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Pleasure, Change and Values in Doctoral Pedagogy

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Abstract

This article explores pleasure in terms of the values of independent judgement, writerly authority, originality and singularity associated with doctoral study. It also considers how pleasure can be understood as a mode of experience that acts as a force for change. Here, the article takes a broad Deleuzian approach that is concerned with our capacities to affect and be affected. The data presented illustrates the complexity of pleasure in academic work as it is experienced, as giving rise to guilt, anxiety and a felt lack of deservingness. It also illustrates moments of intellectual *jouissance* and the importance of imagined pleasures as a very necessary force of change. In the conclusion, I return to the conceptualization of pleasure at the heart of this article to provide a critical account of the potential of understanding pleasure in terms of change and values.
Introduction

This article explores pleasure in terms of values in the doctoral process. It also considers how pleasure can be understood as a mode of experience that acts as a force for change. The article seeks to achieve these aims through an analysis of the processes of learning to become an academic. The pedagogical stage that is the specific focus of this article is the period of apprenticeship of undertaking a doctorate. It perhaps goes without saying that much formative learning takes place during this time and, as many accounts testify, this period of an academic career can be experienced in strongly negative ways in terms of loneliness, isolation and anxiety about direction and completion. It is certainly the case that the data presented here reflects much in the way of these kinds of experience. However, pleasure, as with emotions which are more generally held to be positive, tends to be neglected in critical accounts of the doctoral process. This is because, in many frames of analysis, pleasure is strongly theorized as linked to stasis or equilibrium, and as a consequence conceived as returning the subject to a balanced state or leaving the subject unchanged.

In contrast, pedagogical aims, even at the level of an everyday pedagogy (Luke and Gore, 1992), are overwhelmingly concerned with development and progress. Here, desire or motivation is taken as the concept of choice because it is so strongly viewed as a force for transformation. Where pleasure is included in these accounts, there is a tendency to place it in a subordinate position. Thus, it becomes an adjunct to change rather than being a force for change in itself. Through the terminology of plaisir and jouissance, Barthes (1975) draws attention to this by distinguishing between different kinds of pleasure and their role in
change. *Plaisir* is the easy going enjoyment that one experiences when encountering texts that confirm, and hence leave unchanged, one’s own perspectives. *Jouissance* is the more intense pleasure-bliss that occurs when the text opens up hitherto unknown vistas, and as a consequence leaves the subject altered.

The data presented in this article is part of a broader study of pleasure I have been undertaking that has included questionnaire and interview data (for a fuller account see: Hughes, 2007; Hughes, Perrier and Kramer, 2009). In this article I specifically focus on the case of Sian, a doctoral student in her third year of full-time study. Sian is of working-class origin and someone who, by dint of education and working experience, has already experienced significant class travel (see Hughes, 2004; Baxter and Hughes, 2004). This means that, although Sian still connects strongly with her working-class roots, her first degree and paid working experiences of political lobbying have produced multifaceted class identifications. Lucey, Melody and Walkerdine (2003) describe this complexity in terms of hybridity and they note how moving into intellectual domains represents an enormous shift for those working-class young women who do well at school. In selecting one case, I make no claims for representativeness. Rather, I draw on Sian’s account because it exemplifies how pleasure is a force in the processes of identificatory change that comprise this enormous shift.

This article begins with a review of desire and pleasure in pedagogical accounts. I explore the alternative preferences of Deleuze and Foucault in terms of their use of these terms. This is because, despite their different positions, they highlight how change and stasis are so associated with notions of desire and pleasure respectively. In considering pleasure as a
force that contributes to changing class identifications, I argue that this is a machinic rather than a linear or an absolute process. Accordingly, we need to understand change in terms of a multiplicity of forces in motion rather than as a fixed movement from one condition to another. In this way, Sian is conceived in this article as an assemblage ‘where power relations and forces of [pleasure] are constantly at play in creating conditions of possibility for women to resist, imagine themselves becoming other and for new possibilities in their lives to be actualized’ (Tamboukou, 2009: 4).

Deleuze’s concept of line of flight to explore the ‘connection between a has-been and the becoming’ (Maccormack, 2008) is helpful here. Within lines of flight, the stabilizing forces of territorialization maintain internal homogeneity, whilst forces of deterritorialization have destabilizing effects. Tamboukou (2009) notes that both processes can be at work at the same time, and this points to a certain fragility in the unpicking, undoing and remaking that is change. Deleuze and Guattari (2004) also offer us the concept of reterritorialization. This is where lines of flight are overcoded by a new power. Suggesting something of resistance, Renold and Ringrose (2008: 319) note, however, that ‘“Lines of flight” are not so quickly reterritorialized’.

