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Local network externalities and market segmentation

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Banerji, A. and Dutta, Bhaskar (2005) Local network externalities and market segmentation. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.725).

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Abstract

This paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction. It departs from the standard Katz-Shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents. It shows that even if rival firms engage in Bertrand competition, this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits. The analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation, while for others, there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium.

Item Type:

Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)

Subjects:

H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

Group decision making, Market segmentation, Competition

Series Name:

Warwick economic research papers

Publisher:

University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Place of Publication:

Coventry

Official Date:

April 2005

Dates:

Date	Event
April 2005	Published

Number:

No.725

Number of Pages:

Status:

Not Peer Reviewed

Access rights to Published version:

Open Access

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