THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY, IDENTITY AND RELIGION AMONG TURKS IN LONDON

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ABSTRACT

'The Politics of Ethnicity, Identity and Religion Among Turks in London' is a study of a micro-Muslim community in Britain. Earlier research on Islam and Muslims in Britain concentrated predominantly on Islam amongst South-Asian Muslims although there is a large degree of diversity in the expression of cultural and religious identity among Muslim communities in Britain. This thesis seeks to come to an understanding of the politics of ethnicity, identity and religion among Turkish Muslims who are a part of this diversity. The main objective of this research is to analyse how Turkish identity is constructed and what are the roles of family, culture, organisations and religious groups in the reproduction and transmission of traditional values to the young generation. This research is expected to fill a gap in research on micro-Muslim communities in Britain.

Research methods involved participant observation, in-depth interviews and a survey. Seventeen months of fieldwork in the north-east London and two months fieldwork in Berlin were carried out to collect ethnographic data. During the research, 77 people were interviewed in-depth, 93 young Turks participated in a survey and 29 people took part in group interviews.

The thesis begins with a brief account of immigration to Western Europe in general and to Britain in particular. Then, a discussion of theoretical issues on migration, ethnicity and the development of identity is presented where the major anthropological and sociological theories are examined.

Turkish immigration to Western Europe in general and to Britain in particular is outlined in Chapter Four and issues concerning family, kinship and reproduction of traditional values are examined in Chapter Five wherein it is argued that Turkish identity is reinforced by the reproduction of family values and kin relations in London. It is also demonstrated in this Chapter that new types of relations are established which are based on wider social networks.

Continuity and change in the identity construction of the young Turkish generation are discussed by analysing their attitudes towards language, culture, family, sexuality and religion in Chapters Six and Seven. The process of institutionalisation and analysis of the influence of Turkish organisations on the politics of identity and its expression are presented in Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten. The institutionalisation of Islam is analysed in relation to identity and religious diversity within the Turkish community. The politics of main Islamic groups are also analysed to explain how religion and politics are related and the extent to which religious movements in the country of origin influence Islamic organisations abroad.

This research shows that family relations and social networks have played an important role on every stage of immigration and settlement. Traditional values are constantly reproduced within Turkish families as an expression of identity and every effort is made to ensure that the young generation are not alienated from these values. However, there is an emergent identity construction taking place among the young generation, generally inspired by the 'local' experience. This suggests that the emergent Turkish identity accommodates continuity and change in relation to Turkish culture, sometimes producing tension between generations. For the young generation traditions, culture and religion are increasingly becoming values for 'symbolic' attachment.
CONTENTS

Abstract of Thesis 2
List of Tables 6
List of Figures 8
List of Maps 9
Acknowledgements 10

Chapter One: Introduction 11
1.1. Labour Migration to Western Europe 12
1.2. Immigration to Britain 16
1.3. Settlement and Emergence of Ethnic Communities 18

Chapter Two: Methodology 24
2.1. Personal Encounters 24
2.2. Ethnographic Method 26
2.3. Conducting Interviews and Taking Notes 30
2.4. Survey of the Young Generation 32

Chapter Three: Migration, Ethnicity And Ethnic Identity: Theoretical Issues 37
3.1. Recurrent Human Experience: Population Movements 37
3.2. Nature of Migration 39
3.2.1. Push-Pull Model 41
3.2.2. Micro-Macro Model and New Economics Migration Theory 43
3.2.3. World-Systems Theory 44
3.2.4. Socio-psychological Approach 45
3.3. Consequences of Migration 46
3.3.1. Acculturation, Assimilation and Absorption 49
3.4. Theories of Ethnicity 55
3.4.1. Primordial Perspective: ‘givens’ of social existence 58
3.4.2. Situational Approach: Ethnic Boundary between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 63
3.4.3. Foundations of ‘We’ versus ‘Them’ 67
3.5. Approaches to Identity Development: The Meaning of Identity 70
3.5.1. Social Dimensions of Identity Development and Ethnic Group Membership 71
3.5.2. Religion and Identity 74

Chapter Four: Turkish Labour Migration To Western Europe And Britain 79
4.1. Migration to Europe: Process and Patterns 80
4.2. Migration from Cyprus and Turkey to Britain 85
4.3. Settlement of Turks/Cypriots in London 91
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Five: Family, Kinship And Reproduction Of Traditional Values</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1. Here for Good: Settlement</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2. Re-establishment of Family Structure</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3. Kinship, Social Network and Reproduction of Values</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4. Marriage as a Process of Reproduction of Family Values, Kin and Social Network</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5. Marriage and Religious Networks</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Chapter Six: Young Generation, Continuity And Change           | 153  |
| 6.1. Young Generation and Socialisation                        | 153  |
| 6.2. Characteristics of the Sample                             | 155  |
| 6.3. Young Generation and Family                               | 159  |
| 6.4. Language and Culture                                      | 166  |
| 6.5. Sexuality                                                 | 178  |
| 6.6. Friendship Patterns and Identification Figures            | 184  |

| Chapter Seven: Young Generation: Religious Beliefs, Attitudes And Practices | 189  |
| 7.1. Dimensions of Religious Commitment                        | 189  |
| 7.2. Young Turks and Religiosity                                | 191  |
| 7.2.1. Belief in God                                           | 191  |
| 7.2.2. Intellectual Dimension: Knowledge about the Basic Tenets of Islam | 198  |
| 7.2.3. Ritualistic Dimension: Religious Practices              | 202  |
| 7.2.4. Experiential Dimension                                  | 206  |

| Chapter Eight: Turkish Organisations In London                 | 213  |
| 8.1. Organisations as Social Vehicles Among Turks              | 213  |
| 8.2. The Process of Institutionalisation                        | 215  |
| 8.3. Turkish/Cypriot Associations: Cultural, Educational and Welfare Associations | 217  |
| 8.3.1. Cyprus Turkish Association (CTA) (Kibris Turk Cemiyeti) | 218  |
| 8.3.2. Turkish Youth Association (TYA) (Turk Genclik Dernegi)  | 224  |
| 8.3.3. Turkish Education Group (TEG) (Turk Egitim Birligi)     | 226  |
| 8.3.4. Waltham Forest Turkish Association (WFTA) (Waltham Forest Turk Birliyi) | 229  |
| 8.3.5. The Halkevi                                             | 233  |
| 8.3.6. Other Organisations                                     | 236  |

| Chapter Nine: Religion Among Turks In London                    | 241  |
| 9.1. Religion in Turkey                                         | 242  |
| 9.2. Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey                    | 245  |
| 9.3. Recent Developments in Islamic Politics and their Possible Impacts on the Turkish Community | 248  |
| 9.4. Institutionalisation of Islam Among the Turkish Community  | 251  |
List of Tables:

Table 1.1: Stock of foreign population in selected European countries 15
Table 1.2: Resident population by ethnic group in Great Britain, 1991 18
Table 2.1: Number of in-depth interviews 31
Table 4.1: Turks in selected European countries 84
Table 4.2: Number of Mainland Turks and Turkish-Cypriots, various estimates 88
Table 4.3: Applications received for asylum seekers, excluding dependants in the United Kingdom from Turkish nationals between 1987-1995 89
Table 4.4: Local concentrations of those born in Cyprus and Turkey 91
Table 6.1: Age distribution of respondents 156
Table 6.2: Birthplace of respondents 157
Table 6.3: Length of living in London 158
Table 6.4: Parental origins of the respondents 158
Table 6.5: Attitudes towards living with parents 159
Table 6.6: Parental control as perceived by the respondents 162
Table 6.7: Disagreements between respondents and parents 163
Table 6.8: Parental attitudes towards girl/boyfriend relationships as perceived by the respondents 164
Table 6.9: Language fluency of respondents 167
Table 6.10: Languages spoken at home 169
Table 6.11: Preference of language during daily conversations with family and Turkish friends 171
Table: 6.12: Attitudes towards the preservation of Turkish traditions and values in England

Table 6.13: Attitudes towards parent's country of origin and Britain. Where do respondents feel happier?

Table: 6.14: Attitudes towards pre-marital male-female social meetings

Table 6.15: Having a girl/boy friend

Table 6.16: Attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relationship

Table 6.17: Attitudes towards birth control

Table 6.18: Friendship patterns of Turkish young people

Table 6.19: Difficulties in making friends with non-Turks

Table 6.20: Identification figures for respondents

Table 6.21: Reasons of identification

Table 7.1: 'Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing what you believe about God?'

Table 7.2: 'Which of the following factors played the most effective role in your decision about belief or disbelief in God?'

Table 7.3: 'Have you ever had any religious education so far?'

Table 7.4: 'Would you like your children to have a good Islamic education?'

Table 7.5: Measuring religious knowledge: 'What are the five pillars of Islam (Islam'ın sartlari)?'

Table 7.6: Measuring religious knowledge: 'Cuma (Friday) prayer is obligatory (farz) for every Muslim regardless of age and gender.'

7.7: Measuring religious knowledge: 'Alcohol, gambling, interest, witchcraft and eating pork are regarded as sins in Islam.'
Table 7.8: Familiarity with the holy book of Islam, The Qur'an: ‘Have you ever tried to read the translation of the Qur'an?’

Table 7.9: Measuring religious knowledge: ‘The Qur'an consists of ayet and surat.’

Table 7.10: ‘What is your idea about performing prayers such as Namaz (daily prayers) and Oruc (fasting)?’

Table 7.11: ‘How often do you perform the following religious duties?’

Table 7.12: ‘What do you usually do during ‘Kandil’ days?’

Table 7.13: Which of the following statements best expresses your idea about prayer (dua).

Table 7.14: ‘Why do you pray?’

Table 7.15: ‘Which of the following statements most clearly describes your emotional state during prayer (dua)?’

Table 7.16: ‘How do you feel during religious ceremonies?’

Table 7.17: ‘Have you ever had a response to your prayer?’

Table 8.1: Estimated number of Turkish associations and organisations in selected European countries.


Table 10.1: Number of National Vision’s branch organisations, members and estimated number of congregation attending Mosques run by National Vision.

List of Figures:

Figure 5.1: Familial proximity in migration context

Figure 5.2: Family and kin relations in a Turkish family

Figure 5.3: Three-stage model and mechanism of networks

Figure 5.4: Types of marriage between individuals in London and Berlin
List of Maps:

Map 1: Turkey 90
Map 2: Cyprus 92
Map 3: Berlin (Kreuzberg) 94
Map 4: North-East London 96
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Population movements have been a permanent feature of human history. In many quarters of the globe, one can observe the emergence of multicultural societies as a result of voluntary immigration, population exchange or flow of refugees which involved a massive volume of human groups throughout history. These migratory waves are conditioned by varying forces such as wars and ethnic clashes, economic demise or industrial development, and political pressures which determined the direction and nature of population movements. Whether it is voluntary or forced, migration has become a global phenomenon with a wide range of social, cultural, economic and political consequences.

Issues revolving around religion, nationality and ethnic identity, as well as politics of the international community with regard to immigration and citizenship play a central role in shaping current developments. Nevertheless, earlier decades which coincided with industrial development and economic growth differ somewhat in the composition of ethnic groups and construction of identity as belonging to a nation, ethnie or religion. The immigration of workers from underdeveloped countries to industrialised Western Europe which needed a workforce in the 1950s and 1960s, changed the cultural and religious landscape of countries such as Germany, France, The Netherlands and Great Britain. The arrival of foreigners with their own social customs, cultural characteristics such as different language, religion, food and dress, as well as organisations such as Mosques, Synagogues and Qurdwaras, entered the public domain. A large flow of immigrant workers as well as an influx of refugees in recent years and their settlement established heterogeneous and multicultural communities across Western Europe.
1.1. Labour Migration to Western Europe

As mentioned above, the movement of people from one place to another for work and livelihood has been a prevalent issue throughout human history. In the second half of the twentieth century, economic and demographic structures have created an enormous amount of labour migration towards industrialised countries where local recruitment failed to meet labour demand during industrial expansion. Foreign workers were needed to solve the problem of labour shortage and to keep up with economic development.

Economic motivation played a primary role in labour migration from underdeveloped countries as many were unemployed or underemployed because of the inability of their own economy to absorb the labour force. Conversely, developed countries offered new and relatively highly paid jobs. Since both sides, labour-importing and labour-sending countries, have seen some benefit in the movements of workers, it has been encouraged and special arrangements have been made to accelerate this process. Western Europe has always been a significant centre for immigration, as well as emigration in an industrialised setting which absorbed large numbers of immigrant workers from different parts of the world both before and after the Second World War. International labour migration to and from Western Europe has been a recurring theme for the last two and a half centuries. As Werner points out: 'migrations of substantial population groups across the borders of their home countries have continually occurred over the course of history. Only the external circumstances, the socio-economic and political motivations for migrations, have changed over time' (Werner, 1986, p. 543). The pattern of migration to Western Europe was influenced by the diffusion of information, political developments, economic pressures and relations between the sending and receiving countries.

As far as the more recent migration to Western Europe is concerned, four main phases can be established. The first phase of migration to Western Europe soon after the Second World War is characterised by a refugee movement from
Eastern Europe to Germany and Benelux countries and the immigration of workers to France, Britain and the Netherlands from their former colonies in Africa, the West Indies and Asia. The second phase has seen migration flows within the European Economic Community (EEC) and within the Nordic Labour Market between the late 1950s and early 1960s. The third phase of migration to Western Europe is characterised by the large migratory labour force movement from the Mediterranean region to several countries such as West Germany, Belgium, France and Switzerland. During this phase of labour migration, which lasted until the oil crisis in 1973, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia and Turkey became main sources of migrant workers. The fourth phase is marked by a fundamental change in European migration following the oil crisis in 1973. As Straubhaar points out (1988, p. 53-54), this change took place mainly in the politics of labour migration which was reflected by the introduction of restrictive measures concerning migration to Europe. The worker-receiving European countries became either very selective and restrictive or adopted a policy of terminating labour recruitment from abroad.

Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Britain have a long history of a voluminous influx of foreigners as workers, refugees and asylum seekers (Rudolph, 1994, p. 113). It was estimated that there was a total of 800,000 foreign workers in Germany as early as 1907, and they made up 4.1 per cent of the total labour force. The 1910 census showed a total of 1,259,880 foreign residents in Germany including dependants of the migrants (Castle and Kosack, 1973, p. 19; Power, 1979, p. 10). France has a similar history as a country of immigration which goes back to the 1850s. Since that time, France has adopted a policy of importing foreign labourers to replace the landless proletariat who moved into the new industrial areas. By 1886, for example, there were more than one million foreigners constituting three per cent of the total population in France. The number of foreign residents rose from 1.4 million in 1919 to 2.5 million in 1926 and three million in 1930, making up seven per cent of the total population in France (Power, 1979, p. 11). Switzerland and the Netherlands also had foreign workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Switzerland experienced large-scale immigration in the early 1880s and by 1910 there was a total of 552,000 foreigners in Switzerland, making up 14 per cent of the whole population (Castle and Kosack, 1973, p. 20). The Netherlands, as Entzinger (1994, p. 93) points out, had a long history of colonialism and opened its doors to neighbouring countries which shaped the history of immigration in that country. It is noted that the Netherlands had 53,000 non-Dutch residents as early as in 1899. The number of foreigners were 175,000 in 1930.

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of immigrant workers in West European countries. The industrialisation and expansion of the economy after the Second World War opened a new era in the history of labour migration to Europe. Germany, for example, signed bilateral agreements with several countries between 1960 and 1968 in order to alleviate the labour shortage. From the early 1960s onwards, labour migration to West Germany continued in increasing volume and, by 1966, the number of foreign workers had grown to 1.3 million. In 1968, however, due to the ensuing economic recession, the number of immigrant workers was reduced to one million. But recovery and expansion in the German economy absorbed an increasing volume of the foreign workforce, reaching 2.6 million in 1973. In addition, families of immigrant workers began to arrive and the union of families doubled the number of foreign residents to almost four million by 1973. Similarly, France accelerated the import of foreign labour towards the mid-1950s and in the early 1960s Spanish migration to industrial cities in France took off. This was followed by the Portuguese labour migration after 1966 (Withol de Wenden, 1994a, p. 69). The British experience is explained in section 1.2.

Labour immigration to Western Europe ceased in 1973 due to economic repercussions of the oil crisis in the same year. The labour receiving countries introduced restrictive measures to prevent further immigration. In Germany, for example, the Federal Government issued the Auslanderstop (Stopping foreign employment) in late November 1973 (Booth, 1992, p. 111). Although a reduction in the number of foreign workers was observed, the effect of such restrictive
measures on the size of foreign residents remained minimal. The number of foreigners continued to increase in different forms. In the Netherlands, for example, the number of foreigners increased to 350,500 in 1976 and reached 640,600 in the early 1990s. The current number of non-Dutch residents stands at around 780,000 in the Netherlands comprising almost five per cent of the total population. It was recorded, on the other hand that in 1981 the total number of foreigners in Belgium was 885,700 which made up nine per cent of the total population. As Table 1.1 shows, during the following years the number of foreigners in Belgium continued to increase, by almost 20,000 a year, reaching a total of 904,500, making up 9.1 per cent of the total population in 1990.

Table 1.1: Stock of foreign population in selected European countries

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>897.6</td>
<td>862.5</td>
<td>904.5</td>
<td>920.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3596.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4363.7</td>
<td>4240.5</td>
<td>5342.5</td>
<td>6878.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>558.7</td>
<td>518.6</td>
<td>624.8</td>
<td>779.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>390.6</td>
<td>401.0</td>
<td>483.7</td>
<td>507.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>932.4</td>
<td>978.7</td>
<td>1100.3</td>
<td>1260.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1601.0</td>
<td>1839.0</td>
<td>1723.0</td>
<td>2001.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOPEMI, 1995

In a similar vein, the foreign population of Switzerland increased to 892,800 in 1980, making up 14.1 per cent of the total population. The ratio rose to 14.5 per cent in 1985 with a slight increase in the number of foreigners totalling 939,700. In 1990, the number of foreigners living in Switzerland rose to 1,100,300 making up 16.3 per cent of the population. Table 1.1 shows that Germany has the largest foreign population (almost seven million), despite restrictive policies, followed by France which has more than 3.5 million people of foreign origin.

The migratory flow to Western Europe resulted in the formation of a large number of foreign groups within different industrial centres. Industrialised West European countries had a foreign population of 12.5 million in 1986, of which
about 5.5 million were designated migrant workers (Werner, 1986, p. 543). The volume of migrants in Western Europe steadily increased to 18 million over the years (Fassmann and Munz, 1994, p. 6). In addition to legal immigrants, according to one estimation (Power, 1984, p. 5), there are also one million or more illegal immigrants working in Europe.

The migrant labour force displays a variety of national and ethnic origins. Foreign workers from the Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey migrated to countries where there was no colonial link. The colonial links of France, Britain, and the Netherlands, on the other hand, resulted in labour import from former colonies; for example, migrants from India, Pakistan and the West Indies came to Britain, and people from North Africa and former French colonies chose to move to France. People from Surinam, Indonesia and the Antilles, former Dutch possessions, came to the Netherlands.

1.2. Immigration to Britain

Britain was one of the first countries to accommodate a large number of immigrant workers. In the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution easily absorbed the surplus of unemployed labour from the countryside. Rapidly expanding industry required more manpower. Therefore, the British employers turned their attention towards Ireland to satisfy the labour demand. By 1851, there were 727,326 Irish immigrants which constituted 2.9 per cent of the total population of England and Wales. The next immigrant group to arrive in Britain was very different in terms of migration motivation. About 120,000 Jews settled in Britain between 1875 and 1914 as refugees who had to leave Russia to escape religious and political persecution (Castles and Kosack, 1973, p. 17).

During the inter-war period, migration to Britain, like other West European countries, slowed down in comparison to the scale of migration before the First World War. The reasons were, firstly, the difficulty to find employment for
returning servicemen in the army in the immediate post-war period and secondly, the depressed state of the economy from 1929 onwards. Like France, Britain had also repatriated almost all immigrant workers recruited from the colonies during the war. Coleman (1994, p. 39) points out that migration to Britain contrasts with the experience of most other West European countries with the effect that most of the immigrants did not come from mainland Europe, but instead came from Ireland and even more from colonies or former colonies, i.e. New Commonwealth.

The immigration of coloured people has also been an important feature of immigration to Britain with implications for race and racism. Although small black minority communities existed in Britain prior to the 1950s, the overwhelming majority of the current black population owe their residency to the migration which took place after the Second World War. The post-war wave of black and Asian migration to Britain started in the late 1940s, and gathered momentum in the 1950s and 1960s. Coleman (1994, p. 39) notes that the first significant group of foreigners to arrive after the war was the West Indians who came to Britain in 1948 and added their numbers to the small black population comprising West Indians and West Africans. Economic development and industrial expansion in Britain during the post-war period caused a labour shortage which compelled employers to seek foreign workers and, accordingly, this period was marked by an influx of people from The Irish Republic, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and New Commonwealth countries.

Migration to Britain is seen as a response to various factors such as economic and demographic conditions in the countries involved which might be called push factors and economic incentives and advantages in Britain as pull factors. Economic factors dominated other factors in the decision to migrate (Booth, 1992, p. 15). Since 1945, thousands of people have come to Britain for work. The numbers of immigrants in Britain doubled between 1951 and 1961, from 250,000 to 541,000. The total number of immigrants from India, Pakistan and the West Indies reached 669,640 between 1955 and 1968 (Castle and Kosack, 1973, p. 31).
As Table 1.2. shows, the number of those with non-white ethnic backgrounds steadily increased over the years to three million which is 5.5 per cent of the total population.

Table 1.2: Resident population by ethnic group in Great Britain, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Number (thousands)</th>
<th>Per cent of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All groups</td>
<td>54,889</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>51,874</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other groups</td>
<td>3,015</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black other</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Total</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Asian</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Other</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non Asian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It should be pointed out that the figures in the above table are derived from the 1991 Census data which means that the current number of residents with an ethnic background must have increased.

1.3. Settlement and Emergence of Ethnic Communities

Immigration to West European countries resulted in the settlement of foreigners in the receiving countries in increasing proportions against expectations of return to the country of origin. Despite the widespread attempt in 1973/4, to control or prevent further migration as noted by Cross (1986, p. 55), the
proportion of foreign workers continued to rise. Family reunion and the growth of the young generation led to the establishment of organisations and institutions that addressed welfare, cultural and religious needs of the ethnic communities. Further developments, such as economic investments and demand for political participation in the receiving countries, suggested that immigrant workers, as they were once called, were becoming rooted in the host society and were becoming a part of it with their distinct cultural characteristics and religious values, thus changing the cultural and religious landscape of Western cities.

Heisler contends (1986, p. 77) that 'the foreign workers, migrant workers or guestworkers of the 1950s and 1960s have become permanent or at least quasi-permanent settlers in the 1980s.' Accordingly, questions arising from immigration and ethnic community issues have opened new avenues of research such as the nature of ethnic groups, construction and maintenance of culturally distinct identity, reproduction of traditional value systems and religious practices along with their institutional forms and, more recently, the position of ethnic minority youth in European cities. Moreover, debates on citizenship and political participation have recently entered into academia in a more powerful way than ever.

The research presented in this thesis concentrates on an under-researched ethnic community in Britain. It addresses the emergence of the Turkish ethnic community in London and deals with how traditional Turkish culture and Islamic values are reproduced within the British context. The roles of ethnic and religious organisations are examined in order to understand the process of identity formation and the transmission of values to the young generation. The contention I follow in the thesis is that the Turkish community is a part of a larger Muslim community in Europe which is negotiating and building up a 'European Islam'. I also try to establish that diversity, in terms of cultural values and religious commitment, is an important feature of the Turkish community in London. Thus, in the analysis of identity formation and the reproduction of traditional values, this diversity will be taken into account as one of the explanatory points since Muslim communities do not have a monolithic nature.
A review of the literature reveals that most of the research on Muslims in Britain has focused on Asian Muslims. It can be argued that Islam in Britain is usually equated with Asian Islam in the public imagination. This clearly indicates that the Turks, as a micro-community within the larger Islamic 'Umma' (Nation), are not included in studies on Islam in Britain. A content analysis of recent publications such as D. Joly's (1995) Britannia's Crescent: Making a Place for Muslims in British Society; P. Lewis's (1994) Islamic Britain, Religion, Politics and Identity Among British Muslims; and M. Anwar's (1994) Young Muslims in Britain lends support to the foregoing argument that 'Islam' and 'Muslims' as broad concepts in Britain do not include the Turkish community. It should be pointed out that any generalisation about Islam and Muslim societies in Britain, drawing upon studies on micro-communities, would be misleading due to the great diversity within Islamic societies. The expression of Islamic values and identity is also varied. This thesis seeks to understand Turkish Islam as represented by the Turkish community in London. I believe that this research contributes greatly to the current debate on Muslim identity in a broader sense.

Before moving onto the structure of the thesis, I would like to mention that this research also benefited from fieldwork on Turks in Berlin. The research in Berlin provided comparative data which contributed to an understanding of the Turkish community/ies in a cross-national context. The development of a transnational Islam within the context of Western Europe will also benefit from the findings of this research because Islamic organisations among Turkish communities in Europe are functioning across national borders, on the one hand, and they are developing links with other transnational Islamic movements on the other.

It is useful at this point to give some information about the organisation of chapters and their contents. Chapter One, 'Introduction', provides a review of immigration to Western Europe in general and to Britain in particular. Chapter Two deals with methodological issues including details of my
research which involved participant observation, in-depth interviews and a survey. Chapter Three contains a discussion of theoretical issues on migration, ethnicity and identity. In this Chapter, principal theories on the causes and consequences of migration are examined; the emergence of immigrant communities and the concept of ethnicity are discussed in relation to identity and a sense of belonging; situational and primordial approaches to ethnicity and development of identity are also discussed in the light of anthropological and sociological discourses. Chapter Four describes Turkish immigration to Western Europe in general and to Britain in particular. The settlement trends and demographic structure are included in this Chapter.

Chapter Five examines issues concerning family, kinship and the reproduction of traditional values. It is argued in this Chapter that the Turkish identity is reinforced by the reproduction of family values and kin relations in London. This Chapter also demonstrates that new types of relations are established which are based on wider social networks. Chapter Six focuses on the young generation within the Turkish community in London and analyses their attitudes towards language, culture, family and sexuality as variables which influence identity formation among the youth. Chapter Seven analyses various dimensions of religious commitment of the young generation. In this Chapter, the data on the religious attitudes and practices of young Turks in particular are examined.

Chapter Eight examines the process of institutionalisation among Turks in London and analyses the ways in which these organisations were established. More importantly, this Chapter explains how Turkish organisations influence the politics of identity and its expression among the Turkish community in London. The institutionalisation of Islam and the establishment of religious organisations among Turks in London is discussed in Chapter Nine. This Chapter begins with an outline of religion and politics in Turkey and moves on to how religious movements in the country of origin influence Islamic organisations abroad. This Chapter also looks at the development of religious diversity within the Turkish community and analyses the politics of main Islamic groups with regard to
reproduction of Islamic values, reconstruction of religious identity and its maintenance in a non-Muslim society. Chapter Ten explains how religion and politics are related among Turks in Europe in general and in London in particular. The cases of two religio-political organisations in London are studied. These case studies demonstrate how political identity is legitimised by using religious discourse. Chapter Eleven draws main conclusions based on the findings of the research.
Chapter One: Notes

1. For an evaluation of the patterns of migration to Western Europe, see Fassmann and Munz (1994).

2. The following countries signed bilateral agreement with Germany: Spain in 1960; Greece in 1960 (renewed in 1962); Turkey in 1961 (revised in 1964 and came into effect in 1968); Portugal in 1964, Italy 1965; and Yugoslavia in 1968 signed bilateral agreements with Germany as six main sources of labour supply for the expanding German economy (Power, 1979, p. 12; Werner, 1986, p. 544; Booth, 1992, p. 110).

3. For the history of Irish immigration, see Jackson (1963); for the history and analysis of Asian immigration to the UK, see Anwar (Anwar, 1979; Anwar, 1985; Anwar, 1995b; Robinson, 1986; Shaw, 1988; Lewis, 1994).
Chapter Two
Methodology

The social and cultural aspects of immigrant communities in Europe started to receive more attention in recent years as it became increasingly obvious that immigrants were beginning to build up ethnic communities in the receiving countries despite categorical resistance to recognising such a process by political establishments. The emergence of ethnic communities with distinct cultural, religious and linguistic structures, and the growth of a young generation of immigrant descent, added a new dimension to research on migrants. The focus of research relating to immigrant groups varied and anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists became increasingly interested in the social, cultural and political aspects of emerging ethnic communities. The involvement of experts and researchers in the study of immigrant and ethnic communities produced a plethora of literature based on the methods used in each academic discipline which these experts and researchers claimed to follow. My research has benefited from many of this earlier research on immigration, ethnicity and identity.

2.1. Personal Encounters

Labour immigration from Turkey is only four decades old. It entered the public imagination during the annual holidays of workers, and as a flow of information circulated in the neighbourhood by their kin and relatives. Generations of mid-sixties and seventies repeatedly heard socially constructed stories and narratives about the lives of Turkish immigrants. I should note here that in early 1989 I made contact with the Turkish community and attended several public meetings and functions organised by Turks during the course of my MA studies in London. During my studies at the University of London, I established good relations with several people. These early encounters provided the initial experience which sparked my interest in studying the Turkish community in London. However, for the
purpose of this research project, the first contact with the Turkish community was made in April 1993 as part of my fieldwork.

After starting my fieldwork in London, I realised that my previous observations, participation in various meetings and ceremonies as well as meetings with my old contacts were all excellent sources of background information. Given the fact that there is a big lacunae of literature on the Turkish community in England, particularly in contrast to other ethnic groups, these early encounters helped me in the initial stages of the research. While looking for ways to develop an effective strategy to cover a wider set of social groups in order to portray a representative picture of the community under study, I re-contacted old acquaintances and revived old friendships. I felt that I had never been totally cut off from the London context. Many issues and previous experiences had survived in my imagination even when I returned to Turkey in 1990 after completing my MA course. I attribute this to the fact that I continued communicating with some of the acquaintances and exchanged letters, discussing many of the concerns recorded in this research. Moreover, I developed a deeper interest in reading literature and news about Turkish communities in Europe. Thus, I had an intellectual readiness and a fundamental urge to carry out such research even before entering the field.

The collection of data involved fieldwork, participant observation, in-depth interviews and specially designed questionnaires. As mentioned above, the fieldwork started in April 1993 and lasted until September 1994. Although, the fieldwork took 17 months of intensive research, I have always followed subsequent developments and have updated data accordingly. In the summer of 1993, I carried out fieldwork in Berlin, in Germany. This research trip not only enabled me to collect data to understand the Turkish community in London and in Berlin in a comparative perspective, but also facilitated access to literature on the lives of Turks in Germany. In this research, I have used interdisciplinary methods to collect as much information as possible. In what
follows, I will discuss the methods which were used and describe my experiences during the process of collecting data.

2.2. Ethnographic Method

One of the indispensable tools of the ethnographic method is participant observation. This involves gathering data in the natural social setting in which researchers have access to the meaning of events and social interactions as understood by the group or the organisation under study. This method compensates for some of the shortcomings of experimental methods, statistical measures, survey research and questionnaires, as these approaches have limitations in extracting detailed information. Burgess (1984, p. 79) notes that:

'participant observation facilitates the collection of data on social interaction; on situations as they occur rather than on artificial situations (as in experimental research) or constructs of artificial situations that are provided by the researcher (as in survey research). The value of being a participant observer lies in the opportunity that is available to collect rich and detailed data based on observations in natural settings'.

Harvey (1990, p. 9) shares the same views about the advantages of ethnographic approach based on fieldwork and participant observation. He argues that the strength of the ethnographic approach is the 'insights it provides of social phenomena in their natural setting. For some, this is recast in phenomenological terms and ethnography has increasingly tended to be used as a procedure for gaining an understanding of social settings from the subject's point of view'. Harvey also asserts that 'immersion in a field of study allows the ethnographer to gain an understanding of the process operating in the subject group, institution, or community. Thus, the emphasis for most ethnography is usually on forms of social interaction and the meanings which lie behind these'. Moreover, ethnographic method avoids the risk stemming from reliance on a single kind of information as it has the methodological flexibility of using potential data sources (Hammersley and
Atkinson, 1993, p. 24). An important advantage in the case of fieldwork and ethnographic research is to obtain verbal accounts and narratives of individuals in their own language.

During my fieldwork research two languages were used: I spoke only Turkish in Berlin and Turkish and English in London. I noticed that the older generation communicated in Turkish within their families and community. The young generation, in contrast to their parents, used English overwhelmingly in their social interaction. A third group used both languages simultaneously and switched between Turkish and English whenever they felt more comfortable with one of these languages to express their feelings and ideas. This group mainly comprised the young generation.

Different typologies\(^1\) of participant observers were developed according to their role during the course of research. The basic typology devised by Gold (1958, cited in Burgess, 1984) described four field roles for the researchers as 'the complete participant', 'the participant-as-observer', 'the observer as participant', and 'the complete observer'\(^2\). In my field research I mainly assumed the role as 'participant-as-observer' in order to gain access to a wider group of participants in their social interactions and I managed to establish a large network of contacts with various sections of the Turkish community to capture the meaning they attributed to culture, tradition, ethnicity, religion and identity within the context of a multicultural society. The reason for adopting such a role was to 'get close' to the activities and everyday experiences of the Turkish community. 'Getting close', according to Emerson and his associates (1995, p. 1-2) requires 'physical and social proximity to the daily rounds of people’s lives and activities; the field researcher must be able to take positions in the midst of the key sites and scenes of other’s lives in order to observe and understand them'. During the course of fieldwork I tried to take such a role to see from the inside what is meaningful and important to members of groups and organisations in the Turkish community. On the other hand, I tried to avoid situations which run
the risk of leading me to become a 'native' which would have disrupted observation and might have hindered my gaining a fuller insight into and understanding of the group activities and multiple experiences of those observed and their variations in the setting.

As I was familiar with the setting of the Turkish community before I began the fieldwork, I did not have much difficulty in locating Turkish institutions, organisations and supplementary schools as contact points in order to enter into the matrix of the social and natural setting of the community. I visited cultural establishments, welfare organisations, religious and political institutions as well as supplementary weekend schools. I attended meetings, ceremonies, lectures and numerous other activities of these organisations to observe the process while it was taking place. I had the opportunity to participate in a variety of situations in which I came to know the informants and the groups more closely. I attended events as diverse as cultural meetings, religious ceremonies, festivals, political meetings and marches, and classes held at supplementary schools during which I collected the insider's use of concepts and their meaning as ascribed by the informants. Once trust was established between the informants and me, I was invited to meetings, ceremonies, weddings, Bayrams (feasts of religious significance which take place twice a year) celebrations, sunnet (circumcision) and birthday parties. At times, my role as participant observer required following particular groups even outside England as they established wide networks of relationships. In two cases, for example, I visited Belgium to observe annual meetings of a religio-political organisation which has branches in most European countries. These field trips enabled me to meet the leaders of the organisation and interview them.

During the research, I was involved in two voluntary projects to gain the confidence of people and collect data while working in the community. One of the voluntary posts was offered by St. Ann's Hospital in Haringey which had launched an awareness campaign for the Turkish community. The six-
month project involved a short training and outreach work which entailed contacting Turkish organisations, community centres and cafés where meetings were held on drug use, drug related diseases and available resources for help. I was involved in the first three months of the project and met numerous people. At times, discussions went beyond talking about drug-related issues and much wider issues concerning the community were frequently discussed. Sometimes, people asked me to act as an interpreter for them, talk to their children about studying and chair some of their meetings. After three months, I decided to leave the project as it started drawing me into the role of a 'native' thereby risking my detachment from the community.

The second voluntary work was offered by Ikra Primary school sponsored by Aziziye Mosque (see Chapter Nine). This active participation and observation lasted for eight weeks during which I was required to teach basic values of Turkish culture and concepts of Islamic faith. The teaching role allowed me to meet parents and have lengthy talks about cultural and religious issues as well as their expectations from the new school. However, I soon realised that my role as participant observer was becoming overshadowed by the teaching post. Moreover, I had a different approach to teaching which was not approved of by the Mosque administration. I felt at this time that any dispute over teaching methods would involve me more deeply in the affairs of the school and might damage my good relations with the school administration and Mosque officials. Such a development, I thought, might have resulted in my losing contacts and would go beyond the limits of my role as a researcher. I decided, therefore, to leave the teaching post to avoid these risks, but I continued to visit the Mosque and participated in discussions for research purposes. I recorded my observations once left I had the field drawing upon the 'mental map' gained during the observations. In some cases, I noted salient points, using some key words in order to remember the details of the scene. I did this, for example, when I watched a public meeting noting how many people were there, an estimate of age and gender distribution etc.; or
when I was listening to sermons in the Mosques, I noted which verses were referred to or what issues were brought forward.

2.3. Conducting Interviews and Taking Notes

In the present research, semi-structured in-depth interviews and 'interviews as conversations' (Burgess, 1992, p. 107), with the purpose of exploring issues were carried out in order to collect detailed data from the informants. As structured interviews have limitations generated by previous planning and also the risk of manipulating the interviewee by leading the conversation along the line of interview forms, I chose to undertake semi-structured or unstructured interviews as they give more flexibility to the researcher and the informants. In each case, I made use of an interview guide. Since I was interviewing various people and visiting different organisations, I devised several interview guides for each interview. When interviewing cultural, religious and religio-political organisations, I had a set of questions which were sometimes expanded in the course of an interview or were modified along the lines of a conversation. Similarly, interviewing the older generation and the younger generation required different sets of questions. Initial conversations before the formal interviews always helped me to modify the questions.

When a contact was made, I asked the informants to arrange meetings with their parents, children and kin so that the research might achieve a more representative sample. On the whole I received a supportive response from the respondents. As presented in Table 2.1., various people in the Turkish community were interviewed in depth.
Table 2.1: Number of in-depth interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young People</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of Organisations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imams</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin sample</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to depth-interviews, 29 people took part in group interviews. 16 parents from Turkey and 13 parents of Turkish-Cypriot origin were interviewed. Interviews took place mainly in four settings: home; school; work place; offices of organisations and Mosques. In a few cases, informants agreed to be interviewed in a café to provide a more convivial setting. In addition to interviews with individuals, group interviews in the form of informal discussions took place especially with representatives of organisations and young people during supplementary classes held at the weekends. I was allowed to record some of the interviews and in most cases I used key words and concepts to turn the interviews and observation data into a text. Interviews took place in Turkish, English and Turkish-English. As mentioned earlier, the older generation used Turkish during the interviews and conversations which I translated later into English during the writing down of details after the interviews. Young people, on the other hand, used both languages. Before the interview they were asked which language they would feel more comfortable with in expressing their ideas and feelings.

One of the difficulties I encountered during the fieldwork was interviewing female informants. The same difficulty was experienced by other male researchers who carried out research on the Muslim community which designates different roles to genders according to the way in which the
women's sphere is separated from the men's. This problem becomes more pronounced when the segregation of sexes is observed more strictly. Anwar (1985, p. 227) notes, for example, that he had some difficulties in talking to women in families where purdah was practised. I had similar experiences in my efforts to gain access to the 'women's world'. The reluctance of Muslim women to speak stems from the fact that any contact with unrelated males is not approved of by parents and the community. In order to overcome this cultural barrier, I tried to interview ladies in the presence of their husbands or children. In some cases I benefited from female friend/s who acted as a mediator between the women informants and me and arranged meetings with them during which the mediators were also present.

2.4. Survey of the Young Generation

In addition to the participant observation and in-depth interviews, a questionnaire was also used² to obtain a quantitative picture of the young generation and their attitudes towards family, culture, language, tradition and religion. This data also helped me to establish a behavioural pattern among young Turks with regard to friendship, identification, moral values and religious practices. Before giving a final form to the questionnaire, a pilot study was carried out with an early version of the questionnaire, in agreement with Oppenheim's (1992, p. 47) view that 'questionnaires do not emerge fully fledged'. A supplementary school was approached for the pilot study of the first draft of the questionnaire and 12 respondents participated in order to determine whether the questions were properly understood by them. During and after the administration of the questionnaires, respondents were encouraged to give their opinions on the clarity and relevance of the questions asked. In the light of discussions with the respondents, some of the questions were either modified or rephrased to enable the respondents to understand the questions more easily. The pilot study also revealed that some of the questions needed to be replaced with more relevant and open-ended
questions. Parental origin, for example, was added in the final form of the questionnaire.

The questionnaire consisted of two parts (see Appendix): the first part was mainly concerned with questions on age, sex, birthplace, family background, attitudes towards Turkish culture, sexual morality and friendship. The early draft of the first part contained 33 questions but the final form included 40 questions. The second part of the questionnaire was designed to obtain information on the religious beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of the young generation. The pilot study had included 26 questions on the dimensions of religious commitment. The final form of the questionnaire contained 20 questions after omitting, replacing or modifying the questions in the earlier draft. One hundred and ten questionnaires were distributed in three locations, of which 104 were collected. Eleven of the collected forms were not included in the statistical analysis either because some pages were missing or because only a few questions were answered. Therefore, quantitative analysis included 93 questionnaires of which 42 were filled in by male respondents and 51 by female respondents. Some of the respondents were interviewed in depth after the collection of the questionnaires. They were either interviewed when they had finished their supplementary classes or later at an arranged time suitable to them. 21 male and 15 female young Turks from this group were interviewed.

During the course of research I encountered a few situations which had a brief emotional impact on me and caused frustration at times. As mentioned earlier, I did not have much difficulty in gaining access and making contacts for most of the time. Nevertheless, on a few occasions, I received discouraging personal reactions from some people whom I approached for information. In one case, for example, I was accused of being a Turkish intelligence officer trying to gather information about Turks and Kurds from Turkey in order to report this to the Turkish Embassy in London. Several times I was asked who my sponsor was, implying that I was supplying
information to my sponsors. When I was accused of being a spy or an agent, my initial feelings were disappointment and frustration. I tried to avoid further discussions on such issues and tried to explain to the informants that my concern had nothing to do with issues that any agent would be interested in. In these cases I made it clear that any information would be treated with confidence and research findings would be used only for the purposes of my thesis.

The issue of confidentiality occurred several times during the research and the respondents were assured that the information was being collected in order to understand various issues concerning the Turkish community. In one case, for example, I approached a Turkish women’s organisation, explained my research project and asked if they would provide some information about the organisational and clientele structure of the group as well as about their activities and programmes. The person concerned reacted strongly and explained that they were not going to reveal the identity of their members and the activities they were involved in. This particular telephone conversation lasted more than ten minutes during which I explained that I respected the sensitivities and concerns of the organisation. Despite my assurances of confidentiality, I failed to persuade her to provide information for this research. These two cases helped me to develop a more refined attitude towards the reactions of the informants whose concerns and sensitivities led them to a non-co-operative approach. However, such cases were very few and I believe that access to a sufficient representation of the Turkish community was achieved. The data collected by means of participant observation, in-depth interviews and questionnaires helped me overcome the shortcomings generated by such situations as described above.

In addition to collecting ethnographic data, I used several libraries to reach a large corpus of published material. The Resources Centre at the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations and the library of the University of Warwick were used frequently. I also visited the libraries of the London School of
Economics, the School of Oriental and African Studies and the Central Library of the University of London. In Berlin, I benefited from the libraries of the Frei Universitat and Berliner Institut fur Vergleichende Sozialforschung. It should also be pointed out that some secondary sources and documents written in Turkish were also used during my research. Publications of Turkish organisations such as annual reports, magazines, leaflets and handouts, as well as press releases in Turkish, were collected during the course of my research and where relevant have been used for this thesis.

The next Chapter deals with the theoretical issues which help define a general framework for studying the Turkish community in London. The discussion of principal theories on migration, ethnicity and identity will put my study of the Turkish community in London in a wider theoretical context. Therefore, Chapter Three will include a review of some of the literature addressing the causes and consequences of migration, aspects of ethnicity and development of identity in relation to immigrant ethnic communities.
Chapter Two: Notes


2. The role as 'the complete participant' involves the concealment of observer dimension that results in concealed observation; the role as 'the participant-as-observer' does not require concealment of observation, rather it involves observation as well as participation by establishing contacts and relationships with the informants the researcher targets; the role as 'the observer-as-participant' involves formal and short interaction with the informants and the informants are explained the role of the observer; the role as the complete observer refers to a situation in which the observer does not have a prolonged interaction with the informants except fairly brief listening and monitoring.

3. See Table 6.11. for the language preferences of Turkish youth in London.

Chapter Three
Migration, Ethnicity And Ethnic Identity: Theoretical Issues

This Chapter examines the nature of population movements, which have been taking place throughout human history, by using an interdisciplinary approach. An attempt will be made to identify and explain the determining variables in the processes of migration. In order to provide an analytical explanatory framework, sociological, anthropological, historical and geographical literature will be used. This will enable me to explore the dynamics of migration in detail. The discussion, then, will focus on the theories of ethnicity. Some of the literature on primordial and situational approaches to the question of ethnicity will also be reviewed. In the latter part of this Chapter, the development of ethnic identity and its components will be examined. Overall, the relevant literature will help to understand the developments in the Turkish community in London in a wider theoretical framework.

3.1. Recurrent Human Experience: Population Movements

It has already been noted that migration is still a world-wide phenomenon today. Movements of individuals and groups from one location to another have been taking place since the origin of man (Lewis, 1982, p. 1). Especially over the last three or four decades, immigration has emerged as a major force throughout the world (Massey et al., 1993, p. 431). Social, economic and political factors have caused and still cause displacement and disenchantment and these have important influences on the decision-making processes of people. These factors may result in movements of the population as a result of dissatisfaction with the present conditions. Prevalent migratory movements take place on two levels if the geographical location, spatial direction and political boundaries are taken into consideration. Internal migration refers to a movement of a population within a defined border of a politico-geographical setting, whereas international migration entails a movement beyond a politically defined boundary. The main
concern of this Chapter is international migration as it is relevant to the conceptual analysis of ethnicity and identity among immigrants.

Any endeavour to review the literature on migration is confronted by certain difficulties due to the variety and diversity of theories. Regarding the problems one experiences while reviewing the literature on migration, Cohen (1987, p. 33) points out that the existence of many general theories, middle-range hypothesis, laws, casual statements and propositions make it difficult to provide a general model of migration that is related to the level of theorisation attempted by researchers. However, despite the complexity of this subject, a brief review of the literature will reveal that many social scientists have been involved in the study of migratory movements in varying degrees.

As Lewis (1982, p. 3) elucidates, each discipline brings its own distinctive perspective to bear on the process. Among the variety of approaches, economists, for example, have focused their attention on job patterns, employment and economic opportunities, while the role of migration in population growth has been a primary concern in the approach of demographers. On the other hand, sociologists have explored the character of the migrants, formation of groups and organisations, racism, political participation and social change caused by migration. The focus of attention for anthropologists has been problems faced by migrant groups within the host society with reference to ethnic identity, culture, the reproduction of traditional values and their transmission to young generations. The geographer's main contribution has been to emphasise the special patterning of population settlement and locational features involved in migration. As one may observe from the foregoing discussion, an interdisciplinary approach in migration studies can produce more fruitful results as this covers many issues relating to the phenomenon of migration. Massey and his associates (1993, p. 432) argue that, at present, there is no single, coherent theory of international migration. Therefore 'current patterns and trends in immigration suggest that a full understanding of contemporary migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on the tools of one discipline alone, or
by focusing on a single level of analysis. Rather, their complex, multifaceted nature requires a sophisticated theory that incorporates a variety of perspectives, levels, and assumptions.

Although studies on migration provide detailed data on characteristics, patterns and dynamics of such movements, these studies often fail to provide details on historic and comparative processes. International migration studies, as Kritz and Keely argue (1981, introduction), 'should be placed in a broad and comparative context with other ethnic groups'. A comparative approach to the study of migration will enable the researchers to identify the conditions leading to similarities and differences in migration patterns to various countries. Holmes (1991, p. 191) warns, for example, that in considering migration and the British society we should guard against concentrating exclusively on emigrations. In other words, he argues that we need to answer questions which not only relate to the British migrants such as who left Britain and where they went to, but also questions involving international migration, such as who came to Britain and what such groups experienced after their arrival. Holmes (p. 201) notes that the sociologists have dominated academic research on immigration in Britain. The weight of emphasis in this sociological literature centres on black and Asian immigration since 1945. Taking a historical approach, Holmes urges the intending researcher who is concerned with migration to Britain to recover the history of communities in order to construct a general history of immigrants and minorities.

3.2. Nature of Migration

The passing of frontiers by individuals and groups from one place of settlement or a recognised administrative unit to another is still being perpetuated through a variety of reasons, among them economic, social and political factors play determining roles. In an analysis of population movements, several questions arise in relation to the processes involved. As Lewis (1982, p. 1) puts it: 'migration is a major cause of change since it can be viewed as an independent as
well as a dependent variable in the examination of change'. At this level of conceptual analysis, questions such as 'What are the causes of migration?' What kinds of variables are influential in decision-making processes of people who display migratory behaviour?' 'What are the consequences of migration and settlement in a new area?' 'How can one relate a migratory movement to social change in different segments of society?' 'To what degree does migration play a role in the formation of minority-ethnic communities?' and 'What repercussions does it have on successive generations?' beg analytical answers. In what follows, I shall try to provide an account of migration which is aimed at answering the preceding questions.

One of the earliest works on migration was presented by Ravenstein at a conference more than a century ago. In his celebrated essay 'Laws of Migration', which was published in 1885, Ravenstein (p. 198) tries to establish general laws of human migration. Although Ravenstein draws his conclusions from a corpus of data on internal migration, he gives some insight that may be related to international population movements concerning the direction of the 'currents of migrations'. In his second essay under the same title, Ravenstein (1889) elaborates further on internal migration in Britain, drawing general conclusions. On the significance of Ravenstein's work Grigg (1977, p. 41) remarks that these essays, though published more than one hundred years ago, form the basis of the most modern research on migration. After Ravenstein, many works appeared to explain the dynamics of migratory movements and analyse the consequences of population movements from the perspective of host countries as well as from the perspective of the sending countries.

Eisenstadt (1954, p. 1) defines migration: 'as the physical transition of an individual or a group from one society to another. This transition usually involves abandoning one social setting and entering another and a different one'. This definition emphasises the fact that migration is a complex phenomenon. Not only does it consist of a physical displacement, but more importantly it entails a significant degree of social change in one's environment in many respects
through settling in an alien societal structure. Other writers emphasise the spatial
classer of migration. For example, Jackson (1986, p. 2) states that 'migration
implies movement of individuals and groups between two societies; that which
they have left and that to which they have come. The process is usually achieved
by physical movement and consequent change of residence and other
circumstances... Such processes involve paradigm shift which makes it difficult if
not impossible to go back to the old ways'. Here, Jackson touches upon an
important issue which he calls 'paradigm shift' which explains cognitive changes
taking place as a result of migration experience. Spatial and geographical
movements have implications for the perceptual features of immigrants in that
traditionally loaded meanings of some concepts may fade away through the
fusion of novel ideas and expectations by social interaction, school, media and
new social groupings.

The migration of individuals and groups may be prompted by a variety of
factors which are of an economic, social and political nature. The weight and
selectivity of these factors depend on the conditions surrounding a given
community. Research on migration tends to place more emphasis on the
economic factors as an effective and driving force. Beijer (1969, p. 48), for
example, regards the economic factor as one of the most important factors in
voluntary international migration. The importance of the economic factor on the
decision-making processes of migrant groups has also been pointed out by
Ravenstein (1885, p. 198), the premier of migration studies in social sciences, who
states that currents of migration flow in the direction of commercial and
industrial centres. Writing in 1889 (p. 286) he noted that: 'the desire in most men
to better themselves in material respects plays a decisive role in migratory
movements'.

3.2.1. Push-Pull Model

To explain the causes of migration, a model, based on push-pull factors, has been
suggested. In my view, this model only partly explains the phenomenon under
investigation due to the reductionist nature of the push-pull approach to a multi-
sided human experience which, in fact, requires a wider model of explanation
combining interdisciplinary assumptions and findings.

If migration is seen as a response by individuals to a series of economic, social
and economic stimuli within the environment, then such a stimuli may take the
form of attractiveness or vice versa. If the changes generated by such stimuli
within the social environment or in the value system of individuals appear
satisfactory the probability of migration will be very low. On the other hand, if
these changes cause a feeling of dissatisfaction among individuals, then a desire
to migrate is likely to be generated (Lewis, 1982, p. 99). Jackson (1986, p. 13)
explores the underlying background of the push-pull model which, according to
him, takes its roots from the conception of man in society. He argues that in the
middle of the nineteenth century, man was conceived as a rational and Homo
economicus being who was able to respond to varying degrees of pressures from
outside to minimise the effect of discomfort and to maximise advantages
available to him. In this model in which material considerations are emphasised,
push factors were defined as those which drive people from their place of origin,
while pull factors were identified as those which operate by attracting people
through providing opportunities by which the migrants assume that the new
environment meets with their expectations and satisfies their needs.

Push factors are generally of an economic nature, such as lack of access to land,
lack of employment, low wages, uncontrolled population increase, and
fragmentation of land holdings because of inheritance customs and laws (Lewis,
1982, p. 101; Robinson, 1986, p. 27). In the case of refugees and asylum seekers, on
the other hand, the political climate is the main push factor for immigration.
Policies of oppressive regimes which do not recognise freedom of expression and
the persecution of individuals because of their political or religious beliefs force
people to seek places where their beliefs can be expressed.
In contrast to push factors, pull factors are predominantly of an economic nature such as new job opportunities, better living standards, upward economic mobility and attractive urban alternatives, as opposed to rural sources of a downward social mobility (Jackson, 1986, p. 14; Lewis, 1982, p. 101-2; Robinson, 1986, p. 27). In addition to economic pull factors, it should be borne in mind that democratic policies which respect human rights and recognise freedom of expression are increasingly becoming a pull factor for political dissidents, religious minorities and war victims.

3.2.2. Micro-Macro Model and New Economics Migration Theory

Various theoretical models (Massey et al., 1993) explains why international migration begins. Macro theory, for example, suggests that geographic differences in the supply and demand for labour, as well as resulting differential wages caused by the market forces, motivate workers to move from one low-wage country to another high-wage country. Micro theory, on the other hand, implies that individual rational actors decide to migrate as a result of their cost-benefit calculation. According to this model, potential migrants estimate the costs and benefits of moving to alternative international locations where they can be more productive and gain higher wages after calculating the consequences of migration such as learning a new language, looking for work, difficulty in adapting to a new social environment and the psychological strains of leaving the homeland and family.

However, the new economics migration theory suggests that migration decisions are not taken by isolated actors, but by larger units of related individuals such as family members and households. Collective expectations to increase the economic profile of the family are at the very root of migratory decisions. One can argue that the emergence of social networks as human/social capital perpetuates international migration through interpersonal ties based on kinship, friendship and shared community origin which reduces the costs and risks of the movement. Gurak and Caces (1992, p. 151) point out that social networks link
populations in sending and receiving countries in a dynamic way which provides a mechanism for interpreting data obtained through the flow of information as a migration system evolves.

3.2.3. World-Systems Theory

In addition to assumptions of the causes and origins of migration drawn by these foregoing theories, one should also look at the ideological links which are conducive to migration without which any analysis of international migration and its current shape would be incomplete. As Massey and his associates (1993, p. 444) suggest, drawing on the work of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory, the origins of international migration are not linked to the ‘bifurcation of the labour market within particular national economies, but to the structure of the world market that has developed and expanded since the sixteenth century’.

The world systems theory argues that ‘the process of economic globalisation creates cultural links between core capitalist countries and their hinterlands within the developing world. In many cases, these cultural links are long-standing, reflecting a colonial past in which core countries established administrative and educational systems that mirrored their own in order to govern and exploit a peripheral region’. The colonial experiences of Pakistanis and Indians under British rule, Algerians and Senegalese as well as Moroccans and Tunisians under the French (Garson, 1992, p. 81) and subsequent immigration to the core countries are two main examples of how international migration is determined by colonial links because of the cultural, linguistic, administrative and communication links they already have.

Foregoing discussions lead us to the view that the push-pull model addresses itself to a certain number of variables involved in the migratory behaviour of individuals or groups at internal and international level. One should be more cautious in considering international migration which may generate significant changes affecting the social and economic structure of the periphery and centre of sending as well as host countries.
3.2.4. Socio-psychological Approach

A socio-psychological level of analysis will enable us to go beyond the boundaries of the reductionist approach which ignores the personality traits of individuals and aspects of relations as contacts established between individuals and society. In other words, 'a knowledge of ideal norms and values provides an insufficient basis for an adequate understanding of the migration process,' thus, 'the attitudes and expectations of concrete individuals must also be taken into account' (Lewis, 1982, p. 103). Eisenstadt (1954, p. 1-2) advances an explanatory model on similar lines by making references to psychological components of migratory decision processes and migratory behaviour. He argues that the migratory movements of people are prompted and motivated by the migrant's feeling of insecurity and inadequacy in his present environment. The original setting of the migrant prevents him from meeting all his expectations and fulfilling the roles he would like to. Eisenstadt notes, with reference to psychological dimensions in the decision-making process of migrants, that: 'it is this feeling of frustration and inadequacy, whatever its cause, that motivates migration, and it is the existence of some objective opportunity that makes it possible to realise the aspiration to migrate. For that reason immigrants tend to develop certain definite expectations in regard to the role they fulfil in their new country'.

Eisenstadt identifies four main areas with regard to feelings of inadequacy and insecurity of potential migrants and their expectations in relation to the new society. He outlines these areas as follows: the first area concerns the 'immigrant who may feel that his original society does not provide him with enough facilities for and possibilities of adaptation'. The second social area of contact is that the migrant 'may be prompted by the feeling that certain goals, mainly instrumental in nature, cannot be attained within the institutional structure of his society of origin'. The third is that, 'the migrant may feel that within the old society he cannot fully gratify his aspirations to solidarity, i.e. to complete mutual identification with other persons and with the society as a whole'. The last area
relates to the probability that the migrant 'may feel that his society of origin does not afford him the chance of attaining a worthwhile and sincere pattern of life (p. 3). Therefore the model advanced by Eisenstadt gives some insight into the psychological dimensions involved in migration.

Before concluding this short account of migration, I believe that one other dimension is worth mentioning in the study of migration and subsequent developments within the immigrant community. This dimension in migration studies can be labelled 'cultural dimension', since migration processes involve and produce cultural changes. Without having a knowledge of cultural variables at work, one cannot advance an adequate explanation of migration processes. Immigrants differ in their class and cultural background, in their political values they espouse and they display different cultural characteristics. They also vary in their religious preferences as well as in their gender, life styles and identifications. There can be no doubt that all these characteristics and cultural variables affect the attitude and behaviour of migrants in varying degrees. Therefore, any attempt to understand the nature of migration with reference to multicultural societies would be incomplete if these cultural dimensions were to be ignored. As I will show later, some of these dimensions are directly related to the migration of Turks to London.

