DISCOURSE ON THE QUESTION OF INCOMPLETION

BY

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

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March 2001
‘At the limit reason becomes an insoluble question for itself and it might then seem as if it gives in to the absurd of its own accord. But such is not the case if one wishes to see more lucidly (perhaps also painfully). The absurd cannot destroy the reasonable because reason brings about in and of itself that which the irrational does from the outside: its own endless questioning. This is precisely where man prevails over negation: he does not prevail in a decisive victory, after which rest and sleep would be granted him; he prevails by way of the doubt that awakening is’

Georges Bataille, from ‘Notes on the Victim and the Executioner’
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Acknowledgements

True to its subject of incompletion this work has produced many difficulties. Firstly, I would like to acknowledge the support and generous help that has been given to me by my two supervisors, Peter Wagner and Robert Fine. I also want to thank them for the friendship they have shown me throughout the years. However, the most important thing I have received from Robert and Peter is something that contains the above qualities but that also goes beyond them as well - this is the faith they have had in me from the very start of this work. Their faith in me has been unwavering since the time of my MA at The University of Warwick and their steadfast knowledge and guidance has been my touchstone ever since.

This work has also taken place within a period of great difficulty for me and so I also want to thank those who have given of themselves in order to give me much needed personal support and help. The main two people who have given me this invaluable gift have been my parents. In this respect I would also like to give my heartfelt gratitude to Philip Bartholomew, Michael Cassidy David Reeves and Malcolm Rowse. Without the diversity of help that has been provided by all these people this work would not exist.

I am also grateful to the University of Warwick for providing me with the necessary funding that I needed to do this work, and I want to express my thanks to The Department of Sociology at the University of Warwick for providing me with the much needed academic and administrative resources for my project.
Declaration of inclusion of material from a prior Thesis

Part of Chapter 5 draws upon and further develops the ideas from my MA thesis which was entitled 'Foucault and the problem of incompletion', as well as from my article 'The problem of incompletion: self, thought and community in post-structuralist philosophy' (Leyshon, 1998). It was within my MA thesis where I first theorised an initial conception of incompletion through the work of Michel Foucault and the way in which he thought the problematic of selfhood. I confirm that the MA thesis and the published article were all my own work and that neither them or this PhD thesis have been submitted for a degree at another university.
Summary

This study presents a discourse on the question of incompletion and simultaneously inaugurates the development of a critical approach to contemporary social and political questions concerning selfhood, thought and community in terms of incompletion. Such a strategy has taken place on two main levels in this work. Firstly, there is a close textual reading and analysis of texts where the question of incompletion has been engaged with. Secondly, there is a historical/social analysis of existing institutions, this is a secondary analysis of how the United Nations can be conceived in terms of completion or incompletion in relation to the quest for community. A major part of the close textual reading deals with French post-structuralist writers such as Bataille, Derrida, Foucault and Jean Luc Nancy. These writers are of interest in this work to the extent that they think central problematics of the philosophical tradition as necessarily and unavoidably incomplete. An important tension in the work of these writers is explored by showing that they theorise the central concepts of the self, thought and community as being impossible to resolve in any reachable present and yet they also do not abandon these central problematics either. The theoretical task entails bridging the gap between the deconstructive and the constructive, the nihilistic and the utopian within post-structuralism itself, and this, paradoxically, is to attempt an agitated reconciliation. Such a reconciliation may only act to deepen the difficulties to be found within the thought of such writers, but the theorization of incompletion does ultimately seek to both comprehend and critique contemporary difficulties surrounding the questions of community and selfhood.
List of Abbreviations

Books


Organisations

APEC: Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation

EFA: European Free-trade Association

EPZ: Export Processing Zone

HIC: High income Country

ICFTU: International Confederation of the Free Trade Unions

IMF: International Monetary Fund

LIC: Low Income Country

NATO: Northern Alliance Treaty Organisation

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NIC: Newly Industrialised Country

OAU: Organisation for African Unity

OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPEC: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

SCR: Security Council Resolution

TNC: Trans-National Company

UN: United Nations

UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

WTO: World Trade Organisation
Introduction

'You are good when you are fully awake in your Speech.
Yet you are not evil when you sleep while your Tongue staggers without purpose.
And even stumbling speech may strengthen a weak tongue.'

Kahlil Gibran, The Prophet.

1.

The phrase "this is not a conclusion or even a beginning" runs throughout this work, even when it is not actually present in the text. The phrase signals the difficulty of writing about and within incompletion. This phrase is not meant to open up to an attempt to arrest the beginning of the work, or to preclude any substantive ending. However, it is an attempt to avoid - in the words of Gillian Rose -

"Striving to begin and end in the same paragraph [an attempt which] arises from trying to think together the lessons of "Hegel" and "Kierkegaard" without the former's so-called "determinism", and without the latter's oblique, non-homogenous Incursions into "the universal correlative connections of human history" at scandalous moments of paradox.' (Rose, 1992:8)

This work attempts development of a critical perspective by engaging with aporia rather than by trying to escape from aporia into certainty, so working from within what Rose has termed 'the aporetic universal' (Rose, 1992:164) - a universal that constantly re-figures itself in terms of 'perplexity'. In fact, according to Gillian Rose, philosophical consciousness proceeds 'unevenly through the stumbling blocks of personified aporia after personified aporia as
each configured concept is mismatched to its object and corrected by a newly configured concept mismatched to its object, again - and then again.' (Rose, 1992:10). This is not a work upon the work of Gillian Rose, but this thesis does engage with the concerns of her work. Rose is here used to introduce the thematics of this work, but this work seeks to develop beyond the position that Rose herself reached. This thesis also develops out of a dissatisfaction with the position that Rose established and maintained through her writing.

Aporetic universalism explores and experiments with the disunity of singular and universal in time and through time - so always avoiding the eschatology of completion. Eschatology of completion can be in the form of the leap of faith needed to have begun and to think there is no need to return to the beginning in order to reconfigure it again, or it can be the certainty that one has finished and finally unified the universal, the singular and the particular now and for all time. As Gillian Rose has said, the issue is to "begin again by developing the beginning" (Rose, 1992:6) - to always end by expanding upon what the end has become.

Instead, the phrase 'this is not a conclusion or even a beginning' is designed to point toward an important tension in the work of many post-structuralist writers which has been revealed in this work by showing that they theorise the central concepts of the self, thought and community as being impossible to resolve in any reachable present and yet that they do not abandon these problematics either. In other words, such writers theorise the central concepts of self, community and our ability to think these things (thought itself) in terms of the impossibility of totality and absolute reconciliation. And so this thesis develops by constructing a critical
perspective around the notion of incompletion and post-structuralism simultaneously. The development of this critical perspective presupposes aporia and does not attempt to assimilate it or exclude it. Yet, this thesis is not a move to dismantle the concept and the possibility of reconciliation; theorising incompletion is more an attempt to found a concept that focuses upon the difficulty of founding the concept. In other words, incompletion attempts to begin at the point where 'the beginning can no longer be made by presupposing the concept any more than it can be made by denigrating the system' (Rose, 1992:10). So, with such a task in mind, how did I proceed? How is it possible to introduce the concept of the work when what is at stake in the body of the work is that very concept? In answer it is Gillian Rose who has written 'We are now - and have been - beginning by coming to recognize the occlusions and stumbling blocks lying across the beginning' (Rose, 1992:10). So the beginning is always suspended within itself, it is kept unresolved in its constant reconfiguration. So how can an introduction configure the concept of the work without itself being only another possible reconfiguration of the beginning? The introduction's concept of the concept of the work remains suspended in a restless reconfiguration. Can a concept, thought, a community, can anything sustain itself within a constant reconfiguration that maintains the necessity of a pre-determined gesture (repeated at the moment it has ceased)?

In this work I wanted to present the development of my thought as it occurred in terms of aporia, disclosing it as it emerged through the course of time, as the concept of incompletion searched for its own adequate presentation. However the concept of incompletion can never, because of
what it attempts to present and comprehend, be completed as a finite idea or as the sublime unity of an infinite concept. So the development of this work proceeded, as it must proceed, 'unevenly...as each configured concept is mismatched to its object and corrected by a newly configured concept mismatched to its object, again - and then again' (Rose, 1992:10). For this reason it was written (from day one of my PhD), having not been 'written-up' after a set period of 'research'; the writing process was itself an intrinsic and creative part of the process of the whole thesis. The writing started with an exchange between fragmentary ideas expressed in short stories and anecdotes; then little by little, unexpected relations took form. So instead of offering a unified theoretical statement of purpose which would have prevented any emergent relations occurring, the emergent relations themselves were encouraged to change the form and considerations of the concept of the work itself, so forcing the reconfiguration of its beginning. This repetition of reconfiguring the beginning is exactly what should happen in any truly reflexive theoretical work.

So the phrase 'this is not a conclusion or even a beginning' points toward Gillian Rose's notion that we should always begin within 'the middle'. For Gillian Rose 'the middle' means - put quite simply - convergence.

'At the world's end, just before everything stops, there may not be a war going on, but it is where broken lines of contested frontiers converge' (Dunn, 1986)

Of course, everything does not stop, the world doesn't end, and the convergence continues along the broken lines and across the fractured terrain of modernity - the convergence continues to take shape in the finite
suffering of the moment. In the moment convergence is never complete for it constantly reconfigures its own form and possibility, so in this way there can be seen to be both convergence and a breaking apart. The convergence is the third, the 'struggle' (agon), between the oppositional terms of the finite and the infinite, the universal and the singular, the actual and the possible (the possible and the impossible), a struggle that can never be absolutely resolved. In this way the middle is always 'failing toward and away from form' (Rose, 1992:84), being simultaneously a coming together and a breaking apart - for this Rose has employed the term 'diremption'. For Gillian Rose, such diremptions between oppositional couples are always at the heart of any substantial social and political thought. Within such a lack of resolution the worst thing to do, for Rose, would be to leap toward a form of completion and certainty. For Rose, such a leap would be an act of despair in the face of seemingly irresolvable difficulties. To understand what despair means for Rose, it is illuminating to quote the following passage that Rose herself has quoted from Kierkegaard -

'for despair is always the infinite, the eternal, the total, at the instant of impatience; and all despair is a kind of bad temper' (Kierkegaard, 1968:492).

Instead, Rose argues, we must write from faith and not despair - faith and possibility. Yet faith and possibility, even more than despair (in order to avoid becoming despair), must not finish the beginning in the end. Faith must always return to the equivocation of the middle and not leap toward eschatology. Equivocation is the defining word concerning what the notion of 'the middle' means - 'equivocal: of double or doubtful meaning, questionable,
liable to suspicion; equivocation: sound made when hesitating in speech' (Dictionary definition, 1988, emphasis added). And it is in the equivocation of the middle where we can find the previously mentioned tension in the work of many post-structuralist writers. The main post-structuralist writers that are covered in this context, within this work, are Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Georges Bataille, and Jean Luc Nancy. However, there are other writers in this vein, who have often been coined 'postmodern', who have walked away from the possibilities of keeping within the equivocation of the middle. The reason for such a retreat is simply that the incompletion that the middle entails is difficulty itself and so is fraught with the weighty form of irresolvable tensions and scandalous moments of paradox. The middle is a place that is always uncomfortable and it is an easy place to leave! In other words, the equivocation of the middle, ' - the Janus-faces of our failing - makes us flee, existentially, or in commentary and criticism, in one way or another to the beginning' (Rose, 1992:85).

However, the paradox for Rose is that the more we reach for the beginning, to attempt completion, the more we look into 'the anxiety of beginning and the beginning of anxiety' (Rose ,1992:85), the more we are returned back to the middle - this is the movement of repetition backwards and forwards. This is a repetition that 'pivots around the equivocal middle and yields a persistently ethical reflection' (Rose, 1992:85). And this is the difficulty of an ethical labour, which cannot (must not) announce the ethical Law once and for all, now and for all time, this is our finite suffering. It is here that we come across another major convergence and breaking apart, and this
is to be found in the modern diremption between Law and Ethics.

2.

In conflict with Rose's idea of aporetic universalism, incompletion does not posit resolution as a given possibility. The contention here is that this is in conflict with Gillian Rose's notion of aporetic universalism because throughout her work she presupposes that aporia can give way to diaporia and that diaporia may, in turn, give form to resolution. This view is often present in her work despite her persistently aporetic stance - there are signs of it that one can follow down the trail toward an assumptive synthesis. On the other hand, incompletion presupposes that intelligibility, transparent discourse and synthesis cannot be presupposed at all. Whereas Gillian Rose's work seems to be always open to the possibility of resolution, the difference is that incompletion is equally open to the possibility of its own collapse, the possibility that the attempt to found a concept that focuses upon the difficulty of founding the concept may only result in the failure of conceptuality itself. The overriding understanding behind such openness to failure and collapse is that such openness is necessary if any true risk is to be taken in the act of theorising - in the act of writing itself. Or strangely, as Rose herself writes, 'The art of power is "freedom": how to be always all-ready for anxiety. Creation ex nihilo may be inconceivable, but destruction ex nihilo is the beginning, the onset of all intelligibility' (Rose, 1992:88).

In fact, negation is inseparable from the creative and affirmative act of reconfiguration. And negation is what this work engages with as a utopian rather than as a nihilistic aspect of thought, so bringing together the
oppositional motifs of absence and presence, destruction and creation in the prodigious ambiguity of 'the middle'. However, this is not a coming together in the homogeneity of a unifying concept, it is as much a breaking apart of these very terms themselves. What must always be present in this breaking apart is the danger and threat of melancholia and failure. So, within incompleteness, the abyss of thought as its own impossibility is the always present risk in the act of writing in terms of incompleteness.

This is why I am here using the word 'convergence' to rearticulate Rose's notion of 'the middle'. The word convergence means the movement of elements toward the same point, but it does not mean that the elements in convergence will form a harmonious resolution once they meet. The convergence can easily become a collision, a breaking apart of form, as the middle consumes itself in its own equivocal expression - in which case the possible harmony can be impossible to distinguish from the possible disharmony. Gillian Rose's thought is by no means homogenizing but her desire that the 'broken middle' be mended can blind her to the insight of her own thought, which is that, within the equivocation of the middle, within a constant renegotiation of meaning, any process of 'mending' would have to be opened up itself to a renewed brokenness, only to be opened up to a renewed movement of mending. However, it is exactly such blind spots in theory where incompleteness can be found. Instead of keeping within such a restless movement, Rose assumes that the diremptions of modernity will develop through restless relations toward universal substance.

Instead of a movement into a dialectic that still insinuates harmony there is, in this work, a movement toward absence as the middle - as being the
‘true’ aspect of possibility within temporality. Temporality is itself theorised as an absence where 'time and eternity touch each other...[as] time constantly intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time' (Kiekegaard, 1980:89). Incompletion attempts to begin and end by addressing this absence without reserve - a beginning that can never be left, an ending that can never be finished.

3.

The work progressed by figuring the concept of incompletion by posing it in terms of an historically specific question concerning the social and political milieu and so making that milieu, and the problematic itself, open to temporality and change. Making this problematic historically specific keeps drawing the work back to the possibilities of conventional social theories that always stressed history and social change. In relation to this move, the perplexities concerning the aporia of thought are re-articulated through contemporary social and political issues, so further developing the problem of constructing a satisfactory concept of incompletion itself. A large section has been given over to looking at issues of community on a global level with regards to the UN. The sustainability of an idea of community gives focus to the aporias generated in the foundation of politics and philosophy so opening up the aporias within the founding of the concept itself. This is done by looking at the possibilities and difficulties that writers such as Gillian Rose, Jacques Derrida, Jean Francois Lyotard and Jean Luc Nancy have come across in trying to address contemporary issues of community and politics.

The underlying starting point of this work is the conviction that if we
manage to stay in the unease of keeping the self, community, and thought itself as incomplete forms, then we succeed in keeping with the central exigencies of social and political thought - those of reflexivity, creativity and vitality. In these terms it is also the case that this actual piece of work paradoxically 'succeeds' as discourse if it itself remains incomplete and inoperative as a finished totality of speech. It is in this sense that the 'Discourse on the Question of Incompletion' is itself an organic entity, not a mechanical process and finished as such. Instead it explores its terrain – the terrain of incompletion. This exploration may only serve to produce yet more questions and uncertainties, maybe even multiplying them - but this can be seen here as positive development rather than as negative dissemination. This is in line with the above stated objective in relation to the maintenance of the exigencies of social and political thought. The argument here is that, in order to keep these exigencies, the social and political must enter its own absence. So in this work emptiness is seen as something positive founded as negativity, and this is the productive presence of absence.

A central argument here is that much post-structuralist discourse is both nihilistic and utopian in nature because it seeks to deconstruct present forms of thought in relation to established concepts of the self and community in order to explore new possible configurations and variations of these. However, any new conceptions cannot be complete in the present because they would then just be part of present conceptuality. So there remains a

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1 The term 'deconstitution' is used throughout this work to mean the process of taking apart form - this term describes a more general process at work in post-structuralism as opposed to the more specific method of deconstruction via Derrida.
nihilistic absence in the present but this absence is productive of new possibilities. In this way the potential of post-structuralism will be shown to be not a reflection of deconstruction alone, but that it aims towards the exigency to create something ‘new’, a creation that remains incomplete. The theoretical task then is to bridge the gap between the deconstructive and the constructive, the nihilistic and the utopian within post-structuralism itself, and this, paradoxically, is to attempt an agitated reconciliation, so returning once more to the equivocation of the middle through productive absence.

Another central claim being made here is that post-structuralism is not a ‘unified’, complete discourse, but that it is an agitated process in thought and writing that necessarily aims beyond present conceptuality and so it aims beyond itself - it aims at its own demise. This agitation within the present is something that Bataille elaborates as an ‘unceasing agitation of “the possible” and the impossible’ (Bataille, No.79: 39), working at the extreme limit of the possible. This leads onto the contention being made throughout this work that incomplete theorising is the attempt at a reconciliation that entails an understanding of its function as theory to be aiming towards (and back-to) a certain modernist conception of art whose main drive is toward a type of violent creation of the possible, an essentially utopian stirring. This violent creation occurs at the limits - the limits of knowledge and the limits of what constitutes us as social, ethical and political beings.
Chapter One - Stories toward incompletion

‘How does newness come into the world? How is it born? Of what fusions, translations, conjoinings is it made? How does it survive, extreme and dangerous as it is? What compromises, what deals, what betrayals of its secret nature must it make to stave off the wrecking crew, the exterminating angel, the guillotine? Is birth always a fall?’

Salman Rushdie, from ‘The Satanic Verses’

‘At the world’s end, just before everything stops, there may not be a war going on, but it is where broken lines of contested frontiers converge’

Douglas Dunn, from ‘The Deserter’

1. The Longest Journey

I am writing about things which happened a long time ago. At the moment I am in a small wooden boat with a shrewd looking man rowing it; he faces me as he rows and constantly chatters away to himself. Now and again the boatman and I argue, usually about whether I have already paid for the journey. These arguments are the result of him constantly pestering me for another coin, requests and hints which I ignore until I finally get wound up to the point of nervous exhaustion and start to insult him - insults which he returns readily. Due to my exhaustion, and much to my shame, the insults quickly deteriorate into childish remarks concerning each other’s appearance or mannerisms. Apart from the depressing squabbling I am always silent
nowadays; the reason for this is not due to any kind of rudeness or shyness – it's just that I no-longer know who and even what I am. The boat has been moving in the same direction now for what seems like a very long time. It also seems as though the sun is just about to rise upon this calm water, this means that everything is forever a deep iridescent blue.

I am writing about the time when I was a boy (before all this happened) and a factory chimney was demolished in my hometown. However, you should remember that while I am writing on this boat I am also standing in a dark room with bare featureless walls. Remember that in the room I am standing over a well dressed man who is bound to a plain wooden chair which is placed in the centre of the room under the glare of a single light-bulb; I am speaking to that man as follows –

At the end the last movement will be that of a rusted wheel clicking around one more time, a wheel that had edges painted blue - a childhood held within this dreamless colour. This wheel is turning now but itself moves nothing.

The last report has been issued; all the actors have long ago ceased to believe in their roles.

I have already lied to you, lying has become a habit, an addiction, that helps me believe in my own reality. All the reports have not been issued, filed away and forgotten. There is one more report to be made and it is mine: it is the last document.

One last command arrived, from where I don't know, and with its arrival I think I understand a little of my situation. This is what the command said -
'Like you I have trembled and cursed. From my origin I developed to my present form, now when I close my eyes I can still see. Now I am dead you must blind me. Close the doorways, shut the files, burn the books, write the last report.'

Well it kind of makes sense after all that has happened. I look into the night sky, see nameless stars and smile. No more communication - well that's it then...if I could just...touch that colour blue, but of all things this is not possible and even if it were...what would be the point? The last report, well then...if you were in my position (if there could be someone in my position) you might ask if you had missed something. You might ask yourself if everything ever sent was filed away and stored, if everything was taken into account - everything. You might even worry if you'd done something wrong, I must admit that a feeling of guilt passes through me... but this quickly turns to laughter. I might as well start.

It's strange to exist so surely and then, quite suddenly really, one just starts to deteriorate like an old dog no-one wants anymore - realising that you have ceased to exist...

Sometimes even I come to believe in the reality of the forms and objects of your world - it must be so easy to step once and for all into that half reality. But at times like this I know the permanence of such things is an illusion. I endure to watch them dissolve back into the shadows as they fall back into their reflections, watching as their reflections in turn ripple and disperse.

Now it may seem obvious that the sort of knowledge that I could have of
reflections would be much vaguer and more uncertain than that which I could have of their originals. However, I assure you my friend, all one has to do is hang around long enough and one will invariably become better acquainted with the shadows and reflections than the ‘original’ form and substance. All you need is time, time to gaze and time to wait, then you would realise that the forms are reflected upon the surface of an immense unavoidable ocean upon which they float for a while before being engulfed once more. It is in this sense that the reflections, in their distortion and transparency, are nearer to the ‘truth’ of things than the seemingly concrete originals.

Suns rise and fall, galaxies form and disperse only to reform and fade again - everything is sacrificed to this endless movement. It is this movement, above everything else (and not your ignorance or mistakes) that prevents and squanders your naïve labours toward happiness and perfection. And if you still want to try measuring, numbering and weighing everything, and by that method attempt to overcome the confusions and ‘contradictions’ of experience - if by that method you hope to rise above the mess and turmoil to something which approaches knowledge - then, please understand, you will only come nearer to me and it is I who will be the measure of you.

Then you will realise your greatest error was to suppose that your immediate experience consisted of inconsistencies and to think of these as clues that you must piece together in order to tread the narrow path toward wisdom and knowledge. Here is your greatest error because in looking behind the world of appearances you only act to dismantle the only solidity
and reason that you can possibly hope for, and the more you search the closer you get to the realisation that you are not walking along a path but are in fact falling, falling, and you always have been. You will come apart as I have done, and it is then that we will meet, in increasing darkness I will consume you. I am everything you can never measure, everything you can never think.... Everyday it is the same; the department's business goes on and on, and they giggle and day-dream and file reports - little do they realise that I am writing the last report...

'This isn't very convincing' this interruption comes from the ageing man tied to the chair. As the bound man speaks he looks up at me.

'It's just not very convincing' comes this time whispered from his mouth, 'I mean, for a start, why do you think you are filing “the last report”?'

This last remark is asked with a kind of calm authority, in reply to it there comes from me a hiss of what could be frustration. I scream back at him that he knows nothing about me. In response to this outburst the man again looks up into my face and chuckles almost to himself. His eyes reveal nothing apart from the presence of some strong urge or desire; he begins to speak -

'If you want to compare our suffering then I cannot answer you' he pauses before he continues. ‘However, I once visited a chess tournament, the competition had entered the final stage and the two left playing had been at it for hours. The tension was thick in the air. It was unclear if a stalemate was inevitable and so one had been waiting for the other to move for a long time - both were frozen to the spot. Each player was trying to discern something in
the configuration of the pieces that they had missed or was trying to discover a mistake that they themselves had made in an otherwise faultless lay-out. I can tell you now, it was fascinating to watch and every onlooker stood there mesmerised.

Then suddenly it happened - one of the players grabbed the chessboard and flung it across the room. For an instant there was complete silence as the two players looked up from where the game had been and stared into each other’s eyes. I watched this and saw that there was no hate or anger in their eyes - they were completely opaque. Then in the next instant the two ex-chess players fell upon each other and in all my days I have never seen such desperation as they bit and scratched and bellowed.

It took many of us to drag them apart and just now, while you were talking, I was wondering what would have happened if no-one else was present apart from the two ex-chess players. It was then, yes, just now, that I think I truly understood you. You are like the chess player that starts to perceive that the game may be futile, so he has a desire to walk away into the world beyond the room and the game. His mistake is to consider that the game and he are two exclusive elements, not understanding that the game and he do not wholly exclude each other. The difference between you and the ex-chess player is that he discovered his mistake, for in destroying the game he only further entered what he sought to disown.’

He pauses again and lowers his head. Grabbing my hair in desperation I ask him incredulously whether he thinks we are playing a game; at this he
smiles.

‘I can’t be sure’ he whispers, ‘but I think we are among those who did not understand the significance of chess.’

Once more he pauses before he begins to speak again.

2. The Tower

Rain is beautiful when it first falls outside a window on a quiet evening. After some days without respite the same rain quickly loses its beauty and becomes stale; just like unending classical music will eventually choke itself in the confines of a room. After days and days of such rain all my music had suffocated.

I stood with my back to my wife as she sat hunched over my desk just gazing into its surface. She was looking at nothing and I was also gazing at nothing because we only had each other to look at; we had been in that room for a long time. As usual we were arguing, hurting each other in my flat as the rain died outside, and as usual she was doing the same as she always did – just sitting there, still and silent. It was all so cruel, so useless and cruel.

‘Well answer me or are you stupid!’ she never answered my questions. I watched a slight tear fall from the edge of her eye and she just stared; the more she stared and the more she cried the more angry I became. I wanted her to listen and understand, I wanted her to see it my way, but she just stared.
‘You come up here and throw my life away and then you expect me to be calm and rational about it all!’ and with my words there just came more rage because she wasn’t answering me. So shouting I turned to glare at her hunched form which looked at that moment only stubborn and ignorant.

‘I don’t know exactly what I want’ she choked out eventually ‘but it isn’t just your life that’s involved here; can’t you see – there’s nothing left here anymore, don’t you see?’

I didn’t see, I really didn’t see why she was doing this and throwing it all away and at that moment it seemed to me the fact she could just sit there and cry showed a true lack of feeling. I held myself with a steel vice and if I let go at that moment I was terrified of what would happen to me and to the world – what terrible manifestations would my grief evoke in the room or even upon the horizon outside. I sat down on the edge of the bed, upon our bed. Our features were too harsh in the grey afternoon light, our faces were too brittle, everything could just shatter apart.

How could a marriage end so young was the question I was asking myself over and over, but my answer was that I knew she wouldn’t really leave tonight – you see we had had this argument so many times before and it always resolved itself. I told myself that we would go for a walk in a while and everything would calm down...and I desperately needed a drink.

Then she quickly stood up and looked directly at me.

‘I’m going!’ her voice was strange and alien ‘there’s no point with you anymore’. She turned to go and I jumped up and grabbed her shoulders.
‘You just can’t go!’ I shouted ‘You just can’t come here and leave this!’

I was incredulous, as we stood face to face I wanted her to feel my rage but more than this I wanted her to recognise my pain…my shock…my fear. She had moved to the door of the room, at this point her face softened and she told me that she didn’t want it to end this way. I could suddenly see what I had missed all this time. There was a desperation in her eyes which I did not quite understand and I thought that if I just reached out and touched her gently in that room…yet something had collapsed, and in horror from some far off corner of the room I watched myself scream at her that everything had its nature and that such was the nature of endings. I remember thinking from some other place what a ridiculously cerebral phrase this was.

She still stood at the door, saying we could be friends. Somewhere something had collapsed. I sneered and called her a fool. Then she looked at me with hatred.

‘You’re destroying everything!’ she shouted.

I told her she always had to be the moral one, so innocent and virtuous, I told her that in fact she was just weak….I told her.

‘You’ she spoke softly now ‘I can’t do this anymore’

It was too late…just to hold her.

‘You’

Disgust in her eyes, I was falling.

‘I’m leaving’

Too late.
All I remember is the next moment she was gone from the room and I stood suddenly still and helpless. I heard the front door shut; she didn't slam it, the number of times she had slammed it after an argument - that was the frightening thing - the way she shut the door firmly, quietly, finally.

She never opened that door again. The door clicked shut at about six o'clock, at first I was very calm, I even watched the local news on television. The rain had stopped, the T.V hummed; I sat and stared at colours on T.V and fell and fell.

'In 1860's Russia, Dostoevsky wrote –

"we don’t know where to place our allegiance, what to hang onto to; what to love and what to hate, what to respect and what to despise. We even find it difficult to be human beings – and try to be some kind of imaginary general type. We are stillborn, and for a long time we have not been begotten of living fathers and this pleases us more and more. We are acquiring the taste. Before long we’ll think up a way of being somehow begotten by an idea" (Dostoevsky, 1991:123)'

Then a year had passed since all that happened and my wife left me. I had thought a lot about that evening and about her, her memory distorted like a drunken retina. It was January 10th, a listless January and I couldn't stop the feeling of hopelessness. I was sitting drinking whiskey, staring out of the bedroom window at the daylight outside. I was thinking that when I was with my wife I didn’t really think of her that much...I suppose she was always something that was safe in my mind, a kind of reassurance. I felt unsafe and
ill and I remember thinking of a memory I had from early childhood, it kept recurring in my head.

I must have been twelve years old at the time. I remember that I’d just finished my work at the supermarket and was walking home through dusty summer streets. It was such a peaceful evening, there was a shy wind and only a few cars passed my way. About halfway home I knew that I would turn the next corner and the old factory chimney would come into view. It would be there, dirty and irrelevant. It would be right down the other end of the street and it would loom large even before I got near its base. At that age I remember I was impressed with it. It couldn’t be moved, it couldn’t be bowed by anyone or anything. Smoke had never poured from it and so, although I knew it was actually an old industrial chimney, I imagined it as a mysterious pinnacle - dark, immortal, powerful. When I stood directly below the chimney the sky seemed to lean in towards it like a tower cut out of a fairy tale. The tower enveloped me and I saw the city bow down toward it. I felt it like one feels a mountain, like one feels the sun.

As usual I walked past it on my way home. That day was strange because the streets were so quiet and still. I remember I felt like I was walking through water. I walked in this underworld for a while and then just stopped still for no real reason - the air was suddenly filled with a presence. No-one was moving, no one was there to move; it was just me and slowly gathering bits of panic – gathering together to make something happen.

I was anticipating something and I remember the actual sound so well
when it came. I remember the cutting scream of the siren, only then I did not know what it was. I only heard a deadly wail that shattered into tiny shards. I spun round instinctively. All I remember after that is the sound of an explosion, a violent thump that went through the air and was over as soon as it began. I looked to see the victim of this sound, I looked in apprehension to see a man fall in an unknown street. Instead I saw a thick cloud enveloping the bottom of my tower, and then with morbid wonder I saw it fall ever so gradually. It twisted and finally buckled like a broken leg. A rumble filled the air as my planet fell and disappeared from out of sight.

Of course it was just a chimney and the council had decided to demolish it. The silence before hand was because the area had been cleared; they must have missed me. Nobody told me and nobody explained it to me because nobody thought it mattered. There is one last fragment - this is the image of me standing still and helpless as the last glow of the sunset caught the cloud around the rubble, making it seem cunning and alive. The sky seemed too large, a wound across the horizon.

Its funny in a way, I always felt that if the tower fell it would pull the sky down with it like torn curtains and let the darkness in. Of course nothing happened and the mild clouds drifted by as before, indifferent. Strange that I remember that now, that feeling of knowing indifference; to feel numb and watch the clouds drift by overhead and feel the ocean stir just below my feet. I feel the indifference of it all just like when the tower first vanished from sight. Yet I am shocked now to find that, in fact, a hole has been torn in the sky,
that a thing has entered through it, the terrifying and liberating knowledge that
something completely new and unforeseen can happen.

While I’ve been writing a sea bird has settled on the boat and I know that
the ocean is not endless and quite suddenly I start laughing and the bird
takes off into the lightening sky, spiralling as if falling.

3. Shadows

‘Let me tell you this story’ says the ageing man, ‘Once upon a time in a land
of towers there was once a princess who seemed to live far beyond
everything. In innocence she took a needle and thread to her white virgin
dress and started to embroider it. Through the years she slowly created
multi-coloured patterns upon her plain dress and in time the pattern was thick
and rich, shimmering with beads and rings – memories of fables once
cherished. In dark satin pools of texture there sheltered strange metallic
lights like gateways.

Yet one day she realised with dismay that she had inadvertently sewn the
pattern through the dress and into her skin – staining the floor of her room
red. She could not get the thread out and neither could she get the dress off
so she was faced with choice: she could either declare the pattern her skin
and deny her flesh or she could tear her skin from her very ligaments and so
rid herself of the pattern altogether. She could not decide what to do so she
tried to trace the thread of the pattern back to its origin. To her surprise the
thread ended between her legs and wound up through her body until she saw
that the thread was her thoughts – all the years she had lived – all the things she had done and undone, all the things she had become and then forgotten. The thread wove her tower and all the others into the very roots of the earth. The thread shivered with the wind, trembled with unseen messages and commands – whispers and distant voices from the past. Familial horror and the hypnotic power of crumbling institutions surged through her veins as the thread moved, tightened, multiplied. The flickering patterns were older than her, these stitches were not hers, so in a bid to find herself she took a scalpel and sliced the flesh from her bones. From her skin and the patterns upon it she tailored an elegant suit which she hung on a hook next to her ruby slippers.

However, now she had no skin and so was monstrous to look upon, with her skull showing and her heart throbbing bare. All her organs would somehow not conspire to make her human and those that came to see her could not stand to look upon her. Instead of hair she now had snakes. Driven by her pain and isolation she picked up her needle and thread again and this time, out of her mind, she tried to find another pattern – a way back into the maze. Upon her organs, her brain, her intestines, she stitched words, trinkets and artefacts of a lost and seemingly innocent time. But the needle slipped, it bent upon the reality of her bones and she could not find a pattern. So one day she stood up from her bloodied chair, bid the snakes a fond farewell and put on her ruby slippers and suit. Wearing her garment she descended from her tower and into the courts and palaces of the world below.
All thought her very beautiful.'

As the tower fell an old woman held her back and walked out of her fortress house. Her bones and muscles moved painfully, her neck arched. She opened her eyes wider and a smile destroyed her face. A breeze tickled her neck as she laughed and she looked up into the sky, into the invisible radio waves, the endless words, the silent clouds. She gazed into crystal winds and laughed, cracked her neck and laughed.

As the land dissolves like paper-mache.
Chapter 2 - The Question of Incompletion

'If thought is not measured by the extremity that eludes the concept, it is from the outset in the nature of the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to drown out the screams of its victims'
- Theodor Adorno.

1.

For Kant 'the beautiful' concerns the form of the object which consists in the object being bounded. The sublime is found in a formless object 'insofar as we present unboundedness, either [as] in the object or because the object prompts us to present it, while yet we add to this unboundedness the thought of its totality'. The sublime, for Kant, is the exhibition of an indeterminate concept of reason whereas the beautiful is an indeterminate concept of understanding. The sublime as this unbounded form, may then 'indeed be contrapurposive for our power of judgement, incommensurate with our power of exhibition', violent to our imagination, yet Kant states that we judge it all the more sublime because of this (Kant, 1987:98). Yet something that is contrapurposive to judgement and incommensurate with our power of exhibition cannot be called an object that can be approved or disapproved. By the very fact that such things must be infinite (without centre or end) they have no 'nature' and cannot be stated. What is sublime in the proper meaning of the term cannot be contained in any sensible form but concerns only ideas of reason which, though they cannot be exhibited adequately, are aroused and called to mind by this very inadequacy which can be exhibited in sensibility.

It cannot be the sublime that is found in appearance (in nature) but it resides
in Ideas. Nothing that can be an object of the senses can be called sublime. Kant argues that our imagination strives toward infinity while our reason demands totality from the idea itself, so causing our imagination to fall short of the power needed to estimate the magnitude of such things in 'the world of sense'. The imagination then becomes inadequate to the Idea. In other words, the Idea of infinity eventually transcends our ability to imagine its substantive content or form. Kant goes on to argue that this very inadequacy itself arouses in us the feeling of magnitude. Kant concludes, 'Hence, what is to be called sublime is not the object, but the attunement that the intellect gets through a certain presentation that occupies reflective judgement...sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense' (Kant, 1987:106)

Following Kant's analysis Lyotard argues that the sublime occurs where thought has the power of conceiving 'objects' that exceed any possibility of presentation (such an 'object' could be the infinite, understood as an absolute totality). The concept of such objects is called the 'Idea of reason', this being a concept of the understanding that goes beyond any sense-perception or any mental image which could embody the Idea. It thus leaves cognitive finality only to speculate on the absolute, the unconditioned, and it is here that Lyotard wants to connect this Kantian sublime with abstract painting.

The mind, in surpassing any standard of sense, begins a debate in thought, a debate between its power of reasoning at the very limits (of conceiving the limit or the absolute) and its power of imagining, of a presentation of the Idea in finite
forms. With the pure idea of thought that exceeds imagination, Lyotard argues, ‘thought feels its moorings in the sensory being ripped away and its objects trembling at the edge of the abyss’ (Lyotard,1991:92). It is the 'object' that is being conceived that causes this rupture so its presence is ‘felt’ by this sensation of vertigo (or distress) and yet at the same time it is not there, it is not present. It becomes 'there' only as a sign of the unpresentable (the work of art and its effect upon us being the sign). However, there is a sense in which a sign for that which is forever unpresentable is itself inconceivable - it has a meaning which is forever absent - because it has a meaning only in relation to something, yet this something is itself unimaginable in its totality. If the sign of the unpresentable becomes an enigma then the ‘debate in thought’ also, and inevitably, becomes incomprehensible.

Problems occur when thought 'reaches into infinity' because it also goes beyond concepts, the unity of discourse and speech, and eventually it goes beyond its ability to comprehend itself, which is thought's impossibility. Concerning this 'beyond' of thought David Wood has commented that ‘the image of breakthrough to a philosophical beyond is a mirage, a shimmering invitation to walk into a mirror in which are reflected the artefacts of a practice (philosophy) that essentially projects an impossible achievement.’ However, this general drive to overcome established limitations in thought and language is also a central exigency of any inherently critical discipline. Wood provides the following insightful quote from Wittgenstein at the start of his book - ‘Man has the impulse to run up against the limits of language...this running up against Kierkegaard
also recognized... (as running up against paradox). This running-up against the limits of language is ethics' (Wood, 1990). Much post-structuralist work can be placed within this situation as revealing historical limitations and contingencies only so they should be overcome in relation to something that is presently absent and which cannot be conceived under the present conditions because it would then be a part of these limitations. So it remains necessarily outside language, as Blanchot states, ‘anonymous, deferred, without identity’ (Blanchot, 1993: note).

Derrida differs from this in as much as he endeavours to articulate a critical task that dismantles itself and so dismantles its own inherent limitations, yet it uses and maintains its own conceptual resources in order to achieve this movement. As he says - ‘to concern oneself with the founding concepts of the entire history of philosophy, to deconstitute them, is not to undertake the work of the philologist or of the classical historian of philosophy. Despite appearances, it is probably the most daring way of making the beginnings of a step outside of philosophy. The step “outside philosophy” is much more difficult to conceive than is generally imagined by those who think they made it long ago with cavalier ease, and who in general are swallowed up in metaphysics and the entire body of discourse which they claim to have disengaged from it’ (Derrida, 1978: 284).

Yet this ‘step outside’, as Derrida calls it, may become a way of theorizing a sublime ‘object’ that is necessarily absent; but at the end of the essay ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ Derrida ends by noting ‘a kind of question’, whose ‘conception, formation, gestation and labour we are only catching a glimpse of today’. Derrida goes on to say that he uses these words (gestation, conception, formation), ‘with
a glance toward those who, in a society from which I do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the as yet unnameable which is proclaiming itself (Derrida, 1978:293). He goes onto to characterize this unnameable ‘thing’ as formless, mute and terrifying. The words ‘as yet’ when talking about the unnameable stop this unnameable ‘thing’ from becoming unknowable and so becoming a sublime object. The words ‘as yet’ place the formation of the unnameable within a historical context and as something in a process of becoming.

