Butterfill, Stephen A. (Stephen Andrew) (2011) Joint action and development. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.62 (No.246). pp. 23-47. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00005.x

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Abstract

Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining
how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action
be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman’s, says it is. For
on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions
and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of
minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to
joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different
kind of joint action, an account compatible with the premise about
development. The new account is no replacement for the leading
account; rather the accounts characterise two kinds of joint action.
Where the kind of joint characterised by the leading account
involves shared intentions, the new account characterises a kind of
joint action involving shared goals.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Action theory, Human behavior
Journal or Publication Title:	The Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
ISSN:	1467-9213
Official Date:	October 2011
Dates:	Date Event October 2011 Submitted
Volume:	Vol.62
Number:	No.246
Page Range:	pp. 23-47
DOI:	10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00005.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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