COMPANIES OF CLOUDS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTILATERAL CULTURAL COOPERATION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

JOY PARRY B.A., M.A. (WALES)

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D
UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CULTURAL POLICY,
DEPARTMENT OF THEATRE STUDIES
APRIL 2000
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter One:</strong> Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Two:</strong> Cultural diplomacy up to World War I</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Three:</strong> The growth of bilateral cultural relations 1914-1929</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Four:</strong> The League of Nations – the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Five:</strong> Developments in cultural cooperation after World War II – (I) UNESCO</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Six:</strong> Developments in cultural cooperation after World War II – (II) European international systems after 1945</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Seven:</strong> The Council of Europe – background and structure</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Eight:</strong> Cultural cooperation in the Council of Europe – the CDCC and its programme</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Nine:</strong> Types and changes in cultural cooperation in the Council of Europe</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Ten:</strong> Cultural cooperation in the European Community</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong></td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annexes:</strong> Chronology; European Cultural Convention; Article 151 of Treaty of Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY

COMPANIES OF CLOUDS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTILATERAL CULTURAL COOPERATION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.

This thesis traces the development of styles and theories of cultural cooperation from the pre-World War II models developed by France and Britain in particular, through the post-WWII international cooperation structures which included cultural cooperation as part of their structures. Organisations considered include the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, the Council of Europe and the European Union, focusing primarily on the non-educational or scientific aspects of cultural cooperation. Sources used include documentation of the two latter bodies and the public records of the UK Foreign Office and Ministry of Education.

Intellectual cooperation was launched under the auspices of the League of Nations as a separate entity from the bilateral cultural relations of governments. Its tradition continues to be powerfully felt in the activity of the Council of Europe, after WWII the fulcrum of multilateral cultural cooperation. The thesis shows how it moved away from acting as a counterpoint to political developments towards the creation of a programme based on sociological study, which contained a strong element of federalist ideology, developing its own orthodoxy of "cultural policy", until partly "repossessed" in the 1990s by political imperatives.

The contrast with the tightly regulated European Union is marked, and shows in certain respects a return to earlier experiments in cultural cooperation, which developed most of its theory and practice in the pre-1992 era when the Community Treaty did not provide for action in the field of culture. The thesis argues that the EU's cultural programme is not a manifestation of a "Europeanisation" of cultural policy, although policies elsewhere in the organisation may well have that effect, but of multilateral cultural cooperation.
COMPANIES OF CLOUDS:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTILATERAL CULTURAL COOPERATION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

"...la compagnie internationale des nuages...." (Gonzague de Reynold, referring to the more idealistic members of the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, Mes Memoires, 1963).

"...il venait ... en Europe ... comme à la source de la plus haute activité spirituelle; ce qu'il cherchait en Europe, c'est la beauté que créent les hommes dans la mesure et l'harmonie...." (Julien Luchaire, of a Latin American member of the ICIC, Confession d'un françois moyen, 1965)

".....to vote large budgets and then quickly adjourn to leave the secretariat unhampered in its pursuit of such objectives as the compilation of an international catalog of recorded music or the investigation of 'how the artist lives'" (Inis L. Claude, on the role of governments as seen by international organisations, Swords into Plowshares, 1965)

"...pour sauver, en face de la terre des masses et de la terre des machines....une Europe qui demeure la terre des hommes...." (Jacques Freymond, on the task of intellectuals in Europe after WWII as seen by Denis de Rougemont, Denis de Rougemont, L'imagination et le courage au service d'un vocation, 1995)

".....its belief in the power of words....aggravated by a return to a sociological dialectic founded on a vision of the world in total contradiction to the ideas that stimulated politicians in most member states." (view of unnamed delegate to the Council of Europe as to what constituted the Council of Cultural Cooperation's major failing, 1982)

"Culture.... Is but a diffracting prism of the religious sense upon those activities of ours called creative...." (Denis de Rougemont, Man's Western Quest: the Principles of Civilization, trans. Montgomery Belgion, 1957)

"I hate the Intellectual Cooperation" (de Reynold, op. cit., attributed to an Irish secretary in the League of Nations).
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Cultural cooperation is an "assumed" feature of international relations, not very important in itself, a footnote in the study of pre-war and post-war Europe, oil for the wheels which turn to produce more important things. If asked what European cultural cooperation was about, most people would probably mention pupil exchanges and town twinnings, two widely familiar and popular activities intended to provide ordinary citizens with a taste of the daily life of other countries and to create transnational friendships.

Such activity is in practice only one part of what is undertaken as "cultural cooperation" and in fact has almost nothing to do with the cultural cooperation undertaken between governments either bilaterally or through the international institutions which exist to encourage and support this kind of cooperation. Furthermore, the range and purpose of the activity carried out is so diverse and so difficult to agree on that it calls into question whether this "low-level policy" is as straightforward as it is assumed to be.

This thesis attempts to establish what happens in cultural cooperation: to identify its relationship to diplomacy and international relations on the one hand and to the cultural polices formulated and practised by European states on the other. What is cultural cooperation for, and why do governments agree to spend money on it? If it is so emollient why is it so difficult to make it work effectively? What role does it fill as
public policy? Is it supposed to encourage a sense of common ownership in the
project of European integration, and if so is it really well suited for this task? Or is it
linked to fears about loss of national diversity in the face of Europeanisation or
Americanisation? Is there such a thing as a "European cultural policy" and is cultural
cooperation a stage towards creating it? Or is it a reflection of competing notions of
cultural policy within Europe?

The method chosen to try and arrive at some answers to these questions is to follow
and analyse the century's efforts to create a multilateral cultural cooperation through
formal institutions which require, normally, governmental participation and thus a
level of political engagement which will help to determine what value is placed on the
process and its results. The value for an artist in experiencing other cultures or making
connections with artists from other cultures is reasonably evident; the value for a
national administration in investing public money in that artist's experience less so.

It should also be noted that "cultural cooperation" is not simply about the "high arts".
Indeed, nothing is more frequently emphasised than that "culture" is about as fluid a
category of public policy as it is possible to find (the lines are far less clearly drawn
than in "health", "employment" or "defence", for example). Much ink has been
expended on trying to draw up a workable definition of culture, but no-one has ever
succeeded in producing one that everybody accepts. What is clear, however, is that in
terms of intergovernmental cooperation, the fields covered by the term tend to define
themselves. No government or international body can seriously claim to have policy
responsibility for the spiritual dimension of mankind. What takes place within cultural
cooperation is mostly a generally worded commitment in a founding statute to
promote, respect or otherwise have concern for "culture", "cultures" and/or "the common heritage".

The ways in which this obligation is to be fulfilled are left wide open. The methods vary; the subject matter quickly refines itself down to a few specific areas of public policy in which most, if not all, governments have an interest and are authorised to intervene. The subject matter of culture may be as broad as you will; the subject matter of cultural cooperation is not defined by theoretical considerations but by what is introduced onto the agenda. It can be summarised, despite regular protestations to the contrary, as, on the one hand, what concerns the wellbeing of the international intelligentsia\(^1\) and, on the other, the "matter" of Europe's past and present as it is reflected back to the populace. Cultural cooperation invites its participants to consider themselves and their society within a context of political change. In its more dynamic manifestations it attempts to influence the direction of that change.

The area covered by cultural cooperation is, broadly, education, both statutory and extra-statutory (e.g. adult education); the visual and performing arts; the built and moveable heritage; the media (mostly film, broadcasting and publishing, though there has been sporadic interest in the press); exchange and language teaching; and copyright. To this we should add a sub-set which is not normally thought of as part of public policy, but which nevertheless is a significant element in cultural cooperation in its own right: intellectual contact between individuals and groups. Finally, science, sport and youth are all policy fields which at various times have been considered part

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\(^1\)the constituency of cultural cooperation is likewise ill-defined, and ranges from the scientists and academics of pre-World War II intellectual cooperation to the "cultural workers" espoused by the European Commission and Parliament meaning all those with jobs connected to the "culture industries"
of cultural cooperation, though by no means consistently. These are treated as mostly outside the scope of the present study.

The term "cultural cooperation" nearly always includes cooperation in the field of education. This thesis cannot avoid discussion of the education component, if only for purposes of comparison, but in general it focuses as far as possible on "pure" culture – that part which most closely affects what in the UK has generally been called "arts policy". This is partly in order to keep the subject matter manageable but also in order to relate it to a single domestic policy field. Nevertheless, it is impossible to restrict an examination of cultural cooperation to this "soft policy" core, since it is constantly affected by the "hard policy" which surrounds its dissemination: audiovisual policy, publishing policy, copyright policy.

However, there are at least four other reasons for concentrating on this side of cooperation. One is its political ambiguity: there is no consensus about what the state's job is in relation to culture and therefore cultural cooperation is free to devise and follow its own agenda to a very considerable degree. Secondly, it lacks technical requirements in a way that is not true of education or even of heritage management. The artist is not central to the cultural agenda in the way that the educator is central to the educational agenda or the conservation technician to the heritage agenda. Culture's technical sector is hard to pin down and consult. Thirdly, culture has special resonance in the context of the European project: it is seen as in a sense embodying what is particular about Europe. In some readings, as we shall see, it is presented as the central issue of a European identity. Finally, there is simple expediency: "culture committees" feature in most manifestations of cultural cooperation and their agendas
show a surprising consistency down the years, making it possible to follow how they attempt to make sense of the (usually extremely imprecise) brief they are given.

The symbiosis of education and culture within cultural cooperation is traceable to its roots in bilateral "cultural diplomacy". The thesis begins with a consideration of the development of this form of foreign policy. It then goes on to look at the major pre-World War II manifestations of multilateral cultural cooperation in the form of the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, carried out under the auspices of the League of Nations. After an examination of post-war ideas of cultural cooperation via UNESCO and the Brussels Treaty Organisation, it will consider the two primary organisations concerned with this in western Europe since the war: the Council of Europe and the European Union. The thesis does not attempt to cover developments in eastern Europe prior to the resumption of democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

It will be argued in this thesis that cultural cooperation is not a constant which can easily be identified and labelled, but a series of continuous reinventions resulting from changing sets of political circumstances and the interacting priorities of, mainly, the governments who take part in it. Despite its apparent role as a contribution to mutual understanding, its capacity for generating conflict and mutual mistrust is striking. It argues for unity, yet nearly always displays a divided nature. Its attempts to argue instead for diversity, however, become thwarted by the unsuitability of its mechanics for this and its lack of an underlying consensus. Because of the extent to which cultural cooperation is not state-dictated, despite being negotiated formally at that level, it has an oppositional quality which can be traced throughout its history, in
which different aspects dominate at different times, hence the importance of a chronological approach. It often provides a commentary: upon European identity, upon the policies of the different governments, ultimately on the success or failure of the European integration project.

The term "policy" needs some definition. This thesis finds that the view, formulated by Karl Deutsch, that "politics is based on the interplay of habits of cooperation as modified by threats" is a reasonable description of the process it observes, while policy is "an explicit set of preferences and plans drawn up in order to make the outcomes of series of future decisions more nearly predictable and consistent"\textsuperscript{2}. In other words, policies are not themselves a matter of applying principle (or fundamental truths), though they may be designed to encourage or discourage certain values, but are predicated on instruments of management.

\textbf{Literature and methodology}

Cultural cooperation’s literature is both thin and fragmentary. It consists largely of the output of the international organisations themselves, often in the form of explanation, interpretation or justification. It has not acquired a theoretical literature in which different commentators discuss and evaluate it, though "European cultural policy" is beginning to develop a literature of sorts, sometimes based on the experience of international organisations. Cultural diplomacy has a more substantial corpus to draw upon, although this too is often in the form of memoir or presentation from practitioners or former practitioners.

It has a secondary literature, however, in the form of related theories which impinge upon it. Of these, works of pure cultural theory\textsuperscript{3} are not as helpful as may be supposed in relation to cultural cooperation. Cultural critics comment on the nature of culture within society and to a certain extent on its management as a field of public policy. This tends to form part of the intellectual consensus of the day, rather than to inspire the process of policy formulation directly. This thesis is less concerned with how particular interpretations of culture find their way into public policy than with the relationship of governments’ policies to the ideas about culture held by "internationalist" idealists, even though the two may overlap.

The thesis does, however, find a useful framework within international relations theory, which provides the "missing" typology, relevant to the actions of these particular protagonists as well as describing the context within which cultural cooperation operates. It should be emphasised that in most of the more general discussions of international relations theory, cultural cooperation barely features. In general they provide background and context rather than theories which can be tested. Exceptions to this are the work of Chris Brown, from whom I have borrowed two key concepts, those of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, which provide a satisfying framework in which to locate cultural cooperation; and, more generally, that of James Der Derian.

\textsuperscript{3} by which is meant the analysis of cultural phenomena generally called "cultural studies". The academic framework provided by this discipline, though sometimes invoked as background, is not the basis by which decisions in cultural cooperation are reached. This is not to suggest that public policy occurs in a vacuum, simply to point out that in this respect cultural cooperation reflects the times, rather than attempts to interpret them.
Two related (though rarely overlapping) literatures, that of nationalism, such as that of Benedict Anderson and Anthony D. Smith, and that of European integration have also been consulted. A particularly valuable source is the literature of federalism, particularly that of the Swiss "personalist" Denis de Rougemont⁴, who, though only tangentially involved in the work of intergovernmental cultural cooperation, is a strong invisible presence in its story.

My primary source material throughout has been the publications and, where publicly accessible, meeting papers of the main cultural cooperation bodies. I have also drawn on the available files of the UK Foreign Office and Ministry of Education, which contain internal minutes relating to national attitudes to cultural cooperation as well as background detail about motivations and decision-making. The argument thus makes much use of official statements and positions, which often require some deconstruction. To analyse these I have drawn on my direct involvement as a civil servant and national negotiator, although it should be noted that in doing so I have had to observe rules of government confidentiality. Accordingly, nothing in this thesis is directly based on material or knowledge which is not normally accessible to researchers. Since it is my contention that, to a considerable degree, the programmes and philosophies of cultural cooperation are shaped not by abstract theory but by the political and other conditions in which they were formulated, I have considered it necessary to devote a good deal of space to historical narrative and the analysis of particular paths taken.

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⁴ De Rougemont, as will be explained in Chapter Six, was prominent in situating a strong cultural component in the federalist congress of 1948 which led to the setting up of the Council of Europe and subsequently established a European Cultural Centre to promote his ideas. Alongside such federalist luminaries as Henri Brugmans, he wrote copiously on the history and destiny of Europe
Multilateral cultural cooperation is greatly affected by the interaction between "realist" and "idealist" approaches to international relations. Attention is therefore paid to analysing motives, with a bias towards pragmatic rather than theory-based explanations of developments. My aim is not to advocate a "philosophy of cultural cooperation" or indeed to elaborate a "theory" but to demonstrate how cultural cooperation tailors its responses to shifting patterns in the political as well as the social landscape. It is central to my argument that cultural cooperation is the product not merely of the preoccupations of national policy-makers but also of the relationship between the different institutional players themselves. In many cases this involves a triangular structure consisting of governments: secretariats: parliamentarians. Where appropriate, therefore, attention is paid to the way in which these mechanisms are structured and how they interact, since it is often this interaction which explains the decisions taken, at least as much as the intrinsic merits of the action proposed. I have not attempted to evaluate cultural cooperation's impact: as should become clear, this is a task impossible to carry out in the absence of serious attempts at evaluation by the organisations and member states themselves.

Cultural cooperation and cultural policy

While cultural cooperation is clearly linked closely to both cultural diplomacy and cultural policy, it is a subset of neither. The often contending duality of ideology which it embodies is inadequately conveyed by the international relations terms

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5 see S. Smith, "The Self-images of a Discipline: a Genealogy of International Relations Theory", in K. Booth and S. Smith, eds., "International Relations Theory Today", Polity Press, 1995. The terms are used to describe approaches to international relations based on progressive thinking associated with the 1920s and 1930s - the time of "intellectual cooperation" - and on conservative ideas of the 1940s and 1950s which were a reaction to them. The "social scientific" thinking of the 1970s - exemplified in the Council of Europe's cultural programme - rejected both
"realist" and "idealist" (hence the preference for Chris Brown's subtler and less judgmental terms "cosmopolitan" and "communitarian"). The conflict can also be seen as between expedient and intellectual approaches (it is not usually appropriate to see cultural cooperation in terms of solutions to problems, as will be seen); between federalist and integrationist views of Europe; between personalist and individualist views of society; even, at its most fundamental, as a conflict between the spiritual and the temporal, an idea which begins with the notion of a "League of Minds" as counterpart to the League of Nations.

It follows from this that cultural cooperation is unlikely to function effectively in the ways traditionally expected of international cooperation: either as low-level support to ease the passage of other policies considered more significant by the various protagonists; or as a functionalist method of effecting the transfer of popular loyalty away from the national level towards the supranational; or even as a way of institutionalising the place of the artist and the intellectual within the European polity. Furthermore, unlike most forms of cooperation, it often does not represent the interaction at intergovernmental level of clearly understood and accepted national policy interests.

To a considerable extent, cultural cooperation writes its own scripts. The reason is partly to be found in its (theoretically) non-governmental origins, but also in the

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6 functionalism is the idea, common in international relations literature and particularly that of the European Community, that international organisations will take over from nation states technical functions which they can deliver better because they meet the function better, and which in due course will establish themselves in the public mind as a more effective source of government than that provided at national level

7 see Chapter Four for the role of the French government in the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation.
divergence of views held by different European national administrations about the
extent to which the state intervenes in cultural questions. This ranges from a highly
dirigiste approach in France in which cultural policy is sometimes presented as a
central plank of government policy across the whole sphere of public life; through a
precisely demarcated split of functions in the former Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) between the national federal government and the Länder; to a fragmented
approach to cultural policy in the UK at government level which remained until the
1990s to the extent that a Minister for the Arts could disclaim the existence of any
cultural policies.8

Over the years, and particularly within the Council of Europe, cultural cooperation
has developed an approach to cultural policy itself which tries to make sense at a
European level of the different sets of preferences and plans (in Deutsch's terms)
favoured by its member states and to steer them in the direction of consistent
decisions based on a common goal. It is this in particular that has led to discussion of
cultural cooperation as if it were the basis for a "European cultural policy". However,
this thesis hopes to show that the approach is both a relatively recent one and is far
from being the unchallenged and accepted aim of European cultural cooperation.

Some themes found in cultural cooperation

Cultural cooperation is a hybrid, combining an independent tradition (intellectual
cooperation), which is not simply non-governmental but anti-governmental, with a
system (cultural diplomacy) based on straightforward national self-interest. It is this

8 report of the ad-hoc conference of European Ministers with responsibility for cultural affairs, p.39.
Council of Europe, Oslo, 1976.
which gives it its curious duality and internal tension. Cultural diplomacy, examined in the following chapter, is based on the idea that national policy is served and advanced by the active promotion of a nation's culture abroad. Seen as cultural relations, it still forms the bedrock of international cultural interchange and has not been supplanted, either in terms of investment or political importance, by multilateral cultural cooperation.

Within cultural diplomacy some central issues – national identity, language, the chosen self-image to be displayed to potential political and trading partners – can be accommodated without difficulty. Its relationship to cultural cooperation, within which these things have to be set aside or overridden, is ambiguous. Nevertheless, it is from cultural diplomacy that some enduring themes of cultural cooperation derive: notions of "rayonnement"\(^9\), the idea that a particular (national) culture can extend an influence that is both self-serving and morally improving to the recipient; the importance attached to manifestations of high art as a symbol of unity as well as prosperity; the idea that opinion-formers and future élites should travel and experience (favourably) each other's cultures.

Cultural relations, though a term appropriated by governments to provide a positive gloss on "official level" exchange\(^10\), is of course not exclusive to them. Intellectual contact has its own status and input, which converged with that of governments

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\(^9\) this term, borrowed from French cultural diplomacy, has recently reappeared in the literature of the European Commission. It is used here because of its evocative quality as an image of Europe, which is not conveyed by English translations such as "influence"

\(^10\) see Chapter 1 of J. M. Mitchell, "International Cultural Relations", British Council, 1986, for a discussion of the importance attached to the term "relations" as opposed to "diplomacy"
during the life-span of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) under the auspices of the League of Nations, continued briefly in the General Assemblies of UNESCO, then dissipated into the national committees of that body. It reconstitutes itself as a force after 1968 in the form of expert groups advising the Council of Europe (to use Chris Brown's term, "epistemic communities") and expands into the "cultural networks" of the 1980s and 1990s.

Intellectual cooperation in its turn supplies some key themes of its own: the social security, employment and remuneration of artists; copyright and "droit de suite"; cross-frontier collaboration on joint projects; the idea of organisation at the working level for artists and others involved in cultural activity; professional training. To intellectual cooperation too might be attributed the idea that cultural cooperation should concern itself with the impact of industrialisation and globalisation upon the cultural good of the population, a theme which runs from pre-war concern about the taste of the masses through the Council of Europe and UNESCO's sociologically-based programmes endorsing cultural "animation" policies to the attempt to obtain a "cultural exception" in the GATT negotiations between the EU and the USA.

Bound up with intellectual cooperation is a thread of symbolic association of Europe with the cultural tradition of western man. This is perhaps most clearly expressed in Paul Valéry's idea of the "cultural capital"\(^\text{11}\) possessed by Europe, which he introduced to cultural cooperation through his work with the ICIC's Arts and Letters Committee, but which was taken up by the federalist movement and Denis de

Rougemont in particular. This strand of thinking, although it had its high-water mark at the Hague Congress of 1948, continues throughout much of cultural cooperation, particularly by way of the parliamentary assemblies, and manifests in a general argument for culture to be regarded, not as low-level policy but as in some unspecified way central to European integration. There is a subtext in much of this which is about the place of intellectuals themselves as "unacknowledged legislators of the world", in the phrase of Shelley which neatly associates cultural cooperation with the Romantic movement.

European federalism itself provides another theme of cultural cooperation. It will be argued that whereas the integrationist approach embodied by Jean Monnet discarded much of federalism, many of its elements – the insistence on diversity, the championing of regionalism, the emphasis on community values and on networks of people co-operating on shared projects – emerge in what is offered, especially by the Council of Europe, as the "European" vision of what cultural policy ought to be. If federalism has been defeated politically, it lives on in the values of cultural cooperation.

Conversely, this communitarian vision may conceal contending national political visions. From the earliest days of the ICIC, cultural cooperation has reflected a struggle for leadership based on different visions of how cooperation should be conducted, on the role of culture itself in European policy-making and on the degree to which "European" priorities should override national ones. It would be disingenuous to deny the part played by language issues, initially in perpetuating the dominant status of French, latterly in diminishing the impact of the dominant status of English (and leading to the fiercely fought issue of regulating the cultural industries,
especially television). The pivotal role played by France in cultural cooperation is impossible to miss; but there are also subsidiary "national" themes at work, including the diplomacy-centred view of the UK and Germany, the well-timed interventions of the Nordic countries, the support of the Netherlands for supranational rather than intergovernmental techniques and the role played by the French Community of Belgium as, almost, a surrogate for France and a driving force towards an attempted "Europeanisation" of cultural policy.

Finally, attention should be paid to the insistence often found within cultural cooperation on the special nature of the enterprise — all-pervasive, at once commonplace and numinous, culture, it is sometimes asserted, cannot be subject to the rules that govern the rest of intergovernmental activity. The word is, as Raymond Williams notes, notoriously difficult, and not without associations of hostility (some of which percolates into the way the UK, in particular, has prioritised cultural cooperation). The sense in which cultural cooperation carries about it an aura of peculiarity is hard to pin down, whether via the almost priest-like assumptions made by intellectuals, or the belief that the task of cultural cooperation is to identify and codify sets of values which are somehow specially "European", or the arguments which seek to exclude certain areas of activity, both industrial and individually "creative", from the normal rigours of life in a market-led economy.

This thesis tries to identify this thread of "resistance" through the influence and thought of a small number of individuals who provide an ideological subtext to the development of cultural cooperation which also acts as a counterpoint to the

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12 R. Williams, "Keywords", Fontana, 1976: pp. 87-93, "Culture"
interactions on the political level of national and institutional interests. A focal point will be suggested in the ideas of Henri Bergson, whose theories of creative evolution were popular at the turn of the century as a way of handling the intellectual conflicts between Enlightenment and Romantic attitudes to culture, and in particular the French and German versions of these. Bergson has been credited with the idea for the ICIC, and was its first chairman.

Some of "Bergsonism" later found its way into the quasi-religious "personalist" movement which was influential in France before and after WWII, and which, associated with the politics of the French Resistance, subsequently influenced federalism. Bergson's influence will be explored in the context of the ICIC, but his thinking, often attacked as anti-intellectual and irrational, has something to offer to account for the persistently non-practical strand in cultural cooperation which favours rhetoric over achievement, champions the alternative, and hankers after the grail of "fostering creativity" in preference to the less challenging but more achievement-oriented activity of facilitating exchanges and financing tours. A particular example of this is the Council of Europe's attempts to promote "cultural democracy" and a "Cultural Charter".

13 by Gilbert Murray: see "An Unfinished Autobiography" and other texts
Culture and Europe

Why associate European integration so closely with European culture? It is worth beginning with a survey of the ways in which this linkage is traditionally made. "The cultural dimension" is assumed to be a unifying factor, evoking common imagery and positive feelings\(^{14}\). The imagery of European culture, however, suggests a more complex set of associations. It contains a strong element of fear, of a common enemy, the "barbarian at the gate". It also contains the powerful image of the community of the learned, for whom part of the attraction of European integration is that it bolsters their "special role".

Appeals to Europe's culture as the raison d'etre of European unity were fairly commonplace in the first half of the century even before WWI and certainly after it, including in the burgeoning literature of European federalism. French writers and intellectuals seem to have engaged more directly with the notion of European culture\(^{15}\) whereas their British counterparts\(^{16}\) have preferred to comment, often at one remove, on notions of world government or institutional reform, or for purposes of comparison.

Articulations of European cultural identity as well as those of national cultural identity find their source in Rousseau and Montesquieu\(^{17}\). Such images were in part a reaction to theories elevating national culture which these writers and others (Herder,

\(^{14}\) it is consistently used this way in political texts of European organisations and throughout the literature of integration

\(^{15}\) examples include Julien Benda, Jules Romains and Paul Valéry

\(^{16}\) for example, Leonard Woolf

\(^{17}\) see the discussion of the federalist idea in these authors in Elazar (1987) and of their ideas of nationhood in Llobera (1994) and elsewhere
Fichte) had already made a commonplace, including the association of shared language with shared society, and which had already become distorted by politico-cultural extremism in both France and Germany - hence the need to imagine “Europe-ness”. The imagery may sometimes be transferred from one to the other with little amendment: for example, Denis de Rougemont approvingly quotes Hoffmannsthal, “a great man or a great achievement becomes European...Where a great idea is conceived, there is Europe” \(^\text{18}\). This in fact echoes a comment of Victor Hugo made about France\(^\text{19}\).

Probably the most consistently invoked image of Europe is that of “les trois sources”: Greece, Rome and the Christian church. Denis de Rougemont and others attribute this formulation to Paul Valéry - an emphatically western and Christianised vision which embraces the espousal of democratic institutions, the love of order and the idea of the sanctity of the rights of the individual which is held up as uniquely European. De Rougemont encapsulates this in a metaphor of the town square: “shared spiritual values, the rule of law, the tacit respect accorded by all citizens to public institutions...a balanced mass of interacting tensions” \(^\text{20}\).

This staple of European imagery appears again in the speech of welcome of the French education minister to the Second Conference of University Vice-Chancellors in 1959, but in a slightly different form: “the Graeco-Latin heritage, the Christian

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\(^{19}\) “La France est d'intérêt public. La France s'élève sur l'horizon de tous les peuples. Ah! disent-ils, il fait jour, la France est là”. (Speech at opening of an International Literary Congress, 1878. Calmann Levy, 1879)

faith...and science based on observation and reason”\textsuperscript{21}. The Enlightenment notion of Europe as the embodiment of Reason, of “l’Universel”, is particularly popular with French writers staking their country’s claim to embody Europe, but it is by no means confined to them: the British historian Christopher Dawson\textsuperscript{22} uses it too, referring to a specifically European “irrational faith in Reason”\textsuperscript{23}, and de Rougemont (who was quite aware of the pitfalls of presenting “Europe” as white, Catholic and francophone), more cautiously expresses the same principle as “objective truth”.

Another favourite image is the university. These form the “republic of letters”, the unifying force of Europe, and are particularly identified with key figures, such as Erasmus\textsuperscript{24}, and periods (the Middle Ages). For de Rougemont, they are the forerunners of the cities, which he sees as peculiarly European in the cross-fertilisation of ideas which they permit (a preoccupation later taken up by both the Council of Europe\textsuperscript{25} and the EU\textsuperscript{26}).

The “European man” (who appears in many other forms as thinker, monk, Faust or Tristan) is portrayed as the partaker of knowledge, linked with others by a common thirst for understanding and especially by the common language of scholarship, Latin, “a reticulum which held Europe together”\textsuperscript{27} in the phrase of Sir Eric Ashby. The intellectuals whose deliberations are recorded by Max Beloff in 1956 wondered

\textsuperscript{21} proceedings of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} conference of European University Rectors and Vice-Chancellors, Dijon, September 1959 (Western European Union)

\textsuperscript{22} de Rougemont regarded Dawson, alongside T.S. Eliot and Hilaire Belloc, as one of the few British authors with an understanding of Europe

\textsuperscript{23} C. Dawson, “Understanding Europe”, p.39. Sheed and Ward, 1952

\textsuperscript{24} hence the naming of the European Community’s university interchange programme

\textsuperscript{25} in Project 5, which looked at cultural infrastructure in 21 cities

\textsuperscript{26} the European Cities of Culture, one of the EU’s few popularly known cultural initiatives

\textsuperscript{27} proceedings of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} conference of European University Rectors and Vice-Chancellors, op.cit.
whether science could replace Latin as the "substitute common culture to which all Europeans would in future have access".

This is often accompanied by a real sense of the duty that falls upon intellectuals and universities in particular to take upon themselves the recreating of Europe, and the leading of others towards it. Some writers extend the metaphor to the monastery: it is not unusual to find the idea of the "secular monk" in connection with advocates of European unity, from Salvador de Madariaga's use of it to describe the dry Englishness of Gilbert Murray and Lord Robert Cecil to John Hellman's use of the term "knight-monks" to describe the enthusiastically ascetic idealists of the Uriage community during the Vichy period. This recalls Talcott Parsons' description of modern intellectual groups in terms of old monastic elites, an aristocracy of the humanities.

The Middle Ages have a particular place in the imagery of Europe, as a Golden Age of spirituality and social coherence. In the writings of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, one of the pioneer figures of European integration, there is a yearning for the Europe of the chivalric ideal. This is the "true Europe", the age of the scholar, of moral

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29 In his contributory essay to J. Smith and A. Toynbee, eds., "Gilbert Murray - an Unfinished Autobiography", p. 178, in which he refers to "this forward-looking, possibly heretical, group of British Civic Monks"


32 "the intellectual and moral aristocracy of the future which is bound to replace one day the material principle of numerical superiority now dominating democracy", Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, "An Idea Conquers the World", p.133, Hutchinson, 1953
certainty, of faith and of a form of unity under the Roman church. The conferences organised by Paul Valéry’s Arts and Letters Committee are said to have had “a flavour of cultured medieval Europe”. This sense appears strongly in the writings of Catholic intellectuals such as Dawson, who pursues the idea of ties between intellectuals as the last remnant of the unity between north and south after the Reformation.

In this view of Europe - Catholic, spiritualised, given leadership by a quasi-chivalric corps of scholar-knights - Charlemagne is a primary symbol, although his value is limited. Apart from his direct link with the Papacy as giver/recipient of temporal authority to rank alongside the spiritual, the justification for the constant invocation of Charlemagne is the association of the name “Europe” with his empire (which, as Norman Davis notes, is itself a revival of an ancient name). It is a rather small Europe, covering roughly the "Rhineland corridor" of the unenlarged European Community, and Carolingian unity itself was short-lived. A more convincing explanation for the enduring potency of the Charlemagne symbol is the way in which it unifies France and Germany, whose pervasive cultural imagery of light and darkness, reason and mystery, universality and particularity, Catholicism and Lutheranism, is so central to “cultural Europe” that the absence of so many other Europes often hardly seems to matter.

33 the Papacy itself is sometimes explicitly, often implicitly, equated with Europe as a unifying force, the latter a way of replacing what Protestantism took from the former, and of bringing the strayed sheep back into the fold
34 G. Davies, "Intellectual Cooperation between Two Wars", p. 6. CEWC, 1963
Whereas even contemporary French writers, such as Edgar Morin\textsuperscript{37}, seem to find it quite difficult to move away from the classic French insistence on the call to intellectuals to rouse Europe in the name of culture and the “universal”, others, such as the non-French federalists Denis de Rougemont (Swiss) and Hendrik Brugmans (Dutch), and Salvador de Madariaga (Spanish) all make efforts to shift the image of Europe away from the Catholic stereotype towards something more all-embracing. Each of them wishes to convince the reader of the culture of Europe as its unique gift to the world, indeed, the main reason, after World War II especially, why it should continue to exist. Accordingly, they make rather less than the French intellectuals of European unity as moral regeneration, and more of Europe as the embodiment of the indomitable individual spirit, with or without God.

For Brugmans, Europe is “a civilisation of non-conformists...it is the European climate that makes life dangerous, adventurous, magnificent and tragic”\textsuperscript{38}. Madariaga, a Spaniard equally at home in Paris, Oxford or Geneva, compares the special characteristics of different nationalities in a sometimes eccentric fashion, but singles out the idea of the individual as a European discovery - they instinctively humanise the abstract\textsuperscript{39}. His “European Olympians” (Don Juan, Don Quixote, Hamlet and Faust - all notably non-French) personify the expansionist, the abstract, the enquiring mind.

The Protestant de Rougemont concurs with the notion of the Faust figure as essentially European. Despite his attraction to the orderly notion of the microcosmic town square, he also concedes that the “spiritual adventure” of Europe involves

\textsuperscript{37} E. Morin, “Penser l’Europe”, CNRS, 1987
\textsuperscript{39} S. de Madariaga, "Portrait of Europe," Hollis & Carter, 1967
motion, change and perturbation. At the centre of his idea of European culture is the notion of tension and balance, passion ordered by reason. In “Man’s Western Quest” (1957) he draws on Grail quest imagery to argue that western man, possessed by a “principle of imperfection”, is in perpetual search, without resolution⁴⁰.

These are versions of Europe which are clearly designed to accommodate Germanic culture, not exclude it. They still insist, nevertheless, on the culture of the exceptional man. The idea that “Europe” may consist in a cultural life shared by, and made accessible to, ordinary people is so absent from these writings that the inference may be drawn at which Coudenhove-Kalergi⁴¹ hints: “low” culture is national, particular, “volkisch”, even domestic, whilst “high” culture is European, universal, and the preserve of high minds. Cultural cooperation, to a certain extent, sets out to rectify this.


⁴¹ in “Pan-Europe”: see Chapter Four
Cultural diplomacy up to World War I

Multilateral cultural cooperation has had an informal life since the medieval heyday of the universities. It would be remarkable if it had not. This existed separately, however, from diplomacy, which evolved from court practice for purposes very different from the high-minded exchange of ideas. This chapter, which does not contain original research, is a scene-setter, examining the growing desire of politically powerful nations to present themselves to the rest of the world related to their different responses to the state’s role in cultural life within their domestic spheres and their different expectations in promoting interest in their culture as part of their diplomatic effort.

The literature of diplomacy

The theory and practice of diplomacy has received some attention from international relations theorists and is supplemented by the memoirs of some diplomats. An early "standard" text for the Anglo-Saxon is that of Sir Harold Nicolson, whose 1939 book "Diplomacy", still in print in 1969, has classic status. Nicolson embodies the image of the well-bred Englishman and of the diplomat as super-civilised cosmopolitan, "homme de culture": like many diplomats, he combined accomplished authorship with a career in the foreign service. As a later writer, James Der Derian, observes, he presents diplomacy as "common sense" without analysing how its norms come to be.

1 H. Nicolson, "Diplomacy", Oxford University Press, 1969
accepted. Nicolson compares different national styles of diplomacy, noting the importance placed on method and system, concluding that it relies above all on creating a space of trust, within which different means of obtaining a goal can be tested without destruction (the tragedy of the Cold War for him was that it shattered the convention of mutual trust).

Later writers include Adam Watson, also a former diplomat, who defines diplomacy as "the instrument of international society: a civilised process based on awareness and respect for other people's point of view; and a civilising one also, because the continuous exchange of ideas...increases that awareness and respect"\(^2\). Although this description sounds made for multilateral cultural cooperation, he concurs with Nicolson in concluding that multilateral diplomacy, while having its place, "shows no sign of replacing bilateral contact"\(^3\), offering the frequently-heard observation that most useful work at international gatherings gets done in the margins. Multilateral diplomacy (by which he mostly means the United Nations) acts mainly to shift the status quo: "in the realm of doctrine and belief, of ideology, then diplomacy is apt to find itself at a loss"\(^4\).

Der Derian (1987) goes more deeply than either into the theory of diplomacy partly by acknowledging its cultural nature. Drawing on Sartre and Foucault, he defines it as "a mediation between estranged individuals, groups or entities"\(^5\). He accepts much of Nicolson's association of diplomacy with high culture, but notes it has folk origins too, from priesthood to scapegoat. Nicolson offers the image of diplomats as angelic

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\(^3\) ibid.
\(^4\) ibid., p. 69
messengers\textsuperscript{6}, Der Derian glosses this with a reference to early imagery of daimons ("knowers"), and "the unsettling possibility that the earliest mytho-diplomat had not wings but horns and a tail"\textsuperscript{7}. Nevertheless, he does not dissent from the overall image of diplomacy as the province of the cultivated man.

\textbf{Some definitions}

Cultural diplomacy has a (limited) literature of its own, which mostly derives from the post-World War II (WWII) manifestations of the form and falls mainly to be considered in the next chapter. At this point it seems preferable to offer some definitions of the terms cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, cultural cooperation and two variants, cultural projection and cultural propaganda. Some commentators find all of these inadequate and supply their own, as does J. M Mitchell in his term "external cultural policy"\textsuperscript{8}. This thesis makes use of all these terms at various points, also referring (in the context of the EU in particular) to "cultural intervention", meaning the action taken by an international organisation.

There is an element of evolution involved: the term “cultural relations”, for example, is advanced at a specific point in time to mark a shift in public policy (or at least in the presentation of public policy) away from a one-sided approach which considers only the national foreign policy interest towards a reciprocal approach which considers that that interest will be better served if it appears to receive as well as to offer. Broadly, therefore, we can consider cultural propaganda and cultural projection

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{6} citing the Greek "angeloi" as "messenger"
  \item \textsuperscript{7} Der Derian, op.cit., p. 66
  \item \textsuperscript{8} Mitchell, op. cit, throughout
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as aspects of a cultural diplomacy which tends to be one-way. "Cultural diplomacy" refers to the use of culture as a mechanism in the practice of diplomacy to serve the broader ends of a nation's foreign policy. As such it may be influenced by developments in internal cultural policy, where this exists, but is no sense either governed by it or required to serve its aims.

"Cultural propaganda" (a term which it should be noted is not necessarily always used pejoratively) seeks to convince its targets of the superiority, power, material and spiritual wealth or military invincibility of those who generate it, and the weakness/inferiority of the opposition. The sum of such messages is that here is a world power not to be trifled with. It is associated most often with the actions of Germany between 1870 and 1945, and with all the main protagonists during the two World Wars.

"Cultural projection" is a term much favoured specifically by the British pre-WWII to distance themselves from the type of cultural diplomacy practised by their main rivals, the Germans and the French, and to a lesser extent the Italians (see particularly Tallents\textsuperscript{9}, Taylor\textsuperscript{10} and most writing by or about the early British Council). The intention was to portray the British version as morally preferable to both the French and German models. Cultural projection, therefore, enabled a country to present a positive vision of itself and its values but abjured any element of imposition (as practised, it was implied, by the rival versions). The term remains useful to describe the activity of non-governmental organisations, particularly those operated by private

\textsuperscript{9} Sir S. Tallents, "The Projection of England", Faber & Faber, 1932

individuals, in promoting the culture of their countries.

By the end of WWII, the term "cultural relations" had generally replaced all of these. As the use of cultural conventions\(^\text{11}\) became commonplace, this softer-edged, more neutral-sounding term was considered a fairer reflection of what was actually taking place on a reciprocal basis. It avoided suggestions of inequality between the partners and signified that cultural diplomacy had an existence and a raison d'être of its own that was both part of the normal discourse of diplomatic relations and apart from it. It also underlines the idea of diplomacy as a privileged space of trust, where certain types of public rhetoric are suspended\(^\text{12}\).

The consciously neutralised idea of cultural relations provided a useful separating function for diplomats, particularly during the Cold War period: it was possible to assert that cultural relations were untouched by the cruder political imperatives of foreign policy, and could therefore continue to operate independently of national political positions. While this may have been more of a comforting illusion than reality, it was nevertheless for many years a successful one, and has had significant value as a justifying belief, as essential for the Americans\(^\text{13}\) as for the Russians, and for east-west relations in general. As Mitchell points out, "relations" imply, as "diplomacy" does not, the possibility that non-governmental agencies or individuals can take part in the process. While that has appealing overtones of inclusiveness and

\(^{11}\) bilateral agreements negotiated in order to authorise and regulate the traffic of international exchange at government level

\(^{12}\) see any diplomatic memoirs, such as those of Sir Nicholas Henderson or Sir Pierson Dixon, for examples of how this operates

\(^{13}\) there are many examples of former State Department officials testifying to this, including P. H. Coombs, "The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs", New York, Harper & Row, 1987 - originally 1965; C. A. Thomson & W. H. C. Laves, "Cultural Relations and Foreign Policy", Indiana University Press, 1963
participation for non-governmental bodies, for governments the element of distancing that accompanies it is equally attractive: an appearance of independence that can nevertheless be controlled. It also brings that which cannot be directly controlled (day-to-day contact between individuals) within an acceptable framework and minimises conflict.

"Cultural cooperation" is multilateral, not bilateral, and takes cultural relations a crucial step away from the foreign policy area towards a mechanism for adapting and influencing a set of increasingly homogeneous internal cultural policies operated by those who participate within it. As this study will argue, its operation is significantly more precarious than that of cultural relations, partly because the mixture of external and internal cultural policy priorities is not always resolved, but also because the degree of consensus on what is involved in the process is very far from clear. Whilst it is arguable that the “game” element is a large part of all international negotiation, it is perhaps particularly evident in multilateral cultural cooperation - a game where everyone decides for himself what the rules are.

The diplomatic background of cultural diplomacy

Historians of diplomacy trace its origins to the role of envoys between powers - Harold Nicolson emphasises that the skills employed by these individuals (oratory, negotiation, tact, discretion and information gathering) remain the classic skills of the diplomat. Diplomacy’s ground rules appear to have been established by the Roman Empire, which gave diplomats the framework of international law in which to operate, notably the binding validity of contracts, and thence of treaties.
In the case of cultural diplomacy, other origins can be identified, along with accompanying sets of skills to define the practice of the form. Ninkovich recalls the Pharaonic practice of exchanging princelings between courts, in which the young potentate returns home with an understanding of his host’s culture and manners, useful for future alliance building and possibly other less reputable purposes (assuming, of course, he returns home at all). This kind of strictly controlled exchange can be considered alongside the way artistic developments themselves were transmitted via the less formal but still court-focused “oral tradition” which facilitated cultural cross-fertilisation in Europe, creating inter alia the literature of the “Matter of Britain” and of courtly love. Der Derian also gives weight to the role of the church, which Nicolson does not, and makes the artist-diplomat link explicit in his reference to Minnesänger. Both forms involve a kind of normalisation of self-image which is central to any consideration of cultural policy, in which the diplomat embodies a certain level of courtly refinement. Image is perhaps the strongest common thread of the internal and external cultural forms.

The formal recognition of cultural diplomacy as part of the armoury of the state mission abroad is nevertheless relatively recent. According to Harold Nicolson, diplomacy itself was not formally established as a profession until the 15th century when the Italian city states began to appoint individuals to represent them at foreign courts, rapidly followed by France and England. Diplomacy was a trade practised by the élite without much reference to the population in general and its main concern was

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15 1987, op.cit
16 he connects it explicitly with a form of "mission civilisatrice", as do Deibel & Roberts (1976) in their discussion of Pope Gregory XV’s "Congregatio de Propaganda Fide", a committee of cardinals set up to do what its name suggests
access to and influence with the higher echelons of the ruling class.

Cultural diplomacy at this level was therefore essentially a mating ritual intended to attract allies. It had no social dimension independent of the strategic and political, and involved a strong element of display. This ranged, and continues to range, from the siting of an embassy and the good connections of the ambassador to the level of decorative opulence to be found in the furnishings of both. In some cases, France being the obvious example, the diplomatic value of being able to promote an image of cultural pre-eminence was established very early on. Roche and Pigniau, in their history of French cultural diplomacy, attribute this in part to the fact that diplomacy provided a suitable career for men of letters such as du Bellay, Diderot or Voltaire (a tradition which carries through to Claudel and Giraudoux). But it also suggests that, at some level, thought was being given to the idea that France, even before reinventing herself through the Revolution, needed to assert an international identity that was neither military nor mercantile.

In 1914 Germany's flagrant disregard for the rules threw the diplomatic game into confusion. For Nicolson, it was not surprising that it should have been the Germans who did this - he saw in them the lack of a solid centre, evidence of a "spiritual homelessness" dating from the withdrawal of the Romans, and in their hands

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17 even in the cash-strapped 1990's, the UK government maintains a modest but museum-standard Government Art Collection for show in embassies and relatively junior officials are still eligible to have the costs of entertainment figured into their cost of living allowances.
18 F. Roche and B. Pigniau, "Histoires de Diplomatie Culturelle des Origines à 1995", Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documentation Française, 1995
19 according to Lord Eustace Percy, who after a distinguished diplomatic career became one of the first chairmen of the British Council, they “wantonly broke out of the well-understood bounds of permissible adventure set by the Concert of Europe" ("From the Concert of Europe to the United Nations – an Estimate of Change", Burge Memorial Lecture, International Friendship, 1954)
20 Nicholson, op. cit., p. 145: the phrase is attributed to Friedrich Sieburg
diplomacy became Machtpolitik. Bismarck had broken the rules half a century previously during his period of "Kulturkampf" when he had operated through covert funding to manipulate opinion in other countries for his own political ends.\(^{21}\)

Bismarck’s Kulturkampf was new because it did not look to “the proper channels” for achieving its goals but tried to influence public opinion directly. Historians confirm that governments were already aware that with new communications and a growing section of their populations which were both educated and enfranchised, foreign policy was changing, and cultural diplomacy involved more than maintaining an impressive and cultivated official presence. Cultural projection and propaganda achieved two aims that unsupported diplomacy could not: they reached various strata of public opinion in key countries abroad; and they also provided a self-image that could be reflected back to the populace at home.

**Cultural diplomacy and projection in France, Germany and Britain**

**France**

The thirty years preceding WWI saw three players in particular developing their cultural diplomacy: France, Germany and Britain. Each was pursing territorial ambitions outside Europe. They fed off their anxieties about each others’ ambitions and used each others’ perceived advances in areas where they were competing for influence to cajole more resources out of national authorities. Other countries were not out of the game altogether (Italy’s Dante Alighieri Society was established in 1889, but, as Mitchell points out, until Mussolini the Italians colonised mainly

\(^{21}\) M. O. Kolbeck, "American Opinion on the Kulturkampf", Catholic University of America, 1942
through emigration), but in broad terms the standard-bearers were the two major colonial powers and their new rival, with France well ahead of the opposition. As a result, both Germany and Britain chose in many ways to define their image by its un-Frenchness.

Roche and Pigniau describe French diplomatic activity up until 1870 as accompanied, without a systematic plan but in a very regular manner, by “action culturelle”\(^{22}\), which appears to mean primarily the links maintained with expatriate French and the work done by the missionary societies and others to teach French abroad. Like its rivals, France in the course of the 19th century established French schools and institutes in areas where it wanted to maintain its political influence\(^{23}\). In Greece particularly, archaeological schools were established, of which the French had the first in 1846. In Turkey, French lycées were established to assure the French-speaking future of the Turkish élites. Lauren\(^{24}\) notes that French public administration underwent a major upheaval after the Franco-Prussian War, which included the formulation of new concepts of “total diplomacy”. These brought the press and information clearly within the remit of the diplomatic function, (and in doing so, saved the French from the contortions later experienced by both the British and the Americans in trying to separate out the information and culture functions). By the end of the century the French Foreign Office had set up the first formal governmental structure for supporting cultural diplomacy, the Service des Oeuvres Françaises a l’Etranger.

\(^{22}\) this term, much used subsequently in French cultural policy, was later taken up by the European Commission to describe its interventions

\(^{23}\) especially Egypt and the Balkans

\(^{24}\) P. G. Lauren, "Diplomats and Bureaucrats: the First Institutional Responses to 20th Century Diplomacy in France and Germany", Hoover Institution Press, 1976
France was, of course, marketing more than her intellectual pre-eminence\textsuperscript{25}. The French had assumptions about the universal validity of their recent achievements - "the international climate of the Enlightenment, refined by the French environment, was to them the real revolution"\textsuperscript{26}. This assumption of special-ness amounting to a vocation in the world persists to the present in French writing on cultural policy, internal as well as external. Even Jacques Rigaud, whose 1979 assessment of French external cultural policy generally eschews French cultural rhetoric, speaks of France's "position singulièrè"\textsuperscript{27} and "vocation" in these matters.

The mystical relationship French culture has with French national identity is well expressed by Lebovics as "the founding myth of 19th century nationalism: the belief that there existed, or should exist, a functional relation between political unity and unity of culture"\textsuperscript{28}. French policy subsequently replicated this national myth on the new stage of European integration. Kolodziej\textsuperscript{29} shows de Gaulle taking it to its extreme as a guiding principle: France cannot be France without grandeur. The myth was retrospective: Raoul Villedieu, writing about the French Academy at Rome, Villa Médicis (an unusual 17th century experiment which combined cultural policy interests at home and abroad in a manner which seems to be without parallel), described the institution without apparent embarrassment as "l'Ambassade du génie, du coeur, de la France"\textsuperscript{30}.

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\textsuperscript{25} see Heald & Kaplan (1977, below) for a discussion of the relationship between France and the former American colonies over free trade (lack of) and the ideals of the French Revolution.
\textsuperscript{26} M. Heald & L. S. Kaplan, "Culture and Diplomacy, the American Experience", p. 36. Greenwood Press, 1977
\textsuperscript{27} J. Rigaud, "Les Relations Culturelles Extérieures, Rapport au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères", p. 13. Documentation Française, 1979. One of Rigaud's interlocutors goes much further and asserts that "la culture française appartient au monde et nous ne sommes que les gérants" (ibid).
\textsuperscript{28} H. Lebovics, "True France, the Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945, p. 5. Cornell, 1992
\end{flushleft}
What this amounts to in cultural diplomacy terms seems to be a pace-setting talent for spiritualising the most pragmatic of motives: the gaining of influence by other means when the obvious methods of trading and military pre-eminence are unavailable or cannot be consistently maintained. Villa Médicis is interesting because it attempted to bring the world to France - the idea was to expose selected artists to the riches of classical and renaissance Rome so that they would replenish French art both culturally with the influences thus gained, and physically with a supply of original works and copies to decorate the palaces of their homeland. The fact that it also sent a subliminal message about the open and welcoming nature of the French cultural establishment would hardly have been missed, yet seems not to have been predominant. Villa Médicis was not in itself an early example of cultural diplomacy, therefore. Yet it contains the elements of the French type: a statement to the effect that a nation’s significance could be measured through a dialogue conducted in the language of the arts other than displays of ambassadorial plumage; the principle of “accueil”, which, by declaring France’s readiness to embrace the high culture of others, subtly implants the message that France is the acknowledged centre of such culture; and the willingness of the state openly to assert that the arts and artists fall within the bounds of affairs of state.

France established the “model” bilateral cultural organisation in the form of the Alliance Française in 1883. It was not entirely the first in the field: the Deutscher Schulverein was created two years earlier, and there had been church missionary groups before that. But its aims were much wider than those of the Deutscher Schulverein. The subtitle of the Alliance Française was the “National Association for
the Diffusion of the French Language in the Colonies and Abroad”. Its historian, Maurice Bruézière, states that the immediate impetus for its creation was national military defeat at Sedan in 1870, and the loss of “les deux provinces martyres” 31, Alsace and Lorraine. Its aim was to restore France’s “image de marque internationale” and it was to operate on the grand scale. Explicitly created not as an organ of the state but as an association of subscribing members, it nevertheless had obvious state approval and, within a few years, overt state financial support.

It was recognised by public decree as an “établissement d’utilité publique” in 1886, with a governing body including Paul Cambon, the influential future Ambassador to London and Madrid, a civil servant from the Foreign Affairs ministry, a former minister of public instruction and, to reinforce its ecumenical image, an “israelite”, a “protestant” and a “missionaire apostolique”. Later this line-up was strengthened by intellectual heavyweights such as Ernest Renan, Hippolyte Taine and Louis Pasteur. Its first public subsidy, according to Bruézière, was granted in 1886 by the Conseil General de la Seine, followed rapidly by other regions. By 1889 it had not only its prestigious board of governors, but also a general assembly which elected 50 members to an administrative council in charge of distribution, a steering committee on propaganda, committees throughout the Levant, Spain, Latin America, Copenhagen, Zurich and London (though not in Germany) and link groups in Prague and New Orleans.

Roche and Pigniau note that although the Alliance itself was the initiative of a group

of “personnalités françaises”\textsuperscript{32}, from the outset diplomatic posts abroad were instructed to offer as much practical back-up as they could to the Association’s efforts. Government funds were channelled openly through the Oeuvres Françaises department and in secret through other mechanisms. The Alliance itself was at great pains to establish its private credentials and its seal of official approval simultaneously. The description\textsuperscript{33} of its role by its secretary-general, Pierre Foncin, is masterly in this regard and is worth summarising here. Whilst independent, he observes, the Alliance is naturally supportive of government. It does not engage in politics but has a policy, namely, the promotion of concord within its own country, “rayonnement pacifique” without. Far from disliking foreigners - who are represented on its committees - it asserts that every man has two fatherlands, his own and France; and that being so, one day perhaps French will become the universal language common to mankind. In the meantime, the reader of a French book may be a natural customer for other French products. This, in a nutshell, is the mission of bilateral cultural diplomacy.

It is worth noting here the amount of space given to a description of the Alliance’s flag, since it anticipates European Union imagery by nearly a century. The national colours appear on a blue backdrop: “à la fois, le bleu de la mer et le bleu du ciel, l’espace immense et idéal” across which the French language will resound and, more,

\textsuperscript{32} Roche et Pigniau, op.cit., p.30

\textsuperscript{33} taken from a prospectus published in 1889. More luxuriant and less cautious language follows in respect of France’s colonies, where the task is one of “moral conquest” of the soul of those peoples sheltered beneath the flag of France, and of besieged Francophones bravely holding out on the North American continent (“Louisiane, isolée, lutte courageusement”). For those who have somehow missed the message, there is back-up physical imagery in the form of mother France seated under a palm tree instructing her children, and an exhortative article by the statesman Jules Simon listing the qualities which link the nation and the language and making the case for French as the universal language. The combined effect is to persuade the patriotic French reader of the merits of the enterprise not only in terms of the cultural enrichment of the fortunate heathen, but also of France’s place as the cultural crossroads of the western world, both drawing in and radiating out — again, France as universal gift.
will articulate "les hautes vérités...qui, pareilles aux astres, se cachent dans le ciel profonde de la pensée humaine".

The Alliance proved a successful and enduring vector of French cultural influence, with, according to Bruezière, strong national committees in all its priority areas by the end of the century and the active commitment of influential men such as Cambon, publishers such as Plon and Hachette and industrialists such as Michelin. It achieved a number of things: it dealt with the situation, delicate for an avowedly secular government, whereby the protection of French as a world language was largely left to religious organisations; its participatory structure allowed the public at large to feel a sense of national mission which went beyond colonialism to taking on the rival powers directly, and on ground of French choosing; it succeeded in bringing the commercial sector into the game by providing the major publishers with opportunities for display and marketing at the major intentional expositions; and showed how to diversify into new areas of development.  

By the end of the century, France had a structure for cultural propaganda that provided a valuable back-up resource to conventional diplomacy and was much envied elsewhere. It combined a powerful state resource (the Oeuvres Françaises) with a private network which conveyed the message back to the French public that France counted internationally through the universal appeal of her language and her culture, a message that seems to have commanded an enduring level of acceptance. The imagery of offer and welcome, integrated into a powerful national rhetoric,

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34 Bruezière (op. cit., p. 35) cites a children’s scheme, “le Sou de l’Alliance Française”, which was not successful, and holiday courses for teachers of French, including “visites artistiques” and free theatre tickets, which were
enabled France to appear innocent of base imperialist motives. The offer made of herself to the world, an offer the world could hardly wish to reject, was reinforced by her willingness to take the world to herself. Universality matched by “acceuil”, but at the same time preserving exclusivity - this was an offer only France could make.

Even the fact that the policy failed in its primary goal - preventing the encroachment of English and preserving French as the language of civilisation - could be turned to advantage, in that a defeat for French could be presented as a defeat for culture. At the same time, France succeeded in creating the template for bilateral cooperation which would be followed elsewhere. What could not be replicated was the identification of French interests with the good of civilisation in general, which allowed an official report as late as 1927 to speak of France’s policy as offering “with complete disinterestedness” to educated élites the opportunity to assimilate the “treasure” of French “elegance of expression...the flower of humanism”\(^\text{35}\).

**Germany**

Cultural diplomacy in Germany at first reflected developments in France after the Franco-Prussian War. Lauren\(^\text{36}\) notes that the German public administration reorganised itself along the pattern of the changes in France and, in order to keep pace with public opinion, the Foreign Affairs Ministry developed a propaganda interest. Like both Britain and France, Germany had interests in the Levant and by 1878 was subsidising a Burgerschule in Constantinople. Germany’s priority, however, was

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\(^{36}\) 1976, op.cit
closer to home, i.e., the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where the position of Germans and
the German minority was considered to be under threat from Magyar interests. The
Deutscher Schulverein\textsuperscript{37}, established in 1881 in Vienna, was meant to counter
Magyarisation\textsuperscript{38}.

Germany’s cultural diplomacy rapidly became focused on the need to create a viable
state quickly, and accordingly played on a sense of identity. The idea of
“Germanism”, drawn from Hegel, Fichte and Herder, was heavily promoted and its
target was expatriate Germans. Its prevailing theme was the notion that a German
living abroad, or even a citizen of another country of German extraction, had two
loyalties: to the state of which he was a citizen and to the wider community of Pan-
Germany. That greater loyalty involved a duty to secure for German culture and the
German language a place in the world. Academics such as Kuno Francke\textsuperscript{39}, based in
Harvard, devoted much effort to persuading Americans that German culture was
enjoying a Renaissance equal to anything to be found in Britain or France.

Private associations such as the nationalistic All-Deutscher Verband, the Deutsche
Kolonialgesellschaft and in particular the Schulverein were involved in the invention,
on the grand scale, of a national self-image in which culture played a central role.
Ralph Bischoff\textsuperscript{40}, an American of German origin who researched these associations in
1942 with a view to determining to what extent they had been made effective
instruments of nazification, was confident that, despite the nature of their mission,

\textsuperscript{37} the full title is Allgemeiner Deutsche Schulverein zur Erhaltung des Deutschtums im Auslande —
roughly, the General German School Association for the preservation of the German way of life abroad
(my translation)
\textsuperscript{38} McMurry and Lee, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{39} K. Francke, "German Ideals of Today", Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1907
\textsuperscript{40} R. E. Bischoff, "Nazi Conquest through German Culture," Wesley College, 1942
most, prior to the 1930’s, were genuinely privately funded and only loosely political\textsuperscript{41}.

The prevailing tone of German cultural diplomacy at this time was aggressive, and it created insecurity in others. The new German state responded to what Nicolson identified as a national sense of spiritual homelessness by propagating the idea of a global home of the spirit of which all Germans were a part. This was partly a response to the experience of America, where German communities were failing to retain their language\textsuperscript{42}; and partly a way of articulating a sense of frustration that the successful and prospering German state was less highly regarded abroad than recently defeated France and arrogant England. A 1907 dispatch from Germany to the British Foreign Secretary explained how culture was seen by the Germans as a way of counteracting hostility and suspicion “because German culture is really the culture of the civilised world”\textsuperscript{43}.

Drawing conclusions about the early years of German cultural diplomacy is difficult because of the relative scarcity of coverage in English. Two distinct strands of activity seem to emerge from the literature, however. One is the substantial consciousness-raising effort involved in the promotion of Germanism, which has some present-day parallels in attempts to create a sense of Europeanism through creating new imagery and appealing to common values and a common sense of destiny. Encouragement for festivals, celebrations of heritage and a flow of information to incline expatriate

\textsuperscript{41} he notes that German-American patriotic fervour, strong during the Franco-Prussian War, was muted once the US entered WWI, with loyalties to the state easily winning out over those to “Greater Germany”

\textsuperscript{42} see McMurry & Lee, op.cit., also Bischoff, op.cit

\textsuperscript{43} Lauren, op.cit., p. 185
Germans to feel part of a larger cultural community were the mechanisms for this. Male voice choirs were particularly strong in pre-WWI America\(^4^4\). Germanism was also given an academic underpinning in the form of research, taken up by a substantial number of universities, into the origins of the German race in the world (although this seems to have taken off in earnest around WWI) and encouragement to build up archives of German heritage.

At the same time, the selling point of Germany to non-Germans was its modernity. Kuno Francke, who succeeded in establishing a Germanic Museum at Harvard, was at pains in 1907 to distance himself from what he felt was the overly popular "Schiller" view of the German as specially chosen to devote his work to the "eternal structure of human culture"\(^4^5\). This was out-of-date, and the task facing the modern German was how to harness the fact of his overwhelming success as a citizen of a modern nation and empire to the national search for "higher forms of national existence" towards which there was "a wonderfully organised collective will"\(^4^6\).

Francke rejects universal brotherhood in favour of universal sympathy and points to the successful secularisation by Germany of its inner life, freeing it from the mistakes of the past, which, he notes, still weigh down other, older, European countries. He cites scientific achievement as a part of this process. Lewis Pyenson\(^4^7\) has described how Germany was actively pursuing an imperialist strategy in the exact sciences well before WWI, noting that technological advances greatly assisted the process of

\(^{4^4}\) Bischoff, op.cit
\(^{4^5}\) Francke, op. cit., p. 4
\(^{4^6}\) ibid, p. 8
\(^{4^7}\) L. Pyenson, "Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences, German Expansionism Overseas 1900-1930", P. Lang, 1985
establishing the dominant interests. Germany also made use of shifting borders within Europe: in 1870 the German authorities consciously “germanised” the University of Strasbourg by filling it with serious German scientists to create a seat of German learning. Pyenson describes how this process led in due course to a rhetoric of “German science” which by the turn of the century could be translated into “Aryan physics”.

