URBAN CONTROL AND CHANGING FORMS OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN UITENHAGE, 1977-1986

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DECLARATION

I declare that unless otherwise indicated by way of appropriate footnotes, that the research contained in this thesis was conducted exclusively by myself and that the material has not been used prior to this for purposes of publication or to obtain another academic degree.

Signed ........................................

Date ........................................ 20 June 1995
SUMMARY

The central question posed in this thesis is as follows: why did the apartheid urban system change over time and in space during the 1980s? Based on a case study of Langa Uitenhage, the changes in this local urban system are explained in terms of the complex and irreducible relations of power that exist within the urban system between three primary sub-systems that interacted at the local level, namely the state agencies (especially local governments and the security forces), community- and workplace-based social movements, and formal business sector, particularly the local branches of large-scale national and multi-national corporations.

The primary findings of the thesis are as follows:

(i) Uitenhage's urban system changed over time and in space as a result of the complex interactions and transactions between the elements of this local urban system and as a result of the dynamic interplay between this local urban system and the wider non-local urban, socio-economic and political systems within which Uitenhage's local urban system was embedded.

(ii) Local urban politics can be explained as the organised expression of those interactions and transactions that resulted from conflicting conceptions of urban meaning and the corresponding urban functions and urban forms that flowed from different urban meanings.

(iii) The dynamics of local urban politics cannot be explained as the epiphenomena of underlying structural contradictions. There were key moments when certain interactions occurred that decisively changed the qualitative nature of the relationships between the elements of the local urban system as a whole. Herein lies the importance of such occurrences as police massacres of peaceful demonstrators, violent crowd attacks on representatives of the state, local-level negotiations and mass detentions.

(iv) This local case study contributes to an explanation of urban system change and the dynamics of urban politics. However, the case study has not been designed to generate another general theory of urban system change or urban politics. It only demonstrated the usefulness of systems theory as a guide for case study research.
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INTRODUCTION: THESIS, CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY

THE PRIMARY THESIS

The central question posed in this thesis is as follows: why did the apartheid urban system change over time and in space during the 1980s? The secondary questions that flow from this relate to the following: What was the connection between changes in the urban system and local urban politics? What were the dynamics of local urban political conflicts and why did they follow the patterns that they did? Finally, what were the linkages between local urban politics and non-local political dynamics?

It is argued in this thesis that the rapidly changing dynamics of the South African urban system during the 1980s can best be grasped via a case study of the local urban political dynamics that shaped systemic changes in the urban system. In the case study of Langa, Uitenhage, the changes in this local urban system are explained in terms of the complex and irreducible relations of power that exist within the urban system between three primary sub-systems that interacted at the local level, namely the state agencies (especially local governments and the security forces), community- and workplace-based social movements, and formal business sector, particularly the local branches of large-scale national and multi-national corporations. Using open systems theory as an alternative to the mainstream largely structuralist paradigms that predominate in contemporary urban studies, it is argued that the dynamics and outcomes of ongoing and ever-changing conflicts over the nature and meaning of the urban system cannot be explained in terms of a single or dominant group of factors that are deemed a priori to possess the necessary explanatory capacity for accounting for the nature of the system as a whole. Instead of being the sum of its parts, the localised urban system is a product of their interaction and these interactions, in turn, are profoundly influenced by the dynamics of the non-local systems within which local systems are embedded and which often define the terrain of local power relations that determine the nature of the interactions between the component parts of the urban system.
Social actions are embedded in meanings and contextualised relations of power that require forms of explanation that are far more complex than structuralist and reductionist explanations have been able to offer. This is why this thesis attempts to examine the changing dynamics of the urban system via an in-depth study of a particularly significant local context, namely Uitenhage. This is not, however, a "case study" of non-local processes from which it is possible to somehow derive the logic of the local context. Nor does it set out to prove a predetermined theory. Instead, it is an open systems examination of a local context at three levels: (i) the local material interests of those directly involved in state agencies, social movements and businesses who found themselves having to respond to political and systemic processes in ways that changed the way they realised their respective interests in the way the form and function of Uitenhage's urban system was constituted and managed; (ii) the impact of national (and where possible even international) systems and processes (within which local interests were embedded) on the dynamics of the local context, paying particular attention to how the interests and actions of local actors were influenced and re-defined by these ever-changing non-local processes and, in turn, how local processes affected non-local dynamics; (iii) the micro-level dynamics of conflict in situations such as massacres, crowd violence and negotiations where subjective choices of action had more to do with the way meaning was constructed and interpreted through symbols and language mediated by the spatial imperatives of the local context than with the 'dull compulsion' of wider structural contradictions.

The primary findings of the thesis are as follows:

(i) Uitenhage's urban system changed over time and in space as a result of the complex interactions and transactions between the elements of this local urban system and as a result of the dynamic interplay between this local urban system and the wider non-local urban, socio-economic and political systems within which Uitenhage's local urban system was embedded.

(ii) Local urban politics can be explained as the organised expression of those interactions and transactions that resulted from conflicting conceptions of
urban meaning and the corresponding urban functions and urban forms that flowed from different urban meanings.

(iii) The dynamics of local urban politics cannot be explained as the epiphenomena of underlying structural contradictions. The cut and thrust of local urban politics is contingent and dependent on a myriad of subjective choices. However, it is possible to identify key moments when certain interactions occurred that decisively changed the qualitative nature of the relationships between the elements of the urban system as a whole. Herein lies the importance of such occurrences as police massacres of peaceful demonstrators, violent crowd attacks on representatives of the state, local-level negotiations and mass detentions.

(iv) This local case study contributes to an explanation of urban system change and the dynamics of urban politics. However, the case study has not been designed to generate another general theory of urban system change or urban politics. It only demonstrated the usefulness of systems theory as a guide for case study research.

Each chapter of the thesis exemplifies the above abstract findings via an analytical discussion of a concrete set of local and non-local processes that directly affected the dynamic of the urban system at distinct points in time and space. This is done in each chapter by way of an introductory discussion of the relevant literature. Key literary interventions are surveyed to glean perspectives on the process that the chapter deals with. Critical questions are posed and a central problematic extracted that situates the chapter in the literature as a whole. This is then followed by an analysis of the relevant non-local processes and dynamics, followed by an in-depth examination of the local context at particular points in time and space. Each of these issues is then related back to the primary findings referred to above, namely the non-derivative but necessarily interactive nature of the local context from the wider (inter-)national context, and the contingent nature of the choices made by interests located within their respective local urban sub-systems.
All the elements that have been used to construct the above articulation of the primary thesis are unpacked and developed in the sections that make up the rest of this introduction.

**WHY UITENHAGE AND ITS CONTEXT**

By the mid-1980s, Uitenhage was a still a relatively small town of just below 200 000 people. Broken down into the official racial categories, there were 26 000 whites, 30 000 coloureds and anything between 110 and 150 000 Africans.

Located in-land beyond the 'rust belt' some 35 Kilometres north of Port Elizabeth, it formed part of the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolitan economy (see map 1.1). In many ways it resembled the classic apartheid urban form: a white controlled Central Business District surrounded by well serviced, leafy white suburbs comprised of solid working and middle class housing. About 10 Kilometres south west of the centre of the town, there was a large black township that was consciously created behind a hill to replicate the familiar apartheid illusion of non-existent black people. And then a distinct coloured area to the north that was supposed to be separated by a buffer strip from the white suburbs. It was this buffer strip, however, that had been intensely contested by the town's population groups at least since the 1920s. By the mid-1980s the ferocious Group Area laws that were passed in the 1950s had still not been applied in a way that 'cleansed' this little patch of land sandwiched between the white suburbs, the coloured area and the CBD of the african community that lived there. This was the community called Kabah or Langa,2 and it is this community that is the focus of this thesis (see map 1.2).

Although Port Elizabeth was the Eastern Cape's largest city and a key Cape port, Uitenhage was not simply a dormitory town that served Port Elizabeth. It had its own distinct economy, polity and urban system that were, in turn, a product of their own historical processes. It is the distinctive features of Uitenhage's urban history that forms the basis for the argument developed in the chapters that follow. These local processes and dynamics, however, were constituted within
(and partly by) a national context of dramatic socio-economic and political transition.

The great historical forces that shaped the dynamics of South African politics during the 1980s were comprised of a set of inter-linked processes that can be described as follows:

* the crisis of an essentially capitalist economic system that had hitherto been racially structured to meet the needs of a largely white consumer market and was premised on import-substitution, foreign exchange earnings from raw material exports, cheap black labour and high levels of regulation;3

* the dynamics of regime-driven constitutional and political reform coupled to a militaristic security strategy both of which had, since the Soweto Uprisings of 1976, attempted to respond to popular demands for democracy, redistribution and justice without fundamentally compromising the form and function of the apartheid state;4

* the birth in the early 1970s and subsequent maturation throughout the 1980s of a set of community and workplace-based social movements in civil society that connected up with underground and exile-based liberation movements in a way that systematically deepened the economic crisis and delegitimised the state's reform initiatives;5

* the urbanisation processes that relentlessly re-shaped the nature of urban living for everyone,6 from the super-rich that had ensconced themselves in remarkable luxury, to sprawling white suburbia that housed the white middle and working classes, to the upwardly mobile black middle class and employed workers that lived in peripheralised and standardised dormitory townships, to the masses of urban poor who migrated to wherever they could find a patch of land to erect their shacks;
MAP 1.2

Uitenhage’s Historical Areas

Inset: Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage Area

the internationalisation of the South African conflict to the point where its pariah status began to affect the economic foundations of apartheid as multi-national companies either reformed the workplace or withdrew or both, and the international political and social system collaborated to ensure that the apartheid state never enjoyed the kind legitimation that many other second and third world authoritarian regimes have enjoyed over the decades.7

By the time the transition to democracy began in 1990, all these historical forces had intersected and combined in particular ways at different points in time and space throughout the previous two decades. The onset of the transition did not represent the "resolution" of the multiple contradictions inherent in the social formation created by apartheid, but it did mark the beginning of a new political process that brought actors into political society that the regime had hitherto insisted on excluding.8

All of these processes and their various manifestations at different spatial scales have been extensively studied and written up by scholars and writers whose intellectual traditions and methods span the disciplines and paradigms. This is not the place to review the entire gamut of contemporary South African studies because the purpose of this thesis is not to further the debate about these processes in their generality per se. Instead, the purpose is to try and integrate an understanding of these national (and indeed global) processes by threading them through the eye of a local context. The problem with much of the general writing is that although in practice it was the constant reformation and recomposition of the intersections and interdependencies of different processes that actually shaped the history of the 1980s, they were often dealt with as distinct and disconnected dynamics by the different disciplines that 'owned' their respective fields. Economists dealt with the economic crisis, political scientists "did the state", industrial sociologists and management experts studied the unions and the labour process, sociologists and urbanologists dealt with urban social movements, urban planners dominated the spatial analysis of urbanisation, and so on. It was only in some of the rich case studies of contemporary processes that have evolved over the last decade and a half that
some disciplinary and paradigmatic integration has occurred. It is in this unselfconscious and largely unexamined tradition (if it is possible to call it that now) that this study is located. Put another way, it may well be that this post-modern moment of paradigmatic agnosticism is opportune for going back to local processes and dynamics in order to explore what I think may be an emerging systems approach to phenomena that are now regarded as interdependent and therefore irreducible to any one variable that is deemed a priori to have greater explanatory weight than any of the other variables. This post-mechanistic systems way of thinking clears away the debris of reductionism so that the integrity of the complexity of each context can be more adequately grasped and analysed. (More on this below.)

However, before elucidating the methodology and methods used during the research process, it is necessary to situate this thesis in a review of two (related) bodies of knowledge, namely the South African literature on township politics, and the international theoretical literature on the nature of urban dynamics and political processes.

SOUTH AFRICAN LITERATURE ON URBAN POLITICS: A BRIEF REVIEW

For the purposes of this review, a selection of South African academic writings have been selected that relate in one way or another to the main focus of this thesis, namely the politics of the apartheid urban system with particular reference to the black townships. In other words, only that literature that has the urban system as its subject matter has been addressed in this review. To demonstrate the various approaches used and subject matter tackled, distinct and related trends in the literature will be reviewed.

Given the dominance of the state in the making of apartheid via law, regulation and coercive enforcement, it is not surprising that there is a significant body of writing that is focussed on the strategies, tactics and manipulative power of the various state agencies involved in the planning, control and management of the urban system. On the whole this literature has assumed that the Apartheid state had a high degree of control over the urban system and therefore it was the policies and strategies of the state that were the dominant determinant of urban development processes. Both Marxist and institutional (in the structural
(or both) components of state strategy and have either explained these as functional to the needs of capital (in the case of Marxists) or in the interests of an Afrikaner Nationalist hegemonic interest (in the case of liberals). From the point of view of the subject matter of this thesis, a state-centric approach is less than helpful because the evidence points quite decisively to the fact that the urban system and its sub-systems are shaped by a multiplicity of non-state forces that are at least as significant as the regime-driven dynamics. Furthermore there are contradictions and competing interests within the state system that state-centric analyses often ignore.

Closely related to the state-centric analyses are those analyses that have focussed on the role played by the security forces in managing urban-based resistance, conflict and violence. While yielding a rich and subtle literature on the institutional dynamics of policing strategies and (to a much lesser extent) the role played by the Defense Force in backing up the police during periods of heightened township conflict, the underlying purpose of much of this writing has been to reinforce the state-centric analysis of urban control. In other words, after accepting uncritically that the logic of state urban controls was to simply maintain the oppression of black township dwellers, these analyses were largely about demonstrating the inherent functionality of the security forces in the enforcement of these urban controls. As will be demonstrated in this thesis, the relationship between security force action and urban management cannot be simplistically reduced to their shared origins in apartheid policy. The interaction between the two means of control changed at different points in time and space for reasons that were not always related to policy choices at Central Government level. In fact, as will be shown, the policy choices of those responsible for urban management in Uitenhage at central and local level were at crucial moments contradicted by security force action. Herein lies the importance of the 'local-level negotiations' literature referred to below.

Since about the mid-1980s a rapidly growing literature that was self-consciously focussed on 'urban development'/ 'urban policy' / 'urban processes' began to emerge. In recent years this literature has begun to emerge in the form of edited collections with specifically urban titles and in 1990 a new academic journal called Urban Forum began to be published by the University of the
Witwatersrand Press. While substantial portions of this literature addressed the policy and structural context of urban politics, there was also literature that addressed the urban policy framework that local governments and other sub-national state agencies established and maintained. Since the transition began in 1990, the production of normative urban policy literature has escalated enormously with institutions like the Urban Foundation, NGOs linked to the democratic movement and state agencies generating position papers for the negotiation process. While the prodigious output of self-conscious urban literature has contributed significantly to our understanding of South Africa's urban system, it has tended to suffer on the whole from two problems. Firstly, it is largely descriptive - a point that Seekings observed in his review. Secondly, when describing the urban system, the approach has been to describe the component parts of the system ( racially segregated townships, pass laws, Black Local Authorities, separate legal systems, demographics, socio-economic conditions, social movements, etc) on the assumption that the urban system is the sum of these parts. While being spatially textured, this approach has inadequately explained the dynamics of urban processes over time. As the next section will show, until a system is seen as the product of the interaction between its component parts as opposed to merely the sum of these parts, then it becomes difficult to comprehend the complex and changing rhythms of meaning, structure and power.

Local Government is probably the most well researched and written about area within the burgeoning urban studies field. It is also a rich and diverse literature that is generated by scholars from disciplines that range from classical public administration through to avante garde public management, from political science through to urban planners, from sociologists through to social historians. To classify this literature, Atkinson and Swilling reviewed 170 of the key articles on local government in terms of five categories. These categories were the 'public administration approach', the 'radical/progressive' approach, the 'institutional dynamics' approach, the 'transition literature' and the 'partisan political' literature.

The 'public administration' approach has contributed a huge quantity of scrupulously technicist writings on the formal institutions of local government. This literature focussed on law, structure and procedure and ignored politics,
power and process. Up until the transition began in 1990 it was the dominant intellectual tradition within the formal state system. The 'radical/progressive' approach was normatively committed to the interests of the oppressed majority and was concerned to demonstrate the linkage between local government institutions and the relations of production (in the case of Marxists) and the relations of political power (in the case of radical liberals) or both (in the case of those using the 'Colonialism of a Special Type' theory). It is this tradition that has had the most profound impact on policy making during the transition.

The 'institutional dynamics' approach has been overwhelmingly interested in the relations of power within local government institutions and less interested in the external impact on local government institutions of economic or even political forces. Influenced by phenomenological methodologies, researchers using this approach focussed on the categories of players within the institutions, differentiated interests and intra-institutional conflicts.

The 'transition approach' began to take shape after 1990 (but with roots in the late 1980s) when the search for post-apartheid local government alternatives began. Thus the subject matter was international comparative examples, model building, policy prescriptions and proposed transition processes for how South African towns and cities could get from an apartheid form of local governance to a post-apartheid alternative.

Finally there was the 'partisan political' literature that was turned out by the various players as part of their respective hegemonic projects during the negotiations processes that have driven the transition.

On the whole the local government literature is overwhelmingly focussed on institutions. Either it is descriptive about what these institutions are (public administration approach), or it analyses what functions these institutions perform in terms of the relations of production and/or power ('radical/progressive' approach), or it is about the internal dynamics of these institutions ('institutional dynamics' approach), or the literature is searching for alternative institutional models (transition literature). It is quite remarkable how tenuous the link is between the local government literature and the urban studies literature really is. (A notable exception is provided by Morris who
consciously tried to explore the complex non-reducible relations between local government officials and the responses of the communities they had administrative jurisdiction over\(^\text{19}\). From the point of view of the analysis provided in the rest of the chapters that follow, the institutional fixation impedes a systems view that would locate institutions and the people operating within these institutions in a larger and more complex conception of the urban system of which local government institutions are an essential part.

In order to bridge the gap between urban systems and local government institutions, a number of writers have attempted to explain urban political dynamics in terms of the ideological predispositions and political strategies of leadership elites\(^\text{20}\). Whether they were dealing with community struggles, liberation movements, state agencies or business, the focus tended to be on the ideological mind-set of the players as the key determinant of political action, policy choice and tactical decision-making. While offering a degree of subtlety and insight that is often missing in state-centric structuralist analyses, a focus on the ideological and strategic choices of leadership elites tends to abstract out the complex system of relations within which these leadership formations are embedded. This becomes particularly apparent when urban processes occur that none of the formal leadership formations propagated, e.g. intra-communal crowd violence or land invasions. This is more than a case of the 'common man' making 'his' world as the social historians have argued in relation to elite analyses, it is also about how these kinds of developments shape and impinge on leadership choices and vice versa - i.e. it is about interactions rather than the causality of one or other component.

In contrast to much of the literature reviewed thus far in this section, probably one of the most creative fields of urban research over the last ten years has been the numerous studies of local social movements that have waged extended struggles over the nature and terms of urban living\(^\text{21}\). With some notable exceptions\(^\text{22}\), this literature has on the whole been structuralist in nature because it has derived explanations of social movements and community protest from the logic of the structure of the urban system. The classical format has been to analyse spatial location, urban management structures, socio-economic conditions and the build-up of oppositional organisation as the antecedents of the movements of protest that followed. Leadership formation, strategic
decision-making, the relations of power between the movement and the structures of urban management and even the internal contradictions within the movement were often ignored. Even those analyses that focussed on specific relations of power such as gender and youth never really went much beyond providing a more textured version of the structuralist analysis. From the point of view of this thesis, it is questionable whether it is possible to provide an adequate explanation for social movement formation without taking into account the effects of the two-way interactions between the movement and the formal state structures, the interactions within the movement itself, and how the former influenced the later and vice versa.

The growth of studies of local struggles and social movements had two significant spin-offs. Motivated by a desire to look below the imagery of heroic undifferentiated communities pitted against a monolithic police/racist state, researchers began to look into the nooks and crannies of the social movements themselves and into the relationships between these movements and the monolithic state they were supposedly completely opposed to. Those who looked into the movements themselves began to generate a rich literature on what was called the 'organs of people's power'. The 'people's power' researchers were particularly interested in the forms of popular justice that emerged in various places around the country. While hotly debated, this research rapidly revealed the connections between 'people's justice' and the state criminal justice system because quite often the two supposedly competing systems were found to be inter-dependent. As far as those who chose to ask questions about the relationships between social movements and the state, they soon discovered surprisingly complex interactions that belied the popular notion of a revolutionary rupture between the 'power bloc' and the 'the people'. I am referring here to what has become known as the 'local-level negotiations' literature. Although quantitatively limited and theoretically undeveloped, it was this literature that first began to define the need for a theoretical approach to the changing spatial and temporal dynamics of power. The reason for this rather bold claim is that the literature on local-level negotiations was focussed on the discussions and negotiations that took place between the leaders of powerful local township-based social movements and the established white leadership of local business associations and local governments. Why this occurred, what actually happened and the effects of these interactions on the nature and
management of the urban system were the questions that began to generate answers that were at odds with the conventional wisdom about what drove South African politics. It is no coincidence that this thesis is about one of the most well known of these instances of local-level negotiations.

While the 'local-level negotiations' literature emerged to explore integrative processes that began re-shaping urban dynamics and processes, another body of literature emerged to explain the disintegrative processes that resulted from escalating levels of urban violence. While local-level negotiations is a key element of the drama of this thesis, so is violence in its various manifestations. The violence literature has provided useful overviews of violent processes, the effects of violence on particular sectors of society, the socio-psychological determinants of violence and the structural context of violent conflict. It is lacking, however, in two respects. Firstly, violence may have reached extreme levels in the South African conflict, but violence still did not affect every urban community. Why did violence occur in the form that it occurred where it occurred and not in similar spatial and temporal locations despite the fact that in both locations the same structural conditions existed? Although Thornton was one of the few that actually asked this question, he evaded the answer by focusing only on what was specific about the symbolic effects of the Langa massacre. This opens the way for the kind of detailed reconstruction of what specifically triggers violent conflict in particular contexts. This is what this thesis attempts to do. Secondly, the violence literature is lacking with respect to the analysis of violent behavior by sections of the community. Once again, this is addressed in this thesis. In both instances - the spatial and temporal specificity of violence and the dynamics of community-based violence - a structural approach is found wanting.

The analysis of urban political dynamics has also emerged in writings that have focussed on national-level organisations such as the United Democratic Front as well as on national-level trends and strategic/ideological dynamics. In a similar vein, workplace-based social movements that have impacted on the nature and political dynamics of the urban system have also been analysed. These two related bodies of literature played an exceptionally important role in the process of constructing a national picture of an organised political alternative representative of the oppressed black majority. While this literature has been
used in this thesis to contextualise the formation, ideology and strategic choices of Uitenhage's political and trade union organisations that represented this town's oppressed communities in the 1980s, this literature is limited to national generalisations despite the (often implicit) claims of some writers that local trends were merely derivatives of national processes. This view is explicit in the conspiratorial literature that emanated from the state-linked security analysts and implicit in the writings of those sympathetic to the liberation movement who conceptualised every element of resistance as moments in the unraveling of a 'National Democratic Revolution' that was, in turn, constructed teleologically as an inevitable process with a singular end-point. Obviously between these two poles there were more subtle analyses that were much more modest in their claims. The best of these simply sought to set the stage of national political contestation rather than assume universality.31 However, I would like to conclude by agreeing with Seekings who argued that "[a] full account of protests and conflict needs to locate the choices regarding political action made by individuals at the local level - leaders, activists, and other township residents - within the context of constraints, pressures, and opportunities set by both the political economy and the actions of national political organisations."32

In conclusion, the 'township politics' literature has contributed significantly to both a general and localised understanding of community-based political dynamics. In particular, it has provided a valuable analysis of the relationship between apartheid urban systems, community leadership formation, ideology and internal community processes as resistance to urban apartheid built up. It has, however, largely failed to connect the dynamics of resistance to changing urban policies at national and local level. The more generalised analyses of urban structures and urban policies contained in the urbanisation literature does provide some understanding of these changes, but tends to neglect an analysis of the interface between resistance and structure. Unfortunately, the South African literature on the local state does not help to transcend this dualist perspective that ably depicts the complexity of resistance, but against the backdrop of a homogenous state/ruling bloc on the one hand, or else the complexity of policy and structural change is provided without linking this to the impact of resistance.
By focusing on relationships in a local context, it is possible to begin to ask and answer two questions. Firstly, how did the local officials interpret and implement the central state's urban policy? By state urban policy is meant the set of administrative practices, planning procedures and regulatory controls that officials were empowered to use to determine the form and function of the urban system. Marxist and Weberian analyses have tended to assume that state systems are homogeneous rational entities free of internal contradictions and hence capable of implementing the central state's policies in a uniform and mechanical manner. This view tends to ignore two processes. Firstly, the specificity of the economic, social, political and ideological nature of the circumstances which local officials have to deal with, and how this influences the content and limits the scope of their actions. Secondly, the peculiarities of the ideological mind-set of the local officials and their perceptions of their social roles - a factor which has had a major influence on the nature of local administrative systems.

If the impact of these two processes is taken into account, it will be possible to identify the social character of local administrative structures and the role that particular officials played in constructing these structures. This approach avoids the assumption that the local forms of urban control are the mechanical expressions of a monolithic undifferentiated state policy. It also helps to unravel the empirical connections between local interests (e.g. business and communities) and the views and actions of officialdom.

The second question is how do different classes and social strata within urban communities respond to the way their urban existence is controlled and managed by local officials? How do these responses, in turn, affect the local officials?

These questions address issues related to the sociological composition of the community, the specific way in which the local forms of control affected the community, and the complex linkages between different segments of the community and the local officials. The object of this exercise is to disaggregate and bring into relief the social agents whose experiences shaped and molded the character of the community instead of assuming that it is culturally homogeneous and socially undifferentiated.
Before proceeding, the approach outlined above that has been located in the context of the South African literature needs to be contextualised in the international literature on urban theory, particularly that literature that has attempted to provide a theory of local urban politics.

**REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL URBAN THEORY AND ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO URBAN ANALYSIS**

International urban theory has emerged out of the need to theorise relations of power and production that increasingly appeared to be distinct from what were assumed to be general relations of power and production. This section will review a selection of the key urban theorists that have attempted to theorise the spatial dimensions of these relations. Given the centrality of urban/local politics in this thesis, the inquiry will be around the way international urban theory has attempted to conceptualise local urban politics.

The spatial relations between the location of home, work and urban facilities has often occupied the minds of urban theorists. In particular, the relationship between spatial and social inequalities became important in the 1970s. Williams argued that "[b]ecause objects are not randomly distributed, neither is the value and meaning of places." Williams argues from this that given that the spatial location of homes, workplaces and urban facilities is the result of specific decisions by a defined set of decision-makers located within particular structures, and given that location determines access, it follows that it is these decisions that are the stuff of urban politics.

Williams argues that urban communities use various strategies to determine the value of the spaces they occupy. These range from defensive strategies such as zoning, through to offensive strategies such as private or public investment schemes in urban facilities, and also 'purification' strategies aimed at rooting out incompatible urban elements through urban renewal or slum clearance. No matter what strategy is required, Williams refers to the way urban coalitions form around particular strategies. Urban politics is then about the competition between these urban coalitions. This competition is present in the institutions of urban governance, particularly in local government.
The spatial access analysis provided by Williams succeeds in highlighting the spatial determinants of urban politics, but it can be criticised for reducing urban political conflicts to spatial relations when, in certain instances, non-spatial social relations may be where the explanation lies. In addition, the emphasis on competition between urban coalitions may be pertinent to a democratic pluralist environment as understood via elite competition theory, but where there are structural obstacles to urban political competition (like in South Africa before democratisation), it may be preferable to refer to conflict rather than competition. Finally, Williams' assumption that spatial access is specific to the local level ignores the impact of non-local political decisions about the spatial structure of the urban system. Given the dramatic and intrusive impact of Central Government urban policies on South Africa's towns and cities, this aspect of Williams' analysis seems particularly unhelpful.

Cox also attempts to find a connection between spatial location in the urban system and urban political dynamics. However, instead of doing this via Williams' concept of spatial access, he does it via his notion of 'externality effects'. An externality effect is the effect of the activities of individuals/communities/companies/public agencies etc on other individuals/communities/companies/public agencies etc that experience the external effects of these activities. These externality effects can be positive or negative. The explanation for urban politics lies in the way urban subjects either move close to positive externality effects or away from negative externality effects; or they try to alter their existing environment by bargaining with those who can improve their living environment by diminishing negative externality effects or promoting positive externality effects.

Applied to an explanation of the politics of inequality and the measures to address inequalities in American cities, Cox's analysis makes it possible to explain numerous urban political dynamics. He shows, for example, how middle-class suburbs protect themselves from the negative externality effects of having to subsidise the urban poor by keeping the urban poor out via zoning mechanisms. Or he shows how Local Governments with large impoverished inner city populations may try to attract the middle class back into the inner city by taking steps to diminish negative externality effects. He can also explain inter-locality conflict in terms of how certain stakeholders become territorially
organised to diminish the negative externality effects generated by stakeholders that are territorially organised elsewhere in the city. His analysis also makes it possible to explain the locational decisions of capital as it pursues lower labour costs or improved infrastructural services. Or, alternatively, his analysis can explain the strategies of local governments to promote positive externality effects to promote the movement of certain kinds of citizens and investments from one locality to another.

Like Williams' analysis, Cox's analysis runs the danger of reducing politics to the dynamic of spatial relations when in fact the explanation for certain political processes may lie in non-spatial dynamics. More importantly, it is unclear why political processes triggered by spatial conflict over externality effects can be limited to the types of interactions that take place within the urban system. Put another way, this explanation of political dynamics can be applied at numerous levels (local and non-local) and beyond the urban system.

Whereas Williams and Cox share the notion that local government gets used by the urban coalition that gets control of it to service the spatial interests of that urban coalition, writers influenced by managerialist conceptions of the state have provided a very different conception of local government. Pahl, for example, is a leading proponent of the 'urban managerialism' thesis which posits that the spatial distribution of urban inequality is the result of manipulative decisions by a wide range of independently positioned (or 'relatively autonomous' in a different lexicon) 'urban managers' located in the public and private sectors who are involved in the allocation of scarce urban resources.35 These 'urban managers' are largely professionals who are located somewhere between the urban poor and the economic and political elites. It is assumed that they share a common interest, have similar views on what needs to be done and have equal access to resources across localities. It is the empirical impossibility of this last statement that has brought Pahl's 'urban managerialism' thesis into question. His later writings removed the crudity from the argument and in so doing paved the way for an important more nuanced focus on the role of private and public sector professionals in the 'management' of the urban system and, in particular, in the role they play in the allocation of scarce resources.36 This theoretical point is taken up in this thesis in various chapters, but without the bias towards managerial autonomy that tends to permeate Pahl's work.
While Williams, Cox, Pahl and others were trying to find explanations for urban political dynamics in the way scarce urban resources were allocated or accessed by spatially defined interest groups, urban theorists from the Marxist tradition were trying to define 'urban politics' in terms of the processes of 'collective consumption' that were required to reproduce labour power in capitalist societies. The leading exponent of this tradition was, of course, Manuel Castells.

Castell's point of departure was that all relations between social agents are also always spatial relations. This means that any relation of production (in the Marxist sense) must have a spatial location. Given that for Castells every space in capitalist society has a meaning and purpose, it follows that it is the nature of the relations of production that are spatially manifested that determine the nature of these spatial relations. In other words, the explanation for why a certain space is structured in the way that it is can be found in the logic of the economic processes that require that space to be configured in the way that it is. In particular, it is those economic processes that relate to the reproduction of labour power via the collective consumption patterns of urban households that most directly shapes and structures urban space. It is this theorisation of the relationship between space and capitalist production that allows Castells to conclude that the city (or urban system) is equivalent to the spatial location of the means of collective reproduction of labour power. It follows from this that urban politics is about the contestation over the way in which the means of collective consumption is organised.

The two central 'urban actors' involved in urban politics are 'urban planning' and 'urban social movements'. As far as Castells is concerned, the role of urban planning is to ensure the extended reproduction of labour power, regulate non-antagonistic contradictions and to organise the urban system in a way that reproduces the conditions for capital accumulation.

As far as urban social movements are concerned, Castells defines these as structurally determined by urban contradictions that have the effect of substantially shifting the balance of political power in an anti-capitalist direction.
For the purposes of this review, the wide-ranging critique of Castells' early work (including by himself) will be left aside for the moment. What is important here is whether his concepts are useful for an analysis of South African urban politics. Although the entire Althuserian project (of which Castell's early writings was a part) is intrinsically hostile to empirical 'testing', it needs to be said that the reduction of urban politics to the politics of collective consumption poses a very serious problem for empirical research. If operationalised, it would drive the researcher into the structure and workings of the means of collective consumption. The first finding is that this would not have any specific spatial parameter. Each means of collective consumption (water, electricity, education, welfare, etc) has a different spatial context and are organised at different levels. This would pose a problem for determining these means as the material basis for urban political conflicts and struggles. Secondly, urban planning is not an activity that is spatially bound. As the history of urbanisation and urban development in Uitenhage will reveal, decisions about this urban system were taken at numerous different levels at different points in time. And finally, to judge Uitenhage's social movements purely in terms of their effects would result in an explanation of urban change that leaves out the relations of power that determined what actually happened at every point in the process.

It would, however, be unfortunate to lose the concept of collective consumption. It has penetrated everyday thinking about the urban system and has informed a wide range of international studies. Dunleavy tried to rescue the concept by retaining the link between urban politics and the politics of collective consumption, but he avoided theoretical confusion by demonstrating that this link is not automatically manifested at the level of the urban/local level but is rather manifested at many levels. This local/non-local urban political analysis is a pragmatic way out of the problem. It remains, however, essentially reductionist in nature. As the analysis of Uitenhage's urban political dynamics reveal, urban political conflict originates from a multiplicity of sources that cannot easily be reduced to the structure and workings of the means of collective consumption. Nevertheless, it was the complex conflicts over one particular means of collective consumption - namely housing and urban services - that played a particularly important role in the politics of Uitenhage.
In contrast to the economistic explanations of local urban politics reviewed thus far, two influential theories provided by Fischer and Castells have emphasised the cultural determinants of urban political conflict.41

Fischer argues that urban society clusters groups together in ways that creates the necessary 'critical mass' for urban sub-cultures to form. Each critical mass of specifically clustered urbanites generates urban sub-cultures that define behavior, norms and practices in the urban society. Different sub-cultures, however, come into conflict with one another as some become innovators and others become deviants. Political dynamics emerge out of these conflicts.

While Fischer's theory provides a useful counter-balance to economistic explanations of urban politics, his theory provides an inadequate explanation for why certain sub-cultures form in particular contexts. There is no necessary connection between the nature of urban society and the sub-cultures it generates. By referring to the process of building up 'critical mass' via 'urbanism' as the basis for urban political conflict, Fischer has possibly tried to explain much too much in terms of what is only one component of the process of urban political formation. It is the 'late' Castells that provides a more rooted theory of cultural determination of urban politics.

In direct contrast to his earlier work, Castell's *The City and Grassroots* is consciously set up to provide a series of "theorised histories" of specific urban systems rather than a general theory of what the urban system is. He does this via his notion of "urban meaning" --a cultural concept that attempts to grasp the historical evolution of what urban systems mean to the historical actors that "make" them at specific points in time and space. Because this concept has deeply influenced the approach adopted in the rest of this thesis, it needs substantial elaboration.

Castells defines the city as follows:

"Cities, like all social reality, are historical products, not only in their physical materiality but in their cultural meaning, in the role they play in the social organisation, and in people's lives. The basic dimension in urban change is the conflictive debate between social classes and historical
actors over the meaning of urban, the significance of spatial forms in the social structure, and the content, hierarchy, and destiny of cities in relationship to the entire social structure. A city (and each type of city) is what a historical society decides the city (and each city) will be. Urban is the social meaning assigned to a particular spatial form by a historically defined society."42

For Castells urban meaning determines the function and form of the urban system. So, example, if the meaning assigned to a particular urban system is that it is the centre of colonial control, its function will be to assemble in space the instruments of military and territorial force that will be required to realise this meaning. The urban form that will emerge will reflect this function, i.e. fortresses or protected laagers of colonial settlers. Another example would be the medieval city where the meaning of the urban system was determined largely by the requirements of the priesthood to subordinate peasant production in the interests of feudal lords. These cities assembled the necessary religious institutions in a way that gave functional expression to this meaning and the urban form was an architectural replication of the cosmological order that the priesthood's ideology attempted reproduce. Capitalist cities can be explained in similar terms: their meaning is capitalist surplus value extraction and so their form is the result of how factories, offices and homes are assembled in space to realise the basic laws of capitalism. Their architecture is only partly functional to these requirements because this architecture is also about the construction of a skyscraper urban landscape that is representative of the dominance of wealth in the urban system.

When applied to the South African urban system, obviously racial control and reproduction of cheap and differentiated labour power is what urban meaning was all about. The functional spatial organisation of the apartheid city followed from this urban meaning which, in turn, gave rise to an urban form that symbolised racial oppression through homogenised peripheralised black settlements surrounding a skyscraper Central Business District where capital accumulation was defined as the abode of white ownership.

Based on the conceptual building blocks of urban meaning, urban function and urban form, Castells argued that urban politics arises out three inter-related
processes: conflicts over the definition of urban meaning, conflicts over the effects of urban function, and conflicts over the cultural forms that express urban meaning and/or form. In other words, unlike his earlier work and the work of Williams or Cox, he is not arguing that urban politics must *a priori* be seen as the expression of purely material contradictions. Rather, urban politics should be seen as the product of conflicts that will have historically specific (or 'conjunctural' - to use the old Althusserian language) determinants, some of which may well be symbolic forms rather than material urban functions.

In practical terms, urban political conflict can have numerous outcomes. For Castells, 'urban social change' is when urban meaning is redefined. However, when urban functions are adapted or recomposed, this is what urban planning is about; while urban design is about the process of constructing urban form.

The main operational problem with Castell's cross-cultural theory of urban systems is that his central concept of 'urban meaning' tends to be used in the singular rather than the plural. By this I am referring to the fact that he has assumed that it is possible to identify what the urban meaning of a particular urban system is and then identify what conflicts arise out of this. An alternative would have been to accept that the function and form of a particular urban system can be generated by more than one urban meaning that is operative within that urban system. This means that urban political conflict could either be between one set of urban actors who want to defend a particularly dominant urban meaning against another that wants to oppose this urban meaning. Or else, urban political conflict could be between one set of urban actors that have an alternative urban meaning that they would like to see become hegemonic and another set that would like their conception of urban meaning to be dominant. In the latter case, urban politics is about competing urban meanings, rather conflicts about a singular dominant urban meaning.

While South African urban systems were at a superficial level the product of a singular urban meaning as defined by national policy, in reality local urban politics was about a multiplicity of urban meanings that shaped urban functions and forms at different points in time and space. As the last chapter of the thesis reveals, one of these urban meanings replaced another after the apartheid urban
meaning was displaced from its dominant position in the local government system.

Castells' conception of urban social movements does, in fact, capture the dynamic of competing urban meanings. He argues that when a particular social group consciously and collectively mobilises against the institutionalised urban meaning and replaces it with a new urban meaning, then this is what he would call an urban social movement. He elaborates this by arguing that in transhistorical terms, urban social movements of this nature have mobilised around one or more of the following three aspects of the urban system, namely:

* collective consumption demands that relate to the nature of the 'city' (or urban system to use the language of this thesis);

* cultural identities that relate to the nature of 'community'; and

* the nature of local governance or local political power.

While these are useful indicators as to what kinds of issues urban social movements 'take up', Castells relapses into his erstwhile structuralism when he goes too far by arguing that urban social movements only deserve to termed 'urban social movements' when they mobilise around all three aspects of the urban system and when this mobilisation has the "effect" of changing urban meaning. Without making the same mistake, it is possible to use Castell's framework of terms as a basis for empirical analysis.

Although the thesis chapters that follow are influenced by the work of the 'late' Castells, this framework needs to be understood in comparative perspective with other urban theories that have focussed specifically on themes that Castells does not address directly, namely urban planning per se and the local state or (to avoid the conceptual dilemmas) the politics of local government.

The connection between urban planning decisions about land-use and urban politics are starkly clear in the South African context where this connection has been racially structured. Internationally, however, urban theorists have tried to
understand this connection as it manifests itself in capitalist urban systems. One such theorist is Scott.\textsuperscript{44}

Scott derives his conception of the 'urban land nexus' from a general theory of the capitalist economy. The 'urban land nexus' he argues, is the spatial distribution of capitalist property relations into a dense pattern of differentiated "locational advantages". Due to the way these property relations are spatially distributed through the urban system, different spaces acquire different values that are determined by the transport costs, rents and capital/labour inputs/outputs that flow from the spatial manifestation of the capitalist system. This then gives him the basis for developing a theory of land-use change. So, for example, he argues that \textit{intensive} land-use changes at the centre of the urban system are determined by increased capital and labour inputs that are designed to increase the productive output of the inner cities. \textit{Extensive} land-use changes take place on the periphery of the system where the emphasis is not on increasing inputs/outputs per unit of space, but increasing the units of space to accommodate greater input/output requirements that develop on the peripheries (especially residential requirements).

On the basis of the above theory, Scott advances the notion that industrial firms that can replace labour with capital equipment will tend to move outwards in search of lower land rents, while labour intensive industries will gravitate towards the inner areas where labour is cheaper. This simple logic, however, is overdetermined by the multiple logics of non-productive speculator capital, residential patterns and changes in the capitalist economy. In short, at base level the capitalist system creates multiple spatial movements of households and firms which if left to themselves will create an urban system that will become unworkable. The role, therefore, of public sector urban planning is to impose social order on a set of market transactions that have the potential of creating urban disorder. The resultant interactions between the market-driven movement of households and firms and the land-use decisions made by urban planners is, for Scott, what explains the changing 'urban land nexus' in capitalist urban systems. Although Scott does not go this far, it is also possible to say that it is these interactions that are the stuff of urban politics.
Although Scott's work is useful because it provides the tools for developing an understanding of the workings of the urban economy, it is a structuralist and functionalist argument that suffers from all the problems that flow from seeing state intervention (in the form of urban planning) as the necessary response of the capitalist state to the disfunctionalities of the capitalist land market. More importantly for the South African context, it becomes extremely difficult to explain urban planning purely in terms of the spatial requirements of the capitalist mode of production. The obvious politically determined racial prescriptions that urban planning had to impose on urban systems in South African localities requires a far more nuanced theoretical explanation than Scott's can provide.

Whereas Scott was concerned with explaining state intervention via urban planning in terms of the logic of the capitalist land market, Marxists like Lamarche and Harvey have tried to explain the role played by financial and property capital in the urban system. In order to resolve the problem of why capitalism has tolerated rents as deductions from surplus value, Lamarche argued that property capital assists in the circulation of capital in the interests of capitalism as whole by investments in fixed property that have the overall effect of reducing time and labour costs for productive capital. This is done by property development in new spaces, or the redevelopment of existing spaces. For their efforts, they obtain a share of surplus value from productive capital via rents. Where owners speculate by withholding land from the market until they can sell for a huge profit, Lamarche calls this absolute rent. It is this search for absolute rent that Lamarche uses to explain episodic incoherencies in the patterns of urban development.

For Harvey it is the lending decisions of financial institutions that determine the rate of investment in the built environment. These lending decisions are designed to reproduce a particular model of urbanisation, namely single family dwellings, suburban sprawl, private motor transportation to link home places and workplaces and centralised centres of employment. This kind of urban system was seen to be necessary for boosting consumerism, stimulating economic growth and ensuring stability.
For both Lamarche and Harvey, urban politics is merely a derivative of the laws of motion of the capitalist urban economy. Thus urban planning serves the interests of property capital (Lamarche) and the interests of financial capital (Harvey). Where urban social movements do arise, these are largely reactive in the sense that they can be explained away as forms of protest against the human and community consequences of the spatial manifestations of the logic of capital accumulation. Their only interest to the researcher would be as effects that can be used to reveal the underlying structural causes. It therefore follows that for this kind of Marxist structuralist analysis, local urban politics is largely irrelevant as a field of study. This is not surprising given that the subjects of analysis are structures, institutions and capital flows rather than people, processes and culture.

To conclude this brief review of urban theory, we need to consider the writings of those who have focussed on political institutions, in particular local government institutions as the central state actor in the urban system.

Duncan and Goodwin's theory of the 'local state' takes the Marxist theory of uneven development as its point of departure. In essence, the theory of uneven development as applied in an urban context argues that the valorization, revalorisation and devalorisation of the built environment as a result of the changing nature and flow of capital explains the growth, change and decay of the cities (or parts thereof). The role of the state system is, according to Duncan and Goodwin, to manage the process of uneven development. However, because this process manifests itself in different spaces in different ways, it is not possible for a single central state to respond appropriately to each local context. Thus sub-national state systems were created to manage the local context in a way that was relatively autonomous from the policies of the central state. However, because liberal democracy necessitated that these different levels of the state came under electoral control, contradictions opened up when local states came under the control of interests that were reacting to the negative consequences of uneven urban development and sought to use the state to redress these imbalances. Out of this conceptual framework, Duncan and Goodwin proceed to develop a theory of the 'spatial division of the state system' and 'spatial division of civil society' that complements the theory of the spatial uneven development of labour and capital. They open a space for local urban
politics by acknowledging that the effects of uneven development are mediated by the practices of local communities ("local civil society") and the relatively autonomous local states that they have access to and/or control over.

Duncan and Goodwin's strongest point is their acknowledgment that the dynamic and nature of local urban politics cannot be read off from a general theory, but needs to be analysed in each local context. This effectively theorises the notion that the politics of the local context cannot be derived from national-level politics. Instead, the local state is the point of intersection between national political dynamics and the local urban system. This represents an important theoretical stepping stone for the development of this thesis and complements Castell's notion that local government/local political power is a key focus for mobilisation of urban social movements.

Without adopting the uneven development paradigm as her point of departure, Cockburn also attempts to develop a theory of the local state under capitalism. In essence, her rather crude argument (that is quite often contradicted by the rich empirical evidence on Lambeth's local government) is that the role of the local state is structurally determined by the logic of capitalism. This logic is such that to survive capitalism needs to reproduce the labour force and contain class conflict. The local state does both by providing services that reproduce the labour force and by incorporating the working class into the political system via community participation programmes. Even if radical socialists manage to gain control of the local state via the electoral process, Cockburn argues, there is little they can change by using the instrument of the local state because this instrument exists only as long as it does not challenge capitalist relations of production and reproduction. This extremely functionalist and structuralist theory of the local state effectively marginalises local urban politics into a meaningless waste of energy. Contrary to the trends analysed in the chapters of this thesis, it is assumed that localised political actions can never change the urban system in any way.

Besides the enormously productive output of Marxist analyses of the local state/local politics, the 'community power studies' literature has also been interested in analysing local politics. Unlike much of the literature reviewed up until now, this tradition has not addressed local urban politics in order to reveal
the way in which general societal processes impact on and manifest in the local political context. Instead, in the tradition of empiricist studies, these are local case studies that were used as a basis for drawing conclusions about the nature of politics in general. There are several tendencies within this overall tradition.

Local elite studies attempted to identify which individual elites hold actual political power and why. Hunter's study of Atlanta Georgia focussed on the key decision-makers in the city. His main aim was to identify which leaders were by reputation the most influential and then to assess their inter-relations and social location/movements. This provided the basis for assertions about the nature of local politics as a function of the quantifiable power possessed by key individuals.

Pluralist analyses rejected Hunter's reputational methodology and corresponding individualism by arguing instead for an analysis of power structures via 'decisional analysis'. The most well known exponent of the pluralist school was Robert Dahl and his book *Who Governs?* In essence, Dahl and Polsby set out to operationalise their theory of power which posited the notion that the power of an individual is defined in terms of that individual's capacity to act in a way that gets another individual to do what that individual would not otherwise have done. For the analysis of local politics, this entails finding out who was responsible for determining the outcomes of political decision-making processes. If this can be ascertained, then it follows that these were the most influential political actors in the system.

Because the pluralists studied actual decision-making processes to determine the nature of power, they were by definition looking at concrete acts of political "conflict" between specific empirical "interests" who had different policy preferences with regard to a defined and understood set of political 'issues'.

Bachrach and Baratz criticised the pluralists for ignoring the fact that power is not only about actual conflict between established interests over defined issues, but it is also about the manipulation of the decision-making process itself in such a way as to ensure that certain interests are kept out of decision-making and certain issues are kept off the agenda. In short, those with power have the capacity to get their way through both decision-making (that works in their
favour) and by ensuring that nondecision-making also occurs in their favour. In both instances there is still actual observable conflict - the only difference is how this conflict is resolved. Where there is no conflict, Bachrach and Baratz argued, it must be assumed that there is consensus.

Steven Lukes has argued that while Bachrach and Baratz have taken the study of local politics much further than Dahl and Polsby by acknowledging that power is not just about actual decision-making but also about nondecision-making, he criticises them for hanging onto the behavioral assumptions of the pluralists.52 This behavioral assumption lies in the fact that Bachrach and Baratz argued that observable conflict must exist for power to be exercised. But as Lukes argued, these authors "suppose that because power, as they conceptualise it, only shows up in cases of actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place."53 As far as the claim that in the absence of conflict one must assume consensus, Lukes argues that this ignores "the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definitional fiat".54 To break from the empiricist behaviorism of the elitists and pluralists, Lukes essentially moves away from the notion that interests are reducible to observable actions and adopts what he calls the "radical" view that accepts that nondecision-making about issues that affect certain interests may take place without observable actions simply because the overall structure of power may be such that these interests have been unable to act in their own interests for various coercive and/or non-coercive reasons. (This theoretical framework was operationalised in a brilliant case study of local politics in the Appalachian Valley.55)

The importance of the community power literature as developed by Lukes and operationalised by Gaventa is that it attempted to develop a conception of the power relations that underpin local politics. This perspective on the nature of local power adds to the notion of local political power as a basis for urban social movement formation as conceived by Castells or the derivative notions of local state found in the work of Duncan and Goodwin. In fact, it comes closest to an explanation of politics in terms of the complex interactions between local political actors that make up the local urban system and as such paves the way for the systems approach to local urban politics outlined below.
Systems theory cannot be said to originate in a single theory or school of thought. This is partly due to the way this way of thinking and seeing has gathered international momentum from the early decades of the c.20th when it began to be used by natural science (particularly physicists) to comprehend natural phenomena in a way that old Newtonian physics and Cartesian philosophy were incapable of grasping. Since then, systems theory has begun to penetrate the social sciences with grand philosophical texts providing the founding ideas for this ever-widening circle of influence. Out of all the social science branches, management and organisational studies have probably been most comprehensively transformed by systems thinking. However, development management has also begun to be consciously influenced by systems theory. One of the leading elder statesmen of development management theory recently appealed for quite a fundamental break from old pyramidal conceptions of development administration - an appeal that he consciously based on systems theory or, as he put it, "the insights of a pluralistic universe that underlie the bottom-up notion of self-organising structures and processes." Although still too influenced by closed systems thinking from the days when Parsonian structural functionalism was influential in political science, David Easton has nevertheless consciously advocated a more open systems theory as a basis for political analysis. In a search for a marriage between developmental functionalism and structural dependency theory as a basis for a new "systems theory of Third World development politics", White and Kabashima also predict in their introduction to their edited collection on the subject that "developmental systems theory will be with us for a long time". Finally, in the arena of development planning, it is clear that systems theory is making a very serious impact.

What then is the essence of systems theory and how is it relevant to the subject under analysis in this thesis? First and foremost it is an attempt to break from reductionism. Reductionism, as originated by Isaac Newton for the natural sciences and Descartes for philosophy, rests on the assumption that all aspects of complex phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts in order to identify those few parts that determine the behavior of the rest of the parts. In physics, scientists studying the atom in the early decades of the c.20th were forced to develop the theories of quantum mechanics to make sense
of the atom not only in terms of the sum of its parts, but more importantly as the product of the interactions between these parts. Reductionism told them what the atom consisted of, but not why the atom behaved the way that it did. The result was systems theory or, if you like, a theory of the system in its wholeness as defined by the interactions between its parts and, further, between the atomic system and the wider sets of natural external systems within which the atomic system is embedded.

Quantum physics has seriously challenged the Cartesian world view which so powerfully legitimised Newtonian science and underpinned the intellectual traditions of western philosophy and (subsequently) social science. Originating in Descarte's awesome image of the clock as the archetype of natural and social phenomena, it was left to subsequent generations to equate the workings of society to the workings of machines. The job of the scientist was simply to dismantle the machine to identify the parts; and then to put it all back together again armed with the "knowledge" of what made it all work. Having grasped the limited determining variables that made the whole "machine" work, it was left to social scientists to analyse how those with power competed to control those variables. Unfortunately, they never fundamentally questioned the mechanistic assumptions of the paradigm and so in the process provided the social scientific rationale for organising society and its individual persons like the machines on the factory floors of the industrial revolution. All that Marx did by providing a "critique" of this structure was to expose the "crippled monstrosities" that were created in the process.

Like the pioneering physicists of the early c.20th, social scientists have willy nilly gone beyond trying to understand society as the sum of self-contained parts. Instead of focusing on the basic building blocks of the social system, there is now a concern to understand the basic principles of organisation that penetrate, cross-cut and integrate all the different parts of the system. Five basic propositions often flow from this founding objective: the component elements of systems are pluralistic rather than unitary in nature; the behavior of each element affects the behavior of all the other elements and the behavior of the system as a whole; interactions and transactions between the elements of the system are more important than the internal logic and nature of each individual element; the system's overall nature and performance is more than the sum of the outputs.
and behavior of its elements; and every system is embedded within and inter-dependent with every other system outside of itself.

Instead of dissecting social systems to determine what they comprise of, the research focus that flows from systems theory is above all else the interactions and transaction between the elements (which are themselves sub-systems) that make up the whole. Given that the performance of the whole is more than the sum product of the elements, it follows that the research focus must be simultaneously focussed on the interactions and transactions between the elements and on the performance and changing dynamic of the whole.

This thesis is essentially about the urban system. However, the urban system is a nationally organised system that is embedded in a larger national (and indeed international) societal and natural set of systems. Given the constraints of this work, a particular local manifestation of the urban system has been selected as the focus of study, i.e. a particular sub-system of the national urban system. This can be defined as Uitenhage's local urban system. I want to know why and how this local urban system changed in space and over time. In particular, following Castells, I want to know why and how urban meanings were defined and changed, and how urban functions and urban forms were transformed. To do this, I have tried to identify in each chapter a set of interactions and transactions between the elements of the local urban system that directly affected urban meaning, urban function and urban form in ways that impacted on the nature and dynamics of the local urban system as a whole. This, however, has been done by constantly locating the local urban system and its elements in the larger non-local set of systems within which the local urban system was embedded. In this way it was possible to traverse multiple levels of analysis all of which directly affected the overall dynamic of the local urban system. This is why it is justifiable to develop microscopic analyses of massacres and crowd violence because present within these interactions and transactions were the elements of the larger system as a whole while, simultaneously, these were interactions and transactions that may not have been structurally determinant (in the reductionist paradigm sense), but did directly change the overall dynamic and performance of the local urban system.
It is on the basis of the above conceptual framework that a clearer conception of local urban politics becomes possible. Local urban politics can be defined as the organised manifestation of the interactions and transactions between the elements of the local urban system. The central focus of local urban political dynamics are conflicting urban meanings each of which have implications for urban functions and urban forms. Urban social movements as one powerful local urban political force articulate popular urban meanings in opposition to the dominant institutionalised urban meaning and organise around consumption, community and local power. Urban social movements, however, are only one local urban political force. The others that are examined in this thesis are the various elements involved the local and non-local governmental system and the elements of the formal business sector involved in the contestations over urban meaning, function and form. In essence, the primary interactions and transactions that are examined in this thesis are those that took place at the local level between the urban social movements, local government and formal business and how these local-level interactions and transactions were embedded in a larger set of non-local processes that impinged upon the local urban political terrain at specific points in time and space.

In short, once the strictures of reductionism are thrown off, a much more fruitful and promising line of inquiry becomes possible than what is possible if the mainstream South African and international literature on urban studies is used as guide. This does not, however, represent a fundamental break from this literature. It actually helps to "theorise" what some are already beginning to point to when they urge researchers to go back to local empirical studies to find reasons for contingent complexity.

RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS

The trajectory of the South African urban studies literature and international urban theory literature is such that a general theory of the urban system is both deemed to be unnecessary and/or impossible to achieve via theoretical elaboration. This is why there is a distinct move towards empirical analysis in a bid to understand the specificity of local urban political dynamics. However, as the trajectory of the community power studies literature reveals, if this leads to empiricism, the result may well be a form of analysis that depends exclusively on
the existence of observable behavior. This effectively obliterates any analysis of political power outside empirically observable action.

It follows from the above that in order to gain a better understanding of urban systems and the local urban political dynamics that shapes the urban system, an analytically informed empirical case study is required. This does not necessarily mean a case study that is designed to "test" a general theory, nor does it necessarily mean a case study of how general social trends manifest themselves in a particular local context. But rather it is a case study using qualitative methods that is designed to contribute to the literature a detailed nuanced approach to the study of the urban system that takes into account a set of interactions that have hitherto been structurally derived or defined out of the circle of sociological importance. This may shed light on similar dynamics in similar contexts, but this will depend on comparative studies of cases that attempt to achieve similar objectives. The rest of the chapters in this thesis constitute this case study. However, to establish the methodological framework of these chapters, it is necessary to justify the research strategy (i.e. the case study approach) and the choice of research methods utilised within the case study.

The traditional range of research strategies are experiments, surveys, histories (archival or otherwise), field studies and contemporary case studies. Admittedly it is probably inaccurate to say that the case study is seen as part of the traditional repertoire of textbook methodologies. This is because the case study is usually defined as one of the sub-strategies of field research alongside participant observation, ethnographies, etc. Whereas these latter terms refer to research methods, the case study is in fact at a higher level - a level that I have called research strategy. Within the research strategy it is possible to use a range of methods - this is particularly the case with the case study method.

The choice of the case study research strategy (which is defined in greater detail below) is based largely on the inappropriateness of the other strategies. Research experiments require the researcher to be able to control the events involved in the experiment so that s/he can manipulate various variables to determine a given outcome. This is obviously inappropriate for a research project that is trying to find out how a particular system of relations operates on its own terms. As far as surveys are concerned, these are useful for ascertaining generalised
quantitative data such as household size and household incomes, and for determining aggregated attitudes. However, they are less than useful when it comes to understanding collectivities in action. Touraine has argued forcefully that survey methodologies are premised on methodological individualism because it is assumed by those who use the survey method to study social movements that the reasons for individual participation in social movements are individual attitudes and motivations. Instead, Touraine argues, social movements are collectivities in action and therefore can only be studied by observing participants (not just participant observers) who are in a position to structure collective discussions about their involvement in the movement. The movement, therefore, is studied 'in motion', so to speak.64 I will return to this theme further down.

As far as the historical method's reliance on archival records or individual interviews with survivors of the historical period being studied is concerned, this suffers from the same critique that Touraine uses against survey methods because archival records in particular are often records of leadership statements rather than a record of popular discourse. As far as the project of this thesis is concerned, the selection of an historical case study would have severely limited the range of information sources needed to demonstrate complex social actor interactions.

Yin argues that the choice of research strategy is dependent on the form of questions posed, the degree of control that the researcher has over the events studied, and whether or not the events being studied are contemporary or not.65 Out of the traditional "who", "what", "where", "how" and "why" questions, a case study research strategy is required when qualitative "how" and "why" questions are posed about contemporary events that the researcher has no actual control over.

Following Yin, a case study research strategy is an empirical inquiry that "investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence [read: methods] are used."66
This thesis poses qualitative "how" and "why" questions about contemporary events that this researcher had no direct control over. As outlined in previous sections, the questions are essentially about *why* various actors in a particular urban system acted in the way that they did and *how* they tried to achieve what they wanted to achieve. The events studied were contemporary and although the author played a certain role in shaping these events, this role cannot be construed as approximating the role that would need to be played by social scientists using experimental methods. In addition, the study of the subjects of the research took place within the context of the phenomena that were studied and multiple sources of evidence were used (more on this below).

As far as the rationale for the particular case study selected is concerned, the methodological literature usually require researchers to refer to a combination of indicators that can be used to test whether the use of a single case is justifiable. Although expressed in different ways, these indicators can be categorised as follows: whether the case study is a *critical* case for testing the validity of a general theory; or whether it is an *extreme* or *unique* case that serves to disprove generally accepted assumptions and is therefore helpful in building a new general framework of analysis; or whether it is *revelatory* in that the case serves to reveal how general processes that have shaped the social formation as a whole are manifested within a particular set of circumstances. As far as the Uitenhage case is concerned, it is more revelatory than critical or unique. The Uitenhage case is not being used to prove a general theory of urban political change, nor can it be said that the dynamics and features of Uitenhage are particularly unique given the self-evident existence of similar dynamics in many other towns and cities across South Africa in the 1980s. Rather the Uitenhage case has been analysed to deepen our knowledge of one context as a contribution to the deepening of a general comparative knowledge of similar processes and dynamics that occurred in numerous other contexts. To this extent, the case may be contributing to the gradual build-up of a general theory of urban political change over time. This, however, is very different to starting with a general theory that needs to be proven via the case study. In short, the use of the Uitenhage case study as a single case study is justified in the first instance on the grounds that it is revelatory rather than critical or unique. However, it is arguable that every case is revelatory and therefore there is no compelling reason why one case should be selected over and above another. I would argue
that cases that possess certain unique features are the most useful revelatory cases. This is especially true if these unique characteristics of the case are unique not because they do not exist in other contexts, but rather because their uniqueness lies in the fact that they are particularly pronounced or well developed examples of processes and dynamics that self-evidently existed in other contexts.

Listed below are a set of processes and dynamics that are the focus of the rest of the analysis in each chapter of the thesis. They are listed here to demonstrate that while they are nothing new to South African society (i.e. they are not unique in themselves), they were manifest in Uitenhage in ways that made them particularly visible for the case study researcher. To this extent, therefore, the Uitenhage case does not possess unique features per se but rather a unique combination of researchable features that if analysed in a certain they can serve to reveal the complexities involved in the dynamics and processes of urban political change. With this methodological framework in mind, it is possible to refer to the following features of the Uitenhage case:

* it was the only major urban area known to the author where a century-old african community still inhabited by the 1980s an area at the centre of the town that it had originally occupied when african urbanisation began (chapters 1 and 3);

* it was a leading centre for the growth of a manufacturing sector that, in turn, employed a white and a black labour force that were heavily unionised and developed completely opposed political ideologies (chapters 1 and 2);

* the close alliances that developed between coloured and african workers was the basis for the first great general strike of the 1980s that, in turn, initiated the nation-wide "living wage campaign" in 1980 (chapter 2);

* the conflicts between the community and the state during 1984-85 that lead up to the Langa Massacre on 21st March 1985 made Uitenhage the first area to witness a large-scale police massacre of peaceful demonstrators
during the 1980s - dozens more were to follow over the next 8 years (chapters 4 and 5);

* on the 23rd March 1985 South Africa witnessed with horror the first 'necklacing' when the violent crowd turned on Councillor Kinikini killing him and his sons67 (chapter 6);

* subsequent to the massacre and the 'necklacing', Uitenhage gained sustained national attention for two things: the threatened forced removal of a self-built settlement of 50 000 people living in Kabah, and the first local-level negotiations around urban development plans generated by the community - a phenomenon in 1986 that ran counter to the dominant trend of state-planned private sector-driven apartheid-based urban development (chapters 7 and 8);

* the implementation of a textbook counter-revolutionary warfare strategy after the national State of Emergency was declared in mid-1986 that led to mass detentions of the leaders who were negotiating, one of the largest urban forced removals ever, and a system of managed terror that replicated the vision of control that the newly empowered "securocrats" concocted (chapter 9);

* finally, after the political transition began in 1990 and Kabah was acknowledged as a non-racial area after being incorporated fully into Uitenhage, one of the country's first community-based urban development schemes was initiated with the social movement leadership of the 1980s as the development coordinators and the state providing subsidies and a planning framework (chapter 10).

Finally, the Uitenhage case is revelatory because the public nature of some of the key sources of information (e.g. court records, records of a commission of inquiry and information available to the author as observer-participant) made it possible to describe interactions that have hitherto been largely inaccessible to researchers.

The five sources of evidence that are traditionally used in case study research are documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, and participant
observation. Before commenting on each source and the corresponding research method used, it is necessary to emphasise three principles that guided the overall deployment of evidence. Following Yin, these are (i) the need to utilise multiple sources of evidence in a case study approach, (ii) the need to create a case study data base, and (iii) the need to maintain a chain of evidence.68

As far as multiple sources of evidence is concerned, this thesis has been consciously constructed out of multiple sources of information. While social historical and contemporary urban studies have used multiple sources of information, very few have managed to use the wide array of sources that have been used in this thesis. As the discussion of specific sources of information will reveal below, the cross-referencing across different sources of information that has been used in this thesis greatly enhances the objective validity of the factual information that was used to develop the analysis. The fact that I was involved in a particular capacity in the events studied helped to gain access to these multiple sources of information.

The case study data base that was built up over the period March 1986 through to January 1994 consisted of three related components. These are as follows:

* A set of research notes drawn from all the sources of evidence referred to below. These research notes were indexed onto a computerised database that cross-referenced all the evidence according to the chapter headings and sub-headings of each chapter. In some cases special databases for a specific set of events were developed, e.g. for the Chapters on the Langa Massacre and the Necklacing of Kinikini. The database indexed the entries over time which meant it was possible to track the evolution of particular themes over time (e.g. the ebb and flow of particular ideological discourses). This cross-referenced set of entries over time is, in effect, a kind of research diary that has standardised the trajectory of the information gathering process.

* A filing system for primary documentation was developed. This has stored primary documents such as court records, newspaper clippings, tape cassettes and photocopied archival material in a systematic way. In addition, the tabulated survey findings and survey materials that were
used to write up a section of Chapter 3 have been filed in this system. The filing codes were then linked to the computerised database to ensure proper cross-referencing.

* A written up or tape recorded set of narratives drawn from interviews, political rallies and small discussions. These narratives are referred to in the text of each chapter both as sources of information and as sources for attitudinal perspectives on specified issues.

The three components of the database are available as referenced primary data.

Finally, a chain of evidence was built up that operates in two ways. Firstly, there is a chain of evidence that links the different chapters together leading in the end to the concluding chapter. Secondly, each chapter is based on a relatively self-contained chain of evidence that ensures that the narrative of the chapter is sustained by a body of evidence that is captured in the footnotes. This means, therefore, that the chapters are in effect the chain of evidence for the thesis; the chapters have their own contained chains of evidence embodied in the footnotes; and the footnotes are traceable to the case study data base.

The case study data base was constructed over a period of seven years starting in 1986. On average I visited Uitenhage twice to thrice annually to collect specific documentary material and conduct interviews. I was not, however, engaged full-time in the research.

The specific sources of information that were used are listed below. They are referred to here in general terms rather than in terms of each specific chapter and the corresponding procedures and methods used are also spelt out under each heading. In addition, the problems encountered in data collection and the impact on the thesis are also discussed.

*Documentation*

The following documentation was use:
local and national newspapers, in particular the *Eastern Province Herald* that was read on a daily basis and the relevant news clippings extracted and stored in the case study database;

* letters of communication between various persons involved in the events;

* minutes of meetings that took place between social movement leaders on the one hand, and government and business representatives on the other;

* a wide range of unpublished reports compiled by research organisations, University Departments, businesses, professionals, government agencies and non-governmental organisations;

* unpublished speeches or records of speeches compiled by others made by prominent leaders;

* articles and reports published in magazines and journals.

The documentary material was used in the following ways:

* to check dates and attendees at meetings that had been referred to in interviews but which interviews were not specific about enough;

* to contribute to the development of a chronology of events - newspapers and minutes of meetings were especially useful in getting a proper order of events;

* to provide empirical data that human informants do not carry in their heads;

* and, in the case of certain chapters, to reconstruct the detailed events that makes up the main narrative of the chapter in the absence of live informants.
Due to the reliance placed on court records in chapters 5 and 6, a special mention needs to be made here on this evidence and research method used. As far as Chapter 5 is concerned, this is about a massacre that resulted from police firing on an unarmed march. This event prompted the state to appoint a Commission of Inquiry into these events. The detailed verbatim proceedings of this Inquiry have been used to reconstruct the massacre. The beauty of these proceedings is that they reflect the language, discourse and perspectives of the protagonists as they were engaged in the process of reconstructing their version of what happened. Out of this it is possible for the researcher to extract both a chronology of events (via computerised cross-referencing) and the lived experiences of those involved. This provides a remarkable database for reconstructing the interactions that brought the massacre about.

The same applied to chapter 6 which is a reconstruction of violent crowd action directed against local government representatives. Here the court proceedings of the co-accused were used to reconstruct these events. I was disinterested in what the court was mainly interested in, namely the guilt of the individual accused. My main interest was the chronology of events that were uncontested by the prosecution and the defense. This was possible to extract, along with the perceptions and language of the participants.

All documentation was read and research notes taken down. These research notes were fed into the case study data base for cross-referencing and storage until the actual writing up took place.

Archival Records

The primary archival material used was records of proceedings of the meetings of the KwaNobuhle Town Council - the local authority responsible for the black townships in Uitenhage. Although public access to this kind of contemporary archival material was (and still is) restricted to the public, I managed to secure access mainly because the officials in possession of these documents were either unaware of or disregarded these regulations. However, I was not allowed to take them off the premises. This information was therefore translated into research notes that were then deposited in the case study database. These archival records were particularly valuable for two things. Firstly, they provided monthly
updated demographic information. Secondly, the minutes of meetings recorded
more than decisions which meant that the actual discourse could be picked up.

The archival records were used mainly to corroborate interview information
about intra-governmental tensions.

The obvious problem with regard to obtaining further archival evidence is that it
was not possible to get the same access to the white Uitenhage Municipality as it
was in the case of the KwaNobuhle Town Council. This means that evidence on
Uitenhage's official perspectives on key issues over time are largely absent.

Interviews

Interviews of various kinds have played a central role in the generation of
information for the chapters of the thesis. The following kinds of interviews
were conducted:

* Unstructured open-ended one-on-one interviews with leading figures in
government, business and the social movements. In some cases, persons
were repeatedly interviewed. One person in particular is worth
mentioning here. He was Weza Made, the leading figure of the Langa-
based anti-removal movement. The multiple interviews with Weza Made
provided a rich source of information on leadership tactics, community
feelings, events and his own personal dilemmas. These interviews were
used for three things:

- to develop chronologies of events that were then cross-tabulated,
checked (against documents or other informants) and standardised;

- to obtain descriptions of events that were then also cross-tabulated,
checked and standardised;

- to obtain perceptions which were then used to contrast how
different interests perceived certain events or issues;
to unpack and understand the complex inner workings of the social movements.

Unstructured interviews with selected groups within the social movements over a period of about four years. The aim of these group interviews was as follows:

- to obtain qualitative socio-economic and demographic profiles of sections of the support base and constituency of the social movement;

- to obtain attitudinal and perceptual information across constituencies about particular events, leadership strategies, prevailing political crises and issues of the day - in short, about how these people understood their social movement;

- to obtain data for reconstructing events and chronologies.

It should be emphasised that like Touraine I found that these small group discussions of ordinary rank-and-file members of the movement revealed more about the nature of the movement than leadership speeches and documents. The reason for this is that it was possible to facilitate discussion in these small groups about the 'moral economy' of the everyday life of movement participants. In general, these discussions were not group interviews by an outside researcher, but were literally facilitated discussions that I would structure around three basic themes, namely the issues that the group thought were important for the movement to be addressing, their perceptions of what they called the "enemy" (i.e. government, vigilantes, and business), and their leadership. When it was possible, these discussions were tape recorded. However, when this was not possible, either I took notes or if even this was not possible because it made people nervous, I would write down all I could remember after the meeting. In all these discussions it was understood that I was part of the movement. This, in my view, substantially changed the degree to which participants in the group discussions were open and frank. What they said to me and what they said to other outside researchers differed considerably because it should be remembered that most of these discussions took place
during a State of Emergency and in 'underground' conditions. The notes and cassette recordings of these discussions were fed into the case study data base and cross-referenced to the themes across the chapters. It is only now that the ancien régime has passed away that this material can be so openly used for research purposes.

The most obvious and serious limitation with respect to the interviews is that whereas sufficient interviews with government and business were conducted, much more could have been done with respect to interviewing a wider range of community leaders. This weakness is reflected in the fact that there is possibly an over-reliance on the interviews with Weza Made which, in turn, could mean there is a bias in the thesis in favour of his perspectives on the complexities of Uitenhage's political alignments.

As far as the group discussions are concerned, due to the State of Emergency and underground operating conditions, it was not possibly to set these up in sufficient numbers or in a satisfactorily systematic way. Because it was a serious security risk to bring too many key people together at any one time, there was always a general reluctance to pre-plan proper meetings where I would come prepared with tape recorder and so on. Instead, it was quite often on-the-spot discussions that took place after political meetings, or negotiations or social gatherings that generated much of the output of these group discussions.

Surveys

Surveys have not constituted a primary source of information for this thesis as a whole. However, a socio-economic and demographic survey was conducted and its findings used to develop Chapter 3. This is the chapter that analyses the history of Langa and what its characteristics were by the mid-1980s. The best way to get aggregated quantitative and (to a more limited extent) qualitative data on Langa's contemporary characteristics was to conduct a survey. This survey was devised by a team of professionals that included the author and administered by members of the Langa community who had been trained for this purpose. A random sample was selected by the professional team from maps of the
settlement. The results were analysed by the professional team using computerised survey analysis packages. The results were then used as a basis for policy proposals that became the focus of an extended campaign against forced removals. The fact that this survey was used for this purpose does not detract from the factual validity of the data itself because it is not the policy proposals that have been used to develop Chapter 3, but the raw survey results. Furthermore, the fact that the author was merely one member of the professional team rather than the sole manager of the survey is irrelevant because the survey does not constitute the central piece of research activity for the thesis as a whole. The main point is that survey results were used to develop Chapter 3 and the methodology was a conventional survey approach.

Direct Observations

Although related to the participant observation methods that are discussed next, there is a need to refer to the evidence gleaned from direct observations. The reason is that whereas participant observation is useful for researchers because they obtain qualitative information about the social movement they get involved in, the problem is that this can quite often cut them off from observing the behavior/actions of those parties that the researcher is not involved with. This could be particularly problematic if the researcher is trying to analyse the interactions between social actors.

As far as direct observations were concerned, the following are given by way of examples to illustrate the case:

* meetings of white ratepayers to provide me with data on their discourse, perceptions and politics;

* judicial proceedings such as inquiries, political cases, hearings, etc - these events provided one of the few arenas for structured interaction between the leading participants;

* seminars and workshops organised by liberal human rights groups where the different leadership groups put their respective cases to the public;
walkabouts through Langa talking to individual households or simply making observations about everyday practices such as where women did their washing, where refuse was deposited, how shacks were built, and how the "comrades" staffed "people's roadblocks".

In all these kinds of direct observation opportunities, I would compile research notes and feed the notes into the database.

**Participant-Observation or Observing Participation**

Researchers wanting to understand and write about the dynamics of conflict in South Africa's seething black townships found themselves in a very difficult position during the 1980s for essentially three reasons. Firstly, societies going through convulsive (and even revolutionary) change do not create the kinds of informants who can be sufficiently dispassionate about the truth. This makes it almost impossible for researchers to rely exclusively on the disengaged individual interview for reliable information. Secondly, even if researchers did manage to get reliable information, writing about these events was a fundamentally political act. The struggle waged by the regime and its opponents for the moral high ground placed an enormous burden on the researcher to take sides. Thirdly, traditional methodologies premised on documentary evidence or survey techniques were effective in obtaining leadership perspectives and individual opinions, but they were inadequate when it came to grasping the dynamic of collectivities in action (which is what social movements are about), or the interface between regime representatives and regime opponents.

