Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Statistics
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login

Individually-rational collective choice

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Carvajal, Andrés M. (2004) Individually-rational collective choice. Discussion Paper. Egham: Royal Holloway College, Department of Economics. (Discussion paper (Royal Holloway College).

[img]
Preview
PDF
WRAP_Carvajal_dpe0429.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader

Download (421Kb)

Abstract

In this paper I consider the following problem: there is a collection of exogenously given socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between individuals. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I here characterize collective choices in terms of the way in which individual preferences must co-vary in order to explain them. I do this by combining standard revealed preference theory and its counterpart under random preferences. I also argue that there exist collective choices that cannot be rationalized, and hence that the individual rationality assumption can be refuted.

Item Type: Working or Discussion Paper (Discussion Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Group decision making, Conflict management, Consumer economics
Series Name: Discussion paper (Royal Holloway College)
Publisher: Royal Holloway College, Department of Economics
Place of Publication: Egham
Date: October 2004
Number: No.29
Number of Pages: 31
Institution: University of Warwick
Status: Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version: Open Access
Funder: Brown University, Banco de Re
Grant number: 222622 (Briw)
References: Block, H. and Marshak, J. (1960). Random orderings and stochastic theories of responses, in Contributions to Probability and Statistics, I. Olkin (Ed.) Stanford University Press. Debreu, G. (1952). A social equilibrium existence problems,” Proceedings of 28 the National Academy of Sciences, 38, 886-893. Matzkin, R. and M. Richter (1991), “Testing strictly concave rationality,” Journal of Economic Theory, 58, 287-303. McFadden, D. and M. Richter (1990), “Stochastic rationality and stochastic revealed preference,” in Preferences, uncertainty and optimality, J. Chipman, D. McFadden and M. Richter (Eds.) Westview Press. Richter, M. (1966), “Revealed Preference Theory,” Econometrica, 34, 635-
URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/4

Request changes to a record

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Document Downloads

More statistics for this item...
twitter

Email us: publications@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us