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THE PARTICULARITY OF AUTONOMY

ERIC LOMAX NEWBIGGING

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Department of Philosophy
University of Warwick
THE PARTICULARITY OF AUTONOMY

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THESIS SUMMARY

Title The Particularity of Autonomy

1 The nature and scope of this thesis is the meaning and possibility of personal autonomy for the contemporary self embedded in a complex of changing organizations.

2 Its contribution is in relating philosophy to the study of complex organizations.

3 The research is based upon the relevant literature and empirical studies informed by the writer's organizational experience.

4 The thesis is structured in two parts with the following arguments. Part I (The Situated Self of Sensible Reasoning) sets out a checklist for personal autonomy as positive freedom and rejects a universalist concept of autonomy as moral autonomy for its neglect of the self's particularity - its situation, sentiments and contingency. A midway position combines the principle of detachment with an evaluatory understanding of the nested self of cognitive sensibility. The self's coherence and its perspective are embodied in a unique narrative which governs the portfolio of the individual as agent in its relations, roles and aims. The self's portfolio constitutes the choices of its nestedness and its autonomy: it's not here, not there but where I choose to locate it.

Part II (Managing Contingency) explores different types of organizations and their members' behaviour to identify those which enable the individual to confront contingency in its own terms. The final chapter examines how the current organizational disembedding process forces the individual to confront its autonomy in a contemporary world of change.

5 The main conclusions of the thesis are:
(i) There is a workable concept of personal autonomy, understood sui generis, ie in terms of its own particularity;
(ii) Those organizations enabling the individual to confront contingency in its own terms offer the best hope of autonomy;
(iii) The architect and the entrepreneur are key in illustrating the role of autonomy in a creative relating of order and contingency;
(iv) The demise of the metanarrative of permanent and full employment are inter alia forcing upon the individual the choices of heteronomy (captured in another's metanarrative as consumer and viewer), anomie (whim or chance) or personal autonomy.
References


GMM  Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals  Immanuel Kant, Harper and Row (Translated by HJ Paton)  New York 1964

LLJ  Liberalism and the Limits of Justice  Michael Sandel, Cambridge UP 1982

MF  The Morality of Freedom  Joseph Raz, Oxford UP 1986


SS  Sources of the Self  Charles Taylor, Cambridge UP 1989


Abbreviations

Ch  Chapter
N  Note
P  Page
Tr  Translated by
UP  University Press
US  States - standard abbreviation used.
This thesis is essentially speculative. Its aim is to reflect upon what autonomy means to the individual living in a world of organizations undergoing dynamic change. It attempts to relate some philosophical ideas about the self, its autonomy and its contingency, drawing upon notions and models from the study of complex organizations. The difficulties of a cross discipline thesis are well known. I've doubled the foolhardiness in introducing a strong empirical element.

On my efforts to bridge philosophy and sociology I offer Merleau-Ponty:

"Philosophy and sociology have long lived under a segregated system which has succeeded in concealing their rivalry only by refusing them any meeting ground, impeding their growth, making them incomprehensible to one another and thus placing culture in a situation of permanent crisis."

On the import of the empirical, Annette Baier, says of philosophers:

"(They) will have to get their hands a little dirtier, a little more officially familiar not merely with intellectual arguments but with other forces that drive human life for better or worse."

During a working life of fifty years I have seen managerialism emerge as a dominant force which today 'drives human life for better or worse'. After half a century's close involvement as a manager, management consultant and teacher in some 25 private and public sector organizations, including university management schools, and service in the Royal Air Force, it seemed useful to me to ponder upon the rhetorical ambivalence which pervaded, and continues to pervade managerial discourse whenever the subjects of autonomy and empowerment are discussed. These issues have become increasingly problematical with the apparent demise of one metanarrative which has informed individual identity and embeddedness, namely lifetime and full time employment. Perhaps the best justification for what follows remains Socrates' stricture in the Apology on the unexamined life.
The newly appointed English master John Keating urges his pupils in the film *Dead Poets Society* to "be your own person". His call is made in the face of the threat he perceives to the boys' sense of self posed by the repressive conformity of a private school and by their future pursuit, as members of a professional and business elite, of material success. Keating urges his 17 year old pupils to "seize the day", *carpe diem*, to "make your lives extraordinary". One pupil, Neil Perry, much taken with the new master's ideas is inspired to revive, with some half dozen friends, the poetry reading group of the film's title and of which Keating, when a pupil, was a founding member. Neil also has the chance to play the part of Puck in Shakespeare's play *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. His father has already reprimanded the boy over his extra-curricular activities and reminded him of the parental sacrifices in sending him to a school for the sons of the wealthy. Neil tells his friends: "For the first time in my life I know what I want to do and I'm going to do it, whatever my father says". Knowing his father will forbid this the boy deceives him and the Academy's head. The father, on discovering the deception, tells the boy he will be withdrawn from the school and sent to a military academy. "One day", says the father, "you will be a doctor". The boy commits suicide. The Head, at the behest of the parents, initiates an inquiry among the members of the Dead Poets' Society. One member, Cameron betrays Keating. As a result Keating, the destroyer of the father's dreams, is made the scapegoat for the son's death.
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION: BE YOUR OWN PERSON

Issues Arising

The aim of this chapter is to propose a conception of autonomy for development in Part I. It sets out for analysis the problems implicit in Keating's call. The film raises in a dramatic and poignant manner the main concern of this thesis, what it means to be autonomous. In their actions, in Keating's challenge and Neil's final act both are asserting a belief in the individual's right to shape its life. Keating's simple call poses three fundamental philosophical issues: (1) it constitutes an ethical challenge, and raises questions about (2) self identity and (3) self knowledge. Differences in beliefs over these three issues underlie the conflict between Keating and the Head and the boy with his father and are basic to (4) what it means to be autonomous - "to be your own person".

1 Keating's Ethical Challenge

Keating's call and his subsequent actions amount to a challenge as to what is for the individual the good life and what counts as 'right' behaviour. Both the Head and the boy's father see the good life as abiding by the School's values of 'tradition, honour, discipline and excellence' in order that the boys can equip themselves for success in their future careers. For the Head, Keating's primary duty is to support the school in its endeavours and not to undermine its values. Neil's duty is to obey his father. Both Head and father would regard their view of the primacy of duty as both rational and moral. Without observance of the rules by all participants the school system would breakdown and be unable to fulfil its function. Pursuit by each individual of their own project would find itself in conflict with the principle of equal respect for others. However for Keating and the boy this primacy of rationality and duty is conceived as a constraint on those who like them want to go their own way and live in accord with the words of Thoreau which opens each meeting of the Dead Poets' Society:
I went to the woods because I wanted to live deliberately. I wanted to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life. To put to rout all that was not life. And not when I die, discover I had not lived.

2 The Self's Identity

Basic to this conflict over values and beliefs are differences with regard to the 'self' in its relation with (i) its situation (ii) its sentiments and reasons and (iii) its contingencies.

(i) The Self's Situatedness

Since neither the boy nor Keating is willing or able to emulate Thoreau and retreat to a Walden pond the demanding 'I' has to come to terms with a variety of attachments and commitments. It is to these that they will feel different degrees of loyalty and this will in some measure contribute to what each is as a person. Among these loyalties are those of the boy to his father and mother and of both he and Keating to the school, and of the boy to the ideals of the Dead Poets' Society. As for the father, what manifest and hidden role do his commitments play in determining the 'self' of this authoritarian figure governed apparently by instrumentality? While Keating gives priority to the boys going their own way he says nothing about how they might reconcile being "your own person" with what might be expected of them in terms of obligations and virtues as 'good' members of their 'community' - as good citizens. Keating's innovative behaviour raises the eyebrows of even the friendliest of his colleagues. In such an organization whose primary task is the education of the young, where rules and obedience are seen as essential to this task, there must be limits to the iconoclastic behaviour of members of staff. The boys' fathers, pillars of their establishment, would no doubt have strong views on Keating's conception of autonomy as a subject for emulation or of himself as a role model. The key issue of the individual's situatedness for its autonomy is, of those aspects of its situation available, which does the agent wish to affirm?

(ii) The Self of Sentiments

Keating urges his pupils to explore their feelings, to develop their imaginations and sensibilities, their creativity, to go their own way and reject a second hand and arid formalism. The primacy which Keating gives to the expressive over the instrumental is
dramatically illustrated when he has the whole class rip out a chapter of their textbook on poetic appreciation which uses a graph to measure the excellence of a poem. Keating's values and their influence on Neil Perry conflict with the father's rigidly instrumental scholastic and career aims for the boy as well as with the Head's belief in conformity, order and personal success. The father's sentiments are reflected in the behaviour of a cold, unsmiling man concerned with order whose relationships are characterised by an aloofness and a ritualistic role behaviour with its focus upon duty and filial obedience. The mother dominated by the father can only offer ineffectual maternal concern during the scene between father and son just before the boy's death. Behind the father's role mask is an overwhelming emotional involvement with, and commitment to, his son. When he discovers his son's body, the father shows all too late the emotion, which we as the audience knew to be bursting from him. Among the members of the Dead Poets' Society their burgeoning adolescent sexuality is evident in their attitudes towards girls with its mixture of fear and desire, covered by a kind of mild pornographic bravado. Cameron, Keating's betrayer, is willing to trade his loyalty. It is the sensitive, inarticulate Todd Anderson who leads the class in a demonstration of the warmth and depth of feeling the boys have for the departing Keating. The main issue is the role of moral sentiments in our moral behaviour. The character contrast, the Head and Keating, Cameron and Anderson, is between those for whom behaviour is governed by an instrumental obedience to the rules and those for whom judgment is pre-eminent - a judgment informed by a capacity for sympathetic understanding.

(iii) The Self and Contingency

What of the broader societal influences, the contingencies and structures, which bear upon the young men, their parents, teachers and the School? The film is set in a particular time and place: the last year of Eisenhower's presidency, 1959 and in New England. Influenced by the state and flux of contextual change - political, economic, socio-cultural and technological - boys, parents and teachers share common societal values. The film's events take place during the West's post-war economic boom. In this period, roughly dated between 1950 - 75, Western governments played a leading role in the promotion of
the Keynesian welfare consensus with its demand management, a focus upon economic growth and a policy of high, if not full employment. The competition of the new industrialising countries, and the increased globalization of markets and companies and the nascent information technology with their de-stabilising effects on employment had yet to be felt. This was the high point of W.H. Whyte's 'organization man' whose gradual demise was to begin in the latter part of the 1970's.

Welton Academy is the forcing ground for the American Wasp as witness the names of the masters and the boys, and it is for males only. The boys share values in their expectations and in the importance of a successful career, in the professions or in business, as constitutive of the good life for the individual. Their behaviour towards one another reflects both brüderschaft and competition. The latter is seen in their notion of American masculinity and their attitude and behaviour towards girls identifying them as objects in which conquest rather than the relational appears to be the primary aim. It is with these dynamic contingencies and their impact on personal and social values and upon institutions and organizations, in which individuals are embedded, that the individual must cope in shaping and controlling its life. Keating is well aware of the values the boys are likely to share with their parents. This suggests that there is about Keating's behaviour, particularly as he was a former pupil, a hint of naiveté. This arises either from his unwillingness to recognise, or his unawareness of the nature of the contingencies with which he has to cope. His undoing is foreshadowed in the potential confrontation between those elements of determinacy, embodied in his notion of self-identity and autonomy, and the indeterminacy inherent in the contingencies of a situation in which the Head wields the formal, legal authority. Its ultimate source is the economic power of the wealthy parents. At least four other models of the use of power are demonstrated in the film: deference, the father's expectation of his son and the teachers of the pupils; negotiation, Keating's suggested strategy to the boy with his father; persuasion and dialogue, both of which Keating demonstrates in his relations with the boys. The significant issue here is freedom, the capacity of the individual to shape its own life, that
is its ability and its power in relation to its contingency. As with the individual's embeddedness there will be aspects of its contingency that it wishes to affirm.

3 Self Knowledge

Keating's simple call, in addition to being an ethical command and inter-related with personal identity, poses a third set of issues. How do the boys, how does anyone acquire knowledge about themselves? Keating could be assuming (a) a self with some kind of special unity, discoverable and identifiable, the instantiation of an individual particular in some Platonic sense of universal personhood, or (b) a self antecedent to ends which it seeks to possess through an act of will; or (c) a self less certain more reflective about ends that already exist within its own situation. With the latter the individual selects those ends which it struggles to make uniquely its own and in so doing, gains not merely self-understanding, but creates a self. When the individual has this knowledge it needs to ascertain if it is about a 'true' self. For example the emotion he feels for the boy is never consciously held by the father as part of a 'self'. Hidden to him, but not to us, it is never given voice. It is only when he realises what he has lost, that he becomes for us the focus. Keating with his 'radical' values and behaviour and the boy's action in committing suicide, could be construed as a demonstration of autonomy, of an irreducible sense of individuality, of an authentic self. Alternatively, Keating could be seen merely as an eccentric iconoclast, guilty of wanton behaviour and the boy, as the eventual victim of anomie - acting on impulse since he has no reason to do otherwise. If we are to seek knowledge of a 'true' self we need an account which will enable us to ascertain the difference between truth and judgment, between those judgments which are true and those which are false. Our need therefore is for a model which will enable us to accept a self knowledge which has the mark of truth.

To sum up thus far. Keating's call constitutes a challenge to the Head and to the boy's father over appropriate behaviour and involves three issues relating to personal identity - the self's situation, its sentiments and its freedom and power over its contingencies. For the Head, Keating's primary attachment is to Welton Academy and for Neil's father it is of his son to his parents. For Keating and Neil, this primacy of obedience takes no account
of their own aspirations, feelings and attachments only a part of which involves the school. In making his call Keating also poses a dilemma over the source of the self's knowledge - do we discover or do we create the self, how do we know when we have knowledge of the 'true' self? However, authoritative paternalism governs the Head's relations with his staff and his pupils, and Neil's father with his son. This involves a distinctly different view to Keating's over the boy's right and capacity to shape his own life. It is to this difference we now turn.

4 Autonomy: Moral or Personal?

Despite the differences of what it means to have self rule both parties to the conflict would accept it as a right of the individual. In the case of the Head and the father, given the boys' \textit{in statu pupillari} this would be seen as an eventual right, in adulthood. In so doing they would appear to share the following conditions governing a conception of autonomy.

(1) Autonomy constitutes a person's irreducible individuality and reveals itself in their authenticity, confirming itself in their uniqueness - their idiosyncratic nature.

(2) While autonomy is perceived as a fundamental right, it is grounded within a moral framework and is therefore incompatible with extreme moral subjectivism.

(3) The autonomous individual is able to make informed and effective choices between options, i.e., choice is autonomous if reason-based and reason-giving rather than grounded in giveness.

(4) An autonomous individual is not subject to the will of another.

These conditions constitute a conception of autonomy as both moral and rational. For Keating this would be the one way in which the individual could be 'your own person'. However to him it would appear minimalist since his notion of the self embraces the loyalties and desires which enrich a life - a life lived imaginatively and creatively - a life uniquely one's own. Keating might accept the above conditions as necessary but would find them insufficient for his conception of autonomy as \textit{personal} autonomy. Keating's words and actions suggest an autonomy in which significantly autonomous individuals shape their life and determine its course. An autonomous agent is part creator of its own
world, part author of a self-narrative of its life, a life lived *sui generis*, in terms of the particularity of its situation, sentiments and contingency. Autonomy is construed as an ideal in which the process of its quest, not a definitive objective, is all important. Belief that the individual is not the subject of another's will recognizes autonomy as a matter of degree since elements of heteronomy are inescapable. This is a different way of 'being your own person' and one which would be inadmissible to those whose definition is governed solely by conditions (1) - (4). I suggest that in order to get a grip on a concept of autonomy to satisfy Keating the following additional conditions appear to be a richer way to be your own person than (1) - (4). These conditions link the self to its values and circumstances.

(5) All choices are from options whose nature and range are socially dependent and are informed by a moral and cognitively based sensibility.

(6) The autonomous individual has the ability to adopt personal projects, develop relationships with and loyalties to others and commit itself to causes. What matters is that they are my plans and attachments since it is through these that I make concrete my personal dignity and self respect and engender the respect of others.

(7) It is not the goals and attachments as such which are significant but the creative and critical process which I bring to bear on their setting and to my subsequent relationships with them. Any unity of an autonomous self will lie not in the goals or their achievement but in the unity of my sensibilities which tells me from whence I came and how I achieved, not what I achieved.

This concept of autonomy, with the addition of conditions (5) - (7), accepts it both as a right and a good for the individual. It expands autonomy beyond an abstraction grounded in notions of morality and rationality, with its primacy of the right over the good. It attempts to make autonomy relevant to the individual trying to make sense of its life, with its particularity of values and circumstances lived in a world of dynamic change. Autonomy is perceived not as universalizable, moral and rational autonomy but as a creative act of a self whose reasoning is informed by the sentiments. This is a self which
brings a critical view to the choice of its situations but above all to the nature of its relationship with them. This is a self whose coherence is aided by its own narrative guided by a moral perspective. It demonstrates its autonomic competence through its capacity to cope with contingency without sacrificing its sense of irreducible individuality and to exploit those opportunities which offer enhancement to this sense of self. Conditions (1) - (4) are consistent with the Kantian conception of autonomy, which both the School Head and the boy's father would accept, and which I discuss in the next chapter. This is not Keating's version of autonomy which, I suggest, embraces conditions (5)-(7). Its concern is not with the universality of autonomy but with its particularity in relation to the individual life. In the rest of Part I of the thesis I explore the reasons for adopting conditions (5)-(7).

My hypothesis is that the individual is best placed to cope with contemporary uncertainty and change if it grounds its conception of autonomy in the particularity of its circumstances and values rather than in universalist and transcendentalist notions of the self and its autonomy.

The thesis is divided into two parts. The aim of Part I, The Situated Self of Sensible Reasoning, is to progress towards a conception of autonomy as personal autonomy, through a critical discussion of the issues raised by the film, Dead Poets Society, as follows. We need initially to distinguish those principles of moral autonomy useful to a concept of personal autonomy from those we should discard. There are two of the former, the ideas of a moral perspective and the capacity of the individual to take a detached view of its circumstances. Its principal disadvantages for personal autonomy are its rejection, as heteronomous of the self's situation, its desires and contingencies (Chapter 2). The next two chapters address these aspects of the individual's particularity which moral autonomy rejects: the relation of the self's identity to its situatedness (Chapter 3) and its sensibilities and contingencies proposing an embedded self whose sentiments are cognitively grounded (Chapter 4). These issues are further explored in the next chapter.
This examines autonomy as positive freedom and introduces the topic of the relation of contingency and power (Chapter 5). Finally, in Part I, I give an assessment of the contribution of the above analyses to filling out the conditions for a conception of autonomy as personal autonomy (Chapter 6).

The aim of Part II, Managing Contingency, is to put some empirical flesh on the theoretical bones of Part I by exploring the individual's quest for autonomy in the context of its situatedness, firstly in a plurality of organizations (Chapter 7) and secondly, in the contemporary world of dynamic change (Chapter 8). Some two hundred years ago the poet William Blake perhaps most aptly summed up my main conclusion: "I must create a system, or be enslav'd; by another mans".
The object of this chapter is to review the traditional conception of autonomy as moral autonomy in order to compare it with my own conception of personal autonomy. The chapter is not intended as an attack or a refutation of Kantian-Rawlsian moral autonomy but rather to set out those problems which have been identified within their concept to which a notion of personal autonomy will need to respond. In the previous chapter the conflict between the Head and Keating and between the father and son was thought to stem from differences over the right and capacity of the individual to shape its own life. The conflicts appeared to be rooted in different views as to the constitution of the self. For Keating particularly, but also for the boy, the notion of the self is of a nested, sentient being with a primary concern for its self-development. Keating's ideas pose the issue of what personal autonomy might mean for a self so enmeshed. The Head and the father conceive the self as essentially obedient to a core set of values. From this flows everything, except their values, in particular the instrumental rationality which governs their thoughts and actions. While both Head and father would share with Kant a belief in the importance of duty, their stance is essentially emotivist while Kant's is firmly grounded in rationality. In dealing with the self as rational and dutiful, this chapter has five tasks:

1. To review the nature of autonomy as moral autonomy, as initially conceived by Kant.

2. To review its contemporary re-working by Rawls.

3. To examine Rawls's ideas on life plans for the autonomous self.

4. To assess (i) the extent to which Rawls deals with the problematic arising from the Kantian notion of moral autonomy and (ii) the implications of Rawls's revised notions on the self and the community.
To identify what might be retained from the Kantian-Rawlsian concept of moral autonomy of value to my own concept of autonomy as personal autonomy.

1 Kantian Autonomy

Two centuries before Keating, Immanuel Kant had thought about what it meant to 'be your own person'. For virtually a century and a half after Kant his imperative of autonomy, the challenge to the individual to take charge of its life and live by its own laws, underpinned much of the dialectic of modern philosophy. As one's own laws they cannot be viewed as constraining. They are not contingent and their governance is rooted, like the laws of logic, in their pure universality. It is this which led to charges of formalism against Kant. As I shall argue below, my conception of personal autonomy is capable of embracing contingency. The sovereign subject reigned supreme, from Kant to existentialism, as the seat of truth-value until contemporary efforts to dethrone it. Despite the post modernists, Kant's call to autonomy with its focus on the individual remains a distinctive feature of western culture. Kant's influence on liberalism, with its own notion of the self as individualistic, embodying a rational and finite will, profoundly evident in the nineteenth century, continues in the work of John Rawls. Kant's conception of autonomy refers both to a property of the will and a moral principle:

Autonomy of the will is the property the will has in being a law to itself (independently of every property belonging to the objects of volition). Hence the principle of autonomy is, 'Never to choose except in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of your choice are also present as universal law. (GMM 108)

The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duty conforming to them; heteronomy of choice, on the other hand does not establish any obligation but is opposed to the principle of duty and to the morality of the will. 2

These two quotations identify the main features of Kantian autonomy, those related primarily to:

(i) individual reason, freedom and will,
(ii) the individual in a social context: morality, duty and universality, and

(iii) the importance of Kant's distinction between autonomy and heteronomy.

(i) Reason, Freedom and Will

Kant presumes an 'essentialist' self whose basis is political and moral. The former accords its freedom and gives primacy to justice, and the latter views the individual’s task as doing its duty in accordance with universal moral law. This sets the Kantian self apart from one conceived as a function of its contingencies whose principal concern is with the individual's quest for the virtuous life. In his conception of the self Kant distinguishes the empirical 'self', rooted in the world of appearances and introspection, from the rational 'self'.

Beyond this character of himself as a subject made up, as it is of mere appearances he must suppose there is something which is its ground - namely his Ego as this may be constituted by itself; and thus as regards mere perception as belonging to the sensible world, but as regards whatever may be in him of pure activity (whatever comes into consciousness, not through affection of the senses, but immediately) he must count himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which however he knows nothing further (GMM 119).

To know anything at all we need the noumenal self, the rational self of the 'intelligible', 'intellectual' world, as the one category which embraces all others and which as part of the intelligible world remains unknowable and unchanging. Prior to our perceptions the self provides a unifier which enables us to hold these together in a single consciousness. It is both subject and object of experience. With the self as object I live in a world of senses where my actions are governed by natural laws and causality. With the self as subject my world is independent of the laws of nature: here I can regard myself as free, to transfer myself into the intelligible world in which I am able to recognize the autonomy of my will. This is not the world of empiricism where, as a purely empirical being, I could never be free because governed by my desire my will would no longer be the first cause. Kant in describing autonomy as a property of the will also identifies it as a positive freedom whose
source is negative freedom. For rational beings the property of the will is its ability to work independently of its 'determination by alien causes'. Kant is thus explicit in directly associating autonomy with the incompatibilist notion of freedom, ie that we cannot be free and responsible if determinism is true. Freedom is the power to will my own end of action, an end which emerges from reason alone and on which I act only if I can will it as a universal law. This is the autonomy of the will, 'the sole principle of all moral laws'. Autonomy admits of no external properties to the will of either sentiments or attachments since these are heteronomous: their relationship is only contingent. In contrast to reason these constrain the will. One’s duty is the deliverance of pure reason from these and to oppose them as irrational. This is a self free of the causality of nature which chooses its actions for their own sake as ends in themselves. The importance of will as a defining feature of autonomy is its motivational independence, its capacity for self determination independent of, or in opposition to its needs and desires. Thus the agent's reasons for action are rationally independent of his sentiments, ie independent 'of every property belonging to the objects of volition'.

(ii) Morality, Duty and Universality:

Kant’s thesis that the autonomy of the will is the sovereign principle of morality presupposes accounts of moral worth, duty and a specification of the categorical imperative as universalizable. 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become the moral law' (GMM 88). For Kant those moral theories opposed to autonomy are heteronomous: relegating the categorical to the hypothetical imperative (GMM 111). It is the universality of one's duty which is at the heart of Kant's moral autonomy, the highest product of man's moral aspirations. We cannot act morally if we follow our own finer feelings, moral action depends upon our autonomy and requires us to follow a particular principle not because it has been ordered but because we have chosen it as our own. Kant argues that it is through our experience of obligations that we are called to the noumenal order to which we implicitly belong. As well as being sensible creatures we have rational experience. It is the rational part of the self which seeks to subjugate its phenomenal counterpart to the principle of our own higher self.
Through the categorical imperative the self comes to realize which maxims are in accord with the rational self. Kant's view of society as consisting of a plurality of persons leads him to accord primacy to justice in which the principles of governance conform to the idea of right and not to any particular conception of the good. The priority which Kant accords to justice derives, according to Rawls, entirely from his notion of freedom in our interpersonal relations.

The principles of justice are also categorical imperatives in Kant's sense. For by a categorical imperative Kant understands a principle of conduct that applies to a person in virtue of his nature as a free and equal rational being. The validity of the principle does not pre-suppose that one has a particular desire or aim (TG 253).

This freedom enables us to realize our principal characteristic as human beings: namely the exercise of will, capable of being used freely in autonomous action. This autonomy lies in obedience to the moral law which we access through critical use of reasoning. Moral law is not imposed. Superficially it might appear to constrain but with its basis in rationality it cannot be said to do so. Its imperative is similar to the laws of logic. When we act from desire, through attraction or repulsion to things external to ourselves, we are not self-determining. It is the capacity to act autonomously, to think and choose, and not the specific actions, interests and notions of the good we decide to pursue, which is the distinctive feature of the self. Thus the subject is given prior to its ends. At the heart of Kant's personhood is his claim for justice as foundation. The subject is given prior to its ends and is essential to our understanding of ourselves as autonomous in a society not governed by any conception of the good. A society so governed would fail to respect our autonomy since it would treat us as means and not ends. Thus Kant's claim for the primacy of justice pre-supposes an essentialist self, that is one which is antecedent to, and distanced from, its circumstances. Only in this way can we view ourselves as subjects and objects of experience and as autonomous and not merely as agents of the aims we pursue.

(iii) The Heteronomous Self of Situations, Sentiments and Contingency
Kant's self of detachment is one which is unencumbered by its present situatedness, its desires and contingencies. Such encumbrances render the self heteronomous guilty of abandoning itself to externalities of the will. With the aid of Hegel initially I now wish to show what is at stake in Kant's claim of heteronomy. Hegel, among the earliest of Kant's critics, attacked his moral theory as 'empty formalism'. Kant's universal law was deemed not to provide principles from which we can derive specific duties or test the moral correctness of his maxims (Allison 1990). In place of Kant's abstraction, with its individualistic view of morality (moralität) Hegel proposes one rooted in a social ethos (sittlichkeit). While both Hegel's critique of Kant and his own formulation of sittlichkeit have attracted much criticism our present focus is upon motivation. In particular it is upon Hegel's response to Kant's failure to relate his requirement that for an action to be morally worthy it must be motivated by duty, that is to the conditions of the possibility of agency. Hegel's attack on Kant's moral view of the world amounts to the requirement that action towards a specific end requires more than moral duty it must take account of the agent's interests and desires:

(When I really act, I am conscious of an 'other' which is already in existence and of a reality I wish to produce. I have a specific and fulfil a specific duty in which there is something else than the pure duty which alone should be intended (Hegel 1974: 386).

Where Kant views the self imposition of moral obligation as the result of the rational contemplation of the moral law, for Hegel individual rationality lies in recognizing as its own, those moral beliefs and institutions which constitute the individual's social and cultural world. It is through the individual's membership of a community that a morality, constitutive of its social being, is embraced. Particular beliefs or membership of such institutions are not passively accepted because they are constitutive of the individual's identity. Its membership of the moral community the sittlichkeit is, as Rousseau concluded, a matter 'for each while unifying himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before' (TF 173: Note 3, 320). For Kant what distinguishes autonomy from heteronomy is not the individual's actions but its reasons: the latter acts
from acceptance of the moral law, the former from external reasons, eg desire. Kant's
distinction is problematical. While he provides abstract conditions for practical
rationality he gives no guidance on how we should act when faced with the prevailing
\textit{sittlichkeit}. If we assume that autonomy is worthwhile how do we seek this without, in
Benn's words:

\ldots so desocializing independence of mind that the autonomous person is endowed
with the capacity according to the law he prescribes to himself but bereft of any
resources to fabricate such a law (IT: 175).

Hegel foresaw the problem. He was not prepared to accept the reliance upon individual
conscience and self will as a principle of action since this made the absolutely universal its
principle. Hegel viewed Kant's 'self' as somewhat thin and abstract. His own more
complex conception foreshadowed the notion of the self embodied in the notion of
autonomy, as \textit{personal} autonomy, outlined in Chapter one. Hegel grounds his theory of
the self in a social context, in a historical and cultural process. To avoid cultural
relativism Hegel envisaged a self whose self-knowledge is acquired through a dialectical
process aimed at a form of creative self-development, or self-actualization. While Kant
fails to reconcile the abstract conditions for practical rationality and what one does in an
actual situation, Hegel has no doubts: just behave according to the existing \textit{sittlichkeit}.
This does indeed blur the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy leaving little room
for radical criticism of existing convention. Although Hegel admired the truly autonomous
he was unable to explain its achievement in the face of their social essence. For Kant, to
be a free agent requires the capacity to reflect from a detached standpoint disassociated,
not only from one's situation but from the desires themselves. Through reflection we
demonstrate our freedom, our ability to come to terms with our desires, to assess and
control them. Kant's requirement that the agent, governed by an impartial morality,
adopts a detached impartial viewpoint also requires that he disassociates himself from, in
Williams's words, those 'ground projects providing the motive force which propels him
into the future and gives him a reason for living' (Williams 1981: 13). It is our deepest
interests and attachments which, as will be argued below, are constitutive of our self
identity. So the moral imperative appears to 'have at best a relative legitimacy'. The cost of a total Kantian commitment to the moral requirement in the interests of rationality and detachment is a possible loss of one's integrity and the alienation from one's self. While recognizing the legitimacy of Kant's rational freedom for factual deliberation Williams claims that he is mistaken in believing that this could be used in practical deliberation.

(F)actual deliberation is not essentially first-personal. It fails to apply to practical deliberation and to impose a necessary impartiality on it, because practical deliberation is first-personal, radically so, and involves an I that must be more intimately the I of my desires than this account allows (Williams 1985: 67).

Hegel asks of the Kantian 'free will' - with a will so detached, from the situation and the desires in which it has to make decisions and take action, how does it know what to will? As we have seen the Kantian 'self', posited as a rational construct, antecedent to its ends and circumstances, a self of will which discounts its desires, has attracted two major criticisms: it is abstract and detached. It is precisely because of the point made earlier that the moral law is not a constraint and it would be irrational to ignore it that the Kantian 'self' remains formal and empty like the laws of logic. Despite his attack Hegel failed to resolve the obvious issue of how one might seek autonomy without being overwhelmed by one's social circumstances. Kant's criteria for determining the moral law, as the law we prescribe ourselves, grounded in practical reason for the individual abstracted from society and sentiments, were regarded as formal. His prescription for autonomy was viewed as devoid of practical meaning. While Kant aids our moral understanding of the moral law he offers no guidance on how we live in the world of the here and now coping with our attachments, our feelings and our contingencies. It was the criticism of the transcendental, abstract nature of the Kantian doctrine of justice with its failure to take account of the empirical world which led Rawls, to whom we now turn, to attempt its reformulation.

2 Rawlsian Autonomy

This section provides a brief review of Rawlsian autonomy. It identifies the differences from the Kantian concept in order to lay down markers the discussion of which will lead to
the development of my own conception of personal autonomy. When Keating was urging his boys to "be your own person", John Rawls was pondering the same issue as a starting point for his Theory of Justice which he was to publish a decade or so later (Rawls 1971). Rails's theory involved a reworking of Kant's conception of moral autonomy. In his conception of 'justice as fairness', Rawls acknowledges his debt to Kant and captures the essence of his project in the title to his 1980 paper: Kantian Constructivism of Moral Theory. Rawls draws upon a 'procedural interpretation of Kant's concepts of autonomy and the categorical imperative' to set out his theory of justice (TJ 256). Its basic idea is that the fairness of political institutions is solely dependent upon the respect they accord to the individual's right to autonomy.

Rawls posits justice as the first value of social institutions. The ideal person to inhabit his moral world is the individual possessed of autonomy, an autonomy of the rational will giving universal laws to itself. Rawls, with his notion of rational autonomy prior to the concept of moral autonomy, shares with Kant the connection of reason and morality. A person acts autonomously when the principles of action he chooses are 'the most adequate expression of his nature as a free and rational being'. The advantage for Rawls of his 'procedural interpretation' of Kant, is that in specifying the right to autonomy he provides a 'minimum standard of political decency' and thus frees himself from the potential controversy over the evaluation, and ranking 'of different levels of substantive achievement'. This departure from Kant is perhaps more significant in regard to its interpretation of the nature of morality and of autonomy. For Kant morality, chosen only for its own sake, establishes a 'realm of freedom'. For Rawls it is the means through which we achieve the 'most felicitous distribution' of primary social, ie non-moral, goods eg, liberty, opportunity, income and wealth. Kant views autonomy as the summit of man's moral achievement and takes universality as his key concept. Rawls just assumes autonomy as a kind of starting point, 'a natural datum' from which we all begin. Rawls's departure from Kant has led to his drawing upon sources other than Kant, particularly neo-classical economic theory (Smith 1989: N8 3). This is evident in the four principles described by Steven Smith as basically hypothetical assumptions about human nature which
he identifies as: Methodological Individualism, Value Neutrality, Psychological Hedonism and Social Contract (Smith ibid). I have adopted these headings for the discussion of Rawlsian autonomy which follows.

(i) Methodological Individualism: Here the sole basis for the agent's thought and action is rationality. With Rawls's view of the self as the autonomous, rational choosers of its ends, over which it has absolute moral priority, his ethical grounding of human worth is readily evident. It is the individual's capacity to choose, not the choices, which merit our respect. With capacity prior to use the locus of human worth must be antecedent to its choice. Since the ends are those of the subject because he chooses them there must be a subject to do the choosing. The identity of the self, prior to its making its choices cannot therefore be determined by what it chooses. The right as priority sets out a conception of the good 'within definite limits' and provides the unity of the self. This unified, antecedent self remains forever prior to its ends, its independence as an agent unfettered by circumstances no matter how heavily these weigh upon the individual. In common with Kant, Rawls's notion of the independent self views the moral world as devoid of meaning and purpose. Hence he attacks the idea of teleology as 'radically misconceived', arguing that our nature is revealed not primarily by our aims but rather by the principles governing 'the conditions under which our aims are formed and the manner in which they are pursued' (TJ 560). Rawls gives to the self absolute metaphysical priority from which follows absolute moral priority (ibid). In so doing he reverses the relation between the right and the good proposed by the teleologists and grants absolute priority to the right. In a world without purpose it is left to human beings to construct meaning and order. Without prior and independent order there are 'no (moral) facts apart from the procedure as a whole' (Rawls 1980: 568). Only in such a world are we able to conceive the self as independent and prior to its ends. Rawls believes with Kant that the moral law results from pure will. It is the capacity of the will to deliver the advantage over the theoretical. The deontological self does not imply a self devoid of ends or incapable of moral commitments or a world without order, ungoverned by regulative principle. Our aims and attachments are the result of choice as possessions of a self, given prior to its ends. This is a self
whose moral meaning for the world in which it lives is its own: 'as agents of construction in the case of the right, as agents of choice in the case of the good' (LLJ 176-177).

(ii) Value Neutrality: This is the calculation of the means, not ends which enables the agent to acquire the objects it desires rather than those it ought to desire. An account of the self given prior to its ends would need says Rawls to tell us how the self is distinguished from and connected to its ends. Without the first we would be left with a 'radically situated self' and without the second without a 'radically disembodied self' (ibid). Rawls answers this dilemma with a self as a subject of possession that both owns, but is distanced from its ends. He also assumes that the parties engaged in co-operative endeavour share a mutual disinterest in each other's interests. This works as an epistemological claim, related to the conditions Rawls sets for his construct of the original position, it enables us to identify the notion of the self and the kinds of knowledge that we might achieve. With the assumption of mutual disinterest and individuation without ends the criteria for the individual's decisions must be those of instrumental rationality, the balancing of costs and benefits. His assumption of mutual interest raises as a general issue the relationship between the self and its motivation ie how the self is constituted and how it stands in relation to its situation (ibid). Its concern is not with the content of individual desires or aims but with the 'subject of these interests of the self that regards the conception of the good as worthy of recognition' (TJ 127). The assumption of mutual interest provides the key to Rawls's conception of the subject, of how it must be for justice to be primary. This self of possession, antecedently individuated, distinct and separate has its bounds fixed and prior to experience. To act out of duty my identity as a subject must be given independently of the things I own, independent of my interests, aims and my relations with others. 'It is not our interests that primarily reveal our nature but rather the principles that we would acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which these aims are formed and the manner in which they are pursued' (TJ 560). Thus the Rawlsian 'self' is distanced from its ends. Ends are mine not me. Rawls sees no reason why people's ends should be predominantly individualistic in a well-ordered society. The Rawlsian 'self' can embrace values and notions of the good provided they constitute the interests of the
subject, indviduated in advance of its ends and they describe the objects sought rather than the subject doing the seeking. With such possessions as contingent there appears to be for Rawls a loss of self which arises from his particular understanding of the nature of possession. One consequence is to place the self beyond the range of experience in which one's public form as moral identity is not affected over time in my conception of the good (TJ 544-5). Experience cannot change me, I remain forever alone. This self which excludes any notions of the good as constitutive of its identity rules out visions, aims, aspirations held in common with others and capable of inspiring 'more or less expansive understandings of the self' (LLJ 62). Its view of the community is as an object of common aspiration not one which is capable of being definitive of the self in any constitutive sense. The contribution to self understanding which results from inter-subjectivity, our dealings with others, and intra-subjectivity, our own reflections, appears to be limited for Rawls. He would appear to regard my dealings with others as instrumentally valuable in so far as they might reveal what my possessions are. At the same time our relations with others and with our thoughts suggest the ways of a subject whose bounds cannot be assumed in advance. Rawls's rationally distinct 'self', with its detachable communal aims, neglects the manner in which shared beliefs and visions can be, or might be thought to be, essential to an individual's understanding of its own identity. The latter would include for example loyalty to a tradition, as a central part of the individual's social inheritance or a faith, inseparable from one's sense of worth. In contrast to the Rawlsian conception of the self is one whose ends are not detachable but form an integral part of our deepest nature. This is not a self just of instrumentality and duty detached from its social situation and its sentiments but one where the latter are constitutive of that self and of its most intimate aspirations, relationships and projects (Williams op. cit.).

