ABSTRACT

Within the range of literary reviews in Twentieth-Century France, none has a more highly-esteemed reputation than la Nouvelle Revue Française, originally founded in 1909 by André Gide and his friends. Resuming in 1919 in a world profoundly shaken by the upheaval and consequences of the First World War, the NRF, at first under Jacques Rivière and then, from 1925 (for the rest of the Inter-War period), under the editorial control of Jean Paulhan, re-established itself at the forefront of literary and critical creativity.

Informed by much of the unpublished correspondence of Paulhan, this thesis shows that the NRF was not exclusively literary. An examination of Paulhan's role, and of his editorial policy (Chapter One) precedes the identification of a number of themes. Already sensitive to topical questions, the NRF debated the role and responsibilities of the intellectuals (Chapter Two), whose attitudes tended to become more politicized as they grew more aware of the deficiencies of the Third Republic (Chapter Three). Their preoccupations reflected major themes, in particular Franco-German relations (Chapter Four), Franco-Soviet relations (Chapter Five), and the Jewish question (Chapter Six). Of course the writers involved with the NRF continued to consider political and international issues in the light of their own preferences and prejudices; yet their reactions and interpretations show that they were ever-more conscious of the crucial, historical importance of the period. Indeed its nature was such that History forced the NRF, eventually, into adopting a partisan position which was Antifascist, anti-Munich, and which even prefigured the Resistance (Chapter Seven).
"Historical and Political Preoccupations in *La Nouvelle Revue Française* under the editorship of Jean Paulhan, 1925 to 1940"

by

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ABBREVIATIONS USED THROUGHOUT:

AEAR : l'Association des écrivains et des artistes révolutionnaires.

AP : Archives Paulhan.

AR : Archives Rivière.

BD : Bibliothèque Littéraire Jacques Doucet.

BN Mss : Département des Manuscrits, Bibliothèque Nationale.

CJP : Cahiers Jean Paulhan.

CPD : "Les Cahiers de la Petite Dame" (Maria Van Rhysselberghe), in Cahiers André Gide.

CVIA : le Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes.
INTRODUCTION

Writing in 1940 of La Nouvelle Revue Française and its development and influence during its first thirty years, the American critic Justin O'Brien paid the review the following compliment:

"No other single periodical will afford historians of the future such a vast panorama of literary activity in France during the years 1909 to 1939"(1).

Indeed, as early as 1920, the Nationalist periodical La Revue Critique des Idées et des Livres, welcoming the reappearance of the youthful Nouvelle Revue Française after the four years' interruption of the war, printed, with uncharacteristic generosity, a veritable eulogy of its rival:

"Vers 1950, l'historien des lettres, s'il cherche à se faire une idée des mouvements profonds qui orientaient celles-ci aux alentours de la guerre, n'aura fait qu'un vain travail tant qu'il n'aura pris connaissance des collections de La Nouvelle Revue Française (...) Nulle part il ne trouvera aussi concentré cet appétit d'invention et d'originalité qui est un des plus remarquables mérites de La Nouvelle Revue Française"(2).

Subsequent literary history has more than proved the accuracy of these two predictions, for it is now a commonplace in both literary and general histories to quote the Nouvelle Revue Française (hereafter NRF) as the exemplar of a successful review in Twentieth-Century France(3). More than this, the NRF has, in retrospect, been regarded as the most influential literary monthly of the century, a judgement corroborated by personalities connected with it, as well as by outsiders and enemies(4).
It would be incorrect, however, to view the NRF as an exclusively literary review. Although admired for its ability to sustain "un état de tension entre un "mouvement" qu'elle entendait favoriser et une "résistance", voire des intolérances"\(^{(5)}\), and in spite of its recognition of "l'esprit critique comme l'un des ingrédients essentiels à l'origine de la création"\(^{(6)}\), the NRF did not shy away from the historical and political realities of the two Inter-War decades. The nature of the period and the coincidence of a number of historichally-derived factors ensured that issues came to the fore which had not been hitherto a source of interest or anxiety in the public domain, and still less so in the hallowed pages of high-quality literary reviews. The fact that the NRF opened its pages to discuss the implications of historical events is of great significance and deserves detailed attention. These considerations are, indeed, of such importance that the two recommendations to future historians already mentioned above should be extended to the domain of intellectual history. The events of the 1920's and 1930's were so inescapable that the NRF should be viewed in a perspective which gives as much emphasis to its status as a forum or platform for intellectual debate as to its predominant role in nurturing literary creativity. The essential point is that any picture of the intellectual history of Inter-War Europe would be incomplete without reference to the pages of the NRF\(^{(7)}\).
The editor from 1925 to 1940, Jean Paulhan, took control of a review which was becoming increasingly subjected to the forces of History: far from expunging it entirely of "non-literary" content, Paulhan, sometimes willingly and sometimes under coercion, opened the NRF to the debates of the day. Inevitably this raises the problem of identifying the nature of the issues in question, a problem which, here, is most usefully solved by examining the debates thematically, with, of course, an historical emphasis. The issues reflect an interest not only in domestic politics, but are also largely determined by international relations and events. Thus it is as essential to examine the political attitudes of the review's contributors towards the character of the Third Republic as it is to assess the influence upon them of the revolutionary upheavals in Germany and Russia. More simply, the NRF may be said to show increasing concern for the way events impinged upon France and the international community.

It was partly inevitable that Paulhan should allow the review to reflect the preoccupation of his contributors; yet, later on, and depending upon the quality and type of debate, he encouraged "engagement". And, when it was perceived that peace should not and could not be bought at any price, Paulhan steered the review towards an identifiably partisan position, even making clear his own views on the matter in its pages. This was not done merely in order to introduce new content, but out of sheer conviction.
All this raises a number of further questions not only regarding the nature of the issues themselves, but also in connection with the way in which it was advisable - or even possible - to respond to them in the NRF. The temperament and background of the personalities involved, among them André Gide, Jean Schlumberger, Julien Benda, Ramon Fernandez and Roger Martin du Gard, to name only the most important, further helped to ensure that intellectual and political questions of international scope were treated. It is true to say that, thanks to such personalities (and, in addition, thanks to Jacques Rivière, Paulhan's predecessor), the NRF was already sensitive or alerted to questions which were not entirely "literary". It is also, however, true that after Paulhan took over in 1925, he found it increasingly difficult to avoid the politicization of intellectual or historical debate: paradoxically enough, this was a corollary of (or a factor of) his own policy towards the review.

Moreover it should not be forgotten that writers and intellectuals (particularly those in the NRF) did not adopt committed points of view without much prior reflection, nor did they do so in haste or in a vacuum. Indeed their own status during these years lent weight to their pronouncements and invested them with a conviction which they might not otherwise have had; nor could they be treated lightly. In the same way the NRF - grouping as it did so many luminaries of the intellectual world - stood out as a particularly
authoritative tribune for the expression of opinion.

With all this in mind it is necessary to reflect upon Paulhan's role at the heart of the review. Beyond his organizing its monthly numbers, he was constantly obliged to act as an intermediary between the numerous members of an "équipe" of contributors whose political views were often more extremely polarized than their literary ones. In fact one of the most fascinating aspects of Paulhan's direction of the NRF is, precisely, the manner in which he balanced the review, both aesthetically and politically, around what might be called a Radicalist pivot. At the same time, he encouraged a critical consciousness which did not hesitate to concentrate its attention upon the very ideology which had produced it. Clashes were, of course, inevitable, but the NRF never truly suffered from the occasional release of internal tensions. It is of paramount importance to see how Paulhan managed, rather, to exploit these tensions both for his own ends, and to the commercial benefit of the review.

Despite the late Auguste Anglès' work covering the pre-1914 review, and despite a number of other studies dealing with specific topics, a comprehensive view over all the themes in the NRF, set in the full context of Inter-War history, has not hitherto been provided. Thus, in order to produce as complete an answer as possible to these questions, it is
essential to adopt a multiple perspective. The NRF itself is, of course, both the subject and the primary source of this assessment (8). Even a rapid scan through the covers of the review over the years 1920 to 1940 reveals a great deal regarding the questions of the day. Yet closer inspection of each number reveals still more. As the period progresses, contemporary preoccupations penetrate ever more deeply, and their traces are detectable in every type of text - articles, serialized novels, regular features, book reviews and topical items. However, considering the pages of the NRF alone would have resulted in a restricted, monocular view which is, of necessity, broadened by examining the pages of the other periodicals it engaged in debate, including its life-long enemy L'Action française and its satellites, and friendlier rivals such as Europe.

It has, moreover, been possible to complete the picture by consulting an "inside" source in the shape of Paulhan's unpublished correspondence (9). As editor of the NRF Paulhan wrote unceasingly to a wide range of contributors and associates. Inspection of these thousands of letters provides a privileged insight into the way Paulhan conceived and shaped his editorial policy, as well as into his motives for including or excluding material which might have been or was politically sensitive, and therefore unacceptable. Furthermore these letters stand as one of the last great collections of literary correspondence in France, in the tradition of Diderot. Not only do they provide
evidence of the day-to-day tasks of arguably the century's most influential literary editor, they are also testimony in their own right to the rapidly evolving sequence of events during the years 1919 to 1940: the long process of preparing their publication has now begun to come to fruition (10).

As suggested above Paulhan's role was, eventually, more than simply editor of a monthly review. Yet at the beginning, his responsibilities at the NRF were primarily organizational and as such he, as much as his contributors, were very much subjected to its regular "mechanics". Paulhan relished his task as editor (11). However, any appreciation of his undertaking would not be complete without a detailed, prior discussion of the various elements of the organization, aspect and policy of the NRF. This is an essential prelude to the ensuing thematic study.
CHAPTER ONE

"Jean Paulhan and the Nouvelle Revue Francaise: Continuity and Renewal, 1925 to 1940".

"Tout ce qui a paru depuis vingt cinq ans dans les lettres de neuf et de puissant sortait de la NRF. (...) La NRF continue et vous verrez se former en elle tout ce qui comptera dans la litterature de demain". (Jean Paulhan, "Présentation de la NRF à Radio-37", Oeuvres IV, p.363)

"Dans une revue, c'est tout différent. On y voit la litterature qui se forme et s'invente et tâte entre mille dangers. On y prend part. On s'y reprend à plusieurs fois. C'est qu'une revue n'a de prix que si l'on y voit, à côté de quelques auteurs consacrés (comme on dit) de jeunes écrivains qui recommencent la litterature à leurs risques et périls. On y voit les lettres à l'état naissant". (Jean Paulhan, "Présentation de la NRF au Club du Faubourg", Oeuvres IV, p.377)

"Un des charmes de la NRF, un des secrets de sa persistante jeunesse fut de s'accorder de temps en temps une fugue dans les vignes du Seigneur. Elle tituba quelque peu, à la suite de Gide, sous l'effet de la vodka communiste, et jamais elle ne sut refuser les elixirs que lui faisait goûter l'Ange du Bizarre. L'influence qu'elle a eue sur la vie des lettres pendant l'entre-deux-guerres, impliquait qu'elle entrât dans la jeu de son époque et ne nageât pas à contre-courant". (Jean Schlumberger, Oeuvres II, p203).
The exalted reputation of the NRF was only achieved through the application of the considerable skills and talent-seeking activities of its editors, first Jacques Rivière; then Jean Paulhan. Of course it was impossible for them to ignore the preferences and tastes of the remaining founders of the review, particularly André Gide and Jean Schlumberger. Still less could they operate editorial choice in a vacuum, separated from the commercial exigencies of Gaston Gallimard, the publisher both of the review and the "maison d'édition". Yet equally importantly, it should not be forgotten that the editors' selections of material, both literary and non-literary, were ultimately determined by the intrinsic logic of the review, by its periodicity, by what might be called its "mechanics". To some extent, the choice of material was subordinated to the nature of the review itself; in this way, although it could never hope to chronicle or report the sometimes rapid progress of events throughout the period, it could - and did - reflect seriously upon the issues raised by those events. Before examining in detail the issues raised and treated by the review, it is necessary to outline the particular nature of Jean Paulhan's relationship with the review, with the personalities involved in it and attracted to it, as well as to examine the evolution of his editorial responsibilities and policy.

Jean Paulhan only officially assumed the direction of the NRF on January 1st 1935. He had, however, already been the Secretary of Rivière's review from 1920 to 1925, and editor-
in-chief from 1926 to 1935, with Gaston Gallimard as nominal
director. As for the NRF, by the time Paulhan came to the
review in 1920, it already had an established reputation, thanks
primarily to its rapid initial success in the years 1909 and
1910, a success which had enabled the review to grow in stature
until war interrupted it in 1914. With the resumption in 1919,
Jacques Rivièrè further exploited and consolidated the status
of the NRF, and its considerable attraction as a focus, or
tribune, for intellectual debate was established and grew\(^1\).

Paulhan's background and intellectual formation were to
prove invaluable to him in his eventual function as Secretary
to Rivièrè, and ultimately as director of the NRF. The Paulhan
family had moved from Nîmes to Paris in 1894, when Jean was
ten. His father, the philosopher Frédéric Paulhan, had
"beaucoup d'influence sur son fils qui parvint difficilement
à se dégager de son emprise intellectuelle"\(^2\). This
philosophical and psychological predominance led Jean to begin
preparing his "agrégation de philosophie" in 1907, just
prior to his departure for Madagascar in December of that year
on a teaching appointment. He remained there from January 1908
to November 1910, when he returned to France\(^3\). The correspondence
with Guillaume de Tarde shows how closely Paulhan kept in touch
with Paris, from where he received a steady stream of reviews\(^4\).
Already in 1908 Paulhan and his friend were responsible for
the "Psychologie" rubric of Alfred de Tarde's review
La Vie contemporaine\(^5\). Still more crucial was the role
Paulhan played in the foundation of Le Spectateur in April 1909\(^{(6)}\). This was "une revue de culture critique"\(^{(7)}\) and, according to Paulhan:

"il s'agissait d'une entreprise, une sorte de logique appliquée: une grammaire des idées qui cherche patiemment à mener quelques observations cohérentes et dégager quelques lois. Le Spectateur a courageusement vécu jusqu'en 1914"\(^{(8)}\).

This enterprise provided Paulhan with an apprenticeship in running a review; after the war, he widened this experience when he became the "rédacteur-gérant" of La Vie from December 1919 until August 1920, by which time he was officially Secretary of the NRF\(^{(9)}\).

Another early but lasting influence was anarchism. Between 1894 and 1904, the latter year being that of Jean's military service, the Paulhan household, for financial reasons, was forced to take in boarders; among these were "des jeunes filles russes, quelquefois anarchistes"\(^{(10)}\). Moreover Jean "ira jusqu'à militer activement au sein d'un mouvement anarchiste"\(^{(11)}\).

Paulhan himself remembered that, in 1904, "j'hésitais entre le socialisme et l'anarchie. L'anarchie, c'était Jean Grave qui me l'enseignait dans sa petite boutique de la rue Mouffetard..."

This experience in his formative years helps explain his later, sometimes idiosyncratic and paradoxical approach to events and issues in the 1930's. Moreover it imbued him with a streak of antimilitarism which was to temper his later sense of respect for authority and order.
Just prior to the war in 1914, Paulhan took the entrance examination for the "Ministère de l'Instruction publique" in which he would become a "rédacteur", a post which proved very useful, for not only did he manage to disseminate favourable propaganda through the educational administration on behalf of the NRF, he was also able to pass on information about vacant teaching posts to various contributors. During the early phase of the war Paulhan was severely wounded. By 1916 he had still not fully recovered, and it was only in 1917 that he was able to assume the duties of interpreter and driving instructor for Madagascan troops. The same year Paulhan began to write in earnest and, indeed, contacted André Gide indicating that he wished to dedicate an early version of the narrative Progrès en amour assez lents to him. Paulhan's interest in and admiration for Gide are traceable at least to 1914, when he published a study on Souvenirs de la Cour d'Assises.

During the period leading up to and after his demobilization on 21st March 1919, Paulhan was becoming increasingly involved in the literary "avant-garde"; in 1917, the review Nord-Sud was launched, and Paulhan had a text published there in May 1918. He also became involved with the group of writers who founded Littérature and had a text published in its first issue. As far as his direct relationship with the NRF itself is concerned, Paulhan had offered Jean Schlumberger an extract of Les Hain-Tenys Mérinas for the review as early as 1912 and, although this did not
appear, Paulhan was not discouraged from submitting a "note" in 1913(20). The same year, Paulhan noted the importance of the newly-born "Théâtre du Vieux-Colombier" in that it represented a challenging and logical extension to the NRF and the publishing-house(21). Wishing to exploit his valuable position as "réacteur" in the "Ministère de l'Instruction publique" he wrote again to Gide before the reappearance of the NRF in 1919 to offer his services; Gide replied:

"Votre lettre m'emplit de joie. Je crois que vous êtes parfaitement dans le vrai en pensant que la NRF est loin d'avoir trouvé tous ses lecteurs, en estimant qu'une saine propagande pourrait faire beaucoup et je ne puis vous dire avec quelle satisfaction je vous vois soucieux d'y travailler"(22).

It therefore appears that Paulhan was already engaged in a temporary or non-official capacity during this time, for Gide also asked Paulhan to tell Gaston Gallimard that he wished to receive details of some publishing plans (23); Paulhan's primary task, however, was to help in organizing the "propaganda effort" for the NRF. By February 1920, Paulhan also had his first contribution appear in the review(24).

During the first half of 1920, Rivière's family circumstances helped bring Paulhan much closer to the review. On February 2nd that year, Rivière urged Paulhan to be patient:
"Je suis profondément touché par votre gentillesse. Je vais étudier la question de savoir quel travail je pouvais vous confier. Et si je ne me décidais pas tout de suite à vous appeler à mon secours, je profiterais certainement de votre offre amicale au moment des couches de ma femme, c'est à dire dans un mois d'ici"(25).

Thus, starting in March 1920, Paulhan was engaged to take charge of organizing material for the review Rivière, not only forced to withdraw temporarily due to the imminent birth of his son Alain, was also exhausted from his exertions in restarting the NRF, made worse by the long-lasting effects of his extended captivity during the war. Paulhan kept in touch with Rivière by corresponding regularly. He enumerated his tasks and action taken on the left-hand side of his letters, and Rivière replied with the appropriate remarks opposite: in this way, Rivière was able to take a much-needed rest while keeping a finger on the pulse of the NRF. Discussing the make-up of the issue for June 1920, Paulhan and Rivière exchanged ideas:

" - l'article de M. Arnauld ne m'est parvenu que ce matin, 6 mai. Je l'ai envoyé aussitôt (à l'imprimerie)...

- j'ai envoyé à Paillart les notes, sauf Mac Orlan, qui n'est pas arrivé, Breton, Allard et Larbaud (...)

II. Allard: Très bref et très simple, n'a pas de portée, et d'ailleurs, pas de prétention...

Bien

- puisque nous avons tant fait de la lui (à Breton) demander, prenons-la. Mais je ne souhaite pas voir s'agrandir dans la NRF le champ réservé à la "critique synthétique"

Faire passer"(26)
A further, still more detailed exchange occurred a few days later, in which Paulhan wrote on May 12th and Rivière returned his instructions on the 15th. Paulhan was worried this time that Paillart, the printer, was late in sending back the "placards" for two forthcoming texts; Rivière calmed his assistant:

"Vous avez encore du temps devant vous. Si d'ailleurs le numéro paraissait, cette fois encore, quelques jours en retard, il ne faudrait pas vous désespérer" (27).

Evidently Paulhan's efforts were deeply appreciated at the NRF during this trying time, for he told Rivière that none other than Gaston Gallimard had advanced a provisional offer to make his employment more permanent. He took advantage of this vote of confidence by suggesting improvements in the review's administrative organization (28). Rivière too praised Paulhan, stressing how their different approaches would only benefit the review (29); he agreed that Paulhan should be engaged more permanently:

"Il faut que notre collaboration devienne régulière; elle peut nous être infiniment profitable à tous deux, je crois; et je suis convaincu qu'en tous cas elle aura pour la revue les effets extrêmement précieux. J'examinerai, en rentrant, avec Gaston Gallimard, les moyens de l'organiser pour ainsi dire légalement. Il y aura bien quelques petites difficultés matérielles à vaincre; mais nous les vaincrons" (30).

Not long after this, in the NRF for July 1920, the name of Jean Paulhan appeared for the first time as "Secrétaire".
Indeed by June 22nd, the news of the appointment had reached Paul Valéry, who wrote to congratulate the NRF's new secretary:

"Je suis très heureux pour la NRF de vous y voir définitivement attaché. Un homme de votre conscience et de votre précision d'esprit est une acquisition très précieuse pour une revue. Et quant à vous, quant à la réaction sur vous-même de cette occupation, je suis sûr qu'elle ne sera pas sans conséquence pour votre œuvre à venir. L'exercice presque perpétuel et aiguisé de responsabilités, du sens critique (qui est, quoi qu'on dise (sic) et quoi d'on croie, la chose la plus rare de ce monde), vous servira certainement" (31).

Valéry's comments here are extremely astute, for both Paulhan himself and subsequent critical appraisal of his role (both as author in his own right and as editor of the NRF) concur that it is difficult to evaluate which of Paulhan's functions depended more heavily on the other. Not enough weight has been attached to Paulhan's role as editor at the NRF when assessing either his own work and ideas on literature, or the powerful influence wielded by the NRF in the literary world. Robert Kanters, however, has justly written:

"Son (i.e. Paulhan's) œuvre, au sens large, c'est la collection des quarante énormes recueils de la NRF depuis 1925, anthologie in vivo d'à peu près tout ce qui compte et a compté" (32).

Having been officially appointed as Secretary, Paulhan's expertise and editorial talents began to mature. He was able to influence his director by introducing young authors from the "avant-garde"; Aragon and Breton were among those invited to contribute. This interest in the modernist movement evidently
attracted Rivière too, for he was anxious to prevent the review from becoming too staid, a worry shared even by André Gide (33). In the early weeks of 1922, preparations were under way for the "Congrès de Paris", whose object was to "opposer à un esprit étroitement traditionnaliste un autre esprit qui, niant qu'on puisse concevoir l'"ordre" autrement qu'à postériori, court de mille manières ce que nous appelons l'aventure moderne..." (34).

This venture was partially patronised by the NRF, for Paulhan's name appears among those on the organizing committee as "secrétaire général de la NRF". Paulhan's manuscript alterations to the draft proposals, and his letter to Breton (35), show clearly that the NRF was lending much support to this "Congrès". It transpired, however, that some within the NRF felt that their adherence to such an exhibition of "l'esprit moderne" was too dangerous to pursue, for Rivière later wrote apologetically to Breton withdrawing their support (36).

Apart from his occasional involvement with projects of this nature on behalf of the NRF, Paulhan's tasks as secretary were, by and large, no different from those which had fallen to Rivière when he had occupied the post from 1911 to 1914 (37). In addition Paulhan helped organize the NRF's propaganda effort, a task which had already met with Gide's full approval (38). Furthermore Paulhan was instrumental in augmenting the stock of material for the "notes" section of the review. Here he carried out his duties with exemplary efficiency often earning high praise from Rivière, who granted him an increasingly free hand (39). Paulhan easily satisfied Rivière's strict prescriptions
in regard to the critical section of the review (40), and, although usually the final choice lay with Rivière, the evidence shows that often Paulhan held an equal responsibility for requesting book reviews not only from regular contributors, but also from new recruits to the NRF (41). Thus Paulhan became established at the centre of Rivière's review; he knew how he should help his editor and was fully aware of the sacrifices Rivière was willing to make. He did not hesitate to make it clear that he could ease the burden and even had the confidence to evaluate Rivière's performance:

"C'est par faiblesse, aussi, Jacques, que vous acceptez aussi facilement tout nouveau travail qui s'offre, et le plus étranger à vous. Ce double mouvement d'influence sur vos collaborateurs, de recherche intérieure, à quoi vous obligez la direction de la revue, la composition de votre œuvre: ce mouvement en deux sens opposés, vous ne pouvez, vous ne pourrez l'accomplir qu'en vous vidant de tout votre souci" (42).

As secretary and later, as editor, Paulhan had frequent dealings with Gide at the NRF. Clarification is necessary here, since some confusion persists regarding Gide's role within the review, especially as there has always been a tendency among literary historians to see the NRF as exclusively Gide's review. At the time of its foundation in 1908-1909, Gide was listed among the members of the "comité de rédaction", along with the other founders (43). Yet Jean Schlumberger clearly saw himself as the director responsible for composition (with Rivière as his secretary from 1911) (44), whilst Gide, though enthusiastic (45), was too peripatetic to assist with
the day-to-day running. He was certainly never nominally
director or editor. It is however undeniable that Gide
inspired much of what came to be known as "l'esprit de la NRF" -
in other words he brought the literary inspiration to the
review. Literary historian Robert Kanters is rightly
careful to distinguish between Gide as the "moving spirit"
and Rivière and Paulhan as editors:

"(Gide) a été l'âme du mouvement littéraire
le plus important de l'époque, celui de la
NRF, mais même une personnalité aussi complexe
que la sienne ne peut exprimer toute la
complexité d'une telle entreprise...
Elle n'eut que deux directeurs, Jacques Rivière
et Jean Paulhan."

In 1921, Gide himself complained in the pages of the NRF
that "plus je me retire de la NRF, plus on croit que c'est
moi qui la dirige", showing that he already wished to
disassociate himself from the misconception that the review
was solely in his charge. Yet it is true that on occasion
Gide had come close to assuming the role of director. Just
prior to the reappearance of the NRF in 1918-1919, Gide had
contemplated taking over; Claudel, however, informed Rivière
that if such a step were taken he would immediately cease his
contributions. Gide himself made it known that he thought
Rivière had made a grave error in not consulting other members
of the review regarding approbation of his June 1919 "Manifesto";
Gide wrote that "peu s'en fallut que ce premier numéro d'après-
guerre ne fût aussi bien le dernier". The aftermath of
this dispute lasted well into 1920. Later, after Rivière's
death in 1925, there could be no question that Gide should be
appointed director \(^{(54)}\), for from February till April 1925 Gide was in the Midi finishing *Les Faux-monnayeurs*, whose pre-publication had already begun in the *NRF* \(^{(55)}\). He left the manuscript of his novel in the charge of Roger Martin du Gard and departed for Africa on July 14th 1925 \(^{(56)}\). On his return, his preoccupations had changed. He found he disliked the *NRF* and even had the idea of publishing his own periodical \(^{(57)}\). His criticisms led in part to the eventual campaign to renew and expand the review in 1927, yet the evidence suggests that Paulhan and Gide maintained a frosty relationship and kept at a distance from one another \(^{(58)}\).

Viewed one way, the *NRF* was only a small, loss-making part of Gallimard's publishing empire; this also tended to underline the distance between Gide and the review, for he felt that literature and commercialism were incompatible. From 1927-8, Gallimard expanded his publishing ventures, above all by buying *Détective*, a lurid weekly with a far greater lucrative potential than the *NRF*. Gide displayed an intense dislike for the magazine, to such an extent that during 1930 rumours were rife that he was about to break with the *NRF* over what Léautaud characterized as an "affaire d'argent" \(^{(59)}\).

Yet like it or not, Gide, in the long term, had to accept that one of the consequences of founding the publishing house, partly funded by Gallimard's capital \(^{(60)}\), was the increasing commercialization of the *NRF*. For all this, however, the misapprehension that Gide directed affairs at the *NRF* persisted well into the 1930's and is well illustrated by an episode.
concerning André Suarès. Paulhan had been trying for some time
to lure Suarès back to the NRF(61) and negotiations to recommence
the "Chroniques de Caërdal" had almost come to fruition when
Montfort's Les Marges (always willing, jealously, to attack
the NRF) published an interview with Suarès in which he saw
Paulhan's review as a

"pitoable cénacle (...) dirigé avec une
incroyable étroitesse d'esprit par ce
Goethe des mouches, ce pasteur de Sodome
qu'est André Gide, oligarchie dont :
les dirigeants mettent leur puissance
pécunière au service de leurs petites
idées"(62).

The publication of this interview caused Paulhan considerable
embarrassment: he told Suarès as much on 15th June 1933: "votre
interview des Marges me met dans la situation la plus fausse
et la plus gênée qui soit"(63). Gallimard preferred that
Suarès' resumed contribution should be delayed, but Paulhan,
seeking clarification later in another matter, clearly indicated
the source of the problem:

"s'il semble aux critiques que l'article de
Jean Schl. était spécialement dirigé contre
Gide, c'est que Gide passe pour diriger la
NRF"(64).

Finally, the fact that Gide's inspirational role had little
bearing upon the month to month running of the review is
underlined by the fact that both Rivière and Paulhan, whether
as secretary or editor, looked to Jean Schlumberger and not
to Gide as their mentor and editorial advisor, for, as he
emphasised himself, Schlumberger had had all the experience
of composing and balancing each issue. Schlumberger's role,
so little appreciated, was highly important, and Paulhan paid him this compliment: "vous êtes à la NRF comme le tao, qui inspire sans se montrer, qui ordonne sans intervenir"(65).

All this helps explain that when Rivière died unexpectedly on February 14th 1925, there was some confusion over who should become "directeur". Although Gide was mentioned, it was out of the question he should become director for the reasons already given(66). Charles du Bos dreamt of succeeding Rivière, but Schlumberger and Gide quashed this idea(67). Rumours spread that Rivière's widow Isabelle might covet "une situation importante (et) une influence personnelle"(68), but this too was not feasible. Although Benjamin Crémieux was also a candidate(69), Gallimard himself assumed the title, a shrewd move indeed, for he at once quickly ended the speculation, avoided offending unsuitable candidates, and passed the reins of the editorship to Paulhan, as "rédacteur en chef". As Claude Martin has so aptly written, Paulhan "devint progressivement l'âme de la NRF; neuf ans et demi après, sa nomination comme Directeur ne devait guère faire plus que consacrer un état de fait"(70). If further justification were needed for the choice, Paulhan himself provided it in his preparation of a special number in honour of Rivière which remains a model of the genre, and powerfully illustrates his powers of organisation(71).

This is not to ignore, however, the fact that Paulhan sought advice elsewhere. Gallimard was his link with the publishing house, but he also corresponded with Schlumberger; the dating and frequency of Paulhan's letters show that initially he relied
heavily on Schlumberger(72). Schlumberger could not only wield his influence over potential contributors (such as Henry de Montherlant(73)), his name also carried more weight with such as Isabelle Rivièrè(74). Furthermore he provided a "control" over his close friend Gide. Détective and Gallimard's commercialism had disillusioned Gide and caused him to seek publication elsewhere, leaving Paulhan potentially embarrassed and deprived of material(75). Yet Paulhan did not hesitate to use Schlumberger as a supporter for his intentions, given that Paulhan had already complained to Gide of a lack of authority: Schlumberger's weight enabled him to operate efficiently with the proviso that he did not always have to accept sole responsibility. It was only in December 1934 that Gallimard nominally handed the directorship to Paulhan, who accepted somewhat begrudgingly(76). Thus from January 1st 1935, Paulhan was officially "directeur" of the NRF. As the 1930's progressed inevitably toward war, the review itself was forced more and more to react to political and historical events(77). This made Paulhan's task no easier, and on several occasions he felt driven to expressing his frustrations as editor(78). By 1936, Paulhan's mood led him towards occasional expressions of indifference: he seemed to have accepted the inevitable and he often shared his feeling of impotence with his closest contributors(79). Indeed, as the war came nearer, Paulhan felt more and more isolated: he complained to his former mentor Schlumberger that "Gide et vous êtes véritablement trop absents, ces temps-ci, de la revue"(80). So isolated did
he became throughout 1939 and until May and June 1940 that he and his letters became an invaluable source of news as to the whereabouts of many NRF contributors; his letters to Gide, Schlumberger, Caillois, Etiemble, Guéhenno and many more earnt him the nick-name "la marraine des écrivains de la NRF mobilisés (qui) lui va à merveille", as Sartre quipped at Christmas 1939 (81).

As editor Paulhan fulfilled two mutually-dependent tasks: he prepared the review and acted as intermediary between it and his often temperamental (if not refractory) contributors, attempting to protect the interests of both to the detriment of neither. As Lina Morino puts it, Paulhan was a "conciliateur" (82). He demonstrated his exemplary skill, tact and patience in managing to reconcile the review and such "difficult" personalities as Suarts (83), Claudel (84) and Léautaud (85), but only after expending much time and effort in behind-the-scenes manoeuvring, usually by correspondence. Even a superficial acquaintance with this correspondence gives an idea of the range and type of contributors he dealt with (86). Part and parcel of these negotiations with potential and existing NRF - authors was fixing their payments (87), but by far his most important duty was to plan and compose each issue of the review.

When he became editor in April 1925, the NRF, a monthly subscription review, appeared in 128-page issues (88). What helped to establish the uniqueness of the NRF was the self-conscious, non-dogmatic but selective approach applied in
composing each issue. Whatever material it published, Paulhan insisted that literary criteria should be applied in the selection. Moreover, due to its mechanical nature, a further key to imposing order on an apparently eclectic monthly lay in planning ahead and in having the completed number printed and distributed on time. Thus, in order to fulfil the promise of all publicity material that the review appeared by the first of each month, Paulhan was assisted in his task by applying the "tableau d'ordre", or working schedule, established under Riviére and adhered to with even more rigour by Paulhan. Copy had to be received so that, in normal circumstances, the layout of the review and the first proofs could be checked in time for the "bon à tirer" on the 20th of the month. The second proofs were then checked and the final printing and binding took place between the 25th and 28th or 29th, when the review was distributed through the post. Late submissions could delay the issuing of the "bon à tirer", much to Paulhan's distress; he would sometimes even be obliged to travel to Abbeville to correct the final proofs at the printer's, Paillart, as shown in this important letter to Schlumberger:

"1) Je ne me souviens pas que Jacques ait jamais accepté une note plus tard que le 15. J'ai conservé son "tableau d'ordre", suivant lequel les derniers bons à tirer doivent être donnés le 20. Il s'en suit nécessairement que les dernières pages à composer ont été envoyées à l'imprimerie le 15 le plus tard. Le tableau d'ordre est suivi à présent plus strictement que jamais. Aucun numéro, depuis un an, n'a paru avec un jour de retard. Mais je n'ai pu obtenir de Paillart l'organisation, et quand il y a lieu, les coups de collier nécessaires qu'en prenant de mon côté (et en
tenant) les engagements qu'aucun manuscrit nouveau ne soit envoyé après le 15. Un retard d'un jour (...) m'a obligé l'année dernière, en Août, à aller passer une journée à Abbeville pour corriger les épreuves sur place. A quoi s'ajoute: 1) qu'avril n'a que 30 jours - 2) que Paillart m'a averti, il y a un mois, que tout retard de ma part entrainerait pour le numéro un retard de quelques jours (à cause d'une nouvelle application des lois du travail: interdiction des heures supplémentaires, etc.).

One or two days' delay could therefore determine whether an item would be included or not, for later on in the 1930's, events tended to move with a rapidity which often excluded the holding-over of material until the next issue; on August 25th 1937, Paulhan thanked Grenier for his text, saying that "le Congrès (another text) est arrivé trop tard (avant-hier seulement, quand tous les bons à tirer étaient donnés)".

Most importantly, regarding the treatment of politically - and historically - related questions in the NRF, Paulhan was often forced against his will to alter the content of any given month's issue at short notice. Thus, replying to a complaint from Grenier, who was mystified by the non-inclusion of his "notes", Paulhan explained:

"Il m'est difficile d'arrêter chaque mois tout mon numéro par avance parce que la dimension des articles peut varier au dernier moment dans d'assez grandes proportions. De sorte qu'il me faut souvent retirer de la mise en pages les notes qui sont le moins "d'actualité"."

Balancing each number had, indeed, always been an almost obsessive concern at the NRF and, as he had worked so closely with Rivière, Paulhan continued the tradition himself even more obsessively.
Paulhan, however, in questions of selection and presentation, by no means had sole responsibility; this was a change from the more authoritarian style of control under Rivièrè to the more collegiate approach which had characterized the very first review. As early as January 1926 Paulhan outlined his idea for an editorial committee, revising it during 1927 to a more manageable caucus. A wide range of topics was covered at these editorial meetings and Paulhan reported the success of one such meeting to Schlumberger:

"nous avons décidé de nous réunir un jour chaque mois - Arland, Crémieux, Fernandez et moi - le matin un de nous fera une communication, l'après-midi on discutera de la NRF. C'était hier la première réunion; tout s'est fort bien passé, et le soir nous étions ravis. Je crois que cette fois nous tenons notre comité - mais je voudrais bien que de longtemps on ne songeât à lui donner d'autres membres que Gide, Gaston, vous et nous quatre. Le prochaine réunion aura lieu le 5 octobre. Crémieux doit lire un essai, peut-être une pièce..." (94).

Much of the success of Paulhan's early phase at the NRF is owed to the committee-structure, but as the years passed, Paulhan gradually became more authoritarian himself. On the eve of the war, after Munich, Paulhan felt confident enough at times to ignore the strongly-voiced objections of such as Jean Schlumberger, and steered the NRF very much according to his own firm convictions (95).

As editor, Paulhan was also obliged to take account of a commercially - if not sociologically - determined factor: that is, that more new subscriptions could be gained at certain times of the year. The covers and the "cahiers publicitaires"
of the NRF show that the review was targeted specifically at the "étrennes" market. Special offers of books were an inducement for resubscription and for the purchase of gift subscriptions; the same was offered for introducing new subscribers. As far as Paulhan was concerned, he too had to select material with this in mind. Thus new serials began in January; moreover, an attractive author such as Suarès could bring a promotional advantage (96). Very often the November, December and January numbers carried more pages, making the review appear more substantial (97). Not only was the Christmas and New Year market an important one for the NRF, considerable care also went into preparing the "rentrée" issues. This explains why some serials or other important texts started in August, September or October, and could then run through until Christmas in time for resubscriptions (98). With these commercial factors in mind, Paulhan and his committee then proceeded to select and order their material. If there was a risk of discord between certain articles, Paulhan would postpone one in favour of another (99).

Pre-publication in review form was then a normal fact of literary life: a good serialization could, in certain circumstances, double the printing of the review (100). Sometimes reviews would outbid or out-manoeuvre one another in order to print the latest novel by the newest celebrity: the case of Jean Giono is illuminating. Daniel Halévy, responsible at Grasset for Les Cahiers verts, wrote to Paulhan offering him the chance to publish Colline in the NRF, but in the event, it was passed
on to Commerce (101); the NRF took Giono's "Champs" for its August 1928 number and pre-published Un de Baumugnes in 1929 from August to November. The rush to publish Giono led to his having a contract with both Grasset and Gallimard, a fact which appealed to Paulhan's wry sense of humour (102). Despite this cut-throat competitiveness, Paulhan attempted to adhere to certain principles, as illustrated by the criticism levelled at the NRF for pre-publishing novels in incomplete or fragmentary form, particularly Les Faux-monnayeurs. Conscious of the storm of protest provoked in 1925 over the part-publication of Gide's novel (103), Paulhan made it a matter of policy never to repeat the same mistake – this was also a useful pretext to invoke when refusal of contributions might be awkward (104). In reality, however, Paulhan was forced to accept the sometimes compromising link between the review and the publishing house (105). The monthly serialization was, indeed, a major selling-point, and Paulhan was aware that the sometimes large leaps in new subscriptions were linked to specific serials: in 1926, for instance, the NRF gained 1100 new subscriptions precisely because of the choice of serials (106).

Among the most memorable works serialized in the NRF are Giraudoux's Bella (1925), Gide's Voyage an Congo (1927), Proust's Le Temps retrouvé (1927), Malraux's Les Conquérants (1928) and La Condition humaine (1933), Chamson's Les Hommes de la Route (1937), Giono's Un de Baumugnes (1929), Drieu's Reveuse Bourgeoise (1927), Limbour's Les Vanilliers (1938) and Aragon's Les Voyageurs de l'impériale (1940, but incomplete).
The aesthetic problem of cutting a novel into extracts of more or less the same length without necessarily following the author's chapter structure was one which Paulhan constantly faced. Gide, for one, commented that Malraux's *La Condition Humaine* was ill suited to publication in review-form, that it cohered much better as a book, and objected to Aragon's seemingly interminable work *Les Voyageurs de l'Impériale*. In Aragon's case, however, political factors (Aragon's communism) over-ruled the aesthetic, even though Paulhan defended his decision in literary terms. Indeed the reading of a novel in monthly instalments is problematic, and becomes more so the longer the novel in question. Yet the key to balancing the NRF was to find the "centre of gravity" of each segment which, for Paulhan, became a challenging and rigorous principle. As a last resort, Paulhan would palliate his rejections by insisting that he was acting in the best interests of the NRF.

Authors themselves often expressed profound dissatisfaction with serial publication, but, due to pressing financial anxieties, they were forced to accept it: nowhere is this better illustrated than in the case of Roger Martin du Gard, who exchanged a number of letters with Paulhan over the protracted negotiations regarding his play *La Gonfle*. For all the problems and complaints, however, Paulhan managed to satisfy the needs of both authors and readers; the continuing success of the review was proof enough that his choices were judicious and his skills matched the "balancing act" of the review.
The continuity of any review, however, derives from its regular features, and in the adaptation of their presentation to a variety of needs including, in particular, readers' expectations and changes in editorial policy. Paulhan's further duty to the NRF was to nurture and promote interest in the highly important regular, critical section of the review, a section which had always had a solid reputation. Schlumberger has confirmed that "L'important, à nos yeux, c'était nos dernières pages, celles qui contenaient notre appareil critique". Literary history has also tended to view the NRF as largely a critics' review, and that it was critical innovation there which produced a bolder and more exploratory approach to literature. Albert Thibaudet, the longest-serving of the NRF's critical team, identified two strands within the review. Gide represented all that was best of a "critique essayiste" but, equally important, was the philosophical leaning of the review: he singled out Gabriel Marcel, Jacques Rivière, Ramon Fernandez and Paulhan himself.

The "chroniques" (or regular feature articles) expanded under the editorship of Paulhan. Out of the entire review, it was the part which assumed the most mechanical character, providing what sometimes became a tribune for expressing and exchanging the ideas of the most regular contributors. Moreover the "chroniques" provided subscribers with a sense of security - each month they could rely on reading Thibaudet or Benda whatever the rest of the review had to offer. For the contributors, the "chroniques" offered a prestigious monthly outlet for their
essays and a (relatively) reliable source of income. As far as the most important "chroniques" are concerned, Alain's "Propos" and Thibaudet's "Réflexions" provided the backbone of the Inter-War NRF; not only this, they also accounted for the largely and identifiably Radicalist orientation of the NRF during the first half of the period, and helped bring about the introduction of essays of political analysis. The contribution of philosophy-teacher Alain began in April 1927, although the NRF had been attempting to secure his regular contribution since 1920. Initially Alain's presence met with tacit approval; moreover, in January 1928, in the event of his 60th year, the monthly Europe produced a glowing tribute by reputed NRF regulars, seeming to underline the fact that the renowned "philosopher of Radicalism" was NRF property. By 1930, however, Alain's "Propos" had begun to attract some highly uncomplimentary remarks, particularly from Roger Martin du Gard and from Jean Grenier, who noticed perceptively that the reason for Alain's presence was to attract a large number of subscriptions from teachers. Alain had indeed taught a new generation of teachers who perpetuated his thinking in the Inter-War years, including Raymond Aron and Sartre, the latter being a good example of a "contre-élève". During 1936, Alain's monthly "propos" ceased, although he still continued to submit material. From 1934 Alain lent his valued support to the Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes (the CVIA) and wrote for the pacifist periodical Vigilance. As the appeal of Radicalism waned as the 1930's progressed, so
Alain's association with the cause of integral pacifism grew; on the eve of war, he was interrogated about his writings (127).

Albert Thibaudet, a teacher at the University of Geneva from 1924, was widely admired by the same audience as Alain (128). Thibaudet's greatest influence was perhaps over the post-war generation of critics; his expositions of Bergsonism, Barrès and Maurras won him respect in the early 1920's (129). The title of his rubric "Réflexions sur la Littérature" was significantly shortened to "Réflexions" in early 1928, indicating an important change of emphasis (130). Thibaudet's partial deflection away from literary matters did not please everyone at the review, notably Jean Prévost (131) and André Gide (132); yet Paulhan admired him and praised several of the "non-literary" essays, including the October 1930 "Appel au Concile" (133). After Thibaudet's death Paulhan was appointed literary executor (134); at the review, such an assiduous presence meant that it would be difficult to replace Thibaudet, although Nizan and Schlumberger were considered (135). In the event Arland broadened his "chronique" into "Essais critiques" from 1937: despite this, Thibaudet was profoundly missed at the heart of the NRF.

Although he wrote less regularly in the "chroniques", Ramon Fernandez, introduced by Rivière in 1923, would occupy more controversial ground (136). Fernandez, the archetypal "philosophical" critic whose profession of critical faith was ideally-suited to that of the NRF (137), had his first essay-length book review appear in October 1926 (138), and
took over the more regular "Essais" rubric: by November 1933, he had submitted some thirty essays. By 1931 he had established a solid reputation, drawing support in particular from Martin du Gard. Yet as the 1930's progressed Fernandez became more and more committed politically, moving from a position of liberalism to support for and involvement in the anti-fascist organisation l'Association des écrivains et artistes révolutionnaires (the AEAR). Soon afterwards, however, following a bitter exchange between Aragon and Drieu, Fernandez veered further and further across to the extreme Right; by 1938, he was writing regularly for Doriot's newspaper Emancipation nationale, freely attacking his former NRF colleagues. Under the Occupation he regularly submitted material to Drieu's NRF, as well as continuing his work for Doriot's Parti populaire français (PPF) as intellectual advisor. During his most constant period at the NRF, Fernandez was undoubtedly a great asset, his intellectual rigour and powerful, clear argumentation finding favour among many, both inside and outside the review.

The "chroniqueur" of perhaps the greatest importance and value regarding the NRF as a focus of intellectual debate was Julien Benda. Here was the great defender of Republican idealism, a fact which, once again, enriched the Radicalist tint of the NRF, particularly in the debate (partly pursued in the review) following the publication of La Trahison des Clercs, serialised in 1927. Not only this, but the
widespread repercussions of the debate on intellectuals' responsibilities directly prepared the way for the " politicization" of the NRF after 1932(148). Paulhan granted Benda a regular "chronique" called "Scholies" in addition to the many articles, serials and book-reviews he submitted(149). This intense activity was the fulfilment of an ambition; he confided to Louis Guilloux, then working at the publishing-house, that "Je voudrais bien devenir une éminence grise de la NRF"(150), an ambition whose effects were felt by the younger generation: "Dans ces années proches encore de La Trahison des Clercs (Benda) faisait figure d'éminence grise, presque du rédacteur en chef de la revue"(151). Such prolixity was not possible without considerable support: this support came almost uniquely from Jean Paulhan himself. Paulhan deeply admired Benda's apparently disinterested rationalism, especially as it was embodied in his earlier essays: his admiration is well-defined in a remark Paulhan made to Benda in the company of Francis Ponge:

"Un jour, s'adressant à Julien Benda, Paulhan a déclaré: "il est un intellectualisme qui s'en tient à l'observation patiente et à l'expérience méthodique, tente de dégager quelques lois, évite les partis-pris, si séduisants soient-ils, et se garde le plus longtemps possible de conclure. Je voudrais que ce fût le mien""(152).

Benda reciprocated Paulhan's admiration(153) and has confirmed that his support was maintained in the face of much opposition from both within and outside the review(154), although, for a time, Gide backed Paulhan, thus approving of the opening-up of the NRF to current debate(155). Some within the NRF disliked
Benda's presence, considering him to be a philosophical vulgarizer, if not a charlatan (156), yet it was equally recognised that he drew an audience (157).

The period of the most inimical tensions regarding Benda's position came during the year following the Munich crisis in 1938: Benda's unflagging anti-Germanism became increasingly entrenched as the 1930's progressed, and as the dangers of Nazism became more apparent (158). In a long, very important letter of 1939, Benda, answering the criticisms of such as Schlumberger (159), defended his own position, clarifying his status at the review:

"Voir moins fréquemment mon nom dans la NRF, être absent des "Airs du Mois" sont des choses que j'accepte sans aucune peine (...). J'aimerais que S (chlumberger) sût que je ne me suis jamais "donné des gants" (n'ayant, d'ailleurs, aucun droit) "d'être directeur de la revue". Que de fois, sollicité par un jeune homme de faire passer un article dans la maison, j'ai répondu que je n'y avais aucun pouvoir, y étais un simple collaborateur(...)"(160).

