behaviour within the organization with the peculiar characteristics of the external environment, in this case one in which tribal values play a predominant role and determine the country's political structure and constitution. These tribal values colour every aspect of life in the country, make a deep impression on the quality of the administration and create a unique pattern of administrative behaviour different from that found in any other country in the world.

In the light of this argument, the study of the United Arab Emirates' administrative behaviour and the attempt to associate it with its broader culture and identify its developmental capacity may constitute a significant contribution to awareness in this field. It may even make it possible to initiate and develop an effective administrative approach to

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\(^{12}\) - Ibrahim Ziyani, in Hassan A. ElTayeb, Administrative Reform in the Arab Countries: Between the Original and the Contemporary, in Nassir Al Saigh (ed), Administrative Reform in the Arab World: Readings, Jordan: Arab Organization of Administrative Sciences, 1986, p 120.
developmental responsibility in the U.A.E. after the disappointing results of so many previous developmental programmes.

In line with this objective, the present chapter attempts to identify the major ecological variables which have affected and still affect the administrative system of the United Arab Emirates in that they have created a distinctive climate bound to undermine or stifle any development efforts.

There are three major ecological variables which are assumed to have played a negative role in the United Arab Emirates development administration. These are the:

1. Socio-cultural factors
2. Education factors
3. Demographic structure

Before we discuss the ecological variables themselves it is essential to assess the factors which have led to concern over development administration in the United Arab Emirates.

1. The disappointing results of most development programmes, and the discrepancy between what was hoped for and what has been achieved, put the government under tremendous pressure to pay more attention to the administrative system as the axis of development and the primary agency responsible for all the processes of development.

2. The growing economic disparity between the wealthy and the poor emirates increased pressure on the federal government to bridge this gap and compensate inhabitants disadvantaged by this unjust situation. Thus, administration emerged as a means of narrowing this gap and bringing about prosperity in the poor emirates.

3- The appointment of skilled and enthusiastic indigenous administrators to prominent positions at federal level has increased the demand for change in the administrative system.

The ecology of the U.A.E. public administration:

The assumption of this chapter is that there are three primary ecological variables contributing to the disappointing results of the United Arab Emirates' development administration. These variables are socio-cultural, educational and demographic. Before we attempt to address these variables, it is essential to define the term 'ecological variable'. For the purpose of this study we define it as 'the continuous interaction between an administrative system and its broader environment'. It includes the social, cultural and political factors which influence the performance of the administrative system, either positively or negatively.

Socio-cultural variables:

Since the United Arab Emirates is basically a confederation of many different tribes, it is a society in which tribal values predominate. The tribal nature of the society has inevitably influenced and shaped the administrative system to give it special character which distinguishes it from that of any other country in the world.\(^{13}\)

It is difficult for public administration to separate itself from the wider cultural context, because it is a cultural product which reflects the values and norms of the society; whether positive or negative.\(^{14}\) Understanding this fact will enable us to identify and explain various administrative problems in the U. A. E's bureaucracy. Furthermore, it may enable us to understand the duality of this bureaucracy which appears to the outsider to be a


modern system applying the most advanced administrative techniques, while in fact its latent functions prevail over its manifest functions.\(^{(15)}\)

The vast bureaucracy of the U.A.E. is of recent origin, having reached its present considerable size only over the last twenty years, more precisely after the 1973 war which resulted in a tremendous increase in the price of oil. The oil boom pressurized the government into expanding its bureaucratic apparatus and enrolling more employees to carry out its development plans and projects. Accordingly individuals from all sections of U.A.E. society have entered the bureaucratic system in return for generous salaries and job security. This has meant that many with inadequate education and qualifications have been appointed to responsible and sensitive positions, confident that they are entitled to share in new wealth.\(^{(16)}\) They have brought with them many social ills and inappropriate patterns of behaviour from their tribal backgrounds into their administrative units and jobs. The most noticeable examples are:

**Paternalism:**

This kind of behaviour is associated with patriarchal tribal societies. In a bedouin society like the U.A.E., the authority of the father or tribal chief is absolute and final, his decisions are respected and implemented, loyalty and allegiance are his without question and as head of the chain of command he is the source of orders which others receive and obey.\(^{(17)}\) This traditional behaviour which most people of the Emirates take for granted will inevitably be reflected in their performance in administration. What they have learned from their fathers and tribal chiefs will be implemented in their jobs. Having learned from their father that all decisions must be approved by him, they assume that their boss's approval is equally essential before any decision can be made. The result is centralization. They will

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\(^{(15)}\) Osama Abdul Rahman, op. cit., p 105.


\(^{(17)}\) Gerd Nonneman, *Development Administration and Aid in the Middle East*, London: Routledge, 1988, p 42.
fear responsibility because they are not used to it; they are used to obey, not to discuss; they are used not to think but to apply; they are used not to oppose but to agree; they are used to believing that their father or tribal chief is always right, therefore they assume that their boss must always be right.

This phenomenon has further implications for individual administrators and their extended families. In tribal societies family ties are crucial and strong and this restricts employees vis-à-vis their jobs. Family ties prevent them relocating and as a result mobility within United Arab Society society is limited. Mobility, if it did exist, would be among those who lack skills and education. Adherence to the extended family also results in nepotism, favouritism (Wasta) and ethnocentrism. (18)

Non-achievement Behaviour:

"A tribal society is a status rather than an achievement-oriented society; who you are is more important than what you can do" (19)

In a tribal society respect is more likely to be based on age and family status (ruling or influential) than importance of job or monetary success. (20) In this society the crucial thing is the name of the family to which you belong rather than what you have achieved. Since the administrative system inevitably mirrors the Emirates' general behaviour, most influential positions are allotted to those who have right names or belong to ruling and influential families. The qualification here is loyalty rather than ability. Thus, the United Arab Emirates administrative system has been used to stress the importance of the status of those who happen to be the elite of the society. Therefore, administrators,

"have been considered not servants of the state, but servants of the ruler" (21)

18 - Saud Al Nimir and Monte Palmer, op. cit., p 103.
It seems that within United Arab Emirates' society two cultures function side by side:

First, the tribal culture which dominated society during the pre-oil period and still has a powerful influence today.

Second, the foreign culture which has been imported by the foreign workers who have been drawn to the country by the oil boom. (22)

The combination of these two cultures has resulted in a third, an amalgam of old and inherited with the new and imported. Al-kubaisy calls it Sheikhocracy, Al-Rumaihi prefers Bedoucracy. (23) The main characteristic of this phenomenon is duality. Duality, as defined by Hassan ElTayeb, is:

"Manifested in the distinct dichotomy between systems and behaviour; between the methods and tools which we copy and the way we do our work." (24)

In a modern or developed society this is a negative or pathological phenomenon whereas in a traditional society like the United Arab Emirates it is natural and acceptable. The most essential features of duality are:

**Favouritism (Wasta )**

Favouritism manifests itself when the administrative officer publicly condemns and denounces some practice but does it in his job and justifies it for himself. (25) ElTayab, accurately describes this phenomenon when he argues that:

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"We make laws and regulations but overstep them with numerous exceptions, and go back to them frequently to justify decisions; we design a functional hierarchy of authority and responsibilities but concentrate all authority in the leaders." (26)

Formalism:

Formalism is a pathological phenomenon which has affected many people of the Emirates since the oil boom and the arrival of huge numbers of foreign workers. It is an exaggerated concern for appearance rather than reality and essence; a readiness to be impressed by the job title rather than the responsibilities of the job, the luxury office rather than the job itself— even to the extent that the size of office and kind of furniture determine the importance of an employee’s position in the administration. The indigenous population has been transformed into a leisure class, depending heavily on foreign workers. A nation of sophisticated consumers, they import almost everything from pins to aircraft.

Finally, we must reiterate that cultural and social variables have created various problems for development administration. We may sum them up as follows:

1. Loyalty to family and tribe prevail over loyalty to job or organization.
2. Social status is the most essential qualification for promotion and the achievement of high government position, therefore personal achievement and innovative impulses are extremely rare.

The United Arab Emirates’ Education System:

The U. A. E.’s education system is another major ecological variable which affects development administration to the extent that it plays a very essential role in determining the success or failure of its efforts. This is because there is a direct correlation between education and administration in that the products of the human factory which is the

education system operate the administrative system. Education determines and shapes the content of men's minds and any attempt to understand civil servants' administrative behaviour must take into account their educational background.\(^{27}\) Considering their behaviour in isolation is a major error most developing countries have fallen into. Accordingly, knowledge of the Emirates' education system would enable us to understand instances of inappropriate administrative behaviour found in the U. A. E.'s bureaucracy.

The discovery of oil in the 1960's was a watershed for education in the U.A.E. in that it led to the introduction of a modern education scheme brought to the Emirates by a Kuwaiti mission. Prior to that date education followed the traditional pattern, basically concerned with *Quranic* studies and lessons in the Arabic languages. After the creation of the United Arab Emirate in 1972, a comprehensive educational scheme was launched to cope with the rapid economic expansion the country was experiencing. Many schools were built, experts from other Arab countries and from UNESCO were brought in to study the curricula and schooling system; teachers were imported from other Arab countries, mainly Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and the Sudan.\(^{28}\)

In spite of efforts made to encourage vocational education, its results are limited compared with the country's need for technically skilled manpower to meet the demands of the country's development ambitions. Nevertheless, because social pressures belittle the technical job and represent it as (*Aib*) shameful, most students are keen to enrol in a general education and become white collar employees, guaranteed a generous stable salary, light work and social prestige.\(^{29}\) This means that while the technical jobs are left for foreign workers, mostly from India and Pakistan, the administrative jobs suffer from overemployment and administrative inflation.


\(^{29}\) Muhammed AL-Rumahi, op. cit, p 196.
Table 3.1

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<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Even though more than two decades have passed since the first steps towards the introduction of formal modern education methods were taken in the United Arab Emirates, the system is still in its infancy and still unrelated to the real needs of development. Most government apparatus lacks effective leadership; there are far too few planners and economists to plan for development and there is a desperate shortage of engineers, teachers, doctors, etc. (30)

We assume that for a country like the U. A. E., where foreign workers dominate not only most technical posts but also most relatively low-rank administrative posts, the major role of education would be to develop indigenous manpower to replace these non-nationals. (31)

In the United Arab Emirates, as well as in most other countries of the world, the concept education is associated with the concept of employment. In other words, jobs are given to those who have obtained school certificates. Essentially education is no longer primarily a means of spreading knowledge but a means of getting a job. To all intents and purposes, schools have become supermarkets selling the commodity most in demand on the market. The market determines the most profitable area of study-engineering, medicine,

31 - J.S. Birks and J. A. Rimmer, *Developing Education Systems in the Oil States of Arabia: Conflicts of Purpose and Focus*, University of Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1984, p 3.
etc, or administration? School becomes a tool of production: the student enters as raw material and graduates as a qualified engineer, doctor or administrator, etc. (32)

The impact of the U.A.E education system on the bureaucracy:

Undoubtedly the quality of their education has a substantial influence on the behaviour and attitudes of workers in a bureaucracy. Thus, the education system contributes to the existence of a number of unhealthy phenomena within the U.A.E bureaucracy. Among them are the following:

Lack of independent thinking:

Due to the nature of education, which places emphasis on memorizing rather than understanding, students lack independence of thought, initiative and innovatory drive. When they graduate from school and enter employment they carry with them the behaviour they have learned at school. This helps to explain the lack of initiative of most government employees in the U.A.E bureaucracy. Fadlalla Ali rightly argues that Arabic schools, universities, teachers, indeed the whole educational process, combine to produce a conventional employee within whom all talent and abilities have been stifled. (33)

Avoidance of Responsibilities:

Avoidance of responsibility and apathy are the most negative part of the legacy of the educational system. This educational system, as Al Saigh points out, "Does not plant in a child the love of work, efficiency, or responsibilities...... as a student, he has to put on an act in front of his teacher to get the necessary passing grade, or else he would fail. Then this student graduates and joins the civil

service, only to make sure to bow his head in front of his supervisor and respect him to avoid suppression. Finally he gets promoted and becomes the head of a unit or department, only to practise the oppressive role previously practised upon him."(34)

Demographic Structure:

Population structure is the third ecological variable which must receive special attention in any study of development administration. It may not be such an important factor in many other countries, but it is crucial in the United Arab Emirates where natives constitute no more than 24 per cent of the total population.

Because the United Arab Emirates' population is made up of so many different peoples the society is a combination of a great variety of cultures and values. Nationals are a minority in their own country. Normally the size of population is determined by the ratio of births to deaths but in the U.A.E. the demand for labour and workers is the factor which determines the size of the population.(35)

United Arab Emirates society is officially divided into two main groups, nationals and non nationals, but there are, of course, many subgroups within each main group.

1- Nationals:

Those who have United Arab Emirates citizenship. This group is divided into three subgroups:

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Ruling elite:

They are the ruling families of the seven emirates which constitute the United Arab Emirates. (al-Nahyan, al- Maktoom, al- Qassimi, al- Mu‘ala, al- Nuaimi and al- Sharjy). The Emirates' power structure is currently monopolized by these families. Most key positions are dominated by them. Their authority and power are absolute. This authority and power has been increased since the discovery of oil. The oil revenue is regarded by most of them as their private property. As a result it is so difficult to distinguish between the income of the state and the income of the ruling elite that it is believed by many to be the same thing. (36)

First-class nationals:

These comprise those who are originally from the United Arab Emirates, and belong to distinguished tribes in the country. They are known as the Asil. (37) They wield considerable power in commerce and have traditionally held essential positions in the United Arab Emirates. They belong mainly to al-Shamsi, al- Swadi, al- Muhari, al- Mansorri, al- Amri, al- Mazroi and al- Dhahri families. Almost two thirds of ministers in the 1990 cabinet reshuffle are from these families. The ruling families basically rely on them for support, stability and the running of internal affairs.

Second class nationals:

Those who immigrated to the country after the discovery of oil, or after 1925. (38) They are naturalized citizens but their political rights are limited compared with those of the previous two groups. Constitutionally they have no right of election or nomination and may

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not occupy a key position either at federal or local level. Most of them are Arabs from the eastern coast of the Gulf ( Iran ) who are known as "Howala ". There are also the Yamanis and Baloushis and many others who have come to the country since the discovery of oil, mainly to work.

2- Non-Nationals:

The need for social development and a modern infrastructure, coupled with the promise of huge financial rewards has attracted and encouraged many people to come to this area. Given the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled local manpower to carry out these huge developmental projects, dependence on foreign labourers was inevitable. Most of them are Pakistanis, Indians, and Arabs, mainly Egyptians, Palestinians, Sudanese and Jordanians. Arab expatriates are concentrated in administration and education, while most of the others work as construction labourers, domestic servants and at other jobs which do not require skills.

Table 3-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popul. &amp; Manpower</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationals</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>114033</td>
<td>29162</td>
<td>201544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-National</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>66193</td>
<td>48909</td>
<td>356343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.2 shows that the population has virtually doubled nine times since the 1968 census. The census recorded a population of 180,226. Nationals accounted for 63.3 per
cent of the total population and 37.4 of the manpower. We have seen how the huge increase in oil prices after the 1973 war doubled the country's revenues, and increased the demand for foreign labour to carry out development and infrastructure projects. Because of this, in the 1975 census the aggregate population of non-nationals had increased tremendously to reach 63.9 per cent of the total population and their contribution to the workforce now amounted to 85 per cent. Only 36.1 per cent of the population were nationals and their contribution to the workforce was only 15 per cent. The 1980 census showed that the figures for the nationals had declined even further to 27.9 per cent of the total population and 9.6 per cent of the country's manpower. In contrast, the non-nationals were now 72.1 of the population and represented 90.4 per cent of manpower. The final census since independence, conducted in 1985, recorded a total population of 1,622,464. The non-nationals outnumbered the citizens to the tune of 75.7 per cent of the total population and 91.7 of the workforce. This meant nationals comprised not more than 24.3 per cent of the total population and only 8.3 per cent of the country's manpower.

The Influence of demographic structure on the U.A.E bureaucracy:

Undoubtedly the existence of this complicated social network has had a substantial and direct effect on the administrative situation in the U.A.E, particularly bearing in mind that the economy totally depends on social services which are run by government agencies intensively staffed by both nationals and non-nationals. The administration has had to absorb this heterogenous mass of people and deal with them according to their indigenous culture and background.(39)

The Influence of nationals:

The monopolization by certain segments of nationals (Asil ) of the most influential positions in administration has created animosity towards them among other employees

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which reflects negatively on their administrative behaviour and performance fostering ills such as apathy, carelessness and absenteeism. In my opinion these problems stem from prejudice in recruitment, promotion and advancement. Of two employees who enter the service together one finds himself stuck in his position for ten years while the other is promoted to become assistant deputy minister. When the reason is not merit but a question of social status it becomes clear that qualifications and ability are secondary criteria in United Arab Emirate society.

The Influence of non-nationals:

The influence of this group varies from one nationality to another. For example, Egyptian influence is very apparent in local political and administrative thinking. The constitution and civil service code have been formulated by Egyptian scholars. Due to their huge numbers and long bureaucratic traditions Egyptians predominate in most government agencies. Immediately after them come the Palestinians and Jordanians who compete with them to impose their own procedures and way of thinking. Each nationality is keen to secure certain jobs and to monopolize particular units of the administration. Each tries to increase its number through the recruitment of more employees from its own country. Each tries to maximize its influence by the appropriate use of international events to serve their own interests. This was well illustrated during the second Gulf crisis, when one group exploited the political stand their own government was taking to prove to U.A.E. officials that they were the group to be trusted, meanwhile deliberately discrediting rival nationalities for the political stands their governments were taking in the crisis.

Muhammed Rumaihi asserts that Arab workers have a negative stereotype of the national worker, regarding him as arrogant, unproductive, uneducated and concerned only

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40 - Muhammed Rumaihi, op. cit, p 128.
with making money. In return, nationals have a negative image of the foreign workers, regarding them as lazy, hypocritical and snobbish.\(^{(42)}\)

In conclusion, public administration in the United Arab Emirates does not work in isolation but reflects the values, norms, ills and goods of society. It affects, and in return is affected, by these elements. It is a mutual relationship in which society has the upper hand and ultimate power. Therefore, any weakness or strength in society will be invariably reflected in administration output and in administrators' performance.

This chapter identified three major ecological variables which are assumed to have played a negative role in the U.A.E.'s public administration. These are: socio-cultural factors, education factors and demographic structure. Paternalism, favouritism and formalism are the results of socio-cultural variables. Lack of independent thinking and avoidance of responsibilities are the immediate outcomes of the educational system. Finally, apathy and carelessness are the consequences of demographic factors.

Ultimately, the United Arab Emirates' administrative system is, and will remain, the natural product of indigenous social and cultural conditions. Therefore, development strategies must take this into consideration if they are to succeed. The attempts of development scholars to transplant administrative models, concepts and theories from other countries, depending on imitation and neglecting the indigenous circumstances (social, political and economic) which have far-reaching affects and influence on any administration and also ignoring components peculiar to the prevailing administrative system, can neither be realistic nor mature.

\(^{(42)}\) - Muhammad Rumaihi, op. cit., p 129.
CHAPTER FOUR

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

Introduction

Administration in the United Arab Emirates is quite unlike administration in most developing countries, it is even different from that in its neighbouring Gulf states. The reason lies in the tremendous accumulated wealth generated from its oil revenues which enables the country to establish any necessary new infrastructure within a much shorter time since it does not suffer the same lack of resources and liquidity. It is also unlike most Gulf states in that it operates on two administrative levels. One is federal and the other is local. Thus, it is unique among its neighbours. Each emirate in the federation has its own administrative system which may differ from the federal one and even from those of the other emirates.

The discovery of oil in the 1960s has turned these semi-nomadic emirates into a technically "modern" state. The new wealth forced the emirates to establish as a first priority an apparatus to deal with this sudden development and the result has been a rapidly growing bureaucracy.

The federal administration of the U. A. E. is by no means fully developed- indeed it is still in its infancy. Federation took place on 2 December 1971 which meant that with one or two minor differences common principles were introduced throughout the emirates. Prior to that date individual municipalities were responsible for practical requirements, such as cleaning roads and investigating market prices.
Administration has already been identified as the vehicle of development and by its nature it may make or mar an emerging country's chances of success. This chapter deals specifically with the administration of the United Arab Emirates, its evolution and functions, and its main instruments. Special attention will be paid to the Federal Council of Ministers as an executive apparatus and two selected local administrative units will be highlighted, namely that of Abu-Dhabi which is regarded as advanced and that of Ras Al Khaimah which is less developed.

Federal Administrative Machinery:

There are three main bodies charged with federal administration of varying importance. The most powerful is the Council of Ministers which controls the large federal bureaucracy and initiates federal programmes; the Civil Service is the executive tool and the Federal Personnel Department is there to make implementation possible.

Federal Council of Ministers:

The Federal Council of Ministers consists of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and, currently, 20 ministers. Most crucial posts are divided between Abu-Dhabi and Dubai. With only one exception, ever since the first cabinet the Prime Minister has come from Dubai and the Deputy Prime Minister from Abu-Dhabi. Ministers of Defence and Finance always come from the ruling family of Dubai. Abu-Dhabi monopolizes the ministries of the Interior, Petroleum, Housing and Public Works, Foreign and Information; Ras Al Khaimah monopolizes the Ministry of State for the Supreme Council; Fujairah monopolizes the Ministry of Agriculture, Sharjah, umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman are categorized as pro-federation and do not insist on portfolios.
Article 60 in the Provisional Constitution lists among other functions of the Council of Ministers:

1- Supervising the execution of judgements rendered by Union law courts and the implementation of international treaties and agreements concluded by the Union.

2- Appointment and dismissal of Union employees in accordance with the provisions of the law, provided that appointment or dismissal does not require the issue of a decree.

3- Controlling the conduct of work in departments and public services of the Union and the conduct and discipline of Union employees in general.(1)

Since the establishment of the United Arab Emirates in 1971, serious conflict has arisen between the modern state with its modern constitutional institutions and the tribal elements in society struggling to preserve their interests and privileges. This is a problem that has surfaced during every cabinet reshuffle. Harmony between the inherited tribal tradition in which the sheikh has absolute power, and the modern state, which requires him to transfer his power to the federal institutions, is obviously a primary objective in all cabinet formation. To understand this situation we should look in some detail at the five cabinets reshuffles which have taken place between the creation of the country in 1971 and the most recent one in November 1990.

The First Cabinet 9 December 1971:

Before the formation of this cabinet the individual emirates were informed of the ministerial positions allotted to each of them. The Provisional Constitution specifies twelve federal portfolios:

1- Foreign Affairs
2- Interior

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(1) - The Provisional Constitution of The United Arab Emirates, Article 60, 1971.
3- Defence
4- Finance, Economy and Industry
5- Justice
6- Education
7- Public Health
8- Public Works and Agriculture
9- Communications, Post, Telegraph and Telephones.
10- Labour and Social Affairs
11- Information
12- Planning\(^2\)

When the nominations of each emirate were submitted to the President of the Federation he found that all the nominees were from the ruling families, with the exception of some from Abu-Dhabi who were from influential but non-ruling families. Accordingly, to avoid embarrassment, since each emirate insisted on their nominees, the federal government had to amend Article 58 in the Constitution, to increase the number of portfolios to nineteen. In February 1972, Ras Al Khaimah joined the federation and the Constitution had to be amended again to increase the number of ministers in the cabinet to 22.\(^3\) From this it is clear that the number of ministries reflects the interests of the ruling families rather than the actual needs of the country.

The first Prime Minister was Sheikh Maktoom Bin Rashid, the elder son of former Ruler of Dubai. His brother Hamdan was his Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. 11 ministers out of 22 were from ruling families. Abu-Dhabi was allotted 6 portfolios; Dubai 4 (in addition to the post of Prime Minister), Sharjah 3, Ras Al Khaimah 3, both Ajman and Umm-al-Qaiwain and Fujairah 2 each. Two of the ministers from this

\(^2\) - Ibid, Article 58.
cabinet were subsequently upgraded to sit on the Supreme Council. The Minister of Education became ruler of Sharjah (i.e. Dr. Sultan Bin Mohamed Al Qassimi) after the assassination of his brother. The Minister of Agriculture, Sheikh Hamed Bin Mohamed Al Sharqi, became ruler of Fujairah after the death of his father.

The Second Federal Cabinet 23 December 1973:

Almost a year after the first cabinet reshuffle internal circumstances forced the Federal Government to form another cabinet to keep up with development in the region. The increase in oil prices during October 1973 meant a tremendous increase in the oil revenue which reflected on the country’s economic situation and led to a demand for new services which the cabinet was not empowered to provide. Accordingly, a new cabinet was urgently needed and in December 1973 a second cabinet was formed. Sheikh Maktoom Bin Rashid of Dubai remained Prime Minister but Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed the Crown Prince of Abu-Dhabi became Deputy Prime Minister and the number of ministers jumped from 22 to 29, 17 of whom came from ruling families. Nobody from the previous cabinet was replaced but there were six newcomers. Abu-Dhabi was allotted 11 cabinet portfolios, Dubai was allotted 5 portfolios, Sharjah 3, Ras Al Khaimah 4, Ajman, Umm-al-Qaiwain and Fujairah 2 each.(4)

Such a dramatic increase in the number of ministers may seem surprising but it is explained by the fact that 23 December 1973 was the day on which Abu-Dhabi disbanded its local cabinet and merged many of its local departments with the federal administration. Consequently, it had to compensate those who had lost their cabinet positions with new ones at the federal level. Thus, the composition of the cabinet was not changed in response to popular demand but rather to satisfy certain interests in the country.

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Chapter four

The Third Federal Cabinet - 3 January 1977:

Sheikh Maktoom Bin Rashid continued to hold the position of Prime Minister, but this time Sheikh Hamdan Bin Mohamed Al-Nahayan, who belonged to a powerful branch of Abu-Dhabi's ruling family known as the "sons of Sheikh Mohamed Bin Khalifa", took over the position of Deputy Prime Minister. In 1966, this branch of Al-Nahyan supported the Ruler of Abu-Dhabi in the overthrow of his elder brother, Sheikh Shakboot, and for this were rewarded with a prominent role in Abu-Dhabi's affairs. One member of this branch held the post of Ministry of Interior the time of country's inception. The number of ministries decreased to 23, 8 of which were held by the ruling families, 6 new faces entered the cabinet, 10 ministers retained the same portfolios, 5 changed their positions. Abu-Dhabi was allotted 7 ministries, Dubai 6, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah 3 each, Ajman 2 and Umm- al-Qaiwain and Fujairah 1 each. (5)

The noticeable decline in the number of Sheikhs in this cabinet may be attributed to the spread of education in the emirates which forced the ruling families to sacrifice some of their ministerial positions to those educated persons within the "inner circle" of those who surrounded them. (6)

The Fourth Cabinet - 1 July 1979:

The cabinet was formed after a political and constitutional crisis. The crisis began when both the Council of Ministers and the Federal National Council had a meeting which resulted in a joint memorandum addressed to the Federal Supreme Council. Three principal demands of this memorandum were: a permanent constitution; unification of the armed forces into a single federal body; and the establishment of a command council under the chairmanship of the Minister of Defence with the General in Command as his deputy.

5 - United Arab Emirates Official Gazette, No. 4, 1977, pp 82-83.
It seems to many commentators that this last recommendation was intended to solve the crisis that had arisen between Abu-Dhabi and Dubai when Sheikh Zayed of Abu-Dhabi, the President of the Federation, appointed his son to the Command of the armed forces without consulting the Minister of Defence, son of a former Ruler of Dubai. Dubai considered this an insult to the Minister and declared the Decree invalid. It was hoped the new recommendation would provide an acceptable formula for both Dubai and Abu-Dhabi.\(^7\)

The other main recommendations of the memorandum were unification of the federation revenues which would involve merging the incomes of the individual emirates into a single federal income; the increase of the power of the Federal president to enable him to exercise his state responsibilities and subordinate the powers of the individual rulers to the federal authority.\(^8\)

The Supreme Council had two meetings to discuss the memorandum, the first one was on 19 March 1979, but was postponed for further consultation since both Sheikh Rashid Al-Maktoom, former Ruler of Dubai, and Sheikh Saqr Al-Qassimi, Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah, refused to attend the meeting. Thousands of citizens most of them students, from all over the U.A.E. demonstrated in favour of the memorandum and demanded both absent Sheikhs join the Supreme Council meeting. Ras al Khaimah citizens were more enthusiastic about federation than those of Dubai since they totally depended on federation subsidies. The second meeting of the Supreme Council convened on 27 March 1979, but still Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah boycotted the meeting and again it had to be postponed for further discussions. However it resumed on the following day. On the second day the Sheikhs of Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah held a meeting of their own in Dubai while the Supreme Council were in session. The absence of these emirates prevented the Supreme Council from taking

\(^7\) A. O. Taryam, op. cit., p 240.
\(^8\) Al-Azminah Al-Arabia, No. 5,11-4-1979.
any decision, since the Constitution stipulates that the votes of both Dubai and Abu-Dhabi are required on the procedural decision.(9)

To solve this crisis the Sheikhs of Abu-Dhabi and Dubai asked other Gulf States to arbitrate and in response Kuwait's Foreign Minister arrived to consult with the Saudi Ambassador. The Kuwaiti/Saudi intervention seemed to meet with a measure of success but as Abdullah Taryam, a Minister of Education at that time and Minister of Justice in the current cabinet, observed, the aim of the mediators was mainly to preserve the status quo. They were at pains to stress the:

"Dangers inherent in conflict and warned against demonstrations, pointing to the Iranian revolution and its impact. Then the Kuwaiti Minister proposed that Sheikh Rashid should be directly involved in federal responsibility by being appointed Prime Minister. He believed that in this way Sheikh Rashid would come to seek to strengthen the federal executive and therefore, enable it to obtain more powers from Dubai."(10)

Consequently, the joint efforts of the National Council and the Council of Ministers, together with the clear aspirations and demands of the people, were stifled by that diplomatic mediation which saw the crisis as a threat to the ruling families' authority throughout the whole region. The result was that on July 1979 a cabinet of 23 ministries was announced, to be chaired by Dubai's former Ruler Sheikh Rashid Al-Maktoom, with his son Maktoom as first Deputy Prime Minister and Sheikh Hamdan Al-Nahyan (Abu-Dhabi) as second Deputy Prime Minister. Ten of the ministers came from the ruling families, four were new to the cabinet and ten were from the previous cabinet.(11) Two of Ras Al Khaimah's ministers were removed from their posts for being too outspoken about corruption in their ministries. They were replaced by two from Dubai.

10 - A.O. Taryam, op. cit., p 244.
Another feature of that cabinet was the resignation of Ahmad al-Swaidi as U.A.E. Foreign Minister. Ahmad al-Swaidi considered by many to have been the architect of the federation, had certainly played an effective role in the formation of the U.A.E. His resignation was directly attributed to the dispute between the traditional rivals Dubai and Abu-Dhabi. Hassen al Alkim argues that there were two main reasons behind his resignation: the first was the appointment of Mahdi al-Tajir, Sheikh Rashid's personal adviser, as U.A.E. ambassador to Western Europe (including Britain) without prior consultation with al-Swaidi; the second was Dubai's decision in January 1980 to grant the U.S Navy certain facilities in the emirate, and that due to the increased threat from the Iranian revolution to the Arab Gulf states, a decision taken despite the opposition of al-Swaidi and the federal government and considered by him such an insult to his authority that left him no choice but to resign from the federal cabinet.\(^{(12)}\)

In 1982 the Federal Vice President and Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai became chronically ill and unable to perform his duties. The work of the Federal Council of Ministers was virtually paralysed as a result since his deputy the Crown Prince of Dubai, Sheikh Maktoom, spent most of his time in Britain. It fell to the second Deputy Prime Minister to chair the Council of Ministers. This unsatisfactory state of affairs continued until November 1990 and was the worst situation the U.A.E. had had to face since it was first established in 1971.