German cultural diplomacy succeeded in that it fulfilled its first main purpose: it reached substantial numbers of opinion formers and future élites. Both France and Britain became seriously alarmed by the sheer numbers of overseas students who were studying at German universities. In so far as Germany was marketing itself as a successful modern nation, it was doing no more than they were doing. Of serious concern, however, was the “dual loyalty” notion being fostered by the Germanists, which undermined accepted ideas of what was due to the state and created concern about the relationship of the German government to ethnic German minorities in other states. “Kultur” became a sinister concept, well beyond anything the French had pioneered, and outside the reasonable limits of cultural diplomacy. It seems to have set up for the first time the feeling that a counter-campaign was needed if “culture” was not to become a destabilising force rather than the universal gift advocated under the French system.

There is some evidence that German diplomats themselves were uneasy with what was happening. Mitchell (1984) notes that in correspondence between Reichskanzler Hollweg and Karl Lamprecht (credited with the first use of the term “auswärtiges
Kulturpolitik, or external cultural policy) there was concern about the showing made by Germans: "not every German abroad represents his fatherland in his person, as the Frenchman does Paris and the Englishman the British Isles". The disjuncture between the kind of national feeling being promoted by the Germanist organisations and what was permissible within the bounds of diplomatic convention cannot have been easy to bridge.

It is possible to speculate that a strategy based on the spirit of modernity alone and conducted within the constraints of conventional diplomacy alone, might well have succeeded, as France's did. Cultural expansionism, after all, was deemed permissible within certain limits and there was a case to be made for the recognition of the contribution of German cultural life to world culture on equal terms with that of France. German policy, however, tried to set cultural claims above the normal conduct of international affairs. Essentially, the proposition that German blood provided access to a cross-border community whose interests should be promoted independently of and alongside the state of which a person was a citizen cut across accepted rules of international commerce.

The image Germanism reflected back to the nation was dangerously out of control; that of a civilisation uninterested in other civilisations; to which other nations were unreasonably denying the opportunity to fulfil itself; membership of which transcended territorial borders; and all members of which had long been denied access to their own history and heritage, which they were now in the process of

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48 see P. Fussell, "The Great War and Modern Memory", Oxford University Press, 1977, on the use of "Kultur" as an anti-German image
49 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 25
regaining after centuries of suppression. In Francke’s words, “what is the colonisation of Asia Minor by the Greeks compared with the gigantic colonisation of America by the Germanic and Romance nations?...we should be made intellectually at home in our own country and people”\textsuperscript{51}.

\textbf{Britain}

Most commentators agree that there was little concerted activity to promote British culture abroad prior to WWI and indeed for some time afterwards. McMurry and Lee do not discuss Britain prior to the setting up of the British Council in 1935; Taylor and Sanders\textsuperscript{52} focus on information policy only; both Taylor\textsuperscript{53} and Mitchell\textsuperscript{54} make reference to the reluctance of both the Treasury and the Foreign Office to bring culture within the field of formal diplomacy. Or, as a contemporary commentator put it, possibly ironically, “British genius speaks for itself”.

This is somewhat to overlook the way Britain’s rivals saw things. The "official view" which accompanied the launch of the British Council, with its self-deprecating and rather self-satisfied references to “national shyness”\textsuperscript{55}, sounds remarkably similar to the justification Lord Keynes makes of the “very English, informal, unostentatious, half-baked if you like” Arts Council of Great Britain\textsuperscript{56}. To the Alliance Française in

\textsuperscript{50} see also B. Bond, "War and Society in Europe 1870-1970", Leicester University Press/Fontana, 1983, who notes that the Germanist societies were not always popular with the authorities
\textsuperscript{51} Francke, op. cit., pp. 25-6
\textsuperscript{52} P. M. Taylor and M. L. Sanders, "British Propaganda During the First World War", Macmillan, 1982
\textsuperscript{54} Mitchell, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{55} "Interpreting a Civilization", inaugural speech by H.R.H. the Prince of Wales to the first meeting of the British Council, 2\textsuperscript{nd} July 1935
\textsuperscript{56} J. M. Keynes, "The Arts Council, its Policy and Hopes", (reprinted from The Listener, 1951)
1889 British national shyness was not evident. There may not have been a society for the propagation of the English language, but the activities of many religious and missionary societies, such as the British and Foreign Bible Society, made up for that: "ils ...fondent des missions qui deviendront peutêtre un jour des colonies car en même temps qu’ils prêchent l’évangile, ils répandent les idées et propagent l’influence de la mère patrie". This is backed up with estimates of the numbers of members and of the annual incomes of a list of such associations. Roche and Pigniau cite the concern of a budget rapporteur in 1906 about the "guerre des langues" being waged in Egypt where since 1891, "les agents anglais ... commençaient à envahir le domaine de l'instruction publique presque exclusivement réservée jusque’là à l’élément français". Mitchell points out that to the nascent Germany, the entire British Empire was an attempt to impose British "Kultur" on the world by the export of British stock.

What commentators on cultural diplomacy are reflecting in the case of Britain is a lack of state sponsorship for a very real and active cultural propaganda effort abroad and the fact that there seemed to be little need for such a state role. The job was already being done quite effectively. Aside from the work of the missionary societies, English libraries were to be found abroad, often maintained by anglophile societies and the British School at Athens was founded not long after the French one in 1886. National self-image was vested in perceptions of Empire, which included, if necessary, a policy of isolationism. For as long as the Empire was perceived to be

57 Alliance Française, Association nationale pour la propagation de la langue française dans les colonies et à l'étranger – Prospectus, 1889
58 op. cit., p. 14
functioning, it served in itself to promote British culture and to send the messages that needed to be sent. This, rather than any ancillary attempt to promote British institutions and cultural life, was deemed sufficient\(^{61}\). In the same way, the infrastructure of Empire obviated the need to reinforce ties of loyalty by constant reminders of the culture left behind. Indeed, the main difference between France and Britain at this time seems to have been the need in France for the state to articulate a formal external cultural policy - had the British been pressed to do so, they might well have produced a lower-key translation of very much the same rhetoric of offer and universality (for the latter read democracy and parliamentary government).

Nevertheless, as Reynolds points out, that self-image was shaken after the Boer War. The debate which took place as a result led the British to undertake some of the reforms which France and Germany had carried out decades previously, notably in the sphere of bureaucratic reform and that of active diplomacy\(^ {62}\). The search for a stronger self-image seems mainly to have been channelled in ways which reinforced ideas of the virtuousness of Empire, whilst drawing on some of the defensiveness and uncertainty which resulted from defeat. Examples are the proliferation of organisations such as the National Service League and the Victoria League, as well as youth organisations such as the Boy Scouts (developments which had parallels in Germany).

Bond\(^ {63}\) has looked at the impact of war on society at the end of the 19th century. He

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\(^{61}\) Taylor (1981, op.cit) points out that in 1911 the government still refused to allow foreign readers to subscribe to journals and newspapers

\(^{62}\) the experience of negotiating the Entente Cordiale with France around 1904, which Roche and Pigniau regard as having been reinforced by the work of the Alliance Française, must have introduced the concept of a cultural diplomacy policy to the British, even if they chose not to pursue it

\(^{63}\) Bond, op. cit.
points to the way the military associations inter alia contributed to a public climate in Britain that was both aggressive and defensive. As instances of this he cites the fashion for scare stories and outbreaks of spy fever. It is interesting to consider whether this activity has a parallel in the explosion of interest in museums and the emergence of “English heritage” as a concept at the same time. Between 1890 and 1914 the number of museums in Britain doubled, the Museums Association was established in 1889, and the National Trust followed in 1894, founded by three members of the Commons Preservation Society. This somewhat subverts the idea that the British image of itself was entirely secure, even before the Boer War. It suggests a need both to verify the nation’s claim to what it had - a public museum is a powerful legitimiser of acquisition as well as a highly visible way of reflecting a nation’s status back to itself - and to protect it from outside onslaught.

Accordingly, when the need arose with the outbreak of war in 1914 to formulate the national myth for propaganda purposes, the elements were in place. The choice of image was consciously un-French as well as un-German: few claims were made for intellectual pre-eminence; rather a kind of heightened ordinariness became and remained the leitmotif - a myth of national character rather than national sophistication or national destiny. Anti-French feeling in a cultural sense went back at least as far as the eighteenth century, as Linda Colley has shown. Sir Frederic Kenyon, addressing a university audience in 1915, attempted to define “English” culture in terms of its distinctive contribution to offset “German thoroughness” and “French clarity”: “this special type or principle which we would vindicate for England

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64 exemplified in popular fiction with names like “The Invasion of Dorking”
65 G. Kavanagh, "Museums and World War I, a Social History", Leicester, 1994
66 L. Colley, "Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837", (Yale University Press, 1992)
(sic) as against this arrogant claim of Germany" to cultural supremacy. He came up with individualism, common sense and morality, which take the forms of a dislike for formal regulatory structures such as academies, a preference for enlightened patronage over what he describes as a “professional” approach to the arts, and an unwillingness to “dissociate art...from its effect on conduct” 67. In fact, the impression conveyed is that English culture is one of good taste, and the ability to appreciate rather than create or innovate. However, Kenyon’s speech conveys both anxiety that English culture risks being judged inferior to French or German and the sense that different territory must be found to project it.

A very different character, Sir Evelyn Wrench, a pre-war imperialist deeply impressed by Cecil Rhodes, also chooses a form of morality as his cultural leitmotif, and his progress reflects the gradual shift of British policy towards acceptance of a cultural component in its approach to diplomacy. He refined his vision of “a great secret society for promoting British interests” 68, which would be somewhere between the Jesuits, the Freemasons and “a kind of grown-up Boy Scouts” 69 (with girls in it, for inspirational purposes), to “a new Imperialism...of the sister-nations of the Britannic alliance”. It would be built on Britain’s power for doing good in the world and offer admission to those of non-British stock (such as Afrikaners and French Canadians) who nevertheless believed in the “English-speaking world’s ideals and institutions” 70. Two results of this vision, the Overseas League and the English-Speaking Union, prepared the way for a post-war third, the All People’s Association which in due

67 Sir F. Kenyon, "Ideals and Characteristics of English Culture", p. 17-18. 1915. Kenyon, a classicist and director of the British Museum, was later to chair the British National Committee of the ICIC
68 E. Wrench, "The Story of the Overseas League", pp. 42 - 44. Overseas League, 1924
69 ibid., p. 6
70 ibid., p. 54
course became absorbed into the British Council. In both these morality-based approaches, reflecting the observations of Matthew Arnold in "Culture and Anarchy", is found a reluctance to associate the state with the propagation of culture (Wrench does not seem at any point to have considered that his "secret society" should have had any kind of public function).

Conclusion

This historical examination is intended to establish a particular point about the development and practice of bilateral cultural diplomacy. This is that there seems to be a gap between the way in which bilateral cultural relations is seen by most commentators on the political process as low-level policy facilitating more serious diplomacy and the weight of national image and identity placed on it when it was started. The intensity of the battle for linguistic dominance justified the use of considerable resources in France, as did the necessity to establish French pre-eminence in the intellectual sphere. For united Germany, what was at stake was national identity and a challenge to the hegemony of the European state, for which the German intellectual inheritance was prayed in aid. The overwhelming need was to create dependable structures of loyalty which would reinforce that image and lead to influence within the states where those loyalties were operating.

In Britain, these were not, initially, public policy goals since they arose from a sense of threat and the need to counter weak self-image. Nevertheless, there was sufficient activity wherever rival powers were at work to ensure that British interests were maintained, although this was not state-supported and where the aim was the
propagation of English, this happened under the cloak of religion. In addition, a heightened sense of threat led to new developments of cultural protection and preservation which were reflected externally in popular defensive structures and values-based organisations which formulated specifically “British” ideals of service to be promoted to the Empire, though not to rival empires.

Cultural projection, therefore, appears to have been acceptable and even desirable as an instrument of foreign policy, overt or covert, for as long as it did not aspire beyond that status. When it did so, as in Germany’s attempt to create a dual loyalty with culture as its key element, it became an embarrassment, and a negative element. The response was to develop rules for its containment, leading to the present situation of “diplomatic marginality and scholarly indifference”\(^\text{71}\) which the subject has since enjoyed. Cultural diplomacy thus became regulated into a system of support for institutes and for dissemination through voluntary organisations. Although new elements were added after the two world wars, and the element of language teaching has become predominant, this model remains at the core of the structure, and bilateral cultural relations remain essentially a support structure for diplomacy, as the next chapter will show. Furthermore, after decades of exploration of different modes of cultural cooperation by multilateral organisations, there are signs that this model is reasserting itself, this time on behalf of a newly confident and dominant European Union.

\(^{71}\) Ninkovich, op.cit., p. 1
CHAPTER THREE

The growth of bilateral cultural relations 1914 – 1945

Multilateral cultural cooperation on an institutionalised level emerged from the experience of the First World War. The two world wars in fact provide a distinct framework in which to examine it, since the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) existed from 1922 to 1939\(^1\) and its successors (UNESCO, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, the Council of Europe) were all created after 1945. The purpose of this chapter is to supply the cultural relations background against which the ICIC operated and which was formalised at the end of WWII as the generally recognised western European system for cultural relations, based on a network of bilateral cultural conventions. The emphasis, once again, is on Britain, France and Germany as the major influences on structured cultural diplomacy.

Cultural propaganda in World War I

The use of propaganda by Britain in WWI (famously admired by Hitler) has been researched exhaustively by Sanders and Taylor\(^2\). From their work a number of points are worth noting. Firstly, the decision to create a Ministry of Information under Beaverbrook (dismantled after the war) included the setting up of an Art and Literary Branch, which produced and disseminated books, periodicals and art work, including the first war artists. There was also a cinema committee which was responsible for a propaganda film, "Britain Prepared". Eminent authors were recruited to produce

\(^1\) technically it continued to exist until 1947, when it was formally replaced by UNESCO, but it did nothing significant after 1939

\(^2\) P. M. Taylor and M. L. Sanders, "British Propaganda During the First World War", Macmillan, 1982
pamphlets which represented the arguments for war in a way which purported to be objective and was accordingly more likely to be suitable for, in particular, intellectual American opinion. Propaganda on behalf of Britain in neutral countries and the dominions was discussed by a writers' conference convened at the outbreak of war. Towards its end, Arnold Bennett and H. G. Wells were enlisted to manage British propaganda in France and Germany respectively under the direction of John Buchan in the Ministry of Information. Despite its success, it was dismantled when the war ended, partly because of public distrust of the techniques involved, partly to remove the press barons (the team included Lord Northcliffe) from public office.

In France, where there was already a functioning department in the Foreign Affairs Ministry and a "Maison de la Presse" to manage not simply newspaper propaganda but also the supply of books, films and "manifestations artistiques", there were pressing reasons to keep the operation going. The most immediate was the need to present France as strong and victorious. In the wings, Roche and Pigniau note, "la culture americaine avait commencé à seduire l'Occident". For France, the insistence of Woodrow Wilson that the Treaty of Versailles be drafted in both English and French was a key defeat for the language policy. According, the "Service des Oeuvres" continued after the war and was not replaced until 1946.

Germany had the problem in reverse: its aim was to vilify France and discredit the Versailles deal. Despite the widespread disdain which its Kulturpropaganda section attracted, the press office's budget was doubled in five years from 1918 and a culture department was established in the Schuldreferat (War Guilt Section) with the task of

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3 Roche and Pigniau, op. cit., p. 39
winning back sympathy for Germany. This was no easy task: the war had been consistently presented by British and French propagandists alike as a war about culture, which played on the image of Germans as barbarians and connected the destruction of historic buildings with atrocities to people. “Real German culture in all its manifestations ... accepts and champions the new principles and fresh ideas which are to regenerate the effete social organisms of today....” with militarism as “the paramount power before culture can ascend the throne.”

Exercises in cultural propaganda took different forms and, indeed, began to discuss the practice itself, as when, around 1916, opposing groups of French and German Catholic academics took up the question of attacks upon buildings. The German group accused the French and the British of turning German culture into a convenient totem for disguising their own territorial intentions by blowing up the threat out of all proportion. One of the first significant acts of international cultural cooperation, article 56 of the 1899/1907 Hague Convention, concerned the preservation of monuments in wartime, thus, it was argued, transferring responsibility for the preservation of civilisation to the international community. The destruction of great architecture had a profound impact on both sides, notably the ruin of the Ypres Cloth Hall, “witnessed by hundreds of thousands,” and contributed to the widespread sense after the war that the visible and invisible signs of European civilisation alike had been obliterated.

The role of culture as a weapon of national identity during this period seems to have

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5 G. Pfeilschifter (ed.), "German Culture, Catholicism and the World War", Wanderer Printing Co., 1916
6 Fussell, op. cit., p. 40
been highly varied: the use of men of letters directly to present propaganda arguments suggests a need to convince a better educated and better informed public with diverse arguments, emotional and intellectual as well as political and diplomatic. The impact of war on Europe's built heritage could be used to inspire feelings of national outrage but also gave rise to more thoughtful arguments based on an idea of the "common property" of civilisation. Cultural feeling was open to manipulation at all levels, not just amongst intellectuals. Paul Fussell's account of the imagery favoured by soldiers at the front (war diaries, memoirs) shows how strong was the attachment to images of England and the English literary tradition, where pride and possessiveness went alongside a dislike of the Catholic imagery of mainland Europe which may underlie some of subsequent UK attitudes to the idea of "European culture".

Cultural diplomacy between the wars: the pre-Nazi period

During the 1920s bilateral cultural diplomacy began to assume its standard pattern, particularly in France and Germany: the creation of schools and institutes in selected countries, catering to a mixed expatriate and local audience, the latter drawn usually from the educated classes. This was counter-balanced by increased efforts to attract foreign students to French and German universities, there to ingest the language, culture and influence of their hosts. Language teaching became, as it remained, a keystone of the strategy, complemented increasingly by efforts to create, then meet, a demand for cultural products, specifically books, journals and films.

7 ibid.
8 recalling Ralph Bischoff's memories as a child in America of receiving annual calendars depicting German pastoral and traditional views
9 Roche & Pigniau, op. cit
10 H. Arnold, "Foreign Cultural Policy: a Survey from a German Point of View", Oswald Wolff/Erdmann, 1979
Even in France, where budgets continued to grow, Roche & Pigniau note that as much as 95% at times was absorbed by educational and university-based action.

In France, there were two developments of particular interest. The first was the creation in 1922 of the Association Française d’Expansion et d’Echanges Artistiques (later AFAA), which was both publicly and privately funded and is described by Roche and Pigniau in a footnote as the “secular arm” of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. The second was the pioneering of bilateral cultural accords to establish a framework within which language teaching in particular could be formalised (the authors note that this was a way of gaining the entrée in countries where foreigners were not permitted to open language schools). Roche and Pigniau also note the French initiative of establishing and financing an institute in Paris attached to the ICIC, an ostensibly multilateral body which nevertheless had close links to the Service des Oeuvres. There was also the Cité Universitaire, an Alliance Française - sponsored venture for foreign students in Paris.

In Germany, a significant development was the foundation in 1924 of the Akademischer Austauschdienst, which became the Deutsche Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) in 1931. By 1927 it had an office in London, followed by one in Paris in 1930, where it ran a cultural programme The Goethe Institut was not established until 1932. According to Bischoff, the Verein für das Deutschtum in Ausland, formed in 1908 from the Allgemeine Deutsche Schulverein, had

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11 with Iran in 1929, then with Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Romania
12 the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (IIC) which will be discussed in detail in a later chapter. The UK Foreign Office was sceptical about its international vocation, noting the government had given 2 million FF to the body which, “although ostensibly an organisation of the League of Nations, has proved itself a most powerful factor in the spread of French culture abroad”.
had a cash-strapped war after which it had shifted its focus away from the Austro-
Hungarian territories towards areas where there was now anti-German feeling.

Early signs of the kind of ideology which Nazism would graft onto the structures of
the policy of Germanism, well adapted to receive it, were already evident in the
“The Defence of the West” by Henri Massis, a far-right figure associated with the
crypto-fascist Action Francaise movement. Massis attacks Weimar Germany’s
fascination with eastern culture (“Oriental anarchy”) and warns that the unstable
German soul cannot cope with such influences: “it is her intellectual revenge on the
classic West which has conquered her that Germany is seeking to prepare”14.

Compared with this flourishing investment, British reactions remained slow. British
post-war cultural life was deeply ambivalent - while a sense of nostalgia for the lost
Eden and a culture of “heritage in danger” was growing, intellectuals were neither
particularly popular in themselves nor inclined to lend their support to ideas of
spreading the word about England’s merits. Even those who had been involved in
wartime propaganda seem to have held aloof subsequently15. The pressure which
eventually led to the setting up of the British Council came mainly from Foreign
Office circles, both serving officials and retired ambassadors, and the cultural
personalities it attracted were the establishment figures16 who later served CEMA (the
Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts).

15 e.g. Arnold Bennett, whose diaries record a mild interest in the activities of the League of Nations
but nothing more passionate
16 like John Masefield, Walford Davies and Kenneth Clark
Roche and Pigniau record a similar withdrawing amongst French intellectuals who also grew less interested in the idea of national promotion: in particular, those who had been opposed to war "ne partagaien plus les valeurs du messianisme français". In France too, a mixture of cultivated politicians and establishment literati dominated the Alliance Française. There is even a parallel in the revival of interest in ethnography and folklore as a way of life which was passing (and which was annexed by the Vichy regime for internal propaganda purposes).

Fussell's account of experiences during the war, reinforced by accounts such as that of Williams (1972) of public opinion in Britain, France and Germany, show that national cultural attachments deepened as a result of the war (although only in Britain, it appears, was internationalism widely regarded as unpatriotic by definition). There was also revulsion against the use which had been made of culture as propaganda. Some of the WWI propagandists, such as J. Wickham Steed, seem to have moved towards federalism: the "New Europe Group" set up in 1929 attracted a mix of Chatham House and Bloomsbury, while in France the attraction of European federalism was much stronger, appealing to both the groups of statesmen who backed the ICIC and to the circles surrounding Emanuel Mounier and Jacques Maritain. It is hardly possible, therefore, to argue either that public and intellectual opinion began to reject cultural sentiment as a result of the war, or that it rejected feelings of a wider cultural closeness. The two coexisted, possibly without much mutual reference in most cases.

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17 ibid., p.39
19 J. Williams, "The Home Fronts: Britain, France and Germany, 1914-1918", Constable, 1972
As ever, perceptions differed: according to the Secretary General of the Alliance Française in 1926, "l'Angleterre, l'Italie, l'Allemagne font partout des efforts pour développer leur langue....la France est loin de dépenser pour sa propagande les sommes que consacrent à la leur les autres nations", an argument intended to extract more funds from the French government. However, by the 1930s, not only did France and Germany have substantial investment to show in national projection overseas (though admittedly, the UK did not have the complication of the Versailles settlement to deal with), but the beginnings of the intense Franco-German cultural cooperation were under way, starting with the Cercle du Sohlberg (groups of young intellectuals).

In Britain, the 1920 Tilley Committee had considered the cultural and educational welfare of expatriates, but to little effect. In 1928, the Travel Association (in due course the English Tourist Board) was formed out of the "Come to Britain" movement, essentially a businessman's committee, with the support of the Department of Overseas Trade. It had a vague cultural interest - its members included a representative of the Society of West End Theatres and, as had been the case with the Alliance Française, diplomatic missions were urged to help by identifying local organisations and provide facilities for propaganda films. It was followed in 1930 by Evelyn Wrench's internationally-minded All People's Association (APA) which had the backing of the great and good including the Archbishop of York, John Galsworthy and John Buchan. Its structure was not unlike that of the Alliance Française, and despite its optimistic internationalist aims, it remained overwhelmingly British-

\[21\] at the same time, the head of DAAD in Paris observed, "non sans amertume, l'habileté avec laquelle la politique culturelle française faîr servir sa propre buts par l'autres" (B. Pellissier, "L'Antenne Parisienne du DAAD à travers les Archives de l'AA de Bonn jusqu'à en 1939", p. 275, in Bock, op.cit)

\[22\] see R. Thalmann, "Du Cercle du Sohlberg au Comité France-Allemagne: une Évolution Ambigue de la Coopération Français-Allemand", in Bock, op.cit

\[23\] Taylor, 1981, op.cit
dominated and struggled to get sufficient funds on a voluntary basis to expand. These two formed the basis of the new British Council established in 1935, and the APA ceased to exist the following year.

Disparaging reports of British showings had also been coming back from international expositions, which appear in themselves to have been very influential as weapons of cultural diplomacy, both as benchmarks for international comparison and propaganda for domestic consumption. Lebovics (1992) describes the propagandist elements of the Paris exhibition of 1931, designed to convince the French of their mission to the colonies. Sir Stephen Tallents, an eccentric former diplomat credited by Taylor (1981) with focusing much of the debate in British official circles, visited Barcelona in 1929 and found the (unofficial) British exhibit depressing, whereas the German pavilion, designed by Mies van der Rohe, impressed with a sense of Germany as a modern industrial power.

1933-1939: the British Council and "national projection"

The British ambassador to Egypt, Sir Percy Loraine, whose 1933 despatch is credited by historians of the British Council with providing the impetus for the British change of heart, described French cultural diplomacy as "a rather unpleasant form of propaganda for purely selfish national ends". A less prejudiced Foreign Office view came from R.K. Johnstone (later employed by the British Council) who conceded in a 1936 memorandum about cultural projection in the Mediterranean that France was successful in “the national propagandist’s dream of intellectual domination” partly

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because her tradition is "lucid and accessible", partly because of the French conviction of "the power of culture in general and the superiority of their own in particular", and partly because France had had a lot of practice. He concluded that British interests were damaged by such activity, although the clincher was, once again, its practice by Mussolini’s Italy (considered to be overdoing it to the extent of being counter-productive) and Nazi Germany ("more discreet and more thorough")

The history of the British Council is well chronicled and will not be repeated here. However, the Foreign Office papers covering this period reveal much about why cultural diplomacy was starting to acquire priority for British diplomats and what sort of action was considered a suitable response. Alongside the growing threat of fascist regimes operating in spheres of British interest was the need, initially more pressing, to counteract the negative image of a country in economic depression. To achieve this it was deemed acceptable to allocate small sums for the purchase of books, to assist with the expenses of lecturers (preferably touring) to anglo-foreign societies, and to advise about suitable films "which would attractively depict British scenes" and events of national importance such as Henley and the Derby.

Responses from diplomatic posts also did much to determine the approach to be adopted. There was solid consensus that a low-key operation which played on the contrast with the opposition would be effective and welcome. Not only the Germans and Italians (there was by now a heavily subsidised programme under Mussolini) but

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27 PRO FO 431/2
28 ibid.
29 PRO FO 431/1. These ranged from Loraine’s broadside from Egypt against the scandalous behaviour of the French in attempting to get their language onto the same footing as English, to a suggestion from a diplomat in Estonia with a wide-ranging conception of what constituted culture that, whilst the art lectures from London were much appreciated, some Keep Fit classes would also be well received.
also the French are criticised for general pushiness and, in the latter case, excessive Paris dirigisme. The report from Greece asserts that the British are respected for not trying to stuff their culture down Greek throats.

The British Council, accordingly, was launched as something reassuring, unthreatening, essentially ordinary, and the Britain it presented as a stable society whose unassuming values deserved to be better known. Despite disclaimers that “we should avoid the idea that it is directed against any other country or indeed that it is competitive”\textsuperscript{30}, the determinedly non-evangelical tone seems designed to draw comparisons with the French as well as the Germans and Italians. Indeed, until the outbreak of war, the British Council hardly attempted to articulate a policy or philosophy at all. It did not produce an annual report until 1940 (partly to avoid giving information to rivals, according to White), and its main publications, the “British Life and Thought” series and “Britain Advances”, also date from WWII. Its early effort seems to have consisted of behind-the-scenes support for the three existing British Institutes in Florence, Paris and Buenos Aires, establishing more where the support was thought likely to be strongest (Portugal, Scandinavia and the Baltic States) and encouraging the involvement of the travel and publishing trades.

\textbf{Nazi cultural propaganda}

The literature available in English on the cultural policy of Nazi Germany says little about Hitler’s external cultural relations policy, which was part of the Goebbels culture/propaganda portfolio. Arnold\textsuperscript{31} skirts the issue somewhat. Grosshans,

\textsuperscript{30} Rex Leeper, quoted in Taylor, op.cit., p. 144
\textsuperscript{31} Arnold, op.cit
however, mentions the personal influence on Hitler of Dietrich Eckart, who considered that “the European invitation to peoples of diverse characteristics and different historical experiences to participate in European culture”32 was a failure (so was Germanism, in his view). Eckart died in 1923, but Hitler, in the opinion of Grosshans, came to see Germany as the custodian of the “true Europe”, and cosmopolitan France as corrupt, racially impure and not fitted to represent a European ideal. The Deutsche Schulverein changed its name again, from ‘Verein’ to ‘Volksbund’, and, though remaining a private organisation, nevertheless squared Nazism with its own established aims without too much trouble and was used as a channel for disguised funding (to Sudeten Germans, at a time when Reich funding was illegal)33. McMurry & Lee describe how a number of organisations (including a foreign division of the Hitler Youth) were briefed to promote a “community of destiny for all Germans”34, a centralised direction justified by the argument that such bodies needed information in order to do justice to the regime’s philosophy.

A 1993 colloquy35 provides an invaluable collection of papers showing how Franco-German initiatives of the pre-war period, mostly involving young intellectuals, followed a similar pattern of increasingly strained relations as German attitudes hardened and became more racist and propagandist, while the French partners either split off in disgust or became increasingly apologist for the regime (the 1935 Franco-German Committee which resulted from one such initiative is pithily summarised as “somme tout, le Gotha de la future collaboration”36). There was some reciprocity with other fascist regimes - in the FO’s trawl round its posts, Spain was reported as having

33 Bischoff, op. cit
34 McMurry and Lee, op. cit., p. 63
35 Bock, "Entre Locarno et Vichy", op.cit
36 Thalmann, p. 82, in Bock, op. cit.
established links with the recently established DAAD, described as a "semi-official body".

The British Council in its first annual report in 1940 summed up: "Nazi cultural propaganda is the fanatical propagation of a gospel fanatically held, differing from English (sic) cultural policy in that it is determined to overawe where it cannot convert"\(^{37}\). Péllissier corroborates the view of Bischoff that the cultural propaganda bodies had few problems adapting their mission to that of Nazism. She cites the opinion of the director of the Paris branch of the DAAD that efficacy depended on getting rid of the idea, "fréquente outre-Rhin"\(^{38}\), of the superiority of France, particularly as France is a centre of Jewish and Marxist counter-propaganda. Germanism and Nazism were to be considered identical. In 1938, Germany followed France in establishing cultural agreements (with, unsurprisingly, Italy and Japan).

There were attempts to retain at least an element of persuasion by cultural means. Péllissier states that DAAD's French "antenne" had until 1938 tried to remain a cultural centre open to all French, with the aim of proving how committed all non-Jewish Germans were to the cause. Meanwhile, T.S. Eliot noted after the war how what he considered to be the much more important task (compared to formal cultural relations) of keeping channels of contact open between men of letters had become impossible: first Italian contributors to "The Criterion" "became silent", then German writers became "worse than silent...unintelligible"\(^{39}\). Eliot was not a great believer in cultural diplomacy, but this experience had convinced him of the importance of non-formal cultural cooperation at the intellectual level.

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\(^{37}\) First Annual Report of the British Council, p. 18

\(^{38}\) Péllissier, p. 278, in Bock, op.cit

\(^{39}\) T. S. Eliot, "The Unity of European Culture", BBC broadcast, Berlin, 1946; also appears in "Notes towards a Definition of Culture", p. 116. Reprinted Faber, 1983
Evelyn Wrench, too, found things grew increasingly problematic for his All People's Association as the 1930s progressed. Despite lengthy articles in the APA newsletter on the "Kraft Durch Freude" programme and Wrench's own efforts at understanding - "the first Englishman in these critical times tries to explain the German point of view to his countrymen"\(^4\) -, moral and intellectual fissures were apparent by 1935, when the Amsterdam branch of the APA failed to appreciate Dr Eugen Kuhnemann's talk on "Deutsches Schicksal im Lichte des Geschichtes" - "a point of view which is seldom fully understood abroad"\(^41\).

Cultural relations during WWII

Of the three countries under consideration here, only the UK was in a position to develop anything during the wartime period which could contribute to a European system after the war ended. German cultural propaganda was of a piece with the internal cultural policies of the Reichskulturkammer\(^42\). By 1943 a Kulturabteilung in the Auswärtiges Amt under von Ribbentrop was operating alongside Goebbels. The general account given by McMurry & Lee in 1947 remains the most useful on external cultural policy after 1939: all available organisations were mobilised for fund-raising and propaganda amongst allies and potential allies, with explicit roles

\(^{40}\) Newsletter no. 12, 1934

\(^{41}\) Newsletter no. 17, 1935. Other examples of post-WWI national responses to cultural diplomacy included the Soviet VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) created in 1925 with the express aim of winning sympathy abroad for the USSR through friendship groups under the guise of "the triumph of genuine world culture" (see McMurry & Lee, op.cit) and the very different non-governmental Swiss organisation Pro-Helvetia, created in 1939 specifically as a spiritual defence against Nazism and which remains an important element in Swiss cultural policy-making today. See also H. Grosshans, "Hitler and the Artists", Holmes & Meier, 1983; B. Taylor and W. van der Will, (eds), "The Nazification of Art: Art, Design, Music, Architecture and Film in the Third Reich", Winchester, 1990, etc. See also J. W. Baird, "The Mystical World of Nazi Propaganda", Minnesota Press, 1974, for a discussion of the use of propaganda broadcasts aimed at denigrating French culture as a "softening up" process preceding the invasion of France.
vis-à-vis the population when the Germans invaded, e.g. Norway. The authors note that the Nazis nevertheless continued to maintain they had no European or world mission - the idea of Lebensraum remained substantially unchanged from that which was propounded in WWI.

Although the apparatus of the external cultural policy of France passed to the Vichy regime, its scope for independent operation was severely limited. Roche & Pigniau note that the heads of the Service des Oeuvres and of AFAA were removed from their posts, while all the institutes with the exception of those in Spain and Portugal were closed. Villedieu (1950) notes that the Villa Médicis was left throughout the war in the hands of an Italian caretaker. Vichy was debarred by the terms of its armistice agreement from maintaining diplomatic relations with countries occupied by the Germans, terms subsequently extended to the UK, USA and the whole of the American continent except Argentina. Where it could operate, the Service des Oeuvres was mainly used to promote the values of the "National Revolution".

The London branch of the Alliance Française severed relations with Vichy in 1940 and acted until 1942 as a backup service for de Gaulle's Free French, co-operating closely with the British and maintaining a provisional management committee rallying committees abroad and keeping the Alliance afloat until the liberation. In 1942 it moved with de Gaulle to Algiers, having established itself in Bruézière's words as "le front intellectuel et culturel pour défendre la prestige de la France encore intact". Meanwhile, the separate Institut Français was kept operating as a British company under the chairmanship of the head of the FO's French Welfare Department,

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43 Bruézière, op. cit., p. 130
Lord Bessborough\textsuperscript{44}.

The British Council, meanwhile, became, somewhat to its own surprise, the focal point of European cultural relations in exile. From 1940 the Council worked closely with CEMA\textsuperscript{45}, to which it channelled part of its grant to present concerts and performances for Allied troops stationed in Britain. This operation was managed by the Home Department, which also operated hostels and centres in provincial ports for Allied seamen and in provincial towns for refugees. It was also responsible for the lease on the London headquarters of the Alliance Française which it also subsidised from specially augmented appropriations. The Council formed the centre of a network of cultural institutes keeping alive the culture and contacts of the Allied and occupied countries: during the 1941/42 financial year, there opened an Institut Belge, a Czech Institute, a Polish "hearth", a British-Norwegian Institute, a Turkish "Halkevi", with a Greek Institute and a Netherlands Institute on the way and plans for a Yugoslav House\textsuperscript{46}.

The British Council and CEMA acted as complementary agencies throughout the war.

\textsuperscript{44} PRO FO 370/756. These links gave rise to a curious discussion in 1943 about the future of French culture after the war. Bessborough, Sir Henry Pelham, chairman of the British Institute in France and Prof. W.J Entwhistle of the British Council agreed to ask the Foreign Secretary to put together a national plan to assist the French nation in "their cultural reconstruction after the war". Their anxiety was caused by the proliferation of private schemes for Franco-British organisations, many unfamiliar with France, with the potential for causing a "disastrous imbroglio". The Foreign Office commented that this was both naïve and unnecessary, believing that French culture, far from being ruined, "may astonish us after the war". More pragmatically, Bessborough noted that "as rumour has it that Vansittart has collected £100,000 to persuade us to hate the Germans, it may take a good deal more than... £10,000... to persuade us all to like the French!". The scheme perished.

\textsuperscript{45} Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts, the forerunner to the Arts Council of Great Britain, set up in 1940 as a joint venture of the Pilgrim Trust and the Board of Education. In 1943, the Treasury compared it favourably to the British Council in terms of self-sufficiency, thus preparing the way for a post-war programme of state subsidy to the arts.

\textsuperscript{46} British Council, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Annual Report, 1941-42
period. The Public Record Office contains the minutes of CEMA meetings, as well as CEMA’s correspondence with the British Council. These show that the two bodies mainly saw themselves as responsible for facilitating and managing the activity of a similar range of clients at home and abroad respectively, rather than as formulators of a strategic policy. They shared a certain cosiness of style, populist rather than intellectual, pragmatic rather than visionary. Practical problems arose regularly when one side made arrangements without consulting the other but the records show no evidence of significant policy disagreements. The respective tasks of each body were understood and largely unchallenged by the other.47

At the end of the war the British Council felt sufficiently confident about its role to articulate a theory of cultural relations: “this work, conducted as one side of an exchange, rather than the intentional projection, as it is called, of Britain and the British way of life, is the core of popular relations, as it is the core of relations between individuals”48. In his foreword to the 1947 study by the Americans McMurry and Lee, Archibald MacLeish, fervent internationalist, US delegate to UNESCO and contributor of the “ringing phrases” to its constitution49, says much the same thing more bluntly: “Foreign Offices are no longer offices to speak for one people to another; the people can now speak for them themselves”50. The authors, using the Council’s own phrase “national interpretation” to describe the newly

47 see also Sir Stephen Tallents, whose 1932 pamphlet “The Projection of England” is credited by Taylor (1981) with helping to change the climate of opinion on the use of cultural propaganda. Despite his easily mocked ideas about the attractions of foxhunting and the House of Lords for foreigners, Tallents is interesting because he looks beyond the narrow concept of cultural diplomacy towards “the borderland which lies between government and private enterprise ...a school of national projection...more free to make experiments than the ordinary government department dares to be”, (Tallents, p.45), a rare instance when the internal and external aspects of cultural policy are seen as combined.
48 British Council, 5th Annual Report, 1944/5, p. 9
50 foreword, p. x
developed British approach, noted the contrast between the French emphasis on intellectual life and high culture and its slightly folksy British counterpart\textsuperscript{51}, which they thought had the effect of de-politicising diplomacy by distancing it from government.

American diplomats generally were impressed by this British model. The State Department had resisted any formal cultural diplomacy other than the (genuinely) private. George N. Schuster regards the British Council as the most influential of the European systems, albeit rather disingenuously describing it as “an organisation of private citizens”. For him, it “very greatly encouraged those who believed that an effective cultural relations programme should be divorced from official propaganda”\textsuperscript{52}. If the first distinctive characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon approach to cultural relations was its normalising quality, noted by McMurry & Lee, the second, and more significant, is precisely that well-marketed separateness. It is the external mirror-image of the “arm’s length principle” which is still regarded as the defining characteristic of the UK arts policy system, and might even have influenced it.

The Foreign Office appears to have been more cautious than the British Council (whose post-war existence, as it well knew, was by no means assured) about using the UK’s position of dominance at the end of the war to impose a British model of cultural relations on the rest of Europe. However, there was nonetheless a sense throughout official circles that something of a cultural lead would be looked for from

\textsuperscript{51} for example, the early British Council publications included the series “British Life and Thought” which aimed to introduce the rest of the world to the merits of “The British System of Government” (“...the qualifications for becoming a Parliamentary candidate are not exacting...”) and “British Justice”, which contains an example of a murder trial and a photograph of police moving on some very orderly-looking demonstrators from Downing Street "where they had been causing a disturbance"

\textsuperscript{52} p. 5, in P. Braisted (ed.), "Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations", Englewood Cliffs, New York
Britain after the war.

One of the centrepieces of the British Council's wartime triumph was its role as secretariat to the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME), which had been its own initiative. In 1943 R. A. B. Butler, Minister of Education, was persuaded to convene and chair a meeting of governments-in-exile for the purpose of discussing the educational reconstruction of Europe after the war. Its initial aims were to monitor, discuss and collect information about war damage, no more. However, it formed the basis for an Anglo-American proposal for the post-war cultural cooperation body that became UNESCO. This is evidence that the Council saw a multilateral role for itself within cultural cooperation.

There seems, nevertheless, to be some lack of clarity in planning for a post-war role for Britain in cultural relations. The report commissioned from Sir Findlater Stewart is ambiguous about its European commitment, partly because of the sheer extent of potential British commitments, which paralysed any action beyond the immediate continuation of the Council on a "business much as usual" footing. Stewart describes Europe as the main problem to be faced, yet devotes only one paragraph to it. He gets no further in defining the content of such relations than the need to convey a sort of generalised niceness, treated in order of symbolic importance. When, in due course, the FO and the Council did consider policy on Europe, their approach to it was to use it as a testing ground for new policy approaches (such as a move away from the

53 PRO FO 924/112. The report concludes that, for instance, the merits of queuing and of British policemen should be conveyed, while those of a particular "fried fish shop in Barking" need not be

54 PRO FO 924/535, 1946
Accordingly, the British were less well-prepared than they may have believed themselves to be to take the initiative in post-war cultural cooperation, particularly as the model of bilateral reciprocity they had pioneered, and which they expected to become the cornerstone of any cooperation, proved not to be the only possibility. In particular, the structures of Franco-German cooperation proved durable enough to withstand the testing-to-destruction they endured during the 1930s and subsequently, becoming the bedrock of European unity.

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55 Europe was divided into three zones - “normal”, “semi-normal” and “abnormal”. The first consisted of wartime allies, plus Spain, Portugal and Switzerland, where there was an established government, no military occupation and conditions were relatively stable. The second was Italy and Germany, where British forces were present but conditions were stabilising gradually. The third (which at that point included Austria) meant areas with Communist governments “highly suspicious of Western cultural penetration”
CHAPTER FOUR

The League of Nations: the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation

"...like a new Columbus, they seem to have seen before their eyes a world that only needed to be grasped with wide enough arms and it would rejuvenate the tired efforts of people who had worked hitherto in the isolation of their own cabbage patches..."1

(Sir Frank Heath on the first years of the ICIC, minutes of the British National Committee, 1929)

WWII brought about a major change in attitudes to cultural relations. By 1948, all the major structures of multilateral cultural cooperation were in place2, suggesting a fairly seamless transition from the wartime activity centred on the Allies and building on the structures of bilateral cultural diplomacy culminating in the network of bilateral cultural conventions. In fact, this was not the case.

To understand the post-war diversification into multilateral cultural cooperation, and the extent to which it was a new direction, not a progressive development, it is necessary to examine two pre-war themes: intellectual cooperation and European federalism. This chapter looks primarily at the French-led initiative which brought leading intellectuals of the day together under the auspices of the League of Nations3 as the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC). This lasted from 1922 until the outbreak of war. The committee, and France's role in shaping it, not only created a template for the subsequent subject matter of cultural cooperation, but also established a tradition whereby the function of cultural cooperation was to act as a commentary upon the actions of governments rather than, as with bilateral cultural diplomacy, a lubricant for achieving national objectives.

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1 PRO ED25/25
2 apart from the European Community, which did not become established until the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 and did not acquire an active role in cultural cooperation until the late 1970s
3 the forerunner of the United Nations set up under the Versailles settlement which was intended to act as arbiter in all subsequent international conflicts, but which lacked binding authority
The ICIC provided post-war cultural cooperation with its shape and its methodology. However, it was not intended as an exclusively European exercise. In order to provide as complete as possible a picture of the influences that brought about the particular configuration of structures for cultural cooperation in 1948, the concluding section of this chapter will look at a scheme, unrealised, for European unity which explicitly foresaw a place for cultural cooperation in bringing this about. The Pan-Europa movement never became more than a pressure group, but its founder, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, was influential and his ideas offer a counterpoint to the thinking of both the ICIC and to their intellectual successors, the European federalists who developed more fully a theory of culture in the context of European integration which detached it from the individual interests of nation-states and relocated it within the unification project. Although Pan-Europa and the ICIC appear to have had no contact, the latter seems almost perfectly to embody the former’s vision of a cadre of intellectuals working on behalf of other intellectuals to bring a sense of international mission into their day-to-day activity.

The International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation: its inception and aims

The membership of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) could hardly have been more eminent: it included Henri Bergson, Albert Einstein, Marie Curie, Paul Valéry and a range of statesmen/men of letters such as Edouard Herriot and Jules Destrée⁴. Though usually discussed as the precursor of UNESCO, a more rounded picture emerges from other literature, including the detailed memoirs of

⁴ respectively, a former Prime Minister of France and a government minister in Belgium
two of its founder members, and from its proceedings, which are available in full in the Public Records Office, along with some original correspondence relating to the work of its British National Committee.

The most detailed account in English of its work appears to be that of Jan Kolasa, who has researched its origins thoroughly. Otherwise, accounts of its activities are mainly perfunctory. Frank Ninkovich discusses it briefly from an American perspective in the context of the activity of American voluntary societies in the 1920's. J. A. Joyce regards the Committee ("a small League brains trust") as one of a number of attempts in the 1920s to win over public opinion to the League. Other historians of the League touch on it in passing, if at all. F. S. Northedge, a respected international relations commentator of the realist school, notes that, if the League had seemed quixotic, the ICIC "must have seemed a thing of pure fantasy", but also that this "quiet seminar... of great names in the learned world" did make a contribution to international cooperation as a concept: "a symbol of the fact that, at the highest level of mental achievement, the human race is one, not a chaos of conflicting parts."

Kolasa's account is particularly helpful on the origins of the ICIC, less so on its

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6 PRO ED25/34 and 35
7 J. Kolasa, "International intellectual cooperation (the League experience and the beginnings of UNESCO)", Travaux de la Societe des Sciences et des Lettres de Wroclaw, no. 81, 1962. Kolasa himself refers to a 1950 thesis on the subject by A. L. Bennett, University of Illinois, not consulted for the present thesis
11 Northedge, op. cit, pp. 186-9
programmes, as he concentrates on the less purely "cultural" aspects of its work. Accordingly, I have drawn most heavily on the ICIC's own documentation, supplemented by memoirs, to enable me to concentrate on the most relevant areas of work to cultural cooperation, especially the work of the Arts and Letters Subcommittee.

Most commentators attribute the idea for a "League of Minds", as the ICIC was sometimes known, to Léon Bourgeois. Bourgeois was certainly its proposer at the League of Nations, of which he was president. However, the British classicist Gilbert Murray, a founder member, gives the credit to his predecessor as chairman, and the ICIC's first, the French philosopher Henri Bergson. Curiously, few (English language) accounts of Bergson and his work, which was highly influential in intellectual circles at the turn of the century, mention his involvement with the ICIC or suggest what influence he had on cultural cooperation. As this chapter hopes to demonstrate, he in fact left a lasting legacy.

The ICIC existed for seventeen years in active form, although technically it survived until 1946 when its assets and functions were formally made over to the United Nations. From 1926 onward it was supported by the Paris-based International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation under the directorship of, first, Julien Luchaire (an Inspector-General of Schools), then Henri Bonnet (subsequently French ambassador to the USA at the time of the creation of UNESCO). By 1937 it supported a programme of such completeness that it was able to provide a substantial base for

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12 i.e. its scientific, educational and international relations programmes
13 Luchaire and de Reynold both give this impression, which is echoed by Roche and Pigniau, op.cit. The term "League of Minds" was used by Paul Valéry in the first of the "Correspondences", open letters by prominent intellectuals, which he edited in the 1930s
The status of the ICIC was that of a technical/expert committee. It had no representative function: its members were appointed ad personam by the League Council\textsuperscript{15} and were supposed to advise the League on its action, if any, in the field of intellectual cooperation, a function which did not appear in the League's founding Covenant and for which no budgetary provision was made until 1926, when the Committee was provided with back-up in the form of a permanent Institute, housed and subsidised by the French government. According to Kolasa, the French Association for the League of Nations had urged the creation of a permanent supporting organisation from the outset, and it seems that such a body was the real political aim of the French government.

The Committee met annually for sessions of four or five working days each. Its task, which it had to define for itself, was to act as a focal point for intellectuals on a global basis, including picking up the threads of those organisations which had been disrupted by the war, and to improve their function by the encouragement of new ones or the completion of existing ones. There was nothing new about gatherings of intellectuals – Kolasa notes that the Union of International Associations, which itself acted as a kind of forerunner to the ICIC, had 230 members by 1914, and the ICIC seems to have seen itself initially as taking over some of the work of this body. In so far as intellectual cooperation was ever defined, it was this process of liaison and the encouragement of new structures to facilitate contact\textsuperscript{16}. The majority of the

\textsuperscript{15} in fact, the secretariat – see Luchaire, op.cit
\textsuperscript{16} see PRO ED 25/34, ICIC first session, minutes – opening remarks of Dr Nitobe of the League Secretariat state that the work "had not been strictly defined", but was intended "to facilitate intellectual relations between peoples"
committee's members were drawn, at first at least, from the science and university research community.

As it settled down, the committee began to assume other aims for itself, such as the fostering of international solidarity or advocating the interests of the intellectual community. There was not always consensus about these; nor did the Committee agree at first about the extent to which its work was supposed to obtain practical results as opposed to indicating the right way ahead in world affairs. It was shaped, therefore, by the enthusiasm of individual members. Like other such groups that came after it, the ICIC started with a blank sheet of paper and figured out what it was meant to be doing as it went along, as its minutes make clear\(^\text{17}\).

**Structures and working methods**

As an advisory committee the ICIC could not act independently of the League’s principal organs. It had to make recommendations at the end of each session for onward transmission to the General Assembly. It would then have to wait until the Assembly’s reaction was transmitted back. If money was required to implement a proposal, this would have to be expressly voted\(^\text{18}\). The Committee relied a great deal on the physical presence of its members to direct and coordinate activity between sessions. The sheer difficulty of getting to Geneva meant that despite its best endeavours the Committee was dominated by Europeans and by European concerns (a problem which bedevilled the League in general). This showed most clearly in the composition of the work of the various sub-committees, which had to meet more often

\(^{17}\) The minutes are verbatim and comments attributed, giving a vivid picture of the way in which the Committee reached its conclusions

\(^{18}\) Which the Assembly was reluctant to do – according to Luchaire, it regarded intellectual cooperation as "une fleur à sa boutonnière" (op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 94)
and thus became composed mainly of those who could spare the time to travel.

The South Americans tried hardest to keep non-European concerns at the forefront of the agenda, but the struggle was an unequal one and few topics of concern mainly to non-European members ever got beyond the stage of initial discussion. However, the difficulty extended even to the Scandinavian and East European countries. Once the Institute had been set up in Paris, with its demands for frequent attendance by a Committee of Directors, the narrow geographical concentration of influence worsened.

The ICIC also encountered difficulties making contact with the intellectual associations who were supposed to be its raison d'être and persuading them to respond if it succeeded (those who did become involved with it tended to be Paris or Brussels based). The solution was thought to be a system of National Committees who would act as its information-gatherers and disseminators, especially in liaising with academies, intellectual workers' federations and learned societies. However, these tended rapidly to become bored with being post-boxes and started to see themselves as either lobby groups or generators of ideas, or both. By the 1930s they had their own regular conferences; and by 1937, when the ICIC discontinued active work, they had more or less displaced the ICIC as the main influence on the, by then largely autonomous, Institute. The Institute itself encouraged "national delegates" and "correspondents", which it accredited, who mainly lobbied for national projects but were also able to secure national donations for work which interested their authorities.

19 those that did often reflected European aspirations, as, for example, the attempt of a Japanese member to persuade the ICIC to promote the use of western script for official purposes in the Far East
20 the member from Norway, the scientist Kristine Bonnevoie, pointed out that it took her four days each way to get to and from Geneva
Despite the Committee's cherished and often-reiterated belief in itself as a group of non-aligned individuals, it is evident that individual members sometimes spoke and acted with the support of their national governments, and on occasion felt obliged to press a governmental agenda\textsuperscript{21}. This was most obviously the case with France, where the politician Paul Painlevé, who joined ICIC when Bergson stood down, was obliged to admit that he was, in effect, under government instructions to resist the reforms of the Institute which were being pressed for in 1930\textsuperscript{22}.

ICIC's non-political status became a polite fiction where the Institute was concerned. The French offer to establish and fund it was made and the arrangements pushed through the League Assembly by Bergson between two sessions of the Committee, several of whom appear to have felt bounced, with some reason. Despite early claims that it would be "a small international island" outside Paris and efforts made to attract non-French nationals, French personnel tended to predominate amongst its staff.

Although the disinterestedness of both the French government and the Committee are many times proclaimed throughout the minutes of the Committee, Roche and Pigniau state frankly that the Institute was "très liée au service des Oeuvres"\textsuperscript{23}, while Luchaire, who claims credit for suggesting the Institute to the Minister of Education, states that "une conversation suffit pour lui faire comprendre l'intérêt qu'aurait la France à prendre la tête des affaires internationales sur le plan intellectuel"\textsuperscript{24}.

\textsuperscript{21} from 1932 onwards, the ICIC was obviously unlikely to be immune from the general political disintegration of the League: Madariaga in his memoirs ("Morning Without Noon", Saxon House, 1973) notes how from 1932 onwards the meetings he attended as part of the Arts and Letters Sub-Committee featured government placemen who forced him to sit through "fascist twaddle".

\textsuperscript{22} See ICIC, Twelfth Session (ED25/35)

\textsuperscript{23} Roche and Pigniau, op. cit., p.44

\textsuperscript{24} Luchaire, op.cit, vol. II, p. 95
However, this was not confined to France. Jules Destée, a passionate advocate of artists’ rights, had domestic interests in mind as surely as international ones when arguing for the general adoption of measures such as “droit de suite” and “droit de respect” which had recently been introduced in France and Belgium. The members from these countries in particular were fond of announcing to the Committee that its “ideas” (generally formulated in working groups they themselves attended and adopted subsequently by the committee in plenary) had been conveyed to their national governments and subsequently implemented by them.

In the case of Italy, the Mussolini regime actually sacked one ICIC member and replaced him with another, which the ICIC seems to have accepted without protest. The regime’s role in the creation of the Rome-based Cinematograph Institute is less clear-cut. This became, by rather unclear means, officially linked to the Institute in Paris, but was paid for and run by the Italian government. Oliver Bell, secretary to the British National Committee and later the first director of the British Film Institute, was sent to look at it in 1929, and confirmed this. Links were severed when Italy left the League of Nations. According to de Reynold, however, Mussolini was persuaded to set up the Cinematograph Institute in order to wrest it from the grip of Luchaire, who wanted it as part of the Paris Institute.

Likewise the US, if less overtly, made efforts to push the Committee in a direction which would accord more with US policy, particularly over reform of the Institute,

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25 In fairness it should be noted that some East and Southern European countries with no obvious axe to grind are also recorded as having taken up some of the Committee’s recommendations and implemented them nationally.
26 See Kolasa, op.cit; also de Reynold, op.cit.
27 Apart from Einstein, who walked out but was persuaded to return.
28 He reported that “at the moment, the Institute is Mr de Feo. Everything is centralised in himself” (Minutes, British National Committee, 9th December 1929, PRO ED25/25). De Feo had previously run the Fascist propaganda film agency, LUCE.
much criticised as a French bastion under Luchaire, and an inefficient one at that. The US used budget appropriations as a bargaining counter, blocking these in the League Assembly to make up for its geographical distance. As Ninkovich notes, after 1930 the US actively put pressure on the Committee to develop a role in promoting the study of international relations in order to justify its continuing involvement, and made sure that money was forthcoming from the Rockefeller Foundation to enable it to do so.

The UK held back from any obvious direct involvement at the political level, an attitude about which Gilbert Murray, both as British member and as chairman, had mixed feelings. Although his correspondence makes clear that the Foreign Office made no attempt to influence his actions as a member one way or the other, it often joined with the US in blocking appropriations at the General Assembly and declined either to appoint a UK National Committee itself or to offer financial support when one was set up under pressure from the UK's learned societies.

German involvement is hard to pinpoint, if any, due no doubt to the fact that the German member was Albert Einstein, who consistently found his position difficult and according to Kolasa insisted that he be regarded as representing not Germany but German science. He was not a regular attender, a fact which de Reynold attributes to

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29 though according to de Reynold, the Foreign Office took exception to the Indian intellectual Mr Bannerjea when he turned out to have strongly anti-British views and tried to get him sacked

30 ironically, on the eve of WWII, Gilbert Murray believed he had persuaded the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, to change his mind. But by then it was too late (correspondence of the British National Committee, ED25/12). The British National Committee (1926-1934) rubbed along on voluntary donations to cover expenses (Lord Eustace Percy gave them £30 a year) and unpaid work by its members, responding to requests for advice, about which it then frequently heard no more (minutes, ED25/25)
his discomfort as a German. In 1932 he quit, finding his position untenable.\(^{31}\)

Luchaire, on a fund-raising trip for the Institute in 1926, records receiving a friendly welcome and some financial assistance in Berlin. As for the Russians, de Reynold's account suggests that neither of the two Russian members was exactly persona grata with the regime: the first was tried as a Trotskysite and hanged; his successor was Geneva-based and later joined the League secretariat.\(^{32}\)

The ICIC’s programmes 1922-1937

The ICIC’s earliest preoccupation was with the situation of the intellectual community, particularly those in distress, and ways in which the League might “facilitate intellectual relations between peoples”\(^{33}\), with particular reference to scientific relations. Its attempts were often misread as an attempt to impose a layer of bureaucracy on networks that were functioning quite well without it\(^{34}\) and it moved instead towards a different role as a spokesman for the intellectual community, beginning with an “enquiry into intellectual life”, conducted by questionnaire, which produced an interesting but useless pen-picture of the financial and social status of intellectuals across much of Europe and beyond. The enquiry, which seems to have made little impact on the governments to which its findings were addressed, set a

\(^{31}\) Einstein was not in any case impressed with the ICIC, calling it "the most ineffectual enterprise with which I have been associated" (M. White & J. Gribbin, "Einstein - a Life in Science", p. 188, Simon & Schuster, 1993) and as "too French, too Allied" (G. Holton & Y. Elhana, eds., "Albert Einstein: Historical and Cultural Perspectives", p. 333, Princeton University Press, 1982)

\(^{32}\) it may have been this member who caused one of the ICIC’s diplomatic problems with the Russians over the choice of contemporary Russian authors suitable for translation – unsurprisingly, his selection did not appeal to the Soviet delegation at the League who insisted, successfully, that the Ministry of Culture should decide on the content

\(^{33}\) PRO ED 25/34, First Session, 1 May 1922, opening remarks

\(^{34}\) in some instances, the effects seem to have gone beyond the merely irritating: a letter to the UK’s League of Nations Union refers to ICIC’s interference with pre-war international scientific organisations as “disastrous”, referring to “the wreckage accomplished in the name of the politically imposed” (PRO ED 25/11)
pattern for future European cultural cooperation in two important respects\textsuperscript{35}: it created expectations of action (notably teacher exchange) which could not be fulfilled because of lack of resources; and it tilted the balance away from disinterested coordination towards actively representing the interests of the intellectual constituency.

Without a clear remit, the Committee could also get into new areas on a largely ad-hoc basis, usually on the suggestion of a particular organisation or individual member (for example, Destrée on copyright, and a number of other topics which, until the arrival of Paul Valéry, steered the "cultural" output of the ICIC). The scope was not limitless: it had already been decided by the Council of the League that education\textsuperscript{36} was too sensitive an area for a committee of non-governmental intellectuals to tackle: it was thus restricted to university cooperation and a sideline on the contents of school textbooks. It was "tacitly understood that any vexed questions should be avoided"\textsuperscript{37}. This meant the Committee's pronouncements on any subject had to be cautious, uncontroversial and apolitical, which effectively drew any sting they might have and made them easy for the Assembly to ignore.

Accordingly, the Committee's work began to diversify in an unstructured manner. While some members, such as Marie Curie, consistently argued that it should stay faithful to its original constituency, the scientific community, the tendency to colonise new areas of work was irresistible to others, particularly Destrée, who developed what was, in effect, the blueprint for a cultural cooperation process.

\textsuperscript{35} it also resulted in an immediate and lasting focus on Europe, the "understood" area, at the expense of the rest of the world

\textsuperscript{36} this did a great deal to alienate the non-European countries, who regarded education as the sphere where the Committee could potentially exert most influence

\textsuperscript{37} Bergson, speaking at the ICIC's Second Session, 1923. PRO ED 25/34
ICIC accordingly developed an “intellectual cooperation” which broadly consisted of
the revision of school history and geography textbooks to remove nationalistic bias;\(^38\)
the US-backed effort in international relations, which duly became the Anglo-Saxon
world’s answer to the French;\(^39\) university cooperation, which was taken up by
governments and duly absorbed by the Council of Europe; scientific cooperation,
which lost its primacy as the composition of the committee changed; and "arts and
letters". In time, education itself replaced textbooks, alongside university matters, as
the fourth pillar of intellectual cooperation in the process of becoming “cultural"
cooperation. The fifth pillar, arts and letters, which was always more than that term
implies,\(^40\) did involve both learned societies and universities, as the others did, but
quickly broke loose from this institutional base.

With arts and letters, the tendency was either to appeal to individuals directly, or to
form new groups amenable to the Committee’s outlook. One reason for this seems to
have been the different north-south traditions at play - early attempts to make use of
the PEN Clubs to act as arbiters of taste in compiling lists of recommended
translations came to grief because the movement was mainly strong in anglophone
spheres of influence, whereas continental Europe and Latin America (in this area
European by extension) traditionally looked to academies and national associations.
Another reason, or perhaps a different version of the same one, was the unregulated,
weak and disorganised nature of much of this sector - the Committee found that where
it could deal with existing international organisations they were often based in the

\(^38\) a consistent thread in cultural cooperation through to the Council of Europe and the work of the
Georg Eckart Institute it supports
\(^39\) it is interesting to note that international relations specialists agree on their discipline’s strong Anglo-
Saxon bias, suggesting that a perhaps subconscious division of territory was happening as early as the
1920s
\(^40\) including, for example, what became the International Museums Office, and subsequently ICOM
(International Council of Museums) under UNESCO
small triangle of Paris, Brussels and Rome, and without influence, or even acknowledgement, in London or Washington, let alone further afield. This left a relatively empty space which it, and more particularly the Institute, could colonise.

