Reconstructing Ethnicity and Identity:
The Influence of Second-Generation Turkish-Cypriot and Pakistani Women in London

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Abstract

Scholarly and political interest in the Muslim population in Britain has greatly increased since the 1970s. Issues such as the Rushdie affair and the Gulf war brought Muslims into the media spotlight, and provided focal points for the mobilisation of Muslims committed to maintaining Islamic values in Britain. Most research on Muslims in Britain has focused on Asian groups. While these may represent the majority, generalisations about Islam and Muslims in Britain are not possible without examining the experiences of other Muslim communities. This thesis, therefore, sets out to improve social scientific understanding of the varied experiences of Muslims in Britain by comparing women from two Muslim groups: Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots.

The aim of the thesis is to examine the significance of religion and culture in the lives of Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women in London. The principal objectives are to show (a) how these different and often competing elements are involved in identity formation and transformation, and (b) how they influence, and are influenced by factors such as race, class and gender. My research is based on two years of fieldwork with a variety of different community organisations catering specifically for Muslims, Pakistanis, or Turkish speakers. In addition I carried out thirty in-depth interviews with women who were actively involved in these communities. The aim was to examine the major issues relevant to each of these two groups, as well as to assess the importance of the organisations for Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in London.

My research found firstly, that despite the vast diversity evident among my informants in terms of their identity and the individual strategies they choose to adopt, their community organisations had a vital and significant role to play in the development and empowerment of women across the generations. Secondly, my findings revealed the complex and changing nature of social identities, as well as the ability of second and third generation Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women actively to select and interpret competing cultural systems, and to adopt, incorporate or abandon specific elements in their search for an appropriate individual strategy. Young Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women are shown to be actively defining and redefining themselves as a result of the multifarious cultural and structural factors that they experience both on an individual and group level. 'Race', class and gender are crucial to this process of cultural redefinition, as women's cultural beliefs necessarily reflect the structural forces that affect their lives. The intersection of 'race', class and gender locates individuals in their social positions and subsequently elicits considerations of beliefs and identities.
Introduction

Muslims are the largest minority faith group both in Britain and Western Europe. The Muslim population in Britain is estimated to be between one and one and a half million, and includes migrants from Asia, Turkey, Cyprus, the Middle East, Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia (Weller 1997, Anwar 1998). However, the majority of Muslims in Britain are Asian from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and East Africa.

Although the Qur'an outlines the basic guides to life that must be adhered to by all Muslims, there is no common Muslim 'culture'; as with all religions, there is an element of interpretation involved. Thus within the various Muslim countries across the world, although the basic values and principles might be the same, the customs and cultures vary considerably. Elements of the national cultures in such countries as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey are distinguishable in many ways from Islamic values and norms. Although Islam dominates these countries, many aspects of social life are not directly determined by the religion. Hence a Muslim from Pakistan can vary quite considerably in dress and customs from a Muslim in, say, the Egypt or Syria. It would be a mistake, therefore, to consider the Muslim population in Britain as a homogeneous community. British Muslims continue to socialise and organise along lines of nationality. Furthermore, as Samad (1992:508) points out, British Muslims adopt different identities according to political circumstances: 'Consequently working class Mirpuris from Bradford can see themselves as British, Pakistani, Muslim, or Punjabi depending on the political and social circumstances which depress or elevate various strands of identity'.

Nevertheless, despite this diversity the notion of a single Islamic community in Britain is receiving more attention. Events such as the Rushdie affair and the Gulf war provided platforms for increased co-operation and collaboration between Muslims, as different groups joined forces in defence of Islam and their rights as a religious minority in Britain. This increase in Islamic activity in Britain has had a significant impact on the younger generation, abating tendencies towards westernisation and secularisation. Increasingly, young Muslims are coming to see themselves as first and foremost Muslims, and emphasising the
importance of a united *Umma* (community of fellow believers) to defend their position in British society.

The findings from research that I carried out previously among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Coventry and Bradford showed that many young Asian Muslims were using Islam as a guide to redefine their identities in Britain, producing a synthesis of Islamic, Pakistani and British cultural forms. For women in particular, adherence to Islam enabled them to construct roles that gave them more freedom and choice. By taking a more conscious Islamic approach they were able to utilise the rights that their religion gave them as women in the search for freedom from some of the cultural restrictions previously imposed. However, the research also emphasised that this process of cultural redefinition could not be understood without examining the intersectionality of ‘race’, class and gender and its influence on the lives of Asian Muslim young people. Such factors inevitably limited the cultural resources available to these young people.

The overwhelming majority of research on Muslims in Britain had tended to focus exclusively on Asian groups, so for the purposes of this thesis I particularly wanted to study two Muslim populations in Britain. The first aim was to examine the level of diversity that exists among various Muslim groups (in much of the existing theory the concept of ‘Muslim’ is almost taken to be synonymous with that of ‘Pakistani’). The second aim was to analyse the elements that these two groups share, not merely as a result of their religion, but also as a result of their position and status within British society. I therefore chose to study Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots because the former represent an Asian population and the latter a European one. This again has implications for their position in British society, and therefore inevitably has a significant effect on their lives in Britain. The exclusive focus on women in these two communities was dictated by my theoretical interest in the ways in which ethnicity and religion intersected with social class and gender. Although this intersection of social factors had been the object of other scholars’ research, I chose to add a novel dimension by examining it in a comparative framework.

The women I interviewed were chosen because they worked directly or indirectly within the Pakistani or Turkish-speaking populations. I was interested in their views and observations about the two populations, as well as their own experiences of being a second-
generation Pakistani or Turkish-speaking Muslim women in London and more widely in British society. These women can be seen as ‘mediators’ or ‘intermediaries’, which refers to their professional and/or personal role of mediating between the migrant community and the wider society (Lutz 1993). For Lutz such mediators can be seen as advocates for their communities, who manage their role despite the limits and restrictions of operating on the margins of wider society. Second generation women in particular can experience difficulties working in these areas because their education and training has been undertaken in a western society with a ‘western agenda’. This includes the valuation and definition of their ethnic identity and cultural background. They therefore rely on the dominant society’s discourse in order to represent themselves as ‘spokespersons’ for ‘their’ group, even though they have no official status to do so within their own communities. Their ethnicity is not an automatic guarantee of acceptance by other members of their communities. Boundaries can arise from within and from outside. Many of these women have to challenge sexism from within their own communities as well as structural and personal discrimination on the part of wider society.

The aim was to examine the significance of religion and ethnicity for the maintenance and transformation of individual and collective identity, and how they are experienced and evaluated in relation to factors such as ‘race’, class and gender. The accounts of mediators gives a good indication of the subtle differences in meaning and the intersectionality of ‘race’, class, gender and ethnic relations on both the structural (collective) and individual level. Ethnicity needs to be examined with reference to social structures, ‘discursive constructions’, and identity formations and at the level of concrete social practice. In this way, ethnicity can be seen to be appropriated and transformed by both the individual and the group. This thesis therefore aims to provide a greater understanding of the complex and contradictory factors influencing Muslim women in Britain.

Chapter one sets out the theoretical perspective of the thesis by providing a critique of the concept of ethnicity and questioning whether it can provide a useful theoretical tool for empirical analysis. This chapter aims to clarify many of the terms that are used in my analysis and to examine the way in which the meanings of these terms has evolved over the last few decades. It concludes by suggesting the ways in which a more complex representation of
culture and ethnicity can be adopted for sociological purposes; one that allows for social change and the influence of structural factors such as 'race', class and gender, yet at the same time acknowledges that some individuals wish to maintain a sense of common 'identity' and cultural exclusion.

Chapter two examines in detail the situation of Asian Muslims in Britain. It focuses on the notion of Muslim unity that continues to dominate much of the discussion of Muslims in Britain. It examines the factors that have served to promote cultural cohesion among the Asian Muslim communities as well as those factors that produce and maintain internal differentiation. They demonstrate the complex and shifting nature of religious and ethnic variables, and the social identities that are constructed out of these variables, as well as the influence of structural factors such as race, class and gender.

Chapter three examines the literature on Cypriots in Britain, both Turkish and Greek, and the factors that influence the creation, maintenance and transformation of ethnicity and identity. It compares the experiences of Cypriots in relation to other New Commonwealth migrants in Britain, the extent to which they experience similar ethnic disadvantages and what particular cultural resources they have utilised in an effort to overcome some of these disadvantages. It also explores the maintenance of ethnic identity among Cypriots in Britain and their relationships with other ethnic groups, demonstrating the way in which ethnic identity is created and sustained by these relations, as well as transformed in the British environment. It also examines the maintenance and transformation of ethnicity among the second generation and the importance of the position of women to the re-creation of patriarchal norms and values among Cypriots in Britain.

Chapter four deals with methodological aspects of the research, including details of my participant observation in a number of Turkish speaking, Pakistani and Muslim organisations and my in-depth interviews with some of the female workers in these organisations and other women active in their communities. It also discusses the influence of feminist research on methodological debates, and in particular the focus on feminist objectivity. Finally, it also describes the practice and principles of my research, and analyses my experiences of being a white researcher and a woman in light of the discussions outlined.
Chapter five provides a brief overview of the literature on Pakistani, Muslim and Turkish community associations in Britain, together with a description of the roles and objectives of the various organisations that I worked with during my field research. It also examines in more detail the views and experiences of my respondents on the organisations for which they worked and their experiences of working within the Turkish speaking and Pakistani communities.

Chapter six examines social interactions in terms of internal and external relations, through the attitudes, opinions and experiences of the women interviewed, and how these influence the creation, maintenance and transformation of notions of difference and commonality/ethnicity. The area in which my informants live is assessed in terms of its influence on the maintenance of religion and culture, together with the perceived divisions among Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain and their interactions with other groups. It also looks at intergenerational relations and the opinions and experiences of my informants in relation to their own parents and family. Finally, it examines the women’s experiences of racial and ethnic prejudice and discrimination, and the influence of these experiences on Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis in Britain.

Chapter seven considers the position of women within the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot communities and within British society in general. It examines the informants’ views on the position of women in Islam, as well as in relation to Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot traditional norms and values. It explores their opinions on the changing experiences of the first, second and succeeding generations. These changes are believed to be greatest in relation to marriage, education, and employment choices. The aim is to paint a broader picture of the experiences that influence Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in terms of identity formation and their commitment to the maintenance of ethnicity.

Chapter eight examines the importance that my informants placed on religion for themselves and for the second and third generations as a whole. The influence of Pakistan and Cyprus are examined together with the women’s attitudes towards the maintenance of traditional values and customs in relation to both themselves and others. The maintenance of mother tongue languages is also explored in relation to ethnicity. Finally, the chapter examines how these different elements influence the respondents’ assessments of their
identity and the significance of these to the maintenance of ethnicity among Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain.

In the conclusion I summarise my research findings in the context of a theoretical analysis of ethnicity and hybridised identities. I explain some of reasons for the contrast between Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women, whilst also noting the diversity that was evident within these groups. The concept of 'hierarchies of experience' is deployed to provide a theoretical understanding of how individuals make sense of their contrasting and conflicting experiences. This concept seeks to outline how individuals make sense of the world they live in and how they can prioritise different dimensions at different times, in different contexts.

I include a glossary of Turkish, Urdu and Arabic words at the end of the thesis. Words included in this glossary can be seen in the text in Italics. Sources have been referenced in the text by author and year of publication, and appear in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.
Chapter One

Theoretical Issues in the Study of Ethnicity

Since the 1960s there has been increasing emphasis in the social sciences on the importance of 'ethnicity' as an explanatory concept. While some commentators take a positive attitude to the existence of 'ethnic' differentiation, others feel that it is merely another form of potential conflict that cannot be resolved. However, the existence of various ethnic cultures in Britain is clear; the question is how should they be perceived.

The criticisms of ethnicity principally focus on its inability or failure to account for the power relations operating within society and their influence on individual and collective identity. However, despite these criticisms it is clear that an emphasis on culture cannot be abandoned. The existence of cultural differences is essential for understanding questions of belonging, identity and politics. New conceptions of ethnicity aim to provide a radical reworking of the term which takes account of these cultural differences whilst separating ethnicity from the dominant discourses of 'race' and 'nation'. Thus they highlight the importance of placing ethnicity within the context of globalisation and focusing on the interaction between the local and the global. In this way, it is argued, the concept of ethnicity can be used to explore the question of power in terms of its influence on both individuals and groups. Such an approach takes account of the intersectionality of different forms of social differentiation and their influence on culture and identity formation.

This chapter has three main purposes. Firstly, it aims to clarify many of the terms that are used in my analysis of identity formation among Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women in Britain. Secondly, it analyses the way in which the meanings of these terms have evolved over the last few decades. And thirdly, it indicates how my own research is related to preceding conceptual and theoretical debates. The discussion does not pretend to be exhaustive; it merely covers a selection of the contributions that I consider to be significant in themselves and directly relevant to my research.

The chapter begins by exploring the concept of ethnicity: how it is defined, what it entails and why it has come to be seen as such a major feature of British society. It then goes
on to examine some of the problems surrounding the notion of 'ethnicity', and its alleged inability to account for the influence of 'race', class and gender. More recent attempts to study the interplay between 'cultural' and 'structural' forces are highlighted, which emphasise the need for a more complex interpretation of culture and ethnicity. The chapter concludes by examining new conceptions of ethnicity which attempt to acknowledge the influence of these often conflicting and contrasting forms of social relations.

**Ethnicity in Theory and Practice**

The arrival of New Commonwealth migrants into post-war Britain initiated countless public disputes and media debates about the likely future outcome of these 'minority groups', but there was a particular 'model' or framework of assumptions which tended to dominate the debates. This was referred to as the 'immigrant-host' model, and whilst its origins lay within the social sciences it was also depicted in the media and in general political discussion. The immigrant-host model centred on the belief that migrants from the Caribbean and the Asian sub-continent would eventually become 'acculturated', gradually shedding their distinctive identities and cultural norms, and slowly becoming socialised into the dominant values and customs of the host society. Whilst the model admitted that only very limited cultural assimilation was likely for 'primary' settlers, and that racial discrimination was likely to continue to be a barrier as far as the second generation was concerned, it still maintained that eventually New Commonwealth migrants would become completely integrated into British society.

However, by the late 1960s and 1970s there was a gradual realisation that migrant cultures were not simply short-lived phenomena destined to disappear under the dual impact of disruptive migration and the alluring attractions of the host culture. On the contrary, migrants and their descendants appeared to be persistently retaining many elements of their 'original' cultures, modifying them to only a limited extent, and sometimes emphasising them even more fervently with the passage of time. It became increasingly obvious, therefore, that those cultural allegiances warranted special attention. Thus from the 1960s onwards there was a concerted effort to outline the distinguishing cultural features of selected groups of New Commonwealth migrants, charting the ways in which these groups differed in such
things as language, religion, core values and social attitudes, kinship patterns, diet and routine life styles. This marked the beginning of ‘ethnic studies’ as a framework of analysis.

Milton Yinger (1981:250) has defined an ‘ethnic group’:

A segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves and/or by others, to share a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture, and who, in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common origin and cultures are significant ingredients.

Thus the key features of ethnic groups would seem to be: shared culture, regular interaction and a sense of ‘belonging’, accompanied by an almost ‘cult like mystique’, which secures the bonds of unity between the members (Schermerhorn 1970). The key term in ethnic studies is ‘culture’, which is seen as the distinctive ‘design for living’ that a group possesses, the sum total of its rules and guides for shaping behaviour and patterning its way of life. These cultural bonds can be so strong that when members move from one country to another they frequently make determined efforts to sustain their ethnic identity by pursuing traditional religious and cultural customs, maintaining dietary habits, and keeping alive the languages and dialects of their homelands. It has also been suggested that certain types of social experience and group formation are particularly conducive to the emergence of clearly defined ethnic groups, and the most familiar examples of ethnic groups are usually considered to be based on nations, territorial units, religious codes, common language, and tribal or clan membership.

Some writers have further suggested that ‘race’ is another likely source of ‘ethnicity’, so that one might expect the boundaries between ‘races’ to coincide with the boundaries between ethnic groups. However, Michael Lyon (1972) argues that a clear distinction can be made between a ‘racial category’ and an ‘ethnic group’. Firstly, he argues an ethnic group is defined culturally, whereas a racial group is physically defined. Secondly, he states that an ethnic group actively erects barriers between itself and other groups, whereas a racial group tends to be forcibly excluded and prevented from freely interacting with other groups. Thirdly, Lyon argues that ethnic groups display a sense of solidarity that provides a substantial capacity for mobilisation of their collective interests, whereas racial groups can only be considered to constitute ‘residual categories’ with little or no prospects for collective action.
Accordingly, Lyon argues that African Caribbeans in Britain constitute a racial
category, for although they possess some common cultural characteristics they are the
consequence of slavery and colonialism. The negative connotations that such a past holds
means that these characteristics cannot provide the basis for positive group identity in
reaction to their racial categorisation within Britain, and they therefore lack any means to
challenge their socio-economic position in society. Migrants from the Asian subcontinent,
however, according to Lyon, constitute a number of different ethnic groups, the three main
ones being Pakistanis, Indian Gujaratis and Indian Punjabis. All of these groups possess a
strong historic culture and sense of cohesion that provide a basis for positive group
identification. Such identification, Lyon argues, provides these Asian ‘ethnic groups’ with a
means to resist racial categorisation by British society.

According to Robert Miles (1982), Lyon has clearly taken the notions of boundary
and ethnic group from Fredrik Barth’s (1969) work; but his analysis differs from that of Barth
in two fundamental ways. Firstly, Lyon states that social boundaries can be established and
maintained both internally and externally. Secondly, he claims that social boundaries that are
established and maintained externally can be formed only through the identity of phenotypical
criteria. However, Miles argues, in this way Lyon ignores the most innovative characteristic of
Barth’s analysis, that is, his claim that ethnic groups are defined by the process of boundary
maintenance and not by the fact of cultural difference per se. Lyon’s conceptualisation
represents an attempt to sort out important terms and to avoid confusion, but ultimately it fails
to establish a clear distinction. For example, there is no convincing reason why a racial group
cannot be ‘self-defined’, possessing a positive sense of its own identity and purpose, and
displaying considerable potential for political and social mobilisation. The experience of
racism itself may help produce a unifying cultural identity, as in the case of black people in
the United States and Britain. Moreover, members of a racial group tend to live in the same
areas and grow to share the same economic and social experiences, and from this a
common culture may develop. Consequently, the rigid separation of ‘race’ and ‘ethnic group’
cannot be sustained.

Previous definitions of ethnicity tended to emphasise a group’s distinctive culture as
marking it out as different or distinct from other members of society. Fredrik Barth (1969)
however, highlighted the limitations of such an approach. He argues that cultural characteristics cannot be considered adequate signifiers of an ethnic group, for such cultural traits are not fixed and impermeable but are constantly being changed and modified by the group itself. It is therefore impossible, Barth argues, to define an ethnic group and explain its separate status by the cultural characteristics it displays, as those characteristics are likely to change over time. Instead, he argues, it is necessary to examine the power relationships between different 'ethnic groups' and the factors which help in the maintenance (or loss) of cultural characteristics.

Patricia Jeffery's work (1976), one of the earliest in the 'ethnic studies' framework, marks a return to Barth's analysis, by focusing on the social processes involved in non-assimilation and the maintenance of ethnic boundaries. Like Barth, she argues that cultural differences and similarities are not necessarily compatible with the way social relationships are patterned, and it is therefore necessary to concentrate on the structural aspects of the situation. It is the social (or structural) processes that enable distinct ethnic groups to co-exist through time, even when they occupy the same territory and when their members have social relationships not only within the ethnic group but also with members of the other group. Thus for Jeffery, an important factor for Pakistanis in Britain is the links which extend outside Britain to the sending country. Such elements, previously ignored by ethnographic studies, encourage Pakistanis to maintain their culture, as their desire is to eventually return home. However, while Jeffery feels that Barth has made an important contribution to the study of 'ethnic relations' and the ways in which social factors help to maintain cultural differences, she believes that he deals only superficially with the factor of power. Thus, in her view, maintaining an ethnic identity may for some individuals merely represent a poor substitute for their unfulfilled desire to be accepted by the wider society. However, she states that this particular 'drawback' to Barth's analysis is not crucial for her Muslim informants since they wish to maintain their separation from British people, and do not want to be merged with them.

A similar but more detailed analysis is offered by Sandra Wallman (1979, 1986). She states that (1979:ix), 'Ethnicity refers generally to the perception of group difference and so to social boundaries between sections of a population. In this sense ethnic difference is the
recognition of a contrast between “us” and “them”. For Wallman, social boundaries can be marked by a number of different criteria and these can change from one social context to another. It is not the source of differentiation between groups that is important, as these merely represent potential boundary markers; it is the perception and attributions of significance to such difference which is the foundation of ethnicity. In addition, she claims that ethnicity can be viewed in a number of ways. It may be regarded as a resource which can at times be used to the advantage of ‘a social, cultural or racial category of people’; it can have no meaning or value at all at other times; and it can, at still others, be considered a ‘liability’ to be avoided or denied as far as possible. However, Wallman argues (1979:14), ‘All the evidence points to the conclusion that ethnicity will only be manifest where it is useful; and that it will only be useful and manifest in contexts appropriate to it’.

James Watson (1977) takes what he calls the ‘political approach’ to ethnicity, found in the work of Cohen (1969). Cohen argues that alliances based on ethnicity function like ‘informal interest groups’ and should therefore be seen as political entities that operate through the identity of shared ‘culture’. According to Watson, ethnicity in this context only has meaning when two or more groups are interacting and competing for control over scarce resources. Like Wallman, he believes that ethnicity can change and be modified according to political and economic circumstances. However, Watson states that one of the limitations of the ethnicity studies to date is their inability to sort out the interconnections between class and ethnicity, and he admits that the contributions to ‘Between Two Cultures’ are no exception.

In an attempt to deal with the notion of power, Verity Saifullah Khan (1982) argues that the relationship between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups is a relationship of power that is manifest in, and maintained by, the economic and social order. Thus Saifullah Khan defines culture as ‘the system of shared meanings developed in a social and economic context that has a particular historical and political background’ (1982:197). Culture only has reality within the social context from which it is derived and which it helps to structure. What is of interest for Saifullah Khan is not the fact of cultural difference, but the process by which, for example, migrants from the Indian sub-continent become aware of their difference once in social contact with sections of the majority population. Saifullah Khan uses ethnicity,
therefore, to refer to the development and maintenance of ethnic awareness and identity. Thus she claims that one cannot speak of 'Pakistani ethnicity' in any meaningful sense because migrants from Pakistan rarely consider themselves as sharing common characteristics. Rather, the sense of difference with the majority population in Britain is perceived in relation to their family and fellow villagers from the same region. This subjective component refracts the considerable social differentiation within the population of Pakistanis in Britain.

For Saifullah-Khan, therefore, the main focus should be on the perception of difference, which is dependent on how individuals and groups define a system: what the main components of culture are and how they relate to the social environment and the economy. It is the lack of fit between these two notions that to Saifullah-Khan is of prime importance to ethnicity. However, having stressed the importance of structural determinants in the process of 'ethnic identity', she still focuses on culture as her prime concern. Hence she talks about majority/minority relations in terms of the influence of the 'dominant culture' on the 'social interaction' of 'ethnic groups'. The existence of racism is acknowledged, but only in its cultural form. As Lawrence (1982) argues, what seems to go unnoticed is the fact that the communities that 'ethnic minorities' live in and the culture they operate under, are subject to conditions which are not of their own making. Thus the problem for Saifullah-Khan and for ethnicity studies as a whole is that they tend to obscure the relationships of power and treat ethnicity as a meeting of cultures on equal terms.

Ellis Cashmore and Barry Troyna (1990) argue that whilst they acknowledge the fact that Asians and blacks in Britain form a disadvantaged class due to their exploited positions in the division of labour, both groups have developed unique customs, practices, beliefs, languages, diets and leisure activities, that may be considered ethnic responses. Thus although the position of blacks and Asians in inner city areas was assisted by employment markets which more or less determined which part of the country they could settle in and housing policies consigning them to specific zones of the cities, the migrants' 'obvious' desire to avoid feeling estranged and different combined to produce a ghettoization of the inner cities.
Inside the zones, distinct immigrant communities developed. It gave Caribbeans a feeling of separateness that they perhaps didn't crave when they first set foot in the UK. The hostile reception would have promoted experiences of isolation; grouping together with others that had undergone similar experiences would have served to use this. At the same time, this provided emotional support, a feeling of group solidarity or togetherness and a sense of community.

(1990:149)

Cashmore and Troyana believe that there is no meaningful way of defining ethnicity apart from its being a reflection of 'the positive tendencies of identification and inclusion'. They argue that ethnicity cannot be seen as only related to class. Instead they attempt to relate the different forms of ethnicity to changes in group consciousness and social condition. Thus they state that at first conditions in Britain allowed ethnic groups only limited scope and that ethnicity was designed more for promoting 'cohesion, solidarity and comfort', although the later industrial disputes, particularly amongst Asians, affirm their potential for resistance. However, they argue, it was the rise of the Rastafarian movement in the mid-1970s and 1980s and the 1981 Riots that can be seen as the beginning of more formative action and heralded the complete rejection of society and its values by the second generation, which was subsequently adopted by 'similarly disposed' white working-class youth.

Roger Ballard's (1994) edited collection 'Desh Pardesh' represents one of the most recent attempts to sort out some of the problems in ethnic studies. He attempts to locate common strategies used to create 'Desh Pardesh' ('home from home' or 'at home abroad') amongst 'ethnic minorities' generally. With reference to the second generation, he argues, there are two important factors to consider: first, they employ a similar strategy to rejecting assimilation by relying on their own meaning for creating 'Desh Pardesh'; second, each group has its own specific human and cultural resources. Hence each community is different, the overall result being 'steady progress and ever-growing diversity'. According to Ballard, the second generation participates more fully in the wider social order and is therefore subject to different moral and cultural conventions. As a result they are skilled 'cultural navigators'. For Ballard, the problem with the notion of 'culture conflict' stemmed from the mistaken notion that culture is the comprehensive determinant of behaviour. Instead, Ballard conceives of
culture as codes, and individuals possess the ability to switch from one code to another. In conclusion, Ballard states that the second generation are well aware of differences between the majority society and their parents, and therefore are strongly committed to ordering their own lives on their own terms; yet their commitment to 'Desh Pardesh' remains. Ballard's work represents an important contribution to the analysis of culture, and to an understanding of the way in which individuals make sense of different and often competing cultural systems. However, what Ballard fails to explain is why it is that the second generation continue to build a 'home from home', and the factors that influence this phenomenon.

A Critique of Ethnicity Studies

The preceding ethnographies by no means exhaust the entire repertoire of available studies, but they do illustrate the general direction and familiar preoccupations of this approach. The framework of assumptions involved in such analysis, according to Miles (1982), in many ways represented a breaking of the mould of 'race relations' research. Firstly, by concentrating attention on the perception that a particular ethnic group possesses of the cultural characteristics that mark it off from the rest of the population, it also takes account of ethnic groups whose phenotypical characteristics are very similar to those of the majority population (such as the Irish, the Italians and the Cypriots). Such groups, although similar in appearance to the majority of the population, have experienced a degree of ideological, political and economic exclusion similar to that faced by New Commonwealth migrants. This, Miles argues (1982:64), would seem to support the notion that 'skin colour or any other phenotypical characteristic is not itself an active determinant of social conflict, but such differences can serve as a focus for or symbol of conflict which has an origin in other, quite distinct characteristics'. Thus, where a group possesses no distinct phenotypical differences, other cultural characteristics may be given social significance to mark off that group from the majority population. Consequently, Miles argues, what is of prime importance is the way in which phenotypical difference is perceived and given significance rather than the actual characteristics of that difference.

Secondly, ethnicity studies have encouraged an awareness of the nature and extent of cultural heterogeneity amongst New Commonwealth migrants. Thus although it can be
demonstrated that New Commonwealth migrants share a common experience of racial discrimination there are also major differences between the various groups. This difference, expressed in cultural terms, can act as a major barrier to the development of a sense of cohesion and solidarity between these different groups based on an awareness of their common experience of racial discrimination. The chances of mass black political mobilisation are therefore severely limited. Thirdly, the emphasis on ethnicity has had the effect of restoring the ethnic minorities to the position of 'active subjects', fully human beings with their own aspirations, allegiances and consciousness (Miles 1982). If nothing else, ethnicity studies have successfully challenged the notion, previously neglected by 'race relations' research, of migrants as mere empty vessels or passive victims without a history and consciousness of their own.

Fourthly, because of its concern with the actor's definition of the situation, 'ethnic relations' research breaks with the notion of 'immigrant' in preference of 'migrant'. This distinction is significant because the term 'immigrant' refers to an individual who moves to another country with the intention of settling there permanently, whereas the term 'migrant' simply denotes an individual who lives in another country. Thus emphasis is placed on the fact that New Commonwealth citizens who came to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s did not intend to settle permanently in this country, but rather their aim was to gain sufficient money to improve their social, political and economic position back home. Consequently, the migrants maintain considerable links with the areas from which they migrated and this has considerably influenced their attitudes towards participation in British society. Their whole way of life consists of preparation for return to their home country, a desire to increase their savings and an unwillingness to participate in British culture for fear of weakening their own culture and identity (Anwar 1979; Robinson 1986). Fifth, and following from the previous point, 'ethnic relations' research points to the significance of studying the political economy of labour migration. By conceiving migration as a chain that connects the country of the migrant's origin with Britain, there is a clear suggestion that the reasons for and effects of migration have to be considered in relation to both ends of the chain (Miles, 1982; Watson, 1977).
Part of the theoretical problem consists in explaining why ethnic groups achieve prominence in the first place. James McKay (1982) identifies two opposing schools of explanation for the importance of ethnic groups in modern industrial societies: the 'primordialist' and the 'mobilisationist' arguments. Primordialists contend that the strength of ethnicity derives from the way it meets the human need for deep-seated, sacred, non-contractual attachments. Ethnic allegiances answer our 'natural' need for belonging and community, and so ethnic groups emerge spontaneously from the innermost recesses of human nature. A more technical version of primordialism is afforded by 'sociobiology' (van den Berghe, 1978) which suggests that ethnic or racial attachments are coded in the genes. Ethnicity is explained in sociobiology as a particular example of 'kin selection', or the tendency to show favouritism to people of similar appearance or kin networks, in order that the common genes have a better chance of evolutionary survival.

The 'mobilisationist' school, on the other hand, suggests that ethnic loyalties are peripheral rather than primordial, and so groups only mobilise ethnic symbols when it offers them some strategic advantage in obtaining access to social, political or economic resources. In the British context, these mobilisationist arguments are usually translated into the concept of 'reactive ethnicity', which conveys the tendency for ethnic groups' members to construct ethnicity as a defence against racism and discrimination. Thus, Ballard and Ballard (1977) describe the ethnic ties of first-generation Sikhs as little more than a somewhat muted expression of their cultural traditions; the second-generation, however, attempted to strike compromises with British society, but were stung into 'reactive' pride in ethnicity because of the continuing experience of repeated rebuffs and racist humiliations. Moreover, this victimisation created a greater awareness of the similar problems faced by other ethnic groups, and so the second generations are increasingly reaching beyond the more overarching pan-Asian identity. As members of single ethnic groups of cross-alliances, the members manipulate ethnic symbols to build a positive identity and to engage in political and economic activity to promote their material interests.

These mobilisationist views helpfully avoid the rather mystical and circular arguments of the primordialist approach, and they appear more useful in understanding the ebb and flow of ethnic loyalties. However, it is not always clear what particular 'interests' are being
promoted or defended. If the interests involved are not just material, but include identity, then this merely seems to take us back to primordial arguments. Also, just how strong are the tendencies to 'race' (or 'Black' or 'Asian') alliances in comparison with specific 'ethnic' ties or even broad 'class' groupings? How much is the stress on ethnicity due to 'reaction', and how much to a more straightforward 'choice' to follow cultural traditions? Ethnicity obviously involves both 'emotional' and 'strategic' factors, and it would be premature to claim that these questions have been resolved.

For ethnicity studies researchers, what is of importance is not 'racially defined groups' and the effects of racism and discrimination, but 'ethnic groups' who are self-defined and whose attitudes and values have to be assessed in terms of their distinct culture. Thus their cultural distinctiveness becomes the primary object of inquiry. In this way, ethnicity studies claim to be able to account for the contrast between 'strong' Asian cultures on the one hand, and 'weak' African Caribbean cultures on the other. The key term here according to Errol Lawrence (1982:100) is 'acculturation', which refers to the 'culture stripping' or 'cultural castration' which African slaves supposedly underwent during slavery. Ken Pryce (1979) argues that African Caribbean cultures are derivatives of European cultures and it is partly for this reason that he views them as being weak. They are 'weak' because they cannot give African Caribbeans a sense of their 'true' identity; these cultures reproduce 'anomic' personalities. Asian cultures on the other hand, are not seen as having undergone the traumatic process of acculturation and their languages, religious and social institutions and family systems are, consequently, viewed as having remained more or less intact. However, as Lawrence (1982:112) points out, studies so far have failed to examine the impact of British imperialism on the experiences of Asian people:

What is implied if this is not taken into account is that the Asian subcontinent has enjoyed an uninterrupted historical development. Such an omission is, to say the least, misleading and can only serve to fuel the commonly held belief...that the poverty and hardships of these 'underdeveloped' regions are the result primarily of their 'backward' and 'rigid' social and cultural institutions.

According to Miles, what is most striking about the majority of the groups of migrants that came to Britain is not so much their cultural difference from each other and from the 'majority'
population but rather the similarity of the material circumstances that they experienced before their migration and the experience of the migration process itself.

Thus one of the major inadequacies of 'ethnic studies' research is its failure to make connections at the structural level between the home country of the migrants and the wider world economy. They see 'culture' as a distinct entity, unconnected with other social processes. The effect of this, according to Lawrence, is to produce a static and idealised vision of migrant cultures which cannot account for class, caste or regional differences and which cannot explain the changes that have occurred within these cultures. In addition, Lawrence states, ethnicity studies are unable to deal with the question of power. For them power is not an issue, for they see all sections of society as being subject to the same political and economic pressures. However, he argues (1982:116):

It seems to us that there are power relations in operation here that limit the range of choices black people can make. They do not 'choose' to live in inadequate housing any more than they 'choose' to do 'shift-work'. Given the frequency, for example, of violent physical attacks upon them, and the reluctance of the police to investigate these attacks, it makes a good deal of sense to remain within the community where support, protection and mutual defence can be relied on. This cannot be characterised simply as a 'cultural preference' interacting with 'external determinants'.

One of the major criticisms voiced against ethnicity studies is that they attach ultimate 'blame' to the minority ethnic groups themselves. It is argued that these studies, by focusing their attention on the migrants' cultural distinctiveness from the 'indigenous' British population, tend to emphasise the 'pathological' or 'inappropriate' nature of these cultures. For example, crime amongst West Indians is seen as resulting from their 'weak' family structures rather than their depressed position in society; the disadvantaged position of Asian women in the employment market is attributed to their traditionally 'subordinate' role rather than from the exploitation of their labour in Britain. The predominant emphasis on ethnic cultures conveniently deflects attention away from the racism endemic in British society. 'Race' problems are subsequently framed in terms of 'mutual misunderstandings' and the solutions are posited along the tame lines of 'multi-cultural education' and 'cultural pluralism'. Jenny
Bourne (1980:346) bitterly attacks ethnicity theorists, who, she argues, 'by freezing the
dynamics of race struggle in culture and ethnicity, subserve the interests of the state'.

Paul Gilroy (1987) claims that this 'evolution of racism from vulgar to cultural forms'
can be seen quite clearly in the way in which the categorisation of 'races' has moved away
from the all-encompassing category of 'black' referring to both Afro-Caribbean and Asians,
and instead made it applicable only to those of African descent; thus inhibiting the prospect of
Afro-Asian unity in the struggle to combat racism. He states that (1987:39):

This development has its origins in an understanding of 'race' that stresses the
obstacles to political accommodation erected between groups by culture and
ethnicity. Its conception of cultural differences as fixed, solid almost biological
properties of human relations is similar to the theory of 'racial' and national
differences propounded by the radical right. It has been amplified and reflected
politically in special state policy and provision for 'ethnic minorities' (invariably
defined so that they coincide with the old idea of biological 'races'). These policy
initiatives have played a part in the fracturing of the inclusive definition of black.
They have institutionalised the desire to meet minority needs that are perceived
to be distinct and separate though formally equal.

Thus, Gilroy argues, today's British racism is much more subtle and elusive than previous
forms. It is no longer defined in terms of notions of inferiority and superiority associated with
the period of British expansion overseas, but has become anchored to the decline of the
national economy. The process of national decline is presented as coinciding with the cultural
contamination of British society and its values by alien strains. Alien cultures come to be seen
as a threat to society's values and norms, and thus the decline of the national economy is
viewed as being precipitated by the arrival of blacks. Recognising this fundamental
development, Gilroy argues, enables one to understand how the gap between radical and
conservative, socialist and openly racist theories 'race' and explanations of racial
discrimination have been narrowed so considerably.

Martin Barker (1981) has labelled this apparent change in conception 'the new
racism', and he sees its major role as being to account for the present situation of national
decline. Its uniqueness, it is argued, stems from its ability to combine ideas of patriotism,
nationalism, xenophobia, Britishness and gender difference into a complex system which replaces notions of 'race' difference with those of culture and national identity. These perceived cultural differences are reproduced in educational institutions and, above all, in family life. However, whether or not such an emphasis on cultural difference or preference can be considered to constitute a 'new racism' (and many would argue that it cannot) such an emphasis can be used in explaining or justifying the segregation of migrants into the bottom sections of society, concentrated in inner city areas and in low paid, unskilled work. Thus one of the major problems of interpretation confronting ethnic studies researchers is the difficult task of striking the correct balance, one which gives due weight to cultural variations without at the same time exaggerating the gap which exists between the various ethnic minority cultures and, between them and the rather under-researched 'host' culture (or, more appropriately, host cultures).

Furthermore, accusations of ethnocentrism are frequently hurled at writers on ethnicity; it is frequently alleged that sexist assumptions creep into the descriptions of Asian females. Thus, a distorted stereotype of 'passive' Asian females is circulated, in which they are portrayed as 'subjugated' and 'oppressed' by patriarchal Asian culture. Pratibha Parmar (1982) argues that this patronising over-simplification ignores the brave and constructive role played by Asian women in resisting racism, capitalism and patriarchy. These criticisms of ethnic studies certainly deserve attention, but it is also important to note that mainstream ethnicity writers do not always agree on these descriptions and evaluations. Moreover, not all the researchers are white or male. And it would be curious if ethnic cultures contained no 'internal' problems, tensions or weaknesses, especially given the damaging history of racism and the dislocating impact of migration.

According to such writers as Carby (1982) Trivedi (1984) and Westwood and Bhachu (1988), Asian women (and black women in general) remain an invisible minority in Britain, largely ignored by the majority population, or if considered at all, discussed in terms of common stereotypical images. Thus, Asian families are seen to be 'unhealthily strong', cohesive and controlling of their members. Asian women are portrayed as passive victims of their religion and culture, exploited and oppressed by their menfolk and forced to stay in the home. Focus has been placed on the arranged marriage system and the practice of purdah,
which are considered to form the primary source of oppression for young Asian Women. However, as Amos and Parmar (1982) point out, such views fail to understand the cultural traditions of Asian people and the important part they play in the growth and development of Asian women, and because they do not understand them they label them as 'backward' or 'inferior'. Thus cultural traditions such as purdah and arranged marriages are highlighted as repressive features of Asian society which exploit women in a way that is unacceptable to the 'more liberated' West. These images of 'oppression', according to Amos and Parmar (1984), serve to perpetuate racist stereotypes in Britain and further justify the institutionalisation of racism. Parmar (1988) argues that such analyses have focused on one form of oppression at the exclusion of another. In order to understand the position of Asian (and black) women in Britain, she argues it is necessary to examine the factors of 'race', gender and class that simultaneously shape their experiences and contribute to their lack of power in society.

The Importance of Race, Class and Gender

For ethnicity studies researchers, what is of importance is not 'racially defined groups' and the effects of racism and discrimination, but 'ethnic groups' who are self-defined and whose attitudes and values have to be assessed in terms of their distinct culture. Thus their cultural distinctiveness becomes the primary object of inquiry. Such an analysis, while recognising the fact that these cultures form an important part of the individuals' lives, fails to examine the social, political and economic features involved. However, for many commentators (Miles 1982; Phizacklea 1984, Gilroy 1987), the underlying problems are structural ones of power and conflict, and these issues cannot be tackled by abstract debates about 'culture'. Racial disadvantage, it is argued, is not the 'natural' outcome of a multi-cultural society in which some ethnic groups cling to cultural values: it is the structural outcome of an exploitative oppressive society which can only be transformed through radical change. As Jenny Bourne (1980:345) states:

Reactive ethnicity', or cultural resistance, can only be a resistance to racialism in British society. Racialism is not about power but about cultural superiority.

Racism is not about cultural superiority but about power; and the resistance to
racism must in the final analysis be political resistance, expressed perhaps in
cultural forms.

What Bourne is arguing here, is that the relationship between different ethnic groups in
Britain is one of power. Ethnicity theorists, by focusing solely on culture, fail to account for
these power relationships. It is the racism in society, Bourne argues, which points to political
struggle along ‘race’ lines; and it is the denial of that struggle which produces ethnic
organisation that has no power. Likewise, Miles and Phizacklea (1979) argue, it is racial
discrimination that has forced black people to organise ethnically, and because the cultural
characteristics of Asians and African-Caribbeans are so different collective organisation is
impossible. Thus by focusing on ethnicity and the reinforcement of cultural values, the
common fight against racism has been divided, the various groups split into the component
parts and black people as a whole rendered powerless.

In this respect, several commentators have attempted to show how, by concentrating
solely on aspects of culture, ethnicity studies researchers have misinterpreted what are, in
fact, ‘racial’ situations. Annie Phizacklea (1990), in her study of the fashion industry, provides
a contrasting view of ‘ethnic entrepreneurship’ from the traditional cultural theories which
focus on the characteristics which certain ethnic groups possess that are favourable to
entrepreneurial success, such as hard work and risk-taking. Instead, she argues that for
many minority ethnic groups entrepreneurship has become a necessity. With the continuing
high levels of unemployment in Britain and the persistent presence of racial discrimination
many Asians and Afro-Caribbeans have found it necessary to adapt their own skills and
resources to create their own employment. In this way, Phizacklea argues, entrepreneurship
can be regarded as ‘a form of disguised unemployment’ (1990:80).

In addition, Phizacklea argues that the disparity that exists between different ethnic
groups in terms of their involvement in entrepreneurial activities can be explained in part by
differential rates of access to cheap and flexible female labour. She states that: ‘My
contention is that those ethnic groups deemed to be more successful in the business world
than others are characterised by social structures that give easier access to female labour
subordinated to patriarchal control mechanisms’. This situation, Phizacklea argues needs to
be examined in the context of sexist immigration legislation that has reinforced and aided the
reproduction of patriarchal expectations of women's dependency. With respect to Asian migration, this was predominantly male-led; the men came over to Britain to work for a short time in order to earn enough money to buy land and property at home. However, restrictive immigration legislation for New Commonwealth citizens, introduced in 1962, encouraged many men to bring over their wives and family to join them in Britain. Thus, according to Phizacklea (1990:95): ‘the fact that many minority women had no choice but to enter as a family woman on a voucher sponsored by a relative has had a major impact on the terms upon which they entered British labour markets’.

Phizacklea is highly critical of cultural explanations that she believes provide a useful justification for exploitation. Such explanations see ‘ethnic’ businesses as providing a valuable source of employment for minority women who are prevented from finding alternative work because of racial discrimination and the decline in manufacturing jobs. In addition, it is argued, the jobs available to these women are limited by the women’s own ‘disadvantages’, such as poor language skills, cultural preferences and a lack of relevant skills and qualifications. Phizacklea refutes these claims, stating that ‘it is imperative to recognise that it is racism and discrimination that constrain choice and force many minority men into the entrepreneurial option and thus minority women to work for them’ (1990:93).

Ann Phoenix (1988), using data from a study of young Afro-Caribbean and white women in the process of motherhood, argues against the use of narrow definitions of culture for explanation. She states that such explanations are unsatisfactory because they serve to reinforce the notion that black people are deviants from the norms of white British behaviour. Phoenix (1968:153) argues that:

Concentration on cultural differences between black people and white people has frequently obscured the fact that cultural beliefs, identities, and practices necessarily embody the structural forces that affect people's lives, and that culture itself is dynamic rather than static. In particular, analyses of class, race and gender are crucial to the understanding of British society and of individual behaviours, since the intersection of these structural forces serves to locate individuals in their social positions and also to produce social considerations of beliefs and identities.
Thus Phoenix highlights the importance of looking at racism, class relations, and gender as factors in explaining and describing the processes whereby young black and white women become mothers. In this way, she emphasises the fact that although there are experiences, such as racism, that are specific to black women, the two groups do share common experiences relating to their gender and class position. Phoenix thus rejects cultural explanations of early motherhood among Afro-Caribbean women as resulting primarily from the cultural traditions of specific regions of the Caribbean, and instead attributes it to the class forces operating in British society, class forces that also impress upon the lives of young white women.

**Culture Re-defined**

However, Phoenix does not believe that culture is irrelevant to the study of 'ethnic and racial minorities' or that it is never legitimate to compare black people and white people. However, complex (rather than simple) representations of culture need to be used which embody the structural influences of class, gender, and race, which affect white people's as well as black people's lives. This sort of approach takes account of the experiences that black and white people share as the result of their gender and class positions, whilst recognising that racism divides white people from black people and stops them from being aware of their similarities. The narrow representations of cultural influence cannot portray these complexities, and are therefore inadequate for the explanation of human behaviour.

According to Paul Gilroy, what is needed is the incorporation of a more sophisticated theory of culture into the political analysis of 'race' and racism in Britain by claiming the term back from ethnicity. Culture should not be seen as a 'fixed and impermeable feature of social relations', but, instead, the active, dynamic aspects of cultural life should be emphasised. Gilroy states that one need only to examine the changing nature of culture within the black communities in Britain to see this active use of culture:

Black British cultures have been created from diverse and contradictory elements apprehended through discontinuous histories. They have been formed in a field of force between the poles of under- and overdevelopment, periphery and centre. Their bi-lingual character expresses these origins and dislocates the
languages of sometimes antagonistic political formations - black and white, slave and slaveholder, class, people, nation and locality into new meanings.

(Gilroy 1987:218)

Gilroy uses culture in a far more constructive way than previous researchers, and links it very much with race, gender and class. He talks about culture not in a narrow sense but as a means of resistance, as a vehicle for social change. The syncretic cultures of black people in Britain, he argues, have freed cultural practices from their origin or source and used them to develop 'new patterns of meta-communication' which provide a solid basis for their collective identity. In this way, he argues, 'The defensive walls around each sub-culture gradually crumble and new forms with even more complex genealogies are created in the synthesis and transcendence of previous styles' (1987:217). For Gilroy, these new forms of expressive black culture do not develop along ethnically absolute lines but in complex, dynamic patterns of syncretism, which elicit new definitions of what it means to be black based on the experiences of black people globally.

Part of the problem with previous theories of ethnicity, Nimmi Hutnik (1991) argues, is that they tended to assume that there was a direct relationship between an individual's 'strategy of self-categorisation' and the 'style of cultural adaptation' they adopted for themselves. In this way, someone defining him or herself as Indian would be expected to display attitudes and behavioural patterns that were consistent with this categorisation. Thus, for Hutnik, focus on the presence of one was used as an indication of the other. However, evidence would seem to suggest that the relationship between self-categorisation and styles of cultural adaptation is much more complex. Strategies of self-categorisation, she argues, may be quite unconnected with styles of cultural adaptation, and may subsequently obtain 'functional autonomy'. Definitions of ethnicity that emphasise 'shared sense of peoplehood' and 'common cultural tradition', are therefore inadequate. Such definitions, Hutnik argues, are unable to account for the second and third generation who, despite displaying strong styles of cultural adaptation, nevertheless maintain a strong commitment to their ethnic heritage in terms of their strategy of self-categorisation. Thus Hutnik (1991:159) argues: 'not all ethnic minority individuals have an “ethnic identity”, in that they may eschew the cultural traditions of their group. However, all have a method of ethnic identification that is manifest in
a strategy of self-categorisation and a style of cultural adaptation'. To account for this distinction, she argues, the concept of ethnic minority identity must be revised. For Hutnik, the notion of functional autonomy seems to account for the recent rise of ethnicity. It represents an increase of 'dissociative self-categorisation' despite greater levels of cultural adaptation in terms of the country of residence.

Similarly, Ann Swidler (1986) also examines the relationship between culture and action. The problem with previous theories, she argues, is that they envisage human action in terms of individual acts. Thus they believe that particular actions are chosen individually, i.e. one at a time, according to an individual's values and interests. Swidler, on the other hand, argues that actions are not isolated phenomena, but are integrated into larger networks that she refers to as 'strategies of action'. In this way, culture shapes action by providing the resources from which strategies of action are constructed. Thus the relationship between culture and action is built on the fact that individuals rely on culturally acquired skills, habits, views, and attitudes in order to develop particular patterns of action.

Swidler's theory acknowledges the fact that culture is not a unified system, constant and unchanging, 'that pushes action in a constant direction', but rather that all cultures contain a multiplicity of varying and conflicting symbols, values and 'guides to action' (Swidler 1986:277). She thus sees culture as a 'tool kit' or 'repertoire' from which individuals can select differing elements for constructing lines of action. For Swidler, individuals are not 'passive cultural dopes', but active and often skilled users of culture who possess the ability to choose different lines of action in different circumstances, according to culturally-based knowledge they have at their disposal. Thus although culture provides a variety of tools from which people can construct different strategies of action to achieve different life goals, culture nevertheless restricts action in that people are most likely to choose lines of action for which their 'cultural equipment' is best suited.

To assess the influence of culture, Swidler distinguishes between the role of culture in settled and unsettled lives. In the case of settled lives, Swidler argues, culture is more closely integrated with action, indeed they seem to reinforce each other. It is therefore difficult to see clearly the relationship between culture and action. In settled cultural periods culture provides the resources from which individual and groups construct strategies of action.
However, such cultural resources are diverse and thus individuals will usually choose specific resources to construct different strategies of action in different situations. Settled cultures therefore support various lines of action, while at the same time, obscuring culture's independent influence.

For Swidler, settled cultures also warrant a distinctive explanation. Firstly, although culture provides the 'tool kit of resources' from which individuals can select different strategies of action, the construction of such a strategy necessarily involves choosing particular cultural elements and investing them with certain meanings in specific historical circumstances. Thus in this instance, culture can not be said to cause action, as both the cultural elements and the strategy of action are chosen simultaneously. Indeed, the meanings given to particular cultural elements depend, in part, on the life strategy of which they are a part. Nevertheless, the role of culture is significant in that it provides the resources from which a strategy of action is created. Furthermore, as Swidler argues, as specific cultural resources become more central to an individual's life, and they become more fully invested with meaning, they give stability to the strategies of action individuals have developed. Secondly, according to Swidler: 'the influence of culture in settled lives is especially strong in structuring those institutionalised, but recurrent situations in which people act in concert' (Swidler 1986:281).

It is during unsettled periods that culture is most subject to change. To assess how cultural change occurs in these situations, Swidler distinguishes between ideologies, traditions and common sense. She describes an ideology as 'a highly articulated, self-conscious belief and ritual system, aspiring to offer a unified answer to problems of social action' (Swidler 1986:278). For Swidler, ideologies mark the first phase in the development of a 'system of cultural meaning'. Once an ideology becomes accepted by a specific group of people, it can become a tradition. Traditions also represent 'articulated cultural beliefs and practices', but ones which people take for granted so that they seem 'inevitable parts of life'. Swidler argues that the same belief system, such as a religion, may be regarded as an ideology by some people and as a tradition by others and it is possible under certain historical circumstances for a belief system previously considered a tradition to become an ideology. The final phase of this cultural transformation is common sense: 'a set of assumptions so
unconscious as to seem a natural, transparent, undeniable part of the structure of the world' (Swidler 1986:279).

Ideological battles occur when different and competing systems of organising action are developing or fighting for supremacy. During such periods, new patterns of action are developed and put into practice. It is here, Swidler argues, that culture can be seen to directly shape action, as new ideologies instruct people how to act and begin to formulate the workings of community life. It is in these unsettled lives, according to Swidler, that ritual habits and practice often become highly charged with meaning. Ritual acquires such significance because it represents an expression of the new ideology and a challenge to the previous ‘taken-for-granted’ habits and models of the old cultural system. Individuals developing new strategies of action rely on cultural models to learn styles of behaviour. Thus allegiance to a new ideology involves a greater consciousness of thought and action, as it represents a break away from the tradition and common sense of previous ways of life.

Swidler argues that these ‘explicit’ cultures can be thought of as systems, for although they are not entirely consistent, they do provide a unified model of how individuals should conduct their lives. These cultural systems are coherent in the sense that they must fight with competing cultural models to dominate the attitudes and values of their members. In this way, therefore, cultural models can be seen as exerting a powerful influence, although in a restricted sense. They are restricted, firstly, in that such ideologies are not made up from scratch, but rely, to a certain extent, on traditional ways of understanding the world. They therefore include ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions from other cultural systems. Secondly, in any period of cultural transformation, ideology necessarily forms around established patterns of behaviour. Thirdly, in order to assess the influence of culture on unsettled lives it is necessary to explain why it is that a particular ideology is adopted in preference to another. Such analysis necessitates an examination of the structural constraints and historical circumstances within which particular ideologies fight for dominance.

Swidler’s model of culture allows for a more thorough understanding of the way in which individuals use the various cultural resources at their disposal to maintain and transform their identity. By focusing on the role of culture in unsettled lives, it is possible to see how competing ideologies battle for dominance in instructing people how to act.
Conceiving of the various cultural systems as ideologies in this context enables an examination of the way in which individuals draw on specific aspects of these systems to construct their strategies of action. What it is important to emphasise here, is that this process of cultural redefinition is not purely a case of individuals choosing one ideology over another, or indeed, selecting elements from several ideologies. In order to understand why one cultural model triumphs over another it is necessary to analyse the structural constraints and historical circumstances within which such cultural models compete for supremacy. Factors such as ‘race’, class and gender inevitably effect the choices that individuals make.

New Ethnicities

Many theorists have attempted to assess the influence of these different and competing cultural and structural elements in terms of their effects on both individual and collective identities. This has involved for many, a rediscovery of the importance of ethnicity as an explanatory concept. Stuart Hall (1988) argues for a return of the concept of ethnicity, but attempts to define it in a more radical way, by using it to explore the question of positioning. The revival of ethnicity comes, he argues from a shift in black cultural politics in Britain. He states that the coining of the term ‘black’ in the 1970s and 1980s represented a means to reference the common experience of racism and marginalisation in Britain. It provided a means by which different groups and communities could come together and produce a potential challenge to resist the ‘dominant regimes of representation’, in both the media and academic discourses, that stereotyped, pathologised or simply ignored the position of black people in Britain. This ‘moment’, which he describes as the ‘relations of representation’, sought to challenge their marginalised position and increase their access to the rights of representation. Hall states (1991:55) ‘In that moment, the enemy was ethnicity. The enemy had to be what we called “multi-culturalism”. Because multi-culturalism was precisely what I called previously “the exotic”’.

