University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick

http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/36272

This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright. Please scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
"THE GOOD POPE":

BRITISH REACTIONS TO THE PAPACY OF PIUS IX, 1846-52

Saho Matsumoto

Submitted in part fulfilment for
the degree of Phd in the Centre for
Social History at the University of Warwick

January 1996

This dissertation may be photocopied
Summary

From the time of the Reformation in England Anglo-Vatican relations have typically been seen as a long history of unending antagonism. It is not common knowledge that in the period between 1846 and 1851 there was a notable, if temporary, lull in this animosity and even talk of establishing full diplomatic relations. This thesis aims to account for this thaw in tensions and to analyse the British response to the early ‘liberal’ years of Pope Pius IX, not only looking at government policy but also the attitude of the British public towards the new Pope. In addition, this study sets out not only to look at individual issues, such as the Risorgimento, the history of the Roman Catholic Church in England and the Irish question, but seeks to explain the interplay between them in order to come to a fuller understanding of British policy.

This thesis reveals that British policy was based on the need to achieve a number of goals, such as a peaceful solution to the political crisis in the Italian peninsula and the curbing of the Irish agitation, and that it was held that an enlightened Pope could help in the fulfilment of these aims. The effort to improve relations in the end failed as it was undermined by an over-optimistic assessment of the Pope’s liberalism and failure of the British government to appreciate the depth of anti-Catholic opinion among the British public and their representatives in Parliament. The result was that this short thaw in relations came to an abrupt end.
Contents

Acknowledgements i

Introduction 1

Chapter I: Britain and the election of Pius IX 10
Section I: The 1831 Memorandum 11
Section II: Mazzini and the impact of the 1831 revolution 24
Section III: The Manifesto di Rimini and its consequence 36
Section IV: The death of Gregory XVI and the election of the new Pope 48

Chapter II: The Pope’s liberal reforms and the origins of the Minto mission in 1847 81
Section I: British reactions to Pius IX’s reforms 82
Section II: Ferrara and Papal diplomacy 106
Section III: Religious aspects of the diplomatic negotiation with the Papal States 121

Chapter III: Britain and the 1848 revolution in Rome 164
Section I: Pius IX and the establishment of a constitution 165
Section II: The Roman constitution and the crisis of ecclesiastical power 188
Section III: Pressure on the Pope for war against Austria 192
Section IV: The Mamiani administration 206
Section V: The failure of the Diplomatic Bill with the papacy 212
Section VI: The Pope’s flight 235

Chapter IV: Britain and the Roman Republic in 1849 260
Section I: British reactions to the proclamation of the Roman Republic and its political reforms 261
Section II: The collapse of the Roman Republic and foreign military intervention 278

Section III: Anti-clericalism and the Roman Republic 294

Chapter V: British reactions to the restoration of Papal authority in Rome and the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy, 1850-52 332

Section I: The restoration of Papal authority in Rome 334

Section II: The re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy 353

Section III: The 'No-Popery' movement as a reaction to the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy 360

Section IV: The government response to the anti-Papal movement 386

Section V: The Ecclesiastical Title Bill 399

Conclusion 421

Bibliography 428
Acknowledgements

On my arrival in Britain in 1990, I started work on Anglo-Italian relations in the period of Risorgimento under the supervision of Professor John A Davis. My decision to focus on Anglo-Vatican relations for my Phd thesis was made when I found some cartoons in Punch and a number of articles in The Times on Pius IX, which led me to wonder why Britain was so obsessed by this particular Pope? This simple and curious question has developed into this Phd thesis.

I could not have completed this thesis without help from numerous individuals and institutions. Therefore I would like to thank the staff at the following institutions for their assistance in my research: the Public Record Office in Kew; the Heartly Institute at the University of Southampton; the Bodleian Library, Oxford; the British Library (including the Newspaper Archive in Colindale); the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh; the Modern Record Centre at the University of Warwick; the Archives of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide in Rome; the City State Archive in Rome (Archivio Stato di Roma); the Italian Foreign Ministry Archive (Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome); and the Biblioteca Nazionale Storico Moderno e Contemporaneo, Via Gaetano, Roma. In addition, I particularly wish to express my thanks to Dr Ivan Dickie of the Westminster Diocesan Archives, London, to Signor Bourne of the Vatican Archive (Archivio Segreto Vaticano), and to
Monsignor Camisassa and his assistant in the Archivio Storico Congregation Pro Negotiis Ecclesiastics Extraordinariis. For helping me to gain access to the Vatican Archives, I am grateful to Sister Tesuko Nakagawa, the President of University of the Sacred Heart, Tokyo and to Padore Pittau, the President of University of the Gregoriana, Rome. I would also like to thank the staff of the libraries at the University of Warwick, the University of Birmingham, Senate House Library, and University College in London.

I would like to express my thanks to Professor Takao Matsumura who gave me the opportunity to study in England, to Professor John A Davis who supervised my thesis and provided numerous references on my behalf, to Professor Gwynne Lewis for his patience, to Dr Tony Mason for letters and references, to Mrs Ros Lucas for motherly support, and to the other members of staff in the Centre the Study of Social History at the University of Warwick. During the writing of my thesis I was inspired by a number of stimulating seminars and conferences which were organized by the staff and the members of the Institute of Historical Research in London. In particular, I am grateful to Dr Robert Oresko who gave me the opportunity to give a talk to his Sixteenth to Nineteenth Century Italian History seminar, where Professor Harry Hearder made some useful comments on my paper. The members of ASMI (Association of Modern Italian Studies) also provided me with useful information, among them I would
particularly like to single out Dr Lucy Riall, for her
tremendous patience and extremely helpful suggestions
when she was kind enough to read through my thesis. In
this respect I also wish to thank Dr Rohan McWilliam who
helped me to clarify my arguments and Dr Tony Taylor who
encouraged my research.

I would also like to thank for their intellectual and
personal assistance; Loredana Polezzi, Gabriella Rienzo,
Peter Brown, Kate Beaumont, Anastasia Ioannidou, Fiona
Lewis, Jonathan Simmon, Mauro Battocchi and Philip Best.
Finally I would like to express my deepest love and
appreciation to my parents who have generously supported
and encouraged me, and to Dr Antony Best not only for his
warm support but also for his intellectual advice.
Introduction

On 19 November 1847, Lord Minto, the British Lord Privy Seal and special envoy to the Papal States, wrote to Sir George Hamilton, the British minister to Florence, about the policies of Pope Pius IX. It included a surprisingly positive comment about the Pope:

We are going on as well as possible here. And if the good Pope and the Consulta di Stato draw well together the government will soon acquire the strength which is at present wanting to it. ¹

There have been only a few times since the Reformation when a British politician has paid such a compliment to the Pope. This favourable view was not only expressed by the British government’s representative but was also shared by the English press, which was usually more critical towards the Pope than the government. For example, Punch, which was renowned for its radical sympathies and its sarcasm towards the Pope, described Pius IX in 1847 as the embodiment of ‘Rational Liberty’ who was giving the ‘Roman Punch’ to despotism. ²

It is surprising to find in the mid-nineteenth century this wave of governmental and public enthusiasm for the Sovereign Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church. The traditional view of the Papacy in Britain was very
negative. The British government’s view of the Pope’s role in European diplomacy and politics was that he acted as a supporter of the conservative powers and in particular of Austria. There was also the problem that the nature of the Papal government and administration was so reactionary that it inspired a series of revolts within the Papal States; these required foreign intervention to suppress them and this in turn threatened to provoke a confrontation between the Great Powers due to rivalry over control of the Papacy and the strategic position of the Papal States in the Italian peninsula. Both at international and Italian domestic level the Pope was a symbol of autocracy.

For the British public the Pope was traditionally the embodiment of a despotism which contrasted with the Protestant constitutionalism of Britain. The modern British political system had its roots in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and it was not forgotten that the ousting of James II had been a victory over Catholicism. The legacy of the Reformation was that Roman Catholicism and the Pope’s claim to temporal and spiritual power were seen as fundamental threats to British freedom.

The favourable view of the Pope in 1847 was thus a significant shift from the previous period, but surprisingly it has not been studied in detail. This is mystifying considering that there have been many works on both the international and the domestic impact of Pius IX. It is well known that Pius, on taking office,
initiated a policy of reforms, and many accounts have been written about his 'liberal' period. There are a number of studies of his diplomacy with the European Catholic Powers, particularly with France and Austria, and his internal reform programme. Among them, Giacomo Martina’s *Pio IX 1846-1850* and Coppa’s *Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli and Papal Politics in European Affairs* about his Secretary of State, are important for Pius IX’s domestic and foreign policy. Ivan Scott’s *The Roman Question and The Powers, 1846-1865* concentrates on Franco-Roman relations, and Alan Reinerman’s *Austria and the Papacy in the age of Metternich* is the most important analysis of Austria’s policy towards the Papacy.

However, little has been written on relations between Britain and the Papal States in this period. The British government’s interest in the Papacy has been discussed chiefly in the context of British foreign policy towards the Italian Risorgimento and British competition with France and Austria. The lack of research on relations between Britain and the Papal States has in part been due to the fact that there was no direct diplomatic communication between the two in this period, except through the Papal Nuncios in Paris and Vienna. There are two other reasons why the study of Anglo-Roman relations has been neglected. First, because of the traditional emphasis in historical studies concerning Britain and the Risorgimento on Britain’s good relations with Piedmont,
the course of Anglo-Roman relations has largely been ignored except in terms of Papal opposition to unification. Second, Britain’s anti-Catholicism has meant that there has been a marked reluctance to examine its relations with the Vatican. However, an important if limited contribution has been made by Ottavio Barrie’s two-volume *L’Inghilterra e il problema italiano nel 1847-48, 1848-49*, 7, which is the only study extensively concerned with Anglo-Italian relations in the period of the 1848 Revolution. Even here the text mainly discusses Britain’s interests in Southern Italy and Piedmont, being based on the papers of Minto’s mission which is generally regarded as having a more significant effect on politics in Turin and Naples than in Rome. Two important works on Britain and the internal politics and the diplomatic position of the Papal States do exist, but they do not deal directly with this period. From the Roman perspective Emilia Morelli’s *La politica estera di Tommaso Bernetti* 8 looks at the period of the 1831 Five Powers Conference, while C.T. McIntire’s *England Against the Papacy, 1858-1861* 9 is significant but concentrates exclusively on a later period.

Another area of studies which is relevant to Anglo-Roman relations is the history of the Roman Catholic Church in Britain. Research on the leading Roman Catholic figures in England such as *Newman and His Age* by S. Gilley, 10 *Nicholas Wiseman and the Transformation of English Catholicism* by R.J. Schiefen 11 and *The Life and Times of*
Cardinal Wiseman by W. Ward are central to an understanding of religious relations between Britain and Rome. In addition, Donal Kerr's works on the British government's policy towards the Irish Catholic Church, Peel, Priests and Politics and 'A Nation of Beggars? make reference to the British government's attempts to use interference by the Pope to restrain the priests of the Irish Catholic Church from their political activities. However, these studies concentrate on domestic politics and religion without paying much regard to the diplomatic situation.

It is, however, vital when dealing with Anglo-Roman relations during the period of 1846-51 to remember that diplomatic, political and religious elements were all exerting their influence at one and the same time. This thesis therefore seeks to integrate the two strands of this particular relationship which are normally kept separate - religion and diplomacy. The aim is to demonstrate that a true understanding of the nature of Anglo-Roman relations can only be reached by following the development over time of the various different aspects to this relationship and seeing how these issues influenced each other.

In such a study it is obvious that some aspects of relationship will appear more significant than others. Consequently emphasis will be placed on a number of major themes. First, the effect on Anglo-Roman relations of the
political developments within the Papal States and the significance of Pius's reforms on the Italian peninsula. Second, the British government's concern about the growth of the Repeal movement in Ireland and its links with the Roman Catholic Church. Third, the desire of the Roman Catholics in England to see a re-establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy. Fourth and finally, the effect of public opinion in Britain, both radical and conservative, on the development of British policy towards the Papacy and the Italian question.

The analysis of these themes is based upon a number of different archival sources. The material on 'high politics' and diplomacy has utilized documentary evidence from both British and Papal government sources, contemporary published documents and correspondence from a variety of private papers. On the whole these sources have underlined the argument behind this thesis, that it is impossible and unrealistic to attempt to draw a divide between religious and political diplomacy. The correspondence of the leading actors in this thesis, Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Lord Minto and Cardinal Wiseman demonstrate time and time again that no such division existed within their own minds. There are, however, some problems with these sources as it is difficult to tell how complete a record of events and opinions they contain.
In regard to sources on British public opinion, there are greater problems. It is obviously difficult in this period to extrapolate what exactly the British public thought, but an attempt has been made by using Hansard, the government’s records on public activities and contemporary newspapers and pamphlets to give at least some idea of how British opinion reacted to the issues raised by British relations with the Vatican.

Chapter I discusses the background to the election of Pius IX, starting with Britain’s involvement in the Five Powers Conference in 1831, Giuseppe Mazzini’s contacts with Britain after his arrival in 1838, the political and social situation in the Papal States and other parts of the Italian peninsula, the election of Pius IX, and the British government’s diplomatic and domestic interests relating to the Papacy.

Chapter II deals with Pius IX’s popular political reforms, such as the introduction of the Civic Guard and the new press law, which were followed by the Austrian intervention in Ferrara. It then looks at the British government’s and public’s reactions to the reforms and the Austrian threat, and analyses the motives behind the British government’s decision to send Lord Minto on his mission to Rome.

Chapter III examines the course of events in the Papal States in 1848, British reactions to the establishment of
the constitution, and the battle for power between the Pope and the political parties. It also analyses the British government’s attempt to open diplomatic relations with the Papacy and the reasons for the failure of this policy.

Chapter IV looks at the establishment of the Roman Republic, and the reactions of the British government and radical public opinion to the policies propounded by Mazzini. In particular, it examines the British government’s response to the Pope’s call for support and the resultant French intervention in Rome, and the British response to the anti-clericalism of the Roman Republic.

Chapter V discusses the British view of the restoration of Papal authority in Rome and the subsequent clash between the Pope and Piedmont. It then deals with the re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy, which was followed by the rise of a No-Popery movement, in both high politics and popular reaction.
Notes


2 Punch, 13 (July-December 1847), p.135, Roman Punch, Rational Liberty to Despotism, Punch to the emperor of Austria.

3 G. Martina, Pio IX (1846-1850), (Rome, 1974)

4 J.F. Coppa, Cardinal Antonelli and Papal Politics in European Affairs, (New York, 1990)


7 O. Barrie, L'Inghilterra e il problema italiano nel 1848-49, (Milan, 1965)

8 E. Morelli, La politica estera di Tommaso Bernetti, segretario di stato di Gregorio XVI, (Rome, 1953)

9 C.T. McIntire, England Against the Papacy, 1858-61, (Cambridge, 1983)

10 S. Gilley, Newman and His Age, (London, 1990)

11 R.J. Schiefen, Nicolas Wiseman and the Transformation of English Catholicism, (Shepherdstown, 1984)


Chapter I
Britain and the election of Pius IX

Introduction

The election of Pius IX as the Pope in July 1846 has often been seen by historians as a critical event in the development of Italian nationalism. At last a champion of reform had taken charge of the most reactionary of the Italian states. The new Pope inherited a state that was poorly administered, full of corruption and averse to social and political progress, and began to initiate policies that led to substantial change.

Before discussing Pius IX’s election and the subsequent reforms, it is necessary to study the historical background to his succession to the Papacy, and in particular the two principal proposals for reform made prior to this date. The first of these was made by the five European Great Powers in the Memorandum of 1831, the second by Luigi Carlo Farini, the Romagnolo intellectual and politician, in his Manifesto di Rimini of 1844. These memoranda are important because, although very few elements in the 1831 Memorandum and the Manifesto di Rimini were put into practice by Gregory XVI, after July 1846 Pius attempted to do so. This in turn helps to explain Britain’s attitude towards the new Pope, because the British government was pleased that the principles behind the Memorandum, which had not been adopted by
Gregory XVI and his secretary of State, Cardinal Bernetti, had been accepted by the new Pope.

Section I: The 1831 Memorandum

Although Britain's interest in the Papacy was growing by the time of the 1831 Conference, it is clear that Austria was still the main power in the Papal States, a position which it had acquired in 1814 at the Congress of Vienna. This was inevitable as the Pope had to rely on Austria to restore his previous possessions and his temporal power. The Congress introduced a settlement which protected Austria's Italian interests by decreeing that Austria would withdraw its military force from the Papal States on condition that it was allowed to annex a small section of the Legation of Ferrara that lay on the left bank of the Po river, and maintained the right to garrison the citadels of Ferrara and Comacchio, both of which were important for strategic reasons. 1

After Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, Pius VII's Secretary of State, had negotiated the restoration of the Papal territory and the Austrian evacuation, he collaborated with Prince Metternich on political reforms, introducing a more centralized administration, more modernized finance, an efficient military and police system to maintain law and order, and a rationalization and simplification of the judicial system. 2 These measures led to the Motu Proprio of 6 July 1814 that partly secularized Papal offices, gave each province (a
Delegation or Legation according to its governor’s title) a consultative council of local notables to advise the governor, and abolished torture and arbitrary arrest. ³ Reinerman argues in his *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich*, that even though limited in degree Consalvi’s reforms brought tranquillity to the Papal States between 1816-23, at a time when Piedmont and Naples were convulsed by the revolutions of 1820-21. Metternich too expressed his satisfaction with Austria’s diplomatic relations with the Papacy around this period.⁴

In spite of Pius VII’s and Consalvi’s efforts the Zelanti, the ultra-conservative elements in the Curia, were a major obstacle even to gradual and moderate reforms. When Pius VII died in 1823 Leo XII, who was close to the Zelanti, alienated public opinion and popular discontent increased.⁵ After Leo XII’s death in 1829 a new moderate Pope, Pius VIII, attempted once again to take up Cardinal Consalvi’s policy of conciliatory diplomacy and moderate political reform. As with Pius VII’s regime, Pius VIII relied heavily on Austria not only for military reasons but also for religious motives, because while Austria supported the Catholic Church’s interests anti-clerical tendencies were growing in France. In particular, the Papacy closely co-operated with Austria in suppressing the revolutionary activities in Italy which were a consequence of the social discontent that had accumulated during the period of Leo XII and remained even with Pius VIII. Although Pius VIII
was more moderate than his predecessor, he kept strict control over the political malcontents. But during this time, revolutionary groups were plotting beneath the surface, waiting for the appropriate time for an uprising.

An opportunity arose when revolution broke out in France in July 1830 and soon spread into Belgium and other parts of Europe. French radicals openly encouraged revolution in Italy, but Austria was determined to protect the existing order in Europe against revolt and reinforced its army in Italy.

The Italian revolutionaries, however, realizing that the Austrian army would always stand behind the Pope, had begun to make plans to launch an insurrection should the Pope die, and thus take advantage of any subsequent power-vacuum.

A promising opening offered itself when Pius VIII died in November 1830, and the rebels were encouraged further when, after the Pope’s death, French revolutionaries declared that they would defend Italy from any foreign intervention. Ciro Menotti, a leading member of the Carbonari, started an uprising in February 1831 in Parma and Modena which overthrew the local rulers, and was followed by uprisings in Bologna, Forlì, Ravenna, Imola, Ferrara and Ancona. In particular, Bologna became the centre of the revolutionary movement and its provisional government proclaimed the union of all the insurgent
provinces under one government, calling it 'the United
Provinces of Italy.' However, these revolutionary
movements in Italy hoped for French support against
Austria, and therefore, when it was discovered that the
French were not in a position to interfere, the new Pope,
Gregory XVI, called for Austrian military intervention to
restore order. Austria re-occupied the states of Parma
and Modena and then crossed the Papal frontier to enter
Bologna. Subsequently on 27 March the revolutionary
government was forced to surrender. 8

The revolution of 1831 attracted the European Power’s
attention to the Papal States, and Papal affairs became
for a moment a major issue in European affairs. This was
an important and sensitive matter for all the Great
Powers as there was a general fear that events in the
Italian peninsula could lead to a clash of interests
between Austria and France. In particular there was
concern that competition between Vienna and Paris over
the Papacy had the potential to lead to war between the
two states. Britain’s main preoccupation was its belief
that such a clash might bring about a general European
war involving Russia and Prussia on the Austrian side.

A conference of the five European Great Powers was held
in April 1831 to restore Papal authority in the Papal
territories, such as Bologna, which had been occupied by
the revolutionaries, and to discuss how security in the
Papal States could be guaranteed. The conference led in
the end to new conflicts among the European Powers, and especially to hostile relations between Austria and France which resulted in 1832 in an Austrian occupation of Bologna and a French occupation of Ancona. However, it was not simply a two-sided confrontation between Austria and France, because the presence of Britain complicated matters further. Viscount Palmerston's dictum that "Britain had no permanent friends or enemies, just interests" can be seen to operate here: it was Britain's interest that the Papal States should introduce reforms in order to avoid further revolution and that they should remain free from foreign domination.

A British representative, Sir Brook Taylor, was sent to Rome in April 1831 to discuss the reform programme in the Papal States with representatives of the other four powers. Taylor's status was "without any official diplomatic duty" and his mission was to prevent either France or Austria from increasing its influence in and domination of the Papal States. Britain would not support either state's interests in the Papal States, and it was believed that this policy could work if the British representative remained an unofficial, and thus politically neutral, envoy.

Britain's policy towards reform was designed to establish the foundations of 'good government', and focused on specific issues such as a Code of Laws. As George Seymour, the British minister in Florence, noted to Palmerston on 25 April 1831:
As far as I am informed the great evil - or at least greatest of the great evils of the Roman system is the absence of any Code of Laws: a bit of paper pasted upon a wall has, in that unfortunate country - the force of an Act of Parliament - and hence uncertainty which paralyses all enterprises, destroys all confidence, and places the prosperity of the people at the mercy of the Pope, or the Cardinal Secretary or the Cardinal Legate of the day. ¹²

Seymour, who was much more vigorous than the mild Taylor and was regarded as "a desperate radical" by the Austrian minister, ¹³ sharply pointed out:

*I have no doubt that the evil spirit might be laid by proper concessions on the part of the Pope - but altho' his intentions are said to be good I dread the uncompromising disposition of the Sacred College, relieved as it now is from the influence of present danger.* ¹⁴

This was a difficult task, for not only was it hard to persuade the Papacy to accept reforms but also the French-Austrian rivalry made it almost impossible for the Great Powers to come to any agreement. Taylor's instructions were to stay above the international competition and to work solely to secure reforms.
Palmerston said in his despatch to Taylor on 2 April 1831 that even if the French minister, Saint-Aulaire, was withdrawn:

... you will nevertheless continue to cooperate with the Austrian minister in encouraging to effect the desired arrangement. But you will in such case consider yourself as more especially charged with the interests of the subjects of the Pope, whose cause would probably not be very warmly espoused by the minister of Austria. 15

This advice demonstrated that the desire for reform rather than any pro-French sentiment was the major influence on British policy. Nevertheless it was expected that Taylor would find the greatest support for reform from the French.

France gave support to the liberal movement in Italy and advocated political reform in the Papal States, but in fact its primary interest was to force Austria to leave the Legations. However, Austria was determined to keep its influence over not only the Papal States but also the whole Italian peninsula as well, and opposed any liberal concessions in the Papal States.

George Seymour, the British Minister in Florence, reported on 25 April 1831 to Palmerston, after the Conference had started, that the Austrians wanted to
commit the other powers to perpetuating the status quo in Italy. He noted that the Austrian ambassador in Rome, Count Lützow, had been trying to gauge whether the representatives of the Great Powers were agreeable to the establishment of the permanent committee to oversee the security of Italy. He observed:

As I have alluded to the Austrian Ambassador I will take this opportunity of noticing to you an idea which I have heard lately thrown out by him - it is that the affairs of Italy should be discussed by Representatives of the Great Powers in a manner similar to those of Belgium—and that great advantage might be derived from the continued sitting of such Junta to consider any fresh difficulties which might arise. 16

This was obviously a disturbing prospect as it was feared that such a committee would be used to bolster the reactionary regimes in the peninsula. However, Metternich was not in a strong position to push this proposal. Russia supported Metternich, but was too busy suppressing the revolution in Poland to take much part in the conference. In any case Russia’s suppressive policies towards the Catholics in Poland brought a chill to its relations with the Papacy, so that Britain did not have to worry about Russia’s involvement. 17 Freiherr Christian van Bunsen, the Prussian representative and minister at Rome, was moderately in favour of reform, but
he was instructed by the Prussian government to support Austria in the final stages of the conference.

After a month's discussion of a reform programme the conference submitted a Memorandum to the Pope on 21 May 1831. It included proposals that the central Junta should be elected from local councils, that laymen should be admitted to lower and higher positions within the administrative and judicial system, and that financial reform should take place. It also asked the Pope to agree to the evacuation of Austrian troops. 18

The Memorandum was greeted with enthusiasm by the British government, and on 23 June 1831 Palmerston informed Taylor that:

This government has been gratified at learning the success which has hitherto attended the efforts made to prevail upon the Roman government to adopt those measures of conciliation and internal improvement which have been considered essential to the future contentment and tranquillity of the Papal states,... 19

The main contents of the Memorandum, which were a reflection of French and British liberal ideas, were obviously opposed by Austria and by Bernetti. On 5 July the Pope made his response. He adopted part of the financial and judicial reform provisions of the Memorandum, but rejected the central proposals for
political reform of local councils and the central Junta. As the Memorandum did not meet with the approval of Austria or the Pope, the conference broke up at the end of July.

Taylor was more optimistic than Seymour about the situation within the Papal States, but was frustrated at the lack of progress in initiating reform. He noted to Palmerston on 30 July 1831 that he had advised the Pope to introduce reforms as soon as possible, but that Gregory had informed him that:

He has proceeded, he said, with as much haste as the importance and nature of the ameliorations in the institutions of this country would admit, and that his government would not delay to publish the remaining acts promised, but that the revolutionary spirit of his people was such that nothing would satisfy them.

Taylor to a degree sympathized with this view as he perceived that Papal subjects were just as responsible for the instability as Papal rule, making a contrast with Seymour’s bitter criticism of the Papal regime. Indeed, he noted to Palmerston that ‘it is perfectly true that his Holiness’s subjects are to the highest degree unreasonable’.

Taylor also referred to the issue of the amnesty for political offenders who were involved with the February
revolution in 1831. This was a matter that Saint (Aulaire) had pressed on the Papacy, but such a "radical" concession was almost out of question for Gregory XVI. In his letter of 30 July, Taylor noted:

I now ventured to express to his Holiness my apprehension of the evil effect produced against His government by the numerous arrests going on at this moment in Rome and acquainting him further with my repeated application for the prisoners confined in the Castello Santangelo for the conspiracy of February last.

The Pope answered that there was very little hope of release, because they had made a plot against the Papacy and had tried to seize Bernetti and himself.

Taylor was also frustrated when neither he nor the diplomats of the other European countries received from the Vatican a copy of a document sent to the Pope by the people of the Romagna setting out their political desires. The Pope's reluctance to publicize this letter seemed to show that the Pope had no intention of listening to his subjects.

Against the rising agitation in the Legations, Bernetti reorganized the civil and criminal code and promulgated a penal code. In order to assure the immediate submission of the Legations to the Papal government and to restore the Papal authority, Cardinal Albani asked for Austrian
military assistance and as a result Bologna was reoccupied by the Austrians. In response to the Austrian action, French forces occupied Ancona and declared that they would remain until the Austrians left Bologna and the Pope introduced several liberal reforms, such as a separate lay administration in Bologna as well as in the four Legations, reorganization of the municipal police, the introduction of a new elective system, and the secularization of the offices in the Legation, most of which Britain agreed with. However, such ideas might endanger the Papal regime and were opposed by the Zelanti.

The British government’s response to this crisis was to try to persuade both Austria and France to withdraw, while at the same time Seymour was instructed to revive the reform programme which had been proposed in the 1831 Memorandum. Palmerston wrote to him on 8 April 1832:

You have correctly understood the character in which you appear at Rome which is that of the representative of a great power which has a strong interest in preserving the peace of Europe and therefore in making up the quarrel between its allies and in removing sources of future differences; but which having no direct concern in Italian affairs and no established relations with the court of Rome, cannot take the same active part in guaranteeing arrangements which other powers may be prepared
to do. At the same time these very circumstances ought to give more weight to our advice because they prove that it must be free from all suspicion of interested motives, except in as far as our interest lies, in securing the welfare of other states and the peace of Europe. 27

Against Austria's position regarding the attitude of the Protestant powers to the Pope's temporal power, Palmerston observed that:

... to this I reply that on the contrary, we are endeavouring to render him an important service and to maintain his temporal authority by persuading him to do that which if he does not do, his temporal authority will infallibly be overthrown either by the attack of his subjects or the support of his allies. 28

However, Britain's negotiations with France and Austria were not successful, and Palmerston's relations with Metternich over the Papal issue became strained. Palmerston was convinced that the reform programme in the Papal States had failed owing to Austrian support for Papal maladministration, and he ordered Seymour to withdraw from the Papal States. Metternich was offended by Palmerston's decision to remove Seymour and by the publication in The Times of an exchange of notes between
Seymour and Lützow which contained insulting references by Seymour to Metternich and the Papal administration. 29

The Papacy had, in fact, to wait until 1838 to see Austria and France withdraw, which had less to do with Britain's mediation than with changes within the Papacy. The Zelanti forced the 'liberal' Bernetti to resign in 1836, replacing him with the ultra-conservative, pro-Austrian, Cardinal Lambruschini, who negotiated the withdrawal with Metternich. 30 With the defeat of the Anglo-French calls for reform the social and political situation in the Papal states would not improve until 1846.

Section II: Mazzini and the impact of the 1831 revolution

The revolution in central Italy in 1831 raised two preoccupations among the European powers; first, concern that Papal maladministration was the cause of unrest, and second, disquiet over the activities of the Italian revolutionaries, in particular the rise of Mazzinian republicanism, which threatened not only the Italian states but also the European monarchical powers. Britain's natural sympathy towards the cause of Italian nationalism did not extend to Mazzini, whose brand of revolutionary activity was the antithesis of Britain's desire for gradual reform within the Italian states. Britain saw reform as a means to avoid revolution, and hence the likelihood of Austrian and French armed intervention. Worse Mazzini's link to radicals and
revolutionaries, such as the Chartists, made him anathema to the British government. 31

After the failure of the February 1831 Revolution in central Italy, Mazzini escaped to Marseilles with another thirty or forty revolutionaries, and founded the Association, Young Italy (Giovine Italia), in July 1831. 32 In 1832 he tried to encourage insurrections in Naples and the Papal States, and in order to further his campaign, launched a periodical called Young Italy in 1833. Copies of the periodical inspired young Italian nationalists, such as Vincenzo Gioberti and Luigi Carlo Farini. 33

This was a matter of interest to Britain. Seymour stated to Palmerston on 27 March 1833:

'The Giovine Italia' attributed the failure of the revolution of 1831 to the incapacity of its chief directors, and to the difference of opinion existing among them; and it argues, therefore, the necessity of any future revolution finding a select body of Italians prepared with a set of definite objects, to prosecute which all their energies must be bent. 34

The governments in Vienna, Paris, St Petersburg and London collaborated to collect information about Mazzini’s activities. Mazzini’s letters were intercepted by the Duke of Tuscany, and their contents were passed to Sir Augustus Foster, the British minister in Turin. They
revealed that Mazzini was attempting to convert people from many different backgrounds to his movement, including aristocrats and priests. 35

After being expelled from France, Mazzini arrived in Switzerland in July 1833 and in the spring of 1834, he founded a new association called Young Europe with other European political exiles such as Poles and Germans. 36

Even before this, in the winter of 1834, David Morier, the British minister in Berne, reported on Mazzini’s link with a plot to overthrow the Sardinian government. On 8 February 1834 he informed the Foreign Office that:

The news received here ... have placed beyond a doubt the fact, that the movement of the Poles from Switzerland was connected with a more extensive plan, which it appears included the overthrow of the existing government of Geneva, and the seizure of its warlike stores, to be used in a more serious attack upon Savoy than that which has just failed. The failure is attributed to the impatience of the principal Italian leader, Mazzini, who, anticipating by two or three days the term fixed for the combined operation, revealed the views of the aggressors in a proclamation issued by the self-styled ‘Provisional Insurrectional Government of Savoy.’ 37
Morier also forwarded to London a copy of a proclamation entitled 'Liberty, Equality, Humanity, Independence, Concord!' in which Mazzini declared:

Considering that wherever despotism prevails, insurrection is the most sacred duty; that when the moment, matured by circumstances, has arrived, it is a crime not to assemble under the banner of insurrection; that this moment has arrived; that every insurrection, resolved upon for national purposes, must be carried into effect by the people; and that a general, voluntary, and conspicuous outbreak, is a powerful means of abridging that state of uncertainty which is the forerunner of insurrection ... 38

Expelled by the Swiss government, which came under pressure from Austria, Mazzini in 1837 escaped to England where he had some contacts and a few sympathisers with Young Italy. 39 It is obviously a coincidence that this year also saw the rise of Chartism, but it is known that Mazzini had second-hand knowledge of the English social and labour movement through his contacts with Chartist and radical friends. In July 1839 he relaunched the periodical Young Italy in London and in 1840 started a mutual aid society for Italian artisans in London as a branch of Young Italy. The idea for the Society was inspired by Chartism and the Polish political exiles, and he argued, 'Workers should be organized to be able to
bargain with their employers’ in Apostolato Popolare, a publication of Young Italy. Mazzini’s arrival in England was significant as his links with the radicals helped to persuade this group to give active support to the cause of revolutionary Italian nationalism, which was in marked contrast to the cautious policy pursued by the British government.

In 1843 Mazzini once again organized conspiracies in Italy and although they failed, his reputation as ‘a dangerous man’ was confirmed. These revolutionary plots led the Earl of Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary, and Sir James Graham, the Home Secretary, to decide that the British government should authorize the General Post Office to open Mazzini’s private letters in London and pass any relevant information to Vienna. This plan came about after a meeting between Graham and Count Neumann, the Austrian ambassador in London, in which the latter expressed Metternich’s desire to see Mazzini’s letters.

In addition, in January 1844 the Foreign Office passed on to the Home Office a request from the Austrian minister in London for information on the whereabouts of Mazzini, whether he was in London at that time or had proceeded to Brussels. The Metropolitan Police looked into the question but on this occasion were unable to provide an answer. On 12 January 1844 an officer in the Metropolitan Police was forced to report that:
I have made every possible inquiry at the different Foreign Hotels, Lodging Houses, the Passport Office and the Steam Navigation Companies Office, respecting two foreigners named Mazzini and Tabrizzi, but cannot find any person who knows either of them. 45

It is well known that the discovery that Mazzini's post was being intercepted was revealed in the English press, such as The Times and the Westminster Review, arousing considerable criticism and attacks on the British government. 46 Hansard spent 550 pages alone on this issue. 47 The Home Secretary became a particular target of public hatred.

On the surface it appears that the minister's action was taken simply to stop Mazzini's revolutionary activities, but there was another dimension to the Mazzini letter scandal which helps to demonstrate how for Britain the issue of Mazzini and his link with the Papal States was a complicated one that touched on both foreign and domestic policy.

The Irish Repeal movement

One of the issues with which the British government was preoccupied in the 1830s' and the 1840s' was the Irish Repeal movement. Because the link between Ireland and Papacy was a central aspect of British policy towards the
Vatican, it is necessary to outline briefly the background to the Irish Catholic issue. Religious concessions to the Catholic Church in Ireland and the rest of British Isles had started with the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829. Catholic emancipation was related to a series of political reforms in British politics. Although the Parliamentary Reform Act itself was undertaken in 1832 during the Whig ministry, other reforms had already started in the 1820s under the Tory Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, in particular those related to religious toleration, including the emancipation of the Unitarians, the Non-conformists, the Dissenters and the Catholics. The most significant piece of legislation was the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1828 which granted full civil rights to Catholics and extended the franchise for the first time to Catholic voters. The Act had the broad effect of allowing Catholics to enjoy freedom of speech and association not only within England, Scotland and Wales but also Ireland. However, the fact was that the Irish Catholics still believed that their rights had not been fully recognized as the franchise qualification in Ireland was substantially higher than in other parts of the United Kingdom and they therefore sought more concessions.

Despite these reforms the political situation in Ireland remained volatile. As early as 1831 when Britain was involved in the debates over the Memorandum in the Papal States, there was sensitivity, at least in Palmerston’s
mind, about the possible comparison between the situation within the Papal States and that in Ireland. As he stated to Seymour on 22 March 1832:

If they taunt you with Ireland which all Foreigners do the moment one begins to talk of improvements and conciliation and if they say how would you, England, like us to give you advice as to the best manner of governing that Island, the answer is that in the first place, whether we govern it well or ill, we are able to govern it ourselves without the help of foreign aid, and so long as a Sovereign is able to maintain his authority and enforce the Laws by his own means, there is no reason why others should meddle with his affairs. 50

Also he mentioned Irish Catholic and administrative problems:

The Catholics as a body were discontented at their political disabilities. Britain removed those disabilities. The Catholic peasantry were dissatisfied at the manner with which the present law required them to contribute to the support of a Protestant Establishment. Britain would change that Law, strike out some and put in others. Justice was ill administered by the Provincial Magistrates. Some taxes such as window duty and assessed taxes bore hard upon
Irish, but Britain repealed them and are now able to keep order in a country. 51

Despite Palmerston’s misplaced confidence, Britain’s problems in Ireland did not go away. In the late 1830s Daniel O’Connell began a new campaign for repeal of the Union and sought to mobilize clerical support in Ireland to bolster his cause. Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minister, sought to pacify the agitation in Ireland by appealing to the Vatican. 52 However, Britain did not have diplomatic relations with the Papacy, and the English college in Rome was much weaker than its Irish equivalent. In particular, John MacHale, the Bishop of Tuam and a great clerical supporter of O’Connell, was influential in Rome because he had close links with the Secretary of State, Cardinal Raffaello Lambruschini, who was a prominent pro-Austrian and who had close contacts with Metternich.

It was this need to tackle the Irish question that provided the hidden agenda to the Mazzini affair in 1843-4. The arrangement reached with Austria in the autumn of 1843 was a quid pro quo in which on the one hand the British government would pass information about Mazzini to Metternich, and on the other Austria would persuade the Pope and Lambruschini, to stop clerical participation in the Irish Repeal movement. The British government hoped that it could persuade Metternich to use his influence upon Lambruschini and the Pope to undermine the
Repeal movement in Ireland, given Metternich's concern over Mazzini's revolutionary movement and O'Connell's radical movement and fears that both might spread over the Continent. Irish affairs thus led the British government into a tangled international plot involving an Italian revolutionary and Austrian and Papal diplomacy.

Unfortunately for the British government the Pope was sympathetic to the Irish Catholics who had long suffered from English rule, and the Curia had no intention of antagonizing the Irish Catholics in order to help the English government out of its embarrassment. Therefore nothing was done by Rome to restrict the Repeal movement, in spite of Metternich's concern about the Irish Repeal agitation. Instead of solving the Irish problem, this incident brought nothing but domestic embarrassment to the British government.

Britain could not solve the question of the Irish Repeal agitation through its negotiation with Metternich, but it did not give up negotiations with the Papacy. In November 1843 the Vatican requested through the Papal Nuncio in Vienna, Cardinal Altieri, that Britain control the Italian nationalist agitations that had broken out in Malta. As a result, the Colonial Office instructed the authorities in Malta to restrain the revolutionaries, and Aberdeen, at Peel's request, sought as a quid pro quo Papal support against the Irish clergy who were involved with the Repeal agitations. But although England checked the Maltese agitations Cardinal Lambruschini
claimed that 'whereas the government in Malta had the power to enforce the law of the land, the Holy See had no such power in Ireland.' 57 Once again the British government's efforts to persuade Rome to influence the Catholic Church in Ireland had failed, although Britain would return to this strategy after the election of the new Pope in July 1846.

The failure of the attempt to outflank the Irish nationalists in Rome had an important effect on British policy towards Ireland that was to have significant ramifications for the future of Anglo-Vatican relations. The major consequence of this set-back was the realization on the part of the British government that they had to make a political compromise on a number of religious issues relating to Ireland, particularly as the Repeal movement was attracting support in America, Europe and among British Chartists. This resulted in reforms such as the Charitable Bequests Act in 1844 and the increase of the Maynooth Grant in 1845 which were designed to appease Catholic opinion. 58

Peel's efforts began with the reform of the law governing charitable bequests to the Catholic Church in Ireland in February 1844. This was a move intended to win over the Irish clergy but it soon met with resistance by those close to MacHale. Consequently it was felt by the British government that it was necessary to appeal to Rome and on 27 September 1844, to get the Vatican's approval of the
reform of charitable bequests, Peel directed Charles Canning, Aberdeen's Under-Secretary, to despatch to Rome William Petre, a member of a well known Essex Catholic family, who it was hoped would make a favourable impression on the Papal authorities. Petre was appointed as an agent resident in Rome attached to the British Legation in Florence, he was not an accredited ambassador or minister to the Papal States as Britain did not have formal diplomatic relations with the Papacy. There was intensive correspondence between Petre and Aberdeen about this issue but Petre failed to make progress. This revealed a fundamental problem for British policy which was that any attempt to address Catholic issues in Ireland could only be successful if Papal approval was given, but due to its lack of official diplomatic representation there was little Britain could do to influence the Pope.  

Further to this in 1845 Peel decided to treble the annual parliamentary grant to the Maynooth Catholic College in Ireland. The first Maynooth Act of 1795 had established a college funded by the British government to provide for the education of Irish priests from poor backgrounds. However, the Maynooth Grant, which had been intended to placate Irish opinion ironically gave more opportunity for repeal supporters to study in the College. To distract them from the Repeal movement, Peel was forced to consider increasing substantially the grant to Maynooth, even though he realized that this would be very
controversial and might create difficulties for his government. He was convinced that the Maynooth Grant was important if Ireland was to be subdued, and hoped that it would conciliate a large section of the Irish Catholic community. His policy was to appease rather than confront. However, it was his misfortune that any good that this reform achieved was swept away by the famine.

The issue of the Maynooth Grant was also significant because it brought about deep divisions within the Conservative party, and some would claim that it was not the repeal of the corn laws but rather the Maynooth Bill, which became law in April 1845, that caused the final division within the Tory party. The Maynooth Grant also had the unfortunate effect of provoking widespread anti-Catholic sentiment among the British public. Protestant groups formed a Central Anti-Maynooth Committee which was led by Sir Culling Eardley Smith. This Committee organized a number of large public meetings and indirectly helped in the creation of the Evangelical Alliance. This growth of anti-Catholic agitation would also over time have an effect on Anglo-Vatican relations.

Section III: The Manifesto di Rimini and its consequences

British frustrations with Gregory XVI were not limited to his refusal to help over the Irish issue; there was also increasing dissatisfaction by 1844 over his government of the Papal States. The period between 1844 and his death
in 1846 saw the rise of civil strife within the States, which also spread to Tuscany, but Gregory ignored all calls for reform.

In Italy, after the failure of several of Mazzini's revolutionary conspiracies, several important writers holding moderate liberal ideas emerged around the early 1840s'. These included activists such as Vincenzo Gioberti and Carlo Farini, both former supporters of Mazzini who had moved to more moderate liberal positions. In 1843 Gioberti, who was Piedmontese, published a book entitled *Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani* which advanced the proposal that the Pope should become the leader of a United Italy under a federal system. His *Primato* had considerable influence on other moderate writers, such as d'Azeglio and Farini, and was also read by Cardinal Mastai-Feretti, soon to become Pius IX. Its effect on Farini was particularly significant, because two years later he published the *Manifesto di Rimini*. Farini came from the Romagna and was to have an important role in the Risorgimento both as an intellectual and a politician; he eventually became Prime Minister of Italy between 1862-63. Farini's initial disillusion with revolution came after a series of unsuccessful plots starting with the *Moto di Savigno* in 1843. Most of these insurrections were regarded as directly or indirectly influenced by Mazzini's *Young Italy* in Paris and London. The agitation in Malta in 1843
spread to the turbulent regions of Calabria (in the Kingdom of Naples), Romagna and Bologna, but none of these insurrections were successful. 67 This was enough to give a formidable impression of Young Italy's activities to the Papal States and other European monarchical states such as Austria and Britain, but to some in the movement, such as Farini, the continuous stream of failed revolutions suggested the need for a different approach.

Surrounded by these unsuccessful revolutionary movements, and against the background of yet another failed insurrection, this time in Rimini, Farini suggested in his Manifesto di Rimini in 1845 an alternative to revolution.

He recommended a number of reforms for the Papal States, some of which, close to the ideas suggested in the 1831 Memorandum, were a way of appealing to the five Great Powers. The full title of the document was 'Manifesto of the inhabitants of the Roman states to the princes and nations of Europe,' and proposed a reform programme comprising an amnesty, administrative reforms in the Papal States, and the creation of a Civic Guard. 68 In essence, however, it was a bourgeois document and the main elements contained within it were typical of the constitutional changes demanded by the middle classes throughout Europe, that is the introduction of a modern civil and criminal code of law and the establishment of a
representative assembly which would have control over the collection of taxation. The Manifesto was inspired by several Italian liberals, and included ideas from Gioberti, d’Azeglio and Balbo. The document attracted the attention not only of the Italian states but also of the European Powers.

Farini may have hoped that this manifesto would lead to some progress, but it had no effect on Gregory XVI who continued with the same reactionary policies. However, pressure for reform continued to grow. In 1846 Lord Holland, the British minister in Florence, forwarded to the Foreign Office a copy of another address to the Pope written by an anonymous Italian nationalist. This document was particularly interesting in suggesting how Britain was perceived a model for development, and included the observation that:

A revolution costs too much for people to plunge into it without most cogent reasons, and these reasons wise rulers seek to remove. The tendency of nations to one vast association of interests became a rage throughout most of the whole of Europe. Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bohemians and Austria. Protestant government has the right of knowledge and charity, and respects in popular tumults, the right of him who suffers sometimes to complain. What is protestant England doing for unhappy Ireland:
she furnished her instead with a medium of communicating her beliefs with great order and legality. Britain knows that the people agitate with more tranquillity when it is ruled in equity. 71

Although somewhat naive in its assessment of the Irish situation, this passage is an interesting reflection of Italian liberal views.

The uprising in Rimini inspired Farini’s Manifesto and posed a new problem for the Papal authorities – how to deal with the several hundred people involved in the insurrection and their leader, Pietro Renzi. In his book Lo Stato Romano dall’anno 1815-50 published in 1850, Farini claimed that the Rimini revolution was virtually a non-violent movement. As Farini described it:

The insurgents did not commit either violence or wrong of any other kind; they took possession, it is true, of the little cash that was found in the public coffers, but this, which the Government and its journals afterwards denounced as a wicked robbery, was considered by impartial men a necessary consequence of political convulsion, and by no means as an ordinary crime. 72

Under the influence of the reactionary Gregory XVI, Cardinal Massimo, the Legate of Forlì near Rimini,
pressed the Grand Duke of Tuscany to hand over Renzi and his followers who, after the failure of their revolt, had fled to Florence. The Papal Chargé d'affaires had demanded that Renzi should be given up to the Papal Government in accordance with the treaty of extradition between Tuscany and Rome on 21 January 1846. 73 As Farini noted:

It had already made the most keen and urgent representation, in order to obtain from the Tuscan Government the delivery into its own hands of Pietro Renzi who was the author of the movement of Rimini, and who, first taking refugee in France, afterwards secretly returned to Florence, and was there discovered and arrested. 74

The British government showed interest in these events because it feared the negative consequences of Gregory's policy, not only on the Papal States but possibly too on Tuscany itself.

The British government's reaction was revealed by Holland, who noted to Palmerston in a letter on 21 January 1846 that a number of political disturbances were taking place in Tuscany, 'Frequent acts of insubordination testify to the prevailing spirit of disaffection throughout the country,' and referred to the assassination of the principal police officer in Forli and the large number of political prisoners in
Cività Castellani. He lamented in his letter to Palmerston that 'the laws of humanity are outraged and public opinion disregarded'. In his report of an incident in Cività Castellani, he concluded on 27 February 1846 'There are sufficient causes of discontent to excite among the people of Romagna an abhorrence of essential tyranny.' On 26 January 1846 Holland reported a meeting between the Pope and the Legates of Ancona, Forll and Bologna regarding administrative reform and other matters, but he concluded that '... no measures of real advantage and importance are likely to be adopted'. We can see from this that the political and social situation in the Papal States had not changed since 1831.

The Renzi affair heightened unrest in Tuscany. In January 1846 the fact that Renzi had returned to Florence secretly, using a false name, was discovered by the Papal and Austrian representatives in Rome and they started putting pressure on the Tuscan government insisting that Renzi should be handed over to the Papal government. Holland reported on 11 February 1846:

Though perhaps the termination of this affair as I have related can be supported and justified by international law and the treaty of extradition, it is by no means a wise expedient for the tranquillity of the Roman states.
In spite of Holland's efforts and his collaboration with the French minister in Florence, the Grand Duke of Tuscany agreed to Renzi's extradition to the Papal States. This surrender caused tremendous anger among the people in Tuscany against the Grand Duke as well as the Papal government, especially because a petition for Renzi's release was not considered by the Tuscan government. 80

It was also discovered that the minister who had organized Renzi's arrest in Tuscany was a man who was closely linked with the Jesuits. Holland reported to Aberdeen in February that this had led to the minister being castigated by the people. 81

This increased hostility against the Pope and the Jesuits led to protests against plans to found a nunnery of the Sacred Heart in Pisa. Holland was informed on 16 March 1846 that a petition signed by thirty-five of the forty professors at Pisa University had been sent to the governor of Pisa. This petition insisted that 'The Sisters of the Sacred Heart be refused the permission to found in Pisa a house for the education of girls.' 82 It justified this opposition by observing that:

Instead of introducing a new religious establishment for that purpose it would be better to reform those already existing according to the exigencies of the present times. The House which it is wished to found in
Pisa is evidently intended to become a centre of Jesuitical activity in Tuscany. From the close dependence of the sisters of the Sacre Coeur on the company of Jesus, these nuns ... would necessarily, ... imbue with a Jesuitical spirit the minds of the girls they would educate, and by them influence private families and society in general. 83

Holland noted that the governor of Pisa had greeted this petition with disdain and that he had denied that the Tuscan government had the 'ultimate sinister intention, namely the future return of the Jesuits'. 84

On top of the Tuscan government’s treatment of Renzi, this affair caused Holland to express his dissatisfaction with the authorities and his sympathy for the protests against the Sacred Heart project. He realized, however, that the Tuscan government faced great difficulties in this situation, and his concern became even greater in March when a new crisis emerged.

On 15 March 1846 Holland was approached by an Italian ‘of high standing and reputation in his own country’ and asked to:

... take some steps in favour of some refugees from Romagna still hidden in Tuscany, who had recently become quite desperate and were resolved to resist to the utmost any attempt to arrest them, convinced as they were that the
consequences of such an arrest must be their future surrender to the Roman government. 85

These political exiles had entered Florence secretly, and the place in which they were hiding had not yet been discovered. However, within the last few days, the Tuscan authorities had become increasingly concerned to find them. Holland reported to London that he had heard the men were desperate and ready to die resisting arrest rather than return to the Papal States. 86

The Tuscan government was now in a difficult position, and the Tuscan foreign minister, Monsignor Humbourg, called upon the British minister to show that he shared Holland’s views on the political refugees. On 17 March, Holland reported to Aberdeen that:

He assured me that he would facilitate in any way the quiet departure of these refugees from Tuscany, but the difficulty remained as to where to send them to. Their resources do not allow them to undertake distant and expensive voyages to England or America, and all other countries are shut upon them. The French minister had declared some months ago that he would send no more destitute refugees to France where they become a heavy burden on the government. However, after seeing the minister for the foreign affairs, I had some conversation with Monsr (sic) de la
Rochefoucauld, and I have some reason to hope that he will consent to visa the passports, I have given these men for England and thus enable them to remain at Marseille till they can ascertain whether they may be received by the Sardinian Government or not. 87

Holland also sent for Aberdeen's information a confidential letter he had sent to the Tuscan minister on 15 March in which he informed Hambourg that he would be willing to give the men passports to allow them to leave Tuscany, as he had done at his previous post in Vienna in 1836 for Polish political refugees who had desired to leave Austria. 88

Holland realized that such action might compromise the Foreign Office and noted to Aberdeen that:

I trust that Your Lordship will not disapprove of the step I have taken - I have been actuated merely by the anxious desire of preventing any effusion of blood, as well as by the hope of assisting the Tuscan government out of difficulty which must be painful and might become very serious in the present state of public feeling in the country. 89

Despite Holland's efforts to save the Tuscan government from further embarrassment, their problems continued, and their treatment of the refugees from Rimini even affected their relations with Piedmont. When the moderate Italian
nationalist Carlo d’Azeglio, who was in Tuscany to propagate his liberal ideas, criticized the behaviour of the Pope and his collaborator, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, over the Renzi issue, he was asked by the Tuscan authorities to leave Florence. Holland reported to Aberdeen on 1 April 1846 that, despite protests from Piedmont, d’Azeglio had been expelled due to his authorship of a pamphlet which severely criticized the Grand Duke’s conduct in Renzi affair. Holland noted that:

The expulsion from Tuscany of a man whose works are so popular - whose language and opinions are not violent and who is so much looked up to throughout Italy, has created considerable sensation here. 90

This incident aroused anger among the people of Tuscany as well as the other parts of Italy, because d’Azeglio was, like Renzi, a moderate liberal rather than a revolutionary. This distaste for the suppressive and reactionary policies adopted by the Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany was also reflected by the British representatives in Florence. Although opposed to revolution they were sympathetic towards the Italian moderate liberals and were furious at the ultra-conservative Pope’s treatment of these supporters of reform. They believed that the Pope’s behaviour threatened the internal security not only of the Papal States but of Tuscany as well.
Another sign of Gregory’s reactionary attitude was the invitation to the Russian emperor, Nicholas I, to visit Rome in January 1846, despite Russia’s brutal treatment of Catholics in Poland. This caused consternation in the Foreign Office and led The Times to express its anxiety in an article on 26 January 1846:

... if Russia’s own government acquired a footing in southern Europe, they would in course of time become masters of the whole. In truth, it is manifest that Europeans could not in case of a war, fight the Russians on their own ground.

The Times also noted that ‘Let Catholics have at least the same liberty in Russia that the Russians will enjoy in Rome, and let us have a Nuncio in Petersburg.’

Any little hope that remained for the regime of the present Pope was thus completely extinguished; neither political reform nor any social improvement could be expected. Both within and outside the Papal States there was increasing hostility towards Papal authority, which seemed to epitomize the backwardness of the social and political situation in most parts of the Italian peninsula until the end of May 1846.

Section IV: The Death of Gregory XVI and the election of the new Pope

June 1846 opened with the death of Gregory XVI. Petre, informed Holland on 1 June 1846:
I regret to inform Your Lordship that His Holiness Pope Gregory XVI died this morning between 8 and 9 o’clock in the eighty-first year of his age, and the sixteenth of his pontificate.

His death brought various reactions from the British government and British press. The British government had two main concerns; one, the possibility of revolt, the other, fear of Austrian military intervention. The British Consul in Ancona, George Moore informed Aberdeen on 7 June that:

... every precautionary measure has been taken by the Government to prevent any popular movements, which it would appear had been anticipated by the authorities.

Obviously it was feared that circumstances might be similar to those in 1831, when the death of Pius VIII had precipitated a revolution during the interregnum. Moore also described his anxiety about Austrian movements, stating that the Austrian frigate Bellona had appeared off Ancona harbour.