These analytic concepts are drawn upon to explore Sian’s account of her relationship with pleasure in terms of identifying the values that are, more commonly, reified in the passion for despair that dominates our understanding of being a doctoral student. In saying this, it may be surprising that the first part of the data presented in this article begins with strong accounts of despondency and anguish. However, the key point here is to note how Sian seeks a line of flight away from such negativity, as she strives to overcome her classed sense
of a lack of entitlement to being in the academy. It is perhaps salutary that she appears to fail to do this and, in consequence, this tells us much about the embeddedness of territorialized subjectivities.

I then explore some heady pleasures that arise from being engaged in academic work. In the data presented, these pleasures are realized through moments of *jouissance* where there is considerable pleasure in the practice of intellectual skills and insights. What is significant is that this occurs outside the academy during what may appear simply as leisure time. Nonetheless, it is important to note that it is when watching reality television programmes, rather than in supervisions or presentations, that Sian is able to bring together, most fully, aspects of the self she was and the academic self she seeks to become. What we see here is how processes of overcoding come to have meaning, but do not shift but rather meet with resistance embedded through earlier pleasures.

In a switch from present to future, I then explore pleasure as a necessary resource for change that draws its strength from an imaginary of post-doctoral life. I link this imaginary to the criterion of originality in the PhD. I am not concerned with originality in terms of thesis findings. Rather, I explore how the requirement of originality is a form of recognition of the subject as an intellectual. Whilst Sian views this in terms of a destination at the end of a line of flight away from particular kinds of classed diminution experienced in the academy, in the conclusion I draw a caution to this kind of interpretation. Here, I return to the conceptualization of change and pleasure at the heart of the article to provide a critical account of the potential of understanding pleasure in this way.
In pedagogical discussions, pleasure appears to be the poor relation of desire (however, see Clayton et al, 2009; Quinn, 2008; Swan, 2005; McWilliam, 1999). With desire’s emphasis on lack or need, this may be because desire is strongly aligned to ideas of motivation. A focus on desire directs the teacher to be concerned with meeting the needs and wants of the learner (Watkins, 2008). Indeed, the preference for focusing on desire over pleasure is predicated on this potentiality for change. In consequence, teachers are taught that understanding student desire/motivation is essential to good pedagogical approaches.

This is not to say, of course, that pleasure is never considered as part of the panoply of affects that are necessary to motivation. However, the division between liking (ie the affect of pleasure) and wanting (ie motivational desire) is strongly encoded in our approaches to these concepts. This means that when pleasure is discussed it is predominantly understood as an emotional moment that occurs when desire is met. It is an after effect, a consequence, or indeed a prize of change rather than a force of change itself.

For example, Watkins (2008: 115) notes how pleasure follows the fulfillment of desire when a student achieves a learning objective, as there is ‘the resultant pleasure that ensues for both teacher and student’. Student displeasure, the seeming converse of pleasure, is also understood in terms of change, although this is in respect of the failure of the teacher to effect change or, perhaps, student resistance to change. Displeasure in terms of student critique, poor evaluation of courses and struggling to understand is not understood as something to be embraced, but to be avoided. Each manifestation suggests some kind of pedagogical breakdown.
In terms of broader theory, pleasure is also associated with stasis and equilibrium. For example, in Freud’s discussion of the pleasure/pain principle, pleasure is conceived in terms of a balanced psychological state. Thus, Freud conceptualizes pleasure as a state of oscillation rather than transformation (MacCormack, 2008). Foucault’s (1985) account of bio-power and the development of the ethical subject also indicates how pleasure can be construed in the quantitative terms of balance (Hughes, 2007). Foucault demonstrates how the pursuit of an admirable life was founded in the balance between self-discipline and regulation and permissive or excessive conduct. Too much, one way or the other is problematic.

Foucault’s take up of the term pleasure is not evident in the work of Deleuze who draws on desire as the preferred concept. Indeed, Foucault and Deleuze were each seemingly implacably opposed to the use of the other term as this anecdote by Deleuze makes clear:

*The last time we saw each other, Michel told me, with much kindness and affection, something like, I cannot bear the word desire; even if you use it differently, I cannot keep myself from thinking or living that desire = lack, or that desire is repressed, Michel added, whereas myself, what I call pleasure is perhaps what you call desire; but in any case I need another word than desire. Obviously ...this is more than a question of words. Because for my part I can scarcely tolerate the word pleasure.*

*(Deleuze, 1997: 189)*

Foucault’s preference for ‘pleasure’ was because of a concern about the psychoanalytic understandings of ‘desire’ that always suggested lack, and because it foregrounded a meaning of power in negative, repressive rather than productive terms. Indeed, Foucault
illustrates how pleasure can be a form of resistance through which change occurs. For example, McWhorter (1999: 176) comments that for Foucault pleasure is ‘not just a state of the body and/or mind that occurs following some particular accomplishment or stimulus. Pleasure is not just an outcome. Pleasure, like power, is creative’. Grosz (2005: 191) also notes that ‘if pleasure can function in the service of power, as a means and end of power’s operations, so too pleasure is that wedge which serves and consolidates resistance’ (see also Sawicki, 2004).