However, he argues we are now witnessing a new phase in black cultural politics. This shift, he argues, is not definitive; it is not simply a case of one replacing the other, for as long as black people continue to be marginalised by the dominant society, the struggle remains. However, the collective black identity had the unintended consequence of
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However, he argues we are now witnessing a new phase in black cultural politics. This shift, he argues, is not definitive; it is not simply a case of one replacing the other, for as long as black people continue to be marginalised by the dominant society, the struggle remains. However, the collective black identity had the unintended consequence of suppressing the different experiences of black people in Britain, of homogenising culture, ethnicity, class and gender within the concept of an ‘essential black subject’. Thus by the end of the 1980s, the hegemony of the all-encompassing black identity came under pressure from a variety of sources. The controversy surrounding the Rushdie Affair further challenged the usefulness of collective Black identity as debates centred on the emergence of, and opposition to, religious absolutism within minority communities, suggesting that new political alignments were taking shape.

As a result of these developments, Hall (1988:27) argues that we are now entering a new phase in black cultural politics, which represents a change from a struggle over the ‘relations of representation’ to a ‘politics of representation’ itself. For Hall, this shift marks the end of the innocent notion of the essential black subject, and the beginning of a new cultural politics that recognises the vast diversity in terms of ‘subjective positions, social experiences and cultural identities’ of black people (Hall 1988:28). The acknowledgement of this diversity and differentiation, he argues, requires a different kind of cultural politics, one that ‘engages rather than suppresses difference and which depends, in part, on the cultural construction of new ethnic identities’ (1988:29). Thus the category ‘black’ can not merely be seen as a racialised category, but one which is historically, politically, and culturally constructed. For Hall, it is the term ‘ethnicity’ that takes account of these influences on the construction of

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1 See for example, Modood (1988) and Anthias and Yuval-Davies (1992) for a critique of ‘black’ identity. Ali (1991) cites both the simultaneous success and failure of anti-racism and the emergence of cleavages within communities differentially affected by class, gender and other pressures, as the two main forces that acted to weaken the basis of black solidarity in Britain.
identity, as well as acknowledging that all discourse is positioned and contextual. Thus he argues for a reworking of the concept of ethnicity, separating it from the rhetoric of ‘race’ and ‘nation’ and its discourses within the dominant regimes of society; and focusing instead on its conception at the margins. Thus, for Hall (1988:30), ‘the new politics of representation has to do with an awareness of the black experience as diaspora experience, and the consequences which this carries for the process of unsettling, recombination, hybridisation and “cut-and-mix” – in short, the process of cultural diaspora-isation which it implies’. In this way, new ethnicities challenge not only the nature of black or minority identity but also the dominant coding of what it means to be British. This opens a range of issues that are related to the way notions of authenticity and belonging are defined within racist and absolutist conceptions of culture. Thus as Gilroy (1987:) states:

Black expressive cultures affirm while they protest. The assimilation of blacks is not a process of acculturation but of cultural syncretism. The effects of these ties and the penetration of black forms into the dominant culture mean that it is impossible to theorise black culture in Britain without developing a new perspective on British culture as a whole. This must be able to see behind contemporary manifestations into the cultural struggles that characterised the imperial and colonial period. An intricate web of cultural and political connections binds blacks here to blacks elsewhere. At the same time, they are linked into the social relations of this country. Both directions have to be examined and the contradictions and continuities that exist between them must be brought out.

Central to this process of cultural syncretism, Hall (1991) argues, is the rediscovery of ethnicity. It is important to acknowledge that this process of black cultural production does not occur in a void, but must be seen as placed and positioned within historical, political, and social discourses. In this way, he argues, the rediscovery of ethnicity and ‘roots’ is a prerequisite for the politics of representation: ‘I do not think the margins could speak up without first grounding themselves somewhere’ (1991:36). Thus the revival of ethnicity and ‘roots’ can not merely represent a return to the past, but must be re-experienced through the categories of the present in order to produce a politics of criticism, of challenge and resistance. In similar vein, Cornel West (1993) states:
The most desirable option for people of colour who promote the new cultural politics of difference is to be a Critical Organic Catalyst. By this I mean a person who stays attuned to the best of what mainstream has to offer – its paradigms, viewpoints, and methods – yet maintains a grounding in affirming and enabling subcultures of criticism. (1993:216)

The new politics of representation, therefore, is based on the concept of ‘identity through difference’, in which ethnicity plays as important part. In his later works, Hall uses ethnicity to demonstrate the importance of placing black cultural politics in the context of globalisation. Hall (1992) argues that the expansion of the world market into a global system has had the effect of fragmenting the old identities of race, class, gender, ethnicity and nation, which stabilised the social world, and enabled individuals to locate themselves in society. Traditional sources of authority and identity have become fragmented, and collective sources of membership and belonging displaced (Mercer 1990). Consequently, Hall argues there has been a subsequent shift in personal identities, which can no longer be seen as stable and unified. As Hall (1992:277) states ‘This produces the post-modern subject, conceptualised as having no fixed, essential or permanent identity. Identity becomes a “moveable feast”: formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us’. In this way, individuals can be seen to take on different identities at different times, and within different contexts, producing a multiplicity of identities that can be both complementary and contradictory.

This situation is further compounded by the spread of global consumerism, in which the cultural differences that previously defined identity become detached from their origin and become assimilated into the global consumer market; that is, they become consumed by the process of ‘cultural homogenisation’. According to Kevin Robbins (1991), this ‘global standardisation in the cultural industries’ is indicative of the quest for achieving greater economies of both scale and scope. This is achieved, he argues (1991:29), ‘by targeting the shared habits and tastes of particular market segments at the global level, rather than by marketing on the basis of geographical proximity to different national audiences’. However, Robbins points out, within this process of cultural homogenisation it is not possible to eradicate or transcend difference completely. Rather, the resourceful global conglomerate
exploits local difference and particularity: ‘the local and the “exotic” are torn out of place and
times to be repacked for the world bazaar’ (1991:31). Thus cultural artefacts and images are
commodified, detached from their sources of origin and thrown onto the world market where
their meanings become infinitely translatable. Thus, as Rutherford (1990:11) points out:
‘Difference ceases to threaten, or to signify power relations. Otherness is sought after for its
exchange value, its exoticism and the pleasures, thrills and adventures it can offer’. For
Robbins, time and distance can no longer be seen to mediate the encounter with the
otherness and difference.

Globalisation is about the compression of time and space horizons and the
creation of a world of instantaneity and depthlessness. Global space is a space
of flows, an electronic space, a decentred space, a space in which frontiers and
boundaries have become permeable. Within this global arena, economies and
cultures are thrown into intense and immediate contact with each other – with
each ‘Other’ (an other that is no longer ‘out there’, but also within). (1991:33)

However, whilst he sees the prevailing force of globalisation reflected in the processes
of de-localisation, locality, like difference can never be completely transcended. Rather, the
restructuring of capitalist economies can be seen to have increased the significance of
localities, developing new and intricate relations between global space and local space,
producing what he describes as a new global-local nexus. Thus globalisation, he argues,
necessarily requires an interaction with, and understanding of, the ‘local’. The local in this
sense however does not refer to a specific area or territory, but instead must be seen as a
‘fluid and relational space’, significant only in relation to the global. This is not to undermine
the value of local cultures and identities, but these are always over-shadowed by the process
of cultural homogenisation. Thus, Robbins argues (1991: 41):

The global-local nexus is associated with new relations between space and
place, fixity and mobility, centre and periphery, ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ space, ‘inside’
and ‘outside’, frontier and territory. This, inevitably, has implications for both
individual and collective identities and for the meaning and coherence of
community.
As Hall (1992) argues, what is being debated in part is the tension between the 'global' and the 'local' in the transformation of identities. The established boundaries of national identities have been disrupted and dissolved by the spread of global culture, challenging the stability and unity of identity. Thus in Britain, Hall argues (1992:307) 'the first effect of globalisation has been to contest the settled contours of national identity, and to expose its closures to the pressures of difference, 'otherness' and cultural diversity'. One consequence of this, Hall (1991) points out, is the emergence of the local, of the marginal, as a powerful space that has the potential to challenge the discourses of the dominant regimes. As these discourses weaken under the process of globalisation, so the local and marginal pull away. However, the impact of globalisation is nevertheless contradictory, the reaction of the local and the marginal can be both expansive and defensive. Thus some identities may 'gravitate' towards what Robbins refers to as 'Tradition', attempting to reconstruct purified identities which restore unity and certainty in reaction to the ever-increasing diversity. Threatened by the forces of globalisation, the margins 'can themselves retreat into their own exclusivist and defensive enclaves' (Hall 1991:36). Hall (1992) cites two examples of this tendency in the resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe and the rise of religious fundamentalism. However, Hall argues, this is not the only possible consequence of globalisation, another, involves what Bhabha (1994) and Robbins (1991) refer to as 'Translation'. This describes those identity formations which cut across and intersect natural frontiers, and which are composed of people who have been dispersed forever from their homelands. Such people retain strong links with their places of origin and their traditions, but they are without the illusion of a return to the past. They are obliged to come to terms with the new cultures they inhabit, without simply assimilating to them and losing their identities completely. They bear upon them the traces of their particular cultures, traditions, languages and histories by which they were shaped. The difference is that they are not and will never be unified in the old sense, because they are irrevocably the product of several interlocking histories and cultures, belonging at one and the same time to several 'homes' (and to no one particular 'home'). People belonging to such cultures of hybridity have had to renounce the dream or ambition of
rediscovering any kind of 'lost' cultural purity, or ethnic absolutism. They are irrevocably translated. (Hall 1992:310)

In this way, Hall presents a radical re-framing of the concept of ethnicity that moves away from more primordial definitions of ethnic identity, and acknowledges the influences of both local and global in the construction of individual and collective identities. Thus Hall uses the concept of ethnicity to explore the question of positioning and placing in relation to the local and the global. The local represents a space for the development of counter-movements of resistance that challenge the dominant regimes of society, but he is not referring here to a specific locality. Rather, the local should be seen to represent resistances that are separate from one another. 'So I use the local and the global as prisms for looking at the same thing. But they have pertinent appearances, points of appearance, scenarios in the different locations' (Hall 1991:61). Thus as West (1993) points out, what is significant about these new ethnicities in the way in which difference is defined. It is about 'how and what' constitutes difference and what elements are prioritised in the terms of representation. The new cultural politics of representation/difference therefore involves not only a reworking of ethnicity but also a re-theorising of difference (Hall 1991).

For Brah (1996) this involves studying the articulation between different forms of social differentiation, both empirically and historically, and to see them as contingent relationships with multiple determinations. Like Hall, Brah considers the 'de-coupling' of ethnicity from the essentialist notions of race, nation and culture to be vital. She subsequently views ethnicity as 'a mode of narrativising the everyday life world in and through processes of boundary formation' (1996:240). Thus ethnicity is seen as the way in which notions of 'difference' and 'commonality' are created, transformed and resisted; as well as how these are subsequently influenced by the specific political, cultural and historical forces in operation. She therefore views ethnicity as no less 'real' than other forms of social differentiation, such as race, class and gender. For Brah, the significance lies in the particular power relations that operate to articulate these differences. She therefore considers it vital that different forms of oppression are not 'compartmentalised'. Rather, she suggests, what is needed is a strategy for challenging all forms of oppression through an understanding of how they interconnect and articulate. She thus advocates a 'multi-axial performative' concept of
power, which problematises the notion of minority and majority positions, by highlighting the way in which a group considered a ‘minority’ in terms of one form of differentiation may be viewed as a majority in another. Minorities are thus positioned in complex and diverse ways, in relation both to majorities as well as to other minorities.

Brah advocates the concept of diaspora, which focuses on these complex relations of power that differentiate diasporas internally as well as position them in relation to one another. She sees diasporas as ‘historical contingent genealogies’, which are experienced through specific relations of race, gender, class and generation. ‘As such, all diasporas are differentiated, heterogeneous, contested spaces, even as they are implicated in the construction of a common “we”’ (1996:184). They encompass both the local and the global, with members of a single diaspora often scattered throughout the world. The concept of diaspora therefore demonstrates the flexible and changing nature of ‘origins’, whilst at the same time acknowledging the importance of ‘home’ as an imagined place as opposed to a specific territory. Thus the concept of diaspora ‘refers to multi-locationality within and across territorial, cultural and psychic boundaries’ (1996: 197).

Brah proposes the concept of ‘diaspora space’, where experiences and imaginings of diaspora, boundary and location come together and are articulated in relation to economic, political and cultural processes.

It is where multiple subject positions are juxtaposed, contested, proclaimed or disavowed; where the permitted and the prohibited perpetually interrogate; and where the accepted and the transgressive imperceptibly mingle even while these syncretic forms may be disclaimed in the name of purity and tradition. Here, tradition is itself continually invented even as it may be hailed as originating from the mists of time. (1996:208)

It is in this diaspora space, she argues, that cultural process that both unite and divide are experienced, negotiated, transformed and resisted. Thus for Brah, diaspora space is about the contestation of boundaries of both inclusion and exclusion. As such it is inhabited by both the ‘indigenous’ and the ‘non-indigenous’, the ‘migrant’ and the ‘native’. ‘In other words, the concept of diaspora space includes the entanglement of genealogies of dispersion with those of “staying put”’(1996:209). It is here that various forms of social differentiation – race, class,
gender, ethnicity, sexuality, etc. — converge and interweave to produce multiple political and cultural practices through which power is exerted. In this way, the new cultural politics of difference, what Brah refers to as 're-figuring the multi', must be seen as part of the continuous struggle to find new ways of understanding the relationship between and across specific fields of power, as they are exercised in the transformation of social relations, subjectivity and identity. In this way, 'difference' and 'commonality' must be seen as relational concepts. It is not possible, she argues, to prioritise a specific axis of differentiation, for such a priority is contingent; it cannot be envisaged as an autonomous category, despite having independent effects. It is only by viewing difference and power relations in this way, Brah argues, that it is possible to effect a politics that fosters solidarity without eradicating difference.

Ethnicity, therefore, must be seen as a relevant concept but, as Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1992) point out, it cannot simply be viewed as synonymous with culture and identity. Ethnicity is an important concept for understanding the dynamics of culture and structure, but it is not the most important, factors such as ‘race’, class and gender are equally significant to our understanding.

Ethnicity is more than merely a question of ethnic identity, either in the personal sense vis-à-vis the individual's identification with a group or in terms of a collective sentiment. Ethnicity involves partaking of the social conditions of a group, which is positioned in a particular way in terms of the social allocation of resources, within a context of difference to other groups, as well as commonalities and differences within (in relation to the divisions of class and gender, for example, within the group). Ethnicity cross-cuts gender and class division, but at the same time involves the position of a similarity (on the inside) and a difference (from the outside) that seeks to transcend these divisions. (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992:9)

Ethnicity, class and gender all involve differential allocation of resources and process of inclusion and exclusion, through patterns of subordination and domination. They also contain systems of representation involving 'capacities' and 'needs' contained within both general and official discourses, and state practices and policies. However, Anthias and Yuval-Davis
argue, each division relates to a distinct location, 'that is, to different ontological spheres' (1992:17). Their approach, therefore, requires an analysis of the intersection between ethnicity, 'race', class and gender divisions and processes within the state. Only by conceiving social divisions in this way, they argue, is it possible to challenge the practices of exclusion and subordination operating within specific historical context. Political struggles do not have to be uniform. Rather, they argue, what is needed is a recognition of differences of interest in terms of 'race', class and gender divisions, 'otherwise any notion of solidarity would be inherently racist, sexist and classist' (1992:197).2

Summary

From the evidence produced by 'ethnic studies' research it is clear that there exists in Britain a variety of different 'ethnic' cultures, which can often be used not only to foster group solidarity but also to distinguish them from other individuals and groups. However, the overall question is whether tension and conflicts between ethnic groups derive from perceptions of cultural (and physical) differences that one group sees in another, or whether they are the result of political and economic factors that generate conflicts of interest expressed in an ethnic or racial form. Thus one would expect that in the absence of these political and economic factors cultural differences would exist and be observed but would not necessarily give rise to conflict. Two points should be considered here. Firstly, although ethnicity is potentially an important source of in-group solidarity and intra-group division, that potential only has reality within the social context from which it is derived. Thus it is important to consider conflicts that are non-ethnic (and non-racial), particularly those which derive from political and economic inequalities. Secondly, group solidarity and divisions between different groups are always more acute when centred on the bonds of ethnicity and race.

Thus in any examination of 'race and ethnic studies' what is important is to examine the interplay between 'cultural' and 'structural' forces. In addition, it must be acknowledged that different 'ethnic groups' possess differential degrees of power. It is this fact that ethnicity studies, on the whole, have failed to account for. Ethnicity tends to be conceived as a benign

2 These arguments are developed further in a recent article by Anthias (1999), which is discussed in the concluding chapter.
phenomenon not necessarily involving any sort of oppression, coercion or exploitation. Hence the strategy for resolving ethnic conflict is seen to be the fostering of 'mutual understanding' and cultural compromise. By focusing on cultural differences, however, attention has been diverted from the problems of oppression, exploitation and conflict that are the very problems that need to be tackled. Thus in the final analysis, any concept of ethnicity, whilst acknowledging that specific groups wish to maintain a sense of common identity and cultural exclusion, must take account of the structural forces that impinge upon all members of society, black and white, male and female, and from whatever class position, within a specific historical context.

However, although we might want to question the usefulness or accuracy of the 'ethnic studies' framework, this does not mean that the notion of culture is irrelevant to the study of 'ethnic and racial minorities' in Britain. The existence of culture and of a sense of common identity amongst groups of people who wish to reinforce and maintain their cultural characteristics in relation to others must be recognised; for this process has real political, economic and social effects for the groups concerned. Yet, equally, it must be acknowledged that these individuals are members of the society as a whole and subsequently dominated by the processes of 'race', class and gender which operate in that society. Thus, as Gilroy (1987) and Phoenix (1988) argue, what is needed is a more sophisticated theory of culture, one that embodies the structural influences of class, gender and 'race'. Culture should not be seen as a 'fixed and impermeable feature of social relations', but, instead, the active, dynamic aspects of cultural life should be emphasised.

This call for a redefinition of culture needs to reach beyond the description of relevant belief systems towards a search for the social factors that shape and condition those beliefs. Cultural beliefs cannot be seen as 'given' or simply 'there'. Instead we must acknowledge that a society's 'culture' (its network of attitudes, values, meanings and ideologies) is connected in complex and intricate ways with its 'structure' (its productive arrangements, power relationships and social institutions). In this way, culture can be seen to refer to the processes, categories and knowledges through which communities are defined, that is, the way in which they are rendered specific and differentiated. An emphasis on the social construction of 'race', as well as that of gender and class, acknowledges the fact that
individuals play an active role in the creation and maintenance of meaning. Nevertheless, this activity takes place within particular historical and structural contexts that tend to limit people's choices and make certain behaviour and cultural responses more likely than others. It is the interaction of these different variables that recent theories of ethnicity seek to understand. What is needed therefore is an approach that examines the significance of social consciousness, of inter-group behaviour and of social structure.
According to the 1991 Census there are 475,800 Pakistanis in Britain and 160,300 Bangladeshis, representing 0.91 and 0.3 per cent of the population respectively (Anwar 1998), most of whom can be assumed to be Muslims. The majority of Pakistanis in this country are from two particular areas of Pakistan: the Punjab and Mirpur and are from predominantly rural backgrounds. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are the most disadvantaged groups in Britain, according to Anwar (1998). Pakistanis are comparatively less concentrated in the South East compared to other groups and found in greater numbers in the West Midlands, Yorkshire, the North West and Scotland. These settlement patterns are inherently bound up with the nature of the migration process itself. However, as a result of such settlement patterns they have been disproportionately affected by the loss of manufacturing jobs in these areas, and have therefore experienced high rates of unemployment. According to Anwar, the very high unemployment rates and the proportions of unskilled and manual jobs mean that many Pakistanis and Bangladeshis with large families have low incomes and are in poverty. This has implications for housing, health and the education of children (Anwar 1998:183).

The political character of the Muslim population has changed dramatically over the last decade, with Muslims across the country taking a more active role in the politics of their communities. However, it is important to emphasise that although collective Muslim action has been apparent at specific times, for example, during the Rushdie affair, a common Muslim stance does not exist in Britain. Throughout the country there is widespread divergence between Muslims along regional/linguistic, national and British regional lines.

Contrary to the popular view, Britain's Pakistani population is extremely heterogeneous. The migrants come from different socio-economic backgrounds, and lifestyles of Pakistanis from the same region of origin differ from city to city in Britain. Local housing and employment markets, the history of immigration and the composition of other minority populations have produced
varying opportunities for, and reactions to, the local Pakistani population.

(Saifullah Khan 1977:57)

Their political strength as Muslims is therefore considerably weakened by these differences, and the establishment of specific Muslim parties and groups seems to have had the effect of splitting the population further. Yet debates concerning the notion of Muslim unity continue to dominate much of the discussion on Muslims in Britain.

The question of religious unity is not solely confined to Muslims in Britain. For example, Roger Ballard (1994), considering the commitment to unity and solidarity among Sikhs, argues that divisions based on sect, caste, occupation, power and wealth and most notably ‘personal rivalry’, are inherent characteristics of Sikh (and Punjabi) society and have subsequently led to disunity.

They have also long been matched by countervailing forces: Sikhs have always been strongly committed to unity, no less for its pragmatic benefits than for ideological reasons. And it is when they have faced the most severe external threats (successively from the Mughals, the British, the Arya Samaj, the Muslims in the civil war following Partition, and now the rising forces of Hindu chauvinism) that internal contradictions have been most comprehensively glossed over, so allowing the Sikhs to move closer to their ideal condition of unity' (1994:115).

Thus while there is significant evidence of periods of unity throughout Sikh history, this position has not been easily reached. Once the perceived external threats have diminished, Ballard argues, the internal divisions have re-emerged, and any sense of unity has evaporated. Nevertheless, he points out, paradoxically it is these divisions that have held Sikhs together, and led to the ‘collective success’. He believes that it is because of their vigorous pursuit of internal rivalries that Sikhs across the globe have made such significant advances.

A review of the literature demonstrates that a similar situation can be found among Pakistanis in Britain. The factors that have served to promote cultural cohesion among the first generation are also those that produce and maintain internal differentiation. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to highlight the significance of ethnicity and religion among Asian
Muslims in Britain in relation to their experiences of racial, ethnic, class and gender discrimination; and how these often competing and conflicting forms of social differentiation influence the creation, maintenance and transformation of individual and collective identity. To what extent is religion becoming a more attractive basis for individual and collective identification among Asian Muslims in Britain, and to what extent do experiences and perceptions of different forms of social differentiation influence this identification?

The chapter begins by examining these factors and outlines the nature of the diversity among first-generation Pakistanis in Britain. It will then go on to look at the position of the second and third generations, and show how their experiences bring further diversity to the Pakistani population. The literature on Muslim women further highlights the importance of gender as another source of differentiation. Yet despite the significance of these factors, there are still those who view the unity of Muslims in Britain as a real possibility. These arguments will be outlined later in the chapter, together with those studies that have highlighted the importance of a Muslim identity to the second generation. This position, however, is not without its critics and several commentators have warned against the religious grip that is taking hold of many Muslim communities in Britain, restricting the choices that Muslim women can make. Thus while these factors may continue to divide Pakistanis and Muslims in general still further, they do demonstrate the complex and shifting nature of religious and cultural variables, and the social identities that are constructed out of these variables, as well as the influence of structural factors such as ‘race’, class and gender.

The First Generation

The ‘phenomenon’ of the existence of specific regional communities among the Asian population in Britain, according to Vaughan Robinson (1986), can partly be explained by the pattern of chain migration, where newly arrived migrants sought accommodation with earlier arrivals, and also by a conscious desire on the part of Asian migrants to maintain close links with fellow villagers in order to safeguard cultural values. Anwar (1979) claims that the aim behind such residential clustering was to recreate Indian or Pakistani village life in Britain. Such a system provides not only security and support for Asian migrants but also ensures that traditional norms and values are maintained within the community. In this way, according
to Robinson (1986:79): 'the interaction of Indian and Pakistani migrants is controlled by norms, sanctions, and values which are derived directly from those currently prevailing within the village of origin. Migrants seek to create an environment that will strengthen, rather than challenge, these values'. The economic spur to migration is not so much to earn a living but to supplement and build on the resources the kin groups already possess. Migration is seen as an economic investment intended to raise their social and economic status in Pakistan, rather than a serious bid for a gratifying 'new life' in Britain. Consequently, the Pakistani who travelled to Britain (at least in the earlier years of post-war migration) was typically a transient rather than a permanent settler. The intention was to return eventually to Pakistan, and this signified a particular scale of values.

The orientation to Pakistan is perhaps most vividly represented in the reproduction of features of that way of life within Britain. Thus, it is possible to see the migrant community attempting to carve out a life style which approximates to an extension of village life, with some necessary modifications to adjust to the new context. Of course, in the early years of migration it was not possible simply to recreate village life in Britain. Early settlers, often discharged seamen, were drawn from different villages and kin groups, yet had to share accommodation with others. So Badr Dahya (1974) describes a 'fusion' taking place between different Pakistani groupings. Nevertheless, with the pick up in numbers generally - and more particularly with the phenomenon of sponsored migration (where the village-kin group sponsors someone to join another member in Britain) there has been a gradual process of 'fission' or internal division, first along regional then along village-kin lines. There had always been certain divisions within the Pakistani population in Britain, but over time village-kin divisions became more distinct, as larger family units were established in Britain.

This progression from fusion to fission was also highlighted by Verity Saifullah Khan (1976). She states that the earliest migrants from India and Pakistan either became integrated into the indigenous British population or sought the company of other Asians, with whom they had much more in common than with the local population. However, as the number of Asian migrants increased, and with it the growth in ethnic services and facilities, the need for contact with the indigenous population decreases. In addition, with the arrival of friends and family, internal differentiation along ethnic and class lines began to emerge.
"Informal gossip networks" among family and kin in Britain, together with the close communication with Pakistan, combined to reinforce religious and ethnic norms and practices and to safeguard the migrants from the 'corrupting influence' of British society. Thus differentiation or cleavages occurred along village-kin lines and between the more 'Western-orientated' elite and the migrants from the poorer rural origins.

However, Dahya argues that alongside this internal differentiation there is movement towards an over-arching solidarity among Pakistani groups. The considerable separation between these communities and the rest of the 'host' population, and the sheer scale of racial hostility helps unite the Pakistani groups. Thus, the structured exclusion from 'white' society helps generate the internal solidarity of these groups. He describes Pakistani communities as an 'army on the march' who choose to live together to defend their ethnic identity, rather than being forced into it by outside pressures.

Saifullah Khan (1976) takes issue with Dahya on the degree of deliberation and common perspective among all Pakistanis that he implies, but which she feels is clearly contradicted by his and other evidence. For her, there is no such thing as 'Pakistani ethnicity'. 'If ethnicity refers to common identification and behaviour based on a common history and culture, the fact that Pakistan is only 27 years old and its population spans five main ethnic groups will explain why the factor of common national origin has not been more significant in the organisation of Pakistanis in Britain' (1976:228). In addition, the strength of village-kin networks, both in Britain and Pakistan, has contributed to the lack of any manifestations of ethnicity at the level of nationality. Thus according to Saifullah Khan, one cannot speak about 'Pakistani ethnicity' in any meaningful sense because migrants from Pakistan rarely consider themselves as sharing common characteristics. Rather, their sense of difference with the majority population in Britain is perceived in relation to their family and fellow villagers from the same region.

The dangers of generalisation are also highlighted by Roger Ballard (1994). He argues:

If one regards a community as a body of people whose feelings of mutual identification are strong enough to precipitate an active and ongoing sense of solidarity, the great majority of Britain's ethnic colonies rest on much more
parochial foundations than is commonly supposed. The networks of reciprocity which provide the framework for most settlers’ everyday lives are largely grounded in much narrower loyalties of caste, sect and descent-group. (1994:4)

Alison Shaw (1988, 1994), also stresses the importance of family and kin to Pakistani migrants. She points out that although the initial migration from Pakistan largely involved single men, these individuals were sponsored by their entire extended family, and thus their loyalties and expectations where linked directly to those of the wider kinship group or biradari as well as to those of the family. Such links not only had a major impact on patterns of migration, since newcomers tended to head for specific areas in Britain were they were assisted in finding work and accommodation by their family and fellow villagers. The presence of kinsfolk also exerted strong control on the lives of these men, ensuring that most continued to conform and uphold the expectations of their extended family and biradari in Pakistan. For Shaw, the key to the arrival of women and children in the late 1960s and early 1970s lay in the expectations of the biradari back in Pakistan, rather than simply a response to new immigration legislation. The arrival of women and children ensured the further continuation and strengthening of biradari loyalties in response to the new environment, and re-imposing the biradari control over male sexuality. Thus family reunion can be seen to have had a strongly ‘conservative’ influence on lifestyles within the community. ‘This served both to sustain community distinctiveness and to shelter its members from Western influence’ (Shaw 1994:48).

These studies of Pakistani communities point to certain continuities between life in Pakistan and life in Britain. The ‘village institutions’ are reproduced within Britain, and mutual aid, pooling of resources, and religious practices are successfully perpetuated. Thus it is argued that Asians in Britain make conscious efforts to avoid interaction with the rest of British society. Furthermore, as Desai (1963) argues, Indian and Pakistani migrants also minimise the need for contact with other Asian groups. Thus there is a tendency for Gujeratis to mix predominantly with other Gujeratis, Punjabis with fellow Punjabis, and so on. Deliberate strategies are employed for this purpose, Robinson argues, which lead to spatial separation and social exclusivity. In this way, cultural values can be maintained in preparation

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1 Literally meaning brotherhood, it represents a localised intermarrying ‘caste’ group (Lewis 1994).
for return to the village of origin. Furthermore, Shaw (1988) argues, the desire for cultural purity is further compounded by the negative evaluations which Pakistani migrants hold of British society. She claims that while in Pakistan Britain is held in great esteem, Pakistanis in Britain are far more critical of British society. Likewise, Jeffery (1976) argues that Pakistani migrants were highly critical of British morality, sexuality and family life.

However, as Saifullah Khan (1976) argues, it is also important to acknowledge that Pakistani migration to Britain occurred somewhat later than the migration of other ethnic groups, and consequently coincided with the increase of hostility against the immigrant population on the part of the indigenous British people, the tightening of immigration controls and the decline in the British economy.

Such factors as numerical size of the population, the nature of the migration process and the legal, economic and social characteristics are all significant variables in the apparent manifestation of the distinctiveness attributed to Pakistanis. Maintenance, even development, of the minorities' own system of resources and distinct identity is particularly important for the minority that meets structural exclusion and feels insecure or threatened. External definition and reception of the majority society (be it hostile, neutral or misinformed) may support existing tendencies towards encapsulation. (Saifullah Khan 1976:223)

Thus according to both Saifullah Khan (1976) and Anwar (1985), the 'encapsulation' of Pakistanis needs to be understood in the framework of external constraints within Britain and pressures on them to conform to the cultural norms and values of their family and kin in Pakistan. However, Saifullah Khan points out that such encapsulation limits inter ethnic relations across the ethnic boundaries and consequently reinforces their ethnicity.

It is clear that internal differentiation and diversity were significant characteristics of the first generation of Pakistanis in Britain. It is not nationality, religion or language that provided a focusing point for the first generation, but the much more narrowly defined principles of family, kin and biradari. These allegiances, whilst serving an invaluable role in the maintenance of traditional norms and behaviour among Pakistanis in Britain have also divided the population as a whole. However, with the emergence of a British-born and raised generation the focus of the Pakistani population has begun to change. According to Shaw...
(1994), the protection of the community from Western influence and the preservation and assertion of its distinctive identity has now become the main concern for many Pakistanis in Britain.

**The Second Generation**

The family is at the heart of Islamic society, and Muslims regard a stable family life as essential for the stability of that society. There are many rules and regulations in the *Quran* concerning the safeguarding of the family, such things as the relationships between men and women, prohibitions against sex outside marriage, and covering the body. In addition, respect for parents, and elders in general, is strongly upheld. Writers such as McDermott and Manazir Ahsan (1980) and Joly (1987) believe that the preservation of family loyalty and family networks within Muslim communities has assisted considerably in the preservation of Islamic values in the second generation in Britain.

However, it has been suggested that the family can also be a site of conflict between the first and second generation (Anwar 1985). The parents are considered to be largely uneducated, from rural backgrounds, and have an outlook on society that is very different from that of western society. Their children, on the other hand, have been brought up in Britain and have experienced western culture and western ideas and values. They have mixed with people who have different values and attitudes from their own family, and, it is argued, this can cause conflict between themselves and their parents. The second generation holds ideas and values from western culture that their parents do not understand and cannot understand. Thus many writers (Taylor 1976; Watson 1977; Anwar 1982) believe that there is a vast generation gap emerging between Pakistanis of different generations. As a result of this, it is argued, many second-generation Pakistanis find themselves 'caught between two cultures', experiencing both the Pakistani Muslim culture of their parents at home and western culture from their peer group at school and work.

In her study of Pakistanis in Bradford, Verity Saifullah Khan (1977) argues that 'the difference between Mirpuri parents and children is a generation gap, resulting from time of birth, background and subsequent experience of different cultures and social change. There is also a difference of orientation' (1977:86). Whereas for the first generation life in Britain is
perceived as an extension of life back home, the second generation have experience of life in two different worlds which inevitably affects their attitudes, and in turn their behaviour. Saifullah Khan argues that although the ‘two cultures’ may appear contradictory, Mirpuri children are flexible enough to avoid identity conflicts and maintain a consistent view of themselves. In addition, most Mirpur children in Bradford have limited contact with local English children and, together with the strong emotional support of their family and kin, this ensures a relatively coherent and unconfused view of the world. Nevertheless, she argues, intergenerational differences and conflicts are apparent. The divergent culture and orientation of British Asians and their parents, particularly those of rural origin, produce tensions that arise from a mutual inability to appreciate the priorities and preoccupations of the other’ (1977:86).

Within the Muslim population, according to such writers as Anwar (1982) and Joly (1987), the major concern and focus of attention is to ensure the maintenance and security of Islam among the second generation, as it will be they who determine the future of Islam in Britain. The first generation, therefore, make strenuous efforts to preserve the principles of Islam within their children. However, according to Ellis (1991) and Raza (1991), many Muslim parents feel that the second generation is a 'lost generation', who are being enticed away from Islam by the perceived attractions of British society.

There are several factors, Raza (1991) argues that contribute to the westernisation of Muslims in Britain. Firstly, westernisation can occur as result of what he calls the 'income factor', whereby individuals join the mainstream employment market and through this become integrated into the class structure of British society, and hence the culture of British society. Through their involvement in mainstream employment, Raza argues, individuals begin identifying along class lines based on the buying power of their income, and thus adopt the corresponding class ideologies of status symbols and social mixing. Secondly, Raza argues, westernisation can occur through an individual's membership of the British education system. Through this system young Muslims are educated in the history of British culture and society, and as a result may come to identify more strongly with British culture than Islam. Thirdly, it is at school where individuals come under the most influence from peer group pressure, and the strong incentive to imitate the practices of their peers in terms of
dress, culture and identity. Fourthly, Raza argues, language is another factor that can lead to increased westernisation among young Muslims. Speaking English gives individuals access to literature written in that language, and consequently becomes a vehicle of communication for the transmission of ideas, values and knowledge of the dominant society and culture. Finally, Raza believes that the society itself can become an influencing factor, disseminating ideas through the media of its 'superior' culture, undermining and devaluing other cultures and lifestyles.

However, Raza argues, the process of westernisation is not merely a one-sided process. As well as the pressure by family and community to conform to traditional culture, there is also the factor of racism. Thus as several writers point out (James, 1974; Anwar 1979; Ballard 1979; Robinson 1986; Hiro 1991), even though the second generation may have been born and/or brought up in Britain, and possess a thorough knowledge of British society and culture, the presence of racism and discrimination in British society makes them aware that they are 'different' and may never be accepted as British by the indigenous white population. On the one hand, writers such as Henly (1982) and Raza (1991) argue, an awareness of racial discrimination can lead the individual to reject their culture and religion, considering it to be inferior to that of western society. This situation can leave individual isolated: rejecting their own community and culture and being rejected by the dominant society and culture. On the other hand, however, writers such as Watson (1977) and Raza (1991) state that the experience of racism and discrimination can precipitate a reactive pride in their separate 'ethnic' and cultural identity. Feelings of rejection from mainstream society, therefore, can cause the second generation to revert back to the culture and religion of the family and community.

However, comparative studies of Asian young people have highlighted considerable contrasts between Muslims and other South Asian groups, such as Sikhs and Hindus. Hiro (1991) states that religious identification is stronger among young Muslims than young Hindus; whilst other commentators have mentioned the Muslims' greater conservatism (Taylor 1976). Likewise Evans (1971) notes that his Pakistani respondents were 'the most culturally introverted group'. There are several reasons why Muslims may be the most 'conservative' group. Firstly, Islam is regarded as an ethical code which covers most day-to-
day aspects of individual, family and community life, including, for example, dress and
etiquette, food and personal hygiene. Secondly, many Muslims are recent arrivals to Britain
compared with Sikhs and Hindus, and are therefore less willing to change. Thirdly, they
mainly come from rural backgrounds and are mainly working class, in occupational terms.

In a study of young Asians in Britain and Canada, Singh Ghuman (1994) found his
Muslims informants to be more ‘religious-minded’, they attended mosques regularly and had
a greater knowledge of their religion in contrast to their Sikh and Hindu peers, who tended to
be ‘woefully ignorant’ of their respective religions. The main reason for this, he argues, is the
lack of properly organised religious instruction among the Sikh and Hindu communities
compared to the various Muslim communities. In addition, Muslim parents tended to be more
concerned about the religious education of children and young people. Furthermore, Muslim
parents were particularly concerned with the education of their girls, and preferred single-sex
schools. Hindu and Sikh parents, on the other hand, felt that the way to achieve inter-cultural
understanding was to follow the norms of the host society.

In comparison, Anwar (1998) found that the importance of religion for all Asians
marks them out as distinct from other ethnic groups. For the overwhelming majority of Asians
he studied, religion was the main basis for their ethnic identity. However, there were
differences between Asian groups. Three quarters of the Muslims thought that religion was
very important for the way they lived their lives compared with less than half of Hindus and
Sikhs. There were also differences in attitudes towards such issues as single-sex schooling
and the establishing of schools of one’s own religion, with Muslims much more in favour of
such provisions. Differences between Muslims and Sikhs and Hindus also emerged on the
question of freedom for girls. With Muslims, both parents and young people were more in
favour of restrictions on teenage girls. There was also a greater tendency for Muslim young
women always to wear Asian clothes compared to Sikh and Hindu women. In general, Anwar
argues, the young Muslims seemed to have a more ‘conservative’ outlook and a higher
conformity to religio-cultural norms than Sikh or Hindu young people. These differences, he
believes are partly religious and partly linked to social class, educational backgrounds, and
areas of origin and time of migration to Britain.
These studies point to the continuation of Islamic and Pakistani norms and traditions, albeit in a modified form, among the second generation, especially when compared with other Asian groups. However, they also demonstrate the potential for divisions between the generations. Born and brought up in Britain, the second generation has a much wider basis from which to construct their identities and sense of belonging, than is open to the first generation. In addition, they have little or no personal experience of life in Pakistan, which is of such importance to the first generation. Differences in opinions and attitudes are therefore to some extent inevitable, although this need not necessarily lead to conflict as some commentators have suggested. Nevertheless, it does indicate the possibility of increased diversity within the Pakistani population. The issue of gender also adds a further layer of differentiation, as the following section illustrates.

The Position of Muslim Women

The common assumption expressed by the media and other sections of British society is that Muslim women are suppressed and isolated, subordinate to ‘their’ men and confined to their homes. Early studies, whilst rejecting some of these myths, still seemed to confirm the view that Muslim women in Britain were in general more isolated and subject to more restrictions than their non-Muslim counterparts. According to Anwar (1982), Muslim women can face special difficulties arising from certain rules of social behaviour laid down by their cultures and/or religion. To preserve traditional customs like purdah can be very difficult. There are several elements to the concept of purdah, but in general it refers to the creation of separate spheres of existence for men and women. Thus, according to Jeffery (1976), who writes about Muslim women in Pakistan, ‘on the one hand, purdah refers to the division of the home into separate areas (zenana for women and merdana for men), often by use of a curtain, though sometimes with a wall. Further, purdah refers to the subtle ways in which a woman creates and maintains social distance between herself and men through the use of her dupatta, chaddar or burqa’ (1976:28).

Far from weakening the influence of their traditional culture as many earlier commentators predicted, Pakistanis in Britain have become stricter in their observance of purdah, according to Saifullah Khan (1976). The improvement in the financial position of
Pakistanis in Britain and their urban lifestyle has directly led to increased restriction in the movement of women outside the home. As a result of these restrictions, together with the fact that Pakistani women are discouraged from seeking employment outside, Muslim women are considered to have a more isolated existence and a substantially reduced role in Britain. This is confirmed by Joly's (1987) study of Muslims in Birmingham, which looks at some of the issues facing second-generation Muslim women. She claims that Muslim parents show particular concern for the education of girls, whom they see as more vulnerable in British society. Beliefs about women's roles and responsibilities influence Muslim parents' decisions about the upbringing and education of their daughters in Britain. It is almost impossible, she argues, for a girl to participate in the life of her British peers and remain a good Muslim, so restrictions are considered necessary. What most concerns the parents is the free mixing of sexes in all areas of British society including school.

According to Joly, 'Muslim leaders describe the girls as the mothers of tomorrow: they will be the ones who transmit a proper Muslim way of life and values to children to come, as their prime responsibility is to the upbringing of the family' (1987:17). Thus the Muslim community sees the role of women as of crucial importance. They could jeopardise the whole family and community structures if they do not conform. Many parents therefore, because of the fear of westernisation through peer-group pressure and the free mixing of the sexes, are unwilling to allow their daughters to continue in education or go out to work. The reputation of their girls must be preserved at all costs. This, as Joly maintains, can lead to frustration for women who want to pursue a career. Furthermore, Shaw (1988) argues that Muslim women in Britain are likely to experience a greater degree of conflict with traditional culture due to the fact that their role confines them predominantly to the arena of the family and home, that they are denied the freedom afforded to Muslim men and further that they are considered subordinate to men.

Further confirmation comes from Haleh Afshar's (1994) claim that amongst Muslims, women are traditionally the appointed site of familial honour and shame and represent the public face of the society's apparent commitment to Islam.

Muslim women are both the guardians and the guarded. The custodians of religious beliefs, even though for centuries men have been the interpreters of
the norms, values and practices according to that belief. Women, whether they wished to or not, have been required to reflect the religious commitment of the group in their attire and behaviour as well as in most aspects of their lives. This has not been a painless or static process. At different times and places Muslim women have come to different arrangements and have struck different bargains with patriarchal structures within which they find themselves. (Afshar 1994:129)

However, Avtar Brah (1993, 1996) warns against focusing exclusively on 'culturalist' explanations for understanding the position of Muslim women in Britain. By highlighting employment trends among these women she demonstrates the importance of examining structural factors as well as purely cultural elements. She points out that the reason most commonly put forward for the lower economic activity rates for Muslim women is that Muslim families do not permit female members to work outside the home. Such exclusively culturalist explanations, however, fail to take account of factors such as: 'the later migration of Muslim women from Pakistan and Bangladesh compared with Hindu and Sikh women from India; the differences in the economic activity levels of Muslim women for Africa as compared with Muslim women from the subcontinent; the regional variation between the levels of Muslim women engaged in wage labour in the south-east and south-west of England compared with Yorkshire and the West Midlands; the socio-economic position of the women prior to migration and the different time period in which these women entered the 'modern' job market in the countries of origin; and the structure of the local labour markets in the areas of Muslim settlement in Britain' (1996:70). In addition, she argues studies that include young Asian women from different ethnic groups do not allude to any significant variation in the employment aspirations of young Muslim women compared with non-Muslims. When one considers all the evidence, Brah argues religion and the family no longer exercise the 'overarching determinacy' that they are often given in discussions on young Asian women.

Women's personal narratives show them to be positioned differently within and across a variety of discourses. For Brah, Muslim women's position in British society, and specifically in the labour market, demonstrates the multiplicity of their experiences.

Overall we found that the young women's relationship to the labour market was structured by a multiplicity of ideological, cultural and structural factors, such as
the impact of the global and national economy on the local labour market, ideologies about women's positions in relation to caring responsibilities and paid work; the women's own social and political perspectives on such issues, that is how they might 'feel' as well as 'think' about them; the role of education in the social construction of gendered job aspirations, and racism. In other words, structure, culture and agency; the social and the psychic are all implicated and are all integral to the framework outlined. (1993:456)

Thus while gender discrimination both within the various Muslim communities and wider British society remains a significant factor in the lives of young Muslim women, and consequently adds a further layer of differentiation within the Pakistani population, it is not the only factor that influences their lives. 'Race' and class are also crucial determinants in this process. However, it is important to point out that these competing, and often contrasting, elements are not experienced in a void. Muslim women are not merely passive victims of the structural and cultural circumstances in which they find themselves, but, as Brah points out, their own views and aspirations are crucial to an understanding of their position in society. Some of their responses to this position are outlined in the following sections.

The Role of Islam

According to Anwar (1985), Islam is the 'binding force' which holds Pakistanis in Britain together, and differentiates them from other ethnic groups. 'Religion was the basis used for the creation of a separate Muslim state of Pakistan and it played an important role in creating the feelings of minority status among Muslims in British India. It is also crucial for Pakistanis who have settled in Britain and, once again, it is the distinguishing characteristic that identifies them as a minority group' (1985:12). As Islam represents a whole way of life, he argues, so it affects individual social relationships across ethnic boundaries thereby leading to Pakistani 'encapsulation'. In addition, Shaw (1994) states that as the force of the myth of return has declined, there has been a corresponding increase among Pakistanis of the perception of themselves as a religious minority, and thus a growing concern with the issue of Muslim identity. Despite the different emphasis, the current concern with religious identity
can be seen as serving a very similar purpose to that once served by the myth of return, in that it provides an effective way for migrants to maintain and control their distinctive culture.

According to Dilip Hiro (1991), the Rushdie affair had a profound effect on Muslims throughout Britain, bringing them together for the first time. He states (1991:188) ‘the incomprehension of the media and the insensitivity of the government, revealed by the ‘Satanic Verses’ issue, added insult to injury. In a sense, the Rushdie affair crystallised a host of Muslim grievances’. The Rushdie affair thus provided a focus point for the mobilisation of Muslims in Britain committed to maintaining Islamic values in a country where they represented a religious minority. In addition, Hiro argues, the affair halted the process of secularisation which had been increasing gradually in Britain over the past few decades, particularly within the second generation who had begun to question the religious and cultural values of their parents. With the tenets of their faith under attack, secular, liberal and traditional British Muslims were encouraged to join forces in defence of Islam.

Thus despite the evident diversity among Pakistanis in Britain, as outlined earlier in the chapter, the notion of one Islamic community in Britain is receiving increased attention. According to Nielsen (1987:392):

There is quite enough evidence to justify talking of a Muslim community in Britain. Traditional factors of division continue to exist in some strength, factors of theology, policy, ethnicity and socio-economic background. But the ideal desire for unity is increasingly finding ways of expressing itself also in practice, both through common organisation and common responses to particular issues of concern. At the same time, however, a new agenda is in the process of being written as young Muslims begin to make their presence felt. This implies changes in the ways in which the Muslim identity is expressed as well as in areas of social life in which Muslims expect to be active as Muslims.

In examining the notion of Muslim unity, contained in the Islamic ideal of one umma (the community of all believers), Elizabeth Scantlebury (1995) poses the question: ‘is it possible to talk of the Muslim community of Manchester?’ Whilst previous studies have tended to outline the diversity evident within the Muslim population in Britain, and particularly within the Pakistani population, Scantlebury argues that increasingly Muslims, most notably
the second and third generations, are demanding to be recognised as a religious rather than a racial group. She states (1995:425): ‘that while racial, linguistic, ethnic and theological diversity remains, the notion of one religious community cannot merely be dismissed as an unattainable ideal. There is evidence of an emergent British Muslim identity that is effectively crossing racial and ethnic barriers in some circumstances within a localised setting’.

Scantlebury uses Dahya’s (1974) model of fusion and fission, outlined earlier in the chapter, and applies it to Muslims in Manchester. She argues that the pattern of fusion followed by fission has been very evident amongst Muslims in the city, but that there has been a subsequent stage characterised by another period of fusion. This latter phenomenon, she point out, is not solely due to the issue of numerical size but has been brought about by the external pressures that all Muslims have experienced. The Rushdie Affair and the Gulf War had a profound impact on Muslims in Britain. They responded by organising themselves together to give a united front. In Manchester, as in most major cities with a large Muslim population, this took the form of setting up a Council of Mosques. Such collective organisation among Muslims in Manchester, Scantlebury argues, shows the potential for unity despite the diversity that evidently exists. However, as she points out, once these external pressures began to diminish, past divisions and differences once more began to emerge. Nevertheless, whilst such events reflect the inherent fragility of Muslim unity and the force of long-standing divisions within the population, Scantlebury believes that they do demonstrate that Muslim unity is a real possibility, even if it is limited to particular issues and time periods.

While the continuing move from fusion to fission may be apparent among first generation Muslims in Britain, Scantlebury argues, the second generation adds a new dimension to the situation. Increasingly British-born Muslims are looking less towards their parents’ countries of origin as the basis of their identities in Britain, and instead stressing a more specifically Islamic identity. This process, according to Scantlebury, involves a questioning of their parents’ traditional values and norms of behaviour with the aim of separating the ‘merely cultural’ from the ‘genuinely Islamic’. This can lead to many young Muslims rejecting much of the older generations’ traditional lifestyles, which they see as not
only inappropriate to their lives in Britain but also essentially 'unIslamic'. Thus Scantlebury argues (1995:431):

There is therefore a process of redefining what it means to be a Muslim in Britain, taking the form of trying to strip away the varying cultural traditions that first-generation migrants have, rightly or wrongly assuming it to be Islamic, from the 'essential core' of the religion. The basic tenet of this 'central core' is that Muslims should be united in one `umma`.

However, Scantlebury describes the position of the second generation as paradoxical. On the one hand, the aim of many is to unite the Muslim population, and defend their position in British society. On the other, their attempts to create a united Muslim identity have resulted in yet another division between Muslims. Thus, she argues, while the primary divisions within the Muslim population have been vertical, along the lines of national, ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences; young Muslims are producing a horizontal division based on generational variations. Whilst this ever-growing diversity would seem to impede any form of unity among Muslims in Britain, Scantlebury argues that as British-born Muslims move into positions of leadership within the various Muslim communities, it is likely that greater emphasis will be placed on the ideal of `umma`; and the process of fusion could well be achieved.

The importance of generational change is central to Haleh Afshar's (1993) three-generation study of Muslim women in West Yorkshire, which highlights some of the contradictions between the lived experiences of schoolgirls and their mothers' and grandmothers' concept of education as a process of improving their life. She argues that the increased interest in Islam and manifestation of an Islamic identity among the young stems from this contradiction. Like Saifullah Khan (1982), Afshar believes that for many young women they either operate a 'double standard', conforming to the West during school hours and to the East at home or employ a self imposed separatism. In addition, Afshar argues, the combination of racial discrimination at school and at work, their duty to maintain and safeguard the honour of the family and their obligations as future mothers within the community all play a part in restricting the ambitions and aspirations of the third generation. Furthermore, she points out, 'the rampant racism' that was evident throughout the country threatened the delicate balance of conflicting values and identities that these young women
had maintained over the years. Events such as the Rushdie affair and the Gulf war compounded the situation further, and greatly increased the gulf between young Muslims and wider British society.

With the racial lines drawn and the Muslims as a community threatened, many of the youngest generation found that they had no choice other than returning to the fold and suspending all criticism of the biradari. They have chosen to return to Islam, the religion that offers them a sense of identity, of belonging not only to a small immigrant minority, but to a vast, vibrant and vocal community, an umma that is prepared to defend the cause against all odds. There is a real sense of pride in belonging to the righteous group and defending the cause, the morality and the honour of Islam. (Afshar 1993:66)

The growing significance of Islam to the second generation is also highlighted by Katy Gardner and Abdus Shukur (1994) in their examination of British Bengalis. They argue that while Bangladesh remains a central focus point in the lives of those born and raised there, their British-born children display more complex attitudes and priorities. On the one hand, Bangladesh represents a largely alien world to them; on the other, they are aware that no matter how British they may feel, they are not accepted as British by the majority population. In this respect, they argue, Bangladesh represents 'an ideal land where they are accepted', and consequently their 'Bengali-ness' is still crucially important to them. For Gardner and Shukur, therefore, the experience of racism provides a central component of self-definition for many young Bengalis, encouraging them to look for new ways of expressing their cultural identity and distinctiveness in Britain. One of the ways they have sought to do this is through their support of Islam.

Although this renewed commitment for Islam would seem essentially traditional in nature, in the way it separates its followers from mainstream British culture and returns them to their Bengali Muslim roots, Gardner and Shukur argue that such an interpretation is misleading. The increasing support for Islam among the second generation is not a return to old traditions, but is a product of their experiences of racial and ethnic exclusion in Britain, brought to a head by the Rushdie affair and the subsequent negative portrayal of Muslims in the media. Thus according to Gardner and Shukur, this new allegiance to Islam can be seen
as both a reaction to, and a defence against, the racism endemic in British society, which the second generation are no longer prepared to tolerate. They argue (1994:163) 'Islam provides both a positive identity, in which solidarity can be found, together with an escape from the oppressive tedium of being constantly identified in negative terms. Even more important, Islamic rhetoric not only condones fighting for one's rights and acting in collective defence of a Muslim brotherhood, but explicitly encourages it'. Furthermore, support for Islam not only provides young Bengalis with an instrument with which to fight against their exclusion within British society; it also links them to the global umma, and to other Muslim countries. Thus while their commitment to Islam does not necessarily impede their allegiance to Bangladesh, Gardner and Shukur argue that for many young Bengalis, their parents' culture is often seen as a 'distraction' from their true path. Increasingly the second generation is coming to identify themselves principally as Muslims as distinct from Bengali or Bangladeshi. In this way, they are constructing new and varied lifestyles of their own.

In her study of young Pakistani women in Britain, Jessica Jacobson (1997, 1998) also considers the interrelationship between religious and ethnic identities, and examines why religion is increasingly becoming a more significant source of social identity for them than ethnicity. She argues that the greater significance of religion contains two key elements. Firstly, there is a fundamental distinction made by many between religion and ethnicity as sources of identity. The distinction rests on the assumption that whereas Pakistani ethnicity relates to a particular place and its people, Islam has universal relevance. Secondly, she argues a distinction is also made between the essential characteristics of the social boundaries that represent the two forms of social identity. 'Social boundaries which encompass expressions of religious identity among young British Pakistanis are pervasive and clear-cut in comparison to the increasingly permeable ethnic boundaries' (1997:238).

Jacobson suggests that part of the attraction of Islam for young Muslim women is its universalism. By providing these women with a universal set of prescriptions that covers all areas of daily life, Islam enables them to deal with the ambiguities and contradictions they experience in their lives. For many, she argues (1997:254) 'Islam's teachings are a source of precise and coherent guidance that enables them to rise above the uncertainties of existence in a world that they perceive as comprising of two cultures'. However, Jacobson stresses that
this does not imply that these women are able to make a straightforward choice between their ethnic and religious identities, between being Muslim or Pakistani or Asian. In practice religious and ethnic boundaries are not clear-cut, but are very closely interrelated. Nevertheless, she believes religion and ethnicity are increasingly coming to be regarded as separate or even alternative bases of self-definition.