The Arts and Letters Sub-Committee was a late addition to ICIC’s portfolio. It roared into high gear, however, by assembling committees of museum, library and cinema experts within a year of being set up in 1926 and by 1937 seems to have been regarded as having the highest profile of the ICIC’s activities, presumably more on account of its star cast than any concrete achievements. Its rise is certainly linked to the creation of the Institute, which had a dedicated staff section in place even before the sub-committee had been appointed. Its proposer, and first chairman, was Destrée, who continued to preside over the International Museums Office, but Paul Valéry soon succeeded him at the head of Arts and Letters. Under Valéry’s chairmanship, it rapidly assumed a strong, almost independent identity, towards the end attracting members of the eminence of Bela Bartók and Thomas Mann.

Lack of clarity about boundaries meant activities with a cultural angle to them were often contentious. Early work on operational definitions for an international bibliographical standard in the field of scientific periodicals became first broadened, then steered back to science again by Madame Curie; while the status of intellectual workers was the subject of a long-drawn-out institutional struggle between the Paris Institute and the ILO⁴¹, which interestingly prefigures a much later theme of the European Commission⁴². The core of the disagreement was about whether intellectual workers were a potentially vast white-collar employment cadre or whether, as

⁴¹ International Labour Organisation: generally agreed to have been the League's one big success story
⁴² see Chapter Ten, on "cultural workers"
Luchaire believed, their importance was as upholders of spiritual values: "notre institution pût renforcer un immense mouvement des âmes, pareil aux grands élans religieux du moyen-âge, mais s’étendant à toute la terre. C’était une belle chimère."\footnote{Luchaire, op.cit., p. 157}

In other areas, the Committee attempted, with varying success, to develop new instruments by testing governments' reactions and then convening expert groups to formulate proposals. Success would be measured by whether a diplomatic conference was then convened and a multilateral convention developed. In the case of archaeology ICIC was cautious, seeing a need for international regulation but (rightly as it turned out) reserved about the chances of succeeding unless the countries most at risk could be brought to see the benefits of cooperation. It had more success in the field of intellectual property where two initiatives were pursued in parallel, one related to the protection of scientific inventions, the other to that of authors' rights. Although some valuable work seems to have been done on formulating proposals for both, it had to be transferred to the existing remit of the Berne Convention secretariat to make an impact. The Destrée group in particular shifted significantly from coordinating the mutual cooperation of intellectual workers towards advocating their interests, although Destrée never succeeded in getting his proposals on "droit de suite"\footnote{the payment of a royalty on each sale of a work of art to its author or his estate} universally accepted. Nevertheless, their gradual gain in popularity in continental Europe and consistent reappearance on international agendas suggests that the ICIC could exercise a moral clout with governments when it acted as advocate for intellectuals, even when intellectuals themselves stayed aloof from it.

ICIC interest in the audiovisual sector was largely politically inspired, with various
committee members and Luchaire vying to secure the lead role for a League-sponsored European film cooperation organisation on behalf of a national initiative. The Committee tried to keep clear of the issue, initially refusing its patronage and, when obliged to do a deal with the Italians, taking only a reluctant interest in the Cinematograph Institute. The justification for activity in this area was the distribution of educational films rather than developing a policy on film as an art-form or concern for regulation of a growing sector. However, later attempts to achieve cooperation in this sector focused on the effects of debased content on the moral fibre of the audience and worrying about the unfavourable depiction of foreigners. Not until the last years of its active life did the ICIC begin to consider the state of the film industry itself.

The Arts and Letters Sub-Committee did not so much tidy up this situation as allow the ICIC to diversify into new areas including museums cooperation, popular arts, theatre, music and translation. Of these, the immediate success story was museum cooperation. The speed with which an International Museums Office (IMO) was set up inside the Institute and the absence of much debate about it in the Committee’s minutes suggests that this was probably an initiative of the Institute itself which the Committee found uncontroversial. The records certainly give the impression of a full and valued programme of work. A periodical, “Mouseion”, was launched and by 1929 had 250 subscribers. The Office prepared and promoted agreements on exhibitions of engravings, established relationships between cast workshops in Europe and set up a

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45 this seems to have had a lot to do with Luchaire, whose diverting account of it in his memoirs includes the fury of one of the Lumière brothers, despatched to meetings with a brief to insist on the dignity and grandeur of the new art form, only to find himself expected to discuss import tax on educational films

46 at one point, to the horror of the Committee’s scientists, a League of Nations taste committee seemed to be on the cards
travelling exhibition of sculpture casts. It saw a role for itself as a clearing-house for requests for information and documentation, as well as the possible standardisation of museum catalogues, and was successful enough to begin pressing for its own separate budget and status.

Like the later Council of Europe art exhibitions, the IMO also had the benefit of a high-powered bureau, consisting of the directors of the major European collections, including the Louvre, the Rijksmuseum and the Victoria & Albert Museum. This gave the work a kind of professional and technical credibility which seems to have been hard to replicate elsewhere; thus, museums cooperation seems to have had a high degree of autonomy. Like no other area of the ICIC’s work it had visible public approbation. The UK “Museums Journal”, it was reported proudly, had praised its work. As Murray noted when pointing to its “remarkable record of success”, the IMO had seen a gap and filled it. While its range as a practical provider of exhibition material was obviously limited (its touring exhibitions were seen in such contrasting locations as Liège, Rouen and Cologne), the ICIC’s Euro-centricity was perhaps less of a disadvantage in the European-dominated field of museums than elsewhere.

Less successfully, the ICIC took “folklore” into its programme as a result of arrangements made bilaterally by the Institute with the organisers of an independent congress held in Prague47, rather than out of any clear sense of mission towards "popular art". In due course this work became absorbed into wider-ranging activity into which Madariaga, who succeeded Destree as chairman, steered the IMO with the setting up of a central desk for art history and archaeological institutes, a monuments

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47 this was one of the incidents for which Luchaire was strongly criticised: in this case, for having detached a member of his staff to act as secretary to the congress without consulting the committee
committee and a renewed interest in the traffic in and protection of what was not, at the time, called heritage or cultural property.

Other sub-groups either became marginalised (music) or never got started (theatre). Ideas for a convention about music and for coordinating music conservatoires made little progress, although tentative plans for an International Music Centre seemed to be under consideration for 1939. The "Letters" part of the Sub-Committee achieved some low-profile work in library cooperation but was mainly involved in the compilation of a widely-used “Index Translationum”\textsuperscript{48}, published quarterly and listing the appearance of noteworthy works in translation in different countries. It also oversaw the publication of various books about life and culture in different countries, usually explicitly linked to the initiative of particular countries with an interest in getting such material published (such as the Ibero-American collection\textsuperscript{49}) or even, as in the case of a book about Japan mentioned in the IIIC’s annual report, written by a Committee member.

The most frequently mentioned aspect of the Arts and Letters Sub-Committee's work, however, is the series of high-profile colloquies and debates it organised from 1932 to 1933 under the titles "Entretiens" and "Correspondances". At least one of the latter, a sequence of "open letters" between Einstein and Sigmund Freud, entitled "Why War?", became quite famous\textsuperscript{50}. These were, essentially, designed by Paul Valéry, who consciously moved the ICIC’s work in a new, less technical direction, more concerned with "pure" intellect. It is really this part of the ICIC which corresponds to Valéry's

\textsuperscript{48} taken over by UNESCO

\textsuperscript{49} a series of Latin American works in translation (mainly into French) published commercially but overseen by the ICIC

own notion of a "League of Minds": a recognition that, until that point, intellectual cooperation had fatally failed to appeal to intellectuals: "the intellectual... does not need it (intellectual cooperation); it has not entered into his habit of thought. To create this need and to make it habitual should be our principal task".\footnote{PRO ED 25/35, memorandum by Paul Valéry to the ICIC considered at its 12th session, July 1930}

To Gonzague de Reynold, the task of these "Entretiens", themed conferences ("idéosphères") where intellectuals debated chosen themes, was to "export" intellectual cooperation into Europe. In his view, the Arts and Letters Sub-Committee under Valéry had begun to eclipse the ICIC as a whole in terms of public profile. The subjects varied from a celebration of Goethe to the relationship of art and the state, and the future of the European spirit. Some of the conferences generated proposals for the ICIC as a whole to take forward\footnote{such as an enquiry into book acquisition, proposed at the 1937 Paris "entretien" on "The future destiny of letters" (IIIC, Report, 1939)}; most (apart from one which took place in Buenos Aires) were emphatically European in their focus, and may have been one reason why, after the war, the non-European countries were so highly critical of the ICIC and disinclined to reconstitute it wholesale as the UN agency for culture.

Not everyone agreed with de Reynold. The British National Committee took little interest in the "entretiens". Its minutes\footnote{which include the first recorded instance to my knowledge of that favourite Council of Europe image: "a nursery of ideas", c. 1929 and used of the Institute} suggest much greater interest in reform of working methods, international relations and, towards the end of ICIC's career, support for the proposals of the American sociologist James Shotwell to launch an enquiry into the impact of industrialisation and involvement in Moral Disarmament (a particular cause of Gilbert Murray's). They felt this showed an evolution from "the narrower conceptions of the past" towards "a world view in which the legitimate
interests of each nation shall find full expression"\textsuperscript{54}.

The development of intellectual cooperation under ICIC: Bergsonism and world peace

The British involved in the ICIC, at any rate, therefore felt most at ease with it when it seemed to be acting as a conduit of intellectual opinion into the conduct of world affairs. As one definition had it, "the object of intellectual cooperation is intellectual collaboration... Its purpose is to create an atmosphere favourable to the pacific solution of international problems."\textsuperscript{55} This was far from being the only possible approach, however, and the vagueness of the Committee's remit ensured that many variants could be tried out. One was the Curie view, centred almost exclusively on the scientific community and its interests: in this view, the ICIC acted as a sponsor for the interests of intellectuals. Another was the Destré\textsuperscript{56} view, in which the intellectual as artist took centre stage, and efforts were directed not simply towards intercession with governments on their behalf, but towards the harmonisation of national legislation in their favour.

The defining influence of the ICIC, however, was that of Henri Bergson, its chairman until 1926 when ill health forced his retirement. The literature of "Bergsonism" says little about his involvement with international cooperation but the debate his ideas stirred up in pre-WWI Europe illuminates the way in which the ICIC moved away from simple facilitation of contacts and towards a very specifically European idea of asserting culture and spiritual values in a formal international context. Bergson's ideas

\textsuperscript{54} minutes, 7\textsuperscript{th} June 1932, PRO ED 25/25
\textsuperscript{55} memorandum on the organisation of the work of intellectual cooperation from the point of view of moral disarmament (probably authored by Gilbert Murray), in papers of 12\textsuperscript{th} meeting of British National Committee, 15 April 1932, PRO ED 25/25
help to explain the presence in post-WWII continental Europe of an already established "acquis" of cultural cooperation which exists independently of the interaction of governmental interests. (Deering attributes this acquis entirely to de Rougemont, who certainly developed it, but not from nothing).

Bergson was already involved with the League of Nations when he took on the ICIC. There is no evidence in the ICIC's minutes that Bergson attempted to impose a vision of his own upon the members – he was rather a good chairman - but his addresses to the committee set the tone for a high-minded sense of spiritual mission which goes well beyond the technical aspects of cooperation. Indeed, intellectual cooperation as a concept hardly suited the philosophy known as Bergsonism, which turns on the idea that human life cannot and should not be seen in terms of the operation of the intellect alone. Seen in their time as subverting the classical French, indeed the European, tradition, Bergson's works emphasise intuition, "creative evolution" (the title of his best-known work), the "élan vital", accompanied by theories of non-linear time, to try to account for the spiritual dimension in a post-Darwinian, and post-Nietzschian, world. Amongst the accusations levelled at him was that he opened the doors to fashions both for occultism and right-wing extremism.

57 Destée's track record as Minister for Fine Arts in Belgium had included the setting up of a Belgian Literary Academy. Painlevé described him as a mouthpiece for writers and thinkers (R. Dupierreux, "Jules Destée", Editions Labor, Brussels, 1938)
58 the term "acquis communautaire" is used in both French and English to describe the body of accumulated action of which the European Community consists
59 he represented the French government in an attempt to persuade President Wilson to commit the USA to the war, as a result of which he came to know Wilson's adviser, Colonel House, and to discuss the embryonic League with him (R. C. Grogin, "The Bergsonian Controversy in France, 1900-1914", University of Calgary Press, 1988)
Grogin identifies the central question of Bergsonism as "what ensures the preservation of our humanity in the midst of mechanical societies?". This question recurs so frequently in cultural cooperation that it might be said to be its central theme. Undoubtedly it preoccupied the French federalist-personalists who acknowledged a debt to Bergson and who later promoted culture as a central theme of European integration. Yet he initially took on the propagation of strictly intellectual cooperation in a form which gave primacy to contact between scientists – possibly as a way of answering those who had criticised him, earlier in life, for attacking pure intellect. Nevertheless, the extent to which ICIC moved away from this simple vision of its task must have been due in part to Bergson. At least two of his former students, Julien Luchaire and the art critic Henri Focillon, who later worked closely with Valéry on the “Correspondences” and “Entretiens” events, were key players in ICIC.

According to Pilkington (1976), Valéry professed himself puzzled when accused of Bergsonism, but the author himself considers Valéry’s celebrated poem “Le Cimetièrè Marin” to be influenced by Bergson and his concerns. It is Valéry, not Bergson, who is sometimes regarded as the “father of cultural cooperation” and it seems to be the case that Valéry went considerably further than Bergson in elevating the "pure" creative element into “the highest and most complete form of human activity”. Valéry appears to have distrusted Bergson’s interest in the spiritual as akin to mysticism, a search for an unnecessary God. Yet it was Valéry who famously

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61 op.cit., p. 30
62 There does not seem to be evidence that Bergson himself was interested in European unification and a possible reason why, as both Luchaire and de Reynold attest, he did not get on with Einstein and who is cited by Walter Benjamin at the beginning of the preface to “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” with reference to the impact of change upon art
63 Pilkington, op.cit., p. 145
pronounced a eulogy on Bergson to the Académie Française on his death in 1941 in which he credits him with having rescued metaphysics: "il osa emprunter à la poésie ses armes échantées, dont il combina le pouvoir avec la précision dont un esprit nourri aux sciences exactes ne peut souffrir de s'écarter". And it was clearly Bergson who, from the outset, broadened the notion of intellectual cooperation to ensure that its remit included the creative, as reconciling rationalism and faith (it may have been this breadth of vision, too, that kept the scientists and what de Reynold liked to call the "international company of clouds", as well as Catholic activists like himself, more or less happily engaged in the same committee without major upsets for four years).

Bergson began immediately to redefine the ICIC's mission in transcendent terms, speaking at the conclusion of its first session of its "moral aim, namely, the realisation of a greater ideal of fraternity, solidarity and agreement between mankind", which he believed the League hoped “could be more readily realised in high intellectual circles” from whence it could “descend progressively amongst the nations”. Valéry elaborated this eight years later as “a belief in humanity and a certain faith in man’s intelligence”, and throughout ICIC’s existence one finds the idea of intellectuals being brought together to create a kind of rarefied space which would be conducive to the finding of solutions to the problem of war.

Madariaga took this further, and hoped ICIC might set "its hand to a glorious task if it sought to organise the synthesis of human knowledge". He felt that it had never fulfilled its potential: it remained “haphazard.....like the work of a bee gathering

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66 P. Valéry, "Henri Bergson — allocution prononcée à la séance de l'Académie, 9 janvier 1941". Domat Montchétien, (?) 1945
67 PRO ED 25/34, First Session, May 1922
68 PRO ED 25/35, memorandum debated at Twelfth Session, July 1930
pollen". Murray commented that he had trouble defending the ICIC's work within his own country since so little that was concrete ever came of it, while de Reynold argued that the Institute under Luchaire had become a vast bureaucracy generating mostly paper, the ICIC itself becoming "a sort of constitutional monarch". These are criticisms of a sort that are still levelled half a century later at UNESCO and the Council of Europe.

By 1930, when it undertook the major inquiry that displaced Luchaire in favour of Bonnet, the ICIC had a record of achievement which had some substance but was inchoate, as Madariaga noted; the eclecticism of the remit combined with the free hand given to different committee members to take areas of work in the directions they favoured had led to a wide range of issues being tackled but a low hit rate and little thought being given to the impact, if any, on public opinion. As Valéry pointed out, the committee was responding to unmade demands. At the same time, other members asserted that the committee's achievement was in its redefinition of intellectual cooperation: "the real definition consisted in freeing culture, which up to the present had been eminently individual and national, from any element of egotistical nationalism."

By the time the ICIC wound down eight years later, however, it was clear that, despite the improvements in the work of the Institute, the fundamental inconsistencies of intellectual cooperation had not been sorted out. In one sense, the charge that it lacked concrete achievement could not be sustained: the Institute could supply a list of

70 ICIC, Ninth Session, 1927 (ED25/35); this became less true after the reform of the Institute
71 PRO ED 25/35, Ninth Session, 20 July 1926
72 though references to "diatribes in the Press" suggest they did not entirely escape the public attention
73 see memorandum, Twelfth Session, 1930 (ibid.)
74 ibid.
publications, surveys and conferences, plus the work of at least one respected centre (the International Museums Office); it had a good track record with regard to educational associations; and it could always claim that with a decent budget it could have done much more. At the same time, its claim to provide an intellectual contribution to the process of world peace was hardly sustainable. The work (certainly the "cultural" work) had had insufficient impact either at the public or at the opinion-forming level and the structures it had built up were largely ignored as countries developed their own cultural cooperation at bilateral level.

Furthermore, the balancing act which Bergson had established between the moral and the purely utilitarian seems to have faltered, so that the committee’s work shows a kind of dichotomy between the type of activity the British National Committee liked on the one hand; and on the other the Arts and Letters Sub-Committee, regarded by Murray amongst others as a process centred on the intellectual world itself and increasingly devoted to the theory and practice of its own intellectual and cultural values in the modern world, to the virtual exclusion of science – a triumph of Bergsonism.

As early as 1930, France had been considering how to embed this field of international relations in which it had established a dominance more firmly within the developing system of international cooperation. Accordingly it built on the evidence of growing cultural diplomacy amongst countries to create momentum for an

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75 in 1930, the UK Ministry of Education thought it was "just beginning to be useful", although they also thought the French should drop the pretence and take it over as a national institution (ED25/11)
76 even in 1943, Gwilym Davies was writing of it as a largely forgotten episode in League of Nations history (G. Davies, op. cit)
77 ibid; and see also the minutes of the British National Committee concerning the establishment of the "British Council of Foreign Relations", about which they considered writing a letter of protest to "The Times"
International Act on Cultural Cooperation, under which intellectual cooperation would be entrusted to a new Intellectual Cooperation Organisation combining the Institute and the National Committees but omitting the ICIC itself. By 1937 it had gained enough support to call a diplomatic conference, although without the participation of Germany, Italy and the USSR and with the US, UK and Japan present as observers only. The document was subsequently signed by the requisite number of countries and after the war, France launched an initiative to have the main elements of the Act taken into the new UN agency. The resulting compromise between the French and US/UK approaches (the latter derived from the wartime experience of CAME) became UNESCO.

Conclusion

In his assessment of the ICIC, Kolasa considers that they fixed the ascendancy of the "aristocratic internationale" bound by "family ties,...common education, common cultural values" and a common lifestyle which found it natural to transcend national boundaries and based its attempted "intellectual reunification of the world" on an exclusion of the masses in favour of the "higher interests of man". He concludes that in doing this they were acting not only as counter-revolutionaries but were even "preparing the intellectual version of the ancient religious crusades" on behalf of European culture. This is excessive, suggesting a level of planning and premeditation hardly borne out by the records, but Kolasa is right to draw attention, firstly, to the ICIC's disregard for non-European ideas and interests and, secondly, to its

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78 mostly from continental Europe (including the Baltic States and Turkey) and Latin America, but also China, Iraq, Iran, Siam and South Africa

79 Kolasa, op. cit., p. 52

80 ibid., p. 63
"scandalous toleration"\textsuperscript{81} of Nazism up to the outbreak of war.

It did not entirely overlook the latter: in the Institute's report for 1938 it records concern for shielding values against "the threats of disorder". Gilbert Murray is more explicit in a 1933 letter: "I don't say Germany has gone mad-dog, but supposing she has the duty of protecting civilization becomes paramount."\textsuperscript{82} Even so, the ICIC's response - a debate over whether to accept the resignation of Professor Krüss, director of the National Library of Germany - suggests that its idea of "protecting civilization" involved above all preserving the unity of the intellectual community. At no point in its minutes is there any statement of abhorrence, which is consistent with the ICIC's view of itself as above, or untainted by, politics. In this way the ICIC effectively surrendered any claim it may have had to moral leadership.

In fact, it had not succeeded in establishing multilateral intellectual cooperation as the legitimising element of international relations, nor had it affected the growing tendency of individual countries to create cultural relations structures at the national level. Post-war attempts to preserve the paradigm of the ICIC had more to do with French interest in protecting its sphere of influence in an Anglo-American world than with the wish to retain the services of the League of Minds. What the ICIC did, with its Bergsonesque breadth of definition, was to delineate a certain area which went well beyond the facilitation of large-scale networking amongst scientists. It established and colonised the territory of cultural cooperation as presently perceived, comprising intellectual property, the media (books, films and broadcasting), the heritage (including museums), and an additional category, which has no obviously

\textsuperscript{81} ibid., p. 61
\textsuperscript{82} letter to Sir Frank Heath, 27\textsuperscript{th} November 1933, PRO ED 25/12
exact name but which may be described as the operation of culture in society. By the end of its life-span its matériel was human values.

It also set up a confusion about means and ends. At various times it was concerned to act as an advocate for its special interest group and press for favourable legislative action through international conventions; to uphold the social and political authority of intellectuals (including artists and thinkers); and to use the mechanisms of international cooperation to supply services for the intellectual community. At the same time it had no sense of a mission to reach a popular audience directly; nor did it question its right to attempt to "lead" society while disengaging itself from the political crises of the day. Its claims to disinterestedness while clearly, in some instances, driven by political interest, and the imbalance between those who were there to advise and those who had the energy and resources to push through a specific programme opened a gap between appearance and reality which remains present in cultural cooperation, not uniquely (almost certainly other areas of international cooperation are prone to this) but to the extent that it can sometimes seem the dominant characteristic.

A telling comment appears in the minutes of a 1926 session: "it was not the duty of the Committee... and the Institute to obtain any concrete results, at least not for the moment. It was not for them to produce works of science or art but to bring the savants and artists of the different nations in touch with each other...". The confusion about "results" persists in a strain running through cultural cooperation which insists on the right of intellectual cooperation not to be judged by normal

83 quite the reverse - on its list of "things to do after the war" was an enquiry into the formation of public taste.
84 PRO ED 25/35. Seventh Session, 18 January 1926
administrative criteria. Yet the self-imposed requirement for the ICIC to act rather
than opine – the League never required it to devise a programme – created the
situation in which a mechanism becomes needed to achieve for the Committee the
sort of influence it craves; which then emancipates itself from its managers and first
marginalises, then eliminates them.

If, as seems likely, the real aim behind the ICIC was the creation of a funded body
(the Institute) rather than a co-ordinating group of apolitical advisers, as Luchaire
suggests, then this outcome is hardly surprising. The experiment of intellectuals
acting within a political structure, yet not being of it, was in these terms a failure.
Much of the work of the ICIC was in fact the result of French national policy interest,
made more complex by backstage manipulation from other countries, less overt but
undoubtedly present. This raises the question of whether it could have succeeded if
the system had in fact been allowed to proceed entirely free of governmental
interference. The probability is that it could not unless it had been content to act
entirely in the capacity of a debating chamber. Furthermore, the activity of the
Institute prefigures the role of a strong secretariat in a field where the lines are not
clearly marked out in advance.

In broader ideological terms, however, the ICIC "style" in cultural cooperation owed
much to individuals. It was Bergson who ensured that intellectual cooperation would
evolve away from scientific dialogue and commentary into cultural cooperation, a
form with no clear boundaries. As chairman, he could have insisted on clear and
narrow definitions. Instead he ensured its complexity as a series of cooperation sub-
systems mixing vanity projects for the appeasement of artistic and intellectual peer-
groups; political projects, legislative or prescriptive in intent, requiring a conjunction
with one or more set of national government interests to enable it make progress; and, now and then, problem-solving initiatives, usually exchange or information-based, and relatively free of complex political or intellectual principles which might be politically contested.

Valéry's "Entretiens", embodiment of the idea that the interaction of minds on an abstract topic will have a trickle-down effect into public and political consciousness, have successors in the one-off cultural conferences which are hosted by particular countries with institutional support and used to advance or block particular trends in cooperation. In that sense, Valéry is rightly seen as a pioneer, not simply of cultural cooperation, but of the idea that cultural policy can and should be managed by intellectuals away from the level of national interest and in the interest of Europe. Certainly one finds in Valéry the sense of cultural cooperation as a kind of intellectual resistance to cultural diplomacy which later appears in the Council of Europe: "the competition for concessions or loans, for the purpose of sending out machines or experts, of establishing schools and arsenals – a competition that is nothing but the export far and wide of Western dissensions – that is inevitably bringing about Europe's return to that secondary rank to which she is destined by her size, a rank from which the labours and internal exchanges of her intellects had lifted her".85

Finally, Jules Destrée, first in a line of committed Francophone Belgian cultural cooperation specialists, should be credited with the invention of cultural cooperation as the advocacy of artists' needs and particularity. His 1930 observations on the role of ICIC stand as a blueprint of this strand of argument, in which he rejects the narrowness of scientific cooperation and asserts the difference between artists and

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"ordinary" workers (their deferred recognition, for instance) which makes it the duty of the ICIC to see to it that governments impose measures which make up for the perceived imbalance between the rights of artists and the generality of the workforce. In these three individuals can be seen the paradigm of the future "cultural cooperation" of European institutions as a critique, albeit an imperfect one, of the processes of public policy.

Pre-WWII European unity: Pan-Europa

If the ICIC set out the ground rules of future European cultural cooperation, others provided its rationale within a European political context. Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of Pan-Europa, was born in 1894 into an Austro-Hungarian diplomatic family with an exotic and aristocratic pedigree: he claimed descent from Charlemagne and could relate the experience of much European history directly to the fortunes of his own ancestors. Like many who regarded the disaster of WWI as a demonstration of the unfitness to the old order (and "old diplomacy" — see Claude (1965) for a discussion of "open diplomacy")86 to decide the fate of the many as opposed to the few, Coudenhove-Kalergi urged a federation of European nations. Sources for Pan-Europa are its manifesto87, published in 1923, Coudenhove-Kalergi's wartime appeal for European unity published in 1940 at the time when Churchill's ideas for UK-French union seemed a real possibility88, and his memoirs89, published in 1953, when the establishment of the Council of Europe and the beginnings of the

87 R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Pan-Europe," Knopf, 1926
88 R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europe Must Unite", PanEuropea Editions, 1940
89 modestly entitled "An Idea Conquers the World", Hutchinson, 1953
European Community seemed to have fulfilled his aims. His own account of his activities cannot be relied on entirely, given his gift for blithe hyperbole (in 1940 he was confident that only "a very small but very influential minority" had reservations about European union), but he did attract influential supporters from both the intellectual and political worlds, including Heinrich Mann and Edouard Herriot, and his distinctive view of the role of culture in European union is illuminating.

"Pan-Europe" devotes a chapter to culture. Much of what it says is intended to construct a credible alternative to nationalism, untainted by what are seen as the levelling excesses of bolshevism, but which attempts to reconcile nationhood to the wider ideal and at the same time defines Europe by what Europe is not. Coudenhove-Kalergi attempts to define a "cultural" Europe by identifying periods of European civilisation. The "European idea", he states, was created by Hellenic resistance to Persia; thereafter he traces its embodiment from the Roman Empire through Charlemagne, the Roman Catholic church, the Enlightenment (which lets in the Russia of Peter the Great) and finally Napoleon, last creator of a European empire. The next Europe is to be characterised by democracy, and for this reason Russia is now excluded.

There are racist overtones in Coudenhove-Kalergi. European culture's poles of "Hellenic individuality and Christian socialism" ensure that it is "essentially activist and rationalist", and its "highest attainment is Science" and that its Nordic vigour will ensure its victory over other cultures, which "are fast decaying". Coudenhove-Kalergi

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90 Coudenhove-Kalergi, (1923), op. cit., p. 51
91 many writers favour this method of invoking the unity of Europe, up to and including J-B Duroselle and Norman Davis today. The drawback is the tangles of exclusion it leads to, with many early 20th century writers arguing against the European status of Russia, or Britain. Duroselle ran into trouble dropping the Greeks from European history after the Byzantine period; Davis's determined inclusivity reinstates the Celts (as one would hope from a Welshman).
is confident that a century hence "European culture will have absorbed all other cultures". His cultural Europe is an imperialist force, as his lengthy consideration of the problem of the British Empire shows – Britain, defined by its imperial interests, nevertheless belongs culturally to Europe with a part to play in the European "mission civilisatrice": "while the British World Empire (sic) has assumed the extensive mission of Europeanising the world through conquests, Pan-Europe will have to assume the intensive mission of bringing European culture to its highest development through the co-operation of all nations" (quite what he means by this is never clear).

This is a pretty conventional exposition of European culture, of its time, and not very different from that of Evelyn Wrench, the admirer of Cecil Rhodes: the case for basing Pan-Europe on culture is to ensure the propagation outside Europe of European values and civilisation, so that, ultimately, they may be safeguarded by prevailing over others. This is cooperation in an aggressive-defensive sense, underpinned by Coudenhove-Kalergi's belief that Europe needs its own Monroe Doctrine, "Europe for the Europeans". It also illustrates how close the arguments for the "cultural unity of Europe" sometimes seem to those of right-wing nationalist movements, where the word "Europe" can almost be substituted for "France" or "England".

However, Coudenhove-Kalergi also offers a theory of the spirituality of nationhood which depends on recognising a centrality of culture in the European identity which

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92 albeit a democracy which features a quasi-chivalric intellectual aristocracy
94 bringing the rest of the English-speaking world with it: Coudenhove-Kalergi has no hesitations in identifying English as the dominant European language
95 ibid., p. 48
96 ibid., p. 92
97 at the same time, it could appear anti-clerical, as the memoirs of Gonzague de Reynold and the experience of UNESCO with American Catholic movements testify
helps to anchor actions into the Pan-European scenario. This avoids some later federalist and functionalist pitfalls where a European cultural identity is set up either as an alternative belief system to guide people away from the evil of nationalism or as a means to the “transfer of loyalty” away from the state. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s originality is to propose national identity as the cultural part of the wider European identity - almost pan-Germanism in reverse: “the future separation between nation and state will be a cultural need as great as was the separation between church and state”, so that, just as German nationhood has nothing to do with German empire, to the state are owed civic duties, to the nation one’s cultural membership.

Coudenhove-Kalergi links this explicitly to the task of leadership, appealing to the community of intellectuals derived from the now-decayed chivalric spirit of the Crusaders’ Europe, once united by their religion, their code and their common language, Latin, now fragmented into national cultures and literature. He sees their task as to lead their peoples in “deepening and broadening national cultures into a general European culture” by making sure that the “national pantheon becomes a European pantheon”: for instance, by weaning the Germans off their suspect leanings towards orientalism onto a healthy diet of French encyclopaedists on the grounds that they would at once perceive how much these had in common with the great thinkers of Weimar.

The Pan-Europe view of culture was aristocratic and conservative. In the 1923 manifesto there is no interest in spreading, Matthew Arnold-like, the benefits of culture to the masses. A single reference to the two great questions of the time, one of

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98 as with Denis de Rougemont
99 as in European Community neo-functionalism
100 Coudenhove-Kalergi, op. cit., p. 167
101 ibid., pp. 161-2
which is "the reckoning between the states" and the other that "between the classes", is as much as he has to offer about the social dimension. In his compartmentalising fashion, Coudenhove-Kalergi proposes the man of learning as a bridge between feudal aristocracy and future meritocracy: "the intellectual and moral aristocracy of the future which is bound to replace one day the material principle of numerical superiority now dominating democracy".

Coudenhove-Kalergi's assumptions about the natural aristocracy of the cultivated were clearly sufficiently widespread to be attacked by Julien Benda in his well-known polemic "La Trahison des Clercs" at the end of the decade, alongside those who regarded culture as a matter of national superiority. However, the idea that European culture should be taken into account as a political factor in the unification project is unusually strongly articulated; while the notion that rather than being regarded as symbolic of unity, culture should be treated as a way of integrating love of country with love of Europe is unusual, and the main reason why Smith (1996) though certainly right to criticise Coudenhove-Kalergi for his top-down and paternalistic view of culture, perhaps does not do him enough credit for thinking through how cultural identity in fact operates within a unification scenario.

Few other "European utopians" take this view of culture. A far more common view is that culture is the factor that will liberate Europeans from the sterility of the nation-state, and the case for prioritising it is grounded in the aim of eliminating national

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107 also the theme of Massis, op.cit., used in defence of nationalism.
108 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1940), op. cit., p. 133. In 1940, the spirit of chivalry was conveniently to be found embedded in "the civic ideal of the English gentleman" (op.cit., p. 131)
109 for discussions of the French intellectual milieu in which notions of French cultural dominance were prevalent see e.g. Antliff, op. cit., also K. E. Silver, "Esprit de Corps: the Art of the Parisian Avant-Garde and World War I, 1914–1925", Thames & Hudson, 1989
feeling. Coudenhove-Kalergi, by contrast, sees national feeling as having the potential to transmute into European feeling by allowing culture to act as the guarantee of national identity, even as elements of it become recognised, under intellectual tutelage, as having universal application. His proposal for a "Magna Carta of all European nations" looks ahead of its time, prefiguring the debate about "cultural rights" in its suggestion that there is a right to use one's mother tongue in the courts and to be educated in the appropriate cultural community. In such a scenario, culture is used as an element of reassurance in European integration, combating fears that one culture, or even one "image of Europe", will dominate the rest.

By the 1930s Coudenhove-Kalergi had been supplanted in influence by the European federalist movements. Pan-Europa fell apart, though not before it had organised a first European Education Congress in 1937. Coudenhove-Kalergi looked to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as his movement's heir. His arguments about the link between culture and nationhood seem to have passed with him, but serve both to establish cultural cooperation within the European project and to point up the extent to which it has set aside engagement with the issue of identity in favour of the Bergsonian preoccupation with man in modern society.

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106 A critic of this kind of belief was Benda: "constructeurs de l'Europe, ne vous y trompez pas: tous les sectaires du pittoresques sont contre vous", although in his case this derived from a strong reaction against the Romantic and the sensibility of the artistic contrasted with the strength of the intellect: "l'Europe sera une victoire de l'abstrait sur le concret" ("Discours à la Nation Européenne", p. 184, Gallimard, 1933)

107 Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926, op. cit., p. 166

108 It is easy to overlook the extent to which the imagery of Europe between the wars remained the imagery of the French "l'universel" and of Catholicism (the Reformation being frequently perceived as the force that shattered the former cultural unity of Europe); even in 1954 it had to be pointed out that there were cases where Counter-Reformation Europe did not have the monopoly on values (see Beloff, op.cit)
CHAPTER FIVE

Developments in cultural cooperation after World War Two: (I) UNESCO

Reference has been made to the growing importance placed politically on cultural diplomacy, repackaged as cultural relations, on the one hand; and to the separate development of intellectual cooperation, set in the context of the new internationalised "world order", on the other. After WWII the two strands came together in the explosion of multilateral activity which took place around 1947-1948. In Europe, this happened at three levels, which interlock: relations between countries; international relations within the United Nations (UN) system; and the progress of European integration.

No further space in the present thesis will be devoted to the development of bilateral cultural relations, except where this is relevant to the multilateral situation. But one should note, as McMurry & Lee did in 1947\(^1\), that despite the availability of new institutions offering, apparently, economies of scale and a new purity of purpose, countries invested more money than ever in their own bilateral programmes; even, in the case of the USA, becoming converted to the idea for the first time. It seems, therefore, that even in 1947, reports of the forthcoming demise of the nation-state were somewhat exaggerated\(^2\).


\(^2\)In "The European Rescue of the Nation-State" (Routledge, 1992), Alan S. Milward casts doubt on the notion that increased post-war contact was necessarily conducive to a Europeanisation of public sensibilities: pointing out that the greatest increase in visitor numbers between 1950 and 1980 was to Spain, he observes that this has not generally been claimed as "representative of Europe's finer cultural affinities. Their contribution to the development of common cultural attitudes, like that of the great increase in the number of spectators of sporting events, seems to have been mainly to an increase in popular comparative international knowledge of riot police procedures, sentencing traditions and prison conditions" (p. 13)
It is necessary to devote some space to the development of UNESCO in a European context for two reasons: first, it is the only intergovernmental organisation dealing with multilateral cultural cooperation and nothing else; and second, it is often symbiotic with the Council of Europe in creating a "philosophy of cultural policies" as a specifically "European" contribution to the UNESCO world view.

However, the main focus of this thesis is the third level: European integration. Here again, one finds a divided vision at play – the idealist strand found in European thinkers, of whom it is suggested that Coudenhove-Kalergi is the most interesting on a pre-war political level; and the realist strand which associated cultural relations, in its "goodwill" manifestation, populist rather than intellectual, with the defence and foreign policy strategies of the Allied forces in Europe – strategies directed initially at the containment and then rehabilitation of Germany, and subsequently at the Eastern bloc. In the interaction of these two strands cultural cooperation's split personality becomes clearly visible for the first time.

CAME, the Intellectual Cooperation Organisation and UNESCO

UNESCO has been well-documented, initially by those who were involved in its early years, writing to convince a sceptical US audience, (for example, Walter Laves, later Deputy Director General of UNESCO, and James Thomson, both State Department officials) or an equally dubious French audience (Jean Thomas, likewise a former Deputy Director General). A thoughtful paper by Brenda M. H. Tripp (1954),

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intended to provide a context for UNESCO, also looks at some of the contemporary European initiatives.

A more recent literature of UNESCO has been developed by academics interested primarily in the political conflicts culminating in the US/UK decision to withdraw from membership in the mid-1980s. These studies shed relatively little light on European cultural cooperation. However, Sagarika Dutt (1995) demonstrates through her researches into UNESCO that it is unsafe to assume that education and culture are politically neutral subjects. This reads across convincingly as true of Europe too. A more general assessment is that of James Sewell (1975), who is interested in UNESCO as a case study of an international organisation. A good non-advocacy account is found in Ninkovich (1981). A recent publication by UNESCO itself provides a helpful summary of activity between 1946 and the present day.

Richard Hoggart’s 1978 account from his time at UNESCO as Assistant Director General comes somewhere in between these two types, being not just a personal memoir but also an assessment of the way in which UNESCO developed as an international organisation. He too manages to avoid acting as its advocate or concentrating only on the issue of UNESCO’s alleged politicization, which is not of interest to this thesis. The historical perspective available to him adds greatly to the value of his observations. Some speeches by Director General René Maheu made to

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6 S. Dutt, "The Politicisation of the UN Specialised Agencies, a case study of UNESCO", Mellen University Press, 1994
7 J. P. Sewell, "UNESCO and World Politics - engaging in international relations", Princeton University Press, 1975
8 F. Ninkovich, op.cit
National Commission\textsuperscript{12} audiences in the 1960's also provide a valuable articulation of UNESCO's processes from a classic European perspective.

French action in supporting the experimental model of cultural cooperation, and particularly the Paris Institute, had established a distinctly European style of intellectual cooperation despite its apparently global remit. It was a style to which other countries, particularly anglophone countries, did not necessarily respond. At a conference of ICIC National Commissions held in 1935 there had been some recognition of this. The most hostile view was that of the Australian National Commission, which made no bones about regarding ICIC as a European organisation concerned almost exclusively with European things: for them useful cooperation required economic outcomes and therefore meant more emphasis on libraries in particular and closer links with the International Labour Office.

The IIIC continued to exist during the war and for a short time after it. As Allied plans for the United Nations firmed up, Henri Bonnet, who had been director of the Institute and was now Ambassador for the Free French in the USA, lobbied heavily for the Intellectual Cooperation Organisation provided for in the pre-war International Act sponsored by France to be taken up as the new educational and cultural agency of the United Nations. In 1937, the National Committees had resolved upon regional cooperation to make the organisation more meaningful to non-European delegations. However, European considerations may still have been at the forefront of Bonnet's campaign: as Gilbert Murray wrote to Sir Frank Heath: "I think the idea is that Europe

\textsuperscript{12} the UNESCO National Commissions retained the system used by ICIC to feed in ideas and expertise from the member states through panels of distinguished individuals or representatives of organisations
should be encouraged to revive its own culture and neither let it perish nor be entirely
Americanised.

The Free French based in London during the war had also, however, been fully
involved in the arrangements which led to the British Council-inspired Conference of
Allied Ministers of Education (CAME). Its initial aims were confined to monitoring,
discussing and collecting information about war damage. The preparatory committee
interpreted its brief widely, created a sub-committee system and developed a number
of active projects which, by the end of the war, were going concerns. Through its
Books and Periodicals Committee, for example, it pioneered a book voucher scheme
to get around the lack of hard currency and was much concerned with the likely book
provision needs of the liberated countries. A sub-group drafted a model bilateral
cultural convention, drawing on the type pioneered by France before the war. Other
groups considered the restitution of works of art, copyright and the use of film.

The key difference between this and the ICO was its rejection of intellectual
cooperation as the central element, perhaps reflecting the differences in public policy-
making in France and Britain. In addition to the premium traditionally placed by
France on its own ascendancy in cultural matters, French public policy assumes the
centrality of cultural life which it translates into a state-directed decentralisation of
cultural provision, leading in due time to a proactive and innovative cultural policy
model. In the UK there was no such philosophy at work: public policy towards the
arts, while positive, was nevertheless reticent and non-assertive. Unconcerned with
the need either to restore national self-esteem or to reassert a damaged status in the
world, it looked away from culture towards the creation of a strong state education

13 PRO ED25/12, letter dated 27 April 1945
system\textsuperscript{14}. It also had plenty of faith in its own institutions and saw no need to modify these to accord a particular status to the intellectual in society.

Whether consciously or not, CAME represented a break with the pre-war tradition of intellectual cooperation, impatiently dismissed, and to an extent misunderstood, as a high-flown talking-shop. It was intended to focus on "real" problems, practical needs capable of solution either rapidly or by patient negotiation. There was no definite decision for some time in favour of making CAME permanent - indeed, the Foreign Office initially opposed this, partly because it considered that the process of reconstruction was better effected by UNRRA (the planned UN Relief and Refugee Agency). It provided an alternative to the European mainstream which the Anglo-Saxon countries in particular could support, drawing on the recent experience of anglicised cultural diplomacy, exemplified by the British Council: low-key, focused on economic results, linked closely to public policy processes and with a strictly limited role for individuals not directly involved with the business of government. This is not to say that its view was narrowly restricted to educational matters. It covered the whole range of what was normally considered within the sphere of cultural diplomacy. But it was certainly not an "idéosphere".

CAME also shifted the focus away from diplomacy towards the burgeoning domestic policy area\textsuperscript{15}. By involving government officials with domestic policy responsibilities, as opposed to diplomats concerned only with external relations, it permitted

\textsuperscript{14} it is interesting to note how France's contrasting move away from what was seen as a hidebound state-centred tradition towards "éducation populaire" later surfaced in the Council of Europe as the basis for "cultural democracy"

\textsuperscript{15} ironically, by brokering its ideas with the Education Minister rather than the Foreign Secretary, the British Council distanced itself from subsequent influence, to the extent that ten years down the line it had to ask the Foreign Office for information about what exactly UNESCO did
international organisations to concern themselves with questions which before the war would have been considered matters of no concern in a context of external relations. The Ministry of Education\(^\text{16}\) was much more open than the Foreign Office to the idea of turning CAME into a permanent body, but what clinched the decision in favour was the upsurge of US interest in placing such a body under UN auspices. The State Department was under pressure from educational organisations. Ninkovich notes that a good deal of this interest was actively anti-European, in the sense that "the trustees of the great European cultures"\(^\text{17}\) had ruled the roost for long enough and were now tainted with imperialism.

The UK Ministry of Education (successor to the Board of Education) was developing an embryonic responsibility for the arts, museums and libraries sector in the wake of the decision to establish the Arts Council of Great Britain. But this was low-key and motivated by the new post-war relationship with local government\(^\text{18}\) rather than pressure for a new state policy for culture, as in France. The aim was to ensure that municipal cultural institutions had the protection of some kind of formal relationship with the public policy structure. As regards CAME, there seems little to support the idea that the "cultural dimension" was seen as anything more than an add-on, possibly to mollify the French, to a broadly educational project. Nor do the records of the time\(^\text{19}\) suggest that CAME was regarded as a response to the problem of post-war European reconstruction, other than in the short term.

\(^{16}\) it had already developed a certain degree of autonomous cultural cooperation on education matters, mainly with the French but also, before the war, with the Commonwealth Bureau of Education.

\(^{17}\) Ninkovich (1981), op.cit., p. 36

\(^{18}\) see PRO ED 121/375: minute of 12 December 1946 to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education

\(^{19}\) PRO FO 371/720-1.885-6; FO 924/23; ED 25/390; Sewell (1975) clearly does think that Europe played a part and quotes some public speeches in illustration. However, government thinking in the UK on denazification was more cautious than in the USA, and it would be more consistent for HMG at the time to have concentrated on the work of the Allies within Germany.
UK officials became increasingly aware that the new French government found CAME an unsatisfactory basis for post-war intellectual cooperation as they saw it. This was more than the national empire-building assumed by the British, though that was obviously an element. The aspect of CAME which concerned the French most (apart from the fact that, as Jean Thomas observed, it spoke English) was the lack of a role for the intellectual community in these intergovernmental deliberations. It also became evident, after UNESCO was established, that there were fears that it might even dilute the European cultural inheritance: for example, France blocked any attempt to give the UN any role in the training of national civil servants, fearing "the spiritual and cultural ideas of Europe might suffer".

The CAME draft proposing a new UN cultural agency was essentially an American text, which made few concessions to intellectual cooperation, was generally worded and seemed designed to minimise the scope for any decision-making on the multilateral level which might affect domestic policy. It was left to Allardyce Nicoll, attached to the British Embassy in Washington with a special brief for the proposed new organisation, to note that the American preoccupation with "peace through cultural strategies" would not be a sufficient response to Europe, where the Allied representatives were insisting "on the belief that, after the war, the European nations will look to Britain for intellectual and cultural leadership".

At the San Francisco conference, at which future UN agencies were to be discussed,

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20 Thomas, op.cit
21 PRO FO 924/294
22 the Australian and American positions on intellectual cooperation had been made particularly clear. The former regarded it as an unacceptable European construct ("une invention fumeuse de la vieille Europe", according to Julien Luchaire); that of the latter, as evidenced by a speech of Waldo Leland in 1947, was that intellectual cooperation had failed and was to be replaced with a limited number of specifically educational projects
23 PRO FO 370/721
the French government tabled an alternative draft, based very closely on the pre-war International Act and emphasising the importance of intellectual cooperation in the ICIC tradition. Gilbert Murray was asked to intercede with Bonnet on behalf of the "res integra", to avoid the setting up of two separate bodies for education and culture. An acceptable compromise resulted, but the impression remains of a split of sorts. Educational concerns became associated with the "Anglo-Saxon" element, whilst culture became in some sense "European", specifically continental European: a new, and potentially damaging, dichotomy which it is possible to see reflected later in the Europeans' own cultural cooperation programmes.

Its primacy in UNESCO denied, the idea of "intellectual cooperation"24 itself seems to have become identified with culture and cultural activity, or perhaps more accurately as not-education and not-science. Director-General René Maheu25, addressing a conference of European National Commissions in 1962, had to explain that, although the countries of Europe together contributed over 48% of UNESCO's budget, "of activities specially designed for Europe there is no trace" in the programme. To do so he falls back on the universality of Europe: UNESCO's humanistic values are themselves "the voice of Europe in UNESCO". And the areas in which Europe takes an interest are "general activities", which he notes is another name for intellectual cooperation.

But UNESCO itself became neither a model nor a substitute for a specifically European multilateral cultural cooperation. As new international organisations came into being for various reasons, they developed cultural cooperation tailored to their

24 the term is rarely used after this period
25 Maheu, op.cit
own structures rather than delegate to UNESCO. Although the creation of a European region within UNESCO was from time to time proposed, European countries turned away from it. One reason was undoubtedly the presence of the USA\textsuperscript{26} in UNESCO, counterpointed by the absence, in the early years, of the USSR. The battleground seems to have shifted early to east/west mutual distrust with the Western Europeans somewhere in between\textsuperscript{27}. In addition, the organisation itself was seen to work badly. In 1957, the UK government considered whether to withdraw\textsuperscript{28}. UNESCO was "cumbrous and ineffective"; the UK taxpayer got nothing back on the investment of £300,000 a year; and it provided "a world forum for irresponsible high-minded talk."\textsuperscript{29}.

Reasons for staying in included looking impotent if the UK pulled out, and the fact that more UNESCO experts came from the UK than anywhere else. But the primary reason not to leave was symbolic: "UNESCO stands for cultural cooperation among nations feeling themselves morally equal as opposed to the old-fashioned method...of cultural imperialism"\textsuperscript{30}. The argument, ultimately, was a propaganda one: in politically important parts of the world UNESCO stood a chance of being listened to

\textsuperscript{26} the USA pursued a somewhat ferocious personnel policy, annoying both the French and the British by their pursuit of suspected "fellow-travellers" within the organisation and their insistence on importing American administrative methods (see Hoggart, op.cit)
\textsuperscript{27} examples include US policy on mass communications, where the Foreign Office was all too aware of the "cloven hoof" of American interest in freedom of information, though according to Ninkovich US publishers thought the same about the British-backed book voucher scheme; and the USSR-inspired Congress of World Intellectuals at Wroclaw in 1947 (PRO FO 925/725), a public relations disaster which according to Ninkovich proved the main catalyst for the US cultural propaganda counter campaign against the Iron Curtain countries
\textsuperscript{28} the fact that this was a possibility so many years before the UK actually did withdraw in 1986 suggests that those authors who regard such concerns as merely a façade for political displeasure about thwarted western imperialism are not entirely right
\textsuperscript{29} PRO FO 924/1155: paper by Anthony Haigh, Cultural Relations Department, entitled "Should the UK leave UNESCO?". He concluded, on balance, that it should not
\textsuperscript{30} ibid
when the UK might not be. Jacques Rigaud used similar arguments nearly twenty-five years later when reviewing French policy on multilateral cultural cooperation. UNESCO had taken over some of the ICIC's "service activities" and pioneered a new method of creating specific bodies (NGOs) to co-ordinate activity in particular subject areas. Thus the International Council of Museums (ICOM) was established as a successor to the International Museums Office shortly after the International Theatre Institute (ITI). But the Arts programme was considered thin, as Julian Huxley, its first director, acknowledged in his report of activities in 1948. A Canadian observer thought the arts community had been seriously short-changed: "artists all over the world are uneasy about UNESCO" which, in its emphasis on barriers, favoured the distributor and not the creator.

Huxley clearly had difficulty in seeing how UNESCO might act effectively in the domain of the arts, which he saw as a medium for communicating universal values to the public. He disregards Destrée's idea that artists, not the public, are the constituency of cultural cooperation. However, there are echoes of the Bergson/Valéry theme of the spiritual in a materialistic society in his concern about the loss of beauty in daily life, expressed partly in terms of improving public taste but also championing the non-industrial in a positive way, a kind of cultural conservationism which might be considered UNESCO's most distinctive cultural contribution.

31 see Mitchell, 1984, op.cit
32 such as the Index Translationum and the periodical Mouseion (relaunched as Museum).
33 J. S. Huxley, "UNESCO, its Purpose and Philosophy," (1948). Huxley's first report was considered too contentious to present as an official document (his comments about its humanist vocation upset, in particular, religious groups in America) and was published separately
UNESCO began as a compromise between two different visions of what multilateral cultural cooperation should be and in the event satisfied neither. Its global remit and highly politicised priorities did not correspond to continental European ideas of culture as a cohesive element in European reconstruction (Denis de Rougemont notes that intellectuals ceased to bother much with it and turned their attention to European integration). Its size made the secretariat, and thus the programme, hard to manage; its domination by political issues, from both sides of the Atlantic, made it unsuitable as an arena for building bridges; and it turned out to be problematic as a mechanism for promoting western values to emerging states who might be wavering between the competing blandishments of Coca-Cola imperialism and the socialist utopia.

It should be noted that European countries such as the Netherlands, who were able to make use of UNESCO as a way of exporting influence and services which they could not do bilaterally on the same scale, were more inclined to place it at the head of their cultural cooperation priorities and invest heavily in their national committees[^35]. Countries outside the "golden circle" of the wartime allies (the Swiss, the Scandinavian countries and the Austrians) also found UNESCO rewarding as a forum where they could act without having, in effect, to negotiate a relationship with British and French national interests. Over the years both Finland and Sweden have used UNESCO to advance aspects of the European agenda in which they were particularly interested.

[^35]: see Hoggart, op.cit, on which national committees worked effectively and which did not – he singles out the Swiss and the Dutch for praise
Conclusion

The impact of UNESCO on the developing European cultural cooperation sector is not easy to determine. As the next chapters will show, the Council of Europe acquired its ideas and working methods from a range of sources which include UNESCO. A certain eclecticism and lack of discipline in programming reflects the inheritance of both bodies from ICIC, including its history of pressure to prioritise, reform, do less\textsuperscript{36}. Several of UNESCO's landmark events have had European resonance\textsuperscript{37}, however, and at various times one finds debates taking place about the extent to which the Council of Europe can and should operate as a "region" of UNESCO, or whether certain topics (such as international conventions) should be regarded as proper to UNESCO or to the European organisation in question. Insofar as European cultural cooperation turns on the integration of (western) Europe, UNESCO appears as a strong presence, but not a central one. It is represented and on occasion invited to present its work in the Council of Europe but with one notable exception there is little evidence either that it sets the agenda for European cooperation or that it intervenes in it\textsuperscript{38}.

UNESCO's importance in European terms lies primarily in the fact that, until the late 1980s, it was the only forum in which both sides of a divided Europe participated. One significant development is the 1966 Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, adopted to mark the 20\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the organisation. The text does not define international cultural cooperation, but does define its field of

\textsuperscript{36} see Hoggart, Lacoste, op.cit
\textsuperscript{37} such as the decision in 1955 to create a major "East-West" cooperation project, for which, however, the Council of Europe, acting as a UNESCO "region", managed only to contribute copies of its art exhibitions catalogues.
\textsuperscript{38} To illustrate this, countries which have not signed up to UNESCO conventions, as has been the case for the UK on the illicit traffic of cultural property, are not disadvantaged in their negotiations on the same topics in other fora; and although exhortations to sign up to this or that UNESCO instrument may occur in resolutions or other texts, they are not binding and are rarely accorded any attention.
action and its aims\textsuperscript{39}. It goes on to assert cultural cooperation as a right and a duty in that all "should share with one another their knowledge and skills"\textsuperscript{40}. The remainder of the declaration emphasises diversity, dissemination of ideas and reciprocity. Its significance is as a harbinger of UNESCO's developing interest in standard setting for domestic cultural policy, a field where in the 1970s it worked closely alongside the Council of Europe. This is already present in subsection (4) of article IV and will be explored further in the chapter on the Council.

UNESCO seems, therefore, to operate with a European dimension on two levels: as a vector for European diplomacy to act beyond Europe through economies of scale (whether by technical assistance or through the elaboration of international instruments); and as a standardising structure for public policy in and administration of culture. This aim of internal cultural improvement is one of the strikingly post-war characteristics of cultural cooperation. To what extent this was a European input into UNESCO is unclear, but it does not seem to have been a strong element prior to the mid-1960s, when the Council of Europe's driving influences were likewise promoting an agenda of domestic policy change at European level.

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{39} Article III: "International cultural cooperation shall cover all aspects of intellectual and creative activities relating to education, science and culture"; Article IV: "...aims....shall be: (1) to spread knowledge, to stimulate talent and to enrich cultures; (2) to develop peaceful relations and friendship amongst the peoples and to bring about a better understanding of each other's way of life; (3) to contribute to the application of the principles set out in the UN Declarations that are recalled in the Preamble to this Declaration; (4) to enable everyone to have access to knowledge, to enjoy the arts and literature of all peoples, to share in advances made in science in all parts of the world and in the resulting benefits, and to contribute to the enrichment of cultural life: (5) to raise the level of the spiritual and material life of man in all parts of the world."
\textsuperscript{40} it is clearly drafted with an eye to the Cold War situation
\end{quotation}
Finally, a major characteristic of UNESCO (reflected in the 1966 declaration) is the idea of diversity of cultures. This, I think, is drawn from bilateral cultural relations rather than intellectual cooperation. UNESCO is free to place this emphasis, since it has no context of unity and integration within which it needs to situate culture. Diversity as an aim has no particular roots in ICIC (indeed, for the kind of intellectuals who were interested in international cooperation, it held no special appeal compared to the spiritual union of the life of the mind). However, there is clear pragmatic advantage in asserting the virtues of mutual exchange and mutual enrichment of a plethora of different cultures, in the context both of the European/non-European undercurrents of UNESCO's composition and of the message being sent across the Iron Curtain.
CHAPTER SIX

Developments in cultural cooperation after World War Two: (II) European
international systems after 1945

Post-war, Europe sprouted a bewildering number of different, but overlapping,
organisations: the Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO), also known both as Western
Union (WU) and Western European Union (WEU), which was its formal title from
1955 when West Germany and Italy joined; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO); the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC); the Council
of Europe (CoE); Nordic Cooperation; and the European Communities (EC). All of
these except for OEEC (subsequently OECD)\(^1\), NATO and the EC included some sort
of provision for cultural cooperation. Only OECD showed no interest in multilateral
cultural cooperation, although it has a strong presence in the related areas of education
and public administration. At a later stage the non-institutional but significant
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) also played a role\(^2\). All of
these were and are government-led bodies\(^3\): to a greater or lesser extent their actions
reflect the policies of national governments.

However, several also had consultative assemblies of parliamentarians. It is this
element which will be considered first in this section, in the context of the Congress
of Europe organised by the various European federalist movements in 1948. Since it
is the argument of this thesis that part of the ideology of cultural cooperation is drawn
from these movements, the ideas of federalism itself and in particular their relevance

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\(^1\) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
\(^2\) this will be discussed briefly in terms of the later development of the Council of Europe
\(^3\) the odd one out is Nordic Cooperation which began as a parliamentary system
to the philosophy known as "personalism", associated most closely with the French thinker Emmanuel Mounier and his circle, will be examined first.

**European federalism, personalism and the Congress of Europe**

In 1953 Stephen Spender published "European Witness", an account of a journey through Germany and France at the end of the war. Turning the imagery of "true Europe" on its head, he observes that "the destruction...is the climax of deliberate effort, an achievement of our civilisation, the most striking result of cooperation between nations in the twentieth century. It is the shape created by our century as the Gothic cathedral is the shape created by the Middle Ages". He speaks of an "epidemic of despair" throughout Europe, and of a "strangeness and newness about the apocalyptic time in which we live". The 1948 Congress of Europe which brought together the diverse European federalist movements in an effort to press governments towards the federation of Europe was a response to the climate Spender articulates.

Spender had been amongst those who attended a series of "Rencontres Internationales", which drew "the attention of an élite to the European problem and made it fashionable". These were organised by Denis de Rougemont's European Union of Federalists (UEF), one of several European federalist organisations which

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5 ibid., p. 97
6 ibid., p. 95
combined after the Congress of Europe to create the European Movement\textsuperscript{9}. These meetings of intellectuals, intended to gain support amongst opinion-formers for the federalist vision of Europe, seem to derive directly from the tradition of the "Entretiens" and of Coudenhove-Kalergi. De Rougemont used them as preparation for what he later referred to as a summons to the "Estates General of Europe"\textsuperscript{10}. The UEF represented the "idealist" wing of European federalism, grouped around the intellectuals of the "Ordre Nouveau"\textsuperscript{11} movement (which grew out of the Franco-German "Cercle de Sohlberg" meetings of the early 1930s)\textsuperscript{12} and the magazine "Esprit", edited by Emmanuel Mounier.

Denis de Rougemont, a Swiss philosopher and journalist, was an associate of Mounier and Ordre Nouveau in the 1930s, who joined the Resistance during the war and took on board many of their ideas, including the Resistance commitment to networking.

"The international links within the moral élite, typified by Denis de Rougemont and the Union Européenne des Federalistes provided an... exemplary mode of organisation. The intellectuals' ideal, inspired by their Resistance experience, was thus a network of local voluntary associations, vehicles of direct democracy, united within a European federation. The old nation-states, bellicose and unresponsive to the needs of their citizens, were to be superseded at both a lower and a higher level by

\textsuperscript{9} which was and remains the main vehicle for federalist views of European integration
\textsuperscript{10} i.e. the Congress of Europe – the phrase itself is actually borrowed from de Rougemont's colleague Alexandre Marc
\textsuperscript{11} Ordre Nouveau is exhaustively explored by J. Hellman in "Emmanuel Mounier and the New Catholic Left, 1930-1950", Toronto, 1981, and "The Knight-Monks of Vichy France, Uriage 1940-45", McGill, 1993. (Also J. Hellman and C. Roy, in Bock, op.cit). Hellman's arguments associating Ordre Nouveau with the government of Vichy France are controversial (similar claims made in France by Bernard-Henri Lévy were indignantly denied by de Rougemont towards the end of his life). However, these aspects are not relevant to the present thesis, and the ideas that Hellman traces are illuminating for the study of cultural cooperation. See also R. Kedward & R. Austin (eds.), "Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and Ideology", Croom Helm, 1985
\textsuperscript{12} see Bock, op.cit
more responsible institutions”\textsuperscript{13}. However, it was de Rougemont in particular who synthesised a version of federalism which brought together different strands into an ideology, or "theology", to use the phrase of Mary Jo Deering\textsuperscript{14}, in which culture became a central element of the federalist agenda. Cultural cooperation, drawing on the pre-war tradition of intellectual cooperation, was seen as the mechanism for cultivating grassroots diversity and eradicating nationalism in favour of community.

European federalism itself belongs in a tradition encompassing Rousseau and Proud'hon\textsuperscript{15} and traceable back to medieval tradition\textsuperscript{16}. It is more organic and more societal in its conception than the Anglo-American tradition, a holistic rather than a purely territorial approach. Pentland and others who analyse the schools of thought about European integration are divided about the extent of federalism’s impact, but frequently concede its superiority over other approaches in one respect: its readiness to confront all the obstacles head-on and propose radical solutions rather than rely on a process of gradual accretion (a characteristic of functionalism\textsuperscript{17}), or live within the limitations of the world as it is (the "realist-pluralist" view). De Rougemont himself regarded federalism as "revolutionary". It acts as what de Rougemont frequently refers to as a "persistent conscience" of European integration, an ideal which depends almost entirely on successful advocacy, since it cannot, like other theories such as functionalism, rely on outcomes to make its case – federalism, after all, was not the method finally selected for integration and the nation state is yet to be supplanted by the European assembly.