Thus, by the end of the 1930's, Benda's contributions, although initially intended to sustain a rationalist neutrality at the NRF, had paradoxically forced the review to contend with the most controversial issues of the day, a fact clearly recognised by Benda himself:

"Il est clair que si la direction veut ma peau, non pas seulement en raison de mon attitude dans la NRF, mais ailleurs, et en raison de la tendance politique générale, ma cause, notre cause, - puisque vous voulez bien me défendre - , devient singulièrement menacée" (161).
For all this, Benda was a valued regular contributor who found favour among the review's Radicalist-teacher readership: the NRF would certainly have been different without him.

Finally, Paulhan managed to bring André Suarès back to the NRF in 1939 in order to resume his "Chronique de Caërdal". His unmistakeable polemical tone, which would have been familiar to his earlier followers (162), suited the review when he began again in January 1939: indeed his texts led to problems with the censorship (163). Even if Suarès was widely regarded as eccentric, he was valued by Paulhan, for it was equally widely recognised that Suarès detested the tendency for intellectuals to divide into factions with political allegiances; however, his abhorrence of Nazi racism ultimately outweighed his distaste for Soviet totalitarianism, since he was of Jewish origin (164).

Further components of the critical section organised by Paulhan were the book-reviews - or "Notes" and "Notules" - and the important "Revue des revues". Paulhan's apprenticeship under Rivière had provided valuable experience in compiling and balancing the "Notes", some of which became review-articles (165). Paulhan's correspondence abounds in instances of his commissioning "notes" from a wide range of contributors, especially Schlumberger, Grenier and Prévost (166). Moreover Paulhan relied on criticism from such as Grenier and Martin du Gard regarding the "notes" section: timely warnings could alert him to the greatest danger, that of slipping into fatuity or banality (167). Paulhan also re-instituted the "Notules", a compendium of very short reviews,
to deal with the less important part of an ever-increasing book production: he conferred this upon René Lalou in November 1925 (168). To Lalou's distress, Paulhan decided to transform this rubric into the broader "Revue des Livres" section in February 1928 (169); Paulhan himself delighted in these summary executions, but Martin du Gard disliked them (170). They were, however, indispensible, and later Paulhan, writing under his pseudonym Jean Guérin, incorporated them into his "Bulletin" rubric.

The "Revue des revues" was another essential rubric which conformed to the widely-accepted practice of reprinting and commenting upon extracts from interesting or significant articles in competitors' reviews. Thus "house-authors" appearing elsewhere could be quoted, as well as material from reviews which Paulhan supported or wished to promote, particularly those close to the NRF (171). Not only this, mention could also be made of writers who otherwise would never (or rarely) appear in the NRF, such as Henri Massis or Charles Maurras. Extracts from periodicals such as L'Action française or Candide could be inserted as documentation or supplementary material to fuel the debates engaged in the NRF (172). Paulhan, for whom this rubric was of particular fascination (173), provided most of the material and later incorporated the "Revue de Mois" into his "Bulletin" section. All these rubrics provided the basic structure or framework for organising the monthly contributions to the review: regardless of their presentation, they were a constant feature. Periodically, however, given the nature of the historical
evolution of the 1930's, the review was forced to adapt and
to refresh itself: here, Paulhan was particularly successful.

Indeed during 1927 Martin du Gard and Gide had already
praised Paulhan for the positive impetus he had given the
review (174). In March 1927 a "Lettre à nos Abonnés" was
inserted in the publicity brochure at the front of the review.
It confidently announced that the NRF had had a "succès rapide,
inattenué, qui a fait en treize années de la NRF la première
revue littéraire en France" (175). Promises were made to expand
the critical section and, indeed, in August the pagination
increased from 128 to 144 pages; at last Paulhan's "projects"
for the presentation of the review could be put into practice:
Alain's "Propos" began in April, "Jean Guérin" began the expanded
"Revue des Revues" section in July and the critical section
expanded and consolidated after August. Gallimard's choice
had been vindicated: under Paulhan, advised as he was by Gide,
Martin du Gard, Schlumberger and Grenier, the NRF had entered
its most successful phase.

One way of measuring the success of the review is to examine
certain data regarding subscriptions. As is normal with the
publishers of most literary reviews, official figures are rarely
divulged; indeed in the case of the NRF, they are a jealously-
guarded secret, as is the subscription-list itself. However there
is sufficient data in Paulhan's correspondence and elsewhere to
permit a relatively accurate estimate to be made. It is
important to emphasise that the subscription figures of any
review are well below the total printing for each month and,
in the case of the NRF, this figure often fluctuated dramatically, usually upwards, especially on publication of special numbers or tributes (176). The question is made more complex by the fact that with many of the NRF's subscriptions, each issue would reach more than one reader, for, as a literary review, the NRF was indispensable material in railway waiting-rooms, drawing-rooms on the "Messageries Maritimes" and, of course, in libraries (177).

The NRF had quickly attracted a substantial readership from the very beginning, whereas some periodicals were fortunate if they had four or five hundred readers, let alone subscribers. Within the first year alone, 1909 to 1910, the NRF was printing 1,400 numbers a month, and on the eve of war in 1914, the subscription figure had risen to 1,400 (178). These and other data show that the overall printing (tirage) figure was normally double that of the regular subscription list, meaning that by mid-1914 the average printing would have been between 2,500 and 3,000 a month. After the resumption in June 1919 the same figure was quickly re-established, particularly by Christmas that year, for the review had, once again, become very sought after (179). Entering the New Year 1920 with some 1,500 subscribers, the NRF thereafter steadily built upon its success. In the course of a study on its rival Europe, founded in 1923, Joseph Kvapil notes that the NRF had 2,000 subscribers (180). By 1925 when Paulhan took over, the figures become clearer, for the newly-appointed editor kept Schlumberger informed of the progress made: in June 1925 Schlumberger learnt
of some of Paulhan's projects (181) and that the review had gained "200 abonnés nouveaux" (182). "Tout de même", continued Paulhan, "nous sommes bien loin encore des 8,000 abonnés que nous devrions avoir" (183).

By 1927, the year of expansion, Paulhan could celebrate by tabulating all the nett-gains in "abonnements" over an eight-year period:

"Il y a, dans les progrès de la NRF, un côté presque mécanique, qui est assez étonnant. Ainsi la NRF a gagné:

- en 1920 : 100 abonnés
- 1921 : 150 abonnés
- 1922 : 140 abonnés
- 1923 : 750 abonnés
- 1924 : 450 abonnés
- 1925 : 875 abonnés
- 1926 : 1100 abonnés
- (1927 : 900 abonnés). Or ces "bonds" sont régulièrement dus à une œuvre particulière (184).

A calculation may be made to show an estimated (but honest) figure of subscriptions for the end of Paulhan's first seven months as editor. Adding the gains for the years 1923 to 1925 (2,075) to the 1923 base-figure of 2,000, a total of 4,075 subscribers is reached. By the end of 1927 he could expect a further 900 which, combined with the 1926 figure of 1,100, constituted a remarkable success, thus increasing the regular subscription sale to some 6,000 per month; by 1928, the NRF was printing over 12,000 numbers a month (185). Further evidence suggests that as the Inter-War years progressed, the NRF continued to expand its printing (186); this, interestingly enough, was not only due to the changing fortunes of other reviews (187) but is also explained by the fact that the NRF's
treatment of historical events gained readers. In March 1939, after Munich, Paulhan wrote to tell Schlumberger that:

"La "montée" continue: 100 abonnés de plus en décembre - janvier, 260 en janvier - février, 140 en février - mars. Je crois que le numéro de novembre (1938) est à l'origine de tout" (188).

Its stance against Munich drew an extra 500 subscribers in three months showing that the success of the NRF cannot be solely attributed to its literary standing: even during the war itself, the review continued to gain readers (189).

The year 1927 did indeed represent a turning-point, not only for the NRF itself, but also for Gallimard's empire-building: by 1928, Gallimard had added Détective and Du Cinéma to his domains under the umbrella company "ZED" publications (190). In 1932 Gallimard also entered the high-circulation political weeklies market with the founding of Marianne, edited by Emmanuel Berl (191). Paulhan and Berl harboured suspicions of one another (192), but worst of all, Paulhan felt that most of the regular contributors to the NRF would be tempted by Marianne, including Gide (193). In the event, Gide contributed little. Politically, Berl's proximity to Herriot and the "quai d'Orsay" placed Marianne close to government circles and, although sympathetic to the "Front populaire", it was never fanatical. It faced competition from Vendredi in 1935 and after falling circulation hit it in 1937, Gallimard sold it to Radicalist politician Raymond Pâtenotre (194). The whole episode of the founding of Marianne, the commercialization of Gallimard's and intensifying political pressures brought any
Indeed, as the 1930's went on, and in particular, just prior to the "Front populaire" victory of June 1936, pressures to politicize the NRF itself were building up. Paulhan confided to Jouhandeau that "ils ne peuvent pas souffrir, dans la NRF, qu'elle soit si peu politique... je me sens assez seul, dans cette maison" (196).

Accompanying these pressures came suggestions that Gallimard should either take over Europe or set up a new political review under Guéhenno, removed recently from Europe (197); in the event, neither of these possible moves was made. In 1938, however, the "Librairie Gallimard" took over the fortnightly review Les Nouveaux Cahiers (198); Paulhan himself contributed articles to the "Analyse des Mots" section, articles close to the field of interest of Les Fleurs de Tarbes (199). Finally, in 1938, Gallimard expanded into the new medium of radio by arranging for front-line NRF authors to give talks on their work. Although presentations by Paulhan, Gide, Suarès and Claudel were scheduled or envisaged, the "Quart d'Heure de la NRF", broadcast by Radio-37, was doomed to failure when a talk on Claudel's poetry over-ran by two minutes and was cut-off by a concert (200). Early in 1939, the short-lived experiment came to an end by mutual consent (201).

Against this background of commercial expansionism, the NRF itself continued to prolong its success. However, there was no guarantee that the NRF could persist in adhering to the same formula and succeed indefinitely. From time to time certain
risks had to be taken to infuse new strength into the review: this covered two important areas, content (and editorial policy) and the format of the review itself. Regarding the content and the direction taken by Paulhan, two of the most persistent critics from within were Gide and Martin du Gard. Partly due to Martin du Gard's interests in Franco-German relations, and to Gide's increasing interest in the Soviet Union, the year 1932 saw increasing pressures being applied to Paulhan, pressures which eventually were to lead to the instigation of new priorities in policy, as well as to changes in the aspect of the NRF itself. Not only was Gide disaffected by Gallimard's commercialism, by 1932 he was also very distracted from literary concerns; for instance, he confessed to Louis Martin-Chauffier that "je pense tout le temps que des événements si importants se préparent qu'on a presque honte de s'occuper de la littérature" (202).

One direct result of these preoccupations was that Gide decided to publish extracts from his Journal in the NRF. On March 12th 1932, he told Paulhan that "cette publication est (pour moi du moins) fort importante" (203). Plans were even mooted for a new rubric - "Discussions et Controverses", and later, although this idea was not instituted, in January 1933 a selection of documents on Russian youth appeared (204). Not surprisingly, when Gide's pro-Soviet statements appeared in June and July, the reaction was widespread and sometimes polemical. François Mauriac for one went on to the offensive, and Gide agreed that Paulhan should insert extracts in the "Revue des Revues" (205). Gide's remarks to his editor are extremely valuable for they show that he was fully conscious of
the risks he was taking in publishing such potentially explosive material in a literary review like the NRF; he still considered balance to be the paramount consideration:

"Il importe que la NRF se maintienne le plus possible non-tendancieuse et... arbitrale. Je ne me fais point d'illusion sur le péril que mes pages du Journal lui font courir. Il importe aussi que vous la préservez de tomber tout dans un sens, de verser de côté. Roger Martin du Gard me communiqua à ce sujet vos réflexions, qui sont parfaites. Vous me connaissez assez pour bien penser que tout cela se livre de terribles débats et combats dans ma cervelle, où j'ai souvent grand mal d'y voir clair" (206).

There is little doubt that Gide was genuinely troubled by the effect his increasingly committed stance would have on the NRF, especially as the review began to receive a number of cancelled subscriptions (207). This concern was translated by the fact that he was very keen to underline and maintain the demarcation between his own "engagement", and the "raison d'être" of the NRF: in spite of his recent declarations, he was insistent that the NRF must remain independent. Yet this might have been perfectly clear within the NRF circle; outside it was an entirely different matter. Indeed both Schlumberger and Martin du Gard expressed increasingly forceful reservations about the public effect of Gide's political orientation, and how it was noticeably steering the NRF into danger. This question is absolutely crucial in any explanation of the policy underlying the success of the "phénomène NRF"; it certainly remained central in editorial policy at any period in the history of the review in the Inter-War years. If Paulhan disagreed with Gide in other matters, including the publication of his Journal, he was in complete accord with the principle informing this
fundamental issue of policy (208).

NRF policy was pre-eminently self-conscious to the extent that the "orthodoxy" of the review was constantly tested by newer "non-conformist" elements or forces to which it gave birth and then nurtured within itself. This policy was also an extension of the care applied in balancing the review, whether in the presentation of the Contents or in counter-balancing political views. Here Paulhan always attempted to place the NRF at the centre of an oscillation between what he called the "saugrenu"—texts (not necessarily literary) challenging the status quo—and the "orthodoxe". To illustrate this, in 1935 Jean Grenier innocently reported that a Raymond Roussel text and a criticism of it had "épate tous les bourgeois qui lisent la NRF" (209). He perhaps did not know that he was referring to an issue which would preoccupy the newly-appointed director of the NRF for some months ahead in a defence of his policy aimed primarily at Jean Schlumberger. In two long letters of July 1935, Paulhan vigorously defended his own approach and, if his initial remarks were predominantly literary in scope and content (210), his defence was applicable to the motivating principle underlying his broader conception of the NRF:

"Cette orthodoxie, songez aux dangers contre lesquels il a fallu la défendre: après tout, la NRF a infiniment risqué de devenir trop moralisante à la suite de Pontigny, trop communisante à la suite de Gide, trop métaphysicienne à la suite de Benda; elle aurait pu glisser avec Maurois et Morand vers un conformisme assez plat; avec Kessel vers un romanesque assez vulgaire et tapageur. Et je ne dis pas qu'elle soit parfaite: du moins a-t-elle
One of the key sentences here is the following: "Du moins a-t-elle conservé (...) une ouverture vers les jeunes gens et cette sorte de faculté de renouvellement continu". Underlying the impetus toward renewal is implanted a "pointe de saugrenu", within the long-standing orthodoxy of the NRF. Unlike many other unadventurous reviews, Paulhan's NRF was not afraid to offer material which could displease its readers. The particular position the NRF occupied within the range of literary periodicals allowed it to bend both ways: for instance, a review like the Revue des deux Mondes was produced by and for Academicians, civil servants and the upper-bourgeoisie who expected it to print 'conservative' texts. A review sheltering so many Academicians would never have published heterodox texts which might threaten established, even institutionalized, norms of literary or intellectual acceptability. Readership expectation and tolerance were evidently important, for the obverse of the same coin is pertinent here: the NRF was strong enough commercially to
be able to risk printing Artaud, Roussel and Audiberti (or even Léautaud from the older generation) without losing too much. If some subscriptions were lost, others might then be gained from different quarters.

Furthermore there was the connection with the 'avant-garde' reviews, some of which were extremely ephemeral, but, as Paulhan rightly pointed out, were often founded by erstwhile or future contributors to the NRF. Paulhan's astuteness as editor and talent-spotter resided, in large part, in exploiting his seemingly endless network of contacts, form the Academy (occasionally via Daniel Halévy) to the surrealists and communists (via either André Rolland de Renéville or Aragon), with the more liberal sector of the teaching profession occupying the middle-ground. Such a self-conscious policy enabled the NRF to include enough mainstream material to appeal to its liberal-minded audience, but it did not exclude texts which might only have a limited appeal. Paulhan knew that some would cause a stir and would take some time to be recuperated into the broader spectrum of literary taste. It is certain that publication in the NRF conferred an aura of (sometimes fashionable) acceptability. Once again, in the specific context of the letter cited above, it was the public stances and statements adopted and pronounced by such as Gide and Malraux which gave rise to Schlumberger's anxiety; like it or not, their literary merits and talents were widely approved during this time. Schlumberger had no doubt become more conservative than he realized since the start of the review in 1908-9; this, too, partly explaining Paulhan's admonitory tone.
The controversy continued: after a meeting at the NRF in April 1937, Gide and Schlumberger were still discussing Paulhan's predilection for the "saugrenu" "genre" as Gide put it, a "genre" which Gide himself claimed to have revived. As for Paulhan, he was nothing if not consistent; he continued to express similar ideas in a variety of texts even until eight years before his death. Once again, because of the sometimes widely differing views on the direction taken by the NRF, Paulhan had his defenders within the review. Martin du Gard could write in 1936 of the unique position the review occupied in the world of letters:

"La NRF est d'une qualité si particulière, elle occupe aujourd'hui parmi les revues une place si isolée, si "différente", que je n'ai eu aucune difficulté à trouver de quoi satisfaire, à peu près, Europe, Commune, Vendredi et tutti quanti." (214).

There was one fundamental difference between the two remaining founders of the original NRF and Paulhan: Gide and Schlumberger considered it unavoidable (if not essential) to include material on historical, political or social matters. Their great friend-in-common, Martin du Gard shared their concerns although he was not a contributor of such material. It is of significance too that Paulhan felt it necessary to remind his radio audience in 1938 of a principle he considered paramount:
"Laissez-moi vous rappeler d'abord ce qu'est la NRF. C'est une revue littéraire. On aurait tort de l'acheter pour se faire une opinion sur la politique, ou sur l'économie sociale. (...) Il est un point sur lequel elle ne varie pas: c'est la valeur littéraire (...). La littérature a, entre autres, ce mérite: c'est qu'elle dépasse les modes et les partis, l'historie et l'actualité" (215).

Yet despite this insistence, and because of the pressures from Gide and Martin du Gard brought to bear since 1932, the NRF underwent considerable changes as the 1930's progressed; indeed, the ground was being prepared for these transformations as early as 1927 with the publication of Benda's La Trahison des Clercs and the subsequent debate (216).

Also in 1927 the NRF had embarked upon its programme of expansion and renewal, a process which was pursued into the 1930's (217). By 1933, however, clearly Paulhan felt that the review was too restricted, too inflexible. In fact he was thinking of

"une refonte totale de la partie notes de la NRF: quelque chose de plus complet et de bien plus bref (aussi, peut-être des notes politiques - mais les faire intelligentes et sans parti, c'est terriblement difficile)" (218).

After much thought, Paulhan finally struck upon the formula he was seeking to enlarge the scope of the review in order both to deflect criticism and to ease the political pressures being applied by Gide and Martin du Gard. On November 7th 1933, he shared his scheme with Grenier:
"Je voudrais donner chaque mois dans la NRF une rubrique d'Actualité (si l'on peut dire) (...). Le tout traité en notes brèves, d'une demi-page chacune. Je t'en prie, songes-y sérieusement et donne-moi avant dix jours deux ou trois notes. Après tout, pourquoi ne parlerions-nous pas de ce qui "se passe" aussi bien que n'importe quelle Marianne ou 1933?" (219).

Thus in December 1933 the first "Air du Mois" section appeared covering seventeen pages at the end of the review; the longest of the contributions were one and a half pages, and the shortest four lines (220). Thereafter the format changed little. At the beginning, as Claude Martin has said, the "Airs du Mois" offered "une suite d'échos, de pages d'humour ou de menus textes librement conçus, qui donnaient en effect "de l'air" dans la construction de chaque fascicule" (221). Once again reactions were swift and, on the whole, they were favourable, although both Martin du Gard (222) and Grenier (223) expressed reservations about the "journalistic" nature of the material. Having made a relatively successful start, the new section came into its own after February 1934 when Paulhan used it to present a selection of views on the February 6th riots in Paris (224).

By 1937, the director of the NRF began to find that there was a growing demand for comments on recent events, as well as for indications of forthcoming events. Paulhan told Grenier:

"nous allons publier dans chaque numéro (à la demande générale) quatre pages destinées à mettre le lecteur au courant de tout: événements littéraires, livres, théâtre, cinéma, etc. Je t'en prie, envoie-moi huit ou dix notes de 2 à 3 lignes sur ce que tu voudras (surtout des livres)" (225).
Thus the "Bulletin" was inaugurated in March 1937 as a complement to the "Airs du Mois". It later assumed a place of its own and incorporated brief notes on "Événements-Les Livres-Spectacles", the best of which Paulhan thought were provided by Armand Petitjean, of whom he wrote "c'est un homme de génie que nous tenons là" (226).

From February 1938 Paulhan himself prepared the "Bulletin", using his pseudonym Jean Guérin; in particular, in the "événements" page, he achieved a sometimes ironical, even thought-provoking, effect in his juxtapositions and elliptical notations. From October 1939, the "événements" disappeared; Paulhan evidently believed that it was no longer appropriate to continue his commentary given the gravity of the international situation (227).

From early 1938 Paulhan became increasingly embattled at the review; moreover, signs of a decline in the quality of the NRF had begun to manifest themselves, for attempts during 1937 to inject new life had not been overwhelmingly successful. A number of contributory factors led Paulhan to dispatch a circular letter to several writers on March 31st 1938, soliciting their opinion on the review, and ways in which they thought its performance might be improved. The circular began:

"Jamais on n'a reproché la NRF d'être glaciale et morne avec plus de violence que depuis quelques semaines. Brasillach (entre autres) nous appelle des diplodocus; et Jean Marteau, des pédants" (228).

According to Paulhan, the "notes" were most at fault. He felt that "elles vont un peu dans tous les sens" (229); moreover he felt that the "âme de la revue" was somehow no longer present or tangible,
at least not in the sense that it was present in Esprit or Europe, in spite of the fact that these two periodicals were subordinated to "un catéchisme politique ou moral" (230). For all this Paulhan felt that the unity of the NRF group still thrived, but perhaps it could be more prominently exposed in the review itself. Ironically enough at the same time, Gide was again ruminating to Martin du Gard that he shared his regrets "de ne voir point la NRF se faire plus ouverte aux préoccupations du jour" (231). Jean Grenier, one of the recipients of the letter, wrote back at length in a fashion which must have given Paulhan some encouragement (232). Moreover he considered that if contributors other than Paulhan criticised or even monitored the "notes" of their colleagues, then the director might lose his authority, and the priority would shift from judging talent to judging ideas, a step which would only infringe the independence of the contributors. In conclusion Grenier suggested that the "chroniques" section should perhaps be more unified (233).

By late summer 1938 Paulhan still felt uneasy about the critical section of the review and (as he had done several times during the 1930's) invited Grenier to contribute a regular "chronique" and "notes" for the forthcoming year. This time, however, contemporary events provided the "redressement" he was looking for: the Munich crisis of September led directly to the NRF adopting a partisan (anti-Munich) stance with its November issue (234). A year later, at the time of the declaration of war in September 1939, many of the NRF writers were mobilized
and sent to the front: Arland, Sartre and Petitjean, among the regulars of the review's critical section, could no longer be relied upon to submit copy. Moreover Etiemble and Caillios were in the Americas. Paulhan, therefore, had to seek elsewhere for material. In September he wrote that "il me semble qu'il faut à la guerre une revue un peu élargie (et d'autant plus je vais avoir moins de notes et d'Airs du Mois)" (235). Paulhan resorted to some "general interest" texts and complemented them with some short, unpublished material (236).

Before too long however, Paulhan's worries as editor regarding the aspect of the NRF and the fulfilment of any given editorial policy became increasingly subordinated to and overshadowed by his attempts to provide a realistic- or at least unequivocal- representation of the "Drôle de Guerre". In June 1940 Paulhan and his review were literally overtaken by events: the Nazi Occupation prevented the appearance of the periodical which had dominated the French intellectual and literary scene over the last twenty years (237).

By no means always successful, Paulhan contributed to and consolidated the reputation of the NRF, which had been established by the time he took over as editor in 1925. Fully supported and advised by a range of correspondents, he maintained and even augmented the vitality and status of the review, and changed the emphases of his editorial policy to suit the exigencies of the time. What is more, he did not shy away from altering its aspect and structure if, as a result, it could be refreshed. Despite
his reservations and his principles Paulhan found that to ignore the preoccupations of the day would have made the NRF less arresting.

The treatment of such questions followed in the wake of a prolonged debate conducted both inside and outside the NRF on the nature and rôle of the intellectual and his responsibilities within society: this debate found its catalyst, if not its very centre of gravity, in a work published by Paulhan in the NRF. This work, Julien Benda's La Trahison des Clercs, marked the beginning of a phase whereby French intellectuals in general— not merely those circulating at the NRF— defined their stance relative to Benda's own apparently haughty position. It is highly significant that a supposedly exclusive literary review should open itself up as a forum to discuss topical and social issues, even if the periodical did not harbour writers of any one, predominant or identifiable political persuasion, or even if many of these same writers declined to descend into the public arena. Furthermore, Benda's text contained references not only to issues relevant since the Dreyfus Affair and even before, it also presaged those questions which, during the 1930's, would become paramount.
"Between Idealism and Commitment: La Trahison des Clercs and Intellectual Debate in the NRF, 1927 to 1932".

"Peu d'articles de la NRF ont soulevé plus d'émotion, de l'enthousiasme de Gide à l'horreur de Marsan, que La Trahison des Clercs. Il va y avoir des ripostes assez dures" (Jean Paulhan to Schlumberger, BD.25066, November 1927).

"Qu'est-ce que devient la NRF? Quelle drôle d'époque, Hein? Tout ennobli par la politique (au grand sens), tout avilie et compromise par l'autre (hélas! la plus active)" (Ramuz to Jean Paulhan, Lettres II, 1919-1947, Grasset, 1959, p256, 25/7/32).
Since Jean Paulhan had taken over the editorship of the NRF in 1925 nothing had been published in it which might have been politically or even socially sensitive. Paulhan's own attitude and the review's committee structure prevented any possible repetition of Rivière's occasional imperiousness in selecting material, literary or otherwise. Yet Paulhan's admiration for Julien Benda attracted him to a new text, La Trahison des Clercs, particularly as the work's central argument was against any form of what would come to be known as intellectual "engagement"; ostensibly Benda was attacking all forms of intellectual treason. Paulhan could not know, however, that the effect of publishing this work would be the reverse: it coincided with the time when solutions to the apparent impasse it implied were beginning to be considered. Instead of preventing "engagement", the debates it nurtured prepared the way for the public "prises de position" of various individuals such as Malraux and Gide within moves toward a collective mobilization of intellectuals, in 1932.

Thus, situated in the intellectual history of Inter-War France, La Trahison des Clercs, in spite of itself, worked as a catalyst in an intense period of self-questioning culminating in Paul Nizan's essay Les Chiens de garde, a violent harangue not only against Benda's position, but also against the political quietism of university philosophers.

Under the direction of Rivière, Benda had been kept at a distance from the NRF despite their common antipathy for the Nationalist Right, with whom Rivière crossed swords after the
resumption of the review in June 1919(1). It was also possibly the influence of Thibaudet, Bergsonist as he was, who advised Rivière to exclude this inveterate attacker of Bergson(2). Equally it may have been Benda’s rather ignominious literary career and his idiosyncratic views on literary creativity which displeased Rivière(3). Paulhan, however, had a deep admiration for Benda and felt that it was time he should have access to the review: thus from August to November 1927, La Trahison des Clercs appeared in four eagerly-read instalments. Yet Benda’s text did not receive unanimous approval when it was proposed as a serial. Writing much later, Benda himself remembered that Thibaudet, at least, had opposed its publication:

"Quand la NRF décide de publier ma Trahison des Clercs, Thibaudet, qui faisait partie du jury, s’insurgea contre cette décision, déclarant que ma forme d’esprit était absolument désuète, dénuée de tout intérêt. L’ouvrage paraît, et je crois pouvoir dire sans outrance qu’il est l’objet d’une certaine attention. Là-dessus, Thibaudet lui consacre trois grands articles, estimant que l’œuvre était de valeur, puisque le public le retenait"(4).

To say that it was "l’objet d’une certaine attention" is a considerable understatement, for the debates it sparked off and the vocabulary it employed and made current - "les clercs", "la cléricature," etc., persisted long afterwards.

Viewed in one respect Benda’s text was tangential to the question of "inquiétude"(5), and it served to remind especially
those writers of the younger generation that they should not lose sight of eternal principles such as Truth and Justice, that these should remain sacrosanct and respected above all else, and that political commitment was at least dangerous if not treasonable.

One team of young writers grouped around Les Cahiers du Mois had already published their Examens de Conscience\(^6\) in 1926, some two years after Marcel Arland\'s seminal essay "Sur un Nouveau Mal du siècle"\(^7\); Thibaudet clearly saw these Examens as a significant contribution to the problem although, interestingly enough, he noted that "la politique ne tente (malheureusement) personne"\(^8\). Eight months later, reflecting on the young "écrivains philosophes" in the Cahiers verts volume Ecrits, Thibaudet commended:

"Une critique philosophe, qui ne manque pas d'âînés, qui est riche en jeunes, et qui est ou sera chez elle dans plusieurs organes, voilà une réalité d'aujourd'hui et une possibilité de demain"\(^9\).

Among the "âînés" referred to was Julien Benda, and Thibaudet then proceeded to forge an interesting and important link with Rivière\'s review:

"Dans le manifeste vivant et charmant qu'il écrivit lors de la reprise de la NRF en juin 1919, Jacques Rivière déclarait que l'opinion attendait de notre organe des explications sur Marcel Proust, le cubisme et Julien Benda (...). Nous lirons bientôt un important ouvrage de cet écrivain philosophe, La Trahison des Clercs, qui, je crois bien, nous fournira l'occasion de remplir cette partie du programme de Rivière"\(^10\).
Although many connections may be made between La Trahison des Clercs and previous intellectual history, the most important issue, at least within the parameters defining Rivière's "programme", was the lasting effect of the war. The central concern in 1919 had been that the review should, before all else, be re-established as "un terrain propice à la création", with a solid critical base. However, the war and its consequences should not (or could not) be ignored:

"Nous voulons refaire une revue désintéressée, une revue où l'on continuera de juger et de créer en toute liberté d'esprit, non pas "comme si rien ne s'était passé", mais en continuant de n'obéir, dans chaque ordre, qu'à des principes spécifiques."

The very wording of this text implies a paradox, for if the war was to be taken fully account of, it was impossible to adopt a completely objective position without ignoring the fact that the war had taken place. The war had changed the world, so drastically that Rivière's primary task was to "faire cesser cette contrainte que la guerre exerce encore sur les intelligences...". Plainly Rivière's target was the Action française- inspired Parti de l'Intelligence, and his opposition to the war forced him to oppose Charles Maurras and his satellites. In one important sense this is where Benda's connection with Rivière's "manifesto" derives, for one principal target of La Trahison des Clercs was Nationalism. It is true that Rivière rejected ivory-tower detachment and claimed political neutrality; but, in the next page, he insisted that although reflection on current events and on the war would not be excluded from the review,
"Ce ne seront jamais tout à fait des professions de foi politiques: plutôt une sorte de critique et d'interprétation de l'histoire contemporaine, mais à travers lesquelles forcément s'entreverra une couleur politique"(17).

Benda's text is dated 1924-1927, thus indicating that the book was the result of considerable meditation; an interview with Frédéric Lefèvre, published in 1925, usefully summarizes his preoccupations and intentions. In response to a question from Lefèvre on what he called a moral decline in France, Benda stated:

"Ce que je puis vous dire en gros, c'est que la moralité générale actuelle me semble extrêmement basse et mener directement à des entretueries telles que l'histoire n'en aura jamais vu de pareilles"(18).

The basic cause of this decline was, according to Benda, an obsession with "le pur temporel", as well as a distaste for "Toute valeur proprement idéale et désintéressée"(19). There were, now, only two concerns, Nation and Class. Not only this, but writers and philosophers - or "les clercs" - compounded the problem by sanctifying these "religions du terrestre"; Barrès, Bourget, Nietzsche, Marx, Péguy and Sorel preached and glorified temporal realisms. "C'est ce que j'appelle La Trahison des Clercs", continued Benda, and he quoted Renouvier's phrase "la Monde pérît du manque de foi dans une vérité transcendant", a phrase he used as the epigraph to his book(20).

The first two parts of the book examined the "perfectionnement moderne des passions politiques", and outlined the definitions of
these passions; the third part, "Les Clercs", contained the main polemical thrust of the work, and exposed the treason in the light of the political passions. Here Benda's thesis was that "les clercs" had betrayed their secular functions by preaching action. The force of this argument derived partly from the plethora of examples cited to illustrate his case, however contestable some of them are. Their treason was attributable to three main factors. Firstly, "les clercs adoptent les passions politiques" (21). Instead of restraining the spread of political interests, they were now the very agents of their spread. The "clercs" had adopted, in particular, "la passion nationale", whereby the national was preferred to the universal. Here Benda fully paraded his unflagging anti-Germanism: "Il convient de reconnaître que, dans cette adhésion du clerc moderne au fanatisme national, ce sont les clercs allemands qui ont commencé" (22).

Secondly this nationalistic fervour had been fully absorbed into their works: "les clercs font le jeu des passions politiques par leurs doctrines" (23). In exalting the particular and the national, the "clercs" had betrayed humanism. This is the first major issue informing the debates pursued thereafter in the NRF. In flouting the universal, humanism was only good insofar as it promoted the interests of either National or Class. Using culture to exalt, actively or passively, the national good was the only process acceptable to "les clercs modernes" (24). When such passions motivated the writing of history, the treason reached perhaps its most dangerous state. This was the second
area of interest to be developed in the review, in particular regarding Action française historians. Finally in this section came Benda's attacks on intellectuals' glorification of pragmatism, which he found had been promoted by their glorification of courage, honour and what Benda called "la dureté"(25), or lack of human compassion.

The November issue carried the remainder of the book's third part, entitled "Les Causes". Benda considered that "le monde moderne a fait du clerc un citoyen"(26), an emphasis on modern social conditions which heralded his views in the final section. He continued:

"La nouvelle foi du clerc est, en grande part, une suite des conditions sociales qui lui sont imposées et le vrai mal à déplorer de nos jours n'est peut-être pas la trahison des clercs, mais la disparition des clercs, l'impossibilité de mener dans le monde actuel une existence de clerc"(27).

The paradox behind this view is that since the historical separation of Church and State and the institution of a secularized "clericature", it was simply no longer possible to maintain "une classe d'honnêtes exemples des devoirs civils"(28). This line of thinking led Benda to attack the subservience of "l'écrivain pratique" to the bourgeoisie, "laquelle fait les renommées et dispense les honneurs"(29). To Benda, the modern writer did no more than uphold and perpetuate the bourgeois order(30), a line of attack subsequently adopted and discussed in the NRF by Jean Guéhenno and Emmanuel Berl.

This fourth instalment ended with the "Vue d'ensemble-Pronostics"(31). Benda's tone here changed considerably: he
pursued his point that "le réalisme politique des clercs" was linked to the very essence of the modern world. The idealism of a "cléricature pure" was no longer possible. Finally, and to great effect, Benda raised the spectre of war, both the 1914-1918 war and the coming conflagration. The most central of these prognoses was the following:

"Si, en effet, on se demande où va l'humanité dont chaque groupe s'enfonce plus âprement que jamais dans la conscience de son intérêt particulier en tant que particulier et se fait dire par ses moralistes qu'il est sublime dans la mesure où il ne connaît pas d'autre loi que cet intérêt, un enfant trouverait la réponse: elle va à la guerre la plus totale et la plus parfaite que le monde aura vue, soit qu'elle ait lieu entre nations, soit entre classes"(32).

The corollary of this was that peace should be re-established as "une principe abstrait et supérieur (aux) egoïsmes"(33), and "la paix, si jamais elle existe, ne reposera pas sur la crainte de la guerre mais sur l'amour de la paix; elle sera l'avènement d'un état d'âme"(34). Here in embryo is an expression of the thinking which came to underpin the adherence of intellectuals and writers such a Guéhenno, Gide and Martin du Gard to the nascent Peace Movement in 1932. However much La Trahison des Clercs bears witness to Benda's idealism and to his calls for the maintenance of eternal values, it had evidently become impossible to resist the forces of history. Indeed, earlier that same year, the NRF had published Gide's Voyage au Congo (35), a text which made it only too clear that current social, historically-derived issues had to be confronted. Ironically
Benda's book arrived on the scene at a particularly topical time some months after the Vatican had condemned the Action française for its political bias (36). The Action française never fully recovered from this ban, which provoked a number of dissidences. Moreover Benda forced the Action française and Maurras on to the defensive, a reversal of the situation in 1919 when the NRF had had to defend itself against the Nationalist-inspired Parti de L'Intelligence.

Within the NRF Gide and Paulhan welcomed and acclaimed La Trahison des Clercs (37), and in December 1927 reactions to Benda's work began to appear. In his "Reflexions" rubric (38), Thibaudet's opening comments emphasized once again that Rivière attached great importance to Benda's critical ideas, and that he would have been happy to see them published; indeed, continued Thibaudet,

"il eût été plus heureux encore de les voir discuter, de les discuter lui-même. Elles appellent en effet la discussion et les réserves comme une terre sèche appelle la pluie" (39).

Taking issue with his "besoin de logique nue", Thibaudet found that Benda was essentially "en lutte contre son temps" (40). The overriding criticism was the general one applicable to any of the theses in the book that Benda tended to be a victim of his own prejudices. For instance, his anti-Bergsonism had led him into dismissing all pragmatism. "Il pense sous la catégorie du Non!", said Bergsonist Thibaudet; "Bergson, Maurras, Barrès, ayant été les trois grandes influences qu'aït
subies sa génération, il a employé sa dialectique à les combattre. (...)"\(^{(41)}\). Thibaudet continued: "Et il n'a pas eu de peine à leur trouver une tête commune. Cette tête, c'est le pragmatisme"\(^{(42)}\). La Trahison des Clercs was flawed inasmuch as its critical perspective was too narrow; Benda's method was too inflexible for Thibaudet, who was far more optimistic. He concluded that if that human spirit could survive far less enlightened phases of history, then surely it would not allow itself to be crushed in the modern world:

"Je pense bien que, pour M. Benda comme pour nous, tout le mal, si mal il y a, réside dans le suffixe: isme, car les nationalités ont fait la richesse, la variété, la complexité de l'Europe moderne. (...) Je suis extrêmement sensible (...) au grand style intérieur du désespoir de M. Benda, au beau style (...) . Ma pensée, ou ma nature, se refusent en partager la substance"\(^{(43)}\).

Moreover Thibaudet went on to defend Germany against Benda's attacks\(^{(44)}\).

The same month another dissenting view came in the NRF, this time from Gabriel Marcel\(^{(45)}\). His objections were metaphysical; he considered that Benda had misunderstood the vital point that, far from operating in a vacuum, modern metaphysics functioned in direct relation to reality:

"la religion de l'abstrait telle que la pratique M. Benda est en un sens aux antipodes du rationalisme historique véritable"\(^{(46)}\).

Indeed Marcel argued that metaphysics is of utterly no use at all unless it is applied to reality. The "clerc" of necessity is a pragmatist, otherwise he should remain silent.
These were not the only objections to Benda's essay. Ramon Fernandez wrote in late 1927 to Paulhan:

"Le Benda vaut par les principes ou les questions soulevées, mais pêche par les exemples et l'esprit de la dialectique. Il ne marque aucune distinction entre, et donc confond perpétuellement, les idées qui ressemblent à l'intelligence, et qui peuvent ne pas lui ressembler. Que diriez-vous d'une chronique lui répondant dans ce sens?" (47).

Paulhan evidently agreed to this idea for "Sur La Trahison des Clercs" duly appeared in the January number, 1928 (48). Fernandez was ready to agree when Benda objected that "la confusion du pratique et de l'idéal dépasse toutes les bornes permises" (49). With his multiple perspectives, from metaphysics to literature to history, Benda had produced a new outlook on the problem of the intellectual. However, for Fernandez, Benda seemed unaware that, due to the development of science, and due to the decline in religious beliefs, ideas were no longer tenable in a void: "ces idées n'ont d'existence, en tant qu'idées, que si elles se déterminent et se justifient dans l'expérience" (50). Fernandez was clearly taking the step which Benda had refused to take or would not acknowledge: he was arguing from a more modern philosophical perspective than Benda: "c'est par l'acte même de l'intelligence que l'homme perçoit le réel dans son irréductibilité" (51). Although he was arguing within philosophical parameters, Fernandez contended that it was quite untenable for "les clercs" to survive in the modern world without applying their talents to reality: he inverted Benda's thesis, whilst agreeing wholeheartedly that "la tâche la plus urgente du clerc est de
sauver l'esprit" (52). By way of conclusion, he affirmed that

"il ne le sauvera pas en se retirant dans le royaume des vérités abstraites. Le clerc ne sauvera l'esprit qu'en retrouvant l'esprit dans chaque expérience particulière, qu'en montrant comment celui-ci dessine et soutient la moindre réalité" (53).

And, finally, Fernandez urged Benda himself towards "engagement":

"Julien Benda est le philosophe aristocrate, le philosophe aux mains propres. Je crois qu'il faut se salir un peu, et même beaucoup, pour sauver ce qu'il révère avec une intransigeance qui lui fait honneur" (54).

Very soon after the publication of these objections, Benda was able to openly clarify the position he had adopted, and the discussions which took place permitted him to begin assembling the material for the sequel to La Trahison des Clercs, La Fin de l'Éternel. On January 26th, 1928, the Union pour la Vérité held a colloquium entitled "Autour de La Trahison des Clercs" (55) which brought together an audience of distinguished philosophers. It was here that Benda made the first of many re-iterations of his important concession that it was quite permissible for the "clerc" to enter the public arena, so long as he did so in the name of an eternal value such as Justice. In fact he re-defined two categories of "clercs":

"Le clerc peut, et je l'ai dit, descendre sur la place publique sans cesser d'exercer sa fonction. Mais il a une manière meilleure de l'exercer, c'est d'être par sa vie même une constante protestation. C'est ainsi qu'il sera, en réalité, le plus actif" (56).

For Benda this should provoke shame in those who did not renounce "l'égoïsme de classe ou de nation".
During the early weeks of 1928 the reaction to *La Trahison des Clercs* from the Nationalist Right continued unabated\(^{(57)}\). Paulhan reprinted a selection of extracts in the "Revue des Revues" for March. One extract contained a reply from Charles Maurras himself:

"La véritable trahison des clercs est celle qui fraude, falsifie et ment avec cette impudence tranquille. On peut assigner à ceux que M. Benda appelle, après moi, des clercs, bien des devoirs. Le premier est de transcrire loyalement les textes qu'ils rapportent, le second de les comprendre, le troisième de n'en point tirer ce qu'ils ne contiennent pas. Quand M. Benda aura satisfait à ces obligations élémentaires, on lui fera l'honneur de lier le fer avec lui"\(^{(58)}\).

Benda replied to this in the same issue in "les Accusations de M. Maurras"\(^{(59)}\); here he showed that, in his attack, Maurras had falsified his own line of thinking by quoting at cross-purposes. This type of exchange provided Benda with much ammunition in his future invectives against Nationalist dishonesty.

In June, Thibaudet again devoted his "Réflexion"\(^{(60)}\) to "Les Archives de La Trahison des Clercs". Unable to avoid almost daily reference to and discussion of Benda's book, he declared that "le livre a prouvé son contenu par son succès: pour passioner les hommes il faut un aliment pur. Ils exigent des essences, un absolu, un aliment qui soit un élément. Benda apporte l'idée de clerc pur"\(^{(61)}\). In spite of its success and its purity, Thibaudet upheld his conviction that, reduced to their basic thesis, Benda's ideas were only suitable for ascetics. Thibaudet pared down the conception of "le clerc pur" to its
most sterile form:

"Le clerc trahit dans la mesure où il sort de la représentation pure. Mais le monde est représentation et volonté. Donc le clerc trahit en tant qu'il ne dit pas non à la volonté, c'est-à-dire au monde, à la durée. Le clerc trahit en existant, et l'existence est injustice. Conclusion: le bouddhisme" (62).

This was not the last time Thibaudet took issue with Benda; the opportunity arose again during the publication of La Fin de l'Éternel, published from August to October 1928 (63). The first part assembled Benda's objections to the "Réaction du clerc de droite". Here Benda did little more than refute the idea that "il n'y avait là nulle trahison de leur part, mais entière fidélité à leur essence et que tout mon procès contre eux portait à faux" (64). In essence his case reiterated the accusations made in La Trahison des Clercs - he was just as unrelenting in his continuing attack on the Nationalists.

Where La Fin de l'Éternel took a new turn was in its treatment, in the second part, of the "clerc de gauche". Benda repeated his conviction that "la passion de la justice, plus encore celle de la vérité, ne sont point des passions politiques et que ceux qui descendent au forum mus par elles ne me paraissent trahir aucune noble fonction" (65). Here Benda considered the view, apparently held by both left intellectuals as well as by those of the right, that "le contemplatif" was somehow less worthy of respect than "l'actif" (66). Modern "clercs" were insisting that "la suprême fonction du clerc est d'agir, et le cultivateur solitaire de l'esprit est un clerc inférieur" (67). Likewise
another source of irritation for the modern "clerc" was Benda's insistence on separating thought and action: thought was deemed worthless unless it led directly to action, or had practical results (68). For Benda's adversaries, including Fernandez, this line of thinking had become an attractive one and any "thinking in the void" was of no human consequence.

The next series of objections concerned the question of responsibilities for the First World War. For Benda, the shrill reaction of some left intellectuals to his refusal to jointly condemn both German and French responsibilities for the war were very illuminating, and indicated the basis of a leftist "trahison" whereby pacifism was interpreted as a type of intellectual Nationalism. Benda's riposte was based upon considering not only the will of national governments, but also on including the "will of the people" of the nation concerned. For him the German national psychology had been in a bellicose state in the fifty years preceding the outbreak of war; the governments of Germany had only been reflecting the will of the people (69). The German nation, across all class barriers, had wanted the war and had welcomed acts of provocation, whereas belligerent policies of the French government had not been welcomed by the people (70). Benda's anti-Germanism did not find much favour among those in the NRF who backed "rapprochement" with Germany: indeed, curiously enough, his opinions in this respect aligned him with the Maurrassians.

The final part of this text dealt with the finer points of the charges levelled at his attacks on the philosophers, for
Benda the most important. Once more he referred back to the articles published on his work by Thibaudet, Marcel and Fernandez (71) and used them to repeat his stance against putting philosophy at the service of particular interests, and against the exaltation of irrationalism (72). For Benda the worst betrayal of all of the philosophers he attacked was the rejection of the Eternal, the repudiation of a fixed Ideal (73). Willing to admit that the modern thinker could reflect on the conditions governing his own time, he should, however, only contemplate the universal:

"Le clerc moderne proclame une fois de plus qu'il ne se veut pas homme de pensée et refuse d'honorer celui qui le demeure" (74).

The extent of the reactions to Benda's works, even considering only those from within the NRF, clearly reflects a lively interest in the problems it raised. However, the whole debate risked floundering in sterility as the monthly readjustments to the definitions of abstract concepts became ever more minute: La Trahison des Clercs had served its purpose by galvanizing intellectual opinion (75). Plainly the time had come to re-orientate the debate and elaborate on the problems thrown up by Benda, to transform his critique into a more positive impetus. Within the NRF the focus of attention deflected to the question of Humanism.

In November 1928 Paulhan printed Jean Guéhenno's essay "L'Humanité et les Humanités", a shrewd choice indeed, for Guéhenno's argument provided the basis of much subsequent
thinking about the Humanities and Culture in general in the coming decade (76). The crux of Guéhenno's argument was the burning question: "Can the Humanities help Humanity?". His premise was, given that "le peuple" had come of age, the work of the Eighteenth-Century ideologues was finished; furthermore, could it still be maintained that intellectuals held sway over the development of ideas in the social arena? "Le peuple se méfie de la culture" (77), claimed Guéhenno, and he went on to examine this problem in the light of a new phenomenon which Benda had only hinted at, Communism. Seen from the Leninist perspective, culture, said Guéhenno, "était suspecte, instrument de domination aux mains des maîtres, inhumaine" (78). The problem of culture needed re-assessment in the light of the new (Russian) Revolution; in parallel with Benda, Guéhenno agreed that after the initial optimism of the early Nineteenth-Century, after the hopes placed in the great legacy of the French Revolution, "la majorité des intellectuels avaient versé à droite" (79). With the advent of world war and its universal barbarism, the central challenge was now clear:

"Comment l'humanité n'eût-elle pas désespéré de la culture, des "humanités", si la culture ne menait plus qu'à de telles catastrophes et en prenait même avec une sorte de fierté la responsabilité?" (80).

