Butterfill, Stephen A. (Stephen Andrew). (2011) Joint action and development. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.62 (No.246). pp. 23-47. ISSN 1467-9213

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Abstract

Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman’s, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of joint action, an account compatible with the premise about development. The new account is no replacement for the leading account; rather the accounts characterise two kinds of joint action. Where the kind of joint characterised by the leading account involves shared intentions, the new account characterises a kind of joint action involving shared goals.

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Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Action theory, Human behavior
Journal or Publication Title:	The Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
ISSN:	1467-9213
Date:	October 2011
Volume:	Vol.62
Number:	No.246
Page Range:	pp. 23-47
Identification Number:	10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00005.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/38298

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