In contrast, Deleuze rejects the term ‘pleasure’ because he views it as something that interrupts desire. Yet, as the quotation indicates, Foucault’s and Deleuze’s concerns about terminology draw upon particular histories and genealogies. MacCormack (2008) indicates that Foucault’s disdain of the term ‘desire’ lies in its particular Lacanian and psychoanalytic meanings which do present lack as the primary motivator of desire. In contrast, Grosz (2005: 192) notes ‘Deleuze argues that because desire (in his works) is not a psychological concept at all, and because desire cannot be represented by the (Hegelian/psychoanalytic) model of lack – for desire is always and only productive – desire produces and makes the real by establishing connections or generating disjunctions; it is pleasure that must be understood to interrupt and transform desire’ (see also Zembylas, 2007). Desire, for Deleuze, is ‘process as opposed to structure or genesis; it is affect as opposed to sentiment; it is “haecceity” (the individuality of a day, a season, a life) as opposed to subjectivity’ (Deleuze, 1997: 189). Yet, MacCormack (2008) notes how Deleuze’s concept of pleasure draws on the idea of mandatory satisfaction, which accrues to more traditional meanings where pleasure is directed for or toward rather than against something.
Drawing upon these features, MacCormack (2008) challenges Deleuze’s view of pleasure as a reterritorializing threat and argues, in contrast, that it is deterritorializing. She argues that pleasure can be a force of destabilization as she notes ‘like Deleuze’s incarnation of desire, [pleasure] exceeds linguistics, it has no particular beginning or end, and it continually transforms the subject’. Such processes may be quite profound, as in the case of moments of jouissance. They may be more imperceptible in terms of ‘the small and often passed over spaces where regulation and resistance might meet’ (Renold and Ringrose, 2008: 320).

Deleuze views the subject as in constant flux and, through his debt to Spinoza’s thought, ‘in constant interchange with its environment’ (Gatens, 2000: 60; see also Deleuze and Deleuze, 1978). Of relevance to this article is the view that ‘Bodies of all sorts are in constant relation with other bodies. Some of these relations are compatible and give rise to joyful affects that may in turn increase the intensive capacity of a body; others are incompatible relations that give rise to sad or debilitating affects, which at their worst may entirely destroy a body’s integrity’ (Gatens, 2000: 65). As this article demonstrates, the power to affect is not solely vested in human encounters but is also invested in the text that awaits writing. I turn to this issue now.

The Undeservingness of Pleasure

One of the notable aspects of researching pleasure in learning is that there appears to be very little talk about it (see however developments from the work of Deci and Ryan, 1985). This is not only the case in the broad literature on teaching, learning and pedagogies. It is also the case in respect of how often pleasure is referred to in interviews compared with
how often various displeasures are referred to. For example, in responding to one of the questions in a questionnaire sent to doctoral students for this study, Sian wrote:

\[ Q: \text{In a continuum of pain-pleasure, how would you describe your reading and writing experiences?} \]

\[ R: \text{Pain, pain, pain, pleasure, pain.} \]

Whilst the pain of study is not confined to one particular aspect of the PhD, as Sian’s questionnaire indicated, writing is a specific area of concern:

\[ \text{I HATE WRITING!! I don’t hate writing. I hate getting started. This is a tortuous process which confounds me. I think that if I could just get over my inability to get started I would be an amazing academic with loads to offer but I waste time. I get crazy stressed just the same as when I have to read something. I think “why am I putting myself through this?”} \]

There is no doubt that writing 80,000 words of succinct, theoretically critical, grammatically correct and thoughtful prose is a daunting prospect and writing, generally, is an area where research students (and many others!) experience the most struggle. In the social sciences it is also, by and large, a solitary activity and so accords with the dominant idea of isolation associated with undertaking doctoral research (Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 2000). In addition, the requirement to be an authority renders its own insecurities. Indeed, the depth of feeling provoked by the need to write, and the power of the demand to be a writer, illustrates how the body of the waiting-to-be-written text exercises its power to provoke sadness. Taguchi (2007) uses the term embodied violence to refer to the intense feelings of
frustration and provocation, and the displeasures that students experience as they struggle to understand certain issues and perspectives. This is because students often feel that they are being beaten, and even beaten up, by the subject matter, and indeed the very texts, with which they engage:

Such uncertainty was even felt in terms of embodied violence, as if being shoved around in the text, hitting what seemed to be the ‘wrong’ ways of understanding, even causing ‘broken bones’. (Taguchi, 2007: 8)

In a powerful mirroring of the textual and biological body, Sian illustrates how such experiences produce negative body images that reinforce writing as the Other who proves one’s unworthiness for academic work:

I know all the techniques for getting started and I still go through this process every time I have to write something of significance. HOW WILL I EVER WRITE MY THESIS [her emphasis]. It is also hell for everyone around me, I become moody, tearful, snappy, I feel fat, ugly, bloated and totally useless, I look for any other reason other than the fact that I just need to get going to understand and legitimate and relieve my mood. Nothing but getting started works… it’s miserable.

However, these experiences do not negate the expectation that the horror of writing might be overcome at some point and that, in consequence, the relationship between text and self that produces negative and delimiting affects will alter. During an interview, Sian further commented:
I never get in love with it [writing PhD]…. I’ll be gutted if I don’t fall in love with my work at some stage.

Certainly there is something of the value in being an engaged intellectual who brings passion and endeavour to her research in Sian’s remarks about hoping to love her research. Sian’s remarks also point to the value of pleasure itself. Such moments of pleasure are not ones of narcissism, but certainly occur when one experiences technical and aesthetic competence. And yet it is more than this. It is pleasure in change when the text most completely represents the complexities, nuances and thoughtfulness of an imminent intellect:

It mostly happens when I write. It feels like a creeping realization of Oh My God… this is a good one, brilliant, gosh aren’t I clever. Though it’s not that. It’s actually changing. It’s more like I have hit the nail on the head or I am actually using words that accurately reflect what I am thinking and feeling about something. It’s very hard to describe it to you.

Nonetheless, such moments appear to be insufficient to prevent a return to the subject position of incapable writer. Sian describes a more common experience of the ‘fog cloud’ that unravels any hard won sense of the possibilities of becoming an academic:

Before the dissertation [MA dissertation prior to PhD study], where I could think wow I could be an academic, I had the audacity to dare that I could be like them. God I could be someone like. And then I slam it down especially when the fog comes back
and I see I have written one paragraph and I think how dare you have the audacity to think like that, and I slam it down and probably I’ll have another bad writing day.

When asked why the positive emotions associated with pleasure are so elusive in studying for her PhD, Sian responded in terms that it was an unsafe feeling as it presaged a downfall. As her comments indicate, to believe she could have the pleasure she associates with having a PhD, and the career that may go with it, is impudent, an effrontery to (more respected and entitled) others and even reckless daring. These feelings are not ascribed to direct put downs, though we know from the work of others how pervasive are the derisory discourses of class and gender (Lawler, 1999). When pleasure happens or there is a possibility of gratification in outcome, Sian responds by telling herself:

...shame on you for believing it could happen, shame on you to have the audacity to think you could do this; stupid you for thinking that was going to work out, shame on you to have the audacity to think this could happen for you. Silly you for having a smile on your face. I don’t fantasise very much about what I could be academically. Because the disappointment is so enormous ... Could I be an academic in America? Could I could I write even an article? Could I write my PhD? Squash it squash it...SQUASH IT.

There is more to this feeling of the tortures of writing than simply a skill deficit in terms of an inability to put words on article. In one respect, we can view Sian’s responses as evidencing a deeply held sense of a lack of entitlement, which is a consequence of the exercise of class and gender-based power in the academy. Here, Rose’s (2001: 20) history of
the intellectual life of the British working-classes is relevant, as he demonstrates how
‘Educated people commonly (though by no means universally) found something profoundly
menacing in the efforts of working people to educate themselves and write for themselves’. Similarly, Ahmed (2008) illustrates how ‘certain bodies [are] seen as the origin of bad feeling, as getting in the way of public happiness’. Experiencing being the ‘wrong body’ produces a range of affects, some perhaps subtle and fleeting, such as simply feeling somehow that you don’t fit in towards more intense senses of being the object of revulsion. Such is the strength of this sense of lack of entitlement that, even when Sian experiences some success in getting published, the pleasure associated with this achievement is downgraded by drawing on the myriad of ways that it was never really all her own work. And so, when asked how she felt when her work was published she said:

It felt terrible … Well as always I can’t lay claim to it as all my own work because [supervisor] was really helpful in the editing process and as my mum said trying to be nice “You’re lucky she didn’t ask to be first or second author” … I’ve always been incredibly lucky because [another academic] was incredibly generous … but the help I’ve always had takes away, doesn’t feel legitimate… the help I’ve had takes away the authorship.