A similar report was made by the Hon Peter Scarlett, the British Secretary of Legation in Florence, to Aberdeen on 18 June. He observed that the Austrians had increased their garrison at Ferrara and gathered a force at Sinigaglia.
Since the Pope’s death, great fermentation prevails in the marches of Ancona, and extending to Umbria: but no outbreak has occurred, or any act of violence, since the attempt on the life of Colonel Allegrini, who, having been an active member of the Military commission, was stabbed in the street.  

He described his fear that insurrection might break out in the future, noting that the likelihood of such an event depended upon who became the new Pope and observed:

If the choice of a successor of Gregory XVI should fall on a candidate not averse to reform and to an amnesty of political offences which have filled the State prisons with victims, there is a reasonable ground for hope that Italy may be governed tranquilly; but if the future Pope should show as little disposition as his predecessor to adopt a system of Government more in character with the progress of the age and the wants of his people, no military or naval precautions will long be able to stifle public indignation.

Neither Scarlett nor the other British diplomats in the Italian states publicly criticized Gregory’s regime, although the British government had been disappointed by Gregory’s attitude towards the Memorandum and his policies, and strongly hoped for the better
administration of the Papal States. However, *The Times* of 9 June, in an obituary for the late Pope, did clearly express its disapproval of his policies:

... he foresaw and would by concession have obviated, the overwhelming storm, that cannot otherwise be prevented bursting upon Rome at least; but he was overborne by the Cardinals, who to the repeated entreaties of France and Austria, and it is said England, refused concurrence in even the slightest amelioration of the civic and political condition of His Holiness ... but sooner or later and the latest time is not far distant, the whole Italian peninsula will be one flame of insurrection. 98

The British government and the press were both keenly interested in the election of the new Pope.

It is surprising that the press seemed to be more keen on finding out about the background to the Conclave than the Foreign Office. Petre reported to Scarlett on 15 June all the names of the candidate cardinals, 99 but *The Times* went much further in its reports to its readers and described the background and political tendency of all candidate cardinals in detail, which the government correspondence did not mention.

The Conclave had always been a place where foreign interests conflicted with each other: in particular,
although most of the Cardinals in this period were Italians, the Catholic great powers, France and Austria, could exert influence upon the election of the Pope in order to secure a pro-French or pro-Austrian candidate. On this occasion Metternich put pressure on the Curia to prevent it from electing a pro-French liberal Pope, and tried to ensure that Lambruschini, who as Secretary of State had been Gregory’s closest adviser, would be the new Pope. On the other hand the French ambassador to the Vatican, Pellegrino Rossi, who had been appointed a few days before Gregory’s death, tried to counteract Austrian influence, and had instructions to act in a liberal but anti-revolutionary manner and prevent the election of any ally of the Jesuits and Austria. 100

On 16 June 1846 the Conclave announced its decision to the world. The new Pope was Cardinal Mastai-Feretti, who took the title of Pius IX. He was known to be a man of moderate views and was considered to be pro-French. Within a few days it became clear that his election had been well received. On 21 June, Scarlett informed Aberdeen that:

The favourable impression already produced by the election of a Pope from whose moderate and liberal character some improvement is expected in governing the country, is further increased by the hope of his conferring the post of Foreign Minister on Cardinal Gizzi. 101
The Times on 6 July 1846 had a long article explaining all the details about the background to the election, and in particular the conflict between French and Austrian interests, which were again absent from the Foreign Office documents:

It appears that Cardinal Micara was the prelate most popular with the lower orders, and that he had to escape privately to the Vatican for the purpose of avoiding being carried there in triumph by the mob. But Micara had no chance of carrying the Conclave as he might the people, and the number of votes given him was very small. Cardinal Altieri was the candidate of the nobility; but, as in all Europe at the present day, neither the high aristocracy nor plebeian democracy are powerful, and these candidates had to give way to the Juste Milieu claims of Cardinal Gizzi and of the present Pope. Cardinal Gizzi was at first certain of his election, but as his opinions stray beyond the bounds of the Juste Milieu, he was set aside to make way for Cardinal Mastai Feretti, who combined all the qualities possessed by the other, with a temperament more subdued, and a reputation for practical good sense. 102

The Times was pleased with the Conclave's choice, and described Pius IX as 'an excellent man', and stated that 'In England these qualities will be duly estimated'. 103
It also noted with satisfaction that, despite the recent visit of Tsar Nicholas to Rome, Russia had not influenced the election of the new Pope and it took comfort from the victory of the French candidate, although it feared that Austria was 'working hard to regain her position, and some people say that it is impossible for the new Pope not to succumb'.

The role of the Catholic Great Powers in influencing the result of the election led *The Times* to ask whether it was now appropriate for Britain to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Papacy. Its correspondent observed on 6 July 1846 that:

> It is much to be regretted that a British ambassador is not officially appointed to the Holy See and I cannot understand while we accredit one to the Sultan we do not do so near the Pope. ... I heard that the new Pope has already expressed a wise opinion on this subject and if popular feeling will allow the nomination with us I am convinced it would be acceptable here. At this moment the calm and consistent advice of a British representative having no interest in the intrigues which throw suspicion over all the acts of the Austrian and French embassies, would be most valuable; ... not only must our position with regard to Irish and Canadian Roman Catholics be strengthened, but the sacred cause of constitutional liberty
all over the world be ... advanced. The leaven of prejudice is still at work in England and the scarlet old lady has still her terrors for our people. 105

Furthermore The Times noted that the temporal power of the Papacy could not be ignored.

The Times’s noticeably positive view of the election of Pius contrasted with that of The Northern Star, the Chartist and radical newspaper, which did not pay much attention to the election because they were politically opposed to the Roman Catholic Church authority. The article in The Northern Star on 4 July 1846 explained the history of the Pope’s predecessors, and provided the following statement:

Among the French Popes is found, in the thirteenth century, the son of a poor cobbler of Troyes in Champagne, Jacques Panteleon, who took the name of Charles VI, and in the fourteenth century the son of a baker, of the country of Foix (now department of the Ariega), Jacques Fourinier, known by the name of Benedict XII. 106

It is quite amusing to see that The Northern Star, because of its political stance, tried to put emphasis on Popes who came from poor backgrounds.
On 17 July 1846, a month after the election of Pius, he granted an amnesty to political prisoners and exiles. Hundreds of potential revolutionaries were freed including Angelo Brunetti, called Ciceruacchio, a Carbonaro and supporter of Mazzini who later became a leader of the revolution in Rome, and Carlo Luciano Bonaparte, Prince of Canino and the son of Napoleon's brother Lucien, while a large number of exiles returned to the Papal States, including Carlo Armellini who would be one of the Triumvirs of the Roman Republic in 1849. The amnesty was greeted by popular demonstrations and enthusiastic applause in Rome and in the cities of the Legations and the Adriatic provinces where anti-Papal feelings usually dominated.

Baron Cowley, the British ambassador to France, wrote to Palmerston on 17 July 1846 about the Austrian reaction to the amnesty:

Prince Metternich disapproves of the measure granting a general amnesty to the disturbers of the public peace in the Legations, and wishes that the institutions which it is in contemplation to grant to those districts should be confined within the limits proposed in a memorial which he caused to be presented by the Austrian Ambassador at Rome to the Pope's predecessor.
The Pope, however, showed no sign of changing his policy. This in turn led Metternich, who was 'strongly impressed with the danger which may result from the too liberal policy of the Pope', to ask the French government to instruct its ambassador to Rome, Count Pellegrino Rossi, to put pressure on the Pope. 110

In Britain the amnesty was greeted with enthusiasm. On 29 July 1846, The Times reported that a ceremony had taken place in Rome and that a procession of 40,000 people had marched with torches to the Quirinal palace, stating:

In fact, the joy of the people is sincere, the amnesty is fuller than was expected, and there is not this day in Rome a single discontented person,... reform in every department of state and under examination, justice, taxation, reduction of duties to prevent smuggling, political prisoner and exiles restored. 111

Another article in The Times on 31 July 1846 mentioned that Renzi was one of the liberated political prisoners, and noted that 'The Pope was the idol of the people'. 112

Even The Northern Star on 9 August 1846 was quite in favour of the amnesty:

The liberal policy of the new Pope seems to have produced universal satisfaction among his new subjects and rendered him extremely popular. ...The amnesty was published on the 7th
in the evening and the people contented themselves that night with assembling before the palace of Quirinal, cheering for His Holiness and marching in procession through all the principal streets ... Subscriptions were opened in favour of the poor political prisoners. 113

It appears from the above that both conservative and radical public opinion in Britain was at least initially impressed with the new Pope.

Palmerston was at first cautious in his response, since he knew that Austria had tried to prevent the Pope from issuing a full amnesty for political offenders and he desired to know the French government's opinion. Replying to Cowley's correspondence from Paris, Palmerston declared to Count de Jarnac, the French ambassador in London, on 21 July 1846 that:

... if the French Government should be of opinion that it would be wise and proper of the Pope to signalise his accession to the Papal Chair by an act of general grace, and also to take measures for carrying into effect the reforms which were recommended in 1831 by the Representatives of the Five Powers in a memorandum delivered by them in that year to the Roman Government, I was sure that Her Majesty's Government would be glad to co-
operate with the French Government for so benevolent a purpose in any way in which the assistance of the British Government could usefully and properly be given. 114

Palmerston declared that Britain’s stance regarding the amnesty was the same as it had been at the time of the 1831 Memorandum, and all that Britain wished to see was the establishment of stable government in the Papal States.

To understand Palmerston’s views of the situation within the Papal States and its relation to the general European situation it is necessary to look at the letter which he wrote to Lord John Russell, the Prime Minister, on 30 July 1846, just after the election of Pius, which included a copy of the Memorandum of 1831. Palmerston came to the heart of his concern when he observed:

Italy is the weak part of Europe and the next war that breaks out in Europe will probably arise out of Italian affairs. 115

He noted that during the reign of Gregory XVI there had been no attempt at reform and that as a result the Papal States were threatened by revolution; and if a revolution broke out there was a possibility that it could lead to a clash between Austria and France. Palmerston foresaw that the French liberals would support a revolution in the Papal States, and would very likely come to the aid of
the rebels if Metternich should attempt or be invited to suppress the rebellion:

France and Austria would then object to each other in Italy and France would have all the Italians on her side. But the war begun in Italy would probably spread to Germany; and at all events we can have no wish to see Austria beaten down... 116

Palmerston concluded from the above that Britain could only avoid these circumstances by adopting a firm policy. The alternative, he noted to Russell, was that:

If these things should happen and they may not be so distant as many may suppose, people will naturally ask what the Whig government of 1846 was about and why they did not take advantage of the liberal Institutions of the new Pope to encourage and induce him to make reforms which if then made might have prevented such events. 117

Palmerston concluded that this would benefit the Papal States as well as British interests, and noted:

... I believe we shall be doing a thing agreeable as well as useful to the Papacy and shall strengthen and support him in effecting reforms which every enlightened member of the Roman government has long ... acknowledged to
be necessary, if on the contrary we fail, and if all four should refuse to do anything, we shall at least stand justified, and shall be able to show that we are wholly abstained from the responsibility of any misfortunes which may therefore arise from that question. 118

This memorandum was significant because it helped to define the aims of British policy towards the Papacy for the next five years.

The Pope’s amnesty was supported by France but disapproved of by Austria; it encouraged popular expectations in the Papal States, in particular in Ancona. The amnesty encouraged the hopes of nationalists and led to a movement within the Papal States to drive all foreign reactionary influence out of Italy. In Ancona the people cried "Down with foreigners" about Austria and Russia, while the French Consul was cheered. 119

Britain saw the growth of Italian nationalism as a means to undermine Austrian and French influence over the Italian peninsula. Consul Moore in Ancona first reported anti-foreign agitation to Palmerston on 26 August 1846:

I have the honour of stating that the public rejoicing for the amnesty has terminated without any riot or public disturbance. Some individuals, detested by the public for being the too ready tools of government during the
last reign prudently quitted this town before the holidays. The Austrian and Russian Consular Generals have taken umbrage at the spirit of the inscriptions during the illumination: the former considering that whether the interference of the "foreigner" was alluded to it pointed to his own country; and the latter found fault with remarks made upon the Polish nation, which is strongly recommended to His Holiness's attention; he also was offended with the cries uttered under his windows by the populace of "Down with foreigners!" 120

On 2 September 1846, Sir George Hamilton, the new British minister in Florence, repeated the information which had been received from Moore to Palmerston and noted in addition that, '... the Austrian Ambassador has been hissed frequently at Rome'. Hamilton also expressed his own support for this movement, which was remarkable considering the level of foreign influence in the Papal States. 121 British diplomats in the Papal States and Florence could not help showing their enthusiasm. Petre explained to Hamilton on 31 August 1846, a proposal to establish a Civic Guard and the possibility of abolishing the Swiss Guard. At the same time, Petre was more realistic than the other two British diplomats:

The Cardinal reminds the delegates how foreign, certain theories quite inapplicable to the situation and nature of the States of the
Church, are to the notions of His Holiness, and which might compromise that internal as well as external tranquility of which every Government stands in need for the well-being of its subjects. 122

On 14 November 1846, Hamilton informed Palmerston that a Civic Guard in Bologna was already being organized by men from the most respectable classes. 123

After the amnesty in July there was expectation of reforms in other areas. On 18 July John Freeborn, the Consul in Rome, reported that:

It has come to my knowledge and I have it from unexceptionable authority, that His Holiness proposes to make rational reforms, commercial and other improvements, to such an extent as the position of his Government and the spirit of the times require; that the people who have severely suffered under the late Pontificate will become happy and contented. 124

In fact, in order to continue his reforms, Pius IX needed somebody capable of assisting him, because the ultra-conservative Zelanti were still powerful and opposed to reform. 125 It had been expected that Cardinal Lambruschini would be elected Secretary of State again, but Pius needed to remove the ultra-conservatives from the Curia. On 13 August 1846 Hamilton sent Palmerston the good news which he had received from Petre in Rome that
Cardinal Gizzi had been appointed Secretary of State, and that Cardinal Massimo had been made Prefect of the Congregation of Rivers and Roads ("delle Acque e Strade "). 126

The appointments of Cardinal Gizzi and Cardinal Massimo were important for Britain as both were considered to be liberals and in favour of reform. However, their taking office did not mean that reform would follow immediately and Gizzi had to act to dampen the people’s expectations. Petre reported to Hamilton on 31 August 1846 that a circular had been issued by Gizzi to counter some of the more extreme hopes expressed by the people. He noted:

The real intent of this circular is to contradict the various rumours, not indeed of reforms under consideration, but of organic changes in the whole system of government; such as the secularisation of nearly all the chief offices, and the disbanding of the Swiss troops. The better informed, and those who know anything of the circumstances of this State and of its component parts, have of course given little credit to these reports; but they have been eagerly received in the provinces, the more so as foreign journals repeat them and various others, on the faith of their correspondence in Rome. The term of the service of the Swiss troops will not expire before
An example of the repetition of the rumours that were circulating within the Papal States came in The Northern Star which produced on 10 October 1846 a rather premature announcement of a new constitution in the Papal States (an event which did not happen until March 1848):

New constitution will be granted by the new Pope in November. It will comprise of provincial councils with the principle of election, and a consultative senate to be assembled at Rome every two years. 128

It also referred to a list of improvements including the National Guard and stated 'A National Guard of 4000 will be organized in Rome and re-established in the province where it was ceased in 1832'. It also noted that the secularisation of offices was a possibility and made clear its approval of Gizzi's nomination as he was seen to be 'favourable with new system'. 129 Apparently even The Northern Star perceived Gizzi to be a liberal.

Petre who took a realistic view of the situation, was supportive of the caution shown by Gizzi and the Pope, and stated to Hamilton on 10 November that the reform programme in the Papal States needed sufficient and careful consideration before it would actually start functioning:
The political state is getting better. It is not a great change, but His Holiness is fully determined on effecting reforms in every branch of the administration, and has already appointed several commissions, recommending the members of them to hasten on with their plans as much as prudence and reflection on the present state of things will allow.  

Hamilton, however, believed that reform in the Papal States was vital and urgent if the situation was to remain under control and when he forwarded Petre’s report to London he warned:

The measures of reform so ardently desired will not be delayed much longer nor can it be expected that such delay can be prolonged without danger, under present circumstance. (Since the organization of a civic guard at Bologna, under the direction of the Government, though it is said this body of men is not armed). On the 11th instant at Rome, a meeting at dinner of 700 persons took place, recommending in strong language the necessity of reform.  

Although Gizzi’s liberal policies were as yet still only intentions, they were enough for the new Pope to receive applause from his subjects and sympathy from both the
British government and public opinion of different political tendencies (The Times and The Northern Star). But while Britain was keen to applaud the first tentative steps taken by Pius towards reform of the domestic situation within the Papal States, another matter of more immediate and direct interest was the plan for constructing a railway in the States.

Since the Papal States occupied the central part of the Italian peninsula no railway network from north to south could be built without the permission of the Pope's government. This was, however, a matter of some importance for Britain, which was keen to encourage railway-building in Italy which would benefit Mediterranean trade and provide a useful link in the communication route to India. The British government favoured the idea of a railway starting from the port of Brindisi in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies that would run along the Adriatic coast and finally reach Bologna.132

A plan for railway development had been put forward earlier in 1846, but no progress had been made as Gregory XVI was firmly opposed to permitting any railways, whether foreign or locally owned, to be built in the Papal States. 133 As soon as Pius became the Pope British interest was renewed, and there were soon signs that the Papacy might agree to railway development. It was not until 10 November 1846 that a concrete plan emerged; Petre reported to Hamilton that Gizzi had announced:
... that the Government authorized the execution of the four lines of railways which appear to be of principal importance.

1. From Rome to Neapolitan frontier near Ceprano.
2. Rome to Porto d'Anzio.
3. Rome to Civita Vecchia.
4. Line running through the most populous parts of Umbria to Ancona and thence from Ancona to Bologna, following the track of the Flaminian and Aemilian ways.

The contraction of these roads will be entrusted to the private industry of companies represented by Papal subjects. The Government reserves for future consideration other lines within the State, as well as those communicating with the neighbouring territories. 134

Petre noted, however, that it was a possibility that in the future 'companies approved of by the Government' would also be allowed to compete for railway contracts.

Discussions about this issue were held in Rome between John Freeborn, the Consular agent in Rome, and the Papal authorities. Freeborn explained in one of his letters how Britain might directly benefit from the construction of railways in the Papal States, referring to his
conversation with the Papal Treasurer, Cardinal Antonelli, on 11 November 1846:

His Excellency the Treasurer Monsig. Antonelli ... stated that he was well aware and perfectly sensible of the advantage this country would devise in the events of a rail road being established at Brindisi and passing through the Papal state, provided that the line was selected for passing the Indian mail, ... and you will recollect that H.E. stated that although his position did not allow him to give an official opinion without the commands of His Holiness, still he had no objection to give his private opinion, which was, that the Roman government would place no obstacle in the way of an English Engineer examining, and reporting upon the practicability of the line decided upon for the purpose of conveying the mail from India; ...; this important rail road will be soon laid down and the communication between India and England be reduced in time by several days compared with the transmits through France and Germany. 135

This good news from the Papal States was mirrored by the success of the representations made by the British minister in Naples, Mr Waghorn, who had persuaded the Neapolitan King of the benefit of a railway from Brindisi. The only problem now was deciding whether to
take the route from Bologna through Trieste or Marseilles. The preference was for the Austrian route, and on 11 December 1846 the British ambassador in Vienna informed Metternich that Britain desired permission to link the railway from Brindisi to the Austrian railway system. 136

While the railway issue could not be completely solved until the Austrian government had made its decision, there was still relief in British circles that the Pope had shown a more liberal attitude towards the railway development. This more moderate approach was also in evidence when, for the first time, the new Pope permitted subjects of the Papal States to attend the Italian Scientific Conference. Among the Papal subjects who went to Genoa to participate in the conference was the nephew of Napoleon I, the Prince of Canino, who sent his thanks to the Pope after the successful conference. 137 This moderate step, like his interest in the new railway project, indicated the Pope’s desire for the social and economic improvement of the Papal States, in such fields as the development of technology and science and the reduction of unemployment. 138

In supporting the new reforms in the Papal States, Britain found an ally in France. However, it was not easy to co-operate since Britain had to contend with the French desire to expand its political influence in both the Italian and the Iberian peninsulas. In particular, conflict over the 'Spanish Marriages issue' cooled
relations between the two countries. Towards the end of 1846 Britain also experienced difficulties in its relations with the other European Powers as a result of Austria's intervention in Cracow, Austrian and French intervention in the Swiss civil war, and the Irish famine. There were already sufficient reasons for Britain to support Italian nationalism and the new policies of the Pope, but these international issues made British interest in Italy even greater. The Spanish marriage question in particular gave Britain an opportunity to support the Papacy independently from France, making a clear contrast with the period between July and August 1846 when Britain had been too keen to ascertain French opinion about the Pope's new policies in order to decide how Britain should react.

The declaration of the French Foreign Minister, François Guizot, that he wanted to arrange marriages for the Queen and her sister to fasten French influence upon Spain caused a split between Britain and France. Aberdeen agreed to the French initiative in Spain, as long as France did not dictate to Spain on the marriage question. In 1845 he agreed to the marriage of the Queen's sister to the Duc de Montpensier, son of the King of France, but only after the Queen had married and an heir was born. However, in July 1846, when the Whig government came to power under Russell and Palmerston returned to the Foreign Office, the latter was not prepared to accept Aberdeen's assumption that France should have special
influence over Spain. Palmerston insisted that Spain’s independence should be respected, and tried to undermine French ambitions in Spain. Guizot realized that Palmerston would not accept the agreement he had made with Aberdeen over the Spanish marriages and decided to move quickly to complete a double-marriage pact: the Queen of Spain would marry a pro-French Spanish Bourbon and her sister would marry the Duc de Montpensier. Palmerston was furious that he had failed to prevent the marriages and concluded that the English entente with France had come to the end. 139 Although Palmerston sought the eastern powers’ assistance to undermine French ambitions, it was Guizot who moved quickly to construct good relations with Austria in order to avoid diplomatic isolation in Europe. 140 This meant that Britain’s position became increasingly isolated, which was one of the reasons for Britain’s interest in the Italian peninsula, and in particular, the Papal States.

Conclusion

The end of the diplomatic entente between Britain and France due to the Spanish Marriage incident brought to a conclusion the Anglo-French agreement about the need for reform in the Papal States. Britain was thus obliged, in trying to implement Palmerston’s policy of encouraging reform, to search for a way to influence the Papacy directly rather than through any other European power such as Austria and France. The logical way to achieve this was to send a diplomatic mission to Rome. There were
not only diplomatic reasons but also other motives which led Britain to believe that it needed to influence the Papacy directly. The most important of these was Ireland. In spite of Peel's fairly successful policy of reconciling the Irish, the Great Famine during the autumn of 1845 and through 1846 and 1847 renewed the difficult situation in Ireland, and once more made it imperative to attempt through the Vatican to control the political activities of the Irish priests. By the end of 1846 one can see that Britain's foreign policy towards the Papacy had begun to shift, and a door was opening that would eventually lead to the arrival of Lord Minto in Rome in November 1847.
Notes


3 Ibid., p.42.

4 Ibid., p.42.


7 Ibid, p.173.


12 George Seymour (Florence) to Palmerston, 25 April 1831, in Palmerston Papers, Hartley Institute, University of Southampton Library.


14 Seymour to Palmerston, 25 April 1831, Palmerston Papers.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


19 PRO FO43/24, Palmerston to Taylor, 23 June 1831.
The heart of the Memorandum lay in a reorganization of the administrative system on the basis of greater local self-government. p.75.

PRO FO43/24, Taylor to Palmerston, 30 July 1831.

Ibid.


PRO FO43/24, Taylor to Palmerston, 30 July 1831.

Ibid.


Palmerston to Seymour, 8 April 1832, Palmerston Papers. See also Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, Vol.1, p.213.

Ibid.


Reinerman, Austria and the Papacy, Vol.II, p.79.


Mack Smith, Mazzini, p.5.

Ibid., p.7-9.


BPSP, LII, Sir Augustus Foster (Turin) to Palmerston, 1 July 1833.

Mack Smith, Mazzini, p.11.

BPSP, LII, Mr Morier (Berne) to Palmerston, 8 February 1834.

Ibid. The document was included with Mr Morier's letter to Palmerston on 8 February 1834, for reference. "Proclamation" St.Julien, 1 February 1834, signed by Joseph Mazzini, Amadeus Malagari, John Ruffini, Rubin & C.

Mack Smith, Mazzini, p.20.


PRO HO45/751, Metropolitan Police report 4 February 1844.

PRO HO45/751, report by N. Pearce (Home Office), 12 January 1844

The opening of Mazzini's mail by the British General Post Office was reported in The Westminster Review in 1844 (pp.225-250) with the title, 'Report from the Secret Committee of the House of Lords, upon the Detaining and Opening of Letters at the General Post Office, and Report from the Committee of Secretary of the House of Commons on the same subject, as Mazzini and the Ethic of Politicians'; in addition Sir James Graham, the Home Secretary, was attacked by Punch's article entitled 'Punch's anti-Graham Wafer's, dedicated to the Home Secretary, and the anti-Graham envelope'.

Mack Smith, Mazzini, p.42.


Ibid p.199.

Kerr, Peel, Priests and Politics, p.76.

Ibid, p.95.

Ibid, p.102.


PRO F07/319, Aberdeen to Neumann, 22 January 1844.
Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari, Segreteria di Stato, (Sala di Consultazione, Sala Borgia), f.23 Cardinal Lambruschini to Baron Hundom, (Austrian Ambassador in London), 27 April 1844.

Kerr, Peel, Priests and Politics, p.110.

Ibid., p.149-150. The previous British government agent in Rome, Thomas Aubin, had died in May 1844.

This impression can be surmised from Petre’s correspondence to Aberdeen throughout 1845, see PRO, FO43/38.

Kerr, Peel, Priests and Politics, p.3.

Ibid., p.248.

Ibid., p.282. The Tory party’s division over the Maynooth Grant issue has been discussed by several historians who specialise on the nineteenth century, such as Adelman, Peel and the Conservative Party, passim.


Ibid, p.64.


Martina, Pio IX, p.67.

Farini, Lo Stato Romano p.129, See for example the French journal, Journal des Debats, which supported Guizot.

BPSP, Correspondence Respecting Affairs of Italy, (Pt.1. 1846-47) 1849/LVII.29 P. Scarlett to Aberdeen 28 April 1846, From the Papal States, Address to the Most Reverend Prelates, Monsignors Janni, Most Holy Chief-Justice, and Inspector-General Ruffini.

Farini, Lo Stato Romano, p.127.

PRO, FO79/118, Lord Holland (Florence) to Aberdeen, 26 January 1846.

Farini, Lo Stato Romano, p.135.
PRO, FO79/118, Holland to Aberdeen, 21 January 1846. This dispatch noted 120 prisoners, 40 of them condemned for participating in rising in Bologna and Rimini.

Ibid.

PRO, FO79/118, Holland to Aberdeen, 27 February 1846.

PRO, FO79/118, Holland to Aberdeen, 26 January 1846.

PRO, FO79/118, Holland to Aberdeen, 11 February 1846.

Ibid.

Ibid.

PRO FO79/118, Holland to Aberdeen, 9 March 1846.

Ibid.

Ibid.

PRO FO79/118, Holland to Aberdeen, 17 March 1846.

Ibid.

PRO FO79/118, Holland to Aberdeen, 17 March 1846.

PRO FO79/118, Holland to Aberdeen, 15 March 1846.

Ibid.

PRO FO79/118, Holland to Aberdeen, 1 April 1846.

The Times, 26 January 1846.

BPSP, LVII, Mr Petre (Rome) to Holland, 1 June 1846

BPSP, LVII, Consul Moore (Ancona) to Aberdeen, 7 July 1846.

Ibid.

BPSP, LVII, Scarlett (Florence) to Aberdeen, 18 June 1846.

Ibid.

Ibid.

The Times, 9 June 1846.

BPSP, LVII, Petre to Scarlett, 15 June 1846

101 BPSP, LVII, Scarlett to Aberdeen, 21 June 1846.

102 The Times, 6 July 1846.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 The Times, 26 June 1846.

106 The Northern Star, 4 July 1846.


108 BPSP, LVII, Freeborn (Rome) to Palmerston, 18 July 1846.

109 BPSP, LVII, Lord Cowley (Paris) to Palmerston, 17 July 1846.

110 Ibid.

111 The Times, 29 July 1846.

112 The Times, 31 July 1846.

113 The Northern Star, 9 August 1846.

114 BPSP, LVII, Palmerston to Cowley, 21 July 1846.

115 PRO, PRO/30/22/5b, (Russell Papers) Palmerston to Lord John Russell, 30 July 1846.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 BPSP, LVII, Moore to Palmerston, 26 August 1846.

120 Ibid.

121 BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 2 September 1846.

122 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 31 August 1846.

123 BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 14 November 1846.

124 BPSP, LVII, Freeborn to Palmerston, 18 July 1846.

125 J.F. Coppa, Pius IX: Crusader in a Secular Age, (Boston, 1979), p.50.

126 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Palmerston, 13 August 1846.
80

127 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 31 August 1846.
128 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 10 October 1846.
129 Ibid.
130 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 10 November 1846.
131 BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 14 November 1846.
132 PRO FO67/137, Ralph Abercromby (Turin) to Palmerston, 25 October 1846.
133 PRO FO79/118, Holland to Aberdeen, 18 May 1846.
134 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 10 November 1846.
135 PRO FO43/39, Antonelli to Freeborn, 11 November 1846
136 PRO FO67/137, Cowley to Palmerston, 11 December 1846
138 PRO FO67/137, Abercromby to Palmerston, 30 September 1846.
140 PRO FO27/745, Lord Normanby (Paris) to Palmerston, 29 November 1846
Chapter II
The Pope's liberal reforms and
the origins of the Minto mission in 1847

Introduction

In 1847 Pius IX expanded the reform programme he had introduced the previous year, and in particular concentrated on the reorganization of the Papal administrative system. These new policies, including the new press law of 15 May and the establishment of the Civic Guard on 5 July, made Pius extremely popular, associating him with the Italian nationalist movement. There were public demonstrations of support with cries of 'Viva Pio Nono' in the streets. For many he was the patriot Pope - 'Papa Angelico'. His popularity extended beyond Italy to other Catholic and non-Catholic European states such as France and Britain, even reaching America. In France sympathy with the Pope was expressed by some liberal Catholics: even in Britain statements of support were made in Parliament. However, within the Austrian government Pius's reforms were seen as too liberal and as potentially destabilizing, and led to the Austrian occupation of Ferrara.

It is often held that the Austrian military intervention in the Papal States provoked Italian nationalism and encouraged the British government to express support for the Pope. In particular, it is believed that the
despatch of Lord Minto (father-in-law of Lord John Russell) as British Special Envoy to Rome in 1847 was a result of the Austrian action, and that Britain by this move proved its support for Pius's liberal policy and showed its particular interest in the Papacy. However, Minto's mission was motivated not only by Britain's political concerns over Italy but also by its domestic religious preoccupations. The correspondence between Lord Minto, Russell, Palmerston, Shrewsbury and the Roman Catholic Bishop Nicholas Wiseman clearly shows that Minto's mission was intended to cover religious as well as political and diplomatic issues.

Section I: British reactions to Pius IX's reforms.

In the six months of Pius's reign after June 1846, his reform programme took shape and excited an enthusiastic response. To advance these liberal reforms it was necessary to remove the old Gregorian elements from the Curia and to appoint new liberal-minded ministers to the Papal government. Britain's expectation of reform in the Papal States was increased by the fall of Lambruschini, the influential ultra-conservative and pro-Austrian Secretary of State under the previous Pope, Gregory XVI, and his replacement as the chief minister on 8 August 1846 by the more liberal Cardinal Gizzi. Gizzi was one of the most important of Pius's advisers in regard to the reform programme. He wanted to achieve administrative reform through the creation of an advisory council of
ministers, while acting to restrain over-enthusiastic popular movements.

The replacement of the old ministries, including the Secretary of State and other posts such as the Papal Legates, was supported by British officials. The British minister to Turin, Ralph Abercromby, was enthusiastic about these changes. In a letter to Palmerston on 12 January 1847 he observed that the conduct of ministers under the previous Pope had been a cause of Papal maladministration. He noted with pleasure that:

> The Roman government has ... acted wisely in removing from their government those Cardinals who have become identified with the system followed by the late Pope in the administration of the various Legations. 6

Furthermore, Abercromby was able to report that the removal of the ultra-conservative elements from the mainstream of Papal politics had been 'followed by the adoption of a line of policy which proves the disposition of the present Papal Government to be of a liberal tendency.' 7

Although the replacement of the old Gregorian faction by the liberal ministers made concrete administrative reform possible, Abercromby realized that the extent of the intended administrative reforms could lead to difficulties. This was especially the case with the legal reforms which aimed at preventing the abuse of
ecclesiastical power and protecting the rights of the Pope's secular subjects. Despite these problems Abercromby was fairly optimistic, and observed to Palmerston that:

There is much to be done to improve the condition of the Papal states to restore the finances and extend the resources of that country; but the disposition which the present Government of Rome have shown to effect a sound and judicious reform of the crying abuses that exist, has created a better spirit amongst the subjects of His Holiness. 8

He believed that as political instability and insurrection were the result of bad administration, administrative reform was the best way to quell social disorder in the Papal States.

He informed the Foreign Office about the reforms undertaken, described how effective they were, and told Palmerston that a key element in Papal policy was the introduction of consultation with well-informed members of the populace in order to correct the most resented abuses of power. 9

However, in his opinion administrative reform was more urgent in the provinces than in the city of Rome, as the abuse of power in the Legations was the most serious threat to the stability of the Papal States. 10
This was particularly the case in Bologna, where political disorder was widespread and where improvement was a matter of some urgency:

As Bologna has at all periods been the province of the Papal States that has shown the greatest unquietness and the strongest liberal tendencies, ..., which justifies the hope that they may abstain from insurrections and thus afford the Papal Government sufficient time to mature their reforms and to carry them into execution.  

However, he believed that the recent replacement of the Cardinal Legate by the liberal Piedmontese Cardinal Amat gave some hope that political reform would be effective, as Amat was thought to be in favour of reform.

Abercromby perceived that the appointment of Bologna’s new Cardinal Legate might create a liberal political tie between Sardinia and the Papal government which could be crucial for the creation of a liberal Italy. He noted to Palmerston on 12 January 1847 that:

The past year appears therefore to have been marked, in the States of Sardinia and of the Church by a desire on the part of the Sovereigns of these two countries, to better the condition of the people and to consult more extensively their general interests;
Furthermore, he observed, an alliance between the two liberal states in Italy might contribute to the peace of Europe and that:

...it is by a steady prosecution of such system that Italy is gradually to be brought to assume her proper influence amongst the other nations of Europe. 14

The welcome given by British officials in Italy to the Pope's policies was also shared by Palmerston. The Foreign Secretary was optimistic about reform in the Papal States and believed in the importance of the political role of Papal authority in Italy as well as in Europe, and persuaded the government to move towards active support for the Papal States. On 25 March Palmerston, after receiving a report from John Freeborn, Consular in Rome, regarding a meeting between the Pope and the prominent free-trade supporter, Richard Cobden, noted:

Mr Freeborn and Mr Petre should take every fit opportunity of complimenting the Pope on behalf of the British govt upon each successive improvement which he may from time to time introduce into the system of administration. 15

This advice was promptly relayed to the representatives in Rome and Freeborn took it upon himself to convey this information immediately to Gizzi, despite the cautious
tone of Palmerston's original instructions. Freeborn's initiative had an interesting result as Gizzi told the Pope of Britain's approval of Papal reforms, and the Pope duly offered his thanks to Freeborn in June. Palmerston only learnt of these events in July and was rather surprised but pleased at Freeborn's actions. 16

Although there is no clear evidence to prove it, one can postulate that Freeborn's report to Gizzi of Palmerston's support helped to spur a Papal initiative to Britain. On 19 April 1847 the Papal Nuncio in Paris, Cardinal Raffaele Fornari, held a meeting with the Marquis of Normanby, the British Ambassador to France, in which he stated that the Pope wished to have closer relations with England, as he was troubled by the 'jealous interference of Austria' and the lack of support of France. Fornari insisted to Normanby that British assistance would be of 'greatest possible service to the progress of social improvement in Italy'. 17 Palmerston in turn suggested to Normanby on 27 April 1847 that he should reply to the Papal Nuncio by asking:

... his Excellency to explain more precisely the way in which he thinks that the British Government could give more active moral support to the Pope; and you will state to the Nuncio that Her Majesty's Government have every desire to do whatever may properly be in their power
to comply with any wishes which the Pope may express. 18

Normanby met again with Fornari on 30 April, and told him of Palmerston's views and enquired 'how could moral support be given? The Nuncio replied that it could not be given effectively without direct communication.' 19 Furthermore Fornari stated that if a former diplomatic representative could not be established in Rome, the Pope would be willing to meet someone in confidence of the British government. This exchange lay the origin of the Minto mission.

To a large degree Palmerston's positive view of Pius was influenced by the belief that his reforms would steer the Papal States towards peaceful and gradual political change rather than revolution. This was encouraged by the apparent popularity of the Pope among his people. Abercromby, for example, reported on 28 April 1847 that six days before more than 20,000 people had marched to the Quirinal Palace 'for the purpose of expressing their gratitude to His Holiness the Pope and to his Eminence the Cardinal Gizzi for this new boon'. 20 This view of events was, however, too optimistic.

In reality the political situation in Rome was far more volatile than the British officials in Italy perceived. The period between January and April 1847 witnessed the emergence of liberal political groups which would
subsequently divide into radical and moderate factions, working together with the objective of securing liberal reform. For example, on 21 April Pietro Sterbini, who became the radical party’s leader, and Massimo D’Azeglio, who became a representative of the moderates, organized a political banquet. D’Azeglio, who originally came from a Piedmontese noble family and who had come to the Papal States to encourage links between the moderates in Rome and Turin, was the principal orator and spoke with eloquence about the ancient glories of Rome soon to be renewed under Pius. Sterbini, one of the most influential men in Rome through his presidency of the inflammatory political club, the Circolo Popolare, also made a patriotic speech. Sterbini had had a long career as a political radical. After joining the rebellion of 1830 he had fled to Paris and became a member of Mazzini’s Giovine Italia. In 1846, as result of Pius’s amnesty, he and his colleagues were pardoned and returned to Rome. He was a radical democrat, but in 1847 he viewed the first concessions of Pius with apparent gratitude, and seemed ready to accept the idea of a federated nation with the Pope as president.

Sterbini also played an important part in the rise of radical press and was the editor of a radical newspaper, The Contemporaneo, which along with other journals agitated for political reform and in particular an end to censorship. This call for press freedom met with a positive response from the Papal government, which little
realized that the relaxation of press censorship might nourish revolutionary opinions among the Roman people. As there had been too many restrictions on publishing any kind of political and religious work, it was thought that a change to the press laws would simply be regarded as a measure to extend people's rights.  

The Press Law

The press law of 15 March 1847 marked an important stage in the birth of the 1848 revolution. After the relaxation of censorship political newspapers burgeoned in Rome. One of the most influential organs to benefit from this reform was The Contemporaneo, which was initially progressive but moderate and respected the fundamental tenets of Papal government and the Catholic religion, although it soon became increasingly hostile towards Papal authority. The Bilancia was formed on 29 April, partly as a reaction against the increasingly progressive views of The Contemporaneo, and was followed soon after by the Contra-Bilancia, which provided a platform for liberals who were alarmed at the moderate view of the Bilancia.

Initially, however, there were some problems that emerged from the new legislation. On the Sunday following the promulgation of the press law the Contemporaneo was not able to appear due to the high tax levied on newspapers. The Papal administration quickly recognized this problem.
and the Pope decided on his own authority that the stamp tax on newspapers should be reduced to a nominal amount.²⁷

Petre believed that the press provided a reflection of public opinion, and did not feel any kind of suspicion that now that it had obtained this position it would be able to organize the mass of the people and control their political opinion. Instead, he felt that the press would have a positive effect on the public administration. On 20 March he observed to Palmerston:

If we may judge by the way in which questions concerning literature and history are treated in The Contemporaneo, a weekly journal established at the beginning of the year, and by permission of the Roman authorities, and by the frank advice offered touching reforms in the public administration of affairs and in the system of education, sufficient liberty will be allowed in political discussion now for the first time officially allowed by this edict on periodical journals. ²⁸

However, this was not an accurate reading of events. Petre failed to understand the true nature and complexity of the press reform issue. In fact, it is important to realize that the press law of 15 March was largely a consequence of popular pressure on the Papal government. Gizzi responded to this pressure but remained cautious and acted to ensure that the new press law should not be
abused by the liberal parties. In fact, Vatican Archive sources show that the new press law retained considerable restrictions on publications about political and religious subjects in the Papal states.

Under the new law a Council of Press Censorships was established in Rome under the presidency of the Master of the Sacred Place, to be composed of no more than five members named by His Holiness. Also within each of the Papal Legations and Delegations a local Council of press censorship was set up. These local Councils had to subordinate themselves to the Council in Rome regarding publishing on political as well as religious subjects. Gizzi was very careful about selecting the members of the Council in Rome, and intended to use the Council to introduce a sophisticated administrative system to concentrate local government power in the hands of the Council in Rome, which was given a direct link with the judiciary and the police. Gizzi hoped to suppress any abuses and illegal publishing, to control the authorization of new publications, and also to check and modify articles in Rome and the provinces.

The result was that the new press law was not so much an exercise in liberalism as an attempt to rationalize the Papal bureaucracy. Instead of appeasing the people it marked the beginning of political conflict between the authorities and several political journals and publications.
This conflict did not take long to reveal itself. Although the Contemeporaneo was authorized under the press law of 15 March, the supplement to its 26 April issue (No.17) was banned and those attempting to sell it threatened with arrest as a result of Austrian protests about its content. This incident provoked popular hostility towards Austria and the Council, and encouraged more clandestine journals. In spite of Gizzi’s effort to centralize power into the hands of the Council in Rome, the police force was not sufficiently effective to inspect all political journals. The new publications succeeded in attracting the public’s attention by printing sensational manifestos and radical political propaganda. In response to the rise of radicalism, the Bilancia, with support from moderates such as Professor Francesco Orioli, the lawyer Andrea Cattabeni, and the ex-Jesuit Paolo Mazio, published on 7 May an article deploring the political friction between the Pope’s liberal policy and the radical political movements. The Bilancia was in turn criticized for being too moderate by the radical party, largely because Cattabeni, who was one of the editors of the journal, was an old friend of the Pope and often went to see him. Provoked by the Bilancia’s defence of the press law, the Contra-Bilancia, which sympathized with the radicals, replied with a severe criticism of the government’s censorship of all journals at the time they went to press. They especially questioned the legitimacy of the Council, as it seemed that the decisions made by its old and reactionary
president were against the spirit of the new press law introduced on 15 March. The Contra-Bilancia was also directly critical of the Bilancia's moderate and parochial tendencies, which was the first indication that the liberal movement would soon divide into two opposing moderate and radical factions, not only in the press but also more generally.

In spite of the still relatively tight control over the press and the friction between the censors and political journals, the British government did not seem to understand the situation well. Pius's relaxation of press censorship was welcomed by Britain, a country that had already enjoyed relative freedom of the press. Petre believed that the relaxation of the press law was evidence of the Pope's desire for reform, and he wrote enthusiastically to Hamilton, the British Minister in Florence, on 23 June 1847 that:

Perhaps one of the best proofs of the upright honest intention of His Holiness to effect improvement in his Government, is the liberty with which reforms are discussed in the newspapers; and I would mark for notice, among others, an article on the late Motu-Proprio published in The "Bilancia" of the 22.

But he seemed to be unaware that the press law was leading to increasingly acrimonious debates in Rome that in the long term would threaten Pius's reforms.
Unfortunately Petre showed the same lack of understanding in his reports on the other significant issue raised in the summer of 1847, the establishment of the Civic Guard.

The Civic Guard

The campaign for the creation of the Civic Guard began in Bologna in May 1847 and was organized by a moderate faction concerned to maintain order. From Bologna young men such as Marchese Luigi Tanari corresponded with those in other Legations, advising supporters of the Guard to orchestrate their efforts. In Rome Bologna’s representatives urged the Pope to consider with favour the many petitions for the Guard flowing in from the provinces. As Bologna was the place where crime and social disorder were most dominant in the Papal States, it was argued that the Civic Guard was urgently required to establish and maintain order. This was not altogether convincing because as Hughes has pointed out ‘the Bolognese ... had already obtained the right to have citizen patrols as a curb against crime’. No sooner had Bologna won its right to organize night-patrols and to request a more organized Civic Guard than demands for the same privileges were made in other towns: Ancona and Ferrara demanded the right to set up a Guard, and soon Forli sent a deputation to ask for one, and in the beginning of March the Amnistiatì were collecting signatures for a petition to Pius.
Two main groups were calling for the creation of a Civic Guard. Many property-owners saw it as a protection against crime and disorder, while the radicals regarded an armed force as a political instrument. While the former wanted the Civic Guard to prevent disorder, the latter saw it as a means to increase disorder and encourage more radical political reform. Amongst them, the Bologna group, whose organizer was Marco Minghetti, was most influential. He and Massimo d'Azeglio worked together to establish the Civic Guard.

Britain had a very positive view towards the establishment of the Civic Guard in the Papal States. The Foreign Office's underestimate of the Civic Guard's revolutionary potential was influenced by its unequivocally enthusiastic view of D'Azeglio, whose political ideas and actions were indisputably those of a moderate liberal. D'Azeglio's role was important, not only because he personified the links between Roman and Piedmontese moderate political factions, but also for relations between Rome and Britain. An article written by d'Azeglio appeared in the Quarterly Review offering a positive assessment of Pius's liberal policies for an English audience.

There were three other reasons to explain why the British government did not fully realize the danger inherent in the Civic Guard: lack of information, support for the liberal reforms, and anti-Austrian sentiment.
The British government did not have enough knowledge about the social context of or the background to the Civic Guard. Its information was that the campaign for its creation began in Bologna and was organized by a moderate faction concerned to maintain law and order. This was true in the beginning, because originally the Civic Guard had been an extension of the civic night patrols to protect property-owners: however, the radicals' intention to use it as a revolutionary force was not fully apparent to the British government. Freeborn emphasized the need for a Civic Guard in the Papal States to Palmerston on 5 July 1847:

The higher classes and people of property amongst the middle classes could not look on such proceedings without alarm; and it was resolved that Prince Borghese, Count Piancinai and others, should wait upon the Pope and state to His Holiness the causes of discontent of the people; and further to pray His Holiness to take such measures as might protect the lives and property of the inhabitants from the possible violence of the irritated mobs, as the military and police did not think it prudent to interfere, and therefore this protection could only be afforded by a powerful national guard, and by the fulfilment of hopes raised and promises given of reform and improvements. 46
As Steven Hughes points out in his book, *Crime, Disorder and the Risorgimento*, if Pius had been able to restrict recruitment to the upper and middle classes he might have recouped much of his popularity among the moderates while augmenting the forces of law and order to deal with popular disturbance. 47 The lower classes such as braccianti were to be excluded, as they had a tendency to associate with radical views which were growing in the provinces. Although initial recruitment to the Civic Guard was restricted to the upper and middle classes, the situation began to change when Cardinal Amat, the Legate in Bologna, personally started to argue for some artisans to be admitted to the Guard. The moderates were, however, determined to keep the masses unarmed and cowed; the core of the new Civic Guard would come directly from the existing citizen patrols. 48

The problem with this kind of exclusive recruitment was that it created a relatively weak and ineffective Civic Guard. In addition, democratic leaders such as Conte Livio Zambeccari dreamed of opening the ranks of the Guard to the lower class, hoping that they could be used to fight for the regeneration of Italy as a whole. 49 In September 1847 in Bologna, Zambeccari took advantage of disturbances by the lower classes to get himself and some of the radicals commissions as junior officers. However, despite the appointment of a few radicals the Civic Guard remained largely an institution of the professional classes. 50
There were debates over how to use the Guards to fight against crime and banditry without giving them the capability of rising up against the authorities. As Reinerman has argued, some dangers could have been reduced by keeping the force under tight control; but such apparatus was also "likely to kill the spontaneity and enthusiasm which was their main strength, leaving them merely an untrained rabble of little value." 51 In effect the choice lay between an organization like the volunteers, useful but dangerous, or one like the reserves, safe but useless. However, the dangers of recruiting members of the Civic Guard from the lower class did not seem to be perceived by Britain. 52

As Britain was well informed about crime and brigands in the Papal States, particularly in Bologna, it was thought that establishment of the new forces (the Civic Guard) could improve social stability and counter the radical ideology stimulated by discord between the classes. 53 Although Britain always worried that these social disturbances might cause revolution as in 1830, there was also a belief that the radical tendencies were induced by the people's discontent with Ultra-conservative ecclesiastical politicians who were frequently associated with the Jesuits.

Sympathy for popular discontent with Jesuit politics was expressed by Freeborn to Palmerston on 5 July 1847:
If the promises made by His Holiness to Prince Borghese are fulfilled without delay, the country will be placed in tranquillity; but if not, the present state of anarchy will increase, and violent measures will be adopted by the malcontents, which may fall heavily upon the Cardinals, Jesuits, and anti-Progressists, long before Austrian intervention can save them. 54

It was necessary to maintain law and order using effective forces. However, the British officials in Italy believed that the way to keep social order should not be through suppression by the theocratic ecclesiastical authority, but by the hands of those people, that is the moderate elites, who were loyal to the Pope.

Politics also clouded the role of the police. As the protectors of the old order, the police and the Carabinieri could easily be supposed to be automatically enemies of reform. Many people believed that the police and the Carabinieri had given a free rein to criminals and brigands to discredit the new liberal tendencies of the government, 55 and therefore that it was necessary to establish forces separate from the Carabinieri. The Civic Guard, therefore, played both ways: it guaranteed the course of reform for moderate elites while tying them even more tightly to the Papacy. The fear of crime and anarchy thus formed a common political ground from which order and progress could arise together. 56
It was notable that the British representatives had no concern about the Civic Guard’s loyalty to the Pope and no suspicion that they might be transformed into an armed force for the revolutionary contingents in Rome.

Petre noted optimistically to Hamilton on 8 July 1847 that:

...the recent measures of the Pope, establishing a civic guard at Rome and at Bologna, have confirmed the people of those two cities in their feelings of gratitude towards their Sovereign by this fresh mark of his confidence in their loyalty and attachment to his person and government. 57

There was another obvious reason why Britain did not realize the problems and dangers raised by the Civic Guard: the British government was preoccupied with the Austrian military intervention in the Papal States which followed the establishment of the Guard.

Before the establishment of the Civic Guard, the Pope’s main defence was the Austrian army, which watched over the Pope’s policies and the political situation in the Papal States. 58 The protection of the Pope, however, was only a pretext; in reality the Austrian forces were there to suppress Italian nationalist and anti-Austrian sentiment in the Papal States. Indeed, when Austria intervened, Viscount Ponsonby, the British Ambassador in Vienna, informed Palmerston on 14 July in 1847:
I can have no doubt of his [Metternich] thinking intervention likely to be called for, and that it is necessary for Austria to act at any risk to oppose those who, he says, mean to destroy the Roman Government. His Highness, in speaking upon this subject, used the following words twice or thrice,—"The Emperor has determined not to lose his Italian possessions". 59

Because Palmerston supported the Italian nationalist movement, the British government was naturally on the side of the newly established Civic Guard. It therefore followed that Britain was anxious over Austrian military intervention to stop the Pope’s acceptance of the Civic Guard, because the latter was an obvious challenge to Austrian influence over the Papal States and even over the Italian peninsula as a whole.

Due to this concentration upon Austrian intervention, Britain failed to appreciate fully the actual and potential danger posed by the Civic Guard to the internal security of the Papal States.

It is not surprising that Britain did not realize the potential danger of the Civic Guard, because neither did the Pope himself. During the spring and early summer of 1847, he weighed the advantages and disadvantages of establishing the Guard, and finally approved its
establishment. Cardinal Gizzi was the liberal-minded minister who clearly foresaw that the establishment of the Guard brought a real threat of revolution in Rome. Fearing that many people had overestimated the country’s capacity for change, on 22 June Gizzi issued a proclamation affirming the Pope’s special status as head of the Church and warning that there were definite limits to the extent of his liberal reforms. The proclamation generated much resentment and hostility, even among the moderates, who nevertheless cheered the provisions of the declaration since they agreed with the call for an end to the popular assemblies and demonstrations in Rome. These crowds became rather hostile following the proclamation, making their dissolution all the more critical.

However, Gizzi could not stop the Pope’s approval of the Civic Guard on 5 July, and consequently, unable to stand by as the Civic Guard became an armed revolutionary force threatening the Papal authority, he resigned. As the Secretary of State, his decision to do so was made immediately after the Pope’s acceptance of the Guard, as Hamilton explained to Palmerston on 12 July 1847:

... because he couldn’t agree with the Pope’s recent determination to establish a national guard both at Rome and in the provinces.

Great disappointment at Gizzi’s resignation was expressed by Lord Abercromby to Palmerston on 22 July 1847, saying that "... His resignation was a great regret not only for
Italy but also for Europe."63 Gizzi's resignation brought excitement and agitation to the Roman people, because it was believed that he had been pressed to resign by the ultra-conservative cardinals such as Lambruschini and Corboli, opening up the possibility that the Pope's liberal policies might be endangered.

Freeborn wrote to Palmerston on 5 July 1847.

... my fears have been to a certain extent realized, as during the whole of the week masses of people paraded the streets in a most menacing attitude, and cries were vociferated of "Death to the C Lambruschini [ex secretary of State], Monsignor Corboli [present Under-Secretary of State], and the Pope's evil counsellors". 64

Whatever the reason for Gizzi's resignation, the British government believed that it would be disadvantageous for the Pope's liberal policy. Abercomby had a similar conviction to that of Freeborn, and reported to Palmerston on 22 July 1847 that Gizzi's resignation 'increases most materially the difficulties of His Holiness' position.' 65

In particular, he feared that the Pope's liberal policy, which had been shaped by Gizzi, would now be more difficult to pursue, and noted to Palmerston:
His Holiness is thus deprived of the active and recognized services of one whose statesmanlike views, liberal opinions, knowledge of foreign States, and steadiness of conduct, had succeeded in inspiring throughout the territories of the Church an affection and respect for the Sovereign Pontiff and his government... 66

The absence of Gizzi meant that the Pope was more likely to be influenced by the ultra-conservatives whose corrupt politics had already brought social and economic backwardness and poverty to the Papal States.

Abercromby continued:

His Holiness, surrounded as he is by Princes of the Church, many of whom unfortunately entertain notions little in unison with the necessities of their country or with the prevailing opinions of the day, requires the moral support and assistance of all who by their knowledge, their wise and liberal principles, can help him to overrule the advocates of existing prejudices and the retrograde notions of bygone days; and for such an object the consuls and advice of Cardinal Gizzi were pre-eminently useful. 67

While the ultra-conservative cardinals had neglected their country's interests, considering only their own and
thus creating a miserable social situation, the Pope had, under Gizzi's influence, emerged as a national leader acceptable to all. The British government thought that Pius and Cardinal Gizzi were the real leaders of the country who always considered their subjects. However, the fact was that Gizzi was acting against the moderates, warning Pius about the possible political consequence of the Civic Guard. 68

Britain did not understand the real reason for or significance of Gizzi's resignation, and still anticipated further liberal policies after the replacement of Gizzi by Cardinal Ferretti. 69 As Abercomby stated on 22 July 1847: "... Cardinal Ferretti should show by his acts, that he is animated by the same wise and liberal principles as those of which Cardinal Gizzi has given proof..." 70 There was little real awareness of the widening political crisis facing the Papacy.