Here Derrida’s theorizing remains historically specific and so his ‘unnameable’ is not necessarily absent but exists as an absence in the present. However, for Derrida, the problem still remains that any proclamation still remains deferred, and if this deferral becomes infinite then the unnameable becomes a sublime object that is eternally absent. Derrida actually states in the same essay that it is not a matter of choosing, choosing between the attempt at deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and that which affirms play and attempts (via Nietzsche) to pass beyond man and humanism. It is not a question of choice, for Derrida, it is a question of questioning, of critically dismantling thought in order to explore its limits.

What Lyotard would like to assert here in relation to Kant’s sublime is the attempted affirmation that, for thought, the limit experience itself represents something like a new origin. The sublime object is something that comes from nowhere and that disrupts the present conditions, it haunts the present forms as an enigma and it is the enigma that eventually opens us not to itself but to
different possibilities that were previously not present. This may be the case but it still leaves unanswered the problem of comprehension and language itself because (as has been stated) the enigma of the sign is only present due to its relation with the limit or the absolute. Yet how does one relate the presence of the absolute which is not relative? As Lyotard himself points out concerning the work of art, ‘commentary, in order to respect this presence, seems doomed to being bound to the work only by undoing this bond [the relation], and thereby doomed to negation and a negative aesthetic.’ (Lyotard, 1991:92)

Establishing limitations and then trying to overcome them into the beyond or 'the other' of thought seems to be impossible. It appears as an impossibility because in order to theorize beyond historical limitations one must reject present conceptuality, language and discourse, so making any intelligible thinking impossible. However, if the other of thought is theorized and articulated then it is merely something that is conceived using the limited concepts and language of the present - so it will not be otherness but will in fact be part of the present conditions.

The terms 'the same' and 'the other' are widely identified with the thought of Emmanuel Levinas. In his book 'Totality and Infinity' Levinas himself asks, 'How can the same, produced as egoism [limitation], enter into relationship with the other without immediately divesting it of its alterity? What is the nature of this relationship?' (Levinas,1969:38). Levinas answers this later on by stating that metaphysics, which is the relation between the same and the other, is "primordially enacted as conversation where the same, gathered up in its ipseity
as an 'I', as a particular existant unique and autochthonous, leaves itself' (Levinas, 1969:40).

Levinas believed that thought tended to be totalizing, always enacting the reconstitution of totality, so containing an intrinsic violence. For Levinas it was such totality that should be avoided and it is the ethical relation between the same and the other that achieves this avoidance. The relation occurs as conversation in the sense that it maintains the distance between the same and the other; Levinas states that, 'this is the radical separation asserted in transcendence which prevents the reconstitution of totality' (Levinas, 1969:40).

The one 'law' for Levinas is that the other should never be reduced to the same, for it is the other that is refractory to categories that prevents totalization, a notion that is summed up by Levinas in the following phrase, 'It is not I who resists the system, as Kierkegaard thought, it is the other' (Levinas, 1969:41). In this sense it is otherness that invades the same rather in the manner that a virus is present in the body. However, the problem here is that Levinas's thought 'reaches into infinity', this is because such an ethics led Levinas to resist any further articulation of the other. In the following quote Derrida comments upon such resistance to any categorization -

'I could not possibly speak of the other, make of the other a theme, pronounce the other as object, in the accusative. I can only, I must only speak to the other; that is, I must call him in the vocative, which is not a category, a case of speech, but rather the bursting forth, the very raising up of speech. Categories must be missing for the other not to be
overlooked, "he" must be present himself as absence, and appear as nonphenomenal. Always behind its signs and its works, always within its secret interior, and forever discreet, interrupting all historical totalities through its freedom of speech, the face is "not of this world". It is the origin of the world. I can speak of it only by speaking to it; and I may reach it only as I must reach it. But I must only reach it as the inaccessible, the invisible, the intangible.' (Derrida, 1978:103)

This means that any origin or end is missing (invisible) and will always be inaccessible. Conversation with the other can only take place as a vocative speech. But for Levinas it is the other that invades the same and that 'resists the system', all that needs to be done is to respect the radical alterity of the other. Derrida, in his writing on Levinas, calls this position the Ethics of Ethics because it does not seek to determine a morality but rather seeks to establish the essence of ethics in general. However, Derrida observes that the Ethics of Ethics lies with an other that is refractory to categories so it must be the case that this Ethics of Ethics cannot determine or articulate actual ethical laws or moral codes without negating and forgetting itself, destroying the essence of ethics and reducing the other to the same. So it is that Derrida states, 'is this Ethics beyond all laws? Is it not the Laws of laws? A coherence which breaks down the coherence of the discourse against coherence - the infinite concept hidden within the protest against the concept' (Derrida, 1978:111).

Stating that identity is limitation and, in this sense, it is symbolic of all present conditions can bluntly sum up the problem here. In leaving identity what must not
be established is a new identity, yet this means that we cannot think the other of identity for this would be to give it content in terms of conceptuality. To give something content is to give it identity in terms of the present, so by conceiving the other of identity we cannot have actually left identity. Yet to say that we must not think the other of identity in this way (as Levinas does) is to establish law upon the departure from identity and this is to establish a process of reconstituting system and totality that returns us to identity and limitation and this, of all things, cannot happen. This unresolved tension between identity and non-identity, the finite and the infinite, between the same and the other, is a major part of a serious contemporary question (questioning) concerning what can be termed ‘incompletion’.

2.

Problems immediately arise when the question of incompletion is addressed without barriers. Incompletion, taken literally, may have serious implications for the intelligibility of any structured work, whether this be society or thought itself. It could have serious implications because a notion of incompletion inevitably brings into question any structure, whether this structure be of thought, art or social process. An incomplete structure cannot have a centre or an origin, but it is exactly such fundamental reference points in any structure that give it its unity, that form a presence giving an organizing principle. It is difficult to conceive of an unorganized structure. Derrida often concentrates upon this problem, he comments upon it in the following passage -
'By orientating and organizing the coherence of the system, the centre of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total form. And even today the notion of a structure lacking any centre represents the unthinkable itself.

Nevertheless, the centre also closes off the play which it opens up and makes possible. As centre, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, or terms is no longer possible. At the centre, the permutations or the transformation of elements is forbidden.' (Derrida, 1978:279)

This should mean that for a structure to remain a structure, it must, of necessity, be limited. However, structure is the interplay of elements, the relationality between elements, so the centre, as that unique thing that governs the structural play, is the very thing that must escape structurality. This means that the centre is paradoxically within the structure and outside it. As Derrida states -

'The centre is at the centre of the totality, and yet, since the centre does not belong to the totality (it is not part of the totality), the totality has its centre elsewhere. The centre is not the centre. The concept of centred structure - although it represents coherence itself, the condition of the episteme as philosophy or science - is contradictorily coherent. And as always, coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a desire.' (Derrida, 1978:279)

Structure experiences the force of desire as restriction, the possibilities
concerning various differential configurations must be restricted in order for it to exist. The desire found in philosophy and science is the desire for coherence and intelligibility. Yet, as in Levinas, it can become a coherence that breaks down the very coherence of the discourse against coherence. What occurs then is a tension between structure and its other; Derrida shows an awareness of this and attempts articulation of this lack of resolution between finite limitations and infinitude. At the end of his essay on Levinas, 'Violence and Metaphysics', Derrida asks in his own terms, 'Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in the difference between the Jew and the Greek' (Derrida, 1978:153).

Derrida calls the experience of the infinitely other 'Judaism' stating this only as a hypothesis. He goes onto to say that one must reflect upon the necessity in which this experience finds itself, which is, 'the injunction by which it is ordered to occur as Logos', and so, 'to reawaken the Greek in the autistic syntax of his own dream' (Derrida, 1978:152). This 'reawakening' of the Greek Logos in the experience of the infinitely other of Judaism occurs as the necessity to avoid the worst violence which threatens when 'one silently delivers oneself into the hands of the other of the night' (Derrida, 1978:152). This violence, as Derrida states earlier in the text is 'the worst violence, the violence of the night which precedes or represses discourse' (Derrida, 1978:117). It is here that Derrida resists any attempt to situate his work into an easily recognizable position. He shows an awareness (through his commentary upon Levinas) of the danger of his own work becoming a coherent law against law and coherence and so reveals an over-arching awareness of the force of desire in his work and in the work of
others.

The ambiguous relation between the infinitely other of Judaism and the Greek Logos Derrida theorizes as unresolved - incomplete - this is the difficulty of incompleteness. It is in his commentary upon Levinas that he returns Levinas's work itself toward incompleteness. As he states, 'are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in the difference between the Jew and the Greek, which is perhaps the unity of what is called history. We live in and of difference, that is, in hypocrisy, about which Levinas so profoundly says that it is 'not only a base contingent defect of man, but the underlying rending of a world attached to both the philosophers and the prophets (Tl.p.24)' (Derrida, 1978:153). Again Derrida quotes from Levinas as saying, 'one must refer - I am convinced - to the medium of all comprehension and of all understanding in which truth is reflected - precisely to Greek civilization, and to what it produced: to the Logos, to the coherent discourse of reason, to life in a reasonable state. This is the true grounds of all understanding.' (Derrida, 1978:152)

Derrida here shows an awareness of placing difference (his theorizing) within the difficulty of a difficult relation between the 'coherent discourse of reason' and the infinitely other of Judaism (that reaches into infinity). To ask what this difficult relation would look like, to ask oneself where one's own desire exists in it, these are only questions that seem to deepen the difficulty. There still remains the possibility (and it is to ask another question) that this process of writing the difficulty of thought's possibilities only functions to affirm impossibility itself.

It is with such difficulties that structuralism collapses but is it here that thought
must collapse? If thought collapses then there can be no further development of its articulation and yet the most disturbing ‘truth’ is that it will not end after this ‘event’; what does instead occur is thought’s absolute alienation from history. For Adorno, in ‘Negative Dialectics’, thought has already collapsed in this way with the actual event of Auschwitz. For Adorno, with such an event, ‘our metaphysical faculty is paralysed because actual events have shattered the basis on which speculative thought could be reconciled with experience’ (Adorno, 1973:362). Auschwitz produces and comes to represent thought’s perplexity. The question concerns whether thought, when faced with such seeming impotence in the face of events, negates itself completely? Such a negation would entail the end of the possibility of the coherent discourse of reason (the Logos), and this remains a contemporary problem because with the end of reasonable discourse in living history there remains the possibility, as Derrida calls it, of ‘the worst violence, the violence of the night that precedes or represses discourse’. Gillian Rose also addresses this problem in her book ‘The Broken Middle’, to quote -

‘We cannot opt out of the difficulty of ethics and law, ethics and halacha. To rediscover “the passage from the non-ethical to the ethical”, for in so doing we discredit ethics once again by exalting it beyond the way of the world, replacing the broken with the holy middle. If we so do, we collude in the diremptions we intend to sublate’ (Rose, 1992:267)

So there must be articulation or discourse in order to avoid this possibility, or to be policing thought, as Gillian Rose puts it, against a ‘pre-mature celebration of justice’ (Rose, 1995:115) - the formation of a political theology. Yet in what
way does a historically enacted discourse, and its accompanying limitations, guard against such a pre-mature celebration? Addressing this question almost immediately produces new difficulties. The problem here is to avoid the establishment of a new political theology that would repress the difficulties of discourse, and the lack of resolution such difficulty entails, in what must be an intrinsically violent act. Both the boundlessness of theology and the totality of the same are to be avoided - both entail an end to the difficulties of incompletion, both veil a desire for integration and completion. Incompletion is, if nothing else, the acknowledgement of this difficulty. Gillian Rose has written of such difficulty in terms of ‘aporia’ and ‘diaporia’, perplexity and the exploration toward ‘the good enough justice’ which recognizes its own limitations. As she states -

‘Metaphysics, which, in Aristotle’s technical terms, is concerned with the relation between the universal “nose” and the sheer snubness of a nose, which no term can capture, this remote sounding metaphysics is the perplexity, the aporia, at how to find the path from the law of the concept to the peculiarity of each instance, from “the nose” to “the snub”. If metaphysics is the aporia, the perception of the difficulty of the law, the difficult way, then ethics is the development of it, the diaporia, being at a loss yet exploring various routes, different ways toward the good enough justice, which recognizes the intrinsic and contingent limitations in its exercise.’ (Rose, 1995:115)

Adorno has commented that ‘the most far out dictum from Beckett’s “End Game”, that there is really not so much to be feared anymore, reacts to a
practice whose first sample was given in the concentration camps, and in whose concept - venerable once upon a time - the destruction of non-identity is ideologically lurking’ (Adorno, 1973:362). In what may seem to be interminable negation Beckett’s texts seem only to collude with and eternalize the negativity of the occurrence of Auschwitz. If we see Samuel Beckett’s texts in this way, as ‘writing out’ metaphysics’s possibilities until there is less than nothing left, and so as writing the impossibility of ethics or any development towards ‘the good enough justice’, then his writing could have the same criticism directed at it as Gillian Rose directs toward ‘post-modern philosophers’, as she argues -

‘Philosophy…[post-modern philosophers claim] is revenge for the unbridgeable distance between thought or language and concrete being; metaphysics is spleen at the diversity and difference of beings; ethics is the violent domination of the troubling otherness of the other’ (Rose, 1995:116)

However, later on in his text Adorno further comments that a man who was strong enough to survive Auschwitz and other camps ‘said in an outburst against Beckett that if Beckett had been in Auschwitz he would be writing differently, more positively, with the front-line creed of the escapee’. Adorno thinks this is right only in the sense that Beckett, if he had remained in control of himself, would have been broken in Auschwitz and so would have been forced to ‘confess that front-line creed which the escapee clothed in the words “trying to give men courage” - as if this were up to any structure of the mind’ (Adorno, 1973:368).
This becomes a strange entanglement whereby the escapee is forced to confess the front-line creed which is clothed in the words ‘trying to give men courage’ due to the fact of being in control and so being ‘broken’ by Auschwitz. Courage is obtained after the breakage and so there is less to fear. Whereas Beckett fears that there is nothing left to fear anymore now that we have survived, but so broken that we are unable to recover the ‘structure of mind’ necessary to make sense of experience, not just to survive it. Beckett’s work, of course, is not directly related to the Holocaust but the contention being made here is that both Adorno and Beckett labour at the same issue. This issue is that survival is not enough, as Adorno and Horkheimer stated in an earlier book, ‘The Dialectic of Enlightenment’ - ‘that the hygienic shop-floor and everything that goes with it, the people’s car or the sportsdrome, leads to an insensitive liquidation of metaphysics, would be irrelevant; but that in the social whole they themselves become a metaphysics, an ideological curtain behind which the real evil is concentrated, is not irrelevant’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1992:intro). In short, what is at stake with both Adorno and Beckett is the difficulty of the contemporary possibilities of thought - of still constituting ourselves as ethical, political and artistic beings. To survive experience that takes us to the limits of language and consciousness and yet not to be broken and collapse, but to extend thought at these very ‘limit experiences’. Without this ‘extension’ the negativity of events such as Auschwitz becomes absolute, an eternal prison of incomprehensible experience. Beckett writes of this ‘prison’ and simultaneously establishes a distance from its walls, exploring a restless stance toward this
incomprehension -

‘I have no explanation to offer, none to demand, the comma will come where I’ll drown for good, then the silence, I believe it this evening, still this evening, how it drags on, I’ve no objection, perhaps it’s springtime, violets, no, that’s the autumn, there’s a time for everything, for the things that pass, the things that end, they could never get me to understand that, the things that stir, depart, return, a light changing, they could never get me to see that, and death into the bargain, a voice dying, that’s a good one, silence at last, not a murmur, no air, no listening, not for the likes of me, amen, on we go. Enormous prison, like a hundred thousand cathedrals, never anything else any more, from this time forth, and in it, somewhere, perhaps, riveted, tiny, the prisoner, how can he be found, how false this space is, what falseness instantly, to want to draw that round you, to want to put a being there, a cell would be plenty, if I gave up, if only I could give up, before beginning, before beginning again’ (Beckett, 1979:376)

In the deepening aporia’s found within Beckett’s works there always lies the possibility of continuing, of diminishing, vanishing, reappearing again continuing. The problem to be found in Beckett’s perceived writing of the impossibility of ethical movement lies in our conceptualization of movement, the problem is then one of thinking movement. If metaphysics is ‘the perception of the difficulty of the law, the difficult way’ and ethics is ‘the development of it’ then ethics cannot be a movement outside of, or beyond, the perplexity of metaphysics, for then it would
be a premature celebration of justice as an ‘easy way’ (Rose, 1995:115). This 
would be a potentially autocratic and totalitarian establishment of the law exactly 
because such an ethical move would no longer be at a loss; it would have 
forgotten ‘the intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise’. This is in fact 
the charge that Rose levels against post-structuralist thought in general by 
stating that ‘post-structuralist philosophy completes itself as law...that post-
modern antinomianism completes itself as political theology, as new 
ecclesiology, mending the diremption of law and ethics’ (Rose, 1992:intro). Such 
criticism (although some of its targets are mistaken ones) holds within it an 
important distaste and disappointment towards any premature or ‘easy’ form of 
completion, a distaste that Beckett obviously shares.

Then if we are to take the general idea of such criticism seriously must not 
any ethical movement or articulation occur within the perplexity of metaphysics. 
However, would not any movement from, but still within, metaphysics as 
perplexity be developing only the perplexity, deepening the confusion? In relation 
to such a question Pascal has written the following passage - ‘A letter of 
exhortation to a friend to encourage him to seek. And he will answer: “But what 
use will it be for me to seek? There seems to be nothing.” And as answer to him: 
“Do not despair”’ (Pascal, 1995:11). However the question of whether there can 
only be a deepening of confusion still remains, only stated in different terms, as 
the question, ‘Does Beckett despair?’ Beckett himself has stated -

‘The confusion is not my invention. We cannot listen to a conversation for 
five minutes without being acutely aware of the confusion. It is all around
us and our only chance now is to let it in. The only chance of renovation is to open our eyes and see the mess. It is not a mess you can make sense of...one can only speak of what is in front of him, and that now is simply the mess’ (Driver, 1961: quoting Beckett 22-23)

It can now be coherently stated that Beckett does not simply write the impossibility of ethics - ethics as it was defined in the passage by Gillian Rose. Instead it can be said that there is a movement in his writing, not towards something, but a movement that is itself ethical because ‘ethics is the development of [metaphysics]’ as being ‘at a loss yet exploring various routes’. It is in this sense that Beckett, ‘the nihilist’ (that is meant to write the impossibility of ethics) was in fact engaged in ethical writing. Yet as has been argued, his development of difficulty is difficulty itself and within the process of such a writing there is always present the danger that any development of metaphysical aporia leads only to further perplexities so that no true movement is possible, in a sense, no movement has ever been possible. Beckett, at many times, dissolves himself in this amorphous possibility and in writing it seems that if there can only be metaphysics as perplexity then there is no loss in there not being any movement, for the possibility of movement itself is self-contained, restricted inside the concept of movement. If the world then becomes absurd, ‘so what’, there can be no loss in that, for from within absurdity everything is laughable and endlessly disposable. Once within this despair, which, once arrived at, is no despair at all, can there be any further elaboration? There is no loss of movement in the impossibility of thought’s development, there is the dazzling
stillness of a hypnotized confusion, yet this ‘despair’ is by no means a conclusion or even a beginning, here or in Beckett’s writing. Adorno writes further on Beckett, commenting about the image of nothingness as something in Beckett’s work -

‘The legacy of action in it [the image] is a carrying-on which seems stoical but is full of inaudible cries that things should be different. Such nihilism implies the contrary of identification with nothingness. To Beckett, as to the Gnostics, the created world is radically evil, and its negation is the chance of another world that is not yet. As long as the world is as it is, all pictures of reconciliation, peace, and quiet resemble the picture of death…Thought honours itself by defending what is damned as nihilism’ (Adorno, 1973:381).

Ethical writing is different from writing ethics because it keeps ‘returning’ to within metaphysics as perplexity; on the other hand, writing ethics involves a certain religious leap of faith, the faith that the purity of the concept will be, or has been, realized in experience. A leap of faith that involves stating justice or ‘the just society’ prematurely in a state akin to ecstasy, or at least in a state of certainty that escapes perplexity. Ethical writing refuses to make any ‘leap of faith’, it stays within the conceptuality of thought, within discourse, it is a writing aware of its own concrete limitations within the finite. Yet ethical writing does not accept these limits as a conclusion or even as a beginning, they are part of difficulty itself. As was mentioned earlier, this running up against the limits, ‘running up against paradox’, is ethics. Derrida has written of these difficulties to
be found in the difficult relations between the same and the other, the finite and the infinite, movement and arrival, of beginning and ending any movement, of discourse and its limit -

‘Negative theology, a philosophy of intuitive communication gave itself the right (correctly or incorrectly, another problem) to travel through philosophical discourse as through a foreign medium. But what happens when this right is no longer given, when the possibility of metaphysics is the possibility of speech? When metaphysical responsibility is responsibility for language, because “thought consists of speaking” (TI) [“Totality and Infinity”], and metaphysics is a language with God? How to think the other, if the other can be spoken only as exteriority and through exteriority, that is, nonalterity? And if the speech which must inaugurate and maintain absolute separation is by its essence rooted in space, which cannot conceive separation and absolute alterity? If, as Levinas says, only discourse (and not intuitive contact) is righteous, and if, moreover, all discourse essentially retains within it space and the same - does this not mean that discourse is originally violent? And that the philosophical Logos, the only one in which peace may be declared, is inhabited by war?’ (Derrida, 1978:117)

What is being said here can be re-framed by what was said previously by stating that, for Derrida, negative theology - that gives itself the right to travel through philosophical discourse - establishes a premature ethical development that arrives at an ‘easy way’ - the ecstasy of a hyperbolic justice. Without this
type of movement we are left with difficult relations and persistent tensions, not peace, not war, but the labyrinth, a terrain where, as peace is declared, war is inaugurated. But is this labyrinth not then just the impossibility of peace and ethical movement? If so, then the labyrinth becomes a broken, fragmented, infinite horizon - the unwritten law of incoherence. However, an infinite labyrinth is a contradiction in terms - a labyrinth is finite, it has an outside and a centre; if made infinite it would be a simultaneous explosion and implosion of routes. Difficulty, if infinite, has lost nothing. There would be no ‘original peace’ that has been defiled in this infinity and any telos loses itself upon an infinite horizon - the ‘metaphysical responsibility for language’ finds itself only capable of a vocative speech, spoken into a vast acceleration of routes, a useless expenditure. As Derrida was quoted saying earlier, ‘The notion of a structure lacking any centre represents the unthinkable itself’. So ethical writing always returns again to a finite labyrinth, ‘exploring various routes’, with a difficulty that is difficulty itself. Such difficulty partly because there is also the notion, taken from Derrida, that thought, theorized as a labyrinth, as a structure with a centre, will always be a contradictorily coherent concept.

However, this difficulty must be articulated without accepting the possibility of finite totality (unity and identity) but also it must not leave such finite limitations so ‘reaching into infinity’ and becoming discourse as a useless expenditure. The contingent forms of modernity are things that remain, they remain unresolved and open to question. This type of articulation is also to accept that it is impossible to completely theorize being totally outside of categories and
discourse, and that such an acceptance has significance for any attempt to theorize the otherness of being or the absence of identity. This, of course, raises problems for the way that Levinas wanted to theorize the other and it also raises problems for any post-structuralist theory that resists any unified conceptualization of such traditional problematics as the self or community. Yet, on the other hand, a unified articulation must avoid a process of historical totalization whereby these problematics form a pre-mature completion and fixity in the present.

The difficulty lies in a process of theorization that accepts articulation in the concrete present without this articulation being ‘at home’ in the present, in the reconstitution of finite totality. This leads to a lack of resolution but one that does not end with an impossible attempt to theorize a sublime object such as Levinas’s other that must, of necessity, remain ‘anonymous, deferred, without identity’. This type of ‘negative theorizing’ can lead, in Maurice Blanchot’s words, to ‘a surplus of emptiness’, leaving the theorist ‘staring’ into a vacuum, knowing there can be no further response to a vocative speech. It is Blanchot that talks of such a ‘surplus of emptiness’ as thought ‘reaching into infinity’; its impossibility is ‘the very ordeal of thought seeking to escape the power of unity’ (Blanchot, 1993:note). Blanchot sees this ordeal as a fundamental type of limit experience that is demanded of us and that is in us, that is ‘the infinite heart of the passion of thought’. Concerning this passion Blanchot states that the limit experience is the experience of ‘what is outside the whole when the whole excludes every outside, the experience of what is still to be attained when all is attained and of
what is still to be known when all is known: the inaccessible, the unknown itself.’
(Blanchot, 1993:205)

Thought's impossibility becomes the end of discourse and articulation and in
this sense it becomes a type of completion, a fixing of thought in an eternal
moment of ineffable finality. There occurs a complex situation in theory whereby
history is totalized in order to affirm a non-historical discourse that is meant to
occur in the overcoming of this totality. However, the limit experience of what is
'outside the whole when the whole excludes every outside' is dependent upon
the determination of what exactly constitutes 'the whole'. So the two forms of
completion, the historical totality and the sublime theorizing that reaches into
infinity, can sometimes be related to each other in an ironic play between naming
the fixity and fixing the terminus of this finite totality. In short, the two broad
terms that become relevant here are the modern and the post-modern - it being
important to realize the post-modern itself as a possible non-historical fixity.

3.
The relationship of dependency between two seemingly differing, and opposed,
forms of theorizing can be seen in the following quote from an essay entitled
'When was Modernism?' It shows that post-modernism's discourse against
modernism is dependent upon modernism's own self-definition. The law of high
modernism was that it would/has (at a particular historical moment) completed
itself - this inevitable completion being the law of high modernism in the arts -

'After modernism is canonised, however, by the post-war settlement and
its complicit academic endorsements, the presumption arises that since modernism is here, in this specific phase or period, there is nothing beyond it. The marginal or rejected artists become classics of organized teaching and of travelling exhibitions in the great galleries of the metropolitan cities. “Modernism” is confined to this highly selective field and denied to everything else in an act of pure ideology, whose first, unconscious irony is that, absurdly, it stops history. Modernism being the terminus, everything afterwards is counted out of development. It is after, stuck in the past.

What rapidly happened is that modernism lost its anti-bourgeois stance, and achieved comfortable integration into the new international capitalism...The innovations of what is called modernism have become the new but fixed forms of our present moment. If we are to break-out of the non-historical fixity of post-modernism, then we must search out and counterpose an alternative tradition taken from the neglected works left in the wide margin of the century, a tradition which may address itself not to this now exploitable because quite inhuman re-writing of the past, but for all our sakes, to a modern future in which community may be imagined again.’ (Williams, 1989:26)

Post-modernism as a movement, in its rejection of coherence and intelligibility, is complicit with one of the most intelligible uni-linear narratives of history - this is high modernism’s self understanding. Underlying modernism’s self-understanding is the presumption that since ‘it’ (modernism) ‘is here, in this
specific phase or period, there is nothing beyond it'. Post-modernism's own self-understanding depends upon an acceptance of this doctrine that is fundamental in modernism’s uni-linear narrative in the arts and, more so now, in society.

Post-modernism’s mistake, in both the arts and the humanities, is to consider that modernism and itself are two exclusive elements, not fully understanding that modernism and its own becoming do not wholly exclude each other. Incompletion, as a lack of resolution in either direction, is an acknowledgement of this mistake and it is to accept the fact that ‘modernity remains to be invented’. This is not a return to modernism but it does entail a re-working of the two terms, modernism and its ‘post’. One of the apparent ironies of this re-working is in noticing the strong identity between these two opposites and the ways in which, in trying to announce modernity’s termination (its completion) post-modernism only further enters what it seeks to disown. For not only is post-modernism the ‘nothing’ that can be the only possibility ‘beyond it’ (modernism), but it is also an intensification of a major modernist aesthetic, deepening its qualities (ironically) in claims of its collapse. This modernist aesthetic was always concerned with fragmentation, non-representative forms and ontological indeterminacy.

Lyotard in ‘The Postmodern Condition’ (Lyotard, 1984), characterizes postmodern societies as unchecked differentiation. It is because of this differentiation, for Lyotard, that the state can no longer be conceived of as the ethical, political and social ‘mind’ of society. It no longer has an over-view of society, this connects to the problem that there can be no true public sphere. This, of course, raises the question of whether any true ethical or political life is
possible. For Lyotard knowledge, in postmodern societies, becomes dispersed into different language games and so, in this way, there can be no stable substantive self that is capable of reaching some form of expression within civic society. The self is always being defined by the particular situation with its own rules, sets of knowledge and procedures, with the self having a different ontological status in each case. The subject has the 'ability' to drift from one game to another. With this situation of increasing fragmentation and ontological indeterminacy a unified and coherent representation of the world seems particularly illusionary.

For Lyotard this 'postmodern condition' is historically specific. Increasing societal fragmentation and personal ontological indeterminacy are inter-linked phenomenon of developed western capitalist urban cities. However, Lyotard combines such historically specific theorizing with a discourse that eternalizes these very same phenomenon, that makes them part of 'the human condition' itself. In later books, such as 'The Differend', Lyotard can be seen to be attempting to establish a 'justice of multiplicity' where 'justice' lies in the recognition of a fundamental ground of plurality. His theories in The Differend seem to be proposing a critical project of exposing 'differends' (that which has been hidden under the finality of a universal genre of discourse) so as to avoid transcendental illusion. Ironically this returns us with a principle of plurality (a universal a priori law concerning reality) and the final prescription to 'be plural'. As Lyotard states, 'It is not that humans are mean, or that their interests or passions are antagonistic. On the same score as what is not human (animals,
plants, gods, God and the angels, extraterrestrials, seasons, tides, rain and fair weather, plague and fire), they are situated in [the] heterogeneous' (Lyotard, 1988:140). It is here that Lyotard can be seen to be eternalizing the indeterminacy and fragmentation which he also wants to make historically specific phenomenon. So here we are faced with the impossibility of a ‘negative theorizing’ that stresses the historical nature of conditions of possibility for knowledge and the human sciences and which then tries to theorize beyond these boundaries.

Lyotard’s ‘self’ drifting through a landscape of social fragmentation (so itself becoming more fragmented) has already been characterized in the highbrow culture of literary modernism. Baudelaire personified the joining of social and subjective fragmentation in the figure of the ‘flaneur’ - the modernist literary ‘intellectual’ drifting through the vast aesthetic flux and complexity that was the ever growing capitalist cities of the West. Such flux and complexity of the growing capitalist cities was made up of a number of interwoven aspects, there was the perpetual movement and flux of identity, enmeshed within the wider economic movement of goods and capital, that was itself enmeshed within the perpetual displacement of people, place and time, the incessant changes in style and taste - that were themselves seen as enmeshed in the growth and proliferation of the urban landscape. The flaneur encapsulated what Baudelaire called ‘the attitude of modernity’. Baudelaire wrote that, ‘Modernity, the painter of modern life, is the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is the one half of art, the other being the eternal and the immutable’ (Baudelaire, 1964:13).
The difference is that the immediate crisis and flux at any one historical moment of modernism was always orientated toward the future as an exciting openness to the future, a future which had already arrived in the moment of crisis and rupture and yet was still to come. So the figures of the modernist avant-garde, although themselves flaneurs and nomadic ‘marginal or rejected artists’, always viewed themselves in terms of progress and revolution - the eternal and immutable. Whereas with Lyotard’s ‘principle of plurality’ we are met with thought’s impossibility as the completion of modernism’s artistic/philosophical uni-linear (meta) narrative - this being the postmodern as the only possibility beyond the all-encapsulating narrative of modernism. The singular possibility of the end of modernism is nothingness, for there must be nothing outside of the whole, if there was something then the whole could not have completed itself (the meta-narrative could not have been disowned). Any type of post-modern movement is then not overcoming modernism but is actually subordinate to modernism’s own self-understanding and in this way it only further enters the historical meta-narrative that it seeks to disown.

Postmodernism further enters what it seeks to disown (or overcome) by turning the ‘transient, fleeting and contingent’ contemporary situation of urban flow and flux, which is historically specific, into an eternal fixity. That which is present in the present must be eternalized because, in the present of postmodernism (after modernism) history is over as uni-linear movement; after this movement history has to become heterogeneity and infinity. So it is that in many ‘post-modern theories’ the historically specific aspects of contemporary
urban capitalist development have a tendency to be eternalized into ontological statements that in some way comment upon 'the human condition'. Historically specific theorizing is forgotten about in the rush to eternalize the present moment in theories that characterize the self itself as necessarily fragmented. The discourse of these postmodern theorists becomes itself a non-historical fixity.

The task presented here becomes one of articulating or 'imagining again' such things as community, identity and art in a fleeting present that is grounded in concrete phenomena, without such theorizing becoming merely a reflection or part of these historical limitations. Yet at the same time such theorizing has to avoid eternalizing theoretical statements concerning such traditional problematics as community, identity and artistic production. Not to be situated completely in the fleeting or the eternal, in the finite or the infinite, not in the past, present or future, then is this not just again trying to establish a 'god's eye view' in relation to knowledge, the ultimate timeless objectivity? No, because the statements of objective de-contextualized knowledge must of themselves hold a claim to non-historical (eternal) truth. Then is not this 'task' just another impossibility? This impossibility is a possibility - but at the moment this impossibility is not a conclusion or even a beginning.
Chapter Three - The aporetic imagination

1.

One central question has emerged. This question asks how to address the difficulty of ‘imagining again’ politics, art or community while accepting a lack of resolution, but a lack that does not end with a truly impossible attempt to theorise such things in terms of sublimity, a sublime object that must remain, of necessity, ‘anonymous, deferred, without identity’. In relation to the task of ‘imagining community’ in the realm of political and ethical thinking a good example of sublime theorising can be given in Lyotard’s conception of the archipelago. It will clarify the problems that are under consideration to look at the conception of the archipelago. As has been stated earlier, Lyotard, in his book ‘The Differend’, seems to be proposing a critical project of exposing differends (that which has been hidden under the finality of a universal genre of discourse) so as to avoid transcendental illusion, but also in order to produce the ethical society.

Lyotard’s critical project becomes a responsibility to thought of exploring difference through the use of undetermined judgement, or as Lyotard calls it, unpredetermined judgement. Unpredetermined judgement could be described as the way in which one would approach any situation without a universal rule, principle or law - without a universal genre of discourse that would over-determine how one would interpret and act upon, or within, a given situation. Unpredetermined judgement, for Lyotard, acts in opposition to transcendental illusions that suppress the differend. For Lyotard such smothering serves to
reduce the possibility of the emergence of 'unknown phrase universes' (Lyotard, 1988:181). This emergence is the process that occurs when new ways of thinking and acting are allowed to emerge in a situation of tolerance and sensitivity to otherness. So, in Lyotard, there can be found a conceptualisation of absolute justice that appears in the negative, it lies in the refusal to form any absolute, the refusal to form a final judgement or prescription. The ethical society emerges when no areas of legitimacy are wronged, smothered, or repressed under a universal law or rule. In relation to Kant unpredetermined judgement would actually be reflective judgement. For in Kant's terms, if judgement is not placed in heteronomy (determined by context or the status quo) and it is not attached to the idea of autonomy (operating under an a priori transcendent principle independent of 'nature') then such a judgement must be reflective.

Kant, in the third critique, states that 'judgement in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgement, which subsumes the particular under it, is determinative. But if only the particular is given and judgement has to find the universal for it, then this power is merely reflective' (Kant, 1987:18). Kant goes on to argue that -

'Determinative judgement, [which operates] under universal transcendental laws given by the understanding, is only subsumptive. The law is marked out for it a priori, and hence it does not need to devise a law of its own... On the other hand, there are such diverse forms of nature, so many modifications as it were of the universal transcendental concepts
of nature, which are left undetermined by these laws, that surely there
must be laws for these forms too. Since these laws are empirical, they
may indeed be contingent as far as our understanding can see; still, if
they are to be called laws then they must be regarded as necessary by
virtue of some principle of the unity of what is diverse, even though we do
not know this principle. Hence reflective judgement, which is obliged to
ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, requires a principle,
which it cannot borrow from experience, precisely because it is to be the
basis for the unity of all empirical principles, and hence is to be the basis
that makes it possible to subordinate empirical principles to one another in
a systematic way. So this transcendental principle must be one that
reflective judgement gives as a law, but only to itself: it cannot take it from
somewhere else (since judgement would then be determinative).’ (Kant,
1987:19)

So the problem of reflective judgement is to discover laws for the diverse
forms of nature, which are left undetermined by any universal transcendental
laws. Lyotard thinks that heterogeneity affects Kant’s third critique (Lyotard,
1988:130) and he can be seen to accept the problem (and challenge) of
reflective judgement.

For Lyotard, to return reflective judgement to determinative judgement is to
return to transcendental illusion. Instead Lyotard proposes that the faculty of
judgement appears as a ‘force of passages’ between heterogeneous genres,
between ‘diverse forms of nature’. Lyotard compares the over-all diversity of
genres of discourse to an archipelago. Where each genre of discourse would be like an island, the faculty of judgement would be like 'an admiral', who would launch expeditions to one island and the next. The important point is that the faculty of judgement allows linkage between different realms without neutralising their legitimacy; Lyotard states that judgement cannot have a determined object, that -

'This object could only be a symbol. Let's say an archipelago...whether war or commerce, this interventionist force (judgement) has no object, and does not have its own island, but it requires a milieu - this would be the sea - the Archipelagos or primary sea...furthermore, this is the faculty which has enabled the territories or realms to be delimited, which has established the authority of each genre on its island. And this, it was only able to do thanks to the commerce or the war it fosters between genres.'

(Lyotard, 1988:130)

This is the free inter-play of realms that become joined through an explorative project of judgement that must accept the necessity of constantly seeking to phrase the unphrased - to find new phrase universes. However, even though, in such a situation, the realms seem to be delimited it also becomes difficult to determine the proper horizons of each. The archipelago becomes the flux in which each realm starts to be deterritorialised, just as real commerce (or war) between strictly defined nations always ends by putting those nations' proper boundaries into question. So if, for example, the legitimacy of aesthetics started to inter-relate with that of politics, politics would then have to be radically re-
defined in order to include aesthetic considerations - this would not be the delimited realm of politics as we now understand it. So the commerce (war) that is entailed in the archipelago, that at first delimits realms and allows exploration, eventually becomes the destruction of established genres of discourse in the search for new phrase universes, the mutation that would be the fate of any one realm due to its open interaction with others. This is how Lyotard has also defined Marx's idea of communism which is a typically modern project concerning the conceptualisation of some form of progress toward freedom.

According to Lyotard the proletariat demands communism which he defines as a speculative idea concerning the free linkage of phrases, the destruction of genres in the over-coming of the universal rule of capital (Lyotard, 1988:171). This can be interpreted as a notion of progress, a typically modern project, where each 'voice' would be given the freedom to find its proper idiom. Lyotard states that 'Marx tries to find the idiom which the suffering due to capital clamours for. In the suffering and in the class struggle...he thinks he hears the demand of the proletariat' (Lyotard, 1988:171).

So communism, for Lyotard, is a site of radical heterogeneity that comes to form a unity in the dispersion of all fixed boundaries, this being the end of distinctions between the subjective and objective, the private and public. Yet it is only in such a situation, according to Lyotard's own arguments, that the ethical society can emerge. It seems to become an answer to the questions, 'What ought we to be?' and 'What is to happen?'. However, this answer (this ethical society), should also lead to an acceptance of ultimate boundlessness, the lack
of finality in history, and this places Lyotard’s thinking in a paradox. This is that he develops the justice of multiplicity, which, it has been argued here, ends up becoming a typically modern project that entails some notion of progress that should contain an idea of finality in history, but it is this very notion of progress that must deny finality and the modern (Marxist) project of legislating progress. In other words, Lyotard faces profound problems because the formless ‘form’ of the archipelago becomes a political-ethical goal, and something that is formless cannot be a goal.

