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Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
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Bloch, Francis and Dutta, Bhaskar (2006) Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.763).
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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/rehttp...
Abstract
This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games
and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Game theory, Equilibrium (Economics) | ||||
Series Name: | Warwick economic research papers | ||||
Publisher: | University of Warwick, Department of Economics | ||||
Place of Publication: | Coventry | ||||
Official Date: | 21 June 2006 | ||||
Dates: |
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Number: | No.763 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 26 | ||||
Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) | ||||
Funder: | Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC) | ||||
Grant number: | RES-000-22-0341 (ESRC) |
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