(iii) Social Contract: This is assumed as the basis of political legitimacy. The key issue in politics is to find ways of limiting the infinity of human desires so that as individuals we can all co-exist 'under the universal'. In the discussion on means-ends relations above the object of the Rawlsian community was characterized as one of common aspiration never as constituent of the self. This remains an attribute even of a well-ordered society, which
defined by justice as the first value of social institutions, is prior to any aims the members may embrace. The self's relation to the community is one of contingent possession, not constitutive of the self. It was this inadequacy in Rawls's theorizing which led him to rethink the communal constitution of the self. Rawls's moral subject stems from his belief that the 'plurality of distinct persons with separate systems of ends is an essential feature of human societies' (TJ 29). The plurality of persons is dependent upon distinguishing empirically those given characteristics: the agglomeration of needs, desires and attributes, which individuate human beings and locate them uniquely in time and space. Accompanying the notion of the unity of the self is a need to recognize the priority of its plurality. This is a plurality whose presumption is essential to our being creatures capable of justice the principles of which 'apply to relations among several persons and groups' (TJ 16). As distinct individuals we form relations, then co-operate with one another. This is not from selfish motives but because the knowledge of the basis of our plurality is given prior to our experience whereas our experience of unity or co-operation comes only with experience. Rawls's theory of justice in its relation to a conception of the self and its recognition of the individual as a person is essentially social or distributive - a matter of pure procedural justice. Founded upon a scheme of co-operation its concern is with the 'correctness of distribution' among the scheme's participants. Rawls's notion of justice as distributive is regarded as problematical. Young, for example, believes that matters of distribution cannot be distinguished from those of moral ontology (Young 1990). As will be discussed in Chapter 4 the issue is one of exclusion, or oppression of some individuals. The latter denies them the opportunity to exercise any powers of determination in their efforts to seek autonomy.

(iv) Psychological Hedonism: Broadly defined as the individual agent's natural goal, which is to 'maximize the number of pleasures and minimize the number of pains' (Smith: op.cit. 3). While Rawls is not explicit we can deduce from his rejection of inter- and intra-subjective factors in the self's constitution his assumption is that each individual consists of a single system of desires. 'A person properly acts, at least when others are not affected to achieve his own greatest good, to advance his rational ends as far as
possible' (TJ 23). While for Rawls given the plural nature of society justice is required in matters of private morality utilitarianism seems to suffice: 'where others are not involved I am free to maximize my good without reference to the right' (LLJ 63). Here Rawls differs from Kant who emphasized the 'necessary duty to oneself' and thus applying the category of the right to private as well as public morality (LLJ 63-4).

3 The Life Plans of the Unified and Autonomous Self

The application of the above four principles is illustrated in the methodology Rawls proposes for life planning. Rawls conceives of autonomy as 'acting from principles that we would consent to as free and equal rational beings' (TJ 516). Their objectivity lies in our wish that all, including ourselves adopt these principles. It is the veil of ignorance which 'prevents us from shaping a moral point of view to accord with our own particular attachments and interests' (ibid). Central to the individual's autonomy are its life plans for which Rawls lays down the following principles:

(F)irst a person's plan of life is rational, if and only if (1) it is one of the plans that is consistent with the principle of rational choice when these are applied to all the relevant features of the situation and (2) it is that plan among those meeting this condition which could be chosen by him with full deliberative rationality, that is with the full awareness of the relevant facts and after consideration of the consequences (TJ 408).

Closely inter-related with Rawls's notions of the life's plans, the self's ends and his conception of the moral person is his belief in the unified self. To the question posed in a section on the 'Unity of the Self' (TJ 560-66), 'if there is no single end that determines the pattern of aims, how is the rational plan to be identified?' Rawls replies: 'a rational plan is one that would be chosen with deliberative rationality as determined by the full theory of the good' (TJ 561). This conception of the good embodied in a rational life plan and a sense of justice are the characteristics of the moral personality, one which having chosen its ends seeks to express its 'nature as a free and rational being'. The coherence of a plan demonstrates the individual's unity: a unity grounded in the desire to pursue the principle of rational choice consistent with the individual's sense of right and justice. The
individual's final aims are unknown and a matter of choice the basis of which, where others involved, is to ensure the fair representation to all human beings. The object of cooperation among individuals is to establish those conditions, just and favourable, for the individual to justify his own unity, a unity which 'in a well-ordered society is the same for all' (TJ 563).

The instrumental and procedural rationality which informs much of Rawls's thought is evident in his ideas about life planning and raises issues of concern to the next two chapters. The plan's principles of rational choice and deliberative rationality do not provide a perspective on the self's situatedness and its sensibilities: their past - their development - their relation to present contingency and how these might serve me in the future. In addition expressions such as 'relevant features', 'relevant factors' and 'consideration of consequences' appear to ask too much of the bounded nature of human perception and cognition. Given that we are able to discern and collect all the relevant features of the situation, it's remains highly questionable even if our cognitive capability were able to subject these to 'full and deliberative rationality' that we would want to. In any judgments which the Rawlsian self might make it is unable to take account of the crucial role which the sensibilities play. What is more important than the plan's proposed end states, subject always to unintended consequences, is the process of planning. It is here that internal conflicts and contradictions - both intra and interpersonal - over values, projects and priorities might be resolved. This is a process which gives more than an instrumental plan. It involves a richer notion of planning since it embodies an enlarged faculty of reasoning in which the sensibilities play a major role (See Chapter 4). There is about Rawls's ideas of life planning a sense of a closed system, ruled by an instrumental and procedural rationality and a will entirely oblivious to the 'messiness of life' lived in a feed and breed relationship with our social and physical environment. His ideas appear consistent with a notion of moral autonomy which discounts, with Kant, any externalities to the will. As will be argued below for those in
quest of personal autonomy, 'life' plans reflect a form of self-narrative in which the process is as important as the content. In their formulation, inchoate and half-formed ideas and aspirations, plans and projects are jettisoned, developed and continuously and iteratively re-defined as one gains insights and self-knowledge as part of a creative process. This is far removed from Rawlsian procedural instrumentality. My notion of planning is one which enables the individual to make sense of the particularity of its contingency.

4 Rawlsian Autonomy Revisited

Rawlsian autonomy appears to be characterized by the instrumental rationality of a social isolate whose relations with others are based on a contract predicated on the supremacy of the right which has no place for them within the individual's system. Two issues arise. Firstly, Rawls's success in dealing with the notion of the empirical self bequeathed by Kant. Secondly, Rawls's thoughts on the self and its autonomy subsequent to his original theory of justice.

(i) How successful has Rawls been in meeting his declared aim in the Theory of Justice to deal with Kant's transcendental self and the self of the empirical world? The impression gained in reading Rawls's more recent work is that he appears not to have fulfilled the task he set himself. The self of the participants in the original position emerges as an abstract, disembodied self lacking particularity in regard to its natural endowments, social status and aims. This amounts to a criticism of the original position which cannot involve a contractual situation accompanied by a bargaining process since there are no differences between the uniform and abstract participants. This self possesses an over-riding interest to devise, revise and rationally seek concepts of the good, with self-knowledge prior to experience it is separate, distinct and antecedent to its ends. It is not clear that such a self is credible. If the need arose it is difficult to see how this individual with its detached view of its values and attachments could disband them and take on new values in the face of its escapable location in a community of others. The reason offered for this abstract self is its value as a theoretical device in Rawls's
development of his principles of justice. The cost of the device appears to continue to be Rawls's failure to bridge the gap between the Kantian self and the contingent world.

(ii) Two decades after his Theory of Justice Rawls published a collection of papers which have been characterized as a move from philosophical to political liberalism (Rawls 1993). The key difference lies in Rawls's abandonment of the notion of the well-ordered society as based on comprehensive liberalism which he now distinguishes from political liberalism. He gives as his reason for the revision his inability to retain his belief in comprehensive liberalism given the pluralism distinctive of modern society. My intention is not to deal with Rawls's revision but to focus upon how these alter his views upon the nature of the self and its relations to the community. While he retains a belief in the consensus of a well-ordered society he now limits the hope for its achievement to political justice not justice per se. He retains as the basis for his notion of autonomy the capacity of the individual to change his ideas about the nature of the good. He now abandons the connection of this to the public domain where the individual is seen as a citizen of a constitutional democracy. With regard to the non-political self Rawls sees the possibility of its being constituted by the nature of the good, as opposed to the act of choosing. Such conceptions rather than being individualistic may be communal. In accepting a 'communitarian' view of the identity of the self the latter is no longer separable from its notion of the good. With this now essentially political conception of autonomy Rawls raises for the empirical self the plausibility of its sustaining the division in conflicts over values which are essentially political and those which are part of a more comprehensive self. While acknowledging Rawls's tilt towards 'communitarianism' his notion of the self retains a sense of abstraction and isolation.

Conclusion: Problems Personal Autonomy Will Need to Address.

The foregoing presents problems which a conception of personal autonomy will have to address. The Kantian-Rawlsian conception of autonomy is fundamentally different from the personal autonomy which Keating seeks and for which a check list was given in the Introduction. Autonomy, for Kant and Rawls, as the individual's capacity to make
choices represents a principal characteristic of human identity. The assignment of moral worth presumes a self to which it is assigned: absolute metaphysical priority precedes absolute moral priority. Both Kant and Rawls would share a somewhat similar view of Neil Perry as a unitary, transcendental rational self, prior to ends which it achieves through an exercise of will and whose values and attachments do not constitute part of that self. Rawls’s conception of the moral self would be one whose conception of the good is embodied in its life plan, based upon deliberative rationality and a sense of justice, that is by 'a regulative desire to act under certain principles of right'. The coherence of the individual's plan would demonstrate his unity: a unity grounded in the desire to pursue rational choice consistent with the individual's sense of right. The individual's final aim, a matter of choice, of volition are unknown. Where others are involved the relationship is contractual and the object of co-operation is to ensure the right of every individual to determine its own unity. The worlds of Rawls and Kant are not those of empiricism, here the individual would not be free since the will, subject to desire, would no longer be the first cause. Essential to understanding ourselves as autonomous is the priority which Rawls gives to justice over the good. A society promoting a particular form of the latter would, in treating us as means not ends, fail to respect our autonomy. Rawls assumes our being distanced from and antecedent to our circumstances. Only thus can we understand ourselves as both subjects of experience; that is, as autonomous agents who are not instruments of our aims. The advantage of this detached, distanced self, individuated prior to its ends, free of its desires and situation, is in enabling us to view our ends critically. This value cannot be overstated. It is central to the idea that autonomy is of value to a self with a cognitive drive.

For the self values and attachments are mere possessions, not constitutive of the self, subject to an instrumental rationality that can be discarded. I co-operate with others only so long as it is to our mutual advantage. Both the boy, with his desire to be an actor, and Keating with his concern for a life of the sentiments and shared emotions would find the Kantian-Rawlsian formalism, with its concept of an instrumentally rational, socially detached self of will arid terrain for those seeking 'to be their own person'. Its abstract
nature would not help them in their daily task of coping with the contingencies of their present lives, nor aid them in their future quest for personal development nor in their efforts to understand the past.

At the same time we gain little for the idea of personal autonomy if we reject the Kantian-Rawlsian concept as no longer of value for the reason that the both moral and personal autonomy share certain basics. The limitations of the former, identified above disclose the kinds of issues we need to address in order to gain a conception of autonomy of more practical value to the individual in the living of his life. Both concepts share a belief in autonomy as constitutive of the individual's irreducible identity. As such it remains a value central to western culture despite the efforts of the postmodernists to dethrone the subject. As a fundamental right it is grounded in a moral framework and in the individual's capacity to make reason-based and reason-giving choices unfettered by the will of another. We need to retain for personal autonomy the principle of critical detachment. However it has to be so formulated that it does not sacrifice in the interests of detachment those features essential to the self's identity, namely its situatedness and its sentiments. It is this last issue that is addressed in the next chapter.

Before leaving Rawls we should note four issues which are relevant to the general conditions of autonomy and discussed in subsequent chapters.

Firstly, is the Rawlsian belief in the right and the capacity of the individual to pursue their own concept of the good, including that of autonomy, a matter of arbitrary expression for the individual? Or, can we, and does it make sense to discriminate, between useful and useless ways of living life, using criteria based on some form of objectivity. This issue is important in Chapter 4 when the self of sensibility is explored.

Secondly, is the belief in the individual's right to its own conceptions of the good one in which the community, society or whatever their political embodiment in the state, has no role? Rawls and many of his fellow liberals remain detached and aloof from the substantive concerns of how people should live their lives. However, is the liberal stance of non-intervention possible without its implicating a particular conception of what
constitutes the good life for the individual? This issue is particularly significant in our
discussion of Raz in Chapter 5.

Thirdly, the Kantian-Rawlsian liberal conceptions of the self and its autonomy originated
in Europe and the United States. Does this mean that the notion of autonomy is culturally
specific or does it have a universal meaning? This is discussed in Chapter 5.

Fourthly, Rawls's original text on justice was written three decades ago and grounded in a
liberal tradition which goes back at least two centuries. Has the political, social,
-economic and liberal context changed in such a way as to render Rawls's theory and the
liberal view of the self and its form of moral autonomy, no longer relevant? The second
and fourth issues are clearly linked and these become important in discussing the nature of
autonomy in the contemporary world in the final chapter of this thesis.
Notwithstanding the value of the Kantian-Rawlsian detachment, we need to capture the meaning of the individual's situatedness for its personal autonomy. In this chapter I initially review and then critique the contribution of Sandel, Maclntyre and Taylor to notions relevant to a conception of personal autonomy before assessing what might be retained of value to such a concept. Important to this chapter is the development of a model for the self's situatedness with two aims, one negative, the other positive. The first represents an effort to avoid being swamped by either of the radical extremes, of the individual's detachment or its situatedness, by building a kind of consensus model from bits of the above three writers. The principal weakness of these three as we shall see, is their tendency towards a reductionism: evident in the primacy which Sandel and MacIntyre give to the community at the expense of the particularity of the individual's situatedness. It is otherwise with Taylor who wants to capture the phenomenology of the individual's life. Despite his wish to avoid it he ends up 'trumping' his own card of particularity with a retreat into his own form of universality. The second, the positive aim is to propose a model of the self's portfolio which focuses upon its particularity - its roles, relations objects, values etc. This constitutes in part the context within which the self's thinking and actions will be judged, that is by their appropriateness to the actual situation it faces. This model will enable me to develop in this chapter, and the next, standards of appropriateness for understanding the agent's actions, _sui generis_. In addition to the characteristic of appropriateness, particularity is concerned with the intrinsic messiness of life - of how we live our lives, how Keating's pupils seize the day - in which regret becomes a redundant emotion. These three particularity, appropriateness and life's messiness are the key to the dialectic in this and the next two chapters. To illustrate that these three can only be understood in their own terms, ie they cannot be 'trumped' my examples are drawn from literary sources. The check list for a conception of autonomy as
personal autonomy, in Chapter 1, embodies as necessary conditions of the self, as non-
optional extras to autonomy as moral autonomy, its situatedness, its sentiments and its
contingencies. As we have seen the rejection by the Kantian-Rawlsian self of these
attributes as heteronomous has led to its being criticised as both abstract and detached. At
the same time I acknowledged that the principle of the self's capacity to take a detached
view of its embeddedness in the interest of objectivity, remains vital to my own
conception of personal autonomy. The aim of this chapter and the next is to develop a
model for the self which encompasses the three elements excluded by Kant and Rawls and
for which, as a situated self of sentiments and contingencies, it can hold for itself and its
conditions a notion of truth. This chapter deals mainly with the first of the self's attributes,
its situatedness and draws upon the work of three critics of the liberal self; Michael
Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. The next chapter reviews the self of
sensible reasoning.

In their critique of the Rawlsian self as unencumbered by its ends, values and
attachments, each of the above three writers provides us with an understanding of the self
constitutive of its grounding in the community. Sandel, in attacking the incoherence of the
Rawlsian voluntarist 'self', proposes a conception of a cognitive self. MacIntyre's 'self'
in quest of the good life for the individual, shapes and re-shapes its telos through the
narrative unity of the self. This stands in marked contrast to Rawls's deliberative rational
self, prior to its ends its unity grounded in its life's plans. Taylor, views the principal
characteristic of humans as self-interpreters, located in a moral framework and governed
by moral intuitions. A major task of his essentially phenomenological concept of the self
is to explain how humans 'live their lives in its own terms' (SS 58). The belief of the
above three writers in the community's role in the self's constitution has led to their being
dubbed as communitarian, what is more significant in distinguishing them as a group is
their opposition to a Rawlsian conception of the self as essentially individualistic,
antecedent to ends and attachments which are never construed as constitutive of that self.
It is to Rawls's critics that we now turn. The chapter is divided into four sections:-
Section 1 Sandel's Cognitive Self.

The initial part of this section describes the Sandelian 'self' prior to its critique in the latter part. In chapter 2 the Rawlsian self was described as a subject of possession, distinguished and distanced from ends which are 'mine' not 'me'. This distinction, crucial to understanding much of the critique of the Rawls's voluntarist 'self' and Sandel's concept of a cognitive self, is essentially one of 'having' and 'being' in which the Rawlsian deontological self appears committed to the former. When I say that something is 'mine' I merely claim that it is not yours. Its loss makes no difference to my essential characteristics as a person since I am not claiming that it is 'me'. This distancing of the 'mine' and the 'me' is essential to my coping with life's contingencies and to my being able to say something about 'who I am'. Thus those things which are 'mine' are merely possessed or owned, and those which are 'me', are those things and interests which I regard as an integral part of my self and its identity. Through dispossession of something, either its loss or its becoming so much a part of me, I am disempowered. With the first type of dispossession, the loss of 'mine', the end is distanced from a self whose end it once was. The Rawlsian self - prior to its ends, its boundaries fixed, impermeable to change through experience, the continuity and the unity of its life, governed by the content of its plans and the degree of its resolution - remains inherently problematical. Continuity of the self and its ends can only be affirmed by the self 'reaching beyond itself', to embrace as an object of its will the ends the self wants, holding them always external to itself. With the second kind of dispossession, one in which an end becomes more absorbed by 'me' and less and less 'mine': for example, with intense desire the 'less I possess it the more I am possessed by it' (LLJ 56). My problem is then one of maintaining the space between the end or article, and the 'me' if I am not to lose my ability to distinguish my self identity from the world of attributes and desires. Without this ability to
detach ourselves we risk 'a constant danger of being drowned in a sea of circumstance' (LLJ 57). The voluntarist and the cognitivist self each deals with repossession of their ends in a different way. The voluntarist 'self', through the will and choice can transcend the distance between the subject and object without closing it. Where the self is so entangled with its ends, unable to differentiate between the two, its sense of loss or disempowerment can be restored through its knowledge and understanding of the self. With its ends given in advance the self restores its sense of command by reflecting on these and how they might become a part of that self. When I am able to identify and reflect on my obsessions I can establish a certain space between it and me, diminish its hold so that it becomes more an attribute and less a constituent of my identity (LLJ 58). This twofold distinction of possessions - mine or me - has significant implications for the self's identity.

1.1 The Self: (i) its knowledge, (ii) its ends and (iii) its grounding.

(i) Self Knowledge

From the foregoing two modes for choosing one's goals emerge, one the will, the other cognition. It is through the latter, our efforts at a deeper self-understanding, that we commit ourselves to goals which reflect and become an essential part of our self. Our prime concern is not with the conditions of choice but with seeking through self-knowledge what ends we ought to set for ourselves. The cognitivist view of Neil Perry, in the film is of a self faced with a plethora of ends, socially grounded, in which the process of adoption and achievement of the ends is through the boy's efforts at self understanding. In this way he internalises the ends making them a constitutive part of his self and in so doing, opens up the possibility of the creation of an 'authentic' self. The selection of 'appropriate' ends will depend upon the individual's characteristics, for example his cognitive capability, his emotional maturity as well as their harmony with a uniquely authentic self.

The authentic is not the daimon whose quest, as noted above, is a recurrent theme in Western literature. It is in part created, in part constructed. Like an authentic work of art it is not a copy, it is my work, not a reproduction of some old master or the result of the group effort of a workshop. It is above all one in which I am alive to my feelings. Any
coherence it has comes from my understanding of my sentiments and how they inform my self. When I am alone I know what it is and others may perceive it through my actions. Any explanation of it will lie at the level at which through the particularity of my sentiments I confront the particularities of my contingencies. Those actions I judge appropriate will not be tinged by the arbitrary: they will be consistent with my sensibilities. (I will return to these three issues of authenticity, particularity and appropriateness in detail below, important to which are the various literary references).

As we progress towards the development of an expanded notion of the self, embodied in my conception of personal autonomy, the issue of detachment continues to haunt us. This asks whether the only form of an authentic self, the only real self for which any form of personal autonomy is possible, is the Rawlsian 'self' of his 'thin' theory. That is, where our relation with our interests and attachments is one of independence, never identified with our ends are we always able to stand back, assess and revise them. Sandel views such a self as 'flawed', devoid of any constitutive attachments, less 'liberated' than 'disempowered', rather than being seen as a free agent it appears to be a 'character without moral depth' (LLJ 179). On Sandel's view the self has a capacity for self-interpretation. It moves in a history which carries consequences for our choices, making some appear more appropriate than others and with process and choice subject all the while to our reflection. In this way the self reflects upon and feels the moral weight of its knowledge (LLJ 179). For the deontological, characterless and unencumbered self with nothing to reflect upon any reflection over ends becomes, in Sandel's words, 'an exercise in arbitrariness'.

(ii) The Self's Ends

Rawls's self, according to Sandel, distinctly separate and never integrated with its identity is distant, placing it beyond the world of experience, its identity is both invulnerable and permanent. No purposes, plans, projects or subsequent changes to these, says Sandel, would in anyway undermine the 'contours' of the self's identity or raise the question of the self's identity. This independence enables me to distance myself from my values and my
public identity and as a moral person I remain unaffected by changes over time in my conception of the good (TJ 544).

In this way a distance is created between me, the self as a subject, and what it values. In so far as they are bestowed by an act of will the values are in the objects sought and not in the self as subject. Rawls's concept of self rules out both intra-subjective and inter-subjective conflicts and understandings over competing values and identities. It involves ends, no more than the interests of an individual, capable of being possessed but never integrated with the self. Rawls's antecedently individuated self appears to be a closed system, with boundaries impermeable to external circumstance, incapable of self-reflection and with a process of adaptation limited to one of consensual negotiation rather than a self whose very nature is formed in a process of self-reflective coping (LLJ 53-5).

In the case of Neil Perry, are his aims, in particular his ambition to be an actor, mere Rawlsian possessions which he is prepared to exchange, 'sell at market price' or, is he parting with more than mere possessions? Is he similar to Thomas More, in Robert Bolt's play A Man For All Seasons, who knows how far he will yield to love and to fear? Among the members of the Dead Poet's Society it is the boy Cameron, never an authentic member of the Society, the 'fink', the squealer who treats his ends as possessions, yielding to fear and ready to ditch them under pressure from his parents and the School's Head. Is Neil Perry, like Thomas More a martyr to his adamantine sense of self, whose ends are constitutive of this self? Is the 'fink' Cameron like Richard Rich in Bolt's play who talks of every man having his price? If that were true there would be no selfhood. The most moving statement More makes about selfhood is when he says to his daughter Margaret:

> When a man takes an oath. Meg he's holding his own self in his hands. Like water (cups his hands) and when he opens his fingers then he cannot hope to find himself again. (Ibid.)

More's statement is one of commitment to duty, to a responsibility in which the ultimate loyalty is to one's self, to that irreducible sense of individuality which is uniquely 'me'. More's religious convictions are so essential to this sense of self that he is prepared to
sacrifice his life. For Neil Perry the prospect of a military academy appears to destroy his concept of self. His only way out is suicide. There is, of course, a world of difference between the teenage boy struggling with the process of maturation, and possibly transient fads and choices, and a 58 year old Thomas More, lawyer, scholar and Chancellor of England engaged in maintaining, in the face of royal, secular authority and the threat to his life, deeply held religious beliefs. To these issues of the self's authenticity and emotional maturity I return in Chapter 6. But they frame a central question which lies at the heart of this thesis. If we are to theorise the self as constituted by its contingent attachments etc., how are we to provide it with the detachment necessary to treat these things cognitively and not be swamped by them?

(iii) The Grounding of the Self

Rawls's view of the political community is for Sandel restricted since, as an aim of antecedently individuated persons, it cannot be constitutive of their identity. The good of Rawls's political community involves participation in a 'well-ordered society' founded in mutual advantage it accords primacy to justice. Thus both the self's values and ends and the sense of community remain mere attributes, never constituent of that self. The well-ordered society similarly is never constitutive of its sense of community. By according absolute priority to justice, Rawls, in Sandel's view, excludes a community which would foster the specification of the subject as well as those objects of mutual aspiration. There is about Rawls's self an asocial individualism in which he neglects the extent to which it is the society in which people live that shape their identity and their values. Sandel's view of Neil Perry would be of a self constitutive of the social groups in which he lives - his family, his fellow pupils at the elitist Welton Academy. Neil's defiance of his father, in acting in the play could be construed, on this basis, as a reaction to a father whose only way of expressing paternal love is to offer his son, not understanding, but the chance to realize the father's values and ends. These values, rooted in the late 1950's American culture, feed the father's aim for the boy which is for Neil to reach a higher branch on the professional and socio-economic tree than the one on which the father is perched.
Rawls’s community, as a system of co-operation for mutual advantage, is an aim rather than constitutive of the individual’s identity. Rawls’s subjectivist view of moral choices as expressions of preferences raises doubts about his claim to neutrality between competing conceptions of the good. At the same time his reliance upon an inter-subjective notion of self appears inconsistent with his antecedently individuated conception of self. Rawls seems unaware, in the *Theory of Justice*, that the individual, constitutively a part of its community, is unwilling to accept a concept of the good unachievable on their own. For Rawls and other liberals the view of the self as antecedently individuated is unable to entertain a conception of the good which is founded upon constitutive commitments. Based upon a quite different conception of the person, Rawls’s political society is one of mutual co-operation enabling the individual to do what he would be unable to do on his own. Citizens are not linked to one another by ties which when entered into, broken or changed would in some way change their identity as persons.

1.2 The Self: Voluntarist or Cognitivist, Disembodied or Situated?

Sandel construes Rawls’s conception of the self as 'sparse', dubbed both 'voluntarist' and 'disembodied', the self is will and until it chooses its ends, which it does purely through preferences, it has none. Sandel’s claims for his cognitive self the capacity of critical reflection and an abundance of socially given ends (LLJ 58-159). For the Rawlsian self the problem is to determine its identity and to decide upon the acquisition and adoption of ends. For the Sandelian 'self' the problem is to distinguish itself, through critical reflection, from its environment. Rawls’s 'self' appears to face an unbridgeable chasm between the self and its ends. Each individual has its own idea of the good and its ends are accumulated through experience and are not internalized, ie they are mine not me - not a constituent of my self identity. Sandel’s 'self' fuses self and ends, each person embodies a conception of the good and full of aims, it adopts, through a process of reflection, those it already possesses (LLJ 21, 62).

The Rawlsian subject resurrects the Kantian transcendental subject, which beyond experience, is unable to entertain those commitments basic to and hence constitutive of the self (ibid. 82). The characteristics of the Rawlsian self are all contingent including that of
community (ibid. 69, 74). With only contingent desires to reflect upon, and an antecedent self as a given self-reflection is severely restricted. The Sandelian subject characterised by its membership of a family, community, nation etc., shares common discourses and a background of implicit practices and understandings. With its capacity for more thorough reflection we must as subjects be constituted 'in part by our central aspirations and attachments ... always open indeed vulnerable to growth and transformation in the light of revised self-understandings' (LLJ 172). However Sandel's subject, viewed in terms of its being, rather than having certain desires, faces the danger of collapsing the distinction, essential to a coherent concept of particular human subject, between the subject and its situation. A distinction which is essential if we are not to be left with a radically situated self (ibid. 20-21). The Sandelian subject accepts this distinction and attempts to find a balance between the two; between a radically situated self and a radically disembodied self. This is evidenced by the quote above from Sandel on the self's central aspirations and attachments. Such a subject would possess a 'core self', on which it can therefore reflect, socially constituted in part, not solely, it retains the capacity to distance itself from its possessions and attachments. Does Sandel succeed?

The importance of a core self grounded in the individual's particularity was noted on the first page of this chapter. Sandel's view of the core self is problematical. His reason for accepting virtually without argument the incoherence of the sociologically conditioned subject is precisely its lack of a core self (Hekman 1995: 53). At the same time Sandel fails to explore (i) the possibilities of the socially constructed subject, (ii) the gap between the constituted self and the self that does the constituting and (iii) the concept of a core - 'true' authentic - self and its relationship to a transcendental self. Sandel's wider notion of self rather than rejecting the 'disembodied' self requires such key features as its self knowledge, agency and responsibility (ibid.). Sandel's response to the Rawlsian subject is to offer a sense of self which he claims is constituted only in part by society and which retains the capacity to distance itself from its possessions and relationships. The result of this is to pose problems for the 'self' of Rawls and of Sandel. The Rawlsian 'self', characterised by will and detachment faces being radically disembodied. The Sandelian 'self' with its capacity for critical reflection and its social embeddedness risks being
'radically situated'. Each conception brings its own trade off. Rawls's rejection of any attributes as constitutive of the self implies a personality fixed, insubstantial, generated by its choices, incapable of examining its ends critically, fully malleable and lacking a rational basis on which to embrace any particular end that might change its personality. On the other hand Sandel's 'self' appears to be no more than its constitutive qualities. With its ends imposed by social experience, the self experiences vagaries of circumstances with only a minimum of individual control. Sandel's analysis appears to offer a stark choice with regard to the self's choices and its social experience. Are its choices the result of will or reflection? Is its social experience that of a disembodied or a radically situated self?^3

Both Rawls's voluntarist self, which may have control but lacks depth and, Sandel's cognitive self, with depth but lacking control, suggest extremes. The dichotomies, will or reflection and the disembodied or radically situated self, and the pairings, of the first terms and those of the second in each of the dichotomies, are patently false. It is difficult to believe that the self of will, choosing its ends on the basis of contingent preferences is able to escape the possibility of innate preferences and those acquired through social experience. If the ends of the cognitive, radically situated self are the result of critical reflection, the sole basis of which are prevailing social norms, can its reflection be described as critical? This appears to be no more than a mere arbitrary arranging and re-arranging of equally constitutive ends because the criteria available to reflection are no more than the set of ends it is attempting to assess. Voluntarism and critical reflection are both untenable unless the former has some measure of situation and the latter an independent base for making choices, that is some notion of its preferences and attributes. Insight into the false nature of the above pairings can be gained through reading a couple of modern classics in which each of the two principal characters borders on pathological extremes. Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man* suggests a self which has depth but lacks self control and whose eventual fate is a disintegration into anomie (Ellison 1952). This is a prophetic portrait of a modern black man but also of those who feel themselves marginalized in modern society, "who knows but that, on lower frequencies, I speak for you":

40
I can hear you say, "What a horrible irresponsible bastard". And you're right, I leap to agree with you, I am one of the most irresponsible beings that has ever lived. Irresponsibility is part of my invisibility, any way you face it is a denial. But to whom can I be responsible and why should I be, when you refuse to see me and wait until I reveal how truly irresponsible I am (Ellison: 16).

In this apparently radically situated self both will and reflection are evident. Ellison's character contrasts graphically with Kazuo Ishiguro's remarkable portrait of the English butler, Stevens in *The Remains of the Day*. This shows a man, always with the appearance of absolute self-control, totally immersed in his role as a butler but lacking depth. He seems to have no private life and his relations with his father lack warmth. In the obvious conflict between his barely understood feelings for the housekeeper and the role of the butler the latter triumphs.

A butler of any quality must be seen to inhabit his role, utterly and fully; he cannot be seen casting it aside one moment simply to don it again the next, as though it were a pantomime costume (ibid. 169).

His self-control borders on the pathological. When the housekeeper tells Stevens his father has died in an upstairs' room Stevens says that he is too busy to come up at the moment. "In that case Mr Stevens will you permit me to close his eyes?" To which Stevens merely replies: "I would be most grateful if you would, Miss Kenton" (ibid. 106). While Steven's 'self' might suggest the falseness of a dichotomy of will or reflection, there is no doubt that it calls into question the pairing of will and disembodiment. Stevens' seemingly detached, resolute self is firmly grounded in its social context. Stevens is the truly heteronomous self with values derived from the expectations which many English aristocrats probably once had of their chief servant.

The hard reality is surely that for the likes of you and I there is little choice other than to leave our fate ultimately in the hands of those great gentlemen at the hub of the world who employ our service (ibid.).

This is re-enforced by the butler's professional code, symbolised in the idea of dignity for which his father had provided Stevens with the role model. The dichotomy of voluntarist and cognitive self becomes critical in determining the nature of our autonomy particularly if we choose to stress some existing constitutive qualities of our self or to choose to change others. No matter how deeply we are involved we need to retain for our autonomy the
capacity to question our social embodiment. Sandel's 'self might well regard the kind of
choices 'as a basis for autonomy to be irremediably accidental' (Meyers 1989: 85). Because of lack of space, I leave the question of whether such change is directly possible or whether the best we can do is through indirect transmutation, for example, by choosing to place ourselves in new or different situations and behaving in ways that might, to a greater or lesser degree, facilitate change. While the individual has preferences derived from experience it has no reason which would enable it to take a critical view of its inclinations. However since preferences and reasons mutually influence one another volition and critical reflection would appear to be amenable to co-ordination. Although Sandel's critically reflective self derives its reasons and desires from its social context he can hardly deny that socially grounded reasons are not genuine personal ones. The voluntarist and the cognitivist are analogous, to an individual faced with a wardrobe of clothes. The voluntarist, 'disembodied self' models the true self on the wardrobe of a person who lacks interest in style or utility. Any merits the wardrobe has are fortuitous and the clothing lacks either intrinsic or instrumental value. The wardrobe of the radically situated self is a collection of uniforms and a kit for sewing on its name tapes. In neither case would it appear that the adoption of a particular mode of dress is a matter of conscious and informed choice, but rather one of implicit or explicit pressure. Both models discount the individual's capacity for self definition and the possibility of autonomy as a priority quest.

Sandel's rejection of Rawls's self, his own conception of the cognitive self and the socially constitutive nature of the self mark an important step towards a conception of autonomy as personal autonomy but they do not go far enough. A conception of autonomy as self-rule will need to take account of a self shaped both by individual choice as well as social experience. This will require for a self in quest of autonomy some kind of unifying device. Rawls offers a 'life plan' which enables the individual to seek a kind of harmonious balance in the self's interaction with its social world. This is however a plan prepared by the sparse Rawlsian self, given in advance of its ends. For a self unfettered by its antecedence we need a 'plan' which is able to seek as an end its own notion of the good life and in so doing defines and redefines both its ends and its identity. There is a
difference between the latter plan, in which what matters is the process of planning, and the proceduralist, instrumentalist plan envisaged by Rawls. It is, as we shall see in the next section, MacIntyre with his concept of self narrative which offers the hope of a life ‘plan’ which embodies the individual’s particularity.

In the meantime one final point, on the comparison of the voluntarist and cognitive selves, of importance to my conception of personal autonomy detailed below in chapter 6. Sandel claims that Rawls’s failure, to replace the Kantian noumenal subject with a self whose choices take account of empirical conditions, has resulted in an unencumbered subject. This does not mean however that the antecedent Rawlsian self cannot have ends other than those it currently possesses. This suggests a further dichotomy. Do we discover the self through understanding and acknowledging our attachments or is it the result of our choosing the type of person we want to be, or become? The former is associated with Sandel and the communitarians and the latter with Rawls and the ‘liberals’.

For my conception of personal autonomy it will be seen that this dichotomy can be pushed too far. As I argue below, the self will be constituted by elements some of which are discovered and others the result of judgment. However neither discovery nor judgment take full account of the self as a part process of creation, as a quest, as a developmental effort towards some achievement. Whether the process is one of discovery, judgment or creation the essential for the autonomous self is that the elements of our situatedness be informed by a coherence. This will be found not in the questions we ask about individual attachments but in the strategy, sentiments and critical questioning we bring to all our attachments, including our roles, commitments, loyalties and ends. Strategy, by definition requires a perspective for which Sandel’s two fellow communitarians, MacIntyre and Taylor, offer some prospect.

Section 2 MacIntyre’s Encumbered Self

This section on MacIntyre begins with a description of his notions of ‘self’ prior to its critique. Two broad topics of MacIntyre’s of key concern to my thesis are: firstly, his ‘encumbered self’ and secondly his critique of modern managerialism as emotivist. The first, which offers through its concepts of practice, narrative and tradition the possibility
of a significant contribution to my conception of personal autonomy, is dealt with in this section. The second topic, central to the discussion on personal autonomy in the contemporary organization, is dealt with in Part II.

2.1 Practice, Narrative and Tradition

While the Rawlsian self is for Sandel antecedently individuated for MacIntyre it is unencumbered. Both discount the possibility of Rawls's 'self' developing aims and commitments which might become constitutive of the self's identity and attack its failure to take account of the community. For Sandel the importance of this failure lies in the neglect of the community's political aims and activities: for MacIntyre it is its failure to take full account of the community in the individual's moral life. MacIntyre believes that the unencumbered self results from a contemporary, essentially emotivist and fragmentary moral discourse in which moral argumentation is mere statement of individual preference and the resultant moral positions incommensurable (AV 11-12). Exemplifying a clash of wills, the aim of emotivist judgments, in their expression of personal feelings and attitudes, is to induce others to share these with that individual or to get others to do what the appellant wants them to do.⁸ This fragmentation arises, he claims, from the loss of a moral vocabulary, grounded in an institutional framework which once gave it both meaning and persuasive force and which MacIntyre finds characteristic of pre-historic societies. It is the failure of the Enlightenment project, in particular its abandonment of the notion of telos, which accounts for the current disarray in moral discourse. MacIntyre views the telos as central to a morality which has claims to rationality and objectivity since this enables us to legitimise the transition from statements of fact to statements of obligation, that is from the 'is' to the 'ought'. Acceptance of a final state for human nature, evidenced for example in the individual's performance in his various roles, enables us to distinguish the good from the bad aspects of behaviour and character. The latter are those which do not facilitate our development and realisation of the telos.⁹ 'We humans enter society', writes MacIntyre:-

... with one or more imputed characters - roles into which we have been drafted - and we have to learn what these are in order to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be understood (AV 216).
MacIntyre's conception of role means that the self is in part prior to the choices it makes. Not all our roles are ascribed (eg son) some are achieved (eg an architect). In both these roles our performance is improvised in the light of what is expected of us in a particular role and our own character. Our character enables us to filter the expectations and demands which others may have of us in a particular role. Too close an identity with our role and we lose the distinctive nature of our character: like Stevens the butler we appear to be puppets. Too great a distance and we risk being dismissed as eccentric or as mad or, in the case of Ellison's invisible black man being socially marginalized. Thus the notion of role adopted here and developed below is more than a minimalist definition of socially programmed behaviour. It is a medium of self-expression and upon a role we imprint our unique identity in which important elements of character are our sensibility and our capacity for sympathetic co-operation (See Chapter 4).