There were two ways out of these problems. The first was to retreat back into historical work about events that preceded contemporary processes. This lead to a flowering of social historical studies that played an important part in reconstructing a recorded memory that contemporary struggles were able to call upon and refer to in the process of myth-making and ideological development. The second was to take Alain Touraine's route into direct participation in movements as a way of getting close up to the subject to be able to see the dynamics of collectivities in motion and the interface between these collectivities and their opponents. It is the latter course of action that this author has favoured.
Although my relationship with the Eastern Cape began in 1980 when I assisted Mkhulu Jack in various ways during the school boycotts, it began in earnest in May 1985 when the *South African Labour Bulletin* commissioned myself and Marcel Golding to go to the Eastern Cape in order to write up an account of what happened during the stayaway actions that took place in the week 16 - 22 March 1985. It was during this time that I met the Uitenhage activists who later requested my assistance when they began to look for ways to counter the forced removal of Kabah/Langa. It was this request that triggered an eight year long relationship with this community. My role was to coordinate technical assistance for the movement that converted a struggle against removal into a struggle for the first community-based urban upgrading plan in the country. It was this role that gave me an insight into collectivities in motion and the interface with the regime. Like Touraine, I think getting up close to the subject by being a participant in the social movement does not compromise 'objectivity'; it simply enhances one's understanding of the texture and dynamic of what actually happened - or, as Touraine has argued, it brings one closer to the 'subject' than so-called 'objective' methods are capable of achieving. However, to avoid becoming a propagandist that covers up weaknesses, the researcher-participant (or reflective activist) needs to retain the right to make judgments in terms of the highest ideals of the movement.

In practice, and to summarise, my structured relationship to the social movement began in late-1986 when I was requested to coordinate a team of professionals who provided the Langa Coordinating Committee led by Weza Made with technical, policy and media assistance. In effect this meant conducting extensive research into the problems faced by the Langa community and to assist in the formulation of policy alternatives. Over the years I got drawn ever deeper into the inner leadership grouping where strategies and tactics were discussed. It was from this vantage point that I was able to see the complex interactions between the movement on the one hand and government and business on the other. In addition, I began to gain an insight into the complex inner workings of the movement.

As my socio-economic research for the movement began to extend outwards into research for this thesis, it became clear that I had access to multiple sources of
information that combine traditional research methods with the more innovative participant observation methods. In fact, following Earl Babbie (who draws on the work of Raymond Gold), there are actually four different types of roles that are possible: complete participant, participant-as-observer, observer-as-participant, and complete observer. In terms of these typologies, my role probably comes closest to the *participant-as-observer* role. According to Babbie, "[i]n this role, you would participate fully with the group under study, but you would make it clear that you were also undertaking research." It is a role, however, that is the subject of extensive debate in social research methods literature. Babbie sums up the skepticism when he says: "Compared with surveys and experiments, field research measurements generally have more validity but less reliability, and field research results cannot be generalised as safely as those based on rigorous sampling and standardised questionnaires."

The key types of information that I was able to collect which would not have been possible without adopting the *participant-as-observer* role are as follows:

* the self-expression of values, ideology and perceptions by collectivities involved in the movement itself;

* how the strategies and tactics of the players that the social movement was engaging were understood, interpreted and responded at different moments in time;

* the internal dilemmas and choices that the leadership faced as they responded to changing conditions;

* the tensions between different personalities and constituency interests within the social movement, especially at those points when strategies were changed;

* the process of learning within the movement that eventually changed the way the relations of power between the social movement and those it was engaging in the state and business sectors were perceived;
the process of language and discourse construction that created the symbols and meanings that were used to justify strategies and explain conditions at different points in time.

Through observing meetings, recording speeches and rallies, interviewing leaders, holding small group discussions and engaging in the process of strategic formulation, it was possible to take copious notes that were systematically fed into the case study database for cross-referencing through the chapters.

As already indicated above, this method also had at least three limitations. Firstly, due to time and resource constraints (which were partly related to the fact that I lived some 1400 Kms away from the study area), I was unable to use my advantageous position to the greatest possible advantage. I could have conducted more group discussions and networked more widely with community leaders who were not directly involved in the Langa struggle. Secondly, although I was able to overcome some of the problems associated with the State of Emergency and underground conditions, this must have still affected the scope of what was discussed with me. In particular, although some material on the military strategies of the social movements was collected, much of this was surely withheld for fear that this kind of information could compromise both themselves and myself. Thirdly, in chapters where I relied entirely on documentary evidence, it is clear that more in-depth work with the participants could have enriched the final product.

The obvious criticism will be that the resulting analysis will tend to justify the strategic choices of the social movement rather than explain why it did what it did and how it failed or succeeded. Like Touraine, my defense would be twofold. Firstly, being a participant-as-observer, I got closer to the social movement subject that I was studying under very difficult conditions than would have been possible if I had adopted the more conventional objective social scientist model. Secondly, I reserved the right to make judgments and criticism on the grounds that my research judgment was not based on what was tactically useful to score immediate advantages, but rather my research judgment would be normatively based on the highest ideals that the social movement itself was committed to.
Finally, as far as mobilising the evidence derived from all the sources referred to above is concerned, this has been done on a chapter-by-chapter basis. Each chapter, therefore, is in fact an exercise in iterative explanation building. This is why each chapter opens by positioning the central research question via a brief review of specialist literature, followed by the narrative that assembles the evidence in a way that attempts to explain the events under discussion. All the chapters put together provide an overview of how Uitenhage's urban system changed in space and over time.

This thesis proceeds from the need for an integrated understanding via the complexity of local dynamics; but it has been constructed in a way that avoids the problems with the case study method. It is not a case study of national and global processes, nor is it a case that is located outside the context of these processes. At most, it helps us understand how these national processes impacted on the lives of a particular set of communities, and how the responses of those affected impacted back on these national (and in this case in only a limited way on international) processes. It is for this reason that the analysis of local processes is often preceded by a brief analytical overview of the non-local political and economic context that directly affected the choices made by actors that shaped the history of Uitenhage. This inter-relationship, however, is not the primary concern of the study. Instead, to be faithful to the subject, there is a concern to accept the contingent integrity of the local dynamics by getting as close to them as possible. This is why the golden thread that runs through this whole study is the question of subjective choice and, inevitably, the contingent rather than reducible nature of choice. This is not, however, a bid to leap out of the materiality of the social context of subjective choices into some kind of voluntaristic void; it is, rather, a bid to understand the choices that subjects make as they experience the impact of complex and contradictory local and non-local processes that they comprehend via a language and mental map that are, in turn, historically constituted at a personal and societal level. It this interplay between causal determination and backward loops between effects and causes that has influenced the methods used in this thesis to "get as close up" to the subject as possible.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Taking the above general conceptual and methodological framework as a point of departure, each chapter is located in a particular body of literature that is relevant to the events analysed.

After sketching out a general socio-economic and organisational background in Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3 attempts to grasp the unique features of Uitenhage's urban system by linking the evolution of urban form to the political interests of local elites. This analysis is positioned in terms of the literature on South African urbanisation that has tended to move from concerns with generalised historical processes, to specific localised dynamics and how these have influenced non-local policies and processes.

Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the numerous political conflicts that tore apart the black townships during the period September 1984 to March 1985. Whereas a huge and rich literature on the politics of township conflict has emerged to explain this and subsequent periods of intensified and open conflict between the state and urban communities, this chapter takes up the challenge laid down by the main reviewer of this literature who concluded that this literature suffers from assumptions that are either too structuralist or too conspiratorial. The challenge is to identify the non-structural determinants of conflict, determinants that have a lot to do with subjective choices that are best grasped by a localised analysis.

Remaining within the general problematic articulated at the outset of Chapter 4, Chapter 5 takes the analysis to a microscopic level by explaining why police shot at peaceful marchers on their way to a political funeral. Such violent confrontations are usually used as dramatic events upon which an analysis of structural causes and political effects can be pegged. This kind of analysis, however, runs the danger of being much too functionalist: why, for example, was there a massacre in one township and not in another when the exact same structural conditions pertained in both instances? A structural analysis cannot answer this question. Nevertheless, a simple description of why it happened is also unsatisfactory. Chapter 5 tries to understand the "moral economy" of the
crowd and the institutionally determined role of the police in a way that explains why the event actually happened at a particular time in a particular place. Besides judicial inquiries, this has not been done before by academic researchers.

Chapter 6 continues the microscopic focus developed in Chapter 5, but instead of looking at violent police action directed at the non-violent crowd, this chapter sets out to explain violent crowd action directed at agents of the state. Given the almost absolute silence on violent crowd action in the sociological and political science literature (mainly because such subjects were not convenient for authors wanting to depict crowds as essentially on the side of good, peace and justice), it is the social psychology literature on the nature and effects of political violence that frames this chapter.

Like Chapters 4 and 5, Chapters 7 and 8 are linked together because these both address the community-state dynamic in a way that attempts to understand how social movement strategies changed in response to changes in local state strategies, and how local officials changed their strategies in response to changes in social movement strategies. Both, however, were operating within a national context that overdetermined the local causes of strategic choices at critical junctures. These chapters, therefore, address both the 'local' - 'non-local' debate and the assumptions in the literature about the nature of state-community relations. These assumptions were either that this relationship was inherently contradictory and therefore only resolvable through a revolutionary rupture, or structurally determined by the logic of capital's interests. These chapters describe and analyse processes that lead to the conclusion that the emerging literature on the dynamic of negotiating relations of power is possibly more useful when it comes to understanding community-state dynamics than the revolutionary theory or state-capital logic literature.

Chapter 9 changes tack once again by focusing almost entirely on the 'local'-'non-local' relationship. Whereas local dynamics had hitherto played a central role in shaping the nature of conflict and strategy, the declaration of the 1986 State of Emergency was imposed by the central state as an aggressive security framework that obliterated the locally generated dynamics of negotiation described in the previous two chapters. The illusory assumptions of this security framework are
revealed and analysed in this chapter in a way that takes forward the debate on this intriguing period of pre-transition history.

Finally, Chapter 10 serves as a conclusion that locates an analysis of a community-based urban development process in the context of two trends in the literature, namely the nature of transition and the dynamics of community-based development strategies.

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1. To use a phrase from Marx
2. Kabah and Langa will be used inter-changeably throughout the thesis. They refer to the same area even though Kabah is the oldest of the names, dating back to the c.19th.


9. For most of the case studies, see the extensive annotated bibliography prepared by Seekings, J., South Africa's Townships, 1980-1991: An Annotated Bibliography, Occasional Paper No. 16, Research Unit for Sociology of Development, Department of Sociology, University of Stellenbosch. They are influenced by the social history tradition which is very self-consciously case-based, but also criticised by some for being a-theoretical, see Bozzoli, B. (ed.), Labour, Townships and Protest, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1978; Bozzoli, B. (ed.), Town and Countryside in the Transvaal: Capitalist Penetration and Popular Response, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1983.


11. The debate on reductionism in SA studies has raged for some time now, with Marxists arguing that the class relations created by South African capitalism explain the racial structure of the society and polity, while liberals have argued that racism is rooted in the autonomous political dynamic of Afrikaner nationalism. Systems paradigms as a reaction to mechanistic reductionism flourishes in some post-Marxist texts, from Jean Cohen to Ernesto Laclau. However, it has achieved a synthesis of natural and social science paradigms in the remarkable works of ecological theory, see Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I., Order Out Of Chaos, London, Flamingo and HarperCollins, 1984; and Capra, F., The Turning Point, London, Fontana, 1990.


14. For a review of this literature in the context of urban research over the last three decades in a Southern African context see Swilling, M., "Towards an Urban Research Agenda for Southern Africa in the 1990s", paper presented at the Conference on Urban Research in Developing Countries, American University, Cairo, February 1993.


19. An important example of writing that did begin to grapple with this relationship is Morris, A., "The South African State and the Ouakissi Removal", Transformation, 8, 1989.


32. Seekings, J., "Township Resistance in the 1980s", in Swilling, M. et.al. (eds.), *Apartheid City..., op. cit., p. 298.


38. Castells, M., *City..., op. cit., p.16.

39. Ibid., p.36.

40. Dunleavy,


43. This is the gist of the critique of the 'late' Castells that Lowe develops in Lowe, S., *Urban Social Movements*, London, MacMillan, 1986, Chapter 2.


53. Ibid., p.23.

54. Ibid., p.24.


58. Although there is now a vast a rapidly growing literature in this field with inputs from across the disciplines, for the best recent review see Ray, M. and Rinzler, A., *The New Paradigm in Business*, New York, Jeremy Tarcher/Perigee Books, 1993.


60. See his classic Easton, D., "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", *World Politics*, 9, 3, April 1957.


66. 'Ibid., p.23.
67. 'Necklacing' refers to the act of putting of a tyre doused in petrol around a victim's neck and then lighting it.
68. Yin, R.K., op. cit., p.79.
69. A similar point is made by Seekings, J., "South Africa's Townships...", op. cit., p.12.
70. See Bozzoli, B. (ed.), op. cit.
74. By referring here to Touraine, it is not to suggest that the method he developed for the study of social movements was in fact applied. It is arguable that his method is inappropriate for an authoritarian context because for his method to work, structured interaction between the movement and its opponents is required. This was largely impossible in South African for most of the 1980s.
76. Ibid., p.265.
77. Ibid., p.289.
78. Following Yin, explanation building if one of three dominant case study analytical approaches - the other two being "pattern-matching" and "time series" approaches - see Yin, R.K., op. cit., pp.103-114.
80. Seekings, J., op. cit.
CHAPTER 1

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE PORT ELIZABETH-UITENHAGE REGION

INTRODUCTION

This first chapter provides a profile of the socio-economic and urban structure of the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage region. Primary markers such as the historical development of industrial activities, demographic trends, housing, education and urbanisation processes have been used to build up this profile. This, in turn, provides a background context for the socio-political dynamics that are the primary focus of the chapters that follow.

ORIGINS OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMY

The origins of industrial economic activity in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage (PEU) region date back to the 1820s when a permanent white settlement was established at Algoa Bay. One of the first industries was a whaling factory founded by Frederick Korsten. In 1851 a wool washing factory was established by Frames. Port Elizabeth's main function, however, revolved around the export of agricultural commodities, particularly wool which was the Cape Colony's main export.1 With the founding of the Standard Bank by John Paterson in Port Elizabeth in 1862 and the take-off of the import/export trade through her port that exceeded Cape Town in volume by the late 1950s, Port Elizabeth began its transition from a settler entrepot to one of the colony's most important centres of mercantile capital.2

By the turn of the century, Port Elizabeth had a population of 33 000. The city's transport links with the interior made the port a crucial link in the chain between the Transvaal mines and the colonial metropole. The service sector activities this stimulated, plus the small-scale manufacturing centred largely around wool washing and leather tanning, provided the foundations for Port Elizabeth's c.20th industrial base.

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The Landrostdy of Uitenhage was proclaimed in 1804 after General J.A. Uitenhage de Mist toured the Eastern Cape on behalf of the Batavian Government in search of an administrative headquarters for the expanding white settler communities. For many decades it was merely the small centre of a large agricultural community. By the mid-1800s, it had concerns engaged in craft production, tanning, wool washing and the manufacture of hats and saddles. However, it was only during the 1940s with the establishment of a tyre and rubber concern that Uitenhage became an industrial centre.3

In 1946 a firm called South African Motor Assemblers and Distributors Limited (SAMAD) was established in Uitenhage to produce Studebakers. In 1951 SAMAD signed an agreement with Volkswagen (Germany) to produce Beetles. In 1956 Volkswagen acquired a controlling interest in SAMAD and in 1961 the company changed its name to Volkswagen of South Africa Limited. By 1974, Volkswagen (Germany) had bought all the shares of the company thus turning it into a wholly owned subsidiary.4

The urban population of PEU grew from 68 000 in 1921 to 350 000 in 1960. Approximately half this population was black by the end of the period.5

The number of industrial establishments increased at an average rate of 2,3% per annum, from 186 in 1920/21 to 469 in 1961/62. These establishments employed just under 5000 people in 1920/21 and nearly 53000 in 1963/64. This was a 5,4% rate of increase, the highest rate of employment growth in the country.6 After WW I, PEU's industrial base was limited. Measured in terms of numbers of employees per enterprise, textiles and footwear were by far the most dominant sector that supplied both local and non-local markets. Whereas this sector employed 34% of the total workforce, food and beverages employed 28%, metals and machinery 8%, furniture 8% and the rest was divided fairly equally into the other sectors. The picture had changed slightly by the 1930s because although textiles and footwear were still dominant (employing 43%), the establishment of two motor vehicle assemblers in the 1920s meant that 15% of the workforce found employment in the transport sector.7 By the 1960s, the industrial base of PEU in order of size of employer was as follows: transport, 29%; textiles and footwear, 27%; food and beverages,
13%; metals and machinery, 13%; non-metals, 5%; wood, 4%; printing, 4%; chemicals, 3%; and furniture, 1%.8

In general, the PEU regional economy underwent the classic transition from mercantile colonial capitalism, through intermediate processing coupled to service sector growth, and finally, with the help of import tariffs and later local content legislation, the establishment of a secondary industry. As the metropolitan heartland of the Eastern Cape, it inevitably became the focus of black urbanisation.

THE REGIONAL ECONOMY

The PEU regional economy was unique in the South African context because by the late 1970s the manufacturing sector produced the highest percentage of this region's geographic product compared to other regions, i.e. 38.4% as compared to 30.5% in the PWV, 24.1% in Durban/Pinetown and 22.7% in the Western Cape.9 The manufacturing sector was followed by transport and communication (15.1%), wholesale/retail (13.2%), finance (11%), government (9.4%) and then a few smaller sectors.10

The largest industrial concerns in Uitenhage are related to the motor and transport industry. They were Volkswagen; Good Year Tyre and Rubber Company (established in 1945); Guestro Industries (Dorbyl subsidiary) that produced crank-shafts and other forged components; Cam TRW (established 1970), an Australian company that produced steering gear mechanisms; Bosal Afrika (established 1964) produced exhaust systems; SKF, the giant Swedish firm that produced ball bearings; Borg-Warner South Africa produced rear axles; Hella, a German linked producer of lighting and signaling equipment for motor vehicles; Veasey and Sharples, machine builders; National Standard produced steel wire for the tyre industry and copper wire for the Post Office; finally the South African Railways Workshops which manufactured spares and repaired rolling stock for the country's entire railway system. Although the motor and transport industry dominated Uitenhage's economy by the 1980s, the roots of this economy lay in the wool and mohair processing plants. The main companies still involved in these activities were Gubb and Inggs, Cape of
Good Hope Woolcombers, Veldspun, Union Cotton Mills, and Llama Fashion Techniques (Feltex). In general, all these establishments employed huge labour forces of between 1500 and 6000 people, were controlled by large national monopolies or multi-nationals and had capital investments of between R20 million and R300 million. This well serviced area located beyond the "rust belt" but close enough to a fully-serviced port, probably contained the highest concentration of large-scale modernised manufacturing industry per geographical head of population in the country.
The manufacturing sector in PEU was dominated by the motor industry and its various feeder sectors. Table 1.1 presents the data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCAL MANUFACTURING SECTOR</th>
<th>TOTAL VALUE OF PRODUCT R'000</th>
<th>AREA OF SALE Local % Non-Local %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>108 164</td>
<td>9,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverages</td>
<td>22 000</td>
<td>1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>50 184</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>16 583</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td>29 569</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood products</td>
<td>8 862</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>4 225</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and products</td>
<td>29 799</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing @ Publishing</td>
<td>5 290</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather and Products</td>
<td>13 812</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>75 182</td>
<td>6,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>56 988</td>
<td>5,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-metals</td>
<td>44 799</td>
<td>3,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Iron and Steel</td>
<td>3 238</td>
<td>0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Products</td>
<td>14 723</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>3 499</td>
<td>0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Machinery</td>
<td>50 252</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Equipment</td>
<td>589 848</td>
<td>52,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>4 464</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 131 481</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Wait and Renders, Table 2, p.8.)
Wait and Renders have calculated that in 1978 "the motor and motor related manufacturing activities in Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage [amounted] to R694 million or 61,3% of the total locally manufactured product." The table also shows that 70,4% of the manufactured product were consumption goods and the nature of the production processes involved were such that there were very weak backward and forward linkages within the regional economy. Furthermore, 74% of the locally manufactured product was sold to non-local markets (including a few exports). To make matters worse, 75% of the manufacturing sector's material inputs came from outside the region. In short, the PEU regional economy was structurally very weak indeed: it had weak internal linkages, most of its product was sold externally and most of its inputs were imported from non-local markets.

Although the motor industry was important for PEU as a whole, it was far more central to Uitenhage's economy than Port Elizabeth's. The original SAMAD factory produced 32 cars per day with a workforce of 320. Although the original Beetle was the mainstay of production, this changed as the Combi was introduced in 1955, the Audi in 1967, the Passat in 1974 and the Golf in 1978. By 1980 250 vehicles were being produced per day by 6000 workers. Volkswagen investment has been nothing short of massive. In 1956 R1 million was spent on plant expansion, in 1963 R8 million was invested in expanded premises and facilities, another R800 000 was spent on plant in 1966 and then in 1980 it was announced that R100 million would be spent over the following three years to expand production facilities, increase local content, add to the vehicle range, establish a new car engine plant and improve welfare and training facilities for staff. Volkswagen claimed it spent R100 million per year to purchase locally made components.
The dominance of the motor industry justifies further discussion of the problems faced by this sector. The following list presents the number of new cars sold per month between 1975 and 1986:

1975 - 19 086
1976 - 15 428
1977 - 13 897
1978 - 17 061
1979 - 17 773
1980 - 23 088
1981 - 25 127
1982 - 23 619
1983 - 22 735
1984 - 22 396
1985 - 17 027
1986 - 13 955

After the 1981 peak, "[t]here has since been a downward trend in annual sales which has accelerated in 1985 and 1986. This has plunged the motor industry into a crisis which is worse than that faced by any other major manufacturing sector in the economy."16

There are a number of cyclical and structural reasons for the decline of the motor industry.17 One market-related reason for the decline in vehicle sales relates to motor vehicle price increases. Whereas motor vehicle prices increased by 37,3% between 1984 and 1986, the Consumer Price Index and incomes only rose 18,9% and 12,1% respectively. The underlying cause of this price hike was the falling exchange rate. Between mid-1984 and December 1985 the Rand value of the US$, German Deutchmark and Japanese Yen increased by 105,6%, 124,7% and 133,7% respectively. This adversely affected the motor industry because no less than 50% of the value of vehicles sold in South Africa were imported.

Coupled to the effects of the falling exchange rate was the effect of rising taxes. Since January 1984 GST rose from 6% to 12% and an import surcharge of 10% was imposed. Volkswagen calculated that R2628 tax was paid on a R15000 car in January 1986. The decline in sales this produced
was exacerbated by the introduction of a fringe benefit tax in 1985 that undercut fleet sales, a traditionally stable segment of the market.

Although these cyclical problems could have been resolved if the government had the will to do so, there were structural weaknesses in the industry for which there were few remedies. Firstly, given that there was a small domestic market of 350,080 units per year, and given the relatively competitive nature of the industry, no manufacturer could realise the economies of scale attained by overseas producers. Secondly, as a result of the local content programme, manufacturers had to purchase materials from local suppliers even though these could be imported at cheaper rates. Thirdly, although the white market was saturated, the black market remained too constrained to facilitate major expansion in this area. Fourthly, although the port was the original reason for locating assembly-based motor manufacturers in PEU, with the shift away from assembly to direct manufacture as a result of the local content programme, the Reef-based competitors were closer to material input supplies. Fifthly, the PEU firms were located comparatively greater distances away from the main consumer markets in Natal and southern Transvaal. Sixthly, motor manufacturers complained that because the PEU motor industry experienced the longest period of unionisation of the workforce, wages had risen faster than productivity increases. Finally, the more attractive industrial decentralisation incentives in Industrial Decentralisation Points located elsewhere in the Eastern Cape/Border Region diverted potential investors away from the high-wage zones of PEU areas close to the apartheid-created bantustans.

Given these problems, the share of the national market accruing to PEU manufacturers fell from 58% in 1965 to 46% in 1970 to 41% in 1980 and finally to 32% in 1985.

"In 1986, PEU manufacturers have for the first time, received a smaller share of the market (23%) than either Durban (28%) or Reef (39%) based manufacturers."18

The growth of PEU manufacturing as a whole was -0.09% during 1970-1979.19 Black et al conclude their assessment of the PEU regional
As far as the PEU workforce was concerned, it was relatively well paid, fairly productive, relatively well educated and skilled.

The average annual wage and salary per worker in 1979 was R3811.80, the highest after the PWV where workers earned R4588.30. This corresponded to high productivity levels with the PEU workers producing the second highest output per worker in the country. As far as the racial composition of the workforce was concerned, in 1979 26.4% were white, 34.3% coloured/Asian and 39.3% African.
The dominance of the motor industry resulted in the creation of one of the most skilled regional proletariats in the country. After categorising different industries according to "high", "medium" and "low" skill levels, Black et. al. provide the information contained in Table 1.2:

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>HIGH %</th>
<th>MEDIUM %</th>
<th>LOW %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PWV</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban-Pinetown</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Peninsula</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEU</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London &amp; Hinterland</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

(Source: calculated from Black, P.A., et. al., p.29)

This relatively high skill level in PEU and the consequent bargaining power through trade unions it afforded semi-skilled and skilled workers, helps explain the relatively high wage levels in this region and the depth of union organisation.

The problems of labour 'control' and productivity were of primary concern to the dominant capitalist interests in the region. These interests were rooted in the manufacturing sector and to a lesser extent the commercial sector. The Midlands Chamber of Industries (MCI) that represented the former and the Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage Chambers of
Commerce that represent the latter were totally dominated by white English and Afrikaans business interests. The multinational corporations that controlled the motor industry were clearly the dominant interest in the MCI. Small-scale largely English-speaking commerce in Port Elizabeth and Afrikaans traders in Uitenhage dominated the chambers of commerce.

How these interests understood the economic problems of the region was reflected in a survey of opinions conducted amongst leading local business and public representatives. They identified the following causes of the problem: (i) under utilization of infrastructure (e.g. the harbour operated at under 50% capacity); (ii) rising unemployment; (iii) local authorities had insufficient income to provide all essential services; (iv) contracting industrial base because of more attractive investment opportunities in other regions; (v) PEU-based industries losing their competitive advantage; (vi) slow industrial growth relative to the PWV and the country as a whole; (vii) "labour unrest and poor black/white relations resulting from this"; (viii) slow job creation coupled to 3% annual growth of the "labour force"; (ix) shrinking pool of skills and talent in the region.24

This survey also revealed that business regarded "labour unrest" as the second most important "barrier to economic growth" in PEU after "distance from major markets".25 When asked which organisations "do you feel hindered local economic development", labour and political organisations that organised "unrest" were regarded as the primary culprits.26 Nevertheless, when asked what were the PEU region's "most important assets", "unskilled labour" was rated most highly. The second "most important asset" was the harbour facility. When asked what "improvements are required" to solve some of these problems, the list in order of priority was not surprising: "improvement of general business attitude; provision of low income housing; improved public transport; improved training facilities; industrial parks for small [black] entrepreneurs; improvement of recreational facilities; more serviced industrial land; development of irrigation potential; improved hotel accommodation; expansion of water/sewerage systems."27 In short, except for the demand for improved hotels and business attitudes, the primary
demands of PEU's capitalist interests were for substantial upgrading of the main reproductive facilities (housing, transport, water and sanitation, training and recreation). One typical comment from the respondents was: "Adequate labour force although untrained and unhoused."²⁸

In a special research report into black living conditions commissioned by the Urban Foundation's Eastern Cape division, one of the key conclusions was:

"A major education programme is required to develop home ownership desires leading to increased home purchases and ultimate social security.

The growing importance and influence of the youth group must be recognised and maximum attention given to providing needed acceptable education, recreational and entertainment facilities. These facilities are fundamental to quality of life and neighbourhood awareness and pride."²⁹

This pre-occupation with reproductive facilities was directly related to the general perception amongst employers that workplace resistance and township unrest were an important obstacle to economic growth. Their response to black protest was to argue that living and related reproductive facilities needed to be improved. This perception legitimised and supported popular black demands for housing and better urban services. However, in light of the state's failure to address these problems in any meaningful way (especially housing), these issues were to become the foci of sustained popular rebellion and protest amongst the popular classes during the mid-1980s. These classes, however, were to attach meanings to these community needs that contradicted the "social security" and "quality of life" concerns of the private sector.

In short, by the 1980s the PEU regional economy was moving rapidly into a severe structural recession with little relief from the state. The rapidly contracting regional economy and the drastic limits this placed on occupational mobility and income distribution was incapable of meeting the needs of the increasingly well educated, relatively highly skilled and
relatively well paid working class. Given that all this was overdetermined by rapid urbanisation and population growth rates without simultaneous expansion of housing stock (as the next section will show), it is unsurprising that community-based struggles over the terms of labour power reproduction became the focus of political conflict in this region and in Uitenhage in particular during the 1980s.

**DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRENDS**

The total population of PEU for 1984 was conservatively estimated to be 727 580. Of this, nearly 400 000 or over 50% were african. The total growth rates of this population were 33% during the two decades 1960-1980. However, african growth rates increased from 37,9% in 1960-1970 to 44,3% in 1970-1980. A more reliable population estimate put the figure at 450 000 in the range 420 000 to 470 000. This source also argued that the most reliable population growth rate since 1970 was 4,7% in a range 4,5% to 5,0%.

Although specific figures on the age and gender of the PEU population are unavailable, these do exist for Region D as a whole. According to Kruger and Potgieter, there were 1 041 760 african males and 1 337 120 african females in Region D in 1970 or, in other words, a 78 "masculinity ratio" (i.e. number of males per female). By 1980, the masculinity ratio had shifted to 81 with 1 474 424 males and 1 815 925 females.
The age profile of Africans living in Region D is reflected in Table 1.3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-9 yrs</th>
<th>10-19 yrs</th>
<th>20-34 yrs</th>
<th>35-44 yrs</th>
<th>45-54 yrs</th>
<th>55-64 yrs</th>
<th>65-74 yrs</th>
<th>75 + yrs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>362120</td>
<td>303200</td>
<td>222420</td>
<td>109940</td>
<td>80020</td>
<td>51300</td>
<td>33880</td>
<td>14440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>30,8</td>
<td>25,8</td>
<td>18,9</td>
<td>9,3</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>476380</td>
<td>398000</td>
<td>371060</td>
<td>150900</td>
<td>99640</td>
<td>73040</td>
<td>43780</td>
<td>20780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>29,2</td>
<td>24,4</td>
<td>22,7</td>
<td>9,2</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>2,7</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: calculated from Kruger and Potgieter, Table 3.2.)

This table is important because it shows that no less than 53% of the African population were younger than twenty and that 76% were younger than thirty-five. The first figure in particular is revealing because it points to the demographic centrality of what came to be known in everyday language as "the youth". Given the conditions of poverty and economic recession they lived under, this was one reason why this group came to play such an important political role in the struggles of the 1980s. Also, given that most of this group were school-going age, it becomes easier to understand why education grievances rapidly affected the community as a whole.

Using a "dependency ratio" calculation, Kruger and Potgieter demonstrate from these figures that there were 135,2 dependents (young and aged) per 100 economically productive people (aged between 20 and 64) in the African community. This compared with 82,5 for whites, 88,9 for Asians...
and 128.5 for coloureds.\textsuperscript{36} If a 50% unemployment rate is included, then this dependency ratio must be doubled to approximately 270 or 2.7 dependents per earner.

As far as African education is concerned, similar crucial sociological implications emerge. Table 1.4 presents the basic data:

| TABLE 1.4: LEVEL OF AFRICAN SCHOOL EDUCATION IN PEU, 1970-1980\textsuperscript{37} |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                 | None            | < Std. 6        | < Std. 6&7      | < Std. 8&9      | <Std. 10        | Total           |
| 1970 Number                     | 94040           | 109340          | 29600           | 7960           | 1320           | 242260          |
| %                               | 38.8            | 45.1            | 12.2            | 3.3            | 0.3            | 100             |
| 1980 Number                     | 105940          | 162240          | 64580           | 26180          | 6840           | 365780          |
| %                               | 29.0            | 44.4            | 17.7            | 7.2            | 1.9            | 100             |

(Source: calculated from Kruger and Potgieter, Table 4.2(d))

Like the age profile, the sociological implications of this table shed invaluable light on current township tensions. In the short space of a decade the number of Africans who achieved some sort of education up to standard 5 increased by over 50 000. The number that achieved standards 6 and 7 more than doubled while, most dramatically of all, those who obtained standard 8 and 9 more than trebled and those who achieved standard 10 (and higher) increased almost five times. This rate of educational advancement continued into the 1980s as the state increased its expenditure on black education. Given the politicised nature of black education and given that the PEU regional economy entered a deep structural recession from the later 1970s, the educational system was
producing politicised young people with diminishing chances of using their qualifications to obtain economic positions to satisfy rising expectations. Adding fuel to the fire, rising state expenditures were aimed at increasing the quantity of people going through the educational system without a concomitant improvement in the quality of the system itself.

This trend towards rapid educational advancement is reflected in increases in the number of diplomas and degrees achieved by Africans in the PEU area. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of diplomas awarded to Africans in this area increased from 1080 to 2100 and the number of degrees awarded increased from 40 to 200.38

It was reliably estimated in 1985 that the unemployment rate in PEU was between 50 and 60 per cent.39 Rising unemployment was the product of slow employment creation and high urbanisation and population expansion rates. Whereas 41 980 new jobs became available for Africans during the decade 1970-1980, the size of the African population increased by 123520 from 242260 in 1970 to 365780 in 1980.40 With the population growing at three times the rate of employment growth, it is unsurprising that unemployment rose. It also explains why there was a significant decline in the number of economically active Africans (defined as those with actual employment) in PEU. Whereas 90,1% of the total population in the 20-64 year age bracket were economically active in 1970, this dropped to 71,3% in 198041 and it is safe to assume that this downward trend accelerated with the onset of the recession during the first quarter of 1982. If these trends are seen against the backdrop of relative educational advancement, a clear picture of a context conducive for severe social tension begins to emerge.

Despite relative declines in employment growth and economic activity ratios reflected in the above percentage shares, there were crucial economic changes that, if measured in absolute terms, reflect the extent to which shifts in the industrial base affected the occupational structure of African employees. Table 1.4 presents the basic data:
If we assume that the production, service and farming categories refer to employees broadly located in unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour, then this table reveals that about two thirds of all African employees can be defined as falling within wage-based labour, or what could be categorised as the working class. However, during the decade 1970-1980,
the number of working class employees increased negligibly. The most important shifts were significant increases in the number of employees in professional, administrative and clerical employment. This, if seen in the context of relative educational advancement, suggests the emergence of an important upwardly mobile middle class. These professional and white collar employees complemented and reinforced the growth of another crucial segment of the black middle class, namely the entrepreneurs. A study of Port Elizabeth's small business sector arrived at this conclusion:

"[T]here is little doubt that a significant Black entrepreneurial class does exist in the city. ... They consist of a relatively small group of entrepreneurs, predominantly middle-aged males who probably constitute less than half of one percent of the total black population of some 400 000."42

In short, the PEU's regional political economy had a productive base that grew, transformed itself and then began declining as structural constraints reinforced cyclical downturns. When the impact of these economic trends are located in their social context, a picture emerges of a severe set of dislocations between employment growth, population expansion, demographic transformation and occupational restructuring. The crisis in production that these dislocations reflected were reinforced by state urban policies that were responsible for creating a crisis in reproduction by the 1980s.

**HOUSING, INFRASTRUCTURE AND TOWNSHIP SERVICES**

The black townships of the PEU region, like those built in the rest of South Africa's "urban areas", are the product of apartheid urban policy (see chapter 3 for a detailed analysis). Although designed to maximise state control of the labour force, townships became the bases for a popular movement that emerged as a direct threat to state power in the 1980s. Although an important mix of ideological currents gave shape to this movement, urban contradictions were the underlying structural determinants that led to the formation of networks of local community
organisations that underpinned the movement.

No less that 85% of all african housing in the PEU region was built prior to 1970 (63% prior to 1960).\textsuperscript{43} The state's failure to provide housing despite high urbanisation and population growth rates forced poor and working people to resort to illegal land invasions to build their own shelter, i.e. shacks. This is why over 40% of all african dwellings in the PEU region in 1985 were shacks.\textsuperscript{44} Table 1.5 sums up the state of african shelter by 1985:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Township</th>
<th>Date Established</th>
<th>Units built prior to 1950s</th>
<th>Units built in 1950s</th>
<th>Units built in 1960s</th>
<th>Units built in 1970s</th>
<th>Units built in 1980s</th>
<th>Total No. of formal built units</th>
<th>No. of shacks per township</th>
<th>No. of served sites per township</th>
<th>Total no. of residential units/sites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lbhayi: New Brighton - Red Location</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbhayi: New Brighton - McNamee Village</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>869</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>869</td>
<td>869</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbhayi: New Brighton - Elundini</td>
<td>1934-1943</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbhayi: New Brighton - Kwaford</td>
<td>1951-1954</td>
<td>2577</td>
<td>2577</td>
<td>2577</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2577</td>
<td>2577</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbhayi: New Brighton townships</td>
<td></td>
<td>5047</td>
<td>2577</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>8021</td>
<td>554</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbhayi: Walmer</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>216</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbhayi: KwaZakheli</td>
<td>1963-1961</td>
<td>11727</td>
<td>11727</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11727</td>
<td>11727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbhayi: Zwide</td>
<td>1965 &amp; 1970s</td>
<td>3351</td>
<td>2824</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>6935</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6935</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbhayi: Soweto-by-the-Sea</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16084</td>
<td>16084</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for lbhayi % of total per decade</td>
<td></td>
<td>5197</td>
<td>14354</td>
<td>3466</td>
<td>2824</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>26899</td>
<td>17661</td>
<td></td>
<td>44560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDB: KwaDvusi</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3004</td>
<td>3004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDB: KwaMakhulu</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>186</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDB: Motherwell</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3447</td>
<td>3447</td>
<td>17000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for ECDB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3633</td>
<td>3633</td>
<td>22001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNB: Despatch</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>538</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNB: Langa</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>6116</td>
<td>7148</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNB: KwaNobuhle</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2356</td>
<td>6856</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>14849</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number for KNB</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1329</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2356</td>
<td>8185</td>
<td>8350</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>22535</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total per decade</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL NUMBER FOR PEU</strong></td>
<td>5197</td>
<td>15683</td>
<td>5966</td>
<td>4824</td>
<td>7047</td>
<td>38717</td>
<td>26011</td>
<td>28001</td>
<td>92729</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Ibhayi was the name of the local authority that was responsible for the administration of townships in Port Elizabeth. ECDB refers to those township that feel directly under the ECDB. KNB = KwaNobuhle which refers to the local authority that was responsible for the administration of townships in Uitenhage.

(Source: calculated from Expro, p.UF6/004 & p.UF7/005-1)
Table 1.5 reveals that in 1985 there were 38717 houses, 28001 serviced sites and 26011 shacks. It would be incorrect to assume that the serviced sites would have been able to cater for the shack dwellers because too many of the latter could not afford the rates in any formal or controlled settlement schemes (more on this later). The two highest shack concentrations were Soweto-by-the-Sea in Port Elizabeth and Langa in Uitenhage. It is significant, though, that in Uitenhage as a whole, there were more shacks (8350) than formal houses (8185). Furthermore, between 1983 and 1985, the number of shacks erected in Port Elizabeth only increased by 1.5% (from 17397 to 17661), whereas in Uitenhage the number increased by 29.7% (from 6439 to 8350). Although the number of service sites increased substantially in Uitenhage, they were located in a very different place to where the squatters erected their shacks, i.e. the serviced sites were in the planned township of KwaNobuhle located some distance from the town, and the shacks were in Langa, an illegal settlement close to town. The resultant struggles over the spatial mismatching of where people settled and where investment in serviced sites took place underpinned the dynamic of political conflict and resistance in the PEU townships in the 1980s and forms the key focus of the chapters that follow.

Using the findings of two studies of squatter settlements in the PEU region, a profile emerges of stable communities whose incomes were relatively high compared to other similar communities. 56% of the squatters surveyed said they moved to the settlement because they wanted shelter. This was high compared to the 9% response obtained from the same question in Durban. This suggests that the reason for moving into squatter settlements in PEU were primarily related to the housing shortage rather than employment or relocation reasons. This was reflected in the relatively low importance of other reasons given for moving into the settlement, namely because they had recently moved to the PEU area (18%; Durban - 26%), they had been displaced from previous lodging (11%; Durban - 9%), they wanted a congenial environment (12%; Durban - 4%) and, most important of all, the need to be close to employment (3%; Durban - 52%).
The stability of the squatter communities was largely facilitated by the fact that no major forced removals or evictions of squatters had taken place in PEU since 1979. The Jardine survey revealed that of those in the communities she surveyed, 74% had resided there for five years or more. The largest number (44%) had resided there for between 8 and 11 years.

Unlike in the Western Cape where the state acted heavily against squatters, the East Cape Development Board (ECDB) never followed this example. This had much to do with the fact that the "coloured labour preference" regulations were applicable to the Western Cape, but not to the Eastern Cape. This effectively "protected" african squatters in the PEU settlements. However, given the above figures which show that squatters were not recent migrant arrivals (as in the Western Cape), it is safe to assume that most of the squatters qualified as 'urban insiders' in terms of Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act which meant they could not be evicted from the urban areas. They were forced to live in shacks because although they qualified to be in the urban areas, the housing shortage defined them as urban marginals. Ironically, influx control actually protected these communities from being defined as rural marginals because the implementation of influx control meant they were defended from authorities who would have liked to "resolve" the squatter problem by simply dumping the homeless in the bantustans. This anomalous situation provided the material basis for housing struggles in squatter communities which, in the absence of meaningful state and capitalist initiatives, were forced to build their own shelter.

It has been reliably estimated that the population density of african households in the PEU region in 1985 was 6,9 persons per dwelling. This was 0,9 higher than the optimum density of 6,0 persons per dwelling which is used to determine Household Subsistence Level (HSL) estimates. Based on an estimated 450 000 Africans in PEU, a further 10600 dwellings would have been required to reduce this density down to the normal 6,0 persons per dwelling.46 This meant that the housing shortage equaled 26011 shacks plus 10600 additional dwellings resulting in a total shortage of 36611 houses or a number nearly equal to the existing regional housing stock.
Urban services in the PEU townships were totally inadequate. A 1984 HSRC survey found that 98% of its respondents had no running water, 91% had no electricity, 96.2% had no bathroom in their houses, 91.4% had no kitchen sinks, 36.4% had no ceilings, and 19.3% had no interior doors. The report concluded that the conditions in which 76% of its respondents lived were "poor or very poor".47

The severe shortage of basic services within the household was reproduced in the community as a whole. For a population of nearly 600 000, a large percentage of whom were under 18 years of age (38% in Port Elizabeth and 25% in Uitenhage), there were very few recreational and community facilities. In the area as a whole, there were 34 recreational facilities (e.g. sports facilities, swimming pools, etc), 37 entertainment venues, 123 educational institutions, 41 health and welfare agencies (e.g. crèches, legal aid, social workers, etc), 144 religious institutions and 201 commercial outlets (supermarkets, service stations, bottle stores, etc).48 In short, few institutionalised recreational or communal facilities existed for the youth in these communities.

The cost structure of African housing in PEU reflected the complexities that face an administration that had to deliver houses to extremely poor communities. In Port Elizabeth there were four rental schemes, namely sub-economic housing, economic housing, subsidised housing and shacks.
### TABLE 1.6: COSTS OF RENTAL SCHEMES IN PORT ELIZABETH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SUB-ECON</th>
<th>ECONOMIC</th>
<th>SUBSIDISED</th>
<th>SHACKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R'/ month</td>
<td>R'/ month</td>
<td>R'/ month</td>
<td>R'/ month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly household income level as determined by means test:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*below R150</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>not qualified</td>
<td>11.99</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*above R150</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>graduated up to R54.06*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*above R450</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVICE CHARGES:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flush sanitation</td>
<td>21.11</td>
<td>21.11</td>
<td>21.11</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Soil, i.e. bucket system</td>
<td>22.56</td>
<td>22.56</td>
<td>22.56</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* There were no less than 16 different graduations calculated on the basis of a means test.) (Source: Expro, p.0018/15)

It is important to note that these service charges and rentals were not increased between 1982 and 1985. This probably reflected a reluctance on the part of the state to risk increases during a period of heightened politicisation.

Uitenhage had a different set of schemes with a bureaucratically more
complex means grading system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.7: COSTS OF RENTAL SCHEMES IN UITENHAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUB-ECONOMIC</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R' per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECONOMIC</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R' per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;NEW&quot; ECONOMIC</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R' per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHACKS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R' per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RENT:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaNob.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.88, graduating thro' 100 gradations to 33.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.45, graduating thro' 21 gradations to 80.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SERVICE CHARGES:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaNobuhle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Langa:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*std rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMM. taps/no night soil</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*communal taps + night soil removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*tap on site/no night soil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*tap on site + night soil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Expro, p.14/7/2 and p.0018/21)
In addition to rental schemes, by 1985 houses could be purchased on the basis of a 99-leasehold scheme and an "indefinite occupation" scheme based on a 30 year residential occupation contract. As far as 99-year leasehold was concerned, the houses were valued at between R2500.00 and R3000.00 and the land cost between R435.00 and R475.00. Depending on income status and time of purchase, various discounts and incentives could be obtained including free deposit, 3% interest on loans and low house prices. In the end, the resident got security of tenure for monthly rates of (a) R64.00 for a house purchased that cost below R2500.00, (b) R21.00 for a house that cost above R2500.00 but was purchased by someone with a monthly income of below R450.00 per month; and (c) R45.00 for a house that cost above R2500.00 per month but was purchased by someone who earned above a monthly salary of R450.00. (The initial outlays in each case were R6.00, R156.00 and R156.00 respectively.) It is important to note that these monthly costs excluded the monthly service charge that still needed to be paid.

The Great Sale of State-owned housing that was initiated by the state in the early 1980s as a reformist measure, was not very successful in the PEU region. Of the 26899 houses available for sale in Ibhayi, 20% were purchased. And in Uitenhage, out of a total of 8185 houses available, only 5% were sold. The reasons for the failure of the Great Sale have never been systematically studied. The Executive Projects (Expro) report asserts that the clumsy half-baked nature of the 99-year leasehold scheme was to blame because it did not make leasehold more attractive than rental in financial terms. Another explanation is that housing was a relatively low priority for township dwellers compared to problems related to transport, criminality, services and education.

Although failures in the delivery of housing was clearly one cause of the housing crisis, another was the economy's wage structure which effectively excluded large sectors of the African community from the housing market. If we take into account the fact that the HSL was about R325.00 per month in PEU in 1985, that the average wage rate for Africans in 1985 was R352.00 and that each breadwinner had an extended family to support because of high unemployment, then it is not surprising that the Expro
report could come to the conclusion that "the shack community effectively represents a financially attractive accommodation area". This crisis of affordability was reflected in the fact that over 20% of all township residents were in permanent arrears because they could not afford normal housing costs.

The Expro report, on the basis of three independent surveys and census data, concluded that total household income (i.e. not just head of household income) in the PEU region was as follows: 40% earned below R300, 15% between R300 and R400, 15% between R400 and R500, 20% between R500 and R600, 5% between R600 and R700 and 5% above R700. Furthermore, 39% earned below the HSL. If we assume that a household could only buy into the formal housing market at the very lowest level (i.e. a R5000.00 house with a loan at 12% interest) if it earned R400 or more, then it meant that no less than 55% of all PEU households had incomes below what was required to meet the costs of the most basic housing structure. This exclusion level rose dramatically when it came to the number who could purchase newly built houses, the cheapest of which cost about R20 000.

State and capital responded differently, albeit equally inadequately, to the PEU region's housing crisis. The Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr. P. Koornhof, appointed the Metropolitan Black Planning Council (MBPC) - the so-called Rive Commission - in October 1982 to investigate problems in the supply of housing and infrastructure in the PEU region. Organised business, through the Urban Foundation, commissioned its own investigation in May 1985.

The MBPC was chaired by Louis Rive and Dr. J. Wessels was the vice-chairperson. Its members comprised the chairpersons of the Uitenhage Community Council and Port Elizabeth Community Council, as well as the Chief Director of the East Cape Administration Board and the Chief Commissioner. The personnel drawn into the panel of experts that helped the MBPC came from ECDB, Greater Algoa Bay Planning Authority, Port Elizabeth Municipality, Uitenhage Municipality, SA Association of Consulting Engineers, SA Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors, CSIR, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning,
Department of Community Development, Department of Cooperation and Development and the Department of Posts and Telecommunications.

In short, the MBPC was a central state initiative that drew its personnel from the heart of the political, professional and bureaucratic establishment. The MBPC's brief was restricted to infrastructure and how the backlogs could be remedied. Its stated commitment to formulate proposals in consultation with the black communities never went further than coopting two community councillors. In any event, the full MBPC only met on three occasions during which the councillors made no contribution. All the work and thinking took place in the technical sub-committees. The final recommendation of the MBPC boiled down to minimal upgrading of services in existing townships and provision of "sub-minimum" services for 29187 new sites in new township areas.

The recommendations were as follows:

(i) A distinction was made between "minimum" infrastructural standards (running water, flush sanitation, roads, stormwater drainage and electricity) and "sub-minimum" standards (running water and sanitation). It was calculated that the former would cost R296,5 million (at 1983 prices) and the latter R203,2 million.

(ii) Given government's constraints, upgrading to "sub-minimum" standards would be acceptable. Not surprisingly, the state accepted the "sub-minimum" rate.

The glaring omissions and failures in the final report were as follows:

* because only estimates of costs were calculated and not affordability estimates, there was no way the community could know how much it would have to pay after the upgrading was completed;

* no growth predictions were given and therefore the community had no idea whether the quality and quantity of services would be adequate by the time the programme was completed;

* all "black spots" designated for removal were excluded from the
plan despite vigorous anti-removal struggles in Walmer, Langa and Red Location;

* the management structure proposed by the MBPC to run the upgrading project was totally dominated by technocrats controlled by ECDB - the community councils were given the status of an "advisory panel".

In short, there were no recommendations for substantial upgrading of infrastructure nor were there proposals on how the housing shortage could be resolved. It was essentially a programme to facilitate the servicing of sites for squatters so that these communities could be brought into a "controlled squatting" system rather than allowing them to continue as illegal uncontrolled settlements with all the security risks that this implied.

The Greater Algoa Bay Affordable Housing Research Project report\textsuperscript{59} was commissioned by the Urban Foundation's Eastern Cape office. The steering committee comprised the managing director of the Urban Foundation, Robin Lee; the Director of the Urban Foundation Eastern Cape, Roger Matlock; Peter Arton-Powell, Chief Executive Officer of Unifound - a construction utility company; Derek Cleary, ex-director of Housing in the Port Elizabeth Municipality and managing director of Urban Villages; Stan Anderson, managing director of Maybaker - a multinational chemical company based in Port Elizabeth; Rod Philip, prominent Port Elizabeth architect and board member of Urban Villages; and Lindi Tshume, personnel manager of British United Shoe Machinery.

The report focussed essentially on the problem of how to facilitate housing development following the preparation of serviced sites in line with the Rive Plan. It concluded that "unco-ordinated efforts by government agencies and independent enterprises" and the absence of "home ownership desires" necessary for "increased home purchases and ultimate social stability" were the main problems in the housing market.\textsuperscript{60} Its recommendations were:\textsuperscript{61}

* the acceleration of infrastructural upgrading proposed by the Rive
Plan;

* in situ upgrading and retention of squatter settlements "which must be recognised as a practical, realistic and necessary part of the accommodation cycle";

* the granting of freehold title to ensure that the "Great Sale" scheme is a success;

* the provision of "affordable housing and land prices" which will necessarily include the need for subsidisation;

* the initiation of "employment generating ventures";

* the rationalisation of administration of urban development under the auspices of the Regional Services Council;

* the privatisation of construction programmes;

* decentralisation of property and bond registration to the local level of government;

* the scrapping of the "means test" for establishing affordability and the gradual transition to a "rates and taxes system".

In short, the focus of this report was on the housing delivery system rather than on infrastructure. Although its aim was "to determine the range of affordable housing options potentially available to low income groups" and which are "acceptable to the total community", the report never questioned the two underlying determinants of inequities in housing provision, namely the Group Areas Act and the low wage structure in the economy. Nevertheless, by accepting the need for subsidisation and opposing removals of squatter camps, it deviated in these important respects from government policy.
CONCLUSION

The picture that emerges from the analytical overview of housing and urban services in the PEU region points to the existence of a deep crisis of reproduction. By the 1980s household and community structures were experiencing the combined pressures of population growth, urbanisation, housing shortages, low absolute incomes, unemployment, relative educational advancement and expanding size of the youthful age groups. In their struggle to survive, at least 40% of all the households were forced to move into the squatter settlements. When the Port Elizabeth camps became too congested, Uitenhage became the major growth point during the 1982-85 period.

With many returning to an old residential area close to Uitenhage's CBD that still existed in the memories of at least three generations despite successive forced removals, Langa was to become the focus of PEU's urban social movement. Langa emerged as a symbol of many struggles: the struggle for shelter, for land, for the right to build a community and eventually, the right to control social and political destiny. It is to this struggle and to the social movement it generated that we can now turn.

2. see Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.3.
6. Ibid., pp.49-54.
7. Ibid., pp.60-63.
8. Ibid., p.66.
10. Ibid., p.6.
16. Ibid., p.27.
17. For this analysis of the motor industry I will rely entirely on Black, P.A., et. al., pp.27-47.
18. Ibid., p.39.
20. Ibid., p.215.
22. Ibid., p.28.
23. Ibid., p.29.
25. Ibid., p.21
26. Ibid., p.30
27. Ibid., p.34
28. Ibid., p.28
31. Ibid., p.10.
33. Ibid., p.16/4.
34. Region D is the pre-1993 term that was used to refer to what is now the Eastern Cape Province which incorporates the former Transkei and Ciskei homelands, plus the Border region and the Eastern Cape hinterland and coastline. Region D was created as a functional planning unit along with 8 other similarly constituted regions across the rest of the country. They were created by the state as part of a reformist initiative in the late 1970s when the then PW Botha Government was looking for ways of maintaining political independence for the homelands, but within a framework of an nationally planned integrated economy. For a detailed analysis see Cobbett, W., Hindson, D., Glaser, D. and Swilling, M., "A Critical Analysis of the South African State's Reform Strategies in the 1980s", in Frankel, P., Pines, N. and Swilling, M. (eds.), State, Resistance and Change in South Africa, London, Croom Helm, 1988.
36. Ibid., p.25.
37. This table lists the highest school standard passed on average, regardless of what post-schooling qualifications may have been attained. As far as the "None" category is concerned, it is misleading because it includes infants and pre-school age groups. The National Technical Certificate I, II and III are included in the Std. 6&7, 7&8 and 10 categories respectively. They are not counted as post-school qualifications.
41. Ibid., p.57.
44. Ibid., p.UF6/004.
46. Executive Projects, op. cit., p.16/4.
49. Ibid., p.UF6/003
50. Ibid., p.0023A/1/sm.
54. Ibid., p.14/2/2.
55. Ibid., p.0018/1.
57. See Executive Projects, op. cit.
58. Interview with Roger Matlock, Eastern Cape Director of the Urban Foundation, June 1986.
59. Executive Projects, op. cit.
60. Executive Projects, op. cit., p.11/1/3.
61. Ibid., pp.11/1/3-16/11.
62. Ibid., 11/1.
CHAPTER 2

POPULAR ORGANISATION IN THE PORT ELIZABETH-UITENHAGE REGION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO UITENHAGE

INTRODUCTION

Popular organisation in Uitenhage's black communities was, in many ways, unique. The actors, ideas and social conditions that shaped the patterns of mobilisation and organisation in these communities gave rise to atypical formations. The distinguishing feature about Uitenhage is that it was probably the only "union town" in South Africa. With Volkswagen employing nearly two thirds of Uitenhage's economically active population and with the rest of the labour force concentrated in large private and public sector establishments, it is not surprising that the unionisation of Uitenhage's black working class made a substantial impact on the organisational form and ideological content of community-based movements during the 1980s.

Although popular organisation in Uitenhage's black community probably stretches back to colonial penetration, direct contemporary linkages can be traced back to Communist Party agitation during the 1940s and 1950s and, more importantly, widespread ANC organisation during the 1950s. A number of old-timers from the fifties that did time on Robben Island could still be found speaking or in the audience at political meetings during the 1980s in Uitenhage. They told heroic stories of how they worked with Mbeki, how they held mass meetings in the veld and how they organised ANC branches and campaigns in Uitenhage. The leading Uitenhage organiser, Mr. Mfazwa, recounts in some detail how he organised Freedom Volunteers to collect demands for the Congress of the People in 1955 that drew up the Freedom Charter. Many of today's leading youth congress activists in Uitenhage had parents who participated in the Defiance Campaign. Although no mention is made of Uitenhage in the accounts of the 1950s, we can safely assume that popular struggles in Uitenhage's black communities developed along similar lines to those which emerged in Port Elizabeth.

Unlike in Port Elizabeth where the re-emerging popular organisations in the 1980s were rooted in student and community protests, the re-emergence of popular organisation in Uitenhage was shaped largely by trade union...
organisation. As I described in chapter 1, the massive impact large-scale industrial manufacturing had on Uitenhage's economy not only explains the formation of an advanced industrial proletariat, but also why trade unions were to play such an important role in the establishment of contemporary social movements. This is why this chapter will start with an account of the Uitenhage trade union movement. Like the East Rand, the remarkable feature about Uitenhage's trade unions is how they entered the 1980s as fairly conservative economistic trade unions opposed to community involvement, but ended up as strong allies of radical politicised community organisations by the mid-1980s.

The period October 10th 1979 to June 16th 1980 saw the birth of mass organisation in the Eastern Cape's factories, communities and schools. The form, content and pattern of these struggles were not only distinctly different from previous phases of resistance, but they generated conceptions of struggle that were to shape national strategies and tactics in the years ahead. This is because at root they raised, for the first time, the critical question of how home and workplace struggles could be combined to create a new and effective social movement. It was from this crucible that leaders, activists and analysts would draw lessons, precedents and arguments during the rest of the 1980s.

It would be a mistake, however, to comprehend the emerging politics of resistance in the PEU region simply as an outgrowth of unionisation in the workplace. The communities had their own dynamics that led to forms of community organisation in the region that quite often had conflictual relations with the unions.

The key moments in October 1979-June 1980 period were as follows:

* October 10th: proposal to form the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) which was officially inaugurated on the 30th October;

* October 23rd: founding of the Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation (UBCO);

* October 31st: commencement of Ford Strikes;

* April 30th: commencement of East Cape schools boycott;
THE UNION MOVEMENT

Right-wing racist unions and politicised black trade unionism are two sides of the same coin. And in the Eastern Cape, this irony was to be overdetermined by social conditions and a political culture that eventually spawned the most militant union movement in the country.

The form and structure of contemporary Eastern Cape unionism goes back to the decision by the conservative white union Yster en Staal to organise white workers in 1964, and the formation in 1967 of the mainly coloured National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa (NUMARWOSA).

**Yster en Staal**, a conservative union whose membership was drawn largely from Afrikaans speaking artisans in the Transvaal, began organising in the Eastern Cape motor firms in the 1960s. It won recognition from General Motors (Port Elizabeth) in 1966 and subsequently at Ford (Port Elizabeth) and Volkswagen in Uitenhage. The basic strategy of the right-wing white artisan unions during the 1960s was to use their race as a bargaining tool. As mechanisation and job fragmentation steadily diluted the bargaining power of white workers after WW II, and given that this increasingly privileged stratum was attached to a racist ideology that prohibited cross-race class alliances, it followed that a key form of pressure available to white workers was their ability to pressurise the state into job reservation. This is exactly what Yster en Staal did in the Eastern Cape motor firms.

In 1967 Yster en Staal asked the Minister of Labour to appoint an industrial tribunal to establish whether white workers were unfairly losing jobs to cheaper black workers. Based on the findings of this tribunal, the Minister promulgated Job Reservation Determination Number 16 which stipulated that all supervisory and control work in the motor industry must be reserved for whites; that 65% of all jobs must be occupied by whites and that all existing jobs occupied by whites were reserved for whites. Furthermore, if an employer wanted to employ a black in a job reserved for whites, an
application for a special exemption had to be forwarded to the Department of Labour which in turn referred the application to Yster en Staal for sanctioning. The severe constraints this imposed on the labour market not only caused tension between white workers and employers, but was to eventually lead to the formation of an Industrial Council in 1970 that would, due to pressure from black workers, steadily undermine the only bargaining power white workers had, namely their race.

Fred Sauls, a 27 year old "cycle checker" at Ford, decided to join the embryonic union of coloured motor workers in 1967. After formally registering in June 1967, NUMARWOSA was to grow into a significant force. After becoming general secretary of the union in 1971, Fred Sauls led NUMARWOSA into the Industrial Council (IC) for the Eastern Cape Motor Industry in the same year. At the same time, the union leadership decided to organise african workers into a "parallel" union called the United Automobile Rubber and Allied Workers Union (that used "UAW" as its acronym). It was "parallel" because Africans were not allowed to join registered trade unions at this point. NUMARWOSA believed this was important because "it was in our direct interests to unite workers to prevent management from dividing them. ... We made it clear from the start to management and the Industrial Council that separate representation for coloureds and Africans was completely against our principles." The NUMARWOSA and UAW worked closely together and caucused positions prior to IC negotiations. The UAW applied for and won de facto recognition from employers in 1977 claiming it had 50% representation at Ford and Volkswagen and 20% at General Motors.

Responding to the unionisation of black workers in the Eastern Cape and elsewhere, the state adjusted the Labour Relations Act in 1973 to provide for the formation of "Liaison Committees". These in-house committees that gave Africans a very limited voice were given representation on the IC but under the supervision of the Department of Labour's regional Bantu Labour Officer. Although intended to make unions redundant, the NUMARWOSA-UAW succeeded in organising the liaison committee members which meant that the key african liaison committee representatives on the IC were in fact UAW members. One of them, John Mke, was the UAW President and well connected to international auto and metal federations. The other was John
Gomomo, the skillful leader of Volkswagen's black workers. Finnemore captured the underlying reasons for the success of African unionisation in the Eastern Cape when she commented:

"The dominance of white workers, differing structures of industrial relations, fears of repression and general recession in the auto industry all contributed to the relatively powerless position of black workers during the 1970s. The negotiated minimum wage still fell below the Household Subsistence Level, and where wage increases were granted above this, it was at management's discretion."

The emerging strength of UAW solidified its relationship with NUMARWOSA. It was this relationship that led to NUMARWOSA's resignation from the moderate Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) because of this federation's reluctance to seriously apply itself to the unionisation of African workers. The NUMARWOSA and UAW were thus freed to participate in the movement that culminated in the founding of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979.

The failure of the liaison committee system, the growing power of the "independent" trade union movement that the formation of FOSATU symbolised and the pressures emanating from employers to review the industrial relations system culminated in the findings of the 1979 Wiehahn Commission and subsequent amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act on December 1st 1979. These amendments not only legalised the registration of black trade unions, but by providing for the phasing out of job reservation the infamous Job Reservation Determination Number 16 of 1968 was summarily scrapped. White workers now had nothing except their racism to defend themselves, and this they were to use to support the growth of right wing political parties in Uitenhage - a political process that undermined the hegemony of the National Party during the 1980s and pressurised local National Party politicians into adopting aggressively racist and authoritarian approaches towards black urbanisation.

The East Cape unions entered the new labour relations era with an advantage most other unions were only to achieve by 1982, namely a base on the factory
Because this was achieved by using a combination of strict workplace bargaining, tight disciplined shop-floor organisation, strategic participation in ICs and caution when it came to community politics, the NUMARWOSA-UAW unions (that later merged to form the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union [NAAWU]) underpinned a strong "workerist" current in FOSATU that stressed similar principles. With its roots in moderate "parallel unionism" during the 1960s and 1970s, the leaders of the East Cape motor unions were acutely aware of how much their organisational power depended on adherence to these tactical principles. What they remained unaware of, however, was how much the conditions of struggle had changed by 1980. Instead of recognising the contingent nature of these tactics and devising new ones to cope with new conditions, the old tactics were retained and defended. In Uitenhage during 1979-80, this tendency translated itself into a radical workerism where workplace and community struggles were funneled through trade union organisations. However, in Port Elizabeth during the same period, these unions were simply marginalised as mass protest action and resistance took place under the leadership of community-based organisations.

PORT ELIZABETH: FACTORIES, COMMUNITIES AND THE SCHOOLS

THE COMMUNITIES: THE RISE AND FALL OF PEBCO

Although a distinct break between the 1976 protests and the re-emergence of generalised resistance in 1980 can be identified in most areas, this is inapplicable in Port Elizabeth. Starting in 1976 with very badly organised student-led demonstrations that targeted the "symbols of apartheid" for extremely voluntaristic violent action, a pattern of generalised unrest continued well into 1978 that centred around the schools but soon spread as township residents began organising around housing conditions. By 1979 local residents associations had formed in Zwide, Kwaford, and Thembaletlu and the beginnings of organisation were apparent in New Brighton, Kwazakhele and Walmer. These organisations provided the sub-structure for what later became an umbrella body called the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO).
Although the general housing shortage and apartheid planning affected all residents, local residents associations formed around township specific grievances. In Zwide grievances arose amongst residents who could not afford the rentals for houses they had been moved into after their old houses were demolished because they were too close to the white areas. This forced ECAB to lower the rentals and helped demonstrate that collective action could yield improvements. In KwaZakhele organisation coalesced around the fact that piped water had not been provided to the houses despite an eight year old official promise to this effect. Other grievances were the threatened demolition of 350 houses, high rentals and the fact that 3-4000 families were forced to live in single men's hostels. In Kwaford - named after the company that subsidised the construction of the township - the residents association protested against abnormally high rent bills and electricity charges. Once again this resulted in a lowering of the rent. In Walmer, organisation developed around resistance to the threatened removal of the township which had been designated a "black spot" since the 1960s. In Tembalethu, high water accounts triggered protest action resulting in the withdrawal of these accounts.

In short, urban grievances related to specific administrative policies carried out by the local state resulted in the formation of well organised residents associations. Leading activists built these organisations on a door-to-door basis thus linking "civic" grievances to long-term political demands. This new method of organisation was personified in the person of Thozamile Botha, chairperson of the Zwide Residents Association (ZRA). Born into a poor working class family from "White Location" in 1948, Botha attended school in Port Elizabeth and then went to Fort Hare University to study the arts in 1975. He left when the university closed down during the 1976 protests and was detained in 1977. After his release he was employed by Ford as a trainee draughtsman and became active in "civic politics". A man with tremendous charisma and substantial intellectual abilities, Botha emerged as Port Elizabeth's leader. He succeeded in combining through his own person four critical elements: grassroots organisation amongst the urban poor, the Black Consciousness persuasions of his generation, a working alliance with the old ANC stalwarts and unionisation of the militant working class at Ford.
Upon its formation in September, the ZRA executive decided to call a meeting with Louis Koch, director of ECAB. Before doing so it met with the Kwaford Residents Association to discuss strategy. After the meeting with Koch where the demand for lower water bills was rejected, a public meeting of all the residents organisations was called on October 10 and a decision was reached to call a boycott of water charges. It was also decided to form an umbrella organisation for all the residents associations and a "committee of ten" was elected to draft a constitution. On October 30 a mass meeting of 9000 people met in the New Brighton Centenary Hall to adopt a constitution and elect an executive. Port Elizabeth's social movement now had its organisation and in Thozamile Botha, its charismatic leader.22

PEBCO leaders were careful to define their organisation as a "civic" and not a political body, i.e. a body concerned with local township [read: "urban"] rather than national political issues. This did not mean PEBCO did not lend its support to national political issues - which it did, but referred to the fact that it organised people around urban problems and negotiated with authorities on these issues. Reflecting these commitments, PEBCO played a role in formalising resistance in New Brighton, Kwazakhele and Walmer by establishing residents associations in these townships.

The aims and objectives of PEBCO were outlined in the constitution as follows:

"1) to fight for equal civic rights for all the people of Port Elizabeth;
2) to fight all discriminatory legislation enacted by the government and local authorities;
3) to seek participation in decision-making on all matters affecting the people of South Africa;
4) to fight for the granting of the right to blacks to buy land under freehold title at any place of their choice; and
5) to resist any attempt, direct or indirect, to deprive blacks of their South African citizenship."

Besides the workplace struggles which will be dealt with later, PEBCO's main campaigns were resistance to the removal of Walmer, the Zwarte rents issue, the housing shortage, educational grievances and the detention and banning
of leaders. It also played a role in initiating organisation elsewhere in the Eastern Cape, namely Uitenhage, Graaf Reinet, Cradock, Queenstown, East London and Grahamstown. These initiatives planted the seeds of the Eastern Cape civic movement that took off during 1983-86.

The complexity of PEBCO's ideology and the interests it represented reflects the fluidity and shifts within black resistance at the time. As the general shift from Black Consciousness to "charterism" was only just beginning to take place during this period, new discourses and actors were emerging and jostling for power with old. The PEBCO executive represented both conservative middle class township interests and the radicalised working class. Botha attempted to unite these forces under the rubric of militant populism that emphasised common "civic" grievances. His language and discourse borrowed heavily from the Black Consciousness lexicon and his younger support-base was clearly influenced by this ideology. However, there were also old ANC stalwarts and "charterist" oriented Congress of South African Students members active in the upper echelons of PEBCO. As early as 1980 it was clear that this emerging highly capable congress-oriented leadership was steadily consolidating a very different discourse in township politics to that which had prevailed during the 1970s.23 In the end, it was the personality of Botha that kept the movement together and this is why it collapsed when Botha was detained in January. He was subsequently banned and then forced into exile in May where he joined the ANC and got a position on that organisation's National Executive Committee. This bears testimony to the fact that he was by no means a Black Consciousness operator while in Port Elizabeth and explains why he opposed the formation of an AZAPO branch in the city in 1979.

Evans' sound assessment of PEBCO concludes that "events began to overtake it [PEBCO] and problems had to be tackled by a leadership still relatively immature."24 Nevertheless, PEBCO left its mark on black political culture. It became identified with a new process of organisation: mass-based, oriented around "civic" problems, non-racial, radical, participative and premised on class alliances.
The Ford Strikes marked the turning point for industrial relations: for community organisations, they pointed to the need to take workplace issues seriously; for the unions they were a bitter lesson in how not to deal with the militant working class; and for management and the state they were the birth pangs of the new labour dispensation and a grim sign of things to come.

The story of the Ford Strikes revolves around events that took place in 1979 at two of Ford's Port Elizabeth plants, the Cortina plant and the engine plant. Both were located across the road from New Brighton township. The course of events can be summarised as follows:

* 31st October: 700 workers at the Cortina plant strike in protest against the dismissal of Thozamile Botha and joint efforts by UAW president Johnny Mke and Ford management to convince workers to return to work fail;
* November 1st: Botha reinstated and strike continues;
* November 2nd: strike ends and all workers reinstated with full pay;
* November 13th: most Cortina workers strike for one day in protest against racist remarks from white foremen;
* November 14th: 300 workers at the engine plant down tools for a while to discuss grievances;
* November 20th: 60 Cortina plant workers down tools in protest against overtime requirements;
* November 21st: 700 Cortina workers plus 3 engine plant workers (including Botha) strike in support of overtime demands;
* November 22nd: strikers pledge to continue the strike until all demands have been met;
* November 23rd: Ford dismisses and pays off all 700 Cortina plant workers;
* November 23rd: as a direct challenge to UAW, PEBCO forms an affiliate to represent the Ford workers that becomes known as the Ford Workers Committee (FWC);
* November 26th: Ford begins hiring new labour force while PEBCO
organises employment boycott of Ford;
* November 28th onwards: the Ford dispute is internationalised including action by Andrew Young and Jesse Jackson, FWC-UAW conflict mount, key worker activists detained, Ford continues re-employing workers;
* November 14th: Ford plants close down for Christmas season;
* January 7th: Ford opens with 357 workers, 244 being former employees;
* January 9th: at a meeting attended by Ford management, FWC, UAW and the United States Consul General from Cape Town, an agreement was reached to reinstate all former employees;
* January 10th: PEBCO leadership detained signaling the beginning of its demise.

These strikes are significant for one reason only: they were led by a community-based leadership and resulted in the formation of a rival to the FOSATU affiliates. Why this came about and how it happened had important organisational and ideological ramifications for the national oppositional movement as a whole. The irony is that worker disillusionment with UAW was caused precisely by the strategy that had made it one of the largest unregistered unions, namely careful workplace organisation and strategic intervention in liaison committees and ICs.

Ford built the Cortina plant in 1973 and consciously decided to employ exclusively African labour in contrast to the mixed-race workforce it employed at other plants. The result was the employment of relatively young African workers who had experienced the politicisation of education and township life during the 1970s. They brought with them an adherence to the Black Consciousness ideology and in some cases Pan Africanist loyalties. A generation younger than their counterparts at the engine plant and unfamiliar with the difficulties union organisers had had to overcome during the 1960s and 1970s, this new politicised workforce was extremely intolerant of the stately, collaborative and legalistic style of the UAW leadership. They rejected the need to participate in liaison committees and ICs and showed no enthusiasm when the UAW organisers tried to organise
the Cortina plant. Instead of establishing shop floor structures to deal with this problem in creative and democratic ways, the UAW organisers were only interested in signing up enough members to convince Ford management to recognise the union.29 The real leaders of the Cortina workers did not participate in union elections or meetings. Their power-base and identity only emerged much later in the decade when they emerged as activists in the local residents associations, in PECBO and then in the FWC. It was this leadership that turned the FWC into the Motor Assemblers and Component Workers Union of South Africa (MACWUSA) in September 1980 and it was around MACWUSA that a militant community-linked union leadership in Uitenhage emerged.

After NUMARWOSA and UAW merged to form NAAWU, the NAAWU - MACWUSA "split" in East Cape unionism set the tone for national debates between what became known as the conflict between "community-based unionism" allied to the mainstream political movements and "industrial unionism" that emphasised "workerist" concerns.30 In reality, the roots of the division in East Cape unionism lay in the racially divided working class that had unique consequences in Port Elizabeth.31 Hoping to exploit this division to hamper unionisation, Ford management unintentionally imported politicised workers whose consciousness was shaped by township grievances, political rightlessness and an aggressive psycho-iconoclastic ideology that did indeed hamper unionisation, but not in the way Ford management ever imagined.

Despite attempts by some FWC elements to make a case for entering NAAWU,32 and despite criticism of UAW from within the labour movement,33 the dye had been cast in Port Elizabeth. Political identities and loyalties in many other centres were to determined accordingly. Labels such as "populists" who do not care about workplace struggles and "workerists" who ignore community problems abounded and shaped choices and conceptions of strategy and tactics. Subsequent struggles in Cape Town, East London, Durban and the East Rand reinforced the dichotomy. The organisational and ideological consequences of the Ford Strikes directly affected alignments and alliances in Uitenhage. But before we come to this, an account of the schools boycotts is needed to complete the picture of protest in Port Elizabeth in 1980.
The pupils of Mountview High School, Cape Town, began boycotting classes in March 1980. This started a schools boycott in 81 coloured schools that subsequently triggered solidarity action in schools around the country, including the coloured schools of Uitenhage. The spread of the boycott to the Eastern Cape's african schools not only linked educational struggles to general community struggles, but created a movement whose leaders were solidly within the "charterist" fold of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). The East Cape schools boycott, therefore, consolidated the ascendance of "charterism" that PECBO and Thozamile Botha began.

Particularly poor educational standards in the Eastern Cape explains the commencement and subsequent persistence of the East Cape boycott for a longer period than elsewhere in the country. These poor standards were reflected in the fact that 60% of all matriculants in Port Elizabeth failed in 1979, compared to a 74,4% pass rate in the rest of the country. Only 26 of the 322 matriculants scored university exemption passes. This was a drastic decline given that in 1978 only 21,6% of all matriculants failed and 40% achieved university passes. Educational authorities explained this declining standard of education in terms of (1) a 50% increase in student enrollment without a corresponding increase in educational expenditure; (2) township unrest; and (3) the fact, to quote a Department of Education and Training Official, that "effective instruction in classrooms appeared more the exception than the rule". Syllabi were only completed in 4 out of 11 Port Elizabeth schools by the end of 1979.