Again, Guéhenno took up the point made by Benda that the Humanities, once used as a source of wisdom, the fountain-head of education, had now become debased, for their acquisition bolstered class-interests:
"Benda nous parlait de la trahison des clercs; ce n'est pas assez dire peut-être. Peut-être faut-il parler d'une trahison de la culture elle-même, d'une trahison des Humanités"(81).

In order to prevent any action which might provoke an even greater clash of interests, Guéhenno proclaimed: "il faut qu'un esprit nouveau intervienne"(82). This new "spirit" should aim to include all Humanity, for the exclusivity of culture only underlined the class-differences he referred to earlier. If society was beginning to make concessions to "le peuple", then it was high time education also took account of these changes: "Jamais encore on n'a enseigné le peuple au peuple"(83), insisted Guéhenno. Finally, culture should move with and adapt to the shifts and changes in an evolving humanity; it should no longer merely comfort the bastions of the privileged.

Writing to Paulhan on reading this essay, Fernandez, already engaged in the discussion on new approaches to humanism since early 1927(84), found Guéhenno's article "bien insuffisant"(85). Moreover Romain Rolland, mentor of Guéhenno during his editorship of the NRF's rival Europe, pointed out that in his opinion, in spite of the worthy sentiments expressed in Guéhenno's essay, their place of publication, the NRF, threatened to devalue them:

"Puisque vous écrivez à la NRF, vous devez vous rendre compte que, malgré sa haute tenue de pensée "intellectuelle", les "humanités" l'emportent chez elle sur l'humanité..."(86).

As for Fernandez, he made his reservations clear in a review-article on Caliban parle in February 1929(87). He considered
that Guéhenno's book illustrated in detail the gap, highlighted in the November essay, between Humanism and Humanity; for Fernandez, Guéhenno was too timid. In his approach to Communism, Guéhenno had not pushed his arguments far enough, although Fernandez did not necessarily concur with the direction in which Guéhenno's thinking was propelling him:

"Les réserves que M. Guéhenno, avec une pudeur charmante, ne marchande pas au communisme, et qui sont bien les réserves de l'esprit, ne l'exposent-elles pas à l'indignation de ceux qui ne veulent en rien se laisser distraire du sort des Calibans?" (89).

Fernandez, applying Benda's recommendations, enlarged the scope of the problem and argued that Guéhenno's intellectual faced a choice:

"Tout ce qu'on demandera à l'intellectuel sorti du peuple c'est de choisir, après avoir fait son examen de conscience, d'être un serviteur de sa classe ou d'être un serviteur désintéressé de l'esprit" (90).

Fernandez saw no reason why the "intellectuel sorti du peuple" should have to serve the interests of a class to which he did not belong; after all, the spirit was the spirit. He went on to identify the same need for choice as in Guéhenno's critique of the Catholic (i.e. Thomist) Renaissance:

"Elle oscille entre un jugement pragmatique fondé sur une sorte de patriotisme de la sensibilité populaire, et un appel aux lois pures et libres de l'esprit. Encore une fois il faut choisir" (91).

The significance of this standpoint is that where Benda allowed no choice, Fernandez, although critical of certain weaknesses in Guéhenno, positively encouraged the choice.
Next month, Paulhan, writing as Jean Guérin, ironized on the discussion of Caliban parle at the Union pour la Vérité. "M. Guéhenno, fils de prolétaire, a le physique laforguïen, le regard et la moustache tristes", remarked Paulhan. He characterized Guéhenno's book as "une plainte timide, c'est une suite de cris de coeur touchants". Instead of the expected reaction from the Right, Guéhenno's position was attacked by "trois révolutionnaires", according to Paulhan:

M. Emmanuel Berl, qui s'est fait récemment pamphlétaire après quelques tentatives dans l'ordre de la métaphysique et du roman:
M. Brice Parain, plus subtil (... ) enfin,
M. André Malraux, courtois et méphisto-phélique.

Paulhan's account showed that there were younger writers who were willing to take the arguments about culture and humanism further than Benda and Guéhenno. Guéhenno had agonized about the difficulty of making bourgeois culture available to the masses; yet Paulhan identified a distinction which went unchallenged in the rue Visconti meeting. Berl, Parain and Malraux countered Guéhenno by insisting that "nous voulons une culture prolétarienne sans accointance avec la culture bourgeoise". Guéhenno, though, for Paulhan, had failed to notice that "prolétarienne" did not mean "populaire". The debate was to take an interesting turn for Paulhan ended his commentary by alluding to the intervention, at the discussion, of "un représentant des syndicats ouvriers" who made some remarks which were "pleines de bon sens et de mépris pour les intellectuels, auquelles on fit peu d'attention".
Reflecting the fact that among certain readers of the NRF the debate was taken a good deal more seriously than Paulhan had anticipated, the review published a letter in the next issue from the "secrétaire du syndicat des jardiniers" (97). Here a M. Hodée objected to the fact that Paulhan-Guerin had misrepresented his comments; he had not taken all intellectuals to task, only those "clercs faux" like Georges Sorel who exploited the working classes as a testing-ground for their doctrines (98). Furthermore he denied that his class displayed any desire to establish "une culture de masse", and yet "le prolétaire (sic) E. Berl était d'un avis contraire" (99). However much Paulhan had wanted to deflate the serious intent behind it, the debate sparked off by Guéhenno's book is further evidence of a continuing desire within the NRF to assess the crisis in humanism, and to develop the premises upon which the debate was founded. As early as February 6th 1929, Gide had been present at a lively discussion with Berl and Malraux on modern literature, during which Gide "s'efforce de nourrir le débat, sans vraiment prendre position" (100). Clearly Gide was living through a period of confusion and self-doubt about the validity of his own rôle, and the NRF itself helped to fuel Gide's uncertainty. By July the review-article of Berl's essay La Mort de la Pensée bourgeoise (101) helped Gide define and focus his own position.

Like Guéhenno's book, La Mort de la Pensée bourgeoise was another "cri de coeur"; however, Berl's book was a much more forthright attack on quietist attitudes. Dedicating his text to Malraux's character in Les Conquérants (1929), Garine, Berl...
accused all other modern writers of conformism and of being afraid of the new Revolution\(^\text{102}\). Once again, where Benda had argued that writers and intellectuals were subservient to and cowed by a dominant, bourgeois cultural system, Berl adapted the argument in the light of an awareness of the full, active potential of the Revolution. "Trahison ou peur?", asked Berl\(^\text{103}\); for him, the 'clerc' committed treason by not acting, and this fear of action had to be overcome. Thought and action had to be co-existent. By the same token, Benda was guilty of dilettantism; for Berl, Benda's "nostalgie du cloître" was artificial and sterile in the post-Revolutionary world\(^\text{104}\). Thus, "une idée ne devient trahison que si elle est maintenue par la carence ou par la peur"\(^\text{105}\). The basic thrust of Berl's argument was that in spite of efforts to conceal the fact (i.e., through conformism, through dilettantism), since the Revolution "la pensée est révolutionnaire ou n'est pas"\(^\text{106}\).

As with Guéhenno, the position of the intellectual within the modern world was a "un drame": the tension being that the intellectual was a product of capitalism and yet, at the same time, found it anathema to subscribe to a rigid (communist) programme\(^\text{107}\).

Reviewing the book for July's number Jean Prévost considered that Berl's study was only worthy of attention for its faults: in this way it was in the same lineage as La Trahison des Clercs\(^\text{108}\). After listing a number of inaccuracies in the text, Prévost proceeded to undermine Berl's argument by insisting that "il n'y a pas de pensée bourgeoise"\(^\text{109}\), for "toute la
bourgeoise est puissance, acquisition, manoeuvre; pouvoir tout temporel, et même (...) pouvoir caché"(110). Prévost did not believe **Les Conquérants** could solve the revolutionary problem since, in the French context, it was not possible or viable to provoke or sustain a revolution either by armed insurrection or by strikes. Prévost's claim, in fact, was that Berl's analysis was unrealistic, for, although Prévost professed to being no more a friend of the contemporary regime than Berl, "il ne faut vouloir que ce que l'on peut"(111). The roots of Prévost's misgivings are traceable to the assertion at the beginning of the book that "il sait se qu'il veut détruire, mais il ne sait pas où il va"(112), and, furthermore, Berl did not admit that the well-being of the proletariat was the sole aim of revolution. Prévost contended that "cette légèreté d'informations, cette lourdeur de style, cette confusion d'esprit semblent passées en habitude, et presque autorisées par les moeurs"(113). In the end Prévost dismissed Berl as "le type de l'amateur distingué", and found that he was far from representing "une image du révolutionnaire"(114).

Not surprisingly Berl wrote to the NRF to complain that this account of his book had left him mystified, all the more so since Malraux was helping Berl transfer from Grasset's to Gallimard: a potential Gallimard author should not be attacked in the "house" review(115). Given the animosity between the editor of the NRF and Berl, it is permissible to detect Paulhan's support of Prévost in this affair, especially considering Gide's vacillating position at this time. Initially Gide
(and Martin du Gard) were perplexed by the Malraux-Berl onslaught; in fact, Berl recalled that Gide "m'engueule", particularly since Berl had defended Zola(116). The important fact is that Gide was showing signs of seeking a cause worthy of support at home having investigated European injustice in Africa; such an interest could, in the long run, only reflect upon the review for, in June 1929, Gide read Prévost's article in proof-form before publication in July and even wrote to express his objections:

"J'ai lu avec intérêt votre article...
Vous éclairez fort bien certains points de la thèse de Berl sur lesquels mon incompréhension parfaite me laissait me méprendre (...). Vous m'étonnez un peu en parlant de "lourdeur de style"... Malgré tous ses défauts, Berl nous entraîne et nous force à le suivre, fût-ce pour le combattre"(117).

Gide stressed that in spite of its stylistic infelicities, Berl's "pauvretés" "retiennent à ce point l'attention de nombre de nos amis communs, même les plus prévenus contre Berl"(118). Gide felt that Martin du Gard was even more attracted to Berl's thesis, and consequently sent him a copy of Prévost's review; replying to Gide, Martin du Gard indeed admitted that "ce livre n'est pas rien"(119). Thus an important stage had been reached: the social and historical fact of the Revolution, even if it was discussed in tentative or exploratory terms, had reached the pages of the NRF in a prolonged internal debate.

This episode was not yet concluded: in September the NRF printed a contribution from Benda to the discussion (120). The
experience of reading Berl's book allowed Benda to sharpen his own critique of the bourgeoisie he had outlined in _La Trahison des Clercs_ (121). Using a combination of his own terminology and Berl's, Benda now asserted that bourgeois thought, by virtue of being bourgeois, was condemned in advance; more precisely:

"La pensée qui est décidée à l'avance à respecter, et au besoin à fortifier, les idées sur lesquelles repose l'ordre social qui profite à la bourgeoisie. Ces idées reviennent au fond à une seule, à savoir que la direction politique de la société doit appartenir à la classe bourgeoise" (122).

As it was a "une pensée "conformiste"", bourgeois thought was not free (it was decided in advance), therefore it was dead thought. Benda went on to make the point that if the established order were communist, then the same thinking would apply. Moreover, Malraux and others, "des révolutionnaires intelligents", according to Benda, were well aware of this fact (123). Indeed Benda inverted Berl's line of argument and used it to re-iterate and re-inforce his own position; summing up Berl, he posited the following equation:

"1. La pensée bourgeoise est de pensée morte;
2. Cette mort, en France du moins, n'a jamais été plus vivante" (124).

Evidently Berl's pamphlet was as provocative and almost as much discussed as Benda's had been in 1928; the questions of the role of the intellectual and his attitude towards the Revolution had been openly articulated and considered in the _NRF_. Before very long the debate was to become more complex and was to
spill over into the pages of other reviews.

As the discussion of Berl's ideas subsided, the NRF printed a very long "Note sur la Réaction"(125); Benda, once again, went on to the offensive against the Nationalists. In this important article, he analysed how the "réaction idéologique" exploited the vacuum created by the "réaction sentimentale", the latter having no doctrinal basis, being simply nourished and perpetuated by sentiment and prejudice. Benda's argument clearly demonstrated his thinking on democracy, and how the forces of anti-democratic reaction militated against the Republic. His argument was that the "sentimental" reaction, as embodied by the rancours of the aristocracy, the Church, the "petit peuple", the bourgeoisie and "les mondays", had, in itself, posed no real or lasting threat to the well-being of Republican democracy in France; what was dangerous was the "opposition de formation savante"(126), where the sentimental reaction was underpinned by ideology. Benda's target was the doctrine of the Action française in its "forme simpliste, la seule sous laquelle ils ont chance d'atteindre les masses..."(127). After examining the nature of Action française doctrine and the reasons why it was of such appeal to students and intellectuals, Benda proceeded to identify and describe the two poles of Action française thought, the negative (anti-democratic) and the positive (pro-monarchy). The negative ingredient departed from the belief that due to its very nature (i.e. through weight of numbers), democracy inevitably led to defeats abroad, decomposition at home and bankruptcy in general. Such thinking,
argued Benda, had little appeal for the masses but was successful among writers and "mondains". The positive part held that France could only be saved by the restoration of the monarchy; this, while being of great appeal to the aristocracy, was worrying for the bourgeoisie who saw their interests threatened. Benda's point was that with so many conflicting interests in the anti-democratic camp, democracy was safe so long as the bourgeoisie did not forge any damaging alliances:

"Le vrai danger pour la démocratie demeure toujours la bourgeoisie inquiète des progrès de la classe ouvrière, et son alliance toujours possible avec le petit peuple antiparlementaire et désireux d'un chef".

The reaction to this article centred upon one of Benda's footnotes. The main adversary on this occasion was Jacques Bainville, writing in La Revue universelle. Bainville accused Benda of "un maniement élémentaire de la matière historique, une faible réflexion sur le développement des faits historiques", and went on:

"le parti radical et radical-socialiste possède, en plusieurs de nos chefs-lieux, des polémistes qui ne sont pas inférieurs à M. Julien Benda (...) J'ai besoin d'un clerc qui soit vraiment pur".

Bainville's point is important here: it is true that Benda's defence of French democracy was Radicalist in tone and vocabulary, and was in harmony with the fundamentally Radicalist nature of the NRF. For Benda, Bainville had not answered the charge that Action française historiography distorted the truth. Moreover Benda analysed Bainville's
condescending tone and converted it into a renewed attack on the nature of Nationalist betrayal:

"Ce ton hautain", continued Benda, "(…) lui est en quelque sorte fourni par sa doctrine elle-même: il est évident que, lorsqu'on prétend parler au nom de la tradition française, on se trouve, de ce seul fait et avant de dire un mot, toiser son contradicteur"(134).

The second point was that even though it was obvious Bainville had not replied to his accuser, he would not be criticized for this omission by those within his own camp. This was the central point of Benda's argument, and his comments introduced other adversaries into the debate. Although what he was saying might be self-evident, Benda went on, it was essential to challenge the generally-held belief that

"l'écrivain de droite s'adresse à un public épris d'obéissance et celui de gauche à un monde qui pratique la liberté de l'esprit; que le premier écrit pour des moutons et le second pour des loups"(135).

If this definition was to be universally-applicable, then surely some left-wing writers should be considered as right-wing; for, claimed Benda, turning his attention towards another adversary, "il est clair que M. Romain Rolland écrit pour des moutons tout comme M. Maurras"(136). The only reason for calling the writer for free men "left-wing" was in order to distinguish him from the Right; perhaps he should more properly be labelled "de milieu"(137). In a footnote, Benda clarified his point that "les moutons de M. Rolland" had attacked him from the left in the review Europe(138). Still adhering to the same
line of thought as expressed in *La Trahison des Clercs*, Benda contended that the "moutons de Rolland" did not consider the "clerc" as

"l'homme qui exerce la vie de l'esprit,
mais l'homme qui se bat pour obtenir,
les conditions sociales nécessaires à
la vie de l'esprit. C'est en somme la
même thèse que celle de l'Action
Française..." (139).

Benda believed that whatever Bainville chose to say, so long as he attacked all opponents of the *Action française*, no-one from their side would challenge Bainville's accuracy or veracity. "L'avantage de l'écrivain de droite est écrasante", concluded Benda (140).

Gide was so pleased with January's "Scholie" that he wrote a short letter to Benda to congratulate him (141). Benda's attack on Bainville's "mauvaise foi" did not, however, meet with universal approval. On 31st January 1930 Gide reported that Fernandez had reacted so violently against this attack that he threatened to leave the *NRF*: evidently Benda's contribution to the debate was beginning to highlight any polarities which were developing within the review (142).

Paulhan's correspondence with Jean Guéhenno, the editor of *Europe*, shows how close the two reviews' editors were at this time; they often amicably exchanged opinions and judgements on their respective publications. Benda's unflattering comments in the *NRF* on the "moutons de M. Rolland" did not, however, help relations between the two, and very
quickly drew fire from Europe; this exchange lasted well into the summer of 1930. Guéhenno wrote a "lettre ouverte à M. Julien Benda" referring specifically to January's NRF (143). This text is extremely important in that it helped to clarify Europe's position regarding Benda's definition of "les clercs". After an aside where he wondered "si (...) on n'est pas toujours le mouton de quelqu'un, fût-ce de Spinoza" (144), Guéhenno insisted that "notre berger" had always promoted "l'indépendance de l'esprit", and he cited the following text by Rolland:

"De libres âmes, de fermes caractères, c'est ce dont le monde manque le plus aujourd'hui. Par tous les chemins divers (...) nous retournons à la vie grégaire. L'Humanité a besoin que ceux qui l'aident lui tiennent tête et se révoltent contre elle quand il le faut" (145).

The priority for Guéhenno, as his earlier article in the NRF had shown, was humanity itself, not the humanities nor the "clercs"; yet this said, he confessed to owing a debt to La Trahison des clercs:

"Ce petit livre, ses propositions nettes, son impitoyable clarté me paraissait opérer comme un grand travail d'assainissement" (146).

Guéhenno admitted that he hardly noticed Benda's intention to attack the "clercs de gauche". Using Benda's principles, Guéhenno insisted, even if naively, that he believed Benda's and his own apprehension of the Truth were one and the same:
"Il me suffisait qu'en dénonçant la traitrise des clercs vous dénonciez dans son principe même le pharisaïsme du monde moderne et portiez ainsi de l'eau au moulin de la Révolution" (147).

All this had been three years before; now, Benda no longer seemed interested in "les vrais combats de la terre", only in skirmishing with Bainville and Maurras, whom Guéhenno characterized as "dead" thinkers. In a further important point, Guéhenno, arguing with forceful earnestness, referred to Benda's hesitation between positioning himself with writers on the Left and those in the Centre; Guéhenno firmly placed Benda with all those who profess that they belonged to no camp:

"Que dites-vous que vous n'avez point de troupes, point de camp derrière vous? Je crains que vous n'ayez tous ceux que peut bien intéresser sans doute la recherche de la vérité, mais à la condition qu'elle demeure un jeu (...), qu'elle ne soit pas de la terre, mais de l'éternité. (...) Le camp des esprits libres? Non pas. Mais tous les salons des dilettantes" (148).

Here Guéhenno joined Berl in a condemnation of cant and dilettantism and then returned to the essence of his thinking, that "la vérité n'appartient plus aux clercs" (149), but to men in general. Guéhenno believed that Benda's vocabulary underlined "un dangereux mépris pour les innombrables laïcs que nous sommes" (150).

At Europe, concluded Guéhenno, if Rolland were to be seen as a "clerc", it was because "il porte en lui toujours l'immense espérance du XIXe siècle (...). Il ne se fait pas de la raison un privilège. Il a hâte de la mêler comme un levain à la pâte humaine"; his final point was that "nous n'avons ici nulle
pretention à être clercs. Etre des hommes nous suffirait" (151).

Rolland wrote to Guéhenno to tell him that he had been impressed by his "lettre ouverte", and that he was pleased by the stress laid upon the independence of Europe (152).

By the last week of March, Guéhenno knew that Paulhan was about to print a riposte to his letter from Benda himself; this "Scholie" duly appeared in the NRF for April (153).

Here Benda mounted a defence of his position which, once again, met with Gide's approval at the heart of the NRF (154). Moreover Benda's attack on Rolland deeply influenced Paulhan's attitude when the latter came to criticize the adherence of NRF personalities to the "Amsterdam-Pleyel Peace Movement" in two years' time. The essence of Benda's objections to Rolland's stance (as it had been defended by Guéhenno) was to be found once again in the question of the responsibilities for the First World War. Listing several examples taken from the text of Au dessus de la mêlée, Benda charged Rolland with using exactly the same dangerous, sentimental (not to say irrational) vocabulary as the Nationalists:

"En un mot de tels mouvements dénotent ou une incroyable légèreté d'esprit ou une odieuse flagornerie nationaliste" (155).

Secondly he denied that he had only been skirmishing with Maurras and Bainville, "dead" thinkers in any case; in fact, the aim of La Fin de l'Eternel had been precisely to throw the cant and hypocrisy of these thinkers into even higher relief by using their own most recent ripostes as raw material. Benda
could accuse Guéhenno, too, of only waging "la petite guerre"; as far as he was concerned, against the likes of Barrès, this could only be "la bonne guerre" (156). In a remarkable (albeit mild) foretaste of Nizan, Benda attacked Guéhenno's colleagues for not being more outspoken:

"...Combien j'aimerais que vos collègues d'Université fissent de temps en temps, comme vous, la petite guerre, combien je suis confondu de la quiétude avec laquelle ils laissent l'impunité aux malfaiteurs publics" (157).

However, claimed Benda, most of Guéhenno's rancour was aimed at his definition of "le clerc", that "le clerc" had nothing to do with humanity in general. Adhering still to the precepts of his first book on the subject, Benda highlighted the distinctions to be made between "les laïcs" and "les clercs":

"Je pose qu'être clerc c'est, par définition, ne vivre que pour la vérité, tandis qu'être laïc, c'est, également par définition, avoir des intérêts temporels à défendre, ce qui exigera toujours qu'à un certain moment on estropie la vérité, laquelle est par essence non pratique, non intéressée; d'où il suit que la malhonnêteté fait en partie de la définition du laïc, qu'il soit individu ou gouvernement" (158).

Benda's point was that Guéhenno had confused definitions, that it was illogical to "devenir clerc en restant laïc", which Guéhenno had insisted was his aim. Moreover Benda might agree if only those in power were to adhere to non-temporal values; but, by definition, this was impossible to achieve. In the end, affirmed Benda, "le conflit qui nous divise est éternel" (159), precisely because Guéhenno, arguing as an atheist, rejected the
precept so dear to Benda that "il faut une corporation qui entretienne la notion de l'Idée abstraite et éternelle". Once more Benda's conclusion only frustrated his adversary by leading him back to a sterile negativity; repeating the analysis of La Fin de l'Eternel, the article ended:

"L'actif (i.e. "le laïc", Guéhenno, or Maurras) ne peut pas comprendre que le contemplatif soit la plus haute incarnation de la foi, et même (...) la forme suprême de l'efficace. Mais le contemplatif (i.e. Benda, "le clerc", etc.), s'il est vraiment celui qui voit les choses dans leur nécessité, doit comprendre cette incompréhension de l'actif, comprendre qu'elle est son essence même et, puisqu'il connaît, lui, le valeur de l'actif, respecter cette incompréhension. C'est ce que je ne fais pas assez pour vous et vos amis. Croyez-le, mon cher Guéhenno; nul m'en blame plus que moi-même".

However much Benda's reasoning may have impressed some, like Gide and Paulhan, for others, like Jean Grenier, he was a "penseur de salon"; for Rolland, he was guilty of "une abominable et consciente mauvaise foi". One further "Scholie" in July's NRF dealt with the debate on the responsibility for the war; thereafter, Benda began preparing the pre-publication text of his book on the metaphysical questions raised by La Fin de l'Eternel.

This series of debates, professions of faith and ripostes in the NRF was being pursued against an increasingly lively national and international background. The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 caused great anxiety, although the effects of this crisis in capitalism did not reach France until 1931.
At home, governmental instability was the major preoccupation (165), while on the international scene early 1930 was characterized by renewed speculation concerning Germany, particularly the apparent impasse caused by the consequences of the Versailles Treaty. On March 29th 1930, the ratification of the Young Plan, re-negotiating reparations to France, raised again the whole question of the responsibilities for the war (166). Benda's exchanges formed only part of the intellectuals' preoccupation in the historical context; their major effect was to concentrate the attention of the NRF's readers on such matters, whether they were avowedly or unconsciously "laïcs" or "clercs". The fact that a turning point had been reached did not go unnoticed, least of all in the NRF. In July 1930 Paulhan inserted an essay by Marcel Arland (167) which is of central importance in the evolution of the NRF's attitude to historical or political questions.

Arland's essay began by reflecting upon his first days in Rivièrè's NRF - "l'un des centres de la France intellectuelle" - when his editor asked him to describe the state of "la jeune littérature" (168). The result of this request had been "le Nouveau Mal du siècle": its influence had been widely felt. However, the difference in 1930 was that it was no longer "inquiétude" or the "Nouveau Mal du siècle" which threatened to dominate literature: it was politics. Arland explained:
"Les attaques de M. Julien Benda n'y ont rien changé. Un écrivain, qu'il le veuille ou non, est contraint de compter aujourd'hui avec les partis politiques. Il ne peut écrire un livre qui ne soit aussitôt jugé de droite ou de gauche. Ce sont les partis de gauche qui ont assuré le succès de *La Trahison des Clercs*; ces mêmes partis, comme M. Benda répondait insuffisamment à leurs avances, se tiennent aujourd'hui sur la réserve..." (169).

An intense interest for politics among young writers of his generation was perfectly comprehensible to Arland, the reason being that "ils y trouvent ou croient y trouver un moyen d'action immédiate" (170). For Arland, the principle cause for concern was literature, the same conception of literature which Rivière had defended just six years before (171):

"C'est de lui que j'attends les oeuvres les plus précieuses. Un écrivain qui n'est pas un artiste me touche peu; n'est-il qu'artiste, il me touche moins encore" (172).

Arland desired most of all

"une perpétuelle justice de la pensée, entre le coeur et l'esprit la balance la plus sensible et la volonté de ne rien avancer où l'on ne s'engage tout entier" (173).

Moreover he had observed that "ce que le public réclame, c'est une formule, une étiquette, nette, frappante, sonore..." (174); in his own concluding sentence, he produced a striking "formula" which truly set the tone for the coming decade, the 'Thirties:

"C'est l'heure où ceux qui ne croient pas s'être trahis prennent envers eux-mêmes un nouvel engagement" (175).

This statement bore hidden resonances which became clearer as the months went on into 1931. For all Arland's reservations, and for
all his commitment to literature, there was a tone of acceptance, or at least of inevitability, in his remarks concerning the writer and politics.

Three months later, Fernandez re-appraised the relationship of the intellectual and Revolution in a long, complex article "La Pensée et la Révolution" (176). In the first part Fernandez asked the question "Que faut-il faire de l'individu?", against the background of a crisis in those beliefs which bolstered humanism: "Nous constatons, dans beaucoup de milieux différents, la faillite des croyances dont les deux siècles précédents ont vécu" (177). These beliefs had been shaken by the development of the modern world, above all by "la vie économique" and "l'argument formidable de la guerre" (178). Fernandez drew an important and topical distinction between the previous war, and "la paix actuelle, qui n'est qu'une guerre délayée dans l'eau saumâtre des parliettes diplomatiques, à la guerre latente qui couve sous les traités (...)" (179).

The central concern of Fernandez' essay was to place the problem of individualism against this context, and he proceeded to show that philosophers of history, whether from the extreme Right or from the extreme Left, were in agreement: the individual should be suppressed (180). In a line of argument which ran directly counter to Benda's in essays such as "Note sur la Réaction" (181), Fernandez insisted that right-wing doctrine, wishing to subordinate the individual to the national interest, "ne vaut ni plus ni moins que la doctrine démocratique et que la doctrine révolutionnaire" (182).
For the Nationalists, the suppression of the individual was a bitter but necessary pill to swallow, rendered unavoidable by the errors of democracy. For the revolutionaries, however, "la suppression de l'individu est une articulation de leur logique" (183).

The second part of this essay went on to analyse the dialectic of Marxist thinking; for the first time in the pages of the NRF, a serious and very competent exposition of dialectical materialism revealed the philosophy underlying revolutionary thought. For Fernandez, Marxism was a formidable doctrinal tool and one which would tempt those who might be victims of "un état d'esprit plus lâche et plus mou, qui pousse nos intellectuels à consulter l'histoire à la mode afin de savoir ce qu'ils ont le droit de faire, de sentir, de penser" (184).

Like Arland (185), Fernandez concluded by referring to the transitional nature of the period, and, bearing in mind his recommendation for "une philosophie virile" (186), ended with a rhetorical question:

"Est-il besoin d'ajouter que la défense de l'individu (...) est pour l'intellectuel non seulement un devoir, mais une nécessité inéluctable?" (187).

The question of Franco-German relations was, from this time, becoming the principle preoccupation of writers such as Gide, Schlumberger and Martin du Gard (188), and predominated during 1931. Writing in *Les Nouvelles littéraires* in December 1930, Louis Martin-Chauffier, very close to Malraux and Gide
at the NRF, noted that "depuis un peu de temps, on constate une grande nouveaute: la descente des clercs sur le pre". Martin-Chauffier insisted that no betrayal was involved, for the issue which had motivated this burst of interest was Peace, and, by extension, Civilization. The primary source of anxiety was that "les clercs voient la paix instable et menacee", and he continued:

"Ils savent que, cette fois, c'est une question de vie et de mort, et que la civilisation sombrerait dans une nouvelle guerre, dans un nouveau desordre".

It was necessary for the intellectuals to become involved precisely because politicians were acting too precipitately and without due regard for future consequences. Martin-Chauffier was convinced that the intellectuals, by reflecting upon and commenting upon events, would help stabilize the situation by exerting their appreciable influence upon those in authority. The opportunity for intellectuals - including all those important figures in the NRF - was immediately within reach. Some three weeks after the publication of Martin-Chauffier's article, Notre Temps published a highly important manifesto entitled "Contre les excès du nationalisme, pour l'Europe et pour l'Entente franco-allemande". Signed at first by 186 writers and artists, the most significant names were closely associated with both Europe and the NRF. The only notable absence from the NRF roll-call was Gide; even Benda and Paulhan had signed. Worried by rumours of war and disorder, the intellectuals who had signed were attracted by the neutral wording of the manifesto; Benda
would have evidently approved of any text which placed Civilization before any specific national interest. It was the international flavour of the manifesto which was uppermost in the intellectuals' minds:

"ils n'ignorent tout ce qui menace la paix en d'autres pays et ils comptent que les intellectuels étrangers sauront mener contre les excès de leurs nationalisme, l'action qu'eux-mêmes sont résolus à soutenir contre ceux du nationalisme français. Ils affirment que le vrai visage de la France n'est pas de haine et de guerre, mais de justice et de paix (...)" (194).

Throughout 1931 various texts and surveys reflected the feeling already described the year before by Arland and Fernandez that a new era had begun, that a more positive, constructive attitude was necessary (195). Others examined the present in terms of the previous decade and concluded that "la fin de l'après-guerre" had been reached and overtaken (196).

At the same time the activity of pacifist movements was infuriating militant sections of the Right. The Action française and, in particular, the Camelots du Roi had, for some months, taken increasingly to direct action. On 27th November 1931, the pacifists' meeting at the Trocadéro, presided by Edouard Herriot, was broken up by the Action française (197). This brawl set off a chain of events which, once and for all, changed the direction of the NRF, against Paulhan's wishes. On 1st December Gide met André Chamson who, close to important figures in the Radical Party, felt that some form of protest was necessary against the Action française in order to attenuate
"le déplorable effet que cela peut avoir en Allemagne" (198).

Chamson persuaded Gide that a group of intellectuals should head the protest, not in Europe, "une revue trop colorée", but, precisely because it was seen as a review with no particular political affiliations, in the NRF. Gide thought of Schlumberger, who should

"prendre la parole dans un article que tous pourraient signer du reste, mais (Gide) est un peu incertain sur l'opportunité de cette manifestation" (199).

This episode is extremely important in understanding how Gide, although still unsure of his own stance, was willing, eventually, to exercise his powerful influence over the policy of the review. In this case Schlumberger thought that the mechanism of the NRF forbade such a move since three weeks later, reference to the event in question would have had to be made in such strong terms that it would no longer be an article, but a "protestation de principe" (200). Paulhan soon learnt of the proposal and, in a letter to Grenier, was able to freely express how ill-advised he believed such a protest would be:

"Gide voudrait que nous protestions dans la NRF contre les incidents du Trocadéro (...) et Marcel contre la carence du gouvernement... Il y aurait beaucoup à dire sur ce besoin d'être ridicule, qui est commun à tant d'intellectuels. Je crois que je les apaiserai" (201).

In the event no appeal appeared in the NRF for January 1932. However, Gide and Martin du Gard were both thinking that the NRF could and should do more in providing a platform for discussion.
Another cause possibly worthy of support offered itself in the New Year: the so-called "Aragon affair". This "affair" centred upon the charges laid against Aragon on January 16th 1932 for the publication of the poem "Front Rouge"; the courts had held this to be an incitement to murder. At the instigation of the Surrealists a petition was drawn up and signatories were sought in Aragon's defence. By February 2nd, Gide and Martin du Gard had been solicited for support; Gide was against signing, but Martin du Gard hesitated and, although he did not like either Aragon or his poem, he thought he might sign: "J'incline à penser qu'il faut toujours protester contre ce genre de choses". Meanwhile Paulhan did all he could to dissuade Gide from mobilizing NRF support in favour of Aragon: on February 18th Gide reported two very important conversations, one with René Crevel, who had tried again to enlist Gide's support, the other with Paulhan, who had forcefully indicated all the dangers inherent in espousing this cause. Gide reported his refusal in terms which make it quite clear that he had absorbed Paulhan's arguments to such an extent that he used them against Crevel. Paulhan moreover, writing that same day to both Gide and Martin du Gard, repeated not only his strong reservations, but also pronounced his feelings on the dangers of signing petitions (as he had done to Grenier).

Once again, albeit temporarily, Paulhan had managed to deflect the pressure being brought to bear on the review. Yet Gide confessed to Martin de Gard that he still felt frustrated: "Je suis comme vous: j'ai envie de signer quelque chose".

With Gide in this mood it was rapidly becoming inevitable that the NRF would find itself under closer scrutiny. Already on February 10th 1932, Martin du Gard wrote to Gide saying that the NRF was, for him, unsatisfactory:

"Je vous dis tout bas une pensée qui m'est venue: c'est que, en cas de chambardements et d'ébranlements sociaux, je crois que je me détacherais tout net de la NRF pour me rallier à Europe (...). J'entends par "NRF" un certain dilettantisme dans la hardiesse de pensée, mitigé de beaucoup de raison et de prudence (très justifiée); j'entends par Europe un groupe de gens généreux, d'esprits moins avisés mais agissants, capables d'erreurs mais aussi d'action positive"(207).

Given that Gide was already meditating upon the publication of his Journal, it is not surprising that, in a crucial discussion of March 6th 1932, the politicization of the NRF's editorial policy was being contemplated:

"Il est beaucoup question de la NRF", wrote la Petite Dame. "Gide trouve qu'il serait grand temps qu'elle reflète les préoccupations du moment, que la qualité ne suffit plus, que cette qualité devrait s'allier, et même se laisser submerger par ces préoccupations. Martin (du Gard) trouve qu'en effet elle devient un peu vieille dame, et que ceux-là mêmes qui pourraient la vivifier sont tentés de porter ailleurs leur tribut. Je fais remarquer que pourtant avec une équipe comme Jean (Schlumberger), Fernandez, Malraux, eux, etc., ils sont beaucoup à pouvoir toucher à autre chose que l'art. (Gide) pense qu'il faudrait peut-être se grouper... faire une tentative avec aussi des apports de l'étranger... Il a une idée assez amusante: créer dans la NRF même une partie qui s'intitulerait "Ring" et où on serait invité à se battre au nom des idées du jour, des idées vivantes"(208).
These opinions and projects represent a remarkable departure from the intent of the original NRF. More importantly, they diverged significantly from the ideas Rivière had expressed in June 1919, and which Thibaudet believed had been vindicated by publishing *La Trahison des Clercs*.

One further debate, lasting from April to August 1932, was played out against this desire to politicize the review. Paulhan himself was finally drawn into the arena to argue publicly against what he saw as intellectual hypocrisy in the Europe camp, and what he thought of privately as betraying the conception of the NRF itself. In the "Revues des revues" section of the NRF for April 1932, Paulhan printed two extracts from a letter written by Guéhenno and published in Europe entitled "Les Intellectuels et le Désarmement". In a short commentary, Paulhan accused Guéhenno of intellectual bad faith for having judged "par avance d'un événement qu'il ne connaît pas". Yet the gravest omission was that Guéhenno refused to condemn all war; in other words, for those at Europe, armed violence was acceptable and inevitable in Revolution:

"Vous en voulez moins aux canons et aux mitrailleuses qu'aux patries et aux nations (...). Je vois bien que vous posez mal la question."

Paulhan was clearly following Benda here: if intellectuals were to protest in the name of principles based upon reason, then that reason should be applicable universally.

Jean Guéhenno wrote back to the editor of the NRF on April
12th (213). He argued that even if he had posed it badly, the important thing was to have posed the question of war. He dismissed Paulhan's objections to having avoided a condemnation of revolutionary violence: his justification, he said, would tax the readers' patience. His basic premise was that the writers of their generation had lived the experience of the 1914-1918 War and that it was therefore essential to know what intellectuals' attitudes would be "devant de nouvelles violences nationales" (214). For Guéhenno, the crucial point was that past and future wars were all bad, and Paulhan should not distinguish between them. The real issue, repeated Guéhenno, was that of "les violences nationales", and argued that as far as revolutionary violence was concerned, "prenons garde que rien ne saurait la justifier mieux que la lâcheté et l'avilissement des intellectuels" (215). Finally intellectuals now had to face these problems: "ce monde est si plein de misères que beaucoup d'entre nous se refugient dans les magnifiques domaines du songe" (216). In his reply, Paulhan insisted upon method and precision in these arguments; self-deception was too high a price to pay, even for "la cause de la paix" (217). The free association of principles and politics would only lead to the worst type of cant:

"cet engagement que vous nous demandez de prendre, êtes-vous sûr de la tenir vous-même? Ne lirions-nous pas en tête d'Europe, le jour où Paris serait menacé par quelque armée hitlérienne ou fasciste, un appel aux armes signé Jean Guéhenno? Et croyez-vous donc qu'il soit toujours aisé de décider si une guerre est nationale ou civile?" (218).
These comments mystified Martin du Gard, who asked for some clarification: Paulhan repeated his point that the true nature of the next war was likely to be civil, or "revolutionary", and that it was not at all easy to distinguish between them, according to what principles motivated the war (219).

Martin du Gard was not convinced: although he had reservations about Guéhenno's presentation, "c'est un homme qui s'engage; qui s'engage à fond, avec armes et bagages" (220). In essence, Martin du Gard preferred Guéhenno's attitude; he preferred not only Guéhenno's "emotion" and "sincerity", but also the commitment of Europe to the burning issues of the day:

"Je préfère sa "Lettre à Paulhan" à votre réponse. Il s'y engage une fois de plus, il se découvre généreusement; le fond du débat lui importe plus que ce qu'on pourra penser de son attitude, ou ce qu'on pourra critiquer dans le détail. Votre réponse est d'une fine plume, mais habile à se réserver (...). Vous avez pour vous les rieurs de l'"élite"(!), mais l'accent de Guéhenno touche au cœur. Et il se peut que les temps ne soient plus à éborgner les mouches, et qu'il y ait plus urgent à faire" (221).

Martin du Gard made a case for Fernandez to refresh the approach of the NRF to these matters:

"Le ton d'un Fernandez me semble illustrer précisément ce que voudrais savoir dire. Rien n'est plus loin du ton d'Europe; mais rien n'est plus loin aussi des subtilités intellectuelles de la pure littérature" (222).

Martin du Gard concluded: "Les fenêtres sont ouvertes; l'air du temps est entré et circule" (223).
Paulhan wrote back to clarify his thinking still further: "Reconnaissez", he pleaded, "que l'engagement importe moins que le choix des idées suivant lesquelles on s'engage"(224). He repeated his conviction that the next war would, sooner or later, become a civil rather than a national war, and that Guéhenno was remiss not to condemn it equally. He argued that the great danger was intellectual inconsistency and, in a remarkably strong rebuke, warned Martin du Gard of falling into the same trap(225). As Benda had argued, Paulhan firmly believed that by usurping pacifism, by adopting its defence as their sole prerogative, Rolland and his followers on the Left were guilty of their own betrayal, or, as he put it, "bourrage de crâne"(226).

Guéhenno reprinted his own letter to Paulhan in Europe for June 1932(227). Paulhan, in turn, wrote back to make public the sentiments he had been spelling out privately to Martin du Gard(228): "Oubliez-vous donc que les "violences nationales" de 1914 paraissaient civiles à tous ceux qui partaient pour défendre le droit?"(229). Meanwhile Gide and Martin du Gard were in the process of submitting their own declarations against war to Félicien Challaye(230). Moreover Gide insisted that the NRF should reproduce Rolland's call for a World Peace Congress, though not without considerable resistance from Paulhan, who objected to the poor quality of Rolland's text(231). Furthermore the hypocrisy underlying the declaration was grotesque to Paulhan: he pointed out to both Gide and Martin du Gard that the Pacifist Congress was
to be organized by Barbusse,

"qui n'est pas du tout pacifiste, qui même, étant communiste, est "contre tous les pacifismes", et prêt à substituer aux guerres impérialistes la guerre civile"(232).

Martin du Gard told Paulhan that the failure of the Lausanne Conference had persuaded him to sign, and that he thought the wording of the declaration left no room for equivocation(233). At last, by publishing Rolland's communist-inspired declaration with the explicit and public backing of Gide and Martin du Gard, the NRF had followed Europe into the broader Left, anti-fascist camp.

If, at first, the inclusion of La Trahison des Clercs seemed to fulfil and perpetuate Rivière's conception of the NRF, Paulhan subsequently found that the debate it engendered forced him to accept material which was not only non-literary but of a marked political colouring. This was directly due to the movement of events both abroad and at home, events which awakened intellectuals' fears and stirred them to action. Paulhan wrote to Guéhenno:

"Quant à Gide, je crois qu'il accepte nettement aujourd'hui, et souhaite peut-être, la guerre civile. D'ailleurs, avouez qu'il y a maintenant un élan vers cette guerre civile, exactement pareil à l'élan de 1910-1913 vers la guerre nationale. Rolland a remplacé Bartès. A-t-on beaucoup gagné ou changé?"(234).

Paulhan might be justifiably sceptical, even bitter, in expressing himself thus, given the pressures Gide and Martin du Gard had exerted upon the NRF literally to move with the times; he had
not succeeded in deflecting them for long. Indeed, after 1932 in particular, the NRF continued to consider political questions, concentrating first of all upon the decline of Radicalism as an effective force within the Third Republic. The review also examined some of the remedies and alternatives being considered, among them, ideas and plans proposed by various small factions and groupings of "non-conformist" intellectuals. Moreover several NRF writers, including Malraux and Benda, began to look favourably upon the prospect of a Popular Front. Once Blum's government was in power, however, Paulhan resisted continuing attempts to politicize the NRF, and strove to restore balance by criticizing Marxist orthodoxy.
"From Radicalism to Popular Front: Attitudes to Politics in the NRF from 1932 to 1938".

"l'antifascisme n'est pas seulement le vaste champ où les libéraux se mêlent aux communistes, comme le montrera la guerre d'Espagne (...), c'est un sentiment; c'est une attitude; c'est aussi une politique". (André Malraux, preface to Romain Rolland-Jean Guéhenno Correspondance, 1975, p7)

"Il n'y a plus d'innocents, de nos jours. Et je crains que le manichéisme du fascisme et de l'antifascisme ne trahisse qu'une assez grande paresse d'esprit: mais c'est une paresse qui se traîne dans le sang" (Jean Paulhan to André Suarès, BD 4966/8, dated 19/8/36).

"La politique a discrédité le mot "centre" en lui faisant évoquer des idées d'indécision, de neutralité, de lieu vague où se massent tous ceux du troupeau qu'effraient les aventures". (Jean Schlumberger, NRF August 1936, p382).
Jean Touchard, in his book *La gauche en France depuis 1900*, writes:

"Vous ne trouvez pas de revues de gauche de quelque importance dans les années 1930. Il y a Europe, qui est fort loin de l'univers radical, la NRF, mais la NRF est essentiellement une revue littéraire" (1).

It is not only simplistic but also, strictly speaking, inaccurate to think of the NRF in the 1930's as a neutral review, or as a review which was purely literary. Touchard made this comment while discussing the Radical Party in the 1930's; but, despite Rivière's and others' claims of neutrality, and of Paulhan's attempt to maintain that stance by publishing *La Trahison des Clercs*, the NRF did have political tendencies, and these were indeed Radicalist. A close examination of the personnel it gathered, of the texts it published and of the policy underlying editorial decisions, bears this out. As the Radical Party gradually became more sympathetic to the idea of a Popular Front government, so the NRF itself gained a more partisan reputation than Paulhan might otherwise have wished. Far from seeing the Popular Front as uniquely the result of a consensus of political parties, most historians have also tended to trace its origins back to the action and influence of intellectuals, writers and their front-organizations, in particular to the founding of the pacifist "Amsterdam-Pleyel" movement, and of the "Association des écrivains et artistes révolutionnaires" (or AEAR) in 1932(2).

Indeed the rise of Nazism in Germany and Hitler's coming to power in January 1933 further increased the pressure upon
political parties to rally together in a broad, antifascist front; as Malraux has put it,

"l'appel au "Front populaire" n'est pas né avec confusion, de la seule conjoncture; il a été suscité avec précision, par les Soviétiques, contre la menace hitlérienne"(3).

It would be inaccurate too, however, to insist that intellectuals were simply for or against fascism: within each "camp" there were many factions and splinter-groups which reflected the general political confusion of the time and, in the confusion, intellectuals jostled for position. The NRF was not immune to this phenomenon, so aptly described by Claude Roy:

"Quand on les (i.e. "les intellectuels") considère aujourd'hui, leurs allées et venues, leurs marches et contremarches, la première image est celle du film "comique", ou de la fourmilière écrasée. Ils entrent et sortent, vont et viennent, s'agitent entre le communisme, le fascisme socialiste, le Maurrassisme, le radicalisme d'Alain, comme si la tarentule les piquait"(4).

Against this background Paulhan had to steer the NRF through dangerous waters, managing as he went to avoid lurching dramatically one way or another, and manoeuvring skilfully to maintain as much political poise as he achieved in composing the review.

Until 1932, although the NRF approached politics and political writing in a relatively even-handed, non-controversial manner, the review was identifiably Radicalist in tone. As early as 1923 Henri Béraud had called the NRF "caillautiste"(5). Not only the founders Gide (born 1869) and Schlumberger (born 1877), but also its three regular "chroniqueurs" Alain (born 1868), Benda (born 1867) and Thibaudet (born 1874), had all grown up in and been
educated by the early Third Republic, the so-called "République des professeurs". In particular, they had all been profoundly marked by the Dreyfus Affair and the subsequent Radical-led "Défense de la République" (6). By 1930 these "elders" of the NRF had almost if not already passed their 60th year, a significant factor in considering the political attitudes of the review, for, if Radicalism was "plus profondément enraciné en tant qu'idéologie dans la société française de 1930 qu'il ne pouvait l'être dans la société française des années 1900" (7), its effectiveness as a political party had truly begun to stagnate by the end of the 1920's (8). Clearly the disastrous economic performance of Herriot's "Cartel des Gauches" government in 1926 had undermined the credibility of the Radicals, so, from 1927-1928, vigorous attempts were made to renew and improve the Party's image (9). Furthermore, though both Touchard and Mayeur have included the Radicals within the Left in France, there was a very noticeable shift from the moderate Left towards the Centre (if not the Centre-Right) as the 1930's progressed:

"Si l'influence du parti (radical) recule à la Chambre, elle s'accroît toujours au Sénat, où le nombre de radicaux passe de la cinquantaine à la centaine de 1922 à 1938, indice de ce que le parti devient un parti de notables, que la force des choses conduit à une évolution conservatrice, et à passer de la gauche au centre" (10).