Section II: Ferrara and Papal diplomacy

As tensions continued to rise in Rome a new crisis emerged due to foreign intervention. The establishment of the Civic Guard in Ferrara prompted Austrian military action to prevent the Pope from continuing his liberal policy. Ferrara was, after all, a garrison town where an Austrian army was stationed, ostensibly to defend the Pope. 71 In such a city the formation of the Civic Guard
was a direct challenge to the Austrian power. But it also gave the Austrians a good pretext to show that their army was there to protect the Pope from revolutionary forces. Since the Pope himself supported the Civic Guard, he protested against Austrian "support".

Metternich had been alarmed by Pius's liberal policies, such as the new press law and the amnesty, and had sent several warnings to the Pope. However, when Pius confirmed the creation of the Civic Guard on 5 July, and his concession was greeted with acclaim in Ferrara, this proved to be the last straw for an Austrian government which regarded the Civic Guard as a danger to their interests throughout Italy. As soon as the Austrian Field Marshal, Joseph Radetzhky, heard of the Edict of 15 July, he decided to reinforce his garrison in Ferrara, and exploited the occasion to make a military demonstration against the Pope. The entry of the Austrian forces into Ferrara disturbed peace and order, and was considered an insult to the Pope. Pius was justified in taking a strong personal line, and when the Papal States, which were supposed to be a neutral institution, was attacked it was his duty to defend it. On 8 August Count Auersperg, the Austrian Commandant, wrote to Cardinal Ciacchi, Legate of Ferrara, to order the Civic Guard not to put guards on the Piazza and the city gates in Ferrara, otherwise his Austrian troops would increase the strength of their detachments at those same posts. On the following day, the Cardinal replied that His Holiness
had every right to exercise his temporal power in his town of Ferrara. 76

The Austrian military expedition to Ferrara had great impact in Britain and led to hostility towards Austria. 77 This was a new direction for British foreign policy. As Austria was the key to a set of alliances designed to contain France and Russia, Britain's traditional policy in Italy was to support Austria whenever possible as a check to France and Russia. Consequently it was difficult for Britain to act openly in support of those who challenged the dynastic legitimate principle, in spite of her parliamentary liberalism and entente with France. 78 In addition Britain followed a cautious policy as there was always the possibility that the contagion of revolution would spread, threatening the political stability not only of the Italian peninsula but of the whole of Europe. 79

Britain was also reluctant to take action due to the possibility that it might encourage French intervention in Italian affairs. Although Britain and France shared similar liberal attitudes, the tradition of Anglo-French rivalry was always in the British government's mind. However, in 1847 the circumstances dictated a new policy. One difference was that, in spite of Guizot's parliamentary liberalism, the French government was reluctant to take any prompt action against Austria's military intervention in Ferrara. This was made clear in
conversations between Palmerston and Normanby, the British ambassador in Paris. 80

Another key difference was that Palmerston thought well of Pius. If Pius were to continue his reforms, albeit at a slower pace, Britain would approve. Feeling that some direct contact would be advantageous in these difficult circumstances, a proposal was made to put the relations between the two courts on a firmer basis.

On behalf of the Pope, Cardinal Ferretti, the new Secretary of State, made a general appeal on 18 August to the European powers: he wrote a formal note of complaint to the Austrian ambassador in Rome, 81 and similar notes and enclosures were addressed by the Papal government to all the foreign embassies and representatives in Rome. 82 Given the hesitancy of France and Prussia the British government saw an opportunity to strengthen its role in the international affairs. It was quite exceptional to voice clear opposition to Austria, considering that such a move was bound to put strains on the Anglo-Austrian relationship. Nevertheless the British government offered its support.

One factor in Britain’s pro-Papal policy was the situation in Ferrara, which was rapidly deteriorating. Abercromby noted to Palmerston on 19 August that the conduct of the Austrian military authorities was provoking opposition among the people in Ferrara. 83
The Austrians had actually occupied the citadel of Ferrara in the name of the Treaty of Vienna and thus based their case on their rights under international law. To the British government, however, Austria's actions were imprudent. They feared that the Austrian intervention in Ferrara would exacerbate the situation within the Papal States, leading to the threat that reform might turn into revolution. In such unstable circumstances there was a danger that France may decide to intervene, bringing it into a confrontation with Austria which could lead to a new European war.

Evidence that the situation in the Papal States was becoming more inflammable was shown in a letter from Sir George Hamilton to Palmerston about an anti-Austrian incident in Rome on 6 July, which noted that there were:

...Contradicting reports of great agitation at Rome, and of insults being offered to the Austrian Ambassador in the persons of some of his guests at a dinner on the 30th ultimo (June).

The most important way in which Palmerston could aid the Pope was to put pressure on the Austrian government to withdraw from Ferrara. Metternich's position, as outlined by the Austrian ambassador to London, Count Dietrichstein, to Palmerston on 11 August, was that Austria's action was in line with the Treaty of Vienna and was necessary to prohibit the unlawful scheme put
forwards by some revolutionaries for the unification of Italy. Palmerston refused to accept this argument. He noted in a letter to Ponsonby, the British ambassador in Vienna, on 12 August that he had no knowledge of any scheme for Italian unification and that Britain had no intention of allowing the territorial arrangement of Italy to be altered. 87 With regard to the Treaty of Vienna he refused to accept Metternich's interpretation and noted that the Austrian action had been undertaken without prior consultation with the other Concert Powers. Most importantly Palmerston observed that

Britain would wish to observe that there is another right beside that of self-defence and self-maintenance, which is inherent in independent sovereignty, and that is, the right which belongs to the sovereign power in every State, to make such reforms and internal improvements as may be judged by such sovereign power proper to be made, and conducive to the well-being of the people whom it governs. 88

Furthermore he continued to comment that the Pope's reforms would actually be of benefit to the Powers and noted

it may be hoped that if the Pope is encouraged and assisted by Austria and the other Four Powers in removing the grievances of which his subjects have long complained the discontent
which those grievances have created will soon
die away. 89

Metternich, however, refused to accept this argument. Consequently at the end of August Palmerston issued a warning about unjustified Austrian action, 90 and on 21 September the British government published a Parliamentary Sessional Paper entitled "Communication for the Austrian Government as to the Territorial Arrangement and Political Condition of Italy" which made its disagreement with Austria public. 91

Metternich’s intransigence was based on the belief that diplomatic relations between the British and Austrian governments would not be damaged in the long term; he knew that, even if Palmerston criticized Austrian intervention, the monarchical links between the Queen and the Habsburgs Monarchy would not allow Anglo-Austrian relations to be shaken. 92 To an extent his view was justified, as Queen Victoria and Prince Albert did not agree with Palmerston’s reaction to the Austrian military exercise in the Papal States. Both were convinced that it should not jeopardize diplomatic relations between Britain and Austria. Albert advised caution over Britain’s reaction and was anxious not to 'irritate' Austria' and feared that supporting Papal liberal policy might even raise the spectre of Jacobinism throughout Europe. 93
Palmerston, however, held very different views from the Prince, and this led to a clash over a new issue: whether Britain should send a special envoy to Rome. Palmerston agreed with the view expressed by Abercromby, the British minister in Turin, on 27 August that it would be beneficial to send a representative to hold talks with the Pope, and, in consultation with Lord John Russell, decided that Lord Minto, the Prime Minister’s father-in-law, was the most suitable candidate. 94

Prince Albert disagreed with this plan and stated to Lord Russell on 29 August that:

The probability is that Lord Minto will have very little real influence and will be made responsible for every act of a doubtful nature, and of which he may have been totally ignorant. 95

Russell, the Prime Minister, was obliged to persuade the Queen, insisting that as the Austrian military intervention had provoked social disorder, Britain must act. Russell asserted to the Queen on 31 August that:

It is to be feared that before anything can be done the rash and intemperate conduct of the Court of Vienna may have set fire to the inflammable matter in Italy. The only course by which a convulsion can be prevented is by the support given by England and if possible by France to the Pope, the Duke of Tuscany and the
King of Sardinia. These Sovereigns may thus have the means of keeping in check the ardent republicans of their states. 96

In the autumn of 1847 Minto was sent to the Courts of Sardinia, Tuscany, and Rome. His brief was to advocate a system of progressive administrative improvement to reform obsolete institutions, and to convey the message that any Government had the right to implement such a policy without being molested by foreign Powers. 97 In addition there was a further element to his agenda, as the Ferrara issue had reopened the question of whether Britain should open diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

Anti-Austrian public opinion

The British government and the British public shared similar opinions towards Austria, both opposing Austrian absolutism and expressing some support for the Pope. So far as the general public was concerned this represented an interesting shift of opinion. In a cartoon in Punch, on 25 September, Pius was depicted as a national leader and hero of "rational liberty", giving the "Roman Punch" to the Austrian Emperor of Despotism. 98 In another edition Mr Punch was seen hanging the Austrian Emperor as the Pope expelled the Austrian Eagle from his territory, with Russell disguised as a cockerel supporting him from behind while the British Lion was looking on with a
A column in *Punch* of 25 September scolded the Austrian Emperor:

The last of your extremely reprehensible proceedings is the occupation of Ferrara by your troops - a gross insult to the Papal Crown and a scandalous invasion of your neighbour’s property. You will perhaps throw the blame of this outrage on your Minister, Metternich: but as a despotic monarch, you are responsible for your servants’ acts. You are not a constitutional sovereign and you not only can do wrong, but a great deal of it, as your late conduct has abundantly proved.

*Punch* displayed a remarkably positive attitude toward the Pope going as far in a piece entitled ‘Important demonstrations at Madame Tussaud’s’ as to call the Pope, ‘heroic’:

Jenny Lind in the character of the Figlia del Reggimento, Edward VI, the benevolent Pope Pius IX, Henry VII, and the heroes Hardinge and Gough, the whole in new and magnificent dresses got up for the present season, are the public knows, now to be seen at Madame Tussaud’s. The public, however, may not know that an interesting conversation took place the other evening after the doors had been closed, between those distinguished personates. The
Swedish Nightingale told the Pope that she was so charmed with him, that she would be happy to sing his hymn any day. Edward VI. said that, although a true Protestant, it was with great pleasure that he found himself standing by the Pope. Henry VII observed that he had the pleasure of drubbing a tyrant; he alluded to Richard III; and he trusted that Pius would enjoy a similar triumph over a despot whose policy was as utterly crooked as the back of his own former antagonist. The heroes Hardinge and Gough, in their heroic capacity, begged to tender their best services to the Pope, whom they recognised as one of themselves. The whole company agreed that they would show the world what they were made of, by sticking to the cause of His Holiness like wax. 101

The Times also criticized the Austrian military intervention and the latter was quoted in a letter from Lord Shrewsbury, a Catholic politician, to Hamilton in Florence which observed that The Times had said that 'to drive the white uniform out of the street of Ferrara, the Pope ought to be ready to violate his conscience and betray his religion!' 102

To some extent the British public and government (Palmerston, Russell and Minto, but not the Queen and Prince) shared a similar hostility to Austria after its intervention in Ferrara. This led the press to show some
sympathy towards the government's policy. In fact Punch declared its support for Palmerston's foreign policy if he would defend the Pope against the Austrian intervention, and noted in its open letter to the Austrian Emperor:

You have no business in Ferrara whatever. I therefore not only protest against your occupation of that place, but request you to get out of it without delay. If you do not, I give you notice that I shall make arrangements to smack you, independently of those which will be entered into by Palmerston. I have made up my mind to take Pius' part: so I tell you, you had better leave him alone. 103

This support for Palmerston is interesting in that his policy has been traditionally regarded as 'liberal abroad and conservative at home'. However, A. Taylor, has recently suggested that, with the demand for reform at home blunted, Palmerston was able to pose as a radical by defending constitutionalism abroad and championing the rights of oppressed nationalities in Europe. 104 As a result he had been able to win over many key working-class radical figures. He would achieve considerable popularity in radical circles for his refusal to prosecute the Berkeley's draymen for their attack on the Austrian General, Julius Van Haynau, on his visit to London in 1850, as well as for the asylum he extended to Lajos Kossuth in 1851. 105 In addition, Palmerston's
radical tendencies proved amenable to Chartist demands on a number of major issues.

Anti-Austrian sentiment amongst the British public can partly be attributed to Mazzini’s anti-Austrian propaganda in England. Mazzini was convinced that public opinion in London not only supported his idea of Italian independence from Austria, but was even beginning to consider Italian unification as a possibility. In England Mazzini concentrated on working upon public opinion through his International League. As M. Finn has shown: Mazzini’s International League was keenly supported by the Chartists and the British radicals. Mazzini hoped to promote anti-Austrian sentiment among public opinion and to encourage the government’s foreign policy to be favourable to Italian nationalism.

A surprising aspect of Mazzini’s opinion at this time was his favourable treatment of the Pope, which reflected the general view. An important consequence of the Ferrara incident was that the Pope had in 1847 become a symbol of opposition to Austria. His quarrel with Austria over the occupation of Ferrara and his bold stand against Metternich, who was eventually forced to withdraw, fanned the flames of Italian nationalism.

Although the situation would change in 1848, in 1847 the idea that the Pope was a symbol of Italian nationalism spread even to Britain. British public opinion, which generally identified Papal politics with Austrian
absolutism, warmed to Pius's liberal reform policy because it was believed that Pius could lead the way in eradicating Austrian influence from the Italian peninsula.

The British public's unprecedented praise of the Pope was partly inspired by Mazzini's recognition of Pius IX as a national leader. On 8 September Mazzini wrote a long open letter from London to the Pope, begging Pius to unite Italy under Papal leadership. 'Unification would come anyway, because it was part of God's providence, but better if under Papal patronage with you at its head. Our struggle will take on a religious aspect and liberate us from the risks of reaction and civil war.' Mazzini subsequently said that he had never had much hope that this letter would produce results, but at the time he confirmed in private that he was ready to recognize Pius as life president of a united Italy. The sincerity of his admission was widely accepted, though he must have known it would upset many of his supporters on the radical and anti-clerical left.

Mazzini's open letter was sincere in its conviction that the Pope was capable of achieving a great deal for the Italian nation, and in its statement that Mazzini would be glad to see Pius initiate a national revolution: There is no man in Europe more powerful than you. Europe is in a tremendous crisis of doubts and of desires. Through the passage of time,
aggravated by your predecessors and the exalted hierarchy of the church, belief are dead:
Catholicism is lost in despotism, Protestantism is losing itself in anarchy.

The letter continued:

To fulfil the mission which God entrusts to you two things are necessary; to believe, and to unify Italy. Without the first you will fall by the wayside, abandoned by God and by men; without the second you will not have that lever with which, alone, you can achieve great, holy, and enduring things.

The Pope was well aware that the support of radicals like Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi put him in a difficult position. Even in his first encyclical, 'Qui pluribus', he pointed out that he was in fundamental agreement with his predecessor and had nothing in common with some of the political and philosophical 'liberals.' However, it became impossible for him to restrain popular enthusiasm. As a result, the Pope was pushed towards the forces of revolution, and every demonstration or insurrection during 1847 claimed his support.

The position in the early autumn of 1847 was thus an entirely novel one; Britain had forsaken its traditional policy of supporting Austria in Italy and had opted to back the Pope in Rome. Even more surprising was that this
policy united Palmerston and the English radicals in a common cause. It would be a mistake to assume, however, that the British government’s support for the Papacy and the sending of Minto to Rome was merely a result of concern for Italian affairs. An additional influence on policy was the interplay between domestic issues and Catholic religion.

Section III: Religious aspects of the diplomatic negotiation with the Papal States.

The religious aspect of Minto’s mission to Rome has not been fully explored: it has, if anything, been considered insignificant. As Prince Albert said at the time, ‘it was of very little influence’, and even, ‘criminal by the law of England’. However, a detailed study of the diplomacy reveals that for both Britain and the Papacy the religious concerns were important.

The first thing to note is that, although it is difficult to demonstrate its direct influence on diplomacy, it is important to understand that the state of British politics made it necessary for Russell to treat Catholic issues with some sympathy. His policy towards the Catholics and other ecclesiastical matters was complicated because religious issues, such as the Maynooth Grant, the disestablishment of the Church of England, and the future of state education, were at this time matters of controversy. Indeed, all of these issues
proved to be crucial in the election of July 1847, in which Russell’s government found itself under attack from both the Dissenters and the ultra-Protestants.

The result of the election was the narrow return of Russell’s ministry. It was, however, a weak government because it had to rely for support on such a broad coalition, including radicals, Catholics and Dissenters. Even Russell’s Catholic supporters were divided among themselves, and it was impossible for his policies to please everyone. As Russell sincerely stated, ‘I can not please the Catholics and the Dissenters at the same time.’ His relations with the Peelite ministers in the Cabinet made the situation even more complicated, as the need to keep them in the coalition made Russell’s Whig government even weaker than that of 1837-41. Russell sometimes had to search for the Peelites’ support not only for commercial measures but also for ecclesiastical matters. For example, Russell, for reasons of political expediency, supported Peel’s Maynooth Bill thus offending his Dissenter supporters. The result was that from 1847 Russell’s policy towards ecclesiastical matters was never clear-cut because of the heterogeneous nature of his supporters. Machin explains that ‘under the pressure of clerical demands and assertions, the Whigs were caught between liberal and Erastian tendencies.’

There was, however, a recognition by Russell of the importance of the Catholic vote. During the 1847
election, Catholic voters in general supported Liberals and Peelites, and Russell himself emerged at the head of the poll in the City of London with the help of their votes, supporting the Maynooth Bill, opposing immediate disestablishment and championing State education. 117 There were strict limits to how far the government could support Catholic causes, but within these boundaries the administration realized the need to satisfy Catholic opinion. This and other factors helped to influence Britain's benevolent policy towards the Papacy.

In addition it is necessary to understand that other important factors linked to religion came into play. For Britain one key concern was the link between the Papacy and Ireland, while for Pius an important aspect of his policy towards Britain was the pressure being exerted by Wiseman, the Pro-Vicar Apostolic in London, for the re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy. 118

The nature of Minto's political position in Rome was widely discussed before and after his despatch both in diplomatic correspondence and in Parliament. 119

Correspondence between a number of the key figures who influenced British foreign policy towards the Papacy, such as Lord Minto, Lord John Russell, Viscount Palmerston, Lord Shrewsbury and Dr Wiseman, clearly indicates that Minto's mission was intended to cover religious as well as political and diplomatic issues. As Russell wrote to the Queen on 1 September:
When Lord Palmerston first proposed that Lord Minto should be charged with this special duty, he contemplated the internal advantage to be derived from it still more than its effect on our external relations. 120

The key to Britain’s religious objectives regarding its diplomatic negotiations with the Holy See is illustrated by Dr Wiseman’s involvement with Lord Minto’s mission in Rome. 121 Wiseman’s effort came from two directions, appealing both to London and to Rome in order to persuade the British government and the Papacy of the advantages which might be obtained through the establishment of a direct communication channel. It was Wiseman’s contribution that paved the way for the political and religious entente between London and Rome.

Wiseman’s approach to London

Palmerston’s letter to the Queen on 31 August insisting on the importance of Minto’s mission in Rome significantly included a copy of a letter which had been written by Wiseman on 8 August in Rome to the Catholic politician, Lord Shrewsbury. Wiseman’s letter illustrated his intention to persuade the British government to provide diplomatic support for the Papal States. In his letter, he noted:
The ambassadors of all the great powers are working against its [the Papal government's] measures, within and without. Austria and France are only biding their time, to take advantage of any disturbance to rush in. The strong feeling on the part of the government and its sincere friends is that the appearance of an English envoy here, would both greatly neutralize the intrigues of foreign parties, would secure the Papal States from foreign interference and would give strong moral support and encouragement to the government in its measure of reform. 122

Although Wiseman himself said that he was not concerned with political matters - 'I have proceeded on a business of a purely ecclesiastical nature' 123 - Wiseman's diplomatic involvement with the British government was undeniable, and he made contact with both Russell and Palmerston.

Wiseman set off from Rome on his journey to London on 24 August, and arrived on 11 September, 124 which was just a week before Minto's departure. He lost no time in bringing the Pope's argument for better relations before the British government, and establishing his own credentials as a reliable channel to the Papacy.

Wiseman very quickly made an impact upon the British government. A memorandum which he presented to Russell on
13 September reiterated the case which he had previously stated to Shrewsbury about the importance of the Pope’s reforms, and again stressed the need for Britain to send an ‘unaccredited Agent’ to Rome. Russell and Palmerston agreed to this request and subsequently issued instructions to Minto to visit Rome. His status had already been settled he was, as Palmerston had informed Queen Victoria on 31 August, to proceed to Rome ‘simply as a member of Your Majesty’s government authorized to communicate confidentially with the government of Rome’. 125

The letter to Russell of 13 September acts as an example of the political arguments which Wiseman deployed to persuade the British government of the wisdom of opening relations with Rome. He began by describing the reform programme undertaken by Pius IX, and asserted the importance of British assistance to the Papacy, emphasizing that Austria and France had deceived the Pope. Wiseman continued to state that:

... independently of such mere vague and general impressions there are grounds of a much higher and sounder character on which the Papal government seems to have a just claim upon the active co-operation of the English to remove the obstacles at present thrown in the way of its internal improvement and its enlightened policy by the hostile movements and marked opposition of Austria, and also, by diplomatic
support and avowed encouragement, to
counterbalance and frustrate the embarrassment
which the Austrian policy causes in the
interior of the state. 126

He also insisted that direct diplomatic communication
with the Papacy was not illegal, as Britain had after all
taken part in the Five Powers Conference in Rome in 1831,
and he noted that:

Whatever extent of communication with the Papal
government was then lawful, must be so still
nor could merely the degree of secrecy then
observed or the more open avowal now required
make a difference in the legality of the act. 127

The law as it stood, he contended, had little to
recommend it, and indeed it bore the appearance almost of
panic legislation; there was little threat to the
Protestant Ascendancy from diplomatic exchanges, and an
exchange of views would be helpful to both sides. He also
noted that as long as there was no Papal Nuncio in
Britain, and therefore official diplomatic communication
had to be through the Papal Nuncio either in Paris or
Vienna, the situation was open to interference by the
Catholic powers, Austria and France. 128

After Wiseman argued that Britain’s aid to the Papal
States would facilitate Italian unity, he noted in his
letter to Russell on 13 September.
His Excellency added that a more active moral support from England would be of the greatest service to the progress of social improvement in Italy. He was aware that the form of our constitution had been supposed to place considerable difficulties in the way of any diplomatic communications between the two States; but it was impossible that Her Majesty's Government could do otherwise than watch with anxious interest the progress of administrative reforms which seemed to have been undertaken with so much discrimination, and conducted with so much temperate energy amidst complicated difficulties of an unexampled character. 129

These were obviously powerful arguments as far as diplomatic relations were concerned, but there can be little doubt that behind Wiseman's appeal to the government in these terms, there was obviously a religious motive, which was to obtain the government's support to improve the status of the English Catholic Church in Britain and of the English College in Rome. 130 To achieve this goal Wiseman was obliged to acknowledge how useful it would be, and how advantageous it would be to the government to have close and direct communication with the Papacy.
His ultimate religious objective was to obtain approval for the restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy in England. As soon as he became pro-Vicar Apostolic, negotiations about restoring the English Catholic Hierarchy (the Catholic Church’s administrative status) had begun between the English Catholic Church and the Vatican through the Propaganda (Catholic Society for the Propagation of the Faith). 131 He had already sent a letter to the Pope directly in July 1847 entitled ‘Condition of the Catholics in England’, describing the expansion of the Catholic population and the more positive attitudes of the public towards Catholicism in England. 132

Minto and Wiseman’s missions, and Wiseman’s approach to Rome

To understand the nature of Wiseman’s diplomacy, it is also necessary to look at how he portrayed his diplomatic efforts to the Pope. Wiseman’s original involvement in these matters began when the Pope, hoping that Minto’s visit to Rome could be linked to the plan to re-establish the Catholic Hierarchy, ordered Wiseman to arrive in London before Lord Minto’s departure in order to influence the British government. Wiseman wanted to make a success of this mission not only to influence the British government to accept the Hierarchy but also to create a favourable impression with the Pope.
Wiseinan's correspondence with the Pope makes it clear that he emphasized that he was in a good position to mediate on Anglo-Roman matters, something which underlines the linkage between Wiseinan's political and religious objectives. 133

In the Vatican archives one can find a letter from Wiseman to Pius IX about his meeting with Palmerston and Russell in London on 24 September, in which he confessed to the Pope that, although he had not indicated this to the British ministers, it was his intention to improve the Catholic status in England which lay behind his advice to Palmerston and Russell. 134 In addition Wiseman in his correspondence with the Pope emphasized his own contribution. In a letter to Pius on 9 October he informed His Holiness that Palmerston had asked him unofficially to go to Rome to support Minto's Mission, and encouraged the Pope about the prospects for Anglo-Vatican relations by mentioning Shrewsbury's letter to Russell concerning the possibility of the Queen's conducting direct diplomatic communications with the Papacy. 135

Wiseinan also wanted to give the Pope a positive impression of Palmerston and of Lord Minto's diplomatic strengths, and stressed:

Palmerston seems to be the kind of person who has encouraged a positive opinion about
political events in the Papal states among the other ministers in Parliament. 136

He also emphasized that he himself was fully trusted by the British government:

... but as they can be confident about my position under your sovereign, they [Russell and Palmerston] showed their confidence about my suggestion. 137

Further to this, Wiseman also stated that he had been able to show Russell and Palmerston the benefits which Britain would receive through direct communications with the Papacy, and informed the Pope that in order to impress the British government '... I do not hesitate to do anything but follow its exact suggestion'. 138 He emphasized that the British government actually referred to his suggestions in the process of making a policy to the Papal States, and therefore he believed that he could influence the government on this issue. As far as Wiseman was concerned, he informed the Pope, 'I really feel satisfied with seeing my ideas so well reflected in those of the government.' 139

Wiseman thus attempted to convey the British government's, and especially Palmerston's, positive perception of developments in the Papal States, and also to demonstrate the tremendous confidence the British government had in him. It is clear that his brief was to
mediate between the two states, emphasizing the Pope’s intention of eliciting British support in order to improve Anglo-Roman relations.

Wiseman’s efforts to improve relations between Britain and the Vatican were supported by Lord Shrewsbury in his role as one of the key members of the Catholic aristocracy. Shrewsbury lobbied the Cabinet, Minto and other interested parties to be favourable to the Papacy, stressing the common interests between London and Rome. On 4 November, Shrewsbury noted to Hamilton in Florence that:

As two great free and reforming Powers we shall have a mutual interest in each other, and it will be a splendid alliance between the first spiritual and the first temporal sovereignty in the world! If we go cordially and fairly together, we shall command public opinion in every State in Europe, and public opinion is now an immense engine.

Shrewsbury’s efforts can thus be seen to complement those of Wiseman. The contribution of the English Catholics was therefore significant in paving the way for the Anglo-Vatican entente. Wiseman’s importance in this period was that he provided a direct channel to the Pope, thus avoiding the need to work through the Papal Nuncios in Paris and Vienna, and that he facilitated the development of mutual understanding. In the summer of 1847 the
inconvenience of having no regular channel of communication between England and Rome had been keenly felt, however, by the autumn this problem had to a degree been overcome. 141

The Irish issue

Beneath the surface of the improvement in Anglo-Vatican relations was another vital issue; the Irish Question. This was not a factor which was discussed publicly, but the private papers of those involved in the diplomatic overture to the Papacy reveal the importance of the Irish angle. This is particularly apparent in the correspondence of the Earl of Clarendon, the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. 142

Lord Clarendon was pleased with the news of Lord Minto's mission to Rome, and immediately emphasized its Irish dimension. In a memorandum to Lord Russell in September 1847 he enquired:

I should like to know in what form and to what extent you mean to enamour Irish subjects with His Holiness. I believe he is under a good deal of apprehension about the Colleges and the political views of the government about them. I believe also that the conduct of the priests in interfering with politics and matters unconnected with their calling has been
represented to him in a far too favourable and religious light. 143

Clarendon's concern was not surprising, for at this time the Irish situation was desperate.

It has been argued that the Irish issue was, in terms of British foreign policy towards Italy, not of major concern in the first half of the nineteenth century, and that British policy was determined by international interest in the Papacy and the Risorgimento. 144 However, 1847 was destined to be a watershed year in Irish history, and therefore the British government could not ignore the Irish Question in Anglo-Roman diplomatic relations.

1847 was the worst year of the famine in Ireland following the failure of the potato crop. The failure of the potato harvest produced outbreaks of associated illness. Poverty in Ireland was, of course, widespread and heart-breaking. In a letter which Lord Shrewsbury wrote to Minto on 20 December, he noted that a priest in Galway had written to one of his acquaintances that:

The poor around us, in this district, are as yet peaceable and quiet, but much worse off than last winter. This winter they have no employment, last they had. Fever and dysentery are almost gone, but the poor are dying of exhaustion for want of food & clothing. It is
melancholy, it is heart rending even to contemplate what I am obliged to daily, hourly to witness. 145

Most informed observers realized that the root of the problems lay in the distribution of land. Large tracts of land were let at a fixed rent to a single individual on a long lease, and he sub-let as he chose. 146 The result was a land tenancy system which discriminated against the tenant farmer, for even when crops failed or the market was depressed rent still had to be paid.

The famine brought about a change in the attitude of the British government towards Ireland. It was impossible any longer to deny that something was dangerously wrong. There was little to choose between the rebellious people and the irresponsible landlords; as Russell remarked to Clarendon on 18 December 1847 'The Irish landlords are the most heartless wretches in creation!' 147

On 10 October Clarendon told Palmerston 'A great social revolution is now going on in Ireland, the accumulated evils of misgovernment and mismanagement are now coming to a crisis'. 148 Clarendon’s alarm became particularly acute during the autumn of 1847, just as Minto set off for Italy, when in a succession of assassinations, seven landlords were shot in less than two months, six being killed outright and the seventh horribly injured. Famine
had suddenly brought the suppressed anger of centuries to a head. 149

Poverty in Ireland, accelerated by an inadequate land system, produced crime, disorder, and social instability. On 29 November Sir George Grey, the Home Secretary, introduced the Crime and Outrage (Ireland) Bill in the House of Commons. Under its terms the Lord-Lieutenant was given power, at his discretion, to draft up to any number of police into any district, such districts would be punished by being required immediately to repay the cost of the drafting. 150

There has been controversy over whether the peasants’ violence against the landlords was organized and integrated into the mass revolutionary and Irish nationalist movement or not. Woodham-Smith has asserted that the popular rising which the British government feared was not being planned, and that when a revolutionary movement did come about it originated not among the starving masses but with the intellectuals and the middle class. 151 However, there is an another argument which contests his thesis that the murders which horrified and alienated public opinion had no insurrectionary significance and were not related to any political conspiracy. 152

Whatever the fact was, it is clear that the British government believed that such successive outbreaks of violence against the landlords in Ireland were associated
with the Irish nationalist movement. As Catholic priests were involved with these insurrections, or at least supported the poor peasants, it was also perceived that a marriage had been organized between the Irish nationalist movement and Catholic religion. 153

Lord Clarendon’s memorandum of 1 October on the situation in Ireland recognized the danger from this alliance and made clear the narrow distinctions between religion and political affairs. He noted to Russell in this paper that:

The Irish are essentially a religious people, but of late years religion has for party purposes and by party agencies been so mixed up with politics that the completely distinctive characters of the two are almost lost sight of, and an Irishman loves his religion and the Ministers of his church, not so much for their own sake and his own spiritual welfare, as because he is deeply impressed with the idea that they are national. 154

He confirmed that acts of violence were not just an expression of peasant dissatisfaction but were an integral part of the Irish nationalist movement, and that priests, recognizing that ‘the spirit of nationality burns strongly in an Irishman’s breast’, encouraged these political feelings in order to maintain influence over their congregations. 155 Furthermore, he emphasized that
the insurrections were organized to forward the Repeal movement, referring to an episode involving an anti-Repeal priest:

During the late election at Dundalk, Dr Cloyne the Parish Priest, one of the most exemplary and respectable clergymen in Ireland, was grossly insulted by the people and spat upon, his life was in danger and his Chapel was afterwards deserted because he gave his support to a liberal candidate of great ability, but who was unfriendly to Repeal, and opposed a youth of American extraction, without character station or fitness for Parliament but who was a Repealer and supported by the Repeal party. 156

Irish priests who were involved with or showed sympathy for this violence were mainly local priests who had direct contact with the local poor, rather than figures within the high levels of the Church Hierarchy. Indeed the problem in Ireland was complicated by the fact that the Church was not of one mind, two factions were struggling against each other not only in Ireland itself but also in Rome. This rivalry was based upon differences within the Church over how to react to the growth of Irish nationalism, but was also exacerbated by a division of opinion over the British government’s plans for the establishment of nondenominational Queens Colleges in Ireland. 157
The Irish priests involved in violence against the landlords and opposition to the colleges looked to John MacHale, the Archbishop of Tuam, for support. MacHale was the first prelate to be wholly educated in Ireland since the Reformation; intensely nationalist, he felt deeply the sufferings of the poor, became Daniel O’Connell’s most important clerical supporter, until the latter’s death in May 1847, and was always prepared to take an independent line against his own hierarchy and also with Rome.

Clarendon stated the danger of MacHale to Minto on 26 November:

MacHale is a dangerous demagogue whose proceedings as a citizen, and irrespective of their ecclesiastical indecorum, no government in the world but our’s would tolerate. Political agitation, popular elections and inflammatory publications are his favourite pursuits. His object seems to be to set the people against their rulers, and if he would have his way their ignorance and their turbulence would be perpetual, and throughout his province those priests have the greatest share of his favour who most promote his sinister designs. 158

The fact that Irish priests such as MacHale supported the violence of the poor Irish peasants and co-operated with
O’Connell’s nationalist movement prompted the British government to discuss the situation of Ireland with the Pope, not only because ‘... the Pope does not know what is going on in Ireland’, but also to prevent the Pope from giving any favour to the Irish priests in Rome.

As Clarendon insisted to Russell on 1 October, accurate information regarding Irish affairs was being distorted by the Irish College in Rome in the process of informing the Pope.

Information with respect to Ireland has hitherto reached the Holy See through a perverted channel. Even if facts be correctly transmitted from Ireland (and the reverse is often the case) they are metamorphosed in the Irish College at Rome and the Pope is required to exercise his judgement upon evidence either one-sided, or garbled to meet the political more frequently than the spiritual purposes of the party in Ireland from which the Irish College receives its inspirations. 159

Even more disturbing for the British government was its concern that the Irish nationalist movement itself was making a positive impression on the Pope, and that Pius might be persuaded to support the Repeal movement. Minto could hardly conceal his annoyance with Daniel O’Connell’s son John, who had inherited the leadership of the Irish nationalist movement after his father’s death,
when the latter travelled to Rome for an interview with the Pope, and then used this privilege to stir up Irish nationalism. He noted to Shrewsbury on 28 October in reference to a meeting that John O'Connell had held in Dublin that O'Connell had informed the audience that he was organizing an address to the Pope thanking him for 'his noble exertions to sustain the Catholic religion in Ireland'.

This letter to Shrewsbury also included an article from the Waterford Chronicle which attributed to the Pope a sympathetic attitude towards Ireland. The article entitled '1847 Approbation of O'Connell policy by the Pope' declared:

Ireland owes the Holy Father many debts. She owes him for this Encyclical letter, which called forth the sympathy and assistance of all the nations of the world for her children. She owes him for the real honours which he paid to the remains of our beloved Liberator, and the adoption of O'Connell's political doctrines. She owes him for the bold stand he has made against the tyrants of the world, thereby lifting up her own cause and making it powerful against persecution.

It seemed that the Pope had taken a positive view of John O'Connell, and in that case there was a danger that the
violence organized by MacHale in Ireland would be defended because he was one of O'Connell's principal religious supporters. The fact that O'Connell was supported by the Pope was a factor in driving the British government to act over the Irish Question.

Clarendon's belief that the Pope was being duped into backing the Irish clergy in their opposition to the colleges led him to recommend that Minto should be instructed to bring home to the Pope the real nature of the conditions in Ireland and the real motives behind the educational reforms. In his memorandum of 1 October he observed:

> It is rapidly becoming worse and demands the remedy which the Pope alone can supply, as the head of the Roman Catholic church, as a Sovereign in alliance with Great Britain, and above all as a man ardently desirous to promote the well being of his fellow creatures, it cannot be supposed that he would withhold his aid towards a great religious and social reform, if the necessity of such aid were demonstrated and if his power to afford it were clearly established. 162

He went on to explain that before the Pope made up his mind over Ireland, it would be necessary to persuade him
to interfere, although it is clear from the documents that diplomatic guile was essential.

Assuming then that enough has been said to show that the Pope is uninformed of what is passing in Ireland, and that the state of things here loudly calls for his spiritual interposition, it remains to consider in what manner His Holiness can interfere beneficially and effectually. Nothing should be asked of the Pope which had solely for its purpose to further the interests of the political objects of the British government in Ireland. 163

He also explained how to persuade the Pope using anti-Irish propaganda. 164 He enclosed with his memorandum a number of documents which Minto could use to demonstrate to Pius the hostile nature of the Irish clergy. The documents, Clarendon noted, provided:

...ample evidence of the inflammatory language and the personal abuse in which the Clergy freely indulge both in speeches and letters, of the political purposes to which the palaces of worship are perverted, and of the importance attached by all classes of agitators to the support of the priesthood and the sanction of the Pope's authority. 165
Clarendon concluded that it would be a mutually advantageous quid pro quo if Britain intervened in Roman affairs to support the Pope as an Italian national leader, and the Pope intervened in Irish affairs to tranquillize violence in order to undermine the Irish nationalist movement:

The countervailing influence on the other hand, will be very powerful and likely to prevail in the long run if a firm and persevering course be pursued by the Pope, and the British government acting in concert. A popular outcry will be raised at all events. Not only the slightest interference on the part of the Pope to aid the government, but the very appointment even by England of an accredited agent at Rome will be made a perpetual handle for agitators to influence the popular mind with the notion that the British Minister is interfering with the Pope for the purpose of making him subservient to the political projects of England. 166

It also could be said that Britain intended to search for similarities between the problems of Britain and those of the Papal States.

The rise of the Irish problem was also a significant factor for the involvement of English Catholics, such as Wiseman and Shrewsbury, in the diplomatic process. In
this context Wiseman emerged once again in an important role. Wiseman and Daniel O'Connell had worked together during the struggle for Catholic Emancipation in 1829, founding the Dublin Review. However, Wiseman had warned that the Dublin Review should not be used to promote the political views of O'Connell. Aside from his wish to avoid topics that might divide Catholics, Wiseman was fully aware of the fact that Newman and his Catholic fellows opposed the principles held by Daniel O'Connell.  

Wiseman understood how seriously divisive the questions related to Ireland might become. Daniel O'Connell's promotion of the repeal of the union of Ireland with Britain was especially contentious. Hoping to avert unnecessary bitterness, Wiseman wrote to his friend and supported Shrewsbury on 2 November, offering to serve 'as mediator in any unkind feeling which might have sprung up between your Lordship and [John] O'Connell'.  

Wiseman was most worried that a lack of union among Catholics could only weaken their power for doing good, and he argued that there was no reason why they could not be divided in politics, while 'being thoroughly united in all points bearing upon the progress of religion, the removal of its difficulties, and the interests of the Catholic body'. Wiseman himself opposed repeal: 'I can see no Catholicity in the repeal movement: I fear it is thoroughly of this world'.

167
Most importantly, the disturbances in Ireland had ramifications for the re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy. The strength of feeling which the famine aroused made it even more likely that the Irish College would attempt to use its influence in Rome to torpedo the restoration of the Hierarchy. This was particularly the case because Wiseman was regarded by the Irish as unsympathetic to their cause. At the same time, however, the British government’s concern about Ireland and its lack of influence at Rome strengthened the case for the re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy.

Lord Shrewsbury raised these issues with Charles Hamilton, the brother of the British minister in Florence, on 4 November in a letter that he hoped would be passed on to Minto. In it he deplored the inferior position of the English Catholic College to the Irish Catholic College, and noted to Hamilton, in regard to the Pope’s recent opposition to the Queen’s Colleges, that:

... now the Irish Party at Rome will endeavour, I apprehend ... to gain the Pope over to their views in other matters by applauding him for his conduct in this, and this Irish influence ought and must be counteracted. Drs Kirby and Cullen of the Irish College, who represent it at Rome, are both excellent men but thorough Irish; whilst we have none of equal weight. ...
The Irish are strong and active; we are weak and idle. Dr Wiseman’s appointment to the Metropolitan See of Westminster will be the struggle and the trial. He is presumed to be anti-Irish and as such will be assailed, in all probability by a host of clamorous malcontents.170

Exposing his hostility to the Irish Catholics, he asserted that Wiseman would be the only person who could counter the influence of the Irish College and observed that it was vital that Wiseman should be appointed to the Metropolitan See of Westminster. He warned that:

If Wiseman be not appointed, the triumph of the Irish party will be complete, the game they are playing will be won by making it appear that England is only a bigoted tyrant, and a ruthless enemy of Catholicity. 171

He noted that the despatch of Minto to Rome while a positive move could not entirely overcome Britain’s problem and emphasized that:

It is of the utmost importance that Rome should be well and wisely informed on these points, and yet I know not from whence the information is to come. Lord Minto may be suspected of partiality, of a one side view of the case as a party man; still I hope he will prevail by persevering assiduously in his Mission. 172
Shrewsbury explained that only Wiseman's appointment could help Britain’s cause, and noted that the only alternative to Wiseman as Archbishop of Westminster was Bishop John Briggs, the pro-Irish Vicar-Apostolic of the Yorkshire District. Shrewsbury explained that ‘He [Wiseman] is the only man we have fit to communicate with government and who has any knowledge of the World and its concerns.’ He also stressed that Wiseman would be able to compete with other priests in the European Catholic states’s colleges in Rome, especially the Irish College.173

Their concern over the Archbishopric made it imperative to Wiseman and Shrewsbury that Britain should be seen to take a sympathetic attitude towards the Papacy, and thus heightened their determination to push for a reconciliation between London and Rome. In addition, they were keen to stress the importance of an end to discrimination against Catholicism in Ireland. Lord Shrewsbury, although a Catholic himself, had little sympathy for the Irish Catholics, particularly if they were involved in Irish nationalist propaganda, but noted in his letter to Minto on 20 December that:

All that is degraded and criminal in Repeal - all the falsehood and imposture upon which it is based - all the vile passions and still viler principles that were, or have been bonded together in the support - all are traceable to
this one cause, that we have made a forcible separation between the religion of the people and the political Institutions of the country.174

The concerns of the English Catholics over Ireland complemented those of British government. Before his arrival in Rome and during his stay there, Minto was constantly reminded of the importance of the Irish issue. Indeed, the necessity for Minto to persuade the Pope to help Britain solve the Irish problem became ever more central to Minto’s mission. The scale of the problem became even more apparent when in late October 1847, just before Minto’s arrival in Rome, the Pope, on the advice of the Propaganda, issued a statement opposing the British government’s plan for non-denominational Queen’s Colleges to be established in Ireland. This confirmed that in the competition between the English and Irish Catholic Churches through the English and Irish Colleges in Rome, the Irish were more successful and thus more influential. Consequently on 27 October Russell informed Minto that:

I hope you will move heaven and earth to convince the Pope that he is misled by the mischievous party in Ireland, that they aim at rebellion and separation, that we do not object to any measures he may take to secure his own faith, but that he ought to discountenance the
seditious and rebellious harangues of priests.
He ought to feel that we are his friends. 175

Palmerston was also keen to see the Pope aid Britain, and in a letter to Minto on 29 October he noted that as there were by this time indications that the Austrians were keen to reduce tensions in Italy that:

The Pope ought to feel grateful to us for this; and if he does so, he ought to give us some tokens of his thankfulness. I send you a copy of memorandum sent some little time ago by Clarendon for your use. It is the main good.176

This desire for Papal action was made all the more urgent by the increase in Ireland of acts of violence and the apparent complicity of the Irish clergy. On 21 November Clarendon informed Palmerston that the situation was so bad that 'sedition and murder are now all but openly recommended by certain priests' and he insisted that the Pope should be persuaded:

... to put a stop to ... the practice, unheard in any other Country, of denouncing people by name from the altar or in other words issuing their death warrant... 177

By the end of 1847 the Minto mission had become vital to Britain for not only Italian affairs but also for the peace of Ireland.
Conclusion
By a curious combination of international politics and religious circumstances, the British government had become the defender of the Pope’s temporal power in spite of its traditional and historical anti-Catholicism and anti-Papal feeling. Therefore in 1847 there was good reason for the Pope to look for help from Britain.

Fortunately for the Vatican both Palmerston and the British officials in Italy supported Pius’s reform programme and regarded it as an important step in the development of the Papal States and Italian nationalism. Although the new press law and Civic Guard were granted because of the radicals’ pressure upon the Pope, Britain failed to appreciate fully the actual and potential danger of these reforms. As has been pointed out, Britain’s naivety about the Civic Guard was in part due to its hostile feelings towards Austria, which brought the British government to support the Papacy after the Ferrara incident in August. The despatch of Lord Minto to Rome and other cities was motivated by the Ferrara issue in order to support the Pope diplomatically and to encourage his liberal policies. This was, however, not the only issue at stake, for while diplomatic and religious studies of Anglo-Roman relations have normally been kept separate, it is evident that in fact political and religious concerns were equally important and were intricately interwoven in Britain’s negotiations with the Papacy. This is particularly the case in regard to the
decision in August 1847 to send Lord Minto to Rome, which was inspired by religious as well as political considerations.

The extent of the link between the Minto mission and Dr Wiseman has not hitherto been recognized by many historians. On the face of it, the two men were negotiating over separate issues, but some collaboration between the English government and Italian and British religious bodies can be discovered in Minto’s papers as well as in the Vatican Archive. These documents reveal that the British government and Dr Wiseman, as a representative of the English Catholic Church, worked in parallel in Britain’s political and religious negotiations with the Papacy, on the one side seeking to establish formal diplomatic relations with Rome, and aiming to solve the Irish Question, while on the other hand, attempting to improve the status of the English Catholic Church.

It was over the Irish question that the government sought help from Wiseman. It was believed that the main problem facing Lord Minto in Rome was the possibility that the Irish College would attempt to sabotage his mission. Lord Shrewsbury regarded Wiseman as anti-Irish, and hoped that Wiseman would be able to counter the influence of the Irish priests. The desire for a Diplomatic Bill with the Papacy was not just for the improvement of Britain’s position in terms of international competition with France and Austria, but also for solving the Irish
question. Wiseman's relations with Daniel O'Connell, before the latter's death, and his warning to O'Connell that Catholicism should not be used to provoke Irish nationalism in Ireland, proved his attempt to undermine the Irish nationalist movement in the name of harmony between the Catholic Church in England and that in Ireland.

Since British fears about Austrian ambitions had begun to subside by the time Minto arrived in Rome on 4 November, it was the Irish issue that came increasingly to dominate British policy. Towards the end of the year the situation in Ireland was becoming a matter of great concern and Britain looked to the Papacy for help, hoping that Pius would bar the Irish Catholic Church from political activities. In order to show its sincerity Britain began work on a Diplomatic Bill to legitimatize the opening of relations with Rome.

British optimism about the chances of an improvement in relations with the Papacy was, however, based on a false premise. The British government failed to see that in fact the Pope was being pushed into reforms which created dangerous expectations, both within the Papal States and Italy as a whole, which he could not fulfil.
Notes

1 Proceedings of the Public Demonstration of Sympathy with Pope Pius IX, and with Italy, in the City of New York, on Monday, November 29 A.D.1847, (New York, 1847).


3 British Parliamentary Sessional Paper (House of Commons) Correspondence Respecting Affairs of Italy, Pt 1. 1846-47, 1849/LVII (BPSP).


5 The 2nd Earl of Minto’s Papers relating to his diplomatic mission to the states of Italy (including his private letters and diary) are in the National Library of Scotland, Department of Manuscripts, an entire section of the Minto archive. (NLS, MSS.) His official papers are in the Public Record Office.

6 BPSP, LVII, Ralph Abercromby (Turin) to Lord Palmerston, 12 January 1847.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid. ‘Any events likely to disturb the general peace of Europe would I fear be followed by a prejudicial result to this peninsula. A field would then be opened to the action of foreign intrigue; and the public mind in Italy is at this moment in too unsettled a state to afford a hope that intemperate and mischievous counsellors might not readily meet with dangerous and eager followers.’

15 PRO FO43/41, Minute by Palmerston, 25 March 1847.
16 Ibid., Consul Freeborn (Rome) to Palmerston, 24 April 1847, Freeborn to Palmerston, 11 June 1847, and Minute by Palmerston, 7 July 1847.


18 BPSP, LVII, Palmerston to Lord Normanby (Paris), 27 April 1847.

19 Wallace, 'Pius IX and Lord Palermston, 1846-49', p.14

20 BPSP, LVII, Abercromby to Palmerston, 28 April 1847, 'On the night of the 22 instant, a procession by torch-light, of more than 20,000 people, proceeded to the Quirinal Palace...'


22 Ibid., p.105 In 1847 Sterbini, who was regarded as a Mazzinian, still respected the Papal authority.

23 The Contemporaneo had already been founded in Rome before Gizzi introduced the new press law on 15 May.

24 BPSP, LVII, Petre (Rome) to Palmerston, 'Feelings at Rome as to projected reforms.' 9 April 1847.

25 It consisted of four large sides which appeared weekly at first and afterwards daily, Berkeley, Italy in the Making, p.103.

26 Ibid., p.104.

27 PRO, F043/41, Petre to Sir George Hamilton (Florence), 27 March 1847.

28 PRO, F079/123, Petre to Hamilton, 20 March 1847.


31 Ibid., p.77.

32 Ibid., p.69.

33 Ibid., pp.78-80.

34 Ibid., p.69.
BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 23 June 1847.

BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 3 July 1847, ‘The following is a translation of an article from the Bilancia newspaper of yesterday evening, and which of course passed under the revision of the censors...’


Hughes, Crime, Disorder and the Risorgimento, p.172.

Hughes, Crime, Disorder and the Risorgimento, p.170.


Hughes, Crime, Disorder and the Risorgimento, p.173.

Hughes, Crime, Disorder and the Risorgimento, pp.171-2.

Hughes, Crime, Disorder and the Risorgimento, pp.173-4.

A.J. Reinerman, ‘The Failure of Popular Counter-Revolution in Risorgimento Italy: The Case of the Centurions, 1831-1847’, The Historical Journal, 34 (1991), pp.21-41. This article focuses on the question of the military system in the Papal states, which emerged as one of the most important issues in the period covering the creation of the Civic Guard in 1847. p.40.

BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston. 6 July 1847, ‘Already good effect and feeling between the Pope and his subjects, and patriotic intentions of the Pope and of his Minister, were beginning to be generally experienced throughout the Papal States...’

Hughes, Crime, Disorder and the Risorgimento, p.170.

BPSP, LVII, Freeborn to Palmerston, 5 July 1847.
Hughes, *Crime, Disorder and the Risorgimento*, p.170

Ibid., p.172.

**BPSP, LVII**, Petre to Hamilton, 'the Pope has instituted a civic guard.' 8 July 1847.

Berkeley, *Italy in the Making*, p.4. Ferrara was situated in the north-western district of the Papal States, two or three miles south of the Austrian frontier, the river Po, and therefore was the most important town in terms of defence.

**BPSP, LVII**, Lord Ponsonby (Vienna) to Palmerston, 14 July 1847.


Ibid., p.198.

**BPSP, LVII**, Hamilton to Palmerston, 12 July 1847.

**BPSP, LVII**, Abercromby to Palmerston, 22 July 1847.

**BPSP, LVII**, Freeborn to Palmerston, 5 July 1847.

**BPSP, LVII**, Abercromby to Palmerston, 22 July 1847.

Ibid.

Ibid.


**BPSP, LVII**, Hamilton to Palmerston, 20 July 1847.

**BPSP, LVII**, Abercromby to Palmerston, 22 July 1847.

**BPSP, LVII**, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 14 July 1847.

**BPSP, LVII**, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 27 July 1847.

**BPSP, LVII**, Consul-General Dawkins (Venice) to Ponsonby, 17 July 1847, 'Reinforcement of Garrison'.

**BPSP, LVII**, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 20 July 1847. See also A. Sked, *The Survival of the Habsburg Empire, Radetzky, the Imperial Army and the Class War, 1848*, (London, 1979), p.96.

**BPSP, LVII**, Consul Moore (Ancona) to Palmerston, 21 July 1847.

**BPSP, LVII**, A formal protest on the incident was also written in the *Diario di Roma* of 10 August 1847 (and read
aloud enthusiastically in the piazzas of Rome), and it was passed by Petre to Hamilton on 11 August 1847, and Hamilton sent it on to Palmerston on 13 August 1847.

77 BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 14 August 1847, The Austrian occupation in Ferrara on 13 August 1847 was reported by Hamilton in Florence to Palmerston on 17 August 1847.


79 Ibid.

80 BPSP, LVII, Normanby to Palmerston, 21 August 1847.

81 Ibid, enclosing a copy of Cardinal Luigi Ciacchi's protest on 18 August 1847.

82 BPSP, LVII, Abercromby to Palmerston, 19 August 1847, Cardinal Ferretti made an appeal to the European powers regarding Austrian intervention on 17 August 1847.

83 BPSP, LVII, Abercromby to Palmerston, 19 August 1847.

84 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Palmerston, 15 August 1847.

85 BPSP, LVII, Lord Napier (Naples) to Palmerston, 27 August 1847.

86 BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 6 July 1847.

87 BPSP, LVII, Palmerston to Ponsonby, 12 August 1847.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 British Parliamentary Sessional Paper (House of Commons), Communication for the Austrian Government as to the Territorial Arrangement and Political Condition of Italy, (BPSP), 1847-48/LXV Metternich to Palmerston, 25 August 1847:

'The first is to express the wish of the Austrian Government to know whether Her Majesty's Government admit the principle that the state of possession established in Italy by the Treaty of Vienna ought to be maintained; and it also declared the determination of the Emperor of Austria to defend his Italian territories against any attack. The second relates to a scheme which the Cabinet of Vienna supposes to be entertained by some parties in Italy, to unite the greater part of Italy in one Federal Republic;

91 BPSP, LXV Palmerston to Metternich, 21 September 1847.
'But indeed the ancient alliance and long-established confidence which unite the Government of Great Britain and of Austria, would at all events render it the duty of Her Majesty's Government to express the views and sentiments of the Government of Great Britain upon everything which is either happening or likely to happen in Italy, and which, by their bearing and importance, must necessarily be of great European interest.'

Curato, Missione Minto, Memorandum by Prince Albert, 29 August 1847, Vol.1, No.5, p.40.

Palmerston (Broadlands) Papers, University of Southampton Library, Abercromby to Palmerston, 27 August 1847.

Curato., Missione Minto, Memorandum by Prince Albert 29 August 1847, Vol.1, No.5, p.41.

Curato., Missione Minto, Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria, 31 August 1847, Vol.1, No.8, p.43.

Despatch of Lord Minto, 4 November 1847, Minto's Papers, NLS.MSS.12081.

Punch, 13 (July-December 1847), p.135, Roman Punch, Rational Liberty to Despotism, Punch to the emperor of Austria.

Punch, 13 (July-December 1847), 25 September, p.120, Given at our Office Fleet-street in our Court of St Bride's, Hieroglyphic.