Lyotard’s narrative of the justice of multiplicity, that eventually allows for each sovereign realm’s corruption by interplay with others according to a notion of progress, actually establishes the domination of a singular narrative over all others. Lyotard is then subjecting all other narratives, a priori, to determination by this discourse. This means that the reflective judgement that acts as a linkage between genres then operates under a wider principle of determination, which is the determination of Lyotard’s justice that works under the a priori of the end of these genres as a notion of progress - an Idea of purposiveness. However, according to such an a priori determination of free inter-play between genres no a priori determination (transcendent illusion) can be allowed to emerge! So Lyotard’s archipelago becomes a reflection upon the sublime, as thought presenting the enormity of that which cannot be phrased, ‘presenting what is not presentable under the circumstances [en l’occurrence]’ (Lyotard, 1988:181).

Yet the enormity has not diminished and it cannot be, for as soon as the announcement is made that all has been announced, that all differends have
been acknowledged, this is exactly the point (by definition of what a differend is) where a singular ‘voice’ will be hidden or repressed under this universal statement of finality, this determinative judgement. Within this enormity no ethical community can emerge and be given any kind of substantive content. Such enormity cannot obligate and paradoxically 'should not' obligate and so the political/ethical question of obligation remains still unaddressed - certainly it remains unanswered. The ethical/political questions 'What ought we to be?' and 'What is to happen?' remain vocative and impossible. The archipelago is an answer in the negative, it is terminal to answers, it refuses the finality of answers. To refuse finality would be to form a theoretical system of closure that would amount to a final prescription, just as to impose finality would also amount to a theoretical closure. In other words, if finality is denied altogether then the possibility of a unified ethical and political life would then become a differend, that which is denied a voice, the damages of which are hidden under a single rule of judgement. In this case the single rule of judgement would be the prescription of plurality. It is here that fragmentation and heterogeneity are eternalised into a strange determinative rule of judgement, a determinative judgement that subsumes the particular within particularity (an impossible determinative rule of judgement). An impossible rule maybe, but it is one that marks out the law for all possible phrases, now and tomorrow and for all time.

The archipelago, as a sublime object, fails to provide that which the ethical community would be founded in order to provide - it fails to provide the answer to the question 'To whom or what can the political actor appeal in deciding what is
right?'. It hardly needs to be said that within the archipelago such a question and its answers are deferred. The question here is whether they are to be deferred endlessly, an eternal deferment? If this endless deferment is affirmed then we are left again with a surplus of emptiness, the end of discourse and articulation, lacking the ethical resources with which to articulate actual ethical laws and moral procedures. Here we are faced with the failings that Derrida explores in Levinas's Ethics of ethics. The deferment of actual community cannot then be eternalised just as post-modern fragmentation cannot be. However, if the ethical community is not deferred then we are returned to the troublesome possibility that in the announcement of the ethical community there only really occurs the pre-mature celebration of justice that is also the end of reasonable discourse.

2.

With what are we left with? Can we call that with which we are left 'ethics'? Derrida asks in the preface to 'The politics of friendship', 'would this still deserve the name of "politics"' (Derrida, 1997). Derrida asks this question in relation to democracy, 'a regime which, as is well known, will always have been problematic'.

Derrida starts 'The Politics of Friendship' by questioning the notion of friendship by tying it to fraternity; he asks, 'Why would the friend be like a brother?' Derrida shows that this linkage between brotherhood and friendship characterises notions of justice throughout western culture and tradition. For Derrida this is problematic, for it produces an identity between friendship and the
familial and phallocentric schema of fraternity. It must be said that this first move by Derrida is hardly original and, in this sense, is not at all unique to his own work. In the 20th century feminist thinkers have worked extensively to develop a critique of patriarchy and fraternal politics.

Carol Pateman is a contemporary thinker whose work is well known for its feminist critique of the patriarchal bias in liberal democratic theory. Pateman has looked at the way in which social contract thinkers such as Freud and Rousseau saw women as outside of the formation of political society. For Pateman, social contract thinkers in general think the social bond as being constituted in and through fraternity, so a division is created between the essentially male social bond, the public sphere, the sphere of freedom, and rational autonomy and the private realm, the conjugal world where women reside, which is completely separated from the public sphere. Pateman urges that the way forward is to start from scratch and produce a new theory of the body politic, one that is a genuine general theory, not just one that unjustifiably disqualifies certain categories of person from being full political subjects - a disqualification borne by women and one which has been a major concern for the feminist movement up to the present day. So Pateman's general theory would have to be at least an expansion of the western model of liberal democracy in terms of an overcoming of the problem of the gendered private-public dichotomy.

Derrida continues this general theme by writing, 'let us dream of a friendship which goes...beyond parenthood...let us ask ourselves what would then be the politics of such a "beyond the principle of fraternity"' (Derrida, 1997:preface).
However, in relation to such a community, towards a deeper and more inclusive democracy, Derrida also talks of the aporia of friendship, aporia being perplexity, 'the aporia of a friendship which seems doomed to the similar and to the dissimilar'. He goes onto to say, 'but even before this first aporia, the just will be said and the passage will be forced only by first aligning oneself on a commonly held opinion. This opinion concerns the very work of the political: the properly political act or operation amounts to creating the most friendship possible. How is this the "most possible" to be understood? How many? Can that be calculated? How can you interpret the possibility of this maximum or this optimum in friendship? How is it to be understood politically? Must the "most friendship" still belong to the political? (Derrida, 1997:preface). Here a tension starts to emerge between the singularity of friendship and the universality of community, a more inclusive democracy, the maximum possible friendship (whatever that may be). Earlier on in the preface Derrida has written, 'Democracy counts, it counts votes and subjects, but it does not count, should not count, ordinary singularities: there is no numeros clausus for arrivants - it is perhaps still necessary to calculate, but differently, differently with one and with the other.' (Derrida, 1997:preface)

We are back again with what Gillian Rose has characterised as metaphysics: as being 'concerned with the relation between the universal "nose" and the sheer snubness of a nose' (Rose, 1995:115) - between the brother/friend and the unheard-of friendship, between each love and its maximum. In 'The Broken Middle' Rose has discussed the relation between universal, particular and
singular, such difficulty being the political difficulty 'par excellence', a difficulty found in the opposition between particular and general will (via Rousseau), or the struggle between particular and universal class (via Marx). For Rose such struggles are concerned with 'the difficulty of representing this relation in terms of political institutions and aesthetic values' (Rose, 1992:164).

Later on in his text, Derrida talks about the possibility of law (the universal) that would command one to recognise the 'transcendent alterity of the other who can never be anything other but the heterogeneous and singular, hence resistant to the very generality of law' (Derrida, 1997:277). There is a difficult relation here between the universal and the singular, the universal law that insists on the ethical imperative of recognising the singularity of the other, and the singularity that resists the universality that attempts its recognition. For Derrida this 'complication' (as he calls it) is at the very heart of friendship.

The familial friendship lies in the singular (the Kantian sensible singularity of intuition) and the polity, or the community, lies within the generality of the concept or the Kantian idea. The difficulty, for Derrida, is deepened by the fact that fraternal/familial friendship would be logically alien to the founding of the political community but 'the great philosophical and canonical discourses on friendship will have explicitly tied the friend-brother to virtue and justice, to moral reason and political reason' (Derrida, 1997:277). So, for Derrida, between the oppositional couples there lies a relation, a debate, but also a confusion. There is a confusion because universal concepts of justice and morality have been articulated by philosophical and canonical discourses that are themselves
generated by the familial and phallocentric schema of fraternity - the fraternal friendship (contained within the sensible singularity of intuition) - which, 'appears essentially alien or rebel to the res publica; it could never found a politics' (Derrida, 1997:277). So at the core of the universal concept there can be found the alien singularity of fraternal friendship. Does this mean that there is an inevitable pathos between the concept and its realisation in concrete being? It seems more accurate to state that the concept gets contaminated or invaded by the 'alien' body of concrete being. The purity of the concept is always infested by the historical structures and repetitions of phallogocentrism - an ancient familial horror. The oppositions in the Kantian dichotomy collapse as the generality of the concept becomes difficult to distinguish from intuition, from heteronomy - as being conditioned and determined.

With Kant there is the possibility of an 'abyss' between the noumenal and phenomenal realms. As with the sublime, in Kant, thought always has the capacity for transcendence, a supersensible power that can overreach the world of phenomena and determination. The trouble is that it is always an incomplete transcendence because the pure conception exceeds any possibility of presentation, but it also exceeds any possibility of conceiving its totality. The purity of transcendence exceeds our ability to conceive it in sensible understanding. If thought can never be properly presented in form then we are confronted by an abyss between the noumenal and phenomenal realms. Then, as Derrida highlights, when talking of friendship beyond the principle of fraternity (an unheard-of friendship) are we not just stumbling, scratching an infinite and
age-old wound? Like a senile old man desperately trying to remember his own name (or to invent a new one) but never being able to succeed. Being senile, the man's 'name' is thought only for this thought to be immediately forgotten, an impossible utterance. There seems to be a gulf separating the meaning of the man's existence from itself, from its name and its naming - yet it has already been silently named under the sign of the father and of the brothers. This would be a perpetual event and upheaval but could it be a limit to the absurdity of finality, the absurdity of the old man announcing his name to thunderous applause and jubilant laughter? Without any announcement there is the silent 'limit' to the meaninglessness of limits, but without an announcement there still exists the name of the father being whispered again and again in the names of the brothers.

The abyss ceases to be pathos but becomes more a space of contamination between the singular and the universal. The singular name contaminates the name 'as yet' to be invented for the singular name (the fraternal friendship) already pulses within and generates the discursive conditions of possibility for its invention. This contamination is what the old man mutters in his sleep, dreaming a dream which he began by dreaming of his own demise. Derrida states that, in patriarchy, the brothers begin by dreaming of its demise (the demise of the father); the trouble is that 'patriarchy never stops beginning with this dream' (Derrida, 1997:preface)

This relation between the singular and the universal is a relation itself (a contamination) 'which no term can capture' (Rose, 1995:115). We are in the
perplexity again, but exploring various routes, an ethical writing that calculates and delivers, takes away again and starts to count - but counts differently. The diaporia, being at a loss, yet calculating, finding it 'necessary to calculate, but differently, differently with one and with the other' - between one and the other, amongst these possibilities? How can we speak of the aporia at all? How to articulate a relation which 'no term can capture'? Impossible? Then let us begin again...but differently.

3.

Let us begin instead, and as Derrida does, with grief - grief of the victim and the enemy. Grief: complaint, injustice, conflict - pain and morning - a violence to be repaired. A fundamental starting point for justice and ethics, ethics and politics; here there is definitely damage, injury and blame. Within this and about this grief Derrida introduces us to the principle of patriarchy, patriarchy in which the brothers begin by dreaming of its demise. This is the dream of 'a friendship which goes beyond parenthood', yet 'patriarchy never stops beginning with this dream' (Derrida, 1997:preface). Here Derrida confronts the historical totality from which all dreams, imaginings, love or grief must stem.

In the western phallocentric culture and a democracy based around fratriarchy the question of friendship also raises the question of the impossibility of friendship, the impossibility of politics: 'O my friends, there is no friend' (Derrida, 1997:1). So to return to the principle of patriarchy, Derrida says, 'At the centre of the principle, always, the one does violence to itself, and guards itself against the
other’ (Derrida, 1997:preface). In principle then, he argues, we should think of political crime, not necessarily of those crimes called political crimes (although not excluding these either), ‘Rather...thinking of that crime in which, allowing for the difference of a repression, the political tradition is constituted (the “real possibility” of the enemy being killed)...Unless we must think the crime against the possibility of politics, against man qua political animal, the crime of stopping to examine politics [to search through the political], reducing it to something else and preventing it from being what it should be.’ (Derrida, 1997:preface)

After this Derrida suggests that perhaps we have only the choice between these differing crimes, as he writes, ‘between these forms of grief in which accusation mingles with mourning to cry out from an infinite wound. As if nothing could happen or be thought elsewhere than between these imputable crimes, between sentiments of guilt, responsibilities, compassions, testaments and spectres: endless processions and trials.’ (Derrida, 1997:preface). As if nothing could be thought elsewhere other than within fraternity, familial preference and bondship. All of these can be seen as inscriptions, inscriptions signed or cut into the coupling life of friendship and enmity - cut into the very heart of the polity. If nothing could happen or be thought other than this then the wound is infinite.

Then is there a wound? This is not a mutilation, it is impossibility itself: inconceivable because unmendable? Can a concept, thought, a community, can anything sustain itself within this infinite wound that maintains the necessity of a pre-determined gesture? Inadequacy endless and yet claustrophobic, decaying into a still dead recycled point, the repetition of neurosis becomes the self-
justification of its necessity. The intensification of the event, this eternal upheaval, the corpus of the father pulsing and endlessly re-born in the names of the brothers. The proliferation of neuroses is psychosis itself celebrated. Claustrophobic. Endless? Wounded. What is it to be wounded?

A signified: pure surface to be cut into, inscribed upon, mutilated, yet if this significance is not present, how do we ‘think’ or conceptualise the purity that is to be mutilated - or how can we make sense of the idea that the mutilated is to be made pure? The notion of wounding presupposes a skin, unbroken and whole, that has been ripped open, taken apart, that the two sides of the flesh have forgotten each other in their separation.

Is it sustainable and tenable to use the term wounding at all, to mourn a mutilation that has never occurred because infinity is a multiplication in all directions from all points, a unity that is constantly ruptured, unknowing and unknowable. This writhing Lovecraftian horror has its own blades which it uses in self-creation, ‘self’ mutilation. Yet again (and in another direction) can something be mended that is always opened, gaping, bleeding, dismembered? Then is there any wounding (in the zealous dance of signifiers without any signified) without a ground, without a presence that can be present; without all this (in the dance) is it sustainable to say ‘There is a wound’. A mutilation that is not a mutilation, a wound that is always a wound - then why still use these terms? A mutilation that never occurred, that never mutilates...In relation to friendship this would be to state, ‘there can never be friend or enemy’ - which is something Derrida does not entertain.
“I don’t mind having my sorrow derided if derided it has to be, he only will grasp me aright whose heart holds a wound that is an incurable wound, who never, for anything, in any way, would be cured of it... And what man, if so wounded, would ever be willing to ‘die’ of any other hurt’ (Bataille, 1989:155)

Yet what person who uses the term ‘wounded’, who thinks of themselves as wounded, would not hope for a cure? Would to not have hope be the hardest affirmation, or would it merely be a form of surrender, a refusal to continue, the negation of movement? Is to say, like Bataille, “My wound is not a wound”, merely an inability to continue, an inability to even begin? As with the phrase ‘O my friends, there is no friend’ there is no easy answer, there is instead the paradox that this statement is both a negation and an affirmation.

'(The beginning is tough. My way of telling about these things is raw. I could have avoided that and still made it sound plausible. It would have seemed "likely", detours would have been to my advantage. But this is how it has to be, there is no beginning by scuttling in sidewise. I continue and it gets tougher)...

Continue? I meant to, but I don’t care now. I’ve lost interest. I put down what oppresses me at the moment of writing: "would it all be absurd or might it make some sense?", I’ve made myself sick wondering about it. I awake in the morning - just the way millions do, millions of boys and girls, infants and old men, their slumbers dissipated forever...These millions, those slumbers have no meaning. A hidden meaning? Hidden, yes,
"obviously"! But if nothing has any meaning, there’s no point in my doing anything. I’ll beg off. I’ll use deceitful means to get out of it, in the end I’ll have to let go and sell myself to meaninglessness, nonsense: that is man’s killer, the one who tortures and kills, not a glimmer of hope left. But if there is meaning? Today I don’t know what it is. Tomorrow? Tomorrow, who can tell?’ (Bataille, 1989:148)

The beginning is tough and ‘the brothers begin by dreaming’ of their fathers demise, of their own demise, always seemingly failing. But tomorrow, what of tomorrow? This is a ‘kind of question’ that Derrida wrote about in ‘Structure, sign and play’, that there is now (was then as well) a kind of question, whose ‘conception, formation, gestation, labour we are only catching a glimpse of today’ (Derrida, 1978:293). Always today? And tomorrow, what of tomorrow? As has been stated previously, Derrida goes onto to say that he uses these words (gestation, conception, formation), ‘with a glance toward those who, in a society from which I do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the as yet unnameable which is proclaiming itself’ (Derrida, 1997:293). The words ‘as yet unnameable’, bring this question (bring the dream) into historical theorising and so into the realms of possibility, but they do this only by throwing the present open to a nameless absence. In this way Bataille’s ‘moment of writing’ ceases to be so oppressive for its seeming absurdity loses the weight of eternity - such is the dictum found in the words of T.S.Eliot when he wrote -

‘If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable’ (Eliot, 1974:189)
With this 'as yet' what is also at stake (what has been at stake throughout) is a question concerning deferment or decision - whether to defer or to decide? An endless deferral, as in the case of Lyotard’s archipelago, becomes an infinite regress concerning possible content but with the ethical imperative of doing nothing else other than regress - to defer endlessly. This can become an infinite wound, which is not a stable 'thing' but is instead something that accelerates beyond any possibility of articulation.

Instead Derrida turns to Nietzsche's notion of friendship in 'Thus spoke Zarathustra' and examines Zarathustra's double accusation against both men and women concerning the absence of friendship. Zarathustra accuses women of being incapable of friendship and so seems to confirm the whole western tradition that is within the phallocentric schema of fraternity. However, Zarathustra also turns his accusation towards men - basically accusing them of being in the same predicament. So both women and men are not yet capable of friendship, and as Derrida states, it is 'under the category of "not yet"...this "up until now" that we are questioning their respective capability, and in this respect men and women are equal. Up until now they are equally late, equal in avarice (Geiz), equally unable to give and love in friendship' (Derrida, 1997:283). As with Derrida's 'as yet' (the 'as yet unnameable') we are again faced with two letters (not yet) that bring the question concerning deferment or decision towards a historical necessity of decision.

There is no friendship as yet, it has not yet begun to be thought: concerning such statements Derrida argues that 'we are saying here, on the threshold, that
we already think that we do not yet have access to friendship. May we have it one day! Such is the exclamation mark, the singular clamour, of this wish. This is Zarathustra's "O my friends, there is neither friend nor enemy" (Derrida, 1997:284). However, to decide can become a crime, a differend created, a political violence in the attempt to mend the grief. So to try and answer the question. ‘To whom or to what can the political actor appeal in deciding what is right?’ is also, in Derrida's words, to ‘ask ourselves what a decision is and who decides’ (Derrida, 1997:preface). Who decides, who sets down the law, who grants or imposes the law, is the decision free and sovereign (can it be), asking again who it is that decides and most importantly we must ask, ‘Whose friend or enemy?’ (Derrida: 1997:preface). These questions are all the concerns of an historically specific theorising, they are all concerned with the historical totality from which all dreams, love or imaginings must stem. They are historically specific, that is today, and so today are we again unable to begin? Are we saying, with Bataille, ‘today I don't know what it is, Tomorrow? Tomorrow, who can tell?’ (Bataille, 1989:148)

In answer to this Derrida poses the question that, for Zarathustra, friendship may continue to mean freedom, equality and fraternity - the unstable and excluding motto of a republic. Unless friendship means, for Zarathustra, an appeal to overwhelm both philosophical history and enlightenment fraternity - yet this idea of a ultimate breakage is something, Derrida argues, 'with which we must break' (Derrida, 1997:285). Any idea of overcoming the western tradition or the whole of logocentricism, or the phallocentric scheme of fraternity is, for
Derrida, flawed from its outset. In 'Structure, sign and play' Derrida identified various discourses that occur in the event of 'rupturing', or disrupting, the history of metaphysics (some of these being Heideggerean onto-theology, Freudian critique of self-presence, the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics). The trouble with all these 'destructive' discourses is that they are themselves trapped in the history that they seek to leave; in a way, the more they seek to leave it the more they enter into it. We can see this with sublime theorising and in Zarathustra's conception of the unheard of friendship, the problem being that such theorising lies within the danger of eternalising (so making metaphysical) its own statements, as Lyotard sometimes eternalises fragmentation and heterogeneity. Derrida sums this problem up much more neatly when he argues that all such discourses are trapped within the circle of metaphysics. As he says, 'this circle is unique. It describes the form of a relation between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics' (Derrida, 1978:280). This circle exists because there is no sense in trying to do without the concepts of metaphysics in order to destroy metaphysics. The trouble is that 'we have no language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest' (Derrida, 1978:281)

Derrida gives us the example of the concept of the 'sign' that is used to dismantle the metaphysics of presence. The difficulty emerges because as soon as one seeks to demonstrate that there is no transcendental signified and that
the play of signifiers, the domain of signification, is actually infinite, then one simultaneously rejects the concept of 'sign', which is what cannot be done within this destructive move. The concept of 'sign' must be rejected along with the signified because the signification of 'sign' has always been understood and determined as 'a sign-of', as a sign-of a signified - the signifier always referring to the signified. So, as Derrida argues, if one erases the relation between signifier and signified it is the word 'signifier', the sign, that must be abandoned as a metaphysical concept at the exact moment that one wants to use the concept of 'the sign' against metaphysics. Derrida admits a necessity to this act of overcoming but also sees that concepts such as 'sign' cannot surpass metaphysical oppositions. In trying to destroy metaphysics one only further enters what one seeks to disown.

Yet Derrida also states that he opens 'The politics of friendship' with an apostrophe, a mark showing an omission of a letter or letters - an omission or maybe a call. This is consistent with his comment on Nietzsche in 'Of Grammatology' when he says that we must also let Nietzsche speak outside of the circle of metaphysics. Heidegger returned Nietzsche to within the circle as an inverted Platonist and this reversion was, for Derrida, as much to do with the difficulty of the attempt as it was to do with a historical process that was carried out upon Nietzsche. Derrida thinks that, in spite of everything, we must let Nietzsche's words be his own in their singularity, 'the content of the Nietzschean discourse being almost lost for the question of being, its form regains its absolute strangeness, where his text finally invokes a different type of reading, more
faithful to his type of writing: Nietzsche has written what he has written. He has written that writing - and first of all his own - is not originally subordinate to the logos and to truth' (Derrida, 1991:35). So Derrida opens with a call, without another trial or procession that marks the justice of fraternity, that produces and is also produced by the great philosophical and canonical discourses on friendship. Instead, to simply let a call be heard before any articulation is set concerning its possibility - 'before another testimonial agency, from fact to law and from law to justice' (Derrida, 1997:preface).

Then let us form a mourning procession toward an awkward question, asking what is justice in a place where no trials occur? No trials, that is, for 'the victim or the enemy - in other words, the grief' (Derrida, 1997:preface). The point is that in the over-coming of familial/fratriarchial friendship the history of that friendship may well repeat itself, for in reaching for infinite justice (as in Lyotard's archipelago) - a justice without familial proximity - there occurs the possibility of the impossibility of actual justice. However, to begin with an apostrophe (a mark showing an omission) is to question friendship, to question the concept of friendship itself, but mainly it is to question the concept of friendship in its history. This questioning also brings into question the completion of present conceptions of ethics, justice and law because they are tied to friendship and the friend, in western culture, is also the brother. What this 'mark showing an omission' does is to question, but also (by its questioning) to bring into proximity the unknown, that which is 'not yet' nameable but which should not become a presence which is absolutely absent - an endless deferment.
So Derrida’s opening apostrophe - simply letting a call be heard - is a call that inaugurates the unknown, ‘well before any destination is set down concerning its possibility, in the direction of familiar sentences’ (Derrida, 1997:preface). Yet once a destination has been set, maybe not yet, but when it is, is there also the unknown at the end of the call? For Derrida states that, ‘the common is not the common of a given community but the pole or the end of a call...the whole question remains: what is really being called the call, and what is being called “common”?’ (Derrida, 1997:297).

This common that is not the common in relation to the question of community emerges out of the question of what ‘common’ can still mean as soon as friendship goes beyond proximity. The term common then is used in a different way than the term common is normally used. The paradox of stating, ‘the common is not the common’ is the central thread of the entire book, as is the phrase that the book meditates upon, ‘O my friends, there is no friend’. These paradoxical oppositions are central because they reveal the underlying methodology that is at work in ‘The politics of friendship’. The methodology at work is Derrida’s past (and ongoing) interest in the oppositional couples that make up the western political and philosophical tradition. So the phrase, ‘O my friends, there is no friend’ runs parallel and serves the same deconstructive function as the ‘community without community’. This function works within an over-all methodological problem of ‘economy and strategy’ (Derrida, 1978:282). Friendship is not just something (impossibly) sought but it is also something that represents and attempts to coherently contain the oppositional couplings of the
circle of metaphysics. In deconstructing friendship, and especially the politics of friendship, Derrida produces a rupturing of the neat categories and containments that the great philosophical and canonical discourses on friendship constructed around notions of justice and moral/political reason. This rupturing shows that the oppositional couplings and the neat dichotomies are contaminated by each other and by awkward historical determinations. Derrida's writing on friendship is involved with a wider strategy, and for this strategy it is a question of 'systematically posing the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself' (Derrida, 1978:282)

The heritage under deconstruction in 'The politics of friendship' is the familial and phallocentric schema of fraternity and the metaphysical oppositions that underpin this schema. So Derrida is here labouring at an old and seemingly interminable task. Friendship, however, opens us up to the concrete problems and particularities of politics and ethics and at the end of all this there lies the issue of community. So there occurs an productive dilemma that, in a way, the deconstructive move itself is not enough. There emerges the problem that if one is deconstructing ethics, justice and politics then there immediately occurs the question of what is then to be theorised as community, ethics and justice because these problematics deal with concrete phenomena and problems that, by their very social and temporal nature, demand to be addressed 'now', today, not tomorrow - not constantly deferring their articulation until 'the next day'.

This problem concerns Derrida's systematic investigation of the
transformatory possibilities emerging within the deconstructive method, emerging, that is, historically. These possibilities occur in the way that the concept of friendship and/or community is deconstructed - and in this way the selected term comes to mean something other than what it is, it escapes its own identity and historical/theoretical limitations. As Derrida states, 'we come to call the friend by a name which is no longer that of the near one or the neighbour, and undoubtedly no longer the name of man?' (Derrida, 1997:293); likewise, 'what can the name "brother" or the call to fraternity still mean when one or the other arises in the speech of friendship which...has so radically delivered itself from the hold of all determined communities, all filiation or affiliation, all alliances - families or peoples -?' (Derrida, 1997:304)

Let us reiterate: what actually is all this talk about friendship without proximity? Behind these paradoxes is Derrida's method, and his difficulty of relating this method to politics, ethics and any conception of community. As Derrida writes, 'I was wondering why the word "community" (avowable or unavowable, inoperative or not) - why I have never been able to write it, on my own initiative and in my own name, as it were. Why? Whence my reticence? And is it not fundamentally the essential part of the disquiet which inspires this book? (Derrida, 1997:305). It is argued here that transformatory possibilities occur not outside, or in spite of, the deconstructive method - they occur within the deconstructive method itself.

For Derrida any 'step outside' of the circle of metaphysics must start by concerning itself with the founding concepts in order to de-construct or to distance oneself from the construction of the discourses within this history. This
method would be a systematic and historic questioning. This essentially negative impetus to dismantle the whole legacy of western metaphysics and its founding concepts and oppositions has (so Derrida himself thinks) possibly sterilizing effects. In order to avoid this sterilizing effect Derrida speaks of a second aspect of the method. He writes that this second aspect 'consists in conserving all these old concepts [the founding concepts] within the domain of empirical discovery while here and there denouncing their limits, treating them as tools which can still be used. No longer is any truth value attributed to them; there is a readiness to abandon them, if necessary, should other instruments appear more useful. In the meantime, their relative efficacy is exploited, and they are employed to destroy the old machinery to which they belong and of which they themselves are pieces' (Derrida, 1978:284).

So within this method the concept of friendship is addressed and deconstituted in order to dismantle the old machinery that is the phallocentric schema of fraternity. However, simultaneous with this negative move there occurs the possibility of a transformation in the denouncement of friendship's limits. Here again there can be found, at the very core of Derrida's latest work, a relation (or a tension) between completion and incompletion, negation and affirmation. This is the negation of the completion of the 'old machinery' and the seeming purity of its founding concepts and an affirmation in relation to the 'unknown' of the canonical discourse: remoteness as opposed to proximity. So incompletion is affirmed but it is an incompletion that bears paradoxically a closeness to, and that conserves, the founding concepts of democracy. Derrida
more or less finishes 'The politics of friendship' with this statement -

'Is it possible to think and to implement democracy, that which would keep
the old name "democracy", while uprooting from it all these figures of
friendship (philosophical and religious) which prescribe fraternity: the
family and the andocentric group? Is it possible, allowing a certain faithful
memory of democratic reason...not to found, where it is no longer a matter
of founding, but to open out to the future, or rather to the "come", of a
certain democracy?

For democracy remains to come, this is its essence in so far as it remains. Not
only will it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future,
but, belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its
future times, to come. Even when there is democracy, it never exists, it is never
present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept. It is possible to
open up to the 'come' of a certain democracy which is no longer an insult to the
friendship we have striven to think beyond the homo-fraternal and
phallogocentric schema?

When will we be ready for an experience of freedom and equality that is
capable of respectfully experiencing that friendship, which would at last be just,
just beyond the law, and measured up against its measurelessness' (Derrida,
1997:306)

Democracy 'measured up against its measurelessness?' - democracy
conserved: it remains, like painting, ethics and modernity itself, it remains to be
invented. The enormity of infinite deferment would be to state, 'there can never
be friend or enemy' - the impossibility of ethics and community. To state one's friends, to say only 'my friends', would be, metaphorically, to stay in relation to the finite totality of fraternal friendship, to be within the hold of all previously determined alliances and affiliations. Instead Derrida, from the start of the work, uses the paradoxical phrase, '0 my friends, there is no friend'. An opposition is set up between friendship and its absence, a seemingly dialectical relation yet there is no apparent movement to supersede or overcome this entanglement. The two sides of the opposition do not come to assimilate each other in a profound form or synthesis - yet neither do the two sides negate each other. There remains the difficult relation that exists to be worked upon in time - yesterday, today and tomorrow. A difficult relation that contaminates and exceeds the limits of that which does remain, this denouncement of limits is the 'imagining again' (the invention) of democracy. The invention is not an intentional act, the 'imagining' is the very 'workings' of the difficult relations that mutate and contaminate each seemingly self-sufficient and oppositional term - that exceed each term - only acting to denounce each and every particular limit. This is to 'speak' of the relation which no term can capture, the perplexity, the aporia.

4.

Derrida, in a recent discussion orientated around The Politics of Friendship has said the following-

'Hospitality, and hospitality is a very general name for all our relations to the Other, has to be re-invented at every second, it is something without a
pre-given rule. That is what we have to invent - a new language for instance. When two people who don't speak the same language meet, what should they do? They have to translate, but translation is an invention, to invent a new way of translating in which translation doesn't simply go one way but both ways, and how can we do that? That's the aporia, and this is political, the new form - but it had always been a form - of politics, but today it has, because of the development of communication, of crossing borders, of telecommunications, it has new forms of urgency.' Derrida, 1997a)

In this last quote we can see that Derrida, in relation to the idea of hospitality in the contemporary global situation, is exploring the notion of a genuine intersubjectivity that entails mutual recognition amongst equals. It is here that the use of a metaphor of the doppleganger can prove illuminating concerning the exact nature of this problem of genuine intersubjectivity.

A doppleganger - the wraith of a living person - is the haunting of a person by their own spectre (a spectre: the haunting presentiment of ruin, war and madness); the doppleganger as a spell into which one is bound (spell: binding, attraction, a fascination excercised). When the doppleganger exits, the person that it doubles no longer exists as a self-sufficient entity - that person has no choice but to enter into and collude with the inevitability of an ambiguous relation between itself and that which has occurred as a now unavoidable supplement to it. There was no a priori necessity to supplement the person, but once the doppleganger exits, the person immediately becomes deficient in and of itself.
To re-think the double not as duplicate reality but as something that is both the same and otherness.

A doppleganger is the person that it doubles and yet it is not that person - in relation to that person it is otherness. For the other to be recognised as the other it must remain as otherness. In order for recognition to occur it can never be recognised fully in terms of sameness; in order to be recognised as otherness the other has to always be encountered in the terms of mis-recognition. This is to say that the other can never be fully articulated and recognised in a complete translation from otherness to sameness. The only way that the other can be properly understood by sameness is for the same to enter into its alterity - then both the same and the other are disrupted as exclusively de-limited categories. Therefore any recognition of authentic sameness or otherness is a mis-recognition. This movement of sameness into otherness is the unavoidable relationality of the same and the other. This occurs in the use of an Hegelian logic of recognition as the aporetic logic of mis-recognition. In other words the mis-recognition cannot be negated within the logic of recognition that would lead to the further progressive unfolding of Truth toward Hegel's Absolute Subject.

This is drama, this is the advent of tragedy, when an individual or an ideal (a self-sufficient concept) is drawn into ambiguous relations with other (often opposed) entities - where the carefully maintained limits and definitions of each are deconstituted - ambiguous relations that command the inevitability of tensions, irresolvable difficulties and impossible dilemmas and paradoxes that eventually exceed the limits that had hitherto constituted what that person or
ideal actually was. According to the argument so far, this transgressive negation, that produces drama, cannot be negated in terms of further mutual recognition and the move toward an inevitable reconciliation, for this move would be to avoid the need for mis-recognition in any form of genuine intersubjectivity.

There is a well known debate concerning the thought of Hegel that focuses upon the Greek tragedy 'Antigone'. It is a debate that Derrida has entered and that has informed the writings of Gillian Rose. The basis of the tragedy is that, in ethical life, Antigone has a duty to bury her brother which conflicts with her duty to the state which asserts that her brother must be left unburied since he attempted to overthrow the state. Antigone's duty to bury her brother is a divine law in which resides a notion of singularity because there can be no substitute for Antigone's brother and so there can be no compensation for the fact that he remains unburied. Antigone's duty to the state is a human law that is concerned with the necessity of the universal in which all families and members of those families are always subordinate to the polis with regards to public affairs. Antigone decides to bury her brother.

Argued from the perspective of Hegelian recognition the ensuing conflict between the family and the polis does not subsume the singular under the universal, but instead it articulates it as the exigency of recognition that constitutes the form and development of the tragedy. The tragic recognition, in the Hegelian sense, occurs when each law (divine and human) comes, through their mediation, to recognise the other law as its other and that the truth of each law is its other, so leading to the realisation that the universal can only be

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properly understood in and through a harmonious resolution with particularity and visa-versa. In this sense it is Antigone herself that becomes the active third in the conflict between the two conflicting laws - she acts as the medium between them. However, according to how otherness has been understood in this work, for any such recognition to be achieved, each law must come to recognise its other as its other in a recognition of its fundamental difference from itself. This recognition of the other through the recognition of alterity is (via Hegel) exactly what cannot happen through the fundamental terms of mediation and accelerating relationality between the two laws in which the tragedy develops. The harmonious resolution never occurs, the aporetic relation remains, the diremption is left complete in its incompletion, and so is the political/social conflict and struggle that this entails. Contradiction exists for resolution and the possibility of resolution always exists for contradictions, but the conflict, in 'Antigone', between the polis and the family ensues in the terms of an aporetic relation between irreducible differences. Habermas has acknowledged this difficulty concerning genuine intersubjectivity when he states that, 'the relational of reciprocity of recognition demands the non-identity of the one and the other, both must also maintain their absolute difference, for to be a subject implies the claim of individuation.' (Bernstein, 1991: quoting Habermas 305). The contention being made here with regards to 'Antigone' is the difficulty of genuine intersubjectivity in relation to the impossibility of Hegel's completed recognition and Habermas' pathos of absolute difference. Richard Beardsworth has succinctly focused upon this whole issue -
'For the other of ontology to be recognised, it must not be recognised... One must argue with Hegel against Hegel... Derrida finds Hegel saying the same thing in the Jena version of the struggle for recognition in "The Phenomenology of Spirit" which concerns the dialectic of two singularities rather than the pitching of singularity against universality. For singularity to be recognised it must risk its life in combat with another. If, however, the other, the very condition of recognition, is killed, then recognition takes place at the very moment when it cannot take place, since the other's death abolishes the very condition at the same time. The truth of contradiction is aporia, just as the description [in 'Antigone'] of the relation between the family and the polis is aporetic and not contradictory.' (Beardsworth, 1996:88)

This relation is not just a matter of philosophical debate, it is played out in time, which is how the relations between the universal and the particular, justice and law, the finite and the infinite (to name a few oppositions) are actually figured and constituted in the temporality of social and political organisations. In this way we can see social and political organisations as the constant re-configuration and re-definition of these very relations. In fact, with the absence of the possibility of any complete recognition of self-contained categories such as the finite or the infinite, identity or non-identity, the relations, and negotiation, between the chimerical choice (offered in these binary oppositions) is actually all there is to work with in political terms, when re-defining what the political is and is to be - when considering political implications...
Yet Gillian Rose continues with such difficulty. In 'The Broken Middle', Rose asserts that 'aporia and agape have no object and are no subject. In each case the meaning is difficult, and it is difficult to state the meaning.' (Rose, 1992:165). She goes on from this statement to explore what is 'for Aristotle, "the greatest of aporias"....to know the individuality of individuals, that is, individual substance, unknowable except in universal terms' (Rose, 1992:165). Rose states that this aporia, to use a phrase that has been employed earlier, may be addressed by 'homely examples', such as 'the snub nose' (Rose, 1992:165). She goes on to quote from Edward Booth's 'Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology', where it is written that, '[the snub nose] even more in Greek than in English, freakishly gives a simultaneous connotation of nose and its concavity. "Concave" is a mathematical conception, entailing complete regularity; "snub" has about it the toleration of every individual irregular development' (Booth, 1983:6-8). So, Rose argues, the 'snub' keeps unity and difference, universal and singular, aporetically together. However, she also notes that Booth further comments that the 'snub' in the nature 'even of physical things has no analogous expression' (Booth, 1883:7-8). The aporia can only be manifested but not resolved in this way. It is here that Rose makes the point that the manifestation of aporia (rather than the resolution of aporia) may itself be the beginning of 'movement' (Rose, 1992:166). However, Rose says that the beginning of movement through the manifestation of aporia is difficult to convey through the etymology of the Greek aporia, meaning 'without a ford', or the general English translation of aporia as difficulty.

Would such 'movement' occur within a dialectic in which the tension between
the two sides does not cumulate in the reconciliation of the opposition, nor does the tension cumulate in the eventual destruction of both sides of the opposition in terms of pathos and separation? Both movement and doubling occur paradoxically - dependent and yet apart, proximate yet infinitely distant. This difficulty has been focused upon in Derrida's political writings when he discusses democracy's desire to reconcile the demand for equality with the demand for singularity, with respect for the Other as singular. He asks how this 'double injunction', as he calls it, is possible - how to simultaneously take into account the equality of everyone, justice and equity, and nevertheless take into account and respect the heterogeneous singularity of everyone? Rose argues that it is only forms of arcadian and utopian universalism that attempt to reconcile and posit the unity of the particular and the universal, so attempting to mend the broken middle. For Rose the broken middle involves the diremption of state and civil society, law and ethics, and to mend it in this eschatological manner ensures a premature celebration of justice. Derrida argues that we must try for the lesser violence of thought which endures the perplexity.

This issue that concerns itself with how the manifestation of aporia, rather than its resolution, can actually be the source of political/ethical movement has been addressed earlier (in the previous chapter) when looking at the writings of Samuel Beckett, and in relation to Gillian Rose and her thinking of aporia and diaporia. The argument put forward in the previous chapter stated that the problem to be found in Beckett's perceived writing of the impossibility of ethical movement lies in our conceptualization of movement.
In the previous chapter it was argued that if metaphysics is ‘the perception of the difficulty of the law, the difficult way’ and ethics is ‘the development of it’ then ethics cannot be a movement outside of, or beyond, the perplexity of metaphysics, for then it would be a premature celebration of justice as an ‘easy way’ (G. Rose, 1995:115). This would be a potentially autocratic and totalitarian establishment of the law exactly because such an ethical move would no longer be at a loss - it would have forgotten ‘the intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise’ (Rose, 1995:115). The meaning of Beckett's writing concerns the insight that any ethical movement must endure perplexity, any movement must occur within relationality itself.

