Pogrebna, Ganna, Schade, Christian, Krantz, David H., 1938- and Keser, Claudia, 1961-. (2011) Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations. Theory and Decision, Vol.71 (No.4). pp. 473-502. ISSN 0040-5833

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Abstract

We use a sequential voluntary contribution game to compare the relative impact of firstmover’s non-binding announcement versus binding commitment on cooperation. We find that non-binding announcement and binding commitment increase individual contributions to a similar extent. Since announced contributions systematically exceed commitments, in sessions with non-binding announcement, second-movers tend to contribute more to the group activity than in sessions with binding commitment. Yet, second-movers appear to be more motivated towards achieving a social optimum when the first-mover uses commitment. We also find that non-binding announcement has a higher impact on individual propensity to cooperate than the ex post contribution of the first-mover. However, the failure to make announced contributions decreases cooperation even though the first-mover is reassigned in every period.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Cooperativeness
Journal or Publication Title:	Theory and Decision
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0040-5833
Date:	13 April 2011
Volume:	Vol.71
Number:	No.4
Number of Pages:	30
Page Range:	pp. 473-502
Identification Number:	10.1007/s11238-011-9248-5
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Funder:	Volkswagenstiftung (VWS)
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/37685

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