\textsuperscript{14} see Deering, op. cit
\textsuperscript{15} see introduction to D. J. Elazar (ed.), "Federalism as a Grand Design", Open Press of America, Center for the Study of Federalism, 1987
\textsuperscript{16} C. Pentland, "International Theory and European Integration", Faber & Faber, 1973
\textsuperscript{17} for a discussion of functionalism and cultural cooperation see Chapter Ten
De Rougemont’s 1950 pamphlet, published for a British readership by the organisation Federal Union, sets out six principles of federalism, of which the most relevant for cultural cooperation are the last three. These propose an agenda of cultural diversity, grassroots control and rejection of globalisation: "the object of federation is not to destroy diversity and to reduce all nations into one block but, on the contrary, to safeguard their individual qualities; federalism rests on a love of complexity, in contrast to the brutal spirit of simplification, which distinguishes the totalitarian attitude; a federation is formed between neighbour and neighbour, through the medium of persons and groups, and certainly not by working from the centre outwards, or through the medium of governments".  

De Rougemont regards "a love of culture" as central to the federalist regime. However, the centrality which he accords it is explicitly grounded in his ideological background within the French personalist Ordre Nouveau, many of whose members achieved prominence in French cultural life and who acknowledged the influence of Bergsonism.

"Ordre Nouveau" was not an exclusively Catholic ideology, but it did demand a high degree of spiritual awareness and there seems little doubt that its roots were in Catholicism. Personalism substitutes the idea of the person for that of the individual, proposing that society be based on "the integral man" - that is, the individual within the community, with spiritual as well as material needs. On this basis it rejected both communism (which subjugated the person to the state) and capitalism (which did the

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19 according to Hellman (1981), op.cit, Mounier was a pupil of Jacques Chevalier, a disciple of Bergson who wished to direct Bergson's ideas into a specifically Catholic movement
20 Mounier himself was strongly Catholic, but de Rougemont was Protestant and some others professed no religious faith
21 see Hellman, op.cit
22 F. Kinsky, "Personalism and Federalism", in Elazar, op.cit, p. 273 (again, quoting Alexandre Marc)
opposite, denying the individual’s integrity within his community). It also involved the notion of “engagement”, the duty of the intellectual to concern himself with the public world. Although this became associated with Sartre, de Rougemont claimed to have thought of it first. John Wright identifies personalism's main features as a revulsion from materialist values, coupled with a distaste for the state (which in de Rougemont manifests in strong support for regionalism) and an interest in creativity and human rights.

The theoretician of personalism, Emmanuel Mounier, had the standard intellectual's dream of European unity: “a circuit of active friendship...intellectual collaboration...In as many cities as I can...little work groups” with a contact in another city for every two in France. But his relevance to cultural cooperation is indirect: he was interested in European unity but did not involve himself with it actively. However, he linked personalism to the idea of a "cultural policy" as early as 1934 in a “préface à une réhabilitation de l'art et l'artiste”, part of his book “Révolution personnaliste et communautaire”. Here he sets out ideas about the role of the state in cultural life and the role of the artist, which emphasises the artist's task as ministering to the interior life of the community: to connect the community’s outer with its inner life - the “Inutilisable”, with which a community must be in touch in order to survive.

These ideas grew in part out of Mounier's association with the youth movement "Jeune France". Fumaroli regards Mounier as the father of the Maison de la Culture movement on the strength of his work for this movement, and his 1941 report for the

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24 Hellman (1981), op.cit. p. 45. Cf. T. S. Eliot, another profound believer in the importance of intellectual communication, urging the ideal of a network of intellectual reviews.
25 his list of ideal antennae was a mixture of cultural capitals and university centres - Glasgow, Vienna, Oxford, Gent, Cracow, Salamanca.
organisation of cultural activity in France as the blueprint for post-war French cultural policy, notably in its emphasis on popularising, rather than academicising, culture. A colleague of Mounier's in Ordre Nouveau, Joffré Dumazédier, later founded the movement "Peuple et Culture" which reflected similar concerns and provided the grounding philosophy for the Council of Europe's cultural thinking in the 1960s27.

In writing about federal Europe culture tends to be seen as both spiritually uplifting and a supplier of symbolism and ritual, both of which will lead people away from nationalism towards a sense of greater unity. As Pentland says, referring partly to the communitarian theories of Etzioni, “by such means as education,... national rituals.... and the manipulation of symbols, the integrating élites can harness or create a supporting popular will. This will in turn provide a justifying ideology or a degree of legitimacy for integration”28. De Rougemont certainly regarded culture as a justifying ideology, but saw culture as much more than symbolism, as an active agent for change - “une présence vivante et dynamique”29 without which the project of European unity, indeed, the survival of Europe itself, really had no point. De Rougemont’s “theology” for Europeans was intended to provide less a programme for facilitating understanding than a paradigm for governance centred in western ideals and values30, and intended to define the objectives and aims of future European institutions. His vehicle for this vision was the Congress of Europe.

The Congress gathered together the various European movements for integration in the wake of Churchill's Zurich speech calling for the United States of Europe. Its outcome was the call to governments to set up the Council of Europe. De Rougemont

27 see chapter 8 for Marcel Hicter and the 1965 “leisure debate”
28 Pentland, op. cit., p. 182
29 Deering, op.cit., p. 562
took charge of its cultural discussions and drew up the section of its report which concerned culture. According to Deering, whose account draws on the papers of the Congress itself and the archives of the European Cultural Centre, de Rougemont’s initial proposals closely reflected his own vision, supported by a significant proportion of the intellectuals who were involved in the drafting of them. Though watered down and rendered more general, the “Message to Europeans” which formed the preamble of the final resolution remained clear.

The aim of the "Message" was to “donner une voix et une autorité à la conscience européenne”. Without this voice, economic and political integration would have no meaning for Europeans: “la primauté de la culture appartient donc à la définition de l'Europe”. The structures by which it would have been achieved are left hazy, but it is possible that de Rougemont had in mind some kind of elected senate of the eminent, acting as “elders” – recalling Talcott Parsons, a laicised priesthood.

Deering suggests that the Congress’s British chairman, the Conservative politician Duncan Sandys, set out to marginalise the group to which de Rougemont belonged from the main (i.e. economic and political) business by confining them to culture. De Rougemont nevertheless tried to insist that “far from being a single ornamental adjunct to the serious commissions” the Congress’s cultural committee “must assume

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30 those, at least, of which he approved
31 1992 op.cit
32 set up by de Rougemont in Geneva, and still operating as a research and documentation body, with observer status on the Council of Europe’s Culture Committee (though without any other status vis-à-vis intergovernmental cooperation)
33 “Europe’s mission is ... to unite her peoples in accordance with their genius of diversity and with the conditions of modern community life and so open the way towards the organized freedom for which the world is seeking. It is to revive her inventive powers for the greater protection of and respect of the rights and duties of the individual."
34 quoted in a number of sources, including D. de Rougemont, "L'Europe en Jeu", p. 104. Neuchatel, 1948
35 ibid, p. 108
the decisive role in defining the purpose of the whole undertaking and its hoped-for consequences”\textsuperscript{37}. In the event his idea of a central cultural committee within what would be the Council of Europe, with real powers to direct policy, was replaced by a proposal for a European Cultural Centre\textsuperscript{38}.

The account of the proceedings published under the title of “Europe Unites - the Hague Congress and After”\textsuperscript{39} gives few clues as to what the centre, or a committee, was meant to achieve. French delegates in particular were concerned to protect the primacy of UNESCO, possibly reflecting the recent battle to ensure that matters cultural remained based in Paris. De Rougemont decided upon a “lieu de rencontre et d’initiative européenne”\textsuperscript{40}, informing and educating the public, not simply developing the European loyalty that did not yet exist, but also inculcating in them a love of liberty and the other “European” virtues. Over the years which followed he tried to establish the Centre, which was set up under his directorship in Lausanne, as “une sorte d’Institut de la conjoncture culturelle en Europe”, or “quelque chose comme un Chatham House\textsuperscript{41} européen, mais certainement plus militant”\textsuperscript{42} but given his insistence on a policy-making role it is not surprising that he failed to attract resources which remained under the control of governments\textsuperscript{43}.

The impact of the Congress itself was somewhat neutralised by the fact that at

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\textsuperscript{37} De Rougemont, "The Campaign of the European Congresses", op. cit., p. 117
\textsuperscript{38} "Federalism", he noted, "triumphed only in the documents", ibid., p.120
\textsuperscript{39} Congress of Europe, "Europe Unites: the Story of the Campaign for European Unity", Hollis & Carter, 1949
\textsuperscript{40} Deering, op. cit., p. 277
\textsuperscript{41} Chatham House, the non-governmental British research centre for foreign policies and international relations established in the 1920s
\textsuperscript{42} de Rougemont, "Europa und Seine Kultur", p. 27, Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Europa-Akademie, No.8., 1951
\textsuperscript{43} see next chapter for the relationship between the Council of Europe and the European Cultural Centre
\end{flushleft}
intergovernmental level work was already in hand on what the British called "Western Union". The UK in 1948 was prepared to participate in a closer European cooperation system but not to compromise what it saw as a larger vision involving American support and a defence-based strategic alliance, rather than a "United States of Europe" which would attract the hostility of the USSR\textsuperscript{44}. Ironically, the European Cultural Centre was favourably perceived, as long as it remained unofficial (and therefore without pretensions to affect governments’ policies)\textsuperscript{45}.

The constitution of the Council of Europe, a direct result of the Congress, was a well-documented conflict between, mainly, the UK and France over the extent to which it should embody federal aims (in which a consultative assembly would have precedence) or remain within the management of the member states (through a council of ministers). In the UK France’s support for a federal structure was attributed unambiguously to its ambition to lead Europe and thus restore lost prestige\textsuperscript{46}. UK priorities were focused on the newly negotiated Brussels Treaty, which for the first time included cultural cooperation within a European structure other than that of the Nordic countries, who had been active since before the war.

The Congress of Europe provided an explicit philosophy of cultural cooperation in Europe which went well beyond the limitations suggested by the experience of cultural diplomacy. It asserted the primacy of intellectual influences and suggested that the decisions of politicians ought to be guided by these. It rejected the association of "culture" with "national identity", whilst embracing diversity as its principle.

\textsuperscript{44} see memorandum in PRO FO371/73095
\textsuperscript{45} ibid. The organisation of the Congress was described as chaotic: "the story goes that…. what archives there were left lying….and were swept into dustbins by the charwomen whence as many as possible were sorted out from the cigarette ends the next day by a distraught secretary" (PRO FO 371/73095)
\textsuperscript{46} see PRO FO 371/73096
characteristic, and sought to redefine it as the special contribution of Europe to the
world, to be sustained for the purpose of "civilising" mankind beyond Europe.
Finally, it looked away from culture as an instrument of mutual understanding
between nations towards culture as a way of asserting a community identity which
required the fostering of spiritual values – in other words, cultural development within
European states which was not, however, to be left in the hands of those states
themselves. Though apparently vanquished at The Hague in 1948, this "theology"
remained embedded in the "federalised" elements of the Council of Europe to surface
twenty years later in the debates about a "cultural policy" for the organisation which
would amount to more than straightforward multilateral exchange and problem-
solving.

The Nordic Council

The only significantly Western European multilateral cultural cooperation in action
before the war began as a parliamentary group and was adopted after it by
governments as the Nordic Council. A comprehensive account of the early days of
this is provided by Ingeborg Lyche in a study prepared for the Council of Europe,
although Clive Archer also discusses it, and updates Lyche's study. The new Nordic
Council also took up a pre-war precedent of regular meetings of ministers responsible
for education and culture.

The Nordic Cultural Commission which operated from 1947 onwards was advisory
only, and did not acquire a budget until 1966. Its advantages of language and common

47 I. Lyche, "Nordic Cultural Cooperation: Joint Ventures 1946-72", Universitetsforlaget, 1974
See also E. Solem, "The Nordic Council and Scandinavian Integration", Praeger, 1977
administrative tradition enabled it to function as an "informal working team" of civil servants and non-governmental advisers which aimed at preparing reports and recommendations so thoroughly "that any proposal could be realised without further investigation or treatment".

By the 1970s it was felt to have shown "only minor achievements and slow progress" and was thus reinforced with a new Cultural Treaty meant to underpin stronger economic cooperation. It fell at the expensive fence of television, when the Nordic countries failed to agree a common broadcasting satellite channel. Lyche saw this coming: in 1974 she had noted press comments on the trend for "the failures of the great projects and the successes of the small steps". Twenty years on, Archer backs this view, noting that modest cultural achievements paled before this major setback. In a recent (1995) Council of Europe review of educational cooperation it is nevertheless stated that education, research and culture now absorb about 50% of the Nordic Council's budget.

Lyche also notes that Nordic cooperation became essential as a factor of cohesion in the face of different Nordic patterns of representation in other European groupings (Sweden's absence from NATO, Denmark's early entry into the European Communities, Finland's lack of full membership of the Council of Europe): "the cultural field was considered the least controversial". Considered in the context of

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49 Lyche, op.cit, p. 69
50 ibid., p. 52
51 ibid., p. 101
52 ibid., p. 154
53 the Nordic Council has met at ministerial level since 1972, a strengthening of the Nordic cooperation process made necessary by the accession of Denmark to the EC. See Carl-Einar Stålvant, "Nordic Cooperation", in W. Wallace (ed.), "The Dynamics of European Integration", Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990
54 Lyche, op.cit, p. 48
other European cultural cooperation, what is striking about Nordic cooperation is the
method: the habits of close working\textsuperscript{55} help make the Nordic countries an influential
co-ordinated voice within, for example, the Council of Europe, even though they do
not formally act as a single unit\textsuperscript{56}. The insistence on protracted evaluation and
analysis before decisions can be taken reduces the risk of railroading from the centre.
But on the whole this does not read across into the wider forum, where secretariats
tend to push forward their own agendas without careful preparation, and, despite
occasional hopeful references in secretariat documents to converging "habits of
thinking", individual member states pursue their domestic priorities largely
uninfluenced by those of others.

**Brussels Treaty Organisation**

The Brussels Treaty Organisation, which as we have noted, took precedence over the
nascent Council of Europe for the UK, was the first intergovernmental attempt to
build a system of multilateral cultural cooperation without the linguistic and
historical\textsuperscript{57} infrastructure of coordination enjoyed by the Nordic countries.

The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
Defence\textsuperscript{58}, known as the Brussels Pact, had as signatories the five Allied European
states of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK. The Brussels
Treaty Organisation (BTO), known also as Western Union\textsuperscript{59} (WU), was firmly

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\textsuperscript{55} Stålvant (op.cit) makes a similar point when he observes that, in Nordic cooperation, coordination of views and exchanges of information are standard procedures

\textsuperscript{56} neither does Benelux, and efforts to rally the EU members states around a single position have generally failed too

\textsuperscript{57} Stålvant (op.cit) states that of 436 Nordic non-governmental organisations with at least three members in 1972, 40% had pre-war origins

\textsuperscript{58} Cmd. 7599, 17 March 1948
intergovernmental – all decisions on the political level were taken by Foreign Ministers acting as a Consultative Council and served by a Permanent Commission of diplomats. There was no elected Assembly, and certainly no National Commissions or favoured NGOs as in UNESCO. In 1954 the Treaty was revised to admit the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Italy, whereupon the name was changed to Western European Union (WEU). In 1960 the WEU’s cultural work was absorbed into that of the Council of Europe (CoE).

The Brussels Treaty Organisation served four purposes; defensive (in the form of mutual aid); political (consultation and recourse to arbitration by a Court of Justice); economic (improved living standards and better social services); and cultural. Culture is intended to underpin the other three, as a measure for inculcating understanding and developing the habits of interchange: in other words, creating the conditions for the achievement of the other aims.

The preamble to the Treaty defines the aims. Emphasising the signatories' "common heritage" of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, the Treaty intends to uphold these through strengthening economic, social and cultural ties and coordinating action towards economic recovery. It also stresses a commitment to the United Nations. Article III of the Treaty deals with cultural cooperation. Under Article III the parties undertake to "make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchange by conventions between themselves or by other means."

59 though mostly, it seems, by the British: the term was apparently coined by Ernest Bevin to seem inclusive towards the Atlanticists and emphasis the BTO's distance from European federalism. It is certainly much used in Foreign Office minutes to denote the BTO
It is not obvious from surviving Foreign Office papers, which have been my main - almost only - source for the BTO cultural programme, why cultural cooperation was included in what was primarily a defence treaty. What evidence there is suggests that for the UK, at least, solidarity rather than bilateral influence was the goal, in the sense that encouraging a sense of fellow-feeling between its members might also encourage public confidence in the Treaty. Official pronouncements of the time make much use of the rhetoric of morality, suggesting that cultural cooperation in some way endows the "Western democratic system" with spiritual authority, or provides a rallying-point for western values. The task in hand was thus not the transmission of expertise but the construction of family feeling in the face of the Soviet threat: to define "us" made us better able to resist "them".

Archer points out that the BTO was also in some sense a political response to the European Movement and the Congress of Europe. UNESCO had already provided the UK with practical experience of how quickly multilateral cultural cooperation

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60 the relevant material is on PRO FO 924/727-732, 746-751, 869-871 and 904-908. Board of Education papers are on ED 121/318 and 320. Council of Europe-BTO relations are covered on FO 571/96355 and 102318. The move to Western European Union is dealt with on FO 371/107920. After 1953, records concerning cultural cooperation in the WEU have not been preserved. I have not encountered any critical literature or history which deals with cultural cooperation under the BTO other than the somewhat sparse account given by Anthony Haigh in his book "Cultural Diplomacy in Europe" prepared for and published by the Council of Europe in 1974. Haigh was a British diplomat who, until he joined the Council as director of education and culture in 1962, was head of Cultural Relations Department at the Foreign Office. Several of the files consulted, therefore, contain advice and assessments by Haigh during the formative period of multilateral cultural cooperation when he was involved in most of its manifestations as the UK delegate to its various intergovernmental committees.

61 c.f. the 1950 pamphlet produced by the Central Office of Information explaining UK participation in BTO cultural cooperation explicitly in terms of spreading "western" rather than "European" civilisation (i.e. by associating the US and the British Commonwealth with the exercise) (PRO FO 924/869); also A. and F. Boyd, "UNA's Guide to European Recovery", Hutchinson, 1948, a "world government" view meant to appeal to the general public, which places strong emphasis on the "common heritage" in terms of democracy and the rule of law.

62 See W. Park, "Defending the West: a History of NATO", Wheatsheaf Books, 1986: it was widely believed that the USSR's "preferred mode of advance was political subversion", until the Korean War shattered that belief.

63 Archer (1994), op.cit

64 in the UK files the favourite Foreign Office adjective in respect of federalism is "dangerous"; the second favourite is "premature"
could go adrift, both by trying to do too much and by pushing ahead without clear objectives, if not kept under strict control\textsuperscript{65}. It had also shown how fine the balance was between the positive and negative advantages of innocuous-seeming cultural cooperation if political goals were not harmonious to start with. The Foreign Office was thus determined that BTO should not go the same way. Later papers show that UK officials subsequently held up BTO as a model of operational cultural cooperation. However, this happy position was reached only slowly and after much frustrating experimentation.

**Putting Article III into practice**

From the outset, therefore, the British wanted to keep BTO activity limited\textsuperscript{66}. The UK starting point, and its central argument, was that multilateral cultural cooperation had to be grounded in the system of bilateral cultural conventions (negotiated in the UK by the Foreign Office’s Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and operated by the British Council as the government’s agent). By 1948 such conventions were in place between most permutations of the Five Powers\textsuperscript{67}.

It is worth describing the system in some detail. Despite the fact that France had pioneered it well before the war, the UK chose to see it as having had its roots in CAME\textsuperscript{68}, where a model text had been developed. By 1954 fifty such agreements had

\textsuperscript{65} See PRO FO 924/727
\textsuperscript{66} "...the Brussels Treaty was fundamentally based on strategic considerations and on the idea of a common way of life in the political or near-political spheres... We would do well to soft-pedal the strictly cultural aspect of the Brussels treaty and concentrate much more on the information services side" (ibid)
\textsuperscript{67} the five countries signatory to the BTO were known as the Five Powers following Allied practice during the immediate post-war period
\textsuperscript{68} In a CRD guidance note of 1954, "the modern all-embracing Cultural Convention" is described specifically as "a child of the wartime Conference of Allied Ministers of Education" (PRO FO 924/1037).
been concluded, mainly by European countries, amongst themselves and with others. The Foreign Office's own guidance note acknowledges the system has deficiencies, in that it simply classifies what exists already. In its favour is the Mixed Commission system, under which each partner fields an equal number of members who meet alternately in the two capitals at prescribed intervals and under the chairmanship of the host country. "The Commission reviews the whole field of cultural relations between the two countries and makes proposals to the two governments for giving effect to the Convention between them". Where there is a genuine two-way traffic, CRD considers, as with European countries, there is also a genuine cultural benefit. In other cases, the underlying motive is to safeguard the position of, for example, British archaeologists operating in the Middle East: thus the motive behind a Convention may be political.

This was to be the template for all multilateral cultural cooperation. Additional action, if necessary at all, would be strictly complementary to the established bilateral norm. This British thinking was not shared by the other partners, however. A first meeting, which the British fondly hoped might be exploratory and non-committal, perhaps even one-off, ended not only in the convening of a "committee of cultural experts" but in a de facto plan of action, consisting partly of wish-lists, partly of more structured assessments of what might be attempted within the BTO framework.

The five "country memoranda" all survive in Foreign Office files. The French and British efforts are analytical assessments of the scope for common action, and were drawn up by Foreign Affairs officials. It is unclear who drafted the others, as the

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69 "it is said that when political winds are set fair there is no need for a Cultural Convention, but when political storms arise, Cultural Conventions provide no shelter and are soon blown away" (ibid)

70 the Foreign Office agonised for some time about exactly who its fellow "experts" were, how far they could commit their governments politically and what constituted a "cultural expert" anyway
Benelux countries were represented throughout the BTO process by a mixture of education officials, academics and politicians. The French seem to have wanted a forum for the debate of common issues rather than a mini-UNESCO\(^1\). The Dutch, on the other hand, favour the creation of new European cultural institutions\(^2\) and a specific link with UNESCO. Their text contains an underlying anxiety - it worries about the impact of the new Fulbright scholarships\(^3\) (designed to create European-American university interchange) and suggests the creation of a European cultural property institute to guard against any repetition of German expropriation of works of art (this was remitted to UNESCO). This is in keeping with the Dutch approach to cultural cooperation for some years thereafter - defensive, seeing cultural cooperation as a bulwark against cultural encroachment from elsewhere\(^4\).

Belgium and Luxembourg offered lists of things, mainly cultural events, the partners might do together, and policy areas where they wanted to reach some common view. Many of these were the same topics that had preoccupied the ICIC – translation, artists' rights, film co-production agreements and schemes for the mass reproduction and distribution of works of art\(^5\). Belgium in particular seemed to have in mind a kind of Brussels Treaty-wide cultural service offering at the multilateral level what a national government might do. The question of finance was left vague. BTO's secretary-general optimistically proposed the sum of 40 million French Francs, but

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\(^1\) "une large tour d'horizon sur les problèmes culturels intéressant les cinq puissances et d'examiner les suggestions présentées" (PRO ED 121/318)
\(^2\) they may have felt politically obliged to take forward the recommendations of the Congress of Europe they had so recently hosted
\(^3\) the motive being fear that their nationals would lose university places in their institutions to incoming Americans
\(^4\) this has not been true for many years of official Dutch policy, but it can still be found, notably in the speeches and articles of Maarten Mourik, a former cultural ambassador
\(^5\) a particular obsession of the Belgian delegate, with which he persisted well into the mid-1950s: "it is to be hoped that M. Kuypers will eventually lose heart", commented Cultural Relations Department the following year, unaware how long they would have to wait (PRO ED 121/318)
the BTO cultural programme never gained a central fund. Governments incurred spending as they went along. This was problematic, especially for the British, who relied on the system of parliamentary estimates, but the initial assumption that governments (in practice, Britain and France) would be prepared to approve notional figures seems to have set up an abiding distrust in the BTO secretariat by the partner governments.

The BTO Cultural Programme

The four continental partners accepted the British view that the bilateral convention system should be regarded as the core of the system, but resisted the notion that a joint programme should be minimal. An internal note by the British Council's Richard Seymour, who played a leading role in the work of the "Cultural Experts", explicitly took as its measurement of success the work of CAME: if these "experiments" succeeded, they would achieve "the sort of inter-allied co-operation in administration which existed during the war" — an intriguing British parallel to the way in which continental Europeans sought to carry across their Resistance experiences into post-war cultural policy.

The programme devised was hasty and looks fitted in around other, more pressing, work, without much part being played by the secretariat. As with much multilateral cultural cooperation, it gives the impression that its objectives were formulated to fit

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76 under the system of annual estimates, UK government departments had to seek and justify supplementary estimates on individual items approved by the Treasury if they wished to incur extra spending during the year. The only alternative was for offsetting savings to be made from the British Council budget, causing many agonies over priorities. For example, the Foreign Office failed to persuade the Treasury to authorise extra spending on a contribution to a series of Five Power (i.e. BTO) films about western art ("a frill") (PRO FO 924/908).

77 "the so-called budget is a collection of random guesses", briefed a CRD official (PRO FO 924/747)

78 PRO FO 924/746
the action rather than vice versa. Accordingly it is difficult to discern a guiding aim behind the rather miscellaneous programme which was assembled by trial and error.

The creation of new bodies à la UNESCO was ruled out. Although high profile projects were not excluded in theory, in practice lack of access to resources made it unlikely that anything ambitious would be attempted. Having decided, or in the case of the UK conceded, that the BTO should create a programme, the committee of cultural experts seems to have selected activity which conformed broadly to two categories — administrative and service. The first covers administrative action to negotiate changes in the national regulatory framework which meet the goals of multilateral cultural cooperation: something which approaches the approximation of laws, either through the signing of an international convention or through unilateral action in each country. BTO does not seem to have contemplated normative action which would change national policies: in practice action only happened if it could be achieved without changes in policy being necessary, as opposed to modifications in procedure.

This was the case with early BTO action to try to remove obstacles to the free movement of cultural and educational material. Understandably, given wartime restrictions, the facilitating of travel and of import and export were the key themes. On the basis of a questionnaire each country identified administrative barriers which existed under its present provisions and tried to press within government for relaxation of controls (for example, on the importation of works of art). Results were not spectacular - the tendency was for liberalisation to take place only when this would have happened anyway, - but the exercise had some merit in that it obliged the

79 a frequent criticism of the cultural programme of the Council of Europe
lead policy departments to look for concessions which could be offered up in the spirit of cooperation without involving major policy shifts. Comparative information material was also provided which could be used for monitoring the progress of liberalisation.

The question of passports is especially interesting as it led to a debate about whether it was possible to discriminate between would-be immigrants on the grounds of "cultural status". This revealed the gap in thinking between the UK and its partners. The former found distasteful the idea that "cultural persons" were somehow morally more deserving than others, even if a workable definition could be found, which it felt was unlikely. The latter were much readier to extend the boundaries and worry about refining definitions afterwards if this turned out to be necessary.

The outcome of this falls into the second, service, category. As originally conceived the card would have been a "cultural passport", as valid for travel as a real passport. The compromise was found in a French suggestion for creating a "Cultural Identity Card" which would entitle the holder to concessions such as access to collections, reduced accommodation costs or cheap travel. There was found to be a demand. The scheme was later taken over by the Council of Europe and lasted well into the 1970s, enjoying in its time a degree of success that persuaded the UK to drop its original opposition.

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80 BTO itself did not classify its activity in this – or any other - way
81 examples of this included persuading rail companies to offer fare concessions by for groups of young people travelling "for cultural purposes"; ensuring the removal of restrictions on the importation of types of printed matter (the UK proudly announced the implementation of open general import licences for all sheet music except "cheap dance music from the USA"); and attempts to institute a single passport or entry card for youth groups (this was firmly resisted in the UK, where officials despairingly suggested that a sheepdog might be hired instead) (PRO FO 924/751). It is notable that very little attempt is made to justify a refusal to act where this is given
82 by 1968 around 30,000 had been issued (M. Palmer, J. Lambert et al., "European Unity: a Survey of the European Organisations", George Allen & Unwin, 1969)
The great merit of the Cultural Identity Card was that it could be described and held up as a practical example of the benefits of cooperation. It may not have made much appreciable difference to the numbers of "cultural visits" but it was made use of and, unlike the vast majority of multilateral cultural cooperation projects, had measurable results. It is probably the closest cultural cooperation has ever come to establishing a popular, recognisable European "service" aimed at the general public. Both types of cooperation responded in some sense to the overall aim of Article III, if somewhat indirectly. But they did help to make the nuts and bolts of cultural transactions a little easier and "European cooperation" could be pointed to as the agency which achieved this. If that cooperation additionally offered the public something which had not previously been available to it, the result should be warm feelings towards the source of that something. This is closer to the functionalist concept of the transfer of loyalties (from the national towards the European) than to the somewhat pedagogic formulation of Article III.

Throughout its history there was disagreement between the UK and the continental partners about the purpose of BTO activity. The UK wanted cultural cooperation to focus on public awareness, on the understanding of democratic values and systems and on mutual appreciation of one another's education systems. Its favourite types of activity were courses for teachers, civil servants and youth leaders. Its representatives constantly complained about, and were baffled by, the emphasis placed by the

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83 another "service" activity, a "calendar of congresses" put together by the British Council, was dropped to general relief once it was found to be entirely unwanted. Briefly dredged up again in the mid-1980s by the Council of Europe as "Europe's Cultural Summer", it enjoyed a similar span of popularity and life.

84 "...to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization..."

85 the idea of culture as a method of achieving loyalty transfer will be examined in the context of the EU
continental partners on "high culture" and on artistic appreciation which, to the UK, had nothing to do with the aim of creating a "Western European point of view". If anything symbolised this gap, it was the idea of a "cultural person": a British account of the discussion about this comments plaintively that "with the exception of the Belgian representative, the others were thinking in terms merely of professors, students and practitioners of the arts and journalists, film producers etc.... They did not seem interested in exchanges of trade unionists and rising men and women pursuing ordinary non-cultural vocations. Similarly they showed an undue interest in the more rarefied things such as poetry, modern pictures etc. ..."86

Some of the reasons for this difference are discernible from the files. It is clear from the set of papers just quoted that the sense of European culture under siege was not far from the surface. National interests were also in play. For France, it would have been less than strategic to allow a cultural cooperation programme to play down the artistic and intellectual achievements of Europe, since it was there that France had already decided its claims to world leadership chiefly resided. Meanwhile for the Benelux countries, the BTO represented an opportunity to export and promote their own cultural products, albeit in a limited setting, on a par with the so-called "major powers". Thus "high culture", where excellence was unpredictable and did not necessarily reflect a country's political status, was simply not the secondary issue for the continental countries that it was for Britain.

BTO approached the audiovisual sector cautiously, and without, it appears, any idea of trying to regulate it in common. In the sphere of the broadcast media the technical nature of the main issues (such as wavelength standardisation for television) masked

86 PRO FO 924/728
some of the difference in viewpoint. Here the sector was already working on problems independently, via the European Broadcasting Union. There seems to have been general agreement that it was best equipped to agree its own solutions without interference. BTO was kept informed but added nothing to the policy deliberations on such issues. The main stumbling block tended to be incompatibility of government policies towards the administration of broadcasting. In 1949 a Franco-Belgian proposal for a unified TV system was briefly considered but not pursued: the differences in approach were too great. Often, BTO ideas were simply dismissed by the BBC which preferred to make its own arrangements.

The case of film was somewhat different. Everyone accepted it was important to establish some kind of cooperation. For the British film was the vital "popularising" link which would help build up commitment to the theme of Western solidarity. Their interest, accordingly, was in non-fiction. The agenda of the continental partners was initially, in discussion at least, much more geared towards resisting the encroachment of Hollywood. However, the actual work of BTO's film group, which remained as a separate entity in the WEU and was finally incorporated as a technical committee into the Council of Europe, seems to have consisted mainly of conducting studies into topics of interest and developing recommendations on aspects of good practice. There was also a modest system for the circulation of newsreels. Attempts were made to create BTO information films but these depended on interest from

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87 the Foreign Office briefed its permanent representative that the bilateral negotiations it was pursuing with France were quite difficult enough without trying to negotiate through BTO
88 such as an exchange system for radio broadcasts. The British Broadcasting Corporation was also outside direct government control and could not be obliged to implement any commitments made by the government on its behalf
89 to the Foreign Office, film was simply a medium. They were just as interested in organising public lectures
90 with, again, the strongest anti-American sentiment coming from the Dutch
91 these tended to be of military manoeuvres with names like "Operation Bulldog"
independent organisations whose risks could not always be underwritten, tended to be
onerous as well as labour-intensive and as often as not had to be dropped.

By 1951 the BTO system seemed to have shaken down to the extent that both the
French and the British wondered whether there was enough for the committee to do\textsuperscript{92}. The "cultural" part of its remit was mainly restricted to the initiatives already
mentioned. The possibility had existed from the start of merger with the Council of
Europe, whose own Cultural Experts' group was getting under way and was drawing
on the BTO members' experience of cooperation.

Further progress seemed to depend on whether anything more could be done towards
the liberalisation of exchange of goods and persons following the initial concessions.
These did lead to a progressive reduction in the categories of items which could not
be imported under Open General Licence or the continental equivalent. Nevertheless,
in the UK the subject was regarded by the Board of Trade as a matter for the OEEC,
thus drawing attention to a recurrent problem of cultural cooperation: the fact that
much of its natural territory forms part of a larger area of work proper to other bodies
and subject to different priorities. The Committee of Cultural Experts could and did
exert some pressure nationally to have books, in particular, given a priority grade in
terms of customs treatment.

The work on cultural free trade (including the Cultural Identity Card) had been
deemed successful, and there were modest achievements to record on the exchange of
newsreels and educational films, and joint courses. There were no significant
achievements on art gallery and library exchange, translation, exhibitions or attempts

\textsuperscript{92} see PRO FO 924/906, Richard Seymour's account of a conversation with M. Joxe of France
to set up a fund for culture. Talks on television standardisation had also failed to produce agreement: the UK and France had chosen one standard, the rest another.

Finally, the issue of reaching agreement on the protection of works of art in wartime, initially seen as an important part of the agenda, had been taken over by the Conference on Civil Defence.

Much of the documentation of the "cultural experts" emphasises the extent to which its members themselves had developed a spirit of cooperation. However, there is a sense that this was substituted for creative intellectual input. When the organisation came to review its achievements, it simply checked off its original shopping list of ideas. Throughout the meeting records there is little hint that the group tried to define what it should or might achieve through cultural cooperation. Rather, it seems to have operated by trying out ideas, of which those which met with the least opposition would be taken forward. Fundamentally, it operated on a principle close to Parkinson's Law that work expands to fill the space available.

Whether it could seriously claim to have acted to lead the populations of its signatory states towards a deeper appreciation of the principles which form the basis of their common civilisation seems debatable. The UK thought that it did, on the grounds that much of the effort had been steered away from artistic enterprises towards what it considered a practical programme of study visits by professional groups and conferences of university vice-chancellors. This is consistent with a view of cultural cooperation which sees its purpose as back-up to a defence treaty: a kind of peace-

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93 cf. the Secretary-General's review of BTO's achievements in its first three years, PRO FO 924/870
94 on the one occasion when the Arts Council of Great Britain appears in the BTO discussions, the observation is the following: the ACGB is "an independent body concerned only with artistic matters and ...could not be asked to take an interest in Western Union" (PRO FO 924/727)
time version of war-time propaganda, where it helps if you understand and have sympathy for the people who are supposed to be on the same side as you.

For those who were uneasy with the yoking of culture so easily to defence propaganda, as the papers note the French were, or who had looked to BTO to provide services geared to the study and conservation of European visual arts (the Belgian representative), or for a programme aimed at encouraging the appreciation of modern art (the Dutch), this record looks less impressive. At the level of identifying some of the operational difficulties in the way of cultural free trade, BTO had served a useful purpose but that had led only to incremental changes in administrative action, which were still better than no changes at all.

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the absence of a British experience of wartime occupation may have been a strong underlying theme in BTO's conflict of ideologies. Without direct experience of the repression or perversion of cultural life, and with an idea of cultural relations based on the security of ordinary life, the UK delegates failed to make a connection between "high culture" and ideas about solidarity. Instead they dismissed their colleagues, for much of the time, as "companies of clouds" not because of any strongly idealistic approach taken by the latter but because they saw the European "high" cultural tradition as a potentially unifying force, aimed at least in part in restoring a European sense of self-respect.

To assess BTO's success as a first attempt at European level by countries to work out a strategy for cultural cooperation where there was relatively little pre-existing community of interest to draw upon, one must note first that it does not assume

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95 apart from Belgium's M. Kuypers, who really does seem to have had a dream
anything other than state-centred interest: the fundamental aim of the Treaty, after all, is to preserve and strengthen a defence alliance. But in the provision of unifying symbols or services, BTO was weak. It did best when examining practical aspects of administration which approximate to law – its work towards reciprocal loosening of import barriers on cultural material and, to a lesser extent, on free movement of persons, and interchange of individuals wishing to learn about aspects of its administrative systems. In this respect it began to move towards the kind of process of harmonisation of legislation practised by the EU: the kind of "hard policy" which operates, directly or indirectly, to modify the economic climate within which culture exists. In its other manifestation, that of managing public opinion, its "cultural" aspect is unimpressive – it must be doubtful whether even the holders of BTO cultural identity cards felt significantly more positive about Western Union than they would have done without them. Its successes in this area lay much more in providing a framework within which essentially bilateral mechanisms – visits and courses – could be applied, but which remained small-scale.

Western European Union and NATO

Before leaving the subject of cultural cooperation as an adjunct of defence and foreign policy, one must touch, briefly, upon the later history of BTO as Western European Union (WEU) and the cultural aspects of NATO96. The expected merger of BTO and Council of Europe cultural work was in fact deferred until the beginning of the 1960s. The Foreign Office hoped that BTO might come to be regarded as "a sort of steering committee for the Council of Europe Cultural Experts, so that within the larger group

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96 North Atlantic Treaty Alliance
the smaller should pursue previously agreed policies"; meanwhile within WEU, the FRG and Italy would be joining "a going concern...offering quick returns" in terms of links between government officials, school inspectors, youth leaders and teachers.

The main purpose of WEU, once the negotiations to establish a European Defence Community had failed, was to draw together the strands in a package which offered a forum for restoring German sovereignty and controlling rearmament. The old BTO Consultative Council expanded to include meetings on foreign policy and defence. It also enabled the UK and the European Community's member states to meet on neutral grounds until UK accession in 1973, after which it fell somewhat into abeyance. There is no particular reason to assume that its cultural activity differed significantly from that of the BTO. It continued to take some interest in civil service exchange until at least the late 1980s. It produced items as diverse as a five-language vocabulary book of cinematographic terms and the system of conferences of European university rectors which in due course became the Council of Europe's Committee on University Problems. It also kept the Cultural Identity Card going until the Council of Europe took it over.

In general, studies of NATO rarely mention the cultural aspect of its operations. The NATO treaty, signed in 1949, had scope for cultural cooperation under Article II but no action was taken until 1953, possibly triggered by WEU expansion. According to Max Beloff this was at the insistence of Canada, which could not accept a

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97 PRO FO 924/1042. The Public Record Office does not have records later than 1953 relating to cultural cooperation in WEU
98 in 1954; see Milward, op.cit, pp 119-120, and others
99 Archer, 1994, op.cit
100 the Italian for a 'sprocket-hole' is 'perforazione'
101 M. Beloff, "New Dimensions in Foreign Policy", Allen & Unwin, 1961
defence arrangement which had no political underpinning. Heald and Kaplan suggest that the motivation for this, in their view unconvincing, element was to ensure that NATO could be classified as a regional arrangement which supported common culture, and was thus consistent with the UN charter and not a rival regional power-base. A third likely factor was the beginning of a NATO Information Service the previous year.

The Foreign Office disapproved of the bracketing of cultural relations with information, which in NATO was run on lines modelled closely on the US State Department and in which they thought cultural cooperation would come off worse. However, there was widespread European support for a NATO effort at cultural cooperation, inspired by a growing feeling that NATO had to be grounded more thoroughly in public consciousness as a spiritual as well as a military alliance. Jordan notes the view of the first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay: "he recognised that it was not enough continually to assure the Russians of the unity and steadfastness of the Alliance to resist aggression: it was almost equally necessary to convince the peoples of the Member countries of the existence of this unity and the necessity of it".

The thinking mirrored that behind the Brussels Treaty, showing just how far the value of cultural cooperation as an underpinning to defence alliances had by 1953 become

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102 M. Heald, & L. S. Kaplan, "Culture and Diplomacy, the American Experience", Greenwood Press, 1977
103 they note that this "regional" status was seen by many as a get-out clause which permitted regional aggression independently of the UN, since it implied action might legitimately be taken within the region in defence of common values – as, for example, in the recent Kosovo action
105 the large number of books by former State Department heads of cultural relations explaining why cultural relations is as important as information suggests the Foreign Office was probably right
106 see also S. L. Bills, "The US, NATO and the Third World: Dominoes, Imbroglios and Agonising Appraisals", in L. S Kaplan, (ed.), "NATO after Forty Years", SR Books, 1990, on the suddenly pressing need to repackage NATO after the 1950 US Congress hearings
107 Jordan, op. cit., p. 173
accepted wisdom. The Council of Europe also considered the possibility in the context of the proposed European Defence Community in the 1950s. One UK official likened the apparent trend for every international organisation at that time to go in for cultural cooperation to "a species of cultural mumps", an ailment that children go through (but usually get over). But in the case of NATO, American mumps was the worst.

As Peter Coleman shows, this was the period when the CIA was investing covertly in the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an association of intellectuals active until the late 1960s in organising seminars and conferences. This might almost be seen as a revival of the Paul Valéry "Entretiens" - intellectual cooperation, but this time used for explicitly western political priorities. Ninkovich argues that for the Americans cultural relations had become intellectual relations with "ideas as the determinant cultural reality" – culture thus became "the last hurdle before international understanding". This is an interesting distinction, harking back, first, to Coudenhove-Kalergi's perception that culture is intimately linked to national identity and, second, to the proposition that the world of the intellect is essentially universal.

For the USA intellectual relations involved the conflict of two systems, western and eastern.

There was a general feeling among the European partners that if the Americans wanted to use NATO for cultural cooperation they should be allowed to, since this would help keep them interested in the defence of Europe. UK policy was to

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108 the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly was the debating chamber for the European Defence Community proposal
109 PRO FO 924/1012
110 P. Coleman, "The Liberal Conspiracy", Macmillan, 1989
111 Ninkovich, op.cit., p. 182
encourage NATO to concentrate on transatlantic interchange\textsuperscript{112}. In a rare burst of forward thinking, the Netherlands’ Dr Reinink, who was also one of the BTO’s cultural experts, was commissioned to produce a report on the prospects for NATO cultural cooperation. To the horror of the British, he came up with proposals for a wide-ranging cultural programme based on Europe intended to "create a recognised Atlantic community, or more accurately to obtain recognition that an Atlantic community exists"\textsuperscript{113} (in effect, a spiritual Marshall Plan for Western Europe requiring, naturally, a substantial budget).

Although the Foreign Office records do not make it clear what happened, the Reinink report was quietly shelved, no doubt on expense grounds\textsuperscript{114} but also because NATO governments were not prepared to upgrade cultural cooperation to a full-scale "cultural community", or, in the words of Richard Seymour "a kind of Atlantic version of the Commonwealth" rather than "a façade for talking purposes". By the end of 1954, the UK permanent delegation to NATO reported that "the committee is now so lost in the maze of Dr Reinink’s report that if nothing is done to throw out precise proposals we shall all have culture engraved on our hearts at the retiring age!".

Nevertheless a limited programme did get under way. Again, it seems that the absence of a clear common aim seems to have disabled cultural cooperation. However, Beloff notes that all the civilian activities of NATO were kept starved of funding, with the result that the military arm achieved a "genuine internationalism" which did not extend to the civilian side. Jordan confirms that this was the fate of the Information

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\textsuperscript{112} the information for this section is contained in PRO FO 924/1012 and 1038
\textsuperscript{113} PRO FO 924/1038. The Foreign Office view was that nothing could be gained by encouraging NATO to duplicate existing intra-European cooperation
\textsuperscript{114} the State Department, after all, was already getting results though bilateral, if covert, means
Division: he does not mention the Reinink report, but states that "many projects suggested by the Division were not carried through, owing to lack of money or of adequate terms of reference, or of domestic support and encouragement"\textsuperscript{115}. While NATO has retained a programme of support for exchange, I have been unable to establish that it ever undertook a programme involving "pure culture". Council of Europe papers\textsuperscript{116} suggest that by 1965 all contacts of a cultural cooperation nature were with its Scientific Division, which offered research grants.

\textbf{Conclusion}

On the basis of its record of achievement, it would be hard to claim that cultural cooperation succeeded in establishing a climate of public trust and confidence in the post-war Western Europe defence alliances. There are no accounts in the UK records of either which suggest that the work was even known outside a small section of the European population\textsuperscript{117}; unlike UNESCO, where the files contain frequent references to public reaction to its programmes\textsuperscript{118}. Had WEU become the European pillar of NATO\textsuperscript{119}, and perhaps its "civilian" arm as well, a stronger cultural emphasis might have developed. Instead, WEU's eventual future bias leaned towards the European Union, where culture was by that time already on the point of being established within

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{115} Jordan, op. cit., p. 188. Examples of NATO cultural initiatives given include the NATO Caravan of Peace, paid for by the US government and a big success in Greece, Italy and Turkey, where vulnerability to USSR cultural propaganda was felt to be a daily reality; films about NATO, study visits for journalists and latterly a scientific publications programme.

\textsuperscript{116} CCC (65) 21

\textsuperscript{117} there are, for example, no press cuttings or evaluation studies.

\textsuperscript{118} not always favourable

\textsuperscript{119} see J. Myers, "The WEU: Pillar of NATO or Defence Arm of the EC?", London Defence Studies, no. 16, 1993
\end{footnotesize}
the EU's Treaty competences, and its cultural work was hived off to the very different Council of Europe.

Some tentative conclusions can be drawn from these try-outs for a distinctive European multilateral cultural cooperation, on its own or within a global organisation. The first is that culture was incorporated into new international relations systems where it had not previously figured in order to act as a stimulus towards a political goal which was not necessarily cultural. The goal might be European unity, world peace and security, or defence and mutual aid, but it was not the federal ideal of fostering diversity. The second is that there was no clear consensus on the ways in which cultural cooperation might help to achieve that goal. Within the organisations where the UK was a dominant voice, cultural cooperation centred on an intensified web of contacts and relations for exchanging information about each other's systems but not interested in common policies or in culture per se. The prevailing imagery being purveyed was that of western-style democracy and liberal institutions. For continental Europe, this was an incomplete imagery which needed to be supplemented by assertions of Europe's past spiritual and cultural greatness and its potential for future renaissance. These were, fundamentally, different self-images, appealing to different popular needs and arising from different experiences of the war and of the inversion of civilisation perceived by Stephen Spender.

In trying to create and apply its own view of multilateral cultural cooperation, the UK Foreign Office disregarded and distrusted the substantial, specifically "European", tradition of intellectual cooperation which had been built up without its participation on the continent. It regarded UNESCO as the sole suitable venue for intellectual cooperation, which took insufficient account of its importance in a European context.
The report of Sir Alfred Zimmern\textsuperscript{120} to the UNESCO Preparatory Commission on what might be learned from the ICIC hints at the way the UK might have wanted things to go. This envisages a synthesis of ICIC and CAME which combined some acknowledgement of the Bergson "élan vital" as an element in cooperation with a serious emphasis on planned action undertaken only after the rationale for it had been clearly understood and agreed. Much of the subsequent disillusionment with UNESCO, particularly in the case of the anglophone countries, came from the sense that it was devising programmes for the sake of being seen to be busy and active, which in turn seems to have led to a pattern of under-resourcing\textsuperscript{121} which has remained to the present day.

The financial aspects of cultural cooperation also reflect the UK-France polarity. In terms of national policy interest, France had more to gain from a substantial investment in cultural cooperation\textsuperscript{122} while in order to justify the use of public funds on any scale\textsuperscript{123} the UK relied on visible returns the nature of which it could rarely predict. This was even more the case for the US State Department, which had endless battles with Congress over UNESCO. The perception that money spent on the intellectual-creative areas of cultural cooperation was not money well spent worked against the Anglo-Saxon rationale for supporting cultural cooperation in the first place, i.e. that public perception of the international systems themselves would improve.

\textsuperscript{120} the original UK candidate for the job of secretary-general, and a former deputy to Bonnet at IIIC: the Foreign Office thought the report the best such document they had seen

\textsuperscript{121} it may not be accidental that the UK, at least, thought the most efficient of the programmes was the one where governments kept direct control of the purse strings

\textsuperscript{122} as Jacques Rigaud noted, the benefits of UNESCO to France are increased twelvefold by the simple fact of its presence in Paris (J. Rigaud, "Les Relations Culturelles Extérieures, Rapport au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères", Documentation Française, 1979)

\textsuperscript{123} c.f. the history of public criticism of the British Council
Even so, and despite conventional wisdom about British attitudes to Europe, the papers suggest, not so much UK unwillingness to participate in a specifically European cultural cooperation like BTO, as misgivings about the value of cultural programmes in general. The Foreign Office was extremely sensitive to accusations of not being interested in Europe and felt the record would show that it had played its part. What it was not able to show was an appreciation of the extent to which cultural cooperation in Europe was bound up with the continental experience of the war and the way in which appeals, such as that of de Rougemont, to culture as the core and defining "European experience" were more than superficial rallying-calls for the window-dressing of a political project.

Finally, these early experiments show how unlikely it was that the functionalist argument in favour of integration, that of essential services more efficiently delivered, would become applicable to cultural cooperation. Its advantages were political, whether in the form of a quasi-propagandist rebuttal to the Soviet "cultural offensive", of more popular support for the Western European defence alliances or of securing influence in developing countries in a non-imperialist way. Cultural cooperation would be judged on how it achieved these objectives. Yet such objectives were clearly difficult to achieve when strongly contrasted sets of motives were in operation.

The Council of Europe, examined in the next chapters, brings the duality of European cultural cooperation together. Its forty-five year history shows how the attempt has been made to develop a working theory of cultural cooperation from the different strands already established through the extended bilateralism of the UK and the much more deeply embedded process of social reshaping under a cultural agenda which the federalists had installed within an integration context. These were modified in turn by
the highly case-specific tradition of Nordic cooperation. The interaction of all these produces what the Council itself likes to think of as a "philosophy", but which in fact is a process of continuous reinvention in response to changing circumstances.
CHAPTER SEVEN

The Council of Europe: background and structure

The Council of Europe and its cultural cooperation span half a century. Within that
time it has acted as a testing-ground for different approaches in cultural cooperation.
In order to present this process as coherently as possible, this and the chapters
following will deal thematically with the Council's work, beginning with an historical
explanation of the context, political and administrative, within which it takes place.
This is followed by an account of its main programme orientations over the years, and
will conclude with an examination of the themes emerging from these and their
implications for European cultural cooperation.

International relations theory and literature

Terminology drawn from international relations theory is helpful for locating cultural
cooperation within a theoretical framework, and can also read across to developments
in thinking related to cultural policy at the domestic level. Particular attention is paid
in the following chapters to the idea of cultural cooperation as an attempt to
demonstrate "communitarian" theory within international relations, as opposed to
"cosmopolitan theory", as developed by Chris Brown. The analysis also makes use of
the ideas of James Der Derian relating to "anti-diplomacy".

1 C. Brown, "International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches", Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1992
2 J. Der Derian, 1987, op.cit
This thesis favours a realist, or neo-realist, approach to explain outcomes, in that these are attributed to the interests and behaviour of individual states rather than an assumed 'consensus' represented by the organisation itself and, indeed, purveyed by the organisation as an image of cooperation. The work of Keohane, a neo-realist, will also be drawn upon for definitions of "cooperation" and that of Deutsch for consideration of "policy" and the characteristics of integration. However, the choice of commentators (in a wide field) is guided partly by the extent to which they take into account the non-realist, especially idealist, approaches which play such a large part in cultural cooperation. It will be argued that the essential elements of such cooperation are identity and interest, separately or together. International relations theory as a critique of cultural cooperation will be examined in chapter 9.

Literature of the Council of Europe

Cultural cooperation in the Council of Europe has, as usual, very little critical literature. The closest is the account by Grosjean (1994), a valuable and accurate synthesis which undertakes some analysis but is essentially a commissioned work of advocacy and celebration and does not pretend to be a critical examination. Haigh

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3 the term "realist" in international relations is associated with E. H. Carr (who according to Brown (1997) supplied the international relations vocabulary) and with M. Wight, whose essay "Why is there no international theory?" (published in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, (eds.), "Diplomatic Investigations", George Allen and Unwin, 1966) is regarded as seminal (see S. Smith, in "International Relations Theory Today" (S. Smith & K. Booth, eds.), Polity Press, 1995; also C. Brown, "Understanding International Relations", Macmillan, 1997). In this view, international relations is primarily about the way nation states pursue their particular interests within a system which is fundamentally anarchic. Neo-realism seeks to explain the unpredictability of such behaviour by identifying the sets of rules which govern and constrain it. Realism is seen by Wight as deriving from Machiavelli, and is compared with other traditions (rationalism, revolutionism), deriving from Grotius and Kant respectively.


presents the early years of cultural cooperation within the CoE, but again is an advocate. A doctoral thesis published in book form analyses the "cultural policy" of the Council but is in German and therefore inaccessible to this author. Baeten (1987) offers a description from the point of view of an arts administrator seeking to provide information, but this is not, on the whole, a critique and is out of date.

Some histories of the organisation exist, most of which make reference to its cultural function and generally agree that it is one of the justifications of the Council's existence. More general works also refer to it in this context. However, it tends to be mainly the educational side of the programme which is singled out, with the exception of the Council of Europe art exhibitions, an unbroken series from the early 1950s to the present day. Its intergovernmental nature makes some critics assume that the Council's cultural cooperation is similar to bilateral cultural cooperation. De Witte discusses the Council of Europe in his article "Cultural Linkages" but considers it "cumbersome", is disparaging about the extent to which it remains in the control of member states and does not examine its programme. Roche & Pigniau (op.cit), in their invaluable account of French cultural diplomacy, and J. M. Mitchell (ditto) both ignore the Council of Europe. Two commentaries are provided by Denis de

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6 A. Haigh, "Cultural Diplomacy in Europe", Council of Europe, 1974
7 J. Kruse, "Europaische Kulturpolitik am Beispiel des Europarats", Munster, 1992
8 E. Baeten, "Arts Policy of the European Community and the Council of Europe", 1987
10 a typical such comment appears in William Wallace's introduction to "The Dynamics of European Integration" (1990, op.cit), p. 17: "from the creation of the Council of Europe, with its modest cultural exchanges and town-twinning schemes, to the ambitious programmes of Franco-German exchanges, governments have acted on the assumption that increased interaction under conditions of mutual trust does change attitudes"
11 de Witte, in Wallace, op.cit., p. 196
12 as the following chapters will show, he is not entirely correct to dismiss it as "very much a tool in the hands of the member governments" (ibid.).
Rougemont, one in the form of an anniversary assessment\textsuperscript{13}, the title of which says it all, and the other a "bilan" of achievement carried out by his Centre in 1964\textsuperscript{14}.

Accordingly, these chapters draw heavily upon documentation of the Council itself, especially meeting papers of the officials' group\textsuperscript{15} (variously called the Committee of Cultural Experts and the Council for Cultural Cooperation) which are preserved at the Council's headquarters in Strasbourg. These are backed up by public records of the British Foreign Office and Ministry of Education (where available)\textsuperscript{16}, which provide insight into the early years, although little after the late 1950s has been retained\textsuperscript{17}. Finally, and to a limited extent only, the author's own notes and recollections as a delegate to the Council for Cultural Cooperation from 1986 – 1996 have been consulted.

The Congress of Europe and the Council of Europe

The background to the Council's creation is covered in many political memoirs of the period as well as in accounts of the post-war development of international organisations. There is a general consensus that the Council was defused politically from the outset and remained useful mainly as a lubricator for the real business of

\textsuperscript{13} D. de Rougemont, "35 Ans d'Attentes Décues, mais d'Espoir Invaincu: le Conseil de l'Europe", in Cadmos issue no. 30, 1985 (journal of the European Cultural Centre, Lausanne)

\textsuperscript{14} European Cultural Centre, "Bilan des Activités Culturelles au Service de l'Europe 1949-1964".

\textsuperscript{15} these papers have reference numbers indicating their provenance, year and order of issue: thus, document CCC(67)4, the report of a working party, is a paper tabled at a meeting of the Council for Cultural Cooperation in the first half of 1967

\textsuperscript{16} PRO FO 924/854, 878-9, 909-917,1008-9, 1224; FO 371/80119, 88628, 88647, 96355, 102316-8, 124788, 131008, 173361-5; and ED 121/1128, 1130-37 and 1144.

\textsuperscript{17} under the 30 year rule, material after 1969 is not yet public
political integration\textsuperscript{18}. Its role in European integration is now generally downplayed\textsuperscript{19} and it seems to have attracted little critical attention on its own account\textsuperscript{20}. However, it is important politically for having been the crucible\textsuperscript{21}, in the early 1950s, for integration schemes including the "Schuman Plan" which became the European Communities, and again as a re-entry point, in the 1990s, for the states of the former eastern bloc, including Russia.

The Council of Europe was formally established in 1948 as an intergovernmental body without supranational powers, or indeed any decision-making capability independent of its member states. It has a tripartite composition - a Committee of Ministers (foreign ministers whose powers are delegated to a group of permanent representatives, the Ministers' Deputies), a Consultative Parliamentary Assembly made up of delegates from national parliaments, and a permanent secretariat\textsuperscript{22}. Its main instruments of regulation are intergovernmental conventions, backed up with non-binding recommendations and resolutions. The latter may be taken by the Assembly and passed to the Committee of Ministers for endorsement, action, or inaction.

Its intergovernmental nature, with no transfer of sovereign powers, prevented the Council from gaining acceptance as an arbiter of "European policy", by which is meant a level of reference higher than the national against which domestic policy

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\textsuperscript{18} Federalist historians, such as Mayne and Pinder (1990, op.cit) writing from a UK perspective, and Greißammer (1975, op.cit), writing from a French one, agree in regarding it as having been subverted by British (mainly) and Scandinavian (partly) insistence that it remain intergovernmental and without legislative powers to override Member States
\textsuperscript{19} e.g. by Milward (op.cit), Margaret Sharp in Wallace (1990, op.cit)
\textsuperscript{20} in English – the same may not be true elsewhere
\textsuperscript{21} in the words of the Belgian statesman Paul-Henri Spaak, it acted as an "aircraft-carrier" (PRO FO 371/73095)
\textsuperscript{22} other organs, such as the European Court of Human Rights, are obviously important to the organisation but have no particular relevance for cultural cooperation
\end{flushright}
decisions were taken and measured. For Archer, the Council was the "spirit level", supplying moral pressure, debate and attempts at standard-setting which were closely bound up with the idea of Europe as a moral entity acting for a more enlightened governance within the world. A key feature was that it offered, in Archer's words, "an ideological orientation for even the Western European states that were unable to join NATO". The Nordic countries thus enjoyed a particular status and influence from the start, reinforced by their ability to co-ordinate amongst themselves, something which the BTO countries had never really achieved. Subsequently it served the same function for the new democracies of central and eastern Europe.

Given its links with the Congress of Europe, it would have been surprising if the Council had not attempted cultural cooperation from the outset. In the Council's statute this is an explicitly moral commitment to the "ideals and principles which are their common heritage". The context is different, however, from that of BTO or NATO: the goal which is to be served is that of European unity, not a specific alliance. Foreign policy and defence, with which cultural cooperation had to date been associated, were excluded from the remit of the Council of Europe, which was instead focused on social and economic progress. It was associated also with human rights and "fundamental freedoms". This immediately gave cultural cooperation an interior context, related to the management of society within member states' own borders, which had not been present previously.

Structurally, the Council was set up as a debating chamber (the Consultative Assembly) whose recommendations would be remitted to an executive (the

23 Archer (1994), op.cit., p. 59
24 i.e. the signatory states
Committee of Ministers) for decision. The secretariat provided services to both, but separately. As the Assembly began to set up its various specialist committees, so "shadow" committees of national servants were convened to examine the results and advise their ministers on how to proceed. Accordingly, in the early days of the Council of Europe the running on content was made by the Assembly, several of whose members on the cultural affairs committee were convinced federalists and veterans of the Hague Congress. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the Assembly took up many of the recommendations from the Congress, chief amongst them the creation of a European Cultural Centre and a College of Europe.

The Centre, set up in Geneva shortly after the Congress took place under de Rougemont's direction, was originally intended to have several identities: an information centre, promoting "an awareness of European unity"; a forum, providing "a meeting place for leaders of thought enabling them to express a genuinely European point of view on all the great questions..."; a co-ordinator of scientific research "especially in the spheres of Teaching, Psychology, Philosophy, Sociology and Law"; a multilateral cooperation centre, encouraging "free circulation of ideas, literature and works of art" between countries; and a focus for university cooperation and textbook revision.

This remit, a watered-down version of which appears in the cultural recommendation from the Hague Congress, looks remarkably like that of the pre-war Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. But two key tasks demonstrate de Rougemont's own vision of the Centre as a political entity: it was "to exercise vigilant care over the words

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25 the balance of power was intended to be about equal, with a quasi-bicameral feel
26 PRO FO 371/ 102318 (taken from De Rougemont's draft: the final text was much less detailed)
actually used in discussion without which no pact could be concluded"; and was "to affirm... the right of every citizen to ascertain the true facts of current events, uninfluenced by interpretation or commentary and... the duty of every government to secure for its people the exercise of that right...." In other words, it was to act as a kind of supra-governmental arbiter: what de Rougemont himself had called "un Conseil de l'Esprit européen". It would study and opine, not co-ordinate in a neutral fashion. It would have a view and a policy; and this would be accepted in some sense as a European policy.

De Rougemont had emerged from the Congress with approval for the principle of the Centre but no institutional backing. The European Movement itself, now the voice of European federalism, did not take over responsibility for the Centre, which received instead what it hoped would be temporary financial support from the Swiss federal authorities until the Council of Europe could be persuaded to assume sponsorship. Once it was clear that the Council was not prepared to regard the Centre as its "cultural self", Swiss support became permanent. The Centre continued (and continues) to function as a research centre but its relationship with the Council of Europe remained ill-defined and its influence on cultural cooperation at inter-governmental level very limited. Today it is unknown outside specialist circles and enjoys no political prestige. The European Movement invested more effort in the College of Europe, set up at Bruges under the direction of the federalist historian Henri Brugmans. Over the years the College, whilst not associated with the Council of Europe, has become a mainstream, not specifically federalist, element of European

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27 Deering, op.cit. p. 278
integration and claims a significant proportion of European Commission staff as its graduates. Unlike the Centre, it is highly regarded as a repository of expertise in European integration studies.

**Working methods: the Committee of Cultural Experts**

The preparatory cultural work of the Hague Congress, and the "low-tech"\(^{28}\) nature of the subject matter, meant the Assembly had a raft of proposals ready for consideration within a short time. As well as support for the Centre, these included the extension of BTO work on the free circulation of cultural material; the creation of a system of "practical aid" to "private organisations that are working to promote European culture"; and meetings of ministers with responsibility for education and culture to discuss an agenda suggested by the Assembly itself (which it thought should cover topics such as the heritage, folklore, film and broadcasting etc.)\(^{29}\).