3.3. Consequences of Migration

Migration, as I have noted, is a complex phenomenon which involves economic, social, cultural, political and psychological variables. When looking at such a multi-dimensional process of human behaviour, one is always confronted by the diversity of approaches, lacunae of data on specific issues and varying explanatory models. In what follows, I will try to develop an explanatory approach to an understanding of the implications of migration for the immigrant communities as well as for the receiving societies in a wider context, and how this relates to the subjects of my study.
Migration produces a significant change in many respects, especially on the part of individuals and groups who undergo such an experience. Migratory movements have, broadly speaking, economic, social, psychological and political repercussions. The economic consequences of migration relate to issues such as job patterns, living standards, employment opportunities and the changes in the economic structures of the sending country through remittances and of the host country with reference to foreign labour-forces in the industry. Social effects relate to the formation of minority groups and ethnic communities in a foreign environment with different cultural values. The relations between majority-minority, attitudes towards immigrants, gender and generational issues fall into the category of social consequences of migration. Psychological impacts could include problems of affecting personality traits and the well-being of immigrants as well as identity conflicts and the psychological equilibrium of the individuals concerned. Political implications, on the other hand, are seen in discussions on race relations, nationality, citizenship and the political participation of immigrants in the host society.

The effects of migration upon the individual involved can take many forms. According to Lewis (1982, p. 182) for example, 'much of it being related to the extent to which his needs and aspirations are being met in the host community as well as his own adaptation to new surroundings. In the host community the migrant has to adapt to a new social, economic, political cultural environment, although his adaptation may be eased if he joins a group with a similar cultural background to himself. Immigrant groups are expected to face numerous problems in their new place of residence, including hostility and exclusion. Holmes (1991, p. 196) points out that a historical survey of immigrants and refugees in Britain will disclose a procession of evidence indicating that such groups encountered both hostility and discrimination. In a survey on British Social Attitudes, researchers provide some data on prejudice and discrimination against ethnic groups (Jowell & Airey, 1984, p. 9). According to the survey, which included a sample of 1761 adults in 114 parliamentary constituencies throughout the UK, nine out of ten people involved thought that Britain was racially
prejudiced. One in three admitted to being prejudiced against black and Asian people. Concerning the degree of prejudice in the past and in the future, only one in six felt that there was less prejudice today than five years ago and only one in six believed that there would be less prejudice in five years to come.

One of the consequences of the migration process relates to the social behaviour and social participation of migrants. The migratory process generates narrowing effects in the realm of social participation. This limitation displays two dimensions, of which one relates to the availability and diversity of roles that the immigrants can perform. At least some of the roles which migrants used to perform in the old society are not available any more in the new surroundings. Therefore, a migrant's life becomes centred in restricted primary membership groups. On the other hand, various institutional communication channels between primary membership groups and society as a whole may become largely severed. Various reference groups of the old community are replaced by the image of the new society but the migrant still feels attached to the images of the country of origin (Eisenstadt, 1954, p. 5).

In his study of Asian migration in Blackburn, Robinson (1986, p. 76-7) argues that housing represents the first problem which confronts a new migrant upon his arrival in a new country. Residential clustering, he proposes, can be regarded as a response to experiences of migrants in the host community. Motives behind residential concentration which may lead to socially encapsulatory clustering may well be rooted not only in the attraction of inner city property, but also in a chain migration system which, to some extent, provides a shelter for the new migrant against cultural contamination and discrimination. One can argue that residential segregation due to housing discrimination, chain migration and containment of ethnic groups by social and economic exclusion may further exacerbate the creation of ethnic ghettos. The underlying nature of a ghetto what Herbert (1990, p. 238) calls 'genuine neighbourhoods of foreigners' is its cultural specificity and boundaries erected by situational variables exerted by the larger community and accepted by the minority.
3.3.1. Acculturation, Assimilation and Absorption

Moving from one place to another is always a major event since it entails an abandoning of not only a spatial setting but also of social relations built around internalised values, closely attached relatives, friends and significant figures with whom one identifies. In this new setting one finds varying patterns of cultural values, social relations and a different lifestyle which has hardly any similarity with the prevalent customs of the old society. Although the migrant leaves his original and primary group relations behind, through a physical transition from one society to another, he always maintains his emotional attachment to his previous images and values. The migrant's attachment to his national origins, language, religion and customs on the one hand, and the host society's values on the other, constitute contrasting poles of cultural systems. The ambiguity generated by conflicting social and cultural values plays a discomforting role in the rationale and personality of the new member of society. With this state of mind the migrant is, from the onset, confronted with several forces which can be explained under the rubrics of acculturation, assimilation and absorption which aim to curb the salience of the migrant's identity through the fusion of the host culture.

Acculturation, assimilation and absorption are broad terms with loose meanings and these terms may be used interchangeably if they denote a culture contact. No clear line is drawn between these concepts by social scientists since the contents of the definitions of each concept juxtapose in dealing with migrants who encounter different sets of situations in the social and cultural atmosphere. Gordon (1964, p. 61) points out that both cultural anthropologists and sociologists have described the processes and results of ethnic meetings under the rubrics of assimilation and acculturation. Whilst sociologists tend to use the term assimilation, anthropologists showed more inclination to favour the term acculturation. Nevertheless, acculturation is usually considered one of the first phases of assimilation. Assimilation has to be distinguished from acculturation which may be regarded as accepting single elements of the core society without
Acculturation, or the acquisition and acceptance of new cultural traits by the members of an immigrant community, may take place in various ways. The process of acculturation may remain a relatively superficial learning without internalisation of the behavioural patterns of the larger society, or it may go beyond a simple acquisition of knowledge of the new cultural values and penetrate into the personality of the migrant with substantial behavioural concomitants (Lewis, 1982, p. 184). In the new social and cultural environment, a migrant is confronted with varying degrees of acceptance and he will gradually find himself in a position of acquiring certain elements of the host community's culture, such as learning a foreign language. The acquisition of language skills, developing a positive attitude towards the host culture and the willingness to participate in civic and political life in the new setting may be seen as indices of integration. It should be pointed out here that integration differs from assimilation in that an immigrant can preserve his own distinct identity in the case of integration. The process of assimilation requires a weakening of salience in expressing a cultural identity (Jackson, 1986, p. 7). Price (1969, p. 196) notes, with reference to the degree of acculturation, that requirements placed on the shoulders of individual migrants such as acquiring new knowledge as well as new attitudes and values may lead to a twofold reaction. The migrant's response may take a passive form through a deep involvement and identification, or his reaction may display a pattern of superficial acceptance or further a rejection of new roles completely.

Assimilation, on the other hand, is defined as 'participation in the culture of social system and is measured as the degree to which a system unit occupies positions on culturally relevant status lines'. In a more conventional terminology, one can denote assimilation as 'the adjustment of nonindigenous members to the...
culture of the dominating society, i.e. the taking over and internalising of the cultural contents existing there, in short adoption of a foreign ethnic identity' (Nowotny, 1981, p. 81). Assimilation is also defined as a process in which persons of diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds come to interact in the life of the larger community. The disappearance of separate social structures based on ethnic and racial concepts means that complete assimilation has taken place (Simpson, 1968, p. 438).

Three main theories are advanced regarding assimilation: 1- Anglo-conformist; 2- Melting-pot; and 3- Community theory. The Anglo-conformist theory argues that assimilation is possible and necessary for new settlers (Price, 1969, p. 183). This theory is based on a one way-process of interactionism that may be formulated as a \( (A \rightarrow B = A) \) process in which subordinate group \( B \) is incorporated within the dominant group \( A \), in such a way that it becomes \( A \) with no significant changes in the cultural structure of \( A \) (Hutnik, 1991, p. 26). This theory demands the complete renunciation of the immigrant's ancestral culture in favour of the values and behaviour of the larger society (Gordon, 1964, p. 85). The Melting-pot theory, on the other hand, is based on a two-way process of interaction as Hutnik (1991, p. 26) portrays in a \( (A \rightarrow B = C) \) process of relations during which subordinate group \( B \) interacts with the dominant \( A \) in such a way that both groups are changed by the interaction and the result is a homogenous amalgam of both groups represented by \( C \). The Melting-pot theory proposes a bilateral interaction which is meant to produce melted, blended and reshaped personalities (Price, 1969, p. 183; Gordon, 1964, p. 85). The Community theory allows cultural pluralism in an atmosphere where immigrant groups can maintain and preserve their cultural traits in relation to the values prevalent in the core society. Each ethnic group is allowed to establish its own communal life, preserving their cultural heritage while participating in the social and civic life of the host society (Gordon, 1964, p. 85; Price, 1969, p. 183). Almost all societies in our contemporary world contain in their social mapping a certain degree of diversity which supports the assumptions of the Community approach. People of different racial and ethnic origins, of religious and denominational affiliation and
of different colours are visible in many societies living together today. This diversity constitutes multi-cultural societies where cultural pluralism is supposed to be gaining precedence over the ideas based on racial discrimination and the cultural suppression of ethnic minorities. The Community theory is more relevant to this study which is of particular relevance to Turks. However, the rise of racism and militant nationalism in recent years (Weil, 1991, p. 82; Weissbrod, 1994, p. 222; Skrypietz, 1994, p. 133; Hargreaves & Leaman, 1995, p. 3; Solomos & Wrench, 1993, p. 7), seems to have shaken the foundations of the Community theory which presupposes the accommodation of different races, ethnic groups and cultures.

The assimilation of minority groups into a new socio-cultural context takes place in different forms and stages. In his much-quoted model of assimilation, Gordon (1964, p. 71), for example, presents an account of seven types or stages of assimilation. These are cultural/behavioural assimilation, structural assimilation, marital assimilation, identificational assimilation, attitude receptional assimilation, behaviour receptional assimilation and civic assimilation. He argues (p. 77) that cultural assimilation, acculturation, is likely to be the first type of assimilation to occur. According to Gordon, structural assimilation is of phenomenal importance since: ‘once structural assimilation occurs, either simultaneously with or subsequent to acculturation, all of the other types of the assimilation will naturally follow’. This emphasis clearly indicates that structural assimilation is regarded as a key stone and the consequence of such a structural assimilation leads to the giving up of ethnic values and the disappearance of ethnic identity as a distinctive social unit. Price (1969, p. 185-8), on the other hand, argues that the adjustment of immigrants to their new environment depends partly on their personal and social backgrounds as well as on their expectations and motives for migration. The migrant's customs and beliefs are also significant in this respect. He claims that quantitative characteristics of immigration influence the assimilation, as a large concentration and residential clustering encourage the formation of encapsulatory communities and strong institutions which impede the process of assimilation.
From a sociological point of view, social events, attitudes, stereotypes and discrimination prevalent in the host society and resources available to the migrants are among the factors which influence the degree of assimilation. One of the important indices of absorption, Eisenstadt (1954, p. 12-3) asserts, is acculturation which is concerned with the extent of the immigrant's acquisition of new customs, norms and the role of the receiving society. These roles and values, imposed upon individuals, are accumulated through internalisation of them by the migrants. Full absorption of migrant groups depends upon abandonment of the migrants' separate identity within the host community's social structure. Whatever the indices of complete assimilation might be, Oudehoven and Willemsen (1989, p. 247) argue that full assimilation may develop a cultural vacuum among minority group members. They assert that 'the second generation of immigrants, in particular, may lose their ethnic, religious or linguistic roots while not being adequately rooted in the majority culture either. This loss of identity and historical roots—being caught in between several cultural identities—may result in feelings of alienation or marginality'.

Generational structure, gender differences and the religious affiliation of migrants and minority groups are important variables which should be taken into account when considering the process of assimilation that is assumed, in the words of Park and Burgess (1963, p. 360) 'to entail a process of interpretation and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons or groups and, by sharing their experiences and history, are incorporated with them in common cultural life'. However, in many cases it is observed that minority members are reluctant to abandon their cultural and social identities and are not willing to assimilate into the culture of the larger community (Oudenhoven and Willemsen, 1989, p. 247). Stopes-Roe and Cochcrane (1987, p. 47) found, for example, in their study of assimilation of Asians in Britain that generation as a variable has a very strong effect on identificational, cultural as well as structural assimilation. They noted that young people scored higher in all these respects than did their parents.
Citing Human, (1933) Lewis (1982, p. 187) points out that the assimilation process involves three generations: 'the first generation' tend to establish ethnic groups and institutions to maintain their original culture rather than adopting the host society's social, cultural and economic values. Therefore, a reactionary response curbs the fusionary effect of assimilation among the first generation members of an ethnic minority. The second category, 'bridge generation', constitutes a category of individuals who have ambiguous tendencies towards values and habits of both minority and majority groups. They have a desire, on the one hand, to preserve parental values at home and, on the other hand, to adopt the host culture outside. The third category is noted as an 'assimilated generation' who reject parental institutions and values whilst adopting the cultural pattern of the core society.

It should be borne in mind that there is a significant difference between the socialisation experiences of the first and the second or successive generations of an ethnic community. The first generation individuals migrate to a new setting with a set of ideas and beliefs. Their socialisation took place in the country of origin and moulded, to a certain extent, by clearly defined ideals of the home culture. In the case of the second and subsequent generations, one finds a different line of socialisation process and personality development. The second generation individuals are exposed to a dual socialisation process, one being at home by the family and the other being in the larger society by school, peer groups and the media. The young Turkish generation in London are also experiencing a similar process of socialisation. There is no doubt that this kind of dual process of socialisation experience leaves a permanent mark on the personality of the second generation with concomitant behavioural responses. The natural outcome of exposure to different cultures is reflected in the form of identity conflicts which surround the individuals who are influenced by differing and often conflicting value systems embedded in parental and host cultural environments.
Religious beliefs and values are always maintained by the overwhelming majority of ethnic groups and are reproduced in private and public spheres. Religious institutions are usually spontaneously established at the same time as ethnic communities begin to emerge. I argue that strong religious affiliation among the immigrant groups reduces the effect of assimilationist policies. Religious beliefs, especially in the case of Muslims, provide a paradigm which stamps the thought and action of its followers. Internalisation of religious values, submission of one's will to an ultimate vision of reality and commitment to living up to its ideals may serve as a strong guard against assimilation. The upholding of religious values and participation in its institutions, fostering communal gathering and consciousness, may generate a powerful vehicle against the forces of alienation. The persistence of a Muslim identity in Europe in the midst of Western culture lends support to the foregoing argument that religious commitment and the salience of Islamic identity resist the forces of assimilation. This argument is directly related to the study of Turks in London.

3.4. Theories of Ethnicity

Various events in different parts of the world in recent years have brought the problem of ethnicity to the centre of contemporary debate in the social and political sciences. One consequence of this was to revive anthropology's long interest in the subject, as reflected by the plethora of publications on ethnicity and ethnic identity which have appeared during the last couple of years. The staggering events after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the dramatic political changes and disintegration of the former Soviet Union led to the emergence of proclamations of independence by many ethnic and national groups. Durance (1993, p. 21) argues that a new Weltanschauung (style of thought and life) developed in the midst of recent changes. One of the characteristics of this Weltanschauung, he asserts, is 'the rediscovery of values linked to "ethnic" identity (understood primarily in a cultural sense as opposed to a biological sense)'. Chaos and a lack of central authority have given rise to the tragic conflicts along ethnic and national lines in the former Soviet Union. Ethnic
conflict in the former Soviet Union has led ethnic communities to take up arms and weapons in defence of their territorial independence. Along with the old Soviet Union, some countries in the Balkans have also become open arenas for fierce and bloody ethnic conflicts. As Goulbourne observes (1991, p. 12) 'the assertion of difference between collectivities of people has became the hallmark of many social and political demands. Whilst in the past similarities between groups of people formed the basis for unity or collective existence, the growing demand, or emphasis, today, is for communities to be bound together by the factors which establish difference from others'.

The resurgence of ethno-nationalism perpetuated by religious and historical narratives has produced a new Holocaust. The problem runs world-wide, for example, the Bosnian Muslims suffered at the hands of Serbs who are described as carrying out the 'ethnic cleansing' of Muslims. Racially motivated riots in Los Angeles after the Rodney King affair in 1992, during which many people were killed and stores were looted by angry crowds, raised the issue of race and ethnic tension in an American city. South African history is replete with ethnic clashes rooted in the racial white-black dichotomy. Occupied territories in Palestine are yet another example where prevalent ethnic conflict has been on the agenda for many years. The list could easily be extended by adding other instances where ethnic differentiation is a source of ongoing conflict such as Burma, Burundi, Zaire and Rwanda.

All these new developments indicate that ethnic issues have once more gathered momentum, not only on the regional level with regard to national boundaries, but also on the international level, affecting international relations. In what follows I shall examine the issue of ethnicity and ethnic identity through a general review of theories of ethnicity in order to put my study of the politics of ethnicity and identity among Turks in London in a wider theoretical context.

Ethnicity is an elusive concept, difficult to define with precision (Burgess, 1978, p. 266). Ethnicity as a term is derived from the Greek word *ethnikos* which is the
adjective of *ethnos*, a term referring to a people or a nation. In its contemporary usage the term 'ethnic' still retains this basic meaning in the sense that it denotes some degree of coherence and solidarity among people who are aware of having common origins and interests (Cashmore, 1991, p. 97). Despite its elusiveness, ethnicity continues to fascinate and perplex (Banks 1996, p. 1) many researchers. Cohen (1974, Introduction) acknowledges that 'because of its ubiquity, variety of form, scope and intensity, and its involvement in psychic, social and historical variables, ethnicity has been defined in a variety of ways, depending on the discipline, field experience and interests of the investigators.' Psychologists, for example, seem to be more concerned with the individual processes of self-perception in relation to ethnic identity whereas anthropologists are more concerned with the social aspects of group formation and interaction which lead to the emergence of basic group identity (Sahoro, 1989, p. 98).

It may be argued that one of the underlying features of the contemporary world is the existence of nation-states. The premise underlying the nation-state involves a clear definition of political and geographical boundaries. Nevertheless, the prevalence of nation-states with clearly defined borders has not prevented the formation of multi-racial and multi-ethnic societies. As Anwar (1985, p. 1) notes, 'most societies in the world today are plural societies, in the sense that they consist of different ethnic and racial groups. One phenomenon which has contributed to the formation of such 'plural' societies was the economic development arising from the growth of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution which led to great international migrations of labour in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries'. The United States, Britain and many West European countries accommodate a significant number of people from non-native racial and cultural backgrounds. Blacks, Hispanics, Italians and Chinese in the United States and Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, West Indians in the UK, Turks and Yugoslavians in Germany and Moroccans and Algerians in France constitute minority groups within the larger society, having different racial, linguistic, cultural origins and sometimes religious (as in the case of Indians, Pakistanis, Turks and Moroccans) affiliation. These minority groups with
characteristics distinct from the indigenous members of the society form ethnic groups. Morris (1968, p. 167) defines an ethnic group as: 'a distinct category of the population in a larger society whose culture is usually different from its own. The members of such a group are, or feel themselves, or are thought to be, bound together by common ties of race or nationality or culture'.

A review of the literature on ethnicity reveals differing perspectives on ethnicity and ethnic identity of which primordial, situational and sociobiological contentions may be useful tools for understanding the nature of ethnicity and the forces behind the formation of ethnic identity among migrant and minority groups. The explanation of the concept of ethnicity and ethnic identity in this thesis is related to the migration experience. With regard to this relation, Charsley (1974, p. 359) points out that one of the ways in which ethnic groups appear to be established is a process of migration. This position is also supported by Hechter (1986, p. 14) who contends that migratory movement as a result of which two different communities face intergroup relations play a generative role in the formation of ethnic groups.

Discussions and the theorisation of ethnicity are primarily rooted in anthropological, ethnological and sociological discourses. An ethnic group is usually defined in terms of biological, linguistic, cultural and religious criteria (Liebkind, 1989, p. 28). Theories of ethnicity display variety and diversity in their explanations of the ethnic phenomena. Therefore, a review of the relevant literature is important for grasping the meaning of ethnicity and the rationale and forces behind the formation of ethnic groups and ethnic identity.

3.4.1. Primordial Perspective: 'givens' of social existence

The primordial approach to ethnicity may be traced to Edward Shils whose well-known article on interaction among members of primary groups laid the foundations for this approach. In his article entitled 'Primordial, Personal, Sacred
and Civil Ties,' Shils (1957, p. 130-139) touches upon the concept of primordial attachment in his analysis of the systems of value orientation. Shils argues that primordial attachments to kin, territory and religious belief systems are characterised by a state of intense and comprehensive solidarity, coerciveness, ineffable significance, fervour and passion and sacredness. But he does not elaborate further on primordial allegiances beyond saying that primordial attachments are different in nature from attachments to other social units. The primordial view, which considers ethnicity as an irrational and deep-seated attachment to kin, territory, culture and religion, is further developed by Clifford Geertz. Geertz sums up his contention in the following way:

‘By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens' of social existence: immediate contiguity and live connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech custom and so on, are seem to have an ineffable, and at times, overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour, one's fellow believer, ipso facto as the result of not merely of personal attraction, tactical necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligation but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute importance attributed to the very tie itself' (Geertz, 1973, p. 259).

Geertz argues that ethnicity has deep roots outside the conscious realm of human life. In his view, ethnicity is not determined by external and circumstantial forces, but by internalised attachments. Geertz's approach indicates that the primordialist approach sees ethnicity, 'as a permanent and fundamental aspect of human identity, expressed either alone and for its own sake, or in relations with differently ethnic others' (Banks, 1996, p. 185). According to the primordialist view as developed by Geertz, ethnicity has an essentialist character which ignores the effects of social, cultural and political environment; rather, it argues that the sense of belonging to an ethnic group is rooted in the 'givens' of social existence and historical experience.
Isaacs' (1978, p. 30) view on basic group identity and Horowitz's (1978, p. 113) understanding of ethnicity also echo Geertz's contention of ethnicity as rooted in primordial attachments derived from the assumed givens of social existence. Isaacs contends, for example, that the basic group identity is derived from what is called an ethnic group which is composed of 'primordial affinities and attachments'. Horowitz, on the other hand, thinks that ethnic identity is generally acquired at birth, although he remarks that this is a matter of degree, and ascription is the key characteristic that distinguishes ethnicity from voluntary association.

For primordialists, Stack (1986, p. 1) argues, a sense of peoplehood forms the essence of ethnic identity and ethnicity assumes a nature which perpetuates the expression of basic group identity. This basic group identity is passed down from one generation to the next, binding the individual to a larger collectivity based on a common outlook that differentiates members of the group from non-members.

The sociological version of the primordial contention regards linguistic characteristics, religious beliefs and attitudes, racial features, ethnic origins and territory as organising principles and bonds of human association throughout human history. Since these organising principles precede more complex formations and also prepare the social and historical basis for the latter to be built on, they are truly primordial. Smith points out that primordial ties have caused divisions and polarisation between societies and will always do the same on varying degrees because primordial ties are not likely to disappear with the alteration of modern conditions. He argues that:

'Units and sentiments found in the modern world are simply larger and more effective versions of similar units and sentiments traceable in much earlier periods of human history; and that, given the characteristics of the human beings, their propensity to kinship and group belonging and their need for cultural symbolism for communication and meaning, we should expect nations and nationalism to be perennial, and, perhaps, universal' (Smith, 1986, p. 12).
For Smith (1984, p. 100), shared myths and memories are significant. He notes that shared 'ethnic myths' and memories are peculiar to each nation and 'comprise the ethnic heritage of the nation and include, besides myths and memories, the values, symbols and traditions associated with a particular homeland'. Smith (1996) also argues: 'that the process of transmission, reinterpretation and reconstruction of these elements and of their patterning in successive generations' need to be explained by exploring social and cultural dimensions such as 'cognitive maps', 'social memories' and 'public moralities'.

The primordialist view emphasises that irrational attachments are based on language, a religious value system, racial belonging, ethnicity and territory. This perspective claims that nations and ethnic groups can be regarded as the natural units of history and integral elements of the ongoing human experience. Sociobiologists, on the other hand, argue that ethnicity is an extension of kinship organisation which constitutes a vehicle to pursue collective goals in the struggle for survival. van den Berghe (1978, p. 404), a leading theoretician in sociobiological approach, asserts that: 'ethnic groups, for nearly all of human history, were what genetics call breeding populations, in breeding super families, in fact, which not only were much more closely related to each other than to even their closest neighbours, but which, almost without exception, explicitly recognised that fact, and maintained clear territorial and social boundaries with other such ethnic groups'. In a later study, van den Berghe (1987, p. 261) argues that the propensity to give support to kin and ethnic individuals is deeply rooted in our genetic nature. But he acknowledges that our genetic programming is designed to be highly flexible and our specific behaviours are adaptive in response to a wide range of environmental stimuli. He contends that ethnic sentiments have evolved as an extension of nepotism, the ethnie being conceived as an extended kin group sharing common biological descent. van den Berghe (1987, p. 250,261) seems to take a synthesising stand on ethnicity; according to him, ethnicity is not a "given" nor a "constant", but it waxes and wanes in response to environmental conditions'. Thus, ethnicity is both primordial and situational.
As noted at the beginning of this discussion, the primordial approach views ethnicity as irrational, deep-seated attachments to kin, territory, religion, language and race. According to this perspective, ethnic sentiments are the 'givens' of social existence. The main advantage of the primordialist endeavour to penetrate the dynamics of ethnicity and ethnic group behaviour is that it focuses our attention on the human psyche where the emotional strength of ethnic allegiances is deeply rooted.

However, the primordialist perspective has not remain immune to criticism. This approach is criticised on several grounds. McKay (1982, p. 398-98), for example, argues that primordialists seem to employ deterministic and static terms in their explanations because 'primordial givens' are not seen to change or to display dynamic properties, but rather they have a primitive or atavistic nature. He contends that ethnic phenomenon is not the consequence of some primordial need, but is a rational, calculated response to certain stimuli. McKay's critique of the primordial perspective seems to centre on two points, one of which is its psychological reductionism and, secondly, its cultural determinism since primordial traits are often viewed as fixed, involuntary and compelling. Stack's (1986, p. 2) reservations on the primordial perspective lend support to McKay's criticism. Stack points out that Geertz's emphasis on the unaccountable nature of primordial attachments does not sit well with the attempts by social scientists to probe the dynamics of ethnicity. He argues that the primordial approach not only 'infuses a romantic dimension into the study of ethnicity' but also its conceptualisation comes close to cultural determinism which may lead to the use of stereotypes. Although the primordial approach fails to explain why ethnicity disappears during one historical period and re-intensifies during another, Stack believes that it captures an undeniable aspect of the phenomenon now identified in terms of ethnicity and ethnonationalism. Geertz's (1973, p. 259-60) following statement confirms this argument: 'the general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and from time to time. But for virtually every person, in
every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow from a sense of natural -some would say spiritual- affinity than from social interaction.'

3.4.2. Situational Approach: The Ethnic Boundary between 'Us' and 'Them'

There has been a trend away from primordial explanations of ethnicity and ethnic identity to situationalism which views ethnicity as a rational response to social, economic and cultural circumstances. The situational approach emphasises instrumental, contextual, pragmatic and changeable aspects of ethnicity. As McKay (1982, p. 399) notes, the essential feature of this viewpoint is as follows: ‘renewed ethnic tension and conflict are not the result of any primordial need to belong, but are due to conscious efforts of individuals and groups mobilising ethnic symbols in order to obtain access to social, political and material sources’. The situational view, also referred as the instrumentalist approach, tends to regard ethnicity ‘either as a position or outlook that is adopted to achieve some specific end or to see it as the outcome of a set of particular historical and socio-economic circumstances. That is, ethnicity is adopted by choice’ (Banks, 1996, p. 185).

The underlying premise of the situational perspective, which argues that ethnic mobilisation is not simply an inevitable result of primordial affinities, is that the essence of ethnic mobilisation is ‘situationally determined’. Barth, (1969, p. 10) in his introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, concedes that ‘ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organising interaction between people’. Barth acknowledges that different processes are involved in generating and maintaining ethnic groups. He argues that the ethnic boundary, which is social in essence, defines the group; and the persistence of ethnic groups as significant units depends on their display of marked difference in behaviour, i.e. ‘persisting cultural differences’ (Barth, 1969, p. 15-16). Boundary variation for Barth, as Wallman (1990, p. 230) points out,
'comes in the content given to the ethnic category as a boundary ‘vessel’. That content affects or reflects firmness of the boundary and the significance of any of the diacritical which differentiate ‘us’ from them. The more signs of difference available, the greater the boundary potential, but even where diacritical abound, there will be times when the ‘vessel’ is left empty. The metaphor implies that ethnicity is always there, sometimes cool in the belly (like Azande witchcraft perhaps) but even then primordial'.

Several features of the analytical model of Barth on ethnicity are established. Jenkins (1990, p. 174), for example, enumerates the following features of the Barthian approach: ‘In the first place, the analysis of ethnicity starts from the definition of the situation held by social actors. Second, the focus of attention then becomes the maintenance of ethnic boundaries; the structured interaction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ which takes place across the boundary. Third, ethnic identity depends on ascription, both by members of the ethnic group in question and by outsiders. Fourth, ethnicity is not fixed, it is situationally defined. Fifth, ecological issues are particularly influential in determining ethnic identity, in as much as competition for economic niches plays an important role in the generation of ethnicity’.

Derived from Barth’s arguments, ethnicity is conceptualised as a group identity that is essentially fluid, depending on how the boundaries of an ethnic group are drawn in a specific content and, hence, the precise content of ethnic identity is defined in relation to distinct external stimuli. Theorists of this posture tend to conceptualise the mobilisation of ethnicity in terms of competition over scarce economic and, to some extent, political resources, because ethnicity is viewed as fluid and ‘situationally determined. Moreover, situational approach regards ethnic groups as “interest groups”’. Charsley (1974, p. 363) observes that ethnic organisation may be established in order to promote or defend some ethnic interests of a political, economic, religious or cultural nature. The instrumentalist (situational) perspective, which views ethnic groups as a category of people gathered around certain interests, attributes the variations in cultural patterns between different ethnic groups to their commitment to increasing their share of scarce resources, such as income, good jobs, better housing and schooling as well
as prestige and political power. The mobilisation of ethnic groups and the pursuit of ethnic interests are therefore interpreted as a strategy for the achievements of goals or cultural values shared by the members of an ethnic group (Ballis Lal, 1983, p. 156).

Okamura (1981, p. 453-454) distinguishes between the structural and cognitive dimensions of situational ethnicity which merges both. The structural aspect of situational ethnicity denotes: 'the restraints enjoined upon parties within social situations as a consequence of the setting of social action, which in this case is provided by the overall structure of ethnic group relations in a given society. The setting also includes the relative political and socio-economic statutes of these groups, the distribution of occupation, education, income, wealth and other social and material resources among them, their numerical proportions, and the immediate prospects for change in any of these areas'. The structural dimension of ethnicity denotes the significance of ethnicity as an organising principle of social relations. The other aspect of situational ethnicity, the cognitive, according to Okamura, 'pertains to the actor's subjective perception of the situation in which he finds himself and to the salience he attributes to ethnicity as a relevant factor in that situation'. The cognitive realm, Okamura notes, is concerned with the person's perception of cultural signs and symbols. Okamura's ideas on the cognitive dimension of situational ethnicity largely derive from Barth's (1969, p. 10) assertion that 'ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identifications ...'. Mitchell (1974, p. 16-17) also tends to explain ethnicity on two levels as behavioural ethnicity which corresponds to Okamura's structural dimension and cognitive ethnicity which can be traced back to Barth's treatment of ethnicity as a cognitive category.

Some authors such as Weinreich (1996), on the other hand, use different concepts to denote the changing nature of ethnicity. He argues that processes situated within a particular socio-historical context very much influence the formation of ethnicity. Weinreich prefers using the concept of 'process' and 'context' rather than situation to denote the circumstantial aspect of individual ethnicity and
asserts that ‘socio-historical contexts differ greatly in terms of the particular distribution of multiple ethnic groups in a country and the nature of the relationships between the ethnic groups. The historical contexts of economic migrations, of conquest, apartheid ideologies and ethnic cleansing, and of genocide and refugee status will have profound impact on the statutes of an ethnic group’.

However, the situational perspective, with its emphasis on contextual and rational sources of ethnicity, was also subjected to critical examination. Cohen, for example, argues that:

‘the definition of ethnicity as cognition of identity obscures, even nullifies, the conception of differences in degree of ethnicity. Barth’s conception of ethnic categories as organisational vessels that are fixed, static, always there even when not relevant to behaviour, suffer from the same difficulties. His separation between ‘vessel’ and ‘content’ makes it difficult to appreciate the dynamic nature of ethnicity. It also assumes an inflexible structure of the human psyche and implicitly denies that personality is an open system given to modifications through continual socialisation under changing socio-cultural conditions. Unless we recognise differences in degree of manifestations we shall fail to make much progress in the analysis of ethnicity’ (Cohen, 1974, Introduction).

It has also been argued that the explanations of the ethnic phenomenon, which is exclusively based on the interest paradigm in political, economic or in other domains of ethnic group formation, underrate the emotional power of ethnic bonds and exaggerate the influence of materialism on human behaviour (McKay, 1982, p. 400). The pursuit of interests by itself, Charsley contends (1974, p. 359), is not an adequate explanation for the formation, development and maintenance of ethnicity. The situational approach to ethnicity is said to have played down ‘the possibility of the overall mobilisation of the resource of ethnicity in the interests of a class’ (Rex, 1986, p. 28).

It seems that neither a primordialist nor a situational approach to ethnicity can be dismissed out of hand as explanatory categories. As Scott suggests (1990, p. 167), both approaches may explain different aspects of ethnicity and ethnic solidarity. I
would like to close this discussion by quoting an assertion in a recently published book on ethnicity to point out constant reproduction and re-expression of ethnicity. This would also reflect the contention of the thesis. Banks (1996, p. 190) observes that:

‘the fragmentation and reformulation of macro political structures since the end of he Cold War, and the rise of ’new genetics’ (which will alter ideas about human reproduction if not everyone’s practices), mean that new folk systems of knowledge are being thrown up every day. These systems, while local in colour and character, are neither particularistic nor bounded. They are linked in nested hierarchies, feed off each other, and make competing claims to authoritativeness and universalism. Ethnicity lives self-consciously within these systems’.

Thus, both primordial and circumstantial variables are important to an understanding of ethnicity as ‘both types of factors are significant: some sort of ascriptive commonality is after all necessary for a group to be ethnic in any meaningful sense, but the salience and level of inclusiveness of different ascriptive characteristics in determining ethnic boundaries varies according to differences in circumstances’ (Chai, 1996, p. 281). The concept of ethnicity and ethnic identity, therefore, should not be seen as a fixed category. Smith’s (1996) comment on national identity fits this conclusion. He notes that ‘national identity is undoubtedly imagined, but it is equally felt, known and lived’. So is ethnic identity.

3.4.3. Foundations of ‘We’ versus ‘Them’

I have, so far, reviewed the perspectives on ethnicity and discussed the underlying premises of primordial and situational approaches to this complex phenomenon. A review of the literature on this subject revealed that there are approaches to the concept ethnicity. Burgess (1978, p. 266-267) attributes the variations of theories to two sets of criteria. According to Burgess, differences between perspectives on ethnicity stem from a rational-non-rational dichotomy regarding the sources of ethnicity: a non-rational framework presupposes that ethnicity is an involuntary, innate or instinctive phenomenon as primordialists
concede. On the other hand, a rational predisposition views ethnicity essentially as a voluntary, pragmatic and situational process.

However, as noted earlier, it is suggested that ethnicity should be seen as both primordial and situational to avoid a one-sided approach. McKay (1982, p. 413) argues that primordialist and mobilisationist (instrumental, situational) contentions are not mutually exclusive but, rather, are interrelated. He proposes a polar model of ethnic phenomena which combines both the primordial and the situational explanations of ethnicity. Most observers now tend to accept the eclectic idea that at least to some degree both 'primordial' and 'interest' factors are involved in ethnicity. It is viewed that under some circumstances, feelings of cultural unity and ancestral attachments constitute the major source of ethnic belonging, whereas under other circumstances a perception of shared interests and material purposes are the major source of ethnic allegiance (Yinger, 1986, p. 26).

Whatever the differences in these perspectives, it may be suggested that ethnicity provides an answer to the question of 'Who am I?' or 'Who are we?' and ethnic consciousness may facilitate the development of an identity construct based on a 'we' versus 'them' mentality. Ringer and Lawless (1989, p. 18,19) also argue, for example, that the ethnic group which develops a sense of 'we-ness' is quite aware that beyond the boundaries of this defined consciousness of 'we-ness' there is a 'they' that constitutes the larger society which plays an important role in the very being and functioning of the ethnic group. It can be said from the point of the larger society that those outside its boundaries can also be designated as 'they', just as the ethnic group's designation of the larger society as a 'they'.

An ethnic community is distinguished from the larger society. The features that distinguish an ethnic group from the larger society constitute the foundations of an ethnic community. Various dimensions upon which an ethnic community is established are recognised as distinctive features of ethnic groups. It is argued that an ethnic group is distinguished by six basic traits which define 'we' or
‘them’. These are: 1- a collective name; 2- a common myth of descent; 3- a shared history; 4- a distinctive shared culture; 5- an association with a specific territory; 6- a sense of solidarity (Smith, 1981, p. 66; Smith, 1986, p. 24-30; Burgess, 1978, p. 269; Ringer & Lawless, 1989, p. 5).

In his analysis of an ethnic group, Yinger (1985, p. 159), on the other hand, proposes a mixture of significant ingredients of ethnic identity as language, religion, race and ancestral homeland which he later (1994, p. 3-4) reformulates in three categories. In Yinger’s view, an ethnic group has three defining particularities: ‘1- The ethnic group is perceived by others in the society to be different in some combination of the following traits: language, religion, race, and ancestral homeland with its related culture; 2- the members also perceive themselves as different; and 3- they participate in shared activities built around their (real or mythical) common origin and culture’. Ascription by self and others, as well as participation, are the foundation stone of an ethnic group.

Beyond these theoretical positions, this thesis is concerned not only with ascription and participation, but also with the reproduction of social, cultural and religious values among a minority community which are all related to the concept of ethnicity, ethnic identity and ethnic belonging to a culturally distinct group, i.e. the Turkish community in London.

In the following section, theories of identity development will be reviewed as the concept of identity is used in conjunction with ethnicity in this thesis. An understanding of the meaning of identity, its development and maintenance is essential because a sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group is embedded in the internalisation of such an identity built around certain values and experiences.
3.5. Approaches to Identity Development: The Meaning of Identity

Identity is a multidimensional concept, therefore any attempt to explain the concept of identity and discussions surrounding the formation of identity, its components and dimensions, as well as what kinds of variables are crucial in the development of identity, requires one to adopt a multidisciplinary approach. Such an approach would produce a better explanatory framework overcoming the limitations of one-sided approaches to such a complex area of research: namely, the formation of identity within a multicultural setting and its relation to ethnicity, culture and religion. This section examines the concept of identity from social and psychological perspectives and relates it to how ethnic minorities achieve a sense of identity. It also looks at the influences of family, religion, culture and group belonging on the formation and maintenance of identity.

Erikson (1968) recalls in the preface of his seminal, and oft-quoted study of identity, that Dr. Paul Federn, who was a teacher in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute, asked himself at the end of a series of lectures on the concept of identity: 'Nun-hab ich mich verstanden'- Now have I understood myself? - Erikson’s recollection of his teacher’s self-questioning indicates how problematic the concept of identity is and how complex are processes involved. Erikson, one of the forerunners of the systematic study of identity in terms of conceptualisation, tries to develop a framework to explain what identity means and how the sense of identity develops from childhood through adolescence as the titles of his books (Identity: Youth and Crisis, 1968; Identity and the Life Cycle, 1959) on the subject in question imply. Erikson (1959, p. 109) ascribes various meanings to the concept of identity. He contends that identity at one time may refer to a conscious sense of individual identity; at another to an unconscious striving for a continuity of personal character; at a third, as a criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis; and, finally, as a maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group’s ideals and
identity'. In the literature on this topic, identity is usually referred to as a sense, attitude and resolution. Marcia (1980, p. 159) defines identity 'as a self-structure, an internal, self-constructed, dynamic organisation of drives, abilities, beliefs, and individual history'. Depending on how these structures are developed, an individual posits himself in relation to others. In his study, Erikson argues that:

'identity formation begins where the usefulness of multiple identification ends. It arises from the selective repudiation and mutual assimilation of childhood identifications, and their absorption in a new configuration, which in turn, is dependent on the process by which a society (often through subsocieties) identifies the young individual, recognising him as somebody who had to become the way he is, and who, being the way he is, is taken for granted' (Erikson, 1959, p. 122).

As Wright (1982, p. 25,71) points out, the concept of identity is usually raised by means of asking 'Who am I? In the first instance one gets the impression that the very wording of the above question denotes self as the only dimension of identity. Nevertheless, identity is comprised not solely of self but is more than the private 'Who am I?'. Thus, one has to ask about other dimensions of identity (I's) such as environment, society, world view and culture³.

3.5.1. The Social Dimensions of Identity Development and Ethnic Group Membership

Human beings are born in societies. As soon as the newly born baby acquires life, he is surrounded by individuals and institutions. Family members in early life, peer groups, schools and many other social establishments at a later period influence the growing child in varying degrees during his life cycle. The setting in which an individual grows up presents itself as a societal dimension of identity. Liebkind (1989, p. 52) rightly notes the insufficiency of sociological theories of minority identity since, as she puts it, 'sociological theories of minority identity have often neglected the fact that human identity
has both personal and social aspects. While the content of social identity derives from membership in various social groups, personal identity derives from characteristics which distinguish an individual from other members of the same group(s). Markstrom-Adams (1992, p. 174) calls all these surrounding elements 'social contextual factors'. He argues that: 'contextual factors pertinent to identity formation encompass issues that close social relationships and the socio-cultural milieu present to the adolescent. Identity formation is not wholly an individualistic process; rather, the social environment exerts its forms of power and influence'. In relation to identity, Markstrom-Adams identifies three main social contextual factors that include family relationships, ethnic and racial group membership and religiosity.

Taking the environmental contexts into account, Kroger (1993, p. 11) argues that looking at the social dimension has a methodological potential of allowing researchers to specify features most likely to facilitate the identity formation process within social institutions. She believes that the roles of culture, social class, ethnicity and historical ethos are among the contexts related to identity formation process. With regard to the social dimension of identity formation, Hitch (1983, p. 118) draws our attention to the meaning of that dimension. As he points out, 'social' means something more than the influence of other people, it cannot be limited to the effects of others on an individual. Identity also means more than a self-description in terms of qualities. Hitch notes further that: 'what may be termed "social identity" is that aspect of the cognised self which refers to membership of a group, or category of social significance'. Identity is a psychosocial construct. The community within which the young persons seek to find themselves constitutes the social dimension of identity (Wright, 1982, p. 81). Erikson (1959, p. 161) refers to this dimension of identity as ego-aspect as opposed to self-aspect of identity formation.
Ethnicity is one of the variables that marks the process of identity formation. Belonging to an ethnic group enables the members of that group to define their distinct features by means of comparing themselves with other ethnic, religious or cultural groups. Apter's (1983, p. 79) argument lends support to the idea that group membership is a source of developing a self-concept. He argues that 'one of the most salient forms of self-definition in most people derives from the membership of groups, both primary and secondary groups... Extending the 'I' and 'me' terminology, to a group could be said to provide a way of giving meaning to 'Me' in terms of 'Us'.

The process of identity formation for young people who are members of ethnic and racial minority communities acquires a complex nature due to several intervening factors. As Markstrom-Adams (1992, p. 176) points out, one can attribute such complexity to issues of colour, linguistic distinctions, behavioural differences, physical features and social stereotypes. There appears in the formation of identity, a culture conflict between majority and minority cultural values. It is especially important to note that 'sorting through the two sets of values and selecting those to incorporate into one's identity may, for some minority individuals, yield a no-win scenario. That is, adopting an identity consistent with values of the dominant culture may result in ostracism from one's minority group'. It is well-documented that children of migrants, even though they are settled, due to contextual conditions pursue different avenues in their identity development from their ancestors and peers in the host society (Weinreich, 1986a, p. 231). In this regard, Weinreich brings to our attention the issue of dual socialisation of migrant children. His research findings show that children of migrants in Britain are exposed to a distinctive kind of dual socialisation. He observes that:

'during primary socialisation within their homes they form their early identifications with their parents and other members of their own ethnic community. Subsequently, during secondary socialisation at
school, representing a different culture, and within the wider community, they form further identifications with significant others embodying values and aspirations of the subordinate community. Elements of the latter identifications will be incompatible with the earlier, home-based, ethnic ones, so that these earlier identifications become conflicted. Thus, by adolescence, second generation boys and girls will tend to have conflicted identifications with people of their own ethnicity' (Weinreich, 1986b, p. 304).

In another article, Weinreich (1983, p. 157) analyses culture conflict which derives from differences between the values held by different ethnic groups. He argues that those who grow up experiencing two distinct and diverse cultural values are likely to adopt several aspects of these two different sets of values. Internalising parts of two different value systems means that the identifications of children and youth cannot be confined to one ethnic group and its cultural values. A duality of world views, values based on diverse sets of a cultural 'belongingness' that conflict with each other may also be interpreted as cultural discontinuity. According to Phinney, as the title of article Multiple Group Identities: Differentiation, Conflict and Integration suggests, an important component of the communal culture is the group identities in a given society. Phinney (1993a, p. 47-48) notes that the development of all youth will be influenced by their identification with social groups, and group identity is likely to be particularly salient for adolescents from ethnic groups. Therefore, within a multicultural society, siblings of ethnic communities have to deal with multiple identities.

3.5.2. Religion and Identity

Historical research on earlier societies reveals that religion played a major role in the establishment of social identity of individuals. Religion appears to be a source of identity. Beals (1978, p. 147) argues that 'for the individual, religion provides subjective access to a universe of meaning by which he is able to transcend the determinism of social identity and everyday experience. For the believer, religion opens up an “ultimate” identity that subjectively situates him as unique and free'. Religion provides a unique
Weltanschauungen or world-view for its members (Abromson, 1979, p. 6). Therefore, religious belief was used as an important variable in research on identity by leading scholars such as Marcia (1966, p. 553). Baumeister (1986, p. 114) argues that: ‘a firm religious context can enable the adolescent to interpret his or her personal experience in terms of religious symbols, such as the struggle against temptation or redemption. The religious framework also provides a clear model of how to resolve the adolescent phase by providing a model’.

Erikson (1968, p. 83) also emphasises the role of religion as a deeply rooted source for coherent identity achievement. He suggests that religion systematises and socialises the first and deepest conflict in life by combining the dim images of each individual’s first providers into collective images of ancient protectors. Religion also restores the crisis of the life cycle and gives a new sense of wholeness to things surrounding the individual. Baumeister (1986, p. 114) also supports the view that religious values have constructive effects on youth identity formation. A firm religious belief and internalised moral values provide young adolescents with a powerful guide for behaviour and constitute an influential ally during identity formation. In the formation and consolidation of ethnic identity, religion also plays a constructive role. Moll (1979, p. 37), for example, contends that religion, as the sacralisation of identity, reinforces ethnic identity by delineating the ethnic group from its surroundings. A sense of belonging to a religion which provides a shared meaning of life for an ethnic group will help its members not only strengthen their identity but will also define it more clearly vis-à-vis ‘others’.

In any discussion of identity, the role of the past and family influence on identity formation should also be taken into account. Erikson wrote as early as 1959 (p. 109) that the term ‘identity’ expresses ‘an individual’s link with the unique values, fostered by a unique history, of his people’. Wallerstein (1991b, p. 78) regards the shared past of the given community as an identity. In the formation of peoplehood as having an identity, the past plays an
important role. Wallerstein contends that 'pastness is a mode by which persons are persecuted to act in the present in ways that they might not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each other. Pastness is a central element in the socialisation of individuals, in the maintenance of group solidarity, in the establishment of or challenge to social legitimation. Pastness is therefore pre-eminently a moral phenomenon'.

As noted earlier, the identity of an individual or a group is formed, developed, achieved, changed, preserved and maintained throughout the life cycle in various identity negotiations. A child's early and foremost socialisation takes place within the family. The first identity negotiations are observed between parents and children. Parents and other family members consciously or unconsciously convey their concepts, attitudes and evaluations of social characteristics to their children (Liebkind, 1989, p. 53). The child, surrounded by immediate family members at the first stages of his life and by peers, school teachers later, looks as Erikson (1959, p. 19) puts it, 'for models by which to measure himself, and seeks happiness in trying to resemble them'. 'Parents, siblings, and other family members provide a cultural context that becomes for the child a lens through which to view the world. The "correctness" of these values, their representations of objective reality, are unquestioned and become integral aspects of the child's reality' (Rosenthal, 1987, p. 161). During the early period of their life cycle, parents are the most immediate sources of identification and role models for children. As the child grows up, familial relations and values personified by elders play a primary role in the formation of individual identity. Phinney and Rosenthal (1992, p. 153) found that family influences on the formation and maintenance of ethnic identity in childhood are very strong and pervasive. They argue that the family is: 'the source of children's first experiences related to ethnicity and it is generally with the parents and other family members that children make their first identifications as part of a group'.
In the light of foregoing discussions on theoretical issues including immigration, ethnic-minority community formation, ethnicity and the development of a sense of belonging to an ethnic group, I will analyse the case of Turkish ethnicity and identity in London. I will try to explain how Turkish ethnicity and identity are constructed and how they are expressed. The role of the family, tradition and religion on the formation of identity will be discussed in the light of the ethnographic and survey data. However, before that I would like to examine the process and pattern of Turkish migration to Britain and other European countries and explain how Turkish ethnic communities have emerged and evolved.
Chapter Three: Notes:


Chapter Four
Turkish Labour Migration To Western Europe And Britain

The presence of Turks in Europe is not a recent phenomenon. Their presence can be traced to long before the arrival of Turkish workers in Britain and in other West European countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A review of the movement of Turkish people towards Europe will reveal that, although in a different nature, several thousand Turks came to Europe as early as the thirteenth century. Inalcik (1993, p. 10) argues that the advent of the Anatolian Turks in the Balkans dates back to the 1260s. The expansion of the Ottomans extended to Thrace in the reign of Orhan Gazi (1324-1359) whose son Suleyman managed to establish the first permanent Ottoman base at Gallipoli in Europe from which the initial conquests of the Balkans were made in subsequent years. Orhan's conquests in Europe were followed by the settlements of Turkoman nomads in large numbers from Anatolia.

Ottoman expansion in the Balkans continued gradually and the Ottomans encouraged immigration to the newly conquered territories. A large number of Muslim nomads were transferred to the Balkans in Europe as a state policy. In line with his predecessor, Murat I (1360-1389) launched an offence from this base in Europe to conquer Thrace. As his predecessor, Murat I advocated a programme of mass immigration and settlement of Turkomans in the newly conquered territories in Thrace, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Serbia to strengthen the Turkish presence in the Balkans (Shaw, 1988, p. 17). Eminov, (1987, p. 280) points out, for example, that the settlement of Turkish Muslims in Bulgaria dates from the second half of the fourteenth century. Sofia was conquered in 1386 and, thereafter, the tide of invasion rolled on which made the Ottoman-Turkish presence in the Balkans more effective (Yucel, 1987, p. 17). The victory of the Turkish army at Kosova in 1389 destroyed the last organised resistance in the Balkans against the Ottoman expansion. This meant that the Turkish presence in Europe reached as far as Serbia and all of South-eastern Europe (Shaw, 1988, p. 22). It is worth noting here that after the victory in Kosova, the Ottomans
established a Turco-Muslim presence in the Balkans as the ruling political power. The conquest of Istanbul (Constantinople) by the Ottoman forces in 1452 during the reign of Mehmet II (1451-1481) was a historical turning point in Turkish history with regard to the Turkish presence in Europe and the consequent relations between the Turks and the Europeans.

The military expansion of the Ottoman Turks had not only changed the political and economic power balance of the region, but the ethnic and demographic structure of the Balkans was also altered. The arrival of Turkish groups changed the distribution of the people with regard to ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions in society. However, ethnic and cultural diversity have always been maintained through adopting a policy of recognition and tolerance of other nationals and cultures under the millet system. The maintenance and nourishment of ethnic diversity was not only encouraged to promote a multi-racial society, but such a diversity was also protected by imperial decrees within this multi-ethnic empire. The Ottoman bureaucracy seems to have succeeded in dealing with ethnic groups by devising an administrative system which allowed the existence and preservation of ethnic diversity.

However, the rise of nationalism in the Balkans in the nineteenth century coupled with an irreversible decline in the military and political power of the Ottomans, opened a new phase. The weakened Ottomans were forced to retreat from Europe, leaving a substantial number of Turkish-Muslims behind, some of whom later emigrated to Turkey either forcefully or by bilateral agreements. Bulgaria and Greece still have a significant number of Turkish-Muslim minority population.

4.1. Migration to Europe: Process and Patterns

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, for predominantly economic reasons, a large-scale labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe became a frequent phenomenon (see also Chapter Three for pull-push factors). The initial wave of
Turkish labour migration was mainly directed to West Germany. This may be attributed to the friendly relations between the two countries. Turkey allied itself with Germany during the First World War and since then both countries have sustained good relations. However, labour migration from Turkey was not only confined to Germany. Migration of workers had also taken place towards several other West European countries such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Britain. It should be noted that, in contrast to several other manpower-supplying countries, labour migration was a rather new phenomenon for Turkey. As mentioned in Chapter One, there was a colonial background of immigration to France, Britain and the Netherlands. These countries received a significant number of migrant workers from their former colonies. Turkey differs in this respect in that, as a labour-sending country she had no colonial links with countries where a large number of Turkish migrant population exists. Whereas, for example, Britain received immigrants from the West Indies, India and Pakistan; France turned to Algeria, and the Netherlands hosted migrants from Indonesia as colonial or ex-colonial territories (Beeley, 1983, p. 25). However, Turkey had no direct colonial relationship with any of the receiving countries. Therefore, as noted by Paine (1974, p. 2) this fact should be taken into account when drawing any general conclusions of labour-exporting experience in Turkey.

The beginning of organised labour migration from Turkey goes back to October 1961 when Turkey and Germany signed a bilateral agreement for the recruitment of Turkish workers in Germany. Before 1961, participation of Turkish workers in post-war labour migration to Western Europe had, at least officially, not taken place (Martin, 1991, p. 3). Historically speaking, Turkey was a rather late starter among the main labour-sending countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece (Paine, 1974, p. 36). Not until the bilateral agreements were signed between Turkey and several countries after the post-war period did the scale of Turkish labour migration gather momentum. Turkish migration for recruitment was organised and regulated through these bilateral agreements. Turkey signed its first bilateral agreement with Germany in 1961 to send its labour surplus in
response to the labour demand by Germany. Turkey had also signed similar agreements with Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1964, France in 1965 and Sweden in 1967 in order to find employment for the highly active working population.

Most of the bilateral agreements were modified after the 1973-74 economic recession when employment of foreign labour in Europe was halted. Germany and other labour-recruiting countries decided to adopt restrictive policies in the early 1970s, aimed at stopping additional immigrant workers. However, these restrictive measures did not stop family unification. Germany has been the dominant receiving country since the signing of the bilateral agreement in October 1961.

Turkish labour migration to Europe developed in several phases. Abadan-Unat outlines these major phases in relation to the nature and volume of the emigration and subsequent developments. She concedes that the first phase between 1956-1962 has an experimental nature. The initial phase is marked by 'the attempt of semi-official institutions trying to organise an exchange of trainees (Praktikaniten), while in reality this already constituted at the time a temporary form of industrial manpower recruitment'. It was reported, for example, that 12 craftsmen had arrived in Kiel, Germany in 1957 as part of a first agreement following the application of the Institute of World Economy of the University of Kiel to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requesting for a programme to exchange vocationally trained volunteers. The number of Turkish migrants was as little as 2700 in 1960 and, in 1963, 27,500 workers left Turkey. The following phase of Turkish external migration covers 1963-1967 which displayed an explosive growth, governmental mediation, adjustment to industry and social life. This phase is characterised by a significant change in the volume and structure of Turkish labour migration. The scale of the migration increased dramatically following bilateral agreements (Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 15). While family reunions were taking place, settlement patterns of Turkish workers began to take shape. The economic recession in 1966-67 made most Turkish workers
redundant. Economic recession has caused a rapid decline in the number of guest workers, from 1.3 million to 900,000 during the recession years of 1966-67 (Holzner, 1987, p. 428). Due to high unemployment rates, many Turks had to return to Turkey. Their size decreased from 161,000 to 123,000 between September 1966 and January 1968 (Sen, 1989, p. 24; Penninx, 1982, p. 786).

According to Abadan-Unat, a later phase (1968-1973) is characterised by the rapid increase of Turkish migrant workers recruited in European countries. Although the 1967-68 economic recession discouraged many Turks to attempt to come to Germany for work, after a hesitant period Turkish labour migration to Germany resumed. From 1968 onwards, Turkish labour migration increased unexpectedly until Germany decided to end labour recruitment from other countries (Penninx, 1982, p. 786). Between the two periods of economic crisis, Germany hosted more than 103,000 Turkish workers in 1973. The percentage of Turkish women workers also increased in this period. The third phase, as pointed out by Abadan-Unat (1976, p. 13-18), 'represents both for Turkey and the major European host countries the achievement of gaining “consciousness” in regard to the manifold problems of foreign workers'. This means that issues concerning immigrants such as working conditions and legal matters regulating their status entered into discussions. The volume of migration and the trend towards settlement increased awareness among policy makers and the case of immigrants, so to speak, established itself as a social and political reality in the countries of origin and immigration. This phase was followed by the second economic recession in 1973 which had serious implications for migrant workers and their families.

The Government of Germany decided to close all the labour-recruiting offices abroad as a first step to halt additional labour immigration. The expectation on the side of the German authorities was that, while new recruitment was stopped, the present workers would leave Germany and, thus, the volume of ‘guest workers’ would rapidly decline (Holzner, 1987, p. 429). Against this wishful thinking, a new trend assumed priority in the form of reunification of families in
Germany. Dependants of foreign workers began to arrive to join their families, increasing the number of foreign nationals in Germany. This phase (1975-1978) of Turkish labour migration was marked by 'settling abroad for indefinite periods; mixed marriages, family migration, educational problems...' (Abadan-Unat, 1986, p. 337). This period, it can be argued, represents a transformation in the nature of Turkish labour migration and an emerging ethnic minority community in Germany. Members of the Turkish labour force were joined by their spouses and children, showing a tendency to settle in Germany rather than return to Turkey. The federal authorities in Bonn introduced visa requirements for Turkish nationals in 1980 and, one year later, in 1981, further restrictive policy was adopted by dropping the age limit of dependants who wished to join their parents from eighteen to sixteen. The waiting period for married couples to join their spouses as alien residents was increased from one year to three years. Other European countries also imposed similar restrictions to halt migration (Beeley, 1983, p. 27). Despite restrictions and discouragement, family unions continued and, against the expectations of a return to Turkey, the number of Turks in Germany steadily increased to almost two million as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Turks in selected European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>615,827</td>
<td>1,552,328</td>
<td>1,965,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>33,892</td>
<td>144,790</td>
<td>254,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>30,091</td>
<td>154,201</td>
<td>252,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>30,527</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>14,029</td>
<td>63,587</td>
<td>90,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6,250</td>
<td>17,240</td>
<td>34,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>28,480</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>.........</td>
<td>3,086</td>
<td>5,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5,061</td>
<td>20,900</td>
<td>36,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>19,710</td>
<td>48,485</td>
<td>76,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>777,727</td>
<td>2,108,097</td>
<td>2,930,392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SOPEMI, 1995; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Auslander, 1995; Annual Report, Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 1984, 1992, 1993; Turkish Employment Service, Statistics on Turkish Migrant Workers, 1974
The migration of Turkish workers to other European countries took a similar course although on a smaller scale and, as Table 4.1. shows, the number of Turks in several European countries steadily increased and had reached almost three million by 1995. According to the statistics of the Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, the second largest Turkish minority community lives in France. They are mostly concentrated in Paris, Strasbourg, Marseilles and Lyon. Turks in the Netherlands, on the other hand, are clustered largely in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag and Utrecht. Austria accommodates Turkish workers mainly in Vienna, Tirol and Vorarlberg. Belgium also has a similar pattern of clustering in particular areas such as Brabant, Limbourg and East Flandre. The concentration of Turkish people can be attributed to the availability of jobs in these areas, especially during the early phase of migration and the chain migration determined by social networks and patronage such as family, kinship and village relations, especially in the latter period of migration underlined by family union and settlement.