The East Cape boycott in african schools began at Grahamstown's Nyaluza High School on April 30th and soon spread to other schools in the area. By the end of the first week in May, most of Grahamstown was out and had been joined by Fort Hare. It was clear that tensions in many East Cape schools were high and that it was a matter of time before the educational powder keg exploded once again. By May 14 it looked as if the Grahamstown boycott was over as a result of intensive lobbying and negotiations between parents, teachers, education officials and student leaders. However, the short fuse of discontent was re-kindled when a vigilante squad called the Peacemakers laid into school boycotters leading ultimately to one of them being killed and
mass arrests of pupils. As news of these events spread, student leaders met over the next week and formulated a strategy. The schools boycott recommenced on May 19th in Port Elizabeth and as one observer put it, "Eastern Cape black pupils were on the path to their long and bitter confrontation with the authorities." Once again, despite repeated attempts by parents committees to negotiate solutions, by July all schools in Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage were deserted. This happened after police units entered the schools and beat up pupils, killing one of them. Although student leaders and parents agreed on a temporary suspension of the boycott in September, police brutality and an official decision to close the schools rather than negotiate prevented this from materialising. By the end of 1980, East Cape pupils had lost another year of education.

The Committee of 41 was a committee of 41 representatives elected directly by pupils in the 41 schools in the Port Elizabeth - Uitenhage area engaged in the boycott. Its chairperson was Mkuseli Jack, a capable, charismatic, 20 year old student leader from New Brighton. An impressive group of university students - back in Port Elizabeth after the official closure of Fort Hare on May 20th - surrounded Jack. Devoting their attention to organising the schools boycott while simultaneously working to build parents committees and school committees to ensure close student-parent collaboration, this new generation of young leaders were laying the foundations for sustained grassroots organisation in their communities. Critical of the one-man populism of Thozamile Botha and outside the internecine squabbling that wracked the remains of PEBCO after Botha "skipped" in early May, these new leaders were well placed to establish mass-based organisations that eventually provided the United Democratic Front (UDF) with one its most sturdy pillars of support. However, to do this they needed to survive the 1980 schools boycott which meant finding ways to end the boycott with dignity and with the support of the parents. Although they had lost control of the boycott by the end of 1980 because many were in detention or hiding, by February 1981 they were able to engineer through intermediaries an end to the boycott in return for the release of some detainees.

In short, dismal educational standards, deteriorating township conditions and mounting tensions in the factories as the new union movement flexed its
muscles, combined to turn Port Elizabeth into the epicentre of what was eventually to become a powerful regional social movement. By linking these struggles in mass-based organisations, Port Elizabeth's organisations were helping to forge new conceptions of resistance and mobilisation during the opening moments of the new decade. In the meantime similar alignments were emerging in nearby Uitenhage, but this time under a very different leadership and centred around workplace rather than community organisation. With the above account of Port Elizabeth politics as background, the contrasting patterns of mobilisation between the two centres can be brought into relief and the significance of the Uitenhage experience amplified.

COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS IN UITENHAGE

The Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation (UBCO) was in many ways an anomaly. It grew out of a PEBCO initiative in 1979 to establish a residents association in Kwallobuhle called the KwaNobuhle Residents Association (KRA), but culminated in the formation of UBCO under the direct leadership of 'workerist' oriented FOSATU activists. This outcome reflected power relations between the factories and townships in Uitenhage that reversed the logic that produced the opposite outcome in Port Elizabeth: instead of weak factory organisation and strong community structures as in the latter case, in Uitenhage there were powerful factory structures and very weak community organisations. Although workplace mobilisation will be dealt with later, this section will attempt to develop a picture of how community organisation developed in 1979-80.40

By 1980 tensions were mounting in Uitenhage's townships. The underlying causes were housing shortages and the high cost and poor quality of urban services. Bill Hickson of the local South African National Tuberculosis Association said that Uitenhage was "rotten with TB". In July 1979 36 new TB cases were reported. Dickson said the high incidence of TB in Uitenhage as compared to "other parts of the country" was directly related to the severity of the housing shortage in Uitenhage.41

Like in Port Elizabeth, local activists used urban grievances to mobilise a
support-base. On October 23rd, an interim committee was established to plan the formation of what was to eventually become UBCO. According to one leading organiser at the time:

"What we actually wanted to deal with was civic matters only. Although you cannot separate the civic from politics, but we felt it was strategic to fight for the right of our community through the civic. The first problem we intended to tackle was the rent issue. Our rent was too high. So we decided to organise the community and we explained to them the situation." 42

This conception of a "civic" was identical to that held by the PEBCO leadership. Then, on 14th November 1979, Thozamile Botha spoke at a meeting called to establish the KwaNobuhle Residents Association (KRA). 43 This was consistent with the PEBCO strategy of establishing local associations to underpin the township-wide umbrella organisation, i.e. UBCO in Uitenhage's case. About 2000 people attended the meeting which was held in St. Anne's Church Hall. Botha called for the "equal distribution of wealth among all the peoples of Azania". He argued that the problem was not race but "economic oppression". However, the economy depended on blacks and there were shouts of "Amandla" when he said: "If we remove our labour and our buying power, what will happen to the white man?" He called for unity and criticised "cosmetic changes" on the grounds that whites made concessions because "they want you to keep quiet". He argued that political rights must be accompanied by "the need for economic liberation of the black man". Botha went on to criticise the Urban Foundation and called it "a devil bent on creating class divisions among the oppressed". Finally, Botha and other speakers criticised the community councillors saying they were not representative of the people. 44 The main decision at the meeting was to oppose the high rentals in the townships.

Following several more rallies and mass meetings, it became clear that three issues were of central concern to the residents: (a) high rentals, (b) opposition amongst Langa residents to moving to new housing extensions in KwaNobuhle because the rents there were higher than in the older parts of the township, 45 and (c) resistance to the proposed removal of Langa to KwaNobuhle. A strategy to deal with these problems was formulated which
involved a decision to negotiate with the ECAB authorities. After several meetings with local officials, it became clear to UBCO that "in all these instances they could not redress our grievances. Then we mobilised the people."46

In short, UBCO went through the initial stages of grassroots mobilisation: the expression of grievances, formation of an organisation, petitioning and negotiation to bring problems to the attention of the authorities and then, when this failed, the turn to mass organisation.47 Many constituencies were mobilised around the issues which affected them directly: pensioners who were forced to queue up for hours to get their money each month; residents opposed to high rents and removal; women around child-care issues and the youth under the auspices of the "youth league". Because UBCO activists were also shop stewards at Volkswagen, and given that this factory employed most employed workers, it is not surprising that much of the community organising was actually done in the factory. "That is where the idea started", said one informant, "because at Volkswagen we could explain to the people our objectives and we could organise." Specific shop steward meetings of Volkswagen workers were called to discuss community problems.48 From these meetings, workers would be dispatched to different parts of the township to organise meetings to discuss community problems. These meetings usually took place on Sundays in houses and then once a month a mass meeting would be held which was announced with loudhalers.49

Decentralised structures were established that were similar to what became known later on as the "street committees".50 Although they were not given this name, informants said they amounted to small house meetings of all those in a particular neighbourhood or zone. These meetings were particularly successful in Langa.51 The organisational power UBCO attempted to generate this way was directed into a boycott of shops owned by local government councillors. In this way pressure was brought to bear on the local state to redress popular grievances.

Volkswagen workers also tried to organise a "worker's culture". They did this by forming dart clubs in the townships because, as one UBCO leader put it, "for darts you need an education, you need to be able to count and have judgment".52 This could not express more clearly the centrality of the
established skilled and semi-skilled worker in the whole NAAWU-UBCO project. This is the actor that had traditionally molded a "working class culture and politics" in industrial societies and in Uitenhage, this process was well under way by the end of 1980 complete with its own political ideology, cultural clubs and general strike (see next section).

Although all informants agreed that UBCO did achieve some success in organising the community at grassroots level, all was not well amongst the leadership. UBCO was initiated before the Ford Strikes. By the time the Port Elizabeth divisions had been packaged into ideological categories and disseminated, the UBCO executive had been formed and included what later emerged as two opposing ideological positions, the FOSATU "workerists" and congress "populists".

Unlike in Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage's unionists - particularly the Volkswagen shopstewards - felt their factory base was strong enough to support their move into community politics. Instead of leaving UBCO to the "populists", the unionists contested and won top executive positions. The biographical characteristics of this group are significant: they were mostly skilled or semi-skilled workers; came from fully urbanised stable backgrounds; were relatively well educated and fairly fluent in English; and their ages ranged from late twenties to late thirties. Unconnected to the ANC traditions of the fifties and excluded from the student protests of the mid-1970s, these workers - like their contemporaries on the East Rand concentrated on building "worker power" on the shop floor. They tackled community problems only if this was a logical extension of workplace struggle and if their factory base could be strengthened in the process. In the final analysis, it was the strength of union organisation at Volkswagen that made it possible for unionists to enter township politics and because of the pervasive dominance of this factory, the shopsteward elite at Volkswagen emerged to dominate all union and community structures. At the centre of this elite was John Gomomo - charismatic, shrewd, skillful, powerful and a brilliant organiser. With his power-base apparently secure, he and his comrades came to share Freddie Saul's interpretation of the after-effects of the Ford Strikes:

"The workers will decide what interest is paramount to them and what should be pursued by any party political organisation."
But at this point, I think we are operating in a dangerous area where there's a lot of politicisation, where black nationalist ideologies dominate. The people who are practical realise that to get workers united, you need to work in the union movement - and our prime objective is to build solidarity and proceed step by step to improve on the demands of the workers. The danger is where, like the Ford situation, workers can be motivated on party political issues, but what do they achieve and how do they benefit?"54

In short, this classic statement of so-called "workerism" accurately suited the organisational power-base, interests and values represented in the Volkswagen dominated union, community and cultural structures in Uitenhage. Strategies, tactics and ideas were shaped by workplace organisation and extended outwards to the community. Alliances with other community-based organisations were unnecessary. Not surprisingly, this tightly organised exclusive leadership soon created its enemies and opposition. This did not come from a rival source of power within the community context, but rather emanated from leadership groupings in the union movement itself who used the ideological rivalry generated by the Ford Strikes to justify the formation of a separate organisational project.

The NAAWU-UBCO rival coalesced around two men: Ficks Kobese who worked at Goodyear and felt excluded from the Volkswagen elite, and Emson Banda, a salesman at a clothing firm in central Uitenhage. Banda was born in 1950 in Uitenhage into a family of 11 children. His schooling was uneven because the farmer who employed his father on a farm near Kirkwood insisted on the children working and refused them permission to attend school regularly. In 1968 Banda's eldest brother died and he had to give up school altogether to help his family. He got a job in a clothing shop and remained in its employ until he was badly assaulted by vigilantes in 1987.

The formation of MACWUSA in later 1980 provided Kobese with an opportunity to challenge the Gomomo leadership. Resigning his position as secretary of the Uitenhage branch of NAAWU, Kobese established a MACWUSA branch in Uitenhage. Using an array of arguments to justify his break with FOSATU - ranging from a critique of workerism to accusations
that NAAWU was organisationally ineffective as a union - Kobese built an organised worker support-base in Goodyear. Unlike the NAAWU leadership, the MACWUSA leadership at Goodyear comprised younger more politicised workers, many of whom had links with the emerging student and community organisations. It was logical for Banda to join this group because he knew that his network of organised commercial workers in town had no place in NAAWU. After joining MACWUSA, he said "I was organising to make trade unions active at the supermarkets, dry cleaners and all the town's small business places".

By joining MACWUSA, Kobese - who was on the UBCO executive - and Banda who helped out in the UBCO office, identified themselves with a strong anti-FOSATU movement and in so doing effectively challenged the UBCO leadership. After failing to win a power struggle within UBCO, they resigned and formed a rival body called Save the Starting Community (SSC). The SSC immediately began organising a constituency the NAAWU-UBCO leadership ignored, namely the unemployed. It is worth quoting Banda's description of what he did:

"[The SSC] had an executive. I was the chairman. We had field workers who went door-to-door with a survey. They got information from the owner of that house about unemployment, what accounts he got and all that. This was done in KwaNobuhle and Langa, but it was strong in KwaNobuhle. We also thought of the pensioners every three months. By the time the third month came, there was no food, nothing. We gave food to pensioners monthly and unemployed people weekly. We started writing letters to the factories that produce food and the East Cape Chamber of Commerce. We got donations of food and money and made up food parcels and we also collected old clothes from people and gave them out." 

This strategy was extremely effective and soon led to the decline of UBCO's influence in the community. It also paved the way for the formation in 1983 of the Uitenhage Youth Congress(UYCO) that came to represent a wide range of community interests, but under the leadership of a remarkably capable and
articulate leadership of young workers, unemployed school and tertiary institution graduates who also commanded a considerable support-base amongst the more marginalised largely illiterate unemployed. By 1984, MACWUSA, the SSC and UYCO were the primary opposition to government bodies in Uitenhage. They were solidly within the national democratic camp represented by the UDF and extremely critical of FOSATU which was regarded as "workerist" and unsympathetic to the problems of workers in the community.

Although it would appear from the above account of the evolution of the SSC-MACWUSA-UYCO movement that the contours of ideological development replicated the workplace-community divisions that had evolved in Port Elizabeth, this apparent similarity belies three important facts:

* firstly, it ignores the way the union leadership did make an attempt to organise the community through UBCO in a way that is not evident in the Port Elizabeth case;

* secondly, the divisions between coloured and african workers in Uitenhage were not nearly as severe as they were in Port Elizabeth, a phenomenon that has much to do with the different patterns of urbanisation and urban development in the two cities;

* thirdly, the militant general strikes that hit Uitenhage in 1980 were responsible for creating the space and organisational context for the growth of community mobilisation during the early- to mid-1980s - it was this historical connection that led to a community- and workplace-based social movement during the mid-1980s that was built around a common interest between unions and community organisations in a negotiated non-racial and affordable urban system that suited the needs of the marginalised and employed working people (see Chapters 7 and 8).
UNIONISATION IN UITENHAGE AND THE 1980 GENERAL STRIKE

The unionisation of Uitenhage's employed workers was heavily dependent on the central role of the union leadership in the giant R120 million Volkswagen plant that employed about 6000 people in 1980. The next largest was Goodyear that employed 2000 in 1980. With an economically active population Uitenhage as a whole of about 30 000 people in 1980, Volkswagen's central role in the city's economic and labour history was not surprising.

In 1980, three unions represented workers at VW in Uitenhage: Yster en Staal that represented 72.4% of the 1080 white workers, NUMARWOSA represented 77.7% of the 1620 coloured workers and UAW represented 58.9% of the 3300 african workers.

Like many other industries in South Africa, wages and working conditions were negotiated in Industrial Councils (IC). The IC for the Eastern Cape motor industry essentially involved the three unions and the three major employers, namely Ford, Volkswagen and General Motors. Agreements reached in the IC were binding in law and conflict resolution mechanisms were managed by the IC. Wage negotiations invariably revolved around the calculated Household Subsistence Level (HSL) for Uitenhage as determined by the University of Port Elizabeth. The HSL was the cost of the most basic basket of goods that an african family of 6 or a coloured family of 5 would need to barely survive above the poverty datum line. The HSL plus 50%, however, was regarded as the Household Effective Level (HEL), i.e. the basic minimum required by a family to ensure a decent living and long-term reproduction. The HEL was regarded by the European Economic Commission guidelines for European employers in South Africa as the yardstick for evaluating the adequacy of wage levels.

Eastern Cape motor manufacturers were proud of their record as employers who paid relatively high wage levels as compared to Transvaal employers in the motor manufacturing sector. Eastern Cape rates were 117c per hour in September 1978 as compared to 82c in the Transvaal, and 129c per hour in August 1979 as compared to 92c in the Transvaal. The IC agreement that came...
into effect in February 1978 was valid for 18 months with an unwritten agreement that it would be reviewed - not adjusted - every six months. The wage levels that this was intended to promote over 5 years were as follows:

TABLE 2.1: WAGE LEVELS IN THE PORT ELIZABETH-UITENHAGE AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>MONTHLY HSL</th>
<th>VW MINIMUM MONTHLY WAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October '75</td>
<td>R118,18</td>
<td>R103,80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October '76</td>
<td>R126,94</td>
<td>R119,37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. '77</td>
<td>R130,59</td>
<td>R134,94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January '78</td>
<td>R136,47</td>
<td>R136,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May '78</td>
<td>R136,56</td>
<td>R138,40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August '78</td>
<td>R137,56</td>
<td>R147,05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April '79</td>
<td>R151,83</td>
<td>R157,43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A new IC negotiated agreement came into effect on August 1979 that provided for a minimum R1 per hour wage increasing to R1,15 per hour by February 1980. This meant that the net pay of someone working 43 hours per week was R218,74 when the HSL was R169,72 for that month; or R254.58 if this was used to calculated the HEL. VW, however, added in the value of meal subsidies, transport levies and medical aid in order to increase the basic minimum wage to R271,60, or 60% above the HSL or 10% above the HEL. The assumptions underlying the HSL and HEL calculations were, however, mistrusted by union leaders and members.

In addition to improved wages, VW also implemented extensive training programmes aimed at black staff. This, however, could not keep up with the
very rapid rate of employment growth that was taking place in order to meet the growing demands stimulated by the 1979-1982 boom. The Industrial Relations Director reflected on the consequences of labour expansion when he said:

"Most of these new employees are young blacks who have never worked in a factory before, and I can't say we are doing a good job of introducing these new people to the industrial environment. The object is simply to get in as many people in the shortest possible time."59

The boom, however, was accompanied by rising prices at a rate of about 12% that rising wages could not always keep up with.

The first indications of tension emerged in May 1980 when wildcat strikes broke out amongst small groups of workers on the 23 and 26 May and 9 June. Although there were other grievances expressed, the striking workers demanded R2 an hour minimum wages. With talk of general strikes for a living wage rippling through the workforce, and the departure for the United States of key shop steward John Gomomo in early June, the scene was set for the 12 June IC negotiations. All this, in turn, was taking place within a countrywide context of rising mobilisation within the communities. The schools boycotts described in a previous section provided a focus for community actions that were coupled in some cases to strike actions in the workplace. With the 16 June coming up, it was clear to all involved that local and national tensions were coming to a head.

Without going into the details, a joint employer offer at the 12 June negotiations was rejected by all three unions in favour of more substantial increases and less job restructuring. The employers wanted a speedy settlement on increases that did not exceed the 10,5% limit they had budgeted for. The unions, however, tabled proposals that would have resulted in 13,5% increases. Agreement was not reached and negotiations shifted to the plant level.

The NUMARWOSA and UAW unions had arranged a report back meeting for Sunday 15 June. However, this meeting was banned by the authorities and
enforced by the police. With no way of getting a mandate to continue with negotiations while workers continued to work, the union leaders were catapulted into a conflict that they never planned for.

Although the black and coloured workers reported for duty on the morning of the 16th June - the 4th anniversary of the Soweto Uprising, by 8am they had begun to congregate on the lawn outside the Managing Director's Office. Eventually, 4000 workers had gathered. The union leadership were powerless because the crowd said they wanted a report from management, not from the shop stewards. The shop stewards, in turn, informed a worried management that the workers wanted R2 an hour. After attempts by management and union leaders to explain things to the crowd, it eventually broke up into grumbling smaller groups who trickled off the site after agreement was reached to hold a mass meeting at VW the next morning.

On Tuesday 17th, the mass meeting took place and after being addressed by Freddie Sauls, dispersed with the assurance from the union that their demand for R2 an hour before returning to work would be put to the management. Subsequent meetings with management resolved nothing. Instead, management informed workers the next day that the plant was closed until further notice.

By Tuesday the strike had begun to spread to other factories. Workers at Hella where 80% of the workforce was coloured women went on strike over R2 an hour living wage demands. They were joined by workers at SKF that afternoon.

In all cases where strike action broke out, the union leadership seemed out of control and unable to get workers back to work while negotiations proceeded. Instead, the workers left their plants and marched through Uitenhage's CBD singing freedom songs and raised clenched fists. When they walked past the union offices, some of the crowd jeered at the premises in an apparent gesture of disgust. In the townships police clashed with youths and like in 1977 when the students and gangs went on the rampage, the acrid biting smell of teargas once again drifted across the township.

The strike continued through the 18th and police clashed with workers at
certain factories and in the streets. Workers at least three more factories joined the three already on strike, including at Goodyear, Borg Warner, and M. Jeeva and Sons. At the same time African and coloured schools were on full-scale boycotts with no resolution in sight. As tension mounted and police reinforcements were brought in, Uitenhage was declared an emergency area which effectively gave the security forces carte blanche to secure the area, including control over access to information about what was happening by restricting journalists from having access to the area.

As far as the managers, police and press were concerned, the strike was a pre-planned political action enforced through intimidation and aimed at forcing a conflict around an unrealisable R2 per hour wage demand in order to focus attention on foreign investment in South Africa and extend the political influence of PEBCO and UBCO in the union sphere. Radio Xhosa accused the strike of furthering the aims of the ANC. Meetings and formal and informal contacts between managers, police and the press soon consolidated this general strategic position that was premised on a conspiratorial analysis and as is common with this kind of analysis, more is ascribed to the powerful and ominous intentions of the leadership than to the self-activity of ordinary people angered by their poverty and politicised by their local and national environment.

By Friday, management had lost control of the situation to the police. This meant that negotiation processes to resolve the conflict were difficult to arrange, strike levels rose and conflict in the townships intensified. Over 8000 workers at twelve establishments were affected by strikes by Friday, including the municipality. However, it was also payday. This meant that workers congregated at their factories to get their pay, but because the factories were closed, they got their pay and then marched back in their thousands through Uitenhage's CBD to Kabah whereupon the marchers were attacked by police who used birdshot, teargas and hand grenades to disperse the crowd. By the end of the week, the police had extended the news blockout to include the whole town - probably the first time, one journalist noted, that this had happened to a whole town.

While conflict continued, negotiations resumed on Tuesday 24. Employers offered R1.40 per hour, increasing at six monthly intervals to R2 per hour by
January 1982. At a mass meeting of VW employees on 26 June, the employer offer was rejected outright. Workers voted to continue with the strike. Management, in turn, decided willy nilly to reopen the plant on Friday 27 June. This proved to be a complete failure as only 96 coloured workers and 10 African workers reported for duty.

By the beginning of the third week of Uitenhage's general strike, two things were very clear. Firstly, employers were divided with some choosing to settle quickly on higher than standard wage rates (e.g. SKF), some decided simply to fire-and-rehire (Goodyear), others to call the police (Hella) and others adopted a wait-and-see approach (e.g. VW due to the fact that it was under the international spotlight in Germany). Secondly, unlike during the Port Elizabeth strikes the previous year, the FOSATU unions managed to retain the political leadership of the movement instead of losing it to political-cum-community groups. This had much to do with the fact that the movement was jointly driven by coloured and African workers, many of whom lived in mixed areas or in close proximity to one another in and around Kabah.

By the end of the third week, employers that had adopted a compromise-and-settle position and those that adopted hard-line fire-and-rehire positions early on in the strike were beginning to get back into full production. Heavy-handed police action coupled to detentions of union leaders helped to intimidate workers in many factories into returning to work. The strike at VW, however, continued. VW employers were instructed by their German HQ not to fire their employees - a response that had much to do with pressure from the powerful IG Metal, Germany's biggest trade union. To reinforce the role of the international unions, a representative of the 15 million strong International Metalworkers Federation arrived in South Africa to assist the FOSATU unions. VW management were terrified that he may provide the unions with valuable information about VW's finances that could, in turn, have buttressed the "living wage" demand.

With IC negotiations planned for Friday 4 July, positions began to move. The unions obliquely indicated the possibility of settling for R1.60 per hour and management was coming under international pressure to follow the example of SKF, i.e. to agree on R1.60. In the meantime, more workers began turning up for work and unions began to worry about retaining the support of
coloured workers. The dissipation of the general strike substantially weakened the VW workers who were the first to strike and stayed out the longest.

Agreement was reached at the IC negotiations on 4 July that workers should return to work and in return employers agreed to accept in principle the "living wage" concept. Further negotiations were arranged for the following Tuesday. After the workers returned to work as agreed on Monday, an agreement was reached at the Tuesday negotiations on R1.45 per hour, a service bonus of 3 cents/hour minimum and an investigation into what constituted a "decent living wage". The agreement was formally accepted at a meeting of the IC on 15 July after the unions got a mandate of support from the workers.

CONCLUSION

Although the 1980 General Strike ended well in that workers managed to win the principle of a living wage, it also ended badly in that the combined power of the employers, police and press was too much for the unions and workers. In addition, the free hand that the police enjoyed in the townships underlined the need for strong community organisation. As a result, during the months and years that followed the General Strike, unionisation escalated and prepared the way for the merging of NUMARWOSA and UAW to create the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU). Over time, more flexible and less conflictual approaches to industrial bargaining emerged.

The General Strike contained the seeds of an organisational approach that subsequently became accepted practice both inside and outside the workplace in Uitenhage, namely mass organised action around popular demands, coupled to ongoing and direct negotiations. The existence and maturation of this approach in the workplace prepared the leadership with organisational and negotiation skills that were to be used for very different purposes later on.
1. Interview with Mr. Mfazwa, ANC organiser for Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth in the 1950s, 4.11.1987.
6. Ibid.
10. John Gomomo is currently national President of the giant Congress of South African Trade Unions.
12. See Interview with Freddie Sauls, op. cit.
15. Interview with a leading member of these actions and an executive member of the Port Elizabeth Youth Congress, April 1985.
18. Ibid., pp.11-12.
19. Ibid., p.11.
21. Thozamile Botha is currently on the ANC's National Executive and is head of the ANC's Department of Local Government and Housing. He is tipped to be the next Minister of Local Government and Housing in the up-and-coming Government of National Unity.
22. For this account I have relied on Cooper, C. and Ensor, L., pp.27-28.

26. I am grateful to Glen Adler for this information.


28. Favis, ibid

29. Ibid., p.39.


31. For an account of this see Labour Monitoring Group, "The March Stayaways in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage", *South African Labour Bulletin*, 11, 1, September 1985; (the author conducted the field work for this article and was one of the co-authors).


33. See the editorial *South African Labour Bulletin’s* "Comment" which argued that the "UAW is shown to have failed to mobilise Cortina workers in the plant because it lacked a democratic shop floor base.", *South African Labour Bulletin*, 6, 2 & 3, September 1980, p.1.


36. Ibid., p.19.

37. Discussions with activists at Fort Hare University, 6 May 1980.


40. This picture, unfortunately, because there is no written or journalistic accounts of this period and the organisations involved have been so repeatedly hit by repression that they have no historical documentation either. I have had to rely, therefore, on oral accounts. The problem with these oral accounts is that serious tensions existed amongst leaders of these organisations which means that the truth often is hidden or compromised.

41. *Weekend Post*, 9.8.80

42. Interview with a group of ex-UBCO leaders, Uitenhage, 20.10.1987.

43. *Evening Post*, 14.11.79

44. Ibid.

45. *Eastern Province Herald*, 10.10.80

46. Interview with ex-UBCO leadership, op. cit.

47. See Chapter 8 for an elaboration of this typology of township conflict.

48. Interview with ex-UBCO leaders, op. cit.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.


56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Faull, N.H.B., op. cit. The rest of this section is based on the account of events provided in Faull’s documents, but also in press clips and personal communications with people involved.
CHAPTER 3

URBANISATION, LOCAL POLITICS AND THE RE-MAKING OF LANGA

INTRODUCTION

South Africa's unique pattern of urban development has been the subject of extensive scrutiny by sociologists, planners, anthropologists, historians and public administration analysts. A spate of recent edited collections has brought together some of the best writing on the subject. The central issue at stake in all this writing is how best to explain the evolution of the South African urban system and its various elements. This is no mean feat because of the enormous complexity of a system that evolved as a result of a costly, bureaucratically driven and repressive combination of initiatives that affected where people were born, where and how they were educated, where and how they lived, where and who they worked for, what their labour power was worth, how they recuperated their health, where and how they got old and eventually died and, after that, where they could be buried. As an exercise in social engineering, the construction of urban apartheid must rank in the same class as the numerous great experiments that purposively attempted to create in reality an ideal image of urban living - from Haussman's Paris, to Peter the Great's St. Petersburg, to Robert Moses' New York and onward to the incarnations of Le Corbusier's one dimensional urban modernism from Atlanta to Brazilia.3 But unlike the cases referred to here where the search for modernism masked the domineering drive by the world's urban bourgeoisie to mold the cities in ways that suited their image of 'modern living', the South African city - the apartheid city - was consciously portrayed by the urban middle class and those who controlled the state at central and local level as a racial project. The debate, therefore, has essentially revolved around two issues: Was it the logic of race or class domination that explains the apartheid city? And did the final manifestation of the apartheid city accord with what the state intended it to be?

As the debate has progressed through structural functionalist ('urbanism will stabilise as modernisation takes its course')4, Marxist reductionism ('the city reflects the logic of capital's labour requirements')5 and liberal economistic paradigms ('the non-racial economically rational logic of the market will undermine the irrationality of race-based development'), it
has become increasingly clear that although grand concepts like class, race and state help outline general trends, they are less than useful when it comes to comprehending the complexity of specific urban dynamics. This is why terms of a different order and history have emerged, namely locality, specificity and contingency. It is this approach that emerges most centrally in the recent works of urban geographers, sociologists, economists and political scientists. It is an approach that informs the analysis provided in this chapter.

In essence, this chapter will start with an outline of the evolution of Uitenhage's urban geography. This provides the backdrop for an understanding of the institutional development of black local government and how this created a local black political elite whose interests lay in a pattern of urban development that did not accord with either the bureaucratic interests that represented the central state, or the local white political interests rooted in Uitenhage's white community. It was these contradictions that laid the foundations for the emergence of Langa township.

**UITENHAGE'S URBAN GEOGRAPHY**

Black urbanisation in Uitenhage dates back to the mid-c.19th. By the 1920s, Africans resided in four proclaimed 'locations': Kabah, Doornhoek, Gubbs, and Oatlands situated respectively to the north, west, south and east of the centre of Uitenhage (see map 1.2). The population by 1936 was 6588 Africans, 4334 coloureds and 9437 whites. This demographic position was arrived at after a period of high countrywide urbanisation rates, but with the highest rates experienced in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage region and surrounding areas. Whereas 58,9% of Africans in this region resided in rural areas in 1921, this had fallen to 26,7% in 1936. Given that gender ratios in the urban communities were equalised during the period, it follows that the urbanising Africans in this region were not single sex migrants as was the case in a number of other localities. This pattern of relatively early 'urban stabilisation' is significant for an understanding of the subsequent history of urban control and social movement resistance to these controls.

Kabah was located in an area that was later to become known as Langa and was the largest of the 'locations' that housed Uitenhage's African population during the 1920s and 1930s. It had electric street lights, central
Like similar settlements elsewhere in the country (e.g. Sophiatown, Lady Selborne, Top Location, Duncan Village, Dukatole, etc), these inner-city African urban settlements were the product of paternalistic white local government policies and the home of a lively developing urban culture rooted in survival and adaptation. Conditions in the other 'locations' were worse than in Kabah. The number of self-built structures increased, services were rudimentary to non-existent, health conditions were very poor, and officials found it difficult to collect rent and service charges. As urbanisation continued and unemployment rose and conditions declined, the Uitenhage Municipality began considering alternative options. After first applying in 1933 for the application of influx controls in terms of the notorious Urban Areas Act of 1923 (as amended) to control immigration and the settlement of unemployed people, officials began working on plans to reorganise the locations. These plans essentially involved the demolition of the three smaller locations and the removal of the population to Kabah. Part of the plan was to separate the coloureds living in the three smaller locations from their African brethren and to relocate them to an area in Kabah designated for coloureds. This would have brought Uitenhage in line with the requirements of the Urban Areas Act.

Although numerous measures taken by the Uitenhage Municipality during the 1930s succeeded in running down the three smaller locations and relocating the people in Kabah, by the mid-1940s officials were still dealing with an extremely overpopulated Kabah township where development had failed to take place as planned. This prompted the Uitenhage Municipality into taking certain strategic steps. These steps included the permanent settlement of urbanised Africans in sub-economic housing with freehold title, as well as a proposal to demolish all residential buildings in Kabah on the grounds that they were unhygienic, that there was inadequate room for expansion, that coloureds and Africans were too inter-mingled, and that the location was too close to the white areas. The result was a proposal to remove Kabah to an area known as Sandfontein, east of the town centre. No decisive action was taken, however, during the war years.

After the war and the coming to power of the Nationalist Party Government in 1948, a national policy framework began to be put in place
that favoured much stricter racial segregation of different racial groups living in the urban areas. It was in this context that the Uitenhage Municipality revisited the problem of what to do about Kabah. The renowned Johannesburg town planner T.B. Floyd was retained as a consultant. Like his work elsewhere in the Transvaal, Floyd's town planning prescriptions were premised on racial and spatial principles that were precursors to what would later be inscribed in the Group Areas Act, namely strict residential segregation on racial grounds. Floyd was critical of Kabah because it was not separated by a buffer zone from the white areas, it was not adjacent to the employment areas in the south east which meant Africans were required to walk through town from the north to get to work, and it mixed together coloureds and Africans. He therefore proposed that Kabah be retained for coloureds and that Africans be relocated to Sandfontein in the east where they should be housed in sub-economic housing and work as unskilled labour in the nearby factories.20 Although it initially accepted Floyd's town planning scheme, the Uitenhage Municipality rescinded this decision and decided in 1945 to upgrade Kabah via a comprehensive sub-economic housing scheme- a policy framework that was developed and pushed through by white liberal politicians in control of the 'native affairs' administration.21

Taking advantage of the funds provided by the newly created National Housing and Planning Commission, the Uitenhage Municipality approved a scheme in 1947 for the erection of 320 semi-detached houses in an extension of Kabah called McNaughton. The longer-term aim was to build 2000 semi-detached units (i.e. 4000 dwellings) for Africans. However, the quid pro quo was to ensure alignment with the Urban Areas Act by removing coloureds from Kabah. Hence, in a separate scheme located closer to town, 100 sub-economic units were planned for coloureds. Although this was vigorously opposed by the coloured political leadership, promises of voluntary relocation with financial incentives pacified the protesters.22 It was this plan that the Uitenhage Municipality thought would stabilise the african workforce, segregate off the coloured community and prepare Uitenhage for what it thought would be the paternalistic segregated future envisaged by United Party Government (led by Jan Smuts), complete with financial subsidies to make things happen and freehold title for Africans. In the end, however, this Faganite vision for Uitenhage was not to be realised.23
In the meantime, as indicated in Chapter 1, it was after the war that Uitenhage's local economy changed from being an agricultural processing and service centre to a growth centre for the motor industry. The economic growth that ensued was a major stimulus for further urbanisation. Whereas the African population was 6588 in 1936, this grew to 10016 in 1946 and then to 16942 by 1951. Between 1936 and 1946 the population increased by 3.4% per annum, and between 1946 and 1951 the increase was 8.2% per annum. As far as the coloured population was concerned, it increased from 4334 in 1936, to 4958 in 1946 and 7161 in 1951. The white population increased from 9437 to 11015 to 14272 during the same period. With increased investment and growth and these levels of urbanisation, it is not surprising that the urban policy of the Uitenhage Municipality right up into the 1950s tended to support residential stabilisation within a segregationist framework, including even the scrapping of influx controls. However, even though strongly supported by employers keen on having their labour properly housed, the Uitenhage municipality never had the resources nor the will to commence a large-scale mass housing programme commensurate with the principles of its Faganite urban policies.

The Nationalist Party Government moved quickly to ensure that its Sauerite urban policies were implemented. The combination of the amended Urban Areas Act, Group Areas Act and Population Registration Act and associated regulations fundamentally changed the nature of the game in all urban areas, but especially in Uitenhage where a consolidated Faganite urban policy could have been implemented if there was a United Party Central Government to complement the political orientation of the United Party-controlled Uitenhage Municipality. Instead, like many other United Party controlled local governments, the Uitenhage Municipality was faced with the prospect of being the implementing agents of an urban policy devised by the Nationalist Party Government and in so doing it would have had to cut across the delicately balanced matrix of political, social and economic interests at the local level.

In practical terms, implementing the new urban policy in Uitenhage effectively meant reversing many of the plans and schemes that Uitenhage's officials had been developing since the war. Whereas the new policy required separate residential areas for coloureds, Africans and whites with each area separated by an adequate buffer zone, Uitenhage was
faced with an existing situation where coloureds and Africans lived together in Kabah; coloureds, Africans and poor whites lived together in the poorer sections of Uitenhage; and the new coloured area that was about to be built across the road from Kabah was unacceptable to central government because it was only across the street from Kabah and not properly separated by a decently sized buffer zone. Throughout the early-to mid-1950s, squabbles and tensions between on the one hand various central government departments (the new Commissioner for Coloured Affairs, Native Affairs Department and the Land Tenure Advisory Board), and the Uitenhage Municipality on the other over the application of central government's urban policy effectively prevented forward movement with respect to both the Uitenhage Municipality's Faganite strategies and the Central government's Sauerite strategies.

Under pressure from Indian and Chinese business interests and the coloured community, the Uitenhage Municipality resolved in 1953 to defy central government by deciding not to actively implement the Group Areas Act provisions. However, it was also under enormous pressure from industrial employers to initiate housing schemes for black workers, schemes which themselves needed the approval of the agencies that the Municipality had resolved not to cooperate with. When it came to resisting the Group Areas Act, what was at stake was the economic interests of Indian and Coloured business who together owned a sizable chunk of ratable property, as well as the fact that Indians and Coloureds were still enfranchised at the local level in the Cape at that time and therefore had votes that were crucial for United Party Councillors faced with electoral challenges from the Afrikaner-based Nationalist Party. No such economic and political considerations existed when it came to African interests, other than the housing demands of employers.

In July 1957 the Uitenhage Municipality was informed by the Chief Native Commissioner for the Eastern Cape that no financial support for housing development would be provided unless and until the residential pattern conformed to the requirement for 500 yard buffer strips between the residential areas of different racial groups. Besides squeezing it between the housing demands of employers and the urban policy priorities of the central government, this presented the Uitenhage Municipality with a serious practical problem because it had never got round to clearing the buffer zones - an intended neglect on the part of liberal councillors in
control 'native administration'. In addition, large numbers of squatters had moved in over the previous 5 years. Since 1952 the population of Kabah had swelled from 2000 to 11100 and the number dwellings from 300 to 1200.

To resolve Uitenhage's problem, the Chief Native Commissioner bluntly suggested the wholesale removal of Kabah to an area south of Uitenhage and the reproclamation of Kabah as a coloured area. When this was rejected by the Council on the grounds that it was impractical, he immediately made applicable to Uitenhage the onerous financial provisions of the Native Services Levy Act - these levies were payable by employers to finance black housing and collectable by local government. This, in turn, prompted a policy change that led the Uitenhage Municipality to resolve to purchase a farm south of Uitenhage as a site for the relocation of Kabah. Its only motive was financial: if keeping Kabah was going to be costly to employers and the ratepayers, and if central government was willing to subsidise the development of a newly located african township, then the choice was very clearly to go along with what the Chief Native Commissioner wanted. After further financial incentives were provided, the Uitenhage Municipality formally resolved in January 1961 to remove Kabah to the newly acquired site. By July they were discussing proposals with the Group Areas Board on using the Kabah site (when it was eventually vacated) for coloured development and a year later the Municipality was fully involved in discussions to apply the Group Areas plan to Uitenhage as a whole. The quid pro quo from central government was to declare a portion of the commercial area a "free trade zone" in order to allow the Indian and Chinese businessmen to continue doing business, and substantial financial incentives for Uitenhage's urban restructuring. It took six years of preparation until, in October 1967, Uitenhage as a whole was declared a pure apartheid town when it was formally proclaimed in terms of the Group Areas Act.

The forced removal of the century old community of Kabah began a year later to an area that was called KwaNobuhle - "place of beauty". Unlike Kabah, this was to be a well planned classic apartheid township located on the periphery of the white town and safely behind a hill. As for the employers, their labour was about to get housing for no extra cost and the white ratepayers were saved from paying for it all because of sizable grants from central government. And as far as the Indian and coloured middle
class was concerned, they got their businesses protected and were provided with exclusive middle class residential areas, complete with financial compensation and freehold title.

Although the forced removals began in 1968, it was not a simple one-off process. Instead, a series of removals took place in 1972, 1979, 1981 and then finally in 1986. The reasons for this were numerous and inter-linked and included the following: the messy disentangling of the coloured and African communities as the state attempted to convert Kabah into a coloured Group Area without adequate funds to do the job in a way that compensated everyone for their various property losses; the relatively slow pace of development at KwaNobuhle that failed to keep up with the rate of urbanisation; the massive growth during the 1960s of the motor industry in Uitenhage that drew into Uitenhage increasing numbers of working class families who tended to infiltrate the 'coloured' areas in their search for accommodation; and then finally the impact of a new set of political interests represented in the post-1976 local government institutions that were created by the state as one response to the build-up of resistance to the implementation of Grand Apartheid in South Africa's towns and cities. It is this latter process that is the subject of the next section of this paper.

**THE CHANGING LOCAL STATE AND THE RE-MAKING OF LANGA**

The first major removal of Langa's residents took place in 1968 when the first houses began to be built in KwaNobuhle. This, however, was incomplete because not everyone moved - only those closest to the white areas were moved.
MAP 3.1
Langa's Geographical Layout

Legend:
- Proclaimed Black area boundary
- Suggested area to be proclaimed
- Area presently occupied by Coloureds

Source: East Cape Development Board, Survey Department, 1985
Another removal took place in 1972. On this occasion, 2000 Kabah households were relocated. By this stage all African houses had been demolished between 1st and 19th avenues and the residents removed to KwaNobuhle (see map 3.2) However, between 1972 and 1985, shacks began to re-emerge on the old plots in Langa for four reasons: the ECDB and then the KTC decided to limit the number of lodgers who were allowed to live in houses in KwaNobuhle, housing construction in KwaNobuhle failed to keep pace with population growth and urbanisation, some people wanted to move back to Langa for social reasons, and, most importantly, the rentals that backyard shackdwellers were expected to pay were much lower. In 1979 all shacks beyond 12th avenue were demolished and at least some of the residents relocated to KwaNobuhle. In 1981, the 1st - 17th Avenue area was cleared.

Although there is evidence of a significant ANC-led social movement in Kabah during the 1950s and 1960s, many activists say that no real resistance took place during the 1968, 1972 and 1979 removals. This paved the way for the deproclamation of a section of Langa in terms of Proclamation No. 1414 of 3 July 1981. This section was proclaimed coloured and recreational (see map). It was only during the 1980s that the combined impact of petty bourgeois patronage networks and popular resistance forced the local and central state in 1986 to reverse its attempt to remove all Africans from Langa; but then this was soon overruled by a security-driven forced removal in that same year (see Chapter 8).

The late beginning of the construction of KwaNobuhle in 1968-69 and the commencement of a series of removals during the early- to mid-1970s meant that by the late 1970s Uitenhage's Group Areas plan was only partially implemented. By this stage, the Uitenhage municipality had come under firm Nationalist Party control and had lost control of the black townships of Kabah and KwaNobuhle to the East Cape Bantu Affairs Administration Board (or later the East Cape Development Board [ECDB]) - one of 14 administrative extensions of the central state responsible for black township administration in 14 regions across the country. However, unlike when they were controlled by the white Municipalities, the townships were now fully self-financing and therefore any internal upgrading and development had to be financed from revenue derived
from the residents themselves. Given the dormitory nature of black
townships and the absence of a commercial and industrial tax base, this
administrative framework steadily led to rent and service charge increases
without these increases being sufficient to cover the costs of substantial
upgrading.\textsuperscript{38} This was one of the factors that contributed to the 1976
national uprisings which, in turn, forced the state to make reform
concessions.\textsuperscript{39}

By the late 1970s not all Africans were living in KwaNobuhle and
coloureds were still living in mixed areas with Africans. In addition, as
demonstrated in chapter 1, influx control failed to stop african
urbanisation during the 1969-1979 period. Reforms in urban controls
introduced after 1976 as well as liberal lobbying by organised business
helped create a climate that weakened the classical Verwoerden resolve to
implement a purist urban vision. This fed into trends within Uitenhage
that had resisted this vision since the 1940s. It was this rather
extraordinary mixture of tendencies that provided a \textit{space} for the re-
emergence of Langa in exactly the area that Africans had inhabited since
the middle of c.19th.

Between 1979 and 1983, the number of shacks in Langa increased from
about 1000 to 4205. By June 1985 there were 6116 shacks.\textsuperscript{40} Although the
reasons for why people moved to Langa will be given later, suffice it to say
at this stage that by early 1983 the pressure on the local state to provide
shelter within the framework of the new urban policy was mounting. At
the same time, the government's local government policy was changing
in line with the new urban policy framework outlined by the
government-appointed Riekert Commission.\textsuperscript{41} Based on the assumption
that 'urban insiders' must now also be granted the right to 'vote' for their
'own' local governments, the government passed the Community
Councils Act in 1977 that provided for the creation of Community
Councils in african townships. This was the first step towards creating
fully-fledged and autonomous local governments for african townships in
terms of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982.\textsuperscript{42}

In June 1983, the Director of the ECDB, Louis Koch, announced that the
Community Councils of Cradock, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and
Grahamstown would become Black Local Authorities in terms of the 1982
Black Local Authorities Act.\textsuperscript{43} The body created for Uitenhage's african
townships (namely Langa and KwaNobuhle) was called the KwaNobuhle Town Council. Remarking on what was to become a major source of tension between the ECDB and the KwaNobuhle Town Council (KTC), Koch said that it would take six months after the establishment of the council to transfer administrative functions from the Board to the councils, including financial powers. He said elections for the first councils in the Eastern Cape would take place in October 1983.44

Out of 29 community councils that were elected throughout the country in the major urban areas in 1978, Uitenhage's community council was the only one whose councillors were elected unopposed. Although the voters role had 15757 people on it, no-one voted for the 14 councillors.45 The same thing happened again in 1983 when the local authorities were elected in terms of the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act. On this occasion 16 councillors were elected unopposed (75% of whom were councillors in the community council). This only happened in 3 out of the 29 elections that took place in 1983 (the other two being Mhluzi [Middleburg] and Lingelihle [Cradock]).46

A common saying in Uitenhage during the 1984-86 period was that "the councillors elected themselves". It is not hard to see how this popular perception came about. It signified the absence of those legitimising mechanisms the new Black Local Authority system was supposed to create, i.e. the appearance of popular representation based on electoral sanction. Precisely why one more candidate could not be found to contrive an election is difficult to determine. It may be because of a powerful unified patronage network that eliminated potential competitors, or else 14 candidates in 1978 and 16 in 1983 really did represent the outer limit of the number of people willing to participate in local government. If the latter was the case, then it is possible that different reasons might explain the low level of participation in each case. The point, however, is that whatever the underlying explanation may be, the effect was the absence of the legitimising mechanism of elected popular representation. And it is this mechanism that was needed to prevent the gap between expectations of improvement and actual improvement from exploding into protest.

Although the KwaNobuhle Community Council was converted into a Black Local Authority in 1983 and in the wake of the unopposed
election of the council, the ceremonial inauguration of the KTC took place on 16th January 1984. All 16 councillors present were elected unopposed after paying their R300 candidature fee. The Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development was the guest of honour and in his speech he made an ironic plea that councillors should not be motivated by "personal gain":

"No councillor or official should grant special consideration, treatment or advantage to any person which would not be made available to any other member of the public in similar circumstances. Councillors and officials should conduct themselves to promote the full confidence of the public in the integrity of its local government and their conduct in both official and private affairs should be above reproach. They should do nothing which would create in the minds of the ordinary citizen a lack of confidence in the honest and impartial administration of the municipality and should not give any grounds for the impression that they can be improperly influenced in the performance of their duties."47

The Mayor of Uitenhage was also present and paternalistically compared the KTC and Uitenhage Municipality to the relationship between a daughter and a mother. The KTC Mayor, Tini, incisively cut to the root of what was the main problem with the Black Local Authority system when he used this occasion to appeal to Central Government to "find other sources of revenue other than service charges".48

With grandiose visions of how autonomous municipalities could be used to further the "social and political development for blacks",49 many councillors began preparing a social base. They were well aware of the limitations, but were of the opinion that political rights for blacks needed to be achieved by first starting with socio-economic development and that this could best be attained by securing control of local state structures that were no longer extensions of the ECDB, but had direct access to their own Minister in the Cabinet.50 Realising the low credibility of the Community Councils, existing councillors were well aware that if they were going to enjoy the fruits of being the ones to bring about change for blacks, a strong support-base for the new local government structures was indispensable. And what better way to create such a support-base than exploiting people's
housing needs?

It was at this stage that old Mr. G.K. Majombozi began to realise that popular pressure for shelter could become the basis for a successful patronage network. Majombozi was 81 years old, lived in Langa and had been involved in African local government for 40 years. Faced with pressure from people who wanted to move back to Kabah from KwaNobuhle because they could not afford the rent and service charges or who no longer had access to housing, Majombozi began organising these people into a constituency that shared his lifelong desire to see Kabah built up into an African community. It was, in fact, the policy of the KTC to enforce the provisions of the national Riekert-inspired urban policy framework by insisting that the only people who should be allowed in KwaNobuhle are those who had work, who had 'appropriate accommodation', and the ability to pay rent and service charges. Without the capacity to forcibly exclude people from the urban areas who had Section 10 'rights' and with the loss of direct ECDB control over the intra-urban movement of people, this policy framework for KwaNobuhle led those excluded from KwaNobuhle but not from the urban area as a whole to seek out an area where urban control was less severe - and what better place than the historical home of Uitenhage's African community.

Not all structures inhabited by Africans were demolished in 1981. The deproclamation of a portion of Kabah in 1981 following the removal of people from this area still meant that parts of Kabah were still proclaimed African. During the three years mid-1981 to mid-1984, an increasing number of people began moving back into Kabah, but mainly into the area still proclaimed African. According to East Cape Administration Board figures, there were 3737 "unauthorised structures" in Kabah by November. By July 1984 this figure had gone up to 4105.

When 'Old Man' Majombozi decided to turn the increasing number of shack dwellers into a support base, he had a number of factors in his favour. Firstly, because the portion of Kabah that was still proclaimed African was transferred from the ECDB to the KTC, this gave the KTC effective control over this area. This meant that for the first time, Kabah shack dwellers were not dealing with white officials employed either by Uitenhage Municipality or the ECDB, but politically vulnerable moderate politicians. Secondly, there was no need for Majombozi to organise a land
invasion; all he needed to do was 'sanction' the right of those who had moved in to remain there. So, over the Easter Weekend of 1984 - when the ECDB officials were safely out of the way on their Easter vacations - Councillor Majombozi unilaterally decided to allocate lodgers permits to people occupying sites - or as former Mayor Tini put it, he actually "allocated sites". When the ECDB officials arrived back from their Easter breaks, they were furious, but as Mayor Tini put it, "people were officially given the sites. We could not say people must demolish the shacks - we could have been sued." Majombozi convinced the council to accept what had happened as a fait accompli and even got them to agree to install more taps, grade the roads and commence a bucket system. It was a masterstroke for Majombozi because no-one wanted to rock the boat at that delicate moment - the councillors were keen to build a support-base where they could and since the establishment of the KTC which also controlled most of the Langa area, the ECDB was powerless to act unilaterally in the area. Tini pointed out:

"After this we were forced to re-demarcate the Langa area and the old man automatically moved to the shack area. He knew that in the next election he is sure of his 100% support. That was his motive for allocating sites, but he never gave that as a reason. He only said that he felt sorry for the people."58

Under Majombozi's 'protection' and sanctioned by the issuing of what the KTC declared to be legally invalid 'lodger's permits', people seeking secure shelter close to Uitenhage began building shacks in Langa according to the street layout of the old Kabah. By January 1984 the shacks had been erected up to 13th avenue. This caused considerable alarm amongst white residents and in its last meeting of January 1984, the Uitenhage Municipality discussed the problem. After a discussion that must have echoed similar discussions by similar kinds of people in the same haloed halls of the 'Council Chambers' down the decades, the council resolved that because there was "[n]o infrastructure provided for this situation", the spread of shacks in Langa constituted a health problem. Answering this in true populist style that simultaneously provided a legitimising discourse for the squatters, Mayor Tini said:

"The people who put up shacks in Kabah [Langa] enjoy residential rights and come from KwaNobuhle where there
is a housing shortage. The people do not like their living conditions, but what else can they do? Shacks are their last resort and we cannot wish them away. Whatever the legislation, shack dwelling will never be easy to control. The best way is to provide proper housing.”61

Echoing this sentiment and using terms not substantially different from Tini’s, the main anti-state body, the Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation (UBCO), said:

"They [the squatters] would rather have a roof over their heads and tolerate those conditions than sleep in the open."62

In short, the established moderate and radical black leaders condoned shack construction in Langa thus reinforcing a popular consensus created initially by Majombozi that squatting in Langa was officially sanctioned. The patronage network on which this popular consensus rested gave Majombozi a much needed support-base on the one hand, and the squatters had the apparent protection of official approval on the other. Not surprisingly, this arrangement was not without its contradictions.

KwaNobuhle, Despatch’s “Old Location” and Langa fell under KTC’s jurisdiction. KTC had 16 councillors who represented 16 wards; three in Langa, three in Despatch and ten in KwaNobuhle. Each ward had a ward committee of between 7 and 10 people which was, in turn, chaired by the councillor. Mojombozi’s ward represented Langa’s shack area. The main activities of each ward was to maintain a support-base of some sort by providing a link between the grievances of ordinary people, the councillor and the council. Tini described these activities as follows:

"Those people [on his ward committee] used to help me and tell me that this and that is going wrong in my constituency. They would tell me there is a blockage of water there, there is no water there, the streets are bad, etc. In turn, I would instruct technical people to fix these things."63

By linking these "neighbourhood-based" ward committees to the council’s service departments, the councillors aimed to link local notables co-opted into the ward committees to the councils - a system that can most
appropriately be called "administrative clientilism". Although this never succeeded as intended because of resource limitations, it did entrench what had been started with the community councils a few years earlier, namely a conception of local government that rested on the practice of neighbourhood participation. Unlike white local government, the councillors fused political support-bases, patronage networks and administration into a complex regime that in the event failed to weld together a stable alliance dependent on existing local government structures. As will be shown, without a successful collaborative alliance to keep the local power structure together, new power-centres emerged which skillfully appropriated and recast the participatory morality of the ward committees.

There were two issues that dominated the proceedings of council meetings throughout its existence, namely (i) the inadequate fiscal base from which the council had to derive its income, and (ii) the control of squatting in Langa. It was the failure to resolve these two issues that led to the deep and eventually violent conflict between the KTC and the community.

At the very first meeting of the KTC on 16th January 1984, Mayor Tini proposed that the Department of Co-operation and Development be requested to find "other sources of revenue other than service charges" to augment the council's income. This demand was unsurprising given the attempt by the councillors to use their systems of administrative clientilism to legitimate the state instrument that they now controlled, an instrument that they used to sustain petty accumulation initiatives (allocating trading sites, etc) and to build up political support bases and patronage networks. They were of the view that rent and service charge increases would have made them too unpopular and hence threatened their control of the KTC and its associated benefits. Although this view rested on the assumption that they had an electoral support-base to start off with (partially true for people like Majombozi, but by no means for all the councillors), it does help explain why they acted in the way that they did. In any event, the state's failure to resolve the fiscal problem forced the KTC to contemplate rent and service charge increases in September 1984. This, in turn, triggered the unrest that paved the way for the resignation of the councillors in March 1985, the Langa massacre and the killing of Kinikini. But before these events are dealt with in any detail, the
struggles surrounding squatting in Langa need to be dealt with.

The squatter problem caused enormous tensions and contradictions within the local state. On the one hand, the councillors wanted to protect their squatter support-base by preventing the ECDB from demolishing shacks in Langa. They did this by insisting that their new status as autonomous municipalities meant that the ECDB had no right to unilaterally take action against Langa's squatters. On the other hand, the ECDB and the white officials employed by the KTC, were under tremendous pressure from Uitenhage's white political establishment to remove Langa's squatters.

The Oosterlig, an Afrikaans-speaking daily, reported in early March that white houseowners in suburbs located close to Langa were selling their houses. House owners interviewed said that when they bought their houses 30 years ago, they were promised that Africans in Langa would be moved to KwaNobuhle. Reflecting an accurate understanding of the history of the Municipality's approach to the problem over the decades, one resident was quoted as saying: "We don't want the question to take twenty years to deal with, it must be resolved within the next six months. We feel that the council is ignoring us." Barry Erasmus, Uitenhage's town clerk, tried to re-assure his white constituency by saying that he was trying to find ways to raise funds to facilitate the removal of Africans from Langa. Once this had been achieved, he said, the area would be deproclaimed african and turned into a golf course for whites and coloureds. The remaining area would be proclaimed coloured, he said.

In other words, by 1984, the Uitenhage Municipality was still singing the same tune it had sung since the early 1960s - a tune that was first invented by T.B Floyd in the 1940s: it was committed to the implementation of Group Areas, but only if the central state covered the costs. But by this stage, however, the Uitenhage Municipality was having to operate within a nationally determined urban policy framework that was less inclined to spend large amounts of money implementing a grand apartheid plan it no longer completely believed in. More importantly, this framework's local government policy had resulted in the existence of the KTC because the central government needed in all black townships a set of black political allies at the local level who, in the case of KwaNobuhle, were unlikely to support the forced removal of squatters in Langa, not least because these
squatters were an important support-base for these allies. While this hiatus between changing national urban policy and the more orthodox apartheid agenda at local level provided the space for the expansion and survival of Langa, it also put in place a contradiction that was only 'resolved' when a State of Emergency in 1986 provided a national security policy framework that overrode the reformist urban policy framework.

Despite concerted attempts by the ECDB to convince the councillors to support the removal of Langa's squatters, the councillors refused. The ECDB even tried to argue that the KTC should relinquish control of Langa and hand the matter over to the ECDB. In the meantime, the number of shacks expanded and the pressure from Uitenhage's whites mounted. In the end, central government got involved in the fray resulting in a special meeting in Uitenhage between the councillors, the Uitenhage municipality and the Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development to discuss the Langa squatters. This meeting, which took place in early May, was followed by another between Mayor Tini, KTC's town clerk and the Chief Commissioner. At both these meetings, the state offered to make available money to build 500 new houses in KwaNobuhle on condition the KTC agreed to let the ECDB take control of Langa. Tini tried to delay this decision by saying he needed to consult with his council.

On 16th May 1984, a crucial meeting was held in the KTC's chambers. Present were Mayor Tini, deputy Mayor Ntsiko and four councillors (Majombozi was absent). Then there were all the officials: R.J. Rautenbach, acting town clerk; P. Mulder, treasurer; S. Erasmus, deputy town secretary; R. Basson, administrative officer; P. Veldtman, township manager of Despatch; N. Mqulwana, township manager of Langa; M. Machemba, senior clerk; C. Hobongwana, committee clerk. Louis Koch, chief director of the ECDB and D.J. Bezuidenhout, Director of the Department of Community Affairs, were also present.

After an introduction by Tini, Koch was asked to present the government's position. He started by conceding that he "understood the Council's problems where it had to face an acute housing shortage and pressure from legitimate residents where it was compelled to make available open land in Kabah which had already been vacated. This took place in the council's area of jurisdiction. The Minister had received complaints from white residents as well as from the Municipality and the
matter was eventually introduced at ministerial level." Koch went on to argue that by taking over control of Langa, the ECDB was simply facilitating what was eventually going to happen in any case, i.e. the transfer of the land to Uitenhage once all the people had been removed. This did not mean that the powers of the council were being undermined. To support this argument, Koch even said that the KTC could continue to speak for the Langa residents even though Langa was no longer under the council's jurisdiction. Koch concluded with an uncomfortable reminder for the councillors, namely that given that the ground was going to be transferred to Uitenhage in any case, by transferring control over Langa to the ECDB, the KTC "would be relieved of political pressure as this would then be shoudered by the board." The carrot Koch offered was that if the council agreed to this strategy, 500 new houses would be erected in KwaNobuhle before Christmas.

In rapid succession, councillors Tize, Matshaka, Mbengo and Mqolomba rejected Koch's proposal and argued that the council should retain control of Langa. Mbengo said that unlike elsewhere in the Eastern Cape, Uitenhage has politically quiet and the "civic organisation locally did not enjoy the support of the residents". However, if KTC relinquished control over Langa, this situation might be upset. Koch replied that he understood why the civic organisation was a threat, but argued that the consequences for the council could be even worse if the removals went ahead while the council still controlled Langa. Ntsiko responded by saying that just "as the municipality had obligations to their ratepayers so this council had a responsibility towards its residents." He said that if the deputy minister implemented his plans, the result would be a "forced removal". The KTC was not consulted by the minister and therefore the decision was unacceptable, he argued. He concluded by proposing (a) that the KTC will undertake to ensure that no further shacks are built, (b) that if more shacks are built, the ECDB can take control of Langa, (c) the 500 houses should be built as soon as possible, after which the people will move to KwaNobuhle.

Koch responded by suggesting the KTC and ECDB enter into a formal agreement whereby, (a) the ECDB could be appointed as the KTC's agent with a mandate to control squatting in Langa and re-house the people in KwaNobuhle; and (b) the KTC would remain in full control. This proposal was accepted by Tize and Tini. In the end a motion was passed that rejected
the Minister's proposal on the grounds that "it may adversely affect the
good relations existing between the Council and the residents and may
give rise to political exploitations (sic) which the council has to date been
able to avert through its effective management of the area." The
alternative that was accepted involved (a) that the council would continue
to "render all civic services"; (b) that joint control between the KTC and
ECDB through a liaison committee be established; and (c) that the ECDB
will handle the control of squatters and the re-housing of Langa's
residents. In short, the KTC agreed to the final implementation of the
apartheid blueprint for Uitenhage, but on terms that ensured that central
government first made available housing in KwaNobuhle before they
would agree to the relocation of the people. This rather shrewd move on
the part of the KTC enabled them to agree to the relocation of Langa, but
on terms they knew very well could never be met, i.e. all that needed to
happen was for insufficient houses to be built in KwaNobuhle and Langa
would remain. In this way they hoped they would not lose their support-
base. What they forgot to consider was the possibility that the emerging
Langa community was less interested in housing in KwaNobuhle than in
staying in Langa where they were in walking distance to the Uitenhage
CBD and industrial area, and where urban controls were easier to avoid. It
was this dynamic that re-emerged later in the process at a time when
councillor-driven patronage networks were no longer in place.

The ECDB submitted a memorandum to the council on housing
construction costs. The memo was discussed on 23rd May. It listed six
different house-types ranging from R5914.00 each to R6783.00. House
rentals were calculated on the basis of 11 different income brackets. The
cheapest house would have cost R13.61 per month for someone earning
between R0 and R50.00. The highest rent for the cheapest house would
have been R19.09 for someone earning between R141.00-R150.00. The
type of house being recommended here had the following features: single
150mm concrete block walls, concrete floors, no floor coverings, no
ceilings, no electrical installations, unpainted internal walls, and no fences
or gates.

By April 1984 the KTC, ECDB and the Department of Cooperation and
Development had accepted this option, as well as the wider plan to
relocate Langa's residents to KwaNobuhle. Included in the package was
the KTC's commitment to prevent further squatting and the ECDB's
commitment not to remove people until adequate housing had been erected. In so doing, they effectively agreed on a plan that was impractical for two reasons: firstly, there is no way that the KTC had the capacity to prevent the further erection of shacks given the pressures of urbanisation and homelessness; and secondly, the amount of money allocated was insufficient to finance the construction of an adequate number of houses to re-house all the Langa residents. Furthermore, these two objective obstacles were overdetermined by another set of political processes that the officials and councillors never anticipated, namely the build-up of highly conflictual tensions between the KTC and the state in general on the one hand, and the community as a whole and the Langa squatters in particular on the other from about November 1984 onwards. But before these conflicts are analysed in greater detail in the next chapter, a socio-economic profile of the emerging Langa community is required.

**LANGA: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE**

In general, living conditions in Langa were poor and inadequate. There was one small health and dental clinic on the south-western edge of the township. In the squatter areas there were 28 taps. The sewerage system was one of the biggest problems. A bucket system operated in the formal housing area. Buckets were placed in the road and collected twice a week. In the squatter areas, an irregular combination of pit latrines and bucket system operated. No formal school buildings existed in Langa during 1985-86. Some concerned teachers and social workers organised some form of tuition in four church halls and a large wood and iron shed. There were seven areas that served as "sportsfields". These were rough, ungrassed open pieces of land that were frequently littered with rubbish or were too swampy to use. There were eleven churches, four of which were wood and iron buildings. There were no other services in Langa: no electricity (except for the brick houses), no libraries, no parks, no post office, no places of entertainment, no eating places and no civic halls.

The most important economic services were provided by four general shops located on Maduna Road and a few houses were converted into shops. There were also various clusters of informal sector activities around Maduna square and along 20th avenue. The bustling legal and
pirate taxi business centred around Maduna square and provided links between points within Langa, between Langa and town and between Langa and KwaNobuhle.

Using the results of a survey conducted by PLANACT covering 225 households and 1147 individual members of these households, it is possible to construct a fairly accurate socio-economic profile of Langa.79

Reflecting a lower average household density than in the PEU region as a whole, Langa's household had approximately 6 members each. Only one third had more than 7 persons per household. This figure is significant because it stands in stark contrast to comparable figures obtained from similar surveys of shack settlements where the household density was 10.80 Furthermore, it is significant that when the density figures for the formal housing areas and shack areas in Langa are disaggregated, it appears that the average density in the shack areas is only 5, whereas in the formal areas it is 7. This suggests that shack erection was a solution both to the housing shortage and overcrowding. In their natural quest for shelter, Langa's squatters sensibly used available land space to build enough dwellings to avoid the overcrowding problems experienced as a matter of course in the formal townships.

The low household density of Langa's squatters was because the predominant structure of each household unit was the nuclear family. The PLANACT survey found that the majority of adults living in the shacks who were not heads of the households were wives or husbands. Very few (only 5%) were people outside the nuclear family relationship. The large majority of people living in the shacks (60%) were children of the head of the household.

Equally significant is the fact that no less than one third of all the household heads were women and that 54% of the members of the households surveyed were women. This points to the unusually prominent role in relative terms that women played in Langa's community. Many had migrated to the urban areas or left the formal townships to set up homes and raise families by themselves. Women were forced into these informal settlements as a result of a "triple oppression" that apartheid policies forced onto women, namely migrant labour meant only men could come to town legally, if women did, they
had to live in illegal settlements; up until the late 1970s, single, divorced or widowed women were not legally entitled to rental housing stock; wage rates were nearly 50% lower and unemployment levels higher amongst women compared to men, i.e. families with women heads were poorer and hence less capable of affording rates in formal townships. Women in Langa often justified this in terms of the high costs of consumer culture in KwaNobuhle, i.e. the pressure to own modern furniture, a large dining-room table, a hi fi, modern stove and permed hair-styles.

Langa's age profile is of crucial importance given the prominent political role played by the "youth". The PLANACT survey revealed that over 50% of Langa's residents were under the age of 25 and no less than a third were of school-going age. Given that no schools existed in Langa, it is not surprising that Langa residents regarded educational facilities as a critical problem (more on this later).

As far as employment was concerned, only 46% of the potentially economically active population said they had a job. A large proportion of the population (43%) said they were unemployed despite having had work previously and then 13% said they had never been employed. This last category - many of whom were young - is the group that was not located in the workplace or even in the household economy and which came to fill the ranks of the youth congress in 1984-86. A breakdown of the relationship between personal characteristics and work status is contained in the following table:
TABLE 3.1: WORK STATUS OF SELECTED SECTORS OF LANGA COMMUNITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>No. and % of sample who were working</th>
<th>No. and % of sample who were not working</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of household</td>
<td>116 - 63%</td>
<td>68 - 37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male workers</td>
<td>123 - 60%</td>
<td>82 - 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female workers</td>
<td>70 - 43%</td>
<td>94 - 57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 30 years of age</td>
<td>66 - 50%</td>
<td>65 - 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 60 years of age</td>
<td>119 - 68%</td>
<td>56 - 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated up to Std. 2</td>
<td>72 - 48%</td>
<td>78 - 52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated between Stds. 3 and 8</td>
<td>88 - 52%</td>
<td>81 - 48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated above Std. 9</td>
<td>23 - 72%</td>
<td>9 - 28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: PLANACT, 1986, p.16)

This table reveals that male household heads aged over 30 years who had some education tended to have jobs. Women, the youth and the minimally educated had the highest unemployment rates.

Uitenhage's labour market was very unstable. This was reflected in the fact that only 7% of those who were employed had worked for an employer continuously for at least 20 years. 60% of those who were unemployed had worked for their previous employer for 1 - 5 years. Furthermore, it is significant that of those who had lost their jobs, 46% said they had been retrenched or sacked, while 30% lost their jobs because they got sick or pregnant. Only 23% said they voluntarily left their jobs by retiring or resigning.

Of those who were employed, 32% said they were union members. This was much higher than the national union-membership average which
was 12% at the time. 90% of the union members said they were members of a Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) affiliate while the rest were members of a Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) affiliate.

Bus transport was the primary link between home and work with 60% of the respondents saying they used the bus to go to work. The remainder used taxis, private cars or walked.

Contrary to the general educational profile of the PEU region, the general standard of education in Langa was low. The following table gives the range and percentages:

**TABLE 3.2: EDUCATION LEVELS IN LANGA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level of Respondent</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub A-B</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stds. 1-2</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stds. 3-4</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stds. 5-8</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stds. 9-10</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Matric (Std. 10)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High unemployment, low levels of education and general recessionary conditions resulted in very low wage rates and extreme poverty. The following table reveals that 21% of all the households had no regular income and that only 9% had incomes of over R400.00. The average monthly household income was R186.38.
This table shows that only 4% of all heads earned more than R300.00. More significantly, the fact that only 9% had total incomes of over R400 suggests drastic differences between Langa and the Port Elizabeth squatter areas where 45% of the households surveyed earned above R400 (see previous section). This can only be explained by the fact that whereas in Port Elizabeth people were driven into the informal settlements by the housing shortage, in Uitenhage it was shear poverty and an inability to afford the cost of living in the formal townships - especially those households where women were the head.

The quality of the shacks and when they were built tells us something about the permanence of the community. 92% of all the shacks were built between 1971 and 1986, 76% of which were built between 1981 and 1986. The most distinctive feature about Langa's shacks is how substantial and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Category</th>
<th>Household No.</th>
<th>Income %</th>
<th>Income of Hse. Head No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1-50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R51-100</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R101-150</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R151-200</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R210-300</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R301-400</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R401-600</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over R600</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
well-built they are. Seasoned observers of Durban's shack areas, Crossroads and Port Elizabeth's "Soweto-by-the-Sea" remarked on the high quality of Langa's shacks, most of which were built from "zincs" and planks. The high quality of the shacks may be explained by the fact that there were small informal sector builders who built shacks for people. This is why 28% of the shack dwellers said their shacks had been built for them. The permanence of Langa's squatters that this reflects is reinforced by the fact that no less than 54% of the shacks had between 3 and 7 actual rooms and 37% had separate kitchens.

The explanation for the stability of Langa's shack dwellers emerges when the average length of residence is taken into account and why people lived in Langa. Contrary to the common belief that squatter settlements comprise "recently arrived rural-urban migrants", the evidence suggests the opposite. In response to the question "How long have you lived in this house?", 53% said between 0-4 years, 12% said 5-9 years, 8% said 10-14 years, 6% said 15-19 years, 9% said 20-29 years and 12% said over 30 years. More significantly, it was found that no less that 84% of the respondents said that they had lived in Langa prior to moving to where their shack was at the time of the survey. In other words, the large majority were not coming from a rural "kraal" to live in town. In fact, the majority of respondents (62%) said they moved to their present dwelling in Langa because they wanted their own house or because of overcrowding in other areas or because they wanted a better home. 22% said they moved because they liked the location, 6% said they moved because of removals, and only 4% because they needed work in the area. This confirms with remarkable exactness the general trends in the PEU region as a whole identified in Chapter 1.

Although the housing shortage was by far the most important reason why people moved to the dwellings they were in in 1985-86, when asked "What do you like most about living here?", the following responses (that measured the benefits of living in Langa as compared to KwaNobuhle) were recorded: 97% said the location of Langa was what they liked most. This was followed by less rent to pay than in KwaNobuhle (79%), Langa had a good social life (39%), there was a sense of communal solidarity (21%), it was cheaper to live in Langa (19%), houses and plots were larger, it is easier to survive (12%), living conditions are better (11%) and Langa is nearer to other races (3%). Besides the expected importance of material
factors such as location close to town and places of work and low rent, it is significant that these figures show that 60% felt that Langa's social life and sense of communal solidarity were what they liked most about the community. This contrasts sharply with the sense of isolation, alienation and breakdown that was recorded amongst these same people after they were moved to KwaNobuhle (see chapter 9).

In short, Langa's "stability" and sense of "community" was created by its residents' determination to carve a niche out of the soft underbelly of the Eastern Cape's metropolis. These efforts, however, would not have been successful if the contradiction between the demand for shelter and state housing policy was not overdetermined by the equally contradictory effects of influx control and the patronage networks of local councillors. It is significant that 71% of the respondents to the PLANACT survey were in possession of official lodgers permits and that 94% had never been evicted from their places of residence. This suggests that either most residents had Section 10 qualifications and hence were protected from being "repatriated" Western Cape style to the bantustans, or influx control regulations were simply not being enforced. These remarkable figures bear testimony to the fact that the patronage network that Majombozi created was most certainly in the material interests of the squatters and that the ECDB officials could not or did not undermine this network by "removing" the squatters out of Uitenhage. This meant that squatter struggles in Uitenhage were not about entry into the urban domain (as in the Western Cape), but rather were about the terms of this inclusion.

CONCLUSION

The incomplete application of the apartheid blueprint in Uitenhage was the result of tensions and conflicts between a complex constellation of local interests vying over the application of nationally determined and locally inspired urban policies during consecutive historical periods. These local conflicts mediated the way national policy was interpreted and applied, while national policy prescriptions created structures and processes that constantly constituted and re-constituted different local interests. These vertical and horizontal flows of power resulted in the creation of an urban environment by the 1980s that, in turn, was the well spring for some very serious multiple political conflicts within the local
state system and between this system and the community as a whole. This urban environment, however, may have been a necessary condition for these political conflicts, but it was by no means a sufficient condition. For an understanding of these sufficient conditions, we need to venture onto the relatively more unstable and intangible terrain of politics, without losing sight of the fact that it was the elements of the urban system that were the subject of these political conflicts.

1. For a recent overview of the last thirty years of this literature see Swilling, M., "Towards an Urban Research Agenda for Southern Africa in the 1990s", paper presented at the Conference on Urban Research in Developing Countries, American University, Cairo, February 1993.
12. Ibid., p.8
13. Ibid., p.10
16. Ibid., pp.11-12.
17. Ibid., pp.13-14.
19. Ibid., p17.
20. Ibid., pp.18-19.
21. Ibid., p21
22. Ibid., pp.22-23
23. Ibid., p.25. The reference to "Faganite" is to the Fagan Report that was the report that came out in the mid-1940s that proposed a soft paternalistic segregationist approach that recognised the permanence of fully urbanised Africans. (See Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Operation of the Laws in Force in the Union Relating to Natives in or near Urban Areas; the Native Pass Laws; and the Employment in Mines and Industries of Migratory Labour, 1946-48. This policy framework, however, was replaced by the Sauer Report that was adopted by the newly elected Nationalist Party Government. This report effectively echoed the Stallardist principle of 1921 by proposing much stricter
reinforcement of the notion that African urbanisation should be prevented by way of a national system of labour regulation and control. (See Verslag van die Kleurvraagsnik Kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party, 1947.) See Hindson, D., op. cit. and Posel, D., op. cit., both of whom have developed sophisticated theoretical and empirical analyses premised in large part on the differences between these two approaches. They both argue that the Faganite approach persisted into the 1950s after the Nationalist Party election victory in 1948, but that by the end of the 1950s the Stallardist-Sauerite approach had become dominant. This dominance lasts well into the 1970s at the end of which there is a return to Faganism in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower (Excluding the Legislation Administered by the Departments of Labour and Mines), 1979 (the so-called Rickert Report after its Chairperson).

