Impartial reasons, moral demands
McElwee, Brian. (2011) Impartial reasons, moral demands. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol.14 (No.4). pp. 457-466. ISSN 1386-2820Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9256-5
Consequentialism is often charged with demandingness objections which arise in response to the theory's commitment to impartiality. It might be thought that the only way that consequentialists can avoid such demandingness objections is by dropping their commitment to impartialism. However, I outline and defend a framework within which all reasons for action are impartially grounded, yet which can avoid demandingness objections. I defend this framework against what might appear to be a strong objection, namely the claim that anyone who accepts the theory will be practically irrational.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Consequentialism (Ethics), Utilitarianism, Irrationalism (Philosophy), Fairness, Ethics, Responsibility|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Ethical Theory and Moral Practice|
|Official Date:||August 2011|
|Page Range:||pp. 457-466|
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