4.2. Migration from Cyprus and Turkey to Britain

Available research suggests that migration from Cyprus to Britain started as early as the 1920s and, by the 1930s almost 1,000 Cypriot immigrants had settled in Britain. However, early immigrants from Cyprus were exclusively Greek-Cypriots (Oakley, 1987, p. 31). The annexation of Cyprus by Britain took place in 1914 and, thereafter, residents of Cyprus acquired a new status as subjects of the British Crown. The migration continued throughout the 1930s and 1940s until the Second World War. The immigration of Cypriots was regulated through the issue of affidavits (George and Millerson, 1966/7, p. 278) and passports. The outbreak of war in 1939 halted Cypriot migration and the issue of affidavits was suspended to prevent further population movement. Hence no further migration was observed until 1945. There were only a few Turks among these early immigrants. According to Home Office statistics, for example, the number of
Turkish-Cypriots recorded between 1933-34 was only three and, in 1936, only four (Oakley, 1989, p. 518).

Economic stagnation and political instability after the War produced the second wave of migration from Cyprus. The increase in the volume of Cypriot immigration led to the introduction of restrictive measures by the early 1950s. The prospective migrant was expected to have an affidavit of financial support from someone he knew or was related to in London; he was also expected to have a working knowledge of English as well as place £30 against the cost of possible repatriation (Solomos and Woodhams, 1995, p. 240). Despite these measures, no decrease was observed in the rate of immigration, and on the contrary, as George and Millerson (1966/7, p. 279-80) note, ‘when the strict requirements of the affidavits were lifted at the outbreak of the E.O.K.A revolt in Cyprus in 1954, the number of immigrants to this country (Britain) rose substantially in the following years... The political unrest in Cyprus, with the inescapable violence, curfews, economic stagnation and psychological frustration, added its own share in contributing to the number of immigrants’.

The independence of Cyprus in 1959 and its joining with Commonwealth countries was a turning point in facilitating a significant number of immigrants from Cyprus until the Immigration Act of 1962. Within a short space of time, a significant number of Cypriots had left for Britain and the estimated number of Cypriots in Britain had risen to 78,486 by 1964. Although the Immigration Act of 1962 prevented large-scale migration from Cyprus, migration of Cypriots still took place to Britain, but on a much smaller scale, in the form of family union until 1974-75 when ethnic tension in Cyprus turned to confrontation. It is reported that, following the 1974 war in Cyprus ‘several thousands of Cypriots entered Britain on a short stay basis as unofficial “refugees” from the fighting and territorial displacement’ (Oakley, 1979, p. 13). The number of Cypriots, regardless of their ethnic origin was 160,000 in the 1980s, of which 20-25 per cent are said to be Turkish-Cypriots (King, 1982, p. 93).
It is plausible to argue that Turkish-Cypriots came to Britain during the second and third wave of migration from Cyprus. As noted earlier, there were a very small number of Turkish migrants before the Second World War. This trend changed between 1950-1960 (Sonyel, 1988, p. 12) when Turkish-Cypriots also started to migrate to Britain for economic reasons. Bhatti (1981, p. 2) points out that, before the introduction of the 1962 Immigration Act, Turkish-Cypriots made use of free movement to Britain and, by 1958, their number had reached 8,500. The partition of Cyprus after the 1974 ethnic clashes produced a second significant wave of Turkish-Cypriot migration to Britain.

Given the lacunae of sufficient statistical data, it is very difficult to give a precise figure of either Turkish-Cypriots or Turks from the mainland in Britain. Statistical information about Cypriots does not distinguish between Turks and Greeks except the more recent figures extracted from the 1991 census. Immigration from mainland Turkey is not as well documented as immigration from Cyprus, due to the small volume of Turks coming from Turkey. Fieldwork data suggests that migration from Turkey can be traced back to the late 1960s and early 1970s. Since there was no bilateral agreement between Turkey and Britain, as was the case with Germany, for example, no official agency was involved in facilitating the Turkish migration and consequently Turkish migration did not gather momentum. Nevertheless, beginning from the mid-1970s an increasing number of Turks started coming to London on their own initiative using their social networks and kin relations. The 1980 military coup in Turkey further motivated not only politically active people but also those who were disillusioned with economic and political instability, to seek alternative places of work and residence. Britain appeared to be one of the most suitable places for prospective immigrants, many of whom came to Britain as visitors and stayed, as they were not required to have visas until 1989. One can also argue that other European countries already had an ample number of Turkish immigrants. Therefore, there was not much to explore there compared to Britain. As many of the informants told me during interviews, the textile and restaurant industry attracted many Turkish people who received news about potential vacancies in
London; and this was in contrast to Berlin, Paris or Rotterdam. There are varying figures about the size of the Turkish population in Britain. In Table 4.2., the estimated figures of Turks are presented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2: Number of Mainland Turks and Turkish-Cypriots</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Various estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a- 26,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b- 65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c- 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d- 45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e- 40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Country of birth statistics suggest that 26,597 mainland-born Turks reside in Britain. As this figure does not include those who were born in Britain, it can be argued that the number of mainland Turks is expected to be much higher. It could also be suggested that all Turkish born Turks might not have necessarily specified their birthplace as Turkey in the census. The data provided by the Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security gives the number of mainland Turks in Britain as 65,000. This figure is based on the records of the Turkish Embassy in London. In order to keep a Turkish passport and nationality, Turkish nationals are required to register with the Consulate. Without such registration it is not possible to renew or extend Turkish passports or birth certificates. Newly born children are also registered with the Consulate to ensure that they do not lose their right of Turkish citizenship. As seen in Table 4.2., it is very difficult to make an accurate estimate as to the total number of Turks living in Britain. The above figures, for example, may not include Turks with British nationality who have not registered with the Consulate. It should also be remembered that current estimates on Turks do not take asylum-seekers from Turkey into account. As Table 4.3., shows, there are more than 13,000 asylum-seekers from Turkey. This seems to be a significant figure in proportion to all Turks living in Britain. Therefore, the recent trend in asylum applications from
Turkey should also be examined in order to reach a reliable statistical estimation about Turks in Britain.

Table 4.3: Applications received for asylum-seekers, excluding dependants in the United Kingdom from Turkish nationals between 1987-1995

<table>
<thead>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>2,415</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>2,110</td>
<td>1,865</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>1,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


My observation on the opening of new Turkish-owned businesses in various fields, the increasing number of social, welfare and religious organisations addressing a larger clientele and the growth in the population of school-age children and asylum-seekers in recent years suggests that the number of Turkish people from both mainland and Cyprus is somewhere around 125,000. Nevertheless, due to the nature of data sources it is not possible to verify the given estimate precisely because the 1991 Census seems to have failed to measure the Turkish population in Britain accurately, as is the case with the Cypriot population (Storkey, 1996).

As mentioned earlier, in contrast to migration to other European countries, Turkish migration from both Turkey and Cyprus to Britain was neither organised nor regulated by the government. This means that emigration centres were not chosen by the Turkish government policy, as was the case with immigration to other European countries. Earlier research (Tumertekin, p. 109, cited in Abadan-Unat, 1974, p. 368) on the immigration and emigration centres in Turkey suggests that Turkey’s immigration provinces are located west of a line drawn between Samsun and Hatay. The government’s policy in Turkey which gave priority to some areas determined the geographical origins of outward migration. The Turkish State Planning Organisation divided the country into three major regions as developed, developing and underdeveloped areas, according to which priority to migrate abroad was given in reverse order. Similar
Map 1: Turkey
privileges for departure were also awarded to those candidates from areas affected by natural disasters such as drought and floods. Immigration to Britain, on the other hand, did not take place in a similar fashion in terms of the areas of origin in Turkey and Cyprus. Therefore, immigration centres were not chosen by government policy. Instead, they were largely determined by individual initiatives which were followed by a chain migration by using social networks. It is difficult to single out particular centres of migration to Britain especially in the early stages of migration. However, social networks such as family and kinship ties, village connections and friendship influenced the migration flow in the later stages.

During the fieldwork, I came across people from many regions of Turkey and noticed that certain regions appear to be centres of migration to England. The northern part of Turkey appears to be one of the sending regions. I met a number of Turkish people sharing the same geographical origins, especially the city of Trabzon and its districts. Similarly, the city of Nigde and Aksaray in Central Anatolia seem to be centres of migration to Britain (see Map 1). During the fieldwork several informants told me that there are almost 700 people from one district of Aksaray living in London. The cities of Kastamonu and its environs towards the west part of Turkey are also centres of out-migration. In addition to these areas, the research findings suggest that the south-eastern part of Turkey seems to have supplied a large number of migrants to Britain. The city of Kahramanmaras and its districts are the main areas of out-migration in this region. Turks from Cyprus also have a mixed background in terms of their geographical origins. Different regions of Cyprus have supplied Turkish migrants to Britain. Nicosia (Lefkosa), Kyrenia and their districts, for example, are mentioned as centres of out-migration. During the research I also interviewed three Turkish-Cypriots from Limassol which is controlled by Greek-Cypriots (see Map 2).
Map 2: Cyprus
4.3. Settlement of Turks/Cypriots in London

The settlement pattern of Turkish immigrants to Britain is similar to that of Greek Cypriots. Almost all Turks live in Greater London. It may be suggested that the use of social networks, kinship relations and patronage has perpetuated the concentration of Turkish people in the same quarters of the city. Oakley (1970, p. 99) notes that, due to a similar clustering of Cypriots in the same area, Camden Town used to be called ‘Little Cyprus’. As shown in Table 4.4., Turks in London live mostly in north-east London. A much smaller number, on the other hand, live in Lewisham, Southwark, the City of Westminster, Barnet, Kensington and Chelsea. Dokur-Grysiewicz (1979, p. 187) found in an earlier research on Turks that 54 per cent of her respondents in London reported that they preferred living with Turkish neighbours. This finding explains, at least partly, the concentration of Turkish people in particular locations of London.

Table 4.4: Local concentrations of those born in Cyprus and Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Born in Cyprus</th>
<th>Born in Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enfield</td>
<td>11,339</td>
<td>1,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haringey</td>
<td>7,798</td>
<td>3,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnet</td>
<td>3,944</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islington</td>
<td>3,153</td>
<td>1,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>4,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>2,297</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewisham</td>
<td>2,061</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brent</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redbridge</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster, City of</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kensington &amp; Chelsea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of top ten</td>
<td>37,792</td>
<td>15,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>78,031</td>
<td>26,597</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Owen (1993)*

I observed a similar phenomenon during my fieldwork in Berlin (see Map 3) where Turks have created particular neighbourhoods. I noticed the concentration
Map 3: Berlin (Kreuzberg)
of Turkish migrants in places such as Kreuzberg and Wedding where Turks were very visible in shops selling ethnic food, in restaurants with Turkish names, and more importantly by their appearance in terms of clothing and overt behaviour. In such an environment a Turk can satisfy many of his daily needs without having much contact with Germans. In the Turkish quarter of Berlin, I did not need to speak any German. Shop owners were mostly of Turkish origin and I discovered that it was not very difficult for many Turks to survive without knowing much German. Kreuzberg, as Mandel (1990, p. 27) points out, has a nickname (Little Istanbul) reflecting the origins of its inhabitants and its ethnic features marked by Turkish lifestyles, shops, cafés and Mosques. In addition, the underground line passing through this district is named ‘Orient Express’ which echoes the image of Little Istanbul, a common joke that Berlin is another province of Turkey’ (Mandel, 1990a, p. 154).

As seen in the table above, Turks predominantly live in north-east London (see Map 4). The information on housing and employment among Turks, though far from sufficient, would also contribute to drawing a better picture of the Turkish community in London. According to the 1991 Census findings, of those who were born in Turkey (26,597), 14,276 are at an economically active age. Of this group, 8,525 are in employment and 6,248 are reported to be unemployed. Those who are reported to be employed are mostly working in catering and textile industries. Research published by the London Borough of Hackney suggests that some 10 to 15 per cent of Turkish Cypriots and 20 to 30 per cent of the Turkish mainland community are self-employed workers. The same report indicates that the unemployment rate among the Turkish community in Hackney is 35 to 45 per cent. The data on housing conditions of Turks in London is also insufficient. The above-cited report notes that, ‘some 80 per cent of Turkish mainlanders live in council housing, 20 per cent of Turkish-Cypriots are owner occupiers’. As it is evident from the foregoing information, extensive research is required in order to establish a more representative picture of housing and employment conditions among the Turkish community in London.
Map 4: North-East London
The next Chapter analyses the ethnographic findings on the establishment of Turkish families and the reproduction of traditional values and social networks. This Chapter will explain how the traditional family structure was re-established in London and how kin and social networks were expanded. The politics of family and marriage in facilitating the construction of Turkish identity will also be analysed in the following Chapter.
Chapter Four: Notes


4. According to Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Asylum Statistics, Issue, 9/96, 16 May 1996, of these 13,783 applications for asylum 2,918 were refused; 1,488 recognised as refugees and granted asylum and 4,138 cases were not recognised but granted exceptional leave.

5. Shule Avni & Fatima Koumarji (December, 1994) Turkish/Turkish Cypriot Communities Profile, London Borough of Hackney Directorate of Social Services.
Chapter Five
Family, Kinship And The Reproduction Of Traditional Values

The emergence of families on foreign soil could be seen as the foundation stone of the establishment of ethnic communities. The history of immigration shows that in the early stages of migration it was mostly single men who migrated to find work. The early migrant workforce in many West European countries comprised either single men or married men who had left their families with the intention of returning home after accumulating some savings. By the time their plans and hopes of returning home had dwindled, the idea of joining the families left behind merely survived as a myth. As the title of Anwar's book *The Myth of Return* (1979) suggests, the majority of the immigrants subscribed to the idea of return but only a handful of them did so. Temporary movement of a considerably large number of the labour force gradually assumed a permanent character. European cities with numerous foreigners witnessed a process of settlement as a result of family unification, establishment of ethnic organisations, institutionalisation of religion and participation of immigrants in economic life through the opening of shops, factories, retail and wholesale outlets and investing in properties, in addition to political participation where legally entitled.

5.1. Settlement Trends: *Here for Good*

The extent of participation in economic life which indicates the permanency of settlement is striking in Germany. It is noted (Sen, 1993, p. 27) that the number of businesses owned by immigrants of Turkish origin has reached up to 35,000, creating 125,000 employment opportunities within the German economy. The settlement trend can also be seen by comparing return intentions in 1980 and 1993, and accordingly looking at the figures of home or property ownership by Turkish workers. The number of Turks who expressed a desire to return to Turkey was around 40 per cent in 1980 and this high percentage dropped dramatically to 17 per cent in 1993. The
commitment to settle down in Germany generated a demand to invest in property and accordingly more than 45,000 Turks bought a house and around 135,000 signed a contract to buy some kind of property (Sen, 1993, p. 24). Anwar's findings regarding another immigrant community lend support to the foregoing arguments that the myth of return is being replaced by permanency in the 1990s. Reassessing Pakistanis, Anwar (1995a, p. 256) observes that 'the myth of return, which was spread in the 1970s, is slowly diminishing as the children of the first-generation Pakistanis are settling down after going through the educational system in the UK'.

As the early phase of immigration is characterised by unsettled feelings and the status of temporary living underlined by the hope of return to the home country, the latter period of immigration is paradoxically marked by feelings of permanency evoked by the settlement. During the process of change from that of single and fragmentary working individuals to an ethnic minority community, families were united by joining together after years of separation. It could be argued that family union has given rise to the foundation of a relatively organised ethnic community as opposed to a fragmented working class, clustering around employment areas with little social contact.

As Castles' book title Here for Good (1987) clearly indicates, guest workers in Western Europe developed into ethnic minorities. No matter how vehemently official discourse, such as in Germany, denies the permanent character of immigration, it is a reality that new ethnic communities have emerged in European countries. Nevertheless, 'otherness of the migrants continues to be emphasised' (Thranhardt, 1995, p. 20). Whether the new communities are seen as 'others' or not, it should be recognised that recent developments indicate a growing tendency of disillusionment with the myth of return, implying that the new communities of the host societies are in the process of taking root and generating multicultural societies. As early as the mid-70s, Ladbury (1977, p. 309) found a trend of willingness among Turkish-Cypriots
to settle and live in England. Anwar (1995b, p. 278) observes a similar trend among immigrants from Commonwealth countries. Anwar sees these ethnic minorities as an integral part of British society for, ‘over half of them were born in the UK and most others have British nationality’.

It could be argued that the reconstruction of families by reunification following the first phase of single immigration and involvement of the younger generation in schooling and employment has led to a wide range of developments. These developments range from economic activities, investment in various kinds of properties, establishment of social, cultural, welfare and political institutions to the reproduction of traditional values by developing social and kinship networks and by transmitting shared ideals and values which underline the self-perception and identity preference of the young generation. Thus, although changes are taking place in the family structure, in the relationships within and outside the family environment, values and principles are maintained and emphasised by family members as a small unit and by kinship relations as a wider social network. These are the main issues examined in this Chapter, in order not only to analyse various forces affecting identity maintenance, but also to understand the position of the young generation who are expected to adhere to the same codes of behaviour. This Chapter also provides a background for the analysis of continuity, resistance, change and intergenerational differences in behavioural patterns and attitudes of the first and young generation which is covered Chapter Six.

The emergence of Turkish families in England echoes the formation of Turkish families in other West European countries such as Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and France. A similarity of family formation can also be drawn with other ethnic minorities which have developed into ethnic communities such as Pakistanis in Britain. The migration of Turkish people from Cyprus and Turkey took place mostly on an individual basis, not as families. Almost all of the early generation came to London as single men,
either unmarried or leaving their wives and children behind. The intention of returning, the feeling of insecurity stemming from ambiguous challenges awaiting the migrants in the destination country, prevented immigrants from taking their wives and children with them. Since ‘village and rural contexts provide traditional structures that aid in caring for members of the family left behind’ (Wilpert, 1992, p. 180), they felt that their wives and children would be more safe in the country of origin if left with close kin and relatives, mostly with parent-in-laws or brothers. A Turkish-Cypriot who came to London in the mid 1970s justified his own departure from his country and his family by referring to his plan of return. He explained that:

'I came to London soon after Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. I left my wife with my parents on the Turkish controlled northern part and I was convinced that my family was safe there protected by the Turkish army. At the time of my departure for England, we all thought that I would work for a few years and go back to my family. With the help of my relatives I came to London and found a job. After four years of working in a garment factory, I decided to return to Cyprus. When I voiced my intention to my family they all told me that there was no political settlement in Cyprus and the future looked bleak. But I did not want to live apart from my wife and we came to the conclusion that at the earliest opportunity she would join me and did so in 1981. When she came to London we decided that our future was in England, though we paid regular visits to our parents in Cyprus'.

There were similar replies from other informants who came as single men and brought their families at a later stage. It should be pointed out that until they realised that the idea of returning home had been replaced by the intention of settlement, they were not willing to bring their wives and children. Economic uncertainties and social challenges also influenced the head of the family to venture out on his own. When asked why he did not bring his wife and child with him when he came to London in the early 1970s but decided to bring them later, one Turkish man gave his reasons as follows:

‘As you can imagine, it is not an easy experience to leave your home and come to a place where you know only a handful of relatives and in my case with no knowledge of English. Coming to London meant to me a kind of journey to the unknown future at the time of taking
my decision to leave Turkey. First of all, I never intended to stay in this new place for such a long time. This is one reason for leaving my wife and child at home. Even if I decided to stay in England I did not know what was waiting for me here. I did not know, for example, whether I could find a job or a place to stay -though I had secured a promise of help from my cousins-. I had too many questions in my mind which made me worried about my future in England. All these ambiguities and uncertainties evoked a feeling of insecurity that convinced me to leave my wife with my parents in Turkey.

This typical reply indicates that migration is seen as a challenge and a journey to an unfamiliar environment which involves abandoning one social setting and entering another and a different one (Eisenstadt, 1954, p. 1). Migration is a risky venture and immigrants do not want to involve their families the in same risk. But once the feeling of security is established in the country of destination, then they increasingly tend to unite with their families. When I asked whether his fears and worries turned out to be true, the same informant told me:

'Some of my fears were real, they were there and I was glad that I did not bring my family with me during my first arrival. When I arrived here, I was completely dependent on my relatives. They found a job for me in a restaurant and let me stay with them for a while. Then I rented a room. It would have been really a disaster to bring my wife and child without arranging a job and accommodation. Had it not been for my relatives, I would have returned immediately. Thanks to them I found my way through and after accumulating some money and starting my take-away kebap shop I gained confidence to fetch my family'.

Intentions to return to Turkey or Cyprus were strengthened by sending money home and investing in land, houses and, in some cases opening savings accounts. The case of a Turkish man who came from the city of Aksaray (see Map 1) is illustrates this point. The 60-year old man who came to London 25 years ago invested heavily in real estate with the intention to return. When asked why he continued investing in Turkey, he said:

'I came here on my own and left my family at home. I had three children at the time and I had to look after them. I started as an assistant cook in a kebap shop and sent almost half my earnings to my wife. After working day and night I managed to open a sandwich
bar in 1975 which turned out to be very profitable. Until then my family stayed in Turkey. As I accumulated capital, I decided to bring my family to England for the reasons that my wife and grown-up daughter could help with the business while my sons could have a good education. Even at the time of their joining me I intended to return. So, we started buying houses and furbishing them even though we were here and visiting Turkey only once a year. Now looking back, I feel that my wishful thinking of going back home one day motivated me to invest heavily in Turkey. However, as you can see, in addition to what I own, my two sons are grown up and contrary to my expectation of providing them good education they both own restaurants’.

There were also cases where some single men returned to Turkey or Cyprus to get married and, after marrying, left their wives at home. After working a couple of years and becoming financially capable of providing suitable accommodation, they then brought their wives. A Turkish-Cypriot who settled in London with three children had an arranged marriage in Cyprus after working in England for four years. His case displays the need for achieving a sense of confidence and security before bringing wife and children. His story is as follows:

‘I worked in London in a dry-cleaning shop and saved some money. I was not happy alone and I wanted to marry. I knew some girls here but my family wanted me to marry a relative’s daughter. Then I went to Cyprus to see that girl. My mother had a good choice for me and we got married within two months. Since I spent most of my savings for the marriage expenses, I could not take my wife with me and asked her to stay with my family until I saved some money. Although she did not like the idea at first, she reluctantly agreed to remain in Cyprus. I worked really hard on my return to London and in less than two years my wife joined me’.

As Robinson (1986, p. 87-88) indicates, several developments such as changes in the country of origin, changes in the host society and internal changes either to the individual migrant or to the entire community acted as forces for migrants to reconsider their position abroad. Eventually the idea of return lost its salience by the increasing number of family unions that led to a permanent settlement. The Turkish immigrants in London experienced a similar process of reconsidering their position and as the history of their immigration informs, they became a settled community.
5.2. Re-establishment of Family Structure

As families joined together in London, traditional family structure was revived and conventional roles and inter-family relations were reproduced. Within the traditional Turkish family, its members assumed different responsibilities and duties reflected in the hierarchy of authority which was rooted in Turkish customs and beliefs. The early immigrants in particular seemed to have preserved the traditional structure of the Turkish family. This gives the father the dominant role as 'bread winner' and considers the mother a 'care taker', responsible for the internal affairs of the family such as looking after children and carrying out household duties. Immigration to European countries has changed the nature of the family in many instances from that of an extended family to a nuclear one. Such changes were already under way in the country of origin due to internal immigration, urbanisation and socio-economic developments which influenced the structure and survival of extended families in Turkey. In a large scale survey (UNICEF, 1991, p. 251), it was found that 73 per cent of urban families and 67 per cent of all Turkish families had a nuclear structure. It can be argued that outward immigration and family unions in a different country have further changed the traditional family structure. The nuclear family has almost become the norm among the Turkish community in the countries of immigration.

Stirling (1965, p. 100) observed as early as the 1960s that ‘men form the permanent core of any normal household. The senior man, his sons and grandsons are born into and remain in the household until his death... the life long relation between male agnates of this minute lineage is the basis of the household’. In the traditional Turkish family, the senior man exercises full authority and control over all other family members, including women and younger men (White, 1994, p. 36). Stirling (1965, p. 101) also observed that the father’s authority was emphasised in the traditional Turkish family, never challenged, and sons were expected to take seriously what their father said and obey him. As these observations indicate, the traditional structure of the
Turkish family confers different roles upon family members according to that authority lies with the elder man of the family, in most cases with the father since Turkish society was comprised mainly of nuclear families, particularly in urban areas. The woman is expected to exert a good influence at home and deal with household chores such as cooking, cleaning, washing and raising children. Children are under the strict control of their parents and are expected to obey orders from the elders. The control exercised on girls is much stricter than on boys, mostly because girls are thought to be more vulnerable to outside influences and any wrong doing may result in damaging the reputation of the girl and the honour of the family.

My findings suggest that traditional family values are still important for older members of the Turkish community in London. Nevertheless, spatial movements of Turkish immigrants and the reconstruction of traditional family structures in a culturally different atmosphere has inevitably challenged the resistance of the underlying family composition of the Turkish community. On the one hand, immigration to another country where there are no or only a few relatives made women more dependent on their husbands in the public sphere. Women who joined their husbands were mostly confined to the home and deprived of kin relations which are very important as a source of help and assistance in times of difficulties. The dependence of women on their men was further exacerbated by the lack of socialising among the Turkish community. However, in the country of settlement women have continued to carry out their traditional roles such as taking responsibility within the internal domains of the family.

In connection with the early phase of ethnic community formation, one can argue that the conventional roles within the Turkish family were more vigorously reproduced as a result of responses to circumstantial developments. The situational position of immigrants also affected relations between men and women in that most of the men had expended a great deal of effort in bringing their wives to share their burdens at least
psychologically. The corollary to this development was that women acquired a supportive role and, accordingly, their status and treatment assumed a more favourable nature. While families became united, even the extended families were transformed into nuclear families consisting of husband, wife and children. In the early phase of migration, some children were also entrusted with parents or relatives in the country of origin until the re-establishment of the family was thought to be complete and better conditions had been prepared for the children to join them. Meanwhile women were emancipated, at least from the close control of parent-in-laws who no longer were able to exercise direct authority over the bride.

Some of the social and familial expectations were lifted in the post-immigration family, though new duties were also created, and this situation opened up new avenues for the immigrant women. Once the settlement had taken place, even with the myth of return at the back of their minds, some women also started to work in order to contribute to the family income. This changed their status from that of partners to an economic resource, although they were still expected to carry out household duties. One respondent whose wife had started working explained this development as follows:

'As you know, many people came here with the intention of returning at some stage. But rarely did so. Our case is one among similar other thousands. When my wife joined me, what we thought was to work together and save money and return to Turkey in a shorter time than we planned initially. Then, I asked my boss at the garment factory whether he could give her a job as a machinist. When he said okay, I borrowed a sewing machine from a friend and my wife started working at home on a piece basis. After a while we started sending more money to Turkey and later on decided to buy a house. Had it not been for the economic assistance of my wife, who really worked hard, it would not have been possible even to take such a decision, let alone send more money home'.

As the above informant clearly mentioned, his wife provided additional income to the family. Working from home as a machinist is a common practice among the Turkish community in London. Some women either buy or borrow a sewing machine to work at home to make garments for
manufacturers. The status of women as economic contributors was further developed when the Turkish ethnic business started taking root in the host countries. During my fieldwork I came across dozens of women who worked as cashiers, shopkeepers, cooks and as manageresses in their family owned shops and in other businesses owned by Turks.

During my research in Berlin, for example, I regularly frequented a Turkish restaurant in Kreuzberg (see Map 3) as a customer. I noticed that all the workers there were women except for a young man. While eating there for the first time, I had a conversation with a waitress and discussed Turkish food in Berlin. When I told her that I had come from London to do my research, she became more interested in talking to me which led to longer conversations and subsequent visits. I asked her who the owner of the restaurant was. She said, ‘This is our restaurant’. I realised then that this was a family-owned business and all members of the family were working here on rotation. The mother was helping the cook and taking care of cleaning duties and the father was responsible for the food shopping. Three school-age children were also helping their parents to run the restaurant during their out-of-school hours. Two of the cleaners working there were also relatives of the family.

My non-structured interviews revealed that the woman started working when the family had decided to open a restaurant. Until then, she was doing household work and taking care of the children. She told me that her husband asked her opinion before taking a final decision on starting a family business. Her husband’s approach to her to ask her opinion and to request her help in running the restaurant increased her influence in decision making and negotiating within the family. Similar improvements in the status of women were also observed among Turkish families in London.

After the establishment of family businesses, the economic contributions of women were recognised and, in return, subsequent investments were
documented on shared ownership certificates which included the woman’s name along with the husband’s which was a sign of their improved bargaining position. Changes in the Turkish migrant women’s role should not be seen in isolation from the developments in Turkey where such changes started to take place in the 1950s. With regard to women’s roles in Turkish society, Acar (1995, p. 107-108) observes, for example, that starting from the 1950s and precipitating after the 1980s, women acquired an increasing responsibility for their children’s education. Another activity that women shouldered after this period was the organisation and management of familial relations. Finding spouses for young ones leading to marriage arrangements and administering necessary activities are mainly within the domain of women’s responsibilities. In addition to these roles, women found more space in economic and political life in Turkey. Some migrant Turkish women are also entering public life in London. The number of women professionals, for example, is increasing. The entrance of women to professions such as teaching, social work, interpretation, law and journalism informs us of the change in the status of Turkish women in London. The Turkish women elected as local councillors in Hackney and Enfield, for example, may be seen as clear signs of changes in the role of women.

5.3. Kinship, Social Networks and Reproduction of Values

The Turkish community in London has reproduced kinship structures and social networks as institutions which have facilitated the formation of ethnically defined entities whose interrelationships and interdependency are strengthened by traditional sets of relations and social networks. My findings suggest that kinship relations, patronage and social networks exert their influence even before migration takes place and a whole set of relationships is utilised as a mechanism of solidarity and reproduction of values. The case of the Turkish community in London reveals that kinship relations, patronage and social networks already established in the country of origin regulated various areas of activities of an individual who intended to migrate. Both
morphological (anchorage, density, reachability, range) and interactional (content, directness, durability, intensity, frequency) characteristics (Mitchell, 1969, p. 12-29) of a network seemed to be instrumental for Turkish people in the processes of taking a decision to seek work abroad, choosing a spatial direction, finding a job, settling, and participating in the formation of an ethnic minority community by taking part in the institutionalisation of the Turkish identity. In what follows I will analyse how kinship relations and social networks operate among the Turkish community and the extent to which they were altered in terms of broadening or curtailment of the social web as an inevitable consequence of making contact with outside groups.

In order to gain a better understanding of kinship relations and social networks among the Turkish community in London, it would be useful to give a short terminological explanation of what akraba (relative) and akrabalik (relationship or relatedness) denote. The Turkish term for kin is akraba which originates from Arabic. White (1994, p. 121) explains that the term akraba 'provides a broader set of meanings within which proximity, relationship and kinship are given equal place. Akraba, which means 'kin' or 'relative' in Turkish, is derived from the Arabic root qaruba, meaning 'to be near'. Another form of the same Arabic root qurba, means 'relation, relationship, or kinship'. Delaney (1991, p. 148) points out that, 'akraba and akrabalik do not function like the English 'relative' or 'relation' and 'kinship', which have other meanings in other contexts. In Turkish, these words are used only in the context of 'kinship' but 'not quite the equivalents of 'relative' and 'kinship' when these terms are defined by consanguinity'.

Stirling (1965, p. 148) observes in his anthropological study of a Turkish town back in the 1960s that kinship relations appeared to be the single most important set of social relationships outside the domestic group, and that kinship activities were observed to be of a very high proportion within the village community such as visiting each other, spending leisure time together, helping each other at times of crisis and participating in traditional
ceremonies like circumcision, marriage and death. Relationships with kin and relatives form a primary source of security in times of social and economic crisis, therefore it is important to reproduce these patterns of relationships (Ozbay, 1995, p. 108).

Current literature on ethnic minority groups suggests that members of a particular ethnic group re-establish kinship relations and social networks in the receiving country. Anwar (1985, p. 64; 1995, p. 240) explains how family and Biradari\(^2\) relations operate within the Pakistani community in Britain. He describes how these institutions have played a role in the process of migration, job selection, choice of residence, settlement and subsequent community formation through mutual support. The function of Biradari as a kinship and friendship group occupies a central role as Anwar remarks, ‘the whole way of life of Pakistanis is directly or indirectly related to this institution’. However, in the new environment, immigrants extend their relationships beyond primary kin and village networks. This expansion of kinship and network relationships is engendered by common experiences and shared interests (Werbner, 1995, p. 214).

Kinship relations and social networks seem to have influenced the behaviour of individual immigrants from Turkey and Cyprus to a considerable extent. The long term effects of kinship networks and the social web outside the immediate family may be readily seen in almost all stages of immigration, settlement and post-settlement of the Turkish community in London. Similar to the Biradari system among Pakistanis as outlined above, akraba networks and social acquaintances such as arkadaslik (friendship) and komsuluk (neighbourhood) not only influenced the decision-making of an individual to seek a job outside the country, but also played a decisive role in selecting the country of immigration, finding a job, deciding to settle and participating in particular groups as an expression of allegiance and identity.
My observations and interviews both in London and Berlin clearly demonstrate that kinship relations and social networks were involved in all stages of migration and community formation as well as in subsequent developments. Before explaining how and in which contexts and stages kinship ties and circles of social networks mark the life of an immigrant, I would like to clarify a tentative difference in the use of the term *akraba*, denoting proximity among those who constitute *akraba*. Delaney (1991, p. 153-154) explains how *akraba* denotes the degree of proximity: ‘the principle of descent is temporal and linear, establishing a unity of identity over time. By contrast, relationships with those on the ground are seen as spatial. People who were related are either *yakin akraba* (close, near relatives) or *uzaktan akraba*—alternatively, *hisim*—(more distant relatives).’ The proximity of relatives influenced the rendering of services and support to kin on an order of closeness→distance/remoteness scale during the process of pre- and post-migration. In this Chapter, the term *akraba* will be used in its most embracing sense which denotes relatives who are related by blood and marriage.

My findings indicate that during the ‘pre-migration/decision making process’, kinship relations, social networks and patronage are activated. The pre-migration/decision making process refers to a stage whereby an individual is made or has become aware of job opportunities abroad through a relative or a friend who has already had an experience of working in a foreign country. Either through letters or annual visits, an individual is bombarded by the news of a relative or a fellow villager, who has already started investing money in the vicinity as a constant reminder of employment opportunities overseas. When asked how he decided to come to London, a Turkish-Cypriot who owns a travel agency and a music shop, replied that the information passed on him by his cousin was the starting point of his departure from Cyprus in 1972. He explained how he became interested in the idea of coming to London for a job:

‘At the time of my cousin’s migration to England in the mid-sixties I was working as a mechanic in a workshop. I heard from my uncle
that my cousin started working in a dry-cleaning shop owned by an English. After a while he started sending small amount of money to his father. Although he did not come to Cyprus for the first two years, I constantly asked my uncle how he was doing and in each case I was told that he was making money and working in a relatively good environment. Then my cousin came for a visit and told me that mechanics with the level of my experience get a better payment there. While he was returning to London, I seriously began planning to go to England'.

A garment factory owner both in Turkey and in London recalled how he was informed of the work opportunities in England through his elder sister's husband who had come earlier. This particular informant came from a small village of Kastamonu in the Western part of Turkey and settled in London for good but travels to Turkey very often for business purposes. When asked what made him decide to come to London rather than go elsewhere, and how he received information about work opportunities in England, he replied:

'When my sister's husband went to London she did not accompany him immediately and stayed with her in-laws as was the case with many other families. So there was a constant talk in our house about working abroad. Especially at the times when my sister visited us, she always mentioned her husband and talked how he was doing, when she was going to join him, etc. We heard that he found a job as a machinist and soon after as a cutter, and accordingly began earning enough money to send back home. With the money he sent, my sister's in-laws bought a piece of land within two years. And they started building a new house just next to us. Obviously this aroused my interest in getting more information about finding a job in England and then I started asking more questions to my sister and wrote letters to her husband who promised to help find a job and accommodation. After the arrangement of a job and accommodation I came to London'.

The pre-migration process is marked by the flow of information from relatives and social networks about the advantages of working abroad (Gurak and Caces, 1992, p. 151). In addition to information obtained through letters, annual visits and a mystification surrounding the earning potential that was assumed to exist abroad, the scale of investment in Turkey stimulated people to seek the help of their kin and family friends. This kind of influence and the search of support is revealed in the following response of a restaurant owner
who came from central Turkey in the early 1970s. He told me of his experience as follows:

'My brother was already employed in Germany, working in a car factory when I became interested in the idea of working abroad. Our family was a kind of extended family at the time and his wife and two children were living with us. Within a very short time, I remember that my brother sent the first remission. In the following summer holiday he visited us and came to Turkey with a car. After three years since his departure, my father managed to buy a house for him in the town with the remittances and kept some in the bank. I was single then and as soon as I completed my military service I decided to go to Germany'.

As mentioned earlier, an immigrant worker's life has always been cloaked in mystic and, in most cases, idealised. Working conditions, social stress, culture conflict, lack of communication, the quality of accommodation, legal provisions, health and training, etc., did not matter for the people whose minds were fixed on making money and buying land, house and car etc. Thus the rise in the quality of living standards among immigrants' families and the visibility of material gain evidenced by the remittances and investment, assumed a decisive role in the decision making mechanism of a potential immigrant worker. The informant referred to above, who eventually came to London, expressed his disappointment with the working conditions in Germany. When asked if he found what he had expected, he replied:

'My brother bought my ticket and met me at the airport on my arrival in 1972. After staying with him a year or so and working casually, mostly illegally, I found out that jobs were scarce in Germany and the government was making things difficult for newcomers. While looking for an alternative country, I learned through a friend that it was possible to find a job in England. When I came to London in 1973, I started working as a waiter in a Turkish take-away kebab shop but disappointed by the low rate of payment and long hours of working. But thank God (Allah'a Sukur) my patience bore its fruit in time'.

As pointed out earlier, the pre-migration/decision making process is clearly marked by the involvement of relatives in informing kin and fellow villagers about being a migrant worker and in promising help, as a part of the duties
conferred upon them by kinship relations and by being a member of a social network. Likewise, the ensuing period, that could be called the 'actual stage of migration/spatial movement' is also marked by social network institutions such as *akrabalik* (relatedness), *komsuluk* (neighbourliness), *hemsehrilik* (being from the same town/village) as providers of various services needed by the new arrivals. The support of these networks ranged from giving/lending money to an individual to pay for the ticket, to meeting him on his arrival as the first stages of being involved in sponsoring a relative or an acquaintance. A Turkish-Cypriot who was a cook in Cyprus told me during an interview that he arrived in London in 1975 with only a few pounds in his pocket. As his story depicts, a common pattern of receiving financial support and shelter from already established relatives in London was in operation as a requirement and an obligation of kinship and the social network. When asked how he had managed to come and survive in London the informant said:

'We were forced by the Greek Cypriots to leave our home during the military clashes in 1974. When we fled to Turkish controlled northern part of the Island there was no job. The war had wrecked the economy and immigration exhausted employment chances. I needed a job and wrote to my uncle who migrated to England and settled in the late 1960s, asking him to help me find a job. His reply was a relief. He wrote to me that he found a job for me as a cook. But I did not have the resources, neither to pay for the travel nor even for a cheap accommodation'.

The lack of economic resources forced him to turn to his relatives in Cyprus, but as he explained, he could not raise enough money to realise his wishes. He therefore wrote once more to his uncle, this time for some money to enable him to travel to Britain. He continued explaining how committed he was to coming to London and expressed his gratitude to his uncle. He said:

'My uncle was very kind and generous. As soon as he received my letter, he sent my ticket money. I bought a ticket and packed my stuff informing my cousins of my arrival details. They met me at the airport and took home straightaway. Within a week, I started working in that restaurant which years later I managed to own. Now looking back I feel that my uncle's attitude and help made me more closer to them and strengthened our relations'.
The support that was generated by kinship relations was also extended to *uzak akraba* (distant relative) and to *komsu* (neighbour) and even to *arkadas* (friend) at times, widening the scope of kinship to a more flexible social network. The case of a Turkish man who came from Bursa illustrates the flexible nature of such kinship networks. This respondent used his former employer’s contacts to come to London and received full support including accommodation. While working in a tailor shop, a visitor of (indeed, brother of) the shop owner, who had a job in London talked about the possibilities of employment and of saving money. As soon as the visitor had left the shop, he approached his employer and asked whether he could arrange a meeting with this man so that he could ask more questions about jobs in London. The shop owner called his brother (visitor) and asked for his help in finding a job for this young and ambitious man who had lost his parents a long time ago. The respondent said that since he had become an orphan, his boss had always been helpful to and protective of him like a father figure. The shop owner used his influence and negotiated the arrangement for a job and accommodation with his brother. As the informant explained, his relations with the boss and his brother became closer over the years, though he was not related to them by descent. This case clearly indicates that kinship relations transcend tightly defined boundaries of descent and relatedness by blood. He expressed his feelings for this family in the following way:

'I managed to come London and found a job only because my former boss in Turkey and his brother here in London extended their support to me. When I came to London I stayed with this family for almost three months and they never treated me like an outsider. I believe that my employer in Turkey played the primary role by giving a good reference about me. These people were the only ones that I knew in London. That drew me closer to them and I felt like being part of the family. This is still the same'.

At the time of the interview, my informant was married with three children and was still working as a machinist in a garment factory owned by a Turkish businessman. At a later stage, I also learned that his marriage was also arranged by the former boss with whom the informant always kept in touch.
Kinship and social network relations are further strengthened by the more demanding life style of the new environment in order to cope with the new challenges that did not exist in the country of origin. The 'post-migration' period, marked by 'settlement and post-settlement' (Heisler, 1986, p. 77, see also Figure 5.3.), not only changed the nature of kinship relations, by forcing members of the immigrant community to seek help outside aknaba since it was not always available inside, but it also expanded the responsibilities and obligations of the social network through more varied demands generated by settling in a culturally, religiously and linguistically different country. Familial visits, marriage patterns, joint-venture economic enterprises, schooling of children, establishing welfare organisations and religious institutions make up the new spheres that play a determining role in reproducing kinship relations and reconstructing social networks based on shared experiences as an ethnic minority group settled at the margin of a larger social system. My findings suggest that the settlement stage (as a period of second-decision making process) and post-settlement process (as a continuing phenomenon) are also marked by the relations that prevailed throughout the first two stages of migration (pre-migration/decision-making process, migration/spatial movement).

Clustering around one particular area is not an ad hoc decision or a chance experience. As many informants revealed, it was by deliberate choice, and settlement in a specific area relatively populated by relatives, friends and acquaintances who speak the same language and share numerous common features made certain areas more preferential than others. Chain migration and the creation of ghettos in industrial areas or in large cities with employment opportunities, also explain the role of kinship relations and social networks during the post-settlement stage which regenerates exchange and reciprocity within a given ethnic minority community. The distribution of the Turkish community in Green Lanes, Newington Green, Stoke Newington, Islington and Edmonton in north-east London (see Map 4) lends
support to the above argument that proximity is engendered by ethnic origin and various forms of relatedness as sources of economic and social support. A Turkish garment factory owner who came from the city of Kahramanmaras explained why he preferred living near his elder brother when he got married. When asked why he chose to buy a house in Edmonton, the informant replied:

‘Before I got married, I was living with my brother who was managing the family owned garment factory. My parents were also living in the same house. When I got married I had to move out and establish a different household since my brother’s house could no longer accommodate a new family. What we did was to buy another house nearby my brother so that my wife could stay with my parents during the day time when I go to factory’.

The case of a Turkish man who came from the city of Trabzon (see Map 1) also suggests that this pattern of settlement, especially in the early phase of migration, finding a job and accommodation, was common practice and led to the emergence of areas populated by a significant number of Turkish people. This informant who was a tailor in Trabzon and who came from Turkey in the early 1970s, gave me the following response, when asked why he wanted to live in Stoke Newington:

‘I came here as a single person through the help of some hemsehriš (fellow villagers) and shared a room with three others in a house owned by an English man. We were all hemsehriš coming from Trabzon. It was near Essex Road in Islington and we were spending most of our time together at work and outside. At this stage, I did not have an urgent feeling that my neighbourhood should be comprised of mostly Turkish people. I simply took the existing Turkish neighbours in the area for granted. But when I married I felt different, because my wife needed to establish social relations’.

As the above informant explained, while he was single it was not so important to be right in the midst of the Turkish neighbourhood, simply because friendship seemed to satisfy his needs on an individual level, as most people were busy with their work. Moreover, their single status did not require them to establish a broad social network as compared with married
people. My findings suggest that marriage and having a wife and children played an important role in determining the choice of neighbourhood by the immigrant Turks in London.

Single people had a greater chance of mobility since they did not have such a wide variety of concerns as married people. The establishment of families through marriages or reunion of couples produced new concerns. Married people started asking questions that reflected their concerns in their new environment. Who, for example, could they turn to when they needed help? What could the wife do when her husband was at work? Where could she go? Who could help her while she was ill or when she gave birth? These and similar questions of survival as a consequence of the migration process caused serious concerns. Therefore, those who came with their families or married at a later stage sought to live near their kin, relatives, friends, village men or acquaintances in London.

The establishment of a neighbourhood through clustering around a particular area constitutes one of the first stages of institutionalisation and reproduction of values. If we follow the life-cycle of the informant referred to above, we will see how marriage and familial concerns, which were underlined by socio-psychological forces, could instill a willingness to move to a Turkish neighbourhood where social interaction is more easier and the spirit of the community is revived. When asked if there was a particular reason for living in Stoke Newington this informant explained:

'Of course there were very important reasons to move from Islington to where I now live. As I told you earlier, I was single when I came here first. Two years later I got married and returned with my wife. Before I went to Turkey, I rented a small flat near Angel. I still remember my wife's reaction to the new environment on our arrival. The first thing she asked was who our neighbours were. When she heard that we did not have any Turkish neighbours and acquaintances in the vicinity she protested by asking whether I brought her to an open prison. She never lived in a social isolation back at home. Since we did not have enough financial resources we had to live in this small flat for more than a year and then moved to
another small flat near Dalston, where we knew some Turkish families who came from Trabzon'.

This informant later moved to a council house on Sandringham Road, Dalston (see Map 4), after his wife had given birth to their first child, a daughter. There they had their second child, a son, and according to the informant, his wife was able to socialise with other Turkish women who visited each other on several occasions. This opened avenues for seeking and receiving help based on reciprocity and exchange. This pattern of settlement around kin and acquaintances was further reinforced even by the recent marriages of their children years later. The daughter of the family married her cousin through an arranged marriage and her husband moved to London. Likewise, her brother married a cousin back in Turkey and his wife joined him in London. As Figure 5.1. shows, these three families were living in the same neighbourhood at the time of the fieldwork. It should also be noted here that the subsequent developments in the area proved, as the informant expressed, that he had made the right decision. As a religious person who takes Islam and its teachings seriously, he witnessed the setting up of several religious institutions and took part in the establishment of the Aziziye Mosque. It can be argued that the reproduction of traditional forms of Islam is not only influenced by the significant number of Muslims living in the area but has also strengthened the idea of living near a Mosque, at least for some religious people.

Figure 5.1: Familial proximity in a migration context

- Family 1: Father & Mother live on Sandringham Road,
- Family 2: Daughter married with her cousin from mother's side lives in Dalston High Road
- Family 3: Son married with her cousin from father's side lives on Sandringham Road with his parents within a walking distance from his parents house (see Map 4)

Another typical example is provided by a Turkish-Cypriot photographer who lives on Hewitt Road, off Green Lanes in Haringey. He came to London in 1973, when he felt threatened by the increasing signs of ethnic conflict in Cyprus. He is now settled and owns a photo-developing shop as well as
working for a Northern Cypriot-based newspaper. When asked what made him buy a house on Hewitt Road, his response was similar to other cases which suggested that kin relations and social networks as sources of social, psychological and financial support influenced some individuals when selecting a particular neighbourhood for settlement. In the case of this respondent, the preferred choice was facilitated by the availability of kin and social networks on Hewitt Road. He explained how he had settled in Green Lanes as a deliberate decision which was underlined by various issues such as ethnic origin, familial links, social networks and availability of some of the ‘ethnic’ services in the area. His response sums up a common trend among the Turkish community. When asked why he settled in this area, this informant gave his reasons as follows:

‘Before I came to London, almost half of my family migrated either to Turkey or to England. When I came here, my two uncles were about to open a dry-cleaning shop. On my arrival I stayed with them for a while and when my younger brother joined me, we rented a room near their house and continued paying regular visits. After I married, I rented a flat not far from them. When I decided to buy a house after saving some money, my uncle told me that there was a house near to them for sale. It was a good opportunity to buy this house simply because me and my wife would be very close to our relatives’.

The following pattern of relationships and locational distribution was observed in a Turkish family which indicates that extended familial and kin relations assume a complex nature as different localities enter into a kin circle.
One of the implications of migration and settlement in a different country was the division of family and kin into two or, as in the case of the above family (see Figure 5.2.), three locations. This implies that kin relations are reproduced in different locations simultaneously.

It is common behaviour among Turkish immigrants to cluster in a particular neighbourhood. A similar phenomenon was observed in Berlin during my fieldwork. The Kreuzberg area, for example, is referred as 'Little Istanbul' indicating that the overwhelming majority of the residents are from Turkey (see Chapter Four). Quantitatively speaking, Turks in Germany far outnumber the Turkish community in London (see Table 4.1.). Due to the immigration policy of the German government and the subsequent chain migration, as well as family reunions, Turks concentrated in several cities where industry needed foreign labour. Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Duisburg,
Munich and Frankfurt are some of the cities where Turkish quarters have emerged. In a similar fashion Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Den Haag in The Netherlands; Brussels in Belgium; Copenhagen and Arhus in Denmark; Zurich in Switzerland; Stockholm, Malmo and Goteborg in Sweden have ethnically marked neighbourhoods as these cities have become permanent homes for Turkish immigrants. In this context, it is plausible to argue that the cluster of an ethnically distinct group in a particular area may change the cultural map of the given quarter of a city to a considerable extent. Similar to the concentration of Turks in particular areas in several European cities, the cluster of Pakistanis in particular localities also adds new characteristics to the cultural structure of cities. The northern city of Bradford in England, for example, is called 'Britain’s Islamabad’ (Lewis, 1995, p. 1) implying that Bradford has a changing cultural map with its significant number of Muslim residents from Pakistan.

Economic activities among Turks in Berlin and London also have similarities in terms of joint ventures and employment of relatives and friends which establish the trust (guven)³ necessary for preferential treatment and choice. A comparison of two cases from Berlin and London will explain how trust is utilised as a mechanism of solidarity among families, friends and religious groups in creating solidarity in economic activities. By analysing a case of a joint-venture in Berlin, I would like to illustrate the invention of solidarity among a second generation group who share a similar educational background and long-term friendship, strengthened by common ideological leanings and moral values. The joint-venture under study was formed by five young Turkish graduates of technical colleges. All had their college education in Germany and had known each other for a long time. Three people in the group were school friends, one was a brother of these three classmates and the fifth was a member of a closely-knit friendship network though older than the rest of the group. Their friendship became a more closely-knit network by their involvement in weekly discussions on cultural and religious issues.
My observations of this group suggest that common values, as well as long-term relationships, seemed to have produced a strong bond and trust as a residue of social capital. They all had intellectual capital established by their experience in the industry. What they needed was planning and turning this social and intellectual capital into a joint-venture economic activity. During my fieldwork, I had long discussions with three of the group members and had brief talks with the other two. Our discussions included issues such as racism, family, religion, marriage (four already had arranged marriages in Turkey and had brought their wives to Berlin), returning to Turkey, and economic and political participation. Since they were planning to start a business, talking about economic activity was one of the primary issues which indicated that returning to Turkey was out of question, at least for the time being.

Our talks increased my interest in exploring what kinds of relations had produced such a circle and sustained it over the years. It seemed to me that the origins of the trust established among the group could be traced to the college years where friendship was usually based on ethnic lines. As one of them said when asked where they met each other first: 'Three of us met in college and strengthened our relationship. Personally, I found it easier to make friends with my own people. Germans used to avoid us. Over the years, our friendship extended beyond school hours and we started visiting each other at home and went out together'. This group also used to have regular discussion meetings on Islamic issues which they started organising for college/university students. These meetings were also fruitful for strengthening their relation in the group. One member of the group told me that:

'During the discussion meetings, in addition to our long-term school friendship, we realised that we had a great deal in common. We realised that we had established an enormous trust among us and wanted to be more productive by bringing our experiences together
on the basis of this trust. I think our belonging to the same discussion group unearthed moral virtues that strengthened the feeling of trust'.

At the time of my fieldwork, I observed that they had finally decided to start a business servicing electrical appliances. All members of the group invested an equal amount of money and all were expected to provide equal amount of energy and labour. I have checked the progress of this venture by telephone and correspondence since my return to England. Foregoing observations on this joint-venture suggest that it was based on mutual trust. It can be argued that this trust is rooted in being from the same ethnic group, having long-term relations and in subscribing to the same ideological and religious values. This case clearly indicates that a social network beyond the immediate family and kin relations is an important institution of solidarity and choice.

The second case study of a London firm also suggests that trust as social capital which originated in ethnic origin, kinship, friendship and village networks is reproduced within the context of ethnic business. During the fieldwork research in London, I visited a garment factory and noticed that the workers, machinists, pressers, cleaners etc., were all Turkish. Most of them came from Turkey; some of them were from Cyprus. This family-owned factory is a typical example of many other growing ethnic businesses established by the Turks. What they have in common is the ethnic composition of the employees who worked in the workplaces owned by the Turks in London. The above mentioned factory employed between fifty to sixty workers depending on the workload. They were, as mentioned above, all Turkish. As the factory owner explained, at least half of the workers came from his village and many were related to each other by kin and friendship or by village origin. Social obligations generated by the network institutions were met by helping the members of the same social web. In the case of this garment factory, the owner explained how mutual trust was sustained particularly in the family itself and between workers and the management in general. The father and three brothers also took an active part in running the factory. All three brothers were married and had their own household living
near each other in Edmonton. The trust in the family is seen as a crucial asset in achieving a successful result according to the manager of the factory, who said:

'Except my younger brother who is in a full-time education, my father and my two younger brothers are working in the factory. Everybody is responsible for one aspect of the business and as a manager, I don't have to worry about the conduct of my brothers. What lies behind this is brotherhood, coming from the same family which is the basis of trust and responsibility. When I am away, I feel assured that everything will work as usual, even better, simply because this is not my factory, but 'ours' (bizim) and this feeling is shared by everybody in the family. My younger brother was not studying before but when he saw that we needed a professional manager for the future, he decided to go back to school to study marketing and management as a part of his duty towards the family'.

As this statement clearly indicates, family relations instill a sense of responsibility and obligation towards the family as the basic unit and reservoir of trust. Kin relations, social and village networks open new avenues of trust embedded in responsibilities towards a relative, friend or a village man. As mentioned earlier, the factory under study employed more than half of its workers from the same village as that from which the owner came and most of them were related to each other. When asked how this pattern had emerged, the manager replied:

'Whichever factory you visit in London, like ours, you will see a similar picture that was coloured by some kind of relatedness either stemming from kin-village network or in a much wider sense by the ethnic origin. I have my own relatives among the workers here. When you are approached by your own kin and village men you can not simply refuse helping them. Somehow I feel responsible and obliged to support my relatives and friends. In our case we try to give them a suitable job. If they don't know anything about the job we even teach them. You should not see it as an act of mercy, but a mutual and reciprocal act of solidarity'.

The reciprocity and mutual obligations are strengthened when the employers in London either request something from their kin or friends in the village of origin or when they actually visit them. The manager's account above suggests that both sides benefit from such a network, extending from the
village to London where network institutions are re-established and sustained under the patronage of employers of relatives, friends and village men. This garment factory also employs other Turks who are not related to the family who owned it. In this case a wider network of ethnic community relations exerts its influence on the manager who sometimes receives a request from the Imam of a local Mosque, from a president of a Turkish community organisation or simply from one of his workers who is already established there and earned trust by his/her conduct, to give a job to a Turkish fellow friend or villager. One of the workers in the factory, who found his job through a friend working in this factory, informed me that without the help of his friend he would not have been able to find this job. His case is a good illustration of how a wider network, beyond the immediate family and kin relations works in London. When asked how he managed to find this job after several months of being unemployed, this respondent replied:

'I found this job through a very good friend of mine with whom I worked in the same factory for a long time. Later he moved to this factory because it was nearer to his flat. While I was working in the previous factory, I became ill and went to Turkey for almost four months. When I came back after the recovery, I found that my previous employer could no longer give me a job. There was no suitable vacancy for a machinist. During the recent years too many people came to London and most of them are willing to work for longer hours and for less wages. Naturally, employers tend to employ these people for their benefit. In contrast to previous years, it is becoming more difficult to find a job on a regular basis. So I had to try my contacts to arrange a job and called my friend who took a machinist job in this factory and asked him whether he could talk to his boss for me. Luckily he was told that the factory had vacancies and they wanted mature and reliable machinists and finishers. Upon my friend’s reference I was given this job'.

This informant’s answer not only indicates the fact that friendship networks are effectively used but also implies that employment is getting more and more competitive due to an increasing number of people in the same industry. Jobs are becoming less available for those who do not have many skills. Nevertheless, the expansion of business and new sectors such as travel agencies, banks and import-export companies conducting business with
Turkey or Cyprus are creating new jobs for the educated young Turks in London. One of the oldest Turkish grocery-bakery shops in Green Lanes (see Map 4) also provides us with the evidence of the extent to which social networks may determine the nature of the workforce in terms of ethnic backgrounds, and belonging to a community whose members relate to each other in the business context as well as in other areas of communal activities. The owner of the shop came from Cyprus twenty years ago and worked in different places until he realised that there was a growing market for 'ethnic food'. The number of Turks was increasing and they preferred to eat their own ethnic food and use traditional Turkish recipes in their cooking. In addition to Turks, Greeks also had a similar taste for food such as white cheese, black olives, aubergine and yoghurt and both communities were also fond of eating vegetables and fruit from the Mediterranean region. The development of the ethnic food business could be interpreted as an expression of ethnic identity in the context of north-east London. One can draw analogies with the availability of a large variety of Asian foods as well as the visibility of ethnic and regional dress among the Asian communities in Britain as identity markers.