As a result a working group of officials from national culture and education ministries (where these existed) and foreign ministries was convened at the beginning of 1950 to advise the Committee of Ministers on the Assembly's recommendations, one of the first areas to organise in this way. The group borrowed the title Committee of Cultural Experts from BTO. The fate of the European Cultural Centre was discussed at official level but postponed on Ministers' agendas until it was finally dropped altogether\(^{30}\). However, the need to keep in mind the possibility that all cultural cooperation might

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\(^{28}\) i.e. requiring relatively little specialist advice

\(^{29}\) PRO FO 924/879

\(^{30}\) only the Netherlands appears to have offered serious political support for the Centre, which it subsequently assisted through the formation of the European Cultural Foundation
be remitted to such a body, and with it any available resources, meant that in the first years it was difficult to develop a coherent in-house programme.

The early work of other committees is of limited interest in this study, except to provide context. For example, in 1964 cultural cooperation was one of nine steering committees working in areas as diverse as criminology, public health, human rights and legal issues (where there were seven subject committees dealing with, inter alia, patents, wines and spirits and foreign money liabilities). The pattern of work here was, and is, normative, or standard-setting. Cultural cooperation, therefore, was already unusual in Council of Europe terms in having relatively little to offer in the normative area.

In its first years the Council was mired in conflict between the Committee of Ministers and the Assembly. The former felt the latter was irresponsible and unrealistic; the latter thought the former was interested only in thwarting its ambitions and stifling imaginative debate. The Cultural Experts’ report to the Committee of Ministers in June 1950 emphasised mainly educational cooperation. The Assembly was not satisfied with this response and began to press for a less reductionist approach to cultural cooperation which reflected its own ideals and identified "the common elements of European culture (ideals and methods)". Cultural cooperation proceeded for some time in this somewhat unsatisfactory manner, as a series of proposals being

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31 in the course of a decade, it is interesting to note, the perception changed completely within the UK Foreign Office: it felt that the Committee of Ministers had become stale and conservative, while the Assembly was now acting as a genuine international forum for airing issues

32 AS (2) 65: Assembly motion for the organisation of a European Cultural Centre, 1950
batted to and forth between the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, without much attempt to analyse either purpose or method, let alone impact.\textsuperscript{33}

**The European Cultural Convention**

In 1954, Anthony Haigh, a British diplomat who had acquired a strong personal commitment to the development of cultural cooperation, took on responsibility for drafting of a European Cultural Convention\textsuperscript{34} which would establish a formal instrument for the Council's activity in this field, though without defining its content. This was intended to break the deadlock. The Assembly was initially suspicious of the Convention, which it saw as a mechanism for constraining rather than privileging cultural cooperation.

The European Cultural Convention was meant to act not just as a mechanism for collective cooperation but as an "umbrella" convention providing cover to countries who had not yet negotiated bilateral conventions with one another. While its structure clearly reflects the UK preoccupation with defining multilateral cultural cooperation as an extension of the bilateral form, the text does not establish any kind of hierarchy; indeed, it barely alludes to bilateral cooperation at all. It is still the basis of multilateral cultural cooperation within the Council of Europe.

\textsuperscript{33} A UK civil servant comments that the experts "ought to be given comprehensible terms of reference or else none at all and left to work out their own salvation as happened in Western Union" (PRO FO 924/880)

\textsuperscript{34} It should be noted that the international convention, outlining general principles by which signatories agreed to abide and action they agreed to take, would have been the most binding instrument open to the Council of Europe for the regulation of a specific area in the absence of any coercive powers. However, the European Cultural Convention seems to have been a one-off in terms of regulating agreement on ends and means within Council fields of competence – other conventions exist, but achieve specific aims in policy terms rather than creating the framework within which cooperation will take place: another example of cultural cooperation's peculiarity as an area of cooperation.
Its features include a commitment in the preamble to "a policy of common action designed to safeguard and encourage the development of European culture". The signatories then agree to "take appropriate measures to safeguard and to encourage the development of its national contribution to the common cultural heritage of Europe"; to encourage and promote the study of others’ languages, history and civilisation; to consult each other "within the framework of the Council of Europe with a view to concerted action"; to facilitate the movement and exchange of objects and persons; and to "regard the objects of European cultural value" in their control as "integral parts of the common cultural heritage of Europe". At the secretariat’s suggestion a clause was included permitting the accession of non-member states of the Council if invited to do so unanimously by the Committee of Ministers.

International conventions are considered to have binding force on their signatories but are difficult to enforce, in the absence of meaningful sanctions. The European Cultural Convention’s more radical elements seem to have been little noticed at the time. The wording in effect commits its signatories to maintaining at national level policies likely to lead to the overall enhancement of the "common cultural heritage of Europe". There is no evidence, however, that the signatories have ever taken this to heart. It also, as the Secretariat noted at the time, enunciates the fact of a "common cultural heritage" in which all have an interest, just as, in the case of human rights, all agree to participate in the work of the Court even if they do not accept its jurisdiction. The nature of that heritage is, however, left undefined, as is the nature of the "policy of common action" to be embarked upon as a result. There are no instances in which

35 as Oppermann notes in regard to UNESCO's Convention on Educational, Social and Cultural Rights, "the juridical stringency of those rights... must be doubted" (T. Opperman, "Cultural Agreements", in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. 9, 1986, pp 56-58). The UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Traffic of Cultural Policy is a good example of a convention with good intentions but little chance of being enforced.
member states of the Council have been called to account by the organisation for any alleged deficiencies in safeguarding this heritage. The European Cultural Convention therefore does not enable the Council to act in any sense as an overseer of national standards, or indeed as a setter of such standards.

It has also been noted that the capacity to extend membership to non-member states during and particularly at the end of the Cold War period was significant. As well as Finland, which acceded to the European Cultural Convention in 1970 but did not join the Council of Europe as a full member until 1990, and Yugoslavia in 1987, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were all able to accede in 1989, before democratic governments had been established. Spain was able to participate in cultural cooperation from 1957 onwards, while still under Franco. However, no-one seems to have remarked on this far-sightedness at the time. Overall, the text of the Convention might mean a lot, or very little. This flexibility of interpretation gives states considerable latitude - one reason why there has been little member state enthusiasm over the years for amending it.

The Cultural Fund and the European Cultural Foundation

The Convention was supplemented in 1959 with a novel mechanism intended to insulate its programme from the uncertainties of annual renegotiation by the Ministers' Deputies. As the only Council of Europe committee with a more significant spending programme than normative function, the Committee of Cultural Experts felt the so-called Cultural Fund was needed not simply to carry over commitments from one year to the next but also to raise additional funds from outside the public purse.

36 comments in the UK records indicate that it was not in fact a new idea in international diplomacy
37 in 1999 there was, however, a proposal for amendment from the Netherlands
The Council was by now conscious of efforts to introduce cultural cooperation into the European Communities, inclining the non-EEC member states to invest in safeguarding their monopoly on this aspect of integration.

The Cultural Fund, therefore, far more than the European Cultural Convention, can be seen as an attempt to rethink cultural cooperation and revive the Council of Europe programme lest cultural cooperation migrate elsewhere, thus marginalising the Council further. The financial arrangements involved a fixed national contribution using a formula based on payments to the Council budget as a whole, supplemented by additional voluntary contributions, which could be from private sources. This remains the way CoE cultural cooperation is funded.

Haigh hoped that it would enable resources to be targeted on the larger projects that had hitherto proved impossible to put together. In order to resolve concerns about possible duplication, it included an agreement with the recently created European Cultural Foundation (ECF) jointly to collect private funds, a proportion of which would be retained by the ECF, the remainder to be paid into the Cultural Fund. However, the gamble to attract significant sums from private sources failed badly. The project was not attractive enough. ECF National Committees generated scarcely any income for the Cultural Fund and the arrangement ended in 1962.

The European Cultural Foundation was set up in Geneva in 1954 in an attempt to raise funds for the European Cultural Centre. In its early days it was closely associated with the federalist movement, in particular de Rougemont and Brugmans. Over the years, however, that link has become less strong. De Rougemont’s account

38 such as the Belgian led group "L’Intergroupe des Intérêts Intellectuels" which attracted some notice in 1955 from leading integrationist figures such as Robert Schuman
of the setting up of the ECF (for which he claims credit) appears in the Foundation's journal. The aim was to replicate in Europe the great American foundations "financed by capital drawn from Europe itself...to restore our continent's sense of moral independence, to give our research scientists and creative artists confidence in themselves and in the future". The Netherlands government shortly afterwards oversaw its move in 1957 to Amsterdam.

The ECF is interesting partly as an early experiment in cross-national business sponsorship. Prince Bernhard announced at the Foundation's first Congress in 1957 his aim of attracting contributions of 5,000 guilders apiece from corporate affiliates alongside an individual membership of 400 "prominent Europeans". It is fairly clear that the Foundation was intended to act within Europe as a counterpart to the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, with an agenda favouring integration but focussing primarily on direct intervention to assist the cultural world itself. Although the ECF still flourishes, it no longer acts as a fund-raising body, depending instead on income from the Dutch national lottery and football pools and contract work carried out for the European Commission.

The Council for Cultural Cooperation

In 1960 it was finally agreed that the social and cultural work of the Western European Union should be transferred to the Council of Europe. The merger brought in two new committees, one for university vice-chancellors and one for film experts. As a result the Committee of Ministers merged the old Committee of Cultural Experts

40 mostly Dutch and German
with the Administrative Board of the Cultural Fund to form the Council for Cultural Cooperation (CCC), a title which reflects the presence of representatives from the Consultative Assembly and the ECF. Three new permanent committees were established which were responsible to it. All three were educational in nature, although as we shall see one began to acquire a strong cultural dimension: Higher Education and Research (HER); General and Technical Education (GTE); and Out-of-School Education, which dealt with youth, physical education and adult education.

The work inherited from WEU included plans for a conference of WEU ministers of education, which the CoE took over and retained as a fixture. Although its agenda was exclusively focused on education matters. Grosjean states that the first of these meetings produced guidelines that were subsequently taken up for cultural policy. This reflects the apparently highly political, and contentious, nature of the preparations for this first meeting. The papers of the UK Foreign Office make it clear that part of the intention was to use the preparatory work for the conference to set up a policy steering group which would take over responsibility for educational and cultural cooperation both within the Six and for the Council of Europe as a whole. This would have moved cultural cooperation out of the sphere of cultural diplomacy and towards an integrated European education policy dominated by the supranational community of the Six.

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41 the "partial agreement" system which enables activity to be conducted within the Council by a smaller number of its members (see Duclos, op. cit.)
42 see PRO ED 121/1130
43 see Grosjean, 1994, op.cit., p. 39
44 the pre-enlargement European Economic Community is often referred to as "the Six", "the Nine" or "the Twelve" to point up the changed nature of its membership
45 the 1959 report of the Administrative Board refers to a proposal for "a European Office of Cultural Relations through which all cultural work in Europe would be canalised" (p. 29)
This attempt to link a ministerial conference to a new management structure for cultural cooperation appears to have been very damaging. Perhaps it accounts for the suspicion with which the CoE has viewed the EU’s forays into cultural cooperation from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, as almost a planned act of territorial annexation. Haigh regarded it as tantamount to a coup ("a revolt ...against the ministers of foreign affairs") in which education ministries tried to marginalise the cultural diplomats. This sense of relations soured still echoes in the relationship between the culture ministries (now the Culture Committee of the Council for Cultural Cooperation) and the Committee of Ministers, where a low-level battle for control remains a continuous feature of the landscape.

The introduction of debate about education policy at the domestic level through meetings of departmental ministers visibly switched the agenda of the Council of Europe in multilateral cultural cooperation towards education and away from culture for the rest of the decade. Thus, by 1960, the structure of cultural cooperation had settled into its present form, with modifications, but with a strong bias towards education and away from culture. The European Cultural Convention provided a formal framework for enabling annual programmes to be drawn up by the CCC and approved by the Committee of Ministers. The Cultural Fund provided a reasonable degree of flexibility, being a global sum which could be attributed by the CCC without further reference to the Committee of Ministers.

46 the proposal appears to have been particularly associated with Belgium, and linked to the Plan Fouchet, the French-led attempt to restructure the EC with a stronger intergovernmental component which would have included educational and cultural cooperation. The UK suspected a Franco-Belgian attempt to marginalise them by marginalising the CoE, although the French appear to have switched tack and supported retaining cultural cooperation within the CoE framework.

47 PRO ED 121/1130

48 Resolution (61) 39 of the Committee of Ministers remained in force until December 1977 when it was replaced by a second resolution reconstituting the CCC as a steering committee (CDCC) with renewable terms of reference.
By 1963 cultural cooperation was taking a substantial share of the Council's budget. Of a total of 1,587,900 FF, the CCC took 276,000 FF - 50,000 FF more than its nearest committee rival, although the organisation's total running costs accounted for 649,000 FF. At this period the Council of Europe itself was perceived to be failing, lacking in influence and outgunned by the success of the European Economic Community. Cultural cooperation, in common with other cooperation fields, came under growing pressure to compress and sharpen both its objectives and the action taken to achieve them, particularly from non-EEC countries who depended upon the Council to maintain their influence in European affairs.

Structurally and politically, progress in the Council of Europe seems thereafter to have been defined in large part by the evolution of the European Community. The failure of the UK to join the EEC resulted in a short-lived attempt to revive the Council as a forum for wider European cooperation. It did produce a number of serious conventions on subjects as varied as conflict resolution and labour conditions (in which its claim to fame is to have pioneered the concept of the minimum wage). By 1970, the Assembly was described by Duclos as "une sorte de miroir fidèle des diversités locales," a grassroots perspective which had been strengthened by the establishment in 1961 of the Conference of European Local and Regional Authorities (CLRAE), which has its roots in an Assembly gathering of 1953. The pinnacle of the Council's activity, then as now, was human rights.

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49 this wistful note is struck as early as 1956 - in Robertson (op.cit), the foreword by Guy Mollet, a leading parliamentarian of the Assembly, notes that "other forms of European cooperation are making faster progress on a more limited basis" (p. ix). Robertson notes that cultural cooperation is one of the few areas to have developed operational expenditure, and observes that it is "one of the most effective of all the committees" (op. cit., p. 140)

50 the recent (1998) report of the "Committee of Wise Persons" to the Committee of Ministers mentions there have been over 170

51 Duclos, op. cit., p. 54

52 Archer regards the CoE's human rights system as the most effective one in operation on an international level
Thus the Council established itself as a specialist in the non-economic aspects of European integration. Some of this activity had a bearing on cultural cooperation, notably the various initiatives on landscape and built heritage\(^{53}\). The fact that it no longer had a serious stake in the economic aspects of integration weakened it, however, especially in relation to the OECD, which as Haigh notes\(^ {54}\) also began to expand into educational cooperation from the 1960s onwards,\(^ {55}\) specialising in research and information with a strong development focus.

The crisis induced by the successful application by three of the Council of Europe’s members (the UK, Ireland and Denmark) to join the EC in 1973 put the organisation under further pressure. From 1975 onwards it seems to have undergone a process of constant reorganisation and remodelling, beginning with the introduction of the "medium-term plan" system, under which the Committee of Ministers approved five-year plans with sets of objectives and operational constraints to which the committees were expected to conform. A sense that the committees had proliferated out of control appears in UK papers as early as 1963\(^ {56}\) and throughout the 1970s committee papers reveal a battle to bring them back within the general management of the Committee of Ministers by restricting them to a small number of large-scale projects each with agreed life-spans and targets. The CCC seems to have been regarded as a particular problem child\(^ {57}\).

\(^{53}\) listed by Grosjean on p.75 of his study; at least three different committees were active in this field, not including occasional incursions by the Council for Cultural Cooperation  
\(^{54}\) Haigh, op.cit  
\(^{55}\) it also covered environment and social policy (Archer, op.cit)  
\(^{56}\) PRO FO 371/173363 – at this period committees were spawning working parties and policy seemed to be a question of how many meetings of how many people ought to be paid for (CCC had eight working parties in 1963)  
\(^{57}\) see, for example, CCC (75) 14, in which the Secretary-General attempts to impose a political steering group on the committee with the aim of preventing it from "jeopardising rather than improving" the state of intergovernmental negotiations
The CCC was reconstituted at various times in accordance with these political efforts to streamline the organisation (which, though growing in membership, was not attracting increased levels of funding from its member states). In 1977, the CCC was placed under new terms of reference which explicitly separated out the two strands of "educational" and "cultural" policy for the first time, though keeping them under unified management. It kept its name and the autonomy it had under the Cultural Fund but lost its sub-committees. "Culture" did not acquire managerial autonomy within the CCC/CDCC system until 1990 when the CDCC again acquired new terms of reference which established it as an umbrella structure supervising four specialist committees (education, culture, cultural heritage — formerly a separate steering committee — and higher education).

The mid-1980s represent a low point in the Council of Europe's fortunes. Further expansion in the European Community (which had twelve members by 1986, and had recently begun to consolidate a growing cultural role at ministerial level through meetings of the Council) meant it was starting to fulfil its threat to outstrip the Council of Europe in terms of financial resources available. Its social dimension had been launched in the mid-1970s and by 1987 it had overcome the objections of "Community competence" to the ERASMUS programme for university exchange, with a budget of 307.5 million ECU, well in excess of anything the Council could command. The continued relevance, and possibly existence, of the Council of Europe was seriously in question.

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58 these replaced the original 1961 terms of reference which set up the CCC  
59 however the initials change from CCC to CDCC, reflecting the technical change of status to a Steering Committee ("Comité Directrice" in French) which brings CDCC in line with other CoE committees  
60 see Chapter Ten on the institutions of the EC (Council, Commission, Parliament)  
61 ibid  
62 source: Green paper on European Social Policy: options for the Union, CEC, 1993 (COM(93)551)
The CSCE process and the Council of Europe

The Council of Europe may well have been saved as a viable organisation by the CSCE process, assisted by the expanded membership of the European Cultural Convention which preceded the fall of communism. As noted, the Convention was used as an induction process for the countries of the communist bloc from the late 1980s onwards, i.e. while they remained under communist rule. In the four years between 1990 and 1994 the number of signatories increased from 28 to 42, accounted for primarily by the unforeseen fragmentation of federations (the USSR and Yugoslavia) into autonomous states. In addition, with the aim of creating a complete "map of Europe", some small autonomous states (Andorra and Monaco) who had not hitherto sought to accede were encouraged to do so.

The 1990 summit meeting of the CSCE completed a process which had begun with the Helsinki meetings of 1975, seen as "the high-water mark" of East-West détente. Its agenda looked back to WEU as a classic combination of defence commitments underpinned by "the development of international relations with a view to contributing to the freer movement of people, ideas and information and to developing cooperation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields..."

Cultural relations formed the so-called "Basket III".

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63 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE, which covered east and west Europe as well as the USA and USSR, was not an international organisation as such, but a standing conference of diplomats over many years intended to "manage" the Cold War and negotiate advances in détente. Within CSCE, cultural cooperation assumed its classic role, that of underpinning foreign and defence policy.


65 meaning a group of related subjects managed within a single negotiating committee.
Culture was grouped with information, rather than with scientific research, reflecting developments at that time in UNESCO. As in UNESCO, this proved controversial and difficult to negotiate. However, according to Maresca, cultural relations (in the sense of exchange) performed their diplomatic function of providing material on which it was relatively easy to agree, paving the way with partial success for the more difficult concessions needed on freedom of information.

The Helsinki Final Act was not a treaty but became CSCE's de facto constitution, paving the way for the formalisation of the process into an organisation after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Basket III is amazingly detailed, with provisions about competitions for town planners, inclusion of works by other countries' composers in national repertoires and courses for restorers, emphasising its status as cultural diplomacy, an extension and consolidation of the contents of bilateral cultural agreements based on the practice of Mixed Commissions. The multilateral programme of the Council of Europe does not feature.

Two cultural conferences followed Helsinki, with mixed results. The 1985 Budapest Cultural Forum, involving "leading personalities", was not considered a success, getting bogged down in vast numbers of highly specific proposals and failing in the end to agree on a concluding document or even a communiqué. As Lehne notes, the

66 the events which led to the US and UK departure from UNESCO in the mid-1980s were related to conflict over information policy. See numerous writers on this, including M. Imber, "The USA, ILO, UNESCO and IAEA - Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialised Agencies", Macmillan, 1989; J. Maddison, "The UNESCO and Britain Dossier, 1945-1986"; Royston, MADA, 1986; C. Wells, "The UN, UNESCO and the Politics of Knowledge", Macmillan, 1987

67 signed in 1975 by 35 countries as the culmination of the negotiations

68 Archer, 1994, op.cit

69 CSCE is thus now OSCE

cultural proposals "never became the subject of serious negotiations at the Vienna\textsuperscript{71} meeting", the umbrella process which carried forward the Helsinki Act. In his view it did nothing to change the impression that "the concretization of cultural cooperation could be left to the bilateral level.\textsuperscript{72}"

The second event, a symposium on cultural heritage which took place in Cracow in 1991, was also short on outcome but nevertheless helped to feed into a Concluding Document from Vienna which combined some familiar rhetoric on free movement of art works, exchange of persons and joint endeavours with linkages between cultural cooperation to human rights in new ways. This involved rights of access to cultural events from abroad, encouragement to NGOs to become involved in implementing state agreements, and the restatement of a provision in the Helsinki Act related to "the contribution" of national minorities in much stronger terms, namely the commitment to endure that persons belonging to national minorities or regional cultures could "maintain and develop their own culture in all its aspects". It did not, however, lay down guidelines for further cultural cooperation.

It had been suggested that the Council of Europe might become the de facto "executive arm" of the new Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on cultural matters. This did not happen, but its involvement in the CSCE/OSCE process led to a much tighter focus on human rights as the core of its work. Throughout the 1990s, work on cultural cooperation has been a process of coming to terms with both this and the implications of the formal extension of

\textsuperscript{71} the diplomatic conference proposed by Gorbachev to discuss the "common European home" and agree post-1989 mechanisms for European security and cooperation

\textsuperscript{72} S. Lehne, "The CSCE in the 1990s – Common European House or Potemkin Village?", p. 13. Braumüller, AIIA, 1991,
European Community competence into culture and education in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht.

Conclusion

The Council of Europe offered the first post-war opportunity for cultural cooperation to take place in a context other than that of foreign and security policy. It had to develop, however, in a climate of declining influence in the process of European integration as a whole, dependent largely for its functioning on being seen as distinctively a part of intergovernmental Europe\textsuperscript{73}.

In addition, a structure which initially saw cultural cooperation as an extension (through the Cultural Convention) of diplomatic cultural functions proved inadequate in the face of political challenges which threatened its monopoly. The tensions inherent in a control system which pitted realist concerns (the Committee of Ministers) against idealist concerns (the Consultative Assembly) seemed initially to have been resolved in favour of the former. In fact (as should become clear in the succeeding chapters) they were revived by the creation of a domestic dimension (conferences of specialist ministers) which championed – or were made to seem to champion – a significantly more interventionist and idealistic agenda, which substituted a "philosophy", "theology" or "cultural policy"\textsuperscript{74} derived from the Assembly and its predecessors.

In this somewhat fluid and unfocused social and political territory, dominated by fears of irrelevance and usurpation, the aims of cultural cooperation could be reinvented in

\textsuperscript{73} hence the frequent reiteration of the theme that "Europe cannot stop at the borders of the Six/Nine/Twelve"

\textsuperscript{74} terms used by, respectively, Grosjean, Deering (of de Rougemont) and Haigh
ways that sometimes seemed removed from the political aims of the Council of Europe itself, let alone the governments who nominally controlled it. They seemed to have less to do with the careful negotiation of legal instruments intended to underpin a European commitment to democracy and rule of law than with reviving some of the aspirations which guided the pre- and post-war thinkers who sought to place culture at the centre of European integration. In doing so cultural cooperation came increasingly to concentrate on diversity, trying to reconcile that favourite mantra of European cultural cooperation, "unity in diversity".

75 The reason why de Witte's dismissiveness of the CDCC as a passive tool of its governmental masters is somewhat different from reality.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Cultural cooperation in the Council of Europe: the CDCC and its programme

In this chapter, the evolution of the cultural cooperation programme from its beginnings around 1950 to its present form will be explored. It is to be expected that major changes will have taken place over half a century. What is particularly striking in this examination, however, is how the programme mirrors change and conflict in social concerns and political priorities as opposed to consistent and maturing progress towards clearly articulated goals. The impression gained is of changing mood rather than measurable, or measured, achievement. In other words, the process being reflected is that of the management of culture as public policy rather than that of deepening European integration.

The Council of Europe programme is not notable for its clarity. The accusations of vagueness which tend to accompany it\(^1\) at various stages of development are usually justified. Evaluations for effectiveness are rare, feedback from the national or regional level about impact even rarer. The practice of issuing detailed annual reports precisely accounting for expenditure lasted only from 1960 to 1963 (the period in which the Cultural Fund had its own Administrative Board). Subsequent reports list activity but not details of expenditure and use a somewhat frustrating international rhetoric which tells the reader more about aspirations than about achievement. This is partly because from about 1963 onwards the programme ceases to be grant-based, switching instead to a programme method based on meetings and specialist publications. Accordingly,

\(^1\) found in CDCC's meeting records, especially where written comments have been sought from delegations
"content" can be difficult to pin down; the programme as presented to the member states usually lacks concrete illustration and can often only be interpreted and not assessed; in places the best that can be managed is an educated guess at what was intended.

What does become clear, however, is that the cultural cooperation programme of the Council of Europe can be expressed as a series of successive themes. The first, lasting till the mid 1960s, is fellow-feeling, adjusting to and negotiating the condition of peaceful coexistence. It is more "getting-to-know-you" than the functionalist "we-feeling", a sense of separate identities pitched without much warning into a new relationship which they can only hope will be to their common benefit. This is the only period in its history where cultural cooperation seems really to address the "common cultural heritage".

First steps: 1950-1954

Early efforts at designing a cultural programme for the Council of Europe took place in difficult conditions. There already existed two core groups within the CoE system – the BTO countries and the Nordic countries – who had created arrangements involving joint cultural action. The Consultative Assembly had opined strongly in favour of a decentralised approach, recalling that of the ICIC\(^2\) (it deplored "increased control by governments of everything affecting culture" and urged that governments "coordinate and stimulate the numerous activities of organisations" rather than "either try to control or dissociate themselves altogether")\(^3\).

\(^2\) unsurprisingly, since the committee in question was chaired by Salvador de Madariaga, a veteran of the Arts and Letters Sub-Committee who had also chaired the Cultural Committee at the Hague

\(^3\) PRO FO 924/857
The Committee of Cultural Experts tried to sort the requirements of a cultural programme into "methods to be adopted in the interest of European unity to raise the cultural level of the population by education of adults, university extension lectures, broadcasts and the cinema, exchange of records and films between nations and by art and folklore exhibitors" and "collective utilisation of the artistic and particularly archaeological treasures, which constitute one of the fundamental elements of the common heritage of the European peoples". In other words, the aim of cultural cooperation would have both a pedagogic aspect and a symbolic aspect, which would entrench Europe in the public mind as a source both of improvement to the quality of life and of a renewed sense of identity.

Between 1950 and 1954 the programme settled down into a series of ongoing initiatives and small annual grants to organisations. BTO’s Cultural Identity Card scheme was extended to the CoE and remained in the programme until the early 1980s. Individual grants were awarded on an ad-hoc basis, rather as the European Commission was later to do. Member states continued to try to suggest joint initiatives. Mr Kuypers, the indefatigable Belgian delegate to BTO, urged a programme of mass-produced art reproductions upon the committee, which got as far as drawing up proposals before finally acknowledging its impracticality. He had more success in attracting backing for an already planned exhibition about 16th century humanism, which the Council duly took over and part-financed. The exhibition became the first of a series: by 1960 six had been hosted on artistic and

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4 PRO FO 924/828
5 the sheer scale of the operation defeated the small secretariat, who, as one art expert remarked, would have needed storage space equivalent to Strasbourg Cathedral (PRO FO 924/1009)
6 despite having oddly chosen, as the same expert noted in the course of a memorably acerbic meeting report, "to start a series of exhibitions on European unity with the period in which that unity effectively broke up"
intellectual movements ranging from Mannerism to Romanticism. They remain a fixture in the programme, 26 having been held to date.

Still looking to reach a wider public, the Cultural Experts also examined ideas to create, variously, an International Broadcasting University and a "Voice of Europe" radio station. The latter did not get beyond the Christmas message stage despite heavy pressure from France. In general, the CoE had little luck either with this kind of infrastructure-based activity or with efforts to adapt national systems to the needs of intellectuals. That the art exhibitions took permanent root may be attributable to the fact that one country at a time took on main responsibility for it, both financial and organisational, rather like the later European Cities of Culture scheme operated by the EU. This type of cultural cooperation has a unique place and function which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Programme content 1954 -1965

The introduction of the European Cultural Convention did not significantly change the content of the programme. The Cultural Identity Card and the art exhibitions remained the centrepieces. The first report of the Administrative Board in 1960 records that 95 research fellowships had been awarded since 1953. As well as prizes for newsreel films of European interest, a small number of grants was made available for translating works from lesser-known languages into English or French. This was done by selecting three countries per year to be the recipients of a lump sum which

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7 all are described in an evaluation carried out for the Council of Europe in 1999 by Elina Middleton-Lajudie
8 a reference to the situation of refugees from Eastern Europe
they then disbursed. Work had begun on a folklore project, which involved the publication of a scholarly book on some aspects of European folktales.

Some money was set aside for grants for events or courses. They had to be part-funded from elsewhere (50%) and were for specific projects only, of "high utility in relation to their cost" and were – in theory – non-renewable (in practice they tended quickly to become programme fixtures). Examples included grants in 1959 to the Norwegian Foreign Affairs ministry to organise a study tour for teachers to Brussels and Strasbourg; to the Institute of European History at Mainz; and to the Religious Drama Society of Great Britain for organising an international conference.

Neither Haigh's nor Grosjean's account devotes much space to the first fifteen years or thereabouts of the cultural programme. Haigh dismisses it as "primitive" in comparison to the "collective cultural cooperation" developed during the 1960s, a view which will be examined in the next chapter. Grosjean relies on a 1992 DECS document which categorises the work as generally directed towards "reconciliation" after the war. Neither seems an entirely accurate assessment. It would be truer to say that this was a programme aimed at contributing to a gradual mutual familiarisation effort by the diverse populations of the Council of Europe.

The cultural cooperation programme up to about 1965 was worthy but very small-scale. It was also very much of its time. Prizes for "inspiring" factual films about subjects such as the Rhine, the State Opening of the UK Parliament or the Dutch dyke system ("Hold Back the Sea") are at once recognisable to British people over forty as part of the ethos of the post-war education system. They will have touched

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9 Directorate of Education, Culture and Sport: i.e., the secretariat
individuals’ lives here and there without contributing much to an understanding of European unity, but perhaps creating a pre-disposition to ideas of such a nature\textsuperscript{10}. The translation programme allowed for too few completed translations per year to be accomplished and contained no provisos guaranteeing dissemination\textsuperscript{11}. An extremely disparate range of CoE-supported research theses was published as "European Aspects". Again, the effect of such initiatives may have been to touch one life and through that, others: to offer a British example which may be recognised as having had a repercussive effect, one research grant was given to Peter Brinson, later of the Gulbenkian Foundation and an influence in British dance, to explore European archives of classical ballet\textsuperscript{12}.

This style of cultural cooperation seems to derive from British cultural diplomacy: broad-based, low-key, information-based, inspirational only in the sense that the practical and prosaic may inspire, relying on the chance response. Its impact would in fact have been impossible to assess in terms of its objective. A small Greek child made to sit through a Council of Europe approved film about the Rhine would be as likely to feel bored and hostile as inspired by the marvellous example of common action presented. It is notable that these initiatives focussed strongly on the similarities between nations, as examples of common problems faced, or happy collaboration on a solution to a common problem. The underlying message was of similarity beneath surface difference: the "foreignness" of Europeans to each other was invariably skirted.

\textsuperscript{10} a parallel might be found in the work of the Council for World Citizenship, an NGO set up in the same post-war atmosphere of attempts at comprehension
\textsuperscript{11} this was in essence the project revived in the 1980s by the European Community
\textsuperscript{12} other topics include the psychology of refugees. These grants ceased to be offered from 1960
Reconciliation implies a confrontation with the past, as well as possibility for the future, that simply did not happen. These projects tried in a sense to disregard the immediate past as an aberration which disrupted the ordinary and natural predisposition of Europeans to work together on the future whilst recalling what was good and unifying about their history. They promoted back to the citizens of Europe a portrait of themselves as confident, forward-looking, interested in each other and celebratory (newsreels of royal weddings seem to feature regularly). There is little or no element of actual common problem-solving within the programme itself or of acting consciously to improve the quality of the cultural life of the European populace. This perhaps reflects the extent to which these policies were still being tested out at national level as well as responding to a fundamental need for optimism.

At the same time it replicates the image-based nature of cultural diplomacy.

The programme lacks two further things which at this stage one might have expected: an attempt to find and promote a European symbolism\(^\text{13}\); and a sense of the personality of the organisation as something in itself worthy of loyalty. One of the few attempts at symbolism, Europe Day, failed to take root because of bad planning\(^\text{14}\).

As regards loyalty, the CoE’s practice of drawing up conventions establishing minimum standards and common practice might be said to have established the organisation as a force for good in the daily lives of the citizens. In the 1950s, however, conventions were little used within cultural cooperation except for standardising aspects of university study. Ways of using them do not seem to have

\(^{13}\) In fact it was the Assembly that took this on, as Carole Lager shows ("L'Europe en Quête de ses Symboles", Euroclio series, Peter Lang, 1995): it generated most of the "symbols" of Europe which are sometimes seen as embodying its "cultural dimension": the flag of stars on a blue background, the choice of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony as an official anthem.

\(^{14}\) It coincided in many countries with the anniversary of liberation from WWII occupation, which subverted the symbolism very effectively. A later, more targeted, event, European Schools Day, seems to have had better success, though not in Swansea in the late 1960s.
been actively sought out. In fact, very few legal instruments have ever been drawn up within the Council for Cultural Cooperation and its successor.

From the "leisure debate" to Arc-et-Senans: sociology and culture, 1965-1972

The second theme of cultural cooperation is culture in society. If, prior to 1965, the emphasis was on Europeans' common identity, after 1965 it shifted to their perceived common interests. The 1962 to 1965 process of rethinking the Council's strategy had radical implications for the "cultural" side of the cultural cooperation programme. The secretariat's nine-point plan, adopted in 1965 as the "cultural policy of the Council of Europe"\(^{15}\), proposes a culture programme "adapted progressively to the methods of cooperation introduced in the education field"\(^{16}\) with special reference to the "European cultural heritage in the new conditions of industrial society". Direct awards of film prizes and translation grants disappeared, to be replaced by studies on the importance of cultural policy planning and the role of public authorities.

The impetus behind this change was the involvement of a new generation of players in cultural cooperation who used the Out-of-School Education Committee as a springboard to develop a specially European dimension to national thinking about cultural policy. Although the composition of the CCC had always been mixed\(^{17}\), it now included education policy specialists with a strong interest in cultural policy, in particular Jeanne Laurent, who represented the education ministry of France on the

\(^{15}\) see Haigh, op.cit, pp. 216-8
\(^{16}\) CCC(65) 1, draft 3\(^{rd}\) report. According to Grosjean, this was a by-product of the Education ministers' conference of 1960, while the methods referred to appear to be those of convening meetings of specialists which prepared recommendations on good practice
\(^{17}\) i.e. involving both education ministry and foreign ministry officials
CCC, but had been a driving force in the arts sector in the 1940s, and Marcel Hicter, a Belgian official responsible for youth and leisure policy in the French Community.

In the same year the CCC commissioned studies on "cultural responsibilities in the present phase of European civilization", including "urbanism", the cultural implications of town planning, "cultural equipment" and the role of public "collectivities". Hitherto the CCC's concern had been mainly to disburse money for cultural activity to be conducted at arm's length, rather as the ECF was subsequently to do. The new approach implied that it would try to shape thinking in the increasingly autonomous sector of cultural policy and administration. Laurent and Hicter imported a set of policy concerns unrelated to cultural diplomacy, which not only reflected the growth of culture as a policy area in France under André Malraux, but also emanated specifically from the French education ministry. They had already been introduced into the Out-of-School Education Committee under the broad heading of "permanent education", itself derived from French thinking about "éducation populaire" but which also recall earlier forays by ICIC into problems of industrialisation and public taste. These ideas solidified within a new category of "cultural development", emphasising domestic rather than external policy concerns, and thence into the CCC's flagship cultural concept of the 1970s, "cultural democracy" versus "the democratisation of culture".

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18 see D. Looseley, "Paris versus the Provinces: Cultural Decentralisation since 1945", in M. Cook, (ed.), "French Culture since 1945", Longman, 1993; also Fumaroli, 1992, op.cit
19 the author of its publication, "Permanent Education, an Agent of Change", Henri Janne, was one of the four contributors to the first conference of cultural ministers in 1976, as was J. A Simpson, author of the CCC's "Permanent Education and Community Development"
In 1965 the CCC held a policy debate on "the problem of leisure" with memoranda by Laurent and Hicter to which the other delegations responded. Both officials express concern about the effects of "passive culture": Laurent urges "a forward-looking study, made in a spirit of enquiry into what was discernible and desirable in the civilisation of the future", a survey of future needs and problems which "only economists had so far made"; while Hicter emphasises a more spiritual approach, based on Joffré Dumazédier whose definition of leisure as "essentially a problem of the individual and of conditions in which individuals make free choices" is advanced. Hicter's arguments are remarkably like those of de Rougemont and the personalists and, before them, of the ICIC sociologists in their emphasis on "development of the personality" contrasted with the "fundamentally amoral" entertainment industry" whose object is not "the service of mankind but financial gain". The subject, he concludes, is "the democratisation of culture" and the opportunity of "creative activity" for all.

This debate is key because it confirms the switch away from a "cosmopolitan" to a "communitarian" agenda, to use the terms suggested by Chris Brown, which will be explored further in the next chapter. The "cosmopolitan" approach is exemplified by a project of the Council of Europe at the time, in which CCC took part, called "Europe Marches On", a series of travelling exhibitions and films originally celebrating

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20 it should be noted that this was partly a response to the Consultative Assembly, which had adopted a recommendation on the subject, apparently based on input from trade unionists, as well as industrialists who had not liked it at all
21 CCC (65) 18, addendum
22 ibid
23 i.e. Professor Shotwell and his colleagues
24 he seems here to have used the term to mean changing attitudes, rather than the more disparaging sense later given to it by the advocates of "cultural democracy" when contrasting efforts to improve public taste with those designed to inspire individual creativity
25 a somewhat regrettable English rendering of the more felicitous French "L'Europe continue"
"birthplaces of art and industry in Europe". Essentially intended to create (positive) links in the public mind between their own experience and the larger scale of "Europe", this is cultural cooperation which serves an externalised political end, in which the relationship with bilateral cultural relations is clearly seen.

The "leisure debate", by contrast, sets out a different stall, one based on the cultivation of diversity and social improvement. It has very little to do with the idea of "being European", or indeed with asserting the glories of a European lineage. Brown identifies "communitarian" theory particularly with environmentalism, but could as easily have applied it to this new strand of cultural cooperation which attacks the apparently unifying factor of global economic interdependence in favour of a sort of spiritual self-determination and self-awareness. As he states, "for community to begin to emerge there has to be a growing awareness of common interests and identity; the creation of 'one-world' is a necessary condition... but is not, of itself, sufficient". Identity is still present in this project, but it is no longer expressed in the attempt to create a larger community of interest which subordinates the local and the particular — indeed, it celebrates the particular at the expense of the universal.

Nevertheless, in the course of the "leisure debate" the implication of "a single common cultural policy for Europe" was immediately perceived and, as quickly, rejected as a desirable prospect. In some quarters the Laurent-Hicter approach was perceived as disguised dirigisme and even incitement to class warfare. However, it

26 the Council of Europe returned to this approach in the 1980s and 1990s with its "Cultural Routes" project, a series of consciousness-raising gatherings and publications on linking aspects of European culture such as the Baroque or the Hanseatic League
27 ultimately, the Kantian aim of "perpetual peace": see Brown (1992), op.cit
29 the original Assembly resolution had "given rise in Austria to press attacks' along these lines: see CCC (65) 18
30 ibid
offered some practical advantages. It could be developed in the Out-of-School Education Committee with perfect ease, more or less integrated with the "permanent education" philosophy being developed there by the same group: a "cultural policy" managed within an education context. It enabled the CCC to get around the problem of public impact by addressing a smaller audience (policy-makers and other specialists) with studies and recommendations for action at national level and thus reinvent itself as a policy think-tank for culture\textsuperscript{31}. It was also cheaper than trying to be a cultural foundation: as a later report noted\textsuperscript{32}, at government level European unity did not convert into cash contributions, without which no mass campaign was seriously achievable, though behind-the-scenes investments in programme items which interested or benefited individual governments were becoming normal practice.

Those elements, such as grants to translators and work on a folklore collection, which were considered to be out of keeping with the aim of policy planning were duly dropped. "Inherited" items, such as the Cultural Identity Card, to which member states showed an attachment were classified as "ways and means" (of doing what, is not very clear). Most of the cultural budget went on studies, presumably delivered to member states then left to individual discretion\textsuperscript{33}. Papers from the UK Ministry of Education\textsuperscript{34} make it clear that, for some at least, culture now appeared to be a private fiefdom of the secretariat, inclined to proceed on the basis of reports commissioned from individual experts rather than the comparison of experiences in the different

\textsuperscript{31} the origin of its self-image as "a laboratory for ideas", even if some of these seem in fact to have started life in UNESCO test-tubes
\textsuperscript{32} CCC (67) 4, "Europe Twenty Years Ahead", a report of "three wise men", one of whom was Marcel Hicter, suggested various changes to the CCC programme in 1967
\textsuperscript{33} CCC papers are notably short on information of this nature
\textsuperscript{34} PRO ED 121/1128: the absence of a culture sub-committee "makes it possible for the strong secretariat on the culture side to push its own programme through CCC with little scrutiny"
countries. There was concern that work was being undertaken and paid for which would have "no demonstrable result"\(^{35}\).

In addition to art exhibitions and cultural identity cards, the CCC continued to maintain a programme on film. This included plans for a Council of Europe film week\(^ {36}\) to replace the system of prizes; assistance for the dubbing and distribution of the chosen films; and a conference on distribution. Additional projects, such as a proposed card index cataloguing fragments of Byzantine artworks, were included because individual member states lobbied for them.

The culture programme split increasingly into activity which could be considered broadly to do with "the common heritage" (such as art exhibitions) and the research-based work covering "new requirements of industrial civilization", to borrow the term used in the 1965 programme document. As regards the former, several initiatives seem to have been in hand at this time relating to the technical conservation of the built heritage\(^ {37}\), leading up to preparations for a conference of specialised ministers. This marks the start of work on "built" heritage with a separate identity from cultural cooperation\(^ {38}\). The latter appeared under a series of headings: for example, "Man and his Environment" covers studies on the aesthetic training of town planners, urban design and the development of taste. "Creativity" includes an item on "collective artistic productions of a European nature" and another on action by public authorities

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\(^{35}\) ibid. A particularly cold eye was cast on the study of "socio-cultural equipment of towns", which UK officials could not believe would be "worth the effort it will involve...The work so far has a certain interest if and when ideal conditions prevail but there is something of the "angels on a pinhead" quality about researches which inform us that the cultural equipment of, say, Gloucester should include an opera house, three theatres and a theatre workshop....no doubt it should, but where does it get us to know this?"

\(^{36}\) which would be held at an already established film festival somewhere, such as Locarno

\(^{37}\) including research into training for experts and "current aspects of craftsmanship"

\(^{38}\) money was voted from the Cultural Fund for a small pilot conservation project in Malta in 1968, which appears to be a fore-runner of the later system of offering technical assistance to chosen sites where there are particular conservation difficulties
The period of student unrest in many countries of Europe known as the "events" of 1968 ironically acted as an endorsement to the growing sociological focus of the CCC programme. The objectives of the programme read like a university syllabus rather than an exercise in co-operative action between governments:

- integration of culture in permanent education;
- mobilisation of social and human sciences for the benefit of administrators;
- reinstating culture in its social context;
- the conception of culture not as an end in itself but as a means by which man can see how he stands in relation to the world around him, create an individual style of living and improve his style of human relations; organisation of work by the prospective method corrected by the application of norms.

The immediate response to "1968" was to concentrate on youth programmes. The impact of the political events, however, as is clear from the debate which followed, varied tremendously between those delegations, like France and Belgium, which felt that fundamental issues of public policy had been called into question, and those, like Switzerland, who felt more worried by the rhetoric that was being used than by anything which had actually happened in their countries. However, for Hicter in particular the task of the CCC was now to get beyond "the contradictions of our technical and bureaucratic consumer society" and find a role for the young, particularly in combating the effects of mass communication ("a mosaic of boneless

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39 a persistent UNESCO theme that has never attracted much response from either the Council of Europe or, to date, the EU
40 CCC (69) 2
At this point Hicter’s role in the Council of Europe strongly resembles that of Jules Destree before the war in ICIC, as an advocate of political intervention in the cultural sector on sociological grounds.

This appears to be the point at which the CCC began to act as, in effect, the European region of UNESCO, a role it had hitherto disliked but which, with the shift away from diplomatic considerations, now acquired a certain logic. In 1969 UNESCO produced a preliminary study on cultural policy, which offered a definition: “a body of operational principles, administrative and budgetary practices and procedures which provide a basis for cultural action by the state.” An ad-hoc CCC cultural development committee reproduces this in its own paper as a guiding definition. Its identification of policies with principles contrasts interestingly with the idea of policy as "sets of preferences", used by Deutsch, implying that policy is based on something immutable rather than that it can and will change with circumstances: the world as it should be rather than the world as it is. It is unclear to what extent member states themselves felt in need of Council of Europe guidance in determining either principles or sets of preferences. UK papers suggest concern at the proliferation of research proposals on culture and some distaste for the idea that national policies might be modified in line with their findings.

41 Grosjean, himself Belgian, refers to it without qualification as "the cultural crisis"
42 CCC (69) 7
43 see X. Dupuis, "Culture et Développement: de la Reconnaissance à l'Evaluation", UNESCO/ICA, 1991, for an account which demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between the two organisations at this time; also Grosjean, op.cit, p.101, who confirms that the 1972 UNESCO ministerial meeting, EUROCULT, drew on CCC discussions
44 "we can see no profit (in defining) structures and contents of lifelong integrated education... we must underline in this context our determination to control our own programmes" (PRO ED 121/1128)
UNESCO held an intergovernmental conference in 1970\textsuperscript{45}, the first of a series, to which the specifically European follow-up on cultural policies in Helsinki (EUROCULT) two years later was a response\textsuperscript{46}. Much of what was offered as CCC thinking about cultural development seems to have been derived directly from post-Malraux (and post-1968) France\textsuperscript{47}. The programme is almost wholly based on analysis and research, perhaps reflecting the fact that France at this time already had a substantial research department in its culture ministry able to direct the Council of Europe's output\textsuperscript{48}. Comparative study of national situations, which the British had favoured, was rejected in favour of encouraging "national research aimed at joint study of the various cultural strategies", which would include a "slim volume of the main requirements of a cultural policy". One "experimental study of cultural development in towns" grew into the CCC's major cultural research project of the 1970s\textsuperscript{49}.

\textsuperscript{45} this took place in Venice and, according to Dupuis, "a reconnu que la culture est inséparable de la vie quotidienne et que la culture scientifique et technique est une réalité qui doit impérieusement être prise en compte" (op.cit., p.21)

\textsuperscript{46} others followed in other parts of the world, culminating in the 1982 MONDIACULT conference in Mexico

\textsuperscript{47} Caune mentions that Malraux's successor, Jacques Duhamel, was strongly committed to the idea of cultural development (J. Caune, "La Culture en Action: de Vilar à Lang: le Sens Perdu", Grenoble, 1992); and Duhamel's speeches of the period bear this out (J. Duhamel, "Discours et Ecrits", Documentation Française, 1994). M. Conil Lacoste (op.cit) also draws attention to the "constant obsession" of the French Director-General of UNESCO, René Maheu, with the subject

\textsuperscript{48} Dupuis (op. cit., pp. 98-99) implies as much, referring to the series of socio-cultural indicators produced by the Ministry of Culture from the early 1970s onwards and the document "Notes sur la méthodologie de la comptabilité culturelle" which DECS put to the CCC in 1969 and which advocated a system of collecting cultural data. This could hardly have come from anywhere else

\textsuperscript{49} initially the "14 towns project" – the numbers of towns involved seem to fluctuate, so I have followed Grosjean -, which studied how towns in different member states executed their municipal responsibilities for culture. The aim was to produce case studies leading to guidelines which other European towns could adopt
Cultural policy-making became entrusted to a small group of specialists, led by the French Ministry of Culture. With cultural development as its framework, this group now began to develop a concept which it called "cultural democracy" as an essentially social strategy, a rejection of the "democratisation of culture" (extending access to high culture to a wider spread of society) in favour of liberating the innate creativity of each individual by favouring techniques of "socio-cultural animation" and rejecting an "imposed" culture in favour of self-determination at grass-roots level.

The successful export of these French policies to the Council of Europe hit a high point in 1972 at a meeting of twenty "futurologues" and researchers chaired by Jacques Duhamel at Arc-et-Senans, designed as input to the EUROCULT meeting. The resulting "declaration" rapidly acquired quasi-biblical status and is thought to have launched the term "cultural democracy" itself. The declaration is a cross between a manifesto and a series of demands, and is plainly non-governmental in nature; but its ready acceptance within the Council of Europe in the wake of 1968 marked a new phase in which cultural cooperation could be redefined as confrontational, "alternative", more radical than its patrons in national administrations.

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50 The term does not appear in the CCC's "Policy, Machinery, Directives, Methods, Programme" document (undated, but from the content prepared around 1965-6), where the emphasis is on comparative study, but appears in CCC(69) 7 as part of the remit of the Out-of-School Education Committee, chaired by Simpson, who was succeeded by Hicter. By 1971 the whole of the cultural programme is described as "cultural development". Xavier Dupuis offers a hint that the concept was pioneered in Africa, beginning with the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (1964) and before that with the 1956 Congress of Black Writers and Artists (Dupuis, op. cit., pp. 31-33). A moving spirit of the latter, Léopold Senghor, was also a deputy of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly in the 1950s.

51 Besnard notes that this concept had been around in France from 1964 onwards and links it specifically to the "éducation populaire" movement, while Looseley (op.cit.) associates it more with the "Sixty-Eighters", following the perceived failure of the Maisons de la Culture movement of Malraux. Both authors emphasise animation socio-culturelle as "une sorte de l'école parallèle, sinon une contre-école" (Besnard, p. 19) or a way "by which the non-public becomes politically aware of its situation, freeing itself from alienation and repossessing itself" (Looseley, p. 227). Both emphasise its debts to French sociology.

52 Grosjean, 1994, p.101. The reference is: "réaliser les conditions d'une 'démocratie culturelle' comportant, dans une perspective de décentralisation et de pluralisme, l'intervention directe des intéressés"
themselves would perhaps dare, or wish, to be\textsuperscript{53}. It was aimed primarily at UNESCO, and may in fact have been somewhat manipulated for the purpose of associating centre-left governments, in particular, with idealistic and radical thinking, thus preempting standard Eastern accusations about capitalism and Western degeneracy\textsuperscript{54}. The welcome it received, therefore, may have had less noble motives than Grosjean, for instance, is prepared to admit.

The language of this ultra-communitarian text, and particularly the extraordinary "resistance" rhetoric it embodied, will be discussed in the following chapter. Its significance for CCC was in providing a basis upon which to seek a political imprimatur for the ideas which were becoming the CCC's "mission statement". The key themes of these are set out in a 1973 document on permanent education\textsuperscript{55}: radical challenge to the "long-established European 'cultural model'"; challenge to the "functional society" and its baggage of "cultural mediocrity" created by "pseudo-rationalism"; rejection of the "culture of the past"; and the replacement of "mosaic culture" by "structured culture" which situates the individual in society. This recalls Emmanuel Mounier's insistence on the "person" as an individual integrated with his community.

\textsuperscript{53} Marcel Hicter hints at this in his contribution to the 1969 debate on policy and programme when he speaks of choices to be made "between the political systems which protect formal freedoms and those which institute fundamental freedoms" – a breathtaking extension of the field of operations of cultural policy, but one which has rooted itself in Council of Europe orthodoxy, and one which recalls de Rougemont's claims at the Hague Congress (CCC (69) 7, op.cit)

\textsuperscript{54} a feature of UNESCO gatherings during the Cold War from the 1948 Wroclaw symposium onwards

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Permanent Education – the Basis and Essentials}, CCC, 1973. No named author. Part of the series "Education in Europe"

The theme of culture and the individual in society continues well into the 1970s. The aim of cooperation had moved away almost completely from the creation of a European identity towards the promotion of a vision of social change within Europe. The CCC programme consists of a succession of working groups and ad-hoc committees engaged in commissioning investigations which would, ideally, provide planning tools, though CCC papers are unrevealing about the extent to which potential users availed themselves of these tools.\(^{56}\)

The key strands of the work had already been identified: aspects of planning for culture, which was beginning to develop into a concern with the methodology of cultural policy in member states; and creativity, which began increasingly to focus on the politically charged territory of the culture industries. Both these took place under the broad heading of "cultural development". Meanwhile, "cultural democracy", rightly identified by Grosjean as the most recognisable of the CCC's "unifying concepts", appears to have been just that – an underlying philosophy which translated personalism into a rhetoric for cultural cooperation and shaped its programme.

Accordingly, one finds no project specifically entitled "cultural democracy". It was expounded as a series of aims at the political level and offered for endorsement to culture ministers at their first Council of Europe conference in Oslo in 1976. In a policy paper\(^ {57}\) presented on that occasion, the author argues that the task of the Council of Europe, having rejected cultural diplomacy, is to lead governments towards cultural pluralism, suggesting possible answers to common problems. The

\(^{56}\) A Swiss suggestion in 1975 that CCC's practical impact at national level be assessed seems to have been ignored (CCC(75)1/2)

\(^{57}\) J. A. Simpson, "Towards Cultural Democracy", Council of Europe, 1976
suggestion in this paper is that national administrators have made a muddle of the challenges of cultural policy and should now be encouraged to look to the Council of Europe for guidance about what to fund and why.

From a later perspective, much of this looks over-confident and over-ambitious - "the European voice, as it is heard in the Council, is not raised to defend an old order, but to herald change" — but it does convey a sense of purpose, a belief that study and planning are what is needed to guide society in specified directions. Its conclusion evokes de Rougemont: CCC has "contrived to produce ... an ensemble of concepts which constitutes a moral force, a European conscience." This is the apogee of the Council of Europe "philosophy", a point at which idealism and realism seemed to converge. However, it also contains the philosophy's problems: its assumption of consensus combined with an essentially oppositional nature. Simpson urges this intergovernmental forum to denounce values "inimical to its own, even when they have the support of popular opinion and mass behaviour patterns as served or moulded by the mass media or the culture industries".

In the light of this rejection, in effect, of diplomatic priorities in favour of sociological ones, it is hardly surprising that cultural cooperation should have been perceived as increasingly problematical by the Committee of Ministers. A key element of cultural diplomacy is that it should be perceived as politically neutral, "safe" territory, oiling the wheels for weightier matters. The anti-diplomacy of the CCC in the 1970s

58 Simpson, op. cit, p.42
59 ibid., p. 124
60 at times it appears to live on: the 1996 survey "In From the Margins" argued in similar ways, though without Simpson's sense of certainty, for a broad concept of culture and an acknowledgement of a central role for culture in the public policy process
61 op.cit, p.104
62 it will be recalled that these are ministers of foreign affairs, receiving briefing from, mainly, diplomats
appeared to espouse a specific ideology closer to that of an NGO than an intergovernmental organisation. The CCC began to be increasingly heavily criticised from both within and without: from within for rejecting the mission of influencing public opinion in favour of European integration, and from without (i.e. its delegations) for its unwillingness to evaluate its achievements in relation to the political aims of its governments. The "rhetoric gap" is plain to see in the account of its first ministerial conference, in which the idea of rejecting the past is generally politely refused. "We have also seen and learnt, if we did not know it before, that cultural policies and cultural politics are indissolubly connected with tradition, heritage and socio-economic systems in each country", noted the post-Oslo report to CCC, a little ruefully.

The CCC seems to have devoted much of this period to relabelling its various activities, which still included old staples such as art exhibitions alongside newer activities such as expenditure assessments, and dealing with criticism of its lack of wider relevance. The 1976 Oslo conference was therefore as much about throwing up ideas for reorientation as about providing political approval for cultural democracy. Beneath the confident rhetoric lies much uncertainty from those outside the core group. The culture programme was competing with the education programme for ways of making an impact; and, although barely mentioned at this stage, the European Commission's burgeoning "social dimension" programme would have been a factor also.

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63 The interventions of the ministers, though edited, are offered as direct rather than reported speech.
64 Dupuis, op.cit, describes three of these taking place in France, Sweden and the Netherlands, researching spending on culture. He sees these as forerunners of the economic impact assessments popular in the 1980s.
65 See CCC (75) 13, on the Council of Europe medium-term plan.
66 CCC (75) 25, meeting report.
From 1976, the dominant emphasis was on the two major projects which CCC was allowed to undertake on culture after the 1975 reorganisation. The focus of the first (Project 5) was on the "improvement of cultural policies at national level", intended to examine relationships between national, regional and local levels. This took in the formerly separate research project on "cultural policies in towns" as its "local" aspect. The second was to be a project dealing with culture and the mass media. This was tried out in various permutations, including "integrating television and post-television technical media into cultural policies" and even "training for a critical reading of televisual language". CCC eventually settled for "culture and the media".

Of the two, the greater emphasis was placed on the cultural policy project. This was the post-Oslo project, "the framework and basis for the CCC's cultural activity". The intention was now to create a "cooperation system permitting the constant pooling of information" between cultural policy-makers. Following the change in structure which did away with the Out-of-School Education committee, the CCC's cultural planning nexus swiftly relocated itself within the planning group for Project 5 where it became the "inner circle" responsible, de facto, for the bulk of CCC policy alongside the secretariat. The project seems to have relied substantially on meetings and studies to produce its "basic analytical tools". The "towns" part of the project seems to have had the more enduring legacy (descriptions of the project tend to

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67 the difference in expenditure levels in 1976 was considerable: 3.8 million FF on education, compared with less than a million on culture

68 a third project, on the writer and artist in a changing society, was planned in 1975 but finally dropped, to be incorporated (rather uneasily) in the "second generation" mass media/ culture industries project

69 also known as the "Cities and Culture project" (R. Rizzardo, "The Cultural Challenges for Europe's Regions", CDCC, 1993)

70 CCC (77) 8. At this point the project was known as project 9. It became project 5 the following year

71 it produced a series of policy publications under the heading "Your town, your life, your future"
concentrate almost exclusively on this). The ideological aspects of cultural democracy are here played down, and the practical exchange of experience emphasised, perhaps reflecting input, for the first time in CCC history, from outside practitioners.

The "partner" project on the cultural role of the mass media, Project 6, under the chairmanship of a Belgian television specialist, mainly prepared ideas which, it was hoped, might become the basis for a "European" media policy. Simpson notes in passing that it aspired to regulate the nascent satellite broadcasting industry. It included a pedagogic element ("guidelines on teaching methods") and planned a network for informing member states about new developments, but produced instead a highly dirigiste draft resolution recommending a "concerted audiovisual policy by the national authorities concerned".

Following the structural upheaval in which work had to be "shaped" to fit the terminology laid down by the medium-term plan, the two major projects took up the bulk of the CCC's attention until beyond the end of the decade. Although planned since 1974, Project 5 only launched as such in 1978 and did not finish until 1983. However, in 1979 the Project 5 group, by now the CCC's de facto policy committee, proposed new terms of reference for itself which would mandate it to work on a large-scale consultation exercise conducted with cultural interests at national, regional and local levels. The result would be a charter, to be ratified at political level, which

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72 see Grosjean, op.cit., p.43: "the main emphasis lay on towns' solutions to their practical problems and on evaluation of their action and the lessons to be learned from it"

73 Simpson, op. cit.

74 this project has hints of failure about it. After long postponement, it seems to have been very much a Franco-Belgo-German affair, and Grosjean downplays it in his account, which also suggests a truncated three-year lifespan instead of five. The CCC moved on rather rapidly to its follow-up media project, Project 11
would "codify the objectives and the fundamental principles of a cultural policy for Europe". The idea of a European charter had been put forward by the Secretary-General at the second ministerial conference in Athens in 1978 and appeared to be based on a French initiative, a "Charter of the Quality of Life". The communiqué from the event suggests agreement to this was the main outcome of the meeting, although the meeting report itself does not.

The attempt to elaborate a European Cultural Charter is an example of a failed attempt to impose a communitarian project on a political structure which had not been designed to accept it. It may have originated in UNESCO, as the presentation (as a precedent) of an African Cultural Charter project at the CoE's 1981 ministerial conference in Luxembourg suggests. The idea of a charter was extremely contentious and eventually had to be recast as a political statement of limited scope and status.

At the turn of the decade the CDCC continued to think in terms of cultural development, using the Project 5 group as its policy centre. In a 1979 paper on "future prospects" it saw cultural action as a forward-looking strategy, gathering and developing ideas, and promoting "practical explorations and experiments in the field" to test them out. In practice, however, the CDCC's capacity to mastermind experiments seems limited to the terms of the reference of its major projects.

Consideration of themes for new projects, alongside the preparatory work for the

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75 CDCC (79) 8 rev. draft 1980 programme
76 Report of the 2nd Conference of Specialised Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs, Athens, 1978
77 see also Chapter Nine
78 the work was managed by a former UNESCO official who had become a national delegate and was a future, director of DECS
79 a further outcome of the OAU/UNESCO cultural development project described by Dupuis, op.cit. See 3rd conference of specialised ministers responsible for cultural affairs, Luxembourg, 1981: presentation by Basile Kossou
80 the 1984 "Declaration on European Cultural Objectives"
Cultural Charter, seems to have taken up most of the available resources. A small number of one-off projects seem to have taken place, loosely connected to research into "aid to artistic creation".82

The impression gained of this period as a whole is of conflict beneath the surface consensus characteristic of the meeting papers of international organisations. References in meeting reports83 hint at trouble, ranging from comments on "a disturbing meeting" full of "petty squabbles over Project 5" in 197984, to the sense of "a much calmer spirit" after "the stormy period of the last six years", in which CDCC "has abandoned its earlier ambitions" to try to be "the pioneering focus for educational and cultural unity"85.