25. Ibid., p. 28.
27. Ibid., pp.38-40
28. Ibid., 46-47
29. Ibid., pp.50-52.
30. Ibid., pp.56-7
31. Interview with Former Mayor Tini, Uitenhage, 10.9.87.
32. Lodgers are people who are not part of the immediate family of the registered tenant who were only allowed to stay in the house if they applied for and got a lodger's permit. This also applied to children of tenants when they became adults.
33. Some of the information about removals was obtained in an interview with Barry Erasmus and Eddie Coetzee, Administrator and Town Clerk respectively of KwaNobuhle, 26.5.86.
34. Interview with Mayor Tini, op. cit.
35. Interview with Freddie Magugu, Uitenhage branch organiser for the National Union of Textile Workers, 27.5.1987. Magugu lived in Langa at the time of the interview and he had experienced some of the removals.
36. See Adler, G., op. cit., pp.53-55.
39. Although education grievances were at the centre of the 1976 uprisings, urban grievances also played a role. This is reflected in the articulation of urban grievances as student protests mushroomed out into planned stayaway actions late in 1976 and into 1977. However, these were not particularly successful actions. However, local townships associations in the E. Cape continued to take up urban grievances from 1976 onwards, with some of these in the Port Elizabeth, for example, eventually formed themselves into urban movements under civic associations like PEBCO.
41. The Rickert Commission reported in 1979 and recommended a fundamental change to the kind of urban policy framework that originated in the Stallard Commission of 1921, and carried on through the Sauer Report and into the strategies that were implemented during the 1950s and 1960s. The Rickert Commission effectively recommended - and the government adopted - the kind of policy framework that the Fagan Report recommended in the 1940s, namely the recognition of the fact that there was a sizable African community that were fully urbanised and should therefore be accepted as fully-fledged urban dwellers complete with rights to property, movement, trade and local government representation. In other words, in light of the urban-based uprisings of the mid-1970s, this was a political manoeuvre to accept the incorporation of the 'urban insiders' on condition influx controls were intensified to keep out the 'rural outsiders'. Although the Rickert framework therefore retained influx control as a central tenet of apartheid, it removed another central tenet of apartheid by accepting that at least some urban Africans were not 'temporary sojourners' in the white towns and cities. For analysis of these processes see Cobbett, W., Hindson, D., Glaser, D. and Swilling, M., "A Critical Analysis of the South African State's Reform Strategies in the 1980s", in Frankel, P., Pines, N. and Swilling, M. (eds.), State.


43. Eastern Province Herald, 7.6.1983

44. Ibid.


46. Ibid., p.12.


49. Interview with ex-councilor, Uitenhage, 30 June 1986 (he wanted to remain anonymous).

50. Interviews with Tini, op. cit., and with a Former Councilor (who wanted to remain anonymous), op. cit., 30.6.1986.

51. For example, the housing regulations were such that women lost their housing rights if their husbands died or divorced them.


53. Section 10 qualifications entitled people who had resided in the urban areas for a certain period of time to remain in the urban areas permanently - a provision that the Riekert framework entrenched.


56. Interview with Mr. Tini, the ex-mayor of KwaNobuhle, 10 September, 1987.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Eastern Province Herald, 17.1.1984

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Interview with Tini, op. cit. and a reading of the Council minutes.

64. This assessment was obtained from a reading of all the council's minutes in the offices of the KwaNobuhle Town Council in September 1987.


66. Oosterlig, 2.3.1984. Translated by the author.

67. Ibid.

68. Document entitled "Minutes of the 4/1984 special meeting of t Executive Committee held in the council chambers Matanzima Road, KwaNobuhle on Wednesday 16 May 1984 at 14h00."

69. Ibid., p.36.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., p.36.

72. Ibid., pp.36-37.

73. Ibid., pp.38-39.

74. Ibid., p.38.

75. Memorandum to KwaNobuhle Town Clerk from L. Koch, Director of the East Cape Development Board, 16 May 1984.

76. Memorandum sent to Director of Development and Special Tasks in the Department of Technical Services in the ECDB by J.B.W. Johnson, 19 April, 1984.

77. This section is drawn from a socio-economic, demographic and attitudinal survey supervised by the author during the course of 1985. Although by this stage the Langa community was larger than it was in 1984 when the conflict began, this profile provides the basis for an understanding of what the conflict was about during the 1984-86 period which is what the rest of the thesis covers. The survey was financed by PLANACT, a Johannesburg-based development NGO. The report was publicly released.

78. Ibid., pp.35-40.

79. Unless otherwise indicated, the remainder of this section of the socio-economic profile of Langa will be entirely based on Planact, op. cit. All figures and facts come from this report. It is important to point out that I was one of the authors of the PLANACT report. Furthermore, I played a role in administering the survey, formulating questions and liaising with the community organisations that commissioned the report.


81. This was a common trend during this period. See Hindson, D., op. cit., pp.86-91.

82. See Cole, J., *Crossroads: The Politics of Reform and Repression, 1976-1986*, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987. Although the Western Cape has a long history of squatter struggles, the fact that it was defined as a coloured labour preference area meant that Africans were deemed to be legally excluded from the labour market. This contrasts with Uitenhage where the coloured labour preference policy was not applicable. The result was that the substantive content of squatter struggles over access to land was de facto a struggle against the coloured labour preference policy, i.e. urban space and labour control were much more intimately connected than in the Eastern Cape.
CHAPTER 4

STATE, COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICS OF TOWNSHIP CONFLICT,
NOVEMBER 1984-MARCH 1985

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an account of the conflicts that led up to the Langa Massacre that is, in turn, described in the next chapter. These conflicts arose of out tensions that existed within the local state system and between this system and the community as a whole. The concern here and in the next chapter with the actual detail of the political events arises out of a need to go beyond the traditional approach to resistance in most South African writing. The typical approach of most analyses of township politics is to sketch out a structural and political context, followed by a brief statement that the event took place, and then concluding with some statement about what this tells us about the sociology and/or history of these structural/political conditions. In other words, the dynamics of the events of the conflict are not seen as a subject of analysis in and of themselves, but the conflict is simply used as a kind of entrée for analysing why it took place.

This chapter will build on the preceding chapters and sketch out some of the immediate political dynamics that created a context of generalised conflict during the period leading up to the massacre. Although these events led to a massacre that, in turn, was a product of police violence against non-violent crowd action, Chapter 6 takes up some of the more detailed strands of these political dynamics by looking at another form of crowd action to that which is examined in chapter 5, namely the brutally violent crowd action that took place two days after the Langa massacre - an event that heralded South Africa's first 'necklacings'.

In his trenchant work on township politics, Seekings has argued that the analyses of township politics have been either 'structural' or 'conspiratorial' in nature. Whereas structural approaches explained township politics in terms of the political economy of material inequality and oppression, conspiratorial approaches explained these same political processes in terms of the activities of a small group of 'agitators' (in the case of state apologists) or 'leaders' (in the case of oppositional propagandists) conspiring to overthrow the regime. Seekings observes that whereas the conspiratorial approach was used by national political
organisations (state and ANC), the structuralist approach dominated academic perspectives. He calls for a synthesis of the two approaches by resorting to the dynamics of locality when he argues that "[a] full account of protest and conflict needs to locate the choices regarding political action made by individuals at the local level ...". This is what this chapter will seek to do and in doing so, the irreducible and contingent nature of political choice will be highlighted.

THE CONTOURS OF CONFLICT

The six month period leading up to the massacre was a period during which conflicts broke out in the schools, factories and communities. The 'elections' for the newly created 'tri-cameral parliament' for whites, coloureds and Indians were held in August 1984. This was immediately followed by the rapid countrywide spread of township resistance and the emergence of new forms of mass action in the form of the mass stayaway, consumer boycotts, general strikes and mass demonstrations. The Vaal Uprising in September 1984, followed soon after by the Transvaal Regional Stayaway in November 1984 and then spreading outwards to Natal and the Eastern Cape, all set the tone for the intensification of conflict and resistance at the local level.

Although the occupation and growth of Langa from April 1984 onwards was one dimension of the evolving local dynamics of political conflict, the politics of Langa will not be dealt with here because this is the subject of forthcoming chapters. What is significant here is that the Langa massacre took place because a large crowd wanted to attend the funerals of people killed during politically inspired clashes with the police, and the police were trying to stop them because it was, they believed, their duty to maintain 'law and order' in an area where 'unrest' had reached what the police perceived to be crisis levels - a euphemism for 'threat to the white community'.

Increasingly violent policemen, the activities of vigilantes linked to the police and the increasingly organised 'amabutho' squads were the central actors in an escalating cycle of violence and counter-violence that characterised the September 1984 - March 1985 period. Two empirical surveys done at the time provide rough indicators as to the nature of this escalation. The following table is derived from figures provided by the police in evidence to the Kannemeyer Commission.
TABLE 4.1: TARGETS THAT WERE ATTACKED BY GROUPS, OCTOBER 1984 to MARCH 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Council Blgs &amp; Vehicles</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Vehicles - mainly trucks and busses</th>
<th>Private homes</th>
<th>Homes &amp; properties of councillors</th>
<th>Homes of SAP officers</th>
<th>SAP vehicles</th>
<th>Shops &amp; businesses</th>
<th>Community Facilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. '84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. '84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. '84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. '85</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. '85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March '85</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although this table is indicative of these rising levels of conflict, it is obviously misleading because it creates the impression that the only source of violence was groups who were attacking government, SAP and private property and persons. To rival this view, the human rights activist group Black Sash released a report entitled Memorandum on Police Conduct in the Eastern Cape. This report was compiled from a long list of affidavits taken from ordinary people who experienced first hand extremely brutal forms of police misconduct during this same period. These included drunken behavior by policemen on duty, repeated lashings of randomly arrested people, indiscriminate shooting at individuals and groups, assaults of innocent people walking along the road, prolonged torture in police cells (especially of young people), the beating up and killing of children, and the intimidation of public and private doctors into revealing the identities of patients who reported bullet wounds. The memorandum concludes:
"There are too many corroborating affidavits for anyone to believe that the police are blameless in helping create conditions in the Eastern Cape which led to the disaster on 21st March."9

The rising levels of increasingly violent conflict in Uitenhage may have been the result of police and vigilante action, but before this is empirically established, the relationship between violent action on the part of police, vigilantes and amabutho and the internal and external dynamics of the KTC needs to be understood. For in the final analysis, it was these dynamics that triggered the build-up of conflict from September 1984 onwards.

THE POLITICS OF FISCAL UNVIABILITY

The fiscal unviability of the KTC was an issue that was raised by Mayor Tini as early as 16 January 1984, the day this newly established Black Local Authority (BLA) was inaugurated. Like BLAs elsewhere in the country, this fiscal crisis originated in the mistaken notion that black townships that had no viable tax base could become politically autonomous and financially viable.10 In reality, the labour and consumer power that resided in the townships helped sustain the tax base of a legally and constitutionally separate local authority (namely the white municipality) that, in turn, had no fiscal responsibilities towards the township. The resulting intra-urban resource flows systematically underdeveloped the townships in a manner reminiscent of colonial relationships of exploitation.11 This in-built fiscal fault had disastrous political consequences for the new petty bourgeois elite that grasped these local state instruments: they were illegitimate from the start because they were presented by the national government as substitutes for national political rights and they did not have the resources needed to bring about substantive urban upgrading and development - a strategy that if they were financially viable may have ameliorated the consequences of illegitimacy. It was this conundrum that the KTC found itself trying to handle during 1984 and in so doing found itself squeezed between central government departments that were reluctant to provide the Council with additional funds, and an increasingly politicised community that was unable and unwilling to shoulder the burden of increased levies at a time of deepening recession.

At a meeting in the Council Chamber on 28 May 1984 attended by
Councillors, Council officials, the Director of Local Government John Hitge, and C.C. Kloppers from the Chief Commissioner's Office, the overall financial position of the KTC was reviewed. As far as the 1983-84 budget estimates were concerned, no real problems were raised and it was noted that they provided for no service charge increases for the period up to June 1984. However, John Hitge expressed concern about the fact that the Council's income was not as high as was projected in the budget estimates. This, the city treasurer explained, was due to the fact that the expected income from lodger's fees was not forthcoming, i.e. the fees from people who the Council had resolved were not members of the family in whose name houses were rented, but nevertheless lived in these houses. To compensate, Hitge proposed that the Council's liquor outlets should generate higher profits, vacancies should not be filled, debts currently being carried by the ECDB on behalf of the KTC should be retained in the ECDB books and not transferred, and that various special funds and levies currently managed by the ECDB should be transferred to the KTC to make the income side of the books look a bit more respectable. In other words, to make the books look a little better, Hitge wanted them juggled and manipulated.

However, when it came to the 1984-85 budget estimates, manipulative accounting was not going to solve the problem. In essence, the KTC proposed a budget for approval by the Minister that increased expenditure by 117% over the 1983-84 budget without recommending an increase in service charges levied on the residents. Hitge rejected this outright and proposed service charge increases of between 15% and 20% and a reduction in expenditure. The councillors agreed to reconsider the matter in line with national guidelines laid down by the Department of Public Finance (normally around 15%).

After various discussions and meetings during May and June, the Council met again on 3 July in a defiant mood. It resolved to confirm and approve its 1984/85 budget estimate of just over R6 million which represented a 30% increase over its previous budget - a substantial compromise from 117%! Nevertheless, this effectively meant going against the instructions contained in a letter dated 8 March 1984 from the Department of Public Finance. To justify a higher increase than what the Department of Public Finance was prepared to recommend for approval to the Minister, the Council pointed out that with its increased
responsibilities as a result of becoming a BLA, it had additional costs that needed to be taken into account. However, the Council resolved that it was prepared to accept only very minor increases in service charges, namely an increase in hostel fees from R7 to R10 per month, and the installation of water meters in businesses so that water can be charged in accordance with metered consumption. The problem with the budget, however, was that income was well below the planned expenditure. The Council rejected the notion that increases of more than 15% should be contemplated to make up the difference on the grounds that residents were unable to afford this "... as a result of the current recession and unemployment prevalent in the areas ... ."\textsuperscript{14} It was in this light that the Council concluded that "having only very recently become a local authority, [it] will at an early stage already be faced with a serious financial problem... ."\textsuperscript{15}

To resolve its "financial problem", the KTC resolved to request the then Minister of Cooperation and Development to agree to (i) that the profits that accrued from liquor outlets during 1982/83 owned by the ECDB be paid over to the KTC; (ii) the transfer of "labour contributions" payable by employers to the ECDB to the KTC; (iii) the direct payment to the KTC of money provided to the ECDB by Central Government to make up for deficits incurred from service provision; (iv) the transfer from the ECDB to the KTC of the R357 138 in the Services Levy Fund; (v) the transfer of all interest made by the ECDB from investments made by the ECDB of money that by rights belonged to KTC; (vi) provide the KTC with suggestions on how it could balance its budget without increasing service charges by way of direct subsidies from Central Government or indirect taxes.\textsuperscript{16}

In the end, the meeting resolved on increases for residential and business sites that were all more or less 13%. As far as residential sites in KwaNobuhle were concerned, these were supposed to go up from R19.90 per month to R22.90, and in Kabah from R17.29 to R19.90. The meeting also resolved to impose lodger's fees on various categories of lodgers (married with dependents, single with dependents, single without dependents).\textsuperscript{17} However, although this was the formal decision taken, there is clear evidence that the Councillors were of the view that no real increases would need to be levied because all that was needed was for the ECDB to give the KTC a grant to offset the additional income that was supposed to be obtained from service charge increases.\textsuperscript{18} But for this to
happen, the KTC needed community support as a form of pressure to back up its case - something that it attempted to get at a public meeting in September.

In short, after several months of wrangles and tension with various central government departments that dragged out the final approval of the KTC budget to a point where it risked collapsing financially altogether, the KTC was eventually cajoled into accepting a drastically reduced capital development programme as well as service charge increases - albeit more moderate ones than originally envisaged by John Hitge. This effectively placed the KTC in a politically invidious position vis-a-vis the community: by August -September it had failed to acquire the large-scale resources it needed to finance substantive upgrading and development to legitimise the KTC structure; it had effectively compromised on the principle of retaining Kabah as an african settlement (see chapter 3); and it had committed itself to (moderate) service charge increases. By the time the Councillors called a public meeting in September to discuss the council's activities and the question of service charges, it had nothing significant to deliver to counter the growing social movement campaigning against it.

THE FAILURE OF LEGITIMATION AND THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The build-up of national resistance against the implementation of the tri-cameral constitution and the "Koornhof Bills" began in earnest in 1983 with the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF). It was common for a "civic association" of some kind to form in order to mobilise residents around housing and service charge issues that the BLAs were supposed to deal with. However, the historical pre-existence of UBCO meant that the "space" for a militant grassroots mass-based civic was already occupied. It was therefore the leadership of the Uitenhage Youth Congress (UYCO) that became the primary organisers of the anti-BLA campaign in Uitenhage. Although UYCO's base was in the ranks of young workers, students, unemployed school leavers as well as marginalised elements with very low literacy levels and minimal chances of employment, it soon began building a base amongst tenants of council housing, owner-occupiers in site-and-service schemes and shack dwellers - all of whom were opposed to increases in municipal service charges. In
the words of Nkala:

"The people all over the country rejected overwhelmingly the puppet councils. In Uitenhage (i.e. Langa and KwaNobuhle townships) the Uitenhage Youth Congress undertook a peaceful but vigorous campaign against the dummy councils. Through one of the Koornhof Bills which later became law, the 'community' councils were given repressive and oppressive powers. For example, the community hall was place under their control. So it was easy for the council to refuse the use of the hall to who whoever was opposed to their Pretoria-cooked ideas. Had it not been for the protest for the residents, they would have raised the already high rents. The rent issue is also under their control."22

Although tensions between the councillors and the community were building up during the course of 1984, these tensions came to a head and broke out into open conflict on 9 September 1984. This was the day that the Councillors called a public meeting to inform the community about the progress of the council and to inform them about the issue of rent and service charge increases. There is agreement amongst informants that the bulk of the meeting was taken up with reports from councillors about what had been done and what their plans were. Mayor Tini, however, was not there for most of the meeting - he was addressing a meeting in Uitenhage. However, the meeting had been informed that it was Mayor Tini who was going to deal with the service charge issue. When he eventually arrived the hall was tense and there were clearly elements present who were waiting for this issue to come up. Although newspaper reports leading up to the meeting reported that the meeting was called to announce service charge increases, and although this is what was reported to have happened at the meeting,23 Mayor Tini is adamant that he came in and announced that there would be no increases. In order to get the ECDB and Central Government to provide the KTC with additional funds, he explained in an interview that "we were going to force that it should be a grant, hence we called the public meeting so that there should be no increases in service charge. Nobody would return and say there must be an increase in service charge. We called the meeting and informed the people that no increases were forthcoming, but it was too late because there were political organisations which were saying there will be no increases."24
After Tini made his announcement, in his view the crowd became extremely angry and accused him of lying. By all accounts, the crowd simply dismissed Tini no matter what he said - if he said there were to be no increases, they never believed him; and if he tried to justify the increases, they would have rejected that too. Tini and other eyewitness accounts are in agreement that the crowd then started throwing things at the councillors and as the dynamic got uglier, it was clear that the councillors were in danger of being physically attacked. They managed to escape out of a side door and that night chose to sleep outside the township.25

In short, Tini got his resounding community rejection of increases, but it was not his political project that got the credit. Instead, increases were prevented, but it was UYCO that got the credit.

This was the turning point. From this point onwards, the relationship between the local state and the community shifted: it was no longer about a race between different political projects using different means to improve township living, it became an outright violent confrontation. Councillors, officials, policemen and activists are in agreement that this was the event that triggered the escalation of open conflict leading eventually to the massacre. But, once again, there is nothing inevitable about this train of events. The actual activities and decisions of the actors need to be comprehended.

It was immediately following the September 9 debacle that the Councillors requested and got both personal arms for their protection, and a police guard.26 The community response to the meeting was immediate: UYCO called for the resignation of the councillors and a boycott of their businesses. Tini admitted that the boycott of both his and the businesses of Councillor Benjamin Kinikini was a "100 percent boycott".27 Not surprisingly, having lost their bid for community backing for their struggle with higher levels of the state to get additional resources, the councillors, who were now in defensive positions, had to react to the way they were being targeted by UYCO and its supporters. This was not, however, done in a united manner. Instead, different factions emerged with different approaches. The leading elements of the two factions were Mayor Tini and Councillor Benjamin Kinikini.
SPLITS IN THE COUNCIL AND THE TURN TO VIOLENCE

Tini was 45 years old in 1984. He was born in Uitenhage and lived in Kabah until 1976. He spent 24 years working his way up the lower ranks of the "Bantu Administration" bureaucracy where he came to understand the workings of the apartheid state. It was also a position he used to get himself elected on the Executive Committees of sports and community bodies. He joined the Community Council in 1978 and was elected the first Mayor of the KTC in 1983. He got involved with Benjamin Kinikini's undertaker business in the late 1970s and in 1983/84 started his own funeral parlour and undertaker business. This followed a fall-out with the Kinikini family, particularly Joyce Kinikini, Benjamin's wife.28

Benjamin Kinikini was a petty accumulator in the classic mold. He was a thin sickly man who often needed to spend time in bed.29 He wore large square steel rimmed tinted glasses that were too large for his thin drawn face. Beneath the face and wizened body, however, it was not difficult to sense the hardened cruelty of a self-made man that had used whatever means that were available to survive and who managed to command the absolute loyalty of his family and the small group of young men that he collected around himself - young men who became police informers and members of a vigilante gang called the Peacemakers.

Instead of being concerned primarily with defensive action, Kinikini - together with the Peacemakers and leading Peacemaker and wealthy businessman Jimmy Claassens - entered into a proactive relationship with the police. As advocated by the strategic framework of "counter-revolutionary warfare", security agencies formed alliances with moderate elements in the community who became the "eyes-and-ears" of the security forces and were willing to perform extra-legal activities that the security forces were prohibited from doing.30

Even before the September meeting and subsequent conflicts, it was clear that there were distinct factions within the Council itself. At a Council meeting in late August, Mayor Tini referred to divisions amongst councillors and called for a vote of confidence in his leadership. Ten out of the fifteen councillors present voiced their support for Tini, while
Kinikini reacted negatively to the way the issue was handled. Tini publicly admitted much later that there were two factions in the Council, one led by himself (most of whom bowed to community pressure and resigned in March 1985), and the other led by Kinikini who publicly refused to resign and was eventually murdered by a violent crowd two days after the massacre (see chapter 6).

It was Kinikini and the Peacemakers that effectively brought the police directly into the KTC-community conflict and in so doing gradually marginalised Mayor Tini and his group. This was demonstrated most clearly by an incident that officials, policemen, ex-councillors and activists always refer to when describing the build-up of conflict during this period, namely the conflict over the use of the community hall in November.

The UDF organisations applied via a committee of respected individuals to use the hall for a mass meeting. Although there is confusing evidence on how it came about, Kinikini was the person who either directly controlled the key to the hall, or controlled the caretaker who kept the keys to the hall. After heated confrontations where Kinikini openly brandished his firearm, Kinikini flatly refused on behalf of the Council to allow the UDF organisations to use the hall. UYCO was extremely angry and some its supporters stoned the Kinikini residence in protest. Joyce Kinikini said that crowds gathered outside their house and chanted: "Kinikini, give us the key to the hall." It was after these events that the conflict was taken over by two groups that were openly committed to the use of violence, namely the Peacemakers and the 'amabutho'. The police, in turn, openly backed the Peacemakers and in so doing transformed the conflict into a "low intensity war".

The Peacemakers were a gang that operated as a close-knit vigilante-cum-dispute resolution group. It was based in Kabah and had a leader called Mfusi Sibigla who was known to his followers as Busa Bisa. The day-to-day activities of the Peacemakers revolved around apprehending 'criminals' and 'troublemakers' and taking them to the police station to be charged. They would also recover stolen goods and assist feuding groups or families to resolve their problems. They had a "court" at 20 9th Ave Kabah where there was a judge, prosecutor and defense that disposed of the matters that the Peacemakers brought to it for a decision, usually in the form of an aggrieved and an accused party. The role of the
Peacemakers was to enforce the decisions of the court - including referring the matter to the police or the authorities.\textsuperscript{35}

As the conflict between the KTC and the Amabutho\textsuperscript{36} (who were often rank-and-file supporters of UYCO) intensified, Kinikini sought the assistance of the Peacemakers. Eric, one of Kinikini's sons, was already a member of the Peacemakers.\textsuperscript{37} The Peacemakers, who already had strong relationships with the police because of their role in bringing into the police station people against whom others wanted to lay charges,\textsuperscript{38} quickly took over the role of hunting down "comrades", "arresting" them (as they called it) and bringing them into the police station for questioning, torture and occasionally arrest or simply prolonged detention. Quite often the Peacemakers participated in the assaults.

The police soon came to rely heavily on the Peacemakers as their interface with the community. In a trial of three Peacemakers accused of assaulting a group of young men on the night of 29/30 January 1985 (one of whom later died), evidence of the relationship between the police and Peacemakers was given in camera - evidence that led the Judge in his judgment to conclude: "It seemed from the evidence that accused no.'s 1, 3 and 5 belonged to a group called the Peacemakers who either with the connivance of the police, or upon whom the police turned a blind eye, apprehended and dealt with law-breakers in the township. If we understood the evidence correctly it would seem that these people acted as vigilantes; that in the case of minor offenses they would deal with the perpetrators themselves, and in the case of more serious efforts they would hand them over to the police."\textsuperscript{39} This remarkable confirmation of the way police used extra-legal means to intervene in township affairs, was reinforced by other policemen during the trial of those accused of murdering Kinikini on 23rd March. Major Theron, second-in-command of the SAP in Uitenhage, said the police regarded the Peacemakers as helpful in maintaining law and order and admitted that members of the Peacemakers were acting as "informers" for the security police.\textsuperscript{40} One well known Peacemaker, Dumse Ngocaza, was very familiar with, in particular, the black policemen - "he moved freely with us when we went out [on patrol]", one policeman admitted.\textsuperscript{41}

After the community hall affair, the Peacemakers effectively became the
private army of Kinikini and his cabal in the Council. They set out to wage war, and in the process reinforced the build-up of the amabutho squads as the only defensive action available to the community. As a prominent supporter of Kinikini and the Peacemakers, Jimmy Claassen was directly associated with them. Inevitably, urban legends about the extremely violent and rapacious behaviour of the Peacemakers circulated around the community. These legends were fueled by fear and extortion that preyed on impoverishment and the existence of a legally unprotected and politically voiceless majority. As will be demonstrated in later chapters, some of the exploits of the Peacemakers were tolerated by the security forces, but even this tolerance was insufficient to protect some of the Peacemakers who were eventually tried and imprisoned for violence-related activities. A common story was related by Weza Made:

"There's this guy Jimmy Claassen who is being used by the police. He's the one who has been kidnapping people. He's a businessman in Uitenhage. He moves with these gangsters at night kidnapping people. We don't know what happens to the people he kidnaps. But people believe that he killed them. We now have evidence that this guy killed people. We have this girl who was kidnapped by Jimmy Claassen, but fortunately she escaped. She told us how she was given a lift by Jimmy Claassen, but he took her into the bush and raped her. She was then taken to a spot where these thugs of Jimmy Claassen were. She told us that at this spot there were many heads of people and parts of flesh of people. She said that human flesh was being cooked."  

Although one of the more horrific accounts of the activities of the Peacemakers, Made's story is similar to numerous accounts of abduction, rape, torture and intimidation that are captured in Black Sash affidavits, court records and press reports from the period. The fact that the police - and black policemen in particular - were implicated in these activities helps provide a foundation for understanding many of the events and activities dealt with in the rest of this thesis. It also helps explain the extremely violent demise of the Councillors later on.

THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE
The schools crisis was an important dimension of the conflict. In fact, according to one policeman, the "unrest" began in Uitenhage in the schools in August. 43 By August 1984 many parts of the country were plagued by endemic school boycotts, a number of which started early in 1983. Conflict between the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the education authorities in Uitenhage frequently spilled over into running street battles in the streets. This generated an atmosphere of tension and conflict that began, in turn, to engender sympathetic responses from the trade union movement. The schools crisis resulted in an important alliance between the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and COSAS as unions came under pressure from parents to do something about the problems. The Uitenhage Parents Committee was established by FOSATU elements which were, in turn, instrumental in resolving the schools crisis in Uitenhage in January-February 1985. FOSATU was also involved in the Parents Teachers and Students Association which was formed in February 1985 to take up educational grievances in Uitenhage's coloured schools. 44

On 3 December the home of Fikile Kobese - prominent union organiser and Vice-President of the UDF Eastern Cape - was firebombed and in a subsequent attack his brother Leslie Kobese was killed. The Peacemakers were blamed for this and Benjamin Kinikini's nephew, Zamuxolo Mondile, was subsequently killed by an amabutho group outside Kobese's home on the day of Leslie Kobese's funeral. Triggering an amabutho reaction, a running series of attacks and counter-attacks ensued claiming lives throughout December, January and February. For every house belonging to a "comrade" that was attacked, the house of a black policeman or councillor would be attacked. While the Peacemakers and the police initially had the advantage due to the fact that they were armed and patrolled in police vehicles, the amabutho soon picked up the crude skills of urban warfare. Petrol bombs were their main weapons. Eleven different kinds of petrol bombs were invented, including the so-called "acid bomb" - a bomb made of sulfuric acid. 45 By January, in the words of Captain Goosen of the Uitenhage SAP, "sporadic incidents of unrest and firebombing was the order of the day. The situation escalated ... with more attacks on police patrols taking place.... " 46 The amabutho groups quickly learnt how to counter teargas, rubber bullets and birdshot - the primary means used to disperse groups until March. For birdshot and rubber
bullets, they wrapped their bodies and limbs up in strips of tyre tubing. Then when they were shot, they would fall down and a few moments later, in the words of a policeman, "jump up and run away as if nothing happened". Using urine-soaked cloths to counter the effects of teargas was another tactic. Wounds soon became status symbols amongst these self-anointed urban warriors.

By February, several incidents per day of direct conflict between amabutho groups on the one hand and a combination of Peacemakers, police and armed councillors was the norm. The ineffectiveness of vigilante terror and police action became a source of concern to both the councillors and senior policemen. In two successive statements, Mayor Tini and Kinikini called for peace talks between the Council and UDF organisations in a bid to quell the escalating violence. However, a few days later a group of Councillors visited the Chief of Police for Uitenhage, Colonel Pretorius, to appeal to him to find more effective ways of countering the "unrest". They said that teargas, rubber bullets and birdshot were ineffective and the daily use of teargas was causing great discomfort to the residents. They proposed that hard ammunition be used, "as in 1976". This set the stage for a visit to the region by the Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange and Commissioner of Police General Coetzee on 19 February. They were thoroughly briefed on the situation by local policemen and the ineffectiveness of "soft" weaponry was demonstrated.

**FROM SOFT AMMO TO 'ELIMINATION'**

On 8 February the District Commander of the Port Elizabeth Security Branch sent a telex to Security Branch HQ in Pretoria that outlined the unrest situation and pointed out that teargas, rubber bullets and birdshot are no longer effective. He requested permission to use buckshot and handguns. Brigadier Wandrag replied the same day giving permission on condition daily reports were sent to Pretoria outlining the effects of the new tactics.

On 14 March Uitenhage's most senior police officers that comprised what was called the "Order Group" met to discuss strategy. Colonel Pretorius laid out the problems for discussion, including a telex from Pretoria urging all police vehicles to ensure that helmets and shields were carried; the fact that petrol and acid bombs were becoming an increasingly serious problem; the growing danger to life and safety of the policemen; that they
never had AAA ammunition (a relatively light shotgun shell); that they only had SSG ammo (a heavy shot); and that under certain circumstances, rubber bullets and birdshot were ineffective against petrol and acid bombs. He told the Order Group not to use teargas, rubber bullets and birdshot when under heavy attack.52

As a result of the Order Group discussion on the 14th, police patrols were not issued teargas (because the community leaders objected to the smell and it was getting too expensive53), nor were they given rubber bullets and birdshot on the 15th March. Instead they carried heavier ammunition only and no loudhailers.54 On 19 March a telex was received from Pretoria instructing all Caspirs to carry R1 automatic rifles and sufficient ammunition. This was the telex that read: "When acid bombs and/or petrol bombs are thrown at police vehicles, private vehicles and buildings, then under all circumstances an attempt must be made to eliminate the guilty parties."55 In short, as the cycle of violence and counter-violence escalated, all the police could do was to finally issue the order to its patrols to "shoot to kill". Additional policemen were flown in and on 20th March, a special "temporary base" was established on a Uitenhage sports field to coordinate the new operation. The stage was now set for a ten day period beginning 16 March of organised resistance, increasingly brutal police action and barbarous crowd violence - ten days of fury that transformed Uitenhage's political relationships.

In the meantime, the councillors finally realised that the game was up. Three councillors resigned in mid-February, one resigned in early March and the rest (except Kinikini) led by Mayor Tini himself resigned en masse on 12 March at a special meeting of the Council. Benjamin Kinikini was not at the meeting and was, therefore, the only councillor who never resigned.56 Instead, Kinikini, his sons and members of the Peacemakers were guarding Kinikini's funeral parlour day and night - a building that both he and the community began to call the "barracks". Under pressure from his wife Joyce, Benjamin inquired from the officials how he could resign given that he was not at the meeting. Joyce Kinikini said "he was told that ... [it] was late for him to resign. ... he should come and see them the following week."57 Benjamin Kinikini never lived long enough to carry out his wife's wishes.

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THE BLACK WEEKEND

In response to dynamics that originated in UDF organisations in Port Elizabeth, a call was issued for a three-day stayaway and consumer boycott starting Saturday 16th March. The issues around which these mass actions were organised were recession-induced retrenchments, the merger between AMCAR and Ford motor companies that was going to result in more retrenchments, and petrol price increases. Although the unions rejected the action, it went ahead nevertheless. The "Black Weekend" of 16-17 March was successful in Port Elizabeth and moderately supported in Uitenhage. However, at least two and up to six people were killed in clashes with the new heavily armed police patrols. It was these victims that were eventually to be buried on 21 March - the 25th anniversary of Sharpeville Day!

The Labour Monitoring Group conducted a study among employers, unions, and community organisations in the area to ascertain the dimensions of the various actions. In Port Elizabeth a random sample of 50 of the 235 firms listed in the Midlands Chamber of Industries Directory were interviewed. Seventy-five percent of industrial employers in Uitenhage were interviewed, along with a sample of employers in the commercial sector. All interviews with employers were conducted over the telephone. In-depth interviews were conducted with key activists in the community and the trade unions. The main findings of the telephone survey were:

1. Forty-three percent of black workers in Port Elizabeth and 62% of black workers in Uitenhage were on some form of short-time.

   **TABLE 4.2: SHORT-TIME WORK IN PEU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>All Black Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uitenhage</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. In Port Elizabeth 99.5% of the African work force in the commercial sector heeded the call to stay away on 16 March, a
Saturday morning shopping day. Workers classified as coloured came to work as usual, although many stores closed early. On Monday 18 March 90% of African industrial workers stayed away. Again few coloured workers participated. The situation in Uitenhage was less clear, as 69% of the companies surveyed employed African workers who were not expected to work that day because of some form of short-time. Of those meant to come to work on 18 March, 36% stayed away.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Port Elizabeth</th>
<th>Uitenhage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. In Uitenhage a further stayaway was called on 21 March, the anniversary of Sharpeville, so that all members of the community could attend the funerals of people killed by the police the previous weekend. The massacre at Langa on 21 March ensured that the following day was also a stayaway. Ninety-eight percent of the African workers stayed away on Thursday and 97% on Friday. The proportion of coloured workers staying away reached 16% on Thursday but dropped to 4% on Friday.

Low as coloured participation in the stayaway may seem, it was nonetheless high in comparison with that in the Port Elizabeth area. In certain factories the coloured stayaway was much higher than the mean. This reflects the fact that geographical and organisational divisions are not so clear cut in Uitenhage.

4. Sixty-one percent of the employers surveyed in Port Elizabeth, and 73% of those surveyed in Uitenhage held discussions with employees before the stayaway. All employers, regardless of whether they held such discussions or not, followed a policy of 'no work, no pay' as recommended by employer bodies. In some companies workers lost their attendance and service bonuses, and a few workers in unorganised firms were dismissed.
5. Of the employers, 71% of the sample in Port Elizabeth and 69% in Uitenhage predicted that stayaways would continue in the future. Only one employer thought stayaways would not continue. "Stayaways", one employer remarked, "have become a fact of life". Most of our informants felt that the solution to stayaways lay either in quelling the unrest or employing coloureds instead of Africans in future.

The unions' opposition to the stayaway has been interpreted in different ways. The consensus among community organisations was that the stayaway was a resounding success, and that the unions had misjudged the level of support for it among workers. In the words of the President of the Port Elizabeth Youth Congress: "For the first time we have managed to draw our parents into the struggle". As far as the unions were concerned workers stayed away because of intimidation. Although it is extremely difficult to ascertain the truth of the matter, there is evidence of substantial support among workers for some form of collective action, but there was also a feeling that workers feared the consequences of not staying away.

Views of the political objectives of the stayaway also differed. The vice-president of FOSATU criticised the stayaway as not being in the interests of the working class. Instead, he argued, non-workers ultimately benefited: white chainstores registered record takings on the Friday before the Black Weekend; black traders and shebeen owners made a killing over the weekend; taxi drivers did extremely well because there were no buses; and it was only workers who lost out - they lost a day's pay, some lost their jobs, and they were left weaker and more divided than before.59

Community organisers judged success in very different terms. As they saw it the stayaway demonstrated the level of resistance in the township, increased the organisational power of community organisations, and satisfied the demand by unemployed youths for more militant action.

These differences reflected the disharmony between unions and community organisations over the purpose of political mobilisation. To the unions, community-based action should not have played into the hands of non-working class interests. The unions did not provide an
alternative plan of action which, in turn, reflected the difficulty of organising a pure working-class politics outside the workplace, especially when unions were preoccupied with defending workers on the shop floor during a recession.

To the community organisations, there was no real difference between the interests of the community and those of employed workers, many of whom were on short-time in any case. Therefore, they argued, the unions should have followed where the community was leading. This indicated that the political strategies of the community organisations were being shaped predominantly by community conditions and particularly by the highly politicised youth who bore the brunt of the depressed regional economy.

This kind of politics, however, ran the risk of intensifying divisions between unemployed and employed workers, especially as it was couched in populist ideology. All this reinforced the traditional ideologically-based divisions that had plagued union-community relationships in the Eastern Cape.

Significantly, during the stayaways in Uitenhage on 21 and 22 March there was greater harmony than in Port Elizabeth between community and union organisations as well as between coloured and African workers. This was partly due to the strength of UYCO which, unlike PEYCO, had a substantial base among the older working-class members of the community, and also because the unions did not oppose these stayaways. This paved the way for greater unity later on when struggles around the removal of Langa became the focus.

CONCLUSION

The most important consequence of the Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth stayaways and the state's response to them in the form, in particular, of the Langa Massacre, was to catapult the Eastern Cape into the forefront of mass resistance. By joining what the Transvaal started the previous year, the Eastern Cape turned township resistance into a national uprising that eventually forced the state into imposing a selective State of Emergency in these two regions for the period July 1985 - March 1986. This chapter has
demonstrated how the political choices of those involved in the Uitenhage conflict during the September 1984 - March 1985 period triggered dynamics that rippled outwards into the political culture and fabric of the Eastern Cape.


5. The name used in the community to refer militant groups of mainly youths who took it upon themselves to attack the people and property associated with the police, authority and less frequently private business.

6. Computed from SAP evidence, Transcript of verbal evidence submitted to the Kannemeyer Commission of Inquiry into the Events at Langa, Uitenhage, on 21 March 1985 (hereafter referred to as the Kannemeyer Commission), pp.615-618.


8. Handwritten summary of affidavits that were used to compile the memorandum, provided to the author by Black Sash, Port Elizabeth office.

11. The first 'political economy' of South Africa's local government finance system was provided in PLANACT, The Soweto Rent Boycott, Johannesburg, PLANACT, 1989. This author was intimately involved in conceptualising and writing this report.
12. The account of the meeting is drawn from "KwaNobuhle Town Council: Minutes of the 4/1984 Special Meeting of the KwaNobuhle Town Council held in the Council's Chamber, Matanzima Road, Monday 28 May 1984 at 15h00."
13. Document entitled "KwaNobuhle Town Council: Minutes of the Continuation of the 5/1984 Special Meeting of the KwaNobuhle Town Council held in the Council's Chambers, Matanzima Road, KwaNobuhle on Tuesday 3 July 1984 at 8h00."
15. Ibid., pp.7-8.
17. Ibid., pp.9-10.
18. Transcript of interview with Former Mayor Tini, Uitenhage, 10.9.87. What exactly happened is the subject of dispute because the minutes of council minutes for the period September 1984 into early 1985 have disappeared from the KTC offices.
19. There were three "Koornhof Bills": the Black Local Authorities Act (creation of black local governments), the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill (intensification of influx controls), and the Black Communities Development Bill (conversion of Administration Boards into Development Boards and the upgrading of various property and development rights).
21. From document entitled "Uitenhage Massacre, 21st March 1985 - Speech delivered by Uitenhage Community Leader to Grahamstown Congress of Democrats, Commemoration Service, 28 March 1985". Sue Lund, a Grahamstown activist at the time told the author that the author and presenter of the speech was Wonga Nkala, President of UYCO.
22. Ibid., Section B.
23. Eastern Province Herald, 10.9.1984
24. Interview with Tini, op. cit. Also, when giving evidence in 1987 in the trial of the alleged murderers of Councilor Kinikini, he was adamant that he went to the meeting to announce that there would be no increases - see Record of Appeal in the Matter between S.T. Mpumlo and others and the State, Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 13th May 1987, p.117 (hereafter referred to as the Appeal). The Eastern Province Herald report and activists, however, deny this claim. Given the rising tension in the community, this author is of the view that it is unlikely that Tini would have called a public meeting to announce increases. Given the acrimony between the KTC and the ECDB, it seems more likely that he needed community backing for this fight to prevent increases - this being a tactic used by councilors elsewhere in the country.
25. Interview with E. Coetzee and B. Erasmus, town clerk and administrator respectively of KTC, KTC Offices, 26.5.86.
27. Appeal, p.111.
28. Interview with Mayor Tini, op. cit., pp.1-2; Appeal, pp.88-91.
29. Trial Record, State versus S.T. Mpumlo and Others, Supreme Court, Eastern Cape Division, Case Number CC582/85, vol. 21, p.1123-4. (All references to this trial record will henceforth be referred to simply as Trial Record, followed by the volume number and page.)
31. "Minutes of the 8/1984 Special Meeting of the KwaNobuhle Town Council Held in the Council Chambers, Matanzima Road, KwaNobuhle on 30 August 1984 at 16h45."
32. Trial Record, vol.20, p.1057.
33. Ibid.
34. Trial Record, vol.10, p.534.
35. Ibid., vol. 10, p.531.

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36. "Amabutho" was the popular name that was given to the crudely armed gangs of youths that allied themselves loosely with the social movements, but unlike the movements their primary activity consisted of harassment of and attacks on policemen, municipal officials and other representatives of the state.

37. Ibid., vol. 5, p.230.

38. Ibid., vol. 10, p.529.

39. Record of the Judgment, State Versus Dawid Sikiweo and Others, Case No. CC 44/85, Supreme Court, South Eastern Cape Local Division, p.3, emphasis added.


41. Trial Record, op. cit., vol.9, p.436.

42. Interview with Weza Made, Executive Member of UYCO. June 1985.

43. Kannemeyer Commission, p.42.

44. Taken from Swilling, M., "Stayaways...", op. cit.


46. Kannemeyer Commission, p.158.

47. Ibid., p.605.


50. Ibid., p.620.


52. Ibid., p.820.

53. Ibid., p.785

54. Ibid., p.772.

55. Ibid., p.450. (My emphasis)

56. Record of Appeal..., op. cit., p.93.

57. Trial record, op. cit., p.1129.

58. This section is taken direction from Swilling, M., "Stayaways...", op. cit.


60. UYCO claimed it has 8 000 paid-up members.
"And there was a bicycle which was also moving along Maduna road. I cannot say where it originally came from but it was about to pass the white prisoner truck. The bicycle would have passed on to the left side of the white truck but I show with my left hand that the policeman on top of the white truck made a sign to the person riding the bicycle to move between the two vehicles. ... The bicycle was still in front of the crowd. I saw that the policeman on top of the white prisoner truck shot at the one riding the bicycle and as he was hit, he was almost thrown into the air and I saw that he was shot through the head. And I saw that the one on top of the Hippo held his rifle and he was moving from the one side to the other and he was shooting all the time, and I saw people falling." - E. Thambani, Langa resident.

"At no stage until I left the scene was there a bicycle on the scene." Warrant Officer Pentz, South African Police.

**INTRODUCTION**

_Thursday, 21 March 1985:_ it was quiet, hot and cloudless, the start of a typical March day for the Eastern Cape. Most people in Uitenhage's white suburbs were still asleep as the few dozen riot policemen reported for duty at their Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage bases shortly before 6.00 a.m. Many white workers were sleeping late because the giant VW factory was closed for the day. Adhering to the stayaway call, very few residents were planning to go to work in the black townships. The absence of the usual bustle of early morning cars, pedestrians and pirate taxis left what one policeman on patrol later described as a "deathly quiet".¹ There were some who tried to walk to work at about 6.00 am, but they were turned back by small groups of residents.² No-one anticipated the tragic violence that was soon to claim the lives of 43 people, nor were the people of Langa to know that their poor dusty township would, by the end of the day,
become a name synonymous with the worst of Apartheid in the eyes of the world.³

**THE FUNERAL BANNINGS**

On Thursday 14th March, Captain Andre Goosen of the Security Branch acted in accordance with the new hard-line security tactics by approaching the local magistrate - Magistrate Steyn - to issue an order banning the holding of funerals on weekends and public holidays. Goosen gave the banning orders to a Sergeant Snyman with orders to deliver them to the families of four victims of police action that were due to be buried that weekend.⁴ The intention was to prevent further mass political funerals from taking place because these had become the primary means whereby the political leadership galvanised the community into resisting police action.

In response, community organisations called mass meetings for the weekend where it was announced that the funerals had been banned and that they would be held on Thursday 21st March⁵ - this not being a legal public holiday, but rather a "people's holiday" to commemorate Sharpeville Day.⁶ Pamphlets were then distributed urging people to stayaway on the 21st to attend the funeral. Follow-up meetings took place after that in various areas.

On Monday 18th, Magistrate Steyn was made aware of the consequences of his banning the weekend funerals - he had effectively assisted the activists in ensuring that Sharpeville Day was going to be a mass stayaway and a major political success.⁷ Employers were equally concerned and together with the trade unions made representations requesting that the banning order be lifted because the result was going to be a stayaway. As a result, Magistrate Steyn deliberated on the matter and when he saw Captain Goosen again on the 20th March, he issued another order that stated that funerals were only allowed to take place on Sundays.⁸ This order was issued at 4pm on the 20th and was again given to Sergeant Snyman for distribution.

Police vehicles then announced the new banning order in both KwaNobuhle and Langa. Sergeant Bradly from the Riot Squad in Port Elizabeth was in the vehicle that did the announcements in Langa between 18h00 and 21h00. Although it is clear that the Magistrate and
Security Police intended to prevent all political funerals from taking place on Thursday in a rather fruitless bid to prevent a mass stayaway, the wording of the order and the briefing given to those who announced the new order through loudhailers that evening was confusing and unclear. The result was that Sergeant Bradley and his team only announced that the funeral of one of the victims had been moved from Thursday to Sunday. The other funerals, the community could only have concluded, were still going to go ahead in KwaNobuhle as planned.

Besides the pamphlets distributed by the fleet-footed boys that scamper about the township, as well as the announcements made at many factories reminding people that there was going to be a stayaway the next day so that people could go to the funeral, a mass meeting was held on Wednesday night in the Apostolic Church Hall in Tsoshowa Street to finalise the activities. One participant in the meeting said that the funeral and proposed stayaway were discussed and the transport arrangements were announced. It was agreed that no-one would go to work and people would meet at the taxi rank on Maduna Road between 8h00 and 8h30 to travel to KwaNobuhle. No mention was made of the bannings.

**THE POLICEMEN**

Lt. Fouche reported for duty at Uitenhage’s temporary base at 5.45 a.m. He was aware it was Sharpeville Day, but never discussed this with his men. Despite this, he never expected more trouble than the usual unrest conditions of recent times. Although he was the station commander in Kirkwood, this tough hard policemen was brought over to Uitenhage to take command of an anti-riot detail on 15th March. On that day, he found the body of a policeman in a township street who had been killed by crowds and retaliated by condoning the vicious beating of young black men in the local police station. He was aged 43, had served in the police force since 1961 in various small Eastern Cape towns and had received medals for bravery, merit, loyalty and one for outstanding service during his stints on the border. After attending an anti-terrorism course in 1973, he spent 68 days fighting in East Caprivi and Rhodesia in 1974, 106 days in Ovambo in 1977 and 110 days in Ovambo in 1980.
Fouche was in charge of 2 caspirs and a landrover. There were six men in his caspir: Sergeant Noonen, one of Fouche's men brought in from Kirkwood and who was armed with a 9mm pistol which was his personal possession; Adjutant Doyle, armed with a shotgun and his personal 9mm pistol; Sergeant Smit who had an R1; Sergeant Manama, another Fouche man from Kirkwood and armed with a shotgun; Constable Danster who had an R1 and Constable Marais who was armed with a shotgun. Fouche had an R1.

Fouche took charge of one caspir (a certain kind of armoured vehicle) and put Adjutant Officer Pentz in charge of the other. Pentz, also an Eastern Cape policeman, had behind him 18 years experience including three years as station commander in Glenconnor in 1972-1975. After this, he was posted to Uitenhage's detective branch and played a role in the police units that put down township rebellions in 1976. He had done two stints on the border, three months in 1971 and three and a half in 1980 when he received two medals. On March 21st, Pentz brought his own 9mm Beretta to work and wore it in a holster on his side.

Pentz had six men in his caspir: Sergeant Stumke, a seasoned policeman with 13 years experience in Uitenhage and the recipient of the SAP anti-terrorism medal in 1984; Sergeant Rudman, a 30 year old who attended police college in Pretoria, participated in counter-insurgency courses in 1976 and did border duty in 1977, 1981 and 1984 during which he received a medal for meritorious service; Constable Andrews, a 33 year old coloured man with seven years in the force behind him, was the only one in the caspir who could speak Xhosa because he grew up in the poor multi-racial Port Elizabeth suburb of Korsten; and then there was Constable Els and another two coloured policemen, Constables Keteldas and Loff.

In addition to the caspirs and landrover from Uitenhage's temporary base, four other units from Port Elizabeth were patrolling Uitenhage. Warrant Officer Barn and Sergeant Le Roux were each in charge of caspirs, while Sergeant Lekuba commanded a caspir with a detail of black Transvaal policemen. Sergeant Makgobokoane was in charge of a troop carrier. None of these units carried teargas, birdshot, rubber bullets or a loudhailer; only heavy ammunition like R1s and SSG shotgun rounds.

After Adjutant Meyer had dispensed SSG and R1 ammunition from the magazine at the base, the caspirs entered the townships. None of them
were worried about the fact that they had no teargas, rubber bullets, loudhailers or the lighter birdshot. The policemen sensed the tense quiet and noticed how empty the streets were. Stumke thought that he had better be "more on guard than normal for these rioters" and Fouche thought "this stayaway was one hundred percent successful". Pentz said he knew about the stayaway call and cancellation of the funerals, but was unaware of the significance of Sharpeville Day.

Pentz went to patrol KwaNobuhle while Fouche drove to Langa. Pentz arrived in KwaNobuhle at about 6.30 and as he turned into Matanzima Road, he found a group turning back pedestrians and cars trying to leave KwaNobuhle. An attempt was made to disperse the group and Stumke fired a shot. This probably failed to disperse the group because Pentz radioed Fouche for assistance.

Fouche arrived in Langa just after 6.00 a.m. and reported by radio that everything was "still and quiet". Responding to Pentz's report of trouble in KwaNobuhle, he left Langa soon after 7.00 am and arrived in KwaNobuhle around 8.00. On his way he must have had a tiff with a television crew, because at 7.35 he reported having bashed their car. This probably explains why he took so long to get to KwaNobuhle. (Television crews were frequently targets of frustrated and aggressive riot policemen.)

From 8.00-9.20, Fouche concentrated on breaking up groups and protecting strategic points (such as main entrances) from being occupied by stayaway supporters. Bam and Le Roux were also in KwaNobuhle, but Fouche was unaware of them. At 9.00 Pentz went back to the police station to pick up Constable Groep, an additional member of his crew. Instead of returning to KwaNobuhle where Fouche was now, Pentz decided to head for Langa. He took the Kamesh Road entrance, turned right into 23rd Avenue and then right again into Maduna Road. He entered Maduna Road about a block away from the square where the taxis and buses congregated. That is when he saw a crowd of about 250 gathered on the square.

Pentz and his crew were not the first police patrol to see the crowd. Sergeant Lekuba drove straight to Langa from his Port Elizabeth base and at about 9.00 am came across a group gathered on Maduna square. Although the group was singing and some had raised clenched fists, his impression was not that they were in any way unruly or threatening. He
drove up a side street out of sight of the crowd and tried to make radio contact with other units to notify them about the crowd. He stayed there for between 20 and 30 minutes as he tried in vain to get his faulty radio to work.26

When the police encountered the crowd on Maduna square, they felt morally obliged to enforce what they understood to be the truth: the funerals were banned by legal decree and no-one should be allowed to attend them. What they could not see was that every person who came to Maduna square that morning supported the stayaway and participated in a collective march precisely because they all believed it was their natural traditional obligation to show solidarity with the dead by attending the funeral. When two such profound belief systems constitute two social groups so antagonistically - one small but armed and the other large and unarmed - the outcome was unsurprisingly violent under the circumstances..

THE CROWD

Mr. E. Thembani lived in a shack on 15th Avenue. He had been unemployed since April 1983 when he was retrenched from Volkswagen. He had a wife and children, one of whom worked to support the family. His mother occasionally shared her meager pension to help him out.27 On the morning of the 21st he planned to go to the funeral. He never knew the deceased, but planned to attend the funeral because everyone went to these funerals. No-one in particular told him about the funeral, he had "just heard about it". He had planned to go to the square to catch a "kwela-kwela" (taxi), but by the time he got down to Maduna road, the crowd had already begun marching towards Uitenhage. Instead of joining the front of the crowd, he walked down to 16th Avenue to find a place in the middle of the crowd. When asked why he joined the crowd instead of going straight to KwaNobuhle on a different road he said: "I knew that these people were also going to the funeral."28 He never knew the funerals had been banned.

Gabriel Matebelie was an unmarried man of 24 years who lived in a shack on 10th Avenue with his aunt, brother, cousin and his 6 month old baby. He lost his job on 8th March 1985. He planned to go to the funeral.29 On his way to the square where he was intending to catch a taxi to KwaNobuhle, he came across the crowd marching down Maduna Road.
He joined the crowd and participated in the singing of what he called the "guerrilla song", the one about the guerrillas who "have arrived in South Africa to free us."30

Moses Mgwanza was aged 25 and lived with his wife and children in a brick house in du Bois Street. He worked at Volkswagen as an apprentice electrician and was in his third year of training in 1985. A staunch NAAWU member and deacon in the Presbyterian Church, Moses was a good example of a stable politicised young worker. After meeting his friends Tomile and Zanga, these three set off to attend the funeral. However, when he saw the crowd marching down Maduna Road and realising he might have to walk to Kwallobuhle, Moses ran back home to put on his "takkies".31

Between 7.00 a.m. when Fouche left Langa and 9.00 a.m. when Lekuba arrived on the scene, a crowd of about 250 had already begun to form on Maduna square. Many of them could tell similar stories to Thembani, Matebelie and Mgwanza. Using biographical data obtained from three sources, it is possible to reconstruct a profile of the crowd as it was shortly before the shooting took place.32

Using a sample of 70 people in the crowd about whom details of their gender is available, no less than 80% were male. Out of a total of 82 whose ages are known, 47,5% (i.e. 39) were between the ages of 10 and 20, 36,5% (i.e. 30) were in the 20-30 age bracket, 8,5% (i.e. 7) in the 30-40 range and then 7,3% (i.e. 6) were aged between 40 and 50 years old. Assuming this sample is representative, it would suggest the crowd was overwhelmingly young and largely male. Nevertheless, the presence of older people and young girls in the front rows of the crowd suggests that this was not a crowd of "angry male youths".

Probably more important than the age and gender profile of the crowd was its origins from within the township (see map 5.1). Reflecting the existence of a widespread sense of purpose, the 25 members of the crowd whose addresses are known came from all the major sections of the township. Obviously this was facilitated by the fact that Maduna Road was the main road through the township.
The people who congregated on Maduna square, the Kannemeyer Commission concluded, were indeed intending to find transport to the funeral:

"The point is that the victims were elevated to the position of martyrs in their communities and their funerals assumed a political character. Attendance was a means of showing one's sympathy for and solidarity with the deceased and the cause they supposedly espoused."33

This is all the political activists had organised through pamphlets and small meetings since the previous weekend. The magisterial ban of the funeral had no effect on this sense of "solidarity" because, the order stipulated that funerals could only be held on Sundays but never rescinded the previous ban of funerals on Sundays, not all the funerals were prohibited on Thursday 21st, and the information announced by police loudhailers the previous day was "inadequate".34 No witness at the Kannemeyer Commission or interviewee spoken to by the author was under the impression on the morning of the 21st March that all funerals had been banned and none of them believed it might be illegal to try to attend the funeral.

Significantly, very few members of the crowd knew it was Sharpeville Day. A survey of political attitudes conducted by the lawyers amongst members of the crowd they had contact with revealed that only about 5% were aware that it was Sharpeville. This suggests a low level of national political awareness which, nevertheless, did not in any way diminish support for a local form of defiance and solidarity with the victims of police violence.

In short, the original intention of those who later formed a crowd was to attend the funeral. "I would not have joined if they were going to attack the hippo", Thembani said, "I was on my way to a funeral." Refuting police claims that the crowd was intending to kill whites in Uitenhage and not attend a funeral, Kannemeyer observed that if this was the intention of the crowd, "it is improbable that girls and children would have been included. ... Also, had this been their intention one would have expected some degree of organisation. ... [T]here is no indication of any organisation. People joined the ranks at random and appear to have walked as and where they chose."35
MAP 5.1
Geographical Origins of Langa Crowd

KEY: Dots represent the approximate address of participants in the march whose addresses were reported in the press or court records.

Source: Calculated from reported addresses of victims. Map is from East Cape Development Board, Survey Department, 1985
While Lekuba was up a side street fiddling with his radio, Pentz approached the crowd and eventually stopped his vehicle on the Uitenhage side of Maduna square facing south. He used his radio to notify Fouche of the crowd and asked for reinforcements. Although police evidence maintained that at this stage the crowd was armed, frenzied and singing about going to "kill the whites", members of the crowd and eye witnesses described how the police taunted and provoked a relatively harmless and calm crowd into an aggressive and agitated mood. David Tini described how police shouted to the crowd "throw, throw" and one policeman said: "We're going to show you today." Andrew Williams said a policeman shouted "where are the stones, throw them, throw, throw." Another policeman shouted: "Now we've got them nicely." Because of the inconsistency of police testimony and consistency of community witnesses, Kannemeyer conceded that police provoked those gathered on the square into a more cohesive and antagonistic posture. This was coupled to police actions to prevent bakkies and taxis from transporting people.

More important than provocative police remarks was the undisputed fact that the police told the crowd that the funerals were banned. Given this, those who came to Maduna square soon formed a cohesive crowd when they believed their right to attend the funeral had been violated - a right that had in effect been sanctioned by the first magisterial order. They rejected police claims that the funerals were prohibited because these claims were seen as arbitrary and unfounded. One member of the crowd said when asked whether the police announced the banning that yes "they did say that they had banned the funeral and then we said to them that we did not know that this had been done." Council for the police then said: "So in spite of the fact that the police said the funeral was banned, you all said you were still going to the funeral?" "Yes", was the reply, "we were determined to go to the funeral. .. We did not believe that they spoke the truth. We thought that they did not want us to attend the funeral." This was an unsurprising assessment given the provocative and aggressive behavior of Pentz's crew in particular and the community's perception of the police in general.
After breaking up to let Pentz's caspir through, the crowd then began to move down Maduna Road in an "orderly" fashion. The front ranks linked arms and everyone began singing freedom songs. Many held clenched fists in the air. Out in front was a man with dreadlocks dressed in a black cloak and girdle, while others took responsibility for keeping the crowd orderly and giving direction. "The people were singing silently. ... I would say softly", Andrew Williams said. Kelman Bafile said "the people were walking in an orderly manner. They said that they were on their way to a funeral and they were not going to turn back." From all sides of the original crowd of about 300, hundreds flocked to swell its ranks. They came down the side streets, across the open ground and out from the houses alongside Maduna Road and intersections. A small group walked below a large sun umbrella and many others simply moved into the crowd and found a place to walk. Twenty-two year old Sydney Ntlanjeni was in the third row where he could see the rastafarian leader, hear the people singing freedom songs and see the caspirs moving alongside and in front of the crowd. Like all the other members of the crowd who gave evidence to the Commission, Sydney said he saw no-one carrying weapons.

After the crowd began to move, Pentz drove 100 to 120 metres along the road and stopped until the crowd reached him again. Although denied by the community witnesses, Pentz insists he tried once again at this stage to turn back the crowd. He then moved to a spot on a rise just below 15th Avenue and parked across the road. On his way to this point, Pentz was in constant contact with Fouche who said he was on his way from KwaNobuhle.

MOSES BUCWE: THE CYCLIST

Kwabele Moses Bucwe was 15 years old in 1985. He lived in a shack at 6 Stofile road with his two sisters and brother. He had a standard 3 education and worked at Graham's Poultry Farm, a job he got in January 1985. He left school in 1983 because his mother could no longer afford to pay his fees - "she is poor", he said. The Farm paid him R19.50 per week, part of which he used to buy a bicycle from his brother.

Moses went to work as usual on Wednesday 20th. He arrived home that evening at 5.00 p.m. He was aware that the next day was a stayaway and that a funeral was to take place because the people had been "speaking
about it in the township”. However, he was unaware of the significance of the day itself (i.e. Sharpeville Day), nor did he know that the deceased were meant to have been buried the previous weekend. He never heard any announcements that evening canceling or banning the funerals. Nevertheless, Moses had decided his job at the poultry farm was too valuable to risk for the sake of a funeral or stayaway.

He normally left for work at 6.00 a.m. However, on the morning of the 21st, he knew “no-one was going to work” and although some people tried to go to work at 6.00 a.m. he was afraid to go with them at that stage. He eventually got on his bicycle and left for work at 9.15 a.m. He took his normal route from Stofile Road, down 16th Avenue and then left into Maduna Road.

Moses will probably never forget the scene that confronted him as he turned into Maduna Road that morning. On his right was a very large crowd singing “Nkosi Sikelele iAfrica” and on his left, about 25 metres from the crowd, were two caspirs parked in a “V” formation across the road just below 15th Avenue. He tried to get past on the right side of the caspirs, but a policeman standing on top of the caspir on the left signaled that he should ride in between the two vehicles. He turned in towards the centre of the road, but before proceeding between the caspirs, he turned towards the crowd and, in order to dispel any suspicions about his true destination, he gave a clenched fist salute. As he did so, he was shot in the back of the head. Bucwe said there was no warning shot nor were there any announcements. The strike-breaker became the first target.

FEAR, VIOLENCE AND THE TRUTH: POLICE VS THE COMMUNITY

The police completely disagreed with Bucwe’s version of events. As far as they were concerned, the crowd was 10 metres away, it was aggressive and armed, people in the crowd stoned the caspirs, the police fired a warning shot and tried to tell the crowd to disperse. More importantly, they all emphatically denied the existence of a cyclist. Very few of these claims withstood cross-examination and only some were accepted by Kannemeyer. Both Kannemeyer and Haysom called into question the reliability of police evidence. Haysom argued that the accepted existence of Moses Bucwe on his bicycle proved the police conspired to “fabricate the evidence. The existence of the boy on the bicycle established conclusively
that each and every police witness had lied. They had lied because the existence of the boy on the bicycle would indicate that the crowd could not have been as close and as threatening as they alleged.\textsuperscript{47}

Irrespective of how the policemen presented their version of events after the shooting, there is little doubt they were a small well armed group faced by a crowd of 1-3000 people determined to walk through part of white Uitenhage.\textsuperscript{48} Pentz said that after parking his caspir behind Fouche's in a "V" formation, he "realised that there was going to be a confrontation. That is what I realised - this crowd is approaching, we were standing in the road and we were attempting to stop them. ... They swung the sticks and weapons, jumped in the air, made the black power salute and shouted and screamed."\textsuperscript{49} Andrews told Pentz that the crowd was singing a song that said: "Ons gaan die blankes doodmaak vandag in die dorp." ("We are going to kill the whites in town today.") Fouche's assessment was that this crowd could overwhelm the caspirs and recalled the mutilated body of the policeman he picked up on the 15th avenue. "I was not prepared to let myself and my men be mutilated like that."\textsuperscript{50} Stumke said he was very afraid of the oncoming crowd, "I feared for my life."\textsuperscript{51} Andrews echoed this when he said: "With their words that they were going to kill us, that is the boers, and I called myself a boer at that specific moment because they call all policemen boers and dogs. ... I realised that my life is now in danger. I was finished, got scared, I was scared."\textsuperscript{52} One police witness said he was so frightened that he cowered on the floor of his caspir.

To summarise the police version of the sequence of events:\textsuperscript{53} Fouche and Pentz formed a "V" on the hill; the crowd was ordered to stop when it was 50 metres away; a warning shot was fired when the crowd was 10 metres away; a bare-breasted coloured woman jumped out from the crowd and threw a stone; the leader pulled out a petrol bomb; 6. the order was given to fire when the crowd is 7 metres in front of the caspirs.

The community version can be summarised as follows:\textsuperscript{54} orderly march of unarmed people took place from Maduna square; the caspir moved ahead and parked across the road near 15th Avenue; another caspir arrived and formed a "V" across the road with the first caspir; Bucwe appeared on his bicycle when the crowd was 50 metres from the caspirs; as the crowd moved forward a policeman held up his hand in what appeared to be a signal to stop; some members in front of the crowd stopped

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momentarily; Bucwe then turned inwards to go between the caspirs; without warning, a volley of shots was fired from the caspirs; Bucwe was the first to fall; the crowd turned and fled as the shooting continued.

**THE SHOOTING**

Sydney Ntlanjeni: "They shot at the front row in front of us and I saw that the police were all visible from the top of the hippos. The one behind was also shooting. They also shot up to the third row. I was holding a girl, she fell, and as I started to pick her up, I was shot at in the back. I let go of her and I started running and I was grazed by the bullet in the, on my waist. I ran up to the house which was in front and I looked back at the scene, and I looked at what was happening. There were people trying to stand up but these were shot at again."

Gabriel Matebelie: "Well I heard the shooting and as I turned back to run, I heard another shot and I felt hit on my head and I put my hand over my head and I could feel blood. My legs started shaking and I fell down. ... It was as I was turning to run into 16th avenue."

Two R1 bullets, forty-four shotgun cartridges and at least four 9mm pistol rounds were fired by police during the shooting. The Commission had confirmed post-mortem reports of 20 people who were killed. Molly Blackburn and Emson Banda testified to the effect that it was believed in the community that 43 people were killed. Neither of them could provide the commission with hard documentary evidence to support this allegation. Of the 20 official deaths, there were 5 women and 15 men. Their ages ranged from 11 to 50 years, with nine of the deceased below the age of 16. In addition, 27 were wounded excluding many of those who never went to hospital for treatment for fear of being arrested. Of the known injured, 20 were men and 7 were women. Of the 23 whose ages could be established, 6 were 16 or younger, 15 were between 18 and 30 years and 2 were between 30 and 50 years of age.

Of those killed, one died from a 9mm pistol bullet and 19 died from shotgun ammunition. All except one of the injured were hit by shotgun fire while the remaining victim was hit by an R1 bullet.
Only one of those killed was shot from the front while five of the injured were hit from the front. No less than 35 of the total of 47 dead and injured were shot from the rear.56

Given that most of those injured and killed were probably in the front row of the crowd, and given that over a quarter were women and that a high proportion were young people, it follows that the police shot people - many of whom were women and children - who had already turned round to run away. Their gender, age and absence of weapons would suggest this was not an aggressive organised mob bent on overpowering two caspirs and making its way to Uitenhage to kill whites. One member of the crowd summed up the feelings of many when he said: "I never thought that they would do anything to us with their guns because we had nothing."57

The people fled to the opposite hill and watched the police climb down from their caspirs. About seventy people lay dead or screaming in pain. The community witnesses alleged the police then laid stones amongst the bodies, shot some survivors, made ugly comments and prevented the ambulances from arriving for twenty minutes. No matter what happened after the shooting, the fact remains that the moment of extreme violence had arrived. It brought to a head months of ongoing violence between Uitenhage's black community and police and triggered a rupture between state and community that would, until the forced removal of Langa over a year later, give rise to a new form of resistance and conflict.

CONCLUSION

The policemen who gave evidence to the Kannemeyer Commission were united in their attempt to argue that the primary objective of the crowd and its leaders was to kill whites in Uitenhage and not attend a funeral in KwaNobuhle. This was crucial for them because as long as the view that the crowd was on its way to a funeral remained credible, then their decision to use such brutal force to stop the crowd could be seriously questioned. They knew that if it came to weighing up the moral validity of implementing a badly conceived magisterial order and the right of the crowd to attend a funeral that had been planned well in advance, the conclusion that the police acted in bad faith was more than a distinct probability.
Everything hinges, then, on the collective intention of the crowd. To determine the intentions of collectivities means questioning traditional liberal assumptions about individual rationality. On one extreme Elias Cannetti has argued that when individuals join crowds a collective sense of power is created that destroys the individuals' respect for authority and turns him or her into a manipulable member of a "hunting pack" motivated by destructive primordial instincts. The leaders of crowds are pathological paranoiacs who crave power for its own sake and not because they desire retribution or justice.58

E.P. Thompson, Charles Tilly et. al., George Rude and Barrington Moore reject the notion that crowds express primordial or irrational impulses.59 Instead, using an historical method absent in Cannetti's work, they explain the occurrence of crowd action in terms of the violation of shared moral norms or popular conceptions of justice. For Thompson "the grievances [of the crowd] operated within a popular consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate practices."60 For the Tillys, "[i]n general, justice - and conflicting conceptions of justice at that - lies at the heart of violent conflict."61

Cannetti's theory of crowd behavior is implicit in police perceptions of the township mob. Its irrational violent intentions, the strange rastafarian leader carrying a petrol bomb, the primitive singing style and the bizarre account of the bare-breasted woman, are all images of the primordial, clearly calculated to justify their role as enforcers of "civilised" law and order.

This chapter has questioned the irrationalist conception of crowd behavior and attempted to reconstruct the logic of crowd action, a logic that is determined by both the contingencies of the moment and the dull compulsion of deeper longer-run social tensions. In the final analysis the crowd was a collectivity united by the immediate belief that their right to attend the funeral had been violated. This was the "popular consensus" that resulted in the march. It was based on the desire to enforce what was seen as a legitimate practice and not on the revolutionary objective to challenge authority for its own sake.

EPILOGUE
In the end, justice was done when the state agreed to settle a damages claim lodged by 51 of the victims. In August 1987, the state handed over a total of R1,3 million to these victims and in so doing effectively admitted liability for this terrible event. Moses Bucwe, who was one of the recipients, told a reporter that he intended using his R17 000.00 payout to buy his family a house. But by then he, his family and many other families had been forcibly removed from Langa to KwaNobuhle.62

1. Transcript of verbal evidence submitted to the Kannemeyer Commission of Inquiry into the Events at Langa, Uitenhage, on 21 March 1985 (hereafter referred to as the Kannemeyer Commission), p.184.
3. The only other academic analysis of the Langa shootings is provided by Thornton, R., "The Shooting at Uitenhage, 1985: The Context and Interpretation of Violence", in Manganyi, C. and Du Toit, A. (eds.), Political Violence and the Struggle in South Africa, Halfway House, Southern Books, 1991. While the strength of Thornton's analysis is that it is not structuralist and therefore it is interested in the actual dynamics of the shooting and why they occurred, his main interest is in the symbolic and semiotic effects of the event and what these events tell us about the way political meaning was constructed in the South African political system.
6. Sharpeville Day refers to the day that police shot peaceful demonstrators in Sharpeville on 21 March 1960 - this marked the beginning of a clamp down on and eventually banning of the ANC and other liberation movements.
8. Ibid., p. 16.
9. Kannemeyer summed up the lengthy testimony provided by Bradley on the two occasions when he was called by the Commission: All those who heard Bradley "must have thought that the funeral, the funeral of Dlanga, is moved from Thursday to Sunday.", p.100.
11. Ibid., p.213.
12. Ibid., p.213.
13. Ibid., p.224.
32. The names, addresses and ages of 17 are contained in a report in the Eastern Province Herald, 12.7.85; the ages of 10 more are in this same report; detailed biographical data on 8 people is obtained from the Kannemyer Commission, p.826, p.877, p.900, pp.933-4, pp.962-3, p.991, p.1009 and p.1025; and the sex and age of 20 people killed and 27 injured mentioned in the Report, p.88 and p.80.
33. The Report, p.28.
35. The Report, p.31.
38. Kannemyer Commission, p.1449 (my emphasis).
42. Kannemyer Commission, p.1468. (Despite repeated police claims that the crowd was heavily armed, the only weapons left on the scene after the shooting were a piece of wood, a pick handle and a length of iron. Nor could police witness Lekuba and a white official who witnessed the shooting from 600m away confirm they saw any weapons. This is why Kannemeyer had to accept the overall claim by the community that the crowd was unarmed, see The Report, pp.33-38.)
43. Kannemyer Commission, p.84.
44. Most of the information on Bucwe is taken from his oral evidence. See Kannemeyer Commission, pp.878-888.
45. Bucwe maintains he gave the clenched fist salute so that the crowd would not suspect him of going to work. Kannemeyer said it was a boyish act of bravado.
46. Whereas police evidence was based on the repeated insistence that there was no cyclist in front of the crowd, witnesses from the community in their affidavits the day after the incident and in their oral evidence to the commission insisted there was a cyclist in front of the crowd and he was the first to be shot. After weighing up the evidence, Kannemeyer rejected the police version, accepted that Bucwe was indeed the cyclist, but concluded that he was probably hit by a ricochet bullet that was the warning shot the police claimed to have fired; see The Report, pp.16-24.
48. In this context, an account of the perceptions and feelings of the policemen helps shed light on why they chose to open fire. I am not claiming that anything they said about these feelings or the crowd were true. To understand in their own words why a group of people chose to kill other people is an important part of the explanation of violence, even if they are lying.
53. I am leaving out all the inconsistencies and following mainly Fouche's version, see Kannemyer Commission, p.7.
54. I am following the version given by the legal team that Haysom was part of, see Haysom, op. cit., pp.502-3.
60. Thompson, E.P., op. cit., p.105.
CHAPTER 6
THE "NECKLACING" OF BENJAMIN KINIKINI: A CASE STUDY OF CROWD VIOLENCE

INTRODUCTION

As dawn broke on Tuesday 1 September 1987, and the first rays of summer illuminated the imposing walls of Pretoria Central Prison, Moses Jantjies and Wellington Mielies were fetched by the wardens from their place on death row. They were prepared in the usual fashion and then taken to a room where they were hung by their necks until they died. Accused of being South Africa's first 'necklace' murderers, these two young men from Uitenhage were tortured into admitting that they were part of a crowd that was directly responsible for the brutal killing and neckling of Benjamin Kinikini and his sons and associates on the 23rd March 1985, just two days after the Langa Massacre.

Even though there was insufficient evidence that they directly assaulted the victims, the mere fact that they were part of a crowd engaged in collective violence was sufficient to convict them of murder in terms of the notorious doctrine of 'common purpose'. As Justice Mullings, the presiding Judge, argued in his final judgment: "Where ... the state has no evidence of the participation by an accused in the actual assault which causes the death of the deceased, the state must prove not only the intention to kill, but also active participation in the acts or conduct of the group or crowd which is responsible for such killing." It was this simple and remarkable statement that was the basis of the Judge's decision to not only find Jantjies and Mielies guilty of murder, but also to sentence them to death by hanging.