Despite the illness of the Prime Minister he remained nine years in his position until November 1990 when he died. His death created a political vacancy at federal level and led to the most recent cabinet reshuffle which brought back his son Maktoom as Prime Minister, Vice President and Ruler of Dubai. Sheikh Rashid was not the only seriously ill member in the previous cabinet-there was another sheikh who remained in his position Minister of Interior in spite of the fact that he was physically unfit-but it seemed that illness was:

"Not yet considered a disqualification to holding office and it would be considered a mark of great disrespect to suggest that Shaikh Rashid should resign." 13

The Fifth Cabinet, November 1990:

Sheikh Maktoom Bin Rashid was appointed Prime Minister, with Sheikh Sultan Bin Zayed, son of the Ruler of Abu-Dhabi, as Deputy. Both Sheikhs Mohamed and Hamdan continued in the positions they had held since the establishment of the country, the former as Minister of Defence and the latter as Minister of Finance. In addition to the Prime Ministership, Dubai was allotted the same five cabinet portfolios as in the previous cabinet and they continued to be held by the same ministers. They were the Ministries of Defence, Finance, Financial Affairs, Transportation and the Council of Ministers Affairs. Abu-Dhabi, on the other hand, preferred to make changes and, accordingly, most of its ministers entered the cabinet for the first time. Three of them were Sheikhs -two of them the sons of President of the Federation and the third a member of the Mohamed Bin Khalifa branch. Among the five cabinet ministers from Sharjah was one new face-that of a nephew of the Ruler of Sharjah. Ras Al Khaimah was allotted three cabinet ministries of which one was occupied by a new comer-the son of the Ruler. Ajman, Umm-al-Qaiwain and Fujairah were each allotted one ministry. This cabinet consisted of 23 cabinet portfolios.

The Obstacles Which undermine the Effectiveness of the Council:

Various obstacles prevent the Council from playing the federal role expected of it. Among them are the following:

Formation of the Council and its Role in Relation to the Supreme Council:

The Council is no more than a subordinate body to the Supreme Council, there to execute its policies and implement its decisions. Consequently, the effectiveness of the Council depends on the effectiveness of the Supreme Council, and it inherits all its problems and difficulties.

The way the Council is constituted is another major stumbling block preventing it from taking truly federal responsibility for executive matters. Since all ministers are nominated by their individual emirates and represent the interests (i.e. the Shaikh's) of that emirate, the Prime Minister has no power in selecting his cabinet. As a result:

A - The Council consists of an uncohesive group which does not work as a team but rather as rivals.

B - Many Ministers have remained in their positions since the establishment of the country and this deprives the cabinet of new blood.\(^\text{14}\)

The Council's Lack of the Executive Power:

The Council lacks genuine power to implement its policies and decisions throughout the U.A.E. It is always met with opposition and ignorance from certain emirates which are basically anti federation, i.e. Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah. Thus a federal decision may be implemented in one emirate while it is ignored in a neighbouring emirate. Dr. Manne al-Otaiba, the former Minister of Petroleum, described how he has no authority in certain areas of the U.A.E. He said at an enquiry by the Federal Assembly about the country's petroleum affairs, that he was 'a minister without authority'. He complained that the Provisional Constitution restricted the ability of a Federal Minister to represent the country at international conferences, and he added that each ruler has absolute power over his

emirate's petroleum affairs which makes me a secondary figure to the petroleum companies who deal directly with the ruler himself and are unwilling to consult me. Thus, I am a Federal Minister without authority."\(^{(15)}\)

**Lack of Specific Programme:**

Article 64 in the Provisional Constitution specifies that:

"The Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be politically responsible collectively before the President of the Union and the Supreme Council of the Union for the execution of the general policy of the Union both domestic and foreign."\(^{(16)}\)

We may ask where is the general policy for which the Council of Ministers is responsible before the President? Since the establishment of the country five different cabinets have been formed and none of them has had a genuine published programme to implement within a given time. The absence of a specific programme renders general policy vague and flexible and provides a kind of legal excuse for internal consumption.\(^{(17)}\)

**Concentration of Authority in the Ministry of Finance and its effect on Other Ministries:**

Normally the role of a government institution is to provide a service to the public. The Ministry of Health, for example, provides a health service for patients, the Ministry of Education provides education for students and so on with all other ministries. By the same token, the Ministry of Finance is supposed to organize the country's revenues and expenditures. Therefore, its role must be essentially supportive and not the opposite. However, in the U.A.E. the Ministry of Finance it seems is a major stumbling block preventing other ministries from conducting their work efficiently. To illustrate this we will give an example. The Ministry of Finance's ministerial decision No. 14 in 1978 withdrew

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\(^{(16)}\) The Provisional Constitution of the U.A.E., Article 64.
\(^{(17)}\) Al-Azminah Al-Arabia, No. 11, 1-5-1979.
authority for expenditure and recruitment from all other ministries and took it upon itself. Moreover, the decision fixed the maximum amount the minister could spend without prior permission from the Ministry of Finance at 1000 Darhams ($300)!!

In the 1979 cabinet, the United Arab Emirates University came under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Education and the University Vice Chancellor and General Secretary were subordinate to him. Ironically, while the Ministry of Finance restricted the maximum amount the Minister could spend without permission to 1000 Dhs, it empowered the Vice Chancellor to spend up to 500,000 Dhs and the General Secretary up to 50,000 without prior permission from the Finance Ministry. In other words, those who were subordinates of the Minister were empowered to spend 100 times more than he was.\(^{(18)}\)

**Table 4-1**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Nationals</th>
<th>Non-Nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>45</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**The Civil Service Council:**

The second federal body responsible for federal administration is the Civil Service Council. The Council acts in a consultative capacity. Its task is to investigate and monitor the administrative performance of the U.A.E. civil servants, and provide suggestions and comments before their decisions are finalized by the Federal Council of Ministers.\(^{(19)}\)

\(^{(18)}\) Al-Azminah Al-Arabia, No. 26, 5-9-1979.

Thus, this sector is mainly consultative and its recommendations are not mandatory but negotiable.

The Council may be headed by any federal minister supported by a number of deputy ministers and heads of departments, including one representative each from the Federal Personnel Department and from the Ministry of Finance. Currently the Council consists of the following:

1- Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs (Head)
2- Deputy Minister of Health (Member)
3- Deputy Minister of Finance (Member)
4- Deputy Minister of Petroleum (Member)
5- Deputy Minister of Education (Member)
6- Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs (Member)
7- General Manager of the Federal Personnel Department (Member & Secretary).

The Council meets every week on Sunday to ratify the decisions and recommendations of the previous week and to discuss recruitment, promotion and termination of employment applications.

The Council's Functions:

Provision 17 in the Civil Service Law indicates that the Council's aims are to improve and promote civil service standards, increase civil servants' productivity and ensure just treatment for all civil servants and employees.

Provision 18 specifies that the functions of the Council are to include:

1 - Suggesting laws, decrees and regulations concerning civil servants.

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2 - Supervising the execution of the laws, decrees and regulations and methods of appointment and definition.

3 - Suggesting methods for selecting the best applicant for any particular job and specifying the qualifications necessary for any particular job.

4 - Suggesting delegation and training methods and ensuring their efficient execution.

5 - Laying down a wages and salaries policy and stipulating the number of jobs to be allocated and their grades.

The Council has to submit an annual report to the Prime Minister about its achievements and rate of progress during the year. The report has to include recommendations to improve and promote the administrative affairs of the federation.(21)

The general aim of the Council would seem to be the preservation of a civil service structure which is now regarded as conservative and outdated. The Council is not aware of the existence of dynamic administrative concepts designed to improve, promote, organize and simplify procedures, which are what the U.A.E.'s federal administrative machinery really needs.(22)

The annual report of the Council, addressed to the Prime Minister, indicates that the Council has been occupied mainly with procedural matters and dealing with run-of-the-mill promotions and appointments. In 1987 the Council discussed 816 decisions and recommendations most of which related to employees' leaves, appointments, promotions, etc.(23)

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21 - Ibid. (Provision No. 20).
Another observation that may be made that for its members the Council is not a full-
time job. The Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, for example, is assigned other
responsibilities as both chairman of Institute of Administrative Development and chairman
of the National Centre for Computing Service. Other members are deputy ministers and so
overloaded with work of their ministries that they are prevented from fulfilling their
responsibilities toward the Council.\(^{(24)}\)

**Federal Personnel Department:**

The Federal Personnel Department supplies the Civil Service Council with the
support it needs in order to be able to conduct its task. It provides the Council with the
required data and information regarding employees in the federal sector, it keeps federal
employees' files and records and follows up the execution of Council decisions and
orders.\(^{(25)}\)

As may be seen from the organizational chart of the Department, there are four areas
of administration, under the supervision of the Director General, who is also a member of
the Civil Service Council. The Department consists of four sections and each has a number
of units. The main sections are:

1- Administration of Organization and Administrative Improvement.
2- Administration of Computers.
3- Administration of Legal Affairs.
4- Administration of Financial and Administrative Affairs.

The Federal Personnel Department has two main branches. (Abu-Dhabi and Dubai).
Both branches are under the supervision of a single Director General but each has its own

\(^{24}\) Amer Al-Kubaisy, Administration of Civil Service in the U.A.E. (Arabic), *Journal of the Arabian Gulf*,
\(^{25}\) The U.A.E. Civil Service Law, (Provision 21), 1978.
manager. Abu-Dhabi’s branch is devoted entirely to matters relating to federal employees in Abu-Dhabi. Dubai’s branch is responsible for those who work in Dubai and in the northern emirates.

**Personnel Sub-Committees:**

There are sub-committees dealing with personnel in all federal ministries. Those committees were established by federal law no. 5 in 1978. They are formed by ministerial decision and consist of three senior executives’ including the head of the personnel unit in each ministry. Their responsibilities are mainly devoted to matters of recruitment, promotion and transfer between grades 2 and 3 in each ministry. The purpose of establishing those committees is to reduce the huge pressure on the Federal Department. Despite this, those committees are still regarded as purely consultative and their decisions are not mandatory for the minister or the Federal Department.\(^{(26)}\)

**Remarks on the Federal Personnel Department:**

The existence of two separate branches, one in Abu-Dhabi and the other in Dubai certainly makes for duplication and waste of time and effort. Moreover, having to divide his time between the two branches undoubtedly has a negative impact on the performance of the Director General.\(^{(27)}\) Although the organizational chart designates a certain unit as being responsible for training needs, its role is in fact limited to discussing and arranging leave granted to federal employees for educational purposes. The same shortcomings apply in other areas. For instance, the manpower planning and improvements unit has not produced any significant study concerning U.A.E. manpower improvement or planning. Hitherto its activities have been restricted to publishing data and statistics about federal employees without coming to grips with a genuine analysis of the problems of U.A.E. manpower.

\[^{(26)}\] Ahmed Abu Sen and Others, op. cit., p 88.

\[^{(27)}\] Amer Al-Kubaisy, op. cit., p 72.
The Main Feature of the U.A.E. Federal Civil Service:

Before passing onto a discussion of the promotion and recruitment systems in the federal sector it's worth glancing at the main features of the federal civil service.

The first feature of the federal civil service is that employees fall into four main categories:

A- **High Level Occupation**: (Circle 1 and above)

This category includes Deputy Ministers, Assistant Deputy Ministers and those in circle 1, i.e. general managers, most of whom are U.A.E. nationals, with the exception of certain consultants and advisers who are non-nationals.

B- **Senior Executives**: (Circle 2)

This category includes heads of sections and units. These executives are mainly U.A.E. graduates whom the Federal Government has undertaken to employ in government. As a result of this policy this grade suffers from overstaffing and administrative inflation. The graduates are mainly concentrated in circle 2 of grade 2, which has been reserved for them. U.A.E. nationals constitute 78% of the total staff in this circle and non-nationals 21%.
The U.A.E. Federal Administrative Structure


Figure 4-2
FIGURE 4.3

Civil Service Employees Based on Grade (1987)
C- **Clerical Staff**: (Circle 3)

In this category, which consists of 4 grades, U.A.E. nationals do not exceed 40% of the total staff. Non-nationals dominate in the figures for this circle and remain there despite the fact that most of them have high qualifications and long experience. Those in the higher circles depend heavily on this category in their daily business.

D- **Service Employees**: (Circles 4)

In this category, which consists of 4 grades, U.A.E. nationals are well represented due to the fact that the nature of the work does not require special skills. Drivers, guards, servants (Farash), etc., of whom 55% are U.A.E. nationals and 44% non-nationals, make up this circle.

**The Rapid Growth in the Number of Federal Employees**:

The number of federal employees has increased rapidly over a very short period. The increase was always in favour of non-nationals. Table no. 4.4 shows that in 1972 U.A.E. nationals numbered 7,926 (75% of a total of 10,575), whereas, non-nationals numbered 2,649 (25%). The following year the number of non-nationals jumped to 6,197 (55%), whereas, the number of U.A.E. nationals fell to 5,103 (45%). The reason behind this may have been the sudden increase in the price of oil during the Arab/Israeli war which promoted many U.A.E. nationals to quit the government and go into the private business sector which was booming at that time. Over the four years from 1972 to 1976 the increase in employees was incredible. The total reached 12,876, a number still dominated by non-nationals. Subsequently the proportion of nationals to non-nationals remained almost constant. The number of non-nationals went up from 2,649 in 1972 to 28,315 in 1988 which meant that within a mere 16 years the U.A.E. federal government had increased the workforce by a
further 25,666 non-nationals. In 1981 U.A.E. nationals accounted for 12,632 jobs which marked a genuine increase in their numbers and may have been due to the fact that the newly established U.A.E. University was beginning to contribute to the national workforce. Significantly, between 1984 and 1988 the number of U.A.E. nationals continued to increase and the number of non-nationals to fall, perhaps for two specific reasons: first, the illness of the former Prime Minister Sheikh Rashid Al-Maktoom who had presided over what was a golden era for the federal institutions and, secondly, the economic recession which occurred in the whole Gulf region as a result of the Iraqi-Iranian War and the collapse in oil prices, especially in 1986.

**Table 4-4**

*The Rapid Growth in the Number of Federal Employees, (1972-1988)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nationals</th>
<th>Non-Nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>7926</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5103</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6081</td>
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<td>8670</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9147</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>10341</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>11085</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>11786</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>12632</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>12631</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14485</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>15754</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 4.5

The Growth of Number of Employees in Federal Sector
Chapter four

Concentration of National Employees in Certain Ministries:

The concentration of newly graduated U.A.E. nationals in certain ministries may be regarded as another feature of the present U.A.E. Federal Civil Service. A glance at the list of appointments to Federal Ministries in 1987 shows that the Ministry of Education takes the lion's share of graduate appointees. It has absorbed 68% (437) of graduates entering the federal sector until 1987. Most of them are employed in teaching and female appointees outnumber male. The Ministry of Health is second in line, employing as it does 7% (46) of graduates, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs employs 5% (36). The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs employ 3% (24) each and the rest are employed by the remaining ministries.(28)

The reasons for this concentration may be that:

1- The majority of national graduates come from the northern emirates, notably from, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Umm-al-Qaiwain, Ajman and Fujairah, and are underprivileged compared with their colleagues from the rich emirates of Abu-Dhabi and Dubai. The latter prefer to work in their emirates local administration where payment and advancement is better. Those from the poor emirates also prefer to work in their emirates local administration but since jobs to suit their qualifications are rarely available and since opportunities for advancement are extremely limited the only way they can work in their home emirates and be near their family and friends is by joining ministries with branches in their home emirates and these are the Ministries of Education, Health, Labour and Social Affairs and Islamic Affairs.

2 - Given the fact that most national graduates are female and due to social pressure have to work in their home emirates, they prefer to be in teaching where they will not have to work with men. Consequently, they outnumber men in this sector. In 1987 women accounted for 1,782 (58%) and men for 1,299 (42%) of the total number of national graduates in the Federal Sector.\(^{(29)}\)

**Recruitment to the Federal Sector:**

In the United Arab Emirates as in all Gulf states political affiliation, tribal traditions and family status play significant roles in recruitment to all positions of power and leadership and in the case of the federal administration this has prevented low social ranking candidates being appointed. Attempts have been made to tackle this problem through legislation but these have almost invariably failed. Let us examine the recruitment of both high-profile and low-profile employees to the federal administration.

**Recruitment of Administrative Leadership:**

According to Article 54 of the Provisional Constitution, the Federal President is empowered to appoint the Prime Minister, accept his resignation or relieve him of office with the consent of the Supreme Council. He also appoints the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministers and may relieve them of office if requested to do so by the Federal Prime Minister. This means that in theory the Federal President is entitled to appoint or dismiss the Prime Minister and his cabinet, but in practice this is not what actually happens. In reality the President has no power either to appoint the Prime Minister and ministers or remove them from office. The appointment of these high-profile figures depends in fact on various other considerations of which the most crucial are family status and political affiliation. Relieving the Prime Minister or any member of his cabinet of their positions is officially the duty of the President, but in reality falls to the Rulers of the emirates convened

\(^{(29)}\) Ibid, p. 23.
as Supreme Council. The decision must be passed by the Supreme Council by a majority of five which must includes the votes of Abu-Dhabi and Dubai. Consequently, it is impossible for the Ruler of Dubai who is Prime Minister and a member of the Supreme Council to agree to relieve himself of office. The same is true with other ministers. The removal of a Minister would be an insult to the local government which nominated him.\(^{30}\)

Obviously, this complex situation is reflected in the appointment of workers throughout the federal bureaucracy, whose recruitment is, as a result, based on patronage and regional criteria. Thus, there are some ministries which are monopolized by members of certain emirates—for example, the Ministry of Electricity by members from Ras Al Khaimah, the Ministry of Finance by members from Dubai, the Ministry of Education by members from Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah, the Ministry of State for the Supreme Council by members from Ras Al Khaimah, and so on. The concentration depends on the origin of the minister: if he comes from Dubai he will bring followers from Dubai, if he comes from Ras Al Khaimah he will prefer members from his own emirate, and so on.

Under the current system, no minimum requirements have been established with respect to qualifications for positions of high office, such as that of deputy minister, assistant deputy minister or any of those in circle 1. The Minister has absolute authority to appoint whomsoever he wishes when such a position falls vacant or even while it is still occupied. In the absence of any established standards for selecting among candidates he can apply whatever criteria he chooses. Among the possible criteria are:

1- **Patronage:**

The minister may choose a particular candidate on the basis of the candidate's relationship to some high ranking official. For example, he may select the relative of

\(^{30}\) A. Al-Shaheen, op. cit., p 412.
another minister, hoping in that way to strengthen ties between ministries and to put the other minister under an obligation to do him a similar favour at a later date.

2- Nepotism:

As was mentioned earlier, because tribal and family ties are still strong, many officials regard it as their duty to look after their relatives and fellow tribesmen. Therefore, a minister may select his deputy on the basis of kinship rather than on the basis of the individual's qualifications for the position. In this way, the minister not only fulfils his tribal and family obligations but also guarantees himself a loyal subordinate who will look after his interests and those of the family. Thus, the first thing a new minister does is to find a deputy who is a relative or friend, someone who shares the same ideology. There is, in fact, a federal ministry which may be called the deputy ministers' dumping ground. This is the Ministry of State for Cabinet Affairs which has many unwanted deputy ministers who have been deposed from their positions by Ministers who have had them replaced by relatives or friends.

3- Seniority:

The federal civil service works very like the systems in most other Gulf countries. Under such a system, the individual's seniority- i.e. length of employment-usually weighs heavily in decisions about promotion to higher administrative posts. Thus, the minister may choose the candidate who has served with ministry for the longest period, whatever that candidate's qualifications. Candidates who are better qualified but who have been employed for a shorter period of time may be rejected.

Recruitment of Low-Profile Administrators:

In the United Arab Emirates recruitment of low-profile employees is quite complex and very much under the control of the Ministry of Finance, the Federal Council of the Civil
Service and the Federal Personnel Department. Any applicant for a position in the federal bureaucracy has to apply first to the Personnel Department which vets the application then send it to the Council of the Civil Service which has to obtain the approval of the Ministry of Finance before proceeding with the application. In this way, recruitment is centralized since the Ministry of Finance and the Council of the Civil Service are the only sectors empowered to approve the employment of applicants. This policy is time consuming on both sides and the applicant may wait for more than four months to receive a reply.

According to Provision 13 in the Civil Service Law, jobs must be advertised and qualifications required and conditions of employment clearly laid out. In spite of this, graduates-U.A.E. nationals particularly- are often appointed to civil service jobs which have never been advertised. Ministries complain that nationals are enforced upon them by the Council regardless of the needs of the ministry or of the applicant's qualifications.\(^{31}\) Bear in mind that many of them look for a prestigious title such as "manager", "consultant", "head of unit", etc., which are not readily available. The policy of the U.A.E. to guarantee a job in government to every graduate has affected the quality of government bureaucracy and caused several problems.

A study of the Federal Civil Service in the U.A.E. conducted by United Nations experts in 1980 was critical of this recruitment of nationals. It stressed the importance of qualifications in making appointments and deplored the fact that unqualified nationals were being appointed to high-profile positions and unsuitable persons without proper experience were being promoted to such positions while highly qualified and experienced non-nationals had to work as their subordinates. The result was that the nationals depended totally on their foreign subordinates who carried out their own duties as well as a large part of their superiors'.\(^{32}\)

The Promotion System in the U.A.E. Federal Administration:

During the early days of the Federation, particularly in the 70's, promotion from one circle to the next was too rapid. It took a newly graduated employee not more than three years to reach the highest position in the bureaucracy. Consequently, many unskilled and unqualified persons were placed in key decision-making positions and this reflected negatively on the performance of the bureaucracy. In 1984, the Federal Council of Ministers issued a decree (no. 25) in which it froze all promotions. The decree applied to all employees, whether national or non-national. After 3 years, however, in 1987, the Federal Council of Ministers exempted U.A.E. nationals from this ruling and left it to apply to non-nationals only.

Conditions of Promotion:

Provision 31 of the law laid down for the Federal Civil Service specifies conditions and criteria for promotion. It states that:

"Promotion depends on the order of seniority in the previous grade. However, promotion may be possible through selection on grounds of efficiency to half the vacant grades in circle two and a quarter of the vacant grades in circle three. Promotion to any job in circle one is done through selection on grounds of efficiency. A civil servant who is assessed in his report as being "weak" cannot be promoted during the year in which the report is submitted. Seniority among candidates must be taken into consideration when promotion is being proposed; so that promotion can be achieved fairly in the case of candidates of equal efficiency."(33)

Apparently, Civil Service Law identifies two types of promotion: by seniority and by selection. The most popular method is seniority, as laid down in Provision 30 of the Law. This states that:

"Civil servants are categorized according to their grades and within each grade alone. Seniority dates back to the day of appointment in the grade or promotion to it. If the decision involves more than one civil servant in the same grade, seniority is given to the one who holds the highest qualifications. If the civil servants share the same qualifications, seniority is granted to the one who holds the better degree, or, failing that, the one who is the older." (34)

Promotion by seniority is a method widely used in the U.A.E. administrative system. In practice, this type of promotion increases apathy and sustains inefficiency and low productivity among employees since they know they will be promoted automatically if they spend a certain number of years in the job.

Selection is a method of promotion confined to those in circle one (high level administrator). Civil Service Law states that:

"Promotion to any job in circle one is done through selection on grounds of efficiency". (35)

This provision is somewhat vague since it does not define 'efficiency' nor does it suggest how it is to be measured. It is left to the personal assessment of their superiors. Bearing in mind that Civil Service Law exempts those in circle one from the annual performance reports which might provide a reasonable guide to their general efficiency and suitability, this method of promotion usually has to be based on subjective judgement, influenced by such evils as nepotism, favouritism (Wasta) and so on. Thus, qualified and enthusiastic employees are victimized rather than encouraged and the result is often frustration and disappointment.

34. Ibid, ( Provision 30).
35. Ibid, ( Provision 31).
The Relationship Between Local and Federal Government:

The first thing to strike the student of public administration in the United Arab Emirates is the strength and independence of the local administrative apparatus in each emirate and the extent of its authority and power over the affairs of the emirates. The Provisional Constitution in Articles 120 and 121 lists the powers of the Federal Government but does not define the functions of the individual emirates. Moreover, the Constitution does not specify which administrative system each emirate is to follow, but leaves it up to local government to select the appropriate system which suits it. Consequently, each emirate has its own distinct administrative system. Abu-Dhabi is the only emirate which has adopted a relatively modern system. This is a structure which has three branches of power and although the role of each is limited and simple, it is a step in the right direction. In contrast, all the remaining emirates prefer to retain their traditional, conservative systems under the thumb of their respective Rulers.

In order to understand the nature of the relationship between local and federal government, it is essential to examine Articles 120 and 121 of the Provisional Constitution. It will also be interesting to see to what extent local governments adhere to these Articles and implement them in real life.

Article 120 states that the Federal Government shall have exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction in the following areas:

1- Foreign affairs
2- Federal defence and armed forces
3- Protection of the federation's security from whatever threatens it externally or internally
4- Security, order and rule in the permanent federal capital
5- Affairs of the federal work force and the federal judiciary
6- Federal finance and federal taxes, duties and fees
Resistance on the part of Rulers, accustomed to exercising absolute power within their individual emirates, to the idea of relinquishing their authority is inevitable. Although all of them have agreed on the Provisional Constitution that does not necessarily mean that they feel any real commitment to implement it in their emirates. Local sources of revenue, especially, are jealously guarded, particularly by the poor emirates to whom abandonment of these resources means a loss of their fixed income. Consequently, any discussion of Article 120 of the Provisional Constitution reveals a conflict of interest between the Federal Government and the local governments. The following pages will look at how local governments have violated the article which has transferred most of their functions of the Federal Government. For the purposes of this study, we intend to discuss three main sectors which should now be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government, but which are trespassed upon by local governments. These are Foreign Affairs, Public Health and Medical Services and Electricity and Water Services.
Foreign Affairs:

The Federal Provisional Constitution stipulates that the Federal Government shall have exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction over the foreign affairs of the United Arab Emirates, which means that the Supreme Council (consisting of the seven rulers of the emirates) determines foreign policy and ratifies all treaties and international agreements. Accordingly, the Federal Supreme Council has issued a federal decree which stipulates that all local governments must hand over their foreign affairs to the Federal Government and all international negotiations must be conducted through the Foreign Ministry. Moreover, all oil agreements with international oil companies must be dealt with by the Ministry. However, Article 123 of the Constitution accords member emirates, "The right to conclude limited agreements of a local administrative nature with neighbouring states and countries." The same Article allows individual emirates to retain their membership of OPEC or OAPEC or to join them. To what extent have the individual emirates adhered to the federal rulings? Investigation has shown that individual emirates are more likely to have broken them than to have stuck to them.

Let us start with petroleum agreements between individual emirates and the international companies working on their respective territories. We have referred earlier to the fact that the Federal Minister of Petroleum has complained that his role in the petroleum affairs of the federation is severely limited since he has no power over the individual emirates' local sectors which are monopolized by the rulingfamilies.
Surprisingly enough most local governments insist that they simply adhere to Article 123 which entitles them to conclude limited agreements of a local administrative nature with neighbouring states or countries. Can we consider these petroleum agreements as being of a local administrative nature? Do the American, Japanese and the British petroleum companies located in the neighbouring countries see them as such? Furthermore, Abu-Dhabi is the only emirate which is a member of OPEC and OAPEC, the others are not. They deal on the black market at competitive prices and do not abide by OPEC or OAPEC petroleum policies.

The desecration of the articles of the Constitution is even more blatant in the matter of boundary agreements between individual emirates and neighbouring states. Two agreements in particular, one between Ras Al Khaimah and Oman and the other between Abu-Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, in which the latter recognized the U.A.E. as an independent country, were signed in 1974 without prior consultation either with the Foreign Ministry or with the Supreme Council. Hitherto, the agreements have still not been submitted to the federal apparatus which may void the effectiveness of them since the validity of any agreements is contingent on the approval of the Federal Supreme Council.(40)

More recently, another violation to the Constitution occurred when the Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah agreed with a petroleum company to survey oil in a disputed area between his emirate and a neighbouring emirate, Umm- al-Qaiwain. The latter mobilized forces to stop the oil operation and the Federal Interior Ministry had to send a committee to arbitrate in this critical situation.

The Ruler of Umm-al-Qaiwain, however, did not wait for the final decision of the committee but paid an official visit to Oman in which he met with Sultan Qaboos and discussed with him the disputed matter. Two days later on 19 May 1990, the Crown Prince of Ras Al Khaimah, Sheikh Khalid Bin Saqr paid a brief visit to Oman and had a meeting

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with Sultan Qaboos at which the latter tried to urge a particular solution upon him. Meanwhile, in another political manoeuvre, Sheikh Saqr sent his other son Sheikh Saud to Iraq in an attempt to pressurize the Umm-al- Qaiwain Ruler and also to show the Omani Sultan that he had the backing of Iraq. All these negotiations took place without official consultation either with the Foreign Ministry or the Supreme Council.\(^{(41)}\)

**Public Health and Medical Services:**

The second sector which has been assigned to the Federal Government is Public Health and Medical Services. According to the terms of the Provisional Constitution, the Ministry of Health will deal exclusively with all matters relating to public health all over the country.

In practice this is not the reality of the situation. Only the poor emirates adhere to the Constitution, probably because of the high cost of health care and not because of their commitment to the federation. With their superior financial capability Abu-Dhabi and Dubai are able to keep this sector under their local governments' authority. In the event, all hospitals and clinics in the poor emirates are run by the Federal Ministry of Health, having been taken over during the 1980's from the foreign health-care companies which ran the hospitals when they started up.

Dubai's hospitals and health services are run by Dubai's local Department of Health and Medical Services, which is completely separate in terms of medical cadres and administrative policy from the Federal Ministry of Health. The only hospital which has been absorbed into the federal sector is Kuwaiti Hospital which was subsidized mainly by the government of Kuwait to help the people of Dubai prior to the oil era. The result (and perhaps purpose) of this move has been to point up the difference between Dubai's own service and the federal one, a comparison decidedly to the detriment of the latter.

\(^{(41)}\) Al-Azminah Al-Arabia, No. 229, July- August, 1990, p 51.
On 22 November 1975, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Seyyasa interviewed Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoom the former Ruler of Dubai, and put to him that:

"It is common knowledge among the public that you are against the federation, and for that reason have refused to merge Dubai's public services with the federal services. Do you prefer Dubai to have a separate army, flag, etc?" His answer revealed his ignorance of the Constitution when he said, "We have a Provisional Constitution which we have all agreed will be effective for five years. I believe we should first wait until the end of this period then amend it to suit our new situation. Any way, the Constitution has not stipulated explicitly the merging of local public services into the federal system - and I would like to know why I am said to be against the federation."(42)

In another interview, with Mahdi al Tajer, former U.A.E. Ambassador to London and the Personal Adviser of Shaikh Rashid the former Ruler of Dubai, he said,

"I cannot imagine Rashid Hospital performing to the same standard if it had been handed over to the federal authority."(43)

In health as in other sectors, cuts in the federal budget in 1984 as a result of the Iraq-Iran War widened the gap between the richer emirates and poorer.(44) While most of the poorer emirates' hospitals suffer from lack of medical equipment, medicines, skilled staff, healthy buildings, etc, the prosperous emirates (i.e. Abu-Dhabi and Dubai) have a surplus not only in all types of equipment but also in other facilities. Consequently, patients from poor emirates prefer to be transferred to Dubai or Abu-Dhabi where medical care is so much more advanced than in their own emirates.