Yet, Sian should not be understood solely in terms of negative self-evaluation and as falling into the abyss of a lack of entitlement. Indeed, she reflects, correctly, that “The self esteem you shouldn’t be here – you know that isn’t true. If it were totally overriding I would have given up wouldn’t I?” In this case, Sian resists giving in (or giving up) to the negative feelings that writing produces. Perhaps for necessary reinforcement of the more positive messages
that publishing accords to one’s work, Sian sends her article, as a literal flight line, to an academic whom she admires very much. She receives a very positive response and yet keeps this to herself (though shared with her partner), perhaps because she did have the audacity to approach a senior member of the academy and perhaps because to show such pride would result in another kind of fall:

\[I \text{ couldn’t believe I’d put myself out there to be judged. I felt so exposed. I knew that was crap and shouldn’t listen to it. So I sent it [the published article] to [admired academic]... she said ... I love it love it love it. It certainly contributes and great for our teaching. I don’t think I sent it [the email response from respected academic] to anyone ... I whispered it to [partner]. Did you print that email? No but I’ve kept it. I was so embarrassed I didn’t even thank her for her kind words.}\]

**Jouissance: The Orgasmic Pleasure of Being Intellectual**

Barthes’ concept of *jouissance* points to pleasure as orgasmic bliss. It is something that cannot be prepared for and so cannot be readily converted to the arsenal of formulaic pedagogical interventions that are the realm of much quality assurance. As Aristarkhova (2007) comments, ‘To assume that all our pleasures are pre-constructed is to miss the point of “productive power” and that resistance “comes first”’. Rather, *jouissance* occurs spontaneously and without warning. It is a moment of physical engulfment ‘when my body pursues its own ideas – for my body does not have the same ideas I do’ (Barthes, 1975: 17). In contrast to *plaisir*, which Barthes describes as easy going enjoyment of texts that confirm rather than challenge one’s own views or experiences, *jouissance* produces a sense of bliss/joy when texts becoming openings for hitherto unrealised vistas and creativities.
Jouissance is a significant moment of change in an intellectual trajectory, as it is so strongly linked to moments of epiphany (Lambert and Parker, 2006; Phipps et al, 2005). Jouissance is, therefore, relatively rare when considered against the backdrop of the thousands of hours of study students and academics engage in, and yet it is a vital moment of proof that becoming an academic is possible. Jouissance has the capacity for transgressive potential, and the intensity of such experiences may well contribute to why we remain bound to the perverse pleasures (Hey, 2004) of academic work. Perhaps it does have a drug-like dopamine effect, in that having tasted its heady pleasures we continue to seek moments of jouissance:

99% of the time you don’t get the pleasure but when you do you think, I could do this forever, why isn’t it like this all the time, it is so good, really like a childish cycle of rediscovery and joy.

During the interview, Sian was asked if there was any kind of pleasure or any place that she experienced pleasure without guilt, or without feeling she does not deserve pleasurable experiences. It is noteworthy that the only type of enjoyment that she could name was watching reality television. Yet this form of cultural production is notoriously understood to be low class and therefore sits at odds with a trajectory of escape from a sense of diminishment she experiences in academic study. In their audience research on reality television viewing, Skeggs, Thumim and Wood (2008) note how middle-class participants expected the researchers to share their views about television generally being ‘a bad object’ (p 9) and reality television specifically as an object of derision. They note that ‘No other group felt they had to display such a critical stance or self-justification for their television
viewing ... [T]hey needed to show not only cultural detachment, but also cultural superiority to the bad object’ (p 11). Skeggs, Thumim and Wood note that this is not to say that such participants did not watch, or express pleasure in watching, either television or reality television. They did. But their interviews demonstrated forms of distancing, through for example irony and critique of such cultural forms, in ways that enabled them to hold on to their value positions.

Such detachment was not evident in working-class respondents, whose viewing evidenced how emotions were brought to the fore and how they got ‘carried away’ when watching. They ‘gasped, laughed, tutted, sighed, ‘ooh’ed and/or ‘aah’ed’ (p 17). This form of engaged viewing produced alternative expressions of moral authority as they made judgements that were more closely bound with their own lives. In contrast, middle-class viewers ‘were less closely involved with some of the details occurring in the lives of “reality” television participants, showing less empathy with the protagonists and being less likely to immanently locate themselves within the drama’ (p15).