The establishment and development of the above mentioned shop through expansion, to offer more variety to its mostly Turkish customers, inform us of the social interactions among the Turkish community, established within this particular quarter. While the community became enlarged through chain migration, the shop owner grasped a fruitful opportunity by providing ethnic food for the Turks and to some extent for the Greeks. My observations suggest that this and other ethnically based shops not only sold food, drinks and vegetables but also offered jobs to the community whose members sustained the economy of these shops. It seems that a reciprocal relationship was established between the ethnic shops and their ethnic customers. During my fieldwork in London, I have visited several shops owned by the Turks and noticed that the same pattern of employment exists. One owner, for
example, explained how such a pattern emerged when asked why all his employers were Turkish. He said:

'When I opened this shop it was only me and my wife who worked in the shop, which by then did not occupy such a large space. By the time we observed that there was a demand for what we sell, which largely comprised of Turkish products, and we decided to expand the shop to offer a wider range of food. When we rented the adjacent shop, there emerged a few vacancies which required Turkish-speaking workers. So I told my relatives what kind personnel I was looking for. My first employees were my close relatives whom I really trusted. When the availability of jobs became known among the community more and more Turks started making inquiries'.

As the business progressed, the shop owner decided to add new sections to his shop. In subsequent years a bakery, a sweetshop and, a *Helal* meat section were added. When these sections were opened, more skilled workers were needed to take responsibility in running these departments. Such a development resulted in seeking workers with some experience who were not necessarily found within the immediate family or among close relatives. Accordingly, a wider social network was involved in finding workers with the required skills and in return for the services delivered by the social network of the shop owner, he met his obligations toward his friends and acquaintances by employing the people they recommended. This process is summed up in the following explanation by the same shop owner:

'My supermarket is open between 8 a.m. to almost 11.00 p.m. and always busy. Especially after adding bakery, sweet and *Helal* butcher sections, I needed more people and it was impossible to fill the vacancies with my relatives simply because there were no suitable candidates. I needed people with some skills. What I did was to turn to my friends and asked them to recommend me reliable people. Now, most of my 20 employees were accepted through using such a mechanism. I never advertised vacancies because you never know who comes and applies'.

My interviews with some of the workers confirmed that especially those skilled ones were not related to their employer either by descent or by kin relations. In fact, most of the skilled workers were from Turkey whereas the
owner was from Cyprus. This suggests that a social network may assume a different nature within a new social and economic setting, where the marginal and peripheral status of an ethnic community forces it to forge new and in most cases wider allegiances than traditional kin relations and social networks. Following these discussions, which were drawn from my fieldwork in London and in Berlin, I would like to suggest the following three-stage model of a mechanism by which kin relations and social networks worked within the context of a migration process (see also Chapter Three).

Figure 5.3: Three-stage model and mechanism of networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1- Pre-migration and decision-making process:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Providing information on advantages, disadvantages, earning potential and ways of finding a job,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Investments of migrant workers suggesting the high-earning potential,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Promises of help in finding a job, accommodation and meeting on arrival,</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Beginning of a chain migration,</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Stage 2- Migration and Settlement Process</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Financial support</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Chain migration gathers momentum,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Issuing a letter of invitation or recommendation if needed,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Paying for travel expenses,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Meeting on arrival and providing accommodation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Finding a job,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Helping to arrange a marriage,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Helping to buy a flat or a house,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Emergence of ethnic quarters or ghettos,</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 3- Post-settlement process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Forming new relationships and expanding the social network,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Establishing/strengthening familial relations, regular visits,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Foundation of religious organisations as an expression of religious identity,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Establishment of welfare organisations as indices of integration, and participation in mainstream society,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Schooling of children, establishment of private schools or supplementary weekend classes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Establishment and expansion of ethnic businesses, joint-venture economic adventures,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Involvement in local politics,</td>
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</table>
It should be noted here that several developments during these three stages have an overlapping nature which could be recurrently observed at every stage of the migration process. Kinship structure and social networks among the Turkish community appear to have a dynamic characteristic which suggests that kin and network institutions are reproduced within new contexts in order to meet the needs of the emerging community. The dynamic nature of the network institutions allows community members to widen the scope of their activities and involvement in their new environment. Ladbury's (1977, p. 307) observation on the Turkish community in London supports the above argument in that new relationships were formed during the settlement and post-settlement stages. She notes that ‘certain kin relationships have been strengthened and completely new relationships formed between individuals who now relate, not on the basis of where they once lived in Cyprus, but on the basis of their present status. Thus, a Turkish-Cypriot family will quickly come to know and depend on other families when it moves into a neighbourhood and the most relevant kin become who live nearest and who visit most frequently’. In contrast to Turkish-Cypriots, mainland Turks still attach importance to being from the same village, town or even from the same city.

During my fieldwork, I observed that some of the social clubs and ethnic organisations were overwhelmingly made up of co-villagers. A striking expression of the attachment to the village of origin and generating friendship among its members was observed during the month of Ramazan when an Islamic organisation organised iftars (dinner) during the course of thirty days. When I looked at the publicity board inside the organisation's office, I noticed that they had put up a list of those who were either willing to finance or prepare the iftars. The list did not give any name but only the name of a town or a city, suggesting that people from these particular cities would sponsor the preparation of iftars. The first day was booked by people from Adana, on the second day by people from Gaziantep (see Map 1). The same pattern repeated itself for the remaining twenty eight days. Every morning,
the organisers contacted those who had signed up for giving iftar and reminded them that it was their turn to get the food ready by iftar time. Thus, the thirty-day experience indicates that mainland Turks from the same village or city met on at least one evening to share food and exchange conversation during which hemsehrilik ties were renewed and the circle of hemsehriks became larger. In addition to that, people from the same city or village also had chance to meet other Turks since everybody was invited to the iftar. This enlarged the hemsehrilik ties by establishing a new circle of social networks by interacting with Turks from other cities, facilitated by religious activities.

5.4. Marriage as a Process of Reproduction of Family Values, Kin and Social Network

One of the outstanding features of socialisation within the Turkish community is marriage. This means that marriage is expected from men and women at a suitable age in their life cycle. The community owes its existence and survival to the establishment of families through marriages. White’s (1994, p. 38-39) observations clearly explain this aspect of socialisation. She notes that ‘the basic prerequisite for the existence and the continuation of the traditional Turkish family is marriage. Turkish social practices require that an individual marry, and enormous social, personal, and economic pressure is brought to bear that an individual does so’. What lies behind this pressure is the proper duties and responsibilities of the adult stage of the life cycle. An individual is thought to achieve an adult stage by marriage and performing the duties generated by entering into married life. Delaney (1991, p. 112) calls this process ‘social adulthood’. Bainbridge (1986, p. 447), on the other hand, observes that ‘to be a wife or husband, from this perspective, is also to be a woman or a man. One adult is neither youth nor man, neither girl nor woman. Their status is indeterminate... Their marginal status renders them dangerous. A person cannot be fully independent until they have established their own household, and had their children’. Until they get married, no matter how grown up they are, both boys and girls are under the control of
their parents. Through marrying and taking the responsibility of running a family they achieve ‘social adulthood’ and establish their independence.

Despite the changes in the wedding rituals and marriage prestations⁴, the establishment of family institutions based on marriage is still of central value among the Turkish community in London. The meaning of marriage could be seen in its large scale functions. Marriage means not only bringing two individuals together. The meaning of marriage for Turks in London goes far beyond that. Marriage is seen as the first and foremost step for the ensuing performance of duties conferred by the commitments of marriage. From this wide perspective, marriage means establishing a new household, forging new kin networks or restructuring the old ones, reproducing traditional family values, procreation, child rearing and transmitting shared values to young generations by reproducing conventional patterns of relationships and lifestyle within the Turkish family. It appears, however, that the migration experience and diaspora situation has changed some facets of wedding rituals and marriage prestations. Nevertheless, it is still seen as an indispensable institution and perceptions related to the necessity of marriage persist.

Social pressure on unmarried individuals increases when they are thought to be mature enough to marry provided that they have sufficient economic resources to cover expenses. Parents, relatives and friends put pressure on the individual to get married. My findings suggest that achieving economic independence, either by saving or starting a business, and educational expectations such as graduating from a school and finding a job, delay the entrance into the process of marriage. Economic dependence and lengthy educational activity evoke discouraging feelings on the part of single males/females as opposed to the social pressures brought upon them by parents, friends and relatives. Here one sees a clash of pressures regarding marriage which puts the individuals into a dilemma of either bowing to the external pressure to establish a household or continuing to carry out his/her plans for the future. The involvement of kin and social network in the process
of marriage begins even before such a decision is taken by an individual. The kinship network extends its presence well beyond the marriage process. Newly-weds find themselves surrounded by various types of kin and social network relations. These are exchange of gifts and solidarity which constitute the important grounds on which the relationships among families, relatives and friends are sustained and consolidated. I would like to argue at this point that the development of strengthened relations among the families and kin as smaller social units of minority ethnic groups and the diffusion of such relations among the Turkish community reproduce a fertile ground over which shared values and consciousness of an ethnic identity may be nourished.

As a consequence of immigration new patterns of marriage have emerged within the Turkish community. Arranged marriages still persist but often the candidate has the right to veto the choice of their parents or relatives. In addition to that, love marriages that are accepted and approved by the parents, and also marriages of one's own choice despite family disapproval, take place among the Turkish community in London. During the fieldwork, I came across marriages of these kinds and also observed that endogamy is not always practised under the new social and economic circumstances which have led to the emergence of larger group allegiances beyond the immediate family and kin network. While marriages take place between Turks living in London, it is still common practice to arrange marriages between individuals living in different countries. The current pattern of marriages is presented in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4: Types of Marriage between individuals in London and Berlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marriages between individuals living in England and living in Turkey; or vice versa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Marriages between individuals living in England and living in Cyprus; or vice versa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Marriages in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Marriages between mainland Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Marriages between Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Marriages between mainland Turks and Turkish-Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Marriages outside the Turkish community, English, Irish etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What concerns us here is the involvement of kin and social networks in the process of pre-marriage and post-marriage behaviour of individuals. The above model suggests that at every stage of marriage families, friends and relatives play their part in the performance of wedding rituals and marriage prestations. During the fieldwork in London I came across all these types of marriages. A similar pattern emerged in Berlin too, in terms of arranging a marriage between individuals living in Berlin and in Turkey or vice versa.

Whether in Turkey, Cyprus or in London parents who would like to arrange a marriage for their son look for namus (honour) in the prospective bride. At the time of his research, Stirling observed that namus was by far the most important characteristic sought. The reputation of the girl depended on her purity gained by not having contact with the opposite sex (Stirling, 1965, p. 189). Parents who are looking for a suitable spouse as soon as their children reach a marriageable age usually follow a pattern of search from inside to outside. The first circle is close kin. Then comes making inquiries within a larger circle among distant kin, friends, neighbours and fellow villagers. When none of these possibilities bears fruit, then parents seek spouses elsewhere outside the kin and spatial boundaries (Delaney, 1991, p. 108; Bainbridge, 1986, p. 164) which is a common case within the Turkish community both in London and in Berlin. However, one's own choice and preference is also accepted provided that the candidate has a good reputation, honour and conforms to the values that the family upholds. The significance of namus still persists in London as an important criterion for describing the moral state of a woman (Ladbury, 1979, p. 139).

Marriages that take place between individuals from different countries are mostly arranged due to the unsuccessful attempts of the parents to find a suitable spouse for their children in London and Berlin. When the parents fail, the next step is usually to activate kin relations and social networks to search for a match. Such a request is welcomed wholeheartedly by relatives, fellow villagers and neighbours. During my fieldwork in London, I closely
observed seven marriages in which kin relations and a wider network of connections were involved. Five of these marriages took place between families in London and families in Turkey. Three girls married boys in Turkey and two boys married girls in their villages. All the spouses joined their partners in London except one girl who moved to Turkey. I also came across other marriages which took place between individuals living in England and individuals living in Cyprus. In addition to these, I witnessed two marriages, of which the first one took place between a Turkish man and an Irish woman, and the second was between a Turkish man and an American woman.

My research in Berlin gave me an opportunity to observe three marriages that resulted in two brides joining their husbands in Berlin and one going back to Turkey. One different pattern emerged in the case of a marriage between a boy in England and a girl in Germany where the husband joined his wife in Berlin. It should be noted here that my data on marriage patterns and involvement of social networks in the various stages of this process is not solely derived from observing such a small number of marriages, but rather, it is based on a larger examination of already existing families. For example, I did not come across a marriage ceremony during my fieldwork between a mainland Turk and a Turkish-Cypriot. However, I interviewed couples who had married some years ago. Similarly, I managed to witness only two out-marriages (Irish and American women) during the fieldwork but the data is enriched by interviewing those who had married English women years before, though in a few cases divorces had taken place. It should also be noted that kin and social network involvement during the process of out marriages is not very effective. Marriage of such girls to Turkish boys in Turkey were primarily arranged, though the consent of the girls was a precondition of starting the process.

One of the salient features of the post-settlement process is visiting the country of origin at least once a year or once every two years. Regular visits
to Turkey and Cyprus in the case of the Turkish community generate an opportunity to renew and strengthen family and kin relations. Moreover, these travels provide a chance for parents to find spouses for their children of marriageable age. All three of the girls in my sample, for example, met their husbands while they were on holiday in Turkey. One girl who married and went to Turkey, explained how she was introduced to her prospective husband by a relative:

'As soon as I finished my degree course, my parents started talking about marriage. I had male friends at the college but none of them were Turkish. At this time, the idea of marriage did not cross my mind even if it did so I was not prepared to marry a non-Turkish. After a year I went to Turkey with my parents on a long holiday and I was introduced by a relative to a boy with a university degree and a good career. Then he started coming around to give us company while going out'.

When she met the boy this informant had no idea that her mother had asked their relatives back in Turkey to look for a suitable candidate. This came to light later during the holiday when the boy expressed his interest in her. She explained what followed:

'As soon as he talked about things that one can easily relate to marriage, I opened the subject to my parents immediately. They did not seemed to be surprised and straightforwardly asked me what I thought about the boy. Then my parents told me that they had asked my aunt to make an inquiry about such a boy whom I may be interested in marrying'.

One can see from the above account that the aunt had acted as a mediator between the two families whose children got married later. The girl was happy to settle in Turkey since her husband had a good job and it was also important for her to live in Turkey where she found family relations much closer and friendship and neighbourhood more genuine. I felt at the time of the interview that the existence of a large kin and social network in Turkey played an important role in her decision, as she said 'if something happens to me such as illness, economic need or marriage crisis, there are too many people whom I can turn to and rely upon'.
The second case is also a good illustration of the involvement of relatives in arranging meetings between families living in Turkey and London. One informant who married a boy in the village of her family’s origin, told me that she also met her husband through a relative and a love-relationship developed between the youngsters during her consequent visits to Turkey, followed by frequent correspondence. She said:

‘I felt that we were introduced with the idea that we may like each other and get married. Before I met my prospective husband, I knew him by name only. But my parents never forced me to enter into marriage with him. However, I remember that my uncle’s wife was always praising him and telling me that I would be very happy with him if I marry this boy. Later, I discovered that she was the one who acted as a go-between the families and in a way made preliminary negotiations that if I marry, my husband should join me in London etc’.

My informant admitted that had it not been for the mediating role of her uncle’s wife she would not have readily started a relationship that would lead to marriage. This case suggests, therefore, that relatives are involved during personal decisions and such an involvement is regarded as a duty by the members of a social network.

In the third case of a girl who married in Turkey, a similar phenomenon was observed whereby not only relatives but also neighbours as members of the social network influenced the girl’s decision in choosing a partner. When asked how she met her spouse, the interviewee gave a familiar response: ‘Like many other Turkish people living in London we visit Turkey and my mother’s home town at least once a year, and spend our holidays with our relatives and my mother’s close friends who are still very close to us. My parents left it to me to decide when and whom to marry, as long as this is within the acceptable boundaries of cultural and traditional values. Having a boy-friend, for example, was discouraged’. This informant explained that while studying, she enjoyed a relatively free life and did not feel too much social pressure to conform to the practice of marrying right after school. Nevertheless, social and parental pressure exerted itself in different forms as
she grew older. According to her, social and parental pressure became more intense in the following years. She explained the developments as follows:

‘When I became twenty-six, I was still single which is not a suitable status for a girl according to our tradition which impose marriages at an earlier age. After this time, my parents started asking my plans about marriage. Although they were not panicked about my single-status and about what other people were talking regarding my case, I felt that they were urging me by asking questions. With this state of mind we went to Turkey and started a tour of visits. We received always very good reception from our relatives and my mother’s friends whom I called aunt (teyze) as an expression of intimacy. Like my parents they bombarded me with questions of marriages and reminded me that I should not delay it any further’.

During the course of her holiday in Turkey she was introduced to the son of her mother’s friend. Later, he appeared to be the candidate for marriage as her mother and relatives asked what she thought about him. As the informant revealed, his manners and interests were likeable to her. The next summer in 1994, he visited her in London and meanwhile both families explicitly encouraged them to get married. Then she accepted his marriage proposal of her own free will. It should be pointed out that though she was not forced into marrying this particular man against her will, one can argue that social and parental pressure in the form of expressing expectations from her, the unsuitability of becoming too old for marriage, and, the building up of potentially damaging circulation of gossip, convinced her to reconsider suggestions for marriage.

In a sense, institutions of kinship, friendship and neighbourliness have socially conditioned her behaviour. During the decision making process, she negotiated that she wanted to live in London at least for the foreseeable future. This was accepted by the prospective spouse and after the wedding ceremony in Turkey the new couple moved to London where a second marriage reception was held to which relatives and friends in London were invited as a part of the marriage custom. Those who do not receive invitations to the wedding feel isolated from a social network and usually retaliate when
their son/daughter gets married. This is seen as a damaging action to social ties, and marriage is always seen as an occasion for strengthening kin and social ties; therefore a great deal of effort is made to make sure that everybody who is related to the marrying couple is invited.

It seems that although families and relatives are trying to arrange suitable candidates for the youngsters who are thought to be of marriageable age, the children are given the right to accept or refuse. In the cases I have studied, I have not come across a 'forced marriage'. As mentioned above, there is social and familial pressure to get married but this pressure is not extended to force a candidate to accept a marriage proposal if she/he does not approve. Personal choice at this stage is also important, and it is clear from the statements of the couples that being introduced to someone is only a beginning leading to marriage only if both the candidates feel that their personalities are compatible. As it will be seen in Chapter Six, young generations are increasingly demanding to make their own choices in marriage.

In one case, for example, which started as a friendship and developed into a love relationship between a London born and bred Turkish-Cypriot couple, whom I met before their marriage, it was clear that the choice of the youth may receive the support of families if they knew each other and felt that family reputation would not be damaged. Bainbridge (1986, p. 214), in her study of Turkish-Cypriots in London, also observed a similar phenomenon of 'an increasing tendency for young people to make their own marriages' though couples who make their own choices 'still go through the formal procedures of marriage'. However, it should be noted here that families and relatives show great concern even if the marriage process was started by the couple themselves as opposed to an arranged marriage. This underlines that kinship ties are renewed at the time of marriage. When asked what were the reactions and the involvement of their families during the course of decision making and the marriage process, this Turkish-Cypriot couple explained that
a number of factors influenced their families who extended their support. The husband’s account of the matter helps us to draw a framework which may explain how various factors relating to kinship ties play a role in a marriage of choice and approval rather than that of an arrangement. When asked what kind of remarks he received from his parents and relatives at the time of disclosing his marriage plans with someone who was not arranged by his own parents or relatives, the husband who works in a travel company told me that:

‘Though I was born, brought up and educated in London, I was raised in a Turkish-Cypriot household where certain values are being constantly emphasised of which, protecting family reputation through successful education, exhibiting good manners, having a good job and marrying a reputable girl were important. Like many other Turkish-Cypriots, I was convinced that whatever I do would affect my family. In addition to familial influence, one is also exposed to different kind of socialisation at the school; among peers and play groups. Looking back, I could say that my schooling taught me to take important decisions personally such as job, where to live and more importantly whom to marry. But I should admit that I had always taken my family’s reactions seriously. In the case of my marriage, I received their support because they were convinced that I made a good choice of a girl whose family had also a good reputation’.

The wife’s account also confirms that the choice of the young generation is now more tolerated and accepted as long as it conforms to certain traditions and values. Her explanation suggests that a change is taking place within the Turkish community allowing more space for the views and personal preferences of the young generation. When asked how her parents and close relatives reacted to her marriage to someone outside their kin, she replied:

‘I had more or less same upbringing as my husband. Family values and relations with relatives had always been important, therefore when you are taking a decision you spontaneously are taking these factors into account. When I opened the subject of marriage to my mother, her first reaction was surprise and, maybe a shock rather than that of happiness because it was something she was not used to; and I think she had somebody else in mind for me to get married. My close relatives argued that he was not known by the family because he was out of our kin. Later, I found out that as soon as I told about my husband-to-be’s name and his family, my relatives started
making inquiries about who he was and whether his family had a good reputation. When the two families met upon our insistence, they found out that both families had more or less same sets of values and expectations. Although some close relatives expressed their disapproval at the very beginning, my parents convinced them that I made a good choice and they all participated in every stage of my marriage'.

This explanation also suggests that social networks are activated right at the beginning of a marriage process whether it is arranged by parents and relatives or an individual's choice, as long as it is approved. The following case study of a marriage between a young Turkish man from Berlin and a girl from Antalya, Turkey, confirms that family, friends, relatives and neighbours get involved at all stages of a marriage. The informant from Berlin was interviewed when he was making preparations to go to Antalya for the wedding ceremony. When asked how he found the prospective bride, he gave a typical reply suggesting that arranged marriages still persist especially for religiously oriented young people who do not favour male-female courtship for religious reasons. This informant explained:

'It was not me who found my fiancée but my brother's friend who lives in a nearby village to my parent's hometown. Though I did not have strict religious education, I read too many books on Islam which does not allow boyfriendship-girlfriendship relationships. I try to practise Islam and observe religious rules. During my university education in Berlin there were some girls around, but I was very much preoccupied with my studies and with spreading the message of Islam among my fellow Turkish students. When we started talking about marriage in my family, it became obvious that I was not in a position of finding a spouse. Then, we turned to my elder brother who had stayed in Turkey when my parents were moving to Germany. Before he started activating his contacts, I told him that I wanted to marry a practising religious girl'.

This was the first stage at which his relatives in Turkey became aware that their kin in Berlin had asked for their help which is of reciprocal importance for those in Turkey, and for those who work and live abroad. The second stage of the involvement of kin took place when the informant went to Turkey to meet the girl. Before he flew to Turkey, his brother went with his wife to see the girl and her family. This visit was arranged and accompanied
by a friend of his brother from a neighbouring village. After the visit, it was reported back to Germany that she was a suitable girl with good manners. When the informant arrived in Turkey, he went to meet the girl on a pre-arranged day. He was accompanied by his brother, uncle, his brother's friend and their wives. At the first visit he did not exchange any word with the girl but mostly replied to questions put forward by her family. After the meeting both sides liked each other and the respondent expressed his desire to talk to her before taking it any further. At the second meeting they talked about their expectations of marriage and exchanged ideas about their plans for the future. The meeting took place in the presence of the girl’s older-married sister and aunt. After the meeting he told his brother that he wanted to marry the girl if she also wanted this.

The next stage was to find out whether she wanted to marry him. The informant's sister-in-law talked to her and learned that the girl was ready to accept the proposal. What followed was a request for the girl's parental approval. When/if the girl's family approves of her decision then the male side is supposed to ask for the girl's hand⁷. In the case under study, the informant's brother and uncles visited the girl's family and formally told them that the informant wanted to get married to their daughter. Upon the approval of the girl's family, close family and kin members were invited to an informal party at the girl's parental house where sweets were offered⁸. Since the informant was on short leave, one week later a nisan (engagement) ceremony was organised, attended by relatives, close/distant kin, friends and neighbours to announce that these two youngsters had decided to get married and their families had agreed to this.

Nisan is seen as a period given to couples to get to know each other more and establish good relations. The significance of the engagement party as far as the kinship and friendship networks are concerned is the attendance of a large number of relatives at the ceremony. Relatives, acquaintances, neighbours and villagers at the party are expected to give presents to the new
couple. Offering gifts (*hediye vermek, taki takmak or para atmak/takmak*) are an important part of the marriage customs in Turkish society and this practice is still observed by the Turkish communities both in London and Berlin. The wedding ceremony (*dugun*), like the engagement party, provides a good opportunity to renew kin relations. Bainbridge (1986, p. 376) sees each wedding ceremony as ‘a microcosm’ of the Turkish community in London. Therefore the offering of gifts by the kin and relatives of both sides is repeated at the *dugun* ceremony.

As far as the network institutions among ethnic minority groups are concerned, the importance of exchanging gifts has been well documented. Anwar (1985, p. 67), in his study of the Pakistani community in Rochdale mentions that *Vartan Bhanji* as a mechanism for kinship network, which is based on gift exchange is widely practised and it strengthens the social networks among the Pakistanis. In a later study Shaw, (1988, p. 112) also shows that the practice of gift exchange known as *lena-dena* still persists among the Pakistanis in Oxford. The underlying feature of such a practice is the reciprocal nature of the gift exchange and the obligation it places on the ones who offer a gift. Shaw (1988, p. 124) notes that friends and relatives of the respective parties in Oxford give gifts at the various stages of marriage. Similar practices also takes place during Turkish weddings. At the wedding of the informant referred to above various kinds of gifts were given to the new couple as an expression of reciprocal concern of the relatives and family friends. Host families also feel obliged to offer gifts to those who have brought presents for their children when they are invited to similar ceremonies by their guests in the future.

5.5. Marriage and Religious Networks

As mentioned above a new marriage pattern is likely to develop outside Turkey when it takes place between individuals living in London and in Berlin. At the time of my fieldwork, I noticed that there was a new type of
network developing, in addition to that of kin and friendship networks. I would like to refer to it as a 'religious network' originating not in blood relations, neighbourhood or in village origin but by belonging to a particular religious movement which has an organisational structure in many European countries. Religious networks among Turkish immigrants in West European countries are determined by the nature of religious movements and their response to the problems faced by Muslims. Religious networks operate on the basis of a large number of members who are scattered in many countries but continue to communicate through visits, meetings, publications, common enterprises and centres of learning.

Religious groups such as Suleymanci, Nurcu, Sufi movements and religio-political groups such as the National Vision and the Turkish Federation, manage to exchange information on every aspect of their activities and problems (see Chapters Nine and Ten). Each group has centres in many European countries that subscribe to their headquarters mostly based in Germany due to the numerical intensity of the Turkish community in that country. Institutional forms of these movements operate at two levels. Local activities are organised within the reach of every organisation involving religious ceremonies, wedding ceremonies, celebrations of birth and circumcision, and observance of death rituals. Religious organisations try to organise a wide range of activities that can cover as many aspects of a minority community's life as possible. Social problems are at the forefront of these activities and family issues, child rearing and establishing Islamically sound marriages are frequently discussed within the local context. Such discussions could be translated into an international context at the time of annual general meetings or during the regular visits of leaders to their branches based in different countries, creating an excellent opportunity for the flow of information. Activities of religious organisations at international level require regular visits and frequent discussion of issues of common interest among which family, marriage and child-rearing seem to assume priority as the number of young people of marriageable age is increasing. At
the meetings organised by religious groups, families are provided with an opportunity to meet each other and encouraged to develop these relations further by visits beyond the boundaries of the Mosques or meeting halls. Religious families who have children of marriageable age may find it easier to search for a suitable match within the religious network, which provides an excellent reference by belonging to the same Islamic group.

My data suggest that religious families and Islamically educated young people within the Turkish community would like to marry someone who has similar tendencies. In many cases this is seen as the precondition of mutual understanding and compatibility. My interviews at the Mosques on marriage issues revealed that an ideal marriage is based on Islamic rules whereby religious rituals are observed and children are brought up according to Islamic principles. Such an approach to marriage and family life encourages some members of the same religious group to look for ‘in marriages’ within the group if/when it is possible. This kind of marriage may take place locally between the members of the same religious group or in the same neighbourhood or city. ‘In group’ marriage may also take place internationally, which means that such a marriage can be arranged between individuals living in different countries. The arrangement of ‘in group’ marriages depends on the involvement of a member in group activities, and the intensity and frequency of social interaction within a given religious network.

The marriage of a young Turkish man from London, who defines himself as a ‘religious person’, to a girl living in Berlin is a good illustration of an emerging pattern of marriage facilitated by the membership of a religious group. This informant told me that his marriage was arranged by an Imam. He said that he frequently visited the Imam and was an active member of the Jama’a. He knew that there were exchanges of visits between the Imam and people from other countries. During one of his visits to the Mosque, the Imam told the informant that he was hosting a family from Berlin. The visiting
family was also associated with the same group. The Imam used to discuss marriage issues with the Jama'a. This time, he told the informant that this family had a very good daughter and asked him if he would be interested in considering marriage. When the informant agreed to the Imam's suggestion, both families were informed. The Imam informed the parents of the girl and recommended the informant to them as a very good match for their daughter.

The Imams, as religious leaders, are respected and their word is taken as a reliable reference by the Jama'a. Issues around family and marriage are always discussed and the Imams are asked how a Muslim family should conduct themselves. Imams frequently mention the importance of family life to the Muslim community. It appears that these concerns confer a responsibility on Imams and senior members of the Jama'a. This responsibility is sometimes translated into arranging marriages within the same religious groups. It should be noted here that the involvement of an Imam or other respected people does not necessarily lead to a marriage as the consent of the two sides are seen as essential, because according to Islam forced marriages are not accepted.

The role of religious networks in making matches and arranging marriages is clearly seen among Sheikh Nazim's Sufi group in London. During my fieldwork, I interviewed some followers of Sheikh Nazim and learnt that a few of them had met their wives through their membership of the group. I talked to three men who had married 'within the group'. It is worth noting here that all these women were of national origin other than that of Turkish, who had converted to Islam some years before through the message of Sheikh Nazim and began to follow him at the meetings even in different countries. One informant who had married a German woman convert told me that he had seen her in London at a religious ceremony held in the Mosque where the Sheikh had come to deliver a sermon.
The informant who is of Cypriot origin joined the group in the late 1980s and never missed a meeting in London whenever the Sheikh came. When he saw the German convert, he approached one of the deputies of the Sheikh and asked him whether he could help him to find out if she was single. He said: ‘Since similar inquiries were made to the deputy Imam, he was not surprised and forwarded this message to his wife who made the inquiry among the women and found out that she was a single woman’. The Imam’s wife who was regarded by the informant as close as his own mother, played the role of mediator between the two sides and the German convert told her that she would consider marrying him ‘if the Sheikh approved’ it. This matter was taken to the Sheikh who is known as encouraging marriages between members of his followers as he believes that his disciples are more compatible with each other than to outsiders. The informant said that he had been called by the Sheikh and asked if his parents would also accept this German convert as a respectable bride. When asked for his reaction, the informant replied:

‘I was thrilled when my Sheikh called me and my father who came with me and told the Sheikh that they would be happy as long as the Sheikh approves this marriage and pray (dua) for them. In fact this call was a kind of urge for me to marry that woman who gave up her religion and accepted Islam. The Sheikh’s message to her was conveyed by the Imam’s wife and we got engaged after a while. As this process was taking place, we received support from all around us in the group because marriage is seen as an important institution leading to the establishment of family as the basic unit of an Islamic community’.

As soon as the engagement was announced, a religious wedding contract (dini nikah) took place in order to enable the couple to see each other in accordance with the Islamic rules. After six months engagement the couple married in Germany and the wedding ceremony was repeated in London and attended by the relatives, friends of the informant and some members of the Sheikh Nazim Jama’a. A similar wedding took place between a Turkish man and a French convert woman in the same community, facilitated by belonging to the same religious network. As this respondent told me, his marriage took place in almost the same way as the above case and went...
through the same process. These case studies suggest that 'out marriage' between different nationalities and unrelated individuals is transformed into 'in marriage' in the context of religious networks which provide a broad basis for belonging and proximity transcending nationality, ethnic background and kin boundaries.

The analysis of ethnographic data collected in London and Berlin clearly suggests that traditional family values, kin relations and social networks are constantly reproduced and expressed in the countries of settlement. As explained at the beginning of this Chapter, the temporary character of migration was replaced by permanent settlement as evidenced by the participation of Turks in social and economic life in the countries of immigration. Turks in London, as in Berlin, Cologne, Rotterdam, Paris etc., are no longer guest workers, but a permanent part of the wider society. One of the consequences of the tendency for a permanent settlement is the reunion of families and the re-establishment of Turkish family structures in London.

It is suggested in Figure 5.3., that kin and social networks are involved in every stage of immigration, settlement and post-settlement of Turkish immigrants. However, as a result of spatial movement, kin and social networks expanded and new allegiances were established. The expanded social networks were utilised in finding jobs, establishing joint-venture economic investments and even in arranging marriages. Marriage is still regarded as an important part of socialisation by the Turkish community. It is a prerequisite step 'to become a man' and 'to become a woman'. From a wide perspective, marriage means establishing a new household, forging new kin networks or restructuring the old ones, reproducing traditional family values, procreation, child rearing and transmitting shared values to young generations by reproducing conventional patterns of relationships and life styles within the Turkish family. Despite the concerted efforts of families towards continuity, some changes are taking place in families and in marriage practices. The young generation in particular, are trying to balance
the effects of change and continuity. Chapter Six and Seven will further explore the experiences of the young generation. It will be argued that young Turks are constantly negotiating and redefining their identities.
Chapter Five: Notes

1. For a list of kinship terms used in a Turkish village, see Stirling (1969) Turkish Village, p. 152-153

2. Derived from the word Birader, brother, Biraderi refers to kinship networks beyond the joint-extended family among Pakistani community (Anwar, 1979 p. 62). Saifullah Khan (1977, p. 61) defines Biradari (brotherhood) as 'an endogamous group whose members claim descent in the paternal line from a common male ancestor, but in certain contexts the word is used to refer to individuals or groups with whom there is a 'brotherly' and hence loyal relationship'. However, within the UK context, the Biradari assumes varying definitions which indicate more flexibility as observed by Shaw (1988, p. 99)

3. 'Trust' is seen as an important 'social capital'. In his recent book, Trust (1995), Fukuyama tries to explain the central role of 'trust' as a social capital produced by shared values for the mobilisation of economic resources. His views remind what Weber tried to establish in his seminal work, The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, that the origins of Capitalism should be sought in Protestant ethics. According to Fukuyama, the economic development in South Asia is largely based on social virtues such as social capital, common interest and shared values embedded in trust. Union around shared values, it is argued, is an effective source of solidarity which replaces individualism.


5. Gossip about the family and the girls also influence attitudes. For the meaning and role of gossip in a Turkish village community, see Stirling (1965), p. 240-246; A. L. Epstein's (1969, p. 117-127) noteworthy essay analyses how gossip, norms and social networks control the behavioural patterns.

6. This is known as gorucuye gitmek (to go to see the girl). At the first stage family members or relatives of the male side go to female's family to see her. If they decide that she should be seen by the their son, a second arrangement for gorucluk is made if the girl's family decides to accept further negotiations. In this case, the male candidate comes to see the girl (and to be seen by her) with his family elders.

7. This stage is referred as kiz istemek literally means 'asking for the girl'.

8. All close relatives (yakin akraba) were invited to this small ceremony known as tatli yemek/soz kesmek literally means eating sweet to mark the marriage promise expressed.
Chapter Six
Young Generation, Continuity And Change

The children of immigrant communities are variously referred to in the literature on immigration, race relations and ethnic identity as 'second generation', 'third generation', 'immigrant youth', or 'young generation'. In this thesis, I prefer to use the terms 'young generation' and 'young people' interchangeably to denote the children of immigrant Turkish communities. My usage of the term, 'young generation', includes not only children who were born in the country of immigration but also those who were born in the country of origin but joined their parents, or migrated with them, at an early age and participated in social and educational life in the receiving country.

6.1. Young Generation and Socialisation

Young generations are exposed to a different socialisation than that of their parents in the new setting. Their socialisation is characterised by different social and cultural values. In the case of the Turkish immigrant community, the first generation was socialised in Turkey or Cyprus where they grew up in a social and cultural environment surrounded by family, tradition and religion from an early age. The content of Turkish-Muslim identity is transmitted by the readily-found structural forces and agencies in the society which passed on its values to the children and therefore, helped in the construction of their identity.

Turkish parents who were born and raised in the country of origin did not experience most of what their children experienced in the country of immigration, where different social and cultural forces determine the contents and boundaries of identity. Among the readily-found structural forces and agencies in the country of origin, one can mention linguistic unity with the society, the traditional family structure and educational institutions that aim to create a national Turkish identity. Religious influences of the
Mosques, mystical orders and Qur'an courses teaching the traditional Islamic way of life may also be added to this list. In contrast to their parents, the young generation in the Turkish diaspora lack the influence of many of these institutions during the process of their socialisation while developing a sense of identity and belonging. Although some of the above factors exert their influence on the young generation, they are not only less persistent but also loosely rooted compared to Turkey/Cyprus. It should also be pointed out here that the influence of traditional Turkish and Islamic agents are countered and contested by the establishments of the host society where Turkish children spend the formative period of their life cycle.

The young Turkish generation experience continuity and change in the face of their upbringing in British society which provides a social and cultural order different from that of the Turkish environment. The changes the young generation experience are largely rooted in their socialisation and exposure to contextual factors. As I discussed in Chapter Three, this means that the identity development ‘is not simply an intrapsychic process, but also an interpersonal process, embedded in a social context’ (Phinney, 1993a, p. 47). The sociocultural context is recognised ‘as a determining factor in the process of ego-identity formation’ (Watermann, 1992, p. 54). Markston-Adam’s (1992, p. 174) findings also lend support to my argument that ‘social-contextual factors’ are influential in identity formation of the young generation. Markston-Adam argues that ‘identity formation is not wholly an individualistic process; rather, social environment exerts its forms of power and influence’.

In this Chapter, I will focus on the development of ethnic identity among the young Turkish generation. The process of continuity and change will be analysed in the formation of their identity. Since identity construction is a dynamic process, the young Turkish generation is constantly renegotiating and redefining their identity. The process of renegotiation and redefinition is an ongoing process as far as my respondents are concerned.
A number of studies have already been published on the Turkish young generation, focusing on several aspects of their life such as identity conflict, cultural clash, changes in their socialisation, educational problems, generational differences and transmission of traditional values and attitudes. The research material of these publications with one exception, were drawn from a sample of young Turks who were living in several immigrant receiving countries other than Britain. Whereas there is a lacunae of literature on young Turks in Britain, there is, however, an increasing number of publications on the young generation of other ethnic minorities in Britain. It might be expected that such literature would help us to understand the experiences of young Turks from a comparative perspective. Studies by Anwar (1976, 1994), Ballard (1979), and Weinreich (1979) among others are good examples of such efforts, providing an overview of other ethnic youth in Britain. In this context I also undertook a survey of young Turks and studied their attitudes and beliefs by using different variables of continuity and change which are presented below.

6.2. Characteristics of the Sample

The following findings are based on a survey, in-depth interviews and participant observation. As I have explained in Chapter Two, the survey was carried out at supplementary schools for Turkish students. Some of these students -21 males, 15 females- were interviewed at length. In the following analysis, the quantitative and qualitative data (from London and Berlin) will be presented together. The questionnaires were distributed among almost an equal number of both sexes to assess gender differences in relation to several variables (religion, culture, sexuality and birth control etc.). When the completed questionnaires were analysed, I discovered that there were 42 males and 51 females in the sample.

Since most of the earlier studies of identity formation focused on an age group of young people aged between 13 and 18 years old (Patterson et al.
1992, p. 15), I also tried to achieve a similar sample. Therefore, I chose supplementary schools for the survey. However, depth-interviews included young people outside the school. As Table 6.1 shows, a targeted sample of young Turks was achieved. Of the male respondents, 57 per cent come from the 12 to 15 age cohort whereas 43 per cent come from the 16 to 18 age cohort. As for the female sample, the 12 to 15 age cohort includes 71 per cent and the 16 to 18 age cohort includes 29 per cent of the female samples.

Table 6.1: Age distribution of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12-15</td>
<td>24 57</td>
<td>16-18</td>
<td>18 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-15</td>
<td>36 71</td>
<td>16-18</td>
<td>15 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 100</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reason for choosing such an age cohort is the contention that adolescence, and the years following are the formative period of identity acquisition. Phinney (1993b, p. 75) notes that 'during adolescence, many minority youth undergo a process of exploration and questioning about ethnicity in which they attempt to learn more about their culture and understand the implications of group membership. By exploring their culture, they can learn of its strengths and come to accept their culture and themselves'.

There is an increasing tendency among researchers to use concepts such as British-Pakistanis, British-Caribbeans, British-Muslims, French-Muslims and Dutch Muslims. This suggests that the country of settlement creates an hyphenated identity structure. As Table 6.2 shows, the majority of the respondents (68 per cent) were born and brought up in London. Therefore, it may be suggested that young Turks in Britain will also develop hyphenated identity.
Among the male respondents, 41 per cent stated that they were born in Turkey and had moved to London with their parents or joined them at a later stage. Similarly, 14 per cent were born in Cyprus. Those among the male respondents who were born in London comprised 45 per cent. The percentage with regard to female respondents and their birthplace, however, appeared to be different. Only six per cent said that their birthplace was Turkey and eight per cent said that they were born in Cyprus. The overwhelming majority of the female respondents (86 per cent) were born in London.

The figures on birthplace in Table 6.2. indicate that the major part of the respondents’ upbringing and socialisation is taking place in British society. As I discussed in Chapter Three, siblings of ethnic communities have to deal with multiple identities within a multicultural society where they are likely to adopt several aspects of different value systems. The young generation is influenced by the social forces and civic culture of the birthplace to which they develop an allegiance and sense of belonging. Therefore, it is highly likely that the terms such as British-Turks, German-Turks, Dutch-Turks, French-Turks, will soon appear in sociological literature.

It could be argued that the symbolic meaning and influence of the birthplace are increased by the length of stay. A prolonged length of stay in a multicultural society means a longer process of socialisation and acculturation of the immigrants’ children in terms of educational processes, peer group relations and media influences. As presented in Table 6.3., 45 per
cent of male and 86 per cent of female respondents had lived in London since their birth which means that Turkish girls had a longer period of socialisation in London.

Table 6.3: Length of living in London

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Since birth</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 years</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 years</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears that more than half of the male respondents (55 per cent) came to London at a later stage. Of these, 36 per cent who came with their families or joined them later had been living in London for 6 to 10 years. A smaller number of the male sample (19 per cent) had lived here for 1 to 5 years. As shown in Table 6.3., the female sample (68 per cent) primarily consisted of those living in London since their birth. Only six per cent of this gender group had lived in London for 6 to 10 years. Those who had lived in London between 1 and 5 years were also a small proportion of the female sample.

As mentioned earlier, this research includes both mainland and Turkish-Cypriot. Therefore it was expected that the respondents had different parental origins. Table 6.4. shows that parents of the respondents largely came from Cyprus and Turkey.

Table 6.4: Parental origins of the respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mother</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from the above table that 30 per cent of the respondents' mothers came from Turkey and 56 per cent came from Cyprus. There was a similar
pattern of the fathers' origins i.e., 34 per cent of the fathers had migrated to England from Turkey and 54 per cent had migrated from Cyprus. Among the parents of non-Turkish/Cypriot origin, there were one American and three English mothers, and one British-Italian father. Table 6.4. also suggests that the marriage pattern among Turkish community is largely confined to the country of origin. Although there are some marriages between Turks from mainland Turkey and Turks from Cyprus, it seems that the marriages of the first generation primarily took place in their own countries. It also appears that the respondents are the first Turkish young generation because the majority of the mothers (88 per cent) and fathers (90 per cent) came from Cyprus or Turkey. This means that the parents of the respondents are still the first generation, and that the respondents themselves comprise the first young generation of the Turkish community in Britain.

6.3. Young Generation and Family

I argued earlier that the family is the first social context of socialisation for children. In Chapter Five, I discussed the reproduction of traditional values and the role of the family in the transmission of such values to the young generation. This section will analyse the attitudes of the young generation towards living with family, parental control and generational differences. All the respondents in the sample were living with their parents at the time of my research. As presented in Table 6.1., the sample included young people aged between 12 and 18 who were not expected to leave home at an early age. Nevertheless, as Table 6.5. shows, some of the respondents expressed their wish to live on their own rather than with their parents.

Table 6.5: Attitudes towards living with parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Want living with parents</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want living on their own</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When asked ‘If you are living with your family, do you want to live on your own?’, 52 per cent of the male and 63 per cent of the female respondents replied that they would like to live with their family whereas 26 per cent of the male and 37 per cent of the female respondents said that they wanted to live on their own. As presented in Table 6.5., 58 per cent of the sample wanted to continue living with their parents as opposed to 32 per cent who did not want to live with their family for the reasons explained below.

When asked to explain why they wanted to live with their parents, a variety of replies were given. ‘Love’ and ‘attachment’ towards parents, ‘being loved’ by them, the ‘need to be protected’, ‘lack of confidence’ in living on their own at this very young age, were frequently mentioned as reasons for living with parents. One respondent (Female:14) said, ‘I love my parents and at the moment I do not have any problem with them. I know they love me as well. We have really a good relationship and I do not see any reason to leave them even if I become older’. Another respondent (Male:17) said:

‘We have strong family relationships nurtured by respect and sacrifice for the family. My parents are both working and they are doing it for us, to provide us with good education and good future. And I am aware of this. Time to time trivial problems occur as to when and where to go, but I do not think that I would like to live on my own for such simple matters’.

The ‘need for protection’ is another reason for living with parents as one respondent (Female:16) said, ‘I am only sixteen and I would like to continue my education. I need my family to support me in that without which I would not be able to finish my education. This is also their wish and expectation’. A similar pragmatic reason was voiced by another respondent (Female:17) who said, ‘I cannot live on my own yet. I need my family and their protection until I establish myself’. Those who expressed their wish to live on their own instead of with their families mostly gave reasons such as ‘lack of independence’, ‘to have more freedom’ and ‘proving their self’. One respondent, for example, (Male:17) mentioned ‘responsibility’ as his reason
for living on his own. He said 'I want to be responsible for my life and I want to prove to my parents that I can manage looking after myself'. Similar replies came from some other males and females. This suggests that some young people are trying to show that they have attained maturity which would justify their claim for more freedom and responsibility. But the more common reason 'to live on their own' appeared to be the 'constraints' exercised by the parents on the behaviour of young people. An 18-year old girl summed up her feelings in a paradoxical expression. She said:

'To be honest, I do not have big problems with my family except that they are overprotective which sometimes becomes unbearable and limits my social activities. I would like to have more freedom. I want them to trust me. On the other hand, I understand that they want to protect me and I respect it, but when it becomes too constraining I wish that I was living on my own'.

Another respondent (Female:16) who thought that she was more confined to domestic activities compared with her brother and wanted to have equal freedom said: ‘My parents allow my brother to go out and he wears whatever he likes. When it comes to me, they always interfere. If I lived on my own I could do what I wanted and when I wanted’. As this reply shows, some of the girls do not want to be accountable for whatever they do and wish to receive equal treatment with boys. One can suggest from these findings that the girls in Turkish families are more strictly controlled than the boys. It appears that the reputation of the girls is more central than the reputation of the boys. If a boy is seen with a girl this is usually regarded as a matter of temporary enjoyment for the boys and most of the families, except those religious families who believe that chastity must be equally observed by both sexes, tolerate such forms of behaviour as the community does not condemn these acts. However, when it comes to girls, the preservation of chastity suddenly becomes a centrally important issue and therefore girls' behaviour is more closely watched over since any act of wrong doing, such as going out with unrelated boys, would bring shame and damage the reputation of the family.'
Parental control is further documented by the findings in Table 6.6, which show that 33 per cent of the male and 73 per cent of the female respondents felt that their parents exercised 'too much' control over them.

Table 6.6: Parental control as perceived by the respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too much</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not too much</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that those who did not feel too much parental control comprised 45 per cent of the males and 27 per cent of the females. Overall, more than half of the respondents (55 per cent) found parental control 'too much' whereas 35 per cent of the respondents felt that their parents did not have too much control over their behaviour. The figures in Table 6.6 confirm my earlier observation that parents place stricter control on the girls.

I have mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter and in Chapter Three that the children of ethnic communities within a multicultural society face different sets of cultural values. The young generation may sometimes adopt the culture of the larger society which might conflict with the parental culture. The existence of multiple identities may lead to disagreements between parents and the young generation. As presented in Table 6.7, generational differences emerged between Turkish parents and the young generation. This suggests that the Turkish young generation are developing different attitudes against the wishes of their parents. Generational differences on several issues give rise to disagreements and tensions between parents and their children.
When asked whether they had disagreements with their parents, the majority of the male (69 per cent) and female (90 per cent) respondents said that they did have disagreements with their parents. Only 12 per cent of the males and 10 per cent of the females felt that they had no disagreements with their parents. When the total figures are compared, one can observe that the great majority of the respondents have some kind of disagreements with their parents. Eighty one per cent of the total sample were experiencing disagreements whereas only 11 per cent of them seemed to give in to parental demands. When asked what kind of issues were at the centre of disagreements, respondents mentioned several points of conflict most of which may be directly related to the parental culture. Among the frequently mentioned issues were the 'type of clothing', 'make-up', 'meeting and socialising' with the opposite sex, 'spending time outside' the house, 'restriction of freedom', 'friendship with non-Muslims and non-Turks', 'schooling', 'plans for the future', and the ways in which their 'marriages' would be arranged. Generational differences and conflicts rooted in cultural and religious values of the parents appear to be a common feature of Muslim communities. Anwar (1976, p. 20-35), for example, explored cultural and religious attitudes of parents and children in a survey of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims in Britain. He also found differences between the generations on several issues. In a later research carried out on the Pakistani Muslims, he reported (1985, p. 60) that at least three issues (wearing western clothes, arranged marriages and limitation of freedom) emerged as areas of disagreement which affected the relations between Pakistani parents and their children.
When the content of the disagreements and conflicts between young Turks and their parents were analysed, two facts emerged: 1- Most of the issues of conflict are rooted in the traditional and cultural values of the parents; 2- The young generation are distancing themselves from some of the values of parental culture by internalising social attitudes of the wider society. These observations suggest that a process of change and deeper integration in the surrounding society are becoming influential forces shaping the identity of the Turkish young generation in Britain.

I discussed in Chapter Five how Turkish families try to keep their honour intact. The reputation and chastity of a girl is very important for the honour of the family. Therefore parents watch their daughters' behaviour more closely and limit their actions if they feel it necessary for the protection of family reputation and honour. Table 6.6. and 6.7. showed that the young generation, especially girls, feel that their parents are overprotective and have too much control over them. Therefore they have disagreements with their parents. One of the frequently-mentioned issues of conflict for girls was parental disapproval of friendship choices. As seen in Table 6.8., a sharp contrast emerged between parental approval/disapproval of girl/boyfriend relationships for boys and girls, as perceived by the respondents.

Table 6.8: Parental attitudes towards girl/boyfriend relationships as perceived by the respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not approve</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked 'Do you think that your parents would approve of your having a girl/boyfriend if they knew?', 64 per cent of the male respondents said that their parents would approve of them having a girl friend. As opposed to the
males, only 12 per cent of the girls thought that their parents would tolerate such a relationship.

Findings on parental attitudes towards boy/girl friendship among their children confirm the pattern I have proposed earlier that allows boys to have more freedom whereas it presupposes stricter control over the girls. These figures clearly indicate that boys were raised more freely and enjoyed a wider toleration, whereas moral codes relating to boy/girl friendships were more strictly applied to the behaviour of the girls. When asked what might be the reasons behind the disapproval of their parents, respondents generally used value-laden terminology such as ‘they are strict’ (Female:15), ‘they are typical Turks’ (Female:13), ‘they do not expect us to do such things’ (Female:14), ‘because of religion’ (Male:16), ‘they are not open minded’ (Female:14), ‘they are old-fashioned and do not trust boys’ (Female:18), ‘they think I am too young’ (Male:15), ‘it is not right until you get married’ (Male:17), ‘they do not want me to go behind their back’ (Female:17), ‘they do not want me to get harmed’ (Female:15), ‘they want me to concentrate on my education and career’ (Male:17). When the same question was asked to a mature female university student she said:

‘Problem of honour was the central issue for my parents when I was 15-16 years old. At times, I felt apart, dealing with conflicting family values. I was mixing up with other young people who had different attitudes towards sexuality. With the passage of time, excessive protection of my parents subsided and since we did not have immediate family who might talk behind us, my parents came to accept my choice. But this was a difficult and painful experience’.

Parents who were interviewed were more concerned with the chastity of their daughters than their sons. According to parents, girls are more vulnerable and need more protection. One mother who has two daughters and one son argued that ‘girls need more control’. When asked why she thought that ‘girls need more social control’, she said ‘Streets are full of danger for our children, especially for girls. Drugs, sex and prostitution are increasing. These are threatening our children. We must protect them, especially girls, because they
can be easily deceived'. While conversation was taking place the father intervened and said: 'I do not want my daughters to go around with boys and sleep with them. This is totally unacceptable. And if we allow them to go out with boys and tolerate such loose behaviour, one day they will harm themselves and us both. As you know, girls are the namus (honour, reputation) of the family and namus must be protected'. This is a typical reply of most parents who, more or less, used identical words and concepts when referring to differences between boys and girls and explaining why girls should be more closely watched over.

One can observe in the statement of parents that boys are not thought to damage the namus and reputation of the family. In order to find the grounds for parental justification of their different approach to boys, some parents were asked why they treated boys and girls differently. But before asking this question I reminded them that religious values discourage both sexes from going out with the opposite sex, and male chastity is considered as important as female chastity. The responses of parents led me to conclude that differing attitudes towards girls have much to do with cultural practices, not necessarily rooted in Islamic beliefs. Therefore, the justification of parents cannot be based totally on religious grounds. Had it been so, they should have developed the same attitudes spontaneously towards their sons because religious principles apply equally to both sexes.

6.4. Language and Culture

It is argued that language is one of the first elements of immigrant culture to disappear over the generations (Waters, 1990, p. 116). In order to counterbalance this trend, one of the main concerns of the Turkish families has always been teaching of the mother tongue to their children as language is regarded as an indispensable part of Turkish culture. Turkish parents feel that teaching the mother tongue will enable children to learn more about Turkish society, its history and customs. More importantly it is believed that
Turkish is regarded as a key to establishing effective communication between the generations. Many parents feel that not being able to communicate in Turkish is a strong sign of a loss of identity. I will explain in Chapter Eight that in order to prevent such a loss of identity, supplementary weekend classes were organised by the Turkish organisations and a number of teachers were invited from Turkey and Cyprus. As it will be shown in Chapter Nine, Mosques were also involved in teaching Turkish language in addition to religious subjects. To what extent these efforts have born fruit is shown in Table 6.9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English/Turkish</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked 'in which language(s) are you fluent?', 13 per cent of the respondents stated that they were fluent 'only' in English and six per cent said that they were fluent 'only' in Turkish. As shown in the above table, a great majority (72 per cent) of the respondents claimed that they were fluent in 'both' English/Turkish. Nevertheless, these figures should be treated with some caution for several reasons. First of all, the survey was carried out in supplementary schools where children are taught Turkish. Therefore, the findings on language represent the situation of young people who were taking Turkish education. It is difficult to generalise these findings for those who have not received such an education. The second reason is directly related to the sample under question. Although 72 per cent of the respondents claimed to be fluent in Turkish, none of them asked for a questionnaire prepared in Turkish. All of the participants asked to have forms prepared in English. Therefore, it can be argued that the young generation might be fluent in spoken Turkish but they are not fluent in
written Turkish as they refused to fill in the questionnaires in Turkish. This argument is supported by the fact that children learn Turkish mostly at home through conversations within the family. Therefore their Turkish language skills are not attained through a formal education in reading and writing. Therefore, children may not be expected to be as fluent in reading and writing as they would be in spoken Turkish. The third reason for caution in looking at these figures is the fieldwork observation recorded during the research and after the interviews.

As I explained in Chapter Two, before the start of the in-depth interviews with young informants they were asked whether they wanted to conduct the conversation in Turkish or in English. As it happened, many started conversing in Turkish, but when complex questions were asked on culture, religion and identity most of them switched to English. Then interviews continued in both languages. Questions that required straightforward replies were answered in Turkish, whereas questions such as what religion meant to them were answered in English. That led me to believe that in simple daily conversations most of the respondents were fluent in Turkish but in the exploration of ideas and expression of feelings they seemed to be more comfortable using English.

Families who are concerned about the language education of their children speak Turkish at home to encourage the younger members of the family to improve their Turkish. In order to find out the extent to which the use of Turkish and English dominates the family atmosphere, young people were asked which languages they spoke at home. As Table 6.10. shows, a very small number (only two per cent) of the respondents speak 'only' English at home, and 12 per cent speak 'only' Turkish.
Table 6.10: Languages spoken at home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Spoken at Home</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish/English</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Turkish</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only English</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.10 also shows that both languages are spoken in most of the Turkish households. Seventy six per cent of the respondents said that bilingual usage of language was taking place within their families. Van der Lans and Rooijackers (1996, p. 181) reported contrasting findings over the use of languages at home among young Turks in the Netherlands. They found that Turkish youth with 'exclusive Turkish ethnic identity', almost 100 per cent, preferred speaking Turkish at home whereas 37.5 per cent of the subjects with 'dual ethnic identity' indicated that Dutch and Turkish were used equally within the family context.

As mentioned earlier, young Turks seem to be fluent in both languages in daily conversations. They are able to deal with using both languages in the family context where parents and the older generation prefer speaking Turkish. Nevertheless, drawing upon my findings, I would like to suggest that there is an increasing concern among the Turkish community about the language fluency and communication between generations. The case of a Turkish-Cypriot family typifies this growing problem among many families. The parents in this family knew only a little English when they came to London. As the father explained, there had not been a great deal of improvement in his English since he was working in a car-repair shop owned by a Turkish person where everybody spoke Turkish. He only improved his English to the level he needed at work. His wife's case was much worse in terms of learning English, as she was mostly confined to their council flat. At the time of interview this informant had four children, two of whom were at
the school age, of which one was on the threshold of adolescence. During a visit to their flat I noticed that English was the only language of communication within the family, but neither the father nor the mother was articulate in using English. Similarly, the children were not able to converse in Turkish. When asked how they communicated and resolved problems, the informant said:

‘Well, this is our main problem. My English is not enough to explain my opinions on matters such as their education, our culture, religion and traditions. Neither can they understand Turkish properly. There is certainly a lack of communication which is growing. And that worries me quite a lot’.

Some families send their children to Turkish classes at supplementary schools to overcome this lack of communication with their children. The number of young people at supplementary classes is steadily increasing. According to a recent estimate by the Turkish Educational Attaché in London, there are more than 2,500 students attending supplementary classes on the Turkish language and culture. As the figures in 6.10. imply, the first young generation seem to have gained knowledge of Turkish. At least they have fluency in daily conversations. But it remains a question whether subsequent generations will acquire adequate language skills in Turkish.

Tables 6.9. and 6.10. established that the young generation were bilingual and that they used both languages in conversing within their families. However, when they were asked which language they would ‘prefer’ in their daily conversations with their family and Turkish friends, a different pattern of attitudes towards the use of Turkish emerged, which suggests that the young generation feel more comfortable and fluent in using English. As presented in Table 6.11., 27 per cent of the respondents told that they would prefer speaking Turkish whereas 63 per cent of them told that they prefer using English as a medium of communication in their conversations.
Table 6.11: Preference of language during daily conversations with family and Turkish friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked why they would prefer a particular language in their conversation with family members and Turkish friends, similar replies were given which revolved around the issues of ‘speaking and understanding better’, ‘feeling more comfortable’, ‘being more fluent’, ‘expressing oneself better’, ‘natural and spontaneous reaction’, and ‘one’s own language’. A fifteen year-old female informant said, ‘Well I know English better than Turkish. If it is convenient I prefer speaking in English’. A typical reply came from a 17 year-old male respondent who said ‘I can speak English better and it comes naturally. When it comes to Turkish, I can speak it too, but not as natural as my English’. A seventeen year-old interviewee also made a remark that can be generalised for other young people. She said: ‘Although I can speak both languages fluently, I can express myself better in English. I think our education, television, films and books all contribute to that. When I want to say something, English comes naturally and I feel more comfortable when I use it instead of Turkish’.

