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Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations : a natural experiment

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Pogrebna, Ganna and Blavatskyy, Pavlo. (2009) Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations : a natural experiment. Public Choice, Vol.40 (No.1-2). pp. 125-143. ISSN 0048-5829

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Abstract

This paper studies coordination in a multi-stage elimination tournament with large monetary incentives and a diversified subject pool drawn from the adult British population. In the tournament, members of an ad hoc team earn money by answering general knowledge questions and then eliminate one contestant by plurality voting without prior communication. We find that in the early rounds of the tournament, contestants use a focal principle and coordinate on one of the multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies by eliminating the weakest member of the team. However, in the later rounds, contestants switch to playing a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Television quiz shows -- Great Britain -- Economic aspects, Decision making, Games of strategy (Mathematics)
Series Name: Working Paper Series
Journal or Publication Title: Public Choice
Publisher: Springer
Place of Publication: University of Zurich
ISBN: 1424-0459
ISSN: 0048-5829
Date: July 2009
Volume: Vol.40
Number: No.1-2
Page Range: pp. 125-143
Identification Number: 10.1007/s11127-009-9415-1
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/37598

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