Sian provides a description of her viewing style as distinctly engaged and emotional. She also indicates how it produces exceptional pleasure:

If I’m on a good day the pleasure is ... on the whole is really good fun, tv watching ... I love telly ...I watch loads of telly I get loads of pleasure from that, and I don’t feel guilty it and my argument with [partner] mostly centre on his rubbingish or people in general rubbingish my tv watching and I say bugger off I do love it but it means I
stay up late and feel tired ... I enjoy deconstructing it. I’m not a passive watcher. I love it. They [friends] see my responses to it as evidence that I’m not enjoying it [get cross and involved] ... do you not think I’m enjoying it?

Pleasure can of course be deemed a more base emotion than that of pure reason (MacCormack, 2008) and this highlights the classed schism between appropriate and inappropriate cultural pleasures, as Sian’s partner and friends ‘rubbish’ her taste. Sian is not performing according to appropriate middle-class convention either by what she watches or how. Nonetheless, Sian’s account of her enjoyment of reality television is not quite in the way of the working-class participants described by Skeggs, Thumim and Wood, who directly relate the programme content to their own lives. In this sense, it is the easy going enjoyment of plaisir (Barthes, 1975) that such viewers experience as they identify with and submit to the programme’s ‘socially accepted (dominant) meanings’ (Ott, 2004: 196). Plaisir is, as Ott notes, ‘a conservative pleasure not because it always (re)produces a conservative ideology, but because it is comfortable and comforting’ (p 198).

By contrast, Sian’s engagement is closer to a middle-classed reflexive awareness of this cultural form, as her television watching is performed as a critique through which skills and knowledge acquired in academic study can be practiced and enjoyed. She notes how she can get angry whilst watching such programmes, and how they produce a deep sense of involvement. She also says she has no guilt in watching television. This is because her distance from working-class lifestyles and life chances enables her to bring gendered and classed anger and analysis, by ‘deconstructing’ such programmes whilst simultaneously recognizing the classed devaluing that her partner and friends attempt to subject her to.
Unlike the respondents in Reay’s (1997) study of class mobility, in these moments Sian does not feel disconnected from her originary class or the class she is moving toward. Rather, the practice of jouissance that Sian experiences enables a fusion between them.

**Call No Student Happy until She Has Achieved Singularity**

Colebrook (2007: 84) notes that ‘Human happiness, in contrast to mere animal pleasure, has - from Greek ethics onward - always referred to life as a whole. Such a life is a narrative life, where the end drives and orders each element, and where the time of the self is not a mere series of pleasures: not a time of mere ’nows' with no relation to each other or a grander whole. Narrative time is a time aware of itself, a time bounded by death, by the sense of an end or the limit of the self’. As Colebrook notes ‘Call no man happy until he is dead’ (ibid).

The narrative of an end point, in which previous experiences come to be re-evaluated as more positive and worthwhile, indicates the significance of an imagined end of an identity. In such imaginings, the devaluing of one identity and the valuing of another gives rise to anticipated pleasures. In so doing, future pleasure seduces through a glimpse of possible becomings. It is, if you like, part of what keeps one going. As Colebrook (2007: 84) notes, ‘It is the self I would become that allows the present to be more than itself. The present is rendered meaningful or happy only by the promise of the future, a future which can be anticipated only as the end of the self (where 'end' refers both to the ideal self and the termination of the self).’ I explore this here through the notion of originality so central to PhD study.
As we know, the concept of originality is exceptionally nebulous and yet it is the key value ascribed to the PhD. A PhD student is required to have some mark of singularity, something that sets them apart in order to demonstrate how they have broken away from the mass of received knowledge. PhD students need, ultimately, to exhibit their intellectual independence. Rose (2001: 13) suggests that there is nothing specifically bourgeois in the pursuit of intellectual independence, and indeed ‘if anything, it may have been strongest in people who have spent their lives following orders and wanted to change that’. Rose charts the ways in which working-class people pursued their reading of literary canons through a form of self-directed learning at an individual level and also, more collectively, how, for example, religious understandings were challenged through various church groups. Rose states how the mission statement of such autodidacts can be understood ‘to be more than passive consumers of literature, to be active thinkers and writers’ (p 57). In its concern to challenge received canons of knowledge intellectual independence is also a key site of, and for, class and feminist struggle.