As shown in Table 6.11., 27 per cent of the respondents stated their preference for Turkish. One respondent (Male:16) gave the following reason for his preference: ‘Well this is our language and I want to improve it by practising’. Another one (Male:17) said: ‘We are Turkish and we must learn it. Look at Greeks and Pakistanis for example. They all know their language. Why then should not we learn and use it in our daily conversations’. The high rate (63 per cent) of preference to use English by the Turkish young generation suggests that, the mother tongue is gradually loosing its value as a medium of communication.
As I discussed in Chapter Three, immigrants and their children face acculturation and assimilation as a consequence of living in a different society where they are exposed to cultural influences. Chapter Five showed that the Turkish community try to reproduce Turkish traditions and values. Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten, on the other hand, explain that several organisations were established for transmission of these values to the young generation who have to deal with the cultural values of the Turkish community and with the influence of British society. The identification of the young generation with Turkish traditions and values can be seen as one of the indices of cultural assimilation. To find out the young generation's attitude towards their own cultural values, the following question was asked: 'Do you think that Turkish traditions and values should be preserved while living in Britain?'. As Table 6.12. shows, a significant number (76 per cent) of the respondents said that Turkish traditions and values should be preserved.

Table: 6.12: Attitudes towards the preservation of Turkish traditions and values while living in England

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should be preserved</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should not be preserved</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question did not specify what Turkish 'traditions' and 'values' were. This allowed the young people to express their views on what Turkish 'traditions' and 'values' meant for them. The terms 'tradition' and 'culture' were understood to include 'religion', 'Islam', 'language', 'chastity', 'family', 'religious and national festivals', 'respect', 'identity', 'marriage' and 'origin/roots'. These words were most frequently mentioned by the respondents when they wanted to explain what they understood by Turkish traditions and values, and why they thought that these traditions and values should be preserved. One respondent (Male:18) referred directly to Islam when this question was asked to him and said 'Islam is our religion, a way of
life and a source of identity which is deteriorating. We should keep our identity. For some young Turks there was a direct correlation between tradition, religion and identity as a 17 year-old male explained: 'You cannot be a proper Turk without being a Muslim. Look at the Jewish people in this country. They stick to their religion which keeps their identity strong. Therefore we also have to respect our religion and preserve religious values, celebrate religious festivals'.

Traditions as 'origin/roots' were mentioned by a number of respondents who thought that traditions were the origins of their identity. One respondent (Female:15) explained: 'It is important to know your tradition and your culture. No matter where we live these are our origins/roots. And we have to respect and preserve these origins/roots wherever we are. It should not make any difference in what country you are living'. A seventeen year-old female respondent went on saying, 'I have got to know whole my family, where they come from, what they believe in. If I don't learn my cultural background I will lose my identity. Therefore we should never forget our culture and values'. These findings suggest that, parents and other family members appear to have managed to persuade their children of the importance and significance of traditional Turkish culture and values. Nauck’s findings on the children of Turkish immigrants in Germany confirm this observation. His study on the intergenerative transmission of cultural values in Turkish families in Germany found that:

'in spite of all intergenerational differences in attitudes and behaviour, the results reveal that intergenerative transmission is an essential and integral part of the socialisation of the 'second generation'. Despite all the differences between the generations in their assimilation behaviour and their behaviour to the receiving society, the dense interaction structure of the migrant families obviously results at the same time in a high level of co-ordination between generations in their basic value orientations and action preferences' (Nauck, 1994, p. 134; 1995, p. 82,83).

Family life provides or imposes a social and cultural atmosphere for identity development. As Waters (1990, p. 19) puts it, the 'ethnic identification
involves both choice and constraint. Children learn both the basic facts of their family history and the cultural content and practices associated with their ethnicity in their household. A thirty year-old single female interviewee who was brought to London when she was eight years old summed up the attitudes of the young generation when I asked her how she felt about Turkish traditions and values:

'I think that traditions and values are parts of my identity. They are significant for me, not only because I was born in Turkey but also I still live with my parents who stick to these values and more importantly such traditions and values are the only part of Turkey we can have even on a symbolic level. I understand that there is a difference between Turkish and British identity, but I do not think that having one of them necessarily negates and rejects the other one. In my case for example, though I am fairly integrated into British society and absorbed being British, it is still important for me to have a Turkish identity'.

However, as seen in Table 6.12., 13 per cent of the respondents differed from the majority and said that they would not totally support the preservation of traditions and values. The differences in attitudes surface more in relation to some cultural concerns that are regarded as constraining the choices of the young generation. Arranged marriage was the most often mentioned traditional practice that girls especially would like to see abandoned. One informant (Female:17) expressed her partial disapproval of traditions as: 'I am Turkish and respect the traditions but I feel that traditions should not be so strict and our opinions should also be valued. Arranged marriage is one of the traditions that I do not want it to be imposed on me. I do not refuse all the traditions but some of them should accommodate changes at least'. Anwar's (1994, p. 27) findings on young Muslims' attitudes towards arranged marriages are similar to that of my findings. Anwar points out that 47 per cent of his respondents disagreed with the custom of arranged marriage and 53 per cent thought that children's marriages should be arranged by themselves. Another respondent (Female:16) expressed her disappointment with the unequal treatment of boys and girls. She saw the roots of overprotection of girls in the tradition and wished that girls would be
recognised for being as responsible as the male members of the family and the community. She referred to the concept of chastity and honour of the family and said:

'When we (girls) want to meet our friends and spend time with them our mothers suddenly become our guardians and always limit the time and they control whom we are meeting. They do not tell us but we feel that they are checking on us. As you know, when a Turkish girl is seen with a male friend, let alone a boyfriend, everybody starts circulating a rumour about the girl. If a boy does the same thing, nobody takes notice of his behaviour. If that is the tradition you are asking about, it should be changed and not preserved at all'.

Restrictive parental practices towards the girls is not only peculiar to the Turkish Muslim community in Britain. Ballard (1979, p. 117) and Joly (1995, p. 167) observed a similar phenomenon among South Asians and the Pakistani Muslim community. They note that some Pakistani Muslims are more lenient to boys than girls. Boys are allowed to go to cafés and discos and socialise with girls. Pakistani girls, however, are not allowed to follow the same pattern of behaviour and are more closely controlled. Similar findings on young people of Turkish and Pakistani origin suggest that both communities have corresponding cultural values. These similar cultural values seem to centre around chastity and the reputation of the girls and family honour.

As presented in Table 6.2., the majority of the respondents (68 per cent) were born and brought up in London. Thirty two per cent of the respondents, on the other hand, were either born in Turkey or in Cyprus, but as Table 6.3. shows they joined or came with their families at an early age. This means that the young people in the sample spent their childhood in Britain and were educated here. Therefore, it may be expected that the young generation might have developed a sense of attachment to the country where they were born and brought up. Families, on the other hand, constantly remind their children about where they come from and take them to Turkey and Cyprus. As
presented in Table 6.13., young people are developing multiple allegiances and attachment to Turkey/Cyprus and England.

Table 6.13: Attitudes towards parent's country of origin and Britain. Where respondents feel happier?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus/Turkey</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked ‘where do you feel happier, in England or in Turkey/Cyprus?’, 30 per cent of the respondents replied that they feel happier in Turkey/Cyprus when they visit the country. A sixteen year-old male respondent explained his source of happiness as ‘There, it is easy to communicate with people. I can make friends easily than here. I feel that I am a part of the community in Turkey whereas here I am only an ordinary individual’. Another respondent (Female:17) said that she felt happier when she went to Cyprus. When asked why, she said: ‘Because of the safe environment. I feel more safe and less protected in Cyprus where I am allowed to go out more freely. I can not feel that much safe here and therefore my parents are more strict’. As this reply suggests, the young generation are given more freedom because of the nature of the society in the country of origin where exposure to threat is thought to be much less. Another reason for feeling happy in Turkey/Cyprus was expressed by a 17 year-old female respondent who said: ‘I like being with my own people who understand my background. In Cyprus, there is no racism and you are treated equally’. It seems that the experience of racism, discrimination and disrespect to one’s own culture alienate some young people from the society they live in and encourage them to develop a positive attitude to the country of origin.

In contrast to those who felt more comfortable in Turkey/Cyprus, 28 per cent of the respondents said that they were more at home in England. When asked
why she felt more at home in England rather than Cyprus, a 15 year-old girl who visits Cyprus every year with her parents, said that England was her birthplace. She had spent all her life in England where she had made friends and received her education. Although she enjoyed visiting Cyprus for a short time, she did not feel a strong attachment to the country and its people as much as her parents did. She said: 'I see Cyprus as a holiday spot. I like being there for sometime and see my relatives. But I cannot imagine living there for a lifetime as I am used to a different kind of life in England. My parents' village is a very small one compared to London and not everything is available there'. A seventeen year-old respondent expressed similar reasons for his preference for living in England rather than in Turkey. He said:

'Well, it is fun to go to Turkey and have a holiday. But when I stay there for a month or so I start missing our home in London and my friends here. Since I go to Turkey once a year and stay in a small village where my parents came from, I get really bored and want to come back soon. Moreover, I feel less restricted here. When I am in Turkey everybody tells me what to do, but here in London only my parents remind me of things to be done or refrained'.

In addition to those who feel more at home in Turkey/Cyprus or England, there is a significant number of Turkish young people who seem to have developed a neutral attitude towards the country of their parents and their own birthplace. As Table 6.13. shows, 42 per cent of the respondents said that living either in England or in Turkey/Cyprus would not make much difference. The explanation of a young girl, aged 18, clearly describes the development of a balanced attitude towards both countries. When asked why she did not feel any difference between these places, she said:

'I think that I learned to be capable of living in both countries and both cultures. First of all, I was born in London and raised here. I feel that I am a member of this society. But, there is also another side of the coin. I remember that, since my childhood Turkey was a central place of visit and was dominating the conversations at home. We were always told that our roots were in Turkey and I felt that my parents were right. As many of my friends, I came to the conclusion that we did not have to get rid of what our parents presented to us as national and cultural heritage. I can say now that, although I am not an active member of the society in Turkey, I still feel that I am member of the same culture'.
Similar division of attachment and development of multiple allegiances are observed among the young generation of Greek origin. It was reported in *Observer Life* (4 February 1996, p. 21) that a young Greek man who was born in Greece but who had spent most of his life in England experienced a divided identity; a split sense of belonging between two places, his birthplace and where he lived. When asked whether he felt English or Greek in an interview, he replied: 'That is a very difficult [question]. I don't really know how to answer it. My heart and my soul are Greek, 'cos I was born there. Yet my education and, I suppose, my business style are very much English. I suppose I'm neither one nor the other. And yet, I am both'.

As mentioned earlier, parents exercise pressure on their children to develop commitment to their own country, society and its values. As presented in Table 6.13, 28 per cent of the respondents do not seem to have been influenced by these pressures while 30 per cent seem to have developed the desired attitude towards their parent's country. The majority of the respondents, on the other hand (42 per cent) seem to have developed a different strategy which accommodates both countries and both societies. In earlier research, Liebkind (1988, p. 186) also found a similar pattern among Turkish youth in Sweden regarding the country of origin. According to her findings, 28 per cent of Turkish respondents felt more at home in Sweden, 26 per cent felt more at home in the country of origin and 39 per cent felt equally at home both in Sweden and in Turkey.

6.5. Sexuality

I discussed in Chapter Five that traditional family values are reproduced within the Turkish community. Earlier in this Chapter, I also noted that parents try to control their children, especially girls are discouraged from going out with unrelated males as this is thought to damage the honour of the family. This section will analyse the attitudes of the young generation towards relations with the opposite sex, sexuality and sexual behaviour. The analysis of the young people's attitudes towards these issues will enable us to
understand continuity and change in their perception of Turkish culture and traditions. As Table 6.14. shows, despite parental insistence and cultural discouragement, the young people are developing a more accommodating attitude towards social meetings with the opposite sex.

Table: 6.14: Attitudes towards pre-marital male-female social meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not approve</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have no idea</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked ‘Do you approve of pre-marital male-female social meetings?’, 13 per cent of the respondents replied that they would not approve of such relations. It seems that cultural values, family pressure and religious beliefs have influenced this group. One respondent (Male:17) said: ‘It is against our religion and as I can see from my friends, such relations lead to too many problems. I do not go out with other girls. And I do not want my sister to go out with boys’. One female respondent, aged 17, on the other hand, mentioned social pressure rooted in the culture of the Turkish community. She said: ‘I do not go out with boys because my family is strongly against it. If a boy goes out with girls and does whatever he likes, nobody talks about him. But when a girl goes out and is seen in the street, even with a classmate, everybody talks behind her and her family. I do not want to hurt my family with the gossip around. Therefore, I refrain from socialising with boys and go out with girls, and even this is limited’.

It seems that the circulation of gossip about the behaviour of girls has wide implications, and functions as a social control on the female generation. de Vries’ (1995, p. 39) findings on Turkish girls in the Netherlands supports my argument that gossip becomes an effective means of social control. de Vries also found that young Turkish girls are in a situation similar to that of their counterparts in England. After interviewing twenty five Turkish girls, aged
between 16 to 25, de Vries analysed the implications of gossip for the girls and for their families. She explains that 'most girls live surrounded, to a varying degree by compatriots who see it as their task to keep watch over the girls' behaviour: they must be chaste and remain Turkish..'., and if they become a subject of gossip, 'this will be directed, not only against her, but also against her parents' (de Vries, 1995, p. 39). As mentioned earlier, involvement of some members of the community in the circulation of gossip and the resulting damage to the parent's reputation produce social pressure which forces the girls to behave along the lines laid down by cultural attitudes towards male-female socialising.

Table 6.14 shows that 33 per cent of the respondents said that 'they have no idea' about male-female outings whereas more than half (54 per cent) of the youngsters said that 'they approve pre-marital male-female social meetings'. The responses of the young generation indicate that a change is taking place in the attitudes of London-born and bred children in contrast to family pressure to conform to parental values. One respondent (Female:17), for example, challenged her parents' views on male-female outings and said: 'We are living in a different society. It might have been really wrong in their own village, but here is not their village. What is wrong with seeing your male friends? My parents say it is wrong. Why? Because that is the culture. I do not believe that this is the culture. If it was the culture it should have been the same for the boys as well'. Another respondent (Female:18) also argued that parents must change their minds on certain issues such as male-female relations. She said: 'What harm you can get by seeing your friends? I always want to remain honest to my parents, but if they try to control everything, then I am forced to do things in secret. I think our parents should be more open minded and have more toleration as they have for my brothers'. This was also mentioned by several other female respondents. Some of them implied that their parents were using 'double-standards' in the treatment of boys and girls. Many female respondents explicitly accused their parents of not being fair to them and of being too restrictive on their social life. As
shown in Table 6.14., young people are developing a more approving view towards male-female social meetings which are not accepted by their community. Table 6.8., on the other hand, shows that parents do not approve of girls' relations with boys, whereas boys are tolerated if they have a girlfriend. The findings in the following Table not only confirm the findings in Table 6.8., but also indicate that young Turkish girls are trying to conform to the attitudes of their parents.

Table 6.15: Having a girl/boy friend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has a girl/boy friend</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has a girl/boy friend</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not have a girl/boy friend</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked, 'Do you have a boy/girl friend?', an expected pattern of reply emerged. The analysis of the replies shows that there is a significant difference between the genders in relation to boy/girl friendships. Sixty nine per cent of the male respondents said that they had a girlfriend whereas only 27 per cent of the females admitted having a boy-friend. In contrast to boys, 73 per cent of the girls replied that they 'have no boy-friend', whereas 31 per cent of the boys said that they 'have no girl-friend'. These findings support my earlier argument that parents are more lenient towards their sons and the community has less social control over the behaviour of its male members. As Table 6.15. confirms, more social control is exercised over the girls.

The attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relations also indicate that there is continuity and change among the young generation. Pre-marital sexual relationships are strongly rejected by the traditional Turkish culture and religious values. As presented in Table 6.16., some of the young people are still conforming to cultural and religious values and some of them are developing new attitudes which are in conflict with parental culture.
When asked, 'Do you approve of pre-marital sexual relationships?', 14 per cent of the respondents did not reply to the question on the grounds that this was a personal matter. When the replies were analysed, a contrasting pattern of attitudes emerged between the males and the females. Fifty five per cent of the male respondents said that they would approve of pre-marital sexual relations whereas 33 per cent of the female respondents expressed the same attitude. In contrast to males, 53 per cent of the females said that 'they would not approve of pre-marital sexual relations'. The contrast between males and females can be attributed to the values of the Turkish community and to the attitudes of parents and the community who set different social roles for boys and girls.

It may be argued that a high approval rate of culturally and religiously prohibited practice indicates a meaningful change in the attitudes of the young generation towards sexuality. Forty three per cent of the total sample expressed their approval of pre-marital sexual relations. Since respondents were reluctant to talk about the subject, I can only make suggestions, based on my observations, as to why a high number of the respondents approved of such relations despite the strict Islamic prohibition. It may be argued that the first generation was not very successful in transmitting religious values to their children. It may also be suggested that the young people are adopting some of the values of the larger society where such relations are regarded as natural and practised by their peers. Nevertheless, while cultural changes are taking place which influence the identity development of the young generation, as much as 43 per cent of the respondents seem to display a

Table 6.16: Attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not approve</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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continuity in their attitudes and behaviour. The tension between chance and continuity will remain as long as the young generation is exposed to conflicting value systems and multiple group belonging. However, whether one of -or which of- these forces will overcome the other remains as an open question.

In addition to sexual relations, young people were also asked for their views on birth control. They were asked if they approved of birth control. Eleven per cent of the respondents gave negative answers as presented in Table 6.17., and said that they would not ‘normally’ approve of birth control. Twenty seven per cent of the respondents stated that they would approve of birth control ‘under some circumstances’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normally yes</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normally no</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under some circumstances</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than half of the respondents (54 per cent), on the other hand, said that they would approve of birth control. During the interviews, only a few respondents were willing to talk about the reasons behind their approval or disapproval. Those who approved of birth control gave almost same reasons emphasising ‘choice’ and ‘control’ over their own lives. One informant (Female:17) who volunteered to talk about this said: ‘I think that this a personal issue which must be decided by the individual concerned. I do not think that we can look after too many children. Personally, I approve of birth control which means I decide and control my own life’. The reply was a typical one which suggests that young people would like to be less influenced by external agents when they are making their own decisions.
6.6. Friendship Patterns and Identification Figures

Friendship patterns of the Turkish young generation suggest that the majority of them still choose their peers from, or are encouraged to be friends with the same ethnic group. In order to see whether a pattern of friendship dominated by one group exists they were asked 'are your friends mostly Turks, English or other minorities?' Although the analysis of in-depth interviews indicate that they have friends from all ethnic backgrounds including English, it is clear from the survey that Turkish young people mostly befriend children from the same ethnic group despite some gender differences.

Table 6.18: Friendship patterns of Turkish young people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Turks</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly English</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As presented in Table 6.18., the male respondents have a higher tendency (76 per cent) to be friends with Turks in comparison with the girls, of whom 63 per cent said that their friends were mostly Turks. There is a reverse tendency among the youngsters in that while only five per cent of males had mostly English friends, 21 per cent of the girls emerged as having mostly English friends. Seventeen per cent of the total respondents on the other hand, pointed out that their friends consisted mostly of other ethnic minorities including, Greeks, Pakistanis and Caribbeans.

As the figures in the above table show, 69 per cent of the respondents claimed that their friends were mostly Turks. In order to find out whether they had mostly Turkish friends because of personal difficulties in making friends with English and other minority children, they were asked 'Do you have difficulties in making friends with non-Turks?' As Table 6.19. shows, only
seven per cent of the males are having difficulties, whereas the rest (97 per cent) of the respondents find no difficulty in making friends with young people from other communities.

Table 6.19: Difficulties in making friends with non-Turks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have difficulties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have no difficulties</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings suggest that, although friendship patterns are mostly determined by the same ethnic background, Turkish youngsters have a positive attitude towards making friends with the members of a larger society and other ethnic communities. The emergence of non-biased and non-prejudiced attitudes towards friendship with non-Turks may be taken as an indication of the willingness of the Turkish young generation to interact with the other sections of society.

To what extent does the young Turkish generation have role models with whom they identify themselves? If there are role models, who are these figures? To find out the possible impact of identification on the development of young Turks, they were asked to reply to the following question: ‘Who do you identify yourself with most?’

Table 6.20: Identification figures for respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother/Sister</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famous player</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movie/TV star</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famous musician</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leader</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table 6.20. shows, most of the respondents, 31 per cent of males and 68 per cent of females, said that ‘they do not identify themselves with someone other than their self’. Almost identical replies were given when they were asked why they did not look for a role model. They emphasised their ‘individual personality’ and referred to the processes of ‘achieving an independent identity’ such as ‘I want to be myself’ (Female:16), ‘I do not want to imitate others’ (Male:15), ‘I do not want to be copy of another person’ (Female:18), ‘I want to have my own personality’ (Female:16), ‘I want to be different’ (Male:18), ‘I want to listen to my voice from inside and follow my instincts’ (Female:18).

Identification with brother/sister as a role model was the highest. Thirty three per cent of male and 11 per cent of female respondents expressed their identification with their sister/brother. Identification with other figures varied as shown in Table 6.20. The reasons for identification are explained in the following Table 6.21.

Table 6.21: Reasons of identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common values</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable life</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those who identified themselves with another person as a role-model gave different reasons. These fall into four categories of which ‘ideas’ and ‘common values’ appear to be the most common reasons for identification with another person. More than half (54 per cent) of the respondents mentioned ‘ideas’, for identification while ‘common values’, (29 per cent) stable life style, (11 per cent) and ‘status’ (six per cent) were also mentioned as reasons for identification.
The above analysis shows that change and continuity are the underlying experiences of the Turkish young generation in London. Although they still respect parental values and Turkish traditions, there is a tendency among the young generation to change constraining customs. This means that they are developing a new identity in constant negotiation with parental values. The negotiation and redefinition of identity as a dynamic process is influenced by the socialisation of Turkish youth in a different cultural context. It seems that the Turkish youth are adopting some of the socio-cultural values of the larger society. They are, for example, demanding more freedom and responsibility. Girls, in particular, are complaining about parental control over their social behaviour. Turkish youth are also developing different attitudes towards sexuality in conflict with the values of their community. Generational differences are the natural outcomes of these sociocultural changes and negotiations which sometimes give rise to tension between parents and the younger generation. Language, culture, sexuality, control and freedom on the one hand and the multiple identity allegiance on the other, seem to be the sources of tension and conflict.

In the following Chapter, I will examine the religious dimensions of identity of young Turks such as beliefs, attitudes and practices which will enable us to see this change and continuity in a wider context.
Chapter Six: Notes

1. Kellner takes the view that one of the persistent and underlying properties of identity is its social character. Comparing identity in pre-modern and modern societies, he suggests that identity remained as social. In Kellner's (1992, p. 141) words 'in modernity, identity becomes more mobile, multiple, personal, self-reflexive, and subject to change. Yet in modernity [identity] is also social and other related'.


5. See also Ladbury (1977, p. 140)

6. For a discussion of variety in the orientations of ethnic youth, see Phinney (1992); Phinney et al. (1994)
Chapter Seven

Young Generation: Religious Beliefs, Attitudes And Practices

Islam is one of the identity markers of the Turkish community as clearly explained by one of the informants cited in Chapter Six who summed up a common perception among the Turks that 'without being a Muslim, one cannot be a proper Turk'. This straightforward expression shows the extent to which Turkish identity is linked to religion. Nevertheless, religious affiliation and practices among the ethnic youth are under-researched issues (Phinney, 1990, p. 505). In this Chapter I will examine several dimensions of religious commitment among the Turkish young generation because, as discussed in Chapter Three, religion is one of the key sources of identity. Before analysing the survey findings on religious beliefs, attitudes and practices of the Turkish youth, I would like to discuss some of the earlier theories of the dimension of religiosity and the concepts which are used to denote such dimensions. This brief discussion will set an explanatory framework for the analysis of religious commitment.

7.1. Dimensions of Religious Commitment

Religious commitment entails more than one dimension. One's acceptance of and position towards a supernatural being, towards an ultimate reality and its manifestations, involve a multidimensional process such as attitudes, beliefs, emotions, experiences and rituals. Research on religious commitment indicates that religiosity is not a unidimensional experience in individuals' lives. This means that religious orientation has different dimensions. One of the earliest theorists on the dimension of religiosity proposed a four-dimensional model in approaching religious orientation and religious group involvement (Lenski, 1961, p. 21-24). The discussions on the conceptualisation of religious orientation were also contributed by Glock (1972, p. 39), who proposed a five-dimensional model of 'conceptual framework for the systematic study of differential commitment to religion...'.

189
Glock argues that despite the great variety of detail, all world religions share general areas in which religiosity is manifested. These are the five core dimensions of religiosity: 'the experiential', 'the ritualistic', 'the ideological', 'the intellectual', and 'the consequential'. According to Glock (1972, p. 40), the experiential dimension of religiosity refers to the achievement of direct knowledge of the ultimate reality or experience of religious emotions in the form of exaltation, fear, humility, joyfulness and peace. The 'ideological dimension' gives recognition to the fact that all religions expect that the religious person should hold certain beliefs which followers are expected to adhere to. The 'ritualistic dimension' includes specific religious practices expected of religious followers. Among them prayer, worship and fasting can be mentioned. The 'intellectual dimension', in Glock's framework, is constituted by the expectation that the religious person should have some knowledge about the basic tenets of his/her faith and its religious scriptures. The 'consequential dimension', on the other hand, encompasses man's relation to man. This means that the 'consequential dimension' includes religious prescriptions which determine attitudes of the adherents as a consequence of their religious belief. Glock's five dimensional approach was added several sub-dimensions4 (Stark and Glock, 1968).

King (1967, p. 173-185) also developed a framework for the analysis of religious commitment and proposed nine dimensions to measure religiosity5. King and Hunt later (1969, pp. 321-323) revised the early findings and subsequently proposed a new model on similar lines. On the King-Hunt model Roof (1979, p. 24) notes that it provided the most comprehensive conceptual framework to test the multidimensionality model. Instead of using the concept of 'dimension' Verbit (1970, p. 26,27) proposed the concept of 'components' in his attempt to develop a theoretical framework to understand religiosity. Verbit argues that 'religion has several 'components', and an individual's behaviour vis-à-vis each one of these components has a number of 'dimensions". He identifies six components of religion including 'ritual', 'doctrine', 'emotion', 'knowledge', 'ethics' and 'community'6. Drawing upon
earlier models, O'Connell (1975, p. 200-203) also proposed a seven-
multidimensional explanatory framework and tried to find out the
relationships between the dimensions of religiosity. The same year,
Himmelfarb (1975, p. 606-618) invented a synthesised form of a typology of
religious involvement and argued that religious involvement has at least two
elements: 'doctrinal beliefs' and 'ritual observance'.

7.2. Young Turks and Religiosity

As the foregoing discussion establishes, religious commitment and
involvement are multidimensional phenomena. The core dimensions of a
religious commitment include belief, knowledge, practice and experience. It
should be pointed out that each dimension of a religious orientation may
have numerous sub-dimensions because of the nature of religious experience.
Therefore all the theories and explanatory frameworks for the analysis of
religious commitments are susceptible omitting some of the dimensions and
sub-dimensions of religiosity. Nevertheless, they are a useful means of
identifying the general patterns. I will therefore analyse religious beliefs,
attitudes and behaviour of Turkish young people within the framework of
multidimensional typology of religiosity.

7.2.1. Belief in God

An overwhelming majority of the young Turks said that 'they believe in God'
(see Table 7.1.). Sixty two per cent of the male and 43 per cent of the female
respondents 'absolutely believe in God'. Nineteen per cent of the males and
47 per cent of the females, on the other hand, 'have some doubts' but still
believe in God. Those who rejected a belief in God comprised six males (14
per cent) and two females (4 per cent). Only 2 females replied that 'they have
no concern about belief in God'.
Table 7.1. shows that ‘belief in God’ is significantly high. More than half of the respondents (52 per cent) have ‘absolute’ belief in God, and 32 respondents (34 per cent) also have belief in God but with some ‘doubt’ as a common characteristic of adolescent religiosity. When these two groups of respondents are counted under ‘believers’ category, one can see that as much as 86 per cent of the respondents believe in God. van der Lans and Rooijackers, (1992, p. 61) also found a high rate of belief in basic principles of Islam among young generation Turks in the Netherlands where 67.6 per cent of the informants (total number: 65) expressed their belief in the tenets of Islam. Thirteen per cent, on the other hand, were found to have an ‘ambivalence’ attitude while 9.2 per cent were reported to be experiencing ‘scepticism’. The same research also indicates that 12.3 per cent ‘reject’ traditional ideas regarding Islam.

In my London sample, atheists constituted 9 per cent of the respondents, agnostics on the other hand, comprised a small proportion (2 per cent) of the total sample. As pointed out earlier, as many as 34 per cent expressed having ‘some doubt’ along with their belief in God. Such an attitude might be ascribed to the fact that adolescence and the early period of youth are characterised by intellectual questioning and critical thinking. Smith⁹ (1941; cited in Hyde, 1990, p. 103) argues that religious development has emotional and intellectual aspects. Emotional and imaginative enthusiasm of childhood
is replaced by doubt during the development process which is a period marked by fluctuations between idealism and realism. In his study of religious development of adolescents, Bradbury (1947, cited in Hyde, 1990, p. 146) also found that religious doubt surfaced during adolescence and he attributed the origins of doubt to the development of critical reasoning at this period of the life cycle. It could be concluded from my findings that the intellectual/doctrinal dimension of religious commitment is represented by a high proportion of respondents who believe in God. During the interviews only two respondents gave a reply when they were asked why they did not have a belief/interest in God. One girl based her agnosticism on the current events taking place in the name of religion. She explained how she became alienated from the idea of believing in an organised religion as:

‘Although I was born in a Muslim family, gradually I lost my interest in religion. I think extremism of some people and murders in the name of religion were effective on my attitude towards religion. In addition to that, when I was at the college, I began reading some atheist philosophers who shaped my thinking. I should mention one more reason which is the widespread indifference toward religion and particularly to Christianity in this country’.

During the interview, this particular respondent frequently made references to the media coverage of Islam and cited examples from Iran, Iraq and Libya to support her argument that religious belief produces violence. Thus, she rejected organised Islam and turned to practising meditation. It may be argued that media coverage of Islamic movements and portrayal of Islam as an extremist, violent, bloodthirsty and fanatical religion has created a negative image of Islam even for the children of Muslim Turkish families. It was a recurrent theme during the interviews on religion that some parents and young Turks used the word ‘asiri dinci’, which literally means ‘extremist’. This term is frequently used by the media and soon picked up by people in this information age. The Turkish media also use such terms with negative connotations. When one make references to religion or religious people by using the terminology as mentioned, it may be expected that, especially young people in search of identity would not want to associate themselves
with derogatory categories of religiousness. It appears that the media is gaining more powerful influence on the young generation as information technology and globalisation are turning the world into a 'small village'.

As discussed in Chapter Five, Turkish families try to transmit their cultural and religious values to their children. In order to facilitate the construction of Muslim-Turkish identity, several religious institutions and religio-political organisations were established as will be explained in Chapters Nine and Ten. The findings in Table 7.2. show that parents play the primary role in their children's belief in God. As presented in Table 7.2., 65 per cent of the respondents said that 'family members' had the most decisive impact on their religious beliefs. Books (eight per cent), friends (eight per cent) and some kind of private/personal experience (seven per cent) were also mentioned as having the most important influence. It is observed that parental influence is the most effective of the environmental and situational factors in the formation of religious attitudes.

Table 7.2: 'Which of the following factors played the most effective role on your decision about belief or disbelief in God?'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family members</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books read</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private experience</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious persons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers/tutors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975, p. 30) and Hyde (1990, p. 226) report that adolescent religious practice is strongly related to parental religiousness. Faulkner and De Jong (1966, p. 251) also support my argument about the influence of parental religious involvement on children. They carried out research on 362 college students about their religious commitments and
found that parents' religiosity influenced children's attitudes towards religion. Faulkner and De Jong found a low ritualistic and consequential dimension correlation among students who came from homes where neither parent was a church member whereas a high consequential dimension correlation was identified among students who came from homes where one parent was a church member. When the efforts of Turkish parents to teach their children Islamic values under the name of tradition, culture and heritage, either at home or by sending their children to supplementary schools, Mosques and on long holidays to Turkey/Cyprus, are taken into account, it becomes clearer that parental control and nurture assume a prominent role in the religious commitment of children and the young generation.

There is no doubt that religious education in childhood and adolescence will also have some influence on the transmission of religious beliefs and values to the young generation. As shown in Chapter Six, most of the respondents were born and brought up in London and they are all students at the schools where there is no special provision for the teaching of their culture and religion. Therefore, as will be explained in Chapter Eight, some Turkish organisations have set up supplementary schools to fill this vacuum of information. More religiously oriented people, on the other hand, send their children to courses at the Mosques or, as I will discuss in Chapter Nine, establish an Islamic school (İkra) to teach their children principles of Islam. Table 7.3. shows that 48 per cent of the respondents received some kind of religious education. This ranged from family and Mosque to private religious education. Thirty three per cent, on the other hand, said that they had not received any religious education.
Table 7.3: ‘Have you ever had religious education so far?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male %</th>
<th>Female %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only my parents taught me religion</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I went to Mosque to learn from Imam</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I had a private religious education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I did not have any religious education</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of those who received some kind of religious education, 33 per cent explained that their ‘parents taught’ them religion. This confirms the findings presented in Table 7.2. that parents play the most prominent role in the formation of religious beliefs. Twelve per cent of the respondents, on the other hand, said that they were sent to a Mosque by their parents to take courses on Islam. It appears that Mosques were not very successful in their appeal to a large number of Turkish young people. This may be attributed to the divisions among Islamic groups and to the teaching methods at the Mosques. However, it may be predicted that the number of students at the Mosques will increase because they are increasingly providing special education on a boarding basis at the weekends. The expected increase in the number of students may be even higher should the Mosque administrations modify their traditional teaching methods.

It may be argued that the religious education of young people may determine their attitudes towards the religious education of their own children in the future. When the replies were analysed, 36 per cent of the respondents appeared to have a positive attitude towards the religious education of their own children in the future whereas the majority of them were still ‘not sure’ about it. As presented in table 7.4., 43 per cent of males and 31 per cent of females think that they would encourage their children to attend Islamic classes. In contrast, 14 per cent of males and 12 per cent of females said that they were not thinking of giving their children an Islamic education.
Table 7.4: 'Would you like your children to have a good Islamic religious education?'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male %</th>
<th>Female %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked why they wanted their children to receive religious education in the future, similar replies were given which centred on 'self perception', 'community', 'belonging to a religion' and 'having an identity' of which Islam is seen as an indispensable component whether it is practised or nominally accepted. An 18 year-old male said: 'All Turks are Muslims. Religion is important for us. Many of our families come from an Islamic background. I want my children learn what Islam is'. Another informant (Female:17) said: 'Being a Muslim is our identity. Sometimes we may ignore practical aspects of it, but we are still Muslims. I think the more we know about our religion the stronger identity we will have. And I want my children to have a strong Turkish-Muslim identity'. Lack of Islamic knowledge as evidenced by the findings (see Tables 7.5.; 7.6.; 7.7.) also seems to be a motivating factor for the young generation in providing their children with religious education. As one respondent (Male:18) explained: 'Personally I feel that I did not receive adequate religious education. When my friends ask me about Islam and its practices I feel ashamed because only then I realise that I know very little about Islam. I do not want my children to fall into same situation'. Those who disapproved of giving their children a sound Islamic education mostly argued that religion should be a matter of their own 'choice'. Therefore they would allow their children to decide for themselves.

One of the interesting findings in Table 7.4. is the high number of respondents who said that they were not sure about giving an Islamic education to their children in the future. As shown in the same table, 38 per cent of the male and 53 per cent of the female respondents were uncertain about the religious education
of their children in the future. It may be suggested that this uncertainty of the young people will ultimately disappear. This means that the adoption of Islamic values taught by the family and the community will motivate young people to transmit these internalised values to future generations. Acculturation and assimilation, on the other hand, will have a reverse effect on the development of Islamic identity among young people.

7.2.2. Intellectual Dimension: Knowledge of the Basic Tenets of Islam

The intellectual dimension of a religious commitment refers to the knowledge of the basic principles of a given religion. As Glock (1972, p. 40) explains, the intellectual dimension is constituted by the expectation that the religious person should have some knowledge of the basic tenets of his/her faith and religious scripts. A few basic Islamic concepts and rules were used in this survey as an index of measurement. I have not come across these in any previous surveys. As a first step to measuring the knowledge of the Turkish young people about their religion, the respondents were asked to write down the five pillars of Islam (Islamin sartları).

Table 7.5: Measuring religious knowledge: 'What are the five pillars of Islam (Islamin sartları)?'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identified only 1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified only 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified only 3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified only 4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified all 5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified none</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 7.5. shows, 28 per cent of the respondents correctly identified and named all the five pillars of Islam; 23 per cent identified between two to five items correctly. The majority (48 per cent) of the respondents, on the other hand, failed to identify any of the five pillars of Islam. The lack of knowledge of the
basic principles of Islam may be attributed to different factors. The indifference of parents or their inability to teach the fundamentals of Islam to their children, failure of religious organisations to attract a large number of young clientele and a lack of information on Islam in schools are among the factors suggested as the sources of insufficient Islamic knowledge.

Findings in Table 7.6. also support the figures presented in Table 7.5., that most of the young Turkish people do not know the basic principles of Islam. The respondents were asked if the weekly Friday prayer (Cuma Namazi) was obligatory for male and female Muslims. The Friday prayer is held once a week on that day and its performance is obligatory for male Muslims who have reached puberty.

Table 7.6: Measuring religious knowledge: ‘Cuma (Friday) prayer is obligatory (farz) for every Muslim regardless of age and gender’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above shows that only 21 per cent the respondents gave a correct answer to the question about the Friday prayer. The overwhelming majority (75 per cent), on the other hand, either gave a wrong answer (18 per cent) or said that they ‘do not know’ whether the Friday prayer was obligatory for male and female Muslims. These findings also suggest that the majority of the Turkish young people do not perform the Friday prayer simply because most of them do not even know that its performance is obligatory for male Muslims.

A different picture emerged when a question was asked about the position of Islam towards issues such as alcohol, gambling, interest, witchcraft and consumption of pork meat. As presented in Table 7.7., 64 per cent of the
respondents gave the correct answer when asked if these were allowed according to Islam. Fourteen per cent of the respondents, on the other hand, gave a wrong answer whereas 18 per cent reported that they 'do not know'.

Table 7.7: Measuring religious knowledge: ‘Alcohol, gambling, interest, witchcraft and eating pork are regarded as sins in Islam’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.7. shows that, in contrast to the other issues concerning knowledge of the basic Islamic principles, a higher number of respondents appeared to have a correct idea about the above issues. These results might be attributed to the fact that drinking alcohol, gambling and eating pork etc. are daily issues and children as well as youngsters are constantly reminded to avoid such things.

Stark and Glock (1968, p. 147-155) used knowledge about the Bible as an index of religious knowledge. In a similar vein, the young Turks were asked if they had the opportunity of reading the holy scripture of Islam, the Qur’an. As table 7.8. shows, only five per cent of the respondents claimed to have read all of the Qur’an; 16 per cent had read some parts of it and as much as 28 per cent said that they had tried to read the Qur’an but soon gave up reading it because they could not understand it. Forty five per cent of the children, on the other hand, reported that they never read the Qur’an. These findings suggest that Turkish young people do not have basic knowledge of the Qur’an.
Table 7.8: Familiarity with the holy book of Islam, The Qur'an: ‘Have you ever tried to read the translation of the Qur'an?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I read all the Qur'an</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I read some parts of Qur'an</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I tried to read but I gave up since I couldn't understand</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have never read it</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in Table 7.8. show that 28 per cent of the respondents made an attempt to read the Qur'an but stopped reading it because they were not able to understand it properly. The lack of young people's understanding of the Qur'an may be attributed to the fact that the language used in its translation is beyond the comprehension of the young generation. This means that the young generation are not able to communicate in the language of the Islamic scripture, neither in English nor in Turkish. In addition to such a shortcoming in the linguistic domain, there is a significant lacunae of introductory books written on Islam appraising to the intellectual capabilities of children and the young generation. This lack of literary sources not only deprives young generation of acquiring direct knowledge from the Qur'an but also discourages them from reading the sacred scripture as they do not have adequate linguistic skills and basic knowledge of it. The teaching of the Qur'an in the Mosques supports my argument that the young generation do not learn much about the contents of the Qur'an. As I will explain in Chapter Nine, the Imams and other personnel in the Mosques use mostly traditional and outdated methods of teaching. For example, children are always told to memorise the verses in the Qur'an without knowing what they mean. It may be expected that after a while young students of Islam may lose interest in something that they do not understand.

The findings suggesting that the intellectual dimension of Islam is little known by the Turkish young people are also confirmed by the findings presented in the following table:
Table 7.9: Measuring religious knowledge: 'The Qur'an consists of *ayet* and *sure*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings in Table 7.8. showed that knowledge of the respondents about the sacred scripture of Islam is very limited because many of them either cannot understand it or have not read it at all. Their knowledge of the Qur'an was further measured as shown in Table 7.9. When asked if the Qur'an consisted of '*ayet*' and '*sure*', only 25 per cent of the respondents gave the right answer, whereas 71 per cent either did not know or gave a wrong answer.

7.2.3. Ritualistic Dimension: Religious Practices

The ritualistic dimension refers to specific religious practices expected of religious followers. Prayer, worship and fasting are examples these religious practices. As in other religious traditions, Muslims are also required to perform specific practices. Daily prayers (*namaz*; five times a day), Friday prayers, (*Cuma namazi*), fasting (*Oruc*) during the month of Ramazan are among the obligatory religious practices that followers of Islam are expected to observe. It appears from the findings that most of the young Turks do not observe prescribed prayers, at least on a regular basis as required by the religious principles. Table 7.10. shows that only a small number of respondents 'try to perform prayers such as *Namaz* and *Oruc*.'
Table 7.10: 'What is your idea about performing prayers such as Namaz (daily prayers) and Oruc (fasting)?'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I can not pray because I don’t know how to pray</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I try to perform prayers such as Namaz and Oruc</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find it very difficult to perform prayers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t pray to avoid criticism from my environment</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from the findings in the above table that young Turks are not very interested in religious practices. Fifteen per cent of the respondents said that they found it very difficult to perform prescribed practices while 13 per cent said that they did not pray because of the environmental pressure which discouraged them from observing religious practices. Only 18 per cent of the respondents claimed to carry out religious duties. The most interesting finding in Table 7.10 is the fact that 43 per cent of the respondents do not observe prayers, simply because they do not know how to pray. That lends support to my earlier observations (Tables 7.5 and 7.9) that the intellectual dimension of religiosity of Turkish youth is weak because they are not equipped with the basic knowledge of how to perform prayers.

As mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, Verbit (1970, p. 27) argues that components (dimensions) of religious commitment can be measured along with four dimensions: 'content', 'frequency', 'intensity' and 'centrality', of which 'frequency' refers to the constancy and prevalence of religious behaviour. A question was included in the questionnaire to find out the frequency of practising religious rituals observed by the young Turks. My findings suggest that regular fulfilment of prescribed Islamic practices in the daily lives of young adherents does not seem to be a salient devotional/ritualistic dimension of their religiosity. The respondents were asked about the frequency of their involvement in daily prayers, Cuma/Bayram prayers, fasting and reading prayers (dua). Depending on
the nature of the prayers, respondents gave replies that indicate varying degrees of frequency in performing the practices. Daily prayers which are supposed to be observed five times a day received the least frequency as shown in the following table:

Table 7.11: ‘How often do you perform the following religious duties?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Daily prayers</th>
<th>Cuma-Bayram</th>
<th>Fasting</th>
<th>Reading dua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings presented in Table 7.11., show that 61 per cent of the respondents said that they ‘never observe daily prayers’. Twenty eight per cent, on the other hand, replied that they ‘sometimes’ fulfil this duty, whereas only two per cent seem to practice daily prayers (namaz) regularly. As pointed out earlier, one of the underlying reasons for not performing prescribed prayers was the lack of knowledge about how to pray. This may hold true for the daily prayers as well. However, one can suggest that the lack of prayer halls at the colleges, designed for the Muslim students, may be another discouraging factor along with the environmental pressure in the form of criticism of religious practice. A similar result emerged regarding the frequency of fulfilling Cuma and Bayram prayers which are obligatory for male Muslims.

However, as the figures in Table 7.11. show, fasting and reading prayers (dua) are observed more frequently. Those who ‘always’ observe these rituals are 9 and 12 per cent respectively. Those who replied that they ‘never’ observe fasting and reading dua, constitute 33 and 22 per cent of the respondents respectively. A significant number of the respondents, on the other hand, is understood to observe fasting (48 per cent) and reading dua (57 per cent). The higher frequency of observation of fasting and reading prayer in contrast to daily, Cuma and
Bayram prayers may be attributed to the nature of these prayers. Fasting and reading prayer require less knowledge to observe them. More importantly fasting and reading dua are personal experiences which escape social pressure due to their private nature. Before moving further, a comparative remark is necessary to see the differences between different Muslim communities. In contrast to our findings on the frequency of performing Islamic rituals by the young Turks, Anwar’s (1994, p. 33) findings on the frequency of praying among the Pakistani Muslim community appear higher. However, Anwar’s findings also indicate that frequency rate is dropping among the young generation in contrast to the frequency of parental observance of religious practices.

There are several important events in the Islamic calendar that Muslims either celebrate or commemorate. Among them the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (Mevlid Kandili), the beginning of revelation, and the ascension of Prophet Muhammad (Mirac Kandili) to heaven can be mentioned. The days that these events are thought to have taken place in the Islamic calendar are called ‘Kandil’ days in Turkish society. Several religious celebrations and events are organised on these days. To find out whether the young generation participate in these communal gatherings, the young people were asked what they usually do during Kandil days. As Table 7.12. shows, only 27 per cent of the respondents usually participate in and pray during Kandil days. Fifteen percent of the respondents, on the other hand, did not show interest in such ceremonies.

Table 7.12: ‘What do you usually do during ‘Kandil’ days?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I usually don't remember Kandil days in this country</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I pray during these days</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no interest in Kandil days</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.12 also shows that 43 per cent of the respondents do not remember these days of religious importance. These findings further confirm the earlier conclusion that young Turks do not have a sufficient knowledge of Islam. These findings also indicate that environmental and situational contexts influence the religious awareness of the young generation. *Kandil* days are not celebrated by the larger society. Therefore there are no preparations or publicity for the celebrations. This means that there is no reminder of important events and special days of the Islamic calendar. In contrast to the indifference of British society to such Islamic events, in Turkey/Cyprus one cannot avoid coming across the celebration of *Kandil* days. At least live television programs on these days remind the large section of society that some kind of religious celebration is taking place. It can be argued that the extent of publicity in educational establishments, in the neighbourhood and in the media leads to the creation of an atmosphere of awareness of special events of particular significance. It seems that the young Turks’ lack of knowledge about Islam is perpetuated by the deprivation of young Muslims from an awareness-raising social and cultural atmosphere about for religious values.

7.2.4. Experiential dimension

I have discussed at the beginning of this Chapter that religious commitment also has an experiential dimension. The experiential dimension of religiosity refers to the experience of religious emotions in the form of exaltation, fear, Joyfulness and humility (Glock, 1972, p. 40). In that sense, prayer (*dua*) is truly a personal religious experience which encompasses emotional reactions and feelings of the individuals involved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I believe that the prayer is beneficial</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t believe that the prayer is beneficial</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no idea</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table shows that 48 per cent of the respondents said that ‘prayer is beneficial’. Only seven per cent thought that ‘prayer is not beneficial’. Forty three per cent, on the other hand, appeared to have no clear idea about this issue. The figures in Table 7.13. indicate that 48 per cent of the informants had a personal experience that had led them to a positive attitude toward prayer.

According to the figures in the following table, different reasons were given by the respondents as to why they pray. It appeared from the findings that many of the respondents tend to have an ‘extrinsic’ attitude towards praying. The desire to achieve happiness and success seems to be the main reason for prayer.

Table 7.14: ‘Why do you pray?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I pray for happiness in both this world and in hereafter</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I pray to be happy in the hereafter</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I pray because I want my worldly affairs be realised</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.14. shows that 47 per cent of the respondents pray for ‘happiness in both this world and in the hereafter’; 11 per cent pray ‘to be happy in the hereafter’; and eight per cent pray to achieve their worldly goals. Some of the respondents, for example, mentioned ‘being successful in the exams’, ‘getting A levels’, ‘happiness in the family’, ‘finding a good job’, ‘being in good mental and physical health’ as reasons for prayer. The high percentage of extrinsic attitude towards prayer may be attributed to the nature of Islam according to which God accepts prayers from believers. One can find numerous references in the Qur’an and in the prophetic traditions related to the Prophet Muhammad whose sayings and deeds are taken as an example to support our argument that Islam encourages its followers to pray and ask for worldly and heavenly favours from God. Thus, extrinsic orientation of young Turks is an expected result as justified and encouraged by the religion itself. However, it should be noted here (Roof,
1979, p. 20) that 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' orientations should not be seen as 'separate and distinct orientations but, rather alternative ends of the same motivational continuum'.

I have mentioned earlier that the experiential dimension of religiosity encompasses feelings, sentiments and emotions of a person in relation to supernatural or ultimate reality. Prayer may be described as a personal communication between an individual and the ultimate reality. Communication with the ultimate reality or supernatural being, as perceived by the believer, evokes varying emotions such as fear, awe, nearness, joy and unity with God.

Table 7.15: 'Which of the following statements most clearly describes your emotional state during the prayer (dua)?'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel relaxation and tranquillity while praying</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel much nearer to God while praying</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't feel any difference while praying</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 7.15. shows, young people have varying emotional experiences during prayer. Thirty seven per cent of the respondents 'feel relaxation and tranquillity', while 20 per cent of them seem to 'feel much nearer to God' at the time of praying. Thirty one per cent of the respondents, on the other hand, expressed that 'they don't feel any difference while praying'.

Religious ceremonies also evoke various emotional reactions among young people. As shown in Table 15.16., emotional states they experience while performing religious practices or during their participation in religious ceremonies vary from happiness to disinterest.
Table 7.16: 'How do you feel during religious ceremonies?'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel happy</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't have any interest in such religious ceremonies</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel very bored and want it finish soon</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't like these ceremonies and don't participate</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures presented in Table 7.16. show that 41 per cent of the respondents claimed to have a 'happy' emotional state at the time of involvement in a religious ceremony. Religious ceremonies are boring occasions for 17 per cent of the respondents. The same proportion of the respondents do not like such ceremonies. Nineteen per cent of the respondents, on the other hand, do not seem to have any 'interest' in participating in religious ceremonies.

Table 7.17: 'Have you ever had a response to prayer?'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I mentioned earlier that prayer is an experiential dimension of religiosity which may be described as a personal communication between an individual and the ultimate reality. When asked if they had ever a response to their prayers, as shown in Table 7.17., 28 percent of the respondents said that had they received some kind of answer to their prayers, whereas 62 per cent said that they had not had such an experience.

The analysis of survey findings on religious beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of young Turks indicates that an overwhelming majority of them believe in God. It appears that parents have played the primary role in the development of belief in
God among young people. The findings suggest that there is not sufficient religious education given to children in the family, in the schools or even in the Mosques. This finding is supported by the fact that young Turks do not have sufficient knowledge of basic principles of Islam. Therefore many of them are unable to pray. It seems that the lack of written Turkish or English sources on Islam is another reason for the lack of knowledge. Young people can not even understand the language of the Qur'an and therefore they are deprived of access to the original sources of Islam. However, despite this lack of knowledge, generally young people display positive attitudes towards the experiential dimension of Islam.
Chapter Seven: Notes

1. For a critical review of literature on research focusing on approaches to the religious commitment, see W. C. Roof, (1979), pp. 17-45.

2. These dimensions are 1- ‘associational’ aspect which includes frequency of religious involvement in worship and prayer services; 2- ‘communal’ dimension which relates to the preference and frequency of one’s primary-type relations; 3- ‘doctrinal orthodoxy’ which refers to the intellectual acceptance of the prescribed doctrines of the church; and 4- ‘devotionalism’ which involves private or personal communion with God through prayers, meditation and religious behaviour.


4. On the basis this five-dimensional explanatory framework, Stark and Glock (1968, p. 62-80) attempted to document the nature of religious commitment in America and added several sub-dimensions to the original framework. Concerning religious belief, for example, ‘orthodoxy’, ‘religious particularism’ and ‘ethicalism’ were used as indicators for measuring the religious belief. ‘Worship’, ‘communion’, ‘organisational participation’, ‘financial support’, and ‘saying table prayers’ or ‘grace’, on the other hand, were used as the main indicators of religious practice-ritual. Later, Faulkner and De Jong (1966, p. 246-254) devised items and developed a scale criteria in order to test Stark and Glock’s five-dimensional model of religiosity. Faulkner and De Jong used 23 items of scale to see the interrelationship among the five dimensions of religiosity. Their findings led them to conclude that these dimensions were positively related. However, Faulkner and De Jong (Ibid., p. 253) pointed out that ‘the degree of relationships differ for the various dimensions. This diversity in degree of relationships lends support to the view that religious involvement is characterised by several dimensions’. See also Nudelman (1971, p. 46) who also tried to measure the dimensions of religious commitment by using the model proposed by Glock (1972), Stark and Glock (1968).

5. These dimensions are delineated (King, 1967) as ‘Credal Assent and Personal Commitment’; ‘Participation in Congregational Activities’; ‘Personal Religious Experience’; ‘Personal Ties in the Congregation’; ‘Commitment to Intellectual Search Despite Doubt’; ‘Openness to Religious Growth’; ‘Dogmatism and Extrinsic Orientation’; ‘Financial Behaviour and Financial Attitude’; and lastly ‘Talking and Reading about Religion’. These dimensions are similar to those proposed in the earlier research. ‘Credal Assent and Personal Commitment’ includes, for example, Glock’s ‘ideological’, and Lenski’s ‘doctrinal orthodoxy’ dimensions. Similarly, ‘Participation in Congregational Activities’ is related to Glock’s ‘ritualistic’ and Lenski’s ‘associational’ dimensions. ‘Personal Religious Experience’ on the other hand, corresponds to Glock’s ‘experiential’ and Lenski’s ‘devotionalism’ dimensions.

6. In Verbit’s model, these six components of religion are measured along four dimensions as ‘content’, ‘frequency’, ‘intensity’ and ‘centrality’. Of these dimensions ‘content’ refers to the elements of one’s religious repertoire and denotes the ‘direction’ of his/her religious behaviour, indicating participation or non-
participation in any item of religion. Dimension of ‘frequency’, on the other hand, measures the ‘amounts’ of involvement of a person in religious behaviours and practices. ‘Intensity’, as argued by Verbit, refers to the degree of determination or consistency in relation to one’s position towards religion. The fourth dimension, ‘centrality’, measures the importance that a person attributes to religious tenets, rituals and sentiments (Verbit, 1970).


8. Himmelfarb (1975), identified nine dimensions and three subdimensions of religious involvement as ‘Devotional’; ‘Doctrinal’; ‘Experiential’ (these three dimensions are oriented toward the supernatural); ‘Affiliational’ (including three subdimensions: associational, fraternal, parental); ‘Ideological’; ‘Intellectual-Aesthetic’; ‘Affectional’ (these two are cultural in orientation); ‘Ethical’ and finally ‘Moral’ (the last two encompass interpersonal relationship).


11. Here prayer (dua) means requests from God, communication with words. Such type of prayer is not necessarily accompanied by prescribed prayers which involves physical movement as in daily prayers (namaz) five times a day.
Chapter Eight
Turkish Organisations In London

The emergence of ethnic institutions among immigrant groups is a part of settlement and ethnic community formation. In the analysis of Turkish organisations in London, several terms such as ‘association’, ‘establishment’ and ‘institution’ will be used to denote social groupings among the Turkish community within an organisational framework. These terms juxtapose and overlap in the ensuing interpretation of the field data. Therefore they will be used interchangeably. I argue that wherever social groups and categories exist, both living and interacting with others, organisations become prevailing aspects of virtually all individual beings and human collectivities. Naturally, the Turkish community does not constitute an exception to this widely observed reality.

8.1. Organisations as Social Vehicles among Turks

Organisations and associations of various kinds established by the Turkish community present great variety of diversity with their differing organisational structures, membership, clientele, strategies and purposes epitomised by their activities among the Turkish community in London. This reflection of organisational diversity is embedded in dual, if not manifold, construction of the Turkish community itself and is shaped by the needs generated within the wider society. Here we have at least two forces, if not more, at work that not only guide but also fashion the shape of the organisations under question. One of these emanates from within the Turkish community. During the process of the formation of the Turkish community from that of a fragmented ethnic group, specific needs of the community and the strategies adopted left a mark on the structures of organisations and associations. This inside stimuli is matched by an outside impetus originating from being situated in a multicultural environment which has its own distinct
Ethnographic data collected both in London and Berlin suggest that Turkish organisations and issues surrounding their foundations, ideals, structural features, activities and strategies, necessitate the adoption of a wider approach, covering not only the British context but also other European countries where a substantial number of Turks are living. Within the limited scope of this Chapter, I will try to analyse complex relations between some Turkish organisations whose roots can be traced to Turkey where daily developments have an impact on the associations in Western Europe in general, and in Britain in particular. This approach entails understanding the politics of root organisations in Turkey that served as models in terms of ideological and political composition for the associations in Europe. This view is supported by Nielsen (1991, p. 48-49), who points out that political, economic and social developments in the home country continue to have a major effect on the Muslim communities in Europe. Ideological and political proximity across organisations does not negate the significance of distinct characteristics of associations established by immigrant Turkish communities.

As mentioned earlier, this problem stems from the fact that many of the institutional formations were and still are, being influenced by various dynamic sources. These include politics of the country of origin, changing conditions and regulations in the host society, and the immigrants' own experiences during the process of community formation. Globalising forces spread by the development of media and information technology have also influenced such organisations. Therefore, when looking at the associational structure of the Turkish community, a wide range of discourses and paradigms that are anchored in sending and receiving societies' minority communities, should be taken into consideration in order to overcome this complexity.
8.2. The Process of Institutionalisation

During the early phase of immigration, the prevalent idea among immigrants was to save money to buy property in the home country and accumulate capital so that they could start a business back home. Their plans for the future had always involved the idea of return as evidenced in remitting huge sums of savings to relatives to enable them to invest in land, houses or other forms of assets, from which, upon their return, they could gain financial benefits. However, the history of migration and the ensuing trend to settle in the receiving countries proved that the idea of return once prevalent in the minds of immigrant workers, was merely a 'myth'. Even though many immigrant workers have met their economic expectations by remitting money and investing it in several ventures, the 'myth of return' has been replaced by the tendency of settlement due to changing circumstances in both sending and receiving countries. A survey carried out in 1980 found out that more than 40 per cent of the Turks staying in Germany wanted to settle down in this country (Mehrländer, 1980, cited in Sen, p. 41). According to later research by the Centre for Turkish Studies on Turkish migrants living in Germany, 39.4 per cent of the respondents said that they did not intend to return Turkey and 21 per cent revealed that they had no intention of going back within the next ten years. These statistics suggest that at least 60 per cent of those interviewed displayed an intention to stay in Germany either permanently or for a long period of time (Sen, 1989, p. 41). In 1992 the number of those who wanted to stay permanently increased to 83 per cent. Only 17 per cent of those interviewed expressed their intention of returning to Turkey (Sen, 1993, p. 25) (see also Chapter Five).