In fact, by the mid-1980s it seems clear that the cultural programme was in some trouble. The DECS memorandum86 from which Grosjean quotes, despite an effort to characterise the period as one of "pooling of solutions", acknowledges that multilateral cultural cooperation was in "a period of crisis" brought about by fear of the EC and "stronger doubts about European cultural identity". Other factors may also have contributed, however. The desire to assert universal principles and to direct effort towards a set of common aims, coupled with the explicit rejection at the beginning of the 1970s of a less politicised strategy of comparison and sharing of information, had led to a situation in which reciprocity ceased to be a possibility. The attempt to express cultural cooperation as a "common philosophy" appeared to lay

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81 CDCC (79) 10.3
82 e.g. a colloquy on the theatre hosted by the UK
83 usually in the presentations of Assembly observers, which tend to be reproduced verbatim
84 CDCC (79) 14
85 CDCC (81) 17
86 "Future orientations of cultural cooperation in Europe", DECS, 1992
bare a conflict about the relationship between culture, cultural policy and governments.

**Cultural policies and cultural industries: 1983-1990**

During the 1970s and early 1980s, the promotion of cultural cooperation as a channel for social engineering and a branch of futurology led to a strong programming emphasis on research and method. Despite the failure to translate cultural democracy into a universal political commitment at member state level, its narrow and broad themes - the management of arts and amenities and the place of culture, expressed as creativity, in an industrialised society – continued to inform CoE cultural cooperation through the 1980s. In the second half of the decade they became its staple.

As Projects 5 and 6 came to an end, they were replaced by new projects, numbered 10 and 11. Their subject matter followed naturally from that of the earlier projects. Project 10, which looked at the management of cultural policy at regional level, continued the sociological perspective of Project 5 by seeking to analyse this in terms of "cultural dynamics". Project 11 utilised the growing confidence of some member states that pressure at the European level could be used to assert an equal weight for cultural interests with the economic interests of the "culture industries", particularly the broadcast media.

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87 "To what extent had human sciences been used to analyse the links between culture and region?...Could the system put together by the Council of Europe for studying various aspects of culture and cultural democracy be applied to the "culture-region" problem area?" (Interim report by the study group responsible for Project No. 10, pp. 9-10, Council of Europe, CDCC, 1987)
Project 10\textsuperscript{88} used a system of locally-held hearings and seminars to explore how culture was managed in different European regions, the outcomes of which were then written up and published. Two conferences were held, one in Florence at the halfway stage in 1987, the second as a final conference in Lyons in 1991\textsuperscript{89}. Although the project began with the objective of testing out the ideas about cultural democracy which CDCC documentation had been rehearsing for well over a decade\textsuperscript{90}, it is evident that this had to change fairly rapidly in the face of a different reality. For instance, although the interim report places quite a lot of emphasis on examples which support the "house philosophy", such as the influence of "Peuple et culture"\textsuperscript{91} and of "animation culturelle", it is also obliged to acknowledge that some people prefer not to use the word animation any longer. The project work evolves to reflect late 1980s concerns – how cultural programmes reinforce or recreate a regional identity, how culture joins forces with other social interests to tap into funding structures, the economic argument that cultural budgets are not expenditure but investment.

Did Project 10 merely record and analyse the changes it encountered or did it supply a missing European context? In the same year (1987) that the interim report appeared, the 5\textsuperscript{th} Specialised Conference of European Culture Ministers took as its theme the economic impact of culture, its documents prepared by economists rather than sociologists. Little of the work of Project 10 seems to have informed these discussions. By the time its final report appeared, it was necessary to record a gap

\textsuperscript{88} variously "Cultural dynamics in regional development" and "Culture and Region": despite the theoretical five-year duration of such projects, the dates Grosjean gives for this are 1982 to 1991 – nearly a decade in itself

\textsuperscript{89} the two are very different, the first having produced, under the influence of the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, a list of demands including a Regional Cultural Fund; the latter much more low-key and confining itself to a few projects, such as a training course for cultural administrators, which could be carried out within a modestly resourced programme

\textsuperscript{90} the interim report constantly refers back to the various texts and recommendations of the later ministerial conferences and even the Arc-et-Senans Declaration of 1972
between the ideas about cultural policy which the project had promoted and the experiences of the policy-makers and administrators who attended the final conference. The end of Project 10 may in fact have been the point at which there ceased to be a real attempt to promote the idea of a Council of Europe "cultural policy". Thereafter the Council of Europe began to market itself as a kind of resource centre for professionals engaged in public administration, largely eschewing the difficult political area at member state level.

Project 11, by contrast, began as, and remained, a highly political initiative. It saw the Council of Europe's task as to assert cultural objectives against economic ones and to obtain a political commitment to public sector regulation at a time when the media were perceived as alarmingly in thrall to market forces. The new project, again under Francophone Belgian direction, and against a national background of considerable sensitivity, was initially supposed to focus on music but quickly extended itself to other issues in contention at European Community level: resale price maintenance on books and records; harmonisation of VAT; copyright law; the status of the artist; how to "Europeanise" programme-making; film subsidy.

After holding meetings with representatives of artistic circles as well as the culture industries themselves, Project 11 held a final conference at which recommendations

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91 the movement which influenced Marcel Hicter
93 full title, "Promotion of creativity, taking into account the culture industries" (1982-86)
94 this was foreseen at the conclusion of Project 6 which was considered by an in-house evaluation to have proved that "the functioning of the sole market forces (sic) is insufficient to ensure the development of culture" (CDCC (81) 10)
95 specifically, the ownership of RTL; and more generally, the start of Franco-Belgian pressure to establish a favourable audiovisual policy within the EC (see Chapter Ten)
96 as a contribution to European Music Year (1985), a Council of Europe political initiative which had not been launched in CDCC
97 in some countries a formal government policy, but in others an unofficial trade arrangement, and in either case suspected of being a restrictive industrial practice
were drafted to be taken forward for adoption by CDCC. In the event, they were unacceptable to a group of countries and went forward only with strong reservations on parts of the text. The most contentious of these referred to measures to be adopted by public authorities, particularly as regarded the regulation of broadcasting and the idea that broadcasters should be required to invest in production as a condition of access to new networks. Some of the recommendations cut across the work of the Council of Europe’s own committee on mass media, CDMM, which was in the early stages of preparing a much more industry-oriented approach to the audiovisual sector.

These contemporaneous projects offer very different versions of cultural cooperation: the one, towards the end\textsuperscript{98}, largely discarding national interest as a factor to the extent that the project seemed virtually neutral in terms of government level feelings towards it\textsuperscript{99}; the other highly politicised, with "tip-of-the-iceberg" overtones related to the intensely national interests — at both ends of the spectrum - operating below the surface. The CDCC has subsequently avoided issues where national interests are powerfully polarised.

The lessons of Project 10 may be seen in the next innovation of cultural cooperation which followed the failure of the European Cultural Charter: the system of national cultural policy reviews. The idea came from Sweden, which had been strongly opposed to the idea that a Council of Europe Charter could make formulations for the proper functioning of cultural life in member states. Its suggestion was that evaluation could help states identify where their action was appropriate to their aims, rather than to prescribe what those aims should be. It was based on a similar exercise undertaken

\textsuperscript{98} in its earlier stages the project seems to have been a little too intrigued by cultural animation in the Jura region to appear quite pure in this respect

\textsuperscript{99} the exceptions were in countries like Switzerland and Belgium with heavy investments in transfrontier contacts based on shared language areas
in OECD\textsuperscript{100}, where aspects of member states' economic policy were subjected to examination by a team of external evaluators, whose report was then defended before the other member states by a senior representative (a minister, or similar).

The reviews began with France, which published its national report, explaining and defending its management of cultural policy and assembling relevant data, in 1988, followed by Sweden in 1989. Several others followed before the focus switched from west to east in response to the requirements of the new member states. The examiners' report\textsuperscript{101} would then be the basis of national debate leading where appropriate to changes in policy. Over time, it was hoped, the reviews would mount up and form a significant archive of comparative material.

The new project was seen not as a one-off with a pre-determined life-span but as a fixture for as long as countries were interested in it. According to Grosjean its rationale is "the need for a common approach to evaluation"\textsuperscript{102}. Another explanation may be the opportunity which it provides for member states to assemble statistical material which may have been lacking and to explore strengths and weaknesses within the national system in a politically "neutral" context\textsuperscript{103}. In the absence of follow-up assessment of changes made as a result of the reviews, it is unclear whether countries have in fact used them to conform to a "European" norm. In Grosjean's account the accent seems to be on how diverse the various systems are.

\textsuperscript{100} since OECD was a body with a wider membership than Western Europe, the method was used for drawing attention reasonably tactfully but publicly to areas where particular governments failed to meet "normal" western liberal standards
\textsuperscript{101} this task is usually carried out, usually in teams of four or five, by a mixture of the DECS "house" experts and others, practitioners or academics, without previous CoE involvement
\textsuperscript{102} Grosjean, op.cit., p. 49
\textsuperscript{103} based on discussions with officials from participant countries
For reasons of space\textsuperscript{104} it is not possible to give a detailed account of other elements in the culture programme at this period. Since the beginning of the 1980s it has been increasingly large and diverse. The art exhibitions have been a constant feature, the one unbroken link to the beginning of Council of Europe cultural cooperation\textsuperscript{105}. From time to time attempts were made, usually by the Secretary-General on behalf of the Committee of Ministers, to reintroduce other symbolic activities such as prizes on the grounds that these "satisfied more fully both member states' needs and Europeans' expectations"\textsuperscript{106}. Examples included the Prix Europa\textsuperscript{107} and the European Theatre Prize, which ran for a few years before being quietly dropped because of its lack of impact compared to its cost\textsuperscript{108}. A typical year might be 1988, when alongside the major projects and policy reviews the programme included an attempt to create a European Poetry Foundation; a colloquy on schools and museums; plans for a conference on arts and education; and support for academic work on linguistic terminology. Two of these were projects suggested by member states\textsuperscript{109}; the others initiated by the secretariat. In addition, the CDCC was working that year on "cultural routes"\textsuperscript{110}, largely at the behest of the Committee of Ministers which in turn was trying to accommodate a Parliamentary Assembly resolution on trans-border itineraries.

\textsuperscript{104} for this reason also the decision has been taken to omit all reference to work on the cultural heritage, which was not brought within the remit of CDCC until 1990 and retains a strongly separate identity
\textsuperscript{105} for example, between 1980 and 1990 five exhibitions were held, ranging from Florence under the Medici to Anatolian civilisation and the impact of the French Revolution
\textsuperscript{106} CDCC (83) 30 – this may have been a response to events within the EC, where the European Parliament had started to vote monies for just such "symbolic" initiatives as the European Community Youth Orchestra
\textsuperscript{107} a joint "house" enterprise with the European Cultural Foundation set up to reward films and documentaries thought to contribute to the European idea
\textsuperscript{108} mainly the expense of travelling juries. Like other cultural prizes (such as the EU's "Aristeion"), the balance between irrelevance in a large country with a strong linguistic profile and prestige in a smaller one with a lesser-used language proved hard to get right
\textsuperscript{109} schools and museums (Austria) and arts and education (UK)
\textsuperscript{110} the CDCC was instructed to take on this project and continued with it until the 1990s, despite the difficulties of expressing what was essentially a tourist incentive in terms which might interest cultural authorities
The position of film in the CDCC is slightly anomalous, in that a separate experts’
group has been active since it was inherited from the WEU in 1961, with an agenda
which was mainly concerned with the development of education technology. After
1965 it covered production, distribution and other problems of the film industry and
gradually concentrated on the structural difficulties of European cinema. However,
the group seems to have had only limited impact in this high-profile and controversial
policy area. In 1989 when a Council of Europe contribution to the European
Community’s European Year of Film and Television was required the CDCC
Experts were sidelined. Nor were they given a role in the management of the
intergovernmental "Eurimages" fund for cinema and TV co-production which was set
up within the Council of Europe after the rejection of such a fund within the EC.
However, recently they have embarked on the preparation of two draft conventions,
on co-production in Europe and the preservation of the cinematic heritage, the first of
which has been considered generally useful (the latter has yet to be adopted).

The 1990s: expansion and networking

By the beginning of the 1990s the last of the "major projects" of cultural cooperation
had come to an end. The overall structure of the Council of Europe’s programme no
longer demanded such initiatives and for some time the national cultural policy
reviews replaced them as the "flagship" aspect of the cultural cooperation programme.
These were mainly of interest to the participants, however, and most member states
continued to feel that the CDCC needed to be seen to be addressing high profile

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111 For examples of texts drawn up by the Cinema Experts Group, see Grosjean, op.cit, pp. 56-58; also
Lange and Renaud, op.cit
policy concerns. There were attempts to keep alive the idea of cultural cooperation as a generator of new, forward-looking thinking, most notably in the study project on "culture and neighbourhood", in effect a continuation of Project 10\textsuperscript{113}. However, the absence of much evidence of convergence around a Council of Europe norm and of wide-ranging influence on government thinking on cultural policy compared to the heyday of cultural democracy now made CDCC's claim to be a "laboratory of ideas" look a little threadbare\textsuperscript{114}.

At the same time, political imperatives required the CDCC to respond to the new role of the Council of Europe as a stage on which problems of transition for new democracies could be worked out. Here the disjuncture between the "internalised" style of the Culture Committee\textsuperscript{115} and the "external" style of the Committee of Ministers became strongly evident once again. There was, and continues to be, pressure on all the committees to make their programmes relevant in terms of human rights, tolerance and democratic values. CDCC's first attempts to respond to this included trying to formulate concepts of "cultural rights" within the context of protecting national minorities. It proved difficult, however, to integrate this kind of thinking into a programme which, in an effort to engage and retain the interest of national cultural ministries, had chosen to ground itself in aspects of their direct responsibilities.

\footnote{112 as a sign of cooperation between the two bodies, although the "Year" was in fact an (ill-judged) element of the Adonnino Report on a People's Europe, intended to identify ways of 'humanising' the unloved European Community}

\footnote{113 a selection of case studies of cities, including Liverpool and Bilbao, where local experiments in cultural management were seen to have been successful}

\footnote{114 for example, the Council seems to have had next to nothing to offer on key issues of government cultural policies in the 1980s and 1990s such as managing the relationship with large national institutions, adapting tax structures or dealing with reduced public expenditure}

\footnote{115 from 1990, the CDCC was divided into four subject committees, including the Culture Committee (CC-Cult). This subgroup of CDCC is entirely responsible for determining programme content and aims}
Certain possibilities had been effectively blocked off\textsuperscript{116}. The Committee of Ministers consistently declined to increase the budget for culture (harder than ever to justify in the face of competing demands from the more efficiently run education and heritage committees). As McMurry and Lee might have foreseen, expertise continued to be transferred bilaterally not multilaterally, suggesting that the Council of Europe had not established itself as a more efficient vector of cooperation than member states' own structures. The group which had formed within and around DECS, with the CIRCLE network\textsuperscript{117} as its nucleus, therefore began to work directly with groups of like-minded cultural activists encountered in the course of implementing the major projects and who wished to create informal ties amongst themselves on a European level.

Project 10 claimed to have succeeded in reaching over 3,000 individuals during its life span\textsuperscript{118}, as a result of which the project's managers realised that they could no longer promote the Council's version of cultural policy as a realistic model. They thus switched their interests to comparing the methods by which cultural policy was administered within member states. On the initiative largely of the secretariat and its advisers, CC-Cult began to set aside some of its programme for small-scale initiatives to encourage cultural organisations (mainly arts bodies) to network at European level. Networking provided the Council of Europe with a chance to return to first principles by offering itself as a resource to the intellectual community.

\textsuperscript{116} in an echo of the 1950s, governments once again avoided setting up new institutions which they would then have to resource

\textsuperscript{117} this group of researchers and information officers may be seen as the successors to the Project 5 policy group, although they did not have that level of formal responsibility within the CDCC. Its members have consistently been used by DECS as experts on national cultural policy reviews, on project 10 and its successor, and most recently as an instant "task force" deputed to draw up a report on cultural policy in Europe ("In from the Margins", Council of Europe, 1996)

\textsuperscript{118} final report, 1993, op.cit., p. 88
Of particular interest to the DECS approach of the 1990s, derived from Project 10, was the training function of networks, which might be harnessed and developed, not necessarily as a way of promoting a particular orthodoxy but as a means of achieving the elusive original goal of encouraging a trans-border mindset and ways of working. A course run by the Marcel Hicter Foundation and financed by the Council of Europe had this aim, although one might argue that teaching people how to formulate projects for the international institutions to fund is a little artificial, not to say self-perpetuating. The networking approach also led to a certain demand for input into the policy-making process. Groups such as the European Council of Artists (a Scandinavian-led pressure group) and the Informal European Theatre Meeting were at one point unsuccessfully proposed to member states as "privileged partners" with whom to open some unspecified form of policy dialogue.

As well as a form of intellectual cooperation, a network-based policy allowed those who participated to attempt a return to some of the ideals of federalism and cultural democracy – participation, grassroots self-determination, the bypassing of the (national) political level, channelling advice (which might or might not be of use) rather than trying to negotiate compromises between conflicting national interests.

This reopened the old gap, partially closed during the previous twenty years, between

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119 although the possibility that networks might be receptive to the "Council of Europe idea" should not be excluded
120 a Belgian "not-for-profit" organisation in memory of the former CDCC member, funded by the French Community of Belgium and contracted by DECS to operate training courses on its behalf, using many of the "house" experts
121 it has, however, been helpful for running conventional bilateral cultural relations programmes
122 DECS' 1992 description of the programme of the early 1990s as "cooperation... organised primarily through 'clearing houses' and networks" shows the extent to which the focus had shifted
the organisation's interests and those of the member states, leading to renewed, albeit less acrimonious, criticism of its relevance, effectiveness and working practices.123

Accordingly, the focus, helped by the reform of the organisation as a whole, has returned to member states' interests, in particular those of the new members. A good example of the new flexibility is the ten-year long attempt to put together a coherent CC-Cult project centred on books and publishing.124 Originally sparked by the political need to keep language-based issues on the agenda, the project combines several useful aspects of other cultural cooperation "styles" whilst avoiding their pitfalls. Eschewing a sponsorship/advocacy rule, as used with networks, DECS' team instead targeted professional associations and devised an active response to what it found. The project's literature avoids promoting a particular point of view, whether that of the "house" or of a particular member state. The impression it gives is of ideological neutrality and adaptability. Like project 10, its method is reports, studies and conferences, but it also diversifies into subsets of other activities (a "book cultural policy review" system, a "book cultural route"), picks up on useful new technologies which it can promote and inform about (digitally-based print-on-demand techniques of value to cash-strapped publishers) and sets up nationally-based projects (New Book Economy). It contains an element of normative work in the project, involving codifying best practice in the management of archives and libraries. It has no group of "experts", but brings several specific tasks related to technical problems in member states under a single umbrella and gives the impression of being co-ordinated rather

123 a 1996 working party, which included the present author, made recommendations for reform which centred on restoring main responsibility for the determination of the programme, its aims and content to the national delegations

124 this began seriously in 1992 as a French initiative (including the provision of a senior expert to carry it out) following their hosting of the 7th conference of culture ministers, for which they chose the theme and directed most of the preparation. Prior to this "books" had featured in the programme for years without any serious activity attached to it
than imposed. This "mixed economy" stands in contrast to the traditional CDCC preference for analysis and synthesis into a "house style", which is then applied, in quasi-academic fashion, to a range of situations.

The cultural policy reviews have also changed following the arrival of large numbers of new member states, for whom they offer real advantages. Rather than attempting to cover the whole range of policy issues in one country, these reviews now address a group of specific issues. A complementary project – transversal studies on managing "desétatisation" and privatisation – has been launched in which a group of "old" and transitional member states are studied together. In 1998 a Dutch-funded project called MOSAIC was launched under the system of voluntary contributions used for the art exhibitions. This uses the cultural policy reviews to create a channel of access for new member states on a demand-led basis to specialised advice on difficult policy areas125.

Both developments – books and cultural policy – suggest a movement away from the general to the specific. If cultural cooperation is in the process of reinventing itself once again, it is with an emphasis on assembling project management techniques which can be applied to individual requirements. The process of transfer of expertise has come to the fore because of the existence for the first time of a quasi-client relationship within the system.

Planning papers for 2000126 show how the "standards" of the programme (cultural policy reviews, support for networks, art exhibitions, cultural routes, cinema) have been compressed into three "all-purpose" categories (cultural development policy,

125 in this it is reminiscent of the system of "technical assistance" which has for years been a strong feature of the heritage programme: a member state asks for an expert from another member state to visit, consider a particular problem in conservation and draw up a report. It is then up to the requesting state to act on the report.
126 kindly made available by Mme Vera Boltho of DECS, for which I am grateful.
technical assistance and "visions of Europe"), which reflect the types of cooperation which generated them. However, these are no longer the fulcrum: that has shifted to the "political" priorities of information technology\textsuperscript{127} and technical assistance (through the Mosaic project).

This repackaging clearly shows the influence of the two Council of Europe "summits" at Heads of Government level\textsuperscript{128} which were the organisation's response to political developments in eastern Europe. The first of these produced new core principles or pillars — the pre-eminence of law, pluralist democracy and human rights — and included a reference to "common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity". The second summit dropped the reference to culture and a debate is still running as to whether culture is or is not a "fourth pillar" of the Council of Europe. It has been sufficiently emphasised\textsuperscript{129}, however, to oblige a rethinking in which high visibility and political content take priority, in the form of standard-setting accompanied by monitoring of compliance, and budgeting according to results.

The logic of this would be to cut back actual multilateral cultural cooperation quite considerably. If the aim of intergovernmental action in Europe is to prevent major lapses from standards, there is very little within cooperation on culture which contributes to it, just as it never succeeded in contributing meaningfully to world peace. There are few signs that this is acknowledged. In the following chapter it will be suggested that part of the explanation lies in the way that cultural cooperation provided the Council of Europe, at a time when it had effectively ceased to be a significant international force, with an alternative narrative which preserved some of

\textsuperscript{127} normative work, within a newly created "house" style involving a "good practice" text emphasising freedom of expression and empowerment
\textsuperscript{128} in 1993 (Vienna) and 1997 (Strasbourg)
the core ideals of the Hague Congress federalist vision. The notion of cultural cooperation as "both an objective and a method"\textsuperscript{130}, i.e. as a value in itself rather than one means amongst others to an end, is central to the idea of a "different" Europe which challenges the values of its established politicians. The fluidity of its programme, however, and the constant repackaging it has had to undergo to appear relevant, shows that this visionary Europe remains unable to shake free from the political demands which cultural diplomacy continues to make.

\textsuperscript{129} see "Building Greater Europe without Dividing Lines", Report of the Committee of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe, 1998

\textsuperscript{130} view expressed by the Director of DECS in a policy paper to the CC-Cult, 1999
CHAPTER NINE

Types and changes in cultural cooperation in the Council of Europe

The previous chapters have tried to show how the Council of Europe has developed cultural cooperation and some of the pressures which informed its choices. This chapter examines the outcome of these choices and argues that at the peak of the Council’s cultural influence the goal of better interaction between states and peoples became not just secondary to, but entirely displaced by, that of constructing and promoting a value system which, far from reflecting "cultural policy" as practised by governments, explicitly rejected those policies and offered itself as a critique of them. However, as the fluctuations in its fortunes show, more traditional approaches are not entirely routed and have recently reasserted themselves.

International relations theory and cultural cooperation

In international relations theory, the terms "realist" and "idealist" are used to convey the relationship, often conflict, between governments, keen to maintain the status quo, and secretariats who with their expert advisers look for change rather than containment. Chris Brown¹ offers a less loaded, more satisfactory, contrast between "cosmopolitan" and "communitarian" approaches which in practice try not merely to co-exist but to cooperate actively. This allows for a wider range of motives in situations where governments may often combine realist and idealist perspectives (or, put more cynically, present realist motives as idealist). Brown does not discuss the

¹ Brown, 1992, op.cit
personalist legacy, nor indeed cultural cooperation, but his categories supply an excellent framework for a discussion of the Council of Europe scenario and will therefore be used in this chapter. They also provide a valuable link with the "Classical" and "Romantic" ideas of society which provide the backdrop to cultural policy, and not least to the Bergsonian synthesis between intellectual cooperation at the level of scientific contact and creative cooperation which tries to place the artistic impulse\textsuperscript{2} at the centre of the body politic.

A "cosmopolitan" approach to international relations is state-centred, inclined to interpret events and action as governed by the various interests of the participants. Its antecedents are Kant and the Enlightenment and it is assumed to have a certain universality of outlook. The post-war international relations structure may be considered to have been built on the assumption of cosmopolitan values: based on commitment to the idea of international law as the major governing factor to international relations. It looks for more rational ways of running the world's affairs which include moral interests, social institutions and the higher interest of humanity as a whole\textsuperscript{3}. The decision to study different cultural policies in member states in terms of how well they meet their aims, rather than to redirect those aims, might be considered as cosmopolitan\textsuperscript{4}.

A "communitarian" approach, conversely, depends on the assertion of a "general will" as the legitimating factor in decision-making, which can only be expressed via small-

\textsuperscript{2} one might consider Mounier and the idea of "L'Inutilisable" here: in particular, "l'école tue pour toujours l'artiste que tout homme porte en soi", which might stand as a motto for communitarian cultural cooperation (from his "Préface à la Réhabilitation de l'Art et l'Artiste" in Révolution Personnaliste et Communautaire", op. cit, p.186).

\textsuperscript{3} Brown includes both Marxism and Benthamite utilitarianism in this category

\textsuperscript{4} whereas "realist" would hardly suit the spirit of open-mindedness with which some, if not quite all, undergo this process.
scale organic communities. Not necessarily anti-nationalistic but distrustful of the state, it has its roots in Rousseau and the Romantic movement. Communitarians place a premium upon social solidarity and question the supremacy of "man" (the Western thinker) over civil society. Brown groups idealist thinkers, utopians and many post-modernists in this category. He also associates the term with the growth of what he calls "epistemic communities", a term originally coined to describe pressure groups and NGOs who base their arguments on scientific consensus combined with "concealed political threat". The obvious illustration is Greenpeace, but the term is also applied to expert groups within an international organisation. The Council of Europe's cultural democracy project, with its outsider input, insistence on radical change and on the sterility of "classical" education systems and desire to obtain political commitment to a shared philosophy of "culture-centredness", is surely the ideal communitarian project.

Clearly, these descriptive categories do not meet every aspect of cultural cooperation. The eminently communitarian Denis de Rougemont would have insisted strongly upon the centrality of the universal image of mankind, as it was the unique gifts and achievements of "the European man" which for him justified Europe's place in the world. However, they do provide a recognisable paradigm for the conflicts being worked out over the years in multilateral cultural cooperation.

The Brussels Treaty Organisation approach was never anything but cosmopolitan: posited entirely on the interplay of relations between states, seeking to extend benefits

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5 Brown regards Hegel as the "team leader" of the communitarians, and there are clear links with the kind of nation-building processes identified by, inter alia, Benedict Anderson ("Imagined Communities", Verso, 1983)
6 who include many pre-war international theorists including ICIC's Alfred Zimmern
within a vaguely articulated notion of the general good for as long as this did not
conflict with or detract from the benefits enjoyed by the immediate constituency. The
Council of Europe initially followed this line, but changed under the influence of the
Consultative Assembly and influential individuals. From 1965 (the "leisure debate")
 onwards, the drive towards a cultural policy, based on the tenets of "permanent
education", seems wholly communitarian: culture as, in essence, for the good of the
individual, his or her personal development and location within a community. There
is, furthermore, a "resistance" element based on rejection of economic, or
consumerist, values which seems to go beyond what a government cultural policy
could be expected to adopt.

**Cosmopolitan cooperation in the Council of Europe**

International relations theory also offers useful insights into what we mean by
"cooperation", a word which is rarely defined yet seems to cover anything from a
joint political statement to a tacit agreement not to complain about international
money diverted to an essentially national activity. Anthony Haigh⁸, inventor of the
Cultural Fund, speaks of "collective cultural cooperation" in terms of spirit versus
matter, evoking de Rougemont's ideas of "consciousness" and "cultural mission"
rather than a series of administrative exchanges aimed at improving the efficiency of
the status quo.

Keohane is one of the few to examine what is meant by international cooperation. He
sees it not in terms of a common mission but of reciprocity and retaliation: you give
something, you get something back, otherwise you withdraw your offer. As we have

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⁸ Haigh, *Cultural Diplomacy in Europe*, op.cit. p. 216
seen, this reciprocity was already central to post-war bilateral cultural relations; and it
seemed at first to carry forward into Council of Europe cultural cooperation – the
"pragmatic approach" to which Haigh refers. Keohane explains reciprocity as game
theory: cooperation is likely to result in the certainty of a limited gain, preferable to
the risk of losing all in a bid to win all.

He acknowledges, however, that reciprocity is difficult in multilateral situations.
Cooperation requires that "the actions of separate individuals or organisations – which
are not in pre-existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one another
through a process of policy co-ordination." But the gains may not be clear, there is
often nothing that can be withdrawn and incentives to enforce compliance are low.
This seems particularly true of multilateral cultural cooperation, where if one of the
group decides not to participate the others will scarcely be affected, unless there is
some form of kickback affecting bilateral cooperation, which is rarely if ever the case.

In other words, why engage in multilateral cultural cooperation when the benefits are
far from obvious? They can be quantified in the field of the cultural heritage, where
there is a general goal of improving the overall standards of conserving and
appreciating the heritage to the benefit of all, but are otherwise not obvious. If there
is no obvious benefit to common action, one has to be invented, since the alternative
proposition – common action is not necessary – is unthinkable in terms of an
organisation which has to justify itself. Keohane cites Haas' term for this: "upgrading
the common interest", a process by which benefits offered now will be paid back in
the unknown future. Thus the process itself becomes the benefit, and concessions are

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9 R. O Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", p. 280, in Der Derian, op. cit., pp. 279-302
10 which may account for the fact that, from the outset, the "heritage sector" has made much greater use
of the international convention as a standard-setting instrument
made in order to build up the process rather than achieve any immediate measurable outcome.

The process of cooperation within BTO, despite the absence of obvious concrete results, therefore appears to its participants as worth persevering with partly because the "getting to know you" process works amongst officials themselves as well as, theoretically, amongst the general public. The aim is improved good-will at all levels which will smooth the path of more substantial negotiations; this can at least be seen to be linked to the ultimate goal, no resumption of war. Nothing is at stake which impacts on national policy interests in this, the softest of "soft policy". The comment of Inis L. Claude, cited at the beginning of this thesis, demonstrates how cultural cooperation is often regarded by those who deal in the wider picture.

However, one might suppose that benefit cannot be deferred for ever and the time must come when a return is demanded on the investment. One way to evaluate cooperation, according to Keohane, is in terms of change resulting from it. Cooperation need not necessarily be benign (the strong may gang up to force compliance on the weak) but it should be able to demonstrate an outcome to show that it has made some difference. Cultural cooperation as a cosmopolitan project is difficult to justify in these terms. Even where 1950s-1960s-style promotional activity is likely to have had isolated pockets of impact, for example, amongst the audiences for its prize-winning films, or readers of its (few) translations, and the spectators of its art exhibitions (though in all but a few cases these were confined to capitals where international events already happened), it seems likely that this in itself hardly justified continued investment. Furthermore, it must have become clear by the early 1960s that the primary aim, exchange, was being met quite independently of efforts
by international organisations, in ways ranging from municipal twinning schemes to
the ubiquity of television and quicker, more practical travel, such a significant factor
in the days of ICIC.

Nor is it evident that multilateral cultural cooperation is as effective as cultural
diplomacy in terms of providing an image. Cultural diplomacy does not only look
outward: part of its task is to underpin national foreign policy by offering a reflection
of the country back to itself with which the citizen will be satisfied and which will
incline him to continue to support the government's actions. The task of reflecting
back, through culture, a positive image of participation in Europe was already
significantly harder than for a single member state, if only because of the difficulty of
associating cultural advantages with membership of a defence treaty. BTO seems to
have had most success when the link was clear and referred primarily to the
propagation of Western ideals as a defence against communism (and, by implication,
a war with the Russians). Leadership courses, information films and booklets, and
opportunities to exchange ideas and travel all planted the message that the
organisation which laid these things on was also ready to fight to defend the values
they represented.

For the Council of Europe, a different problem existed: how to inculcate a strong
sense within the populations of fifteen diverse European countries of belonging to a
single entity. Reinforcing the reciprocal element to bilateral cooperation might seem
an obvious option: making the "foreign" familiar. In 1992\textsuperscript{11} DECS presented the aim
of this first stage as "to avoid the resurgence of fanatical nationalism", but its
immediate task was more pragmatic: to secure the requisite popular loyalty for the

\textsuperscript{11} paper cited in Grosjean, op.cit
project of European unity. Little attempt was in fact made to confront the causes or results of that fanatical nationalism; yet neither was there any serious attempt at intergovernmental level to develop a set of alternative symbols for Europe.

From the outset, two different approaches were evident. One assumed that the Council of Europe would operate much as BTO had done, i.e. promote Western values with an Atlantic tinge. This was the view of the UK, and is uncompromisingly cosmopolitan in its insistence on the division between the image which the western Europeans combine to present to the world and the reality of their operation as individual sovereign states. Cultural cooperation in this scenario is politically "neutral", in that it has no impact on the conduct of internal policy beyond that of reflected image. The Scandinavians countries seem to have supported this view initially.

The other approach was articulated by France but supported, at least in part, by most continental countries and by Ireland. This argued for a significantly different cooperation with a much broader base: mutual knowledge and exchange, certainly, but also standardisation ("an aspect of the process of unification") of national practices and the creation of supra-national authorities and activities. This, if not going all the way towards the federal ideal of the Hague Congress, suggests a will to accept that cultural cooperation might involve common policy. Accordingly, early cultural cooperation was already a hybrid and was seen by some as a staging post towards a much more integrated process.

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12 cf. Richard Seymour, of the British Council, to his Norwegian counterpart in 1951: "where joint action by Member States is recommended, it should be regarded as a widening of the bilateral basis rather than a narrowing of the world basis" (PRO FO 924/914)
13 see response to Richard Seymour's paper, ibid.
14 PRO FO 924/917
15 including European awards, exhibitions, joint film productions and a University of Europe
If an idea of cultural cooperation as potential harmonisation of aspects of domestic policy allied with strong "European" imagery was already established in 1951, the willingness to press ahead with a programme which was not obviously delivering results is explained. It was, in fact, a question of deferred benefit. The failed attempt to use the renegotiation of the European Economic Community\textsuperscript{16} and the first meeting of education ministers in 1960-1961 to create a European cultural/educational superstructure is prefigured in this early declaration of intent. Thus, although Anthony Haigh attributed the "cultural mission" to the Consultative Assembly, there was a strong political pressure in that direction from some governments.

Nevertheless, this remained a possibility rather than a cause for immediate action, especially as regarded institutions. Bruno de Witte also observes the reluctance of European states to attempt a concentrated common approach in culture and suggests, rightly, that there is much to be said for an appearance of action without significant consequences: "could it be because this is a sector of symbolic politics in which it matters more to be seen taking numerous initiatives in various settings rather than developing effective and coherent forms of regulation?"\textsuperscript{17} Contemporary bilateral developments seem to confirm this: in 1954 France and Germany concluded their own bilateral Cultural Accord which intensified exchange between them while the British Council suffered severe cutbacks for its work in Europe in order to shift resources to the developing world. If it mattered, you did it bilaterally.

The intellectual community itself seemed scarcely readier to move cultural cooperation beyond the cosmopolitan. The 1954 Council of Europe Round Table

\textsuperscript{16} the "plan Fouchet", which would have established educational and cultural cooperation as a Member-State controlled competence, like foreign and defence policy

\textsuperscript{17} in Wallace (1990), op.cit., p. 202
which took place in Rome in 1954 under the chairmanship of Denis de Rougemont disappointed its chairman, as he admits in his preface: "I awaited, pencil in hand, the ingenious, wise and daring suggestions that would surely not fail to stream in from all sides". To his surprise, these "convinced and tried Europeans.....occupied themselves with multiplying objections...and warnings against the mysticism of union" to such an extent that he ended by asking himself whether "the very notion of European culture corresponded to any reality or was merely a slogan for over-enthusiastic schoolboys".

De Rougemont's idea had been that culture is to politics as content is to form, the creative impulse which dictates in what direction policy shall move. The Round Table suggested not only that intellectuals themselves were no longer interested in that idea (even within the federalist movement itself there had been a major schism between "realist" and "idealist" wings, de Rougemont heading the latter), but were also uncertain whether culture could even be employed effectively in the service of unification. It went instead for practical service-based activity – documentation, services for journalists, language-teaching – which might be more effectively delivered multilaterally than bilaterally.

Some of the Round Table's interests sound very like the approach later taken by the European Commission: functionalist, requiring the existence of added value, directed towards underpinning economic revival. However, the main reasons for the failure of a cosmopolitan, or diplomatic, approach to cultural cooperation lie in the inability of

19 not until 1986 was there again a serious move to mobilise cultural personalities in favour of European union (the Florence conference of the European Commission)
those involved to create a delivery structure that would have utilised national machinery to provide serious services, whether because of lack of clarity of purpose or lack of faith in the organisational machinery of the Council of Europe, or both.

"Communitarian" cultural cooperation: cultural policy

The twenty years from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s may be seen as an experiment, in which the failures of a cosmopolitan approach were succeeded by an attempt to create a "cultural policy" shaped by the perception that domestic problems existed for which governments were not finding their own solutions. Cultural cooperation became a means of supplying (largely communitarian) solutions presented in different ways: as a tool "to enable...states...to meet their educational and cultural needs more rapidly and more efficiently"; as "collective" action, valid in its own terms, toward the fulfilment of a "cultural mission"; or as "the development of a common philosophy based on the founding concepts of cultural development, permanent education, cultural democracy" which did not aim at enhanced efficiency but at "the elaboration of fundamental concepts".

The "communitarian", or social, phase runs roughly from the 1965 "leisure debate" to the replacement in 1984 of a European Cultural Charter by a lower-key Declaration on Cultural Objectives. The relative novelty of cultural policy as a concept separate from education policy and the ubiquity of debate about the future of the "leisure

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20 CCC (65)2 meeting report
21 Haigh (1974), op.cit., p. 216
22 1992 DECS paper on "Future Orientations for Cultural Cooperation in Europe" cited in Grosjean, op.cit., p. 121
society" in the mid-60s gave some credibility to the idea that an international organisation might take the lead in its development. Public structures were still new enough and fluid enough to adapt to the idea that "principles" could be developed which national governments would incorporate into their own policy planning - the idea that it is "possible to progress from the 'democratisation of culture' to 'cultural democracy'". It was perhaps the last occasion in which intellectuals could confidently set the agenda for international government action in Europe.

Two points should be made about cultural development/cultural democracy as a communitarian project. The first is the ambiguous position of member states in relation to it. Keohane suggests that the aim of cooperation is conformity, but intergovernmental cooperation has no mechanisms for enforcing this. Its measure of effectiveness can only be the extent to which it is taken up at national level. The evidence suggests that it did enjoy a considerable degree of influence, but that governments held back from the kind of political commitment which would have given it the status accorded to, for example, human rights.

Secondly, despite its cross-referencing with UNESCO, the CoE's cultural democracy programme was an essentially federalist project in the mainstream European sense. It allowed the organisation to declare its separateness from governments and to return, in a sense, to its roots. The values projected are those articulated by Denis de Rougemont in "The Way of Federalism": inclusivity; the safeguarding of diversity.

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23 DECS foreword to the report of the 2nd Conference of European Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs, Athens 1978
24 the two terms are often used interchangeably, although "cultural development" is generally the preferred descriptor - "cultural democracy" being used to denote the "ideal state" to which policies are assumed to aspire
25 in the case of Norway, for instance, a complete overhaul of government policy took place using the Council of Europe's ideas as a basis: see L. J. Wilhelmsen, "Cultural Policy in Norway", (bound typescript; British Library accession date 1976)
26 de Rougemont (1950), op.cit
by ensuring that different systems and circumstances are enabled to flourish; complexity rather than simplification, so that the autonomy of the individual is given priority; power to reside in neighbourhoods and groups, not with governments, managed through private shared networks. Cultural democracy redefined the relationship between the Council of Europe and governments, who became of interest only in so far as they were advancing the interests of the European citizen by applying the project.

The Council was also able to align itself with the intellectual community in a way that had until then been available to UNESCO, with its networks of national commissions, but not to the relentlessly government-dominated Council of Europe. The language of "needs and aspirations" becomes prominent from 1970 onwards, fed in from a community on whose behalf the Council itself claims to speak: acting both as a mediator to governments and as a pressure group for social rather than political change. Martha Finniemore\(^\text{27}\) (1993) shows this happening in the context of UNESCO's scientific programme and concludes that power-bases of specialised knowledge build up in international organisations which can thus effect social, though not political, responses in member states. If UNESCO indeed acted as catalyst for the shift in the Council of Europe's approach (and given the speed and timing of the shift, it seems reasonable to assume it did) this has resonance, particularly when one looks at the impact of cultural democracy at the operational level in the UK, where (as "community arts") it was influential amongst arts organisations though not at central government level\(^\text{28}\).

\(^{27}\) M. Finniemore, "International Organisations as Teachers of Norms", in International Organisation, No.47, no. 4, pp.565-597, 1993

\(^{28}\) see R. Hewison, "Too Much: Art and Society in the Sixties, 1960-1975", Methuen, 1986, on the problems of community arts in getting Arts Council support, and R. Shaw, "The Arts and the People", Jonathan Cape, 1987, on cultural democracy as an attempt to displace "traditional" high art forms
Finniemore notes that in UNESCO the impetus had come from a consultant, Pierre Auger, who urged that science policy should move from passive support to active pressure with the express intention that member states should give priority to a policy on scientific matters which until then had been marginal or non-existent. Like cultural policy, science policy came out of the blue: "science was believed to proceed most efficiently and productively if left to scientists...Science policy and promoting the science capabilities of member states were not even mentioned in the original set of UNESCO aims. "UNESCO officials simply declared science policy-making to be necessary and good; there was no serious attempt to prove that was so."

Finniemore's account looks very similar to what happened in the Council for Cultural Cooperation.

Finniemore suggests that the Cold War acted as the primary outside stimulant to create a UNESCO science policy. For the Council of Europe, read 1968. Whereas the massive European insecurities of WWII were almost entirely ignored by cultural cooperation, the social upheavals of the late 1960s received enormous attention, even though they were by no means universal. The strong Franco-Belgian flavour of the cultural democracy project no doubt accounts for this. However, although this may have supplied the political justification for a "cultural policy" programme, the process had been moving that way earlier than 1968. A national project already existed in French public policy which provided a ready-made template for the rest of Europe to embrace. Furthermore, as part of "permanent education", it had already been successfully transplanted as part of the Council of Europe's "education policy".

29 Finniemore, op.cit, p. 577
30 ibid., p. 583
Some of the rhetoric in Council of Europe documentation at this time is startlingly "alternative", suggesting the organisation wished very much to align itself with the ideas of the youth movement. A memorandum prepared for EUROCULT\(^\text{31}\) deplores the funding of theatres or museums: "they provide culture for the cultured". Instead, "culture that is handed out must give way to culture that is experienced. . . . Everything is cultural that is meaningful to the individual, gives him pleasure and contributes to his development". The individual must undergo a "cultural apprenticeship"\(^\text{32}\).

A document on "permanent education" goes further, arguing that the recent "crisis"\(^\text{33}\) called into question "the very roots of European culture, i.e. the long-established European model"\(^\text{34}\). This is less a policy document than a polemic: the "functional society...erodes and dismantles 'European culture' and the State machinery, although it is not self-contained but itself imbued with national, religious and humanist culture"; so education must cease to be "the sclerotic invocation of the past as a preparation for the future"\(^\text{35}\), "the concept of 'class' will be eliminated" and teachers will become "animateurs"\(^\text{36}\), while "psycho-social technology" will replace "prescribed" curricula. It concludes by accusing the school system of "upholding individualist principles" and "resisting" the "development of community life"\(^\text{37}\).

The concepts found in "permanent education", and cultural democracy, were not new. They can be traced back to the French pre-war Front Populaire and the wartime

\(^{31}\) probably by the secretariat, although this is not clear
\(^{32}\) "An experiment in multilateral cultural cooperation in Europe: the Council for Cultural Cooperation", CCC, 1972
\(^{33}\) unspecified; however, cultural development rhetoric tends to assume that the reader will know that it is the student unrest of 1968 which is being referred to
\(^{34}\) CCC, 1973: part of a series on "Education in Europe": this quote appears on p. 1
\(^{35}\) ibid., pp. 3-4
\(^{36}\) ibid., p. 21
\(^{37}\) ibid., pp. 36-37
Resistance. Titmus\textsuperscript{38} relates this to French concern with developing an educated working class\textsuperscript{39} and the evolution of an explicit public policy under Léo Lagrange for managing the cultural dimension of leisure. Joffré Dumazédier\textsuperscript{40} and the movement "Peuple et Culture", a sociological research-orientated organisation interested not merely in the cultural betterment of the individual but in subsequent "social action", have already been mentioned.

The willingness of the members of the CCC to absorb these preoccupations suggests more than passive acquiescence or even a cultish desire to give cultural cooperation a belief system. Concerns about "a sterile, commercial pseudo-culture"\textsuperscript{41} go back to the Frankfurt School and were being expressed elsewhere by such as Raymond Williams. Besnard\textsuperscript{42} (1980) notes the extent to which "animation culturelle" was taking off in France at the same period that Jeanne Laurent and Marcel Hieter were introducing it to the Council of Europe. As he describes it, it appears to have had its own set of guiding principles which cut across the whole range of the French public policy system. The strands of French life to which he relates it (the Catholic voluntary movement, syndicalism, dissatisfaction with the perceived rigidity of the scholastic system) are similar to those in Greilsammer's (1975) study of French federalism, in which Europe is embraced in reaction to the centralised, élitist French state and

\textsuperscript{38} C. J. Titmus, "Adult Education in France", Pergamon, 1967
\textsuperscript{39} he notes that the British find this preoccupation strange because of the part played by their tradition of free public library provision and adult extension classes provided by the university system
\textsuperscript{40} Although the link should not be over-emphasised, Dumazédier also had some connections with Mounier, de Rougemont and Ordre Nouveau (he was not, however, either a Catholic or a personalist)
\textsuperscript{41} Titmus, op.cit., p. 52
\textsuperscript{42} P. Besnard, "L'animation socioculturelle", no. 1845 in the series "Que sais-je?", Presses Universitaires de France, 1980
associated with decentralisation, flexible planning, the "déprolétilsation" of the individual, participation and "la primauté du culturel"\textsuperscript{43}.

The cultural democracy project, therefore, became the cultural policy of the Council of Europe not simply because it was resolutely pushed by the member state which more than any other had chosen to associate its national self-image with cultural policy, nor because its intellectual credibility made it irresistible, but also because it had roots in European idealism. Its communitarian aspects attracted a secretariat which was perceived as having a free hand with the content of a troublesome part of a cooperation programme. Finally, it was able to achieve a close synthesis with the activity of UNESCO, itself troubled in the mid-60s by the lack of a convincing European aspect to its activity\textsuperscript{44}.

Furthermore, this type of cooperation did not really need active consensus. A sort of negative assent was sufficient, as the record of the 1976 ministerial conference demonstrates. Ernst Haas\textsuperscript{45} offers findings on consensus formation in the Consultative Assembly based on voting patterns\textsuperscript{46} which illuminate behaviour of officials in working groups and, by extension, ministers. He finds that education and cultural questions are those on which national delegations most often vote with unanimity, because, he considers, these issues have few implications for national programmes. In other words, they cost nothing politically and can be used as a flag-waving tactic for the institution itself. Whether they would sign up so readily to the

\textsuperscript{43}A. Greilsammer, "Les Mouvements Federalistes en France de 1945 a 1974", p. 201. Presses d'Europe, 1975
\textsuperscript{44}see report of 4th Regional Conference of UNESCO National Commissions, Sofia, June 1962, which notes the lack of "activities specially designed for Europe" in UNESCO's programme, and suggests that Europe's contribution "can be conceived only in terms of the whole world" through intellectual cooperation, its unique selling point
\textsuperscript{45}E. B Haas, "Consensus Formation in the Council of Europe", University of California Press, 1960
\textsuperscript{46}officials' committees, by contrast, rarely vote
same texts at home is a moot point: Haas' findings suggests they would not\(^{47}\). The same may be said of officials advising ministers on multilateral cultural cooperation. In committee they will look for negative political or policy effects nationally rather than positive gains, and will not necessarily insist on the latter. Thus one should be wary of taking apparent consensus at face value, or of mistaking acquiescence for enthusiasm. It may simply indicate absence of consequences.

Just as it offered an independent identity to the organisation, cultural democracy provided member states with a "brand name" for the neglected culture dossier and equal status with permanent education, CCC's flagship communitarian project. It also provided a defensible methodology which could be presented as distinctive, ground-breaking and, most important of all, inclusive, in that it allowed, indeed relied on, the involvement of experts who were not necessarily government officials. The "network" method is the dream of intellectual cooperation made flesh: small groups of like-minded individuals (Brown's "epistemic communities"\(^{48}\)). Their presence, in theory unencumbered by the political interests of their governments, in practice allows the advocacy of a communitarian-idealistic agenda. This accounts for the consistency of the "Council of Europe view" over a twenty to thirty year period in which member state interests have been very much more politically eclectic.

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\(^{47}\) "members...voted for texts which, perhaps because they were no worse in quality than many of those the Assembly had passed in earlier years, aroused no objections. When, however, members asked themselves whether these texts were ones to which they could confidently put their names in their national parliaments considerable diffidence could be seen" (p. 64)

\(^{48}\) the term is borrowed from Peter Haas to describe technical pressure groups who use scientific consensus combined with the threat of bad publicity to set agendas which governments are then obliged to control (see Brown, 1997, op.cit)
This consistency appears most strongly in the attempt at a European Cultural Charter. Seen initially as an opportunity to enshrine the Arc-et-Senans Declaration\textsuperscript{49}, it was regarded by the secretariat as "an initial effort to define a cultural policy for Europe"\textsuperscript{50} and emerged from the CDCC's "epistemic community" par excellence, Project 5. After consulting ten "prominent European personalities", selected by the Secretary General\textsuperscript{51}, a wider consultation was undertaken. A text was presented to culture ministers at their 3\textsuperscript{rd} Conference but was rejected. Sweden articulated the objections: "we consider it inconceivable to have politically elected governments formulate recommendations on the functioning of cultural life. When discussing cultural objectives on a national level, we have always considered it to be of paramount importance that statements from government and parliament should relate to responsibilities and action by public authorities."\textsuperscript{52}

This suggests that the limits of a communitarian project within cultural cooperation had been reached. The charter not only attempted to make normative a number of principles which might be acceptable as desiderata, but it also took the responsibility for deciding the priorities for policy-making – Deutsch's "sets of preferences" - out of the political sphere and relocated it with intellectuals, rather as de Rougemont had envisaged his European Cultural Centre might do. The flawed assumption was that certain areas of public policy might be bound, at national level, by "European" principles derived from a very particular set of circumstances, namely, French education policy, affected by national experiences, especially 1968, and mediated by a

\textsuperscript{49} see previous chapter for an account of this text as a "doctrine" allegedly "unanimously and wholeheartedly" endorsed at the 2\textsuperscript{nd} conference of culture ministers in Athens (the conference report suggests nothing of the sort)
\textsuperscript{50} CDCC (79) 10
\textsuperscript{51} including Denis de Rougemont, the Luxembourg culture minister (who would host the next conference), and Lord Kennet (Wayland Young), the Labour peer, environmental activist and former member of the Parliamentary Assembly
project which set out to examine cultural provision in municipalities and ended up promoting a theory of cultural policy. By contrast, the European Declaration of Cultural Objectives, adopted four years later at the Berlin conference, appears as a set of affirmation of a general nature, resembling a set of "best practice" guidelines of the kind currently being developed again in CC-Cult, in which the nature of the policy is left open. Where the Charter assumed a kind of harmonisation without the mechanisms to enforce it, the Declaration is consistent with a cosmopolitan system, which accepts a limited framework of universal goals but leaves action to be decided elsewhere.

Keohane suggests that cooperation involves some assessment of risk and benefit. Cultural cooperation is often noticeably lacking in reward. Pressure comes from a limited and not always influential circle (intellectuals/artists) rather than from the general public. A communitarian project within cultural cooperation, which in the absence of public pressure offers benefits of an ideological nature only, is therefore unlikely to succeed without making some concessions to this factor of cost and benefit.

It may even be the case that such projects need an element of opposition in order to remain true to their own intellectual starting points and to a self-image which defines itself as extra-national in a system which remains primarily nation-based. The difficulty of identifying the point at which the communitarian agenda needs to compromise with cosmopolitan interests, which are on the whole happy to maintain

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52 3rd Conference of Ministers with responsibility for Cultural Affairs, Luxembourg, 5-7 May, 1981, p. 154
53 this is obviously not true of all countries equally – there may well be countries where evidence of a strong and idealistic stance in relation to European cultural policy will produce significant returns at the ballot box. The point is that there will be countries – the UK being an obvious example – where such a stance will not attract public approval, and may, as in the 1980s and 1990s, attract the reverse
the system as it is, may be at the heart of intellectual cooperation's dilemma, which is how to find the means of implementing its beliefs and visions when it cannot mobilise public pressure at the national level. Many commentators on the European federal idealists point to the fact that they failed for precisely this reason (for example, Coudenhove-Kalergi, who nevertheless saw that culture had national rather than supranational appeal). Sympathetic chroniclers such as Mayne and Pinder\(^{54}\) (1990), whilst they accept this, argue that the failure was not total because some of the federalists' ideas gained acceptance. Similar arguments are used by Grosjean:

"European cultural cooperation ....has enabled ideas and concepts perceived as minority views owing to their dispersal to emerge gradually as 'mainstream ideas' "\(^{55}\).

This explanation sounds closer to a description of the way single-issue pressure groups achieve their objectives than of intergovernmental negotiations. It reinforces the communitarian status of cultural democracy as a grassroots advocacy project accommodated within a system (the public administration of culture within European states) without fundamentally changing it. Grosjean is nevertheless right in identifying the stealthy progress of these ideas into the mainstream of thinking, even if they do not succeed in supplanting other policy, such as the sustenance of traditional art-forms or "high culture".

The philosophy of the visionary outsider is still found and articulated within cultural networks, as a recent article in the newsletter of the main Project 5 spin-off group, CIRCLE, shows: a "voluntary group" developed out of a project meeting, which grew as a result of the efforts, not of "high-ranking civil servants or outstanding academics"

\(^{54}\) op.cit

\(^{55}\) op.cit. p. 99
but of "believers’ rather than "knowers"\textsuperscript{56}, people who have suddenly found a vocation which gives meaning to their lives", supported by "the courage of a few civil servants in the cultural section of the Council of Europe who unhesitatingly placed their trust in these dangerous individuals"\textsuperscript{57}. The article, by one of the founders of Project 5, concludes that "the cultural fraternity that existed in European monasteries and medieval universities ... has been replaced by culture ministries.... A new resistance movement must be mounted", to be orchestrated by "cultural activists" who will "rise up in protest – at international level – against what is happening". This is an almost classic description of intellectual cooperation filtered through the vision of the European idealists, and one of which de Rougemont would have approved. It also reveals a self-image ("dangerous"; "resistance"; "believers") which depends on being outside the mainstream and on being seen as challenging and confrontational.

Some of this element of "resistance" is present in what James Der Derian calls "anti-diplomacy"\textsuperscript{58}. Der Derian's approach to his subject is to use Foucault's ideas of genealogy to explain diplomatic culture more profoundly than is generally the case in realist authors, from Harold Nicolson to Hedley Bull. Although he does not say so, he uses a cultural perspective to approach foreign policy and is thus an ideal commentator on cultural cooperation\textsuperscript{59}. For him, diplomacy and culture are both "sponge words, in the sense that they can soak up a variety of operational meanings but at some saturation point they begin to leave a logical and functional mess.

\textsuperscript{56} there is an unconscious echo here of Der Derian's diplomat 'daimons' or 'knowers' mentioned in chapter I

\textsuperscript{57} "Circular: research and documentation on cultural policies", no.10, July 1999 (p. 3, "Thirty Years", by Augustin Girard)


\textsuperscript{59} Der Derian actually uses the UNESCO expert debates on cultural policy as a theme for his chapter on diplomatic culture, as an example of evasion: since no-one could agree on what was meant either by culture or by the cultural policy of states, it was decided to order some more studies...
behind." His diplomacy recalls Matthew Arnold's view of culture as a system for the management of anarchy and evokes, too, the idea of the artist/intellectual as social mediator. Commentators such as Nicolson play down the idea of the diplomat as the cultivated man, despite the proximity of the two callings, preferring a mainly post-mediaeval imagery based on trade and "common sense". Der Derian evokes the earlier travelling cleric, disseminating courteous values in the church's own "mission civilisatrice" — part of the favourite imagery of the European idealist.

Diplomacy also has to do with the protection of the group from "the Other", an idea here borrowed from Sartre but common in the literature of European integration and a term which the Council of Europe secretariat occasionally uses in its own efforts to locate or propose action within an ideological framework. The classic "other" for Europeans is Islam, replaced (until recently) in the 20th century by communism. However, if, using Der Derian's method, communism is the post-war cosmopolitan "other", cultural cooperation posits an alternative communitarian "other" in the form of industrialisation, American culture and the "monstrous" media of Marcel Hicter, which threaten cultural identity in general and the French language in particular.

One of Der Derian's "interpenetrating paradigms" of diplomacy, which he calls anti-diplomacy, is a variant of utopianism, devoted to the removal of segmentation within society (examples range from Thomas More, in his championing of the domestic over the external in policy, to the "Philosophes" who channelled desire for glory into the passion for science - "plans for perpetual peace were largely a plan for perpetual

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60 ibid., p. 31
61 French commentators would be less likely to take this view, given the status of artist-diplomats such as Paul Claudel or Jean Giraudoux
62 Der Derian, op. cit., p. 5
research\textsuperscript{63}). It is not hard to see, first, in the ideals of personalism and, later, in the creation of a "common philosophy" of development and self-determination in place of exchange and projection this sort of critique of diplomacy itself: its perceived sterility, lack of interest in participation and its emphasis on the state rather than the community.

Reconciling cosmopolitan and communitarian

In this reading, the changing shape of Council of Europe cultural cooperation appears as the conflict between these two styles of cooperation. The period prior to 1965 shows how uncertainty about objectives and how to achieve them combined with different interpretations of the job in hand to thwart a "cosmopolitan" approach to cultural cooperation along the lines of bilateral cultural diplomacy. After 1965, and progressively towards the mid-1970s, this type of cooperation was simply replaced by a communitarian approach with its roots not in diplomacy but in ideas about society developed, appropriately, in and around the French Resistance and able to colonise the older, but dormant, traditions of intellectual cooperation which also had lines back to Bergsonism. The communitarian project was in retreat from the point where it came into direct conflict with national political priorities, in particular in the refusal of national interests to reject the idea of heritage and tradition in the kind of sweeping terms found in documents like those quoted. The communitarian experiment in its "pure" form ended with the rejection of the European Cultural Charter.

\textsuperscript{63} ibid., p. 163
There is not space to examine subsequent cultural cooperation in depth. However, it seems reasonable to see it as a succession of communitarian-cosmopolitan hybrids, combining elements of both approaches. The documentation of project 10, "Culture and Region", begins in the full flush of communitarianism and ends five years later as a testimony to cultural diversity, which goes so far as to acknowledge that "nations are still the best framework for identities". This should not be interpreted as a progress from a "wrong" approach to a "right" one, simply as evidence of an accommodation with the previously rejected values of national identity and cultural heritage.

There is a similar accommodation in the national cultural policy reviews which began in 1985 and continue in a modified form today. These show member states "repossessing" cultural cooperation in a way which acknowledges the communitarian project, by conceding the notion that consistency Europe-wide may be, at least, a nominal aim, but refuses to treat it as a paradigm for their own policy decisions. The reviews are cosmopolitan in their autonomy, their "take it or leave it" design (participation is entirely optional; so is action arising from the review), and their concern with visibility — the idea that cultural cooperation has to be seen to have direct benefit, even if deferred. There is an echo of cultural diplomacy in the system of semi-publicly staged "defences" of the cultural policy in question by a minister and/or a team of senior officials (a situation which would raise issues of propriety - is

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64 see the section "Cultural dynamics: a broad democratic concept" in the interim report of the project 10 study group, by Michel Bassand, Council of Europe, 1987: this specifically locates the project within the cultural democracy format, to the extent of repackaging the anodyne Declaration on Cultural Objectives as a statement of the aims of cultural policy (the term is never used in the text)


66 reflecting their OECD origin, perhaps: an organisation predicated on exchange of information and gradual adherence to norms, or evolution rather than revolution

67 i.e. in a session of the CC-Cult (Culture Committee), which is not, however, open to the public
it appropriate for civil servants to cross-question ministers? - if taken seriously) and in
the fact that participants may benefit politically from being seen to be willing to
accept outside criticism\(^{68}\).

The mixture has had its failures: the project on "culture industries" (project 11) ended
in political stalemate over the way in which cultural cooperation was used to make
points about differing government policies. In this project, the "resistance" agenda
was turned against global media ownership as the "enemy", but in a context of
competing national interests, which might seem on the face of it more characteristic of
a cosmopolitan project\(^{69}\). Success depended on one view prevailing over the other; but
reciprocity could not operate where no sanctions existed to oblige one side to change
its behaviour. Its overt ideology of deregulation versus state dirigisme really prevents
it being described as "cooperation" at all. However, the technique – using one policy
area, culture, to attack other policy areas, namely, free market economics – is
certainly one with potential, albeit better suited to an arena (the EU) where coercion
has weapons (Qualified Majority Voting) to help it achieve its goals.

Since 1990 the tension between cosmopolitan and communitarian cooperation seems
to have been resolved, at least for the time, in a new interest in "classical" normative
work. The kind of standard-setting which, combined with technical assistance,
currently dominates cultural cooperation is not obliged to operate in a political
vacuum, unlike the short-lived "common philosophy" of cultural democracy. In the
two summits, it has a purposeful framework in the same way as the EU. The
communitarian style lives on to an extent in the encouragement of artists' networks

\(^{68}\) a parallel may be drawn here with the utterly un-communitarian but stubbornly long-lived art
exhibitions series: a successful international exhibition makes its host look good
\(^{69}\) although I have not researched it, it seems probable that similar "mixed agendas" occur in areas such
as environment and health policy
but the idea that these will in any real sense replace "old" cultural diplomacy\textsuperscript{70}, rather than run in counterpoint to it, depends on a belief that national interests will themselves give ground to supranational and regional interests. Networking revives the appealing self-image which comes from being part of the "club" of the European-minded but has yet to move from an oppositional role, concerned with its own needs and demands, to an interactive and reciprocal relationship with either member states or the institutions\textsuperscript{71}.

The efforts to shape the cultural cooperation programme as it appears at the end of the 1990s\textsuperscript{72} suggest that new activity has been based on consistency with a broad agenda designed to support democratic values and human rights\textsuperscript{73}. Insistence on support for "core" values has always been a justification for cultural cooperation but until recently was set aside in favour of more specialised ideological strategies. The result is that cultural cooperation has accommodated this insistence on values by embracing diversity as its agenda, thus removing much of the pressure to conform to a particular vision of Europe. Diversity allows for a universalist approach as well as protection of the particular, and seems better able to accommodate national interests than the rather single-minded communitarian agenda.