In discussing young Muslims in Bradford, however, Philip Lewis (1994) draws a distinction between Muslim and Islamic identity. During the Gulf war, for example, when many young people were actively promoting their Muslim communal identity in support of Iraq, in the local schools where he carried out some his research, very few of these young people prayed in the area set aside for them. Young people’s perception of themselves as Muslims, he argues, does not, for the most part, ‘translate into prayer’. Furthermore, Lewis points out, the younger generation’s allegiance to Islam and/or to Pakistani nationalism if often dependent on context: ‘during the Rushdie affair youngsters rallied around Islam as a vehicle of ethnic identity; after Pakistan won the cricket world cup in March 1992 many youngster celebrated by driving through parts of the city in high spirits, waving flags, some a little to enthusiastically’ (1994:75). The hope for many religious leaders, Lewis argues, is that the explicitly ‘Islamic’ component in identity will assume greater importance.

The increase in Islamic activity among Muslims in Britain, however, is not viewed as a positive development by all. In particular, groups such as ‘Women Against Fundamentalism’ have warned against the increase in religious commitment and its effects on the position of women. Those involved in ‘Women Against Fundamentalism’ and others seek to address ‘the efforts of fundamentalists to restrict women’s life choices and sexualities’ (Connolly 1991).

Pragna Patel (1991), herself a member of WAF, also highlights the oppressive, dictatorial nature of Muslim fundamentalism. She argues that religion should be regarded as a personal matter and left to the individual to interpret. Instead, she believes Muslim fundamentalists seek to impose one version of Islam and thereby restrict any form of individual interpretation. In this way, they present their male-dominated view of Islam which aims to return women to the realms of the home and limit their position by confining them to the traditional role ascribed to them in the Qur’an. Patel argues that the rise of Muslim
fundamentalism is linked to the notion that 'what occurs within a minority community must be left to those who have the power within it, that is, male heads of the family and religious and community leaders, to resolve. To do otherwise, many argue, is to play into the hands of racists' (1991:100). Not only does Muslim fundamentalism prioritise racial oppression over that of gender, and thus deny the experiences of women; it also 'plays straight into the hands of the state', which she argues 'is only too ready to adopt social policies on schools and the family that serve to leave minority communities at the mercy of religious leaders' (1991:101). As a result women become subjected to the male-dominated traditions and customs within the community. Fighting racism, from this perspective, becomes a fight to preserve ethnic cultures and traditions as if they are 'ahistorical' and 'apolitical'. For Patel, the danger for women like herself, who have fought to find a space for themselves, lies not so much in the rise of religious fundamentalism, as in the 'orthodoxy, conservatism and traditionalism' that is increasing, along with the power of religious leaders, within certain communities.

The rise of religious fundamentalism in Britain, Gita Sahgal and Nira Yuval-Davis (1992) argue, is partly due to the rise of religious fundamentalist movements globally, and in particular in the countries of origin of minority groups in Britain. However, also of central importance to its manifestation are the multiculturalist policies apparent throughout the English education system and 'the Race Relations Industry'. Multiculturalist discourse, they argue, defines minority communities on the basis of stereotypical notions of their 'culture', which are increasingly being interpreted as expressions of religious identity. In this way, minority communities that were previously defined in terms of their national or regional origin, for example: Pakistani, Mirpuri, Bengali, Punjabi, are now presented as unified religious communities. This is especially apparent in the case of Muslims, partly as a result of the Rushdie affair. The construction of minority communities into religious groups, according to Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, can be seen as a result of both external and internal definitions. However, the main beneficiaries of this process, they point out, and of the adoption of multiculturalist norms, are the fundamentalist leaders of minority communities. By presenting themselves as the most 'authentic' representatives of their communities, they have been able to silence criticism from both within and outside these communities, on the grounds that such criticisms are racist.
According to Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, fundamentalists seek to impose strict limitations on the behaviour of women in order to ensure the maintenance of religious solidarity.

The “proper” behaviour of women is used to signify the difference between those who belong and those who do not; women are also seen as “cultural carriers” of the grouping, who transmit group culture to the future generation; and proper control in terms of marriage and divorce ensures that children who are born to those women are within the boundaries of the collectivity, not only biologically but also symbolically (1992:8).

Yet despite these restrictions, Sahgal and Yuval-Davis acknowledge the fact that some women gain a sense of security and even empowerment ‘within the spaces allocated to them by fundamentalist movements’. Their active involvement in religious movements gives them a legitimate, public position that they would otherwise not possess. It can also provide a ‘less threatening’, but nevertheless attractive, social role and identity for unskilled working-class women and ‘frustrated’ middle-class women. Furthermore, they point out, it provides some women from minority groups with a means of challenging racist stereotypes and prejudices. However, Sahgal and Yuval-Davis argue, ‘the overall effect of fundamentalist movements has been very detrimental to women, limiting and defining their roles and activities and actively oppressing them when they step out of the preordained limits of their designated roles’ (1992:9). Women like themselves, they point out, who are actively involved in the fight against fundamentalism, often feel they are caught ‘between the devil and the deep blue sea’. Not only are they having to confront the emergence of fundamentalism within their own communities and/or countries of origin but they must also confront the racial prejudice and discrimination evident within British society in general, as well as within the Left and the feminist movements.

Hannana Siddiqui (1991) is also highly critical of those who seek to impose one view of Islam to the exclusion of all others. In her review of Rana Kabbani’s (1989) book Letter to Christendom, she challenges Kabbani’s support of Islamic fundamentalism. Siddiqui argues that Kabbani’s criticism of Rushdie’s ‘Satanic Verses’ for being depoliticised and unaccountable to its non-western readership is unjust. Instead, she believes it represents the
exploration and questioning of religious values that many Muslim women like her have been involved in. She adds ‘to dismiss and classify my views as a “Westernised, Muslim intellectual” response is to deny my experiences, which have included fighting both racism and the orthodoxies of my religious and cultural background. It also denies the experiences of many ordinary Asians living in Britain, especially women, who have been castigated and censored for expressing doubt and dissent within their families and communities’ (1991:80).

Like Patel and Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, Siddiqui believes that the rise of religious fundamentalism brings with it a demand for greater conformity to traditional orthodoxies, which makes it more difficult to practise a more liberal version of religion. Whereas Kabanni argues that it is impossible to be both Western and non-western, Siddiqui believes that it is possible to reach a point of balance between two cultures, and to forge an identity that is not based on the restriction of freedom of others. She states, ‘I have learnt that it is not a simple either/or situation. In fact, my struggles have created a stronger bond between myself and my family, who have grown to respect my right to choose for myself. I realise that enemies exist on both sides of the cultural and racial divide, as do friends. Winning freedoms means the right to choose who my enemies and friends are. In this the hope for the future lies’ (1991:83).

**Diverse Responses to Changing Environments**

In many ways, as Kim Knott and Sajda Khokher (1993) point out, these different perspectives represent the changing experiences of young Muslims during the last few decades, both in relation to the history of settlement of the various Muslim communities and their position in British society. The changing experiences of young Muslims is highlighted by Haleh Afshar (1994) drawing on her study of three generations of Muslim women in West Yorkshire, outlined earlier. She looks at the ways in which different social and economic circumstances offer these women different choices in terms of their identity. For many young Muslim women, Afshar argues, the revitalisation of the 1980s was of crucial importance, for it provided an ideal worth supporting. It offered them a new form of identity that conferred dignity on those who adopted some form of the veil, providing women with a separate space. It also made them part of ‘the great anti-imperialist Islamic movement’.
In her interviews with second and third-generation women in 1992, however, she found a slightly different situation. There were still those with a strong commitment to Islam, who gained strength from their vision of a united Islam, but these were predominantly the youngest group, still at school. Amongst the second generation, however, many now working in the social services, education, the local councils and the ‘Race Relations’ industry, ‘the mood was less euphoric’. Despite their hopes, they found that in practice, when it came to support in the workplace and to economic and professional allegiances, the gender divide between Muslim women and men was ‘unbridgeable’. To conform to the norms of morality and modesty and to represent ‘the immaculate face of Islam’, Afshar argues, means keeping a respectful silence on issues to do with women. Feminism is presented as the ‘ultimate weapon’ of the British State. Thus like Patel and other members of WAF, Afshar highlights the difficulties that many Muslim women can face as a result of the male-dominated nature of Islamic revitalisation and its stifling effects on the lives of Muslim women. She concludes by saying: ‘It is true that the Muslim community as a whole and its men as a group begin to reconsider the demands made by their women to move towards a position that allows these women to choose a combination of identities that suits them, rather than to be forced to adopt ascribed identities that do not add up to a coherent whole’ (1994:145).

As Knott and Khokher (1993) point out, in one sense research has now gone full circle. With Muslim women like Siddiqui demonstrating the problems of rejecting one religiocultural model in favour of another and instead pointing to the need to embrace the idea of being ‘between two cultures’ with the hope of finding a new and positive way forward, a point of balance. However, what is of particular significance and importance about these recent discourses on Muslim youth, and particularly Muslim women, is that they represent a development from the ‘externally observed and defined models’ to the ‘internally generated’ ones which highlight the self-determination of individuals. Knott and Khokher state that their contribution to this approach, and to the discussion about the interrelationship of religious and ethnic issues in the experience of Muslim women, stems from two factors: the particular questions they asked when interviewing and the way in which they chose to analyse the answers. However, they claim, it was the thoughts of the young women themselves which gave substance to their ideas. Thus rather than beginning their work with a hypothesis: for
example, that a religious identity offered the most effective way forward for young Muslim women in Bradford, they decided instead to work with the premise that ‘different women offer different interpretations and pursue different strategies’ (1993:598). They considered it ‘unhelpful’ to work with the notion that Muslim women would share a common orientation. However, they adopted a ‘perceptual map’, which they admit can also be a potentially limiting tool, for assessing the interrelationship of religious and ethnic issues in the experience of young women. This map contains four religio-ethnic orientations: religiously orientated, not religiously orientated, ethnically orientated and not ethnically orientated, the aim being to place each of the women they interviewed on one area of the map. In conclusion, they state:

It has been our attempt, however, not to force young women into rigid categories or ideal types, but rather to see them - at a specific point in time - as negotiating religious and ethnic factors in a particular way, perhaps giving preference to one domain over the other. We do not see this process as static: a different map would be produced if we were to interview the young women now, several years on’ (1993:607).

The evidence produced by their research thus highlights the ‘complex, shifting and multi-faceted’ nature of the experiences of young Muslim women, who at certain times can be ‘selective, critical and assertive’. While they admit that these experiences are indicative of the different and often conflicting environments in which they find themselves at home and in school, Knott and Khokher do not believe that these need necessarily be experienced as an opposition. In addition, evidence of cultural synthesis among the young women points to the variations and diversity that such an approach can take. Not only do they feel that existing descriptive models are inadequate to deal with such diversity, but they also consider the more commonly used identity descriptions like ‘Muslim’ and ‘Pakistani’ to be problematic. Such terms, they argue (1993:608) ‘while of some limited general use, inevitably fail to inform us of the complexity of their self-understanding’.

In a further elaboration of this theme, John Eade (1994) seeks to analyse the diversity apparent in the social identities of young British Bangladeshis. He argues that the construction of these identities is influenced not only by their social situation within Britain where racism plays a significant role, but also by the political and religious developments
within Bangladesh and other nation-states within the Indian sub-continent. He states (1994:377) 'like other descendants of migrant workers in Western Europe, they are caught up in the public debate about national belonging where their supra-national links provide them with special insights into the construction of hybrid identities and new ethnicities and the maintenance of individual identities in the globalising world'.

The result, according to Eade, is the manifestation of a variety of different opinions and perspectives associated with the different claims of national and Muslim belonging. Whilst the majority of individuals acknowledge that their social identity is made up of a wide range of different elements, they also recognise that many of these elements may be contradictory. Such contradictory and often conflicting 'definitions of belonging', Eade argues, make it very difficult for individuals to choose appropriate social identities. However, 'through highly versatile individual deliberations' Eade believes young Bangladeshis are able to provide some meaningful understandings of themselves and their social identities. He states (1994:392):

An important element in that ordering was the ability to distinguish between social identities, which were constructed through political and cultural discourses, and the personal significance of these identities. Yet at the same time the consistency of their deliberations must not be overemphasised. There were anxious moments of self-doubt and ambiguity where 'home' – an emotional as well as political and cultural phenomenon - may not be locatable.

Summary

These studies of Muslims in Britain highlight the complexity of the issues surrounding the second generation, and the differing responses that individuals make at different times in their lives. While some may look to the universal appeal of Islam to help them solve the contradictions in their lives, others may choose to adopt a more secular response in their efforts to balance the varying and often competing cultural systems within which they find themselves. Second-generation Pakistanis, therefore, like their parents, can not be seen as a homogenous group displaying a common perspective and a similar strategy in the
construction of their identities. Instead, differentiation and diversity would seem to be a more accurate interpretation of their lifestyles and aspirations.

In addition, the review of the literature also highlights the importance of examining structural factors, such as racial prejudice and gender discrimination, which have a significant impact on the lives of the second generation. Thus the existence of racial prejudice and discrimination within British society, it is argued, has the direct effect of 'pushing' young Muslims towards their own communities. In the case of Muslim women, it would seem that their gender status produces a double discrimination, both within their own community and within British society as a whole. Second generation Muslim women, it is argued, experience considerable pressure from their parents and older members of their community to conform to traditional religious and cultural values in order to preserve the nature of their community. In addition to these internal 'pressures', it is inevitable that these women will also experience the sexual discrimination in British society generally, which, together with racial prejudice, acts to restrict and limit the opportunities open to them.

However, as commentators such as Afshar (1994), Eade (1994) and Knott and Khokher (1993) point out, although such competing and conflicting elements may make it all the more difficult for individuals to construct appropriate social identities, their evidence would seem to demonstrate that the majority do manage effectively to provide a stable sense of self, even if this may vary over time according to their individual experiences. This highlights the complex and changing nature of social identities, but it also points to the ability of the second generation actively to select and interpret competing cultural systems, and to adopt, incorporate or abandon specific elements in their search for an appropriate individual strategy. Young Muslims are therefore actively defining and redefining themselves as a result of the multifarious cultural and structural factors that they experience both on an individual and group level. There are a great number of possibilities open to them, despite the restrictions they experience. Thus for the time being at least, differentiation and diversity among Pakistani Muslims in Britain is likely to remain.
Chapter Three

Ethnicity and Identity amongst Cypriots in Britain

Although the focus of this study is on Pakistani and Turkish Cypriots, this chapter will examine the literature on both Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Britain. This is because firstly, they share many similarities in terms of migration and settlement patterns and their position in British society; secondly, their sense of ethnicity has, in many ways, been defined in relation to each other; and thirdly, my Turkish Cypriots informants identified very closely with Greek Cypriots, far more so than with Turks or members of other ethnic groups in Britain. Therefore, in common with many of the authors mentioned in this chapter, I have used the term 'Cypriot' where the discussion is considered relevant to both populations, and 'Turkish Cypriot' or 'Greek Cypriot' where the emphasis in more pertinent to one. According to Floya Anthias (1992), the main similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots are that they both possess relatively low language and technical skills and have tended to draw on the traditional skills and roles of women to enable them to establish entrepreneurial activity in the retail and clothing industries. They both display a strong sense of ethnic identity which has developed through their political and economic experiences in Cyprus, their strong ties of kinship, the importance they place on the family and the religious and cultural prescriptions placed on the control of female sexuality.

This chapter will therefore examine these and other factors and their influence on the creation, maintenance and transformation of ethnicity and identity among Cypriots in Britain. In doing so it demonstrates the importance of kinship and ethnic ties for sustaining and enhancing collective solidarity for Turkish Cypriots in Britain. Furthermore, it points to the significance of their perception of ethnic distinctiveness in relation to other ethnic groups, and especially in relation to Turks and Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot ethnicity, therefore, involves ascription of both 'self' and 'other' fostered in, and through, boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. However, crucial to an understanding of ethnicity among Turkish Cypriots is also an analysis of 'race', class and gender. Such social divisions interact with those of
culture and ethnicity to produce multiple and contradictory effects for both individuals and
groups.

The chapter will begin by examining the experiences of Cypriots in relation to other New Commonwealth migrants in Britain, the extent to which they experience similar 'ethnic' disadvantages and what particular cultural resources they have utilised in an effort to overcome some of these disadvantages. It will then go on to examine the maintenance of ethnic identity amongst Cypriots in Britain and the factors that have influenced this. The relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and the former's relationship with migrants from Turkey will also be discussed, demonstrating the way in which ethnic identity is both created and sustained by these relations, as well as transformed in the British environment. The chapter will then go on to examine the maintenance of ethnicity among the second generation and the factors that influence this. Finally, the position of Cypriot women in Britain will be discussed along with the main concerns and issues facing the second generation.

Managing Ethnic Disadvantage

As a white minority group, displaying few distinctive physical features, Cypriots, according to Oakley (1987), have not experienced racial exclusion to any significant extent. Consequently they provide a useful marker by which to evaluate the influence of racial exclusion on the experiences and socio-economic positioning of migrants in Britain. In addition, he argues they enable an examination of the significance of cultural factors in determining the 'choices' that migrants make in relation to the economic and social opportunities available to them. As Floya Anthias (1992) points out, studies on minority groups in Britain have tended to concentrate on their degree of cultural and structural integration or assimilation with British society, or the effects of racial discrimination on their socio-economic position. Discussions of the latter, she argues, tend to ignore the position of Cypriot migrants in Britain, as they are not considered to constitute a racialised group. Nevertheless, as the institutionalisation of racism in Britain is considered to be rooted in the historical development of capitalism and colonial relations, as colonial migrants Cypriots must be seen as relevant to this discussion.

Unlike black migrants from the New Commonwealth they do not suffer racialisation as such. Historically, racism is constructed through the medium of
slave society and not only colonialism. But racism is dynamically constituted and can be attached to any difference that has an ‘ethnic’ character; that is, it is possibly an essential character of locus or ‘origin’. What was foreign – white – exotic yesteryear may become racial and undesirable this year. (Anthias 1983:37)

In addition, Cypriots can be seen as displaying many similarities with other colonial migrant groups. Cypriots in Britain possess a distinctive language and traditional culture. They also share a predominantly rural agricultural background. The island, which is now divided into two states: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot State of South Cyprus, is based on a predominantly mixed agricultural economy, traditionally organised on an individual, peasant land-holding basis, often highly fragmented. According to Oakley (1979:16) ‘The Cypriot village may be described typically as a fairly compact community of small autonomous family groups, closely interconnected by numerous ties of marriage and descent’. The economic and social background of Cypriot migrants is therefore closely resembles that of Pakistanis and other Commonwealth migrants in Britain. Their reasons for migration are also very similar; Cypriots migrated to Britain for economic reasons, to obtain stable jobs and better wages (Oakley 1970). Most Cypriots came to Britain from depopulated rural areas, some having already migrated to the town to find work. Like other Commonwealth migrants, the early Cypriots did not intend to settle permanently in Britain but to improve their economic situation with the intention of returning to Cyprus. Thus there was a desire to maintain cultural values and social relationships in preparation for their return, which was further enhanced by the process of chain migration. Thus, Kucukcan (1999) argues, Cypriot migrants followed the pattern of many other minority groups, and preferred to be near friends and relatives already settled in London.

However, despite these similarities Cypriots differ from other migrant groups in several respects. As Oakley (1970) points out, their settlement is highly concentrated in London. Over three-quarters of Cypriots in Britain live in the Greater London area. London therefore contains the largest number of Cypriots living outside Cyprus, although proportionally more Turkish Cypriots have settled in London than Greek Cypriots. This degree of concentration in a single urban area is the highest for any ethnic minority in Britain.
This settlement pattern, he argues, is indicative of the social and economic development of the Cypriot community generally in Britain. It can be seen as a response ‘firstly to a desire for cheap rented housing near workplaces in the West End, secondly, the desire to be near the centre of community life in Camden Town, and most recently, the preference for the move away from poorer ‘reception areas’ to better quality owner-occupied housing further out’ (Oakley 1970:100). However, he points out that although Cypriots have tended to move gradually further away from the central area of settlement, the degree of residential concentration has remained high, as ethnic services and employment have moved accordingly. Thus, Oakley argues, Cypriots have displayed a ‘moving concentration’ rather than a dispersal process. The settlement patterns of migrants are highly significant in accounting for the concentration of ethnic business in any one area. ‘Proximity of residence creates the demand for ethnic services and provides labour for the business set up to meet this demand’ (Ladbury 1984:107). According to Kucukcan (1999), the establishment of a neighbourhood through ‘clustering’ around a particular area constitutes one of the first stages of the institutionalisation and reproduction of values for migrants.

Perhaps the most significant point of difference between Cypriots in London and other Commonwealth migrants, Ladbury (1977) argues, is that Turks and Greeks in Cyprus are not financially dependent on migrant remittances for their material existence. In fact, she points out, ‘migration was not an economic necessity for the majority but a matter of personal choice for the individual’ (1977:303). Among Cypriot migrants, it is the nuclear family and not the wider group of kin that constitutes the normal residential unit. In marked contrast to Indian and Pakistani migrants, the decision to migrate is therefore seen purely in terms of the benefits it accrues to the immediate family alone. Thus, as Oakley (1970) points out, although it is common for both jobs and housing to be provided or arranged by close relatives, and for there to be a strong preference for the ‘company of kin’, the immediate family remains very close-knit and essentially autonomous. In this way, he argues, Cypriots can be seen as far more ‘family-centred’ than any other large ethnic minority in Britain, and certainly more so than the population at large.

In addition, Anthias (1983) states, unlike other New Commonwealth migrants, Cypriot men have tended to take up employment in areas vacated by earlier migrants, such as Jews
in retail and Italians in the catering industry. Cypriot women, on the other hand, like other migrants, have acted as replacement labour in jobs that indigenous women had left in favour of more stable and desirable white-collar service positions. Furthermore, Oakley states, Cypriots in Britain have been more economically successful than other Commonwealth groups in achieving steady employment and the higher standard of living that they sought from migration. As a result, the Cypriot community is to a large extent self-sufficient in providing for its needs. The first Cypriot migrants to Britain found work mainly within the catering industry. This economic pattern continued, despite the growth in settlement during the 1950s and early 1960s, together with a move into the clothing industry and into other service occupations. According to Oakley, the success of Cypriots in the clothing and catering industries is a reflection of the widespread desire among them to own their own businesses. A fifth of all Cypriot men in Britain are self-employed, more than twice the national average. These businesses are predominantly ‘one-man’ or small family enterprises.

The ability of Cypriots in Britain to maintain a high degree of concentration together with geographical and social mobility, Oakley (1987) argues, suggests a considerable amount of ‘choice’ in terms of where they choose to live and an absence of ‘constraint’. However, he considers this to be a superficial analysis. For Cypriots, the element of choice has been greater because of the absence of racial discrimination, and their increased wealth that has been accrued as a result of their involvement within the ethnic economy, and their ability to utilise an ‘exploitable niche’ for Cypriot employment and entrepreneurship in the retail and service industries. Nevertheless, despite these advantages Cypriots are just as much influenced by the social and economic constraints operating in society as any other group. ‘It is not possible to isolate or oppose the elements of “choice” and “constraint” in this situation, for it is essentially the interaction between Cypriots and their environment that produces the form of the relationship at any one time’ (Oakley 1987:25).

Thus in order to explain why Cypriots have entered the clothing industry and service sector, Ladbury (1984) argues, it is necessary to examine both structural and cultural factors. Like other migrants, Cypriots have, on the one hand, been constrained economically, politically and socially by the discrimination of the indigenous population and the British State in general. On the other, the experiences and aspirations of the migrants themselves present
a range of opportunities, some of which may be more appropriate and desirable than others. Both these factors, Ladbury argues, are influential in determining the employment patterns of Cypriots in Britain, that is, there are elements of both choice and constraint. Nevertheless, she points out, structural constraints must be considered primary as these define the boundaries within which cultural choices can operate. As Sasha Josephides (1988:43) states: ‘for many of them, going into business was seen as the only way to make money and fulfil their dream of going back to Cyprus with sufficient capital to buy property and live comfortably’. However, she points out, in reality, the majority of small business owners have not made money but merely enough to live on, and what they have earnt has been achieved by working long hours and dealing with the uncertainties of being in business. Such entrepreneurial activity therefore is very much situated on the margins of the economy. In addition, as Salahi Sonyel (1988) demonstrates, while a small number of Cypriots have managed a degree of success and have moved away from decaying inner city areas to the suburbs, the majority of the community still live as owner-occupiers in the ‘partly depressed’ and ‘under-privileged’ areas of the inner city. As a result they experience the same socio-economic conditions and difficulties as the indigenous working class people, such as low income or unemployment, bad housing, poor schooling, lack of proper community facilities, etc. In addition, as a minority group they have ‘tended to suffer severely constrained life chances over and above those of the native working class’ (Sonyel 1988:38).

Despite their position as a white minority in Britain, Anthias argues, Cypriots are subject to same forms of social and economic disadvantage as other Commonwealth groups. Such disadvantage therefore questions the distinction between racial and ethnic categories that is often made.

As colonial migrants from an underdeveloped region, Cypriots brought with them cultural visibility, low language skills, low occupational and educational qualifications, and non-initiation into the structural ‘openings’ and cultural capital of British social relations. They are also a physically visible minority group particularly in certain areas of high concentration in London. But more importantly, ethnic disadvantage is implicated in the structures of employment, housing, and access to the state in the interplay with ethnic and class resources.
of the group. Ethnic disadvantage is linked to the exclusion processes structured by sectarianism and the dominant ethnicity of British society both at an institutional level and that of employer and the working class. (Anthias 1992:2)

Thus while Cypriots in Britain have in many ways been able to use their ethnicity in the development of an ethnic economy, providing both employment and services for many Cypriots, and have managed to avoid economic and social assimilation into British society, this can not simply be seen as evidence of their ability to exercise cultural choice in the absence of racial exclusion. As Anthias argues, cultural choices and identities need to be examined within the context of migrant or ethnic exclusion and disadvantage. Cypriots, like other New Commonwealth migrants, have been subject to political, economic and social exclusion in Britain, and have therefore had to use their ethnicity to 'manage' the ethnic disadvantage they face. The following section will therefore outline the factors which have helped to sustain and reproduce Greek and Turkish Cypriot ethnicity in the British context.

**Maintaining Ethnic identity**

Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots brought with them to Britain a strong sense of their separate ethnic identities, which had evolved in relation to the political, social and economic conditions in Cyprus. Greek Cypriot ethnicity was defined, as Anthias (1992) highlights, in opposition to both British colonialism and to Turkish ethnicity, and structured through the growth of the Enosis movement (Union with Greece). On the one hand, Enosis represented the ideological expression of the polarity between 'Greekness' and 'Turkishness', formed in Greece in opposition to Ottoman Rule. Articulated in Cyprus initially through the Church and the bourgeoisie, it affirmed the ethnic distinctiveness of Greeks and Turks and the desire for union with Greece. On the other hand, Enosis became increasingly articulated as a 'national liberationist' movement in opposition to British rule and the economic exploitation of Cyprus by the British, and incorporating the Greek Cypriot peasant and working class. By comparison, Turkish Cypriot ethnicity, as Sonyel (1988) states, developed from a strong Turkish Cypriot community opposition to the Enosis movement and a desire to maintain their own religion as Muslims, their Turkish language and their Turkish way of life. While initially the Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie favoured British rule in order to safeguard their rights as a
Turkish minority, Turkish Cypriot nationalism and ethnic expression developed into the concept of Taksim (Partition). Thus as Anthias (1992:43) states: 'Enosis and Taksim stood in opposition as the representation of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ethnicity'.

The development of their distinct ethnic heritages in Cyprus, in relation to each other and to British colonialism, helps to explain why Greek and Turkish Cypriot migrants in Britain have maintained a strong pride in their respective heritages and did not regard themselves as culturally inferior. They therefore preferred accommodation to assimilation. For Anthias (1992) this strong sense of ethnicity may partly explain why certain cultural values and traditions have not progressed naturally as in Cyprus but have remained in a 'time warp'. Such traditions include the maintenance of the Cypriot dialect and traditional norms and practices in relation to female sexuality, both of which have been considerably modified in Cyprus. Nevertheless, as Anthias points out, the development of Turkish and Greek Cypriot ethnicity in Britain cannot merely be seen in terms of their orientation to Cyprus, but is structured by the migration process itself and the social and economic conditions of their local environment.

Cypriot migrants, as Monica Taylor (1988) argues, have subsequently made conscious attempts to develop their own community, to maintain their loyalties to Cyprus and to resist 'Anglicisation'. This process, she argues, was further aided by the self-sufficient nature of the Cypriot community, which sheltered them from the 'forces of assimilation'. The development of ethnic shops and services, Kucukcan (1999: 93) argues 'could be interpreted as an expression of ethnic identity in the context of north-east London'. They not only provide goods and services for the local Turkish (and Greek) community, but also offer employment and help develop wider social networks through friends and acquaintances.

According to Pamela Constantinides (1977), two main factors can be seen as central to the maintenance of Cypriot identity in Britain. Firstly, the large proportion of married couples and nuclear families that emigrated as a group; and secondly, the fact that the bulk of immigrants arrived over a limited period between 1955 and 1962. The presence of whole families, she argues, served to keep men under a certain degree of 'moral control'. Kucukcan (1999) argues that the desire to maintain or recreate social relationships and the capacity of Cypriots to achieve this has been considerably enhanced by the process of chain migration,
in which individuals and families moved along lines of kinship and patronage, thus reconstituting groups and relationships in the British setting. In addition, Anthias (1992) points out, Cypriot migration was seen as only temporary; thus there was a greater incentive to maintain cultural values and traditions in preparation for their return. This 'ideology of return', she argues, also affects the British-born Cypriots' participation within Britain and reinforces traditional social values and networks. Thus Cypriot migrants have retained their basic commitment to traditional Cypriot social values, both as regards life-styles and patterns of social relationships. Thus, according to Sonyel (1988:21) 'they have become accustomed, rather than integrated, to British society. As Cypriots arrived in large numbers, Anthias states, the ethnic service industry developed simultaneously. Single women were absorbed into the ethnic economy and made the ethnic marriage market more feasible. Moreover, she points out, the ethnic economy has been strong enough to absorb the second generation.

Thus the migration patterns of Greek and Turkish Cypriot migrants can be seen to have had an important influence on their specific ethnic identity, which had been created and sustained by the particular economic and political conditions in Cyprus. However, although Cypriots in Britain have tended to preserve their ethnic identity and maintain strong links with other Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot families and neighbours, their ethnicity is nevertheless distinct from that of Cyprus. As Sonyel points out:

As it was impossible for them to maintain their Turkish Cypriot identity in a foreign country owing to cultural differences in language, morals and religion, they developed a dynamism of their own, and gradually ceased to be an exact replica of the home society. As a result, they have adapted and developed a new version of their Turkish culture and Turkish Cypriot sub-culture in the UK...The culture they now identify with is a re-cycled one; it resembles the homeland culture or sub-culture in many ways, but is not quite the same thing (1988:21).

A similar observation is made by Anthias (1992) in relation to Greek Cypriots in Britain. She states that their ethnicity is not the same as that of Greek Cypriots in Cyprus because it is structured by the migration process itself and must therefore be seen in relation to the exclusions and subordinations they experience as a minority ethnic group.
Nevertheless, the economic and political conditions of post-war Cyprus have provided the foundations for the changes and adaptations made. 'The strong sense of ethnic distinctiveness and the importance of the Greek language and family were constructions that predate the migration experience but the ways in which they are expressed and their role has changed in the new setting of British society' (Anthias 1992:137).

The maintenance of religion can also be seen in a similar light. According to Anthias (1992) although the Greek Orthodox Religion can be seen to represent an important part of Greek Cypriot ethnicity, and much of the early nationalism in Cyprus was articulated through religion, she describes their allegiance to it as one of 'passive religiosity'. In Britain, while the majority of Greek Cypriots maintain traditional religious festivals and many women in particular attend Church, religion does not play as important a role, neither ethnically nor politically, as it did in Cyprus. For Turkish Cypriots, Anthias points out, the influence of Kemalist nationalism has led them to develop a more secular and 'Statist' ethnic identity. According to Ladbury, only a small minority of Turkish Cypriots in London make any concession to formal religion such as attending a mosque or reading prayers in their homes. In contrast, however, Kucukcan (1999:255) who generalises about migrants from Turkey and Cyprus argues: 'Islam is one of the indispensible components of Turkish/Cypriot identity'. Amongst his informants, even those who defined themselves as 'not religious' or 'normal' Muslims believed that religion has had public and private influence on the formation of Turkish identity. Thus, as Taylor states: 'It may be that religious beliefs and practices are more important in maintaining ethnic and cultural identity rather than on their own account' (1988:28).

In addition, Ladbury (1977) states that compared with Greek Cypriots, working class Turkish Cypriots have lacked group organisation socially and culturally as associations have largely been run and patronised by the middle class. Since this time the numbers of Turkish Cypriot (and Turkish speaking) organisations has greatly increased, as Kucukcan (1999) reports. Nevertheless, the majority of Turkish Cypriots do not actively participate in these organisations; their only contract with them may be through seeking Turkish language teaching for their children (Sonyel 1988). Among Greek Cypriots, however, ethnic

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1 My own research, however, highlights significant contrasts between the religiosity of Turks and Turkish Cypriots, as reported in chapter eight.
organisation tends to be more 'popularly based', which Anthias suggests may be linked to the historical importance of socialism in Greek Cypriot social and political life.

Thus neither organised religion nor other forms of organisational activity provide a centralising focus for Turkish Cypriots in London. 'If one is to find such a focus one must turn to the ties of kinship and affinity and to the interdependence of neighbours, all of which link individuals and provide the means whereby Turks in London retain, as far as possible, their self-sufficiency as an ethnic group' (Ladbury 1977:307). Likewise, Constantinides states that the majority of Greek Cypriots do not involve themselves in the political or other activities of the community. Instead, their lives are centred round the boundaries of family and work ties. 'Many are little interested in building a "British Cypriot community". They see themselves as transplanted members of their Cypriot village, and as individual family units struggling to achieve an acceptable standard of material comfort' (1977:290).

According to Kucukcan (1999), the influence of kinship networks on the behaviour of migrants from Turkey and Cyprus can be seen throughout the processes of migration, settlement and post-settlement in Britain. Akraba (kinship) networks among Turks and Cypriots in London, he argues, therefore play a similar role to the Biradari system among Pakistanis (outlined in the previous chapter). In the early stages of migration kinship and social networks help fellow members to find employment and accommodation, and provide mutual support for coping with the challenges of the new environment. Nevertheless, as Ladbury points out, these relationships are also influenced by the new environment. Thus, marriages are not arranged between members of families who originated from the same village in Cyprus, nor are relations maintained with non-kin after leaving Cyprus. 'Rather, certain kin relationships have been strengthened and completely new relationships formed between individuals who now relate, not on the basis of where they once lived in Cyprus, but on the basis of their present status' (Ladbury, 1977:307). Turkish Cypriots in Britain, therefore, tend to focus their relationships on other Turkish Cypriot families in their local neighbourhood, and the strongest kin-based ties are among those they see most often. However, Kucukcan points out, unlike Turkish Cypriots, migrants from Turkey still attach considerable importance to being from the same village or city.
The social interaction of Cypriots, as Taylor (1988) states, was primarily within their own group, rather than with the British or other local minority groups, thus reinforcing traditional social and cultural values. Furthermore, she argues, within the Cypriot community there are strong religious, linguistic and kinship differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots which, together with the importance placed on family life, have served to perpetuate ethnic distinctiveness despite a certain amount of economic interdependence. However, as Ladbury (1977) points out, different influences may affect both the migrants and the home society so that considerable differences develop between them. On the one hand Greek and Turkish Cypriot ethnicity is maintained by distinguishing themselves from each other and from other ethnic groups, in the same way as Pakistani ethnicity has been maintained and reproduced in Britain. On the other, the attitudes Turkish and Greek Cypriots have towards other groups with whom they come into contact are also a product of the environment in which they live. Thus the attitudes of Turkish Cypriots to a particular group in London are not necessarily the same as those held towards the same group in Cyprus.

In Cyprus, Ladbury points out, cultural differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turks are often exaggerated and emphasised and discriminatory attitudes or derogatory stereotypes displayed as a result of the perceived economic advantage given to Turks since the Turkish invasion of 1974. She suggests that since this time Turkish mainlanders have come to fulfil the important social role of the scapegoat, normally reserved for the Greek Cypriots, to maintain ethnic distinctiveness. In London the majority of Turkish Cypriots have relatively little contact with mainland Turks, even those living in the same areas or similarly employed in catering, although some visiting occurs and occasionally marriages are arranged. In Britain, Ladbury argues, although derogatory stereotypes of mainland Turks can emerge in individual situations of conflict or disagreements from time to time, they do not exist at the group level. The reason for this, she suggests, is that Turkish Cypriots do not see the existence of mainland Turks in Britain as a threat to their own interests as individuals. Thus they are not regarded as competitors either economically or ideologically, as they possess very similar religious and cultural traditions and values. Although mainland Turks are usually considered more traditional and religious than Turkish Cypriots, Ladbury argues, this is not reinterpreted to mean 'backward' or 'uncivilised as it is in Cyprus. In addition, Turkish
Cypriots in London often rely on the greater religiosity of the Turks to provide religious ceremonies, for example when someone dies. According to Kucukcan (1999) the 'subtle differentiations' between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots represent two poles of Turkish identity, and are based on 'self-ascription' rather than 'external attribution'. Nevertheless, he argues: ‘these self-ascribed boundaries between Turks from the mainland and Cyprus have become diluted during confrontations between "Us" and "Them"'. The relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turks in Britain, therefore, demonstrate the significance of local environmental conditions in determining the nature of ethnic relations.

Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Britain can also be seen as indicative of the local context. According to Anthias (1992), the Greek-Turkish distinction that developed in Cyprus in the 1950s as a result of 'chauvinist nationalism' is much less relevant in Britain. Although their distinct identities are still important they are maintained and emphasised for different purposes. Despite differences of kinship, language and religion that served as the boundary markers in Cyprus, relationships at an individual level between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in London are very good. Both Constantinides and Ladbury argue that despite intercommunal hostilities of 1963 and the subsequent fluctuating nature of Greek and Turkish relations on Cyprus, this did not have profound consequences for inter-ethnic relations in Britain. The migrants, many of whom came from ethnically mixed villages, had already established working relations together in London. Common origin and working conditions in Britain gave Greek and Turkish Cypriots greater unity of outlook than prevailed in Cyprus after 1963. Indeed, as Taylor points out, relations between British Cypriots were often held up as an example to be emulated in Cyprus. Although the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and its aftermath imposed a real strain on relations, individual and working relations have remained good. However, Ladbury argues, although ethnic differences have been played down in the context of work and the neighbourhood, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have mostly remained public. Family visiting and intermarriage between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is rare and any relations overstepping conventional behaviour lead to the ethnic boundaries being redrawn with renewed vigour. Nevertheless, the local environment has clearly influenced these relations.
These opinions and attitudes towards other groups demonstrate the ways in which Cypriot ethnicity is influenced by the environmental conditions within which it is based. Thus while Cypriots in Britain can be seen to maintain a strong commitment to their ethnic heritage, cultivated by the political and economic conditions in Cyprus and subsequently reinforced by the circumstances of migration, Cypriot ethnicity, Greek or Turkish, cannot be seen as an exact replica of that found in Cyprus itself.

The Second Generation

Whilst first generation Cypriots in Britain display a well-defined ethnic identity, the situation for the second generation is much more complex. Their sense of ethnicity is not only formed in relation to their allegiance or orientation towards Cyprus, or to Greek or Turkish Cypriots, but the fact that they have been born and/or brought up in Britain subsequently affects their sense of who they are. This involves not only their experiences of aspects of British social and cultural life through their participation in school and work, but also the way others perceive them. Consequently their orientation towards Britain and their sense of 'Britishness' is also a major factor in their ethnic identity. Furthermore, as Taylor (1988) points out, the fact that they are less distinguishable by physical appearance than other ethnic minorities means they may 'pass' as indigenous British.

The main factors that influence the ethnic identity of second generation Cypriots, according to both Anthias (1992) and Taylor, are firstly, their degree of orientation towards Cyprus, particularly in relation to the 'Cypriot problem'; secondly, the level of social, political, economic and cultural organisation and dissemination among Cypriots in Britain and the degree of allegiance an individual has to his or her local Cypriot community; and thirdly, their awareness of cultural differences between themselves and other groups, together with their perceptions of the attitudes of the indigenous population to these differences.

In relation to the second generation’s orientation towards Cyprus, commentators are somewhat divided in their views. Constantinides (1977) argues that as a result of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, second generation Greek Cypriots became acutely aware of their Cypriot origins and their allegiance to family and kin, which still tied them to Cyprus. Ladbury, on the other hand, writing about Turkish Cypriots in the same publication, stated: ‘Meanwhile
a generation is growing up which knows the beaches of Cyprus better than its politics and, in many cases, does not care very much about either' (1977:329). Similarly, Sonyel (1988) argues that having grown up in Britain many second generation Turkish Cypriots feel a greater sense of allegiance to Britain than to Cyprus, which represents a 'distant land' or merely somewhere to go for a holiday and a place where relatives might live. Thus despite the strong emotional ties of the first generation to Cyprus and their efforts to instil a sense of 'roots' and 'origin' in their children, most of the second generation, she argues, find it very difficult to display such allegiance to Cyprus. Rather, the majority has become 'accustomed' to life in Britain and regard it as their home.

The orientation of both Turkish and Greek Cypriot young people towards Cyprus, Taylor (1988) points out, varies from individual to individual. However, she does not feel that being born and/or brought up in Britain necessarily prevents the second generation from identifying with their parents' country of origin. ‘Regardless of the length of time in the UK, emotional ties persist and romanticised images derived from family stories, together with the increased consciousness of cultural and ethnic roots at times of war and from visits back, may serve to revive identity’ (Taylor 1988:183). Nevertheless, she points out, research seems to indicate that although many Greek Cypriots seem to be identifying themselves as London Cypriots, thus emphasising their allegiance to both Cyprus and Britain, Turkish Cypriots tend to be split between either dismissing their Cypriot identity altogether or reaffirming it more determinedly. Part of the reasons for this, she states, were considered to be the fact that Turkish Cypriots represent only a small group in Britain and had a less extensive support structure than the Greek Cypriots. In relation to Greek Cypriots, Anthias (1992:120) states: ‘Most young people, however, express a certain degree of ambivalence about their ethnic identity, although they often “know” they are Greek/Cypriot “deep down”’.

Despite these differences, it is clear that the second generation have been influenced as much by their experiences of British society as they have by those of Cyprus. According to Oakley (1970), many Cypriots were encouraged to migrate not just to improve their financial position, but also for the educational advancement of their children, which they believed Britain offered. Nevertheless, it was assumed that their children would remain essentially Greek or Turkish. Thus he argues, ‘a new and largely unanticipated problem is that the
influences of school and neighbourhood deflect children far from parental ideals of Cypriot youth, forcing unwanted changes in family life' (1970:102). Thus, as Sonyel (1988) points out, on the one hand parents fear the integration of their children into mainstream British culture, but on the other continue to hold high educational aspirations for their children. Such aspirations necessarily require a significant amount of participation in British schools and society, yet instead Cypriot parents tend to encourage cultural isolation in order to safeguard Cypriot values, and strong measures are often taken to maintain this isolation.

Furthermore, Constantinides argues many children have severe difficulties in reconciling their own values and aspirations with those of their parents, causing many to resent their parents' traditional Cypriot values and lifestyles. According to Oakley: 'Few parents, however, seem really to confront the different situation, preferring to avoid decisions that might enable them to resolve conflicts in a constructive way. Often changes come by default, so relations between parents and children may become bitter and hostile, in some cases communication ceasing altogether' (1970:102). Similarly, Sonyel states that Turkish parents can experience severe communication problems with their children, which can lead to tensions and conflict and 'to the breakdown of the harmony of family life at home' (1988:55). Turkish young people, as Kucukcan (1999) highlights, are adopting different attitudes and values to the first generation. These generational differences can lead to disagreements and tensions between parents and children, which are rooted in the traditional cultural values of the first generation. Consequently, he argues, many young people are distancing themselves from some of the values of the first generation by 'internalising' social attitudes of the wider British society. According to Kucukcan (1999:122): 'these observations suggest that a process of change and deeper integration in the surrounding society are becoming influential forces shaping the identity of the Turkish young generation in Britain'.

Thus like Pakistani young people, second generation Cypriots are considered by many commentators to be 'caught between two cultures', confronted with two often contrasting and conflicting models of social behaviour.

Turkish Muslim children are growing up in an alien culture, under the constant risk of losing their ethnic identity, and of being completely assimilated by the indigenous Anglo-conformist culture, which neglects, omits and even degrades
Turkish Muslim culture, and causes some Turkish children to denounce their own culture through self-fulfilling prophecies and low self-concepts. Many of them are ignorant of their own culture: language, religion and traditions; and many more are becoming strangers to their own ethnicity. Under the influence of British culture, a number of them question, and even reject, their own values and traditions. (Sonyel 1988:45)

The result of this confusion, created by their experience of two conflicting cultures, Sonyel argues, is that they become 'victims' of the 'dual-role dilemma'. This involves having to practise different values and adapting to different cultural patterns of behaviour, while retaining a 'mutual existence' between them. For Oakley, the situation of the second generation 'is doubly acute, seeking as they do an identity astride two cultures, and lacking the communication to traditional and comforting institutions upon which their parents can always fall back' (1970:102). In addition, Anthias (1992) points out, the contrasting patterns of behaviour that they experience at home and at school, together with the failure of parents to allow them to develop an identity relevant to their experiences in Britain, and the inability of the schools to acknowledge or understand their cultural and structural position, lead many young Cypriots to feel that they are doubly misunderstood. Furthermore, these conflicts are experienced differently by young women and young men, due to the greater restrictions that parents place on daughters in order to protect their sexual purity (Kucukcan 1999). According to Anthias, young women face specific difficulties in reconciling the aspirations of their peers and school with the strict sexual mores of their parents. As a result, Sonyel argues, many parents attempt to restrict the socialisation of their daughters at school by not encouraging them to participate in after-school activities, and many parents seek to send their daughters to single-sex schools to limit their contact with males and thus safeguard their reputation.

This situation is further compounded for Turkish Cypriot young people in particular by the difficulties and disadvantages they experience in school. Thus as Sonyel notes, Turkish children were considered to represent 'the worst underachievers' in British schools, according to the 1985 Swann Report. Many of these difficulties result from a lack of recognition of their culture, language and religion. In addition, she points out, the socio-economic conditions of the majority of Turkish people in Britain have been a major contributory factor in the
underachievement of the second generation. Such conditions include unemployment or long and unsociable working hours among parents, poor and run-down localities, overcrowding, malnutrition, unhygienic conditions and so on. Such conditions, she argues, have a considerable effect on the physical and mental well-being of Turkish children, as well as preventing their parents from spending time with them or taking an interest in their education.

While many of these conditions apply equally to Greek Cypriots, they do not seem to have experienced the same levels of underachievement. Anthias (1992) states that although there is evidence that Greek Cypriot children experience specific disadvantages in relation to their class and ethnic/racial status, there is a greater tendency for them to continue on to further education and consequently become more ‘upwardly mobile’. According to Sonyel, these differences in Turkish and Greek educational achievement can largely be explained by the greater levels of prejudice, discrimination and stereotyping that they experience. Increased levels of prejudice towards Turkish Cypriots in relation to Greek Cypriots were seen by the Swann Report to be based on the fact that Turkish Cypriots, being darker-skinned, may well be viewed as black, whereas Greek Cypriots could more easily ‘pass’ as white. Furthermore, stereotypes attributed to the two groups were based on historical interpretations which regarded the Greeks as ‘the great civilisers of the world’, while Turks were largely viewed as ‘uncivilised and cruel barbarians’ (Sonyel 1988:46). These stereotypes, Sonyel points out, are evident in the assumptions of the majority population, articulated in the curriculum and consequently influencing teachers’ expectations.

These difficulties and conflicts affect the second generation in a variety of different ways, leading them to adapt a number of different possible strategies. Some may come to reject their parents’ values, others to identify with them more strongly. In addition, as Anthias (1992) states, those who have achieved a greater level of educational success and acquired professional status may ‘move away’ from their ethnic identity and social life. However, as both Constantinides (1977) and Anthias point out, whilst many of the second generation may reject their Cypriot identity in adolescence, once leaving school many will return and reassert their ethnic identity as they become aware of the problems they face as ‘foreigners’ and the restrictions this imposes on their economic and social integration in British society.
For many, a type of identity crisis seems to occur in the period after they have left school and sought employment. Those who have received education in overcrowded and poorly staffed schools in the inner city find themselves poor candidates for the more glamorous jobs they dreamt about. In the case of girls, parental concern for their moral welfare may place restrictions on how far away from home they are allowed to work. However, the ethnic economy is ready and willing to absorb them, particularly when there are family businesses to be maintained. For quite a few rebellious adolescents, this period marks their ‘re-entry’ into their ethnic group (Constantinides 1977:286).

The experiences of Turkish young people, Kucukcan (1999) highlights, demonstrate ‘continuity and change’: they may still respect their parents’ traditional Turkish values, but there is a tendency for them to ‘change’ restrictive customs and practices. In this way, he argues, the formation of Turkish identity among the younger generation can be seen as a dynamic and on-going process, involving constant negotiation and redefinition.

Thus the existence of a strong and extensive system of economic, political and social organisation among Cypriots in Britain provides opportunities for employment, helps preserve language and cultural values and upholds the sanctity of female sexual morality, which may exert a considerable influence on the second generation. Nevertheless, as Taylor states: ‘The very fact of growing up in wider society and the educational environment means that in different places or phases in the lives individuals may choose to adopt values more attuned to their Greek, Turkish or Cypriot backgrounds at one time and those of British society at another (1988:178). Consequently, individual aspirations and self-perceptions of identity may vary considerably, possessing few clear or shared meanings. As a result, Taylor argues, it may be more relevant and appropriate to examine individual perceptions of identity and social positioning in order to understand the complex nature of identity formation among Cypriot young people in Britain.

The Role of Women

Traditional Cypriot norms and gender divisions can be seen as central to the creation and maintenance of Cypriot ethnicity in Britain. Women, Anthias (1992) argues, are crucial to this
process as they represent both the transmitters of the 'cultural stuff', as well as the definers of the ethnic boundary. Their defining of the boundary works both legally in relation to citizenship and in terms of the system of sexual relations, which ensures the maintenance of ethnic reproduction through patriarchal control over the activities of women. This system, which is far stricter for women than it is for men, places restrictions on the choice of suitable marriage partners thus ensuring that children remain in the ethnic group. 'For women this entails behaving in ethnically appropriate ways by conforming to the principle of sexual purity and for men it entails maintaining control over women' (1992:93). Similarly, Kucukcan (1999) highlights the hierarchical authority of the traditional Turkish family, which assumes different roles and responsibilities for family members: 'this gives the father the dominant role as “breadwinner” and considers the mother a "care taker", responsible for the internal affairs of the family such as looking after children and carrying out household duties' (1999:74).

Furthermore, as Anthias points out, the patriarchal nature of the Cypriot family can be seen as a major factor in the 'management' of ethnic disadvantage and for achieving the economic aims of migration. Cypriot women, therefore, provided a cheap and readily available source of labour for small-scale businesses in catering and clothing, that were themselves facilitated by drawing on Cypriot women's traditional skills of cooking and sewing. In this way, Anthias argues, Cypriot female labour can be seen as the 'cornerstone' of the ethnic economy.

The norms and values governing family practices and women's actions, Sasha Josephides (1988) points out, are based on the concepts of honour and shame, which permeate every aspect of social and economic life in Cyprus, as in other Mediterranean countries. Such values are easier to maintain she argues if women do not work outside the home. To do so is a blatant indication that the husband is unable to support his family himself, as well as exposing women to outsiders. However, the economic impetus for migration to acquire sufficient money to return home and live comfortably, made it necessary for women to work as well. Nevertheless, as Anthias states: 'It was however unthinkable for women brought up in the enclosed world of traditional Cypriot rural life to enter into unskilled manual work in a foreign and “dangerous” male-regulated territory' (1983:79). In addition, as the Cypriot economy was predominantly based on agriculture, women lacked confidence of
working in an urban setting, which was exacerbated by their lack of language skills. Thus most Cypriot women in Britain work as either machinists, finishers or homeworkers in the clothing industry, or with family in restaurants, cafes and shops situated in the main areas of Cypriot settlement in London.

Despite the large proportion of Cypriot women working and the subsequent growth in their economic independence women remain under the control of male authority. This is because, Anthias states, their employment as machinists, while reasonably well paid, involves long working hours and poor conditions, in which the women have little security or control over their work. In addition, Cypriot women have very minimal opportunity to resist patriarchal control. To stand up to their husbands could lead to estrangement, as they are unlikely to receive support within the Cypriot community, which for most women, and for older women in particular, constitutes the whole basis of their social lives. Whilst there seems to be a greater ‘willingness’ to seek separation or divorce from their husbands than is evident in Cyprus, Anthias points out, Cypriot women in London feel more isolated, living away from their family and kin in Cyprus. Childcare is also more difficult, as older relatives who would usually help out are not present in London.

Cypriot women in Britain, therefore, continue to be controlled by the patriarchal norms and values which affect the second generation as much as the first; and parents continue to bring up their children, and more particularly their daughters, according to traditional norms of appropriate sexual behaviour. However, this can cause tension between parents and daughters, as such values contrast quite significantly with those of British society. Nevertheless, Anthias suggests, Cypriot women in general have more opportunities in Britain to confront these forms of patriarchal control. In London women are supervised less closely than they would be in Cyprus, and an increasing number of young women are finding employment outside the Cypriot communities. Similarly, Kucukcan argues that the process of migration and settlement in Britain has lifted some of the social familial expectations of women. They are no longer under the close control of parents-in-laws, and their contribution to family income through employment has changed their status ‘from that of partners to an economic resource’, although they are still expected to carry out household duties (1999:76).
reputation of their daughters, in the more 'anonymous' environment of London they tend to be less traditional in their approach. Furthermore, the second generation have a much greater knowledge of British society and subsequently are more aware of alternative models of behaviour, including those of feminism, which promote equality and women's rights. Second generation Cypriot women may therefore be more 'prepared' to resist the norms and values of their parents.

However, Anthias points out, most young women seem quite capable of 'managing' the potential tensions and conflicts they experience. Most do not publicly go against their parents' expectations, although many do display alternative values and patterns of behaviour in private; many have boyfriends and some are involved in sexual relations with them. ‘Parents may suspect but as long as a public display has not taken place and as long as they are assured in their own minds that the girl is still a virgin they make concessions’ (Anthias 1983:90). Although there is considerable variation in the attitudes of Cypriot parents, Anthias states, most are beginning to allow their daughters more freedom in Britain and giving them more autonomy over their lives.

Education is also becoming a much higher priority both in Cyprus and in Britain. Many parents, as Josephides points out, are now more willing to allow their daughters to continue their education and obtain employment; many even expect this. Yet, she argues that among the better-off families this may be considered merely an 'interim period' until the young women are married. In addition, Josephides argues, most of the second generation, are determined not to follow their mothers into the clothing and catering industries. On the other hand, as Ladbury (1984) points out, many young Cypriots are forced to seek work in the ethnic economy as a last resort, when they are unable to acquire employment in the open market. Second generation Cypriots experience the same kind of disadvantages in education as those from other ethnic minorities, and display comparable levels of unemployment. Yet within these constraints, Josephides argues, young Cypriots are making certain choices. Young women tend to aspire to what they perceive as 'glamour' jobs, such as beauty therapy, hairdressing and fashion. These represent a major contrast to the work that their mothers have been confined to. In addition, many young Cypriot women are taking up clerical positions, particularly in travel, banking and insurance. In addition, Kucukcan points out,
some Turkish women are also entering public life and there are a number of Turkish professionals in areas such as teaching, social work, interpretation, law and journalism. The number of women in these areas, he argues, demonstrates the changing status of Turkish women in London.