During the early phase of immigration which comprised mostly single people, there was not much need to form organisations as immigration was thought to be temporary. As the table below shows, numerous Turkish organisations were established in the latter phases of immigration and settlement in European countries. It is reported that in Berlin alone, there are currently more than 150 Turkish associations. These associations comprise
welfare, cultural, political, religious and sports organisations. Table 8.1. gives an estimated number of associations in various West European countries.

Table 8.1: Estimated number of Turkish associations and organisations in selected European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associations</th>
<th>Federations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Report (1993), Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, Ankara, Turkey

A similar pattern was observed in London among Turks from Cyprus and mainland Turkey. Much of the communal activities took place within a small circle of people mostly in private domains because immigrants did not perceive their existence as permanent. However, they began to realise that the period of their stay became longer than they had planned. In the early seventies, family reunion dominated the agenda and temporary stay was reversed to permanent settlement. The process of family reunions changed the perception of Turkish immigrants about their settlement plans. The tendency towards a permanent settlement and the concomitant needs of immigrants and their growing number of families conjured up the idea of overcoming multi-faceted challenges that they had not encountered before their arrival. Sander (1991, p. 70) in his study of Turkish Muslims in Sweden, found a corresponding process of association formation. He states that, ‘as a result of the growing presence of women and children in what the Muslims themselves regarded in many respects as the hostile and decadent Swedish society, new problems became pressing. Perhaps the most important can be stated as that of reaffirming and legitimising their ‘old’ culture and religion.
for themselves and, even more important, transmitting them to the future generations'.

The need for migrants to adapt to the new environment also appears as a stimuli to the formation of organisations. In his study of Pakistani community in Rochdale, Anwar (1985, p. 175) demonstrates that the process of adaptation within a new setting, involving the adjustment of home values and old ways of dealing with daily life to the new environment, created a demand for welfare associations. Lewis (1994, p. 19) writing on the Muslim community in Bradford, also sees the investment in ethnic institutions and the proliferation of Mosques, as an indication of both commitment to remain as a Muslim in Britain and a determination to pass on to their children Islamic values and traditional customs. As Shadid and Koningsveld (1991, p. 2) observe, this resulted not ‘only in a growing pressure on the existing infrastructural provisions in these countries, but also made the creation of specific provisions such as mosques and mosque-centred organisations, Islamic schools and Islamic religious education indispensable’. Shaw’s (1988, p. 139) findings on the Pakistani Muslim community in Oxford also supports the preceding arguments, that a need for protection from the threat of western values is being expressed. Thus Muslims became involved in establishing organisations and associations as soon as they felt that they were becoming a part of the larger society.

8.3. Turkish/Cypriot Associations: Cultural, Educational and Welfare Associations

Immigrant organisations are categorised in various ways. Anwar (1985, p. 174), for example, classifies Pakistani associations in Rochdale according to their functions in the migrant community. His typology includes four types: ‘welfare’, ‘religious’, ‘political’ and ‘professional’ organisations. In a study of Turkish associations in Stockholm (Lundberg and Svanberg, 1991, p. 14) researchers used the objectives of the associations as an explanatory tool to
analyse various aspects of Turkish organisations.

Turkish/Cypriot associations in London display diversity in terms of their foundational purposes and subsequent activities. This visible diversity derives from the founders, their background and the clientele who use such services. The activities and services made available by the existing organisations address various issues such as welfare, education, social and cultural challenges and the religious needs of the Turkish community in London. As mentioned earlier, these associations cluster around a set of ideals and purposes. The names of the organisations indicate their priorities and orientation, and the clientele/membership structure of Turkish/Cypriot organisations. The classification and categorisation of the organisations according to their functions, such as welfare, cultural, educational, political and religious would be of little use since there is no clear cut differentiation between ethnic-based formations. My findings suggest that there is a juxtaposition and a proximity across the interests and activities of Turkish/Cypriot associations. Nevertheless, Turkish organisations in London will be examined in three Chapters because of their differing priorities and objectives. In what follows I will examine Turkish/Cyprus organisations and discuss their role in the reproduction and preservation of traditional Turkish-Islamic values and also their role in mobilising the Turkish community in the political domain of the home country and British society.

8.3.1. Cyprus Turkish Association (CTA) (*Kibris Turk Cemiyeti*)

The Cyprus Turkish Association (CTA) (*Kibris Turk Cemiyeti*) has been on the scene since 4 February 1951 in close co-operation with the other Turkish associations and the governments of both Turkey and Northern Cyprus. CTA was established by a joint participation of Turkish-Cypriot students and workers. Its name had been changed a few times over the years. The initial name of the organisation was the Cypriot Turkish Club (*Kibris Turk Kulubu*). This was changed to the Cyprus Turkish Union (*Kibris Turk Birligi*) in 1952.
Political developments in Cyprus during the 1950s motivated the members of this organisation to change its name again in 1955 to the Cypriot Turkish Independent Association in order to express their disapproval of ENOSIS, the movement which was trying to annex Cyprus to Greece. Its current name was adopted in 1960 when Cyprus declared its independence. CTA has been trying to mobilise the Turkish community on ethnic and national lines. As stated by the Chairman of CTA during an interview, the fundamental issues they address are the education of the young generation and political mobilisation of the Turkish community in London regardless of the Turkey/Cyprus dichotomy regarding national problems such as Cyprus, the Turkic world in Central Asia and the other Turkish minorities in Europe.

CTA claims to have more than one thousand members. Its membership and clientele profile suggests that Turkish-Cypriots outnumber the mainland Turks. The Chairman and the majority of the executive committee of the CTA have always comprised mostly Turkish-Cypriots. Therefore, Cyprus is one of the central interests that recurrently surfaces in its activities. As mentioned earlier, since its establishment, CTA has organised numerous public meetings to try to mobilise the Turkish community in London. The purpose of these attempts has been to raise money to send to Cyprus. More importantly, CTA has encouraged members of the Turkish community to send letters to MPs and policy makers to influence British public opinion in favour of the Turkish-Cypriot side. Until 1960, CTA attracted many clients from the Turkish community and remained as a central association. With the increase of Cypriot immigrants and their settlement in a wider area, new organisations were set up. Nevertheless, while different Turkish/Cypriot associations were established in London in the following years, CTA failed to become an umbrella organisation. Following the ethnic clashes in 1974 in Cyprus, many displaced Turkish-Cypriots came to London. This urged community leaders to establish an umbrella organisation to unite the Turkish-Cypriot community. Accordingly, the Federation of Cypriot-Turkish Associations (FCTA) (Kibris Turk Dernekleri Federasyonu) was established as an
umbrella organisation in 1982. CTA, because of its commitment to the unity of Turkish organisations, has joined the FCTA.

During the early years of its formation, CTA was primarily concerned with the education of the young generation and took an active part in establishing evening and weekend classes in neighbourhoods with sizeable numbers of Turkish residents. In these classes the official policy of CTA was to promote Turkish language and culture. It seems that teaching the Turkish language to children dominated the contents of classes. As argued by the Chairman of CTA, the priority of the early immigrants was economic and therefore they were preoccupied with earning money. He said:

‘When people from Cyprus started to arrive here, they were obsessed with making money and saving as much as possible in a short span of time so that they can go back soon. With the passage of time they brought their families and kept working, buying houses and opening their own shops at the expense of youngsters. Only a handful of them knew the value of education and the majority were not able to realise that cultural identity of their children was weakening. Children were even not able to learn their native language. These considerations surrounding cultural identify of Turkish children who were in danger of losing touch with parental values prompted us to take the initiative and negotiate with the parties concerned’.

CTA’s annual report in 1982 states that a fourteen-page report on the needs of Turkish children was forwarded to the Lord Swann Committee on 19 December 1981, in which ‘mother tongue education’ was emphasised. CTA rented its first premises in the mid-1960s and started educating Turkish children in different locations as diverse as Newington Green, Turnpike and Elephant and Castle. These premises were given Turkish names as a symbol of cultural identity. For example, one of the premises used for language and folklore teaching was called the Independent School, (Hurriyet Okulu) denoting the importance of freedom in Cyprus, while another one in Turnpike Lane was called Ataturk School (Ataturk Okulu) as a mark of respect for the founder of modern Turkey (CTA Newsletter, 16-31 May 1968, no: 20). In 1982, the number of students at CTA’s language and culture classes
reached almost 500 in 14 different locations. The main purpose of the educational activity organised by CTA was to ‘raise a consciousness in Turkish children to say ‘Ben Turkum’ - I am a Turk’ (p. 43). It is stated in the same unpublished manuscript (p. 46) that if ‘we do not teach Turkish culture, customs and language to our children in this foreign society, one day they will lose their Turkish Identity’.

Educational activities of CTA were overtaken by the Federation of Cypriot Turkish Associations in the following years. CTA’s understanding of cultural identity centres around linguistic issues and national days that mark the important events in the history of the Turkish/Cypriot nation. CTA argues that language and history coloured by the common experiences of the nation are integral parts of the Turkish identity; and the only way to preserve Turkish identity in a culturally different social setting is to transmit these values to the young generation. CTA’s policy to acculturate Turkish children does not include the religious domain. In its activities, CTA remains neutral to the teaching of religion. It is worth mentioning here that Turkish/Cypriot organisations developed a tactful strategy concerning religious matters in order not to jeopardise Islamic sensitivity among the Turkish community.

In recent years, however, a policy change from education to that of political mobilisation has been observed. During my fieldwork, I participated in several functions of the CTA and I observed that during the last couple of years it began to place more emphasis on political issues concerning Turks around the world in contrast to its formative period. The involvement of minority communities in the politics of their home countries is well documented. Goulbourne (1991, p. 7) calls this phenomenon ‘diasporic politics, that is, the commitment of migrants and their offspring to the politics of their original homelands’. Whenever Cyprus was debated in the British media and the Turkish side was blamed for the current situation in Cyprus, for example, the executive committee of CTA tried to organise an event that attracted the attention of a significant number of mainland and Turkish-Cypriots. On one
occasion Bulent Ecevit who had been Prime Minister of Turkey at the time of Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, was invited to London in 1992 to give a series of lectures to an English and Turkish audience on the Cyprus issue. The invitation of Ecevit by CTA was a major event. It stirred up nationalist feelings among Turkish and Greek-Cypriot communities and renewed hostilities. Ecevit delivered talks in two places, the first one at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, attended by a British audience. The purpose of this talk was to influence the opinion of academics, journalists and policy makers on the issue of Cyprus.

The second talk had a popular purpose of renewing allegiance to Cyprus and reaffirming the commitment of Turkish-Cypriots in London. Ecevit’s visit, sponsored and organised by CTA, highlighted the role of ethnic organisations in mobilising community members politically. This meeting not only mobilised Turks for a political cause but it also mobilised the opposition side as evidenced during the meeting at which Greek-Cypriots, joined by some Kurds, had protested to Ecevit strongly. The police were called in case of a possible clash since nationalist feelings on both sides had been aroused by the event. The profile of the participants once more reflected the ethnic dimension of clientele patterns of the association. The majority of the audience were of Cypriot origin and men in their mid-thirties suggesting that women were either less interested in political matters or were discouraged by the cultural orientation of the society which requires role differentiation between genders.

CTA’s functions are not confined to the Turkish community in London. CTA’s political standpoint is categorically emphasised as being to facilitate unity among all Turks which transcends the British context. Global politics seem to be shaping the organisation’s structure, particularly the recent developments in Bulgaria, Greece and Central Asia where Turkic people are either in the minority (Bulgaria and Greece) or in the majority (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan). Ethnic conflicts have global effects on the
development of ethnic organisations. The influence of global politics is illustrated by several activities of CTA. In protest at the racist attacks in Germany, CTA organised a meeting in front of the German Embassy in London and handed a protest letter condemning racial abuse and demanded tougher sanctions against it. The protest march was attended by many sections of the Turkish community. It can be argued that violent attacks on Turks elsewhere helped overcome divisions and united community members in London towards a common cause.

A similar phenomenon of unity was observed after the violent racist attacks on Turks in Germany. On 21st November 1992 in Molln, a house where a Turkish family had resided since 1976, being their first accommodation since their arrival in Germany, was set on fire by extremist gangs. Bahide Arslan (51), Yeliz Arslan (10) and Ayse Yilmaz (14) lost their lives in the fire (Der Spiegel, 49/1992, p. 15). Bade (1994, p. 86-87) argues that the racist attacks on foreigners in Germany 'is more than a simple hostility toward foreigners and outsiders. It is a xenophobic violence originating from a lack of perspective, lack of orientation, and social fear, as well as frustration and aggression'. According to Bade, 'hostility toward foreigners', 'xenophobia', 'right wing extremism' or 'youth violence', are tied to the continued disorientation of the population towards social problems relating to immigration and integration, since Germany denies emphatically that it has become a country of immigration in a social or a cultural sense. Yet, continuation of the violent attacks on Turks contributed to the culmination of a sense of unity among the Turkish community. At the end of May 1993 another Turkish family fell victim to a racist arson attack in Sollingen. The reaction of the Turkish community to this violent attack was spontaneous. Angered by frequent aggression directed at its members, the Turkish community filled the streets of Sollingen and demanded protection and punishment of the aggressors. In many parts of Germany where there are a significant number of Turks, liberal and Islamically oriented Turkish organisations were united and took unified action in protest at the violence. The tragic events in Molln and Sollingen united the diverse sections of the Turkish community members, from
secular to religious ones, around the same issue. The diversities and varieties of political and religious orientation were overcome by the common concern about the future of the Turkish community in Germany. As mentioned earlier such concerns also caused united action in London.

8.3.2. Turkish Youth Association (TYA) (Turk Genclik Derneği)

The Turkish Youth Association (TYA) (Turk Genclik Derneği) was established in 1981 to address various needs of Turkish/Cypriot youth in a multicultural society. TYA is located in Green Lanes in north-east London, where there is a large concentration of the Turkish community. TYA had employed six paid workers and several volunteers at the time of this research. Apart from a general director and a secretary, TYA’s employment policy was based on its targets and projects. At the time of my interview in 1994, I was told that one HIV officer, one education officer, one drugs worker and one youth worker were being employed by TYA. The duties of these officers inform us about the nature of TYA’s principle concerns regarding Turkish children. TYA’s main aim is to educate Turkish children and increase their level of academic success and self-confidence by means of educational activities. Therefore, TYA organises supplementary classes to overcome difficulties at school under the scheme of ‘Homework Club’. Parents are encouraged to send their children to these classes. Young students are given advice on many aspects of education, such as helping them with applications for grants and degree courses available to them.

The presence of an HIV officer clearly indicates that TYA has a different approach to sexuality among Turkish youth. TYA frequently organises awareness meetings on HIV and health issues. At first, this seems to be offensive to some Turkish-Muslims due to their religious viewpoints which disapprove of premarital or extramarital sexual relationships. TYA also had an officer dealing with drug use among youth who was in a close contact with the local authority that funds the projects. TYA’s dependence on the
funding made available to them seems to influence its policy when drawing up projects. The effect of economic resources coincides with the position of TYA in regard to multiculturalism and the place of Turkish culture within the British context. As one of the TYA officials explained during an interview, ‘TYA does not teach Turkish language and culture because we (TYA) believe that what other Turkish associations are doing by teaching Turkish language and culture is not designed to achieve real success in a multicultural society. What they are teaching is not compatible with the needs of children who were born and brought up here’. As this statement explicitly informs, TYA is more concerned with the day to day problems of Turkish children and it tries to offer practical solutions to these problems, predominantly in the field of education. While addressing the challenges stemming from being a minority community, TYA tries to make use of the concept of multiculturalism and its policy is directed to the incorporation of Turkish youth in the larger society.

Although TYA seems to avoid tackling the teaching of Turkish language and culture as the core issues, clients of the association influence the policies of TYA. Parents, for example, still want their children to learn Turkish. Responding to the demands of parents, TYA organises youth camps where young children are also taught Turkish. This case exemplifies the effect of clientele on the associations whose social base of recruitment is drawn from the Turkish speaking community. The knowledge of funding regulations and the focus of its projects enable this association to obtain financial support from local authorities. As mentioned above, sources of funding sometimes determine the functions of TYA. In one case, TYA had co-operated with the Drug Advisory Unit based at St. Ann’s Hospital in Haringey to raise awareness of drug related issues among the Turkish speaking community. Seven part time Turkish speaking workers were employed for a period of six months to work among the Turkish community to inform them about drugs and advise them where to go whenever they need help (in this project, the Drug Advisory Unit at St. Ann’s Hospital). An anthropologist and a drugs-
training expert were involved in the project which was totally funded by the local authority.

Like CTA, TYA is indifferent to religion. It does not organise any function in any way related to religion. Neither does it repudiate religious values in public. When asked why TYA does not organise any activity for the propagation of Islam among the young Turkish generation one official at TYA clearly expressed their position as follows:

'Religion is an obstacle for Turkish youth to become adjusted to the British society. We endorse multiculturalism, therefore we do not teach something that excludes others. We hear that some Turkish-Cypriots are joining religious groups. There is a growing trend among some Cypriots towards religion, especially some young people are joining Sheikh Nazim's group.'

This explanation indicates that the policies of TYA are dedicated to the issues of integration into and adjustment to British society. Religion is seen as an obstacle to integration, because it creates a distinct identity which is not desired by TYA which emphasises a British identity vis-à-vis Islamic identity.

8.3.3. Turkish Education Group (TEG) (Turk Egitim Birligi)

The Turkish Education Group (TEG) (Turk Egitim Birligi) also has similar aspirations to those of TYA. Education and welfare services are the main priorities of TEG as stated in its constitution:

'The Group is established to benefit the Turkish Community in the Greater London area and in particular within the London Borough of Islington and to promote the good race relations by the advancement of all ages, relief of all aged persons, protection of health and the provision of facilities in the interest of social welfare with the object of improving the conditions of life of those Turkish people who have need of such facilities by reason of their age, infirmity, disability, poverty or social and economic circumstances' (TEG's Constitution).

TEG's activities cover a range of areas centred around educational and welfare issues. Its membership is open to all Turkish speaking persons. TEG's
social base of recruitment is also characterised by ethnic and national origin. Turkish is the commonly used language at meetings, reflecting the origins of its clients. TEG's financial resources are drawn mainly from grant giving bodies such as local authority funds and foundations, and to a lesser extent, from membership fees. TEG runs four main projects to realise its aspirations as expounded in its constitution: the education project, the women's project, the elderly project and culture, art and youth projects. These receive funding from the local authority. As its annual report reveals, the primary concern of TEG is to give advice on education, employment and welfare benefits to immigrants and refugees, to support language classes, both Turkish and English and organise courses on fine arts and traditional Turkish folk dance.

TEG also takes part in the political mobilisation of the Turkish speaking community. For example, in October 1991, TEG organised a meeting in front of the Home Office to support the separated immigrant families for their unification. Although there are overlapping areas of interests and activities, TEG's political mobilisation differs from that of CTA. TEG mobilises the Turkish community on immigration policies, whereas CTA mobilises its members on national issues such as Cyprus, Turks in Bulgaria and Greece. In contrast to the nationalist stand of CTA, socialist tendencies and Third-World concerns are expressed by TEG, through joining solidarity day functions with other groups. Third-World identity is emphasised more than Turkish identity in several functions of the group as exemplified in December 1991 when TEG joined forces with the Cuban solidarity committee to organise a joint event. Cultural activities revolve around reviving a Third-Worldliness rather than Turkishness. Two film nights in May and June 1992 highlighted the affinity and proximity of TEG and its identification with the Third-World as symbolised by films on guerrilla fightings in Eritrea, Ethiopia and in al-Salvador.

However, TEG also organises short outings to enable the Turkish speaking community to share experiences. As far as TEG is concerned, it endorses a
mixture of identity construction among the Turkish community in London. Its recent leaflets make reference to the 'Turkish speaking' community rather than 'Turkish people'. The arrival of Turkish speaking Kurds and Alawite people claiming to have a different identity has influenced TEG, which has changed its identity discourses to include Kurds and Alawites from Turkey. The shift in the strategy of TEG as a Turkish association is also evidence of outside influence on the politics of an organisation. The changing political landscape in Turkey and identity politics among Kurdish and Alawite people have had repercussions among the Turkish community in London. A distinct identity claim of Kurds and Alawites has facilitated the fragmentation of an already heterogeneous Turkish identity on ethnic lines in London. The fragmentation and the expression of different identities illustrate the fact that global developments can have diverse effects through communication, as Beyer points out very succinctly:

'The globalization thesis posits, in the first instance, that social communication links are world-wide and increasingly dense. On perhaps the more obvious level, this means that people, cultures, societies, and civilisations previously more or less isolated from one another are now in regular and almost unavoidable contact. This leads to a twofold result. On the one hand, we see the conflicts that arise as quite diverse and often contradictory cultures clash within the same social unit. On the other hand, globalizing social-structural and cultural forces furnish a common context that attenuates the differences among these ways of life' (Beyer, 1994, p. 2).

When applied to TEG's case, this approach shows that while two multiple identity claims might clash with each other in the home country, they may also press for reconciliation in the British context. As far as the activities, ethnic origins of its members and clients are concerned, TEG has increasingly widened its ethnic base to include anyone coming from Turkey or Cyprus. Therefore its documents and statements refer to 'Turkish speaking communities' rather than the 'Turkish community' as a single category.
As the Turkish minority community finds new settlement areas and ethnic concentration reaches a significant degree, there seems to be a tendency among community members to initiate new ethnic organisations to address the needs of their members within that new surrounding. Within this context, it can be argued that the emergence of the Turkish community, as a result of settling in a new environment, leads to the establishment of ethnic organisations to meet social, cultural, educational and religious needs of the Turkish minority in London. The establishment of the Waltham Forest Turkish Association (WFTA) (Waltham Forest Turk Birligi) is a typical case which illustrates the developmental pattern of Turkish organisations in new settlement areas. In the early 1980s the number of Turkish speaking people started to increase in the Waltham Forest area. This increase has changed the settlement pattern of the area in terms of ethnic population distribution. As the Turkish speaking groups within the area reached over five thousand (estimated by the community leaders), the creation of WFTA followed. It was established mostly by Turkish-Cypriots in 1988 for charitable purposes giving primary emphasis on the education of children. The constitution of WFTA clearly indicates the ethnic characteristic of the organisation in its stated objectives. It reads: ‘... in particular to benefit people of Turkish/Cypriot origin and their families resident in the United Kingdom.’ WFTA's membership is also drawn on ethnic lines as an annual report for 1991-1992 indicates. According to the report, WFTA had 192 full members in that year, of whom the overwhelming majority, 171, were Turkish/Cypriots. It had only two members from the Caribbean community, four members of Pakistani origin and the remaining members categorised by the association as 'white/UK'.

It should be noted here that the number of registered members do not reflect the real number of those who are involved in the services and activities of
such organisations. Membership requires filling up application forms, registration, payment of membership fees, voting in the committee elections and in some cases providing references. This procedure is seen as a burden for many people in addition to the fact that there is no tradition of registered membership among the Turkish community. My observations lead me to argue that the majority of the clients of the associations are not full members which means that the volume and strength of an organisation should not be measured by only looking at the registered members of that organisation. The figures in the same annual report lend support to this argument. The report indicates that although WFTA had only 192 full members, the users of the services reached 633 within the same year an excess of 441 persons, two times more than the actual number of registered members. As with membership patterns on ethnic lines, the same pattern repeats itself with regard to the background of clients. The annual report states that 612 of a total 633 clients were Turkish/Cypriots. The remaining fifteen were white/UK, two were Caribbeans and four were Pakistanis.

Although WFTA is involved in welfare activities such as giving advice on immigration, housing, health and issues concerning women and the elderly, its main emphasis is on a supplementary school project as education is seen as a means of transmitting traditional values to the young generation and strengthening their ethnic identity. WFTA's constitution describes this commitment as 'to acquaint the children of our (Turkish) community with the basic principles and values of our culture'. To realise this aim, WFTA opened a weekend school. The purpose of opening such a supplementary school was explained by one of its founders as follows:

'our children go to English schools and take classes on English language, culture, history and geography. They are taught of nothing about their background, their own language and culture. So they are exposed to an education that is dominated by the values of the English society. If we do not acquaint our children with our values, one day, they may even forget where Turkey or Cyprus is, let alone our language and cultural heritage. With these concerns in mind we decided to set up this school to teach our children Turkish language
and culture so that their Turkish identity is not lost. We also wanted to contribute our children's academic achievement in their education by providing supplementary classes'.

This statement reflects a widely shared view among Turkish parents that education is the key to the transmission of traditional values to the young generation and to countering the cultural exposure they come across in the larger society by evoking a self-consciousness about Turkish identity vis-à-vis 'other's identity. Thus, the Waltham Forest Turkish School (WFTS) (Waltham Forest Turk Okulu) was established in 1988 with an enrolment 30 Turkish children. The number of students at WFTS, based at Stoneydown Park Primary School, had reached 214 (96 boys and 98 girls) by 1993. The continuous increase in the number of students at this Saturday-only school indicates that parents are worried about the identity of their children. When asked why she was taking her daughter to WFTS, mother of an eleven year-old girl expressed her feelings as follows:

'Well, when my daughter was a baby I had no worry about her because she was with me all the time and I thought that I could teach her our language and family values. I was not aware the effects of TV programs and play groups at the nursery. Quite later, I realised that she inclined to speak English with me. It was easier for her to communicate in English rather than Turkish because she was talking to her friends in English and whatever she watched on TV was in English as well. Then I began worrying that she would forget her mother tongue and values attached to it. As soon as I found out that WFTS was there to offer classes, though only on Saturdays, I decided to bring her along'.

When asked what changes had taken place since she first brought her daughter to the school, the mother replied: 'Now it has been three years that I bring my daughter here. I feel that she is more confident than before in using Turkish language. She gave up talking to us in English at home. She is also developing an interest in Turkish folklore which is a very good thing that she enjoys our culture. And also she is making more and more Turkish friends to socialise'. A fourteen year-old teenage boy who was taking supplementary classes admitted that the school environment and classes on Turkish history
and culture enabled him to discover his own identity. When asked what kept him coming to WFTS, he said:

‘When my parents asked me to come here at the weekends, I felt that this would be a great burden on me while seeing other kids playing. But I needed some help in my mathematics classes and there was supplementary classes at this school. So, I started coming here with the hope of getting some help. School administrators and teachers showed a close interest and enthusiasm by listening to our needs and problems. There I saw other Turkish youth learning to play baglama/saz (a traditional Turkish musical instrument) and to perform folk dance which until then I have never seen in my other school. For the first time I took interest in learning to play this musical instrument. While getting help in mathematics I improved my poor Turkish and learned few Turkish songs. Now I am happy that I know more about Turkish culture, before that I did not know much about Turkish traditions when asked by my non-Turkish friends’.

The same student expressed aspirations to learn more about Turkish music and folklore in Turkey and to teach them to Turkish youth here in London. He was also seriously considering doing a degree on a similar topic. These cases illustrate that the transmission of traditional values and symbols such as language, music and other specific components of cultural heritage can evoke a sense of identity and spark a feeling towards discovering one’s own background and ethnic differences. The transmission of Turkish culture and tradition to the younger generation through education is thought to be an effective way of countering the loss of identity among Turkish youth. Research findings suggest that those who attended the weekend schools can speak better Turkish and do know more about Turkish culture than those who did not show any interest in taking such classes. The self-understanding of the first group seems to be much clearer than in the second group, as the first group is more able to locate their place by exhibiting a sense of belonging to the Turkish community, whereas the second group seems to have ambiguities in their sense of belonging.
8.3.5. The *Halkevi*

The case of the *Halkevi*, and its transformation in terms of ideology, membership and activities during the course of its development is a good illustration of the extent to which political changes in the country of origin can influence the immigrant associations. The *Halkevi* literally means ‘House of People’ or ‘Home of the People’ denoting a social function where people are supposed to socialise and discuss community issues thereby strengthening ethnic ties and developing social networks among the community members. The *Halkevi* was founded in 1984 as a Turkish community centre in Stoke Newington, Hackney.

The name of the organisation ‘*Halkevi*’ was taken from a very well known network of associations established by Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, during the early years of the republican era, to disseminate ideals of westernisation by using these associations as centres of education and proselytising. From its inception the *Halkevi* in London adopted a similar ideological standpoint towards western civilisation. Ataturk’s strong nationalism inspired the founders of the *Halkevi* in London to readily express their ethnic and national pride by displaying the name of the organisation ‘Turkish Cultural Association’ with a large and visible board on the facade of its large premises. As reported by the informants, the members and clients of the *Halkevi* Turks during the early years of its establishment were predominantly mainland. This pattern may be attributed to the fact that Turkish-Cypriots were mostly using their own associations and also because there were not as many Kurdish refugees then as there are today. The *Halkevi* has received almost all its financial support from Hackney Council and provided Turkish speakers with advice on health, education, social benefits. It has also offered classes on Turkish culture and language to strengthen Turkish identity among the Turkish youth. As informers pointed out, during the early years of the organisation, the *Halkevi* was not overwhelmed by...
political concerns. Rather it was predominantly involved in welfare activities and cultural functions.

As the ethnic pattern of immigrants coming from Turkey has changed and claims to different national identity on the part of Turkish speaking Kurdish people are being more frequently spelled out, the Halkevi has undergone several transformations. An increase in the number of Turkish speaking Kurdish immigrants forced existing patterns of organisations to change in order to accommodate these new comers. Politically conscious Turkish speaking Kurds slowly took over the administration in the early 1990s. This change was promptly reflected in the ideological preferences of the organisation. First, the name of the organisation at the entrance to its premises was slightly altered from Turkish Cultural Association to that of Turkish-Kurdish Cultural Association. As reflected in the new name of the Halkevi, Ataturk's strong Turkish nationalism lost its significance and importance for the administrators.

During subsequent years, the emergence of Kurdish nationalism within the ideological framework of the Halkevi and its involvement in the political problems of Turkey alienated most of the Turks from the organisation, paving the way for a change of client patterns and membership structure. While many Turks distanced themselves from the Halkevi, the politics of Kurdish nationalism achieved a forum and used the facilities available at the Halkevi. The Halkevi introduced Kurdish language classes along with Turkish as a result of an increase in the number of its Kurdish members.

The most provocative activity to alienate Turks, as far as its nationalist politics is concerned, was the invitation of an ardent Kurdish nationalist, Leyla Zana, as a speaker at a meeting held at the Halkevi in 1993. Zana, at the time of her visit to London, was a Member of Parliament in the Turkish Grand National Assembly representing the city of Diyarbakir in south-east Turkey, where the majority of the population are of Kurdish origin. During
her speech, she accused the Turkish Government of stripping the cultural rights of the Kurdish people in Turkey. She condemned the political strategy of Turkey in its east and south-eastern regions. Her main arguments were centred around the distinctiveness of Kurdish identity from that of the Turks in language and customs. Paradoxically, she delivered her speech in Turkish, which some of the audience found confusing. Zana’s remarks seem to have caused disappointment among many Turks who used to go to the Halkevi and socialise with Kurds from Turkey.

One informant gave a typical reply when asked about his opinion of her speech. He said: ‘I can not understand why these people are trying to divide Turks and Kurds. We need each other here in a foreign country more than anybody else. I do not support these kinds of activities at the Halkevi’. Another one recalled the above-mentioned conflict between a distinctive identity claim and the use of Turkish instead of Kurdish by saying: ‘Look! Which language she is using. She delivered her speech in Turkish not even in Kurdish. Isn’t that falsification of her claim that Turks and Kurds are completely different? I believe that if we (Turks and Kurds) are left alone on our own and not provoked by the politicians we would prove how peacefully we can live together’. An informant of Kurdish origin also disagreed with Zana’s argument about the characters of these two groups. He underlined one important issue which according to him Zana seemed to have overlooked. When asked what she had overlooked, he replied: ‘Well, there are numerous common values between Turks and Kurds that they have been sharing for centuries. First of all both Turks and Kurds are Muslims. I believe that our shared belief, Islam, left an important mark on both Turkish and Kurdish identity. Secondly we shared the same geographical locations as towns and villages. Moreover, there have been and still are intermarriages between Turks and Kurds both in Turkey and in London. So, I regard myself as a member of the whole society rather than of single unity. This is not a denial of being Kurdish’.
As reflected by these informants, political engagements of the Halkevi played a destructive role with respect to the ethnic integration of Turks and Kurds from Turkey. Symbols such as flags and posters supportive of a Kurdish armed separatist terrorist group known as PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) which were displayed during the politically charged meetings at the Halkevi discouraged many Turks from going there again. Transformation of the Halkevi, as a consequence of pressures by the changing nature of immigrant community, first from a Turkish Cultural Association to a Turkish-Kurdish Cultural Association, and then to a Kurdish nationalist association as evidenced by its interest in and focus on Kurdish politics, illustrates the effects of general political developments in the country of origin. The increasing influence of politics at home seems to dominate the agenda of some Turkish and Kurdish organisations. Goulbourne's (1991, p.126-169) analysis of the political behaviour of the Sikh community in Britain supports the foregoing argument about the influence of diasporic politics on minority communities in Britain. Goulbourne shows that Sikhs in Britain were concerned with political developments in their 'homeland'. The Khalistan movement which is demanding an independent state in the northern Indian state of the Punjab, for example, has received support from the Sikh community in Britain. These developments indicate that politics in the country of origin are still important for some ethnic groups in the diaspora.

8.3.6 Other Organisations

So far, I have analysed the data on five main Turkish/Cypriot associations. However, the Halkevi can no longer be defined as a Turkish association, as many Turks claim that this organisation has become a solely Kurdish organisation with strong pro-Kurdish nationalistic views which exacerbate ethnic division between Turks and Kurds. Despite its current status however, it is still relevant to include the Halkevi in the analysis of the role of Turkish organisations in identity politics since this group was established by Turks, and over time, transformed into a Kurdish organisation with a larger
clientele. These five organisations, CTA, TEG, TYA, WFTA and the Halkevi, are representative organisations in terms of their establishment, clientele, membership, policies and activities. As it is clear from the foregoing discussions culture, identity, education and identity politics are the main concerns of these organisations. The other organisations which are recognised with less degree of significance within the Turkish/Cypriot community are: the Turkish Cypriot Cultural Association (TCCA) (Kibris Turk Kultur Dernegi) established in 1977; the Cypriot Community Association (CCA) (Kibris Turk Toplum Dernegi) established in 1976; and the Mustafa Kemal Association of London (MKAL) (Londra Mustafa Kemal Dernegi) established in 1992. All of these address a range of issues related to the Turkish community. Among these issues the welfare of the community, education of children, preservation of Turkish culture and identity are the prominent concerns. CCA, for example is concerned with the transmission of Turkish culture to the young generation. Therefore it organises seminars and lectures on Turkish language and culture. Youth groups are targeted by CCA through sports projects. As one worker explained: ‘Turkish-Cypriot youth is on the verge of losing its identity and self-confidence. What we are hoping by organising sports projects is to enable them to come together and develop a sense of closer affinity with fellow youth. We also believe that these kinds of projects will strengthen their sense of confidence and assertiveness of their Turkish identity’.

One can see from the above statement that the reconstruction of Turkish-Cypriot identity among youth groups is supported by CCA. The Mustafa Kemal Association of London (MKAL), on the other hand, is trying to lobby interested parties to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (Kuzey Kibris Turk Cumhuriyeti) as an independent state. Its activities are marked by patriotic ideology centred around evoking feelings of solidarity among the Turkish community. Through enlarging the political concerns from a national and ethnic line to that of the international arena by identifying the Turkish community-with the Muslim World, MKAL is also
campaigning for the protection of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya and Western Thrace where atrocities are constantly being committed.

This Chapter would be incomplete if we did not mention the institutionalisation of women's issues among the Turkish community in London. The foundation of the Union of Turkish Women in Britain (UTWB) (Ingiltere Turk Kadinlar Birligi) goes as far back as 1974. Since its establishment, UTWB has dedicated itself to family matters and women issues especially supporting women with family problems. One worker at UTWB explained the main problems facing Turkish women in a new cultural atmosphere where the lack of language is rampant. She informed that:

'...many of our clients seem to experience the effects of immigration. First of all they came to a society where they have virtually no contacts except a few kin, if they are lucky enough to have some relatives here. Many of the Turkish women feel lonely and are discouraged to go out on their own. In addition to that, language problems and lack of communication are adding more stress on women's life, making them totally dependent on husbands or on their children who can speak English'.

Services available at UTWB are illustrative of the problems Turkish women face in London. UTWB offers English language classes to reduce the effects of lack of communication and organises seminars on childcare, and health issues concerning women. Social and cultural activities are also organised to enable women to form a social network and solidarity along ethnic lines. One specific area that UTWB is concerned with is domestic violence and matrimonial problems in Turkish families. One worker mentioned that 'UTWB is trying to keep the family together when a family problem arises between the couples. We encourage women to be more assertive and open to their partners'. One can argue that this kind of constructive approach can increase women's self-confidence and they would become more resistant to immigration pressures. Two other women's organisations function in a similar way. Haringey Cypriot Turkish Women's Project (Haringey Kibrisli Turk Kadınlar Projesi) and Islington Turkish Women's Association (Islington
Turk Kadınlar Dernegi) provide more or less the same services and receive funding from the Local Council. The client patterns of these three Turkish women’s organisations have similarities. As explained in Chapter Three, ethnographic data on women’s organisations and interviews were problematic due to the nature of the Turkish/Cypriot community. Being male, I would say, prevented me from reaching a wider and more representative group of women informants. Nevertheless, the data on this organisation reveals a common pattern on issues concerning the institutionalisation of women issues among the Turkish community in London.

In sum, Turkish/Cypriot organisations in London appear to be important social, cultural and educational centres with different emphasis on the politics of identity among the Turkish community. Ethnographic data presented in this Chapter indicate that Turkish/Cypriot organisations are not only diverse in terms of their orientation, clientele and politics but also dynamic because they are open to change to adapt to new situations and address new challenges.
Chapter Eight: Notes

1. For the historical development, the scope of participation and activities of Turkish voluntary organisations in Sweden, see Ingrid Lundberg & Ingvar Svanberg (1991) *Turkish Associations in Metropolitan Stockholm*, Uppsala Multiethnic papers 23, Centre for Multiethnic Research, Uppsala University.

2. With the unification of two Germanys, The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic a new phase started in *gastarbeiter* phenomenon with a renewed significance. Since the demolition of Berlin Wall in 1989, thousands of people from the East entered the West. This flood into the West German labour market is said to have posed a threat to the ‘already fragile position of the Turks and other non-German migrants in Germany’ (Kudat, 1993, p. 153). The process of unification has also a weakening effect on the position of foreigners and heightens their feelings of insecurity (Ashkenasi, 1990, p. 314). As Bade (1994, p. 85) points out, after unification in 1990, growing fear of foreigners regarding aggressive xenophobia and violence was heightened. First in the Eastern and then in the Western parts of the Germany, foreigners were attacked in the streets with racist slogans such as ‘foreigners out’ and ‘Germany for Germans’. Skrypietz (1994, p. 133) notes for example that 49 people lost their lives in racist attacks between 21 October 1990 and 25 May 1993. During the initial tide of violent attacks primarily asylum seekers were victimised. It is noted that 2,600 violent criminal offences in 1992 alone were reported as having been racially motivated (Baringhorst, 1995, p. 225). Since 1992 such kind of attacks have increasingly aimed at the largest group of foreigners living in Germany; the Turks. The Turks became the primary targets for racist attacks as ‘the skinhead ‘culture’ praises the ruthless mercenary who polices the streets to make them *turkenfrei* (free of Turkish people) as the true German hero’ (Skrypietz, 1994, p. 139). The extent of racism which developed a *turkenfrei* Germany discourse evidently confirms Wallerstein’s observation on the nature of racism and xenophobia in the capitalist world economy. Wallerstein (1991a, p. 32-33) argues that racism is not simply a matter of having an attitude of dislike for other groups on the basis of physical or cultural criteria. Racism is more than that and it seems that modern world is reproducing its old practice of ejecting the ‘barbarians’ from the physical centre of the society. The old practice aimed at cleaning the ‘others’ and purifying the environment.

3. A short note on a different organisation which was established by Turks would be timely, though it was marginalised by the Marxist ideology it espouses and by its disinterest in cultural affairs and identity discourse within the Turkish community in London. Union of Turkish Workers in Britain (UTWB) (*İngiltere Türk Isçi Birliği*) was established in 1979 by a group of Turkish workers in response to growing problems the Turkish workers. The main activity of the UTBW centred around giving advice to employees and offering interpretation to both Turks and Kurds. Leaflets distributed by UTWB reveals the strong affiliation of the organisation to a leftist ideology. There is a very discernible political tone in the language they use and Marxist influence on the ideology of UTWB that draws a boundary vis-à-vis non-Marxist Turkish workers. The UTWB’s ideological paradigm derived from what is called in Turkish *asiri sol* (far left) distances Turkish workers with right-wing ideological tendencies from UTWB. This apparently leads us to a conclusion that institutionalised form of Turkish work-force is far from being completed.
Chapter Nine
Religion Among Turks in London

This Chapter examines the development of institutionalisation of religion among Turks in London. In the light of three case studies, the role of Islamic organisations in the construction of a shared identity will be analysed. The rationale behind the analysis of institutionalised Islam is the contention that religion influences the formation/maintenance of ethnic identity. This contention is also held by Yinger (1994, p. 255) who argues that 'there is a close and natural affinity between religion and ethnicity. This affinity is strongest where the sense of a primordial attachment to an ancestral group and its traditions is most deeply felt. Almost nowhere, however, can an ethnic order be described and analysed without reference to a religious factor'. Parks's (1994, p. 153) approach which notes that 'religious and ethnic identities are usually closely intertwined, and often cannot be readily separated from the other' echoes a similar view. The equation between being a Turk and being a Muslim has been a landmark of the Turkish identity. As Lewis (1961, p. 418) observes, Islamic values are deeply rooted in Turkish society. He points out that despite the striking changes the Turkish society has faced, Islamic imprint on the fabric of society still remains alive:

'...Islam has profound roots among Turkish society. From its foundation to until its fall, the Ottoman Empire was a state dedicated to the advancement or defence of the power and faith of Islam. Turkish thought, life and letters were permeated through and through by the inherited traditions of the classical Muslim cultures, which, though transmuted into something new and distinctive, remained basically and unshakably Islamic. After a century of Westernisation, Turkey has gone under immense changes greater than any outside observer had thought possible. But the deepest Islamic roots of Turkish life and culture are still alive, and the ultimate identity of Turk and Muslim in Turkey is still unchallenged' (Lewis, 1961, p. 418).

These observations indicate the strong influence of Islamic values on the identity of the Turks. The embeddedness of Islam among Turkish society is self-evident. White (1994, p. 37) points out that 99 per cent of Turks are Muslims
and to varying degrees they try to practice the prescribed rituals such as daily prayers and fasting in Ramazan (the month of fasting). She also notes that moral values are vigorously upheld within the patriarchal structures of traditional Turkish families. As will be seen below, in the analysis of Islamic organisations among Turks in London, religious and political developments in the country of origin still influence Islamic movements abroad (see also Chapter Ten). Therefore, before moving on to the institutionalisation of religious values and their effects on the formation and maintenance of Turkish ethnicity and identity, I would like to give some background information about religion in Turkey. Without such information, it would be difficult to understand the ideological diversity among Islamic organisations, among Turks in Europe in general and in London in particular.

9.1. Religion in Turkey

Political, social and religious developments in modern Turkey were marked by the ideals of modernism and secularism. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first President of modern Turkey, introduced sweeping changes in Turkish society, inspired by the principles of modernisation. Ataturk's main aim in the process of modernisation during the early years of the Turkish Republic was to change the basic structure of Turkish society (Toprak, 1981, p. 39) and to redefine the political community by trying to draw society from an Islamic framework into that of national belonging as a newly defined 'Turkish nation' (Eisenstadt, 1984, p. 9). In order to achieve this target, as Mardin (1981, p. 217) notes, Ataturk launched a movement of cultural westernisation in order to provide the Turkish nation with a new view of the world that would replace religious worldview and culture. Separation of religion and politics was seen as a prerequisite step to opening the doors to western values. Therefore, secularism was adopted as one of the foundation stones and central tenets of Ataturk's program because it was thought to be an indispensable necessity to accomplish this modernisation (Weiker, 1981, p. 105; Akural, 1984, p. 126)1.
As a part of this secularisation policy, a major westernisation campaign was launched against the institutional and cultural basis of religion in society to disestablish Islam as the state religion, and to prepare the climate for the introduction of secularism in the Turkish constitution (Turan, 1991, p. 34). It is argued that (Mardin, 1988, p. 142) secularisation reforms which were undertaken during the first decade of the new republic, founded in 1923, aimed at minimising the role of religion in every walk of Turkish society. Moreover, the motive behind the secularisation program was to reduce the societal significance of religious values and eventually to disestablish cultural and political institutions stamped by Islam.

This program was implemented in a four-phased programme. The phases are symbolic secularisation, institutional secularisation, functional secularisation and legal secularisation. Symbolic secularisation involved enforced changes in various aspects of national culture or societal life which had a symbolic identification with Islam (Toprak, 1981, p. 40-1). This phase of secularisation was designed to transform the connotation of a set of symbols, perceived as sacred by the masses, to the profane, to disestablish Islam as a source of symbolic identification. The most significant secularisation reform in the symbolic sphere took place in 1928 which resulted in changing the alphabet from the Arabic script to that of Latin (Lewis, 1984, p. 195; Lewis, 1961, p. 398). The new regime regarded language as one of the communicative means with history, culture and the sacred scripture. Therefore, the Kemalist regime sought to break the continuity of the Ottoman-Islamic heritage in Turkish society. The acceptance of the western hat and western styles of clothing in 1925; the adoption of the Gregorian calendar in the same year; the introduction of Western music in schools and the change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday in 1935 (Akural, 1984, p. 127; Toprak, 1981, p. 45) were also meant to facilitate symbolic secularisation in Turkey.

Institutional secularisation, on the other hand, was designed to reduce the institutional strength of Islam and its influential role in the political affairs of the
country (Toprak, 1981, p. 46). The first step in 1924, was to abolish the Caliphate, to start a transformation from Umnet (Umma, Community of believers) a to national entity which was meant to eradicate religion as a common bond of solidarity. With the abolition of the Caliphate, the principles of political legitimacy were changed as to exclude Islam as a source of legitimacy and political loyalty to the state (Mardin, 1981, p. 210). The abolition of the office of Seyhu'I Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations was put into effect in 1924. The basic goal of the Kemalist elite, Heper (1981, p. 350) notes, was ‘to completely free the polity from religious considerations. Islam was not supposed to have even the function of ‘civil religion’ for the Turkish polity; Islam was not going to provide a transcendent goal for political life’. Institutional secularisation continued in the ensuing years. The Sufi movements (Tarikatlar/Tasavvufi hareketler) and their activities were outlawed in 1925. The Tekkes and Zaviyes of widespread Sufi movements such as the Mawlarvi (Mevlevi), the Bektashi, the Nakshbandi and the Kadiriye were closed.

Functional secularisation was the third stage of the four-phased secularisation programme in Turkey. Functional secularisation was carried out in two stages (Toprak, 1981, p. 48) of which, the secularisation of the court system through the adoption of western codes was the first step by because the Seriat law (Sharia) was regarded as an obstacle to the westernisation programme. The main purpose of the pro-westernisation elite in implementing such a strategy was to reduce the functional influence of Islam in the community. The second stage of functional secularisation was carried out in the educational system in order to implement a program of functional differentiation of institutions, primarily of Medreses (Madrasas). With the introduction of the law for the unification of instruction (Tevhid-i Tedrisat) in 1924, all educational establishments, came under the strict control of the state (Winter, 1984, p. 186).

Legal secularisation, on the other hand, was designed to firmly establish modernisation reform in Turkish society. Legal secularisation was accomplished by the adoption of a new civil code based on a Swiss cantonal code in 1926 as a
replacement of Seriat (Shariah) law. Modernisation and secularisation reforms were also implemented by Atatürk's successors during the one-party period and as Arkoun (1984, p. 97) argues, these reforms 'introduced a certain mobility into political, institutional and cultural life, but at the cost of a serious break with Islamic heritage'.

9.2 Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey

The transition to multi-party politics in the late 1940s was a turning point in relaxing the official attitude towards religion. The multi-party period ended the implementation of militant secularism (Ahmad, 1991, p. 10). The first election in 1950, after the transition to the multi-party system was won by the Democratic Party (DP) (Demokrat Parti). This underlined the centrality of Islam in Turkish society and its potential force in shaping the political behaviour of the community. Turan (1991, p. 45) attributes DP's election victory in 1950 to the tolerant attitude of the party officials towards religion and to the response of the party to the pragmatic needs of the population including those in the religious domain. In the first multi-party general election, religious groups sought to influence parties by giving support to them. Of these, a well known example of alliance between the political leadership and a religious group is the Nurcu movement and its support of DP in the interest of Islam (Ahmad, 1991, p. 11; Landau, 1981, p. 375).

The emergence of political ideologies inspired by the religiously oriented worldview began to enter the public domain towards the end of the 1960s. Nevertheless, the accommodation of religiously-based political ideologies was against the ideals of modernisation and secularisation. Therefore the politics and expression of Islam through a political language have always been a source of tension and controversy. The case of the Welfare Party (RP) (Refah Partisi), in contemporary Turkey is a prominent example of the fact that religion has been one of the oft-observed elements of political life and culture. RP has its origins in The National Salvation Party (MSP) (Milli Selamet Partisi) whose origins lie in The
National Order Party (MNP) (*Milli Nizam Partisi*). MNP was founded in 1970 and, following a military intervention, it was closed down in 1971 by the Constitutional Court (Mardin, 1988, p. 145) on the grounds that the party was using religion for political purposes and was therefore violating fundamental provisions of the constitution concerning secularism. But another party, under the MSP banner with the same political ideology emerged before the 1973 election, led by Necmeddin Erbakan. MSP was the direct descendant of the former MNP and its political philosophy was identical with that of MNP. According to the results of the 1973 general election, MSP had acquired a key role to form a government, because none of the parties had gained a sufficient majority to establish the government on its own. Neither the right nor the left-wing parties were able to form a government without the support of MSP. The MSP was once more dissolved by the military regime that came to power in 1980. Along with other parties, all political activities of the MSP were outlawed and its leader was banned from involvement in politics. Until its closure in 1980, MSP played an important role in Turkish politics as a coalition partner. MSP's contribution to the political development of Turkey ranged from ideological principles of the party programme to the implementation of its policies while it was a coalition partner in the government.

MSP's political stand was expressed in a formula, named as National Vision (*Milli Gorus*) that was claimed to be rooted in religious, moral and traditional values of the Turkish society. One of the principle tenets of the party was its opposition to the dissemination of Western materialist ideas which were thought to shake the fabric of society in terms of religious, moral and family life of the nation. As soon as the political ban, imposed by the military regime in 1980, was lifted by a referendum, Necmeddin Erbakan turned to politics. He assumed the leadership of the Welfare Party (RP) (*Refah Partisi*) and entered the elections in 1987, but RP could not achieve parliamentary representation. RP had to wait until the 1991 general elections to achieve representation in parliament.
The issues referred to as revivalist Islam, resurgent Islam and fundamentalist Islam drew the attention of politicians, journalists and scholars to the global phenomenon of rising Islamic awareness. A plethora of semi-scholarly and scholarly literature was produced to examine different aspects of Islamic revivalism and movements of return to religious values. Especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979, numerous publications appeared with differing approaches to understand and explain the nature of the Islamic resurgence in Muslim societies (Kucukcan, 1991, p. 71-74). Along with many other Muslim societies, Turkey had also witnessed the revival of religious values among different segments of the society. The westernised elite in Muslim countries seem to have failed to establish a viable economic and political system during their long stay in power after the establishment of independent nation-states. Moreover, they were not very successful in providing workable solutions to the depressing problems prevalent in Muslim societies such as poverty, unemployment, education and equal political participation. In the grip of these unresolved problems, Muslim intellectuals began to question the value and viability of regimes in their countries. Islamic movements appealed to a large segment of society arguing that the Western-inspired regimes had all failed to produce and sustain a just process of development. Muslim intellectuals also promoted the idea of seeking alternative sources of development and progress in the social, economic and political construction of Muslim societies. This meant a return to the Islamic idioms and root-paradigms, and to rediscover the Islamic ideology as a world-view rooted in Qur'anic paradigms in the face of modern developments.

As mentioned earlier, Islamic values are deeply rooted in Turkish society and despite the striking socio-political changes as a result of modernisation and secularisation, the Islamic imprint on the fabric of society still remains alive. The revival of Islam in Turkey gathered momentum after the 1980s. Heper (1981, p. 361) attributes the revival of Islamic values to the failure of the Kemalist effort to replace religion with totally modern secular values. He argues that Kemalism could not perform the metaphysical function of a religion. It could not provide a
system of beliefs and practices which would enable people to struggle with the ultimate problems of life. Kemalism failed in its approach to religion because, as Mardin (1981, p. 128; 1989, p. 229-30) observes, it undermined the role of Islam for Turks in the building of identity. Atatürk’s intention to make religion purely a private concern in an individual’s life has not been materialised because the boundaries of private daily life have assumed a wider profile in Turkish society. While private daily life increasingly gained new variety and richness, religion acquired a more effective role and a central focus in societal life. Private religious education, development of Islamic fashion and dress, production of religious music, publication of Islamic journals as aspects of the privatisation wave, gave Islam a new up-lift by making it pervasive in modern Turkish society. The spread of universal education in Turkey and rapid developments in communication technology in everyday life, transformed the message of the Sufi Orders into mass religious movements which can be described as faith movements, with new distinctive characteristics from that of local and particularistic beliefs. These developments have also resisted the forces that attempted to make religion a private matter. Social changes such as migration from rural to urban to settlement areas, rapid demographic change, multi-party politics, economic and industrial developments that Turkish society had experienced within the last three or four decades, have all affected the revival of Islam in Turkey in varying degrees.

9.3. Recent Developments in Islamic Politics and their Possible Impacts on the Turkish Community

The general elections on 24 December 1995 were closely monitored by many Turks in Europe. The political developments soon after the elections and the efforts of the Welfare Party (RP) to form a government preoccupied the Turkish community regardless of their political preference and the degree of religiosity. As the foundation of the Turkish Republic RP, as an Islamist party, had for the first time claimed a majority. This development caused concern on the part of secularists but conversely joy on the part of Islamists. The rise of RP meant that
political Islam managed to receive large popular support (see Table 9.1, which shows the electorate support for various political parties between 1987 and 1995 in Turkey).

Table 9.1: Parliamentary Elections and the Rise of Welfare Party in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamistic party</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Party</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre-Right</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Path Party</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>135</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
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<td>Seats</td>
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<td>Democratic L. P.</td>
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This table shows that RP has steadily increased its votes during the last three general elections. Since there was a national threshold of ten per cent in the 1987 elections, RP could not win any seats despite its 7.2 per cent share in the results. In order to avoid such a result in the 1991 elections, the RP leadership negotiated with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) (Millietci Hareket Partisi) who also sought an electoral partner to beat the ten per cent threshold. As soon as the elections were over, in which both parties managed to enter parliament, an electoral coalition ceased and RP assumed its particular stance in Turkish politics.

Table 9.1 also shows that RP had 168 seats in 1995 and was the largest party. After an initial failure to form a coalition government, RP eventually succeeded in becoming the bigger partner of the government in June 1996, following the fall of Motherland Party - True Path Party coalition. Necmeddin Erbakan, as an Islamist politician, became the new Prime Minister of Turkey. RP's achievement was attributed to its integration into the political culture of Turkey; its respect for the republican principles and the legal systems as well as its advocacy of the market economy (Rouleau, 1996, p. 76). The rise of RP or political Islam in Turkey can not be understood by referring to RP's respect for democratic values.
and acceptance of the market economy. The Islamic revival or 'return of Islam' is a much more complex phenomenon which involves social, economic and political developments in the past and increasingly in the present. Islamic movements and Muslim politics do not have a monolithic nature. Therefore Islamic revival should be viewed within the context of a current global revival of religion which is not peculiar to the Muslim world.

One of the interesting aspects of the last elections and subsequent developments, in relation to this thesis, is the expected impact on the Turks abroad as RP categorically claimed to follow a determined policy to negotiate for the protection of their rights. As it will be documented in more detail in Chapter Ten, RP has a close connection with and control of National Vision, a grass-root religio-political organisation in Europe. This connection once more became self-evident in the last general elections. The Director-General of National Vision, Osman Yumakogullari, was elected as MP on RP's ballot. The second person in the leadership hierarchy of National Vision, Ali Yuksel, was also a candidate on RP's list. Nevertheless, he was not as successful as Yumakogullari, yet he succeeded him and was elected as the Director-General of National Vision in its 1996 annual meeting at which the ex-Director-General attended as an honorary guest. The 1995 general elections in Turkey have also produced new alliances with potential implications for the Turkish Muslim communities in Europe. The establishment of such an alliance has escaped the attention of observers.

I would like to conclude this analysis of religious and political developments in Turkey with several suggestions on how such an alliance may influence Turkish-Islamic organisations in Europe in general and in London in particular. As I will argue later, almost all Turkish organisations, whether they are of a religious, secular or political nature or be it independent, self-sufficient, off-shoot or state sponsored, compete over economic and human resources. As far as these organisations are concerned, it appears that rivalry, competition and conflict rather than negotiation and co-operation are prevalent features of their politics. Such a state of affairs was inherited from the conflicts in Turkey and reproduced
in Europe. In the midst of conflicting political interests, however, RP negotiated successfully with the Suleymanci leadership in Turkey before the elections and persuaded them to support RP, at least partly. In return, the Suleymanci group, which is one of the most influential religious movements among Turks in Europe, was offered a secure seat at the elections in Antalya. At these elections, a well known figure from the Suleymanci group was put at the head of RP's list and entered parliament with other MPs of RP with whom the Suleymanci group had never previously politically affiliated. Moreover, both groups were in subtle rivalry, if not in animosity, to attract clients both in Turkey and in the European countries with a sizeable Turkish community. I argue that the religious coalition between RP and the Suleymanci group will have some implications for the Turkish communities in Europe.

I suggest that there might be two principal effects of this religious coalition. First of all, the Suleymanci group will enjoy more protection from the political establishment in Turkey, under the premiership of RP leadership. In return, RP will continue to receive political support from a large and effective religious group. The second principal implication will be directly related to Turks in Europe where the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi*) has been in open contest with both groups. Diyanet is trying to curb the influences of both the National Vision and the Suleymanci group with its large resources provided by the Turkish government. It is expected that the RP government may press to ease the grip of Diyanet which will be very beneficial for both groups. A note of caution is that the religious coalition between RP and the Suleymanci group will not necessarily lead to the disappearance of differences in their approach to Islam and its organisation among the Turkish communities in Europe in general and in London in particular.