In spite of the efforts of Edouard Daladier and the "jeunes turcs" (such as Jacques Kayser and Jean Zay) who wished to return "aux sources du radicalisme", reality had to be confronted: "le parti se veut à gauche, il est en fait, désormais, au centre de la vie politique" (11).
In the Inter-War period the strength of the Radical Party lay principally in its appeal to the lower middle-classes, in particular to teachers, small businessmen and professionals. The primary characteristic of its appeal to teachers was what Touchard has called "une sorte de très grande nèbuleuse radicalisante, (...) ce que Jacques Kayser appelle "le radicalisme sans frontières". C'est le radicalisme de l'Université humaniste, rationaliste, tolérante et gidienne". The political ineffectiveness of the Party was compensated by its supporters' influence and enthusiasm within this "radicalisme sans frontières", and they looked back nostalgically to the 1900's upon what came to be seen as a "golden age" of Radicalism. The most influential survivor of this age, regarded as such by both himself and his disciples was Alain; for instance, in his Citoyen contre les Pouvoirs (1926) he called himself the only remaining "combiste", a point remembered by Paulhan much later.

The first mention of Alain came in the pre-1914 NRF, in the form of a book review by none other than Gaston Gallimard. Auguste Anglès, too, has pointed out that Gide regularly read Alain's early "Propos" in La Dépêche de Rouen. By the time Paulhan took over Alain had already been asked to join the regular contributors to the review, and eventually did so in 1927. In 1925 Gallimard collected and published a number of texts by Alain dating from before 1914, Eléments d'une doctrine radicale. This publication was exploited by Gallimard's commercial director Hirsch, who distributed complimentary copies at a ministerial meeting during Herriot's cabinet in 1925. Thibaudet retold the episode:

In spite of its humour, this judgement of Radicalist "doctrine" is largely true (21). Alain's Radicalism, reduced to its basic principle, extolled the virtues of the "citoyen", who, whilst in complete obedience to the Republic and to its ideals, should exercise the rights of the individual "contre les pouvoirs"; it intended to support and protect the "little man" against the State (22). Alain's true influence lay in his role as teacher at the Lycée Henri-IV and the Ecole Normale Supérieure; here his philosophy or, more accurately, his moralism, had a lasting effect on a number of pupils and students (23). For some, it was his personality which predominated. Raymond Aron admired Alain's anti-war views more than his doctrine; as he recalled, "si la politique d'Alain me tentait, c'est qu'elle m'épargnait la peine de connaître la réalité," and most importantly, "le citoyen contre les pouvoirs s'arroge immédiatement l'irresponsabilité" (24). This anarchistic trait in Alain certainly appealed to Paulhan, whose formative years had, indeed, been open to the influence of anarchism (25).

The greatest appeal of Alain's thinking lay precisely in the glorification of the individual's rights within the Republican state: Raymond Aron confessed to being
"pour le peuple contre les privilégiés, pour le progrès contre la tradition, pour la reconstruction rationnelle de la société contre les traditions traditionnelles. Les symboles républicains ou révolutionnaires me touchaient plus que les symboles conservateurs" (26).

Thus Alain, in the forefront of the NRF's "chroniques", was viewed as a standard-bearer for a certain idealistic conception of the humanist, Radical, Republic. The teachers and academics who gave the NRF much valued support found in Alain "le miroir idéal qui réfléchit l'image embellie de la république provinciale, familiale et pacifique, la République d'avant 1914" (27).

In the NRF very rarely were any of the "Propos" directly political: out of over one hundred to appear between 1927 and 1936, only those of April and September 1934 referred to current events, and even then Alain's conclusion, in April, was typically oblique and non-committal: "La politique est un jeu de finesse et de précaution, auquel tout citoyen doit être initié" (28). Coming only weeks after the February riots it was clear that Alain's Radicalism had little to do with forceful or strident political action. This state of affairs could well be partly explained by the fact Paulhan was able to choose which "Propos" appeared, as he informed Martin du Gard (29). Although privately some within the NRF tired easily of Alain (30), he received eulogies from former pupils in essays and reviews. Denis Saurat, for example, classed Alain with Montaigne in a paean of praise published in the NRF in November 1932 (31).

Outside the NRF, Alain's thought was despised equally at both extremes of the political spectrum. Léautaud noticed an all-out
attack on the review in December 1928, delivered by l'Action française. The anonymous critic wrote that if the NRF had once been a "lieu d'asile", it was now "envahie par les pires passions partisanes". Having chastized Léautaud, Montherlant and Prévost, the author then took Alain to task for being "le professeur de philosophie dont se réclament les jeunes révoltés de Normale, qui (...) poursuit son dangereux enseignement par de pesantes ironies". Then in 1934, replying to a survey organized by Aragon in Commune, Alain answered the question "pour qui ecrivez-vous?"; his response was savaged by Aragon:

"(Alain) est l'idéologue du radicalisme (...) Il est le grand pourrisseur de gauche des écoles normales. Alain fait appel à ses élèves pour prouver qu'il n'a jamais cherché qu'à enseigner soi-même. Nous voudrions espérer (...) qu'ils oublieront les leçons d'un des plus dangereux maîtres que la bourgeoisie donne à la jeunesse (...)".

Thus if Alain drew criticism towards the NRF, it was more due to his status as a "figurehead" than as a rigorous or dogmatic political theorist.

As for Julien Benda, the language and references of his La Trahison des Clercs were distinctly Radicalist, or at least Republican. His impassioned crusade against "la réaction" and his idealism led him to defend the ideals of the 1789 Revolution and to reject both political extremes, which he saw as endangering the Republic. Writing specifically and very succinctly of Benda's achievement, Pierre Chambat has summed up:
"Le rejet des extrêmes, comme la réactivation de l'idéologie républicaine définissent l'espace de ce consensus national dont la traduction politique serait assez bien (...) un gouvernement de concentration républicaine, nationale et laïque, à tendance radicale dont le modèle fut donné par le gouvernement de Waldeck-Rousseau de 1899 à 1902" (37).

It should not be forgotten that second to his constant presence in the NRF, Benda also wrote 131 articles for La Dépêche de Toulouse between 1933 and 1940; this newspaper was one of the most prominent Radical dailies (38).

Thibaudet too, though severe on certain aspects of Radicalism, was highly admired in the period, and reflected all that was best in the République des professeurs (39). He showed a particular propensity for writing analyses of the Third Republic, which often drew replies both from within and outside the NRF (40). Fundamentally, Thibaudet was a Radical, but showed such openness of spirit that he was able to express sympathy for writers as opposed as Drumont and Nizan (41). His approach is perhaps best summed up by Jean Grenier, who wrote:

"Il était impartial parce que pour lui être partial signifiait être partiel. Personne de moins moniste: l'humanité ne lui apparaissait pas comme une armée en marche mais comme une société des esprits. Il n'aurait pas conçu même la possibilité d'une unification des idées et des volontés (...) C'était un pluraliste convaincu" (42).

Sometimes, within the same issue of the NRF, Benda and Thibaudet would combine forces in defence of the Republic. For instance in 1935, if Thibaudet adopted a gentle admonitory tone in pointing out the deficiencies of the latest views of the Third Republic, including Bainville's, then Benda spared nothing in his execution of
La Troisième République, a work "rempli de roueries, quelquefois un peu grosses"(43).

Among the younger generation of contributors, even Marcel Arland, so often seen subsequently as a-political, expressed his beliefs in identifiably Radicalist vocabulary in reply to a little-known survey in 1926(44). Both Berl and Chamson were avid Radical supporters; Berl's admiration was strongest for Herriot, while Chamson worked closely with Kayser and Daladier(45). Grenier certainly saw L'Année des Vaincus, serialized in 1934, as the work of a Radical. He told Paulhan:

"Le Chamson est intéressant, bien même- philosophie un peu courte: (...) on ne peut pas inventer une nouvelle façon de vivre: mais si! Enfin cela fait partie d'un radical-socialisme primaire qui fait le fonds et la philosophie de notre temps"(46).

Moreover, Paulhan reported Benda's comments:

"Benda lisant L'Année des Vaincus ce soir à ma table disait: "Si c'était moi qui avais écrit ça, vous l'auriez refusé". Il ajoute tristement: "C'est l'âge de Chamson que vous acceptez""(47).

Benda was probably not wrong in drawing attention to this distinction: Chamson, close as he was to Daladier, was a prime example of the "jeunes radicaux" patronized by the new Radical leader from the late 1920's onwards.

As for the political preferences of Jean Paulhan himself, any judgement must be subordinated to the overriding fact that he was, first and foremost, the editor of the NRF. Some, such as Léautaud and Sartre, looked upon Paulhan as a Socialist, or at least as a sympathizer with, if not a supporter of, the "Front populaire", 
while others have called him "un homme de droite"(48). Most of the time when writing in the review as editor, Paulhan adopted the pseudonym Jean Guérin, clearly underlining the distinction. However, his political writings in the later 1930's bore his own name, emphasizing the fact that the views expressed were his own and not necessarily the review's. The assessment of Paulhan as Socialist probably derived from his selection as municipal councillor in Châtenay-Malabry in May 1935, on the list of Jean Longuet. "Imaginez que je suis candidat au conseil municipal, Longuet m'ayant porté sur la liste", wrote Paulhan to Martin du Gard. He added, modestly, that "la confiance des gens dépasse les bornes raisonnables"(49). In a personal capacity, Paulhan at this time (1935) was willing to admit to Martin du Gard that

"je n'aime ni les révolutions, ni les révolutionnaires et je me sens tout près, pour bien marquer la confiance que je porte à la société actuelle (...) d'adhérer au parti SFIO ou communiste"(50).

Paulhan's politics, by nature as well as by choice, were kaleidoscopic to the extent that Jacques Debû-Bridel was able to write:

"Jean Paulhan échappe au clivage classique mais facile de notre terminologie politique: il ne s'est laissé accaparer par aucun clan"(51). Yet this ability to sustain a multiple perspective is indicative of the same liberal pluralism as Thibaudet's; no doubt the vocabulary and the rhetoric of pre-Second World War Radicalism have been too swiftly forgotten. Paulhan sympathized with Alain's opinion of the NRF:
"Alain (disait) que c'était une revue "toujours modérée et toujours hardie". Eh bien, peut-être tenons-nous maintenant la raison de cette modération et de cette hardiesse: c'est que la NRF ressemble à toutes les revues et à tous les livres, et à tous les hommes"(52).

Such "modération" and "hardiesse" were not only the same as those qualities exalted in Alain's "doctrine", "le citoyen contre les pouvoirs", they were also fundamental to the nature and policy of Paulhan's NRF. These comments were in fact originally made by Paulhan (using his own name, not Guérin) in the NRF for July 1938. Paulhan was referring to a critique by Robert Brasillach of a volume of Thibaudet's Réflexions (53). Having explained the inaccuracies of the account, Paulhan conceded that Brasillach had a point in stating that Thibaudet had been well-suited to the review, because "on reconnaît bien là l'esprit scolaire et anarchique à la fois de la NRF"(54). Paulhan concluded:

"Il faut avouer que (Brasillach) a gardé un sens admirable de la formule, et du raccourci. Anarchique et scolaire, pouvait-on mieux dire? C'est à la fois l'extrême indépendance, l'extrême discipline; la hardiesse, mais la modération; la liberté, mais l'obéissance. Si la NRF n'est pas encore digne d'un tel éloge, elle s'efforcera de le mériter"(55).

At about the same time, Paulhan implied that even-handedness was the principal ingredient in the editorial policy of his review, and that it extended into the political domain:

"La NRF, c'est une revue littéraire (...). Il lui arrive de parler politique, mais c'est, en général, en des sens contradictoires. Et le lecteur qui la suivrait fidèlement devrait se résigner à être réactionnaire un mois, et révolutionnaire le mois suivant; fasciste en janvier et antifasciste en mars"(56).
At first sight, on glancing through the contents pages, this statement may have some justification, and it certainly holds true in the literary perspective, as the ability to compile such a heterogeneous author-list has often been advanced as one of the keys to the success of Paulhan's NRF. Yet the constant presence of Alain, Benda and Thibaudet, in varying degrees of concentration, gave the NRF an inevitable Radicalist bias, and perpetuated its appeal to its strong academic audience, traditionally Radicalist.

However, if the values still lingered, electorally the Radicals weakened in the political stasis of 1930-32, qualified as "extrêmement morne et plat" by Touchard. Radicalism was viewed with disdain, even by those who had been sympathetic: it was a "passéisme". Renewal became a priority for the Party. As early as 1928, Thibaudet, in his extremely perspicacious essay "Réflexions sur la Politique", published as a leading article on the eve of the legislative elections in late April, detected that "en France, les elections de 1928 se font ou vont se faire dans la crise, le marasme ou la démission des partis". The parties would be the major victims of the lack of political ideas, said Thibaudet. He constantly stressed the need for "un redressement général", particularly in the face of an ever-increasing class-consciousness:

"Je crois que le problème des partis, partis qui, dans une république parlementaire, sont unis par une certaine règle du jeu, s'efface devant le problème des classes".

This was evidently troubling Thibaudet deeply; he considered that since the Russian Revolution, the most urgent task for the Parties
in France was to assimilate class-awareness, for by doing so, they might resolve their own problems:

"On est engagé dans un parti par des opinions et des intérêts. On est engagé dans une classe par une manière d'être. Le radicalisme prête son suffixe à un parti, le socialisme à une classe"(64).

Thibaudet's article offered an acute insight into one of the reasons for political stagnation in France. In October 1932, Paulhan printed another illuminating article by Thibaudet, this time the conclusion from his book Les idées politiques de la France(65). Here Thibaudet's tone was more anxious; although intending to defend liberalism, he was forced to admit that "la France est en somme le seule grande nation continentale (...) où se soient maintenues les conditions d'un libéralisme moyen. La dictature est devenue l'état normal de l'Europe et de l'Asie..."(66). Contrasting liberalism and traditionalism in France with the newer ideologies he identified, he highlighted once more the major shortcoming of French politics:

"Le libéralisme est un système de coexistences dans l'espace. Le traditionalisme est une système de continuité dans le temps. L'un et l'autre, s'ils étaient dépourvus de fermeté et de l'esprit de dialogue, donneraient ses dimensions à une critique politique passive, miroir, reflet. L'un et l'autre impliquent en somme la même nature de passivité"(67).

Passivity: this was the key-word in Thibaudet's analysis. He had warned of the need for renewal in his April 1928 article; now, even with the victory of Herriot in June 1932, the long-awaited opportunity to close ranks with the Socialists had been lost(68). Thibaudet went on:
"Le nom même de radical-socialisme indique que l'idéologie radicale a besoin d'une rallonge sur sa gauche (...) C'est pourtant le socialisme qui crée aujourd'hui dans la vie politique l'appel d'air des idées, des problèmes (...). C'est par rapport au socialisme que s'établissent les positions. C'est sur le Parti que se règlent les partis" (69).

The article concluded by re-affirming that "un pluralisme de conformismes reste, du point de vue de la liberté et du libéralisme, préférable à un conformisme monopoleur" (70). This pluralism resided in six ideas, still Radicalist in nature, which would, according to Thibaudet, "élever sur la civilisation politique d'une époque le plafond que cherchent nos yeux" (71).

Thus the main political analyses in the NRF were provided by an essentially pro-Radical commentator. Liberalism was still valid, should be maintained, while Revolution should be discouraged. In February 1933 Jean Prévost reviewed Thibaudet's book: his major criticism was that it lacked understanding concerning the extreme-Left (72). Prévost believed Thibaudet had ignored totally that a Revolution led by the Socialists, and not the Marxists, could be achieved already "dans le syndicalisme des fonctionnaires (et dans) l'énorme force organisatrice qu'il possède" (73). However those were the only drawbacks in what Prévost felt was another exemplary piece of political analysis. Further analysis was provided by Emmanuel Berl's book La Politique et les Partis, written in 1931 but not reviewed in book form until June 1933 by Fernandez (74). The book, dedicated to André Chamson, claimed that "le parti radical à beaucoup d'égards, c'est la France même" (75). In his account Fernandez pointed to the fact that "les partis français poursuivent en gros une même politique" (76),
which explained how Berl could conclude that "il retrouve à la fin une grande division entre la droite et la gauche, non plus politique, cette fois, mais sentimentale, traditionnelle, fondée sur des réflexes, des habitudes" (77). The most interesting part of Fernandez' review came in the concluding paragraph where, concurring with Berl that the Communists could "préserver un radicalisme réel", he suggested that common ground should be sought upon which to unite all of the Left in France:

"Qu'il y ait un minimum de choses à changer, sur quoi un radical sincère, un socialiste et un communiste pourraient s'entendre, je ne songe pas un instant à le nier" (78).

Berl, sensitive to Marxist theory, could not however envisage its successful application in France; Fernandez concluded that if the book highlighted a vacuum in French political ideas, it was here: "son livre reflète une fatigue des doctrines, une méfiance vis-à-vis d'elles, un désir de s'arranger sans elles" (79).

Not surprisingly the lack of new doctrine led to an explosion of interest in "le renouvellement de la pensée politique française" as attempted by the groups of so-called "non-conformist" young intellectuals gathered around a swarm of small reviews (80). Among the first books to reject both capitalism and communism, and to point the way towards a "révolution de la personne", was Décadence de la Nation française, by Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu (81). This text received favourable treatment from Fernandez when he reviewed it in the NRF in June 1931 (82). In Fernandez' view Aron and Dandieu were launching a double attack upon traditional French political life in that it was a critique at once of reformism
based upon idealistic rationalism (i.e. Radicalism), and of traditional Nationalism. Patriotism could be recuperated, according to Aron and Dandieu, in a new framework of revolutionary, or personalist, individualism \(^{(83)}\). Fernandez said he would await the results of and reactions to this effort with great interest. Robert Aron was Gaston Gallimard's secretary and, as such, was able to wield some influence and, indeed, Paulhan found himself under increasing pressure during 1932 to include more "auteurs de jeunes équipes", as he told Schlumberger in August \(^{(84)}\). It became clear that Gallimard had reproached Paulhan for not accepting more material from "les jeunes équipes politiques: (et particulièrement: aux jeunes équipes révolutionnaires)" \(^{(85)}\).

Fully aware of the dangers inherent in allowing the NRF to be used as a platform for "revolutionary" ideas, Paulhan explained his misgivings to Schlumberger:

"la vérité est en effet que la mode (je ne prends pas du tout le mot au sens péjoratif) révolutionnaire d'aujourd'hui ne me paraît ni moins insensée ni moins dangereuse que la mode nationaliste de 1910-14, à laquelle elle répond si exactement; et que, s'il s'en suit une guerre civile (qui ne pourrait être qu'internationale) elle passera, je pense, en horreur, la guerre de 14. (...) Ne faut-il pas mesurer la place — étant d'ailleurs revue littéraire — aux révolutionnaires?" \(^{(86)}\).

Clearly Paulhan was still as anxious to avoid committing the NRF (in a one-sided manner) to this issue as he had been with the "Amsterdam Pleyel" movement \(^{(87)}\). For all this, however, preparations began at this time for the important "Cahier de Revendications", which appeared in the NRF for December 1932 \(^{(88)}\). It did not appear unreasonable to Schlumberger to assemble a collection of texts, especially as he himself had lent his support to the Chantiers
co-opératifs plans of mid-1932, which were a major effort of the "nouvelles équipes" "pour la construction du monde nouveau"(89). Paulhan asked Denis de Rougemont to assemble the "Cahier"; as Loubet del Bayle has remarked,

"ces textes se répartissaient en deux catégories: d'une part, ceux des partisans d'une révolution "matérialiste", d'inspiration plus ou moins marxiste, signés de Henri Lefebvre, Philippe Lamour et Paul Nizan; d'autre part, ceux des tenants d'une révolution "personnaliste", c'est-à-dire (...) pour l'ordre nouveau, pour Esprit(...) pour la Jeune Droite"(90).

The principle aim of de Rougemont was to attempt to define "une cause commune de la jeunesse française"(91). In what seemed a genuine effort to present a balanced, unified set of new doctrine, the "Cahier" caused Nizan to vehemently disassociate himself and the AEAR from this collective publication(92). If the political divergences between the "personalists" were usually slight, there was an unbridgeable gulf between them and the materialists; the NRF had attempted to unite the "jeunes équipes", but it succeeded in splitting them over a year before the 6th February riots. Guéhenno told Rolland that in the "Cahier" "le programme fasciste y est au complet (...) Il resul te des renseignements(...) que ce "cahier" publié par la NRF n'est qu'une réaction de tous ces groupes à mon article sur la "contrerévolution" qui les avait mis dans une grande colère"(93). Jean Grenier, who sympathised with Esprit and was present at the founding of this movement(94) found that the "Cahier" was "très bien(...) Cela coupe l'herbe sous le pied des jeunes revues concurrentes"(95). Commercial motives for publishing the "Cahier" were probably important for Gallimard; yet for Paulhan balance was the essential factor.
He told Grenier that he had liked the "témoignages de Maulnier et de Lefebvre. C'est déjà beaucoup" (96); moreover, he confirmed that Guéhenno and Prévost were "têtres fâchés", and suspected that Chamson and Berl would also be "dans l'indignation" (97). Yet if Paulhan could endorse both Maulnier and Lefebvre, Nizan, writing in the name of the AEAR, launched a ferocious counter-attack upon these "amateurs distingués", as he called them, and insisted that "nous ne conclurons pas d'accords (...) avec nos plus authentiques ennemis" (98). For Nizan, his was the only authentic revolution, Marxist and proletarian; for, although the "personnalistes" could well diagnose the shortcomings of bourgeois political ideology, "ils ne peuvent aller prendre rang parmi les adversaires de classe de cette bourgeoisie", the reason being that their primary motivation was to "combattre le communisme" (99). This was a new situation in France, said Nizan, for "un petit groupe d'intellectuels bourgeois revendique le pouvoir" (100). What was unprecedented was their search for new political space: Nizan quoted de Rougemont -

"Ni à gauche ni à droite, il n'y a rien pour nous. Nous nous plaçons à l'origine de quelque chose d'autre, dont la réalité échappe encore à ceux qui récitant Marx" (101).

Despite their "rhetoric", Nizan quite clearly discerned this space as being fascist: drawing the analogy with Germany where the fascists developed "en dehors de l'opposition formelle" (102), in France, "nos nazis naissent à peine dans les revues littéraires" (103).

As for de Rougemont, he insisted that Nizan had known of "la composition et l'esprit du "Cahier" (...) le jour même où nous
The central ideological problem as hinted at previously by Thibaudet, was to achieve the apparently impossible reconciliation between bourgeois institutions, their defenders, the intellectual élites, and the masses. Fernandez considered this problem. In a collective volume of essays published in 1932, Fernandez conjoined "La Vie intellectuelle" and "La Vie politique". Here he argued that the true place of the intellectual was within society, and that the myth of the ivory tower had led to the misunderstanding that he was somehow a superior being. Although the intellectual had to subordinate himself to the nature of his work, Fernandez repeated that

"rien, dans le développement essentiel de la pensée, de la sensibilité contemporaines ne justifie une opposition radicale entre l'intellectuel et la masse".

At the basis of Fernandez' argument lay the premise that "l'homme moyen" benefited from the society created and defended by intellectuals; therefore, their professional and political roles were inseparable. Fernandez continued in this line of thinking in an article in the NRF in March 1933. Fernandez believed that any conception of a politico-intellectual élite had to consider...
the masses, for the new ideologies in operation in Italy, Russia and Germany had manipulated the masses "en utilisant (leur) façon de voir et de sentir"(111). In France, economic development had altered the political charge of the masses, thought Fernandez:

"La masse n'est plus cœ qu'elle était (...). Elle exerce une pression nouvelle et surprenante sur les pensées et sur les décisions des élites"(112).

The fact that "il faut agir et penser comme elle afin d'obtenir d'elle la délégation de pouvoir"(113), meant that parliamentarianism was henceforward at risk: "Je frémis", admitted Fernandez, "en songeant à tant de jeunes héros qui se ruent vers les révolutions de droite et de gauche pour y engloutir le peu qui leur reste de liberté"(114). Thus intellectuels like Robert Aron and Fernandez both talked of decadence and of the changing character of political élites; as Touchard has remarked, these central themes in the early 1930's became linked: "les jeunes intellectuels des années 1930 pensent que les élites ont une mission et que les clercs ne peuvent pas trahir"(115). Eager as they were to denounce the rationalism of such as Benda, Jean Paulhan made strenuous efforts to prevent the NRF from further providing what would have been an extremely influential platform for the "jeunes équipes".

During 1933, the contents pages of the NRF remained relatively free of controversial material, except for the continuing debate concerning Gide's "engagement"(116); Paulhan did not dare attempt to exploit the acrimony surrounding the publication of the "Cahier de Revendications". However, the question of revitalizing French politics continued to intrigue a range of writers associated with
the NRF. Among them, Jean Schlumberger replied to a survey launched by yet another new group, L'Homme nouveau (117). The dominant ideology of this periodical was what Ster鹶ell has called "le planisme, ou le socialisme sans prolétariat" (118). The survey asked whether a new, "planiste", social regime would generate more than just economic liberation and lead to the creation of a New Man (119). Schlumberger's reply was couched in suitably vague phraseology as befitted a response to such a vast question. However, he implied that nothing was better than a shock to the system in order to produce results:

"Ces mêmes Français qui sont lâches devant l'impôt, pusillanimes devant les réformes, et qui soutiennent au dehors une politique d'autruche, se révéleraient entreprenants et courageux si on les mettait en face de tâches plus viriles" (120).

Yet Schlumberger did not talk of revolution, but of "grandes réformes" (121); it was left to Fernandez, the same month, to answer the question "La Révolution est-elle nécessaire?" (122).

This review article was based upon another book by Arnaud Dandieu and Robert Aron, La Révolution nécessaire (123). The questions raised by the book invited very serious reflection, said Fernandez. He wasted no time in stressing that the book's great merit was "d'avoir voulu débarrasser le concept de révolution de ses parasites à la mode" (124). For the authors, the revolution "est d'abord "anarchique". C'est avant tout le besoin de sauver la personnalité humaine et de l'affirmer devant les cadres sociaux" (125). Fernandez went on to examine the concept of personality and feared that "cette personne libre ne soit qu'un concept et (qu'ils) ne substituent un conceptualisme du concret" (126). Not only would this result in no great advance or change from the materialist position,
Fernandez felt strongly that "la tragédie des révolutionnaires modernes est que le personnel leur fait défaut", basically because "l'homme d'aujourd'hui (n'a pas) le moindre penchant pour la liberté" (127). Moreover, throughout his article, Fernandez reminded his reader that these "new" revolutionary ideas were intended primarily as exercises in faith, that the revolution was a spiritual one; "esprit" and its correlatives abound in the vocabulary of this and many other movements. Fernandez wanted to challenge the relevance of such spiritualism, when he began his conclusion by stating that

"si je consulte les hommes, et principalement ceux qui n'exercent pas le métier d'écrire et de penser, je découvre en eux une totale indifférence à la suprématie du spirituel" (128).

He ended by repeating, significantly, that although he could hardly concur with the ideas it expressed, the book highlighted the preoccupations in the minds of everyone.

If the régime needed a shock to its system to alert it to dangers at home and abroad, the 6th February riots of 1934 provided it (129). Historians trace the immediate cause to the revelation of the Stavisky scandal on January 8th, and the subsequent lax attitude of police chief Jean Chiappe to control the marauding leagues. Serge Berstein has placed these events in the broader context of the "crise" and how it affected primarily the traditional support of the Radical Republic (130); J.M. Mayeur has stressed that for the first time in the Third Republic "la rue (...) permit le dénouement de (la) situation..." (131).
Only a month earlier than Stavisky's "suicide", Paulhan had inaugurated a new rubric, "L'Air du Mois" (132). This innovation could not have been more timely, for it introduced into the NRF additional flexibility and the ability to comment on current events; Paulhan had called it "une rubrique d'Actualité" (133). Between the 8th January and the 15th (the deadline for copy), he decided to comment on the scandals. Under the heading "Stavisky", Jean Guérin opened by saying that "Panama avait un prétexte, Stavisky n'en a pas. C'est le scandale pur, et qui semble fait pour donner raison, - à qui? - À Karl Marx, à Hitler et à Charles Maurras à la fois. C'est la maigre chance de la République" (134). As though to prove him right when he stated that "les violents jettent aujourd'hui feu et flamme pour obtenir quelques têtes de coupables" (135), five days after the February number appeared, the violence and its repression broke out bringing down Daladier. Once more, there was just over a week to assemble the March number. Benjamin Crémieux wrote eight pages for the "Chroniques" section, and over ten pages of "l'Air du Mois" were devoted to the crisis. Some 20 pages of a 174-page number were directly concerned with the riots.

Benjamin Crémieux considered that three-quarters of the crowd were "manifestants innocents", and that they were manoeuvred by extremists (136). His analysis proceeded to show that any alliance between the Radicals and the SFIO Socialists "coalise contre elle toutes les forces bourgeoises et petits-bourgeoises, ainsi qu'une fraction importante des electeurs radicaux, surtout les paysans" (137); here Crémieux's judgement was not at all far from that of modern
historians. He quite clearly saw "la transformation du capitalisme" in France (and abroad) as being the major root cause of the troubles, and the choice between "les solutions étatisantes et autoritaires" left the French bewildered. Crémieux highlighted the other factors crucial to the equation; the danger of a fascist take-over was defused by the disunity and lack of will on the extreme-Right, while in the Centre and on the Left the Radicals, and even some Socialists refused to unite against fascism because of their anticommunism, or anti-Marxism.

Not forgetting the looting of the 7th, the demonstrations of the 9th and the strikes of the 12th February, Crémieux insisted that any measures taken by Doumergue would be interim ones: "ce ministère d'hommes trop vieux (...), d'une pureté discutée, sans une idée commune ne peut durer...". "Ordre-liberté- je-m'en-fichisme reste l'idéal du Français moyen", Crémieux believed, and this, combined with the economic illiteracy of successive cabinets, called for "un gouvernement autoritaire". Balancing both extreme-Left and extreme-Right authoritarianism however, Crémieux felt that either would irreparably damage France; nor did he even hold out much hope for a "front unique": "aucun signe précurseur d'une large union de ce genre ne se montre encore". In his concluding paragraph Crémieux's tone did not disguise continuing idealism tempered with resignation, and even a feeling of impotence:

"Nous savons aujourd'hui que l'aménagement rationnel du monde ne s'est ébauché partout qu'à travers une éclipse de la liberté et de l'individu (...). Nous voudrions que le révolution nécessaire se fit sans un sacrifice total des conquêtes de l'individu(...) 6 Février 1934: charnière de l'histoire française ou mauvais cauchemar?".
For a great many intellectuals, the events of 6th to 12th February were decisive: they felt forced into adopting a political position and the NRF reflected these moves. In the "Air du Mois", Drieu rejoiced at the Concorde riots and wished that "ce moment durât toujours" (144). Georges Altman, a communist, provided an eye-witness account studded with picturesque and colloquial language (145); his evocation of the silence in which the demonstrations of the 12th took place hinted at a growing unity among the Left. Julien Benda's contribution was a series of meditations by his alter-ego, Eleuthère; quite clearly, he went to the defence of the Republic:

"Méditation d'un chef au matin du 6 février: Donc je lance mes jeunes gens à l'assaut du régime. S'ils gagnent, qu'importe qu'on tue quelque mille hommes. L'écrasement de la gueuse vaut bien cela. S'ils perdent et qu'on m'en tue seulement un, j'ameute toute la France contre le régime de sang. Dans les deux cas, excellente affaire" (146).

Indeed Benda saw the February riots as evidence of a new "Affaire Dreyfus", as he told Paulhan, who, in turn, told Grenier that "Benda cache assez mal le plaisir que lui ont fait les massacres de la semaine dernière" (147).

Finally, Fernandez made the first of several statements signalling the beginning of his itinerary of commitment which would lead him from fellow-travelling to Doriotism; "Pour l'unité d'action" expressed, in controlled language, Fernandez' displeasure at the fact that "A Paris en tout cas, les gens qui ont de l'argent forment un front commun contre ceux qui n'en ont pas" (148). The implication was that the Left should unite against the moneyed-classes:
"Dans la poursuite de leur unité jusqu'ici chimérique, que les gauches songent à cet énorme avantage des droites sur eux: l'unité que créent naturellement la possession et l'intérêt" (149).

This provided another instance of how the timing of events had coincided so well with the appearance of the NRF on the first day of the month; for, on March 5th, the "Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes" (CVIA) launched its manifesto under the triple patronage of Alain, Paul Langevin and Paul Rivet (150). Moreover, Fernandez' claims in March led to a bitter exchange of correspondence with François Mauriac, who could never forgive the publication of the letters (151). On the whole the public positions adopted by NRF writers and stalwarts - Alain, Benda, Fernandez - were on the Left. Paulhan's correspondence shows that he believed that "il ya trop de politique dans l'air" (152), and that he sympathized with the right-wing Jouhandeau, who told Martin du Gard:

"J'ai choisi; (...) trop profonde connaissance des radicaux-socialistes de ma province pour leur faire confiance. L'individu au dessus de tout. A aucun prix le bolchevisme. Plutôt, s'il faut s'y résigner, une tyrannie de droite(...)" (153).

"La Petite Dame" even noted how Gide wrote to Groethuysen, analysing the split within the Left (154); Gide seemed to approve of Fernandez' lurch to the Left, while Martin du Gard insisted that "je crois encore au libéralisme" (155).

Meanwhile, Crémieux returned to his political analysis in the "Chroniques" of April 1934 (156). All the parties, wrote Crémieux, across the political spectrum, "atteignent au comble de la confusion" (157). On the Left, he pointed to the split between
the SFIO and the Communists, and to the fact that any "front commun prolétarien" would be constantly obliged to redraw its right flanc (158). Crémieux went on, in a very important paragraph, to imagine the nature of a "Front populaire", while finding Radicalist dominance of it impossible;

"La journée du 12 février, l'irruption de la province contre Paris laissent apercevoir la possibilité d'un vaste mouvement de gauche. Et le radicalisme devrait théoriquement prendre la tête, s'il était tel que le définit Alain. Pratiquement, hélas! il n'en va pas de même. Et on peut estimer vain d'espérer une rénovation assez rapide du parti radical pour qu'il redevienne digne de son destin" (159).

Radical ministers had been implicated in the Stavisky scandal, Crémieux reminded his readers, and repeated that "sans une épuration dans le sens (...) de la vertu, le radicalisme est condamné" (160). After similarly berating the SFIO and the CGT, Crémieux identified "un certain réalisme" and "les grandes lignes d'un programme (qui) se dessine" (161). Although differing in their details, they concurred in their essential thrust:

"Le plan Henri de Man arrive de Belgique (...). Il se rencontre avec les plans des groupements: de jeunes et de la CGT, avec les idées "néos", avec l'esquisse que traçait à la Nouvelle Ecole de la Paix Jules Romains" (162).

Any "programme minimum" would involve the establishment of a mixed economy, the "socialisation" of monopolies, means of credit and banking, and the setting up of economic and "syndicalist" bodies alongside the political body. Crémieux favoured this approach above a "front unique" and concluded:
Crémieux's heavy emphasis on the shortcomings of Radicalism were echoed in the same number by Thibaudet (164). The pretext for his article was the publication by Rieder of Alain's Propos de Politique. Essentially Thibaudet's argument was based upon the "Propos" of Alain himself, whereby "l'esprit radical se définirait volontiers pour Alain comme une opposition et un refus devant les activismes, et que le radicalisme (...) ou l'esprit républicain, se définirait presque comme un passivisme" (165). After demonstrating various forms of action in the Third Republic, Thibaudet confessed to being struck by the 'anachronism' of Alain's Radicalism (166). Faced with the dynamism of the new ideologies, Radicalism, "écrasé sous son passif" (167), was leading France into real peril. Thibaudet ended on a striking image: "...nous vivons aujourd'hui une heure où il faudrait un Clemenceau: cela pendant que le Vieux se décompose, debout, dans sa tombe vendéenne" (168). Such criticism within the NRF of Radicalism, and calls for completely new political affiliations no doubt reflected the mood of some of the NRF's readership. Others, however, baulked at expressions of commitment, and cancelled their subscriptions. Paulhan told the young Etiemble that Fernandez' latest "Chronique" had led to "quinze désabonnements (dont cinq comtesses)" (169). "Lettre ouverte à André Gide" (170) ended by repeating Fernandez' conviction that he could no longer continue to support "une éthique de droite. Après le 6 février cet espoir n'est définitivement plus permis. Il n'y a rien, rien, là-bas, derrière leurs grands mots, que des
porte-monnaie qui se dégonflent. Marx avait trop raison, je choisis le camp des porte-monnaie vides"(171). Paulhan was evidently concerned to avoid cancelled subscriptions; yet his attitude was one of resignation when he informed Franz Hellens that

"Je reçois des lettres d'abonnées - "quand Fernandez sera dans un camp de concentration..." etc. C'est un ton nouveau, qui ne demande qu'à se développer"(172).

Thus in April 1934, all of the "Chroniques" section had been preoccupied with the serious side of February events, yet by no means were the reactions unified. This was a point noticed by a reviewer in Commune, who wondered why Crémieux had turned a blind eye to a host of germinating proto- or neo-fascist groupings, and had not joined "notre camarade Ramon Fernandez, (...) qui fut un des premiers à prendre parti"(173). Paulhan would have been gratified to read that as yet, Commune did not detect a completely partisan stance at the NRF; his inclusion of Schlumberger's "Air du Mois" the same month attested to the desire to retain a distanced political poise(174). Schlumberger himself, commenting much later on this text, claimed that it was intended to introduce a humorous note into the discussion(175). Schlumberger departed from Crémieux's view, for instance, by stating that as soon as one passed Versailles, the people in the provinces "n'ont pas cru devoir conclure que c'en fut fait de la République et qu'on eût passé, le 6 février, d'un ordre du monde dans un autre"(176).

By the beginning of May the "engagement" of intellectuals was proceeding apace; Paulhan told the distant Grenier that
"ici l'on se convertit de plus en plus à quelque chose. On fait aussi des manifestes" (177). The Union pour la Vérité assembled on April 28th to discuss "Libéralisme et Communisme" (178); here, Fernandez defended the "interprétation communisante" with special reference to the 9th February, and declared himself in an even more forthright manner than in his "Lettre ouverte": "comme je suis marxiste, je dis simplement que c'est une lutte de classes" (179).

In the NRF for May, Fernandez communicated "Un Appel aux Travailleurs" whereby antifascist intellectuals declared themselves allies with "tous les travailleurs, nos camarades (...), contre une dictature fasciste. (...) Nous sommes prêts à tout sacrifier pour empêcher que la France ne soit soumise à un régime d'oppression..." (180).

The NRF was, once again, bending before political pressures, and followed Commune and Europe into the broad Left, antifascist camp: the list of NRF - associated luminaries who signed the CVIA manifesto was impressive. Among them were Alain, Benda, Fernandez, Gide, Martin du Gard, Dabit, Daumal, Desjardins and Lalou (181).

No doubt deliberately, Paulhan inserted in May's issue, directly following the "Appel", an "Air du Mois" in which Drieu declared that "il y a quelque chose dans le fascisme qui répond à mes tendances naturelles (...). Ce qui me plaît dans le fascisme, c'est une certaine disposition virile" (182). Some would have been shocked to read that "l'anéantissement du monde libéral, radical et social démocrate" was due to "l'oubli total des vertus viriles" (183). Drieu preferred the prospect of "la révolution anti-parlementaire" to "la république staviskienne (...) ou soviétique" (184). Drieu had at last found a political ideology which suited his conception of "L'Homme nouveau", and
which had once brought him so close to Malraux. This similarity did not go unnoticed by Paulhan for, from this time, he used work by both Malraux and Drieu to attempt to balance the contents pages. In February 1935 Drieu again made a fascist declaration in the form of the short story "L'Homme mûr et le jeune homme", just before Malraux's Le Temps du Mépris began serialization in March that year. However, the scales were plainly weighted in favour of the Left; taken with the rest of the Left-leaning writers in the contents pages, Drieu's presence, if viewed cynically, might well be qualified as a token one. This is not to deny that his influence remained important. For instance, at the Union pour la Vérité debate, Drieu refused to believe that Fernandez was serious when he declared himself a communist:

"Je crois que tu estres hésitant, que le dernier mot n'est pas dit, que tu n'est pas une recrue sure, et que ce que tu as dit de tes réserves est très grave. Tu te méfies profondément de la tactique communiste".

Drieu was proved right, for on June 12th, Fernandez resigned from the AEAR, and by May 1935, expressed sympathy with the Comte de Paris.

In the NRF, by the summer of 1934 the flood of reactions to February had receded, except for Benda's jibes at Daniel Halévy. The change of mood was signalled by the publication by Gallimard of the Plan du 9 juillet, with a preface by Jules Romains: Crémieux's call for a "programme minimum" seemed to have been answered. The Plan, countersigned by 19 young "fonctionnaires" with an extremely diverse range of political views, "Obtint (...
un gros succès auprès du public (...) et de la presse. Gallimard tira éditions sur éditions de cette petite brochure de 60 pages" (192). Romains' name helped the commercial success of the Plan, but in the NRF, Thibaudet gave it unusually sarcastic and severe treatment in September (193). His objections were that it offered little that was not already existent or developing in other contemporary institutions. Moreover, he believed it was a good example of how Parisian 'cadres' imposed their will upon the provinces. He also asked: "La France ne serait-elle pas encore assez scholocratique?" (194), a reference to the "normalien" background of Romains and his associates, as well as to characters in Romains' "roman-fleuve", Les Hommes de bonne Volonté. In short, Thibaudet was dismissive, saying "la foire aux plans reste ouverte ..." (195). Later, Paulhan reproduced part of an article by Romains in the Dépêche de Toulouse in defence of the Plan, as well as a letter from the group's secretary, Jean Thomas (196). Both of these texts pointed to inaccuracies in Thibaudet's assessment, but, if Thibaudet was willing to admit errors of detail, his opinion of the Plan did not change (197). In spite of the reception of the Plan, its fate was similar to that of the other ideas which attempted to define "l'esprit des années trente" : as J-M Mayeur has said, their implementation "se fit surtout ensuite, dans les années de Vichy (...) et jusqu'à la cinquième République" (198).

One major political consequence of the February riots was the phenomenon known as "le reclassement des partis" : gradually, differences were settled and alliances re-cast, and, following the
intellectuals' lead, the path was cleared towards the Popular Front: as Mayeur has stressed, "L'union de la gauche n'a pas suivi immédiatement le 6 février"\(^{(199)}\). Once the communists had settled their internal differences and Moscow had issued its new directive, by the end of June the Comintern called for "L'unité d'action "à tout prix" avec les socialistes"\(^{(200)}\). After that, things happened more quickly. On July 27th 1934, the Parti communiste and the SFIO signed their pact; Thorez, on the eve of the Radicals' conference in October, launched the slogan "Pour le pain, pour la liberté et pour la paix!"\(^{(201)}\).

In the NRF Thibaudet noticed these changes, and Paulhan included an important "Réflexion" in December 1934 intended as a corrective sequel to Les idées politiques de la France, "Les Partis politiques en France"\(^{(202)}\). Thibaudet stated that "La République est entrée dans une période nouvelle de son histoire"\(^{(203)}\), and that the Radical party was the sole survivor of the original Republic. He felt it essential to take account of "la coexistence des anciens partis qui se déclassent et des nouveau partis qui ne sont pas encore classés"\(^{(204)}\). He then listed a series of consequences directly attributable to February 6th, the two most important of which were -

"1. Le renversement des alliances opéré par le parti socialiste, lequel a rompu avec les radicaux pour s'allier aux communistes, d'où, comme formule d'un bloc de gauche, la substitution de la formule de Front commun. (...)

2. La division du parti radical, dont une fraction, la plus petite, entend conserver le contact avec les socialistes, et dont la plus considérable, groupée autour de M.Herriot, est destinée à grossir les rangs d'un centre parlementaire national"\(^{(205)}\).
Thibaudet pointed out that the unity of the Left (even if superficial) was nothing new: the general elections of 1924, 1928 and 1932 brought the Left to power united in a cartel. Yet they had failed time and again to govern, primarily because the Socialists had never really wanted to participate in a government where they had no majority, and because the Radicals had been chronically out of touch with the real needs of the country (206). On the new moves towards unity, however, Thibaudet did not mention that the Communists, the new Left party holding the balance of power, were under orders from Moscow to unite at all costs against the risk of fascism in France.

At this time another storm was brewing inside the review. Some, especially Jean Schlumberger, felt that the review had for some time been betraying its "charte de neutralité qu'on suppose à la base d'un programme délibérément littéraire" (207).

Paulhan told Jouhandeau that

"Jean Schl. s'explique, dans le prochain numéro, sur les exagérations, dit-il, de Gide et de Suarès. Mais où serait la place de toutes les exagérations, sinon à la NRF? Et puis, je penserais volontiers que les choses sont telles en "réalité" que l'on ne s'approche d'elles que par exagération" (208).

Schlumberger felt that their original pre-1914 position had been justified by the proximity of the Dreyfus affair, and that Rivière's political bias had been unavoidable in the aftermath of the war. He now believed that, over the last nine months, an insidious change had come about:

"Il y a glissement d'un plan où l'auteur essaie (...) d'apporter des pensées universellement recevables, à un plan où l'auteur parle consciemment en homme de parti" (209).
Schlumberger's great fear was that the NRF might drift towards political orthodoxy in the Marxist camp, that it would lose its in-built heterogeneity. That he should express himself in this manner showed that he was, at this time, far removed from Gide's position, and even Paulhan's, who believed the review could exploit such political "exaggerations". (210).

The question of ideological orthodoxy was to return at the time of the 1936 elections, when Jean Grenier's important essay appeared (211).

Meanwhile Julien Benda, inspired by support for Schlumberger's line in Le Temps (212), wondered whether Gide would have attracted so many insults if he had been ""partial" dans l'autre sens", as he put it (213). This led Benda to clarify his own position regarding the signing of manifestos. He had signed the CVIA manifesto "parce qu'il me semblait défendre des principes éternels. Invité par la suite à signer pour des actes de politique temporelle et concrète, j'ai refusé" (214). Benda was repeating essentially the reasoning he had outlined in La Trahison des Clercs and the ensuing debate. What was different was that this time, he was willing to admit that Péguy's conception of a "mystique de gauche" was "recevable pour le clerc", but not that "toutes les mystiques sont belles" (215). Benda could rationalize his support for the Left as follows:

"La mystique de gauche honore la justice et la vérité. Elle est belle. La mystique de droite - du moins celle d'aujourd'hui-honore la force, subordonne la vérité à l'intérêt social, respecte l'injustice "fatale". Elle est laide" (216).
Benda's vocabulary and terms of reference reflected a renewal of interest in Péguy's thought, a fact borne out by Paulhan's granting Pierre Hamp a regular place in the "Air du Mois" from this time (217).

Fernandez wanted to join this debate, and an article intended as a direct reply to Schlumberger appeared the next month (218). Fernandez, identifying himself with the "turbulents plumitifs" upbraided by Schlumberger, wrote that he wanted to generalise the debate (219). His first point was that no-one was surprised to read an author's impressions of travel in a literary review, so why should it be of concern to read political impressions? So long as literary primacy was maintained, the policy to include such material could be defended, and, indeed, it was:

"Quand Jean Paulhan affirme la priorité d'importance de la littérature sur la politique, je pense qu'il reconnaît du même coup que l'expression littéraire d'un conflit politique participe de l'importance de la littérature" (220).

"Quant à moi", continued Fernandez, "j'ahomite ce mot de littérature" (221). His central premise was that literature and politics were not mutually exclusive, that the NRF was quite the proper place for writers to express themselves politically; he added, "la sottise serait d'adjoindre, au bureau de Jean Paulhan, une salle de vote" (222). He had been inspired to conceive of the problem in this manner having read Drieu's Socialisme fasciste, where Fernandez saw an excellent example of a writer fusing a poetics and a politics, in what he characterised as a "document de prophétie poético-politique" (223). Likewise
Fernandez, at this stage in his own political itinerary, would have agreed wholeheartedly when Drieu declared:

"Je ne souhaite nullement, et d'ailleurs, je crois impossible la neutralité. Je crois que de l'oeuvre d'un intellectuel et même d'un artiste se dégage une tendance politique profonde..."(224).