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42 - Al-Azminah Al-Arabia, No. 100, 28-2- 1981.
43 - Ibid.
44 - Sarah Searight, op. cit., p 23.
Electricity and Water Services:

The Provisional Constitution explicitly stipulates that electricity and water services must be solely under the jurisdiction of the federal authority. Since the establishment of the country in 1971, many attempts have been made to merge local electricity and water services into the federal system. Again it is the poor emirates who have accepted the idea of merger. Umm-al- Qaiwain, Fujairah and Ajman have agreed to hand over their local services and Sharjah has surrendered that of its Eastern province. The Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah, despite his emirate's poor economy, at first refused to merge with the federal system, but during the second Gulf Crisis a number of influential persons met with the Ruler to complain about the poor electricity service during the summer months and threatened to create disturbances and demonstrations which might be exploited by those in the Iraqi media in the habit of cracking jokes and making fun of the U.A.E. One of these jokes was that during the day the U.A.E. consists of seven emirates and at night it becomes six, a reference to the electricity crisis in Ras Al Khaimah. It was, in fact, Iraqi propaganda which forced the Ruler and the federal authority to resolve the problem. Four days after the invasion of Kuwait, more precisely, on the 6 August 1990, a Presidential decree was issued to merge Ras Al Khaimah's Electricity Department with the federal Electricity Services.

Dubai and Abu-Dhabi retain their own local services. Dubai has a joint-venture company; most of its shares belong to the Dubai government and the rest are owned by local individuals and investors from the private sector. Abu-Dhabi's Electricity services is run by Abu- Dhabi's Department of Electricity and Water which is directly under the authority of the government of Abu-Dhabi.

The Rest of the Federal Sectors:

The degree of commitment of the remaining sectors to the federal authority depends on their degree of local importance. For instance, education is completely centralized under
the Federal Ministry of Education. There are no local institutions dealing with education. The violations of spirit of the Constitution, however, when it comes to matters regarded by local governments as so critical that they may not be safely left to federal authority. Consequently, control of the armed forces and interior security is still a hot and controversial subject in the country.\(45\) In fact, each individual emirate has its own local army and security forces which are normally headed by the Ruler himself or by one of his sons.

Local Governments' Administrative Organizations:

Local administrative organization differs from one emirate to another. Some adhere to the conventional administrative pattern in which the Ruler monopolizes executive, legislative and to some extent judicial powers, in other words, has absolute power over his emirate's affairs, and official departments have no real authority. Some emirates, on the other hand, believe in a more modern style of administration based on three branches of authority although they accept that the Ruler has the final decision in almost all affairs of his emirate. Abu-Dhabi is the only emirate which has actually adopted this type of administration; the remaining emirates are still run along the old conventional lines. For the purpose of this study, we will discuss Abu-Dhabi's administrative organization as representative of the modern style and Ras Al Khaimah as representative of the traditional style.

Abu-Dhabi's Administrative Organization:

The administrative organization in Abu-Dhabi has gone through three main phases. The first, was the accession of Sheikh Zayed to the emirate's rulership and the establishment of the local departments; the second was the establishment of the local ministries; and the third was the formation of Abu-Dhabi's executive council.

The Accession of Sheikh Zayed and the Establishment of Local Departments:

The accession of Sheikh Zayed to the emirate's rulership is considered by many of Abu-Dhabi's citizens as having been the turning point in Abu-Dhabi's history. From 6 August 1966 Abu-Dhabi's witnessed a rapid expansion of its administrative and government services as a result of the new ruler who wanted to share Abu-Dhabi's wealth with its citizens and compensate them for the harsh conditions they had suffered during the reign of his brother, Sheikh Shakboot Bin Sultan, who was reluctant to use the emirate's wealth to improve the lot of his subjects. During Shakboot's rulership the administration had been strictly associated with the ruler himself who represented all executive, legislative and virtually all judicial power and whose palace council (Dawan) was the only body to deal with the emirate's affairs. Immediately after the Sheikh Zayed succeeded to the rulership he issued an Amiri decree no. (2, 1966,) to reorganize the emirate's administrative apparatus and establish the first local departments Abu-Dhabi had ever experienced. Eight Sheikhs from Abu-Dhabi's ruling family were appointed to take charge of the most crucial and sensitive posts in each department, leaving one open in every case for a member of an influential family. The most important posts were reserved for the Sheikh's eldest son, Sheikh Khalifa, who was appointed Crown Prince, Head of Defence, Viceroy in the Eastern Province and Head of its Courts. Each of the other Sheikhs was allotted a number of posts.

Fourteen (14) different departments were founded in all:

1- Defence
2- Public Works
3- Electricity and Water
4- Health
5- Customs and port
6- Financial Department
7- Police and General Security

Four more departments were created as the emirate moved towards modernization; these departments were: Petroleum and Commerce; Telecommunication and Postal; Civil Aviation; and the Chamber of Commerce. As a result of the establishment of these departments the number of employees steadily grew. An original 630 administrators and technicians in 1967 became 2,031 in 1968 an increase of 222%. By 1970 the number of employees had reached 4,162, most of whom were non-nationals.\(^{(48)}\)

**The Establishment of Local Ministries:**

On 1 July 1971, the Ruler of Abu-Dhabi introduced the second major Amiri reformist decree, designed to replace the local departments with ministries and to establish Abu-Dhabi's first appointed consultative council. The decree specified that the functions of the new ministries were to determine the emirate's political, social and economic affairs and to exercise the legislative powers.\(^{(49)}\) The cabinet consisted of 15 portfolios, of which the majority were shared among the ruling family, with five of the less important ministries being awarded to members of prominent families who had a link with the ruling dynasty. The number of employees proceeded to increase rapidly until there were 6,202 staff


personnel drawn from thirty different Arab and foreign nationalities. Nationals constituted only 28% of the total, i.e. just over 1,700 employees.\(^{50}\)

Based on this reorganization, Abu-Dhabi’s government structure consisted of the following:

**The Ruler:**
who still has absolute authority in the emirate’s internal and external affairs and appoints the Prime Minister, whom he can remove at any time.

**The Prime Minister:**
who comes second in the emirate’s hierarchy is usually the Crown Prince of the emirate, often the eldest son of the Ruler.

**The Council of Ministers:**
whose task it is to determine the emirate’s political, social and economic policy and in addition to perform a legislative role in the emirate.

**The Ministers:**
who are not to exceed eighteen in number and must be appointed by Amiri decree on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.\(^{51}\)

At the same time the first appointed Consultative Council was installed to advise the Ruler on the affairs of the emirate. The members of the Council were appointed by the Ruler from prominent families. Therefore, each member represented a certain family and

\(^{50}\) Amer Al-Kubasiy, op. cit., p 59.
The Council consisted of 50 members most of whom were possessed of only limited education.

The most essential thing to notice about Abu-Dhabi's Consultative Council is that its authority transcends the boundary of the emirate to influence the Federal Government. We believe that its role is more influential and powerful than its counterpart at federal level and this might be explained by the fact that its members are the tribal chiefs of the emirate who are respected by the Ruler of Abu-Dhabi who is at the same time the President of the Federation. Despite its effective role the Council is still in its infancy and has not yet fulfilled the aspirations and needs of Abu-Dhabi's people to the same extent as it has served the interests of its members.

The Establishment of Abu-Dhabi's Executive Council:

The establishment of the first Federal Council of Ministers in 1973 created an embarrassing situation for Abu-Dhabi, an emirate considered to be pro-federation. The existence of its own Council of Ministers might well be seen by others as a sign of contradiction between theory and practice. Accordingly, the decision was taken to abolish the local Council of Ministers and merge some of the ministries with their federal counterparts, changing those that remained into local departments under the direct authority of the Executive Council. The Executive Council was designed to replace the emirate's Council of Ministers and to play the same role, but under a different title. The Council consists of the President and his Deputy and the heads of Abu-Dhabi's local departments who are mostly from the ruling family.

Currently the Council is headed by Sheikh Khalifa, the eldest son of the Ruler and the Crown Prince and chairman of many of Abu-Dhabi's local institutions. These include the Supreme Petroleum Council, the Abu-Dhabi Investment Authority and the Abu-Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development. At federal level he is the Deputy High Commander of the Armed Forces.
Fourteen local departments constitute Abu-Dhabi’s local administration:

1- Department of Finance
2- Department of Petroleum
3- Department of Organization and Administration
4- Department of Social Services
5- Department of Planning
6- Department of Electricity and Water
7- Department of Public Works
8- Department of Civil Aviation
9- Department of Seaports
10- Department of Public Police
11- Department of Municipality and Agriculture
12- Abu-Dhabi’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry
13- Department of Purchasing
14- Department of Islamic Court

According to the Annual Report of the Department of Organization and Administration, the total number of employees working in Abu-Dhabi’s local departments in 1989 had reached 30,421. Of these 5,903 were indigenous while the rest were foreigners belonging to 48 different nationalities, 21 Arab and 27 non-Arab. (52)

In June 1988, Sheikh Zayed the Ruler undertook a far-reaching reform of the emirate’s local departments. His motive was to bring the emirate’s wealth and oil under the direct control of the ruling family. His most drastic move was to replace the Department of Petroleum with the Supreme Petroleum Council, headed by Sheikh Khalifa the Crown Prince and consisting of eleven other members, all of them either from the ruling family or from influential families. The establishment of this Council means the marginalization of

the Minister for Petroleum's authority over the emirate's petroleum policy which is now directed by the Council.

Other crucial reforms were in both the Abu-Dhabi Investment Authority, which invests the emirate's surplus money, and the Abu-Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, which was set up primarily to assist poor Arab nations. Sheikh Zayed followed tribal custom in taking the opportunity to place a number of younger sons and relatives in positions of authority with the dual purpose of guaranteeing loyal support and keeping the emirate's wealth in the family. New boards for these institutions have been established, headed by Sheikh Khalifa. Below Sheikh Khalifa comes Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Mohammed, representative of the Ruler in the Eastern province, followed by his brother Suror, the head of the President's Court (Diwan). After him comes Sheikh Sultan Bin Zayed, the Deputy Prime Minister and the head of the Department of Public Works, and then Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed, Commander of the U.A.E. Armed Force. Interestingly enough the Council includes Dr. Adnan al- Pachachi a former Iraqi diplomat who is a political adviser to Sheikh Zayed. The remaining members come from influential families in Abu-Dhabi.\(^5\)

Ras Al Khaimah's Administrative Organization:

Ras Al Khaimah is one of the poorest emirates in the U.A.E. It is an emirate without oil and its economy totally depends on agriculture, fishing and the export of rocks to neighbouring emirates Bahrain and Saudi Arabai. It benefits in many ways from the help of the rich emirates Abu-Dhabi and Dubai who subsidize many of the emirate's projects. It has been described as a 'child of a second wife' by the residents of the rich emirates.\(^5\) Geographically, it is situated in the northern part of the country and shares with Oman the strategic Straits of Hormuz.

\(^5\) - The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report, United Arab Emirates*, No. 3., 1988, pp 11- 12.
Since the 17th century the emirate has been ruled by the Al Qwassim dynasty who resisted both the Portuguese and British invasions of the region. It is a dynasty with a proud history and feels belittled in the Federal Government since it may not fill the position either of President or Deputy President and does not have equal representation with Abu-Dhabi and Dubai on the Federal National Council. Moreover, most important posts at federal level are divided between Abu-Dhabi and Dubai, while Ras Al Khaimah is granted only secondary posts.

The current Ruler of the emirate is Sheikh Saqr Bin Mohammed Al-Qassimi who came to power in 1948 after a palace coup in which he overthrew his uncle Sheikh Sultan Bin Salim.

Ras Al Khaimah's system of government is essentially paternalistic and authoritarian, all powers being concentrated in the hands of the Ruler and his sons and cousins. All local departments and institutions are headed by shaikhs (his sons, nephews and cousins) and they are the absolute power in all emirate affairs. Tired of this authoritarian rule and lacking most essential services, the emirate's nationals decided in 1979 to establish a committee of thirty members to convey to the Ruler their demands for an elected council to be set up to assist the Ruler in the legislative and executive affairs of the emirate. The Ruler promised to study the demand after consulting the ruling family. At the same time leaflets were distributed in the emirate, setting out the demands and urging the people to join a political rally in Ras Al Khaimah's main Mosque (Abu Resli). To prevent further escalation of the unrest the Ruler threatened to use force and to turn the emirate into another Lebanon. Meanwhile he started to recruit non-locals and mercenaries in an attempt to create an anti-riot brigade. Under these pressures and due to the treachery of certain Committee members, the Ruler's agents succeeded in penetrating the Committee and broke it down from within.\(^{55}\)

\(^{55}\) Al-Azminah Al-Arabia, Sharjah, No. 8, 25-4-1979.
Normally the administrative system reflects the political ideology and doctrine of the
government. If the government believes in Socialist ideology the administrative system will
reflect that, if it is a Capitalist government this will be reflected in its administration, if the
system is tribal the administration will mirror tribal doctrines. Thus, administration is the
daughter of the political system; it affects and is affected by that system either negatively or
positively. Accordingly, Ras Al Khaimah's administrative system may be classified as
tribal, since all authority is concentrated in the hands of the ruling family, but this does not
mean that the emirate has not been influenced by modern concepts of administration.
Various new departments have in fact been established but not it seems in order to provide
services for the residents. Instead they are business oriented and are there to maximize the
emirate's revenues rather than provide public services.

To understand Ras Al Khaimah's administrative system it is essential to discuss its
three major components - the Ruler's Office (Diwan), the Municipal Council (City Council)
and Municipality and The Personnel Department.

The Ruler's Office (Diwan):

Owing to the centralized nature of Ras Al Khaimah's government, the Ruler's Office
is at once the executive, legislative and to some extent the judicial body of the emirate.
Virtually all residents affairs' have to be dealt with by either the Ruler or one of his sons.
The Ruler conducts a daily meeting (majlis), at which he meets with as many as possible of
the individual citizens seeking his help with their personal problems. The Diwan is headed
by his son Saud assisted by other members of the ruling family.

The main functions of the Ruler's Office:

1- Receives official guests who visit the Ruler.
2- Receives individual citizens and arranges their meetings with the Ruler.
3- Administers federal affairs and liaises between local and Federal Government.

4- Supervises the works of the emirate's local departments and ensures their efficiency.\(^{56}\)

Recruitment to Ruler's office has to be approved by the Ruler himself or his son Saud, and is mainly based on patronage and political affiliation. Ironically, despite the low salary, lack of pension facilities and poor job security in the Diwan, most citizens dream of working there. Apparently, such an appointment carries with it high social status since all residents require the services of the Diwan at one time or another. Another benefit of working in the Diwan is the high possibility of moving on to another job at the federal level. Most nominees to the Federal Council of Ministers or the Federal National Council work or used to work in the Ruler's Office.

The Municipal Council and Municipality:

In 1969 the first Municipal Council (city council) was set up under Shaikh Hamed Bin Mohammed Al Qassimi, the younger brother of the Ruler. The Council consisted of 12 members, all appointed by the Ruler. Prior to that date the Municipality was the only source of services to the residents. The services were very simple and extended no further than road cleaning and the monitoring market prices. The total number of workers in the Municipality was originally 3. The number had increased to 9 by the beginning of the 1970's and 58 by the middle of the 70's. By the beginning of the 1980's the number had jumped to 500 workers and by the middle of the 80's there were 751 workers.\(^{57}\)

In 1984 the Ruler issued a reformist decree increasing the number of members to 46. The Chairman and the First and the Second Deputies were from the ruling family, the remaining members were from among loyal merchants and influential families. Most of

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\(^{56}\) Personnel Department, Ras Al Khaimah's Administrative Guide, (Arabic), 1987-88, p 15.

\(^{57}\) Ibid, p 36.
them were illiterate or semi-literate. Currently the Council consists of 44 members, most of whom retain their seats from the previous session, and is chaired by the Ruler's son Saud with his brother-in-law Shaikh Saqr Bin Khalid as his First Deputy.

The Municipal Council is like a British city council but has no real authority. The Ruler appoints its members and has the power to approve or veto any decisions passed by the Council; moreover, he may dissolve it or suspend its work. As a result the Council's role is purely consultative since its decisions are not mandatory for the Ruler and are not effective unless approved by him. What's more its chairmen invariably come from the ruling family. It seems that the Ruler believes in the old Arabic proverb, "Nothing scratches your back like your own nail."

The Personnel Department:

Ras Al Khaimah's local administrative apparatus consists of 11 different departments. They are:

1. The Ruler's Office (Diwan)
2. Municipality Department
3. Personnel Department
4. Audit Department
5. General Accounts Department
6. Courts Department
7. Information and Tourism Department
8. Lands Department
9. Customs Department
10. Civil Aviation Department
11. Public Works Department.
According to a 1984 Personnel Department report, the total number of workers in all departments was 1,877 (although that number fell after the merger of the Department of Electricity and Water with the Federal Ministry). Of these a mere 175 were nationals.

The Personnel Department is the central administrative apparatus for the emirate. Its main responsibilities are:

1 - To propose civil service legislation.
2 - To ensure the appropriate implementation of civil service law.
3 - To suggest rules and regulations for recruiting qualified staff. (58)

The Department consists only of three units: Civil Affairs, Inspection, and Archives. Positions at the head of the first two units are currently vacant - indeed, the Inspection unit only exists on the organizational chart, having in reality not a single employee, and it is the Legal Adviser to the Department who takes responsibility for its work.

Remarks on the Personnel Department:

The total number of nationals working in the emirate's local departments remain a mere 175. The majority of employees are Arab workers, mainly from Egypt. Graduates who are nationals are not keen to work in local administration when they can get a better salary and a higher position at the federal level. The national graduate in the emirate's administration will be appointed to circle 2 of grade 3, while his colleague at federal level will be appointed to circle 2 of grade 2.

Lack of retirement policy (59) is another discouraging factor for nationals thinking of enrolling in the emirate's administration. Most of the Egyptian workers in the administration

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58. Ibid, p 119.
have already retired in their own country and are happy to find another opportunity to work, despite the low salary. On the whole, nationals prefer to work with the Federal Government and those who do remain in the emirate's local departments either gain personal benefit from doing so or lack the qualifications to compete with others at federal level.

In conclusion I would say that the modern approach to administration is relatively new to the United Arab Emirates—indeed it is only with federation that it has come. Prior to federation, only the local municipalities and rulers' offices were there to provide services for the residents. However, since the establishment of the U.A.E. in 1971 tremendous efforts and vast amounts of money have been expended on improving and promoting administration as a vehicle of development. The major stumbling block preventing administration from assuming its rightful importance was the lack of qualified indigenous administrators, and it was necessary for the Government to import experts from abroad.

As we have seen, the federation has three administrative tools and their roles are contingent on their locations in the authority structure. The Federal Council of Ministers is the first of these and determines the guidelines administration should follow. Second comes the Civil Service Council which is the executive arm of the former. Its main concern is to promote the productivity of federal employees and generally improve their performance. Thirdly comes the Federal Personnel Department which ensures the efficient implementation of the decisions and policies handed down by the other two.

Administration in the U.A.E. differs from that in its neighbouring Gulf states in that it takes place at two levels, federal and local. The two systems are distinct but some times clash, especially since there is a gulf between the sophisticated local administration of Abu-Dhabi and the more backward local apparatus in the other emirates.
The existence of two administrative levels and the lack of indigenous qualified administrators, in addition to the general weakness of the tripartite executive apparatus, undermine the effectiveness of the administration and this problem is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

Introduction

Like many developing countries the United Arab Emirates has run into a number of difficulties trying to establish and develop an efficient and effective administrative system. Some of these difficulties are related to the nature of the socio-political system which is considered by many practitioners and outside observers as a major stumbling block preventing the administration from playing its genuine role in the development process. Others argue that the problem lies solely with the actual administrative procedures, policy and structure. The failure of many U.A.E. development plans and programmes must be attributed to the inability of the administration to cope with the tremendous demands of development, an inability which is not so surprising bearing in mind that the only sector required to bear this huge burden is the public sector.

We intend in this chapter to discuss the most crucial problems facing the U.A.E. federal sector and consequently undermining the country's ambitious development plans. In our estimation the most serious problems are:

1- Weakness of the federal administrative institutions in comparison with their local counterparts.
2- Economic disparity between the constituent emirates and the reflection of this on administration performance.
3- Bureaucratic inflation.
4- The out dated administrative regulations.
5- Excessive centralization.
6- Lack of indigenous skilled manpower.
Firstly, The Weakness of Federal Institutions in comparison with their local counterparts:

The weakness of federal institutions is the most critical problem facing development administration in the U.A.E. The refusal of the local governments to allow greater sovereignty to the federal institutions handicaps, if not paralyses, the federal apparatus. As a result, institutions are duplicated and overlap at the emirate level and local institutions retain the real authority in their emirates, while the role of the federal institutions is severely limited. The duplication even exists in the emirates considered pro-federation, such as Abu-Dhabi. This emirate as we have seen earlier, has its own local cabinet (executive council), departments (ministries) and national consultative council (Federal National Council). Ironically, while the federal counterparts suffer from loss of role in the federal theatre the former institutions prove their effectiveness not only at local level but at federal level as well, thanks to the tremendous support they receive from their governments. In contrast, the federal institutions, which have been founded merely to serve the poor northern emirates who lack the appropriate resources to enhance their own local institutions, depend mainly on the federal machinery to provide services for their subjects.\(^1\)

A look at the local government buildings of the rich emirates like Abu-Dhabi and Dubai reveals the difference between the federal and local institutions. While the federal government buildings suffer from delapidation, humidity, dust and overcrowning, the local buildings have nice-looking skyscrapers, with modern facilities, and are situated in the best location in the emirate, usually near the beach.

Something more needs to be said to explain the weakness of federal institutions and the fact that local interests invariably prevail over federal. Two cases, will support our analysis.

The Ministry of Public Works & Housing and its Counterparts in Abu-Dhabi and Dubai:

The roles of the federal Ministry of Public Works include:

1. Building and constructing federal government buildings and supervising their maintenance.
2. Studying and preparing urban development plans.
3. Building and maintaining federal highways and roads.\(^2\)

These are the most important functions of the federal ministry and they are duplicated by its counterparts in Abu-Dhabi and Dubai, the only difference between these local departments and the federal ministry being the formers' access to resources to execute and implement their projects.

The fact is that only the poor northern emirates benefit from the services of this ministry while Dubai Municipality and Abu-Dhabi Department of Public Works assume responsibility for their own maintenance and development programmes.

During the Iraq-Iran War the United Arab Emirates Government suffered from lack of liquidity and this was reflected in many federal development programmes. The Government was forced to freeze and in some cases cancel most of their projects, particularly in the northern emirates i.e. Ras Al Khaimah, Umm-al-Qaiwain, Ajman and Fujairah. The situation had already deteriorated in 1984 after the decline of oil prices led the Government to review all its projects in the northern emirates. Paradoxically, while federal projects have been cancelled and frozen in the northern emirates, Abu-Dhabi's

Department of Public Works and Dubai's Municipality have continued regularly to announce new projects and programmes to be conducted in their emirates.

A comparison between the quality and quantity of services provided by the federal ministry and those provided by its local counterparts inclines in favour of the latter. For example, while thousands of citizens of the northern emirates whose properties were affected by government projects and programmes complained about the delay (from 1977 to 1990) in the payment of compensation, Abu-Dhabi and Dubai's local apparatus announced annually their plans to compensate their eligible subjects with thousands of millions of Darhams. In Abu-Dhabi individual compensation consists of an appropriate house (in some cases a villa) and up to 3 million Dhs ($900,000), depending on the size of the property affected. Dubai has a similar scheme. Up to the present time, more than 90% of Abu-Dhabi's citizens have been affected by local department projects and as a result have been awarded millions of Darhams. Compensation on this scale amounts, in fact, to being another way of distributing wealth to the citizens.

Despite the ministry's huge responsibilities and the vast number of clients it has in the northern emirates, it is virtually paralysed by lack of financial support. The annual funds allocated in the federal budget simply are not consistent with these responsibilities. For example, according to a report published in Al Khaleej, the Ministry of Finance this year (1991) has provided the Ministry of Public Works with only 15 million Dhs for the maintenance of federal buildings, in spite of the fact that the genuine requirements of the ministry is in excess of 167 million Dhs. Consequently, the Ministry of Education has been forced to close many schools in Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah and in other poor emirates because of their delapidated state and the students have had to be transferred to other schools despite the negative results of this procedure.(3)

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Chapter five

It was only during the recent Gulf crisis that the federal government has released a
project to build 2000 public houses in the northern emirates after several bitter years of
delay and empty promises. In the circumstances it was a government policy to contain and
absorb any public complaints, particularly from northern emirates citizens who were under
pressure from the Iraqi regime to revolt against their rich neighbours who had deprived
them of their wealth and distributed it to the Westerners.

The Sharjah Gas Dispute:

The Sharjah Gas dispute is another indication of the weakness of federal institutions
and the conflict of interest between local and federal government. The problem arose when
the Sharjah Government, represented by Amoco, agreed to supply the federal Ministry of
Electricity and Water Power Generation in the northern emirates with gas from the Sharjah
Sajaa field. The gas was to be supplied to the federal ministry by the Emirates' General
Petroleum Corporation, which belongs to the federal Ministry of Finance.

Due to the budgetary constraints, which kept the Ministry of Finance short of
money, the Ministry refused to pay the price agreed upon between the Sharjah Government
and EGPC since that price was $3.50 Mn Btu and Dubai had since been supplied from the
same field at a price of $1.25 Mn Btu. Sharjah argued that the difference in the two prices
was due to the changes in the market between 1983 when EGPC's agreement was signed
and 1985 when Dubai's was drafted. Federal government sources argued that the difference
was based on Sharjahs' refusal to contribute to the federal budget, as agreed under the terms
of the Provisional Constitution.

Five years later the Sharjah Government represented by Amoco. was awarded $383
million in damages from EGPC by a Paris-based international arbitration panel. The award
covered supplies of gas between 1983 to 1986.\(^4\)

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Secondly, Economic Disparity Among the Constituent Emirates:

A close look at the Provisional Constitution instantly reveals the disparities between the constituent emirates since they are actually divided into three groups according to their wealth. Therefore, Abu-Dhabi and Dubai as the richest emirates in the federation have the lion's share of all federal posts, hold seats in the Federal Cabinet, have eight seats each in the National Council and, furthermore, have the power of veto in the highest institution of all, i.e. the Federal Supreme Council. Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah come next with 6 seats each in the Federal National Council and almost equal representation in the Federal Cabinet. Making up the least important group are the three remaining emirates, i.e. Umm-al-Qaiwain, Ajman and Fujairah. Each of these is allocated 4 seats in the Federal National Council and an equal representation in the Federal Cabinet. From all this it is clear that the division is based on wealth rather than on anything else. Accordingly, the Constitution has reinforced if not increased the disparity between the members of the federation.

The availability of petroleum wealth in Abu-Dhabi, Dubai and to a lesser extent in Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah but not in the other three emirates is what has led to the economic disparity between them in spite of the fact they all belong to the same country. The incompatibility of their respective economic programmes and the element of competition only aggravate the situation. Many projects have been launched merely to challenge a rival emirate. Numerous examples might be quoted to demonstrate the truth of this. In the petrochemical field for instance, in 1976, Dubai launched a plan to establish an industrial complex and harbour at Jabal Ali; Abu-Dhabi retaliated with a similar project at Al Ruways. In the field of communications, six international airports were built, one each in Abu-Dhabi, Al Ain, Fujairah, Dubai, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. Absurdly, the distance between Dubai Airport and Sharjah Airport is not more than 10 minutes driving and

Ras Al Khaimah International Airport is so under-used it has only two flights a week, one to Bombay and the other to Cairo. We believe if both Umm-al-Qaiwan and Ajman had enough land for a runway they would not hesitate to build their own airports.

Such examples of overlapping and conflicting projects are legion. Each emirate has a cement plant, but one of them was closed down recently when common sense prevailed. This plant belonged to Umm-al-Qaiwain and was built for political rather than economic reasons in a desert with a lack of rocks and no access to the sea as a means of export. It appears that the plant was located on the border with Ras Al Khaimah in order to stress the territorial boundary, regardless of economic advantage. High-capacity seaports were built in Abu-Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah, in additional to another two on the other coastline, one each at Fujairah and Khor Fakhan (which belongs to Sharjah). Perhaps not surprisingly, there is no coordination between these seaports and what is prohibited in one is legal in another. For example, in 1989 a shipment of Australian lamb, rejected by Abu-Dhabi's seaport authority as being a health hazard, found its way into the market through Ras Al Khaimah.

The competition between emirates has not been limited to economic projects but extends to leisure and luxury pursuits. For example, Dubai has built a golf course at Jable Ali (desert and remote) which consumes 2 percent of Dubai's water when most local people have never heard of this sport. Abu-Dhabi has recently launched a golf course project at Al-Ain city (near Dubai) only to compete with Dubai.

Thus, the most critical problem facing the federal administrative system could well be the lack of a united federal economic policy, and the lack of coordination between the constituent emirates, which continue to be identified as independent economic units whose economic development is contingent on the availability of financial resources and the will of a ruler who does not distinguish between the federal budget and the emirate budget.\(^8\)

\(^8\) - Amer Al Kubaisy, op. cit., p 128.
The second critical problem handicapping if not paralysing the effectiveness of the federal institutions is the absence of a federal policy to fund the federal budget. This budget since the establishment of the country in 1971 has been a constant source of dispute among the emirates.

Theoretically each emirate is supposed to contribute 50 percent of its revenue to the federal budget after the deduction of the cost of the services provided to its subjects which are supposed to be provided by the federal government such as the construction and maintenance of roads, etc. Practically, the only emirate which is fully committed to pay its share is Abu-Dhabi. Dubai claims that it already contributes 25 percent of the federal budget and has done ever since the establishment of the country, a claim denied by the government of Abu-Dhabi who say that Dubai considers its contribution to the Military Central Province, which belongs to Dubai and is under the command of the Ruler's younger brother, to be its share of the budget.\(^9\)

Prior to the recent Gulf Crisis, approval of the federal budget has been required at end of the financial year, which coincides with the beginning of the calendar year. The 1985 budget was not approved until late October 1985, and approval of 1986 draft budget was delayed until late October 1986.\(^{10}\) The draft budgets of 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 were delayed until late December of each year. It was only during the Gulf Crisis that approval of the 1991 budget came forward to July of the same year. Dhs. 19.7 billion ($5.4 billion) was the sum involved and this was an increase of 4.1 billion over the previous year's budget which was 15.6 billion ($4.2) billion.\(^{11}\) The work is going on to approve the draft budget of 1992 at the beginning of the calendar year.

The invariable delay in budget approval was due to Abu-Dhabi's cut in its contribution combined with the refusal of other emirates to pay their share in the budget.

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Accordingly, the federal budget fell from an actual Dhs. 23.2 billion in 1981 to only 12.8 billions in 1989. Therefore, total expenditure fell from Dhs. 20.6 billion to Dhs. 14.3 billions over the same period. Monthly federal expenditure has been limited only to one twelfth of the previous year's level.\(^{(12)}\)

Among the many ambitious federal projects that have had to be frozen or cancelled is the United Arab Emirates University complex at Al Ain city which was supposed to have been finished by the year 2002. As a result the only university in the country still occupies old secondary school buildings. In 1988 federal civil servants had a particularly critical year when the government failed to pay them their salaries and wages and many were forced to sell their belongings to support their families or to borrow from the banks at high interest rates. After the President's intervention the government extended the month of the U.A.E. to 45 days, in other words federal civil servants thereafter received their wages every 45 days instead of every 30 days and they were only paid for 30 days!!

The delay in budget approval affects many segments of U.A.E. society. For example, national contractors who have carried out projects for the federal Government still complain of delayed payments which put them in debt to both the banks and their labour force. Consequently, many national companies have gone bankrupt. Confidence in the government on the part of national companies is almost non existent. When the federal Ministry of Public Works and Housing announced its need for 125 construction companies to do maintenance work on 300 schools, only 30 companies responded.\(^{(13)}\)

Thirdly, Bureaucratic Inflation:

The most striking feature the student of public administration will encounter when studying administration in the U.A.E. is the plague of bureaucratic inflation spreading to

\(^{(12)}\) Sarah Searight, op. cit., pp 26-29.
most administrative levels. It is no surprise to find this problem in Egyptian, Iraqi and Sudanese systems which have a long administrative history, but it is absolutely amazing for a country like the U.A.E., where natives constitute only 24 percent of the total population and merely 8 percent of the total manpower, to suffer from this administrative phenomenon.

