Frey, Bruno S.. (2010) Federalism as an effective antidote to terrorism. Review of Law & Economics, Vol.6 (No.3). pp. 161-174. ISSN 1555-5879

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Abstract

Many governments as well as terrorist experts see the use of military and police forces as the only way to effectively counter terrorism. The most effective negative sanctions are considered to be military strikes, aggressive actions (including kidnapping and killing) against individuals known or suspected of being terrorists, or against persons supporting and harboring terrorists. Overt and covert military and paramilitary action is also thought advisable to pre-empt and prevent actions by terrorist groups, as well as against states suspected of hosting or tolerating terrorists. This paper argues that decentralization constitutes a powerful antidote as it strongly reduces the incentives for terrorists to attack and because the expected damage suffered is much smaller than in a centralized society. It moreover strengthens society, as economic, political and social decentralization (or polycentricity) is an essential element of a free and vigorous society. This in turn makes a society less vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Indeed, terrorism has no chance of success against a society that actively guards its fundamental liberal institutions, of which decentralized decision-making forms an essential part.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare J Political Science > JC Political theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Terrorism -- Prevention, Federal government, Decentralization in government
Journal or Publication Title:	Review of Law & Economics
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press
ISSN:	1555-5879
Date:	December 2010
Volume:	Vol.6
Number:	No.3
Number of Pages:	14
Page Range:	pp. 161-174
Identification Number:	10.2202/1555-5879.1541
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/3970

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