Moreover, Fernandez could see a poetical element in totalitarianism: mass rallies, emblems and credos all bore witness to this. At home, a year before, Fernandez admitted it would have been easy, after his declaration of support for the "porte-monnaie vides", to build a "communisme poétique"(225): yet he discovered that "la politique poétique n'était pas du tout mon fait"(226). Experience had shown Fernandez that most intellectuals had been more attracted by political ritual than by "réalisations pratiques", whereas "J'ai le goût des trains qui partent"(227), as he put it. Such was the thinking which led Fernandez (and Drieu) towards supporting Doriot's Parti populaire français(228).

One noticeable and lasting consequence of this debate in early 1935 was that henceforward the NRF attempted to be much more critical of Marxist orthodoxy in the doctrinal sense: for instance, one exchange was reprinted in the "Air du Mois" section between Julian Benda and Pierre Herbart(229). At the same time, however, the NRF was favourable to the increasingly likely prospect of a "Front populaire". In March 1935, reflecting upon the large demonstration signalled by the anniversary of the riots, Benda mused:
"Donc, le 10 février, les communistes ont admis dans leurs rangs ce drapeau tricolore. Ils ont compris que leur intérêt est de défendre la démocratie contre le fascisme" (230).

A month later, Léautaud reported the impression that:

"la NRF est en réalité un milieu de communistes, (...) On y est scandalisé, paraît-il, sur le compte de R. Fernandez, qui, après avoir été anarchiste, puis communiste, paraît tourner maintenant au monarchiste" (231).

Moreover, the Municipal Elections of 5th and 12th May, and the 14th July demonstration of unity, were two more important episodes in the preparation of the Popular Front (232). Jean Paulhan was elected as a pro-"Front-populaire" candidate (233), and Paul Rivet, co-patron of the CVIA, was elected in the fifth "arrondissement" in Paris (234). Thus, despite Schlumberger's misgivings, events were leading the NRF into adopting a pro-Popular Front attitude. To celebrate the victory of Paul Rivet, Benda's leading "Air du Mois" in June took the form of an open letter, in which he recommended the founding of a new party: "l'antifascisme patriotique" (235). This time, the stress was laid upon both defending democratic liberties at home, but also upon actively opposing Hitlerism abroad. Benda's appeal was very strongly-worded indeed, in spite of the fact that, for the sake of balance he advised refusing the support of Langevin and Guéhenno, who might prevent more universal appeal. Benda's terms of reference showed once again how deeply entrenched his Republicanism was, for he could distance himself from the current Radical party, at the same time upholding the old values:
"Vous me dites: Ce parti, à la fois antifasciste et patriote, il n'est pas à créer: c'est le parti radical. Je réponds que les radicaux ont voté ces mesures de sûreté en marchandant, en rechignant, comme sous la cravache de la droite. Je veux que vous les votiez fièrement, pleinement (...) par ardeur à défendre les libertés démocratiques contre la menace de l'étranger, comme les eussent voté un Danton, un Gambetta, un Clemenceau, les vrais parrains du parti que je propose" (236).

Benda, concluded: "Dressez-vous contre le fascisme hitlérien aussi résolument que contre les hommes du 6 février. Tout la France vous suivra" (237).

In the same issue, Jean Guérin, whose "Air du Mois" "Péguyisme pas mort" described Jacques Madaule's candidacy against Chiappe, found that "toujours dans la grande tradition péguyiste, la bataille morale aboutissait (...) à une bataille citoyenne" (238). Although Madaule only gained 488 votes, according to Guérin the important thing was that "le péguyisme (...) triomphait puisqu'il avait été le centre moral et intellectuel de cette bataille" (239). Uniting France in a "moral" crusade had become the priority, instead of underlining political differences which deflected from the true threat, fascism abroad (240).

Early that summer, NRF-associated writers were, once more, fully in the public eye at the impressive international "Congrès pour la Défense de la Culture", organised and "sponsored" by the AEAR (241). Despite the apparent unity achieved by this gathering, the circumstances leading to the suicide of René Crevel on June 18th showed Paulhan's desire to distance the NRF from AEAR intellectuals. Lottman opens his book La Rive gauche with this episode. Crevel committed suicide on the eve of the Congress (242).
Paulhan invited Jouhandeau, a close friend of Crevel, to write an obituary for the July number. By the 24th June, three days after the official opening of the Congress, Paulhan told Jouhandeau that Gide was very pleased with the two-page tribute to Crevel (242). In his text, Jouhandeau made a clear link between Crevel's suicide and his agonized adherence to communism (244). Coinciding as it did with the Writers' Congress, and Aragon having read a speech there by the late Crevel to great emotional effect (245), the appearance of the obituary was explosive. Gide heard that Aragon was furious:

"(Aragon) affirme que non seulement tout ce qu'il insinue est faux, mais que Jouhandeau sait que c'est faux, il se tourne aussi contre Paulhan qui accueille un semblable article"(246).

Paulhan was evidently frightened by the power wielded by communist intellectuals such as Aragon and Malraux; from this time on (until his increasing involvement with the Spanish Civil War), Malraux was beginning to exercise his own influence at the NRF, including the support he gave Gide in preparing his Russian visit (247).

The campaign for the Popular Front was interrupted in October 1935 by the news that Italy had invaded Ethiopia; this event provided a further opportunity for intellectuals to align themselves either for or against the fascist cause (248). The "Manifeste des intellectuels français pour la défense de l'occident" appeared in Le Temps on October 4th; Jules Romains led a left-inclined group which replied to Massis and the Academicians (in l'Oeuvre, 5th October), and this in turn
was followed by a corrective manifesto drawn up by left-centre Catholics, including Jacques Maritain (in l'Aube, 18th October). Although the NRF did not, this time, reprint the Left's text, nor list its signatories, Europe did; in addition to Romains', the names of Gide, Malraux, Chamson, Prévost, Schlumberger, Crémieux and Berl appeared alongside the usual Europe and communist roll-call. Paulhan, writing to Adrienne Monnier, felt "navré que le manifeste Romains soit si faux : il n'y avait pas un mot, dans le manifeste Massis, sur l'inégalité de race. The one absentee from any of these declarations was Fernandez, whose "Remarques sur le conflit Italo-Ethiopien" appeared in November's number. Here Fernandez assessed the intellectuals' responses to the events in Africa: he wrote, scathingly, that "la politique est mal faite pour être pensée autrement que de façon toute pratique. Dès que nous la mettons en idées, nous sommes atteints d'aphasie."

In Fernandez' opinion the manifestos of both Right and Left demonstrated the "aphasia" of the intellectuals who had signed. He was scandalised at how lamentable the quality of opinion was on this affair, and accused opinion-makers of only having a monocular view: "Cette guerre(...) n'a suscité chez nous que des réflexes de politique intérieure!". Although more vituperative than Thibaudet, Fernandez was making the same observation about "cette carence d'une opinion politique": in the manifestos he had referred to, "vous y trouverez des idées beaucoup moins claires et beaucoup moins valables que celles que vous recueillerez au cabaret du coin". Since "les bases concrètes d'une pensée politique font défaut", concluded Fernandez, "retrouver ces bases, en déduire une pensée,
est une de nos tâches les plus urgentes. Nos intellectuels feraient bien de s'y employer, au lieu de gaspiller leur signature" (256). Given Paulhan's distaste for signing manifestos, he no doubt fully approved of Fernandez' stance on this occasion.

Early in the New Year, the political atmosphere was as volatile as ever: Paulhan told Jouhandeau of an explosion in the offices of the NRF, one explanation of which was that a bomb had been laid by the "Croix de Feu" (257). Moreover, on February 13th, 1936, Léon Blum was seriously injured in an attack by sympathisers of L'Action française and the "ligues" (258). At this very time, and evidently influenced by such events, Paulhan was finalising arrangements with Jean Grenier to publish his controversial text "L'Age des Orthodoxies" (259). Already Paulhan had made it clear that he felt Gallimard and Malraux wanted to politicize the NRF still further: he admitted: "Je me sens assez seul, dans cette maison" (260). The correspondence between Paulhan and Grenier shows how concerned Grenier was to have the text appear as soon as possible: "il vaut mieux le faire paraître le 1er mars ou 1er avril au plus tard. Tu sais mieux que moi combien l'actualité peut varier" (261). Paulhan acknowledged receipt of Grenier's proofs on February 15th confirming, very importantly, that "Je compte donner "l'Age des 0" en tête de la NRF du 1er avril. Il ne sera pas trop tard, et Blum, aux dernières nouvelles, n'est pas tout à fait mort" (262). He wrote to Grenier again to quell his annoyance at the delay: Paulhan repeated that "pour une foule de raisons, il est en avril mieux à sa place. Et
tu ne vas pas me faire croire que tu écris pour l'actualité (263)."

Yet given the comments in their correspondence and the proximity of the first round of the forthcoming general election, the timing of Grenier's article was plainly important. Moreover, Paulhan was scandalized, despite the 2,000 extra subscriptions it brought, at the ousting of Guéhenno from Europe (264); the review was about to be taken over by a committee of fellow-travellers and Marxists (265). Likewise, the recent creation of the Pro-Popular Front weekly Vendredi grouped several NRF-associated writers such as Gide, Schlumberger and Benda: as Lottman has said, Paulhan willingly assisted the editors of Vendredi in passing material to them which might be out of place in the NRF (266). "L'Age des Orthdoxies" also provided the opportunity of distancing the NRF from Vendredi, as well as preventing it from succumbing to the same dangers of orthodoxy which beset Europe.

Grenier's article opened:

"C'est un trait frappant des dix dernières années que le brusque passage d'un doute absolu à une foi totale et parallèlement du désespoir sans limites à un espoir sans limites également" (267).

In much the same way as Arland and Crémieux had done, Grenier retraced the steps of the current literary generation from the First World War (268); like Schlumberger too, Grenier noted that "ce qui est urgent n'est plus de se faire une foi, c'est adhérer à un parti" (269). By rallying to communism, intellectuals had of necessity adopted Marxist doctrine which, in Grenier's view, "n'est pas seulement une théorie économique, c'est même une théologie" (270). Grenier's basic critique was that to
subordinate the intelligence to materialism, dialectical or
not, was to betray intelligence; moreover, the fundamental
impulsion behind the application of Marxist doctrine was
"l'abaissement intellectual (...) sous pretexte de répondre
une nouvelle culture..."(271). Grenier proceeded to illustrate
his thinking by referring to a collection of Marxist essays
covering many diverse fields from biology to astronomy(272).
Grenier found that Marxism as a system was illogical:

"C'est que le marxisme, à la suite de l'hégelianisme,
s'appuie sur un système du Devenir qui justifie aussi
bien la thèse que l'antithèse en les conciliant dans
une "synthèse" supérieure.

Mais cet illogisme qui est érigé en méthode
suprême pour juger de tout est compensé par un optimisme outrancier..."(273)

Still more outrageous was the fact that, for Grenier, this
"messianisme" justified and excused the death of millions on
the way to an earthly paradise(274). Similarly, the "Congrès
pour la Défense de la Culture" had provided an illustration
of how "deviation" from the Marxist line was frowned upon, that
only those writers who "toed the line" would be tolerated. As
though to compensate for this forthright assault upon Marxism,
Grenier briefly treated Thomism as the Church's latest fashionable
orthodoxy(275). Grenier began his concluding remarks by noting
that others had perceived this tendency to subscribe to
orthodoxies; nothing could be more understandable
"dans le monde de ruines et de mort que nous habitons"(276). Yet the
perils inherent in blind allegiance to a faith were as clear as
ever: "qu'est-ce qui cause la ruine d'une croyance sinon ses
annexes scientifiques et temporelles?", concluded Grenier\(^{(277)}\), for once echoing Benda.

The central point in Grenier's article was that there was a real danger in espousing communism, when its faith, Marxism, could justify anything in the name of progress. Coming at the time of the Popular Front, when not only intellectuals but political leaders and parties were rallying together with the Communists, this article was bound to be controversial. Paulhan's letters to Grenier reflect this: on 18th April, Paulhan wrote that even *Le Journal des Débats* had quoted it, and, significantly, Malraux especially was "indigné" de la légèreté (...) avec laquelle tu exécutes sinon Marx, le Marxisme\(^{(278)}\). In May, reactions were still being voiced; "Lefebvre. m'a paru plus attristé que furieux. Malraux m'a demandé si la NRF prenait la responsabilité de..."\(^{(279)}\).

Paulhan enclosed a cutting from *Commune* in which Grenier was attacked as a "pourfendeur du marxisme"\(^{(280)}\). In a letter of May 13th, Grenier learnt that "quelques abonnés (qui se désabonnent) citent ("l'Age des Orthodoxies") sans sympathie. C'est bizarre", added Paulhan ingenuously, "il y a des tas de gens que ça a exaspérés"\(^{(281)}\). Grenier's article also caused a stir, in particular, with Etiemble, who sent Paulhan his own critique of Grenier\(^{(282)}\). However, by far the most impressive published rejoinder to Grenier came some weeks later in *Europe*, which had moved substantially leftwards\(^{(283)}\). Friedmann had noted the position of "L'Age des Orthodoxies" in the *NRF*, and called it a "Manifesto". He set about demolishing Grenier's critique:
"Il n'est presque pas une ligne des quatre pages par lesquelles M. Grenier pense condamner l'effort des savants et philosophes marxistes, qui ne porte à faux et ne révèle une connaissance très superficielle des recherches qu'il prétend dominer..."(284).

In turn, Grenier based part of a further article upon Friedmann later that year(285): evidently Paulhan and Grenier between them had managed to offend many "orthodox" sensibilities.

Much of this debate went on against the background of the electoral victory of the Popular Front: after the second round gave the Left their victory on May 3rd., Léon Blum formed his first cabinet on June 4th(286). In the political "reclassement" which followed, many intellectuals re-aligned their own positions: André Gide, for instance, an old friend of Blum, lent the new Président du Conseil much support(287). What is more, the NRF itself was beginning to lose its Radicalist aspect: Thibaudet died in early 1936, Alain submitted his last "Propos" in November (although Paulhan still accepted his work), and, if Julian Benda still admired "les valeurs cléricales", he increasingly came to feel that the Communists were the only party to uphold them.

The only direct mention of the elections was made in "L'Air du Mois" in June(288). Here Fernandez took a distanced view and, instead of commenting on the victory of the Left, preferred to analyse why the Right had failed. He believed that the Left had won because they had managed to link their own cause with a truly national defence of sentiments and interests(289). Such an attitude coincided well with Paulhan's attempt to keep his
review free from partisanship; yet evidence exists to show that Paulhan himself and others supported the cause of the Popular Front. Benjamin Cremieux defended the workers who proceeded to strike during June: he believed they had no other means of redress. Paulhan defended the efforts of the Popular Front on behalf of deprived groups of workers against Jouhandeau's outright hostility, which was not free from anti-Semitism. If Paulhan was worried, it was by "l'hypocrisie des communistes, la faiblesse possible des socialistes, le rôle évident de l'argent étranger..."; these misgivings were, indeed, at the root of the troubles besetting the Popular Front, after what Lacouture has called "le bref été du socialisme".

In another episode which is, fortunately, documented in Paulhan's correspondence, the NRF proved to have re-aligned, in the view of some, as a pro-Popular Front periodical. Alfred Fabre-Luce, himself for some time close to the NRF, wrote to Jean Grenier asking him to collaborate with his new weekly L'Assaut, offering him the attractive fee of 1,000 frs. per month for a literary column. Grenier asked Paulhan for his advice:

"Le numéro (spécimen) qu'il m'envoie contient un article de Brasillach, bon en soi, mais mauvais pour l'équipe de Vendredi.

Extrait de la lettre de F.L.: "Peut-être êtes-vous plus à gauche que nous le paraissions actuellement puisque des événements nous situent en opposition avec le Front populaire, alors que la NRF est actuellement sympathisante..." Mais il dit aussi opposition avec conservatisme et que j'écrirai en toute liberté, qu'il y a distinction entre pages politiques et pages intellectuelles, etc."[294]. (sic)
This appropriately-named weekly was obviously mobilized against the Popular Front and its intellectual support: Paulhan telegraphed on October 20th: "Journal suspect conseille refus - Jean" (295).

A letter followed in which Grenier learnt that L'Assaut "est, ou va devenir, doriotiste. (il y a un accord F.L. - Doriot)" (296).

Grenier, in turn, confirmed he had refused on the grounds that, although he had liked Pamphlet, he could not write for a "journal de combat" as it had a clear political orientation (297). But in the end, Grenier did contribute and Paulhan shrewdly assessed the motives behind Fabre-Luce's offer:

"Ce qui me gêne un peu, c'est le parti qu'il veut évidemment tirer de ta présence; et c'est surtout ce parti qu'il te paie. (Mais peut-être en effet n'as-tu pas à t'en soucier)" (298).

Grenier said that he would write an article on Jean Blanzat's Septembre, stressing Blanzat's rôle in Europe, "revue dont les revendications nous paraissent souvent animées du plus pur esprit de justice..." (299). Indeed, in L'Assaut dated 17th November, Grenier's article appeared, including the passage he had described to Paulhan: he added -

"Un écrivain a le devoir de ne pas cacher ses préférences politiques, ses idées sociales ou religieuses; et il doit aussi conserver le droit de s'affirmer comme écrivain dans le domaine où il lui plaît" (300).

Paulhan was distressed by Grenier's presence in L'Assaut and told him so: but Grenier wrote two more articles before withdrawing (301).
From October 1935, the initial successes of the Popular Front slowed down to what Lefranc has called "la pause implicite"(302). Gide was on the point of publishing his *Retour de l'URSS*, a text which would deeply upset the Communists: yet he was still attempting to support Blum's efforts to hold together the Popular Front (303). By mid-November, Gide was worried that the Government was under attack from all sides, and lunched with Blum on at least two occasions (304) in order to underline his support. As for Paulhan, the news of the suicide of Blum's minister Roger Salengro caused him to share with Suares his feeling that "la plus grave, ou la plus tragique des difficultés actuelles me semble tenir à la haine que se portent les Français"(305). At around the same time he told Etiemble that "simplement je crois que Blum (...) se montre aujourd'hui lamentablement faible, et sera écrasé, s'il ne l'est par les communistes, par les puissances d'argent ..."(306).

It was from this time onwards, when Paulhan realised that the Popular Front and its in-built weaknesses was not much different from the succession of cabinets which had preceeded it, that he became increasingly open to Maurrassian ideas. This is borne out by the fact that he was constantly pressing Jean Grenier to write an appreciation of Charles Maurras; an article finally appeared in February 1938 (307). Yet Paulhan joined others in sending a modest sum to *Vendredi* when the weekly appealed for financial support in April 1937: evidently Paulhan believed that it was worth continuing to assist *Vendredi* so long as it deflected controversial material from appearing in the *NRF* (308).
Indeed the review printed very little controversial material in 1937. Armand Petitjean was a new, young writer who, deeply influenced by Péguy, had an emotional article printed in the January number 1937(309). The optimism of this derived from the fact that it was dated July 1936: in it, Petitjean called for a mobilization of youthful talent in France— the tasks were urgent. Petitjean concluded thus:

"Puissent mes camarades savoir distribuer les rôles entre les disposibles et les révolutionnaires, entre l'esprit de revendication et celui de sacrifice, entre la préparation matérielle, matérialiste au besoin, de la Révolution, et le caractère nécessairement éthique (...) qu'elle prendra dès qu'elle aura "accroché l'événement" et que les hommes se sentiront pressés par l'Histoire!"(310).

As though responding to the spirit of Petitjean's call, Paulhan published Jean Prévost's novel La Chasse du matin in six parts, beginning in March 1937(311). Here Prévost's characters, robust, intelligent and virile, after qualifying in a range of professions, try their hand at different jobs with little success. In Part 3, however, they are involved in the setting-up of a daily newspaper with the financial backing and political outspokenness of a dynamic businessman, Crouzon, whom the narrator likens to Marcel Déat. The action takes place between the summer of 1932 and the aftermath of February 1934, and describes the preparation and publication of La France nouvelle, in the atmosphere of political lethargy in October 1933. The narrator writes:

"La Chambre de 1933 s'amusait à renverser les gouvernements (...) ceux qui prêchaient rajeunissement des cadres parlaient de Crouzon pour un ministère(...) Crouzon écrivit quelques articles fort vifs contre ces changements de gouvernement"(312).
Such editorials turn out to provide the key to the newspaper's success, which was open to intellectuals such as Guitton, who had earlier told the central protagonist, the architect Dannery, that he had had an article accepted by the NRF, but "je ne pourrai rien faire paraître là pendant un an" (313). Dannery, obviously impressed, asks -

" - Mais de paraître là, ça t'ouvrira des portes?  
- Ça m'en fermera d'autres. Toutes les chapelles servent des Dieux jaloux" (314)

At the end of the novel, Guitton appears to be lukewarm in his optimism for the future. The final chapter, symbolically titled "Commencement", finds the characters enjoying the summer of 1936: Guitton feels that a phase of creation must follow that of action (315).

The cautious optimism of such texts contrasted sharply with the reality of June 1937, when Blum's government fell, due to Radical opposition. Chautemps' new cabinet signalled what Lefranc has called "Dix-huit mois d'agonie" for the Popular Front (316).

By November that year, Gide was thoroughly disillusioned with Vendredi and the Popular Front, reflected by the fact that he switched allegiance to Gaston Bergery's La Flèche (317). Meanwhile, all that year, Paulhan had continued to press Grenier for his text on Maurras (318). On November 14th Grenier told his editor he had been very impressed with the re-publication of Maurras' Mes Idées politiques (319). This coincided with the Manifesto released by the Comte de Paris in Geneva on November 11th,
and which was followed by a letter to *L'Action française* on December 3rd: Paulhan wrote to Grenier:

"Tu m'envoies bien ton Maurras, n'est-ce pas? J'en suis très pressé (cela le réconfortera dans les difficultés présentes). La lettre du Comte de Paris n'est d'ailleurs pas sotte du tout" (320).

Paulhan was aware that both the Comte de Paris and the Duc de Guise, by severing their links with *L'Action française*, might discredit Maurras; the Duc de Guise had written:

"Si sa (i.e. de Maurras) doctrine politique postule le régime monéarchique, les enseignements de son école, par contre, se sont révélés incompatibles avec les traditions de la Monarchie française" (321).

Yet, as Weber has shown, the "excommunication of 1937 hurt the Pretender more than *L'Action française*, which received much rallying support from the rest of the Royalist press" (322). Grenier's article finally appeared in February 1938 amid much protest at the NRF; the text, surprisingly sympathetic, was intended to acknowledge Maurras' influence over the last 40 years (323). Grenier deliberately concentrated upon Maurras' achievement, and played down his anti-government, anti-Semitic, polemical output:

"Sa doctrine pour lui et les siens demeure intacte: elle tend seulement, à force de perdre ses points d'application, à devenir une œuvre d'art" (324).

Léautaud in particular praised Paulhan for printing Grenier's article, in spite of all the "jeunes (...) tous "Front Populaire" en diable", and Benda, who had opposed it (325). Léautaud thought that "Paulhan (...) tient ferme pour conserver à la NRF une sorte de libéralisme et d'équité. Mais ce pauvre Benda! Il tourne
de plus en plus au partisan, à l'énergumène politique. Il est vraiment dégringolé de sa colonne" (326).

Events began to move more quickly at home and abroad; the utter impotence of the French government was glaringly illustrated by the Anschluss, when Hitler moved into Austria the day after Chautemps' resignation on March 10th (327). Two days before this, Paulhan sent out a circular letter to a number of NRF contributors, asking them for their evaluation of the failure of the "Front populaire" (328). The replies were intended for the April number, but due to the government's fall, Paulhan put the project into abeyance (329). From the wording of his circular, Paulhan was evidently very embittered by the "experiment" of the "Front populaire". If there had been changes, they were for the worse: the cost of living had increased; productivity had fallen and workers were demoralized; and abroad, the dictatorships were consolidating their position (330). Moreover, continued Paulhan,

"Quand Léon Blum veut former un ministère, il parle à présent d'Union nationale. Et du ministère Chautemps, l'on peut tout dire, sauf qu'il est de Front populaire (…) Il faut avouer que (…) le Front populaire vient d'aboutir à un fiasco complet" (331).

It seems that Grenier was able to read the replies to the "survey": he thought it had been an excellent idea, but that "les réponses sont souvent décevantes par leur frivolité ou leur vague" (332).

The only reply to be printed in the review was de Rougemont's in July (333). Here, de Rougemont "psychoanalysed" the "Front populaire": the revolution of 1936 had suffered a ""refoulement"
d'où procèdent les actes manqués\(^{(334)}\). He preferred to oppose "un pessimisme actif à tant d'espérances bernées"\(^{(335)}\).

It was by now obvious that the "Front populaire" was in full decline and that it was only a matter of time before it disintegrated for good\(^{(336)}\). Blum's second cabinet fell on April 10th, after 26 agonizing days in office. The NRF for that month, however, preferred to follow the clarion-call for National Unity: Armand Petitjean's patriotic appeal declared: "Et maintenant, apprenons à regarder en face la réalité de 1938"\(^{(337)}\). In effect, Petitjean called for military preparedness: he concluded in a manner which prefigured the anti-Munich stance of the NRF later that year:

"Nous voulons l'Union, et l'Union totale; et nous demandons aux communistes de déclarer que leur première patrie est la France, dont je ne doute pas un instant qu'ils seront les premiers et meilleurs soldats (...)\(^{(338)}\).
Nous voulons des canons pour la France, des avions pour la France, et un gouvernement national.
Nous voulons la dictature de la France sur les Français"\(^{(339)}\).

Evidently, at least for Paulhan and the NRF, the Popular Front could no longer be relied upon to unify France, so internally scarred since 1934. On April 10th, Daladier formed a new cabinet which, as Lefranc puts it, "n'est plus un Gouvernement de Front populaire"\(^{(340)}\). Paulhan, in his "Bulletin" for May 1st, achieved great ironical effect when commenting on the cluster of Manifestos calling for National Unity: desperation and panic seemed to have taken over:
"Paris. Ont signé le manifeste Aragon (pour l’Union nationale): Marcel Arland, Julien Benda (…) 
Paris: Ont signé le manifeste Alain (contre l’union sacrée): André Breton, Paul Eluard, Jean Giono (…) 
Paris: Ont signé le manifeste Henri Bordeaux (pour la "véritable Union nationale"): Abel Bonnard, Drieu la Rochelle, Ramon Fernandez, Thierry Maulnier (…) 
Paris: Bergson, Claudel, Gide et Valéry n’ont jusqu’à présent signé aucun manifeste…" (341). 

By May 13th, Vendredi proclaimed: "Le Front Populaire est pratiquement dissocïé (…) ; on ne défend plus ce qui n’existe plus" (342). Guéhenno declared too that he and his colleagues would and could no longer uphold the political purpose of the weekly and that they were reverting to more literary concerns, "en conjugant leurs efforts avec ceux des équipes de la NRF" (343). 

Evidence of this intention to join the NRF is provided by the fact that Paulhan accepted and serialized Chamson’s long novel La Galère: apart from Proust’s Le Temps retrouvé, this was the longest work Paulhan ever serialized (344). Subsequently Chamson himself has not regarded the book very highly, calling it "une chronique romancée de notre époque. C’est aussi un essai de démonstration de l’absurdité" (345). Summed up very briefly, La Galère evokes the meeting of two former history students, Jean Rabaud and Louis Boulan, on the eve of the February riots in 1934. The two main parts of the novel relate the events of the 6th February and its aftermath, and how it separates the two families so recently brought together. An important "Epilogue", set in November 1934, shows the "newly-"engagé" Rabaud haranguing Claire Boulan:
"Au 6 février, (...) chacun a été pris par son camp. J'ai été pris par le mien, vous avez été pris par le vôtre. Voyez-vous, Claire, l'homme ne fait quelque chose qu'en luttant contre l'homme..." (346)

This epilogue is responsible for the "longueurs", and the "critique extra-littéraire" which spoilt the book for its critics (347).

Moreover, it appears that adding the "Epilogue" was an afterthought, for Chamson told Paulhan on September 8th that

"Il me tarde de vous parler de la fin de La Galère. J'ai l'ambition - peut-être démesurée - d'avoir encore dix à douze pages dans la numéro de décembre. Est-ce possible? Je voudrais en effet pouvoir donner un morceau de l'épilogue" (348).

Apart from the epilogue, the critics agreed that Chamson's narrative technique, "simultanéiste" in nature, helped to provide multiple viewpoints and objectivity (349). Lalou, however, raised the very important point as to how such a book, "ni tout à fait historique ni entièrement fictive" (350), would be received by contemporary readers, and the same question applies to those reading it in review-form from June to December 1938 (351).

One thing is certain however: La Galère outlived the "Front populaire", and the reader of December 1938 could reflect upon the irony that Chamson's fictional alter-ego Rabaud, in November 1934, had declaimed:

"Je ne sais pas ce que l'avenir nous réserve. La bataille n'est pas achevée. Nous aurons peut-être à traverser des événements plus durs que ceux que nous avons déjà vécus. Je ne désertera pas mon combat. Je donnerai de moi-même tout ce qu'il faudra donner. Mais je suis sûr de rester ce que je suis" (352).
The NRF in 1938 was a different review from the one it had been in 1934, or in 1932. At this time it had been consistently reflective of the "grande nébuleuse radicalisante" (353), idealistic, yet politically passive; it steered a middle course whilst upholding the Republican values so revered by its "chroniqueurs". After the trauma of February 1934, Paulhan did not fully allow it to follow the commitment its personnel were seeking, but he did permit it to move with the Radicalist "reclassement" towards the Centre, a drift which was characteristic of the period. Yet, while many contributors, including Paulhan himself for a time, militated on behalf of the Popular Front, the review not only recoiled from, but actively criticised Marxist "orthodoxy", and this at the very time of the victory of the Popular Front. Once this "political experiment" was in full decline, in a bid to re-align in the atmosphere of National Unity, the NRF even gave the Republic's worst enemy at home sympathetic treatment. By late 1938, the NRF had adopted the grim, new mood of political realism, and then backed the anti-Munich camp (354). For Paulhan, the greatest danger of all for his review was partiality: it was a question of optics. In March 1936, he wrote:

"La NRF (...) depuis qu'elle existe, a régulièrement paru réactionnaire aux hommes de gauche, mais révolutionnaire aux hommes de droite. Elle a constamment été suspecte aux royalistes, mais aussi aux communistes..." (355).

And he added: "L'on n'est jamais tout à fait sûr d'être impartial" (356).
"The NRF and attitudes to Franco-German relations, 1925 to 1935".

"L'on va recommencer à nous appeler: la Nouvelle Revue Pro-allemande" (Jean Paulhan to Jean Schlumberger, BD. 25066, November 1927).

"En ce moment (...) un article sur les relations franco-allemandes et sur la révision des traités (...) va avoir en Allemagne un retentissement considérable, venant de la NRF" (Roger Martin du Gard to Jean Paulhan, AP, 7/11/30).

"Il n'est pas douteux que la NRF tienne une place de première importance parmi les publications qui ont présenté l'Allemagne au public français(...). Nous voyons se dessiner une nouvelle image de l'Allemagne" (Georges Pistorius, "L'Image de l'Allemagne dans la NRF de 1909-1943", in Connaissance de l'Etranger, Mélanges offerts à la mémoire de J-Marie Carré, Librairie Marcel Didier, 1964, p.397).
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Franco-German relations in the history of the Inter-War period. Of all the issues, historical, political or cultural, which confronted French intellectuals at that time, the German question was central. Not only did it play a determining part *per se* in the history of the period, it also underpinned other related issues such as pacifism, First World War historiography, relations with the Soviet Union and Antifascism.

It is now fully recognised that the imposition of the Versailles Treaty, in particular its nature as a *Diktat*, planted the seeds of Hitler's success which led directly to the Second World War\(^{(1)}\). Indeed the Treaty turned out to be Hitler's greater propaganda weapon\(^{(2)}\); what is more, it has been clearly demonstrated that Hitler exploited both French incompetence and lack of understanding in foreign policy, as well as intellectual-led pacifism, of such importance from 1932\(^{(3)}\).

Henri Michel, writing in 1980, points to pacifism as a key-factor in how French confidence and competence were undermined from within:

"Ce qui existait en France entre 1932 et 1936, c'était un profond pacifisme, qui animait tout le peuple français, sur ce point unanime, et qui, par horreur de la guerre, pour en éviter le retour, poussait les milieux les plus divers à souhaiter une entente avec l'Allemagne; même devenue hitlérienne, elle était, après tout, l'Allemagne, l'ennemie de hier qui de devait pas redevenir l'ennemie de demain. Le paradoxe de cette période est que, au-dehors, et parfois au-dedans, la France est présentée comme une puissance militariste et impérialiste, alors que toute la nation est inspirée par un pacifisme profonde, proche parfois du défaitsm"\(^{(4)}\)
Moreover, and equally important, Michel indicates that

"les erreurs de jugement sur la nature du nazisme et sur les objectifs de Hitler ne sont pas seulement le fait de Léon Blum et des socialistes, mais de l'ensemble des Français. Ils se trouvent tout d'un coup devant un phénomène politique qui ne répond à aucune des normes dont ils ont l'habitude" (5).

Intellectuals too displayed the same tendency to misinterpret or prognosticate wrongly: even those writers and academics who were more perspicacious than others tended to prolong or invent mythical or stereotyped images of Germany thus ignoring the true peril of Hitler. In his examination of the cultural "ambiance" of the period, J-B Duroselle has written:

"L'Allemagne vient en tête des préoccupations françaises. On la connaît très mal, parce qu'on y voyage peu, parce que peu d'Allemands viennent en France; oultre les sentiments, le contrôle des échanges, établi en 1932, leur interdit pratiquement tout voyage extérieur. Au surplus, l'Allemagne est l'objet de passions mal éteintes et de stéréotypes fondés sur la haine..." (6)

The NRF itself, even from its inception in 1909, had always shown preoccupation with Germany. Indeed, with regard specifically to the review, no other non-literary issue has attracted more study than the way it approached this problem (7). Writing in 1960, Jean Schlumberger, Paulhan's unofficial "editorial advisor" from 1925 to 1927, wrote that "Les rares fois où nous avions, Jacques Rivière ou moi, cru devoir introduire dans La Nouvelle Revue Française des réflexions sur la politique, c'était toujours à propos des relations franco-allemandes" (8).

In the "first" review it was Gide who elaborated the line of thinking which so clearly distinguished the NRF from other
reviews of the period. Lionel Richard has stressed the importance of this:

"On constate que les premières années d'existence de la revue sont marquées, en réalité, par une polémique persévérante contre les tendances strictement "nationalistes" en littérature. La culture française est mise en avant, mais parce qu'il est impossible de concevoir un art qui soit à la fois universel et dénationalisé, et non pour rejeter toute influence étrangère. Pour Gide, en effet, l'enracinement dans une culture nationale est précisément le moyen de parvenir à l'universalité" (9).

Richard goes on to point out that "la préoccupation essentielle de la NRF, l'hostilité qui se développait alors dans les milieux intellectuels envers les littératures étrangères, paraît avoir été en effet de concilier la tradition nationale avec l'héritage littéraire universel" (10). These efforts to combat the problem of the "nationalization" of culture were at once what distinguished the NRF from the Nationalists, opened it to German literature and culture, and laid the foundations for subsequent constant attacks from Maurras and his satellites. Yet for all this, Richard concludes that in the NRF to 1914, "le regard de l'observateur est rarement neutre: l'aune est surtout française. A travers la culture allemande, c'est généralement à la France qu'on pense, à elle qu'on revient" (11). This was enough, however, for Germans such as Ernst Robert Curtius to notice the NRF at this time and to later join Gide in building up Franco-German reconciliation (12).

Durosay too, has detected consistency if not continuity in Rivière's approach to the problem:
"L'on peut dire que Rivière reste fidèle à l'esprit de la première NRF: nationale et politique, malgré elle, la NRF ne peut s'empêcher de l'être par une certaine conception de la francité qu'elle annonce dans son titre, mais la symétrie subtile, ménagée dans le titre même, entre la novation et l'héritage empêchait que son nationalisme libéral pût jamais rejoindre le nationalisme intégral de Maurras"(13).

For Rivière, the war and Germany were inseparable: having been a prisoner of war under the Germans, this was inevitable, and the result was his book, L'Allemand(14). Durosay qualifies this book as an "exemple(...) de ce goût cher aux hommes de la NRF pour l'analyse, la psychologie et la généralisation ambitieuse appliquées aux génies nationaux"(15). In what was a deeply personal view of the "national psychology" of Germany, Rivière purged his own "grande détestation que mon esprit fait de l'Allemagne"(16). The book revealed what was for Rivière "l'incompatibilité radicale des deux nations"(17), an incompatibility analysed in a particularly French manner.

Secondly, Rivière's intention was to "dépeindre l'Allemand, et indirectement le Français, dans leur essence éternelle"(18); this is what makes his study idealistic and a-historical. The most important feature of Rivière's method is what Durosay shows to be "la fragilité de (son) psychologisme, la persistance d'un recul ou d'un refus"(19), a feature which effectively devalued any political posture relative to the problem, and to which Paulhan was to object once he became editor.

Not only were Gide and Rivière profoundly interested in Germany and its culture, Jean Schlumberger too had direct family ties with Alsace, and had many German connections.
Alfred Grosser has stressed that Schlumberger's background and understanding of the problem made him evidently suitable as a "spokesman" on Franco-German affairs:

"Sa naissance, le destin de sa famille qualifiaient Jean Schlumberger pour être utile dans un secteur particulier de la vie publique: celui des relations franco-allemandes. Et il se trouvait que nulle part ailleurs la prise de position politique n'était davantage liée à des choix moraux"(21).

If Jean Schlumberger was primarily interested in political moralities, then the eminent Germanist Félix Bertaux dominated the literary "chroniques allemandes". Already having contributed material from 1921 to the early review, Bertaux's penetrating notes and review-articles were extremely important to the NRF from 1919, when Rivière brought him in more regularly(22). Apart from his long close association with Schlumberger and Rivière, Bertaux had dealings with the Mann brothers, Thomas and Heinrich (23). Moreover, the German philosopher Bernard Groethuysen, born of a Dutch father and Russian mother, studied and taught philosophy in German universities, and was particularly conversant with contemporary German philosophy. Invited to contribute to the NRF under Rivière from 1920, Groethuysen became especially close to Jean Paulhan (24). Often described as an "éminence grise", Groethuysen was a convinced Marxist who had considerable influence over Gide and Malraux. As early as 1920, Gide remembered Groethuysen after his strange meeting with Walter Rathenau:
"Devant le mysticisme de certain de ses propos, (je songeais) à ce que disait (...) Groethuysen qui, dans le livre qu'il préparait dès avant la guerre, sur le caractère allemand, cherchait à montrer que l'Allemand est composé de deux extrêmes: une âme et un automate..."(25).

For Malraux, Groethuysen was "peut-être l'homme qui j'ai le plus admiré"(26). Groethuysen's politics made it impossible for him to live in safety in Germany under the increasing influence of the Nazis, and he left for Paris for good in 1932. Besides the importance of his political commitment, Groethuysen did much to help introduce Kafka into France, and advised Paulhan on the quality of German writers(27). Apart from these writers and teachers contributing regularly to the review, the NRF had close ties with the Mayrisch family of Colpach, Luxembourg. Mme Mayrisch (under the pseudonym Alain Desportes) provided some early articles crucial to the preliminary moves towards Franco-German reconciliation in 1919, and opened her home in Colpach with her husband Emile Mayrisch as a "neutral" meeting-place for French and German intellectuals, politicians and industrialists(28). It was here that Gide was able to meet Walter Rathenau and Ernst Robert Curtius, both keen to exploit these early French moves towards "rapprochement"(29).

It was against this background that Rivière in particular introduced his own analyses of Franco-German problems into the NRF: Daniel Durosay has studied these in some detail in the context of Rivière's political evolution(30). These articles, according to Durosay, "font en un raccourci frappant la
mutation d'un discours politique qui se déplace cette fois très nettement de l'idéalisme au réalisme, de la psychologie à l'économie" (31). It is important to discern that although Rivière was writing in his own name, the three articles in question were no longer wholly "psychological" in nature, nor were they based on Rivière's personal war experience. They were all written in response to current political developments in the negotiations over reparations (32). In the second article, July 1922, for example, Durosay detects Rivière beginning to abandon his previous "method" (33); by the third, without explicitly criticizing French policy, Rivière indicated "les excès, les visées annexionnistes et le danger d'enlisement" inherent in the Ruhr occupation (34). At last Rivière was converted to co-operation and active economic collusion with Germany, instead of merely contending with the charade of "les principes moraux qui avait cours depuis Versailles" (35).

André Gide, too, wrote an important article on the absolute necessity of re-establishing contact with Germany (36). This was a direct result of the talks Gide had had with Curtius earlier in 1921 (37), and, knowing his own personal influence, Gide backed the ideas of both Curtius and Thibaudet on how to restore communications between French and German writers. The essential thrust of their thinking was that international relations should be approached as humanistically and as non-contentiously as possible. Gide quoted Thibaudet:
"Il y a une vie internationale, dans laquelle les individus et les nations sont baignés(...). Sachons la considérer non d'un point de vue internationaliste, mais d'un point de vue international, c'est-à-dire d'un point de vue humain"(38).

Thibaudet underlines the importance of the fact that intellectuals could initiate reconciliation and, significantly enough, Gide added his own conclusion: "Puisse la NRF y aider; il n'est peut-être pas aujourd'hui de tâche plus importante"(39). This article had predictable repercussions; in the "Revues" section for February 1922, the editors reproduced extracts from various sections of the press(40). Gide's article had provoked a debate which echoed the familiar divisions; the liberal conservative Paul Souday, supporting Gide, criticized "la xénophobie intellectuelle", while the more nationalistic Fortunat Strowski condemned any collaboration with Germany(41). In June, the NRF gave extracts from an important article on the subject by Jean Guéhenno, who, writing in La Grande Revue, upheld the internationalists(42). The NRF, although agreeing with Guéhenno's attacks on French propagandists, did not, however, reproduce these lines on Gide's dilatoriness:

"A quoi bon tant de gloses et tant de reprises? M. André Gide toujours semble écrire dans les marges. (...) Il craint les pensées brèves et les mots trop rapides. (...) Ce sont des gens de cénacle. Leur pensée, comme leurs livres, est à tirage restreint. Ils redoutent, par dessus tout, les collusions politiques, et seraient navrés si on les soupçonnait d'avoir, un jour, voulu parler du monde..."(43).

Already Guéhenno used the NRF to illustrate how, in his opinion, intellectuals merely pontificated in a void when they ignored or
denied the importance of political commitment.

Nevertheless the Mayrisch family were persuasive enough in inducing the NRF to enter the fray over the Ruhr occupation. As Durosay has shown, "les interventions politiques de la NRF dans l'affaire de la Ruhr (...) paraissent liées à l'influence de Mayrisch" (44). Moreover he quotes from an unpublished letter to Mme Mayrisch where Rivière indicated the difficulty of commenting on events when these could change at any moment: what was important though, was that "nous allons tâcher pourtant de faire quelque chose" (45). With Schlumberger's article "Le sommeil de l'esprit critique" (46), the NRF appeared to be moving further and further towards direct political support for Franco-German reconciliation. If Guéhenno and the "internationalists" saw the NRF as ineffectual, the Nationalists, such as Camille Mauclair and Henri Béraud, saw it as totally pro-German. In his anti-NRF crusade, Béraud had accused the review of manipulating their diplomatic connections at the Quai d'Orsay and of obtaining preferential treatment (47). He also believed that the NRF was unfairly biased towards Germany. In La Croisade des longues figures, Béraud reproduced extracts from a constellation of provincial newspapers which delighted in attacking what they would have seen as part of the Parisian 'avant-garde'. For instance, Camille Mauclair saw the root cause of the problem thus: "C'est, pour parler net, la tendance obstinée de la NRF à prôner le rapprochement intellectuel et économique avec les Boches" (48). Mauclair referred directly to Rivière's latest article (May 1923) and suggested that the NRF should change its name to
La Nouvelle Revue Franco-Allemande (49).

Thanks to Gide, Schlumberger and Rivière therefore, the NRF already had considerable influence in the area of Franco-German relations. L'Huillier has written that Rivière's approach had consequences of historic importance (50). Moreover the extent of Rivière's interest in Germany was reflected by the NRF in its special tribute to the late director in April 1925; no less than eight "témoignages" and articles were devoted to the question, and an extract of his war diary was also included (51).

Paulhan inherited a review which, as Claude Lesbats has said, "est témoin du débat entre ceux qui s'intéressent sur le fait littéraire en tant que tel, et ceux qui ne voient en lui qu'un aspect des questions de civilisation et de politique" (52). He also affirms that Paulhan continued in much the same line regarding the relationship between the intellectual and society. However, there is much evidence in his correspondence which conclusively demonstrates that, at the beginning of his editorship at least, Paulhan felt fundamentally different about the inclusion of material on international issues. He believed it was completely unsuitable material and campaigned strenuously to restore consistency to the review's policy, basically because he had observed Rivière's direction at such close quarters. One example is provided by a letter to Franz Hellens. Paulhan had had to transmit Rivière's refusal of a political "chronique" submitted by Hellens. To Paulhan's sense of logic it was, to say the least, inconsistent to invoke editorial policy in this refusal when it was evidently being
broken each time Rivière accepted an article on Germany. Although Paulhan had himself written an article much earlier on Franco-German relations, it had had cultural (if not semantic) implications rather than political ones. With this in mind, he determined to prevent his review from following the same path as Rivière; while at first temporarily successful, the tide of history and events abroad swelled up again, and forced a policy change.

At the time Paulhan assumed the editorship, Herriot had been in power since May 1924 and had placed relations with Germany on a more congenial footing: this was the beginning of the Briand era. In what was to prove to be an historic speech, and one with profound significance for Paulhan's review, Herriot called for a national union in foreign policy on 28th January 1925: the speech signalled to Germany a spirit of "détente" which opened the way to the negotiations preceding the Locarno Conference of October that year. Herriot's biographer relates:

"Dans une péroraison pathétique, il lance un appel prophétique aux États unis d'Europe et à la réconciliation avec l'Allemagne: "La France n'a pas de haine, la France garde au milieu de tous les périls (...) son sang-froid (...). Mon plus grand désir est de voir un jour apparaître les États-Unis d'Europe (...) Dans la grande institution de la Société des Nations, je voyais la première esquisse de ces États-Unis (...)".

The spirit if not the letter of this speech was adopted by those intellectuals who were campaigning in favour of a policy of reconciliation, and marked the beginning of Paulhan's problems.
Sometime between the beginning of April and July 1925, an article by Pierre Viénot was submitted to the NRF for consideration (58).

In his article for the *Revue de Genève*, Viénot had emphasized how necessary it had become to change French perceptions of Germany, and how efforts needed to be made to understand their neighbour without prejudice. At the same time, Viénot approached Schlumberger and the Mayrisch family, and discussions began on the founding of the *Comité d’information franco-allemand* (59). If the NRF had wanted to take the lead in these initiatives, an article by Viénot would have presented the ideal opportunity. A succession of some four letters to Schlumberger, however, written from before July to August 6th 1925, reveals a great deal of how Paulhan was determined to re-establish the literary primacy of the review, and how he applied literary criteria to the judgement of non-literary texts. Gallimard, nominally director at this time, passed on (and apparently approved) the Viénot text, and thereupon Paulhan sought Schlumberger's advice:

"Si vous dirigez la revue, publieriez-vous l'article de M. Viénot? Gaston me l'a remis ce matin... Je le trouve comme vous extrêmement intéressant, juste presque toujours, aussi mal écrit que possible.

