Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
Bloch, Francis and Dutta, Bhaskar (2006) Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.763).
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This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games
and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Game theory, Equilibrium (Economics)|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||21 June 2006|
|Number of Pages:||26|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC)|
|Grant number:||RES-000-22-0341 (ESRC)|
Alesina, A. and Spolaore, E. (2003). The size of nations. Cambridge and London: MIT Press.
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