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Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations : a natural experiment
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Pogrebna, Ganna and Blavatskyy, Pavlo (2009) Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations : a natural experiment. Working Paper. Zurich: University of Zurich. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics. Working Paper Series, Vol.403 .
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Abstract
This paper studies coordination in a multi-stage elimination tournament with large monetary incentives and a diversified subject pool drawn from the adult British population. In the
tournament, members of an ad hoc team earn money by answering general knowledge questions and then eliminate one contestant by plurality voting without prior communication.
We find that in the early rounds of the tournament, contestants use a focal principle and coordinate on one of the multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies by eliminating the weakest member of the team. However, in the later rounds, contestants switch to playing a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Television quiz shows -- Great Britain -- Economic aspects, Decision making, Games of strategy (Mathematics) | ||||
Series Name: | Working Paper Series | ||||
Publisher: | University of Zurich. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics | ||||
Place of Publication: | Zurich | ||||
ISBN: | 1424-0459 | ||||
Official Date: | February 2009 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.403 | ||||
Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) | ||||
Version or Related Resource: | Pogrebna, G. and Blavatskyy, P. R. (2009). Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment. Public Choice, 140(1-2), pp. 125-143. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9415-1 |
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