In her pursuit of intellectual independence, Sian views her research as a biographical project, an intellectual project and a political project. In this respect, she hopes that her research will make a contribution, in a broader political and intellectual sense, to feminist and class change. Intellectual independence, nonetheless, is not solely about potential impacts in this more public citizenship sense. It is also about changes at deeper personal levels of identity and selfhood. Sian’s education and experience have rendered her class identifications complex and contradictory, and one would add highly reflexive. One of the key aims of her continuing education as a research student is to strive for a form of identity
that remains authentic in the sense of not being other than that which she was, but is other in terms of whom she might become. Intellectual independence, then, means being:

*At one with what you are doing, totally, it is like you are vindicated, all the doubts, and the rejected doubt as well, gone.*

In this regard recognition is a necessary condition of intellectual independence. Having the title ‘Dr’, for example, evidences such recognition in the broadest sense and permits the recipient to practice their craft in relatively independent ways. But there is something more than simply being recognized as worthy of the title ‘Dr’ in the interpellation of originality that is central to a PhD. There is also the potential pleasure of singularity, of being unique and individual and, indeed, special. Singularity does more than vindicate doubt, though not I would argue completely extinguish it. It can mark one – or one’s work - out as superior.

When discussing with Sian whether she indulged in any private fantasies or dreams about the future after the PhD, she commented that she sometimes imagines receiving the academic equivalent of an Oscar for her work. This imaginative line of flight pushes her to the person she might become as a respected and fully fledged academic. As such, this is not an issue of self-aggrandizement, but rather a very necessary resource of hope and possibility.

Sian’s description of receiving an ‘Oscar’ adds a further important element of sociality to our understanding of how pleasure works as a force for change. Gatens (2000: 67) notes how sociality is a significant aspect of Spinoza’s thought and through which ‘each individual seeks out that which it imagines or thinks will increase its power of preserving itself. From this
simple maxim, it follows that an attempt to organize one’s encounters in order to minimize bad and maximize good affects leads human beings to sociability. He [Spinoza] argues that, of all the bodies we are most likely to encounter, it is those bodies which are like our own that will be most useful to us, most composable with our own, and most enhancing in our endeavour to maximize good affects’. Receiving an Oscar is a public event, unlike the relatively unusual privatized experience of a UK PhD viva. It is public recognition on the grandest scale. Sian’s description of her dream is one where she is surrounded by bodies like her and where feminist concerns about connection are such that the Oscar is not just about recognition of self. It is also recognition of the, often invisible, labour and support of others. Thus the public recognition of an Oscar is an extended and pleasurable sociality to peers, family and colleagues:

*Sometimes the acknowledgement pages make me cry especially the feminist ones that esteem their feminist colleagues. That side of it is like fantasizing about winning an Oscar … these are my best mates and they have nourished me and this is why they are so great and this is what an Oscar speech is like … I couldn’t do it without all these people.*

Just as Sian can allow herself the pleasure of an idealised fantasy, we can imagine how this forms part of a resource that can be called upon when continuing with a PhD becomes difficult in the face of the various material and emotional pressures that students experience and the learnt gendered and classed insecurities of those experiencing class travel. We can also imagine how this pleasure is a *necessary* resource to enable Sian to live
with the difficulties of the now in order that life as a PhD student might become a grander whole in which the life lived and the sacrifices given, are deemed worthwhile.

Conclusion

One of the purposes of this article has been to explore pleasure through values within the doctoral process. I have noted how displeasure appears to be the significant mode of understanding doctoral experiences. Without in any sense downplaying the struggle many students experience, it may be worth pausing to consider how this configures PhD study in very specific ways and how the discursive construction of the PhD as a fundamentally negative experience has hedonophobic tendencies. In terms of value we might, first of all, ask why we don’t value pleasure in learning to become academic more.

More specifically, I have enquired into the production of specific affects consequent upon encountering bodies that are representational of values that one is striving to emulate. These include the bodies of various texts, including the writings of esteemed academics and the awaiting-to-be-written PhD text, the bodies of the supervisor(s) and other academics and students. The values I have discussed in this article in respect of doctoral pedagogy include the ability to express oneself and develop independent judgment. I have also discussed the value given to originality and singularity. The written PhD provides the evidential basis for attribution to a person of these qualities.

In terms of the data presented in this article, the affects arising from encountering the academically located aspects of the PhD, such as the requirement to produce written text and to become published, illustrate how pleasure is attached to a range of other emotions.
including guilt, unease and fear of pleasure’s potentially chimerical qualities. This is not to say that there is no pleasure here at all. Rather, it can all too easily be lost in the weight of joyless anxiety associated with, although not wholly consequential upon, being the kind of not-quite-of-the-academy body that has to change.

Yet pleasure is released from this tie to negative emotions in specific sites of experience and moments of *jouissance*, that include the practice of critical reasoning and the secret pleasure of achievement, both actual and possible. Engaged critique of reality television programmes may appear a stretch too far away from doctoral processes per se. It is certainly not an assessed element (in this case at least), and may indeed be part of Sian’s life that is not just invisible but also unimportant to doctoral supervision. Although it lies outside the academy, this pleasure is not completely beyond its judgmental reach to be compromised. As Sian’s university friends indicate, they hold her to account for her working-class ‘ways’. However, Sian is able to resist the full impact of this to diminish her because this pleasure is fully orgasmic. That is, it is all encompassing and life affirming as it brings together so completely the past and future.

