The “is-ought fallacy” fallacy
Oaksford, M. (Mike) and Chater, Nick (2011) The “is-ought fallacy” fallacy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol.34 (No.5). pp. 262-263. ISSN 0140-525XFull text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11000665
Mere facts about how the world is cannot determine how we ought to think or behave. Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that this "is-ought fallacy" undercuts the use of rational analysis in explaining how people reason, by ourselves and with others. But this presumed application of the "is-ought" fallacy is itself fallacious. Rational analysis seeks to explain how people do reason, for example in laboratory experiments, not how they ought to reason. Thus, no ought is derived from an is; and rational analysis is unchallenged by E&E's arguments.
|Item Type:||Journal Item|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Human behavior, Reason, Reasoning|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Behavioral and Brain Sciences|
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Official Date:||October 2011|
|Page Range:||pp. 262-263|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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