Bloch, Francis and Dutta, Bhaskar (2006) Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.763).

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Abstract

This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games
and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Game theory, Equilibrium (Economics)
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	21 June 2006
Dates:	Date Event 21 June 2006 Published
Number:	No.763
Number of Pages:	26
Institution:	University of Warwick
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC)
Grant number:	RES-000-22-0341 (ESRC)

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