The individual's role performance in relation to its function enables MacIntyre to claim moral judgments as statements of fact (AV 59). MacIntyre's re-introduction of rationality to morality through the idea of telos is only possible for a conception of the self which is grounded in and identified by its historical, social and cultural circumstance. There is no hope for the individually abstract, 'ghostly' emotivist self. The three elements, moral judgments as factual, a human telos, and a socially constituted self are central to a moral understanding of Ancient Greece to which MacIntyre turns in his efforts to supplant what he sees as the incoherent fragments of modern moral morality. In his reconstruction of Aristotelian virtue ethics MacIntyre's concern is with the transition of the contingent individual as-it-is to as-it-might-be-if-it realised its telos. Aristotle's telos is the fulfilment by the individual of his function as a good human being in the performance of its roles - in which the individual's task is to balance its various roles. The disassociation of one role from another is unthinkable. It is those societies, according to MacIntyre, in which individuals have specified roles and statuses that virtues flourish.10

The centrality of MacIntyre's belief in the community is obvious in the above and clearly evident in three further inter-related concepts of practice, narrative, and tradition. The self knowledge we gain from our narrative contributes both to an understanding of our relations to others and the kind of choices we make. A chooser or decider for the
Rawlsian voluntarist self is always ready to question, and if necessary discard, aspects of its social context. For MacIntyre and Sandel these are inescapable. Through reflection and a deeper understanding, our socially derived ends become constitutive of the self. MacIntyre believes this greater understanding comes through an essentially educative process in which the telos of a human life is its quest for the good life. This is a quest sustained by the virtues enabling us to increase our self-knowledge and our knowledge of the good.

MacIntyre makes scant reference to autonomy as such and my reading of MacIntyre suggests strong elements of ambiguity. It would appear that the individual seeking his/her own idea of the good life through a process both enriching and educative, whose narrative provides a unity and its telos direction, must be concerned with its own governance. In MacIntyre's comments on Parfit's view that self-identity is a matter of degree, of more or less, we gain a good idea of what a creative self-unity might mean for individual autonomy. At the same time there is ample textual support for the association of autonomy, in its claim for individual rights, with his attack on emotivism. However, MacIntyre's belief that behaviour should accord with socially prescribed roles would appear to constrain the possibility of achieving substantive autonomy in which one's actions are governed by judgment.

At the same time MacIntyre gives an insight into a self and its potential for an autonomy much richer in its possibilities than does Rawls. The self's unity and its autonomy is provided for by the responsibility which the individual undertakes for his/her own life as an unfolding narrative. If this is not written and owned by the individual it constitutes heteronomy, it's my narrative, I may possess it but it's not me. My own self narrative encompasses a responsibility for a past, rooted in tradition, a present governed by practice, and a future, in which the individual's quest for the good life requires for its living certain virtues in relation to the individual's life in the community. We all, says MacIntyre approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular moral identity. Our inheritances from all those formal and informal groupings of which we are members, lay upon us rightful expectations and obligations and 'constitute the givens of my life, my moral starting point'. It is in our attitudes and behaviour towards the development of
children that the weakness of MacIntyre's emphasis upon role is apparent. We can act as legislator, the provider of rules, and then police their role behaviour. Or, we can offer guidance, understanding and the resources and opportunities which will enable our children to write their own narratives. (See next section (ii) and Chapter 4). In his analysis of the structure of historical virtue-based moralities MacIntyre identifies three stages, practices, the self-narrative and tradition: these are also the features associated with his encumbered 'self'.

(i) The Concept of Practice

For MacIntyre a practice is essentially the social context within which 'a coherent practice of virtues is intelligible' (McMylor 1994). MacIntyre defines it as:

\[(A)n\text{y coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence appropriate to, and partially definitive of that activity (AV 187)}\]

The essential feature of a practice lies in its implications for a standard of excellence internal to a particular practice that is, those such as skill which are related to the activity per se and not to such externals as fame or wealth. The point about his distinction is that no activity without internal goods constitutes a practice and such goods are at the heart of MacIntyre's definition of virtue. Without virtue we would be unable to achieve these internal goods. My participation in the practices requires that I accept the rules of the game and relate my own preferences to current communal standards and authorities. For example the profession of an architect and the wider 'community' has its practices. The former must be understood in terms of their appropriateness in use: practitioners cannot look to the community to legitimate them. This may involve practitioners in the process of educating public sensibility: as was the case with the Georgian architects whose enlightened patrons were prepared to give them a relatively free hand in their use of Palladian motif. The problem of educating public sensibility is now Richard Roger's with the Millennium Dome. It is a problem compounded by the existence of our official guardians of taste whether they be royal architectural critics or the chairman of English Heritage and of the Fine Arts Commission.
concerned with a particular practice, the issue of individual authenticity and autonomy.

Any change or dissent, over practices must take account of existing rules, paradigms and criteria if it is not to be merely personal preference. Participation in shared projects, acceptance of such communally and historically defined standards initiates the individual into forms of life in which human judgments are immune to the threat of emotivism. Where allegiances compete or threaten the life lived according to the virtues it is the narrative unity of human life which, as we shall see below, offers the hope for resolution. Morality is conceived not in terms of general or abstract principles but in terms of a life lived according to the virtues. These are practice-based, 'good' action is determined by individual practice. The distinction between external and internal goods, similar to the notions above of 'having' and 'being', is important to the individual's motivation. External goods belong to an individual, he has them, they are possessed by him. Always subject to competition the more I have of them the less another has. Internal goods are achieved through efforts to excel, this enriches the practice and benefits the particular community of practitioners. 16 The importance of virtues in sustaining practices is not solely by excelling in the goods of the practice but also in their institutional setting (AV 191). This close connection between practice and institutions brings, MacIntyre believes, a corrupting threat from those external goods associated with the acquisition and distribution of power. The relentless pursuit of these goods by individuals in a market based society threatens our institutions. (As will be discussed in Part II). Faced with the choice of goods available within the context of practices MacIntyre eschews a hierarchical ranking. He favours the goods which aid those institutional and social forms essential to sustaining practices. However MacIntyre is rather pessimistic over the outcome of conflicts between the maintenance of particular organizations and the 'manifest good'. With many organizations characterised by bureaucratic individualism the justification for internal goods depends ultimately upon an arbitrary choice made by a modern self devoid of criteria. 17

Finally there remains for the individual the question of the role of authority as an essential basis for our relations with others, for example in the sharing of common practices. It is the influence of the postmodernist writers with their idea of the decentered
subject which for MacIntyre threatens this link. This brings with it an arbitrariness for the individual, a feeling of fragmentation and a sense of entrapment in a market dominated society. The hope of escape MacIntyre believes lies in his notion of the telos bringing with it a sense of unity for the individual life, a unity to be found in his concept of the self-narrative.

(iii) The Self as Narrative

In order to make some sense of an individual's life as a unity we need, claims MacIntyre, to be able to relate particular episodes as instalments in the history of their lives. With the understanding of intention we are able to: separate the manifest from the possibly undisclosed reason for their action, discern the priority which they give to particular acts and to distinguish autonomous from heteronomous action. Because they have this basically historical character our lives are, in effect, enacted narratives, they possess a certain narrative structure in which what I am now is continuous with what I was in the past (Horton 1994: 8-10). In these we are the authors, co-authors and characters with leading or walk-on parts in our own and others narratives. Stories are lived, says MacIntyre, before they are told except in the case of fiction. Or, as Dennett expresses it, 'Our tales are spun but for the most part we don't spin them: they spin us. Our human consciousness and our narrative selfhood is the product not the source' (Dennett 1991: 418). Dennett poses a problem for the autonomous self, analogous to the risk for the Sandelian 'self', of its being swamped. This raises again the issue, to which we shall return, of the self's detachment. In the meantime we should note that it is in the context of the narrative that MacIntyre provides his concept of selfhood. The unity of this self resides in the unity of a narrative linking 'birth to life to death as a narrative beginning to middle to end' (AV 205). In living our narrative we don't know what will happen next and in our relationships we share with others conceptions of the future. Our present is always informed by some image of the future ' an image which is always present itself in the form of a telos' or of a variety of ends or goals. Our lives lived in a narrative form enable us to make rational choices. When conflict arises over the demands of different practices this enables us to choose those internal goods which are most important to us in shaping our life in 'the ways (we) want it to go'. The systematic asking of the question of what is the best
way to live out the narrative unity of one's life is for MacIntyre as important as our attempts, through our words and actions, to find possible answers. Both our questions and our attempted answers provide the moral life with its unity - the narrative quest for the good. 19

Our quest for the good life will enable us to place other goods in order of importance and to broaden our understanding of the virtues. Quest and goals are inseparable. This is a quest which begins with a partly determined telos but it is only in coping with all the vicissitudes encountered that the goal can be finally understood. A quest, always educative both in regard to its objective and in terms of knowledge of our self, is made within a social and moral context. It is in opposition to the notion of the voluntarist self as a decider and chooser that MacIntyre proposes the narrative self. 20 In place of the self antecedent to its choices MacIntyre focuses upon the moral and social context, not of one's own choosing, within which the individual comes to understand the choices yet to be made, and their circumstances. These choices involve not only what we might do but also the discovery of who we are in relation to others.

We may be comfortable with the idea of self-narrative since it seems to resonate with our own experience but there are problems. Among which are: the self of impulsion, those who lack a capacity for self-rule through defects of epistemic or practical rationality or a sense of psychic continuity 21 or, are the subject of partial myth such as Scott Fitzgerald's Gatsby or, Bernard Crick's portrayal of Jeffrey Archer. 22 The difficulty of distinguishing autobiographical elements from those of fiction are well-known and were much debated in France when in 1984 Marguerite Duras was awarded the Prix Goncourt for her novel L'Amant. The problem is often one of separating authorial descriptions of events in which they were participants and justification. In reading the memoirs of politicians one is often aware of its nature as an apologia as a piece of ex post facto justification. However as Dancy points where there is moral justification this is narrative not subjective. Dennett's notion of heterophenomenology offers a possible way out in viewing the narratives of others: we neither challenge or accept ' as entirely true the assertions of the subject but rather maintain a constructive and sympathetic neutrality in the hopes of compiling a definitive description of the world according to the subjects' (op. cit. 72-78).
becomes somewhat more complex however when we ponder with sympathetic detachment our own narratives particularly when these conflict or are those of some kind of Beckettian multiple self. To safeguard the value of the self narrative for our autonomy we need to ensure that we are not driven by our narrative. We need a way of reviewing which takes advantage of the narrative's value in enriching our reasoning about the self, its values and circumstances, and its autonomy by its adding temporal depth to our decisions (See Ch 4).

Despite the objections to the notion of the self narrative it remains a powerful and useful concept in relation to personal autonomy. However the important task is not to justify the conception of the self narrative but to look at the way it works for personal autonomy. In the case of the architect it enables him to relate his creativity, its past and potential development, to the particularity of his current projects and those to which he might aspire. It also enables him to relate meaningfully, i.e. not as a copyist, to the traditions and practices of architectural excellence. It offers the prospect of personal integrity in which no part of his practices or his character are found wanting, found to be arbitrary and inauthentic. To seek governance for an irreducible sense of self requires for the architect as agent a unity which his narrative posits both for himself and his audience.

(iii) Tradition

We cannot, says MacIntyre seek the good as solitary individuals because we bring to our circumstances a social identity: social inheritances, expectations, obligations etc. 'These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity' (AV 220). Thus the self has to be understood within a social context embodying practices which define the values and tradition which offers the individual the resources for its quest of the good. 'It is traditions which are the repositories of rationality and which are crucial to moral deliberation and action' (Horton 1994:12). The possession of an historical and social identity are co-incidental limiting our roles as sovereign narrators but at the same time constituting the context within which we make those decisions which move our narrative forward. Tradition, a central part of our social inheritance, is a set of practices and ways of understanding their values and as such constitutes the means whereby practices are formed, changed and passed on to
succeeding generations. A tradition in 'good order' is never static always subject to continuous argumentation about the goods 'the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point or form' (AV 222).

The distinction between a static tradition and one in good order is well illustrated in the *Dead Poets Society*. The School's Head, during a highly formalised and ritualistic start to the academic year asks the assembled pupils for the four pillars of the light of knowledge to which the boys call out in unison: 'Tradition, Honour, Discipline, Excellence'. Contrast this with schoolmaster Keating who, his class grouped around a photograph from which the pupils from the 1880's stare out, brings to life a tradition the boys share of hope and aspiration. We see from what follows that Keating is trying to get the boys to write the heroic in their own terms not, as we shall see in discussing Charles Taylor, to make their lives extraordinary on some cosmic scale. That is to make their lives extraordinary here today, this day not at some ultimate level or time.

Keating tells the boys:

"They're not any different from you, are they? Hope in their eyes, just like yours. They believe themselves to be destined for wonderful things, just like many of you. But where are those smiles now boys? What of hope? Did most of them wait until it was too late before making their lives one iota of what they were capable? In chasing the almighty deity of success, did they squander their boyhood dreams? Most of them gentlemen are now fertilising daffodils. However if you get close, boys, you can hear them whisper. Go ahead, lean in. Hear it? Can you?".

The boys quiet, leaned hesitatingly towards the photograph. Keating is illustrating to the boys that tradition is a matter of timely, and not just timeless truths. "Carpe diem", Keating whispered loudly. "Seize the day. Make your lives extraordinary". Keating's tradition is not that of the Head's formalism, the mimicry of ritual. For Keating the School's tradition is alive, it has the capacity to be built upon, to evolve.

2.2 MacIntyre's Self - Rooted or Rootless?

The centrality which MacIntyre gives to the notion of community raises for personal autonomy questions about (i) its contemporary meaning and (ii) its significance for
personal identity and (iii) the choices we might have with regard to membership. I wish to delay the more general consideration of its meaning until the conclusion of this chapter when I will have dealt with the last of the three communitarians - Charles Taylor. In the meantime I deal with it below specifically in relation to MacIntyre's ideas about embeddedness. The second two questions, on self identity and choice, are important in relation to the self's capacity to detach itself from and assess critically its attachments. Given the communal grounding of, and one's embeddedness in, social practices and tradition how far can one claim for a personal narrative a freedom and independence in its 'writing'. To be overwhelmed by one's situatedness, or by contingency, is to lose any hope of personal autonomy. At the same time the need for personal autonomy to take account of both situation and contingency is inescapable. We enter the world already embedded to which the process of socialization adds further socially constituted elements to the self's identity. Our development thrusts upon us the role of child, son or daughter, adolescent and, once we have undertaken it unconsciously or consciously, the role of parent - natural or adoptive. Most of these roles arise principally from the biological nature of our relations with others. We have no choice of where we are born where we spend the vital years of our childhood. These roles, physically inescapable bring with them, largely culturally determined expectations as to behaviour of ourselves and that of others towards us. We could of course at some stage in our lives through for example religious or political conversion reject, walk away from these roles and their associated responsibilities. However we might attempt to re-write them into our personal narrative their imprint on our personal identity remains. With maturation comes other roles, in the choice, perception and conduct of which we have a greater or lesser degree of freedom of choice: pupil, student, employee, employer, partner, neighbour, citizen, member of a particular social community or professional group. These two types of roles, our ascribed roles, those which are thrust upon us and our achieved roles those, on the selection and conduct of which we have some measure of choice, constitute what I term briefly the self's portfolio. It embraces not only our roles and our role sets but all the associated aims, relations, commitments, loyalties, projects etc., associated with our being purposeful agents in the world. This portfolio constitutes a major element in our
self-identity and the identity which others attribute to us. With it we face an adventitious world. Its essentially changing nature is intimately interwoven into our changing personal narrative.

The significance of the second type of role is its offer of personal choice. In seeking a form of personal autonomy, that is a sense in which we can choose for ourselves how we might live our lives, we face the continual task of re-appraising our role portfolio. The important elements are the more firmly embedded, those which offer an element of structure and stability in a dynamic world of contingency. These elements, 'zones of stability' offer us a measure of ontological security. To achieve what we believe we are capable of in our contingent world is an act of creation, in which our portfolio is a resource, a backdrop to our effort and an essential part of our self-narrative. As part of our embeddedness we choose those social groups, 'communities' with which we wish to identify. The idea of community here extends well beyond the idea of geographical, or local community of inhabitants to embrace a wide range of social groupings which reflect our interests, values, sympathies, sentiments, aims and aspirations as well as our physical, social, ego and self-actualisation needs. With a plurality of roles the individual will have a clutch of communities, many without geographical limits, with no direct social contact, eg a community of academics working in the same discipline, and embrace a plurality in which some attachments are permanent and others transient, with which are associated varying degrees of embeddedness.

For MacIntyre there appears to be a single, or at least a dominant community membership which for the individual appears inescapable. Although MacIntyre is well aware of its process of renewal there is an impression of the community as static, somewhat conservative. He has a predilection for small historical communities all of which predate the process of industrialization with its increased geographical and social mobility, major cultural transfer via population movement and the growth in international institutions. While the narrative unity of one's life has always to be understood within a social context there seems to be in MacIntyre an unawareness of the existence of an element of choice over one's community or communities. We appear to be simply embedded.
Indeed for some such choices may be forced upon them, for example if they are immigrants or born of parents of different cultures. Here possible conflict between values originating in the family's original culture and the country in which they live may present an individual with acceptance or rejection of parental values or living with an uneasy, and stressful truce. The choice of an association with a community, and tradition may be a free one made as part of a self-narrative possibly largely fictional in content by those victims of Hegel's *ungleichliche bewusstsein* or by those with tenuous links to a community, or tradition who may adopt it as a central constituent of their identity to become 'plus catholique que le pape'.

Among these are the contingent men and women whose embeddedness is apparently detachable and with Fitzgerald's Gatsby, 'the corrupt dreamer', personality becomes a 'series of successful gestures'. On the other hand, conduct of one's role, and hence choice of attachment to a community may be severely circumscribed. For example, in the case of an arranged marriage, a woman with children living with a man prone to violence who faces a role conflict, or a woman with a career mobile husband. His frequent job changes subject his partner and his family to a disruption in their family life, their social relations and their feeling of embeddedness. All three women are likely to feel themselves entrapped in another's narrative. In a sense we are all, at some stage in our lives, entrapped in another's roles, for example in childhood. Change in our portfolios of roles and attachments is not of one's own making. This sense of entrapment pervades not only an individual's roles but also its personal narrative. The issue for the individual's autonomy is the extent to which he/she can make a choice, to write their own narrative, free of pressure, aware of the consequences of a particular action, for example in not following her husband and taking the family to a new job and a new home in the tropics. The difficulty arises when one party, unknown to the other, behaves manipulatively treating the other as a means to their own ends. Thus I believe in common with Kant that it would be morally unacceptable not to share with another in a partnership our purpose. The present aim of this excursus into manipulation is to amplify the possibility of entrapment and its implications for the individual's quest for autonomy.29
MacIntyre's notions of tradition, practice, narrative, role and telos are all grounded in the idea of the community and central to his efforts to replace contemporary emotivism with a more coherent moral philosophy. However I remain doubtful whether a self, so burdened by its tradition, shared practices and virtues, all grounded along with a personal narrative in his problematic concept of a community, could achieve a meaningful degree of autonomy. To ask if an individual so embedded can identify a self capable of personal autonomy raises again the issue of the self's detachability. It is their belief in the latter which leads the moral autonomists to reject all the above encumbrances of MacIntyre's subject. MacIntyre would of course claim that in the same way that the narrative is communally grounded so is the argument to which those believing in detachment would appeal. If so, then some form of social grouping appears inescapable. The issue then becomes perhaps one of defining what is meant by community. The general issue of defining the contemporary community is dealt with below, in the meantime let us look at the example of an individual's relationship with its professional community.

We gain an insight into the particularity of the relation of the individual's embeddedness to MacIntyre's concepts of practice, narrative and tradition if we look at the job of an architect. The design and construction of a building involves an understanding of the potentialities of current internal practices both of the canons of good design and of sound construction. At the same time elements of tradition will, to a greater or lesser extent influence both design and construction. This is the living tradition of the dead and not in Frank Lloyd Wright's the stylisation of tradition, of the 'dead living'. How far the architect is able to innovate through his own sense of creativity, embodied in his personal narrative, will be governed by practice and tradition. As the meeting ground of science and art, where practices interact, the instrumentality of construction technology and cost temper the human expressiveness embodied in practices, tradition and the individual narrative. Without the expressiveness our houses and buildings would be little more than, to adapt Le Corbusier's somewhat dated aphorism, 'machines for living (and working) in'.

Without those elements of embeddedness of order which practices and tradition bring, our buildings might collapse, or lack an economic rationale or become meaningless. It is
in working with practice and tradition that the architect employs a creative flair whose nature is embodied in a self-narrative. This creative flair, in relating particularity and contingency, combined with an entrepreneurial vigour, ie the unwillingness to accept the conventional givens, calls for a powerful belief in one's essential individuality. This is an individuality embodying wise judgment, guided not by rules but by sympathy, and a strong sense of one's self-worth and of one's capacity for self-governance.30 Finally this is a self, informed by a living and evolving tradition, fuelled by imagination and the exercise of its sensitivity. It is not role governed.

What emerges from the foregoing are some serious doubts about the nature of MacIntyre's self and its grounding. This brings into question those notions which are dependent upon his form of social embeddedness and which MacIntyre views as key in moulding for the individual: practices, with their internal and external goods, the narrative unity of the self, tradition and a personal and communal telos. There is a sense of entrapment in MacIntyre's community which ignores the considerable psychological freedom which an individual has in choosing its own form of community, or communities. The danger with MacIntyre's self is analogous to Sandel's 'radically situated self', one that is so embedded in its social contexts that it is difficult to discern a self for which to seek a telos, let alone personal autonomy.31

At the same time the scale, speed and complexity of change in our world is destabilizing those elements once regarded as embedding eg tenure of employment. Where does this leave the self in relation to the fading of traditional forms of embeddedness, to the ending of what the postmodernists would call another meta-narrative?

One possibility for some measure of personal autonomy is to disregard with Rawls a metaphysical self and settle for one whose relations are essentially political, contractual in which notions of personal quests and individual moral thought can be disregarded. Another possibility is to accept with the postmodernists that the ending of another metanarrative has decentred the self. Or, to acknowledge with Rorty a centreless self, which is nothing more than the interchange nexus of different lines on the Paris metro. My rejection early on of the dethroning of the sovereign self has been re-inforced by my acceptance of the narrative self. One alternative to a Rawlsian portfolio of contractual
relationships, in which the criteria for the inclusion of elements is some form of instrumentality, is to broaden the perspective. That is, to provide for ourselves a strategy for our relationships, situations, roles etc., which is something more than mere rationality. In this way the issue of what the concept of community means in practice becomes less insistent than it appears for Sandel and MacIntyre. Charles Taylor, to whom we now turn in the next section of this chapter, serves as a useful opener to the development of such a perspective in the next chapter.
As with the other two communitarian writers I begin with a description, in this section of Charles Taylor’s concept of the self and its autonomy, prior to its critique. It is my effort to find a midway between the extremes of the radically disembodied self and the radically situated self which provides the dialectic for this chapter. We have seen the problems with Sandel’s and Macintyre’s conception of a socially constituted self to which we now add those of Charles Taylor. Before doing so it is important to affirm my belief with Taylor in the importance of particularity for the individual in trying to make sense of its life. However, what I have to avoid is ‘trumping’ (Taylor’s word) the individual’s particularity with a more abstract universalist notion. The task is not an easy one given that the individual in seeking appropriate actions has to cope through its own particularity with that of its contingencies the significant feature of which is their ‘messiness’. That is, the difficulty of comprehensively recapturing them linguistically.

Taylor’s moral perspective does enable me however, to develop my model of the situational portfolio, as a key element in my conception of personal autonomy. At the same time I have considerable doubts about the ultimate basis of his conception of moral selfhood. Taylor provides valuable insights into the nature of the individual’s particularity. Despite his declared aim to offer an explanation of the way the individual lives its life at the level at which it is lived he ends up with a form of theistic transcendentalism.

The section on Taylor is divided into three parts:

3.1 Taylor’s Moral Selfhood.
3.2 Taylorian Autonomy and the Modern Self.
3.3 What Can Be Saved from Taylor? This assesses critically his contribution to my conception of personal autonomy.
3.1 Moral Selfhood; its Intuitions, its Daily World, its Objectivity

(i) Its Intuitions

Taylor's conception of agency in *Sources of the Self* (Taylor 1989) embodies a notion of the self as a 'strong evaluator', historically situated and conditioned by a perspective grounded in its moral sources, its life goods and those goods constitutive of that self. This is a socially constituted self faced with living and coping with the world's daily contingencies and for whom objectivity lies in its moral framework.

Taylor's belief in the role of the community stems from his view that it is through our inescapable membership of a moral and language community that we set up and maintain our moral frameworks. Community is thus an essential for morality and for the foundational significance of the self. This is a 'self' firmly grounded in certain shared moral intuitions, in our deepest moral instincts. These contribute to a moral framework which enables us to establish the nature of our identity, to consider what constitutes the good life and to evaluate specific moral positions. The particular way we articulate our moral intuitions, ie recognize the right terms, implies an account of what it means to be a human being. Taylor identifies as the three basic intuitions, our sense of respect for, and our obligations to others, our understanding of what constitutes the good life and the sense of our own worth and dignity (SS 15). The moral framework founded on these intuitions embodies qualitative distinctions by which our actual responses to questions about the good life, through our deeds and emotions, might be judged. Since it is our moral responses which shape our world our moral thought cannot, says Taylor escape 'strong evaluation', that is our recognition that there are some things which are important to us regardless of our desires and interests. To eschew a moral framework and do whatever is considered acceptable would mean the absence of any rational basis for a conception of human dignity. We need these frameworks in order to make sense of our moral responses, as the background, explicit or implicit, for our moral judgments, intuitions or reactions and through the reasons they provide, for rejecting in matters of choice moral subjectivism (SS 26). Mere arbitrary expression of preference ignores our responsibility to set out the grounds for these intuitions as moral ones. The self whose identity is located in moral
space and grounded in the world of others, involves our commitments and preferences, without which we would be unable to know what is for us significant and so face a crisis of identity. This is the world of communication and meaning, to which we are inducted from infancy, and through which we gain our experience of situations and as individuals contribute to these meanings which offer us self-interpretations and when internalized - that is, they become a part of 'me' and not merely 'mine' - they provide us with our identity as distinctive persons. (SS 27)

A linguistic community reinforces (i) the concept of linguistic practice which has to be understood in its own terms and offers the possibility of (ii) a sense of inescapable values and (iii) an encoding of our attachment to a higher order. In effect the values we use in the course of our conversational practice may lay some broad parameters for moral life. It is Habermas who claims a rational foundation for ethics through communication (Habermas 1985). Communication enables us to move towards a consensus, motivated by reason, about 'what is and what ought to be'. When we face the issue of self-identity we need to discern all our commitments, to formal and informal social groups and institutions, which define in part our identity. These contribute to a framework which enables us to decide what is significant in the face of the world's complexity as well as those 'commitments and identifications' on which we are prepared to make a stand. 32

Knowing who you are is to be oriented in moral space, within which, when I ask the question "Who am I?" I place myself as a potential interlocutor in the company of other interlocutors. We can only answer this question when we know where we stand, since this, our fundamental orientation determines where our answer comes from. Such questions are inescapable and without some kind of moral framework we are unable to answer them. (SS 29). The moral space within which I seek my bearings is independent of me and my success or failure in locating myself within it. The questions defining it to which the moral frameworks provide the answer are both independent, objective and also inescapable. At our birth we enter a world of ongoing conversation and for the rest of our lives we live in an interlocutory world. There is, says Taylor, no way that we can dodge fundamental moral questions including those about our self identity.
It is as individuals who have a specific role within our social network that we learn about the nature of emotions. However our moral and spiritual stances alone will not define our identity. As we develop and begin to experiment with our emotions we use, as members of a defining community, a shared language. This leads Taylor to reject as atomistic the antecedently individuated self and a society so composed to be a mere aggregation of such selves. He is unable to accept that such individuals could remain human beings since as self-interpreting animals we need to acknowledge the essentially social origin of the conception of good and hence of the self (SS 47). This orientation to the good is inescapable. It's 'woven into my understanding of my life as an unfolding story' (ibid). Only through a coherent narrative can we address the 'space of questions' in which we live our lives. To seek the life worth living we have to identify and embrace those goods which define our spiritual orientation and enable us to assess the worth of our lives, to know where we are in relation to such goods - how we have become what we are? - and the possibility of our achieving them - where are we going? This becomes, in Taylor's use of Maclntyre's term 'a quest' (SS 48), never achieved by a self 'always changed in becoming' and it is through a coherent narrative that I am able to orient myself within a space of moral questions and address issues about my past, present and potential identity. Hence the two concepts of orientation towards the good and the narrative unity of life are inextricably linked.

Thus, for Taylor, community constitutes a pre-condition of morality and provides the foundational significance of the self, its narrative unity and practical reasoning and an individual identity determined in part by our membership of a particular linguistic community. When we talk in terms of our personal relationship, our listeners learn from whence we speak, then we are able to answer the question "Who am I?" In this way our language community and our social contexts and membership confirm me as a 'self among other selves. (SS 36).

Through the conversation of adults we learn, as children, of those objects, events and goods of significance to them. As we develop our conception of the good for our personal identity will change and inevitably we face conflicts between one good and another. It is practical reasoning, that is the idea of the individual life, presumed as a moral project,
rooted in a moral framework and subject to actual moral experiences, which enables us to choose and justify a more superior position as a rational one. Through our moral framework we are enabled to articulate a substantive theory of the good. It is this, says Taylor, which Rawls's thin theory of the good lacks. With its priority of the right over the good, it embodies a procedural mode of practical reasoning and deontological conceptions of justice, and is therefore weak and incoherent. Without the qualitative distinctions, constitutive of a thick theory of the good, we are unable to articulate the moral point of our actions and feelings which our moral intuitions commend to us as admirable. Only practical reasoning enables us to reason in 'transitions', to justify one moral position as more rational than another in its capacity to deal with epistemological crises and develop for ourselves a substantive theory of the good as a result of the resolution of a former conflict or the introduction of new, previously unknown or ignored factors. Choice involves: narration, how it relates to what I am and what I hope to be; and evaluation, that a particular good is more important to me than another, and the motivation which comes from a feeling of being deeply moved, committed to something of importance to me.

The ultimate test of our choice in the ranking of competitive goods as rational is a substantive one, ie was it the right one? This involves the understanding of human action and moral thinking in their relationship with the good. Many modern ethical theories with their focus upon a procedural, rather than substantive mode of practical reasoning face a contradiction. Despite their denial of the connection with values, these procedural modes in their adoption of one specific form of assessment must inevitably use certain values. When primacy is given to the agent's will, - ie autonomous choice - its effect is to deny the possibility of a universal objectivity. The idea of an objective order with its notions of good and bad lead us back to the substantive and away from the procedural mode which for Taylor reflects the kind of hypergoods valued in modern society. 'The modern idea of freedom is the strongest motive for the massive shift from substantive to procedural justification in the modern world' (SS 86).

It's up to the individual to choose both its way of life and the standards for its assessment with the result that the proceduralists have both to separate the moral and defend an absolute boundary but are unable to provide reasons. (SS 88)
Those who share with Rawls the prioritizing of justice do not encompass the qualitative distinctions Taylor sees as inseparable from the development of a moral framework. The former's theory of justice eschews dependence upon other than a theory of good as anti-autonomous yet Rawls concedes as essential to his method of reflective equilibrium the use as criteria of our moral intuitions. Once we set down those frameworks and ontological accounts which inform our intuitions then we must begin to articulate a substantive theory of the good. Rawls failure to do this is, according to Taylor, repression or a denial (SS 89). Without the qualitative distinctions, explicit or implicit, available for informing our moral life there would be nothing we could recognize as morality. My conception of personal autonomy is predicated upon a notion of moral autonomy.

Taylor's moral self is inextricably linked to morality and as such it is essentialist in that its essential, or necessary properties are its moral intuitions - without which it could not be said to exist. These appear to be somewhat insubstantial underpinnings for Taylor's major structure which his text on contemporary moral agency constitutes. Basically my doubts are two (1) about their empirical validity and (2) how they function. In order to discuss these more fully below I need first to look at Taylor's moral self in its quotidian context and his notion of objectivity.

(ii) The Self in its the Daily World

How can we ever know that humans can be explained by any scientific theory until we know how they live life in its terms (SS 58)

The aim of self-identity, for Taylor, is to 'examine how we actually live our lives, and to draw the limits of the conceivable from the knowledge of what we actually do when we do so' (SS 32). The identity of the self is inter-woven and in part constituted by the meanings we attach to the objects and events we encounter. The meanings we give to our experiences, interpreted and shaped by the language in which we live these meanings, become the internalized self-interpretations constitutive of our identity and of the nature of our agency. Thus Taylor rejects the idea of the antecedent self fixed and incapable of exploration through the process of human interpretation.
Implicit in the quotation at the head of this section, is the contrast between the notions of objectivity and an evaluation and a judgment of the individual's orientation to the good. At the one end, rationality, the sovereign reason of the antecedent self, involved in the instrumental manipulation of abstract symbols and at the other the self of values and attachments, an entity not objectively given but largely constituted by its values. A static study of such a self is fruitless since it is only through our historical narrative that we are able to understand those ultimate rationalities governing our thoughts and actions. Taylor, believing that the dependence of scientific and epistemological discourses upon unavowed moral grounds renders them weak, seeks in the phenomenology of human life a way of making sense of human lives. This includes our 'realistic orientation' to the good and enables us to take account of our own thoughts, feelings, and actions as well as those of others. In our efforts to make sense of these, those scientific theories which try to explain human behaviour from an observer’s standpoint are, he claims, useless: for the individual they serve no purpose. Such theories discount as not serious for explanatory purposes a natural, intuitive way of thinking about how we go about living our lives and relegate it to the realm of mere appearance. There will always be different levels of explanation depending upon particular system's location in the infinite hierarchy of systems - from the mechanistic, or the unicellular through the techno-social to the transcendental. What then, in Taylor's words 'ought to trump' the language in which I live my life? We cannot disregard those terms used in our non-explanatory contexts of daily living, for the purposes of theoretical explanation both overlap.

The terms we use to decide what is best are very much the same as those we use to judge other's actions and these figure again for the most part in our own account of what they do (SS 58)

A powerful impetus for instrumental theories are their links with instrumental control intertwined with a conception of knowledge which involves our being taken out of our normal way of experiencing ourselves. Emotionally uncoupled our subjective experience becomes objectified. For the self in quest of its personal autonomy my concern is with its particularity, with the essential messiness of its situation, hence the literary allusions which pepper this text. It is this messiness which resists the unification and the underlying explanations which the rationalist seeks.
From the foregoing two issues arise:

First, the problematic nature of narrative which I discussed above in reviewing MacIntyre's conception. Second, there is a distinction between a knowledge of 'how things are' and one dependent upon perception. The risk with the latter is the reliance upon intuition, essentially non-inferential knowledge which, particularly in relating to another's sensibilities, may amount to little more than hunch. While Taylor is cognizant of the need for both explanatory and non-explanatory knowledge, as his comment on overlap indicates, it is difficult to see how Taylor's perceptually derived knowledge of the world enables him to proceed toward the decisions required of the strong evaluator. This issue of melding sensibility and reason is at the heart of the next chapter and is germane to the next section on objectivity.

(iii) Objectivity

Why should we regard the moral judgments and choices, made within Taylor's conception of a moral framework, as 'real'? As he recognizes, we need as criteria something external to ourselves if we wish to make sense of our existence, emotions, beliefs and actions. Mere arbitrary emotional reactions will not do. Our options appear to be an appeal to reason, to nature, to God or to a kind of culturally derived personal knowledge. The latter enables us to make sense of the events and emotions in our life, as well as our life as a whole, through the common beliefs we share about life and its meaning. We require this state of mind we share with others in order to engage in intelligent activity. Since we involve ourselves without our consent being needed it can in this sense said to be objective. Based on rules and established practice which transcend individual free agency the issue is one of defining its status - the key task of sensible reasoning (see Chapter 4).

The problem in our attempt to assess objectively and make sense, in our lives, of events, experiences and emotions lies in separating these from our interests and our commitments. This difficulty is compounded by the almost conventional dichotomy we maintain between objectivity and subjectivity in assessing 'facts'. Rather than using these as criteria it would be more helpful to consider them as modes of our thinking. It seems difficult to imagine a totally objective scientist or a totally subjective artist. The two terms are complementary, the knowledge we value is fired by our commitments. Our intellectual
skill comes in part from the way we use our subjectivity as a permanent watchdog on the bias to our thoughts which, arising from particular beliefs and values, constrains our capacity in dealing with perception of external reality. The kind of intellectual robustness envisaged in my conception of personal autonomy embodies scepticism and creativity and requires the balancing of both objectivity and subjectivity. Faced with claims by both cognivists and the non-cognivists that any meaning we give our lives is a purely subjective act of will or that our efforts to assess our values in the light of empirical observations is unsatisfactory, Taylor proposes the qualitative distinctions of his moral framework as vital to self identity. Defined by commitments and identifications, this provides the 'horizon' against which I can determine what is good or worth doing. The idea of identity defined merely by some de facto preference is for Taylor incoherent. We cannot escape a moral orientation because of the inescapability of the questions posed by the framework. When I locate myself in a space I do so independently of myself and my success or failure in orienting myself within it. It is this spatial metaphor which he claims brings out the objective status of the questions to which the moral framework provides the answers. The ultimate dependence of this moral framework upon moral intuitions makes Taylor's claims to objectivity suspect. It is difficult to see how their non-inferential nature provides any form of anchorage, ie there is the possibility of a general error with different frameworks.

Taylor does not provide us with a form of anchorage which can be subjected to critical reflection and defended in terms of its truth. His essentially foundationalist account implies indubitable truths which cannot be questioned. Taylor's problem with his intuitions is that, despite what he says about trumping, he still feels they need anchorage, for example by hypergoods. In the process he ends up trumping himself so that any heroic quality it might have is not in the self's own terms but at another, superordinate level. The issue of a basis of the objectivity for the self's values is a key concern of the next chapter.

3.2 Taylorian Autonomy and the Modern Self - An Excursus

The inclusion at this stage of Taylor's notions of the modern self, as an excursus requires justification. My reasons are:

(1) My conception of personal autonomy is posited, in Chapter 1, on the idea of a sovereign self. It is Taylor who provides powerful support for its particularity in
the arguments he directs at the postmodernist's decentred self and Rorty's centreless self. I share his view that to reject the known for the unknown offers the prospects of a hazardous journey with a highly uncertain destination.

(2) Taylor, within the context of modernity, adds further to his belief that the individual's autonomy must be informed by a moral perspective - a necessary condition of my conception of personal autonomy.