Autant enfin il me semble propre à amorcer heureusement, dans quelque revue politique, une longue discussion, au cours de laquelle ses véritables traits se dégageraient peu à peu- autant je lui prête difficilement ce caractère "définitif" que prend un article politique publié par une revue littéraire" (60).
Obviously worried by the nature of Viénot's article, and by the support it was receiving within the review, Paulhan wrote again at about the same time to develop his reasons for refusing Viénot's article. Here he continued to use the pretext of style and form in his reasons for turning it down, and added that he considered it to be thoroughly unsuitable:

"...Vraiment, un tel article est-il à sa place dans une revue littéraire? - si encore il était l'application dans le domaine politique d'une méthode, d'une philosophie qui par ailleurs nous pourrait toucher (comme c'était le cas pour les autres articles politiques qu'a donnés la NRF), j'admettrais bien que l'on pût à la rigueur oublier une telle incorrection de forme - mais un article qui n'est et ne peut être que politique, qui n'a point d'autre intérêt, ni d'autres ambitions, que lui reste-t-il comme excuse? Je serais bien désolé qu'il vous parût mériter d'être retenu" (61).

Evidently there were some within the NRF who were willing to make a stand on this issue. Nonetheless Paulhan prevailed; Viénot's article changed destination and appeared finally in the July number of La Revue européenne, as well as in a separately-produced off-print (62). Anxious to avoid a repetition of Nationalist attacks, Paulhan was relieved that the article could be deflected to a periodical which was not only committed to, but also financed by interests belonging to the Comité d'information franco-allemand (63). However courageous and meritorious Viénot's stance was, and however attractive it was both to the German intellectuals and as a promotional exercise to Gallimard and Schlumberger, Paulhan felt he was right and explained himself yet again:
"Mais ignorez-vous donc quelles menaces nous ont valu, et même de la part de nos abonnés les plus fidèles, l'article de Jacques (Rivière) sur les relations franco-allemandes, la campagne de Mauclair nous accusant - dans dix journaux de province - de toucher l'argent allemand? Combien de désabonnements nous sont parvenus, combien "d'amis" de province, qui s'occupaient à ce moment d'organiser des conférences de la NRF, nous ont écrit qu'ils ne pouvaient plus s'intéresser à nous? Bien entendu, il nous était facile de répondre: l'article était de Jacques..." (64)

This letter is interesting in that it shows that although some within the NRF were willing to make allowances for the refractory Rivière, they could do nothing to prevent Nationalists such as Mauclair from spreading malicious allegations. Paulhan was keen to follow through the dispute with Schlumberger, for he insisted he only had the "esprit de la NRF" at heart:

"vous me direz qu'il faut d'abord faire la revue selon notre coeur, et ne songer aux abonnés qu'ensuite. Oui, et je ne voulais que répondre à votre remarque sur les abonnés allemands que nous aurait valus l'article Vienot. Et je n'insisterais pas non plus, si je n'étais bien sûr de défendre contre vous ce qui a toujours été l'esprit de la NRF. Je ne parle même pas de la première revue, la vôtre, qui n'a jamais dit un mot de politique en un temps malgré tout infiniment plus dangereux, plus exposé que le nôtre. Mais la seconde, celle de Jacques, quels obstacles ne devait pas franchir, avant d'y pénétrer, une étude relevant d'une autre discipline que la discipline littéraire. Vous le savez comme moi, mieux que moi..." (65).

In a passage which verges upon the sarcastic, Paulhan risked provoking Schlumberger's anger by indicating that the review might well be accused of inconsistency if it did not open itself up to other areas:
"Me direz-vous que les problèmes politiques se présentent avec un caractère d'urgence tel, qu'il faut les traiter, quitte à les traiter mal. Mais il n'y a pas que les problèmes de politique étrangère, qui soient urgents. Devrons-nous parler aussi, sans choix, de la dépopulation, de la syphilis, de l'alcoolisme?..." 

For Paulhan, Viénot's article had risked making the NRF into a 'revue de combat', because his ideas were so clearly opposed to the Nationalists that former animosities surrounding the "Parti de l'Intelligence" debate might be raised again:-

"Si nous publions sur la politique étrangère un article médiocre, un article "plein de bonnes citations", ce seront les disciples de Jean Schlumberger que nous jeterons dans les bras de Maurras ou des communistes... Est-ce Viénot que nous opposerons à Bainville?" 

These letters have been quoted at length because they provide a unique insight into Paulhan's own thinking on editorial policy at the NRF; they show him attempting to be as independent as possible within the bounds of his rôle at that time in the review. Furthermore, they show how aware he was of the dangers inherent in commenting upon current affairs when, as a result, perhaps the review would be co-erced into areas which were, or should have been, foreign to a "literary" review.

The last letter of this sequence referred once more to the doctrinal content of Viénot's study: implicit in Paulhan's comments was his criticism that simplistic or spurious psychologizing could only damage efforts being made to improve relations with Germany. On 16th August 1925, he wrote to suggest the following as a policy stipulation:
"A propos des relations franco-allemandes, ne pensez-vous pas que nous devrions refuser énergétiquement tout article, ou note, fondé sur le détestable "mieux on se connaît, plus on s'aime" ou tout lieu commun analogue? (68)

Paulhan's insistence kept the NRF free of any such material which might invite controversy for some months to come, in spite of the pressure being applied within the review. Yet, during the months after this exchange of views, indeed, throughout the period leading to the Locarno negotiations and Pact in October 1925, the NRF devoted more than the normal ratio of space to German literature. In September, Bertaux reported on his "lectures allemandes", and the following month reviewed the latest novels by the Mann brothers (69). November saw the inclusion of an essay by Groethuysen on Hölderlin and the translation of a text by the German poet, and Drieu wrote a review-article of a work by Fritz von Unruh (70). Here Drieu rejoiced in von Unruh's energy and rejection of decadence in a dying Europe, and concluded:

"Le Mal, c'est l'Individu déchaîné par l'Occident; le Bien, c'est l'Individu ressaisi par une discipline que préparent en eux-mêmes les meilleurs hommes du monde" (71).

Although Paulhan had succeeded in playing down the issue, it would be false, as Richard has claimed, to say that Franco-German interests received no further attention until 1933 (72). In January 1926, Thomas Mann came to Paris on a semi-official visit; among other functions, he was to speak at the "Union pour la Vérité" and at the "Union Intellectuelle Française" (73).
Following the ratification of the Locarno Pact only just over a month earlier, this visit seemed to announce a further warming of relations; thus Paulhan felt able to make concessions to his earlier hard-line. On January 21st, 1926, the very day of Mann’s two speeches mentioned above, Paulhan wrote: "il me semble qu’il serait bon de donner dans la NRF le discours qu’a prononcé Mann à l’Union Intellectuelle"(74). By February, however, after this idea had probably been accepted, he wrote again to explain that it would have to be shelved due to the fact that the speech had been reproduced in extracts or in full elsewhere: its inclusion would therefore have been superfluous(75). The Mann speech would have represented a considerable "coup" for the NRF, for both Mann brothers were seen world-wide as the "Ambassadors of Weimar", as Nigel Hamilton describes them(76). At the same time, there was a possibility that Heinrich Mann might contribute material for the review as well; it seems that Charles Du Bos was instrumental in increasing the pressure on Paulhan, who again asked Schlumberger:

"Est-il (Charles Du Bos) véritablement convaincu de l'urgence d'une réconciliation franco-allemande (dont il se moquait assez méchamment il y a deux ans)? Je ne sais pas trop"(77).

Moreover, although Paulhan and Du Bos were usually on the best of terms, evidence suggests that there was some lingering hostility regarding Du Bos' exclusion from the direction of the NRF(78). In the same letter, Paulhan spelt out how he had sought advice from several quarters on what text by Mann to accept: apart from Schlumberger, Bertaux preferred a novella, but Groethuysen
was "violemment défavorable" to any contribution\(^{(79)}\). Paulhan himself agreed with Groethuysen, who pointed out, somewhat sweepingly, that Mann "a justement coulé auprès de tous les intellectuels allemands un peu sérieux"\(^{(80)}\). He went on:

"cette dernière raison n'avait pas été sans me toucher: les réconciliations entre peuples tendent assez naturellement à devenir des réconciliations avec la mauvaise littérature - et tout ce que j'ai lu de Mann m'a donné le sentiment d'un Georges Lecomte, un peu plus "à la page""\(^{(81)}\).

Although Paulhan again succeeded in excluding potentially dangerous material from the review, the atmosphere of Franco-German relations was steadily improving at this time. The Socialists in Poincaré's government supported Briand's efforts, and the Pope's condemnation of \textit{L'Action française} drove Maurras' Catholic support behind Poincaré\(^{(82)}\). Furthermore, the intense bilateral negotiations to establish the "Comité d'information franco-allemand" were coming to fruition: in July the French executive committee met for the first time, and offices opened in both Paris and Berlin in November 1926\(^{(83)}\). Once Gide had returned from the Congo, he turned his attention to the problem: Jacques Bariéty has written -

"Le Comte de Pange, Wladimir d'Ormesson (...), André Gide et ses amis de la NRF poussent dans le même sens. Sans oublier, bien sûr, Romain Rolland. Au cours de ces années naît donc une sorte de mystique du rapprochement franco-allemand..."\(^{(84)}\)

In September 1926 Germany was admitted to the "Société des Nations", and Briand and Stresemann continued their interminable negotiations over reparations.
The following April, Félix Bertaux wrote a long review article on the latest intellectual trends in Germany\(^{(85)}\). Bertaux found that in the German cultural tradition, thinkers very often strove energetically to identify and develop an ideology to explain cultural phenomena. The current trend, he felt, was that there was less and less about which Germans could agree. At the centre of the cultural situation there, Bertaux detected a "réapprofondissement", with two major tendencies\(^{(86)}\). These were the "reconstructors" and the "revolutionaries", with the "adaptors" in between; for Bertaux, the Mann brothers belonged to the former group, as they showed a desire to develop new ideas and contacts within the existing cultural tradition. By then proceeding to review a number of important essays on Germany, Bertaux perceived that a fundamental change was taking place. For example, Groethuysen's *Introduction à la pensée philosophique allemande depuis Nietzsche*, published by Stock, demonstrated how Dilthey, Simmel and Husserl, by fusing a metaphysics of value with an interest in the real, had advanced towards phenomenology\(^{(87)}\). Max Scheler, too, was of particular interest and influenced such pro-French intellectuals as Curtius, and Bertaux found Maurice Boucher's study of Heinrich Keyserling's work of special import, because Keyserling was so "à la mode" in France\(^{(88)}\). Bertaux found that "Réalpolitik" was now beginning to take account of the uniqueness of the German spirit, and he felt justified in his optimism for the future when so many ideas were being aired in a variety of German periodicals. These contributed to "(le) rebrassage d'éléments
If the NRF was moving very gently towards expressing support again for Franco-German reconciliation at this time, then Paulhan manifested a desire for balance by publishing Benda's *La Trahison des Clercs* from August to November 1927\(^{(90)}\). Here Benda paraded an anti-Germanism which paradoxically enough could have aligned him with Maurras; in September 1927, Benda placed the blame for the "nationalization" of culture squarely on "les clercs allemands"\(^{(91)}\). "Le clerc nationaliste", continued Benda, "est essentiellement une invention allemande"\(^{(92)}\). This view was central to his book, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that Benda saw Germany as in the process of hatching a conspiracy on a European scale:

"C'est d'ailleurs un thème qui reviendra souvent dans cet ouvrage; que la plupart des attitudes morales et politiques adoptées depuis cinquante ans par les clercs en Europe sont d'origine allemande et que, sous le mode du spirituel, la victoire de l'Allemagne dans le monde est présentement complète"\(^{(93)}\).

Like the *Action française* historian Bainville, Benda saw Germany historically as having been a constant threat to France, with the difference being that Benda viewed German irrationalism and its moralism of violence as the real menaces to French rationalism and Republicanism. As a true universalist, however, Benda should be considered as attacking Nationalism first, and Germany second: seen from this perspective, *la Trahison des Clercs* was equally an attack upon French Nationalist intellectuals. Against this background, Paulhan found himself in difficulties once more.
He had to make a decision on Curtius' essay "Restauration der Vernunft" which had been submitted to the review. Given Curtius' proximity to Schlumberger, Viénot and Gide, and his active rôle in the "Comité d'Information franco-allemand", Paulhan clearly believed that accepting the Curtius text might be damaging: "si la "Restauration der Vernunft" entame une campagne, je crains que ce ne soit une campagne riche et d'idées vague\(s\). Mais opportune, peut-être. En tous cas, terriblement inopportune à la \textit{NRF}\(94\). Weighing up the advantages against the dangers, Paulhan ended by being highly critical of any eventual decision to include the essay, given that Benda's \textit{La Trahison des Clercs} was nearing completion in serial form. Moreover, knowing how quickly such material could be rendered obsolete by publication elsewhere, Paulhan exploited this and again distanced himself from Schlumberger, to whom he wrote:

"Mais pensez-vous qu'il soit possible, dans un moment où nous malmenons assez durement les intellectuels français (...) de leur faire encore faire la leçon impérieuse et sèche! Peu d'articles ont soulevé plus d'émotion que \textit{La Trahison des Clercs}\(95\)."

Obviously Paulhan wanted to avoid what would have appeared as a two-pronged attack upon the Nationalists, from both Benda and Curtius. So, remembering Mauc_lair's 1923 invectives, he concluded by warning Schlumberger that "l'on va recommencer à nous appeler: \textit{La Nouvelle Revue Proallemande}. Vraiment ce moment serait mal choisi d'accueillir Curtius (96). Once again therefore, Paulhan had prevailed: his committee refused the Curtius article for the \textit{NRF}. It was released simultaneously.
to Eliot's *The Criterion* and to Ortega y Gasset's *Revista de Occidente* (97), and it received a brief mention in the NRF's "Revue des Revues" for February 1928 (98).

Meanwhile in December 1927 Thibaudet devoted a significant part of his "Réflexion" to reprimanding Benda for his anti-Germanism (99). Thibaudet quite rightly detected much of *La Trahison des Clercs* in Benda's "Billets de Sirius publiés en 1925 (...) mais qui sont datés du temps de guerre, où (...) ils paraissaient dans quelque journal" (100). In this sense Benda's book was "un livre de guerre, ou plutôt un livre de la guerre, (...) et il l'a pensé d'abord comme une défense contre l'Allemand" (101). It was a polemic in the literal sense of the word, and as such would have met with Rivière's approval, at least in the immediate post-war period. Thibaudet, turning his attention to Benda's underlying assertion that Nationalism was a German invention, advanced the alternative opinion that "le fait général, c'est la création des nationalités, non par l'imitation des clercs allemands, mais par la Révolution française" (102). Thibaudet had given an historical illustration of this view:

"La nationalisation de l'intelligence est bien (...) une conséquence des guerres de la Révolution et de l'Empire. L'Allemagne asservie de 1813 fut appelée à l'être par ses clercs" (103).

Thibaudet was implying a criticism of Benda's historiography, believing that Napoleon and his campaigns had forced Germany into belligerently establishing its own national unity and identity (104). Paulhan had been proved right: *La Trahison des Clercs*, or at least one of its central and topical themes, had
attracted much criticism, even within the NRF

In early 1928, while Gide was being entertained in Berlin by, among others, Ratheau's biographer Heinrich Kessler, Paulhan prepared to commemorate the third anniversary of Rivière's death by publishing an extract from his War diaries. By publishing "En Marge de L'Allemand", Paulhan risked re-opening wounds which had taken so much time to heal. However he could answer his potential critics by reminding them that the diary was a reflection of Rivière's own deeply personal if not idiosyncratic reaction to his captivity. Rivière had written -

"J'ai voulu peindre l'état où cette scène (de prison) m'avait mis, parce qu'il me parait représenter d'une manière excellente l'état de tous ceux qui vivent sous la prise allemande, qui ont à subir le caractère allemand "

Such material was not in the purest spirit of Franco-German reconciliation, and it was becoming clearer that Paulhan, even at this relatively early stage, was showing signs of a profound patriotism which would only manifest itself explicitly much later.

This year also marked the beginning of the first difficulties in relations between France and Germany. The effect of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, finally signed by fifteen signatories on August 27th, was to weaken France. Briand had wanted a unilateral pact with the United States, but Kellogg, by making it multilateral, allowed Germany to undermine France's military strength. It was against this background that Paulhan began publishing Benda's
La Fin de l'Eternel, with the September number in particular placing responsibility for the First World War squarely upon Germany (111). Running concurrently with this was Thibaudet's article on "l'Affaire Demartial" and its subsequent exchange of correspondence. Demartial, an ex-Colonial minister, distinguished himself by blaming Russia and France entirely for the First World War (112). The result of the ensuing scandal was that Demartial was suspended for five years from the "Légion d'Honneur" (113). Thibaudet noted that Europe had now published a "dossier" on the affair, but felt that a number of facts needed qualification. He insisted that even level-minded Germans would find it difficult to agree with Demartial that it was France's entry into the war which provoked German aggression (114).

Secondly it was patently not true that Germany was innocent of having started the war. Thirdly, and most importantly, Demartial was guilty of over-simplification. Thibaudet borrowed an image from Bergson's Matière et Mémoire and applied it to the complex question of responsibilities:

"Pour ma part, j'en verrais les plans réels comme autant de coupes sur un cône. (…) Plus les coupes sont éloignées de la pointe du cône, plus le problème se dilue, se confond avec la profondeur, les ondulations, les rythmes de l'histoire européenne" (115).

Turning to the vexed question of the Versailles Treaty, Thibaudet displayed his optimism; whereas Demartial devoted all his efforts to applauding those who "stigmatized" the Treaty, Thibaudet resigned himself to its existence, its evolution and its eventual death. He went on:
"Il a commencé de mourir quand il a commencé d'être. (...) La responsabilité unilatérale des Empires Centraux a suivi dans le tombeau la mise en jugement de Guillaume, celle des coupables de guerre, tout ce qu'impliquait le diktat. L'esprit du diktat commence à faire place à un esprit contractuel..." (116)

As far as Thibaudet was concerned, France should continue to seek a fairer negotiated settlement with Germany; this was something which should have become more likely in the still-optimistic climate of mid-1928. Thibaudet concluded by affirming his faith in the "Société des Nations":

"(le traité) à fondé la S.d.N. Il a préparé des conditions du désarmement. (...) Oublions les germes de guerre du traité; attachons-nous à développer ses germes de paix, qui ne sont encore que des germes" (117).

The French obsession with retribution was holding back moves towards disarmament, Thibaudet believed, but he was evidently ignorant of the growing belligerence of the National-Socialists in Germany.

In November 1928, the NRF reprinted a letter from Demartial, who questioned Thibaudet's optimism, particularly regarding his opinion that the article of the Versailles Treaty concerning responsibility for the War was now a "dead letter" (118). Demartial held that the "ex-enemies" of Germany should abandon their impossible position and consign the question of responsibility to history, rather than persist in making it central to international politics (119). Predictably enough, this "affair" had considerable repercussions in the French press. In December 1928, Thibaudet
briefly examined one sample reaction. Replying to Pierre Bernus, who quoted Renouvin's book *Les Origines de la Guerre*, Thibaudet stressed that he had found nothing in Renouvin's very objective study which totally condemned Demartial (120). Without being explicitly critical of the Nationalists, Thibaudet, drawing a parallel with the Dreyfus Affair, insisted that "il s'agit en effet d'une affaire qui nous occupe ordinairement ici (i.e. "La NRF") : celle de la différence et de l'incompréhension entre générations" (121). He concluded by maintaining his previous stance, and called for continuing reconciliation (122).

In this way the years 1928 and 1929, ten years after the Armistice and the Versailles Treaty, bore witness to attempts at achieving a new honesty regarding the First World War. The War was gradually being absorbed into history, and historians and writers were beginning to demythologize the causes and the conduct of the War (123). At the NRF, Gide signalled his continuing interest in Franco-German "rapprochement" by publishing a letter dated 25th June 1921 to Rathenau (124). This coincided with Kessler's visit to Gide in Paris in October (125). Yet the prospects for the true settling of differences were becoming much less bright. The Young Plan, drawn up between February and May 1929, rescheduled the Germans' reparation payments over the next sixty years, with, in return, a stipulation that France and the Allies should withdraw from the Ruhr by mid-1930 (126). Moreover the Plan further weakened the Weimar Republic, already under threat from Hitler, who scored a
propaganda victory by claiming that the reparations would enslave Germany for generations to come (127). These important changes were observed by Pierre Viénot, then in Germany attempting to strengthen Franco-German understanding. However, he encountered so many obstacles and hesitations, and such reluctance by the French Press to take any lasting initiatives, that Viénot resigned from his post on 31st December 1929 (128).

The Second Conference on reparations in The Hague put the finishing touches to the Young Plan, and when the French withdrew from the Rhineland, there were violent Nationalist demonstrations in Germany (129). Finally, the Wall Street Crash meant that American credits backing the Young Plan would no longer be forthcoming, and the Nazis, as a direct result, scored a highly significant electoral victory (130). Indeed, the election of an additional 107 Nazis to the Reichstag on 14th September 1930 at last spurred several German and French intellectuals into action, action which not only signalled the beginnings of an awareness of German fascism, but which also had direct consequences for the NRF.

On 2nd October 1930, Léautaud noted Thibaudet's article in the NRF, calling it "remarquable" (131). The events of two weeks before in Germany somewhat diluted the optimism of this article, but it was a truly notable analysis (132). Thibaudet highlighted the fact that as early as 1873, Renouvier had had the foresight to consider the Alsace-Lorraine question as a European problem (133). Renouvier had also anticipated a
"future assemblee européenne"(134), and Thibaudet went on to criticize the persistent Gallocentrism of successive governments. France, in 1930, needed to be far more generous of spirit insofar as the opportunities of mollifying the Versailles Treaty had not been sufficiently exploited. Yet he still remained optimistic regarding the future rôle of the "Société des Nations"(135). Relations between governments should be conducted according to the ideal principles of sincerity, truth, peace and freedom, but violence in particular should be condemned(136). Thibaudet concluded:

"Ce programme ne manque pas de difficulté, mais moins encore de nécessité. Il est resté, jusqu'à présent, à peu près étranger à qu'on appelle l'esprit de Genève(137). Le moment ne viendra-t-il pas de parer à cette carence de la cléricature?"(138)

Clearly Thibaudet believed that there was a distinct difference between the theory and practice of the "esprit de Genève" and the "S.d.N.". If confirmation were needed of such ineffectuality, it was already to hand: the electoral successes of the Nazis had shaken many in Germany, and the French press at last began to take notice. *Les Nouvelles littéraires* ran a series of statements by German intellectuals who all pointed to the urgency of revising the Versailles Treaty, and they all spelt out the danger to the future of democracy in Germany of Hitler(139). Heinrich Mann, for example, castigated Hitler and his National-Socialism, and called for renewed efforts of opposition:
"La masse du parti national-socialiste, qui n'a rien de socialiste ni de national, est formée par les désespérés, qu'en ce moment on compte par millions, et par une jeunesse anarchique (...). Nous nous battons pour notre peuple contre ces ennemis intérieurs; et ce faisant nous défendons des intérêts communs à la France et à l'Allemagne" (140).

Thomas Mann also called for "une alliance franco-allemande pour la paix" (141), as well as for the revision of the iniquitous Treaty which the Nazis had so long exploited (142).

Already the NRF was preparing to comment on this alarming state of affairs. In a letter of great importance, Martin du Gard told Paulhan that he fully approved of the idea that Jean Schlumberger should make a statement, especially in view of the distress signals he had read in the French press (143). Martin du Gard clearly felt he could not over-emphasize the extent or the importance of the impact the NRF's view would have in Germany:

"(le) retentissement dépassera sans doute les milieux intellectuels. Jean sera considéré comme le porte-parole du groupe de la NRF et davantage encore - comme représentant les intellectuels français. Il va jouer là-bas le rôle que jouent pour nous, Français, les frères Mann" (144).

It was for these reasons that the article should be extremely carefully thought-out and presented: it had to be a statement "(qui) nous engage tous" and, by virtue of this, it had to be "un coup magistral" (145). From the tone of Martin du Gard's exhortation, it was obvious to Paulhan that the NRF would be making a momentous political gesture by publishing this statement on Franco-German "rapprochement", and that it would appear to
many in Germany as a last-ditch attempt to improve relations. On December 1st, the NRF appeared carrying Schlumberger's text "en tête".

The article strove to be as restrained as possible in its criticism of French policy towards Germany: indeed, Schlumberger played down their specific relationship. He interspersed his commentary with an imagined dialogue between the author and an interlocutor, whereby he added depth to his statement by anticipating some of the more obvious objections. Schlumberger saw no reason why imagination, like hope, should not become a form of courage (146). The implications of hasty political action and panic reaction by the public had to be carefully contemplated, because war remained a threat (147). The central premise of Schlumberger's was that France had failed to adapt to "un monde où tout s'est déplacé" (148). If peace was illusory, it was the fault of the Versailles Treaty. Schlumberger underscored the difference between peace and peace-treaties (149). He was certain that a choice had to be made:

"La France met-elle son espoir dans la paix ou dans les traités de paix? Ce sont là deux termes qui ne se recouvrent pas, qui souvent s'opposent et entre lesquels il faudra choisir" (150)

This choice was crucial in understanding how Europe was a dangerous place, since "les pays d'Europe sont encordés comme une équipe d'alpinistes" (151). Should one of the "climbers" fall, the result would be only too plain. Yet this was not necessarily the central problem; France, like other countries
in Europe, was suffering from a "manque de confiance en elle-même"(152). Schlumberger asserted (like Thomas Mann) that "tous les pays d'Europe (...) connaissent une sorte de neurasthénie qui se traduit par ce que Freud appelle des complexes d'infériorité"(153). Europe was in extreme peril because it was afraid of the unknown; France, which should have been a pathfinder, preferred to remain in her flimsy shelter.

Once again, Schlumberger stressed how slowly France was adapting to the post-war world, and how technology was making it ever more dangerous to procrastinate over critical decisions: "Avec la T.S.F. les pays ressemblent à des ruches que la moindre provocation alerter en un instant"(154). A new sense of realism was long overdue, according to Schlumberger, because, in spite of the somewhat illusory concessions France had made over the previous decade, Europe was poised on the brink of disaster:

"Entre une Amérique trop puissante et une formidable Asie, il sera laborieux de nous tirer d'affaire, et toutes nos chamailleries sont bien risibles entre ces deux gueules ouvertes. C'est quelque chose que dix années dans la vie d'une civilisation dont l'existence même est en jeu.
- C'était le payer cher.
- La paix vaut cher"(155).

As far as Schlumberger was concerned, he detected a real and "tragic" gulf between the true aspirations of France and the way they were distorted by the Press: if imagination meant foresight, then this was the most lamentable shortcoming:

"Nos préférences sont toutes pacifiques. Mais nous croyons encore que le choix se pose entre des préférences, alors qu'il se pose au-delà, entre être et ne plus être"(156).
Drawing an analogy with Pascal and especially the image of the 'pari', Schlumberger enjoined his reader in conclusion to reflect upon the fact that there was no harm at all, in fact, positive good, in reiterating some old truths:

"Vous flattez-vous que ce soient là, malgré l'aide de Pascal, des vérités bien neuves, bien rares? Si ces vérités étaient rares, il ne serait pas urgent de les dire. C'est parce qu'elles sont vieilles, et de gros bon sens, et du domaine public, qu'elles ont chance d'être bonnes à quelque chose et qu'il faut inlassablement les imaginer à nouveau" (157).

As Schlumberger has quite rightly indicated since, the effective content of his article was not a great deal different from his 1923 view: what made it so much more critical was that the historical moment was infinitely more highly charged (158).

Hitler had been a part of the political scene in Germany since 1923; yet it had taken seven years and considerable electoral success to awaken both French and German intellectuals to the growing menace of Nazism.

Schlumberger's article met with much praise (159). Martin du Gard told Paulhan that the text, "imprimé en tête du numéro, et relu attentivement, m'a fait la meilleure impression, et je suis très sûr qu'il a porté" (160). Paulhan himself remained unconvinced, still believing that a literary review was the wrong place for such pronouncements (161). Yet for all Paulhan's misgivings, some NRF-associated writers launched into debates at the "Union pour la Vérité" (162). These discussions provided the context for a further article in the NRF on the subject in January 1931 by Ramon Fernandez. Fernandez intended to
counterbalance Schlumberger, Europe and Friedrich Sieburg, whose controversial book *Gott in Frankreich* had just appeared in French (163). Fernandez drew a distinction between Schlumberger's careful expressions of anxiety ("pacifiques" rather than "pacifistes"), and the uncompromising pacifism of Europe, mediated in "un langage absolu" (164). For this reason, the writers in Europe "prennent les choses de haut et de loin. En un mot, ils parlent en cleres" (165).

Fernandez adopted a similar stance on this issue as he had with Benda's *La Trahison des Clercs*: however admirable and praiseworthy the pacifists' sentiments were, the Franco-German question required positive, practical action from those who best understood the problems involved (166). "Le Français pacifiste", believed Fernandez, "c'est le conférencier idéal" (167), basically because he could bend both ways: "Il croit coincider avec l'âme allemande lorsqu'il lui prête des sentiments qu'il découvre en lui-même" (168).

Although the pacifist could and always did raise the well-worn commonplace that the Versailles Treaty needed revision, he was powerless to imagine a policy whereby relations between the two countries could be placed on a more equitable footing. As for the Germans, Fernandez thought that "Qu'il en ait conscience ou non (...) l'allemand attend de la révision des traités qu'elle lui rende sa liberté d'action" (169). Whatever this meant for the Briandist ideal of Europeanism, it was difficult to judge, but Fernandez certainly believed that it was a false ideal, one which intellectually and historically favoured France:
"Il est vrai que le pacifisme français se dénationalise, ou croit se dénationaliser, en se plaçant sous le signe d'un certain esprit européen (...). L'Europe est une fausse synthèse, puisqu'elle enveloppe des tendances violemment opposées (...). Or, l'Europe n'a la même dimension pour un Français et pour un Allemand (...)."(170)

The most lucid part of the essay dealt with Schlumberger's distinction between "peace" and "peace-treaties": if the aim of peace were divorced from reality, this could also lead to "l'autre impasse" (171). Implying again (as Thibaudet and Schlumberger had done) that France desperately needed to treat Germany with more generosity of spirit, Fernandez clearly felt that the most perilous French failing was the inability to view their action from outside:

"Gardons-nous de bâtir une doctrine universelle qui serait reçue par le monde comme un régionalisme. Ce contraste entre l'universalité de l'intention et le particularisme de l'effet est présentement la tragédie de l'esprit politique français" (172).

French modes of thought ("la raison française") were no longer universally applicable; if they were good for France, they could be disastrous if applied to Germany. Fernandez' thinking here prefigured much of the writing on Germany which accepted that there were irreconcilable differences between the cultural characteristics of the two countries, leading to the tendency to treat the phenomenon of Germany as a mysterious 'enigma'. Quite rightly Fernandez believed that

"l'abandon des traités n'inaugurerait pas le règne de la paix. Ce serait la fin d'une guerre qui se prolonge en sourdine, mais ce serait aussi le commencement d'une ère d'aventures et de risques auxquels nos pacifistes semblent bien mal préparés" (173).
Curiously, Fernandez perceived pacifism as being, unwittingly, "l'envers négatif et sentimental d'une autre doctrine, active cella-là, et cohérente: je veux parler du communisme" (174). Yet under Communism peace was subordinated to other values; Fernandez preferred "une politique ouverte et souple, s'appuyant sur certains avantages juridiques, mais en même temps modifiant le statu quo par des accords de fait avec l'Allemagne..." (175). Essentially Fernandez thought that the French should take the initiative before events overtook their politicians and rendered them powerless. This article vacillated between shrewd insight and the familiar, lax tendency to apply "national psychology" to a complex international problem which had its roots firmly planted in history and contemporary politics (176). Moreover, if Fernandez favoured "une politique ouverte", there was no indication of what this would entail nor how it could be achieved.

Likewise, in the review of Sieburg's book in the same issue, Fernandez believed the future Nazi had done the French a great service by publishing this book, for it showed, in high relief, where the greatest failings of France were (177). Once again it was France which had a distorted view of the world (178). The true threat to France and Europe was developing in Germany however, according to Raymond Aron, who reflected upon Fernandez' assessment in Europe (179). Aron believed Fernandez had completely misunderstood pacifism, while he himself felt that the fundamental cause of the crisis in Germany
was economic, not cultural (180). They both attended the "Libres Entretiens" at the "Union pour la Vérité", where the German representatives' tendency to be dismissive of Hitler sowed the seeds of confusion among French intellectuals, as exemplified by Fernandez (181). The Nazis were increasingly able to actively promote such misunderstanding of Germany within France, not in any covert, subversive manner, but openly, and within prestigious intellectual and political circles (182).

Henceforward the issues of peace and the continuing calls for European unity became the central preoccupations in the minds of many intellectuals, as attested by the publication of the *Notre Temps* manifesto (183). What is more, as Gide became obsessed with the Franco-German problem so he began to admire the achievements of Soviet Russia (184). In November 1931 Gide wrote: "Je puis souhaiter le communisme, mais tout en réprouvant les affreux moyens que vous nous proposez pour l'obtenir" (185). Already he was preparing for his support of the "Amsterdam-Pleyel" movement (186). Most interesting, however, was the fact that this realization of a desire for social change and the simultaneous rejection of revolutionary violence coincided with his reading of texts in November's *NRF*. The "Lettres d'étudiants allemands tués à la guerre" were selected from a German edition of letters written by young soldiers to their relatives and friends before they were killed; they affected Gide deeply (187). These letters were followed by a French "Post-scriptum" in which Paul Desjardins
hoped that their publication would demonstrate how the
Germans had suffered equally in the carnage of the First World
War; it was a universal appeal to the emotions(188). Once more
the path was being cleared towards adopting a pro-pacifist stance:

"La paix est une chose non point rêvée, mais
secrète, comme un germe sous des enveloppes;
(...) Voilà à quoi le recueil de ces épaves
aura servi quant à la Pacification. Autrement,
à rien"(189).

In conclusion, Desjardins underlined the bitter irony of the
letters: the students had had to die before they could, as
Germans, ever be understood(190). This article appeared in an
atmosphere of gathering gloom. Significantly enough, even the
optimistic Thibaudet had emphasised that the chronic flaccidity
of the "Société des Nations" and the passivity of "les clercs"
in finding a new approach had made 1930 to 1931 a very unpropitious
year indeed. Thibaudet lamented:

"La Fédération Européenne, si elle se produit, ne
viendra pas de l'initiative des homme d'Etat, elle
sera imposée par l'opinion (...), par les clercs.
D'où le devoir pour les clercs de faire entendre
à Genève autre chose..."(191)

He concluded:

"Le manque de réaction d'une opinion (...) a contribué
à faire de l'année 1930-1931, celle qui va de l'Assemblée
torpilleuse de septembre dernier à l'Assemblée de la
semaine prochaine, ait été depuis dix ans celle où
le prestige de Genève a marqué la plus forte baisse.
Il n'y a presque plus de mystique de la S.D.N."(192)

Such evaluations of political ineffectiveness impelled some NRF-
associated writers towards the formation of the intellectual-led
Pacifist movement, for which the NRF showed support.
In December 1931, Curtius at last had a text published in the NRF. This was the first chapter of his book *Deutscher Geist in Gefahr*, and had originally been delivered as a speech in Berlin (193). To the European humanist Curtius, Germany had been and was rapidly transforming itself into a society whereby the existing culture was becoming redundant. He predicted:

"Le complet renversement des couches de la nation qui s'est opéré dans les cent dernières années nous contraint, me semble-t-il, à reconnaître que l'avenir de notre civilisation ne peut plus se réaliser sous le signe de la culture et de la civilisation classiques" (194).

For Curtius, the death of Hugo von Hofmannsthäl marked the end of an era: now, "la jeunesse s'est émancipée depuis longtemps et ne lit que ce qui lui est recommandé dans les petites feuilles des associations ou des partis politiques" (195). Curtius identified National-Socialism as the underlying cause of the new philistinism (196). He proceeded to outline how the "irrational" was becoming fashionable in Germany: "en Allemagne on s'efforce aujourd'hui d'atteindre à une nouvelle connaissance de l'homme" (197). It was his obsession with French rationalism which tended to blind Curtius to the underlying political and economic changes in Germany which had brought about the new irrationalism there. He saw France nostalgically as a unified, classical, formalist-oriented culture, straddling the French Revolution.
"La culture classique du XVIIe siècle est une rationalisme esthétique et philosophique... (...) La forme d'existence de ce rationalisme politique est la république démocratique. Elle ne s'est établie en France qu'il y a 60 ans, après bien des départs manqués, mais cette durée de deux générations a suffi pour en faire le patrimoine impérissable de la nation" (198).

Furthermore Curtius believed that French humanism was much closer to reality than German humanism. "Son principe directeur n'est pas l'envol platonicien vers l'idéal mais le choix prudent du milieu juste, à égale distance des extrêmes" (199), wrote Curtius, adulating what could be read effectively as a résumé of French Radicalism. It was precisely this centrist, non-committed, passive attitude which was beginning to trouble so many in France at this time, not least Thibaudet himself among NRF-associated writers (200). Such adulation on Curtius' part would have had a very hollow ring in France, particularly when he held up as an exemplar Tardieu, who had explained away the corruption in the "Oustric Affair" by pointing to the lack of culture among the guilty (201).

Another component of French uniqueness identified by Curtius was self-sufficiency: "au triple point de vue politique, économique et intellectuel, la France est un système d'existence clos et isolé" (202). Once again, echoing Fernandez' critique of French insularity, Curtius felt that what might seem to be universal to the French would appear as parochial to outsiders: "le Français (...) se sent d'abord Français, et homme en seconde ligne seulement" (203). In conclusion, after quoting Rathenau's desire for an "indissoluble alliance" with France, Curtius
repeated the same refrain which, as it had become more familiar over the previous dozen years, seemed to have become less and less practicable in the contemporary situation (204).

1932 saw the failure of the final attempts at re-establishing equitable relations between France and Germany. Preliminary talks at the Geneva disarmament negotiations began in February, and Herriot, returned to power in May, presided over the Lausanne Conference, where German reparation payments were abandoned for good (205). Jacques Barjety and Charles Bloch have documented the detail of the last attempt of French and German industrialists to settle their countries' differences within the context of the so-called "Comité Mayrisch" (206). Moreover Hitler began to play down his own violent hatred of the French as he had expressed it in Mein Kampf, and concentrated his propaganda efforts on the intensifying pacifist mood in France (207).

As for Gide, during one of a series of visits to Berlin in 1932, he declared himself very pessimistic regarding Franco-German reconciliation, and told Heinrich Kessler that

"le projet de désarmement d'Herriot n'est pas sérieux, il ne l'adéposé que pour la galerie, dans l'espoir qu'il sera rejeté. Et pourtant, un accord était tout à fait possible entre les deux peuples..." (208)

This was also the beginning of the period during which Gide became increasingly interested in the problem of literary exiles from Hitler's Germany (209). Likewise during 1932, the NRF switched its attention to the international Peace Movement and
to the debate it provoked, as well as to Gide's declarations of sympathy for the Soviet Union (210). All this did not detract from the success of the Goethe centenary tribute in March 1932, which sold out very rapidly (211). Paulhan gathered the essays of a number of illustrious writers, including Curtius, Thomas Mann and Gide; the overall tone showed how Goethe was admired for his interpretations of the French Enlightenment, but Fernandez, in an essay entitled "Réserves", questioned the validity of praising Goethe's achievement in 1932 (212). After this, the only article of any substance was Fernandez' "Note" on Curtius' book Essai sur la France in July (213).

With the cancellation of reparations on the 19th, however, any remaining optimism for Curtius' view was quashed for good (214). Due primarily to the nature of his intellectual formation, Curtius had displayed a clearly stereotyped view of France, a shortcoming detected later by Jean Grenier (215). With his supporters within the NRF, Curtius had ignored or had been indifferent for too long to the menace of Nazism and its root causes, which were economic, not cultural.

Apart from a few isolated and short reviews, the NRF remained silent on Germany until August 1933, seven months after Hitler had swept to power on January 30th (216). Some in the NRF circle saw a new war as inevitable, basically due to French hypocrisy regarding disarmament (217). Others, including Gide, were driven to protest at the alarming oppression of any effective opposition in Germany. Indeed the AEAR induced
Gide to speak on the matter on March 21st 1933. Here Gide inferred that Russian Communism was infinitely preferable to Hitler's barbarism. Germany under the Nazis had become the embodiment of a Fascist state and as such, the Franco-German question was realigned henceforward with the parallel issue of Fascism-Antifascism. The review tended to follow this development, which helps explain the fact that after 1934-1935, having continued its interest in the Franco-German debate, "(elle) se détournait de l'actualité brûlante".

In August 1933, the NRF introduced a new rubric "Textes et Documents". The first to appear were the "Documents sur le National-Socialisme". Here extracts from a variety of sources were selected, introduced and linked by Brice Parain (a communist) and Georges Blumberg (a Jew). Evidently their intent was to be as objective as possible, for the authors stressed immediately that the National-Socialist movement in Germany was widely misunderstood. There followed a brief historical outline, in which the crucial events after the 1918 defeat were the Ruhr occupation, the rationalization of German industry from 1925 and the electoral successes of 1928 and 1930. The early phase of National-Socialism had derived its major successes through responding in particular to the agricultural crisis, in which Parain and Blumberg detected most of the Nazis' strength. Furthermore, underlying the anti-industrialism was a profound anti-rationalism, which was the subject of the first of four sections grouping a variety of documents. Anti-Semitism was elevated into a doctrine by those "Réprouvés".
who "repoussent avec méfiance les valeurs dites "spirituelles" et ne se réclament que de la nation"(226). Secondly, National-Socialism had a ready-made mass audience among the unemployed as well as the "Réprouvés"(227). Thirdly, the electoral successes of 1928 and 1930 were particularly due to peasant support, which explained the doctrine of "Le Sang et le Sol"(228). Finally, the predominance of the agricultural question explained the early moves towards what Parain and Blumberg read as a plan for disindustrialization. The idealizing of the peasantry signalled the Nazis' hatred of the Left as embodied in the proletarianized masses, many of whom were unemployed as a result of the rationalization of industry(229). Hitler's attitude and policy towards industry was still uncertain at the time Parain and Blumberg prepared their "dossier", for in their conclusion they detected vacillation in the most recent Nazi declarations. What was clear was that Nazism was "une révolution contre la raison, contre la ville, contre l'industrie, et c'est pour avoir mis en question les valeurs du rationalisme industrialisateur qu'il a remporté son succès politique"(230).

Gide was particularly pleased by the publication of these documents, for they fulfilled the rôle of the NRF, which was to "éclairer impartiellellement l'endroit ou l'envers des pensées, des systèmes"(231). Others however, like Alix Guillain, violently disapproved of the objective treatment Nazism received in the hallowed pages of the NRF(232). On the international scene, the Germans withdrew from the "S.D.N." on October 14th, 1933(233). In Germany, the Leipzig trials underlined the brutality of
Hitlerian repression: this provoked protest in France over which Gide presided in November, and which led to Gide and Malraux's journey to Berlin the following January to plead for Dimitrov's release (234). At this time there were growing signs of a widening gulf at the heart of the NRF regarding Germany: while Gide found that "rapprochement" with Hitler was untenable, Schlumberger felt France could still negotiate for peace without necessarily interfering in Germany's internal affairs (235). Schlumberger put his point of view in an "Air du Mois" for January 1934 (236). Reviewing the confusion of press-opinion on Germany, Schlumberger criticized the left for resorting to the old "thèmes sur la barbarie germanique" and for ignoring Hitler's appeals to France (237). As for the right, the general feeling was that this "last chance" should not be lost (238). Schlumberger also noted that there was a marked tendency in public opinion to blame the Jews for preventing "rapprochement" with Hitler: "l'antisémitisme progresse à pas très rapides" (239). "L'opinion oscille, tâteonne, dans un extrême malaise", concluded Schlumberger (240).

The difference of opinion between Gide and Schlumberger highlighted once again that the issues of Franco-German relations and the Fascism-Antifascism opposition overlapped to an increasing extent. Moreover, the chronic confusion and misinterpretation on the French side made it ever more necessary to penetrate the smokescreen surrounding Germany. In February 1934, the NRF produced what was ostensibly a special number on Gobineau; but there were two additional texts and the usual "Airs du Mois" (241). Apart from the second part of Giraudoux's Combat avec l'ange.
Paulhan inserted an extremely important essay by Trotsky. Lacouture points out that Malraux, at this time a sympathizer with Trotsky, gave the exiled Russian the occasion to publish this essay in the *NRF*. The article was dated 10th June 1933, at Prinkipo, but a paragraph had been appended dated 2nd November, 1933, while Trotsky was in France. There was no doubt for him that National-Socialism had prospered on the disillusion of the "petite-bourgeoisie". By exploiting the familiar grievances, the Nazis had managed to weld the disinherited petty bourgeoisie together in a common hatred of the proletariat. Shunning Marxism, materialism and rationalism, the Nazis turned to racial theory to elevate the nation above History. Trotsky wrote: "Hitler a dû emprunter de seconde main les idées du racisme à un français (...), le comte de Gobineau", as though to underscore the relevance of including this essay in a tribute to the racial theorist.

Continuing his analysis, Trotsky believed that once in power, Nazism was no longer "le gouvernement de la petite bourgeoisie. Au contraire, c'est la dictature la plus impitoyable du capital monopéristeur". The inevitable outcome was imperialism - "mission historique réelle de la dictature fasciste -", and Trotsky's rhetorical question concluded the original article: "L'orbite politique des nazzis (sic) aboutira à cette alternative: la guerre ou la révolution?". In retrospect, Trotsky's prognosis was remarkably accurate in pointing to the next European war: the November 1933 addendum ended thus:
"Le délai qui nous sépare d'une nouvelle catastrophe européenne est déterminé par le temps nécessaire au réarmement de l'Allemagne. Il ne s'agit pas de mois, mais il ne s'agit pas non plus de dizaines d'années. Quelques années suffisent pour que l'Europe se trouve de nouveau précipitée dans la guerre, si Hitler n'est pas arrêté à temps par les forces internes de l'Allemagne elle-même"(251).

A few pages further on, Paulhan included an "Air du Mois" by Drieu which celebrated "l'Allemagne, ce beau monstre industriel qu'avait choyé le capitalisme international..."(252). This text, whose poetic prose reflected Drieu's idealized conception of National-Socialism (253), heralded a longer text which appeared in March, alongside Crémieux's analysis of France's internal problems (254). Drieu's impressions were based on a recent journey to Berlin; he found that the overwhelming atmosphere was one of material poverty and sacrifice which dissembled "une richesse morale" and in which the Germans took great pride (255). Drieu himself rejoiced in this, and affirmed that "le fascisme n'est pas de la crotte comme se contentent de diagnostiquer sommairement la plupart des anti-fascistes..." (256). Drieu believed that the Nazis has learnt much from the Russian Revolution, and that Socialism was "en fermentation dans le monde fasciste"(257). At the same time, capitalism was being recuperated into the Nation-State: "Le capitalisme épuisé a besoin de l'Etat pour le soutenir: il se livre à l'Etat fasciste. La mécanisation du capitalisme aboutit à son étatisation"(258). The old structures were in the process of being supplanted by "le statisme", "depuis le principe du racisme, jusqu'à cette conception de la société(...) rangée.
en corporations" (259). Drieu saw European capitalism and socialism as having entered their final phase of decline: he believed there were two lessons to be learnt from this process. Firstly, all efforts and hopes had to be made under the sign of a new Stoicism (260). Secondly, Germany was a microcosm of "L'Europe trop faible pour porter plus avant le capitalisme dans le monde, trop faible aussi pour accueillir largement le socialisme..." (261). By May 1934, Drieu felt confident enough in fascism to write:

"Or moi, je suis séduit par le courage des fascistes (...). Je veux espérer encore qu'ils emploieront ce courage à faire le socialisme. Car si les fascistes ne font pas le socialisme, qui le fera?" (262)

Drieu, however, did not celebrate the autodafés in Hitler's Germany. In June 1934, the NRF drew attention to the establishment of a "Bibliothèque allemande des Livres brûlés" under the auspices of, among others, Gide, Heinrich Mann, Rolland and H.G. Wells (263). Moreover Félix Bertaux examined German propaganda efforts in the literary domain, whereby it was insinuated that "real" German literature - that is, approved by Goebbels - was being deliberately withheld from the French (264). The Nazis were operating a "renversement des valeurs" in their autodafés, firstly in the name of morality, secondly in the name of racial purity, and finally in order to replace all those intellectual values which did not absolutely conform to Nazi orthodoxy (265). The Nazis were effectively committing the intellectual treason "par excellence" (266).
It was against this background that Paulhan began the serialization of Chamson's novel, *L'Année des Vaincus* (267). Written after his own journey to Germany, Chamson opened his novel with a description of how five German diesel engineers interact with the French, in their "Village nègre". Initially there is much reciprocal sympathy and understanding between the main protagonists, especially the central French character Carrière and the two Germans Karl and Ludwig (268). The "instituteur" Martin, however, is clearly worried by the advent of Hitler, and the Germans can give no satisfactory answer to his fears: "Mais cet Hitler? Il va faire la dictature?" (269).