Most young women prefer not to work for other Cypriots, despite opportunities for work in Cypriot banks, tourist agencies and other Cypriot offices, which require Greek or Turkish language skills. However, Josephides argues, most young people felt that it was better to work for non-Cypriots if possible as there was more prestige attached to finding work in the open market. 'So not only do Cypriot women choose not to work within the traditional spheres of the ethnic economy, but they also choose not to work for Cypriots if they can help it' (1988:52).

The preference of most young women to work outside the Cypriot communities, however, does not mean that they have abandoned their Cypriot values, and the majority will still live at home until they are married. In addition, as Anthias indicates, most young Cypriot women will adopt a more Cypriot based social life after leaving school, usually maintaining only their Cypriot friendships and confining their leisure activities to those within the community. Although many young women are critical of some of their parents' values, the majority will submit to their parents' dictates, but as independent adults they do so out of obligation. As Anthias argues: 'It appears to be in their economic interests to maintain these, since Greek Cypriot parents have an ideology of "sacrifice" towards their children that not only imbues guilt but also self-interest' (1983:91). Most young women are better-off financially living at home, where they are often provided with cars and not obliged to contribute to the household expenditure, consequently their money is their own. In addition, Josephides argues, the second generation enjoy the safety and security that being part of a Cypriot community gives them, and many are therefore unwilling to rebel or behave inappropriately, at least in public. Furthermore, as Anthias highlights:

A further factor is that often geographical, social, economic and political links of the Greek Cypriot community act as an effective 'policing' mechanism. Greek Cypriots congregate in particular areas, many of them working there and having
a close network of family and relations. Under such conditions, traditional sexual
relations and roles are preserved. (1983:91)

Similarly, Kucukcan (1999) points out that the involvement of some members of the Turkish
community in the circulation of gossip and the damage that this can cause to the parents'
reputation produces social pressures which force young women to behave in ‘culturally’
appropriate ways.

Thus while the second generation retain, on the whole, a sense of ethnic identity, and
most Cypriot norms and values are still strongly maintained in Britain, there have been
certain modifications relating to marriages and dowries. Most Cypriot women, Constantinides
notes, prefer to marry other Cypriots because they feel they will have 'more in common' with
them, and thus, in theory at least, uphold the concept on ‘family honour’ (Anthias 1983).
However, most are not in favour of arranged marriages and the practice is generally
becoming less common in Britain than it is in Cyprus, although it is still the norm. Also in
contrast to Cyprus, the dowry system has mostly disappeared in Britain, although many
parents still provide financial assistance in setting up a home. Constantinides argues that the
decline in the practice of formal dowries can partly be explained by changes in marriage
customs, but more significantly she believes, it is linked to the socio-economic background of
the migrants themselves. As the majority of Cypriots who migrated to Britain are from the
poorer sections of Cypriot society it is unlikely that they would have obtained much in the way
of a dowry when they were married. Furthermore, Constantinides points out, in Britain it is the
economic success of women that is becoming more important. Ladbury (1977) also notes
that many of the urban educated Cypriot migrants are attempting to introduce new forms of
behaviour in an effort to become more 'western'.

Yet despite these modifications, concepts of reputation and sexual modesty in
relation to women are still given a high priority. Indeed, as Josepides claims, many of the
first generation are maintaining the attitudes and values they brought with them in the 1950s,
in contrast to Cyprus where many of these values have become less important. For young
Cypriot women, she states, most of these issues focus on the question of ‘being allowed out’. Most are allowed to go out with family members or other Cypriot women known to the family. However, conflict can arise over the issue of going out with school friends and young men.
According to Josephides, there is much variation in the extent to which parents will allow their daughters freedom, and although some are given more freedom than others are, most young women do not feel that they are given enough. Therefore, she argues, the concept of honour can be seen to have been separated from the issue of women's role in employment and has become 'exclusively attached' to the issue of 'being allowed out'.

For Josephides, the possibility of change rests on the 'coupling' of women's increasing role in the labour market with their access to wider society, allowing them to 'exit' from the Cypriot community if they choose to. This does not mean, she argues, that the second generation will choose to adopt British cultural values and patterns of behaviour in favour of Cypriot ones, but their access to these alternative values weakens the power of the constraints and restrictions which they may experience. The increased choices and opportunities they experience, therefore, give second generation Cypriot women greater bargaining power within their own communities.

Summary

What is clear from studies of Cypriots in Britain is the extent to which they experience the same kind of economic and social disadvantage as other ethnic minorities. Although they may have been able to utilise ethnic ties in the development of an ethnic economy providing goods and services both internally and externally, this in itself is a reaction to their disadvantaged position in society. Thus Cypriot ethnicity has been used to manage the ethnic disadvantage they face. Although the foundations of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot ethnicity developed as a result of the environmental conditions in Cyprus, the British environment has also had a significant effect on it. Their ethnicity therefore is both a product of and a reaction to their experiences of migration and settlement. Gender is also a major factor in the formation and transformation of Cypriot ethnicity in Britain. Patriarchal models of sexuality have been used to reinforce Cypriot values and patterns of behaviour among Cypriots in Britain and have helped create and maintain the ethnic economy.

Class distinctions, as Anthias highlights, can also be seen as significant in the appropriation and use of ethnicity by Cypriots in Britain. For those working class migrants who lack educational and economic resources their reliance on ethnicity, in terms of
providing both employment and services, is paramount. Among more middle class migrants, on the other hand, their greater and more 'universal' resources enable them to utilise their Cypriot ethnicity when and if they consider it appropriate, according to the specific context within which they are operating. Although they may rely on ethnic ties in terms of providing workers for their businesses or customers for their goods and services, they are nevertheless able to vary their 'ethnic' allegiance in accordance with their economic interests. In this way, Anthias argues: ‘ethnic allegiance may facilitate extensive exploitation of their own ethnic workforce whilst they avow a commonality of ethnic interests with it’ (1992:140).

The self-sufficient nature of the Cypriot communities has helped shelter them from the forces of assimilation. The second generation has become re-socialised into their ethnic identity by the community structure and in particular through ethnic employment. Yet with more women in particular choosing to work outside the ethnic economy, this has implications for their ethnic solidarity. Indications are that the majority of the second generation is still maintaining their Cypriot identity and still upholding many traditional Cypriot values and norms. However, their involvement in wider society, both socially and economically, gives them a greater bargaining power within the community. Thus second generation Cypriots, like their Pakistani counterparts, are in a process of continuity and change: using their own experiences to challenge patriarchal norms that limit their socialisation, while at the same time, maintaining their commitment to their Cypriot identity.
Chapter Four

The Research Process: Feminist Approaches to Methodology

The increased focus of research on ethnic minorities in Britain has also led to a questioning of the role of the sociologist in effecting social change. The principal concerns of these debates has been the intended and unintended consequences of research on ethnicity and "race", and the ethical and political concerns and obligations of the professional sociologist. For some, a major concern is who carries out the research, and there are as many issues to do with the position of white researchers in "race' relations' research as there are about men in gender studies (Harding 1986). Black and feminist researchers have been critical of conventional (Western) research methodology, which they see as dominated by white, male sociologists (Roberts 1981). Another area of concern relates to issues of eurocentricism in research, compounded by the 'distortions' of white feminists (Carby 1982, Bourne 1983).

Concern with eurocentricism is linked to issues of stereotyping, in which sociologists are seen as unwilling to take on board the racist and sexist characterisations of the ethnic minority communities. These issues are discussed in chapter one in relation to research on ethnicity. Thus as Lawrence (1982) argues, much of the literature within ethnicity studies is permeated with examples of pathologisation and a tendency to 'blame the victim'. Such studies, it is argued, perpetuate racist stereotypes and further justify the institutionalisation of racism in Britain (Amos and Parmar 1984). Furthermore, a focus on cultural differences ignores the influence of "race", class and gender and prevents the formation of collective struggle to combat these forms of inequality within British society.

One of the most comprehensive challenges to research principles and practice in the social sciences has come from feminist researchers. Through their debates on objectivity, accountability and positioning, many feminists have sought to challenge conventional methods of social research in relation to issues of "race", class and gender that simultaneously shape individual experiences and contribute to a lack of power in society. Their concerns are therefore very closely connected with both the theory and methodology used in my thesis. I shall therefore begin this chapter by examining the influence of feminist research on methodological debates, and in particular on their focus on feminist objectivity. I
shall then go on to describe the practice and principles involved in my own research, and seek to analyse my own experiences of being a white researcher and a woman in the light of the discussions outlined.

A Feminist Critique

Feminist researchers have raised fundamental questions about the value of conventional methods of social research in the analysis of gender issues. These questions are linked with the more widespread concern that the social sciences have in general either ignored or distorted the position of women in society. The central issue for feminists, therefore, is 'how best to correct partial and distorted accounts in traditional analysis' (Harding 1988:1).

Oakley (1981) argues that suggestions contained in the research method books have objective ideas that go against her experiences of research on women. She found it impossible to maintain the distance that traditional methods advocate. For example, Moser and Kalton (1971), in discussing interview techniques, argue that the response you gain from a question is a function of 'individual true response', the interview effect and some interactional error. Thus accordingly, one moves towards the scientific process by getting rid of the element of humanity. The general idea is that you impose uniformity on the research process. But how do you deal with the need to probe? It is here that such traditional methods face difficulties. The distant approach that the researcher is encouraged to adopt for the sake of objectivity, and thus reliability, can make it particularly difficult for interviewees to 'open up'. According to Oakley, 'the woman to woman interview is of a very different nature'. She states that the women she interviewed were keen to ask her questions and to 'chat' more informally. The traditional, formal interview, she argues, is therefore unsuited to research on women. Instead she recommends less-structured research procedures which avoid creating hierarchical relationships between the researcher and those 'she' is studying.

Janet Finch (1984) had similar experiences in her own research. She claims that she had expected to have to work hard at establishing some kind of 'rapport' with the women she interviewed. However, she found that such efforts were unnecessary, as her female respondents were keen and enthusiastic to talk to her, even though some may have had initial anxieties about the purpose of the research or of their own 'performance' in the
interview. Thus, although Finch claims no 'special personal qualities', she states that her interviewees found the interview a 'welcome experience', in contrast to the lack of opportunities to talk about themselves in other circumstances. Finch argues that this is not just a simple reflection of the effectiveness of in-depth interviewing, but rather, it suggests that the woman to woman interview has special characteristics which give rise to the 'easy flow' of information, and subsequently more detailed and comprehensive data.

The specific nature of all-female research gives rise to two important questions for feminists: Is there a distinct feminist method? And how should feminists deal with the ethical dilemmas that arise from their research? I shall deal with the former question first. According to Sandra Harding (1988), by focussing on the method question, social scientists have 'mystified' the most interesting aspects of feminist research, that is, what makes feminist-inspired research so 'powerful'? Furthermore, Harding (1988:2) points out, feminist researchers use just as many methods as traditional researchers:

For example, they listen carefully to how women informants think about their lives and men's lives, and critically to how women traditional social scientists conceptualise women's and men's lives. They observe behaviours of women and men that traditional social scientists have not thought significant. They seek examples of newly recognised patterns in historical data.

It is not method that makes feminist research so distinctive, she argues, or adding women to traditional analysis, but it is 'women's experiences' which provide the new resources for research. Central to this notion of 'women's experiences' is the emphasis on plurality. Harding argues that in accepting the fact that there is no universal man, feminist analyses also recognise that there is no universal woman; but the experiences of women vary as a result of class, racial and cultural differences between them. However, whilst acknowledging the existence of these differences, Harding believes that they do not negate the importance of gender relations as an area of study. For just as elements such as "race", class and gender affect the experiences of women, they also affect the 'experiences, desires and interests' of men. According to Liz Stanley and Sue Wise (1993) what is essential to 'being feminist' is the possession of 'female consciousness'. 'And we see feminist consciousness as rooted in the concrete, practical and everyday experiences of being, and being treated as, a
woman. Feminist consciousness...is a particular kind of interpretation of the experience of being a woman as this is presently constructed in sexist society' (1993:32). Thus the importance of feminist research, they argue, is not so much that it should be conducted by women only, but that it should be conducted for women. The product of feminist research, therefore, should be used by women to formulate policies and provisions necessary for feminist activities.

According to Finch (1984:76), there is always an additional dimension when women interview other women, because 'both parties share a subordinate structural position by virtue of their gender'. Through this, not only is a particular kind of identification likely to develop, but this relationship between interviewee and interviewer denotes a high level of trust. Such a degree of trust, she argues, has 'real exploitable potential', which makes women especially vulnerable as subjects of research. This leads to the second key question that feminists involved in research must address, that is, how should they deal with the ethical dilemmas that arise from their research? Finch suggests that central to feminists doing research on women must be the acknowledgement that collective, and not merely individual, interests are at stake. Feminist research should actively promote both the interests of the people being researched and those of feminism in general. 'I would endorse Oakley's (1981) position that, as a feminist and a sociologist, one should be creating a sociology for women — that is a sociology which articulates women's experiences on their lives — rather than merely creating data for oneself as researcher' (Finch 1984:86).

This notion of 'female consciousness' locates feminist research projects firmly in women's experiences in political struggles, struggles not just against gender oppression, but also against the oppressive nature of other factors such as class, "race", culture, disability, sexuality and so on. Indeed as Harding (1988:8) suggests, 'It may be that it is only through such struggles that one can come to understand oneself and the social world'. Taking account of factors such as "race", class, and culture etc. means not only accepting that women's experiences may vary as a result of the influences of such factors, but also looking at their influence on the research process itself. Thus, it is argued, feminist researchers must pay careful attention to the relationship between the researcher and the researched, and to
breaking down the power differences that exist between them. As Stanley and Wise (1993:157) point out:

> Whether we like it or not, researchers remain human beings complete with all the usual assembly of feelings, failings and moods. And all of these things influence how we feel and understand what is going on. Our consciousness is always the medium through which the research occurs; there is no method or technique of doing research other than through the medium of the researcher.

For Harding (1988), the feminist researcher must be placed on the ‘same critical plane’ as the subject she studies, thus opening up the entire research process for critical scrutiny. ‘That is, the class, “race”, culture, and gender assumptions, beliefs, and behaviours of the researcher her/himself must be placed within the frame of the picture that she/he attempts to paint’ (1988:9). The researcher should make his or her gender; “race”, class and culture clear and, where appropriate, suggest how this may have shaped the research project. In this way, Harding, along with other feminist writers (Oakley 1981; McRobbie 1982; Finch 1984; Ramazanoglu 1989; Stanley and Wise 1993; Gelshtorpe 1992; to name but a few) argues against an ‘objectivist’ stance, which attempts to make the researcher invisible, in favour of a more open approach. Only by acknowledging the influence of the researcher in this way can feminism hope to produce research that is less biased by such influence.

However, as Caroline Ramazanoglu (1989) points out, the influence of the researcher is not merely confined to the research process itself, for all research involves selection and interpretation of people’s accounts. She describes this need to select and interpret as ‘the Achilles’ heel of all science and social science’ (1989:53), and a problem which feminism has still not resolved. If we accept the unavoidable nature of this subjective element, does this mean that feminist knowledge is invalid? Ramazanoglu argues that in order to account for this, feminist researchers must look critically at how their knowledge is produced and the consequences of that knowledge. Harding (1988:9) supports this view and adds ‘Introducing this “subjective” element into the analysis in fact increases the objectivity of the research and decreases the “objectivism” which hides this kind of evidence from the public’.
In an attempt to re-evaluate these issues, Donna Haraway (1988) suggests three elements that are central to any discussion of feminist objectivity: positioning, partiality and accountability. Firstly, she argues, the production of theoretical concepts from research must be seen as a historical process, dependent on who is being studied, why, how and where; as well as who produces and interprets the study. Feminist research, therefore, should not be viewed as the production of complete knowledge, but rather as ideas and theories that are historically situated and situation specific. She states (1988:581): ‘Feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges’. Such an approach acknowledges that there is no such thing as the ‘universal woman’, and that women may have contradictory and contrasting interests. It is thus quite possible for different standpoints to develop which may be in direct opposition to each other. Accepting this notion of positioning as crucial to feminist research ‘allows us to become answerable for what we see’ (1988:583). That is, to focus specifically on the subject we seek to study. This leads on to Haraway’s second element of feminist objectivity, partiality. She suggests (1988:590): ‘we seek those ruled by partial sight and limited voice – not partiality for its own sake, but, rather, for the sake of connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible. Situated knowledges are about communities, not about individuals’. Such partiality, she believes, could lead to greater insight for feminist analysis. Thirdly, Haraway points to the importance of accountability for feminist objectivity. Like Harding and others, she believes that the researcher’s own beliefs and behaviours must be rendered open to scrutiny, as an inherent part of the research process.

Drawing on Haraway’s observations about feminist objectivity, Kum-Kum Bhavnani (1994) suggests three questions which help outline criteria and principles by which feminist research may be seen as implementing the goal of feminist objectivity. Firstly, she argues, any research claiming to be feminist, and whose main subject of inquiry is women, should not reproduce the subjects he or she has researched in ways which reinscribe inequalities present in the dominant society. Thus the first question feminist researchers must ask themselves and deal with in their analysis is: ‘does this work/analysis define the researched as either passive victims or as deviant – does it reinscribe the researched into prevailing representations?’ (1994:30). Secondly, Bhavnani argues, feminist research must make explicit the micropolitical processes which are in play during the research process. She
suggests that feminists should ask the question: ‘how and to what extent does the researcher’s conduct, write-up and dissemination deal with the micropolitics of the research encounter – what are the relationships of domination and subordination which the researcher has negotiated and what are the means through which they are discussed in the research report?’ (1994:30). Thirdly, with specific reference to Haraway’s element of partiality, Bhavnani argues that feminist researchers must ask themselves: ‘In what ways are questions of difference dealt with in the research study – in its design, conduct, write-up and dissemination?’ (1994:30). According to Bhavnani, these three questions generate the criteria and principles necessary to providing a framework for evaluating research as feminist.

In this way, feminists seek to describe and account for ‘women’s experiences’, acknowledging the differences that may separate them as women. However, Mary Maynard (1994) questions the usefulness of the notion of ‘difference’ for feminist analysis, especially when dealing with the issues of “race” and ethnicity. She acknowledges that discussions of difference have highlighted major problems that existed in the ‘narrowly defined and overgeneralised nature’ of previous Western feminist discourses, where a concern for “race-related” issues was almost non-existent. However, she believes that a focus on ‘difference’ alone prevents feminist researchers from exploring not only the ways in which women may be distinguished from each other, but also the processes and mechanisms through which distinct and specific forms of subordination are brought about. Part of the problem lies in defining what the concept of ‘difference’ actually means and how it can be used constructively in theoretical and research analysis. With reference to the issue of “race”, she argues, it can lead to an ‘us’ and ‘them’ connotation where only non-white women are seen to be ‘different’. Consequently, “race” is only seen to be a problem for black women. Such an approach has the effect of separating “race” and gender not only from each other, but also from racism and patriarchal oppression. In addition, an overemphasis on difference creates endless possibilities for diversity. As Maynard (1994:19) states ‘All forms of diversity are linked together as examples of difference, implying that they are similar phenomenon, with similar explanations. So many forms of difference are created it becomes impossible to analyse them in terms of inequality or power’. In this way, she argues, simply to emphasise
difference may in itself mask the conditions that give some forms of difference power over others.

Rather than focusing on difference per se, Maynard suggests several things that should be taken into account. Firstly, she believes it is vital to examine the material, as well as the cultural, aspects of social life and the relationships that are created from and interact with these. Here she is referring to access to and the quality of resources such as food, shelter, money and education; and the restrictions that come about through lack of them, as well as from violence, harassment and abuse. She states (1994:21) ‘The interaction between these things, how they are represented and their relationship to more specifically cultural phenomena may be complex and contradictory. They are, nonetheless, mediating factors in any social circumstances and cannot be ignored in analysing situations of black and white women’. Secondly, Maynard concurs with Ware (1992) who argues that in considering the issue of “race” and gender, we need to problematise the label ‘white’. Whiteness is not seen as a racial identity, and thus issues of “race” tend to focus on black people. However, in so doing, black people are presented as ‘the problem’. Maynard argues that the processes of racism and gender may be better understood by focusing on the practice and means of white privilege and power. In addition, this approach also accepts that the meanings of the categories ‘black’ and ‘white’ are not constant or homogenous concepts, and that it is not only black people who experience racism, for example Jewish and Irish people have also been subjects of racism. Finally, Maynard (1994:21) argues that we need ‘to end the continual splitting of racial and gender identities and positions, as if they can be dichotomised. It is necessary, instead, to focus on the ways in which each is implied in and experienced through the other, and not separately’. Here Maynard cites much of hooks’ work, which examines how both “race” and class influence the extent to which male domination and privilege can be asserted, and how racism and sexism are interconnected systems of power, which support and sustain each other. According to Maynard (1994:21) ‘Such an approach is likely to involve concentrating on culturally and historically specific circumstances, reversing the flow of theory away from the grand abstract theorising of the metanarrative type dismissed (yet still used) by postmodernists’.

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In summary, feminist concern with research practices and objectivity has provided valuable insights for the whole of the social sciences. By focusing on ‘women’s experiences’, feminists have acknowledged the differing ways in which factors such as “race” and class impinge upon women’s lives. By acknowledging and engaging with this notion, feminists have used difference as a ‘springboard’ from which to transform feminist arguments about objectivity. Feminist research thus aims to dismantle power differentials between women by eliminating hierarchy in all research, and by subjecting the research process itself to more rigorous analysis. Feminist research is about more than merely studying women, but it is fundamentally involved with, and derived from, the nature of ‘feminist consciousness’. As Stanley and Wise (1993:44) argue:

While we see ‘feminism’ as a particular way of seeing reality, we also feel that ‘feminist research’ can be identified as something more than this. This ‘something more’ is to be found in the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the researched, as well as in the researcher’s own ‘feminist consciousness’ and her experience of being a woman.

From my own point of view, understanding the structural and cultural aspects of women from different ethnic, racial and class backgrounds is an essential part of being a feminist. If we are to address the sexual oppression that we all experience as women we must also address other forms of exploitation and oppression that cut across gender lines. It is therefore necessary to understand the ways in which racial, ethnic and class based oppressions interact with and further sustain gender inequality. We must also come to terms with the ways in which we as women may maintain and further the oppression and subjugation of other women. In other words, fighting our rights may limit the rights of others. Only by acknowledging the differing elements that shape the identities and life-chances of other women can we come to terms with our own identities as women – black or white, working class or middle class. Yet at the same time, we must not lose sight of the commonalities that we possess as women as these are vital for effective collective struggle.
The Study

The aim of the thesis is to examine the influence of ethnicity and religion among Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women for both individual identity and collective representation. It further seeks to highlight the ways in which notions of difference and commonality are influenced by the evaluations and experiences of "race", class and gender, which position individuals and groups in a variety of different and contrasting ways. Hence my field research focused on a number of Pakistani, Turkish Cypriot and Muslim organisations and associations, and interviews were carried out with a number of women working either directly within these organisations, or who were otherwise active within their communities. The aim was to explore differences in the experiences of these women and how these experiences are appropriated to form both individual and collective identities.

For the purposes of this research I particularly wanted to study two Muslim populations in Britain. Firstly, in order to examine the level of diversity that exists among various Muslim groups (in much of the existing theory the concept of 'Muslim' is almost taken to be synonymous with that of 'Pakistani'). And secondly, to analyse the elements which these two groups may share, not merely as a result of their religion, but also due to their position and status within British society. I chose to study Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot people as one represents an Asian population and the other a European one. This again has implications for their position in the dominant society, and therefore inevitably influences their lives in Britain.

I chose North London as the location for my research not only because most Turkish-speaking people in Britain live in London, and predominantly in the north and east of the city, but also because of the level of diversity that exists there. I felt it to be important that both populations that I wished to study lived in the same geographical area, as this can have a considerable impact on people's lives. For example, I found there to be significant variations between the Pakistani populations in London and those in Bradford, with whom I had carried out research some years earlier. I shall explain these variations in more detail in the succeeding chapters.

As highlighted in chapter one, the main focus of this research is the interaction of "race", class and gender and their relationship with the continued reproduction of patriarchal,
sexist and class-based oppressions. My exclusive focus on women is part of this concern. It is also very closely linked to my own research methodology. The feminist accounts of research practices outlined earlier in this chapter testify to the extraordinary ways in which female researchers can achieve incredibly rich and detailed information, purely on the basis of their gender. It would be almost impossible, it is argued, for a male researcher studying women to achieve the same results. The same can be said, I believe, for women interviewing men. There are, therefore, very practical as well as theoretical reasons for choosing to study women only.

Data for the research was collected by using a combination of participant observation and a series of in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The participant observation was carried out over a two-year period within a number of organisations specifically catering for Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot women. Access to the associations and organisations that I worked with during my research was gained through contacts I had at Warwick University and elsewhere, who provided me with names of individuals and organisations; I also consulted phone directories and lists of voluntary and charitable organisations in the London area to acquire further names and addresses. In addition, living in North London during the period of my fieldwork I often visited organisations that I spotted when I was out and about generally. The aim was to contact and visit as many different organisations as possible that catered specifically for Turkish Cypriot (or Turkish speaking), Pakistani or Muslim women. Within the Boroughs where the research was focused (Haringey, Hackney, and Islington) I contacted all of the organisations that I could find, as well as a number from outside these areas. The majority of my fieldwork was undertaken in four organisations, two Turkish Cypriot and two Pakistani, two of which catered specifically for women, and two catered for both men and women, although with female workers and female-only sessions. These groups I considered broadly representative in terms of their clientele, membership, organisational arrangements, policies and activities, of other social and welfare bases organisations.

The women I interviewed (fifteen Turkish Cypriots and fifteen Pakistanis) were chosen because they all worked either directly or indirectly within the Pakistani or Turkish-speaking communities. I was interested in their views and observations about the two populations, as well as their own experiences of being a second-generation Pakistani or
Turkish Cypriot woman in London and more widely in British society. The theoretical implications of their professional positions will be discussed in the following chapters. However, it is important to point out that my choice of informants was not designed to be representative of Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women as a whole, or indeed the second generation. Rather the aim was to examine their experiences of working (either paid or voluntary) within the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot communities, and its influence in terms of their evaluation of both individual and collective identity (ethnic or religious). The aim was therefore to examine the intersectionality of ethnicity, "race", class, gender and generation on both a collective and individual level.

Most of my informants were contacted through the organisations I visited, either directly through working there, or indirectly through being recommended by others. I also gained contacts through other groups and activities that I was involved in as part of the research. Although the women were not representative in terms of class or educational background, a larger proportion having studied to a higher level than is common among Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women, as well as nearly half coming from middle class backgrounds, they were more representative of the second generation in terms of age and country of birth. My respondents ranged in age from twenty to fifty, and just over a half had been born in Britain (seven of the informants were born in Cyprus, four in Pakistan and two in Kenya). At the time of the interview, ten of the Pakistani women were married, including one who had divorced and remarried. All were married to Pakistanis except one who was married to a white British man. Nine of the Turkish Cypriot women were married, all had married fellow Turkish Cypriots except one who had a white British partner, and two were divorced.

Six of the Pakistani informants can be seen to come from broadly middle class backgrounds. Five had fathers who owned or had owned small businesses (two had grocery shops, one was in building, one owned a take-away, and another was involved in the family business importing carpets from Pakistan). One of the informants had come over to Britain in her late teens to study; her father was a doctor in Pakistan, now retired. Four of the women's fathers were unemployed at the time of the interview, some for health reasons, one worked for London Transport, two were factory workers, and two had died when the informants were children. Among the Turkish Cypriot women, seven can be seen as coming from broadly
middle class backgrounds. Four had fathers who owned their own businesses (one owned a café, one a take-away, one had previously had their own retail clothing business, and another a building enterprise). Among those who had come to Britain as teenagers to escape the war in Cyprus, either on their own or with other family members, three of the women's fathers were, or had been, a teacher, a policeman, and a civil servant in Cyprus. Two of the informant's fathers were unemployed, two were factory workers, and four had died when the informants were children.

Among the Pakistani informants, only one of their mothers worked, she was a community worker, although several did sewing in their own home. Among the Turkish Cypriot informants, all of the widowed mothers worked, three were machinists and one was a nurse in Cyprus. In addition, one of the informant's mothers was a nurse in Cyprus, another was a teacher in Cyprus, and one was a machinist in Britain. Many of the other mothers had worked as machinists or helping their husbands in shops and takeaways in the past. For those Pakistani informants who were married, two of their husbands owned or worked in the family business, two were unemployed, one for health reasons, and two were factory workers. Other occupations included a solicitor, an engineer, a service sector worker and a mechanic. Among the married Turkish Cypriot informants, three of their husbands owned or worked for the family business, two worked in the service sector, one was unemployed, one a journalist, one a mechanic and another a solicitor.

In terms of their qualifications, five of the Pakistani and five of the Turkish Cypriot informants had degrees, including two from each group who had studied, or were studying, for their masters, and one who had done a PGCE. Two of the Pakistani and one of the Turkish Cypriot women held Tec or Higher National Diplomas. One Pakistani woman was studying for her degree at the time of the interview, and a Turkish Cypriot woman was studying for her HND. Among the remainder, one Pakistani and three Turkish Cypriot women had A'Levels only, seven Pakistani and five Turkish Cypriot women had O'levels or GCSEs only, and one of the Turkish Cypriot women had no formal qualifications at all.

The posts that the women held included co-ordinators, advice workers, educational development workers, youth workers, refugee workers, counsellors, health advocacy workers, administrators and voluntary workers. A few of my informants were also active in
their communities in other ways, for example campaigning over particular issues, such as educational or health provision.

My interaction with the organisations and associations involved not merely passive observation, but essentially acting as a volunteer. Subsequently, my activities within these groups included helping out with basic paperwork and administration, looking after children, helping out at functions, attending meetings and classes – sewing, cooking, first aid, health awareness, English, Urdu and Turkish language courses, among others – and with the Pakistani women’s group in particular, driving their mini-bus and organising two of their holiday play schemes for children in the local area. My involvement was therefore quite extensive, and gave me a good insight into the workings of the organisations, the women who attended, and the issues of significance and relevance to many. It also allowed me to give something back to the organisations that were so instrumental to my research, and increased levels of trust between my informants and myself.

The interviews were obtained in the latter half of my fieldwork and many of the women interviewed worked in the organisations where I was carrying out my field research. Therefore, not only had I come to know these women quite well, but they had also given me much assistance in suggesting areas of research, creating interview topics and providing me with other contacts. Their participation had therefore been fundamental to the research design and practice. With the other respondents, I had only talked to them on the phone or in person about my research before conducting the interview. It is worth noting here that although I knew some of the women I interviewed much better than others, this did not seem to affect the quality of the interviews I gained. All the women interviewed seemed willing and able to talk openly about not only the wider concerns of the communities, but also personal aspects of their lives. I shall discuss this in more detail further on. All the interviews were tape-recorded and were based on a broad list of topics and questions to be discussed. They ranged in length from one and a half, to four hours, sometimes conducted in two or three separate sessions. A full transcript was undertaken for data analysis.
Personal Reflections on the Research Process

In the final part of this chapter, I want to attempt to analyse my personal experiences of the research process itself and how this relates to my position as a white non-Muslim female researcher, as well as to other aspects of my identity. As highlighted earlier, there have been many debates over the issue of white researchers studying ethnic minority communities. Sandra Harding (1986) for example argues that although black women have been encouraged to speak out about their own lives, white women still claim the privilege of describing the lives of ‘women’. This has led to the creation of simplifications and ideological distortions on research of women in general and ethnic minorities in particular. One way I have tried to overcome this problem in my own research is to actively involve many of my informants in the research design and process: carrying out pilot studies, formulating topics and questions for discussion and following other leads and contacts given to me by my informants. In addition, I have tried as much as possible in the following chapters to illustrate attitudes and opinions of my informants by letting them speak for themselves. The comments that are included aim to provide additional information, as well as drawing out the main points discussed. The aim therefore has been to provide a platform for the expression of the diverse views of the women interviewed on the issues discussed. Nevertheless, I am aware of my influence on the selection and interpretation of information used.

There were of course some disadvantages in not being Turkish Cypriot or Pakistani myself, the main one being lack of language skills in Turkish, Punjabi and Urdu. I have a limited knowledge of Punjabi and Urdu, which I acquired through personal study and classes attended when conducting previous research, although I am not confident in speaking either. With reference to Turkish, however, my general lack of language skills meant that my ability to learn Turkish was severely hampered. Consequently despite spending two years working with a number of Turkish speaking organisations, my Turkish remained very poor. Although a knowledge of Punjabi, Urdu or Turkish was unnecessary for my interviews as all of the women were second generation, and consequently fluent in English, it would have been beneficial for interacting with many of the first generation who attended the organisations. Although I could understand most of what was being said by my Pakistani informants, I could
not reply or ask them questions in Punjabi or Urdu, which I found frustrating. On the other hand, however, the majority could speak English and were happy to talk to me through this medium. Indeed, some of the women, and particularly more recent arrivals from Turkey would often like to practice their English with me, and this in itself provided another outlet for data collection. In addition, those who did speak English, and particularly those who worked in the associations were always happy to interpret for me, or provide me with a running commentary of proceedings at events and official meetings. I owe a large dept of gratitude to the patience and time of these women and the enormous help they provided me in this way.

It is interesting to note that Kucukcan (1999) found in his research that on a number of occasions he received ‘discouraging personal reactions’ from some people he approached for information because he was Turkish. He states that on several occasions he was accused of being a Turkish intelligence officer, trying to gather information about Turks and Kurds from Turkey in order to report this to the Turkish Embassy in London, or to his ‘sponsors’ in Turkey. A Turkish women’s organisation refused him to give him any details of their organisation or members because they were suspicious of his use of the information, despite his assurances. With reference to my own research, however, I was often surprised at how readily people accepted my presence and my research status. Not once during my entire period of field research was I refused access, information and assistance from any of the organisations, groups or individuals that I came into contact with. Perhaps my position as an ‘outsider’ made people less suspicious of my intentions and objectives, and therefore more able to trust me. It is, of course, difficult to say for sure, but certainly I did not experience any of the problems that Kucukcan mentions.

My status as a woman was, however, vital for my research as many of the activities and events within the organisations were confined exclusively to women. Indeed much of the data could not have been gathered if I were male. Several male researchers who have carried out studies within various Muslim communities in Britain have highlighted the problems involved in interviewing Muslim women, who are discouraged from any contact with unrelated males. For example, Anwar (1985) stated that he had difficulties in talking to women for his research, especially when the segregation of the sexes was more strictly observed in the form of purdah. Similarly, Kucukcan (1999) stated that he experienced major
difficulties in his efforts to access the ‘women’s word’ with the Turkish communities in London. Being female, therefore, was a necessary part of the research project.

In considering my relationship with the women I interviewed and observed I would argue that with reference to the former, they were able to identify with me not just because I was a woman, but for a number of other key reasons. Although I was neither Pakistani/Turkish Cypriot, nor Muslim, we nevertheless shared a number of things in common. On a rudimentary level, we were all professional women of a similar age, educated within the British system. We all displayed interests in the issues concerning Pakistani and/or Turkish Cypriot women in Britain, the interviewees by virtue of the positions within specific organisations, myself by virtue of my research interests, which I always made explicit to the women I interviewed. I also attempted to share the research process with these women by seeking advice on topics to be explored for their concern, significance and/or importance. The women themselves were very keen for someone to take notice of what they were saying about issues concerning their own communities, and the provisions and changes they felt were necessary both within and outside of these communities. They therefore saw my research as a chance to publicise these views and were consequently very helpful and enthusiastic about the study, giving me advice, information and other contacts.

However, although they were interested in the research topic, and many participated in the research design, they nevertheless placed an enormous amount of trust in me, and in my role as researcher. Whilst some of the women I interviewed had come to know me over the preceding year or two that I had been carrying out my fieldwork, many I had met with only briefly before conducting the interview. Yet the level of trust displayed in giving me very detailed and often very personal information on their own communities, on the women they worked with and on their own lives, seems to have been the same in both cases. The interviews that they gave me were very frank and open; and although their professional status meant that most were used to talking about their own communities, they seemed equally forthcoming in talking about their own lives. This may seem surprising, as many of these women stated that they tried to keep their personal lives very much separate from their work, and particularly from the women who attended the organisations they worked for. Part of their willingness to disclose detailed and personal information about their own lives could
stem from the fact that they felt able to identify with me in some way; or because they felt that the information was important to my research interests and to the opinions that they wished to put forward; or simply because I was an outsider, because I represented someone to talk to about aspects of their lives that they otherwise had little opportunity to discuss. Whatever the reasons behind this frankness, it seemed clear that the women I interviewed did feel able to trust me, and all our conversations were thus easy and open.

With reference to the women I observed, I felt my identity, as a white non-Muslim researcher was more of an issue, particularly with the older women. Like Oakley (1981) and Finch (1984), I found that the women were keen to ‘place’ me as another woman with whom they could share experiences. Indeed, this ‘placing’ was a vital part of my fieldwork. The younger women I observed (usually second or third generation) seemed keen to have someone of their own age to talk to, regardless of religious or ethnic background. On the basis of age and gender, as well as the fact that they had been born and educated in British society, we shared much more in common. In addition, they had a good knowledge of the British education system and therefore some understanding of what doing a PhD involved. They were thus completely accepting of my role as a PhD researcher and displayed much interest in my study. These various factors all helped to produce a very easy relationship with the young women I observed.

With the older women in my fieldwork study, there was a lot more curiosity about who I was and why I was there. This curiosity was not hostile, but stemmed largely from the fact that these women could not understand why a white non-Muslim should want to study Pakistani or Turkish-speaking communities. The significance of their need to ‘place’ me was very apparent here. Initially these women felt that my involvement must stem from personal interest, either I had a Pakistani or Turkish partner or that I had a desire to convert to Islam. They therefore asked many questions about my background and my marital status, as well as about my role as researcher. My continued presence among these women helped considerably. They were still aware of my ethnicity and religious status, but accepted it, and thus a much greater level of trust developed between us. Once they saw that I was willing to open up to them about myself and willing to contribute to the groups’ activities, my presence was accepted far more readily. Indeed, over time not only was my presence accepted, but it
was also expected. If I missed a particular occasion or function, or if I had not been to the centre for a few days, the women would ask me where I had been, tell me everything I had missed, and why I would have found it interesting. In addition, the women became keen to explain things to me about their culture and/or religion in much more detail. With this in mind, I was taken to mosques, taken shopping, and showed how to cook Pakistani or Turkish food in the 'correct' way. With the Pakistani women I observed, they found me shalwar kemiz (the traditional Asian suit) to wear for particular functions, and showed me the 'correct' way to wear them. My knowledge of various Asian cultures and customs learnt both through my research and through personal experience further showed these women that my interest was genuine and encouraged them to explain things to me in more detail. In the case of the Turkish-speaking women I observed, my knowledge of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot cultures and customs was less comprehensive. What I had learnt had come from my reading of the limited literature available, from Turkish friends, and from backpacking holidays in Turkey. However, this basic knowledge, together with my continued involvement with these women, seemed enough to show genuine interest and for my presence to be accepted. Thus although the women I observed still perhaps saw me as an 'oddity', they nevertheless accepted my presence among them.

It is worth noting here that the Turkish-speaking women I observed seemed to accept my presence among them far more readily from the beginning. I would suggest that this could be largely explained by the fact that they are much more used to seeing indigenous Britons in the organisations that they attend. The recent arrival of Turkish refugees over the past few years has brought an increasing number of officials into these organisations. Many of the Turkish women therefore have had more dealings with outsiders, and answering questions from them, with both positive and negative results. My continued presence in these organisations, however, did make my role less formal, and hopefully more positive for them, and the women, therefore, over time felt more able to trust me.

My own research experiences highlight many of the points that have been raised by feminist researchers, outlined earlier. Firstly, the idea that the researcher should keep a certain amount of distance from the people she is studying in order to remain objective, as purported in traditional methodology textbooks, is neither practical nor helpful when
interviewing women (Oakley 1981, Finch 1984). Although it is often argued that this approach is particularly important when asking sensitive questions, I would suggest that the opposite is true. When carrying out in-depth, semi-structured interviews with women, it is important to develop a level of trust between interviewer and interviewee, in order for the women to feel comfortable enough to discuss such issues. In addition, the more conversational style that I chose to adopt in my interviews not only made the women feel more at ease, but in itself produced more information. To give an example from my own research, when one of the women was describing the attitudes and behaviour of her much-loved, but in her view rather strict and old-fashioned father, I commented that I had one like that at home. This comment not only added a note of humour into the proceedings; it also encouraged the interviewee to discuss her own situation in much more detail. This sense of identity and commonality is important in interviews, it also allows the researcher to take a closer look at the attitudes and behaviour being described and to see how they vary according to factors such as culture, "race", class, gender and so on. The comment I made was not deliberate, to gain a specific effect, it was just part of natural conversation, but its effect was to illuminate the situation further. This shows the importance of responding to interviewees as people, not as objects under study, and as equals, whilst acknowledging any differences that may exist.

But how is the researcher to define her or his identity, and how are differences to be interpreted? How should I define myself? I could describe myself as a white, middle-class woman, or as an anti-racist socialist feminist, but I am also a sociologist, a single parent (although I was not at the time of my fieldwork), a daughter, mother and sister. I am British, but also half Canadian; I was born in Birmingham, but grew up in the countryside, and have spent the last half of my life living in cities. I could choose any or all of these categories, and others, to define myself; and other people will use them to define me. I am all of these things, yet I may choose to prioritise one over another at different times and in different situations. All of these things, and others, are relevant to me and make up what I call my identity. Do I lack identification with a married woman with children because I am a single parent, or does the experience of being a mother override this 'difference'? I would agree, therefore, with Maynard (1994), that we must be aware of diversity whilst not letting it obscure any similarities that may exist.
I would argue that both with the women I interviewed and with those I observed in my fieldwork, that the greater the similarity, the easier the identification, and therefore the quicker the 'rapport'. Where there was less similarity between the women and me I interviewed or observed, it was necessary to work harder in order to gain their trust and confidence. Yet at the same time, where there was a lack of knowledge (or a perceived lack of knowledge), the women were often keener to fill in that knowledge and this in itself helped produce a rich and invaluable source of information.

**Terminology**

Three points need to be emphasised in relation to the use of terminology by my informants and myself and included in the discussions outlined in the following chapters. Firstly, although the women interviewed are referred to as either Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot, and all of the women had at least one parent who was born in Pakistan or Cyprus (and more commonly both) many of the women did not refer to themselves in this way. This was particularly the case among the Pakistani women, as the following chapters will illustrate. Nevertheless, in order to distinguish between the two groups the use of such categories was considered necessary. All of the women interviewed were quite happy to be identified in this way.

Secondly, in the following chapters, the term ‘practising’ has been used according to the women’s own definitions, to describe someone who actively and consciously follows the laws of Islam. For most this meant, among other things, praying five times a day, keeping the fasts and carrying out the specific prayers and rituals laid down in the Qur’an. The term is of course open to much interpretation, but all of the Pakistani women described themselves in term of being ‘practising’ or ‘non-practising’. The term has therefore been used accordingly. None of the Turkish Cypriot women interviewed referred to the term; it has consequently not been used to describe any of the women from this group.

Thirdly, the term ‘English’ was used by many of my informants to refer to the white indigenous population of Britain (Scottish, Welsh or Irish were not referred to by any of the women). They therefore used the term to distinguish the indigenous population from members of other ethnic groups. Where discussion is made of an informant’s views or experiences, the term has been used, but only if the individual concerned used it herself in
discussing that particular issue. More generally, I refer to the 'indigenous population' of
Britain.
Chapter Five

Implementing Ethnicity: Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot Women’s Organisations in London

During my two-year period of field research I had contact with a number of Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, Pakistani and Muslim associations and organisations. In particular I worked very closely with four organisations, two Pakistani and two Turkish Cypriot, and spent time with the female workers from these groups. Because I interviewed many of the women working in these organisations I have decided not to disclose the names of the organisations. To do so, I believe, would risk identifying the women I interviewed. For this reason, instead of providing a detailed account of the specific associations I shall give a brief overview of the different organisations in terms of their roles and objectives, as highlighted by the workers themselves, the various literatures obtained from the groups, such as pamphlets and annual reports and my own observations. I shall then go on to examine in more detail the views of my informants on the organisations they worked for and their experiences of working within the Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani communities. However, I shall begin by providing a brief overview of the literature on Pakistani, Muslim, and Turkish speaking organisations in Britain.

The establishment of Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot ethnic organisations and associations can be seen as an acknowledgement on the part of the migrants of their permanent settlement in Britain, and of their need to adapt to the new environment and to face the challenges of living in a ‘multicultural’ and multi-faith society (Anwar 1985, Kucukcan 1999). George and Millerson (1967) state that one way Cypriots have sought to establish their own community in Britain is through the various voluntary associations with the objective of keeping alive and re-creating traditional cultural practices, values and activities. For Muslims in Bradford, Lewis (1994) argues the creation of ethnic and religious institutions resulted both from commitments to their settlement in Britain, and from their desire to pass on traditional and religious customs and values to their children. Likewise, Shaw (1988) suggests that organisation among Pakistanis in Oxford represented their need to safeguard religious and ethnic values from the threat of western influence. As Pakistaniis and Turkish
Cypriots became more settled in Britain, therefore, they established ethnic and religious organisations in areas of Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot concentration in Britain.

Many of the Pakistani associations established in Britain, Saifullah Khan (1976) notes, have been set up by urban, educated professionals. These associations have often been unstable in nature and consequently not long lasting. This is partly because their leadership derives from self-appointed status and consequently they often only receive active support from those directly involved in the initiation of the association. In addition, Saifullah Khan argues, the majority of the rural, uneducated Pakistanis remain indifferent to these associations. Their everyday lives revolve not around issues of nationalism and ethnicity, but those of kin. As many were believed to maintain the intention to return, collective action in Britain was not seen as important. Furthermore, the majority are suspicious of the associations and their members who, they feel, are involved purely for their own financial gain. On the one hand, Saifullah Khan argues, Pakistanis may at times require intermediaries to represent them in wider British society, because of their own lack of communication skills. On the other, no similar pattern or experience of such leaders exists in the Pakistani villages, where decision making and authority is vested in the kin group, and in particular with the elders in these groups. According to Lewis (1994:21), 'in such an environment, the very concept of community representation is alien'. These 'leaders' therefore find it difficult to mobilise support amongst the majority of Pakistanis in Britain.

Similarly, there was less evidence of Turkish Cypriot organisation in London in the 1970s than amongst Greek Cypriots. This was partly believed to stem from their small numbers vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots, their more scattered settlement and their later emigration. In addition, Ladbury (1977) argues that the central organising force for Turkish Cypriots has been that of kinship ties and interdependence with neighbours. Like the early Pakistani organisations, those associations established by Turkish Cypriots tended to be run by urban educated elites, and to cater mainly for the middle class. Working class Turkish Cypriots were little influenced by these associations, and had minimal contact with them other than through the provision of Turkish language classes for their children and sometimes through social functions and national holidays.
Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot ethnicity in Britain, therefore, has largely been sustained through kin-based ties, which also accounts for the lack of ethnic solidarity in terms of politics or interest groups. Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain are not homogeneous groups, but divided along class (caste), ethnic and sect lines (Lewis 1994, Kucukcan 1999). According to Shaw (1988), the Pakistani communities are composed of numerous different kinship groups that are in competition with each other for access to political power. This often results in internal conflict and division, in which allegiances are shifting and fluid as individuals and groups attempt to consolidate their positions both in relation to their own community and outside it. Furthermore, as Anthias (1993) and Anwar (1985) note, the nature of community dependence and help has differed from one occupational group to another. For example, professional and other middle class educated Pakistanis were providing help in day-to-day life while working class Pakistanis were mainly on the receiving end. Similarly, dependence on kin for help and companionship differed between working class and middle class Pakistanis. The professionals tended to depend much more on friends than of kin.

In addition to these forms of differentiation within the ethnic communities, according to Kucukcan (1999), the changing political landscape in Turkey and identity politics among Kurdish and Alawite people have had repercussions among the Turkish community in London. The distinct identity claim of the Kurds and Alawites has led to the further fragmentation of Turkish identity on ethnic lines. Nevertheless, he argues, the existence of certain organisations that cater for Turkish speakers as a whole demonstrates that while competing identities might clash with each other in their country of origin, there is the possibility of reconciliation of these competing identity claims in the British context. As far as the activities and the ethnic origins of their members and clients are concerned, a number of organisations are widening their ethnic base to include all migrants from Turkey or Cyprus. Increasingly, therefore, the documents and statements of these associations refer to ‘Turkish communities’ rather than the ‘Turkish community’ as a single category.

Turkish speaking organisations and associations, Kucukcan (1999) argues, are very diverse in terms of their different organisational structures, membership, clientele, strategies and purposes. Such diversity stems from the construction of the Turkish community itself and is shaped by the needs generated within wider society.
Here we have at least two forces, if not more, at work that not only guide but also fashion the shape of the organisations under question. One of these emanates from within the Turkish community. During the process of the formation of the Turkish community from that of a fragmented ethnic group, specific needs of the community and the strategies adopting left a mark on the structures of organisations and associations. This inside stimuli is matched by an outside impetus originating from being situated in a multicultural environment, which has its own distinct social structures and organisational forms that are not available in the country of origin. (Kucukcan 1999:167)

In his study of Pakistani associations in Rochdale, Anwar (1985) aims to classify these associations in terms of their functions into: welfare, religious, political and professional. For Kucukcan, on the other hand, Turkish/Cypriot associations in London display such diversity in terms of their foundational purposes and subsequent activities that such classification is impossible. Rather, the Turkish speaking organisations tend to provide a range of services that address the various welfare, education, social and cultural challenges, and the religious needs of the Turkish community in London. These associations, he argues, therefore play an important role in the various Turkish communities, with each displaying a different emphasis on the politics of identity. Furthermore, as Turkish speakers have moved to new areas of residence, and as their concentration has increased, new ethnic organisations have been established to provide for the needs of Turkish speakers in their new surroundings. Turkish speaking organisations, Kucukcan argues, are therefore not only diverse in terms of their orientation, clientele and politics but also dynamic because they are open to change to adapt to new situations and address new challenges.

Two of the main challenges that ethnic organisations must address are the changing position of women and young people in Britain (Lewis 1994). With the increasing numbers of British educated Muslim women furthering their education and/or developing careers, working increasingly in the public, private and voluntary sectors of society, the Muslim communities, and other ethnic communities in general, face the challenge of addressing the new found aspirations of these women. As Ali (1992) argues, Muslim women are beginning to challenge
the ‘hegemony of male community leadership’ and the patriarchal and oppressive religious and cultural traditions of their communities.

According to Brah (1996), Asian women in general are actively engaged in political struggles both within and outside their communities. The diverse range of organisations that have been established by Asian women seek to develop support networks for one another, organise social and cultural activities, provide information and advice and offer women somewhere to organise and campaign on issues they see as relevant. ‘These self-help groups speak to the shared experience of Asian women and address issues of common concern in an atmosphere of trust and self-respect’ (1996:82). Such organisations, Brah argues, are difficult to categorise politically as they represent the ‘multifaceted’ nature of oppressions, which requires resistance and struggle to be made on many different levels.

Asian feminism is one of the most creative and vigorous forces within contemporary black politics in Britain. It draws upon the political traditions of women and men in the sub-continent, but its identity is indelibly composed with the British social and political dynamic. Asian feminists have had to address issues surrounding the ways in which factors such as caste, class and religion configure in the British situation (Brah 1996:83).

Similarly, in relation to the second and third generation, Lewis (1994) argues, many community leaders and Muslim elders remain confused as to how to respond to the emerging ‘Muslim youth culture’, a hybrid of British and South Asian forms, expressed in music, magazines and local media. Schools, youth and community centres are places in which British Muslims enjoy space to experiment with their multiple identities, relatively free from parental control. According to Brah (1996:47) the emergence of youth groups marks the ‘coming of age of a new form of Asian political and cultural agency’. These new groups should not be seen, she argues, as more ‘progressive’ than those of the first generation; rather, their originality lies in having grown up in Britain. They articulate a home-grown British political discourse. Their identity claims lie in Britain, and from their position as ‘insiders’, no matter how much they are constructed as ‘outsiders’ by others. Organisations that seek to represent ethnicity institutionally need to take these internal differences into account, as well as those constructed externally by the dominant regimes in society.
Profile of the Organisations

Field research for this thesis was carried out within the Boroughs of Islington, Hackney and Haringey in the North and East of London. There is a fairly high concentration of Turkish speakers in these areas, gradually dispersing eastwards towards the suburbs of Enfield. It is estimated that one in ten of the local population of Hackney is of Turkish, Kurdish or Turkish Cypriot origin. There are a number of Turkish shops and services available in these areas, as well as a small number of Turkish mosques. Green Lanes in Haringey is considered the main centre of the local Turkish area. The majority of shops in this area were previously owned by Greek Cypriots, then Turkish Cypriots, and are now mainly Turkish or Kurdish owned. There is also a whole range of political, social, cultural and welfare organisations scattered throughout these boroughs. The Pakistani population is much more dispersed in these areas, with a larger concentration in Walthamstow in East London. There are a number of Pakistani shops and businesses, as well as several Pakistani mosques, Islamic bookshops and Muslim information centres. The Pakistani associations are scattered throughout the boroughs as are the Turkish speaking organisations.

Overall, those families who originate from the Indian sub-continent are under-represented in Haringey, Hackney and Islington (see Table 1). In Haringey they constitute 5.8 per cent of the borough's population compared with 7.8 per cent in Greater London as a whole, though the Borough has a slightly higher proportion of Bangladeshis (1.5 per cent compared with 1.3 per cent). Indian, Pakistani and Asian people tend to be more evenly distributed throughout the borough than black groups. Nevertheless, in three wards (Green Lanes, Harringay and Woodside) around ten per cent of the population comes from the Indian sub-continent that represents a quarter of the Borough's total.

Similarly in Hackney, while those who originate from the Indian sub-continent in general is slightly lower than the average for greater London at 6.29 per cent (with only 0.95 per cent Pakistani), in certain wards the number is much higher than the average. In Leabridge, for example, the percentage of residents from the Indian sub-continent is 15.58 per cent of which Pakistanis make up 2.95 per cent. In Homerton the percentage of those from the Indian sub-continent represents 11.46 per cent of the population, 3.42 per cent of which are Pakistanis.
### Table 1: Ethnic Group Projections for the Year 2000. Source: Greater London Authority 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Hackney Total</th>
<th>Hackney %</th>
<th>Haringey Total</th>
<th>Haringey %</th>
<th>Islington Total</th>
<th>Islington %</th>
<th>Greater London Total</th>
<th>Greater London %</th>
</tr>
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<td>White</td>
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<td>61.25</td>
<td>138,910</td>
<td>63.13</td>
<td>129,989</td>
<td>73.25</td>
<td>5,206,198</td>
<td>73.11</td>
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<td>11.24</td>
<td>21,520</td>
<td>9.78</td>
<td>9,565</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>335,649</td>
<td>4.78</td>
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<td>Black African</td>
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<td>9.04</td>
<td>19,869</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>12,245</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>288,514</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7,261</td>
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<td>4,348</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>120,788</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>6,852</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>7,701</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>418,980</td>
<td>6.03</td>
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<td>81,136</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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In the Borough of Islington the number of residents who originate from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh is 4.6 per cent and they tend to be more scattered than in the other Boroughs. Two wards, Gillespie and Sussex have the highest number of residents who originate from the Indian sub-continent, representing 6.66 per cent and 5.89 per cent of the population respectively. The highest proportion of Pakistanis is in Highbury although here too they represent less than one per cent of the population. Bamsbury, on the other hand, contains a higher proportion of Bangladeshis at 3.45 per cent.