It is the very temporality of human organisation that entails the impossibility of eternalising the historical particularity of the structuring of relationality through present social and political organisation. For to announce that the present structuration of relationality is fundamentally true would be to make this claim for all time (past, present and future time) and this would be an attempt to stop time and this, of all things, is what cannot be done. It is impossible to predetermine the structure of what has not yet come into being (the not-yet of the future) in the structure of the present, because then one would be destroying the very thing which constitutes future possibility and this is its alterity from 'what is' - from the present. It is in this sense that social and political organisation is aporetic just as is the relation between the present and the future, which is the relation between presence and absence, or more precisely, it is the constant inevitable disruption of the structuration of social and political organisation in the contingency of the
movement in time from presence to absence.

This movement from presence to absence should be taken to mean an inevitable absence in the present organisation of the social and political - this absence being the futural abundance of possibilities for the re-configuration and re-definition of the social and political. This absence is the very disruption of time working upon present social and political organisation, it is the transgression of the presently constituted limits of any form of social and political organisation because it is the very evacuation of Being that occurs in the movement from the present into the future, from presence to absence - between the finite and the infinite.

Dualistic terms can never be understood as exclusive and self-sufficient categories, they exist in the ambiguous relations between these terms that occur in the inevitable passage of time from present to future time, where the finite is indistinguishable from the infinite. As with the metaphor of the doppleganger, it is not the existence of the doppleganger that is important to the person whose life has been invaded, nor is it the reader’s task to privilege one or the other as being the truer or more authentic entity. What should interest the sensitive reader, and what the writer must concentrate on in order to develop the drama and tension in the ensuing story, is the ambiguous relation that occurs as the emergent exigency due to the doubling effect, and the perplexity that ensues concerning the identity of both entities. This is the way in which the persons self-constituted limits (that define them as a person as separate and exclusive in their own right) are exceeded by the existence and alterity of the other. As in
any relationship between people what is of interest is the relation between them and how this relation changes and disrupts each person's own definition and so exceeds the limits of him or herself that this entails. For to enter a relation with another is to necessitate a transgression of one's limits if one wants to recognise the alterity of the other and properly engage with this, and this entails opening oneself to the absence of what one is not and to aporia. With regards to the issue of community it is this relationality at work upon the community itself that eventually disrupts its own limits, limits that attempt to constitute its own self-determination.

For Derrida, this relationality does not just occur between individuals but also occurs (perhaps more profoundly) with the guiding concepts of the historically constituted concept of democracy. In this following extract from a talk Derrida gave at the University of Sussex, Derrida poses the aporetic difficulty of the concept of democracy in the tension between the need for a calculable equality and the demand for singularity, with respect for the other as singular -

"democracy to come", which I repeat again and again - because democracy is a strange name for a regime; from the beginning it was difficult to locate democracy among the spectrum of regimes, and everyone has always had difficulty with assigning a place to democracy. Democracy means, minimally, equality - and here you see why friendship is an important key, because in friendship, even in classical friendship, what is involved is reciprocity, equality,
symmetry, and so on and so forth. There is no democracy except as equality among everyone - I'll try to make this more specific in a moment - but an equality which can be calculated, countable: you count the number of units, of voters, of voices, of citizens. On the other hand, you have to reconcile this demand for equality with the demand for singularity, with respect for the Other as singular, and that is an aporia. How can we, at the same time, take into account the equality of everyone, justice and equity, and nevertheless take into account and respect the heterogeneous singularity of everyone?... Is it possible to think differently the double injunction of equality for everyone and respect for singularity beyond the limits of classical politics and classical friendship?’ (Derrida, 1997a)

Such 'double injunction', as Derrida calls it, is part of the formation of the aporetic relation in the conception, maintenance and re-invention of the social and political. The contention being made here is that the aporetic relation has always already exceeded any double injunction and that any doubling only occurs in order to produce this third aspect through which newness and invention can occur, and this third aspect is the disjunction of relationality.

In one of Derrida'a earlier works, entitled 'Plato's Pharmacy' (published in the book 'Dissemination'), he focuses his attention on Plato's text 'The Phaedrus'. In the untitled preface to the work Derrida starts by saying that reading is writing, in other words to read is also to write. As he says, 'if reading and writing are one, as is easily thought these days, if reading is writing, this oneness designates
neither undifferentiated (con)fusion nor identity at perfect rest; the is that couples reading with writing must rip apart...One must then, in a single gesture, but doubled, read and write' (Derrida, 1981:64). Here Derrida asserts that the text does not reside either in the act of writing or reading, but that it exists in the relation between the two, a relationality that does not produce a harmonious resolution between the two, but one that 'rips apart'. This relation that no term could capture rips apart the presupposed limits and the delimited realms of both reading and writing. The relation between the two exists 'by the logic of play'. He begins by saying that 'a text remains...forever imperceptible. Its law and its rules are not, however, harboured in the inaccessibility of a secret; it is simply that they can never be booked, in the present' (Derrida, 1981:63). This analysis of the text takes on added significance when one understands that Derrida means much more than that which pertains to books when using the term 'text'. As Derrida has written concerning 'the text' -

'No more than writing or trace, it is not limited to the paper which you can cover with your graphism. It is precisely for strategic reasons...that I found it necessary to recast the concept of text by generalising it almost without any limit that is. That's why there is "nothing beyond the text"...That's why the text is always a field of forces: heterogeneous, differential, open, and so on. That's why deconstructive readings and writings are concerned not only with library books, with discourses, with conceptual and semantic contents. They are not simply analyses of discourse...They are also effective or active (as one says) interventions
that transform contexts without limiting themselves to theoretical or constative utterances' (Bernstein, quoting Derrida, 1991:211).

The only way to enter the game of the text is to enter the relation - to enter into the risk of writing the text - inscribing a new thread to the woven inter-play between reading and writing, and this would be to read the text. Here there is a substantive risk in the present that is necessitated by the aporetic relation between reading and writing, and because the text is forever imperceptible in the present any possible resolution of this aporetic relation is constantly disrupted by the excess of the inevitable passage of time. This is how Derrida's statement that 'reading is writing' is to be understood here. Such relationality is not formed by contradictions that are to be resolved, it is instead relationality made up of differences that cannot form a harmonious resolution. Each thread in the interweaving disunity cannot be presented, theorised, conceptualised or re-appropriated within a unifying concept (now and for future time); the concept is always exceeded and itself re-appropriated within disunity. Deconstruction is the dissimulation of the woven texture, the undoing of the web, yet the relational game of the text, that between reading and writing, cannot be absolutely undone. The relation cannot be absolutely undone because (logically) the very process that acts to dissimulate the 'woven texture' ensures its re-simulation in the supplement of reading that entails the addition of some new thread. In any case, an absolute undoing is not Derrida's intention.

It is important to understand Derrida's claim concerning reading and writing as entailing an aporetic relation between the two because this understanding will
help to illuminate Derrida's use of the pharmakon in 'Plato's Pharmacy'. This understanding will also show how the social and political thinking of Derrida and Gillian Rose shares a concern with very similar problematics, showing a relation itself between these two thinkers and eventually leading to a decision concerning an eventual disunity in the political implications of their work.

At the start of 'Plato's Pharmacy' Derrida introduces the reader to the term pharmakon which is to be found in Plato's 'Phaedrus'. Of the pharmakon Derrida has written -

'The pharmakon would be a substance - with all that that word can connote in terms of matter with occult virtues, cryptic depths refusing to submit their ambivalence to analysis, already paving the way for alchemy - if we didn't have eventually to come to recognise it as antisubstance itself: that which resists any philosopheme, indefinitely exceeding its bounds as nonidentity...granting philosophy by that very fact the inexhaustible adversity of what funds it and the infinite absence of what founds it' (Derrida, 1981:70)

It is important to note here that, although maybe not directly applicable, these words written by Derrida about the pharmakon can be very easily appropriated to describe Derrida's later ideas concerning the 'democracy to come' in works such as 'The Politics of Friendship'. Democracy 'measured up against its measurelessness?' (Derrida, 1997:306): [democracy] 'indefinitely exceeding its bounds as nonidentity'? (Derrida, 1981:70). The 'democracy to come' that belongs to the time of the promise and so it demands the duty to act, where it is
'no longer a matter of founding, but to open out to the future, or rather, to the "come", of a certain democracy?' (Derrida, 1997:306). In open discussion, at The University of Sussex, Derrida has talked of this 'democracy to come' in the following terms -

'when I speak of a "democracy to come", I don't mean a future democracy, a new regime, a new organisation of nation-states (although this may be hoped for) but I mean this 'to come': the promise of an authentic democracy which is never embodied in what we call democracy. This is a way of going on criticising what is everywhere given today under the name of democracy in our societies. This doesn't mean that "democracy to come" will be simply a future democracy correcting or improving the actual conditions of the so-called democracies, it means first of all that this democracy we dream of is linked in its concept to a promise. The idea of a promise is inscribed in the idea of a democracy: equality, freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press - all these things are inscribed as promises within democracy. Democracy is a promise. That is why it is a more historical concept of the political - it's the only concept of a regime or a political organisation in which history, that is the endless process of improvement and perfectibility, is inscribed in the concept. So, it's a historical concept through and through, and that's why I call it "to come": it is a promise and will remain a promise, but "to come" means also not a future but that it has "to come" as a promise, as a duty, that is "to come" immediately. We don't have to wait for future democracy
to happen, to appear, we have to do right here and now what has to be done for it. That's an injunction, an immediate injunction, no delay' (Derrida, 1997a)

It is of interest to note here what Nietzsche has written concerning what it is to have the right to make promises. In 'The Genealogy of Morals', Nietzsche wrote - 'This involves no mere passive inability to rid oneself of an impression, no mere indigestion through a once-pledged word with which one cannot "have done", but an active desire not to rid oneself, a desire for the continuance of something desired' (Nietzsche, 1989:58). This desire for the continuance of something desired eventually, in Nietzsche, becomes the indefinite desire for the continuance of desire - the will to overcome as an infinite, and so always insufficient, promise.

Like Nietzsche's overcoming, democracy, for Derrida, will 'remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its future times, to come: even when there is democracy, it never exists, it is never present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept' (Derrida, 1997:306). Democracy 'to come', measured up against its measurelessness, being the promise of an authentic democracy which is never embodied in what we call democracy - a way of going on criticising what is everywhere given today under the name of democracy in our societies, 'granting philosophy by that very fact the inexhaustible adversity of what funds it and the infinite absence of what founds it.' (Derrida, 1981:70)

With such relations between the pharmakon and 'democracy to come' in mind,
it should also be considered that the pharmakon is also seen, in 'The phaedrus', as that which leads astray but not in order to follow any definite direction. Socrates compares the written texts of Phaedrus to a drug - a pharmakon - which has lead Socrates outside the familiarity of the city, outside the city walls. As Derrida writes, 'operating through seduction, the pharmakon makes one stray from one's general, natural, habitual paths and laws' (Derrida, 1981:70). Here the pharmakon is seen to inhabit ethical writing, as writing which ceases to be writing as escape from identity and culture if it is fully understood and articulated. So we can also identify Derrida's apostrophe with the pharmakon, as it acts to bring into question present conceptions of justice, ethics and international law in the form of 'a call'. Derrida's opening apostrophe, simply letting a call be heard, a call that inaugurates the unknown, 'well before any destination is set down concerning its possibility, in the direction of familiar sentences' (Derrida, 1997:preface). This opening apostrophe is that which leads us astray from our general, 'habitual paths and laws'.

Derrida goes on to show that the association of writing with the pharmakon is not merely "artificial" or "coincidental" in 'The Phaedrus' (Derrida, 1981:72). About the myth in 'The Phaedrus', that concerns the story of Theuth, Derrida says that the 'entire hearing of the trial of writing should some day cease to appear as an extraneous mythological fantasy, an appendix the organism could easily, with no loss, have done without. In truth, it is rigorously called for from one end of the Phaedrus to the other' (Derrida, 1981:67).

In the myth, Theuth is the divinity of writing and makes his case to Thamus
who represents Ammon (the king of the gods) that writing should be imparted to
the other Egyptians. However, the King of all Egypt (the god-king) has the role
of bestowing value to this ‘uncertain gift’. As Derrida says, in the Platonic logic,
'the value of writing will not be itself, writing will have no value, unless and to the
extent that the god-king approves of it' (Derrida, 1981:76). Writing must be
imputed value by the true form of the spoken word - its value must be constituted
in the origin of truth and value. In the myth, the god-king proceeds to disparage
and deprecate writing. Derrida's claim is that the myth is not something Plato
throws in at the last minute, explaining that the appearance of the myth is
"supervised and limited by rigorous necessities" (Derrida, 1981:85). Derrida is
asserting that the "structural laws" governing the myth are identical to those
governing Platonic philosophy.

This, as Derrida suggests, is a major statement, since Platonic philosophy
defines itself in opposition to myth of all kinds. Indeed, the statement threatens to
undo the familiar Platonic distinction between 'mythos' and 'logos'. As Derrida
states, 'Plato had to make his tale conform to structural laws. The most general
of these, those that govern and articulate the oppositions speech/writing,
life/death, father/son, master/servant, first/second, legitimate son/orphan-bastard,
soul/body, inside/outside, good/evil, seriousness/play, day/night, sun/moon, etc.,' (Derrida, 1981:85, emphasis added)

Derrida develops his argument by articulating Theuth as being not only the
god of writing, but also the god of death, and he shows that Theuth is often
described as the polar opposite of his father, Ra. Ra is associated with life, the
sun, and the East, Theuth is associated with death, the moon, and the West. Yet even as Derrida describes the opposition between Theuth and Ra, he also notes an interesting paradox: although Theuth is the mirror image of his father, he also serves as a substitute or supplement for his father (Derrida, 1981:93). As Derrida states, 'the figure of [Theuth] is opposed to its other (father, sun, life, speech, origin, . . . etc.) but as that which at once supplements and supplants it.' (Derrida, 1981:93). What that means, according to Derrida, is that 'the god of writing is . . . at once his father, his son, and himself' (Derrida, 1981:93). Derrida continues - 'He [Theuth] cannot be assigned a fixed spot in the play of differences' (Derrida, 1981:93). Theuth the god of writing (not to mention draughts and dice - chance) - writing as a pharmakon - is that which becomes the inevitability of an inescapable relationality between the Platonic oppositions, the emergent disunity (that Plato's text cannot contain) between the oppositional couplings. The important point here is that, as Derrida himself writes -

'the figure of Thoth [Theuth] takes shape and takes its shape from the very thing it resists and substitutes for. But it thereby opposes itself, passes into its other, and this messenger-god is truly a god of the absolute passage between opposites... In distinguishing himself from its opposite, Thoth also imitates it, becomes its sign and representative, obeys it and conforms to it, replaces it, by violence if need be. He is thus the father's other, the father, and the subversive moment of replacement' (Derrida, 1981:93, emphasis added).

Once again we are returned to the metaphor of the doppleganger and to the
meaning given here to that metaphor: where any recognition of authentic sameness or otherness is a mis-recognition. When the doppleganger exists, the person that it doubles no longer exists as a self-sufficient entity - that person has no choice but to enter into and collude with the inevitability of an ambiguous relation between itself and that which has occurred as a now unavoidable supplement to it. It is through such inevitable ambiguity that Derrida shows the inescapable instability of Plato's most fundamental distinctions. As Derrida argues -

'it is precisely this ambiguity that Plato, through the mouth of the king, attempts to master, to dominate by inserting its definition into simple, clear-cut oppositions....And if one got to thinking that something like the pharmakon - or writing - far from being governed by these oppositions, opens up their very possibility without letting itself be comprehended by them....one would then have to bend into strange contortions what could no longer even simply be called logic' (Derrida, 1981:103).

Here Derrida asserts that, although Plato tries to master the ambiguity of the pharmakon, his efforts prove futile.

The divinity of writing, Theuth, as the 'absolute passage between opposites'; the pharmakon: "'ambivalent"...because it constitutes the medium in which opposites are opposed, the movement and play that links them among themselves, reverses them or makes one side cross over into the other' (Derrida, 1981:127, emphasis added). Antigone as the active third, the medium between two opposed laws. This problematic of the pharmakon itself bears an
important relation with the way in which Gillian Rose articulates and grapples with what she has termed aporetic universalism, as that which 'explores and experiments with the disunity of the singular and the universal' (Rose, 1992:164). Aporetic universalism is that which restlessly explores the relationality between the singular and the universal. As Derrida seeks to re-think democracy in terms where 'it is no longer a matter of founding, but to open out to the future' (Derrida, 1997:306), so Rose seeks to 'examine authority without arrogating it, to suspend the ethical and not abolish it' (Rose, 1992:165). In both cases the task is to re-think and explore the contemporary political/ethical diremptions 'well before any destination is set down concerning... possibility, in the direction of familiar sentences' (Derrida). This is the relation between Derrida and Gillian Rose, a relation which is hard to articulate because it itself is not a complete and unproblematic relation, it is full of fractures, differences and confusions - this, it seems, is fitting for two such thinkers.

'It is appropriate to say that Derrida is always encouraging us to question the status of what we take to be our centre, our native home, our arche, whether it is the principle of reason itself of some other authority. Derrida is not arguing that we abandon all authority but rather that we never cease questioning it.' (Bernstein, 1991:183). Bernstein is arguing that Derrida does not have the nihilistic desire to abandon all authority, but rather that we never cease questioning authority, can be related to Gillian Rose's thinking concerning the suspension of the political - of interrogating authority and not abandoning it. For both thinkers then it is important that thought has the force of questioning.
As Gillian Rose talks about the diremption in metaphysics that is instituted in modern social and political configurations, the diremption between ethics and law, between state and civil society, so Derrida deconstructs the either/or which has haunted so much of the history of philosophy and western civilization. In line with such a deconstructive strategy Derrida also refuses to make a choice between, to quote Bernstein, 'either an absolutely stable foundation and fixed Archimedean point, or intellectual and moral chaos, madness' (Bernstein, 1991:184). He attempts to maintain a restless position where he can examine the diremptions without entering either side of the oppositions. Does this not bear a relation with Gillian Rose's political stance?

For Derrida deconstruction has never been about some form of a defence of chaos, deconstruction is and has always been a strategy concerned with the overcoming of established limits and boundaries. What characterises the vitality of thought, the exigency of thought, is not any type of dogma or a search for firm and necessary foundations, the vitality consists in questioning the conditions and possibility for knowledge and experience, including ethical/political experience and possibility. It seems that such an approach will always produce an ambivalent position concerning any ethical and political framework which serves to answer the fundamental questions 'What ought we to be?' and 'What is to happen?'. In his later writings Derrida does discuss the fact that deconstruction should not be separate from any political problematic and that it should seek to be involved in a new investigation of responsibility. This would be an investigation which questions codes inherited from western ethics and politics.
though he has observed that this may prove difficult to recognise as politics for those who only recognise politics by the most familiar road signs.

An important point to make here is that Derrida's argument is that we have to think and act without false barriers, or more exactly, with the realisation that it is 'we' who construct and deconstruct these. For Derrida, the danger with any political code is that it can become reified - a set of unquestioned and unquestionable assumptions and formulas that we (dangerously) rely on to direct our actions. Such reification, for Derrida, is intimately linked with any ingrained process of institutionalisation. More importantly, for Derrida, no code is ever sufficient to justify and legitimate a decision now and for all time.

However, Derrida's himself does not rigorously question his own linkage of social and political institutions with reification. It is here that we can question Derrida's linkage of modern institutions with reification by relating back to the temporality of human organisation. As was focused on earlier, it is the very temporality of institutions that entails the impossibility of eternalising the historical particularity of the structuring of relationality through present social and political organisation. Derrida would not disagree so far, but it is further being argued here that future possibility is actually activated through the very relationality between the universal and the particular, justice and law, the finite and the infinite, that is figured and constituted in the temporality of social and political organisations. This is the way in which we can see social and political organisations as the constant re-configuration and re-definition of these diremptive relations. They do not absolutely reconcile, but instead, they double
diremption, not as duplicate reality, but differently, not with the aim to legitimate a 'spurious universality' (Rose, 1992:164), but in order to find an analogous expression for 'the snub' - as that which keeps unity and difference, universal and singular, aporetically together. Rose does not disavow social and political organisation as a relational medium through which there always already exists the possibility of an intensive universality. So, in the thought of Gillian Rose, as we are returned to a disunity between the universal and the singular, the insufficient codes of social and political institutions are nevertheless attempting universal substance in 'aporetic unity'. Any general moral or political code attempts to justify or legitimize a decision, however any decision will always take place in a singular and particular context and, as Gillian Rose has been quoted earlier, aporetic universalism is that which 'explores and experiments with the disunity of the singular and the universal' (Rose, 1992:164). Such exploration is the real exigency underlying 'Antigone'.

Therefore, in spite of there having been drawn a relation between Derrida and Gillian Rose, Rose thinks the ambiguous relations as enacted in modern social and political institutions. Political and moral diremptions, for Rose, are ingrained into the very fabric of modern institutions and the task is to comprehend and work upon, and within, these diremptions themselves. Whereas Derrida, on the other hand, always keeps at the margins and distances himself from any type of institutionalisation, for he sees this as being the very disavowal of rigorous reflexivity and the vitality of thought.

It is here that we can conclude that Gillian Rose's work has a much more
tenable (and workable) perspective with regards to political action and the taking of political risks in the present. It could be said that in the persistent struggle between 'the philosophical' and 'the historical', the former is the ultimate reference in Derrida (and the latter, despite all invocation, gets subsumed), whereas in Rose, the philosophical is always brought back to the historical-institutional (despite her persistent philosophical style), something Derrida would never accept in that form - this is why both act to supplement each other. This writing upon Rose and Derrida itself exists as a performative act of doubling that resists duplication, as both writers meet their 'doppelganger' and so are drawn into ambiguous relations between each other, so being forced to face what they do not want to face. Derrida's work is being drawn toward an institutional framework and Rose's work is being drawn toward the idea that modern social and political aporias/diremptions are not (inherently) open to some form of 'unity'/reconciliation.

The political implications of Rose's aporetic universalism are far more substantive than those of Derrida's thought. Rose's philosophy intrinsically accepts that violence is implicit in any form of social and political organisation, so it can struggle much more thoroughly for 'aporetic unity' - being able to engage with the risk, action and violence that is already and will always be present to be worked upon in any form of society or community. Whereas Derrida seems to still be positing a rather Kantian form of cosmopolitanism that, in its measurelessness, points toward an always insufficient perfection because power, violence and universal law exist only to be displaced and overcome in
relation to the infinite promise of 'democracy to come', displaced (without another
trial or procession that marks the justice of fraternity, that produces and is also
produced by the great philosophical and canonical discourses on friendship)
'before another testimonial agency, from fact to law and from law to justice'
(Derrida, 1997: preface).

Derrida has said the following in the discussion, that was mentioned earlier,
concerning the political in his work -

'What I am trying to do now, especially in the books 'Spectres of Marx' or
in the 'Politics of Friendship', is to try to understand or to re-think, I'm not
the only one doing that of course, but to try with others to re-think what
the political is, what is involved precisely in the dissemination of the
political field. So, I'm not proposing a new political content within the old
frame but trying to re-define, or to think differently, what is involved in the
political as such, and for the very same reason I don't propose a political
theory because what I'm saying, specifically on friendship and hospitality,
on what friendship is and what hospitality is, exceeds, precisely,
knowledge', and later he states that, 'I think that what I try to call a 'New
International' in 'Spectres of Marx' should go beyond this concept of the
cosmopolitical strictly speaking. We have to do a lot of things, and to
work of course within the space of the cosmopolitical, and an international
law that keeps alive the sovereignty of the State. There is a lot to be
done within the State and in international organisations that respect the
sovereignty of the State, that's what we call politics today, but beyond this
task, which is enormous, we must think and be oriented by something which is more than cosmopolitical, more than citizenship. So you see, just a few sentences before I stop, how strange is this itinerary calling for a new concept of democracy grounded - assuming this is a ground, and I'm not sure it is-grounded on this groundless experience of friendship, which shouldn't be limited in the way it has been, and a concept of democracy which would re-define the political not only beyond the nation-state but beyond the cosmopolitical itself (Derrida, 1997a).

A Kantian Idea of the cosmopolitan would likewise be always aiming beyond its present constitution. For (strictly speaking) Kantian cosmopolitanism is not an end-in-itself. At the end of his essay, 'Is the human race continually improving?', Kant states that 'they [humanity] will thereby enter into a constitution based on genuine principles of right, which is by its very nature capable of constant progress and improvement without forfeiting its strength' (Kant, 1991:189). Kant is quite explicit in this passage in stating that universal progress (predictive cosmopolitan history) is 'capable of constant progress and improvement without forfeiting its strength', and something capable of constant progress and improvement cannot be theorised as an end point to history which itself can be moved beyond, or as Derrida states, to move 'beyond the cosmopolitical itself'. Kant makes his case more explicit in ‘The Critique of Pure reason' when he writes that, ‘no-one can or ought to decide what the highest degree may be at which mankind may have to stop progressing, and hence how wide a gap may still of necessity remain between the idea and its execution. For this will depend
on freedom, which can transcend any limit we care to impose' (Kant, 1970:191). However, in Kant, this constant progress is bound by the regulation that it is 'based on genuine principles of right', so this process would occur within and through institutional form - for to have 'genuine principles of right' there would be needed all the institutional forms that maintain law, a judicial system, citizenship, the state and the legal status of persons and continual progress would then take place through and within the maintenance of these structures. So within the infinite (so always insufficient) promise of predictive universal history, citizenship, the state, law and justice would always remain as imperatives to be worked upon and within, not seen as things to be overcome in relation to a certain 'beyond' - a beyond that is outside their structure and at the margin of their proper domain.

At this point (quite rightly) Gillian Rose would still insist on asking the awkward question - what is justice in a place where no trials occur? No trials, that is, for 'the victim or the enemy - in other words, the grief' (Derrida, 1997:preface).

Derrida does not readily perceive that the margin is already itself positioned and delimited by the centre - in the social and political - by the very institutions from which it is apart. The margin or the outside is itself a position that articulates itself in relation to presently actualized social and political organisation - it is not absolutely apart and separate. This last point is actually a very 'Derridian' issue. This issue holds the concern that the centre and the margin, the inside and the outside, are not, and cannot be, mutually exclusive categories. So (oddly) it is exactly here, at the moment when we seem to start to form a substantive critique against Derrida, that we must return to Derrida, finding the
importance of the term 'pharmakon' and 'Theuth', the god of writing, as being the absolute passage between opposites. For there is an ambiguous relationality between such terms as centre and margin, inside and outside. However (now contra Derrida) this is a relationality that necessitates the acceptance of the 'messiness' of political action, risk and also violence; and, for Gillian Rose, conceptuality is already, in a sense, actualised - so there is really no 'beyond' as Derrida calls it, there is instead the diremptions, the 'broken middle', in which and through which we must labour. Such a viewpoint can be discerned in the following quote from Rose -

"[Philosophy's]...Grey in grey warns against philosophy's pride of *Sollen*, against any proscription, any imposition of ideals, imaginary communities or "progressive narrations". Instead the "idealisations" of philosophy would acknowledge and recognise actuality and not force or fantasize it. They act as the third, the middle, their own effectivity at stake between the potentiality and the actuality of the world and engaging at the point where the two come into a changed relation: not *ex post facto* justification, even less a priori rejuvenation, but reconfiguration" (Rose, 992:intro).

It is through the actuality of reconfiguration in which human potentiality is itself (and can be) actualised. For Gillian Rose, history is itself the constant reconfiguration of the relation between potentiality and actuality. It is in this sense that the limit of human potentiality can not be separate from, or separated from, its configuration in historical/institutionalised form, in terms of the social and political. As Rose states, 'humanity achieves an initial measure or idea of its
potentialities by encountering its limit. That encounter does not arrest it in an endless "labyrinth", but sets it off on further encounters where what has been learnt or not learnt is tried out again and again, constantly changing both the idea of the potential and the idea of the limit.' (Rose, 1993:240)

However, Rose goes on to propose that, paradoxically, 'the claim advanced formerly by modern and now post-modern architecture and philosophy, that each alone offers a genuine "opening", disowns previous openings - attempts to renegotiate potentiality and actuality - by characterising the other position without differentiation as "total", "closed", "functionalist", "rationalistic", "dominatory", instead of drawing on the experience of those openings and their subsequent subversion, instead of comprehending illusion: the relation between the limit of the meaning at stake and its configuration or form' (Rose, 1993:240).

However (and again paradoxically), Gillian Rose has included Derrida in the 'post-modern' and so is claiming both that he claims to offer a 'genuine opening' and that, in actuality, he is involved in the very thing that disavows any validity to the claim of a genuine opening. For if all previous (modern) openings were 'attempts to renegotiate potentiality and actuality', then Derrida's ('postmodern') claim to offer a genuine opening must itself also be engaged, whether consciously or not, in such renegotiation.

Whereas the claim here is that, although he does have the previously mentioned political weaknesses, Derrida is nevertheless fully aware of the absurdity and impossibility concerning the claim to 'a genuine opening', an absolute break with previous thought and history. For Derrida it is the idea of an
ultimate breakage 'with which we must break' (Derrida, 1997:285). It is hard to understand Gillian Rose's broad condemnation of Derrida's thought in terms of a claim to 'post-modern' breakage and the attempted establishment of new completions concerning law and justice when one of Derrida's more well known (and previously quoted) statements is that any idea of over-coming the western tradition or the whole of logocentricism, or the phallocentric scheme of fraternity, is flawed from its outset. Instead of an idea of 'ultimate breakage', Derrida stresses the importance of working with relationality. This, it has been argued here, can be found in Derrida's earlier works such as 'Writing and Difference' and 'On Plato's Pharmacy', and it is a perspective which has important ramifications for his later social and political writings. Derrida's use of the term 'pharmakon' in 'On Plato's Pharmacy' explicitly shows the sometimes uncomfortable unavoidability of working with a difficult relationality that exceeds the limits of that which remains. Yet, in terms of the social and political, this denouncement of limits needs to be the on-going reconfiguration (the invention) of democracy, the state, law, justice and ethics - the temporal and specific substance of the social and political itself.

This is where ethical writing 'exists' - 'ethical writing', a phrase which itself contains a difficult relation. This is a relation between writing and ethics, writing that (from within post-structuralism at least) ceases to be writing if it is fully understood and articulated, and ethics that demands some form of articulation, that needs a culture from within which to function and be articulated. Ethical writing returns to metaphysics as perplexity and must return to articulation and
culture if only to exceed them. Ethical writing must then remain within the conceptuality of thought, within discourse; yet ethical writing (as has been stated previously) does not accept these limitations as a conclusion or even a beginning, (they are part of difficulty itself) it denounces them and so exceeds them, and its exigency then becomes one of imagining them again...but differently.

However, there are thinkers today who articulate an unfractured resolution of the contemporary social and political aporias, to reconcile the disunity. Habermas attempts to reconcile such disunity in his theory of communicative rational action and a certain type cosmopolitanism.

Habermas argues that Derrida’s ideas and his ‘method’ - that has been termed deconstruction - cannot be used constructively in social and political contexts. However, it has been argued here that the more general Derrida/Rose ‘approach’ can be vital in understanding contemporary political difficulties. Globally, as in the institution of the United Nations - such an approach can prove incisive in understanding the ongoing perplexities and problems associated with a general failure to comprehend an unprecedented political situation.

It is well known that Habermas believes Derrida prefers and privileges the ‘pure realm of philosophy to that of politics and history’ (Hoy, 1996:138). It has been argued here that it is important to return the theoretical problematics of post-structuralism to the historically specific, so returning to the insights of more conventional social theory that always stressed the importance of history and objective social change. Yet in relation to such a move, it becomes pertinent to
look again at Derrida's use of 'grief' in 'The Politics of Friendship'. As Derrida says, this is 'grief of the victim and the enemy'. It is true that the notion of grief in Derrida is not really satisfactorily applied to specific historical/political examples, it is kept in a rather abstract realm of reasoning. However, the notion of grief ultimately points to actual victims and actual violence. In terms of the social and political this 'grief' continues to call for the reconfiguration of democracy, the state, law, justice and ethics - exactly the temporal and specific substance of the social and political itself. In the contemporary situation the social and political is in no way confined to the nation state and, in order to comprehend the institutionalised aporias and diremptions of such a global situation, we can turn to an institution such as the United Nations, an institution which has assumed increasing importance in the overall situation of globalisation.

On the 7th July 1990 the decision was taken by the Soviet Union to dismantle the Warsaw Pact. This was a significant move in relation to the general social, political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union. It is safe to say that America has emerged in the 1990’s as the dominant world power. Within these monumental events the on-going confusions and perplexities concerning the UN's function, powers and attributes have re-emerged in yet more pressing forms. The UN is normally seen as containing within itself the possibility of completion for the quest for community on a global level. However, within the quest for this completion, the question of incompleteness becomes more and more apparent through historical experience and together with the task of the re-thinking of community as incomplete that is occurring within this text.
On a practical level Derrida's aporia of friendship was always to be found in the activities and difficulties of the UN. The United Nations was generated by ideas concerning the possibility of universal justice on a global scale, justice underpinned by determinative judgement, within which any one particular political instance can be understood and acted upon in relation to universal law and principle. However, the UN is itself infested with familial filiations and fraternal understandings and from this confusion there occurs much misunderstanding, and much non-action, or mis-action, on its part. It is important to understand that this confusion (if we are to follow Derrida's analysis) does not come from a dynamic tension between a universal ideal and its possible realisation in concrete being, but that the universalist discourse of the UN holds within it fraternal concerns, at its very core, the familial and phallocentric schema of fraternity.

At the heart of the UN there lies a deep confusion, and this is that its universalist discourse is constantly disrupted by the way in which (by its members) the friend is seen to be like the brother. This connection between friendship and brotherhood simultaneously contaminates the United Nations, so doing violence to itself, and excludes others from it, so doing violence to the victims that it seeks to help. The result of this process of exclusion and contamination is the various indecisions and delays in its policies, the contradictory nature of its decisions from one political incident to the next, and the general on-going disagreements concerning exactly what role the UN should be playing in the new forms of global politics. The UN stands as a possible
community of friends encompassing universal hospitality in terms of the cultural, legal, ethical and the political, but the aporia of friendship within it leads to a great sadness for the victims of war and oppression that it has failed. This sadness exists on ‘our’ part (we who read these words and we in the west) and it certainly exists on the part of the victim - as grief.

With the advent of ‘perestroika’ the Soviet Union instigated a political initiative of co-operation with other major powers and an active involvement in international affairs. In this new atmosphere of international co-operation a United Nations, that had previously seemed impotent in relation to the great forces at work in the slow conflict between the two super powers, started to seem capable of fulfilling the (global) universalistic role that it seemed (in theory) to have been constructed to perform. However, the USA quickly became the major world super power and this quickly led to many claims that the UN itself has become nothing more than an extension of US power and representative of its particular interests. In a recent article in the Guardian newspaper George Monbiot has argued that the UN now represents the big business interests of the West, which, of course, are underpinned by the vested interests of the USA. As Monbiot states, ‘The UN...appears to be turning itself into an enforcement agency for the global economy, helping western companies to penetrate new markets while avoiding the regulations which would be the only effective means of holding them to account. By making peace with power, the UN is declaring war upon the powerless’ (2000, Moniot). Even though the UN, in 1988, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace, with more recent and pivotal political/military
events such as the Gulf War, claims such as those made by Monbiot raise to a new level questions concerning exactly what the UN’s potential is and if it is failing that potential with regards to the social and political problems of the new global politics.

The basic problematic here is one concerning a cosmopolitan order in a global context, and, within this problematic, Habermas can be seen as a thinker who unerringly develops an idea of contemporary cosmopolitanism along Kantian lines. According to Richard Falk, in an article entitled ‘False Universalism and the geo-politics of exclusion’, problems arise, not so much because the UN reflects a conflicting and fragmented world, but due to the fact that the UN depicts and subsumes the particular and the partial as if they were synonymous with the general and the universal, ‘not only with respect to substantive results, but more crucially in relation to the processes by which these results are reached’ (Falk, 1997:7). Again the basic argument is that the singular is found within the universal; so within universalist claims to global justice and moral/political reason there can be found the partial concerns and affiliations of fraternity. In this sense the UN can be seen as a Western construction. For this reason Richard Falk argues that the UN is characterised by a false universalism which he attributes to the cultural heritage of the West and, more specifically, to the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment project had its concern with ‘decontextualised reason, as embodied in the language, ideas, diplomatic style, experience and rules of representation that originated in Western Europe’ (Falk, 1997:8). Falk argues
that the notion of the UN as a universally representative institution is, in fact, a mask worn to obscure Western civilisational hegemony. He makes the point that this mask of universalism has been worn for so long that it is indistinguishable from the face itself for the wearer and beholder alike. This is very close to Derrida's statements concerning the confusion that arises because universal concepts of justice and morality have been articulated by philosophical and canonical discourses that are themselves generated by the familial and phallocentric schema of fraternity. So the particular language, experience and rules of the West are taken, by its investment in de-contextualised reason, to represent universal Truth.

Falk argues that, in contrast, a true universality would acknowledge significant difference, as well as sameness, in constituting a world order based on procedures and norms designed to ensure equitable participation by each major world civilisation. Falk thinks that global politics is made up of many differing civilisations, with differing normative paradigms, such as Islam, the West, China and the Orient. Any global world order must give recognition to these differing civilisations. The problem is not that the UN is inevitably contaminated by the violence of history and so it represents conventional conflicting states, with the same weaknesses and inconsistencies as their predecessors over generations; the problem is that the UN sees the diversity of civilisational and cultural differences (with their conflicts and weaknesses) as contradictions that must be resolved in order to make way for the established 'universal' principles contained within the UN and constructed by the West. A linear and universal view of
historical development is very characteristic of Enlightenment thinking and the problem for Falk is that specifically western rules, values and experiences are taken to be universally valid. The Enlightenment was, of course, distinctly optimistic. This optimism developed out of a belief in human reason, an increasing awareness of the power of 'man's' mind to subject himself and the world to rational analysis and, through such analysis, to improve and refine both the world and humanity itself. The main idea is that, through the use of reason, humanity can transcend imperfect conditions and in this transcendence there will be progress.

However (to return to Lyotard) the non-western civilisations such as Islam become a differend whose own normative rules, values and experiences have been hidden or silenced by the Enlightenment universalism of a western civilisational hegemonic closure. This exclusion takes the form of a profound differend whereby the hegemonic closure always presents any conflicts or tension within the UN only as contradictions to be resolved (as obstacles) rather than as real cultural and economic differences between the western world and differing civilisations such as Islam, or between the developed countries and the developing countries. The heritage of western thought and modernity (shown in Hegel) has a tendency to theorise form as concept still confused, seeing that thought's 'task' is to overcome these contradictions. The reality of civilisations such as Islam point to real differences that cannot be subsumed into this classic western problematic. To do so would be to return their very real differences within western hegemony. The grief would then not be addressed or even
revealed but its denial merely doubled.

The whole notion of a truly universal and all-inclusive UN is problematic for in the announcement of such a public body we can find Derrida murmuring, ‘ask ourselves who grants or imposes the right to all these distinctions, to all these preventions and sanctions that they give rise to. Is it a living being? A living being purely and simply, presently living. A living present? Which one? God? Man? Which man? For whom or to whom? Whose friend or enemy?’ (Derrida, 1997:preface). So the claim to universality itself seems to be problematic, even as a future potentiality. This would also refer to Falk’s ‘the universality of significant difference’ - for who decides what constitutes a significant difference in the first place, ‘who grants or imposes the right to these distinctions?’
Chapter Four - The United Nations and the quest for community

Grief as a fundamental starting point for justice and ethics, ethics and politics, is the fundamental measure against which the United Nation's (UN) failures emerge. To follow Derrida's analysis, one glaring example of fraternal politics within the UN is the way that the USA uses it according to its own political agenda, so the UN's posited global politics are always again infested by the USA's particular filiations and partial fraternal ties. As Derrida argues, fraternity is the heritage of the west and so the public body of the UN continues to be thrown into confusion by the vested interests and private filiations held by its dominant members. The 'res publica' of the UN is disrupted by the way in which its members see that the friend must be like the brother.