(3) His discussion contains a number of issues of subsequent relevance to my thesis:

(i) immediately relevant (to the next chapter) is his concern with personal resonance and the insights into sensibility and particularity offered by the writers of fiction and poetry (Chapter 4)

(ii) his notion of situated freedom: the issue of reconciling a belief in the right to personal autonomy with the individual's social embeddedness and his demands as a citizen (Chapter 5)

(iii) the importance of authenticity to a concept of personal autonomy (Chapter 6)

(iv) in Part II the key issue is that of personal autonomy in contemporary organizations, the tension between instrumental reasoning and the role of citizen, in the field of politics and its centrality in the individual's life, are both paralleled in contemporary organizations and increasingly so with the growth of managerialism, and

(v) Taylor's awareness of the dilemma which faces voluntary organizations and the therapeutic community: both would appear to offer scope for the individual seeking a greater autonomy but in practice the substantive increasingly gives way to technique and instrumental procedure.

For Taylor, allowing each individual to fulfil a demand for self determination has become, particularly since Kant's formulation of moral autonomy, a major concern both for contemporary society and for the individual. His ideas on autonomy are set out against a background in which he sees: a breakdown in communal authority, a growth in secularized values which appear inadequate in dealing with the moral challenges posed by modernity and the opposing trends of rationalism and expressivism. The latter have engendered the conflict between the individual and the community. Taylor believes with MacIntyre that
the *a priori* unity of the 'self' lies in the personal narrative of a self, with a responsibility for its past, present and future. Whatever the differences in individual thought and action, some form of moral framework embodying our moral intuitions is essential in our quest for the good life. Among these intuitions are autonomy, concern for the good life and respect for the other. The latter is respect for his/her moral autonomy. When we speak of universal human rights we link respect with autonomy and the individual's quest for the good life. Through co-operation we establish and guarantee the respect due to others, a respect engendered by the individual other's own sense of respect and dignity, derived in part from its everyday roles. These together with power and moral values combine in our sense of dominating public space, of our own self-sufficiency, of our life having its own centre, of our being liked and looked up to by others as a centre of attention (SS 15). Associated with the emergence of autonomy, Taylor identifies the complex inter- relationship of a rising moral culture with economic change in structures, methods and disciplines. These presented the dilemma of autonomy as constitutive of new forms of activity accompanied at the same time by increased forms of social control. With these changes came a growing feeling of living in a 'well regulated economic order' in which instrumental reasoning became central in the individual's pursuit of the ends of its daily life.

This has brought a circular relationship in which those elements of moral culture, such as the autonomy constitutive of political authority, were, at the same time, entrenched and propagated by these developments. At the same time the individual inherited an obligation to sustain a society within which autonomy is a possibility. Taylor believes that atomism has now replaced the autonomy of the individual at the centre of the Western system of law. The basic immunities are of life and liberty with its foundations in 'possessive individualism' has led to a tension within its democracies between a liberal, atomist instrumentality and the demands for citizen participation. The growth in instrumental reason has led to influential theories which see in modernity the fragmentation and division of human life as well as a threat to the cohesion essential for a free participatory society. Among current responses to this is a subjectivist expressionism which has led to the 'triumph of the therapeutic' reinforcing some of the negative aspects of instrumentality with
its effect upon communal solidarity. For example, the use of procedural justice to resolves disputes and the emphasis upon the therapeutic community values at the expense of traditional community and family values. Another important influence of subjective expressionism upon modern identity is the replacement of the idea of a telos of nature with the creative construction of our own character. Framed in a new understanding of language linked to expressive self-completion it brings a new 'poietic', productive power of creative imagination.

Taylor in examining Habermas's efforts to retrieve the positive aspects of instrumentality, eg control over nature, from the negative ones, eg control over people, through communication, discussion and ultimate consensus, attacks the latter's neglect of a morally centred self. This is a self of personal resonance and sensibilities, concerned with an understanding of what constitutes for it the full life. For this exploration of personal resonance Taylor suggests we look less to the language of philosophy and more to that of the poet and the novelist. In doing so he invokes a language some of which borders on the mystical, both religious and managerial: eg epiphany, disengagement and empowering. It is only through personal resonance, personal sensibility, that we can explore the definition of moral sources and standards and try to resolve the personal issues of our lives. In this we share with others a locus of our moral values and revive those crucial human goods formerly found in the commonly held traditions of family, ecology and polis.

Taylor finds incredible the rejection of an orientation to the good by postmodernist philosophers with their underlying belief in that 'most invisible, because it is the most pervasive of modern goods', unconstrained freedom (SS 489). This is the potential freedom and power of a 'decentred' self, a self without a telos, without either a moral centre or the capacity to oversee or escape itself. Taylor's notion of teleology, central to his assumptions about existence, is linked to the distinction he makes between a distorted and an authentic self-understanding.

He is ambiguous about the modern subject and unwilling to sacrifice the progress we have made in terms of freedom and truth by sacrificing truth in the 'namelessness of the
unknown', Even if we could reject with the post-modernists who we are, we would not know what it is worth to destroy the subject. The human being, as a transcendental signifier remains at the centre of his thinking and through its authenticity it might achieve full presence.\textsuperscript{37} Taylor is forcing us to choose between the self-understanding we now have, connecting it to a more authentic meaning of our existence, or to discard it for 'the unknown world of bodies, inchoate feeling and not a shred of truth'. What the likes of Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard have on offer are.\textsuperscript{38}

...charters for subjectivism and the celebration of our creative power at the cost of occluding what is spiritually arresting in the whole movement of contemporary culture (SS 490).

Taylor, as his language on personal resonance shows, believes in a subject which, part of a larger whole - too large to understand - retains the hope of a self situated in the world of others. Through dialogue it is enabled to establish its own sense of authority and governance. Here Taylor appears to be offering the constrained creativity of an imagination not ruled by its narrative orientation.

At the same time Taylor sees the individual in its quest for 'expressive fulfilment', through sources and affiliations external to the individual and its relationships, as facing a 'loss of substance, the thinness and shallowness of the things we use'. The public consequence of people seeking fulfilment through affiliations, increasingly regarded as revocable, is the undermining of the strong identification needed to sustain the political community which public freedom needs. This primacy of self-fulfilment has led to the growth of voluntary bodies whose members share particular ends and situations. Membership is temporary, and together with allegiance, ceases when the individual feels it is no longer of use. This movement towards self-fulfilment often generates an ethics whose main concern ends in procedural fairness. So we have the curious situation that those who in seeking expressive fulfilment originally joined in reacting against bureaucracy and instrumentality frequently embrace one of their principal tenets - procedural fairness (SS 508).\textsuperscript{39} Many of these voluntary bodies represent for Taylor instances of the 'therapeutic turn'. Their growth has led to an erosion of autonomy in which technique has
supplanted people's trust in their instincts where their quest for happiness or self-fulfilment or raising a family is concerned. This movement is hastened by the lapse of traditional standards and practices.\textsuperscript{40}

Taylorian autonomy is essentially the freedom of the situated self, finding itself at home in a society, capable of being changed it offers at the same time the opportunities and possibilities of self-fulfilment. This freedom contrasts with the modern notion of self-dependence, of justifying one's actions to oneself and overcoming, or freeing oneself from external barriers and obstacles. The latter is the radical freedom which Taylor and Hegel reject as empty. In its place Taylor offers the notion of situated freedom, based on self-understanding it results from our involvement with others and is incapable of being sustained on its own since it underlies the practices of our society. We need for the identity of the autonomous, self-determining individual, a social matrix. Through its practices it recognizes the right to autonomous decision and requires for the individual 'a voice in deliberation about human action'. Taylor's dispute with the atomist's dismissal of the individual's social grounding, as 'recondite and speculative' is not solely over freedom but about what it means to be a human subject. The atomist notion of self-sufficiency and of human rights as the foundation of personal identity, ignores the fact that the free individual gains its identity through its relationship to a 'developed liberal civilization'. He finds absurd the notion of the subject living in a state of nature unable to achieve this identity and creating by contract a society which granted it respect. The individual, concludes Taylor, affirming himself as free is already obligated to 'complete, restore or sustain the society within which this identity is possible'.

3.3 Conclusion: What can be saved of Taylor?

We saw at the beginning of the previous section the issues posed of relevance to the rest of my thesis. The prime aim with this conclusion is to decide what can be saved from Taylor of value to my conception of personal autonomy. As noted above Taylor's essentialist self is grounded in its intuitions and this poses two problems: the one empirical, the other functional. On the first point, Taylor presents his three moral intuitions as descriptive of an apparently universal human nature, or at least of Western man. As prescriptions these
would no doubt find universal acclaim. However the history of the 20th century shows and continues to provide ample evidence of their being honoured in the acclamation rather than in practice. These intuitions are quite capable of being suspended or over-ridden, with public support, by national and political ideology. It is an event such as Auschwitz which has led many writers to discard the belief in a human progress of shared intuitions.41

On the second point, the functioning of the moral intuitions, the bottom line of Taylor's project is to provide for the self an irreducible capacity for the good governed ultimately by certain moral intuitions. This poses the task of reconciling the individual's orientation to the good, based on these intuitions with a concept of rationality. At the one extreme the sovereign self of the antecedent self, prioritizing right and making its choices through instrumental manipulation and at the other a self of values, attachments and commitments contingently made and concerned with its ends. The weakness of Taylor's project lies in a methodology which offers no objective criteria by which we can judge whether the resultant moral judgments are actually true. So how does the individual, without some universal, Archimedian point, give direction to its quest for autonomy? Without this fixity we appear to be like very early navigators who, cast in an open sea without landmarks, the sun or the stars, with a compass but no knowledge of magnetic north. As with these early navigators we have to make our own compass, but in our case a cognitive compass with a knowledge of the magnetic north. Taylor offers us a self grounded in certain moral intuitions appealing to a sensibility dependent ultimately upon a kind of theism: a 'disappointing denouement' leaving Taylor 'whistling in the dark'.42 However there is much that is worth saving, in particular his principle of fixity which encompasses the possibility of moral sentiments as the points of our moral compass by which we can to some degree navigate our lives. In the absence of objective knowledge, of how our intuitions work, we have to seek a truer compass, ie one which enables us to locate our sentient self and head for Taylor's ultimate direction using a more objectively based moral framework. At the same time we take with us in our haversacks those Taylor valuables of the notions of a phenomenological and sensible self. This offers the hope of a journey aided and enriched less by philosophical abstraction and more by the particularity
of those who write imaginatively, in poems and novels, about other travellers who have traversed the 'rough grounds' of life.

Taylor's notion of the individual born into a linguistic and moral community adds strong support to the 'communitarian' argument for the antecedence of the community over the self. At the same time his distinction between the simple weigher and the strong evaluator enables us to understand the distinction between joining a group, as with the liberal's contractual relationship, and discovering one's place in a context. The former is an unreflective choice in so far as it does not require self-knowledge. The strong evaluator learns through reflection the conflicting values woven into the community. They do not choose but discover their situation becoming aware that communal values shape and constitute their personal identities. The strength of Taylor's belief in the community of shared understandings is evident in Taylor's view that to escape from it we would cease to be ourselves in the full sense. Even such liberal theorists as Rawls do not regard the idea of situated subjectivity as wrong but that its metaphysical considerations are irrelevant. The problem with Taylor's shared moral and linguistic understanding is to determine how they work out in practice.

As for discovering one's place in a situation as I argued above in proposing the situational/role portfolio we might discover some of our inescapable places in which we share understandings, eg the family but in others we can exercise choice, albeit reflective choice. This capacity to choose is important to my conception of personal autonomy. In the evaluation of our portfolio - the embracing of new situations and roles, the amendment of existing ones and the rejection of others - we require more than the economic rationality of a cost benefit analysis. Taylor's principle of a perspective, both moral and sentient, offers hope but it requires a firmer notion of objectivity. This is a notion which includes both its metaphysics - what it is - and its epistemology - how it works. These are two of the key issues addressed in the following chapter on cognitive sensibility.
Section 4 Conclusion: The Communitarian Balance Sheet

The final task of this chapter is to draw up a balance sheet. This takes account of the problems - the liabilities, presented by the three main writers discussed and weighs these in relation to the assets, their contributions towards my conception of personal autonomy. This will enable me to decide what residual tasks they leave me with. The bottom line remains that of the particularity of autonomy. The principal liability lies in their allegiance to a problematic conception of the community. My intention here is not to explore in detail its weaknesses but to confine myself to those aspects which bear most directly upon the implications of situatedness for personal autonomy. Community, widely used by philosophers, in general, and political philosophers in particular is for our three communitarians central to the individual's situatedness. We have already seen, in discussing MacIntyre, that it is a slippery concept. Described by Holmes as a 'phantom' the Oxford English dictionary defines it both in a geographical sense and in terms of the sharing of qualities. In the public mind it is the socio-geographical which appears to be significant. MacIntyre, as is evident in his notion of tradition, links the sharing of qualities among people living in a particular area. As noted above it is this sense that is becoming increasingly tenuous. Sandel provides us with a threefold definition: the instrumental, based upon reciprocity, the sentimental with its bonds of affection and the constitutive, i.e. an attachment which is discovered not as an attribute but as constitutive of individual identity (LU 147-154). While these three may not be mutually exclusive it is to the constitutive that our three writers appear to adhere. Association with all three types could be included in the self's portfolio but only our ascribed relations and roles could be said to be discoverable.

The three communitarian writers, particularly MacIntyre, tend to idealize and romanticize the idea of community: either the bygone world of history we lost or the expected, promissory world as a consolation for a meaningless present (Holmes 1993: 177). MacIntyre combines nostalgia for bygone societies with an idealized view of their moral virtue and almost a craving for authority. Small groupings, e.g. neighbourhoods predominate and there are no details about national political institutions, or the relationship between the two, or the key issue of the sanctions for dissidents and the character of
membership. The fierce partisanship between proponents of the community and their individual rights-based opponents has contributed to some stark dichotomies. For example, private interest and public virtue, autonomy and community suggesting, in the case of the communitarians an unawareness of the possibility of either private virtue, or self interested behaviour which is not necessarily anti-social, or that in overcoming self-interest we automatically behave morally. The latter appears to neglect the possibility of behaviour open to an interpretation as immoral which is neither perceived by the community as anti-social or as base self-interest (Holmes 1993: 178). This is evident in Arthur Miller's play The Crucible and in the record of Judeo-Christian societies over the past two millenia. It is frequently through intense social interaction that humans acquire and indulge in some of their most intolerant and nastiest behaviour, eg Nazi Germany.

The communitarians also tend to perpetuate the myth of the social but as Holmes points out man is obliged to belong to society and many of his capabilities can only be exercised in society. Attempts have made to resolve what is clearly a conflict between discourses but as in the case of Sandel unsuccessfully. Sandel sets for himself the job of finding a satisfactory balance, an Archimedean point. The point we need is between a self so immersed in its social context as to be 'radically situated' thus lacking the individuality to seek for the self any form of autonomy; and a self antecedent to and so detached from its context as to be 'radically disembodied'. The latter lacks a reflective self of substance for which any claim to autonomy is restricted to a self of voluntaristic choice. MacIntyre emerges from my earlier discussion as an almost unconstrained communitarian with a strength of belief, which results from his romantic predeliction for pre-modern societies, in which role and 'sockdology' predominate.44 His notions of telos and self-narrative appear to dispose him towards a form of personal autonomy. As both After Virtue and his subsequent writings show he conceives personal autonomy, in its concern with individual rights and governed by emotivism, to be antithetical to an individual and a society whose primary telos is that of virtue. While MacIntyre makes much of his reworking of Aristotelian ethics as a basis for a morality opposed to a contemporary emotivism he is in the final analysis a theist, with a belief in a God given source for morality.45
Taylor shares with MacIntyre a theistic belief in the ultimate source of moral values. He attempts to gain a conception of man in which free action is a response to a call that comes from God who is also beyond nature. Fundamental to this, for Taylor, are certain shared moral intuitions which inform the moral framework within which the individual locates itself, finding its identity and determining its future direction. Apart from the doubts expressed above about the current nature and status of these intuitions it is difficult to envisage how these motivate, fire our moral behaviour given that they are not linguistically recoverable. Similarly, given all the definitional problems involved in the notion of community, its more specific application to one based upon shared language and a shared moral discourse, seems to me to compound the problems. There may exist communities, possibly small and as yet unthreatened by the global tentacles of a monoculture or totalizing communities whose religious fundamentalism or political structure imposes or sustains such commonality. But these hardly constitute universal features in our modern world.

The communitarians appear to import into the notion of community a stability which tends to play down the disembedding effects which multiculturism, transmigration and globalization and other contemporary dynamics of change have on the individual. However the ubiquitous nature and the rate of change in our current world presents us with social groupings to which the use of the description linguistic and moral community becomes increasingly untenable. This is of course not to ignore those more local separatist movements with a common language and values, rooted in a shared ethnic tradition (eg Basques, Scots, Chechnians etc) which have become increasingly active as countervailing political movements to increased political regionalization (eg the EEC). However any geographical or ethnic groupings would find it increasingly difficult to sustain a movement towards any form of totalization, exclusion, or isolation in the face of the above current trends.

So much for the principal liabilities, what about the communitarians' assets? Their belief in the situatedness of the individual, ie the socially constitutive nature of the self as opposed to a self antecedent to its attachments and ends, is essential to my conception of personal autonomy. It is Sandel who, despite the limitations already discussed, provides a comprehensive critique of the Rawlsian self and a powerful case for a self capable of
reflection upon its grounding and its aims. Concomitant with this is MacIntyre's belief in the importance of role which, if we take it in its simplest metaphorical sense of the part we play in society, constitutes a major component of our lives. So that, in seeking one's autonomy account must be taken of all one's roles, associations and commitments, together with those desires and aims which inform these and define in part our self and its location. Consideration of the foregoing has led me to propose, in place of a focus upon the individual's membership of a community his situatedness in a plurality of associations. This is the individual's portfolio which encompasses all those social groupings - formal, informal, organizational and institutional - of which the individual is a member and over which it has a measure of choice. Initially conceived as similar to a financial portfolio we would want to retain as a principle a measure of detachment towards its contents. At the same time we would want to avoid its apparent weakness, that is its evaluation in terms of individual components to which we are related rather than the nature of the relationships. For this we require a perspective, a strategy. This takes account, not just of some cost benefit analysis but incorporates our narrative which elaborates on those values, sentiments and sensibilities which inform our choices. The latter are not just extra entries in the daily ledger. They offer a different way of reasoning. They strengthen the self's capital resources in its task of relating its particularity to its contingency.

MacIntyre's contribution to this is to suggest a telos in which the individual is in a never ending quest for the good and in so doing defines and redefines the nature of the self and its end. Informing this quest are those societal practices and traditions, governing a search for excellence and in which the self's unity is given by a narrative which takes account of the self's history, its present and potential future. The notion of narrative remains, despite the qualifications discussed above important to my concept of personal autonomy, as an essential part of that 'centre of gravity' which enables others to identify us as unique. The above contains important foundations upon which to build my conception of personal autonomy. My concern over MacIntyre remains his idealised and somewhat totalizing concepts of the community and of role.

It is the last of our trio of communitarians, Charles Taylor, who offers the best prospect of overcoming the inadequacy of my initial conception of the self's portfolio in particular the
limited nature of instrumental criteria for the inclusion of items. In place of economic
criteria Taylor offers the concept of a moral framework as the basis upon which we can
decide whether to include, or exclude individual items. Instead of instrumentality we have
a moral perspective influencing the portfolio's composition. Two other contributions from
Taylor are important to a conception of personal autonomy. Firstly, his focus upon an
understanding of the particular way in which we live our lives rather than upon mere
abstraction. Secondly, his notion of resonance and in particular its firing of the sentiments
through reading literature. Both MacIntyre and Taylor claim for their moral systems an
objectivity in the making of moral judgments. MacIntyre's belief that this lies in society's
roles and practices is, as we saw, problematic. In addition both his and Taylor's ultimate
dependence is upon a form of theism. Finally, on Taylor, he provides substantial support
for my statement made in setting out the conditions for personal autonomy, in Chapter 1, that
this is predicated upon the belief that the self remains a sovereign concept in contemporary
society. The self is a central concept in Taylor's moral discourse which refutes the attack
made by those who claim it is either decentred or centreless. So what remains of value to
my notion of personal autonomy when the problems are discounted against the contributions
of our three communitarians. Sandel illustrates the inescapability of our historical and
cultural roots. However having discovered these I can exercise a degree of choice. What
matters for my autonomy is not the choice of situations and attachments per se, including
those I acquire, but how I relate to them. Many of my relationships will not be informed
solely by calculation but, as we saw earlier, by a disposition to engage sympathetically
with the sensibilities of others. From MacIntyre we gained insight into the importance in
our pursuit of excellence of inner practices and of their need to embody commonly agreed
elements of what constitutes good practice. These must however be based on more than
mere social consensus if my own contribution is to be understood objectively. The
concept of narrative provides a unity for a self, a coherence and a continuity, around which
I can discover, make judgments about and create a self as a strategic indexical. This
enables me to reflect productively upon my past experience, to cope with current
contingencies and preserve in the face of these, a sense of identity and to create and
implement future projects. While allowing for the strong nostalgic element which
pervades much of MacIntyre upon community and tradition they nevertheless constitute
elements of rootedness I share with others. As we have seen above it is tradition, together
with practices that provide the elements by which I and others can understand and assess
the value of my contribution.

It was Taylor who provided an understanding of how through our initial embodiment
and development within a linguistic and moral framework we acquire and share certain
values. These inform, along with those values acquired from other relationships, our ideas
as to what constitutes for us the good life, i.e., our notion of autonomy. While rejecting his
theism we need to retain his focus upon the way the individual lives its life. In particular,
we require for the self a form of objectivity for the particularity of its sentiments free of any
transcendental trumping. It is this task which the next chapter addresses.
The ultimate test of the three communitarians just discussed, for my conception of personal autonomy, is the adequacy of their account of the individual's situatedness. All share a belief in the importance for self identity of its social grounding, in the 'community', albeit that their concept of the community remains problematical. On the positive side they drew out the importance of narrative to the self's identity in relation to its past, present and potential circumstances. An important contribution by Taylor to the notion of particularity is the need to explain how the individual lives his life in terms of the level at which it is lived. Despite his own warning he manages to find a cosmic card with which to trump his own notion of particularity. However his concept of the individual's moral framework provides a useful stage in my development of a perspective for the self's portfolio. Our three communitarians left us with two problems, to which the present chapter is devoted: first, the need for an adequate account of the role of the sentiments in the development of this perspective and second, that of providing for these sentiments a measure of objectivity which amounts to more than mere social consensus. In distancing myself from a purely moral conception of autonomy I added as two additional requirements for autonomy as personal autonomy the self's situatedness and its sentiments. In the choice of our attachments the options we face are socially engendered, what matters in our choosing is the critical and creative process which we bring to their setting and to our subsequent relations with them. Key in this process are those sentiments and emotions which inform our values and actions and which I now want to build into the model of the self's portfolio set up in the last chapter.

To this end I begin by relating to the particularity of the individuals in *Dead Poets Society*, to the values, emotions and characters with which they face the events in the
film. The evident conflict between behaviour governed by duty and approbation and one shaped by its sentiments gives a starting point for a discussion of Annette Baier's reconstruction of Humean morality (Baier 1991). While she provides a useful insight into how our sentiments inform our understanding of, and our sympathetic relations with others, she does not go far enough. In grounding such sentiments in a social consensus she founds their objectivity on a rocky base. It is David Wiggins and Michael Luntley who offer a firmer base for a reasoned sensibility. Baier is joined by two other women philosophers, Martha Nussbaum and Iris Murdoch, in filling out the notion of a self of sentiments through the particularity of literary allusion. Key among the influences upon women philosophers is that of Carol Gilligan who poses a difference, she perceives, between a male concern with autonomy and a female focus upon the relational. I reject this difference as doubtful and as tending to perpetuate the kind of stereotypes characteristic of the extremes in the Rawl esi an-Communitarian debate. Iris Marion Young's concern is with the excluded, those to whom access to social goods is denied and for whom personal autonomy does not present itself as a possibility (Young 1990). Implicit in Gilligan and Young is the issue of the retention by a relational self of its distinct sense of selfhood. This chapter is pivotal. It picks up on the neglect by the communitarians in the previous chapter of the particularity of the individual's social grounding and explores the crucial role of the sentiments for self autonomy in our relations with others. It also provides a lead in to the next chapter in which Raz's contribution to a conception of personal autonomy is critiqued for its failure which, in grounding our values in social and cultural forms, neglects their particularity. This chapter explores:

1 The Self's Sentiments: the key determinants and influences in one's relatedness, desires, emotions, feelings in effect our sentiments,

2 The Cognitively Sensible Self: the importance and nature of a cognitive grounding for such sentiments,

3 The Relational Self: what the situated relational self of reasoned sentiments means for a conception of personal autonomy.

3.1 Three Women Thinkers: Baier, Nussbaum and Murdoch

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3.2 Carol Gilligan: A Different Voice

3.3 Iris Marion Young and the Excluded, and

4 Conclusion: The Self of Cognitive Sensibility - Autonomous or Relational?

1 The Self of Sentiments

The main aim of the behaviour of the boy Cameron, Keating's Judas in *Dead Poets Society*, appears to be to please and avoid blame. This is initially evident when, with ruler and pen at the ready he starts to imitate unthinkingly Keating's blackboard reproduction of the spurious model for the instrumental assessment of a poem's perfection. When Keating tells the boys to rip the worthless chapter out of the book Cameron's ripping is controlled, extracting each page carefully with the aid of a ruler. His membership of the Dead Poet's Society appears to lie in his belief that it will in some way improve his grade average. It is Cameron who gives Keating away to the Head. It would be wrong to describe this as betrayal since his relationships seem to lack depth. They are tradeable, engaging not loyalty but calculation. His is the world of the school's Head, and of Neil's and the boys' fathers where, as we saw earlier, thought and action are grounded in obedience, not to the universal laws of a Kantian rationality but, to a core of essentially emotivist values. Cameron's character is in striking contrast to that of Todd Anderson, the shy, sensitive teenager trying to make sense of, and articulate his feelings who uncharacteristically and courageously leads the outburst of sympathy for the departing Keating. This character contrast appears to be between a Cameron 'self' obedient, with a desire to please, governed by an economic rationality, with its calculative weighing of the objectives and benefits of a relationship, and an Anderson 'self' in which the latter are informed, not by the observance of rules or social conformity but one who uses a judgment informed by the sentiments of one capable of sympathy. I initially discussed character in the last chapter and given its significance to what follows in this chapter I will attempt to amplify its meaning. What it is not about is evident in the reaction of Cameron when Keating has the boys examine the photographs of the previous classes of
students (See page 52 above). Where one boy describes it as "spooky" another as "weird", Cameron asks somewhat confused, "You think he'll (Keating) test us on that stuff?". Charlie Dalton laughingly replies "Oh! Come on Cameron don't you get anything?" The boys' reactions govern their orientations towards the world. Cameron's sentiments are not fired because he does not understand them: his rationale is calculative. It is the thoughtful Anderson who, as his character develops, has the best chance of understanding and shaping his sensibility. This understanding will not be of sentiments governed by subjectivity but those which take up the marks of cognitive sensibility. This contrast enables me to illustrate the nature of the conceptual space I intend to occupy below. This is one in which both sentiment and rationality together play their part in the individual's efforts to live in the daily world of contingency. This is neither the abstract world of metaphysical individualism nor that of the wanton indulgent self, but one in which the individual is trying to make sense of a life lived in a world peopled by others. As we saw above Sandel accuses Rawls of putting the self outside the realm of experience, fixing an identity both permanent and invulnerable. With a subject distanced from its values these are to be found in the object sought and not in the subject. Rawls's 'self' appears to be impermeable to external circumstance with little self-reflection and a process of adaptation limited to consensual negotiation rather than a self whose nature is formed in the process of self-reflective coping. The Rawlsian self, as we saw above contrasts with Sandel's cognitive self, MacIntyre's living in a world of social practices and tradition its unity and historicity embodied in a self-narrative and Taylor's phenomenological self. Taylor claims a need to understand this self at the level at which it lives its life and not at some more abstract level. For these three writers, individual beliefs and actions are not amenable to evaluation solely through instrumental reasoning and manipulable models.

These do not help us to reason about the operation of our sensibilities, formed and informed by our associations with others, in the making of choices, using our judgment in the face of causal contingencies. The problem for the individual's autonomy of choice, as we saw with the wardrobe analogy in the last chapter, is that faced with the objects and events which attach themselves to us, our desires are transient. We cannot
abstract the self in its rational and abstract modes from its embeddedness and for a self surrendered to contingency we would have difficulty in establishing an identity constituted by elements of rationality, objectivity and stability. We need the latter elements in order to make sense of, and bring some measure of control and stability to our lives, lived in and fashioned in part by a world of contingency. Dependence upon a mere expressive evaluation of the relation of our sentiments to this contingent world would, in MacIntyre's term, be purely emotivist. My aim therefore is to relate sensibility and reasoning, to reconcile objectivity with sentience, in order to offer a self of sensible reasoning, that is one for whose sensibility the 'marks' of truth might be claimed. I begin below with the self of sentiments.

The difference in the Dead Poets Society between Keating and the Head and between the boy and his father, as we have seen is about what constitutes the 'right' action when moral conflict arises. The Head and the boy's father share with Kant, albeit for different reasons from the latter, a belief in dutiful behaviour and with Adam Smith the importance of approbation by those capable of inflicting pain or pleasure. Apart from the teachers, these are primarily the role models, the fathers and older brothers of whose success the Head frequently reminds individual boys. The guiding values for today's behaviour of tomorrow's doctors, lawyers and bankers is obedience, hard work, emulation and the gaining of approbation. Keating's 'self' is radical, subversive of these values, not constrained but expansive and above all governed not by instrumental reasoning alone but with thoughts and actions shaped by its sentiments. In quoting Walt Whitman's O Me! O Life! 2

Keating tells his class:

One reads poetry because he is a member of the human race and the human race is filled with passion. Medicine, law and banking - these are necessary to sustain life. But poetry, love, beauty? These are what we stay alive for.3

This is a self which uses its imagination to communicate sympathetically with others. Among the other poets and writers to whom Keating might well have appealed, in addition to Whitman, is David Hume. His view of moral behaviour stands in contra-
distinction to one which sees appropriate behaviour as obedience to a universal moral law, governed by reason which, when conflict arises, would ordain the decision. In Kant's case there is no room for sympathy, regarded as irrational, this would be heteronomous. Inter-personal relations, seen essentially in individualist terms, are governed by contract. The critical issue is one of freedom whose solution lies in the collectively agreed general law.

For Hume, the problem is one of co-existence the solution to which lies in the 'social artifices' governing our relations with one another. In these relations authority is part of the social process, for which respect is grounded not in deferential obedience but in an authority which issues few commands. This sets out for the individual standards of excellence in human character and not in making its demands primarily upon the will. This requires in the individual a character with the capacity for sympathy, a sensitivity to the feelings of others, as an essential to the use of judgment where moral conflict arises. This is judgment grounded not solely in reason but also in the sentient self of interests, desires and customs. Not dependent upon the will such judgment will vary with the community. Reason instead of being sovereign is the slave of the passions and enables us to evaluate the consequences of our actions, actions governed not by universal moral principles but by our responses to particular individuals. We develop this character, with its capacity for co-operation, self-control and the sharing of scarce goods, as members of a family, where parental love and care engender in us the virtues in which we as individuals and as a society are inextricably mixed. It is the priority given to the sentiments in moral behaviour which has led Baier to make claims for Hume as the women's philosopher (Baier 1994: Ch 4).

2 Cognitive Sensibility

I have discussed above the significance of character in shaping the way we relate to the world. This is not the world of instrumentality which fails to fire our sensibilities. At the same time any concept of the latter has to be filled out in such a way that it is not reduced to a set of subjective traits. Such traits require cognitive structuring. As we shall now see it is Baier in her restructuring of Hume's moral thought who attempts to
import the notion of cognition. Baier, in *Moral Prejudices*, says of the Kantian distinction between heteronomy and autonomy that as long as this fails to take account of the self's reflective passions and 'concern for agreement with me ... it faces the danger of deteriorating into pretend-sovereignty over compliant subjects'. Describing the lack of shared decision-making as a Reich, not a co-operative she says of reflection based on 'guilty self-will...(that it) seems in Kant, to get us only as far as a higher version of self-opinionated self-will' (Baier 1994: 85).

Baier's basic argument informing her work on moral sentiments is that it is these which make it possible for us to have moral judgments and that such judgments are amenable to universally objective standards. In support of her thesis Baier draws substantially upon the contrast between David Hume's sympathy based model of the moral self on the one hand, and on the other the detached rationality of Kant's and Adam Smith's contractarian concept of moral judgment. In discussing the film earlier in this chapter we saw a practical application of Adam Smith's notion of moral judgment in the the boys' quest for the approbation of those able to inflict pain or pleasure. This is a legalistic, other-directed self of heteronomy in which the mimicry of a Cameron prospers. By contrast Keating would find in Hume, with his model of moral judgment, founded in sentiment and essentially creative, facilitating for the individual the development of standards of excellence in character, an ancestral fellow-traveller. It is the belief we share with others as to standards of good taste which govern our moral thoughts and actions. It is our social skills, those of listening, communication and imagination which play the primary role in the development of the necessary values and competence we need, the kind of reflexivity, and judgment found in the competent moral critic. Like his literary counterpart this moral critic will enjoy characteristics including an effective reflexivity. This enables him to have confidence in the stability of his judgment, one which is not subject to varying sentiment across time and culture. So in addition to effective reflexivity such features as impartiality and universality exercised in the making of universal moral judgments constitute part of a more 'informed and cultivated reason'.

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For these to work effectively we need for our standards of taste and judgment, which nourish the social world and to which our sentiments respond, some form of objectivity. In seeking to found Hume's model for universal moral judgments on something more than mere like-mindedness Baier proposes that of 'reasonable conversation', which governed by a more enlarged and 'cultivated reason', will Baier, believes, command universal consent. Thus the sentiments emerge as part of the concept of an enlarged and cultivated faculty legitimised through universal consent. However, shared feelings do not in themselves enable the competent moral critic to assess objectively whether a particular sentiment constitutes an appropriate reason for how things are. For our moral thought to be based upon more than Baier's 'constancy of socially engrained habits of sentiments' we need a sensible reasoning which enables us to assess the responsiveness of our moral sentiments to something objective. The notion required is one which enables us to see our moral judgments as responses to how things are. At this point two inter-related ideas about the situated self, discussed in the last chapter are relevant, Taylor's notions about particularity and MacIntyre's self-narrative. The particularity of our daily living in the contingent world combine with our narrative efforts to enable us to make moral sense of events and happenings and to ground our essentially perspectival view of our situation in the world. 

Our efforts to subject our self-narrative to the conditions of objectivity require for the concept of sensible reasoning an understanding of what it is like to respond to how things are. As a mode of thinking truth requires that our thought (1) be syntactically structured exhibiting 'systematicity of judgment' through its 'subjection to combinatorial patterns of logical grammar' and (2) resemble reality, ie that our sentiments have a structure independent of their operation. However given the nature of our sensible thinking (1) above, the purely symbolic, will not capture it completely. Our sensible thinking in acknowledging its responsiveness to how things are is a 'worldly discipline' - it is not disengagable from the world. At the same time it must embody an innate capacity to experience sentiments and the capability of self-narrative. Since it is through the latter that we engage our sentiments, we fire them and whenever we argue about morality we cannot escape them. The purely formal, instrumental form of
narrative like Rawls's procedural life-plan fails to capture the moral content because it does not light up our sentiments. This is a plan which is disengagable from the world rather than a pattern of engagements with it. Its structure is not codifiable. It cannot be characterised in terms of that to which it is attempting to respond - that is, how things are for the other.6

On the other hand because of the nature of the subjectivity of sensible reasoning, encompassed in narration, it might appear that it will eventually fail to relate to how things are. To conclude thus is predicated on the belief that for our thought to be consonant with how things are requires its expression in symbolic and sentential terms governed by a logical grammar. In dismissing this as 'too strong a demand' Luntley proceeds via an analogy with perceptual demonstratives to develop his argument for sensible reasoning. We use such expressions as 'I am here' to understand where we are physically by relating ourselves to the individual symbols representing different topographical features. So when I position myself thus, either in relation to the physical or social context, I engage in a form of worldly thinking governed not by a discipline of syntactic rules but through the inescapability of self-narration. Here we locate ourselves spatially and temporally outside of our experience of the objects in which we are embedded. Luntley in aiming for a similar 'metaphysics for sensible thinking', finds direction in the similarity between the disciplining role played by objects for perceptual demonstratives and the passions for sensible thinking. Dependence upon social consensus, as noted above, does not go far enough in the disciplining process yet offers a glimmer of hope. In Baier's interpretation of Hume she picks upon his key idea of sympathy as reflexive that is, how we respond to how things are for others of sentiment. Any disciplining of sensible thinking comes not from social consensus but from the way we use our sympathy to govern our sentiments. In making moral judgments we can then with the aid of sympathy reflect thoughtfully about how others feel:

...the picture here is then a picture in which we plot our moral course through the world by a procedural sentiment that is responsive to how things are in that world (Baier & Luntley 1995: II 13).
Drawing upon the Humean distinction between a competent piece of literary criticism and what constitutes a competent literary critic Luntley suggests that rather than focussing upon the description of the life well lived it would be more useful to define what constitutes a competent moral critic. So when we share similar views about a novel we do so not because of our shared feelings but because 'we have hit on the truth' (RST 14). With moral consensus our view of a particular book or a moral action could always be capped by a more discriminating, more insightful interpretation. Here our moral development is through education, not the emulation, the step-by-step training which results from sitting by a moral 'Nelly'.

To have an objective grounding our moral sentiments, if they are to meet the criteria of 'plain truth' require more than intersubjective convergence, we need to know that the reason they converge is that is the way the world is. However as Wiggins asserts in his discussion on the meaning of life our judgments do not fulfil this requirement (NVF 87-137). While in seeking a basis in truth for our beliefs and judgments about the meaning of life he attacks non-cognitivism, he does discern an element of truth. This leads Wiggins to offer his doctrine of cognitive underdetermination for those beliefs and judgments which fall short of the marks of plain truth. Wiggins summarizes his doctrine thus:

...in so far as anything matters, and in so far as human life has the meaning we think it has, that possibility is rooted in something arbitrary, contingent, unreasoned, objectively non-defensible - and not the one whit less arbitrary, contingent and indefensible by virtue of the fact that the unconstrained inventive processes underlying it has been gradual, unconscious and communal. Our form of life - or that in our form of life which gives it meaning - is not something that men have ever (as they are apt to say) found or discovered. It is something they can criticize or regulate or adjust with an eye to what is true or correct or reasonable (NVT 124).