While the 1991 Census included for the first time a question on ethnic origin, people of Greek, Turkish or Cypriot origins are classified as 'white', since these communities were not thought by OPCS to be sufficiently large nationally to warrant separate identification. According to the Greater London Authority (2000), an estimated 10 per cent of London’s population are from white minority groups: Irish, Cypriot, Turkish, and some Arab people, making the total ethnic minority percentage 37 per cent rather than 27 per cent as shown in the figures. According to the 1991 Census of population for Haringey people whose head of household was born in Cyprus represented 5.7 per cent of the population of the borough. Those just born in Turkey constituted 1.9 per cent of the population. In Islington the number of people born in Turkey or Turkish Cyprus, according to the 1991 Census represented 0.61 per cent of the population. Similarly a housing needs survey carried out in the borough of Hackney in 1997 found the number of people with a head of household born in Turkish Cyprus to represent 0.6 per cent of the population. The percentage for those born in Turkey was significantly higher at 3.4 per cent.

The majority of the organisations that I worked with during my field research catered specifically for Pakistani and Turkish speaking women. Others catered for both men and women, but employed female workers and had female only sessions. The aims and functions of these organisations can roughly be divided into social, cultural, political, welfare, and educational; they usually include specific activities for both the elderly and young women. The welfare section is concerned with specific problems experienced by Pakistanis or Turkish speakers arising from their settlement in Britain. The aim is to help individuals and families on a personal level, as well as bringing issues to the attention of the authorities concerned (the police, hospitals, schools, social services, etc.). This is becoming an increasingly important
part of their work, providing trained female workers to offer advice on issues concerning welfare benefits, housing, social services, immigration and asylum, education, health, domestic violence, racial harassment, etc. Most of the centres provide a drop-in service for women, and offer interpretation and counselling. They also organise seminars and courses in relation to health promotion and awareness. Immigration and asylum rights were major issues for many of the organisations, particularly the Turkish speaking ones, as a result of the larger numbers of refugees that they were increasingly dealing with. This often involved petitioning and campaigning for certain individuals and for a change in Government policy generally.

The cultural role is seen as important to many of the organisations, and they arrange cultural, national and religious celebrations for their members and clients. Many also participate in 'multicultural' events in their local boroughs, where members of different 'ethnic' groups and associations put on displays of dance, drama, music and poetry recitals, providing samples of 'traditional' Turkish or Pakistani food, fashion shows of 'ethnic' dress made by some of the women attending the organisations, and make-up demonstrations, etc. These festivals gave many women, young and old alike, the opportunity to participate more directly in the cultural side of their ethnicity. While one might want to question the effect that these 'multicultural' events have on the population as a whole in terms of inter-ethnic relations, certainly among the women involved it was a chance to focus on the positive aspects of their ethnic heritage. Young people in particular were very keen on these events.

The political role varied from organising or attending events for visiting dignitaries or artists from Pakistan, Turkey or Cyprus, to publicising particular issues that they felt were relevant, such as highlighting the suffering of the people of Bosnia by many of the Pakistani associations, or the situation in Cyprus for Turkish Cypriots, or holding vigils for people who had 'disappeared' in Turkey. Their political work also involved representing their 'community' within mainstream society concerning particular issues, such as educational and health care provision, immigration and asylum rights, and issues surrounding domestic violence. The organisations varied to a large extent in terms of the weight they placed on this political role. Some preferred to keep politics to the background; others were much more overtly political. Some of the respondents were often critical of the events organised around visiting
dignitaries or politicians. It was felt that these individuals were merely coming to Britain for their own political gain, rather than for the benefit of Pakistanis or Turkish speakers in this country. In addition, some of my informants believed that these functions were purely for the middle class elites and did little for the working class. According to one of the Pakistani respondents who had recently attended Eid celebrations at the Pakistani Embassy, the women attending this function were all wearing very expensive suits, diamonds, nail varnish and make-up, which she felt was very different from the world of the 'ordinary' Muslim. These activities, however, demonstrate the continued importance of links with their countries of origin, as well as those political activities focused much more on issues relating to their country of residence.

On the educational side, the organisations provide a range of classes in English, Urdu/Turkish, adult access, assertiveness, first aid, keep fit, sewing, cookery, arts and crafts, etc. The majority also provides supplementary education for young people in Urdu/Turkish, Maths, English, as well as more general classes about Pakistani/Turkish Cypriot history and cultural heritage. In addition, one of the Pakistani women's associations provided an Asian craft training and employment project. This included training in pattern cutting, sewing, embroidery and framing, as well as business skills and basic numeracy. The aim of the course was to assist women in selling their own products as small businesses. For many of the women, these classes are as much a social occasion as a class. They give them a chance to meet and talk with other women of similar and different backgrounds. They discuss what they have been doing and the plans they are making. It is a very informal atmosphere and the women can talk freely to each other. In addition to these classes, the organisations provide a whole range of social activities, events, and excursions. For many of the women attending, it is a break from their everyday lives and the day-to-day difficulties they may experience. It helps them with the feelings of isolation, loneliness and depression that many can experience living away from relatives and kin. The social side that is most important for many of the women attending these organisations.

Most of the associations organise special activities for the elderly, and some have specific workers in this field. They provide support and advice, and arrange activities for elderly women, many of whom face isolation, both social and economic. They also offer
interpretation services, take women to hospitals and clinics if they have limited abilities in English or there is no one to accompany them, and provide information and seminars on health issues and health promotion and awareness. They have regular get-togethers that give the women a chance to meet others, to share their experiences and exchange views. Many also arrange regular shopping trips or visits to mosques (predominantly the Pakistani organisations), as well as trips to other towns. Most have a luncheon club especially for elderly women.

Many of the associations have activities and classes especially for young people, including youth groups, music, cookery, arts and crafts, and fashion classes, holiday playschemes, crèches, careers advice and organised events and trips. They provide supplementary education in Urdu or Turkish, at various levels, as well as maths, English and other curriculum based subjects. It is interesting to note that whereas all of the Pakistani organisations that I visited provided specific activities and classes for young people, only some of the Turkish speaking ones did, and these were predominantly those that catered for both men and women. However, there was a large Turkish speaking youth organisation in the area, which will be discussed a little later. The Pakistanis had no similar organisation, but instead the associations aimed to cater for young people by arranging separate youth sessions and activities, and the majority had a part-time or voluntary youth worker.

The associations of course vary in the extent to which they offer these services or participate in these activities, but the majority contained these elements. Interaction with mainstream organisations also varied from organisation to organisation. On the welfare side, most had dealings in relation to individual clients, interacting with immigration officials, the police, the welfare agencies, doctors, teachers, and other educational and health professionals, as well as with other women's groups and women's refuges, local Race Units etc.

Since the break-up of the GLC, funding has been much more difficult to access, and for much of the time the organisations in this study were seeking funding for general running costs, as well as for specific projects. Although the majority of the organisations received funding from the local London Councils – Islington, Hackney and Haringey, the London Borough Grants Unit, local Race Units, Women's Units and education and health authorities,
this tended to be very limited and was declining year by year. Increasingly therefore funding was sought from outside of the Borough. They receive funding for specific projects from various charitable institutions and Trusts, and increasingly acquire funding from the National Lottery Board and charities such as Comic relief. They also receive a number of donations. In addition, they may receive some funding from other trusts, which help with one-off costs, for example furniture or trips for the women.

Seeking funding from outside the Boroughs where the organisations are based is always very competitive as several centres throughout London may offer similar services and projects and must therefore compete for funds. Funding is usually obtained for a fixed term period of between one and three years on average, however, many require yearly renewal. The temporary nature of this funding means that there is no stability for the project or the worker/s involved, which can lead to negativity on the part of those involved with their employment under constant threat. Many of the workers are therefore constantly looking for possible sources for funding, as well as positions in other organisations should their attempts prove unsuccessful. Funding is therefore a major priority, and takes up a lot of the workers' time.

A further problem in relation to funding concerns the funding agencies themselves, many of whom have in-projects or issues which they are looking for in relation to funding applicants. During the period of research for this study, the key issue among many of the funding agencies was elderly people. Consequently the overwhelming majority of the associations had projects catering specifically for elderly members, as funding could be sort relatively easily. Currently, however, the key issue seems to be young people with more and more funding being made available to this target group. While this provides the opportunity for many of the organisations to set up new projects catering specifically for young people in their communities, many have found their elderly projects under threat. One of the Turkish Cypriot organisations that I worked with has been running a very active elders project for the last three years, however with their funding about to run out and unable, as yet, to secure further funding, the future of the project and its worker is uncertain.

In general, the Pakistani associations tended to be more social and cultural in nature, although they provide a large and increasingly popular advice service. Nevertheless, the
majority of the women who attend on a regular basis are primarily concerned with the social and cultural side. Religion tends to be far more prominent in the Pakistani organisations, although they are not overtly religious. Rather, religion is seen as part of the ‘cultural make-up’. Many events and celebrations will often include Mushaira (verse reading), and religious celebrations such as Eid form an important part of the social calendar. Often trips and outings will include visits to the local mosques, as well as activities such as shopping.

The Turkish speaking associations tend to be much less religious in their approach. For many it does not feature in their activities at all, although some will celebrate Bayram (the end of Ramadan) to some extent. In addition, their welfare advice service has become the main focus for many of the organisations. This is largely due to the increase in the number of refugees coming from Turkey and Cyprus since the 1980s. Indeed, many of these organisations began catering specifically for Turkish Cypriot people/women in London and have subsequently expanded their services to cover Turkish speakers, as a result of the needs of more recent arrivals. For the majority of these organisations, refugees and recent arrivals now represent the majority of their clients, although some of the women attending these centres will also be those who came in the 1950s and 1960s, especially more elderly women. Consequently the welfare side of their organisations has become much more important, and most have a specifically designated refugee worker.

Domestic violence was also a major issue for the Turkish speaking organisations. They receive a growing number of cases and aim to raise awareness of the issues within their communities, as well as establishing contacts with other organisations and agencies such as women’s refuges, women’s aid organisations, the police, social services, solicitors and housing departments. Although cases of domestic violence were apparent among both Pakistanis and Turkish speakers, it was considered a much more major issue for Turkish speakers. For the Pakistani associations domestic violence came under general welfare provision, although they received a growing number of cases. Among the Turkish speaking organisations, however, and particularly those specifically dealing with women, they tended to be much more outspoken about domestic violence and some had specific projects concerning this issue. According to one Turkish speaking association’s report:
Domestic violence is common among the Turkish community. Within culture it is considered an acceptable form of control by husbands, who are seen as having the right to physically punish their wives, especially if the wives are disobeying their wishes. The majority of women suffer violence, it is perceived as the woman's fate; sometimes it is even interpreted as the husband's sign of love to his wife. There is little support in the community for women suffering domestic violence; they are expected to suffer in silence. There is also a lack of wider family support; there is very little community or statutory support, which makes it difficult for women, especially with children, to leave their husbands. This affects the children, and many may also be subject to violence from the father.

One organisation also employed two crèche workers who dealt specifically with children with behavioural problems, linked to domestic violence issues. The Turkish speaking organisations were therefore very active in relation to this issue, campaigning both within and outside their communities.

As well as these organisations catering specifically for Pakistanis or Turkish speakers I also interviewed a number of women and visited several other related organisations. One of these was a professional development centre which aims to promote the role of parents in education through the provision of advice, information, advocacy and partnership schemes with community organisations and schools. The project has been set up to raise achievement levels amongst children from specific ethnic minority groups that are underachieving in education. One of my respondents worked with the Turkish speaking communities, and there were also individuals working with the Kurdish, the African Caribbean, the Somali, and the Bangladeshi communities. Although the needs of these different communities varied, all were targeted as being the lowest achievers educationally. In relation to the Turkish speaking communities, the major issues were considered to be cultural and the linguistic barriers which prevent many families from playing an active role in education. The aim of the development centre was to empower parents by providing them with advice, information, advocacy, training sessions on a wide range of issues such as admissions and transfers, special needs, national curriculum matters, and so on. The majority of those who use the service tend to be newcomers, as my informant pointed out:
I mean it’s quite sad really, within the Turkish Cypriot community, as a community we’ve been underachieving for years, and we are the most settled community, but a lot of families think because they know the language it’s fine, but it’s not. But we do find that a lot of our clients are new arrivals, who are not familiar with the system, who have language barriers, who aren’t aware of the culture. And we’re basically there to have the cultural imput as well, I mean families come and there’s a real culture shock.

The effect of educational underachievement among Turkish Cypriots is explored further in subsequent chapters.

I also spent some time in, and interviewed one the female workers from, a large Turkish speaking youth organisation. This organisation provides activities for young Turkish speaking men and women between the ages of 14 and 25, although some of those who attend are older; approximately 50 per cent are Cypriots, 30 per cent Kurds and the remainder are from Turkey. About 50 per cent of the young people are from Haringey, about 35 per cent from Hackney, and the rest from other wards. The organisation has six paid employees, including an HIV worker, an educational worker, a drug worker and a youth worker, as well as a number of volunteers. The main aim of the organisation is to educate young people and increase levels of achievement and self-confidence through educational activities. They also organise supplementary classes and provide information and advice on education and career development, as well as issues to do with social welfare.

This organisation differs from other youth services for Pakistanis and Turkish speakers in that it is very much concerned with issues of integration and incorporation of young people into wider British society. Therefore, they do not teach language or culture because they feel that these are being offered by other organisations. Rather, they draw on the ‘multicultural’ experiences of Turkish speaking young people. Nevertheless, Turkish culture, particularly in the form of music, is becoming increasingly popular, as highlighted in chapter nine. The presence of an HIV worker and drugs worker also demonstrate their different approach and the strategies they adopt for providing practical solutions to everyday issues and problems for Turkish speaking young people. Most importantly, they provide
young people with a separate space in which to challenge and negotiate their identities. As one of the workers commented:

It's a lovely atmosphere here; it's great to see them altogether. We run music workshops here as well. But they've got their own talent; it's amazing to see it.

They're all good at something, it's brilliant. And the ones who don't feel they have any specific skills to offer just come and hang out.

Like other Turkish speaking organisations, they do not project a religious dimension in any way, as they believe this would deter many young people from attending. They also feel that religious services are offered elsewhere.

Two of my informants worked for a Muslim women's counselling service, which offered a more Islamic approach to dealing with clients. The organisation was established by professional Muslim women to cater for the needs of women like themselves in Britain. It provides a telephone and, where appropriate, a face-to-face counselling service to all Muslim women whatever their cultural, ethnic or linguistic background. According to their publicity: 'Muslim women are confronted with problems, out of confusion or lack of support, which they are unable to overcome isolation, language problems, and welfare issues'. Counselling is founded upon the Islamic model of the self and based on the teachings from the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions, which they claim provides 'a positive approach that enables the growth of the individual and allows the person to tap into and release their potential'. Clients are referred to specialist counsellors if necessary, but the communities generally lack such specialists. The organisation also has a consultancy role, offering advice to social workers, the police, the probation service and hospitals, and such establishments are increasingly approaching the organisation to deal with clients. The greatest proportion of their clients are British born Muslim women, followed by women born on the Asian sub-continent and those with dual parentage. The overwhelming majority are ethnically from the Indian sub-continent, followed by Arabs and English.

**Impact on the Local Communities**

Although the organisations vary in their aims and approaches, they all seek to cater for the needs of Pakistanis, Turkish speakers or Muslims in London and to empower individuals to
achieve their goals and aspirations, despite the restrictions and discriminations they face. As a Pakistani advice worker commented:

Racism forces Pakistani people back into their own communities to a great extent. In a way our job is to try to empower our community so they can do stuff for themselves, but obviously that’s not working so much. They’re all coming here and they’re going to their own community organisations to do stuff for them. So it forces them back and we’re trying to get them out, but it’s not really working.

Part of the problem, many of my informants believed, was not simply lack of language skills and lack of knowledge of the British system, but the continuation of ethnic discrimination. Nevertheless, the increase of services available for Pakistanis and Turkish speakers provides a very important role within their communities. A Turkish Cypriot development worker believed that the expansion of services provided for Turkish speakers was largely a result of the arrival of people from Turkey:

Since the coming of the Kurdish community, definitely that’s accelerated it. Because like before the Turkish Cypriots were very much just trying to fade into the background, and trying to integrate as much as possible. But now there are more services, and people have somewhere to go and speak to people from their own community. The needs have been met a lot more than what it was, some people had been here thirty years and they never had community centres. They had cafes where they used to meet, but nothing provided by the local authority. So their needs are gradually being met.

The unwillingness of many Turkish Cypriots to become actively involved in voluntary organisations and activities was mentioned by many informants. A refugee and advice worker commented:

Well the thing about Turkish Cypriot women is that they hate to go out of their way, I mean I was recently trying to start a mother’s group within one of the schools in South London, but they won’t go out of their way to do anything. I’m saying ‘well, it’s for the benefit of your children’, you know, ‘you do this and we’ll get a link worker to improve their English’. But they won’t, they won’t go out of
their way. I know from my experiences as well, like I've done voluntary work in
the past, and my parents said 'it's a waste of time, why do you do it?', you know,
'you're just wasting your time'. And I've done voluntary work in a women's
refuge, they thought I was crazy. You have to get paid for your work. So it's not
as strong as it should be, it would be nice, but...

This would further explain the fact that many of the Turkish Cypriot organisations have now
become Turkish speaking organisations as the majority of their members and clients are
more recent arrivals from Turkey.

The majority of the women attending these associations tend to be first generation and
working class, although some middle class women do attend. In addition, many of the
women felt that there was limited interaction between the different groups. As one woman
pointed out, although some interaction may occur in Pakistani women's centres, like the one
where she worked, in reality very few middle class Pakistanis would feel the need to use the
services they offered:

People who are middle class will not come here anyway, and even if they are
living in Islington borough, in a richer place, they'll not really be coming to this
place and utilise the services, because they are already fulfilled in their own
needs. So you'll only find people who are either lonely or need the services, you
know, income support and all that kind of stuff.

Similarly, it was felt that the majority of second and third generation did not attend such
organisations because they believe their needs are being met by mainstream institutions.
However, while the second generation may choose not to use their services on a regular
basis, they are there if they need them for a specific problem or issue; for example if they
want to learn more about their culture or religion, if they would like to learn their mother
tongue, or need help with interpretation in their mother tongue. In addition, some young
women had visited the centres in order to gain specific help and advice on issues to do with
marriage, divorce or death in the family. Several of the women whom I met had started
attending the centre after a parent had died, initially to seek help and advice on burial
arrangements, etc., and as a result had gained a greater interest in the organisation, their
culture and/or religion. Some had also become more regular attendants as a result of
bringing their mothers or older female relatives. In addition, some second-generation women may attend the organisations to increase their educational skills. The co-ordinator of a Turkish Cypriot association commented:

We had a number of clients who maybe at school didn’t get the right support and they don’t have the right writing skills, where they can’t complete basic forms and their English language is obviously like ours, being born and brought up here, which is quite sad, again I try and work with them too.

However, predominantly the majority of the women attended the organisations were first generations. Although all of the Pakistani associations provided services for young people, the numbers of young people using these services was small. Among the Turkish speaking women’s organisations, very few aimed to cater for young people, they felt that their needs were being met elsewhere.

However, while these organisations provide invaluable support for some of the second and third generation, apart from youth provision, generally they are not well supported from by groups. Does this mean that the centres are not adequately providing for their communities in general? Or should they merely be catering for the different needs of the women within these communities? Is it feasible that they can provide services for all? Many Pakistani, Turkish Cypriot, and Muslim women in general would not use the organisations regardless, because many would not wish to, or do not feel they have the need. This is not a criticism of the organisations, simply a recognition that many women will not want to participate for various reasons.

For those who participate in the associations, however, the services on offer are extensive and ‘all-encompassing’ in many respects. It would be difficult to think of similar mainstream organisations that provided such a vast array of services. They act in many ways as ‘one stop shops’ where women can come to get information, help, and advice on a whole range of issues; or can come simply to meet other women like themselves, to chat, socialise and make friends in an informal and safe environment. For many, this is the major reason for attending. It is somewhere to go, something to do, where they can chat to other women whom they see as having a greater understanding of their lifestyles, language abilities,
potential problems, and so on. As a Turkish Cypriot woman active in many areas of the various Turkish-speaking communities stated:

Essential, vital, very very important. A lot of women wouldn't have made it in a number of ways, they would actually have just succumb or cracked up, and might have ended up in mental institutions, or have ended up with severe psycho-symatic illnesses, would have led totally unfulfilled and wasted lives. Some of the young women wouldn't have been able to realise their dreams, would not have been able to go onto further education, they would have not become professionals, as they had wanted to. Some women would now have gone back to further education. A lot of it was to give women confidence, that you were there if they needed you, and they trusted you.

The help and support that these organisations provide for women is evident on both a formal and an informal basis. On a formal basis, the women have somewhere to go where they know they can get advice, support and help if they need help with a specific issue, or simply to talk to someone who is prepared to listen to them. The women can also receive help through formal networks that provide health advocates, educational development officers, welfare advisers, and so on. On an informal basis, there are women in these organisations who are prepared to lend a friendly ear, just to listen, to act as a sounding board for women who may not necessarily require practical help, but support and encouragement. Many of the organisations provided an on-call service, for women to speak confidentially about any issue at any time. Among the Turkish speaking associations in particular, some of the workers were often required to make house calls or visits to hospitals or police stations out of office hours on behalf of their clients, dealing with issues to do with domestic violence or immigration. Many of the informants reported that the organisations were a lifeline for women, helping them to make a real difference to their lives.

Career development was also considered an important role for many of the organisations, offering advice, support, information and encouragement, giving many women a chance to increase their educational skills and giving them more self-confidence generally. As a Turkish Cypriot woman put it:
Possibly career development, maybe they can do something else apart from being a woman with three kids and pulling her hair out, is there anything she can do which is different. Or sometimes all the qualifications that they have from Turkey are not recognised, you've created posts for them, we used to create jobs for them because of the groups we set up. One woman who is now a co-ordinator started as a crèche worker, for example, because we set up the crèche, we set up the women's centre and then we set up the crèche, and some of these young women who couldn't get jobs anywhere else because the parents wouldn't allow them or the racist system wouldn't allow them, we had that.

Several of the informants had begun working for their organisations or similar ones, on a voluntary basis and had gained full-time or part-time employment as a result. Many of the associations provided training for their staff on relevant issues.

The significance of these organisations, however, is not simply in terms of the help and support they provide for individuals, although this is of course important, but the fact that they provide a space for women of similar ethnic backgrounds to meet and socialise. While ethnicity and gender may provide a common bond for these women, their experiences are nevertheless diverse. These organisations therefore provide a forum for these diverse experiences. One of the respondents ran a coffee morning for Kurdish women at a local school. Many of the women had children at the school and they were also encouraged to bring friends along. Different representatives from the health authority or social services would come to talk to the women and provide them with information about the various services they offered. They also had links with other voluntary organisations and ran workshops and seminars. However, as my informant pointed out, the aim of these coffee mornings was not merely to inform the women of their own rights and of the services available to them, but also to educate them about the experiences of their children:

It's trying to help young people in a more indirect way. Very often in our community that's what you have to do, you have to approach it through the back door. Talking to the mothers about their relationship to their kids and how to recognise substance abuse and things like that. With our community it's very
difficult to talk about sex and things like condoms. You have to talk about related issues; maybe 90 per cent of our work is in the indirect way.

These organisations, therefore, give the women attending a chance to mix with women with diverse and heterogeneous experiences, but also to introduce them to alternative perspectives in an indirect and informal way. Through the activities, classes and social events they run they cover a diverse range of issues relating to both their own communities and to wider British society. Two of these issues include the rights of women and the experiences of the younger generation. Thus in an informal way, many of the workers are trying to facilitate changes to established values and patterns of behaviour which may restrict women and young people. The presence of the workers themselves helps to demonstrate to many of the first generation that despite their more ‘western’ appearance and way of life, they are nevertheless still committed to the maintenance of their ethnicity. Change does not necessarily mean abandoning traditional values and customs or ethnic solidarity.

Another important element of the organisations is that they provide a collective voice. As a Turkish Cypriot woman emphasised:

It is very important to be able to bring women together so that they recognise that they’re not the crazy one, they’re not the only one and that collectively they can sort of support each other, emotionally, physically if necessary, as well as finding a collective voice. Things like there is an issue, and then you write about it, you create a platform for women to say things in a collective way about an issue. And it gets printed in a magazine or paper and it gives them a voice which they would never had if they were left on their own, because they are not important as women. Who wants to hear women, especially around political issues or ways of running communities or societies? And of course we learn quite a lot from other women, you know, African Caribbean women, Pakistani and Indian women, and English women too, so I was very much aware of a lot of struggles that were going on around those communities.

The importance of having a collective voice was something that many of the informants mentioned. Whether campaigning over specific issues such as domestic violence, educational underachievement, immigration and asylum rights, or more broadly challenging
gender and ethnic discrimination, having a collective platform to address these issues was vital. These issues, however, also demonstrate the diverse nature of their struggles and the cross-cutting of gender, ethnicity, class and ‘race’ on both an individual and collective level. Campaigning on such issues often involved prioritising different elements at different times and within different contexts.

Each organisation has a management committee made up of elected members and co-optees who are wholly responsible for the organisation, with a co-ordinator to manage the organisation according to the wishes of the committee. The management committees usually meet monthly, and there are regular staff meetings. In addition some of the organisations have monthly-supervised meetings with individual staff, the co-ordinator and a senior management committee member. However the involvement of committee members varies enormously from organisation to organisation. In some of the associations, committee members are very active in the day-to-day running of the organisation, helping out regularly as volunteers or in setting up and running projects, as well as providing support for the staff. In others, however, management committee members may only be seen at high profile events or committee meetings. Organisations that are less hierarchically structured in terms of staff and the management committee tended to be more successful and display a much more positive and friendly atmosphere among staff. Where tensions were more evident these tended to be in organisations where the management committee were much less involved on a practical level. The proportion of first to second generation members also seemed to make an impression, with a greater number of second-generation members often proving to be less hierarchical in their framework than those where the majority was first generation.

The Pakistani, Turkish speaking or Muslim associations are of course also limited by the goals and aspirations of the management committee and those who run the organisations. Some of the women argued that they would like to offer additional services but were constrained by those running the associations. It was also considered that in many ways the first generation had different needs and aspirations from those of the succeeding generations. Hence there was sometimes tension and conflict there. In addition, there was also some conflict between the aims and aspirations of the men and women involved in the organisations, especially if the organisation catered for both. All such organisations had
women-only sessions and female workers, but often the women felt that more provision and time was needed catering especially for women. Furthermore, many of the women attending would have liked there to be a greater religious presence in the centres. This was particularly the case for the Turkish-speaking women. These organisations, as stated earlier, tended to play down the religious side, but many of the women would have like for there to be more. The workers, on the other hand, preferred to keep religion in the background, to do otherwise, they felt, would put many women off attending. This was true for both the Turkish speaking and the Pakistani organisations to some extent. Even the Pakistani organisations have more religious celebratory events, but it was not the main priority in any way. They would organise special trips to mosques, but these would merely be attended by those who wished to. Again they felt if was better to keep religion in the background more, although this varied from organisation to organisation. Generally it was felt that there were other organisations that provided more religious-based services and facilities.

In summary, the organisations offer a vital service for Pakistani and Turkish speaking women in London, catering for a wide variety of different needs. Whether it is for specific help, or just for somewhere to go and socialise with other women, these organisations are important for Pakistani and Turkish speaking women. They have somewhere to go for advice, support, encouragement, and comfort.

Intermediaries

A study of Turkish women in the Netherlands and Germany working with and for other Turks was made by Helma Lutz (1993). Although it focused on different aspects of social work such as social welfare, community work, teaching and care, many of her observations apply to my informants. She describes these women as 'mediators' or 'intermediaries', which refers to their professional role of mediating between the migrant community and the wider society. Her aim is to explore the extent to which their ethnicity was vital for their professional role and how far their personal experiences were institutionally useful and appropriate for the integration of the Turkish communities in the Netherlands and Germany. Lutz argues that for these women 'being a Turk' was crucial for their entry into the labour market, far more so
than their education and training. In her view, ‘ethnicity in the sense of ethnic membership is crucial for the material, social and professional existence of this group’ (1993:487).

For the women working in these various areas of social work, their ‘Turkishness’ serves as both a personal and political resource, an essential component of their access to the labour market, as well as a basis for the improvement of the marginal political position of the Turkish communities. In this way, ‘the structure of the labour market imposing the conditions of bargaining on the agents involved’ (1993:491). Ethnically segmented job areas such as ‘ethnic’ social work, she argues, tend to promote exclusion rather than social integration. Lutz therefore follows Anthias (1992) in arguing that traditional gender divisions within the wider society, together with ethnic discrimination, affect ethnic minority women in terms of both their participation within wider society in general and their access to the labour market in particular. As social work is regarded as a typical female occupation in welfare state societies ethnic minority women often find themselves channelled into these areas.

Similarly, Josephides (1988) draws attention to the number of young professional Cypriot women working increasingly in the ‘ethnic context’ in Britain. As a result of Section 11 funding and the expansion of race relations units and ‘ethnic specialists’, many Cypriot women are being 'channelled' into areas such as social work, community development officers, 'multicultural advisors', and so on, in relation to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. However, Josephides believes: 'In different circumstances many professional young women may not choose to work in an “ethnic” capacity' (1988:52).

Second generation Turkish women working in these areas, Lutz argues, can experience difficulties because their education and training has been undertaken in a western society with a ‘western agenda’. This includes the valuation and ‘problem definition’ of their ethnic identity and cultural background. As intermediaries they learn to solve problems using the professional strategies they have acquired during their western training and education. Such strategies require a mutual acceptance of the ‘problem definition’ in order to deal with them successfully. The clients must therefore come to evaluate the situation in a similar way to that of the professional; they must learn where to go to seek help for a specific issue and to discuss this issue in a way that both parties can understand. Lutz terms this process ‘proto-professionalism’, which she views as an essential characteristic of the Western welfare
state, and inherent in all social work training. The role of intermediaries is to translate and
transfer the ‘western’ terminologies and concepts into something that more easily fits into the
migrant’s own day-to-day experiences. Such a process is not part of the intermediaries’
professional training, but must be negotiated by the individual.

A co-ordinator of one of the Pakistani associations that I worked with claimed that
Pakistani people need the services that the centres’ offer because their needs are not being
met by mainstream provision. He believed that Asians are not adequately catered for
because of the curriculum involved in training social professionals. Many more Asians are
being recruited into the social services, but this in itself does not expand the provision. The
Eurocentric nature of the training limits the focus of the work. What is needed, he believed,
was a more open curriculum. Having these specific Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot
organisations therefore provides individuals with somewhere to go for the majority of the
problems they may be experiencing. However, this does not in itself alleviate all of the
difficulties that Lutz mentions. Most of the people working for these organisations, especially
the women I interviewed, are second generation and therefore experience very similar
difficulties to those of Lutz’s respondents. Most of their clients are first generation with
different educational and social experiences from those of the workers. Similarly, therefore,
the women must learn to translate their British-based knowledge into more accessible
information for their clients.

For Lutz, therefore, being Turkish is not an automatic guarantee of acceptance by
other Turks. Boundaries can arise from within and from outside. Like many of my own
informants, Lutz noted that many of these ‘social workers’ had to challenge sexism from
within their own communities as well as structural and personal discrimination on the part of
the indigenous population. Lutz therefore argues that successful mediators must have an ‘all
round ability’ (1993:491). They must possess a good knowledge of the regional, social,
economic and religious background of their clients in order to carry out their professional role
successfully. Yet to function effectively they must also have an expert knowledge of the social
institutions, cultural traditions and values, and ‘psychology’ of the wider society. ‘Bridging
gaps means to put that which is taken for granted on both sides into relative terms; an ability
which is not easy to achieve’ (1993:491).
Similarly, Philip Lewis (1994), who examines Muslim organisations in Bradford, states that Muslims who mediate between their communities and wider society must be able to operate within two different cultural worlds, and must be both bilingual and 'bicultural'. A good knowledge of Urdu and English, he argues, is therefore vital. 'Without this it is not possible to win the confidence of the elders in the Muslim communities, many of whom have little English, and at the same time be active in the majority community' (1994:204).

Furthermore, their role with both their communities and wider society requires them to have a thorough understanding of South Asian history, culture, religion and languages, as well as that of British politics, law and culture. Indeed, many of my informants pointed out that their knowledge of Urdu or Turkish and of Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot values and traditions had improved greatly since working with the various associations, or within the Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot communities generally.

Lutz therefore sees these mediators as advocates for their compatriots, who manage their role despite the limits and restrictions of operating on the margins of wider society. They rely on the dominant society's discourse in order to represent themselves as 'spokespersons' for 'their' group, even though they have no official status to do so within their own communities. It is the power structure operating in society that creates this position.

If power is not so much that gender, class, ethnicity, sexual preference, age and so on make the difference, but what counts is how the differences are made, then the accounts of the mediators provide us with a rich resource for researching the difference. Listening to their accounts provides a clue to the nuances and the cross-cuttings in ethnic, class and gender relations on the structural level as well as from the agency's point of view. (Lutz 1993:492)

For Lutz, therefore, ethnicity needs to be examined with reference to social structures, 'discursive constructions', identity formations and at the level of concrete social practice. In this way, ethnicity can be seen to be appropriated and transformed by both the individual and the group. 'Bridging the gap is a fine balancing act' (1993:492).

As previously stated, my informants were chosen because they worked directly and/or were active within their local communities. This was not because they were considered to have a better understanding of the Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots in London,
but in order to examine their experiences and influences in relation to their own identities and how they were seen in terms of the collective identities (ethnic or religious) of the groups and communities within which they worked. Certainly these women are likely to be more aware than most of the problems that many women and young people in their communities face, as they are dealing with these on a daily basis as part of their work. However, it should be added that as such they see, in many ways, the worst side of the situation. Indeed, many pointed out that it is the women with the most problems who predominantly tend to use their services. Many who do not have problems, or perhaps more appropriately, do not think they have problems, are less likely to use their services or attend the centres in which many of the women interviewed work. Nevertheless, the respondents maintained a strong commitment to their ethnic communities, whilst acknowledging the diverse problems that some women can experience both within these communities and in relation to wider society.

What effect did working in these organisations have on the women themselves? Why had they started working there in the first place? Some felt that they had developed a greater pride in their respective heritages, but they were aware of its partial nature. Some had become more wary of men, as they saw the realities of some of the problems many women had to face. Many had become more aware of the struggles and hardships that the first generation had faced, and continues to face, as well as the problems they can cause the second generation by their behaviour.

All of the women interviewed were very committed to promoting the rights of their respective communities, to providing for their needs and offering help and support to women in order to empower them. As a Pakistani advice worker admitted:

If you ask me truly, if, when I first joined, my main reason for joining was to help the community, because I was doing that anyway. These kinds of organisations can do wonders for the people provided it’s not a whitewash, you understand? We are helping a lot of people; I have done so during the time I’ve been here personally. And I think there’s so many people we can reach out to, believe me. People who are not coming out because they haven’t got means to come out, and are disabled and all that, and we are here to do that for them.
A Turkish Cypriot refugee worker similarly expressed her desire to empower people within the Turkish speaking communities, and now this had made her come to value her ethnic heritage much more:

Before, as I said, I used to hate it but now, working in the Turkish community as well, it's become an important part of my life and when I apply for jobs I always try to apply for jobs within the Turkish community. Not just to improve my Turkish, but to try to empower the community, if you really want to get something done, you know, get people out of the chip shops, kebab shops, the textile industry. It's definitely important. I'm not going to change anything, but I could try.

However, several of my informants also pointed out that despite the enormous benefits that their work, and that of the organisations in general, brought for many women, they often felt frustrated because they could not do more to help them. A Turkish Cypriot advice worker stated:

I work a lot in the evenings as well and that's going to police stations and refuges with women, and we've got an on-call service as well and I do a lot of work from home as well with clients for counselling or just phoning up to talk. Because a number of clients although they're experiencing domestic violence, they don't generally do anything about it because of the fear of the unknown really, and the family environment. So it is sometimes mainly talking, which is frustrating for me as well because I hear what happens at home and I can't really do anything physically about it.

Many of the informants felt that they would often have to 'take a back seat' with their clients, that they could only go as far as the client was prepared to take it. This was often very frustrating, as they were aware that they could do far more if their client would let them.

The majority of the women felt that their experiences of working within these organisations had also had a profound effect on their own lives. A Pakistani advice worker explained:

It's hard for me to analyse my own life when I think of particular clients who've gone through so much and come up trumps, you know. They really want to
change their life because of something that has occurred that is major in their own life or their children's lives. It's made me think that life's too short as well, I've got to do a lot in life, or see a lot of things. Not push myself for the sake of it, but really do the things that I want to do and perhaps I sometimes push away because I think I can't be bothered. And it's maybe made me more cautious of men, because I tend to, I know it's wrong obviously, but you sort of tend to group them all together when you hear the same story. And obviously you have to take it with a pinch of salt as well because women can lie as well. But when you've got the evidence and the proof in front of you and you see what they've been through, you tend to lump them all together and see them as the same. But I do try to push women, to get them off their seats and do something, because if you don't I think they'll just pass their life away like that.

Several of the respondents said that they tried to keep their private lives separate from the organisations where they worked. Some preferred to live away from the areas in which they worked in order to maintain a certain amount of distance, and to keep their work and home lives separate. A Turkish Cypriot woman explained that:

I try to keep my life very closed from the women. If you work with Turkish women, and you're Turkish yourself they tend to want to know about your life. And to them you're their friend, but they don't look at you as their advice worker or counsellor, you're just someone from their community so they're entitled to know about your every move, your life.

She also pointed out that she tried to encourage the women she worked with to keep her name and the organisation out of the family household. In the past she had been followed home from work several times by the husbands or other family members of clients. As a result she was very cautious about her activities. This situation was considered very frustrating because she wanted people to know more about the services they offered, but at times had to keep their activities secret. This was a dilemma that several of the informants mentioned. They were keen to publicise the work they did in order to reach as many women as possible. However, in terms of family interaction this could often threaten the effectiveness of their work, and some of the workers were concerned that their work could put them in
physical danger, as well as subjecting them to criticism from family members of the clients and the community in general. This was particularly significant for women working in sensitive areas to do with domestic violence or family breakdown.

Another Turkish Cypriot woman who was active in a number of areas within the local Turkish speaking communities told of her experiences:

Some of us, women on our own and being very active in the community, some were divorced, some had never married; and the truth of it was very interesting, that women in particular defended us against a lot of attacks because they could see that we were there generally helping them and responding to them. Although they might not have approved officially of what we were doing or how we were living our lives, because we were there and they need us, it was accepted for us to be such oddballs, you know; either not married at such a late age or living on your own with your child. So I think a lot of us in the early eighties, we won that battle and I think once we got the women to defend us, and it wasn't really important what the men thought about us in many ways. And a lot of us were strong enough to take it because we had come through a lot of other battles and struggles in this country.

She believed that it was easier for women like herself to go their own way because they did not depend on the Turkish speaking communities either politically, economically, socially or career-wise. Despite being active in the communities, she was employed by the local Education Authority and therefore did not rely on her ethnicity for her living. Her link to the communities was through a desire to help. She believed, however, that for women who do depend on the ethnic community, many are forced to compromise in their own lives, just as in any 'societal gatherings' be they Turkish or English: 'if you want to be accepted in a certain society or circles, then you would have to play according to certain rules, and you play that game'. She argued that independent women like her presented a challenge for many members of the communities because they were not prepared to compromise. She believed that it had been important for her relations with the women she worked with that she had been open and honest with them about her own life. And because of the support and help she had provided for many of the women, they gave her their support. Consequently she did
not feel that she had been subjected to the same level of community pressure that other women working within the ethnic context may experience. However, she stated that for her it was not a problem because she had made her choice to live her own life regardless of how others in communities may view her.

Several of the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot respondents took a similar approach to their lives. They were very upfront and open about their own beliefs and practices as they believed that it was this openness that would help to bring about changes for women within their communities. Many were consequently keen to use their own lives as an example to show that just because the second generation were adopting some of the ‘western’ educational and cultural values did not mean that they would necessarily abandon their ethnic heritages. This often meant criticising certain aspects of traditional values and norms that they felt restricted the opportunities available to women within their communities, while at the same time seeking to foster ethnic solidarity and empower their communities to improve their lives in Britain.

Generally the women seemed to be able to acknowledge the reality of the vast range of problems that people can experience both from within and outside of their communities. Yet at the same time, their ethnic/religious commitment was still very important to them and in most cases more important. Hence being critical of aspects of their culture or religion and of the practices of many members of the communities does not mean that they came to reject their ethnic/religious heritage. Rather, it seems to make them more determined to maintain the key elements of their parents’ culture, while seeking change in those areas that they disagree with.

Summary

If the second, third and successive generations are developing individual strategies and forming specific identities on the basis of their differing experiences and in terms of their own aspirations and desires, what is the future of these national or religious based organisations? Where do their future roles lie? They are still very important because of these differences. Some people will have need for them, others will not; some will need them at certain times but not at others. Yet there will still be a need because mainstream society fails to
accommodate and provide for minority ethnic communities. Their task will be the need to respond to these varying and changing needs. They need to be flexible enough to do this. So far I think they are successful, although many of the workers felt that they did not go far enough; many are still controlled by the first generation.

There are some tensions and rivalries between the women, which are inevitable. Yet these issues are minimal compared with the enormous benefits which accrue to them. They undoubtedly have a great influence on all of the women involved, helping them come to terms with their own lives and those of the people around them. They are empowering many of these women, giving them the support they need, whatever this may be, to realise and achieve their goals and aspirations. There are of course limits and restrictions, but despite these, the organisations achieve an enormous amount. The vast numbers of women whom I saw helped are a testament to that. It might not change their lives, but it certainly helps.

The presence of these organisations is therefore very important. They provide valuable spaces for the negotiation and translation of identities; where issues of gender and generation, of ethnicity and community are negotiated and translated on a daily basis. They do not represent places of deep-seated traditions, norms and values, but places where these traditions and subsequent identities are negotiated. This is what the second generation working within these organisations are trying to do, provide a space for negotiation between new and old, between tradition and translation. Yet they are also key protagonists in terms of representing the face of Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain, whether this is done through 'multicultural' events celebrating their traditions and ethnic heritages or through their interaction with other groups, both marginal and mainstream.

These organisations in their varying ways are not merely challenging what it means to be Pakistani, Turkish Cypriot or Muslim, but also what it means to be British, and what it means to be a woman. What is significant is the way in which different elements are prioritised at different times and in different contexts in order to achieve collective representation and to bring about change. The difficult and challenging task for these organisations, and especially for the women working in them, is that challenging disadvantage does not just mean confronting racism, sexism, and ethnic and class discrimination within mainstream British society, but also resisting the prejudice and
discrimination within their own communities. Fighting for their rights as women means challenging patriarchal oppression both within and outside of their communities. It means addressing the elements that unite and divide them as Pakistanis, Turkish Cypriots/Turkish speakers or Muslims, as well as those that unite and divide them from other women. To see how notions of difference and commonality are utilised in the formation of collective representation, it is necessary to understand the process by which different social, cultural, political and economic factors are experienced and evaluated on both an individual and collective level.

The following chapter will explore the experiences of the women interviewed and their attitudes and opinions towards their communities as a whole, and the second and third generation in particular. It examines the various influences that affect Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in Britain, and how they affect their identity formation. In the conclusion, I seek to draw out some overall observations about this process and its relation to ethnicity and collective identity.
Chapter Six

Difference and Diversity: The Influence of ‘Ethnic’ Relations

Ethnicity involves the creation, maintenance and transformation of notions of difference and commonality, and is essentially, therefore, evaluated and interpreted in relation to interactions between people of both similar and different ethnicities. This chapter examines some of these interactions in terms of internal and external relations, through the attitudes, opinions and experiences of the women interviewed. The area in which people live is assessed in terms of its influence on the maintenance of religion and culture, together with the perceived divisions among Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain, and their interactions with other groups. It will then go on to look at intergenerational relations, and the opinions and experiences of the women interviewed in relation to their own parents and family. Finally, it will examine the women's experiences of racial and ethnic prejudice and discrimination, and the influence of these experiences on Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis in Britain.

The Influence of Location

It has been argued that Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots have ‘chosen’ to settle in inner city areas close to their centres of employment and where housing is more affordable. In addition, like many migrant groups, they have ‘chosen’ to live near friends and relatives already settled in Britain. The aim, it is argued, is to recreate village life and help preserve social and cultural patterns of behaviour and interaction (Anwar 1979, Oakley 1979, Kucukcan 1999). Such residential clustering provides support and security for the migrants and ensures that traditional norms are maintained within the community. This is considered especially important for the maintenance of ethnicity among the second generation.

Several of my interviewees believed that the area where an individual grew up as a child was a significant factor in the development of their identity in terms of their commitment to both religion and culture. Many of the Pakistani women believed that Muslims living in areas where there was a large concentration of Muslims were likely to be more religious and conformist than their counterparts living in areas where there were fewer Muslims. One
woman believed that the reason she had not been very religious until recently was because she had grown up in a predominantly white area. Thus, the experience of growing up in a religious environment is likely to have a significant influence on the identity of the young Muslims. Access to Islamic facilities for teaching and worship, was very much dependent on the area where people lived. In addition, several of the Pakistani women argued that the first generation tended to be far more ‘traditional’ culturally in areas of high Pakistani concentration such as Bradford. As one woman commented:

I think in a society where there is a large concentration of Asians, tradition is still there, like Bradford and Birmingham, there’s a stronghold. But in, let’s say Walthamstow, there’s a lot of Asians, a lot of Pakistanis there actually, concentrated Pakistanis, but the values traditionally are, I think they’ve still got them, but they’re not so strong now, I think. They’re there; they’re mixed now. It depends on individuals, how they’ve been brought up. I mean, for instance, in my family, let’s say my immediate family, tradition is not so much now because we were all brought up in this country and our children have got both East and West values, so we don’t bring tradition into it so much now.

Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot women also stated that people living in areas where there was a high concentration of Turkish speakers tended to maintain their traditional cultural values to a much greater extent.

The women were asked about the area they lived in and their preference for living in areas where there was a high concentration of Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots. Among the Pakistani women, three stated that they preferred to live in an area where there were other Muslims, although they considered nationality to be unimportant. One woman explained what she perceived as the benefits of living in an area where there were other Muslims:

It can be very good for you living with other Muslims. Especially if you haven’t been practising at home, you begin to question things ‘why don’t we do that? Why aren’t we like that? A lot of children do that, Why don’t we pray Mummy? Why don’t we do this?’ so its healthy to mix with your own people as well. Because you have an identity, which helps you, grow and develop.
Another stated that although she could see certain advantages to living in an area where there were more Muslims, she also believed that this could lead to isolation:

If you live in an area where you have a lot of Muslims, you have more integration, you mix with them more, you socialise. But at the same time you become isolated, because you don't mix with anyone other than your own community, which can be unhealthy. So even if you live in an area where there are no Muslims, it can be unhealthy too, so you need a balance. So it does affect you. It depends how you see people.

Many of the Pakistani women agreed with this view. The majority stated that they would prefer to live in an area that was more ethnically mixed, although they would like to live near enough to have access to religious and cultural services. Among the Turkish Cypriot women, two stated that they preferred to live in an area where there were other Turkish speaking people. One commented that she felt uncomfortable in areas where there were few minorities. However, she also pointed out that there were disadvantages to living in an area with a high concentration of Turkish speaking people:

I think it's easier because like I don't feel comfortable when I go somewhere and I don't see any ethnic minorities. Like where my uncle lives in South London, it's like you won't see any black people, you won't see any Asian people, you won't see any Turks, and that makes me feel uncomfortable. It's like when we go there, and then come back, I think 'oh I'm glad I'm back', it's difficult. There are disadvantages, because everybody knows what you're doing, it's like you can't keep anything to yourself... It's difficult because there's a lot of gossip. That's all they basically do, Turkish women, drink coffee and gossip basically. Like talking about what somebody else's daughters been doing, because your daughter's an angel basically, and this is what somebody else's doing. So you can't really get away with a lot in a close-knit community, everybody's watching you, and waiting to say 'oh look what she's done', you know, it's difficult.

The majority of the Turkish Cypriot women reiterated this view and stated that they preferred, or would prefer, to live in an area where there were fewer Turkish speakers, although they would not like to live away from the communities totally. Most of the women felt that in a more
Turkish/Turkish Cypriot area there was a lot of gossip, and consequently less privacy, whereas in a more ethnically mixed area, as one woman commented, 'your business stays at home'.

Both groups believed that although the majority of their parents' generation preferred to live in areas where there were other Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots, many of the second and third generation tended to prefer areas where there is a greater ethnic mix, and where they felt their children would receive a better education. In general, they believed that as the first generation became more competent with the English language, and felt better able to mix with people from other groups, there was a tendency for them to move to other areas. As a Pakistani woman stated:

I feel that when they come to mix better themselves they do move out of the existing boroughs if they feel that they are not good for us, you know, they're poor or dilapidated or not racially mixed, to better locations, to the suburbs.

A Turkish Cypriot woman made a similar comment:

I think a lot of people if you gave them choices they would not live with Turkish Cypriot people or Turkish people actually, quite interestingly. And the evidence also is that a lot of them are moving outside London, those who have a choice. Those who have the money do move out, both for themselves, for their own privacy so they are able to come in and go out of the community, as they want. As well as for their children, because they feel that if their children are educated in an area where there is a higher concentration of Turkish speakers they may not be getting the best educational advantage.

Furthermore, as one of the Pakistani women pointed out, as more Pakistani young people move into the professional ranks, they are choosing to move out to the suburbs and into the countryside:

I think there is probably a distinction with people of my generation, they're not necessarily opting to choose areas close to their parents. Because their parents have settled in one area with their friends from the same region, you're finding people are moving away from that into other areas which are conventionally white areas. And as more Asians and more Muslims move into the professional
ranks, and those jobs might be anywhere round the country, then that's where they'll go, regardless of the fact that there's less of an Asian community there. There's less of a need to be in a predominantly Asian or Pakistani area for my generation, whereas that would play heavily on my mum.

Many of the women stated that although they liked to have access to Islamic and/or cultural services and facilities, they would not choose to live in areas of high Pakistani or Turkish speaking concentration as these tended to be largely deprived areas, with poor housing and under-funded schools.

For both Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots, the choice of where to live depended to a large extent on people's financial positions, how long they had lived in Britain, and their degree of English literacy. For many, living in an area where there were many Pakistanis or Turkish speakers providing services in Urdu, Punjabi or Turkish was essential. As a Turkish Cypriot woman commented:

For those who don't have a choice, the majority of the working people, and the poor, it's not a choice whether they live where the Turkish speaking community is or is not. For those who are not articulate in English it is not a choice, they would want to be around where they can shop in Turkish, they can go and get a video in Turkish, where they can get their insurance in Turkish, they can get their lawyer in Turkish, their doctor in Turkish, the hospital has facilities for Turkish speakers, there are Turkish organisations. So it isn't a choice for those, for them of course it's essential that they live near the Turkish community. For those who do have a choice it's a question of whether they exercise that choice or not. But there is preference to go out.

For those with greater literacy skills and higher income levels the preference was predominantly to move away from areas of high concentration to the suburbs.

Thus while all of the women felt that living with other Pakistanis, Muslims or Turkish Cypriots had a significant influence on the second and third generation in terms of maintaining religious and/or cultural conformity, the majority of the women preferred to live in more ethnically mixed areas. Although the first generation was considered to prefer areas where there were other Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots, there was nevertheless a preference...
to move further out towards the suburbs as their literacy skills and income increased. Living
in deprived inner-city areas, where the majority of Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots resided,
was not a choice that most people would 'choose' to make. This would seem to imply that the
predominance of large numbers of minority ethnic groups in inner-city areas has more to do
with structural factors than it does with cultural 'choice'.

Internal Divisions

Ethnicity, it is argued, can function in a number of ways, and is appropriated differently
according to class position. Thus the working class have a greater reliance on ethnic ties for
employment and services because they lack the educational and economic resources
necessary to manage the ethnic disadvantage they face. The middle class, on the other
hand, possess much greater resources, and are therefore more able to transcend ethnic
boundaries and aspire to more British middle-class lifestyles (Raza 1991, Anthias 1992).
Class can therefore be a significant determinant in the maintenance of ethnicity.

The majority of the women did not believe that there was a significant class divide
among Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot people in Britain, although some felt that it was
becoming more apparent in Britain. Of greater significance were income levels, which as the
previous section illustrates, were often linked to where individuals chose to live.
Consequently, those with higher income levels tended to live further out of town towards the
suburbs, which some felt represented an element of class division. As a Turkish Cypriot
woman commented:

I wouldn't put myself in a class, but it happens within the Turkish community and
they think that because they have a big house and their children went to
university, and their children have good jobs, it makes them better than anyone
else. Yes, it happens, it happens a lot.

Another woman argued that although Turkish Cypriots in general do tend to mix with one
another, regardless of their financial status, when it came to inter-marrying, such divisions
might manifest themselves: 'I think when it comes to crunch of perhaps a very rich family's
son marrying a poor girl, with a poor background, then there's a problem there. Because
everybody wants to have this thing of showing off, showing their family background and so
on'. Several of the women believed that within the Turkish Cypriot population there tended to be an element of 'snobbery', with many of the women competing with each other in terms of material possessions. Such competition, many argued, had a major influence on the way they lived their lives. As one woman explained:

I think when I hear it from friends who live in a predominantly Turkish Cypriot area, and everyone is trying to be better than each other in a very sort of middle class road (she laughs). I mean everybody is trying to compete with each other, you can see it from the outside. I think it's horrible actually, I prefer to live in a very deprived area and have my own life. I mean when certain friends tell me about their lives, and they tell their daughters off for coming home late because there is twitching curtains and things like that. I think I would live a very false life if I lived in a road like that, even though it is really lovely and houses are three of four times as expensive than my own. I wouldn't like to live in an environment like that. I think that's more horrible than living in a very deprived area.

Four of the women pointed out that many Turkish Cypriots may choose to live in Turkish speaking suburban areas because of the status implication involved. However, although most of the women did not consider these differences to constitute a class divide, they nevertheless believed that they had a significant influence on the lives of Turkish Cypriots in Britain.

Similarly, the majority of Pakistanis also did not see class as a major issue. Nor did they consider caste to have any major significance for the majority of Pakistanis in Britain, although it was still maintained by some of the more traditional families. Yet, it had largely ceased to be important and very few marriages were sanctioned according to caste. However, like the Turkish Cypriots, they did feel that there were significant differences in terms of income and financial status, often highlighted in the area where they chose to live.

However, of greater significance to many of the Pakistani women were the differences between rural and urban Pakistanis. One woman explained how her parents felt very different from the rural Mirpuris who lived near them:

Although the area I went to school in has quite a large Asian population from Mirpur, my parents didn't have very much to do with them because the way they
lived their lives, and the way my parents lived their lives was completely different. So there was that kind of barrier there. My parents had a middle class background from Lahore, and didn’t feel that there was much connection with the people from Mirpur, so there was that. So that’s why we didn’t have a social circle consisting of many other Asians.

Those from rural backgrounds are considered to be far more traditional in terms of both their cultural values and their levels of integration within mainstream society. As one woman commented:

People who have come from a peasant’s background, from the villages, they’re the ones who have kept the tradition, because they don’t know anything else. Whereas the educated from Lahore and all that, middle class and things, they’re more modern. So it tends to be the more rural and working class people, they’re the ones who’ve kept the tradition, for a very long period actually, till the last generation really got them (she laughs), the third generation.