Bureaucratic inflation may be defined as the increase in the number of employees against a decrease in the quantity of appropriate jobs, or a decline in the quantity of work regardless of the size of the workforce.\(^{14}\)

The United Nations report on the federal civil service in 1980, found that the percentage of bureaucratic inflation in any ministry was never less than 20%, and in other ministries was as high as 35%. It also indicated that the real inflation average was even higher than this because there were large numbers of employees engaged in non-productive occupations. Furthermore, the U.N. experts found that, the problem was worse at the top administrative level, particularly at grade and circle, 1/1, 1/2 and 2/1.\(^{15}\) Nassif Abul Khalik argued that 40% of U.A.E. federal and private-sector employees could be dispensed without affecting performance and the abolition of some sectors would have no significant effect on the country's services.\(^{16}\) This confirms that there is a considerable amount of duplication at all the country's administrative levels.

Specific indications of bureaucratic inflation in the U.A.E. federal administration are:

1. Widespread absenteeism and late attendance have no significant effect on output. The absenteeism phenomenon is associated mainly with native employees who feel that they perform unnecessary and marginal tasks.


which have been created by themselves or their bosses only to keep them busy.\(^{(17)}\)

2- The practice of reading newspapers and magazines during working hours. What is significant is that the newspapers are actually distributed free to high level administrators by the administration itself in an attempt to help them kill time.

3- Frequent unnecessary visits to friends' offices and the tendency to congregate or receive guests during work hours to discuss personal matters.

4- Despite the desperate need of the federal sectors for indigenous manpower, qualified indigenous graduates have to wait more than one year to be appointed by the government.

Factors Contributing to the Spread of Bureaucratic Inflation:

Various factors have contributed to the problem of bureaucratic inflation in the U.A.E. federal sector. Of these three stand out as being mainly responsible: foremost is the administrative system itself; second, come the education and social systems and finally, the political system and its keenness to employ all national graduates regardless of their specialities.

1- Administrative Factors:

The administration itself plays a significant role in aggravating the problem through its recruitment policy which creates a serious management/subordinates imbalance.

A - Administration Recruitment Policy:

The government's commitment to recruit all national graduates, is regarded as a major factor in the perpetuation of federal bureaucratic inflation and overstaffing. Since the establishment of the country in 1971, the government has guaranteed a job to every graduate citizen. Accordingly, although the number of graduate positions has been dramatically increased from only 50 in 1977 to 600 in 1981 and 700 in 1987, the number of posts available still does not match the tremendous demand and currently the Federal Personnel Department is requesting that 1000 positions be reserved solely for graduates. Hitherto, the request has not yet been approved by the Federal Council of Ministers.\(^{18}\)

Thus, the federal government has adopted a policy of employing national graduates at grade 2 of circle 2 (senior executive), without taking into consideration the real needs of the administration and regardless of their specializations. In short, graduates are appointed in the federal sector not because the administration needs them but rather because they need the administration. Consequently, federal administrative institutions have become social security institutions or, in other words, a "welfare bureaucracy"\(^{19}\) whose major function is to absorb unemployed persons.

The 1991 statistics show that there are 47,930 civil servants in the federal sector, 37,4 (17,914) of whom are nationals; 26,123 belong to the special cadre (teaching staff, physicians and medical technicians): the teaching sector absorbs 19,869, of whom 27,5 \(\%\) (5,467) are nationals; the medical sector accounts for 6,254, of whom nationals only 277 (4.4 \%) are nationals. The remaining 21,588 belong to the general cadre (administrative).\(^{20}\) This cadre suffers from the bureaucratic pathology which besets the country. In this cadre nationals amount to 12,179 (55.6 percent of total employees). The

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20. We have obtained these data through personal contact.
percentage of workers in grade 2 circle 2, (i.e. the graduate grade) form 50% of all natives in the administrative cadre. Furthermore, over the three years up to 1985, 1021 nationals were appointed to the federal sector, 600 of whom were recruited at 2/2 grade. In 1987, 992 were recruited, 700 at 2/2 level.

Consequently, the appointment of graduates at 2/2 grade accounted for 65% of total recruitment in 1987. If this situation continues without any radical change, inflation in this particular level will be alarmingly increased.\(^{21}\) From 1979 to 1987 the number of those appointed in level 2/2 multiplied seven times in comparison with those appointed in the next grade, i.e. 2/3, in which 71% of those appointed over the same period were nationals and in level 2/4 where they constitute only 36% of the total number of appointments.\(^{22}\)

Obviously, this recruiting policy has resulted in pronounced "swelling" of level 2/2 as compared with other administrative levels.

Table 5-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Information</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<td>91</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Justice</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
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<td>Labour</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>211</td>
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<td>Finance</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>Planning</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Economics</td>
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<td>Petroleum</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Mini</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>2,483</td>
<td>3,080</td>
</tr>
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</table>


B - Imbalance Between Superiors and Subordinates:

The second major contribution to the problem of bureaucratic inflation is the marked numerical imbalance between those in upper grades and their subordinates of whom there are only half as many. Furthermore, a close look at the U.A.E. federal institutions will
reveal that there are five times as many superiors as subordinates. In other words, the higher we go up in the administrative hierarchy the more the number of employees increases.

Clearly, bureaucratic inflation has been concentrated at the top (i.e. in 1/1, 1/2, 2/1 and 2/2 administrative levels) while the levels immediately below (i.e. 2/3, 2/4 and 3/1) have been starved of nationals. To illustrate our point we will give these examples. According to the 1987 administrative census employees in level 1/1 numbered 131, while in the next level there were only 84. There were 2,423 in 2/2 level, while in the level below (i.e. 2/3) there were only 413.(23)

This abnormal situation has inevitably influenced the distribution of work within the administrative hierarchy, the most substantial amount being concentrated at the lower levels (executive) while those at the top perform only supervisory roles. This means that it is the non-national workers at lower levels who bear the burden of the workload while the mass of nationals at the upper levels constitute what amounts to a leisure class.

2 - Education and the Social System:

Two vocational schools have been established, one in Dubai the other in Ras Al Khaimah; offering international scholarships in technical subjects and an improved vocational curriculum to suit both the interests of the students and the needs of development programmes.(24) These have been major initiatives taken by the government to improve opportunities and encourage students to enroll in vocational education but nevertheless students have been reluctant to take advantage of them, still preferring to be in general education. The result of course is a huge surplus of graduates in the humanities and the arts and a severe shortage in technical and scientific specialities such as engineering, chemistry,

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physics and Mathematics. Consequently, the government is obliged to import most of its technicians from abroad.

Why has the education system failed to direct students into vocational and scientific education? The answer lies in two factors. The first is the government recruitment policy which makes no distinction in privilege or grade between engineering and medical graduates, who spend up to 6 years studying, and humanities graduates who spend only 4 years studying. If they are to be equal in grade salary regardless, why should students choose the difficult alternative when there is a short and easy way to be appointed? The second factor is the social attitude which considers technical jobs shameful and fit only for non-national workers. Consequently, at the 1987 census the total number of national medical technicians was 165 as against 4,200 non-nationals personnel. This meant that nationals amounted to less than 4% of total workers in this sector. Meanwhile, in the private sector, in particular in the banking sector, nationals amounted to only for 7% of total workers.\(^{(25)}\)

In conclusion, it appears that, there is a gap of understanding between the education system and development requirements. In other words, there is a lack of coordination between the education apparatus (i.e. schools and the university) and the administrative apparatus which utilizes the product of the former apparatus and this has led to an imbalance between supply and demand. Indeed the supply in certain specializations has so far exceeded the administration's capacity to absorb and accommodate it so that the result has been over-employment, overstaffing at administrative levels and a severe shortage in other qualifications.

In many countries education is linked to economic development needs and to manpower projection. Consequently, schools and universities have been able to provide

occupations for most of their graduates and at the same time satisfy the country's requirements for human resources.(26)

3 - The Political Factor

No doubt political motives are involved in providing employment for each national graduate. The purpose of recruiting nationals is not solely to distribute the country's wealth, as many people suggest, but rather "to keep them content and loyal to the government".(27) This policy has been adopted even by poor countries. Sudan in the sixties, for instance, guaranteed a job to each graduate, regardless of its economic difficulties.(28)

In the U.A.E., most graduates who seek jobs in the federal government sectors are from northern emirates, notably from Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Ajman, Umm-al-Qaiwain and Fujairah, and have only this avenue open to them, since their local governments are financially unable to appoint all of them. Recruiting them to the federal sectors is the only means the government has of avoiding the mass unemployment which, among the educated youths in a country like the U.A.E. where certain families dominate all the country's wealth, definitely would be politically dangerous.

In 1989, by way of experiment, the government proposed to decrease the graduate appointment grade from 2 2 to 2 4. The proposal was met with vigorous protests from all the university students, who threatened to strike and boycott the university. Consequently, the federal President intervened and dismissed the proposal.

How may other sectors, e.g. public enterprise, contribute to the problem of graduate appointment? There are two types of public enterprises. Economy-oriented enterprises which pursue financial profits, and administration-oriented enterprises which provide administrative services. The Emirates Central Bank; Industrial Bank; Emirates Telecommunications; Emirates General Petroleum Corporation; Emirates Transportation and Al-Ethad Publishing Corporation, are all categorized as economy oriented. The U.A.E. University; the General Information Centre; the Institute of Administrative Development; the General Post Corporation and the polytechnic colleges, represent administrative enterprises.

Of the total 13,415 workers in public enterprises, nationals constitute only 23% (3,079) while the rest are from other Arab countries or are foreigners.

The Government announced in 1971 that its first priority would be to emiratize all government and non-government sectors. The difficulty of fulfilling this promise in the first days of the federation when the country was suffering from a shortage of skilled indigenous manpower in all fields and specialities was understandable. But now that there are so many national graduates with the necessary qualifications, the fact that they are denied access to these enterprises when expatriates with similar qualifications are welcomed is less understandable. Indeed, foreigners abound to such an extent that many officials argue that the success of these enterprises is contingent on the existence of those non-nationals in these enterprises. The very small percentage of locals employed in the average workforce are usually found only in the top administrative ranks (e.g. general managers, managers, etc.), while other levels are dominated by non-nationals. It is especially ironic that while the federal sectors are over-staffed with nationals, public enterprise suffers from a shortage of nationals even in administrative jobs. The obvious question is what prevents national graduates being employed in public enterprise with its huge absorption capacity, when this would considerably reduce the pressure on the federal sectors.
Table 5-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationals</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Non-nationals</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.A.E. University</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>2,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The General Inform</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polytech Coll</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Admini</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The General Post</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>1,116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>3,583</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>4,521</td>
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Table 5-3

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>%</th>
<th>Non-nationals</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>63</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emirates Teleco</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4,179</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>4,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Emirates Petr</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>394</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emirates Transp</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2,706</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Etehad Publish</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,051</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6,703</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>8,754</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First Impediment:

When a certain enterprise is virtually controlled by workers of a particular nationality, they fear the employment of national graduates as a threat to their security.
Therefore they do everything possible to retain their power and to put obstacles in the way of any national encroaching on their territory. Should a national succeed in being appointed he will be marginalized. There are countless examples, among them the U.A.E. University which was actually established to contribute to the emiratization policy, 14 years ago but whose own national employees still do not exceed 14% of the total staff. On the academic level, the Vice Chancellor and two of his deputies, in addition to 5 Deans and 48 out of 52 heads of department, all belong to one Arab nationality, and the situation is even worse when it comes to faculty members. The number of Ph.D who are nationals is a meagre 75.\(^{(29)}\)

On the administrative level, national workers are openly marginalized; all senior positions with the exception of two are occupied by non-nationals.\(^{(30)}\)

**Second Impediment:**

This is associated with the first, in that the manipulation by a certain nationality of all positions within one enterprise, combined with the existence of unqualified nationals at the top of the hierarchy, results in decisions being concentrated in the hands of those mainly concerned with looking after their own interests. Bear in mind, that appointments to the top positions are not based on qualifications or skills, but rather on political loyalty and favouritism.

**Third Impediment:**

In the U.A.E., as in all Gulf states, governments are faced with the problem of how to distribute the oil wealth without disrupting monarchs' and sheikhs' personal interests and without challenging the traditional social structure. Clearly, if these governments decide to

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spend their wealth on economic and social development programmes, that, in the long term, will jeopardize their own interests and raise questions about their right to concentrate the nation’s wealth in their hands in the first place. At the same time, if they avoid all types of development they may risk emulating the former sheikh of Abu-Dhabi, sheikh Shakboot, and the former Sultan of Oman, cautionary examples always at the back of the minds of all sheikhs in the Gulf. As a solution:

"They have tended to follow a pattern of distributing their oil revenues as broadly as necessary, but allowing foreigners to provide most technical services, thereby minimizing structural changes in society" (31) 

Fourthly, Inflexibility, Plurality and Outdated Civil Service Law:

Civil service law and organization regulations in the Gulf States, and in the U.A.E. in particular, have an exceptionally significant and effective role to play because of the rapid economic and social changes these states have experienced over a very short period. These rapid changes must be met with updated and flexible administrative law. (32) Therefore, one of the most serious difficulties facing development administration in the U.A.E. is the growing dichotomy between federal civil service law and the requirements of development.

Federal administrative legislation goes back to 1971, when the Government had no choice but to adopt Abu-Dhabi's civil service law temporarily until the government was able to introduce its own law. In 1973, the government, assisted by Arab experts (Egyptians) alien to the country's culture, values and traditions, introduced a federal civil service law which was a copy of an Arab country law. In 1978 this was reviewed and some changes were made. (33) It is this law which the government still uses, regardless of the tremendous social and economic changes which have taken place in the country over the past 20 years.

Ideally, in any country legislation should be approved by both government and citizens and must satisfy the needs of both. In the U.A.E., however, the Government unilaterally decides whether legislation satisfies the needs and desires of its subjects. Consequently, legislation almost invariably reflects the government's needs rather than those of its people. In the case of the administrative legislation it was introduced in 1973 when people's needs and requirements were simple if not vague. So, even though this law may have satisfied the needs of the people at that date it does not fulfil their needs and requirements today.\(^{(34)}\)

In 1989, the Federal Personnel Department at last introduced a new civil service code but it has yet to be ratified. We understand that the hold-up has something to do with its financial implications.

Plurality of administrative legislation within each federal institution adds another burden to the administrative system in the U.A.E. For example, there has to be special legislation for nationals in the civil service comprising among others diplomats, judges, ministers, members of the Federal National Council, doctors at the Ministry of Health and teachers and workers in the Ministry of Education. There also has to be special legislation for non-nationals, both those with internal contracts and those with external contracts, in addition to legislation for workers and civil servants who are paid by the day.\(^{(35)}\)

This plurality in administrative legislation gives rise to various problems and difficulties. Among them are:

1. Difficulty in obtaining equal treatment for all employees, and preventing some getting more privileges than others even though they have the same qualifications and experience. Injustice certainly leads to ill feeling among employees within the same organization.\(^{(36)}\)


\(^{(36)}\) Osama Abdul Rahman, op. cit., p. 124.
2 - Complicated administrative procedures and unnecessary bureaucratic routine and red tape. Plurality overloads all personnel departments in ministries with tremendous amounts of legislative work and thereby increases the risk of mistakes and mismanagement.\[^{37}\]

Five, Concentration of Authority:

Excessive concentration is another constraint facing the United Arab Emirates' bureaucracy which seriously undermines its effectiveness in achieving its development goals and objectives. Decision making is always concentrated in the hands of a few top executives who seem not to believe in the ability of their subordinates. They adhere to the famous Douglas McGregor's Theory X, which suggests that, man by nature dislikes responsibility, prefers to be led, lacks ambition, is lazy and needs close supervision.\[^{38}\] This view, in fact, has been refuted by a United Nations report on the federal civil service (1980), which found that when authority is concentrated in the hands of deputy ministers and their assistants, and subordinates are deprived of responsibility, this must weaken their commitment to implement decisions passed from above and increase the apathy among them.\[^{39}\]

Thus, in such a control-oriented administrative system, career advancement and promotion are bestowed upon those who follow directions blindly, and withheld from those who discuss and argue. The more you adhere to the superior's directions, the more you are valued by him.\[^{40}\]

The problem of concentration of authority has its roots in the culture of U.A.E. society in which a few families have always held all the country's affairs in their hands. It

\[^{37}\] Amer Al-Kabaisy, op. cit., p. 58.
is not unusual to find a young member of one of these families holding as many as five key positions in spite of the fact that he does not possess the qualifications or experience to enable him to do the jobs. The more positions you hold and the more followers you have, the more important you appear in society; therefore, they compete with each others to enlarge and expand their respective empires.

This sheikhocratic behaviour has spread over right through the federal sectors and many ordinary people have opted to 'follow their king's religion'. As a result red tape is becoming the dominant feature of the administration. Moreover, most citizens have become convinced that the quickest way to get a job done is to bypass all junior administrators, whom they see as ineffective, and deal directly with those at the top.\(^{(41)}\)

It is common knowledge that when certain top officials were asked why they held on to all these responsibilities and refused to delegate some to their subordinates, their concerted reply was, "No man would even give one of his wives away to somebody else."\(^{(42)}\) This indicates how difficult it is for them to relinquish control.

Finally, Shortage of Indigenous Skilled Manpower and Lack of Job Classification:

Skilled indigenous manpower is the most essential component of administration, particularly in a country like the U.A.E., where expatriates outnumber nationals and the existing nationals may come to be regarded, as W. Wood argues, as:


"Passengers, if not brakes, on the development machine, with loss of esteem and morale which ultimately seems destined to defeat the whole purpose of public administration"(43)

Stressing the same point, Stavrianos, describes the administrative system in Kuwait in terms that might be applied to the U.A.E. He argues that, "The citizens of the desert state are employed in sundry government "services". In practice, these people are paid to do virtually nothing............ Most of the meaningful and productive work is performed by the immigrant labour recruits from Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, Pakistan and other neighbouring countries. These foreign workers usually have no political or trade union rights and receive a fraction of the wages paid to local citizens for the same jobs. Thus the citizens are being subjected to a process of deproducutization, which may be satisfying as long as the oil resources last. But when this great regional heritage is expended, it will mean disaster, not only for the citizens of the states involved, but also for the entire region."(44)

The administration in any country cannot be efficiently managed without qualified and competent indigenous staff. This means that skills that are required for administration must be available within the country and that the government services must be able to attract and retain the required staff.(45)

Skilled indigenous manpower is still limited, despite strenuous efforts made by the government to develop and improve its indigenous work- forces. Training programmes have been provided both at home and abroad, but their results have proved fruitless and ineffective. The most skilled and competent indigenous workers gravitate to the military forces and sectors such as Abu-Dhabi's petroleum companies and the Central Bank among

other public enterprises, feeling they offer greater opportunities for meaningful, work advancement, promotion and job satisfaction, not to mention more money and more generous allowances.

Another critical problem facing the administration is a lack of administrative job classification and description. The lack of such an essential administrative element means that employees are given jobs for which they are not suited, duties overlap, responsibilities are unspecified, there is a conflict of decisions, etc.

The Federal Audit Bureau in its report on the U.A.E. administrative system asserts that most federal ministries have violated the Federal Council of Ministers decision only to recruit people if they fulfil the requirements and conditions of vacant jobs. The report suggests that recruitment is not based on scientific and modern methods, but rather based on personal interest. The report cites a number of cases in which violation has occurred. Here are two examples:

1. A person was appointed in the Ministry of Agriculture as an assistant accountant, although he held a Bachelor of Law degree and had no experience whatsoever in accountancy.
2. A person was appointed to the U.A.E. Embassy in Belgium as an accountant, although he held a certificate from the Louvain Academy for Fine Arts.

In conclusion, administration in the United Arab Emirates, as in many of the Gulf states, is handicapped by various problems which prevent it taking its rightful position in the development process. Some of these problems are associated with the prevailing situation which gives priority to the interests of local institutions over the federal institutions. Local departments in each emirate, particularly, in Dubai and Abu-Dhabi, are more powerful and effective than their federal counterparts. Economic differences between

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constituent emirates is another major obstacle undermining the work of the administration. This problem comes to the fore when it is time to contribute to the federal budget and support federal projects. While federal institutions suffer from shortage of resources their local counterparts have a surplus of financial resources. Finally, there are some problems which may be regarded as purely administrative. These persist because of outdated administrative legislation, combined with the influx of rival nationalities.
CHAPTER SIX

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction:

The aim of this chapter is to describe and highlight the different techniques, methods and approaches of data collection which have been used in this present study. As a starting point, the major difficulties of conducting research in the United Arab Emirates will be discussed. The second part of this chapter will be devoted to research techniques, the instruments and methods of data collection and the selection of a representative sample of the population.

Conducting Research in the U.A.E:

Opportunities and Constraints:

Conducting research in the United Arab Emirates and in many other countries, particularly research into people's opinions and ideas about government policy, carries with it a high risk of failure. Because this kind of research is regarded in an undemocratic state as a sensitive issue, most civil servants will refuse to cooperate which will jeopardize the whole effort.

Despite this discouraging statement, conducting research in the U.A.E. can be a constructive exercise and this part of the chapter will explore this positive side; the second part of the chapter will describe the constraints and obstacles the researcher may face in his fieldwork.
Chapter six

First: Opportunities and Advantages:

A- Abundance of research opportunities:

As a newly emerged country, which achieved independence as recently as 1971, the U.A.E. offers a rich field to researchers. Hitherto most research has been conducted by foreign scholars who have been brought in solely for this purpose and whose researches have been unsatisfactory since they were not familiar with the country's culture and traditions. Bear in mind that the key to effective research is to design a research technique to suit a particular context and situation. Research techniques and methods which have been successfully applied in western countries may have disappointing results if applied to U.A.E. society without being modified.

Sensitivity to, and consideration for the feelings of others are characteristics of U.A.E. society known to stem directly from Beduin tradition and Islamic teaching. The successful researcher is the one who takes into account the Arabic tradition and the Islamic codes which shape the many aspects of U.A.E. society. To ignore these factors is to jeopardize the outcome of any research programme.

In contrast, to other countries where most research is either complementary to or repetitious of previous studies, any research conducted in the U.A.E. at the present stage, is bound to be by definition original and creative and in itself a major contribution to knowledge.

B- Conducting research is a good opportunity to establish a relationship with high officials and employees:

One of the most important benefits of conducting research in the U.A.E. derives from the personal contact between researcher and participants. All the evidence suggests that indigenous employees who hold secondary degrees and others bachelor degrees, have a high regard for the indigenous researcher who is pursuing postgraduate studies at a British or American university and is more than willing to cooperate and provide him with the

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information he requires. I stress that a researcher studying in Britain or the U.S. will get more information and assistance than one who is studying elsewhere, simply because of the good reputation British and American universities have in the U.A.E.

National employees are especially eager to lend enthusiastic support to any indigenous researcher in conducting his work, feeling as they do a certain degree of suspicion towards the mass of researchers who are non-indigenous. Therefore when I submitted my questionnaire to my department colleagues at the U.A.E. University (none of whom were U.A.E. nationals) they were pessimistic about the amount of cooperation I would expect since they themselves had had such a bad experience with U.A.E. employees who had refused to answer their questions, even when the questions were in no way politically sensitive. However, I took the risk and the outcome has been encouraging.

Second, Constraints and Problems:

Research problems differ from country to country and from one culture to another, therefore, in this part of the chapter I will concentrate only on problems likely to face the researcher intending to conduct research in the United Arab Emirates.

A- Choose appropriate time for research:

One of the most serious mistakes likely to be made by a researcher unfamiliar with the U.A.E. culture is the selection of an inappropriate time for his research. By "inappropriate" I mean during "Ramadan", the fasting month of Muslims, or during the summer time. In Ramadan Muslims are prohibited from eating and drinking from sunrise to sunset, and also pray late into the night, sometimes until two hours before sunrise. Therefore, in order to relieve the burden on Muslims during this month, the government reduces the number of working hours from six to four a day; accordingly, the working day begins at 9 A.M and ends at 1 P.M. Thus, to conduct research in this month is almost
impossible since, first, employees are not receptive to questions, and, secondly, working hours are too short.

The summer months are similarly inappropriate for research in the U.A.E. Between May and the end of September, the temperature rises sharply to reach over 50°C; to avoid this heat most employees postpone their annual leave till summer time. Senior national officials, in particular, travel abroad with their families and non-national employees travel to their home countries. Moreover, travel within the U.A.E. to conduct research in these months is extremely difficult. Therefore, the best time to be in the U.A.E. is during the winter, which starts in November and ends in March.

B- Dealing with National Female Participants:

The second critical problem facing any researcher in the U.A.E. is how to deal with national female participants, bearing in mind that the U.A.E. is a relatively conservative society. It is essential for the researcher to be aware of certain rules when dealing with national female participants.

Before the U.A.E. University opened its doors to female students, national female employees were mostly concentrated in the education sector as teachers; now, however, the university is turning out female graduates many of whom are gravitating towards positions in the federal ministries. Various high positions in the federal sector which formerly were monopolized by male employees have now been taken over by women, such positions as assistant deputy minister, director general, head of department, etc.

Therefore, it is essential for the researcher to observe three specific rules when dealing with national female participants; he should:
1. Avoid being alone with a female participant in a private room; if possible, meet them all together in one room, normally, there is a special section set aside for women. Men and women never share an office but have their own separate rooms, albeit on the same floor or even within the same department.

2. Avoid frequent visits to female rooms, because this might be interpreted by male colleagues as a pretext to gain access to female employees and will certainly discredit him and create problems for him in obtaining information.

3. Try to arrange to be accompanied by a male superior whenever he visits the female section. This will encourage cooperation among participants since they will see him as one who has come through official channel.

C- Unpunctuality:

Generally speaking U.A.E. nationals, like people in many developing countries, are sometimes unreliable in keeping to schedules and appointments. This is often the result of the social pressures placed by society on its members. Among these pressures are unexpected visits from friends or family members which occur almost every day. Therefore, an employee is sometimes pressurized to break or postpone prearranged appointments in order to entertain his friend or family member.

Therefore, a researcher must be patient and prepared to accept that everything takes a little longer. He should not be surprised if his personal appointment has been cancelled or takes place with a number of other people present, since long-established U.A.E. tradition and culture require every visitor to be received personally, even if this results in the cancellation or delay of a prearranged appointment.
When a researcher meets a national participant, it is advisable not to show impatience or preoccupation with other affairs. The subject will invariably engage in social small talk with his guest for what may seem a long time. Thus, patience is a very essential quality in any researcher if he is to be successful in the United Arab Emirates.

D- Dealing with Expatriates:

As we have discussed in early chapters, U.A.E. indigenous employees are a minority in their country. To fill the vacancies at almost all government administrative levels, the country has had to import workers from other Arab countries (Egypt, Palistine, Sudan, Jordan, etc.) As a result of this policy all government sectors are dominated by these other nationalities, above all by Egyptians.

This being the case, it is essential for the researcher to know how to deal with this cocktail of nationalities, particularly if he intends to exclude them from his research since this may arouse their suspicions that the research constitutes a threat to their interests and they will do their utmost to undermine it. To overcome this problem it is advisable for the researcher to meet with some of these people to explain to them that they are being excluded from the research population for purely technical reasons. Furthermore, he should provide them with a summary of the study thus reducing their anxiety and increasing their willingness to cooperate.

Scope and Research Technique of the Present Study:

This study examines the role orientation of U.A.E. national civil servants, and the expectations and pressures placed on them by their family members and others outside their work organizations. The main aim is to provide solid evidence that much of the irrational behaviour of U.A.E. employees, i.e. favouritism, nepotism, etc., is not the result of corruption but rather of social expectations and pressures which force them to behave the
way they do. Specifically the work setting for this study is the United Arab Emirates federal sector, with samples of public employees in twelve federal ministries:

Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Planning; Ministry of Labour; Ministry of Islamic Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Economy; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Housing and Public Works; Ministry of Electricity & Water and Ministry of State for Supreme Council Affairs.

The target population was entirely made up of U.A.E nationals, both male and female, selected from different administrative levels in the civil service- in contrast to many empirical studies in the field of public administration which are concerned exclusively with high officials. If senior officials cannot depend on middle-and-low level employees to carry out routine business then policy implementation will be seriously impaired, if not totally sabotaged. Therefore, any study hoping for good results should concern itself with the integration of subordinates into organizational roles as well as with the commitment and foresight of those in the high-level posts.

It was essential to limit participants in the survey to U.A.E. national employees because of the nature of the study which attempts to explain the effect of cultural and social pressures on administrative behaviour; Not only were non-nationals beyond the scope of the study, but, technically speaking, the questions presented in the questionnaire would have been too politically sensitive for them to answer.

Civil servant respondents were chosen from four different emirates: Abu-Dhabi; Dubai; Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. These four emirates differ in size, population numbers and financial capability. Abu-Dhabi, the capital of the union, is the richest among its sisters and is categorized as pro-federation. Dubai comes immediately after Abu-Dhabi in terms of wealth, size and population but, being in favour of only a loose form of federation, it resists any federal movements to merge its local departments. Sharjah, being
neither rich nor poor, has taken up a position somewhere between the two but on the whole is believed to be pro-federation. Ras Al Khaimah is the poorest member of the union and is completely dependent on Abu-Dhabi and Dubai for financial support; however, its people are the most educated and occupy many crucial posts at federal level.

Obviously, any sample taken from all the emirates represents the wide range of economic background within the union.

Techniques of Data Collection:

To achieve the objectives of the study, I used three methods of data collection:

A- Questionnaire:

A questionnaire is a powerful tool for measuring attitudes and assessing reaction to proposals. The present research was exploratory and descriptive in nature and designed to obtain data about an area where there has been relatively little previous analysis. The questionnaire was chosen as being the most effective and efficient method for this kind of study, for the following reasons:

1- It allowed a reasonable number of respondents to be questioned (312 responded out of 385 approached, a response rate of 81%).

2- The responses to a questionnaire can be readily analysed and commented upon.

3- It allowed respondents to remain anonymous. This was stated clearly on each form. This was a consideration thought to be particularly essential given that the survey was requesting sensitive information about the respondent's professional and domestic circumstances.
To avoid the common pitfalls of this method, considerable care was taken in the construction of the questionnaire to ensure that questions were unambiguous and likely to elicit accurate responses, and this included the adoption of questions from previous studies, modified to suit the U.A.E. situation. Mainly the questions were adopted from the books and articles listed in the appendix of the chapter.

In addition to using a questionnaire based on a design favoured by other authors in this field, and in order to reduce the anxiety of respondents about the nature of the questions and to assure them that these questionnaires would be used only for the purpose of this study, I decided to attach a form indicating that any respondent interested in the results of this study should fill in the slip provided at the end of the questionnaire. That in my opinion boosted the return rate.

An examination of response patterns among the questionnaires returned provided little evidence of response bias or other reliability problems. Those individuals who were reluctant to express their views simply chose not to answer the questionnaire. In comparing the response patterns with my own personal experience and that of other officials interviewed informally, we noted a consistent trend by some participants to minimize any problem areas which might reflect upon themselves.

The questionnaire consisted of two major parts:

**First Part: Personal attributes and job orientations:**

This part of the questionnaire comprised of fifteen questions designed to provide information about participants and their job orientations. It is recommended that all studies start with general questions then move on to more specific and serious ones. Moreover,
personal details will provide the researcher with vital information which will enable him to classify his client; the data falls into two categories:

1- Individual attributes: *sex; *age; *marital status; *no. of children; *home emirate.
2- Job orientation: *place of work; *accommodation; *education; *types of education; *nature of education; *father's last occupation; *occupational status; *length of service; *job description and *source of recruitment.