Punch, 13 (July-December 1847), 25 September, p.120.

Punch, 13 (July-December 1847), p.140. Italy and Austria.

'The Pope replied that he was very much obliged to all of them, and congratulating both himself and friends around him on their present position, said he felt assured that the attitude that they were then in, was one from which they would not, under any circumstances, flinch.'

Shrewsbury to Charles Hamilton, 4 November 1847, Minto's Papers, NLS. MSS.12081.

Punch, 13 (July-December 1847), p.120.


110 Ibid, Mazzini's letter to Pius IX.


112 Curato, *Missione Minto*, memorandum by Prince Albert, 29 August 1847, 'The probability is that Lord Minto will have very little real influence, and will be made responsible for every act of a doubtful nature and of which he may have been totally ignorant...To hold communication with the See of Rome is held to be criminal by the law of England', Vol.1, No.5, p.41.


114 Ibid., p.225.

115 Ibid., p.184.

116 Ibid., p.182.

117 Ibid., p.185.


119 BPSP, LVII, Palmerston to Minto, 18 August 1847.

120 Curato., *Missione Minto*, Russell to Queen Victoria, 1 September 1847, Vol.1, No.10, p.47.

121 Ibid.

122 Curato., *Missione Minto*, Wiseman to Shrewsbury, 8 August 1847, Vol.1, No.9, p.46.


124 Ibid., p.152-3.
125. *Curato.*, Missione Minto, Palmerston to Queen Victoria, 31 August 1847, Vol.1, No.9, p.44.


127. Ibid.


130. Archivio delle Sacra Congregazione di Propaganda Fide, Rome, Wiseman to Shrewsbury, 10 September 1847.

131. Ibid.

132. Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio Segreto del Segretario di Stato, Rubrica 278, Inghilterra, 30 July 1847, Wiseman was obliged to inform the Pope about the situation of the Catholics in London to the Pope, emphasizing the expansion of the Catholic population in England.


134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.


141. *Curato.*, Missione Minto, Minto to Palmerston, 14 November 1847. Lord Minto had been able to report that the re-establishment of diplomatic relations would be favourably viewed by the Pope, so that nothing remained but to bring in a bill to authorize the Government to take the necessary steps. Vol.1, No.103, p.191.

142. Ibid. As Lord John Russell said: 'these two great Catholic Powers (France and Austria) have the means in their hands to influence the Vatican which we cannot dream of competing with.' No.103, p.192-3.
Lord Russell sent a Memorandum of Clarendon on the Irish Question to Lord Minto, 1 October 1847, Minto’s papers, NLS.MSS. 12102 ff20-9.


Shrewsbury to Minto, 20 December 1847, Minto’s papers, NLS.MSS. No.12082 ff105-114.


Ibid.

Ibid., p.321.

Ibid., p.324.

BPSP, The Crime and Outrage Bill (Ireland), 29 November 1847. Lord John Russell, whose prejudice against Irish landlords had already been made clear in the House of Commons, answered "I am not ready to bring in any restrictive law without, at the same time, restricting the power of the landlord." Woodham-Smith, The Great Hunger, p.373

Woodham-Smith., The Great Hunger, p.373.

Ibid., p.374.


Ibid.

Ibid.

There were anti-Repeal Catholic priests of the Hierarchy and pro-Repeal Catholic priests of the lower class local priesthood.


Curato, Missione Minto, Clarendon to Russell, 1 October 1847, Vol I, No 30, p.82.

Minto to Shrewsbury, 28 October 1847, Minto’s Papers, NLS. MSS. No 2102.

Waterford Chronicle, December 1847.

163 Ibid. His interference in our internal affairs unconnected with his spiritual jurisdiction. p.83.


166 Ibid, p.84.


168 Wiseman to Shrewsbury, 2 November 1847, Wiseman Papers, Ushaw College Archive, Durham.

169 Ibid.

170 Shrewsbury to Charles Hamilton, 4 November 1847, Minto's paper, NLS.MSS. No.12081 ff149-53.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.

174 Shrewsbury to Minto, 20 December 1847, Minto's Papers, NLS.MSS. 12082 ff105-114.


176 Curato, *Missione Minto*, Palmerston to Minto 29 October 1847, Vol.1, No 64, p.129


Chapter III
Britain and the 1848 revolution in Rome

Introduction
By the end of 1847 the British foreign policy towards the Papacy had a number of clear aims; to encourage further liberal reforms, to counter Austrian influence, and to win Papal approval of Britain's policy towards Ireland. All of this was to be achieved by the mission of Lord Minto; however, despite its good intentions, Britain's timing was to prove disastrous.

Not only the Papal States, but almost all of the states of the Italian peninsula were disturbed by revolutionary and nationalist movements in 1848, and the pressures these caused brought Piedmont into a war against Austria and led to the expectation that other states would also get involved. The war issue was to cause grave difficulties for the Pope, for it raised the question of whether Pius, as head of the Catholic Church as well as an Italian sovereign, could sanction a war against Austria. The issue of war with Austria was not the only problem raised by events in the Italian peninsula. In addition the political reforms introduced by most of the Italian states brought pressure on the Papacy to go beyond the measures which the Pope had already granted.

The question that faced Britain was how to deal with this changing situation and how to achieve the goals laid down in the autumn of 1847. It was not in British interests to
see revolution in Rome, nor was there a wish to see a war in Italy that might lead to an Austro-French confrontation. Therefore British policy was to encourage the Pope to pursue constitutional reform, and to attempt to force mediation of the Austrian issue. In addition, in order to show support for the Pope and to forward British interests in Ireland it was decided to push forward with the Diplomatic Bill. The problem that arose with this policy was that in the revolutionary atmosphere of the Italian peninsula it proved impossible for Britain to control the course of events.

Section I: Pius IX and the establishment of a constitution

The constitutional movement in Italy

Rome was not the first place in the Italian peninsula to experience a movement for constitutional reform. In fact Kingdom of the two Sicilies was in February 1848 the first state in Italy to adopt a constitution. The triumph of the Sicilian constitution led to the beginning of the collapse of the concert of Europe, underlining the failure of the Austrian system, which had loosely controlled the Italian peninsula since the Congress of Vienna. Once Ferdinando, King of the two Sicilies, granted a constitution, it became impossible for the Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany not to follow suit, and very difficult indeed for the King of Piedmont, Carlo Alberto.
Even before Ferdinando’s concession, political expectations within the Papal States had begun to grow, as the Pope’s lead in liberal political reform had awakened popular hopes for a constitution and encouraged the rise of radical political movements.

The Pope, however, had at first no intention of going as far as to grant a constitution; he saw the culmination of his reforms as the introduction of the Consulta di Stato on 14 October 1847. The Consulta, a consultative assembly with no legislative powers, was composed of a cardinal as president nominated by the Pope, a prelate as vice-president, and twenty-four councillors from every part of the state, all of whom had to be Papal subjects but none of whom needed to be an ecclesiastic. There was also a general secretary and a head of accounts. The creation of the twenty-four councillors was based on the Pope’s liberal ideas, and opened up the possibility for lay liberal contingents to have limited participation in the Papal government.  Pius nominated Cardinal Antonelli to be the head of this body and hoped that the Consulta would work smoothly under his leadership.  

Pius was soon to be disappointed, as the establishment of the Consulta failed to satisfy the liberals and even the councillors within the Consulta pressed for more powers. On the advice of Antonelli the Pope made a further reform; on 29 December he reorganized the Council of Ministers, which had first been established in June 1847, to allow it a greater role in the running of the state.
The Council of Ministers was a committee of the nine heads of department, the Ministers for Home Affairs, Public Instruction, Pardon and Justice, Finance, Commerce, Public Works, Arms, Police and finally the Secretary of State, but initially it had limited influence. Pius's reform was intended to give it more powers and in particular the right to discuss all vital matters of state before they were forwarded for his approval.  

The creation of the Consulta and the reform of the Council of Ministers were both given a limited welcome by the British government, which recognized them as a development of liberal politics. The idea of a Consulta had after all been one of the British recommendations contained in the reform programme of 1831. The British hopes for the future were reflected in the reports of Lord Minto, the British special envoy to the Papacy, who had arrived in Rome on 4 November 1847. On 18 November Minto noted enthusiastically to Lord John Russell, the British Prime Minister, that:

The opening of the deliberations of the Consulta di Stato here is a great political event, and if it starts well and in sufficient harmony with the government I shall feel no doubt of its success. Its members are perfectly aware of the power which it is destined to acquire, and are I believe generally disposed to await the natural and gradual growth of that
influence without aiming at direct legislative authority, at least in the present condition of Italy. 8

This was a somewhat misguided reading of the situation within the Papal States. It presumed that the Pope intended the Consulta as a body that could in time acquire more power, whereas in fact Pius saw the Consulta as having only a strictly limited role. Minto’s optimism was a reflection of his faith in the British model of evolutionary political reform and his hope that this could be applied to the Papal States. It was one of Minto’s weaknesses that he consistently believed that reforms would necessarily strengthen the governments of the Italian states. For example, he noted to Lord Napier, the British minister in Naples, on 9 December that:

I can safely say as the result of my observation from Turin to Rome, that the effect of the popular reforms slight as they are, spontaneously introduced in that great portion of Italy, has been to rally round the governments the great mass of sound and liberal opinion, and to leave the restless faction of the Young Italy in a helpless and discredited minority incapable of evil. 9

Minto had clearly underestimated the forces of revolution that were soon to break over Italy.
Minto’s optimism continued into late December when the Pope introduced his reform of the Council of Ministers. He noted to Palmerston on 28 December 1847 that it now appeared that the Pope had broken with the advice of the more reactionary elements within the Papal government and put his trust in Antonelli’s more moderate approach, and he observed that:

I am happy to say... that there is the appearance of returning confidence and of that concert and good understanding between the Government and the moderate party, which cannot be interrupted without danger. 10

Lord Minto, however, began to change his views early in 1848. He increasingly felt that the present reforms would not suffice in themselves and was critical of the Pope for his failure to do more. His doubts particularly surfaced when in January the Pope refused to allow the Consulta to make its proceedings public. On 16 January he told Palmerston that the Pope was undermining his own reforms by insisting on ’no diminution’ of his own authority. He also noted that:

... the virtuous Pope is not of sufficient calibre for his position, that is to say for the position of a Sovereign who has little also than fools and rogues to compose his government, and who chooses to be his own Prime Minister. 11
Minto still hoped that, when events revealed that the reforms did not go far enough, Pius would have the sense to realize the need to go even further. On 16 January he wrote to Lord John Russell explaining that:

I have good hope ... that a better government will be formed. The newly established Council of Ministers in which they now assemble and are seen at one view presents such a ridiculous exhibition of notorious incapacity that the Pope must see the necessity for calling a few men of sense to his aid. 12

As a result of Minto's despatches and the uncertainty about the way in which events were unfolding in the Papal States, the Foreign Office's, and subsequently the government's, interest in Roman affairs increased.

The political parties in Rome

Minto was right to be cautious about the political situation in the Papal States, as the Pope's reforms had encouraged the political groups in Rome to become more active.

Two different approaches were taken by the political groups in Rome, one constitutional, the other revolutionary. These approaches were based upon the two main political parties, the Circolo Romano, a moderate liberal party, and the Circolo Popolare, a radical revolutionary group. Both parties operated within the
Papal States and also had links with broader national political networks in Naples and Piedmont. 13

As we have discussed in Chapter One, liberal reform was thought to be crucial by the Italian moderates as well as the foreign powers. The moderate liberal circle in Italy was originally formed around a number of Piedmontese Albertists, a small but elite political group organized by Marquis Massimo d'Azeglio, Dr Pantaleoni, the Marquis Pareto, and later on General Giovanni Durando and the Marquis Cassanova. Their idea was that Carlo Alberto should become a constitutional monarch in Piedmont, and that in the Papal States Pius IX’s political reforms should be supported. They were opposed to the idea of a republic and wished to preserve the existing social order. 14 However, the greatest danger for the Pope was that they desired to make war against Austria to free the Italian peninsula from foreign occupation. The connection between the moderate political parties in Rome and Piedmont was one of the key factors in persuading the Pope to establish a constitution in 1848 and in building up the status of the Circolo Romano. 15

The Circolo Romano’s political ideas were based on Gioberti’s writings. These Giobertian Moderates, such as Francesco Orioli and Marco Minghetti, wanted to preserve the sovereign power of the Pope, but sought the introduction of a modern enlightened government under which the Pope would become a constitutional monarch; an idea which some people termed "neo-Guelfism". In their
view the first step was that the people should gain predominant power in the Papal government and that this power would be used in turn to promote a federation of the small states of Italy, which later would drive out the Austrians. 16

There was also a radical and revolutionary group in the Papal States which had existed since the Mazzinian revolutions of 1831. Although some Mazzinians, such as Farini, became moderate liberals, there were still a number of revolutionaries, in particular those who had been released from prison or had returned to the Papal States after the 1846 amnesty by Pius IX. These included figures such as Prince Canino (Napoleon’s nephew), his secretary Dr Luigi Masi, Dr Sterbini and Angelo Brunetti, better known as Ciceruacchio. The most popular of these radicals was Ciceruacchio, a faithful Mazzinian and a working class hero in the Trastevere, who used his popularity to become one of the leaders of the Circolo Popolare. The radicals were federalists and believed in the ‘democratic universal republic’ of Mazzini. They sought to achieve this goal through encouraging street demonstrations until finally a popular armed up rising took place, which would, of course, mean the abolition of Papal temporal power. 17 They were, however, sometimes prepared to compromise, and during the early period of Papal liberal reforms they had believed that if Pius was successful as a liberal Pope, he might be able to save the Papal States.
1848 opened in Rome with widespread political demonstrations by the Circolo Romano as they pressed the Pope to make more meaningful political reforms. At this stage it was this more moderate group among the Roman political parties which had the greatest influence. 18 The existence of more radical parties such as Circolo Popolare was, however, significant, making a sharp contrast with the ultra-conservative ecclesiastical rulers. These extreme political contrasts, the radical and ultra-conservative, attracted Britain's attention to Rome, 19 because the government considered that the Roman people's dissatisfaction with ecclesiastical maladministration could be a major cause of insurrections provoked by the radical political parties.

The Romagna was, in fact, already a hotbed of political discontent and insurrection within the Papal States; especially in Bologna politically motivated crimes took place frequently and heightened political tensions. 20 Within Rome too the political atmosphere was becoming tense. Increasingly agitators organized by representatives of the Civic Guard and Deputies of the provinces in the Papal States demanded greater secularization of the Council of the State. 21 Their agitation threatened order in the city of Rome. On 13 January Minto wrote a report to Palmerston on the demonstrations which had taken place over the new year, noting that:
... it has been observed that a good deal of active agitation of the ultra-Liberals on foot among the lowest classes; that many strangers had joined them; and the suspicion of some early attempt to get up insurrectionary movements has lately prevailed amongst the well-informed. 22

In particular Ciceruacchio emerged as the leading orator of the revolutionary cause and pressed persistently for additional political changes in Rome. 23 Minto's initial impression of Ciceruacchio was surprisingly positive. On 19 November in a letter to the Marquis of Lansdowne, Lord President of the Council, (the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), he noted that:

... in Rome and its neighbourhood Ciceruacchio exercises his extraordinary influence with the populace in aid of Pio Nono and for the maintenance of order. This man of the class of small tradesman has established his unbounded authority with the people, whom he directs or controls as he pleases. He is consulted, and applied to for assistance, by the Pope, and by the patriots, and with all this he has no object of personal interest or ambition of his own in view, but clings to his humble station and business, though he stands second only to Pio Nono in authority at Rome. I wish we had such a man in Tuscany ... . 24
Ciceruacchio's high profile meant that he frequently became a subject of criticism in the English press, such as the Westminster Review and other journals. A conservative periodical such as the Quarterly Review emphasized his humble origins.

This man in the dress of a peasant and with shirt-sleeves turned over his elbow, was admitted to the conciliabulum of the clerical and political conspirator, and even to the table of the luscious noble. 25

On the other hand, an English traveller named Alexander Baillie Cochrane, stressed Ciceruacchio's popularity, and wrote of the following incident on 1 January 1848 when the Pope ventured out of the Quirinal Palace:

He [Ciceruacchio] jumped up behind the Pope's carriage, unfolded a scroll, on which was written, in large letters, "Have courage holy father! the people are with you!" and amid the discordant yells, the wild enthusiasm, the licentious expression, which greeted this triumphant insolence of Ciceruacchio, the Pope fainted. 26

He also noted that "the next morning the republican papers said he fainted for joy!!" 27

While disapproving of the Circolo Popolare's activities, the British government on the other hand approved of the
Circolo Romano's political support for the Pope's liberal policy. 28 Lord Minto made it a part of his mission to associate with the moderate liberal faction. On 15 January he expressed to Palmerston, while discussing another issue, his opinion of the moderates noting that the Circolo Romano was 'a political society exercising great influence here and having amongst its members those who hold the highest station in rank or talent.' 29

Minto had thus noticed that the Circolo Romano was beginning to influence the political agenda. This influence was to grow in the early months of 1848 as the issue of a constitution began to appear on the horizon.

The establishment of the Papal Constitution

The political events in the Papal States were not happening in isolation, for much of the Italian peninsula was in crisis. The most dramatic events were taking place in Naples where a popular movement was demanding a new constitution. These demands automatically raised the question of how soon the Pope would be faced with a similar situation and how he would react.

Minto raised the issue of the agitations in Naples with Pius IX on 23 January. When Minto stated his opinion that King Ferdinand should grant a constitution to Sicily but only introduce liberal reforms in Naples, the Pope expressed his agreement and told Minto that:
... he entirely agreed with me, that a constitution erected at Naples would agitate the whole of Italy; but that Sicily having already been in the enjoyment of a representative government, and having a claim of right to urge for it, might receive her insular constitution, with less danger of excitement in the continental states; that the constitution in Sicily, beside, seemed inevitable, and what remained for them therefore, was to endeavour to place the Neapolitan institutions as nearly as might be in harmony with those of adjoining states.  

The Pope’s hope that the granting of a constitution would be limited to Sicily was soon dashed. On 7 February Ferdinand gave way to the people’s demands and promulgated a constitution for the Kingdom of Naples.

The British government on the whole welcomed the constitution in Naples as a positive development, which widened the possibility of the establishment of a constitution in Rome and the other Italian states.  

On 3 February Palmerston expressed his opinion to Minto that:

If it was not for the fear of Austrian interference I should say the sooner they all get constitutions the better; and I have no doubt that in many of the Italian states very
fit men would be found for members of
Legislatures and for constitutional Ministers. 32

The British public, however, unconditionally applauded
the constitutional revolution in Naples as well as later
on the revolution in Milan. The Northern Star, the
Chartist newspaper, on 12 February rejoiced at the news
of the revolution in Naples and Palermo:

..You can have no idea of the joy and
excitement threatened here. People go out for
miles to meet the courier on the Via Appia and
extraordinary supplements are issued hourly by
the newspapers. The grand feature of this
outburst is the possession of artillery on the
side of the patriots, over forty or fifty
pieces of ordnance having been secured by their
leaders, and they made prisoners in the onset
of over one hundred artillery men whom they
have put to work their guns. Long live the
Civic Guard, Long live the Pope, Long live the
men of Palermo. 33

Punch expressed a similar reaction to the revolution in
Milan and Naples.

We had very nearly pitched the whole of
Lombardy to the dustmen, and thrown Naples into
the hands of the buttermen by another sweeping
arrangement: but the accumulation of Revolution
is really so rapid, that we have no time to
English radicals displayed real excitement at the revolutions that followed in France, Germany, Milan and Venice, and their expectation and hope was that Rome would have a revolution as had happened in France. This revealed that the enthusiasm for Pius among the British public was likely to be conditional on his continued willingness to advance the cause of reform.

As might be expected the granting of the Neapolitan constitution on 7 February was followed swiftly by similar reforms in other Italian states. On 9 February Charles Albert announced his intention to introduce a constitution in Sardinia-Piedmont on the model of Louis-Philippe and on 5 March it was proclaimed. In Tuscany the Grand Duke Leopold II promised a Constitution which was duly granted on 17 February. This left the question of how the Pope would react.

It was clear that the constitutional revolution in Sicily would have a tremendous influence upon the Papal States, inspiring the people’s enthusiasm for a constitution and presenting the Pope with a choice between granting the people’s wishes or facing the possibility of revolution. To Palmerston, the solution was obvious, and on 12 February he advised Minto, who was now in Naples, to inform the Papal minister there:
That it is better for a government to frame its measures of improvement with timely deliberation, and grant them with the grace of spontaneous concession, than to be compelled to adopt on the sudden changes, perhaps insufficiently matured, and which being extorted by the pressure of imperious circumstances, invert the natural order of things, and being somewhat of the nature of capitulation of the Sovereign to the subject, may not always be a sure foundation for permanent harmony between the Crown and the people. 36

This comment encapsulated the British view that political evolution was the best means to achieve reform and avoid revolution. However, at this time the British style of political development was not applicable to the Papal States, as events in Rome were moving too fast for 'timely deliberation'.

Even as Palmerston was writing this letter to Minto, the political map of Rome was changing. Already in January the situation in Rome had become more tense due to the fear of the possibility of an Austrian expedition to quell the revolution in Sicily. Despite the Austrian withdrawal from Ferrara in December 1847, anti-Austrian sentiment remained high, and when there was renewed concern about Austrian intentions pressure mounted for the reform of the Papal army. The Circolo Romano lobbied
the Consulta to persuade the Pope to reinforce the army, but the Council of Ministers in its new role rejected this proposal. 37

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in Rome the people were extremely frustrated when the idea of military reform, which was supported by the Consulta, was rejected by the Ministers. The people realized that clerical influence was behind the Council’s decision. On 9 February Petre informed Hamilton that:

On the rumour spreading abroad that the council of Ministers did not intend to pay any attention to these proposals, crowds of people began to assemble yesterday, calling out for the arming of the reserve of the Civic Guard,—that is, of servants, daily labourers, journeymen, &c. "Down with the Ministers!" "No more priests!" "No more moderation!" and the like. After much noise and declamation, it was resolved that a certain number should proceed to the residence of Prince Corsini, the Senator, and request him to represent the wants and wishes of the Romans to His Holiness. 38

The Roman people’s eagerness to see military reforms was combined with their strong hostility to ecclesiastical government, and their desire to obtain a constitution. The ecclesiastical domination of politics had the reputation for causing tremendous corruption and
misgovernment, bringing social and economic backwardness to the Papal States. Now the people’s hostility against the clerical ministers was increasingly exacerbated.

The Roman people’s demand for further concessions by the Pope was organized by the Circolo Popolare’s leaders. Ciceruacchio, supported by the dissatisfied elements among the people, persuaded Senator Corsini to press the Pope to authorize military reforms and accept more secular members in his government. Petre informed Hamilton that:

Before night-fall, thousands in regular order, and amongst them hundreds of civic guards, not in uniform, but wearing their military greatcoats, began to collect on their way to the Piazza del Popolo, where they said they would await the answer of His Holiness, to be delivered to them by the Senator. Ciceruacchio here told them that if the answers were unfavourable, they must take the affair into their own hands. 40

In order to pacify the hostility of the people towards the Papacy, Pius promised Corsini that he would consider further reforms. Corsini then reported this to the waiting crowd. Petre noted:

He was received with a very boisterous enthusiasm by the impatient crowd; and
immediately announced that His Holiness had already resolved on the secularizing of the greater part of the Ministerial and other offices; that it was, his intention to invite to Rome some Italian officers of distinction; and that he would propose treaties of defence with other Italian States. 41

On 10 February Pius fulfilled his promise and issued a declaration stating his support for military reform, his acceptance of introducing more lay persons into the Council of Ministers, and made an ambiguous comment about his support for the Italian cause. His call for 'God to bless Italy' has been a matter of debate ever since, some observers believing that the Pope had given his benediction to the cause of Italian nationalism, but it needs to be understood that his wording was very careful.42 It is important to see that when he discussed the condition of Italy he stated that one of the greatest benefits for Italy was that it had at its core the Papacy, which meant that at times of trouble Italy could look for its defence not only to the Italian people but to Catholics world-wide. 43 He observed in his proclamation:

A great gift of heaven is this amongst the many by which it has favoured Italy; that hardly three millions of our subjects should have two hundred millions of brothers of every nation and of every language. This was in far other
times, and in the overthrow of the whole Roman world, the safety of Rome. For this the ruin of Italy was never total. 

In other words the Pope's rhetoric was designed primarily to emphasize the importance of Papal temporal and spiritual power to Italy and to defend his own authority.

On 11 February the Pope, in front of a large crowd in the Piazza Quirinal, gave a vague hint that he might be willing to consider further constitutional reform. The next day he reformed his government by allowing three lay ministers to take positions within the administration. Advocate Sterbinetti was made the Minister of Public Works, Count Pasolini, the Deputy of Ravenna, was made the Minister of Commerce and, Don Michelangelo Gaetani, Prince of Teano, was made the Minister of the Police.

There is a controversy about whether the Pope made these concessions as part of his liberal policy, or whether he was forced to do so. Berkeley considers that Pius's liberal programme had already ended at the end of 1847, and that therefore the further concessions he made in 1848 were due to the pressure of events and the increasing agitation in Rome. Coppa, however, paints a picture in which it seems that the Pope and Antonelli still held some of the political initiative. Martina goes even further and thinks that the Pope's secularisation of the ministers was a genuine part of his
reform process, because he was deeply influenced by Gioberti and liberal Catholicism. 48

The view of the British government at the time very much supports Berkeley’s interpretation. There seems to have been little belief in British circles that the Pope was in control of events, although it was felt that he might be wise enough to make sufficient reforms to avoid revolution. Minto, who had now moved on to Naples, noted to Palmerston on 19 February that:

I am very sorry to be absent from Rome at this moment as the Pope stands in need of good advice but my information on the whole leads me to think that enough would be done by him (and that is not a little) to secularize and liberalize the constitution of his government sufficiently to satisfy the country. 49

On 24 February Palmerston observed to Minto his fear that the Pope was now out of his depth and wrote that:

As to the poor Pope I live in daily dread of hearing of some misadventure having befallen him. Events have gone too fast for such a slow sailor as he is. I only hope he will not be swamped by the swell in the wake of those who have out stripped him, for this would perhaps bring the Austrians into the Roman states and then we should have a regular European row. 50
It is interesting to note that once again Palmerston mentioned his fear that the situation in Rome might lead to a European war.

A detailed study of the events of early February would support the conclusion that the Pope's actions were not his own reforms but were in reality the accomplishment of Ciceruacchio and his Circolo Popolare. Certainly Petre felt that the demonstration of 8 February was the most threatening that had yet taken place. However, it does seem that following this agitation the Pope and Antonelli decided in mid-February that it was necessary to seize back the initiative by convening a commission of Cardinals to consider a constitution. Coppa notes that the constitution that followed was largely the work of Antonelli and that he considered that such a step was essential if revolution were to be avoided.

The constitution was finally introduced in March. On 6 March Senator Corsini had an audience with the Pope and asked for the establishment of a representative government in the Papal States. Pius IX accepted this demand, and ordered that all Papal Ministers should resign and that a new administration should be formed to oversee the promulgation of the constitution. On 10 March Pius appointed Antonelli as the Secretary of State and thus became President of the Council of Ministers and the head of the new government. This was a significant choice. It indicated that Pius realized that he needed safeguards to protect his position while at the
same time satisfying the Roman people’s request. He therefore sought security by appointing a new government which contained both ministers whom he could trust and ministers who were popular among the Roman people. He believed that Cardinal Antonelli, whose political skills and loyalty to himself were beyond doubt, was vital to the administration. Under Antonelli a ministry was formed of seven laymen and three clergymen. Moderate lay figures took over many of the posts in the government: Gaetano Recchi was selected as Minister of the Interior; Luigi Carlo Farini, Deputy Minister of the Interior; Marco Mingetti, Minister of Public Works; and Giuseppe Pasolini, Minister of Commerce. In addition, Prince Aldobrandini was named Minister of War, Giuseppe Galletti, Minister of Police; Francesco Sterbinetti, Minister of Justice; Cardinal Mezzofanti, Minister of Public Instructions; and Monsignor Luigi Morichini, Minister of Finance. Following this on 14 March the constitution was officially promulgated.

The Pope had thus made a careful choice; he had reinforced his own authority by appointing Antonelli, but at the same time had gone some way to satisfy the people by raising the number of secular ministers from three to seven. There was, however, a danger in this for the process of expanding the liberal parties’ power inside the Papal government led to increasing danger for the Papal authority.
Section II: The Roman Constitution and the crisis of ecclesiastical power

It might seem at first sight that the constitution was intended as a genuinely liberal gesture which was designed to open a new chapter in the history of the Papal States. To an extent this was the initial impression given to both the Roman people and to the British government. However, it was not long before the Roman people and the British government realized its limitations.

To assess the Pope’s intentions in introducing the constitution it is necessary to look at its terms. The new constitution was a carefully contrived document which was formulated in such a way as to protect much of the Pope’s power.

In a preamble to the constitution, the Pope declared that he had abandoned his first idea of a consultative chamber and, like neighbouring sovereigns, wished to grant a meaningful legislature. Under the new constitution, there were to be two Chambers, beside the College of Cardinals: a High Council, whose members were to be nominated by the Pope for life, and a Chamber of Deputies with one deputy for every thirty thousand people. The franchise was strictly limited to those with wealth or in the professions. Under this system, the College of Cardinals was to be constituted as a Senate inseparable
from the Pope, and would continue to advise him on ecclesiastical matters. The two deliberative councils were established to pass laws and deal with secular affairs, such as budgetary issues and treaties of commerce. They were, however, prohibited from discussing any issue which encroached upon the Pope's spiritual power. Article XXXVI of the constitution stated that 'the councils can never propose any law, 1. which regards ecclesiastical or mixed affairs, 2. which is contrary to the canons or the discipline of the church, 3. which tends to vary or modify the present statute'. In addition, Article XXXVIII stated 'All discussions on the foreign diplomatico-religious relations of the Holy See are prohibited in the two Councils.' In regard to "mixed matter" the Councils would be consulted but were not allowed to propose legislation.

In Rome the people's reaction towards the new constitution was rather critical because of these safeguards for the Pope and the restrictions binding the secular ministers. These various safeguards were clearly designed to prevent the Pope's concessions over his temporal power from affecting his position as head of the Church, and were thus a strong matter of contention which in time would lead to major confrontation between the people and the Pope. The liberal parties were also upset that under the constitution political rights were given only to the Catholics and that complete freedom of religion was not allowed. In short, the new constitution
failed to satisfy those who wanted to see the Papal States become a constitutional monarchy. 60

There was even a suspicion among the liberals in Rome that the new Chamber of Deputies would remain very exclusive, and would be dominated by ecclesiastical interests. Petre observed to Hamilton on 22 March 1848:

The constitution which was well received at first, has since been dissected at the clubs, its defects exposed, and now the people demand modification particularly of the article 36. 61

Petre did not, however, envisage that Roman disappointment would necessarily lead to renewed agitation, for as he noted to Hamilton on 20 March 'the Romans are not so wild as the French and if the Pope knows how to manage them we may go on quietly for a while.' 62

Just as the Roman people could see the problems with the constitution, its limitations were also apparent after some reflection to some of the British representatives in Italy. Minto, on hearing that the Pope had proclaimed a constitution, was initially enthusiastic. He noted to Palmerston on 21 March that:

I am very glad to see that the Pope has at length announced his Constitution. I have not had time to read it today but I hear it is well taken at Rome; so that we may begin to cry Viva
Pio IX again, which was rather getting out of fashion. 63

However, when Minto travelled to Rome in mid-April for his last meeting with the Pope his enthusiasm was blunted. He found that the Pope was struggling to defend his authority and was opposed to anything which might threaten his spiritual power. Minto noted to Palmerston on 13 April that:

... the Pope, ... himself attaches wonderfully little value to his temporal sovereignty, except as it may serve his spiritual supremacy. He is pleased and flattered by the extraordinary personal influence he has acquired by the collection of the Papal authority in his hands which is with him an object of religious solicitude - And it is his desire to be recognized as supreme head of the catholic church and not as sovereign - that is at the bottom of all the difficulties he now makes. 64

Although the Pope could not separate his temporal power from his independence as head of the Church, the British Government did not sympathize with the distinction that Pius was keen to make between the position of the Pope, who was both a sovereign and a religious leader, and other temporal princes. Minto had already indicated in an earlier conversation with Pius on 23 January that ‘the separate interest of the Church’ should not interfere with civil administration or ‘good government’. 65 Minto had on this occasion told the Pope that in Britain:
Ecclesiastical affairs are conducted by ecclesiastics, and if the Queen interferes with them ..., it is only as head of the Church. Why should not same separation exist here, the Pope retaining his position as Head of the State? 66

Pius's protection of his own powers suggested, however, that he had not followed Minto's advice and that he still put the interests of the Church before the state.

Section III: Pressure on the Pope for War against Austria

The establishment of a constitution in the Papal States coincided with dramatic events elsewhere. On 13 March revolution had broken out in Vienna, and this was followed on 18 March by the insurrection in Milan and then by the revolt in Venice on 22 March. On 24 March encouraged by this revolutionary atmosphere, Carlo Alberto declared war against the Austrian Empire. Against this background the constitution in Rome had implications on both the international and domestic levels. On the international level, Pius's granting of a constitution meant that the Pope himself posed a challenge to Austrian absolutism, and it was believed by many that he would now be willing to be the leader of an Italian Federation in a war against Austria. On the domestic level, the constitution raised the important issue of whether the Pope would be able to declare war against Austria or not. This issue was over the coming months to divide the Papal
government; the High Councils which consisted of ecclesiastical ministers, consistently set its face against the war, while the Council of Deputies, which consisted of secular ministers, enthusiastically supported the idea. 67

As noted above, the political situation within the Papal States had already been influenced by the rise of anti-Austrian sentiment, and Pius had hired some Piedmontese officers to lead the army. In addition, events in the early months of 1848 had led to the revival of an idea for an Italian League or Federation formed from Tuscany, Piedmont, the Papal States and Naples. As early as 3 November 1847, the first three of these states had agreed to a Customs Union but in early March attention began to be focused on a defensive alliance, which would also include Naples. However, the Piedmontese declaration of war against Austria changed the nature of the debate, as it meant that if the Pope now agreed to the Federation it would automatically lead him into conflict with Austria.68

After the victory of Piedmont against Austria at Goito on 8 April, the political movement for independence from Austria gathered force in every Italian state, particularly in the cities of Milan and Venice. 69 Britain’s expectation was that Rome and Tuscany would probably participate in the war against Austria which had already been launched by the Piedmontese. However, for the Pope to wage war against Austria was not as simple as
Britain believed. Although there was now more unity among the states for completing the Italian League, it was difficult for Pius to provide military assistance to Carlo Alberto, despite the fact that his ministers pressed him to declare war, as did the Piedmontese officers who controlled the army. On 23 March one of these officers, General Giovanni Durando, was appointed supreme commander; although Pius did not entirely approve of him, Durando was supported by his Piemontesi albertini colleagues in Rome and the Circolo Romano. 70

The issue of the Pope’s participation in the war against Austria was complicated by the existence of the moderate liberal group in Rome, which had a direct link to the pro-war faction in Piedmont. 71 As mentioned above, the political activities of parties like the Circolo Romano and the Circolo Popolare, were aimed at the achievement of Italian independence from foreign domination as well as the dissemination of liberal ideals in the Italian peninsula. These groups were concentrated in Rome but were connected with similar factions throughout Italy. Therefore, the Piedmontese had no doubt that the Pope could be persuaded to participate in the war against Austria and collaborate with Piedmont. 72 In order to pursue a successful war against Austria, the Piedmontese needed Roman military forces and the Pope’s support as a spiritual leader.

The Pope was thus faced with a terrible dilemma. On 27 March Petre informed Hamilton that in his opinion:
The "Die" is cast. His Holiness will be called upon to proceed with energy in giving his countenance and assistance to the "crusade" if he does not the very existence of the government will be placed in great jeopardy. 73

The outcome of the war policy clearly depended upon Pius: if he tried to halt the army, there would be revolution in Rome, but, if he proclaimed war he might encourage revolution among his Catholic subjects throughout most of Italy: as a temporal ruler sympathetic to an independent Italy the Pope would seem to welcome the outbreak of a war against Austria; on the other hand, as head of the universal church he could not forget that his first responsibility was to defend its independence and preserve intact the powers of the Pontiff. He also could not ignore the fact that Austria itself was a Catholic country. For religious reasons, he hesitated to implicate himself in a war which the Piedmontese had initiated and whose course they largely controlled.

Matters came to a head when on 22 April Durando actually crossed the frontier of Lombardy. Seven days later, on 29 April 1848, Pius issued his famous Allocution, which stated that he could not declare war against the Austrians. This came as a crushing blow to people throughout Italy who considered that a war against Austria, without the Pope’s approval, was not practical. His Allocution seemed to demonstrate that the Pope’s
major concern was to secure the unity of the Catholic Church. 74

There is some controversy surrounding the Pope's refusal to sanction the war. Coppa has argued that the Pope was more enthusiastic for the Austrians to leave Italy in 1848 than is usually realized, 75 even though he would not countenance the idea that he might himself go to war with Austria. Martina argues that the Pope was in a dilemma, 76 but still wanted to remain the Italian liberal national leader. The year 1848 was one of nationalist enthusiasm among Italians and that raised serious problems for the heads of the various Italian states. The attitude of the majority of Italian rulers was ambiguous and dependent upon the degree to which they - the Pope, the King of Naples and the Grand Duke of Tuscany - were in the grip of revolutionary forces, or, as in the case of Charles Albert, feared a revolution. 77

It is generally understood that the British government did not want a general war between Austria and the Italian states, as they feared that French intervention might lead to a wider European conflict and wanted to keep a strong Austria as the pivot of the balance of power in Europe. 78 To this end, Palmerston hoped that the Austrians would accept their defeat in Lombardy and Venice and withdraw from Italian territory. 79 This would avoid the possibility of France's entry and would allow Austria to remain as a great power. On 28 March

Palmerston observed to Minto that:
I consider the destiny of Lombardy and Venice as decided. Northern Italy will henceforward be Italian and the Austrian frontier will be at the Tyrol. This will be no real loss to Austria. If North Italy had been well affected, if would have been an element of strength; discontented as it was, it has proved a source of weakness. 80

His hope for Italy was that a commercial and political confederation could be formed similar to that which existed in Germany. 81

However, the Pope’s Allocution threatened this policy as it seemed to abort the development of the Italian nationalist movement and risked provoking the people’s anger thus creating the danger of further destabilizing revolutions. This was certainly the opinion of Ralph Abercromby, the British Minister in Turin, who warned Palmerston on 4 May that:

This event is of great importance; it deals a heavy blow at the unity of the Italian cause, and seriously endangers its ultimate success. It is to be feared that His Holiness will persevere in the opinion he has promulgated, and if so, there is great risk that in the convulsion that will be produced, the temporal as well as ecclesiastical power of the Pope will be overthrown. 82
As Britain feared and anticipated, Pius's Allocution provoked a number of insurrections and disturbances by the radical political factions in the city of Rome, increasing the tension between the war party and the Pope. The power of the clubs and political societies, which were eager for a conflict with Austria, from this point increased both outside and within the Roman government. In particular the radical Circolo Popolare, which had exercised significant pressure on the Pope to grant liberal political concessions ever since the beginning of 1848, grew even further in importance and revolutionary fervour.

The political chaos that resulted from the Allocution was first reported by Petre when he wrote to Hamilton on 29 April that:

How all this is to finish I know not. In the clubs, many of the leading members talk still more openly than hitherto, of the necessity of appointing a Provisional Government to carry on the war. The Civic Guard, who have lately shown a better spirit in the maintenance of public order, that is, when they think that their own properties are more immediately in danger, are much divided on what they deem mere political questions; and I doubt the firmness and resolution of any authority in Rome to resist or to attempt to resist the schemes of the
clubs; I doubt the efficiency of these Guards; I doubt their standing by their Sovereign. 83

In fact throughout the three days following the Allocution, Rome was in a state of great agitation, and the Papacy only just succeeded in avoiding a revolution. The slide towards chaos began when the Antonelli ministry resigned, observing that, given the public mood and agitation produced by the Pope’s Allocution, it could no longer be responsible for maintaining public order. As Petre noted to Hamilton on 4 May:

The sudden resignation of the Ministers, who had indeed only resumed office provisionally, but still with the hopes that they would be permanently re-established, was owing to the crisis and threats of the leaders of the clubs against any further continuation of ecclesiastics in the Government. Cardinal Antonelli resigned, and as his colleagues would not yield to the clamour, they equally signified their resolution of retiring with their chief. 84

The resignation of Antonelli was important in a number of ways. One significant fact was that as Antonelli was the head of the ecclesiastical ministers, his resignation discouraged other ecclesiastics from taking office, and indeed, as Coppa notes, many Cardinals now fled from Rome. 85
Additionally, the fall of the Antonelli ministry had the effect of exacerbating the tensions that already existed in Rome following the Pope’s Allocution. The people’s anger began to rise dangerously, threatening the security of Rome.

On 1 May a meeting was held at the Palazzo Teodoli by the Circolo Popolare, which called for the creation of a provisional government and for the Pope to be deposed. The following day the Circolo Popolare’s campaign peaked, when it and the Civic Guards, under the general leadership of Ciceruacchio, took militant action together. The whole city was caught up in revolutionary violence, and the Civic Guard was turned into a political body in order to establish a provisional government. Now the Circolo Popolare was not a potential, but a real revolutionary threat. The fear of a revolution was expressed by Petre to Sir George Hamilton on 2 May:

The cardinals were watched and guarded in their houses, and some were not permitted to proceed to the Palace, when sent for by his holiness. Those who were were hosted by the populace. The Romans affixed notices early this morning on many church doors. They referred to his late allocution, and called upon his unguarded subjects to return to their duty but they were soon torn down. 86
An extraordinary situation had now been reached; the Cardinals were virtually hostages of the Civic Guard and the Circolo Popolare, who threatened to exert their influence over the secular and the ecclesiastical ministers. The Circolo Popolare appeared to have power within its sights, and it was clear that the result of its leaders' seizure of power would be for the Pope to be relegated to be a mere Bishop of Rome. Sterbini demanded a government without Cardinals as ministers, the consequence of which would be an erosion of the Pope's power.

The only means by which revolution could now be avoided was for the Pope to reach an accommodation with the Circolo Romano, which still adhered to its original position of advising the Pope to enter the war. In fact the Circolo Romano on 1 May presented the Pope with its own petition which merely asked Pius IX to enter the war against Austria. This position was due to the influence of Count Terenzio Mamiani, who had emerged as one of the leaders of the moderate faction. The Pope finally realized that he had little alternative but to invite Mamiani to form a ministry and accepted his terms, which were that the policy concerning Italian unification should continue and that the Foreign Office should be divided into two parts in order that secular and ecclesiastical affairs could be dealt with separately, the latter remaining in the hands of the Cardinals. On 4 May Mamiani formed a new ministry.
The crisis in Rome was a matter of great concern to the local British representatives. On 1 May Freeborn reported to Lord Napier, the Chargé d’Affaires in Naples, that Rome was in 'a most serious and alarming state' and concluded that 'The Pope’s temporal power is gone'. Napier forwarded this letter to Admiral Sir William Parker, the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, and added that he had heard rumours that the Pope intended to abdicate and had asked for sanctuary in Naples. Parker was disturbed by this news and on his own initiative ordered HMS Sidon to proceed to Civita Vecchia where it was, if the Pope should flee Rome, 'to receive under the protection of the British Flag His Holiness the Pope and entertain him with that respect due to his exalted office'. Although this gesture in the end was not needed, it was significant that the British government's usual hospitality towards exiled monarchs was extended to the Pope. This would be the first in a series of politically motivated visits by British ships to Civita Vecchia during 1848.

With the ending of the political crisis in Rome, Mamiani agreed to take office as War Minister and Minister of the Interior and most of the other ministries were also filled by laymen, although the government was nominally led by Cardinal Altieri. Petre informed Hamilton on 8 May:
You will observe that in spite of the cry of the clubs against ecclesiastics, which broke up the late Ministry, the president of the council is a Cardinal, but that contrary to the Moto-Proprio of the 31st of last December, as reported in the despatch of that date, the Minister for Foreign Affairs is a layman, and the secular will be separated from ecclesiastical affairs. It is probable that the president for the interim of the Council of Ministers, Cardinal Orioli, will be named for Ecclesiastical Affairs. 89

Apart from the Foreign Office, the Papal ministries were occupied by lay members; Giovanni Marchetti assumed the Ministry of secular Foreign Affairs and Guiseppe Galetti remained as Minister of Police. 90

The ultra-liberal nature of these new appointments brought the Pope’s temporal power into question. On the surface it appeared that Pius and Mamiani might work in harmony to establish a new government in Rome. However, a huge contradiction had already been created by the Pope and Mamiani, whose political ideas were profoundly different, and the new government came increasingly under Mamiani’s control. The political power of the College of Cardinals was now under severe attack. Previously, the Pope’s approval had been necessary to conduct any political proceeding under the name of his sovereignty.
However, the new administration formed by political parties and clubs, tended to act without the Pope's consent. The Civic Guard was clearly out of the Pope's control. The truth was that the Pope had lost control of his ministers in the Assembly. From here on Pius appeared to be a constitutional monarch, but it is worth noting that while he had lost much of his temporal power his spiritual power remained intact.

Pius was supported in his desire to retain his power by a number of loyal followers, of whom the most important was Cardinal Antonelli. As Coppa argues in his recent book, *Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli*, after Antonelli's resignation Pius still consulted the Cardinal, who was appointed to head the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs. Although no longer part of the Government, Antonelli remained in the confidence of Pius. Coppa emphasizes that 'unexpectedly, Antonelli's position as private counsellor made him more powerful than he had been while head of constitutional ministry'. 91 Coppa supports this view by stating that it seems that it was Antonelli's suggestion that Mamiani replace him as effective head of the Papal government on 3 May 1848.

Antonelli also played a significant role in encouraging Pius to write on 3 May 1848 to the Austrian Emperor calling upon him to recognize the national existence of the Italian people and proposing that the Papacy mediate a peace between Austria and Sardinia. 92 According to Antonelli, the fact that the Pope found it difficult to
participate in the war did not mean that Pius opposed Italian aspirations. He noted that the Pope had called upon Austria to give up its domination over northern Italy, which was based ultimately on force. But the Pope could not support a lay minister who was eager to fight Austria.

On reporting the Pope’s mediation plan to Hamilton, Petre observed that it was his belief that Pius intended to negotiate with the Austrian Emperor in order to persuade Austria to withdraw from northern Italy. However, this move did little to appease the Italian people.

The British government was not convinced that the Pope’s mediation would work. Abercromby’s opinion was that the political division between Pius and ‘the Roman people’ was now so easily recognizable that the Pope could not act as a serious mediator. Even if the Pope tried to act as a neutral channel, the problem was that he could not control the military activities of the Papal States. Indeed, the situation in Rome was so bad that in late May Count Lützow, the Austrian ambassador, decided to leave and was given passage on the British ship, HMS Locust.

As the British government believed that the Pope could not succeed in its efforts to mediate, Palmerston decided that it was necessary for Britain to take this role upon itself. This was particularly important as by early May the Foreign Secretary had evidence that French troops were massing along the Alps.
Section IV: The Mamiani Administration

Relations between Pius and the lay ministry were strained by the failure of the Pope’s mediation with Austria, while the lay ministry still pursued a policy of war against Austria and rejected Pius’s view that Italian unity could not be achieved through war. In addition, disagreements over the role of the Civic Guard increased tension in Rome. Pius’s position was becoming increasingly untenable.

On taking office, Mamiani had insisted on nominating a lay foreign minister for secular affairs, in addition to the usual ecclesiastical foreign minister, who at that period was to be Cardinal Soglia. Pius opposed the idea that any authority over foreign policy should be transferred to the lay foreign minister, as he was afraid the latter might involve him in war. He was also against any transfer because, in reality, the whole of the Pontifical diplomatic service, the Nuncio, consisted of cardinals or other churchmen, and nearly all its business was related to ecclesiastical matters. The Catholic Powers could not accept that the Nuncio would be taken over by the lay officials of the Papal State, officials who would have to deal with the accredited representatives of the Catholic Church all over the world.

In addition, the deep divide between Pius and Mamiani over the function and influence of the High Council
(ecclesiastical ministers) was soon revealed, and the conflict between secular and ecclesiastical powers created confusion in Rome. Throughout the whole of the Papal States, there was a breakdown of authority and a rise in crimes of every sort. There was clearly a need for strong leadership.

On 5 June, the day of the opening of the first parliament, the confrontation between Mamiani and the Pope came to the fore after Cardinal Altieri, who had been sent as the Pope's representative, gave a speech to open the parliament which made no mention of the government's intentions or programme. Mamiani reacted to this by drawing up his own speech, and with the Pope's reluctant approval, he delivered this to the parliament on 9 June. In his speech he referred to the Pope's proper position in regard to the Italian cause as being that of a mediator, but at the same time, as Hamilton noted to Palmerston on 14 June, Mamiani

... made a speech to the Deputies about the nationality and the independence of Italy, and the justice and right of carrying on the war as long as a stranger shall occupy any portion of the Italian soil.

This passage in his speech certainly did not reflect the view of the Pope. In fact it seemed that the programme of Italian independence, which was a justification for war, was being advanced in the Pope's name but without the
Pope's approval. In parliament Sterbini and Canino, the leaders of the Circolo Popolare, emerged as the leading critics of Mamiani's ambivalent policy. In their address to Pius, which was read to the Pope on 10 July, they demanded that the constitution should be changed, that the war should be pursued, and that the Civic Guard should become the bulwark of the regime. In addition, the Deputies levelled a complaint against the conduct of the ecclesiastical Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Rebutting the charges, the Pope dwelt in his reply to the Deputies on 10 July upon the authority of the Pontiff and his ecclesiastical ministers, and launched a strong defence of his own position. He also protested against the destruction of Papal authority by political parties.

This speech clearly demonstrated that conflict still existed between the Pope, his cardinals and the secular ministers on the war issue. Lord Normanby explained in a letter to Palmerston on 21 July that the declaration made by Pius was significant in two ways:

The reply of the Pope to the Roman Legislature not only shows a wide misunderstanding between His Holiness and that body upon home politics, but furnishes an opportunity for distinct declaration against any participation in the war at present carrying on in the North of Italy.
Normanby concluded that the Pope's refusal to enter the war in north Italy meant that this conflict had become one solely between Piedmont and Austria and 'no longer one for national independence'. He did, however, warn that the situation could change and observed that:

Should the Romans, in consequence of this declaration of the Pope, rise in rebellion against his temporal authority, some volunteers may still be added to the Italian army, but on the other hand the moral influence of the head of the Catholic Church would be transferred to the other side. 106

In this fluid situation Normanby once again raised doubts about the future course of French policy.

Normanby was right to be concerned, for the situation within the Papal States became even more complex when on 17 July Austria began a brief reoccupation of Ferrara. This event once more threw Rome into disarray. On 18 July Pius tried to win back some support by issuing a formal diplomatic protest to Vienna against the Austrian occupation, which was also distributed to the other European powers. Mamiani consented to this, but the Pope's action angered the radical political parties in Rome. In the Council of Deputies, Canino proposed a threefold programme: the deputies should declare the
state in danger, they should make their sittings permanent, and they should call on the Pope to declare war. 107

This action by Canino was not enough to satisfy the Circolo Popolare, which on 19 July presented a petition to the Lower House. This was not all, for on the same day members of the Circolo Popolare, supported by the radical members of the Civic Guard, broke into the Council of Deputies’ meeting. Petre reported to Hamilton on 22 July that:

The president, in consequence of the clamour and of the entry of some of the crowd into the Chamber, declared the sitting dissolved, and harangued the crowd from a balcony. In the meantime the crowd, among which were members of the civic guards in uniform, headed by Ciceroacchio, demanded the delivery of the Castle of Angelo and the town’s gates into the custody of the civic guard, and were on their way to make the attempt. The sitting of the Council was declared permanent, and some Deputies were sent to gather information about the situation returning with the Minister of Police, to announce that there was no fear of further disturbance. 108

The Northern Star emphasised ‘revolution’ rather than ‘rebellion’.
A revolution has taken place in Rome, the people invaded the Chamber of Deputies on the 19th and demanded an immediate declaration of war against Austria, the Pope persisted in resisting that measure. 109

Faced with this disorder, Britain lost hope that Mamiani could reconcile secular and ecclesiastical powers, or maintain Papal authority even in name. It was clear that Mamiani’s ministry had failed to preserve order, and Petre was forced to report in his letter of 22 July that:

In a country where there is not a remnant of authority, nor of military discipline, it is impossible to foresee what may happen from day to day. 110

It was at this time, with Roman politics once more thrown into crisis, that news arrived of the Piedmontese defeat at the hands of Austria on 25 July at the battle of Custoza. Shortly after this defeat, Pius wrote a letter of sympathy to Charles Albert, 111 but this was not enough to satisfy the radicals, who wanted action rather than words. This was particularly the case in early August when Austrian troops advanced to seize Bologna, and subsequently the radicals urged Pius to commit himself to war. The Pope’s response, which was once again to appeal to the Great Powers and to announce his reliance on 'Divine Justice', was once again an inadequate answer to the calls of his people. His position was weakened even
further after the final resignation of Mamiani and his colleagues. The new administration led by Count Fabbri was clearly little more than a caretaker government. The Papal States looked increasingly unstable.

To prevent further Austrian advances in the Italian Peninsula after the battle of Custoza, and to reconcile Charles Albert with Pius IX, Palmerston suggested Anglo-French mediation between Piedmont and Austria. He believed that he could induce the Cabinet in Vienna to accept such mediation of Great Britain and France, if the British government would consent to adopt the line of the Adige as the basis of the negotiation of a peace treaty between King Charles Albert and Marshal Radetzky. 112

Palmerston's plan was adopted, and a shaky peace was restored between Piedmont and Austria. The British government had the optimistic view that the peace between Piedmont and Austria would pacify the internal disturbances, but in fact internal peace and order in Rome remained a fundamental question. 113

Section V: The failure of the Diplomatic Bill with the Papacy

The dramatic events that took place in the Italian peninsula in the summer of 1848 meant that by the end of July the political situation in the Papal States had come to a turning point, with a choice between a more cautious reform programme or a shift towards revolution. This
crisis in Rome raises the question of how Britain reacted to this situation and how it sought to defend its interests and to encourage the path of reform.

It is of particular interest that it was in August 1848 that the British government pushed through the House of Commons a Bill enabling the opening of diplomatic relations with the Papacy. The motives for this and the arguments that arose in discussion of this measure are an important source on British perceptions of the Papal States in 1848.

The issue of opening diplomatic relations with Rome had its roots in the mission of Lord Minto and Wiseman’s advice to the British government in the autumn of 1847. The first public hint that this was being contemplated came on 14 December 1847 in a speech by Lord Lansdowne in the House of Lords during a discussion about the activities of Lord Minto. Following this a Diplomatic Bill to restore formal relations with the Papacy was introduced for the first time in the House of Lords on 7 February 1848.

It was unusual for Parliament to pass legislation on the opening of diplomatic relations as this was a royal prerogative, but the government felt that in this case the issue was potentially so controversial that it was necessary to get Parliament’s approval. The debates in the House of Lords certainly saw the raising of some important issues and objections, and the Bill finally
passed on 28 February with two amendments attached.  