Another woman commented that most urban Pakistanis distinguish themselves from rural Mirpuris. The differences are quite evident in the clothes they wear; the urban middle class from Lahore and Karachi are considered far more fashionable in their dress. She argued that it was the Mirpuris who were viewed as giving Pakistanis a ‘bad name’ in Britain. They are considered much more traditional and observe customs more than Islam. They are also believed to be far stricter with their children, particularly the girls. It is within these families, it was argued, that there are problems between the generations and examples of girls running away from home.

Thus while income and status were considered to be more important in the British context, and caste distinctions had become much less significant, traditional rural/urban divisions continued to be a major determinant of difference for Pakistanis. The Turkish Cypriots did not make such distinctions, because in Cyprus, being such a small island, they are not considered relevant. However, the women did point out that there was a major rural/urban divide among people from Turkey. It was argued that Turkish Cypriots have much more in common with urban Turks than those from rural backgrounds who, like the rural Pakistanis, tended to be much more traditional. These traditional rural/urban divisions among
Pakistanis and Turks/Turkish Cypriots have therefore persisted in Britain, despite the increasing significance of financial and educational status differentials. Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots therefore can be seen to differentiate themselves in relation to a number of different axes, of which these internal divisions form a part. The following section examines some of the external axes of differentiation, created and sustained in relation to other ethnic groups in Britain.

Interethnic Relations

In order to preserve their traditional norms and values, it is argued, Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots make a conscious effort to avoid interaction with the rest of British society. Nevertheless, it is impossible for a community to live in isolation and some level of contact and interaction with other ethnic groups is therefore inevitable (Anwar 1982, Ladbury 1977). Such contact is greatly increased for the second and successive generations, who mix with other groups to a much greater extent both at school and work. Furthermore, it is through contact with other groups that perceptions of difference are created, sustained and transformed. Interethnic relations therefore are likely to have a significant influence on ethnic identity.

Generally it was believed that first generation Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots preferred to mix with people from their own country and of similar background. As a Pakistani woman stated, the existence of specific Pakistani organisations like the one she worked for was an indication of the first generation's lack of integration:

Now I have come to realise that they aren't very mixed. Traditionally, as well as Islamically, Indians have their own groups. Pakistani Muslims will have their own groups, you know, like you can see here, this organisation is Pakistani, next door you'll see, although it's an Asian Centre, the majority you'll see are Indian, and Indian values, Indian films, Indian thought. And I feel they want to keep up their culture and their values as well as their traditions alive, and in order to do that you need your own organisations, don't you? So interactions are not very much.
Thus on the one hand, the existence of these separate organisations was considered necessary for the maintenance of specific customs and traditions; but on the other, it was felt that this could often lead to isolation on the part of the first generation.

Both the Turkish Cypriot and the Pakistani women believed that the second generation was much more integrated into wider British society than the first generation. The majority of the informants had an ethnically mixed group of friends and most considered nationality and religion to be unimportant to their choice of friends. Largely friendships were the result of circumstance rather than actual choice, and had varied at school, college and in their working lives. As a Pakistani woman stated 'It's a mixture, a big cross section. It's just the people around me, in the area here'. Some, however, stated that their closest friends were Asian or Muslims, Turkish or Greek Cypriot because they felt they had more in common and there was therefore a greater level of understanding between them. A Turkish Cypriot woman commented: 'I'm closer to my Turkish friends and my Greek friends, basically people who have more in common with me, who are similar in appearance and background, things like that'. Others felt that although nationality and religion were unimportant, sharing similar experiences was vital. A Pakistani woman, for example, commented that she felt much more comfortable with other women who had been to university or studied, because they had more experiences in common that she could relate to. A Turkish Cypriot woman stated that she preferred to have less contact with other Turkish speaking women because 'they are too concerned with gossiping and I don't like that'. She added that her sister refused to associate with Turkish people altogether because of this. In terms of friendship choices, therefore, the women's preferences varied significantly, according to their own experiences and lifestyles.

However, while most of the women considered the second and third generation to be much more integrated than the first, a few of the women pointed out that the third generation seemed to be increasingly separating themselves into distinct groups. As a Pakistani woman commented:

But the third generation, you know, I am finding there is more segregation now than there was in the old times. Because I've found that they make their own groups now and I said to my son 'Look, why are you all separated into groups, the blacks and blacks, the Asians and Asians, and the Sikhs and Sikhs? Why
aren't you all together like we were at the time?' But they find that there is more of a gap now than there was ever before. Now I don't know why this has happened, especially in university and colleges. I'm finding it very very difficult to understand that. And all that 'this is Sikh and this is Hindu', I never had that, you know. But my son's views I'm telling you, they're the views of all the other generations.

This comment was reiterated by a young Turkish Cypriot woman:

At university the Asian girls would cluster into their groups and the three of us in our group. It's not racist, that's just the way they are. They cluster into their own groups, so so did we. They accuse others of racism, but they hold themselves back as well, they don't mix with us.

Some of the women felt a similar situation was now occurring among young Turkish speaking young people, particularly in the schools. This had increased dramatically since the arrival of more people from Turkey, and many parents, teachers and educational workers were concerned that it might lead to a ghettoisation of Turkish speaking children in schools.

Nevertheless, despite these concerns over the possible segregation of the third generations, all of the women believed that they were much more integrated than the first generation. The desire of the latter to resist integration as much as possible was most strictly reinforced in terms of suitable marriage partners. Generally the women felt that the first generation expected their children to marry another Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot. Marriage to someone outside of his or her community was generally frowned upon. A young Pakistani woman, who had married an English man herself, argued that for most parents this was still something that they found unacceptable:

But I think that's one custom which hasn't been as let go as others, that is marriage to your own kind and a lot of families cling to that. I'm talking about one of my cousins, she was recently getting married, and she said 'my parents would die if I ever married a white man, they'll let you do it, but it would kill them'. So perhaps that's one custom that hasn't let go as much as others.

Similarly, a Turkish Cypriot woman told of her family's reaction to her brother marrying an English woman:
Well they weren't happy at all. There were so many arguments at home that he finally left and he got a flat with his girlfriend. And for years my mum kept thinking ‘well sooner or later he's going to leave her, or something's going to happen'. That's how she was always thinking, and little did she know that they were married, they married as soon as he left home. My mum and dad only found out about four years ago. They still had contact, they used to moan at him basically, but I think he had the support of all of us as brothers and sisters. But he was still upset about how my mum and dad reacted, because now they get on really well with my sister-in-law, plus they have two children. So it's more what people would say, rather than if they like this person.

All of the women believed that there was still much pressure to marry a fellow Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot. However, for the Turkish Cypriot women, while marriage to an English person was generally considered undesirable, marriage with a Greek Cypriot received the most disapproval, as one woman commented:

I think that's a taboo subject, you know, I mean people have done it and I think their family has disowned them. My younger sister was actually engaged to a Greek Cypriot but it didn't work out because of that fact. And it's affected her a great deal because of him being Greek Cypriot, although it didn't matter to either of them because they were both born and brought up here. And obviously if they had children, they still wanted to try to integrate both cultural communities. But she had a lot of problems when she told my mum and dad, and I don't think she will ever forgive any of them for that, because they had to separate because of that and because of his family as well. I think it's really sad when two people want to marry each other or want to be together, but because of this pressure it's not possible. Whereas if they had been English I don't think there would have been so much of a problem, but because it was a particular community, the enemy so to speak.

Although all of the women believed that relations between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were much better than in Cyprus, many of the tensions and animosity between them were still evident in Britain. The two groups were much more integrated in London, living in
similar areas and working together in factories. Indeed, most of the women had Greek Cypriot friends, but these friendships were not without their complications. One young woman stated that although her best friend was Greek Cypriot ‘her dad hates Turkish people, so I hardly ever go round to her house’. Thus while many of the second generation did not see the problems in Cyprus as a barrier to relations with Greek Cypriots; the first generation, despite being on friendly terms with Greek Cypriot neighbours or fellow employees, was still keen to maintain certain divisions, particularly in terms of marriage. An older woman who had been born in Cyprus believed that some of the divisions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were also replicated in Britain, furthering the tension between the two groups:

But I think it is a major influence even within the council structure, you know. You think if there is a specific worker that is supposed to be working with the community, Haringey Council and other councils always employ one worker to help both communities, and most of the time it always turns out to be a Greek Cypriot worker. And then you find that this particular worker isn't helping one side of the community. So I think again we've remained passive in that, but things are changing and our community is getting up more and standing up for their rights. I feel quite strongly myself about this particular issue, and I do do a lot of campaign work in my spare time. I always talk about this with my Greek Cypriot friends, it's not so much about 'oh we want them to listen to us and not to you', it's about finding some kind of solution to living and working together. Rather than seeing us as the persecutors, because that's how we are looked upon by most of the countries, because of Turkey intervening and helping our community in Cyprus during the war.

Thus although all of the women believed that relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were much more amicable than in Cyprus, certain tensions and conflicts were reproduced in Britain.

However, many of the women were keen to point out that despite these tensions, generally they felt that Turkish Cypriots had a lot more in common with Greek Cypriots than they did with people from Turkey. All of the women pointed out that were huge differences between Turkish people and Turkish Cypriots. These differences were considered to include
immigration and settlement patterns, as well as differences in terms of the dialect spoken, cultural traditions and values, and religious allegiance. As a result of these differences, all of the women believed that Turkish Cypriots were keen to maintain their own cultural values and their own traditions. Consequently they did not tend to mix with Turkish people to any great extent. As one woman commented:

In London, there are differences; people keep themselves to themselves if they come from smaller villages. In London there are a lot of dinner dances throughout the year, charity functions. 99% of the people who go to these are Turkish Cypriot, not Turkish. This is very visible, I don't know why. Religion and language are the same, the dialects vary, but that's all. Turkish Cypriots look up to the Turkish more, but they keep their own identity. They have their own folk dances, and different traditions. For example, marriage in Turkey, there is more influence on the male side; the wife goes to the male's family. This is not the case in Cyprus. These traditions also remain in London. Turkish Cypriots are more European, from the English influence when it was under British rule. This is very much part of the make-up of Turkish Cypriot culture.

This comment was reiterated by most of the women, who generally considered themselves very different from Turkish people. Another woman pointed out that even in the centre where she worked, although it was attended by both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot women, they did not tend to mix with each other because of the differences that they perceived between them.

The attitude towards Turkish newcomers was generally quite negative on the part of many of the women interviewed. The following quotes are typical of many, although not all, of the women's views:

The people who are coming here now, in the last few years, both from mainland Turkey and from Cyprus, and they come here, I don't know with what kinds of expectations; they come here with very very high expectations because they have the wrong information. And they come here and they expect everything in front of them, all ready. Which the people who came years ago, they didn't even think about it, they just came here to work, and they are working still. But the people, who are coming now, they don't come here to work, they just come here
to sit around and get money from the government. And every benefit that's going, that we have never heard of, they know about it, and that is worrying me.

It upsets me because it's not right.

For many of the women, the general attitude was that it had been far harder for the Turkish Cypriots who had originally came over to Britain than more recent arrivals. Many were therefore critical of these newcomers who, they felt, were abusing the system in Britain and in so doing making Turkish speaking people as a whole 'look bad'. These views therefore provided further cause for the Turkish Cypriots to maintain their distance from Turkish people in Britain.

Among the two groups, therefore, all of the women believed that the first generation tended to confine their relationships to other Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots as much as possible, in order to preserve their traditional values within their communities. However, for Turkish Cypriots, because of the continuing tensions and problems in Cyprus, weakened, but nevertheless still apparent in London, some of their interaction with other groups, such as the Turks and the Greek Cypriots, were still highly charged. While contact with these two groups was more common than with others, the first generation restricted the extent of their interaction in terms of socialising, and most significantly in terms of marriage.

Intergenerational Relations

Relations between the first and second generation have been the focus of much attention. Commentators have been largely divided over the extent to which there is a generation gap between parents and children, and the amount of conflict that this can generate. Earlier studies tended to focus on the problems that the second generation experienced, due to a lack of communication with their parents and as a consequence of being 'caught between two cultures, leading many to suffer an 'identity crisis' (Thompson 1974, CRC 1976, Watson 1977). Later studies, however, have stressed that although conflict can arise between the first and second generation, its impact is much less significant than previous commentators implied (Ballard 1994, Brah 1996, Anwar 1998). The formation of ethnic identity among the second and successive generations is therefore much more complex than is suggested by the notion of intergenerational conflict. This section will examine the attitudes and opinions of
the Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women to the first generation, together with their own experiences in relation to their parents and family.

The majority of the women believed that the first generation strongly maintained their traditional norms and values. Very few felt that the first generation had adapted much in Britain, and certainly not enough. As a Pakistani woman commented: 'it is also hard I think for the older generation to adapt. They are set in their ways and they try, they do their best to enforce that on their children'. Some believed that many of the first generation were keen to hold on to their traditions and values because they intended to return to Cyprus or Pakistan. Others felt that they were too busy working and earning money to absorb any British cultural values. As a Turkish Cypriot woman commented: ‘they didn't better themselves, they didn't adapt here, they didn't; they just worked with their eyes closed, and that's it'. Furthermore, the majority felt that the first generation was still following traditions and customs from thirty or forty years ago, whereas Pakistan and Cyprus had ‘moved on’. As one young Turkish Cypriot woman commented:

This is a big thing people talk about in our community. It's like if you go to Cyprus, it's not like that; they're more modern. People who are there are more like people of their own age group, more modern than the people who are here because they've come here and they've wanted to hold on to what they had back in Cyprus, that's fifties morals basically, what they had then. Things have moved on in Cyprus, whereas in our community they haven't. They're still basically stuck in the fifties and sixties, you know, making your daughters stay at home, marry when she's 16, she can't have boyfriends. It's not like that in Cyprus, everybody's more open and free, but here it's not.

As a result, all of the women felt that there were significant differences between the generations. Many argued that conflict was inevitable because the second generation had adapted to life in Britain to a far greater degree than their parents had. As one young Pakistani woman commented:

There's a lot of conflict. I mean you try to preserve it, the culture, but it's hard, you have to adapt as well. We have adapted me and my sisters, we have
adapted, but our parents would like us to become more Pakistani. So there's always a conflict at home, always.

Most of the women felt that the family was a site of much conflict for young people, whose parents were often unable or unwilling to understand the changes they were experiencing growing up in Britain. A Pakistani woman argued that the first generation was concerned that their children would lose their traditional values and was therefore very strict on the children, as her own example demonstrates:

Well, the first generation was very scared I remember, because the language was the first problem. Women didn't know where to go; they didn't have groups, there weren't many people. And they were absolutely secluded. OK the husbands were going to work, but the mothers, the daughters, the wives, were left at home, and lonely and all that sort of thing. And then when the children were born they were absolutely scared because they would drop their traditions and values, whatever. And they were scared that their children would be taken away from this with this western culture which they didn't understand and so they did have a lot of problems. And I remember when I was growing up my mother was very strict with me, absolutely strict to the point where I felt I had to lie to her to go with my friends. And I wasn't doing anything, all I wanted to do was go with my friends and to their homes, and stay with them, you know, like teenagers do. And my mother wouldn't accept that. So I think there was little understanding. They were scared, basically, that we will go out with boys and spoil our reputation. I mean I did go out with a boy but I didn't spoil my reputation (she laughs). We did it behind their backs anyway.

Many recounted similar experiences in relation to their own parents. Five of the women believed that parents had been too strict on young people forcing many to adopt two different roles, one at home and one at school. Several of the women pointed out that the experience of different cultures could be very confusing for young people, as one of the Pakistani women commented:

They do continue with their traditions and I think they are really confused as well.

They learn English in school, they have English friends, they have another
culture at school, and then they come home. You know they see people kissing on the street, fifteen years old and going out with boyfriends. And then they go home and they're not allowed to go out after three o'clock in the afternoon. And at home, they're forced to continue their traditions, but outside they have a different world, a different life.

A Turkish Cypriot woman told of her own experiences of coping with two roles when she was younger:

And also being born within a sub-culture and having loyalties torn between the family and life outside the home. Having grown up here I felt that I had two roles, I was a different person at home and a different person outside the house. And they're under a lot of pressure, you know, a lot of conflict. They are taught a different cultural system at home to school, and they act a lot more Turkish at home. You often find that a lot of girls, in particular, are two different people. They are definitely more respectable at home, even like clothes and make-up. I remember that when I used to go to school, as soon as the girls would get to school the skirts would roll up, the make-up would go on (she laughs), so it's physically as well. And it's like before you go home, everything comes off. So you do find that a lot of girls do adopt two different roles. If they act more westernised at home they will have problems, so the pressure is always there.

Another Turkish Cypriot woman told how parental pressure had made her hate the fact that she was Turkish Cypriot. She also felt that such pressure was responsible for her sister leaving home and becoming a single mother.

I'm a lot happier now than I was before being a Turkish Cypriot. Before I used to hate it, but that was because of all the pressure I used to get from my parents. And I was sort of pressurised from my parents for my sister being a single mother and that wasn't fair. But they pressurise you so much, until you rebel and she wasn't as strong as say me or my older sister, so it was her way out, her logical way out was to have babies and get her own place. And they sort of turned round and said 'look what she's done to us?' And often I've wanted to say 'no, it's what you've done to yourselves', but I haven't had the heart to say it.
Many of the women felt that although some parents were changing, there was still a large number who were very strict with their children, and particularly young women who tended to receive the greatest restrictions. Eight of the women also pointed out that many of the second generation who were married at a young age, brought up their children in very similar to way to their own parents. As a Turkish Cypriot commented:

I'd like to say they were, but my older sister thinks exactly like my mum and dad, you know. And she will bring up her kids in exactly the same way as my parents brought her up... Maybe when I have kids I'm going to become like my parents as well, God forbid (she laughs).

The majority believed that the first generation needed to adapt more, and learn to trust their children. Seven of the women felt that communication was vital in order for the first generation to change and to prevent clashes between parents and children. A young Pakistani woman stated that in areas such as Bradford, many young Muslims were trying to conceal their activities from their parents, rather than explaining them. As a result, she felt it would take a lot longer for the first generation to change their views.

All of the women believed that they were different with their own children, or would be very different once they had children. A young Turkish Cypriot woman believed that she would treat her children very differently from the way her parents had brought her up. She felt that communication was vital to avoid many of the problems she and her sisters had faced:

I won't, because before even, we would never even have conversations with my parents, we were too frightened. But now, the last sort of four or five years, since my younger sister left home, and she had the kids, it's changed a bit. We sit and we talk, we actually have a conversation. But as I said, there isn't enough understanding. I'd like to bring them up Turkish, but there won't be that pressure and I definitely won't be as strict as they were with us, because I know they'll just lie, because we've done it, and I'm sure they've done it with their parents as well.

This was reiterated by most of the women, who believed that it was important to give their children more freedom and choice than they had experienced from their own parents, and
allow them to develop their own potentials in ways best suited to their individual needs and aspirations.

Many of the women felt that it was important for parents to find a balance otherwise the younger generation would rebel against both their culture and their religion. As one young Pakistani woman commented: 'there has to be a balance. If you’re living in this country, you have to have a balance, because otherwise you have the younger generation rebelling against custom and Islam'. However, five of the women felt that the second generation who were now parents themselves often went too far the other way, and allowed their children to become too western. A young Turkish Cypriot woman explained some of the reasons for this more lenient approach.

But because like now, I think because a lot of third generation as well, people that were like my age are having kids. I was born in the seventies, but there were like second-generation people that were born in the sixties, and now have teenage children, and they're like letting their children do the things that they couldn't do. I mean I always say I'm not going to be like that to my children, I'm not going to be as strict with them as my mum was with me either, basically. And it's like they're going too much the other way, they're forgetting the fact that our community doesn't really accept that you can do whatever you want, run around, you can't really do that. You can do it to a certain extent if your parents find out, but you can't really do it as openly as maybe English people do it or non-Turks. I think it's them letting their kids do the things that they couldn't do when they were young.

A Pakistani mother reiterated this point, and stated that the third generation tends to be far more 'western' in their lifestyle because their parents did not teach them about Pakistani culture or about Islam. She went on to tell of her own experiences with her eldest son who, she believed, had no real knowledge of Asian or Islamic values.

Because I know when I was in the Western culture and all that sort of thing, I made a mistake with my older son. I thought by giving him all the freedom of choice, the freedom of girlfriends, it backfired. Of course it backfired on me. Of
course I found that he, OK he’s a good boy, but apart from that he doesn’t have
the Islamic values, and culturally Asian values, he’s lost that as well.

She believed that because she had been too lenient with him and not instilled Pakistani or
Islamic values, he had lost those values. At the time she felt that she had a very ‘western’
lifestyle, and religious and traditional cultural values were not important to her. However, she
had taken a much greater interest in Islam in the last few years and now considered herself a
‘practising’ Muslim. She was therefore making a conscious effort to teach her younger son
more about Islam and Pakistani values and traditions, and to bring him up more strictly than
she had with her elder son.

Despite some of the clashes and conflict that many of the women had experienced
with their parents, particularly when they were younger, they all pointed out that their families
were very important to them. Some also spoke of the hardships and suffering that their
parents, like many of the first generation, had experienced. As a Turkish Cypriot woman
commented:

The first generation, they didn’t know the rules and regulations; they had nobody
to go to for advice. Like we have proper advice bureau’s now, we have
community groups. There’s nothing really that you can’t find out now, no matter
which language you speak. Because we have the system in London, in England
they recognise it more. Whereas years ago it wasn’t recognised and you didn’t
even have time to think of it or organise it, or have the money to do it. People
were too busy working to try and survive.

Generally the Turkish Cypriot women believed that it was far easier for newcomers now that
it had been in their parent’s day. As the first generation of Turkish Cypriots who came over in
the fifties and sixties had to adapt far more than those who came later. Similarly the Pakistani
women were very appreciative of their parents and were aware of the sacrifices they had
made, and the difficulties they had had to confront. Thus although many of the women felt
that their parents had been too strict with them, and had made life quite difficult for them
when they were younger, they were still very committed to their parents, and had great
respect for them.
Racism and Discrimination

The experience of racial discrimination and prejudice is considered by many to be fundamental to the maintenance of ethnic identity among the second generation, leading young people to develop a ‘reactive pride’ in their respective ethnic heritages (Ballard and Ballard 1977). These pressures are believed to force migrants and their children back into their communities, where they receive support and security from their own ethnic group members (Ballard 1979). Others, however, argue that the influence of racism is not as straightforward as these studies imply (Hewitt 1990). Nevertheless, it is clear from the literature review that both Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain are subject to prejudice and discrimination on the part of the indigenous population and the British State in general (Anwar 1998, Sonyel 1988). The following section will examine the attitudes and experiences of the women interviewed to racial prejudice and discrimination within the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot communities in London.

Although all of the women believed that racism was still a problem for the second and third generation, they felt that it had been far worse for the first generation. They had received far more racial abuse, it was argued, because they were considered easier targets. In addition, some of the women felt that because the first generation may act differently from the indigenous population, they were therefore subject to more abuse. The second generation, on the other hand, had a better understanding of the system and knew how to act in certain situations, consequently they were more prepared to stand up for their rights. As a Pakistani woman stated:

The first generation, they came and felt an exclusion but probably couldn't call it racism, and accepted it more. The second generation, just like the African Caribbean communities, are less willing to accept it, and more aware of it as racism, because of a lot of the work we've done I suppose. They're more prepared to challenge it, and they're more equipped to challenge it. They're more articulate in the language, they have gone through the system, they're born here, they feel that this is where they belong, if you belong anywhere, they feel that their parents have contributed to the establishment of this society. We
talk to them, and the schools teach them about equality and democracy, and they're much more willing to have a go at achieving these rights.

Most believed that the first generation had generally been more accepting of racism, perhaps 'unable to give it a name'. Six of the women felt that racism and discrimination had improved since their parents’ day as a result of people gaining a better understanding of their religion and culture. Nevertheless, they all believed that racism was still evident in Britain, although some felt that they had not experienced it personally. Five of the women stated that their awareness of racism had increased since working within their own communities. As a Turkish Cypriot refugee worker stated:

I think there's still a lot of it around, and I was not aware that there was so much against Turkish people until I started working here. We have like one client a day sometimes, suffering from racial harassment from their next door neighbour, you know, verbal and physical as well. Where we lived, we never experienced it, thank God. But now it seems to be getting worse. You think because it's such a cosmopolitan city it wouldn't happen, but it seems to be happening more now. I think it thrives on greed as well, everyone just wants something for themselves, and they just don't want other people getting in the way, and because they're a different race, a different colour, it's enough to start picking on them I suppose. But yes, it exists, unfortunately

A Pakistani woman told how shocked she had been when working as a teacher in Camden, to discover the extent of racism experienced by some of her pupils and their families:

I've heard people talk about it, particularly guys, and what they've had to go through and it's pretty much an alien experience to me. I mean I've never had any actual physical torment or verbal torment, I've never had to put up with any of that. So it's still a shock, particularly when I was working in Camden, when I was talking to parents in the Bengali community, and what’s been going on in their sort of housing community and it's just frightening. And it felt like a really alien thing to me, it was a shock. And when you hear that Britain had the highest rates of physical and verbal racism in Europe, it comes as a shock. I'm thinking 'who's doing it? Why's it happening still? I thought we'd all sorted it out.
Thus while both of these women were aware of racism and the effects of such prejudice and discrimination, they had not experienced it to the same extent as others obviously had. The Pakistani woman stated that she had been the only black girl at her primary school and had therefore been seen as a novelty. However, although she had experienced some name-calling at first, she did not think it ‘amounted to very much’.

School seemed to be one of the major sites of racism for many of the women. Another Pakistani woman, who had also been the only black person in her school, reported that she had been stared at and received some abuse from the other children. She also said that some of the teachers had refused to teach her because of her religion and ‘colour’. Nine of the women, both Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot, stated that they had been picked on at school and had often felt left out. A Turkish Cypriot woman claimed that although she had not experienced racism herself, her own children had, and she had been forced to move one of her daughters to another school as a result. Nevertheless, in discussing her own educational experiences, she also stated that she felt that the children from ethnic minorities had generally been ‘lumped’ into separate groups, with the white English girls in the higher ones. Many of the women mentioned similar experiences of being separated or streamed on the basis of their ‘colour’ or ethnicity.

Several of the women also pointed out that schools tended to assume that Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot young women would not do well educationally, or would not be allowed to further their education. Consequently, they were not given the same attention as other children. As a Turkish Cypriot educational development worker explained:

And also stereotypical assumptions as well, that children from our communities won't do well, that sort of thing, low teacher expectations. And these are the concerns that a lot of parents have within schools. It's quite sad really, because with the stereotypical assumptions that a lot of girls for example wouldn't want to study and would prefer to take up girls’ jobs like banking or secretaries, and that sort of thing. It's quite sad because to an extent it can be true, but with the more westernised families, it's very difficult to combat those stereotypes. So that to an extent is still an issue today.
Generally the women felt that it was harder for people from ethnic minorities to do well in Britain, and there were very few in top management or government positions. Eleven of the women also mentioned experiencing racial discrimination in employment, and particularly in terms of applying for jobs, where they felt that their names worked against them. Several believed that things were going to be more difficult for the third generation because of the lack of jobs available, and the fact that it was much harder for Pakistani and Turkish speaking people to find employment. Education was therefore seen as the main weapon with which to fight racial discrimination and prejudice.

All of the Turkish Cypriot women believed that racism was a major problem for the Turkish speaking population, but many felt that they experienced a different type of racism. One woman, who had carried out research on this issue, argued that the effect of racism on the Turkish speaking communities had not really been considered because of the absence of visible differences. Thus the focus was on the African Caribbean communities, who represent a much more visible target. However, she believed, Turkish Cypriots in Britain could be seen to experience both direct and subtler forms of racism. The rise of anti-Islamic feeling in Britain and the criminalisation of Turkish youth and asylum seekers further compounded the prejudice and discrimination they experienced. She commented:

Other issues that have affected the racist approach are directed at the communities. Some of the criminal element is around the huge heroin smuggling and drug smuggling, and this has affected the community, bringing the police in and their racism towards the black communities in general. But the Turkish communities are being targeted in relation to the issue of drug smuggling, and the criminalisation of people in relation to asylum seekers, and bogus asylum seekers. The issue is around regarding the community as on the edges of criminality, or harbouring criminals. The raids on factories, to again accentuate the criminalisation of the communities. So racism is alive and well in a lot of the spheres of the community; it is still rife. And the attitude is, you know, they’re economic refugees, they’re not political refugees. It all fuels this concept that black and bilingual communities, the Turkish speaking community, are here to sponge off the state, and they contribute nothing, which is not the case, they
contribute a hell of lot through the businesses they've set up, the taxes they pay, etc. And that somehow is washed away in an attempt to portray all the black and bilingual communities as living off the state.

Thus while Turkish speakers may not be as visibly different from the indigenous population as the Pakistanis, they nevertheless suffered similar forms of prejudice and discrimination, although sometimes this was expressed differently and subsequently affected the communities in different ways.

Many of the women, and most notably the Pakistanis, mentioned the increased attention that Islam had received in the media and amongst people generally in Britain. A Turkish Cypriot woman believed that the negative portrayal of Muslims in Britain stemmed from Christians viewing Islam as a threat. Two of the Turkish Cypriot women argued that they found the use of the term 'Muslim' offensive, because they felt that people were focusing on their religion rather than their nationality because of the increased focus on Muslims in Britain. However, as one woman pointed out, there are vast differences between Muslims from different countries, and they could not all be 'lumped' together and considered that same.

To be honest, I find the word 'Muslim' offensive, and I don't like to be called Muslim. It's as though we are all the same, but we're not. It's like the Yugoslavian crisis, they talk about Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, they don't call them Bosnians, but Muslims. I find that very offensive. I have written many letters to people in the media complaining about this, but I have had no response. The same thing happens with the term 'Muslim women', it really annoys me. Muslim women are not all the same. For example, some Muslim women don't drink, but Turkish women do; some don't go to the Casino and put a bet on, but Turkish women do. So we are not all the same.

Several of the Pakistani women also believed that the media represented all Muslims in the same way and failed to acknowledge different viewpoints. One woman mentioned the media coverage of the Gulf war, in which all Muslims were reported as being in favour of Saddam Hussain. Whereas in reality, she argued, these views represented only a minority of Muslims in Britain.
Eight of the Pakistani women also mentioned the increased focus on Muslim women in women's magazines and television programmes, which tended to stress the stereotypical image of the oppressed and downtrodden Muslim woman. As one of the women commented:

I try to watch the BBC magazine programmes and the occasional documentary that comes out about Asian issues. But sometimes I think it's just the same old thing, Asian women being oppressed and repressed. And I just think why can't they change the record, what about talking about Asian women who've been successful for a change. I know there are women being oppressed but in a way it's kind of continuing that myth, that all us Asian women have the same situations and circumstances, that we're all chained down and we can't do anything. That's an issue not just for Asian women, but for all women living in this country, no matter what class they're from or what religious background. So I just feel that we need a balance.

The reproduction of these stereotypical views through the British media was seen to further the hostility towards Muslim groups by portraying them as a threat to British society. This 'Islamophobia' has affected the Turkish speaking and Pakistani communities equally, as several of the women pointed out, and has subsequently contributed to the prejudice and discrimination they experience. However, it was those who were most visibly identifiable as Muslims who were believed to receive the most prejudice. Indeed a few of the women who wore the hijab stated that they had experienced more discrimination as a result. One had even taken to wearing her scarf differently because of such pressures.

Many of the women felt that experiences of these different forms of racism and discrimination had the effect of pushing Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis back into their own communities. As a Turkish Cypriot woman argued, anti-Turkish feeling and hostility was one of the reasons why the Turkish communities tended to stick together. A Pakistani advice worker reinforced this view:

It forces people back 100 per cent. If you're getting it day in day out, if you know you didn't get that job because you're black, you're going to go back into your own community, you're going to try and find a job there. But at the end of the day you need to be able to put food on your table. If you're not getting anything
because of the colour of your skin, you're going to go back to your community where you know somebody is going to be there to help you out or offer you a job. You get that secure feeling where somebody's going to look out for your children, somebody's going to look out for your wife if she's walking down the road and three or four people are abusing her. So I guess it does, there is that security. That's why when the first groups of Pakistanis came over they settled together. You knew what was around you and you could help each other out when times were hard.

However, a Turkish Cypriot woman who had carried out research among the Turkish speaking communities in London, qualified the extent to which racism can be seen as forcing Turkish people back into their communities:

I don't think it's racism, racism may be one of the factors but the other factors are to do with the availability of the communities, where are you going to get help from? Whether it's housing or finding a job, or knowing who to ask what, whether it's their cultural needs that are met, you know. I think those are the things that make the community hold on together, and congregate in certain areas. And it's not an accident that the communities congregate in areas where there's been previous areas of Turkish settlement, which were the Cypriots, as well as where cheap housing is, as well as where a lot of the ethnic minority industry is, so that they're able to get jobs in those areas. I think racism operates in those areas, very much so. I think there would be less racism if they went outside, so I think it doesn't hold. In fact it's almost the opposite. But I think if they're together I think they probably feel safer from racist attacks, although racist attacks happen where they are, not out in the country somewhere.

Several of the women felt that they experienced less racism and prejudice living in a multi-cultural area, where there were more ethnic minorities in general. A Turkish Cypriot woman believed that London was generally more 'relaxed' in terms of racism, but that outside London racism was much more prevalent. However, five of the women also pointed out that racism tended to be more overt in areas where there was a high concentration of minority groups, particularly where one group was more identifiable. In addition, many of the Turkish
Cypriot women felt that racism had increased in the last few years due to the number of refugees who had come to Britain. Most considered racism to be far more of a problem for newcomers, whose English was generally poor, and who in many cases looked very different from the indigenous population. These more recent arrivals tended to receive more direct forms of racial abuse than the second and third generations. Nevertheless, it was clear that prejudice and discrimination were still very much an issue in Britain and had a major impact on the lives of minority groups.

However, several pointed out that it was not just the indigenous population who could be racist. Five of the women mentioned the experiences of some of their clients who had received racial abuse from members of other ethnic minority groups. Some of the women also mentioned the racist views of their own communities towards other ethnic groups. Several pointed out that racism was not just experienced from white English people, but was evident on both sides. As a Turkish Cypriot woman commented:

Turkish people can be racist too, especially against black people. Yet they're classed the same in a lot of forms and surveys and stuff, yet very few Turkish people would consider themselves black. It's sad actually that it does exist because their needs are very often quite similar, and they can learn a lot from each other; united they can get a lot of support, you know, it's a shame.

These views emphasise the wide variety of ways in which racial or ethnic discrimination and prejudice can be activated. It is therefore experienced differently by specific groups, as well as by individuals within these groups. It is also clear that many Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis also display stereotypes and prejudice towards other ethnic minority groups, which further divide the possibility of common resistance to mainstream discrimination. In terms of racism pushing people back into their own communities or towards their own ethnicity, as Modood, Beishon and Virdee (1994) point out, the influence is not clear cut. While many may rely on fellow members of their ethnic group for employment, housing, and to generally help 'manage' the ethnic disadvantage they face, it is exactly in these areas of high concentration of one minority group that racial hostility tends to be greatest. Thus although their own group members may offer them security and support,
making them less aware of the effects of racism, such ethnic concentration is likely to increase the extent of the racial prejudice they experience.

Summary

This chapter demonstrates the significance of levels of integration and the extent of interaction with other ethnic groups. Regular contact with other members of the ethnic group can reinforce the maintenance of ethnicity in both the first and successive generations. Thus the women believed that where an individual grows up can be a significant influence on their ethnic identity. Nevertheless while most of the women stated that they liked to have access to religious and/or cultural facilities and services, most would not choose to live in areas where there was a high concentration of Pakistanis or Turkish Cypriots. Some because these areas were considered to be deprived and run-down, and therefore were not considered desirable places to live. Others because living in these close-knit communities can place restrictions on individuals, due to wide-ranging gossip networks and strong community sanctions governing people's behaviour. However, the majority of the women did not consider their preference to live elsewhere as an indication of their lack of commitment to the ethnic group, but merely providing an environment that gave them more freedom to exercise greater independence and follow their own aspirations.

Class, in terms of levels of income and status, is of course relevant here. Those with greater resources are better able to exercise choice in terms of where they choose to live, and the extent to which they participate in the 'ethnic community'. However, as Raza (1991) points out, while middle class Asians may aspire to British middle class values, racial and ethnic discrimination and prejudice prevents them from assimilating into the mainstream British middle classes. Thus although some may choose to withdraw socially from the ethnic group, although they may be economically reliant on ethnic ties; others may prefer to remain both socially and economically integrated because of the status implications involved. Thus many of the Turkish Cypriot women felt that although those with higher income levels tended to move out towards the suburbs, they still preferred to live in areas where there were other Turkish Cypriot families. This was perceived as relating not so much to the support and
security which that may provide, but because they judged their own success and status in relation to other Turkish Cypriots, rather than wider British society.

However, factors that influence the maintenance of ethnicity do not only relate to relations with other members of the ethnic group, or indeed to interaction with the indigenous population; also of significance is relations with members of other ethnic minorities in Britain. For the Pakistani women such relations, as far as the first generation were concerned, were largely kept to a minimum, because most did not consider them to be necessary of particularly desirable. For the Turkish Cypriots, however, relations with other groups such as Greek Cypriots and Turks was seen as a major influence on the maintenance of ethnicity. Relations with these two groups were certainly better than in Cyprus; nevertheless Turkish Cypriots were keen to emphasise what they perceived as the differences between them. However, the motivations behind the reinforcing of these differences, as Ladbury (1977) points out, are not the same as those in Cyprus, but result from their experiences in Britain. In distinguishing themselves from other Turks or other Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots reinforce a sense of their own distinct ethnicity, as a minority within a minority. Thus, as Bhachu (1985) illustrated in relation to East African Asians, a ‘two-fold’ identity can be seen to have emerged among Turkish Cypriots in Britain. One in response to the ‘internal dynamics of the community’, based on their interaction with Turks and Greek Cypriots, and the other results from their interaction with the indigenous British population.

‘Race’, ethnicity, and class can therefore be seen as significant factors in the maintenance of Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot ethnicity in Britain, influencing the first as well as successive generations. Nevertheless, as the discussions in this chapter illustrate, they do not do so in exactly the same way. The greater levels of integration and participation of the second and third generations within mainstream society increase the resources available to them, and increase their ability to manage ethnic disadvantage. In terms of its effects on the maintenance or transformation of their ethnicity, this will be examined in subsequent chapters. However, suffice to say that factors such as ‘race’, class, gender and ethnicity can be seen to have a greater influence on the second and third generation than intergenerational relations. Some may have experienced problems in their youth that could be seen in terms of a ‘crisis of identity’, or a ‘splitting of roles’, but all of the women believed that this was merely
a temporary situation which they had subsequently confronted and dealt with in their adult lives. The strategies adopted in this process, as the following chapters will demonstrate, varied to a considerable extent.
Chapter Seven

Gender, Islam and Culture: The Contradictions

Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women, as the literature view indicated, are considered to face specific difficulties and tensions arising from patriarchal norms and values that seek to control their sexual behaviour (Joly 1987, Afshar 1994, Josephides 1988, Anthias 1983, 1992, Kucukcan 1999). In addition, as the previous chapter demonstrated, they are subject to the racial, ethnic, class and gender disadvantages operating within wider British society, which combine to further restrict and limit the range of opportunities open to them. This chapter aims to evaluate the position of women within the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot communities, and within British society in general. It will begin by examining their views on the position of women in Islam, as well as in relation to Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot cultures. It will then go on to look at their opinions of the changing experiences of the first, second and successive generations. These changes are believed to be greatest in relation to marriage, education and employment choices, and these will subsequently be examined in more detail. The aim is to gain a broader picture of the experiences that influence Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in terms of their identity formation and their commitment to the maintenance of ethnicity.

Women in Islam

It is widely believed that Islam raised the status of women in Arabic society in the seventh and eighth centuries. Under the laws of Islam, laid down in the Qur'an, female infanticide was forbidden, polygamy was limited, and the rights of women guaranteed. Islam upheld the sanctity of a strong family unit, which provided protection and safety for women and children, and gave women legal status as independent individuals (Saifullah Khan 1997). Men were encouraged to treat women with kindness and respect, while at the same time women were urged to dress modestly and restrain their behaviour (Tames 1982). In Britain, however, as the previous chapter indicated, the common assumption expressed in the media and other sections of British society is that Muslim women are suppressed and isolated, subordinate to ‘their’ men and kept like prisoners in their homes. Such media attention undoubtedly affects
Muslim women and the Muslim population in Britain as a whole. This section therefore outlines the attitudes and opinions of the women interviewed about the position of women within Islam.

What was most notable was the extent to which the two groups of women were divided on their attitudes towards the position of women in their religion. All but one of the Pakistani women considered men and women to be equal in Islamic law. Many believed that the position of Muslim women was misrepresented in the West, and they were portrayed as having few rights in relation to men. The majority of the Pakistani women, however, believed that Islam had given women many rights and opportunities. As one woman argued:

Men and women are equal, but different. There are distinct roles, and there are different expectations of men and women, and that is what Islam had laid down, but you are both equal. Islam is all about pushing forward the role of women, encouraging women to be independent and asserting their identity.

Several pointed out that although it may appear to some that women are subject to greater restrictions than men, the laws which have been introduced by Islam were there to protect women rather to restrain them. A ‘practising’ woman argued that Muslim women only experienced difficulties from such laws when they were ignorant of the reasons behind them. To some, she pointed out, the laws may seen unfair, but she felt that if people were to read the Qur’an and understand what it said, they would be happy to abide by these laws. She mentioned laws to do with inheritance, whereby women can only inherit half that of a man. This was not, she pointed out, because women are considered to be less important than men, as is often portrayed, but because according to Islamic law men are obliged to provide complete financial support for their wives and families, whereas women are not expected to contribute to the expenses of the household. Consequently, a woman’s money was considered her own. This was the reason, she argued, that under Islamic law women did not inherit as much money as men.

In addition, six of the women believed that they had far more rights now they were ‘practising’ than previously. One woman, who had become more religious in the last few years and now wore the hijab, commented: ‘I mean Islam has given me a lot of rights and I can walk more free and liberally than when I was a teenager, when I wasn’t practising’. Her
comment was reiterated by many of the ‘practising’ women. Another believed that women who were ‘practising’ Muslims were much more assertive than other Pakistani women:

I think practising men and women, women per se, are more assertive actually and more confident in fact, doing everything. Whereas culturally, tradition and all that, they’re very timid and scared of what she should do because that’s what the tradition says. But once you know in Islam you can do anything you want, do you think women will stop (she laughs), you know what I mean.

Many of the ‘practising’ women believed that once women became aware of the rights that Islam gave them as women, they developed a much greater level of confidence to challenge the restrictions that their parents and communities imposed upon them. For these women, therefore, a greater knowledge of Islam was seen as a way of empowering women, and expanding the range of options available to them.

For the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, all of the women believed that Islam was used to suppress women and keep them in the home. Although two stated that they thought this had more to do with how it was interpreted and practised, rather than what was written in the Qur’an, for most such a distinction was not made and they blamed Islam as a whole for the suppression of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot women. One Turkish Cypriot woman spoke out violently against Islam, which she considered one of the worst religions:

I mean they ask you to stay at home, they get married three times, you know, they’re married to three women. The woman doesn’t have any rights at all. A man can go out, do whatever they want, and they use this, the religion to stop women going out, so definitely not. I think Islam is the worst amongst the religions. At least Christianity, you know, all the religions are male-dominated, but I think Christianity at least gives a little bit of space for women, but Islam doesn’t.

Another, who referred to herself as an atheist, commented at length on the extent to which patriarchy and gender segregation were due to culture or religion. She believed that in many ways, religion was used to continue and support patriarchal activities or to put pressure on women to restrict their activities.
Well this is a long debate, isn't it, it's been going on among sociologists and anthropologists for a long time, whether religion has been taken over by these patriarchal societies for their own purposes and I think that's probably true, and to perpetuate that already existing system. But if you look at the Qur'an you also find parts in there which reflect the society that existed at the time, which was patriarchal, which was a society that did not provide equality for women, and politically that will reflect in the Qur'an. And there are elements in that which actually continue the subjugation of women to men, to her man who is the husband, the father, the uncle, the older brother or whatever, and Muslim law as well. Although it gave some rights to women, in the sixth and seventh century. And some people argue that those laws gave rights to women which western women didn't have in Europe, and that might have been true, but that doesn't mean that just because that was the case in those days that is so the case now. I think it's a dialectic process, and interaction, so it's both. Because a patriarchal society which can use religion to enable it to continue and the contents of the Qur'an, but most importantly the interpretation of the Qur'an reinforces the existing power structures in society.

She pointed out that some women in Turkey (like several of the Pakistani women interviewed) have claimed they have been able to use the Qur'an in order to promote their rights, in education for example, or to gain more freedom and independence for themselves; thus using Islam as a liberating force. However, she believed that this was a perfunctory interpretation, and in reality the essential nature of Islam had not changed; 'it has superficially changed shape, but it is still the same at the core'.

These comments illustrate quite clearly the differences between the two groups in terms of their opinions of the position of women in Islam. The women were similarly divided on the issue of the wearing of the hijab (headscarf), although all of them believed that it should be a matter of personal choice for the individual whether to wear it or not. None of the Turkish Cypriots interviewed wore the Hijab. Among the Pakistani women, four wore the hijab in the traditional way all the time, one always covered her hair, and one woman wore it occasionally; none of the other Pakistani women had ever worn the hijab. One of the
Pakistani women had become more interested in Islam when she was studying at university and started to wear the hijab then. She felt that she appreciated herself far more now as a result of wearing the hijab. Another, who had only been wearing the hijab for a month, reiterated this view: ‘It’s wonderful, I feel much more confident wearing it than when I don’t. If I don’t wear it, I think ‘Oh God, everybody’s looking at me, but as soon as I put it on I don’t care who looks at me’. She also stressed that the decision to wear the hijab was a very personal and spiritual thing for a woman, one between herself and Allah. Another Pakistani woman in her early forties, who had only become a ‘practising’ Muslim in the last few years, also commented on how important a decision it was, and how deeply she had been affected by it. She stated that she had previously lived a very ‘western’ lifestyle, and that she had found it very difficult at first to adjust to wearing the hijab.

Well, that is something I feel that one has to really feel, truly inside their heart to do it. I wear the hijab because three years back when my husband said to me, I just put it on because I saw someone wearing it and I felt that they looked really good in it, and I wore it and he says ‘oh, I like it on you, why don’t you keep it for good’. And I said OK and obviously I didn’t really understand the implications of it and the feelings I would have afterwards. But believe me for a year or two years I found it absolutely difficult to keep it on, somehow it looked so dowdy, it looked absolutely different and it didn’t suit my clothing. And when I go to the park or for dinners and that sort of thing, and they clashed and I looked such like an old woman sometimes, you know, with the hairstyle and with your ornaments, you have to give them up, you can’t wear them. And I did find it very difficult to be honest and I’d say ‘I don’t want to go because of this scarf, I can’t wear this’. And I was feeling sometimes depressed, but as the time progressed, you know, my values changed. You see your values change with life as well, there was music, parties, there was this and that, you don’t want to go to these anymore. So those things aren’t important anymore, clothes aren’t important anymore. So the hijab has become more important than anything else. I feel that anyone who wants to commit to the hijab has to be thoroughly committed to Islam and its values.
Despite the difficulties she had experienced when she first started to wear the hijab, she now felt very comfortable with it and considered the hijab to be very important to her life. Some of the Pakistani women stated that they were not against people wearing the hijab, but they did not feel it was appropriate for them. Just under half of the Pakistani women, however, were not in favour of it. Several pointed out that far from making women less visible, wearing the hijab in Britain was likely to make women more prominent. This was reiterated by another young Pakistani woman, who also saw it as a way of controlling women:

If they feel totally comfortable with it, then go ahead and do it as far as I'm concerned. I don't actually see any benefit in fact. I mean I've read numerous books on this issue, and I've come to the conclusion that it actually does nothing for women. It causes curiosity; it will never stop anybody from looking at you, in fact it probably increases the risk. So if they want to do it, if they want to wear it, fine do it. But personally I see no value. I think there are greater things that Islamic countries need to be aware of, need to concentrate their resources on, rather than on making women cover up. And I just think it's just one way of men actually controlling women, that's how I view it to be honest, and it has no value at all.

Generally these women felt that the hijab was not in the interest of Muslim women, but rather it represented a form of male control. This was also the view taken by all of the Turkish Cypriot women interviewed. The majority was very critical of the wearing of the hijab, and only three said that they did not disagree with those who chose to wear it, although they too argued that it was an unnecessary practice. For most, it was merely seen as another way of men controlling women. One woman also argued that covering the hair was now a redundant Islamic law that no longer had any meaning for Muslim women:

I think you shouldn’t be allowed it (she laughs). I mean, no, they can wear it if they want to but I don’t think it’s right. I think lots of the Islamic rules were sort of, you know, they were OK in those days, but I think they were relevant for those days, sort of like using your left hand, you know, using your right hand when you’re eating, not your left hand, things like that. I think there was no
water, you had to do that. But now things are different, during the twenty-first century, really, I think it’s ridiculous, people covering their heads.

The women’s opinions on the issue of the hijab again emphasise the differences between the two groups towards religion. For most of the Turkish Cypriot women, the hijab was just another way in which Islam tried to suppress women and restrict their rights. For the Pakistani women on the other hand, whilst many considered it unnecessary and some were critical of its use, they felt that this had more to do with the way people practised their religion than with what was actually written in the Qur’an. As the following section highlights, these differences can also been seen quite clearly in the attitudes of the women towards their cultural heritages.

‘Culture’ and the Position of Women

As indicated in the literature review, Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women are subjected to patriarchal norms and values, which are far stricter for women than they are for men. This was confirmed by the women interviewed, although they differed considerably in terms of where they felt the origins of these oppressions lay. The majority of the women argued that Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot traditional cultures viewed women as very much subordinate to men and there was little equality. One young woman who had lived in Pakistan for three years thought the situation there was even worse: ‘If you go back home, the men make most of the decisions, they don’t discuss them with the women much. They think that what is right is right, and women aren’t allowed to give their views’. She felt that in Pakistan women just accepted their role because they had been brought up like that. Another young woman confirmed this view. She felt that a woman’s role was seen to be in the home and there were few opportunities for them to study or work:

There’s still an understanding that women basically, they get married, they leave their father’s house and they come and join their husband’s household. I mean she is someone who is brought in to do the housework, bring up the children, that’s it really, that’s all the role I see for women out there. I’ve met very few women who are actually working, although I know there are women who work,
but I don't know what struggles they've had to put up with in order to become like that.

The Turkish Cypriot women also believed that traditional values were very male-centred. As one woman commented: 'Men are supposed to be, you know, the boss, the head; the women are second class to the men, I find anyway. I find that most Turkish men treat women like that'. Consequently, they argued, Turkish Cypriot women were generally restricted, and were not given the same rights as men. As one of the women stated: 'I suppose, because of the culture they're kept at home, they're housewives; they just have children, and don't do that much'.

Both groups of women felt that the first generation had accepted this position, just as much in Britain as they had in Pakistan or Cyprus. Subsequently they felt that parents still treated young men and women very differently in terms of education, employment, marriage and the amount of freedom they were allowed. In the opinion of a Turkish Cypriot woman: 'Unfortunately the expectations for men and women are still markedly different, men are still given more freedom, you know, women aren't allowed to have boyfriends'. In addition, several of the women mentioned that their communities generally were very much centred on the male. If a woman divorced or became separated from her husband, it was always viewed as the woman's fault, as a Turkish Cypriot woman commented: 'There's always this thing, with women as well; they always blame the woman, even though they should be supporting her. It's like rather than sticking up for the woman; they're just so pro-man'. This view was reiterated by another Turkish Cypriot woman, who told of her mother's experiences and of those of many of the women with whom she worked:

I had a lot of problems when I was young. My dad was a gambler and used to beat my mum. We lived in a Bed and Breakfast for one and a half years because dad threw mum out. Mum's not that strong a person; she needs a lot of emotional support. A lot of Turkish women are like that. Even though he did that to us, when we got a house from the council she took him back. It's like if you don't have a husband you're nothing. A lot of women we see here, domestic violence cases, they come here to get an injunction but they won't take it seriously, it's like 'it's OK because he's my husband'. They're wasting the
police’s time because you know she’ll take him back a week later. It’s difficult, it’s to do with their culture saying to them you have to have a husband, without a husband you’re nothing.

Similarly, the Pakistani women also stated that the first generation considered it the duty of the woman to maintain her marriage at all costs, and domestic violence was generally perceived as something that they must tolerate. Nevertheless, many of the women also pointed out that such behaviour was not condoned under Islamic law, and women could seek divorce if they were being badly treated. In reality, however, very few of the first generation ever did.

Much of the pressure placed on women to uphold traditional cultural and family values stemmed from the notion of family honour. As highlighted in the literature review, the concepts of honour and shame involve the control and restriction of women’s activities through patriarchal norms and practices. Women are therefore seen as representing the ‘public face’ of their families and communities, and must therefore be seen to behave appropriately (Josephides 1988, Afshar 1994). All of the women felt that family honour was still very important to both Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain, and was a major cause of some of the restrictions placed on young women. According to one of my Pakistani informants:

It’s a very big issue, and it’s such a burden for a young person to carry. You’re carrying responsibility for yourself, all your family, and your uncles and often hundreds of people. Just because one young person wants to go out and be free and explore life.

A Turkish Cypriot woman also spoke of the pressure that the maintenance of family honour placed on women, which could be very severe:

The parents will do anything they can in order to protect the honour of the family, and that includes putting pressure on young women, and pressure can take different forms. And there have been some young women who have been driven to suicide because of the pressures.

She argued that the importance of family honour was not just an issue for Turkish speaking women, but for all Muslim women. She believed that as far as their parents were concerned:
they're Muslim girls and they're precious'. However, in reality she believed that it was merely another way of controlling young women and making sure that they did not disgrace the family name. The maintenance of family honour was not seen as cultural tradition, on the part of the Turkish Cypriot women, but as an element of their religious heritage. The women saw it as another way in which Islam tried to control women, and keep them subordinate to men. For the Pakistani women, on the other hand, family honour was seen as inherently part of Asian culture, and had nothing to do with Islamic law.

The segregation of the sexes was another area mentioned by the Turkish Cypriot women, although it was rarely considered an issue among the Pakistani women. One Turkish Cypriot woman believed that parents were always suspicious about men and women mixing, and most felt that they had to protect women from men. 'It's always suspicion, men only have one thing in mind and women always have to be careful, they always have to be protected. So I mean there's always this attitude towards them mixing'. Many of the Turkish Cypriot women felt that the segregation of the sexes was one custom that continued in Britain, with men tending to congregate in cafes and clubs, while women tended to socialise in their homes. Again, for most of the women this was seen as a religious custom, rather than a cultural one. Among the Pakistani women, on the other hand, the segregation of men and women was seen as acceptable by most because it was outlined in the Qur'an. Indeed, two of the 'practising' women felt that this was one feature of their religion that had lapsed in Britain, which they did not consider a positive change.

The majority of the Pakistani women, therefore, believed that traditional cultural values were responsible for the restrictions placed on women and not Islam. Many pointed out that it was traditional customs that confined women to the home, and discouraged them from seeking employment or further education. Religion, they argued was not to blame for the inequality between men and women, but traditional Pakistani and Asian cultural values. Consequently, most of the Pakistani women were critical of Pakistani culture, which they felt was directly responsible for restricting the rights of women that Islam had given them. A 'practising' woman argued that customs such as arranged marriages, dowries, and the confining of women to the home were cultural elements that were directly in opposition to the rights of women laid down in the Qur'an. Another stated: 'there's so many other things that
clash between tradition and Islam, it is a big thing'. Five of the 'practising' Pakistani women argued that for many Pakistanis the religion had become confused with the culture, and that many people were blaming the religion for restrictions, which they believed were purely cultural. As one woman commented:

The way we dress up and arranged marriages, in our religion it does say you are allowed to choose but when culture comes into it, it becomes a confusion, a mix up. In religion we’re not supposed to mix that much with men, but still have the right to choose. There are lots of things that religion says you are allowed but culture says you are not, like education, and religion gets the blame for it.