When Carrière is sent to collect some engine parts from Stuttgart in the company of Karl and Ludwig, it becomes clear that Ludwig is in fear of his life if he returns to Germany, because of his communist activities. Carrière, however, is willing to turn a blind eye to Hitler; it is at the Germans' insistence that they explain what is going on in Germany (270). The journey in the lorry across the border is described in such a manner as to highlight the absurdities of history (271). Once in Germany, however, Carrière's eyes are opened. Apart from being repelled by the constant presence of parading S.A. troops, Carrière is worried when Ludwig disappears and is replaced by a Nazi, Rudolf (272). At the end of the novel, Carrière, back in France, reluctantly tells his friends about the real Germany: "Quelle sale année (...) Deux 3... 1 et 9 ... Deux 3. Ce sont les 3 qui portent malheur?" (273), he wonders. After such hope and such propitious beginnings, Carrière says: "J'ai peur
de tout, de la guerre qui peut revenir, de la misère. J'ai peur de cette année, de celles qui vont suivre. On est tous des vaincus, maintenant"(274). Although Chamson's novel was severely weakened by its stock characters and stereotyped images, the central points were clear. It was necessary to travel to Germany to fully appreciate the menace of Nazism and the implication was that Fascism should be resisted at all costs, for the inevitable result of its gathering strength was war(275).

"En tête" of the same number, Paulhan inserted the first of two extracts from a work by André Suarès, "Vues sur l'Europe"(276). Those familiar with Suarès work could have remembered the series of anti-German polemics he had produced twenty years before(277). Benda's anti-Germanism seemed mild by comparison: Suarès' unbridled vituperation provoked Schlumberger to protest in the review itself(278). Suarès fulminated:

"Vous vous étonnez de l'horreur que l'Allemagne nous inspire depuis deux ans. (...) Vous n'êtes donc pas sensible à la Barbarie?. La voici qui va du Rhin à la mer du Japon; et celle de Berlin l'emporte sur celle de Moscou, parce qu'elle se vante d'y être contraire"(279).

And again:

"Je ne suis pas suspect si je reconnais dans l'Allemagne présente la perfection de la Barbarie (...) les brutes. Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, toutes les sortes de Hesse (sic) et de Rosenberg triomphent dans le plus vil orgueil de la violence et de la haine ..."(280).

Although Richard is right to stress that Suarès castigated all totalitarianisms, Schlumberger believed that such concentrated abuse was out of place in the NRF(281).
In 1935, the NRF was consolidating its anti-fascist, pro-Popular Front image. Most references to Germany were now submerged by or subordinated to the Fascism-Antifascism opposition. The publication of Malraux's *Le Temps du Mépris* should be seen in this light. Not only did the book act as a counter-balance to Drieu, it should also be remembered that since their journey to Berlin in January 1934, Gide and Malraux were instrumental in organizing the "Comité Thaelmann". Certainly Lacouture, quoting Malraux's opinion ("un navet"), has viewed *Le Temps du Mépris* as an "oeuvre de circonstance", dedicated as it is to "les camarades allemands". Moreover, this publication occurred against a background of increasing tension on the international scene. The Saar plebiscite (January 13th 1935) and Hitler's restoration of military service in Germany (March 16th) underlined the Nazis' warlike intentions. Julien Benda, by now a convinced anti-fascist, favourably reviewed Germanist Edmond Vermeil's book in March 1935. The commonplaces which had misled the French public for so long were, enthused Benda, fortunately absent from these pages. Quoting from a speech made by "un chef naziste" reported in *Le Temps*, Benda seemed mystified by the continuing, blatant self-deception of "certains de nos démagogues", who insisted that Franco-German understanding was still possible, "dès lors que chacun est disposé à prendre en considération l'idéal de son voisin".

In the May issue, Benda referred specifically to the restoration of German military service on March 16th. Here Benda anticipated his call for "l'antifascisme patriotique"
in his June open letter celebrating Paul Rivet's election (288). He found that the pacifism of the CVIA was dangerously weak in its policy of "peace of all costs" with Germany. Benda dismissed the objection that the refusal of the French to disarm had caused the Germans to re-arm, and stressed that "l'Allemagne nourrit des revendications territoriales" (289). Moreover he repeated his long-held conviction that Germany had deserved the "humiliation" of the Versailles Treaty, because "L'Allemagne a voulu la guerre (...) et l'a perdue" (290). Benda concluded by attacking the Radicals, particularly for allowing the likes of Henri de Kérillis and Maurras to usurp the defence of Western civilization:

"La vérité est que ces gens-là (i.e. the Radicals) ont perdu tout sentiment de la France de la Révolution, toute perméabilité à la moindre idée générale et ne s'émeuvent plus que de misérables intérêts électoraux" (291).

The Radicals' incompetence in foreign policy had thus provoked Benda to savage the Party which allegedly represented the ideals he stood for: his disillusion drove him to favour the Popular Front and then the Communists in defending Republican ideals.

As Duroselle has written, "assez peu d'écrivains français connaissent l'Allemagne contemporaine, si l'on excepte quelques grands germanistes, tels Edmond Vermeil, Robert d'Harcourt, ... (etc.)" (292). In the NRF, two "Airs du Mois" by the economist François Perroux signalled the beginning of a long period of silence regarding Nazi Germany which lasted, indeed, until November 1938, when the NRF responded to the crisis provoked
by Munich (293). Perroux's two texts were preparatory notes for a forthcoming book, Les Mythes Hitlériens (294). It was necessary to experience the country's achievements at first-hand, argued Perroux (295), but his text itself mythologized Nazi Germany. For instance, he wrote:

"Le Français se trompe quand il applique à l'Allemagne l'idée qu'il a de la nation. Parler du "nationalisme" allemand, c'est tomber dans un contre-sens perpétuel. Bien plus vivante, agissante, décisive est la notion de Volk. Le peuple allemand est la réalité suprême, et non la nation allemande" (296).

In retrospect it is difficult to disagree with Mysyrowicz's evaluation: "Perroux, à force de chercher à comprendre le nazisme, s'en faisait (...) jusqu'à un certain point l'avocat" (297).

The nature of Nazism had become such that it was impossible to fully understand the phenomenon without subscribing to its own mythic structures: by accepting them, it was difficult to avoid supporting Fascism. Given Paulhan's views, and how close the leading personnel of the NRF were to supporting the nascent antifascist Popular Front in 1935, silence was the only real alternative to the unwitting propagation of Nazi ideology. The view of Félix Bertaux, writing his penultimate review in the NRF in January 1937, helps to explain this attitude:

"Il faut avouer que depuis trois ans nous avons perdu contact avec l'Allemagne. Sur tous les terrains, et en particulier sur celui des idées. La politique du national-socialisme, tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur, nous a mis dans un état de choc. (...) On dirait que le monde allemand est devenu l'autre monde, une sorte de fatalité qu'il faut accepter ou rejeter en bloc, sans pénétration possible" (298).
Germany had become the "other world" in a dualist universe: understanding was impossible because Fascism was unacceptable. France and Germany had again become adversaries, and it was only a matter of time before war broke out.

Despite his efforts to re-establish the literary primacy of the NRF, Jean Paulhan had been powerless to prevent the intrusion of the Franco-German question into the review; the long-standing interest in Germany of such as Rivière, Gide and Schlumberger outweighed his authority. His experience made him acutely aware of the risks incurred by the NRF in its making statements which were evidently regarded as representative if not authoritative, on a question which effectively belonged to the domain of international politics and diplomacy. Its early stance against French intellectual Nationalism marked the NRF thereafter as a review sympathetic to Germany, but at the same time it tended to propagate the pre-eminence of French culture. Indeed, by virtue of the very zeal and idealism of its contributors from both sides of the Rhine, the NRF, albeit in good faith, helped perpetuate a deceptive and sometimes dangerously naive approach to reciprocal understanding. The foundations of the problem were planted in the political and economic substructure, not in the cultural superstructure of each nation. It was only after History had forced the review and its contributors into coming to terms with the true menace of Hitler, and only after they had begun to interpret the German problem from an antifascist standpoint, that the NRF adopted a more penetrating and realistic attitude.
CHAPTER FIVE

"The NRF, the Soviet Union and the "engagement" of André Gide, 1925 to 1938".

"Peut-être entrons-nous aujourd'hui dans un âge collectiviste" (Jacques Rivière, NRF September 1919, p. 506).

"Dans l'établissement de la société soviétique, (je vois) une illimitée promesse d'avenir" (André Gide, Littérature engagée, p.24, text dated 21st March, 1933).

"Si l'on prend parti, aussitôt le parti vous prend" (André Gide, NRF April 1935, p.500).

"Je doute qu'en aucun autre pays d'aujourd'hui, fût-ce l'Allemagne de Hitler, l'esprit soit moins libre, plus courbé, plus craintif (terrorisé), plus vassalisé" (André Gide, Retour de l'URSS, 1936, p.59).

"Le désespoir de Gide, le désespoir qui l'a conduit au communisme, le désespoir d'être communiste sont également étranges" (Jean Paulhan to Marcel Jouhandeau, BD. 3832, 1936).
Although the relationship of France and Germany determined and dominated the course of Inter-War history, the nature of Franco-Soviet relations and the image of the Soviet Union as it was perceived in France were hardly less important\(^1\).

In particular, as Germany veered towards fascism in the early 1930's, the influence of the USSR and its ideological, political and (later) material support for anti-fascists was such that Comintern policy led directly to hastening the formation of the Popular Front in France\(^2\). Communist front-organizations found willing adherents among French intellectuals, many of whom readily became fellow-travellers: with André Gide and André Malraux among the most eminent supports of the Soviet effort, the NRF, for a time, inevitably followed the same path\(^3\).

In the case of Germany, it had been the intellectuals (with the NRF in the vanguard) who had made the first moves towards "rapprochement". While Poincaré and the Right staunchly resisted, reconciliation and occupied the Ruhr, Gide and Ernest Robert Curtius represented those on both sides of the Rhine who favoured "détente". With regard to Russia, however, the reverse was true. It was the Radicalist politician Herriot who initiated recognition of the Soviet state, after first travelling there. Apart from a handful of pro-Soviet French "revolutionaries" who had been in Russia during and after the upheavals and who stayed there, intellectuals only began to satisfy their curiosity and travel to Russia after official recognition in October 1924\(^4\). There are two important reasons for this. First, geographically, France is very distant from Russia; located beyond Germany and
Poland, the land of the Tzars was considered to be in Asia rather than Eastern Europe. Secondly, historically-speaking, Russia had been an ally before the war and was considered as having betrayed France in particular and the Allies in general by concluding the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918\(^{(5)}\). This "betrayal" of the Tzarist alliance was bad enough but what was even worse, the Bolsheviks had perpetrated it. As a direct consequence France launched into intervention in Eastern Europe, by not only sending French troops into Poland under the command of Weygand, but also by backing the White Armies of Wrangel\(^{(6)}\).

Faced with the resolve of the Red Army, the policy of intervention failed: the French only achieved the opposite of the desired effect. Maxime Mourin puts it thus:

"Loin d'avoir nui au bolchevisme, (la France) avait conféré au gouvernement soviétique, qui n'avait reçu aide militaire ni subsides de personne, un caractère national et jacobin que lui-même n'avait pas recherché et qui lui assurait, avec un plus large appui populaire, les chances de la durée"\(^{(7)}\).

Among the many young intellectuals returning to his studies after the war, Brice Parain has admirably described the atmosphere which conditioned French perceptions of Russia at this time, against the background of extreme political and military hostility. He writes:
"Quand j'ai commencé à faire du russe, en 1920, ce qui se disait chez nous, c'est que nous étions les gens les plus raisonnables, les plus intelligents du monde et que la Russie était un pays de fous. On avait eu la victoire, on avait évité la Révolution, on vivait comme il faut, on touchait des dommages pour la moindre chaise démolie ou pillée pendant la guerre, on était des rois partout à l'étranger, là-bas c'était le genre famine, massacres, théories, tout cela ne faisant d'ailleurs que continuer les extravagances des boyards, qui, auparavant, n'avaient pas arrêté de se saouler et de se ruiner aux cartes, de perdre toutes leurs batnilles, de se signer pour un oui ou pour un non..."(8).

Parain clearly places his own intellectual formation in a context which dated from before 1914. He detects two primary, influential currents whose juxtaposition merits reflexion:

"Avant la guerre de 1914, il s'était formé un peu partout en France des groupements de jeunes rebelles ayant des doctrines plus ou moins claires, certes, plus ou moins rigoureuses, mais tous plus ou moins sous l'influence de l'un ou l'autre des nihilisme élaborés au XIXe siècle, tous obscurément décidés à changer la vie, donc. Il n'y en a guère eu que deux qui ont réussi à donner un mouvement d'ampleur internationale, le parti bolchevique, qui représentait le dernier messianisme à structure politique, et la nouvelle gnose, la NRF chez nous. Cette sorte de prophétisme, né dans le symbolisme, incapable de s'en affranchir, enseigne à rechercher le salut individuel dans le création littéraire et artistique des formes a priori de la liberté"(9).

These comments imply a recognition of the essential and fundamental non-conformism of the NRF, a fact which assumes its full importance when considering the pronouncements which Gide made later in the review on the Soviet achievement.

During this time too, however, the mythic image of revolutionary Russia as the focus of hope for a great many Western intellectuals (and potential fellow-travellers) was formed and began to evolve.
Jules Romains' fictional character Clanricard expresses a view common to many who were spellbound by Cette grande lueur à l'Est:

"Je ne suis pas communiste (...) sur bien des points, je me sens même très éloigné des thèses communistes (...). Je crois plus à la révolution russe qu'au communisme, plus à l'élan qu'elle incarne qu'à la doctrine qu'elle prétend appliquer. Ce qui m'attire, moi, c'est l'idée qu'il se dépense là-bas une force de renouvellement de création, une enthousiasme, une foi en l'avenir de l'homme, un hérosisme, parmi peut-être des excès terribles... j'ai envie malgré moi d'en approcher, d'y participer"(10).

Clanricard's admiration is typical of the "je-ne-suis-pas-communiste, mais..." attitude which prevailed in varying degrees throughout the Inter-War period. Moreover, Romains' title (Cette grande lueur...) is highly significant when considering the fellow-travellers' perception of the Soviet experiment as somehow an historical extension of the "Enlightenment"(11). This interpretation easily found its political counterpart in the leaders of the PCF, who portrayed themselves as "Jacobins" and who came to be perceived thus by such as Julien Benda, that staunch defender of the ideals of the French Revolution (12).

Once the NRF had resumed after the war, Rivière, as part of his skirmish with the "Parti de l'Intelligence", acknowledged the fact of the Bolshevik revolution in an important article, "La Décadence de la Liberté"(13). Rivière pondered the notion that liberalism and liberty were decaying concepts, particularly within the context of the War: "C'est pour la liberté du monde que l'intelligence français s'est fait pendant plus de quatre ans décimer"(14). Rivière ended the first part of his meditation on liberty with a comment which has far-reaching implications.
Yet Rivière's analysis was constructed according to the same dubious "psychologisme" which he had applied to L'Allemand (16). Rivière believed that all Lenin and Trotsky had had to do was exploit the instinctive "collectivisme" - or sovietism - of the "âme russe" (17): "le bolchevisme est l'épanouissement à peine organisé, à peine systématique, des instincts russes" (18).

French, humanistic individualism was diametrically opposed to this socialist collectivism, but the Russian experience was proving to be an invaluable lesson for socialism: "Grâce aux Russes commence pour le socialisme une ère (...) de réalité" (19). In a remarkably bold statement for the time, Rivière concluded thus:

"Il faut voir les choses en face: même s'il est vrai que le peuple russe subit en ce moment d'affreuses misères, même s'il repent d'être bolcheviste, un fait subsiste: c'est qu'il l'est, et que, par lui, en un point du globe, l'existence socialiste a commencé" (20).

As Richard has said, in confronting the fact of the Russian revolution "(Rivière) est obligé de faire part (...) d'une sympathie qui va à l'encontre des mots d'ordre de L'Action française et des nationalistes" (21). Antibolshevism was already the lynchpin of extreme Nationalist doctrine.

Henri Ghéon, a founder-member of the NRF, and recently converted to both Catholicism and the Action française, counter-attacked in November on behalf of the "Parti de l'Intelligence" (22).
His primary belief was that "le monde entier a intérêt à la restauration de l'esprit français, ferment, moteur, animateur de la seule civilisation que nous regardons (...) celle des Occidentaux"(23), and it was in the light of this that Ghéon proceeded to examine Rivière's view. Ghéon contradicted Rivière's experience by emphasising that most French combatants had seen the Russians as having prolonged the war "sous prétexte de "vider" le tsar"(24). Moreover, Ghéon stressed that Bolshevism was not confined to Russia: "il est ici, à notre porte (...) et déjà nos voisins l'imitent"(25). In the face of this supposed threat from Germany, France had to strive to re-impose its political and cultural hegemony in Europe, "(dans) le sens le plus français, le plus universel", because "le monde attend de nous des directives éprouvées, non des hardiesses sans lendemain. Tout le reste est confusion, contradiction, asiatisme"(26). This text signalled the beginning of the end of Ghéon's contributions to the NRF; even Gide, although he congratulated Ghéon on the quality of his prose, felt now that they fundamentally disagreed(27).

Yet Schlumberger too had only been prevented from signing the "Parti de l'Intelligence" manifesto by his Protestantism: essentially he was as antipathetic to Bolshevism as Ghéon(28). This was confirmed by the stance he adopted against Gide's and Rivière's acknowledgement of Dadaism, which, wrote Schlumberger, transformed "un canular" into "un événement littéraire"(29). Particularly Rivière's August article was highly inappropriate, Schlumberger believed, coinciding with Weygand's intervention in Poland(30). Ghéon agreed: he wrote to Schlumberger:
"...l'introduction de Dada à la NRF est dans l'ordre,
et celle-ci coquettera avec le bolchevisme jusqu'au
jour où la bande du Journal du Peuple occupera
militairement les bureaux de la rue Madame".(31).

Thus there was considerable animosity towards Bolchevism within
the NRF during this period before recognition of the Soviet State.

One result of the Revolution was the emigration of White
Russians(32). Among these was Boris de Schloezer, whom Rivière
invited to contribute to the review from 1921. His particular
sphere of interest was music, and he provided the "Chroniques
musicales" throughout the Inter-War period(33). Yet de Schloezer
was also well-equipped to talk of Russian philosophy and literature,
and did much to introduce the work of Leon Shestov into France(39).
He also translated some of Dostoevsky's unknown work into French,
of especial importance to André Gide, who was writing and delivering
lectures for the centenary of the Russian author during late 1921
and 1922(35). De Schloezer's attitude conformed well to that of the
NRF, at least as conceived by Rivière: in a book review of March
1922, he displayed an ambivalence whereby he felt the reader of
the work in question - "Mon Journal sous la Terreur" - learnt
as much about the author as about the Revolution(36). De Schloezer
wrote:

"L'accusation la plus terrible qu'on ait pu porter
contre le régime bolcheviste c'est d'avoir "avili
les âmes". Sous l'action de la faim, du froid, de
la terreur, les esprits se débilitèrent (...) 
Mme. Hippius ne put échapper à la contagion..."(37).

De Schloezer did not allow himself to be "avili": as he pointed
out, the diary had been written in 1919; it was now 1922, the
beginning of the "New Economic Policy". Moreover, in April that
year the Genoa Conference and the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo signalled the beginnings of international recognition of Soviet Russia(38). Herriot was "le premier homme politique à oser se rendre chez les Soviets", as Kupferman puts it(39). There is no doubt some truth in the assertion that "Herriot voit ce qu'il veut voir: l'union Soviétique convertie au radicalisme, abjurant les erreurs du communisme de guerre, découvrant les vertus de l'initiative privée"(40). This journey paved the way towards French recognition in October 1924, after the "Cartel des gauches" victory of May 11th that year(41). Herriot and Anatole de Monzie then set up a Commission to investigate the vexed question of Franco-Russian debts, and, in October 1925, de Monzie employed Brice Parain "pour un Centre de Documentation Russe"(42). By the time his various missions to Russia ended in 1927, Parain had become a communist; through the Education Ministry in Paris he knew Jean Paulhan, who then introduced Parain into the Gallimard publishing house(43).

After official recognition in 1924, Gallimard exploited the new atmosphere of "détente" with Russia and established two very important collections under the direction of Boris de Schloezer. The first was "Les Classiques russes" launched in 1925, and the second "les Jeunes russes" in 1926(44). Gallimard and the "Editions Sociales Internationales" were the only two publishing-houses to have such collections. Boris Pilniak's \textit{L'Année nue} opened the 1926 collection. In 1934 the NRF publicists boasted that
"Les éditions de la NRF (...) ont été les premières à publier les jeunes écrivains soviétiques, (et) sont restées les seules à continuer systématiquement une collection de la littérature soviétique..."(45).

Not only was the NRF renowned for its interest in young Soviet literature, the "Documents Bleus" collection also carried some interesting titles (46). The NRF, or certainly the publishing-house, had considerable interest in presenting the Soviet Union favourably.

As Paulhan assumed the editorship of the NRF in 1925, in the USSR the policy of "Socialism in One Country" was being adopted; the risk of world revolution seemed to have diminished. In spite of the hardening anti-sovietism accompanying the return to power of Poincaré in August 1926(47), a growing number of French intellectuals were making the journey to Russia. Most of the important "voyages à la mode"(48) occurred between mid-1926 and the end of 1927, and, for the first time since Rivièrè's articles and de Schloëzer's reviews, the NRF began to devote space to treating the Russian question. One way in which the image of Russia was distorted is demonstrated by the fact that Stalin's instigation of the first Five-Year Plan dramatically displaced the NEP at the end of 1927. The false picture which ensued was thus partly brought about by the interval between the journeys of the French and their published accounts.

The most illustrious pair to make the journey at this time were Luc Durtain and Georges Duhamel: "ils se lient d'amitié avec des Russes de bonne compagnie et reviennent enchantés", writes Kupferman (49). Coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the October
Revolution, Paulhan inserted the first fifty pages or so from Durtain's forthcoming book in the NRF for October 1927(50).

Durtain's text was highly impressionistic, dedicated as it was to artist Franz Masereel. Durtain asked the reader to imagine he was accompanying him in the railway compartment on the journey East. At the end of the text in the NRF he apostrophized his reader:

"Voyageur, réfléchis. (...) Où situer ce Moscou d'aujourd'hui et le pays dont il est le résumé et la capitale? Ni en Europe, tu viens de la constater. Ni hors d'Europe, tu l'avais reconnu. Cet amalgame, unique au monde, de nouveauté hardie et d'habitudes archaiques... L'Autre Europe"(51).

For Durtain Russia was another world where the visitor (and by extension the reader) had to suspend their occidental disbelief, a requirement which applied also to the political question. The designation L'Autre Europe was preferable to

"Les mots URSS et Russie (qui) véhiculent en eux tant de passions politiques! Quelles que puissent être celles que tu partages, un nom frais ne peut-il t'aider à les mettre un temps à l'écart: m'aider aussi à oublier les miennes, au cas où j'en posséderais sans le savoir?"(52).

Essentially Durtain saw the new system in Russia as a new humanism: even the way his book is written and constructed demonstrates his liberal, humanist optic. The new Russia was "un motif de plus d'aimer et de redouter l'homme. Une façon de plus de le connaître"(53).

Through this pre-publication Gallimard no doubt wished to exploit the literary "événement" of that summer and autumn, the publication of Duhamel's version of the journey, Le Voyage de
Duhamel praised communism in Russia, but argued for its avoidance in France by reformism. His position provided a perfect example of what David Caute has called "remote control radicalism", involving commitment "at a distance" (55). Duhamel applied the "convenient double standard" of the Western liberal idealist, a process which distinguishes the fellow traveller's commitment from the communist's "because his disillusion with Western society is less radical, less total..." (56). On August 1st 1926, Léautaud noted that "Les Nouvelles Littéraires publient par morceaux Le Voyage de Moscou de Duhamel. C'est le document sensationnel annoncé ... C'est mou, fade, delayé" (57). All in all, the implication was that communism was admirable in Russia, but not applicable to France (58).

In the December NRF, the leading book-review was André Thérive's article on Duhamel (59). The rather peculiar choice of Thérive may well be explained by his growing involvement with "ouvriérisme" or populism at this time (60). In any case, Thérive pin-pointed and attacked Duhamel's centrist position:

"on croit généralement que le livre de Duhamel mécontente les ennemis du bolchevisme. Mais, à en croire des témoignages forts sûrs, il en a mécontenté les tenants" (61).

He berated Duhamel for repeating exactly what he wanted to see: "il incline à un fatalisme historique qui accepte les évolutions et même les révolutions parce qu'elles ne sont bien jugées que longtemps après ..." (61). Duhamel was displaying intellectual bad faith when he showed the USSR such "indulgence", "prudence" and "timidité scrupuleuse" (63). In a critique which anticipates
David Caute's, Thérive squarely placed the blame on the French tradition and on liberalism for their tendency to exculpate Soviet tyranny, which Duhamel barely mentioned: "Qu'on le veuille on non, la tradition française aide là où elle pénètre, le libéralisme d'esprit et de fait".

This criticism is only one sample among many attracted by Duhamel's book. Grasset then published Fabre-Luce's Russie 1927, a work which immediately took issue with Duhamel: Fabre-Luce wrote:

"Je reproche à l'auteur du Voyage de Moscou de n'avoir pas marqué plus vigoureusement l'opposition morale (...) qui sépare l'intelligence libre du communisme".

Reviewing this work in February 1928, Drieu felt that Fabre-Luce showed much promise as a politician. This is attributable to the way Drieu detected a similar political disposition to his own:

"Son après critique du monde communiste décèle un pessimisme qui au fond de son cœur ne doit pas désarmer non plus devant la France".

Fabre-Luce called the USSR "cette Amérique qui n'a pas réussi"; Fabre-Luce's journey had indeed coincided with the NEP, but now, in 1928, the first Five-Year Plan was beginning to sweep away the "petit-bourgeois" Nepmen.

Fernandez' review-article of Durtain's book provides a third example of how Soviet communism was represented in the West. Fernandez believed there was no better book on modern Russia, because Durtain himself was such a seasoned traveller and
could easily compensate for the "curiosity" and "fear" which characterised the shortcomings of so many others' journeys. Fernandez displayed his own humanism when he compared Durtain and Fabre-Luce:

"M. Fabre-Luce, qui fonde sur la "liberté de l'esprit" ses critiques sommaires du bolchevisme, devrait apprendre de M. Durtain le secret de celle-ci" (72).

Durtain's book succeeded because he only depicted reality as it presented itself to him; it was truly objective (73). By singling out and praising Durtain's emphasis on Soviet vitality, Fernandez was already unconsciously anticipating his belief in the necessity for change in France's internal political affairs from 1930.

Commenting on this first phase of liberal reportage on Soviet Russia, Kupferman writes:

"Il est vrai qu'un aller-retour suffit pour rapporter en France une certain image de la Russie. Chacun à la sienne, on s'en doutait un peu. Partis le même été (...) Duhamel et Fabre-Luce reviennent avec des certitudes bien différentes. Le processus est bien connu, depuis que les Français ont perdu leurs derniers pays imaginaires. Le voyageur élabore, à partir de matériaux qu'il a inconsciemment triés, l'image qui renforce son sentiment de sécurité" (74).

These comments on the tendency to sift information are largely applicable to the way the NRF's reviewers assessed writing and reporting on Russia: Thérive disliked Duhamel's liberalism as much as Bolshevism; Drieu found in Fabre-Luce the reflection of his own political aspiration, and Fernandez, well-schooled in the French liberal, philosophical tradition, could admire Durtain's "objective" approach. What tended to be absent from all this was a true image of the Soviet Union: the irreversible process
had begun whereby the skein of fact, misrepresentation and interpretation became ever-more twisted and difficult to unravel.

Meanwhile, in the concluding section of *La Trahison des Clercs*, Benda progmosticated a new world war, "soit qu'elle ait lieu entre nations, soit entre classes"(75). As it turned out, the war would be fought primarily between the fascist and the antifascist blocs.

There is no doubt that had Hitler's National-Socialism been reported and understood in France in 1927, Benda could equally well have chosen Germany instead of Italy in his illustration of this phenomenon:

"Il suffit de penser, en ce qui touche à la nation, à l'Italie, et, en ce qui touche la classe, à la Russie pour voir à quel point de perfection inconnu jusqu'à ce jour l'esprit de haine contre ce qui n'est pas soi peut être porté, chez un groupe d'hommes par un réalisme conscient et enfin libéré de toute morale non pratique..."(76).

It was not long before the *NRF* itself provided a text which would illustrate the validity of Benda's thesis when applied to Russia.

During 1928 and 1929, collectivization in the USSR was proceeding apace. Trotsky, already expelled from the Party, was expelled from Russia on 20th January 1929, from his internal exile in Kazakhstan. Lacouture recounts the now apocryphal story of how the impressionable Malraux - working for Gallimard by this time - wanted to lead an expedition to rescue Trotsky(77). Malraux was beginning his "Trotskyist-adventurer" phase after the success of his novel *Les Conquérants* (serialised in the *NRF*). Yet if Malraux was a Trotskyist, he was no doubt in the minority among nascent
fellow-travellers, for "Trotsky wanted a permanent world revolution and the fellow-travellers didn't" (78). As the influence of Trotsky on such as Berl and Malraux (counter-balanced in Malraux's case by Groethuysen) was detectable during the early months of 1929, so their youthful and exciting ideas were in turn beginning to make an impression upon Gide. Although at first little unsettled by their tendency towards iconoclasm, there is no doubt that Gide was impressed by Malraux (79).

On the international scene during 1929, relations between France and the USSR were somewhat strained (80) and at home, Tardieu's government took rigorous, preventive measures against the PCF in a wave of arrests (81). In France few details were known regarding the extent of the repression and liquidation of the "Kulaks" and the "Nepmen" in Russia during these months. That is, until October 1929, however, when the NRF published, "en tête", a very long extract from a forthcoming book by the Roumanian author, Panait Istrati (82). Istrati, a protégé of Romain Rolland, had travelled extensively within the Soviet Union from October 1927 (83). Rolland, just converted to the Russian cause, and anxious to lend it the support of Europe, had already suggested to Guéhenno that he should ask Istrati for a text which he assumed would be a paean of praise for the USSR (84). Yet after his return to Paris in February 1929, Istrati published nothing until his article exploded in October's NRF. His long, anti-Soviet invective was based upon his first-hand experience of what he felt to be the injustice meted out to Roussakov (and Victor Serge), and upon
the subsequent calumnies and mendacity of the authorities.

The article opened by making two forceful, basic points about what was to follow. Firstly, the treatment of Roussakov was only a microcosmic example of what was going on in the Russian macrocosm (85). Secondly, Istrati underlined his belief that the proletariat was the victim of its own dictatorship which, it transpired, was imposed by the "caste" above (86). Istrati, as it happened, had become entangled with the "opposants du régime", Serge and Roussakov, as early as November 1927 (87). The GPU police, keeping the "subversives" Serge and his father-in-law Roussakov under surveillance, exploited the jealousies of some "jeunes communistes" in order to lay charges against Roussakov which could then be publicized in Party organs to remove him from his employment (88). Istrati summarized the terrible logic of this sequence of events:

"le Jakt ("la co-opérative du Logement") provoque une agression; la Pravda relate l'agression, fulmine, demande la mort du coupable; le syndicat lit la Pravda et exclut Roussakov; la fabrique Samoilova (Roussakov's work-place) chasse un homme que le syndicat avait exclu; la Pravda prend acte des déclarations de la fabrique; le Jakt tient ensuite des assemblées où il lit la Pravda et demande l'exécution immédiate du monstre..." (89).

Utterly scandalized by this injustice, the volatile Istrati - for whom Roussakov was a model revolutionary - launched a counter-attack upon the Soviet authorities whereby it was only his status as a foreigner which prevented him from being arrested in turn:

"Eh bien, tas de salauds! assassins d'ouvriers! Oui, ce sont des ignominies, ce que vous faites, et je protesteraï ici et à l'étranger!" (90).
The functionairies whom Istati harangued, however, merely repeated that they had received "dix résolutions d'usines demandant la peine de mort!" (91). Yet with persistence, Istrati managed to contact Party chiefs, among them Kalinin, who were, admitted Serge, "compréhensifs et circonspects" (92). After one trial, which resulted in the acquittal of the Roussakov family, other charges were conjured up, leaving them without bread rations or the right to work (93). At the end of all these efforts, Istrati "quitte l'URSS, plus misérable qu'au temps où j'étais moi-même un de ces ouvriers qu'on écrase sous tous les régimes" (94). Later, he learnt that in spite of all the energies expended, the Roussakovs had been sentenced (95). "Voilà le visage de la "Patrie prolétarienne", voilà sa justice", exclaimed Istrati (96). Such institutionalized terrors did not even occur "chez Mussolini"; for Istrati, the "goulag" already existed:

"D'un bout à l'autre de l'empire, maté par la trique du fascisme communiste, les Sibéries sont pleines de Roussakov. (...) Il n'est plus question là-dedans de socialisme, mais d'une terreur (...) dont on se sert pour le triomphe d'une nouvelle et monstrueuse caste qui raffole de fordisme, d'américanisation..." (97),

vituperated Istrati, anticipating Céline's wrath (98).

Such powerful material, articulated in such colourful and sometimes extreme language, with whole sections of text italicized or in block capitals, must have seemed an extraordinary choice of article to the reader of the normally restrained NRF. Even Benda had not reached these excesses of language and rhetoric. Not surprisingly, L'Humanité lost no time in mounting a scorching
counter-offensive whereby Istrati was so vilified that he never truly recovered before his suicide in 1935; his rehabilitator Marcel Mermoz has even drawn a parallel with the Salengro affair, when the Popular Front minister also took his own life after a calumnious press-campaign\(^{99}\). On October 4th, L'Humanité's front-page indicated that "la presse bourgeoise fait grand bruit (...) autour d'un article publié par Panait Istrati dans la NRF, dans lequel cet haidouk parjure hurle contre la Russie soviétique avec les chiens bourgeois et social-démocrates..."\(^{100}\). The next day, the paper continued to heap insults on the perpetrators of this "Social-fascism"\(^{101}\). Rolland, disappointed by Istrati's article, nonetheless said he had foreseen his anti-Sovietism\(^{102}\). He wondered whether Europe should print a corrective, but then changed his mind, adding, quite rightly, that the NRF was an "étrange organe choisi, pour ce déballage politique!"\(^{103}\).

Within the NRF, it is only possible to speculate upon the motives for publishing this polemic, in the absence of concrete, textual evidence. The attack was so extreme as to make it unlikely that even the most convinced "Trotskyists" within the NRF (and there were few) should wish to so sweepingly tarnish the image of Revolutionary Russia. It is more likely that Gallimard wanted to exploit this opportunity for a pre-publication for commercial reasons; probably very few non-subscription copies remained once the content of the leading article became known\(^{104}\).
approved and felt the Istrati article was an excellent counter-
balance to Benda(105). Indeed the "Affaire Roussakov" inspired
Benda's November "Scholie"(106). He felt far enough removed
from the Soviet situation to write: "je dois avouer que cette
nouvelle affaire Dreyfus me laisse assez froid"(107). History
was repeating itself, according to Benda; there was nothing new
in the fact that "un groupement (here, the Soviets), ne peut étre
fort que dans l'injustice et le mensonge"(108). Adhering rigidly
to his well-established position, Benda defined the rôle of the
intellectual: "c'est votre affaire et non la mienne"(109). He
gave a display of his gymnastic logic:

"Les nécessités de l'ordre social, les conditions
vitales d'une nation, c'est là des choses que vous
savez et qui ne me regardent pas. Je n'empêche pas
les États de pratiquer le mensonge, s'ils le croient
nécessaire; je les empêche seulement de dire qu'il
est la vérité"(110).

Benda's extreme antipathy for the bourgeoisie, however, allowed
him to excuse the brutal exigencies of history of which Istratib
account provided only one example. The violent repression by the
proletariat of the bourgeoisie exploded because of centuries of
accumulated injustice; for Benda, "cette remarque me paraît
expliquer toutes les violences des mouvements populaires et en
partie, les justifier"(111). Here Benda annexed the Soviet
experience to his own antibourgeoisism, yet the sting in the
tail of his assessment also accused the Russian state for its
betrayal of the revolutionary ideal(112). However, the same
exigencies of history would, with time, erode Benda's idealism,
and he would later rally together with the fellow-travellers.

A few pages further on in the same number, Brice Parain had his own corrective to Istrati inserted (113). Parain, himself a communist and conversant with the situation in Russia, picked out the inconsistencies of Istrati's polemic, referring to his "instinct d'agitateur" (114). Perhaps justifiably Parain saw Istrati as a "trotzkiste" due to his association with Serge (115) and, in one respect, Parain's appeal for impartiality showed just how "orthodox" he was at this time:

"soyons impartiaux: le gouvernement soviétique n'a pas proclamé la démocratie en URSS estimant prématûre de relâcher des rigueurs de la dictature. On ne peut donc exiger de lui ni la liberté de presse, ni la liberté de répandre (...)des propos contrariant l'effort en cours" (116),

explained Parain. The central problem was that Istrati was still a "bourgeois liberal" who, conveniently ignoring the true political significance of the issue, had produced "un réquisitoire contre l'URSS du point de vue bourgeois" (117). Parain believed no-one would be fooled by Istrati's accusations: "Aucun des lecteurs de la NRF, parmi lesquels on relèverait peu de prolétares, j'imagine, ne s'y sera trompé" (118). Istrati had to make a choice: he could not be a revolutionary and a liberal at the same time.

This publication and its subsequent polemic ran concurrently with reports that the first Five-Year Plan was making incredible progress in industrializing Russia (119). French commerce suffered by the so-called "dumping" of extremely cheap Russian goods;
relations were soured by the French counter-measures (120), and by November, Soviet goods were being boycotted in France (121). At the end of the year, relations between the two countries had been almost set back to the 1924 situation (122).

It was the risk of a German-Austrian customs union which provoked action, in particular by Briand, who could easily foresee the consequences. In early 1931 preliminary negotiations began whereby the failure of the Locarno policy might be compensated by a non-aggression pact between France and the USSR (123). Yet Briand was exceptional: as Mourin puts it, the Right continued to parade their inflexible antibolshevism:

"La presse conservatrice continuait à exprimer son hostilité à la signature d'un pacte de non-agression franco-soviétique, qui selon elle renforcerait le prestige du gouvernement soviétique et faciliterait l'activité subversive des bolchevistes à l'étranger. (...) Les partis de gauche (...) à l'exception du PCF, demeuraient prudents, (...) attentifs à déceler les moindres symptômes d'un affaiblissement des nationalistes allemands qui rendrait moins urgent le rapprochement avec l'Union soviétique" (124).

It was against this background of Soviet progress and French short-sightedness and hostility that Gide, already aware of the effect revolutionary ideas had had on the likes of Malraux, Parain, Berl and Groethuysen, began to take an obsessive interest in the USSR. This interest can partly be explained by the fact that contemplation of the Russian achievement was the natural corollary to the ever-increasing German menace: 1930-1931 were fraught with tensions regarding Franco-German relations (125). Moreover, Gide was reading much material on the success of the First Five-Year Plan. In Europe for February 1931, Gide would have read
Guéhenno's statement that it was not necessary to be an economist nor a "grand clerc" to realise that the Russian Plan would exert a decisive influence over Europe(126). Guéhenno was, like Gide would be, completely captivated by the endless pages of statistics which seemed to be the only method of attempting to quantify the enormity of the Soviet effort - as Caute puts it, "statistics were the sacred digits of socialism"(127).

Furthermore, Europe serialized Michael Farbman's Piatiletka (Le Plan russe) in April and May(128): "La Petite Dame" remembered its effect on her companion who read it avidly -

"Bypeed (Gide) entre avec un numéro d'Europe (...) "Ce que je lis est passionnant, c'est peut-être le premier article sur la Russie qui m'emballe vraiment; ce sont de simples statistiques sur le plan quinquennal, c'est tout simplement prodigieux et je ne puis m'empêcher de souhaiter de tout mon cœur qu'il réussisse. Ah! vraiment après tout ce que les Russes se sont entendu dire! quel triomphe! toute l'Europe sera à leurs genoux!""(129).

This reading formed the basic raw material which Gide would draw upon for the published sections of his Journal(130).

In September 1931, the NRF printed a curious article by the aristocratic ex-White Army officer, D.S. Mirsky, which was at least a profession of faith if not a true "autocritique"(131). Mirsky began by talking of the "intellectual emigration" from Russia, which was totally sterile, unlike the powerful reactionary ideologies which had flourished after the French Revolution. He asserted that "tout intellectuel émigré qui voulait rester vivant devait, ou bien se dénationaliser, ou bien d'une façon ou d'une autre accepter la révolution"(132). After a brief sketch of
such curiosities as the "Eurasian" movement which flourished in 1920-1, Mirsky went on to explain how it became gradually more evident that an extreme and unifying form of Russian Nationalism would not displace Bolshevism. By 1926 he had set up an anti-émigré but non-communist movement called Versty: here their hopes were firmly placed upon poets and novelists through whom "vivait l'éternelle Russie"(133). The transitional phase was represented by the defeat of Trotskyism and the founding of a planned economy. Also at this time Mirsky underwent his intellectual conversion, attributable to two main factors. Firstly his discovery of Soviet literature(134) and secondly his studies of history(135). Mirsky's "emancipation" was completed by the liberating death of L'Eurasie in 1929:

"Mon "coeur" matérialiste s'insurgeait contre cette prétendue "raison" qui le tenait prisonnier depuis presque un quart de siècle (...) Pokrowsky avait déjà balayé beaucoup d'ordures matérialistes (...), mais de vieilles inhibitions m'empêchaient encore d'aller plus loin..."(136).

It was then that the final liberation took place: Mirsky had been asked to write a book on Lenin, and it was the reading for this which released him(137). Mirsky ended his self-rehabilitation with lines from Maiakovsky: "J'ouvrail chaque nouveau volume de Marx comme on ouvrait les volets de sa chambre"(138). Gide felt this text was "fort intéressant", in spite of grave reservations about Mirsky's motives(139). Coming nearly a year after the discrediting of Barbusse at the Kharkov conference on proletarian writing, and given Mirsky's émigré status, some would have viewed this article with some cynicism: interestingly enough, much later,
in 1937, Paulhan noted in his "Bulletin" that Mirsky had been arrested in Moscow\(^{(140)}\).

It was the next month, however, that Gide's private obsessive enthusiasm for the USSR reached its height. In an important conversation with Schlumberger and Martin du Gard, Gide countered their objections by saying that it was Russian moral dynamism which attracted him. He even went so far as to admit that

"ce qui se passe en Russie me passionne beaucoup plus du point de vue moral et je crois que pour individualiste que je sois, je me soumettrais très bien à la contrainte soviétique"\(^{(141)}\).

Further conversations and notations in his Journal show very well how Gide managed to think of Russia in a surprising variety of contexts: Martin du Gard anxiously confided to "la Petite Dame": "Vous savez, il file à gauche, notre ami, tout à fait à gauche"\(^{(142)}\). In November Gide told the Soviet Embassy that he was thinking of making his pro-Soviet feelings public, a move which must have heated the telegraph wires to Moscow\(^{(143)}\). By the end of February 1932, his mind was made up; after another important conversation with Martin du Gard, he declared: "Je vais publier dans la NRF mon journal actuel, puisque cela devient presque ma seule façon de produire"\(^{(144)}\). Two weeks later, Paulhan received the following letter:

"... mieux vaut remettre d'un mois le début du Journal dans la Revue. Cette publication est (pour moi du moins) fort importante et je serai soulagé si je ne me sens plus talonné..."\(^{(145)}\).
In early April Gide reminded Paulhan that they had discussed ways of publishing documents on Russia: the result of those early deliberations was Ehrenbourg's selection "la Jeunesse russe" (146). The atmosphere in Paris was highly charged during these months; on May 6th, President Doumer was assassinated by a White Russian, Gorgulov. The Right-wing press alleged that the GPU were implicated; once again, there was a temporary set-back in Franco-Soviet relations (148).

In June 1932, Gide's "Pages de Journal" began to appear (149). June's selection carried nothing controversial on Russia, but Paulhan was critical (150); these pages dated from 1929. It was in July's number that Gide dropped the bombshell: in the last page, he wrote:

"Mais surtout j'aimerais vivre assez pour voir le plan de la Russie réussir. (...) Jamais je ne suis penché sur l'avenir avec une curiosité plus passionnée. Tout mon coeur applaudit à cette gigantesque et pourtant toute humaine entreprise. (...) La première condition pour que ce projet réussisse, c'est de croire obstinément qu'il réussira. Loin de défier l'intelligence il l'appelle et c'est la raison qui doit ici triompher" (151).

Coinciding as these pages did with moves to support the Communist-inspired Peace movement, Paulhan was very worried that the NRF might suddenly lurch to the Left; Martin du Gard told Gide of Paulhan's misgivings and Gide, in turn, told Paulhan that the review should remain as impartial as possible in spite of his own fellow-travelling (152). To Paulhan, Gide seemed disappointed by the reception of the July "Pages de Journal" (153).

Gide's critics would have been equally disappointed to find nothing on Russia in August's selection, but they were more than
compensated by the offering in September's NRF. However, once again, only a few sentences marked Gide's new stance. He repeated his admiration for the Five-Year Plan, for the workers' endurance of apparently subhuman mining conditions, and exclaimed "Comme je comprends leur bonheur(154). Then Gide made his most forthright declaration of sympathy, hoping to live long enough to see such efforts succeed(155). That so few sentences could unleash the storm of protest which followed, and which did not subside until Gide's so-called"apostacy" in late 1936, attests to Gide's personal influence and status in intellectual circles (and, indeed, outside them) at this time. This publication also signalled a new phase for the NRF for, in addition to the Peace question, Paulhan henceforward had to contend with the inevitable political bias which these meagre declarations gave to his review: Grover has shown how Paulhan had already reminded Gide of certain promises made regarding his weak position at the NRF(156).

Among the first reactions were the private ones of Guéhenno and Paulhan. The editor of Europe wrote on September 2nd that, "J'aime(...)les pages de Journal de Gide. Toutes ces réflexions sur les Soviets, sur Barrès, me paraissent venir un peu tard"(157). Paulhan, replying to Guéhenno, felt that there was "de l'enfantillage - d'ailleurs touchant - dans l'adhésion de Gide aux Soviets"(158). Yet Paulhan was already anticipating worse to come, for he had read the 1932 "Pages de Journal" in pre-publication form: upon doing do, he wrote protesting to Gide that "je ne puis m'empêcher
de penser qu'il est facile de vouloir mourir pour les Soviets" (159). Moreover, concluded Paulhan, it seemed foolhardy to make such strong affirmations of faith when Gide had not travelled to Soviet Russia: he asked - "Pourquoi n'allez-vous pas en Russie?" (160).

Also in NRF circles, Fernandez began spreading the rumour that Gide was the victim of communist manipulation through his exposure to Groethuysen, and particularly through Alix Guillain (161); Martin du Gard later told Gide he believed there was some substance in this (162).

All these initial views, all within the NRF (except Guéhenno's), considered Gide's sudden entry into the political arena, as did a steady stream of comment from outside the review (163).

François Mauriac was among the first to commit himself to print: On September 10th his article "les Esthètes fascinés" appeared in Henri de Kérillis' L'Echo de Paris (164). Moreover, Mauriac broadened his front and attacked the NRF in general: to him, it was risibly inconsistent for this group of "grands bourgeois" to commit themselves to the Soviet cause. He wrote:

"Ce petit groupe de beaux esprits, ces grands bourgeois de lettres, vêtus comme de luxueux voyageurs, et munis des mirabolantes valises de Barnabooth, chiffrées NRF, s'approchent à pas comptés de l'ogre bolcheviste avec forces salamalecs..." (165).

