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Tullock challenges : happiness, revolutions, and democracy

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Frey, Bruno S.. (2011) Tullock challenges : happiness, revolutions, and democracy. Public Choice, Vol.148 (No.3-4). pp. 269-281. ISSN 0048-5829

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9821-z

Abstract

Gordon Tullock is one of the most important of the founders and contributors to Public Choice. Two innovations are typical "Tullock Challenges." The first relates to method: the measurement of subjective well-being, or happiness. The second relates to digital social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, and to some extent Google. Both innovations lead to strong incentives by governments to manipulate the policy outcomes. In general, "What is important will be manipulated by the government." To restrain government manipulation, one has to turn to Constitutional Economics and increase the possibilities for direct popular participation and federalism or introduce random mechanisms.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JC Political theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Social choice, Online social networks -- Government policy, Happiness -- Testing -- Government policy
Journal or Publication Title:	Public Choice
Publisher:	Springer New York LLC
ISSN:	0048-5829
Date:	22 July 2011
Volume:	Vol.148
Number:	No.3-4
Number of Pages:	13
Page Range:	pp. 269-281
Identification Number:	10.1007/s11127-011-9821-z
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Description:	Given as the first Tullock Lecture, European Public Choice Conference, Rennes, 28 April - 1 May 2011
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/38383