The first amendment, introduced by the Duke of Wellington with the government's approval, reconfirmed the sovereignty of the Queen and stipulated that Britain was only opening relations with the 'Sovereign of the Roman States'. In justifying this approach the Duke observed on 18 February that:

... he had use [sic] the words "Sovereign of the Roman States" purposely, because he understood the Bill as being a Bill to regulate the political relations with that Court exclusively, and as not having any allusion whatever to matters of a religious or ecclesiastical nature. The only relation which the Bill was to open was a political relation, and therefore it was that he had used the words "Sovereign of the Roman States," instead of "Sovereign Pontiff:" because, as it appeared to him, the term "Sovereign Pontiff" related to religion.  

Wellington's amendment was acceptable to the government and passed by a large majority.

This amendment, however, did not go far enough to satisfy the opposition members of the House, and a further amendment was proposed by Lord Eglintoun which would prohibit the Pope from sending an ecclesiastical as his diplomatic representative in London. The motive
behind this amendment was to ensure that the Pope would only be able to send a lay diplomat rather than a Papal Nuncio. On 18 February the former Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, noted that the religious responsibilities and pre-eminent diplomatic rank of a Papal Nuncio would cause embarrassment. He explained that a Papal Nuncio:

... must be an Archbishop, and as such has an influence over the whole Catholic Church in the country to which he is accredited. With the power which he would possess, and that dignity, rank, and precedence which we could not refuse him, it would be by no means desirable to receive him in this country. 119

The government did not accept this argument, but when put to the vote the amendment passed by a narrow margin as the House of Lords felt that it was necessary to reassure the general public that there would be no danger to the state. The government’s opposition to this amendment is interesting, as already in correspondence between Minto and Palmerston it had been agreed that if the Pope sent a representative to London he would have to be a layman. Indeed Palmerston had noted to Minto on 17 November 1847 that 'This would be a sine qua non with us'. 120 Why then did the government oppose Eglintoun’s amendment? It might be that the amendment was unacceptable because it would formally introduce restrictions on relations with the Pope rather than leaving it as a matter for a private diplomatic agreement, and thus would risk compromising
the Pope and subsequently the success of the policy of opening diplomatic relations.

Certainly after its passage through the House of Lords the Bill in its amended form was put to one side, because of the problem of whether the Bill would now be acceptable to the Pope, with Eglintoun's amendment attached to it. Britain was in a dilemma, as it was clear that the opening of relations would be an important step in the drive to use the Pope to control Ireland. Already Minto's mission to Rome had achieved a small success for British policy in Ireland. In January 1848 Minto had persuaded Pius IX to pass a rescript to the Irish Hierarchy which criticized their involvement in political matters. The British government was much encouraged by this move. On 9 February Lord Clarendon congratulated Minto, noting:

The letter of enquiry which the Pope at your suggestion addressed to the Archbishops is excellent, and perfectly well suited to its object. It was satisfactory to Drs Crolly and Murray and a heavy blow and great discouragement to MacHale and his confederates.\textsuperscript{121}

Following this on 26 February Minto, who was now in Naples, urged Petre in Rome to keep up the pressure on Pius IX over Ireland,\textsuperscript{122} and subsequently on 5 March Petre informed the Pope that the British government was
very grateful for his action. While there was a hope that this development could be built upon, it was clear that it would be difficult to achieve further progress over Ireland and other issues if there were problems over the Diplomatic Bill. On 24 March Russell expressed his concern about the Bill to Minto and observed that:

If you return to Rome, it will be important that you should ascertain in person how far the Pope resents Lord Eglintoun's amendment. I have told him [Eglintoun] that he [the Pope] would not receive an English Minister if the bill passed in its present shape. This seems very unreasonable, but I must allow that the public exception to Roman ecclesiastics as representatives is offensive, and I believe needlessly so.

He also noted that until the situation was clearer 'We shall hang up the bill for the present'. In a further letter to Minto on 28 March, Russell observed that if the Pope did object to Eglintoun's amendment 'we may try to alter it, but I have some doubts of our success.'

Minto proceeded from Naples to Rome in mid-April and discussed the Diplomatic Bill with the Pope on 12 April. The conversation revealed that the Pope was totally opposed to diplomatic relations being opened on the terms stipulated by the Bill in its current state. Minto noted in a letter to Palmerston on 13 April that:
He [the Pope] said that ... the establishment of diplomatic relations and missions either in Rome or in London, was impossible on such terms, that it was contrary to all usage that one government should prescribe to another the class of person from whom its representative might or might not be selected - and that in this case the exception taken was peculiarly offensive and unreasonable. 126

Minto tried to placate the Pope by reminding Pius that in previous conversations he, Minto, had made it perfectly clear that Britain could not accept an ecclesiastical as a representative, and that therefore Pius should not be so sensitive about Eglintoun’s amendment. The Pope dismissed this argument and, in a comment that sheds light on the anti-Irish intentions of the British government, he stated that:

... he repeated now as he had then observed to me that the objects of our intercourse bearing chiefly on religious interests he could only confide them to Ecclesiastical hands. 127

Minto denied that this was Britain’s sole purpose, and replied that the opening of relations was necessary due to the confused state of Europe. In regard to the future Minto informed Palmerston that:

I asked him whether in the event of our finding it impossible to restore the Bill to its
original shape, he would prefer that it should be postponed or that it should be abandoned. He said that he thought it would be better to abandon the measure for the present. 128

After this conversation the future of the opening of diplomatic relations was clearly in disarray, although the government could not publicly admit this. When on 14 May Russell was asked in the House of Commons about the Diplomatic Bill all he could reply officially was that it was the government’s intention to seek relations with the Papacy, but that at this time the legislative load in the House of Commons was too great to allow for the discussion of such an important issue. 129 This excuse might have had some truth in it, but it is difficult to believe that the Pope’s opposition was not the major factor.

Despite the problems raised by the Pope’s attitude, the British government still desired to open diplomatic relations, in large part due to the continued problems in Ireland. In particular, there was concern about the renewed efforts of MacHale to press the Pope not to accept the British government’s proposals for the Queen’s Colleges. 130 In this regard Clarendon, with the support of Daniel Murray, the Catholic Archbishop of Dublin, had decided to send to Rome Francis Nicholson, the Archbishop of Corfu, who would present the government’s case to the Pope. The government in London took advantage of
Nicholson's visit to Rome to assure the Pope of their support. On 6 June Palmerston wrote to Normanby that he should pass the following information to Nicholson, who at that point was still in Paris.

... pray tell Dr. Nicholson that he may on his arrival at Rome inform the Pope that the only reason which has occasioned a delay in the progress of the Bill for legalizing Diplomatic relations with Rome is that we have other measures of greater and more pressing importance to our internal interests which we are desirous of pressing forward in order that they may pass in the course of this session. But Dr Nicholson may tell the Pope that our friendly sentiments toward him remain unchanged and that we take as great an interest as ever in the prosperity and welfare of his government. We have seen with great pleasure the success with which he has hitherto steered the vessel of his State through the dangerous passage which he has had to traverse, and we trust that he will be able before long to come to anchor in smoother water. 131

Nicholson was happy to pass this information on to the Papal authorities. On 19 June he sent a letter to Lord John Russell expressing his appreciation of the British government's good intentions towards the Pope, and
informed Russell that he had told the Papal Nuncio in Paris:

... of the interest which the B. Govt [sic] takes in the Independence of Italy, and of its anxious desire for the permanent union of the temporal and Spiritual Authority of the Sovereign Pontiff. 132

The use of Nicholson as a channel for presenting Britain's good intentions to the Pope was only really a form of flattery. Palmerston's real view on the future of the Diplomatic Bill was revealed in a letter to Russell on 20 July. This letter was written in response to advice from a number of moderate Catholics, presumably including Wiseman and Shrewsbury, that the government should try to change the Eglintoun Amendment. Palmerston noted to Russell:

It seems to me that the progress of events has determined the question as to the Eglinton (sic) amendment; and that now that the Pope's Government has been entirely secularized it would be needless for us to fight a Battle in Parliament to preserve its ecclesiastical character.

The truth moreover is that all the arguments used to induce us to try to reverse the decision of the Lords are in diametrical
contradiction with the arguments upon which we propose the Bill. We ask Parliament to allow diplomatic relations with a Temporal Sovereign; and these Catholic correspondents say we must have an ecclesiastic because the Pope will only send us a Minister in his capacity of Head of the Church. We cannot argue the matter on such grounds, consistently either with our own reasons, or with the oaths we have taken at the Table. 133

This was a considerable shift from the government’s previous position and is interesting not only in displaying optimism about the future of Anglo-Papal relations but also in its reading of events in Rome. What this passage reveals is that the British government’s enthusiasm about the development of a system based around a liberal Pope, which had increased after the establishment of a constitution in March, had led it to underestimate how much Papal power still existed. The British government failed to comprehend the limits of secularization, 134 and in particular ignored the fact that reform of the diplomatic apparatus of the Papal States was strictly limited. The Pope had fought hard to defend his original stance that no concession should be made which in the slightest degree touched upon his spiritual power, and that no change should be attempted which transferred his powers to a secular authority. In the eyes of the Pope, the foreign office could not be
secularized since the functions of the Nuncios were not only diplomatic but also religious. As the Pope's foreign representative, a Nuncio could not divide his spiritual and temporal roles. The people's demand for the secularization of the foreign office was impossible in the eyes of the Pope, and therefore he rejected anything resembling a policy-making function for the secular council since this would have been a violation of the rules of a spiritual power.

It seems, however, that Palmerston, basing his views on the reports from Petre and Freeborn which stated that the Pope's absolute temporal power had come to an end, failed to realize that the Pope, in order to maintain his spiritual power, had to defend his diplomatic prerogatives. Regarding the status of the Pope, the British government's belief was that the Pontiff now acted as a constitutional monarch in Rome as well as the spiritual leader of the Catholic Church, and that political reform in the Papal States had led to the secularization of the Papal administration. This was a naive simplification that failed to recognize the true nature of the crisis that was facing the Papal States, that is that although the Pope could liberalize the administration of the Papal States he could never go far enough to satisfy the people without compromising his paramount position, his leadership of the Catholic Church. British hopes that the Pope's spiritual and temporal powers could be separated ignored the point that
any such separation would undermine Papal authority, reducing the Pope to the ruler of a small provincial state in Italy rather than of the entire Catholic world. Indeed the fact that the Pope was so determined to protect his spiritual power made it even more likely he would reject the opening of relations with Britain on latter’s terms. This was not just an abstract argument, as the problems that arose from the Pope’s spiritual authority had already been witnessed in the debate about war with Austria. 136

The idea that Britain could open relations with the Pope simply in terms of his position as a constitutional monarch or ‘Sovereign of the Roman States’ was misconceived in two ways - it misread the political situation of the Papal States, and it intended to use the Pope’s spiritual power to help British interests. The fact that the Pope had 200 million Catholic subjects all over the world was an important element to consider for the British government’s foreign policy towards the Papacy, 137 rather than regarding the Pope a ruler of the small Papal states in the Italian Peninsula. For the opening of relations to have any real benefit to Britain it had to recognize Papal temporal and spiritual power, which contradicted the idea that these two functions could be separated.

The fact that the British government acted as if the Pope were already a constitutional monarch was not only an
interesting comment on British perceptions of events within the Papal States, but was also fatal to the success of the policy of opening diplomatic relations. Perhaps, however, it was understandable that in the period of late July and early August, when Pius was being challenged by both the radicals and the Austrian army, Palmerston may have imagined that the Pope had no choice but to accept the Diplomatic Bill.

It was not until 17 August that Lord Palmerston presented the Bill to the House of Commons. As one might expect a number of issues in Anglo-Papal relations that had been aired over the last two years, were used to justify this dramatic move. In his first speech, for example, Palmerston noted that the opening of diplomatic relations would benefit British commerce and referred specifically to Britain’s interest in developing a railway system that would traverse the Papal States. This was not, as some contemporaries noted and indeed later historians have contended, an insignificant matter, and Palmerston insisted to the House on 17 August that:

We have great interest in rapid communication with our East Indian possessions. That communication is daily becoming abridged by the introduction of railways in different parts of the continent of Europe. We cannot make use of a railway passing through the territory of another State without having with that State
some arrangement by treaty with regard to the transit of our mails through that country. 138

In addition it was a common understanding that the Bill was, like Minto’s mission to Rome, intended to help the British government to use the Pope’s authority to curb the activities of the Irish clergy. Many backbenchers referred to Ireland in the Commons debates and indeed many Irish MPs opposed the Bill because they suspected the government’s intentions. The government, however, never admitted officially that this motive existed, although it was undeniably in the background.

Palmerston also justified the Bill by referring directly to the contemporary situation within the Papal States. He emphasized that it was the secularization of the Papal administration in the summer of 1848 that had led the government to accept Eglintoun’s amendment. At the committee stage of the Bill on 25 August Palmerston observed to the House that:

It must be recollected ... that the government of Rome was now constitutional and secularised. He believed an ecclesiastic had now been appointed to the office of Foreign Affairs, who was, however, the only ecclesiastic in the Administration. The Government of Rome was now lay, responsible, and constitutional; and the probability was, that the lay advisers of the Pope would be desirous that some opportunity
should be afforded of employing in diplomatic relations the nobles of the Roman States. 139

The flaw in the British government's perception of the Pope's position was recognized by all strands of Catholic opinion. As early as February, when the Lords had debated Eglintoun's amendment, Shrewsbury had warned that Britain must not offend the Pope by insisting on the despatch of a secular representative to London. Further to this he published a pamphlet warning against the provision that the Papal Nuncio to the Court of St James could not be an ecclesiastic, although he stated that he did not object to the Bill in its entirety. 140 Although Shrewsbury and Wiseman disapproved of Eglintoun's amendment, they agreed that it would be possible to support the legislation, viewing it as at least a means of improving the status of English Catholics. Their view of the Bill was supported in August by some moderate Catholic MPs, such as Mr M. Power and Sir H.W. Barron, who also argued against the amendment although they were in the end willing to vote for the Bill. Mr M. Power said on 24 August that:

He was himself a Roman Catholic, and he would not hesitate to tell the Pope, that though he owed him obedience in spiritual matters, he would exercise independently the rights of conscience on all civil questions. 141

The most significant warning came, however, from an Irish member of the House of Commons, John O'Connell, the son
of Daniel O'Connell, who had inherited the Irish Repeal movement's leadership from his father. He said on 24 August, knowing that the British government intended to control the Repeal movement through direct diplomatic relations with the Papacy, that:

The Government, however, preferred attempting to bribe the ruling power at Rome, in the hope that by this means they might corrupt the Irish clergy; but the Sovereign Pontiff would throw back their Bill with contempt. 142

Opposition to the Bill not only came from the Catholics who considered that it did not go far enough, there were also a number of Protestant MPs who considered that, even with the Eglintoun amendment, the Bill went much too far. Some of the speeches in the debates revealed a fundamental distrust of Papal motives and fear that the very fabric of British society was at stake. For example, Richard Spooner, the MP for Birmingham, told the House of Commons on 25 August that Britain had for too long agreed to make concessions to Popery and that:

... he believed the blessing of the Almighty had been most mercifully vouchsafed to this nation so long as she adhered to the true Christian faith, and steadily opposed what he believed to be the delusions of Rome. ... He wished now ... to protest against Parliament being ... coerced ... to accept a Bill which he
did not hesitate to describe as forming a further and most dangerous step in dereliction of the Protestant religion. 143

Despite the complaints of the anti-Papal faction and O’Connell’s warning that the Pope would not accept relations on Britain’s terms, the Diplomatic Bill passed through the House of Commons with a healthy majority. The future of diplomatic relations now rested with the Pope.

There is the possibility that Palmerston and Russell hoped that the Pope would be willing to accept diplomatic relations once Nicholson had assured him of Britain’s support. Nicholson arrived in Rome in late July and in a meeting with the Pope he handed His Holiness a copy of Palmerston’s declaration of 11 June. 144 He learnt in his talks with the Pope that the latter was deeply worried about the situation of Rome and that Pius desired the British to send a ship to Civita Vecchia in order to guarantee his security.

On learning this information Nicholson sent off a letter to the governor of Malta, Richard More O’Ferrall, suggesting that Britain should meet the Pope’s request. He noted to O’Ferrall that:

The Pope cannot make such a request at least at present but you may be quite sure that your
complying with my request make him grateful to the B. Government and to you. 145

O’Ferrall promptly sent a letter to Admiral Parker who then on 21 August ordered HMS Bulldog to proceed immediately to Civita Vecchia. Parker gave Commander A. Cooper Key, the officer in charge of the ship, instructions that the latter was ‘to receive the Pope on board for conveyance to any port in the Mediterranean, should commotions occur which might make it advisable for His Holiness to take refuge in one of Her Majesty’s ships’. 146

Key arrived at Civita Vecchia on 24 August and through Nicholson’s good offices it was arranged for him to have an audience the next day with the Pope. In this meeting Key emphasized Britain’s regard for the Pope and stated to Pius that Admiral Parker had ‘sent the Bulldog with the idea that the person of HH [His Holiness] - of such importance to the peace of Europe - was in danger and that she might afford him a refuge’. The interview went very well and the Pope informed Key that he had only asked unofficially for assistance as he was afraid that a formal request through Petre would have aroused suspicion in Rome. 147

News of Key’s visit to Rome and his favourable reception by the Pope might have encouraged the British government to believe that the Pope would accept diplomatic
relations on the lines of the Diplomatic Bill. If such a hope existed it was misplaced. In reality, opposition in Rome was strong in particular because of the strength of the Irish lobby. MacHale had already in April travelled to Rome with the Vicar Apostolic of Yorkshire, John Briggs, to petition the Pope to reject Britain’s overtures. They stressed in particular that the British terms for opening diplomatic relations were an insult to the Pontiff and the Catholic Church. Pressure was maintained on the Pope in the summer of 1848 by the members of the Irish college. The result was that in September 1848, the Pope rejected the British attempt to open relations, as he was deeply offended by the fact that the Papal Nuncio could not be an ecclesiastic.

The Pope’s unilateral decision over this matter proved conclusively that he had not become merely a constitutional monarch, and that it was a misconception to believe that his spiritual and temporal power could be separated.

Even after this debacle Britain did not give up on its policy of trying to use the Papacy to control Ireland. Russell had in the summer of 1848 decided to put forward a new policy towards Ireland under which the British government would pay the wages of the Irish clergy and provide funds for the maintenance of Church property. This was a controversial move and was opposed by those close to MacHale, who saw it as an attempt to silence and pacify the anti-English priesthood. Once again it was
felt by the British government that the Pope’s assistance could be useful. Russell prepared a memorandum for the Pope which explained the benefits for the Church from this new policy. The memorandum assured the Pope that ‘No interference with the spiritual independence, or ecclesiastical arrangement of the Roman Catholic Church is in contemplation’. It also explained that the measure was being introduced because the government believed that:

... the poverty of the Roman Catholic clergy of the south of Ireland, and the miserable condition of their chapels make it desirable that the state should interpose for relief of the Clergy and the due maintenance of the fabric of place of worship. 148

Once the wording had been agreed between Russell and Palmerston the memorandum was translated with great care by the Foreign Secretary into Italian, as Palmerston believed that the Pope had little understanding of English language. He proposed to Russell on 27 October that the term ‘memorandum’ should not be used and that instead it should be replaced by the word ‘proposition’. He also noted to the Prime Minister that it would be wise to avoid leaving any copy of the British proposal with the Vatican:

I should be inclined to think that it would be best that the memorandum should be read to the
Pope as often as he may think necessary to engrave the contents on his memory, but that no copy should be left with him. If given him it might find its way back into the English newspapers prematurely and do harm...149

Like the Diplomatic Bill, this ambitious plan failed to achieve any positive result. Once again the British government had overestimated its ability to influence the Pope.

The failure of the attempt to open diplomatic relations with the Papacy and the arguments within Britain over the Diplomatic Bill also had a damaging effect on the desire of Dr Wiseman and Lord Shrewsbury to improve the status of the English Catholic Church. Despite the hopes expressed by these two men in the autumn of 1847 and the fact that Wiseman had made a major contribution to the decision to send Minto it is clear that there were limits to Wiseman’s influence. When in November 1847 Shrewsbury tried to persuade the British government to support Wiseman’s appointment to the Archbishopric of Westminster he found that the government showed little enthusiasm. Palmerston wrote to Clarendon on 20 December 1847 that he could see little advantage in the proposed appointment of Wiseman and noted:

As for the idea that we could manage the Irish priests by means of a Roman priest in London, I am convinced that the presence of such a man
[Wiseman] would only have given the Irish priests an additional means of managing us.' 150

Minto also had little sympathy with the scheming of the English Catholics, although through private channels he came under pressure to take some action. In a letter to Shrewsbury on 27 November he noted that the British government would not interfere with the Pope's 'purely ecclesiastical functions'. 151

The only time Minto did act was when in December 1847 he received a letter from Shrewsbury's priest, Father Conolly, criticizing Wiseman for his alleged link with the 'highly objectionable' Catholic newspaper, The Tablet, and thus opposing his appointment to the See of Westminster. In January Minto reluctantly passed this information to Cardinal Ferretti, but made it clear that this was only for the information of the Cardinal and that he had no opinion on the subject. 152

The lack of support from the British government clearly did not help the English Catholic cause, but the prospects for Wiseman and Shrewsbury deteriorated even further when the Diplomatic Bill was discussed in the House of Commons. On 17 August 1848, when the Bill was read for the second time, Sir Robert Inglis, a prominent anti-Catholic, raised the issue of the Pope's ecclesiastical intentions towards Britain, such as the establishment of archbishoprics. Russell's reply was a categorical rejection that the Bill would allow any Papal
interference in Britain’s affairs, and he informed the House that:

I do not know that the Pope has authorised in any way, by any authority he may have, the creation of any archbishopric or bishopric with dioceses in England; but certainly I have not given my consent - nor should I give my consent if we were asked to do so - to any such formation of dioceses. 153

This statement made it clear that any hopes that the English Catholics had in the British government were misplaced.

The supporters of a move towards the creation of archbishoprics did not face problems only in London, in addition there were obstacles to their aims in Rome. In part this was their own fault due to the divisions within their own ranks, with Wiseman opposed by English Catholics sympathetic to Ireland like Federick Lucas, the editor of The Tablet, and Briggs. The other problem was that Papacy had far more significant issues to deal with.

Section VI: The Pope’s flight

Rossi’s policy and his murder

After Mamiani’s failure to pacify the people or to end the conflict between ecclesiastical and lay power, the radicals intensified their political attacks, and
'Republicanism' began to emerge as a serious force. The Pope, fearing that his authority might be overthrown, was therefore obliged to nominate a new interior minister in order to defend his authority. The new minister was to be elected from the liberals, and the intention was to choose a moderate who would protect the Papal and ecclesiastical interests.

The man chosen by the Pope to fill this role was Pellegrino Rossi, who was more conservative than Namiani. Rossi saw his role as that of a minister defending Papal temporal power. He had once supported the revolutionary cause, but, after some years in exile, he had become sceptical of radical and revolutionary rhetoric. When in exile in France he had established a friendship with Guizot, and this had led to his appointment as French ambassador to Rome in 1845, but after the February Revolution in Paris he had become \textit{persona non grata} with the French republican regime. Once in Rome as French ambassador, Rossi also acted as unofficial adviser to Pius IX, who trusted his opinions.

On 22 September, when he took office as the Minister of the Interior, Rossi announced that his policies would be based on the existing constitution and that the safeguards for the ecclesiastical ministers would be preserved. In foreign affairs Rossi negotiated with Piedmont over a new idea for a 'Confederation' which had been proposed by the Abbé Antonio Rosmini Servati on 4 August. The talks did not, however, go well, because
Rossi's ideas on Italian national unification differed from those proposed by Piedmont. He was opposed to war with Austria and was suspicious of the idea of a political league on Piedmont's terms, which would have led to a military league of Tuscany, Piedmont and Rome. Rossi's own views were ignored by opinion in Piedmont, which condemned Pius and accused him of betraying the League. The majority of federal nationalists were against Rossi's foreign policy, because his scheme said nothing about nationality. Also people who were eager for war to free Italy from foreign occupation hated Rossi, because his policy was principally based upon peace.

In domestic affairs Rossi used his influence, especially in financial and military matters, to preserve the temporal power of the Papacy. In order to remove the revolutionary element from the Roman Cabinet, he abolished the Ministry of Police and placed it under the Ministry of the Interior; this allowed him to get rid of Galletti, the Minister of the Police and a radical republican, and his two ex-Carbonari subordinates. With Rossi in control it appeared that Pius had finally found a figure who would be able to stabilize the country. However, as Rossi's power increased so did the opposition. Due to his programme of eliminating any radicals and republicans from the Cabinet, and his disagreement with Piedmont over the Confederation, Rossi had only succeeded in antagonizing the secular political opposition. In addition, his commitment to maintaining
the Pope's liberal reforms meant that he was unable to win the support of the ecclesiastical conservatives.

Rossi's political position as a moderate, suggested that he might be able to reorganize the papal administration along the lines of English constitutional government. Britain hoped that Rossi would be able to reconcile Papal authority with a liberal political system through reform. In retrospect this was too optimistic, for as an English traveller, Alexander Baillie Cochrane noted in his book, *Young Italy* written in 1850:

> Undoubtedly Mr Rossi's advice was too much in favour of progress; he had not sufficiently studied the characters of the Papal government or of the Roman population; he excited the Pope to grant a liberal constitution - "Le Papa, 'he wrote 'donnera sous peu la constitution; il s'en occupe serieusement; il est dans la bonne voie." Mr Rossi lived long enough to regret this opinion, and yet he survived but a few months. 158

It seems that as far as Cochrane was concerned, Rossi's ability and talent as a moderate minister might have enabled him to achieve his liberal political reforms in a secular state, but in the context of Roman politics, where the secular existed alongside the ecclesiastical, they were doomed to failure. 159
On 8 October motivated by the revolutions in Vienna and Hungary, Sterbini and his supporters called for North Italy, Tuscany, Sicily, Rome and Naples to unite as a national confederation to attack Austria. Pius, however, with Rossi's support, disagreed not only with this idea but also with war. As a result Sterbini and his colleagues decided to bring about Rossi's fall from power and began to renew their agitation. On 12 November Rossi was informed of a plot to take the Pope prisoner and proclaim a republic, and he was thus forced to use the Carabinieri to maintain order. However, there was a growing air of expectation, and Petre wrote to Palmerston on 16 November:

People so mad? ... It is said and perhaps with reason that Rossi has been imprudent that he has been trying to attain his object too rapidly without calculating the difficulties attended by sudden changes.

In the Roman Gazzetta of the 14th the enclosed article from his pen appeared and it is said that it sealed his doom, he talks of the Indipendenza Italiana as an Episodio - this article and his having addressed the Carabinieri to the effect that they belonged to no nation and had no right to take any pay as Cittadini that when called upon they must obey and do their duty to their Sovereign - irritated the people much as they said that he
was trying to bring troops and people into collision. 161

On 15 November Rossi was murdered. The circumstances which led to his death are still controversial, particularly whether Sterbini was involved in the plot. It is clear, however, that his death was a turning point.

There is extensive correspondence about the murder of Rossi, in British official papers and in Palmerston’s private papers. Petre reported to Hamilton on the day of the murder:

A most atrocious deed has just taken place. • Rossi the prime minister has been assassinated an hour ago. The camera were repented to day and Rossi had gone there in his carriage and was to have revealed his policy. There has been malcontent for some time against him. 162

Petre had invested considerable hope in Rossi, who he considered to be a realistic reformer, and therefore the statement that his murder was committed by radical parties in Rome was expressed with intensive hostility. He blamed it on ‘the liberal mad caps’, and observed to Hamilton on 16 November that:

It is quite evident that the murder has been the act of a party and not of an individual. We are now anxious to know what is to happen next. In my opinion Rossi’s death is an irreparable
loss - he was the only man in Italy fit to rescue [...] things to order both in government and Finance - Talent is not wanting in Italy but there is a total absence of [...] experience. Rome is quiet and I do not think we shall have any further disturbance - Rossi's death seems to satisfy the liberal mad caps - I forgot to say that during the last few days of Rossi's rule many arrests were made and several Neapolitans had been exiled. 163

There is no real evidence that Rossi was murdered by Sterbini and his colleagues, but this rumour was spread widely among the people of Rome and also the European Powers. 164

Cochrane wrote in 1849 that he was convinced that Rossi's murder was approved by Sterbini and the Council of Deputies, because Rossi's policy was against their radical ideas. He noted in regard to Rossi's savage death that:

The seeds of the Christian religion were nurtured with the blood of martyrs; the blood of Rossi had left an indelible stain on the city of the church; but we must hope that from his blood may spring men fit and able to guide its destinies. 165

In his opinion, this tragic and horrible incident should not be forgotten, and represents one of the most
dishonourable events in the history of Rome. Cochrane exhorted his readers to remember Rossi:

At all events, Rossi has left to posterity a bright example of self sacrifice, and his memory must be cherished by all those who love a Christian church, and would redeem the errors of a Christian people. 166

Cochrane realized that Rossi was the last hope for a compromise between the conflicting secular and ecclesiastical interests. However, Rossi became a victim of the radical Mazzinian party in Rome, whose political idea was 'Violence could be used for the liberation of the people' 167. Cochrane believed that these radical political parties in the Papal States were nourished by the Roman people’s discontent with the corruption of the ecclesiastical politics. Such an explanation only reflected Britain’s antagonism to the Pope’s temporal power as well as to the Catholic Church.

After Rossi’s death, Pius was abandoned by all his ministers, because without Rossi it was difficult to take prompt action to stem the flood of revolution. Pius tried vainly to keep his temporal power but he was now faced with irresistible pressure from the Circolo Popolare, who had the support of the Civic Guard. On 16 November the Deputies demanded the formation of a new government that would declare war against Austria. With the support of the Swiss Guard the Pope tried to resist, but it was
hopeless. On 17 November Pius was forced to accept a new administration led by Rosmini Serbati, with Galletti, as the Minister of the Interior. On the following day the Swiss Guard, the traditional defenders of the Pope, was disarmed and sent away, and the Civic Guard was put in charge of security at the Quirinal Palace. 168 As the city of Rome was placed under the control of the Circolo Popolare, Pius no longer had any legal authority and the government was in the hand of the radical party.

The British representatives in Italy were horrified by these events, not only because of concern for the position of the Pope who had lost his final defender, but also because of the fear of the consequences for the Italian peninsula. Parker’s reaction to this ‘atrocious assassination’ was on 19 November to once again send HMS Bulldog to Civita Vecchia in order to provide the Pope with refuge if this should be necessary. 169 Hamilton reported to Palmerston on the same day that:

The effects of the catastrophe at Rome cannot yet be appreciated, but they must be very serious, and the consideration of them gives rise to great apprehensions. There can be no doubt however that the war cry will now be greatly increased in Rome. I see no hopes that it will be resisted by the new Roman Government. Such a stimulus was not wanted to fan the flame here, and the Roman war party will be echoed in Tuscany. 170
This fear of the prospect of further revolution and of renewed war against Austria was mirrored by Abercromby in Turin. He noted to Palmerston on 22 November that:

Every event tending to throw Italy into additional confusion must I fear be regarded as contributing so much the more to the chances of war, and consequently as rendering more and more difficult the position of Piedmont with those forces and resources such war must inevitably be made if once resumed. 171

Yet more dramatic events were to follow.

The Pope’s flight and its impact

The Pope was now confined to the Quirinal Palace and considered himself a prisoner. In this situation he felt he could no longer remain in Rome. A ministry had emerged against his wishes and sought to impose a programme of which he did not approve. He was concerned that he would be forced to agree to measures that conflicted with his beliefs. The Pope also feared that the anti-Austrian sentiments of the new government could provoke a schism in the Church. In these conditions he realized that the wisest plan was to leave Rome. Already several states had offered him sanctuary, and he decided that the best course of action was to cross the border into Naples, and
set up his residence at Gaeta. He escaped from Rome on 24 November with the assistance of the French, Bavarian and Spanish ambassadors, and some days later issued a statement from Gaeta explaining his flight.

Within Britain the Pope’s dramatic departure was widely reported in the press with a number of different opinions been expressed. The Times on 12 December reported thus:

I may explain that the Pope declares he left the Roman territory because he was a close prisoner in the Vatican, and his duties as head of the church required free liberty of action, to protest against the present government. \(^{172}\)

The Times was sympathetic with the Pope’s situation, and considered that his flight was a reasonable decision in order to free him from his physical imprisonment and to enable him to exercise the supreme power of the Holy See.

The Whig newspaper, The Examiner explained on 23 December that:

The Pope is declared to have forfeited temporal power. If the Pope does not approve of it, he will be declared to have forfeited his temporal power and a new form of government will be established. M Sterbini declared that the Pope could return to Rome as a bishop but not the cardinal or prelates. \(^{173}\)
The Examiner explained the gravity of the deprivation of the Pope's temporal power, and the implications of the idea that he would return to Rome as a bishop only. On the other hand The Spirit of the Age, a radical weekly newspaper, suggested a very different view on 16 December; 

The revolutionary spirit is ready to burst out, the first favourable opportunity. Unless the Pope calls in Austrian aid, which we doubt much, we see nothing but for him to accept the revolution as an inevitable necessity and form his temporal policy accordingly. He may depend upon it, the day has gone, by when his spiritual anathema, would be of any service in arresting the progress of political change. 174

The Spirit of the Age had a decidedly radical opinion, and believed that political change would inevitably coincided with the reduction or deprivation of the Pope's temporal power. From this it is clear that any residual sympathy among radicals for the Pope had by this time completely dissipated.

The British government was absolutely horrified by the transfer of authority from the Pope to Sterbini. On 16 December Petre had informed Hamilton about the recent course of events in Rome and noted:

Soon after dark a band of from 150 to 200 paraded the street with flags and torch,
shouting out. "Italian independence! Death to the Cardinals! Death to the Roman princes!
Blessed be the hand that struck him!" and going round to various quarters of the military and of the police, demanded, and authority seemed to have ceased- no resistance, no remonstrance by the officers and several of the men with many Civic Guards in uniform, joined the procession, which terminated without any further branch of tranquillity, and dispersed on reaching the Circolo Popolare, where the flags were deposited. It is disgusting to read the cold-blooded accounts of the events of yesterday in the "Epoca" and "Contemporaneo" journal of this morning. 175

The British Parliamentary papers, as well as the press, contained extensive foreign correspondence with Rome about the flight of the Pope. Undoubtedly British opinion was interested in the flight of Pius IX, but its attitude to the Pope was not always coherent, because the reaction of the English differed according to their political position. In spite of being fundamentally anti-Catholic, the British government supported his retention of temporal power within the context of a constitution for diplomatic reasons, and they recognized that the existence of the Pope was needed to maintain social order in Rome. Some newspapers such as The Examiner accepted this belief in the nominal temporal and political power
of the Pope, while others like The Spirit of the Age believed in the complete secularization of modern society.

After the Pope's flight, although the Republicans had seized power, they could not proclaim the Roman Republic immediately, because they had first to suppress the political disturbances and social disorders provoked by an absence of the papal authority. The secularization of the ministry in Rome was completed after the proclamation of the Roman Republic.

Conclusion

1848 had begun both for the Papacy and Britain with great hopes for the future, but by the end of the year this optimism had ended in disaster. The Pope had fled from Rome, and no notable advance had been made in relations between Britain and the Papacy, despite the effort that the British government had put into the passage of the Diplomatic Bill.

To a degree Pius had helped to create the situation that led to his flight. He had introduced a series of reforms that suggested a genuine belief in liberal government and on a number of occasions seemed to give his blessing to the ideal of Italian unification. In so doing he raised expectations that he was not able to fulfil. The fundamental issue in 1848 was that as a temporal ruler he might have been willing to make war, however, as the
spiritual head of the Catholic Church he had to pursue policies based on adherence to peace. This posed a dilemma for Pius and also brought him into confrontation with the Roman people and with Italian nationalism as a whole. In the end this conflict over his two roles led to his decision to flee from Rome.

The problem for British policy in this period was that it overestimated the chances for a peaceful resolution of the political situation in Rome. In particular, after the promulgation of the constitution in March 1848 Britain’s expectation that the Papal States could work as a secular constitutional state increased, and there was a failure to realize the fundamental problems involved in a constitution in a state in which the sovereign held both spiritual and temporal positions which could not be separated. This kind of perspective was also reflected in the Diplomatic Bill when it was presented to the House of Commons in August; Palmerston clearly stated his belief that the administration of the Papal States had been secularized and that therefore the Bill with the Eglintoun Amendment was acceptable. This was a misconceived reading of the true nature of Papal government, which still in fact reserved considerable power in the hands of the Pope. It was also contradictory, for while Palmerston argued that a secular administration would accept relations with Britain, it was clear that the major motive in having a diplomatic
representative in Rome was to use the Pope's spiritual
power to control the situation in Ireland.

To a degree it might be argued that it was the urgent
desire for Papal assistance in Ireland that blinded the
British government to the difficulty of opening
diplomatic relations with Rome on its own terms.
Ironically it was the fact that the Pope still had
spiritual power and that the Irish College was so
influential in ecclesiastical politics in Rome that led
to Britain's defeat.
Notes


5 Coppa, *Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli*, p.46.


7 British Parliamentary Sessional Papers (House of Common); *Correspondence Respecting Affairs of Italy, Pt 2 Jan-June 1848. 1849/LVII.345* (BPSP).


10 Ibid., Minto to Palmerston, 28 December 1847, Vol.1, No.154, p.266.


14 Ibid., p.73.


18 Demarco, *Pio IX e la rivoluzione romana del 1848*, p.42.
BPSP, LVII, Minto to Palmerston, 13 January 1848, The British government regarded both as extremely dangerous.


Curato, Missione Minto, Minto to Palmerston, 13 January 1848, Vol.1, No.168, p.298.


Curato, Missione Minto, Minto to Landsdowne, 19 November 1847, Vol.1, p.211, No.117.

The Quarterly Review, 85 (April-July, 1849), p.581. The article continued 'His entire command over the populace gave him a powerful voice in every discussion, and made him an able coadjutor of the club, to whom all the powers of government had now been transferred.'


Ibid.


Curato, Missione Minto, Minto to Palmerston, 15 January 1848, Vol.1, No.172, p.302.


Romeo, Il Risorgimento in Sicilia, p.324.

Curato, Missione Minto, Palmerston to Minto, 3 February 1848, Vol.1, No.228, p.368.

The Northern Star, 12 February 1848.

Punch, 14 January-July 1848, p.106


Curato, Missione Minto, Palmerston to Minto (Naples), 12 February 1848, Vol.2, No.248, p.28.

Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.47.

BPSP, LVII Lord Petre (Rome) to Sir George Hamilton (Florence) 9 February 1848.

40 BPSP, LVII Petre to Hamilton, 9 February 1848.
41 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p.200.
44 BPSP, LVII, The Pope's proclamation of 10 February 1848
was forwarded by Petre to Hamilton 11 February 1848
45 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 13 February 1848.
47 Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.47.
49 Curato, Missione Minto, Minto (Naples) to Palmerston,
50 Curato, Missione Minto, Palmerston to Minto (Naples),
24 February 1848, Vol.2, No.276, p.76.
51 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 8 February 1848
52 Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.48.
53 J.F. Coppa, Pope Pius IX: Crusader in a Secular Age,
(Boston, 1979), p.76.
54 Ibid., p.76.
55 BPSP, LVII, Ralph Abercromby (Turin) to Palmerston, 15 March
1848.
56 Martina, Pio IX (1846-50) p.199.
57 Ibid., p.213.
58 Ibid., p.217.
59 Ibid., p.218.
60 Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.50
61 PRO, FO 43/43, Petre to Hamilton, 22 March 1848.
62 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 20 March 1848.
63 Curato, Missione Minto, Minto (Naples) to Palmerston,
64 Minto to Palmerston, 13 April 1848, Minto Papers, Department of Manuscripts, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.

65 Curato, Missione Minto, Minto (Rome) to Palmerston, 23 January 1848, Vol.1, No.199, p.333.

66 Ibid.

67 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 23 March 1848.

68 Martina, Pio IX (1846-50), p.226


71 Berkeley, Italy in the Making, Vol.III, p.73.


73 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 27 March 1848.

74 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, Rome 30 April 1848, included in Hamilton to Palmerston, 3 May 1848.


81 Ibid.

82 BPSP, LVII, Abercromby to Palmerston, 4 May 1848.

83 BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 29 April 1848.

84 BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 8 May 1848.

85 Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.58.
BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 6 May 1848 reported the following:
'The peace of Rome has not been disturbed by the perseverance of His Holiness in refusing to accede to the war cry, and though the Civic Guard, led by the clubs, are inclined to act without the Pope's authority the Trasteverini determined to support the Pope.

BPSP, LVII, Petre to Hamilton, 8 May 1848.

Coppa, Pius IX, p.85.

Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.58.

BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 4 May 1848.

BPSP, LVII, Abercromby to Palmerston, 1 May 1848.

PRO ADM1/5588, Captain Power (HMS Locust) to Parker, 24 May 1848.

BPSP, LVII, Palmerston to Abercromby, 8 May 1848.


Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.59.

BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 14 June 1848.

BPSP, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 27 June 1848.


BPSP, Correspondence Respecting Affairs of Italy, Pt.III, July-December 1848, 1849/LVIII, Petre to Hamilton 27 June 1848, enclosure in Hamilton to Palmerston, 1 July 1848.

Ibid.

Ibid.

BPSP, LVIII, Lord Normanby (Paris) to Palmerston, 17 July 1848.

Ibid.
107 Coppa, Pius IX, p.86.
108 BPSP, LVIII, Petre to Hamilton, 22 July 1848.
109 The Northern Star, 5 August 1848.
110 BPSP, LVIII, Petre to Hamilton, 22 July 1848
111 C. Baudi di Vesme (ed), La diplomazia del Regno di Sardegna durante la prima guerra d'indipendenza. II: Relazioni con la Stato Pontificio, (Marzo 1848-luglio 1849), (Turin, 1951), Vol.II, p.216, 2 August 1848
112 The Times, 11 August 1848.
113 BPSP, LVIII, Abercromby to Palmerston, 5 August 1848.
116 Ibid., 28 February 1848, p.1688.
117 Ibid., 18 February 1848, p.875-6.
118 Ibid., 18 February 1848, p.876.
119 Ibid., 18 February 1848, p.881.
121 Ibid., Clarendon (Dublin) to Minto, 9 February 1848, Vol.1, No. 242, p.12.
123 Ibid., Petre to Minto, 5 March 1848, Vol.II, No.294, p.109
126 Minto to Palmerston, 13 April 1848, Minto Papers, NLS.MMS.12072.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.

Palmerston to Normanby, 6 June 1848, Palmerston (Broadlands) Papers, University of Southampton Library.

PRO PRO30/22/7c (Russell Papers), Archbishop Nicholson to Russell, 19 June 1848, p.181-2.

PRO PRO30/22/7c, Palmerston to Russell, 20 July 1848 p.255-6.

Martina, Pio IX (1846-50), p.211.

Ibid., p.218.

Although the Foreign Secretary, Palmerston, and Prime Minister, Lord Russell, wished to see an end of Austrian dominance in the Italian peninsula, there were a number of members of parliament, both in the Commons and the Lords, who sympathized with Austria and had strong reservations about the progress of Italian independence.

Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio Personale di Pio IX. Oggetti vari No.176, London, 8 May 1848

Hansard, Vol.CI, 17 August 1848, p.203.


Ibid., p.495.

Ibid, 25 August, p.519.

PRO FO43/44, Nicholson to Palmerston, 16 May 1849. In this letter enquiring about British policy towards the Pope in Spring 1849, Nicholson stated that he had seen the Pope on 31 July 1848 and had handed him Palmerston’s Memorandum.

PRO PRO30/22/7d, Nicholson to O’Ferrall (Malta), 11 August 1848.

BPSP, LVIII, Parker to Commander Key (HMS Bulldog), 21 August 1848.

PRO PRO30/22/7d, Key to Parker, 27 August 1848.
148 PRO PRO30/20/7d, Memorandum by Russell, undated [October 1848]

149 Ibid., Palmerston to Russell 27 October 1848.

150 Palmerston to Clarendon, 20 December 1847, Minto Papers, NLS. MSS. 'Ireland was disunited socially and economically, Religion therefore was the only matter to unite the Irish people.'


152 PRO PRO30/20/7d, Minto to Palmerston, 16 January 1848.

153 Hansard, 17 August 1848, p.220.

154 Coppa, Pius IX, p.87

155 Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.60

156 Berkeley, Italy in the Making, Vol.III, p.130

157 Ibid., p.399

158 Cochrane, Young Italy, p.229

159 Ibid, p.221.

160 Coppa, Pius IX, p.88.

161 Petre to Palmerston, 16 November 1848, Palmerston Papers.

162 Petre to Palmerston, 15 November 1848, Palmerston Papers.

163 Petre to Palmerston 16 November 1848, Palmerston Papers.

164 Cochrane, Young Italy, p.241. 'Last of all came the famous Sterbini; he was lame and was assisted by his friend M Placidi, who smiled ironically on the crowd, as, with loud cheers, they opened their ranks to allow the popular members to enter.'


166 Ibid, p.247.

167 D. Mack Smith, Mazzini (Yale, 1994), p.9

169 PRO FO43/42, Parker to Petre, 19 November 1848.

170 BPSP, LVIII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 19 November 1848.

171 BPSP, LVIII, Abercromby to Palmerston, 22 November 1848.

172 The Times, 12 December 1848.

173 Weekly Newspaper Examiner, 23 December 1848.

174 Weekly Newspaper, The Spirit of the Age, 16 December 1848.

175 PRO FO43/44, Petre to Hamilton, 16 December 1848.
Chapter IV
Britain and the Roman Republic in 1849

Introduction

The Pope’s flight from Rome was followed by a power struggle between the moderate and radical political parties over the form the new government should take and who should provide its leadership. It took over two months from the time of the Pope’s flight on 23 November 1848 to proclaim the foundation of the Roman Republic on 9 February 1849.

The establishment of the Roman Republic presented Britain with two sets of questions; first how to cope with the diplomatic issues raised by the Pope’s request for foreign assistance, and second how to respond to several problems that emerged from the policies of the Republic.

With regard to the international issue, the British government became the object of pressure from the Catholic Powers for some kind of interference in Rome, in order to restore the Pope and to ensure social and political order in the Papal States. Britain was uncertain about the whole issue of intervention whether diplomatic or military. Britain always hesitated between a policy aimed at encouraging social tranquillity through reform, or one of intervening to suppress internal insurrection in order to avoid a general war in Europe. Once again the British government faced the problem of trying to find a way in which to avert any confrontation.
between France and Austria. This was a difficult task as Britain’s preferred policy was to restore the Pope but at the same time to insist upon the necessity of constitutional government in Rome.

One of the major issues raised by the establishment of the Roman Republic was the loss of the Pope’s temporal power. In particular, after Mazzini entered the city of Rome on 6 March, his political, social, financial and religious reforms based on anti-clericalism brought forward a number of controversial issues, such as nationalization of the property of the Catholic Church. The problem for the British government was not just how to react to these policies but also whether it should take account of the sympathy for the Roman Republicans anti-clerical policy among a significant section of the British public.

Section I: British reactions to the proclamation of the Roman Republic and its political reforms.

After his flight from the Vatican in November 1848, the Pope launched a series of complaints against his enemies in Rome, which culminated on 6 January 1849 in his excommunication of all those had taken part in the proceedings of 16 November and those who had taken any part in the Roman constituent proceedings. This declaration was signed by the Pope in his own handwriting so that there might be no doubt of its authority. When this became known in Rome there was a good deal of visible excitement.
John Freeborn, the British Consular Agent in Rome, wrote to Lord Minto on 8 January:

Most people laugh at being excommunicated and consider the Pope an old fool for having recourse to such an expedient— at least they pretend to do so, but I cannot help thinking that they feel it more than they like to show. I doubt however it is having any good effect it will prevent any who have any feeling of religion from voting and will thus throw the election entirely into the hands of the violent party. ²

Minto, because of his previous experience in Rome, was sympathetic to the Pope’s situation, but complained that excommunication was not effective for Republicans, who were indifferent to any religious imposition by the Pope and Cardinals. As excommunication, which the Pope considered the last attempt to restore his authority, failed, the only remaining measure was to defend his authority by relying on the Catholic Powers.

The Pope’s attempt to overawe the new leaders in Rome was not effective and the drive towards a new system of government proceeded. The Roman Giunta proclaimed an edict regulating the criteria for the forthcoming elections to the Roman Constituent Assembly. This decree stated that the Constituent Assembly should exercise full power to settle and establish public affairs, and that
the elections were to take place on 21 January by manhood suffrage and secret ballot.³

At the same time increasing numbers of Republican nationalists, not only from all over Italy but also from other parts of Europe, such as Guiseppe Garibaldi, Enrico Cernuschi, Del Bene, Caldesi, Giovanni La Cecilia and many others, arrived in Rome, and effectively increased the strength of the Republican movement. Republican demonstrations became a daily occurrence, and it was decided by the leaders to get rid of the existing government, and to realize the aspirations of the Giovine Italia.⁴

After being shocked by the flight of the Pope, the British government was very curious to see what would happen next and who would seize power. When they realized that the republican party was prevailing and the moderates were powerless, their anxiety about the political consequences created by the absence of the Papal authority, and their fear of republicanism, could not be hidden.

Sir George Hamilton expressed his fear of the Mazzinian party to Palmerston on 25 January 1849 when he noted that:

Mazzini had been at Florence last week and is now gone to Rome - In this latter city he will no doubt continue his intrigue in form of Republican principles, and it is possible that
he may endeavour to excite Romans and Tuscans to give each other a hand, and out of the two states to form a large Republic in Central Italy. 5

The British government’s support for the Sardinian government contributed to its hostility towards the Republican and Mazzinian parties. Palmerston wrote to Abercromby in Turin on 31 January:

We must encourage the government and the moderate party together, to resist these intrigues of the ultra liberal faction who in fact are but the agents of the Republican and disorderly policy of Mazzini, to enable the government to oppose in the Chambers.6

In contrast to the British government, British radical opinion was notably sympathetic towards the republican movement in Rome, and carried enthusiastic reports on the course of events. The Northern Star reported on 20 January under the headline 'Italy Roman State, Magnificent Popular Demonstration' that:

A most imposing demonstration came off at Rome. Towards evening the guards began to gather on the Piazza Venezia with banners and music. All the banners were ranged round the equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius, and amid solemn silence and intense cold, all heads being uncovered, the decree convoking the
Constituent Assembly was read. Then up rose the Abbate Rumbalidi, and said - Roman people! Your father from this hill originated civilisation amid barbarous Europe, and you have to begin the work again this year of our Lord, to rescue Italy from dark intrigues and brutal despots; and I as a clergymen, call on you from the Capital to vindicate your independence and your right to self-government - principles whose root is in the gospel. 7

The newspaper noted that these words were received with enthusiastic applause and that the speech calmed and satisfied the people.

On 21 January 1849 the elections were held and on 5 February the Roman Constituent Assembly met. The duty of opening the Assembly fell on the elderly Minister of the Interior, Carlo Armellini, but his speech failed to provide any kind of lead. 8 Despite the fact that the republicans had seized power, the Roman Republic was not proclaimed immediately because there was a conflict within the various radical parties. Sterbini was concerned firstly to settle other matters that required attention, such as the choice of a president, which eventually fell on Galletti. After two days on 7 February the debate on the constitution of the Roman State finally opened. 9
In the debate Mamiani declared himself to be strongly in favour of the suppression of the temporal power of the Pope. He maintained that this should be the aim of the people but that this did not mean that he wished for the establishment of a republic. He concluded by arguing that the best course was to await the convocation of an Italian federal Assembly. His ideas did not, however, win much sympathy and amid scenes of great excitement, the Roman Constituent Assembly declared the establishment of a Republic on 8 February 1849.

Once moderates, like Mamiani, had withdrawn, and the ultra-conservative ecclesiastical ministers had been excluded from the Assembly, the Republicans decided to adopt the Mazzinian slogan 'God and the people', and to give Mazzini citizenship. Mazzini, however, did not appear in the Assembly immediately, but arrived in Rome in March. 10

Freeborn informed Palmerston on 9 February that:

I have the honour to report to your Lordship that after prolonged debate and not with standing the opposition of about twenty of the most talented Deputies of the National assembly, the temporal power of the Pope has been suppressed as per inclosed decree and translation, by a majority of 138 out of 143 members and the Repubblica Romana declared by a majority of 120 members out of 143 present. 11
The first act by the Roman Constituent Assembly after the proclamation of the Republic was to reform the executive power of the State; Armellini, Montecchi, and Antoine-Christophe Saliceti were appointed members of an Executive Committee. Its first task was to discuss proposals for a new constitution, the matter then being referred to a special committee. The general consensus was that the question of the constitution of the state demanded the urgent attention of the Ministry and the Assembly. The financial position was also desperate.

There were, however, other more serious problems for the new regime. The proclamation of the Republic in Rome coincided with the flight from Florence of the Grand Duke of Tuscany in late January 1849, which led to pressure from Mazzini and the Giovine Italia to unify Tuscany and the Roman State into the central nucleus of Italian democracy. In addition, the Roman Republic was pushed to take an overt stance against Austria, as Piedmont began to plan for a new war which began on 12 March when Carlo Alberto denounced the armistice with Austria.

As the course of events in the Italian peninsula became more heated on 5 March Mazzini entered the city of Rome. The following day he was introduced to the Assembly by Galletti and made a short speech, then on 29 March Mazzini, along with Armellini and Aurelio Saffi, was made one of the Triumvirate of the Roman Republic.
These dramatic changes had serious implications for Britain. Just after the proclamation of the Roman Republic, the state of Anglo-Roman relations was still undecided. As far as Armellini, a member of the Executive Government at the National Assembly, was concerned, the Roman Republic sought to maintain favourable relations with Britain as well as with France and Piedmontese. As Freeborn informed Hamilton, Armellini had told the Assembly:

The relations with Great Britain are satisfactory. We are in continual communication with the only Representative in Rome, Consul Freeborn. I repeat that the communications which we have from the said Consular Agent in Rome relating to the English Ministry are always satisfactory, and we cannot but be gratified with the light in which England regards our Government and the movement of the Roman States which preceded and prepared the proclamation of the Republic. 16

This was an optimistic view of the British government's attitude and indeed that of Britain as a whole. It was rather the case that British opinion was confused and divided about how to react to events in Rome. The trend among conservative opinion was to support the constitutional revolution, but to disapprove of the overthrow of Papal authority, and this was the view that dominated government thinking. On the other hand radical
opinion regarded the expulsion of clerical power from Rome as a necessary continuation of the constitutional revolution.

The English Radicals and Mazzini and the Roman Republic

The attitude of British radicals towards the government of the Roman Republic was expressed in a form which praised Mazzini, and provided a clear contrast with the British government's strong reservations over both the creation of the Republic and Mazzini himself.

Mazzini was one of the most well known Italian Risorgimento leaders in Britain. His reputation as a revolutionary had been sealed when in 1843 the British government had, as noted above, spied on his political activities and the Post Office on the orders of the Home Secretary had intercepted his mail.

Mazzini, when an Italian republican exile in Britain, had contacts with English intellectuals who supported the Italian National movement through their journals and periodicals. In order to influence the foreign policy of the country in Italy's favour, he pursued two major aims— to appeal to public opinion in Britain, and to enlist the support of the press.