9.4. Institutionalisation of Islam Among the Turkish Community

I will analyse the cases of three Islamic groups among Turks in London. These are *Aziziye Jama'a (Aziziye Cemaati)*, *Valide Sultan Jama'a (Suleymanci*
group) and Sheikh Nazira Jama’a (followers of the Nakshbandiya Order). In this Chapter, I will analyse the institutionalisation, ideology, leadership, and membership structure of these different Islamic groups and their politics of identity among the Turkish community in London. In Chapter Ten the analysis will focus on two religio-political organisations which will then complete the analysis of the institutionalisation of religion and its relation to identity construction among Turks.

9.4.1. Aziziye Jama’a (Aziziye Cemaati)

The foundation of the Aziziye Mosque (Aziziye Camii) in Stoke Newington High Road in north-east London is an illustrative case to understand how and why the Turkish community established an institution in the form of a Mosque whose origins can be traced to the formative period of Islamic history. Aziziye Jama’a is a part of the prevailing religious diversity within the community which accommodates different Jama’as (Cemaatler) with their own Islamic discourses. The founders of the Aziziye Mosque had established the United Kingdom Turkish Islamic Association (UKTIA) (Ingiltere Turk Islam Birliği) in 1979 as a first step towards institutionalisation of Islam among the Turkish community in London. The UKTIA’s aim was to find long-term solutions to the problems surrounding religious education, practices and publications as its constitution mentions. The aims and objectives of the UKTIA are set as ‘to further the religion of Islam, to provide places of worship for all Muslims in the United Kingdom, to provide both spiritual and material assistance to those in need, to advance education in accordance with the tenets and doctrines of Islam and traditions of Turkish culture.’. (The Constitution of UKTIA).

As the UKTIA addresses the Turkish community, its members comprised 100 per cent Turks, suggesting that ethnic background, national and linguistic identity are important factors of affiliation. In 1995 the UKTIA had 96 registered members all of whom were Turkish. The membership structure of
the UKTIA appears to have played a decisive role in the formation of ethnic identity of the Aziziye Mosque as a ‘Turkish Mosque’ and the religious activities it has offered since its establishment. The Turkish ethnic identity of the UKTIA was enshrined in its constitution as article 4 reads: ‘to advance education in accordance with the tenets and doctrines of Islam and traditions of Turkish culture’. Moreover article 4a states, ‘to promote Islamic and Turkish arts and culture’ suggesting that national and religious identity of the Turkish community are inseparable and inextricably intertwined. The references to Islam and Turkish culture imply that Turkish identity lies at the confluence of both national traditional values and Islamic beliefs.

As soon as the UKTIA was established, the executive committee began looking for a suitable premises which could be used as a proper place of worship and religious education of children. It is observed that, (Brothers, 1971, p. 44) ‘a minority group unable to afford its own premises may borrow a hall or church from another group’. Similarly, until suitable premises were found, Turks in London used the facilities of other Mosques in their neighbourhood. My informants said that they went to these Mosques mainly for three occasions; to perform weekly *Cuma Namazi* (Friday prayers) and to perform two annual prayers *Bayram Namazi* at the end of Ramazan (*Idu’l Fitr*) and during the feast of sacrifice/slaughter (*Idu’l Adha*). They did not go to the Mosques for other purposes except during the mentioned occasions and for prayer for the deceased which is supposed to be performed before the burial. One informer attributed his behaviour of not going to the ‘non-Turkish’ Mosque as follows:

‘When I came to England I knew no English but a few words, neither Arabic as well. So I was not able to understand the *hutbe* (*khutba* sermon) since the Imams either were reading it in English or in Arabic. But I still felt obliged to go to the Mosque for Friday prayers but not for other occasions. Although we were all Muslims, they were speaking their own languages. Since the opening of Turkish (Aziziye) Mosque, I have always been coming here because I can understand the *hutbe* properly and participate in other activities’.
In parallel with the increase in the number of Turks, who took their religious life so seriously as to form a Jama’a among themselves, halls were rented to perform Friday and Bayram prayers. This development was also the beginning of the formation of a Turkish Muslim Jama’a in London in addition to those of other Muslim Jama’as divided on ethnic lines. The statement of a fifty year old Turkish man who had lived in London for more than twenty years supports this observation. When asked how he felt about getting together with his fellow Turkish men in a Turkish congregation, he said: ‘I really welcomed the organisations of prayers led by Turkish the Imams even if they were in the halls. You know why? Before, I used to go to pray with other Muslim brothers. Although it is a good feeling being with them, you don’t really enjoy the prayer because you just pray and leave. No socialising, nothing. But when I started to pray with our Jama’a, I felt myself more stronger and more self-confident’. The cycle of going to non-Turkish Mosques and subsequently renting halls for congregational prayers with a Jama’a was completed with the purchase of an old cinema building which was later turned into Aziziye Mosque in north-east London within the vicinity of the Turkish neighbourhood.

Premises of the Aziziye Mosque were bought in 1983. The UKTIA had raised £80 000 to purchase a derelict cinema building. Funding was received in the forms of membership fees and large sums of donations from Muslim businessmen both in England and in Turkey. Many volunteers took part in the clearance of the theatre by removing the seats from the building. One of them, a man aged forty five, said:

‘I discovered my Islamic identity in England. During the early periods of my life in London I was living according to my desires regardless of the Islamic criteria. This took more than five years, then I realised that I had no significant purpose in my life. I also realised that I had only little knowledge of my religion. With the encouragement of my friends I decided to learn more about Islam and meet other Muslim Turks. My first inquiry to find a Turkish Mosque was disappointing. But when heard the activities of UKTIA to purchase a building to establish a Turkish Mosque, I rushed to contribute because that meant I could go
there to improve my knowledge and also send my children later so that they would learn their religion when they are young'.

The foregoing description of the event by the informant who participated in the fund-raising activities and worked physically in the construction of the Mosque indicates that the institutionalisation of Islam evoked a sense of affiliation to a collectivity.

Similar feelings were expressed by other informants who took part in the establishment of the Mosque even though some were disillusioned and distanced themselves at a later stage as a result of developments within the administration of the Mosque. As soon as the Aziziye Mosque was founded, a Turkish Imam was brought from Turkey in 1983 to lead prayers and to teach both children and adults. During the early phase of its establishment, the Aziziye Mosque took a fairly neutral approach to religious groups since people from various religious backgrounds had contributed to the formation of Aziziye Jama’a. That means that the Aziziye Mosque was neither affiliated to a sectarian group nor was its Jama’a fashioned on a particular model of a Muslim religious group in Turkey or in Europe. The independent character of the Aziziye Mosque attracted a large segment of Turkish Muslims in north-east London due to its non-affiliation and its receptive attitude towards all groups. My informants stated that all the functions taking place in the Mosque were well attended and it played a constructive role in uniting the Turkish community around common concerns such as Helal food, animal slaughtering during Kurban Bayrami and Islamic education of children.

Until the late 1980s this status continued without much interruption and disagreement. The first signs of transformation from the neutral identity or non-affiliation of the Aziziye Mosque to that of an attachment to a religious group in Turkey were observed when the Imam changed his appearance. The Imam started growing a beard and wearing a particular type of dress with sarik (turban), salvar (baggy trousers) and cubbe (robe). This change took the
Jama’a by surprise, as it implied a change in Aziziye’s neutrality. One ex-
member of the Aziziye Jama’a described this transformation as follows:

‘The Imam did have no beard when he came from Turkey and he used
to ask us if it was bothering the Jama’a. Neither did he wear sarik, salvar
and cubbe. Some years later, he began wearing these things and started
imposing the dress code upon the Jama’a. At first, we did not realise
why he had changed his clothing but it was revealed later that the
Imam affiliated himself with a religious group in Turkey and adopted
their way of practising Islam, apparently very visible in the dress code
and appearance’.

The transformation from familiar and conventional Islamic practices to that of
unfamiliar practices, as if the Aziziye Mosque was a branch of a group in
Turkey not only took many members of the Jama’a by surprise but distanced
some of them from the Aziziye Jama’a. When asked why he had left the
Aziziye Jama’a, an ex-member gave a typical reply:

‘Well, in the beginning the Imam himself had no beard. He grew it
later and all of a sudden he started to preach us that we must grow
beard and dress like him. As though this was not enough, he began to
impose the same code of dress upon our children as young as ten years
old. I did not understand why a particular way of dressing and
growing a long beard became so important as if they were fundamental
parts of Islam. I did not want to be forced into something I would not
feel comfortable with’.

These accounts imply that sudden and unfamiliar changes within the Jama’a,
especially when imposed from above, result in divisions among its members
and lead the dissatisfied group to reject the authority of the Imam.
Accordingly, they either leave the Jama’a voluntarily in response to the
change that involves all the Jama’a in an unfamiliar version of Islamic
practice, or they are forced to leave by the Jama’a as a result of a growing
pressure put on them to accept the changes.

The Imam of the Mosque who introduced these fundamental changes among
the Jama’a, is a graduate of Islamic Studies in Turkey and worked as a Mufti
for the Directorate of Religious Affairs. He left his official duty in Turkey and
came to London where he was neither paid by the Turkish Government nor had he to observe any rules set by the Directorate. In a sense, he freed himself from the limitations of a state institution by coming to London, where he did not have to preach official Islam to his Jama’a. This non-dependency on the state and accompanying freedom from the limitations of binding regulations, enabled the Imam to change his discourse after establishing himself among the Aziziye Jama’a. The Imam’s new discourse in teaching Islam to his Jama’a implies that he was aware of the effect of total submission to a group identity and its leader which would strengthen his charisma.

The following account of the group to which the Imam decided to affiliate lends support to our argument that unquestioning adherence to the teaching of a religious leader and his Halife (representative, vicegerent) produces similar effects across different geographical and cultural maps of the Jama’a formation. At the expense of distancing some of his Jama’a, the Imam of the Aziziye Mosque declared himself as the Halife of a well known Sheikh, Mahmud Hoca, leader of an Islamic group based in Istanbul that enforces a strict dress code for both men and women. The charismatic leadership and unquestioning authority of the leaders and Sheikhs of the Sufi Orders have played a decisive role during the course of social mobilisation by deriving their legitimacy from the religious beliefs of the masses, and in return have strengthened the status of the Sheikhs even further (Mardin, 1991, p. 123). A similar structure and source of charismatic authority and legitimisation were transferred to London by the declaration of the Imam that he was representing Mahmud Hoca. The Imam’s self-designation of being Mahmud Hoca’s Halife in London was translated into a suggestion that the Aziziye Jama’a were to recognise the Imam as the sole mediator between the Sheikh and the Jama’a. The Imam’s authority over the Jama’a was further established by Mahmud Hoca’s visit to London on April 24th 1992. Mahmud Hoca’s visit to the Aziziye Mosque and his sermons were crucial for the confirmation of the legitimacy of the Imam’s explicit allegiance to Sufi teachings which require unquestioning attachment to and acceptance of his authority.
Reactions to the Imam's affiliation to a Sufi group, which advocates the acceptance of the authority of the Sheikh or his Halife, were expressed by some members of the Jama'a and the Imam's authority was challenged during the annual general meetings and executive committee elections thereafter. Nevertheless, the Imam appears to have managed to keep his position and strengthened his position even further during the elections by having himself elected to the executive committee. Although the Imam had gained the control of the Mosque administration, the conflict over the affiliation to a group in Turkey caused divisions among the Jama'a. Thus, the Aziziye Mosque lost a sizeable number of its Jama'a who were attracted to other Turkish Mosques. It was pointed out by several informants that, as a result of division and schism within the Jama'a, the Aziziye Mosque had lost the wide influence it had had during its formative years. However, it should be noted that although the Aziziye Mosque distanced some Jama'a members, it has formed a smaller but more tightly-knit Jama'a clustered around the teachings of a Sufi group which by its very nature presupposes closer fraternity and stronger identification with the group. A similar observation on religious group identity was also made by Brothers who argues that:

'It is a fundamental presupposition of religious institutions that beliefs should influence the behaviour of the adherents in some way, and in fact much of the effort of religious personnel is directed towards encouraging members to orient their activities in accordance with their beliefs, sometimes in general terms of caring for other people, sometimes in definite prescriptions about the observance of particular rituals. Groups often require distinctive patterns of behaviour from their members with the manifest function of keeping some religious law; this has the latent function of distinguishing the group from the remainder of society' Brothers (1971, p. 7).

In line with the foregoing observation it can be argued that the Aziziye Mosque with its particularistic appeal created a strong group identity within the confines of Sufi teachings. The specificity of dress code and behavioural patterns render Aziziye Jama'a a distinct identity within the Turkish community in London.
An analysis of activities held at the Mosque will also confirm the above observations that these activities are designed to reawaken a 'particularistic Islamic identity' among the Jama'a and to transmit traditional values to the young generation. In order to achieve this objective, the Aziziye Mosque offers religious classes to women and children. Weekend courses for children are encouraged and between 20 to 30 children are brought by their parents to the Mosque. Parents are constantly reminded that children will be defenceless against the moral threats of Western society if their religious identity is not strengthened. One leaflet, distributed by the Aziziye Mosque which was titled 'Child Education' (Cocuk Terbiyesi) reads as follows:

‘Almighty Allah provided human beings with uncountable bounties, of which children are the greatest source of hope and future for a nation (millet). Nations that do not educate their children properly can not expect their future to be safe and bright. According to Islam, children must be provided with physical and spiritual education. And a sense of love for religion (din), faith (iman), sacred values (mukaddesat) and for one’s country (vatan) must be evoked and installed in the minds and hearts of children. Education of our children is not only a concern to one family but a concern relating to all our nation’.

The leaflet ends with a statement of a self-reminder that, ‘... unfortunately we are in state of ignorance and neglect in regard to the education of our children’. This leaflet and others inform us that national and religious identity are mentioned together and love for one’s homeland is a reminder to foster a distinctive character of Turkish-Muslim identity in London vis-à-vis others. It can be argued that Mosque activities play an important role in reproducing traditional Islamic values and in re-evoking sentiments of national belonging as the basic sources of ethnic and collective identity.

The Aziziye Mosque advocates some social functions to be held at the Mosque premises such as weddings and religious nikah (marriage contract) on condition that the strict segregation of men and women is observed. Wedding ceremonies are regarded as important social events in fostering traditional family values which bind the family to the larger Turkish
community. In a leaflet, entitled 'Our Weddings' (Düğunlerimiz) the Jama’a is once more reminded that:

'Islam does not consist of belief principles only. It is a sacred system based on revelation that covers both individual and social aspects of life. Therefore, Muslims have to observe its rules in all aspects of their life including weddings. Unfortunately, many Muslims seem to have forgotten our religious and national traditions, thus our wedding ceremonies are shaped by demonic practices. Consumption of alcohol, dancing and mixing between the sexes are all corrupted customs of the West. They have nothing to do with Islam and with our national customs... Imitation of others stems from an inferiority complex'.

As the above statement clearly establishes, the sources of Muslim Turkish identity are contrasted to Western values and customs. Boundaries of Turkish identity are drawn by referring to the ‘others’ as well as to the ‘self’. A fine line is drawn between Turkish and Western identity by praising the virtues of Islamic values and national traditions on the one hand, and demonising the values of Western society on the other.

In addition to distribution of leaflets and lectures during his sermons, the Imam constantly reminds his Jama’a of the identity construct of Muslim people in contrast to the Western world which represents a Christian identity. To differentiate Muslim identity and Christian identity, he makes frequent references to current developments in the Muslim world. To facilitate the self-definition of community members as Turkish-Muslim, he makes use of current political developments in the globe. For example, he informs his Jama’a about the plight of fellow Turkish-Muslims in Azerbaijan where ‘Christian Armenians’ are attacking them. Islamic identity of the Turkish community is linked with ‘Umma identity’ which implies that the Turks are part of the Muslim World. To evoke these feelings, the Imam gives illustrations of how some Muslim nations around the world are targeted by the ‘Christian West’. In one of his Friday sermons, he said:

'...that is a recurrent theme in Muslim history that whenever there is a revivalist tendency in Muslim countries non-believers are there to curb this resurgent wave and try to distance Muslims from practising
Islamic precepts. Behind the onslaught of Westerners/Christians on Muslim people lies the fact that a strong Muslim Umma and their unity around Islamic ideals poses a serious threat to the interests of the West. The fear evoked by the possible unity amongst Muslims against non-Muslims is the main reason for intervention in the affairs of Muslims by the West and the America'.

In this context, the Imam attributes the misfortunes and sufferings of Muslims in Bosnia, Palestine and Somalia to the Western World and the Americans. In one instance, for example, he was very critical of the American presence in Somalia under the pretext of a peacekeeping force with its other Christian allies. He argued that Christian missionaries were out in Somalia to undermine the Islamisation of the country.

9.4.1.1. Institutionalisation of Islamic Education

The first generation of immigrant Muslims who are convinced that they are no longer immigrants but settlers, is now much more concerned with facilitating the religio-cultural education of the young generation (Anwar, 1995a, p. 243). Similarly, the Aziziye Jama’a is also concerned with the education of their children in an Islamic environment. In order to achieve this objective, the administration of the Mosque decided to open a school to facilitate the religious education of children.

The institutionalisation of Islamic education has been a serious concern for Muslims in Europe generally and in Britain particularly. An increasing number of private and state funded Islamic schools are being opened to counterbalance the cultural effects of education on the young generation as ‘some Muslims regard ‘separate’ schools as essential not only for the religious instruction of their children but for their cultural survival’ (Haw, 1994, p. 72). Despite local opposition, Muslims in The Netherlands succeeded in opening state-funded Islamic schools in Rotterdam and Eindhoven in 1988, and over the last six years, the number of Islamic schools has steadily increased in this country to six in 1989-1990, 22 in 1991-92 (Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1992,
p. 109) and 29 in the 1993-1994 school-year. All of these are primary schools’ (Dwyer and Meyer, 1995, p. 40-41).

Muslims in Britain are also exerting efforts to provide Islamic education for their children. The Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO), The UK Islamic Mission and The Muslim Educational Trust were established to address educational concerns of Muslims at organisational level (Nielsen, 1989b, p. 234). However, the awareness of Muslim parents regarding the religious education of the young generation was heightened by the 1988 Education Act which requires that all new agreed syllabuses ‘must reflect the fact that the religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main Christian whilst taking account of the teaching and practices of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain’ (section 8(3)). The 1944 Education Act did not specify the religion to be taught within Religious Education (RE)6. The daily act of collective worship and the content of religious education have become important concerns for Muslim parents. One of the responses to the recent developments in the area of education was to establish their own private and independent Islamic schools where not only secular subjects but also cultural and religious subjects would be taught. Muslims also wanted to make use of state funds which are presently available to denominational and Jewish schools. In order to become voluntary-aided schools the Zakaria Girl’s School in Batley and the Islamia School in London, for example, made applications in 1982. However, Zakaria Girl’s School failed to receive recognition as a voluntary-aided school and nor did the Islamia School whose application was rejected in 1993 after ten years of campaigning (Dwyer & Meyer, 1995, p. 45).

The first independent Turkish Primary School, IKRA, was opened on 12 September 1994. The opening of IKRA is a significant development because the school project illustrates Aziziye’s politics concerning religious education and the concerns of the families regarding the formation of Islamic identity and its maintenance through education.
The developments surrounding the opening of the IKRA Primary School suggest that the Aziziye Jama’a realised that the religious education in the Mosque environment and weekends-only, was not conducive to creating a strong Muslim identity among the young generation. The experiences since the establishment of the Mosque have revealed the shortcomings of traditional Mosque education. These considerations seem to have played an important role in introducing a more systematic way of teaching children which requires a proper school and expertise. As explained by the project workers, the IKRA Primary School project was launched to fill the institutional vacuum in the field of education.

As the school project matured it came to the attention of project workers that the newly acquired premises for the use of IKRA primary school adjacent to the Aziziye Mosque would not be available by the time of the opening of the school. The first set back was overcome by converting two rooms of the Mosque into classrooms and one room into an administrative office. IKRA Primary School began its teaching with eight registered pupils whose ages ranged between six and nine. The number of students increased to 13 in the second week. At the time of its opening, IKRA employed six part-time teachers to teach National Curriculum subjects with some additional Islamic classes. As far as the Turkish community was concerned, my findings suggest that almost nobody out of the Aziziye Jama’a was aware of the developments for the establishment of a school within their neighbourhood. The Mosque administration did not try to appeal to a wider audience of parents. Some parents were pleased to see the opening of the first Turkish Muslim Primary School with an additional curriculum covering Turkish language and teaching of Islamic topics. One of the informants who sent his child to IKRA said:

‘I have been living in this country for more than twenty years and I have established myself as a citizen in England. I feel that there would be no return to Turkey because I have a factory and bought a house here. I do not see any reason to give up all these achievements after such a long time. Neither do I want to abandon my Turkish and
Islamic identity. I came to this country as a Muslim Turk and I will do everything to remain so. It is also my responsibility to provide my children with an Islamic education. I had to send my first son to a school in Turkey where he could have a good religious education because there is no such place in England where my children can go to learn Turkish language, traditions and Islamic values. I believe that our children should be educated here. Therefore, I regarded the opening of IKRA as a first step towards the foundation of an educational institution that enables our children to learn their own language and culture while living in England.

This typical response reveals the expectations of parents of the staff and teaching program of the school. Parents send their children to IKRA Primary School with the hope that their children will be educated not only in line with the national curriculum but also in accordance with traditional values incorporating classes on Turkish culture and Islamic principles that will evoke a sense of identity and belonging to the Turkish-Muslim Community as is the case with some other minorities in Britain. The question of how far such a school education can construct or strengthen Turkish Muslim identity is a tentative issue and one can only speculate about the nature of its likely effect on the attitudes and behaviour of children by looking at the stated policy of the school and the contents of the classes as well as the teachers’ own approach to Islam. IKRA primary School announced that:

‘the aims of establishing a primary school was to provide and educate Muslim children according to the highest educational standards and principles of Islam. Good education is essential for Muslim children to enable them to live, study and work in a multi-cultural, multi-religious environment. The aim of the IKRA Primary School is to teach the National Curriculum and some additional topics related to religio-moral values’.

In order to achieve its aims the school curriculum was designed to meet the requirements of the National Curriculum and religious education. It is stated in the prospectus (p. 3) that ‘the School follows the National Curriculum while maintaining its basic Islamic ethos. It follows the National Curriculum with some additional Islamic subjects’. The national curriculum subjects (18 hours a week) comprise 75 per cent of educational activities. The rest is allocated to Turkish culture and Islamic subjects (8 hours per week). It is the expectation of both parents and the teachers that classes on Islam, Qur’an,
Turkish and Arabic would instill a sense of identity among children moulded by religious ethics and traditional values to withstand the cultural effects of the larger society. This new sense of belonging which is hoped to be strengthened by the teaching of additional subjects is thought to guard the identity of the younger generation against a possible loss of identity resulting from the ongoing exposure to Western cultural influences.

IKRA primary school is the first full time independent primary school established and run by Turks. The establishment of IKRA should be seen as the beginning of institutionalisation in the field of education within the Turkish community in London. As mentioned briefly earlier, political and sectarian divisions which influence the nature of ethnic and religious institutionalisation persist in the Turkish community. As in the case of IKRA, I have noticed that those who have disassociated themselves from the Aziziye Jama’a would not send their children to this school because of Aziziye’s affiliation to a Sufi group in Turkey. This suggests that educational establishments that are to flourish in the Turkish community in London will also follow suit and carry the imprint of particular groups and their ideologies. It is not only the case of IKRA Primary School Project that lends support to my argument that ideologies of particular groups will shape the nature of educational institutions and its curricular and extra curricular activities. A recent school project by the Nurcu group, with a different religious ideology, established in North London also confirms that the diversity of Islamic approaches will shape the future of educational establishments in London.

9.4.2. Suleymanci Group and Traditional Islam in Europe

As mentioned earlier there are several Islamic groups among Turks in Europe. One of the largest Islamic groups among the Turkish community in London is the Suleymanci Jama’a clustered around the Valide Sultan Mosque. This Mosque was established by the UK Turkish Islamic Cultural Centre Trust (TICCT) which was founded in 1982 by the Suleymanci group who
claim to follow the teachings of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan\(^{\ddagger}\) (1888-1959). When Tunahan died in 1959, the leadership of the group was passed to his son-in-law, Kemal Kacar, who established close relations with the politicians and became an MP for the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi). However, after 1980 the Suleymanci group supported the Motherland Party and the True Path Party, successor to the Justice Party. Therefore, the group enjoyed political protection which enabled them to continue their activities under an umbrella organisation known as the Federation of Welfare Associations for Course and School Students (Kurs ve Okul Talebelerine Yardım Dernekleri Federasyonu). It has been reported (Cakir, p. 32) that the number of member associations to this Federation has risen to 909 in the early 1990s. The estimated number of boarding courses under the Suleymanci group is almost one thousand in which more than one hundred thousand pupils are thought to be educated.

From 1974 onwards, the Suleymanci group has also established similar organisations and opened Mosques in several West European countries to meet the needs of the Turkish immigrant population. The Suleymanci group in Germany, known as Islamisches Kulturzentrum (Islamic Cultural Centre) controls more than 210 local centres in this country. The institutionalisation of the Suleymanci group in London was delayed until the mid-eighties. Two main reasons might be suggested for this delay, of which the first is that the emergence of the Turkish community and the coming of the young generation to the scene occurred much later than those of other Western European countries where Turkish immigrants organised themselves earlier and provided economic resources to acquire premises and pay for the salaries of religious personnel. The second reason might be attributed to the rise of sectarian and ideological differences in the Turkish community. In the early period of community formation and establishment of a Mosque, divisions on ideological lines were largely ignored and relative unity was achieved. However, in the following years the convergence of interests failed to sustain the initial unity and disputes about the control of resources led to the divergence that resulted in disagreement among the groups on ideological
The attendance at the opening ceremony of Valide Sultan Mosque confirms my earlier observation on the existence of international networks among particular Islamic movements. My findings indicate that there is an international Suleymanci network in Turkey, Western Europe and London. The trustees of TICCT invited their leader from Turkey and other leading figures of the Suleymanci movement both from Turkey and European countries. Representatives from Turkey, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and France were present at the opening ceremony to boost publicity in the Turkish community. The leadership structure in Turkish community is also recurrent. In the case of TICCT, the chairman of the board of trustees has been there since its foundation, implicitly presenting himself as the vicegerent of the main leader of the group in Turkey. A similar pattern of life-long claims to leadership may also be observed in the organisational structure of other Turkish institutions.

9.4.2.1. New Approach to Tradition

The Suleymanci group differs from other Islamic groups in London. The differences are embedded in the priorities of the group and in their interpretation of religious traditions. These differences become more visible when the Suleymanci group is contrasted with Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim Jama’ā. The most noticeable difference relates to the dress code that the Suleymanci Jama’ā adopts. Members of the Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim Jama’ā define Islamic dress in a very strict manner and encourage its members to wear a certain type of dress and grow a beard. The Suleymanci Jama’ā see the dress as an external element in Islam although their first leader wore totally traditional gowns similar to that of the Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim group. Members of Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim Jama’ā sharply criticise Suleymanci’s
approach, accusing them of ignoring the Sunna of the Prophet. When reminded of these accusations, a prominent figure of Suleymanci Jama'a rejected the charge and argued:

"This is a matter of priority. We are not saying that growing beard or wearing traditional dresses should be frowned upon or discouraged. What we believe is that we have got more urgent problems to address than disputes over dress. We also argue that Muslims should have a good image in a society they are a part. And I think, the way we dress up wearing a tie and tidy clothes is more approachable and in touch with the community'.

It is very unusual to see a member of Aziziye or Sheikh Nazim Jama'a attending prayer in Valide Sultan Mosque since, as they argue, the Imams of this Mosque wear Western dresses in an open transgression of the Islamic dress code. A more significant dividing line between the Suleymanci group and others is that Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim Jama'a claim to adhere to the principle of mystical Islam whereas the Suleymanci group appears to have incorporated its early claims to adherence to Sufi Islam in the modern politics of Turkey. This suggests that the Suleymanci group have changed its strategy and religious discourse in accordance with the social and political developments taking place since the death of their first leader, Tunahan. As mentioned earlier, the current leader, Kemal Kacar, continues to give support to right wing political parties, having sympathisers among MPs in the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) and most recently the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). In contrast, the Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim Jama'a do not approve of supporting a political party. Neither Aziziye nor Sheikh Nazim Jama'a have such a policy.

In contrast to other Islamic groups, the Suleymanci Jama'a appears to have adopted a more flexible method in dealing with religious matters to appeal to the wider Turkish community. One of the recent initiatives of TICCT was to apply to the Hackney Council for authorisation to register weddings in the Mosque. The right to register marriages by the Mosque authorities was granted to TICCT on 24th August 1994 and the first wedding ceremony took
place in January 1995. Social and cultural functions at the Valide Sultan Mosque are as varied as to include circumcision parties and Mevlut ceremonies. These are not strictly religious rituals, therefore those who are not affiliated to the Mosque are also invited to participate. Such a policy not only allows the Suleymanci group to present their particular understanding of Islam but also help the group to crystallise their different image in the community. These findings suggest that the Mosque as a religious organisation is not confined to strictly defined prayers and religious activities as in Turkey. Rather, the functional variety indicates that the Mosque is not an institution isolated from the concerns of the community but a place with a wide range of social and cultural functions. Similarly, on the Sikh community in Britain, Goulbourne (1991, p. 161) observes that 'for the faithful living abroad, it is not surprising that the gurdwara becomes a central, multifunctional meeting place where the weary renew his/her strength through mutual companionship and worship'.

9.4.3. Sheikh Nazim Jama'a: Mystical Islam

Diversity of Islamic organisations in London is enriched by the institutionalisation of a Turkish-Cypriot dominated religious group known as Sheikh Nazim Jama'a that adheres to the modern interpretation of the Naqshbandiya Sufi Order. The group is led by the Cypriot-born sufi and charismatic leader, Sheikh Nazim Kibrisi who is aged about eighty. Sheikh Nazim was born in Cyprus but went to Turkey for his university education in the late 1940s and early 1950s where he came under the influence of a Sufi group which he soon joined. His interest in religion took precedence over his university education. Therefore, he left his engineering course to acquire a deeper knowledge of Islam. As he told me in an interview, his search for a centre of religious learning in Turkey did not bear any fruit because of the republican attitude towards Islam during the one party regime which undermined religion and closed down traditional learning centres of both Sufis and no-Sufis alike. As mentioned earlier, in the early years of the
republican regime, all the Tarikat (Sufi Order) activities were outlawed and tekkes and zaviyes (dervish lodges) for spiritual education were closed as a part of institutional secularisation. After having realised the impossibility of gaining Sufi knowledge, Sheikh Nazim decided to seek the irfan (gnosis) in another Muslim country. He went to Damascus in Syria where he lived in a dervish lodge for years improving his knowledge of the Qur'ān, Arabic and Sufi teachings. He stayed in the lodge as a murid (disciple) seeking knowledge and left as a guide and Murshid (spiritual teacher). When asked why he had left the lodge after such a long time Sheikh Nazim said:

‘After having mastered the gnostic knowledge and struggled to purify my nefs (soul) as a disciple for more than fifteen years at the hand of a Murshid, I was told that I became matured and told to be capable of establishing a Dervish lodge in Cyprus where I could guide Muslims there. This duty was given to me by my Murshid. Therefore I left Damascus and I came to Cyprus’.

Sheikh Nazim’s return to Cyprus with a new mission was quickly noticed. As his acquaintances from Cyprus told me, they immediately observed the radical transformations Sheikh Nazim displayed. Sheikh Nazim recalled the immediate reactions and later developments as follows:

‘When I returned to Cyprus towards the middle of 1960s, I realised that people were very much surprised by the way I dressed up with long beard and a sarik (turban) symbolising the chain of our Sufi Order. It was not an easy process to spread the message of Islam to people who were living on the margins of religion. When people found out that we were peaceful believers trying to teach spiritual purification of souls, their negative reaction at the outset began to die out and our approach attracted a large number followers among Muslims and non-Muslims both in Cyprus and abroad’.

Sheikh Nazim established his authority gradually and his charismatic leadership grew unchallenged as total obedience to the authority of the Sheikh is considered to be one of the indispensable prerequisites of Sufi teachings. The Sheikh as a spiritual guide (Murshid) has absolute authority and control over his disciples (Murid). The absolute authority of the Sheikh is derived form his status in the long chain of Murshids. It is noted that:
'the Sufis can trace an unbroken chain (silsilah) of masters, going to the source. It is this historical chain which provides the link, or channel by which 'heavenly' knowledge, wisdom and love can be transmitted. The last Grand-Sheikh in the chain of Naqshbandiyyah is al-Daghistani who passed away in 1973. With the death of the Grand-Sheikh, Sheikh Nazim became the carrier of this transmission and barakah (grace or blessing) and marked as the 40th master in the chain. It is believed that there is a spiritual connection between the Grand-Sheikh and Sheikh Nazim. This contact brings light, blessings and protection. So Sheikh Nazim expresses that his heart is connected to that of his Grand-Sheikh' (Kose, 1994, p. 167).

These observations help to explain the sources and grounds of Sheikh's charisma that enabled him to reach a considerable following among the Turkish community in London. After establishing himself in Cyprus, Sheikh Nazim started his mission of spreading the message of Islam in London in the early 1970s. He started coming to London as a visitor to see his acquaintances from Cyprus. Such annual visits were the beginning of the formation of a small group which was gradually enlarged. The meetings with Sheikh Nazim in private houses were extended to the larger community as his messages achieved to have a broader following. When asked about the early developments of the group, one of Sheikh Nazim's Cypriot acquaintances who hosted him in his house said:

'When our Sheikh decided to come to London there was no Turkish Mosque where we could organise a religious meeting. There were also only few Turkish-Cypriots as his disciples. Therefore, we used to host him in large houses during his stay in London. By the time new murids (disciples) had joined the Tarikat (Order) from Turks, other Muslim communities and from non-Muslims, then we started to look for a proper place of worship'.

His followers said that Sheikh Nazim's visits to London had become an organised annual event since 1973. Sheikh Nazim usually comes to London just before the beginning of the month of Ramazan and leads prayers and zikr (recitation) ceremonies in three centres; Peckham Mosque in South London, Shaklewell Sheikh Nazim Mosque and Sheikh Nazim Kibrisi Naqshbandi Centre in north-east London. The arrival of Sheikh Nazim is a significant
event for his followers since he comes to London once a year and stays here only for about two months.

In contrast to other religious groups among Turks in London, the Sheikh Nazim Jama’a is ethnically mixed and heterogeneous in terms of race, colour and national background. Although Turkish-Cypriots outnumber others in the group in London, Sheikh Nazim Jama’a is comprised of people as diverse as Turks from both Cyprus and Turkey, Pakistanis, Indian Muslims, and Europeans from several Western countries such as Germany, France and Britain. Sheikh Nazim’s charismatic leadership melts this diversity in the pot of Sufi teaching that stresses the importance of spiritual cleansing and the significance of attaining a higher state of mind and heart towards the Ultimate Reality; all transcending racial, ethnic and national boundaries of human beings.

The Islamic discourse on humans as equal beings before God regardless of race, colour and nationality is a recurrent theme in Sheikh Nazim’s sermons which attract followers from diverse traditions. Nevertheless, there seems to be a paradox in the discourse of Sheikh Nazim when he addresses a Turkish audience and a mixed audience separately. When he addresses the Turkish community, for example, he makes references to Turkish history, particularly to the Ottoman Empire and he mentions the role of Turkish people in Islamic history. According to him, Turks were the guardians of Islam and should be so again. The Islamic identity of Turks and their national identity are not separable. This means that religion is an indispensable part of Turkish identity. In his sermons to Turks, Sheikh Nazim evokes a sense of belonging to a Turkish-Muslim community. However, when he addresses non-Turkish Muslims, he makes no reference to national history because of the ethnic diversity of his audience. His emphasis falls upon issues surrounding faith and belief (iman) and spiritual purification of the soul. In addressing an ethnically heterogeneous audience, the Sheikh appears to have a different discourse that aims at evoking a sense of belonging to a larger Muslim
community (*Umma*). It can be argued that the two types of identity construction are discernible from Sheikh Nazim’s Sufi discourse as: 1- an ethnic-religious identity (as in the case of Turkish-Muslim identity) and; 2- a universal religious-collective identity (as in the case of belonging to Umma transcending the national and ethnic particularities of the followers).

During my regular visits to three centres used by the Sheikh Nazim group, I noticed that a large number of Jama’a comprised Pakistani, Arab, Africans, German, French and British Muslims in addition to the presence of Turks, at religious ceremonies and meetings led by the Sheikh. It seems that a regular following of the Sheikh has enabled his followers to establish an international network of Sufi brotherhood. At the time of writing the thesis, the Sheikh Nazim group had already opened centres (*dergah*/lodge) in Germany, the United States and Britain in addition to their *dergahs* in Turkey and Northern Cyprus. My observations suggest that this international Sufi network will broaden because, as mentioned earlier, Sheikh Nazim not only addresses Turks but all humanity. The composition of clientele among the Sheikh Nazim group shows that inter-ethnic relations are established on the basis of shared beliefs and values and this would also support the foregoing argument. The diversity of backgrounds is moulded by the universal message of Islam as all Muslim believers are considered brothers to each other. Initiation into and acceptance by the group lead to the formation of a collective identity around the concept of Umma. It was one of Sheikh’s international links, for example, that enabled the group to purchase a large premises for a Sufi centre in Seven Sisters. The funding for the purchase and renovation came from the Sultan of Brunei. At the time of writing the thesis, the same centre started an advertising campaign for an independent primary school which is said to be planned to open in 1996-1997 term.

With reference to the Turkish community in London, it can be argued that Sheikh Nazim’s personality, charisma and his teachings play an influential role in the construction of Islamic identity and in the reproduction of
traditional values among certain segments of the Turkish community, particularly among Turkish-Cypriots. My observations indicate that Turkish-Cypriots are more inclined to join the Sheikh Nazim group in comparison with the mainland Turks. This trend might be attributed to the origins of the religious groupings in London. Sheikh Nazim attracts more clientele from Turkish-Cypriots whereas other Turkish Islamic organisations draw their members overwhelmingly from the mainland Turks. This pattern of membership suggests that there is a subtle ethnic categorisation and preference in joining religious groups.

9.4.3.1. Mosque as a Market Place

As explained earlier, the Turkish Mosques in London are used for various purposes. Worship, Islamic education, religious wedding contracts and circumcision ceremonies are held in the Mosques if approved by the administration. The case of Sheikh Nazim Mosque presents a different aspect of the Mosque as a market place. Some of Sheikh's followers have their vans parked around the Mosque or come with their sleeping bags. Those who travel with their travel bags are provided with a space for living, in a corner of the Mosque, forming a temporary group within the Mosque itself. Although men and women are provided with separate areas of accommodation divided by curtains, they have to use the premises and large hall together as some of them are married and bring their children with them. In addition to the provision of accommodation, small-scale economic activities are also allowed to take place within the Mosque which creates an atmosphere in which men and women mix together in the sacred space of the Mosque. Especially at the end of largely-attended prayers, an economic activity begins in the Mosque where several stalls form a small Mosque-market. Whatever is available at the small Mosque-market is somehow related to the group identity as their symbols and the articles on sale indicate their affiliation to the Sheikh Nazim group. Among the items available at the Mosque-market established within the sacred space, are posters, books,
video-filmed sermons and preachings of Sheikh Nazim, special garments such as turbans, headscarfs, baggy trousers and, long and wide dresses for both men and women. Silver rings, rosary and perfume are also available.

The identity of the followers and their desire to express this to others determine the market structure as these items are used by members of the groups not only to identify with the group but also to distinguish themselves from the identity of outsiders. On the one hand, economic activity works to strengthen the economic solidarity, though on a small scale, and on the other, it crystallises the external symbols of belonging to a religious group that offer a distinct identity. As the Mosque-market addresses the needs of both sexes, men and women freely walk in the Mosque following the prayers. A certain degree of intermixing of genders takes place, in contrast to the gender politics of the Aziziye and Valide Sultan Mosques which observe strict segregation of men and women. This situation has been a matter of dispute that led to an exchange of criticism in that while Sheikh Nazim and his followers see the mixing of sexes in the Mosque as a tolerant attitude of Islam, the opposition charges the group with the violation of Islamic rules. Although these exchanges of accusations and charges of transgressions take place at times, the dispute remains on an individual level, confined to a small group since Jama‘a members of each group rarely go to others’ Mosques and confront each other. The Imams and religious leaders also ignore such accusations and distance themselves from situations that might lead to divisions among the community.

Nevertheless, some leaflets which were distributed by the followers of Sheikh Nazim during my fieldwork indicate that in some non-Turkish Mosques, the tone of criticism levelled against Sheikh Nazim’s teachings and practices is much stronger. A leaflet handed out by a group calling themselves Ahle Sunnat Wa’l Jamaat claims that a number of Wahhabi, Deobandi and Tablighi Imams are misleading their congregations about Sheikh Nazim. These the Imams, according to the leaflets titled ‘Sufism, Myth or Mysticism?’
and 'Sheikh Nazim, A Sufi Sheikh?' preach that Islam has no place for Sufism and adherence to a Sheikh. The leaflets try to legitimise the existence of Sufism in Islam by citing several early scholars. They also cite Sheikh Nazim in an attempt to produce counter arguments in defence of Sufism. Sheikh Nazim is quoted to have said: 'People are against the truth (Hakikat). The whole non-Muslim world is against the truth and the Muslims themselves are also heedless and ignorant. The non-Muslim world is putting their agents within the Muslim world, amongst these foolish ignorant Muslims...'. The dispute between the Wahhabis, or those who support the Wahhabi ideology, and Sufis seems to continue because the Wahhabi ideology strongly rejects Sufism, maintaining it was an innovation (hurafé) which did not exist in the formative period of Islam, but was invented by some ignorant Muslims.

9.5. Diversity Reproduced

Muslims in Europe display an ethnic and national diversity characterised by the country of origin on the one hand, and a prevalent religious diversity on the other hand, mirrored by the numerous Islamic movements, sects and Sufi groups. Even those who come from the same country may also display a rich diversity of Islamic persuasion since Islamic movements do not have a monolithic character. The first and foremost source of heterogeneity among Muslim communities lies in the backgrounds these communities have. The present diversity in understanding Islamic history and politics can be interpreted as the continuity of traditional attachments and interrelationships across the communities concerned. Like the Pakistani community which accommodates groups as diverse as Jamaat-i Islami, Deobandis, Barelwis and Ismailis in Britain, the Turkish community is comprised similar religious variety ranging from purely religious to politically motivated movements. Although I have analysed the cases of three Islamic groups among Turks in London, it should be pointed out that religious diversity among Turks in Europe is much wider. It also includes the politically motivated the National Vision and the London Islamic-Turkish Association (see Chapter Ten); Nurcu
movement; Kaplancilar, a marginal group led by the late ex-mufti Cemaleddin Kaplan who declared an Islamic caliphate in Germany; and Alawites.

Religious diversity and current political tension between official Islam propagated by the state, and various religious movements which are regarded as a threat to democracy in Turkey, are also reproduced in major European cities. The official Islam is represented by the Attaché for religious affairs and the Imams appointed by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Turkiye Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi). Besides providing religious services to Turkish speaking communities in Europe, the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs aims at curbing the influences of Islamic movements. Fierce competition between state-supported religious establishment and Islamic groups originated in Turkey, continues in several forms.

In terms of official Islam represented by state appointed Imams, the Turkish-Muslim community in London is a different case. The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs has not appointed any Attaché responsible for religious affairs in London. During a meeting with the President of the Directorate in London in 1992, I asked him whether there would be an appointment of any Attaché for London. He told me that there would be no appointment for the time being. During a later visit to Turkey at the end of 1994, I inquired whether the Directorate was planning to appoint a representative in London to challenge the other Islamic movements that were gaining ground among the Turkish community. At the time of writing this thesis, there was no plan to this effect. This suggests that for the foreseeable future, Turks in London will not face a confrontation between the state supported official Islam and other Islamic movements.
Chapter Nine: Notes

1. Toprak (1981, p. 2) observes that Kemalist version of secularisation differs from its historical development in the West where church and state became independent from one another. The West relegated religion to the private sphere and its active interference in public life was reduced considerably. In contrast, the Kemalist regime did not truly separate religious institutions from the state but rather made them subservient to its rule. Instead of granting independence to religious institutions from the state, the Kemalist regime attributed new meaning to secularisation by supervising and controlling religious activity. The organisational links between state bureaucracy and religious establishments were not ceased but only modified.

2. According to Mardin (1989, p. 3) ‘..the reproduction of Islamic societies is linked to a common use of an Islamic idiom by the members of such societies’. He sees the Islamic ‘idiom’ pervasive to the extent that it covers all aspects of life in society, and compared to its equivalents in the West, Islamic idiom, which frames the daily life strategies through its wide-spread usage, is shared more equally by both upper and lower classes (p. 6). Borrowing from Victor Turner, Mardin uses the root-paradigm as a term ‘to characterise clusters of meaning which serve as cultural maps for individuals; they enable persons to find a path in their own culture..’ (p. 7).

3. Religious revivalism is a widely observed phenomenon and societies other than Islamic also experience the rise of religious expression and polity. For a general assessment, see Mary Elaine Hegland (1987), ‘Conclusion: Religious Resurgence in Today’s World - Refuge from Dislocation and Anomie or Enablement for Change’ in Richard T. Antoun & M. Elaine Hegland (eds.), Religious Resurgence, Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity and Judaism Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, pp. 233-256; Peter Beyer (1994), Religion and Globalization, Sage Publications, London.


4. Followers of Mahmud Hoca are known as Ismail Aga Cemaati, deriving its name from the name of the Mosque where he is the Imam. Mahmud Hoca, aged more than seventy, was a pupil of a leading Sheikh, Ahiskali Ali Haydar Efendi who lived during the late Ottoman and early republican periods. Mahmud Hoca, following his mentor, affiliated himself with the Naqshbandiya Tariqa (Sufi Order) which adheres to Hanafiya school of law. Mahmud Hoca argued that Muslims must accept the authenticity of Abu Hanifa’s teaching without questioning and imitate his practice of Islam. Thus, Mahmud Hoca dismisses the teachings of modernity and rejects critical approach to Islam and translate it to the modern times (Cakir, 1993, p. 62).


7. Recent reports suggest that schools that were established on the lines of religion generate a distinct identity amongst students. An 18 years old student at the Hasmonean Jewish grant-maintained school in north London, for example, describes himself as a Zionist. He is more concerned with the events in Israel as his homeland rather than what is happening in England. His political view is also indicative of the kind of education he receives at this school. He states that 'I suppose I would vote for a party if they had some good policies for the Jews or Israel.' (The Independent Magazine, 25 May 1996, p. 12). Another young student who is also studying at the same establishment and taking compulsory classes on Hebrew, the Talmud and the Bible portrays an identity choice of an 18 years old who seems to be happy following a code of modesty, no trousers, and uniforms covering elbows. At this point one can incline to think that fourteen hours of religious education per week may have an effect on the formation of young Jewish identity embedded in the traditions and values purported by the school. The case of young students at the Swaminarayan School in north-west London lends support to the argument that religion may instill a sense of identity and sense of belonging. The Swaminarayan School is 'the brainchild of Pramukh Swami Mharaj, guru of the Swaminarayan sect, who, on his visit from India, was alarmed by what he saw as Britain's moral decline'. This indicates that he ordered or advised his followers that their children should be protected from such a moral decline through the institutionalisation of Hindu education. This is the first Hindu school in the UK founded in 1992. Educating their children in a Hindu school and teaching of Hindu religion and values seems to be paying off as an 18 years old girl who is student at the school asserts that '[I] get more moral guidance at a Hindus-only school... Now, being Hindu is more important to me. I have sense of belonging, whereas my friends who are not believers seem confused' (The Independent Magazine, 25 May 1996, p. 14).

8. Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan was born into a religious family. He was educated in classical centres of learning, known as Medrese, at the end of Ottoman era. With the closure of Medreses by the new Turkish Republic in 1924, he engaged in business for a short time and then started working for the Directorate of Religious Affairs as a preacher. Tunahan's central area of activity was to teach Quran to young generation since he firmly believed that the early republican era was marked by outlawing the teaching of the Qur'an. The ban on the teaching of the Qur'an was lifted in 1946 following the transition to a multi-party system. The new era allowed Tunahan and his pupils to embark upon a concerted effort to establish mostly boarding centres for
the teaching of the Qur'an known as the Qur'an Schools (Kuran Kurslari). After his death in 1959, his followers attributed him spiritual powers (Keramet) as he was believed to be Murshid who was granted a mystical intuition from the Naqshbandiya chain of Sufi masters.


12. In contrast to London, The Directorate established a noticeable presence in other Western European cities. According to 1991 Activity Report of the Directorate, 604 mosques were under Diyanet's control in Germany. The Directorate paid the salaries of 418 imams while 186 imams were appointed by the Directorate but paid by local organisations. According to the same report, The Directorate employees 838 personnel outside Turkey mainly located in Western Europe. Apart from permanent appointments, Diyanet sends temporary imams and preachers in certain periods of the year. Activity Report states that temporary appointment of religious personnel had risen to 426 in 1991.
Chapter Ten
Religio-Political Organisations

In Chapters Eight and Nine, the process of institutionalisation in the Turkish community in London was analysed. The formation of various organisations, their structures, clientele patterns and politics of identity were discussed in order to examine their role in the reproduction of traditional values and in the construction of Turkish/Turkish-Islamic identity. In this Chapter, I will go one step further and present two organisations which are of a religio-political nature. The analysis of religio-political organisations will then complete the discussion on the process of institutionalisation and politics of ethnicity, identity and religion in the Turkish community in London. Some of the ethnographic material collected in Berlin and observations during my visits to Belgium on two occasions will also be used in this Chapter. This will contribute to our understanding of religio-political movements in a wider context.

Similar to religious organisations in London, religio-political organisations were established as branches of umbrella organisations based in Germany having close links with the political parties in Turkey. Two organisations of this kind, the London Islamic-Turkish Association (LITA) (Londra Islam-Turk Cemiyeti) and the London Islamic Culture and Recreation Society (LICARS) (Londra Islami Kultur ve Egitim Teskilati- Milli Gorus) are widening their scope of influence by recruiting an increasing number of clientele among the Turkish youth in London. I would like to discuss these organisations in historical order in order to describe the continuity and change in their structures, membership patterns and strategies about various issues related to the politicisation of a shared identity underlined by Islamic ideology.

10.1. Islam and Nationalism: Idealist Youth (Ulkuu Geucilik)

The first organisation I will focus on is the London Islamic Turkish Association (LITA) which has a long history of continuity and change. The
establishment of LITA in Green Lanes, goes back to the late 1970s. LITA was set up as a cultural and religious organisation without any particular political alliance with a political party in Turkey. From its establishment to the early 1990s, it remained as a non-political cultural organisation offering Islamic activities on a small scale and providing a small Mesjid, a place of worship. Until March 1993 a graduate of Islamic studies who retired in Turkey, had served as an Imam and Director of LITA. The Imam, who is mostly referred to as Hoca, came to London by invitation in 1983, after serving as an Imam both in Turkey and in European countries like Germany and Belgium under the employment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Hoca was authorised to plan all the activities of LITA after his arrival.

My first visit to LITA was in 1989 when I was an MA student at SOAS, University of London. I recall that during my first visit there was nobody at LITA. Later, I made an appointment and realised that the association was solely managed by Hoca who refrained from giving responsibilities to other people. This was one of the reasons for having a small number of visitors. It had also come to my attention during the early visits that his family’s continued existence on the premises discouraged those who tend to observe segregation of men and women. On several occasions his wife freely came into the common room and made offerings. In our conversations Hoca argued that Islam was a religion of tolerance that discouraged rigidity in religious matters. By referring to other Mosques and attitudes of Imams, he seemed to try to justify his position on Islamic behaviour. He said:

‘Turkish Mosques are losing their jama’a because of the hard-line attitudes of their Imams. Their method of teaching Islam and presenting it to the Jama’a make people go away from the Mosque since these Imams were concerned primarily with the external elements such as appearances, dress code, beard and turban. Even the small children are exposed to same kind of rigid Islamic ideology. I feel that a mild, tolerant and soft method of teaching should be employed. Children should be taught religious music, art and mevlit. This would be a reward for children those who come to the Mosque.’
The Hoca’s remarks are dismissed by other Mosques, and they accuse him of being loose on religious teachings. As mentioned earlier, the diversity among Turkish-Islamic organisations prevails in this context too. It sometimes is translated into dispute and conflict.

As pointed out on the previous page, LITA, in contrast to other Islamic organisations that offer religious and cultural services, could not manage to get much support due to the Hoca’s attitude towards Islamic issues. The opening of other Islamic centres as alternative places also worked against the Hoca who increasingly lost clients. The success of the Valide Sultan Mosque in forming a large Jama’a, for example, typifies LITA’s failure in developing a community of believers. The Valide Sultan Mosque was opened in 1992, some ten years after the establishment of LITA, but was able to mobilise numerous Turks to join its Jama’a, even recruiting members of LITA. With people deserting LITA, the Hoca realised that he was losing his respectability and the legitimacy of his position as an Imam and a religious leader. Without followers he would no longer be able to continue to enjoy the facilities at his disposal. The decline of interest in LITA motivated the Hoca to take new steps to attract young people to his circle. Therefore, from 1990 onwards he started inviting Turkish youth around Green Lanes to LITA. As a result, a group of young people started to come to LITA during the evenings and at the weekends. Since then, LITA has revived its activities thanks to these young people who at the beginning showed great respect to the Hoca but later began disagreeing with him over what kind of activities should be organised at LITA.

The young people who started coming to LITA by Hoca’s invitation also started challenging the Hoca over the political alliance of LITA. Although the Hoca also had nationalist tendencies, as pointed out by him during an interview, he did not want to associate with a particular ideology of a political party. The dispute between the Hoca and new young members of LITA known as Idealists or Grey_Wolves (Ulkuclular or Bozkurtlar), was
translated into a political conflict that has weakened the Hoca’s authority and credibility among LITA’s members. The number of members rose sharply to 150 and Hoca was removed from the administration at the executive committee meeting in March 1993.

It appears that the 1993 executive committee meeting was a turning point in producing a political identity for LITA which blended with Islamic ideology. Since then LITA has been politicised and has become a branch of the Turkish Federation (Turk Federasyonu) in Germany, an umbrella organisation of nationalist associations supporting the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi) in Turkey. The new political identity of LITA was a synthesis of Turkic and Islamic values.

As soon as a new framework of identity had emerged, some members left LITA and joined the Jama’a of other Mosques. The replacement of the executive committee has transformed the politics of LITA and its membership pattern a great deal. The number of young members soared and visitors overwhelmingly comprised these idealistic youth while the activities centred around political issues in the country of origin. New posters that are being displayed on the walls represent the symbols of their political ideology. Among them, a photograph depicting the current leader of MHP, Alparslan Turkes, is hung on the wall. Video films of speeches delivered by Turkes are being constantly played for the visitors. Political issues such as Bosnia, Cyprus, Western Thrace, the Turkic world and the Kurdish problem have become the central focus of meetings. Speakers from academia, journalists and politicians were invited from Turkey and Europe to address these issues from the MHP’s point of view. In one case, the deputy chairman of MHP, Riza Muftuoglu was invited as a speaker to a meeting held on 5 December 1994. Muftuoglu devoted considerable time to the Kurdish issue during his talk. He said:

‘Unfortunately enemies of Turkey are inciting our people of Kurdish origin to revolt against the state. Sadly enough some Kurds seem to
believe that they can divide Turkey and establish a separate state. We believe that only a small number of people believe in such an utopia. We also have a firm belief that overwhelming majority of them want to live with us. We would like to remind those who are trying to evoke a sense of hatred between Turks and Kurds that it is impossible to draw a sharp line between them for the fact that Turks and Kurds lived together for more than 900 years during which they intermarried, fought against enemies side by side. Now, I ask how such an historical amalgamation and strong integrity would be dissolved?'

As this statement implies, MHP does not want an open confrontation with Kurds nor does their nationalism accommodate a recognition of Kurds having a different identity. Muftuoglu also made remarks about Turkey's relations with the West. When asked whether Turkey should enter the European Union (EU) he gave the following reply:

'New economic and political alliances are emerging today. We are not particularly against all these new formations. However we believe that before joining any camp, Turkey must become a very strong country. This is a prerequisite of nationalism. Unless you prove to be strong, no matter whichever alliance you enter, you will have no power and authority in decision making. Therefore before rushing to join EU, Turkey must lead to the establishment of 'Turkish Common Market' or the 'Union of Turkic World' which would enable Turkey and other Turkic countries to achieve economic independence. Then Turkey can enter EU where it can defend its interests.'

The foregoing explanation indicates that in the hierarchy of relations with other states, economic co-operation with Turkic countries of the former Soviet Union assumes priority in the MHP's ideology. MHP's sympathy with the Turkic world is also expressed in London. The newly elected executive committee has quickly established relations with the Turks from Western Thrace, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkemans from northern Iraq. It seems that a small political unity has been achieved by bringing the leaders of these communities to London. LITA's ideologist youth denounce Kurdish separatism in Turkey and organise meetings to defend and publicise their views. Sometimes this leads to a political clash with people of Kurdish origin who came from Turkey. LITA became a target of political violence twice in the past. A group of people wanted to burn down LITA's premises by throwing petrol bombs. The first attack occurred in November 1993,
damaging the building badly and the *Mesjid* was closed to prayers. The second attack took place in the month of *Ramazan* in March 1994. In a press release sent to Turkish newspapers, LITA responded to these attacks. It stated that:

>'These deplorable attacks on our *Mesjid* and association in such a holy month will never stop our activities. These kinds of attacks do not scare us at all. We believe that any attack on the sacred premises of Muslims like our small *Mesjid* will strengthen our commitment to our ideals and beliefs.'

As these events unfold, politics in Turkey influence the political behaviour of the Turkish community in London. This has had a paradoxical impact on maintaining the community as a unity. It appears, on the one hand, that political conflict in Turkey consolidates the identity of particular groups as in the case of LITA's idealist youth and Kurdish activists. On the other hand, political affairs in the country of origin create a sharper line of division between Turks and Kurds to the extent that an atmosphere of compromise evaporates.

Political activities of LITA are not confined to the Kurdish issue. LITA has organised several meetings to support the plight of other Turkish people around the world. In June 1993, for example, LITA organised a protest meeting in front of the German Embassy in London to condemn the tragic events in Sollingen, handing a petition to the Ambassador asking the German government to take more serious measures to protect Turks and others foreigners in Germany. LITA has also showed solidarity with Turkish-Cypriots and demanded recognition from the English for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Since its beginnings, Bosnia has been an important issue. It appears that religious sentiments and Islamic brotherhood motivated many LITA members to take part in almost all the demonstrations to publicise the plight of Muslims in Bosnia. It can be argued that all these events have strengthened the collective identity of LITA's young members because such issues evoke a strong sense of shared ideals.
The idealistic youth of LITA regard Islam as an indispensable component of Turkish identity. They believe that Turks rendered a great service to Islam in history and in return, God elevated the position of Turks and made them victorious over the non-believers. To facilitate the teaching of Islamic practices, LITA employed a retired Imam from Turkey who served a year in 1993. During his stay, the Imam organised religious classes for young Turks and children in the neighbourhood. During several of my visits to their small Mesjid, I observed that it was packed, especially on Fridays. In a relatively short time the Imam’s authority was recognised and regular meetings on Islam and the Muslim world were held.