Strong dispositions either towards cosmopolitanism or towards communitarianism continue to coexist and to confront each other, however: hence the views expressed in the passage quoted from the CIRCLE newsletter, which sees the task of cultural

\textsuperscript{70} an idea which appears, inter alia, in "In from the Margins" (op.cit), which itself looks rather like a final effort to assert an uncompromisingly communitarian agenda

\textsuperscript{71} cultural networks have so far been the preserve of research students rather than established critics, and I am indebted to Valérie Brisset (MA, Warwick) for her study and observations on which I have based some of the foregoing conclusions

\textsuperscript{72} key elements of the programme in 2000 were to be: normative work on new technologies (i.e. internet access and use); cultural policy reviews in new member states, plus sector studies on e.g. privatisation; support for archives and archive policy; technical assistance (MOSAIC); support for networks and training of administrators; art exhibitions and exchanges (CC-Cult (99) 20)
cooperation as to "speak out" against or subvert a bureaucratic/technocratic system for controlling natural anarchy, and a detectable secretariat unwillingness to accept any dilution of the idea of cultural cooperation as a principle in its own right. One recent DECS paper suggests that cultural cooperation should itself be an aim of foreign policy rather than vice versa, a perverse view which seems entirely rooted in the "common philosophy" days when its function as support for diplomacy was confidently rejected.

Conclusion

The cultural cooperation of the Council of Europe has been neither progressive nor consistent but is rather a series of attempts to try out different roles for itself. Early attempts at a cosmopolitan form of cultural cooperation failed because of its inability to deliver significant benefits to the parties concerned. Powers to harmonise, as the French early perceived, would have provided a greater chance of success by enabling cultural cooperation to diversify into "hard policy" areas where cultural benefits might be derived from the imposition of curbs on the operation of economic sector, particularly where these had a linguistic application, such as broadcasting, film and publishing. Accordingly these particular sectors have persisted on the agenda of cultural cooperation even when no mechanism existed to convert the protection of diversity into a policy requirement.

Communitarian cooperation looked for a time as if it would succeed where cosmopolitan types had failed. Its oppositional nature seemed well suited to a sector

73 in the report of the "Wise Men" (see previous chapter) and at successive summit meetings
which had a history of advocacy rather than efficacious action. But it was weakened by its reliance on imposing a vision of what cultural policy ought to achieve which excluded and indeed attacked "traditional" responsibilities towards "high culture". Its one-sided critique could not be incorporated into national policies which did not share its preferences. It suffered also from being rooted in a particular cultural location (broadly, France and the areas of francophone influence) as well as the tradition of federalist-personalist ideology which embraces thinkers from Joffre Dumazedier to the historians Henri Brugmans and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. The communitarian project required, at the least, a broadly sympathetic left to left-centre political environment in which to flourish. Finally, it took much of its political impulse from a series of events (the student unrest of 1968) which had an uneven impact across Europe and which enjoyed different degrees of influence.

Communitarian ideas of cultural cooperation try to offer a constant in a world of change. Ultimately, the cultural democracy project was not flexible enough to stay relevant in a more cosmopolitan context, although adaptable enough to switch to a more neutral "research and information" format. This in itself, however, did not bring with it political commitment: hence the continued search throughout the 1980s and 1990s for relevant themes which would enable cultural cooperation to retain the political support of culture ministers. The national cultural policy reviews, an attempt to find a satisfactory "mixed" formula, were successful within limits but may have suffered from lack of impact outside the immediate sphere in which they took place.

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74 author of a controversial history of Europe which recounts European history in terms of its peoples rather than its nations (see J-B Duroselle, (tr. R. Mayne), "Europe: a History of its Peoples", Viking, 1990)
75 see R. Fraser et al., "1968, a Student Generation in Revolt", Chatto & Windus, 1988
and the small number of research professionals who might be expected to derive benefit from their findings.

Meanwhile, bilateral cultural relations continue to develop and grow, undiminished by the activity of international organisations. The British Council, for example, has rarely taken an interest in the CDCC since the earliest days. Roche & Pigniau’s assessment of French cultural diplomacy in 1995 compares France with the UK, Germany, Spain and Portugal. The Council of Europe is not mentioned (although UNESCO is). The main argument in favour of multilateral cultural cooperation has been that assistance is more "neutral" and easier to accept when it comes through a non-governmental agency. The Council of Europe’s cultural cooperation has not developed in this way, however. Even the cultural policy reviews have not, on the whole, been about seeking and providing help with problems – countries undergo them on the basis that they have a good story to tell.

The most recent reinvention of cultural cooperation seems to draw the legacy of cultural diplomacy, seen in, for instance, the MOSAIC programme’s focus on specific problems of specific countries, or the country-specific studies being carried out on transversal policy problems. The emphasis is placed firmly at the national level, with cultural cooperation acting as a kind of trading floor: a return to exchange as the basic unit of cultural cooperation. Efforts to displace governments in favour of intellectuals have been dropped. In this kind of cooperation, the communitarian

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76 I am not aware of research which traces the paths of cross-national cultural policy "borrowing" or how much this may be due to bilateral awareness in very specific instances (e.g. Netherlands interest in UK experience prior to its museum ‘privatisation’ of the 1980s) and how much to use made of Council of Europe studies on cultural policy, although I can say with confidence of the (perhaps atypical) UK that at governmental level the latter have been uninfluential
77 op.cit, pp. 172 - 189
78 perhaps in belated acknowledgement of the aspirations towards statehood which have been characteristic of the post-Cold War Europe
programme has been subsumed into a broadly cosmopolitan framework, largely shorn of the contentious elements of both and perhaps offering a solution to the long-standing problem of reciprocity.
CHAPTER TEN

Cultural cooperation and the European Community

The work of the Council of Europe has been affected indirectly by the European Community throughout its history, even though the latter was explicitly set up without provision for cultural cooperation in its range of "competences". As seen already, there were political attempts as early as 1960 not just to alter this, but to give the Community and its member states the leading European role in cultural cooperation, a move much resented by non-members as well as the Council of Europe itself. This reflected the Community's capacity, unparalleled in any other European international organisation, to regulate and legislate, thus opening the potential for harmonisation of the "hard", economics-driven policy practices that affect "soft" cultural policy.

This chapter will examine how the European Community devised a form of cultural cooperation using the specific powers and mechanisms at its disposal. It will be argued that the EC resembles other international organisations in that its "cultural policy" is as much the product of the mechanisms by which the Community operates (especially the tripartite relationship of its main institutions, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament) as of any coherent vision of a "European cultural community".

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1 a "Community competence" refers to a policy area in which the Community is given specific authority, under the terms of its governing Treaty, to act as a Community (and thus legislate on behalf of its member states)

2 these initials are preferred to EU, since only the Community can act and take decisions about Treaty competences

3 the term "institution" is commonly used in the literature and day-to-day work of the Community to denote one of the interacting 'partners', each with its own specific functions, which together make up the Community as a legal entity: as well as the Council, Commission and Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors are institutions of the Community

256
The result has been a bifurcation process in which a "hard" policy, centred mainly on culture as a money-generating feature of the economy, has been integrated with mainstream Community thinking, while a "soft" policy of cultural cooperation has been developed on, if anything, more conventional lines than that of the Council of Europe. Far from ushering in a more centralised policy approach, the legitimising of culture within the Community framework has emphasised the policy role of the Member States while Community intervention has recently swung behind using culture as an emollient for the wider integration project.

Cultural action, cultural policy, cultural cooperation?

The history of cultural cooperation within the EC means that, although the above terms often appear to be used interchangeably, in practice they each carry a certain weight. The Commission itself has, until recently, avoided the use of the term "cultural policy", stating explicitly that it has no locus in this area, which is the exclusive competence of Member States. Traditionally it has preferred the French term "cultural action" to make clear that its intervention is of a limited nature. Since 1996, however, it has begun to speak in terms of a "Community cultural policy". The European Parliament has consistently used the term "cultural policy" in a Community context, most recently arguing that the proposed framework programme, Culture 2000, should be described as an instrument for financing and programming cultural policy. The Council, however, has insisted on the term "cultural cooperation" and shows no sign of being willing to accept the Parliament’s wishes on the matter.

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4 the European Commission is the Community’s executive but also has powers of its own to enforce legislation and, crucially, the "right of initiative" – the prerogative of proposing and drafting any legislation to be taken
5 the European Parliament has been directly elected since 1979. As with the Council of Europe, it has tended to press for an extension of Community influence in policy-making, including areas such as culture which until 1992 were formally outside Community competence
6 as at December, 1999

257
In this chapter, therefore, the blanket term "cultural intervention" will be used unless one of these various positions is being explicitly invoked.

The literature of European Community integration

The European Community has generated a vast literature with its own self-contained academic community, whose specialists in the UK include William Wallace, Helen Wallace, Juliet Lodge, Alan Milward and many others. This literature is separate from that of international relations, and emphasises how the core features and philosophies of the Community project operate, rather than specialised fields such as culture which have not been central elements. Amongst works with this broader scope, Edwards and Spence offer an exhaustive account of the workings of the European Commission, including how lobbying works, the role of the "cabinets" and the Commission's relationship to the Treaty. The latter in particular is essential for the understanding of the internal tensions regarding non-Treaty-based activity such as culture prior to 1992.

Amongst academic specialists, Milward provides an unusual, relevant and satisfying commentary on the economic history of the Community, rejecting a common view that its basis is in the suppression of the nation-state in favour of the argument that the post-war order it embodies is built on the nation-state. He regards the views of such as the European Movement as "political sterility" which "has rightly justified the

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8 personal advisers to the twenty appointed Commissioners who make up the "College" of the Commission
9 "The Treaty" is the "constitution" of the European Community. The original is the Treaty of Rome; all subsequent versions are regarded as "completing" this Treaty rather than replacing it. It is normal in EC terminology to refer to "the Treaty" meaning the different revisions. Where one particular version is meant, this will be indicated in the text
10 A. Milward, "The European Rescue of the Nation State", Routledge, 1992
11 the main federalist grouping which emerged from the Hague Congress, whose ideas pervaded cultural cooperation
exclusion of their holders from the ranks of the blessed". If Milward is right, then the absence of cultural cooperation from the Community's core concerns is logical, since as we have seen the idea that integration is first and foremost a cultural project belongs very much to the federalist vision.

Commentators who do focus specifically on culture use a variety of approaches reflecting different disciplines (especially anthropology and political science). De Witte (in Rijksbaron, Roobol and Weisglas, 1987, and Wallace, 1990), who is perhaps the most prolific in English, considers the development of a Community presence in culture as an example of "spill-over", in which harmonisation becomes necessary as a result of action taken elsewhere. While this approach has resonance for those areas of policy which combine economic and cultural aspects, it is less convincing as an explanation of why the Community eventually acquired funding programmes for "mainstream" cultural activities. Cornu offers a post-Maastricht study of the relationship between culture and the subsidiarity principle. MacMahon gives a straightforward account of the legal basis of Community action in culture. Perrieux analyses Member State behaviour regarding cultural intervention and concludes that national priorities are very much to the forefront.

Other commentators approach Community intervention in culture from the point of view of its supposed effects on national cultural identity. By overestimating the

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12 ibid., p. 340  
14 W. Wallace, (ed.) "The Dynamics of European Integration", Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990  
15 see page 152 for a discussion of functionalism, neo-functionalism and "spill-over theory"  
16 M. Cornu, "Competences Culturelles en Europe et Principe de la Subsidiarité", Bruylant, 1993  
Commission's role and, perhaps, taking the rhetoric of integration a little too seriously they see a threat to national cultures. Shore\textsuperscript{19}, an anthropologist, links a growth of interest in culture during the 1980s to the failures of neo-functionalism\textsuperscript{20}, but sees the EU's "cultural policy" as an exercise in boosting the imagery of European integration without considering the political pressures motivating the various players. For a diverting horror-comic account by an author without a clear grasp of the limitations governing Community action, see Breeze\textsuperscript{21}.

Alan Forrest\textsuperscript{22} offers an account of developments post-1983 at the decision-making level of the Council which, since the Council itself does not interpret its decisions for the public, is an essential corrective to the view that policy is made and executed exclusively by the Commission. For a selection of views, influenced by a meeting convened by the Commission in 1986, which assembles arguments from mainly French and Italian federalists on culture as part of the "osmose nécessaire" of Community we-feeling, see Papini & Delcourt\textsuperscript{23}.

All these commentators have valid perceptions according to their different standpoints. It is that difference which makes it necessary to look in some detail at the somewhat prosaic reality of Community cultural intervention. I have drawn heavily

\textsuperscript{19} C. Shore, "EU Cultural Policy", in The European Journal, November 1995
\textsuperscript{20} "functionalism" argues that international organisations will in due course replace national structures because of the greater efficiency with which they can deliver technical services, and are thus designed to achieve this ("form follows function"); "neo-functionalism" acknowledges this has not happened, and modifies the theory by arguing that integration will come about piecemeal, through the consequences (spill-over) of the decisions nation-states make jointly
\textsuperscript{21} A. Breeze, "Culture Vultures: the European Community's Imposition of Cultural Conformity", International Freedom Foundation, 1992
\textsuperscript{22} A. Forrest, "A New Start for Cultural Action in the European Community: Genesis and Implications of Article 128 of the Treaty on European Union", in European Journal of Cultural Policy, Vol 1, No. 1, pp 11-20 (1994). This brings up to date an earlier article by the same author, "La Dimension Culturelle de la Communauté Européenne", in the internal EC journal, Revue du Marché Commun (pp. 326-332, no.307, May-June 1987). The author was formerly head of the Cultural Division of the Council Secretariat and, as such, closely involved over many years with most aspects of cultural cooperation at this level
for this on the Commission's own publications and a small number of articles by
officials, commentaries from the cultural sector. My own experience working in the
Commission and representing the UK in Council negotiations over a ten year period
(1986-1996) informs the interpretations offered.

Structure and functions of the institutions of the European Community

The European Community is not a federalist project in the sense that the Hague
Congress intellectuals understood the term, though the federation of states may be its
ultimate goal. This has implications for the role of culture within the project.

International relations theory, which proved useful for a discussion of the Council of
Europe, is less helpful here: these theorists emphasise the global rather than the
European order and have a sobering tendency to regard the EC as a specialised, and
rather minor, sub-set with relatively little to offer the student of the wider picture.

However, two theories of integration which cannot be overlooked when discussing the
EC are functionalism and neo-functionalism.

Functionalism dates back to the 1930s and is based on the assumption that
technological and global change make it inevitable that more and more of the public
policy functions performed by the state will be transferred to international
organisations, since this will be more efficient, until eventually the nation-state will

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Economica, 1987

24 the best and most detailed discussion of functionalism and neo-functionalism I have come across is
that of Charles Pentland (C. Pentland, "International Theory and European Integration", Faber &
Faber, 1973)
withered away entirely. Neo-functionalism, which developed in the light of experience of post-war international structures, acknowledges that functionalism has flaws and accepts the probable continuation of the nation-state, assuming instead that as more and more decisions are made internationally, they will create new circumstances which require yet more joint solutions: "spill-over theory"\textsuperscript{25}.

In the EC the stress is not upon constitutional instruments defining relationships and competences but upon systems, and the management of formerly sovereign systems in a new pattern (i.e. post nation-state)\textsuperscript{26}. Neo-functionalism is important in the EC context because it is not simply an outside analyst's tool but also a conscious credo which, fully articulated, motivates Community actions. Until the mid-1970s it could be confidently asserted as the Community "philosophy". Its focus on the efficient delivery of cross-border services helps to explain not only why no competence in culture was originally deemed necessary, but also why the Community has not, organically, developed a "cultural policy" as it has, for example, a competition or a fisheries policy, and why its cultural support programme frequently appears, to those who have an interest in it, superimposed and unsatisfactory.

The Treaty of Rome in 1957 established a European Economic Community (EEC) as one of three supranational authorities (the others were the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community). In 1967 these three were

\textsuperscript{25} A classic example of "spillover" might be the directive and regulation governing the movement of cultural property, in which Community harmonisation was considered necessary, despite decades of happily co-existing national systems, because the implementation of the single internal market meant that customs checks between EC countries would no longer be available to enforce national legislation

\textsuperscript{26} W. C. Olson & A. J. R. Groom, "International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation", Routledge, 1991 (chapter 8 discusses neo-functionalism as "a strategy for federalism by instalments" (p. 174) and relates it to the encouragement of networks)
unified as the European Communities with a single Council and Commission. The Treaty of European Union in 1992 (the "Maastricht Treaty") created the European Union, of which the European Community (with the word "Economic" deleted) became the core and legal personality. Culture became a formal Community competence (i.e. area in which the Community could legally take action) in 1992.

The key to the EC is the interaction of its institutions, each of which has clearly defined powers and responsibilities. Unlike the Council of Europe, Member State governments are not the sole repository of policy-making. The Council, which has its own secretariat, consists of member states' governments and is responsible for all decisions enacting EC law or setting up spending programmes. The Council enacts Community law through adopting Decisions (the normal method for creating a programme), Directives (which must then be converted into national law) and Regulations (which become national law immediately). Resolutions are not binding, but are simply expressions of political will. Officials' working groups exist in all specialised areas to prepare the work of ministers who meet as the "Culture Council"\(^{27}\), "Education Council" etc.

However, since 1992\(^{28}\) the Parliament has had co-decision-making powers in some areas, including culture. The Parliament is also the Community's ultimate budgetary authority\(^{29}\) and can stipulate expenditure within certain limits, including reinstatement of Commission proposals deleted by the Council. The Parliament has its own

\(^{27}\) between 1984 and 1992 a semi-formal device existed to enable culture ministers to meet as "ministers meeting within the Council", giving them access to Council facilities and enabling them to adopt resolutions whilst enabling the participation of Member States (Germany, Denmark and the UK) who did not accept the involvement of the Community in cultural matters.

\(^{28}\) under the provisions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 1992, generally known as the Maastricht Treaty.

\(^{29}\) "Parliament and the Council form the Community's budgetary authority and only Parliament's President can sign the budget into law" (Westlake, in Edwards & Spence (1994), p.231)
committee system which works by appointing individual rapporteurs to recommend opinions and amendments to draft legislation. It may also present its own reports on subjects of its choosing, though these have only moral force. The Court of Justice exists to oversee the application of Community law and to rule in cases of uncertainty. Although the effect of Community law on the cultural field is not the primary concern of this study, there certainly exists a body of case law which has been significant in establishing that culture is subject to the operation of the single market.\textsuperscript{30}

The Commission is not a secretariat, but alone has the capacity to initiate legislation (the "right of initiative"). The Council and Parliament, therefore, may only legislate on the basis of a proposal from the Commission. Since 1984 a Commissioner, usually from a southern member state (the exceptions have both been from Luxembourg), has had responsibility for culture, even though no formal competence existed before 1992.\textsuperscript{31} The Commission is divided into directorates general (DGs): that dealing with culture is DGX or 10.\textsuperscript{32} A central part of the Commission's perception of its role is as "guardian of the Treaties".\textsuperscript{33}

The Commission's apparent lead in arrogating to itself the functions of cultural cooperation without a Treaty basis for such action is accounted for by its traditional view of itself as the "motor of integration" — in other words, as responsible for promoting what it takes to be the common interest even if this takes it into areas

\textsuperscript{30} see de Witte (in Wallace, op.cit) who concludes that ECJ rulings demonstrate that "there is no clear separation between economy and culture" (p. 197); in other words, the rather obvious but sometimes disputed fact that you cannot make rules which discriminate against trade with other EC partners on the grounds that a particular undertaking is "cultural"

\textsuperscript{31} previously, a "Cultural Questions" section was set up in the General Secretariat of the Commission

\textsuperscript{32} in 1999, the incoming Prodi Commission abolished the system of numbered DGs and amalgamated the culture and education portfolios

\textsuperscript{33} i.e. responsible for ensuring that member states, and Community legislation, operate absolutely consistently with the Treaties, which take priority over national law — the Commission's tendency to interpret this role to its own advantage has been challenged in the European Court of Justice Commission's own action
technically off-limits. Much of this was justified under article 235 of the Treaty of Rome, which permits Community action outside the scope of the Treaty if it helps realise the objectives of the Treaty. What some Member States regarded as "creeping competence" was seen by other Member States and the Parliament as reinforcing integration.\footnote{for a full discussion of the question of Treaty base, see Usher, "The Commission and the law", in Edwards & Spence, pp. 148-152}

The Community budget

An understanding of how the Community budget operates is central to the study of Community cultural intervention, since it explains how the Commission has been able to act without formal authorisation to create a cultural programme. In certain circumstances, the Commission can appropriate funds without the explicit endorsement of the Council.\footnote{the "action ponctuelle" mechanism, originally designed to enable rapid action when required, e.g. in response to a disaster in a Member State} Prior to the 1990s it was fairly common practice for comparatively small sums to be designated in this way. Eventually, and successfully, the Council challenged this in the ECJ, leading to the freezing of a number of small budget lines. This is how the whole of the budget for cultural action prior to 1992 came to be created by a combination of small but gradually increasing amounts either instigated by the Parliament or appropriated by the Commission without formal reference to the Council other than in the budget negotiations: a de facto cultural budget "owned" by two of the institutions but not the third.\footnote{since 1988, Parliament's ability to increase the global total of Community spending has been curtailed by a series of Inter-Institutional Agreements.} The Parliament in any case had the power to restore any cuts proposed by the Council.\footnote{this too has been restricted since 1988: see Westlake, op.cit. p. 233: "Council cuts are no longer automatically restored in parliamentary first readings and the onus falls on the Commission to defend 'vulnerable' lines".}
The role of culture in the Community before 1977: the Plan Fouchet

The fact that cultural cooperation was not included in the original Treaty of Rome is sometimes assumed to be because the Member States felt threatened by the implications for their cultural identity (the apochrypal remark attributed to Jean Monnet that if it were to do again he would have started with culture may have popularised this view more widely than it deserves38). A more plausible explanation is that when the Community was founded cultural cooperation was associated with foreign policy and defence, as was explicitly the case in BTO and NATO and would have been the case if the European Defence Community had succeeded.

The EC was conceived in essentially materialist terms, as the importance of functionalism suggests. However, the economic community was not an end in itself, but designed to lead in time to a political community. If there was a need, as Milward suggests, for an "alternative belief system", particularly for the Germans, then "Europeanism was a realistic alternative or supplement to Christianity"39. It was certainly not impossible that cultural cooperation might be added once the economic foundations of the Community were secure, just as in time the mainstream territory of national diplomacy should be incorporated also. As early as 1955 there had been an initiative, by concerned intellectuals led by the Belgian Baron Philippe Nothomb, to create a complementary "European Cultural Community"40 but it was not until the

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38 the remark is not found in any of Monnet's writings (Deering, 1991); Roberto Papini asserts it was spoken privately to friends, and takes it as a comment on the failure of functionalism pure and simple to cultivate a sense of common European feeling (Delcourt & Papini, 1987)
39 Milward, op.cit, p.337
40 PRO FO 924/1136: it is unclear exactly what Nothomb and his "Intergroupe des Intérêts Intellectuels" had in mind (the presence of Gonzague de Reynold in the group suggests that a revival of the ICIC under the EC banner was one possibility), though it included plans for an international literary academy, a review, a scientific institute and an exchange organisation. No political commitments were offered and nothing seems to have come of it
launch of the "Plan Fouchet"\textsuperscript{41} by the de Gaulle government in 1960 that cultural cooperation as an EC activity was seriously considered.

This plan, proposed by France to reform the Economic Community towards a political union\textsuperscript{42}, would have introduced cultural cooperation, but would have placed it under the control of a specially constituted Council of education ministers, without a role for the Commission (instead, the suggested European Office for Education would have acted as the executive). As we have seen, it was conceived as extending beyond the Six to enfold the whole sphere of cultural cooperation in a Community-dominated framework. In an early draft, France explicitly proposed that Member States coordinate and "unify" their policies in four fields of "common interest": foreign policy, economy, defence and culture\textsuperscript{43}. This was modified by the other partners to cooperation. The proposals eventually foundered on Dutch opposition to what was seen as a weakening of the role of the Commission\textsuperscript{44}.

Despite the work of a committee set up under a Luxembourger, Pierre Pescatore, to develop plans for the cultural aspects of the new union, the Plan Fouchet was dropped in 1962. The centrepiece of the Pescatore committee, however, a proposal for a European University at Florence\textsuperscript{45} for which the Italians had already offered a site and which they did not want to lose, stayed under consideration. A Foreign Office assessment at the end of 1961 states: "The only certainty about cultural cooperation

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{41} named after the minister responsible for drawing up the proposals \\
\textsuperscript{42} much of this was eventually realised in the TEU of 1992 \\
\textsuperscript{43} B. J de Araujo, "Le Plan Fouchet et l'Union Politique Européenne", Universitaire de Nancy, Centre européen universitaire, year of publication not shown, but probably 1967 \\
\textsuperscript{44} traditionally seen by smaller countries as their main safeguard against domination by the political interests of the larger countries \\
\textsuperscript{45} this was achieved some years later, but as a postgraduate institution rather than a "university of Europe". It was not a new idea: the minutes of the ICIC note, a little plaintively, that "M. Destree asked only that, for the benefit of posterity, note should be taken of the fact that in 1922 someone had had the idea that there should be an International University." (PRO ED 25/34/1 – first session of ICIC)
\end{flushright}
among the EEC powers is that this will increase; but the pace and direction of this increase cannot yet be assessed." The FO thought the focus was likely to be on higher education, however, which turned out to be right in the short-term.

The case for introducing cultural cooperation into the "functional" EC was, therefore, largely political, linked to the next stage of integration. The remit of the Pescatore committee, according to Bloes, was clear: to institutionalise "un domaine...dù, par priorité, devait s'opérer un transfert des allegiances, celui de la sphere culturelle dû se fait l'échange entre valeurs et attitudes," part of a strategy to build "we-feeling" amongst core élites. The idea of the "transfer of allegiances" is central in neo-functionalist ideology. It assumes that, as the supranational authority begins to deliver on its promises, a grateful populace, benefiting from higher living standards, will attribute this to the efficiency of economies of scale and turn against the inefficient national governments who cannot deliver these benefits.

As Lodge points out, it was clear by the mid 1970s that the transfer of loyalties was not happening to plan: in times of prosperity governments got the credit, but in recession governments and the EC shared the blame. But this was hardly so in 1960 when there was every reason to suppose that economic integration alone would deliver the goods: this was, as Wallace notes, the high water mark of post-war integration. French interest in cultural cooperation looks more like spill-over in reverse: by incorporating elements from the existing cooperation scenario into the

46 PRO FO 924/1363
48 the term attributed to Karl Deutsch
50 Wallace, op.cit, introduction
supranational project, de Gaulle\textsuperscript{51} declared limits to integration and asserted culture and education as nationally-controlled competences within a multilateral framework. Allegiance might be transferred more effectively, but to a Europe in the safe hands of its governments, led by France\textsuperscript{52}. Perhaps, too, the inclusion of culture would help to reinforce the "Catholic nexus" represented by Schuman, Adenauer and de Gasperi against the "Atlantic" tendency represented by the British, and the part played generally by "culturalisme", with the French language seen as a force for continental unity\textsuperscript{53}.

Community action from 1977 to 1984

The Plan Fouchet established certain aspects of Member State interest patterns which continued to have significance for future developments in cultural cooperation, namely, a strong French (and Italian) interest in identifying culture with European integration but defined essentially as a progressive project which would enable a response on a European level to nationally-driven requirements; an equally strong Dutch interest in preserving the integrity of the Community project in which the common legal structure represented by the Treaty guaranteed equality between Member States; and a German strategy, governed by caution and diplomacy, which aimed to make use of cultural cooperation as a legitimate tool of foreign policy within

\textsuperscript{51} see E. A. Kolodziej, "French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: the Politics of Grandeur", (Cornell, 1974) for a discussion of de Gaulle and integration, in which he argues specifically that de Gaulle sought to place the Community largely under Franco-German control
\textsuperscript{52} recalling Coudenhoeve-Kalergi's belief that the function of culture in the European project was to reassure Europeans that their individual identities were not eroded by integration
\textsuperscript{53} hinted at, rather than developed, by Bloes, op cit
the Community\textsuperscript{54}. This alignment created a difficult negotiating situation in which it was hard for the Council\textsuperscript{55} to make further progress towards integration.

Cultural cooperation does not surface again in any serious form until the early 1970s, although the European Parliament early on established a committee on culture and research. Now the impulsion was no longer inter-governmental but came from the Parliament and the Commission itself. Edwards & Spence incorrectly suggest that this originated with the ideas relating to "A People's Europe" current during the 1980s ("...topics...believed to touch on the daily lives of the average European citizen"\textsuperscript{56}). In fact, the revival of interest happened a decade earlier than the events to which they refer, and the motives were both more complicated and more interesting.

Edwards & Spence comment that "relatively few policy initiatives have ever derived directly from the fervid imaginations of faceless Commission bureaucrats"\textsuperscript{57}.

However, the decision to create a Community role in culture has to be attributed largely to a Commission seeking to re-establish itself as a political force at a time when its future was not looking good. It was not the result of a half-considered political directive of Member States, but of a calculated guess that by colonising the "social" areas omitted from the Treaty the Commission could improve its own position without needing to have recourse to the Council for political decisions.

Despite the failure of the Fouchet proposals, the changes which followed in the 1960s and early 1970s, such as EPC, tended to strengthen the Council. By seeking a new

\textsuperscript{54} Germany had a particular interest in political cooperation by traditional diplomatic means which led it later to propose a formal system (European Political Cooperation, or EPC), in which foreign and defence policy problems, and eventually cultural cooperation – all outwith the EC's remit – could be discussed at multilateral level by the Six. The link with foreign policy also ensured the Länder could be kept at arm's length, since cultural relations at bilateral level is an unequivocal competence of the federal government

\textsuperscript{55} as the EC institution which both articulated the political will of governments and which alone could initiate changes to the Treaty (as opposed to new legislation based on the Treaty)

\textsuperscript{56} op.cit, Chapter 1, "The Commission in perspective", p. 18
role in functions such as culture, education and employment, the Commission could reinforce its own prestige and stem the perceived shift towards inter-governmentalism.

In her discussion of the significance of the social dimension, Lodge attributes its early neglect to the assumption that economic prosperity would continue to grow, carrying with it the necessary shift in loyalties which would enable the project to progress towards political integration. Thus the OPEC crisis of 1973, which made the Community's claims to offer consistent material improvement look vulnerable, resulted in a turning towards the idea of "social union" and measures aimed directly at the citizen\textsuperscript{58}. The Social Action Programme and new information policy launched in 1975 were citizen-directed measures intended to create a sense of clearly perceived gain despite economic setbacks.

Education, despite the absence of a Treaty competence, became integrated into the social programme of the Community in 1976 by way of an action plan based largely on mobility and social provision. The Commission rapidly succeeded in developing programmes as flanking measures linked to the Community's social and vocational training competences. Despite substantial political opposition, by the end of the 1980s at least four primarily educational programmes\textsuperscript{59} plus the EURYDICE information

\textsuperscript{57} ibid, an interesting commentary on this period is offered by Ben Roberts ("The Social Dimension of European Labour Markets", pp. 39-49, in "Whose Europe? Competing Visions for 1992", UK, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1989), who argues that the introduction of an emphasis on the social frame was "based mainly upon ideas that were associated with the parties of the centre and the centre left", based on "certain national experiences and beliefs of the 1950s and 1960s that are far from generally agreed" (p. 41)

\textsuperscript{58} ERASMUS, COMETT, Lingua and Youth for Europe
As early as 1974 the European Parliament had declared its determination to provide for Community cultural intervention. It proclaimed its wish that, in due course, 1% of the entire Community budget would be devoted to cultural expenditure. In 1976 it inscribed 20,700 ECUs in the Community budget to be used for cultural intervention and provided quite detailed stipulations about how the money was to be used. The founders of the European Community Youth Orchestra, for example, had successfully lobbied the Parliament the same year to use its powers.

For the Commission, Parliament’s demands had some political advantages: for example, good-will gestures to countries planning accession, such as the agreement entered into with the Greek government to assist the restoration of the Parthenon over a lengthy period. But the resources were insufficient to launch anything resembling a Community-wide action plan and the way in which they were allocated lacked any coherent guiding idea. This gradual, rather back-door accretion of resources may have backfired in due course, since by the time formal programmes came to be voted the financial level reached was regarded by the more financially hawkish Member

60 these programmes marked the beginning of German difficulties with cultural action as a Community competence, which was unacceptable because of the way the German constitution delegated responsibility to the Länder (thus the German government could not technically negotiate and agree programme in this area). The problem was not resolved entirely until 1992. See also C. Jeffery and J. Yates, "Unification and Maastricht: the Response of the Länder Governments", in C. Jeffery & R. Sturm (eds.), "Federalism and European Integration", Frank Cass, 1993, which suggests that the Länder’s price for a compromise on culture was the involvement of a Committee of the Regions in order to separate culture from foreign policy (where the federal government had competence)

61 an ECU is calculated on the basis of a basket of currencies but has generally been roughly equivalent to a US dollar

62 and has been a fixture in the budget ever since

63 it should not be assumed that the Parliament’s powers over the budget allowed unlimited additions to be made. Even before the Inter-Institutional Agreement of 1988 which regularised the amounts by which the Parliament could exceed the recommendations of the Council Budget Committee, there existed percentage limits beyond which spending could not be increased. Thus the Parliament could not, for instance, unilaterally decide to allocate its favoured 1% of the Community budget to culture – this is, and always has been, a symbolic rather than a real commitment
States as, if not a ceiling, then as a ballpark figure: if they could not hope to achieve reductions, they were not about to vote major increases in a programme they saw as low political priority. By the time cultural intervention had a legitimate base, the Commission had to argue its case for resources on a twenty-year track record of unaccountability, unevaluated impact and absence of careful management.

The Commission's first communication\textsuperscript{64}, 1977

While it is not absolutely clear at what point the Commission decided to extend its social action to culture, it is clear that it was to be a "communitarian" project, linked to issues where its strategy had already worked, notably employment and social exclusion, rather than the difficult "political" area of cultural cooperation where the Council's domination\textsuperscript{65} gave it no significant role. The Commission's strategy, elaborated by the Frenchman Robert Grégoire, was based on the potential of using economically-based Community legislation for proposing action advantageous to the "cultural sector". In other words, fields in which action could legitimately be taken on internal market grounds in order to prevent distortion, such as copyright harmonisation, the VAT levied on art sales, or the status of self-employed workers, should be identified and presented as a package of measures in support of one particular sector, culture. This was presented in 1977, soon after the launch of the education projects\textsuperscript{66}. Unlike that of the Council of Europe, the Community's cultural programme was intended to develop independently of educational cooperation. The

\textsuperscript{64} a "communication" is the term used for a Commission policy proposal, often, but not necessarily, containing the draft legislation proposed. They are normally addressed to the Council and to the Parliament, where the latter's opinion is required

\textsuperscript{65} cooperation in foreign and defence matters remained the exclusive competence of the Council under EPC

\textsuperscript{66} Commission of the European Communities, "Community Action in the Cultural Sector", (Supplement 6/77, Bulletin of the EC)
Commission was free, therefore, to develop an approach which did not have to be justified as contributing to the social betterment of Europeans generally.

There were problems with this approach. There were relatively few areas in which Community competence was unambiguous enough to allow the Commission confidently to advocate action. Only five such measures are clearly identifiable in the 1977 paper: the simplification of customs clearance formalities, already in hand in the relevant committee; inclusion of "cultural workers" (a term without a generally-accepted definition) in the scope of a new Community employment vacancy clearing-house system; inclusion of young cultural workers in new vocational training exchanges being launched; a draft directive on the use of the dealer's margin for VAT assessment on art works; legislation to harmonise copyright and related rights; and the introduction of Community-wide resale rights, or droit de suite.

Of these, the Commission has indeed proposed legislation on dealer's margin-based VAT, copyright harmonisation and droit de suite, but at different times (the last not until the mid-1990s) and negotiated them as internal market, not cultural, measures. The extent to which cultural aspects were taken into account would depend on internal Commission priorities in drafting and upon the subsequent degree of domestic coordination at Member State level. Subsequent vocational training programmes did not prioritise cultural workers, nor did employment vacancy schemes.

In other instances, either the Treaty basis was not evident (proposals for legislation on the distribution of fake art works); or the proposal had a basis but looked less than pressing (recognition of art experts' qualifications\textsuperscript{67}, proposals for a Community-wide

\textsuperscript{67} mutual recognition of qualifications throughout the Community is a notoriously slow and difficult process to negotiate, with many arguments for exceptions
record card system for the provenance of art works, a regulation intended to give
special copyright protection to creative craftsmen); or action was up to Member States
since there was nothing in Community law to require it (creation of special common
taxation arrangements for cultural foundations, reformed income tax regimes for
artists – both areas of fiscal policy which remains the exclusive competence of
Member States; changes in royalty systems for playwrights, and revised social
security systems for cultural workers).

Finally, the action of the Parliament in providing a de facto culture budget had landed
the Commission with a "culture programme" which did not resemble its careful
rationale, but looked more like the early Council of Europe: these were the kind of
consciousness-raising exercises the Commission had no authority to undertake
ing, ranging from grants to a conservation centre in Grenoble and the Brussels-based
"Europalia" festival (featuring a different country each year) to a scheme for
arranging a "European Room" in a museum which, if successful, would result in "a
great many curators" being "encouraged to organise their own European rooms". These were clearly "traditional"-type cultural diplomacy activities intended to flatter
the Community's own profile, and were probably the result of individual lobbying;
though in a nod to the Council of Europe's competence in this area, some unspecified
"socio-cultural" projects were to be included which would support cultural
democracy.

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68 these included grants to Pro Venetia Viva, the organisation which the CDCC had been urged by the Council of Europe's Secretary General to finance
69 Commission communication 6/77, op.cit
70 the only examples given are two television co-production projects, one about great Europeans of the past, the other a news programme, possibly a forerunner of the short-lived "Europa TV" project of the 1980s
The 1977 communication relied, for moral rather than legal support, on a range of sources: the 1976 Tindemans report\textsuperscript{71} which associated culture with "we-feeling"; some rather vague pronouncements about values and identity included in Heads of Government Summit communiqués; and two fairly prescriptive resolutions of the Parliament, one of which concentrates on the preservation of the architectural heritage and the second of which endorses some of the ad hoc projects contained in the communication. The intention was to secure a Council resolution approving the proposals. However, the resolution was not adopted and the Commission was left without the political imprimatur for its culture proposals that it had obtained for its education proposals.

The mixture of arguments – on the one hand, a traditional appeal to culture as a technique for effecting solidarity, on the other the necessity imposed by the Community's own rules to link all action to existing economic and social measures – undermines the communication's logic. It leaves doubts about the Commission's real intentions (the fact that money was already being disbursed would have come as news to most member states, who had no equivalent mechanism to the CDCC at this time by which they could express their own interests or interrogate the Commission), and appears driven by the need to promote and popularise the organisation itself.

\textsuperscript{71} forerunner of the Adonnino Report ("A People's Europe")
The European Foundation, the Mitterand government and the Commission's second communication (1982)

The Commission's follow-up communication\textsuperscript{72} appeared in 1982. In the interval there had been some political developments which strengthened the Commission's position despite its lack of success in implementing its 1977 plan of action. The first was the progress towards a broader European union which began with the Tindemans Report and culminated a decade later in the Maastricht Treaty in which foreign policy and security policy were brought together as the "second pillar" of the Union. Cultural cooperation already had a low-key place in this through the "cultural directors" group which met inter-governmentally under European Political Cooperation (EPC)\textsuperscript{73}, where the Commission played only a minor role. The "cultural directors" were (and are) diplomats in charge of bilateral cultural relations nationally. Their presence in EPC shows that the link between cultural cooperation with foreign and security policy (the other matters mainly dealt with in EPC) remained strong.

The decision in 1982 to set up a European Foundation belongs in this tradition. Originally proposed in the Tindemans Report, the European Foundation was to be set up with a mixture of Community and Member State funding. It was to be based in Paris and would implement cultural and educational projects approved by a board of Member State trustees. Although similar in aim to the semi-privately sponsored European Cultural Foundation\textsuperscript{74}, it was not intended to supersede the ECF.

\textsuperscript{72} Commission of the European Communities, "Stronger Community Action in the Cultural Sector", (Supplement 6/82, Bulletin of the EC)

\textsuperscript{73} the intergovernmental system devised in the 1970s to enable matters not covered by the Treaty to be discussed within the Community framework: see Nuttall's account in Edwards and Spence, op.cit

\textsuperscript{74} so similar, in fact, that the ECF's director, Raymond Georis, was lined up to run it
As, in effect, a vehicle of classic cultural diplomacy without implications for domestic policy, the Foundation was much less politically contentious than making culture a Community competence. It would have been a sort of cultural EPC, removed to a sphere of operations where inter-institutional power-brokering played no part. In fact, the plan for a Foundation fell apart when the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament refused to ratify it in 1987. But political enthusiasm for the Foundation had waned anyway: it was already obvious that the Commission had no intention of giving up its activities to a Member State-controlled entity and the indications were that the Foundation’s choices would be neither imaginative nor even significantly different from those of the Council of Europe.

The second factor which moved the EC approach to culture away from cooperation towards strategic Community intervention was the election of the Mitterand government in 1981. It was soon clear that France would seek to engage the Community, and especially the Commission, with cultural policy in accordance with its own heavily interventionist strategy. Jack Lang, the influential minister of culture, was not in the least interested in multilateral cultural cooperation as group collaboration on image-building common projects; he used bilateral cultural relations to construct a series of alliances, especially amongst Mediterranean countries, but with the aim of building a consensus around his vision. The construction of “l’espace culturelle européenne” involved almost a parallel Community based on creativity and competitiveness which would take on the USA, especially, on its own ground: “l’Europe, confrontée au défi américain et qui a trahi sa propre culture, doit retourner

76 a term much in vogue during the 1980s and enthusiastically embraced by the Commission
á sa créativité propre...". This "cultural Europe" had nothing to do with intellectual cooperation between élites or citizen-directed propaganda, but was conceived as a market in which the structures of capital and commerce were redirected to serve European political aims. To this end, participation of the Council was essential, since the Commission could not act without it.

The Commission's 1982 paper seems influenced by the French position, particularly in pressing the claims of the audiovisual sector. The text as a whole is more confident than its predecessor. Although its arguments still rely on the idea of culture as a sector of deprivation to make the case for prioritising it, greater emphasis is placed on the ways in which the Community can intervene to the benefit of cultural workers with only the occasional lapse into overkill ("there is a danger that one day there will be a general shortage of qualified cultural workers"). The tone is clearly meant to encourage the transfer of loyalties by hinting heavily that it is the indifference of governments which causes a blockage preventing real economic improvement.

There is also, however, a real sense, and for the first time, of Lang's idea that the cultural creativity of Europe is a playing card in the struggle for competitiveness. That Grégoire personally shared the views of his countrymen seems evident: in an article explaining the Commission's approach to culture, Grégoire uses a rhetoric of crisis close to that of Lang at UNESCO: "prenons garde que la crise économique et la crise sociale du secteur culturel ne dégénèrent pas maintenant en une crise de la culture! Le risque existe qu’on crée moins – ou moins bien – et que la diffusion, déjà trop

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77 speech given by Lang in Hamburg in 1984, quoted in Desneux, op.cit., p. 52
78 a Parliament term which enabled the net to be cast more widely than simply "artists" and "intellectuals" to give the impression of a significant section of the European workforce
79 R. Grégoire, "L'action Communautaire dans le Secteur Culturel", article in Revue du Marché Commun no. 217 – undated, but the content suggests it was contemporaneous with the 1982 communication
restreinte, ne se restreigne encore... Ou nous redressons la situation et nous assurons du même coup le maintien et le développement de la culture ou nous laissons la dégradation se poursuivre et nous allons droit au déclin culturel. Qui dit déclin culturel dit déclin tout court: décadence, effacement, disparition\textsuperscript{80}. In a later article\textsuperscript{81} in the Revue du Marché Commun, Grégoire situates "cultural action" explicitly as a necessary and integrationist strategy: "la Communauté suit la chaîne qui part de l'économique, passe par le social et aboutit au culturel"\textsuperscript{82}, even though for the moment the emphasis remains strongly social (he cites Jack Lang as having asked for a "clause du travailleur culturel le plus favorisé"\textsuperscript{83}).

Grégoire bases his advocacy of Community action in culture explicitly on the argument that the cultural sector is subject to Community internal market legislation like any other yet is not "like any other" in that it requires special investment because of its political importance. He rejects cultural cooperation, which is too weak (because of its lack of enforceability) to be effective. The idea that the Community must put its weight behind a revitalisation of the cultural sector in both social and economic terms is consistent with the notion that, far from having a homogenising effect on European cultural diversity, the Community has the capacity to preserve and revive it, so that "cultural Europe" itself becomes the political goal of economic and social Europe.

This is a genuinely culture-centred vision and not the deprecating "series of specific

\textsuperscript{80} ibid, p. 9-10
\textsuperscript{81} R. Grégoire, "La Communauté et la Culture", in Revue du Marché Commun no.274, pp. 56-62, February 1984
\textsuperscript{82} ibid, p. 56
\textsuperscript{83} ibid, p. 58
but disparate measures mostly symbolic in nature which the Commission itself describes twenty years later. By 1982 the Parliament’s annual budget line had increased to 706,000 ECUs. It is here that the second communication loses coherence, despite repackaging its ad-hoc grants as "measures for widening the audience" (in his 1982 article, Grégoire does not mention them at all, though they are described in the much less personal-sounding 1984 piece). The two Treaty-focused sections are much the strongest, argued on a proper Treaty base (articles 36 and 117-8 are specifically cited, and there are frequent references to established legislation, such as VAT, and mechanisms, such as the European Regional Development Fund). The text is effective in pointing out the areas where Member States could use Community law to support their cultural sectors but don’t. The other sections rely on exhortation and seem to be justifying various ad-hoc decisions. The gap between the Commission’s ideas and its real action is rather evident.

One reason why the Commission’s advocacy of cultural intervention failed to convince politically at this stage may be its assumption that governments (to whom the communication was addressed and whose action was needed) were willing to bend the rules in favour of an allegedly disadvantaged group whose problems, though doubtless genuine, were not likely to be the subject of massive popular discontent in any Member State, even France, and who were not obviously using what influence

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85 "Freedom of trade in cultural goods" and "Improving the living conditions of cultural workers"; the two others are "Widening the audience" and "Conserving the architectural heritage" 86 for example, a series of concerts by a string quartet under the heading "Quartet for Europe" is presented as an "experiment" proving that cultural exchanges can be "more flexible" (p. 26). Concrete examples are few, however, and where they are given it is unclear whether the Commission funded them or simply heard about them.
they had to affect public opinion in favour of the integration project. The diffuse community of "cultural workers" does not compare with the vocal and increasingly "Euro-literate" academic and educational sectors when it came to putting on political pressure nationally. Ironically, a more brazen appropriation of culture for purposes of European flag-waving along the lines of the European Community Youth Orchestra, Eurojazz\(^\text{87}\) and other more obviously populist ideas, might have had more success. At the same time, the Commission's institutional difficulties with competence made a stronger commitment to the French view of "l'espace culturelle européenne" impossible, given the degree to which it cut across the principle of an unfettered internal market and the absolute lack of Treaty competence to act politically on grounds which were cultural, not economic.

Above all, the Commission was weakened by the lack of a political mechanism for securing the support of those Member States who might not be averse to a cultural version of the Common Agricultural Policy. The narrow target sector it had chosen, the lack of populist appeal in its proposals and the constant need to protest its lack of interest in "cultural policy" made it unconvincing. Its lack of transparency about its modest expenditure aroused suspicion. It needed more than ever to enter into a political dialogue with the Council.

**The role of the Council: 1984-1992**

The adoption of legislation to improve the situation of cultural workers required the acquiescence of the Council. As Alan Forrest records, this situation created a problem in itself: "whilst there was no intention to legislate in the cultural area, culture came\(^\text{87}\) a youth jazz group which received regular Commission funding for a period in the 1980s
up as part of more general policies...or under the influence of court cases. The introduction of ministerial meetings was certainly in part a response to this manifestation of "spill-over". But, as with the Council of Europe, there were strong and conflicting political motivations behind the pressure to set up such a system. Experience of the education programme may have helped prepare positions, and the Commission's two communications ensured its stance was known. By the time the first meeting of ministers took place in 1984, France was already in the vanguard and promoting the idea of a strong and interventionist Community presence in a "European" cultural sector, supported by the southern countries; at the other end of the spectrum, the UK and Denmark were opposed to any suggestion that Community competence should be extended to culture. Germany was also opposed, because of the position of the federal government and the Länder. In the case of the UK, there was also a strong element of opposition to Community expenditure on culture.

Thus when EC culture ministers met for the first time positions were already polarised. The strategy favoured by Jack Lang, whose biographer credits him with having initiated the meeting together with his Greek counterpart, Melina Mercouri, was to build up support for an attempt to introduce a new article in the planned revision of the Treaty. The formal justification for this was the 1983 Stuttgart

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88 Forrest, 1994, op.cit, p. 13
89 a meeting the previous year in Naples (see Missir, in Delcourt & Papini (eds), 1987) seems to have included only the southern governments
90 Denmark's opposition was based on the prerogatives of its Parliament, the UK's on a more general policy of preventing the expansion of Community competence
91 not because it was culture, but because government policy was to resist new spending in most areas.
92 the Single European Act was adopted in 1987 and added several elements to the Treaty, but not a cultural article
Declaration on European Unity\(^{93}\), agreed by Heads of Government, which specifically included a section on cultural cooperation. This, while holding back from an explicit commitment to Community action in culture, emphasised culture as an element linked to further Community development. In particular it sanctioned the use of the EPC framework for cultural cooperation (the "cultural directors"), which suggests that the German Presidency hoped for a diplomacy-based approach which would help it domestically with the Länder. The text makes no reference to the Treaty. However, the contrasting political positions\(^{94}\) which it has to reconcile makes it rather ambiguous, in much the same way that, a decade later, the similarly worded article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty seems to represent no single clear view of what the article is intended to achieve\(^{95}\). It reads, in fact, much like earlier treaties (the Brussels Treaty, NATO, the Council of Europe's statute) which provide for cultural cooperation rather than actively design it.

The missing "third institutional partner" thus entered the dialogue late, and in circumstances which, typically, were full of ambiguities and in which the tension between cultural cooperation and cultural policy was unresolved. The culture ministers could not meet formally as a "Council"\(^{96}\). They could not take decisions, merely adopt resolutions. By the early 1980s it was clear that some areas where commercial logic implied a case for harmonisation were also core areas of cultural cooperation: copyright and commercial piracy of intellectual property; free movement

\(^{93}\) for text see Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, "Texts concerning Culture at European Community Level", OPEC, 1994, Annexe, p.201. The Heads of Government "agree to promote" a number of activities, including exchange, possible joint action on heritage conservation and "coordination of cultural activities in third countries" via EPC

\(^{94}\) for example, it is highly unlikely that the Mitterand government would have signed a text which specifically excluded the possibility of a cultural competence

\(^{95}\) e.g. its insistence on "cultures" rather than "culture", which points away from harmonisation towards diversity

\(^{96}\) the so-called "mixed formula" of "the Council and ministers meeting within the Council" was intended to acknowledge that the competence problem was unresolved
of cultural goods, because the Treaty permitted the exclusion of "national treasures" (a term requiring definition) from free movement; and, increasingly, new developments in satellite broadcasting, where the blocking of cross-border transmissions was an issue. Measures relating to these were certainly adopted but on grounds that were not cultural but commercial. The cultural forum within the Council thus reflected mixed motives: pressure for a cultural dimension, certainly, but also acceptance of the case for some kind of management mechanism to handle an increasingly unruly situation.

Between 1984 and 1992 19 resolutions were adopted by culture ministers on an eclectic range of topics, from plans for a sculpture competition to the virtues of business sponsorship in the arts, with a further ten sets of conclusions. Some of these documents represent an aspect of culture which appealed to the Presidency of the day and have no real additional significance. Others were more purposeful: a 1985 resolution urging the Community to co-ordinate library cooperation in data processing later stimulated the inclusion of libraries in a five-year telematics programme.

The resolutions, which often did not result in action, nevertheless built up into an alternative set of guidelines for the Commission, hitherto left to its own devices and those of the Parliament. Most contain an invitation to the Commission to study a topic and report back, or consider how it might "make a contribution" to some virtuous aim such as the development of the theatre in Europe. Nevertheless, there is still a sense of parallel rather than converging tracks. In the five years following the Commission's

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97 i.e. within other, "proper", Councils, such as Internal Market for copyright and audiovisual, or Telecommunications for library cooperation
98 see Council Secretariat, op.cit, for the complete set
99 usually a sign that no action is to be taken
100 managed, however, away from the cultural section of the Commission
1982 communication, only one resolution\textsuperscript{101} mentions it; while the concept of "l'espace culturelle européenne" is discernible only in a few preambular references to the economic aspects of cultural activity. Equally absent is any mention of the "symbolic" measures being implemented under the Commission-Parliament nexus. This is because the Commission did not discuss them with the Member States. Rather as they were simultaneously rejecting the Council of Europe's Cultural Charter\textsuperscript{102}, EC Member States declined the Commission's vision of a consistent philosophy of cultural intervention with a mainly social aim derived from the social action plan of the 1970s. The Commission had argued that improved social conditions within a certain social group would effect the desired loyalty transition amongst that group, as amongst others, which was necessary for integration to succeed. This strategy could be slotted into a grander vision of "cultural Europe" as a creativity-based parallel to the internal market of commerce and capital. Furthermore, the integration-driven view of cultural cooperation embraced by the Commission was still at odds with the consciousness-raising programme initiated by the Parliament, although the Parliament certainly backed the Commission in its ambitions. Meanwhile, "European cultural policy", consistently repudiated in the present, belonged somewhere in the future along with political union. The resolutions show that, once the culture ministers began to meet, they compounded the confusion rather than resolved it by pushing favourite topics\textsuperscript{103}. Their lack of

\textsuperscript{101} that of 18 December 1984 – the first adopted by ministers themselves – on "greater recourse to the European Social Fund in respect of cultural workers"

\textsuperscript{102} see previous chapter

\textsuperscript{103} it is possible, by matching dates of resolutions to the member state holding the Presidency at the time, under the six-month rotation system, to trace particular national interests in these texts: business sponsorship of the arts to the UK presidency of 1986, training of arts administrators to Luxembourg, archive policy to the Netherlands, etc.
backing for the Commission’s cross-cutting project was primarily because of the competence issue but the Commission’s strategic goals also interested them less than the opportunity to direct it towards support for their own, more mainstream, concerns. These in turn resembled a traditional agenda of intergovernmental cooperation, with a low integration content.

Citizens’ Europe: a change of tack

Two developments of the mid-1980s illustrate the growing cleavage between culture as an organic part of the Community integration project and culture as a tool for achieving that integration. The Adonnino report on "A People’s Europe" of 1985\(^{104}\) was a by-product of the perceived failure of the Community to attract positive popular support. Part of the "deepening" process which is said to be the necessary accompaniment to that of enlargement, the Adonnino report made some proposals for encouraging "we-feeling". Many of its suggestions now look wide of the mark, focussing as they do on "irritants" related to cross-border commerce (traffic control, foreign residence, voting rights) and institutional symbolism such as a EC flag and anthem (appropriated from the Council of Europe) rather than the ordinary conditions of life for the majority who do not travel.

The Adonnino group in fact made only four "cultural" proposals: a European Film and TV Year in 1988; a European Academy which would award prizes to the meritorious; a Euro-lottery; and a suggestion for extending reduced admission for the young to museums and cultural events. Only one, the Film and TV Year, was acted

\(^{104}\) see Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 7/85, "A People’s Europe: reports from the ad-hoc committee"

287
upon and was not a success\textsuperscript{105}. Nevertheless, the Adonnino report is significant because its assumption that high-profile cultural events led to "we-feeling" obliged the Commission politically to look more towards this traditional type of cultural action and away from the genuinely innovative (but difficult) approach of the two communications of 1977 and 1982.

The change of direction was symbolised by the arrival of the Delors Commission in 1985, which brought with it a new and high-profile commissioner for culture, the Italian Carlo Ripa di Meana, who decided for the first time to woo the "high culture" constituency. A large-scale cultural conference was held in Florence, where the commissioner further broke with tradition by asserting that the occasion was "the birth of a Community cultural policy"\textsuperscript{106}. Various high-profile personalities were invited to give their views on what a Community cultural policy should look like, particularly in the light of technological developments, though conveniently overlooking the legal obstacles to its delivery. The cultural community was henceforth to be invited, not to expect improvements in its social situation, but to design its own preferred European cultural policy without worrying too much about the institutional context in which it did so.

The Commission's third policy statement, published the following year\textsuperscript{107}, had to take these developments into account alongside the political failure of the attempt to incorporate culture into the Single European Act of 1987\textsuperscript{108}. This text tends to

\textsuperscript{105} the Year failed to make much impact because of too little planning time and the difficulty of persuading member states either to release Community resources for it or invest at national level

\textsuperscript{106} section heading in "Europe in Transformation: the Cultural Challenge: Culture, Technology, Economy", report of the Florence Conference, March 1987, Commission of the European Communities

\textsuperscript{107} Commission of the European Communities, "A Fresh Boost for Culture in the European Community", (Supplement 4/87, Bulletin of the EC): the French term "relance" better conveys the essence than the rather optimistic English translation

\textsuperscript{108} blocked by the UK, Germany and Denmark
substitute rhetoric for argument. It is designed to resemble a standard Community action plan, with five fields of action each containing three or four sub-categories, suggesting that the Commission's strategy had moved away from justifying intervention on Treaty grounds towards seeking approval for a cultural programme based on the principle of critical mass: there was now sufficient established activity, with sufficient political support, for it to be presented as an ongoing programme of work.

The original vision is greatly watered down in this document. The situation of cultural workers is played down, suggesting that the Commission had accepted the improbability of progress on this, or had simply lost interest post-Addonino. Its spending programme, now renamed "access to cultural resources" is given a much higher profile, reflecting its confidence that there would be no serious challenge.

Several new projects are floated, for the first time apparently trawled from a number of outside sources: a Community data bank for commercial sponsorship, involving a "token contribution" of 1 million ECU; a "policy for publishing", seemingly based on ideas gleaned from one of a growing number of "expert consultations" to which the Commission had recourse at this time; and the development of Europe-wide cultural statistics, an honourable but unsuccessful attempt to pool resources with the Council of Europe. The section headed "dialogue with the rest of the world" recalls the

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109 "the debate as to whether or not the Community has the necessary competence to intervene cannot hide the growing clamour from its citizens to participate in cultural life or their demand for new mechanisms for exchanges and cooperation in this area" ("A Fresh Boost...", op.cit, p.6)
110 the Commission's own assessment of it, five years later, is frank: "albeit modest, it (cultural action) was enough to confirm the value and importance of the growing common approaches and aroused growing interest among the professionals" ("New prospects...", 1992, op.cit, p.2)
111 in fact there was, but not until the mid-1990s, and in a broader context, when the Council mounted a legal challenge to the Parliament's practice of abusing the budgetary procedure by creating budget lines for expenditure with no legal base. The ECJ found in favour of the Council and several "illegal" lines (including one for "cultural development") were frozen.
112 in this case, the short-lived Advisory Committee on Books, set up with the involvement of the Member States, and the European Group of Publishers, a lobbying network.
Stuttgart Declaration but also reflects the discrepancy between the troubled status of culture within the Community and the fact that cultural cooperation already featured (with a bigger budget and a "classical" cultural relations profile) in the Lomé Convention\textsuperscript{113}. A section on training for the cultural sector can be traced to the "Livre Bleu", a paper\textsuperscript{114} launched unilaterally by France after the failure to insert culture in the Treaty. The Commission followed the reference up with a set of proposals but these were never acted upon.

The audiovisual sector and culture

The audiovisual sector is of central significance in the development of a EC cultural programme during the 1980s. It motivates the effort invested by the French government, in particular, in establishing the principle that intervention in the culture industries should be justified on both cultural and economic grounds. This pressure has been consistent throughout the period, as has been France's argument, reflected in some Commission initiatives, that the aim of Community intervention must be to legitimise certain forms of discrimination (such as quotas for television programming of European origin) which will "defend" the European film and television industries from the global market and permit trading protectionism\textsuperscript{115}.

\textsuperscript{113} A co-operative treaty between the EC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ex-colonies and dependencies), which had contained an article mandating financial contributions for cultural projects since the mid-1980s, administered by the Commission from national allocations through a special Foundation

\textsuperscript{114} This initiative, which bracketed culture and education, was essentially a return to the Plan Fouchet. It proposed a fresh start through a process of "variable geometry", i.e. without those member states who did not want to take part, and listed several suggestions. As well as the failure of the Treaty amendment, this was triggered by the rejection of the French-inspired proposal to create a European Community film and TV production fund.

\textsuperscript{115} See G. Nowell-Smith & S. Ricci, eds., "Hollywood and Europe: Economics, Culture, National Identity, 1945-1995" (British Film Institute, 1998) for essays exploring the long history of this issue. In his introduction, Nowell-Smith traces the divergence in French and British attitudes to the post-war decision of the UK to drop quotas in favour of the Eady levy system.
By 1987 the Commission had put forward normative proposals relating to satellite broadcasting, both technical (the "MAC/packet" Directive) and regulatory ("Television Without Frontiers") and was far advanced with preparations for the MEDIA\textsuperscript{116} programme. In addition, the Commission had committed itself heavily to the development of HDTV\textsuperscript{117}. All of this was justified on economic, not cultural grounds\textsuperscript{118}.

The Commission also attempted to introduce a directive setting up a European support fund for film and television production. This was blocked in the Council by Denmark, Germany and the UK on competence grounds. The proposal subsequently became the "Eurimages" fund administered via the Council of Europe and financed by national contributions (had it been a Community initiative it would have been funded centrally with no opt-out possible). The Commission's revised proposal, which became the MEDIA programme, was based, successfully, on the idea that Community support could legitimately be approved as a kind of "flanking" policy, a series of small projects which supported the development, distribution and exhibition aspects of the audiovisual industry\textsuperscript{119} but did not subsidise directly the making of films.

The "Livre Bleu" and the Resolution of 1988

By the end of the decade, therefore, a de facto "cultural policy" of the EC had been

\textsuperscript{116} Mesures pour Encourager le Développement de l'Industrie Audiovisuelle
\textsuperscript{117} High-Definition Television, a technology developed by the French and Dutch companies Thomson and Philips which was intended to compete with US and Japanese technology as the next generation of television. The project failed when the EC industry itself broke ranks with the Commission and shifted towards digital. See X. Dai, A. Cawson, P. Holmes, "The Rise and Fall of HDTV: the Impact of European Technical Policy", in Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 149-164, vol. 34, 1996
\textsuperscript{118} the European Broadcasting Directive, for example, was based on the argument that access across borders for satellite broadcasters had to be guaranteed in Community law. Although the subtext was rampant cultural, the pretext was the free movement of goods and services within the internal market
\textsuperscript{119} e.g. by providing money for script development, exhibition space at trade fairs for small independent producers, assistance with dubbing/subtitling, etc.
developed around the culture industries, where the economic factors were sufficiently strong to support a legal basis for Community action. The dual purpose of this cultural-economic sector is seen in the fact that culture ministers, and the officials’ group which prepared their meetings, negotiated the content of proposals like MEDIA, the Broadcasting Directive and the export of cultural property – areas where national competence was at least partly that of culture ministries – which then passed to the Internal Market Council for adoption under internal market rules. This was not invariable, however: for example, the main negotiations on the copyright/neighbouring rights directives took place outside the officials' working group.