The importance of Wiggins's doctrine for a notion of autonomy is that our lives are not made meaningful through an act of will and that in our ideas as to what constitutes the good life plurality rules. Of more immediate importance to my conception of personal autonomy is the recognition of the rich and subtle complexity of our moral lives, the messiness of our lives, which abstract theories of morality fail to capture. Hence
Wiggins directs us towards a reading of literature sharing with Martha Nussbaum and Iris Murdoch as well as Annette Baier the belief in its value in the 'appreciation and description' of the working day complexity of what is experientially involved in seeing a point in living' (NVT 137)

3 The Relational Self: the Different and the Excluded

There is more than a hint of Panglossian optimism in the Humean ideal of moral sensibility. Hume sees the sensibilities as grounded in human nature and as such easily lit up. It is an ideal that, given the appropriate education of the senses, all will have access to the best of all possible moral worlds. Implicit in this is that those interpersonal barriers to individual's freedom of expression, action and development, ie to their personal autonomy, can through sympathy, an enlarged reason, understanding and conversation be removed. The prospect of autonomy appears to be best for those who have acquired the socially agreed characteristics of a sound moral judge through some process of éducation sentimentale. Baier in her restructuring of Hume's moral thought does not quite share his optimism: Wiggins certainly does not. It is his acknowledgment that the firing of the sentiments will depend upon contingency which makes him much less optimistic. His cautiousness is evident from his theory of cognitive under-determination with the result that he recommends an Asquithian policy of 'wait and see'. At the same time he views literature as important in understanding the particularity of one's sentiments in relation to the evident messiness of life. I share this view and his caution. As we shall see it is otherwise with Martha Nussbaum whose understanding of contingency appears to be somewhat simplistic. Sentiments appear for her to be easily lit up by literature while for Murdoch it is love. The previous section of this chapter, added the requirement for the self of sensible reasoning that it has the capacity to understand and retain a measure of objectivity. The self is strong on the relational, on the sharing of sentiments, sympathy and understanding but there appears to be no recognition of the politics of exclusion. The operation of these in our empirical world has led many writers, particularly female, to question not only existing political and social structures but also the prevailing moral and political discourse. In this section of the chapter I want to address an issue which seems to me inescapable if
one is to relate some broadly acceptable notion of personal autonomy of the self to the current world, particularly a world in which women thinkers have emerged as the voice of moral and political inclusion and as representative of the different and the excluded.

I deal with this issue under three headings: (i) a discussion of three women writers, Annette Baier, Martha Nussbaum and Iris Murdoch all of whom believe with Wiggins in the value of literature in the instantiation of moral issues; (ii) a consideration of the extent to which Baier shares Carol Gilligan's view that the different routes of moral experience and development for male and female, lead to a gender difference in their moral outlook - that is, where males give primacy to autonomy the female concern is with relationships; (iii) this picks up firstly, on the earlier remarks on Iris Marion Young whose attack on Rawlsian distributive justice focusses upon the process which leads to the exclusion of certain groups, from main stream political and social structures and processes; autonomy appears to be neither within their consciousness nor their capability and capacity and secondly, on the alternative which Young posits to the relational self.

3.1 Three Women Thinkers: Baier, Nussbaum and Murdoch

Among contemporary philosophers there has been a major movement away from Enlightenment based ethics, dominated by Kantianism and utilitarianism, to an ethics in which sentiments and particularity predominate. The significant role played by women philosophers, psychologists and sociologists has led to its being dubbed an 'alternative' feminist tradition of ethical thinking. Chief among the philosophers are Annette Baier, Martha Nussbaum and Iris Murdoch all three of whom reject the concept, which informs much of modern philosophy, of the rationally detached self deciding freely upon a course of action. Each in her own way has elevated sentiment as key in the governance of moral behaviour. Among feminist thinkers who have attacked liberal ideals of rights and justice, are those who conceive autonomy to be an essentially male conception, supplanting it with relational ideals of affiliation and care. Key among proponents of the latter is the psychologist Carol Gilligan upon whose empirically based work, on the decision-making process among young females, Baier draws.
(Gilligan 1982). In addition to the importance of the sentiments in moral judgment each of the above three share a number of beliefs. These include beliefs in, a contingent, concrete self rooted in particularity, in its tradition, custom and history, a self with ethics based upon virtue rather than abstract moral principle. Its concern is with affiliation and care and its life is informed by self-narrative and the particularity of literature. The nature of morality is sought not in the dictates of universal laws but in the particularity and relatedness of character and social context. This is to be found in novels where the writer's concern is with the impact upon the individual's life of its moral reflections on its actions.

Baier whose adaptation of the Humean model of moral sentiment was discussed above claims to think reflectively about humans and the multiple and complex nature of their history-bound lives. In her re-working of Hume she seeks, in place of conformity to general, instrumentally based rules and conventions, a morality dependent not solely upon reason but upon self-corrected sentiments or passions. These passions, essentially social in nature, are approved as virtues. In this inter-relationships are central: first in the role of the family 'as the exemplar of co-operation and inter-dependency', and in the moral co-operation which involves 'co-operation in unchosen schemes, with unchosen partners with unequal partners in both close and intimate and distant formal relations' (Baier 1994: 62). It is the conflict which inevitably arises from these relations, and from within the individual subject, which makes morality a necessity. In his attempt to give morality a secure basis Hume locates in human beings the capacity for such co-operation.

A prime concern of Baier's is with the implications for ethics and ethical theory of Gilligan's findings about the differences between males and females in regard to their moral development and their mature versions of morality. In particular, the extent to which this version of morality squares or does not square with women's moral wisdom. Whatever its roots, given the more or less social equality with men, Baier wants to make women's moral outlook as explicit as men's and as influential in the structuring of our institutions and practices. Baier's method is to measure influential moral theories against Hume's. In particular that of Kant and its influence upon Rawls, Piaget and
Kohlberg whose version of moral development and maturity Gilligan found did not apply to girls and women as well as it did to men and boys. Given the Kant-Hume differences, a rational as opposed to a sentient based morality and a patriarchal versus a dialogic decision-making process, it is perhaps natural for Baier to ask if Hume is a women's moral theorist. Hume's morality, say Baier, is not just a 'bag of virtues' account with its grounding in passions, it allows for moral progress and development, ie the progress of sentiments. This development requires the co-operation of male and female in the development of a moral sense which harmonizes reasons and sentiment, justice and care. If Gilligan is right about women's special moral aptitudes, Baier believes that it will probably be women, with their 'natural empathy... better diplomatic skills' who would probably take the responsibility, given their concern about how the 'other party feels, and initiate and propose the marriage'. The result of this union of male and female moral wisdom will be a shared teaching and gradual decline in the gender difference which Gilligan found in moral outlook and moral skills. (Baier 1994: 31-32). It would seem that the problem Gilligan raises, and which Baier to some extent re-echoes, about the nature of sentiments in men and women is not a special problem for contingency but just a good example of it (See below).

A major concern of Nussbaum's is with relationships particularly with love and its fragility (Nussbaum 1985). In her efforts to relate ethical principles to context she attacks Western moral discourse with its isolated individuals and its historical detachment and turns to Aristotle. In her re-working of his ethics she acknowledges the importance to happiness and our ethical well-being of external circumstance crucial to which are our loving relationships. More recently in Love's Knowledge (1990) she gives priority to perceptions, which she defines as 'the ability to discern acutely and responsively the salient features of one's particular situation' and to the particularities of individual lives. It is her concern with the concrete situations and inter-relationships which leads her to commend the novel as a major source of moral education - 'moral philosophy requires attentive and loving novel reading' (ibid: 27). These force us to imagine situations and relationships which enable us to understand our own. One further important feature of her moral philosophy is her acceptance of the essential
messiness of life, its lack of amenability to order and universal principle. It is the abstraction of the latter which according to Gilligan, distorts moral theory. 11

Iris Murdoch shares with Nussbaum a rejection of the detached individual freely making rational moral choices as unrealistic neglecting the values by which we live (Murdoch 1970: 4-6). Like Nussbaum love is central to her moral philosophy. Our understanding of the moral complexities we face comes from our attending to the ongoing activities of our moral life important to which are its connections to our loving relationships. It is not the strength of our will which governs our moral actions, or abstract principles which enable us to understand and deal with particular situations, but our relationships and attachments - particularly the quality of our 'usual' attachments. 'The idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality', says Murdoch, '...is the characteristic and proper mark of the moral agent' (Quoted by Kymlicka 1990: 267).

The above three writers lend support to my argument that a primary concern of the autonomous individual is coping appropriately - 'acutely and responsively' with the particularity and messiness of specific situations. At the same time they present a number of problems which, as I will shortly discuss, are further exacerbated by the support of Baier and Nussbaum for Gilligan's gendered voices of justice and care. Key among these problems for my purpose, in the case of (i) Baier, is her failure both to discuss the constitution of the moral subject or the differences between various moral dialogues. In regard to the latter she has not been able to free herself entirely from what MacIntyre calls 'part of our inheritance ...the contemporary confidence in the single unitary character of morality'. 12 (ii) A major weakness of Nussbaum and her fellow neo-Aristotelians is their neglect of the issues of power and hegemony of dominant moral discourses. (iii) With Murdoch we need more than the direction of a long gaze directed at a particular situation.

To make sense of it we want to be able to understand and assess its features, their individual relevance, particularly those of moral significance if we are to feel responsibility and care about them. It is the importance of these problematics to a
conception of personal autonomy which leads to the inclusion of two further female writers one a psychologist, Carol Gilligan and the other a political philosopher, Iris Marion Young.

3.2 Carol Gilligan and a Different Voice

Gilligan in attacking Kantian type universalist moral theory, particularly the primacy it accords to individual autonomy, believes that any notion of universal moral justice accepts that autonomy is a masculine, not a feminine ideal. Central to the debate over women and moral justice is difference: a difference of voices, the one masculine and the other feminine, with which are associated different modes of thought and feeling. The former accords primacy to justice, to the application of universal principles through which issues of rights and fairness might be resolved. The prime concern of the feminine voice is with care in which the development of moral dispositions enables the individual to attend to her relationships and responsibilities (Gilligan 1982: 19). The result of this difference has been to fragment morality and divide moral labour 'along the lines of gender'. Friedman in somewhat loaded terms claims that the tasks of governing, regulating social order, and managing other 'public institutions have been monopolized by men as their privileged domain, and the tasks of sustaining privatized personal relationships have been imposed upon, or left to, women'. 13 The crucial issue in the foregoing is whether justice and care are gender related. Gilligan believes that gender identity based in a patriarchal society on the devaluation and oppression of women brings attitudes which become internalized in early childhood. This leads to fundamental personality differences in male and female: males having more distinctive and rigid ego boundaries while for females these are more fluid hence their predisposition to relate sympathetically to others. Each of these characteristics brings its problems, for men it is the threat of close bonding to the self and to women determining and maintaining a sense of their own identity as individuals.

The key need for feminist theory is to understand the construction of the difference as an ideology and explain its social and historical grounding. Gilligan condemns self-centred thinking, we need she says a clearer perception of truth concerning human
relations in which women are involved. This leads to a cool and ruthless determination to protect themselves and to a revised version of what constitutes their own interests and a realization that these require attachment to concern for others. This criticism bringing a new understanding of 'the connection between the self and others (which) is articulated by the concept of responsibility' (Gilligan 1982: 74). The danger here is that Gilligan is perpetuating the self - relational stereotypes similar to extreme interpretations of the Rawlsian - Communitarian dichotomy.

While Gilligan's influence has been quite profound upon feminist thinkers, including Baier and Nussbaum, the nature of the different voice she assumes has been attacked. In particular, her attempt to represent as the voice of all women what is seen as that of 'professional, heterosexual white women'. Benhabib asks if there can be a voice the difference of which is independent of class or race (Benhabib 1992: 190-198)? Difference, exclusion or oppression is not unique to women as Young shows (see below) and as Nussbaum's examples of the poor, the blacks and homosexuals illustrate in Poetic Justice (1995). There is considerable debate over the origin of the difference in male and female in moral reasoning. However there appears to be general agreement among feminist thinkers that gender is not a natural fact but is accounted for by socio-cultural and historical factors.14 Gilligan appears to be creating a new version of an old stereotype the gentle, caring and responsible female, the 'good girl' image of heterosexual culture whose aim is their domestication (Benhabib 1992: 195).

What the moralization of gender overlooks is an 'underlying commonality'. This is an oversight which Kymlicka claims arises from 'how we think we reason than how we actually reason' (Kymlicka 1990: 264). Also we can commit ourselves to a relational subjectivity without the male/female split in the belief that this is implicit in being human. It is argued that the distinct moral voices of justice and care are used by men and women with similar regularity. In addition a reason for the different voices is not a difference in thoughts but the possibility that men feel they should concern themselves with justice and rights and women with sustaining social relationships (Kymlicka ibid). This is a reason which reflects culture as a major factor in the separation of roles.

Finally, the tendency of feminists to accept perhaps too readily the dissolution of the
self's boundaries in favour of an integrationist community poses the potential threat of repression. However my own view is that the nature of gender relations is empirical. This issue does not pick out anything special the substance of which affects my conception of personal autonomy.

Marion Young, to whom we now turn, believes that Gilligan rather than challenging, actually maintains the western philosophical belief in autonomy and selfhood since she assumes that one individual is capable of actually understanding another and that each constitutes 'a coherent subject of desire'.

3.3 Iris Marion Young and the Excluded
Young challenges the concept of the relational self with its shared subjectivity’ in which persons will cease to be opaque, other, not understood, and instead become fused, mutually sympathetic' (Young: 1990: 230-32). She claims that the constitution of the West's philosophical tradition has repressed differences, excluded otherness and heterogeneity. As 'reason reigns over passions, the I reigns over the will, otherness must be suppressed'. Young directs her attack at the assumption in moral theory of impartiality. This she believes merely masks the ideology of a dominant group and suppresses difference (ibid 97-102). The key to her Justice and the Politics of Difference lies in understanding the difference which eschews hierarchy. Rather than viewing group differences as deviations from the norm our reflection should begin with their particular characteristics of ambiguity and their relational and shifting nature. Young attacks the universalizing definition of justice in its abstraction from particularities. This is the point from which any reflection must start. She proposes instead a definition in terms of those institutional conditions essential for the individual to develop its capacities, to communicate and co-operate. Injustice, represented by the unequal distribution of social goods, she defines as domination and suppression reflected in exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence (Young 1990: Ch 1 & 2). This is not a distributive view of justice based on equality but one which accords to particular groups special rights. Similarly, to talk of the redistribution of power is inappropriate, it inheres in society's discourses and practices. The need says Young is for the mutual recognition and affirmation of group
differences. Her objection to the impartiality of moral theory lies in its efforts to reduce
differences to unity which has resulted in such insurmountable dichotomies as
public/private, reason/passion universal/particular. Young's proposal is for the ideal
of public fairness which in the interests of heterogeneity and politic discourse would
offer a pluralistic, participatory politics governed by need interpretation (ibid 118).
The foregoing outline of both Gilligan and Young raises again the issue posed in
Chapter 2, in the discussion of the radically situated and the radically disembodied self
- namely the development of a relational self which retains a sense of distinctive
selfhood. Young's notion of power overlooks its practical agency in which the
discursive nature of power is significant (a topic to be discussed in the next chapter and
in Part II).

4 Conclusion: The Self of Cognitive Sensibility: Autonomous or Relational?

(1) On the issue of difference, I noted above the tendency of the femininist viewpoint
to perpetuate male and female stereotypes and differences. Baier argues for
mutual understanding and influence which offers a different and more hopeful way
in the dialogic. Living with the opposite sex has never been founded on a perfect
consensus, daily we understand and misunderstand, agree and disagree. 16 Given
a healthy relationship we are committed to continuous interchange, to a Humean
dialogic of sympathetic listening and above all communication in the process of
which we enlarge our reason and understanding of one another contributing to a
development of character. Gilligan's weakness over gender differences is to apply
an empirical formula to what is essentially contingent. This does not affect the
course of my philosophical argument for the individual's quest for its autonomy.

(2) On the excluded: there is ample empirical evidence to confirm the struggle which
such disadvantaged groups as the poor and ethnic minorities have in establishing a
sense of their own selfhood in contemporary society. 17 However Young's
celebration of heterogeneity, opacity and difference may be at the expense of
individual autonomy. It does not follow that differences necessarily empower, or
that heterogeneity is always commendable or that opacity will aid the individual in
its quest for autonomy.
(3) On literary allusions, I share Nussbaum's and Wiggins' views of their value in illustrating the particularity of moral issues. However Nussbaum seems also to demonstrate their limitations. She appears somewhat empirically naive in her very strong belief in the classics as the fuse to fire the sentiments. In her last book, *Poetic Justice*, she recommends the reading of novels dealing with the 'different' among which is Charles Dicken's *Hard Times*. Its purpose is to engender our sympathy for the poor. However reading a novel written some 150 years ago about the conditions among workers in Victorian England appears to be a somewhat sanitized exercise. It is perhaps the kind of the 'fly on the wall' television documentary, with skilful camera work and limited commentary which might more readily engage our sentiments both for the excluded and the different. Or, like George Orwell, she might try living with the disadvantaged.18 Nussbaum currently holds the Chair of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago.

It remains a matter of speculation of the extent to which those about to enter a profession, in which the instrumental and the procedural are all important, will find their sentiments engaged by reading fiction and discussing their moral issues. It is not the reading of these classics but how they live and will live their private and professional lives which reflects their engagement.

(4) In the last chapter I resisted the pressure to being pushed in either the direction of the rational, antecedent and radically disembodied self or its opposite, the sentient, radically situated self. I sought not to finesse either of these but to create, for my conception of personal autonomy, the notion of a relational, sentient and reasonable self dealing in its moral actions with the particularity of situations. The striking feature of the latter are their messiness. Agency is to be understood here as appropriate action understood *sui generis*. My concern is to capture the phenomenology in its own terms. It is my personal narrative which provides the elements of coherence and direction which enable me to relate my quest for autonomy to my needs for and the pressures of the relational. Hence the issue of the nature of individual freedom in regard to its social solidarity becomes important and to this issue we now turn in the next chapter.
The two important contributions, towards a conception of personal autonomy, from the previous chapter were the importance and the particularity of the self's sentiments and the need for these to have some measure of objectivity. This chapter deals with Joseph Raz's contribution to the concept of personal autonomy. While considerable, a major weakness is in the argument he advances for the grounding of 'social forms'. It is Baier, in her re-working of Hume, who brings out the importance for the functioning of 'social artifices' of the individual's sympathetic understanding in communication. Her test of objectivity with its dependence on social consensus was found to be inadequate. It was left to our two sensible cognitivists, Wiggins and Luntley to seek to relate sentiments to the way things are. Despite his useful contribution Raz takes a backward step - as perhaps Baier might remind him. In the previous two chapters I developed the concept of a self portfolio. The key criterion for the inclusion of situations, roles, attachments etc is not their individual nature but the perspective which informs their selection. The choice of items is not solely an economic one. It is grounded in moral and social forms and informed by the individual's perspective whose sensibilities lay claim to objectivity. Both Joseph Raz and Annette Baier would share this view of choice. However the weakness of Raz's notion that the ultimate embeddedness of our values lies in social and cultural forms is its lack of particularity. The value of Baier's contribution in addressing this weakness, as noted above, does not go far enough.

The checklist in Chapter 1 for my conception of personal autonomy views it both as a right and a good. In taking into account the individual's situations, sentiments and contingencies it embodies a thick notion of the self. This is a self for whom the quest for autonomy is essentially a creative act which seeks for itself the freedom, conditions and opportunities for individual action. It is Joseph Raz who provides the most comprehensive statement of autonomy as positive freedom.1 This chapter gives a
description and a critique of Raz's conception of autonomy and then introduces issues relevant to the context of personal autonomy.

The chapter has three sections:

1 Autonomy as Personal Well-Being.
2 The Grounding of the Self's Goals.
3 The Political and Cultural Conditions of Autonomy.

1 Autonomy as Personal Well-Being

(Significantly) autonomous persons are part creators of their own moral world...(they) have a commitment to projects, relationships and causes which affects the kind of life that is for them worth living (MF 154).

The autonomy principle permits and even requires government to create morally valuable opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones (MF 417).

Raz's prime concern is with those social, cultural and institutional forms which facilitate individual autonomy. These forms with their intrinsic values are essential to the individual's capacity to make autonomous choices. Raz grounds his morality in autonomy. This requires those collective goods whose basic elements are not individual rights and liberty but are found in such social forms as 'art, science, friendship or love to the wealth of a rich and deep public culture' (Gray 1995: 91).

With Rawls, Raz believes in the centrality of autonomy to the individual's life but differs substantially in his understanding of its value. Raz links his concept of autonomy inextricably with a belief in the state's legitimate role to promote individual well-being. The state's role for Rawls is non-interventionist and non-perfectionist: how the individual lives their life is a matter for them not for government. While Raz believes perfectionism to be the aim of all political action (MF 133) it remains a liberal goal since the good life must be one of autonomy for the individual. His non-neutral liberalism, rooted in an understanding of the individual's well-being as dependent largely upon the nature of society and upon the availability of options, inevitably involves government in deciding between
some ways of life as more valuable than others. Individual choices will be made from options influenced ultimately by political power. Raz recognizes that comprehensive goals and hence well-being depend upon the forms of a society antecedent to the individual. In his perception of the relationship of autonomy and personal ends, he differs markedly from Sandel's and MacIntyre's critique of liberal individual choice. He shares their belief in the grounding of the individual self in the community. It is social forms which provide the individual with the valuable range of options, essential to autonomy. Through these it can acquire the goals and identities which make the moral life possible. At the same time he rejects MacIntyre's emotivist view of the 'liberal' self and Sandel's complaint that it is a matter of personal preference. For the individual the value of life is represented by goals and attachments, not just interests. These I choose freely as 'mine' and endorse autonomously (MF 287). Among those attachments and commitments, grounded in the community, are those which, constitutive of my identity, I enscribe in a self-narrative. Autonomy for Raz's 'self' involves it in a creative process of developing a self-conception nested in incommensurable goods. These are the values, commitments, attachments and goals which are mine, I own them.

We need society in order to pursue particular comprehensive goals and for autonomy to be worthwhile requires a range of options and social ties which are more than mere associations between individuals. Here Raz is concerned with liberalism's failure to accord importance to social commitments and its apparent unawareness of or tendency to downgrade the value of strongly communal goods. My understanding of Raz is that deliberation over choice need not be purely instrumental, rationality embodies a non-instrumental orientation to values. Being autonomous for Raz is being able to set up goals which are objective and incommensurable, although the latter bring problems for Raz's conception of autonomy. He does not believe that the good life is only achievable through social and political commitments or that there is only one valuable way of life. He sees political action on behalf of the latter as offering in communal ways of life more hope of survival. With the social matrix as the source of the individual's aims and purposes, their interests tend to converge with those of others. At the same time he has no place for values which conflict with his central commitment to autonomy and pluralism. In linking well-
being with the community Raz calls into question the whole opposition of individual and community. There is no individual right to autonomy, while collective goods are constitutive of autonomy any individual right to these would imply onerous duties. He attacks moral individualism in its failure to recognize value in collective goods some of which are intrinsically valuable (MF 198). If autonomy is itself intrinsically desirable then right-based theories are unable to account for the desirability of autonomy. While this conclusion appears to be at odds with the endorsement by these theorists of personal autonomy Raz shares their belief in the centrality of personal autonomy to the liberal concern with freedom. On the relation of rights to autonomy Raz concludes:

(i) personal autonomy is incompatible with moral individualism: his notion of objective values is dependent upon social forms,

(ii) a concern with autonomy will not guarantee the responsibility of others to ensure that society offers certain options; anyway if these were valuable then morality would include not only fundamental rights but fundamental values and ideals,

(iii) given its ultimate value, the effect of autonomy upon social institutions and practices will be wide ranging: while the possibility of autonomy depends upon many rights the provision of some kind of list of concrete rights is not a possibility.

Raz's notion of autonomy equals positive freedom not autonomy as such.

The provision of collective goods is constitutive of the very possibility of autonomy and it cannot be relegated to a subordinate role, compared with some right against coercion, in the name of autonomy (MF 207).

Raz attacks the right based morality of Dworkin and Mackie who, in assuming that all valid moral views derive from the assumption that certain individuals have certain rights, pre-suppose for their justification no other moral principles. As we have seen Raz rejects moral individualism and pre-supposes certain moral views which are the constitutive role of a common culture and individual action in the shaping of the world.

Raz endorses as a condition of moral theories the humanistic principle that the explanation of the goodness or the badness of anything derives from its actual or potential contribution to human life and its quality. For Raz rights-based morality ties rights to duties and
ignores reasons for action not constitutive of duty, any action beyond the call of duty, i.e., its supererogation does not accord intrinsic moral value to virtue or the pursuit of excellence. 'Acting out of duty' fails to take account of the honest agent with specific motives and appropriate attitudes based upon its views about the conduct of interpersonal relations.

Raz sees rights-based morality as individualistic, they do not recognize any intrinsic value in any collective good which for them has only an instrumental value. In his differences with Rawls and the rights-based theorists Raz, with his belief in the communal grounding of the individual offers a thicker concept of the self and its autonomy.

2 The Grounding of the Self's Goals

Central to Raz's politics of perfection is autonomy, grounded in social forms, its characteristics are moral pluralism and incommensurable values, i.e., these cannot be nested and objective in one uniform way.

(i) Social Forms and Plurality

While Raz accepts that self-perception is a concern of the autonomous individual it is neither necessarily planned or unified although he does concede that there may be something in the view that autonomy 'gives a life unity'. What is central to the individual's sense of self are those projects, with their decisions and actions, constitutive of his identity. His reasons for these are not agent impartial: to abandon those central to his life would not just be 'disagreeable' but their the effect would be to 'alienate' him... 'from his actions and the source of his actions in his own convictions.... in the most literal sense (it is) an attack on his integrity'. In embarking on projects and plans the individual knows what his goal is and his successes with past projects. It is through the goals we set and commitments we undertake that we shape our lives, determining the nature of success and failure the values and reasons of which, as we progress with our project, will change.

Thus is 'a person's life is (in part) of his own making... a normative creation, a creation of new values and reasons' (MF 387). As we develop our goals we transform and add to our existing values, new ventures bring an interplay between impersonal reasons which although independent of choice they guide it. These in turn change the balance of reasons
determining the shape of our well-being that is how good or successful it is from our point of view.

Raz is unwilling to accept as a universal prescription 'pervasive or life encompassing goals'. He nevertheless believes the more pervasive the goal, ie those which he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about' the greater its importance to the individual's well-being. The fact that the individual will want its goals to be well-integrated, contributing to its unity and to such aspects of its nature as intellectual curiosity, spontaneity etc., illustrates the importance of the relatedness, the nestedness of goals in our practical reasoning. It is only through this that we can assess the well-being of our own and other's lives. Despite the centrality of goals to the individual's life and their embodiment in our notions and language of reasoning these may not necessarily be clearly articulated. The over-riding goal of Raz's 'self' is its well-being, posited as an intuition it is 'a pervasive and unshakeable feature of human thought'. Raz defines personal well-being in terms of our successful fulfilment of our non-biological goals, eg shared activities, relationships and those related to our reputation. Raz's conception of goals is firmly embedded in the social forms in which we find ourselves. While pursued out of self-interest Raz does not assume that they conflict with values in general.

As we saw in Chapter 3 we acquire the contents of our situational/role portfolio including our associated goals, relationships, ambitions etc in different ways: some we grow up with, some may be thrust upon us while we choose or drift into others. What matters is not their source or how they were acquired. But that as we embrace projects and relationships they become ours and in working towards their fulfilment they form an important part of our 'emotional responses' and 'imaginative musings'. These responses and musings help to shape our portfolio for which we seek a well-balanced connection with our particularities. For example, we may wish for friends but we hook-up to our particularities, not with the expression of a goal but, by making and retaining friends.

While we arrange our various projects in some kind of hierarchical order the test of our actions is not the number achieved but their contribution to those, our highest goals which pervade all aspects of our life. In pursuit of our goals Raz believes that individual behaviour should not be governed by the desire for social approval, nor does he rule out
its departure from social forms. These derive their meaning from their social embeddedness and any variation would need to be consistent with some common theme. What is important for autonomy is the availability of options. Since these derive from social forms Raz's liberal conception of autonomy is much less individualistic than it might appear (MF 247/312-3).

With his argument for individualistic rights grounded in a form of communitarianism the provision of collective goods are for Raz constitutive of the possibility of autonomy. An important element in a person's well-being is their success in the pursuit of comprehensive goals among which are those like marriage which most deeply structure our lives. These represent an instantiation of a social form, embodying public perceptions of social action and each has its own internal richness and complexity. Whatever the variations, eg open marriage or partnership, its observation or its negation is based on a particular social form. Without these social forms individual behaviour would lack significance and it is only through continuous familiarity with them that the individual is able to have acquired and maintained their goals (MF 310). Comprehensive goals require social institutions to realize their possibilities, eg a professional career and they are acquired through habituation not abstract deliberation. The latter distinction is brought out in the use, perhaps less today, of apprenticeships, articles and pupillage for the development of craftsmen and those in some professions. The passing of examinations alone will not produce a competent cabinet maker or architect. Both have to interpret client sensibilities in the course of their work. This requires on their part Baier's sentiments of character, which I suppose constitutes the 'bedside manner' of a 'good' doctor. In offering sympathetic understanding the doctor engages with the individual's particularities. Their concern is not with the routine writing of a prescription but with the individual's general sense of well-being.

It is this sympathetic understanding which will govern the quality of our relationships with our partner, children, friends, acquaintances and colleagues. Our judgment of the intensity or intimacy of a relationship will depend upon our having the correct expectations of each other. Such expectations are grounded in a common culture, in shared social forms, in a mutual understanding of what constitutes appropriate role behaviour. When
the individual responds to a 'different drummer' by going in a direction of its own choosing, it transcends the particular social form. What becomes significant is the distance travelled. 5

We saw above that the selection, consideration and manipulation of the contents of our portfolio, including our goals, are informed by our sentiments. These are empirically conditioned as we respond to events and objects and above all, to other people. In an earlier discussion it was concluded that our sensibility grounds our moral viewpoint. Thus there is a 'rough' coincidence of moral and personal concerns (MF 319). The individual, with goals drawn from morally and socially grounded forms is enabled to enjoy its life. Its well-being depends upon its ability to make sense in its own life of the morally sound forms of its society. In pursuing interests, aims and relationships individuals engage in activities which simultaneously serve themselves and others. Their selection and evaluation of projects is not solely on rational ground, the ultimate basis of their choice will be governed by the operation of their taste, i.e. their sensibilities. Through their commitment to these projects, relationships and causes individuals make concrete 'their personal dignity and sense of integrity and worth'. Autonomy requires the availability to the agent of quality options and freedom from the will of another. When we restrict choice we subject another to our will. Since autonomy can only be sought in a world of constraints it is always a matter of degree. Raz's ideal embodies a particular conception of well-being involving a process of self-creation, or part-authorship. This is not necessarily a planned or unified life because of its diverse, progressive rather than its once-for-all nature. In undertaking goals and commitments we give shape to our lives, determine what constitutes success or failure and create a life partly of our own making with new values and reasons. It is not our mental or physical characteristics which have changed but our normative condition. The above does not support a notion of radical self-creation of 'free and arbitrary choice' unguided by value (MF 387). On the contrary independent values are pre-supposed which are transformed and added to through one's endeavours and commitments. Choice, guided by the interplay of choice-independent reasons and the creation of the self through one's actions and a past of values, determines the contours of that person's well-being by creating new reasons. 6 It also helps to
understand the role of will in practical reasoning. When we say 'I want to' this does not signify a particular mental state or desire, but a valid reason for action once we are committed to a project. Although not a unique one there is a special connection of self-creation and the creation of values with the ideal of autonomy. While this ideal selects these two features and requires that they be expanded it does not explain the autonomy as free and conscious self-creation.

Our notion of freedom is defined by personal autonomy and not vice versa. Establishing criteria for our goals aids us in the task of self-realization. The latter is not to be confused with the ideal of personal autonomy. The path to self-realization is an optional choice it can be achieved without the pre-condition of autonomy. Autonomy might contribute but has no special status since self-realization might come by chance or be the result of manipulation or in a form inconsistent with autonomy. Autonomy in its link with freedom only has value for Raz when used in the pursuit of the good. This supports the value of pluralism, the availability of a number of markedly different options. Associated with the latter are various styles of life exemplifying different virtues. What matters for one's autonomy and integrity, according to Raz, is one's identification with and loyalty to one's choices. Without the former there is alienation 'the life he has is not his own', without the latter the risk is that of failing to engage, or succeed 'in the pursuits one has set oneself to make the content of one's life'.

The form of the projects and relationships are defined not only by social conventions but by rules that define the activity. Failure to follow these creates the impression for others that we have let them down and that we have failed our intentions. The more projects we fail the more our life represents failure. This is not to argue that an autonomous life cannot be a failure. The significant form of failure for autonomy is not so much the lack of initial commitment as a subsequent failure of fidelity. Lack of initial commitment resembles self-deception, its effect is to diminish the agent's autonomy. The agent thinks he has made a choice and committed himself 'whereas he has failed to do so' (ibid 385). If autonomy, thickly understood, is to be possible then Raz's argument is that autonomy is compatible with and pre-supposes pluralism. For that reason Raz sees no warrant for the state to promote a particular way of life nor does he demand that the state
protects the conditions for autonomous living. Because of pluralism the state cannot lay down what those values should be, ie there is 'no commensurate judgment to be made'. However, Raz believes that the state has a role in protecting institutions from an inappropriate valuation (See 3.1 below). Pluralism pre-supposes conflicting considerations and trade-offs among different goods offering different qualities and advantages. With excellence in quest of goods requiring in the individual particular virtues, different virtues will be needed for the pursuit of different goods. Since there are available more goods of markedly different characteristics than can be chosen and more incompatible virtues than can be perfected the individual faces value pluralism. An autonomous life is impossible without achieving virtue to a significant degree. If it 'is an ideal then we are committed to such a view of morality, valuing autonomy leads to the endorsement of moral pluralism'. The problem of the valuation of goods for Raz is that these must be about particular goods. His notion about their being grounded in social forms is too broad in concept to capture this particularity. The doctor in examining, and prescribing for, the patient may well follow the specific social form. It does not follow from his capacity to do this that he will engage sympathetically with the patient.

(ii) Incommensurability and Objectivity

The tragedy in the film Dead Poets Society lies ultimately in moral conflict over the boy's well-being. The boy sees the latter in his ambition to be an actor: his father in the aim he has for the boy's future as a doctor. For both their reasons are partial in that they represent for each deeply held beliefs about what will determine the future well-being ie 'success' in the boy's life. The boy's immediate aim to act in the play he judges will help his eventual ambition, the father's immediate concern is with filial duty. For Raz the free choice of goals and relations are essential to personal well-being. While accepting that there might be incommensurability within the latter he fails to give an adequate account of the nested nature of values and what it means to choose goals - in particular as part-author of one's life. His own illustration of the nature of incommensurability is that of the conflict between friendship and money in which, while we might feel inclined to be judgmental over those who favour the former, we remain somewhat indifferent (MF 353). The reason is our implicit recognition that those who prefer one to the other are merely
following different project models, different models of what makes life worth living. It is however very difficult to conceive of such indifference in the case of the boy and his father towards the other's project model. Therein lies the nature of tragedy. The shape of the choices of each is dependent upon the available social forms. Whatever the other does would 'irreparably damage' one of the relationships important to the shape of their lives. The incommensurability which arises here relates not merely to their individual goals but to the conceptions of what constitutes a good life.

It is difficult to envisage a universal moral principle which would guide the thought and action of the two of the agents in the film, the boy and his father. Stanley Benn tackles the issue of incommensurability through a re-working of Kant in which he provides a theory of rational action based on the actual beliefs of a coherent and consistent self (Benn 1988). This, he claims, renders the concept of will redundant, using a preference ranking it enables him to provide for values an objective truth value. In the belief that autonomous individuals develop coherent personalities the function of coherence is to enable the individual to maintain its self identity in the face of the threat of submerging socialization. This facilitates the reconciliation of discordant beliefs with the self's constructed coherent system of thoughts, values and beliefs. Benn's account of the rationally constructed personality with its predictable plan is problematical. Any importance of coherence is not as an end state but in disclosing possible conflicts which might call for some strategy of change or in the end an acceptance of sub-optimality. Raz appears to be no more helpful in giving a clear idea of what it means for an individual to make a decision over a particular goal. Faced with non-comparable goals the basis for individual choice cannot be abstract moral principle but one made only in the light of the particular circumstances and the individual's feelings about these. In this the individual attempts to assess one action as offering a greater contribution to its personal well-being rather than another. The choice is a matter of judgment even if it were possible to code this linguistically, ie that these are all the facts of the matter, it would not provide an answer since it fails to take account of the individual's feelings. Both father and son in the film start from particular moral standpoints. The sequence, and branching of their thoughts and actions, as they face specific decision points, has its own contribution to the
end point of their conflicting judgments. Their own narratives, of which their moral judgments are a function, represent the flow of their past, present and, as yet a future of unknown projects - to be realized as present and eventually past. Within their individual narratives while each is a part of the other's narrative only they, as individuals are in the position to know those sentiments which influenced particular decisions - points of judgment - in a narrative uniquely their own. Faced with the boy's aspirations the father's deontic principle fails to recognize that evaluative judgments require the judgment of sensibilities. One of Raz's conditions for autonomy is that of mental ability - the ability to choose (MF 291). For autonomy this is not just a matter of an instrumental capability as we saw above in discussing the function of apprenticeships and pupillage. The decision needs to take account of the sentiments of oneself and those of others.

This is the aim of Aristotle's practical reasoning and of Keating's teaching. He uses his passion for Whitman's naturalistic poetry to inspire his pupils to relate to their own sentiments. This contrasts with the School's formalistic approach in which the Latin master uses his class period to have his pupils reciting after him the declensions of nouns. Keating shares with Annette Baier a concern for the education of the self of sentiments.

Raz's concern is with the formation of beliefs, with the cognitive skill in the capacity to handle information. If the argument above and in the previous chapter that our beliefs be subject to our sensibilities, is accepted, then the issue is not one of cognition but a failing of individual character. At the bottom of the film's moral conflict is the issue of moral education in which all parties - parents, pupils, teachers particularly the Head and Keating - are involved. The conflict is between two educational models. One is a prescriptive model fuelled by an ethically subjective interpretation of what passes for well-being in the USA of the 1950's. The other is Keating's effort, which is to inspire the boys to develop their own sensibilities as part of their personal well-being. The comprehensive goals the latter embraces are more than those of instrumentality and material success.

Raz, in his opposition to ethical subjectivism, rejects MacIntyre's view of contemporary liberalism as essentially emotivist. He believes that there are some ways of
life for the individual which can be known objectively to be more valuable than others. It is from this that his support of anti-neutral perfectionism flows. Since our personal well-being results from lives we know to be valuable we have no reason to discount these in our political and social activities. In fact he goes so far as to say that judgments about the good life are no more doubtful than those about justice and morality in its 'narrow sense'. But with his belief in incommensurability Raz clearly has a problem over his notion of objectivity. In the discussion in the previous chapter on the role of sentiments in the forming of moral judgments one of the arguments against the dependence upon social forms is that these may represent no more than social consensus, unless they are subject to the 'marks of truth'. While Raz rejects ethical subjectivism, with its total dependence upon agent related reasons, his own claim to objectivity for moral judgments as to the valuable life appears to rest on slim foundations. Since incommensurable values cannot be reduced to bargaining by a purely instrumental self, Raz's notion of incommensurability involves a more substantive theory of the self. However as incommensurable values involve sentiments any claim to objectivity must involve a sensibility which is cognitively controlled. The former takes us back to Baier and latter to Wiggins and Luntley.

3 The Political and Cultural Conditions of Autonomy

In this section I wish to deal with three issues of importance to, but problematic in, Raz's notion of autonomy all of which have a special relevance to the second part of my thesis on autonomy in an organizational context.