Second Part: Job characteristics:

This part of the research instrument consisted of twenty-six questions designed to discover the attitudes of national employees in different situations. The questions were designed as cases in which respondents were presented with imaginary situations and asked to select one answer. The questions in this part were indirect and hypothetical in order to spare the participants embarrassment. Therefore, most questions started with the words "Suppose that........" or "Imagine the following..........."

The questionnaires were printed in Arabic and were distributed and collected by myself and friends in each ministry. The questionnaire was initially translated from English into Arabic by the researcher. It was then submitted to a specialist who made some changes and finally it was evaluated by three professors in the public administration department of the U.A.E. University who recommended some changes in order to achieve a valid and accurate translation which would serve the objectives of the study.

Pilot Study:

Taking advantages of the long experience of my colleagues at the U.A.E. University, I submitted the first draft of the questionnaire to them to see their comments and
suggestions. After long discussion we decided to modify some questions, omit others and add some new questions.

The next step was to put these questions to a practical test and (30) draft questionnaires were accordingly distributed among different administrative levels at different ministries. The participants in this pilot survey were asked to note items in the questionnaire that appeared ambiguous, obscure or leading. On the basis of participants' responses, some statements and questions were omitted or modified and others were made shorter and clearer so as to facilitate easier comprehension for respondents. The length of the questionnaire, however, remained unchanged as most participants indicated that it took them about 20 minutes to complete all the questions and this they considered reasonable.

The Population of the Study:

As was mentioned earlier the sample was to be drawn from the pool of national employees, both male and female, working in federal ministries and located in Abu-Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. In the event, the sample consists of public employees from twelve federal ministries:

1- Ministry of Finance
2- Ministry of Education
3- Ministry of Health
4- Ministry of Planning
5- Ministry of Labour
6- Ministry of Islamic Affairs
7- Ministry of Justice
8- Ministry of Economy
9- Ministry of Agriculture
10- Ministry of Housing and Public Works
11- Ministry of Electricity and Water
Participants were limited to federal government nationals working in the four emirates, for two specific reasons: first, to simplify the distribution of the questionnaire, taking into account the limited time available to the researcher and the difficulty he would face in trying to cover all seven emirates of the U.A.E.; secondly, many of these federal ministries have no branches in the other three emirates, i.e. Fujairah; Umm-al-Qaiwain and Ajman.

Data Collection:

In February 1992, the researcher travelled to the United Arab Emirates to conduct the fieldwork and collect the data. It took the researcher about four months to distribute the questionnaire, collect the responses and perform the statistical analysis in the computer department of the U.A.E. University, with help of two specialized persons, one of whom held a Ph.D in psychology from the University of Durham and had direct experience of S.P.S.S. (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) which was used in the analysis of the questionnaire data.

The questionnaire was accompanied by a personal letter from the researcher to all respondents explaining to them the purpose of the study and its importance as a part of a doctoral dissertation being conducted at the University of Warwick in the U.K. The letter also urged each of the respondents to complete the questionnaire and return it as soon as possible. The letter guaranteed the confidentiality of all information provided in the questionnaire in which the emphasis would be placed on the statistical aggregates—that is, the percentage of persons who feel one way or another about a given issue—rather than the responses of a particular individual.
The researcher administered the instrument to all subjects with the aid of staff assistants from each department. The researcher was available to respond to any questions or problems that the respondents might have encountered while completing the instrument.

B- Observation:

The second technique used for data collection in this study was observation. This method was used to test, assess and record the general reactions of respondents in certain situations. Observations were made during unscheduled visits to the respondents' departments. Furthermore, there was informal discussion regarding most of the questionnaire subjects which was very helpful to the researcher.

C- Documents and Official Records:

The third method of gathering data for this study was by investigating any official documents and records which might be helpful.

In the United Arab Emirates as in many other developing nations, the main obstacle confronting researchers and practitioners is that information is either unavailable or unreliable. Certain data is regarded as confidential and may only be obtained after lengthy procedures, while other data, especially statistical data, may be unreliable, incomplete or out of date and therefore useless.

However, for this study, all the following sources were explored in order to gather and collect as much information as possible:

1- The U.A.E. official records, including all federal ministries annual reports.
2- Local departments, including Abu-Dhabi and Ras Al Khaimah.
3- Federal agencies and semi-governmental institutions, including: Federal Civil Service Council; the Federal Personnel Department; the Federal Audit Bureau and the Institute of Administrative Development.

4- University libraries and research centres, including: the University of Warwick; University of the U.A.E; The Royal Institute of Public Administration in London and Arab Organization for Administrative Sciences in Jordan.

5- Educational facilities centres: including: the British Library; Warwick University microfilms; the Inter-library loan system and University Microfilms International in the United States.

6- Arabic and English newspapers; magazines; journals; periodical publications and international reports.

In conclusion, conducting research in the United Arab Emirates, particularly research concerns with government policy, requires various precautionary steps. The most important one is to take into account the cultural and traditional aspects of the country. To neglect this factor is to jeopardize the results of any research, whatever its quality and techniques.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER SIX

Before we designed the questionnaire many social research books and articles have been studied. Among them were:


In previous chapter, the objectives of the empirical research study were defined and the fundamental criteria and methodology which would guide the choice of research methods to be used were presented and discussed. In this chapter we will analyse the results of the research within the framework of a conceptualization comprising two basic components: 1. individual attributes and 2. work situation.

1 - Individual Attributes:

The first component of this study concerns individual attributes presented in the first part of the questionnaire and consisting of fifteen different variables: sex, age, marital status, number of children, emirate of respondent, job place, accommodation, educational level, type of education, nature of education, father's occupation, level of responsibility, length of service, occupational status and methods of recruitment.

There is no doubt that the personal attributes of employees play a significant role in an organization. They affect organization performance and productivity and in many vital ways contribute to the effectiveness of any operation. Sex, age, education, etc., are elements which can have an influence on the success or failure of any organization. Accordingly, in this chapter we will discuss the impact of these variables as far as the national federal employees of the United Arab Emirates are concerned.
Distribution of Respondents by Sex:

Of primary significance is the fact that opinions and perceptions about certain job situations differ according to sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1 presents the distribution of respondents by sex; it would appear that male respondents constitute about 59 percent (183) of the sample while female constitute 41 percent (129). The high percentage of female respondents in this survey may come as a surprise but is explained by the fact that the number of females in employment has increased rapidly since the establishment of the U.A.E. University in 1977; female graduates have now found their way into most government ministries, although initially they were concentrated mainly in the Ministry of Education as teachers. Indeed, many federal ministries have become flooded with them, and they have even risen to such high positions as assistant deputy minister, director general, head of department, etc., positions hitherto monopolized by men.

The prediction is that the number of women will increase every year due to the current shift of men from civil service jobs to jobs in the military forces which carry higher salaries and greater promise of job advancement. In fact, there is a new tendency among U.A.E. males to settle for a secondary school degree which is all they need to obtain a job in the military sector whereas their female counterparts have no choice but to go to University. For women it is the only path which will lead to a job and as a result they now outnumber their male counterparts at the University. According to Al-Qattamy, the number
of female graduates attending the U.A.E. University for the academic year 1992-93 will be 1018 (55%) while their male counterparts will number only 562 (45%).\(^{(1)}\)

**Distribution of Respondents by Age:**

Since independence in 1971, people have become aware of the importance of their date of birth. Prior to that date most people were ignorant of their exact date of birth although there were some who could recall their year of birth. A dental examination was virtually the only way of establishing an individual's age.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 and above</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2 shows that the majority of the respondents were relatively young, an overwhelming percentage (83) being aged 35 and under. This is probably attributable to the federal government policy guaranteeing all national graduates a position in the federal sector in a bid to encourage them to join this sector and thus emiratize government occupations at all administrative levels. As a result of the policy most indigenous employees are people who have grown up since independence in 1971. Those aged 35 or under in 1992 will have been 21 years old or under at independence.

In the U.A.E. especially in government sectors, there are unwritten rules defining certain kinds of jobs as being suitable for persons of particular ages and unsuitable for others. These rules are based on the ingrained idea that power and authority should increase

with age and that younger individuals should show difference to their seniors. According to social norms, the young should show respect to the old and the old should care for the young.

Distribution of Respondents by Marital Status and Number of Children:

Table 7.3
Distribution of Respondents by Marital Status and Number of Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital S.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Fre.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 and above</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 310 100.0
Total 281 100.0

Table 7.3 shows that 34 percent of the employees were single, 63 percent were married and 3 percent were divorced. The percentage of single respondents is surprisingly high for a society which encourages early marriage, bearing in mind that most sample respondents were under 26 years of age. Marriage has become an economic problem, since both males and females tend to marry later because of the financial burden associated with the preparation for marriage (such as providing a house and paying a large dowries). The implication is that most young nationals tend to postpone their marriage until they are over 26 years old. According to the researcher's experience as a member of U.A.E. society, and in keeping with other studies, the percentage of unmarried female workers is particularly high. This may be attributed to the tendency among male nationals to marry only those who work in conservative environments (i.e. environments where there is separation between men and women such as girls schools or medical institutions devoted mainly to female patients). According to Al-Jassim's study of national work-forces, although the overwhelming majority of his sample supported the idea of working women there were only

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certain jobs they considered appropriate. Predictably, the most favoured jobs by women in the U.A.E. were in the medical sector (63%) and the education sector (60%).

With respect to number of children, 38 percent of respondents have 1-3 children, 14 percent have 4-6 children, 8 percent have 7 and above and 40 percent do not have children. I am sceptical about the number of those who do not have children. It seems to me that many single respondents have answered this question.

This low rate of children among the majority of respondents may be attributed to the fact that they were still in their twenties. Another interpretation of this phenomenon could be attributed to the fact that 81 percent of them as we will see in table 7.6 have the benefit of higher education. The hypothesis is that educated people tend to pay more attention to family planning, although government policy is to encourage people to have more children by giving national employees 300 Dh.S (£43) monthly for every extra child.

Distribution of Respondents by Home Emirate, Job Location and Accommodation:

Table 7.4 Distribution of Respondents by Emirate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emirate</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu-Dhabi</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharjah</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Al Khimah</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>312</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 7.4 shows that respondents came from four different emirates: 28 percent from Ras Al Khaimah, one of the poor emirates in the federation; 27 percent from Sharjah which is the most middle class emirate in the union; 24 percent from Abu-Dhabi, the richest of the emirates; and 21 percent from Dubai, the trade centre of the United Arab Emirates.

Table 7.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Location</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Accommodation</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Emirate</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>With Parents</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Emirate</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Own House</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in fixed place</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rented House</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5 reveals that an overwhelming majority of 75 percent (235) of respondents were working in their home emirates while only 24 percent (75) of respondents were working in other emirates. This indicates a low rate of mobility among U.A.E. nationals - in other words, a preference to stay at home. This may be attributed to the element of social pressure which will be examined in detail in the next part of the chapter.

With respect to respondents accommodation, 45 percent of respondents were residing with their parents, 36 percent in their own independent houses and 15 percent in rented houses. The U.A.E. is a society in which the extended family is relatively common, therefore, it is normal to find two or three families living in one house. Because the family structure is so basic to U.A.E. culture it came as no surprise that 45.5 percent of our respondents were living with their parents and that those living in their own houses were usually near their parents if not in one block. Indeed, the government is obliged to provide each family with a piece of land to preserve family unity in accordance with the demands of society.
This is the reason why it is extremely rare to find U.A.E. nationals living in rented houses unless they are working in other emirates, and it explains the low percentage of respondents living in rented houses. It is our assumption that most of this group belong to the Northern emirates (i.e. Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah) and work in Abu-Dhabi.

**Distribution of Respondents by Education:**

Education determines and shapes the contents of men's minds. It provides the individual with the means to make sense of the world around him and helps him to frame personal expectations and aspirations. For the purposes of this research the level of respondents' education is presented in table 7.6, which indicates that the highest percentage (75 percent) have graduated from university, and the lowest percentage (1 percent) have had an elementary education. This table also shows that 81 percent of our respondents have received a university degree or higher education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>312</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In spite of efforts made to encourage vocational education there has been very limited success in meeting country's need for technically skilled manpower to supply the demands of the country's development ambitions. Regrettably, because of society's tendency to belittle technical jobs and represent them as (Aib) shameful, most national
students incline towards general education and become white-collar employees, guaranteed a stable salary, undemanding work and social prestige.

The survey results shown in table 7.7 confirm this argument: the overwhelming majority (97 percent) have graduated from general education and only a small number of respondents (3 percent) have graduated from vocational education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Education</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>309</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purposes of table 7.8, we asked the respondents this question: Do you think that your education has qualified you for your present job? And we provided them with four options, *very well, *fairly well, *not very well and *not very well at all.

Table 7.8 shows that only 17 percent of respondents thought that their education had qualified them very well for their present jobs. The majority, 48 percent, believed that their education had prepared them fairly well, 19 percent considered themselves not very well prepared and finally 16 percent claimed that their education had not prepared them very well at all.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Effectiveness</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very well</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly well</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very well</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very well at all</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>311</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Distribution of Respondents by Father's Occupation:**

There is no doubt that his or her father's occupation has a significant effect on a respondent's future occupation. Indeed, research shows that most people tend to follow their father's occupation.

**Table 7.9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Male Percent</th>
<th>Female Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business Men</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Emp</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passed away</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in table 7.9, the majority of female respondents' fathers (29 percent) had passed away (a high percentage of the total number of females who answered this question) and 19 percent of their fathers were retired (in comparison to 15 percent of male respondents' fathers.) This suggests that the absence of male parents, combined with financial pressures, have forced females to accept jobs like administrators, accountants and the like in which they have to deal and interact either with male colleagues or male clients, something which is regarded in U.A.E. society as a revolt against social values and traditions.

30 percent of male respondents' fathers were businessmen, in contrast to 24 percent of female respondents' fathers, and 3 percent of male respondents' fathers were in the armed forces as opposed to 5 percent of female respondents' fathers.
Finally 5 percent of male fathers and one percent of female fathers were farmers. The low percentage of farmers may be attributed to the advent of the oil era which has turned most U.A.E. nationals into white-collar employees or businessmen and has devalued vocational jobs like farming, fishing, etc. According to the table the father of only one female respondent was a farmer, and this may be because the farming community is so much more conservative than sectors like the business community which is more liberal.

**Distribution of Respondents by Level of Responsibility:**

Among the many bases upon which occupations may be grouped are those of skill requirement, level of education and training possessed, salary category or on degree of social responsibility. For the purposes of this study respondents have been classified into five categories: assistant deputy ministers, general managers, heads of departments, heads of units and administrative clerks. Respondents were asked to state their occupational status and their present administrative grades, then the researcher classified them in accordance with the U.A.E. administrative cadre. It should be realized that the main objective is to determine the difference between those in high ranking jobs and those in low status jobs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistant D.M.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Manager</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Dept</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Unit</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Clerk</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>306</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.10
Distribution of Respondents by Level of Responsibility
Table 7.10 presents our respondents' level of responsibility. It appears that an overwhelming 35 percent were heads of units and this must be attributed to the government policy of emiratizing or localizing most administrative levels, and also to the civil service regulation that all U.A.E. graduates must be recruited as heads of units and above; this has resulted in grade inflation at the higher administrative levels and shortage of qualified manpower at the lower levels, in other words, an administrative hierarchy inflated at the top and shrunk at the bottom.

The table shows that 34 percent were in low level positions (e.g. clerks, secretaries, etc), 21 percent were heads of departments, 9 percent were general managers and only 1 percent were assistant deputy ministers.

This sample was considered representative of the type and range of employment existing in the U.A.E. federal ministries. Although administrative employees were over-represented in our sample, this is not considered seriously to have prejudiced the findings; indeed this helps to support the validity of the study since their responses reflect how most federal civil servants feel about their jobs. Another positive factor was the willingness and ability of this group to participate in the study without jeopardizing their positions since their positions were not regarded in any sense politically sensitive. In contrast to other groups in this study (e.g. assistant deputy ministers, etc,) those who have been appointed because of their family status into the low administrative group are usually ordinary citizens and their recruitment is based on the educational degree they hold.

**Distribution of Respondents by Length of Service:**

The data concerning the job tenure of respondents in the federal sector is presented in table 7.11. This table presents the number of years respondents had been working in federal government.
Table 7.11
Distribution of Respondents by Working Years in F. Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Service</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 Years</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 Years</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 Years</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 Years</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20 Years</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results indicate that an overwhelming 33 percent of respondents had been employed for between 1-2 years and the lowest percentage 11 percent, had been employed for between 6-10 years; 21 percent had worked for between 3-5 years and 14 percent had worked for more than 16 years. This indicates that 54 percent of respondents had spent less than six years in their jobs and this would be consistent with the findings of table 7.2 in which an overwhelming 84 percent of respondents were 35 years old or under. It also appears from the job tenure findings that 46 percent of respondents had been working in federal government for 6 years and above.

Distribution of Respondents by Recruitment Methods:

The method of recruitment to the federal sector is extremely centralized. An applicant must first submit his application to the Federal Personnel Department which will send it to the Federal Council of Civil Service which in turn has to obtain the approval of the Ministry of Finance before proceeding with the application. Although the Civil Service Law in its provision No. 13 has stated that jobs must be advertised and qualifications required and conditions of employment clearly laid out, (4) graduate nationals and many others are often appointed to civil service jobs which have never been advertised.

4 - The U.A.E. Civil Service Law, ( Provision 13,1978 ).
In order to identify the most frequent method of recruitment within the U.A.E.'s federal sector, we asked the respondents to tell us how they came to be appointed to their present jobs.

Table 7.12
Distribution of Respondents by Recruitment Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment Method</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Through the Civil Service</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through the Ministry</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through Advertisement</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through Personal Contact</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>312</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results indicate that an overwhelming 52 percent of respondents have obtained their jobs through the Federal Civil Service and this finding is in keeping with the previous observation that recruitment in the U.A.E. is extremely centralized and under the direct control of the federal apparatus. Those recruited through advertisement were as low as 2 percent, which supported our hypothesis about the uselessness of provision 13 in the Civil Service Law. 52 percent of respondents have claimed that their recruitment was through personal contact (i.e. favouritism, nepotism, etc). This percentage seems quite low, but, from my own knowledge and complaints published in the U.A.E. local press, I suspect that personal contact is the hidden hand behind most recruitment.

There are many cases in which one of two graduates with the same degree and the same grade, was recruited immediately after graduation while the other waited more than a year. The nature of personal contact determines the type and location of a graduate's future job.
2. **Work Situation:**

The second component of this study concerns the work situation. The work situation was dealt with in the second part of the questionnaire. The various aspects of the work situation have a crucial bearing on employees' attitudes and perceptions and for the purposes of this study we grouped the responses under five main subtitles:

1. Role conflict: familial v. occupational obligation.
2. Familial role and job attitude.
3. Occupational commitment.
4. Concentration of authority
5. Job discrimination and favouritism

**Role Conflict: Familial v. Occupational Obligation:**

Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn have suggested in their well known book *The Social Psychology of Organizations* that for an organization to be effective the employees must conform to certain patterns of behaviour. Primarily, skilled personnel must be encouraged to stay within the organization and perform its essential tasks. Second, it must be possible to depend upon personnel reaching some minimal level of quantity and quality in role performance. Third, attention must be paid to those actions which are not explicitly specified by role description but which lead to the achievement of organizational goals. In other words, the success of an organization is contingent upon the individual's readiness to extend himself beyond his routine assignments in the interests of the achievement of organizational goals.\(^5\)

Many scholars in the field of development administration argue that behavioural requirements for organizational effectiveness vary according to context, since every

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organization is linked to its socio-cultural environment. R. Price, explains how the integration of an organization with its environment may contribute to the accomplishment of organizational goals. He argues that,

"Integration implies the absence of role conflict in the relationship between organizational and extraorganizational role-sets. Integration can be said to exist when the social pressure on members from role-sets external to the organization does not impinge on their carrying out of organizationally prescribed roles."(6)

The basic unit in United Arab Emirates society is the family, not the individual. In a small, ethnically homogeneous society such as the U.A.E., where everyone is related to everyone else, family becomes the essential element of the society. In such a society, where you belong is more important than what you may contribute to the society. The rise of someone to a high ranking position is more likely to be based on family connections than on qualifications.

The main difference between U.A.E. society and Western societies is that the former is organized on the basis of corporate groups with all functions residing in those groups, whereas in western societies individuals play a major role.

"Society is perceived by its members as a collectivity of groups; individuals are viewed as extensions of their corporate groups-they have no autonomous existence and identity outside of their group membership."(7)

Stressing the same point, Blunt and others argue that:

"The norms and standards of behaviour required by formal organizational roles will be violated in order that preference can

be given to the particularistic obligations associated with social or traditional role pressures and role expectations."(8)

Based on this argument, the appointment of an individual to a high office in government, means an increase in the importance of his family or his tribe ("incorporate group") as a whole, not of himself alone. Therefore, many essential posts in the U.A.E. are given to individuals not because they are qualified for these posts but because of their familial backgrounds, or as a reward to their families for their services at a certain period of time to the ruling families.

In order to identify the respondents' perceptions of the pressure of the familial role, their affiliation with it, and how they would react if they had to choose between the interests of their job and family obligations. (In other words, how would deal with a situation involving potential conflict between family and career) the researcher presented respondents with imaginary situations which obliged them to tackle these role conflict problems. The imaginary situations were designed in a scenario fashion. The first scenario was called "office scenario". Respondents were asked to suppose that Ahmed is a federal civil servant working in his home emirate (X). He is officially informed that he is to be transferred to emirate (Y). His family, relatives and friends are in emirate (X), and he is looking after his aged father who is too old to move away. For the reasons mentioned he does not wish to be transferred. So he goes to the head of his department, who happens to be his cousin, and asks to be kept in his home emirate.(9)

Respondents were asked three critical questions. The first, do you think that there is an obligation on the head of department to help his relative in this situation? Second, do you think that the head of department's relatives would expect him to cancel the transfer and

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9 - The Transfer and Office Scenarios are Modified Versions of Items Used by, Robert Price, Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana, Berkely, University of California Press, 1975.
keep Ahmed in his home emirate? Third, what will the head of the department's relatives think of him if he refuses to help his cousin? They will think that:

A- he is following the job's rules and regulations.
B- he is being disloyal to his family.
C- he is being unfair.
D- other..........................

The purpose of this imaginary situation is to determine which of the respondent's roles family or organizational role, will prevail. If he is in favour of the family role ("keep his cousin in his emirate") he will display particularistic behaviour in which he will give top priority to his family role. If he sees that it is his role to abide by organizational demands and transfer "Ahmed" he will be displaying universalistic behaviour.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic (cancel his transfer)</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalistic (refuse to cancel)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from table 7.13 that an overwhelming majority of 67 percent of respondents expected the head of the department to assist Ahmed and cancel his transfer. They expected the cousin to resolve the conflict in a particularistic way, in which priority must be given to family interests even if they conflict with occupational roles. Only 33 percent of respondents expected the head of department to give preference to his organization, in other words, to follow a universalistic way of thinking.
This imaginary situation was presented in the questionnaire as a hypothetical case, but in reality it happens very frequently in the U.A.E. bureaucracy. It is very common among nationals to approach their high ranking officials to assist them either to stay in their home emirate or if they have been working in another emirate, to be transferred back to their home emirate.

The next question was designed to identify the expectation of the head of the department's relatives. Would they expect him to assist his cousin and, consequently, cancel the transfer or would they expect him to refuse to help? Would the surrounding environment help the head of the department to be universalistic or particularistic?

Table 7.14
Distribution of Respondents by the Head of Department Relatives Expectation. (Transfer Scenario)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relatives Expectation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic (cancel the transfer)</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalistic (refuse to cancel)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.14 shows that an overwhelming majority of 79 percent of respondents agree that the relatives would expect the head of the department to cancel the transfer and arrange to abandon the official decision to transfer his cousin. And those who think that the relatives would expect the head of the department to give priority to the organizational role were only 21 percent. The majority believed that the relatives' expectations would be in favour of arranging to violate the official decision. What if the head of the department violates the expectation of his family and refuses to help his cousin? Would they understand his position? What consequences or sanction would follow in the event of his violating family expectations? The third question attempted to find answers to all these propositions.
Therefore, we asked respondents what will the head of the department's relatives think of him if he refuses to help his cousin?

Table 7.15
Distribution of Respondents by Consequences the Head of the Department may face if he Refuses to Help.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consequences</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>He is disloyal to the family</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He is unfair</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He is following the job's rules</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>307</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from table 7.15 that almost 50 percent of the respondents felt that the refusal of the head of the department to help his cousin would be interpreted by his family members as an act against the family as a whole not only against Ahmed. Therefore, 25 percent interpreted his decision as the type of disloyalty which by the standards of U.A.E. society constitutes a real threat to the solidarity of the family, and as such must be punished. The most common punishment in such a case would be sanction and boycott which would mean no contact between him and his family members, a painful deprivation in a society based on social solidarity. Another sort of punishment could be a campaign of vilification waged by family members and denouncing him publicly as being guilty of socially unacceptable behaviour. In the words of David Baley,

"The man who uses his official position to obtain jobs for his relatives is not considered immoral: in traditional terms, he is only doing what every loyal member of an extended family is expected to do. He would be censured if he did not act in this way."

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It cannot be emphasized enough that in U.A.E. society priority is given first to the family, second to the tribe and third to the state. If we go back to table 7.15 we find that 24 percent of respondents believed that the head of the department would be perceived by his family members as unfair and selfish if he sacrificed his cousin's welfare for organizational interest.

During my field work I was approached by a U.A.E. national who felt that his cousin, who occupied a high federal position, was selfish, because he had refused to promote him when he and his parents had expressly asked him for this favour; indeed, his cousin seemed to have no respect for his elderly uncle who had visited him at his house, and was positively anti-family. The fact that table 7.15 shows also 44 percent of respondents think that members of the family would understand the cousin's loyalty to his organizational role following his job's rules suggests that privately some respondents disapprove of the traditional methods but are pressurized by society into accepting them.

What may be inferred from the findings of the transfer scenario is that in general U.A.E. people decline to recognize the administrative obligations of the head of the department. They are primarily interested in familial obligations and pay minimal attention to the civil servant's role within his organization. That was the main finding of the transfer scenario. Let's now examine other variables in this study and see whether they have any effect on the respondents' perceptions within the transfer scenario. These variables are the respondent's origin (the emirate) education level, length of service and age.

The relationship between respondents' emirates and their perception of the transfer scenario:

Those who participated in this study, as we have mentioned come from four main emirates (i.e. Abu-Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah) and have very different economic backgrounds; for instance, those who belong to Abu-Dhabi and Dubai are
supposed to be richer and more exposed to modern lifestyles, in contrast to those from Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah.

Table 7.16
The Relationship Between Respondents' Emirates and Their Perception of the Transfer Scenario.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict resolution</th>
<th>Abu-Dhabi</th>
<th>Dubai</th>
<th>Sharjah</th>
<th>R.A.K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Help his cousin</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse to help</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% N=74</td>
<td>100% N=65</td>
<td>100% N=81</td>
<td>100% N=87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears from table 7.16 that economic background and exposure to modern lifestyles have only a limited effect on respondents' behaviour. There was a wide range of differences between the answers of all the respondents; the overwhelming consensus was that the head of the department should yield to the demands of his family and help his cousin to stay in his emirate.

The relationship between respondents' education levels and their view of the transfer scenario:

The likelihood here was that those with a university education would be more likely to resist familial pressures than colleagues with only a limited education. It is our contention, however, that those who have graduated from university are more likely to be open-minded and, accordingly, will be more tolerant of familial expectations.
Table 7.17 shows that the level of the respondents' education had only a marginal effect on the weight that U.A.E. employees gave to organizational roles. The preponderant view at all educational levels was that employees should put their familial role before their organizational role. There was no difference of opinion between those who had a higher education and those who had a limited one, they were all in favour of the particularistic approach in solving the transfer scenario.

The relationship between respondents' length of service and the transfer scenario:

The proposition is that the longer an employee stays in an organization the more he becomes committed to its rules and regulations. In other words, there is a positive relationship between length of service and employees' commitment to their organizations in that the latter grows with time.
Table 7.18 illustrates that an employee's length of service has a significant effect on his perception of the transfer scenario; those with 1-10 years' experience overwhelmingly (75 percent) indicated that familial obligations should prevail over the organizational role, while only (25 percent) believed that employees should not yield to family pressures. On the other hand, those with 11 years' experience and over were less enthusiastic to apply the particularistic pattern. Respondents in this group divided more or less equally between the particularistic and universalistic pattern but this may be because of the nature of the relationship between an employee and his job: he enters the organization with high expectations and tremendous enthusiasm but before long, thanks to bureaucratic rigidity, the employee is left with feelings of disappointment, frustration and dissatisfaction. In other words, the indigenous new employees enter the organization with high expectations, eager to gain higher positions in a short time; when they fail to do so, their attitude towards the job changes and the shift gradually affects their performance. Accordingly, the employee's commitment to his job begins to weaken and instead he will start to search for another way to achieve his ambitions and in the process seek to strengthen his relationship with his family who will be his last chance. On the other hand, long service categories display high levels of commitment because of job security, which has long been perceived as an important benefit of government jobs. The longer the employee stays in the organization the more he becomes committed to its environment and the more it becomes
difficult to break its rules and regulations. This finding is entirely consistent with our proposition that there is a positive relationship between length of service and employees' commitment to their organizations.

Yet another explanation may lie in the satisfaction aspect of their jobs. In other words, those with longer periods of service in their departments tend to be more satisfied with their overall job experience than those with shorter lengths of service.

Moreover, the presence of an individual within the organization for any length of time will inevitably result in interaction with others and pressure to become a major participant in the process of social organization. Therefore, they may create new interpersonal relationships within the confines of their organization and became more involved and attached to other organization members and their culture. Over a period, they undergo a change and their behaviour and attitudes are no longer what they were when they were relatively new in the organization. The longer they stay in the organization the more the organizational culture influences their attitudes, and, the more they become attached to the organization's rules and regulations.\(^{11}\)

To return to table 7.18, we find the longer respondents stay in the organization the more they conform to the universalistic pattern. In other words, we found that there was a positive relationship between the length of service and employees' commitment to their organization rules and regulations.

Chapter seven

The relationship between the Age of the respondents and their views of the transfer scenario:

Age often plays a key role in the evaluation and treatment of a particular situation. Whereas young people are in general emotional, old people tend to be more rational and thus their responses to a particular situation are likely to differ. According to Wright and Hamilton, as the employee ages he becomes more accepting and less dissatisfied.\(^{(12)}\) Hence, the older the employee gets the more committed to the organization he becomes. This age-commitment relationship may be the result of the employee’s adjustment to the increasingly slim chances of his finding alternative employment. Alternatively, it may be that the employee’s expectations alter with maturity.

In this light, it is our contention that young employees are more inclined to apply a particularistic approach than their older colleagues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.19</th>
<th>The Relationship Between the Age of the Respondents and their Perception of the Transfer Scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help his cousin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse to help</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.19 illustrates that an employee’s age has a very limited effect on his view of the transfer scenario. The preponderant view of all ages was that familial obligation should prevail over the organizational role. There was no difference of opinion between young employees and their older colleagues. There were all equal in favouring the particularistic

approach. This finding reveals that the effect of the age variable on the perceptions of U.A.E. indigenous employees on the transfer scenario is only marginal. The overwhelming consensus was that the head of the department should yield to the demands of his family and look after his cousin's interests and help him to stay in his emirate.

In order to confirm the findings of the transfer scenario the researcher has provided the respondents with another imaginary situation and asked them questions about it. The second imaginary situation was presented as following: Suppose Salim arrives at his office one morning and finds many people waiting to meet him regarding routine business. One of these people is his relative. How should Salim deal with this situation: should he give priority to his relative or should he treat him the same as the others, according to the 'first come, first served' rule? The purpose of this question was to identify which of his roles would prevail in this situation, his organizational role or his familial role.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Priority to his relative</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First come, first served</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>310</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.20 clearly indicates that an overwhelming 88 percent of respondents considered that Salim should not give priority to his relative who should be treated the same as the others, according to the first come, first served rule. In other words, they were in favour of the universalistic pattern in dealing with such situation. They believed it fair to apply the universalistic pattern in this situation.