In this increasingly blurred and unstructured situation, brought to a head by the French "Livre Bleu", Member States felt obliged to find an accommodation which would acknowledge the existence of a cultural intervention programme outside the Treaty which all could accept. This was the motive for the German Presidency in 1988 to steer through a resolution which created an agreed structure, without ceding the competence issue, accepting the existence of Community "cultural action". The relevance of this lies less in the nature of what was agreed than in the fact that the Member States themselves were placed in a better position to influence the direction of future policy.

They did so initially by indicating priority areas for the Commission to tackle, all of which reflected their own domestic policy concerns rather than the promotional aspects of culture as a part of the integration project. The "priority areas" bear very different degrees of weight: the audiovisual sector, for example, was already an

\[\text{Note:} 120\text{ known until 1988 as 'cultural attachés', reflecting the post-Stuttgart assumptions that it would handle questions of cultural diplomacy}\]

\[\text{Note:} 121\text{ the audiovisual sector, books and reading, training in the cultural sector and business sponsorship}\]
established fact of Community policy, while the inclusion of business sponsorship, an area where the scope for Community action is not obvious, looks like a concession to UK interests. Essentially, however, the step was important because it supplied an agreed political agenda which the Commission could and did work to, to the extent that it followed up with policy papers on three of the four areas (audiovisual – already in the pipeline -, books and reading and cultural training).

In his 1992 article, Alan Forrest identifies seven broad categories of work undertaken from 1988 until the inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty of a legitimisation for culture in 1992. These reflect the shifting interplay between the Community institutions. The first two (audiovisual and books) are the Member States' political priorities and can thus be considered as the main outcome of the 1988 resolution; whereas the third, architectural heritage, does not feature among the 1988 priorities and represents the influence of the Parliament in a series of "symbolic achievements". The remainder consist of European networking (actually much more of a post-1992 feature despite a 1991 resolution under the Netherlands Presidency); "encouragement of cultural initiatives of a European character", a way of describing the "somewhat arbitrary" sums of money disbursed to arts organisations from the late 1970s onwards; "other activities" (in fact, a range of topics raised in various resolutions but rarely resulting in action) and "cultural aspects of other Community policies", the almost forgotten attempt to use Community policies to benefit cultural workers.

Although this is a more effective classification than anything the Commission itself ever attempted, it cannot mask the essential lack of logic behind what, by 1992, had

\[122\] which it was

\[123\] Forrest, op. cit., p. 15
become the de facto Community cultural intervention programme. It is dominated by
the culture industries on the one hand, - the grey area where Community intervention
carried the possibility not only of expenditure but also of regulation - and
architectural heritage on the other - an area where the Commission had established a
presence through selective grant aid to a small number of high-profile conservation
projects and, from 1988, a competitive annual scheme for grants for individual
smaller projects, apportioned out so that every Member State usually benefited\(^{124}\).
This was entirely a Commission-Parliament initiative. Member States at government
level were excluded, and usually learned of the results through a press notice. It
cannot be said, therefore, that after 1988 the Community programme was entirely
managed according to Member State wishes or that they exercised complete control.

**The Community programme and 1992: the existence, or otherwise, of a "European
cultural policy"**

Thus by 1992 the core elements of Community cultural intervention were already in
place, through a process of spill-over on the one hand and accretion on the other.
Three areas in particular - the audiovisual sector, the publishing sector and
architectural heritage - had emerged as powerfully symbolic fields for Community
action, evoking ideas of cultural threat from, respectively, the USA, the English
language in general and the modern world which disregarded Europe's past glory. One
may still see traces here of de Rougemont's contention that Europe's case for a place
of esteem in the post-war world was mainly cultural. An ancillary territory of single

\(^{124}\) Examples of the Commission's patronage include the long-running commitment to the conservation
of the Parthenon and its later extension to Mount Athos; beneficiaries of the so-called "pilot project"
scheme range from the spire of Salisbury Cathedral to fortifications in Luxembourg and the renovation
of a railway in Greece.
market activity — copyright, transfrontier broadcasting, the art trade — was also increasingly acknowledged for its cultural considerations. The "cultural principle" was becoming defined as conservative: to be invoked on the occasions when the logic of the market went too far. Yet the central functional rationale for action still had to be compatible with removing inconsistencies of trading practice between Member States.

From 1988 the audiovisual programme developed separately from the culture programme, the bulk of which was devoted to architectural heritage support but which, by 1990, still had unallocated resources of 500,000 ECUs a year to spend on random "symbolic actions". Most of these were low-profile and probably of limited impact. In the absence of any evaluation prior to the early 1990s there can be no certainty, and a few high-profile projects, notably the European Community Youth Orchestra, certainly achieved high impact by virtue of the names associated with them. But such initiatives do not represent a consistent policy. This was essentially cultural diplomacy, intended to boost the Community's image by associating it with appealing activity. Ironically, the example par excellence of this "recognition" factor, the European City of Culture programme, is an initiative of the Member States rather than the Commission or the Parliament.

125 by 1991, the Commission felt confident enough to say so in its proposal for a directive on rental right, lending right and related rights (COM(90)586 final), putting forward culture as a justification for action: "copyright is a basic instrument of cultural policy, as there is a vital commercial component in the aims it pursues and the ways in which it is applied." (p. 4)
127 e.g. Commission grants to festivals such as the Brecon Jazz Festival and the international theatre festival at Wiltz, or "local" events such as the Belgian Prix Reine Elisabeth piano competition
128 initially associated with Claudio Abbado, the ECYO has consistently attracted top names and has a reputation for excellence.
129 launched under ministerial resolution in 1985, the programme is Member State financed and nominated with only a nominal contribution from the Community budget and no role for the Commission and Parliament in the selection of candidates. Unsurprisingly, the latter institutions have been battling since 1992 to change this.
Although acting at first more like a business sponsor, whose relationship with culture is motivated by the wish to improve its public image through benevolent patronage, than a public authority, the Commission then started to target the arts constituency itself (already "Europeanised" through contact with the Council of Europe and the growing interest in "networking"). This it did first by advertising the availability of its uncommitted funds for multilateral initiatives, then by opening various consultations. This coincided with a period of anxiety amongst the cultural community about the perceived impact on the arts of "1992", the completion date for the single market about which a certain mythology had arisen. Unsurprisingly, this new direct contact between the Commission and the arts community led to a demand for a properly designed multilateral cultural cooperation programme for the sector geared to the kind of work it wanted to do rather than what was considered exportable by national cultural relations systems. Whether any of this influenced the political decision of the 1991 IGC to accept, finally, a limited competence for culture in the Treaty is doubtful, but it did contribute to a climate which was both more receptive to and more critical of the new competence when it arrived.

The Treaty of Maastricht – the impact of Community competence

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 introduces culture as part of a group of new competences (education, health, consumer protection) intended to offset the

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130 most notably its 1989 "Committee of Cultural Consultants", a panel of high-profile personalities convened to draw up ideas for a Community spending programme
131 a helpful explanation of the situation relating in particular to state aids appears in pp. 177-183 of "Harmony or Confusion for Culture in Europe?", proceedings of a seminar, published in association with CIRCLE, 1994
132 the "Platform Europe" scheme made Commission money generally available for the first time in 1990
effects of industrial change and economic convergence. The loyalty factor is still
strongly evident: "in the other areas mentioned" (which include culture) "selective
action could add substance to what the Community is doing and make its role more
visible to the general public"\textsuperscript{133}. In practice, however, it was still the loyalty of the
cultural community rather than the general consumer which was being sought. Plans
to supply benefits for cultural workers were replaced by incentives to arts
organisations, in particular cross-border networks with whom the Commission
traditionally liked to hold a dialogue\textsuperscript{134}, to act as channels for the integration message,
using the arts as a mediation to reach the sceptical public.

From a Council perspective Alan Forrest sees the effect of this change as a series of
conflicts resolved: the new competence authorises spending programmes, offers
flexibility to minimise potential damage in harmonising legislation, and makes the
Community's external position look a little more coherent. However, his analysis (that
the chances of real impact are no more than "reasonable"\textsuperscript{135}) highlights the
difficulties of an approach to culture that tries at once to defend diversity by focusing
on the threat to it from a single dominant cultural form, whilst at the same time
talking up the unity of Europe through insisting on the importance of a distinctively
European and common cultural heritage. This contradiction appears in the drafting of
the article on culture itself.

\textsuperscript{133} Commission commentary on TEU, "From the Single Act to Maastricht and Beyond", p.28,
COM(92)2000 final
\textsuperscript{134} see Mazey & Richardson (in Edwards & Spence, 1994, op.cit): "some fairly stable 'policy networks'
...were apparent as early as the mid-1950s"; and "while some interests ...have managed to become
part of an identifiable 'policy-making community'...most are involved in ill-defined and rather loose
'issue networks'..." p. 170.
\textsuperscript{135} Forrest, op. cit., p. 18
In its original proposal to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on Political Union the Commission proposed rights and obligations relating to cultural expression as part of a new concept of EU citizenship. There are several significant differences of emphasis between this and the eventual outcome, the most striking of which are the Commission's inclusion of language and communication as a central element in a new policy, its implication of Community responsibility to safeguard, rather than simply enhance, the cultural heritage and its playing down of any distinction between the tasks of Member States and those of the Community as a whole.

The Commission did not succeed in establishing European citizenship as the centrepiece of TEU. Without this element, the central argument in the Commission's draft is the need to protect diversity. Modest as it appears at first reading, its own proposal would have given the Commission the right to propose a raft of legislative measures covering the gamut of economic-cultural and social-cultural issues explicitly basing them on the need to protect the cultural heritage and encourage diversity. This would certainly have amounted to a cultural policy.

The price exacted for the Treaty clause for legitimating the de facto Community presence in culture by those Member States which had opposed it was its closest possible approximation to a programme of cultural cooperation without the characteristics of Community action. In common with several other new competences, such as health, an "exclusion clause" prevented harmonisation, while the "integration clause" assuring that cultural considerations could be taken into account in the formulating of other policies is rather weakly worded compared to some of the other

136 SEC(91)500, 15.5.91
137 an echo, perhaps, of the European Cultural Convention's "common cultural heritage"
such clauses\textsuperscript{138}. The cultural aspects of audiovisual policy were isolated within a category of "artistic and cultural creation", in which modest action to assist artistic content was permitted but regulation on cultural considerations was not.

The most effective curb on future action, however, was the combination of a unanimity requirement (education and health both accept qualified majority voting) with the extension of co-decision to the Parliament, a combination found in no other article in Maastricht. Finally, the removal of all references to language and the low-key reference to cultural diversity makes it difficult for the Commission to use the protection of diversity as a basis for proposals. The article does not enjoin the Community to act to protect diversity, merely to respect it.

Article 128, therefore, is some way short of a Community cultural policy. The record of a symposium held shortly afterwards by the CIRCLE network\textsuperscript{139} shows how difficult it is to square with the whole notion of a "European cultural policy", with some speakers reduced yet again to the rhetoric of the Hague Congress. The symposium tries, as have many arts organisations since, to fill in the blanks by supplying "a scheme of interpretation for governments and parliaments for a better understanding of article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty"\textsuperscript{140}. This comes across less as an aid to understanding than as a reminder of the things the cultural sector thought it was getting.

\textsuperscript{138} compare taking "cultural aspects into account" with forming "a constituent part of the Community's other policies" (health protection) or contributing "to the achievement of the objectives set out in paragraph 1 through the policies and activities it pursues under other provisions of this Treaty" (industry)

\textsuperscript{139} "Harmony or Confusion for Culture in Europe? The Impact of the Single Market and of the Maastricht Treaty", proceedings of a seminar, Venice, 26-28 February 1993, published by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. A helpful assessment from the Commission on the impact of EC law on cultural funding is found in pp. 181-183.

\textsuperscript{140} ibid., summing up by Stefano Rolando, p. 279
The Commission produced a new communication within weeks of the Treaty being signed. In one sense the paper's main aim was to set the record straight. It contains a self-critical 17-page annex listing the Commission's action to date in detail, with expenditure figures (never before supplied) but without assessing the effectiveness of its intervention. Peppered with references to consultation it shows how far the Commission has moved from its earlier stance. Nevertheless, the paper is fundamentally, like its predecessor, a repackaging initiative rather than a result of fresh thinking. It seeks legitimacy for what has already taken place by defining a number of retrospective aims, and asks permission to continue as before.

Article 128 has become a kind of descriptive framework within which to present Commission activity, in the form of support for collaborative arts, backed by a grant scheme and a commitment to quarry existing Community programmes for more money, alongside a "common heritage" programme, drawing on the existing grant scheme for conserving the architectural heritage and the pilot project of subsidising translation schemes which the Council had previously backed. The distinction between audiovisual action as cultural cooperation and as a Community policy with cultural elements (MEDIA) is carefully maintained. This is an exercise in legitimation, a promise of a new relationship rather than fresh thinking.

After Maastricht a shift can be seen away from culture as part of the social and economic fabric of the Community towards external action and competitiveness. Reasserting the traditional foreign policy/culture interface the Community

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141 "New Prospects for Community Cultural Action", COM (92) 149 final, 29 April 1992
142 Resolution of the Council and the Ministers responsible for cultural affairs meeting within the Council of 9 November 1987 on the translation of important works of European culture
143 Support for film festivals, support for cultural television programmes, possible involvement in Eurimages
increasingly builds image-boosting cultural components into its aid programmes; at the same time it revives the idea of the cultural sector as an important player in the European economy which justifies investment on job creation grounds. This strand of policy has tended to concentrate on the information technology sector, with particular implications for multimedia, and suggests a modified version of the French "cultural industries" strategy of the 1980s. By the end of the decade, the Fifth Framework programme for Research and Development actually contained a section designed for the protection and regeneration of the cultural heritage, particularly in cities.

Some in the arts community already saw in this the substitution of a policy utilising culture for a policy directed at culture: "the Commission...will invent its own agenda based on the perceived needs of the cultural sector: an agenda that will reflect more the internal priorities of the political institutions than those of artists and their audiences." Despite the efforts of some Member States, the idea that the integration clause might be used by Culture Ministers as a lever "to seek change when prospective directives and regulations threaten to damage cultural interests" was effectively buried when the Commission was forced to acknowledge that, in any conflict between cultural and economic

\[\text{\textsuperscript{144} such as MEDA, aimed at reinforcing stability to the EU's south, or PHARE, which strengthens the infrastructure of prospective Member States to the east. A precedent already existed in the Lomé programme for ACP countries which had embarrassingly turned out to have a bigger cultural budget than the mainstream Commission cultural budget line.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{145} a possible explanation is found in Dai, Cawson and Holmes (op.cit) when they suggest that, having had its fingers burned in attempting to be a protagonist in the media market, the Commission may be more cautious in future about direct participation as opposed to more generalised background support.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{146} comment by Simon Mundy, quoted by Rod Fisher in his introduction to the CIRCLE symposium, Venice 1993, op.cit., p. 151}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{147} notably Belgium and Ireland}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{148} Fisher, ibid., p. 160}\]
interests, it was likely to give precedence to the latter\textsuperscript{149}.

The requirement that Community policy operates in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity has also worked against changes in the way the cultural sector is treated\textsuperscript{150} - it is quite hard to argue convincingly that Community intervention is needed to ensure the wellbeing of cultural provision at national level. Combined with the lack of a harmonising capacity in article 128 and the persistent emphasis in the drafting on culture as both diverse and unifying, the scope for a coherent policy is limited.

In particular, article 128 does not resolve the split personality of Community intervention in culture. In the great tradition of texts demanding cultural cooperation, it is vague about what it wants to achieve. It authorises a degree of action to counteract "spill-over" from the impact of globalisation on the one hand and the fostering of an open and internationally competitive economy on the other, but does not offer exemption from either. But it does introduce non-commercial values into the discourse of the internal market. In this sense, it may be regarded as an extension of cultural policy to the Community level. This is essentially the agenda that has been pursued through the Community's "other action". It aims to encourage, rather than protect, diversity.

\textsuperscript{149} the long-running test case of this has been the question of cross-border book pricing agreements, where Belgium and the Netherlands in particular have consistently tried to pressure the Commission into taking a stand on cultural grounds in support of retail price maintenance in same-language areas, despite the fact that the Commission generally regards fixed pricing as restrictive trading practice in other areas. They have yet to succeed, but show no signs of giving up

\textsuperscript{150} Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty authorises Community action "only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go further than what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty".
At the same time, article 128 also insists on both the inevitability and the attractions of a shared European identity. It requires the Community to engage in a cultural diplomacy programme directed at its own citizens. The French term "rayonnement", much favoured in France's bilateral cultural diplomacy, seems especially apt to describe this notion of cultural intervention as the benevolent face the Community shows to its citizens: as the Commission's own publicity document has it, culture as "common property"\(^{151}\) of European citizens. In both readings of the article, the agenda of the needs of artists themselves has been displaced.

The Council's own post-Maastricht guidelines\(^ {152}\) emphasise working methods whilst accepting the Commission's interpretation of its future role. It underlines the choice of sectors (audiovisual, books and reading, heritage, and "other forms of cultural expression") whilst leaving the tasks and aims of "cultural action" undefined. Like the Commission, it chooses to focus on inter-institutional relationships, not developments in cultural policy.

Article 128 does not create a Community cultural policy, therefore, but brings culture into the mainstream of Community operations. The Commission had viewed the cultural sector as either a potential cheer-leader for the European idea or a sector of disadvantage. Although the new competence gave it a more conventional patron-client relationship with the sector, the absence of scope to initiate legislation on the sector's behalf means that the Commission's usual role of intermediary between sets of interests has less weight. Its only real sphere of policy influence is as patron, stimulating rather limited quantities of cross-border working, and to a lesser extent as


\(^{152}\) Conclusions of the Council and the Ministers of Culture meeting within the Council of 12 November 1992 on guidelines for Community cultural action
a watchdog, ensuring that culture gets a mention when new programmes are drawn up elsewhere. Pushed back in the direction of cultural cooperation by the belief that investment in the arts creates public goodwill, Community cultural intervention has become, if anything, more conventional than it was before the Treaty.

Post-1992 cultural intervention: the Kaleidoscope, Ariane, Raphael programmes

The Commission's immediate post-1992 priority, and that of the Council also, was to submit proposals for Community programmes of expenditure. It produced three: the "Kaleidoscope" programme\textsuperscript{153}; the "Ariane" programme\textsuperscript{154}; and the "Raphael" programme\textsuperscript{155}. Two were simple exercises in repackaging; the third, "Raphael", was based on consultation meetings with Member State experts and genuinely tried to rethink Community support for the built heritage in particular, replacing the Commission's ad-hoc arrangements with individual Member States by a more complicated system designed to involve expertise from across the Community in the development of major conservation projects. It associated cultural intervention with other Community programmes benefiting the heritage (especially the RTD (Research and Technological Development) Framework Programme). Sector-centred and technical in its bias, it is the only one of the three to reflect and complement Member

\textsuperscript{153} Decision No. 719/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 March 1996 establishing a programme to support artistic and cultural activities having a Community dimension; this eclectic system of grants for artistic enterprises combining partners from three or more Member States, represented the Parliament's budget line repackaged

\textsuperscript{154} Decision No. 2085/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 establishing a programme of support, including translation, in the field of books and reading: based on the small-scale subvention scheme for literary translations, extended to benefit a wider range of book-related activity

\textsuperscript{155} Decision No. 2228/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1997 establishing a Community action programme in the field of cultural heritage
State public policy in its emphasis on sharing of professional expertise (Action II) and public access and participation (Action III)\textsuperscript{156}.

The other programmes, on which there was no advance consultation, were fairly obvious interim measures to regularise the situation of the previous decade, and as such, were bound to disappoint\textsuperscript{157}. None of the three was resourced on a par with programmes such as "Socrates" and "Leonardo" in the education sector\textsuperscript{158}.

"Kaleidoscope" was essentially symbolic, requiring transnational partnerships (some of doubtful authenticity, according to arts sector rumour) to be formed in order to attract small amounts of EC money\textsuperscript{159} into projects which would probably have taken place anyway. "Ariane", though seen by some smaller countries as having potential to replace national subsidy for their publishing industries, would only have had the potential for impact if substantial resources were invested in it. That, paradoxically, could have raised the problem of Community competence once again (subsidies to industry being a delicate issue).

\textbf{Culture and other Community policies}

Because the cultural provisions themselves were limited, great hopes were initially pinned on the "integration clause", which asks for "cultural aspects to be taken into account in its action under other provisions" of the Treaty. It was seen both as a way

\textsuperscript{156} neither Kaleidoscope nor Ariane relates its proposed support directly to policy goals; Raphael is also the only programme of the three to stipulate both follow-up and measurable outcome

\textsuperscript{157} see Rod Fisher's introduction to the CIRCLE symposium, op.cit., p. 159 - "lacking in ambition and vision" and "hardly the new start that had been promised", with no response to offer to "the changing nature of transfrontier international collaboration"

\textsuperscript{158} the budget for Kaleidoscope over three years was 26.5 MECU; that for Ariane 7 MECU over two years; and for Raphael 30 MECU over four years. Compare expenditure of 307.5 MECU on the Erasmus programme 1987-92 and 206.6 MECU on Comett 1986-92 – both later absorbed by respectively Socrates and Leonardo (source: European Commission, European Social Policy Green Paper, 1993)
to influence Community legislation in favour of culture and as a way to divert funds from other Community projects to cultural projects. In terms of legislative impact those hopes seem to have been misplaced. The Commission's first assessment of the impact of the clause considers several fields where action has been taken – freedom of movement of persons, copyright, taxation, competition policy, free movement of cultural goods and agricultural production – but is unable to identify specific areas in which the regulation concerned took account of cultural considerations.

Instead the paper maps out how the legislation concerned affects the cultural sector – worth knowing but not what the Commission was asked to do. Even in competition policy, where a specific Treaty change was made to safeguard state support to culture, the paper warns that this does not constitute an exemption from the normal provisions of the internal market. In the key policy areas of the publishing industry and the audiovisual sector, the Commission asserts the necessity of compatibility with Community law for fixed book pricing and, whilst emphasising on the one hand the importance of protecting pluralism, on the other points out that cultural objectives are not enough to secure exemption from open access rules (i.e. the granting of exclusive broadcasting rights in certain cases).

The greatest overlap between cultural policy and Community regulation to date is in the field of cultural property, where work began in the mid-1980s on developing a legislative framework to manage the absence of border policing of the export of

\[ \text{Footnotes:} \\
\text{159 like most small Community programmes, the culture programmes offer part-funding only and withhold part of the money until after completion} \\
\text{160 First Report on the Consideration of Cultural Aspects in European Community action, report by the European Commission, April 1996} \\
\text{161 "the cultural sector, in its economic aspects, is subject to the rules of competition as are the other sectors. It is therefore necessary for this sector also to guarantee that competition is not distorted and that the provision of aid out of proportion to the cultural aims pursued is avoided". Ibid, part 1, p. 13} \]
works of art\textsuperscript{162} in a single market with (ostensibly) no borders. Not only was this an example of an avowedly "cultural policy" issue being regulated at Community level, but much of the negotiation was carried out at the level of culture ministers and officials\textsuperscript{163}. This legislation, however, was not dependent on the cultural provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and is based on articles 113 (the Regulation) and 100A (the Directive). The Commission's 1996 report does no more than recapitulate this legislation and provide a snapshot of current monitoring and issues outstanding.

The report shows that while article 128 provides a point of view from which to examine Treaty-based legislation, it does little or nothing to affect the way that legislation is framed. The most illuminating section of the document provides an account of ECJ\textsuperscript{164} judgments, several of which predate the Maastricht Treaty, in which plurality or diversity is accepted as a justification for certain action if the Court is satisfied that this is neither disguised economic protectionism nor discrimination on nationality grounds. In other words, there are no safeguards for diversity in the post-Maastricht world that were not there before.

The Commission is on more congenial ground in describing how Community programmes are used to support a cultural objective. It is able to give plenty of examples ranging from the benefits to museums\textsuperscript{165} from the Research and Development Framework programme to the 29\% of projects on adult education under the Socrates programme which can be classified as "cultural". Much of this

\textsuperscript{162} in its one specifically "cultural" reference, article 36 of the original Treaty of Rome provided for Member States to be able to take measures to prevent the loss of national treasures — in effect, permitting them to refuse export licences in exceptional cases


\textsuperscript{164} European Court of Justice

\textsuperscript{165} the European Museums Network project, the AQUARELLE project on the use of telematics, the VASARI, MARC and MUSA projects
information had been provided three years earlier in a study commissioned by DGX, again based on pre-Maastricht activity. This concluded that around 2,473 MECU had been spent on culture in the period 1989-1993, of which four-fifths came from the Structural Funds, mostly in the Mediterranean countries to attract tourists to heritage sites.

In concluding, the Commission acknowledges that "most Community policies have a cultural dimension, interact on the cultural field and mobilise players in the cultural sector". From this it deduces that article 128 constitutes a "cultural policy" which "includes encouragement actions... and the actions taken and the policies conducted on other legal bases of the Treaty": not to be confused with "cultural policies conducted by the States, regions and other decentralised institutions", but specific to the Community. It then interprets this as requiring a contribution to "the European model of society built on a set of values common to all European societies" (a definition taken from its own opinion given to the 1996 IGC).

This goes well beyond anything in the Treaty. The Commission here seems to be redefining article 128 in accordance with its own interests and priorities. It reintroduces some of the thinking (particularly about "the defence of cultures") which was subsequently watered down in the negotiation of article 128, and adds to it the wholly new suggestion that "Community cultural policy must promote an

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166 "Community Support for Culture", a study carried out for the Commission of the EC (DGX) by Bates & Wacker S. C., June 1993
167 MECU = million ECU
168 the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund, Treaty instruments intended to reduce inequalities in standards of living between EC regions resulting from industrial decline, long-term unemployment etc
170 Initial Contributions by the Commission to the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, SEC (91) 500, 15 May 1991
171 ibid. A phrase used in the explanatory memorandum to the Commission's original draft of the culture article, p. 122, where it appears as "dissemination and defence of cultures"
expansion in the cultural influence of European and the European model of society — an idea which not only does not appear in the Treaty article but which is not in the Commission's original draft either.

The Treaty of Amsterdam: article 151

The response of the Council to the Commission's report on integration of cultural aspects into Community actions is found in a 1997 resolution of the same name. It does not take up the Commission's suggestion that the aim of Community cultural policy is to enhance the "European model" of society and popularise it elsewhere. Insofar as it responds to the Commission's redefinition a Community "cultural policy", it seems more interested in fostering a sense of Community citizenship and supporting freedom of expression. By insisting that the Community must "have careful regard to the impact of other policies on culture" it rather hints that the Commission has not done its job of assessing that impact before, rather than after, such policies have been formed.

The sole modification made to article 128 in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which resulted from the second IGC of the 1990s, specifically associates the integration clause with the need to respect diversity. This change does not entrust the Community per se with the task of defending cultures; instead it changes the emphasis to one of vigilance: requiring the Community to ensure that the way in which culture is taken into account serves mainly, though not exclusively, the aim of preserving difference.

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172 "First Report..", op. cit., part 5, p. 3
173 97/C 36/04, 20 January 1997
174 article 151.4: "the Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures" (European Union, Consolidated Treaties, 1997)
This effectively contradicts the Commission's interpretation of the integration clause as being about a European model of society.

**Culture 2000**

Most Community programmes are approved for a fixed term, usually five years, then replaced by a new programme, sometimes a refined version of the old (as in the case of MEDIA II) or a portmanteau of several programmes grouped into a "framework" (as with Socrates and Leonardo, the education and training programmes into which several smaller programmes were combined). Here culture followed education. At the instance of the Council, which sought a "guiding, comprehensive and transparent approach for cultural action within the Community"\(^{175}\), the Commission presented its proposal for a single cultural programme, Culture 2000\(^{176}\).

Culture 2000 is quite explicitly a programme of cultural cooperation in the traditional mould ("the Community's method of intervention is based on cooperation"), intended to make the Community's involvement more evident to the European public "who are unaware that such efforts are being made to preserve and promote their cultures"\(^{177}\). Cultural interests and initiatives are set in the context of broad Community policy objectives: enlargement, social cohesion, employment and accelerated integration.

The latter part of the paper is devoted to an "orientation" on "the explicit integration of cultural aspects into Community action and policy". Although it contains a commitment to "a legislative framework favourable to culture", this is mainly an account of work in progress which has a cultural dimension in the usual domains\(^{178}\).

\(^{175}\) Council Decision of 22 September 1997 regarding the future of cultural action (97/C 305/01)
\(^{176}\) COM (1998) 266 final
\(^{177}\) recalling the Commission's original 1992 response to the new articles as about making the Community's role "more visible to the general public" (COM(92)2000 final, op.cit, p. 28)
\(^{178}\) fixed book pricing, copyright, VAT, the audiovisual sector
Its one innovation is to suggest activating the so far unused provision of the Council recommendation contained in article 128. This mechanism would allow culture ministers to express views on areas of policy within their purview but which are negotiated in other Councils, thus (perhaps) influencing the ministers concerned; for example, a hypothetical recommendation from culture ministers extolling the merits of business sponsorship might affect the decision on whether the directive on tobacco advertising should include a ban on arts sponsorship by tobacco companies.

However, Culture 2000 is primarily a financing instrument. The Commission has devised some new goals which include "highlighting cultural characteristics common to the European people"; "creativity as a source of sustainable development within the cultural area common to the European people"; using culture "to contribute to social cohesion"; and increasing "the profile of European culture in non-member countries". To these ends it proposes three types of intervention: "integrated projects covered by structured, multiannual cultural cooperation agreements"; "major projects with a European and/or international dimension"; and "specific, innovative and/or experimental projects within the Community and/or in non-member countries". The Commission uses "Kaleidoscope" as its model, with no special provision for either heritage or books and reading (though the former appears to be permissible with the wider categories). The "cultural cooperation agreements" (language apparently borrowed from the sphere of external relations) seem designed to meet criticism that Kaleidoscope did not follow through with its support and provided no infrastructure support for networks, who are identified as the main partners.

179 examples suggested are business sponsorship, natural sites and monuments, "moral rights" although there was never such a recommendation, the tobacco advertising directive is real and so was the dilemma outlined here

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The "specific projects" have an explicitly socio-economic dimension and seem intended to embed cultural intervention within the broader Community context. They refer to issues such as access and participation, the young, "new forms of cultural expression (nature, solidarity, science, peace etc.)". There are echoes here of the Council of Europe’s programmes of the 1980s, as well as that body’s new "house" objectives. This aspect of the proposal seems to have appealed to both the Parliament and the Council, perhaps because it at least seems to try to relate to their own policy objectives with references to access and participation, social exclusion and involving the young.

However, the suggestion that support of up to 1 million per project be devoted to "major projects" intended to "strike a significant chord with the people of Europe" has been criticised by both the other institutions. The Council, in its common position 181, reinstated the three named subject areas (arts, books and reading, heritage) and reduced the allocation to "major projects" (now renamed "specific cultural events"). Most of the Commission’s specific ideas for new flag-waving activities (European Days, Presidency festivals, "recognition of great artistic talents") were rejected, leaving only the Council-instigated and nationally-managed European City of Culture with a guaranteed place in the programme. The revised text also dismisses the Commission’s attempt to use the programme to finance cultural cooperation outside the Community 182.

181 published as Common Position EC No. 26/1999
182 Countries such as those due to accede in the next wave of enlargement and the members of the European Economic Area are specifically invited to associate with this and other Community programmes. This is standard Community pre-accession practice and is not to be confused with "rayonnement"
There are practical arguments for this (the Parliament's rapporteur has pointed out that the likely audience for such events is probably already Euro-aware) but there is also a clear rejection of the use of cultural cooperation for "we-feeling". Cultural diplomacy on behalf of the institutions is less attractive than a supporting role for issues which concern Member States – in this case, the question of access and exclusion. There is also an implied criticism of the Commission's attitude to networks, i.e. that they are important primarily as a vector to get the institutions' message across to the arts and their audiences. In fact this simply reflects how the Commission sees networks in general: as intermediaries who can provide the Commission with a ready-made "European view" on policies and will work with the Commission to gain support for its action\(^\text{183}\). It is not the way cultural networks see themselves, and suggests that the days of "privileged partnership", to use the Council of Europe term, may have been short-lived.

**Conclusion**

Adding culture to the Treaty as a Community competence has not significantly affected the way it is handled as a policy area within the Community framework. The areas of policy most influenced by Community legislation were susceptible to such influence before 1992, and the Commission's approach to them differs from its "pre-competence" thinking only in the extent of its readiness to use culture as a feature of cohesion which will enhance the appeal of its other policies. Its funding programmes, which, by the nature of the sums potentially, if not actually, involved, attract greater attention than the parallel programmes of the Council of Europe, have not closed the

\(^{183}\) see Mazey and Richardson in Edwards & Spence, op.cit, pp. 169-187, on "the Commission and the lobby", an explanation of how the Commission employs interest groups to build a policy agenda which Member States must then confront.
gap between Member States' interests and the Commission's desire to encourage "we-feeling" and loyalty transfer, but have drawn attention to its existence.

Why has this happened? Unlike previous practitioners of cultural cooperation, who were confronted with an immediate cultural remit without time to think it through, the Community had fifteen years of experimenting with a cultural cooperation policy before it was legally required to implement one. Member States have not been able to agree whether a policy of fostering diversity involves forms of cultural protectionism to enable a specifically "European" culture to withstand the pressures of globalisation (explicit in the debates about media policy and, above all, the GATT negotiations of the early 1990s); or whether it means keeping cultural policy out of the sphere of supranational action by denying the Community a legislative role. The Commission, meanwhile, has been unable to find a satisfactory compromise between its role as guardian of the Treaty, and thus of the unhampered operation of the internal market, and its wish to play a proactive role in cultural policy. It has therefore revisited cultural diplomacy as a purveyor of positive imagery. The Community's cultural policy, in this reading, promotes the idea of Europe, and specifically the European Community, through culture.

At the centre of this failure to reinterpret cultural cooperation effectively for a supranational institution seems to be evasiveness about the issue of identity. Alan Forrest's experience led him to conclude that the issue of language lies at the heart of the Community's cultural difficulty. This issue, suppressed in Community cultural

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184 It has been suggested that Member States in fact "fear" that the Community will iron out cultural difference if allowed to legislate in this area. I have never encountered any evidence to support this view, nor do I consider it to be seriously held within the institutions themselves.

discourse, is vividly and publicly expressed within the institutional life of the
Community itself, from the outcry in the French press about the new dominance of
English-speaking chefs de cabinet in the Commission\textsuperscript{186} to the wrangles undergone at
any expert meeting hosted by a Member State where interpretation is not provided in
German. In Culture 2000, as in article 128, the Council has deleted references to
languages when they have been put forward by the Commission\textsuperscript{187}.

The closest the Community has come to developing a serious "cultural policy" was
during the Lang era when French strategy was driven by concerns about the status of
France as the lead player in European cultural matters\textsuperscript{188} and French as the primary
language in European transactions. In 1979 Jacques Rigaud spelled out the severity of
the challenge and the only possible solution: "le plurilinguisme...seul peut préserver
la vocation universelle de la langue française"\textsuperscript{189}, which in turn involved "une vue
universaliste, fondée sur le dialogue des cultures". The logic of Lang's European
policy was precisely that: to secure the position of France by establishing cultural
diversity as the pivot of an assertive European programme of financial investment in
the cultural industries, backed up by appropriately restrictive legislation, in which
culture was the leitmotif, but economic investment and control the means.

The fact that this programme ultimately failed to rally enough Member State support
to carry it through (by suitable Treaty amendments) reflects partly the rather obvious

\textsuperscript{186} in particular, "Libération", following the decision of the incoming Prodi Commission in 1999 to
abandon the convention by which cabinets shared the nationality of the commissioner they served
\textsuperscript{187} for an interesting sidelight on the efforts made to preserve multilingualism in the official workings
of Community in order to protect the status of French, see A. Fosty, "La Langue Française dans les
Institutions Communautaire de l'Europe", Quebec, 1985
\textsuperscript{188} for the antecedents to Lang, see also E. A. Kolodziej, "French International Policy under De Gaulle
Dilemma of Americanisation", University of California, 1993
\textsuperscript{189} J. Rigaud, "Les Relations Culturelles Extérieures, Rapport au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères",
p. 18. Documentation Française, 1979
self-interest behind it, and the equally obvious self-interest of the UK, in particular, in opposing it. But there is also a political problem about confronting the idea that cultural policy involves exploring national difference and by extension the situation of minorities, both European and non-European. It subverts the idea that culture is essentially unifying. In this context the Commission’s attempt to abandon the "difficult" nationalistic aspects of cultural identity in favour of the simpler approach based on a unifying message such as that of its "European Integration" booklet\(^{190}\) is at least understandable. But it does, in effect, relegate European cultural cooperation to a large-scale bilateral cultural diplomacy operation in which the European institutions themselves play the part of the nation-state trying to show the citizens a picture of themselves as creative, influential and united by more than divides them.

The reluctance to confront the question of cultural identity is akin to the post-war Council of Europe’s unwillingness to face the fact of the Second World War. It may suggest that meaningful multilateral cultural cooperation is impossible unless it is either "repatriated" into recognisably national terms or presented in the form of one culture (or set of diverse cultures) actively presenting itself in a "European" showcase. Refocusing action on the cultural sector by concentrating on networking projects also avoids the issue of identity – it merely permits a return to the idealism of intellectual cooperation without the overlay of public influence once claimed for it and conveniently overlooks the alienation between the arts and public life and opinion.

\(^{190}\) Borchardt, op.cit., p. 73: "Cultural assets such as the city of Venice...or the plays of Shakespeare are an integral part of a common cultural heritage and are regarded as common property by the citizens of Europe"
Brigid Laffan\textsuperscript{191} discusses the way in which official nationalism has accommodated European integration only to find identity bubbling up elsewhere (in campaigns which attack the internal market as a threat to, e.g., local cheese). She notes that UK and Danish resistance to the integration project reflect the absence of a need for the EU to fill any psychic gap relating to state identity, unlike French reinvention of Europe as a larger France or German feelings of internal conflict about Germany's size and power (resolved by seeing Germany fixed within the wider European context). Her comment that "a European identity may be the preserve of Europe's élites for whom Europe is already a social space"\textsuperscript{192} may be behind the sudden concern of the Council that Culture 2000 should major on social inclusiveness\textsuperscript{193}.

Hugh O'Donnell\textsuperscript{194} examines national stereotypes in sport, comparing how these are presented in comparison with the "European academic community" with its shared texts and "high cultural identity", which are then overwritten in local discourses. These use north-south stereotypes in particular to establish values (the cold, efficient north versus the warm temperamental south\textsuperscript{195}). Europeanism itself has different local meanings — in Greece, for instance, Europe is a signifier of Greek frontier status distinguishing them from their Albanian neighbours. He concludes that trying to create a sense of community through culture is probably a waste of time: "Team Europe may be possible on Brussels headed notepaper but will always be defeated by actual national teams"\textsuperscript{196}. Other essays in the same collection come to similar

\textsuperscript{192} ibid, p. 99
\textsuperscript{193} traceable to the Irish Presidency of 1996
\textsuperscript{195} a Spanish football team on form can find itself described as "the Germans of the south"
\textsuperscript{196} O'Donnell, op. cit., p. 95
conclusions through the examination of "European" metaphor and semantics. Nigel Reeves suggests that we ignore at our peril the "deep-seated diversity of identities...rooted in different value sets and in the continuing need to perceive one's own identity through its distinction with other nationalities."

Thus the tension between cosmopolitan and communitarian continues as an undercurrent in the European Community's cultural cooperation experiment. Article 128/151 makes two sets of different demands, requiring that the distinctiveness of European cultures rather than culture be preserved and encouraged, whilst at the same time emphasising the supposedly unifying effect of the European heritage. The message of the spending programme is universalist, emphasising the merits of cooperation, "working together" on common artistic or conservationist projects which can be promoted as examples of the communautaire spirit.

At the same time, a much more communitarian project is discernible in the continued insistence that Community law must somehow be made to operate in favour of protecting culture from the effects of the open market. This rejects the global, and the unspoken assumptions in "realist" diplomacy that policy is a series of compromises made on the particular in order to achieve the more general goal represented by "the common interest". It favours instead the local and the small-scale, represented by pressure for exemptions, quotas and ring-fenced subsidies, arguments which depend on culture's own "difference" and need of protection from the gales of modern life.

197 N. Reeves, "Den festen Kern festigen: Towards a Functional Taxonomy of Transnational Political Discourse", p. 166, in Musolff etc., op. cit., pp. 161-9
198 a favourite Community theme, and the title of a much-used guide to the Community institutions by Emile Noel, a former Secretary-General of the Commission
CONCLUSION

This thesis began by asking a number of questions about multilateral cultural cooperation: its relationship to cultural diplomacy and to public policies for culture; its purpose and success rate; and its role in European integration. In particular, is it a stage towards a common European cultural policy? The analysis of developments suggests that the cultural cooperation process itself does not constitute such a stage. Within the European Union, the process of convergence in certain policy areas within the Community's competence can certainly be interpreted as drawing some aspects of cultural policy towards a common European norm; but this process takes place largely independently of the cultural cooperation system, which modulates it rather than setting its agenda and dictating content.

The defining characteristic of cultural cooperation is its duality, which ultimately prevents it from acting as either a cohesive or a trail-blazing force. From its earliest manifestations it has oscillated between its cultural diplomacy functions on behalf of the European integration project and the aspirations of its participants to make it relevant to the internal policy-making process at national level. Whilst on the whole the cultural diplomacy function operates on one level only - that of enhancing the image of the integrating organisation using culture to promote positive popular reaction - the cultural policy function has several layers: as a vehicle for promoting national policy interests at the European level; as a way of building up the influence of the international organisation within member states; as an alternative rallying point for culture professionals dissatisfied with the prevailing ideology at national level; or
even, though less often than should be the case, as a genuine exchange for skills, experience and comparative data capable of assisting in the policy-making process. In addition, it can serve as a forum for advancing the interests of intellectuals as a social group. By and large, though, Paul Valéry's observation that it has failed to make itself either necessary or valued beyond certain limits remains true.

From its earliest manifestations in the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation through the Brussels Treaty Organisation to the Council of Europe and EU of today, governments engaged in multilateral cultural cooperation have inclined to one or the other of these two functions. The Anglo-Saxon tendency has been to keep as closely as possible to the straightforward aims pursued through bilateral cultural relations. But even in an organisation like the BTO, where the purpose of the enterprise is explicitly linked to defence and foreign policy and there is no ostensible cultural policy dimension, the records show that this was frequently regarded as an unacceptable limitation, leading to lack of clarity of purpose and a consequent inability to develop action which consistently delivers on its declared objectives.

The tendency led by France and Belgium, on the other hand, by placing a premium on the intellectual as a beneficiary, and also formulator, of public policy has championed the cultural policy version of multilateral cultural cooperation. The difficulty here has been that visions of what cultural policy should be at this level have had to accommodate different ideas about both the role of the state and the aims of such policies themselves, leading to claims for consensus which are often not well founded and which result in inaction at the national level where they are directed.
It is interesting that a distinctive "British" and "French" style of multilateral cultural cooperation has not, on the whole, been complemented by a distinctive "German" style. Germany's late arrival on the scene, after the main lines of cultural cooperation had been drawn, obviously accounts for much of this. However, the division of labour between the federal government and the Länder in Germany has also resulted in a strong German inclination to ground this type of activity as much as possible in the processes of intergovernmental diplomacy. This position, which perhaps also reflects a renunciation of the German history of "breaking the rules" in the use of cultural propaganda, is closer to the British than the French model despite the strength of Franco-German ties both in bilateral cultural relations and in EU relations generally (the so-called "Paris-Bonn axis").

On occasions, however, multilateral cultural cooperation's dual nature has served as a strength. Such occasions seem to have been times of general uncertainty, when the very fact that shared attempts to make sense of the aftermath of upheaval exist points to the need for an idea of common values: as, for example, in the push towards "normality" after WWII; the articulation of a "philosophy" of cultural development which responded to the events of 1968; and the reintegration of the former Communist countries into Western ideas of democracy after 1990. Cultural cooperation has not always been quick to respond to such needs, and some of its responses, such as the Council of Europe's Declaration of Cultural Objectives, seem

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1 a closeness reflected in the frequent similarity of British and German negotiating positions on cultural matters both in the Council of Europe and in the EU.
to have been formulated after the need for them has passed.

If multilateral cultural cooperation’s relationship with cultural policy is ambivalent and ultimately of limited relevance, however, it is clear that it has a high symbolic significance within the European integration project as a whole, particularly with its federal aspects. Initially intended to promote a cosmopolitan, intergovernmental agenda of familiarity and recognition – essentially a bid to underpin the case for cohesiveness in a defence and security context - multilateral cultural cooperation has increasingly become associated with a much more communitarian idea of Europe bound up with the federalist vision of small self-determining communities networked in an overarching European legislative framework, with national governments playing a subordinate role.

The Council of Europe has developed this within an intergovernmental context to the point where its cultural programme represents a tension between competing visions. One tries to assert a conventionally outward-looking view of culture (for example, the art exhibitions programme). It recalls the British approach to cultural relations and is intended to please, to flatter, above all to reassure the citizen that greater European convergence is not a frightening leap into the unknown but a natural institutionalisation of what exists already. The other (e.g. the cultural democracy movement) offers an idea of Europe as a dynamic, challenging force, separate from conservative-minded governments and pushing them towards radical social change in tune with a federalist view of the world. It depends on the notion that governments fail their citizens, who are naturally more progressive than they. In cultural democracy it comes closest to Denis de Rougemont’s and his fellow federalists’ idea of the
restless and the changing (the "principle of imperfection") as being quintessentially European. The intergovernmental nature of the Council of Europe itself, however, has generally prevented the latter vision from prevailing over the former, as has the essentially conservative controlling presence of diplomats in the decision-making Committee of Ministers.

The EU, which has the institutional power in theory to advance the Council of Europe's cultural agenda via legislation, has not chosen to do so. The Member States have so far withheld the means to achieve this by restricting Treaty competence to a "soft" cultural diplomacy function and by insisting that "hard" cultural policy can operate at the EU level only as a supportive measure for action which is justifiable in single market terms. The policy territory which this covers remains remarkably constant throughout cultural cooperation's history, with few attempts to move beyond it. The decision of the EU's founding fathers to move away from the ideology of federalism is mirrored in the development of cultural policy within the institutions as a by-product of economic changes, governed by the key Community principles of free movement of commodities and labour, regulated to ensure commerce is free to develop a European competitiveness and compensate for the social fallout of such competition. Within this framework, the role of culture is, again, to reassure but also to contribute, as a creator of employment and social cohesion. The difference between the "culture industry" and "the arts" is nowhere more marked than in their respective treatment in EU cultural cooperation.2

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2 this may soon be put interestingly to the test. As part of the Prodi/ Kinnock reforms of the Commission a "peer group" of Commissioners is to analyse the impact of a budget cut of up to 15% in order " to identify whole areas of policy-making which could be dropped" (article in European Voice, 6 April 2000).
Most remarkably, the issue of identity, and culture's relationship to it, is consistently evaded throughout the history of cultural cooperation. Instead cultural cooperation addresses itself either to a European policy "élite" of intellectuals assumed to be already in tune with the integration project or to an ill-defined "European citizen" whose nature and allegiances are rarely probed deeply. In particular, the question asked by Anthony D. Smith is avoided: "why should anyone choose a 'European' culture and identity over any other?". The assumptions which underlie cultural cooperation's strategies remain linked to national interest.

The question of language epitomises this. Alan Forrest notes that, ironically, the greatest progress in promoting linguistic diversity has been made under the information society programme, where "no struggles between particular Union languages or groups of languages were involved", aiding "a rational examination of the requirements of the situation". The battles over audiovisual policy can be interpreted as battles about language and, ultimately, about strategies designed to promote identities which are as much national as they are European. The same is true of the various attempts to assert a status for culture which allows it to pick and choose which parts of the single market it will be governed by. These strategies are essentially nationally motivated even when the policy which directs them is itself the result of a strong regional or federal system.

Over the years multilateral cultural cooperation has acted not as a solution to problems, or even as an emollient for "serious" policy, but as a repository for many

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4 Forrest, 1998, op.cit., p. 314
sorts of expectation: of influence on political agendas by individuals outside the political mainstream; of a continued role for Europe in the world after her centrality has ceased to exist; of an alternative centre for policy-making which displaces purely economics-based perspectives in favour of a strong social and community-centred set of priorities; of a last bastion against the encroachment of industrialisation and an Anglo-Saxon world view; of popular affection for the European project based on acceptance of its institutions as upholders of the European inheritance; and of the institutions themselves as a source of largesse and enlightenment which will upgrade culture in the hierarchy of public policy.

It is hardly surprising that cultural cooperation has failed to live up to any of this. Few other areas of policy-making carry such a weight of symbolism or depend so much on an imagined rather than an actual role. At the root of its failure lies the problem of integrating Bergson's question, "what ensures the preservation of humanity in the midst of mechanical societies?" into the more short-term but immediately pressing agenda of the management of technological, economic and social change and its impact on basic provision. The idea that culture can exemplify the spiritual life of the European integration project, endowing it in some way with a meaning and a glamour it does not otherwise possess, is the inheritance of intellectual cooperation. Along with cultural diplomacy's definition of culture as the lightweight aspect of an educational programme, this has diverted attention from the darker side of the project, the question of identity (glossed over in references to "diversity"), which not only governments but also the self-regarding institutions themselves have declined to face.
The influence of "companies of clouds" has ultimately been to deprive multilateral cultural cooperation of a serious function in international relations by failing to challenge governments on the genuinely international aspects of their cultural policies. The field has instead been allowed to degenerate into a tussle for supremacy between two political traditions, cultural diplomacy and federalism, resulting in the kind of trivial special-interest consensus dismissed contemptuously by the American diplomat Inis L. Claude and quoted at the beginning of this thesis. Despite the streams of aspirational resolutions signed up to by Council of Europe culture ministers during the glory years of cultural democracy and cultural development, and the more cautious assertions of EU culture ministers since that time, the more modest view cited by John Mole remains valid: "culture... is the way we do things round here".

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5 I. L. Claude, "Swords into Plowshares", op.cit
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Annexe A: Chronology of cultural cooperation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event/Group/Conference</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>Creation of International Telegraphic Union: first example of “functional” international cooperation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Victor Hugo addresses an International Literary Congress in Paris on Public Lending Right (Domaine Public Payant)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Alliance Française set up</td>
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<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td></td>
<td>Berne Convention on Copyright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Dante Alighieri Society founded</td>
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<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>All-Deutscher Verband created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td></td>
<td>First international conference to consider the protection of cultural property in time of war (the &quot;Hague Peace Conferences&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td></td>
<td>First meeting of Verband der Museumdirektoren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td></td>
<td>Second Hague conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
<td>Covenant establishing the League comes into effect</td>
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<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
<td>International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation created under Henri Bergson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Association Française d’Action Artistique (AFAA) created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coudenhoeve-Kalergi founds Pan-Europa movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>AAD (later DAAD) set up in Heidelberg</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td></td>
<td>Institute of International Intellectual Cooperation set up in Paris under Julien Luchaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pan Europa conference, Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
<td>ICIC Arts and Letters Committee set up under Jules Destré</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
<td>Creation of International Museums Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>All People’s Association created by Evelyn Wrench</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK National Committee for Intellectual Cooperation set up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
<td>Paul Valéry takes over chair of ICIC Arts and Letters Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Goethe Institut founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>British Council set up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>France/ Germany</td>
<td>Comité Franco-Allemand set up to further cultural links</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Pro Helvetia created as &quot;spiritual defence&quot;. Conference of Allied Ministers of Education launched in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>British Association for the Advancement of Science Committee on Post-War Education (includes Zimmern, J. Huxley, W.E. Williams, René Cassin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Svenska Institute founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943-4</td>
<td>France/ UK</td>
<td>Cultural Relations sections set up in both Foreign Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Creation of UNESCO agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Arts Council of Great Britain set up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>UNESCO charter signed in London following San Francisco conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Fulbright scholarships launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Creation of International Theatre Institute, first of UNESCO's NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scandinavian Cultural Commission (NKK) set up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
<td>IIIC formally wound up; assets transferred to UNESCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td></td>
<td>The &quot;Hague Congress&quot; of European Federalist movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>BTO</td>
<td>Signature of Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation by UK-France-Benelux creates Brussels Treaty Organisation (also known as Western Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Statute of Council of Europe adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Creation of Organisation for European Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>World Conference of Intellectuals, Wroclaw</td>
<td>World Conference of Intellectuals, Wroclaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Julian Huxley's &quot;philosophy&quot; of UNESCO published à titre personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>ICOM (International Council for Museums) set up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation created</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1949 Cultural conference at Lausanne, follow-up to Hague. Launch of European Cultural Centre

1950 UNESCO General Conference defines basic tasks, including technical assistance

1950 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Free Trade

1950 Council of Europe Committee of Cultural Experts set up

1950 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Free Trade

1950 Council of Europe Richard Seymour's paper on multilateral cultural cooperation

1951 Germany Cultural relations department created in Foreign Ministry

1951 Council of Europe Relaunch of Goethe Institut

1951 Germany Inter Nationes founded

1952 UNESCO International Conference of Artists, Venice

1952 Germany Relaunch of Goethe Institut

1952 Germany Inter Nationes founded

1952 Council of Europe Richard Seymour's paper on multilateral cultural cooperation

1952 Germany Inter Nationes founded

1952 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Free Trade

1952 Council of Europe Richard Seymour's paper on multilateral cultural cooperation

1953 NATO Working group on Social and Cultural Cooperation recommends programme of cultural cooperation

1953 Council of Europe European Round Table (Rome)

1954 BTO BTO becomes Western European Union on accession of Germany and Italy

1954 Council of Europe European Cultural Convention

1954 France/Germany Schuman/Adenauer Cultural Accord places cultural relations on a legal basis

1954 France/Germany European Cultural Foundation established

1955 Inter-Groupe des Interets Intellectuels discusses a "European Cultural Community"

1956 UNESCO Launch of East-West project

1956 Council of Europe Cultural Fund set up

1957 EC Treaty of Rome signed

1957 Council of Europe Conference of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe (CLRAE) set up

1958 France Ministry of Culture created

1960 WEU Cultural cooperation transferred to Council of Europe

1960 OECD OEEC becomes Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>1st Conference of Ministers of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>First European Summit agrees to take forward the Plan Fouchet. Pescatore Committee set up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Resolution CM (61) 39 sets up Council for Cultural Cooperation (CCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Plan Fouchet abandoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>France/ Germany</td>
<td>Treaty of Cooperation signed, including Franco-Allemand Jeunesse programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>CCC/ECF agreement discontinued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Launch of Europe Day (first 5th May, later 9th May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>CCC issues its first document on its &quot;cultural policy&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>CCC's &quot;leisure debate&quot;, in which ideas for cultural democracy are launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Group of Technical Experts on heritage questions set up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Report of &quot;Trois Sages&quot; relaunches cultural programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation (EPC) established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Nordic Council</td>
<td>Secretariat for Cultural Cooperation set up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Meeting of culture ministers (EUROCULT) at Helsinki on cultural policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Arc-et-Senans Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>World Heritage Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Nordic Council</td>
<td>Cultural cooperation secretariat merged with Committee of Ministers secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>? First meeting within EPC (European Political Cooperation) of &quot;Cultural Directors&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Parliament resolution on Community action in the cultural sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>European Music Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Helsinki Final Act contains &quot;Basket III&quot; on cultural cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Lomé Treaty creates African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) aid programme, which includes provision for supporting cultural activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Secretary-General working party on cultural cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Introduction of medium-term planning system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>1st Conference of Ministers of Cultural Affairs, Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>First appearance of a budget line for culture voted by the European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>CCC reconstituted as a steering committee (Comité Directrice), CDCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Commission publishes its first communication on cultural questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Project 5 officially launched (cultural development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Report on cultural cooperation by Jacques Rigaud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>3rd Conference of Ministers of Cultural Affairs, Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Project 10 launched (culture and region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Project 11 launched (culture and communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Culture ministers' meeting (MONDIACULT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Agreement to establish an intergovernmentally-funded European Foundation to support cultural projects</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>&quot;Stuttgart Declaration&quot; on European Union mentions cultural cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>First meetings of &quot;cultural attachés&quot; group within Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>First formal resolutions adopted on cultural questions at Council level</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>4th Conference of Ministers of Cultural Affairs, Berlin</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>European Declaration on Cultural Objectives adopted</td>
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<td>1984-6</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>USA and UK withdraw from UNESCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>First European City of Culture (Athens)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Adonnino Report, &quot;A People's Europe&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Budapest Cultural Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Cultural policy review programme begun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Beginning of GATT Uruguay Round (bringing in services – GATS)</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Commission conference on culture, Florence</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Commission communication: &quot;Fresh Boost for culture....&quot;</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Single European Act (SEA)</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>5th Conference of Ministers of Cultural Affairs, Sintra</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Cultural policy review of France published</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>France proposes a &quot;Livre Bleu&quot; of EC cultural and educational cooperation</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Committee on Cultural Affairs (unofficial Council working group) set up under German Presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>World Decade of Cultural Development</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Cultural cooperation included in EEA agreement with EFTA</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Year of Film and Television</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Cultural policy review of Sweden published</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>MEDIA programme adopted</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Paris Charter for a New Europe</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>6th Conference of Ministers of Cultural Affairs, Palermo</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>EC/EU</td>
<td>Treaty of Maastricht establishes Community competence in culture (Art. 128)</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>7th Conference of Ministers of Cultural Affairs, Paris</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Cultural policy review of Austria published</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Cultural policy review of Netherlands published</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>&quot;Kaleidoscope&quot; programme launched</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>8th Conference of Ministers of Cultural Affairs, Budapest</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>&quot;Ariane&quot; and &quot;Raphael&quot; programmes adopted</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>UK rejoin UNESCO</td>
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Annexe B: European Cultural Convention (19 October 1954)
The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of Europe,

Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose, among others, of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage;

Considering that the achievement of this aim would be furthered by a greater understanding of one another among the peoples of Europe;

Considering that for these purposes it is desirable not only to conclude bilateral cultural conventions between Members of the Council but also to pursue a policy of common action designed to safeguard and encourage the development of European culture;

Having resolved to conclude a general European Cultural Convention designed to foster among the nationals of all Members, and of such other European States as may accede thereto, the study of the languages, history and civilisation of the others and of the civilisation which is common to them all,

Have agreed as follows:

**ARTICLE 1**

Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate measures to safeguard and to encourage the development of its national contribution to the common cultural heritage of Europe.

**ARTICLE 2**

Each Contracting Party shall, insofar as may be possible,

(a) encourage the study by its own nationals of the languages, history and civilisation of the other Contracting Parties and grant facilities to those Parties to promote such studies in its territory, and

(b) endeavour to promote the study of its language or languages, history and civilisation in the territory of the other Contracting Parties and grant facilities to the nationals of those Parties to pursue such studies in its territory.
ARTICLE 3

The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another within the framework of the Council of Europe with a view to concerted action in promoting cultural activities of European interest.

ARTICLE 4

Each Contracting Party shall, insofar as may be possible, facilitate the movement and exchange of persons as well as of objects of cultural value so that Articles 2 and 3 may be implemented.

ARTICLE 5

Each Contracting Party shall regard the objects of European cultural value placed under its control as integral parts of the common cultural heritage of Europe, shall take appropriate measures to safeguard them and shall ensure reasonable access thereto.

ARTICLE 6

1. Proposals for the application of the provisions of the present Convention and questions relating to the interpretation thereof shall be considered at meetings of the Committee of Cultural Experts of the Council of Europe.

2. Any State not a member of the Council of Europe which has acceded to the present Convention in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 9 may appoint a representative or representatives to participate in the meetings provided for in the preceding paragraph.

3. The conclusions reached at the meetings provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be submitted in the form of recommendations to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, unless they are decisions which are within the competence of the Committee of Cultural Experts as relating to matters of an administrative nature which do not entail additional expenditure.

4. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall communicate to the Members of the Council and to the Government of any State which has acceded to the present Convention any decisions relevant thereto which may be taken by the Committee of Ministers or by the Committee of Cultural Experts.
5. Each Contracting Party shall notify the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe in due course of any action which may be taken by it for the application of the provisions of the present Convention consequent on the decisions of the Committee of Ministers or of the Committee of Cultural Experts.

6. In the event of certain proposals for the application of the present Convention being found to interest only a limited number of the Contracting Parties, such proposals may be further considered in accordance with the provisions of Article 7, provided that their implementation entails no expenditure by the Council of Europe.

**Article 7**

If, in order to further the aims of the present Convention, two or more Contracting Parties desire to arrange meetings at the seat of the Council of Europe other than those specified in paragraph 1 of Article 6, the Secretary-General of the Council shall afford them such administrative assistance as they may require.

**Article 8**

Nothing in the present Convention shall be deemed to affect

(a) the provisions of any existing bilateral cultural convention to which any of the Contracting Parties may be signatory or to render less desirable the conclusion of any further such convention by any of the Contracting Parties, or

(b) the obligation of any person to comply with the laws and regulations in force in the territory of any Contracting Party concerning the entry, residence and departure of foreigners.

**Article 9**

1. The present Convention shall be open to the signature of the Members of the Council of Europe. It shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.

2. As soon as three signatory Governments have deposited their instruments of ratification, the present Convention shall enter into force as between those Governments.
3. With respect to each signatory Government ratifying subsequently, the Convention shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

4. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe may decide, by a unanimous vote, to invite, upon such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate, any European State which is not a member of the Council to accede to the present Convention. Any State so invited may accede by depositing its instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. Such accession shall take effect on the date of receipt of the said instrument.

5. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall notify all Members of the Council and any acceding States of the deposit of all instruments of ratification and accession.

**ARTICLE 10**

Any Contracting Party may specify the territories to which the provisions of the present Convention shall apply by addressing to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe a declaration which shall be communicated by the latter to all the other Contracting Parties.

**ARTICLE 11**

1. Any Contracting Party may denounce the present Convention at any time after it has been in force for a period of five years by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, who shall inform the other Contracting Parties.

2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the Contracting Party concerned six months after the date on which it is received by the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.
Annexe C: Title XII (Culture), Article 151, Treaty of European Union (Treaty of Amsterdam)
Annexe A: Chronology of cultural cooperation
TITLE XII (ex Title IX)

CULTURE

Article 151 (ex Article 128)

1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.

2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:

   - improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples;
   - conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
   - non-commercial cultural exchanges;
   - artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.

3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of Europe.

4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.

5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the Council:

   - acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. The Council shall act unanimously throughout the procedure referred to in Article 251;

   - acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.