This chapter is disinterested in the individual guilt or innocence of Jantjies and Mielies, and more interested in how this crowd formed and why it acted in the way that it did. The defense, prosecution and the Judge spent much time during the year-long trial discussing this crowd, but only in order to establish whether the accused were part of and/or shared the putative intentions of the crowd. Without being concerned with court-room argumentation, this same material will be used in this chapter to understand the crowd and its direct and undisputed involvement in extremely brutal forms of collective violence.
When it comes to the "behavior" of crowds and mobilised groups involved in collective violence, it has been the social psychologists rather than the sociologists, historians or political scientists that have in recent years been most helpful in illuminating the moral economy of violent crowds. Foster, Manganyi and Straker et. al. all share the view that crowd violence needs to be understood in terms of a complex merging of the wider set of power relations that are socially, culturally and politically structured and the psychology of the individual participant in crowd action that is the subject that mediates these relations in space and time. Taking this as a conceptual point of departure, this chapter will link the events of the 23rd March to the immediate aftermath of the Langa Massacre, and to the deeper and more longer-term consequences of the political conflicts identified most particularly in Chapter 4 and the socio-economic trends identified in Chapters 1 and 2.

The analysis of crowd action provided here will go beyond most previous accounts of crowd action because instead of simply looking at causes (mainly 'social' and 'structural' for opposition writers and 'conspiratorial' for state-linked writers) and effects (mainly psychological and political), an attempt will be made here to examine the specific events and actions that transformed what was an initially relatively peaceful (albeit defensive) gathering, into an extremely violent crowd that embarked on actions that started a new trend in the way crowds vented their anger in South Africa's townships - a trend that many caught up in the desperate street battles of the 1980s were to emulate in townships across the country over the years that followed. This examination of violent crowd action also fills a gap that Seekings identified in his survey of 500 publications on township politics after which he concluded that whereas non-violent crowd action was well researched, the opposite was true for cases of violent crowd action. It also takes up where Dennis Davis left off when he criticised the notion of "deindividuation" which was used as a psychological device by defense teams during "common purpose" trials to diminish the intended and rational guilt of their clients.

The killing of the Kinikini family and the destruction of their property was presented by the local and international media as primarily a political act by an angry crowd seeking revenge for the Langa Massacre. Although logical enough, the reality was that the final acts of violence that took place around 11h00 on Saturday 23rd March were the result of a tragic chain of events that
began with pre-dawn abductions of children by Jimmy Claassen's Peacemakers. In other words, just like all the instances of conflict and negotiation dealt with in this thesis, even here there are explanations for violent crowd behavior that are highly contingent and, therefore, their explanation is difficult to derive exclusively from the logic of the larger structural and political dynamics.

**LEAD-UP TO THE FORMATION OF THE CROWD**

Mzobanzi Kamteni was 19 years old in March 1985. He was not attending school that year and the previous year he failed standard 7. He had studied English, Xhosa, history and geography and could tell the time. On the night of 22nd March he slept alone in his parents house because his parents were visiting friends, at least this is what he told the court. At about 4am (probably later because the dawn light was already visible), he was suddenly awakened by the sound of his front door being kicked open. Then next moment three men rushed into his room, grabbed him under the arms and dragged him out into the yard, beating him as they went along. Jimmy Claassens was waiting at the gate with a gun in his hand. Mzobansi was loaded into a Ford Custom where he found two other boys, Landile Kula and Thami Brenda. A fourth boy was then picked up, his name was Michael Klaas. After moving about the township and accosting people in a generally threatening and aggressive manner, the Peacemakers made their way to Benjamin Kinikini's funeral parlour, a place that the community and the Kinikini family referred to as the "barracks". When they arrived there, the youths were put into the cold room where bodies that were there waiting to be prepared for burial were kept. They were in this cold room for a while until at about 6h30-7h00, they were taken by truck out to a place referred to as "the bush" where Kamteni and one other was severely beaten with sjamboks. The assault was interrupted by the arrival of a police vehicle that took the children to a garage on the outskirts of KwaNobuhle where they were transferred to another vehicle that took them to the police station.15

Major Theron was second-in-command of the South African Police (SAP) forces in Uitenhage at the time, and in full command of all unrest units on the 23rd March. He was a seasoned policeman with 22 years experience in the force during which time he was responsible for conventional policing (except for a brief stint dealing with unrest in 1976). He only started dealing with
‘unrest’ matters in Uitenhage in March 1985 and although he had been stationed in Uitenhage since 1967 and steadily climbed his way up the ladder, he "first set foot" in KwaNobuhle on the 22nd March 1985. This was the man who was to make the key strategic decisions about how to handle crowd action that day.

Major Theron reported for special duty at the temporary base in Uitenhage shortly before 6h00. His special duties were the result of a huge police operation that was mounted hours after the massacre on the 21st, including the flying in of 120 policemen from around the country as reinforcements to deal with the Uitenhage crisis - many of them encamped in the temporary base. Major Theron, however, was never given a proper briefing. Instead he and the other policemen on the 6h00-18h00 shift on the 23rd started the day with what seemed like a haphazard parade where section leaders were allocated their teams and given their vehicles and ammunition. A quick briefing on their duties was provided. As one policeman put it, "things were very disorganised during those first few days".

Major Theron had 3 Caspers at his disposal, a landrover and the truck he was in. There was also a helicopter available at the base. He entered KwaNobuhle to patrol the area shortly after 6h00. For much of the first hour he noticed nothing that was cause for alarm. That was until he arrived at Poswa Square where a large agitated crowd had gathered. This was shortly after 7h00. That was until he arrived at Poswa Square where a large agitated crowd had gathered. This was shortly after 7h00.

As in Langa on the 21st, both Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth-based security forces were responsible for patrolling Uitenhage townships without much coordination between them. This is why Lt. Kritzinger of Port Elizabeth's Diamond and Gold branch was doing special duty in KwaNobuhle on the morning of the 23rd. He was in charge of a Casper and ten men and was in radio contact with the temporary base. He was moving southwards down Mabandla Street towards Poswa Sq. some time before 7am when he came across a group of 10 to 12 men. He stopped at the group and with the assistance of Constable April who interpreted for him, Kritzinger established from the group that they were looking for children that Jimmy and the Peacemakers had abducted that morning.

Dumse Nogcaza woke up at his uncle Jimmy's house early on Saturday 23rd. He was a member of the Peacemakers and had participated in various
Peacemaker activities. He was 20 years old in March 1985 and was born in Langa at 21 Khetse street. He was functionally illiterate and could not tell the time. He had left school when he was doing standard 3 because "I did not have money to buy books and uniform". Through his uncle Jimmy, though, he got involved with the Peacemakers. Jimmy gave him work in his shop where he packed groceries and did deliveries. After the beginning of "the comrades and the burning of people" he began living at Jimmy's house in Relu street. His whereabouts and what he saw during the course of the morning of the 23rd is what made him the state's most valuable witness during the trial of Jantjies and the others. (At the time of the trial he was already serving one year of a two year sentence [one year suspended] for his participation in the assault of three youths by Jimmy and the Peacemakers during April 1985.)

Dumse's story was simple: he, Jimmy, and a group of Jimmy's men decided to take three (he disagreed that there were four) youths who had been 'arrested' by the Peacemakers to the police station. On their way, they were flagged down by Benjamin Kinikini and his sons who wanted a lift to the 'barracks'. According to Dumse, the Kinikini group were dropped off at the barracks and because it was drizzling slightly and he only had on a t-shirt, he decided to stay behind with them. As they always did with people they 'arrested', Jimmy and his men then took the children to the police station. Ignoring for the moment the fact that Dumse had an interest in denying that the youths were ever taken to the 'bush' to be beaten, it is possible to accept that Dumse did join the Kinikini group at some stage and sat outside with them probably talking about the sounds of the toyi-toyi coming from the direction of Poswa Square. This group included Benjamin Kinikini (the father), 20 year old Silumko who was his son, a 13 year old boy called Stanley (known as Gwala) who was also Benjamin's son, the 16 year old Qondile who was Benjamin's nephew and 20 year old Eric (known as Geelmuis) who was another nephew, and Zalisile Pram (a friend of Silumko's). It soon became clear that the toyi-toying group was getting louder and seemed to be getting closer. Geelmuis climbed onto the roof and shouted down: "They are coming towards Mabandla. There are people coming, armed with pick handles and spades, and they are singing 'sellout!', 'sellout!'". The group then moved inside and began preparing to protect themselves. Only Dumse survived to tell the story of what happened to them that day.
Partly in reaction to the abduction of the children, but also responding to the early morning disturbances caused by the Peacemakers, a small group of people gathered on Poswa Square before 7h00. Some of them had already telephoned the temporary base where they spoke to a Sgt. Loubscher and inquired whether the abducted children had been brought into the temporary base or police station. Loubscher replied that no children had been brought in and after checking, reported that there were no reports of children having been brought into the Uitenhage police station. The effects of the unknown whereabouts of the children and the knowledge that Jimmy and the Peacemakers were responsible for taking them, must have generated a sense of panic and anxiety amongst those who began to gather at Poswa Square to collectively discuss the problem. When Lieutenant Kritzinger first met them, he said there were only about 10 or 12 in the group and that they were extremely agitated by all accounts. Amongst this early group was Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto, as well as Moses Jantjes. Although it is unclear how he actually became involved in this original group, it is clear that unlike most of the others who were accused of murdering Kinikini et. al., he was one of the few who was actually there from when the crowd was still a small gathering of frightened and angry people from the community.

His death by hanging was a tragedy, but for Moses Jantjes life was probably an even greater tragedy. Like Dumse Nogcaza whose testimony was responsible for the judgment that led to his death, Moses was caught up in the cycles of violence that consumed daily life during those almost traumatic days in late March - days when violence gave desperate lives a momentary meaning. Although the court accepted that Moses was born in Langa somewhere around 1964, he never knew his birth date when his lawyer interviewed him on death row in August 1987. His father deserted the family when he was four months old and he was brought up by his mother's sister. He first met his mother in 1979, but she died that same year. He remembers being badly beaten by his Aunt who often hit him all over his body and head with a stick. He remembers running away at times to get away from the beatings. At the time of his arrest in 1985, he was living with his aunt in KwaNobuhle in a house they moved into after the forced removals from Langa in 1981 ejected them from their Langa home. His aunt worked as a domestic worker until she lost her job in 1984. She could not afford to send him to school beyond "sub B", thus leaving him illiterate. He grew up as just another one of those hungry badly clothed boys who roam the streets of most
townships. He was last employed as a construction worker in 1983 and after his cousin lost her job in 1984, the household had no steady income. He managed to scrape together enough to buy food by being a caddie at the golf course or helping his uncle who sold firewood in return for some spare food. However, he often went hungry. This is why he eventually turned to crime. He was sentenced to 6 months in prison for housebreaking in 1981, 6 months for theft in 1981-82 and another 9 months in 1982-83 for theft. This was also a period during which he started to suffer from severe epilepsy.

Although the prosecution made much of the fact that Jantjies defined himself as a "comrade" in the statement that was coerced out of him during his interrogation, there is no evidence of any real political awareness. He was not a member of a political organisation at the time, and his view of the UDF was of an organisation that was "trying to put things right for people. I am told that we as black people want to live in white areas." He knew that Mandela was the head of the ANC, but not that the ANC was banned. As Straker et. al. found when dealing with similar people, Jantjies was typical of the kind of person that found a home in the toyi-toyi and an outlet for his deepest rage in crowd violence. Like the state witness that testified against him, their domestic and social lives prepared them well for the brutality they witnessed.

**THE CROWD IN THE MAKING**

It was wet and cloudy with occasional light rain when people started gathering at Poswa Square between 6h30 and 7h00. The small group that gathered was intent on finding the abducted children and had already decided to go to the "barracks" to search for them. Someone in the group reported that the children were not at the temporary base or the police station and someone else said that normally Jimmy's captives are kept in what was called the "fridge", i.e. the cold room for storing corpses that were going to be buried. While some stood, most of the group sat around in a circle while someone stood in the centre of the circle and tried to organise the discussion about what to do. More people joined the group all the time and a number were armed with various implements. It was at this point that Lt. Kritzinger came across the group. Across the way at the "barracks", Dumse Nogcaza and the Kinikinis also saw Kritzinger approach the group. Lt. Kritzinger and Constable. April got out of their Caspir and with April
interpreting Kritzinger asked the group what the problem was. Everyone then crowded around them and speaking all at once told the policemen that they were looking for the children that Jimmy had arrested. The group was convinced that the children had been taken to the "barracks". Kritzinger asked the group to calm down and for two people to be put forward to talk to him. After Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto came forward to represent the group, and after some discussion, Kritzinger, April, Brandy, Phindile and a Constable Kruger walked to the "barracks", taking a short cut through the shop's yard behind the "barracks" and across the wire fence. This delegation met Benjamin Kinikini outside in the yard of the "barracks" and after a discussion conducted in Afrikaans, Kinikini allowed the delegation to search the premises, including the cold room. They found nothing. They then walked back to what had become a crowd which by this stage had grown rapidly from a small group that had earlier agreed to the terms of a search of the premises to find the children, to a large crowd of about 1000 that was unaware of what had transpired earlier. Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto tried to report back to the crowd that the children were not in the "barracks". The crowd, however, was not satisfied with this and without denying the truth of what was reported back, started to chant "We want our children! We want our children!" In other words, the fact that the children were not found in the "barracks" did not resolve the crowd's problem because this simply proved where the children were not, and not where they actually were.

Kritzinger responded by trying to find out by radio if there was any news of the children at the temporary base, but Sgt. Loubscher had nothing positive to report. While the original group that were still clustered around Kritzinger were prepared to wait until he found out something definite, the crowd which was growing rapidly to about 3000 in number was becoming extremely restless and aggressive. Kritzinger, however, did not feel threatened at this stage because he did not believe that the anger was directed at the police. After waiting in vain for a positive radio report, Kritzinger noticed that Major Theron had arrived on the scene in a white pick-up truck, accompanied by a Caspir. A landrover with a sneeze machine attached to it followed soon after. Knowing that Theron was first in command, Kritzinger did two things: he wrote down his details on a piece of paper and gave this to Brandy and Phindile, and he ordered his radio man to inform Theron about what had happened. Major Theron addressed the crowd through a loudspeaker, but Kritzinger could not hear what he was saying. Instead, he
noticed that things had begun to get extremely tense: "I felt here was a can of petrol," he told the court, "all it needed was someone to light the match." He eventually left the scene to follow up on a group that had broken away from the crowd and was heading towards Kinikini's house.45

Although Major Theron insists that he immediately entered into negotiations with representatives from the crowd, Lt. Kritzinger said that before he (Kritzinger) left the scene, the sneeze machine was used to disperse the crowd, thus implicating Theron. However, according to Dumse who was watching from the "barracks", it was Kritzinger assisted by the sneeze machine who dispersed the crowd46 before Theron arrived. In any event, what is indisputable is that by the time Theron arrived, the crowd was about 3000 strong and very agitated. It was toyi-toying and slogans were ringing out aimed at Jimmy and the Kinikinis.47 Whether Kritzinger or Theron dispersed the crowd, the fact of the matter was that it had grown rapidly to a large crowd in a matter of an hour and notwithstanding Kritzinger's efforts, instead of finding redress had been forcibly dispersed by police action. Nevertheless, all accounts agree that it re-grouped and after re-grouping was a large toyi-toying crowd that seemed unlikely to negotiate a resolution to its problems. This, however, is exactly what happened once again before the final transition to violent action was made.

Theron's truck and the Caspir that was with him stopped a few paces away from the 3000 strong toyi-toying crowd that comprised men, women and children - it was not simply a youthful bunch of male "comrades".48 Nor was it tightly bunched up in a way that may have reflected an organised common purpose. It was loosely structured and smaller groups were constantly breaking off the main group to head off in their own directions.49 Theron insisted repeatedly in court that the crowd was not at all hostile to the police at this stage. The men from the Caspir got out while Theron walked up to the crowd and asked them to put forward representatives to talk to him. This time four people came forward, two of them old people. After 15 minutes discussion, Theron proposed that he send them to the police station to see for themselves whether the children were there. Whereas the two older people agreed with this strategy, the younger ones were opposed to it. To resolve their differences, the four went back to the crowd and through a loud hailer supplied by Theron informed the crowd of Theron's offer. Eventually, two people came back to Theron and declared their readiness to go to the police.
station - they were Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto. They were taken in a police vehicle while Theron remained behind with the crowd. It was an hour before Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto returned. Although the toyi-toying continued and the crowd grew in size during this hour, it remained calm and grouped together.

While the crowd and Theron negotiated, one of the police vehicles was contacted by Sgt. Loubscher and instructed to investigate an area where the children were being assaulted. This was done, and as Kamteni's account makes clear, the assault was interrupted and the children taken to the police station. Theron radioed ahead to the temporary base and found out that a group of children had indeed arrived at the temporary base. However, he was convinced that the crowd would never have accepted his word because this report would have come from the police and not from "their own people". In other words, he assumed that "they will not trust the police" during a process that he appropriately called a "negotiation".

When Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto returned by police vehicle from the temporary base, they reported to the crowd through the loud hailer that the children were safe. They did not, however, bring the children with them because the police were still processing charges laid against them by Jimmy - charges that Theron was to later in the day dismiss on the grounds that Jimmy had unlawfully "arrested" the youths. The news that the children were "safe" but still in police custody, however, failed to satisfy the crowd. Theron then ordered the crowd through an interpreter to disperse, but there was no reaction. Instead, stones were thrown at the police as the crowd's frustration mounted and suspicions were expressed that the children were still not safe. In other words, the failure by Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto to bring back the children was interpreted as a refusal by the police to give back to the community what Jimmy had effectively stolen. Theron then ordered all his men back into their vehicles and for the sneeze machine to be used to disperse the crowd. He later described the refusal of the crowd to disperse after hearing that the children were safe as very "strange" behavior and in so doing revealed how little he understood about the dynamics within the community as a whole and how these dynamics were playing themselves out in the behavior of this crowd. He then left the scene to patrol other areas where trouble was brewing and therefore never saw the way the crowd rapidly re-grouped once again.
This was, in effect, the turning point for two reasons. Firstly, the crowd that re-grouped was probably also re-composed in a way that brought elements to the fore who were prepared to go to the next stage of defiance under the leadership of people with a very different approach to Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto - possibly the kinds of people that had disagreed with Theron’s proposal to send a delegation to the police station to find the children. Lt. Kritzinger, who was one of the few state witnesses who seemed aware of differences in the crowd, illuminated this tension between immediate and deeper dynamics when he said that even if the children had been found and brought directly to the crowd, then the "immediate group that had been directly concerned with the issue would have been satisfied. I don’t know if we could have satisfied everyone." 59

Secondly, the re-grouped crowd was now no longer in a mood to negotiate. It was angry and unsatisfied because its attempt to find recourse by negotiating with the police was premised on the hope that the police would support community demands instead of continuing to protect Jimmy and the Peacemakers. When the children were not physically returned and no matter how reassured Brandy and Phindile were, the fears and concerns that led to the formation of the crowd in the first place were not adequately addressed by the police. By the time the crowd was involuntarily dispersed for the second time that day, the immediate issues of the children and the clumsy police responses had passed away and the deeper dynamics created by the context of general upheaval that characterised the post-massacre period began to take over.

What does not follow automatically from the above logic is why the property and persons of the Claassens/Kunikini group became the targets at the point when crowd anger was directed at the police for not delivering the children. What is significant is that neither the prosecution nor the Judge substantially countered the defense argument that aimed to "show how correct the crowd was. It is to show the probability that Kunikini and his family were rightly or wrongly viewed as being enemies of the community." 60 When asked why she thought her family was killed on 23rd March 1985, Joyce Kunikini, Benjamin’s wife said: "They died on that day because the beginning of the whole thing was about that key. The 28th of November ... 1984 ... and that he was a member of the Bantu Council. Thirdly, he was an 'impimpi of Piet
Botha (sic)." In short, unable to attack armoured vehicles with implements, and given the direct connection between Claassens, Kinikini and the police that had been the subject of negotiations between the crowd and police that morning, and given the overall perceptions of the community captured so graphically by Joyce Kinikini's court testimony, it is unsurprising that the re-grouped and re-composed crowd was driven inexorably towards targets that were accessible, in close proximity and largely unprotected despite the circling helicopter and police presence in the township. And, furthermore, for the Jantjies' of life that ran with this crowd, these were targets that were morally justified by a popular community consensus. It is possible, therefore, that for them this moment of violent action was the fulfilling of a deeper mission to do for the community what they would have liked done for themselves - a decisive apocalyptic delivery from intense suffering by forcibly removing the cause of this suffering.

**THE BURNING OF THE BARRACKS**

Soon after re-grouping, the crowd started moving up Mabandla Road towards Kinikini's house and Jimmy's supermarket located opposite the Kinikini house. Smaller groups started roaming the streets attacking targets that were associated with the police, local government and authority in general. Significantly, the group that moved past ex-Mayor Tini's house never bothered to attack it despite the fears of Tini and his family who were peeping through the windows from behind the closed curtains: "They didn't even throw a stone at my house", he told the court. This suggests that the crowd was able to rationally select explicable targets - in Tini's case, his resignation from the council eliminated him as a target. As the main group moved up the street, it split into two, with one group attacking Jimmy's supermarket and the other Kinikini's house. According to Mono Badela, a journalist who witnessed the events, although the police initially used teargas to break up the crowd, the police on guard outside the house eventually fled when they saw the size and mood of the approaching crowd. Luckily Joyce Kinikini had packed up her house and, with the help of Lt. Kritzinger and his Caspir, taken what she could carry and her daughters out of the township shortly before the main crowd arrived.

After the truck parked outside the Kinikini house was set alight, the house was next to go up in flames. It was after this that the crowd turned its
attention to the "barracks" where the Kinikinis, Dumse and Pram were boarding up and securing the windows.

Shortly after the crowd was dispersed for the first time, the group that had been sitting around in the yard of the "barracks" decided to go inside. Although Dumse testified that they were not particularly worried at first, he did admit that Silumko said at the time that the "barracks" had been stoned before and that the people who did it may be involved with the oncoming crowd. Following a suggestion by Silumko, the group boarded up and secured the windowless windows with planks and corrugated iron - windowless because frequent stonings had smashed the window pains. Given that this must have been anywhere between 7h00 and 8h30 (i.e. before the second regrouping of the crowd), it is conceivable that the group was not too concerned that they were going to be directly attacked, especially with so many police around. Benjamin, however, carried his loaded revolver on his hip just in case. They went into a TV room to watch TV which is where, a while later, they heard the first stone land on the roof.

As the stoning intensified, the group heard the crowd chanting the names of Geelmuis, Qondile and Silumko, calling them "impimpis" ("sellouts"). The cars were then set alight, starting with Benjamin Kinikini's that was standing at the garage and with Jimmy Claassens' Datsun that was parked on the street. This was followed by the burning of the outside toilet. By this stage the entire building was surrounded by the crowd and parts of it began to be set alight as petrol bombs were thrown. Using a wet blanket, some of the group failed to put out the fire that had broken out in the office because the stones flying through the broken windows made it too dangerous. Gwala was struck by a stone in the ribs and screamed, while Dumse was hit on the leg. To avoid the spreading fire and the stones, the group decided to find a safer room. Silumko, meanwhile, grabbed his father's gun and fired three shots into the crowd through a window facing Jongilanga Street - he obeyed, however, an instruction from Benjamin to stop. By this time, none of the rooms were safe from fire and stones and above them they heard banging as someone tried to break open the roof. Burning tyres were thrown into the building through the doorways creating a stench and smoke that caused Gwala to suffocate and faint. While Silumko tried to revive him with a wet blanket, Benjamin also started to faint. This was when they realised they would need to get out of the burning building. With tyres burning in the
doorways, their only way out was through a window. They ripped off the barricade from a window and began climbing out. The crowd was there to meet them and when it saw the group coming out, people shouted "Joh, they are still here and they are not dead yet." First Silumko climbed out, followed by Geelmuis, Gwala, Benjamin, Qondile, Dumse and then Pram. The crowd allowed them to climb out without immediately attacking them - there was a kind of respite in the frenzy. The group stood helplessly terrified before the crowd and pleaded for "forgiveness": "Forgive us," Dumse claimed they said, "we have done nothing. The people you are looking for, are not here." The crowd responded by saying that if Silumko throws them the gun, they will be allowed to go. Silumko refused, some stones were then thrown and the Kinikini group passed up the last possible moment of negotiation that could have prevented the killing that soon followed.

Silumko took the lead in trying to make a desperate dash for freedom by darting round the corner to the back of the building towards the fence. The others followed, with the crowd not far behind. Dumse was hit on the back with a stone and just after he jumped over the fence, Silumko was hit by a brick. The others then changed direction to jump the fence further away, but before they got there Geelmuis decided to hide in a dog kennel in the back yard of the "barracks" while Qondile was pummeled by stones. Gwala and Benjamin were then grabbed by groups and began to be assaulted, while Pram made it over the fence. Groups, however, caught up with them all. In Badela's words:

"The angry crowd starting hacking at their bodies with pangas, beating them with sticks, and then dragging them to the township's main road, Matanzima Street. Tyres were placed over what was left of their bodies, and they were roasted. People danced around the bodies of these people as they burned. To them, they were burning the symbols of oppression."75

Dumse, in the meantime, managed to find his way into the burnt out garage and made his way back through the wreckage to the Jongilanga street side of the building. He looked out and saw only a few people standing around - the crowd had all moved round to Mabandla street. He ran out, picked up a stone and threw it at the house shouting "impimpi" so that others would think he was part of the crowd. He then fled towards Jabavu Street in the
direction of the hostel where he found policemen congregated at the Labour Office.

Major Theron left the township at about 10h00 and returned to the temporary base. Before taking off in the helicopter at about 12h45, he made sure that the children were released without being charged. It was from the air that he first noticed that the "barracks" and other buildings in the vicinity were on fire. He landed the helicopter near the Development Board offices. Dumse was there to meet him and briefed him on what had happened. He arrived on the scene at 13h00 where he found the burnt out buildings and the victims, some of which were still burning. Kritzinger also arrived on the scene after the killing and burning had already taken place, and there are no reports of others having been there. The truth will probably never be known as to why there were so few police vehicles in the vicinity for that crucial hour and half between 10h00 and 11h30 despite the fact that all the police were aware that earlier that morning there was a crowd that was quite clearly very angry with the Kinikini/Claassens group.

When the police arrived to inspect the scene, all that was left of Benjamin was his spinal column lying near the "barracks" and Eric's and Qondile's bodies were found near the dog kennel. Eric's penis had been amputated, his skull smashed and he had been stabbed twice in the neck before being burnt. Qondile's arm was amputated, his jugular cut and his head bashed in before he was burnt. Silumko's body was found in Mabandla street - his right leg and arms were amputated and he was badly assaulted before he was burnt. Pram was found further down Mabandla street where he died from head injuries before he was burnt - a 20cm long knife was thrust deep into his mouth. Gwala's body was never found.

The video taken of the toyi-toying crowds surrounding the burning bodies caught one prominent person shouting: "These things that they do, we have had enough, we must burn them." The video evidence that finalised the guilt of Jantjies in the eyes of the court was of him standing around Silumko's burning body saying: "This is a dog, viva!" Another moment of extreme violence had arrived. What was not clear then is how much of a turning point it really was.
AFTERMATH

The search for the children, followed by crowd-police negotiations and the climax in the killings was the start of a day that Lt. Kritzinger said was very different from the heightened state of unrest that existed during that March-April period: "It was", he told the court, "in fact absolute chaos." The shift that day never ended at 18h00 - Major Theron only went off duty at 2am the next morning. Badela's description captures, once again, what followed the killings and how little the police were really able to do:

"The crowd moved towards the homes of policemen in the township. The hunted the streets for several hours, searching for other symbols of oppression. By 4pm, more than a dozen policemen's homes had been destroyed. The policemen themselves had moved their furniture and possessions while Kinikini was burning. ... For the next two days, police were unable to enter the township. It was a no-go area - all police could do was hover the area in a helicopter, powerless to act. It was a day to remember: the first necklace killings in South Africa. It was the culmination of a spiral of violence that had been building for months in the two Uitenhage townships of KwaNobuhle and Langa."

By the end of the weekend, the houses and numerous businesses that once belonged to Benjamin Kinikini and Jimmy Claassens lay in smoldering ruins. Jimmy, his family, what was left of the Kinikini family and many black policemen and their families fled the township. They were given a disused building in the white suburbs of what was once the prestigious Innes Primary School to sleep in. By mid-April the homes of some 30 policemen and police reservists had been gutted.

And then, as a kind of reminder of where it all began, the funeral of those who were supposed to have been buried on 21st March took place on Sunday 24th in KwaNobuhle.
CONCLUSION

The transformation of a small crudely armed search party led by people like Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto into a large highly mobilised violent crowd has been explained in terms of a chain of events that were simultaneously contextual and fortuitous. Contextual because the individuals and forces that created these events were the product of their context. There was Jimmy and the Peacemakers, the vigilantes who had hitherto acted as extra-legal extensions of the local authority and the local police. But on the 23rd they acted in a way that, in the aftermath of the Langa massacre, finally triggered a community reaction that the police could not cope with. The policemen were over-extended, badly briefed and untrained to manage themselves out of a conundrum that was partly the result of their alliance with Claassens and Kinikini, and partly a response to the Langa massacre. And then there was the Kinikini family: as defenders of the council, they were as unpopular as other councillors; but with Benjamin being seen as a hard-liner who refused to resign when the other councillors did and as someone who represented the violent wing of that whole group of "sellouts", they were predictable targets. Finally, there was the crowd and its different elements. From the small group concerned about the children, to people like Jantjies and others like him, the crowd's reactions were clearly shaped by the economic and political context described in preceding chapters. After all, it was this context that defined the targets of those who threw the stones, propelled the petrol bombs, assaulted the victims and lit the tyres dowsed in petrol.

But these events were also fortuitous. A close look at the key moments in the chain of events - from the moment the first reports came into the temporary base that the Peacemakers had abducted children to that final moment when the Kinikini group climbed out of the window and faced the crowd - reveals a certain contingent unpredictability. It is only possible to speculate about what would have happened if the following things had played out even slightly differently: the misinformation that the children were in the fridge, the lack of coordination between Theron and Kritzinger, the tactically disastrous decisions to disperse the crowd on two occasions, the failure by whoever took Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto to the temporary base to release the children there and then so that they could have been brought back to the crowd, and then the final absence from the immediate vicinity of key security vehicles.
In the finally analysis, the power relations that have been unraveled in this case study reveal how, even at this level of detail, it is possible discern the way the decisions and activities of those with authority and coercive power created dynamics that shaped the nature of crowd formation and action, and how crowd action reacted back on authority. This case, however, this dynamic ended in extreme crowd violence that effectively transformed the balance of power. As the next chapters show, this moment may have brought to a brutal end one constellation of power relations, but it was also the beginn of another completely new configuration of forces.

1. Lawrence, P., "A Macabre Procession of the Damned", Weekly Mail, 4-10 September, 1987, p.14; for details on how people were hung during this period, see Belcker, J., Inside South Africa's Death Row, Johannesburg, Black Sash, 1986.

2. From March 1985, 'necklacing' was the name given to the increasingly frequent practice of murdering or burning someone by putting a tyre around their heads, dowsing it in petrol and lighting it.

3. Most of the trial that led to the conviction of Jantjies, Mielies and their co-accused was taken up with what was called a "trial-within-a-trial" that revolved around the admissibility of the statements made by the accused after their arrest. The defense argued that the statements were invalid because they were made under duress, i.e. torture. In the end, the judge ruled that they were admissible. So despite the fact that the accused pleaded not guilty, it was only these statements that implicated them. This author will accept the version of the accused to the effect that they were tortured into making statements that implicated them because it is now accepted that as a general rule this is how the SAP handled its prisoners. This, however, does not detract from the version of events that emerged from other witnesses, as well as from these statements because what was at issue was not the events themselves, but the statements by the accused that located the accused in those events.

4. Transcript of Judgment in the case of The State versus Sydwell T Mpumlo & Others, Supreme Court, South Eastern Cape Local Division, Case Number CC582/85.


6. Although the use of court records as empirical evidence for sociological analysis has not been extensively debated in South Africa, it is common practice by historians. In this case, the actual events were largely common cause between the defense and prosecution; what was disputed was the nature of the relationship between the accused, these events and state witnesses who were involved in the events. This relationship, however, is not what is of major concern in this chapter because this chapter is about what happened, and not about who did it and whether they were guilty or not.


12. See Straker, et.al., op. cit. for the best overview of the dynamics of these processes, based on a set of events that took place in Leandra township in the Eastern Transvaal.


15. Trial Record, *State versus S.T. Mpumlo and Others, Supreme Court, Eastern Cape Division, Case Number CC582/85*, vol.58, 3912ff. (All references to this trial record will henceforth be referred to simply by reference to the volume number and page.) Although he disputed his involvement in the actual abductions that morning, notorious Peacemaker Dumse Nogcaza admitted that Jimmy did use his bakkie that morning to take a group of youths to the 'barracks'. What precisely happened to the children between the time of them being beaten and being released some time in the late morning from the Uitenhage police station was a matter of considerable dispute between the prosecution and the defense. These events, however, are of less interest for this chapter because it was more what the crowd thought was happening than what was actually happening that is of interest. (Dumse Nogcaza was later to turn state witness - the secret "Witness D" - during the trial to provide the state's only eyewitness as to the presence of the accused in the crowd that assaulted the Kinikinis.)

16. vol. 3, 103
17. vol. 5, 194
18. vol. 22, 1215
19. vol. 21, 1160
20. vol. 5, 237
21. Major Theron, for example, never knew that Lt. Kritzinger was in KwaNobuhle and therefore no coordinated strategy was possible.
22. vol. 21, 1131
23. See Chapter 4
24. vol. 16, 887
25. vol. 9, 415
26. vol. 10, 526
27. This was the man that Judge Mullins chose to believe entirely and on this basis sent two young men to the gallows.
28. Record of Judgment in the case *State versus S.T. Mpumlo and Others, Supreme Court, Eastern Cape Division, Case Number CC582/85*, (henceforth referred to as Judgment), p.20.
29. A "toyi-toyi" is the word used to describe the rhythmic march-cum-dance that was done by groups of "comrades" while singing freedom songs.
30. vol. 20, 1046
31. vol. 9, 466-474
32. vol. 22, 1212ff.
33. vol. 21, 1132ff.
34. vol. 8, 374
35. Statement to the court by Moses Jantjies, Judgment, 41.
36. Hand-written notes from an interview conducted by Thole Majodina who was Jantjies' lawyer in preparation for a clemency plea. The profile of Jantjies that follows is drawn from these notes.
37. Straker et.al., op. cit., 132-133.
38. Although only Dumse referred to the weather in his testimony, the Weather Bureau recordings for the day confirm that it was cloudy and raining in the early morning; personal communication with the Weather Bureau, 4.10.93.
39. vol. 21, 1132; vol.16, 893ff; vol. 9, 466-74
40. It is being assumed here that the phone calls made to Sgt. Loubscher were by people who were either part of or linked to the crowd (e.g. a nearby house, etc).
41. vol. 16, 893ff.
42. vol. 21, 1132ff.
Reconstructed from the testimony of Lt. Kritzinger and Constable April, vol. 21, 1032ff & vol. 16, 893ff. Although contradicted by Major Theron's evidence, Kritzinger's evidence is confirmed repeatedly by Dumse, other policemen and members of the crowd. Judge Mullins also found that Kritzinger's version was correct.

The Judge's finding that the dispersal took place before Kritzinger arrived (Judgment, 19-20) seems implausible because the only source of this information was Dumse, but Dumse also said that this dispersal took place after the search of the "barracks", i.e. after Kritzinger was on the scene. It seems more plausible that the policemen, worried that dispersal of the crowd may have been responsible for turning it violent, wanted to make sure they were not seen as having given the order to disperse. Hence both Theron and Kritzinger insisted that the crowd was peaceful and unthreatening to the police, but violent later on and by implication after the dispersal. This mistaken judgment by Judge Mullins probably derives from his almost obsessive determination to accept everything said by state witness Dumse as the truth.

The process that Theron was involved in is reconstructed mainly from his evidence, but cross-referenced with other accounts, vol. 5, 242ff.

This episode was never acceded to by the prosecution, nor was it admitted by police witnesses or accepted by the Judge. From both the court record and verbal accounts heard by the author, there is a good chance this episode did in fact take place. Whether it did or not, however, does not affect the process of crowd formation.

Record of Matter between S.T. Mpumlo and Others and the State, Supreme Court, Appellate Division, p.162 (henceforth referred to as "Appeal").

It was at this moment that Mono Badela, a City Press journalist, arrived after having been called by one of the "comrades" who said to him "things are bad - come quickly". Badela was one of the few independent eyewitnesses of the events that followed, see Badela, M., "The weeks of rage that led to that first necklace death", Weekly Mail, 4-20 September, 1987.

The first report on the attack on the Kinikini house came in at 11h45, which means the attack took place shortly before this, vol. 8, 380 and vol. 22, 1305.

Because Dumse Nogcaza was the only survivor of the attack on the barracks, it is on his testimony that the account of what actually happened is based. His account of the sequence of events, however, is largely confirmed by verbal evidence from prosecution and defense witnesses as well as by video material and the accounts of independent witnesses (see Badela, op. cit.). Dumse's testimony appears in vol. 9, 466 - vol. 12, 650. Unless otherwise indicated, the account is drawn from Dumse's evidence in chief, vol. 9, 466-500.
This never emerged as a key issue during the court case for reasons that are due, in this author's opinion, to neglect on the part of both the prosecution and defense.
CHAPTER 7

"BECAUSE YOUR YARD IS TOO BIG": THE POLITICS OF SQUATTER STRUGGLES

"I will build my shack right in the back yard of the white man's house. And when he wakes up the next morning and asks why I have built a shack in his yard, I'll say: 'Because your yard is too big.'" - Langa Resident

INTRODUCTION

By focusing largely on the struggle Langa's squatters waged against forced removal, this chapter will attempt to analyse the complex interactions between local township administrators, the white establishment, employers, community organisations and trade unions. To understand this complexity, the romantic conception of unstratified communities united against a monolithic state needs to be jettisoned. Instead, the internal workings of both the social movements and state apparatuses must be studied. This cannot be achieved, however, without taking into account the impact social movements have on the state and how the actions of state officials affect the strategies of social movements. Furthermore, this relationship does not exist outside the influence employer interests exert on the local state and the way this influence is mediated by trade union pressure.

As this chapter will show, once the object of study is extended in this way, social processes come to light that call into question two teleologies. The first is the optimistic view that social movements are only important to the extent that they contribute to the build-up of a national movement that will, at some moment in the future, detonate the collapse of the state. This basic revolutionary tenet has a long tradition in South African theory. After a useful review Colin Bundy sums up this conception of a "revolutionary seizure of power" by arguing that "this will happen only if those who seek transformation from below can construct organisational means to their ends, so as to link mass actions and effective leadership; if appropriate strategies are devised in the interplay between theory and practice, and if the armed forces of the state can to a degree be neutralised."1
The second is the pessimistic view that social movements only win those concessions that structural conditions allow ruling class interests to concede. In both cases, the impact of local movements and how they determine the terms of social organisation is ignored. For the former, the structure of society will only be transformed when the moment of revolution arrives and not before. As far as the latter is concerned, any changes that do take place, occur on terms determined almost entirely by the ruling class.

The struggle of Langa's squatters helps demonstrate that concessions can be won prior to the moment of fundamental change and that these changes did not take place entirely on terms determined by the interests of the dominant classes. Instead, the differential responses within the state and the complexities of responses from differentiated interests within 'the community' led to outcomes that could not have been predicted from the outset from a reading of structural conditions. These patterns in the case of Langa that are studied in this and the next chapter confirm the findings of Morris and Sapire which were based on similar experiences elsewhere in the country. This chapter will deal with the political conditions that led to the beginnings of what was one of the country's first "local-level negotiations". The analysis, however, extends into the next chapter where a detailed analysis of these negotiations is provided.

To anticipate the argument in this and the next chapter, there were in fact five aspects of Langa's pattern and form of political mobilisation and organisation that determined its impact on the strategic thinking of the representatives of the local state and local business. Firstly, and most importantly from a symbolic point of view, there was the Langa Massacre. This generated enough national and international attention to prompt the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. Secondly, Langa had become one of the most organised communities in the Eastern Cape. Thirdly, Langa's squatters had begun to construct their shacks in a way that made police patrols impossible, thus effectively rendering parts of the community, in the words of a local policeman, "uncontrollable". Fourthly, the community leaders were prepared to enter the risky area of negotiations. Finally, by forging unity between community organisations, youth movements and trade unions, and then using this to force business to support key community demands, the Langa community significantly increased pressure on sections of the state to address its grievances.
The power mobilised by the social movement was enhanced by tensions within and between the state apparatuses and employer organisations. The collapse of the Council of the KTC, trade union and international pressure on Volkswagen, right-wing political tendencies in the white community and tensions between local and central state representatives and between these and the security forces, all played themselves out in ways that initially gave the social movement space to win some key victories. However, as chapter 9 will show, these forces eventually lined up behind a coercive option after the declaration of the 1986 State of Emergency that led to the decimation of the social movement.

FROM MOBILISATION TO MASS ORGANISATION

The massacre, the revenge on Kinikini and rising levels of conflict between the community and security forces in Langa, transformed popular consciousness. As thousands flocked to join community organisations, the activists had to find new creative ways of coping with a mass base in the context of heightened repression.

It has been reliably calculated that a total of 140 people died in politically related incidents in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area during 1985. This was higher than any other region. Significantly, although 20 were killed in the Langa massacre, the number of deaths in March was 52 - the highest for any month. This means that another 32 people were killed in that month, most of them in Uitenhage. This is just one indicator of the intensity of political violence in Uitenhage's townships after the massacre. The number of violent "incidents" however, is a superficial measure of resistance. More important is the extent to which different layers of the community were being mobilised. The most significant feature of the post-massacre period was the rapid mobilisation and organisation of different constituencies; a process which was uneven, frequently undirected and often contradictory. It was this process that transformed daily life in Uitenhage's townships as schools, factories, community halls, shebeens and shacks all became abodes for the relentless struggle for control and power. Weza Made summed up the atmosphere when he said:

"People of Langa asked our leaders to go to Brigadier Swart to ask for the removal of the soldiers and SAP. People believe that if the soldiers and police force can be removed in our township, there will be no death and violence. The people
need peace. But there is no peace when there are people moving around us with guns. Uitenhage is the Ovambo of the Eastern Cape. What you hear about Ovambo, its happening in Uitenhage. Brutal killing of people, kidnappings, disappearances, lot of things. The people believe that what happens in a war zone is happening in Uitenhage - weapons, hippos, buffels and war vehicles."

Continuing the long-standing boycott of schools that began in 1984, the Uitenhage branch of COSAS continued to support school boycotts into 1985. The key demand of the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage schools was the release of 11 senior COSAS leaders. When 9 were released on bail after being charged with public violence on January 21st, the boycott was temporarily called off in Port Elizabeth. The Uitenhage branch of COSAS said it would not suspend the boycott until its nine demands had been met (see chapter 8). By mid-July, Uitenhage's schools were still empty. This hard-line position in Uitenhage can be explained in terms of the impact escalating violent clashes with the police was having on school pupils. In this context, the schools actually served contradictory purposes. On the one hand the schools movement could not be sustained if the boycott continued indefinitely because COSAS leaders lost direct contact with their base. On the other hand, schoolgoers were soft targets for frustrated policemen who saw every uniformed black youth as a potential rioter. Even though there may have been good reason to continue the boycott, it was an accepted fact that going to school even when there was no boycott was a high risk venture. It was in the context of this vicious circle that parents began to be drawn into the education struggle. Their desire to find some way of resolving the problem and the absence of channels for them to do so within the educational establishment gave the Parents Committee the opportunity it had been waiting for to organise parents. By the end of the year, organised parents were playing a more important role than pupils in the education struggle.

Reflecting heightened levels of political consciousness, Uitenhage's factories, Volkswagen in particular, were hit by strikes in April. On Friday April 22nd at about 11.00 a.m., 3500 NAAWU workers downed tools at Volkswagen over wage demands. Some workers threatened to march down Uitenhage's main street, but a downpour of rain prevented this suggestion from being taken up. The issue at stake was directly related to
the recession: up until the end of 1984, an agreement was in force that provided for wage increases at six month intervals. Because of the recession, management claimed this agreement could not be renewed and that it intended increasing wages only every twelve months. NAAWU rejected this by pointing out that this would result in wage increases falling below the Consumer Price Index. To prevent this, NAAWU demanded increases of between 20 and 27%. Underlying this conflict was another struggle related to control over the bargaining process. Following the example of NAAWU workers at East London's Mercedes Benz plant who won a 21% increase in the minimum wage through plant-level bargaining, VW workers demanded direct negotiations with management outside the Industrial Council. After initially refusing to accept this, management agreed after the strike went into its second day. Besides wage demands, Uitenhage's workers were also demanding a reduction of the working week from 45 to 40 hours, new job security provisions, paid public holidays including May Day, and paid maternity leave.

Throughout the year many of Uitenhage's factories were hit by go-slows, stoppages and strikes. This workplace resistance reflected the spread of a new militancy amongst workers in both organised and unorganised factories. Significantly, a number of Uitenhage factories observed the FOSATU call for solidarity action on May 14th in protest against the death of Andries Raditsela, a Transvaal unionist. Like the stayaways surrounding the massacre, this was another sign that political grievances were bound to spill over into the factories. Much would depend, however, on how relations with constituencies who had much less to lose than a job or a house would be worked out.

The so-called "youth" were the most potent force to emerge from the battles of township resistance during 1984-86. In Uitenhage the "youth" became important in a number of roles, i.e. defense, door-to-door organisation, ideological direction and crime control. Although the details of youth organisation will be dealt with in a later section, it is necessary at this stage to unpack the rather amorphous meaning of the word "youth". In general, the "youth" in township political culture refers roughly to a political generation that lies somewhere between the school pupils and employed workers. There are, however, important overlaps. In the Uitenhage area, those who constituted the "youth" can be divided into roughly 3 categories. The leadership of the youth congress came essentially
from a fairly well educated group of young workers, unemployed young men and students. It was largely male and most were in their mid twenties. This group had a remarkably clear political ideology derived from a reading of the alternative media, banned literature (usually ANC material) and some well used Marxist texts (especially Lenin) published by Progress and Lawrence and Wishart. Other influences included regional or national gatherings, workshops and discussions with leaders or old timers from the 1950s. Many of these people remembered 1976 and the leaders of that period as important early political experiences.

There was a relatively small group of young employed workers involved in the youth movement. Although this group overlapped in obvious ways with the formal employed working class constituency, it did nevertheless constitute an important grouping active in both youth congress and trade union activities. As such, it helped bridge differences later on.

From the perspective of sheer numbers, the most important component of the "youth" were the largely uneducated unemployed. These people were the product of prolonged school boycotts that had forced them out onto the streets, age limit restrictions and structural unemployment. Exacerbating this was the fact that because there were no schools in Langa for Africans, it was frequently too expensive for the poorest parents to afford the busfares pupils required to travel to KwaNobuhle. All these pressures produced desperate young men who lived on the fringes of legality and who soon found a home in the social movements as political increased. Their ages ranged from early teens and later twenties. A large number came from extremely poor families who lived in shacks and whose main breadwinner would invariably be unemployed. Interestingly, some of the more renowned members of this group came from families who had strong rural links and still displayed traditional dress and make-up, such as ochre-painted faces and headdresses.

Out of this "lumpenproletariat" came essentially two types of political actors. The one was the person who had for some time been a petty criminal and came into the social movements largely because by adopting an anti-state resistance ideology he could legitimise his illegal activities and define his actions as being in the interests of the community. Their anti-social sub-culture and predisposition to use violence to give effect to
policy decisions existed uncomfortably alongside the social and communal morality that imbued the ideology of national resistance and their own desire to be re-absorbed into the community. Prior to the hegemony of "liberation", it was these same kinds of people who were members of the Peacemakers who comfortably reinforced the dominance of criminal, petty accumulator and Councillor interests. However, there were elements in the amabutho who were the products of the schools movement rather than lumpen groups and they joined the amabutho for very different reasons. Because they were more articulate, they often became the "military commanders".

On the surface it seems incorrect to lump the young ideologues and unionists into the same category as the much less educated 'more militaristic' unemployed. However, these social categories were bound together by the ideology propounded by the youth congress leadership. The leaders, ideologues and young workers were defined as leading the "political wing" of the movement, while the less articulate, poorer unemployed youths soon formed themselves into a "military wing" comprised of fairly disciplined action groups - called "amabutho" - with a separate leading body called the "Military Council". Although these "wings" were a recipe for tension, the political leadership attempted to retain the loyalty of the amabutho by appealing to them to respect the political leadership in the same way that MK was subordinate to the ANC.12

Finally, there was the constituency loosely referred to in township political jargon as "the residents". Obviously this group also overlapped with the employed working class and "youth" constituencies, but given an unemployment rate of at least 56% - a figure that was usually based on the grossly inadequate records of job seekers13 - there was obviously a sizable proportion of family heads who were unemployed.14 The residents of Langa, then, were those employed and unemployed working class people who were responsible for the reproduction of their households including the construction of shelter which, in most cases, consisted of shacks. White opposition to the existence and spread of Langa soon mobilised the residents into tightly structured organisations aimed at "protecting the community".

After the massacre, community organisations experienced a huge inflow
of members and for the first time, mass-based grassroots structures were established. Two interlinked forms of organisation emerged. To represent specific constituencies, there were a range of constituency-based organisations. These included UYCO, Uitenhage Women's Organisation (UWO), Uitenhage Students Congress (USCO), Uitenhage Parents Crisis Committee, Uitenhage Traders Association, Consumer Boycott Committee and trade unions. In January 1986 the Uitenhage Residents Civic Organisation (URECO) was formed specifically to take up "civic" issues, a function that UYCO had been fulfilling up until then. Alongside the constituency-based structures, locality-based multi-constituency structures emerged, namely the street and area committees. By the end of 1985, nearly all Langa's streets had street committees which in turn elected representatives to five area committees. Whereas the actual membership of the street committees varied in size, the area committees stabilised at about ten members each (more on this later).

The first community-based campaign that was mounted after the massacre was the consumer boycott. Although originating from within the youth congress, the initial boycotts gained support. Uitenhage experienced more consumer boycotts than any other town during the 1985-86 period. Consumer boycotts were called for the following periods:

* April-July 1985;
* late July - late September 1985;
* resumes two weeks later and ends 14th December 1985;

The first boycott was a direct response to the massacre and reflected the growing strength of the community organisations as large numbers became actively involved. The success of the first three boycotts, according to press reports, varied from between 70% and 100%. However, the last one was relatively unsuccessful with less than 50% support.

The consumer boycott demands can be divided into local and national ones. The local ones were: students be allowed to form SRCs; reinstatement of dismissed workers at Volkswagen; upgrade rather than removal of Langa. The national demands were release of detainees; unbanning of UDF meetings; withdrawal of troops; killers of CRADOCK leaders be charged (added in July)\textsuperscript{15}; leaders must not be killed, kidnapped or harassed.
Unlike the Port Elizabeth boycott, the Uitenhage boycott was not nearly as successful, nor did it have as dramatic an impact. There were four reasons for this: firstly, unlike most Eastern Cape towns, Uitenhage's african community was located in two townships to the north (Langa) and south (KwaNobuhle) of the white town. This made it difficult to organise a united and synchronised response from the two communities because each faced very different problems related to the fact that in Langa people were poorer, black shops with appropriate goods were less available, the imperatives of the anti-removal struggle often conflicted with those of the largely KwaNobuhle led consumer boycott, and antagonisms between the youth and residents often produced a reaction against the boycott. Secondly, the trade unions never threw their full weight behind the boycotts. Thirdly, the consumer boycotts dragged on for too long without any meaningful concessions being won. Fourthly, Uitenhage did not have a local Chamber of Commerce imbued with the same liberal ideological bias that Tony Gilson and his colleagues gave the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce.

To emphasise the role of the youth in the boycotts, it must be pointed out that the militaristic sub-culture of the amabutho militated against the successful implementation of this strategy. Shaped by the dynamic of ongoing street battles with the security forces, the consciousness of the amabutho was not sensitive enough to the complex task of organisation, persuasion and tactical decision-making. Furthermore, FOSATU's controversial role in the magisterial decision to reverse the bannings that led to the massacre, created considerable tensions between amabutho groups and NAAWU workers. It was these tensions between the unemployed, unionised workers and residents that undercut the consumer boycott.

The rest of this chapter will show that it was the struggle over the terms of reproduction of the labour force rather than consumption or production struggles that was to facilitate the building of organisational unity in Uitenhage across community and workplace organisations. There is little truth in Glenn Adler's generalisation that in Uitenhage "working class responses to worsening social and economic conditions were at best completely uncoordinated during 1985, or at worst in direct conflict."16

After the councillors resigned en masse and ECAB began finding it
increasingly difficult to enter Langa to carry out administrative duties (e.g. rent collection, house repairs, garbage collection etc), responsibility for the development of the community fell onto the shoulders of the community organisations. Renewed efforts by Uitenhage's whites to secure the removal of Langa underlined the need for direction and leadership from the community organisations.

However, these organisations had no idea about how to proceed or what alternatives were available to them. This is how Weza Made summed up the dilemma facing community organisations by June 1985: "The first stage of our strategy was to force the councillors to resign. We succeeded. The second stage was to eliminate the black policemen from the townships. We succeeded. And now we don't know what to do." 17

The impossibility of emulating other "Third World" revolutionary strategies by creating liberated zones defended by permanent people's armies in South Africa's urban areas meant that popular organisations had two choices: either they could immediately take on the might of the state in a full frontal assault to "seize power", or they could reach an accommodation with the authorities to secure space to organise and consolidate their structures until this moment is reached. The first was not a realistic option because of the loyalty to the state and strength of the security forces and the regionally uneven nature of the national movement and the young underdeveloped condition of the local grassroots structures. Not surprisingly, in Langa, as elsewhere, this dynamic led community organisations into what was referred to as "people's power". "People's power" referred to a complex set of apparently contradictory activities including negotiations with authorities and businessmen on the one hand, and 'mass action' on the other. Reading this strategic choice correctly and then leading with an appropriate strategy was, in this context, a particularly difficult and often hazardous task for anyone in a leadership position. It was Weza Made who played a central role in leading Langa's community organisations into the unchartered territory of local-level negotiations.

Weza Made, the soft-spoken, intelligent, shy and slightly built man whose name was to become synonymous with the anti-removal campaigns of 1985-86, was 25 years old in 1985.18 He was born in Kabah on 15 February 1960 in a house on 4th Street. The first eight to nine years of his life were
spent in a one-roomed backyard unit behind a house on 5th Avenue that had been constructed for rental by a relatively well off businesswoman who owned the main house - ownership made possible by the fact that she was classified coloured, although she was a Xhosa from Cape Town. Weza lived with his grandmother, mother and younger sister (who died from illness early in his life.) He was nine years old when he started school in Kabah at the James Ndulula lower primary. He was living at the time with his grandmother's sister's family in a mud-built house on Nakani street. Although this was a big family that survived on the brink of starvation because the sole income was from his grandfather's job at Gubb and Ings, he fondly remembers that "there were very very good relationships among the family. We loved each other and we were happy ... despite such poverty and starvation... ." The house on Nakani Street and the James Ndulula school were demolished in 1969-70, victims of the first forced removals. By 1970 the household had been moved to Kwallobuhle and Weza was enrolled at the Alex Jayiya lower primary. Weza's mother, however, managed to escape removal to Kwallobuhle by getting a house in Macuba street.

Weza's most enduring memories of his childhood are of starvation and the struggle for food. He remembers hating school because he would often go there hungry and be unable to cope, only to be faced with severe and continuous beatings from his teachers who abused children that were seen as lazy and stupid. He eventually stopped going to school and he and others in a similar situation would go off into the forest to eat food they had stolen from their homes. Huts were built in the forest where they often stayed to escape from the brutalities and misery of school, home and the streets. They formed relationships with the young men who spent time in the forest going through their circumcision and initiation into manhood ceremonies - in return for food they would run errands for these young men and the older mentors that ran the circumcision camps. They also kept themselves alive by picking the berries and beans off the hedges that grew on the fences of certain houses which they then sold to the Indian traders in town. It was the money from these transactions that was used by the boys to go to the cinema, or to buy bread and pilchards - their favorite food.

He got his first break while he was still at school in KwaNobuhle when a
young woman teacher began to encourage him to take his studies seriously. To keep him in school she brought him bread and butter each day - "I wanted that bread and butter, it was the only thing I went for at school." But he soon discovered that he had ability and began passing well until he came second in the school. He no longer had a reason to "dodge schooling".

When his grandfather died in 1972, a key breadwinner was lost to the family. Things got even worse for the household. One way he survived was to sell fish baked by his grandmother over the weekends. By 1974 his mother's financial position improved so she brought him back to Langa to live in her Macuba street home. He progressed well in school until 1977 when he encountered the harsh realities of the political struggle for the first time. It was on June 16 1977 when students from his school tried to organise other schools to commemorate the events that took place a year earlier in Soweto. The school was surrounded and before any action could be taken, large contingents of police invaded the school, beat up some students and arrested many more. Weza managed to escape. His school, however, was burnt down when members of the Mongrels and Mafia gangs joined forces with angry students and went on the rampage. After that, it was back to KwaNobuhle for Weza where he resumed school in 1978 and furthered his successful amateur soccer career. By 1980 he was working in Uitenhage's auto factories where he experienced a very different form of resistance, namely militant trade union action. By the mid-1980s he was unemployed, living in Langa and active in the Uitenhage Youth Congress.

REMOVAL AND THE SEARCH FOR A STRATEGY

The squatter's struggle against removal began in earnest in May 1985 after 350 white ratepayers signed a petition drafted by the deputy Mayor, Mr. Bokkie Human, to the deputy Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr. G de V Morrison. It called for the removal of Langa's squatters.

Refuting press reports that ECAB was planning the removal, the Director, Louis Koch, quickly pointed out that Langa fell under the jurisdiction of the KTC and that ECAB's only function was the technical provision of housing and infrastructure. On May 21st, Koch told a journalist that the
ECDB was giving "urgent attention" to the rehousing of Langa residents in KwaNobuhle. He said this was a decision made twenty years ago but because of a "lack of funds" this was not immediately feasible. Now 3000 sites had been completed and 520 houses were in various stages of completion. How many were going to afford these houses without a subsidy was a problem his Board had not yet resolved.

By this stage, however, KTC was not only defunct because the Council had resigned, but also because an Administrator had not yet been appointed. This bureaucratic confusion within the state was a crucial moment for the Langa community because it meant there was no coherent or capable authority that could respond immediately and with sufficient force to implement the demands of the white community. Nor was there sufficient agreement on the issue between the local NP MP and the Uitenhage municipality over how to deal with the issue. There is very little likelihood that Langa's community organisations could have instigated united resistance against removal if the state had acted immediately. In the event, bureaucratic confusion meant there was sufficient time and space for the community organisations to organise a response and develop appropriate organisational forms.

Soon after the press carried reports of the white petition, a meeting of 1800 people representing youth, student, women's and community organisations met on Sunday 26th May to discuss the threatened removal. Speakers from the floor repeatedly emphasised the injustice of the white call for the removal of Langa. One old man got up and said: "I will build my shack right in the back yard of the white man's house. And when he wakes up the next morning and asks why I have built a shack in his yard, I'll say: 'Because your yard is too big.'" The meeting called on the KTC to upgrade Langa and rejected the proposed removal. Made told a journalist:

"The people decided they will not be able to afford the high rents in KwaNobuhle. Most of the squatters are unemployed or on short-time. Most people are dependent on pensions and on money paid by their lodgers."

It was decided that a delegation should meet the KTC to inquire about plans to remove Langa. The delegation comprised youth congress, area committee and trade union representatives. Its leader was B. Haas (UYCO - KwaNobuhle), and the rest were W. Made (UYCO - Langa), B. Sandi (area
committees), S. Mandabana (MACWUSA), P. Speelman (area committees), G. Nojilama (area committees) and S. Nxusa (area committees). Significantly, this delegation excluded FOSATU unionists and the clergy.

Deftly exploiting the bureaucratic confusion in township administration, the spokesperson for the delegation, Weza Made, said that "since Mr. Louis Koch made it clear that he was not responsible for the removals and said that it was the council, we would like to ask Mr. Tini to clarify that comment." Made went on to say that the Sunday meeting had resolved to call on the KTC to upgrade rather than remove Langa, and to build "decent low-rent houses". According to Made:

"The people decided they will not be able to afford the high rents in KwaNobuhle. Most of the squatters are unemployed or on short time. Most people are dependent on pensions and money paid by their lodgers. The people are aware that living conditions in the area are bad in terms of health. But the people [have] asked the town clerk to develop the area and make it healthier."25

When the press contacted Tini, he referred all questions to the town clerk claiming he had disassociated himself from the council. Coetzee, speaking for the KTC, said that he had received no requests from the community to upgrade Langa. He said: "If I receive such a request I will evaluate it and discuss it with the Department of Cooperation and Development. Those concerned may either come and see me or put their request in writing." Before Langa is removed, he claimed, a long negotiation process would have to be completed:

"I must first find out what the people want. I'm not going to force anyone to move."26

Coetzee maintained that KTC was doing three things to control squatters: firstly, it had already prepared 3 000 sites in KwaNobuhle but was planning to more than double this number to cater for Langa's "6 600" squatter families. Secondly, strict measures were being taken to ensure that no new squatter families arrived in Langa. Thirdly, illegal residents were being warned to move out but no-one was being fined or prosecuted. Fourthly, steps still needed to be taken to "clear" shacks that had been erected on roads thus barring the path of sanitation and refuse removal trucks.
The delegation met the officials on 11 June 1985 at 3.30 in the Langa offices of the KTC. The officials were J. Coetzee (town clerk), P. Veldtman (acting deputy secretary), S. Somtsewu (superintendent of Langa), and R.D. Basson (administration officer). (Barry Erasmus was not present because he had yet to be appointed as Administrator.)

The meeting, which lasted an hour and forty minutes, never got much further than both parties stating their respective cases. However, it started with both parties applauding the fact that such a meeting had taken place. Coetzee thanked the delegation for initiating the meeting and proposed that such meetings take place on a regular basis. He pointed out that whereas meetings of this sort were impossible in the past because the councillors had prevented him from meeting community representatives, in future he would be prepared to meet any group regardless of their "political attitudes" provided they were genuinely concerned about the welfare of the community. Haas, in turn, thanked the officials for the meeting and expressed his appreciation of the view that the basis of such meetings should be community problems rather than political affiliation.

Despite their promise not to forcibly remove anyone, the officials strongly urged people to move to KwaNobuhle Extension IV because services are better and houses can be purchased there. The delegation reiterated their opposition to forced removal. However, there was a significant difference between what KwaNobuhle and Langa representatives respectively were saying. Whereas the KwaNobuhle representatives argued that people would probably move if they could afford the rentals and were convinced that conditions were improved, the Langa representatives insisted that Langa residents were only interested in the upgrading and retention of Langa.

Some key issues were discussed during the course of this meeting. Firstly, in response to the claim by the delegation that Langa residents do not want to move because they believe they cannot afford the rents in KwaNobuhle, the officials spent some time explaining the affordability advantages of moving to KwaNobuhle. These included, (a) a built-in R63.81 subsidy per site to be carried by the government so that service charges could be pegged at R19.90 per month; (b) rentals calculated according to income on a sliding scale; (c) the right to purchase a house for R6794 + R160 (for 99-year leasehold) + R6.00 (administration cost). As far as the officials were
concerned, all employed people should have been able to afford these rates.

Mandabana and Made both responded by asking what plans existed for unemployed or retrenched workers. Coetzee said that although a blanket policy exempting unemployed people from payments does not exist, each case would be dealt with on its merits and with sympathy. He strongly emphasized that evictions were not an answer. Nevertheless, the unemployed clearly never figured in official planning, something the delegation was quick to notice.

Secondly, the question of upgrading was discussed. The delegation argued that the houses under construction in KwaNobuhle should be made available for homeless people living in KwaNobuhle and that Langa should be retained and upgraded to cater for the Langa residents. Coetzee said he supported the idea in principle but gave reasons why the upgrading of Langa was practically not possible: (a) Langa was only big enough for 2000 sites, whereas 8000 were needed; (b) no funds were available to cover the high costs of upgrading Langa's infrastructure; (c) there is no adjacent land into which Langa could expand; (d) in situ upgrading was impossible.

In response to Coetzee's insistence that the upgrading of Langa was practically impossible, Made explained that the majority wanted to remain in Langa and suggested that existing services be upgraded. Mandobana submitted there is enough land in and around Langa to accommodate all the people if the Group Areas Act was ignored. Made pointed out that "peace would not be restored" in Langa as long as there were poor living conditions. He strongly urged Coetzee to convey to the government Langa's request to be upgraded. Coetzee promised at the end of the meeting to submit a report to the government.

The importance of the land issue was brought home to the delegation during the meeting, prompting Made to coin a phrase that he used often in the months to follow: "The squatter's struggle is a struggle for land." More importantly, the leaders realised how seriously the officials took the community's capacity to resist. Made's implicit threat that confrontation and unrest would result from removal pointed to the only real form of leverage the community had over the KTC.
Thirdly, the delegation expressed grievances about existing conditions: high bus tariffs, no lower primary school facilities which meant parents had to pay high busfares to send children to schools in KwaNobuhle, no street lights or highmast lighting and the poor condition of Maduna Rd.

Fourthly, in response to Haas' argument that some Langa people wanted to move to KwaNobuhle but were prevented because of an inability to pay the rent/service charges there, Coetzee suggested that with the help of the delegation and the residents he would conduct a survey to determine the housing needs of the community. This would have involved finding out how many wanted serviced sites only, how many wanted the Council to obtain loans for them to erect houses on their behalf, how many were assisted by employers and how many could afford to take out a bond. Coetzee's request that the delegation work with him on this matter displayed how seriously the authorities took the extra-state community leadership at a time when official policy was to define such people as revolutionary agitators bent on overthrowing state power. It also pointed to the mechanisms that could have been used to draw this leadership into a de facto Crossroads-type administrative structure.28

Towards the end of the meeting, Coetzee summed up the situation by saying the committee has to decide which option was in the best interests of the community: remaining in Langa and bearing the cost of upgrading it, or moving to KwaNobuhle where sites have already been prepared at very low cost. The delegation responded by saying that it had no mandate to make that choice. It was only there to communicate the demands of the community and intended returning to discuss the outcome of the meeting with the community.

The meeting ended with both parties agreeing on the usefulness of the meeting and on the necessity for meeting again. However, the conclusion of the meeting left both sides in limbo. The officials were deeply suspicious of the delegation's insistence that it had no power to make a decision and required a mandate. Displaying a fundamental misunderstanding of democracy and how things worked in the extra-state organisations, they interpreted this as a sign of weakness and concluded that if these leaders were so unsure of what their people wanted that they had to go back and "consult", this must mean they are not the "real leaders".29 Over and above the ignorance this view displayed, by making
this comment the officials were in fact admitting how they judged the representivity of black leadership in the absence of legitimate institutionalised representative mechanisms.

As far as the delegation was concerned, they were well aware of the fact that a choice in economic terms had to be made about which option was in the best interests of the community. However, they had no way of making such a calculation. They were well aware of the dangers of either depending on the "expertise" of the officials or simply rejecting the KwaNobuhle option without offering an alternative to the community. It was to resolve the above dilemma that Made and a few of his comrades decided to seek professional assistance in Johannesburg.

Through friends, Weza Made and his comrades made contact with various support groups and press reporters. These groups pledged their support for Langa’s anti-removal struggle and during the coming months he was to work closely with academics connected to the Durban-based Built Environment Support Group (BESG), Sue Lund of the Grahamstown Rural Committee (GRC), Mono Badela of City Press and a group of Johannesburg-based professionals who later formed PLANACT. Resulting from discussions with members of these groups, Made proposed that the community organisations initiate their own upgrading proposals as an alternative to the removal plans of KTC. A group of Natal, Johannesburg and Grahamstown academics were assembled and plans made to travel to Uitenhage in late July to assess the viability of this suggestion. However, these plans were aborted when a State of Emergency was declared in July.

By June-July, the leadership was faced with a range of related problems that demanded organisational solutions. These included: (a) appropriate means of defense against both official repression and vigilante action; (b) the necessity for finding ways of re-organising to cope with expanding membership and rising levels of mobilisation; (c) how extra-state organisations could move beyond reaction and boycott politics to proactive strategies aimed at resolving the crisis of daily life in the townships, i.e. the role of negotiations in particular. In other words, the leadership were searching for a balance between challenging the state, defending the community against repression and negotiating with officials to find solutions to local problems. At a national level, the UDF was faced with
similar problems and responded with the call "Mobilisation to Organisation. Protest to Challenge". However, the call for "ungovernability" - a popular slogan of the time - reflected more accurately the nature of popular politics in mid-1985: rising levels of mobilisation, violent attacks on councillors and police, collapse of township administration and spreading consumer boycotts. The declaration of the State of Emergency in July and the detention of the most established leaders, enabled the militant youth and their belief that violence must be met with violence, to take control of township politics. This pattern repeated itself in particularly violent ways in Langa.

**EMERGENCY RULE, UNGOVERNABILITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMABUTHO**

There is little doubt that the rising levels of police violence and community counter-violence in Uitenhage were related to the threat of removal. The youth squads by this stage were becoming increasingly organised. Whereas outsiders visiting other communities were greeted with the familiar clenched fist and pointed thumb sign accompanied by the shout "Amandla", in Uitenhage they were greeted with the call "Asiyi KwaNobuhle" ("We will not move to KwaNobuhle"). By July some of the youth squads were armed with stolen arms and captured R.1 rifles. They would agree amongst themselves who would stand guard at selected points, watching for any attempt to demolish shacks. They had their own quasi-military command structure and identity. Crude guerrilla tactics were devised to harass SADF-SAP patrols. The most famous was the "hippo trap". A hole longer than the length of a caspir and about four feet deep would be dug in the road. Sheets of corrugated iron were then placed over the hole and disguised with a layer of sand. The next unsuspecting caspir that came along would drop into the hole at which point a large contingent of crudely armed youths would pounce on the caspir from different sides. They would invariably be repulsed but, according to some sources, not before a number of stones and petrol bombs were thrown.

The white youth patrolling the townships in police caspiirs and army buffels were equally uncontrollable and extremely vicious. According to one soldier who staffed an army buffel in Langa during
July-August 1985, it was accepted practice that each caspir or buffel unit would beat up a black person at least once a day. This would invariably take the form of selecting a target who had pulled a fist or thrown a stone, chasing him down and then beating him up on the spot in front of the community. No arrests would be made. This meant that about seven to ten people were beaten up in Langa and KwaNobuhle each day if we assume there was an average of seven units patrolling the townships on a daily basis. Furthermore, informants insisted that they never carried teargas or rubber bullets.

During the height of the Emergency in about August-September 1985, reports of police brutality flowed into the Black Sash offices and churches. One story that was documented is worth repeating in full because it is representative of the many documented accounts that organisations such as the Black Sash accumulated.

"I was born on 3 March and am 18 years of age. On 15th September 1985 I attended the funeral of Lungile Nqgikashe at Despatch. The police were watching the funeral from a distance over the bridge. They were there from 10 am.

On our way back from the graveyard after we had buried Lungile, the police put a Hippo across the street where many of the people were returning home. They took me there and put me in the Hippo. I have the same mother as Lungile and I spoke at the church and at the grave.

Then the Hippo drove to the rent office in Despatch and I was put in a white police van. There were a number of policemen there - more than 6, but they were in different cars. Some of them were wearing uniform, some of them were in plain clothes. They were all whites.

When I was in the police van, the police sprayed teargas about three times through the mesh with aerosols. The van did not have windows. The teargas was too much because they sprayed it on my clothes and in my face. I was coughing and then I think I lost consciousness.

One of the cars that came to the police van before they put me
in it was a yellow Sierra. There were two white men in plain clothes inside. One of them hit me with the open hand a few times in the face. This policeman I know his face as a Uitenhage policeman, but do not know his name - accused me of being the leader of Despatch. They also asked me where I got my T-shirt. I said somebody at the funeral gave it to me there. It was a Uitenhage Youth Congress T-Shirt. Then I was taken to Swift grounds where the police have tents. This is where I was tortured.

They took me from the police van to another sergeant. He asked me where I bought my T-shirt. I said somebody gave it to me there at the funeral. Then they asked me what I said at the graveyard. Then I said to them I was doing a prayer there.

After that they took me to a tent. Then there was an iron there - they handcuffed me to the iron with my hands behind my back. Then they started to hit and kick me. There were four white men who were not in uniform. They kept on hitting me. The police left me standing there handcuffed to the iron bar. I think they went to eat. Then the same four men came back and started to hit me again. I lost consciousness. They put me in a police van and left me to sleep. They threw water into the van, and I had to sleep in the water. I stayed like this the whole night."

As conflict took its toll, a politicised culture emerged and spread through the community. The "toyi toyi" was the most visible manifestation of this culture. These were dances performed in the streets by large groups of mainly young people ranging in age from young children to people in their early twenties. It took the form of a slow forward moving jog accompanied by rhythmic freedom songs, most of which were about or in praise of armed resistance, the ANC and its leaders. Winding their way through the dusty dilapidated streets, these groups performed two crucial political functions: they absorbed into their ranks increasing numbers of young people and acted as effective means for communicating political messages on a regular basis. Given that the style of this communication was repetitive, relatively simple and widespread, it is not surprising that their depiction of the threat of removal was in terms of a white challenge
to the "unity" of the Langa community. It was this emotive rejection of removal, coupled to a political discourse of national anti-Apartheid resistance, that underlay the determination of many youth squads to meet violence with violence.33

Alongside the youth groups, street committees had begun to emerge as early as May in certain parts of Langa, i.e. some months before they were being written about in the press and before they were evident in other parts of the country (except, of course, in Cradock). Nevertheless, although ever-widening layers of the community were being politicised, the volatile and violent state of conflict between the security forces and youth squads militated against the organisational priorities of the activist leadership. The declaration of the State of Emergency forced them underground or into detention leaving the youth squads free to pursue their own voluntarist strategies.

When Made got to Johannesburg in mid-June, foremost in his mind was the rising level of violence in the township and its link to the threat of removal:

"We now have a problem in Langa. It is surrounded by the coloured area, the white area and the business sector area. The white people of Levyvale, they made a petition asking the government to remove the people from Langa to KwaNobuhle because they said in their petition that they feel unsafe. They said that KwaLanga is too near to them. The people of Langa asked the whites to stop demanding the removal of Langa and pointed out that it is the people of Langa who are unsafe from these white soldiers and SAPs who enter our township carrying guns, killing the people, killing the children and innocent people. But the people of KwaLanga never signed a petition about that."34

Another well-known KwaNobuhle-based UYCO activist was also in Johannesburg at this time. He presented a similar picture of escalating violence but went further to say that activists who still supported non-violent methods of organisation and resistance were finding it increasingly difficult to justify their position and even presence in the township. He told one of his friends in Soweto that he decided to come to Johannesburg after a crowd forced him to light the petrol of a "necklace"
after he voiced strong objections to that method of punishment.35

Although the position of the activist leadership became even more tenuous after the Emergency was declared in July, they were painfully aware at this stage - as were the national leadership - that unless "mass mobilisation" was turned into "mass organisation", struggle was in danger of degenerating into a straight military confrontation which the communities could never win.

For the next few months the Uitenhage leadership ceased to operate as a coherent force. Although some were detained (e.g. Haas), others disappeared underground. The only groups who remained organised and retained the capacity to mobilise opposition to the security forces were the amabutho. The trade unions concentrated on protecting the union's base in the face of mounting repression and increasingly politicised communities.

Rather than resolving Langa's problems, the State of Emergency exacerbated them. With the security forces and amabutho squads battling it out on the streets, the township administrators were unable to restore the council's authority and it was too risky for community activists to pursue above-ground legal organisational methods. Not surprisingly, negotiations on the removal question in this context were remote. In any case, Mr. Haas, the leader of the delegation that met KTC in June, was detained. The only communal response to the Emergency was the consumer boycott which was resumed in late July after being called off in early July. However, in the absence of an organisational infrastructure capable of coping at this stage with extreme repression and given the militarised nature of daily conflict, the renewed consumer boycott was coercively enforced by the amabutho who staffed "people's roadblocks" to "check" whether residents had purchased goods in town.

SHIFTING BATTLELINES, NEW TACTICS

As endemic violence continued, both the state and community organisations realised new strategies were required to move beyond this no-win situation. Whereas the state decided to proceed with the removals
in a more direct and purposive manner, the community activists attempted to establish new structures to cope with repression, removal and mass support.