Another ‘practising’ woman who worked for a Muslim women’s support service argued that the main problems facing Muslim women in Britain were to do with Pakistani cultures and traditions. She argued that women were generally ignorant of their Islamic rights and were therefore scared of their husbands and often his family’s power over them. The role of the support service was to inform women of their rights in Islam and in Britain and to show these women that they do not have to put up with being beaten or abused.

Thus although all of the women were critical of certain Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani cultural traditions, which they felt suppressed women and treated them differently from men, they differed quite considerably in terms of where they thought this inequality originated. Whereas for the Pakistani women, these aspects were largely considered to be based on Hindu and Sikh customs, which they regarded as ‘unislamic’; the Turkish Cypriot women, on the other hand, believed that it was their religion that was responsible for the patriarchal traditions and values that they experienced. These views once again highlight the differing opinions that each group held of their religion, and of the position of women within Islam. However, despite these differences, the women’s views on the major issues concerning second generation women were very similar,

The Second Generation

As highlighted earlier, the first generation were largely considered to have maintained traditional norms and values concerning the ‘woman’s role’, and consequently parents tended to place much greater restrictions on their daughters to ensure that the honour of the family
was protected. The second generation, however, was believed to be much less willing to accept such restrictions. Both the Pakistani and the Turkish Cypriot women argued that the second generation expected more equality between men and women, and were generally more assertive in expressing their rights. In the words of a Pakistani woman:

I think the first generation don't speak up much for their rights, if they were told that they were not supposed to do something, they wouldn't. But now the second generation will speak up for their rights and say what they want to do, what is right for them anyway.

Another Pakistani woman argued that although the second generation expected to be treated on equal terms with men, it was the third generation who were the most forceful in asserting their rights:

The first generation thought that everything should be done what the husband says. The Islamic way says that anyway, but the tradition was involved with that. Everything should be, you know, the child should listen to the mother. Yes, they were very strict. The second generation says no, we should be equal, both of us half and half, or they say 'OK I'll listen to you, you're the head of the family but you have to listen to me a little bit', it was more together, you know. But the third generation say it should be equal, no matter what.

This was reiterated by a Turkish Cypriot woman who thought that the situation was definitely changing for the third generation: 'You are having more girls marrying outside the community; you are having more girls being given more freedom, being allowed to have boyfriends. There's generally less pressure'. All of the women believed that things were now changing for Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women in Britain, and that there were significant differences between the first and second generation. Many pointed out that the second generation was becoming more independent, they were taking more control over their lives and making more decisions for themselves. Some of the women believed that such changes were a result of living in Britain, and the fact that women were gaining a better education, making them more aware of their rights and giving them greater confidence. Many stressed the importance of having centres especially for Muslim, Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot women. Such
organisations played a vital role in giving women practical and emotional support, together with increased social and political awareness,

Nevertheless, despite these changes, the majority of Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women were still considered that they experienced a number of difficulties as a result of the greater restrictions imposed on them. A Turkish Cypriot woman described what she thought were the main difficulties facing women like her:

Being independent, going out and getting a job, and doing exactly what they want. Moving out, that's like a 'no way', you know. I rate anyone, who does that and actually gets their parents to come round to the idea as well, because I haven't managed it. But yes, independence, you know, career-wise. The fact that I went to university and didn't stay at home was a big thing. I remember my dad saying 'well if you apply anywhere out of London and you move out of this house, then you can't come back'. But it was just a threat. I've tried to say now that I need to move out, because it's too far to travel, but he won't have it. But it would be nice, to be independent, because there are restrictions, who you have around. Obviously, you can't bring men back, so there are restrictions.

Several of the women pointed out that the second generation had very different priorities from those of the first. Studying and pursuing their careers were much more important to some than getting married. For one Pakistani woman:

I think the second generation think more carefully about marriage, whether I guess it's a priority, and how far down it is on that priority list. Is it at the top, or is it sort of half way down after getting a degree maybe, or studying or doing a course, or getting a job, you know, financial independence first. So those priorities are changing, maybe because they have access to a lot more information here than they would do in Pakistan. So I guess those differences have come about.

These changing priorities represent the differing experiences of the second generation, many of whom will have had a much higher level of education than their parents. These experiences together with an increased knowledge of the British system, and of the rights of women within this, have raised the aspirations of many second-generation women. The
following sections will discuss these changing priorities in relation to marriage, education and employment choices.

Marriage

All of the women believed that marriage practices and customs represented one of the major areas of change for the second and third generation in Britain. They felt that there were generally fewer arranged marriages than previously, particularly in relation to the Turkish Cypriots, and many women were being given more freedom and choice. In terms of their own marriages, ten of the Pakistani women were married, four of whose marriages had been arranged. All of them were married to Pakistanis except one, who had married a white English man. One of the Pakistani women had divorced her first husband with whom she had had an arranged marriage and had subsequently remarried a Pakistani man who she had met herself. Amongst the Turkish Cypriot women, nine were married, only one of whose marriages had been arranged. All were married to Turkish Cypriots except one who had married a white English man. Two of the women were divorced from their Turkish Cypriot husbands, neither of these marriages had been arranged.

The women's opinions on arranged marriages differed to a certain extent between the two groups. Among the married Pakistani women, six believed that arranged marriages were acceptable as long as there was plenty of choice for the individuals involved and they were not forced into them. Two of the single Pakistani women felt similarly, although they said they would not have one themselves. None of the women expected their children to have an arranged marriage. All of the Turkish Cypriot women, on the other hand, were against the custom, and several stated that they thought it 'unnatural'. A Turkish Cypriot woman, whose older sister's marriage had been arranged, told of her experiences:

My sister had one, and well she's happy. Obviously she's been lucky it's turned out all right. But I think people should have their choice, after all you're going to spend the rest of your life, hopefully, with this person. I think people should have the freedom to choose who they want to marry. I mean it's not that she was really pushed into it, dragged down the registry office. But it was the fact that there was this constant bickering in the home, my mum constantly on about so-
and-so's son. And I remember groups of people coming every so often, every week to see my sister. And it's not the right way, I don't agree with it.

Many of the women felt that although the situation was improving there was still a lot of subtle pressure put on young people to get married, especially on women. As a Turkish Cypriot woman commented:

I think more and more though the choices are beginning to be there for the individual, for young people, whether it's a young man or a young woman. Young women have more choice than they had in the past; there are still some young women who don't have a choice. But also I think there is a subtle pressure which is there to get married. And a young woman who doesn't want to get married is a liability and a problem and questions are being asked why they don't want to get married. If they are legitimate reasons, like education, then she can delay it. But some of these women do need strong women who they can identify with, who will support them if they are under such pressures.

All of the women believed that the marriage system was changing in Britain and that the third generation in particular were having far more choice. One Pakistani woman believed that things were very different now, and the third generation was being given far more choice:

The second generation had to do exactly what their parents wanted them to do, OK, or the only alternative for them was to run away, which I think a lot of them did. The third generation have got a choice now, the parents are more sort of easy now, they understand what the values are. Some of them are still very much traditionalists, are doing still the same.

Another felt that the question of marriage was a major issue, not just for Pakistani women, but for Asian women in general:

I mean I speak from the point of view of my Hindu and Sikh friends, and they're all pretty much going through the same thing as well. We've reached a point where we've been working for a couple of years and you know the time has come for us to start thinking about a partner and it's not happening, it's not working out. They have expectations and the guys have expectations and they're not clicking together and so time is getting on, they're getting older and
there’s this idea that ‘this is an old girl, what’s been happening here, what did she do wrong’, or something like that. So there’s that assumption that there must be something wrong with this woman not to be married yet. I think that’s actually one of the biggest hurdles. You know, there’s not this understanding that this girl has been studying for three or four years, she’s worked, maybe she didn’t have time to get married, or didn’t really think about those things. So I would say that’s one of the things, that idea that marriage has to happen when you’re relatively young rather than in your late twenties or early thirties.

Many of the women felt that time of marriage was still a major issue for young Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women. Women were increasingly wanting to study, pursue careers and subsequently put off marriage until much later. Some women, however, were still being prevented from going on to further education in order to be married. A Turkish Cypriot woman argued that many young people were getting engaged very early because they saw it as a way of being allowed to date someone and of avoiding an arranged marriage. The majority of the Turkish Cypriot women however felt that although there had been a lot of pressure in the 1980s to ‘marry women off’ at a young age, the age of marriage for women had increased over the past few years. As one young woman commented:

People are getting away from marrying at 16 and having kids and that. Like ten years ago for me to be single at 21, it was like ‘oh my God, she’s on the shelf, basically, nobody wants her, she’s never going to get married’. Now it’s not like that, the average age I would say is 27.

Generally it was believed that the age was increasing as women were given more opportunities and choices to continue their education or to develop careers. Nevertheless, as all of the women pointed out, many Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots still preferred to marry off their daughters at a young age, in order to ensure that they did not go astray.

Divorce was another area that the women felt was changing. Although the first generation had tended to stay with their husbands, regardless of the problems they may have been experiencing, many more women were finding it easier to divorce their husbands because of the increased support they were receiving. As a Turkish Cypriot woman commented:
There is evidence that more able to divorce now, well they feel confident about divorcing their partners. There are more who are living apart and on their own. Which brings a difficulty with it because a woman on her own is still regarded as a target by men, to be tried out and pressurised. There are also now more support systems for women now. They are also more public, known. So they are able to reach out to those women. Third generation young women, who are at school, some face the same problems in relation to family pressures and being young girls, for some it's not going to change. But I think they would still be much more aware that there are choices that they can make and there are people that would support them if they needed it. Which didn't exist for the first generation at all.

Whilst divorce among the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot communities was generally still 'frowned upon', most of the women felt that the services offered through women's centres and support groups allowed women to feel more confident about their rights in Britain, and to seek divorce from their husbands if they felt it necessary. A Pakistani woman who had divorced her first husband and remarried, told of her experiences:

Like I said to you earlier, my parents wanted to go back home and I felt that I was going to be sort of lumbered with someone I wouldn't want to, and then came my cousin's proposal and someone said 'What do you think of him?' and I said 'I don't want to get married to my cousin', you know. But then I didn't see any way out, so I said, OK (she laughs). And it was 12 years that we were together, but something was missing inside me. I didn't feel, I mean he was ten years older than me, but I don't think age was the problem. I think it was that our values were different really, and he wasn't someone who I would say was very orthodox or anything. He was in fact, on the contrary, very easy going in that matter. But I fell in love with my second husband and we obviously, prior to. I mean I would say I had an amicable divorce because we felt that we were apart. Had I been a practising Muslim I wouldn't have done that.

She said that although she did not regret leaving her first husband, she would not have divorced him if she had been 'practising', because she did not consider him to be a bad
person. At the time she considered herself very 'Westernised' and had wanted more out of life than she felt her marriage could offer her. As a 'practising' woman, however, she felt that she should have tried harder to make the relationship work.

Many of my informants also believed that women were beginning to stand up against domestic violence, as the following comment from a Turkish Cypriot woman illustrates:

Also issues around domestic violence at home in more traditional families it's sort of perceived as a woman's fate to tolerate that sort of behaviour. Whereas now, the divorce rate is so high among the second generation because a lot of women won't have it. So you do find that they are more assertive and sort of tend to challenge. Maybe because there's more support. It is similar for newcomers, they were under a lot of pressure back home, and they realise when they come here that they don't have to put up with it. You can see a lot of divorce because of that. In Turkey they just accept it because they don't have that choice, but when they come here they have that choice, and there's more support. There are domestic violence projects who receive a large number of referrals, whereas previously you didn't have this support. So a lot of women are being empowered by these services and actually have more options than they have done before. And economic independence as well. I mean in Turkey if you just divorce your husband, how are you going to survive? It's very difficult for a woman to survive. And in some parts of Turkey society would not look at you.

A large number of the women interviewed came up against cases of domestic violence, through their work, on a very regular basis. Yet most believed that the situation was beginning to improve for some, as a result of the support they received from the women's groups and the counselling services that they offered. These services were considered invaluable for many women, who had nowhere else to turn.

Marriage was therefore considered a major issue for Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women. The second and third generation wanted more freedom and choice to decide for themselves when and who to marry. The women believed that the second and third generation had different priorities from those of the first. They were keen to delay the time of their marriage in order to continue their education and build a career for themselves.
Education and Employment

All of the women believed that education was becoming a high priority for many Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani young people. As several pointed out, with rising levels of unemployment a greater focus needed be placed on education for the second and third generation as a whole, and especially for women. They believed that the time had come for young women to assert their rights, and develop their own potentials. As a Turkish Cypriot woman commented:

For women especially, women taking new leads in things and making sure they are given full rights, that they are given an opportunity to study, and take leading roles in politics and all sorts of areas, otherwise they’re going to miss out on a lot. I think this is what they should go for, I think this is the next stage.

All of the women interviewed thought education was extremely important, and many had been encouraged by their parents to go to university. Two of the women, a Pakistani and a Turkish Cypriot, had wanted to go to university when they were younger but had been unable to because their parents had returned to Pakistan and Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot woman was hoping to study for a degree in the near future if she could get funding to study in her current job. A Turkish Cypriot woman in her late forties explained how much she had wanted to go to university to do teacher training but had been prevented from doing so by her father:

I did up to what was called then O-level, but I didn't go on to do A-levels. I did want to go on to teaching, but at the time it was going to be difficult because it meant that if I went to university it would not be in London, and that created a problem. My father at the time didn't believe in that. So it became a problem. My mother wasn't well at the time, and my father really wasn't for it at all, because girls didn't go away from home for higher education. And it wasn't because he didn't trust me, or because he himself didn't believe in it, he felt that education was important. But at the time he thought that the educational level that I had reached was far enough for me, I didn't really need to do anymore. And he didn't want other people to, I don't know, talk about me going away. It was a reputation more than anything else, which was very hurtful for me at the time. It was very
very hurtful... Back then, girls were not allowed to be seen with a man, it would start a lot of gossip. It was all about what other people thought.

Although she was the only one of the women interviewed who had not been allowed to continue her education, many believed that some parents were unhappy about their daughters going on to further education. A Pakistani woman stated that education was now a major priority for the second generation, and although most parents were supportive of this, some did place restrictions on their daughters:

I think the second generation want lots of education, as much as possible. They really want to be able to go to University, to be able to progress, to get a good job and get everything they see all their English friends having. I think the majority of parents do encourage their children to go for it and get a good education, some don't, it depends on how educated the parents are themselves. Some parents will let their children work up to a certain level, say A-level and then it will be 'Right, you're going to get married now'. So it depends. But I think most do want them to go on to education and get good jobs.

Several of the Turkish Cypriot women also pointed out that things were improving for women within their communities, and that many more parents were allowing their daughters to go to university as long as they studied in London.

Interestingly, two of the women stated that although their parents had been very keen for them to go to university they were not keen on their choice of career. A Pakistani woman who had previously worked as a teacher explained how her parents had viewed this as an inferior profession:

My parents weren't keen for me to go into teaching at all. Teaching is pretty much looked down upon. In Pakistan if you want to be a teacher you don't have to take any training for it, you can just go into it. So they had those thoughts. Plus my brother and sister had chosen business positions, so my parents assumed that I would go into business as well. But at that time I didn't want to, I wanted to go into something that was more the caring professions. I put it to them and they weren't terribly keen, they thought I wasn't giving myself enough credit.
A Turkish Cypriot advice worker also made a similar comment in relation to her parents’ views: ‘They were keen for men to go to university, but they’re not very keen on the job I do now (she laughs). Because Turkish parents want you to be either a doctor or a lawyer or a teacher, something like this’. Many believed that parents were keen for their children to go to university and develop a career that they valued, which were largely considered to be high earning professions.

Nevertheless, it was argued, many women still experienced restrictions in terms of continuing their education or developing careers. A Pakistani woman who worked as an advisor and counsellor for Muslim women believed that many parents needed to be persuaded to allow their daughters to go to university:

They see the key to their futures as really education. We have a lot of youngsters who are at A-level stage and want to go to University, but their family are saying ‘no, you have to get married now’. And we do try to mediate between the family and say ‘well look, what does it say in the Qur’an? Why are you stopping her? Why are you not stopping her brothers?’ We make them really try to understand that it is their right.

Amongst Turkish Cypriots in particular underachievement in education has been a problem for many years, and shows no signs of improving in the immediate future despite the efforts of both development workers and supplementary schools. A Turkish Cypriot development worker explained some of the reasons for their underachievement.

For the Turkish Cypriot community, I feel that there is a lack of interest involved as well. A lot of the families are working and not really showing enough interest. That’s often something that we’re trying to pump into parents, that we do want parents to become more involved. And another problem can be the lack of positive role models in families. For example in my family there are a lot of my cousins who studied, so for us it was the norm. But for some families they don’t have that. The norm is to leave school at 16, get married, and you know settle down, that sort of thing. A lot of families are quite afraid their daughters are going to have too much freedom if they study, you know. So in order to prevent that they’re sort of marry them at quite a young age. This is more the case in the
more traditional families, I think things are slightly changing now. But in the more traditional families, I know a lot are afraid their daughters will become too westernised, so they don’t want to expose them too much.

Part of this informant’s work, as a development officer is to persuade parents to allow their daughters to continue their studies by alleviating some of the fears they have. In addition, she claimed that part of the problem is the failure of Turkish Cypriot parents to attend school meetings. She pointed out that although Turkish parents generally seem very keen, Turkish Cypriot parents think that they know the system much better because they have been in Britain for much longer, and therefore think it unnecessary, yet their children continue to underachieve. As another woman working in the field of education stated:

The educational achievement of Cypriots has been very low, it is still very low.
Which is an indication of whether you are going to have any professionals in the Turkish speaking community, who have gone through the system here and actually come through it at the other end.

Thus it was believed that although many Turkish Cypriot women had higher aspirations for educational and employment success, the vast level of underachievement among Turkish Cypriots as a whole meant that very few were likely to make it into the professions.

Despite these difficulties, it was believed that things were improving for Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in Britain, and many more parents were beginning to allow their daughters to further their education and develop careers. In addition, the women themselves were giving an education a much higher priority as they were able to see more Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women developing successful careers. A Turkish Cypriot woman who had worked extensively in the area of education in London stated:

The second generation functioning now, or the third generation, have different expectations and they have seen other things. They are able to have role models around them, they understand the system much better, the education system has moved on because of it sex equality and gender studies. Some have benefited from that, you know, they’ve got this pull that they wanted to do it and they could do it. There are more Turkish speaking professionals who are able to go and talk to parents and argue and show that just because their
daughter is going to a girls' project or a youth project she is not going off to jump into bed and get pregnant. Or she is not going to run off with a black kid or an English kid. And also I think the second generation are economically more comfortable than the first generation. And some of the young women can become young businesswomen. They might be running a supermarket or a restaurant or whatever because their parents have set it up; it was a café and it was a corner shop, but it has developed. So amongst those there are differences. And I suppose in the second generation they also have a lot more choices and are able to get to education and do it.

Thus the feeling was that education was becoming increasingly important, both for young people and their parents. Second generation women had much higher aspirations than their mothers and some were developing successful careers. Many of the Turkish Cypriot women pointed out that although women in their communities had always had to work, the second generation were beginning to choose different careers from those traditionally associated with Turkish Cypriot women in Britain. As one woman commented:

I think it's very positive now, I mean I see more young women going into journalism, or going into perhaps advice work in different fields, whereas it was predominantly men. I see it more positively than before. Whereas it was like my age group, my generation, it was hairdressing, over-locking, you know, clothing factories, machining. So it is changing, but as I said about the community that have come over recently, I still see it among the young women, the hairdressing thing. I mean no one is knocking hairdressing, you could be a top hairdresser, but generally it's in a back-street hairdressers shop where you learn the basics from someone who's perhaps had a few years training, where does that leave them? And then eventually they leave because the money's really crap basically. So they end up going into a clothing factory and working there for perhaps more money, but more energy loss and less family life and less life. But I think it's changing now, and I see more and more women, for example, more Turkish Cypriot women who are counsellors perhaps, who've got top jobs within the health authority. I mean there are very few, but at least you're seeing them.
Among the Pakistani women interviewed, they pointed out that traditionally women had not worked in Britain but been confined to the home. Thus for the second and third generations being able to further their education and develop a career marked a major change within their communities. Furthermore, underachievement in education was considered much less of a problem for Pakistani young people, consequently they felt that there were many more were going to university and building careers. However, as one woman pointed out, they still had to juggle these new responsibilities with those of their culture and religion, which required them to be very strong:

You'll probably find more Muslim women going to college, and studying and then trying to get a job and build a career. They are probably quite strong in terms of the ones who are trying to do everything at the same time, you know, they're very committed to their religion, they're very committed to their culture, to their families, and they're trying to juggle everything together. So I think they're very very strong from that point of view. They're trying to make sense of everything for themselves, trying to adapt themselves and their religion and their culture and their family to fit in to their own lifestyle. So from that point of view they're very strong.

A Turkish Cypriot woman reiterated this point. She felt that second and third generation Turkish Cypriot women were in a much better position because they were aware of their rights and the choices they could make. This allowed them to choose aspects of both British and Turkish Cypriot cultural values, and use both accordingly:

Because they are much more certain of the choices they can make in life, the question of losing or not losing their identity or cultures, I don't think it's an issue because of that confidence they have. They will be able to claim part of their culture when and if they want to. But I'm sure there will still be plenty of third generation women who will continue to work in a supermarket or in the garment industry or in a shop. I suppose a major difference for them would be that they have the certainty that they live here, and they have a certain standard of living, that their children can benefit from all the rights that they are entitled to in this country. Some will still be subjected to pressure of honour.
Second and third generation Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women, therefore, were felt to be in a much more powerful position than the first generation, their mothers. They had a better knowledge of the British system, they were more aware of their rights; they had more role models to aspire to and a greater support network to help them achieve their aspirations. Many still faced restrictions from their parents and from wider British society, particularly the more recent arrivals, but the support was there to help alleviate some of these difficulties. The increasing role of Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in public life, however, did not mean that they would abandon their traditional cultural and religious heritages, but that they would have more freedom and choice to maintain their ethnicity in a way that was best suited to them as individuals.

Summary

This chapter illustrates the wide range of opinions that the women held of their religion and culture. In particular, it is evident that the women were especially critical of customs and traditions that they felt suppressed women and led to their differential treatment in relation to men. However, while the two groups of women were largely in agreement in terms of their criticism of certain aspects, such as keeping women in the home and their unequal treatment vis-à-vis men, they were nevertheless divided in relation to what they identified as the major source of these restrictions. Whereas all of the Turkish Cypriot women believed that it was Islam that was to blame for the suppression of women within their communities, or at least the way in was being practised; the Pakistani women largely believed that it was cultural traditions and customs that were responsible for suppressing the rights of women. For the majority of the Pakistani women, they believed that Pakistani cultural values had become infused with elements of Sikh and Hindu cultures, which many considered 'un-Islamic', that is, that they were directly against the laws of Islam. Far from suppressing them, Islam was considered to have given them rights as women, which certain elements of Pakistani cultures sought to take away. Examples of this were considered to be the caste system, the practice of giving dowries, and arranged marriages. For the Turkish Cypriot women, on the other hand, they believed that religion was used as a way of controlling women, examples of which included the wearing of the hijab and the segregation of men and women. These different
attitudes and opinions, as we shall see in the following chapter, have had a major influence on the formation of these women's identities.

However, despite these differences of opinion on religion and culture, their views on the major issues of importance for the second and third generation were very similar. The need for more independence and freedom in relation to living at home, marriage, education and employment choices was something that all of the women mentioned as being major priorities for young Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in Britain. Whether they felt that cultural or religious values were to blame, all of the women argued that change in their communities was necessary in order to allow women to develop their own potentials, freeing them from some of the restrictions previously imposed and giving them full equality with men. This increased freedom would allow them to make the most of their lives within the confines of the economic and social disadvantage of the wider society.

These issues once again highlight some of the difficulties faced by ethnic minority women. Challenging disadvantage, for these women does not just involve opposing the sexist, racist and class-based assumptions of the majority society, but also confronting prejudice and discrimination within their own communities. Furthermore, as the comments of the women illustrate, these varying and intricately interwoven forms of oppression and discrimination are not experienced uniformly by Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women, nor are they experienced in a void. The women's own views and aspirations are therefore crucial to an understanding of their position in society, and the strategies they may chose to adopt in pursuit of these aspirations.
There were significant differences, as the previous chapter illustrated, between the two groups of women in terms of their attitudes and opinions on the position of women within Islam. This chapter begins by examining the importance that the women placed on their religion, further highlighting the disparities between the Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani informants. It will then go on to look at their views on the importance of Islam for the second and third generation as a whole. The influence of Pakistan and Cyprus will be examined together with the women’s attitudes towards the maintenance of traditional values and customs in relation to both themselves and the second and third generations. The maintenance of mother tongue languages will be also be explored in relation to ethnicity. Finally, the chapter will examine the women’s assessment of their identity and the significance of this to the maintenance of ethnicity among Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain.

The Importance of Religion

The increase in Islamic activity among young Asian Muslims in Britain, as highlighted in the literature review, has received much attention since the events surrounding the Rushdie affair and the Gulf War. Young Asian Muslims, it is argued, are increasingly turning to a more religious-based identity that cuts across racial and ethnic barriers (Scantlebury 1995, Jacobson 1997). For Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, religion is not considered to constitute a major part of community life in Britain, but is merely seen as an aspect of their ethnic and cultural identity (Ladbury 1977, Sonyel 1988). This section examines the attitudes of my informants towards their religion.

The importance that the women placed on religion was by far the main contrast between the two groups. All but two of the Pakistani women considered Islam to be very important to them, whereas only three of the Turkish Cypriots believed their religion played
any part in their lives at all. Of the two Pakistani women who considered Islam to be unimportant, one stated that although she still believed in her religion she did not follow the Islamic laws: 'I believe in it, but I don't exactly follow it strictly. I mean I drink, smoke, and break some of the laws you see.' The other felt that Islam was not important to her at all, she had never prayed and did not consider herself to be a Muslim. For the majority, however, Islam was considered very important, and many responded with a straightforward statement of orthodoxy, which was justified, if at all, in terms of providing the individual with the basics of life. This idea was emphasised in particular by many of the 'practising' women, who felt that Islam represented a whole way of life to them and was therefore a major influence on how they lived their lives. One 'practising' woman commented that she always tried to put Islam first in everything she did, even though at times she could be distracted:

It's my life. To me my Islam is first, even everything that is going on around me, I would put Islam first. Well, I'm trying to anyway. Sometimes Eastenders takes the better of me than my Salah (she laughs). So I should really perform it on time, but sometimes I say 'OK let me watch Eastenders first, then I'll do my prayers'. But I should put that first. But then again we are human beings and we are prone to errors.

Despite the importance that the majority of the Pakistani women placed on Islam, their commitment to following Islamic laws varied considerably. Whereas six of the women felt that Islam was not a strict religion, others stated that they found some of the Islamic laws very difficult to keep. One of the hardest rules to maintain, many believed, was praying five times a day, and there was a major contrast in terms of the extent to which the women prayed: four prayed five times a day, three prayed once or twice a day, the remaining six stated that they prayed when they could or when they needed help. The two women who considered Islam unimportant to them did not pray at all. One young woman, who prayed only occasionally said of her religion: 'It's difficult, automatically you say it's very important, but if it was that important I'd actually make more of an effort to study it and understand it'. Four of the women believed that living in Britain made it more difficult to keep the religious laws, although most believed they maintained the ones they could. Others, who regarded themselves as
‘practising’, argued that although some of the Islamic laws could be difficult to follow at first, they had found them much easier to maintain since becoming more religious.

Many of the ‘practising’ women believed that to follow Islam completely involved a huge commitment. However, such a commitment was seen as an important part of their religious beliefs and Islamic identity. Nevertheless, although the ‘practising’ women were generally seen to be more committed to their religion, for many of the other Pakistani women allegiance to Islam was not seen to be dependent on their observance of religious laws. For example, one woman, who did not consider herself to be a ‘practising’ Muslim, believed that Islam was still important to her because it was more than just a religion:

It's very important because this is our basic education. I think that our children should have that basic education of Islam because it's a part of our life. No doubt we don't practise that much, but our religion is not very strict. I mean it does say that you have to pray five times, but if you don't get time you can pray at night. And it's the same for fasting; it's meant so that you can feel the poverty of the poor. So I think we should have a basic knowledge of Islam because it is a part of life, you can't say that it's just a religion.

Consequently, Islam was seen as an important part of life for the majority of Pakistanis in Britain, and all but one of the Pakistani women in my sample believed that Islam was important to their families. It is interesting to note that the one woman who did not consider herself a Muslim, also stressed that Islam was of no importance to her brothers and sister. Although she felt her mother believed to a certain extent, they had not been taught about Islam as children. Among the other Pakistani women, the majority believed they had a good understanding of their religion, acquired either through their parents or through formal religious instruction. Five of the women, however, argued that some parents were too strict in the religious teaching of their children and that they dictated laws without explaining the reasons for them. Such an approach, they believed, often had the effect of turning young people away from Islam. Nevertheless, a good knowledge of their religion was considered very important for the maintenance of Islam among the second and third generation. Only by having this knowledge and understanding, they argued, could young people decide for themselves the importance of Islam to their lives.
The views of the Turkish Cypriot women about Islam showed a marked contrast to that of the Pakistani women. Three considered their religion to be quite important to them; the other twelve did not regard it as important at all. It is interesting to note that the three women who considered Islam to be quite important were also the oldest by some years, all being in their forties and fifties and all three women had come to Britain as children¹. One of these women felt that it was important to believe in something, although in her opinion she did not keep the religious laws, but she did fast when she could and she prayed once a day. Another believed that it was important for Turkish Cypriots to maintain their religion because 'if they lose it, they also lose their identity'. She also believed that she had become more religious since she had got older. According to a different informant:

I believe in my own religion. I don't believe in any religion as orthodox, I don't believe in any religion that is very very strict; that I believe is wrong. I believe that religion should be set so that people have guidelines to live a good life. As soon as religion takes over your life, like you have to cover your head, that's not right. The very extreme religions are beginning to take over in the world, which is a shame, because that is to me not being a Muslim.

This comment again reiterates some of the views of the Turkish Cypriots outlined in the previous chapter, that many Muslims were considered too strict in their interpretation of Islam, and used it to suppress Muslim women. Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, these three women still believed that Islam was 'quite important' to them, because it represented another element of their Turkish Cypriot identity.

However, for the majority of Turkish Cypriot women religion was not important to their lives at all, and many did not consider themselves Muslims. As one young woman commented: 'it doesn't bother me, religion's not a big thing for me. I think I believe in God in my own way, I don't need someone to tell me how to'. Most of the women were highly critical of Islam, and especially the way it was practised by many Muslims, believing that some had manipulated it for their own ends. For example:

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¹ All of the women mentioned the increase in religious observance among Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot people as they grew older; but whereas the Pakistani women viewed this positively as 'a natural and inevitable progression', the Turkish Cypriot women were largely more cynical, they felt the older generation were merely scared and therefore it did not represent a genuine commitment to Islam.
I feel that would be a problem for me to say that I was a Muslim. I mean I know very little about the religion and what I do know I don’t agree with, but there must be some good sides to it, there are so many Muslims. I just don’t like the way it’s been operated in the past, the way it pressurises really, but that’s a cultural thing anyway, because they take that and they manipulate it, they use it however they want, so no, I wouldn’t say I was a Muslim.

Furthermore, all of the women stressed that Turkish Cypriots tended to be ‘very relaxed’ in their approach to religion, and they did not see it playing a large or important role within the Turkish Cypriot communities either in Britain or Cyprus. Indeed several believed that their own lack of allegiance to Islam was largely a result of this. As one woman explained:

It’s different for people who’re from Turkish villages; they’re more in touch with their religion. Because we didn’t have it from our parents, and we’re not getting in from school either, so how are we expected to know it’s difficult? It’s difficult to say I’m Muslim, I don’t even know when Bayram is.

The greater religiosity of people from Turkey was mentioned by all of the Turkish Cypriot women, although a few stressed that there were major differences among people there, with those from the East and the villages considered more traditional and more strict in their observance of Islam than those from the West. Furthermore, most of the women mentioned the rise of religion in Turkey, of which they were all highly critical, believing it to be detrimental to the development of the country as a whole. The following comment is typical of most of the responses:

I feel Turkey’s a lost cause at the moment. I mean, if they’re going to become a lot more religious, I don’t think it’s for the benefit of Turkey, I think it’s a way, it’s going backward. It’s going in that direction at the moment, but I don’t think it’s right. It’s not a way forward, but I think the politics in Turkey are a shambles anyway and I think they’re seeing Islam as a way out, as a way to save them, because there’s no other way out, but I don’t think it’s the right way.

For the majority of the Turkish Cypriot women, therefore, commitment to Islam was seen as neither important nor particularly desirable.
The Importance of Islam to the Second Generation

The majority of the women interviewed believed that Islam was becoming more popular in Britain, and many mentioned the number of black and native British people who had converted to Islam in the last few years. In relation to the second and third generation, however, they were more divided in their views. Some of the Pakistani women argued that although Islam was still an important part of life for Pakistanis in Britain, and most young Pakistanis still believed, they were generally much less strict in their observance of Islam. It was argued that many more young people were going out with members of the opposite sex, girls were wearing make-up, and many young people were drinking, smoking and generally becoming more ‘western’ in their lifestyles. Several of the Pakistani women argued that most of the second generation had lost touch with Islam as they adapted to living in a different environment with different norms and values.

Six of the Pakistani women pointed out that although some of the second and third generation were taking a greater interest in their religion, very few practised it to any great extent. Many young people, and particularly young men, were still drinking, smoking and going out with girls. Their interest in Islam, it was argued, stemmed from the fact that it had become fashionable in Britain. One young woman argued that it was difficult for young people to stick to their religion when they had been brought up in a western country. Another, commented on her own experience, felt that some of the second generation were beginning to take more of an interest in Islam through the constant questioning they receive from non-Muslims, although she also pointed out that some young people were very committed to their religion. Such differences, she argued were largely results of how they had been brought up and the experiences they had had in their lives:

I would say there's an interest in it. I think there are people like me who are fed up with having to kind of explain themselves. And then we explain ourselves and we don't always have the answers. Because we need to find out more, so you're ready the next time. So I think there's an interest that's kind of developed like that, through a negative way. I mean my Muslim friends; they're pretty much relaxed about the whole thing. They're not first and foremost Muslims; it's not
something that they're always pushing. But I know there are people of my
generation who are like that, who are very very secure about their faith and
where they stand in their faith. And that is their priority and they will assert that
first and foremost. It really depends on how you've been brought up, on what's
been around you and your experiences.

Another felt that although some of the second generation had drifted away from their religion
because of the influence of 'western' culture, the third generation had much clearer views
about Islam and consequently their beliefs were much stronger than those of the second
generation. Several of my Pakistani informants pointed out that many young people take a
greater interest in their religion as they get older. They felt that at school many young people
turn away from their religion because of the influence of peers. However, after leaving school
they begin to think more for themselves and subsequently return to Islam. Many may return
to their religion when they have children of their own, as they recognise the importance of
passing Islamic values on to the next generation. In addition, one woman stated that there
were a lot more facilities available now for the teaching of Islam, and that many more parents
were sending their children to the mosque to learn about their religion.

Indeed, many of the Pakistani women felt they were more religious than they had
been in their youth. Some had rebelled in their teens and returned to Islam recently. One
woman stated that she had become interested in Islam at university and had started to wear
the hijab; she realised then that religion was the most important thing to her. Another had
lived what she described as a very 'western' lifestyle – drinking, smoking and going to pubs
and clubs. However, she had felt that there was something missing in her life and became
interested in Islam as a result. She now wears the hijab and feels that religion is everything to
her. Another young Pakistani told of her experience:

Islam and religion was very much forced onto me, and the messages I received
were quite negative and this is why I rebelled so much. It wasn't until basically I
got married that I learnt more about Islam in its purity rather than the culture
wrapped around it.

All of those who considered themselves ‘practising’ Muslims, believed that the increase in the
popularity of Islam had come about through a desire for greater spirituality among many
people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. One young ‘practising’ woman, who worked for a Muslim women’s counselling service, argued that many people were looking for something more in their lives, and turning to Islam as a result:

I think there’s also a desire for spirituality. You may have a career, you may have a family, you may have material desires that are fulfilled, so what’s next? If you are going through a lot of problems, conflict within yourself, and in society, the only way to solve it and to develop is to find spirituality and that can help you move forward, rather than remain in your situation forever.

Another ‘practising’ woman reiterated this view:

Three years ago I wouldn’t have known what’s happening around me because I wasn’t aware of it, but you know three years, up to now, suddenly there has been an influx of converts and also awakenings of Muslims. Also youngsters who we never ever thought would go into Islam, because parents are such traditionalists, you know, their values were exactly the same. I mean my parents’ values weren’t exactly Islamic, they didn’t implement that. And suddenly these youngsters are becoming believers and practising and they’re propagating. You know, suddenly, this has all happened in three years. Where have these people come from? There hasn’t been any institutions who have implemented this. It has been like me; suddenly I got up one day and decided that I didn’t want to do those things that I was doing in my life. Now who has given this to me? No teaching came to me, no Imam has come to me, no religious group have approached me, no person has come to me and propagated to me and yet suddenly I was in my own home and I became what I am today. So I feel that today if Allah has given me that, he has given it to all the youngsters in the colleges and universities.

Five of the Pakistani women pointed out that many of the second and third generation were asserting their Muslim identity more than any other, as they considered it more relevant to their lives than a Pakistani or British identity. As a ‘practising’ woman commented:

A lot of my friends who are Muslim, they don’t feel comfortable with being Pakistani, they are not fully connected with it, and they’re not fully connected
with the English, British background. So being Muslim really connects you to a
brotherhood or sisterhood which is universal, and where everyone has a
common element. I mean you don’t have to be English, Pakistani, Irish,
whatever, you are connected to all these people through one common thing. It
gives you a place; it gives you somewhere to be comfortable.

In this way, a Muslim identity and the notion of Muslim unity that goes with it, can be seen as
providing many young Pakistanis with a universal foundation for identity that does not rely on
allegiance to a specific place (Scantlebury 1995, Jacobson 1997, 1998). It offers, as many of
the Pakistani women pointed out, a universal set of prescriptions that encompasses all
aspects of daily life, as well as a sense of belonging to the world-wide Muslim community, the
umma. However, as Lewis (1994) argues, the perception of a Muslim identity does not
necessarily translate into an Islamic identity, that is, it is not necessarily dependent on
religious observance. Many of the Pakistani women felt that although more young people
were placing a greater emphasis on their religion, only a small minority was committed to
‘practising’ the Islamic laws. Indeed, most of the women themselves were not strict in their
observance of Islamic laws, despite the importance they placed on their religion. While the
overwhelming majority of the Pakistani women believed that Islam was important to
themselves and to Pakistanis as a whole, opinions varied as to how many and to what extent
the second and third generation were committed to Islamic observance.

The majority of the Turkish Cypriot women also believed that Islam was becoming
more prominent among the Turkish speaking communities in Britain. However, unlike the
majority of the Pakistani informants, all of the Turkish Cypriot women took a negative view of
this increase in religiosity. They believed that the majority of the second and third generation
had little interest in religion, and consequently some thought that Islam was likely to
disappear altogether among Turkish Cypriots in Britain. According to one young woman:

I think it’s like the language, as the generations go on people forget about it. I
think that’s what’s happened to the religion and obviously I feel like this about
Islam now, so my kids won’t be taught about it from me. So I think that’s how it’s
become with us.
However, while religion was considered to be of little concern to young Turkish Cypriots, they did believe there had been a slight increase in the number of Turkish speakers ‘taking it up’. One young woman argued, like some of the Pakistani women, that more young Turkish speakers were becoming interested in Islam because it was fashionable, although they still drank, smoked and ate pork. Another woman who worked in a large Turkish speaking youth centre believed that very few young people were becoming more religious. She stated that she had never seen a woman in hijab at the centre and she knew of only two young men who had become interested in Islam.

Although traditionally Islam had not been of much importance for Turkish Cypriot people, One woman, who worked in a number of different areas within the Turkish speaking communities in London, argued that with the increasing number of people from Turkey living in Britain there had been a significant increase in Islamic activity:

I think that with their arrival, particularly in Hackney for example, the number of mosques has increased. Whereas in the old days there was only one mosque, and that served all purposes, and that was primarily when people died, so they could be buried according to the laws of Islam. Recently the increase of Islamic activity and the coalition government in Turkey, which is the Islamic party, has began to show its influence in Britain. Because they’re very well organised, they have well trained quite intellectual people who can challenge the intellectual issues around Islam.

The increase in such religious activity, she believed, although as yet still small, was preparing the ground for a more substantial revival. She stated:

I think in this country the influence to Islam hasn’t really been felt yet, but it’s there, it’s ever present. And I think it’s sort of a period of gestation, it’s a matter of time before I think it makes quite an impact in the lives of the young here.

As an atheist, she was not only concerned about this religious revival, but was also highly critical of the way funding was ‘pouring in’ from other countries to fund religious facilities. Meanwhile, other services such as those around education and women, which she considered vital for the needs of the Turkish speaking population in London, were severely under-funded.
According to seven of my informants more young women were becoming interested in Islam and covering their heads, some perhaps due to family pressure others in search of an identity. In the words of one young woman:

I know a girl, she’s from Turkey, and she’s like starting to wrap up and stuff and they’re going on a pilgrimage to Mecca. I can’t understand it to be honest, I think you’re only young once, you can’t turn into an old woman when you’re 16 basically. I think it can be through pressure from families, but as well, I think because they are living in this country they are looking for an identity to say ‘I’m this, I’m not the same as you’. I don’t know the reason for it, I think it’s a lot to do with identity, to feel that they’re Muslim, Turkish, whatever, I don’t know. Whereas I don’t have a problem with that, I don’t need to prove myself to anybody.

Most of the women, however, believed that it was predominantly men who were becoming more religious, although for reasons very similar to those outlined above. As another woman observed:

Some of the second generation are taking it up, particularly young men, more than young women, although some young women are taking it up. I think one of the reasons young men are taking it up is quite interesting to look at it. It’s a bit like what’s happening in France, with the young children from Magreb, the second and third generation are using it as a counter attack against racism, which has excluded them for a long time, and also as an identity which they want to create for themselves. So some of them are using it in that way, the others, some young people who felt they were really, whether they try to ignore the rejection, the rejection is there, from a racist society of their culture whatever, no matter how much they anglicise themselves in their manners, in their language, in their names, etc, there’s that feeling that they’re not really part of the society. And I think some of them who are also going towards religion are those young people who felt rejected by everything, including their parents. So there’s that rejection, there’s a rejection from the society as a whole, they have
been failed by the school system so they are not getting any work, jobs are scarce, whatever.

In addition, she claimed that many young people had become involved in drugs, and were using religion to help them fight their addiction. She speculated: 'I think some young people have used religion to get off hard drugs. I think it is replacing one form of drug with another, but this is the drug of religion rather than physically injecting themselves or cocaine or whatever'. For some Turkish speaking young people, therefore, like many Pakistanis, Islam was believed to offer them some sense of meaning in their lives; it gave them a sense of belonging to something universal.

The disparity between the two groups of women interviewed in terms of their views and opinions on religion seems to indicate that religious allegiance and activity are perceived to be much higher among Pakistanis than Turkish Cypriots. Even the Turkish speakers who were becoming more religious were predominantly considered to be people from Turkey rather than Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, for all of the Turkish Cypriot women, it was their more 'relaxed approach to Islam' that marked them out as distinctive from people from Turkey.

Furthermore, for the Turkish Cypriots it was Cyprus that constituted a much greater influence on their identity, as the following sections demonstrate.

The Influence of Pakistan and Cyprus

The first generation of Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani migrants, as highlighted in chapter seven, have adapted very little to living in Britain. Pakistan or Cyprus was therefore seen as the major focus for the first generation, with many maintaining traditional norms and values from thirty of forty years ago, representing the Pakistan or Cyprus they left when they migrated to Britain. This section will examine the influence of these two countries on the first, second and successive generations, through the attitudes and experiences of the women interviewed.

There was again a major contrast in the attitudes of the women towards their parents' countries of origin, and towards the amount of influence each country had, particularly in relation to the second and third generation. The obvious difference is proximity. Cyprus,
being much nearer, is much easier and much less expensive to travel to. Consequently my informants’ visits to Cyprus were far more frequent than visits to Pakistan. Most of the Turkish Cypriots visited Cyprus regularly; several had parents who were now living there; and two of the older women, who had been born in Cyprus, stated that they would like to retire there themselves. However, the majority stated that they preferred to live in London, and believed that most of the second and third generation felt similarly. One woman had moved to Cyprus when she was married but had returned to London after a year. She felt that she had become accustomed to the ‘hectic’ city life, and it was in London that she felt at home. This was reiterated by many of the women from both groups. One young woman who had been to school in Pakistan for a year had enjoyed her time there, but she felt that most of the second and third generation had little interest in Pakistan. Another described how shocked she had been when she visited Pakistan:

It’s amazing, when I went on holiday to Pakistan ten years ago, I remember how liberated the women were there, how materialistic they were. And for me it was a shock because here I am a humble woman, I dress very humbly. It was a culture shock. I wasn’t into parties, I wasn’t into dressing beautifully all the time, and I wasn’t interested in pleasing people all the time. Over there you have to do things, you have to dress in a particular code, you have to be good, you have to be like your cousins and your friends and so on. And I couldn’t cope with that kind of pressure.

She felt that as a ‘practising’ Muslim she did not want to live her life in this very ‘materialistic’ and ‘ostentatious’ way, as she did not believe that this was how a Muslim woman was supposed to behave. She had subsequently come to appreciate living in Britain much more, where she was free to focus on her religion and to practise Islam in a way she considered appropriate and relevant to her.

The majority of the Pakistani women felt that Pakistan had little to offer the second and third generation, whose lives were based much more in Britain. This is how one woman explained the differences between the generations in terms of their views on Pakistan:

Well the first generation were absolutely in love with their own past because they were missing it and were lonely and they were very patriotic and nationalistic.
The second generation were sceptic, they went and they were hoping they would go and settle there, they wouldn’t even settle in this country because they wanted to go back and enjoy life there. But found out by going there, they couldn’t come to terms with it, and they found they couldn’t adjust there. The third generation doesn’t have any nationalism and patriotism, for them it’s United Kingdom all the way; that’s their country. You talk about Pakistan and they say ‘what do you want to talk about Pakistan for?’

All of the women considered Pakistan to be of little interest to the second and third generation who had now come to regard Britain as their home. Consequently their main orientation was to life in Britain. Indeed, many of the informants felt similarly; and none believed that they could live in Pakistan.

For the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, the influence of Cyprus was still considered to be very strong in Britain, and many of the women interviewed were actively involved in campaigning around issues to do with Cyprus. Although many of the women felt that events in Cyprus were still very important for the first and second generation, some argued that many young people merely viewed it as somewhere to go for a cheap holiday. In the words of a young woman:

The thing with Cyprus is you go there a lot because it's cheap, you can go there, just pay your flight and stay there with family and have a nice Mediterranean holiday basically. Whereas if you went somewhere else you’d have to pay for the hotel and that. That's why people go a lot. It's like me, I’d rather go somewhere else basically, I like to go to other places and I've only been back twice.

Another, who worked with Turkish speaking young people, believed that most had little knowledge of, or interest in, events in Cyprus: ‘at the end of the day Cyprus did very little for the young people there, that's why a lot of them came over here basically, for a better life. And a lot of them don’t look back basically’. However, she did feel that many young people were now gaining a greater knowledge of Cyprus because of the influence of the supplementary schools:

For the majority, Cyprus was considered to have a significant influence on all Cypriots in Britain. One woman stated: ‘I can say it from my community that any coverage of Cyprus
within the British media or Turkish media, it's just a quick major instinct to stop what you're doing and take in what's happening'. Another woman reiterated this view:

They do, very strongly, because like the newspapers from Turkey and Cyprus are sold here daily, you have cable TV, where you get news continuously, you get Turkish Radio which promotes and says what is going on. As well as the fact that people congregate, the fact that there are political party extensions here, there are the frequent visits backwards and forwards, there are Turkish newspapers published here. So they are very much affected, and the political distinctions and party gatherings also continue here. The majority of people are very aware of what goes on and very influenced by it. But very interestingly also, it perpetuates some of the myths, the young people adopt some of the mythology from parents, about the conflicts between the English and Turks in Cyprus for example. Without having any first hand experience, or even questioning it or analysing it, they adopt it as truth. Which is sad for me, because they have different experiences in this country, they have Greek friends.

Cyprus was therefore considered to have a major influence on Turkish Cypriots in Britain, including many of the second and third generation². This influence, as chapter seven highlighted, also affected their relationships with other minority ethnic groups in Britain, particularly in relation to Greek Cypriots and people from Turkey. The perceived differences that Turkish Cypriots emphasised in relation to these groups, confirming their identity as a distinct ethnic minority and subsequently reinforcing the boundaries of their ethnicity.

There were, therefore, quite significant differences between the two groups of women in relation to their perceptions of the relative importance of Pakistan and Cyprus. The extent to which these differential degrees of influence on the part of Pakistan and Cyprus affect the maintenance of ethnicity and of traditional values and patterns of behaviour is examined in the following sections.
The Maintenance of Ethnic Heritages

The different amount of influence that each group ascribed to Pakistan and Cyprus in relation to the second and third generation, together with their differential citing of culture or religion as the basis of patriarchal norms and values that restricted women within their communities, might lead one to expect a significant contrast between the two groups in terms of their views on the maintenance of their cultural heritages.

As the previous section indicated, Pakistan was considered to have little influence on the second and third generation. Consequently, the majority of the Pakistani women believed that their British identity was becoming increasingly important to the third generation. Several of the women, as highlighted earlier, believed that many young people were emphasising their Muslim identity as primary, because it provided a universal sense of belonging that was not dependent on allegiance to a particular country or place. In addition, it offered a universal set of norms and values covering all aspects of life, which enabled young people to navigate the contradictions and conflicts, they experienced living with two cultural systems. However, a Muslim identity was not the only strategy young people were believed to be adopting to encompass their differing and often conflicting experiences. Instead, many young people were coming to identify themselves as British Asians. In the words of one Pakistani woman:

They say British Asians. They say British first, but Asian afterwards. I said to my son 'You’re a coconut, white from inside, black from outside'. That’s what they all are actually. They’re born in this country, they don’t know what the Asian or Pakistani or Indian thing is all about. I mean we ourselves have not been able to accept going back again and seeing everything there. We couldn’t fit there, where are they going to fit in?

Consequently, she believed that many of the third generation were losing their traditional Pakistani norms and values and adapting their lives much more to the British environment.

To others, however, the ascription of a British Asian identity was seen as a way of acknowledging the importance of the ethnic heritage that they shared with other Asian groups, while at the same time recognising their allegiance to Britain as their home. Many of

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2 As Kucukcan (1999) points out, concern over the Cypriot issue is central to both Turkish Cypriots and people from Turkey.
the women believed that the second and third generations’ experiences of different cultural norms and values living in Britain did not mean that they would necessarily abandon their culture, or that they would experience an identity crisis; most could identify ‘quite happily’ with both. One of the Pakistani women explained:

I don’t really think they’re suffering from an identity crisis to be honest. For some people, they have an identity crisis because they haven’t got both cultures. Most Asians who have both East and West values, they know where they belong, yes they do. They know exactly where they belong, like myself, I should say, I mean I can identify with both.

Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot women also believed that the second generation utilised elements of both British and Turkish Cypriot cultural norms and values. As one young woman commented:

I mean we’re here, we should take something from this society. I mean maybe I’m being contradictory, I’m taking what I like from the British, I’m taking what I like from the Turkish. I mean there’s bits I do like and bits I don’t like and I’m sort of utilising both. I mean stuff like marriage, for instance. OK, yes, I do want to get married but I don’t want an arranged marriage. I would actually like to know someone before I marry them; I would like to have been living with them.

But how could I do that? It’s confusing as well.

However, in terms of the third generation, she felt that they would generally become more British in their lifestyles and less Turkish. Others, however, pointed out that although most of the second generation tended to utilise aspects of both cultural systems, it was the third generation that was most comfortable with this.

The influence of both British and Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot cultural values and traditions was evident in the lifestyles of the women interviewed. Most of the women felt that their home life was fairly equally divided between British and Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot customs and traditions. They believed that because they had been brought up in Britain they had subsequently taken on many British cultural values and behavioural patterns, however, they still maintained certain aspects of their parents’ traditions and cultural values. As a fifty year old Turkish Cypriot woman reported:
Well it's half-and-half I think. I mean you live in a country you have to adapt in everything; otherwise, you become very isolated, you become very stressed and everything. We do try to keep our culture, but you have to adapt to English as well, especially when you have children, otherwise you can't live in the same house.

This view was reiterated by the majority of the women, who felt that it was important to keep some elements of their cultural heritages to pass on to their children. Nevertheless, as highlighted in chapter seven, they also believed that it was necessary to adapt to living in British society, and to provide a balance between the two socio-cultural systems.

Those still living with parents, or in some cases those who had parents living with them, tended to maintain more traditional Turkish or Pakistani customs. When asked to describe her cultural life at home, where she lived with her parents, one young Turkish Cypriot woman stated: 'Some things I think are pretty Turkish but other things are not. Sometimes obviously we argue with our parents about this'. Living at home she felt that she was obliged to 'be more Turkish' than she might otherwise choose to be if she was living on her own or was married. Nevertheless, she felt that her parents' traditional values were still important to her, and that she would wish to maintain certain traditions and customs. Another Turkish Cypriot woman, who was separated from her husband, also felt that she maintained aspects of Turkish culture to a greater extent because her mother lived with her and the children:

I mean if I was on my own with my kids I'd be more European, but my mum is very old fashioned, you know, she's very 'you can't wear shorts, don't wear make-up', you know, she's very behind because that's the way she was brought up. That's why I'm saying, when our kids grow up they're going to be completely different. But there is a lot of the Turkish side, what you wear, what you cook, what you eat, you know, is all based on that sort of side.

A few of the women felt that their home life was far more English culturally, and some of the 'practising' Pakistani women felt that they maintained few Pakistani traditions, but followed a more Islamic framework, infused with various aspects of British culture. In terms of influences that they felt were especially English, many mentioned such things as
entertainment and leisure activities, as well as things like food and dress. The majority of the women celebrated Christmas to a certain extent, although some simply because it was a time when all the family was at home, unlike Eid or Bayram, when most of the family would still be working. In terms of influences that they felt were especially Turkish or Pakistani, they mentioned music, dinner dances, weddings and religious celebrations. Food was one of the major influences for both groups. As a Turkish Cypriot woman commented:

Just the food really, my cooking, that’s it really nothing else (she laughs). I don’t look at myself as anglicised and I don’t look at myself as a normal Turkish Cypriot; I just regard myself as a person first, and then maybe my culture goes into it. It’s just the fact that I do like food, and I learnt cooking from my mum, so that’s the only reason.

These comments illustrate the extent to which the second generation have adapted and changed their lifestyles in comparison to the first generation. All of the women felt that it was important and necessary to adapt to some of the British traditional cultural values, but this did not mean that it was necessary for Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis to abandon their parents’ traditional values and customs completely. Consequently, all of the women, like most of the second and third generation, felt comfortable with this ‘mixing’ of cultural values, which they utilised in different ways and in different contexts.