Such confusion leads to many disharmonies within the UN and many questionable policy decisions, so that, over the years, many have questioned what the role of the UN actually is in a global context. If the UN's major objectives were to lessen conflicts and damaging global divisions in order to assure peace then the UN can be said to have failed. Yet, according to Derrida's analysis concerning the familial and phallocentric schema of fraternity, might not this failure be just an inevitability?

To return to the analysis in the chapter 'The question of incompletition', the Logos, where peace may be declared, is inhabited by 'war' (war in the sense that...
it is rooted in space and the same) and so it is contaminated by the historical totality from which ‘all dreams, imaginings, love or grief must stem’. So the Logos, ‘the medium of all comprehension and of all understanding’, is inevitably infested by the violence of history and so then is the global polity that is the potential of the United Nations. Again and inevitably, the singular ‘name’ contaminates the ‘name’ as yet to be invented for the singular ‘name’ (the fraternal friendship) already pulses within and generates the discursive conditions of possibility for its invention - for the UN’s invention. The UN has been charged with being a partial and ineffective organisation, as this next quote from Evan Luard shows -

‘Consciousness that the UN has failed to bring solutions to any of the main conflict situations of recent years, creates a feeling that it is an increasingly marginal force in modern world politics. The real solutions, the serious negotiations, it is felt (on these, as on East-West relations, strategic weapons, or monetary and trade policy) are undertaken elsewhere, between the great powers. The UN, on all these matters, seems ineffective and irrelevant. It provides, it is said, only words but not deeds; it is a focus for propaganda rather than for serious discussion and debate; it is dominated by a very small number of irresponsible nations who use their votes to steamroller through unrealistic resolutions’ (Luard, 1980:3)

The author makes a point that some of these criticisms are just not true. It is not the case that the UN has provided only words and not deeds. The author
lists five major peace forces that did much in the Middle East and Cyprus. The UNDP (The United Nations Development Programme) is also listed as being of much more importance - spending about 500 million dollars in 1980, plus other areas such as the environment, disaster relief and refugees (more recently, in the Kurdish crisis in Northern Iraq). Many of these social and economic projects have been successful in relation to their original aims and objectives.

The real problem seems to lie with peacekeeping and the maintenance of peace in relation to consensus in the UN and international political systems. Luard provides a telling comment when trying to explain inadequacies in relation to the above; he argues that, ‘the UN indeed, as has often been pointed out, can never be anything but a mirror of the world as it is. It merely assembles together the multiplicity of individual national states with all their imperfections. If the states are bellicose, the UN will be full of bellicosity...If the world is one of rich/poor confrontation (as today), so will the UN be also. If the world is beset with nationalism, so too must the UN be. If there are conflicts and disagreements among continents, races, or ideologies, these will be manifest in the UN as well. It is no use blaming the UN, therefore, for the deficiencies which are those of the world it reflects’ (Luard, 1980:5).

There seems to be much common-sense truth in this argument of a mirror-like and transparent organisation, but is this picture of the UN really the case? Luard wrote the above words over twenty years ago now and much has changed since then. Luard stresses that the characteristics of states in world politics will be reflected in the nature and constitution of the UN. This level of transparency in
the systems and processes of the UN is itself debatable; however, Luard can also be seen to be giving great weight to the role of nation-states in terms of the UN and international politics in general. A direct causal link is made between the nature of nation states that directly determine the nature and constitution of the UN when Luard states that 'it [the UN] merely assembles together the multiplicity of individual national states with all their imperfections'. So, logically, for Luard, the way to manage global politics more effectively and deal with problems in the UN would be to manage and deal with problems within particular states more effectively - it is here that Luard reduces the universal to the particular. In fact, today Luard's statement appears a rather crude and simplistic way of looking at and approaching global politics and the UN system. Such crudity, to be fair, may not be so much the fault of Luard at the time, but rather that international politics have changed and generally become more complex in time.

This new level of complexity in relation to the UN and international politics can be placed under the general rubric of the term globalisation. Different theorists from different perspectives have interpreted the notion of globalisation in many ways. However, this following quote from David Held helps to give a general understanding of the importance of globalisation in this context - globalisation is a 'set of forces' and an amalgamation of processes that 'alone warrant the statement that the operation of states in an ever more complex international system both limits their autonomy (in some spheres radically) and impinges increasingly upon their sovereignty. Any conception of sovereignty that interprets it as an illimitable and divisible form of public power - entrenched securely in
individual nation-states - is undermined. Sovereignty itself has to be conceived today as already divided among a number of agencies - national, regional and international - and limited by the very nature of this plurality' (Held, 1995:135).

Since the advent of the cold war there has always existed a certain tension between the idea of the state as an autonomous agent in both its internal and external affairs and the development of the global system of states, characterized by the emergence of the world superpowers. However, globalisation denotes more than this binary tension. Globalisation (as an ever more significant play of forces at work on a global level) acts to restrict the capabilities of national governments and states by blurring the boundaries of domestic politics and reconfiguring the institutional and organisational context of national politics, so also changing the legal framework and administrative practices of governments - making the lines of responsibility and accountability of nation states themselves unclear.

Within such protean global dynamics it is harder to place exactly what role the UN is (or should be) playing. And yet, with the collapse of the cold war and the major developments of globalisation, it is even more important today to answer the questions concerning peacekeeping, conflict prevention and humanitarian aid that hang over the UN. The international systems of the cold war have disintegrated and no real alternative has yet developed. In this situation the major developments of globalisation continue. Among these developments are to be counted the dynamics of a world economy which produce increasing instability and general difficulties within and between states that exceed the
control of any single nation. Another major development is the rapid growth of transnational connections, which have multiplied new forms of collective decision-making involving corporations, intergovernmental organisations and international pressure groups; linked to this development is the expansion and intensification of transnational communication systems such as the internet and satellite; also there are growing transnational problems such as the proliferation of nuclear arms and the environmental crisis that concerns issues of global warming, contamination from chemicals and radiation, damage to the ozone layer and species depletion - such issues do not acknowledge national boundaries.

Within such a context, as Michael Wesley has said, the UN’s ‘record still begs serious and systematic investigation’ (Wesley, 1997:1). At the UN millennium summit (in September 2000) Kofi Annan, the UN secretary general, called on the world’s leaders to ‘put things right’. His plea was made in relation to a major aim of the summit itself - ‘For Mr Annan this is nothing less than reforming the UN, to make it fit for the 21st century’ (Ellison and MacAskill, 2000:14). However, in the Guardian newspaper’s Comment and Analysis section following this article it is argued that the UN’s ‘peacekeeping operations are frequently shambolic, its numerous agencies too often beset by bureaucracy, incompetence and pernicious patronage...From the Security Council down, its proceedings lack transparency and democratic scrutiny’ (Guardian, Comment & Analysis, 2000:21). The comment and analysis goes on to argue that the power and ‘clout’ of the UN is potentially undermined by other global organisations that
hold within them the western interests of big business, multinationals and the USA. Such organisations are the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the G7 group. The article generally views the UN as a type of scapegoat for the failures of nation states in a global context. Instead of being a force for good, the article argues, the UN is too often an excuse for failure. The article goes onto to say that, in order to overcome this basic problem, the UN must itself overcome the ‘debilitating disconnection between national means and agreed international ends’ (Guardian, Comment & Analysis, 2000:21). So, after the world’s leaders at the millennium summit have given their ‘noble’ international aims, they return to their respective countries and submit these ‘agreed international ends’ to the scrutiny of the familial and fraternal concerns of the nation state. Examples of some of the international aims that have been stated in the millennium summit are Tony Blair’s reference to the ‘dismal failure of the world in Africa’ and his call for a over-haul of UN peacekeeping operations and a ‘new partnership’ with the entire continent of Africa to end its wars and poverty. Bill Clinton listed a whole series of ‘disputes’ that over-shadowed the summit and needed further resolution - included in his list were the Middle East, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Yugoslavia. These aims are stated and then, according to Ewan MacAskill, ‘delegates slope off for one-to-one talks in pre-booked rooms near the hall. Mr Blair, had talks with his counter-parts from Chile, Albania, Montenegro, Palestine, Germany and France’ (MacAskill, 2000:15). More significant one-to-one talks occurred between Bill Clinton, Yasser Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minister, Edud Barak (MacAskill, 2000:15).
Such commentary is not confined to the articles mentioned above, yet the nature of such informed commentary upon the UN's millennium summit highlights, in a most contemporary fashion, seemingly inherent and profound weaknesses in the body of the UN as it now stands. In his work, 'Casualties of the New World Order', Wesley has searched for the common sources of the failure of UN missions since the end of the Cold War. Wesley's book focuses upon UN missions with regards to civil wars, concentrating his analysis on this one thematic because the conflict dynamics of civil wars around the world are able to expose and then accentuate inherent structural weaknesses in UN missions.

Right from the start of his analysis, Wesley notes that there are big differences between the types of missions the UN dispatches in order to try and address civil wars around the world. Yet, according to Wesley, 'a common thread of disappointment, rejection, and failure to deliver mandates runs through all mission types charged with terminating or dampening internal conflicts - from mediation, through peacekeeping, demobilization and election monitoring' (Wesley, 1997: 2). Wesley goes onto to argue that such a 'common thread' questions the view that each mission's failings derive from peculiarities in its mandates, resources, or personnel - and so this commonality suggests that all UN missions share the same general weaknesses. Concerning these common weaknesses, Wesley has written the following -

'The motives of UN member-states for responding to contemporary civil wars through the UN are...identified as the most deep-seated location of
the weaknesses of UN missions. Second, the weaknesses in the structures of the mounting and authorization of UN missions are shown to follow from the motives of the member states. Finally, it is demonstrated that the weaknesses of UN missions, as they manifest themselves in the field through lack of influence, inappropriate mandates and resourcing, and fragmenting endorsement from within the UN, flow directly from these more profound sources.’ (Wesley, 1997:3)

For Wesley, the motives of the UN member states must always be understood in the context that any states actions in the international system, and within the UN system itself, are motivated primarily by self-interest. Such analysis is compatible with the journalistic observations from the UN millennium summit concerning the delegates sloping off ‘for one-to-one talks in pre-booked rooms’ - behind the scenes and in the shadow of the hyperbole of their rhetoric. Such reports and general analysis begs the question concerning how these back-room exchanges - unadulterated by the complication of the public relations machinery - reach implicit agreements between UN members (sealed by the firmness of brotherly handshakes?). How do such ‘understandings’ between member states contaminate the manicured ideals and noble aims that are broadcast (prime time) to the general public? It stands to reason that in these ‘back-rooms’ the friend must be like the brother, with whom concerns can be shared and understood and with whom a special (familial) understanding can be formed.

Beyond the televised rhetoric the reality that contaminates the UN’s universal aims and objectives is the definitional process that distinguishes the
friend/brother from the non-friend/non-brother. So the universal exists inseparable from, and yet fractured by, the particularity of brotherhood and its implicit bondage of one state to another in their mutually illicit motivations. The co-existence of the universal, the particular and the singular within the UN can be related to what J.N. Rosenau has called patterned chaos or, more recently as ‘distant proximities’ (Rosenau, 1998:252). Contained within the concept of patterned chaos Rosenau provides an insightful analysis into the contemporary situation of global politics and the UN, yet the central mistake that he makes is to decide that such patterned chaos is essentially contradictory. Rosenau writes that -

‘Faced with pervasive contradictions, with fuzzy causal sequences, with powerful tendencies offset by startling discrepancies, with a growing multitude of uniformities and a swelling number of disparities, how do we proceed? The answer is complicated, but as a minimum we have to accept the consequences of presuming that fundamental transformations are restructuring the nature of world politics. If one accepts this presumption, if one is ready to affirm that world affairs seem contradictory and elusive precisely because strong currents of change are at work, then one need not cling to traditional conceptions of the role of states or seek theoretical refuge in ambiguous patterns...In short, we have to learn how to accommodate huge similarities and large differences without throwing up our hands and concluding either that everything is so distinct from everything else that generalization is not possible, or that everything is too
murky to be subjected to systematic empirical inquiry.'

(Rosenau, 1998:252)

As Rosenau quite rightly points out, the disparities of the UN run alongside the uniformities, for while the ambiguity of the back-room talks goes on there is also a strong commitment to human rights, peace-keeping and a general appeal to justice underpinned by determinative judgement - within which any one particular political instance can be understood and acted upon in relation to universal law and principle. The article, by Ewen MacAskill and Michael Ellison, on the millennium summit, concludes with a short anecdote concerning an exchange between a reporter and Kofi Annan at a press conference on the eve of the summit. With reference to the planned declaration at the end of the conference - to call on the world leaders to 'spare no effort to free our peoples from the scourge of war' (to ensure a more equitable world) - a reporter reminded Kofi Annan that ringing calls for peace and equality have been made since biblical times. The article reports that, 'Mr Annan replied that did not mean it was not worth trying. "Yes, you may think I am a dreamer, as some have called me, but without the dream, you do not get anything done", he said' (Ellison and MacAskill, 2000:14).

However, Michael Wesley observed, in relation to the 'ultimate failure of the UN to mediate a solution in Bosnia', that the most fundamental weakness in the UN's mediation mission - before the resort to NATO military action in the area - 'originated in its sponsoring coalition within the UN. The states in this grouping brought widely diverging interests in Bosnia to each meeting. The sources of
these member-states' motivations are complex. At one level, the states in the Bosnia grouping were motivated by their own interests, as impacted on by the war, and considerations like relative gains and duties and obligations within the alliances' (Wesley, 1997:33). The major characteristic of the coalition on the UN was disunity.

Throughout the 'Yugoslav wars', from the UN's involvement in 1992, the sustained NATO air strikes in September 1995 and the eventual withdrawal of the Serb army from Croatia, right up to the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, there was much disunity amongst the members of the international coalition. With the start of a UN response to the conflict the USA became involved. From the outset there was a great difference between the USA and the European partners in their perspectives toward the conflict. The Americans perceived the conflict in terms of sovereignty and applied universal judgements to the particular cases of aggression and violence that occurred throughout the Yugoslav wars. The European partners were more concerned with the pragmatic of maintaining unity and stability in Europe. The resulting difference was eventually manifest in the USA's push toward military intervention against Serbia and the European tendency (via France and Britain) toward conflict containment, war relief and intensive negotiations with all parties in the war. For Americans the war always seemed to remain a rather abstract and distant problem - to which general universal 'solutions' could be applied and which the clinical 'precision' (sic) of air strikes could resolve.

There was also further disunity from coalition members that were generally
sympathetic to the Serbian position. The most important of these was the Russian Federation, a member which obviously had vital geographical-military strategic interests in that part of the world and was concerned about the involvement of NATO and US forces in that area. Russia wanted to halt any military intervention in the Bosnian conflict by Western forces and consequently the Western members of the coalition were wary of upsetting their relations with the Yeltsin regime by any kind of pre-emptive military action against Serbia. On the other hand, Greece has a long-standing rivalry with Turkey, and so Greece worked within the coalition to halt any pro-Muslim stance that might be developed by it. However, Turkey identified with the Muslim states and saw many reasons for a largely Muslim Bosnian government, so unsurprisingly Turkey were amongst those members of the coalition that were in favour of lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia with the idea of helping them defend themselves against Serbian aggression.

With only a very brief overview of the state of the coalition in relation to the Yugoslav wars it is easy to understand how social, political and cultural processes occur whereby the singular ‘name’ contaminates the universal ‘name’ as yet to be invented - for the singular ‘name’ (the fraternal friendship) already pulses within and generates the discursive conditions of possibility for its invention - for the UN’s invention. A relation is drawn between singularity and universality, a relationality that is not, a priori, open to harmonious resolution. The problematic nature of resolving such relationality in terms of unity can be seen by the fact that such relationality does not just entail a confusing
contamination of the universal by the singular, but that it also entails the contamination of the singular and the particular by the universal. As with the example of the Yugoslav wars, universal determinative judgement - that does exist in the UN and which was engaged by many of the member states of the coalition - caused the particularity and the singularity of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia to be subsumed by the formalism of universal rules and systems. In order to comprehend the particularities of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia the UN employed rules and procedures which are underpinned by ideas generated by determinative judgement, within which any one particular political instance can be understood and acted upon in relation to universal law and principle. This act of subsuming the particular within the universal resulted in a fundamental misunderstanding of the conflict on the part of the UN and its participant states.

From the very start the UN was involved in the development of the Bosnian conflict when it gave recognition to the republics that were formed in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. On the 18th of May 1992 Bosnia sought UN recognition of its sovereignty and (after Bosnia fulfilled the Carrington Arbitration Commission’s requirement that two-thirds of its voters supported the move into independence by vote in a referendum) had to be granted membership of the UN as a sovereign state. The UN was therefore required to act upon the value that it places upon the state sovereignty of its members and uphold its abstract obligations toward the new independent state of Bosnia. As a state member of the UN, Bosnia would have the rights that are expounded in the Charter of the
United Nations - principle among these is ‘the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in this regard’ (SCRs,a).

Having got involved in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia the UN had to follow the logic of international legal principle and refuse to tolerate the transgression of the pre-defined boundaries of a member sovereign state by the use of force. So followed the statement by the UN that its ‘primary objective remains to reverse the consequences of the use of force [by Serbia] and to allow all persons displaced from their homes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to return to their homes in peace’ (SCR,b). Michael Wesley states that it was as a result of these formal obligations, that the UN had towards its member state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘that the misdiagnosis of the conflict arose: that the conflict in Bosnia was largely over issues of autonomy and self-government, rather than of ethnic assertiveness, a deep fear of being “culturally swamped”, and a brutal complex of desires to live in ethnically pure states.’ (Wesley,1997:36, emphasis added)

Such disunity of the universal, singular and particular must also bring into question any claims concerning the universal nature of the UN and its objectivity with regards to conflicts and political incidents and crises. Richard Falk’s notion of a ‘true universality’ that acknowledges significant difference accepts that the UN is not the transparent organisation that Luard suggested it was. However, Falk’s notion still holds faith in the future potential for such a transparent organisation - in terms of a rational all-inclusive consensus that is itself
underpinned by Enlightenment optimism. A fundamental foundation of such a consensus would be centralised international institutions with power over any one particular state or state interest. These global bodies would have to wield real political, financial, and above all, military power, it would then be a very pressing question concerning how these bodies come into being, and who elects them. What peoples would constitute them? Who and what would they represent? And without a people to govern and tax, and actual land, industry and other capital assets, would any truly global bodies nevertheless remain economically dependent upon states (and other interests) for their finance? Yet, the conception of a truly universal consensus has to be inter-linked (in the most primary ways) with centralised powerful international institutions. In order to think that such a situation is a potential of humankind one must first align oneself with a fundamentally theological conception. This conception posits the a priori unity of humankind (almost that a situation global disunity and conflict is to be restored to an original harmony), before ‘the fall’ and the ensuing fragmentation, which would then attempt (seen in the myth of the Tower of Babel) to re-establish a state of completion. The story of the Tower of Babel represent a powerful human urge toward absolute power, its significance is to be found in the failure of such an attempt when confronted by the reality of absolute power - humanity is confronted by the 'intrinsic and contingent limitations of its exercise.' (Rose, 1995: 115 - see also - Rose, 1993: 225-240)

Logically, the success of the establishment of a truly universal global body would amount to the traditional notion of the establishment of civitas maxima. In
turn, underpinning the conception of civitas maxima, are the Enlightenment assumptions concerning the feasibility and applicability of objective universal reason and the possibility of the transparency of human political organisation. The present UN organisation is nowhere near to the idea of a truly universal, truly powerful, organisation - yet the very magnitude of such a truly universal body merely re-doubles the importance of questions concerning its possible transparency. Questions concerning the possibility of the UN's accountability, actual universality and electability must be able to be properly addressed and adequately answered without it becoming a totalitarian organisation of immense proportions. The aporia of friendship figured in the disunity of the universal, singular and particular seriously calls into question the possibility of posing and completely answering such questions. Those such as Richard Falk should seriously re-consider the nature of what (ultimately) they are proposing, for in the project of establishing the civitas maxima there is a very real danger that in the attempt to overcome present international difficulties and conflicts there could occur a 'pre-mature celebration of justice' that would have forgotten the intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise. This returns us to the importance of understanding that, if metaphysics is 'the perception of the difficulty of the law, the difficult way' and ethics is 'the development of it', then ethics cannot be a movement outside of, or beyond, the perplexity of metaphysics, for then it would be a premature celebration of justice as an 'easy way' (G. Rose, 1995: 115). This would be a potentially autocratic and totalitarian establishment of the law exactly because such an ethical move would no longer be uncertain of itself. As for the
global body of the UN as it is presently constituted, it is evident that the aporia of friendship within it, the obvious privilege given to the major world powers (with the power of veto) to influence and affect the workings and results of UN action, and its financial dependence upon the economically dominant states, all act to refute any idea that it stands as a universal and transparent global organization. Problems concerning the present constitution of the UN are not irrelevant when trying to theorize its potential realization as a truly universal and transparent organization. Danilo Zolo, in his book ‘Cosmopolis’, argues that, ‘if it is recognised that within the international legal order the legal equality of states is nothing more than a myth, and if it is admitted that de facto situations and the logic of power cannot fail to influence the normative structure of international institutions by attributing a “legal surplus value” to certain particular states, then even cosmopolitanism risks appearing no better than wishful thinking, an escape into the pure world of what should be’ (Zolo, 1997:102).

Without formal equality between states - the idea of formal equality being something that underpins any serious modern legal system - then the founding of the UN appears as an act of pure political will that weaker and less developed states have had little choice but to ‘respect’. It goes without saying that no act of the USA can be met by any meaningful sanctions on the part of the UN (or any single state) as the UN is itself subsumed by the power of the USA. Indeed it is inconceivable that the UN would even entertain such courses of action. In such a present context it is not unreasonable to refer, as does Zolo, to ‘the tendency of the “logic of power” to be translated into the legal forms of a sovereign
international autocracy' (Zolo, 1997:103). In attempting to overcome fraternal politics, 'the logic of power' in the international system, with a view toward a genuine and truly universal UN, with real power over particular state interests, one may only further enter what one seeks to disown. The problems of power in global politics would be merely doubled and then multiplied under the mask that would celebrate a true universality, as the monolithic power of the dominant state takes its place upon the new throne of global politics. However, this power would not demand its recognition in the form of tribute, instead it would be invisible and so ubiquitous; behind the mask would be the failure of humanity at the very point when the resemblance to God has been achieved. The failure of humanity to be found, not in the fall of the Tower of Babel, but instead in the irony of its realization. In such a scenario the diremption between law and ethics would become apparent (for those inclined to notice it) in the absolute power of the global legislative body.

2.

Instead of figuring the disunity of the universal, singular and particular it seems that, in many theorist's work, an opposition emerges between a picture of the UN as fractured by fraternal politics and particular state self-interests, and, on the other hand, the possibility of the UN actually superseding the 'aporia of friendship' in terms of a centralized, powerful and politically effective global body. Many contemporary thinkers concerned with the UN often adhere to such oppositional terms. They often reduce the complexity of the problems of the UN
and international politics to the oppositional terms of a ‘choice’ (concerning the character of international affairs) between a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ – where life basically becomes conflict and war - and the establishment of a centralized power, capable of global jurisdiction. In short, the ‘choice’ is often seen as being one between order or anarchy. Such oppositional thinking ignores the modern diremption between ethics and law, which means that law may not entail ethical substance anyway.

Norberto Bobbio is amongst those who believe that, until a centralized global power - a world state - has been established, there will exist a situation of international anarchy. It then follows that there will be doubts concerning the legal status of the behaviour of particular states, and so the legal status of sanctions (or military action) against a state’s behaviour is also potentially questionable. The situation occurs whereby, faced with the absence of a higher jurisdictional authority, particular states can sovereignly interpret international laws according to their own (often fraternal) interests. So, with this absence of a higher jurisdictional authority, states that pursue a discretionary interpretation of international laws through a use of force can successfully pose their actions as legitimate. Bobbio follows such lines of thought and argues that it is understandable that - in the absence of universally legitimate and enforced laws - ‘all types of means’, including the use of terror, are adopted by democratic states in order to dismantle international terrorism (Bobbio, 1992:9).

For Bobbio, the UN is a potentially democratic institution on a global scale, yet, according to him, the process of democratisation will remain forever
insufficient until there is a proper movement - within the old principle of state sovereignty - towards the creation of a strong common power. Bobbio argues that, presently, two separate systems coexist, the old system of the sovereignty of states (and their constant attrition) and the new system of globalisation that reaches toward a unifying global power. The old system constantly loses power and legitimacy to the new, yet the new system has, at present, failed to achieve full realization or even efficacy of action. This, of course, resorts to a classic problematic concerning the project of realizing the purity of the concept in concrete being, this problematic takes no account of the relationality between these oppositional terms and the way in which the universal is always already contaminated by the singular and the particular. To return to Derrida’s analysis, the familial friendship lies in the singular (the Kantian sensible singularity of intuition) and the polity, or the community, lies within the generality of the concept or the Kantian idea. The difficulty, for Derrida, is found in the fact that fraternal/familial friendship would be logically alien to the founding of the political community but that ‘the great philosophical and canonical discourses on friendship will have [already] explicitly tied the friend-brother to virtue and justice, to moral reason and political reason’ (Derrida, 1997:277).

Universal concepts of justice and morality have been articulated by philosophical and canonical discourses that are themselves generated by the familial and phallocentric schema of fraternity - the fraternal friendship (contained within the sensible singularity of intuition) - which, ‘appears essentially alien or rebel to the res publica; it could never found a politics’ (Derrida, 1997:277). The
oppositions in the Kantian dichotomy collapse as the generality of the concept becomes difficult to distinguish from intuition, from heteronomy. In fact, (especially in the realm of international politics) the dualistic oppositions between order/chaos, law/anarchy, and state sovereignty/global community, are not accurate, representative of the actual situation, or theoretically productive.

It can be argued that Bobbio's essentially dualistic thinking leads him to make the most naive claims concerning the Gulf War. For when considered between the binary terms of order or anarchy, fledgling universal law (UN) or an ancient form of despotism (Iraq), then one is immediately pushed into a position of defending the large-scale military action against the Iraqi people. Bobbio has argued that, from a legal position, the Gulf War was 'just' in line with being legal - being in accordance with the highest authorities of international law. So, speaking formally, the Gulf War constituted a legitimate use of force in as much as, once aggression had taken place against the sovereign state of Kuwait, the UN had the duty to react to such aggression - eventually with the use of military force. Such a formal understanding of the Gulf War is completely blind to the long history of western military action in the Middle East with the objective of securing its oil supply from that area and asserting its 'presence' in an area of vital strategic importance in relation to Russia and China. The Gulf War has many similarities with western military action in the Middle East in the past. For instance, the military action against Saudi Arabia in the Suez Crisis was instigated in order to secure economic and strategic interests in the area. This conflict was not taken anywhere near as far as the Gulf War, mainly due to the
backing of the powerful USSR that Saudi Arabia enjoyed at the time. The claim that the Gulf War was 'just' was, along with the carefully edited and censured news coverage, another aspect of the hegemonic mask that gave legitimacy to the real vested interests at work. So Bobbio's theory is logical but, at best, unrealistic and, at worst, he becomes an apologist for the hegemonic constructs of dominant power structures. Concerning the Gulf War and the Security Council's authorisation of the use of force, Bobbio has stated that-

'The exercise of that primary form of common power, feasible even now under the potentially anarchic system of nation states, has finally become possible through the agency of the imperfect yet perfectible institution of the first truly international organisation.' (Bobbio, 1991:23)

Bobbio's naivety stems from his dualistic thinking because, from within his rigid distinction between order and chaos there must also be a clear-cut distinction between conflict and its other - peace. Yet what is peace? It is mistaken and simplistic to theorise peace as merely being the absence of war; instead, peace is a structural alternative to war - a structural alternative that is itself problematic. If the opposite of order is anarchy then conflict must somehow fit into this dichotomy, Bobbio thinks that the inevitability of on-going conflict is aligned with international anarchy and the possibility of peace is sided with the order of a common power - of 'the first truly international organisation'. Yet such a position fails to recognise that hegemonic stability (as it is classically defined) is a mask behind which objective social divisions, injustice and actual conflicts are hidden. In short, order can entail war, discourse can be subterfuge and
institutional transparency can be duplicitous. Bobbio does not rigorously problematise his scheme of an institutional transition from war and anarchy to a state of order and peace.

Danilo Zolo states that Bobbio still applies a 'domestic analogy' to international politics. The 'domestic analogy' is that which makes no distinction between anarchy within the context of the nation-state and 'anarchy' in an international context. Anarchy, in the context of a single nation would mean the collapse of the state itself and it would be naive not to recognise that this collapse would not cause an immediate increase in conflict and violence within the boundaries of that nation. However, the 'domestic analogy' applies this situation to the international context; as Zolo states, it sees that 'international order is guaranteed only if the states relinquish their ability to exercise justice on their own account and agree to submit themselves in Hobbesian fashion to the absolute power of a global Leviathan' (Zolo, 1997:13). So the 'domestic analogy' thinks of states in terms of individuals within states in a rather Hobbesian framework. In this framework individuals, in order to ensure peace for themselves, must give their personal sovereignty over to the monopolistic sovereignty of a common power - without this the selfish interest of individuals and their bitter competition for mutual and limited resources will inevitably bring about war and general brutality. However, Hobbes himself distinguished between the brutality of the state of nature concerning individuals and the 'state of nature' concerning states. States do compete with each other but are themselves organised by economic, social and political systems that channel and mediate
the so-called 'basic aggressive instinct' whose impulse would be to settle the competition in a zero sum conflict. Zolo argues that, in an international context, the absence of a centralised jurisdiction is not equivalent to a Hobbesian situation of constant war and brutality in the context of anomie and anarchy.

Bobbio's analysis of international politics ignores the inverse of the danger of brutal chaos; this is the danger concerning the possible brutality and lack of freedom brought about by the emergence of an 'absolute power of a global Leviathan'. In theorising order in terms of peace as the absence of war, Bobbio cannot see the problems of peace as a structural alternative to war. The major problem of peace as a structural alternative is that it could mean the end of change concerning the world's political, economic and military configuration as it stands at the time of the complete realisation of the global institution. So the conception of peace that is maintained by 'the absolute power of a global Leviathan' can also be opposed to notions of social change and development that entail the freedom and risk of dynamic politics.

However, in opposition to the above autocratic vision of the UN Bobbio does think that (alongside a development of its ability to effectively apply force) the UN should be exposed to, and is capable of, further improvement in terms of its democratic content and so its actual transparency. This aspect of Bobbio's thought is nearer to the objectives of Richard Falk who always stresses the close link between the objectives of his centralising globalism and the expansion of genuine democracy at an international level. Falk's concerns revolve around the need for international protection of human rights and self-determination of a
people; figuring strongly here are concerns of economic autonomy, political freedom and environmental protection. Yet, even if it is elected by popular vote, both Falk and Bobbio think of peace in terms of a centralised monopolistic global power. To think of the expansion of democracy at an international level in terms of a centralised power is to stay within the 'domestic analogy'. For if the domestic analogy makes no distinction between anarchy at the level of the nation state and anarchy at an international level it also makes little distinction between order (peace) within the confines of the nation state and order (peace) at an international level.

As the domestic analogy makes little distinction between states and the international context, those who hold to it (explicitly or not) can take little account of the growing complexity of the international situation and the growing context of interdependence between regimes at an international level. Such a growth of complexity and interdependence, according to James Rosenau, has produced a situation which he has defined as 'governance without government' (Rosenau, 1992:8). Zolo has defined 'governance without government' as being 'a situation in which the absence of a government possessing formal authority (government) co-occurs with a context of extensive phenomena of self-regulative aggregation (governance) of international agents' (Zolo, 1997:106).

In a situation of high complexity any monopolistic base of power or 'centre' has a tendency to be disrupted by a 'polycentric matrix' of power that develops due to widespread strategic interaction (rather than strategically positioned conflicts) and 'multilateral negotiation'. In short this is a process of
decentralisation which constantly disrupts any established, or attempt to establish, a pyramidal (ultimately monopolistic) structure of power. Interestingly, decentralisation involves a reduction of the powers of states but it does not mean the elimination of state sovereignty. Zolo writes that 'despite the necessary self-limitations, nation states remain - and seem destined to remain in the near future - the most important sources of the complex self-organisation of international law' (Zolo, 1997:106).

The emergence of other international agents should also be recognised - it being important to realise that states, just because they remain as important international agents, are not the exclusive source of international political activity and transgovernmental relations. In fact, states interact in a situation of 'multilateral negotiation' (Zolo, 1997:106) with the new emergent agents, and all parties of such an interaction contribute to a situation of increasing complexity of international politics and the growing phenomena of segmentation, fragmentation and a general dispersal of international power. Concerning such a situation Zolo writes that 'such new relations and new agents, whose presence contributes greatly to an increase in the complexity of the international arena...[are] no less than the traditional sovereignty of states, opposed to the perspective of centralist, hierarchical cosmopolitanism' (Zolo, 1997:106).

The important substance of global political developments is that, in a situation of increasingly complex and fragmented interdependence, 'multilateral negotiation' is a decentralised production and application of international law that 'operates effectively despite the absence - or rather thanks to the absence - of

Multilateral negotiation occurs between numerous and diverse international agents; some of the important ones are listed here for the purpose of clarification. The nation states are themselves international agencies; there is the WTO (World Trade Organisation), the IMF (International Monetary Fund), The International Labour Organisation (under the general banner of the UN), the World Bank, the EU, OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), OAU (Organisation for African Unity), OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation), EFA (European Free-trade Association), The Non-Aligned Movement, the ICFTU (International Confederation of the Free Trade Unions); there is also the international influence of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) such as The Red Cross, Friends of the Earth, and Amnesty International. As well as these there is the massive cultural, social and economic influence of the TNCs (Trans-National Companies/Multi-National Companies); the TNCs basically have the ability to move resources from one country to another - thus they can frustrate national government aims and policy, financial transfers can take place to the detriment of the host country, also, trade unions, governments and media have great difficulty holding them to account for their actions in any particular country, and they can (and do) often have long-term damaging effects on the environment.

The initial attraction of TNCs for host countries lies in their massive capital resources, their advanced technology, products, industrial processes, and their
immediate favourable effects upon productivity.

The above list is fairly arbitrary, yet they serve to illustrate the polycentric nature of world politics. However, it must be remembered that power is not equally distributed in such polycentrism, there remains the great power of the USA that is capable of influencing any part of the globe. In fact, the USA is capable of influencing the decisions and actions of many of the other agents in the polycentric matrix, agents such as the TNCs, the UN, the IMF and the World Bank. This is a situation where two tendencies do actually co-exist - one tendency being toward polycentrism the other being toward the subtle global dominance of a single world super-power (the USA). In fact, fragmentation and increasing complexity can make it difficult for theorists, and political analysts, to perceive any underlying pattern concerning dominant global power structures, their presence in world affairs being at once multiplied by the complexity and at the same time dispersed through a confusing matrix of disparate power relations.

In this context of an international situation of growing complexity Habermas still holds to an ideal of possible progress concerning transparent communication in modern western societies. Steven Lukes states that Habermas postulates the possibility of society reaching a state of transparent self-reflection among parties who have reached a stage where 'the level of justification has become reflective'. Lukes further states that Habermas claims to have established a vantage point from which the social world can be critically analysed, from which one can identify ideological deception and normative power-forms of domination - whose legitimacy is imposed and which rely upon 'contingent and forced consensus', on
'preventing questions that radicalise the value-universalism of bourgeois society from ever arising' (Thompson, 1984:135). Habermas sees emancipation from forms of domination as immanent - not as Marx believed, through work/productive activity, but through communication. Emancipatory communicative action would develop in what Habermas terms the 'lifeworld', whereby justice consists in permitting all people to participate freely and equally in conversations aimed at reaching consensus on norms regulating their conduct, 'so, construed, norms are legitimated by a universal consensus whose own legitimacy is demonstrably grounded in conditions of rational speech' (Benhabib, 1996:270). However, for Habermas, the emancipatory potential of communicative action does not entail an inevitable process. Habermas also thinks that a process of reification runs through modernity, or as he says, the possibility of 'a pathological de-formation of the communicative infrastructure of the lifeworld' (Habermas, 1987:375) – such a risk is connected to the lifeworld being 'colonised' by forms of societal domination, for instance, when communicative action is replaced by media controlled regulation. Another important instance of such risk, for Habermas, would be when language, in its role of co-ordinating action, gets increasingly replaced by regulating mechanisms, such as abstract (monetary) exchange and forms of power (Habermas, 1987:375).

It is here that Habermas forms a critique of social reification in terms of modernity. For Habermas, reification takes place when the rationalisation process that occurs with modernity becomes imbalanced, whereby the
processes of rationalisation lead to what is a basically unhealthy societal situation, into which people cannot become well integrated and, at the same time, develop significant identities. In this sense, social reification occurs whenever the proper balance between cognitive/instrumental and moral rationalisation within society favours the former much more than it should. In terms of Kantian differentiation Habermas' notion of health entails a critical project of judging the right mixture of cognitive, practical and aesthetic competencies necessary for the development of integrated people with well developed 'moral identities' (Habermas, 1984:73).

However, Habermas' notion of health, that underpins his critique of social reification, is posed as an inherent and universal quality, and in its naturalistic substance it misses the importance of one of the major driving forces behind modernity itself. This driving force is the continual deconstitution of any form of natural artifice. Natural artifice entails an understanding of a certain condition of the world as being simply the way it has to be – the whole of modernity is, in some form, a refutation of this notion. Habermas in no way thinks that the way the world as it presently exists is the way it has to be, but in his critique of reification, he does substitute inadequate present conditions for a notion of a proper state of social being that coheres to some type of inherent (moral/rational) structure concerning what it is to be human. It is at this point that his idealism overrides his critical thought as his critical task becomes difficult to distinguish from one concerned with the establishment of another form of natural artifice – where social and cultural arrangements are ultimately arranged by natural
necessity. What is missed is that such strategies only exist in certain social and cultural circumstances, in fact, they themselves emerge in the aftermath of the deconstruction of natural artifice that takes place in and through modernity.

The term ‘natural artifice’ is usually applied to pre-modern hermeneutic strategies and cultural boundary construction practices, such strategies would reference some form of undeconstructable authority which is beyond social and cultural interference in order to validate their concerns within a timeless universality - the classic authority being God. In fact, natural artifice can be seen as being a major defining trait of the pre-modern, and, with the advent of modernity, arrangements that were previously understood as natural are, instead, understood as the product of human artifice. Agnes Heller has summed up what this movement, from the pre-modern to modernity, means when Heller says that, ‘what is natural to the pre-modern conception is no longer natural to the modern one. Modern imagination begins to emerge when and where the “natural” appears as artificial; a man-made construct that can be deconstructed’ (Heller, 1990:145).

Habermas has accused Derrida of being conservative, thinking that Derrida (as well as Bataille and Foucault) ‘locate the spontaneous forces of imagination and self-experience, of affective life in general, in what is most distant and archaic’ (Habermas, 1981:53). Such an accusation pertains to Habermas’ claim that such thinkers are anti-modern, labelling them as ‘young conservatives’. He makes the curious claim that they ‘establish an implacable opposition to modernism precisely through a modernist attitude’ (Habermas, 1981:53).
Modernity is, at its core, not a stable and rational process - the important critical insight is that to try to determine it as such is to misunderstand the circumstances one is in, and upon which a theorist wants to comment. Thinkers like Bataille, Foucault and Derrida understand this last point more profoundly than does Habermas and so, the relevance of their writings to (and their understanding of) the perplexities and aporias generated by modernity, are much more acute than are the works of Habermas. The question that emerges here concerns who the anti-modern thinker actually is.