By the end of October 1985 conditions began to change in two respects. Firstly, leaders began to re-emerge determined to operate underground in ways that kept them out of sight as far as the security forces were concerned, but in contact with their constituencies. Having monitored the methods and strategies of the security forces fairly closely so as to identify predictable patterns, the activists decided to re-emerge and operate in ways they thought least risky. This is when the street committees became crucially important as defensive structures. Secondly, and related to the new organising style of the activists, older residents began reacting to youth domination of township politics by establishing their own structures to represent their interests. This led to the spread of the street committees and the formation of Parents Crisis Committees in line with the national Soweto Parent’s Crisis Committee initiative to bring the schools boycott to an end.

The semi-underground activist leadership plugged into these street committee and parent’s initiatives because they supported the need to establish organisational bases capable of countering the power of the amabutho. What followed was an important series of conflicts over the control and direction of the street committees and Parents’ Committees as older residents and activists struggled to assert a less militaristic and non-voluntarist approach. Ironically, it was renewed attempts by KTC to evict 426 squatter families in October that galvanised older residents into action.

It was in this light that it became necessary for the leadership to find strategies to deal with new needs and pressures. These included space to organise; the need to reassert political authority to displace the dominance of the youth squads; concessions to sustain organisation; and defense against repression. This was the context that led key Langa leaders to the conclusion that firstly, negotiations with the local authority must be re-initiated; and secondly, that organisational structures must be decentralised along street committee lines, a particularly important step if the support of the older residents was to be retained.36

By late September the KTC and its Administrator, Barry Erasmus, appointed on 13th September, was caught between two contradictory pressures. Firstly,
the Uitenhage municipality, responding to renewed demands from its white ratepayers for the removal of Langa, was becoming increasingly insistent that KTC do something about the expanding squatter camp. To increase its pressure on KTC, the Uitenhage municipality appealed to Minister Heunis at the National Party's congress held in Port Elizabeth in September, to intervene directly on its behalf. Secondly, the continued unrest in Langa that repressive tactics seemed unable to quell, virtually brought daily township administration to a standstill. This enabled incoming squatters to erect shacks in the 4th-9th Avenue area (more on this later) thus fueling white opposition to the continued existence of Langa. KTC realised that a resolution to the squatter problem was impossible without bringing an end to the unrest.

It took the KTC until September to work out a clear strategy because of bureaucratic confusion within the local state. Although Erasmus was formally appointed as Administrator on 13th September in terms of the Law on Co-operation and Development Second Amendment Act, he had been what Heunis called an "advisor" to KTC's town clerk since June, i.e. one month after his early retirement from Uitenhage Municipality where he had been town clerk. Furthermore, lines of authority were unclear because responsibility for Black Local Authorities was transferred to the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning in July following the cabinet reshuffle that finally dismantled that old Verwoerdian empire, namely the Department of Cooperation and Development (formerly the infamous Department of Native Affairs).

Significantly, Erasmus said he turned down the offer of a senior management position at Volkswagen in order to accept his post. This points to a link between Erasmus and Volkswagen that was to crucially affect the outcome of the Langa struggle later on.
Main Squatter Areas in Langa

Map 7.1

Contested 3rd to 9th Avenue Area

Source: Representation of existing land occupation pattern on official map of the area from East Cape L.A.V. Development Board, Survey Department, 1985.
As the bureaucratic dust began to settle, KTC devised two strategies to deal with the pressures it was facing - one coercive and the other concessionary. The concessionary response arose out of a memorandum that Coetzee sent to the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (DCDP) reporting the demands expressed by the Langa delegation that met KTC in June. Responding to the community's strong demand for upgrading, the DCDP appointed a special Task Group to investigate the Langa problem and its existence was publicly announced by Heunis at the NP Congress.40 The Task Group comprised members of various government departments including the police and army, Barry Erasmus and was chaired by Dr. Scheepers, deputy director-general of the DCDP. The Task Group's brief was to investigate the feasibility of upgrading the area between 22nd and 9th avenues and to compile a Guide Plan.

Two points must be noted: firstly, the fact that squatting was only taking place between 22nd and 9th avenues up until June, and that the Task Group's brief was limited to this area, meant that no account was taken of how rapidly the shack settlement was growing. This meant that agreements reached in June were irrelevant by October when literally hundreds more shacks had been erected. Secondly, the Pretoria-based state engineer who worked on the project was told to operate within a conventional planning framework which was deeply hostile to the concept of in situ squatter upgrading along lines proposed by the Urban Foundation.42 Nevertheless, the seniority of the chairperson bears testimony to the importance attached to the Langa problem.

It was also at this point that the NP MP for Uitenhage, a Mr. D. Le Roux, got directly involved in the Langa problem. Le Roux was a large, extremely confident and bright man in his late thirties. He was the senior partner of the most prestigious firm of Uitenhage attorneys whose offices are located in the old colonial magistrate's building, complete with palm trees and colonnades at the entrance. His office was lined with hunting trophies, pictures of Afrikaner ancestors and of his old rugby and university teams. His firm acted for the KwaNobuhle Town Council and because Erasmus used to be Uitenhage's Town Clerk, Le Roux knew him intimately. Together Le Roux and Erasmus made up a formidable duo of skillful
manipulators.

Although KTC's coercive response was formulated in a private caucus between Le Roux and Erasmus, it was formally recorded at a meeting of "the council" (i.e. Coetzee and Erasmus) held on 30th September 1985, shortly after the NP Congress. On this occasion, a resolution was taken to empower the Town Clerk to instruct the KTC's attorneys to institute an action or alternatively an Application in the Supreme Court to secure the "removal of all illegal shacks/homes and/or structures in and the eviction of all persons living in the area between 9th avenue ... and 4th". 43 Having chosen not to go for a Supreme Court Application, on 8 October KTC served eviction notices on 426 squatters living between 9th and 4th avenues. The notices were delivered between 2am and 4am by KTC officials accompanied by a phalanx of SADF troops who aggressively broke down doors and damaged shacks. This response was clearly designed to remove squatters closest to the white areas in order to temporarily assuage white fears until a more permanent solution could be found. It was no coincidence that the 426 squatters occupied the only part of Langa that was visible from the white suburbs. However, the carefully worded eviction notice prepared by Le Roux, gave very different reasons for the removal.

The notice pointed out to each shack dweller:

* his/her shack was erected without "any permit or authority from KTC" and is "accordingly an illegal structure";

* the shacks are a health hazard with the danger of a cholera outbreak because in the area between 9th and 4th avenues there are no toilets, water supplies, drainage or sewerage;

* the area is a fire hazard because the shacks have been built in a manner which prevents "proper access".

The eviction orders were violating the patronage contracts between councillors and squatters, contracts which squatters could "prove" because councillors issued them with "Lodger's Permits" in the name of the "Cape Midlands Bantu Affairs Administration Board" (the original name of the ECDB) and stamped with a Uitenhage-Despatch Community Council stamp. Consequently, the eviction notice contained a paragraph which
clearly stated that if "you have been shown a site by certain persons [read: Majombozi] who have taken it upon themselves to allocate sites in the area for shacks" and/or if "you paid any money to a person in order to allocate a shack site to you", then this person acted illegally. This legal protection against potential claims that squatters were given "permission" to reside in the area was coupled to another more serious measure. When the KTC officials and SADF troops served the notices, they asked the squatters to surrender their permits. Although most unsuspectingly obliged, a few wily old women with years of experience that had taught them that possessing official-looking documents is better than having nothing, simply refused by saying they had lost their permits.44 Nevertheless, by surrendering their permits the majority gave up their only proof that someone officially sanctioned their right to reside in the area. By defining this sanction as illegal the eviction notice overturned the community's popular conception of the justice of their residential rights.

Aware of the political consequences of this violation of popular norms and patronage contracts, the KTC attempted to establish and legitimise a new norm. The eviction notices stated that the KTC is "aware of the need for housing" and has, therefore, provided fully serviced sites in KwaNobuhle at a monthly cost of R19.90. In addition, the notice stated, KTC will transport all belongings from Langa to KwaNobuhle free of charge.

The notice ended by stating that the shack dweller had ten days to remove his/her structures. If he/she fails to do so, the KTC would assume that he/she "thereby contest[s] the right of the Council to remove you" and it will apply for a court order to remove the shack by force.

The eviction notices generated a sense of panic and outrage in the community as a whole. Panic because the removal of the 426 squatters was seen as the first step towards the removal of Langa as a whole. Outrage because a popular norm - despite it being rooted in the patronage networks of the councillors - had been violated. The effect on political consciousness was immediate and electric. Fortuitously, the following day was October 9, the Day of Peace and Reconciliation that Bishop Tutu and other prominent clergy had called to protest against the State of Emergency. Although there was general confusion in most parts of the
country as to whether this day was meant to be a stayaway or not, in Langa the message was rapidly spread through the street committees that no-one must go to work and that as many people as possible must squeeze into Langa's eleven churches to discuss Langa's problems in general and the evictions in particular. Disguised as "prayer meetings", discussion about the evictions and other problems went on throughout the day, providing activists with a rare opportunity to canvass a broad spread of opinion at a time when all meetings were banned under the Emergency regulations.

The activists, taking full advantage of the opportunity, divided themselves into groups and took charge of proceedings in the churches. They had agreed amongst themselves that although the usual speeches, freedom songs and discussion was important, the main aim should be to ask the meetings to throw up demands related specifically to Langa. These were written down in order of priority. At the end of the day the activists met and, as one of them put it, "Congress of the People style" put all the demands together, categorised and prioritised them. The result was six key demands (wording as in original):

"* lifting of influx control;
* relieving unemployment;
* upgrading of township: who is the cause of health and fire hazard?
* people must be allowed to live where they like;
* schools, clinics, crèches, playing grounds;
* allow us to hold meetings and air our views."

These demands were, in effect, thrown up from the grassroots in a popular manner. They represented, therefore, the community's answer to the Task Group whose recommendations were bound to be purely technical and conventional and were kept secret and never revealed to the community.

A committee was elected from these meetings to represent the squatters and mandated to meet KTC to appeal against the eviction. The committee comprised Freddie Magugu (FOSATU), Weza Made (UYCO), Sipho Mandabana (MACWUSA), T.E. Majoka (UYCO KwaNobuhle), Z.
Mge (UYCO - KwaNobuhle), M.E. Antonie (FOSATU), Nelson Teyise (street committees), Rev. Bashman and A.F. Diko (no details known). This committee became known as the Langa Coordinating Committee (LCC). Significantly, the LCC included FOSATU representatives thus signaling the beginnings of cooperative relations that transcended the old animosities between the FOSATU leadership around John Gomomo and the MACWUSA/UDF leadership around Fiks Kobese. It was Magugu, Made, Mandabana and others who represented the new generation of trade union and community activists who decided to ignore divisions in the established leadership and forge working relations between the street committees and shop floor structures. To quote Sue Lund who worked closely with this new leadership at the time, she observed:

"Leaving aside the most vocal and vociferous feuders, they set about work at grassroots amongst the bereaved and frightened, building new forms of organisation in Langa."45

Although the anti-removal struggle provided a material basis for cooperation between community organisations and trade unions, this was soon extended into other matters. After the transformation of FOSATU into the less "workerist" and more UDF/ANC aligned Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in late 1985, trade unions got direct representation on street committees, the Consumer Boycott Committee, the LCC and the Uitenhage Residents Civic Organisation (URECO).

**LOCAL MOVES BEYOND EMERGENCY RULE**

The LCC immediately contacted the KTC and requested a meeting to discuss the removals and to urge the KTC to stay the evictions. The KTC agreed not to go ahead with removals until the meeting had taken place. The fact that the meeting took place on the 22nd October, i.e. four days after the deadline to move had elapsed, greatly strengthened the resolve of the squatters and activists who interpreted this concession as a sign of weakness on the part of the KTC. In reality, the local state was deeply concerned about the political implications of the evictions.46 This concern was motivated by the fact that Volkswagen wanted to avoid at all costs another blow-up in Langa because of the international profile of the township. Le Roux, the KTC and elements in the municipality were well aware of the consequences of a Volkswagen pull-out if the international
spotlight on Langa resulted in disinvestment pressure on Volkswagen's German headquarters. The KTC tried on several occasions prior to October 8th to arrange meetings with the LCC, but the response was that no meetings would take place until Mr. Haas was released from detention. In the end, mounting pressure from Uitenhage municipality forced KTC to issue eviction notices. When this galvanised the community organisations into action, including the LCC's decision to request a meeting and drop its pre-condition that Haas be released, the KTC was more than willing to find a way of going ahead with the removal without escalating the unrest. Coetzee and Erasmus genuinely believed they could convince the leaders to support the removal with scary reports about health hazards, welfarist housing concessions in KwaNobuhle and denials about the influence of white pressure on their decision.

The meeting was delayed because the LCC knew that meeting the KTC to simply appeal against the removal was too weak and reactive. They were aware of the need to make concrete counter-proposals in line with the community's demands. As a result, they contacted the group of Johannesburg and Durban-based academics they had had contact with before the Emergency and urged them to come down before the meeting with KTC. Two (including the author) traveled to Uitenhage on the 17th and 18th and after some discussions, a document entitled Proposed Steps for Developing Langa was written up that outlined a strategy.

The document started by defining the KTC position as follows: 1) Langa must be removed; 2) Langa cannot be developed; 3) there are no financial resources to upgrade Langa. Based on the assumption that the removal could be stalled, the document recommended that this time be used to develop an alternative that should start with three steps: firstly, the initiation of a detailed socio-economic and attitudinal survey; secondly, using the survey as a basis the compilation of a detailed development plan; thirdly, the mounting of a campaign both within the community as well as nationally and internationally to ensure that maximum pressure is brought to bear on the authorities. The document ended by emphasising two general points: a) if leaders negotiate without a mandate they can be coopted; b) unity and cooperation between community organisations and trade unions will be necessary. The document was subsequently discussed and accepted by the community organisations.
The meeting with the KTC took place on the appointed day at 4.00 pm in the KTC's Langa offices. The officials present were the newly appointed Administrator, Barry Erasmus, Town Clerk Eddie Coetzee, R.D. Basson, Administrative Officer and S. Somtsewu, Langa Township superintendent.

Erasmus started the meeting by explaining his appointment as City Administrator. He then immediately went on to say how urgent it was that unrest in Langa be brought to an end. However, betraying a callous ignorance of problems in Langa, he continued to reiterate the need for removing squatters between 9th and 4th avenues because of pressures from Uitenhage's municipality. As far as upgrading was concerned, he said that the Task Group was favourably disposed towards this idea, but agreed with the KTC that Langa was only big enough for 2000 sites and that 8000 sites were needed to accommodate all Langa's inhabitants. Erasmus informed the LCC that the Task Group would be holding its first meeting on 28th October.

Erasmus explained that eviction notices were served on the 426 squatters living between 9th and 4th avenues because of the appalling living conditions in the area and the constant threat of a cholera outbreak. He rejected press speculation that the evictions were motivated by a concern for Group Area boundaries. He said that those who moved to KwaNobuhle would be given a serviced site, free transport to the new area and unemployed people would not be required to pay service charges. Employed persons who wanted to erect houses would be given loans from the council to purchase on-site materials and council-paid labour would be made available.

In short, KTC was making every possible concession to attract people to KwaNobuhle. Free services for unemployed people and cheap loans and labour for those who wanted to erect houses were, in effect, welfarist policies. More importantly, given that the author is unaware of a similar scheme elsewhere in the country, the explanation for why the local state formulated these policies lies in the fact that they were a response to the intensity of struggle over shelter in the area.

Made responded on behalf of the LCC delegation by pointing out that the community is prepared to negotiate solutions to any problems and difficulties it experiences. He then went on to say that the LCC called the
meeting to discuss the eviction notices that were handed out. He pointed out, (a) that the squatters were unhappy about the 10 day ultimatum to move to KwaNobuhle, (b) that people were angered by the actions of soldiers who damaged shacks when doors were kicked open, (c) that the LCC was discontented by the fact that KTC went ahead with the eviction notices without consulting them, and (d) the people want their permits returned to them.

Other members of the delegation added their comments: Teyise said that the KTC's claims that its concern was health conditions and not white pressure was doubtful in light of the fact that other areas of Langa were worse off than those in the 9th-4th Avenue area. Mge said that people were angry because they believed that permission to erect shacks had been given by the councillors, but now that the shacks were getting close to the white area the KTC was under pressure from whites to remove the shacks. Antonie, in true unionist style, said that the KTC was undermining the authority of the LCC by issuing eviction notices without the Committee's consent.

Much of what followed amounted to argumentation about various conflicting perceptions and reports about what was happening between 9th and 4th avenues. In particular, it became evident to the officials that the LCC was not buying their arguments. The former's position was finally discredited when at one stage Erasmus found it necessary to defend white fears by pointing out that Levyvale residents complained of regular burglaries, seven petrol bomb attacks and dropping property values.

Erasmus said there were three ways to deal with the squatter problem: (a) shacks could be demolished by KTC officials immediately; (b) a court order could be obtained from a magistrate; (c) an application to the Supreme Court could be made. As far as Coetzee and Erasmus were concerned, the latter option was best because it would allow the community to put forward its case in court following which the Supreme Court decision - which they were confident would go in their favour - could be implemented. This would create the appearance of neutrality and fairness in order to redefine the issue in legalistic terms. Le Roux worked out this scheme to use the Supreme Court to depoliticise the issue. In the long run, as the KTC and Le Roux intended, this forced the community organisations onto a terrain where they were weakest.
In response to Erasmus' proposals and in a clear bid to retain control of the decision-making process, the LCC submitted two concrete proposals: firstly, the Task Group must meet the Committee; and secondly, Mr. Erasmus must point out to the Task Group that the 9th-4th Avenue area must be included in the upgrading proposals. The officials responded by pointing out that when the initial request for upgrading was received from the community in June, no-one was living in the 9th-4th Avenue area. This meant the Task Group's brief only concerned the 22nd-9th Avenue area. Nevertheless they recommended that the LCC submit a memorandum to the Task Group. The officials agreed to request that the Task Group meet the LCC. In return, however, they requested the LCC to ensure that no further shacks were erected. The Committee, unlike the Councillors before them, refused to give this undertaking.

At the end of this rather stormy 2 hour meeting, the two parties agreed on three significant formal resolutions:

"Resolved:

1) That it be noted that:
   a) The KwaNobuhle Town Council has instructed their attorneys to issue letters to the residents between 9th and 4th avenue Kabah to remove their illegal structures to KwaNobuhle within 10 days expiring on 18.10.85.
   b) No action was instituted by the KwaNobuhle Town Council in terms of paragraph (a) above pending deliberation with the residents committee of Kabah.

2) That the residents committee BE REQUIRED (sic) to compile a memorandum on the upgrading of Kabah for submission to the Task Group at a meeting to be held on 28 October 1985.

3) That a report back meeting on the meeting of the Task Group on 28.10.1985 BE SCHEDULED (sic) to take place on 29.10.1985 at 16h00 at Town Council offices, Kabah."
On a number of levels the activists felt "the negotiations" were a success: the removal had been stalled; the KTC had effectively recognised the LCC as the representative of the Langa community; KTC agreed to support the inclusion of the 4th-9th Avenue area into the definition of the area which must be upgraded; and the KTC's support for the proposal that the Task Group meet the LCC was won.52 The other gain - that activists never perceived as such because it was not related directly to the removal question - was the welfarist housing and settlement policies the KTC was proposing for KwaNobuhle. These were substantially improved concessions to what they were offered in June. Their spatial location, however, undermined their socio-economic impact.

On the negative side two processes were evident that would eventually weaken the community's capacity to resist. These were firstly the clear indication that the KTC was going to proceed with a Supreme Court Application. Over-optimistic expectations in the "fairness" of the legal system in the coming months would serve to distract activists from concentrating on the organisation of the community, their only real source of power. Secondly, the LCC agreed to submit a memorandum to the Task Group without first discussing this tactic with community organisations. Although the idea of an upgrading plan was being discussed, these discussions were by no means as widespread in the community and factories as they should have been. Given that outside "experts" were inevitably going to be involved in formulating this memorandum, this was the first step towards a dependence on experts as a substitute for organisation that would, like legalism, critically weaken the whole anti-removal movement.

Some activists were keenly aware of these dangers. However, they were not simply strategic or organisational problems. They were, in fact, inscribed into the institutional framework within which the community organisations and trade unions had to operate. This applies to their inability to challenge the decision to take the matter to the Supreme Court, the necessity for "experts" once the decision was taken to enter into negotiations and the sustained level of repression that severely constrained mass participation in the complex and intricate negotiation and planning processes.

(Very similar problems were facing the Parents Crisis Committee which
was also engaged in negotiations with the Department of Education and Training. A crucial meeting took place between the Committee and Sam de Beer, deputy Minister of the Department of Education and Training on 31st September 1985. The meeting, which was organised by Le Roux and Erasmus and took place in the KTC offices, resolved that Uitenhage's schools boycott could only be ended when Student Representative Councils were established.53)

After the meeting with the KTC, activists contacted Dr. Mike Sutcliffe, an urban planner and member of the Durban-based Built Environment Support Group (BESG). They asked him to come down to Uitenhage immediately to help them compile a memorandum for the Task Group. Sutcliffe spent the weekend of 25th-26th October in Langa at the end of which he compiled a memorandum entitled *A Feasibility Survey of the Prospects for Upgrading Kabah, Uitenhage.* The memorandum made the following points:

* upgrading of informal settlements rather than their removal was increasingly becoming an accepted principle of national government policy;

* the shacks in the 9th-4th Avenue area were:
  - the best ventilated, highest and driest in the whole of Langa;
  - of a lower density than most areas in Langa and therefore did not pose a fire problem;
  - well-built structures indicating that the residents had been there for some time;
  - inhabited by tenants who are not "illegals" and who paid service charges to KTC and possessed "official lodgers permits".

* factors in favour of upgrading: more than enough land, perfect topography, and strong community organisation.

* urgent problems: high densities in some areas, bad roads, inadequate drainage, and insufficient standpipes.
Sutcliffe concluded by pointing out that political consciousness in Langa was such that top-down planning decisions made on behalf of rather than in consultation with the community, would be rejected. He proposed that the KTC petition Minister Heunis to get approval for the upgrading of Langa, including the identification of available land. This, he argued, should be coupled to an LCC strategy aimed at securing funding for a large-scale development project. The first step in this regard, he proposed, should be the initiation of socio-economic and site surveys in Langa.

It is important to note that Sutcliffe took his brief from the LCC which insisted that the 9th-4th Avenue area be included in the upgrade. One of the reasons given by ICTC officials for why the Task Group did not consider the report at its meeting was precisely because the LCC refused to give Sutcliffe the same brief that the KTC gave to the Task Group, i.e. consideration only of the 22nd-9th Avenue area. This is a good example of how planning expresses conflicting material interests.

Sutcliffe's memorandum was handed in to the KTC early on the morning of Monday 27th October in time to be discussed at the Task Group meeting that day. Not unexpectedly, the ICTC officials were extremely surprised when the LCC arrived with the memorandum. They never thought the LCC had the resources or the inclination to compile a memorandum during the short time since the last meeting. In the event, the Task Group did not discuss the memo that day.

The LCC met the ICTC again on 28th October. It started off with a report back by Erasmus of the Task Group proceedings the previous day. Erasmus made the following points:

* the Task Group comprises representatives from all government departments;

* Scheepers delivered a message from Heunis that the KTC should proceed with an application for a court order to remove the squatters between 9th and 4th avenues;

* Erasmus said that after taking the Task Group on a tour of Langa, he felt positive that its members would view sympathetically the community's request for upgrading, however no firm decision was reached within the Task Group on whether to support upgrading or
not;

Erasmus and Coetzee pointed out that the Task Group was of the opinion that urbanisation was inevitable, but that the most pressing problem was the influx of unemployed people into the urban areas. That this view was expressed then is significant, because it pre-figures government thinking that eventually led to the scrapping of influx control in July 1986. This might suggest that Langa's struggle and the very real difficulties it posed for the state, made a direct impact on government policy.

The LCC forcefully expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that the Task Group never considered their memorandum and that the only firm decision concerned the court order. Magugu submitted that this indicated a refusal by government to listen to the Langa community's demands and that there is, therefore, no reason why there should be further negotiations. Evidence that Magugu's suggestion plus the Task Groups' lack of a strategy put the KTC in a difficult position came when Coetzee suggested to the LCC that it wait for the Task Group's next meeting where issues might clarify before reporting back to the community. Clearly he was reluctant to see the LCC tell the community anything; if they said that upgrading had been won, this would remove the pressure to move and lend too much legitimacy to the UDF affiliates; if they said removals were to go ahead, this would, as Mandabana pointed out, lead to confrontation.

The KTC replied by trying to re-define the issue in legalistic and technicist terms. The legalistic solution lay in the KTC's constant insistence that the LCC respond in court to the KTC's application, i.e. they clearly perceived that the community's willingness to "participate" in the legal action would ensure its "success", no matter what the outcome was. Keeping the conflict off the streets was their only concern. If the court ruled in favour of the community, then, the KTC officials conceded, the 9th-4th Avenue area would be included in the upgrade and the LCC would have to participate in "certain of the re-planning and upgrading aspects". If the court ruled in favour of the KTC, then the community would have to "accept" this. The technicist solution lay in Coetzee's argument that the Task Group would be considering the feasibility of upgrading the 22nd-9th Avenue area "in Pretoria". Once again, its conclusions would be "final"
and beyond dispute.

Contrary to Lund's suggestion that negotiations had "come to nothing" because the KTC and Task Group were of the opinion that upgrading would only be considered after the court ruling, the evidence seems to point to a much more sophisticated divide through concession and rule through repression strategy: concessions to those living in the 22nd-9th Avenue area and repression for the 9th-4th Avenue area. This is why Coetzee reacted so strongly when Mandabana threatened this strategy by suggesting that the 9th-4th Avenue area people move into another area of Langa until the Task Group and Court had reached their respective decisions.

Finally, and confirming the Task Group's technicist thrust, when the LCC asked whether Erasmus had asked the Task Group to meet the Committee, Erasmus said the request was denied because "the politicians" would be brought in and deliberations would be delayed. Later, when the Urban Foundation attempted to urge Scheepers to meet the LCC, the Task Group's response was that its task was technical, not political. Only after he had reported to Heunis, Scheepers pointed out, could this decision be made. The Task Group subsequently formed a technical sub-committee chaired by an engineer called Mr. Bath to compile a report about the technicalities of upgrading Langa. Bath visited Uitenhage twice spending his time meeting the Uitenhage municipality and the KTC, but refused to meet the LCC.

The meeting ended on a bad note with the LCC under the impression that the Task Group never took its memorandum seriously and with the KTC officials feeling the LCC was unreasonable for refusing to accept the welfarist incentives to get people to move to KwaNobuhle. In reality, the KTC officials later admitted that they never took the Sutcliffe memorandum very seriously because Sutcliffe did not bother to come and see them while doing his research.

Although the Task Group did not oppose the need to apply for a court order to remove the 9th-4th Avenue squatters, there is no evidence that any clarity existed on whether Langa should be retained and upgraded and, if so, how this should be done. This reflected an uncertainty in government urbanisation policy as a whole.
To date government policy was deeply hostile to the spread of informal settlements, particularly if they were as close to the white areas as Langa was. However, this lack of clarity was a function of changes in macro urbanisation policy. The Report of the Committee for Constitutional Affairs of the President’s Council on An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa was published on 12th September 1985. This reflected the thinking of a reformist group with support in the upper echelons of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. It was a response to the obvious fact that influx control was simply not working as a mechanism to keep the urbanising masses out. More importantly, however, the influx control system was a negative urbanisation strategy in the sense that once a large contingent of urbanising people had broken through the urban barrier and established communities like Crossroads and Langa, the official policy framework did not provide guidelines on how these settlements should be dealt with. In fact, once these settlements became inhabited by people with Section 10 (1) (a)(b) or (c) "rights", influx control instruments were rendered ineffective. This enabled these communities to survive and expand, providing relatively protected spaces for other incoming groups.58

The conflict in Langa, therefore, came at a time when two contradictory tendencies were reaching a head at national level: on the one hand the squatter communities were clearly winning the battle against influx control and their struggles helped destroy the classic myth that the urban areas were an exclusive white abode. These struggles finally buried the Riekert Commission’s urbanisation policy and the intentions of the fated Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill.59 On the other hand, by the end of 1985 policy makers had come to support the Urban Foundation’s argument that influx control needed to be scrapped, but like the Urban Foundations’ policy makers they were unclear about what should replace it.60

It was in this context that the impact of the struggles of the Langa community on state policy should be assessed. The Langa community struggled to make itself important. It was important enough to have prompted the formation of a Task Group headed by the Deputy Director General of the DCDP not simply because it physically existed, but because it had established for itself a political identity.
The political sensitivity of Langa became apparent in contradictory press statements made during the week after the Task Group met. Whereas Erasmus said the decision to apply for a court order to remove the squatters was made by Heunis and communicated to the KTC by the Task Group. Scheepers said that his Task Group had nothing to do with the removal and was only investigating the feasibility of upgrading. Erasmus' statement was in any case false, because he and Le Roux had already concocted the scheme and the KTC had already resolved on 30 September to apply for a court order. What was certain is that no-one wanted to accept responsibility for what might happen if the removal went ahead, especially in light of repeated warnings from the LCC that confrontation was inevitable.

Related to, but more significant than the decision to apply for a court order, was the KTC's conclusion that negotiations with the LCC were fruitless. In the notice of motion it distributed in November, Coetzee wrote:

"Prior to the delivery of these letters, certain negotiations also took place between the Applicant and unofficial representatives of a large number of shack dwellers, aimed at voluntary removal of the shack dwellers to Applicant's housing scheme site in KwaNobuhle. These negotiations made some progress, but later did not continue and have come to naught."

This statement starkly reveals that for the KTC, negotiations were seen as useful only to the extent that they could facilitate the implementation of its own pre-conceived plans. When this possibility was thwarted by the LCC that had no mandate to compromise the squatter's demands, the KTC officials used their power to terminate the negotiations.

By the beginning of November the community organisations were uncertain where they stood: negotiations had broken down, the Task Group engineer claimed he was still conducting his study, and the KTC was probably preparing its case but this was by no means certain as far as the LCC was concerned. The KTC strategy only became clear on 8th November when the KTC served notices of motion on the 426 squatters in the 9th-4th Avenue area. These notices were handed out between 2.00 am and 4.00 am in an extremely provocative manner. One policeman said to a resident: "We know you are going to resist, but let us see who is going to
The notice gave the respondents until 22nd November to notify the court of their intention to respond and a further fourteen days after that to file responding affidavits.

The notice of motion that was given to the 426 squatters was a lengthy 78-page document with detailed maps, photographs and affidavits to back up its case. The KTC supported its case with the following basic arguments:

* uncontrolled squatting in the 9th-4th Avenue was taking place at such a rate that 10 new shacks were erected each day;

* the structures were put up without the Applicants permission or knowledge;

* there were no taps, sewerage or refuse removal services in the area, thus creating the real danger of a cholera or typhoid outbreak;

* proper roads did not exist because of the unplanned nature of the area, which meant that in the event of a fire, the Fire Brigade would be unable to stop it;

* 400 residents of Uitenhage signed a petition that prompted the Uitenhage Municipality to lodge a formal complaint with the KTC about the "dangerous and unsanitary conditions" in Langa;

* the drainage and slope of the land was such that "while upgrading of this area may be theoretically possible, it is not possible at any practicably acceptable cost level";

* fully serviced sites had been made available in KwaNobuhle in an area that "is about the same distance from the Uitenhage industrial area ... as the illegal shacks";

* attempts to encourage the squatters to move voluntarily by negotiating with "unofficial representatives" failed, thus leading the KTC to conclude that the "Respondents dispute the illegality of their occupation in the area".

The key component of the notice was provided by an affidavit from Major Theron. Theron was in charge of Uitenhage's Riot Control Unit.
as of March 1984. He argued that the "high density" and "unplanned" nature of the shack area had given rise to a situation that "is extremely difficult to patrol and to police properly".

"There are no proper streets or street numbers - nor are there any passable roads. Attempts to put up street numbers have been frustrated by elements in the population who remove the numbers or over-paint them. Because this happens at night, it is not possible to say who is responsible."64

Criminals are protected in the area because it is "very difficult to trace witnesses afterwards who melt away into the mass of unplanned, haphazard shacks". However, Theron proceeds, the same does not apply to the new area in KwaNobuhle to which the KTC would like to move the squatters. Revealing the intimate connection between urban planning and police control, Theron pointed out that "[i]n this area Police protection of residents will become vastly facilitated [sic] and investigation of crime tremendously simplified."65

It is important to note that Coetzee's affidavit specifically pointed out that the 9th-4th Avenue squatters had erected shacks without in any way notifying or informing the KTC. This is significant because it meant that unlike the 22nd-9th Avenue squatters, the 9th-4th squatters erected their shelter without the condonement of councillors and their patronage networks. The resignation of the councillors, therefore, had two contradictory effects: it removed the protection of patronage but simultaneously created the impression that official obstacles to the erection of shacks had also been removed. The ideology of ungovernability served to confirm this latter impression. But when it became clear that the KTC was still able to function and threaten the squatters, it was not the patronage networks that they turned to for support but rather the extra-state organisations whose opposition to the state offered a solution that made sense to people whose attempts to find an accommodation within the system had failed.

The delivery of these notices clearly drew the battlelines. As far as the local state was concerned, the first priority was the clearing of the 9th-3rd Avenue (i.e. the number of squatters had increased beyond 4th avenue into 3rd avenue) area to satisfy the white residents. Once this was
achieved, the rest was negotiable. However, given the politicised nature of the community, the KTC was attempting to legitimise the removal by way of a Supreme Court Action that would require the "participation" of the community in the process. KTC officials hoped in this way to at least diminish to acceptable levels the confrontational aspect of the removal.

As far as the community was concerned, the new terrain had both obvious advantages and dangers. The main advantage was time. The lawyers assured the community leaders that they could comfortably expect the case to come to court only in early 1986. This was important to leaders who were aware that time was required to build a social movement capable of directly countering any attempt to forcibly remove the squatters if the court case failed. The main danger, of course, was legalism and the possibility that a belief could spread that organisation was now unnecessary. Some of these issues and problems surfaced at a mass meeting of squatters held on the 24th November. On the one hand the meeting had to approve the appointment of the lawyer, while on the other the activists were careful to reiterate the need to strengthen organisation.

On December 12th 1985 the squatters submitted counter-applications to the court that contested the legality of KTC's right to evict on the grounds of a small technicality. Pointing out that it was the "Town Council of KwaNobuhle" that was established in terms of the BLA Act in 1983 and not the "KwaNobuhle Town Council, and that there was no Town Council with any members able to exercise any rights or powers, Virginia Williams said in her affidavit that the 9th-4th Avenue squatters did not need to obtain permission from the KTC to build shacks because it was not a lawfully constituted authority. It followed from this that the lack of services that created health and other hazards was because of the KTC's failure to provide adequate facilities. Made's affidavit rested on a rejection of Coetzee's contention that the negotiations had come to naught. Submitting minutes of these meetings, Made argued the negotiations were wide ranging and revolved largely around the question of upgrading. He said the community would like to continue negotiations.66

Between November 1985 and May 1986, a stalemate existed. Except for the demolition of twenty newly erected shacks on the outskirts of the 4th-9th Avenue area "because they were challenging the authority of the
KwaNobuhle municipality,"67 neither side opted for negotiated or coercive strategies to win the strategic initiative. The community needed to build organisation and formulate its alternative to removal, while the KTC waited for its case to be heard by the court. This stalemate was not affected by moves to suspend the boycott and bring about negotiations in accordance with the Port Elizabeth example.68 The Uitenhage Consumer Boycott Committee said its demands were:

* the withdrawal of troops and members of the SAP's reaction unit from the townships;

* lifting of the State of Emergency;

* an end to the harassment of community leaders by security forces;

* that all workers sacked because of stayaways from work or through detention under the Emergency be reinstated;

* that Langa be upgraded and the forced removal of residents to KwaNobuhle halted;

* the prosecution of the killers of the Cradock leaders and the location of the missing Port Elizabeth leaders.69

On Sunday 8th December, a mass meeting took place in Jabavu Stadium in KwaNobuhle to discuss the consumer boycott. Permission was granted by the magistrate when applications to hold the meeting was supported by the KTC.70 The meeting agreed that negotiations with the Chamber of Commerce could take place only if Uitenhage's detainees were released.71 The statement released by the Consumer Boycott Committee said: "This shows that when leaders are released from detention they are in a better position to talk and solve problems. This was the case in Port Elizabeth."72

There were three reasons why the consumer boycott "talks" in Uitenhage went in a very different direction to those in Port Elizabeth. Firstly, unlike the Port Elizabeth chamber, the Uitenhage Chamber of Commerce was National Party dominated. Secondly, the pillar of economic power in Uitenhage was industrial capital, not commerce - this is why the MCI eventually came to play such a crucial role in negotiating a solution to the squatter crisis. Thirdly, unlike the Ibhayi Town Council, all the councillors resigned from KTC leaving the white officials with much greater scope for
proactive intervention and unconventional action.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the KTC became the central actor. During December and January Erasmus went on the offensive to coopt KwaNobuhle and Langa leaders into a multi-racial ad hoc committee. He called a meeting of all the community organisations - mainly UDF affiliates - on Saturday 25th January to discuss the proposed Regional Services Councils and the potential for non-racial municipalities. Most of the key KwaNobuhle leaders went to the meeting, while the Langa leaders refused. Despite Erasmus' personal approach to Weza Made urging him to come to the meeting because he is a "true leader and supported by the people",73 the Langa leaders were deeply suspicious of Erasmus' motives. They were unwilling to cooperate on any venture until the removals issue was resolved. In the event an ad hoc committee was elected at the meeting comprising Erasmus, Coetzee, Sam Haas and another URECO representative. Keith Ingram of the Chamber of Commerce was also incorporated into the committee. The committee decided to approach Brigadier Schnetler to request the release of detainees and permission to hold meetings. However, before the following week was out, the URECO leaders were forced by the KwaNobuhle organisations to resign from the committee on grounds that they never received a mandate to participate. Luckily the Langa leaders escaped the acrimony this KwaNobuhle-centred controversy generated.

Despite the failure of this committee, Erasmus was deeply impressed with the URECO leaders74 and his optimism was reflected in a press statement he made at the time:

"There is a conciliatory spirit at the moment. There is an atmosphere of change."75

It was in this context that Erasmus called for a local power-sharing option for Uitenhage. He made this suggestion at a special symposium for the public and private sector in December 1985 to consider Uitenhage's future prospects. He suggested that black community leaders be incorporated into the special "contact committee" that the Uitenhage municipality had recently established in response to the consumer boycott. He argued that this will help improve Uitenhage's image as a place with one of the worst race relations problems in the world.76
Even the school pupils voted at mass meetings in stadiums at KwaNobuhle and Langa that they should return to school on the 28th January in line with resolutions taken at the Johannesburg conference of the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee.

CONCLUSION

The easing of tensions in the Eastern Cape from the end of 1985 and into January 1986 was clearly part of a shift in state strategy. Withdrawal of the massive security force presence, negotiations with UDF organisations, release of detainees and other moves were also coupled to an injection of R43 million into township development. Minister Heunis personally handed the cheque over to the ECDB in November. To be used for unemployment relief, infrastructural upgrading, self-help housing and the training of municipal police, these funds were distributed to 35 E. Cape townships with Aliwal North, Bedford, Cathcart, Cradock, Fort Beaufort, Grahamstown, King William's Town, Kirkwood, Molteno, East London, Queenstown, Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth receiving the largest amounts. These areas, not surprisingly, were the most well organised E. Cape towns. The municipal police forces this fund helped establish were to play a critically important repressive role later on.

Uitenhage's political pendulum was to swing a few more times between January and July 1986 before this "atmosphere of change" gave way to undiluted repressive rule.


5. Ibid., p.535.
7. Ibid., p.390.
9. This was reflected in the fact that the Parents Committee was negotiating with the DET by that stage, see Eastern Province Herald, 1.10.1985.
10. This account of worker action in this period is based on a number of informal discussions and Eastern Province Herald, 23.4.85; Die Vaderland, 24.4.85; Oosterlig, 24.4.85; Evening Post, 24.4.85; Eastern Province Herald, 15.5.85.
12. Interview with Weza Made, Uitenhage, March 1986. MK was the term used to refer to Umkhonto We Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC.
14. This was certainly reflected in PLANACT, Langa: The Case for Upgrade, PLANACT, Johannesburg, 1986.
15. The killers of the Cradock leaders refers to the people who were responsible for the kidnapping and murder of three prominent members of the Cradock Resident's Association, one of whom was Mathew Goniwe who was a prominent leader of the UDF in the Eastern Cape.
16. Adler, G., "Uniting a Community", Work in Progress, 50, 1987. This crude disregard of the facts is even more surprising given that Adler spent over a year studying union organisation in Uitenhage and developed some fairly close relationships with key activists.
18. What follows is premised on an interview conducted on 22.5.1988 in Johannesburg. This interview, plus other interviews, conversations, discussions and group meetings that involved Weza and myself during this period generated the material for the biographical sketch of Weza that follows. Substantial sections of the account of events in chapters 7 and 8 rely heavily on my contact with Weza. However, he was never the only source of information. Personal observation, supporting evidence from other interviews and documentation (e.g. minutes and recordings of meetings) were used to corroborate Weza's account of events. Invariably, Weza's disarming candor, remarkably clear memory, and highly intelligent analysis of events and people generated an understanding of the processes that was repeatedly corroborated.
19. Interview with Weza Made, 22.5.88.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Document entitled "Minutes of the meeting between officials from the Kwal Nobuhle Council and a delegation representing the residents of Kabah held on Tuesday 11 June 1985 at 15h30 at the township offices Kabah."
29. Interview with Barry Erasmus, Administrator of the KTC, and Eddie Coetzee, Town Clerk.
26.5.1986.
32. Hand-written copy of an affidavit entitled "Zolile Twana", obtained from the Black Sash office, Port Elizabeth, n.d.
33. Interview with Amabutho leaders in Langa, June 1986.
38. Document entitled "Minutes of meeting held between the KwaNobuhle Town Council and a delegation from the residents of Kabah held on Tuesday 22.10.85 at 16h00 at Kabah Township Offices, Kabah."
40. Minutes of meeting referred to in footnote 34.
42. Telephonic conversation with Dr. M. Sutcliffe, November 1985.
43. See appendix "C" in Notice of Motion in the Matter Between The KwaNobuhle Town Council and David Andries and Others, case number 2966/85, Supreme Court of South Africa, South-Eastern Cape Local Division.
44. Interviews with various women living in 9th-4th avenue area, October 1985.
46. Interviews with Erasmus and Coetzee, op. cit. and Le Roux, op. cit.
47. Minutes of meeting cited in footnote 34.
48. Ibid.
49. Document entitled "Minutes of meeting held between the KwaNobuhle Town Council and the Kabah Coordinating Committee held on Tuesday 28.10.85 at 16h00 at Kabah Township Offices, Kabah."
50. Interview with Le Roux, op. cit.
51. Minutes of the meeting.
56. Document entitled "Minutes of meeting held between the KwaNobuhle Town Council and Kabah Coordinating Committee on 3rd February 1986."
57. Interview with Erasmus and Coetzee, op. cit.
60. Conversation with Willie Breytenbach on 10.12.1985. Breytenbach had just resigned from his position as senior assistant to Minister Heunis and sat on the committee that was reviewing influx control legislation.
62. Interview with Erasmus and Coetzee, op. cit.
63. Coetzee's affidavit in Notice of Motion cited in footnote 42.
64. Affidavit by Major Theron in Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. "Langa: Summaries of Application and Counter-Application Submitted to the Supreme Court Regarding the Removal of 426 Families from the Kabah Area, Langa Township", Grahamstown Rural Committee, memorandum, n.d., p.3.
72. Ibid.
73. Telephone conversation with Weza Made, 23.2.1986.
74. Interview with Erasmus and Coetzee, op. cit.
75. Evening Post, 27.1.1986.
CHAPTER 8

BEYOND UNGOVERNABILITY: PEOPLE'S POWER AND NEGOTIATIONS

INTRODUCTION

During the first six months of 1986, the Eastern Cape erupted into a regional revolt that dominated international headlines, underpinned growing revolutionary hopes amongst leaders of the liberation movement and led eventually to the declaration of a National State of Emergency in July 1986. After the lifting of the partial State of Emergency in March 1986 and the re-declaration of the national State of Emergency in July, an opening was created that exploded outwards into a set of social movements the nature of which will be debated for many years to come.

Uitenhage may not have been the epicentre of this revolt, but there is little doubt that the Langa massacre loomed large in the collective imagination of the region's 'amabutho' squads as they took to the streets to do battle with the security forces. More importantly, the regional revolt must be understood as the context within which the localised dynamics within Uitenhage itself took place. In addition to responding to the logic of local dynamics, the leaders of Uitenhage's local stakeholders across the spectrum took into account the regional processes as they made their tactical and strategic decisions. This is why it is necessary to outline these regional dynamics in this chapter in order to set the context for an understanding of the local processes in Uitenhage.

Previous chapters have explained the dynamics that turned Uitenhage into just one of the Eastern Cape's arenas of conflict. Although the first part of this chapter will briefly describe the Eastern Cape revolt of January-July 1986, it will remain focussed on Uitenhage so that complex local processes can be revealed that may shed light on what may have been happening on a wider scale. In the process, certain assumptions by various writers and interested parties will be questioned. In particular, the ongoing struggle for and negotiations about the removal/upgrading of Langa involved processes that do not fit neatly into numerous analyses of the period of 'people's power'. Two in particular are worth mentioning. The "people's power" literature that flowered during the mid-1980s depicted the emerging forms of grassroots popular power as the precursors to an
emerging revolutionary rupture. The concept of "ungovernability" captured the essence of this notion, but it was an extremely unstable essence that highlighted some important organisational weaknesses facing those who hoped for revolution. Whereas on the streets "ungovernability" was the slogan used by the youthful street fighters bent on attacking the symbols and representatives of authority in a way that challenged the state but did not necessarily build up a revolutionary alternative, the UDF leadership argued that "ungovernability" was not an anarchistic drive, but referred rather to the process of making the townships "governable by the people". To back up this ideology, written analysis of these "organs of popular power" argued that the form, function and leadership of these structures reflected the dynamic of revolutionary transformation.1

The second view denigrated the organisational significance of the emerging forms of popular power by arguing that "[p]eople's power' was primarily a response to the breakdown of formal local state structures, but also to the lack of discipline among the militant youth, and 'com-tsotsis'."2 In other words, instead of conceding that people actually can make their own history, even substantive mass action and organisation was written off by this kind of state-centric analysis as simply a reaction to the internal collapse of the state system.

In the end, the literature on revolution and social movements is not particularly helpful in understanding the interface between the grassroots structures that emerged during this period and the apartheid state system at different levels. Instead, the vast international literature on the dynamics of negotiating the relations of power between interests engaged in conflict is far more useful. An indigenous South African literature has now emerged that has explored the intricate relations of power, interaction and negotiation that emerged both before the transition began in 1990 and subsequent to this turning point when negotiations became the central political dynamic at all levels.3 Instead of assuming that state systems are impervious to external challenges and that the logical strategic choice for a radical social movement is the revolutionary seizure of power, the negotiations literature highlights the minutiae of dynamics at the local level that demonstrated that parties locked in conflicts at the local level prior to the commencement of the transition often reached a point
where the balance of power was in neither of their interests. To break this kind of 'power stalemate', negotiations to find a new equilibrium took place in those situations where the parties came to understand that negotiating may be less costly than destructive spiraling conflict.4

THE REGIONAL REVOLT

In many ways, the images, language and iconography that make up the idealisation of the entire process of rebellion during the 1980s that culminated in the transition of the 1990s were drawn from the Eastern Cape. No-where else in the country (except possibly in parts of the Transvaal and OFS) was there anything approximating the heroic battles between 'people' and 'power bloc' that the idealisation portrays. Across the region, from metropolitan Port Elizabeth to the smallest Karoo towns in the north and north-west, local activists launched campaigns, waged dramatically intense struggles and tried their best to mobilise and organise households on a door-to-door basis. The following map of 'flash points' prepared by the Indicator SA project illustrates the geographical dispersal of reported processes of action and conflict in the region.5
Township Flashpoints: Locating Political Violence

Based on detailed studies of conflict in some 30 localities countrywide (with most of the case studies drawn from the Cape Province), it was possible to draw up a typology of the conflict processes as they manifested themselves at local level over time. This typology is offered here as a general description of what happened in the communities identified in the map above. However, it would be a mistake to see this as a linear set of phases that proceeded irreversibly to the final phase in all cases. These non-linear phases were as follows:

* grievance expression: the first signs of community protest emerged when grievances were expressed about appalling living conditions in the community. When these were not addressed by councillors or administrators, a delegation of local notables would normally present the grievances in the form of a petition of some kind or simply as a verbal articulation of 'what the community felt'.

* official rebuke: in case after case the authorities either ignored, rebuked or dismissed petitioners. Officials frequently responded with excuses that rested on unproven bureaucratic assertions rather than reasoned discussion or demonstrable facts, e.g. 'this is a political matter' or 'this is not my jurisdiction'.

* mobilisation of counter-power: given the absence of democratic representation in government and (during the late 1970s and early 1980s) a lack of access to intermediaries like the media, professionals and liberal pressure groups, active elements in the community then resorted to the mobilisation of counter-power as the only reasonable response to official rebukes.

* mobilisation and organisation: grassroots organisation then spread across communities resulting in regional and national webs and networks that facilitated resource transfers, communication and campaign building. It was these networks that were formalised into UDF structures that were, in turn, effective articulators of the link between the failure to resolve local grievances and the political nature of state power.

* demonstrating power: local and regional organisational structures provided the basis for mounting campaigns to demonstrate counter-power
on a coordinated basis.

* the spiral of repression and resistance: as grassroots organisation developed and as campaigns gathered momentum, so the security forces escalated the level of repression. Although repression did weaken organisation, it also provided a compelling community-wide rationale for greater effort and determination to strengthen organisation, build solidarity and demonstrate that the weaker party actually did have the power to match the power of the state. This, in turn, was met with repression which in turn encouraged greater resistance.

* constructing dual power: as the cycle of repression and resistance continued, so it became necessary to form defensive decentralised structures capable of bringing greater numbers of people into the daily struggle to defend the residents from repression and to mount offensive strategies. It was these dynamics that contributed to the formation of street and area committees.

* stalemate and negotiations: eventually, the repression-resistance cycle resulted in an equilibrium of sorts as the activists began to find community allies from outside the communities in both business and local state circles. Partly as a result of mass actions of various kinds, these alliances were built on the desire to find an alternative to brute repression to solve the problems. This helped isolate the security forces to some extent at local level and effectively prepared the way for 'local-level negotiations'. Because the security forces were absent from these negotiations because they did not share the perception of stalemate, they effectively reserved the power to destroy the negotiations processes at will - a power they used with devastating success after the State of Emergency was declared in 1986.

Although an inadequate measure of organisational coherence, the number of recorded fatalities caused by political conflict does point to the levels of conflict between organised forces within communities and the security forces. As indicated in the tables below, if the high March 1985 figure tapering off into the also relatively high April 1985 figure is regarded as a special case due to the Uitenhage massacre and aftermath, it is clear how the number of fatalities from political conflict rose consistently from February 1985 through to July 1986, with the first six months of 1986 recording more fatalities than the last six months of 1985.
Fatalities arose out of many different circumstances, but some of the most common circumstances surrounding fatalities suffered by the community included massacres of demonstrating crowds, shootings at funerals, attacks on security vehicles by amabutho, random shooting of innocent people by security forces, planned assassinations/assaults by secret security units, and deaths while in custody. In most instances, deaths came at a time of heightened tension and conflict between communities and the security forces.

Given that the national State of Emergency was aimed at 'destabilising' oppositional organisations and detaining activists, it should be no surprise that this corresponded with a drastic reduction in the number of fatalities. This correlation lends weight to the fatalities indicator as a measure of organisation, without claiming it is anything more than an indicator. (See table 8.1.

As far as mass campaigns were concerned, five are significant and can be measured from reports. The Eastern Cape was renowned for the effectiveness of its consumer boycotts. The following tables describe the timing and some of the processes.
Table 8.1

FATALITIES IN SELECTED LOCATIONS

1985 - 1988:
- Port Elizabeth
- Uitenhage
- East London
- Queenstown
- Grahamstown
- Beaufort West
- Cradock

Year
- 18
- 22
- 31
- 32
- 83
- 85
- 280
Rhody council) were estimated to owe the council R4m in arrears.

1987 Port Elizabeth townships' residents (falling under the control of the
was owed more than R5m in rent and service charge arrears. By February
By May 1985 it was estimated that the Eastern Cape Development Board

Note

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{Before July 1987} & \text{Mhluzi (Middleburg)} \\
\text{August 1986} & \text{Burgersdorp} \\
\text{August 1986} & \text{Mdcantsane (Ciskei)} \\
\text{Before July 1986} & \text{Duncan Village (EL)} \\
\text{Before July 1986} & \text{Alexandria} \\
\text{Before July 1986} & \text{Port Alfred} \\
\text{Before July 1986} & \text{Langa (Uitenhage)} \\
\text{Before July 1986} & \text{Soweto (PE)} \\
\text{Before July 1986} & \text{Stutterheim} \\
\text{Before July 1986} & \text{Nonzwakazi (De Aar)} \\
\text{1985} & \text{Ungellaie (Cradock)} \\
\text{1983} & \text{Townsips}
\end{array}
\]

Table 8.2

RENT/SERVICE CHARGE BOYCOTTS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PE/Uitenhage</td>
<td>18-21/3/85</td>
<td>90% PE, 36% Uitenhage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uitenhage</td>
<td>28/3/85</td>
<td>8 000 workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>1/5/85</td>
<td>limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>14/5/85</td>
<td>limited workplace stoppages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>21/8/85</td>
<td>100% African workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queenstown</td>
<td>23-24/9/85</td>
<td>100% African workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>26/9/85</td>
<td>100% African workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimbaza</td>
<td>1/10/85</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>9/10/85</td>
<td>mass support in PE/Uitenhage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE/Uitenhage</td>
<td>21/3/86</td>
<td>100% African &amp; coloureds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cradock</td>
<td>28/4/86</td>
<td>most African workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>1/5/86</td>
<td>90% in PE/Uitenhage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Alfred</td>
<td>5-11/5/86</td>
<td>most African women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>16/6/86</td>
<td>100% in PE/Uitenhage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>14-15/7/86</td>
<td>39% of PE Africans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uitenhage</td>
<td>31/7/86</td>
<td>partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duncan Village</td>
<td>14/8/86</td>
<td>partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>1/10/86</td>
<td>limited workplace stoppages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>12/3/87</td>
<td>limited workplace stoppages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>5-6/5/87</td>
<td>97% in PE/Uitenhage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>16/6/87</td>
<td>93% of Africans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>21/3/88</td>
<td>65% of African &amp; coloureds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>6-8/6/88</td>
<td>low workplace attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>16/6/88</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note

Many of the work stayaways that affected the Eastern Cape were part of broader national stay-at-home calls. It was in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage conurbation that these national stayaways tended to have their greatest impact.

## CONSUMER BOYCOTTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>May 1985 - 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliwal North</td>
<td>February 1986 - 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedford</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colesberg</td>
<td>June 1985 - 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cradock</td>
<td>July 1984 - 1986/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuthbert</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Aar</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>July 1985 - August 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Beaufort</td>
<td>July 1985 - 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graaff-Reinet</td>
<td>September 1985 - 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grahamstown</td>
<td>June 1985 - October 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Williamstown</td>
<td>August 1985 - May 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkwood</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middleburg</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molteno</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Alfred</td>
<td>June 1985 - 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>July 1985 - December 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queenstown</td>
<td>August 1985 - April 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset East</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steynsburg</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stutterheim</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarakstad</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uitenhage</td>
<td>July 1985 - January 1987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

It is extremely difficult to establish precise dates for the beginning or end of consumer boycotts. Boycotts did not run continuously (as the above dates might imply) - in many instances they were suspended for brief periods and then resumed again.

## TRANSPORT BOYCOTTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Trigger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mdantsane - East London</td>
<td>Jul 1983 - Mar 1985</td>
<td>various intro of mini buses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZakele - Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>begins Apr 1985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The classic Eastern Cape urban context was the small white town centred around its CBD characterised by well serviced suburbs, and on an outer perimeter a black township with uniform houses centred around transport nodes, basic commercial services and all this surrounded by shacks. This was a particularly easy geographical unit to use as a basis for organising consumer boycotts, particularly if township business people stood to gain from the boycott of white shops and in return supported activists with food, money and transport. The consumer boycotts invariably had two sets of objectives. The first set was articulated by politically articulate local and regional leaders in terms of the need to force local business to support political demands such as the lifting of the State of Emergency, release of political prisoners, unbanning of organisations and so on. This set of demands were often published in pamphlets, news and other popular forms. The second set were articulated at a local level by local leaders involved in mobilising local constituencies and/or involved in justifying the strategy. To achieve these organisational objectives, local activists and leaders attached a set of local demands that were specific to each local context (e.g. repair and/or upgrading of services, improvement of recreational facilities, scrapping of local petty apartheid laws, stopping of forced removals or even the release from detention of a local leader or two). It was these demands (that were hardly ever given prominence in the print media) that became the basis for local-level negotiations between Consumer Boycott Committees and local business and local government representatives.7

The second form of action was the stayaways. Unlike the consumer boycott that could be sustained for fairly significant lengths of time, the stayaway remained a short dramatic demonstration of power rather than the embryo of a general strike because in a stayaway labour simply stays at home rather than occupying the points of production. Like the consumer boycott, the geography of the apartheid town/city was extremely helpful when it came to mobilising people to stay at home - the neighbourhood rather than the workplace was where the stayaway was organised from (with the exception of Uitenhage in certain instances). The stayaways had a range of local determinants, with some stayaways motivated entirely by local community demands and others simply imposed on local communities by national campaigns. Quite often the overuse of the tactic
and lack of coordination between workplace and community organisations led to serious confusion.8

Although not as prominent as in the Transvaal during the 1985-86 period, there were also transport boycotts. The most well known and probably longest transport boycott took place in Mdantsane-East London, but was largely resolved by 1985-86.9 There were other smaller scale boycotts at local level for short periods of time (e.g. there was one in the Port Elizabeth township of KwaZakhele that began in April 1985 in response to conflicts over the introduction of mini buses).

The rent/service charge boycotts were often a combination of spontaneous household decisions to stop paying for affordability reasons, and organised strategies by civics and/or youth congresses. Although spontaneous household decisions probably played the most important role, it would be a mistake to ignore the organisational energy that went into organising rent/service charge boycotts in certain communities. In particular, the rent/service charge boycotts connected to a larger nationally conceived campaign against township administration and government. This provided regionally informed and linked local activists with an important motive for introducing and/or supporting the boycotts of service and rental tariffs.

Finally, there were the sustained campaigns against the Community Councils and Black Local Authorities in the region. Prior to the conversion of all Community Councils into fully-fledged local authorities in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act in 1986, there were 46 Community Councils established in terms of the Community Councils Act of 1977 and 4 Town Councils established in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. The campaigns against the councillors and the councils themselves began in earnest from about September 1984 when a spate of service charge increases were promulgated. Local activists probably spent more time and energy mobilising people against these local government structures than anything else. They were motivated by a complex mix of political strategy, response to genuine grievances caused by the injustices of the system and competition between competing local elites. These campaigns - together with the inherent fiscal and administrative weaknesses of the system itself - were responsible for the virtual collapse of black local government by mid-1986. Table 8.5 reflects
the process of collapse over time:10

TABLE 8.5: POLITICAL STATUS OF BLACK LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MAY 1985 TO JULY 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY 1985</th>
<th>JAN. 1986</th>
<th>MAY 1986</th>
<th>JULY 1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Councillors who had resigned from all CCs</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>no info available</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of individual CCs where all Councillors had resigned</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13+</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of CCs without a quorum due to resignations of some, but not all Councillors</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5+</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of CCs where municipal administration had collapsed</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures reveal that the majority of councillors resigned between September 1984 and May 1985, i.e. the period between the start of mass anti-BLA campaigns that began nationally with the Vaal Uprising in September 1984 and the declaration of the first State of Emergency. However, despite the large number of resignations during this period, only 39% of the Councils actually collapsed. The collapse of the majority of Councils (68%) occurred during the second period, i.e. June 1985 to July 1986.
This focus on primary campaigns and the recorded effects of these campaigns does not reveal the complexity of everyday political life in the Eastern Cape communities. As the old apartheid regulatory mechanisms broke down in the face of political pressure and because of their own inherent weaknesses, local activists found themselves having to deal with day-to-day problems. With no resources, hunted by the police and caught up in a whirlwind of fairly disorganised activity, these activists were unable to hold together all the components of the emerging process. At an ideological level they promoted "people's power", i.e. the view that what was being created was the embryo of the new society by direct mass action from below. To quote one popular pamphlet entitled "Forward to People's Power - Down With Minority Rule!":

"1. APARTHEID - THE REAL AGITATOR: The government and its stooges are blaming the current political turmoil on the work of so-called agitators. Before their own ignorant eyes they see how the people destroy the system day by day. No longer are we prepared to wait for Botha to make changes in our country - we are taking our destiny in our own hands. Democracy will not come at the day of our national liberation - it should be built already in the process of destroying the old order. ..... 

"5. BUILD PEOPLE'S POWER EVERYWHERE: The people have long decided that they have to take control over their own destiny. We must consolidate all organisations and the structures which organises and develops politically every single member of the community. Those structures (area committees, street committees, etc) must be tested to see its (sic) ability to sustain struggle. Our people have shown their understanding that organisation can only be strong if they are strong."

Although these structures of "people's power" were far more robust and deep-rooted than some analysts have suggested, it is true that the reality did not measure up to the ideology. Rather than accepting the skepticism of observers like Seekings, a more reliable indicator of the problems with the "people's power" structures comes from the activists who were building these structures. In a report to the UDF compiled by the author, activists identified the following grassroots organisational problems:

* in certain areas where the councillors had resigned, the state's
administrative machinery chose to work through local civic associations and other UDF structures. Although this was seen by activists as recognition of the "people's structures" and hence a victory, many were concerned that by taking responsibility for certain administrative tasks they were effectively helping to "govern apartheid". The road from this to cooption was seen as a very short one indeed. It was this organisational dynamic that underpinned the heated debates about "local-level negotiations" at the time.

although the "people's power structures" were supposed to be more accountable and democratic, in reality the amabutho were only loosely controlled by these structures. This helps explain the controversial people's courts - whereas in certain areas there was evidence that these constituted genuine - albeit very rough - attempts to forge a new form of 'popular justice', there were probably more examples of 'people's courts' that were in fact coercive 'kangaroo courts' that some local leaders tended to distance themselves from. In addition, clearly defined written rules and procedures and the necessary organisational skill to sustain self-organised structures were very rare. This militated against sustainable long-term institution building and opened up these structures to two dangers: top-down coercive control from the leadership and/or undirected spontaneous action from below.

although the language of the ideology of 'people's power' often masked what were in reality quite often very mundane activities of ordinary people involved with the struggle for daily survival in impoverished conditions, this language led the security forces to believe that the street and area committees were in fact part of an elaborate revolutionary plan to revive the 1960-61 cell structure that was devised by the ANC to launch the armed struggle. This, in turn, invited vicious repressive retaliation from the security forces for activities that were probably quite harmless and which had little to do with the crudely armed amabutho squads that were committed to meeting violence with violence.

activists were also concerned about the absence of strong and effective regional and even national coordination of 'people's power'. This weakness, it was argued, meant that campaigns were
shaped by local rather than regional/national demands and that this enabled the state to use different strategies in different areas, e.g. stopping forced removals in Duncan Village (East London) and proceeding with them in Langa.

finally, activists clearly recognised the limits of a movement that was confined to a single group area, namely the black/african group area. It was out of this limitation that the demand for non-racial municipalities emerged in certain areas.

Although a large number of people in the communities were involved in and/or affected by to a lesser or greater degree the campaigns mounted by the local activists during the peak of the revolt during the first six months of 1986, in the end it was a relatively small group of local leaders who had the energy, moral legitimacy, resources and (in some cases) coercive capacity to mount what Robin Palmer has described as the "tenth frontier war". The Black Sash estimated conservatively that 1200 people were detained in the Eastern Cape between June 1986 and late 1988. If it is assumed that the security forces managed to detain at least the rump of the activist leadership, and given the decline in resistance the extraction of this leadership caused, it can be assumed that this constitutes more or less the size of the leadership core that effectively executed the 1984-86 rebellion.

Three conceptions exist of the Eastern Cape rebellion. The first is the "frontier war" image developed from a liberal perspective by Robin Palmer and which appears repeatedly as a powerful leitmotif in the writings of Port Elizabeth-based liberal human rights campaigner Rory Riorden. The second is the orthodox revolutionary line developed by intellectuals close to the UDF and ANC. For them, the Eastern Cape rebellion provided the best example of how an urban-based mass movement could develop into a revolutionary movement capable of challenging state power itself. Thirdly, there was the security force interpretation that took the UDF/ANC position at face value in order to justify its conspiracy theory.

The notion of a clash between two power blocs that these three conceptions share does not help to reveal the way urban conflict leads in complex and locally specific ways to the breakdown of old definitions of the meaning of the urban system and the definition and development of
new meanings more appropriate to changing urban dynamics and processes. Out of the stress and pain of the 1984-86 rebellion there emerged signs and elements of an alternative urban meaning. The clearest indication of this revolved around the notion of a non-racial municipality. In a region-wide survey conducted in 1986 amongst local activist leadership and amongst white local government officials, it was found that the notion of a non-racial municipality was seen as a possible 'fresh start' for the region because it was seen as a concept that all stakeholders could support. It was this concept that became the central concern of a number of local-level negotiations.

The impact of the social movements and negotiations on white local officials was measured in the 1986 survey and it was found that of those interviewed, 63% were in favour of some form of non-racial alternative and that an additional 21% believed that the black township should be administered by the same authority that administered the white town. In April 1986 the Queenstown municipality formally proposed to a conference of the Cape Municipal Association that some form of non-racial municipality should be formed at local level. A similar call was made by the Town Clerk of Port Elizabeth in July 1986 and by the Midlands Chamber of Industries in January 1986.

However, instead of supporting the local negotiation processes in the Eastern Cape that could have allowed this region to amicably resolve problems at the local level, the central state intervened from mid-1986 onwards with three new reform-cum-repressive strategies: the National State of Emergency, Regional Services Councils and township upgrading to the tune of R1 billion over five years for the Eastern Cape (more on this unfolding national process and its impact on Uitenhage in Chapter 9)

**BACK TO UITENHAGE**

The preceding section provides an overview of the changing regional context for the local processes and dynamics that emerged in Uitenhage during the first half of 1986. The complex set of conflictual and negotiation processes that emerged led to concrete changes in how the local stakeholders came to understand the future of Uitenhage's urban system. Although this was overridden by a forced removal managed by the activated security system acting on a central state mandate after the national State of Emergency was declared in July 1986, the processes that
preceded this destructive event gave rise to a new urban project that was finally aloud to come to fruition after the national transition began in 1990. Before examining the actual negotiations in detail, a closer insight into the internal workings of the social movements in Uitenhage is required.

Taking advantage of the general perception in the community that the KTC had decided to take legal action rather than seek negotiated solutions, activists began to strengthen and systematise organisation. They were helped by conditions which were easing and by December, following the famous negotiated settlement that ended the Port Elizabeth Consumer Boycott, security force harassment had diminished considerably. The general feeling in the community was that advances were being made and that victories were possible. It was this sense of expectation coupled to the specificity of Langa's struggle that facilitated the rapid growth and entrenchment of the street and area committees.

Contrary to the popular view that street and area committees were initially produced by a deepening revolutionary rupture between state and people, it was actually the context of breakdown and social disruption towards the end of 1984 that brought people together in small meetings at street level. The most noticeable comment made by all activists when asked about street committees was, to quote a good example, "when it comes to issues of trying to ensure discipline amongst the people, like theft and quarrels, then they [street committees] were quite active." Otherwise, this informant said, "they were not very strong" from a "political" point of view.

The absence of the most basic services such as sewerage, adequate water supplies, drainage, electricity and shelter, made daily life both a struggle and the cause of internal friction. The disposal of buckets of nightsoil when the authorities failed to collect them, for example, created huge problems. If they were disposed in holes dug for the purpose, crucial questions were raised: Where must these holes be? must everybody use them? If so, who will dig the holes? What about water from the few available taps? Numerous squabbles arose when women did their washing at taps while others were queuing up to fill their water buckets. Then, of course, there was the problem of where new arrivals in the community should build their shacks. Each new arrival meant more
pressure on available services, i.e. more people wanting to do their washing, more people in the queue at the tap and more people needing to dispose of their sewerage. The division and fencing-off of yards, garbage disposal, child-care and many other problems of collective living that state agencies usually take care of, became the responsibility of the residents themselves and therefore, a potential source of friction.

In addition to these communal tensions, unemployment and poverty created cleavages within the household. Young unemployed men - especially those who had turned to crime - fed off the household without contributing financially. Furthermore, because they were too poor, they could not afford the lobola required to turn their sexual liaisons into marriage. This often resulted in offspring outside marriage that the parents ended up taking care of. The tensions this caused between unmarried mothers living with "mothers-in-law" frequently blew up into severe arguments about familial rights and duties. The absence of formal marriage arrangements also caused bloody conflicts between men who accused each other of "stealing" women. Then, of course, there were tensions that arose out of the economic redundancy of the traditional male head of the family. When his sons or wife were the breadwinners, his authority was undermined thus removing the traditional patriarchal mechanism for resolving conflict.

These kinds of communal and household tensions are common in impoverished communities and need not necessarily give rise to organic coping mechanisms. However, when these tensions are overlaid by the perceived failure or breakdown of state coordinated regulatory mechanisms, then members of the community can only cope if they find alternative dispute-settling or administrative structures. Given the context of rising levels of violent conflict between police and members of the community and the permanent failure of the KTC to deal with the squatter problem, then it is unsurprising that new forms of social organisation began to emerge to handle communal and household problems. The most logical structure to create in this context was a meeting point for people that occupied an area that brought them into direct daily contact with one another, i.e. the street or block. When asked who were the most active street committee members, Magugu said:

"Most of them were elderly people. The idea [of street
committees] itself was not projected in a political way. People regarded street committees as being things that would look into the problems of the street. This means that if you project that they were acting in that sense, then people would always look for elderly people to take up their problems. Every street in Langa has a street committee. It was something that came up quite rapidly with no political input."26

After the massacre it was these pre-existing structures that came to fulfill two functions: they were identified by the activists as useful networks and meeting points when organisation and meetings were effectively prohibited; and they provided crucially important forums capable of absorbing the influx of people into grassroots structures. This is what underlies the comments of two leading activists:

"Before the massacre they [street committees] had just a low profile. They were there before the massacre, but not very strong and only in some areas. But after the massacre they just rocketed."27

"The police and the community councillors lost control of the people, they have no control over the people. That is why people formed these area committees to prevent the crime rate and keep control of the community."28

Drawing from comments made by activists and my own observations, the following pattern of organisation emerges: before the massacre, inconspicuous forms of local organisation emerge in some areas to handle household and communal problems; after the massacre, there was a massive influx of people into these meeting points and for the first time activists begin using the term "street committee" to describe these meetings; with the declaration of the 1985 Emergency, many of these meetings ceased or got much smaller. It was only towards the end of 1985, from about October, that the most politicised activists in the upper echelons of UYCO began formalising the structures and using them as foci for organisational consolidation under repressive conditions.

The organisational drive from late 1985 sought to create an elected street committee for each street. Once these committees had been elected at rather large but loosely organised house meetings, then they elected
representatives to area committees. Langa was divided into five areas each
presided over by an area committee of between ten and twenty people. The
area committees acted as a higher authority over the street committees, i.e.
structures to which more difficult problems could be referred. Then at
township level, there was a committee elected by the area committees
called the Coordinating Committee or Advisory Committee. These
structures were put into place by energetic groups of activists who would
spend 3-4 weeks concentrating on one specific area. One activist described
the process as follows:

"So what we did was that we went at night for each street and
we called a mass meeting in one of the houses to address the
people. We explained what a street committee was and why
we wanted to form them, what are their future goals so that
the people can have a clear idea of what they are participating
in. One of us has to be there when the street committee was
formed. .. When we finished, the election followed and they
decide who they want to represent them in the street
committee. We make it clear to them that it is very
important to them for street committees to be formed and
especially in these conditions and the situation we are now
in, with the repression of the South African government and
the people fighting under the State of Emergency, banning of
meetings, troops and police. It is very difficult for people to
meet and discuss their problems in mass meetings. So it will
be very dangerous for us when the repression is high to sit
back and wait until the government will allow us to have the
freedom of movement and the freedom of expression. We
must adapt ourselves to work under these conditions and
continue with the struggle."29

Given that many ordinary people in these structures were there to resolve
basic communal and household problems, a key problem lay in how the
balance between control functions and political functions could be
achieved. Many activists complained that the committees had emerged
too quickly and there were too few experienced cadres to give them
direction. Consequently, street committees were not structured by a single
directive from a coordinated leadership centre, nor did they develop in a
unilinear direction. The quirks and concerns of the dominant
personalities played the most crucial role in pushing some committees into coherent organs of political mobilisation, while others became rather disjointed marriage guidance associations or street cleaning collectives. One activist said: "Some of the people you find that it is the first time they participate in these structures and they lack the experience, some don't even know what they are fighting for."30

To coordinate the street and area committees according to coherent guidelines, a new structure was established in late 1985. This was called the Uitenhage People's Congress (UPECO). It met on Wednesdays and the chairpeople of all the area committees attended. Representatives of the executives of all the organisations also attended these meetings. The main activity of these meetings was to deal with problems, queries and issues raised in area committee meetings that needed to be referred to a higher authority. UPECO would then discuss the ways of handling these issues and if action was required, tasks would be assigned to the relevant organisations, i.e. civic matters to URECO, youth matters to UYCO, women's issues to UWCO, and so forth. If there was a very serious matter too sensitive to handle even within UPECO, then the "Committee of Ten" would meet secretly to decide on a course of action. It was within UPECO that activists formulated in early 1986 a "code of conduct" and "timetable" for these committees that stipulated what days of the week they should meet and when "social problems" or "political issues" should be discussed.

The UPECO exercise was an attempt to formalise the dual function of the committees and in this respect was only partially successful. In the end, the removal and police violence (e.g. funerals) became the main "political issues" that were discussed at street level. There was very little evidence that any "ideological education" took place in the committees (e.g. study groups, discussion of ANC strategy, or even UDF educational material, etc). The "social problems" discussed included domestic squabbles, crime control, street cleaning, shack allocation, health conditions, child care, transport problems and occasionally unemployment. The most important of these was crime control which included issues ranging from petty crime, to marriage problems, to neighbourhood conflicts.

In general the committees dealt with petty crime. Thieves were found and ordered to return the goods to the original owner, thugs who had assaulted people would be required to cover the medical fees of those who
had been assaulted, wife beaters would be brought together with their wives and relatives to talk about the family problems and adulterers were treated in the same way - a not too dissimilar role as that played by the Peacemakers during an earlier period.

There was also a general campaign to disarm the criminals or at least to prevent them from carrying arms into shebeens. Shebeens were given specific times to close so that troublesome drunks could be kept off the streets at night. This was an effective way of making the walk home through Langa's dark unlit streets measurably safer for thousands of workers. The general principle was to avoid the use of physical force. The emphasis, instead, was to use a political logic to divert grievances outwards against the state. Made expressed this in these terms:

"In these things we get a chance of educating people about our struggle. We try and bring people nearer to our cause. What we say is that fighting each other as oppressed people won't help us, the major thing which people must concentrate on is our fight against the system."31

On why the shebeens were told to close at 9.00 am, Made said: "It is because some of these fights and attacks start as people leave the shebeens for home and most importantly because people can be victims of the system which is patrolling our streets."32

Major crime, however, was not dealt with by the committees. This was not for any theoretical or moral reason, but because in practical terms crimes such as rape required medical examination. Murder too was referred to the police. There was no people's court in Langa, although there was one in KwaNobuhle.