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However, when we asked them how the average U.A.E. employee would actually react in this situation, their responses shifted 180 degrees toward the particularistic pattern. As we have mentioned in chapter six, respondents were not asked to state explicitly how they themselves would handle the proposed situations, instead they were asked their opinion as to what an average U.A.E. employee would do, in other words, what they would expect and accept to be the normal reaction faced with such a situation.

Table 7.21
Distribution of Respondents by their Responses as to what the Average U.A.E. Employee would Actually do in the Office Scenario.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Priority to the relative</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First come, first served</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.21 shows that what the respondents believed was totally different from what in reality was likely to occur. The majority of respondents (77 percent) believed that the average U.A.E. employee confronted with such a situation would give priority to his family role. In other words, his familial role would be given top priority, since he knows in advance what the consequences might be if he yields to the organizational role. A minority of only 23 percent believed that the average U.A.E. employee would actually act in a universalistic manner by giving priority to the organizational role.

To investigate the role expectations of the relative we asked the respondents what they thought the relative would expect from Salim?
Chapter seven

Table 7.22
Distribution of Respondents by the Relative's Expectation in the Office Scenario.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative's Expectation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be seen before the others</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be seen after the others</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>295</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As may be seen from table 7.22, almost 88 percent of respondents believed that the relative would expect to be seen first since he would expect particularistic treatment giving him priority as a family member over all others. In short, he would expect preferential treatment from a kinsman. The finding suggests that disappointing the relative's expectations is viewed as a costly action, something the U.A.E. civil servant cannot handle. It suggests that most U.A.E. civil servants are unwilling to take the chance, because the consequences are socially severe. Even those who are supposed to be agents of change in their jobs (i.e. graduate nationals) are bound to the familial obligations like everyone else.

Table 7.23
The Relationship Between Respondents' Education Level and their View of the Office Scenario.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict resolution Intermed &amp; below Secondary Univers. Post gra.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% N=22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% N=29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% N=234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% N=17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As table 7.23, shows, degree of education made no difference. Respondents all agreed that the familial pressure on the U.A.E. civil servant would be so tremendous he would be bound to yield to it, although, among themselves, they did not consider this to be right.

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Table 7.24
The Relationship Between Respondents' Occupational Levels and their View of the Office Scenario.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict resolution</th>
<th>High Officials</th>
<th>Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalistic</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% N= 88</td>
<td>100% N= 202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Chi Square = 11.173, for p < 0.001.

Table 7.24 shows that occupational rank has a significant effect on the weight an indigenous U.A.E. employee is likely to give to his organizational role. The finding suggests that the further down we go in the administrative hierarchy the more the employees incline to apply the particularistic approach. For instance, 35 percent of high-ranking officials were in favour of the universalistic solution of the office scenario, whereas only 17 percent of ordinary employees inclined towards the universalistic approach. In the other hand, 83 percent of employees inclined to yield to familial pressure and believed that priority should be given to the particularistic solution, whereas 65 percent of high officials were of that opinion.

The question to be answered here is why are those in top administrative positions more in favour of the universalistic approach than those at lower levels? The answer to this question is twofold:

First, those with high administrative rank are under tremendous pressure both from their superiors and the public to show the fairness of their treatment; moreover, due to the nature of their positions, they are the focus of public attention (e.g. daily newspapers, the Federal National Council which may investigate any unlawful act in the government, etc.) and have to be more careful in their use of the particularistic pattern than more junior employees. In contrast, to show the importance of their positions to their relatives low-ranking employees
are more willing to break the rules of their organization in order to gain prestige in the eyes of their relatives.

In conclusion we would argue that the effectiveness of any bureaucracy is linked with the effectiveness of the surrounding variables; if these variables are supportive and encouraging to the organization's goals the administrative outcome will be fruitful and meaningful. The data presented in this part of the chapter indicates that the most powerful variable influencing the behaviour of the U.A.E. civil servant is the family. The most striking finding of our study is that familial obligations and expectations have priority among U.A.E. civil servants. Most of them decline to recognize the civil servant's role within his organization. Furthermore, we found that regional and educational backgrounds had only a limited effect on the respondents' attitudes in comparison.

**Familial Role and Job Attitudes:**

Many studies of developing countries emphasize the importance of the public bureaucracy in realizing the development plans of these countries. Success in meeting the challenges of development is heavily dependent on effective administration in government. Therefore, a high quality civil service is necessary at all levels of government for efficient, productive operation. Furthermore, if the public bureaucracy is to undertake this crucial developmental role successfully, its members must be equipped with the necessary skills and talents.

We would argue that one of the qualities most essential for the United Arab Emirates civil servants to acquire is a willingness to relocate to any part of the country in order to fulfill a job's requirements. It is extremely difficult for a bureaucracy to implement its development plans if its members are either hesitant to take initiatives or unwilling to move to certain areas where their skills and experience are most needed.
To capture these administrative attitudes we presented the respondents with two questions. First we asked them which of the following, given the choice, they would prefer:

* a job with high salary away from relatives and family or
* a job with adequate salary near relatives and family.\(^{(13)}\)

Obviously the question contained a potentially serious role conflict. Selecting one meant sacrificing certain interests.

The purpose of this question was twofold: first, to determine United Arab Emirates civil servants' willingness to relocate geographically in areas where their skills are most needed when doing so means a choice between monetary incentive (high salary) and social stability (near relatives and family); second, to assess their willingness to take initiatives and thereby determine their degree of ambition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternatives</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A job with high salary away from family</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A job with adequate salary near family</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>310</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.25 shows that the overwhelming majority of 84 percent of respondents preferred a job with adequate salary near their family and relatives, whereas only 16 percent preferred a job with a high salary away from family and relatives.

These are findings which may shed light on the administrative imbalance in the U.A.E.; in other words, they may help us find out the reason why there is a concentration of national graduates in certain emirates while other emirates suffer from severe lack of indigenous graduates. This situation is most pronounced in Abu-Dhabi where the federal apparatus suffers from a lack of national workers, partly because of the shortage of indigenous graduates and partly because of workers employment in the local government apparatus where allowances and advancement are much better than in the federal sector; therefore, federal positions have been left to neutral citizens (i.e. originally from Yemen and Iran) and Arab workers. In contrast, in Dubai, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah, most workers in federal positions are nationals. Although chances of promotion and advancement are extremely limited, most graduates prefer not to leave their family and relatives simply for the sake of monetary incentives. Based on our experience, we found that many national graduates choose to work in their home emirates although over-qualified for the jobs they do; we found that many with degrees in law, politics, administration, etc, prefer to work as teachers in their home emirates rather than move to other emirates and get more appropriate jobs.

Female workers have logical reasons not to move to other emirates for the purposes of work. It is, in fact, in conflict with U.A.E., tradition for women to live away from their parents and family. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of them (109 of 127) said they preferred a job with an adequate salary in their home emirate; only 17 of them said they would prefer a high salary job in an other emirate.

Indeed, a high salary (monetary incentive) is rarely a sufficient inducement to respondents to move away from their extended families. In view of this we offered a non-financial motive (high authority) instead and attempted to assess their responses. We asked them to choose between a job with high authority and considerable responsibility in another emirate or a job with moderate authority and medium responsibility in their home emirate.
Table 7.26
The Distribution of Respondents by their Attitudes towards relocation away from their own Emirates (Non-financial Motive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A job with high authority in another emirate</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A job with moderate authority in home emirate</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>308</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.26 shows that even the non-financial motive (prestige) failed to convince the majority of respondents to move away from their extended family, despite the high authority, status and responsibility available to them in another location of U.A.E. An overwhelming 225 (73 percent) of respondents were satisfied with the limited authority and responsibility to be found near their family and relatives; only 83 (27 percent) of respondents were prepared to move to another emirate if they would be provided with increased authority and responsibility.

Having identified the negative attitudes of the U.A.E.'s indigenous workers toward relocation to other emirates, we intend in this stage to examine the extent of the influence of the respondents' educational levels on their views on this subject. In other words, do those with a higher education differ in their responses from those who have only limited education? Are educated graduates willing to relocate in another emirate where their skills are needed? If their reactions to the relocation question differ positively from their less educated colleagues and peers, we would argue that there is a process of change in the right direction and its only a matter of time before it reaches its targets. But, if their attitudes are almost the same as those of their colleagues' then the outlook for U.A.E. development ambitions is indeed cloudy and gloomy.

The analysis of our data indicates that the attitudes of educated respondents are not significantly different from those of respondents with less education; they all preferred a job.
with an adequate salary in their home emirate to any other job. 202 (63 percent) graduates out of 241 expressed a preference for a job in their home emirate with adequate payment; only 39 graduates were prepared to move to another emirate if they offered a job with a high enough salary.

After these findings, the question to be answered here is why are so few employees willing to move to other areas when serious motivation is provided for them. Why, for instance, do Ras Al Khaimah graduates prefer to work in their emirate knowing in advance their career future is gloomy and vague. The answer to this question lies in that familial pressure which prevents them from relocating to other positions. Their responses reflect their loyalty to their families and relatives. Accordingly, to move away from a family would question an individual's loyalty to his family.

Bearing in mind that the weekend in the U.A.E. consists of only one day, Friday, in these circumstances, those who work in other emirates find it hard to travel, perhaps driving for 3 hours only to spend one night in their emirate. Consequently, those working in another emirate, particularly in Abu-Dhabi, tend to settle over there and to visit their home emirate only rarely.

In conclusion, we would argue that until the attitudes of the United Arab Emirates civil servants change the administrative imbalance will remain: Abu-Dhabis' federal sector will suffer a shortage of indigenous workers in contrast to other emirates which suffer an administrative inflation caused by the refusal of graduates to relocate away from their home emirates. As long as this situation prevails, foreign workers are the cheapest substitute for U.A.E nationals and essential careers in rural areas and in other cities remain in their hands.

Occupational Commitment and Effectiveness:

Commitment to occupation or organization is seen by many scholars as a major component of organizational effectiveness in achieving goals and objectives. If members
are committed to the organization they are more likely to be high performers and, therefore, their level of satisfaction will increase. Committed members are those who stay in the organization and urge others to join them, they are reluctant to leave their careers and finally they identify themselves with the organizational goals.\(^{(14)}\)

Organizational commitment is present when people display these spontaneous behaviours:

1- a strong belief and acceptance in the organization's objectives.
2- willingness to take on organizational duties.
3- a definite wish to maintain membership of the organization.\(^{(15)}\)
4- a definite desire and expectation in terms of:

"Enactment of the role and the self identification emerging from the enactment."\(^{(16)}\)

Blau and Boal, argue that there are two different approaches to be taken into account in defining organizational commitment. The first approach views organizational commitment as behaviour, while the second perceives it as attitude. In the case of the former, those committed to an organization see the organization in a calculative manner, in other words they stay because they consider it would be too costly for them to leave the organization. In contrast, individuals who adopt of the attitudinal approach identify themselves with the goals and missions of the organization and desire to keep and maintain their membership of the organization in order to achieve its goals; the organization goals become their goals and their targets coincide with the organization's targets.\(^{(17)}\)

To assess the level and extent of the United Arab Emirates civil servants' commitment to their federal role and their jobs within it, we presented the respondents with this situation: Suppose a young graduate asked you to advise him on his career; what sort of a career would you most strongly recommend him to pursue? We provided them with 6 options to select from:

1. local government career
2. federal government (ministries)
3. armed forces
4. public corporations (central bank, emirates telecommunications, etc.)
5. banks
6. other private sectors
7. others

Obviously, those with a high level of commitment would definitely recommend a young graduate to join their ministries (federal sector), and in contrast, those with limited commitment to jobs would recommend other careers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal government</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public corporations</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>308</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.27 shows the percentage breakdown of the careers spontaneously recommended by the respondents. The figures show that federal government careers came third. Twenty-four percent of respondents recommended the federal civil service for the
graduate. Public corporations were the first choice for respondents; 29 percent of them believed that positions in public corporations are the most highly favoured jobs in the U.A.E. This might be attributed to the independent status these corporations have within the U.A.E. administrative structure. These corporations manage to provide services in a less bureaucratic way and are therefore regarded by society as the most modern sector, and one in which personnel policy and administrative structure differ totally from both federal or local patterns.

The armed forces come immediately after public corporations; 25 percent of respondents would recommend this sector to a young national graduate. This may be attributed to the recognition of the importance of the armed forces after the second Gulf Crisis in which the Gulf countries failed to defend themselves without assistance from Western troops. Indeed, immediately after the war was over the government began to encourage nationals to join the armed forces. Recruitment policy to this sector was eased to include all segments of the society, before it had been limited to certain categories of people. Salaries were increased and many military schools and colleges were established in an effort to persuade national people to join this sector.

Local government jobs were among the least recommended careers. Only 16 percent of respondents would suggest local government careers for the new graduate. It comes as no surprise that the small proportion from Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah would prefer not to work in local government jobs because of low salary and allowances added to lack of security.

It is clear from table 7.27 that the least popular careers are those in the banking sector. Only 2 of the 308 respondents (1 percent) spontaneously recommended the banks as a career. The reason most respondents are so against the idea of working in banks may be because it is in the nature of banks to be based on interest as their main source of income. Muslim scholars overwhelmingly forbid working in banks because they are
against the teaching of Islam. Consequently, most people refrain from doing so leaving the jobs for foreign workers. Other factors which may deter nationals from working in banks may be the working hours (there are two working periods, morning and afternoon), the low salaries and the lack of job security.

Private sector careers are also among the least recommended careers in the U.A.E. Of the 308 respondents only 7 (2 percent) recommended the private sector as a career. Although most U.A.E. nationals are usually involved in one way or another in business, we found they are rarely interested in full-time jobs in the private sector, again because of lack of security and low remuneration in comparison with government jobs. Moreover, the private sector itself is not interested in national workers but prefers foreign workers because they are less expensive and to some extent more experienced than nationals. The government has failed many times to force the private sector to accept new graduates and to increase their salaries in line with the government sector. The failure of government to act in this matter may be due to the influence of merchants who are at pains to defend their interests. Bear in mind that most members of the U.A.E. federal cabinet are businessmen before they are federal ministers.

Throughout this study we have argued that social and cultural factors play a significant role in determining the attitudes and behaviour of respondents towards given situations. Accordingly, in the following paragraphs, we will try to shed some light on how the foregoing factors have affected the attitudes of respondents toward their job commitments. In other words, does a respondents' answer to the careers recommendation depend on which emirate he comes from? Did the recommendation of those from Abu-Dhabi for instance, differ from those from Ras Al Khaimah? Our survey data provided some supporting evidence for this proposition.
Table 7.28
The Relationship Between Career Recommendation and Emirate of Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Abu-Dhabi</th>
<th>Dubai</th>
<th>Sharjah</th>
<th>Ras Al Khaimah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Govern.</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Govern.</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public corp.</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 100% N=73 100% N=64 100% N=83 100% N=88

Table 7.28 clearly shows that a large percentage number of respondents from Abu-Dhabi (38 percent) recommended local government as a career for a young graduate, as against 30 percent respondents of Dubai and only 3 percent of respondents from Ras Al Khaimah and a mere 1 percent of respondents from Sharjah. This table showed that the least desirable career as far as respondents from Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah were concerned was one in local government and that must be attributed to the lack of proper job security in addition to low salary and allowance. Table 7.28 also indicates that those from Abu-Dhabi are far less committed (only 11 percent) to the federal government jobs than are their counterparts from the remaining emirates. The question to be answered here is why respondents from Abu-Dhabi and Dubai recommend local government jobs? The answer may be due to that they have administrative systems which are on a par with- if not better off than the federal system in promotions, salaries and allowances and in addition offer proximity to family and relatives.

It appears that the people most committed to the federal jobs are from Sharjah (38 percent).
The most striking finding of this table is that a large number of respondents from Ras Al Khaimah (43 percent) and Sharjah (30 percent) recommended the armed forces as a career. Obviously, the reason may be attributed to financial necessity combined with lack of other career opportunities in their home emirate; in these circumstances, the armed forces are the obvious choice. Furthermore, only 10 percent respondents from Dubai recommended armed forces as an career for young graduate. This may be attributed to the abundance of work opportunities in Dubai which provide Dubai's young graduates with variety of civilian jobs. In addition to the high living standard of many Dubai's people in comparison with those from Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah.

To discover why respondents have recommended certain jobs in particular, we simply asked them what governed their choice. Was it high salary, social status, job security or opportunity for job advancement?

Table 7.29
Reasons why Respondents recommended Certain Careers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Salary</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Status</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Security</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Advancement</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>304</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.29 shows a large percentage (32 percent) of respondents believed that the most essential reason for selecting certain careers is job advancement, in other words, the opportunity afforded equally to every employee to advance within the organization. This finding in fact, reveals how desperate U.A.E. employees are for promotion and job advancement. It also, reveals how frustrated federal civil servants are with the dead-end employment situation, in which promotion has been frozen since 1986 after the collapse of oil prices and the repercussions of the Iran-Iraq War. From this it follows that job
advancement would be regarded by the majority of respondents as the most important consideration when recommending a career for a new graduate.

Job security is regarded as the second most important factor when selecting a career in the U.A.E.; indeed, 30 percent of respondents gave it highest priority. This finding explains why the private sector and the banks were the least wanted careers in the country, lacking as they do adequate job security. It also indicates why federal government careers' which carry a certain guaranteed degree of security, occupy third place. The preoccupation of many respondents with the security aspects may be attributed to their economic backgrounds; their fathers' occupations suggest that almost 78 percent of them belong to that level of society whose members are totally dependent on their salaries. Therefore, postponement of salary or loss of employment would have severe effects on them and on their families.

A high salary was chosen by 23 percent of respondents as a basis for selecting a career in the U.A.E., while only 7 percent believed that social status has to be taken into account when choosing a career. This finding is in fact inconsistent with the assumption that U.A.E. nationals are always looking for prestigious jobs and place high value on social status when it comes to employment.

We found that respondents chose certain careers on the basis of three main criteria: the most fundamental was availability of job advancement, secondly was job security and finally came remuneration.

Let us now examine what the respondents most like about their current jobs. We provided them with these options. Do they like their jobs because they provide them with the opportunity to be near their families and relatives? Do they like their jobs because they are socially prestigious? Do they like their jobs because they provide them with security? The fourth option asked whether they were primarily concerned with monetary reward,
Chapter seven

while the last was an open ended option. The purpose of providing this option was to give respondents the opportunity to mention other aspects they liked about their jobs. For instance, they may mention that their jobs give them a good opportunity to serve their people and their country.

Table 7.30
What the Respondents Like Most about their Current Jobs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The most valued aspects</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Near family and home</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job security</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social status</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High salary</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly table 7.30 reveals that a large percentage of 41 percent of respondents believe that closeness to their families is the greatest advantage of their jobs. In fact, this result is consistent with the findings of the foregoing analysis of the familial role and job attitudes, (see page 248). On the other hand, 31 percent of respondents perceived job security as the most valuable aspect of their jobs, 13 percent of respondents liked their jobs because they carried a degree of prestige. Only 6 percent thought that monetary advantage is what they like most about their current jobs. Surprisingly, only 1 respondent of the 28 who selected an open ended option in the question saw his career as an opportunity to serve people and the country. Most respondents failed to recognize their real role within the organization, and in almost every case personal interests prevailed over all other considerations.

Expanding the discussion over organizational commitment to cover more socially controversial issues (such as commitment to family, emirate of respondent and federal government) will certainly enrich the debate. More precisely, we intend to examine the position of civil service jobs in relation to other elements of society. In other words, which element in society are respondents more likely to associate themselves with? Are they most
proud to be associated with their tribe or with the emirate they come from, or are they most proud to be members of their ministries? To investigate this issue, we asked the respondents the following question: 'If someone asked you to describe yourself, and you have only one choice, which of the answers below would you most prefer to give.'

* I come from the emirate of ......................
* I work at the ministry of .........................
* I am a graduate of the university of...............  
* Other ...........................................

Table 7.31
Respondents Most Preferred Description of Themselves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I come from the emirate of</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I work at the ministry of</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a graduate of the university of</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>301</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly table 7.31 shows that the largest percentage (35 percent) of respondents would prefer to be described as being from their home emirates, e.g. 'He comes from Abu-Dhabi, from Dubai, from Sharjah,' etc. This finding indicates the failure of federal institutions to eliminate the regional loyalty of many U.A.E. nationals. Furthermore, instead of eliminating the regional identity, most local governments are supportive of this view, even those who are believed to be most pro-federation (Abu-Dhabi and Sharjah). Sharjah, for example, has re-established most of its local government apparatus after it had been merged into the federal government apparatus. Abu-Dhabi, also seems to have lost its enthusiasm for federation and has started to strengthen its local apparatus at the expense of the federal one; the same is true with most other emirates. If we break down the data we will be be able to identify the people most likely to be proud of their emirate. It is our
contention that those from Abu-Dhabi and Dubai are more proud of their emirates than their counterparts from Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah, and that may be because of the opportunities they have and services they receive from their local governments, facilities the federal government is unable to provide. The break down of the data does not support this contention, however; we found that those from Ras Al Khaimah were the most proud of their emirate (11 percent of 35 percent in table 7.31.) This might be attributed to their disappointment over the many federal government projects which have not lived up to the expectations they had when their government decided to join the federation. Another likely basis for their loyalty is the emirate's proud history in connection with its resistance to the Portuguese and British invasions of the area in the eighteenth century. On the other hand, those from Abu-Dhabi were only 6.3 percent of the total respondents to this question.

In return to table 7.31, we find that 33 percent of respondents felt that they most preferred to be identified with their occupations. In fact, the questionnaire has failed to determine which occupations respondents are most proud of or which ministry members are most proud to belong to. Only 11 percent of respondents identified themselves with the university they graduated from. As a matter of fact, most of them were United Arab Emirates University graduates.

Turning to the data obtained by the open ended option in the question, we found 23 respondents out of 63 said that if someone asked them to describe themselves they would reply that they belonged to the family of ....... In other words, they associated themselves with their families. In fact, we found a majority of them came from influential and powerful families and were therefore proud to mention their families' names. Twenty six respondents associated themselves with Islam and said they were Muslims before anything else.

Surprisingly, only 14 of 63 respondents who answered the open ended option in the question said that they came from the United Arab Emirates and they are members of the
federal government. This finding is consistent with our previous analysis in which we argued that the federal institutions have largely failed to melt the regional elements into one federal framework in which people feel that they are one nation and are loyal to one identity.

In essence, the findings suggested that U.A.E. civil servants display an adequate level of commitment to their federal jobs, not because these jobs fulfil their aspirations and ambitions, but because they feel more secure in federal government positions than in any other posts. Furthermore, the federal government provides them with the opportunity to be near their families and houses, in contrast to other jobs. The data also revealed that civil servants fail to recognize their obligations to the country's ambitious development plans, and are more interested in their personal affairs; they lack a comprehensive view of their role in the civil service sector. Finally, the data revealed the failure of federal institutions to enhance the federal notion among U.A.E. nationals. We found that regional views still dominate the attitudes of U.A.E. people who persist in putting the interests of their own individual emirates before those of the federation as a whole.

Concentration of Authority:

The United Arab Emirates officials are often criticized for being inclined to concentrate as much authority as possible in their hands. The decision making process is always downwards; that is, decisions are made at the top of the administrative hierarchy and then passed down for implementation. This means that in the administrative affairs of the U.A.E. nothing happens without the knowledge and direct involvement of the top echelons of the bureaucracy. The U.N report on the U.A.E. administrative system in 1980 recognized that the administrative structures of most federal ministries suffer from the lack of a middle administrative stratum, having only two administrative levels, one at the top and
one at the bottom, but nothing in the middle. In those cases where a middle level does exist it invariably lacks authority and power.(18)

Concentration of authority in the hands of a few officials certainly will have negative consequences for bureaucratic performance, because senior officials will be overburdened with minor issues, which consume their valuable time and distract them from essential major issues, while their subordinates will suffer from frustration and boredom being without any real work to do. Concentration of authority has also meant that red tape and routinization have become distinguishing features of the U.A.E. bureaucracy. Red tape is an inevitable consequence when almost all administrative business is dealt with by the same small number of officials, regardless of the size and importance, while their subordinates sit in their offices waiting for instructions from above. The result is, of course, tension and mistrust between administrators and their clients. Furthermore, clients eventually realize that if they wish to expedite their official business, the most effective way is to by-pass the subordinates and go directly to the top officials. Therefore, top officials are:

"Overwhelmed by particularistic issues and their ability to concentrate on issues of major import is further reduced."(19)

To tap the concentration of authority problem and some related subjects, we asked the respondents first to imagine two employees in the department. The first (A) follows regulations literally in every situation. The second (B) violates regulations if he feels that will contribute to the achievement of the department's goals. Which of the two did they believe to be the better employee? This question was designed to determine the views of civil servants about the flexibility of employees in the organization. Would they be willing to overlook the law if they found it would contribute to the achievement of their organization's objectives?

Table 7.32
Respondents View of the Better Employee.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The better employee</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who follows regulations literally.</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who violates regulations if that would contribute to the achievement of organization goals.</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.32 shows that an overwhelming majority of respondents (78 percent) believed that the better employee is the one who takes the initiative and violates the regulations if he feels it contributes to the success and prosperity of the organization. Only 22 percent believed that nothing was as important as following the law literally in every situation and under any circumstances.

Interestingly, we found that all four deputy assistant ministers who participated in this survey believed that the better employee was the one who followed regulations literally in every situation. This finding suggests the most rigid bureaucratic views are held by the U.A.E. top officials. The question to be answered here is why do those top officials prefer the employee who follows regulations in every situation? It is our contention that there are two possible reasons:

1- Following the regulations literally means consulting them regularly, since maximum authority is concentrated in their hands; violating the regulations, on the other hand, implicitly means discounting the importance of these officials. In other words, their importance and prestige is proportionate to the number of visits their subordinates pay to them daily. When we asked respondents how often they met with their supervisors, we found that an overwhelming majority of respondents (about 59 percent) indicated that they met at least one a day; 13 percent said they met every other day; 8 percent admitted that they
met only once a week and 20 percent said they met only if necessary. This finding supports our argument that top officials seek to concentrate authority and power in their hands and withhold it from their subordinates. It also suggests that most U.A.E. subordinates tend to pass most decisions to their supervisors.

2- Officials may doubt the ability of their employees to recognize that violation of the regulations in certain situations will contribute to the achievement of their job's goals. In other words, they lack confidence in the qualifications of their subordinates. Furthermore, allowing employees to violate the law might lead them to abuse that flexibility for personal ends.

To identify their supervisors' views of the better employee we asked them which they thought would be the better employee from the supervisors' point of view? The purpose was to determine the supervision methods applied by their supervisors.

Table 7.33
The Better Employee in the Supervisors' View

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The better employee</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>who follows regulations</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who violates regulations if that would contribute to organization</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.33 indicates that about 53 percent of respondents believed that their supervisors would consider the better employee to be the one who followed regulation literally in any case situation, while 47 percent argued that their supervisors would consider the better employee to be the one who violates regulations if that would contribute to the achievement of organization goals. This finding confirmed the rigidity and inflexibility of the majority of top officials in the U.A.E.
To elaborate more on this subject we asked respondents to imagine that they had to take an immediate decision regarding a certain matter in their department. What is the best thing to do?

- inform your supervisor before you take the decision or
- take the decision yourself and accept the responsibility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The most effective way</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inform supervisor before taking the decision</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>take the decision and accept responsibility</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>309</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from table 7.34 that an overwhelming 56 percent of respondents believed the most effective way to achieve better results was by informing the supervisors before taking any decision in the department, whereas 39 percent argued that the most effective way was to take the appropriate decision and accept the consequences. In avoiding responsibility and passing every single matter to their supervisors, those who selected the first option reinforced the excessive centralization in the hands of the supervisors and took up their time with minor administrative affairs which sometimes overwhelmed more major issues. This approach inevitably leads to delay, red tape and routinization and the victims are always the ordinary citizens who do not have access to the top officials.

The most common explanation for the centralization of authority in the U.A.E. and other Arabic bureaucracies is that it has its roots in a culture and tradition in which an administrator rules his department as a patriarch rules his family,\(^{20}\) or as a sheikh rules his

\(^{20}\) Ibid,p. 249.
country. This phenomenon has been described by Al-Kubaisy as a "Sheikhocracy", a regime in which top officials and administrators prefer to be treated in their occupations as sheikhs. Sheikhocrats, are those who grant themselves absolute power in the organization and like to be seen as supremely prominent figures in their jobs; however trivial a matter may be they have to deal with it themselves or at least be informed about it before a subordinate can take a decision.\(^{(21)}\)

Yet another explanation may lie in the mistrust between top officials who are usually indigenous and subordinates who are mostly expatriates (mainly Arabs). Many officials who were interviewed informally suggested that only by concentrating authority in their hands were they able to prevent corruption in their organizations. According to them the huge number of expatriates in the U.A.E. bureaucracy, a number greater in some organizations than that of indigenous employees, gives rise to the fear that those expatriates will misuse authority and positions for their personal advantage.

Finally, there were those among the high ranking officials who believed that delegation of authority might cause them to lose their positions. In other words, they saw their educated subordinates as something of a threat especially as invariably their own education' was limited.

To sum up, the concentration of authority in the hands of top officials is a major stumbling block on the road to a modern flexible bureaucracy. According to our survey, top officials were keen on keeping their authority and overwhelmingly in favour of responsibility for all decisions remaining in their hands. As a result, U.A.E. officials are always busy, while their subordinates lack real jobs. This situation increases tension between clients and bureaucrats, because all affairs have to be dealt with by a handful of officials and subordinates always having to wait for the green light and instructions from above, and this leads to frustration and delay. Therefore, the effective way to undertake

business with bureaucracy is to approach top officials directly and for this it is essential that clients have a good contact within the bureaucracy.

To investigate the most effective ways of transacting business with the U.A.E. bureaucracy, respondents were asked to imagine that an ordinary citizen is required to undertake an urgent piece of official business at a certain ministry. What is the shortest and most efficient way for him to achieve his purpose? Respondents were simply required to choose one of the three alternatives set out in table 7.35.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The shortest way</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Go directly to the official place and state your business</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See a relative of his who is also a government official</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See somebody who knows the government officials</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is obvious from table 7.35 that the majority of respondents believed that the shortest way to conduct urgent business was to follow the normal bureaucratic procedures by going straight to the government office and stating their business; 38 percent argued that approaching a high ranking relative to fix things first was the best way of getting business done in the U.A.E. bureaucracy; only 15 percent considered that contacting somebody acquainted with the relevant government officials was a more effective and expedient alternative.

Theoretically, the first alternative may be the most effective way to go about routine business with the government, but only if the client is willing to wait quite a long time to get his business done; we do not believe this is a realistic alternative for urgent business. It
is our contention that a more effective and efficient way if the matter is urgent is to use one of the other alternatives, i.e. either to contact a relative who is also a top official in the bureaucracy or, if one has no high-ranking relative, somebody influential in the bureaucracy. To find out which is the method most frequently used by the average citizen of the U.A.E., we put the question to the respondents.

Table 7.36  
The Method Most Frequently Used by U.A.E. Citizens in Transacting Business with Bureaucracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The most frequently used method</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Go directly to the official place and state your business</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See a relative who is also a government official</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See somebody who knows the government officials</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>306</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.36 shows that a majority of respondents (54 percent) believed that most U.A.E. citizens seek out a relative who is also an influential official to fix things for them before they attempt to contact any other official in the bureaucracy. Only 26 percent considered the most common method to be the direct approach to the official place and only 20 percent believed that finding somebody who knows the government officials is the most common method.