The experience of modernity fuses itself with the historical as modern consciousness becomes increasingly aware of itself as being contingent and historically constituted. With this consciousness an ever-wider space is opened up for experimentation in the arts, culture and politics. This space is constantly opposed by counter-modern tendencies that attempt the regulation and objectification of it using economic, moral, political and scientific terms. Habermas, in his essay 'Modernity's Consciousness of Time', refers to Baudelaire's understanding of modernity as a 'self-consuming actuality, which forfeits the extension of a transition period' (Habermas, 1990:8). For Baudelaire, actuality can be constituted only as the point where time and eternity intersect; of this Habermas comments that -

'in this way, modernity is rescued, not from its infirmity surely, but from triviality; in Baudelaire's understanding, it is so disposed that the transitory moment will find confirmation as the authentic past of a future present. It proves its worth as that which one day will be classic: "classic" is
henceforth the "flash" at the dawning of a new world - which will of course have no duration, for its collapse is already sealed with its appearance' (Habermas, 1990:9, *emphasis added*).

With reference to this last quote it is interesting to note that Habermas uses the adjective 'infirm' to partly characterise modernity. To be infirm: ill, debilitated, frail, weak, feeble, crippled, unsteadfast. If modernity is the experimentation of a self-consuming actuality, such a situation could just as easily be described with adjectives such as intense, excessive, absorbing, engaging or exciting - one's choice of adjectives would depend upon whether one liked the idea of a self-consuming actuality that is constantly in the process of experimenting with its own variable contingency. When Habermas chooses to use words such as 'infirm' to describe a major characteristic of modernity one may well start to wonder just what his desire actually is in relation to modernity itself - and the use of such a word as 'infirm' ties in with the idea that he holds, at the heart of his work, an essentially counter-modern notion of 'health'.

Habermas seems to want to miss Baudelaire's point that the creative force of modernity is generated by the fact of modernity's essential instability, which is in turn generated by the fact that modernity consumes itself, its future, and its history, at the very point where 'time and eternity meet'. The point is not, as Habermas seems to think, that eternal beauty is revealed through the contingent form of modernity - this is only the idea of Christ renewed in contemporary style, as the fleeting and contingent being figured as a representation of the eternal and the divine. The point is that, in modernity, the entire binary distinction
between eternity and temporality, the immutable and the superfluous, ceases to make any sense at all. The binary opposition is itself exceeded and consumed, or as Habermas himself has written, 'The modern work of art is marked by a union of the real or true with the ephemeral' (Habermas, 1990:10). Habermas seems unable to conceive the possibility that modernity cannot be properly thought without understanding that its core rupture and drive is essentially non-rational and unstable. Habermas keeps to a rather orthodox type of Hegelianism in which the diremptions of modernity are criticized only in order to unify them. In such a model Hegel conceives the 'sundered harmony of life as the practical challenge to, and the need for philosophy' (Hegel, 1978:12). This is the misinterpreted Hegelian response to the ruptures of modernity. As Habermas says, 'by criticizing the philosophical oppositions - nature and spirit, sensibility and understanding, understanding and reason, theoretical and practical reason, judgement and the imagination, I and non-I, finite and infinite, knowledge and faith - [Hegel] wants to respond to the crisis of the diremption of life itself' (Habermas, 1990: 21). The trouble with this type of Hegelianism is that it has (at its core) the presupposition that modern diremptions are inherently open to some form of unity or reconciliation. Such a view is rather reminiscent of the child's view that if something has been broken then it must be able to be fixed, if something is wounded it must be able to be healed - because once upon a time it was whole. Wounded...so we must ask once again - What is it to be wounded? A signified: pure surface to be cut into, inscribed upon, mutilated; yet if this significance is not present, how do we 'think' or conceptualise the purity that is to
be mutilated - or how can we make sense of the idea that the mutilated is to be made pure? The notion of wounding presupposes a skin, unbroken and whole, that has been ripped open, taken apart, that the two sides of the flesh have forgotten each other in their separation.

Habermas is right in as much as a critique of modernity is needed (and called forth) because modernity is by its very nature at war with its own persistence, or as Habermas states, that 'modernity is at variance with itself' (Habermas, 1990:20). Habermas correctly traces such fragmentation and disunity back to Kantian differentiation - at least Kant's philosophy as the standardized self-interpretation of modernity - and one that is ingrained deep into modern western consciousness. Kant's philosophy separated the faculties of practical reason and of judgement from that of theoretical knowledge, it gave to each realm its own legitimate foundation and proper realm. In thus grounding the conditions of possibility for knowledge, morality and aesthetic evaluation, Kant left reason the role of judging the legitimacy of every claim to knowledge and legitimacy - so assuming a possible unifying potential - and this is where Habermas comes in.

Here it becomes noticeable to what extent Habermas' project of communicative rational action is dependent itself upon Kant's philosophy - putting all the pent-up religious fervour of a newly secularised age into a faith in reason as possessing the much needed potential to unify and comprehend such differentiation. However, reason is bound to subjectivity and, in modernity, religious life, state, and society, as well as morality and art, are all transformed into differential embodiments of the principle of subjectivity. In 'The Critique of
Pure Reason' Kant gave to reason the power of judgement before which anything that made a claim to validity had to be justified. The harmonious functioning of such differentiation is always problematic precisely because reason and subjectivity become inter-woven. Also, in relation to the excessive difficulties of over-coming such differentiation within the context of differentiation, one example has already been given in the previous chapter - in terms of Lyotard's archipelago.

The archipelago becomes the flux in which each realm starts to be deterritorialised - just as real commerce (or war) between strictly defined nations always ends by putting those nations' proper boundaries into question. So if, for example, the legitimacy of aesthetics started to inter-relate with that of politics, politics would then have to be radically re-defined in order to include aesthetic considerations - this would not be the delimited realm of politics as we now understand it. So the commerce (war) that is entailed in the archipelago, that at first delimits realms and allows exploration, eventually becomes the destruction of established genres of discourse in the search for new phrase universes - the mutation that would be the fate of any one realm due to its open interaction with others. This is how Lyotard also defined Marx's idea of communism, which is a typically modern project concerning the conceptualisation of some form of progress.

So communism, for Lyotard, is a site of radical heterogeneity that comes to form a unity in the dissolution of differentiation into a space that is constantly collapsing its own self-reconstruction - the implosion of time as complete
undifferentiation, this being the end of binary distinctions between the subjective and objective, the private and public. However, as was argued in the previous chapter, within such enormity no ethical community can emerge and be given any kind of substantive content. Such enormity cannot obligate and paradoxically 'should not' obligate - the unification of Kantian differentiation collapses at the very moment it is to be realised. Habermas states that -

'Expressing the modern world in an edifice of thought means of course only reflecting the essential features of the age as in a mirror - which is not the same as conceiving [begreifen] it...Kant does not perceive as diremptions the differentiations within reason, the formal divisions within culture, and in general the fissures among all those spheres. Hence he ignores the need for unification that emerges with the separations evoked by the principle of subjectivity' (Habermas, 1990:19).

Habermas' desire for the 'separations evoked by the principle of subjectivity' within modernity is fundamentally unitarian - to unify dissensus toward consensus. Then modernity - we who are in modernity - must be presently unmade, wounded. Wounded? So we must ask once again - What is it to be wounded? How can 'we' in modernity make sense of the idea that the mutilated is to be made pure? The notion of wounding presupposes a skin, unbroken and whole, that has been ripped open, taken apart, that the two sides of the flesh have forgotten each other in their separation - a separation 'evoked by the principle of subjectivity'? Habermas wants to address a 'mutilation' that exists in terms of disunity, the rupture of which is constantly renewed in and through itself.
Habermas critically underestimates the difficulty of unifying the fissures at the heart of modernity and reconciling modern diremptions. Habermas dislikes the work of thinkers such as Bataille, Foucault, and Derrida, not because they are 'post-modern' but exactly because they are far too modern for him - for they work within modern diremption itself and do not assume or posit reconciliation.

In relation to the work of Walter Benjamin, Habermas states that modernity's unique consciousness of the future opens up a vast horizon of utopian expectation, yet he adds to this that the notion of progress, in modernity, 'served not only to render eschatological hopes profane and open up the horizon of expectation in a utopian fashion, but also to close off the future as a source of disruption with the aid of teleological constructions of history' (Habermas, 1990:12). However, teleological constructions of history close off the openness of modernity's present with the inevitability of a naturalized future, usually leading to rather crude (pre-modern) understandings of the present as being merely a space that is lacking arcadian or utopian completion - the present as an unproductive surplus of emptiness. The understanding of modernity within this work is one that risks absence in the present, but such absence is not posited in relation to invisible and timeless 'substance'. It is not ideality made present, even if it is only the paradoxical presence of its absence. So it is not the absence of something deferred that is posited, it is instead the emptiness of any possibility of presence that is to be found at the limit - the idea being that any creatively productive form modernity will be constantly consuming its own limits in a violent creation of the possible.
Any straightforward teleological construction of history will always end with an endless deferral of that which gives its self-impoverished present meaning and substance. Yet the deferral is always blamed on something - 'if only the last war had been won', 'if only there were no dissenters', 'if only the Jews did not exist'? In fact, the impotence of the present is itself produced by the teleological construction that 'closes off the future as a source of disruption', for teleology is at heart a fear of the future as a source of disruption, change and the unclassifiable - the unknown. Teleological constructions of history are caught in a double bind, they fear the change that they articulate as desirable. So the present of teleology becomes increasingly frustrated by the evident lack of substantive change that it professes to desire, while all the time it increasingly resists any true change. Eventually it projects its fear of change onto something in the present, making this culpable for its own inevitable failure.

In this context Habermas' entire work can be understood as being underpinned by a profoundly teleological conception of modernity itself (and not the most accurate or even helpful conception of modernity at that). He posits a notion of progress that is dependent upon a conception of health (a proscribed moral identity) which is itself an inherent and universal quality of human nature that has mapped out the possibilities of human change and evolution now and for all time - so henceforth it must resist the substantive risk and indeterminacy that real social change entails. The irony is that Habermas is what he accuses Foucault et al of being, in that he 'locate[s] the spontaneous forces of imagination and self-experience, of affective life in general, in what is most
distant and archaic' (Habermas, 1981:53) - this is true in as much as Habermas locates the time of change outside of temporality - in timeless substance that resists the constant threat that concerns the 'infirmity' of change without a guarantee of destination. In other words, Habermas' notion of change is a conception outside of time that resists the risk of time itself. In fact, he may not be telling history as a 'sequence of events like the beads of a rosary' (Benjamin, 1969: 253-264), but Habermas' notion of time nevertheless comes very close to what Walter Benjamin referred to as empty and homogeneous time that is filled in by a 'stubborn belief in progress' (Benjamin, 1969:253-264), a belief that, in Habermas' own words, acts to 'intercept and neutralize the provocation of the new and of the entirely unexpected' (Habermas, 1990:11).

Lyotard, in 'The Post-Modern Condition', has criticised Habermas for trying to establish another universal predictive history, just as Kant did, - it is then ironic that Lyotard posits unity in terms of complete undifferentiation. However, Lyotard's notion of unity is infinitely distant from that posited by Habermas, for Habermas posits unity in terms of the reconciliation of differentiation in the homogenous time of communicative action. Considering what he has written in 'The Differend', it is perhaps hardly surprising that Lyotard claims Habermas' notion of consensus is just not tenable. According to Lyotard, Habermas is seeking the regularisation of language games, that he destroys the heterogeneity of language and culture. In Lyotard's essay 'Universal History and Cultural Difference', Lyotard is suggesting that there is occurring, in post-modern societies, a strengthening of local legitimacies (Lyotard, 1989:322). Lyotard is
claiming that 'post' modern societies are characterised by an accelerating
differentiation and fragmentation - Lyotard would then increase such velocity
toward total undifferentiation. So, even though Lyotard is still bound to the
thought of Kant he would nevertheless claim Habermas' notion of universal
communicative action is even more unfeasible in such a situation of increasing
differentiation (and he would not be wrong) - such unitarian ambition being
bound to lead to a type of false consensus. This would be a type of new ideology
of unity, a kind of societal self-deception. However, in the work of both thinkers,
there is a critical need to renew the thought that the danger of fascism lies at
exactly the point in modernity where differentiation ends in the chimera of
complete undifferentiation. Both thinkers' work tends toward undifferentiation -
such completions exist at two extreme ends of a binary opposition. Habermas
views Lyotard's thought as basically anarchic, while Lyotard views Habermas as
working toward homogenous order. Both revert to the essentially dualistic
thinking that exists within the opposition between order and anarchy.

3.
When he does keep to historically specific analyses Lyotard's work maps out
only further differential complexity. He maps out an empirical growth of localised
intensities and the fragmentation of the public sphere into disparate language
games. He also places significance upon the immense economic and financial
battles being increasingly waged by the trans-national corporations and banks
(with their partisan national states) to win markets; for Lyotard, this situation
offers no cosmopolitan prospects. Such activities, he states, do nothing to reduce inequalities in the world or to break down national boundaries, but are only for 'speculative economic and financial ends' (Lyotard, 1989).

Naomi Klein's book 'No Logo' has been taken up as representative of the general thinking behind the new protests in Seattle (November 1999) and in Prague (September 2000). These protests can be seen to be against the damaging effects of globalisation on the poorer peoples of the world and the environment. These protests contain a great diversity of interests and concerns, but they also share a common thread. This common thread is that the protesters all share anti-corporate ideas and have focused their concerns against the large corporations such as Nike, Gap and McDonalds (to name just a few), and also the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organisation. The protesters target the brand images of corporations, their super-store and retail outlets, and the accuracy of their self-descriptions, because they think that real power in global politics no longer resides with national governments, but that it is held by transnational corporations.

These anti-corporate ideas go hand in hand with the protesters' outrage concerning the damaging effects of globalisation upon the poorer peoples of the world. The link between anti-corporate thinking and protests against globalisation can be understood in the light of the shifting values of the corporations themselves. Within corporations there has been a slow shift away from the actual production of products to valuing the virtual production of the brand itself. The result is that corporations are not just involved in what Lyotard has termed
'immense economic and financial battles', but are increasingly concerned with battles concerning the acquisition of people's cultural and symbolic space. Walter Landor, president of the Lander branding agency has said that 'Products are made in the factory, but brands are made in the mind' (Lander Web Site). This shift in corporate values can be seen in contemporary advertising, where the actual products being sold seem to disappear into the overall spectacle that the advert has increasingly become. The advert is now a vehicle for the expression and reinforcement (in competition with other corporate identities) of the particular corporation's brand image - its 'transcendent' idea - the lifestyle that it emanates, its 'essence'. Naomi Klein states that 'brand builders are the new primary producers in our so-called knowledge economy' (Klein, 2000:196).

According to Klein the way that corporations now value the virtual over the actual has not just brought about cutting edge advertising campaigns and seemingly omnipresent utopian corporate images, but that, in actuality, the idea of the super-brand 'is changing the very face of global employment' (Klein, 2000:196). The change in global employment centres around the corporation's need to free themselves from the reality and the costs of factory production in the western world. Building a super-brand is a very costly business even for a giant corporation and after meeting such costs there is less and less money left over for the production of some kind of product. Klein comments with insight on this situation -

'This slow but decisive shift in corporate priorities has left yesterday's non-virtual producers - the factory workers and craftspeople - in a precarious
position. The lavish spending in the 1990's on marketing, mergers and brand extensions has been matched by a never-before-seen resistance to investing in production facilities and labour. Companies that were traditionally satisfied with a 100 percent mark-up between the cost of factory production and the retail price have been scouring the globe for factories that can make their products so inexpensively that the mark-up is closer to 400 percent. And as a 1997 UN report notes, even in countries where wages were already low, labour costs are getting a shrinking slice of corporate budgets...the timing of these trends reflects not only branding's status as the perceived economic cure-all, but also a corresponding devaluation of the production process and producers in general' (Klein, 2000:197)

As the process of manufacturing products is devalued so the people doing the work of production are increasingly treated as wasteful and superfluous, being things of a past age and expendable where ever possible. As Klein notes, many of the major corporations now bypass the production process completely. Rather than making the products themselves, in their own factories, the corporations contract-out the production work to industries in developing countries where the costs of production are much lower than in developed countries (land, labour and resources can all be gained at a lower price, and the legal and civil infrastructure is mostly very accommodating for big business and industry). The old jobs that used to be in the western 'home countries' of the corporations disappear somewhere abroad, and as this happens there is a more
profound disappearance still, and this is the disappearance of ‘the old-fashioned idea that a manufacturer is responsible for its own workforce’. Instead, ‘from El Paso to Beijing, San Francisco to Jakarta, Munich to Tijuana, the global brands are sloughing the responsibility of production onto their contractors; they just tell them to make the damn thing, and make it cheap, so there's lots of money left over for branding. Make it really cheap’ (Klein, 2000:197).

The first obvious effect of the shift away from production into the virtual world of branding is more and more job losses in western countries. In North America and Western Europe more factory closures are announced each week, 45,000 US apparel workers losing their jobs in 1997 alone (Kernaghan, 1998). In 1993 Adidas turned over its operation to Robert Louis-Dreyfus, formerly chief executive at the advertising firm Saatchi & Saatchi, who quickly shut down the company owned factories in Germany and contracted-out their production requirements to Asia. In 1997 the Sara Lee Corporation announced a 1.6 billion restructuring plan designed to ‘purge’ itself of its own manufacturing base. Thirteen of its factories (beginning with yarn and textile plants) would be sold to contractors who would then become Sara Lee’s suppliers - the company would be able to use the money saved due to such restructuring to double its spending upon advertising (Klein, 2000:200). Between 1996-1997 Levi Strauss shut twenty-two of its plants in North America, with 16,310 workers being laid off in a space of just two years. In 1997 Levi Strauss launched an international advertising campaign that is said to have cost 90 million dollars, Levi’s most exuberant and (of course) expensive advertising campaign ever.
However, seeing that these corporations do actually still produce a product it is reasonable to ask just who is making them? The answer to this question reveals the underbelly of the utopian vision concerning the emergence of the 'global village'. The answer to such a question exposes the way in which globalisation is a process that exploits and actually deepens global inequalities. The answer reveals a strange situation of seemingly infinite distance (in IBM's 'shrinking world') and, simultaneously, an uncomfortable proximity, between western consumers and people in developing countries who are now, as a general rule, the producers (The seemingly infinite distance concerns the immense widening material and cultural gap between the generally well-off western consumers and the poorer people of developing countries, who are increasingly the ones making the products that are consumed in the west. The uncomfortable proximity concerns the way in which the expensive branded trainers that we in the west are wearing have been produced under appalling working conditions for wages that are often below the real cost of living in the country where the production takes place).

The answer is that the big corporations have contracted out their production work to free-trade zones - to countries that have developed export processing zones (EPZs). In many developing countries (Indonesia, China, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Vietnam, the Philippines) EPZs are rapidly emerging as leading producers of shoes, electronics, cars, machinery, toys and clothes. In other words, the free-trade zone industry is increasing at a seemingly exponential rate. By the year 2000 there were 52 economic zones in the Philippines alone,
employing 459,000 people - yet in 1986 there were just 23,000 'zone workers' in the Philippines. Concerning EPZs, Klein states that the 'zone is a tax-free economy, sealed off from the local government of both town and province - a miniature military state inside a democracy' (Klein, 2000:204), and they are multiplying all the time. The International Labour Organisation says that there are now over 900 EPZs in the world (and rising), spread through 70 countries and employing roughly 27 million workers (Heerden, 1999). The World Trade Organisation estimates that between $200 and $250 billion worth of trade is passed through these zones per year (Klein, 2000:205). The EPZs have taken hold and grown in developing countries around the world due to the promise of industrialisation. The plan for the developing countries themselves is originally that establishing EPZs within their borders will attract the business of trans­national corporations as foreign investors. The EPZs are segregated off from the country that they are in, and within these segregated areas the governments of poor countries offer tax breaks, lax (or even absent) regulations and a military that keeps labour movements 'under control'. The poor countries compete with each other for the trans­national business, trying to offer the lowest wage so workers end up being paid less than the real cost of living in their particular country. Therefore, as Naomi Klein states, the EPZs 'exist within a kind of legal and economic set of brackets, apart from the rest of their country' (Klein, 2000:207).

The EPZs are only really meant to be temporary situations. The theory behind them is that the EPZs will attract foreign investors, who will settle in the host
country and so stay after the 'tax holiday' expires. Then the EPZ's segregated assembly lines will turn into lasting development - wages will slowly rise, technology transfers will occur and so the countries own domestic industries will start to develop and flourish. Such changes have to be hoped for by the developing host countries because within the situation of an EPZ the host country receives no income from import/export taxes, no income from business tax, the workers wages are so low that they cannot possibly stimulate the local economies of the country, all the manufactured goods are exported abroad and the capital gained from the surplus value of the products is re-invested abroad into the virtual production brands. However, what is really happening is that 'the boundaries of these only-temporary, not-really-happening, denationalised spaces keep expanding to engulf more and more of their actual nations. Twenty seven million people world-wide are now living and working in brackets, instead of being slowly removed, [they] just keep getting wider' (Klein, 2000:208).

The current enthusiasm that developing countries have for EPZs is based upon the success of the economies of South Korea and Taiwan - countries that have been dubbed the Asian Tigers. It is true that when only a few countries had EPZs wages did tend to rise steadily, technology transfers did occur and taxes were gradually introduced. However, the reason that the current EPZs keep growing and not shrinking away into sustainable development is - as critics of EPZs such as Naomi Klein point out - that the global economy has become much more competitive since the Asian Tigers managed to make the transition from low-wage industries to higher skill ones. In today's global economy there
are now 70 countries all competing for the business of the trans-national companies, and the way to attract them is by offering EPZs with the lowest wages in the world, the longest tax-holidays, the most coerced and so docile workforce. Once a trans-national has been attracted to a country it can hold the threat of departure over the host country's head - to leave for a better deal in another developing country. So tax-holidays are extended, wages are kept extremely low (below the legally set minimum wage for the host country itself) and regulations are never enforced. If the host country is successful in turning its EPZs into a farce of the western model of industrial production and into human prisons then it might be 'lucky' enough to attract other roaming trans-nationals to its exposed flesh. As Naomi Klein has written - 'The upshot is that entire countries are being turned into industrial slums and low-wage ghettos, with no end in sight' (Klein, 2000:209).

Yet, if the EPZs don't bring in taxes for the host countries, if the goods produced there are all exported abroad and if most of the capital gained in the production process is reinvested into the branding process in the west, then why do developing countries such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka bother to entice the trans-national companies to them in the first place? The general idea behind the developing countries enthusiasm to have the trans-nationals locating within their borders is the Keynesian theory of the multiplier effect where investment by successful enterprises means the creation of jobs, and the income earned by the workforce will eventually fuel general economic growth and long term prosperity. Increased spending and demand causes a rise in production, more jobs are
created, followed by increased demand producing further economic growth. Thus a nation that encourages free-market enterprise and big business should be able to stimulate economic growth. However, in relation to the actual production of products in developing countries, the zone wages are so low that workers spend most of their pay on scraping a living for themselves. Migrant workers who have often been 'relocated' to the EPZs from their rural homes spend most of their pay on 'shared dorm rooms and transportation; the rest goes to noodles and fried rice from vendors lined up outside the [EPZ's] gate.' (Klein, 2000:210)

In her book, Klein quotes from interviews and conversations she has had with such migrant workers when she visited the Philippines and the Cavite Export Processing Zone, ninety miles south of Manila, in the town of Rosario. The following contains telling extracts from interviews she conducted with teenagers working in Cavite -

'Salvador, in his 90210 T-shirt, was beside himself..."working on the farm is difficult, yes, but there we have our family and friends and instead of always eating dried fish, we have fresh food to eat."

His words clearly struck a chord with homesick Rosalie: "I want to be together with my family in the province," she said quietly, looking even younger than her nineteen years. "It's better there because when I get sick, my parents are there, but here there is no-one to take care of me."

Many other rural workers told me that they would have stayed home if they could, but the choice was made for them: most of their families had lost their farms, displaced by golf courses, botched land-reform laws and
more export processing zones. Others said that the only reason they came to Cavite was that when the zone recruiters came to their villages, they promised that workers would earn enough in the factories to send money home to their impoverished families. The same inducement had been offered to other girls, they told me, to go to Manila to work in the sex trade.

Several more young women wanted to tell me about those promises, too. The problem, they said, is that no matter how long they work in the zone, there is never more than a few pesos left over to send home. "If we had land we would just stay there to cultivate the land for our needs," Raquel, a teenage girl from one of the garment factories, told me. "But we are landless, so we have no choice but to work in the economic zone even though it is very hard and the situation here is very unfair. The recruiters said we would get a high income, but in my experience, instead of sending my parents money, I cannot maintain even my own expenses."

(Klein, 2000:221)

Klein stresses the way in which globalisation has hit the poor the most. She shows why the new political movement that became focused in and around the Seattle and Prague protests is timely in that it focuses upon this 'moment' of globalisation. Klein is always swift to pick up upon the discrepancy between the image of the contemporary world that the corporations wish the west to unquestioningly accept as consumers and its relation to the actuality, in developing countries, that lives off the persistence of the counter-production of
the virtual world of branding - what becomes apparent is the symbiotic relationship between the two.

According to Klein, the west is now in the age of the 'superbrand' - which also co-exists (at a global level) with the age of 'degraded production' - so the virtual and actual feed off each other. The west consumes more products than ever, but it is difficult to find out who is actually making them. The answer can be found in the fact that the 'death of manufacturing' and the switch from production to consumption is only a phenomenon of the west. Production now occurs mainly in the poorer countries of the world, where there is a ready supply of cheap (sometimes slave) labour, low cost land, lax or absent regulations, no taxes, and cheap raw materials - this is the realm of 'degraded production'. An article on Klein, in The Guardian, quotes her and writes the following -

'This may be a time of "degraded production in the age of the superbrand", as Klein puts it, but corporations do tend to need a product somewhere along the line...someone must be making them. But its difficult to find out who. As Klein says, "the shift in attitude toward production is so profound that, where a previous era of consumer goods corporations displayed their logos on the facades of their factories, many of today's brand-based multi-nationals maintain that the location of their production operations is a trade secret, to be guarded at all costs." Very often, it seems, they are produced under terrible conditions in free-trade zones in Indonesia, China, Mexico, Vietnam, the Philippines and elsewhere' (Viner, 2000:15)
For Klein, the way to tackle the issue of degraded production, and slave labour, in developing countries, is to produce a 'head-on collision between image and reality' - drawing a clear relation between virtual and actual production. This is what the Seattle and Prague protests are attempting to do - to claim the damages that are hidden under the glossy exterior of the Nike, Gap, IBM, and Reebok corporations (to name just a few), and organisations like The World Trade Organisation. Yet, as Falk has argued, the mask is increasingly difficult to distinguish from reality itself. Klein talks about the process whereby advertising and branding started to assimilate alternative politics and culture. As Klein says, 'On the one hand, there was this total paralysis of the left. But, at the exact same time [the early 90’s], all these ideas that I had thought were the left - feminism and diversity and gay and lesbian rights - were suddenly very chic. So, on the one hand, you are politically totally dis-empowered, and on the other all the imagery is pseudo-feminist, Benetton is an anti-racism organisation, Starbucks does this third-world-chic thing. I watched my own politics become commercialised' (Viner, 2000:18). Klein calls such corporate imagery a 'mask of capitalism' - the function of which is to make it much more difficult to perceive embodied power dynamics. So Klein argues that the early 90’s ‘were a time when there was a growing income gap between rich and poor that was quite staggering all over the world - and yet everything had started to look more equitable, in terms of the imagery of the culture' (Viner, 2000:18).

It is interesting to note that the new political movement that Klein talks about attacks the simulated equity and universalism, that is, the 'mask of capitalism',
with an idea of producing a counter universal community - one which would be inclusive and not exclusive, one which is posited as already occurring through new communication opportunities through the inter-net, satellite, and quicker and more affordable methods of international travel. This highlights an important point, this is that if one wants to offer alternatives to the corporate values of profit and abstract exchange then one must have different values and exigencies with which to critique them. A complete denouncement of universal values would only become the replacement of false universalism with the universal of an absolute negation. In other words, denouncement posited as an end-in-itself would mean there would be no values at all to present. There would be no more sense, or desire for sense, and there would be the absolute refusal of ethical movement and the will to an end, which Nietzsche characterized as western nihilism. This would be where the attack on the simulation of universalism and global coherence would become a coherent law against law and coherence itself. Instead, denouncement takes place as process and within historical contingencies, being engaged with the difficulty of ethical movement itself - 'being at a loss yet exploring various routes, different ways toward the good enough justice, which recognises the intrinsic and contingent limitations in its exercise' (Rose, 1995:115). For Naomi Klein, the values of equity and ethical universalism are not to be rejected in themselves, instead the hypocrisy of the corporate values of global inclusiveness (the global village for example) are denounced, but only in order to reconfigure those very values. In other words the supposed values that the corporations would like to present as being
synonymous with their logos are used against them in order to denounce their
cynicism and nihilism in relation to 'a new global movement that is still in its
infancy' (Klein, 2000:intro).

4.
The actual recognition of growing inequalities within any possible global unity
has been attempted in the past by the construction of the Non-Aligned
Movement as a point of reformist reference. There was also the development of
the struggle for participatory rights for indigenous peoples - a move for the
recognition of significant cultural differences - conducted by peoples in the 1980s
and 1990s. The recognition of such differences has great importance for Falk, as
he comments, 'the indigenous struggle also reinforces the point that unless
authentic participation in the rights-creation process occurs, the results are not
likely to be genuinely representative and the whole process [of the UN system]
will be regarded as illegitimate and alien' (Falk, 1997:11).

Falk further comments that the concerted struggle of indigenous peoples in
the 1980s and 1990s was formed against a background of exclusion,
discrimination, persecution and marginalisation that were the result of racism,
arrogance and ignorance - all manifestations of western civilisational hegemony.
Falk cites Islam as a civilisation that has been excluded by the contemporary
'world order'. He argues that there is an authentic sense of Islamic grievance
against (generally western) ideas of a New World Order and the UN itself. He
quotes from Ahmet Davutoglu's book 'Civilizational Transformation and the
Muslim World’ -

‘The Muslim masses are feeling insecure in relation to the functioning of the international system because of the double standards in international affairs. The expansionist policy of Israel has been tolerated by the international system. The Intifada has been called a terrorist activity while the mass rebellions of East Europe have been declared as the victory of freedom. The atomic powers in some Muslim countries like Pakistan and Kazakhstan have been declared a danger when such weapons have been accepted as the internal affairs of other states such as Israel and India. Muslims, who make up about 25% of the world’s population, have no permanent member in the security council and all appeals from the Muslim World are being vetoed by one of the permanent members’ (Davutoğlu, 1995:103)

The problem is not so much that such arguments are immediately to be viewed as true and accurate (although the political accuracy of the above is not here called into question), but that such grievance is hidden or denied representation within international systems of politics and law. Falk comments that, ‘the informal working group on the Rights of Indigenous Populations, set up under the Sub-Commission on Racial Discrimination and Persecution of the Human Rights Commission...has recently taken the primary form of producing a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which is now being considered within the wider UN system. It is doubtful whether this declaration of indigenous rights will eventually be validated by the state-centric procedures; in effect, these remain the gatekeepers within the UN system of the still ascendant
false universalism' (Falk, 1997:11).

It is not the existence of the international political systems themselves or international law in itself that is the problem, but the fact that 'the UN grew out of the League of Nations which was a club of colonial powers' (Hanny and Gott, 1996:16). So, once again, at the core of the universal concept there can be found the alien singularity of fraternal friendship where the concept gets contaminated (or invaded) by the 'alien' body of concrete being. The purity of the concept is always infested by the historical structures and repetitions of phallogocentrism - an ancient familial horror.

According to Richard Gott the origin and development of the UN has more to do with a concern to lessen intercolonial rivalry that was seen as a major factor in producing the First World War. The League of Nations was initially conceived as a kind of club for colonial powers, which was used to settle their disagreements peacefully. Also, The League (and later the UN) acquired prestige in the colonies of the European empires that are now part of the poorest sectors in the world. Gott argues that, in the 1960s and 1970s, when the UN Security Council was deadlocked by the veto powers of the two super-states, the debates of the general assembly gave the UN a populist legitimacy. The UN's function then, according to Gott, is to confer universalist illusion and legitimacy upon western interests. As has been stated earlier, the problem is one of legitimacy, not efficiency. Gott pursues his point in saying that 'if Britain were to abandon its permanent seat on the Security Council and its veto...few people in the country would be willing to obey the UN's directives' (Hanny and Gott,
For Richard Gott there is a major difficulty in the fact that the problems caused by globalisation need global solutions provided by a global institution, 'but the UN is not a global institution. It is a great power institution masquerading as a global one. The big five countries run it, with a veto in the Security Council, which are characterised by their possession of nuclear weapons'. He continues along these lines - 'what I dislike about the UN charter is the hypocrisy. "We the people..." says the UN charter, echoing the American constitution. That is nonsense. The UN is run by barely half a dozen states, mostly in thrall to Washington' (Hanny and Gott,1996:19). 'We the people', the timeless universalist claim, the claim to the transparency of a consensual participation.

The Non-Aligned Movement, as a solidarity of the less powerful in global affairs, grew out of the situation of protest and a commitment to global reform in North-South relations. A strict distinction between North-South is not really applicable to the present polycentric geo-political situation, but such a distinction still contains importance in as much as it implied a disparity between developed and developing countries.

One of the major problems for developing countries is increasing levels of poverty. Developed countries can be termed High Income Countries (HICs) and developing countries Low Income Countries (LICs). LICs have a low Gross National Product. GNP per capita is a measure of the monetary value of all the goods and services produced in a country divided by the number of people within the country. The higher the GNP per capita the higher will be the monetary value.
of the goods and services produced and the more developed a country will be. The HICs were said to be mostly countries of the First World, whereas the LICs were said to be mostly countries of the Third World. This, of course, retains the distinction that entails there being a First (rich) World and a Third (much poorer) World - and a general north-south divide. Such a distinction will be retained here because the concern, in relation to the UN and the issue of cosmopolitanism, is the ever widening gap between strong and weak economies in the context of globalisation, and a working distinction between developed and developing countries is important in relation to this ever widening gap. In this specific context it is true that the Third World no longer exists as it was defined by Neo-Marxists in the 1970’s. In terms of a great monolithic block that was then delimited as being the 'Third World' there has been a great amount of change, and a great amount of differentiation. The most obvious form of differentiation in the Third World 'block' is the emergence of the NICs (the Newly Industrialised Countries) - countries of the Far East such as Taiwan and South Korea - that have reproduced (in part) the industrial boom of Japan.

However, such change and differentiation has not changed the critical disparity between the rich and poor of the world (between the HICs and the LICs) and, as has been stated, the disparity has actually been getting worse. In fact, global differentiation and fragmentation do themselves cause difficulties for the LICs. Danilo Zolo has voiced the crucial issue here -

'The highest price of even more differentiated and fragmented development falls, and will for a long time continue to fall, on the poorest
of the poor countries, representing a sizeable majority of the population of the world living in southern Asia, most of Africa, the more backward countries of Latin America and probably also countries like Brazil and Mexico' (Zolo, 1997:143).

In the 1960s the richest 20% of the world population had a disposable income 30 times greater than the poorest 20%. Presently, the richest 20% has an income 60 times greater than the poorest section of the world population. If distributive inequalities within each country are taken into account then the global disparity increases further, whereby the richest 20% of the total world population receives a share of the wealth 150 times that of the poorest 20%. In short, in thirty years the gap between the poorer and richer countries (measured in terms of GNP) has (at least) more than doubled (UNDP1992, UNDP1994).

If present rates of global development, and present distributive relationships do not radically change, then it has been predicted that by the year 2020 the gap between the richest quarter of the world population and the poorest quarter will be 300% higher than at present. As well as this, statistics show that well over one billion people - about one quarter of the world population - were living in absolute poverty around 1991 (Ekins, 1992). The damaging effects of the ongoing process of globalisation are one of the major grievances of the developing world, which seeks to reveal its damages within international political systems. However, it is within the avowed universalism of international systems where these damages are hidden, denied a voice or just ignored.

One of the most hidden and obscure voices that bear the main weight of
globalisation is that of the peasantry. It is an idiom of grievance that one does not find being readily expressed even in the literature on the Non-Aligned Movement or in the literature concerning Islamic countries. Apart from the effect on ‘workers’ and ‘non-workers’ the peasantry remains a silent witness to the effect of globalisation. This is not just a further ‘bone of contention’ but it serves to show the very real problem inherent in Falk’s ideal of a true universality. If, let us say, the Non-Aligned Movement and Islamic differences were truly incorporated into the UN organisation (their grievances heard and addressed) would this then constitute an all-inclusive consensus without coercion and powerful vested interests? The naivety inherent in such a notion of a true universality is that it posits a utopian point in the future where all power will be legitimate. Such a viewpoint makes the mistake of seeing power, law and ethics, as being too easily reconciled, and so fails to understand the psychology of violence and domination within the rational management of power relations. Within Habermas’ and Falk’s notions of a transparent consensus is an over-all failure to perceive that organisations (whether they be nation states, political parties, businesses or social groupings) are, to a significant degree, ingrained with a psychology of violence and conflict that is not itself contained within an a priori necessity for harmonious resolution.

To put it in terms of the UN, it can be said that law cannot reach the stability inherent in a notion of ‘true universality’ because it is constantly disrupted by growing economic and social disparities in the process of globalisation, and also, by what can be termed the agon of friendship. An agon is generally understood
to be a tragedy based on a struggle or issue in which the psychology of violence is deeply explored and a conclusion reached that there are no external sources of morality (Burrell, 1997:59). Also, both the agon of friendship and increasing global inequalities, act to disrupt Rosenau's notion of 'governance without government' (Rosenau, 1992:8). Rosenau's notion argues that, in the context of uncertainty, increasing global complexity, and economic risk, a polycentric matrix of regimes can establish stable frameworks of negotiation, so improving transparency between international agents and producing international law that acts with equity (and effectively). In short, for Rosenau, at the international level, in conditions of increasing complexity, interdependence and indeterminacy, it is possible that a form of order can emerge from disorder. However, such an order would be polycentric, mercurial and non-hierarchical, so would be rather unstable and precarious - so being vulnerable to the antagonism and conflicts which result from increasing economic and social disparities. Yet, on the other hand, when faced with increasing global unrest and conflict, any posited global Leviathan would be forced to resort to strategies of military domination and repression, which is not a very attractive alternative!

What does escape the idea of order resulting from 'governance without government' is the possibility of an inescapable psychology of violence and domination in human groups. Such a psychology of violence is not to be mistaken for the idea that war and systematic violence are genetically programmed in human nature as part of some form of evolutionary survival mechanism. Yet, fundamentally, war does stem from human aggression that is
focused against members of their own species. This specific organized destructiveness of a species against itself comes about when human aggression is socially structured in a way that produces a strong psychology of violence of individuals in one grouping toward individuals that belong (or are perceived to belong) to a different group. The contention here is that a deeply ingrained psychology of violence produces war, and that this psychology is itself produced from humankind being socially structured, rather than from some form of originary barbarity. The psychology of violence stems from humans becoming social and cultural entities rather than from some dark atavistic impulse. To put this point more specifically, once human beings acquire forms of language, culture, and sociality then they establish cultural groupings that differ from one another in terms of dress-codes, speech, writing, mythology, religion, sexual customs, folklore, and in terms of traditions concerning relationships, family, food and death. Once such differentiation has occurred these differing groupings may well compete for resources needed for their survival, but such competition is not necessary in order to produce systematic conflict and violence between them. Zolo himself outlines a problematic and deeply ingrained process which he refers to as ‘cultural pseudospeciation’ - a process whereby humans come to symbolically perceive other humans as being of a different species than themselves; concerning this process Zolo has written the following -

‘Once pseudospeciation has taken place, cultural groups find themselves occupying different “niches”, and thus begin to defend their collective identity against everything external to their group. They repel outsiders as
if the latter were not members of the human species, and subsequently, having once "dehumanised" the offending outsiders, they set about using out-and-out destructive weapons against their adversaries. In defending its own identity against external threat, a "pseudospeciated" group can count on an individual predisposition to obedience and on extraordinarily heightened emotional resources, as has been clearly shown by research into collective psychology and human ethnology' (Zolo, 1997:147).

