Banerji, A. and Dutta, Bhaskar (2005) Local network externalities and market segmentation. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.725).

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Abstract

This paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction. It departs from the standard Katz-Shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents. It shows that even if rival firms engage in Bertrand competition, this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits. The analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation, while for others, there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Group decision making, Market segmentation, Competition
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	April 2005
Dates:	Date Event April 2005 Published
Number:	No.725
Number of Pages:	30
Institution:	University of Warwick
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access

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