It is perhaps telling, however, that Sian keeps a secret of an academic’s positive response to her work, as this indicates the fragility of new identifications and becomings. These kinds of undisclosed pleasures have a different quality to the pleasure-pain of writing and the orgasmic pleasure of *jouissance*. By keeping them private, one exposes neither frailty nor hope in the way that the written text is an exposure of worth. Secrets and dreams also protect one from the judgment of others. These secret pleasures form a resource in a keep-one-going kind of way. This is more fully explicated in the hopes and dreams of winning an
Oscar. What is significant here is the communal form of this pleasure. For Sian, this is the public approbation of welcome recognition into an academy of scholars of equal merit and respect.

A further aim of this article has been to consider how pleasure may be a force of change rather than stasis. Our common understandings of change are in terms of a before-and-after linear trajectory from one state to another. Certainly, narrative discourses of progress and duality embedded in everyday talk point us in this direction. However, here I have to work against the grain of Sian’s account through which the accomplishment of a PhD is an end point in the way that the end of a life is commonly conceived. I also have to work against the grain of separating pleasure as stasis from desire as change.

When we talk about linearity, what are we referring to? Of course, there is a timeline in acquiring (or not) a PhD. One either has a PhD or one does not. This kind of division presents one kind of marker but, I would argue, only in terms of accreditation, certification and perhaps employability. In terms of subjectivity, can one really say that the award of a certificate marks an end of one identificatory position and the beginning of another? Might not the cynical, or the experienced, argue that whilst Sian might believe her sense of a lack of entitlement to be a knower would diminish once she has been awarded her doctorate, this is not necessarily the case as such feelings are not so easily deterritorialized? Further, in many instances, certain kinds of pleasure in this article appear as a false dawn. They are experienced as undeserving or presage a fall. In this sense they are hardly pleasurable at all. This does not mean, however, that we should discount their affect.
In terms of this article, this requires us to enquire into the force that particular forms of pleasure have in these processes. MacCormack (2008) notes that ‘the body after pleasure ... is not returned, happy or satisfied but disrupted, irreversibly changed and affected’. Here, it is worth focusing a little more on Deleuze’s concept of a line of flight, as this provides a way of analysing flux and flow. Fleming (2002: 202) notes that ‘Resistance for Deleuze and Guattari is captured by the pithy phrase “line of flight” ... and is intended to represent the tangential catapulting that flings us out of the spiral of domination, which a sedimentation of strata has legislated as centre’. In terms of change, this would point us to understanding a line of flight as a partial undoing (Fleming, 2002). Thus, it may be that some forms of pleasure are no more than redemptive moments in an otherwise bleak landscape. The data in this article exhibits a strong sense that, when experienced, certain kinds of pleasure are to be treated with caution. They can offer false hope and can be experienced as undeserving. They can be a momentary escape with a consequent return to stasis. However, pleasure also provides a fragile line of flight away from the negative classed and gendered meanings of being an inappropriate subject in the academy.

In this regard, it appears to me important to note that the complexities of such movements are such that the class traveler does not wish merely to learn how to pass or, in most cases, reject their past completely. This would be something of a reterritorializing move of overcoding or an instantiation of ideology. Rather, successful transition requires a sense of authenticity to be retained, through which the past and present become forged into something as yet unknown. Here, becoming is ‘not a linear activity whereby one simply turns into an identifiable something else’ (MacCormack, 2008). Rather it is ‘a suggestion for entertaining new ways’ (ibid).
Certainly we can argue that moments of pleasure, certainly complicatedly mingled with a host of other emotions, remain in the body-mind. As Renold and Ringrose (2008: 321) note, whilst ‘movements and ruptures and lines of flight are not grand or total escapes but often subject to recuperation ... resonances of the movements remain’. And other forms of pleasure, in this case the Noachian force of jouissance, so central to Irigaray-inspired feminist politics, and the anticipatory pleasures of Oscar moments do leave a more profound mark to counter the fraughtness associated with being inadequate and incapable in intellectual work. In such instances, rather than focusing on melancholia and loss, let us consider the ‘over-flowing plenitude of pleasure’ (Braidotti, 2002: 53) as constituting a challenge to the negativity and lack associated with desire and the gloomy view we portray of undertaking a PhD. After all, there are great pleasures in subversion.

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