And do not the 'cultural groups' outlined above show how justice and law are inevitably contaminated by the way in which the friend must also be like the brother?

It is here that Derrida can remind us that the political tradition (where justice and law are meant to be inaugurated) is itself constituted by crime - violence against its own and against the other. Within the agon of friendship Derrida's writing burrows deeper into the labyrinth where the entanglement between friendship/enmity and justice/law is to be found. Of this entanglement (where the repetition of violence is to be found) perhaps it is exactly the global peasantry that stands as a universal inscription concerning exclusion, denial, extermination, lack and abandonment (an inscription that makes no mark). These numberless and nameless peoples are seen by us in the west as a bizarre spectacle by which we define our relative hermeneutic, material, social and ethical boundaries, for the extremities of their suffering is always maintained as distant and alien - inhuman.

Gibson Burrell, in relation to organisation theory, talks with insight about the
invisible presence of the peasantry - 'Look at the books on globalisation...and one can search in vain in what are otherwise admirable texts for any mention of the peasantry. The peasant is seen as lying outside of the global world, having been bypassed in the move to industrialisation, post-industrialism and postmodernity. When we speak of the planet upon which we live, and research and write about humanity, it appears that there is no theoretical space left for the peasantry' (Burrell, 1997:72). Just as Marx placed the 'workers of the world' central in theorising the historical movement to be found in the struggle between capitalist and worker so modern social theory, in general, omitted the speculative superfluous of the global peasantry. Marx saw the peasants as a transitional class left over from feudalism - a generally redundant system of production. The assumption was that the peasantry was merely in decline numerically; it is nearer the truth that the importance given to their existence was denied by a process of theoretical closure. Instead, when peasantry appeared in theory it was as an object of study for anthropologists so that theorists could further clarify their own theories and concerns relating to such things as the formation of sexuality, identity, morality and commonality in the western world. This may seem like an over-statement, but it starts to seem less melodramatic in face of the actual numbers such a statement is concerned with. In 1992 India's population of 861 million contained about one-third of its populace still in the social form of the peasantry. Of China's 1,180 million today about one quarter are classifiable as peasants; as well as this (more generally) roughly 30% of the remaining world population are peasantry (Hobsbawn, 1994). Gibson Burrell estimated the over-
all number to be at about two billion by the year 2001.

Burrell goes onto to argue that the peasantry, in actuality, is not just significant numerically. He argues that the peasantry is central in understanding revolutionary change since the 1500's. The claim is in contrast to 'Marx's over-determined position on the peasants capabilities within industrialising societies' (Burrell, 1997:75). Burrell cites revolt as a response to famine, taxation and disease. Peasant collective action also could be mobilised in the way Mao mobilised support from peasantry during The Long March and afterwards. Burrell argues that when the powerful cannot maintain single sovereignty then the peasantry may well become an effective revolutionary force. Burrell cites Russia 1917, and China 1949, as examples. He uncovers an underlying assumption in theoretical discourse when he proposes that the 'pain and fear' of the peasantry which lay behind 1917 and 1949 has been missed due to a general research focus upon industrial production and behind this focus there lies a linear view of history that has already presupposed the irrelevance and even the 'objective' disappearance of the peasantry. As Burrell states -

'Like the stations of the cross, the pain often felt by the contemporary peasantry should enable us to see how their role has been denigrated, reviled and hurried into an oblivion which it has steadfastly refused to embrace' (Burrell, 1997:76)

This suffering is both generated and denied within international systems where the friend is like the brother and so justice is linked to fraternity and concerns itself with only one side of fixed hermeneutic boundaries. Yet both
within and without these boundaries violence is implicit as enmity is created in
the announcement of friendship and judicial/ethical discourses withhold
legitimacy to what they make alien and other. This inherent relationship between
violence and politics serves to bring into question another of Falk's naïveties -
this is his general emphasis on the importance of civilisational rights. He talks of
recognising these rights upon a civilisational level as if ensuring such rights
would produce transparent organisations where no real differences would be
coerced into general participation. This is a dream of a political organisation
without a privileged narrative or social strata - and this is itself unitarist ideology.
Consider the case of Islam and the difficulty of reconciling the strongly
patriarchal Islamic religion, institutionalised within Islamic states, and the rights of
women in Islamic countries for the self-determination and political freedoms that
have been so important gains for western women in their struggle for political
and social recognition.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Any critical text, in order to maintain its critical standpoint, must return its own critique back on itself. In
this context it is important to notice that, at this point in the text, a dualism may be perpetuated when
considering 'the case of Islam and the difficulty of reconciling the rights of the strongly patriarchal Islamic
religion... and the rights of women in Islamic countries'. The opposition between a strongly patriarchal Islam
and women's rights can often be found in debates concerning the role of women in Islam, this opposition
acts to cover-up a difficult relation between the two. In fact, such a dualism can only be sustained by
presenting the two sides of the dualism in a populist and simplistic manner. By maintaining simplistic
images of Islam the text, that is written on incompletion, can act to quickly cover and unify an
incompletion. This incompletion consists of the difficulty of drawing a relation between women's rights and
Islam. The ambiguity of the relationality between the two exists in terms of the complexity of gender power
relations structured through differing Islamic states and diverse Islamic legal codes, and it also consists of
the difficulty of establishing an unproblematic connection between Islamic cultures and the concept of
rights.

The problematic relation between Islamic states and 'human rights' is actually developed in the next few
pages which look at the argument that the concept of human rights is underpinned by a specifically western
conception of individual liberty. In this context Danilo Zolo is quoted as saying that such a western
conception of liberty is quite foreign to Islamic culture, even a non-'integralist' Islamic culture, profoundly
marked as it is by a religious sense of belonging to the community (Zolo, 1997:119). The complexity of
women's lives amongst the diversity of Islamic states, legal codes, and the lived experience of people living within these states, also forces incompleteness upon dualistic thinking. Aziz Al-Azmeh argues that the perceived conflict between fundamentalist Islam and the West is underpinned by a form of culturalist essentialism. In his book 'Islams and Modernities', Al-Azmeh shows that the homogenizing claims of 'Islamic radicalism' and the western discourse on Islam itself are refuted by complexity in terms of Islam's actual historical development and contemporary global systems, he seeks to 'bring back to history the category of Islam' (Al-Azmeh, 1993:24). As he has written -

'The hyper-Islamization of collectivities of Muslim origin has accompanied hardening tendencies to social involution premised on structural features of communities of Muslim origin. This representation, which assumes a homogeneity overriding differences between those of rural and of urban origin, rich and poor, educated and illiterate, is by no means a reflection of social reality, which is one of stunning diversity' (Al-Azmeh, 1993:3).

The point here is to show how a text can reinforce or even create over-determined theorizations of the world in no more than a few sentences, theorizations which act to hide and blind the reader and writer alike to the inherent difficulties and perplexities of the process of theorization itself. In reducing Islam and women's rights to the over-determined schema of a dualism between the two, there is a very real danger of totalizing experience into abstract conceptuality. Al-Azmeh thinks that a theoretical division between Islam and the West is characteristic of what he calls 'orientalist scholarship'. Concerning orientalist scholarship, Al-Azmeh argues that it is a cultural 'mood' constructed out of mythological classification that produces a strict division of the world. As in all myth a primitive logic pre-dominates in which 'difference gives way to antithesis in a play of binary structures' (Al-Azmeh, 1993:128). Al-Azmeh argues that it is in terms of these structures that Islam, and communities of Muslim origin, are categorized and connected, and it is such parameters that determine the discourse on all things Islamic. So, the dualism creates two sides of an opposition - the justice of women's rights and the oppression of a strongly patriarchal Islam - which are in fact questionable in themselves, and it also dangerously invites judgement between these two sides of the opposition. As Al-Azmeh has observed, 'Deficiency is, of course, a polemical notion. It implies a requisite completeness, a consummate plenitude, in relation to which deficiency is measured. But this involves not only measurement: the correct order of things causes others to be seen and judged' (Al-Azmeh, 1993:130).
In fact, generalised on a global level, the case for the universality of human rights cannot unproblematically lay claim to any unifying foundation.

It is not so much the problem of discerning a universal human nature upon which rights are to be founded (although this in itself is a very problematic project), but that ‘human rights’, as a general category, holds within it many antinomies. The case of global human rights, in its own terms, contains real contradictions between many apparently indubitable propositions. For instance, there is the tension between individual rights and collective rights - including the right of self-determination of peoples. Also, civil rights and rights to freedoms are often incompatible with economic/social rights, and there can be the difficulty between negative rights and positive rights. In relation to such a problem the ‘truth’ concerning human rights is that they are not and never have been pre-given or inevitable, but that they are emergent from historical events and processes - being without any foundation they arise from bitter conflicts, instigated by political and social forces which have fought for recognition. Concerning this issue Zolo writes that the social events from which conceptions of human rights emerged have been exclusively European (western). So, Zolo argues, it comes as no surprise that the notion of human rights to be found within the formulation of the Universal Declaration should be essentially western - ‘[a conception] therefore that is imbued with the political philosophy of individualism, despite certain compromises imposed by socialist and Latin American countries’. Zolo goes onto to write that ‘The universal character of “human rights” is therefore a rationalistic postulate not only without substantiation in the theoretical
sphere but also historically contested by cultures different from western culture' (Zolo, 1997:118).

Zolo thinks that it cannot be denied that all cultures around the world share certain elementary rules of conduct and as examples he cites the respect for the physical integrity of individuals or the value placed upon keeping promises. However, he thinks that the 'complex of civil, political and social values that constitute the premise of the doctrine of human rights is to a large extent incompatible with the dominant ethos in countries like, for example, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan or Nigeria' (Zolo, 1997:118). It is no coincidence that the countries listed here by Zolo are either Muslim or Socialist. Underpinning the western conception of human rights is the notion of individual liberty. This concept of liberty will always privilege individual rights over collective rights, negative rights over positive rights, and economic/property rights over social rights. This is the case because the western concept of liberty was always designed to protect personal liberty, individual property, political authority and, in the end, the workings of an essentially free-market economy. Of course, as Zolo argues, such a western conception of liberty 'is quite foreign to Islamic culture, even a non -"integralist" Islamic culture, profoundly marked as it is by a religious sense of belonging to the community' (Zolo, 1997:119). Zolo thinks that the same is true of the Chinese Confucian tradition, which has survived the imposition of a type of 'Marxism' upon it; he makes the interesting point that the Chinese employed a new word for the conception of individual rights that they found in western political classics, this word was chuan-li - meaning 'power and
interest'.

This brings us to the charge that is often levelled against the process of globalisation and cosmopolitanism, this is that it is merely a process of westernising the planet. The process of westernisation, as Zolo aptly puts it, involves the powerful countries of the west (mainly the USA and Western Europe), 'overrunning the technologically and economically weaker countries, depriving them of their identity and dignity' (Zolo, 1997:119). He continues to say that, 'such a suspicion also falls on the international policies of "humanitarian intervention": there is no more eloquent testimony to the risks of such policies than the recent failures of the United Nations - that is, of the Security Council under the hegemony of the United States - in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda.' (Zolo, 1997:119)

5.

To remedy what he calls a situation of false universalism Falk suggests a strategy of normative adjustment. Normative adjustment refers to alterations in patterns of practice and the modes of participation in authority structures and processes; as well it means 'overcoming grievances validated as reasonable' (Falk, 1997:19). The grievances referred to here are those resulting from the exclusionary boundaries placed upon participation for divergent civilisational identities by western civilisational hegemony and western vested interests. Overcoming such grievance, for Falk, means establishing and safeguarding rights of participation based upon civilisational identities. Because, for Falk,
divergence between civilisational paradigms is the differend it is exactly the UN’s supposed neutrality between states that is under critical consideration. As Falk argues, ‘normative adjustment cannot be effectively achieved within the traditional framework of statism, even if modified to confer rights on individuals, minorities, groups and, arguably, peoples’ (Falk, 1997:19). This would logically entail the deconstitution of the exclusionary limits (symbolic, cultural and economic) that exist within the UN and that are themselves constructed by western civilisational hegemony. Interestingly this process that emerges out of Falk’s notion of normative adjustment can be drawn nearer to a possible historically enacted movement of deconstruction.

Yet in doing this a distinction must be made between the project of ‘normative adjustment’ and Falk’s notion of universality, and central to this is a critique of Falk’s notion of a true universality itself. Falk returns us to exactly the notion of universality which is here being deconstructed. He critiques the present universality in relation to its falsity but does not problematise the underlying conception of universality itself. In this way Falk and Habermas still retain an ideal conception of a possible transparent organisation, this ideal presupposing a type of knowledge concerning the global community which would ensure there were no excluded parties and no hidden grievances. However, such knowledge must be exactly the myth of de-contextualised reason that Falk criticises as being part of the western heritage that imposes itself on other civilisational realities. Falk stands in danger of merely projecting the present mask of universal representativeness into the future, so constructing a virtual institution
that differs only in as much as it is presented in terms of an impossible future - a virtual institution that is nothing other than a sublime ‘object’. Derrida, on the other hand, functions without such illusions, without Falk's unnecessary retentions, and so a strategy of normative adjustment can take on a more radical form.

Here Falk's normative adjustment can be opened up to the possibility of a wider project and this is concerned with 'systematically posing the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself' (Derrida, 1978:282). The discourse being deconstructed here is that of universality and de-contextualised reason, the heritage is that of western fraternal justice, but this can only occur without notions of true universality or consensus which function as un-deconstructable future presences in work such as that of Falk and Habermas. Instead, the systematic questioning of the universalist rationalist discourse by revealing its filiations and partialities would force the deconstitution of the exclusionary western schema in order to give way to transformatory possibilities. This would bring Derrida's deconstructive method into a historically specific process. So there could not be an endless deferment but instead a process concerning the denouncement of limits that exist within the confines of the substantive exigencies of grievance.

If the UN as it stands is to be denounced - its false universalist status dissolved - then this can only logically come about because its universalist status never really existed. In actuality, the UN is already non-existent, it always has
been - at least the UN as a universally valid organisation (a global organisation) has never really been created. As Richard Falk pointed out, the universalism of the UN is a mask that has been worn by western civilisational hegemony for so long that it is indistinguishable from the face itself for the wearer and the beholder alike - it is in this sense that the UN as it stands is a virtual institution. The UN is an illusion of global justice, and it is this simulation that becomes an actual site where there occurs the contamination of universal concepts of justice and morality by partial affiliations and preferences, the real and the virtual come together in the agon of friendship.

In reply to David Hannay (who supports the UN) Richard Gott has written, 'Tony Blair has been virtually silent on the matter [of the UN]. Why? because (and here, as you rightly note, we are in agreement) there are no votes in it. There is no longer much public support for the U.N...What does your enthusiasm boil down to? That the U.N should be supported because it is capable of "ridding the world of the scourge of war". Is there not some expression to the effect that fine words butter no parsnips?' (Gott, 1996:18). David Hannay seeks to reveal a contradiction in Richard Gott's argument when he replies, 'Do they [the economically powerful countries of the West] love this organisation for its archaic irrelevance or because it is an effective vehicle for their hegemony? Surely it cannot be both at the same time as you seem to be saying' (Hannay, 1996:19)

Unfortunately for David Hannay - according to the way the argument has been constructed here - the UN is exactly both irrelevant and effective at the same time. It is because it is an effective vehicle for western hegemony that it is
irrelevant (non-existent), in actuality, as a global institution that could ‘repair the violence’ and over-come global conflicts. It is in this sense of non-existence (non-meaning) that the U.N can be denounced, and in such denouncement its absence is to be revealed. The denouncement concerns the hypocrisy of its simulated presence.

This would leave us without the universal certainty (present or future) posited by the existence of the UN thus returning us to difficult relations, yet not seeing these difficulties as a conclusion or even a beginning - the UN's exclusionary hegemonic limits being denounced and so exceeded. Here we return to the insights of ethical writing as theoretical demand and as a historical/political exigency. What is to be found within ethical writing (that is one of its generative factors) is the post-structuralist concern with escape (flight) - escape from the unity of culture and identity in order to open new spaces for creativity and invention. So it can be seen that making the issue of incompletion historically specific is not a ‘retreat’ from the original problematic, it is actually a development of it, stemming from the same difficulties. The denouncement (the escape) when placed within historically specific demands shows the inadequacy of an endless postponement. Derrida, in ‘The Politics of Friendship’, theorises ‘a call to be heard before any articulation is set concerning its possibility’. He begins with an apostrophe - ‘a mark showing an omission’ - in doing so he brings into question the completion of present conceptions of ethics, justice and law in western culture. This ‘mark showing an omission’ questions, but it also (by its questioning) brings into proximity the unknown - that which is unnamed.
With the difficulties and perplexities of the international system Derrida's apostrophe takes on a double significance: it firstly signals the unknown rather than the proximate; secondly (as a mark showing an omission) its significance is to show the omission of grief (grievance) within international systems. This reveals that any denouncement takes place because of actual grievances and political pressures from material interests and organisations that arise on a global level. In other words, any denouncement takes place in relation to 'the grief'. In this sense 'grief' can take various forms globally, one example of which could be Islam. Other examples of 'grief' can be found in relation to the general category of 'global peasantry', or the growing number of people being exploited within the EPZs of the trans-national companies (both categories that are growing in the process of globalisation/westernisation), or in the form of dispossessed masses - peoples whose roots have been disseminated.

The process of globalisation/westernisation does not integrate the dispossessed peoples into a universal community; instead it forces them into an invisible existence of social and economic marginalisation. Of relevance to an understanding of the 'grief' Danilo Zolo has written the following:

'The rhetoric of civil globalisation and of a rising "cosmopolitan citizenship" underestimates one of the most characteristic and most serious consequences of the way in which westernisation is cultural homogenisation without integration: namely, the antagonism between the esteemed citizenships of the West and the countless masses belonging to regional and subcontinental areas without development and with a high
rate of demographic growth' (Zolo, 1997:137).

Zolo's 'weak pacifism' aligns itself with ideas concerning governance without government; he refers to what he calls his 'realistic pacifism' as heading in the direction (in opposition to cosmopolitan centralism) 'which is pointed to by the idea of an international "legal society" embodied in a plurality of "regimes" capable of co-ordinating international actors in accordance with a systematic logic of "governance without government"' (Zolo, 1997:168). He does denounce the UN in as much as he refers to it as 'in absolute terms, non-reformable' (Zolo, 1997:170). In distinction to the centralism of the UN Zolo seeks to 'contain the cultural hegemony of the West, thereby allowing the development of a culture of "human diversity" which will not regard cultural differences as "speciated" manifestations of all that is other - and hence to be combated - but will instead accept them as evolutionary differentiations confirming multilaterality and "world-openness" as characteristics of the human species' (Zolo, 1997:154). For Zolo, such 'world-openness' would be something like a new paradigm in human organisation that would act to overcome the psychology of violence to be found within the agon of friendship. The two things are inter-linked, but to state an inevitability of one overcoming the other would be to over-determine the future within the finite limitations of presently constituted discourse and conceptuality. However, his theory of 'world-openness' has relevance to the contemporary situation of international affairs and global politics in as much as it seeks to avoid an absolute negation of universal values as it still values the acceptance of difference on a global level and the ethical unity of 'world openness' and
multilaterality. In this sense it has great value for the contemporary global situation in that it struggles with both unity and complexity - entering the work of aporetic universalism.

Zolo talks with contemporary accuracy of the present cosmopolitan attitude of the West, which is generally uncomfortable with divergence (on a global level) from its model of the ideal type of human organisation and so attempts to compress multiplicity and diversity 'within the bounds of a hierarchical macrostructure comprising only a very limited number of states' (Zolo, 1997:154). In inevitable opposition to such a hierarchical macrostructure Zolo cites the 500 cultural units in Africa which have a claim to recognition of their individual identity and political autonomy, while the actual number of African states that are actually recognised by the UN is just over 50. Zolo makes the further claim that, over the whole planet, there are presently several thousand national entities which are more or less explicitly appealing for the right to self-representation in global politics, but that the number of officially recognised states is below 200 (Zolo, 1997:154). Zolo's ideas concerned with allowing the development of cultural differences and human multiplicity as evolutionary differentiations, can also be seen (according to how the term has been defined here) to be a project concerned with a recognition of the grief - yet how can one properly recognise that which has, through systemic processes of exclusion and denial, been rendered invisible?

It is here that it becomes relevant to return to Lyotard's notion of a differend, and what he says concerning such a notion, as he has written -
'In the differend something "asks" to be put into phrases and suffers from the wrong of not being able to at that instant. Thus, humans who believe that they used language as an instrument of communication learn through this feeling of pain that accompanies silence (and from the pleasure that accompanies the invention of a new idiom), that they are summoned by language not in order to increase the quantity of communicable information in existing idioms for their benefit, but in order to recognise that what there is to be phrased exceeds what they can presently phrase, and that they must be allowed to institute idioms that do not yet exist' (Lyotard, 1988).

It is the excess of that which does 'not yet exist' which would make Zolo's notion concerning a recognition of cultural difference and diversity a perpetually incomplete 'task', but this is not to suggest that such a task lacks validity or is of no importance. However, the very real importance of properly understanding the excess of that which does not yet exist (the excess of time itself) is central to this work and is being/will be developed throughout its length. What is of central concern here, in relation to social and political change on a global level, is the potential for grievances that have been rendered invisible to create, out of their own injuries and violence, new constructive political movements. This concern centres around the possibility for aggrieved peoples to organise multifariously on a global level to counteract destructive global power dynamics. The notion of a symbiotic relationship between grief and denouncement entails that such change and counter-organisation is possible. It is stated in the 1997 report of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that 'Rising inequalities pose a serious threat of political backlash against globalisation, one that is likely to come from the North as well as from the South' (UNCTAD,1997). As Naomi Klein argues, after a while it becomes apparent that the unsustainable search for profits that, for example, leads to the environmentally devastating clear-cutting of old growth forests in North America, is the same ideology that devastates logging towns by moving the mills to Indonesia (Klein, 2000:266).

So finally, in relation to the UN, it is Derrida's apostrophe that becomes central in showing the absence of an ethical community, the absence of a political practice grounded in universal truth. It is in this space, this absence, that grief finds a voice - it is its idiom and is, in this sense, both a negation and an affirmation of discourse. This space, found in the ruins of the Enlightenment, found in the cracks of empire, appears as a possible expansion of the Western schema that is its heritage - a consciousness of omission, an incompletion creating new tensions that in turn generate transformatory possibilities - transformatory possibilities to be created in redefining the given relations between knowledge and truth, image and reality, power and its legitimacy.
Chapter Five - Nihilism and transformation

'Every culture and society requires an internal critique as an essential part of its development... Every culture needs an element of self-interrogation and of distance from itself, if it is to transform itself.'

Jacques Derrida

Consciousness of omission can become a strategy in the present rather than attempting to theorise a sublime future presence as Lyotard tries to do with his conception of the archipelago. This strategy in the present that can still confront the political/ethical questions, 'What ought we to be?' and 'What is to happen?' while accepting the necessary loss of the enterprise of using thought to ground a political practice in truth. The inherently critical nature of modern thought is more likely to undermine any political practice that makes truth claims for itself and this gives it links with nihilism. This relationship between critical thought and nihilism has been focused upon by Nietzsche in such works as 'The Genealogy of Morals'. At the end of this work Nietzsche argues that the will-to-truth, as exemplified in Western science and philosophy eventually undermines itself, and this undermining process is due to its necessarily enquiring and critical nature. Nihilism and truth are not two mutually exclusive and conflicting elements; instead the fundamentally Christian drive for truth produces, and is itself, a form of nihilism. Nietzsche states that -

'Christianity as dogma was destroyed by its own morality; in the same way Christianity as morality must now perish too: we stand on the
threshold of this event. After Christian truthfulness has drawn one inference after another, it must end by drawing its most striking inference, its inference against itself...what meaning would our whole being possess if it were not this, that in us the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a problem?’ (Nietzsche, 1989:161)

The contention being made here is that it is difficult, if not undesirable, to try and separate critical thought’s relationship with nihilism, such attempts usually only lead to some form of suppression of thought’s critical drive - a suppression of the will-to-truth becoming aware of itself as a problematic. Burrell also makes the link between nihilism and critical thought when he argues that The Enlightenment represented the ascendancy of a movement which encouraged the critical reappraisal of existing social institutions and ideas and that it did this by an emphasis upon reason. Nihilism, on the other hand, relies upon a complete denial of existing institutions and authority, and a full and firm rejection of any belief in values, the possibility of human communication and indeed in existence itself. However, Burrell argues, ‘both these stances to knowledge, nevertheless, depend upon a questioning of existing social arrangements and are therefore related’ (Burrell, 1997:110). Within this work the inherently critical side of Enlightenment thought is focused upon, and it is also used upon itself to deconstitute Enlightenment notions such as de-contextualised reason, true universality and the given link between knowledge and truth. In this way the critical reason of the Enlightenment eventually undermines its own origins and so comes to inhabit an increasingly uncertain and open terrain.
This strategy involves accepting a necessary absence in the present. However, this absence is not a conclusion in relation to the impossibility of thought, rather it is generative. This strategy itself has a deep involvement with the philosophical tradition and social and political theorising. The following quote from David Wood can be most enlightening in order to understand the fundamental links this strategy has with social and political philosophy. Wood connects himself with the tradition of edifying philosophy as he says, 'what Rorty calls, perhaps ill advisedly, the edifying philosophers rather than systematic philosophy. Edifying philosophy shows us that things need not be the way they seem to be; systematic philosophy tries to show us how things are and must be' (Wood, 1990:45)

Yet logically, in order to show that things need not be the way they seem to be, edifying philosophy must re-present social and political circumstances as being in some way inadequate or incomplete - in order to question the way things seem to be in relation to the way they actually are or can be. So, for instance, Marx can be viewed as following the edifying tradition of social and political philosophy in that he theorised the capitalist mode of production as being inadequate and so incomplete in relation to the speculative future of communism and also the creative potential of Homo Faber. These two aspects were interlinked in Marx's over-all critique of the present capitalist ideology in relation to the way social relations really are under capitalism and the way they could be organised in the future. In this way Marx's work is inherently critical. However, the difference between the critical methods of Marx and the critical strategy that entails incompleteness is that (to put it
briefly) Marx made of the world an object of critique whereas radical incompleteness makes its own present conceptuality and discourse into an object for its own critique simultaneous to developing a critical capacity in relation to present objective social and political conditions. However, this critical stance toward its own discourse also functions to call into question any present prescription for completing contemporary social and political problematics. Central to both critical projects is, as David Wood states about edifying philosophy in general, ‘defamiliarization, or distancing oneself from the taken-for-granted. When a philosopher asks how something is possible, it is a question that points forward to an answer, or attempts to provide an answer, one that declares an estranged distance from the given, the everyday’ (Wood, 1990:44)

Radical incompleteness necessitates a defamiliarization toward its own discourse whereas the more conventional forms of critical theorising (via Marx) usually entail only a process of defamiliarization in relation to the world, and for this reason it is hard to place post-structuralist writers into an easily classifiable position. This type of defamiliarization is an anti-foundationalism that goes against any form of residual essentialism in theoretical work. The difficulty of the task lies in the fact that it seems problematic to think, let alone critically assess, such fundamental assumptions. David Wood argues that such fundamentals are not impossible to address but that they are instead ‘structurally invisible’. The problem is that ‘in order to scrutinise these assumptions, one would have to make use of the established procedures for noting, questioning, scrutinising, doubting etc. And yet it is in such
established procedures that the assumptions lie. So the attempt to bring them to light would only confirm them.’ (Wood, 1990:18)

This structural invisibility of fundamental assumptions in any theory is why deconstruction works at the margins, or at the limits, of present conceptuality and language. This working at the limits can sometimes mean a denouncement of these very boundaries and an expansion of any neatly delimited realms within them. This is why denouncement is central to incompletion, which engages in a project of radical self-reflexivity. Again, David Wood provides an insightful commentary -

'The key to the specific reflexivity of a deconstructive reading is that the features of a philosophical text that it picks on are not the logical inconsistencies, the weak arguments, the unlikely premises...but rather the features which are philosophically most respectable, the features that make the text a philosophical text...philosophical deconstruction concerns itself with what is philosophical in a text not what fails to meet some philosophical standard or other...there is a strong sense in which each individual text Derrida deals with, it is the impossibility of philosophy itself that is at stake’ (Wood, 1990:46)

This is a project completely different from that of Marx who never really questioned the underlying assumptions to be found in his notion of Homo Faber and universal creative human spontaneity. It can be debated that the notion of Homo Faber was central to Marx's work but the really important point here is the way in which these essentialist principles are inextricably inter-linked with the strongly universalist and linear themes in his work. Marx
believed that Homo Faber was, in a speculative sense, the whole human being as the species being. This conception entailed the possibility of a state where there would be no distinction between organic and inorganic nature in the sense that there would be an immediacy, a spontaneous relation between the two that determines our humanity. Our humanity is determined by our creative labour (productive activity) upon the inorganic - this is productive spontaneity. It is through productive activity, according to Marx, that mankind can come to see 'his own reflection in a world which he has constructed' (Marx, 1988 :127)

Capitalism, for Marx, brings about a general frustration of human creative spontaneity, mainly because labour, the true source of value, has been reduced to an exchange value, it has been abstracted - the product and the act of production having been separated. Capitalism, by failing to recognise the necessary relation between the organic and the inorganic fails to recognise humanity's creative potential and the use-value of labour, so it leads to over-production and alienation.

For Marx, the fragmentary human that is found in capitalism is incapable of transforming himself into a 'total man' - this transformation being a necessity due to the fact that humans are intrinsically social beings. It follows then, for Marx, that any transformation toward Homo Faber can only take place as society itself develops. Although Marx’s exact theorisation changed over time, the fundamental necessity, driven by these basic assumptions, was that bourgeois society was something in the process of becoming. According to Marx's later notion of dialectical materialism society would reach its ultimate
conclusion in the utopia of communism. The social and political thought of Marx can be seen as a blueprint whereby his idealistic notion of the total human being would, one day in the future, be realised. Deeper still within Marx's thought there can be divined unquestioned religious sentiment combined with rationalist humanism. For ingrained through the triadic conception of Homo Faber, capitalist alienation and the movement of dialectical materialism toward communism there lurks the Christian dogma of the original state of grace, the fall and the eventual redemption of humanity. So in this fundamental sense Marx's texts were always involved in the legitimation of their uncritical substance - of what lay 'structurally invisible' within them. On the other hand, texts that are involved with incompletion are concerned with a process of de-legitimation. Whereas Marx could only involve himself in a denouncement of capitalist ideology and fetishism, and so to a de-legitimation of the suffering caused by capitalism in a move to establish the essentially religious authority of his texts, incompletion also de-legitimates its own textual authority and so becomes the flourishing cancer that mutates its own body. Yet, it could be asked here, isn't this the double move that leads to thought's impossibility?

Here David Wood provides a concise linkage with the previous concerns with the U.N, post-modern theories of power (via Foucault and Lyotard) and the deconstructive mode, when (actually answering against the charge that Derrida is an idealist that cannot relate to the world, but the essence of the problem of impotence and inadequacy is the same) he states -

'The fastest answer to this is to consider the role of texts -
philosophical, scientific, legal - in legitimation of the established order of things. One of the consequences of a deconstruction of such texts is something like de-legitimation, which may well have effects in the world' (Wood, 1990:42)

This returns us to the significance of Derrida's apostrophe in 'The Politics of Friendship' - bringing into question the legitimacy and the actuality of present conceptions of ethics, justice and law in Western culture. However, the effect becomes less abstract than this if we also examine Lyotard's notion of information in 'The Post-modern Condition' and Foucault's notion of information in books such as 'The Order of Things' and 'The History of Sexuality', in which it is the very deconstitution of textual structures that would provide the point of transformation in what Foucault has termed 'the polymorphous techniques of power' (Foucault, 1990:11). David Wood argues that each individual text Derrida deals with is not simply concerned with the adequacy or legitimation of that particular text alone - more general conclusions can be gained.

In this sense, if incompletion grows out of and also disrupts the exigency of edifying philosophy then it could have the transformatory possibility of providing an estranged distance between information and its reception, subjectifying discourse and its internalisation into identity. Foucault's acute central criticism of the modern era is that the three techniques of subjectification (truth, power and ethics) are so closely entangled that they allow us no subjective freedom. The entanglement of truth, power and ethics refers here to Foucault's discursive formations and the institutional practices
with which they are interwoven. This is why Derrida’s claim that ‘there is nothing beyond the text’ is not a form of idealism. For within the work of Foucault the textual is inextricably inter-linked with contemporary experience and consciousness. It is illuminating here to re-introduce the quote from Bernstein citing Derrida that was first given in Chapter Three -

’I found it necessary to recast the concept of text by generalising it almost without any limit that is. That’s why there is "nothing beyond the text"...That’s why the text is always a field of forces: heterogeneous, differential, open, and so on. That’s why deconstructive readings and writings are concerned not only with library books, with discourses, with conceptual and semantic contents. They are not simply analyses of discourse...They are also effective or active (as one says) interventions that transform contexts without limiting themselves to theoretical or constative utterances’ (Bernstein, citing Derrida, 1991:211).

Derrida understands writing as the articulation of differences and Foucault theorises the articulation of differences in society as forming multiple sites of power. This claim itself needs further articulation. Foucault, writing on morality, has written the following -

’Anyone who wishes to study the history of a "morality" has to take into account the different realities that are covered by the term. A history of "moral behaviours" would study the extent to which actions of certain individuals or groups are consistent with the rules and values that are prescribed for them by various agencies. A history of "codes" would
analyse the different systems of rules and values that are operative in a given society or group, the agencies or mechanisms of constraint that enforce them, the forms they take in their multifariousness, their divergences and their contradictions. And finally, a history of the way in which individuals are urged to constitute themselves as subjects of moral conduct would be concerned with the models proposed for setting up and developing relationships with the self, for self reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by oneself, for the transformations that one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object. This last is what might be called a history of the forms of moral subjectification and of the practises of self that are meant to ensure it' (Foucault, 1992:29)

The last history Foucault has termed subjectification, which entails a relationship of knowledge toward, and with the aim of developing, self-identity qua morality. Foucault's argument is that, through modernity, this process of subjectification has become omnipresent in all social institutions and networks and so has become oppressive upon human subjectivity. Such a view can be summed up in the following quote -

'Foucault urges us to “refuse what we are”, meaning that we should refuse to remain tied to the identities to which we are subjected...Foucault’s key criticism of the modern era is that the three axes of subjectification [truth, power and ethics] are so closely entangled that the only subjectivities, or modes of being a subject, available to us are oppressive.’ (Simons, 1995:2)
In my MA thesis, and later in a published article (Leyshon, 1998), I have already argued that Foucault (via Nietzsche and Bataille) theorised a way to ‘refuse what we are’, that through Nietzsche’s genealogical method Foucault attempted to deny the subject that was constituted through a process of individualisation (based upon control and regulation of one’s identity) in order to see beyond the limits of our ossified identities. Through these two thinkers Foucault sought the possibility of de-subjectifying the subject, or the dissociation of the subject through transgressive ‘limit experiences’. In this way, I argued, Foucault uses the thought of Nietzsche/Bataille as a strategy, a process, within a wider and rather Kantian project centred on a notion of emancipation.

Foucault himself relates his type of critique, in his essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’, to what he calls the ‘attitude of modernity’, this being a mode of relating to contemporary reality, a way of thinking and feeling. It is not the Kantian doctrine that connects Foucault to the Enlightenment but this attitude. He actually refuses to place himself as ‘for’ or ‘against’ any Enlightenment rationalism. He uses Baudelaire’s dual formulation of modernity to define this attitude. Baudelaire wrote that, ‘Modernity, the painter of modern life, is the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is the one half of art, the other being the eternal and the immutable’ (Baudelaire, 1964:13). Foucault himself thinks that this dual formulation means that being modern does not lie in recognising and accepting the perpetual movement of the
‘ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent’ (the attitude of the flaneur), but in adopting a certain attitude with respect to this fragmented movement or flux. This attitude consists in recapturing something eternal ‘that is not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but within it’ (Foucault, 1991(a):39).

Baudelaire talks of the painter Constantin Guys as the modern painter par excellence because he not only passes through each moment - he transfigures it. This transfiguration does not entail an annulling of reality, but a difficult interplay between the truth of what is real and the exercise of freedom. As Foucault puts it, ‘for the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is’ (Foucault, 1991:41). This is a critical project where what is real is confronted with the practice of a liberty that paradoxically respects and violates it. When applied to notions of the self there emerges the theatrical pose of imagining ourselves other than we are. For Baudelaire this meant ‘dandysme’, but more importantly it entails an indispensable revolt against ourselves. This also relates to the notion of modernity that was put forward in Chapter Four - as modernity being a self-consuming actuality.

It is with Kant that Foucault shares this attitude. Kant played out a similar revolt (at least theoretically) in his essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ and in his essay ‘Is the human race continually improving?’. Here Kant turns this dramatic labour upon humanity and the world itself. Kant, Baudelaire and Foucault all wish humans to invent themselves, using different language and methodologies. They wish to make of ‘modern man’ a work of art, and a work
of art, as Lyotard states, must of itself have infinite possibilities (Lyotard, 1991:93). In line with Baudelaire's 'dandysme' to see oneself (and the self) as a work of art drives Foucault's thought towards a tension between the need to destruct and the need to create. He thinks that 'the main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning' (Foucault, 1988:9), yet in order to achieve this 'undefined work of freedom' Foucault is driven against the idea of universal necessities in human existence. Foucault wanted his various historical analyses to show 'the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made' (Foucault, 1988:11). So here is enacted the way in which the critical attitude of Enlightenment thinking is turned upon its universalist assumptions.

To try and say what has not been said, so that what has not been said (and what has not been) is not seen as something that is nothing but as something that necessarily cannot be coherently stated. Before anything of positive content can be assimilated the denials of possibility must first be denied, and the affirmations of that which is universal and necessary must be 'affirmed' as being only arbitrary and contingent. Only in this manner can the possibilities of being human really emerge, amongst strategic denials and counter definitions. The human subject that is, or can be found in present conditions (in what is happening), the autonomous and biographical self of humanism, must first and foremost be made subject to a critical process of deformation - it must be denounced. As Foucault states, 'I shall thus characterise the philosophical ethos appropriate to the criticalontology of
ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings' (Foucault, 1991:41). This 'work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings' is akin to a notion of self-government that can be found in Kant and his concept of maturity. In his essay, 'What is Enlightenment?', Kant’s main statement is that humans should leave a state of immaturity. Kant had quite a clear idea of what immaturity is - he defined it as a certain condition of social determination, a certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for - and so maturity is a state of freedom from such a condition.