Mazzini had forged links with the labour movement through his English friend, Thomas Carlyle who was sympathetic with the Chartist movement, and developed his political
ideas on liberalism and democracy through his observations of the political movement for the liberation of the English people. In 1847 Mazzini had founded The People's International League, with the object of enlisting sympathy for Italy. As Rudman notes 'It sought to enlighten British public opinion on the political condition and relations of foreign countries; to disseminate the principles of national freedom and progress; to excite public opinion in favour of the right of all peoples to self-government and nationalism; and finally to promote good relations between the people of all countries.' The other organization formed in England which supported Mazzini's political programme was The Society of the Friends of Italy, whose activities included public meetings, lectures, publications, and particularly the promotion of published works on the history of the Italian national movement. It promised to use every available constitutional method of furthering the cause of Italian independence in Parliament and elsewhere.

Some scholars of Chartism, such as Henry Weisser, have treated English radicalism and republicanism as a reflection of continental republicanism, which had been put into practice in the revolutions in France and Italy in 1848. Gregory Claeys emphasizes that Mazzini was important as 'a theoretician and founder of a new form of anti-socialist republicanism in Britain'. Margot Finn has developed this point, stressing the links between
English radical intellectuals and continental revolutionary exiles in Britain. She argues 'that international sympathies, born in the era of the first French revolution, were consolidated by social and political alliance with Polish and Italian exiles who had sought refuge in England in the thirties and forties'.

The People's International League's membership, led by Mazzini, the Polish nationalist Charles Stolzman, and the moderate Chartists Thomas Cooper and William. J. Linton, emphasized 'the characteristic social and cultural formations from which middle-class radical internationalism drew its strength for decades'.

Mazzini's relationships with John Stuart Mill, Thomas Carlyle, and others provided him with introductions to a variety of middle-class reformers. In addition, working-class radicals also identified with his aims, particularly after the cause of domestic reform began to decline in the mid-1840's. A number of Chartists became associated with Mazzini through their international concerns. Finn emphasizes the popularity of Mazzini among the English middle class and affluent working class, asserting 'that Mazzini's nationalist ideology appealed powerfully to middle-class concerns by advancing the nation's collective claims alongside those of the individual, who figured in Mazzini's thinking less as an autonomous agent than as a component of the Commonwealth'.

23

24

25
This support for Mazzini was reflected in the Chartist newspapers, including the *Northern Star*, *The Spirit of the Age* and *Reynolds Newspaper* which tried to mobilize support for Mazzini's Republic in 1849. *The Spirit of the Age* on 3 March 1849, suggested that:

The proclamation of Roman Republic has startled those who were consoling themselves with the comfortable theory that revolution had run its race, and that the star of kings and priests was again in the ascendant.

Opposed to the conservative opinions of *The Times* and the *Morning Chronicle*, *The Spirit of the Age* asserted that the constitution, political equality and the emancipation of labour were important consequences of the revolution in Rome and the establishment of a Republic:

... trumpeters of reaction dread the march of political Revolution, especially where it develops itself in the Republic form, because they know that a Commonwealth must prove fatal to the barbarous and expensive class distinction which constitutes the main element of even the most advanced of what are called constitutional systems, and because political equality is but the first act of the drama, whose denouement is social justice and the emancipation of labour. The Republic is the spontaneous act of the whole Roman people and
as such ought to command the sympathy and support of all liberal minded people. 28

English liberal opinion was reflected in the periodical *Punch*, which was also supportive of Mazzini. It reacted to the eventual demise of the Roman Republic by writing:

Though brutish force the game has won,
Triumvir, thou haste nobly done;
Calm courage in a rightful cause
Gains thee a loftier world’s applause;
And Rome’s old heroes from their spheres
Shout, chiming in with British cheers,
Bravo. Mazzini! 29

The Papacy, the Republic and the dilemma of the British government

In contrast with radical public opinion, which wholeheartedly supported Mazzini and his Roman Republic, the British government had reservations about Mazzini’s political activities and his government. The British government’s perception of the Roman Republic was shaped by the latter’s two principal achievements - the cessation of Papal temporal power, and Mazzini’s republicanism.

The British government’s perception of these issues raised a dilemma about how Britain should act, because the government desired to see neither a return to the
corruption of Papal temporal politics nor the continued existence of Mazzini's republican state. The result was that British foreign policy vacillated over the best solution, although it was clear that a course of action would eventually have to be chosen.

Palmerston's position was especially difficult because, although he continued privately to sympathize with the Italian liberals, he was forced to follow a policy of restoring political order in Rome as his official foreign policy. The problem, in particular, was that Mazzini acted as an obstacle to Britain's possible support of the Italian nationalist movement, because he was perceived as a 'dangerous revolutionary' by the majority of the British government. There was a risk for Palmerston, who was the main pro-Italian minister in a Cabinet where a majority of anti-Italian and pro-Austrian figures dominated, that Mazzini could provide the Queen, who sympathized with the majority, a pretext to suspend his pro-Italian foreign policy. 30 Palmerston was, therefore, obliged to justify his pro-Italian foreign policy in terms of Britain's own direct interests in the international political balance.

The editor of Punch sarcastically explained the government's problem in a poem entitled 'The "True Blues" Dilemma or the Pope or the Republic?':
How completely at sea, how confounded are we
By the Romans' affairs and invasion.
Quite put out of our way, We can't think what
to say,
With our Politics against our Persuasion.
Here's the Papacy down, and the Pope's triple
crown
Is the football of Roman's Population
Which you'd' think, in True Blue theological
view,
Would be a matter of high exultation.
Then, with bayonet and bombs, General Oudinot
comes,
To restore the dominion of Scarlet;
And of course you'd suppose, we should rail
through the nose,
At the wicked Papistical varlet.
But alas! We can't crow o'er the Pope's
overthrow,
And be joyful for Roman's Revolution:
For, in place of his throne, we should then
have to own
A Republic-abhorr'd institution!
Neither can we advance, 'gainst the movement
of France,
Half a word that on censure would border:
For though Babylon's reign she goes forth to
maintain,
We imagine her object is Order.
So we’re forced to be mum, like to dogs that are dumb,
And to give wicked wits an occasion
Us to jeer and deride, thus remaining tongue-tied
With our Politics ’gainst our Persuasion.31

This satirical attack may well have been prompted by Punch’s own anti-papal leanings.

The initial position taken by Palmerston was that the differences between the Pope and the people of Rome were a matter for those two parties to solve and that foreign powers should not get involved. The best solution, he foresaw, was for the Pope to agree to accept constitutional reform. He noted to the British Ambassador to Paris, Lord Normanby, on 5 January that it was important to maintain the Pope as an independent Sovereign, and that:

These circumstances would seem to render it the more incumbent on the Pope to give to his subjects the requisite securities for good government, and these circumstances would also appear to render it the less justifiable for any foreign Powers to use armed interference in order to assist the Pope in maintaining, if he were so disposed, a bad system of Government. 32

These sentiments also influenced a letter which Palmerston drafted for the Queen to send to the Pope in
response to a letter which Pius had sent in December 1848 asking for British assistance. The letter noted the Queen’s regret at the circumstances which had forced Pius to flee from Rome and praised his efforts at reform, but instead of promising British aid stressed the hope that the Pope and the people in Rome could be reconciled. 33

In the face of the increasing likelihood that the Pope and the people would not be able to achieve a reconciliation by themselves, Palmerston came to the conclusion that if the Powers had to intervene it should be as mediators rather than as an armed force.

His fear of military intervention was not solely because of his concern that the Pope would be restored as an autocratic ruler. A more important consideration was the risk that such intervention could lead to a confrontation between France and Austria. In a letter to Viscount Ponsonby, the British Ambassador in Vienna, on 1 February, Palmerston instructed the former to tell the Austrian government that any move by the Austrian army south of the River Po would inevitably lead to either a French force crossing the Alps or one landing at Civitâ Vecchia, and that this would not only delay a solution to the Roman problem but also that

It cannot moreover escape the discernment of the Austrian Government that the entrance of a French force into Italy as a counterbalance to the advance of an Austrian force beyond the Po
would necessarily tend to shake that confidence in the maintenance of the peace of Europe which it is so much the interest of all the Powers of Europe at the present moment to strengthen and confirm. 34

This policy, although well founded in its analysis, faced one major problem, which was that Britain's influence over the Roman issue was very limited. The chief restriction on Britain was that it was not a Catholic power and that therefore it could not persuade the Pope to compromise and was excluded from the negotiations between the Catholic states and the Papacy.

Britain was the country that was most eager to maintain the status quo, social tranquillity, and a political balance of power in Europe.

Section II: The Collapse of the Roman Republic and foreign military intervention.

The French military expedition to Rome.

Unfortunately for Palmerston the proclamation and establishment of the Roman Republic, after the Pope's flight inevitably brought about foreign intervention, as its foundation disturbed the existing order of the international stage in Europe. Clearly the Catholic Powers could not disregard the events in Rome, and sought
to restore order. However, there were rivalries between the Catholic Powers and differences over how to proceed.

The position of France was similar to that of Britain, both agreed that the major cause of social disorder in the Papal States was the misgovernment and maladministration by the ecclesiastics. They therefore strove to restore Papal temporal power on a constitutional basis in order to achieve stability and maintain a balance between the European Catholic states, and thus avoid giving Austria any pretext for military intervention. Although there was a consensus between Britain and France on the best form of government in Rome, there were differences over how this could be achieved. One problem was that in December 1848 Louis-Napoléon had been voted President of the French Republic. Once in power he was determined to use the Roman issue to enhance his position within France, and in particular to appeal to French Catholics by strongly supporting the Pope; he was also disposed to use force to raise French military prestige. The use of French troops had been contemplated in Paris even before Louis-Napoleon’s appointment, but once the latter was in power his domestic political concerns made intervention even more likely. 35

The conservative Cardinals, of whom since 1848 Cardinal Antonelli was the most influential, were not enthusiastic about co-operation with France, as they were opposed to the French conditions for intervention. The French
position was that they would only aid the Pope if he agreed to accept constitutional government after his restoration. The Cardinals had no intention of agreeing to this, and instead favoured Austrian intervention to restore the Pope as this came without preconditions. 36

British Foreign Office documents relating to the Roman affairs in 1849, show that events in Rome were closely monitored. They contain details on the political settlement and negotiations between France, Austria, Britain, Spain, the Republican government in Rome and the Papal government in Gaeta. Since the government of the Roman state was split into two parts - the Republican government in Rome, and the Papal Pontiff in Gaeta - English correspondence with Rome was conducted through the Consul in Rome, Mr Freeborn, while that with Gaeta passed through the British ambassador in Naples, Hon. W. Temple. 37

The first of the Catholic Powers to press for a united response to aid the Pope was Spain, which in January 1849 called for a conference of the Catholic Powers in Madrid. This plan was rejected by the Powers and the Pope, and an alternative scheme for a conference in Naples was put forward by Ferdinand to which all the Great Powers would be invited. 38 Prince Castelcicala, the Neapolitan Minister in London, informed Palmerston on 2 February that King Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies was keen to see Britain involved in any subsequent meeting of the Powers. The Sicilian government's official note stated:
His Sicilian Majesty has ... thought necessary, and he formally demands, the participation of England, in the congress; the presence of those great powers being strongly demanded in a discussion which beside the very important object of religion may have powerful influence on the political circumstances and on the harmony of the Sicilies and of all Italy. 39

Palmerston was pleased to receive this invitation, but noted in reply to the Prince that Britain did not feel free to attend without a request from the Pope.

The British policy was not to take a direct role but to use its influence to press the interested Powers to come to a peaceful solution. After the Pope's call on 18 February for the Catholic Powers to come to his assistance, Palmerston informed Normanby on 9 March that he should inform the French government that:

Although Great Britain has not so direct an interest as France has in the ecclesiastical and political questions which arise out of the present relations between the Pope and the people of the Roman States, the British government nevertheless cannot view those matters with indifference, Great Britain is indeed a Protestant State but we have many millions of Catholic subjects; and the British Government must therefore be desirous, with a
view to British interests, that the Pope should be placed in such a temporal position as to be able to act with entire independence in the exercise of his spiritual functions. 40

In the British government's view, Palmerston noted, the road was not closed to mediation, and he noted to Normanby that:

Her Majesty's Government does not see even in the recent occurrences at Rome any reason for giving up the hope that the diplomatic interposition of friendly Powers might still, without any actual employment of military force, bring about such a settlement of differences as would enable the Pope to return to Rome and to resume his temporal authority.41

The Austrian government did not favour a policy of mediation, as it wished to see the Pope restored to power as an autocratic ruler and this could only be achieved through military intervention. It was not prepared to intervene unilaterally as it was already overstretched due to its confrontation with Piedmont, but it was prepared to intervene in conjunction with France, which would diminish the chance of a general war, separate France from Piedmont, and wreck Palmerston's hopes for Anglo-French mediation in the affairs of Italy. In addition, opposition to mediation by the foreign Powers was expressed by Piedmont, which was keen to reopen the
war with Austria, and hoped for support from the Roman Republic. 42

The conflicting ambitions of Austria and Piedmont complicated the situation and were a matter of concern to the British government, as it might lead either to a Franco-Austrian confrontation or possibly a combination which would freeze Britain out of Italian affairs. Events, however, were increasingly beyond Britain’s control. On 30 March a conference of the Catholic Powers of Naples, Spain, Austria and France was held at Gaeta. The first three of these Powers were sympathetic to the call by Antonelli for immediate military intervention against the Roman Republic. 43 Pressure on France to accept military intervention was heightened when the Austrian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Prince Felix Schwarzenburg, proposed to Louis-Napoleon that France should intervene at Rome while the Austrians took Bologna.

Britain was aware of the two sets of negotiations, those between France and the Roman Republic, and those between Austria and the Papal Council in Gaeta (including the Pope and Cardinals), and remained interested in every political movement which unfolded in Rome. Palmerston still believed at this stage that the Roman people would be happy if the Pope was restored in Rome because of his liberal politics, but despite this he was still reluctant to support any kind of military intervention.
The British government’s caution can to a degree be explained by its concern over French attitudes towards the Roman Republic and the fear that France meant to enhance its own position in Rome and its status throughout Italy. These suspicions were revealed in the extensive correspondence between the Marquis of Normanby, the British Ambassador in Paris and Palmerston, regarding the negotiations between the Roman Republic and the French government, and about the military activities of French forces in the Roman States.

The French view of the Papal restoration

Louis-Napoléon was not averse to the idea of military intervention, but he realized that if he did act to restore Pius to Rome he had to ensure that the Pope would still pursue constitutional reform, otherwise he would lose the support of the French Assembly. It was for this reason that Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Foreign Minister, announced on 19 April that the French force that would shortly land at Cività Vecchia was intended:

... to maintain ... the balance of power, to guarantee the independence of the Italian States; to secure to the Roman people a liberal and regular system of administration; and to preserve them from the dangers of a blind reaction, as well as from the frenzy of anarchy. 44
French intentions were, however, not those of the Pope, who was opposed to any restrictions on his temporal power. He wished to have full liberty in his relations with foreign Powers, but his freedom of manoeuvre would be worthless if the Powers were allowed to regulate his relations with his subjects. It was this internal liberty which he believed would be compromised by French insistence on constitutional government. As early as 12 March this had been clear to the British government, as Petre had reported from Gaeta that 'there was to be no concession, no mitigations of ecclesiastical monopoly and privilege', and that the Pope had declared that 'he will return as absolute master or not at all'.

In his Allocution of 20 April 1849 the Pope went even further, stating that the constitutional settlement which he had proposed in December 1848, and even as late as January 1849, was incompatible with his personal liberty as head of the church. The Allocution of April 1849 proved to be the turning point for the Pope, as far as the constitutional issue was concerned.

Opposition to the French plans was not restricted to the Pope. When an army led by General Nicolas Oudinot landed in Civitavecchia in May, Mazzini confronted the French military commanders in Rome and asked them to explain their motive and objectives in sending an armed force to occupy the territory of the Republic. The French invasion baffled the members of the Roman Republic, because they had counted on French support. Mazzini, the most
important Republican leader, had believed that France was the model of the republican system. The reply received from Oudinot, as reported by a British naval officer, Lieutenant George Willes, was that:

... the first motive was to preserve the Roman State from an Austrian invasion which was then being meditated and prepared; that the second was to know precisely what the sentiment of the people was as to the form of Government they thought most suitable to them, and to seek to promote a perfect reconciliation between Pius IX and the Roman population. 47

This explanation failed to satisfy the Roman Assembly who decided to resist the French, and on 30 April fighting broke out. The French, however, were repulsed and subsequently a new attempt at mediation with the Roman Republic was begun led on the French side by the Viscount Ferdinand de Lesseps.

Faced with the French fait accompli, Palmerston did not protest against the intervention but stressed that it was important that constitutional reforms should be introduced. The Foreign Secretary worked to achieve this aim by encouraging negotiations between the Roman Republic and the French plenipotentiary, Ferdinand de Lesseps. At the same time he put pressure on the Austrian government to limit its occupation of the Legations in order to avoid any Austro-French confrontation. 48
Although Britain had already decided to connive at the French military intervention in Rome, the government was, however, still worried and suspicious about the restoration of any Papal government, which might renew the political and economic corruption in the Papal States. From a number of sources there came reports of the opposition within Rome to the return of the Cardinals, although not to the restoration of the Pope himself. Freeborn noted to Palmerston on 1 May that 'the mass of the people are ill-disposed to the restoration of the Ecclesiastical Government'.

Faced with these reports and uncertain of French intentions the Foreign Secretary was put into a difficult situation which became all the more challenging when the de Lesseps mission collapsed in failure at the end of May and Oudinot resumed his military campaign. On 12 June Palmerston told Normanby that he should inform the French that it was still Britain's hope that the French intended to:

... maintain substantially the Representative Constitution which he [the Pope] granted last year to his States, and that there should be a real and effectual separation between the temporal and spiritual power of the Pope as Sovereign of the Roman States.

The French sought to reassure the British government, and on 3 July Normanby informed Palmerston that:
Whatever difference of opinion there may have existed between Her Majesty’s Government and that of the Republic as to the best means of effecting a common object, they only desire such a solution of the Roman Question as has been counselled at various periods and to different parties by Her Majesty’s Government, namely, the restoration of the Government of the Pope with Constitutional guarantees. 51

On the same day the issue of the future of Rome became much more urgent, as it was on this day that forces of General Oudinot entered the city. The question was now raised of when the Pope would return to the Vatican and what sort of government he would erect.

Palmerston was under pressure from public opinion to make the British voice heard. The Times suggested that it was necessary for British influence to be felt. Its correspondent in Civitā Vecchia noted on 11 July:

The case is full of difficulties, and it is to be hoped that England will, by an immediate recognition of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, be entitled to bring her sage counsels to the common board of European nations. The weight of Great Britain is great; her statesmen, acting on sound principles, are almost omnipotent; and however opposed I have been to Lord Palmerston’s vagaries elsewhere, I
shall be too happy to support a wise and enlightened policy here. 52

Palmerston realized that the prestige of Britain could be used to try to effect a reasonable compromise between the Pope and his people. It was clear by the summer of 1849 that France held little sway over Pius, and that a more effective channel would be to use influence of the Austrian government. On 13 July Palmerston informed Ponsonby in Vienna that he should insist to Schwarzenberg that:

... now that the Romans have been free from the evils of their former Government, a return to those evils would produce infinitely greater discontent than that which has up to this time existed. It is evident, therefore, that in such a case, tranquillity would last only as long as the presence of a sufficient foreign force kept down the discontents of the people, and that whenever that foreign force was removed, renewed disturbances would break out; and such a state of things would not be productive of that tranquillity which the Austrian Government must naturally wish to see established in Italy. 53

Palmerston then noted that:

For these reasons Her Majesty's Government are desirous of engaging the Austrian Government to
exert that influence which it is known to possess over the Papal Councils in order to persuade the Pope to maintain the Constitutional concessions which he made to his subjects last year, and thus to pave the way for his resumption of the Papal throne. 54

Palmerston was, however, being too optimistic. On 16 July Normanby observed to Palmerston that it was unlikely that Austria would accept these conditions, and also noted that as the French were moving away from insistence on a constitution the French government was anxious to end the occupation of Rome. He therefore proposed that Palmerston should be satisfied with a return to the Consulta which had been established in October 1847. 55 The situation was in fact even worse than Normanby imagined. On 27 July Schwarzenberg responded to Palmerston’s proposal. He noted sarcastically that two years before Palmerston had asked Metternich to agree to the encouragement of reform in Italy and observed that since then:

Those princes who were the first to grant to their country Constitutional guarantees have been the first victims of the vicissitudes of popularity. 56

In the light of this Austria could not accept the need for the constitution in Rome and they would only go as far as to recommend to the Pope that he should introduce the reforms recommended in the 1831 Memorandum of the
five Great Powers; the maintenance of municipal councils, the creation of provincial councils and the establishment of a central junta in Rome. To the Foreign Secretary’s dismay it was not just Austria that proposed this course of action. In early August Drouyn de Lhuys, who was now the French Ambassador in London, stated that the French policy was to recommend the 1831 Memorandum to the Pope. In reply to this news Palmerston protested that:

... as the British Government has not yet established diplomatic relations with the government of Rome, we have no means at present of tendering advice on such matters to the Pope, but that I much feared that such a limited arrangement as that described in the despatch which he had read to me, would fall short of the necessities of the case, and would not lay the foundation for contentment among the Roman people, and for permanent harmony between them and their Sovereign. 57

British efforts to halt this retreat were ignored. By August it was clear that the policy that Palmerston had pursued since January was in trouble. The news from Rome also confirmed that a return to constitutional government was unlikely. Commander Key, the commander of HMS Bulldog, reported to Admiral Parker on 22 August that:

The Triumvirate of Cardinals who now execute the temporal functions of the Pope, have shown
so decided a tendency to return even to the system of Government which existed before the present Pope's election, that the Roman people are beginning to look on the French as their hope, and their intercourse with them is gradually becoming more cordial. 58

On 6 September the Pope came to Naples and celebrated mass at the cathedral, after which he gave his benediction to the people assembled in front of the church. The following day, the Pope received at Portici the members of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Court of Rome. 59

The Pope, however, showed no desire to return immediately to Rome. This was largely due to continued disagreement with the French. In French eyes, stable government could only be obtained if the Papal government was to be based upon the principles of the general amnesty, secularization of the administration, the application of the Code Napoleon, and liberal institutions. Despite this pressure from Paris, Pius declared that a general amnesty was impossible, refused to base his laws on the Code Napoleon, and opposed the secularization of the administration. 60 The Pope had already concluded in April that constitutionalism was incompatible with his personal liberty as head of the church; he now broadened his opposition and condemned freedom of the press and constitutional government as intrinsically evil. By September he had further clarified his position, stating
that liberalism tended to mislead the masses in those countries in which it held sway. 61

The *Motu Proprio* of September 12 1849, written by Antonelli, promised administrative and judicial reforms in line with the 1831 Memorandum, but it said little about specific political liberties and failed to mention the constitution of 1848. 62 In addition, Pius granted a limited amnesty to those who had taken a minor role in the revolution. It was the reactionary policy of the Cardinals which shaped this policy and in particular Antonelli was the main influence. As Sir George Hamilton wrote to Palmerston on 6 October:

> This is a melancholy prospect of the future. No immediate remedy seems at hand. The Pope is now undoubtedly swayed by entirely opposite principles to those formerly entertained by him. From being too hasty and energetic a reformer he is supposed to have become opposed to any changes, and to countenance the ancient hierarchical absolutism. 63

Hamilton's perspective on the Pope's political inclinations was pessimistic. There seemed to be no chance of constitutional government returning. 64

The British government's effort to shape the nature of the Papal restoration in Rome thus came to an end in an ignominious fashion which revealed the lack of British
influence over Papal affairs. Palmerston’s frustration at the course of events was evident in a letter he wrote to Normanby on 3 September in which he discussed the recent attacks on French policy in the British press. He noted to Normanby that the weight of public opinion was against France and observed:

The Times, Chronicle and Daily News ... are in no way under my control. If I could influence them I should begin by stopping their attacks on myself, and as I have no means of doing that you cannot suppose I can gag them about the French Govt. But the fact is that everybody here thought and thinks that the French government have made and are still making a series of mistakes about Rome. 65

The French government, however, still influenced by Louis Napoleon’s desire to appeal to French Catholics continued to try to reach agreement with the Papacy on the system of government in Rome and turned its back on the need for a liberal administrative system. The discussions over this question took a long time and the Pope would not, in fact, return to Rome until April 1850.

Section III: Anti-clericalism and the Roman Republic

One of the most important issues raised by the establishment of the Roman Republic was the anti-clerical
and to some degree anti-Catholic, policies followed by the government in Rome. Despite the fact that Britain was not a Catholic country it could not remain indifferent to this policy as British Catholic subjects owned property in Rome and it was therefore on occasion forced to take action to defend its interests.

There had been a strong desire among the Roman people for lay participation and control of the temporal government of the Papal States even before the declaration of the Roman Republic. Once in power Mazzini insisted that his government was based upon this desire, and that his authority rested upon the will of the people who had elected the Constituent Assembly and not of the Pope and the Cardinals. The Roman Republic, therefore, deposed the Papal government, and announced that the new Constituent Assembly would create a new regime.

The clash between the government and the Catholic Church was reflected in the decree of 8 February proclaiming the Roman Republic which declared:

1. The temporal power of the Popedom is suppressed de facto and de jure in the Roman States.
2. The Roman Pontiff will have all the necessary guarantees in the independent exercise of the spiritual power. 66
This very important decree went on in articles three and four to proclaim the virtues of democratic, secular government and its support for a united Italy.

The Constituent Assembly built on this basis when on 21 February it declared 'That our glorious Repubblica Romana declared that all ecclesiastical riches are nationalized, and now become state property'. The intention behind these reforms was to redistribute wealth and liberate economic activity. In order to achieve this a major part of the public debt was guaranteed by the mortgaging of ecclesiastic property, but the enormous amounts of property involved proved difficult to administer. The state assumed the administration of clerical property, and allowed clergy in the employ of the state to be the temporal administrators of this property. As a consequence of this policy, the government introduced its system of salaried clergy.

In the days of the Triumvirate, during the period of the Roman Republic, further serious attacks were made upon the Church by the revolutionary government in Rome. Mazzini, Garibaldi and ardent Mazzinian republicans really wanted to see the end of Papal Rome. The expropriation of ecclesiastical property was complemented in this period by agrarian reform. Although the Roman Republic emerged as a liberal-bourgeois regime, its agrarian policy was more radical so far as the peasantry was concerned than in any of the other Italian states in 1848-9, and the major plank in the agrarian reforms was
the transfer of ecclesiastical land from the Church to the peasantry. Given the short life of the Republic the reforms could not be completed, and therefore it was impossible to say whether the distribution of national property in the Roman States would have been different from that in the Mezzogiorno under the Napoleonic period, but it is evident that this measure was popular as there was no mass peasant rebellion in 1849. 69

In addition, anti-clerical hostility was displayed by agitators outside the Roman government. On the whole rioting and in particular attacks upon the clergy, were more widespread in the provinces than in the city of Rome. Among the most notorious were the murders carried out by the Congregate d’Inferno at Sinigaglia, and the feud between the Republicans and the Centurions at Ancona. The latter reached such proportions that Mazzini was obliged to send his follower Felice Orsini to restore order. 70

Obviously such policies and incidents provoked difficulties in and outside Italy. The policy towards ecclesiastical property was in particular one of the most controversial political reforms executed by the Republican government, and caused a hostile reaction from the European powers as well as the other Italian states. This was not just true for the Catholic powers, but was also the case in Britain, particularly among English Catholics.
The Catholic periodical The Rambler on 14 March informed its readers that:

The government have, of course, been very busy with the Church; declared all its property to be the property of the State, and undertaken to provide a fitting maintenance for the ministers of religion, from the Pope down to the parish priest. They called upon all religious establishments to send in an inventory of their property, their goods and chattels of every description, and upon the Presidents of the different Priori to verify these inventories, where made, and to make them themselves, wherever the clergy refuse. 71

The Rambler criticized the Roman Republic’s policy towards ecclesiastical matters, and expressing its sympathy with a number of priests who had been unreasonably treated by the Republicans:

The two fathers (Cesarini and Concha) were locked up in the Inquisition, which these gentlemen, having abolished as a prison for ecclesiastics condemned by the Pope and Cardinals, seem now disposed to turn into a prison for ecclesiastics condemned by themselves. There were two prisoners; one, the Bishop of Memphis, whose history appeared in the Rambler, copied from Mr. Whiteside’s book,
some time ago, and another, a man who had forged letters of ordination and passed himself off for a priest somewhere in the Kingdom of Naples. 72

The correspondence on the Roman Republic in The Rambler also reveals how the Roman Republic seized ecclesiastical property, for example the bells of basilicas and of religious houses. The whole experience, The Rambler noted, had the effect of alienating Catholics, although this did not necessarily lead to sympathy with the Pope:

... not all who are disgusted with their experience of a Republic have returned to the Pope; a very large proportion of what might be otherwise called the Papal party are yet opposed to Pio Nono personally; they attributed all the commencement of troubles to the amnesty, and the continuation of them to the Pope's weakness and indecision. 73

Already by this date the British government has had cause to be concerned about the Roman government's designs on British ecclesiastical property. As a result of the Pope's flight from Rome, Dr Wiseman had as early as December 1848 written to Palmerston asking for the protection of the property of British Catholic establishments in Rome, and particularly those devoted to education under exclusively British administration. Wiseman stressed that the government should issue
instructions to its agents in Rome, stating that the property of the English College was the property of British subjects and that it was guaranteed by the protection of the British Crown. He noted that Catholic subjects in England had fears that the revolutionary government would 'lose little time in laying heavy imposts, perhaps confiscating, ecclesiastical property'.

Wiseman received assurances from the Foreign Office that British establishments in Rome, belonging to the English Catholic church, would be given 'the same privileges in regard to property held by them as are allowed to similar establishments at Rome belonging to the subjects of other countries'.

Wiseman realized that if he brought this issue to the government's attention the latter was bound to take action, as the sanctity of property was a fundamental principle of the British government. Britain did not act to defend only English Catholic property but also to protect British commercial holdings. This was particularly the case when in mid-February the Roman Republic called on all property-owners to contribute to a forced loan. On 24 February Freeborn informed Palmerston that he had discussed the application of this order to British property-holders with government officials including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Signor Carlo Busconi, and that:

After waiting some time, Sig. Borgatti
accompanied by Sig. Carlo Busconi, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of present government, appeared and informed me that he only considered British subjects holding landed property as liable, which so far is satisfactory. 76

The threat to Church property was, however, complicated by the existence in Rome of holdings belonging to the Irish College. Freeborn noted to Palmerston on 10 February that John Ennis, the head of a group of Irish Augustinian monks, had asked for the British government to protect all Church land whether it belonged to the English or Irish Catholic Church. Ennis’s letter noted:

In bringing the cause of the Establishment of the Irish Augustinians to your notice, I have to remark that, as this (Irish) Establishment like other British Roman Catholic Religious Establishments at Rome and in its States, is the property of British subjects, and is devoted to the education of such, under exclusively British Administrators, it may be considered in the light of national property, at least to the same extent as commercial and other private property, and that as such it may claim the same protection from the British Crown which similar Establishments of other nations, and specifically the Establishments belonging to France and Spain have claimed, and it is alleged, have successfully claimed from their respective Government. 77
Due to the principle of the sanctity of property the British government had no choice but to comply with this request for protection, even though the Irish College in Rome was seen as an enemy of Britain’s Irish policy.78

The British protection of the Irish Church was not the only irony caused by the Roman Republic’s anti-clericalism, for the whole issue of Church property led the British government to exhibit an inconsistent attitude towards the ecclesiastical issue. The basic position of the British government was that it supported the secularization of ecclesiastical offices but at the same time rejected the secularization of ecclesiastical property in the Papal States. British problems over property were exacerbated by the fact that the Roman government found it difficult to control the anti-clerical activities of the people. On 10 July, after the fall of the Republic, Petre noted to Palmerston that the number of seizures of British property had been high because:

... the government had no real authority and was not able to protect the seals against the people and their leaders who did not understand the difference between public and private property in this case and to construe the affixing of the English seals into an act to protect the property of the Neapolitan government as the English were then becoming
very unpopular on account of its protection of French subjects and of the supposed countenance given by the English government to the French intervention. 79

While it would be an exaggeration to say that concern for property, both commercial and ecclesiastical, dominated British diplomacy towards the Roman Republic, clearly the seizure of British holdings in Rome contributed to the desire to see the Republic overthrown and law and order restored.

Papal property and papal temporal power

The issue of ecclesiastical property, especially landed property, was related to the issue of the Pope's temporal power. When his temporal power was under attack from Britain, he emphasized in his encyclicals, in his allocution to the Sacred College of Cardinals, and in his public audiences, that the property of the Church was a patrimony held in trust from St Peter. Its function was to render the Pope independent of other Powers in order that he might exercise his spiritual power free of interference. Pius IX therefore believed that the property of the church was not his to relinquish; his duty was to preserve the patrimony and convey it to the next Vicar of Christ.

There was no doubt that the Pope and his cardinals could not accept the principle of the nationalization of ecclesiastical property, because the Vatican could not be
indifferent to the abandoning of the property and estates of the Church. The Pope was determined to be restored to his throne in Rome, in part because of the threat to the possessions of the Catholic Church, but also because of the challenge to his unlimited authority. These two motives were, in fact, inseparable, and touched upon the issue of the spiritual and physical prerogatives of the Church. Ecclesiastical property was one of the fundamental bases of the Pope’s temporal authority. If the Republicans had not tried to take ecclesiastical property from the Pope, the Pope would not have required foreign military intervention as promptly as he did. 80

Catholic subjects in Britain agreed with the Pope’s argument. In April 1849 an article in the The Rambler asserted that all Catholics conceded that the Pope’s temporal power as ruler of Rome was inseparable from his spiritual power as Bishop of Rome, 81 and stated it was impossible to modify this position. This meant that it was impossible for the Pope to act as a constitutional monarch:

For what is a constitutional sovereign, such as the Queen of the British Empire? In very truth, a constitutional monarch is no independent monarch at all. The sovereign of a free people is that branch of the legislature which has the control of the revenues of the state, and thus also of its army, and of its powers of making peace and war. The Queen of England, ... is
(sic) but the highest administrator of the will of the assembly which represents the people. ... Compare now the position and duties of the Sovereign Pontiff. A mere glance at his spiritual office convinces us that his circumstances are totally unlike those of any other temporal ruler upon earth. He has relations with the rest of the nations of mankind which are unknown to the merely secular potentate. 82

This argument, by comparing the status of the Queen in Britain with that of the Pope, made a mockery of the contention that if Pius followed the advice of the British government he would still be an independent sovereign. It noted that in fact the status of the Pope was that of an independent sovereign, superior to any other temporal monarchy on earth and thus any compromise of his power was impossible. In the eyes of The Rambler, the exile of Pius IX to Gaeta was a result of the circumstances in 1848 that had led him to become a limited sovereign. He had given power to the popular assembly which was then determined to go to war with Austria and violate the treaties of Europe:

And what is there to prevent the recurrence of the same conflict between the spiritual duties of the Pope and the necessity under which he will lie to obey the mandates of the Roman Chambers, so long as those chambers possessed
the real power of the sword, by possessing the power of the purse, and the power of driving any ministry from the helm of government? The Roman revolutions are vile enough, in truth; but it is not the singular and rare vileness of the individuals who proclaimed the republic which makes the existence of modern constitutionalism incompatible with that of the temporal power of the Papacy. 83

The article expressed antagonism towards the Roman Republic, claiming that the existence of a modern constitutional government was incompatible with the temporal power of the Papacy. Although The Rambler emphasized the independence and superiority of the Pope, it realized that the Papacy was at a critical juncture and that it had to adapt to the current political situation.

On the other hand, The Times underlined its strong antipathy towards clericalism, and argued for a policy that was close to that of the British government. An article on 16 June noted:

I fear the European Catholic powers have been acting all this time on false data, and have been confounding two things that are essentially different. I mean the return of the Pope himself, and the restitution of the Government of Cardinals. The one is still
possible, though the French expedition and the loss of life at Rome could convert the love of people for the person of the Pope into a feeling of a very opposite character, but the other is quite impossible, and the sooner the great powers understand that fact the better it will be for the welfare not only of the Roman Catholic religion, but of Christianity in general. At such a moment as the present we must not be deaf and blind, and I am convinced that church government, as it existed, cannot be restored at Rome. 84

When The Times referred to the issue of the separation of Papal temporal and spiritual power it entered into an area of much controversy for English public opinion. The moderate stand taken by The Times, and put into practice by the British government, was not enough to satisfy the increasing calls among the public for the Pope to be deprived of all temporal power. The establishment of the Roman Republic and the Pope’s rejection of his former liberal policies meant that British public opinion had sympathy with the anti-clerical policies espoused by Mazzini and that it became overtly hostile to Pius IX. The call for the British government to push for the end of the Pope’s temporal power became louder after the collapse of the Roman Republic and the arrival of many Republican exiles in Britain.
The Roman Question and political refugees in Britain.

One of the subjects arising from the Roman Republic which has attracted little attention, despite available documentation, is the arrival in Britain of Roman political refugees after the collapse of the Roman Republic in July 1849. At the time this became a major topic of interest in British newspapers and periodicals, and can also be seen in contemporary private correspondence.

The British government was concerned about the political influence which the refugees from the Roman Republic, particularly revolutionaries and republicans, might have over the British public, because, as we have seen above, many Chartists already looked to Mazzini for support. Despite this concern, Britain, as a liberal state, could not reject refugees. In fact Britain already had accepted Mazzini and the other Italian political exiles after the 1830 Revolution in Italy, although Mazzini was treated with some suspicion. 85

The arrival, soon after the fall of the Republic, of large numbers of Mazzinian refugees in England, among them Orsini, Alessandro Gavazzi, Spola, Aurelio Saffi, and before long Mazzini himself, had the effect of spreading their opinions to Brighton and Bristol, to London and Liverpool, and as far north as Edinburgh. 86

The escape of these individuals was made possible by the British Consular Agent at Rome, John Freeborn, who issued
on his own initiative, some five hundred passports to revolutionaries who were trying to escape. Palmerston reproved Freeborn for granting these passports, and informed the latter on 23 July that 'You were not authorized by your instructions to grant such passports'. Palmerston continued his reprimand by observing:

In the present case it does not appear what imminent or great personal danger threatened those 500 persons to whom you gave passports. I cannot therefore approve of your having without any necessity ... encouraged and aided 500 foreigners to come to England, where they will probably on their arrival be destitute of any means of subsistence.

Responding to Palmerston on 5 August, Freeborn regretted that he had earned the Foreign Secretary's disapproval. Freeborn asserted that, as Rome was in a state of confusion following the occupation of the French army, there were a number of Roman people who were in danger and sought safety. He wrote to Palmerston that:

I must therefore beg of your Lordship to rely on the veracity of my assertion that such were their verbal declarations, and I at the time considered them in imminent peril. I take the liberty of stating that I have declined receiving any fee of office on the passports.
above alluded to, and I afforded pecuniary aid to several distressed refugees from a charitable fund made up by me and by some of my personal friends. 89

Freeborn also estimated that the actual number of political refugees to land in England, would be fewer than five hundred individuals, and emphasized that Roman political refugees were not poor immigrants, but were political exiles belonging to Italian noble families. 90

In reply, Palmerston emphasized that discretion was required when issuing a passport, even for British subjects. He alluded to Freeborn’s imprudence in a letter to Consul Moore in Ancona.

The consul will, as a matter of cause, not take upon himself to grant Passports. If however the Regulation of the place at which he may be stationed should require that British Subjects shall be provided with Passport from the British Consul, he will consider himself authorized, with proper caution, to grant such Passport; or if the local Regulations require that the Consul should countersign Passports already granted to British subjects, or that he should furnish certificates to British subjects to enable them to obtain Passports from other specified Authorities, he will, with due
Freeborn's actions were also criticized as an abuse of privilege in *The Times* in an article on 6 August which observed:

I know not whether the profuse liberality with which British passports have been issued here be considered in England as an abuse of consular privileges, but I hear that it has led to more than one unpleasant difficulty with foreign Legations. All these passports were given without signature, to persons evidently not British subjects. I know a diplomatist who has refused to visa them, and I am told that beyond Rome they are often treated as so much waste paper. It is much to be regretted that a British passport should be exposed to doubt, or to dishonour, for every man who has travelled as much as I have done must have found it was better to him than a coat of mail.

Freeborn wrote a private letter to Lord Minto, concerning Palmerston's criticism and the press's accusation regarding his action over the issue of passports to Italian political refugees. Following completion of his special mission to Rome in March 1848, Lord Minto continued to be preoccupied with Italian affairs. In public his involvement had led to his resignation from
the Cabinet because his political enemies were anti-Italian and pro-Austrian, but in private he continued to write letters and keep diaries relating to Roman affairs. It might therefore be presumed that Freeborn intended to obtain Minto's favour concerning the Italian refugees affair, hoping that Minto would have some influence with Russell and Palmerston. 93

If Freeborn hoped that Minto could assist him he was mistaken, for the latter was widely seen as having failed in his mission of 1847-48. The Times on 6 August criticized Minto for failing in his endeavours to move the Italian people towards constitutional liberalism.

The Right Hon. Mr Gladstone passed through Rome a few days since on his way to Naples, and you have no idea how rejoiced those who knew of his arrival were, in the hope of his giving aid in the settlement of Roman affairs, and how disappointed they now are on learning that he had no mission at all. I do not say that the people any longer entertain the extravagant ideas inspired by Lord Minto's pilgrimage and public declaration; what they want to hear is that constitutional England has assisted in the settlement of their affairs. 94

The problem of Roman political refugees even surfaced in Malta, where the Governor was an Irishman, Richard More O'Ferrall. O'Ferrall caused controversy when he refused
to accept the validity of the British passports of some Roman exiles. This incident was reported in widely differing ways within the British press. **Punch**, which had already expressed its sympathy for the Roman Republic and for anti-clericalism, led the charge against O’Ferrall:

Turn we now to England’s hope and representative at Malta, Mr Moore O’Ferrall. Two hundred Roman refugees, with English passports visaed by the English Consul at Cività Vecchia, arrived at Malta in the French steamer Lycurgue, and a vessel called the Robin. They sailed in the fullest belief of the protection of the English passport; for many might have departed in the Lombardo for Genoa. But no; they had a religious confidence in the faith of England. Among these emigrants were men and women; the sick and the wounded. Well the Governor of Malta, contemptuous of the British passport, would not permit the landing of the sufferers. One fifth of the two hundred refugees found means to sail in the Pipon, for England; the remainder, by the last accounts, were still in the Mediterranean.  

**The Times**, referring to the same incident, took the opposite view. It noted in an article on 6 August that one personage among the Roman political refugees was a dangerous revolutionary, and that despite this fact, a
British consul had provided a passport for him. 97

The passport was, the article noted, made out under a false name, that of an English noble, which raised the question of whether the Consul himself was aware of this falsehood.

But what I want to know is by whose order did he receive a British passport; and was it not under the immediate cognizance of the agent who gave it to him that he was then, and since then, employed in hatching rebellion against his own Sovereign, and helping by every means in his power the Republican Government of Rome?98

As far as the argument of the article was concerned, for a British diplomat to act on behalf of Roman Republicans implied collaboration with the rebellion against the Papal Sovereign. The article not only condemned the person who ordered the issue of the passport as a disgrace to the British Government, but also raised the question of whether or not he had acted alone.

I have no doubt the British Agent acted by superior orders, as, though his good-nature may be surprised into issuing some hundred passports under the peculiar exigency of the other day, he is not a man to be humbugged into granting his seal and signature, in defiance of
all legality, as long ago as the 6th of April last. I have taken some pains to establish the facts of this case, and as they are very peculiar, I submit them to your consideration.99

This was not totally speculation, for although the British government had officially opposed the Roman Republic, there were constituencies within the government which personally sympathized with the Republican political exiles after the collapse of the Roman Republic. The Quarterly Review, a conservative periodical, went as far as to suggest in September that Palmerston himself would take pleasure from the presence of the radical exiles in Britain, and that Mazzini would benefit as the latter would:

... now have the advantage of a personal communication with Lord Palmerston, who will have the best opportunity of ascertaining the views of leading republicans from the fountain-head, and of communicating to them in return the intentions of Her Majesty’s Cabinet. 100

It can be seen from the Malta incident and the wider issue of the Roman refugees that the aim of British foreign policy towards Rome, to destroy the Roman Republic through co-operation with French military intervention in Rome, had provoked a widening gap between the conservative and radical elements in British public opinion. English radical intellectuals who had political
links with Mazzini and other Italian republican exiles in his circle, supported the Roman Republic. However, not only within public opinion but also within government circles there were public officials, such as Freeborn, who sympathized with some Roman republicans. That is why Palmerston was obliged to justify military intervention in Rome in the press, explaining that Britain should play an active role on the international scene.

British Public opinion and Italian nationalism

Although the British government recommended the secularization of the Papal administration and the separation of Papal spiritual and temporal power, it still felt that it was necessary to have the Pope as a temporal sovereign. However, a large segment of the British public, which traditionally held anti-Catholic sentiments, was favourable to the Roman Republic's anti-clerical stance. After the fall of the Republic this group within society welcomed the Republican exiles to Britain and were in turn influenced by their views. There was a consensus between the Republicans and the English radicals that Italian liberal nationalism could not coexist with ecclesiastical politics and Papal temporal power. They agreed that Italian independence could only be achieved after the expulsion of Papal authority from Rome. 101

Since the French Revolution, ideas of revolution and the freedom of Europe had often been discussed in the context
of liberation from Catholic despotism. Within Britain the radicals and middle-class intellectuals were attracted to revolutionary causes in continental Europe, simply because of their traditional opposition to Catholic absolutism. This applied as much to the events of 1848 and 1849 as it had to earlier revolutions such as that in Belgium in 1830. 102

The Italian revolutions, in particular, provided inspiration to and provoked the admiration of English radicals. 103 Support for the republican cause in Italy was particularly strong among Dissenters and Nonconformists, who were already a key element in Chartist-affiliated groups like Mazzini's *International League* and *The Friends of Italy*. The most vocal of the Protestant groups involved in support of the republican and anti-Papal cause was *The Evangelical Alliance*. *The Evangelical Alliance* was a radical Protestant group, which held countless public meetings, lectures and sermons on the evils of Popery. Its anti-Catholic position was also developed in printed sources, most notably the pages of *The Record*, an Evangelical journal. *The Evangelical Alliance* was different from other Protestant groups in the fact that it was more well-connected both domestically and internationally, and was able to put pressure on governments to listen to its views. 104
The Achilli affair

The growing strength of anti-clerical opinion and the central role of The Evangelical Alliance was particularly important in the events surrounding the arrest and subsequent release of Dr Giacomo Achilli. Achilli was a former Dominican priest who had converted to Protestantism, and was involved as a republican in Rome in speaking out against the corruption of the Catholic Church.

After his conversion to Protestantism in 1842 Achilli had eventually settled in Britain, and in the summer of 1848 he had joined The Evangelical Alliance. However, in January 1849, inspired by the Pope’s flight, he returned to Rome to take part in the Republican government. He was very enthusiastic about what he saw in Rome and wrote on 7 February to Sir Culling Eardley who was one of the executive members of The Evangelical Alliance, that:

Yesterday there was a great festival to celebrate the opening of the Constituent Assembly. I have never seen so much joy among the people as on this occasion. The few malcontents did not show themselves. To judge from these good appearances, it may be frankly said, that the Romans desired no more Pope and no more Popery. Let God protect us and we shall advance in his truth.
Achilli regarded the Roman Constituent Assembly as a fulfilment of the no-Popery movement, and was pleased to find that his anti-clerical ideas were similar to those proposed by the Circolo Popolare. He became involved in forwarding his opinions to the press and wrote to Eardsley on 7 April:

Today I have sent a second [letter?] to the press, which is somewhat more full and copious, and I purpose having a series of addresses, which will be published weekly on the truths of Christianity, and against the opposite errors of the Papal system. 107

He also observed to Eardsley that the fall of Papal authority had revealed the true character of the Catholic Church's despotism, as visitors to the Papal prisons had witnessed.

... the horrid dungeons, where the victims of the Papacy have been incarcerated. It seems that the inquisitors in hopes of an intervention to bring back the Pope and Cardinals to Rome, did not take sufficient care to remove certain objects which might betray their cruelty to the people. 108

Achilli was still in Rome when it fell to the forces of General Oudinot, and was subsequently arrested in late July and held in detention by the French army. No sooner
had the news of Achilli's arrest arrived in England on 2 August than members of The Evangelical Alliance took prompt measures, in France as well as in Britain, to obtain his release. The statement circulated by the leadership of the Alliance to its members noted:

Dr Achilli was arrested on the 29 July two days before General Oudinot ceded his authority to the Cardinal Vicars of Rome and his agents, ... and it was under the escort of French soldiers that Dr Achilli, converted to Protestantism seven years since, was conducted and incarcerated within the wall of the Inquisition. 109

The committee of the British branch of the Alliance decided to lobby Palmerston, and, in addition, the Committee of the Italian Society of London had an interview with Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Ambassador to Britain. 110

The British branch of The Evangelical Alliance, which held its annual meeting at Glasgow from 12 to 14 October, adopted a resolution in which British Christians expressed their sympathy with Dr Achilli. They agreed to condemn the conduct of the Inquisition for bringing accusations against a prisoner without allowing him to communicate with his friends, or with any evidence being heard in his defence. 111 There was among them confidence, that the French government would regard
Achilli's liberation as justice. To put pressure on France it was decided to send a deputation to Paris, which if necessary would go even to Rome. Lord Wriothesly Russell, the half-brother of the Prime Minister, and the Rev Edward Bickersteth, both members of the Evangelical Alliance, were chosen to form a part of this deputation. Eardley recorded in an account of the Achilli affair published in 1850 that:

We started for Paris the week which followed that of the conference. We bless God for the brotherly reception which the Protestants of Paris have given us, as well as for the cordial co-operation which we have met with in the committee of the French section of the Alliance; the British ambassador also took this affair to heart, the Duke de Broglie, to whom they were presented received them with the greatest kindness, and interposed in our behalf with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 112

In defending Achilli from the charges against him Eardsley observed that:

Though he [Achilli] naturally sympathised with the political aspiration of republicans, and availed himself of their hostility to tyranny to excite their attention to the corruptions of the Romish Church, yet he refrained from any
participation in secular politics. It would be well if the Roman Catholic priests in Ireland could say as much! The reader in perusing these letters will make allowance of the position of the Christian man in the so-called "State of the Church".

It was impossible for such a person not to rejoice in the overthrow of the most hateful Government in Christendom. 113

Even Petre, who as a Catholic might have been expected to sympathize with Achilli's arrest, observed in a letter to Palmerston the danger of any vindictive proceedings against a man so generally known, and whose case was taken up by thousands. On 25 September Petre informed Palmerston:

That when Protestant writers and speakers accused the church of Rome of holding persecuting tenets, they were always met by the assertion that religious persecution had been the sin of imperfect civilisation and enlightenment, and that nothing of the sort was or could be, practised now. If Achilli lost his liberty, and perhaps his life for conscience sake what would the world say? 114

As it turned out Achilli's case did not deteriorate into a grave issue concerning political relations between Britain, France and Rome, partly because Achilli himself
was not a leading figure in the Roman Republic, and also because France did not regard Achilli's detention as a major issue. However, it appears that Britain took his case seriously, because Achilli provoked a political and religious controversy in Britain regarding the Roman affair which touched on the issue of Papal temporal and spiritual power.

There were still by the end of 1849 a few with sympathies for the exiled Pope within the British government including the Queen, but the majority of English people regularly exhibited anti-Papal feeling. After Achilli's appearance in front of the English public in 1850, revealing the maliciousness and corruption of the Catholic Church, and the publication of Eardley's account of Achilli's incarceration, this sentiment grew apace and English people, incited by the establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy, confirmed their hostility towards the Pope. The shift of English public opinion against the Pope from 1849 to 1850 was significant, and can be explained in part, by Achilli's activity in Britain. Thus in 1849 Achilli began to lay the ground that would lead eventually to the anti-Papal movement in 1850.

Conclusion

Although the British government was very reluctant to get involved with military intervention against the Roman Republic, it eventually had to agree to the French
expedition. It was discovered during the crisis that Britain could do little itself to prevent a clash between France and Austria, which was avoided simply due to an Austrian retreat and not because of Britain's diplomatic contribution.

In addition, Palmerston's hope that, despite the use of military power, the French would still favour the installation of the Pope as a constitutional monarch, was disappointed. In the April Allocution of 1849 Pius IX declared that the adoption of a constitution and liberal politics in the Papal States was impossible, because of the difficulty of co-ordinating Papal spiritual power with constitutional liberalism. Ultimately he clarified his anti-constitutional inclination in public in September after the collapse of the Roman Republic. Neither the British nor the French governments could persuade the Pope to compromise.

The Roman Republic's declaration of the end of Papal temporal power brought divergent reactions from the British government and radical public opinion. The British government was faced with a difficult situation. It was restricted by its inability to do anything but support the restoration of the Pope as the legitimate sovereign ruler of the Papal States; to have followed a different policy would have been to break with the order established under the Concert of Europe which would set a dangerous precedent. In addition, the Roman Republic's radical and anti-clerical policy such as the
nationalization of Catholic Church property, was not acceptable to the British government, because this policy directly affected the interests of British subjects, including that of the English and Irish Catholic Church. There were therefore a number of pressures that forced the British government to follow an essentially cautious policy, even though Palmerston had his doubts about French policy and the possibility that Pius would turn his back on his previous reforms.

At the same time an important segment of the British public increasingly expressed anti-Catholic sentiments and supported the abolition of the temporal power of the Papacy. The British radical public identified the power of the Catholic Church with despotism, and expressed admiration for Mazzini's republicanism which was based upon their support for the goal of a liberal and democratic society. These ideas were transferred to Britain after the Republican exiles who landed in Britain exacerbated the English public's anti-Catholic prejudices. The stage was thus set for a confrontation between the government and the public over policy towards Rome which would reach a climax in 1850.
Notes

2 Consul Freeborn (Rome) to Minto, 8 January 1849, Minto Papers, Manuscripts Collection, National Library of Scotland, No.12069.


4 Ibid., p.42.

5 Sir George Hamilton (Florence) to Lord Palmerston. 25 January 1849, Palmerston (Broadlands) Papers, University of Southampton Library.

6 Palmerston to Ralph Abercromby (Turin), 31 January 1849, Palmerston Papers.

7 Northern Star, 20 January 1849.


9 Ibid., p.233.

10 E. Morelli, 'I Verbali del comitato', p.60.

11 British Parliamentary Sessional Paper (House of Commons) Correspondence Respecting Affairs of Rome, 1849 1851/LVII, (hereafter BPSP, Rome), Freeborn to Palmerston, 9 February 1849, 'Decree Proclaiming the Roman Republic'.


14 Ibid., p.404.

15 Ibid., p.402.

16 BPSP, Rome, LVII, Freeborn to Hamilton, 10 February 1849.


18 The opening of Mazzini's mail by the British Post Office was reported in the Westminster Review in 1844, see chapter one.


25 Finn, After Chartism, p.166.

26 G.W.M Reynolds named one of his sons, ‘Kossuth Mazzini’. See entry on Reynolds in Dictionary of Labour Biography.

27 Spirit of the Age, 3 March 1849.

28 Ibid.

29 Punch, Vol.16, Jan-July 1849, p.39


32 BPSP, Correspondence Respecting Affairs of Italy, 1849 1849/LVIII (hereafter BPSP, Italy) Palmerston to Normanby (Paris), 5 January 1849.

33 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio Personale di Pio IX, Sovrani, No.1, Queen Victoria to Pius IX, 8 January 1849

34 BPSP, Italy, LVIII, Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby (Vienna), 1 February 1849.


38 Scott, The Roman Question, pp.35-6.
39 BPSP, Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Rome
1849/LVII (hereafter BPSP, 1849/LVII) Lord Napier
(Naples) to Palmerston, 2 February 1849.