The street and area committees were crucial not only for the mobilisation of power, but for the instrumental use of that power to win recognition and concessions via the negotiation process. Without this network of committees, the leadership would never have been able to negotiate because a mechanism for obtaining mandates and gauging opinion would not have been available. Made said:
"Whatever we do we get the mandate from the street committees. Even under this heavy repression we do hold meetings and so we do get mandates from the people. ... So that we know that from each street the problems of the street will come. In each and every street we will know what is happening and what we will go to present to the authorities is really a reflection of the real situation."33

"The community supports these negotiations. All the negotiating committees have to report back to the community. The community monitors these negotiations through the street and area committees. Even before we go to negotiate we scout for views and suggestions from the people through the street committees."34

Street committee meetings varied in size and frequency. When a particular section of the township was faced with a direct threat, e.g. vigilante action or removal, then large meetings of a few hundred could take place a few times a week. This, however, was unusual. Most of the time, a large meeting of a few hundred people from the street would meet fortnightly or even less often. The street committees themselves started off by meeting weekly, but as the crisis mounted during the months that led up to the 1986 Emergency, they began to meet more often. The smaller more disciplined area committees provided the link between the street and leadership levels. This coordination became particularly important during the negotiation phases.

The story of Mrs. Peta, a middle-aged assistant in a dental surgery and mother of a son in his early twenties, was typical of these times. Whereas before the 1985 Emergency she used to make disparaging comments about her son's politics and why he needed to take such risks "for nothing", by early 1986 she was participating in her local street committee. Interviewed in mid-1987 when talking of this activity was dangerous, she had this to say:

* Q: Are there street committees now in Langa? A: They are afraid to come out. Q: And before? A: Ya ... Q: Before the Emergency, did they exist? A: Ya! Yoh! Q: Did you go to the meetings? A: Ya, I used to but I don't want people to know I used to go to those meetings. Q: Weren't they mainly youths?
A: There were older people. Older than me. ... There was one in our street. Q: When did it start? A: Somewhere in '85-'86. Q: how many were in the street committee? A: It used to take place once a week. Sometimes only a few would come and other times about twenty. Q: How involved were the older people? A: They used to be the chairmen. Q: Not the youth? A: No.

This story confirms what was probably the most significant aspect of the street committees, namely their ability to facilitate grassroots participation. Recognising this, one activist said:

"Street committees are the best way of organising and mobilising people. It is the easiest way of having campaigns and support and making the point that at least the people will support and participate fully in our campaigns. It is the easiest way again to help the people and get their ideas, sometimes more so than in mass meetings, because in mass meetings some people are free to express their ideas, but many people are afraid, maybe because they think their ideas will not be accepted by the whole."35

The most dramatic interpretation of the role of the street committees was given at a mass meeting of squatters in May 1986. The speaker got up and said:

"Comrades, when we talk of the clause of the Freedom Charter that says "the people shall govern", it is not right. This is because the people are governing! Today we have the people's government that did not exist when the Freedom Charter was written during the times of Z.K. Mathews in 1955. If you have a problem with your house, take the matter to your government and not to the puppet local authorities. The people have started to exercise their own future government of South Africa, just as it has been prophesied in the Charter in 1955."36

At the end of his speech he said: "Viva the people's government, Viva!". The crowd replied: "VIVA!" The speaker: "The People ...!" The Crowd: "... are governing." And a new slogan was coined.37
Although "the youth" played an important role in the build-up of popular power, this was an extremely problematic role because in the final analysis, their tendency to use arbitrary violence and act autonomously from civic structures that critically weakened the support-base of the community organisations in the long run. The activist leadership were acutely aware of these problems but failed to secure durable structures to control the amabutho.

Although youth groups committed to meeting violence with violence emerged as early as 1984, it took some time before a formal structure evolved. By mid-1985 the amabutho were organised into so-called "action committees" whose role was consciously defined in military terms. It is essential to note that this organisational initiative and self-definition came from within amabutho ranks and not from the activist leadership or formal community organisations. The action committees had a crude military command structure and enforced their own internal military discipline. The most well organised groups comprised people who changed their names and began living together in groups on the outskirts of the townships in what they referred to as "bases". Up until late 1985 there was an overall military commander - referred to as a "general" - who coordinated the activities of the action committees. However, he was captured by the security forces, charged for Umkhonto We Sizwe activities and sentenced to 24 years in prison. Although the General had managed to keep the amabutho under control to some extent, after his capture the action committees became increasingly violent as an anti-social element gained the upper hand in some areas.

The activist leadership were forced to step in to take counter-measures. A Military Council was established and a group of "commanders" appointed who were politically aware and trustworthy from the activist's point of view, but also respected by the amabutho. The identity of this Council remained secret, except for the overall commander who was the liaison between the area committees and the action committees. In other words, the activist leadership could only control the amabutho to the extent that they could retain the loyalty of some key amabutho leaders. Not all amabutho were UYCO members and even if they were, this was not formal disciplined membership in the organisational sense. This rather
tenuous link was coupled to the permanent possibility and reality of tension between the autonomous action committees on the one hand and the street and area committees on the other. 39

The activist leadership were painfully aware that without a disciplined relationship between the area committees and executives of the community organisations on the one hand and the action committees and Military Council on the other, they would be unable to prevent the amabutho from using force against the community. As a result the activist leaders worked out a framework for winning the allegiance of the amabutho. To quote Made's version of this:

"What I did was never condemn them and I tried to say look I think we can move together and sit together and tell stories and discuss the history of resistance. I found them so fascinated when I told them we can discover a history of resistance from the time of the Youth League when Mandela joined the struggle in 1943, the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 and the formation of Umkhonto We Sizwe. They were so interested and they listened. What I found out was that when you talk to them about MK they were very interested in that they would like to imitate it. They would ask me to tell them about Umkhonto. I told them that MK was the most disciplined military and so they wanted to imitate that discipline. I told them that anyone who has done something wrong in MK made a correction and was disciplined by the army. MK is very loyal to the ANC and MK is aware that it cannot negotiate with the Botha government, it is only Mandela, Oliver Tambo and the ANC that goes there. MK is there to protect the people and to confuse the government. So they took all those things into the local situation. They saw us as the ANC, so that is why they are now very loyal, because of what I have told them." 40

The amabutho commanders confirmed this conception of the relationship when they said:

"Before we do anything we go to the people and tell them. If they refuse we stop, because it is the people who must govern, not amabutho. ... The action committee consults
with the executive and the area committee. ... The area committee has stopped us to kill people here in the township."41

The activist leadership understood the youth and knew how to handle them. Displaying a sensitive insight into the problem, Made said:

"You find that young people are so emotional, they think that we are going to get liberation tomorrow, so some of the things they do are out of hand, but they are innocent because they think they are doing the right thing without any knowledge that they are wrong."42

The amabutho had their own internal disciplinary structure. If any resident had a complaint about the behavior of one of their members, this was taken up through the area committees and then to the leadership who would then take the matter up with the Military Council. Usually the military council would isolate the offender for a few weeks, confining him to his house. Or, if the crime was severe enough, he would be physically punished.

Despite these formal structures and agreements, the cut and thrust of township conflict, unstable conditions and the sheer enormity of the demands on the relatively small activist leadership prevented the amabutho from being brought effectively under control. Although amabutho violence was drastically reduced by about February 1986, there were still occasional reports of arbitrary violence, e.g. stonings of buses, beatings of consumer boycott breakers, killing of "AZAPO" supporters43 and forcible disruption of funerals of "sellouts". For every activist who was detained, a potential controller of amabutho violence was removed. At times, Magugu said, the "amabutho became a reign of terror over the community."44 In the end, the amabutho took on the system where the community was weakest - on the streets and barricades. Any security policeman worth his salt had ample opportunity to exploit this; all he needed was a handful of agent provocateurs.

(On a lighter note, it is worth mentioning that the amabutho developed a strange anti-shebeen alliance with middle-class women. Both these groups had a vested interest in running down shebeens - the amabutho because
they could not afford the costs of shebeen liquor and hence had no access
to the women who frequented the shebeens; and the middle-aged mothers
who held the view that their daughters "got pregnant" because they went
to shebeens. So when the amabutho enforced the closure of shebeens at
9.00 pm, this met with considerable approval from older women.)

COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS

Langa and KwaNobuhle had very different organisational structures. In
general, the leadership of the various community organisations was based
in KwaNobuhle and revolved largely around Ficks Kobese of
MACWUSA, Emson Banda who was chairperson of the Parents
Committee and Wonga Nkala, president of the Uitenhage Youth
Congress. These articulate, politicised and public figures were well known
in UDF circles as the "Uitenhage comrades" and could draw on a support-
base of students, youth and a relatively small group of MACWUSA
organised workers. The inner policy-making structure was the so-called
"Committee of 10" - a secret committee that gave effect to its decisions via
the various organisations. Significantly, KwaNobuhle did not have street
committees. Instead, area committees and the executives of the
organisations were the key structures. The youth played an important
directing role in these structures. Furthermore, a people's court was
established.

The organisational links between Langa's structures and the largely
KwaNobuhle-based community organisations were very unclear. This was
probably due to the mobilisation of support bases with different profiles.
Unlike in KwaNobuhle, the Langa structures were rooted in the material
requirements of impoverished residents living in an unserviced
township. Social cohesion depended on organisation at street level.
Furthermore, some of the leading Langa activists had strong links with
COSATU unions.

Very few of Langa's activists held formal executive positions in any of the
organisations and none of them were public figures or well known in
UDF (or COSATU) circles. Langa's street and area committees were not
given formal representation in the KwaNobuhle-based structures except,
of course, when they were specifically invited to send representatives to
meetings of activists. This division between the Langa and KwaNobuhle
leadership was reflected in where they were contactable: the KwaNobuhle leadership could invariably be found in the Black Sash funded Advice Office on the south east side of town, while the Langa leadership usually gathered at the COSATU offices on the north western fringe of town next to Langa.

Given that Uitenhage's formal community organisations had very shallow roots in Langa, it was not surprising that the Langa Coordinating Committee became the de facto civic representative of Langa’s residents as the squatter struggle against removal became the dominant dynamic of resistance in the community. Instead of simply acting as a delegation to represent squatter grievances to the authorities, it became a key coordinator of organisation and struggle. It also came to represent Langa’s struggle as special and therefore distinct from KwaNobuhle’s. It was this, plus the leadership’s union connections, that resulted in a power struggle over the Langa issue between the Langa and KwaNobuhle leaderships.

The dominance of the KwaNobuhle leadership meant that Langa's leadership had virtually no access to resources. Langa's organisational infrastructure was built and sustained without financial support. There were no full-time paid organisers, nor was there money for pamphlets, reading material, offices, legal assistance or publicity. The financial resources that did exist were accessible largely to the KwaNobuhle leadership. The unionists at least had offices which gave the Langa leadership access to a telephone, a meeting place to connect with outside support workers and occasionally a photostat machine. Normal organisational procedures were absent such as, for example, bookkeeping, budgets, minute taking, membership lists, training, specialisation, documentation and forward planning. Not even the activists were sustained by donations to cover their living expenses, a particularly severe problem for those who were unemployed. Instead, most activists made up for all these organisational deficiencies with Herculean efforts to inform their communities without media, to sustain organisation without resources, to build support without promises of improvements and lead without clearly defined structures. It is not surprising they were continuously exhausted and often fell asleep or arrived late during crucial meetings - much to the disdain of the relaxed support workers, visitors and media people.
Contrary to expectations, this situation was not improved by the founding of URECO in January 1986. This was an important step for the whole anti-removal struggle because up until this stage the LCC was largely an ad hoc grouping of leaders whose organisational connection with the main organisations and street committees was unclear. It made sense, therefore, that a "civic" take responsibility for the removal. Unfortunately, the initiative to establish URECO came from the KwaNobuhle-based Kobese grouping who had, until this stage, attempted to dislodge the Langa leadership located in the LCC from their position as representatives of Langa's high profile anti-removal struggle. URECO was formed at a meeting in KwaNobuhle to which the Langa leadership were not invited and the key resolution of the meeting concerned the removals. However, after the Langa leadership threatened to publicly denounce URECO, Weza Made accepted an offer of an executive position in the organisation thus preventing an open rupture amongst the leadership. Made's demand to be included in the URECO executive could not be ignored because he had the full backing of Langa's street and area committees plus significant COSATU unionists based at Volkswagen, although the latter did not count for much in the eyes of Kobese and his associates.

If Langa's social movement had had absolutely no access to resources, it's impact on state and society would have been negligible. The LCC connected with various "operators" which gave the movement access to crucial media, academic and publicity resources. There were four groups of operators: lawyers, academics, media personnel and service organisations. By far the most important service organisation was the Grahamstown Rural Committee (GRC). GRC was established as part of the network of rural support groups loosely affiliated to the National Committee Against Removals (NCAR). GRC had a local committee of progressive Grahamstown-based intellectuals and employed Sue Lund, an ex-student activist from Rhodes and member of the UDF affiliated Grahamstown Democratic Action Committee. Lund had a fairly well equipped office in Grahamstown and a nation-wide network of support group contacts to draw on. GRC's main function was the coordination of legal aid and publicity. PLANACT, a collective of engineers, architects, planners and urban sociologists, complemented GRC's activities by acting as consultants on the upgrading proposals the LCC presented to the authorities. PLANACT was based in Johannesburg, had offices, funds, full-time workers and its members were largely left-wing intellectuals. Without
these skills, the LCC would not have been able to present alternative planning proposals to the state. Finally, there was Mono Badela of City Press and Patrick Bracher, a Port Elizabeth lawyer. Badela committed himself to keeping Langa in the news which meant there was good international coverage because of the way foreign media used to take their queue from City Press reports. Bracher, whose fees were covered by the Urban Foundation via the Legal Resources Centre, became a crucial source of legal aid and advice throughout the struggle.

In short, Langa's social movement was made largely by the voluntary practices of the people whose grievances it represented. Welling up from below, these grievances generated an organisational structure that enabled people to cope and live in conditions of deep conflict, violence and grinding poverty. Wanting only to protect their space and right to create their own environment, Langa's residents could mobilise only one resource their collective capacity to organise, protest and demand. It was only when the movement connected with its operators that it had access to resources, but this was on terms the movement's structures had no direct control over. Unlike comparable movements,46 these resources did not become the foundation of a stabilised professional leadership.

IDEOLOGY

The most distinctive feature about the popular ideology of township movements in the 1980s was their complexity. The mix of ideas, symbols, demands and perceptions was not codified by a single ideological centre. Nor did the movements have a uniform class profile across localities. The specificities of each local terrain of struggle also generated different ideologies and consciousness. In this section an attempt will be made to reconstruct the world-view of Uitenhage's social movement.47

Uitenhage's popular ideology was a complex mix of apparently contradictory elements. A speech made by UYCO president, Wonga Nkala, to 60 000 people on the first anniversary of the massacre, is an example worth quoting to illustrate this point:

"In 1960 all the people of South Africa were complaining about the unfair distribution of wages. They were also protesting against the carrying of passes. In 1960 the people
were shot dead in Sharpeville for having fought this. This regime continues to assault and attack the people. Today we are saying, this country is not ours, but it is our father's country. This is our forefather's country. This country belongs to Hintsa, Naka, Cetshwayo, Moeshoeshoe and many others. We therefore can't betray that to anybody whatever it may cost. We are prepared to fight shoulder to shoulder, we are prepared to travel together on this journey from Egypt into the promised land. We are prepared to die together or lie with one another on the road to freedom. We say enough is enough."48

National liberation was one of the more important ideological elements in Langa's social movement. By this is meant the view that, to quote one activist, "this is an illegitimate government" that "we must bring down".49 In order "to be liberated in our lifetime", one speaker urged, "we have the street committees and area committees. We are here to build the people's government and this demands your commitment and participation."50 For the average activist, this struggle was a non-racial struggle. This message was repeated ad nauseam. Talking in deep Xhosa at a mass meeting of squatters, one speaker said: "We must commit ourselves to educate our people about non-racialism because our struggle is not about colour. We therefore invite the white community to join us."51 One of Weza Made's concerns was the ideological consequences of the white petition against the squatters: "People are saying the white man is the enemy."52 The most remarkable feature about Langa during this period - and indeed throughout the country - was the extent to which non-racialism had penetrated downwards to the grassroots. From the most uneducated battle-scarred amabutho fighter to the urbane left-wing intellectuals, non-racialism was an accepted principle.

The notion that the enemy was the "illegitimate white minority regime" and that this had to be dismantled by an organised popular movement based on a complex network of "people's committees" was coupled to an uncontested definition of who the leading organisations and people were. To quote one well-known song:

"The ANC is the organisation (3 times);
The government is scared of that ;
Oliver Tambo is our leader (3 times);
The government is scared of that (2 times);
Mandela is our leader (3 times);
Umkhonto is going to seize the land (3 times);
COSATU is going to lead us."

The Congress movement was not only seen as leading the struggle in real terms, but it was also seen as a tradition that could be appealed to when mobilising the "older people". To quote one activist:

"It is very difficult to organise old people, because some of them have lost hope and some of them have found it very difficult to get work. So if you address them you must address them in a way that interests them, like if you remind them about the sacrifice of their leaders, like Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. ... [This is] so that they can remember the old days, the Defiance Campaign and sacrifices by our leaders in the past."

In terms of long-term perspectives, Made summed up popular consciousness when he said in answer to the question "What do you think will happen in the long-term?"

"The South African government doesn't see that the majority of the people support the African National Congress and regard Nelson Mandela as their leader. Botha must release Mandela and talk to him about the future of this country. The majority are not demanding that the black man must rule this country. They are demanding that everybody must have a right to this country, regardless of colour or race. No group must dominate over another group. If the South African government can release all political prisoners and allow those who were forced to go into exile to come back to their country, and unban all those who have been banned, then freedom and democracy will rule in this country. This is the only solution I see. I believe in one-man-one-vote. The people must choose their leaders."53

The Langa movement's working class profile at leadership and rank-
and-file level meant it was receptive to socialist ideas that depicted the interests of the workers, homeless and unemployed as lying beyond simply the dismantling of apartheid. This socialist discourse mingled relatively easily with the ideology of national liberation. One speaker told a mass meeting in Langa:

"I am saying the struggle continues. It will only end when we have dismantled apartheid and when we have destroyed the capitalist economic system. We are being removed because the government is protecting the interests of the capitalist class."54

Another speaker at the same meeting said:

"To all those who believe in the national struggle and as an oppressed nation, we know that the government is trying to hide behind its racial laws and we know the monopolistic power of capital and we know that we are the creators of wealth in this country. We know that his wealth is being appropriated by Anglo-American, Barlow Rand and the Rembrandt Group and these are the people who together with the government are responsible for these removals."55

There were times when socialists explicitly criticised the "petty bourgeois leadership" of the national movement, with one activist saying "we are not prepared to be diverted in our direction as the working class by the petty bourgeoisie". The most dramatic public statement of socialist loyalties came during the Langa commemoration meeting on 21st March 1986. Wonga Nkala, UYCO president, began his address to the 60 000-strong crowd as follows:

WN: Long live the spirit of Karl Marx!
Crowd: Long live!
WN: Long live the spirit of Lenin, long live!
Crowd: Long live!
WN: Long live the spirit of Moses Kotane, long live!
Crowd: Long live!
WN: Long live the spirit of Moses Mabhida, long live!
Crowd: Long live!
WN: Long live the spirit of Oliver Tambo, long live!

Crowd: Long live!
WN: Long live Joe Slovo, long live!
Crowd: Long live!

As far as the implications of this socialist discourse for practical politics was concerned, it became clear during the early months of 1986 that the basis for unity between unions and community organisations was the perceived link between "exploitation wages" in the factories and the cost of housing in the communities. One unionist put it this way:

"We know that the struggle of the workers is not only confined to the factory floor, but it goes beyond the factory floor. We know that the rent we have to pay cannot come from our meagre wages. We know that the money we earn is not sufficient to pay the ever-increasing transportation costs. It is therefore for these reasons that the shop stewards must work hand-in-hand with other activists outside the factory."

Although socialism and trade unionism are not synonymous, there is no doubt that Uitenhage's trade unions were partly responsible for the introduction of socialist discourse into the wider movement. At the same time, straight trade unionism - understood as collective bargaining over the terms of employment - was an extensive and accepted part of popular consciousness. This role was rarely questioned, except when trade unions used the imperatives of this role to justify non-support for popular campaigns. The point is trade unions provided a model of how mass organisation around short-term economic demands should be linked to long-term political goals. It was this conception of the relationship between short- and long-term objectives that translated itself into the community context when forced removals were thrust onto the agenda. The result was the emergence of the third key element in Langa's popular ideology, namely urban reform.

Urban reform refers to those strategies that involved bargaining over the terms of urban living. This included the demand for upgrading as an alternative to removal. Weza Made said this to a question put to him by a visiting UDF activist:
"Q: In your opinion, how do you think the people can go beyond the point they have reached?
A: We have short term and long term plans in our struggle. Our short term plans are seeing that Uitenhage becomes developed to a standard which is comparable to other towns. In the long term we want to see a national strengthening of area committees, unions and student organisations."\(^{58}\)

It went without saying that the short-term objective could not be achieved unilaterally. It involved - as in Uitenhage - of necessity bargaining with the state over immediate concessions to sustain an organised base for struggle over the long term.

Urban reform was linked in practice to national liberation through the process of "people's power". The street and area committees were a system of local democracy necessary for the urban reform strategy but also intimately connected to a conception of liberation. This desire to democratise local power and empower local communities was a common feature of urban movements in other parts of the world.\(^{59}\) It arose, in the South African context, out of a need to win control over the mechanisms of urban regulation as the first step towards creating a liberatory system of administration. This was a natural and logical opposite to the corrupt bureaucratic Black Local Authority system. One speaker told a mass meeting:

"The people today are governing their own affairs. If you have a water leakage problem, we put on our overalls and help. We take your problems and make them ours. We wake up in the middle of the night and help immediately."\(^{60}\)

Weza Made captured, as usual, the complexity in these simple terms:

"Street committees is where all the people are participating. Its where they are producing people's power. It is where they will learn to govern themselves and make decisions about what they need or what they desire for the future of this country. So they will learn at the local level. We hope this will spread to other townships in other parts of the country."
What we aim is to improve the government from the local level."61

Finally, militarism was also mixed into this already complex web of discourses. Although the UDF's formal position was one of non-violence, and although the community organisations and local leadership in Uitenhage firmly refused to sanction any deviation from this, the amabutho groups brought with them a lexicon and set of symbols that glorified the armed struggle and Umkhonto We Sizwe. The "toyi toyi", the commonly worn black beret, the petrol bomb and wooden AK 47s, were all manifestations of a militaristic sub-culture that became part of township life and political meetings. The most common amabutho songs were:

"The boer is oppressing us (repeated);
The SADF is shooting us like animals (x 3);
Kill the boer (several times)."

And:

"We won't abandon Umkhonto we Sizwe (x5);
These boer blood suckers won't get us (x3); We won't abandon Umkhonto We Sizwe (x3)."

And:

"Have hope parents;
Have hope workers;
Umkhonto is going to assure us of our victory."

The first verse of a well known poem called "Run guerrilla run" goes:

"Run guerrilla run
Chase them for the run
Get Botha and Malan
Destroy mother, father and son
'Till they say to you
Number one
Run guerrilla run."

The amabutho see themselves as soldiers. One senior commander
said during a group discussion:

"I don't want to school or work. I want to fight for freedom. We will go to school and work after we have won our freedom."62

Another member of this group said: "We are prepared to talk to them [the government], but if they kill, we are also going to kill them."

In short, national liberation, socialism, trade unionism, urban reform, local democracy and militarism come together in an intricate blend of discourses that was fluid, fragile and uncodified. There were no formal institutions or even permanent organisations to reproduce them. The rise and fall of different forces as the cut and thrust of struggle went through different phases, brought some discourses to the fore while others were suppressed. During times of popular power new symbols and slogans were forged and invariably found their way into the local public eye as graffiti and/or in pamphlets and speeches. Langa’s social movement had its own language, messages and culture. However, when the entire community was eventually dismantled shack-by-shack in 1986, the organisational infrastructure that reproduced this popular ideology was smashed. The discourses of this consciousness then sank down to subterranean levels only to re-surface when the Emergency ended, but by then urban reform had become the dominant discourse.

**URBAN REFORM IN PRACTICE: EXPLOITING THE CONTRADICTIONS**

Given the context within which popular mobilisation was taking place, the mere existence of popular structures was insufficient when it came to making gains. This grassroots power needed to be coupled to the use of a range of instruments if the outcome was going to be anything other than straight repression. From late 1985 but more concertedly from early January 1986, a combination of tactics were devised to complement grassroots organising.

Realising the importance of communicating their demands as widely as possible, the activists worked closely with their allies to publicise Langa’s struggle. Working closely with Sue Lund of the GRC, Mono Badela of City Press and the author, the activists attempted to build Langa into a story that could remain in the headlines. This turned out to be a remarkably
successful strategy, mainly because the Langa massacre had turned the township into one of South Africa's most well known after places like Soweto and Crossroads. A number of international TV documentaries were made by foreign crews and local newspapers regularly carried news from Langa. There is no doubt that this helped keep the pressure on the authorities, but more importantly, it helped build a self-confidence in the community and amongst the leadership.

With regard to KTC's supreme court application, a decision was taken to contest it. Significantly, this decision did not follow a debate in the organisations. It was assumed with very little discussion that lawyers needed to be retained and responding affidavits filed. Although there was an awareness that optimism about the outcome should not replace the need for organisation, there was still a surprisingly hopeful view even amongst the activists that the court would rule in favour of the squatters. This optimism was probably due more to an internal moral belief that the squatters were right in what they were doing than a faith in the justice of the legal system. As far as the activists were concerned, they constantly reiterated the danger of a full-frontal violent confrontation between the authorities and the squatters if the removals went ahead. The prospect that this moment could be postponed by way of a protracted legal battle was more than appealing to them. Nevertheless, in a brief meeting that the LCC initiated with the KTC in February, Made urged the KTC to withdraw its case because the people were unwilling to defend themselves in court and would not, in any case, respect the findings of the court.64

The most important part of the overall strategy used to counter the removals - besides grassroots organisation - was the commissioning of an alternative development plan. GRC, BESG and PLANACT were instructed to proceed with the survey as the first step towards formulating an alternative upgrading plan for Langa. The brief to BESG and PLANACT was to formulate an upgrading plan based on four principles: (a) upgrading must take place for the whole of Langa, not just a part as the KTC was recommending; (b) the plan must take into account the needs of all strata, particularly the unemployed; (c) financial formulae must be based on what people can afford; (d) the upgrading process must be democratically controlled. The decision to go ahead with this initiative without official sanction was communicated to the KTC at a meeting on 3rd February. One of the resolutions taken at the end of this meeting that
expressed the feelings of the LCC went as follows:

"That all planning with regard to the upgrading of Kabah BE DONE in conjunction with the Coordinating Committee of Kabah. Furthermore that it BE NOTED that any planning done without the consent of the committee would be rejected by the people of Kabah."65

It was decided not to abandon negotiations. However, the activists ruled out any possibility of talking sense into the KTC officials and decided, therefore, to meet the Task Group which was perceived as a higher authority that may be more rational and responsive. To reach the Task Group, activists decided to try to go through the KTC once again and also the Urban Foundation. At the February 3rd meeting with the KTC, the LCC's main request was that the KTC make contact with the Task Group to ask it to meet the LCC. In addition, the academics were requested to set up a meeting with the Urban Foundation which, the activists decided, would be requested to support Langa's struggle and take steps to pressurise Dr. Scheepers into meeting the LCC. It was this meeting that saw the beginning of the most interesting phase of the Langa story: the development of an alliance between business, trade unions and community organisations. However, unlike in the Crossroads case, this alliance was not characterised by the dominance of business and reformist interests.66

The Urban Foundation (UF) meeting took place on Sunday 10 November, two days after the notices were handed to the 9th-4th Avenue squatters. The high-powered UF delegation comprised Dr. Robin Lee, Managing Director of the UF; Roger Matlock, Director, Eastern Cape Region of the UF; Anne Bernstein, Director, Urbanisation Unit. The LCC delegation comprised the core Uitenhage leadership: Weza Made, Freddie Magugu, Sipho Mandabana and Nelson Teyise. The others present were Sue Lund of GRC, Father Lerniham (catholic priest in whose house the meeting took place), Glenn Adler (an American student) and the author.67

After all the parties had introduced their roles and after some discussion that helped clarify the function and purpose of the UF, Made explained why the meeting had been called:

"The delegation decided to call the UF. They came to
the conclusion that it was vital to call the UF to talk with it. The question of eviction and the feasibility of upgrading: maybe the government can approve upgrading, that we don’t know. The KwaNobuhle Town Council will opt for the UF and try to co-opt it to its side and I think that would be a major problem."

Magugu reiterated the point when he said:

“If ever the government decides to go ahead, it is highly likely that the UF will be co-opted and used against the residents. The UF has the expertise and is in a position to help as the people involved in these activities."

The agreement reached between the LCC and the UF was as follows:

* the UF would support the Langa community’s opposition to removal;

* the UF would approach Dr. Scheepers, chairperson of the Task Group, in order to arrange for a meeting between him and the LCC;

* the UF’s Eastern Cape office would provide the technical skills required to compile an upgrading plan, with Dr. Mike Sutcliffe of the BESG as the coordinator of the technical side;

* no press statements or meetings with government officials without the knowledge of the LCC;

* UF must only consult with the LCC on the question of Langa, no-one else has a mandate to represent the community on this issue.

As far as the activists were concerned, this meeting was a success because it won them a powerful ally and the UF could provide crucial technical skills in the event of state approval of upgrading. The significance of this alliance only emerged later when the state attempted to undermine it. The UF team was under surveillance when it arrived in Uitenhage. That night, the UF’s Port Elizabeth offices were broken into and searched. More significantly, Minister Heunis later communicated his displeasure to the UF’s Managing Director Jan Steyn questioning why the UF had agreed to
cover the legal costs of the Supreme Court action. Heunis communicated this grievance to leading Afrikaner corporate businessman Fred du Plessis as well. As far as the KTC officials were concerned, PLANACT and BESG were merely UF fronts that Matlock established to hide his involvement in Langa.69

Made was under no illusions about the game that needed to be played. He said this to a visiting UDF organiser:

"We called the director of the Urban Foundation and its Eastern Cape director. We told them that the people see the Foundation as a government created structure and the people are aware that the Urban Foundation was created immediately after the 1976 riots for the purpose of neutralising and normalising the situation. In its projects it works hand-in-hand with the councillors which are not representing our community. We told them that most of their projects are unpopular among the people. They build houses which people cannot afford, and the rental of their houses is expensive. We even told them that they are helping the government by forcibly removing people for its strategic reasons by building these houses. We asked them to disassociate themselves from the government if they want to regain credibility. We told that in future if they want to build houses they must consult with the people."70

Meeting the LCC made a substantial impact on Matlock. Whereas before the meeting he was extremely nervous that the community leaders were about to criticise the activities of his organisation, some months later he explained to the author that the meeting was the start of a new set of relationships between the UF and extra-parliamentary organisations in the Eastern Cape.71 Obviously, this re-alignment affected the UF's relationships with the state. In particular, in a letter to Erasmus, Matlock spelt out his support for, (a) "process oriented housing mechanisms as opposed to the normal product oriented housing delivery mechanism"; (b) in-situ upgrading of informal settlements; and (c) the necessity for "forming a coalition with communities in the planning and implementation of select projects".72 Obviously these policies differed drastically from the KTC's technicist top-down approach and should be
interpreted as a response to pressures and demands emanating from the black communities that the UF had to deal with.

Just over a month after the meeting with the UF, Roger Matlock sent an internal memo to Robin Lee enclosing a letter he recommended should be sent by Lee to Dr. Scheepers of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning.73 This letter was a follow up to a meeting that Lee had with Scheepers in the weeks that followed the original meeting. After referring to discussions with representatives of multinational companies who were signatories to the Sullivan Principles, the letter went on to warn about unrest and calls for direct negotiations between the government and LCC. The most important paragraphs of this rather remarkable letter are quoted in full:

"The multinational companies in Uitenhage are strongly supportive of their employee's aspirations, including their rights to live where they like and to express their political rights in whichever way possible. As a result of the international focus on Uitenhage prompted by the incident in Kabah in March 1985, they are extremely concerned about the adverse effect on their presence in South Africa which a further similar incident would invariably precipitate. It is their belief that no action which is contrary to the attached draft corporate statement on fundamental human rights should be undertaken. ....

"... [F]rom the Urban Foundation's limited degree of contact with the residents of Kabah it does appear that they are a highly organised community which has shown a great deal of solidarity with regard to the retention and upgrading of Kabah. ...

"In conclusion, I feel that the time is ripe for an agreement to be negotiated between the authorities and the community for the replanning of Kabah."

During December, January and the early part of February, the activists concentrated on building organisation and completing the survey. Sutcliffe and Lund drafted the survey and after a group of Uitenhage volunteers were trained to administer the questionnaires by someone connected to the Institute for Social and Economic Research at Rhodes University, a sample was drawn and the work began in earnest. It was by
no means a simple task. After the security police cottoned onto what was happening, activists caught at roadblocks in possession of surveys were immediately detained. The completed surveys were stashed with a sympathetic nun at a nearby convent. Despite numerous problems and breakdowns, the surveys were eventually completed. By mid-February they had been sent to Sutcliffe who began processing them.

About the time the questionnaires were completed, the lawyers notified the activists that the date set for the court case was 25 March. This gave the activists little over a month, but they also realised the need to take full advantage of the fact that the court case was to take place four days after the first anniversary of the Langa massacre. In conjunction with PLANACT and GRC members, the LCC activists formulated a strategy. This involved the completion of an upgrading report under the auspices of PLANACT and in conjunction with GRC and BESG. This report, the LCC decided, had to be completed before the court case so that a press conference could be held to announce the community’s own proposals for a peaceful solution to the Langa problem. Significantly, the LCC decided to invite everyone to this press conference: the UDF affiliates, trade unions, all Uitenhage employers, the KTC, police, Dr. Scheepers and even Minister Heunis and his senior officials.

In the meantime, the number of Langa squatters was increasing. It is worth discussing in greater detail the development of a new growth point in the Kamesh Rd area that the KTC decided to take action against (see map 8.5) The ground occupied by the squatters was formerly proclaimed for black residential but this was revoked in 1981. People began erecting their shacks in this area in early November. On November 4th 1985, a number of these were demolished by the Uitenhage municipality. From that point on the number of shacks increased as follows.74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of Shacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 November</td>
<td>9 shacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 November</td>
<td>no change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 November</td>
<td>3 toilets erected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November</td>
<td>no change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 December</td>
<td>1 completed shack first noticed on the 3rd and 1 completed frame that had been erected during the night of the 4th.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most significant feature about this expansion was that it took place despite official warnings that the structures were illegal. Furthermore, the people were not allocated sites by corrupt councillors. Instead, this erection of structures was in open defiance of authority and hence almost from the start, this area had a thriving area committee. The municipal officials also referred repeatedly to the fact that "there has been an escalation of violence in the area in that Municipal Officials have been threatened with their lives if they continue to carry out inspections and services in the area."75

During the week of 10-14 February, eviction notices were served on 72 families who had built shacks in this area over the previous few months. The case was heard on 15 April and an order was granted that declared the shacks illegal and gave them until April 30 to move to KwaNobuhle failing which their structures would be forcibly dismantled. This effectively meant that if the squatters failed to move, the forced removals would take place on May Day, the day COSATU planned on staging South Africa's biggest ever national stayaway. Clearly the pressure was building up to a climax - some residents could not handle it and about 70 families moved to KwaNobuhle at this point.76 By this stage, however, a new set of negotiations had been initiated that were to substantially alter the balance of forces in the area.
MAP 8.2

Rate of Increase in the Number of Squatters in the Kameash Road Area
7.11.1985 to 22.2.1986

Source: Attachment to Affidavit by Robin Williams, Uitenhage Town Clerk, 11.3.1986.

WEEKLY MONITORING SCHEDULE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>Description of Increase in No. of Shacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-11-1985</td>
<td>9 shacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-11-1985</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-11-1985</td>
<td>3 toilets erected for area shown in green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-11-1985</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-12-1985</td>
<td>2 shacks erected overnight, one complete &amp; the other still a framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-12-1985</td>
<td>Framework and toilet of shacks seen in 5-12-1985 installed and completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-12-1985</td>
<td>Shacks in purple erected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-01-1986</td>
<td>Shacks erected in area marked green and circled by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-01-1986</td>
<td>Newly erected shacks shown in brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-01-1986</td>
<td>Newly erected shacks shown in yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-01-1986</td>
<td>3 shacks under construction in area marked in black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-01-1986</td>
<td>Total number of structures = 42 (dwellings and toilets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-02-1986</td>
<td>Total number of structures = 53 (dwellings and toilets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-02-1986</td>
<td>Total number of structures = approx. 60 (dwellings and toilets, excluding some under construction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-02-1986</td>
<td>Total number of structures = approx. 78 (dwellings and toilets)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Surprisingly, everything worked according to plan. The academics completed an upgrading report entitled *Langa: The Case For Upgrade*, and a large press conference was held on 19 March attended by a number of TV crews, journalists and business representatives. The KTC never came and Heunis sent a telegram to Made's home address apologising for not being able to attend. Press reports and editorials remarked on the constructive nature of the press conference and the report.

Weza Made opened the conference with these words:

"By calling this press conference it is our last attempt to find a peaceful solution; this is our last attempt to prevent bloodshed and confrontation with the government. ... We want you to save the township from explosion because if the government can force us to move to this place we don't want, we therefore have no alternative but to use force to use anything at our disposal."77

Freddie Magugu then gave a detailed account of the LCC's attempts to find a negotiated solution to Langa's problems and ended with the query: "The KTC claims to be representing us and yet it is the one which is taking us to court, this does not make sense".78 Wonga Nkala, President of UYCO, gave an articulate emotional speech that centred around what he called the "crucial question", namely:

"[W]here will the money come from? According to the report the people have no money. The first phase will cost about R3.5 million and the second phase will cost about R22 million. The government has the money which has been taken from the people of Langa and big business has benefited from the people of Langa. It is high time it pays back and helps the people of Langa. If the government had no money there wouldn't be an SADF occupational army in Namibia, oppressing and killing Namibians. If the government didn't have any money RENAMO and UNITA wouldn't have any support. It is high time the government diverts its financial assistance from rebel groups to the people of Langa."79
The formal speeches were followed by comments from residents who arrived at the press conference on their own accord. Speaking in broken English but with great emotion, mainly old people got up and made comments like this one:

"Why must I move to KwaNobuhle, I stay here and this is my home. I am not moving anywhere, they can shoot me dead." 80

In addition, the Eastern Cape's most prominent political and trade union leaders were present. Stone Sizane of PEBCO and the UDF Eastern Cape Executive expressed solidarity with the Langa struggle on behalf of the Front. Michael Dube of COSATU's Eastern Cape interim executive and one time Langa resident, forcefully backed the LCC's demand that the state and business pay for the upgrading of Langa. He argued it was high time that business did something for Langa in return for the labour power this community provided for Uitenhage's industry. Finally, Gugile Nkwinti of Port Alfred threatened solidarity action from the hinterland towns if the Langa removals proceeded.

The report's basic conclusions were delivered by PLANACT representatives. The most important were:

* an average household income was R186.38 per month;

* only 9% of households earned above R400 per month while less than 1% would have qualified for a mortgage;

* 43% of the respondents of the survey were unemployed.

These figures, PLANACT concluded, pointed to the need for subsidised housing. The report itself, however, recommended a R3,5 million Emergency Scheme and a larger R22 million programme to upgrade infrastructure. This, PLANACT argued, would involve a water-borne sewerage system, water supplies to each house, tarring of certain roads, improvement of the drainage system and the installation of electricity. This focus on infrastructure rather than on housing was shaped by survey results which revealed that housing was less important to the residents than basic services.

Most importantly, PLANACT recommended that the street and area committee system could have become the structure through which
community participation in the upgrading process was organised.

Community solidarity around opposition to the removal was greatly strengthened by the press coverage given to the report. More importantly, however, the whole of black Uitenhage forcefully demonstrated its unity and power by giving 99% support to the stayaway call on 21 March. Furthermore, 82% of Uitenhage's coloured workers also heeded the stayaway call. Over 60 000 people packed the KwaNobuhle stadium for a day long rally in commemoration of the victims of the Langa massacre. The sustained mobilisation of the older residents that this meeting represented was explained by many activists in terms of the effect repression was having. One activist said: "The repression and violence from the government made the parents to unite with the youth and fight back."81

This stayaway marked the high point of community-union solidarity. In dozens of factory meetings during the weeks leading up to the stayaway, workers had debated the issue and come to a decision to call a full day stayaway. This decision was widely supported in street and area committee meetings. The combined impact of tight workplace and community organisation ensured the success of the stayaway. This is why grassroots activists were more than a little peeved when two days before the stayaway the KwaNobuhle leadership issued a directive that all workers must stayaway.82

Langa's problems, however, were by no means over. The court case took place as scheduled on 25 March. It was clear that the state was under tremendous pressure to find an amicable settlement by this stage. Le Roux had this say about that period:

"There was active agitation to encourage people to move in and squat. It became a real problem from the point of view of control. There was nothing anybody could do to stop this flow because the police, municipalities and management committees all feared an eruption. It then became a political test of wills: the squatters defiantly moved towards the white areas. The position was out of control. Everyone was scared of an international incident. Everyone knew it was a bomb with a lid on."83
Roger Matlock of the Urban Foundation phoned Dr. Scheepers at the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning on the 21st to propose a deal that went as follows: after KTC obtains a court order to evict the squatters on the 25th, this should be used as a stick to negotiate with the community from a position of strength. He urged that direct removals should be avoided at all costs.

No doubt responding to international media coverage of Langa on the anniversary of the massacre, from business pressure and from the threat of extensive disruption, KTC's lawyers arrived with a message from Minister Heunis on the morning of the 25th urging the parties to reach an out-of-court settlement. The deal KTC offered was that if the 9th-4th Avenue squatters agreed to move to KwaNobuhle, they could live there rent free; while the rest of Langa would be upgraded. Realising that if they agreed to this offer without consulting the people serious divisions could open up in the community, the LCC turned it down. The case went ahead and judgment was reserved indefinitely.

The LCC had now rejected what was, in effect, the state's final offer. This was the most it could have hoped to win at that stage. However, the imperatives of extra-state organisation and the potential for division if agreements were reached that resulted in the sacrificing of the interests of even a minority group, were pressures the LCC could not have ignored. Some of the LCC leaders were well aware that it was "divide-and-rule" deals like this that resulted in bloody intra-community conflicts in the Western Cape.

As mentioned above, the Kamesh Rd squatters case came to court on 15 April and a removal order was issued instructing squatters to vacate the premises by 30 April. Obviously the Langa conflict was reaching a head and the potential for major confrontations prompted community, trade union and business leaders to seek last minute solutions. Using the LCC call made at the press conference urging business to intervene in the Langa conflict, and under pressure from the unions to do likewise, the Uitenhage branch of Midland Chamber of Industries (MCI) decided to take action. Ronny Kruger of the giant Volkswagen Company (VW) commented on this decision by saying that "business has a responsibility to get involved in issues that affect their workers. ... Happy employees make for happy consumers." The LCC met the MCI for a preliminary
meeting on the 25th April and it was agreed that future meetings would take place to hammer out a compromise.

The MCI then took steps that managed to convince the KTC to stay the removal of the Kamesh Rd squatters for ten days on the grounds that the MCI wanted to meet trade union and community representatives in an attempt to find a less violent solution. This intervention was timely because the Uitenhage municipality was under tremendous pressure from its Conservative Party members to go for a full-on armed confrontation to remove the Kamesh Rd squatters - an option with widespread support in Uitenhage's white community. The Mayor was quoted in a Grenada television documentary screened in November 1985 as saying: "If we are attacked we will resist." Using their considerable influence, Le Roux and Erasmus - responding largely to pressure from business - managed to convince the Deputy Sheriff and the Mayor to stay the removals for ten days. This bulwark against an ultra-right-wing line brought together an informal five person caucus of Uitenhage's most powerful white leaders - Le Roux, Erasmus, Coetzee, Kruger, and Robin Williams, Uitenhage's town clerk. They met regularly to plan strategy and agreed to support a negotiation/compromise position for the moment. This crucial alliance between multi-national capital and the local state revolved largely around two concerns: (a) the international consequences of a violent eruption, and (b) the potential advantages of upgrading. It was agreed that Kruger would act as the broker between the state and community. Their objective was twofold: (a) to secure the removal to KwaNobuhle of the Kamesh Rd squatters and the 9th-4th Avenue squatters; and (b) upgrading of the rest of Langa. Their weapons were the stick of forced removal and the carrot of upgrading.

Two mass meetings took place that cemented the alliance between community organisations and trade unions that was to carry the next round of negotiations through. The first was a mass political funeral in Langa stadium where Weza Made spoke on the removal issue. This was the first high profile mass meeting he had ever spoken at. The second was a mass indoor meeting on Mayday. The speakers at this meeting included Freddie Magugu, Wonga Nkala, John Gomomo and Weza Made. Made's comment after the meeting was: "For the first time we see unity between unions and community organisations. It was decided that whatever we do there should be joint decision-making." From this point on, the LCC
became a core of leaders that comprised the original four, i.e. Made, Magugu, Mandabana and Teyise, plus the NAAWU leadership centred around Gomomo. It was this alliance that finally forced an open rupture between the Langa and KwaNobuhle leadership. The URECO leadership accused the LCC of working autonomously because of the influence of "FOSATU" (sic). Underlying this tension were the old disagreements over strategy. The KwaNobuhle leadership saw no reason why negotiations should take place with the MCI to resolve a forced removal problem. For them, it was nothing less than a question of state power.

The meeting between the LCC, trade unionists and the MCI took place on 2nd May - the day after all Uitenhage's workers stayed away for political reasons. Only 11 Africans out of a total of 7 615 employed at Uitenhage's major enterprises turned up for work that day - it was clear who held power on the factory floor. The MCI delegates arrived at the meeting with a discussion paper relating to solutions to the question of the Kamesh Rd squatters only. The paper started by saying that any solution arrived at must be acceptable to the Uitenhage municipality, the "coloured community" (read: the Coloured Management Committee), the Langa community and the Kamesh Rd squatters. Having defined the parties to the conflict in this way - a definition that was not opposed by the unionists and LCC, the MCI paper then went on to identify the cause of the problem as conflicting "interests arising from the problems of rapid urbanisation".

Accepting the squatter's reasons for not wanting to move as being ease of access to places of employment and the high cost of living in KwaNobuhle, the MCI paper said it was prepared to "lobby support for the implementation of the following":

1. that the Kamesh Rd area be zoned for community recreational activities;
2. that Langa be upgraded and, if necessary, extended to the north;
3. that any upgrading or other improvements be undertaken in a way that alleviates unemployment in Langa, i.e. by utilising labour from the community.

In return for its support for these proposals, the MCI argued that the community should agree that the Kamesh Rd squatters be "temporarily
and acceptably ... accommodated elsewhere."

The LCC responded by making four points:

1. Firstly, if the Kamesh Rd squatters agreed to move, this would be a sign of weakness that could set a precedent for the removal of all Langa’s squatters in the future. Clearly the leaders were reluctant to be party to a decision that would allow the thin end of the removal wedge into the community. This demand also clearly revealed the extent to which politically organised squatters who had physically occupied land could use this presence as a lever when making community demands.

2. Secondly, the leaders said they would refuse to agree to any compromises until the basic principle that Langa be upgraded is approved. This reflected a shrewd realisation that it would be a mistake to separate bargaining over the future of the Kamesh Road area from the larger struggle for upgrading.

3. Thirdly, and related to the second point, the leaders argued that upgrading must be planned to ensure that it does not only benefit the better-off sections of the community, but that the poorest elements also benefit. This point was made because activists had been discussing the mistakes made in upgrading schemes elsewhere that worked to the disadvantage of the poorest strata who were pushed out of the community because of an inability to afford the upgraded services and housing (e.g. Crossroads and Alexandra).

4. Fourthly, they said it was unacceptable that the only reason why people could not live in the Kamesh Rd area was because it was zoned in terms of the Group Areas act as "non-residential".

The MCI and LCC agreed to meet again on the 9th. The MCI delegates went back to discuss the issues raised by the LCC with the caucus. The LCC returned to discuss various options with the community. A special meeting for all Uitenhage's organisations was held on Sunday 4th to discuss the removal and the meeting with MCI. On the same day Made gave a moving speech to the Kamesh Rd squatters. Relating the stories of Sofasonke's struggles in Johannesburg in the 1940s and the struggle for Crossroads, he reiterated his view that "the struggle of squatters is the struggle for land". On the court case, he related how Mandela refused to recognise the legitimacy of the South African courts at his trial. He concluded by saying that all that squatters have is the power to organise and that "there is no easy walk to freedom". This is why, he said, the
Kamesh Rd squatters should agree to move to another area in Langa.

By this stage the Kamesh Rd area committee was meeting on a daily basis to discuss plans for resisting the removal. A key problem, as far as the amabutho were concerned, was the open and unprotected location of the Kamesh Rd squatters from a military point of view. The key question in the minds of the LCC activists was whether the Kamesh Rd area committee would agree to the voluntary relocation of the squatters to another area inside Langa. The activists were well aware of the fact that if the rest of Langa was to be upgraded, the community might have to agree to compromise on the Kamesh Rd area. Everything, however, depended on the Kamesh Rd area committee. Eventually, this area committee decided at a meeting on the 6th that the Kamesh Rd squatters would agree to move voluntarily to another location in Langa if this would ensure the upgrading of the rest of Langa. The activists, who had spent literally dozens of hours in talks with the Kamesh Rd squatters, were elated with this decision. However, the amabutho leaders and some Kwallobuhle leaders were opposed to the decision arguing that this in effect meant recognising the Group Areas Act. They also argued that the "black man's struggle for the return of his land" must not be reversed for the sake of compromise.

In the meantime, the LCC and the unionists had decided that a mass meeting needed to be held to get a general mandate for the Kamesh Rd compromise. The white caucus agreed to support the LCC application to the magistrate to hold such a meeting. The result was that the LCC applied for permission to hold a meeting with letters of support from the KTC, MCI and Uitenhage municipality. Not surprisingly, the magistrate gave permission for the meeting. The meeting took place on the 8th in a soccer field in Langa. It lasted most of the day with speeches from all the major Uitenhage organisations, including the trade unions. The LCC leaders chaired the meeting.

An old ex-Robben Islander gave a key speech which began with these words:

"I remember in 1937 and 1938 when people were removed from what is known today as Van Riebeeck's Hoogte to Kabah, some of those people were thrown here in Uitenhage. The white people who occupied these areas are
still there today. The crucial question to ask is why should we be moved around like this? What kind of people are we to be moved around like this? There is even a court order saying that we must leave this place. It is quite clear that the courts belong to the white community because our people were shot and the courts did nothing about it. ... Today we are being moved from this place because of this monster that the government has created, this monster of apartheid. We are saying that the people of South Africa must unite irrespective of colour, creed and ideology. I was a member of the ANC and I have spent 22 years in jail, but all this has not broken my spirit. The fight we fought continues even today."93

A call was also made on residents to support the forthcoming rent boycott, to get ready for another consumer boycott and to participate in the living wage campaign.

The meeting ended with discussion from the crowd about what should happen to Kamesh Rd. Unfortunately, due mainly to lack of experience, the leadership posed the problem as being a question of whether people should move to Kwallobuhle or not. Obviously, this was roundly rejected as an option. One speaker from Kamesh Rd area committee said:

"Comrades, I am not going to give a long speech. What I want to say is that we must make it clear to Botha and his children that we are not going to KwaNobuhle."94

However, because the leaders never laid out the complexities of the compromise then under discussion with MCI - i.e. whether the Kamesh Rd squatters should agree to move to another area in Langa - no clear mandate was obtained for action either way from this meeting. In the end the more radical elements took this opportunity to make emotional statements about the weak and cowardly nature of any proposed move. Given the atmosphere of the meeting, speakers from the Kamesh Rd area also spoke out against the decision to move.

With no room to compromise at this stage, the LCC activists decided to go ahead with its meeting with the MCI scheduled for the 9th, but to use "delaying tactics", i.e. not to agree to anything concrete until further
community meetings could be held.

The meeting with the MCI took place as scheduled on the 9th. The MCI arrived with a revised paper that noted that in addition to the previous reasons for why the squatters refused to move, i.e. ease of access to employment and high cost of living in KwaNobuhle, there was also a fear that the removal of the Kamesh Rd squatters would set a precedent for the removal of all squatters and that the "non-residential" zoning of the Kamesh Rd area was perceived as "political and therefore not acceptable".

In addition to the three proposals put forward at the last meeting, the MCI suggested a further three:

4. that the MCI would "seek a guarantee from the authorities" that Langa would indefinitely remain zoned as a Black residential area;

5. that the MCI would request reasons why the Kamesh Rd area should remain zoned "non-residential";

6. "the upgrading of Kabah/Langa be planned to accommodate all income groups, which would include an area for, i.a. shack dwellers".

The paper ended by saying all the above concessions were conditional on the Kamesh Rd squatters agreeing to move elsewhere.

The LCC requested the scrapping of the proposal that the Kamesh Rd area be zoned for community recreational facilities (proposal 1 above). What eventually happened to this area, they argued, should be negotiated as part of the overall upgrading process. They also asked for more time to discuss matters with the Kamesh Rd squatters before finally agreeing to the MCI's proposals. Through most of the night of the 9th June and into the following day, the Kamesh Rd squatters and the leaders met and discussed all the options. Bitter arguments broke out, but eventually all the squatters agreed that to compromise at this stage was preferable to losing the battle for the whole of Langa in the long run. When the more radical elements heard about this decision, they accused the LCC leadership of acting without a mandate.

At the meeting with the MCI held on the 11th June, the LCC agreed to all the MCI's proposals (set out in points 1-6 above). In addition, further discussion on related issues resulted in agreement on the following
points:

1. "that the squatters are prepared to voluntarily move to an alternative and acceptable location within Langa/Kabah";

2. that the LCC will identify which area in Langa would be the most acceptable location to which the squatters could be moved;

3. that another meeting be held on June 20th attended by the LCC, MCI and representatives of the Uitenhage Municipality, KTC and the coloured and Indian management committees;

4. that the MCI would approach its members to help the squatters with materials to re-build their shacks after they move.

However, the LCC activists insisted that before final agreement on all these points was reached, they wanted to return to the community to fully discuss the proposals. Despite the declaration of the Emergency the following day (i.e. 12th June), the proposals were discussed by area committees, the URECO executive and COSATU's Uitenhage local. A final meeting between the LCC and MCI was held on the 14th June where six key points were agreed to. Because they represent the basis of an agreement arrived at democratically through negotiation, compromise and community participation, they will be quoted in full as they appeared in the minutes of the meeting:

"The MCI is prepared to recommend and lobby support for the implementation of the following:

1. Kabah/Langa will indefinitely remain an area zoned for Black residents.

2. That Kabah/Langa be upgraded and, if necessary, extended on the Northern side, to accommodate the existing residents within sound town planning principles.

3. That such upgrading be planned to accommodate all income groups, which would include, i.a., shack dwellers.

4. That any such upgrading programme be undertaken utilizing the labour of residents presently unemployed, in order to help alleviate the hardships experienced in the present economic recession."
5. That the Municipality of Uitenhage obtain the support of PLANACT for
the master plan to upgrade Kabah/Langa, and to clearly define the future
of zone 61 [Kamesh Rd].

6. It is understood that if the authorities agree to the above, the squatters
will agree to voluntarily move."

This deal meant the Langa squatters were being offered much more than
before the court case in March, i.e. the removal of 9th-4th Avenue and
upgrading of the rest. They were, in fact, being offered almost all of what
they had struggled for from the beginning.

With this agreement under his belt, Ronny Kruger of VW and the MCI
convinced the Uitenhage Municipality to allow him to talk to the Council
as a whole. It was this talk that convinced the Mayor to agree to come to
the June 20th meeting to discuss the upgrading proposals. Largely because
of pressure from VW, by the middle of June all the major interests in the
white establishment had accepted the proposals, i.e. the KTC, Uitenhage
municipality, Le Roux, and the Department of Constitutional
Development and Planning and its Minister, namely Chris Heunis. As
far as the community leaders and unionists were concerned, the June 20th
meeting accepted the proposals the MCI and LCC had agreed to on the
14th. Although the coloured and Indian Management Committees were
not there, the KTC, Uitenhage municipality, LCC, trade unionists and MCI
sat around a table and, with a map of Uitenhage on the wall, discussed the
most suitable areas into which Langa could be extended.

According to Freddie Magugu, "it was quite a nice meeting where
everybody was convinced that if we can keep working in this spirit, we can
achieve a lot of things". The KTC agreed to provide the bulldozers to
clear the area agreed upon. The MCI said it would provide the materials
for the re-erection of the shacks and the LCC agreed to provide the full
names and addresses of the Kamesh Rd squatters to the KTC so that the
area cleared would be inhabited by the right people. All this proceeded as
planned.

Heunis visited Port Elizabeth at this stage to hold discussions with MPs
and officials where he expressed support for the retention and upgrading
of Langa. This message was communicated at the time to the MCI.
As far as the Task Group was concerned, Scheepers abandoned his early position that stipulated that his brief was strictly technical and therefore he could not meet community representatives. Prior to the June 20th meeting in Uitenhage, Scheepers led a delegation of Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth MPs (Dawid Le Roux, Sakkie Louw and Gert Van Der Linde) that met representatives of the UDF's Eastern Cape Regional Executive on June 4th. The meeting was held at the offices of S.A. Bottling and was chaired by Mr. P. Gutsche, an S.A. Bottling director. Also present were representatives of the Eastern Cape Chamber of Commerce, the Eastern Cape branch of the National African Federation of Chambers of Commerce.

Scheepers defined the purpose of the meeting as being the need to discuss the future upgrading of infrastructure in the Port Elizabeth - Uitenhage region in terms of the Rive Plan guidelines for the Eastern Cape (see Chapter 1). Scheepers pointed out that government had allocated R200 million Rand for this purpose. The UDF delegates, who were all from civic organisations, emphasised their commitment to non-violent solutions and the need for joint negotiation over the upgrading and development of infrastructure.

The issues discussed were:

* the crucial importance of negotiations over upgrading;

* that a special Task Force of government officials be established to carry forward these negotiations with the community;

* the fact that the Rive Plan was not compiled in consultation with the community;

* the general acceptance that the Rive Plan was sufficiently flexible to allow for changes that might flow from negotiations;

* that the UDF organisations were representative of the community;

* the necessity for community leaders to enter into genuine negotiations instead of acting as rubber stamps.

The meeting ended with agreement that further meetings were essential
and the next meeting was scheduled for 23rd June, three days after the Uitenhage meeting and, in the event, eleven days after the State of Emergency was declared.

CONCLUSION

To all intents and purposes, therefore, the struggle for Langa had been won. Through grassroots organisation, mass struggle, negotiation, compromise and the building of alliances, Langa's social movement forced multi-national capital, the local state and top government officials to agree on concessions that favoured the majority of Langa's residents. In addition, the function of Scheepers' Task Force changed towards the end when agreement was reached with the UDF regional leadership that planning would take place within the context of genuine negotiations.

In the end, however, these gains were reversed. The unique and fragile balance of forces that made possible mass organisation in the township, divisions in the white power bloc and negotiations over realisable concessions, changed fundamentally when the declaration of the State of Emergency on 12th June 1986 imposed an external dynamic that subsumed by its shear force all other local dynamics. As the next chapter will reveal, working closely with the SADF and SAP, Le Roux and Erasmus reneged on their commitment to negotiation and used their newly trained "greenbeans" (municipal police) to engineer one of the most sophisticated and precision-timed forced removals South African has ever seen.


6 This is based on Swilling, M., "Local-Level Negotiations: Case Studies and Implications", paper commissioned by the Urban Foundation, September 1987; and Swilling, M., "Beyond Ungovernability...", op. cit.


13 Palmer, R., op. cit., p.53.

14 See Chapter 9.

15 Palmer, R., op. cit.

16 This typifies his writing in the Port Elizabeth journal that he runs called *Monitor*.

17 The notion of 'urban meaning' as it is used here is derived from Castells, M., *The City and the Grassroots*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1983.

18 Swilling, M., "Reform, Resistance...", op. cit.


20 Swilling, M., "Reform, Resistance...", op. cit., p.28.


22 *Eastern Province Herald*, 29.12.86


24 Interview with Freddie Magugu, Uitenhage branch organiser for the National Union of Textile Workers, 27.5.1987.


26 Interview with Magugu, op. cit.

27 Ibid.

28 Interview with Weza Made, 29.11.1985.

29 Interview with leading UYCO activist, March 1986.

30 Ibid.

31 Interview with Made, 29.11.1985.

32 Ibid.

33 Interview with Weza Made, 9.3.1986.

34 Ibid.

35 Interview with Langa activist, January 1986.
36. Tape recording of various speakers at mass meeting in Langa stadium, 8.5.1986.

37. Ibid.

38. In many ways the notion of "the youth" is a misnomer because it was a category that implied all "youth" and then applied to this inclusive category certain general behavioral traits that were actually the traits of a minority, albeit a very loud and visible minority. It is therefore more accurate to refer to the amabutho without collapsing all youth into this category.


40. Interview with Made, 9.3.1986.

41. Interview with Amabutho leaders, op. cit.

42. Interview with Made, 29.11.1985.

43. AZAPO refers to the Azanian People's Organisation which was a rival political party on the left of the political spectrum that adhered to the Black Consciousness ideology. It was quite common in the Eastern Cape for rank-and-file activists to assume that AZAPO members were agents of the state simply because they were not for the struggle as defined by the ANC and the UDF. At times there was a certain truth in this claim because state security officials did at one stage set up a front organisation that claimed to be allied to AZAPO - a claim that AZAPO itself denied. Nevertheless, there were occasions when people who were deemed to be informers were attacked by amabutho on the grounds that they were 'anti-struggle'.

44. Interview with Magugu, op. cit.

45. I am using this term in the way Castells uses it, i.e. to refer to those agencies that connect the movement to civil society. See Castells, M., The City and the Grassroots, Los Angeles and Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983.


47. Because this cannot be done by reading off the elements of this world-view from documents, formal statements or even the stated perceptions of leaders, notes and tape recordings of a mixture of group interviews, informal discussions and mass public meetings will be used for this account. Formal quotes have been used when they confirm the general tendency being described. For an elaboration of how this methodology should be used in an ideal situation, see Touraine, A., The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1981.

48. Tape recording of a speech given by Wonga Nkala, UYCO President, on 21.3.1986, commemorative anniversary of the Langa massacre.

49. Tape recording of mass meeting held in KwaNobuhle stadium, 21.3.1986.

50. Ibid.

51. Mass meeting, 8.5.1986, op. cit.

52. Interview with Made, 29.11.1985, op. cit.

53. Interview with Made, June 1985, op. cit.

54. Mass meeting, 8.5.1986, op. cit.

55. Ibid.

56. Kotane and Mabhida were prominent African members of the SA Community Party.

57. Ibid.

58. Interview with Langa activist, op. cit.

59. See Castells, M., op. cit.

60. Mass meeting, 8.5.1986, op. cit.

61. Interview with Made, 9.3.1986, op. cit.

62. Interview with Amabutho leaders, op. cit.

63. But when this power is crushed, new counter-revolutionary graffiti emerges and one can always tell how badly organisation has been affected when no-one even has the courage or energy to wipe out these reactionary messages.

64. Document entitled "Minutes of meeting held between the KwaNobuhle Town Council and Kabah Coordinating Committee on 3rd February 1986".

65. Ibid.


67. The account of this meeting is taken from a document entitled "Minutes of meeting between the
Langa Coordination Delegation and Urban Foundation, Sunday 10 November 1985, 8.00 pm, Uitenhage Catholic Church."

68. Interview with Erasmus and Coetzee, op. cit.
69. Ibid.
70. Interview with Langa activist, op. cit.
72. Private correspondence between R. Matlock and B. Erasmus, 25.11. 1985.(These two men knew each other from the days when Erasmus was town clerk of Uitenhage and Matlock was director of Technical Services in the East Cape Development Board.)
73. "Internal Memo to Dr. Robin Lee from Roger Matlock", Urban Foundation, Eastern Cape Region, 17.12.85
74. Affidavit by Robin Williams, Uitenhage Town Clerk, 11.3.1986.
75. Ibid.
76. Interview with Langa activist, op. cit.
77. Tape recording of this meeting.
78, Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Interview with Langa activist, op. cit.
82. Various conversations with union and community activists during March 1986.
83. Interview with Le Roux, op. cit.
84. Interview with Ronny Kruger, Public Affairs Director of Volkswagen, 27.5.1987.
86. Interview with Le Roux, op. cit.
87. Ibid.
90. The full details of these meetings and the minutiae of the options discussed have been included because they changed and modified as the bargaining process proceeded.
91. Conversation with Weza Made, 8.5.1986.
92. Interview with Amabutho leaders, op. cit.
93. Mass meeting, op. cit.
94. Ibid.
95. This was established at two key interviews, namely with Minister Chris Heunis and six of his top officials on 14.7.1987 in Pretoria; and with Brian Mathew, Director of the Midlands Chamber of Industries, Port Elizabeth, 25.5.1987. Also confirmed at interviews with Erasmus and Coetzee, op. cit. and Le Roux, op. cit.
96. Interview with Freddie Magugu, op. cit.
97. Interview with Minister Heunis, op. cit.
98. Interview with Brian Mathew, op. cit.
99. Minutes of meeting which were compiled by an Urban Foundation employee who went as part of the ECCOC delegation.
CHAPTER 9
THE WHAM BAM REMOVALS: STATE SECURITY, ORDERLY URBANISATION AND URBAN APARTHEID'S LAST STAND

INTRODUCTION

The National State of Emergency was declared on 12 June 1986. Just over a month later, the forced removal of Kabah began. On 13 July municipal police and a bulldozer moved into Extension 61 and began demolishing shacks. In a bid to prevent resistance, key community leaders were detained on 11 July and by 14 July many key activists had been - to use the security-speak of the time - 'taken out'. The way was clear for one last final attempt to impose an apartheid plan on Uitenhage. These events marked the end of local-level negotiations and the beginning of a period of repressive urban reform that was made possible by the switch in national level state policy reflected in the declaration of the Emergency. However, they were also the result of a strategy aimed at forcibly realising the long cherished vision by Uitenhage's officialdom of an urbanised black community settled far away from leafy white suburbia where property prices had a higher value than the quality of life of the black community, and where white ratepayers were moving rightward in their political allegiances.

The irony is that the State of Emergency did not shore up the cracks in urban apartheid as was hoped by the officials, policemen and politicians who enforced the removal. Instead, it was the prelude to a political transition that began in 1989-90 at national level that was complemented by the beginnings of an urban transition that included the scrapping of influx control, Group Areas and racially structured local government. As the Epilogue will describe, the newly negotiated post-February 1990 national urban policy framework provided the necessary conditions for the Return to Langa campaign to succeed in winning back Kabah for the people. In short, although the forced removal and the State of Emergency scuppered the agreements reached in the negotiations prior to and just after the declaration of the Emergency, these agreements were finally implemented three and half years later.
WHAM, BAM AND URBAN POLICY

There is consensus in the literature on the state during the 1980s that the declaration of the 1986 State of Emergency marked a decisive turning point in state strategy and, to a lesser extent, in state policy. Based on extensive primary research, this author argued that by the mid-1980s the essential elements of state reform policy had failed to secure for the dominant classes a stable 'consociational democracy' capable of winning international recognition and popular legitimacy. Whereas reform policy in the early 1980s was coupled to a "counter-insurgency" security strategy, by the mid-1980s security strategists were arguing that a mounting revolutionary threat required a shift to what was called a "winning-hearts-and-minds" ("WHAM") approach coupled to a "counter-revolutionary warfare" ("CRW") strategy. This shift in strategy went hand-in-hand with a restructuring of the internal dynamics of state power and of the relations between state and capital. In particular, it meant the demise of the negotiation-oriented reform strategies of Minister Chris Heunis and his Department of Constitutional Development and Planning - strategies that penetrated directly into the Uitenhage conflict shortly before the State of Emergency was declared. Instead of local-level negotiations to resolve problems, the newly empowered "securocrats" installed the so-called Joint Management Centres to coordinate state strategy at local level. It was these structures that overrode civilian authority and any negotiated agreements reached at local level prior to the commencement of the Emergency.

Although the literature on the shift in state strategy during the mid-1980s adequately provided overviews of the dynamics of state reform policy and strategy, less attention was given to how all this intersected with local-level dynamics. Where this was done, it became abundantly clear that "WHAM" and "CRW" strategies as implemented by the state through an "inner-state" system called the National Security Management System (NSMS) had clearly and unambiguously targeted urban townships as the key foci for WHAM. This, in turn, led to attempts to conceptualise at a general level the relationships between local urban dynamics and national security strategies during the Emergency period. The conclusions were that the complexity of the urban system was such that the aims of state security strategy were extremely difficult - if not impossible - to realise at the local level. The contradictions and cross-cutting structure of interests in towns and cities across the country was such that state security strategies
failed to nail down the lid on urban social movements in the way that was originally intended. Instead, by the late 1980s, local-level negotiations returned with a vengeance, but this time driven by powerful rent boycotts that were crippling the central linchpins of both WHAM and CRW, namely black local government. It was these local-level negotiations that preceded the commencement of the transition in February 1990 and provided demonstrable proof to both the state and the opposition that a mutually hurting power stalemate could be broken.

Although these direct linkages between WHAM and the urban system had much to do with the 'targets' that WHAM strategists selected, they also resulted from the way urban policy shifted in the mid-1980s in response to two primary points of pressure; namely the demographic processes and social movements that ignored and/or resisted the logic and regulations of influx control, and the calls from organised business to scrap influx controls. The State President announced the abolition of influx control in June 1986, shortly before the Emergency was declared. Now whereas organised business had hoped that this would have triggered a new urban development approach that was not premised on the principles of racial control that had shaped the urban system since at least the 1920s, in reality the state implemented what they called an "orderly urbanisation" policy, with much more emphasis on "orderly" than on "urbanisation". At the very centre of this policy framework was the need to build strong, legitimate and viable black local governments - a project that inevitably needed to be achieved coercively. In short, urban reforms were conceded from 1985-86 onward, but these were subsumed into a national security strategy that contradicted what the social movements and capital would have liked a post-influx control urban system to achieve.

To realise the aims of WHAM (popular support for the system by meeting certain material needs) and CRW (elimination of the revolutionary threat by 'taking out' the revolutionaries), three strategies in particular were used in urban townships: mass detentions to 'take out' the activists, urban development in accordance with the 'orderly urbanisation' framework, and the restructuring of civil society via the creation of state-supporting "community leaders" (invariably vigilantes). All three of these were implemented in Uitenhage during the Emergency period. Not surprisingly, it was the specific constellation of local interests that
mediated the particular form that WHAM (and to a lesser extent CRW) took in Uitenhage.

'TAKING OUT' THE LEADERSHIP

It is commonly accepted that the 1986 State of Emergency hit the Eastern Cape region harder than the other regions of the country. It has been estimated by the Black Sash that 1200 people were detained from the Eastern Cape communities. The rate of detentions (i.e. the number taking place per month) peaked during the June-August 1986 period and dropped off slightly from September through November. Releases starting occurring from September and roughly equaled the detention rate through to April-May 1987. From this point through to mid-1988 the number of detainees declined steadily until there were 56 still "inside" in April 1988.

de Villiers and Roux conclude:

"Analysis of our data suggests that the underlying purpose of emergency detention is destabilisation. As a strategy, it destabilises both communities and individuals by the huge length of detentions and the emphasis on young adults. Interviews with a sample of 200 ex-detainees show that the average period of emergency detention is ten months. Over 50 per cent of these ex-detainees are under the age of 26 years."13

The Detainees Parents Support Committee's estimates are higher than the Black Sash figures. It estimated that out of a total of 2516 known detainees from the Eastern Cape for the period mid-1986 through to early 1987, 552 were political activists/community workers, 169 were scholars/students/teachers, 28 were church workers and 9 were journalists.14

In order to find out whether there was a strategy behind the detentions, de Villiers and Roux interviewed 200 ex-detainees. The pattern was that leadership would be removed to remote police stations for interrogation for between 1 and 3 weeks, either at the beginning or the end of the detention period. Non-leadership people, however, were quite often never interrogated. Torture was widely used, with police using in particular a technique that combined suffocation and electrocution that
was difficult for doctors to trace. It was also common for detainees who had been tortured to be used by police to identify others who were paraded before these anonymous informers.\textsuperscript{15} de Villiers and Roux conclude that detentions were "used to unnerve communities and break down individuals."\textsuperscript{16}

A total of 752 people from the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area were known to have been detained in terms of the Emergency regulations by August 1986. The real figure, however, could have been double this amount because these lists were compiled from reports of detentions that were received by the Black Sash Advice Office, PE Crisis Centre, Legal Resources Centre and private attorneys. Out of the 752 known detainees, 100 were from Uitenhage.\textsuperscript{17}

'Taking out' the leadership through detention and assassinations\textsuperscript{18} was a strategy that went hand-in-glove with the establishment of poorly trained municipal police forces. In accordance with the theory of 'counter-revolutionary warfare', law and order can only be maintained in a revolutionary situation by people who come directly from the communities that revolutionaries seek to control and these 'constables' must work closely with friendly community leaders. Hence the strategy of effectively 'arming the councillors' with the newly created municipal police forces - or 'greenflies' as they came to be known in the townships after their green uniforms. By July 1986 there were 429 municipal policemen in Eastern Cape townships with many more employed over the next year. de Villiers and Roux argued that they played four essential roles: (i) to fill the vacuum left by the decimated community organisations, (ii) to enforce the policies of the councils, (iii) to act as black auxiliaries of the SAP, and (iv) to work with and provide support for vigilante groups. Significantly, there is extensive evidence that a number of municipal policemen were recruited from the ranks of the amabutho and so, as one activist put it, "they know everything" about the community.\textsuperscript{19}

The declaration of the State of Emergency and the commencement of detentions fundamentally altered the delicate balance of power that had emerged over the previous six months. Before the Emergency, local leaders were becoming increasingly relaxed about their profile. They slept at home, called public meetings, spoke openly to the press and some even
began contemplating their longer-term futures. The prospect of upgrading and development would have created job opportunities that some, at least, could have applied for. The security police, in the meantime, were excluded from negotiations and so were most of their informers. They began, therefore, to loose control of township political dynamics. Even the local white establishment began to think that maybe Minister Heunis was correct when he told them that negotiations rather than "kragdadigheid" was the future. This was, at least, what the leadership of the white industrial sector had concluded. All of this was, of course, wiped out by what subsequently happened.

After the Emergency, activists went into hiding. Finding safe places with family, friends and sympathetic whites from town was the name of the game. With no access to mass public meetings and the press, strategy was developed in whispers in small clandestine meetings that had to be carefully set up so that only those who were supposed to be there were informed about it, and even then there was a chance that someone was an informer. Not surprisingly, effective negotiations and non-violent action in this context were impossible.

But as detentions proceeded, it became clear that police strategy was to systematically break down the leadership structure by brutally breaking up the psychological systems of individuals, and then disorganising the relationships that sustained the dynamic of the movement. And in their place to put the notorious municipal police and vigilantes. In a letter to his mother, Weza Made described his conditions of detention in Hankey Prison as follows:

"I have a difficult time. I do not get food. For three days I had one meal a day and sometimes I sleep very hungry, not even having any money to send someone to buy me some bread. ... I feel lost, as if no-one cares for me any longer."

In a subsequent letter to the author that was smuggled out of the prison he said:

"I'm still alright in health, but my mind is a little bit disturb because of conditions inside the cell are deteriorating every day, even this
letter I’ve written under difficult conditions because we are being searched ... This chief here and his sergeants have a conservative attitudes towards us, they really hate us. One detainee here asked to see a doctor because he was beaten by police. He was taken by the chief and another black sergeant. When they arrived at doctor’s surgery, the chief threaten him that if he tell the doctor who beat him, he (chief) will beat him again at the police station. .. I’ve heard of what happened to my township... ."

