Cassam, Quassim. (2011) Knowing what you believe. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.111 (No.1 (pt.1)). pp. 1-23. ISSN 0066-7374

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

A familiar claim is that knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs and other attitudes is normally immediate, that is, not normally based on observation, inference or evidence. One explanation of the possibility of immediate self-knowledge turns on the transparency of the question ‘Do I believe that P?’ to the question ‘Is it the case that P?’ This paper explains why occurrent mental states such as passing thoughts do not fall within the purview of the transparency account and proposes a different account of how we know our own passing thoughts. It is also argued that the transparency account fails to explain how knowledge of our own beliefs can be psychologically or epistemically immediate. Finally, questions are raised about the presumption that knowledge of our own beliefs is epistemically immediate.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Self-knowledge, Theory of, Knowledge, Theory of, Belief and doubt
Journal or Publication Title:	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Publisher:	Aristotelian Society
ISSN:	0066-7374
Date:	2011
Volume:	Vol.111
Number:	No.1 (pt.1)
Page Range:	pp. 1-23
Identification Number:	10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00296.x
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Description:	I - The Presidential Address
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/39041

Request changes to a record

Actions (login required)

View Item