3.1 Autonomy and the Polity

3.2 Autonomy, Authority and Accountability,

3.3 Autonomy, Culture and Change.

3.1 Autonomy and the Polity

Raz states his view of the role of government as 'confined to maintaining the framework conditions conducive to pluralism and autonomy' (ibid 27). His principal concern is with government's role in the preservation of those social forms from which the multiplicity of essentially incommensurate values derive. It is in these that our lives and our capacity to
shape them are embedded. His basic reason is that we cannot be neutral about the ideal of the good and exclude it from political action. Particularly as our self-regarding and inter-subjective morality both derive from the same source, that is the social forms to which personal well-being is inextricably linked. While autonomy requires acceptable options this rules out the state’s promotion of a particular form of the good. It is autonomy’s requirement for an adequate range of valuable and socially grounded options which, for Raz, provides the justification for state intervention towards some kind of perfectionism. Without state action there are no conditions for individual well-being the essence of autonomy which the state has a duty to promote. Raz acknowledges Rawls’s criticism of perfectionism’s coercive role but argues that it also has available non-coercive ways - from encouragement and persuasion to inducement through subsidy (MF 417-8). His justification for coercion in the provision of conditions is consistent with Mill’s harm principle. We all share the duty to provide for one another such conditions, the state’s role is to enforce these.

Here we encounter Raz’s theory of authority: the state is in effect carrying out on our behalf obligations we already have. Associated with the three conditions of autonomy - independence from coercion and manipulation, appropriate mental and physical characteristics and the availability of options - are duties and reasons. The last of these conditions provides the justification for the state’s coercive use of power. When we deny to others what is due to them we harm them and thus fail to meet our autonomy-based duties. Here Raz appears to be a possibly unwitting ally of Iris Marion Young (See 4.3.3). The first two conditions above would be acceptable to the anti-perfectionists. The third since it involves the state’s judging the relative merits of ways of life would encounter their resistance. However it remains problematical whether Raz’s recognition of the dependence of valued forms of life and hence of autonomy on social forms warrants state intervention (MF 182). The justification for such action would be the failure of the state to sustain an adequate range of options, needed for autonomy, ‘which enable... (the individual)...to sustain throughout his life activities which, taken together, exercise all the capacities human beings have a desire to exercise’ (MF 375). This is a somewhat broad idea of adequacy. Does Raz however have reasons for concern over a somewhat more limited
range of options whose continuance is dependent upon state action. Mulhall and Swift ask if the withdrawal of state subsidy to opera would fail to provide an adequate range of options (1992: 277). Presumably despite the difficulties of definition Raz has some threshold notion of adequacy enabling one to live an autonomous life although not necessarily a more valuable life.

Michael Luntley in a recent paper on the role of the state in regard to universities accepts Raz's view on this as far as it goes (Luntley 1996). He adds the additional requirement that liberalism requires that 'the state support and preserve modes of social structure other than the free market, structures whose criteria of evaluation will be *sui generis* to the particular mode of living involved' (ibid 56). If we go beyond universities to other non-governmental bodies then Luntley's problem becomes one of distinguishing those non-free market social structures, organizations, which warrant state support, protection whatever its form (See Chapter 8). The test of free market organizations is essentially an instrumental one based upon the accountability for the input-output of resources quantified in financial and budgetary terms. As will be discussed in the next section the key linkage between autonomy and authority, both for the individual and the organization, is accountability. The problem for non-free market structures is to devise criteria by which they might be made accountable in terms other than purely budgetary ones: in terms consonant with in Luntley's phrase 'the particular mode of social living'. If we take as a specific example of the latter organization the Arts Council, the issue becomes one of developing, through dialogue, a system of accountability to their paymasters, ie the government in which, their non-measurable - not particular - options are protected. The issue is one of the incommensurability of the instrumental and the sentimental. This is an issue which re-emerges with particular force in Chapter 7 when different forms of organizational cultures are discussed. The fundamental incommensurability which pervades organizations and those who manage, and theorize about them, concerns the task of harnessing the commitment and energy of a sentient individual to corporate objectives the ultimate achievement of which is measured in instrumental, financial, terms. This is regardless of whatever routine statement the company Chairman makes in the company's annual report says about the contribution of 'our
loyal and hard-working employees'. Basic to this incommensurability is the success of the organization and the well-being of the individual. To find some encompassing objective such as 'corporate well-being' would invite the charge of reification.  

3.2 Autonomy, Authority and Accountability

Three forms of authority are demonstrated in the film *Dead Poets Society*. The first, in the father's expectations that the boy defer to parental authority, the second, persuasion, is represented by Keating's efforts to inspire the boys to find for themselves, what it means to rule their own lives. The third, negotiation, is recommended by Keating to the boy in dealing with the father's probable opposition to Neil's intended appearance in the play. Of course Keating does not only rely upon persuasion but combines this with demonstration and dialogue. Central to Raz's *Morality of Freedom*, essentially an essay about the growth of political morality which emerges from the individual's experience with the institutions of liberal society, is the conflict between authority and freedom. While Raz's principal concern is with political institutions: mine in Part II is with non-government organizations. He recognizes the relevance of his theories to both types of institutions in their need to 'respect the bounds which impose on us all certain responsibilities to others' (Ibid 5).

There is now much discourse at both theoretical and empirical levels on the political nature of non-governmental bodies. Current issues include those of corporate governance, ethical responsibility and the limitations of the sovereignty of national governments in their dealings with the seemingly footloose multi-national corporation. The increased use of the word 'stakeholder' reflects the belief in the enterprise as a coalition of the interests of external and internal participants. Many of the typologies used to discuss managerial power and authority systems parallel those used by the characters in the film. These range from the father's authoritarian monadologic power to the dialogic, in Keating's recommendation to Neil to try negotiation with his father, to Keating's own efforts to persuade the boys by example. These three, characterized by many writers on organization behaviour as: telling, selling and participatory or democratic, are analogous to those adopted by Andrew Reeves in a recent paper.  

The relevance of this paper to the present topic lies in Reeves' criticism of Raz's failure to show that acceptable political
authority is compatible with autonomy and to 'place sufficiently stringent requirements on accountability'. It is the latter which offers a safeguard against the use of power. Implicit in Raz's perfectionism, in which the state is judge and promoter of preferred forms of well-being, is a tension between the conditions, nature and value of autonomy and those who hold political power. This situation is to an extent replicated in the case of corporate bodies with the ultimate source of managerial authority grounded in legal ownership. The issue appears to be one of effecting a reconciliation between authority and autonomy. The prospect of the latter will vary with which of the above three forms of authority used. While negotiated authority represents a stage in the direction of autonomy persuasion, as viewed by Reeves it raises issues of the adequacy to 'delineate accountable political authority'. Setting out efforts to remedy the weaknesses in Raz's conditions for accountability leads Reeves to a preference for negotiated authority. Both Raz and Reeves recognize its value in contributing to the organization's co-ordinative function. As a stage towards autonomy it also recognizes the inequality of the organization's participants. It is the strategy of persuasion which accepts the equality of the parties and represents the condition most suited to personal autonomy. Clearly there is a trade-off between the desire for individual autonomy and the organization's need for a co-ordinated effort. Any effort to reconcile these will be determined by, and reflected in the organization's culture. (See Chapter 7).

3.3 Autonomy, Culture and Change

'Not everyone has an interest in autonomy. It is a cultural value for people living in certain societies only' (MF 189 N1). These are, for Raz, perfectionist liberal societies, societies in which there is a particular form of the good and in which the state has a legitimate role to promote those conditions which favour it. He claims that social and cultural forms which autonomous choosers share have an intrinsic value and for those who fail to embrace it the prospect of autonomy is diminished if not impossible. In assigning to autonomy the role of the engine of perfectionist liberalism Raz is expecting it to carry a weight well beyond its theoretical and empirical limits. Autonomy as a major part of individual well-being is not seen as a universal value but one found particularly in Western liberal democracies where the characteristics of change, mobility, diversity and public debate call for considerable
individual skill in the making of choices (Gray 1995: 91-92). Raz acknowledges that
individuals can lead a good life without their being autonomous individual humans. Gray
claims that Raz is 'conflating' skill in making choices with autonomy (ibid). There appears
to be merit in Gray's charge if his own notion of autonomy includes Baier's notion of the
self of sentiments.

Thus, as Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate, while choice is important to autonomy it is much
more than the skills we can exhibit in their making. At the heart of my concept of personal
autonomy is the individual's narrative role as part-author of a life in which there is a
'progress of sentiments'. Raz's 'functional connection' of autonomy with flourishing and
well-being in liberal societies such as ours becomes tenuous if we attempt to take account
of the sketchy and problematic evidence which Raz adduces. Gray instances Asiatic
community groups who without a commitment to the idea of autonomy appear to do as well
or better on the different criteria of well-being (Gray 1994: 91-2). This suggests that if
the connection of autonomy and human well-being is so tenuous then his case for the
centrality of autonomy in liberal political morality rests upon a totally 'insubstantial basis'.
Gray suggests the way out for Raz is either to make the value of autonomy a universal
component of human good or to accept the complete contingency of liberal communities.
There is no argument for integrating non-autonomous groups in a liberal culture if they can
do better. It could be argued that these will eventually disappear but where asks Gray is
the empirical evidence. (The argument I develop later is not an issue of disappearance
but of their being affected by the contextual conditions they share with other groups. This
may force upon them the need to address, in their own terms, the issue of greater personal
autonomy). However it would still not settle the issue as to whether autonomy is best for
human well-being in the context of largely liberal cultures. If Raz holds functional or
contextual views on the value of autonomy there is no reason to favour liberal institutions
or promote autonomy even in a liberal culture when human well-being is not thereby
advanced.

Raz accepts autonomy is but one valuable life style and those who fail to embrace it
are none the worse for it. If one lives in an autonomous supporting context, since one's
prosperity and well-being will depend upon it, one must choose to live autonomously.
Ultimately it is the preponderance of different kinds of opportunities which distinguish the two societies - supportive and non-supportive of autonomy. Belief in its value does not mean that we would want, even if we were able, to extend it to all our personal choices. This issue of culture poses the question of competing notions of a valuable way of life in relation to that of loyalty upon which the continuity of a community and culture depend. Two cases, one fictional the other based upon a survey illustrate the dilemma posed for the individual when values from an autonomy-supporting culture invade those of a non-supporting culture. In the novel No Longer At Ease the Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe poses the issue between traditional and modernising values. The book's main character an Ibo supported financially by his tribe successfully completes a law degree at a British university. Upon his return to Nigeria he joins the civil service and comes under pressure from his fellow tribesmen to acknowledge the communal support by granting them favours. He resists initially, eventually succumbs and is tried on charges of corruption. In the other case, a survey conducted among Ghanaian civil servants asked, if when dealing with the public their cousin joined the queue would they deal with him first or with the next person. The overwhelming response was the latter. In response to a second question what would their cousin expect the answer was overwhelmingly the reverse. The last case illustrates that for the Ghanaian civil servants the procedural model is the right one. As officers of the state they are behaving neutrally with regard to community groups without promoting one particular way of life. In both cases the issue is the relationship between those cultures aspiring to modernize and the enabling and constraining values which inform relationships in their culture. These values including increased autonomy become significant as industrializing countries move through import substitution to copyist manufacturing into industrial and commercial entrepreneurship and innovation. The last is the stage which calls for a greater individual contribution. Is autonomy an ideal which will tend, with the global impact of technological change, to become a universal human good? As an ideal Raz believes autonomy is particularly suited to our rapidly changing industrial world of increasing technological innovation and the mobility of capital and cultures. The need is for 'an ability to acquire new skills, to move from one sub-culture to another, to come to terms with new scientific and moral views' (MF 370)
The significant question for the individual lies in the effect of the oppositional interplay between such factors as globalization and personal identity. The effect of the former is twofold: the growth in symbolic and expert systems, including managerial systems and at the personal level a disembodying of social relationships. The impact bears upon our ontological security, our sense of order and continuity of events within our cognitive and perceptual environment in relation to the self as a reflexive project. The theoretical issue posed for those who like Raz ground the self and its autonomy is readily apparent but less obvious is the empirical question on the possible increasing universality of the ideal of autonomy.

According to David Wong (Wong 1984) a significant weakness in mainstream moral philosophy is its ignorance of Eastern cultures. If, as he argues there is 'no single true morality' then we need to consider how far the concept and ideal of autonomy, with its grounding in mainstream thought is peculiar to the West. As an ideal autonomy emerged as part of Renaissance humanism, with its focus upon the individual, and found a definitive expression in Kant's moral philosophy, shaped by the admixture of rationalist thought and Romantic expressivism. It is now, as we saw in discussing Taylor, a key value in our modern society. However as Yukawa Hideki, a former Columbia university physics professor and one of the relatively few of Japanese origin to gain a Nobel laureate has written:

The Western mode of thought is characterized by confrontation with external circumstance and by man being armed against them. This isolation of the individual is the very origin of European individualism (Moore 1967: 59).

Hidei goes on to quote Dr D T Suzuki's distinction between East and West ways of thinking, with the latter as dualist, distinguishing 'subject and object, self and not-self, yes and no, good and evil, right and wrong, true and false' (ibid). The Eastern mode is described as advaltist, that is non-dualistic: its origin is in the word advaya non-duality, the rejection of opposites and contradictory viewpoints. One should take care not to draw stark stereotypes especially in our contemporary globalizing society of increasing trans-culturation. In the case of Japan many major Western companies sought to transfer such practices of corporate management as quality circles, in the belief that a major factor in
Japan's outstanding economic and industrial growth since World War II, lay in the nature of its culture with its emphasis upon small group participation and consensus.  

Significant among Japanese social values is a sense of duty and obligation which are both strongly internalized and externally re-inforced through social control. The focus in Japanese society tends to be upon the legitimization of authority rather than upon issues about autonomy.

The Japanese sense of self is directed towards immediate social purposes, not towards separating out and keeping the self distinct, somehow truly individual, as remains a Western ideal (Marsalla et al 1985: 179).

This supports a view of Japanese morality as virtue-centred grounded in a more structured society, with notions of the common good in which the 'frame' of the individual, rather than its attribute, become the individual's distinctive social characteristic. This is the morality, with its antecedents for Japan in Chinese Confucianism, which David Wong believes was characteristic of Ancient Greece: a morality which stands in contrast to that of the West with its centre in individual rights. Much was made by companies and their managers, academics and management 'gurus' in the 1980's of Japanese group cohesiveness and its value in encouraging small group participation. What tended to be ignored was that its structured society, with a Confucian belief in hierarchy, brought with it strong authoritarianism.

Clearly a belief in the ideal of personal autonomy, as set out in my Chapter 1 checklist, needs to take account of the foregoing as a restriction on its universalism. While acknowledging its current status the globalization of management practices is unlikely to see autonomy being adopted in its western form. Attempts to transfer practices from one country to another shows signs of convergency where technology and organizational structure are closely inter-related. Where practices are strongly influenced by social and cultural values there tends to be divergency.

It has been claimed that the emphasis upon individual values rather than upon those of the group tend to be associated with the wealthier countries, ie West European and North American. If this is so then as the per capita income of the Eastern countries grows then
the result of any attempts to transfer practices relating to people, including the idea of autonomy, is likely to result in a new, melded form. In the case of autonomy this does not take account of the efforts of those countries influenced by a strong fundamentalism, whether religious or political, to suppress efforts to assert individual rights. The citizens of such countries face accepting these conditions as contingent facts in trying to make sense of their lives.

In spite of the foregoing I share with Raz the belief that the autonomous life is better than the non-autonomous life. I accept the latter as a contingent feature and one which the individual will address in his own particular way. At the same time lives in non-supporting cultures will not be improved by having autonomy thrust upon them. However it may not be a matter of thrust but of gradual assimilation into many cultures of notions focused upon the individual as the result of globalizing efforts to spread consumerist values. Raz's point that in Western autonomous-supporting democracies the individual has no choice but to be autonomous has become more compelling with the widespread disembodiment of individuals in terms both of their social and work lives (MF 391). As will be argued in Part II this has pushed autonomy to the top of the individual's agenda as a result of institutional and contextual change. The issue this poses remains one of the individual's right and quest for autonomy in its relation to the social and political corpus.

As for those non-autonomous supporting societies the spread of capitalist and entrepreneurial endeavours combined with greater consumer choice and power will make more urgent the issue of reconciling traditional social forms and values with individual aspirations for personal well-being. The issue is not one of a cultural transfer of the values associated with autonomous-supporting societies but the assimilation into existing social forms of values whose impetus comes from the technology and the accompanying institutional and organizational structures of autonomy supporting cultures.

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The value of Raz to this thesis lies in his efforts: firstly, to combine core liberal beliefs with communitarianism as the basis for developing a notion of autonomy as positive freedom and secondly, to develop a more definitive concept of personal autonomy. As I
tried to show in Chapters 3 and 4, what is significant for the self's portfolio is not the attachments and goals to which we are related but how we are related. The individual as a multi-agent tries to balance, to make sense of shifting situational/role relationships in many contexts and 'communities'. This calls for a personal strategy in which there is a reflective and realistic assessment of the nature, degree of commitment and the contribution of individual components to the total portfolio. Its ultimate criterion is the individual's well-being, i.e. what constitutes for him personal autonomy. What saves our assessment from mere instrumentality is the ethically based sensibility which informs our portfolio. Raz captures this in his efforts to retain the right of autonomy for a self whose values and actions are grounded in, and take cognizance of moral and social forms. Here in regard to the nestedness, incommensurability and objectivity of values Raz's thesis is at its weakest. While these ideas are informed by a measure of sensibility their lack is one of cognitive control. In addition the vague grounding of these forms in society fails to capture the particularity of these for the individual's autonomy. However he offers a much richer sense of the self, than either the liberals or communitarians. This is a self whose positive freedom is represented by a creative quest for autonomy. This provides a useful point from which to set out in the next chapter my own conception of autonomy as personal autonomy.
CHAPTER SIX  HOW ONE BECOMES WHAT ONE IS  

This, the final chapter of Part I, draws upon the themes and issues explored above to present a model of personal autonomy which fills out the checklist given in the first chapter.

1 Introduction: The Dialectic

Keating's call 'be your own person', poses the basic issue of this thesis, what does self-rule mean for the individual, socially grounded in a specific time and place, in its efforts to cope with its own particularities and those of its contingent world. The checklist in Chapter 1 provides a working definition of autonomy which (i) finds the Kantian-Rawlesian notion of moral autonomy an element necessary to a conception of personal autonomy but, with its rejection as heteronomous of a socially grounded, sentient and contingent self, it is insufficient; (ii) provides the basis for assessing the contribution to a conception of personal autonomy by three of its major groups of critics, the so-called communitarians and feminist philosophers and the sensible cognitivists. The conflict in the film, Dead Poets Society, is essentially one between the ideal of a dutiful self of instrumental reasoning and a self which, in seeking its own self-governance, is constituted in part by its attachments and desires. The latter conceives of its autonomy not in Kantian terms as a universalizable rational morality but largely as a act of personal creation. The model of the self's portfolio I am proposing is a dynamic and developmental model. The portfolio contains a range of resources: situations, roles with their expectations, relationships, projects past and present and so on but above all they include patterns of action. These are resources both drawn from and informed by the personal narrative, a narrative that captures the dynamic of the resources and of what happens next. It is these resources which makes the self's portfolio dynamic. Informing the content of the portfolio, and its setting, is the self's sensibility - the way it thinks about situations. This is not the instrumental setting of issues, not the static Rawlsian
model of the life plan set by the there and then. It is a portfolio which involves the self in its activities and their setting in the dynamic here and now. My model rejects the deontological notion of the self replacing the idea of duty with an individual responsibility informed by its judgment. However I need to retain from Kant and Rawls the principle of detachment since the self's capacity to detach itself from, and reflect upon its actual situations, interests and desires enables it to control those desires which threaten its autonomy. The principle I have in mind is not some kind of Kantian or Rawlsian Archimedean point from which I might assess the portfolio's contents. This point for reflexion, is undetachable from the other elements in the portfolio and one that involves my own particular narrative. The idea of personal autonomy embraces the self's attachments and desires but makes a claim for a notion of objectivity which is separable from Kantian universality.

The move, by the three communitarian critics of Kant and Rawls, Sandel, MacIntyre and Taylor towards the idea of the individual's particularity results in a socially grounded self in opposition to the former's radically detached, disembodied, self. For my concept of personal autonomy I wish to avoid the two radical extremes of disembodiment and situatedness while retaining both the principle of detachment and the idea of particularity. Each of the latter three writers, in addition to their input into the above dialectic, contributes towards a conception of personal autonomy: (i) Sandel offers a self constituted by its communal attachments with a telos achieved in the course of experience; (ii) MacIntyre's unity of the narrative self endorses the idea of a quest for a telos and facilitates an internal perspectival view of our moral judgements; (iii) Taylor adheres to the idea of the self's narrative, grounds the individual perspective in commonly held moral intuitions and in the particularity of the individual's efforts to live its own life. All three share problems in giving a satisfactory definition of community which acknowledges the essentially pluralistic and dynamically changing nature of the self's relationships, and which gives an adequate account of the role of the self's sentiments. In addition, any claim for the objectivity of community values by Sandel and MacIntyre would appear to amount to little more than social consensus. Taylor manages to 'trump' his notion of the particularity of the individual and its values with a retreat into
a theistic transcendentalism. To avoid the extremes of situatedness or disembodiment I propose a model of the self's portfolio the criterion for which lies in the perspective which informs the self's relationships with the portfolio's contents. What is situated is the way of thinking, the judgment I bring to the portfolio.

This is a perspective grounded in the self's particularities: its self narrative, which takes account of the individual's situatedness and history, its desires and moral values, and its contingencies. This is not the Kantian-Rawlsian transcendental, deontological self of instrumental reasoning nor the teleological version found in MacIntyre's reworking of Aristotelian notions of function and role fulfilment and implicit in Taylor's idea of autonomy as a hypergood. With autonomy sought in the individual's embeddedness what matters is that its very method of selection is situated.

Raz seeks to find the objectivity, lacking in the above three communitarians, in social and cultural forms. In so doing Raz fails to provide for the self an adequate cognitive basis for its values and sentiments. His thoughts on social forms and ends are not clearly worked out. In allying autonomy with its social grounding he does not really say why values can be incommensurable. Among the feminist philosophers Baier, in her re-working of Hume, offers a basis for the objectivity of our sentiments through a shared and sympathetic communication. This enables us to enlarge our reason and understanding of one another. She and her feminist colleagues make a valuable contribution to the particularity of individual moral choice through the use of literary allusion and in Nussbaum's case with the idea of the 'messiness' of life. The nature of messiness is that it cannot be captured by the order of a universal principle and it is also not codifiable. Baier's basis for an objectivity of the sentiments, for an enlarged and cultivated faculty capable of commanding universal consent, requires more than mere moral consensus. She does not go far enough. It is left to the sensible cognivists, Wiggins and Luntley who, in accepting the situated self of sensible reasoning, require for the objectivity of its sentiments the criteria of plain truth. These enable our reason to converge with the way things are. This constitutes for Wiggins a cynosure since our beliefs and judgments will inevitably fall short of the test of plain truth. In this he reflects the messiness of life and directs us to literature if we wish to understand its 'arbitrary, contingent, unreasoned,
objectively non-defensible nature'. Luntley seeks an objective disciplining of our sentiments in an analogy between these and the relation of objects to perceptual demonstratives. With the inescapability of our thoughts the self-narrative enables us to reflect upon and detach ourselves from our experience of those objects, including the sentiments in which we are embedded. If we share views about a moral situation it is because we have struck upon the truth not because of our shared feelings. As with the colour of objects so with the sentiments. Only those individuals with the relevant, developed faculties will be capable of perceiving colours or the nature of sentiments. In making our judgments on whether our own, or another's life is well-lived our concern should not be with the description of the life but with the characteristics of a competent moral critic. Crucial to this is a developed cognitive sensibility, an understanding of the existential particularity of one's sentiments. And, what constitutes appropriateness of their use in action and in our relations with others. It is this understanding which gives the meaning of authenticity to the individual's character.

Despite Raz’s failure to provide an adequate cognitive basis for the self's values and sentiments he does offer a substantial conception of personal autonomy. Equated with positive freedom, autonomy represents the extent to which one has control over one's life. Its central concern is with the individual's personal well-being, that is how far it is successful in achieving its goals. Raz shares the liberal belief in the centrality of autonomy but rejects their views on the community. Raz offers a much thicker theory of the self than either the liberals or Sandel. The key to its autonomy is its nestedness in the plurality and incommensurability of values rooted in social and cultural forms. These contribute to the identity of the self offering it new possibilities for autonomy as an essentially creative process.

A number of issues arising from Raz relating to the political and cultural conditions of autonomy are of particular relevance to the second part of this thesis: (i) Raz’s argument for a non-neutral role for the state in promoting conditions favourable to autonomy poses the issue as to whether such a role extends to a safeguarding of these conditions in particular types of institutions and organizations; (ii) Raz neglects the role of accountability in the relationship of political and institutional authority to autonomy.
This issue becomes particularly significant when, in Part II, we examine different types of organizations; (iii) his distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous supporting cultures raises both the question of the relation of autonomy to culture and to contemporary change.

Personal autonomy is a continuous creative quest of a self constituted by its situation and its sentiments which, in coping with its contingencies, aims to relate these to the way things are. This situated self of cognitive sensibility is in contrast to the transcendental self whose autonomy is grounded in a universal and rational morality. The prime concern of the former self, in seeking its autonomy, is with a relation sui generis, i.e. of the particularity of a self and its contingencies. Personal autonomy represents an ideal and to its relative nature we now turn.

2 Locating Personal Autonomy

Etymologically autonomy signifies self-rule, ontologically it represents the term for positive freedom. Absolute personal autonomy is impossible since it can only be achieved within a framework of social and biological constraints. Values informing the self and its governance must in some measure be heteronomous. The individual's particular location between notional extremes of absolute autonomy and absolute heteronomy, encompassing the various aspects of the individual's life, provides some overall rough measure of autonomy. Within this different values and actions may enjoy varying degrees of autonomy. While the individual may be prepared to accept in some parts of its life the will of others it is in regard to its comprehensive, deeply felt goals that it demonstrates its autonomy. Beyond the absolutely heteronomous are those whose behaviour is based on whim or impulse, the anomic: beyond the extreme of absolute autonomy are those whose actions take no account of others. These are the wantons with values essentially ego-centred, narcissistic whose actions are governed by a form of asocial 'authenticity', a kind of Luciferian pride. Autonomy assumes autarchy, self-sufficiency, and personal autonomy, assumes a moral autonomy. Autarchy is a condition of human normality, both in a statistical sense and as a criterion of what it
means to be human. Defined negatively autarchic individuals are free of impulsons, compulsive neuroses and psychic discontinuity. Positively defined they are free decision making agents possessed of a sense of self-direction and of cognitive and practical rationality. Autonomy goes beyond autarchy to encompass an aim of excellence of character constituting an ideal not a normal condition. Its focus is upon the process and modes of consciousness. The pursuit of autonomy enables us to enlarge and enrich our consciousness and to rule our lives with a rationality. This is a rationality which extends beyond the merely instrumental to embrace the cognitively controlled sentiments. The concept of personal autonomy rejects an elitist egoism which discounts communal values and instead pursues its autonomy through a critical relationship with its society and culture. It is this critical view which it brings to its contingencies, aims and relationships, identity and values, its temporality and historicity. This enables it to understand the existential nature of its lives as part of an the ever-continuing process of creating an authentic self.

This is an autonomy which extends beyond Kantian moral autonomy, in which the individual through common rational procedures discorns and acts in accord with a common, universal and moral law. It is a quest for a personal autonomy whose process is informed by a moral sensibility subject to the marks of truth. Unlike Kant it does not reject as heteronomous the self's values and embeddedness. It stands in contrast to the extreme Sartrean existentialist view of a self whose claim to authenticity lies in the individual's total sovereignty over the choice of its moral values. It excludes the apparent autonomy of the genius, the individual of outstanding creative ability who faces the dialectic of aloofness or association, those who like Jung have little power over their lives, not free but 'captive and driven by its daimon'. The poet Kathleen Raine re-echoed Keating when she said: "You wouldn't learn much by doing everything right...and keeping all the rules and never putting a foot wrong". She recognized her dilemma when she continued: "I was so driven by my own daimon that I failed to give my love to whom it should have been given ". My autonomy is more than mere control of one's life. A more general capacity to be self-determining it requires for the self a perspective whose understanding of its sentiments represents the way the world is. My autonomy is not
found here or there but where I locate it. It is not a static concept, there is no telos: only
the endless quest for the governance of an irreducible self. Its task is not to work out
some kind of Aristotelian naturalism or a Kantian categorical imperative. It is dynamic
and its imperatives are always capable of change and negotiation. Embodied in my here
and now is a history of contingency. In this my family played the role of a special kind of
interlocutor and in doing so framed my sensibility. While my interlocutors tend to be my
family its constitution is itself a contingency. The point about contingency is its
inescapability and if we accept Nietzsche it is not problematical but harmless. If we are
not prepared to go as far as Nietzsche it is at least challenging but inescapable, the
conflicts and incommensurabilities it brings fire our creativity.

3 What Personal Autonomy Gives the Self

When Keating calls upon the boys 'to be you own person' is he posing the same puzzle
as Nietzsche's sub-title to Ecce Homo? Is how one becomes what one is about creating
or discovering a self? What I have tried to establish in the foregoing chapters is that if
Keating is talking about personal autonomy he would conclude with Nietzsche that, being
and becoming are unrelated, self-knowledge is not an end product of discovery but
inheres in the process of self-creation. Nietzsche is not looking for a transcendental self
but recognizes the self for what it is - contingently dynamic. The conception of personal
autonomy, set out in Chapter 1, envisages it as essentially a creative process embodying
elements both of discovery and of judgment. It embraces a self socially grounded yet
capable of a detached and perspectival reflection on how it is grounded. My concern is
to take account, but avoid the extremes, of situatedness and detachment to propose an
autonomy whose decision on its location is mine alone. In so far as this location is
within a moral framework, governed by certain moral intuitions and values grounded in
our social and cultural forms, the self to that extent is discoverable. This may amount to
no more than the unpacking of my socio-psychological baggage, nevertheless this is an
act of discovery given by my history and my goals. The result is to reveal my biological
and social origins through which my contingent self addresses a contingent world through
the dynamics of conversation and my relations with other interlocutors. What follows
from my conception of personal autonomy is:
(i) The ability to reason beyond mere instrumentality, beyond an economic, market nexus, to encompass an evaluatory understanding of the sentiments grounded in notions of truth and objectivity.

(ii) The rejection of universalist ideas of voluntarist coherent life plans, but a recognition of the practical value of coherence in the notion of the self-narrative of a phenomenological and contingent self. Its quest is not for a categorical imperative or a telos - an end goal - but its personal autonomy. This is a quest in which its portfolio represents contingent and interlocutory self in action.

The portfolio brings together our goals, attachments and interests of varying strengths and temporality important among which are our comprehensive goals and relationships. Governing the way we relate to the contents of our portfolio are our moral values, reasoned sentiments and critical judgment. Personal autonomy recognizes the incommensurability inherent in a plurality of values and any effort at their reconciliation is achieved when the individual's action, in relation to the particularity of its perspective and contingencies, bears the marks of plain truth and appropriateness. Hence the moral judgments are perspectivally nested, like all the decisions I make throughout my life, in a self narrative. As we saw above, given our history we need a notion of discovery since there must be some pattern to the options we have faced. This pattern grows out of something that we have done before. While we may discover our history we need a concept of generality for ourselves but one which is not generalizable to the lives of others. It is the notion of sui generis which enables us to view our life in terms of the particularity of our values and actions and their appropriateness in action. While we discover aspects of ourselves we also contribute to its creation of a self through our ongoing narrative. This is embodied in the self's portfolio in which there is no end target of discovery but only a dynamic and never completed quest of a self always becoming. This involves the self in the iterative and inter-related processes of discovery, judgment and creation. Since we cannot know ourselves definitively our narrative engenders a sense of consistency and coherence in our self image and in how we relate to others and deal with our contingencies. It enables us to discern and establish those moral values. These inform our 'true' beliefs by which we as moral agents act in order to live our own
authentic truth. Act from our true beliefs involves personal character, a sense of excellence and competence in 'practice'. These are demonstrated in the handling of our portfolio and its results in terms of our personal well-being. Since personal autonomy is always sought within a social context it is never absolute. Our sense of self is discoverable only in part. The significant part is that which we create as we strive to realize the potential of our unique and always elusive personhood of whose limits we are never certain.

The concept of personal autonomy gives:

(1) The possibility of a personal development aiming for the expansion of one's consciousness, a deepening of one's sensibilities and an enrichment of the lessons drawn from one's experience. From this dynamic process new goals arise. It is my reasoned sensibility which provides the unity which informs my personal narrative and the setting of new goals and commitments.

(2) Excellence in pursuit of projects and attachments which involve certain personal characteristics, e.g. moral courage. This is the courage to strive for authenticity, to understand the nature of our sensibilities and how these relate to our thinking and actions in relation to others and our contingencies. This involves persisting with our intellectual and moral doggedness when in the light of our sensible reasoning we judge it appropriate.

(3) The possibility of assessing our personal well-being; how good or successful we judge our life to be, how far we have achieved goals and completed our projects. These goals and projects are socially defined and include what constitutes a morally good person. They are hierarchically nested and are reflected in our moral sensibilities and reasoning. It is personal autonomy which enables us to navigate our lives enabling us to understand the nature of the distance travelled, our present position and its future prospect.

(4) The recognition of a contingent dynamic self, unconcerned with transcendence, expresses a unity in its actions.
(5) The facility to use our personal power, critical in the handling of contingency, to formulate and implement our aims, exploit opportunities and cope with threats to these and to our sense of personal autonomy.

(6) The opportunity to exercise choice and autonomy in which there is available to the individual a plurality of options. This involves our acknowledging and supporting the non-neutral role of government to increase those options which enjoy a substantial degree of social consensus.

(7) To the individual the concept of personal autonomy provides the potential to cope with current change which, accompanied by a major disembedding process, threatens the individual's sense of ontological security. The alternative to the passive acceptance of the heteronomous values, insinuated into our consciousness by a society increasingly dominated by the instrumentality of the market, is to accept the challenge of autonomy.

As we saw above for Nietzsche the 'becoming does not aim at a final state': being and becoming are unrelated. He saw self-knowledge not as process of discovery but as one of self-creation in which the 'coming to know oneself, confronting one's contingencies, tracking one's causes home, is identical with the process of inventing a new language. Nietzsche thought of this process as analogous to thinking up some new metaphors' (Rorty 1989: 27). These are the metaphors of a self whose unity is organizational - a self understood in terms of its narrative unity.

The metaphor which most aptly reflects my conception of personal autonomy is that of the self's portfolio, the essential me in action at this time and in this place. 4 Governed, only in part, by the economic rationality of an investment portfolio, its contents like those of an ethical investment portfolio are informed by a moral perspective. More than that its creative element is analogous to the architect's portfolio. It represents the self as agent. Never definitive, always in process with some items moving in and others out, new one's coming in terms of their imminent and immanent significance and their fit with my self of sensible reasoning. Nothing is discarded, for it is always there in some kind of lumber room of the self with its traces left in its narrative. The situational portfolio is me, identifying myself with my actions: what I am, what I do,
what I become. It is not a Rawlsian step-by-step plan, or an orderly narrative for a 'foreseeable future'. It is me in my practice, my activity. What I do, reflectively, in the world, but also me, the irreducible individual.

My self narrative provides the developmental story of my portfolio, where it is coming from, how I set up its goals. What matters are not the goals but the process which, reflecting the unity of my sensibilities, tells me how I got there not the arrival and the role of my creativity in the setting of my compass. Important in the model of the portfolio is the quality of its development. As with the unfolding of the architect's talent, so with my own development, there comes new personal goals. Providing the portfolio's unity is the flourishing of my sensibility. This is a sensibility grounded in shared practices and tradition, informed by a self-narrative, enabling the architect, and me, to express our unique creativity, our irreducible individuality, our personal autonomy in relation to how things are. The portfolio, informed by and intimately related to our narrative, contributes a unity to our actions and to the self. We are what we do, we become what we are.

To become what one is... is not to reach a specific new state and to stop becoming it is not to reach a state at all. It is to identify oneself with all one's actions, to see that everything that one does (what one becomes) is what one is. In the ideal case it is also to fit all this into a coherent whole and to want to be everything that one is: it is to give style to one's character, to be, we might say, becoming (Nehamas 1985: 91).

With the above conception or personal autonomy I turn in Part II to an exploration of the meaning of the particularity of autonomy for the contemporary individual. As Heraclitus recognized some two and a half millennia ago change is ever-present. What may be its distinguishing feature over the past few decades is its discontinuous and exponential nature. Change, and contingency, will not go away, we cannot escape it, we should accept it and exploit it. As I will argue in Part II it is personal autonomy which provides our best hope for coping with the contingency of an uncertain future.
THE PARTICULARITY OF AUTONOMY

PART II MANAGING CONTINGENCY
PART II MANAGING CONTINGENCY

In the first part of my thesis I concluded that the only hope for personal autonomy in the contemporary world is to face up to contingency, to accept and to exploit it. Such an acknowledgment of contingency must be compatible with the realism of moral values so that in our actions we can be said to have got it right, that is we acted appropriately. My aim in this, the second part of the thesis is to explore the meaning of the particularity of autonomy for the individual embedded in a contingent world of change. Both chapters have a limited theoretical scope. My object is not to provide a grand architectonic of theories relating to complex organizations in Chapter 7 or of societal change in Chapter 8. Although both chapters capture some of my long term concerns over both sets of theories I do not intend engaging in a substantive discussion but rather to use them as theoretical windows. The conceptual distinctions in Part I will enable me to distinguish different types of organizations and to bring in some philosophical foundations in order to get a clearer view of the options open to the individual embedded both in the contemporary organization and in society at large.

Chapter 7 Autonomy and the Organizations We Inhabit. This deals specifically with the nature of the individual's embeddedness in the organization.

Chapter 8 Situating Personal Autonomy. This, the concluding, chapter of the thesis explores the impact of contemporary change on, and the meaning of, autonomy for the self of cognitive sensibility.
CHAPTER SEVEN  AUTONOMY AND THE ORGANIZATIONS WE INHABIT

What does it mean for the contemporary self embedded in a plurality of dynamically changing social structures to be autonomous? The final chapter of Part I provides a conception of personal autonomy in which the individual self is construed as a situated self of sensible reasoning. In this chapter we explore the nature of the self's situatedness in a world of changing organizations. A crucial attribute of personal autonomy lies in the self's capacity to deal with contingencies, that is its potential to cope with those changes which it confronts as a self of practical reasoning. The key problem which links Parts I and II lies in the need for the autonomous self to retain its sense of irreducible individuality without its being swamped by the flood of changes in, and to its embeddedness. The key concept in this process is power.