40 BPSP, 1849/LVII, Palmerston to Normanby, 9 March 1849.

41 Ibid.


43 Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.69.

44 BPSP, Instructions Addressed by the Government of
France to French Agents at Vienna and at Gaeta.
Respecting French Expedition to Civita Vecchia, 1849/LVII
Drouyn de Lhuys to Admiral Cecille, 19 April 1849,
(communicated to Palmerston by Cecille on 21 April).

45 PRO FO43/44 Lord Petre (Gaeta) to Palmerston, 12 March
1849.


47 BPSP, Rome, LVII Lt. Willes (HMS Spitfire) to Captain
Sir James Stirling (HMS Howe), 1 May 1849, enclosure in
Admiralty to Addington (Foreign Office) 22 May 1849.

48 Scott, The Roman Question, p.53.

49 BPSP, Rome, LVII, Freeborn to Palmerston, 1 May 1849.

50 BPSP, Rome, LVII, Palmerston to Normanby, 12 June 1849.

51 BPSP, Rome, LVII, Normanby to Palmerston, 3 July 1849.

52 The Times, 11 July 1849.

53 BPSP, Rome, LVII, Palmerston to Ponsonby, 13 July 1849.

54 Ibid.

55 Palmerston to Napier, 16 July 1849, Palmerston Papers.

56 BPSP, Rome, LVII, Prince Schwarzenberg (Vienna) to
Count Colloredo (London), 27 July 1849, communicated to
Palmerston, 3 August 1849.

57 BPSP, Rome, LVII, Palmerston to Normanby, 7 August
1849.

58 BPSP, Rome, LVII, Commander Key (HMS Bulldog) to
Admiral Parker, 22 August 1849.

59 BPSP, Rome, LVII, The Hon. W. Temple (Naples) to
Palmerston, 8 September 1849.
60 Coppa, *Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli*, p.74.

61 Scott, *The Roman Question*, p.76.


63 *BPSP*, Rome, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 6 October 1849.

64 *BPSP*, Rome, LVII, Hamilton to Palmerston, 23 November 1849.

65 *BPSP*, Rome, LVII, Temple to Palmerston, 3 September 1849.

66 *BPSP*, Rome, LVII, Freeborn to Palmerston, 9 February 1849.

67 Archivio di Stato di Roma, Repubblica Romano del 1849, 21 February 1849, Busta 1279, No.49504.

68 PRO FO43/44, Petre to Hamilton, 24 February 1849.


70 Ibid.


72 Ibid., p.603.

73 Ibid., p.604.


75 Ibid.

76 PRO FO43/44, Freeborn to Temple, 24 February 1849.

77 PRO FO43/44, Petre to Hamilton, 10 February 1849.

78 PRO FO43/44, 10 February 1849, Petre to Palmerston. The letter noted ‘... I have received a letter dated February 8 from the Reverend John Ennis, a British subject and superior of the Establishment of Irish Augustinians, situated in Santa Maria in Posterula, in which he complains of the great loss of property which he has sustained in consequence of the law lately passed, commonly called Affraniazione di Canoni, stating moreover that though he had protested, through his lawyer, as a British subject, against the operation of this law, ... ’

79 PRO FO43/44, Petre to Eddesbury, 10 July 1849
Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna*, pp.430-431


Ibid., pp.558-9.

Ibid., p.560.

*The Times*, 16 June 1849.


BPSP, Rome, LVII, Palmerston to Freeborn, 23 July 1849.

BPSP, Rome, LVII, Freeborn to Palmerston, Rome, 4 August 1849. In his correspondence Freeborn referred to cases involving aid to Roman refugees by the representatives of other foreign governments: 'I was not singular in giving my aid to the refugees to leave Rome; the other Consuls, moved by a sense of humanity, did the same, inasmuch that 3000 passports were granted by the American, Swiss, Bavarian, and Sardinian Consuls.'

Ibid.

PRO FO43/45, Palmerston to Moore, 23 July 1849.

*The Times*, 6 August 1849.

Freeborn to Minto, 18 July 1849, Minto Papers, NLS MSS, 'I am very much hurt in receiving Lord Palmerston's disapproval of my act in granting passports to refugees. His Lordship does not see the necessity of it and how can I prove that necessity? I am sure however that His Lordship will make allowances for my despatch...these unfortunate people must have quitted the city.'

*The Times*, 6 August 1849.


*The Times*, 6 August 1849. This article explains how the passport was fabricated: 'The passport was not made out in his own name, or in any name by which his profession might be recognized, but in that of a titled person, which as completely covered his incognito as if the same Herr Hecker was styled the Baron of Breadbalance. Not only was he protected himself, but
he was allowed to cover two other accomplices and the word secretary and domestic in blank gave him the power of including two members of the Triumvirate, or two liberated galley slaves, at his good choice."

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
101 Ibid., p. 70.
102 Ibid., p. 66.
103 Finn, After Chartism, p. 112.
106 Ibid., p. 14, Achilli to Eardley, 7 February 1849.
107 Ibid., p. 19, Achilli to Eardley, 7 April 1849.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., p. 29, 14 August 1849, Eardley to Members of the Evangelical Alliance.
110 Ibid., p. 37.
111 Ibid., p. 47.
112 Ibid., p. 49-51.
113 Ibid., p. 57.
114 Petre to Palmerston, 25 September 1849, and, Palmerston to Petre, 28 September 1849, Palmerston Papers.
Chapter V

British reactions to the restoration of Papal authority in Rome and the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy, 1850-52

Introduction

The restoration of Papal authority in Rome in 1850 has always been discussed in a negative context, particularly in terms of the Vatican's relations with Britain. As is well known, Britain considered Piedmont to be the most liberal state on the Italian peninsula, and it has been believed that the hostility between Piedmont and the Papacy, which became more intense after the Pope's reactionary policy was introduced, led to antagonism between Britain and the Papal States. However, the situation was not so clear-cut, and it is therefore necessary to investigate closely Anglo-Vatican relations after the Pope's return to Rome in April 1850.

1850 was, however, the year not only of the restoration of Papal authority in Rome but also of the re-establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy in England. It was no coincidence that these two incidents took place in the same year, as the return of the Pope to Rome was a precondition for the achievement of Cardinal Wiseman's ambition. Wiseman's elevation to the rank of Cardinal was significant not only for the English Catholic Church, but also for British domestic politics, for which it had important ramifications. Wiseman's triumph had the effect of shifting the issue of Papal temporal power from
foreign to domestic affairs, because it provoked the spectre of a Roman Catholic threat to Britain. The timing was doubly unfortunate as these events coincided with Mazzini's presence in London, leading to the danger that, as a symbol of No-Popery, he might be able to transfer the issue of revolution and republicanism from the Italian to the English context, thus threatening the British government. The English public and the British government reacted differently to the situation: while the English public was hostile to the Papacy as well as to Catholics in Britain, the government was forced to react quickly to contain any 'No-Popery' agitation.

The approach of this thesis, in contrast to previous work on this period, is more international in scope, and instead of concentrating only on British domestic affairs, it looks to fit the 'No-Popery' movement into a broader Risorgimento context. Our interest is concentrated on the particular anti-Papal movement period during 1850-52 rather than anti-Catholicism in its widest sense. Emphasis will be put upon the link between the anti-Papal movement and Mazzini's republican and nationalism. Another intention is to integrate religious and political issues, as in Wolfe and Paz's work, in order to demonstrate that anti-Catholicism was not simply anti-Irish in the political context. ¹

Section One discusses the British government's foreign policy towards the Papacy in the light of the latter's
troubled diplomatic relations with Piedmont and France, which has been examined by Scott, Coppa and Martina. ² Section Two examines the process of achieving the restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy, looking at the divisions within the English Catholic Church and the impact of Wiseman’s Ultramontanism. Section Three assesses the rise of anti-Papal sentiment, including the involvement of the radicals and Mazzini. Section Four analyses the extent to which the movement led to incidents of anti-Catholic violence and Section Five Russell’s response to the growing agitation within the country.

Section I: The restoration of Papal authority in Rome.

After the French, Spanish and Neapolitan armies invaded Rome to restore Papal authority, it took a good while before the Pope actually returned to the city of Rome, because he thought the conditions for his restoration suggested by France were inadequate. One reason for this was Pius IX’s resistance to French demands that he support liberal reforms. ³ Another reason was that it was necessary to wait until people in Rome had been pacified following the intervention and the collapse of the Roman Republic.

In August 1849 Corcelle was sent from Rome to Gaeta to persuade the Pope to consider an early return to his lands, but after the failure of his mission to Naples, in late January 1850 the negotiations were transferred to
Paris and there came to a rapid conclusion. On January 28, 1850, the French government sent a letter to the Pontiff, congratulating him on his intention to return to Rome, but this was premature, since Cardinal Antonelli, the Secretary of State, was not convinced of the wisdom of an immediate Papal restoration. He regarded this as a new intervention by the French and therefore turned back to his old project for concerted action by the Catholic powers. 4

After negotiations between the Pope, the European Powers, and the other Italian states, Pius IX finally decided to return to Rome on 11 April. Following his return, the triumvirate of Cardinals who had exercised authority in his absence was dissolved, and power was concentrated in the hands of Cardinal Antonelli. 5

The Pope's return was greeted with brilliant and spontaneous illuminations throughout the capital. An English traveller recorded the following:

It seemed to me that the population never slept; they were perambulating the streets chanting "Viva Pio Nono" all night; there was the same crowd, with the same excitement. 6

He lamented, however, that 'History of the last two years has taught us to set very little reliance on any demonstrations of public opinion', 7 and he recorded his belief that the future was uncertain:
Thus far prognostications have been defeated. The Pope is in the Vatican. Let us hope the prophets of evil may again find their predictions falsified; but alas! It is impossible to be blind to the fact that within the last few days the happiness of many homes have been destroyed and that the triumph of the one has been purchased by the sorrow of the many. 8

Petre also witnessed the enthusiastic response to the Papal procession, and noted to Hamilton on 13 April that the Pope had been received ‘in a manner ... widely different from that in which he used to be greeted by the hireling mobs of the Clubs’. Petre also observed that ‘the poorest of the population joined in the rejoicings’, which was not surprising to see as 25,000 dollars had been distributed to the poor on the order of the Pope. 12 April would afterwards be celebrated annually in the Papal States. Antonelli claimed that these demonstrations of support disproved the lies about the Pope’s unpopularity.

Shortly afterwards the Spaniards and Neapolitans withdrew, the French reduced their forces to one division in the vicinity of the capital, and the Austrians maintained one division in the Legations. 9 The Pope became increasingly reactionary and rejected all reforms that seemed likely to weaken Papal government. The
Sovereign Pontiff had returned to the Holy See, unencumbered by any condition other than his published Motu-Proprio of 12 September 1849, but was slow to introduce even to a limited degree the reforms promised in this address. His temporal power was intact, and his spiritual authority was not diminished but enhanced. As the Pontiff, relying on France and Austria to maintain him in power, was no longer an independent sovereign, his authority had to be enhanced by using his absolute power over the Catholic Church. 10 Louis-Napoléon was content to let the programme of reform and reconciliation between the Papacy and Italian nationalist opinion rest, accepting the philosophy of reactionary conservatism which the Cardinals had imposed upon the State of the Church. 11

This resigned acceptance that the Pope would not introduce any reforms was not only limited to Louis-Napoléon, but can also be seen in the practical attitude of Palmerston. 12 Although politically the British government became much more cautious than it used to be in support of the Pope, because of Pius IX’s rejection of any kind of liberal reforms and Antonelli’s policy of adhering to the Catholic Powers, the British government did not abandon its policy of trying to improve its diplomatic relations with the Vatican. 13

At the diplomatic level the existence after 1849 of a Concert of the Catholic Powers, whose major concern was
'the Roman Question', meant the exclusion of Britain from international consultations about the future of the Papacy. Britain, however, still continued searching for a role in the discussions regarding the future of Rome. 14

Ivan Scott has argued that the restoration was given an oblique endorsement by Palmerston in the House of Commons on 9 May 1851, when he said 'the occupation of Rome by the French troops was a measure undertaken by France upon her own judgment'. This was true, but his assessment that 'the unilateral action of France was opposed by no power and accepted in principle by all', 15 was not completely accurate. Although at the official level the British government had co-operated with France to destroy the Roman Republic and to restore Papal authority in Rome, in fact the British ambassador in Turin was critical of the conservative nature of French policy, which was based on Napoléon's desire to obtain Catholic votes for the election. Abercromby wrote to Palmerston on 19 September 1850 that:

The Sardinian ministers are perfectly alive to the real objects of the French mission, in thus attempting to make tools of the Piedmontese in the hope thereby to curry favour with the church faction in France, and at Rome, & to secure the influence of both for the President at the ensuing Election. 16
In fact Piedmont resented French conservative policy, and was angered by the French intervention in Rome which favoured the return of the old order. French action was also unpopular, because it encouraged a noticeable rise in conservative sentiment in Italy, particularly in Rome and Naples, which was to have immediate and far-reaching consequences for the relations between France, Piedmont and the Papacy.

The specific issue which led to confrontation was the dispute which arose between Piedmont and the Papacy in March 1850. In this month the Piedmontese minister, Count Siccardi, sought Papal sanction for legislation which had been presented to the Parliament in Turin in early March 1850, and included the suppression of religious orders, the introduction of civil matrimony, and the termination of the clergy's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, a programme totally unacceptable to Pius. Following Turin's unilateral emancipation of non-Catholics on 9 March, relations between Piedmont and the Papacy became tense. Pius and Antonelli resented the legislation which restricted ecclesiastical control over education, with the supervision of the curriculum in the hands of the state, and were therefore reluctant to make any concessions to Piedmont. In mid-March Siccardi, seeking approval for the projected changes in Piedmont's ecclesiastical laws, met with the Secretary of State at Portici. However, Antonelli responded to Siccardi's request by observing that the Pope could not remain
indifferent to the harm done to the Church’s power, and threatened to issue a formal protest. He reiterated Pius’s dictum that Piedmont’s actions violated the Concordat, arguing it was unacceptable for a Catholic state to introduce without the consent of the Holy See changes which might prove detrimental to the Church. Irritated by anti-Piedmontese sentiment in the Curia, and convinced that no agreement could be reached at Portici, Siccardi returned to Turin at the end of the month. 20

With the failure of these talks Piedmont’s challenge to the Catholic Church escalated, with its assertion that the state should not be subordinate to the Catholic Church, but that the Catholic Church should submit to the state. The next challenge came immediately after the Pope returned to Rome on 12 April, when the Piedmontese government introduced the Bill of 17 April by which ecclesiastical tribunals and jurisdiction would be abolished.21 In addition, there was outrage within the Vatican when public pressure in Piedmont against the Catholic authority led at the beginning of April to the expulsion of the Archbishop of Turin, Luigi Fransoni, and the Bishop of Asti, Filippo Artico, from their dioceses.22

Tensions continued to rise during the summer and reached a peak in August when the Archbishop of Turin was placed under arrest by Bianchi, a local official. 23 This revealed the extent to which it was public pressure that was stirring up anti-Papal actions, and that the government in Turin was losing control of the situation.
This was understood by d’Azeglio and Abercromby observed to Palmerston on 16 August:

The Turin Sardinian government rightly judging that so indecorous an attack upon the head of the Roman Catholic religion ought not to be quietly passed over, have taken the resolution of intimating to Bianchi that he must quit Sardinia for eight days. Because Azeglio was very sensitive to the violent relation with Rome which is already critical, and he did not want to give any pretext to the Pope to complain. 24

In spite of d’Azeglio’s hope that further crisis could be avoided, this incident caused outrage in Rome. Antonelli wrote to Turin on 2 September:

It is easy to recognize what kind of insult has been done to the Church by the secular authority, with assuming the judicial law of operating the sacred ministers about sacrament, and how much offence has been caused by hostile decision concerning the ecclesiastical issues, and especially with the new attack committed against the sacred person of the Monsignor Archbishop of Turin. 25

Antonelli continued:
Meanwhile in order to meet the duties imposed by his position as Supreme Leader of the Catholic Church, His Holiness has specifically asked me, the Cardinal and Under-Secretary of State, to advance formal complaint and protest even in the current extremely disgusting circumstances, and to demand, in the Pontiff's name, proper compensation for the above-mentioned events. 26

In response to the Vatican's threatening letter, Piedmont did not hesitate to show its strong hostility to the Papal authority and, in line with public opinion, refused to compromise. 27

France tried to encourage Piedmont to seek reconciliation with the Pope, but the French suggestion that the anti-clerical legislation should be withdrawn was rejected by d'Azeglio. Lord Abercromby noted to Palmerston on 19 September 1850:

M. Azeglio replied to the [French] that he and his colleagues are most desirous to settle matters with Rome, but that they can only do so in such a manner as will be consistent with the dignity of the King, and an observance of the principles of the constitution. 28

Abercromby also observed that the French Secretary in Turin, M. Pirest, whom he described as 'an insincere ambitious intriguer', 29 had advised d'Azeglio to
sacrifice Siccardi, but that d'Azeglio had firmly rejected the French suggestion.

... he [d'Azeglio] answers that he can positively assure him [Pirest], that neither the king, nor the Cabinet would ever for a moment entertain the thought of purchasing the favour of the Papal Court by the sacrifice of M. Siccardi ... 30

Abercromby was very critical of this French intervention, in spite of the fact that Britain had originally co-operated with France to restore Papal authority, saying the following:

The French at Turin are acting a very shabby part. Mr Barrot urged Mr d'Azeglio to come to some arrangement with Rome, but without giving any plan by which the Cabinet of Turin can do so with credit, leaving it credibly to be understood that he wishes Piedmont to surrender unconditionally. 31

As the religious rivalry between Piedmont and Rome developed into political antagonism, this confrontation became of interest not only for France but also for Britain. The English public's political stance was favourable towards Piedmont because of Britain's anti-Papal feeling and opposition to French conservatism, especially after the restoration of the Papal authority in Rome. 32
On the other hand, the British government's attitude towards the crisis between the Papacy and Piedmont was more ambivalent. In late May d'Azeglio tried to involve Britain directly when he wrote to Palmerston asking for Britain's military protection and cooperation in the diplomatic field. Palmerston responded to d'Azeglio on 4 June. He noted in regard to the proposal of diplomatic cooperation:

... Her Majesty's Government will readily instruct Her Majesty's Diplomatic Agents at Foreign Courts to communicate with their Sardinian colleagues upon all matters of common interest in which the two countries may be concerned, and Her Majesty's Government will be very glad that Her Majesty's Diplomatic Agents should in such matters have the benefit of the cooperation of the Diplomatic Agents of the King of Sardinia as far as the instructions sent to such Agents from their own Government at Turin may enable them to afford it. 33

It continued:

... communications which have already passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Turin have conveyed to the Government of His Sardinian Majesty the assurance that the British Government must from traditional recollection, from the remembrance
of faithful alliance, and from the dictates of sound policy with reference to the balance of power and to the maintenance of peace in Europe, take a deep interest in the welfare and independence of the Sardinian Monarchy, and Her Majesty's Government sincerely hope that those dangers by which you think it possible that the Kingdom of Sardinian may under certain contingent circumstances be threatened may never come to be realized. 34

After this fairly positive statement, Palmerston, however, showed great hesitation about supporting Piedmont without reservation, as the following passage indicated.

But as I have already had the honour of stating verbally to you and to the Marquis Ricci, there are many weighty reasons which render it inconsistent with the habits of the government of Great Britain to enter into prospective engagements and to contract obligations applicable to events which have not happened, and with regard to which, if they should ever happen, it is impossible to tell beforehand by what particular combination of circumstances they might be accompanied. It is the habitual policy of the Government of Great Britain to
keep itself free with regard to future events.\textsuperscript{35}

Palmerston thus rejected any hint of an alliance.

Ivan Scott has argued that Britain was not fully prepared to support Piedmont, because of Britain's desire not to antagonize France.\textsuperscript{36} While this is true to some extent, in fact the problems facing Palmerston were more complicated than this, for British support of Piedmont would not only alienate France, but also perhaps lead to a confrontation with a wider coalition of the European Catholic Powers. In addition, one must note that, although Palmerston wanted to continue good relations with Louis-Napoléon, his policy was also designed to restrict French influence over both Piedmont and the Papal States. The only way to counter France was to maintain reasonable ties with both Italian states but not to favour either one. Britain could therefore make only limited gestures of support towards Piedmont, most notably diplomatic co-operation and the commercial entente of 6 July 1850.\textsuperscript{37}

One of the reasons that Palmerston was unenthusiastic about supporting Piedmont was that Britain was constrained by its relation with the Papacy. After the political and religious disputes between Turin and Rome, it was assumed that Britain's obvious support of Siccardi's plan might damage Anglo-Roman religious relations and thus strengthen French influence over the Vatican. The British Foreign Office, and particularly
Abercromby, was opposed to France’s reactionary and conservative policy in the Italian peninsula\footnote{38} and believed that the conservative tendencies of Papal domestic policy were influenced by France and that France was also attempting to give conservative political advice to Piedmont. This meant that, although Britain disapproved of the Pope’s reactionary domestic policy, it did not want to worsen its diplomatic relations with the Papacy, and attempted to maintain a neutral position in order to counter French influence.

It seems to be contradictory and inconsistent that the British government did not show absolutely clear support to Piedmont in spite of its hope of seeing liberal reform in the Papal States. This can be explained through Britain’s misguided perception of Papal temporal and spiritual power which we have seen in chapter III. However, the important point was that to be pro-Piedmont was not necessarily to be hostile to the Pope, while the British ministers and diplomats, such as Palmerston, Abercromby, Russell, Petre and Freeborn held slightly different sentiments and ideas concerning the policy to the Papacy. This helps to explain Britain’s ambivalent attitude to the Papacy.

British policy was further complicated in the summer of 1850 by its dispute with the Papacy over the Freeborn case. By the end of 1849 the Pope had discovered that Freeborn, as the British Consular Agent in Rome, had fabricated a number of passports for the Roman
republicans to escape from the Papal States to Malta. The Pope was deeply offended by Freeborn’s imprudent action, and as early as July 1849 the Papal Nuncio in Paris had put pressure on Lord Normanby to have Freeborn withdrawn and prosecuted for his irregularity. The Ambassador admitted that Freeborn had been culpable, but that he was protected against dismissal by Lord Minto and the Foreign Office. Palmerston’s position was that he agreed that Freeborn had been in error, but he asserted that it was necessary to find out more about the political situation in which this incident had occurred.

After one year the issue had still not been resolved, and on 10 August Antonelli decided, in the light of the failure of the Paris talks, to negotiate confidentially with Palmerston by passing correspondence to London through Petre. Antonelli insisted that Freeborn had made a disturbance and broken the tranquillity of the Papal States, and therefore asked Britain to dismiss and replace him. Petre who as a Catholic was keener to avoid offending the Pope than Freeborn and Palmerston, informed the latter on 10 August that:

The Cardinal ... observed that from the manner in which Mr Freeborn had mixed himself up in political affairs in general during the so-called Republic, and from his granting passports to, protecting and assisting numbers of those most hostile to the Papal Government
putting aside the affair of Padre Achilli and other things - it was impossible for H Holiness Government to have any confidence in him. 42

Antonelli especially put emphasis on Freeborn’s assistance to Dr Achilli, who was a member of the Roman Republic and became an outspoken supporter of the anti-Papal aggression in England. 43

Against the Vatican’s accusation Palmerston, who was at heart hostile to the Papacy and regarded the Pope merely as a means for maintaining the status quo, attempted to justify Freeborn’s action. He noted to Petre in his letter of 28 August:

Freeborn acted in perfect accordance with what Lord Palmerston considers to have been his duty and all his acts have either been the result of previous instructions or have been sanctioned by subsequent approval. 44

He also emphasised that Freeborn’s actions had to be seen in context:

A tragedy made by the French army in Rome required such a compromise to give a passport to the non-British people in order to escape from the city of Rome, otherwise they (who were involved in the Roman Republic, and were arrested by the French army) would have been killed. 45
Palmerston therefore refused to accept the call for Freeborn's dismissal. What is noticeable about the Freeborn issue was that, although Palmerston had in 1849 admonished Freeborn over his conduct, he was not willing in 1850 to give in to Papal pressure to remove the Consular Agent. This was a matter of principle which outweighed the need to curry favour with the Papacy.

In spite of Palmerston's antagonistic policy to the Pope regarding Freeborn and the passports, Britain still had a desire to see a settlement between Turin and Rome. In fact, its desire to lessen tensions became even more urgent, as Piedmont and the Papacy threatened to move even further apart. Abercromby noted to Palmerston on 19 September:

It is much to be desired on every account that something should be settled with Rome before the opening of the second Parliament;—for otherwise I fear that the Government will have fresh complications to deal with, from the increasing desire in the public to see the Revenues of the Church appropriated by the state, and the clergy paid a fixed salary.—Except that such a measure would give the Government additional power over the Priests, they cannot desire to see it adopted, because from all I can learn, it does not appear that
in a financial point of view it would be advantageous for the government.- should the measure be proposed by the left in the Chamber I am afraid the Government would find it difficult to make a successful opposition to it, so general is the feeling in the public in favour of such a plan, [Siccardi’s plan].- 46

Another facet of British policy towards the Vatican-Piedmont confrontation was that, although Britain disliked French conservative policy towards the Italian peninsula, the British government could not ignore the continued importance of the Papacy in regard to Ireland. This too made it important for Britain not to offend the Pope by supporting Piedmont.

Since 1848 British policy towards Ireland had achieved little progress either in terms of the Queen’s Colleges or government endowment of the Catholic clergy. The situation became worse in February 1850 when the Pope appointed Paul Cullen as Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of Ireland. Cullen was an ultramontane churchman who, it was feared in British government circles, was close to MacHale. This appointment seemed to make it even less likely that the Catholic church in Ireland would agree to accept British policy and such an assessment proved to be correct when in September 1850 a synod at Thurles organized by Cullen voted to condemn collaboration with the colleges.
In order to counter this new wave of Irish Catholic recalcitrance it was decided by Russell to send the Irish M.P., Richard L. Sheil, a former supporter of Repeal, to Rome as a special envoy to present Britain’s case once again. Also it was hoped that Dr Wiseman, who was travelling to Rome in August 1850, would 'persuade the Pope that he has been misled by MacHale and Cullen'.

Before his departure for Rome, Wiseman was asked unofficially by Russell to present to Pius Britain’s views on Ireland and its desire for good relations with the Papacy. In addition, Wiseman got the impression that Russell was willing to offer a further inducement. Wiseman’s visit to Rome came at a time when the negotiations for the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy had virtually reached their conclusion; Russell, according to Wiseman, hinted to him that the government would not oppose the Hierarchy.

This new campaign to influence Pius did not last long. In October the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy was announced and consequently by November 1850 Anglo-Papal relations were in turmoil. To understand why, after Russell’s hint to Wiseman, this sudden shift in British foreign policy towards the Papacy took place it is necessary to look at the Catholic question in the context of British domestic policies.
Section II: The re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy

As has been argued in chapter II, the British government’s interests in the Papacy and its attempt to restore diplomatic relations with Rome, can be partly explained by the development of the Catholic revival movement in Britain. This revival reached its peak in 1850 with the re-establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy.

The restoration of the Hierarchy was a significant issue in terms of politics as well as religion, and raised serious problems for Russell’s administration. Russell’s policy towards the Catholics and other ecclesiastical matters was complex. It is true that Russell relied partly on Catholic votes and followed a favourable policy towards the Catholics in England, which was reflected in his foreign policy to the Papacy, especially around the 1847 election period. 49

Therefore Russell faced a real dilemma in 1850 when the restoration of the Hierarchy was announced. This decision caused problems, because government approval of the restoration would be seen as favourable towards the Catholics and Tractarians in England and the Catholics in Ireland, which contrasted with traditional Whig values on the importance of civil authority. 50 This would not have mattered so much if the government had been stronger; it could then have afforded to follow a more decisive policy one way or the other, but torn between factions it was forced to take a more ambivalent stand.
To understand the problems raised by the restoration of the Hierarchy, it is necessary to examine the wider background to this development, including the Catholic revival movement. The process of restoring the English Catholic Hierarchy was twofold; first, religious activities outside Britain, particularly in Rome, which were mainly undertaken by Wiseman and his followers within the Propaganda, and, second, activities in Britain. 51

As we have seen in chapter II, Wiseman's negotiations and activities to obtain the Hierarchy took place in both Rome and England. Wiseman and his followers' main contribution to the re-establishment of the Hierarchy in England was to encourage interest in this project within the Propaganda in Rome. In addition, Wiseman was able to exploit conditions within Britain. The rise of the Oxford movement, which had resulted in a number of conversions from the Anglican Church, due to the latter's internal political conflicts, 52 provided Wiseman with a excellent opportunity to integrate the Catholic Revival movement into the pursuit of his own ambition, the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy.

The Catholic revival and expansion can be attributed to three main developments: the influx of poor Irish immigrants into the industrialized cities, the rise of the middle-class intellectuals, who had converted from Anglicanism during the period of the Oxford movement, and
the influence of the old Catholic aristocratic families who, although small in number, wielded power in British politics. The fourth Earl of Oxford, the eighth Earl a Countess of Abingdon, the Countess of Gainsborough, and the Countess of Kenmore were among the twenty-seven per cent of the nobility that one chronicler was to record as Roman Catholic converts during the Victorian era.

The problem with the expansion of the numbers of Catholics, both Oxford movement converts and Irish immigrants, was that it made the English Catholic Church more difficult to govern. The running of the English Church was actually controlled by the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda in Rome, under whose jurisdiction, England was ruled as a missionary territory. Appeals to the Congregation of Propaganda, by one bishop against another, and from disputes between the regular and the secular clergy, were frequent. The documents in the Propaganda archives suggest that the English mission was more difficult to govern than other areas. The difficulties were the result of a lack of acquaintance with Roman procedures and protocol, rather than hostility to Roman authority. In addition, the eight Vicars Apostolic which Britain already possessed, had become incapable of dealing with major problems of organization.

The Catholic revival therefore provided Wiseman with a convincing justification for his own ambition, the restoration of the Hierarchy. This hope became a reality
on 29 September 1850 when, after an intermission of nearly three hundred years, the privilege of being governed directly by Rome was restored to the English Catholics. The Pastoral Letter from Pius IX declared:

For on the twenty-nine day of last month, on the Feast of the Archangel St Michael, Prince of the Heavenly Host, His Holiness Pope Pius IX, was graciously pleased to issue his letters Apostolic, under the Fisherman Ring, conceived in terms of great weight and dignity, wherein he substituted, for the eight Apostolic Vicariates heretofore existing, one Archiepiscopal or Metropolitan and twelve Episcopal Sees: repealing at the same time, and annulling, all disposition and enactments, made for English by the Holy See, with reference to its late form of ecclesiastical government. 58

The re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy meant the reorganization of the geographical diocesan division and the introduction of a new administrative system. By the Papal brief, England and Wales was formed into one province under the new Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Wiseman, with twelve suffragan sees, Beverley, Birmingham, Clifton, Hexham, Liverpool, Newport and Menevia, Northampton, Nottingham, Plymouth, Salford, Shrewsbury, and Southwark. 59
In theory, the Hierarchy was an elaborate achievement for the English Catholic Church, however, in practice it created management problems, especially because Wiseman was not very good at organizing the dioceses. This kind of maladministration created opposition to him within the English Catholic Church, in particular because the re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy involved the redistribution of the existing bishops. This kind of change brought confusion and dissatisfaction among the bishops. 60

Another problem which the Hierarchy failed to overcome was how to reconcile the different interests among the different social classes within the English Catholic Church, because they were very much divided socially and theologically. To appeal to the Vatican through the Propaganda it had been necessary to show not only that the expansion of the Catholic population in England justified a new division of the dioceses, but also that Catholics in England were united. 61 In reality Wiseman mainly relied upon the religious support of the English aristocratic Catholics such as Lord Shrewsbury, who had always had close contact with Wiseman, but he had also emphasized the large number of Irish immigrants, although he was anti-Irish. 62

Substantial disagreements emerged over the nature of the restoration. Wiseman and other ultramontane clergy wanted to revive the English Roman Catholic Church on a Roman model, believing that this was the only way to unify the
various groups within the English Catholic community, and they failed to see that this would only lead to further division. In particular, they faced opposition from some conservative elements, such as the old Catholic aristocratic families who were used to the times, when clergy, even the bishops, were almost family retainers, and who were suspicious of centralized authority. 63

Wiseman himself caused a great deal of discontent. 64 Wiseman’s style of Catholicism created more enemies than necessary, because he always talked about Rome and the Roman style of Catholicism. Wiseman had spent more time in Rome than in Britain, and therefore he lacked sufficient knowledge about the situation of the Catholics in Britain.

Wiseman always talked about Rome as a good example, and wanted to introduce the Roman style as a whole system into England, which seemed to suggest that he expected to see another Rome in Britain. 65

Wiseman’s style of Catholicism was therefore seen as ‘more Roman than Rome’, and this brought him into conflict with the English liberal Catholics, in particular converted Catholics during the Oxford movement. 66 The divisions within the English Catholic Church can be seen in Wiseman’s letter of 30 September 1850 to William Ullathorne, the Vicar Apostolic of the central district of England, criticising Newman’s
Newman in turn disagreed with Wiseman, and criticized Wiseman's absences from Britain which he claimed had alienated converted Catholics. Ullathorne, who became first Bishop of Birmingham, was caught in the middle of this dispute. Ullathorne knew much more about the Catholics in Britain than Wiseman, and had actually contributed to the conversions to Catholicism, and therefore was suited to act as a mediator between Wiseman and Newman over their disagreements about Catholic theology and their confrontations over the internal politics of the English Catholic Church.

Wiseman, however, believed that the only influence which could unite and organize the varied and conflicting groups and sects, which formed the English Catholic community was that of Rome, and therefore of himself as the obvious representative of Rome. What he apparently failed to appreciate was that his Romanized style and his support for ultramontanism created friction between his and other factions which would increase existing divisions.

Wiseman's difficulties in reconciling the different English Catholic elements and his own ultramontane beliefs are not just of abstract interest, for his strict allegiance to Rome made the restoration of the Hierarchy even more unpopular and increased the pressure on Russell to act.
Section III: The 'No-Popery' movement as a reaction to the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy.

To understand the domestic policy of Russell and his government on ecclesiastical matters, as well as his foreign policy towards the Papacy, it is necessary to take account of the English public; reaction, that is the rise of 'No-Popery'. It is well known that the government’s acceptance of the Catholic Hierarchy provoked anti-Papal and anti-Catholic sentiment among the English public. However, it is important to recognize that this movement was not just a direct reaction to the government’s policy but was also based upon the public’s misunderstanding of what the government and the English Catholic Church intended. In particular, it is necessary to look at the role of traditional anti-Catholic sentiment. This section describes the English public’s perception of the Pope and the English Catholic Church.

The phenomenon of the 'No-Popery' movement, which should be distinguished from anti-Catholicism, sheds light upon several significant developments in 1850 and 1851. On the one hand, anti-Catholicism was not only a reaction to the re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy, but also reflected a broader religious and historical tradition in society. On the other hand, the phenomenon of anti-Papal agitation that was to emerge was formed by specific social, economic and political forces in the particular historical moment. To understand the nature of the movement in 1850-51 it is important to note that it followed the outrage felt at the Maynooth Grant and that
the re-establishment of the Hierarchy was considered to be an act of Papal aggression against Britain.

There has been extensive interest in anti-Catholicism recently from a number of different angles. Finn argues that anti-Catholicism should be seen in the context of English radicalism directly inherited from the Chartists; asserting that it was inspired by republican, anti-catholic, and nationalist impulses. As she states 'the Italian revolutions offered Chartist internationalists as much scope for nostalgic election as for liberal panegyric. Liberal intellectuals, inspired by long-standing family traditions of opposition to Catholic despotism were naturally attracted to the revolutionary cause.' For example, Ernest Jones, one of the leading Chartist figures, responded to Papal Aggression by calling upon 'Democrats and Dissenters to unite against the seized forces of Rome, thirsting for the blood of Garibaldi and Mazzini'. In addition, Finn argues that the Protestantism against Popery was widely shared by working-class radicals and offered an ideological link to the late Chartist movements. 70

The anti-Papal movement during the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy in 1850-52 was based upon an idea that the Pope's restoration of the Hierarchy virtually constituted an invasion of England and was an attack upon the Queen's sovereign as head of the Church of England as well as of the state. This kind of feeling was demonstrated in eighteen pamphlets on the Anglican
versus Roman Catholic controversy entitled 'Is the Pope coming to England? Everybody who would not be a Roman Catholic was to be burnt!' and also illustrated in a Punch cartoon entitled 'daring attempt to break into a church'. At the local level it was feared that the Anglican parishes would be taken over by the newly established Catholic dioceses, that at the national level Catholicism would become the national religion, and that the church of England and its head, the Queen would be abolished.

'The Pope's Bull!' an address to the people of England by a protestant patriot in December 1850, announced:

The real objection is to be found in the true and genuine character of Popery, which renders it entirely different from all forms of Protestant Dissent; it is the dark design in the back ground of this measure; it is the intolerance of Popery; it is the claim it has often asserted and never abandoned to grasp territory for the purpose of governing it.

These ideas and reactions were far beyond the reality of the situation, but the problem was that Wiseman's first apostolic letter and his subsequent 'Appeal to the English people' implied his intention to do so.

The problems began on 30 September 1850, when the Pope announced the creation of a territorial Hierarchy of twelve bishops and the elevation of Wiseman, Vicar
Apostolic of the London District and the most prominent leader of the English Roman Catholic Church, to head the new Hierarchy as the first Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. On receiving his red hat, Wiseman issued his first pastoral letter and started out for London on 12 October. When news of Pius’s and Wiseman’s actions reached London, The Times started to organize attacks against the new Hierarchy, emphasizing its assumption of supreme spiritual authority over the nation and its denial of the validity of Anglican orders on 19 October.75

Wiseman’s first pastoral letter, which was read in London chapels on 28 October and appeared in the Press, claimed:

> Your beloved country has received a place among
> the fair churches which are normally
> constituted from the splendid aggregate of
> Catholic Communion: Catholic England has been
> restored to its orbit in the ecclesiastical
> firmament, from which its light had long
> vanished, and begins now anew its course of
> regularly adjusted action, round the centre of
> unity, the source of jurisdiction, of light and
> vigour. 76

Wiseman’s language used in the Apostolic letter was regarded as arrogant. Furthermore he made a provocative statement regarding Catholicism’s bitter history in England.
We will pray that His rule over the Church may be prolonged to many years, for its welfare; that health and strength may be preserved to Him for the discharge of the sublimity of His office; and that consolations temporal and spiritual, may be poured out upon Him abundantly, in compensation for past sorrows and past ingratitude. 77

Not only the spiritual, but also the temporal existence of the Pope through the Catholic Church created a fear in the English people. This letter has been cited by some historians such as Paz and Wolffe arguing that it was Wiseman’s greatest mistake. 78 In addition, when Wiseman received the Cardinal’s title he issued a famous ‘Appeal to the English people’ on returning to the country. This pamphlet appeared extensively in daily newspapers including The Times, replying to the various attacks on and agitations over the restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy. 79 Wiseman asserted that the internal nature of the new reorganization would not affect the royal prerogative, insisted on tolerance as a right, and argued that the establishment of a canonical Hierarchy was essential to Catholicism. However, Wiseman’s appeal was also aggressive, and illustrated the extent to which he was capable of showing contempt for the Church of England, which he attacked on several occasions. He accused the Anglican bishops and clergy of using anti-Papal feeling to regain lost influence, because of a fear
of increasing Catholic influence in England. The contents of the 'Appeal' were reported in The Times on 21 November 1850:

The Royal Supremacy is not more admitted by the Scottish Kirk, by Baptists, Methodists, Quakers, Independents, Presbyterian, Unitarians, and other dissenters, than by the Catholics. None of these recognized in the Queen any authority to interfere in their religious concerns, to appoint their ministers for them, or to mark the limits of their separate districts in which authority has to be exercised. 80

In reply to Wiseman's statement, Punch wrote:

All disaffected individuals, who would rejoice in the humiliation of their country, and who are ready to abet any foreign intrigue against the Queen, her Crown and dignity: Are requested to read the following direction which are offered by way of hints, as to the course they had better pursue, with the view to defeat the national determination to put down the Pope's attempt to domineer over England-. As soon as meetings cease to be held, and addresses to be voted in reference to the Papal invasion, begin to pooh-pooh the whole movement, and go about
saying that all interest in the subject is subsiding. 81

Punch’s hostility to the Papacy was echoed during the period 1850-51 by a majority of the English press, which attacked Papal aggression, no matter what their political tendency, even The Times. In particular the radical newspapers such as The Northern Star, the Reynolds’s Newspaper and the Newcastle Chronicle launched intensive attacks on Papal Aggression. Between October and December in 1850, they argued for the anti-Papal movement in the context of favouring Mazzini and opposing the government’s favourable policy towards the Papacy. The Northern Star at the beginning of November cited an argument that appeared in The Times on 29 October 1850:

...the danger is that this audacious violation of the oath which declared that "no foreign prince or potentate shall have any spiritual or temporal jurisdiction within this realm," together with the open declaration of the zealous Romanist party, that they mean to reclaim England to the fold of the true church, will have the effect of provoking a reaction in which many of the religious liberties which have been slowly conquered by Roman catholics, will be swept away. It shows that humbled as the Papacy is at the centre, it is still aggressive in its essence,.. 82
Regarding this point, The Northern Star gave qualified support for The Times' argument; 

The Times suggests that as the Pope has chosen to interfere with England, Palmerston should give him some work at home, by encouraging the Italian patriots. We trust that however anxious they may be for the emancipation of their beautiful county from political and spiritual thraldom, they will never become the cat's paw of an oligarchical minister, who stood solidly aloof in the hour of their need, and mocked them with barren words of sympathy. Better to wait until they are able to fight the battle of freedom on their own ground without the necessity for such hollow, selfish and treacherous support. 83

This passage indicated that as far as the radical press was concerned their hostility towards the Papacy did not lead them towards any reconciliation with the government. If anything they regarded the Pope's intervention in England as having been encouraged by the government's tacit acceptance of the restoration of the Hierarchy.

Against such severe attacks, and accusations of Papal invasion the English Catholic Church sought to defend itself. In spite of the divisions that still existed within the English Catholic Church, when Wiseman was attacked by the press for his assumption of supreme
spiritual authority over the nation and his denial of the validity of the Anglican orders, he received support from the other senior figures including Newman. On 27 October Newman defended Wiseman proclaiming that God was leading England back to the true church and that the restoration of the Hierarchy was one of the most important achievements for the whole English Catholic Church. 84

Thus Wiseman and Newman, who had originally disagreed over the style of Catholicism, on this occasion had to fight together against the attack on 'Papal Aggression'.

The perceived solidarity between Wiseman and Newman further antagonized the English public, and led to the 'No-Popery' movement becoming increasingly virulent. In addition, the movement spread to include attacks not only on the Catholic Church, but also on the Tractarians within the Anglican Church, because of their use of 'Roman practices', and their association with converts to Catholicism such as Newman who were regarded as treacherous by most Protestants. This phenomenon could be seen in a number of meetings and public lectures. For example, in Birmingham in December 1850, George Dawson, a Baptist pastor, 85 published a pamphlet based on one of his 'No-Popery' sermons entitled 'On the Romish Church and her Hierarchy'. He stated:

"The Puseyite party" state that the Roman Pontiff has been greatly influenced in his policy towards this country by the information which must have reached him concerning the
existence in the Church of England of a certain number of clergymen whose opinions and practices approximate to "the Church of Rome." Considering the character, given by the promoters of this address, to the Pope's doing and to the church of Rome generally we must take this as intended to be a condemnation of the Tractarian party. 86

Another example of the bitterness generated by the Tractarians can be seen in Westminster Review which stated in January 1851:

But why ask us for condemnation out of hand? Have the Tractarians been insidious? For seventeen years the Anglican movement has been going on; all England has heard of it: if it was what it is now the fashion to say of it why did not the Church expel her traitor sons? Now it is said the Puseyist is to be dealt with and anti-Papal indignation is to be turned to anti-Tractarian account. 87

This kind of argument was also reflected in The Northern Star and Reynolds's Newspaper. The former noted on 9 November 1850:

One great cause of this delusion in the mind of Wiseman and that of his fellow conspirators, against the civil and religious liberties of England is to be found in the existence of what
is called Puseyism. For years it has been well known that Oxford has educated and English bishops have ordained to the office of priests, a body of young men far more attached to the slavish and despotic doctrine of Papacy than the Free self-governing and self-reliant principles of the Protestant. 88

Their enemy, the Popish element, was not only in the Catholic Church but also within the Anglican Church, because, not just Newman, but even High-Churchmen who still remained Anglican subjects were regarded as embracing more Popish than Protestant tendencies. They also believed that Newman and the other Oxford converts who had originally adopted a liberal style of Catholicism had now become integrated into Wiseman's more Roman and despotic style, even if the English Catholic Church was still very much divided.

Brewin Grant, delivered three lectures on the 'three shams': one of which, entitled 'the sham church, called infallible', on 30 September 1851 observed in regard to the Tractarians that:

They were the outward and visible signs of the approximation to Popery, and those who stood up for their introduction believed that if by chicanery or coaxing or sharp practice, they could once get the people to don the livery and the trappings of Romanism, it would not be
difficult afterwards to super-induce the
dominion of Rome itself. Instead of resisting
this movement, many of the bishops of the
Established Church took an active part in it.
Others were conveniently mysterious and vague
in their condemnation and suspiciously tolerant
in their conduct. 89

It was argued that these Oxford movement contingents such
as the Tractarians had paved the way for the restoration
of the Hierarchy, and thus were a legitimate target for
attack.

This kind of anti-Tractarian sentiment was further
developed and organized by the Evangelical movement. It
would be a mistake to believe that the No-Popery movement
was just a result of mass spontaneous demonstrations. In
fact, it was highly organized and institutionalized by
several political and religious societies such as the
Protestant Association, the Dissenters, Voluntaryists,
and the Free Church Organization. Among these Protestant
societies were both Anglicans and Dissenters, but the
most influential group was the evangelical movement,
including the Evangelical Alliance, which used its
periodical, The Record, to disseminate anti-Catholic
propaganda. 90

Evangelical hostility to the Tractarians was based upon
the belief that Catholicism, both Anglican and Roman,
'substituted forms for true spirituality and encouraged a
reliance on the institutional church, avoiding the self-abasement and upheaval required by conversion and justifications by faith alone.' In particular they saw this issue as justifying their belief that all links between Church and state should be abolished. They feared the possibility that the Anglican Church, already 'infected' by Tractarianism, might be subverted by Rome, which would have ramifications for the British constitution. They felt that the Papacy must be resisted not by societies but through the better dissemination of anti-Roman propaganda, in order to secure unity among the ministers of all Protestant denominations and organize the unchurched masses.

Although there were various prominent figures who contributed to 'No-Popery' movement among the evangelicals, the most prominent was Dr Achilli. Achilli was a most celebrated and influential orator for Italian nationalism and republicanism. He used his position and experience as an ex-Dominican priest and thus as a first-hand observer of the internal corruption of the Catholic Church in Rome, and as a Roman Republic exile working for Mazzini, to launch vicious attacks on the Papacy. He managed to translate his hostility against the Pope's temporal power, which he shared with Mazzini during the Roman Republic, into the context of the English 'No-Popery' campaign. It was also good timing for him that his arrival in England coincided with the restoration of the Hierarchy and the anti-Tractarian movement. He
contributed to turning traditional English anti-Catholicism, which was a rather abstract concept, into the much more concrete idea of 'No-Popery' by replacing the Pope with domestic targets such as Wiseman and Newman. In addition, Achilli managed to translate the experience of the English 'No-Popery' movement into Italian nationalist terms. In particular he stressed the danger arising from the Pope's claim to temporal power in an attempt to elicit sympathy and support from English radicals for the Italian cause.

Even before the re-establishment of the Hierarchy, Achilli had been a thorn in the side of the English Catholic Church. Wiseman had attempted to counter Achilli's anti-Papal propaganda by revealing in an article in the *Dublin Review* in June 1850 that Achilli had not left the Catholic Church for high, moral reasons but for sexual irregularities. This attack inflamed Achilli who later stated in his memoirs that the article 'stigmatises me to the religious world, as a mere political adventurer, while to the political world it represents me as a religious enthusiast, changeable, inconsiderate, and inexperienced, and an immoral person, and a hypocrite to boot.' (Indeed Newman's repetition of Wiseman's account of Achilli's background in a speech in Birmingham in the summer of 1851 led Achilli to bring libel proceedings against Newman and in 1852 the infamous Achilli v. Newman trial took place.) It is difficult to believe that Achilli's hostile lectures on Wiseman and
'Papal Aggression' in 1850 and 1851 were not influenced by this personal attack.

Achilli’s activities were not just limited to appealing to the public, but also extended to trying to influence the government directly. Using his contacts in high circles he managed in November 1850 to hold a meeting with Palmerston. On 11 November Palmerston informed Russell that:

Dr Achilli ... says there are a number of Italians, Romans & others now in London who wish to record as Catholics their disapproval of this last move of the Pope, and they would be glad to know in what way they could most properly do so, and whether for instance they might be allowed to present or send an address to you. What shall I say? 96

Unfortunately Russell’s response to this overture was not recorded, but this episode and the general importance of Achilli demonstrated one of the most remarkable and important problems for Anglo-Roman diplomatic relations in the context of the Risorgimento, which was the activity of the Italian nationalists who were exiled in Britain.

There were other notable Italian nationalist contributors to the English 'No-Popery' movement. One significant figure was Alessandro Gavazzi. Gavazzi was a Piedmontese Protestant who had been led by the logic of his Italian
nationalism to reject first the Pope's temporal power and then even his spiritual power. He had participated in the lay movement in Piedmontese politics which led to the challenge to the Papacy in 1850. The development of Protestantism in Italy had been organized by the Chiesa Cristiana Libera. This Protestant church in Piedmont was formed from a union of several scattered Italian Protestant communities and its leading figure was Gavazzi. In Italy the Free Church gave moral support to those reformers who saw the Risorgimento as an anti-papal movement, and also by its endorsement of the Sardinian government's attitude to the Papacy tried to encourage Anglo-Sardinian friendship.

Because its expansion in Italy was hampered by the absolutist Papal government, it was not surprising that in 1849 the Free Church people in Italy and in Britain had welcomed the Pope's overthrow. Most were not in favour of violent revolution, though some were prepared to accept it as an inevitable consequence even if not a desirable one, but they were united in welcoming the opportunities given by the revolutions for 'the undisturbed spread of the gospel.' The Sardinian government seemed to provide them with alternative means, since Sardinia was one of the Italian states which allowed freedom of religion.

Achilli and Gavazzi, through the actions of ultra evangelicals and Nonconformists, had been brought to England in March 1850 as living proof of 'Popish
despotism'. Although not as significant as Achilli, Gavazzi was important in using his own experience within Chiesa Christiana Libera to inspire the Scottish Free Church. In late 1851, he toured Scotland and helped to organize a number of 'No-Popery' meetings and to build on the base already established by 'the General Committee of the Free Church of Scotland on Popery'. In addition, Gavazzi's article in Northern British Review was one of the most comprehensive criticisms of Catholicism to appear. It brought together the religious and political, and the foreign and domestic issues in such a way as to transform the aspirations of the Italian nationalist movement into issues of universal significance. 100

There are four reasons to argue that there were links between the 'No-Popery' campaign and Mazzini's presence in England, whether he was directly involved with the anti-Popery aggression campaign or not: 1) he was often quoted in public lectures on the No-Popery campaign, organized by the Anglican priests; 2) he was supported by Chartist contingents who were involved with Protestant Societies' movements; 3) Mazzini's link with Achilli; and 4) The Anti-Popery Evangelical Alliance's tendency towards patriotism was inspired by Mazzini's nationalism.

Mazzini himself was cited in 'No-Popery' propaganda in England. George Dawson argued in his two lectures on the 'Papal Aggression' controversy in front of inhabitants of Birmingham at a public meeting assembled at the end of 1851:
Separate church and state in Rome and we shall hear little more of Papal aggression. The temporal sovereignty of the Pope, we have been told, is the element of danger in the appointment of this hierarchy: ...Mazzini tells us "Papacy excluded from Rome, is, it is well known, papacy excluded from Italy." Place the Pope at Lyons or Seville— he will no longer be Pope: he will only be a dethroned king. Well may he say Protestantism has not understood this: because Mazzini believed as an Italian national leader, that Church and State need to be separated elsewhere too. Not in England only but in Rome. What political danger there may be to us in Romanism lies chiefly in the fact of the Pope being a prince in Rome. 101

Mazzini’s idea of opposing Papal temporal power was developed in the English anti-Papal context, as we have seen, by political exiles from the Roman Republic, such as Achilli, and Piedmontese Protestants such as Gavazzi, and became one of the main arguments used to gain radical support.

The issue of Mazzini’s link with the anti-Papal movement brings into question the degree to which radical political, as well as radical religious, groups were involved in this cause. Here it is worth looking at the
relative strength of the radicals and what kind of links existed between them and Mazzini.

It is generally said that the Chartist movement declined or died out after the failure of the 1848 uprising; however, as Finn has argued in After Chartism, there still remained a radical movement which was inspired by Mazzinians and continental revolutionary elements. 102 As Taylor has argued, the common ground between Chartism and radicalism was heightened after the defeat of the movement in 1848, with a reconciliation between the mainstream of radical and liberal politics. These views were expressed in the radical newspapers such as the Nonconformist, the Leader, Reynolds' Weekly Newspaper and others. Those associated with the Leader took over from the radical reformers the running of several of the Anglo-European groups such as the Society of Friends of Italy and the Hungarian Association, with which, needless to say, Mazzini was closely associated. 103

Taylor particularly emphasizes the strong link between the Leader and the Nonconformist’s anti-clerical tendencies, which were encouraged by the rise of Tractarianism. Both newspapers provided a forum for dissenting ministers and free-thinkers. Most of the latter who became prominent contributors to the Leader were essentially anti-clericalists opposed to both the Anglican and Catholic Churches. 104. Taylor notes that the strength of the anti-Catholicism in London may well have stemmed from London Chartist aspirations to a secularized
society, which presumably liberated them from religious obligations. 105

The degree to which Mazzini influenced the radicals is a matter of debate. Taylor has argued that Mazzini’s political ideas had only limited significance within British radical circles, because he failed to understand the British political context. Even a close acquaintance such as David Masson held different ideas on republican socialism from Mazzini’s. Masson, who was a member of the Leader’s circle, and a former student of Thomas Chalmers, the founder of the Scottish Free Church, believed that the British political context could best be understood by reference to Mill and Carlyle, and disagreed with Mazzini over the importance of Louis Blanc. 106

However, Mazzini’s entry into the circle of radicals and liberals around the Leader was facilitated by his role in the Roman Republic. David Masson was deeply impressed by Mazzini’s idea about Italy and became the first secretary of the Society of Friends of Italy, which was set up in May 1851 in order to support Mazzini against the threatened Alien Bill. 107 This shows that while it is true that Mazzini’s political ideas and principles were not always shared by the English radicals, particularly in regard to socialism, he had enough charisma to attract their attention to Italian republican and nationalist issues. The International League and its followers were both broad-based groups, combining moderate Chartists with a nucleus of London radicals. Although the moderate
Chartists and the London radicals did not agree on every political point, Mazzini’s League had still managed to attract their support. It could be argued in a way that Mazzini’s League acted as an agency to reconcile different radicals’ interests into one broad movement. The Nonconformists, including the Nonconformist newspaper, were particularly attracted by Mazzini’s stance over the anti-Papal sentiment. Again opposition to Papal aggression was one of the few causes that all radicals shared, and acted as a glue to bring together radicals who sometimes held different political opinions.