FORCED REMOVAL

Although influx controls were scrapped in mid-1986, thus removing restrictions on rural-urban migration, the Group Areas Act remained intact. This meant that the locus of control shifted from a focus on the rural-urban nexus, to the intra-urban movement and location of the african population. The struggles waged against influx control succeeded in destroying these rural-urban controls, but in so doing communities were created that did not fit into a Group Area grid. The result was a second round of battles against intra-urban removals in places like Oukasie in Brits, Crossroads in Cape Town, Hasbult at Soekmekaar, Thusang at Roedtan, Tshikoto in Louis Trichardt, Wheeler's Farm outside Vereeniging and, of course, Langa in Uitenhage where nearly 50 000 people were forcibly moved in a space of 3-4 months making one of the largest ever forced removals in an urban area.

The introduction of the State of Emergency, mass detentions and the judicial defeat in late July suffered by the squatters in the court case initiated by the KTC earlier in the year were the necessary conditions for the execution of the forced removal of about 30 000 people during the July-October period from Kabah to Tyoksville - the popular name given to the tent town that originally housed those who were removed. There were, however, organisational processes that provided the sufficient conditions.

The declaration of the Emergency and the commencement of detentions immediately triggered crippling tensions within the community
structures. Prior to the Emergency there were tensions within the Langa Coordinating Committee between the community leadership and NAAWU trade unionists with the former accusing the latter of not putting sufficient pressure on employers to do something about the removals. Related problems were that NAAWU representatives did not regularly attend LCC meetings and NAAWU appeared reluctant to support a rent boycott campaign by calling on employers to cancel stop-order payments to the KTC that covered the rental and service charge payments of union members. After LCC leaders were either detained or disappeared underground, new leaders took over the LCC who were unfamiliar with the complexity of the process. This exacerbated tensions between the LCC and the URECO leadership who had felt excluded from the anti-removal struggle for some time.

The URECO and NAAWU leadership decided to launched a separate structure to deal with the removals and so, three days after the declaration of the Emergency on 19 June the Anti-Removal Committee (ARC) was established composed of two NAAWU representatives, two MACWUSA representatives, one NUTW representative, one youth representative and one URECO representative. The resultant competition between the LCC and ARC meant that by the time the authorities moved decisively to execute the removal in July, the leadership were too divided to respond appropriately. These divisions filtered downward to the community - a fact that became evident when a stayaway called by the unions for 20 June failed.

At 10h30 on 11 July a key meeting took place between officials from the KTC and SAP, the local member of parliament and senior government officials. This meeting agreed on three points: (i) to establish a temporary police station in Langa staffed by municipal police as the command centre for the removals that were to take place; (ii) to prevent the further erection of any additional shack structures in Langa; (iii) to commence with the forced removals - or what was termed the intensification of the process of persuasion of shack dwellers to move to KwaNobuhle.

By 17h00 on the same day, the temporary police station was up and staffed by the new municipal policemen that the KTC had recently been financed and empowered to employ. That night, numerous key activists were
detained and a spree of detentions continued through to 14 July. The close connection between the success of the removals and the detentions was acknowledged by KTC Town Clerk Eddie Coetzee in a court affidavit when he said:

"I respectfully believe that these arrests and the consequent removal of the threat of intimidation by the 'comrades' had a great deal to do with the events that followed."

The NP Member of Parliament for the area, Le Roux, agreed with Coetzee's view, but added that the removal would not have been possible if the police did not have the extended powers granted to them by the Emergency regulations.

On 13 July municipal police began dismantling shacks in Extension 61. Although the KTC Town Clerk Eddie Coetzee denied that force was used to remove people, affidavit after affidavit and the author's own interviews repeatedly confirm that Coetzee was lying. No-one, however, could independently verify what the people were saying because of the total control over the press that the security forces had in terms of the Emergency regulations. Instead, Coetzee instructed his 'greenflies' to tell the people that in KwaNobuhle they would have fully serviced sites, and that there would be free transportation to the new area and that tents would be provided to those who needed time to re-build their shacks.

By 15 July Coetzee was arguing that there were suddenly large numbers of people who wanted to move voluntarily. This was challenged on 15 July by NAAWU unionists who visited KTC Administrator Barry Erasmus to raise claims by union members that they were being forced to move. The unionists were given 60 names of people who had stated categorically that they wanted to move - claims that the unionists found difficult to question, but promised to provide their own lists of people who did not want to move. The problem with this debate, of course, was that the officials were smart enough to define the issue in technical terms by breaking up the question of removal into an individual matter rather than contesting leadership claims about a collective mind-set.
As momentum built up, Coetzee used the rapid decision-making system that the National Security Management System made possible to get the money to rent more trucks, get tents flown down from Johannesburg, purchase a large number of portable toilets and mobilise more policemen. The number of trucks used ranged from 8 in July, 35 in August, 39 in September, 27 in October, 27 in November and 6 in December. This provided Coetzee - who was effectively in command of operations - with the necessary resources to intensify the forced removal. In the process, officials in the KTC cut corners and instead of tendering as is normal practice, they gave the job to friends who, in turn, got rich overnight by renting trucks to service what in the end was a R6 million contract for the transport alone. These fraudulent practices became the subject of a police investigation in 1989 and led to Eddie Coetzee's resignation in mid-1983.

The assaults would start at around midnight when trucks, bulldozers and police vehicles would role into selected sections of Kabah under blinding floodlights. Commands to residents to dismantle their shacks would be barked through loudhailers. Residents were given a simple choice: either demolish your shack yourself, or the bulldozer would do it for you. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising what happened. Le Roux - the NP Member of Parliament - was out of town when he got a call from a jubilant Eddie Coetzee who said there was a "miracle, they are breaking down their shacks". Le Roux, in turn, was in contact with Minister Heunis on a daily basis to keep him informed even though Heunis had made it clear to the Uitenhage Council that removals were no longer a matter for Pretoria to decide upon, but "will be left to the local interest groups." And just over the hill these local interest groups celebrated the removal in the white suburbs of Vanes Estate and Levyvale. White residents formed themselves into armed street guards just in case violence triggered by the removal spilled over into the suburbs - a defensive measure that neo-Nazi leader Eugene Terre'Blanche commended at a mass meeting in Uitenhage in mid-July. One white resident praised the removal: "Our houses were going right down in value. There is hardly a house that hasn't been burgled. We're delighted."

The following story, contained in an affidavit that was signed on 23 July 1986 before legal representatives of the community, says it all:
"I am an adult black male 24 years old, residing at 1500 5th Ave, Kabah and employed at Farm Fare (Pty) Ltd., Kruisriver Road, Uitenhage.

I was living in a two room corrugated sheet shack in 5th avenue. This residence was erected by myself during June 1985. Prior to this I was living as a lodger with Mrs. Mamzwanga at no. 11 Sinyani Street, Langa. I came to Uitenhage during March 1984 from Cookhouse to find a job and was living at the mentioned address. At this stage my family were still living in Cookhouse. I was given permission to reside in Uitenhage by the E. Cape Development Board. My common law wife and my 8 year old son joined me during July 1985 and we lived in the residence which I erected. There were already a lot of squatter shacks on these premises when I started building.

On a certain day, I cannot remember the day and date, at about midnight I was awakened by a knock at the door of my shack and when I opened the door I was confronted by a white Police Officer dressed in camouflage uniform. This officer did not introduce himself so I do not know his name. He handed me a piece of paper and explained to me that it was a notice stating that I would be required to move from my house to KwaNobuhle as this area is a health hazard, due to the lack of sewerage facilities. I was also informed that I would be called to the E. Cape Development Board in due course to be formally informed about the eviction date. The Police Officer then left and I saw him walking to the house next door. I also noticed two 'Hippo' police vehicles outside. I was also informed that no. 1500 has been allocated to my house.

The following day I heard that all the residence (sic) in the area has received similar notices from the Police and people were talking about it. I heard that some of the people had gone to the Offices of the E. Cape Development Board to inquire about the notice and they were told to remain in the area pending the outcome of a Court decision.

I did not hear anything about this incident until Monday 21.7.86 after work when I was again approached by a Police Officer at my house and was instructed that I would be moved to KwaNobuhle today and was instructed to prepare my belongings to be loaded later. There were a lot
of Policemen present and I saw one Hippo Police vehicle. There were also trucks from the E.Cape Development Board onto which some of the people's belongings were being loaded. There people were unhappy about the removal and were protesting as they were being moved against their will.

When being instructed by the police to get my things ready for removal I told him that I did not want to move and I was told that I am the only person objecting against the removal as the other people had agreed to move, so I had no option but to comply with the instruction. The Police left my house and I move my belongings out of the house and then demolished the house. I did this because of fear of being assaulted if I did not comply. The water supply to the taps in the area has also been cut off.

At 01h05 a truck from the E. Cape Development Board stopped at my place and four Black Police Officers, dressed in camouflage uniform, took my belongings and loaded it onto the truck. They did not say anything to me. The material that I used to build the shack with was also loaded. I was then instructed to board another truck with my family. There were other families also on the truck. We were then taken to the Offices of the E. Cape Development Board and upon arrival taken into an office. A White clerk placed a form in front of me and instructed me to sign it. The contents of this document was not explained to me so I refused to sign my name. The other people also refused to sign the forms. We were then instructed to again board the truck to be driven to KwaNobuhle.

At KwaNobuhle the truck stopped at a site where a lot of army tents had been erected and I was allocated a tent where all my belongings were off-loaded by the same people. This tent is divided into two sections. One section is used to store my belongings and the other section serves as living quarters for me and my family.

I wish to object to this removal in the strongest terms as I have forcefully been removed. I did not give my consent for the removal. Physical force was not used on me.
I am supposed to live in this tent for six days during which period I must re-build my shack on area allocated for this purpose by the KwaNobuhle Town Council. I must live in my shack until the Town Council gives me a house to rent.

I do not wish to live in KwaNobuhle because of the high cost of living. I now have to pay busfare to go to work where I usually walked to work. The of renting a house will also be more than what it costed me to stay in Kabah.30

By 19 July 50 families had been moved to Tyoksville, the area in KwaNobuhle that was set aside for the relocated families (see map 9.1). It was on this day that 4 residents brought an urgent application to the Supreme Court to obtain an order to stop the demolition of shacks. The case was postponed to 30 July pending the judgment of Justice Kroon on the case of the 426 squatters - a judgment that was due on 29 July.

Meanwhile negotiations continued, albeit at an informal level. On 23 July a discussion took place between representatives of the Midland Chamber of Industries, unions and civics. Besides the schools crisis and industrial relations matters, the industrialists announced that they had raised money for the purchase of building materials to improve living conditions in the emerging Tyoksville. The community and union leaders, however, responded by saying that the materials should be used to assist those who wanted to go back to Langa. It was agreed that a list should be compiled of all those who wanted to return to Langa.

The removal juggernaut ground relentlessly on. By 25 July 500 families had been moved and the pace continued to speed up. Liberal attempts to stop it all were brushed aside. On 30 July human rights lawyers and groups took down 150 affidavits from people still living in Langa who said they did not want to move. The reasons they gave were that KwaNobuhle was too far from town thus making transport costs high; rents were higher in KwaNobuhle; schools were too far for children to walk; political feuding in KwaNobuhle made it an unpleasant place to live (more on this last point in the next section).
These efforts, however, made no impact, especially in light of the fact that Justice Kroon ruled the previous day, 21 July, that all the 426 structures between 4th and 9th avenue "be and are hereby declared to be illegal. ... [and t]hat the Respondents vacate the said area and each Respondent remove any structure erected or occupied by him in the said area by 15 August, 1986."31 True to form, the South African judiciary came to the rescue of the Executive and in so doing ensured the overwhelming success of a two-day mass stayaway that began in Uitenhage the next day. 100% of african workers and 70% of coloured workers stayed away from unionised factories in Uitenhage in protest against security force actions against residents, continued detention of Emergency detainees, the re-registration of black pupils, and the removal of 426 families from Kabah to KwaNobuhle.32

The standard procedure for implementing the removal was as follows: the midnight visit by a police officer or official who instructed the shack dweller to visit the temporary police station; the shack dweller was then given a form to sign with no explanation - the form said that the undersigned was moving voluntarily and that transport was provided by the authorities on request; the shack dweller would then be given a green card with a stamp on it; he/she would then also be given 2 bags nails, 500g of salt, 500g of sugar beans, 500g samp, 200g mielie-rice and a tin of canned fruit; the shack dweller's goods and family would then be loaded on a truck and taken to KwaNobuhle; on arrival the shack dweller would be required to produce the green card to police officers at the site; a stand and tent would then be allocated to the new arrival with warnings not to start fires inside the tent; to re-build the shack the KTC offered a loan of R900 to hire a construction company to build the shack.

Night after night throughout August and into September the trucks, bulldozers and police vehicles rolled into the shack areas to intimidate, destroy and remove people against their will. Without a tough and courageous leadership to give them confidence and voice, the ordinary shack dwellers chose to dismantle their shacks and move rather than risk losing everything to the steel jaws of a bulldozer. A survey of 56 households that were moved found that none moved voluntarily and in
answer to the question "Why did you move to KwaNobuhle?", answered as follows:

* the 24 hour intimidation by police telling them they "must go" - 33 respondents;
* the loudhailers telling them to move or else - 16 respondents;
* the orders from police/officials to dismantle their shacks or else they would be demolished for them with no regard for the breakages - 22 respondents;
* that the area was to be developed as a coloured area - 9 respondents;
* that bulldozers had either demolished their shacks or stopped just short of them - 3 respondents;
* two respondents said they followed their neighbors.33

In a subsequent survey designed to reveal the subtleties of the removal process, Riorden distinguished between promises of better services, threatened force, perceived but not experienced force, and direct experienced force. He found that 80% of those who were moved early on in the removal were promised better roads, water facilities, toilets, schools, clinics, no rental and leasehold rights; but that most people who were moved later in the process were not given these incentives. 100% of the sample of 20 households said they were threatened by policemen in various ways that "you must go" or else their shacks would be demolished. None of those surveyed were told that they could stay if they wanted to. With respect to perceived force, 19 households said they saw police demolishing other people's shacks, 8 saw policemen kicking in the doors of other people's shacks, 7 saw policemen stoning shacks, and 5 saw policemen hurting or beating others. As far as direct force was concerned, 2 had their shacks pulled down, 5 had their shacks bulldozed, 5 had their doors kicked in, 6 had stones thrown at their shacks, none were shot at, 2 were hurt or beaten, and in 5 cases police banged loudly on the walls of the shack to make them move.34

Despite this mounting evidence, Administrator Barry Erasmus refused to concede that there was any deviation from his instructions to policemen and officials involved in executing the removal to avoid force at all costs. The central core of his view reflected the national security ideology of the day when he said in a court affidavit:
"It also appears that one of the main reasons why most of the residents of the disputed area did not want to move initially was the intimidation exerted upon them by members of the 'comrades' organisation who were trying to attain their own political ends in defiance of the law. ... I submit with respect that the allegations that the people in the disputed area were moved against their will are not correct. It would seem that the main motivating factors for the voluntary move by scores of people (which are still continuing) was the fact that the danger of intimidation by the 'comrades' organisation had, to a large extent, been reduced, and the indisputable fact that the facilities in the new area are superior and more comfortable than those in the disputed area."35

In one sense Erasmus is correct, without the leadership the community lost the capacity to comprehend what was happening and, in particular, what the real alternatives were. Riorden sums up the steps that led to the eventual elimination of alternative courses of action that finally forced people to participate in their own removal:

* initially, there were the promises of better services coupled to the implementation of court orders to demolish certain structures that were still in the process of being erected - this was done loudly and publicly;
* the declaration of the State of Emergency followed by detentions removed the potential for organised community-wide resistance and ensured that a second level leadership would not easily emerge;
* the "levels of threat [then] rose massively, and the psychological impact of loudhailers at night, earth moving equipment and a new police station at the ready, combined with the odd threat with a gun, the odd threat of physical abuse, the odd emergence of dogs, throwing of stones onto houses, and the kicking down of doors all led a demoralised group into total fear";
* whereas 100% of the households surveyed experienced threats of force and 50% perceived force forced being used against others, only 10% - 25% actually experienced direct force;
* then came the threat that if people chose to move later, they would not have free transport; and finally
they signed papers (that they never understood) conceding that they were moving voluntarily.\textsuperscript{36}

These processes graphically reflect how effective the instruments of power that were used by the authorities really were. Instead of dealing with the community as a collective via their leaders, after 'taking out' these leaders the authorities were able to fragment and isolate individuals and without using large-scale bodily physical coercive violence, were able to force people to act individually in ways that they could have resisted collectively. To this extent, the removal was a remarkable example of what Steven Lukes defines as the "third dimension of power", namely the use of symbols and ideology by the powerful to manipulate perceptions of power relations in a way that averts open conflict while simultaneously ensuring that the powerless do what the powerful want.\textsuperscript{37} This is why Erasmus could not afford to concede even the slightest deviation from his rigid construction of events.

By the end of October there were no less than 6000 families in Tyoksville. Taking advantage of the momentum of intimidation and Emergency-induced fear, the authorities went beyond removing shack dwellers in Kabah and turned on the African families living in the coloured area adjacent to Langa called Blikkiesdorp - one of those 'mixed areas' that Uitenhage's officialdom had wanted to 'purify' since the 1950s. Squatters from Despatch's Old Location, and from squatter areas in Port Elizabeth and Kirkwood were also removed to Tyoksville.

Contrary to the promises made to residents who moved, Tyoksville was not a fully developed site-and-service scheme. Most residents got water from motorised water tankers and there was no water-borne sewerage. It was mid-Winter and rained frequently during the September-October period. Numerous people found themselves sleeping on the wet ground because the tents that were provided had no ground sheets. An "inspection team" of liberal professionals and politicians visited Tyoksville on 17 October. They issued a report wherein the Doctors on the team described the area as a "time bomb" and if nothing was done they feared "disastrous consequences". The report argued that water provision was inadequate; night soil buckets were not being removed in sufficient quantities and therefore people were excreting in the bush and emptying
their buckets there; emergency services were not operating; communications systems were non-existent; no provision for washing clothes and person; conditions conducive to the spread of typhoid were prevalent; the cramped living conditions in the tents facilitated the spread of tuberculosis and other contagious diseases; spreading gastric diseases were in danger of fatally infecting children; there were no means to take people in need to hospital.\textsuperscript{38}

The removal had devastating economic consequences for the individual households. A survey of 56 households revealed that 39% had no household income, 9% earned between R0 and R50 per month, 16% earned between R51 and R100, 11% earned between R101 and R200, 9% earned between R201 and R300, 16% earned between R301 and R400, and 0% earned above R401. Out of 56 households, only 23% derived income from someone employed in the formal sector. If these 13 households are removed from the sample, then what emerges is that 43 households had an average of R61-60 per month per household.\textsuperscript{39} With a minimum living level for households of around R800 per month, the poverty this statistic reveals is staggering. It is in this light that the effects of the removal on household assets should be assessed because the goods and materials that went into building up their crude shack shelters in Langa represented an investment over time. A local architect estimated that R100 was needed on average by each household to make good the damage to materials caused by the removal.\textsuperscript{40} One story captures the tragedy:

"One man (elderly) suffered from asthma and was not physically able to rebuild his home. He is living in a tent in which there are two beds and the children are sleeping on the wet ground (the tent has no bottom sheet). All the belongings from their Despatch home were going to rack and ruin in the rain and sun. One metallic cupboard which had been bought in August 1986, was rusting through and they still owe R300 on it."\textsuperscript{41}

On 22 October, Andrew Savage and Rory Riorden - both of the liberal parliamentary Progressive Federal Party - had a meeting with Barry Erasmus, Eddie Coetzee and a third official called Basson. For every point raised by the liberals to demonstrate their opposition to the forced removal, the officials had an answer that was either a straight denial or a
long and contorted argument supported by some empirical evidence, e.g. the fact that people signed affidavits saying they were not removed.\textsuperscript{42} As far as services were concerned, Erasmus was adamant that 1073 sites out of a total of 6000 were fully serviced, i.e. there were roads, stormwater and toilets were in the process of being connected to the sewerage pipes. However, two tenders were going out that would ensure that all 6000 sites would have waterborne sewerage, a toilet, a wash hand basin, stormwater drainage, and built gravel roads. In addition, two schools would be built and would be ready by January and up to 6 health clinics would be erected as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{43} However, Erasmus admitted that there were insufficient sites for all the residents, that not all sites could be sewered because of inadequate sewerage treatment capacity available to the KTC, and that water pressures were too low to enable water to reach those sites situated higher up the mountain.\textsuperscript{44}

Besides the material hardship that encountered the newly settled Tyoksville residents, the most devastating consequence of the removal was the brutal destruction of the rhythms of collective daily survival and bonds of solidarity that had built up in Langa. In the process of building Langa themselves, the shack dwellers also built a well integrated community. The removal, however, dislocated people by settling them without regard to natural relationships\textsuperscript{45} and in so doing transformed what was a rather self-reliant community into a bunch of disaggregated individuals dependent on meager state-provided services. From a developmental point of view, this is the worst possible situation. Zoe Riorden, a Port Elizabeth-based psychologist, had this to say after a visit:

"Despite considerable anger at having been moved - and indeed, everyone we saw was most determined that he/she had been moved against his/her will - no attempts to organise the people (\textit{who are no longer a community in any sense}) were apparent. Clearly, the sheer effort involved in such basic tasks as getting enough water, or keeping dry, makes any further work beyond the capability of those we saw. If the intention was to quash community organisation, this succeeded magnificently. Despair characterised the conversations; neglect and deprivation characterised the physical appearance of the dwellers."\textsuperscript{46}
Nevertheless, all the officials involved and Le Roux were of the view that the removal was a tremendous success. Le Roux boasted that it was "good footwork, smart officials, no red tape, and having the law on your side" that ensured success—these being the values and approach that were most highly regarded by the "securocrats" that ran the National Security Management System. In the end, the whole operation cost the taxpayer just R7.5 million less than the cost of upgrading Langa as estimated by the PLANACT report.

Soon after the removal, the Uitenhage Municipality took control of the Kabah area and plans were put together to turn the whole of Langa into a coloured group area. Barry Erasmus—who was Uitenhage's Town Clerk before he became the KTC Administrator—frequently reiterated after the removal that the removal now made two things possible, namely the development of Kabah as a coloured area and the transformation of KwaNobuhle "into a model township for black people, an example for others to follow". Finally, the 1940s vision of T.B. Floyd looked set to become reality.

But even then, there were individuals who defiantly stood up against the Orwellian machinations of the KTC and the police. Didi Allah and his wife Virginia Matiso were living at 246c Sixth Ave and were one of the 426 that contested the KTC application to the court to remove them. They tell a story that reflects the kind of spirit that must have kept Kabah going for nearly a century and a half:

"On Tuesday 15 July the Law Enforcement Offices ... came to the house opposite mine and I heard them discussing removal to KwaNobuhle. I approach the officers and asked them where people were expected to go if they demolished their houses. The officers then grabbed me, gave me a few slaps and said that they were taking me to their base camp ... At the base camp I was questioned by a white officer who asked me 'who are the comrades who are telling people not to move to KwaNobuhle'. I denied any knowledge of such 'comrades'. I was then told that I would be moved to KwaNobuhle. ... I was allowed to take all my property out of the house; this was loaded onto the truck. My car, which was alongside the house, was hitched to the back of the truck and the truck left for..."
KwaNobuhle taking me with my possessions and my car in tow. ... I was given a tent and my possessions were unloaded at the tent. I stayed in the tent until Saturday night when I removed all my possessions back to my home in Kabah where I am still residing. At about 9h00 on Sunday ... certain officers ... told me that I must move myself, my possessions and my home to KwaNobuhle on the truck provided for that purpose or a bulldozer would be brought to demolish my home. I was informed by neighbours in the area that they had been told the same. After this threat a number of people began demolishing their houses. *I did not demolish my house and I am still residing at the aforesaid address.*

THE VIOLENCE OF COUNTER-ORGANISATION

At about 5h30 on Sunday 4th January 1987 a group gathered at the house of Kelman Befile on the corner of Ponana Tini Road and Laurence Vinqi Drive in an area known as 'Khayelitsha'(see map 9.2). Escorted by the police, the group marched through Khayelitsha and then dispersed into smaller groups that spent the rest of the day engaged in an orgy of violence aimed at the persons and property of leading 'comrades' and activists.
Dory Riorden's Map of March Route and Violent Attacks, 4th January 1987

Like similar police-supported demonstrations of counter-power in places like Crossroads in Cape Town, the events of 4th January in Uitenhage hit national headlines because they provided a very clear example of how the CRW strategists where implementing their grandiose security strategy that was premised on the following principle:

"any governing power can defeat any revolutionary movement if it adapts the revolutionary strategy and principles and applies them in reverse. [The purpose is] to defeat the revolutionaries with their own weapons on their own battlefield." 53

Given the assumption shared by the security establishment that the revolutionaries got where they did through coercion, applying this in reverse meant using the same means but for opposite ends, i.e. to defend the state rather than overthrow it. Its application in the KwaNobuhle area just several weeks after the completion of a brutal forced removal highlighted how determined the security forces really were to bludgeon Uitenhage's black community into submission. What led up to the 4th January and how the violence was orchestrated helps reveal the dynamics of CRW - dynamics that complemented the WHAM strategy that led to the forced removal and state-driven urban development that has already been described.

By January, a cauldron of fractious tensions existed in KwaNobuhle that resulted from the combined impact of the Emergency and removal on the one hand, and misguided over-zealous oppositional strategies on the other.

As far as the removal was concerned, Tyoksville was created on the outer perimeter of KwaNobuhle in the largely unserviced extensions 6, 7 and 8a, with some of those who were moved living in a serviced area defined as Extension 4c. These extensions, in turn, surrounded Extension 4 which were newly constructed houses (built in 1984-85), some of which were owner-occupier contractor-built houses, i.e. the relatively newly settled who could afford non-rented housing because they were employed workers with employer subsidies and guarantees. In other words, over a
very short period of time, three settlement types were created in close proximity to one another: about 3700 houses in Extension 4 for stable employed workers; about 1000 serviced sites in Extension 4c for many people who moved from Langa before the removal and from other parts of KwaNobuhle; and then about 6000 sites in Extensions 6, 7 and 8 for very poor people, many of whom had been forcibly removed from Langa. Each of these groups had their own internal dynamics that the security and local government officials cynically exploited in a bid to recruit allies for WHAM and to harass oppositional tendencies.

Kelman Befile was once a businessman in Langa where he used to live and own shops. He was associated with the Peacemakers. Although never proven in court, hearsay evidence suggests that he killed a youngster he caught stealing, but with the collusion of the police, he was never prosecuted. Instead, rough 'people's justice' was meted out by the amabutho who burnt his shops down and effectively chased him and the group around him out of Langa - actions that were to be interpreted by Befile and others as ideologically motivated anti-Africanist attacks. Befile moved to Extension 4c in 1985 where he got a house and opened some shops from which he prospered. The houses in this extension were originally designated for the Langa squatters that the KTC tried to entice over to KwaNobuhle - when they refused, the houses were allocated by the KTC to people who suited the patronage interests of the KTC's Councillors and who were, therefore, not surprisingly uncomfortable about who would make counter-claims later on the houses they occupied. Most of the people who got these houses came from Old KwaNobuhle and were said to be people who wanted to escape from those areas controlled by the "comrades". There were, however, a significant number of Volkswagen employees who benefited from employer housing finance packages that also lived in the area. They occupied contradictory positions: while they were part of NAAWU whose leadership was increasingly allied with the UDF camp, in the community they came under attack from amabutho squads who lumped them together with the AmaAfrika (see below). This was to have very negative consequences later on.

Befile formed alliances with a motley crew of ex-councillors, out-of-uniform black policemen, criminals, Africanist elements, disaffected ex-UDF supporters and unionists who were opposed to mob rule by
aggressive youths, all of whom were antipathetic to the "comrades", amabutho and UDF groupings who had harassed and attacked them in the past. Since his arrival in Khayelitsha (Extension 4c), he and his group had been party to ongoing skirmishes with UDF activists living in Old KwaNobuhle, namely Extensions 1 and 2. However, when the forced removal from Langa began in earnest in 1986, Befile was faced with the prospect of an entire community that had alienated him landing up on his doorstep. As far as many others living in houses in Extension 4c were concerned, they shared his anxieties because they were well aware of the politicised nature of the new arrivals. Not surprisingly, he decided to organise some armed protection for himself.

The security and local government officials were well aware of the danger that Tyoksville could have become a seething mass of discontent that could have turned against the entire removal scheme and headed back to Langa under the banner of a "Return to Langa Campaign" about which there were already murmurings. Not surprisingly, they actively supported the formation of a "counter-group" called AmaAfrika. Made up of old Peacemaker elements, allies of councillors, africanists and alienated amabutho elements, this group established its "Headquarters" in the heart of Tyoksville in Sgcawa Street. It formed an alliance with Befile's group and with active support from the security forces, enforced its authority through force and patronage - force by way of vigilante rule and patronage by being seen as the conduit for goodies handed down by the state. Their main job was to keep the "comrades" out of the way.

Out of the murky shadows of the kind of black politics that CRW-WHAM strategists 'allowed' to operate during the Emergency, there emerged a mysterious pro-state Africanist called the Reverend Ebenezer Maqina. He was the self-proclaimed leader of AmaAfrika and by 1987 he was headquartered in Port Elizabeth's Court Chambers, the exact same offices that were the UDF/MACWUSA/Black Sash headquarters during the pre-Emergency days when these organisations operated from 'above ground' offices.

Maqina was born in 1937 and was brought up in Port Elizabeth. He studied to be a teacher but his interest in the traditionalist churches led him into a movement called the African Independent Churches
Association which he claims he became the leader of in the early 1970s. It was in this capacity that he came into contact with the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). He fraternised with Steve Biko and other BCM leaders in such organisations as the Black People's Convention, but insists that he remained an Africanist rather than an adherent of BC. Although never clear, by this he meant his attachment to traditional African values and practices - a world view he described as "traditionalist". By the early 1980s he was identified in Port Elizabeth with the BC-oriented Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), although he and AZAPO said he was never a member of this organisation. It was, however, as a representative of AZAPO in committees trying to resolve the schools crisis in the mid-1980s that he first came into contact with the UDF - a contact that was conflictual from the start due to his refusal to support any kind of boycott action to meet popular demands and to the fact that intolerant UDF activists and amabutho took it upon themselves to violently attack him and the large group of AZAPO supporters that congregated at his house during 1985.

Befile's base in the owner-occupied housing in Khayelitsha formed a link with Maqina and adopted the ideological framework of his strange brand of Africanism. In essence, the logic of this framework was as follows: the real issue is the war for the repossession of the land; until this moment, people need services which, in turn, must be provided by the local government; those who use housing and services and the like for their own political purposes, only make the hardships of the people worse and this, in turn, induces violent conflict amongst the African people; it is therefore a "red herring" to worry about local politics. In other words, Maqina had the remarkable ability to couch a collaborationist anti-oppositional strategy in an extremely radical and populist language that connected emotively to land dispossession and the need to prevent anyone from doing anything that made people's lives more difficult - the latter included the increasingly resented and interminable school and consumer boycotts.58

The conditions for intense violent conflict were therefore in place: on the one hand there were the "comrades" or amabutho who were leaderless because of the detention of the political leadership and deeply angered and frustrated by the way they had been targeted during the Emergency. They
were also embedded in the community that was forcibly removed from Langa and they were allied to those in Old KwaNobuhle that had fought running battles with the newly settled groups in Khayelitsha. The declaration of an indefinite poorly organised consumer boycott in July 1986 to protest against the State of Emergency was coercively enforced by the amabutho despite dwindling support. In addition, there was also a more or less indefinite school boycott on with no leaders around to negotiate an end to it. This, Freddie Magugu and other activists argued, alienated many who previously supported the UDF organisations in Uitenhage.59

On the other hand, a growing group of disaffected elements coalesced around an equally aggressive group that had a radical populist Africanist ideology that managed to justify collaboration with the authorities to “minimise immediate hardships” - an ideology that suited those who benefited from new housing developments and were threatened by the creation of Tyoksville on their doorstep. Add in the tacit and overt support AmaAfrika got from the security forces during the intense rivalries for the political support of the newly created constituencies in KwaNobuhle60, and the picture of conflict emerges.

The triggers that led up to the 4th January were twofold. Firstly, prominent UYCO leader Lindile Mente was shot and killed as he knocked on the door of his home after returning from work on the night of Thursday 14th November 1986.61 Although this triggered a series of counter-attacks by the amabutho, the most prominent incident was on 31.12.1986 when Befile’s car was burnt out and his brother “Kid” abducted after Kid was stopped by comrades on the road. This was followed by the brutal public beating in Tyoksville of youths that Befile accused of abducting Kid, including dragging one of them behind a bakkie through the township.62

The plan for 4th January was very clear:63 gather at Befile’s house, march through Khayelitsha to Old KwaNobuhle with a police escort, break up into groups to hit certain targets while the police patrol the outskirts to “catch” those that get flushed out. The conspirators were the core AmaAfrika leadership, the SAP, and municipal police.
Ntsokolo Moss, a Volkswagen employee who lived on 12 Pilane Ntsiko Street, Khayelitsha, was woken at 5.15am on Sunday 4th January by a large crowd armed with sticks. They called on him to accompany them to a meeting at Befile's place. Another VW employee, one Bongolozi, was woken at 3h00 and went around getting others to join the crowd to meet at Befile's place. When he got there, 4 masked men told him and others to join the group to "go and clean out old KwaNobuhle". The meeting was addressed by Mandla Nkonki, another VW employee. He informed the crowd that they were going to march to KwaNobuhle and "we know what we want there".

The group then marched down Ponana Tini Road, collecting more people and getting bigger along the way. The police in Hippos and trucks hung around on the outskirts. The march went through Khayelitsha, past Zamile motors at about 6h30 and entered KwaNobuhle at about 7h15. By this stage, the police were in vehicles at the back of the march and two Citi Golfs and a van were in front of the march. SAP officers encountered along the way simply stood by and watched, seemingly unsurprised by what they saw. The group then split up and different groups headed in different directions, sometimes directed by policemen standing on vehicles gesturing to the leaders of the crowd to turn up certain streets.

As the march wound its way through Khayelitsha, people in Old KwaNobuhle stood on roofs and cars to see what was happening. News spread and various activists phoned one another to warn of the oncoming danger. Most chose to flee out of the township and into the "bush". However, a helicopter that circled overhead could track the terrified activists. Mbulelo Mlali of 8 Peta Street and also a VW employee, was one of those who fled into the bush. But he was quite relieved to come across a Hippo and 2 landrovers because "it was better to be arrested by the SAP than killed by the gangs in the streets". Along with others who had been driven towards the police vehicles by the helicopter, Mlali was taken to the SAP temporary base where there were police informers (and later Befile and Kid) that identified people as "comrades" or not. All those identified as "comrades" were put into one group and sent to the cells, while the others were allowed to go free.
In the meantime, the violent free-for-all across KwaNobuhle continued throughout the day, with the last assaults taking place at 21h30 that night. Riorden’s statements record 15 distinct attacks, but there were obviously numerous others. The pattern was similar in most cases: groups of between 7 and 500 - but mostly 50 - 100 - would converge on a house; the leaders were invariably identified as AmaAfrika leaders like Befile and Matshaka; the windows would be smashed after which the contents of the house would be taken out onto the pavement, smashed with sticks and axes and then set alight; invariably, the activists who lived in the targeted houses were either in detention or had already fled thus leaving the rest of the family to be assaulted, abducted and in at least two instances killed; the police would then arrive shortly after to see how it had all gone, after which they would leave without the slightest indication that they regarded what had happened as a crime. One black policeman who was part of a larger group that visited the aftermath of the attack on Sipho Sotyelelwa’s house on 18 Relu Street was heard to say:

"O ha-ha, we’ve got this rubbish. Look how beautiful is his house. It looks beautiful like our houses.”

It was clearly a day for these black policemen to revenge what had happened to them during and after the attacks on Kinikini nearly two years earlier. In fact, one member of a group that attacked a house told the parents of an activist that had fled that if they found him they would kill him in front of his house, "just like Kinikini”.

On Monday 5th the security police visited a number of the houses that had been attacked. When they got to Stetch Qhayisani’s house (who was a store keeper who had been detained the previous year), one of them said to Stetch’s wife: "You see, the boycott Stetch started has caused all this. You must take your clothes and go as these people will return and put a tyre around your neck.”

According to Ms. Lena Loom, grandmother of a 20 year old boy that was hacked to death by the vigilantes, one of the Citi Golfs that had led the march on Sunday 4th was driven by AmaAfrika leaders through the township’s streets on Monday 5th proclaiming through loudhailers that "there was no more UDF, it was dead, and they were going to take over.

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He claimed that if they can't get the children, they will take the parents and burn them at the stadium." The haunting images of an armed coup come to mind, complete with the authoritarian symbolism of the stadium where victims from the time of the Roman Colosseum to Pinochet's Chile have been subjected to the cruelty of leaders who physically reinforce themselves with packed in crowds enthralled with the spectacle of terror and the power of those who can inflict such pain.

On Tuesday 6th January, the police released a statement saying that the events in KwaNobuhle had "nothing to do with the unrest whatsoever". This effectively meant that the press was free to report the events without reference to the official version put out by the Bureau for Information, the only agency that was allowed in terms of the Emergency regulations to put out a report on "unrest incidents". Local policemen and people involved were also allowed, therefore, to compile their own versions of what happened and these could be reported without restriction. In short, "normality" had been restored. Or, in the words of Major Everson of the SAP: "The marchers felt things had gone on for long enough and wanted to return to normality". The clear intention was to present the events as a "political process" whereby a legitimate "community group" (complete with mass action) decided to "get hold of the troublemakers", as one local policeman put it. As an exercise in well managed terror, the operation was clearly a great success. The security forces must have reveled in the way they had managed to use "the revolutionary strategy and principles" of the revolutionaries "and applie[d] them in reverse". The fact that the real leadership that was by then languishing in detention built up hegemony using very different tactics escaped the unsubtle minds of the CRW warriors.

CONCLUSION

The linked strategies of detention, removal and counter-organisation discussed in this chapter were implemented by the local authorities, security forces and white political leadership in a bid to overcome the contradictions that pre-Emergency negotiations were attempting to tackle. These negotiations were beginning to give shape to a new potentially post-apartheid urban system that international capital, the trade unions, community groups, liberal support groups and even certain central
government Ministries could have lived with. However, the sacrifice of white support and conceding that "revolutionary groups" should be officially recognised as legitimate development partners, was the price that the local state, security forces and reactionary elements in black society would have had to pay. It was at that stage much too high a price. When the WHAM-CRW strategies were adopted at national level by the state and implemented via the State of Emergency in 1986, this provided the ideal framework for an alliance of forces that wanting to forcibly remove once and for all the urban vision that was articulated by the Langa anti-removal movement. It was a framework that empowered them to detain the negotiators, destroy through relocation the community that had struggled for this vision, and then to impose through managed terror a new leadership whose radical apocalyptic discourse and exclusive Africanism was no threat to a regime that measured its chances of survival purely in terms of how successful it was in eliminating its "enemies". As the policeman said, this was "normality".

But the empty contrived quiescence that set in after 4th January 1987 did not survive very long. By 1989-90, local processes began to intersect with national transition dynamics that finally culminated in the realisation of the dreams of generations of African Uitenhagers who had struggled for so long to secure for themselves the right to a decent way of life on that small patch of land adjacent to Uitenhage's Central Business District that they had always known as "Kabah".

8. See Swilling, M., "City Politics Comes of Age: Strategic Responses to Local Government Restructuring", Schrire, R., Critical Choices for


13. Ibid., p.51.

14. Ibid., p. 51

15. These torture methods were systematically revealed in Riorden, R., "Two Irregularities Made Possible by the Present State of Emergency", unpublished mimeo, Operation Real South Africa, Port Elizabeth, 26 August 1987.


18. A year long inquest into the assassinations of Mathew Goniwe of Cradock and his comrades has revealed that the Security Police were directly involved in extra-legal 'hit squad' activities during this period.


21. Rory Riorden of the Port Elizabeth-based Human Rights Trust estimated that the Langa removal was the second-largest ever in South African history, see Riorden, R., "Tyoksville", Human Rights Trust, Port Elizabeth, n.d., p.1. Although Riorden does not cite evidence to back up this claim, when measured against the magnitude of urban removals during the 1960-1983 period, then the enormity of the Langa removal comes into perspective. According to the Surplus People Project, between 1960 and 1983 no less than 612 000 people were relocated in urban areas in the Cape Province - which means the Kabah removals were the equivalent of just under 10% of this total (Platsky, L. and Walker, C., The Surplus People, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1985.) Compared to the great removals over the decades, the Kabah removal ranks with the largest: the nearly 80 000 forced out of Cato Manor in Durban during the 1950s, the 55 000 evicted from Sophiatown in 1955, the bulldozing of the Modderdam camp in 1977 that was home to some 10 000 people in Cape Town, and the 70 000 or so people that were relocated out of District Six over the decades. Most of these big removals, however, took place over fairly long periods of time, decades in certain cases. Kabah, therefore, may be in a class of its own.

22. Unless otherwise specified, the account of the forced removal that follows is taken from Mashego, M., "Caught in the Web of Orderly Urbanisation": Forced Removals in Langa", Johannesburg, Planact, n.d. This study and report was directly supervised by the author who could not, for security reasons, be personally involved in the on-site research. The author also wrote up sections of the report.


24. Written reply by the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning to questions put to him by Andrew Savage MP in parliament.


27. Quoted from minutes of a meeting of the Uitenhage Council, cited in Walt, V., "Too Close for Comfort...", Weekly Mail, 14.8.86.
31. The Kwanobuhle Town Council and David Andries and Others, Supreme Court of South Africa, South-Eastern Cape Local Division, Case Number 2966/85, 29 July 1986. Unlike a few similar cases of the time, Judge Kroon did not stipulate that alternative accommodation must be provided by the state.
33. Riorden, R., "Results of Survey of 56 Houses in the KwaNobuhle Resettlement Area", unpublished mimeo, 29.10.86.
34. Riorden, R., "Results of Survey of 20 Households in KwaNobuhle Resettlement Area", unpublished mimeo, 2.11.86.
37. Lukes, S., Power: A Radical View, Hong Kong, MacMillan, 1978, p.24. At first glance, it may seem more appropriate to depict this forced removal as an example of Luke’s first dimension of power, namely as a direct imposition of force on another. While most other forced removals were most certainly examples of power as a direct expression of force, there is no doubt in my mind that the executors of the Langa removal did all they could to prevent the execution of the removal by means of direct force. Instead, they very cleverly manipulated information and the ignorance of ordinary impoverished people to construct an image of voluntary cooperation. They did this so well that it was very difficult for employers, human rights groups and trade unionists to bring together the evidence for a case to convince the courts to reverse the process on the grounds that it was a forced removal. Yes, of course, as this analysis has revealed, it was a forced removal. But the reference to Lukes’ theory of power here is for the purpose of saying that the power relations in this removal were very different to other removals. On the surface, as Lukes argues in relation to his third dimension of power, the oppressed seem to cooperate willingly in their own oppression. But in reality, if one uses the analytical tools that Lukes provides, it is possible to reveal how this apparent willingness to cooperate in their own oppression was a function of a very complex and sophisticated use of non-coercive forms of power to achieve the same objectives.
38. Correspondence from Andrew Savage, Member of Parliament for Walmer, to Minister of Constitutional Development, 30.10.1993.
40. Ibid., p.2.
41. Ibid., p.2.
42. "Minutes of the Discussions held on Wednesday 22 October 1986 at 10h00 in the Town Clerk’s Office, Matanzima Road, KwaNobuhle between the KwaNobuhle Town Council and a Delegation from the Office of the MP and the P.F.P. Port Elizabeth".
43. Correspondence from R. Riorden to B. Erasmus, 27.10.1986.
44. Correspondence from B. Erasmus to R. Riorden, 31.10.1986.
45. This was more systematically analysed by Frescura, F., "Tyoksville, Eastern Cape: A Survey of the Housing Needs in a Transitional Settlement Area", in Urban Forum, 1, 1, 1990, p.57.
47. Interview with Mr. D. Le Roux MP, 4.11.1987.
48. Written reply by the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning to questions put by Andrew Savage in parliament.
49. Interview with Roger Matlock, Director: Urban Foundation, Eastern Cape, 25.3.87.
50. "Minutes of the Discussions held on Wednesday 22 October 1986 at 10h00 in the Town Clerk’s Office, Matanzima Road, KwaNobuhle between the KwaNobuhle Town Council and a Delegation from the Office of the MP and the P.F.P. Port Elizabeth", p. 5.
51. Affidavit, Parela Didi Allah, in the Matter Between Michael Mali and Others and the KwaNobuhle Town Council, Supreme Court of South Africa, South Eastern Cape Local Division, Case No. 1889/86, my emphasis.

52. The reconstruction of the 4th January events and what led up to them has been done using affidavits and statements provided in a confidential dossier prepared by Riorden, R., "The Events in KwaNobuhle, Sunday, 4th January 1987", unpublished mimeo, 22.1.87. This dossier contains no narrative or analysis, simply a set of maps and 27 statements obtained by Riorden.

53. Anonymous, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare, n.d. (my emphasis) The authenticity of this booklet was verified by the author during political trials of people accused of furthering the aims of Umkhonto We Sizwe when the author used it in his capacity as an advisor to the defense council.

54. Some of this information was gleaned from Frescura, F., op. cit. pp.53-54.


56. For example, Sam Matshaka - the brother of an ex-councilor, and Vuyisile Jonas, former member of Save the Starving Community, were both prominent leaders of AmaAfrika and participants in the 4th January assaults; see statement 6 in Riorden, R., "Events in KwaNobuhle...", p.18 and Interview with Roger Matlock, 25.3.1987.

57. Maqina's biographical data is taken from a transcript of an interview with him conducted by Herman Giliomee, 28.1.1986.

58. Interview with Ebenezer Maqina, 10.9.87, Port Elizabeth.

59. Interview with Freddie Magugu, op. cit.

60. AmaAfrika, municipal police and SAP collaborated in interrogating and torturing people at the KTC offices, see Statement 22 in Riorden, R., "Events at KwaNobuhle...", op. cit., p.40.


63. This plan emerges very clearly from a close reading of the documentation contained in Riorden, R., "Events...", op. cit.

64. Ibid., Statement 16, p.32.


66. Ibid., Statement 16, p.32.

67. Ibid., Statement 18, p. 35.

68. Ibid., Statement 16, p.32.

69. Ibid., Statement 17, p.34.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., Statement 5, p.15.

72. Ibid., Statement 2, p.9.

73. Ibid., Statement 4, p.15.


75. Evening Post, 7.1.1987

CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION: RETURN TO LANGA

INTRODUCTION

Unlike the bustling shacks that used to surround them, Langa's church buildings were not destroyed by the bulldozers in 1986. One of them, the Order of Ethiopia Church, was perched on a hillock on the corner of Maduna Road and about where 13th Avenue used to be. On 11 August 1991, grassroots activists and rank-and-file members of the Return to Langa campaign congregated in this Church hall to workshop the principles and plans that became the basis of one of South Africa's first community-based development projects, namely the re-development of Langa. The proposed development had been accepted in principle by the Uitenhage Municipality (UM) and was to be financed by the state-created Independent Development Trust (IDT). Unifound, an Urban Foundation-linked non-profit developer, wanted the community to be a joint partner in the planning and implementation of the project. The workshop was called so that the community could take their century-old struggle that they had waged against all those who had prevented the development of Langa, into a new phase where they would participate directly in the re-making and development of their living environment. This marked the beginning of a new era of development and reconstruction, an era that would not have been possible if the transition to democracy had not begun.

In short, the Return to Langa campaign had achieved its goal of returning the people who were forcibly removed to their rightful place in the city. This chapter will describe how this happened and provide an analysis of the local developmental processes that emerged in the context of the overall transition to democracy that began in February 1990 when F.W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of the liberation movements and the release of political prisoners.

LIBERALISATION, DEMOCRATISATION AND URBAN TRANSITION

Political science has preoccupied itself with the way power is constituted in political systems that are, on the whole, fairly stable and durable.
Sociologists have been responsible for much of the writing about revolutionary and social movements that have challenged these systems. But neither have been particularly good at providing an explanation for the kinds of non-revolutionary regime transitions that have resulted in the installation of democratic political systems in South America, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and more recently in Africa over the last three decades. It is only more recently that a new and creative literature on the nature of "transitions to democracy" has begun to emerge to answer questions like: Why do incumbent authoritarian regimes agree to democratisation processes that could potentially dislodge them? Where transitions did take place, why were they non-revolutionary? Why did revolutionaries give up their revolutionary strategies and participate in protracted transitions?1

The new transition literature is essential for any understanding of the nature of the South African transition for two reasons. Firstly, it was widely assumed for a very long time that the white minority regime would never voluntary relinquish power. This has proven to be false. Secondly, it was also widely assumed that change would only be possible by way of a revolutionary seizure of power. In reality, since the beginning of the transition in early 1990, it is clear that change is coming about in a very different way. The transition literature provides a comparative knowledge base for understanding what is happening. It has been argued elsewhere by this author that the South African regime incumbents concluded during 1989-90 that the costs of preventing the transition were greater than allowing it to begin.2 There were essentially six aspects of the local and global context that gave rise to this strategic conclusion:

* the failure of the State of Emergency to both suppress resistance and install a legitimate moderate pro-system black leadership;

* the increasingly powerful international anti-apartheid consensus, coupled to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, eliminated potential allies in the west that the regime could have relied on and removed the "red threat" that the regime had always used to justify its security strategies;
changes in the balance of power in Southern Africa, including military defeat in Southern Angola, the independence of Namibia and an increasing consensus amongst Southern African states that the region could no longer afford to sustain the armed struggle against the powerful and brutal South African regime which, in turn, forced the ANC to become increasingly conciliatory;

deepestening economic recession coupled to the conclusions reached by big business and leading economic planners that a political settlement was a precondition for resolving the economic crisis;

severe divisions within the white power bloc between 'hard-liners' and 'soft-liners', with organised business, professionals, intellectuals and sectors of the state lining up behind the 'soft-liners';

the effectiveness of the intermediaries who managed to mediate between the leading regime incumbents and the primary regime opponents.

After F.W. de Klerk managed to wrest control of the Presidency from hard-line 'securocrat' P.W. Botha (after the latter suffered a stroke in 1988), the security establishment lost the control over Executive power that it enjoyed during the Emergency period. This put in place a decision-making process that culminated in the February 1990 announcement that the liberation movements were to be unbanned and political prisoners released.

Like in all non-revolutionary regime transitions, the essential reason why regime incumbents agree to allow transitions to begin and why regime opponents agree to participate in them, is that both conclude that the rules of the transition are such that they stand to gain more from the outcome than from prolonged conflict. This, both sides conclude, can best be done by trying to gain control of the terms of the transition and in so doing determine the end result. This captures the dynamic that lies at the heart of the South African transition.
What is not appreciated in the mushrooming South African transition literature is how much of the struggle to control the terms of the transition has revolved around spatial issues. This author has argued via both case studies and general argument that the intensity of the extremely complex multifaceted struggles to re-define the form and content of urban space is intimately tied up with the struggles over the future constitutional structure of the post-apartheid state. The reason for this is that local government sits at the point of intersection between the urban system and the constitutional system. It is, therefore, impossible to restructure the latter without impacting on the former, and vice versa.

The result is that unlike most of the non-revolutionary regime transitions, the South African transition is not simply a constitutional transition with the limited goal of creating a political democracy. Because apartheid was so thoroughly systemic in its application, the South African transition is, in fact, playing itself out on three levels, namely citizenship, industrial time and space: the constitutional negotiations are about citizenship and involve the state and the liberation movements; the corporatist economic negotiations between the state, organised labour and capital at national and regional levels are about the control and value of industrial time; and the myriad local-level negotiations in the towns and cities of the country are about the form and content of (in particular) urban space. The penetration of the transition dynamic beyond simply the question of political democracy is due to the complex nature of the anti-apartheid struggle which did not simply revolve around liberation movements bent on re-defining citizenship and state form (as was the case in most African decolonisations), but also involved powerful trade union movements that systematically focussed on the restructuring and democratisation of the workplace, as well as coalitions of community-based organisations that have consistently struggled against race-based urban controls and generated their own conceptions of urban space. (Uitenhage provides one of the better known examples of this latter process.)

Recognising the importance of space in the transition, the state moved quickly to create a body called the Independent Development Trust (IDT). The IDT was given R2 billion from public funds and instructed to mount an ambitious urban development programme. The basic principle was that the IDT would spend R750 000 of its funds to provide homeless
people with a R7500.00 subsidy to purchase a serviced site that they were supposed to use as a basis for building their own homes. Only those projects that enjoyed community support qualified for the subsidy. Although heavily criticized by NGOs and community-based movements on the grounds that the IDT was only interested in financing a preconceived product and not, therefore, products that were generated by the communities themselves, the liberation movements and their allies decided to participate in the Board and sub-structures of the IDT. This effectively legitimized the IDT and empowered this newly created institution to trigger off South Africa's first community-driven development movement.

The state coupled its investment in urban development to the systematic removal of urban apartheid from the statute book. Besides much of the petty apartheid, the central pillars such as the Group Areas Act were summarily scrapped in 1991-92. Although the massive racially structured local government machinery was only dismantled towards the end of 1993, it was as early as mid-1990 that the state announced its opposition to race-based local government.

The scrapping of urban apartheid, however, was no panacea for the urban poor. This began to become apparent when local community-based organisations involved in development projects aimed at the urban poor began to realise that the combined costs of land, services and housing in inner city areas prohibited for affordability reasons the large-scale transformation of the urban system. Instead, due to land costs in particular, IDT subsidies ended up in site-and-service projects located on the urban periphery. The focus of the struggle, therefore, shifted from race-based urban controls to the economic benefits of development projects. Langa once again found itself at the centre of this struggle.

This was the changing national context that faced Uitenhage's local white and black leadership by 1989-90. It was a context that relayed to them two messages: urban apartheid was finally dead, and the struggle for Langa/Kabah was about to recommence, but on very different terms.
TOYING WITH FREE SETTLEMENT

The transition from urban apartheid to deracialised urbanisation was by no means direct. For a brief pre-transition moment that lasted from the end of 1987 into late 1989, the state toyed with a bizarre attempt to apply consociational principles to urban spatial ordering. The result was the passing of the Free Settlement Areas Act in 1988. This Act provided for the creation of "non-group" group areas, i.e. urban spaces that were not proclaimed to be either coloured, african, Indian or white. Reformists argued that this was a legislative route to deracialisation because as communities voluntarily declared themselves "free settlement" areas, they would also be eligible for non-racial local governments. The opposite side of this coin was that those who wanted their areas to remain mono-racial group areas would be allowed to do so.

Like many urban areas that had suffered forced removals (e.g. Cato Manor, District Six), the Kabah land was unused from the time of the removals in 1986. It could have only been developed if it was re proclaimed either coloured, Indian or white by the Group Areas Board. Not surprisingly, the machinery began to grind into motion after the removals, but by the time the necessary notices were issued in early 1989 announcing that Group Areas Board hearings were about to take place to determine whether Kabah should be proclaimed coloured, Indian or white, the Free Settlement Areas Act of 1988 was already on the statute book. So although the notices never referred to the area being defined a "free settlement area" as a fourth option, this was now a legal possibility. More significantly, although the notion of a 'free settlement area' was conceded to recognise the de facto 'greying' of a number of inner city areas where middle class blacks had been allowed to purchase property, it ironically also provided a legislative loophole for the Return to Langa campaign to realise its objectives. In other words, like in many other areas of life where the apartheid system began eating its own tail during the last pre-transition moments, the legislative framework that would have been required to reproclaim Kabah either coloured, Indian or white in terms of Floyd's 1940s racist dream for Uitenhage, was beginning to crumble and in so doing created contradictions that were easily exploited.

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The notice called on parties to submit written recommendations by 15 March 1989. The coloured House of Representatives in the national tri-cameral parliament proposed to the Group Areas Board that the whole area should be proclaimed coloured. Although initially supported by the UM, the municipality changed its tune after coming under pressure from the Midlands Chamber of Industries who, in turn, had been approached by COSATU unions on the matter. In a letter to the Legal Resources Centre signed by the Town Secretary of the UM, it is conceded that the possibility of turning the whole area into a "free settlement area" should be investigated.

In a paper that circulated amongst progressive organisations in Uitenhage, a set of key dilemmas were highlighted. Firstly, although the Return to Langa campaign wanted the people who were forcibly removed to be relocated back in Kabah, this could not be done by recommending to the Group Areas Board that Kabah should be proclaimed African for two reasons: this would have disadvantaged the coloureds still living in the area, and it would be "contrary to their organisations' constitutions which called for the promotion of non-racialism". Nor did they see their way clear to recommend that it be proclaimed a "free settlement area" because this would have legitimized state reform policies. Nevertheless, it was decided to brief human rights lawyers to make representations to the Group Areas Board - a pragmatic interventionist strategy that Uitenhage's community and union leadership were very familiar with.

The Port Elizabeth-based Legal Resources Centre (LRC) was contacted and requested to coordinate the submissions of the trade unions, church groups, sports bodies, business associations and community organisations that represented township constituencies. In essence, the LRC proposed that Kabah be proclaimed a "free settlement area", a proposal that was eventually supported by the UM and the Indian Management Committee. In addition, the LRC obtained support for its proposals from Members of Parliament, the Urban Foundation, and liberal human rights groups like the Human Rights Trust and Black Sash.

During the hearings in March, the LRC and Rory Riorden of the Human Rights Trust led argument in favour of Kabah becoming a "free settlement
area". In his final statement, Riorden concluded with the drama that he is particularly fond of:

"Commissioners, you have Kabah in your hands, but your arms are in the calabash. All you need do, to get your freedom, is to release Kabah, and negotiate its future with those who have been born in it, died in it, been massacred in it, been forced from it, and yet still long for it." 13

In August, the reconstituted Langa Anti-Removals Committee (including John Gomomo of COSATU) led by the intrepid Weza Made met the Midlands Chamber of Industries to discuss a joint strategy. Recalling the mandates and agreements reached during the 1985-86 negotiations, the meeting quickly reached an agreement on the need to pressurise the authorities into agreeing that Kabah should be a "free settlement area" and on the need to draw up a detailed development plan (using the PLANACT report as a point of departure) that could be put on the table as a basis for negotiation with the UM. Uppermost in the minds of both Gomomo and Weza was the danger that Uitenhage may be proceeding with plans to turn Kabah into a middle class residential area by building houses that were not affordable to the urban poor. 14 These early concerns about the new class-based instruments of exclusion available to the UM were to be confirmed later on when finance became available for development.

In the meantime, the unions and community organisations went into 'campaign mode', complete with mass meetings, press statements, lobbying and networking. It was the organisational energy that went into these activities that provided the basis for constituting the Langa structures into the Langa Development Committee (LDC), the structure led by Weza Made that was to take the struggle into its next phase - a phase that brought the word "development" into everyday language and into the goal statements of every community organisation with a constituency.
Although the *Return to Langa Campaign* and the LDC were at the forefront of the various struggles, the organisations that were at the core of these activities had no experience or knowledge of the highly complex technical processes involved in bringing to fruition a proper development project. Nor were there service organisations in the PEU area that could have provided this kind of support. The first one, the Port Elizabeth-based Urban Services Group (USG) was established in early 1991 with the assistance of PLANACT.

So while the social movement mobilised support for a non-racial community-based development strategy, the UM requested the Urban Foundation (UF) in February 1991 to assist with the formulation of a redevelopment plan for Langa. The UF brought in Unifound, a UF utility company responsible for managing the implementation of UF development projects. The UM, UF and Unifound officials began meeting and corresponding intensively from 9th April through to 14th May. At the end of this process, the UM agreed at a meeting on the 14th May to appoint Unifound as the developer to coordinate the redevelopment of Langa, with the UF responsible for managing the community consultation process. The UF agreed subject to the project receiving widespread community support and that the development be structured "on a non-racial basis".

On 15th May, the day after agreements were reached with the UM, the UF convened a meeting with representatives of the ANC, Uitenhage Residents Civic Organisation (URECO), LDC, ANC Youth League, Kleinhuisies Committee, and Uitenhage and Despatch Traders Association. The UF informed the representatives of the proposed plans for the redevelopment of Langa and requested their support for a strategy that these organisations had no part in formulating, nor adequately understood. After developing a fully-fledged development plan for submission to the IDT, the UF sent out letters during May requesting endorsements for the project from the Uitenhage chapters of the following organisations: Pan Africanist Congress, Pan Africanist Students Organisation, Azanian Youth, African Women's Organisation, ANC,

In line with pre-determined criteria laid down by the IDT, the UF/Unifound application was for just over R6 million to finance the construction of 802 serviced sites in a section of Langa located just below the old formal built houses beyond 22nd Avenue in the old Langa. Each site was supposed to have waterborne sewerage, a water tap and a water meter, the bus routes were to be tarred, minor roads were to have gravel surfaces, stormwater drains were to be installed, and no electricity was provided. The area included sites for 2 schools and 7 community facilities of one kind or another. Significantly, the newly developed area was to fall under the UM and not the KwaNobuhle Town Council.20

As far as planning and implementation of the project was concerned, Unifound proposed that it would put up the development capital for the servicing of the sites. After construction and occupation, the IDT would pay off Unifound. After that, Unifound would establish an NGO as a joint venture with the community organisations that would, in turn, be responsible for "consolidation", i.e. the construction of housing and social amenities.21

**TOWARDS COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT**

After the application to the IDT was submitted, the LDC called a workshop for 8-9th June 1991 to discuss the proposal. The workshop was facilitated by PLANACT and a representative of the newly formed Urban Services Group (USG). The workshop began by workshopping a set of "development principles" which were, in turn, used to evaluate the Unifound/UF plan and served as a basis for the development of an alternative plan. The following principles were generated:
the whole of Langa must be developed, including the area between 24th and 1st avenues, as well as Lapland, Blikkiesdorp and Kleinhuisie;
non-racialism;
land for all those who want to return to Langa;
all residents who were forcibly removed from Langa must have the right to return;
all organisations with a stake in the development of Langa must be allowed to participate in the project;
their must be full community participation in decision-making during both the planning and implementation of the development;
the community must have access to professional assistance to provide educational, training and technical support;
job creation and skills training must be part of all development projects;
all services and housing must be provided on an affordable basis for the majority;
the full range of business, community, recreational, sports and religious facilities must be provided;
the service standards should be as follows:
- water-borne sewerage;
- water to each site;
- tarred roads and pavements;
- adequate refuse removal and cleansing;
- affordable electricity to each site;
all financial matters must be the shared responsibility of the community with those in control of finance accountable to the community;
Langa must be developed as part of Uitenhage;
development must build community;
all development must promote unity.22

The development principles were used as a basis for an assessment of the plan. The following problems emerged:23

because the people of Langa were dispersed across Uitenhage by forced removals and therefore did not constitute a "community", it
was felt that this community needed to be reunited as a precondition for successful development - the consequences of people getting the sites who had not been removed were seen as potentially very divisive;

* the project-driven approach limited the planning process to the amount of resources available for the project, rather than allowing the planning process to reflect the extent of community need as a basis for a phased approach to meeting this need;

* because the project was not located in a larger development strategy geared to meet a wide range of community needs, it was seen to be exclusionary and, therefore, contradictory to the commitment to 'community participation', i.e. if the starting point was a general inclusive development strategy with the 802 sites as the first project, then a sense of exclusion could have been avoided;

* whereas the UF/Unifound were satisfied with community support for a project the community had no say in formulating, the LDC was of the view that there should be much greater community participation in the planning and implementation of the project, as well as direct control of the project by a properly structured community-based organisation;

* the LDC wanted to ensure that the first phase of the plan was linked to subsequent phases because it had information that the UM was planning a middle and upper income residential development for the area between the proposed UF/Unifound project and the white suburb of Levyvale, including the construction of a large new road to separate Langa from Levyvale - a strategy that the LDC regarded as "another form of apartheid";

* there was also concern that only the area to be developed would fall under the UM, and not the whole of Langa;

* as far as the proposed layout plan was concerned, the workshop observed that it completely contradicted the type of layout that had previously existed, the community was not consulted on the layout, and the layout did not locate the proposed schools on the sites where schools previously existed;

* electricity was not provided for;

* the existing brick houses needed to be upgraded and there was no clear link between the proposed site-and-service project and the upgrading of the existing area.
The June workshop formulated a strategy that included the following elements:

- the printing and sending out of an "application form" in the name of the LDC to all areas where there were people who once lived in Langa - the application form was supposed to be filled in and returned to the LDC so that an identifiable "community" could be constructed to drive the planning and implementation of the project;
- the slowing down of the UF/Unifound project to fit in with the plans of the LDC;
- the creation of a Community Development Trust to take control of the development;
- the acquisition of funds from the IDT to assist the LDC in its efforts to ensure maximum community participation.

It was on the basis of the above principles that a series of workshops took place with representatives from all areas where there were people who wanted to return to Langa. Gradually a shared understanding of development began to emerge as well as a strategic vision for what should happen to Langa as a whole. This formed the basis for a new plan that differed substantially from the UF/Unifound plan in the following respects:

- it was a development plan for the whole of Langa, but starting with a R6 million project in the area closest to the brick houses;
- the planning concept that was developed was not a monotonous row concept as proposed by the UF/Unifound, but rather a community concept built around open public court yards, cul de sacs, pedestrian access corridors and user-friendly yard spaces that could be used in various ways depending on affordability levels;
- the creation of a Community Development Trust as the primary development vehicle that was, in turn, accountable to a broad community development forum inclusive of all the political, union and community organisations;
- the establishment of a joint project team comprised of a Unifound project manager and a community liaison officer appointed by the
LDC to handle the community organising process, with the latter (like the former) paid out of the projects funds.

These were the essential elements of the kind of community-driven development projects that mushroomed across the country during the 1991-92 period. They built on the culture of self-organisation within civil society, but accepted the necessity for development partnerships with private and public sector bodies to ensure there was the necessary capacity for effective delivery.

**WHITE RESISTANCE, CAPITALIST PRESSURE**

After much negotiation, the UF/Unifound accepted the LDC's new development strategy and undertook to sell it to the IDT and the UM. The IDT accepted the new concept, but the UM found numerous reasons for delaying its decision. Its main concern was the way the LDC wanted to link phase 1 to future phases in a way that undercut plans to create a buffer strip of middle and upper income housing between Levyvale and the site-and-service area.

The imminent redevelopment of Kabah triggered reactionary responses in Uitenhage's white community. Although the UM was by no means a strong supporter of the development, it was under heavy pressure from Volkswagen, the Midlands Chamber of Industries and the alliance of business interests represented on the Eastern Cape board of the UF. No such pressures were of concern to the racist white rate payers whose urban imagination had been molded by generations of race-based urban planning. The conflict between pro- and anti-development camps dominated the election campaigns of National Party and Conservative Party candidates that contested a by-election for a UM Council seat on 13 November 1991. Much to the consternation of the NP, the CP's Coen Potgieter won the election. This resulted in a 50-50 split in the Council, i.e. out of 10 councillors, 5 were NP and 5 were CP, with the Mayor having the casting vote. At that stage, the Mayor was NP.

The 13 November by-election was the second one that had increased the size of the Conservative Party caucus in the UM, with the first having taken place in May. Substantially buoyed by their growing electoral
support, the CP went on the offensive and in so doing split the NP caucus between those who perceived the Kabah development as the source of their downfall as a party and those who were still open to business pressure. Eventually, on 25 November four CP councillors managed to call a special council meeting to debate the matter. The motion put to the council by the CP stated that the project area should not be transferred to fall under UM's jurisdiction, a separate structure plan for the whole area should be developed in conjunction with the KwaNobuhle Town Council, and the proposed Unifound/LDC agreement should not be signed. At the end of the debate, 7 voted in favour of terminating the development project and 3 voted against the motion, i.e. 2 NP councillors supported the CP position.

The UM decision hit nation-wide headlines because it provided very early on in the transition a clear insight into the contradiction between the continued existence of racially structured local government and the initiation of non-racial community-driven development. It also brought down onto the UM the full weight of the IDT and central government politicians and officials. Business also mobilized pressure to complement the mass action campaigns that community and union organisations began putting together. The most powerful weapon available to the black community was, of course, the land invasion. Although the UM decision caused political temperatures to rise, the onset of the festive season in December provided a much needed breathing space. It was clear to all that the UM decision was by no means the final word on the matter. In particular, NP councillors began to realise that an uncontrolled land invasion would be more of a headache than a controlled development project. The spectre of Langa in the mid-1980s loomed large in their imaginations.

Matters came to a head early in the new year. Following demands by black leaders to meet the full Council of the UM, an historic meeting took place in the Council Chamber between a delegation led by Weza Made which included representatives from the ANC, PAC and AZAPO, and the NP and CP members of the Council. After nearly breaking down at the outset because the CP representatives refused to speak English, the meeting proceeded with Weza Made addressing the Council on the consequences of its decision to oppose the development project. After heated debate, it
was resolved that another special meeting of the UM would take place where the matter would be discussed again. By all accounts, besides being the first meeting of its kind in Uitenhage, this meeting also changed the minds of the 2 key NP councillors.

On the 7th February, a CP-convened mass meeting attended by 278 white ratepayers voted in favour of a motion calling on the UM to stop the Kabah development. Only 10 people at the meeting voted against the motion. One of the demands of this meeting was for a local referendum on the Langa development amongst whites. Then, on the 8th, a special council meeting took place that reaffirmed the original decision to approve the proposed Unifound/LDC project. This time the decision went in favour of the proposed development, thanks to the pressure that was brought to bear on those NP councillors that voted against the development in November. The Council agreed, however, to hold a referendum.

An application to the Supreme Court by the Uitenhage Ratepayers' Association to get a court ruling restraining the UM from proceeding was dismissed with costs by the Court on 26 February.

On 4 March, Uitenhage's white ratepayers went to the polls to vote for or against the development of Langa - probably the last time they were to be afforded the opportunity to have a say in whether they wanted apartheid or not. In an advert in the local newspapers placed by the Midlands Chamber of Industries, Uitenhage Sakekamer and Uitenhage Chamber of Commerce, the case for and against the development was laid out for prospective voters to "weigh up":

* a vote against would invite unfavorable international attention and block foreign investment, trigger land invasions, undermine the sincerity of the UM, cause unprecedented violence, initiate consumer boycotts and strikes; whereas

* a vote for the development would promote development that would benefit all, eliminate uncontrolled squatting, initiate the development of a new township, and the promote goodwill.
The advert ended off by warning that in the case of a vote against the development "all citizens will lose", whereas in the event of a vote for the development "all citizens will win".

In the event, in a 14,1% poll, 1624 voted against the development, while 205 voted in favour.28

The full council of the UM met at 17h00 on 5 March 1992 to consider two motions: one that recommended that the Langa project should not go ahead, and the other that it should go ahead. In both cases, 5 voted in favour and 5 voted against both motions. Mayor Cronje, therefore, was required to exercise his right to cast his casting vote which he did in favour of the motion that called for the implementation of the project.29

The Administrator gave his approval for the project in a letter to the UM dated 31 March 1992.30

THE PROJECT BEGINS

In accordance with its approach, the LDC sent out "applications for participation in the Langa development project" between August and December 1991. Just over 2000 applications were returned from many of the areas where members of the Langa "Diaspora" (as it was called) lived. In addition, 104 applications were received from shack dwellers who were still living in Langa - people who had either refused to move or who had already moved back. These 104 were given privileged access to the project by being granted sites on application. The rest were invited to a large mass meeting on 17 December 1991 at Thembani Stadium in Langa. All the applications were put into a large barrel donated by Volkswagen and two children were selected to draw out the applications. About 700 were drawn which, together with the 104, made up the project participants. This was the group that was to participate in the planning and implementation of the project.

Eventually, after extensive negotiations, the linked back-to-back agreements were in place. The Land Availability Agreement and the Design and Construction Agreement entered into between Unifound and
UM on the 4 December 1991 and 7 February 1992 respectively could now be implemented. An agreement with the IDT on the terms of the capital subsidy was concluded and Unifound entered into an agreement with the newly created multi-stakeholder Uitenhage Development Forum (UDF), the all-party consensus forum that effectively represented "the community" as a whole. Weza Made, the chief organiser of both the LDC and the UDF, was appointed the Community Liaison Officer for the project and given an office on-site alongside the office of the Unifound Project Manager.

The contractors began construction in April 1992 and the first sites began to be completed in November/December 1992. The first occupants occupied their sites in December 1992, with the rest following during the first months of 1993. By the end of 1993 90% of the sites were occupied.

NEGOTIATING THE NEW URBAN MEANING

As argued at the outset of this chapter, urban transition is intimately bound up with political and social transition. The fact that it was an urban development project rather than constitutional restructuring that brought Uitenhage's black leadership face-to-face for the first time with the elected white leadership was not simply a coincidence. Apartheid was premised on spatial separation of race groups and in so doing "imagined communities" (to use Benedict Anderson's words) were created that underpinned the racially exclusive democracy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the non-racial challenge to apartheid was inevitably resisted by "imagined communities" whose interests lay in defending the urban system that guaranteed their privileges. But national and local processes were afoot that were steadily undermining these interests. For like during the previous decade when race no longer guaranteed white workers a privileged place in the workplace, race was being removed by both resistance and national transition as the primary organising principle of urban spatial ordering. This, however, did not automatically guarantee access for the urban poor to the urban system. In fact, local officials soon realised that class-based planning systems could prove to be effective instruments for protecting at least certain aspects of the apartheid urban form. The leaders of the social movement, however, were wise to these tactics and quickly adjusted to this new threat to their hard-won access by
presenting a vision of a future Uitenhage that disenfranchised poor and working people had struggled for for over a century. In this sense, therefore, what was only to be enshrined when Uitenhage's first non-racial municipality was established in 1994 was effectively won on the dusty barren slopes of Kabah nearly two years earlier. A new urban meaning had asserted itself.

CONCLUSION

The return to Kabah/Langa represents the qualitative change in the urban system that this thesis has attempted to explain using systems theory. As the assertion of a new urban meaning forged through the struggles waged by the urban social movements over the years, it marked the beginning of a new set of interactions and transactions within Uitenhage's local urban system around the definition and construction of urban function and form to reflect the new post-apartheid urban meaning that had been achieved.

The return to Langa, however, cannot simply be explained in terms the impact of national constitutional transition and urban policy change. At the simplest level, this kind of explanation would be incapable of explaining why it was Langa that the community returned to rather than some other space. Rather than accept the functionalist explanations that now abound in post-transition South Africa ("now that the government has changed, everything else will change"), the preceding chapters have attempted to weave together an analysis of a complex set of interactions and transactions between the elements of Uitenhage's urban system. Over time and through space these interactions and transactions at multiple local and non-local levels have cumulatively reshaped the terms and subjects of the local urban politics of Uitenhage. Although it would have been impossible to analyse every one of the complex interactions and transactions that contributed to the changing dynamic of Uitenhage's urban system, I am confident that the chapters have addressed the main ones. The result is what was intended at the outset when in the introduction to the thesis it was proposed that the research focus should operate at two analytical levels: an analysis of the interactions and transactions between the elements of the system and an analysis of the qualitative changes in the dynamic of the urban system as a whole (that

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are, of course, more than simply the sum product of the changes in the elements of the system.) Each chapter and the chain of evidence that links the chapters together both individually and severally contribute to the evolution of the explanations of the events required to justify this statement. To this extent the case study research strategy has proven to be an invaluable basis for this explanation building approach.

8. "Minutes of Meeting Between Langa Anti-Removals Committee and the Midland Chamber of Industries, 4th August 1989."
12. See "Representations to the Group Areas Board with Regard to the Investigation into the Proclamation of the Remainder of the Kabah Black Residential Area and the Disestablished Portion Thereof as Group Areas for the White and/or Indian and/or Coloured Groups under the Group Areas Act, 1966 (Act No. 36 of 1966) to be Held at Uitenhage Town Hall on 15 March 1989." Also Letter from Kobus Pienaar, Legal Resources Centre, to the Administrator, Province of the Cape of Good Hope, 28 March 1989.
13. In "Representations to the Groups Areas Board....", op. cit.
16. Ibid., p.21.
17. Ibid., p.22.
18. Personal correspondence with Weza Made, 15.5.91.
20. Unifound, op. cit.
24. The results of these workshops are reported in Urban Services Group, "The Development of Langa: The Community on Top with Planners on Tap", unpublished mimeo, August 1991.
25. Eastern Province Herald, 27.11.1991
29. "Minutes of the Proceedings of the Town Council, Special Meeting held in the Council Chamber, Uitenhage, 17:00. On Thursday 5 March 1992."

30. Correspondence received by the author from Robin Williams, Town Clerk UM, 25 November 1993.
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