It is clear from table 7.36 that when the question was put in more practical terms the proportion of the sample believing in the first alternative (the official procedure) dropped considerably and there was an overwhelming consensus among respondents that U.A.E. citizens were most likely to use the other two alternatives. Surprisingly, our findings suggest that a majority of U.A.E. top officials who concentrate most decisions in their hands agreed that going directly to the government office and stating
your business would be the least effective means of getting business done in the bureaucracy.

**Table 7.37**  
**Alternative Methods of Undertaking Business at the Government Ministries (by administrative positions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The effective way</th>
<th>D.A. Ministers</th>
<th>G. Managers</th>
<th>H. of Dept.</th>
<th>H. of Units</th>
<th>Clerks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Go directly to the official place and state the business</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See a relative who is also government official</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See somebody who knows the government official</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 % N=4</td>
<td>100% N= 26</td>
<td>100% N=61</td>
<td>100% N=106</td>
<td>100% N 105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.37 reveals that 75 percent of deputy assistant ministers who are normally the decision makers in the U.A.E. bureaucracy, believed that the average citizen would first attempt to contact an influential relative to fix things first or would approach somebody who knew government officials in order to accomplish his business. In other words, they implicitly admitted that personal and mutual interests are paramount in the U.A.E. bureaucracy. 34 percent of the general managers participating in this study believed that the average citizen would try to go directly to the official and sort things out without external intervention, while 65 percent of them believed that the average person would seek external intervention either from an influential relative or from somebody who already knew the official. The opinions of those at remaining administrative levels (i.e. head of depts; head of units and clerks) were not significantly different from those of their bosses; they were all agreed that the average U.A.E. citizen would first attempt to use a non-official channel to achieve his purpose.
In line with the survey's findings and based on the researcher's experience as a member of U.A.E. society, seeking the assistance of an influential relative to undertake business with a government department is the first instinct of all U.A.E. citizens and this may be attributed to the social network which binds all family members into one entity. Furthermore, familial obligation also plays a significant role in driving a member of the family to seek the assistance of his influential relative, since he knows in advance that as a member of the family he will be obliged to serve its members.

In respect of the third alternative which assumes that the average citizen would first seek the intervention of someone who is influential but to whom he is not related to get his business done effectively and quickly, we would agree that many citizens who do not happen to have any powerful relatives quite frequently obtain the assistance of other influential figures in the government or simply make a direct approach to the sheikhs who are of all people the most effective. Indeed, most sheikhs conduct daily meetings (majlis), at which they meet with as many as possible of the individual citizens seeking their help with their personal problems. It is then the practice for sheikhs to write letters to certain officials in the government to facilitate business with the government, and we have to admit here that sometimes those letters contradict and clash with administrative law and procedure. When this happens, the officials simply have no alternative but to execute the business by attaching a note indicating that this matter was executed according to the order and direction of his highness sheikh. Therefore, in a tribal society like the U.A.E. nothing is impossible, all things are possible once you know the right avenue and the right person.

In presenting the above data, we have attempted to evaluate and investigate the concentration of authority and centralization in the U.A.E. bureaucracy, and to assess the relationship between administrators and clients. Our respondents agreed that concentration of authority is a significant feature of U.A.E. bureaucracy and most decisions are in the hands of a small number of top officials; the top officials usually perceive their subordinates
as unqualified to take decisions and fear that allowing them to take decisions will jeopardize their own positions or will devalue their role in the bureaucracy. Therefore, the better employee in their view is the one who follows regulations literally and the one who consults them constantly before he takes any decision.

In respect to the relationship between clients and administrators, our findings suggest that many U.A.E. citizens believe that most subordinates lack the real authority to carry out their business but that going directly to the top officials without pre-recommendation would be a waste of time; accordingly, they either go to their influential relatives or approach other influential persons, often the sheikhs themselves to facilitate their business.

Job Discrimination and Favouritism:

Discrimination in jobs and favouritism are among the many ills and problems besetting the U.A.E. administrative system. These ills and problems, in fact, destroy public confidence in bureaucratic establishments and may divert the rational allocation of the country's resources, either material resources or human resources. As we mentioned earlier, family ties and friendships have a tremendous influence on the attitude and conduct of U.A.E. civil servants. It is only too common in the U.A.E. to find personal interests prevailing over public interests. Urgent office business may be neglected if the client has no contact within the bureaucracy or outside it, while minor business may be given priority if the client has powerful connections. Furthermore, job discrimination appears to overshadow many other ills in the bureaucracy. Who you are is more important than what you have achieved or what qualifications you possess. Promotion to certain high-level jobs is awarded to those with the right name and denied to qualified people. Accordingly, this section of the chapter will be devoted to exploring the sensitivity of respondents to this problem and how they react to it.
To tab job discrimination and favouritism within the U.A.E. bureaucracy, we asked respondents if they felt that they were judged by something other than merit in their jobs? The distribution of responses to this question is displayed in table 7.38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel that you are judged by something other than merit in your job?</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apparently, an overwhelming majority of respondents (about 85 percent) claimed that they felt there was a job discrimination against them in their work. Only a small proportion of respondents (about 15 percent) indicated that they did not feel any kind of discrimination and believed they were judged by objective criteria.

Having established that the majority of respondents feel there is job discrimination in the U.A.E. bureaucracy, we intend here to shed light on the reasons for this discrimination. Therefore, respondents were asked to choose among four possible reasons for this problem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational background</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emirate which the person came from</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Favouritism)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>257</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The respondents' perceptions for the reasons for discrimination in their jobs were based on seniority; educational background; the emirate which the person came from and other reasons, mainly favouritism. The distribution of responses according to these reasons are shown in table 7.39.

The largest category of respondents (39 percent) believed the reason for discrimination was favouritism, 30 percent attributed it to seniority and 17 percent thought it was the qualifications of individuals; only 14 percent argued the emirate which the person came from was the reason for discrimination in jobs.

Favouritism, as table 7.39 clearly indicates is regarded by an overwhelming majority of respondents as the main reason for job discrimination. This finding is entirely consistent with the findings of table 7.35, which show that the bulk of respondents believe the most effective and shortest way to conduct business with the bureaucracy is to make use of personal influence.

Favouritism begins when an employee applies for a job in the government; normally the recruitment period takes up to one year but if the applicant has good connections it will take only a few months. Favouritism and personal influence are facts of life which all citizens have to live with. During the fieldwork I heard many complaints, particularly from new employees, often graduates, who claimed that they waited more than one year in order to be recruited, while others used their family influence to get jobs. Promotion to high positions is even more dependent on the employee's connections and influence. Therefore, it is no surprise to find that 85 percent of respondents felt they were judged by something other than merit.

Seniority was regarded by about 30 percent of respondents as another reason for discrimination in jobs. In fact, seniority (i.e. length of service) usually weighs heavily in the matter of promotion to higher positions in the bureaucracy. According to Provision 30 in the civil service law,
"Civil servants are categorized according to their seniority in their grades and within each grade alone. Seniority is calculated from the day of the appointment in the grade or the promotion to it" (22)

Promotion by seniority is a method widely applied by U.A.E. government. Seniority as a method of promotion is inclined to increase apathy and sustain inefficiency and low productivity particularly among new employees since they know they will be promoted automatically if they spend a certain number of years in their jobs. Therefore, many respondents felt that seniority as the main basis for promotion is a kind of discrimination since it depends on length of employment, without any weights being given to the candidate's qualifications and skills. We believe seniority was suitable for the last two decades when educated indigenous were scarce, and seniority was the only way to accumulate experience. Nowadays, however, educated indigenous constitute quite a high percentage in every ministry and establishment.

A breakdown of table 7.39, reveals that seniority is recognized at all administrative levels as a major reason for discrimination in jobs. More precisely, almost 67 percent of deputy assistant ministers believe that seniority is the major reason for discrimination, and 22 percent of those in managerial positions also feel that seniority is the main reason for discrimination. Seniority is also seen by as many as 32 percent of the heads of departments and by 46 percent of employees and clerks as a source of discrimination in job.

The educational background of individuals is regarded by about 17 percent of respondents as another reason for discrimination in jobs. In this respect, respondents felt that employees were judged on their level of education. In other words, promotions usually were given to those who possessed certain degrees and certificates. It may be that a high proportion of this group are those who have a limited level of education themselves.

and therefore resent the possibility that employees' education levels should be a major requirement for promotions.

Finally, 14 percent of respondents argued that the emirate which they come from has a tremendous bearing on advancement in their jobs. In other words, if they come from a certain emirate they have a greater chance of promotion. Not surprisingly, the majority of them (almost 9 percent) were from Ras Al Khaimah. They believed discrimination to be based on the emirate where employee came from. In fact, this feeling of confidence among Ras Al Khaimah employees was a result of the huge presents they distributed among those in the most high federal positions. (e.g. 9 deputy ministers out of 23 are from Ras Al Khaimah). This situation, indeed, gave rise to so much jealousy that many crucial federal posts were withdrawn from them either by giving them early retirement or having them moved to marginal or minor positions. On the other hand, it has been known by most U.A.E. employees for some time that those from Abu-Dhabi have the lion's share of promotions and job advancement. The tendency now is to inject the federal institutions with Abu-Dhabi natives drawn from Abu-Dhabi's local government.

Summary of Research Findings

At the beginning of this analysis, a breakdown on the basis of individual attributes was attempted. The attributes consisted of a number of different variables: sex; age; marital status; number of children; type of education; nature of education; father's occupation; level of responsibility; length of service; occupational status and methods of recruitment.

The distribution of responses regarding sex showed that the majority of respondents were male (59 percent). 41 percent were female. Although the male respondents outnumbered the female respondents, females were relatively well represented in this study. This may be attributed to their willingness to cooperate with the researcher despite their sensitive situation within the bureaucracy.
Chapter seven

Age was another important factor affecting personal orientations. The research findings regarding age showed that the majority of respondents were relatively young, an overwhelming percentage (83) being aged 35 and under and only 17 percent being 36 years old and above.

Respondents marital status and number of children revealed that 63 percent of them were married, 34 percent were single and only 3 percent were divorced. This finding suggests that most young nationals tend to postpone marriage, and this may be attributed to the financial burden associated with the preparation for marriage (such as providing a house and paying a large dowry, etc.)

With respect to number of children, 38 percent had 1-3 children, 29 percent had 4 children and above and 40 percent did not have children. The low rate of children among the bulk of respondents may be due to the fact that they were still in their twenties. Another factor may be related to their high educational level.

The respondents came from four different emirates: 28 percent from Ras Al Khaimah; 27 percent from Sharjah; 24 percent from Abu-Dhabi and 21 percent from Dubai.

75 percent of respondents were working in emirates other than their own. With respect to respondents' accommodation, the majority of them were residing with their parents and the minority in their own independent houses, only a small proportion lived in rented houses.

The majority of respondents had graduated from university and most of them had a good general education. An overwhelming majority thought that their education had qualified them for their present jobs. Only a small proportion claimed that their education had not prepared them well at all for their current jobs.
The distribution of responses regarding father's occupation showed that the fathers of 29 percent of female respondents had passed away and the fathers of 19 percent were retired; these figures were interpreted as one reason why females were sometimes forced to accept jobs regarded by society as male-dominated, such as administrators, accountants, etc.

Job tenure or length of service was another important factor considered in the individual attributes component. The distribution of responses showed that most of the respondents had spent less than three years in their jobs and that a majority of the sample were in fact new to the bureaucracy.

The final individual attribute was the methods of recruitment. Our findings suggested that most of them had obtained their jobs through the Federal Civil Service and this points clearly to the centralized nature of recruitment procedures in the U.A.E.

In the second part of the analysis we discussed the nature of the work situation. Among the twenty three questions used to tap the work situation, five dimensions were investigated: role conflict; familial role and job attribute; occupational commitment; concentration of authority and job discrimination and favouritism.

The data regarding role conflict shows that most of the U.A.E. employees surveyed declined to recognize the administrative obligations of their jobs. They were primarily interested in familial obligation and paid minimal attention to the civil servant's role within his organization. Furthermore, we found that native emirate and educational background have only a marginal effect on the respondents' behaviours which all inclined to the familial rather than the organizational role.
The findings in the familial role and job attitudes dimension reveal that familial pressure and obligation are given a high priority by an overwhelming majority of respondents. Therefore, many U.A.E. employees would sacrifice an influential and highly paid job in another emirate in order to be near their families and relatives. Furthermore, in this respect the difference between educated respondents and those with only a limited education was negligible.

With respect to occupational commitment, U.A.E. employees displayed an adequate level of commitment to their federal jobs, being aware of the security advantage these job provide, in addition to the opportunity to be near their families. Surprisingly, the data also revealed the failure of federal institutions to enhance the federal notion among U.A.E. nationals.

The data on concentration of authority revealed that most top officials support even more centralization. We found that they were keen for authority and the overwhelming majority preferred close supervision. The most plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that its roots lie in the culture and tradition of the U.A.E. society, a society in which an administrator manages his organization as a patriarch rules his family. The data also suggests that the shortest and most effective way to undertake business with the bureaucracy is to go straight to the top officials with an introduction from another influential person, if possible a relative or a sheikh.

The perception U.A.E. civil servants had of job discrimination indicated that 85 percent of them felt that they had been judged by something other than merit in their occupations. The most widely recognized reason for discrimination in jobs was favouritism. An overwhelming majority of respondents believed that personal influence and connections had become a way of life in the bureaucracy. Another reason for discrimination cited by 30 percent of respondents was seniority which was seen as a major factor where promotion to higher positions in the bureaucracy was concerned. The
educational background and the emirate which a person came from were also considered other sources of discrimination in jobs.
CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis sets out to examine the influence of socio-cultural variables on the United Arab Emirates bureaucracy. It argues that these variables have shaped the behaviour and attitudes of indigenous civil servants in a way that has inhibited the fulfilment of national development ambitions. More specifically, the study aims to identify the role orientation of indigenous federal civil servants, and the expectations and pressures placed on them by their families, clans and other social elements in the society. The main purpose, however, is to provide solid, empirical evidence for our contention that much of the irrational behaviour of civil servants in the U.A.E., such as favouritism, nepotism, etc, is not solely the result of corruption but rather a natural answer to the social expectations and pressures placed on them to behave the way they do.

In this study we have argued that in the United Arab Emirates the relationship between federal civil servants and their socio-cultural environment is highly disproportionate in that the latter has a tremendous influence on the former's administrative performance. We have presented survey data to demonstrate that social pressures placed on U.A.E. civil servants are such that administratively dependable role behaviour is almost non-existent and as a result the bureaucracy fails to play an effective part in the country's development programmes. Moreover, we have demonstrated that in U.A.E. society there are rival forces competing with one another: administrative values which give priority to the interests and goals of the organization, and familial values which emphasize obligations to the family and the clan.

In chapter 1 we attempted to shed light on the failure of development administration as a concept offered by western scholars to assist the developing countries in their struggle to achieve prosperity and development. The scholars themselves have tried to analyse why the
methods devised by the West have been successful in developing their own countries while those same methods have failed to achieve similar goals in other parts of the world. These scholars were shaken when they discovered that their academic equipment was inappropriate to the culture and values of these countries. Consequently, many theories and approaches emerged to tackle this problem. Among them were Fred Riggs' Prismatic Model; Milton Esman's Institution Building and Al-Kubaisy's Sheikhocratic Model. They all argued that in order to understand the administration of developing countries we should first understand the environmental conditions the administration has to deal with. Their assumption was that most developing societies depend on a mixture of values and behaviour, the old inherited and the modern imported, and that this may be one of the distinguishing characteristics of these societies. Therefore, the effective study is the one which takes into account the cultural aspects of the society, and tries to understand it within its cultural context.

In chapter 2 we examined the foundation of the United Arab Emirates and its political structure. We argued that many external factors contributed to the establishment of the country in 1971. Among these were the Iranian threat which took a practical form when Iran occupied three Islands belonging to the U.A.E; the vital role played by the British in uniting these tiny emirates, particularly through the offices of Sir William Luce, the foreign office envoy to the region; and the collapse of the proposed nine-member federation with the withdrawal of Qatar and Bahrain which pushed the seven remaining emirates to establish a smaller federation.

Chapter 2 also isolated four domestic factors which pointed to the wisdom of federation. These were: racial homogeneity, common history, the common security problem and goodwill among the emirates' leadership.

We pointed out in chapter 2 that the U.A.E.'s provisional constitution adopted a method uniquely its own in providing for five federal bodies, four of which would combine
the executive and legislative functions, while the fifth was designated to the judicial function. Furthermore, we found that the constitution did not apply the principle of separation of powers, particularly the executive and legislative functions. Also, the federal authorities have direct jurisdiction over the whole population of the federation, irrespective of emirate.

We have seen that the constitution divided the federal authorities into five major bodies. These were the Federal Supreme Council, which is the highest authority in the union; the president and his deputy; the Federal Council of Ministers; the Federal National Council; and, finally, the Supreme Federal Court, which is the highest judicial authority in the federation.

Chapter 3 of the thesis dealt with the importance of relating the bureaucracy to its surrounding environment. We argued that the family plays a large role in determining administrative performance through the behaviour of individuals. Therefore, the success of any efforts aimed at improving a given administration lies in understanding the social and political context in which it must function. In the light of this argument, we identified three major ecological variables which have affected and still affect the administrative system of the U.A.E. These are socio-cultural, educational and demographic. We have argued throughout the chapter that these variables have a negative influence on the U.A.E.'s administration and have contributed to the development of many inappropriate patterns of behaviour. The most noticeable example is paternalism. This kind of behaviour is associated with patriarchal tribal societies. This traditional behaviour which most people of the emirates take for granted will inevitably be reflected in their performance in administration. What they have learned from their fathers and tribal chiefs will be implemented in their jobs. Non-achievement behaviour is another symptom of the tribal culture, in that who you are is more important than what you can do. Thus, the administrative system has been used to stress the importance of the status of those who happen to be the elite of the society.
Conclusion

Chapter 3 described how the educational system has influenced the attitudes of administrators in the bureaucracy in that it has contributed to the existence of many unhealthy phenomena within the federal bureaucracy. Among them are a lack of independent thinking and avoidance of responsibility.

Moreover the demographic factor has influenced the conduct of the bureaucracy. A preponderance of certain nationals within the bureaucracy will inevitably affect its performance. In this respect we found the influence of Egyptian workers is noticeable. Due to their huge numbers and long bureaucratic traditions, Egyptians dominate most government agencies.

In chapter 4 we saw that the federation has three administrative tools and their functions are contingent on their location in the authority structure. The Federal Council of Ministers is the first of these and it determines the guide-lines the administration should follow. Second, comes the Civil Service Council which is the executive arm of the former. Thirdly comes the Federal Personnel Department which ensures the efficient implementation of the decisions and policies handed down by the other two.

The chapter revealed the strength and independence of the local government apparatus and the extent of its authority and power over the affairs of the emirates. It also revealed the conflict of interests between the federal government and the local governments. Three main sectors were cited as examples of this conflict, these were foreign affairs, public health and the electricity service. In the area of foreign affairs we found that most local governments did not adhere to the spirit of the constitution. We found that in many cases agreements between local governments and foreign countries were signed without consultation or knowledge of the federal authority. With respect to public health and medical services, we found that the poor emirates adhered to the stipulation of the constitution that the federal Ministry of Health should deal exclusively with all matters relating to public health, but only
because of the high cost of health care and not because of their commitment to the federation. Electricity and water services were another controversial issue between local and federal government. Again it is the poor emirates who have accepted the idea of merger of their local electricity services with the federal whereas the rich emirates retain their own local services.

Chapter 5 discussed the administrative problems in the U.A.E., highlighting six of the most serious. Some of these problems are associated with the prevailing situation which gives priority to the interests of local institutions over the federal bodies. Local departments in certain emirates, particularly in Dubai and Abu-Dhabi, are more powerful and effective than their federal counterparts. Economic differences between constituent emirates is another major obstacle undermining the work of the bureaucracy. This is a problem which comes to a head when the time comes to contribute to the federal budget and support federal projects. While federal institutions suffer from shortage of resources their local counterparts have a surplus of financial resources. Finally, we have seen in this chapter that there are some problems which may be regarded as purely administrative. These persist because of outdated administrative legislation, combined with the influx of rival nationalities.

Chapter 6 described the research methodology used in this study. The three methods of data collection were, firstly, a questionnaire, secondly, observation and, finally, investigation of documents and official records.

Chapter 7 dealt with the fact that most of the indigenous employees decline to recognize the administrative obligations of their jobs. They are primarily interested in familial obligation and pay minimal attention to the civil servant's role within his organization. The chapter showed that familial pressure and obligation are given a high priority by the majority. We found that most U.A.E. employees would sacrifice an influential and highly paid job in another emirate in order to be near their family and
relatives. This chapter also revealed that the shortest and most effective way to undertake business with the U.A.E. bureaucracy is to go straight to the top administrators with an introduction from another influential official, if possible a relative or a sheikh.

We found also in chapter 7 that most top officials support more centralization. They were keen on authority and the majority of them preferred close supervision. Our findings suggest that concentration of authority is a significant feature of U.A.E. bureaucracy and most decisions are in the hands of a small number of top officials; the top officials usually perceive their subordinates as unqualified to take decisions and fear that allowing them to take decisions will jeopardize their own position or devalue their role in the bureaucracy.

On the strength of the thesis findings, we intend here to formulate and present some recommendations and suggestions to strengthen and improve the federal bureaucracy in the United Arab Emirates. We are confident that the improvement of the bureaucracy is not solely contingent on the improvement of administrative procedures and regulations. It rather requires a more comprehensive macro approach to cover the many variables which interact with the bureaucracy, affect it and in turn are affected by it. Believing that administration mirrors all social, political and economic elements in the society, we suggest that any improvement in any established sectors will be reflected in the administration; accordingly, we would argue that in order to develop and improve the performance of administration in the U.A.E., we have first to improve two major apparatuses. These are the political institutions and the educational system. These is no point in recommending changes in the administration itself, without simultaneously tackling changes in the political and educational systems.

**Political System:**

In effect, administration is the executive arm of the political system. Therefore, any defect in this system will be reflected in the performance of the administration. In line with
this argument, it is essential to recommend changes to the political system prior to any changes to the administration. For the purposes of this study we recommend the following changes in the political system if the administration of the U.A.E. is to be improved:

**The Constitution:**

As we mentioned earlier in the thesis, the U.A.E. constitution has been provisional since independence in 1971. Although, the permanent constitution draft was ready by 1976, lack of enthusiasm on the part of some rulers was the major stumbling block in the way of its ratification.

In fact, the tenure of the provisional constitution, originally intended to last for only five years (i.e. until 1976), has been extended three times, each time for a five-year period; 1971-76, 1976-81, 1981-86 and 1986-1991. A few months ago, the government created a committee, headed by Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al-Maktoom, Minister of Finance, to review the permanent constitution draft and make recommendations to the Federal Supreme Council.

The provisional constitution was originally designed for a union of nine members faced with problems very different from those encountered by the present union today. Therefore, the government will be obliged to ratify the permanent constitution if it is looking forward to stability for the country in the future. We hope that the permanent constitution takes into account the following points:

1) Emphasis must be placed on a tighter federation, one in which priority is given to the federal state, in contrast to the present situation in which priority is more likely to be given to the local government over the federal. In other words, the distribution of power between the federal government and the local emirates must be adjusted so that more power is given to the federal government to make it more effective. It seems to me that now is a more appropriate time for tighter federation than before, particularly since Sheikh
Maktoom Bin Rashid became the Ruler of Dubai in 1990, a man regarded by other members of Dubai's ruling family as pro-federation. What makes a tighter federation likely to be more achievable in the 1990s is the close relationship between the current sheikh of Dubai and sheikh of Abu-Dhabi (i.e. the federal president). This new good relationship between the powerful emirates in the union should be exploited in the interests of tighter federation.

2) It is necessary to stipulate in the permanent constitution that it is illegal for any constituent emirate to withdraw from the federation, a point which was ignored in the present provisional constitution.

3) The permanent constitution must strengthen economic and financial integration by co-ordinating the exploitation of oil and other natural resources so that the revenues may be distributed more fairly among the constituent emirates. This would mean concentrating the process of oil exploration, contracting and exporting in the hands of a federal Ministry of Petroleum.

4) The veto power of Abu-Dhabi and Dubai in the Federal Supreme Council must be eliminated in order to prevent deadlock among the seven members. This will promote a feeling of equity between all seven members and increase their willingness to implement all the Supreme Council's decisions.

5) The power of the federal president must be increased and he must be allowed to select the prime minister without having to refer to the Federal Supreme Council which usually imposes its will on the president to select a certain person (invariably from the powerful emirates of Dubai or Abu-Dhabi).
The Federal National Council

The legislative body in most countries is supposed to exercise control over the executive and be a check on the administrative apparatus. It can employ various devices in carrying out its role. It can table a question, call a public debate, assemble a select committee, interpolate, recommend or register a vote of no-confidence. In the case of the U.A.E., the Federal National Council is primarily advisory and not legislative. Its constitutional terms of reference are to

"Discuss any general subject pertaining to the affairs of the union unless the Council of Ministers informs the National Council that such discussion is contrary to the highest interests of the Federation ....... The National Council may express its recommendations and may define the subjects for debate. If the Council of Ministers does not approve of these recommendations, it shall notify the Federal National Council of its reasons."(1)

After twenty-one years of marginal status in the political life of the federation, the time has come for the Federal National Council to take up its rightful position and fulfil its real role in the legislative, administrative and political process. Man does not live by bread alone. The individual citizens should be nurtured democratically and provided with freedom of speech and opinion in order to participate in the country's affairs in a democratic way consistent with Islamic teaching and cultural background.

The present provisional constitution in fact allows room for peaceful and gradual transition rather than radical change. This gradual transition will come about through increased democratic participation in the decision-making process in the country which should be based on preserving and respecting the country's political peculiarity, as in Kuwait, in that the ruling family's status is reserved and respected. Certain early reforms to

1. The Provisional Constitution, Article 92.
the present Federal National Council may be recommended in order to encourage
democratic trends in the country. Bear in mind that the Kuwaiti experience in this field may
be taken as an useful guide-line for any future changes in the existing legislative body-
primarily because Kuwait is a Gulf state which shares political, economic, cultural and
demographic factors with the U.A.E., and secondly, because it represents relatively a
genuine democratic bastion in the Arab World.

A gradual process of free elections of Federal National Council members must be the
cornerstone of any future changes. Representation in the Council should be open to all
citizens, whatever their background, so that the interests of all the people may be taken into
account. Each emirate should be represented in the Council according to the number of its
nationals, based on the latest population census, although a maximum or a minimum
number of representatives should be laid down in order to secure the interests of the smaller
emirates. It is, therefore, illogical that an emirate with a total population of about 20,000
like Ajman, should have equal representation in the Council with another emirate, like
Dubai, with a population of about 500,000, and one, moreover, with a relatively higher
level of education and political consciousness. The Council must be allowed to participate
actively in the law-making process and to operate positive control over the executive. It
must have the power to question any person in the government and withdraw confidence
from him if necessary. Its decisions must be binding on the executive branch and must
be taken seriously.

Undoubtedly the existence of a democratically elected council, empowered to
withdraw confidence from the government and allowed to question anybody in the
government, will contribute to reduce the administrative corruption in the government. To
support this argument we will cite an example from Kuwaiti experience. At the time of the
latest Kuwaiti parliamentary election, many scandals relating to mismanagement and

2 - M. Al-Rokn. A Study of the U.A.E. Legislature Under the 1971 Constitutional with Special Reference
331.
corruption either associated with governmental sectors or semi-governmental agencies in the period since the dissolution of the 1986's parliament were made public for the first time. As a result of the constant call for an investigation into investment abroad, the government reluctantly revealed that its investment in Spain suffered a massive loss because of mismanagement and fraud in the Kuwaiti Investment Office. Six high executives were responsible for loosing more than $4 bn. Among them was a member of the ruling family and a cousin of the emir.\(^3\) This scandal and many others would not have been made public and investigated if there were no democratically elected parliament in Kuwait. We are quite confident that there were many examples of administrative and financial corruption during the closure period of the parliament (from 1986-Oct. 1992) when the government was not accountable for its actions.

Similarly, what the U.A.E. lacks is a powerful control apparatus. Such an apparatus would automatically affect the work of most civil servants at all administrative levels and would put them under significant pressure to act according to the law and regulations. We have seen in our empirical investigation that the further we go up in the administrative hierarchy the more the civil servants apply the universalistic approach and the more they resist familial pressure. Our interpretation suggests that they are not universalistic because they believe in the fairness of the treatment to all clients, but rather they are under the focus of public attention and have to be more careful in their use of the particularistic pattern than their employees. Therefore, the existence of such a council, equipped with power to investigate any unlawful act, will certainly influence the attitudes and behaviour of all employees in the bureaucracy.

The Federal Council of Ministers:

We have seen in chapter 4 that the council is no more than a subordinate apparatus to the Supreme Council, its main function being to execute its policies and implement its

\(^3\) The Independent on Sunday, 10 January1993.
decisions. Consequently, the effectiveness of the council depends on the effectiveness of
the Supreme Council, and it inherits all its problems and difficulties. In other words, the
Council consists of an uncohesive group which does not work as a team but rather as rivals
and puts individual local emirates' interests above federal interests. Furthermore, the
Council lacks both the executive power to implement its decisions and a specific programme
to implement. Since the establishment of the country, five different cabinets have been
formed and none of them has had a genuine published programme to implement within a
given time. Without doubt, the absence of a specific programme renders general policy
vague and flexible and provides a kind of legal excuse for internal consumption.

Some reforms must be undertaken before the existing Council of Ministers is able to
take up an effective position in the political structure of the U.A.E. First, the Council must
be endowed with more genuine executive power to implement its policy and programmes
throughout the U.A.E., including in the so-called anti-federation emirates (i.e. Dubai and
Ras Al Khaimah) who on many occasions ignore the Council's decisions. Secondly, the
Prime Minister must be allowed, after consultation with the local rulers, to select his team of
ministers on the basis of ability, experience, education and devotion to the cause of federal
aims. It is noticeable that all key ministries are in the hands of either Abu-Dhabi or Dubai
and as a consequence council decisions are mistrusted by the poor emirates as not being
necessarily in their best interests. Therefore, we recommend that the criteria of selection to
any cabinet post should be based on qualifications and experience rather than on the emirate
of the person. Thirdly, the council must have a genuine programme to implement within its
sessions. The programme should be published in the local newspapers and be debated by
the Federal National Council. It has to concentrate on bridging the economic gap between
the rich and the poor emirates, with more attention paid to the needs of the latter. Finally, it
is essential to limit the tenure of office for a cabinet minister to no longer than four years,
because having ministers remain in office for as long as twenty years has become a
distinguishing feature of U.A.E. politics. The placement of a minister every four years will
have positive consequences on the work of the bureaucracy and will bring new ideas and
aspirations to the administration. New ministers are always in favour of leaving their fingerprints on the work of their ministries and therefore will start to change the status quo of the ministry by introducing new laws and regulations, shifting some employees to other departments, promoting others and so on. At least some changes will occur in the administration, removing the current status quo situation which prevails all over the federal sectors because government policy is to leave ministers in the same positions for over 10 years.

The Education System:

It has been said that if you want to shape the content of men's minds, start with education. Therefore, the first thing any revolution would do is change the education system of the country to suit its trends and goals. If it is a communist revolution, it will inject education with communist ideology, aiming to influence the minds of future generations. The same is true with other ideologies, they all have a certain strategy for education. In the United Arab Emirates the situation is different. Hitherto, there has been no clear-cut strategy for education. It all depends on the Minister of Education. If he belongs to the Arab Nationalist group, that particular ideology will mould and influence the national curricula and inevitably be imposed upon pupils. If, on the other hand the Minister is affiliated with the Islamic group, he will appoint members of this group into key positions in the ministry and as a result the national curricula will be profoundly influenced. In short, the minister who governs the Ministry of Education is the one who will influence the curricula and education. To overcome this problem the government should set up a special board which should be free of the influence of any particular camp or at least should have a representative from every group in the society, a board designed to reflect the actual needs of the society and express its characteristics and aspirations. The job of this board would be to lay down the educational principles, strategy, doctrine and ultimate goals, in fact formulate the future educational policy of the country.
Conclusion

Important among the findings of this research has been the fact that while the overwhelming majority (97 percent) of participants have graduated from general education, only a small proportion (3 percent) have graduated from vocational education. From this it is clear that, more attention needs to be paid to the provision of vocational and technical education and that education policy should be more related to the country's development plans. There should be more co-ordination between the Ministry of Education and other higher education institutions, including the University of the U.A.E., so that students are directed towards the kind of education vital for the development of the country. It is noticeable that the majority of entrants to the work-force have been attracted to the sort of training and education least in demand, notably in the arts and social studies, and have chosen not to enrol in other types of education, such as science and vocational education, despite the country's desperate needs in this direction.