The model of power proposed below maintains the focus in Part I upon the particularity of the individual, its values and circumstances. Our concern with the particularity of power is its function, as the key momentum of praxis where the determinate nature of structure intersects with the indeterminacy arising from action. My intention is not a substantive discussion of theories of power. However we should note that a number of theorists, in their efforts to apply Foucaultian notions of power to organizations, appear to lend support to MacIntyre's view of their totalizing and manipulative nature, eg Burrell in acknowledging that while 'we may not live in totalizing institutions, the institutional organization of our lives is total'. Unlike MacIntyre, for Foucault manipulation is not a one-way process but one in which the manipulated appear to collude in their own manipulation.

The chapter has four sections.

1 A critique of MacIntyre, his attack on modern managerialism provides a useful starting point since it contains valuable insights into the nature of managerial
1 Modern Managerialism: Moral Myth?

In *After Virtue* MacIntyre identifies the manager as a significant character in contemporary society. His view of modern managerialism constitutes a critique upon the way in which power is used by managers. MacIntyre characterizes the manager, together with the therapist and the rich aesthete, as a *significant* contemporary character.² His critique of managerialism is fourfold:

(i) As emotivist, the manager is basically a manipulator concerned solely with getting his/her way over means in which the ends are taken as givens.

(ii) Characterized by bureaucratic individualism, the Weberian bureaucracy provides the ideal organizational home for the emotivist manager.

(iii) Management claims to a legitimacy for its authority are based upon supposedly neutral facts and 'lawlike' generalizations where none exist.

(iv) Managerialism is ideological, for it involves ideas and values which serve to guide and direct social and political ends, presenting political decisions and actions under the guise of common interest.

In the fifteen years since *After Virtue* first appeared the impact of contextual changes upon organizations and their management and upon the lives of their members is all too apparent. A major feature which justifies MacIntyre's designation of managers as *significant* is the widespread growth of managerialism. This is evident in what were once regarded as public sector organizations through, for example, deregulation, the contracting out of
public services and the privatization of nationalized industries and utilities. Over almost
two decades the UK and other governments have actively pursued a strategy, aided by the
widespread use of managerial and financial consultants, aimed at introducing the methods
associated with profit making organizations into the public sector. At the same time the
restructuring of industrial and commercial companies in response to competitive and
technological pressures has significantly affected the levels and the nature of employment.
In both private and public sectors this has led to an overwhelming emphasis upon measures
of efficiency and in the case of the latter at the expense of efforts to establish their
effectiveness in achieving broader social and political ends. Despite the substantial
changes which private and public sector organizations have undergone the continuities
remain as important as the discontinuities. This leads to a somewhat paradoxical view of
MacIntyre. Theory and empirical evidence add support to MacIntyre's view of
organizations, many continue to be characterized by bureaucratic individualism. The
evidence also exposes his rather simplistic view of organizations. He appears to view the
typical organization as a bureaucracy and in somewhat static terms - as a kind of Weberian
ideal. The dialogue between the mechanistic nature of bureaucracy, particularly its
limited ability to respond to contingency, and the organismic (also called the organic),
more flexible and adaptive forms of organization was well established when MacIntyre
was writing After Virtue. The dialogue continues. Along with new forms of
organizational structures the bureaucratic retains its firm hold in both the public and private
sectors. The characteristics of Weberian-Taylorian bureaucracy are: efficiency,
calculability, predictability, and control embraced as organizational virtues, for example,
by the fast food restaurants. The spread of these to other areas of human activity has led
George Ritzer to offer the Macdonaldization of society as a portent of our future. My
own conclusion on the machine-like efficiency of Disneyland is that it represents the
ultimate in role bureaucracy, not only in the wearing of uniforms and costumes but in the
hiding of the individual's particularity behind the mask of Donald Duck or Goofy. Bureaucratic homogeneity with its strongly deterministic values and rules facilitates the
management of contingency as long as the latter can be accepted as relatively stable.
MacIntyre's view of management as characterized by bureaucratic individualism leads him to neglect the diverse range of activities grouped under the task of management and the wide variety of profit and non-profit organizations in which it is practised. Since MacIntyre wrote *After Virtue* the limitations of bureaucracy have been widely recognized. There is also a general recognition among theorists and practitioners that organizational survival depends much less upon bureaucratic systems and much more upon the individual contribution. His other three criticisms, the emotive manager, neutral facts and ideology appear to be on firmer ground. It is difficult to refute the emotive nature of much of managerial power with the roots of market capitalism in possessive individualism and its governance by means-ends relationships in which the ends are taken as givens. MacIntyre's scepticism over managerial legitimacy, with its claim of access to neutral facts and lawlike generalizations, finds support among theorists as well as in my own defence of the particularity of the agent.

The autonomous are likely to resist their treatment as heterogeneous units subject to lawlike generalization. However, this does not, in my view, invalidate efforts to construct a more objective approach to both the theory and practice of management in general and organizational behaviour in particular. Over the past half century much theorizing has gone into attempting to resolve what appears to some theorists as the fundamental incommensurability that exists between the 'brain' and the 'heart' of the organization. Strongly influenced by American behavioural scientists and organizational consultants techniques have been developed and promoted world-wide whose cultural relevance is highly doubtful and whose shelf life is short. In its simplest terms their ostensible aim, in the case of profit-making organizations, is to harness the energy and commitment of the sentient individual to the corporate bottom line objective of return on capital employed. It is obviously much more difficult in the case of the non-profit and voluntary organizations to generalize. However the increased emphasis in non-commercial bodies upon measurement, the emergence of the ideology of the 'enterprise' culture and their employment of private sector managers has led to the use of private sector methods -such methods as the use of sales quotas to motivate volunteers in charity shops and the increased frequency and changed nature of the direct mail shots from the
charities. MacIntyre's attack upon contemporary management as ideological has been reinforced by; the collapse, with the end of the cold war, of a countervailing 'ideology' to market capitalism; the advent of governments committed to a market nexus and to supply side economics; a revival in the belief of management's 'right to manage' aided by the decline in trade union membership and the influence and the adoption by former public sector bodies of an efficiency based managerialism. *After Virtue* was published in 1981 a year which might be regarded as a turning point since most of the above changes had already begun to manifest themselves. While the weaknesses of his analysis are significant, his fourfold attack on management illuminates our understanding of those aspects of the modern organization hostile to individual autonomy. An account of both his strengths and weaknesses provide a necessary background to the examination of the nature of current organizations.

His view firstly of organizations as predominantly Weberian-type bureaucracies, was already in 1981, as we have seen, problematical, and secondly his concept of the manager's role reductionist. The former overlooked the diverse nature of organizations. As for the latter, his concept of the manager did not for example embrace the entrepreneur and the innovator both of whom have a talent for a perverse unwillingness to accept the givens of situations. Thirdly, MacIntyre appears to be unaware that power is a necessary fact of life in all organizations - the equivalent in social systems of force in physical ones. It is difficult to envisage a power system in which there are not elements of manipulation. Since the common link between the organization and its management is power, I tackle this issue next. If we are to understand the particularity of autonomy we require a model of power which focuses upon its use in action within a social context. This is the point where, at different levels of the organization, action and structure intersect.

2 The Particularity of Organizational Power.

The concept of power in which I am interested is the individual's, and the group's, capacity to handle their world. This focuses upon the particularity of the agent in its confrontation with its contingencies. Power enables us to manage the contradictions inherent in human action when the determinacy of the agent's symbolic-normative order
meets the indeterminacies of its situation. Part of this indeterminacy arises from the fact that the symbolic-normative order disregards aspects of contingency. Fundamental to this concept is the relationship on the one hand, between consciousness and symbolic mediation, and on the other, the oscillation created between the opposing need for such objectivated forms as identity and social predictability, and the distanciation from their determinacy. We demonstrate the latter for example in distinguishing the 'I' from its social identity. For the individual this involves such aspects of self-determination as identity and autonomy in their relation with its social context. In discussing Taylor, we saw that the process of our development is through our induction into the linguistic and moral framework of an essentially interlocutory world. The process is not a passive one. Through experience and reflection individuals develop their own systems of symbolic meaning based upon their acceptance or rejection of aspects of their culture. When the individual's inner world, derived from its assimilation and elaboration of contextual symbolic resources, encounters the material and social world the possibility of a significant gap arises. The extent of the individual's power will be reflected in its capacity to maintain its particularity in the face of social role pressure. We need flexibility to avoid either over-dependence upon the determinacy of objectivated forms, e.g. the antecedently individuated self, or the risk of disappearance into the indeterminate world of the radically situated self.

When this subjective power can also be externally attributed it represents the social system in action, i.e. the agents external relations with the organization structure and resources. In order to function the organization must be able to predict members' behaviour and this requires determinate systems of symbolic mediation. In this the organization's executive performs a primary role in consciously, or unconsciously fostering and relating the organizational norms to the external world of other agents.\[13\] The executive often acts, not as the guarantor but as transgressor of organizational normative forms.\[14\] This action is aimed at preventing the reification of those symbolic-normative forms which might constrain the capacity of the organization to respond to contingency. Executive power is usually attributed to an individual, the chief executive, the organizational leader and while he/she affirms values and norms for members within
the organization the leader's own survival depends upon their modifying or infringing them. Hence the executive role is inherently duplicitous. Corporate over-dependence upon prevailing values inhibits the capacity to deal decisively and creatively with the unpredictability of events. The chief executive's apparent reassurance, despite a belief in the need for change and his/her inner doubts, gives to others certainties and ensures a measure of organizational continuity. The flip side of this behaviour is the threat of arbitrary domination and an absolutization of the leader's legitimacy. The results are that indeterminacy for the organization's members is increased and legitimacy is undermined. Attribution of power is objective in the need for the reduction of complexity necessary for social order: it is subjective in that the responsibility is placed upon an individual. The leader becomes for the organization 'a privileged object of identification and assurance' (Crespi 1992: 104-11). The process of attribution might involve the leader and the led in dialogue, negotiation, consensus, or persuasion and manipulation. Pace MacIntyre, it often becomes difficult to distinguish which of these is being used.

At the organizational-structural level, where managing the determinacy-indeterminacy confrontations relates to the organization's normative order, power is for its members objective. The chief executive's survival will depend upon their capacity to deal with these confrontations. Power, at this level, manifests itself in the different forms of control embodied in the organization's various normative forms. These range from the formality of rules, standard operating procedures, policies, to their absence and the informality of a continuing dialogue. As part of its system of symbolic-normative mediation the organization sets the rules for the succession of, and the use of power by the leaders and the shared conditions for the predictability and adaptability essential for the organization's survival. Power serves as a mediative function when the individual or social group, eg project or research team, academic subject group, or organization, has to deal with the externalities arising from the dynamic relations between its actions and the organizations symbolic-normative forms. The form and use of power will vary with the organization, in particular with its structure and processes. These in turn are a function in part of the nature and rate of contingent change in its major external environments: economic-competitive, technical-production, scientific-technological.16 The result is that
different types of organizations may be more congenial for those in search of autonomy while others constrain. Individual commitment and loyalty to the organization may depend upon the opportunities offered. At the same time other organizational members may appear quite willing to accept the assumption and exercise of power by others. We have seen above the strengths and weaknesses of MacIntyre's view of managerial organizations. Implicit in this is the importance of power which he does not make explicit. The model presented above focuses upon the phenomenology of power, i.e., the point where action and structure intersect. Intimately linked with power is the organization's culture. The typology of organizational cultures developed below illustrates the way in which different organizations and individuals confront contingency and the implications of this for individual autonomy.

3 Organizations and Contingency (See Diagrams A and B at end of this chapter).

Three years before the events in the Dead Poet's Society, William H Whyte launched his attack on the corporate social ethic which shaped and legitimated managerial values in large US companies. Twenty-five years after Whyte's book, MacIntyre recalled the opposition, which Rousseau had recognized over two centuries before as significant in modern society, namely the opposition between individual freedom and collectivism. This dialectic underlies the concept of power set out above and fuels much of the theoretical discourse. Among more recent examples of discourses are those relating to corporate culture. These revive the concern that Whyte had over the fit of the individual to the organization. Briefly defined, organizational culture is 'the way we do things' for example in Shell or, in the sub-culture of the University of Warwick's philosophy department. When we join a new organization we enter Taylor's interlocutory world, we are inducted into the organization's moral and linguistic framework. At the corporate level the culture constitutes the organization's symbolic order, the organizational narrative, embracing its values, language, practices, traditions, rituals, myths, folk heroes. Its use by management is in gaining the commitment and harnessing the energy and enthusiasm of the individual or group to the corporate purpose.
A good example of changes in corporate culture driven by contingency are the high street banks. Some forty years ago research in consumer motivation revealed that the bank was often associated in the customer's mind with the Freudian super-ego, the forbidding father. In major towns and cities bank buildings were usually on a grand scale, with marbled floors, high plaster coffered ceilings, highly polished mahogany counters behind which stood the male tellers dressed always in dark suits, white shirts and stiff collars. Saturday was the exception when they were permitted to wear a sports jacket and flannels. With the deregulation in financial markets and under competitive pressure we now have the friendly, listening bank whose oft repeated claim is to break down the barriers of formality and rules which once grounded bank-customer relations. When you now telephone the bank a female voice responds with: 'Tracey speaking, how may I help you?' At the same time the impersonality of information technology imposes its decisions rules with a guillotine-like efficiency.

The model below proposes a typology of organizations based upon their symbolic-normative order, i.e., their cultures. We saw that a key function of power is its mediative role when the determinate symbolic-normative order confronts contingent indeterminacy. In this bi-dimensional model (Diagram A) the vertical dimension represents the symbolic-normative, the horizontal the nature of the power relationship. With the symbolic the significant consideration is the extent to which symbols and values incorporated in the organization's symbolic action are contractually based, that is offered and 'negotiated' with executive management or based predominantly upon the normative values of a particular organizational sub-group. The horizontal dimension in representing the power relations reflects the degree of formalization. At the one end power relations instrumental in nature are governed by written corporate documents, formal contracts of employment, organizational charts etc. At the other end the relations are essentially informal governed by a minimum of documentation and highly flexible. The bi-dimensional model therefore provides four representative types of organizations: the upper two contractually based; the first with an informal power system the second with a formal one. The lower two are governed much more by group normative values, the one with a
formalized power system the other with informal. The four types have the following characteristics:

(i) **Personal**: based upon the values of a single individual, a Maxwell or a Murdoch with whom the contract is in effect made, whatever the legal relationship it is subject to his/her arbitrary will. Such cultures are often young, entrepreneurial endeavours or family controlled businesses.

(ii) **Formalistic**: this is the role based bureaucracy, it is the home of MacIntyre’s emotivist manager. Governed by corporate rules, procedures and contracts, all the subject of a form of negotiation, these are characteristic of many large organizations; industrial, commercial, governmental, unions. Based upon hierarchical authority and direction relationships are structured and compliance expected.

The next two rely heavily upon symbols and values normative in origin, the first with a formal power system, the other with an informal one.

(iii) **Collegiate**: the primary concerns of this organization are with the task, project, technological endeavour and personal relationships which facilitate their accomplishment. While governed by a measure of corporate formality the essential element is co-operation. This kind of organization is to be found among companies in high, developing technologies such as information and bio-technology, in professional practices, research bodies and in some academic institutions. Focused upon specialist, project or subject discipline groups interpersonal relationships are marked by dialogue and consensus, knowledge, expertise, reputation among one's peers rather than status are important.

(iv) **Supportive/Individualistic**: governed by normative values and informal power relationships members put a high value on some form of self-fulfilment rather than on economic reward. Found among voluntary and co-operative activities, relatively small in the number of members, these embrace social and sports clubs, charitable activities, therapeutic and alternative communities and often worker’s co-operatives. These depend upon relationships essentially expressive, affective in nature. These are the most typical of the organizations with which we are associated with throughout our lives. MacIntyre’s ‘bureaucracy’ is analogous to the formalistic above. In both the person and the formalistic cultures members will be more subject to corporate meta-narratives.
Whereas in the collegiate and the supportive cultures members participate in the writing of many of these.

Earlier I noted the various uses of power by the different characters in *Dead Poets Society*. For example, important in setting the mode of deference in the film are the parents and the School's Head. Keating suggests negotiation to the boy and demonstrates persuasion and dialogue to his pupils. Key in setting the discourse of power in the organization are those who perform a leadership role. In the case of Welton Academy it is the Head whose ultimate sanction is coercion, i.e., expulsion. Executive efforts to gain compliance or agreement will reflect different uses and sources of power, ranging on a continuum from the deferential monadological to the dialogical. The sources of this power differ with the four types of organization: (i) in the personal organization coercion via the 'leader's' reward and punishment systems; (ii) in the formalistic their own version of the latter will be supplemented by the use of authority and status, including personal knowledge and experience of the bureaucracy's administrative systems and personal connections; (iii) in the collegiate and in (iv) the supportive, professional and technical knowledge, expertise and personal competence are the significant sources of power. In each of the above four organizations the nature of the 'leaders' personality is important. The binary relationship of a Maxwell and subordinate will often be characterized by the tactics of a bully. On the other hand the collegiate and supportive organizations usually display a tertiary, objective relationship in which manager and staff are subordinate to the task, the project, the problem etc. In the supportive organization where membership is mainly voluntary sanctions and coercion are limited. Effective and consistent participation will depend upon the capacity of its social entrepreneurs to inspire through an appeal to participant sensibility. The way in which these types of organizations provide the opportunity of members to confront contingency in their own terms differs. In the personal and formalistic organizations the basis of the relationships is essentially heteronomous: in the collegiate and the individualistic opportunity for autonomy appears much greater. With the possible exception of the personal organization the individual is not MacIntyre's passive recipient of emotivist managerial behaviour. The individual, as
we shall now discuss, has a number of behavioural responses reflecting his view of autonomy as a value.

4 The Organization and the Individual Quest for Autonomy

We noted MacIntyre's neglect of member behaviour in response to managerial emotivism and manipulation. Within the large organization how does the individual seek accommodation with corporate authority and power given its possible threat to the individual's sense of self, development and creativity? At its simplest and most commonsensical level there appears to be a case for saying that individual behaviour in relation to its membership of any social group could be characterised as their being in, or out or having mixed feelings. 21 Presthus provides one model in which he describes three patterns of adjustment: (i) upwards mobile (ii) indifferent (iii) ambivalents.

(i) The Upward Mobiles

These identify strongly with the organization, their commitment and involvement fires their motivation and energy. Distinguished by a high sense of morale and job satisfaction they enjoy 'disproportionately higher shares of the organization's rewards in power, income and ego reinforcement' (Presthus 1978: 167). These would find the bureaucracy a congenial setting in which to enjoy a synthesis of high personal reward with a commitment to corporate goals (ibid. 203). Their pattern of accommodation with the bureaucracy is through the use of power directed at controlling situations and people in which key concerns are 'efficiency, strength, self-control and dominance' (ibid.). 22

(ii) The Indifferent

Their behaviour is characterized by a withdrawal, an alienation and a reluctance to compete for organizational rewards. Anyone who has worked in a large industrial or public bureaucracy will have frequently encountered the type. Their main way of coming to terms with the organization is through a withdrawal and a probable re-direction of their energy, efforts and interests to off-the-job activities. 23 The indifferent is found among both blue and white collar workers, among professionals, specialists and academics. The last three often assume a 'cosmopolitan' view where interests, loyalty and future are
bound up with one's profession rather than the organization or university in which one is paid to practise it.

(iii) The ambivalent.

Where the upward-mobile is accepting of the organization, its values and objectives, the indifferent refuses to become engaged. The ambivalent often plays the specialist 'cosmopolitan' in which knowledge and expertise are valued. Ambivalents frequently regard themselves as independent professionals frequently failing to acknowledge the organization's need for co-ordination and control. With a tenacious self concern, motivation and specialist knowledge and experience they are resistant to bureaucratic rules and supervision. Between them and the organization's hierarchy there is a continual tension and an unwillingness to accept a status seen as purely subjective. Ambivalents prefer a work environment in which they can be creative, spontaneous and experimental. The 'structured personnel relations, stereotyped procedures and group decision making' in the large organization they find 'stifling' (ibid. 285). James Quinn in an article aptly entitled *Managing Innovation: Controlled Chaos* (Quinn 1985) explores the issue of order and creativity. In this he captures both the spirit and the working methods of the ambivalent. Quinn compares the practices in the small innovative company supportive of the efforts of innovators and entrepreneurs, among whom we find the ambivalents, with the barriers they face in the large company. He then examines the methods of some large companies to safeguard creative independence against its bureaucratic formalism. Among the various approaches are 'skunk works' in which highly innovative research teams work together without any organizational or physical barriers on the development of new products. The 3 M's company uses the practice of 'bootlegging'. Here employees are permitted to spend unsanctioned corporate resources, up to a limit, and 15% of their work time on developing ideas for new products. Given Board approval the innovator can then take on the role of entrepreneur in heading up a team responsible for getting the product to the market. The latter illustrates the overused, and often misused term of 'empowerment'. The power that the innovator is accorded is the right to write his own narrative.

Each of these patterns of organizational behaviour reflects individual attitudes towards its autonomy. In terms of Luntley's analogy of the jazz musician, there are strict limits to the
upward mobiles' virtuosity with its obsessive attention to technique at the expense of imaginative expression. The indifferent would rather be somewhere else playing in a chamber quartet or a brass band. It is the ambivalent whose freedom of expression and idiosyncratic and innovative playing might present problems to the other three members in terms of understanding what he is trying to do. That is unless he combines virtuosity with sensibility. The upward mobile appears essentially heteronomous in his commitment to organizational values, systems and goals. These become internalised, i.e. constitutive of the self's identity. His embeddedness in the organization is an essential part of his/her identity. He would view ambivalents as boat rockers, poor team players, 'not one of us'. Presthus, in commenting upon Arthur Miller's play, *Death of a Salesman*, says that when the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of the myth of the organizational system as an internalised article of faith becomes 'irrepressible, a self punitive mechanism may be invoked to preserve' (it)...'personal failure rather than the failure of the system provides the rationalization' (ibid. 168). While the upward mobiles, such as the fink Cameron in *Dead Poets Society*, are accepting of their heteronomy, the indifferent's heteronomy might reflect a general apathy, a willingness to go along with 'come what may' or even a view of resignation that the organization is hostile to any sense of autonomy. This they might seek elsewhere. It is the ambivalent, who seeks the fulfilment of his interests and his personal autonomy.

Keating the schoolmaster, wants to engage the whole person. He is ready to reject elements of organizational embeddedness in urging the boys to seek their autonomy. With a high sense of personal endeavour and a creative approach to his teaching and his relations with his pupils, a general scepticism towards the formal organization, he has much of significance to contribute. The tragedy of the film is not only the death of Neil Perry but the failure of Welton Academy to harness the iconoclastic energy of this ambivalent. This leaves Keating with a continuing conflict over his sense of autonomy and his experience of a bureaucracy, albeit an academic one. The issue of relating contingency and embeddedness is illustrated in the stages of the growth of an enterprise. Oxford Instruments, manufacturers of super-conducting magnets, provides an example of three typical stages of company growth. In the first, the innovator has
a single minded devotion to an idea but is neglectful of the costs of time and resources. The protagonist in the second stage is the entrepreneur who identifies the financial potential of an innovative idea in the contingent world of external markets. It is he who moves the primary focus from individual creativity towards embedding a degree of order by setting up managerial and financial systems. This entrepreneurial role is found not only in business but among concert impresarios, some art dealers, publishers, charity fund raisers, film producers and in academe among its programme directors, charity fund raisers - to name but a few. The entrepreneur's skill is that of striking an effective balance between the organization's need for elements of embeddedness and its contingencies. In this he acts as a kind of broker, a mediator. The third stage of enterprise development, in contrast to the innovative and entrepreneurial, is the managerial stage in which corporate administration become prominent. Now a public company, it must take a greater account of risk in order to ensure a return to its shareholders. There is a growth in systems, a focus upon instrumentality and often a growing intolerance of those who, like the original innovator, may be poor or non-team players. Thus on the one hand there is the indeterminacy of the innovator's contingent probabilistic world and on the other the determinate world of the management with its concern for formalization and order. It is the entrepreneur who bridges the two. In response to the pressures of increased environmental and competitive uncertainty much corporate effort in recent years has been devoted to the task of a shifting managerial systems from mechanistic, process oriented ones to those more organic in nature, flexible and adaptive, in the commonsensical belief that it is through their employees, not through systems, that companies innovate and adapt to external opportunity and threat. It would appear that the architect, the entrepreneur, and the ambivalent face the similar task of dealing with contingency on their own terms. This is the challenge which faces the individual seeking autonomy. With the gradual demise of one major form of embeddedness, the formal organization with its elements of order and security, the quest for many must now be made within a wider context. This quest appears to be a never accomplished entrepreneurial endeavour in which we seek for the particularity of our self a creative and appropriate relationship with our contingency. It is to this issue we turn in the final chapter of the thesis.
What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to locate individuals within different kinds of organizations and explore how it affects their autonomy. In running through an essentially descriptive mode it has enabled me to note the different empirical ways in which specific types of organizations provide scope for the form of personal autonomy set out in Part I.
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES

SYMBOLIC-NORMATIVE ORDER

CONTRACTUAL

FORMALISTIC

FORMAL

INFORMAL

SUPPORTIVE

NORMATIVE

P
Role Bureaucracy

Maxwell/Murdoch

Branson

OW
Public/Industrial/

System

EM
Architects/Industrial-

Research Group

University Dept

Social/Sports Clubs

Charities

Amateur Dramatics

Union

COlleGIATE

NATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES AND POWER

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The aim of this the concluding chapter of my thesis is first, to review its main dialectic, that of particular and universal conceptions of autonomy and second, to support my adherence to a particularistic conception. As argued above my concern is to relate the particularity of the individual to the way the contemporary world is. It is not to find a universal meta-narrative. The principal object of the last chapter was to relate the idea of personal autonomy to the individual’s situatedness within the contemporary organization and its broader societal context. In both these our familiar meta-narratives, eg community, family, church, tenure of employment, public service are in the process of being replaced by others among which are those of the market, consumerism and enterprise. The whole point about the particularity of autonomy is its efforts to break with the meta-narratives and go for the particular.

The chapter is divided into two sections:

1 A summary of the principal arguments for a conception of autonomy as personal autonomy.

2 The implications for such a concept of contemporary change in organizations and their contexts.

1 Summary of Arguments

The checklist in Chapter 1 set out the distinction between one conception of autonomy as moral autonomy and the other as personal autonomy. The former is concerned with the rights and duties of the individual abstracted from its values and circumstances, whose quest for autonomy is made in conformity with universally held moral laws: the latter’s quest is essentially a creative, developmental enterprise in which the self demonstrates its sense of irreducible individuality. In adopting a conception of autonomy as personal autonomy I wish to distance myself from the moral autonomists but retain two of their major
principles. The first is the capacity of the self to take a detached view of its circumstances and values. The critique of the contents of the self's portfolio does not involve a meta-narrative. The process of evaluation is on-going and is not detachable from the portfolio's other elements. It is reflective, and reflexive and not founded on a Kantian or Rawlesian Archimedean point. It involves a particular narrative the shape and form of which are particular. It does not instantiate a meta-narrative, a universal pattern. The nature of the creative aspect of our narrative is its unpredictability: our reasons are particular. The second, discussed in Chapter 3 is that for the self's quest for autonomy to be more than mere autarchy it must be informed by a moral perspective.

As we have seen both these principles present special problems for personal autonomy since it views the self as part-creature of its circumstances and not, as with moral autonomy, prior to them. One's moral perspective is governed not by a universal notion of moral duty held by a rational self abstracted from its contingency but one which confronts its contingencies in the process of its effort to understand how it lives its life, *sui generis*, in the particularity of (i) its situatedness, (ii) its sentiments and (iii) its contingencies

(i) The Self's Situatedness

My aim here is to find a mid-point between the detached, circumstance-abstracted self and a self whose identity risks engulfment by its context. It is here that I introduce the model of the self's *portfolio*. Informed by its narrative it encompasses the self's history, its present and a future with its trailers of aspiration and project and embraces the self in the particularities of its actions - its roles, relationships, situations, endeavours, aims, etc. These items of my portfolio constitute part of my being and not merely of my having. Given the social grounding of its contents I need the element of detachment in order to distance myself from my context and hence preserve a sense of my self identity. I achieve this through the perspective which I bring to the totality of my relationships not through some cost-benefit valuation of the portfolio's individual components to which I am related.
(ii) The Self of Sentiments

It is not mere instrumentality which governs the portfolio's contents but a view informed by my values, my moral sentiments. The portfolio is not just a holding of investments but one more akin to an ethical investment portfolio whose content is governed by a moral sense whose values I share with others. It is my capacity to engage in a sympathetic relationship, in which my judgment is informed by my sentiments and not merely by a contractual obligation, which is significant. This is a judgment amenable to objective standards, the test of whose truth lies not in social consensus but in its relation to the way the world is. Subject to the marks of truth this enables me to claim for the self a cognitive sensibility.

(iii) The Self's Contingencies

To establish its autonomy, its self-governance, the self requires power over its contingencies. Here I extend the metaphor of the portfolio to embrace its contingencies and adopt as an analogy the architect's portfolio. This is always in process and it addresses the future in its esquisses, its sketch designs of proposed projects, focuses upon the necessities and details of the present in its on-going projects and embraces those completed, inchoate and discarded ones which constitute its history. The architect brings to the particularities of his contingencies, the particularity of values informed by tradition and a moral sense of what constitutes excellence of practice. Above all his efforts are the result of the architect's creativity, of that unique individuality which suffuses his work. The appeal of creativity is not a primitive one, nor does it fit with a meta-narratives. It is integral to a particular narrative. It is not a meta-level Taylorian trump card, available to all players. It is not a universal drop down from Kant, nor a form of subjectivism, or, with the irrational Callicles outside the moral (Williams 1985: 22-3). It is not available to everyone only to those who share with our ideal architect a sensible reasoning. The ultimate test of his endeavours is their appropriateness to contingency and their harmony with the authentic self. It is this creativity, individuality and authenticity together with the essential element of self-development which distinguishes the architect's from the investor's portfolio. The metaphor of the architect's portfolio captures my conception of personal autonomy which sets out not to avoid, or escape the risks of contingency but to confront,
embrace and exploit it. Here the self is engaged in a never-ending quest for a sense of its irreducible individuality. This is a self whose authenticity is grounded in an understanding of its moral sensibility and in whose actions there is an absence of the arbitrary. The contents of my portfolio are me: they constitute my self identity. They are not tradable.

(iv) Freedom and Choice

This presents personal autonomy as positive freedom in which the autonomous are in part creators of their own world whose criteria lies in their well-being - that is their success in achieving those comprehensive goals which 'deeply structure their lives'. The architect's comprehensive goals, for instance a successful professional career, are based on shared expectations and therefore require social forms. The progress of his career is not one of habituation, eg success in examinations or mere conformity to social norms. It requires a practical rationality, a judgment involving notions of best practice. The architect's training course in professional practice may have provided him with the knowledge of the content and procedural requirements of client relations. However its function is limited in dealing with the particularities of a meeting with an individual client. A breakdown in the client relationship may not be cognitive but rather one of character: the failure is in the sympathetic understanding which enables the individual to discern the sensibilities of the other. The architect needs the relevant perceptual faculties and education to make judgments about space, form, colour etc. He needs a similar faculty in his relationships with others if he is to enjoy a sense of well-being in the realities of the world of sentiments. Thus, the autonomous life requires, as well as a significant degree of virtue, a plurality of choices for the individual. This poses the issues of commensurability and the role of government in their availability of choices. Plurality of choice of goods implies the possibility of incommensurability. Given the particularity of goods there is no guarantee that they will be commensurable in advance. Since the conception of personal autonomy is grounded in its particularity our valuation of goods must therefore be a particular valuation and not one in conformity with some transcendental notion.
The practical value of the idea of coherence is not as a goal but as a means for disclosing my conflicts over value. Their resolution calls for our moral judgment as a function of our personal narrative.

(v) Personal Autonomy

My self-narrative gives the developmental story of my portfolio in which the significant is not the goals I set but the process of their setting. It is the flourishing of my sensibility and its unity which provides the portfolio's unity. This is a sensibility rooted in shared practices and traditions informed by my unique self-narrative enabling me to express my creativity, my irreducible individuality, my personal autonomy, in relation to contingent reality. In the reality of our dynamically changing world it is personal autonomy which offers the best hope of coping with contingency, that is of relating the particularity of me to the particularities of my context. In this world traditional forms of institutional and organizational embeddedness appear to offer a diminished sense of the personal security with which to face an uncertain future. The alternatives to assuming responsibility for our self-governance is to accept the values and direction of others or to leave it to whim or chance.

The concluding section of Part I sets out the meaning of personal autonomy for the self: Part II attempts to relate this to the individual's situatedness firstly, in a plurality of organizations and secondly, in the broader political, economic and social context. The model of power adopted in Chapter 7 focused upon its mediative function in enabling the individual, the social group and the organization, to relate the particularity of their values and rules to contingency. A typology of organizations demonstrated the way in which different organizations might confront contingency and also which of these offers the best hope for the personal autonomy of the organizationally situated self. The organizations range from those in which the basis of power is monadological to those in which the dialogical predominates. The latter includes the collegiate and supportive organizations both of which appear to offer a better prospect for personal autonomy than either the personal or formalistic. The value of the former organizations for autonomy is that everyone is involved in the writing of the narrative. The supportive embraces the significant, diverse and numerous non-profit, voluntary organizations, which: (a) provide
most people with the major part of their organizational experience (b) with the reduction in
the individual's security of tenure in the economic and administrative bodies it is in the
individual's membership of the non-profit bodies that the individual may have to seek their
autonomy

The contemporary organization has to be set against a background of rapid and
dynamic changes which has led to the loss of important meta-narratives. The result is a
major disembedding process in which the individual's relationship with the organization
has become increasingly tenuous.¹ Key among these changes are: the growth of global
investment and competition in industrial, commercial, financial and consumer markets and
major technological innovation particularly in information technology, computerization and
automation. These have had a dramatic effect upon the numbers and nature of the
employees particularly with the move away from heavy, smoke-stack industry to service
industry and those others based upon human software and upon lean production and
management.² A growing reaction against the state's involvement in industry, and in those
agencies traditionally regarded as the public sector, has led to a growing managerialism,
imported from the private sector whose ultimate criteria are measures of efficiency. These
changes have been accompanied by the widespread adoption of the view that those once
described under a variety of names as patients, clients, students etc should now all be
regarded as consumers - as customers.³ At the same time discourse on the nature of
organizations has come under the influence of postmodernist philosophy. Analogous to the
latter's efforts to unseat the sovereign self there has been a rejection of such metanarratives
of organizations as the rational Weberian-Taylorian bureaucracy. However neither
economic and political change nor the advent of postmodernism has produced a
significant paradigm shift in organizational theory. As noted above, the continuities in
both theory and practice remain as important as the discontinuities. To talk of
postmodernity as a new epoch, rather than as a stage of 'high' or 'late' modernity appears
not to be borne out by empirical evidence.⁴ What now exists is a much more complex
diversity of organizational structures and processes: some new, many existing, with both a
diminution and an increase in bureaucratic forms of management. What is readily apparent
is that major contextual changes have brought to many organizations, particularly the larger
employers, a process variously described as rationalization, downsizing, delayering, re-engineering. For the individual all these terms have meant a disembedding in its relations with the organization through redeployment, redundancy and unemployment. Increasingly many companies retain a relatively secure core staff supported by contract and part-time employees. Within the organization the scope of the part-time and contract worker for narrative is limited. Outside the organization the narrative process becomes for the individual more pressing and complex.

Much organizational effort is now directed at the creation of new meta-narratives for its more permanent employees. These proclaim and aim to develop the innovational and entrepreneurial skills of the individual per se rather than those related to their former function as part of a man-machine system. This has led to a growth in organizational discourse around the notions of autonomy and empowerment and the use of new forms of organization. Thus the value to the company of individual enterprise and responsibility are lauded as corporate virtues while the individual's tenure is weakened either through their inter-changeability with the hard and software resources or as a result of restructuring. Reduction in employee numbers, restructuring and company closures have also had a major impact on the latter's local community. The demise of industry and company towns with their associated social and recreational clubs and activities - eg the Black Dyke Mills Band - has added to the individual's sense of disembeddedness.\(^5\) At the same time the control of local government functions has been increasingly centralized by the national government and their management dispersed among quasi non-governmental organizations, ie Quangos - the nature of whose accountability is widely regarded as problematical.\(^6\)

The effect of this dispersal, as with the contracting out of services in the public and private sectors, as opposed to internal provision and production is to end a narrative of familiar instrumentality. The conclusion from this decline, in traditional forms of embeddedness, is that for many people seeking autonomy their search has to be made in the voluntary sector and, or in a much wider economic, social context and political context
I have rejected the totalizing claims of postmodernism. While recognizing the important insights it gives into aspects of our society and its institutions I have opted for a view of our contemporary epoch as a later or higher stage of modernity. This stage is characterized by the two faces of rationalization and subjectivation. The former's concern is with economic and technological systems, the latter with the individual as an actor free to shape its own life. The threat to personal autonomy is the subjugation of the individual by the system. For many writers the ideas of freedom and the individual have become increasingly problematical, the former appears to have led not to 'deliverance from a collective yoke' and the latter to an accusation of narcissism. Today this individual is pictured as a selfish egocentric, encompassed as never before in organizational networks in which it has little freedom for self-rule. This view appears to be simplistic and one of despair - hope has given way to resignation. It completely discounts the capacity of the individual to write its own narrative, to shape both its self and its own world. In order to assess the feasibility of personal autonomy we need to explore those forces which shape the contemporary individual's world.

We are all aware of being caught up in an apparently ever increasing rate of change, whose scope and nature we barely understand. The effects of its global ramifications appear to be beyond the control of existing political entities, the nation states either individually or collectively. The impact on our social units, ie community, institutions, organizations, are seen as destabilizing our self identity. A major explanation of this change appears to lie in the separation of time and space. A distinctive historical feature of the economic process of production, exchange and distribution of goods and services has been its ever increasing area of activity, from the parochial to the global. Its features are ever more sophisticated systems of exchange, from barter to abstract systems incorporating symbolic tokens, eg money and credit systems, and expert systems with greater specialisation of knowledge and the growth in information technology. Associated with these features of an increased rate of change and spatio-temporal distanciation is an increased dependency among participants in production and distribution. This is evident in the globalization of capital and consumer markets and in factor supply with the multiple geographical sourcing of components, products, labour and skills. This globalization,
greater interdependency and the sophistication of both our economic and communications' systems, appears to be aimed at the objectification of individuals as consumers or producers. It is the latter system with its concentration on the assembling, selecting and transmission of information and forms of entertainment which, as the culture industry, is increasingly replacing a subject model of the creation of reality and values with a social one.