Some of the informants felt that many of the second generation were taking a renewed interest in their religion and/or culture, as they grew older. A Pakistani woman in her forties stated, ‘we have been enjoying our lives exactly the way we wanted, now we’re running back to ourselves, because you know when you grow up you revert back to your own selves again’. Others pointed out that as people became older and parental pressure had decreased, the second generation was able to appreciate their culture and/or religion to a much greater extent. A young Turkish Cypriot woman stated that she had hated being Turkish when she was at school, but since leaving and especially since working within some of the Turkish speaking communities, her parents’ traditional values had become much more important to her:

I mean we try to adapt to the British way of life, yet try to keep our culture, preserve our culture. But with the pressure I think we become even more
So confused. I remember when I was 18, 19 I used to hate being Turkish (she laughs), you know, because I was never allowed out, even at school when I was 13, 14, never allowed out and I used to say 'Oh, I hate being Turkish', you know. But obviously you realise that there's more to life than that, when you get a bit older, it's important to preserve your culture.

Many of the women believed that the majority of the second and third generation did come to appreciate their ethnic heritages more, in the same way as some of the Pakistani women had developed a greater commitment to Islam as they grew older and their priorities changed. They believed that although many of the traditional Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot values and customs were being modified and adapted in Britain, the core elements would still be maintained by most of the younger generation. Some of the 'practising' Pakistani women, however, hoped that many of the traditional cultural values would be replaced by more Islamic-based values, providing a more Islamic Pakistani heritage. While some Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot customs and traditions were beginning to fade in Britain, the key elements were still being maintained.

Many of the Turkish Cypriot women, however, argued that far from fading, aspects of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 'cultures' were becoming much more prominent in Britain. One woman pointed out that Turkish cultural traditions were now experiencing revival as a direct result of the arrival of more Turks in Britain:

I don't think they're fading to be honest, I think they're resurging more now. Because there's a lot of Turkish people coming into this country, all the weddings are starting again, every week there's a dinner and dance. It's like there's something on every week now, whereas in the late eighties, it was fading, it was like there was nothing basically and they were more embracing English culture, but now I think it's resurging. I mean now you walk through Haringey, before it used to be all Greek shops, now it's all Turkish shops basically. And Green Lanes, it used to be traditionally Cypriot, it's not now: it's Kurds and Turks.

Although the second generation had lost much of their parent's culture and had become very 'western', the third generation were finding their cultural heritages again. As a twenty-year-old...
Turkish Cypriot pointed out, comparing her own experiences at school to those of young people now.

I think before when I was at school, you weren't proud to be Turkish. It was like, you know, if you're Turkish it means your parents don't let you go out, it means you can't have boyfriends, it means you don't drink, you don't smoke, you know, you're parents are really strict. But now there's not so much of that, because there are more Turkish people, it's like there's a lot of people you can relate to. Before, like when I was young, it was like everybody was acting English, acting black, basically being into hiphop and that. It's not like that anymore. There's more, you know, 'I'm into Turkish things, I like my culture', but before you wanted to be something that you weren't, you wanted to have more in common with your English friends, and you would change your name. I had a different name at school; well I was called Emma. People don't have that anymore. All my friends were like that, we used to change our names, my sister was Aisha. It's not like that any more, you admit, you didn't like not admit it, but you would adapt to being English, basically. But kids don't do that any more, they don't need to I don't think.

Many pointed out that Turkish 'cultures' had 'almost been lost' in Britain, but there now seemed to be a 'new sense of pride' about their 'culture'. One woman, who worked in a large Turkish speaking youth centre, believed that the main reason for this cultural revival was the influence of Turkish television, bringing Turkey back into many homes.

But now that's all coming back and I think that's mainly due to the fact, and this is very important I think, that Turkish television plays a big role in promoting Turkishness amongst young people. It's played such a big role in attitude. I mean when Turkish television first came along, we thought 'oh no, turn it off'. But now we look forward to the Turkish programmes in the evening. It's made a very big difference in our community, a very big difference. It's promoted their culture, not so much their religion, but the culture, and the fact that you do get really sort of high fashion imagery from Turkey and it's not such an uncool place. It's just brought Turkey back into their home, in a fun way.
All of the Turkish Cypriot women mentioned the influence of Turkish satellite television, and many felt that this had played a vital role in fostering a positive Turkish identity amongst young people. As one woman commented:

The fact that you now have television, cable TV, I think it was quite an eye-opener for the younger generation to realise that their parents' version of what Turkish culture is, isn't actually what the reality is, because they can see on television that's not the case. There are women who wear bikinis, and there are women who dress in certain ways, and do certain jobs. As well as they can see this in reality because they can go back and meet those people who are lawyers and doctors, go to discos etc. So their parents created this world from their history and cultural background, but that is no longer the case. And the kids can see it with their own eyes; they don't have to take their parents' word for it. So in a way, Satellite TV has led to a shattering of all those ideas, that father and mother know best, and that you do what I say because I know best, because this is how it is in Cyprus, or this is how it is in Turkey. It is no longer valid for the kids. So it's kind of nice, I like it. It can cause some problems, but it's good.

Turkish Cypriot young people, it was argued, were using this increased knowledge of Turkish cultural lifestyles that they had gained from watching Turkish television to question their parents' traditional norms and values. In a similar way that many Pakistani young people were using their increased knowledge of Islam to challenge their parents' cultural values, which they felt inappropriate to their lives in Britain.

Turkish music was another area that many of the Turkish Cypriot women mentioned. Young people were allegedly becoming much more interested in Turkish music than was common when the informants were younger, largely as a result of the influence of Turkish television, but also, as one young woman pointed out, because the tapes and CDs were so much cheaper:

Like before you would never admit that you were into Turkish music, because it was like 'oh my God, you sad person', but now all the young people they go to all the concerts when the singers come over. Because before it was like more old fashioned, it was like the arabesque music, it was like oh my God, and it was
the most depressing music on earth basically. But now it's like pop music, Turkish pop music and good-looking stars and they've got the satellite, and it's like everybody's getting in to it. And even though we haven't got it, we're still in to it as well. And the tapes are really cheap basically, you buy an English CD for £15, a Turkish one's £3, so it's a big difference.

A youth worker also believed that Turkish music had become a lot more popular in the youth centre, among the young people, and there were even Turkish raves now which would have been unheard of when she was at school:

It's surprising, because when I was young we thought it was so uncool to listen to Turkish music. So Turkish young people are getting more into it. There are Turkish raves, that was unknown ten years ago, it would have been so uncool to go to a Turkish rave. The DJ downstairs he used to do like lots of English raves, he's been doing it for years, and now most of his records are Turkish, because that's what he gets requested. It's amazing I think. It's very much like the Bhangra scene, but I would say we're about ten years behind. It's changing. They've created their own culture, sort of fused it with what's happening here. And because of the Turkish television coming into their homes, it's not all culture and Turkishness; it's something new. They're actually influenced by America and Italy and places like that. So some things are completely new and different.

Another woman reiterated this point that the music was not just about simply adopting something from Turkey, but fusing with other music forms that they had experienced living in Britain:

There are some younger people who are actually generating their own music here which is very much influenced by other ethnic minority music particular from the black communities, African Caribbean origin, and rap music from the States which is kind of an expression of living in the ghettos, rebel music. That is very much with the younger generation here.

This synthesising of different cultural elements was not solely confined to the area of music, but to their lives in general, as many of the women pointed out. They believed that the younger generation were not abandoning their parents' culture, or finding themselves torn
between two cultures (contra Anwar 1979), but were creating a new culture and identity for themselves in Britain. An identity that not only represented a synthesis of their experiences and their influences that they considered important to them, but also one that suited their own personal needs and aspirations.

The Pakistani women also believed that the younger generation was forging a new identity for themselves in Britain, fusing together aspects of their parents’ cultures, British cultures and Islamic values. In the opinion of a Pakistani woman:

They've been brought up in a certain way, I don't think it's an adaptation, it's a case of finding their own identity. Look at what they've learnt from their parents' and their culture and religious background, and what they have learnt from British backgrounds' and their religious background. Islam tells you to learn.

But at the same time these new identities also reflected the differing experiences of these young people. Each individual was utilising different elements according to their own specific needs. As a young Pakistani woman commented:

The children attend an English school and they meet with other Muslim, Asian or English friends, so I think the new generation are in a different position to the older generation. That doesn't mean that they want to give up their culture or anything, but they do like to have the best, and decide what is the best for them. What's the best for me might not be the best for someone else. We all have different needs, and our needs are different. I am a Muslim and at the same time I am a Pakistani, but also at the same time I live here, so you take the best of the three.

Second and third generation Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots are therefore synthesising aspects of their cultural heritages with those they have experienced in Britain, actively creating new cultural patterns and identities based on their own individual needs and aspirations.

However, as a Turkish Cypriot woman argued, much of this changing and synthesising of traditional cultures is often criticised by parents and established institutions generally because they think they have the monopoly on traditional culture:
So I think the culture is changing, and it's changing maybe in the ways that parents don't understand, or may not like. But the parents were in a similar position when they were growing up, their parents didn't like what they were interested in or the way they were changing. And this is partly because of the intolerance or some people who actually think they have a monopoly on what culture is. Not only parents, I'm also talking about established institutions: religion may say this is what culture is, or classical music may say this is what culture is. And when we talk about the culture of Britain, or cultures, we can't just talk about one culture. And the danger is that you try and straightjacket communities who share a language, as sharing one single culture which is impossible.

As this comment illustrates, cultures can not be viewed as static and homogeneous entities, which represent a particular place and its people. Cultural heritages are always diverse, always multifaceted, and always in a process of transition. The fusing of different cultural elements on the part of the younger generation, therefore, represents their experiences of other traditions and cultural values growing up in British society, as well as a commitment to certain elements of Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot cultural traditions and values. As Anwar (1998) and Kucukcan (1999) argue, they represent both continuity and change in the lives of the second and third generation.

The Importance of Mother Tongue Languages

The maintenance of mother tongue languages is often viewed as an indication of ethnic allegiance, and is believed to be one of the first elements to disappear over the generations among migrants. For all of the informants, the maintenance of mother tongue languages among future generations of Pakistanis and Turkish Cypriots in Britain was considered important. Some felt that it was vital in order to keep in touch with relatives in Pakistan or Cyprus, others felt that it was a way of passing on elements of their cultural heritages to their children. According to a young Turkish Cypriot, for example: 'I think it is important because you have to preserve your culture and obviously the language is part of the culture'. In
addition, the inability of some young people to speak and understand their parents' language was believed to lead to a lack of communication between parents and children, and subsequently to a lack of understanding for the second generation of their religion and culture.

There was a significant contrast here between the two groups in terms of the number of languages spoken and the degree of fluency. Among the Pakistani women, the majority spoke Urdu to some extent, but several of the women also spoke Punjabi and one could speak Arabic as well. Indeed many of these women could read Arabic in order to study the Qur'an in its original language, but only one of the Pakistani women could understand or translate it. The others relied instead on the English translation. Two of the women had been to school in Pakistan and were therefore fluent in Urdu; one had also taken Urdu at GCSE and A-level. All but one of the remaining women could speak Urdu to some degree although few could read or write it. One of the women spoke no other languages at all; her parents were from mixed ethnic backgrounds, her father from Pakistan and her mother from Malaysia. They had always spoken English in the home. All the Turkish Cypriot women spoke Turkish and could read and write it to a certain extent. One young woman also spoke Greek. Her mother had come from a bi-communal village and preferred speaking Greek to Turkish. Five of the women considered themselves fluent in Turkish, and two of these stated that they were bilingual. One of these women had been to school in Cyprus; the other had lived there for a year after her marriage.

Generally it was believed that the majority of the second generation can speak their mother tongue, but to a limited extent. In addition, although the majority of women spoke mainly Urdu, Punjabi or Turkish to their parents, and often used it in their work, they very rarely spoke it with friends or siblings. Several of the women said that they felt a great loss at not being able to speak Urdu or Turkish fluently. As a Pakistani woman lamented:

I feel the loss inside me, because when I am with the Asian community I feel that they make fun of me when I speak Punjabi or Urdu because they are obviously more equipped and more versatile. And I just happen to say something which is not the right word, you see. And I feel as if I am illiterate. And if you want to work with an organisation or want to go back you are at a loss
because you can't mix with them so much. I feel that when I'm with the Asians who have the know-how of the language, I do feel inferior to them, very much. No matter how educated I feel I am, I am totally out of touch. And when they speak to each other using different speeches I am on a different level because I don't understand. So I feel sad, we should have that language.

Furthermore, many of the women felt that although they were keen to teach their children Turkish or Urdu, their own inability to speak the language properly meant that the third generation would have even greater difficulties learning it. They felt that it was important for Urdu, Punjabi or Turkish to be spoken in the home in order that the younger generation could become more familiar with it.

However, although many of the women were concerned that their mother tongue might be lost with the third or fourth generation as a result of their own lack of knowledge, several felt that with the increase in supplementary schools for Pakistani and Turkish speaking young people many of the third generation were now learning Urdu or Turkish to a far greater degree than their parents. As one woman suggested:

I think maybe we've lost one generation, my generation for example didn't have the opportunities that are around now because there weren't as many Turkish people and most of the families who came here in the fifties and sixties were struggling to survive. But the next generation, like my children's generation, are far luckier because we've got the schools, we know more about it, we speak both languages, whereas our parents didn't speak both languages, so it was difficult to find out where to get information. But now this generation has my children for example, my older daughter did A-level in Turkish, she passed that. Her Turkish is much better than mine, technically speaking. I speak slang Turkish; she speaks far more what the proper Turkish is. She corrects me, which for me, I mean I never thought that my children would one day grow up and have that Turkish language on that level, which is wonderful. But that is because of these voluntary groups that are around, and it is possible.

One of the Turkish Cypriot women had been directly responsible for setting up some of the first Turkish supplementary schools in London, and establishing O-level/GCSE and A-
level classes in Turkish. She argued that many of the second generation, who are now parents themselves, are encouraging their children to learn Turkish; for them to attend supplementary school was a way of maintaining the culture. She felt that such classes have been vital for young people: 'it was important because it gave self-confidence to the kids. These kids who would not even have thought about being GCE, in those days, material; they were able to pass in Turkish, which gave them a confidence and a boost about being able to tackle other classes and other subjects'. Since this time, the number of Turkish supplementary schools has grown significantly in London, and many of the young people seem as keen as their parents to learn Turkish. She stated:

I think for some kids, that's almost like an assertion that they're different and they're OK being different. It's an assertion against racism, the racism of the school system for example, which still does not allow bilingual children the space to be comfortable with their language or value it. The message that is given to the kids is you're not OK speaking your mother-tongue, and for some kids that's almost like claiming that, and creating almost like a sub-culture, a youth culture, in wanting to maintain their language and wanting to exert that feeling of identity. And also at times, what always happens in sub-cultures, is that when they're talking to their friends, they get a buzz talking in a language that the teacher doesn't understand. So there are a lot of reasons for kids to go, apart from the parental reasons for sending kids.

Language was considered one of the many ways in which a greater pride in being Turkish or Turkish Cypriot was being expressed by young people. Several mentioned that although they would never have spoken Turkish at school themselves, it was becoming more common in recent years. Young Turkish speaking people no longer felt embarrassed about being Turkish or felt they had to hide it as many of the women claimed they had felt. However, as one bilingual woman shrewdly observed, although for some speaking Turkish was seen as an affirmation of their identity and of their cultural heritages, this was not reflected in their desire to acquire information in Turkish. Thus, as she pointed out: 'There is quite an interesting dilemma there, their opinions are formed without having total access and command of the language'.
Although both the Pakistani and the Turkish Cypriot women considered the maintenance of language to be important, the Turkish Cypriots seemed to be much more certain about its survival. Generally second and third generation Turkish Cypriots seem to have a greater command of Turkish. An advice worker for a Turkish speaking youth centre argued that this was largely because the Turkish-speaking community was so tightly knit, and because many of the young people eventually ended up working within their own communities, often in family run businesses or shops. In addition, it could also be argued that because Cyprus is very near and fairly inexpensive to travel to, young Turkish Cypriots tend to visit quite regularly. This is also likely to improve their language skills.

However, it is also important to point out that although Urdu is the official language of Pakistan, it is estimated that only one-tenth of the population use it as their first language. Punjabi is spoken by about half of all households, with Pashto, Sindhi, Saraiki, and Baluchi also spoken by many people. For many Pakistanis, therefore, it is not simply a case of learning two languages, Urdu and English, but often three or four, Punjabi being spoken by many of the first generation, as well as learning Arabic for religious translation. Such diversity is bound to lead to a ‘watering down’ of language acquisition on the part of Pakistani young people. What language tuition is available in the Madrassahs and some of the Pakistani centres, is always Urdu, which is often a language with which the second and third generation is unfamiliar. Nevertheless, the views of the women on the decreasing influence of Pakistan on the younger generation, and the fact that visits to the country are becoming much less frequent, may also be a contributing factor to the lack of interest in learning Urdu on the part of young Pakistanis.

Identity and Belonging

As highlighted earlier, the Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani informants displayed significant contrasts in terms of their attitudes and opinions towards their religion and their parents’ countries of origin. At the end of the interview the women were asked ‘Which of the following do you most identify with?’ The categories included Pakistani, Asian or Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, Cypriot, British and Muslim. The responses to this question again reiterate the major
contrast between the two groups of women. All but two of the Pakistani women felt that being Muslim was the most important part of their identity. One considered themselves to be first and foremost Asian, and another felt that the most specific she could be in defining herself was a ‘Pakistani Black Briton’. Among the Turkish Cypriot women on the other hand, twelve considered their Turkish Cypriot identity to be the most important to them, two stressed Cypriot, and one woman considered herself to be British and Turkish equally. Many of the women also mentioned other categories that they considered important to them, but most chose one as primary.

For the overwhelming majority of the Turkish Cypriot women, their Turkish Cypriot identity was fundamental to their sense of identity. The reaction of a 48-year-old woman was interesting:

'I've never thought of it like that before. I think what is very important to me is that people know me as a Turkish Cypriot, I'm very proud to be a Turkish Cypriot because for years we kept it hidden. We never talked about what a Turkish Cypriot was, they never identified us as Turkish Cypriot or even Turkish. And I'm proud to be a Turkish Cypriot, there are times when I'm not very proud, we're not 100% in everything we do, there are lots of wrongs, but I am very proud of it.'

One woman, who had been born in Cyprus, argued that it was important to publicise the fact that she was Turkish Cypriot because she believed that Turkish Cypriots generally received less recognition in Britain than Greek Cypriots:

'I'm a Turkish Cypriot British person, so to speak. I'm Turkish Cypriot first, because of my beliefs about my own original country so I do publicise that, because of the war implications and the division of the country and how I feel that our particular community has not had the recognition perhaps as much as the Greek Cypriot community. So I do publicise it in that way. It's not the fact that I don't want to live with Greek Cypriots, that's another issue, it's the fact that we've been undermined so to speak.'

This comment reiterates some of the views expressed earlier and in chapter seven about the continued importance of the Cyprus issue and of the distinction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the maintenance of Turkish Cypriot ethnicity. However, while the overwhelming
majority of informants identify themselves first and foremost as being Turkish Cypriot, two of
the women stated that they considered themselves Cypriot rather than Turkish Cypriot. One
of these women, who had been born in Cyprus, asserted:

I'm Turkish Cypriot, but I would actually say that I'm Cypriot, more than saying
I'm a Turkish Cypriot. I think I identify with that strongest, and within that division
I would call myself a Turkish Cypriot because of my origins. But from emotional
and intellectual commitment, and how I identify myself, I identify myself as a
Cypriot, which is very rare in our communities, and then I'm a Turkish Cypriot
within that. But very much I know that I am also something which I've created
myself, which it's not possible to define in certain categories. So I'm a Cypriot
living in London, which doesn't say very much (she laughs), and a woman.
The other woman had been born in Britain, but her family had come from a bi-communal
village in Cyprus. She subsequently believed that she had much in common with Greek
Cypriots, and indeed her mother preferred speaking Greek to Turkish. Both of these women
were actively participating in groups in Britain aimed at resolving the problems in Cyprus.

Only one of the Turkish Cypriot women mentioned being Muslim as an important part
of her identity, and this she stated came very much third, after Turkish Cypriot and British.
Nevertheless she found it offensive to be referred to as a Muslim, but instead wanted to be
recognised as Turkish Cypriot:

I find now that politicians don't refer to us any more by nationality, but they're
using more religion, and I object to that. I object to being called Muslims. I'm not
saying that I am ashamed or don't want to admit I'm Muslim, but I'm a Turkish
Cypriot and I want to be called a Turkish Cypriot. You find politicians nowadays
are using that because of the way Iran is now.

This comment again reiterates the views of the Turkish Cypriot informants towards their
religion and the fact that Islam was considered to have little importance for the majority of
Turkish Cypriots.

Only five of the Turkish Cypriot women mentioned Britain as an important part of their
identity, and this was always considered very much second to their Turkish Cypriot identity.
Four of the informants said that they could not consider themselves British, despite the fact
that they regarded Britain as their home. Nevertheless, one woman who had been born in
Cyprus commented that despite not identifying with being British she would still defend it
against criticism.

I'm Turkish Cypriot, I can't say I'm a British subject. I always have been, and my
parents, my grandparents, etc, because Cyprus is under British rule, but I am
still Turkish Cypriot. But equally you will find amongst the second generation that
if someone says something bad about Britain you defend it. The worst is during
Turkey versus England football matches, people don't know who to support.

For the majority of the Turkish Cypriot women, however, being British was not mentioned at
all, or if it was, it was merely considered to represent a passport to them. In the words of one
young British-born woman:

I don't say I'm English, although I was born here, I'm Turkish Cypriot. Probably
because of my parents, but we've had debates about this in the past. People
have said 'but you're British', but I never say I'm British, I feel more Turkish.

The responses of the Turkish Cypriot women are markedly different from those of the
Pakistani women. Not only did the overwhelming majority of the Pakistani women consider
their Muslim identity to be the most important to them, a much greater number also identified
with being British, and only four of the women considered their Pakistani identity to be of any
relevance at all. The majority of the women described themselves as 'British Asian Muslims'
or simply 'British Muslims', thus highlighting their allegiances to both Islam and their country
of residence. All of the women who considered themselves 'practising Muslims' stated that
that being a Muslim had helped them to deal with many of the conflicts and contradictions
that living in Britain can produce for second and third generation Pakistanis. One young
woman, who considered herself to be a Muslim first and foremost, nevertheless also
identified with living in Britain. She felt that for her there was no conflict being a Muslim
woman in Britain, for she had all the rights she needed to practise her religion. Furthermore,
she felt that her British identity was of far greater relevance to her than being Pakistani,
despite having a Pakistani passport. Another young woman explained how discovering Islam
had given her a clearer sense of identity than she had previously felt, being of mixed
parentage and living in Britain:
I was wondering about this for a very long time, so that my identity could have been anything. But recently, having learnt all about Islam, I definitely would say that being Muslim is the most important to me, definitely. Even now, when I go to visit my Asian family, because I'm not completely Asian, I'm not completely accepted, and by my Chinese family, I'm not completely accepted either. I used to let it bother me, but I don't care any more, because I feel good about myself, I have Islam.

Another felt that becoming a 'practising' Muslim had also helped her come to terms with her British identity.

I used to really hate living in Britain. I used to really hate it because I felt that to be British was to be white. So I hated being British, but now I say this is my home, I couldn't live anywhere else. And being British is important to me too because in this country there is so much more opportunity for me as a coloured Muslim woman. Here I've found that some of my friends have had other opportunities.

Several of the 'practising' Pakistani women felt that being a Muslim had helped them to deal with racism and prejudice more easily. One woman reported that she had subsequently grown to like English people more since becoming more religious:

I'll tell you since I've become Islamic I don't hate the English as much as I did before. The reasoning is that I see them in a different light. Before I was feeling that they were biased, they do this and that. I mean if there's a racist in English, there's a racist in black, Asian, everywhere. So I don't see it from that point of view. I look at them, they are very humane people, you know, I admire that, very just and humane and Allah has given you all that you want. There's no poverty in your lives, you've got whatever you want, it's like a heaven for you in one respect.

Among the two women who did not cite being Muslim as the main influence on their sense of identity, Britain was also considered important to them. One young woman stated that although she identified with being both Muslim and Pakistani it was her British and Asian identity that she considered most important to her. 'I would consider myself a British Asian,
I've been brought up here and I've mixed with different people'. Another woman initially considered herself to be a Black Briton, but also felt that her Pakistani and Muslim identity were equally integral to her sense of self, as she explains:

Well I said before Black Briton, but then I would also have to add in Pakistani, born in Black Briton, something like that. It's very confusing, there are just so many different things that affect me, that shape me, that I've been influenced by, that I couldn't pinpoint it down to one thing. So I wouldn't say I'm a Pakistani person first and foremost, I wouldn't say I'm necessarily black first and foremost, or British first and foremost. It's a combination of all those things. I don't know if anybody's come up with a term yet. I mean I know at college, everybody who was non-white called themselves black, only because it just represented someone who was non-white, and that's how I used to call myself black. Ethnically it's a little bit difficult now; I'm a mixture of everything, so I'd find that hard. And I don't feel sufficiently strong about my Pakistani identity or my British identity or even my kind of religious identity. It's all three, I'm shaped by all three.

Furthermore, she pointed out that defining herself as Pakistani was very different from her parents' own definition:

Yes there's differences, they're probably more passioned about it and I'm not. To me it's just one of those things, you know, I don't feel the same love for the country. Having said that if there's a cricket match and Pakistan is playing I'm like very nationalistic all of a sudden. And if anybody says something derogatory about Pakistan I do find myself getting very uptight. So there must be something inside of me that doesn't like that. But I wouldn't say I have this kind of yearning to go back. There isn't the same passion that my parents have.

These comments highlight the complex processes involved in identity formation and the range of different influences that can affect these processes for specific individuals. They also demonstrate the major contrast between the two groups. For the majority of the Pakistani women interviewed, their religion would seem to form the main basis of their identity, as suggested in much of the literature on Pakistanis in Britain. For the Turkish
Cypriots, it was their nationality that was overwhelmingly cited as forming the basis of their identity.

The importance that the women placed on either their Muslim or Turkish Cypriot identity can also be seen quite clearly in their preference for suitable marriage partners. As marriage is often seen as the fundamental element in the maintenance of ethnicity among minority groups, preferences for marriage partners is therefore a significant determinant of ethnic or religious consciousness. Two of the single Pakistani women stated that they would prefer to marry another Pakistani. Two felt that nationality was unimportant as long as they were Muslim, and one believed that religion and nationality were unimportant in terms of a suitable marriage partner. One woman, who identified herself as a Pakistani Black Briton, explained her reasons for preferring a Pakistani partner as follows:

I guess over the last couple of years my own ideas have changed and I think yes, I'd like to marry someone Pakistani. Partly because I suppose I feel that if I had children I would like to be able to pass on the kind of religious and cultural thing to them, and there's a common understanding about the way we'd like to live our lives together, and what's expected of us, by Islam as well. Because if I was married to a non-Muslim, I don't know if that person would be able to understand. It would be very unfair to marry someone who wouldn't know what he was letting himself in for. So I guess at least you know what the boundaries are if you're married to a Pakistani guy.

Among my Turkish Cypriot informants, however, one had no intention of getting married, the other three single women all felt that they would prefer to marry someone Turkish or Turkish Cypriot because they felt they would understand them better and that it was important for the children. One of the women stated that she would prefer to marry a Turkish Cypriot herself and would also like her future children to do the same. She felt it was important in terms of passing on the culture:

Yes (she laughs), yes, I'm quite old fashioned aren't I for a 25 year old. Maybe it's an ideal, I don't know, I don't like to think of myself as idealistic. It's to do with the family as well, I mean you just don't want there to be any conflict within the family. Before it wouldn't have mattered that much, when I was 18 or 19. I
would've said 'well it's got nothing to do with my parents, it's my life and I just want to be happy'. But they've kind of done so much for us, they've had a struggle, they've come here and they've struggled a lot. They expect us to marry a Turk, and it would be nice if we could. It would be nice for our children as well.

It's hard enough with the two cultures we have now, I mean English and Turkish.

Of those informants who were already married, all had Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot partners except two, a Turkish Cypriot and a Pakistani woman both had white 'English' husbands. The majority felt that it was important to marry someone of a similar ethnic background, and many hoped their children would do likewise, although they all pointed out that their children would be free to choose their own partner, regardless of religious or ethnic background. Indeed, one woman who spoke about her children's future marriages said she had changed her opinion on this issue since becoming a 'practising' Muslim:

I said to them choose your own, but it's up to you. If you want me to choose it's fine, if you want to choose your own, as long as they're Pakistani it's OK. But now I say to them, as long as they're Muslim I don't care which country she's from. That's changed my values hasn't it, traditionally? Isn't that amazing? I said to them anyone really. Because you know when you are all Islamic, and when you are all practising Muslim, do you know something, whether you're Indian or Jamaican, because tradition is not important there, and you go the Islamic way, there's no problem. There's no culture in there any way. Tradition and culture doesn't come into Islam when people are together from different backgrounds. Isn't that amazing?

All of the 'practising' Pakistani women felt similarly in terms of their own or their children's marriages, again emphasising the distinction they made between the importance of religion and that of culture.

These preferences which the informants displayed, again outline the differing attitudes towards their religion, their parents' country of origin and traditional cultural values. All of the women preferred a partner for themselves or their children who mirrored their own orientations, allegiances and aspirations. However, these marriage preferences are not simply significant in terms of crystallising and supporting individual categories of self-
categorisation, they are also indicative of the very survival of Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot ethnicity in Britain. As Kucukcan (1999) argues, the specific Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani communities in Britain owe their existence and survival to marriage between their members. It is these marriages that help safeguard the continuation of traditional ethnic norms and values, and reproduce the bonds of ethnicity by forming new relations between families, and subsequently widening social networks of family and kin.

The changing preferences among the ‘practising’ Pakistani women for ‘Islamic’, as distinct from simply Pakistani, partners, therefore demonstrate the re-prioritising of religion over that of ethnicity or nationality. Nevertheless, as an ‘Islamic’ preference does not of course preclude Pakistanis, and as the majority of parents would still prefer their children to marry another Pakistani, the likelihood is that for the time being at least few will marry outside their communities. Despite the changes reported in marriage and wedding norms, as highlighted in the previous chapter, marriage is likely to remain a central value within the Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot communities, further reinforcing traditional ethnic values and patterns of relationships and behaviour. The prioritising of a Muslim or Islamic identity over that of a Pakistani ethnic identity among many of the second and third generation, could however have a profound effect on maintenance of a specific Pakistani ethnicity in the future, especially if young people begin to choose Muslim partners from other ethnic groups. Among the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, the continued commitment to a Turkish Cypriot identity and marriage partners from the same ethnic group would seem to indicate that their ethnicity is still very strong, with events in Cyprus and relations with other ethnic groups in Britain further reinforcing their identity as a distinct ethnic group.

Summary

The discussions presented in this chapter, while demonstrating the diverse range of attitudes held by my informants, nevertheless allow for certain clear distinctions to be made between the two groups. Although religion can be seen to have a major influence on the lives of Pakistanis in Britain, as indicated in much of the literature, the influence of Pakistan and of Pakistani customs and traditions was generally considered much less important. It is
interesting to note that those who considered themselves less religious tended to be less critical of their parents' traditional norms and values and country of origin than those who considered themselves to have a greater commitment to Islam. For the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, the influence of Cyprus was believed to be very important, distinguishing them clearly from other groups. This distinction is apparent not only in relation to their attitudes towards, and opinions of, Islam and Cyprus, but also in terms of their strong commitment to the maintenance of their language and their preference for Turkish Cypriot marriage partners. These were considered vital for the maintenance of their Turkish Cypriot identity.

Another significant contrast between the two groups was their degree of allegiance to Britain. While all of the women considered Britain their home, the Pakistani women seemed to be able to identify with being British more easily than the Turkish Cypriot women. Country of birth does not seem to be a factor here, as many women born in Pakistan or Cyprus identified with being British as readily as those born in Britain. Rather, this contrast seems to indicate, as Afshar (1993) and Jacobson (1997) point out, that a Muslim or Islamic identity enables young Pakistanis to navigate the contradictions that they experience between Pakistani and British cultural norms and values. An Islamic identity provides a more universal source of identity with clear-cut and pervasive boundaries that do not depend on allegiance to a specific country. Being Muslim does not prevent individuals from identifying with Pakistan or with Britain, but it helps them make sense of some of the contradictions that they experience.

The majority of the Turkish Cypriot women, on the other hand, believed that their allegiance to Cyprus and the importance they placed on their Turkish Cypriotness, together with their awareness of racial and ethnic discrimination in Britain, made it more difficult for them to identify with 'being British', despite the fact that they considered it their home.

Despite these differences, a factor common to both groups was the extent to which their identities and allegiances were not necessarily dependent on their observance of religious or cultural norms and values. Although all but two of the Pakistani women considered Islam to be very important to them and to constitute the basis of their identity, the majority of the women did not observe all of the Islamic laws; and indeed, many did not try to.

Similarly, among the Turkish Cypriot women, their allegiance to Cyprus was considered a
major influence on their identity as Turkish Cypriots, or Cypriots, and despite the recent interest in Turkish cultural traditions, their maintenance of traditional values and customs was very similar to that of the Pakistani women. Thus in Hutnik's (1991) terms, their individual 'strategies of self-categorisation' are not dependent on their 'style of cultural adaptation'. Many of the women do not have to behave as 'traditional' Muslims or Turkish Cypriots in order to feel like them. It is their method of ethnic or religious identification that is important, of which their allegiances, social and cultural values and patterns of behaviour form a part.

These different 'styles of cultural adaptation' reflect the different cultural and social experiences that the second and third generation have experienced. Growing up in British society they have obviously been influenced by their surroundings. Nevertheless, it is clear that the younger generation is not completely abandoning their parents' way of life in favour of British norms and values, nor does it seem that they are finding themselves 'torn between two cultures', as some commentators have suggested. It would appear that the second generation is astute enough to adapt to both cultural systems. What the findings of the research demonstrate is that second and third generation Turkish Cypriots and Pakistanis, such as the women interviewed, are in the process of actively creating a new role and identity for themselves in British society, utilising established beliefs and traditions from both British and Pakistani/Turkish Cypriot cultural systems. There are aspects of both that they can use to construct appropriate roles for themselves in Britain.

What it is important to emphasise here is that this process of cultural redefinition is not purely a case of individuals choosing one ideology over another or, indeed, selecting elements from several ideologies. In order to understand why one cultural model triumphs over another it is necessary to analyse the structural constraints and historical circumstances within which such cultural models compete for supremacy. Factors such as 'race', ethnicity, class and gender inevitably affect the choices that individuals make. What is significant about these new 'hybridised' ethnicities (Bhabha 1994, Hannerz 1992) is the way in which difference is appropriated and given meaning by the individual, and how it is used as a basis of collective identification. At the same time it is essential to heed Anthias's (1999) criticisms of the way in which 'hybridity' has been used, especially the implication that the dominant
groups' power to define cultural boundaries has been seceded in hybridised cultures. It is these issues that will be addressed in the conclusion.
Conclusion

In chapter one I explored debates about the concepts of ethnicity and culture, highlighting some of the criticisms levelled at studies of ethnicity in Britain. It was argued that while any concept of ethnicity must acknowledge the desires of specific groups to maintain a sense of common identity and cultural exclusion, such a concept must also take account of the structural processes that affect all members of society. It must be acknowledged above all that different individuals and ethnic groups possess different degrees of power. What is needed therefore is a redefinition of the concepts of ethnicity and culture which goes beyond a purely descriptive account of cultural attributes and belief systems but encompasses the social, political and economic processes that shape these beliefs. Cultural beliefs are not fixed and impermeable, but flexible, dynamic and continually changing, formed and transformed in relation to the historically specific structural processes operating in a given society. Such a perspective enables us to view culture in terms of the processes, categories and knowledges through which communities are defined, that is, how they are rendered specific and differentiated.

Furthermore, an emphasis on the social construction of difference acknowledges the fact that individuals play an active role in the creation, maintenance and transformation of meaning. Nevertheless this process takes place within particular historical and structural contexts that limit individual choices and make certain behaviour and cultural responses more likely than others. In order to understand the factors that influence these processes, it is necessary to examine social consciousness, inter-group behaviour and social structure.

Ethnicity, in this light, can be seen as a way of articulating every day life in and through the processes of boundary formation. It represents the way in which notions of difference and commonality are created, transformed and resisted, as well as how they are influenced by the specific political, cultural and historical forces in operation (Brah 1996). The significance of ethnicity lies in the particular power relations that operate to articulate these differences. These power relations produce and reproduce patterns of domination and subordination within and
across different fields of social differentiation, which affect individuals and groups in different and often contrasting ways.

The analysis of interview data in chapters six, seven and eight, supports the claim that Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women display difference and diversity in terms of their experiences and identities. They are also actively shaping their own identities and destinies in response to these diverse experiences, producing new strategies of action. Yet they are inherently influenced and affected by the structural processes operating in British society. Chapter six demonstrated the importance of interaction with others of both similar and different ethnicities for the creation, maintenance and transformation of ethnicity. ‘Race’, ethnicity, class, gender and generations are all significant factors, but they are experienced in different ways producing diverse and multiple outcomes. The greater interaction and participation of the second generation provide them with more resources for managing ethnic disadvantage. Similarly, the middle classes also have more opportunities and choices available to them as a result of their greater resources. Nevertheless, they too must operate within the confines of multiple social, political, economic and historical processes that locate them within different fields of social differentiation producing contradictory social outcomes.

The exploration of the influence of gender in chapter seven highlighted the significance of gender relations to the maintenance and transformation of ethnicity and identity. Pakistani and Turkish Cypriot women were believed to face specific difficulties arising from traditional patriarchal norms and values that seek to control their identity and conduct. The views of my informants on the issues of major importance to second-generation women were very similar; these concerned the need for more freedom in relation to marriage, education and employment. It was believed that some aspects of traditional values needed to be transformed in order to allow women to develop their own potentials, and to fulfil their own desires and aspirations. Resisting gender oppression for these women does not merely involve challenging the dominant discourses, institutions and practices of wider society where ‘race’, class, gender and ethnicity combine to produce and reproduce their subordination; it also requires challenging prejudice and discrimination from within their own communities that combine to restrict their choices further.
Nevertheless, it is clear from the analysis that these multiple forms of oppression and discrimination are not experienced uniformly by my informants, nor are they experienced in a void. The women’s own experiences, attitudes and aspirations are crucial for an understanding of their position in society. While they may have been in agreement over the major priorities for Turkish Cypriot and Pakistani women in Britain, they differed considerably in terms of where they felt the cause of these inequalities rested, as well as in the strategies they chose to adopt in addressing these priorities.

These differences were highlighted further in chapter eight, which identified significant contrasts both within and between the two groups of informants. The majority of the Pakistani women considered Islam to be the most important element in their identity, and were critical of many Pakistani cultural norms and values that they believed were oppressive to women. The Turkish Cypriot women, on the other hand, believed that Cyprus was still an importance influence on individuals, and the majority considered their Turkish Cypriot identity to be most important to them. They were also critical of Islamic norms and values which, they believed, brought about inequality between men and women within their communities.

Identity

Why did the majority of Turkish Cypriot respondents identify primarily with being Turkish Cypriot, and the majority of Pakistanis with being Muslim? Part of the answer to this question lies with the history of Pakistan and Cyprus themselves, yet my informants’ experiences in Britain are also crucial to an understanding of this contrast of identities. Pakistan was created to provide a separate Islamic state for Indian Muslims, and was granted independence from India by the British at the end of their colonial rule in 1947. Although initially the country consisted of two parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, in 1972 the latter established the independent state of Bangladesh. For Pakistanis, therefore, religion is the principal focus of their national identity. It is their religion that makes them distinct from other Asian groups with whom they are most closely identified. Religion played an important role in creating the feelings of minority status both in India and Britain, differentiating them from other ethnic groups. The Pakistanis’ conception of
themselves as a religious minority has been reinforced further by anti-Islamic feelings in the West. The Rushdie affair and the Gulf war provided focal points for the mobilisation of Muslims in Britain committed to maintaining Islamic values. These events acted as a catalyst for many young Pakistanis who had begun to question their parents’ religious and cultural values. With their religion under attack, young Pakistanis joined forces with their elders in defence of Islam and of their rights as a religious minority in Britain.

For Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, the conflicts in Cyprus have much more to do with maintaining their rights as a Turkish minority. Disputes between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots can be seen in terms of the Greek Cypriots’ desire for union with Greece, on the one hand, and the Turkish Cypriots’ desire to maintain their rights as a Turkish minority on the other. Language, ethnicity, and religion all contributed to these disputes. Bitterness and hostility increased between the two groups with the threat of intervention of Turkey and Greece, which continued throughout the 1960s. In 1974, Greek Cypriots in opposition to the President staged a coup and Turkey used her treaty rights to intervene militarily. The Turks gained control of the northern third of the island and the Turkish Cypriots set up their own administration. In 1983 the Turkish Cypriots declared their own Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The identity of Turkish Cypriots in Britain is further reinforced by relations with other ethnic groups, and in particular with Greek Cypriots and Turks, as chapter six highlighted. The majority perceive the persistence of the unequal distribution of power between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Britain as a factor prolonging the dispute. On the one hand, there is more equality in Britain than there is in Cyprus; on the other, rivalries and disputes persist in Britain and are projected on to multicultural identity. There would be more chance of a united Cypriot identity in Britain if there were less inequality between the two communities. This is linked to their failure to attract public attention in Britain, for example, in terms of underachievement. This is much more of a problem for Turkish Cypriots than it is for Greek Cypriots, again reinforcing the different power relations between them. All of this rests on ethnic identity as distinct from religion to a large extent, but closely related to national identity.
Turkish Cypriots are as keen to preserve their distinct way of life and their language in Britain as they are in Cyprus. With reference to religion, however, their more relaxed approach to Islam was considered a significant factor in distinguishing them from people from Turkey. A more passive approach to religion is therefore believed to be part of their Cypriot identity. For many, to become more religious means becoming more Turkish and less Cypriot. Although there has been a slight increase in religious activity among Turkish people in London, many informants suggested that this had come about since the migration of more people from Turkey. Turks, it was argued, are in a different situation from Turkish Cypriots. They have always been considered more religious and more 'traditional' than Turkish Cypriots, which may help to explain their distinctiveness. In addition, in Turkey they have the history of having to fight for their religious rights as a result of the secularisation of Turkey under Kemalism. Culture is not an issue, but religion is. The situation is still the same in Britain. The recent rise in religious activity in Turkey is therefore beginning to filter into Britain as the number of Turks has increased.

These differences are significant not only in terms of their influence on both individual and collective identities, but also in terms of their sense of belonging and allegiance to Britain. Although the majority of my informants regarded Britain as 'home', the Pakistani women seemed to be much more able to envisage a British identity than did the Turkish Cypriots. This confirms the distinction between religious and ethnic identities, outlined by Jacobson (1997, 1998) who argues that the greater significance of religion as a source of social identity lies in the contrast between the universal relevance of Islam with its clear-cut and pervasive boundaries and that of the increasingly permeable boundaries of Pakistani ethnicity that relates to a particular place and its people. Islam with its central concept of umma and its detailed code of behaviour covering all aspects of daily life provides a much more concrete and all-embracing source of identity than the flexible, constantly fluctuating boundaries of ethnicity or nation (Jacobson 1997, 1998).

In this way, Islam can be seen as providing a universal set of prescriptions that enable young people to deal with the ambiguities and contradictions they experience in their lives. Whilst in practice, religious and ethnic boundaries are not so clear-cut, but closely interrelated, they are increasingly coming to be seen as separate or alternative bases of self-definition. This
situation shows some similarities with that of black identity in the 1970s, in the sense that it provided a means by which different Muslim groups and communities could come together to and produce a potential challenge to their marginalised position in British society and increase their rights of representation. Religion, therefore, is a useful platform for challenging British racist imperialism, which seems to be so evident in the recent anti-Islam propaganda. It is important to point out, however, that this strategy is only one of those available to Muslim women in Britain. In addition, Muslims in Britain have as yet failed to contain internal differences in their attempts to develop a unified solidarity (Hall 1991, Afshar 1994, Brah 1996).

Although many of the Pakistanis were critical of other Muslims who sought to push forward their views on religion with which they did not agree, this did not make them any less religious. They were just more prepared to challenge such views. Similarly, Turkish Cypriots still see negative aspects of their culture, with which they disagree, but this does not make them any less Turkish Cypriot and feel less proud of their identity. They merely seek to transform those aspects that they consider inappropriate to their own lives in Britain. A renewed pride in being Turkish Cypriot or being Muslim is part of that. It is through criticism that many come to appreciate the positive sides of their religious or ethnic heritage. Criticism of their religion or ethnicity makes them focus on the positive side to a greater extent.

This is very different from the idea that ethnic minorities are forced back to their religion or culture as a result of rejection from white mainstream society. This is not reactive ethnicity; the ethnic or religious allegiance was already there. Criticism of it allowed many informants to focus on the positive side and for them to realise just how important it was to them. In addition, they seek positive identification with religion or ethnicity in order to achieve solidarity, to form a common basis for struggle and resistance to this threat and criticism. For those who have limited ethnic or religious allegiance the effect would not be the same, the foundations would not be there. Furthermore, these foundations are reinforced by others, by Muslim, Pakistani or Turkish Cypriot institutions, by Urdu or Turkish supplementary schools, by regular trips to Cyprus, Turkish music, Turkish television, etc.
Thus while both sets of informants face similar problems and difficulties arising from their experiences of ‘race’, gender, class, and ethnicity, they are adopting different strategies for dealing with these experiences, as exemplified in their different identities. These different identities, however, do not seem to be dependent on religious or ethnic observance on the part of individuals. As Hutnik (1991) notes, their ‘strategies of self-categorisations’ may be quite unconnected to their ‘styles of cultural adaptation’ and may subsequently obtain ‘functional autonomy’.

If ethnicity, allegiance, and belonging are not dependent on styles of cultural adaptation, what are they dependent on? Whether an individual identifies first and foremost as Muslim or Turkish Cypriot, Asian or British, it does not preclude that individual from identifying with other factors and the cultural values and norms associated with them. This is the idea behind hybridised identities. The idea is that individuals display different and often competing cultural symbols, values and patterns of behaviour that can be appropriated at different times and within different contexts. Such identities involve what Robbins (1991) refers to as translation, the negotiation and evaluation of difference and diversity, commonality and solidarity. They represent allegiances to new ideologies that involve consciousness of thought and action as they redefine traditional norms and practices of previous ways of life (Swindler 1986). Crucial to this process is an understanding of the way in which individuals use the various cultural resources at their disposal to maintain and transform their identities.

With the expansion of the global system, it is argued traditional sources of authority and identity have become fragmented and decentred, detaching cultural differences from their points of origin and assimilating them into the global consumer market by the process of ‘cultural homogenisation’ (Robbins 1991, Hall 1992). Within such decentring, the marginal has the potential to become a powerful space to challenge dominant discourses both nationally and globally. It is within these marginalised spaces that hybridised identities can be seen, representing identities of resistance and struggle. What is significant about these new identities is how difference is constructed and appropriated and given meaning by the individual, and how it is used as a basis of collective identification (Hannerz 1992, Bhabha 1994).
However, as Anthias (1999) points out, what theories of hybridised identities fail to acknowledge is the power of dominant groups to define cultural boundaries. Which cultural resources an individual ‘chooses’ depend on those available to him or her. Access to cultural resources is severely limited by the social relations of differentiation and subordination operating within a given context, at a given time. Individuals are not ‘free-floating’, but positioned in a system of constraints that leads to the unequal allocation of cultural resources through the social processes of “race”, class and gender. An emphasis on hybridisation, while providing alternative notions of culture and ethnicity to those of the static and homogeneous concepts of previous theories nevertheless underplays the ways in which forms of social differentiation serve different ends in different contexts. As Anthias argues: ‘the bringing together of different cultural elements syncretically transforms their meaning, but need not mean that dialogue between cultural givens is necessarily taking place’ (1999:171). Hybridised identities may possess the power to transform their own meanings, but they are limited by social relations of subordination and domination to transform meanings in wider society, or indeed globally. In attempts to deconstruct difference, Anthias argues, they run the risk of producing their own form of essentialism, that is, the essentialising of difference, reifying the places in which this difference is located and constructed.

According to Brah (1996:246), what is needed is a ‘re-thinking of the multi’ by examining the way in which differences and commonalities are played out, that is: ‘how these are constituted, contested, reproduced or resigned in many and varied discourses, institutions and practices’. Such a process for Brah involves moving beyond notions of the primacy of specific social divisions over others and focusing instead on the articulation of these axes of differentiation. For Anthias, this articulation of social divisions can be seen in two ways: as ‘crosscutting and mutually supporting’ one another in terms of systems of domination and subordination, or in terms of ‘multiple and uneven social patterns of domination and subordination’ (1999:177). The latter refers to individuals who are positioned differently within and across different axes of differentiation, producing contradictory positions and identities.
The potentially contradictory nature of cross-cutting social divisions, as Anthias points out, raises fundamental political questions. If the individual is shown to possess diverse and multiple identities and positionings in relation to social relations, this renders the notion of social categories problematic, particularly in relation to a politics of identity: ‘for such a politics assumes a unitary subject whose identity and political struggle is given by a position, say as a woman or as a member of a class or a member of a racialised group’ (1999:177). In this way, the individual is conceived as the ‘main protagonist’ in political struggles against systems of subordination and domination. However, Anthias argues: ‘the recognition of diversity need not dispense with provisional and contextual commonalities – as oppositional consciousness, multiple otherness’ (1999:161). Awareness of such commonalities is necessary for the formation of political struggles. What is needed therefore is a ‘politics of multiple identifications’, which takes on board struggles around the subordination of both selves and others, increasing levels of communication and collaboration between groups whose organisational bases centre on specific struggles as opposed to specific identities.

In such a schema, the collective ‘we’ of modernity and the problematic of the self in modernity as a unitary phenomenon becomes replaced with the investigation of sets of articulations and narratives relating to realms of existence, and identified through investigating their place in personal experience and its depiction, in practices between social agents, some of whom will be persons, the organisational arrangements implicated and the representational forms that are produced. (Anthias 1999:178)

Understanding the intersectionality and articulation of social divisions and relations helps explain the diversity of social outcomes, but it is also necessary to understand how these can be appropriated to form collective representation and struggles. This involves a focus on agency and its interaction with the public, the institutional and the representative.

What is needed is an understanding of how ‘race’, class, gender and ethnicity are appropriated, transformed and resisted to form individual identities as well as to elicit the possibility of political identification. As Brah states (1996:246): ‘What we prioritise in a specific
context is contingent, but whatever has been prioritised, be it gender, racism, or class, it cannot be understood as if it were an autonomous category, even though it can certainly have independent effects. Individuals are not unitary subjects but are affected by, and subsequently made up of, different and often competing social and political elements, and can belong at one and the same time to a number of different social categories: as women, as a class, as a racialised or ethnic group.

How does a politics of identification take on board our own diverse positioning and those of others, and well as the social processes that affect them? The new cultural politics of difference claims to encompass these differences, but it makes struggles around collective actors such as class, ‘race’ and gender difficult. It is necessary to prioritise certain forms of inequality and relations of subordination and domination in order to produce effective struggles. Yet we must still be aware of the differences in terms of evaluation (both individual and collective) and effects (social outcomes).

As Brah (1996:247) points out, by seeing the individual in this way, ‘as constituted in the interstices of the articulation of “difference” (and “commonality”)’ is to understand agency ‘shorn of its voluntarist connotations’. Identification and differentiation must be seen as related processes marking experience, identity and social relations. As such, identification, whether individual or collective, represents a reconstruction of notions of difference and commonality. Furthermore, as Brah argues, there is no necessary link between individual and collective identity; collective identification may therefore entail considerable ‘psychic and emotional disjunction’. This does not mean that we cannot feel a sense of belonging to a collective, but this sense of belonging is specific to the individual; it is based on her own evaluation of belonging and positioning. Individuals are ultimately positioned by the social process operating within specific contexts, at specific times, but how we evaluate them is important for our strategies of actions and hence for collective representation.
Collective Representation

The organisations and associations analysed in chapter five demonstrate the diversity of struggles and the multiple effects of positioning, fighting the gender, class, ethnic and racial biases of the dominant discourses and organised institutions, and well as prejudice and discrimination from within my informants' own communities. Many struggles therefore arise on a variety of different platforms, yet they are inherently interconnected. My informants, for the most part, were aware of this, and subsequently aware of their and others' multiple identities (despite prioritising one).

In this way, the organisations can be seen to represent 'diaspora spaces' (Brah 1996) where the diverse and heterogeneous experiences of women meet and collide. It is within these organisations that different identities are contested, transformed, and resisted, and where power relations and hierarchies are negotiated and combated. These organisations therefore represent elements of both tradition and translation, as traditional values and norms are invented and transformed. Although these organisations maintain strong links with their ethnic origins they nevertheless represent a reinterpretation and re-siting of these origins, as more and more migrants and their descendants come to acknowledge Britain as their home. Here the production and reproduction of cultural processes converge and combine with multiple political, economic and social processes expressed in power relations. In this way, notions of difference and commonality are re-appropriated and transformed to produce new relations with diverse outcomes.

In their own individual, specific and multiple ways they are contributing to the re-imaginings of the national identity, both Pakistani/Turkish Cypriot and British. They represent important spaces for the empowerment of women, both within and outside the communities they serve or 'represent'; challenging the stereotypes and assumptions both inside and outside their own groups. In their own ways these organisations represent an example of struggle through difference. They are not attempting, in most cases, to provide a united front but to demonstrate that Pakistani, Muslim or Turkish Cypriot ethnicity, in all its multiple forms, is as much a part of
the British national identity as it is of their own ethnic identity. Being proud of the traditions and ethnic heritage does not mean that they cannot or are not contributing to collective British identity. Their sense of belonging is as much related to Britain, as it is to Cyprus and Pakistan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glossary</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allah</td>
<td>Arabic word for god</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayram</td>
<td>Festival within Islam (Turkish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biradari</td>
<td>Brotherhood; localised inter-marriage ‘caste’ group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burqa</td>
<td>Traditional clothing worn by some Muslim women to cover themselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duppatta</td>
<td>Chiffon scarf used by Muslim women to veil themselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eid</td>
<td>Holy day and festival within Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eid-i-Milad</td>
<td>Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eid-ul-Aazha</td>
<td>Festival of sacrifice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eid-ul-Fitr</td>
<td>Festival at the end of Ramadan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadith</td>
<td>Records relating to the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajj</td>
<td>Pilgrimage to Mecca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halal</td>
<td>Permitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haram</td>
<td>Prohibited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam</td>
<td>Muslim leader of prayer; community leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izzat</td>
<td>Honour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrassah</td>
<td>Religious or mosque school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mevlit</td>
<td>Religious meeting, usually held in memory of someone who has died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Turkish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullah</td>
<td>Man educated in religious matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mushairra</td>
<td>Verse reading from the Qu’ran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namaz</td>
<td>A prayer, usually performed by Muslims five times a day (Urdu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purdah</td>
<td>Curtain or veil; often used to indicate the physical separation of unrelated men and women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qemiz</td>
<td>A dress or shirt, worn on top of shalwar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qur’an</td>
<td>The holy book of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramadan</td>
<td>The month of fasting in the ninth month of the Muslim calendar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salat</td>
<td>Prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalwar Kemiz</td>
<td>Loose shirt and trousers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharia</td>
<td>Islamic law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>A sect within Islam, which believes that Ali (Muhammad’s son-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>was the rightful successor of the Prophet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>A sect within Islam, which believes that Caliphate should have become</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>successor to the Prophet on the basis of merit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surah</td>
<td>Chapter of the Qur’an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ummah</td>
<td>Islamic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zukat</td>
<td>Compulsory almsgiving, one of the five pillars of Islam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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