Chen, Bo and Gürel, Sinan (2012) Efficiency analysis of load balancing games with and without activation costs. Journal of Scheduling, Vol.15 (No.2). pp. 157-164. doi:10.1007/s10951-011-0247-8

Preview

Text WRAP_Chen_9471193-wbs-111111-preprint_josh_paper.pdf - Accepted Version Download (331Kb)

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

In this paper, we study two models of resource allocation games: the classical load-balancing game and its new variant involving resource activation costs. The resources we consider are identical and the social costs of the games are utilitarian, which are the average of all individual players' costs.
Using the social costs we assess the quality of pure Nash equilibria in terms of the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS). For each game problem, we identify suitable problem parameters and provide a parametric bound on the PoA and the PoS. In the case of the load-balancing game, the parametric bounds we provide are sharp and asymptotically tight.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Resource allocation -- Mathematical models, Game theory
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Scheduling
Publisher:	Springer New York LLC
ISSN:	1094-6136
Official Date:	November 2012
Dates:	Date Event November 2012 Published
Date of first compliant deposit:	18 December 2015
Volume:	Vol.15
Number:	No.2
Page Range:	pp. 157-164
DOI:	10.1007/s10951-011-0247-8
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item

Downloads