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Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations

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Bloch, Francis and Dutta, Bhaskar (2006) Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.763).

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Abstract

This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games
and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.

Item Type:

Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)

Subjects:

H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Game theory, Equilibrium (Economics)

Series Name:

Warwick economic research papers

Publisher:

University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Place of Publication:

Coventry

Official Date:

21 June 2006

Dates:

Date	Event
21 June 2006	Published

Number:

No.763

Number of Pages:

Status:

Not Peer Reviewed

Access rights to Published version:

Open Access

Funder:

Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC)

Grant number:

RES-000-22-0341 (ESRC)

References:

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URI:

http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/38

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