Knowing what you believe
Cassam, Quassim. (2011) Knowing what you believe. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.111 (No.1 (pt.1)). pp. 1-23. ISSN 0066-7374Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00296.x
A familiar claim is that knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs and other attitudes is normally immediate, that is, not normally based on observation, inference or evidence. One explanation of the possibility of immediate self-knowledge turns on the transparency of the question ‘Do I believe that P?’ to the question ‘Is it the case that P?’ This paper explains why occurrent mental states such as passing thoughts do not fall within the purview of the transparency account and proposes a different account of how we know our own passing thoughts. It is also argued that the transparency account fails to explain how knowledge of our own beliefs can be psychologically or epistemically immediate. Finally, questions are raised about the presumption that knowledge of our own beliefs is epistemically immediate.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Self-knowledge, Theory of, Knowledge, Theory of, Belief and doubt|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society|
|Page Range:||pp. 1-23|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Description:||I - The Presidential Address|
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