This spatio-temporal separation has contributed to a disembedding of more traditional social relationships. For example, the growth in symbolic and abstract systems has led to a reconstituting of many social relationships. Once predominantly face to face these now occur across wide spans of time and space in which the individuals and groups involved never meet, eg paying for one's funeral in advance by credit card and specifying the arrangements over the telephone to a total stranger. Accompanying the disembedding of social relationships and the distancing of space and time the relationship between risk and trust has changed. The increasingly abstract and token systems used in our consumer society of the production, distribution and exchange of goods and services could not function without the risk and trust involved in our increased dependency on others. For example, when we enter the food chain, buy a car, invest in a pension scheme. This delaying, or extension in the link between risk and trust provides plenty of opportunity for those who wish to manipulate the system in their own interest as the recent Leeson-Baring's affair showed. Accompanying these features has been the development of continuous learning systems, reflexive and reflective. The individual and the social group are viewed as learning systems. The notion is captured for the former in *éducation permanente* and for the latter in the *learning organization*. The learning system involves incorporation by the particular agent of new information, knowledge and experience as a contributory component of future action. Its function is analogous to mediated experience in MacIntyre’s idea of the self-narrative. In a world of greater dispersal and fragmentation such a narrative as a 'reflexively organized endeavour' brings to the agent, individual and organization, an element of certainty to its self identity contributing to the determinacy or order which it requires in its confrontation with contingency. What do these trends of high or late modernity - the increasing speed of
change, spatio-temporal separation, the interdependency and delaying of risk and trust, and the development of self-learning systems — mean for personal autonomy? The three key attributes of personal autonomy detailed in Part I are the self's embeddedness, its capacity to reason - ie its cognitive sensibility - and its freedom and ability to cope with its contingency. The changes detailed appear to make the concept of community, with which the idea of embeddedness has been associated, even more problematical. Much of what is written on the subject assumes an accepted definition of community but seldom gives one. Among possible meanings are the two opposites. First, the minimalist rights-based concept of reciprocity founded upon contractual exchange, the ‘instrumental’ community in which social arrangements are conceived as a necessary burden by individuals who co-operate only in order to pursue their own personal ends. Second, the ‘sentimental’ community whose unity is distinguished by shared values and beliefs and in the case of the smaller with direct unmediated relations. So how stands the community now with the separation of time and space and the disembedding elements of abstract systems with their impact on social relationships?

A host of changes and influences now subvert univocal concepts of community as primarily geographical. These changes include new forms of stratification based on lifestyle and consumption patterns, multiculturalism and transmigration, new forms of community, eg internet, religious fundamentalists, temporary communities - therapeutic, project and issue based. The tripartite employment pattern noted above - the permanent, the contract and part time and the disengaged - is paralleled in Touraine's description of contemporary society as consisting of helmsmen, crew or passengers and the excluded, the discarded (Touraine 1992). Are the latter the political stowaways to be thrown overboard?

The foregoing raises two issues for personal autonomy. One concerns the significance of the community for the self and its governance, the other the possibility of sustaining a notion of community other than a minimalist one based on instrumentality. In discussing the self's situatedness we saw the intimate relationship between belonging and being - the social grounding of the self - and the changing and increasingly transient nature of our associations. While the traditional settled communities based on industry or rural
activities have gradually disappeared important forms of mutual associations, many based upon geographical localities, are very much in evidence.

In the United Kingdom the voluntary organization provides for most of the population the bulk of its experience of non-familial organizations. These are organizations in which we co-operate and use power, dialogic in nature, involving ourselves both as thinking and sentient beings. This is the organization, focused not on efficiency and involving only part of the self, but one which engages our cognitive sensibility, 'where taking care of people and things, rather than using them up, is the basic stance to the world' (Wolin 1983). This is the organization of shared values, the alternative to instrumentality and impersonality where system and actor are united. The point about this 'basic stance' is that it is not part of a metanarratives. It is not underwritten by anything other than its own construction. Its own sense has to be contingent. In the face of an economic determinism based on a globalizing capitalism, the ideology of consumerism in which the market nexus and efficiency are the primary focus, what prospect is there for the alternative, supportive, co-operative organization?

With the apparent change in the nature of employment\textsuperscript{12} - less tenured posts, intermittent periods of employment with contract and part-time work, early retirement and alternative life styles, the voluntary body and the social entrepreneur are likely to assume a greater role.\textsuperscript{13} The voluntary body provides for the individual a form of embeddedness within which he might locate the self identity, previously derived from secure employment, and his personal autonomy. Both the rationale and the vitality of these organizations come from their members where the individual actor and not the role or system are pre-eminent. There are other organizations in which the individual contribution provides its lifeblood - for example the university department, the research group and such bodies as the Arts Council concerned with fostering cultural activities. The distinguishing feature between these and the voluntary bodies is that the former's primary source of funding is likely to be public bringing with it the threat of intervention. This raises the issue of the right and capacity of the state to safeguard certain types of organization. In particular where instrumentality might inhibit the contribution of those whose imagination and creativity is fired by its sentiments. This gives the state a non-neutral role which is a danger if this
becomes a totalizing one in which the function of art is to serve the state. On the other hand to claim neutrality by leaving the organization to its fate in the market is bogus it merely substitutes one good for another. The best hope for the revival of citizenship may lie in a hands-off fostering of the voluntary organization and the real empowerment of smaller political, regional units within the nation state, or within a larger economic and political unit, eg the European Community. The issue of a 'hands off fostering' involves the offer of resources and some policy guidance on options but not the determination of the context of these. It also raises the general issue of some notional drawing of boundaries between private and public sectors of activity.

Since the collapse of the major countervailing power to liberal capitalism, ie communism, the idea of society has been replaced by the market. Much of the talk today about freedom conceives the individual as either a rational consumer or producer. Our best safeguard against totalization whether it be the ideology of the market, or efforts to resurrect the notion of community by claiming to speak in the name of its traditions and loyalties, is our cognitive sensibility. How far the current rational critique of the encompassing totality of contemporary liberal capitalist society aids the individual in quest of autonomy is doubtful. The shared values and the sentient relationships which once characterized our communities have given way to a polity and to institutions in which the sole shared value appears to be instrumentality. Those in search of personal autonomy are forced to accept in the daily order of things instrumentally governed relationships. Towards these they need a healthy scepticism that recognizes that there is a case for reconciling efficiency with freedom, and also a capacity to resist encapsulation in someone's power narrative in the role of consumer, producer, or viewer. This involves the continuous surveillance of the contents of our portfolio, of our roles and situations and those contextual factors which affect our selection. Our quest for autonomy becomes, to borrow a vogue term, an enterprise in which we confront contingency, not with instrumentality, but with a self of reasoned sensibility. The alternative to this is to allow the apparent freedom of the abundance of choice offered by contemporary consumerism to lull us into a benign acceptance of its totalizing power. This is the illusory freedom of Baudelaire's swan. Having escaped from the captivity of a cage it scratches among the
dust and dirt of mid-19th century Paris undergoing reconstruction. Uprooted it seeks identity in conditions of contingent change.

Je pense à mon grand cygne, avec ses gestes fous,
Comme les exilés, ridicule et sublime,
Et rongé d'un désir sans trêve!

I think of that great swan in its torment,
silly, like all exiles, and sublime,
endlessly longing....*

For what is the swan longing? Is it like so many of us looking for vanished meta-narratives? These are our nostalgic indulgences through - heritage sites and theme parks, 40 year-running radio serials of 'an everyday story of country folk' or the continual television screening of films about World War II. Or, is the search for new metanarratives in which we are unconsciously captive as consumer and viewer. The one narrative which offers the hope of personal autonomy is one's own, one that is me-grounded in the particularity of one's own circumstances and sensibilities. The alternative to shaping one's life, as Alain Touraine says in re-echoing William Blake, is to leave it to those 'centres of power whose object is to specify and sanction our roles'.

CHAPTER NOTES

PROLOGUE


2. When Keating exhorts the boys to "be your own person" it would appear that he is using person as a synonym for the self.

3. Carpe diem from Horace *Ars Poetica* xi 7. Translated as 'seize the day'. Compare this with a modern version, from Dennis Potter's television interview shortly before his death in 1995.

"We tend to forget that life can only be lived in the present tense, it is and it is now only. The only thing you know for sure is the present tense....if you see the present tense, boy do you see it, and boy can you celebrate it". Quoted by Michael Luntley 1995: 219-220.

CHAPTER ONE


2. "Rip it out". The act of getting the boys to rip out the chapter of the book on poetry is variously construed. One friend, a retired English master at Merchant Taylor's School, thought the act almost comparable to Nazi book burning. Merely to have told the boys to ignore the chapter because it was, in Keating's opinion, erroneous would have lost all dramatic input.

3. Dwight Eisenhower served two terms as US president (1952 - 6 and 1956 - 60). During his first term Senator Joseph McCarthy led the attack on supposed communists. Among his charges was that America had seen 'twenty years of treason', under the Roosevelt and Truman administrations and this eventually included Eisenhower. The events in Arthur Miller's play *The Crucible* (1953) on the Salem witch trials closely paralleled these political events. The events in *Dead Poets Society* undoubtedly suggest a similar parallel.

4. The dates are variously placed. Roughly from the late 1940's until the late 1970's: it would vary between the USA and Europe.

5. William H Whyte's *The Organization Man* published in 1956. Very widely read at the time, it attacked the 'grey-flannelled' conformity which US corporations set up as a collectivist ethic for its management. Whyte argued that the individual should resist this and went as far as to offer advice on how to cheat in personality tests.

6. WASP: White Anglo-Saxon Protestant, the US male establishment of the 1950-60's. Still occasionally used to describe the graduates of an ivy league university who constitute the professional, managerial and financial elite.
Is Keating a man before his time, and in the wrong place? He might have felt more at home a decade or so later in the Californian flower power scene.

The quest for a 'true' self, a constant theme in Western literature, is associated with an 'authentic' and autonomous self and usually involves some kind of spiritual, if not an actual, voyage of discovery. For example in Hamlet, Polonius tells Laertes, about to depart for England: "This above all: to thine own self be true" (Act I Sc iii).

Since it is discoverable it must presume a unitary self. The notion of the unitary self, found particularly in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, has served throughout the history of philosophy both as a psychological construct and as an ideal essential for the moral life. Descartes with his belief in the supremacy of reason over the senses, as the source of knowledge, presumed knowledge of a thinking subject whose unity lay in the soul - seen by Cartesians as underlying our various psychological states. For those in the tradition of Locke and Hume the self is viewed as the passive perceiver of 'relations of causal connectedness between these states' (Wood 1990: 17). It was left to Kant to attempt a reconciliation between the rationalist tradition and British empiricism. The postmodernists have attempted, unsuccessfully in my view, to unseat the sovereign self. In literature, particularly in his trilogy of novels Samuel Beckett portrays a journeying 'self' on a bicycle whose principal characteristic is not a unified self but a plurality of selves. For a contemporary view of the issue of the continuity of the self see Parfit 1984.

CHAPTER TWO

1 In the 1780's Kant published three of his major works: The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Groundwork of Metaphysics and Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788).


3 Herbert Simon, viewed the activities of 'management' as essentially decision making. In his Administrative Behaviour (1960) he proposed in opposition to economic man administrative man, replacing maximizing behaviour with satisficing, implying a course of action as good enough or satisfactory. This followed from his recognition of the limits to rational behaviour for which he coined the phrase 'bounded rationality'.

4 Among planners the use of contingency and alternative plans, and techniques for decision making under conditions of uncertainty, plus unexpected events and consequences testify to the essentially tentative nature of plans. Practitioners of, and writers on planning came to acknowledge in the 1980's, what Karl Popper and Alasdair MacIntyre recognized as the distinct limits to the forecasting of empirical events and the tendency for 'planners' to claim too much for their efforts in the face of unintended consequences.

5 In Political Liberalism (1993) Rawls revised his original theory in which justice as fairness is now presented as political conception. He redefines the 'well-ordered society'

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no longer as a society unified by moral beliefs but by a political conception of justice. The aim of justice as a political conception is practical, and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it represents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one which can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons'.


CHAPTER THREE

Section 1

1 Sandel LLJ 55-58

2 Taylor's distinction between the simple weigher and the strong evaluator is important here. See Taylor Ch 1 What is Human Agency? in Human Agency and Language (1985) and Ch 3 below. Central to Taylor's distinction is the agent's depth and superficiality. The simple weigher's reflection is minimal he acts out of evaluations limited to 'the inarticulate "feel" of the alternatives' (LLJ 160). The strong evaluator acts out of a cognitive sense of agency. He 'participates in the constitution of its own identity as a subject, in the light of goods and ends already before it' (Hurley 1989: 316). Is More, Taylor's strong evaluator?

3 See Meyers (1989: 92). I acknowledge the influence of Meyers on my thinking in this section (1.2).


6 This is adapted from Meyer's analogy (op cit: 96).

7 See Kymlicka (1991: 213)

Section 2

8 MacIntyre defines emotivism as, 'the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and specifically all judgments are nothing but the expression of preference expressions of attitudes or feeling, in so far as they are moral, or evaluative in character' (AV 11-12). MacIntyre identifies as exemplars of emotivism (AV: Ch 3) three significant contemporary characters; the manager, the therapist and the rich aesthete. He distinguishes his three characters as those 'with certain kinds of social role specific to certain particular cultures...a knowledge of the character provides an interpretation of those actions of those individuals who have
assumed the character. (N)ot to be confused with social roles in general. In the case of character role and personality fuse in a more specific way than in general. Thus the manager as a character, unlike those who occupy an occupational role eg dentist or refuse collector is subject to 'a certain kind of moral constraint on the personality of those who inhabit them in a way that other social roles do not'. (AV 27).

An earlier version of MacIntyre's third contemporary character, the aesthete 'committed to the aesthetic pursuit of his own enjoyment', is Cecil Vyse in E M Forster's A Room With a View. "He is the sort who are all right so long as they keep to things-books, pictures - but kill when they come to people", as George Emerson says of Vyse.

9 MacIntyre embodies the idea of telos in his conception of role. We can for example, judge objectively the fulfilment of role in the case of a departmental secretary, if as part of her duties, she is required to take action the same day that letters are received in the department. This says nothing about her character, she may perform her role minimally - according to the letter. There is an air of instrumentality about this conception of role, reminiscent of the once fashionable job descriptions.

10 It was Aristotle's reaction to the Homeric association of role with fixed status which led him to accord more importance to the individual's role as a human being rather than, for example, that of the king. For Aristotle the significant virtues were those of the former.

11 See AV:216-7 for MacIntyre's comments upon Parfit's discussion of psychological continuity.

12 Peter McMylor's book on MacIntyre has proved useful in my understanding of MacIntyre in general, and in particular McMylor's Part II in connection with my critique of MacIntyre's views on modern managerialism in Chapter 7 below.

13 On the distinction between internal and external practices, see AV:82-7.

14 MacIntyre's gives two definitions of virtue (AV 178 and 219). The important difference between the two is that the latter links virtue to the self's educative process.

15 Appointment as chairman offers the aesthete the opportunity to exercise his or her taste with public money, given the problematic status of the accountability of Quangos. Chairmanships of two of these major bodies are held by former government ministers.

16 'So when Turner transformed the seascape in painting or WG Grace advanced the art of batting in cricket in quite a new way their achievement enriched the whole relevant community'. (AV 191).

17 See McMylor (1994: Ch 5) Managerialism and the culture of bureaucratic individualism.

18 MacIntyre quotes Barbara Hardy's, 'Towards a Poetics of Fiction: An Approach Through Narrative', Novel 2, 1968: 5-14, to support his argument that to identify
and understand another's actions we need to place an episode in the 'context of a set of narrative histories'.

19 'In what does the unity of an individual life consist? The answer is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask 'what is good for me?' is to ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it to completion. To ask, 'What is the good for man is to ask what all answers to the former question must have in common. But now it is important to emphasize that it is the systematic asking of these two questions and the attempt to answer them in deed as well as in word which provide the moral life with its unity. The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest'. (AV 218-9)

20 'To be the subject of a narrative that runs from one's birth to one's death is...to be accountable for the actions and experiences which compose a narratable life'...(AV 217).

21 Benn (TF) gives these three forms of the impulsions for the non-autarchic person. As an example of defects of: (i) epistemic rationality he gives paranoia ie 'being afflicted with a radically disordered belief structure' (ii) practical rationality includes various forms of compulsive neurosis 'marked by a pronounced incoherence of belief and action' and (iii) psychic continuity schizophrenic conditions in which the subject lacks awareness as an agent'. Benn also claims that the condition of disassociation 'where facets of the subject's personality split in multiple consciousness' disqualifies one from acting autarchically (TF 156-164).

22 'The rich tapestry is embellished by the great puzzles and mysteries about Jeffrey Archer...And the great challenge for any Archer biographer is hacking one's way through a formidable jungle of inaccuracies, myths and disinformation'. (Bernard Crick, Jeffrey Archer: Stranger than Fiction xv London Hamish Hamilton 1995).

23 See Note 8 Ch 1, and Beckett's trilogy: Molloy, Malone Dies and the Unnamable.

24 'A tradition is constituted by a set of practices and is a mode of understanding their importance and worth; it is the medium by which such practices are shaped and transmitted across generations. Traditions may be primarily religious...political...economic (for example a particular craft or profession, trade union or manufacturer) geographical. The communal understanding embodied in such traditions is neither hegemonic nor static; on the contrary, in a healthy tradition that understanding will be the subject of continuous debate at any given moment and across time' (Mulhall and Swift 1992: 90):.

25 From the previous note MacIntyre's notion of tradition can hardly be described as 'inherently conservative'. However with the particular emphasis he puts on tradition he appears to be 'committed to a form of moral relativism' in which the individual is so entrapped in its tradition that it lacks the resources to enter into any assessment of other traditions. MacIntyre takes the charge seriously and it is one which he addresses in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Versions of Moral Enquiry (Horton and Mendus 1994:12-14).

26 According to Laing, a 'basically ontologically secure person will encounter all the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual, biological from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people's reality and identity' (Laing 1965: 58)
Giddens adopts Laing's notion of ontological security asserting that, 'All individuals develop a framework of ontological security of some sort, based on routines of various forms' (Giddens:1991: 44-46, 53-55). Alvin Toffler in Future Shock (London, Bodley Head 1970) had a similar notion in 'personal stability zones'. 'Certain enduring relationships that are carefully maintained despite all kinds of other changes (ibid 335).

Abraham Maslow defines self actualization as 'the intrinsic growth of what is already in the organism, or more accurately of what is the organism itself (TF 207). Countless management students over the years have been subjected to Maslow's hierarchy of needs as a theory of motivation in which self actualization represents the ultimate stage of a progression through the satisfaction of physical, ego and social needs. For a view of Hegel's notion of self actualization see Wood 1990: 17-35).

See Walzer Chapter 5: He is the halfway communitarian who is committed to autonomy but tolerant of diversity and individual rights.

See Sartre Mauvaise Fol (Bad Faith): Cambridge Companion To Sartre (1992: pp 48-52). 'A lie to oneself within the unity of a single consciousness'. With bad faith as self deception a person is unwilling to accept responsibility for what he has done. As with many who have committed atrocities, the Eichmann defence is invariably offered - "I was obeying orders".

Where I use the metaphor of the architect to illustrate the relation between the individual's particularity and its contingency Luntley's metaphor is the jazz musician. Both are engaged in creativity and in relating practice, self-narrative and tradition. The image of the architect differs in two respects (i) the idea of the portfolio gives a stronger temporal dimension and (ii) in responding appropriately to contingency he/she needs to contend with the continuing dialogue of client requirements.

With the theistic origins of much of MacIntyre's thought autonomy would constitute a denial of God. His critique of emotivism would also deny any grounding for autonomy since this would only be the preference of an individualistic culture (AV 31 and Horton 30).

Section 3

Taylor SS: 1.2.

In 1959 Sir Charles Snow, scientist, government official and novelist published The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, subject and title of his Cambridge Rede Lecture.


This fragmentation is captured in Marx's 'alienation', Nietzsche's 'God is dead', and Weber's 'disenchantment'. (SS 500).

In the managerial organization, in one major management function, the distinction between two of MacIntyre's significant contemporary characters, the manager and the
therapist, has become increasingly blurred. Two developments have led to this, one is the re-titling of what was once known as Personnel Management as Human Resources Management. The new title embraces an increased concern with the nature of the individual's character and personality and their ability to fit the company culture. The other development is the use of personnel training and development consultants many of whom employ techniques similar to those of the therapist. See Bellah et al 1985. 'As the managerial and service sectors of the economy gradually take in a wider and wider slice of the US labor (sic) force, more of us do work for which therapy serves as a model rather than a contrast'. This would now apply to the UK.

37 Taylor has more recently written a book on authenticity. See The Ethics of Authenticity. Also Golomb, 1995 and Trilling 1972.

38 On Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard see SS 487-490. Taylor concludes on this trio: 'They offer charters for subjectivism and the celebration of creative power at the cost of occluding what is spiritually arresting in the whole movement of contemporary culture'. See also Note 90, 590.

39 The nature of this dilemma can be seen in efforts to initiate worker's co-operatives. In the choice of power and authority systems they tend to opt for the informal, as opposed to the formal, legalistic, contractual arrangements. The result is often the collapse of the venture.

40 Taylor makes reference to Habits of the Heart (1985) in which Robert Bellah and his co-authors explore the 'erosion of the political'. 'The primacy of self-fulfilment, particularly in its therapeutic variants, generates the notion that the only associations one can identify with are those formed voluntarily and which foster self-fulfilment, such as life style enclaves in which people of similar interests or situations cluster...' (SS 508).

41 Auschwitz represented for many Western intellectuals the demise of the metanarratives of human rationality and of moral and social progress. The concentration camps combined technical efficiency with an almost unbelievable horror in the treatment of other human beings.

42 See Chapter 3 (Tully 1994:47-8) Skinner attacks as incomplete Taylor's argument in presenting his intuition that belief is essential if 'we are to appreciate the full significance of human life'. It is this alternative hunch to Skinner's 'atheistic values' which is little more than 'whistling in the dark'.

Section 4

43 In his Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Holmes 1963) attacks the philosophical grounding of the antiliberal critics. In Chapter 4 MacIntyre's "antiliberal catechism" in particular. Chapter 7 - he refers to the 'phantom' community.

44 Holmes uses this archaic slang, from the word sockdologer/sockdolager it is defined as a conclusive blow. The American Heritage dictionary suggests a 'fanciful blend of sock (blow) and doxology'.

45 According to Holmes there are two MacIntyres, one in which moral obligations are socially grounded and, the other with its claims that these are imposed upon the
individual by God. He attacks individual autonomy in the name of a reverence towards God and social tradition at the same time as he defends rational autonomy in the face of scientific rationality (Holmes 1993: 104).

The discontent which Claude Lévi-Strauss brought back from his sojourn in Brazil (1935 -1939) arose from his reflections upon the rapid absorption by Western culture of its rivals into a worldwide 'monoculture'.

'Voyages, those magic caskets of dreamlike promises, will never again yield up their treasures intact. A proliferating and overexcited civilization troubles forever the seas.....This grand Western civilization has not succeeded in creating the marvels we enjoy without also creating their opposite. Like its most famous product, the atomic pile in which are created architectures of unknown complexity, the order and harmony of the Occident requires the elimination of a prodigious mass of harmful by-products of which the earth today is infected. The first thing travel has now to show us is the filth, our filth, which we have thrown in the face of humanity'.

What Lévi-Strauss does not include here is the impact of Western 'civilization' upon local cultural values and institutions.


CHAPTER 4

1. A major influence in shaping my thoughts for this chapter was Michael Luntley's lectures (Spring Term 1996) *The Making of the Self: the Metaphysics of Self and Value*. The series also introduced me to other influences, David Wiggins and Annette Baier.

2. 'O me! O life! of the questions of these recurring,

Of the endless trains of the faithless, of cities fill'd with the foolish,....

What good amid these, O me! O life !?

(Answer) That you are here - that life exists and identity,

That the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse.'

(op. cit. 221-2)

3. A superficial reading of Keating's character would see him as a sentimental softie. The one significant incident which shows otherwise is Keating's conversation with Charlie Dalton after the boy has been thrashed by the Head for a 'ridiculous stunt'. This involved Charlie telling the Head in front of the whole school that God was on the telephone for him. Keating tells him that there is a place for daring and a place for caution and a wise man knows the difference. Keating advises Charlie not to destroy the opportunities which the school, despite its shortcomings, has to offer.


5. Two valuable contributions from Wiggins to this section are his notions of (i) plain truth - see Note 7 and, (ii) cognitive underdetermination (NVT: 124-132).

7 Wiggins 'marks of truth' see NVT Essay IV *Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgments*.

8 See N 8, Ch 3


10 On possible alternative moral development see Baier's caveat in *Moral Prejudices*: 65.

11 Among management writers and academics, 'messiness' was discovered some 15 years ago. This replaced earlier ideas of management as an orderly process, amenable to taxonomic models. Tom Peters published, *Thriving On Chaos: A Handbook For Management Revolution*, in 1987. The present writer presented a paper to the annual conference of the Institute of Personnel Managers in 1982 with the title of *Management Development: Panacea, Placebo or Punk?*


13 Marilyn Friedman, 'Beyond Caring: The Demoralization of Gender'. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, supplementary vol. 13 87-110

14 A professional American colleague recounted to me his experience as consultant to a New England electronics firm which relied for digital skill in manufacturing upon women. When it set up a plant in New Mexico, it recruited indigenous Indian female labour only to find that they were total unsuitable as their normal daily work was tilling the fields. It was the men with their experience in making silver artefacts who had the digital dexterity.

15 See Kymlicka 1990: 262-286: *An Ethics of Care*.

16 Chekov portrays the tragedy of loving relationships in the inequality of love and desire - and their influence in power relationships. He also portrays, in his prose, the pathos which arises from the inability of individuals to communicate with one another and the resulting sense of sadness and hopelessness.

17 A situation in which the gap for the 'disadvantaged' seems to be widening. Ref: Galbraith, *Culture of Contentment*, Christopher Lasch, *Revolt of the Elite* and Will Hutton, *The State We're In*.

18 For example in Orwell's *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1937) and *Down and Out In Paris and London* (1933).

CHAPTER 5

1 That is among the writers discussed thus far. Stanley Benn in *A Theory of Freedom* sets out in his Chapter 9 'Positive Freedom as Autonomy' (TF 170-183).

2 MF Ch 8: 193-216.
3 See MF 284-5 for Raz's extensive quotation from *Utilitarianism; For and Against* Cambridge, 1973, 116-7. Raz uses this to support his explanation of how projects and relationships 'figure in practical reasoning'.

4 The question arises as to whether it is possible to have comprehensive goals which are not based on social forms. These presumably would need to be either biological in nature concerned with one's survival, security and physical needs—possibly psycho-physical, eg a sex change operation - or be entirely solipsistic, eg becoming a holy man as a final stage of a Hindu life. It is difficult to see how these could be interpreted, understood without regard to their social context. During the emergency imposed in India, in the 1970's, by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government I recall posters requesting people not to defecate or urinate in public. What about recent legal, ie social judgments about widow's fertility rights?

5 Raz gives the example of marriage - 'an ordinary conventional marriage'. Whatever the arrangement with our partner (eg an open marriage or a permanent relationship without a marriage recognized by law) these constitute deviations which 'share a perception of a social form'. As Raz says, 'The thesis that comprehensive goals are inevitably based on socially existing forms is meant to be consistent with experimentation, and with variations on a common theme and the like' (MF 309).

6 Raz gives as an example New Year resolutions.

7 Raz concludes (MF 353):

'...so people who fail to see that personal relations cannot be valued in terms of commodities are limited (in certain ways). They are incapable of having the deeper and of personal relations'.

8 See Chapter 3 (TF) 'Reasons in Conflict: Quandaries and Inconsistency'.

9 A typical example of reification is found in the expression 'corporate (or company) objectives'. This masks the substantial political process involved in the setting of objectives and constitutes part of the executive assumption that individual members will automatically share the aims set by corporate management.

See Chapter 7- MacIntyre's critique of managerialism.

10 *Negotiated Authority*, paper by Dr. A Reeve, Department of Politics, University of Warwick.


The second case is to be found in Vem Terpstra's book on International Management. (Thesis writer's notes).

12 Various reasons have been advanced for Japan's rapid post-war economic growth, eg defeat, nature of its society. An important thesis, advanced by Ronald Dore, is that of the 'late development effect'. Japan shares with other Far Eastern countries certain structural characteristics such as, the role of government in the development of industry, an educational system established prior to mass industrialization etc. (*British Factory, Japanese Factory*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1973).

13 Che Nakane *Japanese Society* (Tokyo: Charles E Tuttle, 1970). The writer distinguishes frame in situational terms, what is important is the individual's being
located within a frame, a group, e.g. a member of the Honda company. The attribute identifies the common characteristic which members of a social group share based on an ideology and identified for example, by occupation. The striking example which Nakane gives is the Indian caste based in part on kinship and occupation.


CHAPTER SIX

1 The English translation of Nietzsche's sub-title to *Ecce Homo -Wie man wird, was man ist*.

2 For the conditions of autarchy see Benn 1988: 162-164.

3 Guardian article, 23 March 1993.

4 Nehamas reminds us, that for Nietzsche it is literature which 'emerges as the model behind Nietzsche's view of the importance of character and the nature of the self. Because organization is the most crucial feature of literary characters, the quality of their actions is secondary; the significance and nature of a character's action is inseparable from its place in that organization' (Nehamas 1984: 193-4).

5 As Julian Critchley MP reminds us, Michael Heseltine as an undergraduate wrote on the back of an envelope future goal - prime minister. A foreseeable future - unrealized?

6 Along with Rorty I acknowledge the value of Chapter 6 of Nehamas (op. cit.) to my thinking in the preparation of this Chapter 6 of my thesis. (See Rorty 1989: Ch 2).

CHAPTER SEVEN


2 The manager remains MacIntyre's significant character in the managerial organization. However there has been an influx of a type of therapist into these organizations in the form of those managers and consultants concerned with the management and development of 'human resources'.

3 Tom Burns and George Stalker used these two terms to distinguish firms in a study of the difficulties they had in adjusting to continuously changing markets and technology. See *The Management of Innovation* London, Tavistock 1966.


5 Frederick Winslow Taylor published in 1911, *The Principles of Scientific Management*. As an early US management consultant his concern was to introduce measurement into process and production management. His influence was considerable, particularly upon what subsequently became known as time and motion study.

6 In *The Macdonaldization of Society*, Ritzer examines the spread of the four characteristics of bureaucraty to different types of organizations and to other fields of human activity such as the treatment of medical patients.
Disneyland is the archetypal role bureaucracy. Employees are inducted into the founder's values, given detailed instruction and training on their roles and their behaviour towards the visitors. This is evident from the film of companies examined by Peters and Waterman in their book (1982). Disneyland makes a useful contrast with the 3 M's company, between the requirement for predictability and control and the fostering of conditions favourable to innovative and entrepreneurial endeavour. (See Ch 7 4 (iii)).

At the same time the use of bureaucratic systems has spread, eg via the influx of hospital managers, growth in the number of Quangos. For an insider's view - just one among many - of the impact of managerialism upon a public sector organization see the former Head of BBC Overseas Service, John Tuso's paper (Tuso 1994).

See AV: Ch 8 for the failure of predictive power in the social sciences. Robert R Locke in his book of American management (Locke 1996) also examines failed predictive efforts in the field of economics and management. The basic argument of Locke, a history professor, is that alternative management systems (eg Germany and Japan) have been more effective in their management of the capitalist economy than the USA. This has to be seen within the context of the US as a major influence upon managerial methods and management education and development particularly in the UK but also in other parts of the world.

Doctrinal disputes over the nature of company objectives and their measurement is a continuing saga. The limitations, and the arbitrary nature, of many accounting measures is widely recognized. A key concern has been accounting for human resources as a part of the capital resources. Given the increased dependency of companies upon human software the issue appears to be a pressing one.

Julie Nightingale reported in a Guardian article (19 February 1997) that Dr Diana Leat, of the Centre for the Voluntary Sector and Not for Profit Management, had just published a report examining the differences in managing the voluntary and commercial worlds. Commenting on the movement of managers from the business to the charities and voluntary agents she concluded: "After all, what's the difference between a housing association and a business? Not a lot really in terms of the way they are managed".

Franco Crespi's, Social Action and Power has been an important influence in shaping my ideas on the nature of power in relation to organizations. In relating power to my typology of organizational cultures I have adapted Crespi's symbolic-normative dimension combining this with Abner Cohen's power distinction of formal-informal (Cohen 1974). My object is to provide a more reasoned structure on which to base my typologies of culture. This is something I find lacking in the commonly accepted ones. See Charles Handy, Understanding Organizations, Harmondsworth, Penguin (2nd edition) and Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge - The Four Keys of Effective Leadership, Harper & Row, New York, 1985. On Crespi and the nature of power see in particular Chapter 4 (op.cit) 95-118

Crespi adopts the threefold division of political powers for the organization - legislative, executive and judicial.
Corporate ambivalence at different organizational levels is, in the writer's experience, often evident in regard to corporate hospitality: one company rule for the executive another for the remainder of the staff. In one, not untypical incident field sales staff were encouraged by the company sales director to give cigarettes to the customer's showroom staff to encourage them to show preference in their selling for the company products. The sales director told his sales staffs, "But, I don't want to know about it and if you get caught you're on your own".

In *Innocence and Experience*, Stuart Hampshire draws upon his own experience and observation of events to pose the issue of the latter's confrontation with moral theory.

'Observation of politics of the immediate pre-war years first made me think about the unavoidable rift between the acclaimed virtues of innocence and the unavoidable virtues of experience. Moral theory, trying for rational coherence, has covered over the rift and the tidier picture has become a kind of orthodoxy, even though it contradicts experience' (Hampshire 1982: 12).

This threefold division of company activities was used by Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch (*Organization and Environment*, Harvard 1967) in their study of the company in its environmental situation. Together with Burns and Stalker (1961) these writers, together with others, are also known as organizational contingency theorists.

In the 1980's a good deal of attention has been paid by practitioners and writers on management to the experience of Japan in the fit of the individual with the company. (See for example: Pascale R.T. and Athos A.G *The Art of Japanese Management*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1982 and Ouchi W.G. *Theory Z*, Reading Ma., Addison-Wesley 1981). The recruiters for the larger Japanese companies gave priority to the individual's character and his potential to 'fit in' rather than upon his academic achievements. The latter were virtually taken as read given the sources from which they were recruiting.

In regard to contracts of employment the vast majority of these are not formal written documents. They are mainly in the form of a letter offering, with company conditions, employment to which the individual responds with a letter of acceptance. However in the event of a difference with the company, either in the case of a formal contract or a letter, what becomes important is the substantive - psychological - contract which the employee believes he/she made.

Peter Drucker has written extensively on the management of 'non-profits' in which he applauds their capacity to engage and motivate the individual, without the usual corporate material rewards. However, his main work was written before the transfer, at least in the UK, of managerial methods from the profit making sector.

Forms of rewards and punishment are subtle. An example of the latter is, that if one falls into the corporate executive's disfavour one no longer finds one's name as a recipient of company memos in alphabetical order but at the bottom of the list. Next step is to leave one's name off the list of recipients and send a copy marked - for information only. Finally one no longer receives a copy and has to be contented with what is picked up on the departmental grapevine. At this stage the competent victim is probably preparing his 'escape kit'.

Individual and group behaviour is a major topic among organizational theorists. Because of space limitations I have foregone a detailed discussion on the nature of managerial power. I have chosen Presthus's model since this accords broadly with
my own empirical observations. Of particular interest is the behaviour of those members of specialist groups found in the 'hi-tech' company where group norms play a significant role and among which are found the ambivalents.

22 In terms of their quest for personal autonomy the upward mobile may forego their procedural autonomy in favour of a long term prospect of substantive autonomy.

23 Presthus accounts for the frequency of the indifferent in the government bureaucracy as the result of efforts to serve three masters the elected politician as legislator, the current executive in power and the departmental hierarchy in which he works.

24 As one might expect it is among the ambivalents that one finds a priority given to internal rather than external goods.

CHAPTER EIGHT..

1 Will Hutton describes the current employment situation as 'The thirty, thirty, forty society'. The first sector are the disadvantaged, mainly the unemployed, the second the marginalized and insecure, i.e. the part-time and casual workers and the third are the privileged, the full time and self employed (Hutton 1995). Anthony Barnett is concerned with the demise of middle class expectations of job security (Sampson 1995).

2 There is an abundance of texts on this topic but see in particular Clegg 1990: Ch 7, 176-207.

3 Keat (Keat et al 1994: 6) identifies Bauman as having 'put the role of consumption at the centre of the operation of the social world. A new epoch of western society is being established in which the search for self-identity through acts of consumption is a key practice'. See also Alan Wardle's paper, Consumers, identity and belonging: reflections on some theses of Zygmunt Bauman (Keat op. cit).

4 Giddens refers to the 'late modern world - the world of what I call high modernity - its apocalyptic, not because it is inevitably heading towards calamity, but because it introduces risks which previous generations have not had to face' (Giddens: 1991: 4). Wagner refers to the two major crises of modernity which Western societies have experienced since their inception. 'First, attempts to restructure the social order accumulated during the second half of the nineteenth century, and between the closing years of that century and the end of the First World War, the practices of modernity were set on a new social path. Second, from the 1960's onwards, doubts about the adequacy of the mode of social organization have again increased, and social practices are being restructured' (Wagner 1994: 31)

5 McMylor quotes as an example of 'what MacIntyre has taken to be the spurious theatricality of managerial power', the use of financial data by the National Coal Board. Described by one leading accountant as 'a supreme masterpiece of obfuscation' - worthless for the purpose of identifying uneconomic pits (McMylor 1994:167). I am unaware of any attempt, made at the time to compute the social costs of closure.

6 Professor John Stewart, a University of Birmingham specialist in local government, describes the current Quangocracy as a new form of tutelage.
The concluding section of this chapter has benefited considerably from my study of Alain Touraine's, *Critique de la Modernité* (1992), now available as a translation by David Macey (Blackwell 1995).

Holmes (1993: Ch 5) attacks Lasch as anti-Promethean, quoting from *The True and Only Heaven* (New York, Norton 1991): "our society has taken a wrong turn" and we have fallen into "moral and cultural disorder" (ibid. 125).

Politicians' acceptance of its reality, eg major acts of the Thatcher government, the end of exchange control and big bang; the wariness of Blair's Labour party to a detailing of its proposed fiscal and financial plans for fear of upsetting domestic and international capital markets.

When we buy a car how many unknown others in the sequence of productive and distributive operations do we depend upon for our own safety? The recent deception case involving Baring's and Nick Leeson shows the trust placed by Baring's customers in their management and the management's trust in Leeson as an honest company trader in derivatives: a symbolic and abstract market apparently beyond their experience in which subsequent events put a figure on the risk involved. There was no doubt about the degree of autonomy Baring's management were content to see Leeson take. The failings appear to have been in the system of accountability, in managerial expertise, in Leeson's character and his notions of responsibility.

The subject of the overall direction of the company is no longer taught in MBA progammes as general management or business policy but as strategic management. This focuses upon the corporate capacity to cope with complexity, conflict and contingency.

It is perhaps too early to conclude that on the issue of employment we face, in Thomas Kuhn's words, 'a paradigm shift'.

The entrepreneur is found in my fourfold typology of organizational cultures; a Branson in the personal, Harvey Jones in the formalistic ICI, Barry Manson in collegiate Oxford Instruments. Among the supportive the role of the social entrepreneur is key, eg Lord Young who, among his many ventures, conceived the idea of the Open University.

The national lottery appears in its relations with the government to be an example of a 'hands off fostering'.

The issue of boundaries is explored by Walzer (1983: Ch 4). and more recently by Keat (1991: Ch 7 216-230). Keat draws upon MacIntyre's concept of practice and its associated institutions and the extent to which these 'might be damaged or undermined by being subject to the kinds of forced operating in a free market economy' (ibid. 222).
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