To ensure 'man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity' Kant goes on to say that nothing should be sacred - every social order, religion, dogma, every ruler and government - should be open to the scrutiny of the public use of human reason. Discourses would arise around issues (such as taxation and government) due to learned people submitting their judgements and observations into a kind of public forum of debate. So dogmas, formulas and any ideas of unalterable systems and doctrines should be discarded because they hinder humanity from reaching a state of rational enlightenment. To quote Kant -

'Dogmas and formulas, those mechanical instruments for rational use (or rather mis-use) of [man’s] natural endowments, are the ball and chain of his permanent immaturity.' (Kant, 1970:55)

It is through critical self-reflection of himself and his surroundings that human progress struggles forward. However, if the assumption is not
accepted that reflection in the public sphere will lead to the state and its laws being changed slowly in accordance with universal reason then the free and autonomous use of reason becomes itself a mechanism for ensuring obedience from all citizens with there being no guarantee of actual political change within the system. Especially when Kant stated that all individuals must at all times obey the law regardless of their own views on the matter, Foucault has a point when he argues that Kant’s ‘technique’ of attaining Enlightenment through public use of a universal reason is ‘in scarcely veiled terms, a sort of contract - what might be called the contract of rational despotism with free reason’ (Foucault, 1991:37). This contract would be a situation whereby the individual imperative to have ‘courage to use your understanding’ (in Kant’s own words 1970:54) becomes immediately subsumed by the imperatives of the state and its laws and can be seen eventually as the cynical maxim that says ‘talk as much as you like but don’t disturb anything’. This is why Foucault always brings his project into the practical realm and stresses the particularities of resistance and subversion as opposed to universal debate. This is why he states -

‘But if we are not to settle for the affirmation or the empty dream of freedom, it seems to me that this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one. I mean that this work done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open up a realm of historical inquiry and, on the other, put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take.’
In the development of this PhD thesis, through the secondary analysis of the UN, it can now be understood that the 'empty dream of freedom' would be akin to Falk's notion of a 'true universality'. So the construction of the self as 'a work of art', with infinite possibilities (as an infinite space) must be conducted within the framework of a critical historical approach, but one in which the self is not constructed as a sublime object. It is in this sense that Foucault states 'this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do or think.' (Foucault, 1991:46)

But does Foucault, for want of anything substantial to posit in place of what we presently are, choose to will only negation? Is he a nihilist in the sense that Nietzsche meant when he stated that 'Man would rather will nothingness than not will at all' (Nietzsche, 1989:163). This relates back to Chapter Four where it was said that denouncement posited as an end-in-itself would mean there would be no values at all to present. There would be no more sense, or desire for sense. In fact, it is more accurate (and more productive) to see Foucault's work in the light of Baudelaire's dual formulation: out of the forces that constitute our limits, out of the contingent and fleeting reality, to try and ascertain the murmurings of a beginning that is never complete. In other words, out of the question 'What is happening?' we can start to ask 'What is to happen?'. This is to theorise an Idea of freedom
as a capacity for beginning, something not linked to a causal network, as not being an effect of causes that are themselves effects and so only being contained within the historical totality from which all dreams, imaginings love or grief must stem. In this way any finality in history, any finality posed in relation to what is happening is rejected with the finality of always being (potentially) in the position of beginning to conceive ourselves again. To turn this back to a notion of freedom in the practical/historical realm we can point to the way that Foucault theorises a multiplicity of discourses, in modernity, that have come to constitute a form of disciplinary power through the process of subjectification.

It can be said that Foucault ends up with the problem that if a multiplicity of discourses infringe upon personal freedom by regulating the way in which persons should be able to think and construct themselves then one cannot really theorise another discourse which positively narrates the way that people should think and construct themselves out of this very infringement upon their freedom. However, a positive narration of a futural construct of freedom is not needed. What is necessary is a critical project to denounce the actual limits that presently constrain our subjectivities. What is then needed is a re-presentation of present conditions as inadequate but a re-presentation that need only use the excess of the present as a resource.

3.

Foucault's work seems to balance upon the edge of an 'abyss' that is the silence that remains as the only possibility beyond language and
comprehension, it must be understood that what led to this precarious position was his conceptualisation of the self. This problematic of the self, it has been argued here, stemmed from the fact that Foucault stresses the historical nature of conditions of possibility for knowledge and the human sciences and yet he wants to theorise the importance of the human subject as possessing possibilities beyond the limits that history has presently set. He saw his work as groping towards these possibilities by a movement of negation and affirmation, of negating what we are (the subjectified self) only in order to affirm something as yet undefined. The trouble arises because 'what we are' is placed by Foucault within discourse and the unsubjectified self (that lies beyond historical limits) is outside discourse, undefined and without identity; the same problem occurs with Lyotard's conception of the archipelago. So it can be said that the more successful is Foucault's critical task (which is the undefined work of freedom that requires work on our limits) then the more impossible it becomes. It becomes more impossible the more successful it is because the more the inadequacy of our present conditions and limitations is overcome with a view towards attaining the 'completeness' of the unsubjectified self then the more thought reaches into infinity and goes beyond concepts, discourse and eventually comprehension itself. In other words, Foucault urges us to 'refuse what we are' but this refusal could open us up to a 'surplus of emptiness'. In short, what is needed is the meeting of some demand for 'articulation'. However, if Foucault's insights concerning the subjectification of the human being are to be respected this cannot be a call for the re-establishment of a strictly defined human essence. For according to
Foucault this defining of such an essence would merely be just another ossification of a historically contingent knowledge-power discourse that originally functions to normalise subjectivity.

This articulation is to be understood here as an acceptance that there must be posited, a priori, the existence of the human being as registering a site of meaning. This call for articulation is also to accept that it is impossible to completely theorise being totally outside of categories and discourse. The first step here would be the articulation of the concrete human being placed within a (Marxist) realm of necessity (Barth, 1961:62), with basic needs and demands that cannot be transgressed without losing the whole ground from which any demand for freedom (however undefined) must be established. To keep to Foucault’s project of ‘refusing what we are’ there must also be existence understood in terms of potentiality, potentiality understood here as the self as a work of art which, if it is to be properly understood, one must understand what is not present in its presence. As in painting, we are concerned here with the possibilities to be revealed within that space, and these possibilities, at present, only occur as an absence within the present. These possibilities (if they could be thought in totality) would form an absolute. The absolute itself is not needed, merely the acceptance of a surplus within the present, within the work – surplus as absence in present conceptuality. This surplus is an excess that would never truly allow any articulation to form a totality within the present, although the present always grounds any articulation in concrete sites of negotiation. Always returning to concrete sites of negotiation means that any articulation can never really slide
into subjectivism because it will always be placed within a 'community' of
countestation and struggle concerned with deciding exactly where and why any
limits should be registered. This could not become a form of conventionalism
because there remains the exigencies to be found in the realm of necessity
and the meaning given over to human potentiality - intensities within which
any community articulation can be formed.

Taking these twin concepts of natural necessity and necessary potentiality
as essential in defining the constitution and significance of what it is to be
human can act to return us to Baudelaire's dual formulation. For the space of
the 'work' opens up the human being to an immutable potentiality and this
space is fixed in the fleeting and contingent reality by the realm of necessity
which does not only acknowledge human needs but places the human in
contemporary reality. The realm of necessity reminds us that the space held
within a work of art only exists in the work's presence and its structure. The
work may be ultimately unknown and unknowable but it is nevertheless fixed
at a point in time and placed within contemporary constraints and social
structures; so as Foucault has been quoted earlier, 'this work done at the
limits of ourselves must ... put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary
reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and
to determine the precise form this change should take' (Foucault, 1991(a):46)

So Foucault's undefined work of freedom stays grounded in the materiality
of the present moment, where 'the work' is a presence whose absence
makes the meaning of the present problematic, forming a site of meaning that
is always called into question. So there would be no final resolution where the
self could be defined in totality, there would always be an absence in the present that would have to be acknowledged for the self to be 'complete'. There would always be something, which would escape articulation of essence (an essential totality) and so, as Foucault wanted, discourses that become defining of what constitutes our sanity, our sexuality etc., would never be complete, there would be no final word. However, if it is the present meaning of 'the work' (the concrete human being), and so the moment, that is under contestation then Foucault's 'patient labour' would never be able to step outside language, community and comprehension. This is a way of keeping a tension between denouncement and affirmation, nihilism and reason. Keeping this strain results from conceptualising a paradoxical self that is necessarily both present and absent. This is also an initial conceptualisation of a community that sustains itself within the impossibility of absolute reconciliation, a community that is constantly becoming an excess of itself - where there is no absolute reconciliation to be found in the future or in the past. This is a way of conceptualising a notion of community within modernity, modernity which remains, but which remains only to be invented and to re-invent itself. In this sense the important aspect, the creative aspect of modernity, lies in its absence, so being condemned to exist (like the self in modernity) 'not as a real being but as a foetus that had been tainted before term and as an unreality' (Bataille, No.79:11). Then such presence is absence - not the plural ground of being (Benjamin, 1993) but a lack of being and a lack of self-identity.

The past cannot provide an absolute origin for the community that gives its
present form legitimation and the present remains unresolved. What is at stake in such a conceptualisation is the questionable sustainability of community within the recognition of its arbitrary beginnings and future; or as Gunther Teubner has said in relation to the formation of law, the understanding that it is ‘grounded only on itself, based on an arbitrary violence without ground’ (Teubner, 1997:1). We are returned here to the agon of friendship and the troubling possibilities of the self-awareness of a community that is based upon an arbitrary struggle that is not itself contained within an a priori necessity for its harmonious resolution. However, such unified self-awareness on the part of a whole community is merely just another mirage of transparency concerning social totality. These issues of community are not confined to theoretical speculation, they are being enacted in contemporary social, political and ethical aporias. So, once again, the deconstructive mode is both engaged with, and is caused by, concrete historical developments. Teubner talks of the effects of fragmented globalisation on law and the contemporary theorisation of law; while Lyotard is famous for his comments concerning the ‘crisis of legitimation’ in the fragmented complexity of computerised societies (Lyotard, 1986:8). Foucault’s undefined work of freedom here becomes the possible enacted deconstruction of discursive legitimising codes that presently define ‘us’, where the unity and authenticity of these legitimising codes are already destabilised by the excess to be found within the system or ‘community’. This excessive moment can be discerned at multiple sites: in the emergence of insistent differences in a process of cultural fragmentation, in the
economic/industrial imperative of functional differentiation of society (differentiation is of course being linked here to Durkheim's notion of anomie), in globalisation, and also in technological/economic innovation leading to the accelerated proliferation and dissemination of information in all communication systems.

In this sense deconstruction as a discursive process is itself already being exceeded by a wider, materially based, dissemination (scattering) of any previously unified discursive formation concerning nationhood, the self, political/ethical sovereignty, and any substantive claims to political, cultural and moral authenticity and authority. This process has something to do with the term ‘to despoil’ - meaning to strip or rob of possessions, and in this sense it is violent, it is a violence toward the past and the present. This violent dissemination is an intimate part of nihilism and it is what nihilism feeds off - but then what edifying or transformatory potential lies in this process?

In order to understand the possibilities for transformation lying at the heart of such nihilism one must present the present itself as a place that accepts and can accommodate violence, arbitrariness and confusion without it becoming a barren place fit only for despair. So here the present is thought of as a place we can inhabit, between memory and longing, a place full of the consciousness of what is possible, a place empty of what has not yet occurred. The present, full of an immense excess of non-being, this is a ‘place’ that only exists to be infiltrated and disordered, it is not a dwelling place. It is infiltrated and disordered by the future, constantly ruptured by
desire and occurrence. This constant restructuring of the present is a constant re-configuration of ourselves and a constant questioning concerning what it is to be human in modernity. This place is where incompleteness is instigated, this is what posits incompleteness.

Theorising time in this way is essential for any social theory that seeks to retain an historically specific mode of thinking and it also opens up the way that incomplete theorising can logically allow for emancipatory potential without the closure of a positive narration concerning ‘what freedom is’. This potential can only be understood by theorising the unavoidable reality of the passage of time and its effect upon any discourse concerning emancipation or freedom from present limits and over-determinations upon subjectivity. Concerning the movement of time Richard Gale has stated that ‘there must be in addition to the present a past and a future, which are respectively the “no-longer” and the “not-yet”. They consist of events which are not now occurring, but which did or will occur. Thus the tiny perch of the present is surrounded by a vast ocean of non-being’ (Gale, 1976:1)

Again we are faced with Derrida’s ‘gestation, conception, formation’ that were explored in previous chapters, where the words ‘as yet’ and ‘not yet’ place the unnameable thing (that is formless, mute, terrifying) within an historical context and as something in the process of becoming. This is where Derrida’s theorising remains historically specific and so his ‘unnameable which is proclaiming itself’ is not necessarily absent but is instead an absence in the present. The problem remained that any proclamation remained deferred and if this deferral became infinite then the unnameable becomes a
sublime object that is eternally absent - this would be nothingness in the sense of eternalised lack. This eternalisation is to be avoided by working within the difficult relations between the ‘no-longer’, present finality and the ‘not-yet’, and as was argued before, between friendship and its absence there are difficult relations that contaminate and exceed the limits of that which does remain - this denouncement of limits is the ‘imagining again’ of community. This is to paradoxically ‘speak’ of the aporia - of the difficult relation between the finite and the infinite, thinking perplexity through time, in time.
Chapter Six - Productive absence

'What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday?'
Michel Foucault.

1.

Emptiness enters us and is active in every moment. This is an emptiness that is not a surplus of itself, it is in fact the site of possibility. This is in line with the original argument of this thesis that was put forward in the introduction. This argument is that much post-structuralist discourse is both nihilistic and utopian in nature because it seeks to deconstitute present forms of thought in relation to established concepts of the self and community, in order to explore new possible configurations and variations of these. However, any new conceptions cannot be complete in the present because they would then be just part of present conceptuality, so there remains a nihilistic absence in the present but this absence is productive of new possibilities. So through the development of this thesis absence has been theorised as a site of possibilities that negates subjectification and dismantles reification, as a possible destruction, but also as a welcome invitation to imagine ourselves again...but differently, and so reconfigure the historical totality from which all dreams and imaginings must stem. In fact, in terms of productive absence, negation is inseparable from the creative and affirmative act of reconfiguration. In critiquing ourselves and our delimited ways of being, we open ourselves to the absence of what we have failed to become. So the seeming negativity of absence can actually be reconfigured as a necessary
space for the creation of all that is genuinely new in any social, political and subjective human reality. Productive absence is necessary for the affirmative process of reconfiguration because it is the point of convergence between the finite and the infinite, the present and the future, and it is also the point of convergence between differing 'systems' of thought and being.

This convergence continued to take shape throughout this work, in the finite suffering of the moment, and so, in this way, this work is not complete, for in the moment, convergence is never complete, for it constantly reconfigures its own form and possibility. So this work can be seen to be both a convergence and a breaking apart. In this sense, this work functions with the 'logic' of the doppleganger. As was argued in Chapter 3, when the doppleganger exists the person that it doubles no longer exists as a self-sufficient entity, the person has no choice but to enter into and collude with the inevitability of an ambiguous relation between itself and that which has occurred as a now unavoidable supplement to it. There was no a priori necessity to supplement the person, but once the doppleganger exists the person immediately becomes deficient in and of itself. Such convergence is drama, when an form or an idea (a self-sufficient concept) is drawn into ambiguous relations with other (often opposed) forms, where the carefully maintained limits and definitions of each are deconstituted in ambiguous relations that command the inevitability of tensions, irresolvable difficulties and paradoxes that eventually exceed the limits that had hitherto constituted what that original form actually was.

So the work of Gillian Rose has been drawn into the thought of the writers
she sought to oppose and in this way her own work has been drawn back to
the equivocation of the middle and expanded as such. As was said in the
introduction, this is not a work upon the work of Gillian Rose, but this thesis
did start with some of the major concerns of her work. These concerns have
been largely addressed using the work and insights of the poststructuralist
writers she attacked but never really established a dialogue with. If
convergence is a form of dialogue then Gillian Rose has here been forced to
confront her poststructuralist dopplegangers.

Of relevance here is Bataille's view of the connection between eroticism
and death -

'In essence, the domain of eroticism is the domain of violence, of
violation...We cannot imagine the transition from one state to another
one basically unlike it without picturing the violence done to the being
called into existence through discontinuity. Not only do we find in the
uneasy transitions of organisms engaged in reproduction the same
basic violence that in physical eroticism leaves us gasping, but we also
catch the inner meaning of that violence. What does physical eroticism
signify if not a violation of the very being of its practitioners? - a
violation bordering on death, bordering on murder?' (Bataille, 987:intro)

The possibility of reconfiguration through violation, as was shown in the
previous chapter, is central to Foucault's conception of the self. Foucault's
work is a critical project where what is real is confronted with the practice of a
liberty that paradoxically respects and violates it. It is in this sense that
Foucault states 'this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not
deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do or think.' (Foucault, 1991:46)

Baudelaire has been quoted in the previous chapter, as saying of the painter Constantin Guys, that he not only passes through each moment - he transfigures it. This transformation does not entail an annulling of reality, but a difficult inter-play between the truth of what is real and the exercise of freedom. Foucault has already been quoted as writing that, in modernity, 'the high value of the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is' (Foucault, 1991:41). So freedom lies in the creative movement away from the real to the unreal and from the unreal back to the real, drawing and configuring the non-existent into existence. Theoretical questions concerning only the real are ones of the defeat of creative and imaginative social and political thought. The most pressing questions concern the denouncement of the real in relation to the utopian value given to what has not yet come into existence - as in Foucault's notion of the unsubjectified self, where there is always a fluid interchange between the actual and the possible, the possible and the impossible.

The difficulty of incompletion lies in accepting limitations within a critical historical approach while at the same time working at the limit, just as such things as community, art and selfhood remain to be invented but remain in the fleeting present unresolved and incomplete. The task of drawing a relation, within post-structuralism, between the utopian and the nihilistic,
corresponds precisely with the task (presented earlier) of articulating or ‘imagining again’ such things as community, politics, identity and art. The task entails imagining again community, politics, identity and art in a fleeting present that is grounded in concrete phenomena, yet without such theorising becoming merely a reflection or part of these historical limitations. It is the theorising of a productive notion of absence that will make this task possible.

However, this absence cannot revert to substance in the form of a sublime object - the impossible substance of the purity of the infinite concept that cannot be realised in experience, and that leaves cognitive finality only to speculate on the absolute absence of the absolute. Reverting to timeless substance would only return us to a form of sublime theorising where the sublime object must remain, of necessity, ‘anonymous, deferred, without identity’. For Lyotard, it is the sublime object itself that causes a productive rupture in thought, so its presence is ‘felt’ by a sensation of vertigo (or distress) and yet at the same time it is not there, it is not present. It becomes ‘there’ only as a sign of the unpresentable. However, according to the argument earlier, a sign for that which is forever unpresentable is itself inconceivable - it has a meaning which is forever absent - because it has a meaning only in relation to something, yet this something is itself unimaginable in its totality.

So, the productive presence of absence is not posited in relation to invisible ‘substance’, whether this be the future substance of sublime theorising or the past substance of arcadian idealism. As has been seen in previous chapters, such invisible ‘substance’ remains forever absent as a
surplus of emptiness. Productive absence is not ideality made present, even if such presence would mean the paradoxical presence of its abyss - or its absence. In other words, it is not the absence of something, it is instead the emptiness of any possibility of presence that is to be found at the limit. So there is no breakthrough to a philosophical beyond - the invisible God re-appropriating itself as visible in the present. So in this sense the productive presence of absence lies in a violent creation of the possible without any reference to an Idea or an absolute potential which can usually be found hand-in-hand with much classic modernist thought and art. This is because the possibility of any task concerning the realisation of possibility cannot orbit around the traditional one (concerning art) as the Hegelian 'sensible presentation of the Idea' (Nancy, 1996:90). Modernity was always concerned with making the idea present or representing (making present) in the work what is not present - which is the paradoxical presence of its absence - 'this is what makes for a beautiful that goes beyond itself into the "sublime," then into the "terrible," as well as into the "grotesque," into the implosion of "irony," in a general entropy of forms or into the pure and simple position of a ready-made object' (Nancy, 1996:90). So art ends itself with pure conceptuality, having exhausted itself by reaching toward an empty ideality, the sensible presentation of which is the purified and empty concept.

Yves-Alain Bois, in his article entitled 'The task of mourning' (Bois, 1986:326), argues that the meaning of a claim concerning the end of art is bounded by two historical circumstances: the first is that the whole history of abstract painting (and art in general) can be read as a longing for its own
death, and the second is the recent emergence of mourning - the healing (or working through) of the claims of the end (or death) of art. For Bois, this working through of grief produces the question - is painting (art in general) still possible? Concerning this problem Jean Luc Nancy has argued that we are a civilisation without image, because without Idea, and in these historical circumstances, ‘art, today, has the task of answering to this world or of answering for it. It is not a matter of making this absence of Idea into an image...It is instead a question of constructing another task’ (Nancy, 1996:93).

The same problematic can be addressed within social theory where a space opens up due to the absence of any unifying Idea, and so its substantive task gets lost in a proliferation of possible solutions offered and tasks proposed concerning how social theory should be constituted within contemporary conditions. As Geoffrey Hawthorn states in his book ‘Enlightenment and Despair’, ‘there has in the twentieth century [in social theory] been some convergence on the conclusion that there is no convergent conclusion’ (Hawthorn, 1976:270).

In fact, when talking about community Nancy highlights that the exigency of modern community defies representation as the very possibility of signification and representation. He says that, ‘perhaps we should not seek a word or a concept for it, but rather recognise in the thought of community a theoretical excess (or more precisely an excess in relation to the theoretical)...But we should at least try to say this, because "language alone indicates, at the limit, the sovereign moment where it is no longer current"
[from Bataille’s Eroticism] Which means here that only a discourse of community, exhausting itself, can indicate to the community the sovereignty of its sharing... An ethics and a politics of discourse and writing are evidently implied here’ (Nancy, 1991:26). Here, Nancy is outlining the necessity of instigating a theoretical discourse that would exceed its own horizons, or as Nancy himself states, ‘we must expose ourselves to what has gone unheard in community’ (Nancy, 1991:26). For Nancy, to say that community has not yet been thought is to say that it ‘tries our thinking’, in that it is not an object for thought – that it does not have to become ‘an object’. In relation to the ‘exposure’ of what has gone unheard in community, Nancy talks of the passion of the absence of community, with which all writing ‘of this time’ is involved with because it is part of a testimony of the dissolution and dislocation of community itself.

Here, Nancy acts to link community with Bataille’s idea of sovereignty. Bataille’s notion of sovereignty is inseparable from an inevitable exposure to excess in relation to community and selfhood. This excess is never itself present in totality and cannot be appropriated or simulated into a present unity or finite system. Sovereignty is not then an idea of a mathematical form of the infinite, instead it would be something that is not given and which itself does not give, that to which being and unity are abandoned and into which they abandon themselves. Absence is here figured and given form only as a point of convergence between the finite and the infinite, it is a point of intersection, in the time of the present.

Here we return to ethical writing as opposed to writing ethics. Writing
ethics would establish unity in terms of community through the transcendence of disunity and difference, such a 'leap of faith' being symbolised in the fascist processions of Nazi Germany where order and sameness are celebrated. Yet writing ethics would also be present in the socio-political domination, oppression and rationalised exploitation to be found under the old communist systems.

Ethical writing, on the other hand, (as has been explored earlier) always entails a relation, in the present, between two elements which do not come to assimilate each other and yet neither do they negate each other. This relationality is not formed by contradictions that are to be resolved it is instead a relationality made up of differences that cannot be united absolutely. Each element in the disunity cannot be presented, theorised, conceptualised or re-appropriated within a unifying concept - the concept is always exceeded. This excess serves to denounce the present legitimation of democracy itself, serving to denounce the present limits of fraternal politics and notions of a global community. So the deconstitution of present community gives way to a 'more expansive' concept, not a concept of the absolute ethical community for this would be to give positive content using present finite conceptuality and so serve only to eternalise the present. Instead, any deconstitution can be understood as Being abandoning itself to sovereignty.

In terms of art, Nancy has talked of a 'profusion' in which one gets utterly lost - a space in which art can no longer find itself again. Theorising the productive presence of absence means that this space is not theorised as a loss (as lack). Such 'lack' can emerge in many different forms: the loss of the
modern project in social theory to explain, understand and change the world, the loss (or end) of the meta-narratives of emancipation etc, the loss of art as a creative and meaningful activity. Instead of such 'lack', the space of absence is to be theorised in terms of a 'generosity', a surplus of the possible that, as Heidrun Friese and Peter Wagner have pointed towards, opens up 'a broader space of intellectual possibilities' (Friese and Wagner, 1999:27-44.). This, of course, is not to theorise the end of social theory - or of art - in terms of absolute negation. An absolute negation would mean that the modernist projects would still remain as the paradoxical presence of their absence, the surplus of emptiness as the unproductive space of a lost ideality. Instead these things must remain to be invented or imagined again, not as repetition of the ideality, but as an unfolding and a transforming of these projects to encompass the possibility of 'no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do or think'. So they remain, so we humans remain, but only as 'a foetus that has been tainted before term and as an unreality' (Bataille, No.79:11).

It is with productive absence as a surplus of the possible that we find Salman Rushdie. In 'The Satanic Verses' Rushdie celebrates a contemporary situation in which no fixed identities exist. Interestingly, the book starts with the two central characters – Gibreel and Saladin - falling to earth after their plane has exploded in mid-air. They fall through the boundless air of dawn after all their certainties and assurances have just been blown to bits. They become aware of the moment when their transmutation begins 'in air-space, in that soft, imperceptible field which had been made possible by the century and which, thereafter, made the century possible, becoming one of its
defining locations, the place of movement and of war, the planet-shrinker and power-vacuum, most insecure and transitory of zones, illusory, discontinuous, metamorphic - because when you throw everything up in the air anything becomes possible' (Rushdie, 1988:5). And in the midst of this fall through airspace the narrator suddenly asks –

'How does newness come into the world? How is it born? Of what fusions, translations, conjoinings is it made? How does it survive, extreme and dangerous as it is? What compromises, what deals, what betrayals of its secret nature must it make to stave off the wrecking crew, the exterminating angel, the guillotine? Is birth always a fall?' (Rushdie, 1988:8)

Absence as a surplus of the possible can only be realised (exist) in a contemporary situation where there are no fixed identities. A fixed identity, in terms of the personal or the communal, is a presence that posits possibility in terms of unity, now and for all time, an ideality that neatly demarcates the boundary between the possible and the impossible. Having no fixed identity is to ensure that newness can come out of absence - this absence posited not as a self-sufficient Idea, which would be another repetition of ideality, but absence that enables newness. This absence would exist within the denouncement of the given boundary between the possible and the impossible, the denouncement of all that is presently legitimated as being 'who we are' and 'what we should do'. This would entail a process of
breakdown concerning presently legitimised narratives (whether internal or external) concerning the self and community, leaving an absence in terms of stating who we are and what we should do. Again this absence cannot be filled with a 'new' narrative that legitimates present conditions in terms of resolution, for then newness would itself, by definition, be reified by such resolution into an eternal fixity. This would be a point at which nothing more can happen, being the end of history as the absolute negation of the possibility of social and political change, and the end of the possibility of conceiving such change in terms of social and political thinking.

For Bataille, true freedom lies in sovereignty, in abandonment to a nameless absence that invades the present as the present opens up to that which cannot be given name or form in the present. Bataille talks of absence in terms of the miraculous or the impossible. For Bataille, the miraculous could be understood as being that which cannot be anticipated, as the sovereign moment exceeds the limitations of anticipation. In fact, the miraculous occurs at the moment when 'anticipation dissolves into NOTHING' (Bataille, 1991:207). So Bataille writes of the method of his work - 'I no longer anticipated the moment when I would be rewarded for my effort, when I would know at last, but rather the moment when I would no longer know, when my initial anticipation would dissolve into nothing' (Bataille, 1991:208). So Bataille's work constantly finds and reveals the discontinuous, making clear that continuity can only come about through the annihilation of the discontinuity of time itself. Yet such dissolution of the discontinuity of time, for Bataille, could only occur through moments in time that were not
subordinated to some anticipated result, moments that were themselves the negation of future results (the negation of time itself).

Within the discontinuity of temporality the articulation of community or selfhood is not impossible, but it does make their completion impossible in terms of abstract (ideal) sublime objects. With the presence of absence within temporality selfhood and community are always already articulated in the present, through history, in history. They always remain in the present, constantly reorganised and reorganising, in the violent creative process into absence, as absence gives itself over to becoming presence. As, within modernity, the boundaries between the actual, the possible and the impossible are constantly blurred. As Bataille has written concerning the experience of sovereignty, 'what mattered...convulsively, in front of us and for us, was the awful yet, in spite of ourselves, marvellous moment when the impossibility suddenly changed into reality' (Bataille, 1991:209) - like death, sovereignty is the 'impossible coming true, becoming that which is' (Bataille, 1991:210), and so sovereignty is a point of convergence between the continuous and the discontinuous, it is a point of intersection, in the time of the present.

With there being a fluid interplay, in modernity, between the actual, the possible and the impossible, the direct expression of community and selfhood is inexpressible. For Peter Wagner, the point of modernity is ‘that they [questions of power, right and knowledge - problems of identity, historicity and freedom] are open and that they persist. They are – and remain – inescapable; they have to be posed. But final answers to them are – and
remain – unattainable.’ (Wagner, 1998: 102)

For we could only directly express community and selfhood if we could also express what they are not and have not yet become, in terms of their absence, and in terms of impossibility. Any direct expression remains insufficient in the present, where the contested frontiers of the possible and the impossible meet – absence and presence, identity and non-identity, in temporality – yet this is where thought gains rather than loses its vitality. To quote from Adorno –

‘What Heidegger attributes to the poverty of our time is the poverty of a thought that fancies itself beyond time. The direct expression of the inexpressible is void; where the expression carried, as in great music, its seal was evanescence and transitoriness, and it was attached to the process, not to an indicative “That’s it.” Thoughts intended to think the inexpressible by abandoning thought falsify the inexpressible. They make of it what the thinker would least like it to be: the monstrosity of a flatly abstract object.’ (Adorno, 1973: 110)

Time is not made up of the movement of day into night, it is made up of the movement from presence into absence and this absence is made up of all events which have not yet occurred, and those events which it is inconceivable that they will ever occur. Here the metaphysical side of the productive presence of absence resides in the demand that questions, ‘Is this all there is?’ This demand is not asked in impotent rage or vain waiting, it is already actualised in the present process of becoming absence. The void ceases as pure abstraction as it is made culpable with history, as history is
opened up to void.

Harboured and constrained in the present, there is always an excess; an over-flowing into the void (absence) - a point of mutation where what was abstract-infinite becomes actualised-finite. There is no clear-cut distinction here between the finite and the infinite - the two terms converge on each other in the absence of the present. The finite is always involved with the infinite, as infinitude is realised through finitude and its proliferations. In this way infinitude becomes transparent and actualised in the process of modernity – interestingly rupturing modernity's parallel process of institutional reification.

So, paradoxically, it is infinity that assumes the temporal effect of a psychotic rupture in time and through time. Modernity, as it realises itself, dissolves itself, it critically dismantles it own form. By this type of change it has left its original hermeneutic borders, like a river that has burst its banks. Yet in this rupture it has also broken out of its limitations and has become free to disregard any starting 'ground rules' that it might have had. So modernity is seemingly free to allow any possible event to occur and this includes its own self-destruction, which would also be its completion, its zenith, nothingness being the singular possibility of modernism's uni-linear narrative after it has achieved the eternal and immutable – the resulting nil ad infinitum of the whole after the whole has completed itself. However, the death of modernity (its counterfeit triumph) is the 'thing' (the sublime object) that is actually always to be deferred because there will always be something new for modernity to become, to transform itself into, there always being the
possibility of some new diabolic form.

Modernity thrives upon the notion that if the old refuses to die then the new cannot be born, and it is this adage with which Salman Rushdie concluded 'The Satanic Verses'. It is in this literal sense that the self and community, in modernity, increasingly search for their own absence. However, lived politics involved in the creation, or process, of community is also concerned with the art of the possible as well as the impossible. Lived politics is concerned more with the ongoing act of imagining new ways of constituting ourselves, but these ways concern ways of living together and how to respect each other's differences to try and reach a reasonable compromise in the midst of such a process. Such lived politics stresses the importance of always returning to concrete sites of negotiation. This importance, that was stressed in Chapter Five, of placing any articulation within a wider 'community' of contestation and struggle (the agon) is concerned ultimately with deciding exactly where and why any limits should be registered, and exactly where and why any limits should be denounced. This process is concerned as much with the art of the possible as it is with that of the impossible, just as it is with the paradoxical self that is both present and absent.
To conclude is to comprehend in some way what one has written, yet to fully comprehend the work would be to allow no absence in its presence and so this work’s perplexity and the future possibilities of its writing would be diminished or even denied. Instead, this conclusion starts, not with a neat attempt at comprehension, but with the persistent struggle between the necessity of comprehension and the urgency that critical thought, in the present, has to overcome and exceed present conceptuality. So, within the difficulty of concluding this work, a beginning can be made by examining the difference and the relations between two quotes that were written on the Holocaust. The first has already been given in this work at the start of Chapter Two, it comments upon the urgency of critical thought to overcome and exceed 'that which has occurred' and 'that which is occurring' -

'If thought is not measured by the extremity that eludes the concept, it is from the outset in the nature of the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to drown out the screams of its victims' (Adorno, 1973: 365)

For Adorno 'the extremity' is the excessive moment in thought that distinguishes between a way of thinking that attempts to merely complete the present and a critical way of thinking that attempts to overcome the conceptual resources of the present. In terms of incompletion this would be the difference between newness in terms of the social and political as being distinguished from claims to newness. For instance, the Nazi Movement in 1930s Germany made a claim to newness for itself but on critical
interrogation the Nazi movement can be seen to have been made up of a collection of pre-existent and second hand concepts - it was an attempt to unify and complete the present not a movement toward newness in terms of the social and political. The second quote is from Primo Levi who is talking about the need to understand the seemingly incomprehensible nature of the concentration camps in the Holocaust -

'Have we - we who have returned - been able to understand our experience? What we commonly mean by "understand" coincides with "simplify": without profound simplification the world around us would be an infinite, undefined tangle that would defy our ability to orient ourselves and decide upon our actions. In short, we are compelled to reduce the knowable to a schema: with this purpose in view we have built for ourselves admirable tools in the course of evolution, tools which are specifically the property of the human species - language and conceptual thought.' (Levi, 1989:22)

These quotes speak of two fundamental exigencies of critical thought, on the one hand Primo Levi calls forth the demand of the Logos to synthesise experience through the unique tools that the human species has at its disposal to do such a thing - language and conceptual thought. On the other hand, Adorno calls forth the essential force of any truly critical thought to challenge and overcome hypostatized conceptual schemas and prescribed limitations in the present. This challenge is also directed at critical thought's own conceptual schemas and limitations, so it demands that such thought 'will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total. This is its form of hope'

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Both calls hold an equal importance and urgency within them. Incompletion is a recognition of such equity and this recognition calls forth a third exigency of critical thought which is the demand to work within the ambiguous relations between these two forces, and in doing so it in turn calls forth a process of recognition and mis-recognition between the two. This is the difficulty of forming any harmonious resolution between them, meaning that any conclusion must occur within the need to comprehend the demand to create a schema and the urgency to exceed any such schema and any proscriptions or prescriptions leading from such a schema.

So, in concluding, we are returned to the beginning, the beginning as convergence, convergence between these two exigencies that is both a coming together and a breaking apart as the relationality continues to take shape in the finite suffering of the moment. In the moment convergence is never complete for it constantly reconfigures it own form and possibility, so in this way there can be seen to be a struggle that can never be absolutely resolved or concluded. What we are left with (once again) are difficult relations that cause us to hesitate in our thought, in our speech, in our writing, and so act to stop critical thought finishing the beginning in the end. Instead thought moves within a suspicion toward its self and its own works that prevents eschatology.

The above two quotes return this work to what, in Chapter Two, was the exigency of what Derrida termed the 'infinitely other of Judaism' and the 'injunction by which it is ordered to occur as Logo's' (Derrida, 1978: 152). At
the end of his essay 'Violence and Metaphysics' Derrida concludes by asking 'Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in the difference between the Jew and the Greek' (Derrida, 1978:153). So Derrida theorised the ambiguous relation between what he called the 'infinitely other of Judaism' and the Greek Logos as unresolved - incomplete. In this work there has been figured the ambiguity of the difficult relation between the exigency of critical thought to measure itself 'by the extremity that eludes the concept' (Adorno, 1973: 365) and the demand it has to understand and conceptualise experience - without which 'the world around us would be an infinite, undefined tangle that would defy our ability to orient ourselves and decide upon our actions' (Levi, 1989: 22).

However, concerning the profound simplification that is needed to stop the world becoming an infinite, undefined tangle, Levi argues that 'this desire for simplification is justified, but the same does not always apply to simplification itself' (Levi, 1989:23). For Levi such profound simplification is a working hypothesis and so it should not be mistaken for reality because 'the greater part of historical and natural phenomena is not simple, or not simple with the simplicity that we would like' (Levi, 1989:23). So at the very moment when Levi announces the primary importance of language and conceptuality in understanding and making sense of the world and events he simultaneously brings them into question.

Adorno, in 'Negative Dialectics', writes that critique must remain within the medium of the concept because 'no absolute can be expressed otherwise than in topics and categories of immanence' (Adorno, 1973:407). Adorno
gives substance to this claim by relating it to his notion of 'micrology', about which he comments that 'micrology is the place where metaphysics finds a haven from totality' (Adorno, 1973:407). This is not to affirm Adorno's notion of micrology but to show the difficult relation in his thought between the demand that thought must be 'measured by the extremity that eludes the concept' and the demand that thought must remain within the medium of concepts in the sense that 'no absolute can be expressed otherwise than in topics and categories of immanence'.

So, in this conclusion one last movement is displayed, one last aporia figured, but this is only ironically presented here as being the last, for in fact it functions to return us again to the beginning and the beginning of the work. Here, the 'last' aporia is the way in which Adorno stresses the importance of conceptuality at the very moment the conceptual as universal is radically called into question by the nonidentical as particular. Whereas Levi stresses the importance of forming a conceptual schema of the nonidentical only to simultaneously call into question the possibility of such schema because of the excessive nature of the nonidentical as particularity within history and natural phenomena. Levi thinks that the profound simplification that a schema requires can only be posited as a hypothesis, and a hypothesis is, of course, not the schema itself and poses the schema only as a question (a possibility that may not, in the end, be possible), so the possibility of language and conceptual thought is called into question at the very moment it is affirmed. Both thinkers show the irresolvable tension between the concept and the nonconceptual, their work entails the strain of configuring the limits of the
concept and it ends by reconfiguring the limit of conceptuality itself. Both these thinkers work begins and ends without their being positively secured in their own thought.

So, in concluding we are returned to the beginning, which means that this is neither a conclusion or a beginning, for we are returned to what was presented in the introduction to this work which is the development of a critical perspective that presupposes aporia and does not attempt to assimilate or exclude it, and this development is ongoing. Yet, as was stated in the introduction (from the beginning) this development does not move to dismantle the concept and the possibility of reconciliation, incompletion is more an attempt to found a concept that focuses upon the difficulty of founding the concept. In this difficulty this work has been developed by, and has also hopefully revealed, the difficulty of thinkers who continue with and renew the difficulty of critical thinking itself.

In this way this work stands in the middle of a vast process and a kind of 'tradition' that can be traced back to thinkers such as Hegel and Kierkegaard. In his 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript' Kierkegaard has written that 'the negative is present in existence and present everywhere (because being there, existence, is continually in the process of becoming), the only deliverance from it is to become continually aware of it. By being positively secured, the subject is indeed fooled' (Kierkegaard, 1968:81). This presence of absence can be utilised as a creative space for figuring the possible and the impossible or it can be resisted and attempts made to contain it in hypostatized concepts. Much of philosophy and the social sciences, in their
desire for certainty and resolution, form this project of containment and
closure, often without realising it. Instead incompleteness theorises negativity as
containing utopian value – opening to more expansive configurations of
selfhood, community and politics. Through absence the exhausting possibility
can be entertained of awakening to who we are in order to discover what we
have not become and what we could be - this possibility would be an
unfolding without an end-point.

Concerning Hegel, Bataille has written that he saw very well that 'knowledge
is never given to us except by unfolding in time', and also that 'It [knowledge]
is not given in a sudden illumination of the mind but in discourse, which is
necessarily deployed in duration' (Bataille, 1991:202). So, avoiding the end-
point of a 'sudden illumination', the conclusion here will end, using the words
of Jean-Luc Nancy, with the paradox of modern perfectibility: completion
without end, an infinite finishing - and this is neither a conclusion or a
beginning -

'history in a radical sense, that is, not progress but passage,
succession, appearance, disappearance, event. But each time it
offers perfection, completion...this completion without end - or rather,
this finite finishing, if one attempts to understand thereby a completion
that limits itself to what it is, but that, to achieve that very thing, opens
the possibility of another completion, and that is therefore also infinite
finishing - this paradoxical mode of perfection is doubtless what our
whole tradition demands one to think and avoids thinking at the same
time.' (Nancy, 1996:87)
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