The radical support for Mazzini naturally led to opposition to the Pope. The Northern Star on 28 September 1850 argued that the Pope and Mazzini were diametrically opposed. If one supported loyalty toward the Pope it meant supporting death for Mazzini and his republicanism. In contrast, opposing the Pope, Pius IX who had give the Cardinal’s hat to Wiseman, meant supporting Mazzini’s republicanism and nationalism. There was no middle ground. This shows that the target of radical attack was not just Catholicism which could be an abstract idea, and not just the Papacy, but Pius IX himself. It was a personal attack on the Pope.

Mazzini’s presence in Britain was not only of interest to the radicals, it also concerned the government. The Home Office and the Foreign Office both displayed an interest in Mazzini’s activities due to his revolutionary reputation. Mazzini was believed to be trying to
engineer better cooperation between Italian, French and English republicans and revolutionaries, and was therefore seen as a dangerous figure. This threat was confirmed when on 3 June 1851 Normanby in Paris wrote to Palmerston that:

General De La Hilte showed me an address from Mazzini to various corresponding societies, which had been found by the police upon a man who had been arrested the other day. The purport of this document was to establish an universal European connexion between the Revolutionists of all countries for the overthrow at one and the same time of all monarchical government in Europe. There was much caution contained in it as to waiting for simultaneous action, of which due notice would be given. This paper was dated "La Suisse" but the general had learned from M Barman the Swiss Chargé d’Affaires that M Mazzini had passed through Paris last week and was at this moment in London. The paper spoke in the name of the Triumvirs and more particularly alluded to Rome as the head quarters which it probably is, of any designs with which M Mazzini is specially charged. 110

This information prompted Henry Addington, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, to ask H. Waddington, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office,
on 10 June 1851 for more information about Mazzini’s revolutionary society.

An earlier scare had come in November 1850 when The Northern Star revealed that an Italian Revolutionary Fund, called the Mazzini-Italian National Fund, had been established in London. This article entitled the ‘The Italian revolutionary government in London’ was published on 12 November 1850 and noted:

The new Italian (Mazzini) loan of 10,000,000f., for the purchase of ammunition to recommence revolution in Italy, and it is to be presumed, in all continental Europe the proposals for which were published in La Republique of yesterday is the subject of remark in the papers of today. They express their astonishment at such a document being published and dated in London, and the fact of three Englishman forming part of the commissions for the management of the funds.

It continued:

An English banker says the Opinion Publique,- Receiving the money of the subscribers, and delivering certificates stamped with the arms of the Roman republic, a committee depositing at the Bank the funds, purchasing arms and forming an arsenal on the quays of London - is rather too much, and if Lord Palmerston submit
to it he will certainly wear out the patience of all Europe. Let us wait to see the effect of the circulars of Mazzini on the English government. There is on one side a certain law in England which we believe is called the Alien bill, and on the other international law: one permits action, the other exacts it. But if by chance it were part of a system, if there existed an idea of responding to the Bull of the Sovereign Pontiff by Mazzini’s circulars, if it were found useful to prepare for Italy what eighteen years ago was prepared for Portugal why Europe must only look to herself. People are fond of declaiming against Prussia. Let them look a little to England, and let them ask her if she is determined to enrol in her service the revolutionary party. 112

Following this on 16 November Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper appealed to their audience to support the Mazzini fund in an article entitled ‘Italian nationality and independence.’:

We have received from the national committee the following official circulars to which we give insertion. Circular No 1 Italian national loan. ... The money obtained will be deposited in London, at the banking house of Messrs, Martin Stone and Martin 68 Lombard-Street. The committee has the right of changing the place
of deposit according to circumstances. This committee consists of the following Italian and English: William Herty Ashurst, jun. and William Strudwicke, Antonio Ferrara, Vincenzo Cattabeni and Federico Perucelli. "Prestito Nazionale Italiano" London agent James Stansfeld 2 Sidney-place, Brompton. For the national committee, Mazzini Sirtori Montecchi Saffi Saliceti. On the face of the notes are two impressions in the form of seals, one being the arms of the republic, the other the inscription, Italian national committee. 113

It was already known in government circles that Mazzini had obtained from the English radicals not only ideological but also financial support, and it was widely believed that Mazzini had used the International League to receive money through W.J. Linton and to raise subscriptions for his Italian National Fund. 114 This kind of British radical support for Mazzini was worrying for the British government, but its concern became even greater when the idea of a Mazzini fund was openly discussed by the radical press. This disquiet was clearly reflected when, on 12 November 1850, H. Waddington, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office reported to the Home Secretary:

...I beg to report having made further inquiries respecting the Mazzini Loan and have heard from good authority that there is no such
company in London at present as the one mentioned. 115

Another enquiry into the Mazzini Fund was made in February 1851 due to a report in Reynolds's Weekly Newspaper on the money that had been received from various Italian states. A report by the Home Office on 27 February noted there was no record of money being deposited by British citizens. 116

Although it turned out that the Fund was not supported to any great extent by English radicals, the Metropolitan Police kept a close watch on Mazzini's activities. On 12 August 1851 a Home Office report on European revolutionary exiles in London, including Mazzini, noted:

Close observation has been reported on those Refugees from each Country more especially with regard to any proceedings that might affect the tranquillity of our own country and I believe there is no cause to apprehend any movement by them at present. 117

In November 1851 a further report revealed that Mazzini was still under surveillance and was associating with a group of French revolutionaries who met frequently in Soho. 118

Although there was no clear evidence that the radicals were involved in Mazzini's continuing revolutionary activities, the danger remained that with his past
history as a leader of the Roman Republic he could turn into a symbol of No-Popery, and thus provide a bridge connecting English radicals with European revolutionaries.

Section IV: The government’s response to the anti-Papal movement

The British government was seriously concerned about the link between the 'No-Popery, movement and Mazzini’s republican and revolutionary campaign. They feared that Mazzini might use this link to spread his anti-Papal ideas in Britain, particularly because England had such a strong anti-Catholic tradition.

In fact, the 'No-Popery' movement was not merely a phenomenon associated with English radicals such as the Chartists, who had a direct contact with Mazzini; it also had widespread popular support. Contemporary press reports in newspapers such as The Times, The Northern Star and Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, illustrate the extent of mass demonstrations against the Papal aggression. This was particularly evident on Guy Fawkes Day 1850. The fifth of November - Guy Fawkes Day - was traditionally a symbol of anti-Catholicism, but in 1850 it saw a particularly virulent outpouring of anti-Papal sentiment because it was just after the restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy on 29 October 1850.

In southern England there were several large-scale 'No-Popery' demonstrations. These protests included many
characteristics - elaborate effigies of Pius IX and Wiseman dressed in full pontifical robes and sometimes horned; men dressed as monks and nuns; a torchlight procession; anti-Catholic, patriotic and sometimes anti-Tractarian banners; and a ceremonial burning in a public place, accompanied by patriotic songs. 119

The Northern Star reported the people’s enthusiasm for the 'No-Popery' movements in several parts of London in detail in its edition of 9 November 1850:

"Guys of large growth" presented themselves in the more frequented thoroughfares, attended by numberless idlers, who kept up a running fire of pellets against the Pope and Popery. "No Popery", "No wafer Gods", "No Catholic humbug" and similar anti-Romanist expressions.

The Guys were received with more than usual welcome by the populace and the conductors of the several groups found no difficulty in levying handsome mail on the passengers. 120

The report also noted that, with the return of Cardinal Wiseman, his 'red hat' had become one of the symbolic targets:

This pageant included an animate effigy of the new Cardinal Wiseman attired in the gaudy canonical robes of the Romish Church, and
wearing the red and broad-brimmed hat
appertaining to his office, St Imprudence. 121

The Northern Star reported that two large protests took
place in London, one in the centre where an effigy of the
Cardinal Wiseman was carried around the West End, and one
in the East End:

Several thousands people assembled in the
Cambridge Heath Road, Bethnal Green and the
various avenues adjoining for the purpose of
witnessing the destruction by fire of the
effigy of Cardinal Wiseman with those of the
eleven bishops. 122

The greatest insult to the Pope and Cardinal Wiseman was
the use of effigies and of animals dressed in Catholic
robes.

Whilst the fireworks were being let off, a
large figure, representing His Holiness on a
donkey was lead into the ground. The animal
wore a cardinals hat and round his neck was
hung a large bill on which was printed
"Wiseman". Several persons, representing "right
rev. fathers", walked at the side of the
animal. 123

The demonstrations also expanded into the suburban parts
of London, where in one case Wiseman's dress was mocked
with an ostentatious crown symbolizing the corruption of
the Catholic Church. The Northern Star informed its readers that protests had taken place in:

Surrey, Richmond, Hampton Court, Kensington, Blackheath Park, Guildford, Godalming. The chief object of attraction was followed, borne by men: it was a gorgeous effigy of Pius IX in full pontifical robes, sitting in a chair of state two incense bearers proceeding: he wore the triple crown, magnificently ornamented with a profusion of jewels. A large white shoe was prominent, supposed to encase that important functionary, the Pope’s toe, or papal chamberlain, by which the faithful, who liked, were introduced to His Holiness. 124

The 'No-Popery' gatherings were also influenced by the belief that the Roman Catholic Church was, through the establishment of the twelve bishops, attempting aggressively to expand its ecclesiastical and political power. 125 The Catholics, who had been used to a weak position before, were now stronger, and it was believed that they aimed to take revenge after a history of 300 years of justified persecution.

The lesser star Wiseman was only divided from the sovereign pontiff by an immense corsair and this effigy also was dressed in perfect keeping with his rank a cardinal the hat and collar and robes included. Behind him, twelve men dressed
in white with a red cross on each of their backs, and head covering of a combination of mitre and helmet, significant of the Romish church being militant, bore each a placard of his title; and although there was no time to read the names no doubt all the 12 bishops were there. Then came placards and banners ad infinitum. 126

The important point about these demonstrations was that their target was clearly focused on Cardinal Wiseman and Pius IX, they were not anti-Irish. In addition, the fact that they concentrated so much on an anti-Papal target meant that these mass protests must have been highly organized. This was frightening for the government as it proved that the masses could be easily integrated into and dictated to by the anti-popery radicals.

As Paz has pointed out, mass demonstrations using the symbol of Bonfire Night provided an opportunity to affirm loyalty, solidarity and cultural cohesion. 127 It was not just a series of mass riots as a result of an abstract idea of anti-catholicism, but was rather a coherent anti-Wisenian and anti-Pius IX campaign.

These Bonfire Night processions were the beginning of a series of popular, large-scale 'No-Popery' demonstrations which sometimes erupted into violence and continued throughout 1850-52. If anything, after Guy Fawkes Day
1850, the political activities against the 'Papal aggression' became more organized.

For example, the Home Office documents record that an anti-Popery public meeting was held in Hertford on 3 July 1851 which passed resolutions to petition the Queen and Privy Council asking them to defend the liberty of England and refuse to accept the restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy. 128 This was but one of a series of petitions presented to Parliament and the Queen against 'the Papal encroachment'. Several meetings around the country were held to organize petitions, and signatures were even collected after Church services.

These meetings were not always very rational or peaceful, and there were several incidents where demonstrations against the 'Papal aggression' led to violence. The most notable example is the riots that took place in Liverpool and Birkenhead on 20 November and 27 November 1850 respectively. In both cases a meeting held by Protestants to demonstrate against the Hierarchy led to violent protests by the local Irish Catholics. 129

The local magistrates reported on 20 December 1850 about the incident in Birkenhead, which was the more serious of the two, that:

A public meeting for the purpose of presenting a loyal address to the Queen, against the Encroachments of Rome, found a Mob assembled round the place of meeting with sticks and
stones who attacked the Town Hall, and the Room where the Magistrates were assembled and violently assaulted the police. 130

Paz has categorised the Liverpool and Birkenhead riots as "pro-catholic anti-police riots", as much of the violence was committed by Irish Roman Catholics against the police. 131 Certainly it was a clash between the police and the Irish which reflected the bitter sectarian divisions in the Merseyside area, but it is noticeable that the original spark that led to the disturbances was the campaign against 'Papal Aggression'. While acknowledging other background factors, the fact that it was 'No-Popery' meetings that led to the violence indicates the depth of feeling that this issue generated, and it is indicative that after the second meeting was disrupted a petition with one thousand signatures was sent to the local magistrates calling for the punishment of the 'misled and misguided Romanists'. 132

The riots on Merseyside were, however, the exception rather than the rule, brought about by the severity of the sectarian divide in the region. Elsewhere the 'No-Popery' campaign did not lead to serious outbreaks of violence. The reason for this is a matter of debate. Paz has argued that anti-Catholic violence during this period has been over emphasized as a phenomenon, and instead has contended that violence in these years was more often associated with economic and domestic causes rather than religious ones. He has asserted that the crime rate
related to violence against persons and property declined during the 1850s and 60s, and in particular has noted to prove his point, the relatively small number of reported attacks on Catholic priests in 1850-51. 133

One can agree that the number of such attacks was small, but the contention that this was a result of the public’s reluctance to commit violence against the Catholics is open to question. Evidence from Home Office sources suggests that one has to look closely at the government’s role in deterring violence. There are a number of examples of attacks against Roman Catholics leading to the government’s sending police to keep order. One such case took place in August 1851, when the Home Office decided in response to local Roman Catholics’ complaints about violence promptly to send twenty-five special constables to protect the East Church in Sittingbourne, Kent. 134 Further evidence can be seen in December 1851, when the Metropolitan Police produced a report on the scale of violence against Catholic priests in London. This report was a response to a request for information from the Foreign Office. 135

In November 1851 Palmerston received a letter from the Vatican regarding anti-Papal violence against Catholic priests in England, which was based on reports which had been received by the Propaganda Fide. 136 This matter obviously required investigation and prompted the Foreign Office to send a letter requesting information from the Home Office. This letter of 27 November 1851 read:
I am directed by Lord Palmerston to state to you that reference has been made by a Foreign government to violence and insult alleged to have been committed in London towards the ministers of the Catholic Church on the occasion of the institution of Roman Catholic Bishoprics by the Pope in the course of the last twelve months, and Lord Palmerston is desirous of knowing whether any thing took place at the time and on the occasions alluded to, which bore the character of violence or of insult to Roman Catholic Priests or to their religion.

I request Sir George Gray, to obtain through the commission of police exact information. 137

After the Metropolitan Police had provided the necessary information, the Home Office forwarded to the Foreign Office on 6 December 1851 the reports of enquiries by each Superintendent within London. Waddington noted in his covering letter that:

I beg to state that whenever application was made for the aid of police for the protection of any place of the Roman catholic or of any Roman catholic ecclesiastic and wherever there was any apprehension that violence or insult to Roman catholic priests on their religion might
be committed special and effective arrangements of police were made to prevent them. No complaints have been received at this office that the police failed in the performance of this duty and I believe the Roman catholic priests felt assured that full protection was given them. 138

The reports from the Metropolitan Police demonstrated that, thanks to their protection, there were no major incidents of insults and violence towards the Roman catholic priests and that even when minor disturbances took place the police were quick to act. A summary of the Superintendents' reports shows the level of incidents in different parts of London. 139 The summary stated that there were no serious disturbances around the central part of London, such as Marylebone, Holborn, Covent Garden and Whitehall. It also observed that:

In Whitechapel Division area, Stepney area, and Lambeth Division area, no insult, and the authorities have expressed their thanks for the attention of police, in Southwark Division, no disturbance.

It did note, however, that there had been an incident in October 1851 when a large crowd had gathered outside Wiseman's house in Golden Square shouting 'No popery', but that it had been quickly dispersed by the Police, and a Constable stationed to keep the peace. 140
and attention to Wiseman had also been given in February 1851 when he had held a mass in the Catholic chapel in Tottenham. This area had the reputation of being strongly anti-Catholic, and had seen disturbances in 1850 as a result of Wiseman’s Appeal during the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy, and it was therefore decided to send two Constables to the chapel to ensure order. The summary also noted that:

...the attention of constables on beats where Roman catholics are situated has been called to pay particular attention to prevent annoyance.

However, there was one incident when a man had insulted a Catholic priest. He had been arrested by a constable and charged with making a disturbance in a Catholic Church. The same report noted that there were always police situated around Finsbury, especially during the Catholic mass, because of the large number of foreign immigrants that resided in the area. The report observed that:

In Finsbury area, Mr Ferrati, a Roman catholic priest was assaulted by 3 Men supposed Italians between 9 and 10 Pm on the 25th Nov while passing along Baldwin’s Gardens his eye blackened and nose cut.

In this neighbourhood a great many foreigners reside and is specially watched by a constable.
At the Roman Catholic Chapel in Rosamon Street a constable is always on duty during divine service and Wilmington Square in which the minister resides is frequently patrolled by the Police. 142

There were no disturbances in the Greenwich Division, but, Hampstead, Hammersmith and Wandsworth saw some incidents. In particular, in

... the Camberwell Division at the time of the consecration of the Roman Catholic Church Clapham in May last it was stated that Father Ignatius Spencer who was dressed in his vestments had been insulted on his way thither and on the 5th October last a man named Henry Herbert was charged with making a disturbance in the church but it being found he was of weak intellect he was discharged. A constable is always near the church on Sundays and the Commissioners have sworn in a local constable for the place. 143

Within a few days of this report being sent to the Foreign Office another incident had taken place. The Metropolitan Police reported on 12 December 1851 that a problem had arisen in Greenwich because of demonstrations against the building of a new Catholic Church. On 2 December protests organized by respectable tradesmen took place in Blackheath Lee and Lewisham in which 'colossal'
effigies of the Pope and Wiseman, which appeared to have been constructed at 'considerable expense', had been burnt. Once again the Metropolitan Police was forced to take action to reassure local Catholics that they would not be the object of attack.

Paz has used the Home Office document of 6 December 1851 as an example that there were in fact very few anti-Popery riots during 1850-51. Although this was true to some extent, the fact is that the government was fully aware of the danger of this phenomenon. The reason why there were not many 'No-Popery' disturbances was not because it was not significant socially, but rather due to the government's prompt intervention to control popular anti-Papal violence. The number of incidents was low around this period, because the government managed to stop several potentially violent 'No-Popery' protests by sending Special Constables. The problem with Paz's approach is that it relies too much on statistics and figures to analyse a social phenomenon; this is especially a problem in regard to religious matters because figures do not show the complexity of the religious and social background of the anti-Catholic and anti-Papal movements. In addition, Paz has failed to recognize the way in which the government used the police force as a means of social control; the government used its power to protect Catholic subjects and suppress the anti-Catholic riots, thus maintaining law and order.
The evidence therefore proves that the government's reply to the social disturbances associated with 'No-Popery' agitation was very prompt and effective. Particularly it seems that special care was taken of Wiseman, not just because he had become the main target of 'No-Popery' aggression in England, but also because he was still closely linked with the Vatican. In fact it was Wiseman who had informed the Pope about the anti-Papal attacks on Roman Catholic priests in England. The government did not want any more embarrassment in terms of its diplomatic relations with the Papacy, and therefore any possible offence against the Catholics had to be prevented.

Section V: The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill

While in terms of foreign policy there was a desire to placate the Papacy, within the context of domestic politics the restoration of the Hierarchy forced Russell to pose as an opponent of 'Papal aggression'. His initial move in this direction came in his open letter to the Archbishop of Durham on 4 November 1850, shortly after the restoration.

This notorious letter has been interpreted in a number of different ways by historians, and there is still a debate over how sincere Russell was in his newly discovered anti-Catholicism. In addition, there is a controversy over whether he had already committed himself at this
early stage to passing penal legislation against the Catholic Hierarchy, such as that later seen in the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. Russell’s behaviour is difficult to judge because it seems so contradictory to his usual practice. He had after all devoted his life to advancing religious toleration and knew that anti-Catholic legislation was a constitutional anachronism. Furthermore, it was clear that his government depended on the votes of Irish Catholics. 147

The most important passage in his letter to the Bishop of Durham read:

> There is an assumption of power in all the documents which have come from Rome - a pretension to supremacy over the realm of England, and a claim to sole and undivided sway, which is inconsistent with the Queen’s supremacy, with the rights of our Bishops and clergy, and with the spiritual independence of the nation, as asserted even in Roman Catholic times. 148

This was strong language, but Russell soon found that it was not enough to pacify the ’No-Popery’ movement. In particular, a defence based upon the Established Church was unlikely to win over the Dissenters and the radical Nonconformists, who were already deeply suspicious of the growth of Tractarianism within the Church of England.
In addition, Russell faced the problem that he was still perceived as pro-Popish. It was widely believed that Russell had followed a favourable policy toward the Papacy and the Catholics ever since 1846, when his administration had come to power. In particular, the restoration of the Hierarchy in 1850 revived criticism against the Maynooth Grant, which was a serious issue for the weak Russell ministry, depending as it did upon both Catholic and Dissenter's votes. Punch commented at the time:

Will your Holiness please to tell me what I am to say next session to Sir Robert Inglis, and Mr. Plumptre, and Mr. Spooner, now that you have created an Archbishop of Westminster, particularly if you have created an Archbishop of Westminster, particularly if you sanction the decree of the Thurles Synod against the Queen's College? Then, if you confirm the condemnation of the Queen's Colleges how am I to defend the Maynooth Grant against Messrs. Spooner and Plumptre? By what logic shall I attempt to persuade the House of Commons that it is reasonable and right to vote the nation's money for the purpose of training up priests to defeat the ends of good government? And with what possible face can I continue to advocate the admission of Roman Catholics to take degrees at Oxford or
Cambridge? Here - though, of course, your Holiness understands your own business best - I venture to ask whether it will be quite politic of you to condemn the Queen's Colleges, which are merely neutral institutions, whereas, you have all along allowed Roman Catholics youth to go to the positively Protestant University of Dublin? I always thought that Roman Catholicity never contradicted itself. Will your Holiness give a handle to the heretics? 150

More serious criticisms of Russell could be seen in the no-Popery pamphlets of the period. In one pamphlet entitled "Is the Pope coming to England?": the Pope's Bull, an address to the people of England by a protestant patriot, published in December 1850, Russell and his government were clearly accused of pursuing a favourable policy towards the Catholics and the Papacy. The writer noted:

... we see Lord John Russell the Prime minister, the most liberal of Pro-popish Legislators, throwing all the blame of the recent Papal Aggression upon the Puseyites. On the other hand we behold the Bishop of Exeter, the most decided patron of Puseyism on the Episcopal Bench, addressing his Clergy at Exeter in a speech in which he shews up the encouragement afforded to the Church of Rome by Earl Grey, the Secretary for the Colonies in
the House of Lords, and by Lord John Russell, the Prime Minister in the House of Commons. The Bishop quotes from authentic speeches in Parliament, in which Earl Grey mourned over the existence of a Protestant establishment in Ireland, expressed fervent aspirations for the establishment of Popery in that country, and breathed forth an ardent desire to see Roman Catholic Prelates in the House of Lords. The Bishop also quoted sentiments from Lord John Russell in favour of territorial titles by Prelates appointed by the See of Rome. 151

The writer emphasized in one passage that Russell in his letter to the Archbishop of Durham had made much of his previous conciliatory policy towards the Catholics, and continued:

This I take for granted is a brief but rather obscure allusion to the measures of support which his Lordship has bestowed for many years upon the Ecclesiastical system of Popery. It appears then from Lord Russell's own shewing, that he had been fostering and promoting the mummeries of superstition, and using his great personal and political influence in favour of a system which confines the intellect and enslaves the soul. 152
The government’s position was made more awkward by the fact that its claim that it knew nothing of the plans for restoring the Hierarchy was challenged by Wiseman, who claimed, that in the autumn of 1847 the Pope had shown Minto the plans for the restoration and that therefore the British government should have known that this action was contemplated. In response to this claim, Minto protested that all he had done while in Rome was to pass a letter from Father Connelly, which was critical of Wiseman, to Cardinal Ferretti, and that that was the extent of his involvement in the affairs of the English Catholics, and he stated in a letter to Russell on 21 November that Wiseman’s account was a ‘lie’. Minto’s denial did not, however, convince either the public or the Opposition, and it was widely believed that the government only pretended that it had no forewarning.

Against the background of No-Popery agitation, and criticism of the government, Russell finally decided to introduce the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. He informed the House of Commons on 7 February 1851 that the intention behind the Bill was to outlaw the Hierarchy by preventing the new Catholic Archbishops and Bishops from assuming their positions and that any endowment given to those taking such titles would be seized the Crown. Over the next six months, until it finally received Royal Assent in August, the Bill was discussed extensively in Parliament and provoked a number of different reactions.
As might be expected the Bill was opposed by the Irish Catholics, but it was also resisted by some of the Liberal members of the House of Commons, such as John Bright and Richard Cobden, and many of the Peelites, including Lord Aberdeen and William Gladstone. The reasons for opposition were forcefully expressed by John Roebuck, the Radical M.P. for Sheffield, who told the House on 7 February:

Some centuries hence, when people would look back to this period, they would not be so much astonished at the display of stupid bigotry manifested by the people out of doors, as at the position taken by the noble Lord who had been heretofore foremost in religious toleration; that in the midst of this warm gush of anti-Papal zeal, he should be found to yield himself up to the control of the ignorant multitude; and, still more that he should come to Parliament to propose a law which would prove itself the most absurd Act of Parliament that had ever been passed, and one that would disgrace the legislation of the most bigoted times. 153

To the supporters of the 'No-Popery' movement the Bill if anything did not go far enough. 154 Instead of tranquillizing the 'No-Popery' movement against the Hierarchy, the Bill inflamed anti-Papal feelings. One of
the arguments used to attack Russell was that it had been his policy towards the Papacy which had encouraged Rome to restore the Hierarchy. The leading proponent of this view was Benjamin Disraeli, who in his speech of 7 February noted that the Prime Minister’s argument that the restoration had come as a surprise was untenable. as Russell had, ever since 1845, taken a favourable stand towards Catholic issues; he asked the House:

... when the Pope was aware that these were the opinions of so eminent a personage - when the representative of our Sovereign was himself indecently communicating with him in a tone of deferential homage - when he might read in the records of the Irish Court that his archbishops and bishops took the highest precedence ... I ask the House, is it just, is it fair, is the noble Lord authorised to state, to-night, that the conduct of the Pope was "a blunder on the sudden?" 155

Outside Parliament there was much criticism of the Bill. One pamphlet entitled The Whigs versus the Pope, the case of the day, by an old Whig published at the end of 1851, complained:

The clergy canted, the squires ranted, and the people howled, and No popery was the cry of the day. The premier’s manifesto crowned the
glorious explosion of Protestant feeling. It took a fling at the Pope and a kick at the Puseyites, leaving the issue to the wisdom of Parliament. It has agreed to the introduction of a bill for nullifying the appointment of Roman Catholic Bishops; and for rendering them incapable in that capacity of holding trusts in behalf of the church — be they money grants or lands in mortmain. Thus Parliament, at Whiggish instigation, bites at Popery, but only barks at Puseyism. The first is unendowed, and hence may be a fitting object of persecution. The last is powerful, or linked to those who are and cannot be touched. 156

The Bill completely failed to pacify the anti-Papal agitation, for as this lecture emphasized ‘If the object of the Whiggish bill be the arrestment of conversion to the Roman Catholic belief, it will utterly fail.’ 157

It was fortunate for the government that Disraeli and the public did not know that even at this time the government was still attempting to win the Pope’s support for its policy in Ireland. As early as 19 October 1850 Minto had told Russell that it might be possible to use the outbreak of animosity against Rome to put pressure on the Pope to accept the British government’s position over the Irish colleges. 158 The desire to see Sheil represent British opinions in Rome thus continued unabated despite
the 'Papal Aggression'. Palmerston informed Russell on 21 October that Sheil would be an excellent appointment as he was 'master of all Irish matters'. He continued to express this view even as the anti-Papal agitation grew steadily worse. On 28 January 1851 Palmerston told Russell that it was still his intention to make Sheil the British voice in Rome in order to counter the 'Irish malcontents', and noted:

Depend upon it that when Sheil gets to Rome he will put matters upon a much more satisfactory footing; and I believe the best thing we could do would be to send him on there unofficially and without credentials, as soon as our measure is launched in Parliament.

Sheil, Palmerston wrote, was to tell the Pope that there was no intention to use the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill to launch actual prosecutions. Incredibly it was believed that such an assurance would satisfy Rome. Sheil arrived in Florence in January and began to try to influence the Pope to approve the plan for the Queen's Colleges. However, the British government's policy was once again doomed to failure, as on 25 May Sheil died in Florence.

This last failed attempt to win over the Papacy was not the only political set-back for Russell, for the domestic events of 1850-51 also brought his government into a disastrous situation. Far from public opinion being
tranquillized by the Bill violence and attacks on the Catholic clergy continued and even increased, as has been seen above in the cases of violence against the Catholic priests until the end of 1851. Not only was Russell unable to terminate these attacks but also the Bill created more enemies in Parliament such as the Peelites and the Irish and non-Irish Catholic voters. In 1852 his Whig government was finally forced to resign.

Conclusion

In spite of the Pope's reactionary policy after his restoration, the British government still kept a favourable policy towards the Pope for international and domestic reasons, including Ireland and the need to secure the Catholic vote. However, at the domestic level the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy led to the people's anger being turned against the English Catholic Church and the Pope in the form of anti-Papal demonstrations. This posed a difficult dilemma for the government; how to contain the movement without offending either the British public or the Papacy.

Certainly one can see some of the government's actions in 1850-51 as intended to defuse the political agitation over 'Papal aggression'. The problem for the Russell administration was, however, that its policies became contradictory, at one point protecting Catholics and at the next point introducing anti-Catholic legislation.
without satisfying either camp. One could argue that the policy which Russell had pursued since 1846 had come to its logical conclusion and that he could no longer satisfy the different elements in his coalition.

It is possible, however, that there was a deeper motive behind the government’s treatment of the anti-Popery movement in 1850-51. Although one can argue that the government protected Catholics in England from anti-Popery attacks simply to maintain law and order, it is tempting to speculate that fear of revolution may have been an influence. As the British government had already recognized a link between the No-Popery movement and Mazzini’s republican activities in England, there may have been anxiety that the No-Popery demonstrations might get out of hand. The government’s decision to send in special police ensured that this did not happen and that civil peace was maintained.

However, the result of the government’s intervention to contain the anti-Papal violence was to direct the fire of the radicals towards the government and the Establishment itself.
Notes

1 For a text linking anti-Catholicism with anti-Irish sentiment see S. Gilley, 'Protestant London, No-Popery and the Irish Poor, 1830-60', Recusant History, (1969-70, 1971-72)


5 Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.80-1.


7 Ibid, in Velletri, 11 April 1850, p.298.

8 Ibid, in Rome, 12 April 1850, p.304.

9 Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.80.


11 Scott, The Roman Question, p.83.

12 Ibid.


14 Britain was excluded from the four European Catholic Powers conference in Gaeta on 30 March 1849.

15 Scott, The Roman Question, p.84.

16 Ralph Abercromby (Turin) to Palmerston, 19 September 1850, Palmerston (Broadlands) Papers, University of Southampton Library.

17 Coppa, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, p.78. In early March 1850 Piedmont presented the Siccardi legislation, including the first five articles which abrogated various forms of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Proposal eight provided for the suppression of mortmain, stipulating that ecclesiastical corporations could only acquire real
property with the state’s consent. The last provision regulated marriage in relation to civil law.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p.80.

20 PRO FO67/170, Abercromby to Palmerston, 26 March 1850.

21 PRO FO67/170, Abercromby to Palmerston, 18 April 1850, referring to 18 April 1850, ‘Archbishop of Turin address to the clergy relative to their conduct with respect to the law doing away with ecclesiastical Tribunals.’

22 PRO FO67/170, Abercromby to Palmerston, 1 April 1850.

23 PRO FO67/170, Abercromby to Palmerston, 20 August 1850.

24 Abercromby to Palmerston, 16 August 1850, Palmerston Papers.

25 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio Segreto del Segretario di Stato, Antonelli to Turin 2 September 1850, (translation).

26 Ibid.

27 PRO FO67/170, Abercromby to Palmerston, 19 September 1850.

28 Abercromby to Palmerston, 19 September 1850, Palmerston Papers.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 The Northern Star, 28 September 1850, and Reynold’s Weekly Newspaper, 6 October 1850.

33 Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome, La Legazione Sarda in Londra, Palmerston to Azeglio, 4 June 1850.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Scott, The Roman Question p.95.

37 Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome, La Legazione Sarda in Londra, Palmerston to Azeglio, British Foreign Office, 13 July 1850, ‘Good commercial relation between Britain and Sardinia, to issue the necessary order for the immediate application
of the provisions of the law of the 6th July 1850, in favour of the Flag of Great Britain.'

38 Abercromby to Palmerston, 18 August 1850, Palmerston Papers, 'Application of the Papal court to the government of Austria, France, Spain and Naples to enforce the submission of Piedmont in her Ecclesiastical disputes with Rome'.

39 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio della Nunziatura di Parigi, Cardinal Antonelli to Normanby through the Papal Nuncio in Paris, Cardinal Raffaele Fornari, No.74, 7 July 1849.

40 Martina, Pio IX, p.351.

41 Lord Petre (Rome) to Palmerston, 10 August 1850, Palmerston Papers.

42 Ibid.


44 Palmerston to Petre, 28 August 1850, Palmerston Papers.

45 Ibid.

46 Abercromby to Palmerston, 19 September 1850, Palmerston Papers.

47 Kerr, 'A Nation of Beggars?', p.231.


49 Ibid., p.183.

50 Kerr, A Nation of Beggars?, p.252-3.

51 Wiseman's main activities for the Roman Congregation of Propaganda are recorded in the Archivio delle Sacra Congregazione di Propaganda Fide, Rome.


53 Ibid., p.24.


55 Archivio delle Sacra Congregazione di Propaganda Fide, La prima serie, Anglia, 16 October 1850.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.
Westminster Diocesan Archives, Wiseman Papers, Series 15, Pope and Bishop, Item 7 (220), I Pastorals, 1-6, 6; 7 October 1850 on the restoration of the Hierarchy.


Ibid.


E. Norman, The English Catholic Church, p.21-2.


Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio Segreto del Segretario di Stato, No.278, Inghilterra, September 1850


Birmingham Diocesan Archives, at Cathedral House in Birmingham, No.1997, Wiseman to Ullathorne, 30 September 1850


One of the anti-Popery pamphlets published in November 1850, 'The Pope's Bull, the People of England, by a Protestant Patriot'.

Punch, (19) July-December 1850, 'The thin end of the wedge, daring attempt to break into a Church', p.207.

The Pope's Bull, the People of England, November 1850, p.13, 'It is not the mere territorial name, nor is it the mode of creating it, which Protestant and Roman Catholic Dissenters do, each in their own way: it is not that either of them can be asked to derive their spiritual names and titles from the Queen, whose headship in religion they disclaim.' (p.12).
This material is contained in 'The Roman Catholic Question: a copious series of important documents, of permanent historical interest, on the re-establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy in England', (1850-51, London) p.4-6; its Italian translation entitled 'Appello al popolo inglese' is kept in the Propaganda Archive. (Archivio delle Sacra Congregazione di Propaganda Fide, Roma).

The Times, 19 October 1850.

The original copy of Cardinal Wiseman's first Pastoral Letter, is kept in Westminster Diocesan Archive, as part of Wiseman Papers, 7 October 1850.

Ibid.


The Times, 21 November 1850.

Ibid.


The Times, 29 October 1850.

The Northern Star, 2 and 9 November 1850.


George Dawson, On the Romish Church and Her Hierarchy, (Birmingham, 1850), p.15.


Reynold's Weekly Newspaper, 3 and 10 November 1850.

Brewin Grant, The Three Shams: The Sham Peter, Called the Pope; The Sham Church, Called Infallible; Bible, Douay & Tradition, (London, 1851).

Wolffe, The Protestant Crusade p.112. There were quite a few pieces of Protestant literature which reflected anti-Roman Catholic sentiments. One of the most popular of these was John Fox's "The Book of Martyrs" which criticized the nature of Rome, while emphasizing the need for Protestant religious fervour, and linking the latter closely to English national identity. p.307

Ibid. p.118.
92 Ibid. p.125.

93 Achilli also appeared in The Northern Star’s article, 7 December 1850.


96 PRO, PRO30/22/8G, Russell Papers, Palmerston to Russell, 11 November 1850.


98 Ibid., p.293.


100 Ibid, p. 179 and p.183.


102 Finn, After Chartism, pp.170-1.


105 Ibid p.175.

106 Ibid p.197.

107 Ibid p.179.


109 The Northern Star, 28 September 1850, declared in an ironic poem: ‘Death to Mazzini. The Republican is the most famous government. Down with the dominion of the People.
Pio nono for ever. The mildest government is that of the priests. Priestly power for ever.' It then produced the following explanation:
'Reading straight down we find death to Mazzini & co., but reading through both division we have death to Pio nono Mazzini for ever, and so on.'

110 PRO HO45/3272, Normanby (Paris) to Palmerston, 3 June 1851.

111 PRO HO45/3272, M. Addington (Foreign Office) to H. Waddington, (Home Office), 10 June 1851, and 'The Italian Loan by Mazzini', Mayne (Metropolitan Police) report to Sir George Grey 26 February 1851.

112 The Northern Star, 12 November 1850.

113 Reynolds Weekly Newspaper, 16 November 1850, p. 7 'Money for war, Italian patriot'.


115 PRO HO45/3272, 12 November 1850, report about purchases of arms by Mazzini.

116 PRO HO45/3272, Home Office report, 27 February 1851

117 PRO HO 45/3518, Metropolitan Police report, 12 August 1851

118 PRO HO45/3518, Metropolitan Police report, 1 November 1851


120 The Northern Star, 9 November 1850.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Paz, Popular Anti-Catholicism, p. 81-2.

126 The Northern Star, 9 November 1850.

127 Paz, Popular Anti-Catholicism, p. 243.
The letter began: 'I am requested by a Committee appointed at a public meeting of the Inhabitants of the Liberty of Saint Albans and Western portion of the County of Hertford held for the purpose of taking with consideration the proposed amalgamation of the Liberty to forward to you a copy of the Resolutions passed at such meeting...'

PRO HO45/3140, 3 December 1850, Public notice, both Magistrates acting at Birkenhead in the country of Chester, 28 November 1850, To the magistrates, acting in and for the Hundred of Wirral, we undersigned protestant inhabitants.

PRO HO45/3140, 20 December 1850 recorded, includes public notice of 27 November 1850.


PRO HO45/3140, Birkenhead, 30 November 1850, Town Hall. 'They have also examined the Police authorities as to the force that might be requisite to maintain the peaceable and orderly approaches to the place of meeting and have been assured that it is to be expected that the crowd of more than 3000 assembled on Wednesday last would in all probability be largely increased, by the influx of Irish labourers from Liverpool and that at least 500 police men would be desirable.'

Paz, *Popular Anti-Catholicism*, p.264

PRO HO45/3272, 4 August 1851, Report by John Burton of the parish of Eastchurch.

PRO HO45/3783, Metropolitan Police report 6 December 1851.

There are a number of reports on violence against the Roman Catholic priests in England, in Anglia, Archivio di Propaganda, Rome. A letter from the Vatican authority to the British Foreign Office, 26 December 1850, contains complaints against the violence.

PRO HO45/3783, Foreign Office to Home Office 27 November 1851, enclosing Newspaper the *Patriot* 16 November 1850 and article entitled 'The Popish plot more fully developed: and the duty of dissenters under the present agitation. (Birkenhead)'.

PRO HO45/3783, Metropolitan Police report 6 December 1851.

Ibid.

Ibid., the Metropolitan Police noted: 'A month ago a large number of persons assembled in Golden square opposite the House of Wiseman shouting No popery they
were dispersed by the Police. A constable for some days afterwards patrolled the immediate neighbourhood but no other disturbance took place.'

141 Ibid, In the Islington area in February 1851 'application was made by the priest of the Roman Catholic Chapel Tottenham for the attendance of 2 constables during divine service by Cardinal Wiseman which was granted all passed off quietly.'

142 PRO HO45/3783, Metropolitan Police report, 6 December 1851.

143 Ibid.

144 PRO HO45/3783, Metropolitan Police report, 12 December 1851. Around the same period the government was concerned about the necessity of protecting the new Catholic church in Greenwich against another big anti-Catholic demonstration organized by "a respectable trade man." This indicated that anti-Catholic and anti-Popery agitation was a widespread phenomenon. It was felt that the government had to do something to prevent it from developing into a more organized movement.

145 Paz, Popular Anti-Catholicism, p.264

146 See 135.

147 Holmes, More Roman than Rome, p.77.


149 Machin, Politics and the Church, pp.182-3.

150 Punch, 1850 (19), p.173, Punch entitled "MR Punch to Pio nono".

151 The Pope's Bull: An Address to the People of England by a protestant patriot, in December 1850.

152 Norman, Anti-Catholicism, pp.159-61.


154 Machin, Politics and the Church, p.220.


156 The Whigs Versus the Pope (Russell's favour): The Case of the Day, by an Old Whig (Edinburgh, 1851)

157 Ibid.

158 PRO PRO30/22/8G, Minto to Russell, 19 October 1850.
159 Ibid., Palmerston to Russell, 21 October 1850.


161 Kerr, 'A Nation of Beggars?' p.286-7.
Conclusion

During the years of Italian unification between 1859 and 1861 Britain was the state outside of the Italian peninsula which did the most to undermine and bring to an end the temporal power of the Papacy. Indeed, as McIntire has noted, Britain's assistance in the destruction of the Papal States was one of the most important of its contributions to the process of unification. In the light of this it is remarkable to find that only a few years earlier the British reaction to the early years of the Papacy of Pius IX was enthusiastic, and that there was a surprising degree of British interest in and governmental support for the Pope. For a period of six years between 1846 and 1851 the Pope was a central figure who influenced not only the course of Britain's foreign policy but also on its domestic politics.

There are a number of ways in which to explain this unexpected entente between Britain and the Pope. It is tempting at first glance to assume that British enthusiasm for the Pope during these years was due solely to the relief that at last a 'good' Pope had taken charge in Rome and the hope that his subsequent reforms would transform the government and administration of this stronghold of autocracy. This is true to an extent; there was indeed a genuine welcome in 1846 and 1847 to the concept of a liberal Pope and it was believed that Pius
could set a positive example to the monarchs of Italy and demonstrate that reform rather than reaction was the best means to avoid revolution.

The positive response to the Pope was also, however, due to the recognition on the part of the British government that Pius's liberalism could be useful in terms of the balance of power within the Italian peninsula. The abiding British fear in this period, which was particularly held by Palmerston, was that the next general European war would break out as the result of a Franco-Austrian confrontation over an Italian issue. In this context support for the Pope was a means of opposing Austrian domination and of encouraging an indigenous nationalist movement which would not rely on France.

The appearance of an enlightened Pope was not welcome only to the British government, it also appealed to a significant element of the British public as well. Suddenly newspapers and periodicals began to treat the Pope as a fighter against despotism and as a hope for the future of Italy. Even radicals, including, Mazzini joined in the chorus of support and acclaim.

The events of 1848, however, served to demonstrate that the hopes that had been placed in the Pope were based on a misconception of what Pius intended to achieve. Pius may have wished to see a less corrupt system of government within the Papal States, but this did not mean
that he was willing to sacrifice any of his temporal
powers to achieve this, particularly if such concessions
encroached on his spiritual authority. He was therefore
not prepared to act as a figure-head constitutional
monarch, nor would he agree to declare war on Austria.

It would be logical to assume that the failure of the
Pope in the summer of 1848 to act as a rallying point for
Italian nationalism and his opposition to further
constitutional reform meant Britain's positive policy
towards the Pope then ended. To a degree this was true as
the British government due to its concern for the Italian
balance of power, began to transfer its support to
Piedmont, while British radical opinion favoured the
Roman Republic. However, but it could not be said that
Britain turned its back on the Papacy completely. Indeed
attempts to keep on relatively good terms continued until
1851.

The fact that the British government did not give up on
Pius demonstrates that it was not just his 'liberalism'
that attracted support and that other motives were in
play. In part, one can explain British policy by stating
that Britain was reluctant to abandon the Pope even when
he had renounced reform for fear that he would become the
political puppet of the French or Austrian governments.
This was evident in 1849 when Britain supported the
restoration of the Pope to his seat in Rome and opposed
the Roman Republic, and also in 1850 when Britain was
reluctant to give its unequivocal backing to Piedmont in its clash with the Papacy. In addition, one can point to the importance of the pressure being exerted on both the Vatican and the Russell government for the re-establishment of the Hierarchy. There was, however, an even more significant factor that required Britain to show favour to the Papacy - Ireland.

From the autumn of 1847 onwards the rise of political tensions in Ireland meant that a consistent theme of British policy towards Rome was that the Pope had to be persuaded to take action to help. This policy included pressing the Pope to give his sanction to British reforms, such as the Queen’s Colleges and the endowment of the Irish Catholic Church, and to use his power to quell the pro-Repeal activities of the Irish clergy. This was the issue that dominated the thinking behind the Diplomatic Bill of 1848, even though the government could not admit it publicly, and it was still exerting its attraction in 1851 when R.L. Sheil was sent as the British minister to Florence.

It appears that the need for a solution to the Irish Question was so serious that it blinded the British government to reality and forced it to enter into avenues which prejudiced the outcome of its diplomacy. If the period between 1846 and 1847 was based on a naive perception of the Pope then this was even more the case from 1848 to 1851, when a lack of understanding of Pius’s
position coincided with a failure to recognize that support for the Pope could not be reconciled with the pressures of British domestic politics.

The first example of the contradictory approach of the British government was evident in the Diplomatic Bill of 1848, which was designed to open the way for diplomatic relations with the Papacy in order to balance the influence of the Irish College. Due, however, to the weight of conservative anti-Catholic sentiment in Parliament the government was prohibited from dealing with Rome on anything but a temporal basis, although it was the Pope’s spiritual power which the government hoped to utilize in Ireland, and the result was the Pope’s rejection of the British overture.

The second example of this failure of perception and political acumen came in August 1850 when Russell apparently led Wiseman to believe that the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy was acceptable to the British government. This hint did nothing to help Britain in Ireland; it led rather to the restoration of October 1850, which was greeted with outrage by both conservative and radical public opinion. Faced with this powerful if unlikely coalition Russell was forced to backtrack and introduced the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which was to seal the fate of his government and destroy all hopes of better relations with Rome.
By the summer of 1851 it was clear that five years of diplomacy had achieved very little. The Papal reforms of 1846 and 1847 were reneged upon, Austria and France still vied for control over the Italian peninsula, and no solution to the Irish problem was forthcoming. In time the image of the 'good Pope' would be consigned to memory, and when he died Pius IX would be remembered not for his early liberalism but for his opposition to Italian unification and his promulgation of Papal Infallibility. In addition, the high point of Anglo-Vatican relations and the diplomatic revolution attempted between 1846 and 1851 were also to disappear from view.

However, the period of British support for the Papacy is significant and should not be dismissed as an aberration. It illustrates the nature of British attempts to seek a solution to the Italian national question before the rise of Piedmont, and shows that an alternative to unification by Turin was, for a time, a possibility. It tells us much about the influence of public opinion on foreign policy and the difficulty of pursuing a policy which ran contrary to the mass of public opinion. It also shows that the issue of Ireland was so vital to British interests that it too helped to shape policy towards the Papacy. Beyond all of this, however, it demonstrates quite clearly that there was consistently a complex interplay between political and religious issues and that despite all the pressing political reasons for seeking better relations with Rome the fundamentally anti-
Catholic nature of British society made this impossible to achieve. Britain's attempt to utilize Papal influence in Italy and over the Catholic clergy in Ireland to suit its own interests failed because Britain could never overcome its aversion to formal and complete recognition of the Pope. In the end there was a basic contradiction between religion and politics.
Bibliography

Archives (Manuscript sources)

a) Britain

Public Record Office, London (Kew)
Foreign Office, General Correspondence (1831-1851)
   FO 43 Rome
   FO 45 Italy
   FO 67 Sardinia
   FO 79 Tuscany
   FO 7 Austria
   FO 27 France

   FO 44 Italy, Earl of Minto’s mission, 1847-1848

Home Office
   HO 45 Registered Papers
   HO 54 Civil Petitions and Addresses

Lord Russell Papers
   PRO 30/22

Admiralty
   ADM 1 Admiralty and Secretariat Papers

Private Papers

Palmerston Papers: Archive in Southampton University (1846-50)

Lord Minto Papers: the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh


Clarendon Papers: Bodleian Library, Oxford

Birmingham Diocesan Archives

b) Italy

Archivio Segreto Vaticano
   Archivio Segreto del Segretario di Stato
   Archivio Nunziatura di Parigi
   Archivio Nunziatura di Vienna
   Archivio Personale di Pio IX

Archivio di Stato di Roma
   Repubblica Romana del 1849
Archivio delle Sacra Congregazione di Propaganda Fide, Rome
Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome
La legazione sarda in Londra
La legazione sarda presso la Santa Sede
Fondi Archivistici del Museo Centrale del Risorgimento

Published Documents

Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates
1846 vol.83-88, 1847 vol.89-95, 1848 vol.96-101
1849 vol.102-107, 1850 vol.108-113, 1851

British Parliamentary Sessional Papers (House of Commons)

Correspondence respecting Affairs of Italy
Pt 1. 1846-47 (1849/LVII)
Pt 2. Jan-Jun 1848 (1849/LVII)
Pt 3. July-Dec 1848 (1849/LVIII)
Pt 4. 1849 (1849/LVIII)

Correspondence respecting Affairs of Rome
1849, (1849/LVII)
1849, (1851/LVII)

Instructions by Govt. of France to French Agents at Civita Vecchia and Gaeta respecting French Expedition to Civita Vecchia (1849/LVII)

Representation Made to the Roman Government by the Allied Powers in 1831, advising it to adopt certain Reforms and Improvements (1847-48/LXV)

Communications from the Austrian Government as to Territorial Arrangement and Political Condition of Italy, with Reply of British Government August, September 1847, (1847-1848/LXV)

Bill for further Repeal of Enactments Imposing Pains and Penalties on H M Roman Catholic Subjects on account of Religion (1847-48/VI)


La diplomazia del Regno di Sardegna durante la prima guerra d’indipendenza.II: relazioni con lo Stato Ponficio (Marzo 1848-luglio 1849), Baudi di Vesme, C., (ed), (Turin, Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, 1951).

La relazioni diplomatiche fra L’Austria e il Regno id Sardegna e la guerra del 1848-49, III serie: 1848-1860.


Le relazioni diplomatiche fra lo Stato Pontificio e la Francia. III serie: 1848-60. II: 19 February 1849-15 April 1850, (Rome, Istituto storico italiano per l'età moderna e contemporanea, 1972)


Bianchi, N., Storia documentata della diplomazia in Italia dall' anno 1814 all' anno 1861, (8 vols, Turin, 1872)


Martina, G., Pio IX e Leopoldo II. (Rome, 1967)


Contemporary writings

Achilli, G., Dealings with the Inquisition: or Papal Rome, her priests, and her Jesuits, (London, 1851).

Azeglio, M., I miei ricordi, translated into English by Count Massel, Recollections of Massimo D'Azeglio, (London, 1868)

Azeglio, M., La politica di Massimo d'Azeglio dal 1848 al 1859, (Turin, 1884).

Cochrane, A.B., Young Italy, (London, 1850)

Dawson, G., *On the Romish Church and her Hierarchy*, (Birmingham, 1850).

Dawson, G., *Two Lectures on the "Papal Aggression" Controversy*, (Birmingham, 1851)


Grant, B., *The Three Shams: The Sham Peter, Called the Pope; The Sham Church, Called Infallible; Bible, Douay & tradition*, (London, 1851).

Green, J., 'Mr Jolly Green’s Account of the Late Papal Aggression', *The New Monthly Magazine and Humorist Jolly Green*, Vol.90, No.360 (December 1850), pp.414-34.

Gretton, G., *The Englishwoman in Italy*, (London, 1860)


M’Ilwaine, William (Rev)., *Shall the Priesthood of the Church of Rome, Be Endowed in Ireland: A Question for the Protestants of This Empire*, (Dublin, 1849).


Proceedings of the Public Demonstration of Sympathy with Pope Pius IX. and with Italy, in the City of New York, on Monday, November 29 A.D.1847. (New York, 1847).

Report of the Great Meeting of the Protestants of Birmingham in the Town Hall, to Oppose the Endowment of the Popish College at Maynooth, April 17 1845, (Birmingham, 1845).
Rhodes, M.J. His Holiness Pope Pius IX and the Temporal Rights of the Holy See, as Involving the Religious Social and Political Interests of the Whole World: An Address Delivered at a Meeting of the Catholics of Richmond, (Yorkshire, November 27 1859)


The Whigs Versus the Pope (Russell's Favour): The Case of the Day, by an Old Whig (Edinburgh, 1851).

Townsend, G., Tour in Italy, (London, 1850)


Contemporary Published Press and Periodicals

Athenæum (1846-50)

British Quarterly Review (1847-50)

Dublin Review

Economist

Edinburgh Review (1847-50)

English Republic (1851)

Examiner

Foreign Quarterly Review (1842)

Guardian (Catholic)

House of Commons Journal

Illustrated London News (1846-50)

Leader

Manchester Guardian (1846-52)
Morning Chronicle (1849-50)
Morning Star (1844-47)
Nation (Dublin)
North British Review
Northern Star (1846-52)
People’s Journal (1846)
Punch (1846-50)
Rambler (1848-50)
Reynold’s newspaper (1846-52)
Reynolds Weekly (1849-50)
Roman advertiser
Spectator (1851)
Spirit of the Age (1847-49)
Tablet
Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine
The Record
The Times (1831-52)
Waterford Chronicle
Westminster Review (1846-50)

**Historical Studies**


Clarke, W., (ed), *Essay: Selected From the Writings, Literary, Political, and Religious, of Joseph Mazzini*, (London, 1887)


Coppa, F.J., *Pope Pius IX: Crusader in a Secular Age*, (Boston, 1979)


Dasent, A., J.T Delane, *Editor of The Times: His Life and Correspondence* (London, 1959)


Demarco, D., *Una rivoluzione sociale: La Repubblica Romana del 1849*, (Napoli, 1941)


Falco, G., *Mazzini e Repubblica Romana* 1949


Gwynn, D., *Cardinal Wiseman*, (Dublin, 1950)


Leti, G., *La Rivoluzione e la Repubblica Romana 1848-49*, (Milan, 1913)


Masse, D., *Cattolici e Risorgimento*, (Edizione Paoline, 1961)


Rodelli, L., *La Repubblica Romana del 1849*, (Pisa, 1955)


Vinay, V., Evangelici italiani esuli a Londra durante il Risorgimento, (Turin, 1961).


Webster, G., The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-41, (London 1951).


Articles

Berra, L.F., 'La fuga di Pio IX a Gaeta e il racconto del suo scalco segreto', Studi Romani, anno V (1957), pp.672-86


Hearder, H.,'La politica di Lord Malmesbury verso L'Italian nella primavera del 1859', Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, (1956), pp.35-58


Schiefen, R.J. 'Anglo-Gallicanism in Nineteenth Century Britain', Catholic Historical Review, 63 (1977), pp.14-44.


Storch, R.D., 'Please to Remember the Fifth of November: Conflict, Solidarity and Public Order in Southern England, 1815-1900', in R.D. Storch (ed), Popular Culture


Unpublished PhD thesis


