Sequential auctions with informational externalities and aversion to price risk : decreasing and increasing price sequences
Mezzetti, Claudio. (2011) Sequential auctions with informational externalities and aversion to price risk : decreasing and increasing price sequences. Economic Journal, Vol.121 (No.555). pp. 990-1016. ISSN 0013-0133
WRAP_Mezzetti_241011-riskav-dec10.pdf - Accepted Version - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02438.x
A large body of empirical research has shown that prices of identical goods sold sequentially sometimes increase and often decline across rounds. This article introduces a tractable form of risk aversion, called aversion to price risk, and shows that declining prices arise naturally when bidders are averse to price risk. When there are informational externalities, there is a countervailing effect which pushes prices to raise along the path of a sequential auction, even if bidder's signals are independent. The article shows how to decompose the effect of aversion to price risk from the effect of informational externalities.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Pricing, Auctions -- Economic aspects|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Economic Journal|
|Official Date:||September 2011|
|Page Range:||pp. 990-1016|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
 Ashenfelter, O. (1989). 'How auctions works for wine and art', Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.
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