The Ministry of Education should enhance the status of vocational and technical education by creating a financially independent board, directly responsible to the Minister. This board should be concerned with the improvement and development of technical education by all available means, most especially by providing an incentive for students to enrol in this type of education, an incentive such as a guaranteed job in the government's industrial sector with appropriate payment. Legislation should also be considered to force the private sector to accept more locals with the possibility of subsidising their entry. The government should make some distinction in its recruitment policy between vocational and science graduates and humanities graduates by giving higher grades and salaries to the former.4)

Co-ordination between the education apparatus and the administrative bodies which utilize its products should be improved. Schools and universities should co-operate with the Federal Civil Service Council in order to ensure that most of their graduates will be able

to get jobs in the federal sectors and at the same time satisfy the country's requirements for human resources.

Our empirical study revealed the failure of the federal institutions to eliminate the regional loyalty of many U.A.E. nationals. We found that regional views still dominate the attitudes of U.A.E. people who persist in putting the interests of their own individual emirates before those of the federation as a whole. Among other institutions to blame for this failure is, of course, the educational system and more precisely the national curriculum, which pays little attention to this problem. Indeed, the Ministry of Education has positively ignored its real duty to enhance the national feeling of its clients towards the federal state. Therefore, more effort should be made to increase the federal notion and principles among its pupils in which they feel they are one nation, loyal to one identity. That will happen only if the educational planners recognize the importance of their institutions in enhancing the national feeling for unity among their pupils. Moreover, the educational system has another significant role to play in promoting appropriate work ethics among national civil servants. Undoubtedly the quality of civil servants more or less depends on the education they received in their early years. Hence, it is the duty of the education apparatus to inject the appropriate work ethic into the students' minds from the earliest stages and encourage students in independence of thought, initiative and innovatory drive. Students must be taught to take responsibility not to fear it, to discuss directives rather than instantly obey them, to accept that their teachers are not always right and if they make a mistake must be corrected, etc.

The Administrative System:

A bureaucracy that recruits people is never completely static and as we have seen throughout this study ideally it is an open social system constantly interacting with its surrounding environment. We have discussed in the preceding pages the changes required for the improvement of the bureaucracy, changes beyond the control of the bureaucracy
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(i.e. political and educational changes). In the following pages, we will attempt to suggest some steps that are within the power of the bureaucracy to take to assert its position in the U.A.E. development process.

It is noticeable that throughout the development experience of the U.A.E. the decision makers and developmental strategists have concentrated on the materialistic approach to development and attended to the infrastructure by building hospitals, schools, airports, seaports, shopping centres and other related things. But this is not in itself development but merely, as Fred Riggs has put it, a display of the signs of development, in the same way as a pulse in the body is a sign of life but not life itself. To U.A.E. decision makers development planning incorrectly means planning for material achievement without taking into account the long-term consequences for economic development. Important values are missing, values of commitment to federal institutions, to jobs, values of fairness, accountability, merit, values of timing and promoting democracy within the organizations.

It is not only the educational and media institutions which have a role to play in instilling these crucial values into society, other training institutes have a significant role to play. A review of the training courses available at the Institute of Administrative Development, the main training body in the country, reveals that the institute's main preoccupation is with enhancing employees' administrative skills (e.g. communication skills, decision-making skills, etc.) Essential as these are, there are skills more urgently needed by indigenous U.A.E. administrators, such as the ability to increase employees' commitment and loyalty to their jobs, enhance the importance of their organizational obligations over their familial, and promote employees' solidarity. The training courses should encourage employees to view their organizations as teams to which all belong, rather than just work-places peopled by separate individuals. Furthermore, most if not all instructors and trainers at the Institute are non-citizens and, as such, are not aware of the important values.

deep social influences on employees' behaviour and attitudes reflected in our empirical study. Most of the bureaucracy's ills were shown to be more or less repercussions of social and cultural factors.

Accordingly, to reduce the social pressure on employees and to harmonize relations between organizations and their social environment, the training institute and its training courses should be devoted to merging the modern organizational role with society's traditional corporate role in such a way that each organization becomes the corporate group identity representing solidarity and security. This solution has been found by many countries such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, etc, to be valid. The training courses should concentrate on promoting a corporate group based on work rather than on kinship. The U.A.E. has changed, the society has changed, but indigenous assumptions about administration based on favouritism, kinship, etc., have ominously remained much the same. Therefore, the most essential task of training courses is to change the traditional administrative assumptions about administration. The planning of these courses should not be left solely to the Institute, but many other institutions and individuals should be involved in designing the training courses, especially the academic staff of U.A.E. University and nationals with various specialties such as psychology, sociology, administration and human behaviour.

Moreover, to encourage employees to make use of training programmes as much as possible it is advisable that separate programmes with differing emphasis should be held for the more senior employees. We recommend that all graduates should participate in training programmes prior to their enrolment in the jobs. The programmes should concentrate on bridging the gap between expectation and reality, between what they expect from their jobs and what the genuine practice is. According to our findings, new employees were more willing to break the organization's rules to further their personal interests than colleagues.

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with longer service who displayed higher levels of commitment to their jobs and organizations and were more enthusiastic about the universal approach. Hence, training programme designers should pay special attention to reinforcing the new employees' commitment to their jobs and ensure that promotion to higher positions is contingent upon participation in training programmes.

With respect to the federal civil service code, the current legislation was introduced in 1973 when people's needs and requirements were simple if not vague. So, even though this law may have satisfied the needs of the people at that date it does not fulfil their needs and requirements today. Based on our empirical investigation we found that civil servants are frustrated with the dead-end employment situation, because of the rigid and out-dated administrative law. New legislation is urgently needed, particularly since April 1992 when Dubai introduced a new code of administrative law for its local employees which promises to be infinitely better than its federal counterpart in terms of salary, promotion, leave, etc.\(^{(10)}\) This initiative and the degree of military and public cooperation it has obviously involved really will embarrass the Federal Government into speeding up its efforts to introduce new legislation before its employees loose confidence in its apparatus. Ideally, in any country, legislation should be debated and approved by both the government and concerned citizens and must satisfy the needs of both. Therefore, we hope that before the government decides to introduce any new legislation it allows the public to debate and discuss it; it should be obliged to take into consideration all comments and suggestions and even objections raised by the public, because in the end it is the public this legislation will directly affect.

In order for the proposed legislation to be more effective we recommend that:

1- Promotion practices should be very closely linked to some form of performance criteria and not merely based on seniority. This is because seniority as a

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\(^{(10)}\) Al-Bayan Newspaper, No. 4336, 12-6-1992.
method of promotion is inclined to increase apathy and sustain inefficiency and low productivity particularly among new employees since they know they will be promoted automatically if they spend a certain number of years in their jobs (according to the current law, 3 years for graduates). The survey revealed that many civil servants felt that seniority as the main basis for promotion was a kind of discrimination since it depends on length of employment without any weight being given to the candidate's qualifications and skills. As a means of stifling employee enthusiasm for creativity and innovation we believe it was suitable for the last two decades when educated indigenous employees were scarce, and seniority was the only way to accumulate experience. Nowadays, however, educated indigenous employees constitute quite a high percentage in every ministry and establishment.

2- Incentive schemes should be linked to performance, and current salary scales revised to keep pace with an economic situation currently suffering from severe inflation (according to the latest figures 60 percent). It is appropriate to mention here that salaries of federal employees have been frozen since 1976 and promotions since 1982. When the military forces, local departments and public corporations have increased their employees' salaries many times during the intervening years, it is hardly surprising that their colleagues in the federal sectors resent their status quo situation and suffer from chronic apathy, reduced productivity and enhanced frustration.

3- To overcome the centralization problem and retain public confidence in the civil service, it is essential to give more real authority to low-level employees and at the same time increase the authority of top administrators in control of affairs to ensure better performance. Moreover, to increase the confidence of employees in their leadership, they should be encouraged to participate in decision making at various levels within the organization. It should be stressed that this does not necessary imply that employees

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should participate in all decisions, rather just those decisions that have a direct bearing on the performance of their jobs.

4- With respect to national female workers in the civil service, we recommend that the proposed civil service law should adopt a flexible policy which would allow women to choose working hours convenient for them and their families and would reduce working hours to a maximum of 4 hours a day instead of the present 6 hours. The benefits of adopting this policy are various:

- it would encourage more educated women to participate in the national work force, which is currently weighted heavily in favour of non-nationals.

- it would reduce the current dependence on foreign domestic maids (Ceylonese and Philippinos) and increase women's involvement in raising and looking after their children.

We also recommend the establishment of nurseries in the organizations where women workers constitute a high percentage, in schools for example and suggest that women workers with children are encouraged to remain in the service by the provision of 40 weeks' maternity leave, 8 of them fully paid, with their positions guaranteed during their absence and job security once they rejoin the service.

To encourage indigenous employees (particularly graduates) to relocate in another emirates where their skills are more needed, for instance in Abu-Dhabi, we recommend that the government should study the possibility of increasing the weekend to two days instead of one day and adding only one hour for the normal working day, a day starting at, say, start from 7.30 and finishing at 2.30 instead of 1.30. Doing that will encourage many graduates from northern emirates to work in other emirates since they will have enough time to stay near their families and relatives. Moreover, those who work in other emirates, particularly in Abu-Dhabi, should have extra payment in terms of salaries or allowances.
By relocating employees in other emirates the Government will distance them from the influence of their families and indirectly encourage them to use the universalistic approach in dealing with matters in their organizations. Therefore, the Government will hit two birds with one stone. First, it will fulfil its manpower needs in Abu-Dhabi. Secondly, it will reduce the dysfunctional effects of external social pressure on civil servants.\(^{12}\)

Among the most serious problems facing the federal bureaucracy is a bureaucratic inflation at all administrative levels. The problem arises because most graduate nationals prefer to work in this sector since it provides them with the necessary job security. According to our empirical study the job security offered by the federal sector was the factor which most attracted employees to this sector.

The problem is most serious in the northern emirates (i.e. Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Umm al Qaiwan, Ajman and Fujarah) where this is the only avenue open to them apart from the military sector, since their local government departments are financially unable to appoint all of them. Therefore, in order to reduce pressure on the federal bureaucracy, the Government should force other sectors (i.e. local departments, public corporations and private sectors) to recruit national graduates on a quota basis so that each local government department or public corporation has to appoint a certain percentage of graduates annually. Although there are some differences between federal and local departments, in terms of salaries (the former pay more in rich emirates), this problem could be overcome by a federal subsidy, in other words the difference could be paid by the Federal Government. Moreover, the Federal Council of Ministers should also pressurize local government in the northern emirates to attract employees by introducing a retirement policy for all employees, in addition to a clear-cut promotion policy and a job security system. It is essential to have a job security policy in these departments since most employees usually belong to the middle if not the lower social strata, and are usually dependent on their salaries. Therefore they and

their families are severely affected by postponement of salary or loss of employment and in circumstances are particularly concerned with pension rights.

The striking finding of our survey is the number of those who felt that they have been judged by something other than merit in their jobs. Almost 85 percent of participants in the survey claimed that they felt there was discrimination against them in their work and the major reason for this discrimination was favouritism. Therefore, to reduce the use of favouritism and other sorts of job discrimination, we recommend the establishment of a Federal Complaints Commission (an ombudsman system). The time has come to monitor the process of bureaucratic development and organization to ensure reasonable and lawful conduct of bureaucracy. The government has its own apparatus (the Federal Audit Bureau) to ensure lawful conduct of its civil servants towards the government but, in contrast, the civil servants lack any sort of instrument to obtain their rights from the government. Therefore, it is essential to adopt an ombudsman system to check and redress incidents of maladministration.

The commission should be headed by an independent high-level public official, responsible to the Federal National Council, who would receive complaints about injustice and mismanagement from aggrieved individuals, against the government apparatus, administrators, employees, etc. He would have "power to investigate, criticize, recommend corrective actions, and generally to publicize administrative actions."(13)

In conclusion as William Shakespeare said, leave idiots to compete about the characteristics of government ...... the most effective administration is the most efficient government.(14)

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APPENDIX : A. Questionnaire ( in English )
Dear Sir,

Please find enclosed a questionnaire, which is intended to provide information for my doctoral dissertation research being conducted at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom. The aim of the questionnaire is to find out how federal civil servants feel about various aspects of their jobs. The information gathered will be completely confidential, and there will be no way of identifying those who take part. Because we are only interested in statistical aggregates— that is, the percentage of persons who feel one way or another about a given issue, rather than the responses of a particular individual— you will remain completely anonymous.

More importantly, this questionnaire has been prepared to give you a chance to report on how you feel about your present job. The questions concern opinions not facts, therefore there will be no such thing as a right or wrong answer.

I will be pleased to send you a summary of the survey results if you wish.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Ateeq A. Jakka
First Part of Questionnaire:

Here are a few questions about yourself. Please put (x) mark where you think it is appropriate.

1. Gender:
   { } Male
   { } Female

2. Age:
   { } 18-25   { } 36-45   { } 56 and over
   { } 26-35   { } 46-55

3. Marital Status:
   { } single
   { } married

4. How many children do you have?
   { } none   { } 1-3   { } 4-6   { } 7 or more

5. Can you tell me which emirate you are from?
   { } Abu-Dhabi
   { } Dubai
   { } Sharjah
   { } Ajman
   { } Umm-al-Qaiwan
   { } Ras Al Khaimah
   { } Fujairah

6. Where do you work?
   { } your home emirate
   { } another emirate
   { } not in a fixed place
7. At home, do you live:

{ } with your parents
{ } in a house you own
{ } in a rented house

8. Can you tell me about your final level of education, was it:

{ } elementary school { } undergraduate degree
{ } intermediate school { } postgraduate degree
{ } secondary school { } other...................................(specify)

9. Can you tell me what sort of education you had, was it a:

{ } general education or,
{ } vocational education or

{ } other................................. (please specify)

10. Do you think that your education qualified you for the present job?

{ } very well
{ } fairly well
{ } not very well
{ } not very well at all

11. Please describe, as fully as possible, your father's last occupation?

{ .........................................}

12. What is your job title description? { .................................................................. }

13. How many years have you worked for the federal government?

{ } 1-2 years { } 6-10 years { } 16-20 years
{ } 3-5 years { } 11-15 years

14. Can you tell me how you obtained your present job?

{ } Through the Civil Service Council or
{ } Through the ministry or
{ } Through personal contact or
Second Part of Questionnaire:

In this part we would like to know your opinions about work and career in the U.A.E. Please choose only one answer.

15. Suppose a young graduate asked you to advise him on his career. What sort of a career would you most strongly recommend him to pursue? One in

{ } local government or
{ } federal government or
{ } armed Forces or
{ } public corporations or
{ } banks or
{ } Other private sector

{ } other........................................ (specify)

16. Why would you recommend this career? Is it because of

{ } high salary or
{ } social status or
{ } job security or
{ } opportunities for job advancement

{ } other........................................ (specify)

17. Do you think that the 6-hours daily duty period is enough to accomplish all of your work requirements?

{ } yes
{ } no
{ } don't know

18. If your answer is ( No ) can you tell me why?
work load does not match the responsibilities of your department or
you are occupied with other inevitable social activities i.e. meeting friends and
your colleagues during working hours or
Your colleagues are not cooperative, therefore you have to finish things yourself.
other...........................................(specify)

19. What of the following do you most like about your own job?

near house and family or
one way of serving public or
social status or
job security or
good salary
other.............................................(specify)

20. Suppose that you have the choice of the following, would you most prefer:
a job with high salary away from your relatives and family or
a job with adequate salary near your relatives and family.

21. Suppose that you have the choice of the following, would you most prefer:
a job with high authority and responsibility in another emirate or
a job with moderate authority and medium responsibility in your home emirate.

22. Suppose that there are two employees in your department.
(A) follows regulations literally in every situation. (B) violates regulations if he feels that will contribute to the achievement of the department's goals. Which of the two do you believe is the better employee?

the first (A) or
the second (B)

23. Which of the two do you think your supervisor would consider as a better employee?

the first or
the second
24. Suppose you have to take an immediate decision regarding urgent matter in your department. What do you think is the most effective way to do:

\{ \} inform your supervisor before you take the decision or
\{ \} take the decision yourself and accept the responsibility
\{ \} other ............................................................. (specify)

25. If someone asked you to describe yourself, and you have only one choice, which of the answers below would you most prefer to give? Please tick only one.

\{ \} I come from emirate of ........................................
\{ \} I work at the ministry of ......................................
\{ \} I am graduate of university of ............................... 
\{ \} other ............................................(specify)

26. (Imagine the following): Ahmed is a civil servant working in his home emirate (X). He is officially informed that he is to be transferred to emirate (Y). His family, relatives and friends are in emirate (x), and he is looking after his aged father who is too old to move away. For the reasons mentioned he does not want to be transferred. So he goes to the head of his department, who happens to be his cousin, and asks to be kept in his home emirate.

26. A. Do you think that there is an obligation on the head of department to help his relative in this situation?

\{ \} yes \{ \} no

26. B. Do you think that the head of the department's relatives would expect him to cancel the transfer?

\{ \} yes \{ \} no

26. C. What will the head of the department's relatives think of him if he refuses to help his cousin? They will think that

\{ \} he is following the job's rules and regulations or
\{ \} he is disloyal to his family or
\{ \} he is unfair
27. Suppose that an ordinary citizen is required to undertake an urgent piece of official business at a certain ministry. What is the most effective way for him to use in order to achieve his purpose?

A. he should go directly to the official office and state his problem or
B. he should see a relative of his who is also a government official or
C. he should see somebody who knows the government official.

28. Which of the methods do you think the average citizen of the emirate would be likely to use first?

A or B or C

29. If you are asked to describe the kind of supervision exercised by your direct superior, what would you say?

A or B or C

30. How often do you meet with your direct supervisor?

A or B or C

31. If somebody asked you to evaluate the performance of national administrators, what would you answer? Are they
very competent
fairly competent
not very competent
not very competent at all

32. Now if someone asked you to evaluate the performance of non-national administrators, what would you answer?
very competent
fairly competent
not very competent
not very competent at all
don't know

33. Now let me present another imaginary situation to you, and then ask you some questions about it.

Suppose Salim arrives at his office one morning and finds many people waiting to meet him regarding routine business. One of these people is his relative. How should Salim deal with this situation:
should he give priority to his relative or
should he treat him as others according to the 'first come first served' rule.
other........................................(specify)

33.A. What do you think the average civil servant in the U.A.E. would actually do in this situation?
would he meet his relative before the others or
would he not meet his relative before the others

33.B. What do you think the relative would expect from Salim?
to be seen after those who came before him or
to be seen before the others

34. Do you feel that you are judged by something other than merit in your job?
35. If your answer to the previous question is **Yes**, what is the most important reason for this in your opinion?

- seniority
- qualification
- the emirate which the person comes from
- other.......................................( specify)

36. If you have any comments, observations and suggestions please feel free to write them in this space:

Finally all your answers will remain confidential, and will be used only for the research purpose.

Thank you for your interest and contribution to this research.

Ateeq Jakka
APPENDIX : B. Questionnaire (in Arabic)
أحمد المشاريع رئيس المشاريع

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله

أنشرت أن أعرض عليكم هذا الاستبيان لاملاً. وذلك لغرض إتمام دراسة ميدانية استكمالًا لطلبات تحضير أطرحة الدكتوراه في الإدارة العامة وذلك بجامعة ورك بالمملكة المتحدة.

هذه الدراسة تهدف إلى التعرف على الواقع التنظيمي لأجهزة الخدمة المدنية في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة وتأثيرها على أداء وسلوك العاملين المحليين فيها.

أود أن أوضح لكم أن جميع المعلومات ستكون سرية خاصة وانه لن يطلب تسجيل الاسم كما انها ليست من الممكن التعرف على الأشخاص الذين شاركوا في هذه الدراسة وذلك لأن أسئلتما سيكون منصب فقط على الأرقام الإحصائية. أي النسبة المئوية للمشاركين دون التركيز على أشخاص بعينهم.

ويسرنا أعلانكم بذلك على استعداد تام لتوزيعكم بمثابة من هذه الدراسة عند الانتهاء منها. فعلى الراغبين في الحصول على ملخص ذكر المعلومات المطلوبة في نهاية الاستبيان.

وأود أن أوجههم للباحثة

مديحة جمعة

الله الموفق
الأولى: المعلومات الشخصية

الرجاء وضع علامة ( ) أمام العبارة المناسبة:

1- الجنس:
( ) ذكر ( ) أنثى

2- العمر:
( ) 18-26 ( ) 27-45 ( ) 46-55 ( ) 56 و أكثر

3- الحالة الاجتماعية:
( ) متزوج ( ) زوجي ( ) مرغيب ( ) حفل ( أنكر)

4- عدد الأطفال:
( ) لا يوجد ( ) 1-2 ( ) 3-6 ( ) 7 فما فوق

5- الامامارة:
( ) أبو غزالة ( ) دنيس ( ) الشارقة ( ) رأس الخيمة ( ) أم القيوين ( ) عجمان ( ) الفجيرة

6- موقع العمل:
( ) نفس الإمارة التي انتسب إليها ( ) في إمارة أخرى ( ) غير ثابت في مكان

7- السكن:
( ) مع والدي في منزل خاص ( ) في منزل مسجد ( ) غير ذلك ( أنكر)

8- المستوى التعليمي:
( ) ابتدائي ( ) أعدادي ( ) ثانوي ( ) جامعي ( ) دراسات عليا ( ) غير ذلك ( أنكر)
9 - نوعية التعليم:
( ) التعليم المهني (الصناعي)
( ) التعليم العام

10 - هل تعتقد أن التعليم الذي حصلت عليه يتوافق مع متطلبات وظيفتك الحالية؟
( ) يتوافق بصورة كبيرة
( ) يتوافق بصورة جيدة
( ) لا يتوافق نوعاً ما
( ) لا يتوافق بسناًً

11 - من فضلك ذكر وظيفة الوالد:
( ) مزارع
( ) متقاعد ( ) غير ذلك (أذكر)...

12 - درجتك الوظيفية حاليًا (مثال 2/4/2/3,...

13 - عدد السنوات التي قضيتها في العمل لدى الحكومة الاتحادية؟
( ) 10-16 ( ) 11-15 ( ) 16-20

14 - ماهو المسمى الوظيفي الذي تعمل فيه حالياً؟ مثلاً:
( ) رئيس قسم، مدير,...

15 - كيف حصلت على وظيفتك الحالية؟
( ) عن طريق الخدمة الدينية أو
( ) عن طريق الوزارة نفسها أو
( ) عن طريق أعلان في الصحف أو
( ) عن طريق الاتصال الشخصي أو
( ) غير ذلك (أذكر)...
16 - إفتراض أن أحد الخريجين المواطنين طلب نصيحتك ب اختيار وظيفة له فأي نوع من الوظائف توصحك للعمل بها؟
( ) في الحكومة المحلية أو
( ) في الحكومة الإتحادية (الوزارات) أو
( ) في القوات المسلحة أو
( ) في المؤسسات العامة (المصرف المركزي، اتصالات، الخ) أو
( ) في البنوك أو
( ) في القطاع الخاص أو
( ) غير ذلك (أذكر).

17 - لماذا نصحته بالعمل في هذا القطاع؟ هل من أجل؟
( ) الراتب المنطاز أو
( ) المكانة الاجتماعية المرموقة أو
( ) الأمن الوظيفي أو
( ) فرصة الترقي أو
( ) غير ذلك (أذكر).

18 - هل تعتقد بأن العمل يوميا لفترة ست ساعات تعتبر كافية لتلتزم مطالبات وظيفتك؟
( ) نعم ( ) لا

19 - إذا كانت الإجابة (لا) على السؤال السابق هل يعود ذلك إلى:
( ) حجم العمل كبير ويتناوب مع مسؤوليات قسمك أو
( ) انخفاضك بنشاط اجتماعي لعدمك مثل (زيارة الأصدقاء خلال ساعات العمل اليومي) أو
( ) زملاؤك في العمل غير متعاونين مما يستدعي منك أن تراجع معظم الأعمال بنفسك.
( ) غير ذلك (أذكر).

20 - ماهي أهم الأشياء التي تفضلك في وظيفتك حالياً؟
( ) الغرب من المنزل والعائلة أو
( ) المكانة الاجتماعية المميزة أو
( ) الأمن الوظيفي أو
( ) الراتب المنطاز أو
( ) غير ذلك (أذكر).
21 - أفترض أنك خبرت بين عدد من الوظائف التالية فما هي الوظيفة التي سوف تختارها؟

( ) وظيفة برتبة مرتفع ولكنها بعيدة عن عائلتك وأصدقائك أو
( ) وظيفة برتبة متوسط ولكنها قرب عائلتك وأصدقائك.

22 - إذا خبرت بين الوظائف التالية، فأي وظيفة تختار؟

( ) وظيفة ذات سلطة ومسؤولية عالية في امارة أخرى أو
( ) وظيفة ذات سلطة ومسؤولية متوسطة ولكنها في امارة تأ.

23 - أفترض وجود موظفين في قسمك. الموظف الأول (أ) ينفذ القوانين بحرفية تامة في جميع الحالات. أما الآخر (ب) فأنه يتجاوز عن بعض القوانين. إذا شعر انها تخدم أغراض وأهداف العمل. أي الموظفين في رأيك الأفضل؟

( ) الأول (أ) أو
( ) الثاني (ب).

24 - أي الموظفين تعتقد ان رئيسك سيعتبره الأفضل

( ) الأول (أ) أو
( ) الثاني (ب).

25 - أفترض أنه لا بد منك أن تتخذ قرارا فوريا وعاجلا في قضية ما في قسمك? فما هي الطريقة الأكثر فعالية والانفعال لاتجاوز ذلك؟

( ) تخبر مسؤولك المباشر قبل اتخاذ القرار أو
( ) تتخذ القرار المناسب وتحمل المسؤولية أو
( ) غير ذلك ................................................. (أذكر).

26 - إذا حدث أن سألك شخص ما أن تصف نفسك وليس لديك الا خيارا واحدا فقط فاي من الاجوبة التالية سوف تختار؟

( ) أنا من امارة ................................................. أو
( ) أعمل في وزارة ................................................. أو
( ) خريج جامعة ................................................. أو
( ) غير ذلك ....................................................... (أذكر).
تخيل التالي: أحمد، موظف حكومي يعمل في إمارة (س) طلب منه رسمياً الانتقال للعمل في إمارة أخرى بعيدة (ص). علماً بأنه جميع أفراد عائلته وأصدقائه يعيشون في إمارة (س). كما أنه مسؤول عن والده الكبير في السن الذي يرفض الانتقال معه إلى إمارة أخرى.

لجميع هذه الأسباب يرفض (أحمد) الانتقال من إمارة (س) لذلك فقد ذهب إلى رئيس قسمه الذي يملك قرار ابقاءه في إمارة والذي صادف ان يكون أحد أقاربه وطلب منه الغاء القرار وأبقاءه في نفس الإمارة.

(أ) 27 - هل تعتقد أنه من الواجب على رئيس القسم مساعدة قريبه؟


(ب) 27 - هل تعتقد بأن أقرباء وعائلة رئيس القسم يتوقفون منه الغاء قرار النقل وأبقاء أحمد في نفس الإمارة؟


(ج) 27 - ماذا سيظهر أقرباء وعائلة (أحمد) رئيس القسم إذا رفض مساعدة قريبه؟


(د) أفترض أن مواطنًا عادياً أراد أن ينجذب عملاً ضروريًا ومستجلبًا في إحدى وزارات الدولة. فما هي أسمى الطريق لانجاز عمله؟


أ - ( ) أن يذهب مباشرة إلى الشخص المسؤول لإنجاز معاشرته أو

ب - ( ) الاتصال بأحد الأقرباء ذو النفوذ وطلب المساعدة أو

ج - ( ) الاتصال بأحد الأشخاص من غير الأقرباء ذو النفوذ وطلب المساعدة.
29 - إذا طلب منك أن تصف طريقة الإشراف الذي يتبعه مسؤولك المباشر عليك كيف تصفه؟
( ) يفضل أن يمارس إشرافاً دقيقاً وباشرناً ويتحقق من كل شيء أو
( ) يزود مسؤولية بالمعلومات الكافية ويترك لهم حرية التصرف أو
( ) يترك مسؤولية حرية التصرف وتحمل المسؤولية.
( ) غير ذلك ........................................... (أذكر).

30 - ما هي عدد المرات التي تلتقي بها مع مسؤولك المباشر خلال أسبوع؟
( ) مرتين على الأقل في اليوم أو
( ) مرة على الأقل في اليوم أو
( ) يوماً بعد يوم أو
( ) مرة في الأسبوع
( ) غير ذلك ........................................... (أذكر).

31 - إذا طلب منك أن تقييم إداء الموظفين الإداريين المواطنين في الإمارات هل تعتقد أنهم:
( ) على كفاءة عالية أو
( ) على كفاءة متوسطة أو
( ) بلا كفاءة أو
( ) لا أعرف.

32 - إذا طلب منك أن تقييم إداء الموظفين الإداريين غير المواطنين في الإمارات هل تعتقد أنهم:
( ) على كفاءة عالية أو
( ) على كفاءة متوسطة أو
( ) بلا كفاءة أو
( ) لا أعرف.
23 - الآن أقدم لك الحالة التخيلية الأخيرة في الاستبيان. وأسئلك بعض الاستئشarat حولها.

أفترض أن سالم وصل إلى مكتبك في أحد الأيام ووجد عدد من المراجعين في انتظاره لانجاز بعض الأعمال الروتينية. وكان من بين هؤلاء المراجعين أحد أقاربه. فكيف يجب أن يتصرف سالم؟

( ) يجب عليه انتهاء معاملة قريبة أولاً أو
( ) يجب عليه معاملته بالتساوي مع الآخرين بأن ينهي معاملة الذي وصل أولاً
( ) غير ذلك

(أ) - 23 - في رأيك كيف يتصرف الموظف في الامارات بمثل هذه الحالة؟

( ) سيقابل قريبه قبل الآخرين أو
( ) لن يقابل قريبه قبل الآخرين.

(ب) - 23 - ماذا يتوقع القرئ من سالم؟

( ) أن يقابله بعد الآخرين أو
( ) أن يقابلة قبل الآخرين.

24 - هل تشعر بأن هناك اعتبارات أخرى غير الكفاءة والجدارة لها تأثير في ترقيتك؟

( ) نعم ( ) لا


( ) القدرات في العمل أو
( ) المؤهل الدراسي العالي أو
( ) الامارة التي ينتسب إليها الشخص أو
( ) القدرة على انجاز العمل.
( ) غير ذلك

( أنكر )
26 - إذا كان لديك ملاحظة أو تعليق الرجاء عدم التردد بكتابته في السطور التالية؟

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وختاما شكرا لكم على مساهمتكم القيمة في هذه الدراسة.
والله الموافق لما فيه الخير.

إذا رغبت في الحصول على تلخيص النتائج الدراسة الرجاء ذكر:

الاسم: .................................................................

العنوان: .................................................................

الباحث
عاطق جيه
المعهد بقسم الإدارة العامة بجامعة الإمارات
للاتسـفـار / هاف / 1424 (7)