An examination of LITA and LICARS reveals that political developments in Turkey have had a direct effect on religio-political organisations since their raison d’être and survival very much depend on umbrella organisations. Every stage of political developments such as internal divisions, ideological transformation and changes in the political discourse of umbrella organisations, is easily heard among the members in London through constant exchange of visitors, availability of the Turkish press in London and satellite dishes that exist in almost all Turkish households. In this context Goulbourne (1991, p. 7) observes that ‘groups and individuals separated by thousands of miles of ocean and land mass can now establish close links with fellow-religionists, fellow-ethnics and fellow-adherents to a particular ideology’. Various organisations and groups among Turkish communities in Europe in general and in London in particular appear to be having a similar experience.

After the 1992 general elections in Turkey, MHP followed a policy of supporting the coalition government formed by the centre-right True Path Party (TPP) and the centre-left Social Democratic Populist Party. Although MHP did not get any ministerial position, it gave explicit support to the formation of a coalition government whose partner happened to be a centre-leftist party with an opposing ideology to MHP. MHP’s outright support for
a coalition government that included an ideologically irreconcilable party was the beginning of serious debates within the ranks and files of MHP. A group of newly elected young MPs raised their disapproval of the party leadership on the grounds that Islamically oriented right-wing political ideology was being undermined by supporting the coalition government. The opposition group within MHP claimed that their party appealed to the religious sentiments of voters as well as national feelings, yet the party leadership seemed to have ignored the Islamic component of the political identity of the party. Nevertheless, their voice was silenced by the veterans of MHP and the first divisions occurred within the party thereafter. The opposition was led by Muhsin Yazicioglu who challenged Alparslan Turkes arguing that the Islamic approach to political developments must be one of the indispensable elements of MHP’s political ideology. Then, seven MPs resigned from MHP and founded a new party called the Great Union Party (BBP) (Buyuk Birlik Partisi).

Political divisions that occurred in Turkey were simultaneously felt in European countries where there are numerous followers of MHP and newly established BBP, including London. Without exception, all organisations affiliated to MHP in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and England experienced similar conflicts that resulted in divisions within the umbrella organisations in Europe. These issues, originated in the country of origin, dominated the agenda of LITA and its members were divided into two groups. One group supported the foundation of a new party while the other vehemently disagreed with such an initiative. One informer who supported the views of Muhsin Yazicioglu, leader of BBP: ‘I am not happy with the division in the party. But such a step became necessary vis-à-vis the authoritarian attitude of the old politicians. If you can not do anything in a political group in accord with your line of thought, I think it is a wise thing to leave the group. And that is what Yazicioglu had done.’ Another young member who used to come frequently to LITA before the division legitimised
his preference to back Yazicioglu by referring to Islamic ideology. When asked why he supported the opposition, he said:

‘Islam has been undermined by the MHP leadership in designing a political strategy. We were always told that Turkish identity was moulded by Islamic beliefs. If you do not take religious principles seriously when making politics then you lose your mission and no longer can you claim that Islam is an essential part of your political identity. That was the case with MHP when its leadership supported TPP-RPP coalition at the expense of Islamic criteria. The opposition in the Party was stimulated by religious concerns. When BBP was founded I felt that my political ideals were closer to that party in contrast to MHP.’

As the expression of this ex-member of LITA suggests, the ideological dilemma within the body-politic of a mother organisation in the home country determines the reactions of its sympathisers in London. The polarisation of political groups epitomised by the divisions in the Turkish community, lends support to my argument that political behaviour in the society of origin is reproduced in London. This observation suggests that, although the majority of the members seem to have settled in London, it is a recurrent theme that political values and behaviours in the country of origin still shape the political identity of the Turkish community in London.

10.2. Transplantation of Political Islam: National Vision (Milli Görus)

So far, I have tried to establish that West European countries with sizeable Turkish residents became an arena of competition to recruit people for religious and political movements. Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands were the first areas of a contest that was introduced into the British context in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Of these emerging politico-religious movements, the European Associations of National Vision (EANV) (Avrupa Milli Görus Teskilatlari) with its headquarters in Cologne, in Germany, has branches in almost all the European countries and cities with Turkish immigrant groups, including London. The establishment of a branch
organisation in London in 1995 will be my second case in an analysis of the relationship between religion and politics within the British-Turkish context.

The first attempts to open a branch of National Vision in London can be traced to the late 1980s. Since my arrival in England in 1989, I have always taken an interest in the Turkish community in London and have tried to keep in touch. Therefore, I participated in many meetings where community issues were discussed and I was able to meet several Turkish politicians who expressed their interest in the affairs of the Turkish community in England. This means that, in a sense, my fieldwork and participant observation started a few years earlier than the formal start of this project for my Ph.D. As I explained in Chapter Two, this background provided me with a longer history of the institutionalisation process. My first encounter with the efforts for the establishment of National Vision was in late 1989 when I met Necmeddin Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party, to which National Vision is closely affiliated. It could be argued that National Vision was established as the European branch of the Welfare Party. Necmeddin Erbakan held a meeting in the spring of 1989 at the premises of the Islamic Council of Europe in London with young students and some academics. After the meeting it came to light that Erbakan's efforts to recruit Turkish students and academics had failed despite his assurances of financial assistance from National Vision's headquarters in Cologne.

The first setback did not put Erbakan off opening a new branch in London. Therefore, they tried to convince or infiltrate the existing associations which were already established in the Turkish community. The Aziziyeh Mosque, for example, was targeted by Erbakan and his advisers in Germany. The Imam of the Aziziyeh Mosque was approached several times in the early 1990s to convince him that the Mosque should become a base for National Vision. The Director General of National Vision from Germany negotiated with the Imam and offered him vicegerency of Erbakan, but the Imam refused the offer.
During 1992 and 1993 there were frequent exchanges of visits between Germany and London for further negotiations and planning for the opening of the London branch. In March 1994, Erbakan’s nephew came to London to speed up the process of establishing the London branch. During the meeting Erbakan’s nephew outlined their strategy:

‘We, as the Head Office based in Germany, are ready to provide you whatever necessary in terms of advise, planning and finance as soon as you take decisive steps towards the setting up of an organisation. I advise you that you carefully look at the structure of our organisation and try to form same or at least similar one. You should keep in mind that the problems you might address might differ from that of Germany where there is a large and very well established group of our followers. Therefore, try not to alienate general public and adopt a constructive discourse towards all sections in the Turkish community.’

As the contents of the above speech establish beyond any doubt, there are cross-country relations among religio-political organisations as in the case of National Vision. This meeting also unfolds the complex relations involving financial transactions between groups based in different countries. Almost one year after this meeting, a place was rented in the vicinity of Newington High Street where there are Turkish Mosques and a significant number of Turks. The opening of the London branch of National Vision took place on 5 February 1995 under a different name as the London Islamic Culture and Recreation Society (LICARS) (Londra Islami Kultur ve Egitim Teskilati). Although LICARS presented itself in the beginning as not being identical with National Vision, attendance by the Director General of National Vision, its representatives from main European cities and a Welfare Party MP from Turkey at the opening ceremony disclosed the religio-political identity of LICARS as the London branch of National Vision. This observation was later confirmed by the fact that the president of LICARS always refers to this organisation as National Vision and displays the symbols and posters clearly confirming an affiliation to the umbrella organisation.
The opening ceremony of LICARS also revealed the nature of relations among Islamic organisations. The nature of attendance at the ceremony suggested that transnational Islam is broadening its institutionalisation in Europe. The organisers had invited a range of representatives from several establishments including The Muslim Parliament, The Islamic Party of Britain, The Muslim World League, Islamic Cultural Centre and presidents of Turkish Islamic organisations as well as ambassadors of Muslim countries. Guests were also present from several branches of National Vision in Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, France and Germany including its Director General. The opening ceremony of LICARS also exposed the political tensions among the Turkish speaking communities in London, rooted in the divergence of political and religious identity. The resurfaced religio-political tension has its roots in Turkey and it re-emerged in London just as other behavioural patterns are reproduced. At the opening ceremony there were protests by opposition groups formed by the alliance of Alawites and some Kurds from Turkey who support different religious and political ideologies. The protesters threw eggs and tomatoes at the participants and chanted 'Death to Erbakan', 'Death to Sharia', 'Fundamentalism will die in London'. The banners they carried read 'Turkey will not become Iran', 'No to the Sharia organisation'. Similar incidents are recurrent themes of political life in Turkey. This incident shows the nature of religio-political conflict within already diversified Turkish speaking communities in London.


National Vision came into existence in 1985 as the outcome of a merger of three associations defending similar ideas that were established in the 1970s in Germany. The European Turkish Union (ETU) (Avrupa Turk Birliği), the Cologne Islamic Centre (CIC), (Koln Islam Merkezi) and the Islamic Union of Europe (IUE) (Avrupa İslam Birliği) have all promoted Islamic education and established Mosques to address the religious needs of adults and nourish the
Islamic identity of children. According to a booklet published by National Vision in 1993, these three organisations decided to unite under an umbrella organisation in 1985 on the grounds that they were not only in harmony with each other regarding religious and political views but also because their voice to promote their ideals would be heard better (AMGT, Avrupa Milli Gorus Teskilatlari, 1993, p. 9). Following the unification of these three organisations, National Vision expanded throughout Europe in the late 1980s and even spread to USA, Australia and Central Asia in the first half of the 1990s. Since its establishment, National Vision has been involved in a wide range of activities and organised itself to address various problems of the Turkish Muslims.

The description of the organisational structure will reveal the large spectrum of issues National Vision is concerned with. National Vision’s organisational structure and managerial set-up include the General Headquarters, Regional Directorships and Branch Directorships. The organisational structure of National Vision shows that a vast number of sections and sub-sections were formed to address various issues confronted by Turkish immigrants in Germany and elsewhere. The organisational complexity informs us that National Vision is one of the firmly organised Turkish religio-political institutions in Western Europe. The range of functions it hosts or supports both in Germany and in other European countries, with significant Turkish immigrants, draws considerable interest and participation from the Turkish community.

I will now analyse the contents of two documents which describe National Vision’s raison d’être, its purposes, functions, aspirations and plans as an institutional force for the reproduction and maintenance of Islamic political identity among Turkish immigrants. The first document informs us of the foundational aspirations and goals of National Vision and its approach to current status and conditions of Turkish Muslims in particular and Muslims in Europe in general. National Vision organised its 11th annual general
committee meeting on 3rd June 1995 in Frankfurt. The following highlight from the opening speech of the General Director at the meeting to a crowd of almost ten thousand supporters and a handful of representatives from non-Turkish Muslim organisations clarifies National Vision’s policies. The speaker starts off by acknowledging the permanent status of second and third generations of Turkish immigrants. Since the young generation is a permanent part of the host society as evidenced by the establishment of so many economic, educational and cultural organisations, the Turkish community should be granted the following rights:

'Islam as the religion of Turkish community should be recognised officially by the German authorities as in other European countries such as Belgium, Austria and Spain. Turkish children should be given the right for bilingual education. Members of the Turkish community should be able to participate into politics fully during the elections. Turkish immigrants should be granted dual nationality. citizenship should be granted not on the lines of blood but on the basis of birthplace.' (Speech text, p. 4, 1995)

National Vision’s Director, similar to other Turkish community organisations (see Chapters Eight and Nine), places special emphasis on the reproduction and maintenance of Turkish identity in a foreign land and suggests ways in which this can be achieved. He argues that:

'If we want to live without losing our identity we should do the following: We should organise special courses for the mother language and the language of the host country. In order to increase the success rate of our children in primary and secondary schools we should establish pre-school courses for their preparation. Advisory bureaus should also be founded to help youngsters to find their way. In order to lead a life in harmony with the receiving society, cultural centres should be opened for common events. Society is full of evils. For the protection of our children from these evils we should establish youth clubs offering facilities in sports, music and folklore. Moreover, we should also co-operate with recognised organisations to fight against drug use and help them found centres of drug rehabilitation' (p. 4-5).

This statement clearly shows that National Vision’s plans and activities are not purely religious activities. From this perspective, it differs from other religious organisations. For example it supports the teaching of music and art
to children and organises courses on karate and similar sports so that young people can find something that draws their attention to National Vision's activities. In addition, National Vision organises supplementary classes for the Turkish children. It is difficult to find in other Turkish organisations such a policy of varied activities that extends the religious domain.

Political participation has always been encouraged by National Vision to secure the rights of immigrants. To this effect, the Director especially draws attention to political participation in the existing parties as political involvement is seen as an effective way of gaining rights and protecting them. Although gender difference is strictly observed during the meetings in the form of segregation of males and females, National Vision takes the position of including Muslim women in all the aforementioned activities. National Vision is also concerned with the increasing rate of racist attacks on Turkish immigrants. All kinds of racism are condemned by the Director as these are shameful events occurring in the modern world.

National Vision takes a different position with regard to Turkey's application for full membership of the European Union. In contrast to the Welfare Party of Turkey, National Vision sees no harm in integrating with Europe. It is a well known phenomenon that the Welfare Party strongly opposes Turkey's membership in European Union. Paradoxically, National Vision argues that there is no obstacle for a closer relation with Europe. The Director's statement unfolds this point as:

'From a religious-philosophical point of view, there is in no difficulty in accepting integration and establishing closer ties with Europe for a Muslim believer. It is hoped that such an integration in and drawing close to the larger society should not be used as a means of oppression and total dependency. Incorporation and integration with the Christian world is suggested by the Qur'an, let alone rejected. The Qur'an had invited humanity to such a union. This message is addressed not only Christians but also their spiritual kin, i.e. Jewish people. The Qur'an calls upon Christians and Jewish people described as 'people of the book' (ahl al-kitab) along with Muslims not to pray other than one God. The Qur'an denotes Christian world as
the most possible ally of affinity in love. When one looks at the current practices in the contemporary Christian world from the viewpoint of how universal values of the Qur'anic teachings are put into practice, it can be concluded that the Christian world is more closer to the Qur'an than the Muslim world. Therefore, the benefits that one expect from integrating with Europe are not much lesser than the gains from integrating with the contemporary Muslim world. In conclusion, we should enter into European Union if our benefits require to do so. But on the other hand, we should no go as far as to say 'if there can be no membership, there will be no life' (p. 10-11).

The different approach to Turkey's application for full membership in the European union, it seems, has not caused a rift and conflict between National Vision and the Welfare Party. The leadership of the Welfare Party does not mention its adamant disapproval of European Union membership to an immigrant audience as I observed during my fieldwork in Berlin. I have followed the Welfare Party's current leader Necmeddin Erbakan's two long public addresses during large meetings that took place in Belgium in which he pointed out that Turkish immigrants have become a permanent part of the European society forming an increasingly larger group than other Muslim minorities. During his speeches Erbakan encouraged the Turkish minority to participate in the life of the host societies in Europe rather than living in isolated social and political ghettos. In contrast to this stand, Erbakan used a completely opposite discourse in domestic politics designating the West as a Christian Club. National Vision and the Welfare Party seem to have an opportunist position towards relations with Europe, in that while the Welfare Party demonstrates a rejecting political stand towards the West, National Vision endorses closer relations with Europe and fosters positive feelings towards integration with the host society of which the Turkish immigrants are considered to be a permanent part.

The second document used in this analysis is the 1994-95 Annual Activity Report, prepared and presented by the General Secretary of National Vision during the 11th general committee meeting on 3rd June 1995 in Frankfurt. This document outlines the main areas of National Vision's activities and the
extent to which it has reached its goals and aspirations set out in the former
document whose content was analysed above. The Annual Activity Report
starts off with an assertion that National Vision has succeeded in becoming
one of the largest civic-religious organisations with substantial within ten
years. Five areas of activity, institutionalisation, education, publicity,
publication and general projects including establishing external relations and
supplementary organisations were explained in the document. The Annual
Report declares that National Vision has several regional branches in more
than 40 countries, of which 15 are based in Germany, 18 in other European
countries, three in Asia, two in USA, one in Australia and one in London
which was opened in 1995. Table 10.1. shows the details of organisations and
membership of National Vision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Branches</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Congregation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>9344</td>
<td>33890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>9765</td>
<td>36460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>13970</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>791</td>
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The number of branch organisations includes Mosques and all other
institutions at district, regional and national level. The total membership
comprised all members of these branch organisations. As Table 10.1. shows,
the number of branch organisations and members has steadily increased over
the years.
As it was indicated in the first document, National Vision considers the education of young children conducive to the establishment of better relations with the host society in terms of furnishing children with linguistic abilities for better communication and providing them with opportunities to improve their academic success and professional talents. According to the 1994-95 Activity Report, 2885 students attended various summer courses organised in 59 centres. In addition to summer and short courses National Vision initiated the establishment of private schools. Bergkamen Girls College (Bergkamen Kız Koleji), Belgium-Hensies Ibn-i Sina Institute (Belcika-Hensies), Berlin College of Islamic Sciences (Berlin İslami İlimler Okulu), Duisburg Girls College (Duisburg Kız Koleji) and Schiedam Girls College (Schiedam Kız Koleji) were established by 1994.

During my fieldwork, I visited Berlin College of Islamic Sciences (BCIS) which offers Islamic classes to Turkish children. BCIS's teaching programme was similar to that of Imam-Hatip Schools in Turkey. Students, aged between twelve and sixteen are encouraged to follow an Islamic curricula outside their formal school hours. Recitation and interpretation of the Qur'an, prophetic traditions, Islamic history and Turkish culture and language are among the main core topics taught at BCIS by the graduates of Islamic Studies in Turkey. The current facilities and physical conditions imply that National Vision does not allocate significant amounts of money to educational investments. This observation is supported by the youth interviewed in Berlin. A Turkish university student made a critical evaluation of National Vision's educational policy. When asked how far National Vision succeeds in its educational endeavours he made the following comment:

'National Vision claims that we are permanent here. Therefore, education of young generation should be given considerable weight. I totally agree with this position as a student who did not have much support so far. Nevertheless, I have the impression that National Vision is not doing enough in proportion to the support it receives from people. Many people rush to raise money National Vision talks about educating their children. For years, our parents made
substantial donations for educational causes but one can easily
observe that only a little amount of this money had been channelled
to the foundation of educational establishments.

Another young Turkish student took a more critical position regarding
National Vision's use of its funds. About the spending of National Vision's
funding he said:

'I was brought to Germany in 1975. My parents were virtually
illiterate and not very helpful in my educational life despite their
wish for my success. So they were willing to support any kind of
initiative that might likely to help children like me. National Vision
is one of the organisations that realised how vulnerable the parents
were in these matters. Whenever they asked for donation, my parents
donated willingly, hoping that they can establish educational
institutions. As you know, National Vision was established in 1985
and since then it has collected huge amounts of money. Where was
that money invested? Certainly not in Germany. You see, we have
not a proper school or a course funded by National Vision though
there was a desperate demand for quality colleges. I believe that if
they had wanted to materialise their promises they could have done
so because there was enough funding and support and also legally
there was no obstacle for self-financed colleges. Instead of investing
in our future in Germany, National Vision channelled a bulky
amount of the funds to Turkey for the use of electoral propaganda. I
feel betrayed by this policy.'

The foregoing suggests that the young generation, at least some of them, are
becoming more critical of National Vision and other Turkish community
organisations. It appears that young Turks are developing a critical attitude
towards the policies and practices of Turkish institutions. The development of
a questioning frame of mind may be attributed to their education in
Germany. Policies of National Vision and similar organisations which do not
give young generations' concerns a priority, have contributed to the
emergence of such attitudes. As far as my informants in Berlin were
concerned, it appears that educated young Turks especially are disassociating
themselves from organisations affiliated directly to a political party or an
institution based in Turkey. These disaffiliated young people from
organisations such as National Vision were taking new initiatives to form
small but independent groups. A number of young people whom I talked to
during my fieldwork in Berlin told me that they were in search of genuine solutions to their problems ‘within the European context’. ‘Made in Turkey solutions’ were not accepted any longer; therefore, young people tended to initiate ‘German based’ institutions rather than ‘Turkey based’ organisations. When asked why they were not willing to join the existing organisations and change their nature by participating in their decision-making committees and possibly leadership contests, the typical answer was ‘the gap between young generations and older generation in this context is growing. Communication lines are cut off because both generations have different mental maps.’

This widespread perception among youth indicates that there is an ongoing tension between the young generation and their elders. But despite the tensions and generational conflicts, National Vision still manages to draw several members from young people because Islam is used as a powerful vehicle for propagation. Nevertheless, my findings, as presented above, suggest that there is an emergent identity construction among the young generation (Phinney 1993a, p. 47-48; Weinreich, 1986b, p. 304) This emergent identity is not shaped by ‘Turkey based perceptions’ but rather it is increasingly based on ‘local, European based perceptions’. This argument might be taken a step further to suggest that German-Turkish, Dutch-Turkish, French-Turkish and British-Turkish identities are emerging (see Chapter Six).

National Vision tries to achieve a representative role not only for Turks living in Europe but also for the Muslims of other national origins. To achieve such a status National Vision is trying to establish good relations with other Muslim communities and organisations. National Vision is attempting to establish its international credibility by organising international meetings. These meetings are organised as huge conferences attended by a large audience of National Vision supporters, and representatives of Muslim communities from around the world. National Vision holds two main conferences annually in different cities of Europe. These two conferences are called ‘Conference on the Problems of European Muslims’ and ‘Conference
on Introducing Islam To Europe'. The first of these conferences was held in 1987 in Rotterdam and has been repeated annually in different European cities.

As its title 'Conference on Introducing Islam To Europe' suggests, these conferences aim at acquainting non-Muslims with the religion of Islam which had a 'decisive effect on the attitudes and behaviours of Turkish people and other Muslims living in Europe' as one official from National Vision argued. The expectation from organising introductory seminars and conferences is to familiarise the larger community with the values and traditions of Muslim ethnic communities. It seems that proselytising non-Muslims is not the driving force behind spreading information on Islam. Thus, National Vision does not claim to have a proselytising stance. It can be argued that seminars and meetings of such a nature might produce results which could contribute to ethnic conflict resolution. It may also be expected that by eradicating stereotypes and prejudices, intra-ethnic relations could be established which would facilitate mutual understanding between various communities.

As a part of its effort for international recognition, National Vision also participates in the meetings of other Muslim organisations in Europe. National Vision also initiated the idea of establishing a Centre for European Islamic Unity (Aurupa Islam Birligi) in Cologne in 1993 and held a meeting on 28-29 August of the same year in Davos, Switzerland which was attended by 134 representatives of 38 Muslim organisations in Europe. The delegates of Muslim organisations met again in Basel, Switzerland to discuss the position of Muslims in Europe and decided to co-operate in the future. At the time of writing the thesis the decision to build the Centre in Cologne was still waiting to be implemented. National Vision modified its name during its 11th Annual General Assembly meeting in June 1995 in Frankfurt, Germany. The name was changed from European Association of National Vision to that of National Vision Islamic Community in order to strengthen its claim to be the representative of not only Turkish Muslims but the Muslim nation 'Umma'.
It is clear from the above analysis that political Islam is also transplanted among Turkish communities in Europe. As part of their expansionist policy, two grassroots political organisations with Islamic ideology, LITA and National Vision, were also established in London of which LITA’s political ideology was shaped by Islam and strong Turkish nationalism, which has two paradoxical implications for the identity construction. The religio-political ideology of LITA strengthens the group identity, but on the other hand, produces a marginalised identity which exacerbates political polarisation among the Turkish speaking communities in Europe. National Vision’s political identity was also marked by Islam, but instead of nationalism the idea of Umma is emphasised. Therefore, it supports the formation of transnational Islamic political identity among Turkish communities and other Muslims in Europe.
Chapter Ten: Notes

1. National Vision: Organisation of General Headquarters includes a Board of Governors consists of a General Director and seven Deputy-General Directors each is responsible for a designated sub-section as shown below:

Board of Governors

General Director
1- Deputy-General Manager as General Secretary
2- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Organisation
3- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Education
4- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Publicity
5- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Personnel
6- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Publications
7- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Pilgrimage

Below the Board of Governors there is a Management Committee comprised of general director, seven Deputy-Generals and Directors of sub-sections as:

Management Committee

1- General Director
2- Deputy-General Manager as General Secretary
3- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Organisation
4- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Education
5- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Publicity
6- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Personnel
7- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Publications
8- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Pilgrimage
9- Director of Legal Affairs
10-Director of Higher Religious Commission
11-President of University Students
12-President of Youth Organisation
13-President of Women Organisation
14-President of Workers’ Association

The organisations of sub-sections which operate under the administration of directorates and presidencies are devised to reach a maximum effectiveness by sharing responsibilities within the organisational structure of National Vision’s headquarters in Cologne.

General Directorate
-Deputy-General Directors
-Directorate of Higher Religious Commission
-Directorate of Legal Affairs
-Directorate of Accountancy and Finance
-Directorate of Evaluation and Monitoring

General Secretariat
- Presidency of Women Organisation
- SEDAM Research Centre
- Presidency of Workers Association
  - Department of Workers Union
- Presidency of External Relations
- Department of Press and Archive

Directorate of Organisation
  - Presidency of Youth Organisations

Directorate of Education
  - Presidency of University Students
  - Schools
    - Permanent Schools
    - Summer Schools
    - Short Courses

Directorate of Publicity
Directorate of Personnel
Directorate of Publications
  - Video Club
  - Book Club
  - Book Fair
  - Publication of Books and Publicity Material

Directorate of Pilgrimage
Chapter Eleven
Conclusions

I have argued in Chapter One that European countries are increasingly becoming multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious as a result of immigration and settlement of non-indigenous people. This means that European cities are accommodating an ethnically and culturally heterogeneous population. The settlement of immigrants in European countries gave rise to the establishment of permanent ethnic minorities with varying linguistic, cultural and religious differences. These communities have reproduced their distinct value systems in the midst of social and cultural structures of receiving countries. The institutionalisation of ethnic minority cultures exacerbated the heterogeneity of host societies to a certain extent by expressing their own languages, religions, food, music and dress. This means that new identities have emerged in Europe.

Among these new communities, Muslims constitute a significant group with an estimated number of 6.8 million who live in the European Union countries. Although the presence of Muslims in Europe is not a new phenomenon, it could be argued that the expression of Islamic identity has become more pronounced in recent years. The growth of Western-educated young generations and the rise of global/transnational Islamic movements are important sources of motivation for Muslims in Europe to express their identity in Western countries. For example, in recent years, Muslims in Europe have become more concerned with the religious education of their children (Anwar, 1995a, p. 243); they have shown strong reactions against the prohibition of headscarfs in schools and demanded legal recognition on local levels. Expression of Islamic identity has also taken place in the face of international events concerning Muslims such as in Bosnia, Palestine, and Kashmir. The marginalisation of Muslims on local levels and their victimisation on a global level, mobilised Muslims in Europe and strengthened their sense of belonging to the Muslim *Umma*. However, as I have mentioned throughout the thesis, Muslims in Europe accommodate a
great deal of diversity (Vertovec and Peach, forthcoming). Even a cursory look at the Muslim communities such as Pakistanis, Algerians, Moroccans and Bangladeshis in the West would reveal that all these communities have diversities of Islamic movements within themselves. The Turkish community in Europe is a part of emerging 'European Islam' and has its own diversity in the expression of Turkish-Muslim identity. However, this research has shown that Turks in Britain are one of the under-researched ethnic communities.

A proper understanding of Muslim communities in Europe depends upon the analysis of 'Islams' rather than 'Islam'. As I have argued in Chapter Three, identity construction is a multidimensional phenomenon. National history, myths, language, shared values and a sense of solidarity all influence the formation of ethnic and religious identities. The construction of Islamic identities also goes through a similar process, underlined by the diversity of variables which make Muslim groups heterogeneous. Therefore, Turkish-Muslim identity as expressed by the Turkish community in London should be seen as a micro-unit of an already diversified Muslim entity.

My research presented in this thesis, I believe, fills a vacuum in research on micro-Islamic communities in Britain. I mentioned in the introductory Chapter that the overwhelming majority of research on Muslims in Britain has focused on Asian Muslims. It seems that Islam in Britain is usually equated with Asian Muslims in the public imagination. This clearly indicates that the Turks as a micro-community within the larger Islamic Umma are generally not included in studies of Muslims in Britain. This means that any generalisation about Islam and Muslims in Britain, drawing upon studies on micro-communities, would be misleading due to the diversity within Islamic communities. Therefore, I suggest that before making any generalisations about Muslims, 'Islams' should be studied because there is no single expression of 'Islam' even within the same ethnic or national group.
I explained in Chapter One that the focus of this thesis would be on the politics of ethnicity, identity and religion among Turks in London. Therefore, issues related to family, marriage, reproduction of cultural values and their relation to identity construction were analysed in Chapter Five. The re-establishment of Turkish families facilitated the institutionalisation of culture, religion and language in London. The analysis of identity politics within the Turkish community revealed that family, marriage and social networks have played an important role in every stage of immigration. I have demonstrated in Chapter Five that family, kin and social networks were involved in three overlapping stages of Turkish experience of migration. I have suggested (see Figure 5.3.) that pre-migration, migration/settlement processes and post-settlement stages were marked by the involvement of various networks and by the reproduction of traditional sets of relationships rooted in shared values. I have explained in that Chapter, for example, that family, friends, neighbours and village men helped each other in finding jobs and accommodation during the course of migration and settlement. Kin and social networks were and are being reproduced after the family reunifications.

My findings suggest that contextual factors led to the establishment of networks not necessarily confined to family, kin and village origin. This means that social networks were expanded by the influence of situational elements so as to include people previously not related on the basis of descent or village origin (Ladbury, 1977, p. 307; Werbner, 1995, p. 214). Different areas were mentioned which have generated new social relations. I have explained, for example, that adherence to a particular religious group creates a ‘religious network’. Economic activities can also be mentioned as a facilitating factor for widening the social networks. I have argued in Chapter Five that the ‘trust’ derived from belonging to the same ethnic/national/religious/ideological group can facilitate the establishment of partnership among Turkish people. Marriage and reconstruction of Turkish families also widen existing social networks through new alliances.
The establishment of family and marriage practices in the Turkish community inform us that traditional values are constantly reproduced as an expression of Turkish identity. First of all, marriage is still seen as an important institution for socialisation. Therefore considerable social pressure is brought on single individuals to get married (White, 1994, p. 38-39; Delaney, p. 112; Bainbridge, 1986, p. 447). Parents who would like to arrange a marriage for their son, for example, are still seeking for intact 'honour' and 'reputation' of the girl candidate. Therefore, girls are encouraged to avoid situations which may damage their honour and family reputation. However, the meaning of honour and reputation is changing for the young generation. In contrast to parental attitudes they do not see, for example, social outings with unrelated male friends as damaging their honour and reputation. And increasingly they want to make their own choices for marriage. The findings in this thesis also suggest that 'control' over the girls, in contrast to boys, has much to do with the cultural practices, not necessarily rooted in Islamic beliefs. Therefore, the justification for parental control can not be based totally on religious grounds. Had it been so, they should have developed the same attitudes spontaneously for their sons because religious principles apply to both sexes equally.

The generational differences are not confined to the issue of marriage. It is argued in Chapter Three that migration experience might cause 'paradigm shift' (Jackson, 1986, p. 2). This means that traditionally-loaded meanings of some concepts may lose their importance with the fusion of novel ideas through acculturation, social interaction and schooling in Britain. The analysis of in-depth interviews and survey results suggest that such a paradigm shift is taking place between generations. As mentioned earlier (p. 167), Turkish parents are deeply concerned with the transmission of traditional values to the young generation in order to protect their identity from 'cultural contamination'. Therefore, parents consistently put pressure on them to 'absorb' and 'internalise' the cultural values of the Turkish community.
Although there is no whole-sale rejection of traditional values, it appears that the young generation are developing different attitudes towards parental values. I discussed in Chapter Six, for example, that although most of the Turkish young people agree with the preservation of parental culture, they seem to attribute different meanings to some of the elements of traditional values. There is a tendency among young Turks to see marriage, social relations and sexuality in a somewhat different way to that of their parents. The overwhelming majority of young people claim that they have disagreements with their parents over 'meeting and socialising with the opposite sex', 'type of clothing', 'spending time outside the house', 'restriction of freedom', 'friendship with non-Turks and non-Muslims' and 'the way marriages are arranged' (see Table 6.7.).

The development of different attitudes towards these issues may be attributed to the socialisation experience of the young generation in Britain. In contrast to their parents, young people have to deal with multiple identity choices. Parents as the first generation maintain their original culture rather than adopting the host society's social and cultural values. Therefore, reactionary response curbs the fusionary effect of assimilation among the first generation members of the Turkish community. Young Turks, on the other hand, as a 'bridge generation', (Human (1933) cited in Lewis 1982, p. 187) seem to have ambiguous tendencies towards some of the values and habits of their community. They have a desire, on the one hand, to preserve parental values at home, and on the other, to adopt some elements of the host culture outside. This means that there is an emergent identity construction taking place among the young generation. This emergent identity is not exclusively shaped by 'Turkey/Cypriot inspired perceptions', but rather is increasingly based on 'local/British inspired perceptions'. This argument might be taken a step further to suggest that British-Turkish identities are emerging among young Turks in London. My findings support the theoretical approaches of Markston-Adams (1992, p. 174) and Phinney (1993a, p. 47) who argue that 'social-contextual factors' on identity formation should be taken into account in the analysis of how identities are shaped. Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that the emergent
Turkish identity among young Turks in London is expected to be influenced and shaped to a certain degree by the 'British social and cultural context'.

I have argued throughout the thesis that religion is one of the significant markers of Turkish identity. Therefore, the first generation of the Turkish community established Islamic institutions as soon they acquired sufficient resources. These institutions were meant to facilitate the transmission of religious values to young Turks. My findings, as presented in Chapter Seven, suggest that attitudes of young people towards religion are also changing. Although almost all young Turks still believe in the basic principles of Islam, it seems that religion is becoming a symbolic attachment for many of them. The survey analysis on the intellectual dimension of religious commitment among young Turks clearly indicates that young people know very little about Islam (see Tables 7.5; 7.6; and 7.9.)

The lack of knowledge about the basic principles of Islam might be attributed to several factors. It can be argued, for example, that they do not learn much about their religion in the schools because there seem to be no special provisions for the teaching of Islam and Turkish culture. Another reason may be the failure of Islamic institutions to address a larger young audience because of their mostly out-dated teaching methods. Findings on the ritualistic dimension of religiosity, on the other hand, show that only a small number of young people perform prescribed Islamic practices. Young Turks know little about their religion and they generally do not fulfil the required religious duties. Yet, most of them still believe in it. This means that a symbolic religiosity is developing among the Turkish youth who seem to be increasingly feeling the tension generated by continuity and change. It appears that young Turks will experience this tension at least for the foreseeable future. Parents and religious organisations will continue to teach the young generation the importance of religion and will try to inculcate an Islamic belief in their sense of belonging to the Turkish-Muslim community. However, social and cultural effects of the British context will also influence the young generation throughout their life which will inevitably induce changes in
the emergent Turkish identity the among young generation to a certain extent, which would enable them to accommodate a sense of belonging to the multicultural community in Britain.

The role of cultural, religious and religio-political organisations in the construction and maintenance of Turkish identity is also relevant in this context. Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten showed that the organisations and associations of various kinds were established and used by the Turkish community in London as a response to changing social and cultural conditions. These organisations have different membership and clientele profiles, different administrative structures, strategies and purposes. The foundational aspirations and priorities of Turkish organisations, reflected in their activities and functions, reveal that there are overlapping as well as dissimilar, even conflicting concerns among the Turkish community. This means that the institutionalisation of identity politics of assumes diverse meanings according to the cultural, religious and political orientations of Turkish organisations. As pointed out in Chapter Eight, the process of community formation with its own 'cultural boundaries' from that of fragmented individuals through family unions and marriages, was accompanied by the process of institutionalisation in various areas. The raison d'être of Turkish organisations lies in the fact that settlement and post-settlement processes generated numerous problems for the community and these challenging problems needed to be addressed. The issues around culture, language, religion, welfare and education of the young generation preoccupied parental and familial concerns. It can be argued that Turkish organisations emerged in response to these concerns which are related to the expression of ethnicity and identity.

The analysis of Turkish/Cypriot organisations suggests that there is a subtle differentiation between mainland Turks and Turkish-Cypriots which could be seen as the two poles of Turkish identity. My findings confirm that minority organisations are established on ethnic and national lines. In
addition to that, even within the same ethnic or national group there is a discernible degree of internal differentiation rooted in the geographical origins of an ethnic group. The membership structure and clientele profile of the Turkish/Cypriot organisations in London suggest that such a differentiation exists between mainland and Cypriot Turks. This differentiation can be explained by 'self ascription' rather than an external attribution. Both groups define themselves as 'Turks' and 'Muslims' vis-à-vis 'others'. They also attribute more or less the same characteristics to Turkish identity. They would argue, for example, that Turks are 'Muslims', and 'culture', 'tradition', 'family', 'kin' and 'honour' are important elements of Turkish identity. The concern over the Cyprus issue is central to both groups. Transmission of traditional values to the young generation concerns equally mainland and Cypriot Turks and has lead them to join forces to reproduce Turkish identity. However, internal differentiation emerges when Turkish-Cypriots define themselves vis-à-vis mainland Turks. Therefore, I would suggest that Turkish identity is diversified in London in contrast to Turkish communities in other West European countries and it seems to be plausible to suggest that the self-ascribed duality prepares a ground to discuss 'Turkish identities' rather than a single 'Turkish identity' in London. However, these self-ascribed boundaries (Barth, 1969, p. 10-16) between Turks from the mainland and Cyprus have become diluted during confrontations between 'Us' versus 'Them' (Ringer and Lawless, 1989, p. 18,19; Jenkins, 1990, p. 174).

Almost all Turkish/Cypriot associations place a special emphasis on education because education is seen as a key to transmit traditional values to the young generation and to generate a sense of belonging to the ideals of Turkish community. It is a widely held view among the first generation that their children are exposed to the cultural influences of the larger society. Schooling, peer-group relations and media are constantly exerting cultural influences on young people and presenting new identity choices in conflict with the Turkish culture and Islamic values. Turkish/Cypriot organisations with few exceptions are devising policies and strategies to counterbalance the
acculturation of young Turks in order to prevent their assimilation because assimilation would mean the loss of Turkish identity. However, although the meaning of Turkish identity is the same in principle, Turkish/Cypriot organisations seem to emphasise different components of their identity as the most basic and indispensable element. Some organisations, for example, place priority on teaching the Turkish language as it is perceived to be the most effective means of communication with the culture which defines Turkish/Cypriot identity. As I will discuss later some organisations, on the other hand, seem to place more emphasis on Islam because they believe that religion is the most significant source of strength against the forces of assimilation. Political issues are also important ingredients of identity politics within the community as shown in Chapters Eight and Ten.

The Turkish Educational Attaché and some Turkish organisations in London claim that the number of young Turkish students at the supplementary weekend schools has reached 2,500 and it is estimated that their size will steadily grow. Increasing attendance in classes on Turkish 'language', 'culture', 'music' and 'folklore' indicates that parental concern about the future of their children is growing. They do not want to see young Turks lose their 'Turkish identity', therefore the first generation is trying to mobilise Turkish community to prevent 'cultural contamination' of children. It seems that institutionalisation of education is regarded as one of the most effective ways of reproducing Turkish culture and instilling an identity among the young generation by transmitting 'reproduced values' within the British context. However, my findings suggest (see Chapter Six) that despite parental pressure and organisational efforts, the meaning of Turkish identity is changing for the young generation.

I have suggested that Turkish/Cypriot organisations sometimes resort to political mobilisation of the community to revive the 'collective identity' (see Chapters Eight and Ten). The rationale behind such a strategy seems to be the expression of political identity which is considered a prerequisite to
becoming a 'politically conscious community' rather than that of a 'silent ethnic community'. Therefore, some organisations keep the issue of Cyprus alive because it is expected that such issues reawaken nationalist feelings and aspirations as sources of political identity. Political mobilisation inevitably requires involvement in the politics of the country of origin. Involvement in the politics of the country of origin in the diaspora reproduces attachments, alliances and hostilities which crystallise 'identity boundaries'.

Identity politics of Turkish/Cypriots organisations seem to generate at least twofold effects on their members and clientele. The first of these effects relates to the strengthening of 'in-group' solidarity. The second one relates to the polarisation of identity boundaries to a further extent. As I discussed in Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten, political concerns of some Turkish/Cypriot organisations appeal to nationalist feelings and utilise political events both in Turkey/Cyprus. The organisations administered by Turkish-Cypriots, for example, regularly mobilise their members to publicise the Cyprus issue and encourage them to send letters to MPs and the Prime Minister asking for their support for the Turkish side. The invitation of speakers from Turkey and Cyprus clearly indicates that politics in the country of origin are used to generate a strong group identity in the community. It is expected that public meetings and addresses of Turkish/Cypriot organisations on political issues will also mobilise 'others' to protest against these events. I gave some examples in Chapter Eight and Nine to explain that 'identity confrontation' and escalation of 'identity conflict' were rooted in politics. These examples showed that confrontation of political identities crystallise Turkish/Cypriot identity vis-à-vis 'imagined enemies' in London because historical hostilities are renewed and national/political/ethnic allegiances are re-expressed. This means that polarisation between 'Us' and 'Them' adversely consolidates collective identity.

My findings also suggest that not only the politics of the home country but also politics on an international level cause concern for the Turkish
community. Turks in Europe constitute a micro-community within the Muslim communities in Europe. Therefore, political events related to Muslims also enter into the politics of Turkish/Cypriot organisations in London. The reactions towards tragic events in Bosnia is a good illustration of the expression of 'Islamic identity'. Victimisation of Turks in other parts of the world and especially in Europe also produces an emphasised identity expression. I explained the effects of racist attacks on Turks in Germany in Chapter Eight. The reactions towards these events showed that racism and xenophobia caused a 'unified action' among Turks throughout Europe. In many parts of Germany where there are significant numbers of Turks, diverse sections of the Turkish community members, from secular to religious ones, were united around the same issue. The diversities and varieties of political and religious orientation were overcome by the common concern over the future of the Turkish community in Germany. The collective consciousness and reactions strengthened the ethnic bond among the community members. These developments had transnational effects as Turkish/Cypriot organisations showed in London by arranging solidarity meetings, distributing leaflets explicitly claiming a belonging to Turkish communities in Europe.

I have argued throughout the thesis that Islam is one of the indispensable components of Turkish/Cypriot identity. Even those who defined themselves as 'not religious' or 'nominal' Muslims, feel that religion has had public and private influence on the formation of Turkish identity. Institutionalisation of Islam and the growth of Islamic movements among the Turkish community confirm that this perception is widely held. This means that Turkish ethnicity, identity and Islam are closely intertwined and can not be readily separated from one another. Therefore, it is almost impossible to analyse Turkish identity without reference to Islam. However, it should be born in mind that Turkish Islam is as diversified as Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Arab Islam. This means that national and religious identity influenced each other throughout history and it is this factor that lies at the heart of the non-monolithic nature of Islamic movements. Even within Turkish Islam there is a wide diversity of expression of Islamic identity in
Europe. The Islamic organisations among the Turkish community in London also display such a diversity as I have shown in Chapters Nine and Ten. I argued that almost all Turkish Islamic organisations were off-shoots of umbrella organisations/groups in Turkey or Cyprus and that they implicitly, and more often explicitly, claimed allegiance to the 'national-model' organisations.

As far as the Islamic organisations in London are concerned, it appears that rivalry, competition and conflict rather than negotiation and co-operation are prevalent features of their politics. Such a state of affairs was inherited from the conflicts in Turkey and reproduced in Europe. The influence of 'model' organisations is very well documented on the institutionalisation of religious groups among Turks in Europe and in London. Therefore, I argue that without understanding the current developments in Turkey, it would not be possible to analyse the diversity of approaches to Islamic identity and politics among Turks in London. This argument is justified by the simple fact that the origins of Islamic groups among the Turkish community are rooted in the politics of religious movements in the country of origin. However, I suggest that for the young Turkish generation, the focus of Islamic politics seems to be changing. The young generation are increasingly becoming disillusioned by the priorities of these organisations (see Chapters Nine and Ten).

The establishment of the Mosques has always been a priority for the Turks as they are considered traditional centres of Islamic learning, religious socialisation and education which contribute to the construction of Turkish-Islamic identity. Activities held in Mosques are designed to reawaken Islamic identity among the Jama'a and pass the traditional values onto the young generation. My findings suggest that the growth of the young generation especially seems to be causing some changes in the traditional politics of the Mosques. Some of the Islamic organisations, for example, seem to have recognised that classical teaching methods were not very fruitful within the British context. Therefore, they introduced new strategies for teaching, recruiting and appealing to a wider audience. I explained in Chapter Nine, for example that, one of the Mosques
opened an independent primary school despite its ongoing insistence on traditional teaching methods. Another Mosque, on the other hand, had negotiated with the Local Council and was granted permission to register weddings in the Mosque. The novelty was even extended to allow the formation of small market places in one of the Mosques. It should be pointed out that these are significant changes in the politics of Mosques compared to Turkey or Cyprus where Mosques are only used for prayers under the strict control of the state apparatus. This also suggests that Islamic groups in Europe enjoy more freedom of expression since they do not challenge the state system.

The development of new strategies indicates that Islamic groups in London are aware of the social and cultural influences of the wider society. Nevertheless, new policies and strategies also carry the imprint of particular groups who have different approaches to Islamic issues. This means that as I have shown in Chapter Nine and Ten, Turkish Islamic organisations in London display a differentiation rather than convergence in terms of their methods of teaching, ideological standpoints and expression of Islamic identity. I have outlined three main Islamic groups among Turks in London and discussed the differences in their membership and leadership structures. I have shown, for example, that Islam as represented by Aziziye, Suleymanci and Sheikh Nazim Jama’a varies and they differ in their interpretations of what Islamic behaviour really is and what an authentic Islamic identity means.

One of the overlooked aspects of Islamic organisations among Turks in London and Europe in general is their contribution to the development of ‘Islamic networks’. The development of Islamic networks seem to be taking place on two levels. The first level relates to Turks as a micro-Muslim community. As I explained in Chapters Nine and Ten, almost all Islamic organisations among Turks in Europe have their origins in Turkey. Islamic groups such as Suleymanci, National Vision and the Nurcu movement are widening their networks in Europe. My observations of these groups in London and Berlin indicate that in-group relations are constantly renewed between Turkey and Europe. The second
area of network development relates to Muslim communities in Europe. Some of
the Turkish Islamic organisations are also contributing to the widening of
transnational Islam. Political and mystical Islam especially do not confine their
appeal to one ethnic/national group, but rather they try to recruit Muslims from
all national origins. Sheikh Nazim Jama'a, for example, is comprised of Muslims
who have different racial, ethnic and national origins. National Vision, on the
other hand, is increasingly trying to involve themselves in the affairs of Muslims
in a wider context. All of these groups have already opened branches in major
European and American cities to widen their sphere of influence.

The analysis of family, kin and social networks, and various kinds of Turkish
organisations has clearly shown that the politics of ethnicity, identity and religion
have centred around the reproduction of traditional social and cultural values
within the British context where the Turkish identity was perceived to be
threatened. Therefore, despite the diversity of attitudes towards Turkish culture
and differences in the strategies of institutionalisation, the elements of Turkish
identity was and still is reproduced in order to preserve and transmit these
values to the young generation. However, young Turks were and still are
exposed to contextual social and cultural forces which are different from and
often conflicting with the parental values. This situation is producing tension
between parents and young generation who appear to be adopting some
attitudes and values of the British society. This means that the young generation
is developing a somewhat different identity from that of their parents.
Nevertheless, the emergent identity construction among young Turks still carries
the imprint of Turkish tradition and culture but increasingly in the form of
symbolic attachments. It appears that this trend among the young generation will
continue as the Turkish ethnicity and national identity are not fixed categories,
rather they are undoubtedly imagined, but equally felt, known and lived.
1- For a numerical analysis of Muslims in Europe see Peach, C. and Glebe, G. (1995) 'Muslim minorities in Western Europe' Ethnic and Racial Studies, 18: 26-45. For the number of Muslims and their ethnic/national origins see Anwar (1993).
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Glossary

Akraba Relative, kin
Akrabalik Relatedness
Arkadaslik Friendship
Ayet Qur’anic Verse
Bayram Namazi Prayer, marking the end of Ramazan
Camı Mosque
Cuma Namazi Friday Prayer
Cemaat (Jama’a) Congregation, follower
Dua Prayer
Dugun Wedding
Farz Obligatory
Hajj Annual pilgrimage to Mecca
Hoca The leader in prayer
Hutbe Religious sermon
Imam The leader in prayer
Iftar Dinner, ending the fast in Ramazan
Islam Submission to God
Kurban Sacrifice, slaughter
Kurban Bayrami The greater festival, commemorating the Abraham’s sacrifice by the slaughter of a sheep
Komsuluk Neighbourhood
Medrese Centre of Islamic learning
Mevlut Prophet’s birthday celebration
Mesjid Mosque
Murid A Sufi disciple
Mursid A Sufi spiritual guide
Namaz Prayer
Namus Honour
Nisan Engagement
Oruc Fasting
Ramazan The ninth month of the Islamic calendar. The month of fasting
Ramazan Bayrami  The lesser festival, celebrating the end of Ramazan. A time of feasting, gift-giving and unity

Seriat (Sharia) Islamic Law
Sheikh  Sufi master
Sufi  Muslim mystic
Sunnet  Circumcision
Sure  Section of the Qur’an
Tarikat  Mystical Order
Tekke  Sufi lodge

Ummet (Umma) Muslim Nation
Zaviye  Sufi lodge
Zikr  ‘Remembrance’. Sufi discipline involving recitation of the names and Attributes of God
Appendix

Questionnaire used in the survey
Dear Friend,

I am doing a research on different aspects of Turkish Community living in Britain. The main purpose of my research is to understand the structure of Turkish Community and to identify social, cultural and political problems it encounters in British society.

This questionnaire was designed to gather relevant information for a scholarly analysis of Turkish Community in Britain. Your answers will be strictly confidential and will not be used for any other purpose. You don't have to write your name on the form.

You are asked to answer all the questions sincerely. Please try to answer all the questions without consulting others. Tick your choice which describes your idea best. Reliability of our research depends on sincerity.

Thank you very much for your co-operation and help.

Talip KUCUKCAN
Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
PART I
Please answer all the questions

1. Where is your birth place?
   1( ) Turkey  2( ) Cyprus  3( ) England

2. Are you male or female?
   1( ) Male  2( ) Female

3. How old are you?
   ..... 

4. What is your marital status?
   1( ) Single  2( ) Married  3( ) Divorced  4( ) Widow

5. How long have you been living in England?
   ..... 

6. Where do your parents come from? 
   Mother  Father
   1( ) Turkey 
   2( ) Cyprus 
   3( ) Other (please explain) ..................................................

7. Where do you live?
   1( ) Owned flat/house 
   2( ) Rented flat/house 
   3( ) Council accommodation 
   4( ) Other (please specify) .............

8. How much is overall weekly income of your family?
   1( ) less than 200 pounds 
   2( ) 200-300 pounds 
   3( ) 300-400 pounds 
   4( ) 400-500 pounds 
   5( ) more than 500 pounds

9. Education: (please tick the appropriate one)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Spouse</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Mother</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. School till 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. School till 18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. College/University 18+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Postgraduate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. No formal education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. Employment-Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Spouse</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Mother</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Still student</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Working (state job)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Housewife</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Retired</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. With whom are living currently?
1( ) Alone
2( ) With my spouse
3( ) With my girl/boy friend
4( ) With my family
5( ) With my college friends
6( ) Other (please specify) .................................................................

12. If you are living with your family do you want to live on your own?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
Please give reasons for your choice .................................................................

13. How often do you visit Turkey/Cyprus?

................

14. Where do you feel happier and at home, in England or in Turkey/Cyprus?
1( ) In England
2( ) In my homeland
3( ) It doesn't make any difference
Please give reasons for your choice ........................................................................

15. Do you think that Turkish traditions and values should be preserved while living in England?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
Why? .......................................................................................................................

16. In which of the following languages are you fluent?
1( ) English
2( ) Turkish
3( ) Both
4( ) None

17. Which languages do you speak at home?
1( ) Only English
2( ) Only Turkish
3( ) English and Turkish
18. Which language do you prefer in your daily conversations with your family and Turkish friends?
1( ) English
2( ) Turkish
Why? ........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................

19. If you are single will you be willing to marry the following

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>May be</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Non-Turk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Non-Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. Would you be happy to see your child(ren) to marry the following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>May be</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Non-Turk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Non-Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Which of the followings are important in the person you marry(ed)? (You can tick more than one)
1( ) Rich
2( ) Famous
3( ) Educated/Intellectual
4( ) Religious
5( ) Honest
6( ) Open-minded
7( ) Good-looking
8( ) Caring
9( ) Attractive
10( ) Turkish

22. Do you approve of birth control?
1( ) Normally yes
2( ) Normally no
3( ) Under some circumstances
Please give reasons ..............................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................

23. Do you approve of pre-marital male-female social meetings?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
3( ) I have no idea
Please give reasons ..............................................................................................................

24. Do you approve of pre-marital sexual relationship?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
Please give reasons ..............................................................................................................
25. If you are single do you have a boy/girl friend?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No

26. Do you think that your parents will approve of your having a girl/boy friend if they know?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
Why?.............................................................

27. Do you think that your parents' control on your life is too much?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No

28. If your answer is 'yes' why do you think they are trying to control your behaviour? (please explain) ...........................................................................................................
.................................................................

29. Do you sometimes have disagreements with your parents?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No

30. If your answer yes can you please explain over what kind of issues you disagree with your parents?.................................................................................................
................................................................................

31. Are your friends mostly Turks, English or other minorities?
1( ) Turks
2( ) English
3( ) Other ethnic minorities (please specify)........................................................................................................

32. What do you have in common with your friends?
Please state...........................................................................................................................................

33. Do you have difficulties in making friends of non-Turks?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
If yes, what kind of difficulties?..............................................................................................................

34. What do you usually do with your friends?
1( ) We study together
2( ) We go to pubs/discos
3( ) We do sports
4( ) Other (please specify).................................
35. Who do you identify yourself most?
1( ) Famous player  
2( ) Famous musician  
3( ) Mother  
4( ) Father  
5( ) Elder brother/sister  
6( ) Movie/TV star  
7( ) Political leader  
8( ) Religious leader  
9( ) Myself  
10( ) Other........

Please give reasons for your choice........................................

36. Why do you identify yourself with someone and try to imitate his/her behaviour?
1( ) For their ideas  
2( ) For their jobs and status  
3( ) For they have a stable life and a philosophy of life  
4( ) For I feel that we have some ideals and values in common  
5( ) Other (please explain)......................................................

37. How do you usually spend your free time?
1( ) I read books, magazines, journals etc.  
2( ) I watch TV or go to cinema  
3( ) I do sport or go to see a game  
4( ) I go to pubs, bars and discos  
5( ) Other (please explain)......................................................

38. How often do you go to pubs, bars and discos?
1( ) Regularly  
2( ) Occasionally  
3( ) Never  

Please give reasons........................................................................

39. How do you spend your Christmas time?
1( ) By giving parties at home  
2( ) By going out to clubs and pubs etc.  
3( ) I rest during Christmas  
4( ) I don't care about Christmas and carry on my daily work  
5( ) Other (please explain)......................................................

40. How do yo feel during Christmas and what do you usually do?
....................................................................................................

....................................................................................................

5
PART II
Please answer all the questions

1. Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing what you believe about God?
   1( ) I absolutely believe in God
   2( ) Although I have some doubts, I feel that I believe in God
   3( ) I don't believe in God
   2( ) I have no concern about belief in God

2. Which of the following factors played most effective role on your decision about belief or disbelief in God?
   1( ) My family members
   2( ) Books that I have read
   3( ) My tutors
   4( ) Some friends
   5( ) Attitudes and behaviours of some religious persons
   6( ) A private experience (please explain)

3. Which of the following statements best expresses your idea of prayer (dua)?
   1( ) I believe that the prayer is beneficial
   2( ) I don't believe that the prayer is beneficial
   3( ) I have no idea

4. Which of the following statements most clearly describes your emotional state during prayer?
   1( ) I feel relaxation and tranquillity while praying
   2( ) I feel much nearer to God while praying
   3( ) I don't feel any difference while praying

5. Why do you pray?
   1( ) I pray to be happy in the hereafter
   2( ) I pray because I want my worldly affairs be realized
   3( ) I pray for happiness in both this world and in hereafter
   4( ) Other (please explain)

6. Have you ever had a response to your prayer?
   1( ) No
   2( ) Yes (please explain)

7. How do you feel during religious ceremonies such as mevlid?
   1( ) I feel happy
   2( ) I feel very bored want it finish soon
   3( ) I don't have any interest in such religious ceremonies
   4( ) I don't like these ceremonies and don't participate
8. What do you usually do during Kandil days?
1( ) I pray during these days
2( ) I have no interest in Kandil days
3( ) I usually don't remember Kandil days in this country
4( ) Other (please explain)

9. What is your idea about performing prayers like Namaz and Oruc
1( ) I find it very difficult to perform prayers
2( ) I can not pray because I don't know how to pray
3( ) I don't pray to avoid criticism from my environment
4( ) Other (please explain)

10. How often do you perform the following religious duties?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily prayers (Namaz)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuma and Bayram Prayers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fasting (Oruc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer (Dua)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. If you are performing your prayers why are you doing all these prayers?
1( ) In order to go to heaven in hereafter
2( ) In order to fulfil my duties towards God
3( ) In order that my work succeeds
4( ) Since I got used to doing it
5( ) To avoid criticism from my social environment

12. Have you ever looked at the Kur'an and tried to read its translation?
1( ) I read all the Kur'an
2( ) I read some parts of Kur'an
3( ) I tried to read but I gave up since I couldn't understand
4( ) I have never read it

13. How often do you listen to the religious cermons/preaching?
1( ) Very often
2( ) Seldom
3( ) Never
Please give reasons

14. Have you ever had religious education so far?
1( ) I went to mosque to learn from Imam
2( ) I had a private religious education
3( ) I did not have any religious education
4( ) Only my parents taught me religion
5( ) Other (please explain)
15. Would you like your children to have good Islamic religious education?
   1( ) Yes
   2( ) No
   3( ) I am not sure
   Please give reasons.........................................................................................

16. Cuma prayer is obligatory (farz) for every Muslim regardless of age and gender
   1( ) True
   2( ) False
   3( ) I don’t know

17. The holy book Kur'an consists of ayet and sure
   1( ) True
   2( ) False
   3( ) I don’t know

18. Alcohol, gambling, interest, witchcraft and eating pork are regarded as sins in Islam.
   1( ) True
   2( ) False
   3( ) I don’t know

19. According to you:
   1( ) Everybody is on the wrong path except Muslims
   2( ) Non-Muslims will go to hell
   3( ) God might forgive everybody
   4( ) Anyone who believe in God and perform good deeds for mankind will go to heaven regardless of their religion
   5( ) Other (please explain)..............................................................................

20. Please write down five pillars (Islamin sartlari) of Islam:
   1. ......................
   2. ......................
   3. ......................
   4. ......................
   5. ......................

Please write your comments here about this research and questionnaire:
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
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............................................................................................................................