André Rousseaux, in Je suis partout, saw Gide's Journal as the literary event of that summer, and Camille Mauclair gave an imaginative interpretation of "le corrupteur-né qu'est M. Gide" in his "D'Oscar Wilde à Lénine" (166).
The fifth and final part of the "Pages de Journal", dating from 1932, confirmed how Gide consolidated his current position. Here there were more substantial pages of commitment to the Russian cause. The entries for January 29th and 30th showed once more than Gide was rallying to the communist effort for personal, emotional and humanistic reasons:

"29 janvier.
Haine du mysticisme... oui, sans doute. Et pourtant mon angoisse est d'ordre mystique. Que tant de souffrances puissent demeurer vaines, cette idée m'est intolérable. Je ne puis pas, je ne veux pas l'admettre.

Cuverville, 30 janvier.
J'ai donc lu le numéro antisoviétique de Je suis partout (...) Je veux prendre pour exacts les renseignements (...). Ils démontrent par A plus B la faillite du nouveau régime en URSS. Mais alors, si le plan quinquennal, à les en croire, aboutit à un fiasco certain, pourquoi ces craintes?" (167).

Then followed over a page of apostrophe in which Gide, addressing Je suis partout directly as "vous", underlined the combative, anti-rational aspect of their attack, adding that if the Russian experience was a "mirage", he wished it would become reality (168).

From these pages it is possible to gauge that Gide's greatest reservations about Communism hung upon the question of individualism (169). Following his noting of a conversation with Valéry, who evidently believed Communism risked ending civilization as they knew it, Gide protested "Et je ne parviens pas à me persuader que les Soviets doivent fatalement et nécessairement amener l'étranglement de tout ce pour quoi nous vivons" (170), and went on to give a display of that intellectual agility or sleight-of-hand which was so common among the fellow-travellers,
allowing individualism and communism to co-exist in almost Platonic terms:

"Un communisme bien compris a besoin de favoriser les individus de valeur, de tirer parti de toutes les valeurs de l'individu. Et l'individu n'a pas à s'opposer à ce qui mettrait tout à sa place et en valeur; n'est-ce pas seulement ainsi que l'état peut obtenir le meilleur rendement de chacun?" (171).

Happily for the cause, Gide then read a speech by Stalin which seemed to answer his objections, so much so that his fears were quelled enough for him to re-affirm that "je m'y rallie donc de tout coeur" (172).

It was not only the socio-philosophical aspect of individualism which so fascinated Gide, but also the fact that Communism represented a type of "alternative theology" to Christianity. For Gide, the Church had corrupted and perverted the meaning of Christ's mission on Earth, and it was partly in response to his own constantly-deflected need for belief in a faith that Gide turned to the USSR. Gide interpreted the Soviet reality in a manner which was conditioned by the residue of his own Protestant formation. Talking of how Christ would have approached "la question sociale", Gide wrote:

"Ce qui dresse l'URSS contre Lui, c'est qu'il prêche l'acceptation (...). La religion est mauvaise parce qu'en désarmant l'opprimé elle le livre à l'oppresseur. Mais l'opresseur, en prenant livraison de l'opprimé, trahit le Christ et le joue" (173).

The fact that Gide's rallying to Communism was motivated primarily by personal needs and responses - both in terms of the social question and the theological one - was confirmed
by his constant disavowal of politics. On at least two occasions in these pages, Gide referred to his incompetence in politics (174). Although he resisted with difficulty, Gide determined throughout his period of "engagement" to avoid joining a specific political grouping (175). Moreover, commentators of Gide's "political" phase have tended to ignore the literary element in his statements on Russia. In a letter replying to Paulhan's objections on his willingness to die for the USSR, Gide made this telling remark:

"Toutes ces déclarations de mon journal devraient être endossés par quelque héroïne ou héro d'un roman...que je m'etais promis d'écrire et où j'eusse purgé ma pensée..." (176).

Such thinking challenges the seriousness of Gide's pro-Soviet statements; indeed, this private admission to Paulhan must have reinforced the feeling of the editor of the NRF that Gide was guilty of "enfantillage" in his pro-Communism. If confirmation were required of this aspect of Gidean "engagement", it came a year later in the Journal. Gide repeated:

"Je l'ai déjà dit: je n'entends rien à la politique. Si elle m'intéresse, c'est à la manière d'un roman de Balzac, avec ses passions, ses petiteses, ses mensonges, ses compromissions" (177).

For all the private reservations he discussed with Paulhan, Martin du Gard and others, publicly Gide's professions of faith were only slightly tempered by his political shyness and reservations which, if they were not ignored (as they were for the most part), could be marshalled by Gide's opponents as evidence against his hypocrisy or inconsistency. However, it should not be forgotten that such a position was perfectly
compatible with the fellow-travelling stance: Gide's October "Pages" ended thus:

"La réalisation peut être imparfaite. Ce qui m'importe c'est la pièce; pour la façon dont on la joue...oh! cela c'est une autre affaire, qui regarde de plus compétents" (178).

Most of the Right-wing press lost no time in exploiting Gide's "conversion" to Communism to the full (179). Emile Henriot, in _Le Temps_, called Gide's October "Pages" a "Manifesto", while Thierry Maulnier similarly berated Gide in "Sur une Conversion" (180). On the Left, the PCF remained somewhat bemused, although _L'Humanité_ reprinted some extracts (181). One tangible way in which the impact of Gide's "Journal" could be measured was in terms of cancelled subscriptions: by October 11th, Paulhan's worst fears were confirmed. Gide told "la Petite Dame" of the "plusieurs désabonnements à _La NRF_ depuis mon dernier Journal" (182).

Notwithstanding this, Paulhan proceeded to publish a short text by publisher and novelist Jacques Chardonne in November's _NRF_ (183). Very uncharacteristically, Chardonne too made some pro-Soviet pronouncements, although they were much more subdued than Gide's. Clearly impressed with reports of technical progress in Russia, Chardonne wrote that "ceux qui ne veulent pas comprendre la Russie actuelle se privent d'un grand Spectacle" (184).

Chardonne, who seemed genuinely impressed with the apparently superhuman abilities of such as Stalin (in spite of his being "une brute rusée" (185)), noted that
"pendant dix ans, un million d'hommes ont édifié une œuvre originale, dans des conditions très difficiles, construit des usines, restauré un pays, géré d'immenses entreprises, sans l'attrait du gain personnel, sans aucun intérêt propre, simplement pour le bien du prochain, ce qu'on ne croyait pas possible" (186).

For Chardonne, "seul le communisme a fait de l'amour du proclain une réalité" (187), but he still clung to the belief that in Europe, despite the coming phase of communist dominance, "des retours d'indiscipline sont probables, des révolutions de bourgeois, inspirées par la France" (188). Such declarations again did not pass un-noticed. Jean Guéhenno found that although Gide's and Chardonne's statements came too late and would have had an altogether different importance in 1920, it confirmed his suspicion that "de tels gestes témoignent que les vrais écrivains ont besoin d'accompagner au moins la masse humaine" (189). Further over on the Left, L'Humanité remarked upon the fact that Chardonne, "encore un écrivain bourgeois, (...) se tourne vers le monde nouveau que construit le socialisme" (190); his pronouncements were no less important than Gide's, for they too were symptomatic of "le désordre radical de l'économie capitaliste" (191).

One result of Gide's favourable treatment of the Soviet Union was that the newly transformed front-organization, the AEAR, could expect a substantial increase in support from intellectual circles, now that Gide had lent the fellow-travelling stance such respectability. This support quickly became such that the AEAR was able to launch a high-quality periodical, Commune, in July 1933, with Gide as a member of the "Comité directeur" (192).
Moreover, Gide's influence as a "maître à penser" would rally many younger men to the cause, a fact very astutely noted by Léautaud, and which Gide's opponents would later use against him (193).

The NRF certainly seemed to be following Gide's lead. "En tête" of the January 1933 issue, Paulhan placed a curious selection of documents on "la Jeunesse russe" (194). These texts, "entretiens, lettres, journaux intimes", were introduced by Ilya Ehrenbourg (195). In his opening remarks, Ehrenbourg, using vocabulary which would become more familiar as the 1930's progressed, celebrated the joint effort of Soviet engineers and writers in the search for "l'homme nouveau" (196). Coinciding as it did with reports of the incredible success of the first Five-Year Plan, this set of documents seemed to provide confirmation of Gide's faith in the Soviet effort (197). Ehrenbourg insisted that he was more interested in examining how Russian youth "relaxed", "loved" and "dreamt" rather than in establishing the nature of their ideology. The picture Ehrenbourg drew was an heroic one in which Russian students struggled on very limited resources in order to complete their studies: "ils ont soif d'apprendre et sont pleins d'énergie", he wrote (198). These texts would be good enough to provide material for a novel, insisted Ehrenbourg, appealing to the literary sensibilities of the NRF reader, as well as satisfying the requirements of the newly-instituted doctrine of "socialist-realism". Returning to the geological imagery, the documents
"Aident à comprendre ce phénomène qui, maintenant, ramène à lui l'attention de l'univers, ce grand mouvement humain qui peut être comparé (...) au déplacement des couches géologiques" (199).

From the wording of this introduction, it may be understood that Ehrenbourg was conspiring to perpetuate and propagate the favourable French (or Western) view of Soviet Communism as a new humanism; covered with such a respectable veneer, it was easy to see the logic of contributing such texts to the NRF.

After Hitler's coming to power at the end of January 1933, attention was momentarily concentrated upon Germany. The establishment of Fascism in the neighbouring country bolstered the Soviet cause in France, as political issues suddenly came to be perceived in a Fascist/Antifascist optic. Gide was no exception: on March 21st, he delivered his well-known speech "Fascisme" at the Salle Cadet (200). Moreover, support for Russia was growing again in political circles: Herriot, a long-standing friend of the USSR, wrote a pro-Soviet article in Marianne, and left for Russia on another journey which he retold in Orient (201). A gauge of how Gide's perspective had changed is provided by his comments on a text by A. Muret inserted in the "Revue des Revues" in April 1933 (202). Gide concurred so whole-heartedly that he stressed he would have voluntarily signed Muret's text himself, a remarkable statement, considering the orthodox Marxist vocabulary of this piece. This provided a valuable indication of how far Gide was moving towards the Left at this time; Martin du Gard certainly noticed it, and write sharply to Gide on April 3rd:
"Vous êtes embarqué. On souffle dans vos voiles, on trique votre gouvernail. Vous avez dû abandonner votre naturelle démarche, qui, quarante ans de suite, a été de zigzaguer entre les extrêmes. Très habilement, ou vous manœuvrez; ou vous fait dire plus que vous ne pensez..." (203).

Evidently shaken by this criticism (204), and encouraged by Martin du Gard himself to do so (205), Gide wrote his "Explications" or "Feuilles" for inclusion in May's NRF (206). Here Gide took the opportunity to reiterate his conviction that Communism and Christianity could be reconciled. By inverting the critique of an opponent, Gide took to task the hypocrisy of the Christian capitalist:

"Qu'un riche puisse se déclarer pour le communisme, voici qui étonne F.V. Il trouve cela comique (...). Ce qui m'étonne bien davantage, c'est qu'un riche puisse se déclarer chrétien..." (207).

Both Gide and Martin du Gard had felt that the more controversial aspect of Gide's "commitment" could be played down by stressing the parallel with an idealized Christianity. Moreover, Gide concluded that reform of the economic system was inseparable from the need to recondition "l'homme même" (208), and he could think of no better illustration of this than to quote Henri Massis on one of his own works: "Ce qui est mis en cause ici, c'est la notion même de l'homme sur laquelle nous vivons" (209).

Such continuing optimism for the Soviet experiment was considerably marred, or at least qualified, by the news that Victor Serge had been arrested and jailed in Russia (210). Already on May 9th Gide replied tartly to Paulhan, strongly advising against publishing an appeal on Serge's behalf (211).
Furthermore, "la Petite Dame" noted the evidence that Paulhan was equally as willing to entertain anti-Stalinists as he was forced to accept Gide's pronouncements (212). A little later, no doubt under the influence of Alix Guillain's strictly Stalinist position Gide re-affirmed his opposition to allowing the expression of Trotskyist opinions in the NRF (213). All this points once more to the fact that the political question of the moment split the NRF, but did it no lasting harm; Gide and Malraux, backed by Guillain and Groethuysen on the one hand, faced such as Paulhan and Martin du Gard on the other. This tense state of affairs soon came to a head: in late June, Gide read a "note" in proof-form by the new reviewer Charles-Albert Cingria on two works by Trotsky (214). Gide was so outraged by the nature of the book-review that he intervened directly by writing to Paulhan (215). Gide confessed to being "consterné par l'article sur Trotsky, (et) qu'il paraîsse dans la NRF" (216). Gide spelt out his reasons: "Ce que je reproche, ici, ce n'est pas de m'écontenter les trotskistes, mais bien de leur donner de si bonnes raisons d'être furieux contre la NRF" (217). Gide was particularly annoyed by the fact that Cingria had made extremely negative comments about the first sentence of a translation from the Russian; it was intolerable that such sarcasm and irony be applied to such a serious subject, to the extent that "vers la fin, (il) tourne à la bouffonnerie" (218). Gide ended by insisting that if (against his wishes) the NRF were to turn away from current social issues, it should do so much less speciously:
"je me dis (...) qu'il signifierait, dès lors:
pour nous, Cingria (et nous, NRF), qui refusons
à nous placer à un autre point de vue qu'esthétique,
la question sociale ne saurait nous intéresser,
n'existe pas... Mais il aurait fallu l'indiquer
moins spécifiquement, et de manière à être compris
du gros des lecteurs. - Et quant à la NRF, cela a
cessé d'être vrai "(219).

Cingria had evidently touched a raw nerve. Paulhan wrote back
defensively, to persuade Gide that Cingria met with the approbation
of Claudel, Gaston Gallimard, Ramuz, and Max Jacob, and that
personally he found Cingria's "notes" had "une ironique délicatesse,
qui n'est pas sans charme"(220). Yet Gide's objections carried
the day, for Paulhan asked Gide to re-read the review, "fortement
remaniée et raccourcie"(221). The episode illustrates well how
Paulhan periodically played games with the review in order to
re-establish equilibrium: strictly speaking, Gide's protests
were well-founded in that such flippancy was out of place in
the NRF; what made it worse, was the distinct political nature
of the article, for Cingria delighted in his own anti-Communism,
and was perfectly willing for Paulhan to exploit it(222).

In the same issue, Ramon Fernandez wrote his "Notes sur
L'Evolution d'André Gide"(223). Here Fernandez commented for
the first time in the NRF on Gide's "Conversion". Evidently
influenced both by Martin du Gard's view of Gide as an easily-
manipulated recruit to the cause, and by Gide's "exegesis" in
the May "Feuilllets", Fernandez managed to criticise the dangers
Gide ran of becoming conformist, at the same time recuperating
Gide's evolution towards Communism in terms of a "natural
progression". For those who had read Gide's own comments carefully, Fernandez' words had a familiar ring:

"A cause de sa naïveté en ce qui touche aux questions sociales (...) le communisme lui apparaît, non pas sous sa forme spécifique, mais sous les traits simplifiés du socialisme. Pour parler grossièrement, son communisme est une dissociation de la foi et de la volonté chrétienne, cette volonté nourrissant de motifs nouveaux ses vieux mobiles, etc."(224).

What was more, Fernandez went on:

"Définitivement déçu par le christianisme, dira-t-il, j'adhère à ce vaste mouvement qui du moins tend à créer un monde plus semblable à celui que souhaitait le Christ que le monde chrétien"(225).

In spite of this apology, Fernandez remained highly disappointed that Gide, whom he classed as a "transitional spirit" like Montaigne or Diderot, had apparently sacrificed his own fluidity of intellect for a philosophy which was rigidly orthodox: "Je regrette que Gide ait ainsi arrêté sa marche si souple, si subtile et si sûre, qu'il ne pouvait poursuivre qu'en restant seul"(226).

Very skilfully, Fernandez had managed to criticize Gide without disowning him, a fact which was amusingly noticed and commented on by the irrepressible Fernand Vandérem(227). Vandérem remarked upon the awkward position in which the NRF had found itself(228). Calling Fernandez "l'habile porte-parole de la NRF", Vandérem concluded that both Fernandez and Gide were guilty of hypocrisy,

"car, si M. Gide était vraiment homme à s'asservir ainsi aux principes de son nouveau parti, n'y a-t-il pas beau jour qu'il eût résigné tous ses biens de fortune, et ne serait-il pas, depuis un mois, à piocher dans les houillères de l'URSS?"(229).
Vandérem's attitude usefully illustrates the fact that for some the fellow-travelling stance was essentially illogical: for those critics on the Right, the ability to remain a bourgeois liberal at the same time as eulogizing the Soviet Plan derived less from a quality inherent in the French tradition, as from loathsome personal hypocrisy or cant.

Paulhan no doubt felt relief that with Fernandez' "apology" for Gide, the now fully-charged political issue of interpretations of the USSR momentarily left the pages of the review. Abroad, attention was focussed increasingly on Hitler's Germany, and the domestic political situation was becoming gradually more critical. With the February 6th riots and the rallying calls from both left- and centre-intellectuals to unite against Fascism, relations with the USSR were further improved. Moreover, the PCF managed to manoeuvre and redefine itself, and from mid-1934, matured in its political appeal(230). Most important of all, "the February 6th (...) riots (...) appear to have tipped the balance in favour of Dimitrov on the Comintern Executive"(231); the upshot of this was that Thorez was called to Moscow in April, and by June 1934, formal instructions on the "United Front" policy were issued and finally agreed with the Socialists on July 27th(232). These events and moves seemed to provide further vindication for Gide's having adopted his current position. The fact that this position was still regarded with intense fascination was reflected by Paulhan's insertion of an article by Jean Louverné in the NRF for April 1934(233). This text and, indeed, its author, demonstrate very
clearly that Gide's influence over the younger generation was still considerable, and that his "commitment" allowed many such writers to make up their mind politically. Essentially Louverné intended to show that there was no sudden conversion to a political cause, rather a politicization of moral preoccupations which Gide had had and written about since Les Nourritures terrestres and Le Roi Candaule. His premise was based upon Gide's statement in the recently-published volume Pages de Journal that "Communiste, de coeur aussi bien que d'esprit, je l'ai toujours été, même en étant chrétien" (234). Louverné, conjoining the "non-conformist" interpretation of Gide's "Communism" with a literary one founded upon the preface to Le Roi Candaule, showed that this "Communism" "était le fruit de son amour de l'humain, de son "humanisme" : position morale plutôt que choix politique" (235). He explained in conclusion that, far from being hypocritical, Gide's literary moralism was highly consistent (236).

Still more significantly, in the same issue of the NRF Paulhan included Fernandez' "Lettre ouverte à André Gide" (237), whereby Fernandez regretted that, having re-read his July 1933 article, he had not seen the full importance of Gide's gesture. He confessed: "Je crains bien, à me relire, que l'irritation ne l'ait emporté sur la sagesse" (238). Fernandez, believing that he had a deeper understanding of Marxism than Gide, admitted that it had perhaps been this familiarity which had prevented his fully comprehending Gide's move. Yet he still believed, although perhaps not for long given the political situation,
that Gide ought to retain "cette marge de liberté, de jeu, qui me paraît essentielle à votre mission (sic) parmi nous" (239). However, continued Fernandez, delineating his new stance, "il est des moments, dans la vie publique, où l'on se voit forcé de prendre position afin de sauver son honneur d'homme, même si cette position entraîne des acceptations auxquelles l'esprit s'astreint difficilement" (240). Suddenly Fernandez took more steps than Gide down the road towards full "engagement"; brushing aside his own former objections to Communism, Fernandez proclaimed "le point essentiel : l'intellectuel a besoin de la classe ouvrière pour se connaître lui-même complètement" (241). Fernandez leapfrogged Gide when he declared that "le libéralisme est mort: c'est aujourd'hui un chèque sans valeur" (242).

For Fernandez, the only remaining obstacle was the prickly problem of accepting the discipline of a Party: yet this was surely the most indispensible component of the fellow-travelling position, and one with which Gide had already come to terms. Gide had not joined and would not join the PCF: as Caute has shown, the very essence of the value of fellow-travelling was for the writer in question to remain on the outside in liberal circles where he was of greatest prestige (243). Moreover this facet of fellow-travelling was not inconsistent with Stalinist thinking (244). Despite these reserves, Fernandez insisted that as soon as the proletariat was endangered by its enemies, then he would be ready to act on its behalf (245). The motivation for such a realignment derived specifically from Fernandez' reaction against the Nationalists' agitation during February 6th; henceforward
Fernandez became active in the AEAR. Once again, however, the ideological inspiration found its origin in the new "humanism" in the USSR.

As with Gide's Journal, the reactions from the Right to renewed professions of faith in the NRF were swift, vituperative and numerous. Indeed, even Paulhan, in typical fashion, intimated to Grenier a more "realistic" image of the USSR, and told Etiemble of the cancelled subscriptions the two April texts had provoked. Even Thibaudet could not avoid discussing this "problème du jour" in his June "Réflexion". Thibaudet preferred to avoid the political perspective - "dans ce numéro de la NRF où nous descendions tous dans la rue" - and took instead the literary one. Thibaudet challenged Gide's statement which Etiemble had used as his premise, and thought it more appropriate that Gide should have written "J'ai toujours été communiste, surtout quand j'étais chrétien". Gide's phrase, "...même en étant chrétien", was unsuitable as far as Thibaudet was concerned, and, like his contemporary Maurras, Gide "a conclu politiquement, plutôt qu'il ne s'est converti religieusement". Thus, insisted Thibaudet, "il faut (...) distinguer conclusion et conversion. (...) Je crois plutôt à une conclusion". In what remains perhaps one of the most convincing assessments of Gide's political evolution - or at least Gide's intellectual temperament - Thibaudet concluded:
"(Anatole) France et Gide ont trouvé leur croyance politique au bout d'une évolution intérieure, d'une critique intérieure, d'un vide intérieur. Elle correspond, chez deux grands bourgeois, à un dialogue intérieur sur la nature bourgeoise, la société bourgeoise, le genre de vie bourgeois, à une scission entre eux et les autres bourgeois, soit à une crise de l'intellectuel plutôt qu'à une crise du citoyen" (256).

Proof that Moscow had (through the change in Comintern policy) revised its antipathy towards French bourgeois intellectuals was provided by Aragon's indulgence towards Gide (257). Indeed, at this time relations between French fellow-travelling intellectuals and the Soviet Union were reaching their zenith: Gide allowed Ehrenbourg to take a message to Moscow to be read at the forthcoming "Congrès des Écrivains soviétiques" (258). The Conference took place in August, and the French delegation included Nizan, Malraux, J.-R. Bloch and Vladimir Pozner. Moreover on the international political scene, in September, the USSR was admitted to the SDN (259).

In Paris, the "rentrée" of 1934 was dominated by the reports of the statements which had been made at the Conference. Jean Grenier's "Air du Mois" in October (260) heralded a much longer selection of speeches reprinted in November's NRF (261). Grenier had rightly identified the central issue as being the doctrine of socialist realism. All the Soviet writers were of one voice and all followed Ehrenbourg when he said that "le nouveau roman commence à prendre forme", based as it had to be upon "(le) récit documentaire, toutes ces annotations sténographiques, toutes ces confessions, ces procès-verbaux et
journaux intimes\textsuperscript{(262)}. Ivanov was even more enthusiastic for a rigid socialist realism\textsuperscript{(263)}. As for Radek, while talking of the Soviet literary doctrine in the context of foreign writers, he showed much more indulgence towards questions of technique and content\textsuperscript{(264)}. Yet perhaps none of this was surprising, given the circumstances of the Congrès; what was much more shocking was Gide's attitude in his "Message"\textsuperscript{(265)}, coinciding as it did with his important speech delivered at the AEAR session reporting the Conference\textsuperscript{(266)}. In a bizarre coupling of terms, Gide wrote:

"Sa (i.e. "de l'URSS") tâche est aujourd'hui d'installer, en littérature et en art un individualisme communiste. (...) Chaque artiste est nécessairement individualiste, si fortes que puissent être ses convictions communistes et son attachement au parti"\textsuperscript{(267)}. The predictable stream of vilification from the Right was even more violent than before\textsuperscript{(268)}. Gide's "Message" drove Schlumberger to protest in his "Note sur la Politique" in December's NRF\textsuperscript{(269)}. For Schlumberger, when Rivière had treated political questions he had at least been free from what he called "la pensée enroîlée"\textsuperscript{(270)}. Although Schlumberger was aware of Marxist interpretation\textsuperscript{(271)}, the NRF, he maintained, was not a suitable organ for such expressions. In this way Schlumberger was making a tacit apology to the review's subscribers on Gide's behalf. What Gide ignored in his "message" were the increasingly worrying reports of "déportés, affamés, Guépéou, propagande qui ne recule devant aucun mensonge"\textsuperscript{(272)} coming from the USSR. Moreover, Schlumberger managed to criticize Gide and attempt
to explain his motives, when he wrote:

"Ce que la foi remplace nécessairement, c'est une certaine attitude critique à l'égard de son objet. Elle est un élan vital plus qu'un jugement; elle bondit par-dessus les objections; elle accepte le risque qu'elle court s'il lui arrive de manquer son saut"(273).

Ironically enough, Schlumberger's "Note" appeared on the same day as the assassination of Kirov, 1st December 1934, a date which marks a significant change in the course of inter-war Soviet history. Moreover, preliminary moves were being made towards a Franco-Soviet Pact or Alliance (274).

The literary "event" of January 1935 was undoubtedly the debate provoked by Schlumberger's December "Note" and which took place at the "Union pour la Vérité". This meeting gave Gide the opportunity to face his "contradicteurs" (so long hoped for by such as Schlumberger) and to explain himself to them (275). Using his "Message" as a "point de départ", Gide eagerly grasped this chance to re-affirm his essentially non-political position, and on several occasions repeated the humanistic nature of his gesture towards the USSR(276). Gide was plainly influenced by Malraux's fellow-travelling rationale by this stage, for he happily adopted it himself(277).

Schlumberger too, reporting the debate for the NRF(278), praised Gide for confronting his opponents, reminded his readers of Gide's admirable concern for the "question sociale" as represented by his Congo visit, and explained away Gide's fellow-travelling position by referring to his uniqueness of spirit(279).
Quite clearly, Gide was as keen as ever to deny that he had become a "revolutionary", and, although his published "Pages de Journal" continued to show support for the cause, he repeated again and again that he would never join the Party\(^{(280)}\). Moreover, "la Petite Dame" noted on several occasions how Gide was frightened by the rôle he would be forced to play during the forthcoming "Congrès pour la Défense de la Culture"\(^{(281)}\). Indeed, Martin du Gard felt embarrassed at the rôle Gide took in the Conference\(^{(282)}\).

In the meantime, the Franco-Soviet Pact had been concluded on May 2nd 1935\(^{(283)}\). It now seemed essential that Gide should travel to the Soviet Union and see for himself; not only Paulhan, but also Schlumberger, Martin du Gard and Gabriel Marcel had all in previous months and years either hinted or suggested that Gide owed it to his own intellectual credibility to experience the USSR at first hand\(^{(284)}\). Preparations went ahead; but, in spite of increasing pressure from Malraux and Ehrenbourg, Schlumberger managed to dissuade Gide from allowing himself to be manipulated\(^{(285)}\). The result of these discussions and deepening misgivings led Gide to temper his pro-Sovietism in his Journal for October 30th, 1935\(^{(286)}\). Schlumberger was relieved momentarily that Gide had postponed his journey\(^{(287)}\), but in truth the delays were due both to the imminent winter, and to the fact that Gide had not finally decided who was to accompany him\(^{(288)}\).

In the NRF, Paulhan had managed, since Schlumberger's "Note sur la Politique", to steer the review clear of further dangers: Gide's Journal contained relatively non-controversial material. Indeed, he was preparing to combat the manoeuvring of such as
Malraux and Gallimard to politicize the review by publishing Grenier's attacks on Marxist orthodoxy in April 1936(289).

The first issue of the new year contained two texts whose inclusion within the same number achieve that "irony-through-contradiction" which so delighted Paulhan. Challenging Guéhenno in his "Pages du Journal", Gide wrote: "Tout effort de désindividualisation au profit de la masse est, en dernier ressort, funeste à la masse elle-même", adhering to his own personal, socialist ideal(290). Further on in the review however, was a set of documents entitled "Le Mouvement Stakhanoviste"(291).

In his urbane introduction, Habaru wrote:

"Le mouvement stakhanoviste tend à augmenter la production en élevant les capacités de la main-d'œuvre au niveau des possibilités de la machine. Derrière l'émulation individuelle (...) se dessine un vaste plan de rationalisation du travail"(292).

These texts were deliberately left to stand on their own without interpretive commentary(293): the ironical effect was achieved by their inclusion in the NRF, bearing as it did Gide's very nuanced pronouncements. Paulhan was forced to spell out this intention to a correspondent who stridently objected to the texts and complained in Combat(294). Tisserand accused the NRF of descending to the level of L'Humanité in reproducing the Pravda documents, of denying workers their intelligence, and insisted he would never read the NRF again. Paulhan retorted that Stakhanovism merited treatment in the review, because it was "un événement digne d'intérêt"(295). Paulhan used these objections to illustrate his conviction that the NRF was "une revue normale", and that it should always be left to the intelligent reader to interpret the facts(296).
By May 5th, 1936, two days after the "Front populaire" victory, Gide, albeit unenthusiastically, finally decided to travel to Russia\(^{(297)}\). He arrived in Moscow on June 17th, joining his five companions later; there followed a lengthy tour which, despite its favourable and controversial aspects\(^{(298)}\), proved an experience which directly caused Gide's so-called "apostacy"\(^{(299)}\). In the meantime, rumours of Party purges in the USSR filtering through to France\(^{(300)}\) made it difficult for Paulhan to include favourable material in the NRF: indeed, apart from Gide's "Pages de Journal" in March 1936\(^{(301)}\), the NRF contained nothing on the USSR. This period of silence before, during and after Gide's journey indicated a significant change in fellow-travelling attitudes, and it was therefore no longer tenable to print favourable perceptions of the USSR in the review.

Furthermore, apart from awaiting Gide's reaction, Paulhan found himself subject to the tribulations of the Popular Front at home\(^{(302)}\) which, itself, was becoming more preoccupied with the Spanish Civil War\(^{(303)}\).

The ill-starred nature of the visit to Russia seemed to be further compounded by the death of Eugène Dabit\(^{(304)}\). Gide and Paulhan were both upset by the way the Communists claimed that Dabit was one of their own, and that he had been favourably impressed by the Soviet Union\(^{(305)}\), a view which Paulhan, for one, contradicted\(^{(306)}\). Controversy raged as to whether Dabit had been disappointed or otherwise\(^{(307)}\). The literary and intellectual world awaited Gide's account of his journey; after several delays, caused primarily by Ehrenbourg\(^{(308)}\), Gide's Retour de l'URSS exploded on to the
public stage on November 13th 1936 (309). Paulhan lost no time in sending his congratulations: "Votre Retour est admirable de force, d'évidente vérité..." (310); Gide believed his work "va déclencher une scission communiste" (311), for the principal reason for the delay in publication derived from the insistence of such as Ehrenbourg that Gide should temper his now hostile attitude by mentioning the Soviet effort in Spain (312). Yet whatever the continued political implications of the Retour were, Gide felt "un effroyable désarroi" (313) which many would interpret as a "défaite morale" (314).

There was a flood of reactions to the Retour from all sides of the political spectrum (315). Benjamin Crémieux reviewed the book in December's NRF (316). Here Crémieux, in a long, well-balanced account, seemed to accept the picture which Gide drew without being afraid to remark that, if he had cared to, Gide would have discovered long ago all he needed to know "par une masse de reportages et de documentaires" (317). In what was an exemplary exercise in "NRF-style" objectivity, Crémieux identified the central paradox in Gide's "apostacy":

"En résumé, Gide est profondément froissé par la méconnaissance de certaines valeurs éternelles: vérité, beauté, justice, liberté, et par la renaissance de certaines valeurs bourgeois qu'il déteste: famille, argent, conformisme, inégalité.

Mais qui aurait imaginé qu'André Gide, avant son voyage, ignorât tout de ces caractéristiques soviétiques?" (317)

Moreover, Gide had the courage to display "une implacable lucidité" in the demolition of his own mirage, and Crémieux echoed Thibaudet's
1934 assessment of Gide's "évangelisme d'inspiration encore protestante"(319). Crémieux rightly pointed to the undeniable crucial and irreconciliable difference between the French and Soviet social and cultural systems when he wrote:

"Peut-être arrive-t-on au cœur du débat quand on constate que Gide se refuse à sacrifier certaines des valeurs conquises par la révolution bourgeoise de 1789 et que l'expérience stalinienne se refuse à reconnaître ces valeurs..."(320)

Gide, a product of that "golden age" of Radical Republicanism, was ripe for fellow-travelling, because the ideology underlying his intellectual formation could with effort and zeal be extended to embrace and take account of the new revolutionary "humanism" in the East. Essentially Crémieux, reminding the reader of the political experiment currently being carried out in France, restated the liberal view that Communism might be appropriate in the USSR, but unacceptable at home. The final sentence encapsulated the NRF's position on this occasion:

"Lénine pensait avec raison que la révolution russe devait être un exemple, non un modèle pour l'Occident"(321).

While the Right delighted in Gide's apparent "volte-face", the left-wing press erred between outrage and disappointment; many of the articles assisted Gide in preparing his Retouches à mon Retour de l'URSS(322). Gide had nearly completed this work in late March(323), revised it by early May(324), and published it on July 2nd 1937(325). Once again, amid renewed protest from the Left regarding the book(326), Crémieux was called upon to review it for the NRF(327).
For Crémieux, this work added little to the Retour de l'URSS; its primary concern gravitated around Gide's objections to the apparently inescapable need to excuse the unimaginable terrors and repression inherent in Stalin's revolution and to mask them by lying (328). The result of Gide's inspection was, according to Crémieux, to wonder whether Soviet "étatisme" was any less barbaric than the Nazi version. Furthermore, he predicted that the tension created by the co-existence of the opposing ideologies could only lead to a cataclysm (329). It thereby seemed as though Benda's prognosis in La Trahison des Clercs had been proved correct.

Now that the "truth" was known, thereafter the NRF observed an uneasy silence regarding the USSR: the debate raged on elsewhere (330). An indication that the poise of the review had been re-established appeared a year later in the August 1938 issue. The NRF, increasingly patriotic and committed to "National Unity" (331), included an extremely vituperative anti-Soviet essay by Claudel (332) with Benda's "chronique" "Anticommunisme et patriotisme" (333). The message behind this juxtaposition was that the brutality of the Soviet régime should continue to be condemned but also that patriotism and unity at home were above party differences and should be encouraged. In the event, in spite of the efforts of the PCF, the "appeasement" or pro-Munich faction held sway after September 30th, 1938, and, with the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact just under a year later, the Government decided to ban the PCF. For many, the feeling that Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism
were ultimately equally barbaric seemed justified.

Compared to treatment of the Franco-German issue in the NRF, Paulhan, despite encouragement to retain a balance, momentarily lost control over the review's ideological equilibrium due to Gide's pro-Soviet statements. The character of the NRF reflected the tendency of French liberals to view and approve the Soviet Union at a distance as a land of hope, where a new, socialistic humanism was replacing a feudal serfdom with an egalitarian paradise. It soon became clear, however, as exemplified by Istrati's reportage, that the road to the new Utopia (as it was conceived in the West) would only be constructed at enormous cost to human effort and lives. For a time, such sacrifice and "justifiable" brutality seemed to have been rewarded by the overwhelming achievements obtained. So much so, indeed, that Gide, as one of France's leading humanists, went on to publicize his enthusiasm, and he even declared, admittedly from the safety of France, that he too was willing to sacrifice himself for the cause. The issue then became increasingly inseparable both from the effort at home to unite the Left, with the collusion of the PCF, and from the international antifascist movement.

Gide's journey and subsequent change of heart coincided with the beginning of the purges; thereafter, "Cette grande lueur à l'Est" grew ever dimmer and more sinister. Gide's fellow-travelling (whether it was "revolting hypo_crisy" or "a transferred masochistic fantasy"\(^{334}\)) may have dented the non-partisan reputation of the NRF.
causing a number of cancelled subscriptions. All the same, like Gide, it survived thanks to the in-built defence-mechanism of fellow-travelling. After the disillusion of Soviet reality experienced at first-hand, recuperation was permissible if the "apostacy" was seen to be sincere. The NRF did its utmost to ignore this debate, turning its attention to domestic affairs and the growing likelihood of war. Thus history had forced the NRF to take account of the "new ideologies" in the USSR and Germany. In the case of Nazism, its ideology incorporated a racialist philosophy which inevitably raises the question of anti-Semitism: the nature of the NRF meant that it adopted a questionable if not problematic posture regarding this issue.
CHAPTER SIX

"The NRF, the Jewish question and anti-Semitism, 1925 to 1939"

"On parle d'antisémitisme (...) Gide dit en riant: "Par exemple, je n'aimerais pas me laisser infuser du sang juif". (CPD 2, p. 146, 26/5/31).

"J'ai été élevé dans le goût de la République et des principes démocratiques (...) L'attachement de mon père à la Révolution était fait en partie de la reconnaissance qu'il lui portait parce qu'elle avait émancipé sa race, donné aux juifs les libertés civiles et politiques" (Julien Benda, La Jeunesse d'un Clerc, part I, NRF August 1936, pp. 282, 286).

"Au vrai je ne crois absolument pas à l'influence de la race sur la personnalité intellectuelle et morale d'un individu. C'est le climat, le milieu et l'éducation qui sont tout" (Benjamin Crémieux to Jean Paulhan, AP, 12/4/39).

"Le Juif est un mythe, comme la femme. La question juive ne soulèvera chez nous que des polémiques" (Jacques Chardonne, "Politique", NRF February 1939, p.208).
Anti-Semitism, by its very nature, is complex and protean. It combines different ingredients in varying proportions which have conspired throughout History to create, perpetuate and exploit the Jewish myth. Saul Friedländer illustrates one interpretive methodology in his provision of "trois voies d'accès pour l'étude de l'antisémitisme": the three factors he identifies are the cultural, the social and the psychological.(1) Cultural considerations based upon theological differences form the historical foundations of the Jewish myth: however, Friedländer stresses too that "la permanence du stéréotype négatif du juif exige que l'on élargisse l'explication historique traditionnelle pour y intégrer les données de la sociologie et de la psychologie"(2). More importantly, "d'une manière générale (...), nous assistons à une interaction constante de ces trois facteurs, avec des pressions particulières de l'un ou de l'autre, selon les circonstances"(3). In the case of France, the specific "mix" of these circumstances was such that the greatest explosion of anti-Semitism occurred at the junction of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the Dreyfus affair:

"C'est la France qui, lors de l'affaire Dreyfus, connaîtra la manifestation collective la plus importante (...). On y retrouvera la convergence de tous les thèmes évoqués et l'apparition des tendances sociales et psychologiques..."(4).

However, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that with the election of the Popular Front in 1936 under Léon Blum, factors endemic to France further boosted anti-Semitism; this, for a minority of fanatical pro-Nazi Frenchmen, laid the foundations of the
institutionalized anti-Semitism of Vichy. This is the view held by Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, who take a different perspective from Friedländer when they write:

"It is not enough merely to assert that anti-Jewish feeling grew in the 1930's in France. Closer examination reveals an anti-Semitic idiom somewhat different from that of 1920's, to say nothing of the 1890's and the time of the Dreyfus affair. (....) Anti-Jewish images permeated like a gaseous current beneath the cultural surface, periodically changing (....) then sometimes bursting forth, after having mingled explosively with some economic or social issue"(5).

The proximity of some of the right-wing press to pro-Nazi ideas inevitably led to a contagion with Nazi anti-Semitism; this, combined with domestic social problems and the fear of Bolshevism abroad, implanted the "roots of Vichy Anti-Semitism"(6). Indeed anti-Semitism was very deep-rooted in the history of France and was traditionally associated with a range of issues from left to right, from Catholicism to anti-clericalism and from economic history to literature (7).

It is therefore not surprising that, given its propensity for devoting attention to such issues as Franco-German relations and attitudes to Soviet Russia, the NRF was also influenced by the fluctuating climate of anti-Semitism. The problems which Paulhan confronted as editor were not easily resolved when it is remembered that the NRF sheltered writers both of Jewish origin (such as Benda and Suarès) and those who displayed anti-Jewish sentiments (such as Gide, Léautaud and Jouhandeau). However, an examination both of the nature of the NRF, and of Paulhan's editorial methods, shows that the review managed to avoid any lasting damage to its reputation (8).
Although not mentioned specifically in the exchanges of 1919 between Rivière and Henri Ghéon regarding the Parti de l'Intelligence, the Jews were implicated — along with the Bolsheviks and the Chinese — in anything which threatened Western civilization: "tout le reste est confusion, contradiction, asiatisme", wrote Ghéon(9). In spite of the resistance of the NRF to the Nationalist ideology of the Parti de l'Intelligence, the review still tended towards Gallocentrism and perpetuated the immediate post-war view that, as Pascal Michon has written,

"le Russe, le Juif et le Chinois sont les trois figures de l'anti-occident, de l'anti-civilisation chrétienne, de l'anti-humanisme. Ils représentent au sein même de la culture occidentale ce point aveugle par lequel échappaient la Culture, le Sens et l'Histoire"(10).

Moreover, in the specific case of Germany, Mme Mayrisch, writing in the NRF as "Alain Desportes", saw Jewish influence everywhere and called for extra vigilance from the French: her dangerous allegation that German Jews dominated the cultural sphere there reflects one of the many accepted stereotypes incorporated in the Jewish myth(11).

This received view of Jewish activity illustrates one of the major categories of anti-Semites: "ceux qui sont antisémites par conformisme et adoptent l'opinion qu'ils croient être dominante"(12). It is also the major ingredient which fuelled Gide's more literary anti-Jewish feelings and which led Berl to exclaim: "Je ne peux pas lui pardonner son anti-sémitisme stupide"(13). Berl no doubt attributed this in part to what he saw as the "vieux fond anti-dreyfusard de la NRF"(14). Gide privately expressed anti-Jewish
sentiments on several occasions in his Journal, and Berl refers
to the widely-quoted passage from 1914 on Léon Blum's character
and on Jewish literature(15). In Berl's opinion, Gide saw the
Jewish writer as "quelque chose d'intermédiaire entre Bernstein
et Rothschild"(16). Gide turned a blind eye to the more lasting,
or more inestimable achievements of Durkheim, Lévy-Brühl, Bergson
and Proust. Moreover Gide was plainly distressed by Blum's
ambition: "Un temps viendra, pense-t-il (i.e. Blum) qui sera le
temps du Juif"(17); Gide then went on to vent his anger against
the work of French Jews which, he considered, was not French,
but Jewish:

"Il est absurde, il est dangereux même de nier les
qualités de la littérature juive; mais il importe
de reconnaître que, de nos jours, il y a en France
une littérature juive, qui n'est pas la littérature
française, qui a ses qualités, ses significations, ses
directions particulières (...) etc.(18).

These "directions particulières" were not, or should not, as far as
Gide was concerned, be those of the NRF, and there is no doubt much
truth in the assertion that such thinking - equating Jewish literature
with second-rate, "boulevard" or "Right-Bank" literature - led
to the rejection in late 1912 of Proust's novel from the NRF.
Proust was half-Jewish and was considered a "snob and a literary
amateur" by Gide(19). Even if, by 1921, Gallimard had bought back
Proust's work from Grasset, Gide was still of the opinion that
"en parlant de la souplesse de son style, je pourrais dire que
c'est juif"(20).

Considering Gide's attitude regarding "boulevard" literature,
it is well-worth reflecting that the NRF may well have been much
different had Gide objected to and blocked the choice of Gaston Gallimard as publisher. Indeed Gallimard's influence over affairs in later years was often at variance with Gide's preferences and tastes in what both the review and the publishing-house produced under the NRF imprint. Yet Gallimard's wealth, business acumen and expertise outweighed the prevailing view that "on ne peut prétendre avoir l'esprit NRF et habiter la rive droite. On se doit de vivre sur la rive gauche". It was inevitable that through Gallimard's connections with the Jewish "haute bourgeoisie" (he had been Robert de Flers' secretary, and knew Caillavet and Proust), Jewish authors would be considered and some eventually brought into the early NRF. By 1912 Gallimard had published the work of poet Henri Franck, a cousin of Emmanuel Berl. Jean-Richard Bloch also showed an early interest in the NRF undertaking, and Gallimard accepted his work, offering a long-term contract. Later Gallimard employed Louis-Daniel Hirsch as his commercial director, and appointed Robert Aron as his secretary. Thus Gallimard's welcoming of Jewish authors and staff should be contrasted with Gide's particular (anti-Jewish) literary tastes.

In the field of Franco-German relations too, Gide accepted the received opinion on Jews. He was, for instance, most surprised that Rathenau did not comply with the conventional stereotype. To Gide, Rathenau should have been more like "les Juifs en général" because "(il) avait des antennes pour prévoir tout ce qui allait venir". Admittedly Gide's comments were not (and were not
intended to be) overtly anti-Semitic: but they attest to the nature of prevailing received thinking about Jews.

Despite the "Union sacrée" during the war and the concomitant temporary relapse in the direct anti-Semitism of *L'Action française*, the tendency to view the Russian Revolution as a Jewish conspiracy funded by American Jews became dominant from 1917\(^{(28)}\). Moreover, although Drumont died in 1917 and *La Libre Parole* disappeared for lack of readers in 1924, the publication of the infamous "protocoles des Sages de Sion" seemed momentarily to confirm the conspiracy theory\(^{(29)}\). Despite being proved false, these writings fuelled much anti-Semitic sentiment in the Inter-War period. Yet by 1924, "année de victoire pour le cartel des gauches, (...) la guerre (antijuive) de trente ans prenait fin"\(^{(30)}\). For a time, anti-Semitism seemed to be on the wane, to such an extent that by 1927, following the sensational acquittal of Schwartzbard, the Jewish assassin of the anti-Semitic nationalist Petlioura in 1926, "the French parliament passed a remarkably liberal law on naturalization which later eased the pain of exile for thousands of Jews"\(^{(31)}\).

Meanwhile, a few years earlier at the NRF, Rivière seemed to take a genuine interest in Jewish writing by publishing texts by Albert Cohen\(^{(32)}\) and Jacques de Lacretelle's novel *Silbermann*\(^{(33)}\). In the case of *Silbermann*, however, unfortunately the book only repeated once more some of the typical stereotypes of the Jew. Béatrice Philippe has written:
"Reçu à sa parution comme une œuvre nuancée, écrite par un auteur animé des meilleurs sentiments, d'autant de Lacretelle est lui-même d'origine juive, ce Silbermann véhicule tous les clichés de l'antisémitisme quotidien" (34).

Moreover, Gallimard, who showed remarkable indulgence towards Cohen, enabled the young author to set up a review which would promote Jewish interests: this was the enterprise which became **La Revue juive** (35). Cohen was close to Chaim Weizmann, head of the World organization of Zionists; this body provided a substantial subsidy, a contract was eventually signed with Gallimard's after protracted negotiations, and the first issue appeared on January 15th, 1925 (36). The review bore a remarkable resemblance in aspect and production to the NRF: Hirsch was "gérant", and Gallimard used the same printer, Paillart, in Abbeville. In his opening declaration, Cohen maintained that if the new review was first and foremost "une revue littéraire", it was also an "organe de l'activité et de la reconnaissance d'Israël", and would, therefore, treat the Zionist movement with sympathy (37). The editors were inspired by sincere optimism when they declared:

"(la Revue) estime en effet que c'est par la création d'une résidence nationale que pourra être résolu le problème juif dans le monde entier; et sinon prendre fin, du moins diminuer, l'antisémitisme" (38).

Whatever the reasons behind the demise of **La Revue juive**, its Zionism did not appeal to such as Benjamin Crémieux or Julien Benda, for their names never appeared in its pages.
Among the new reviewing personnel brought into the NRF after the war was Benjamin Crémieux. Under Rivière's editorship, Crémieux submitted no fewer than 142 "notes" (39) from 1920. His particular field of interest by training was Italian literature, but he not only wrote a number of essays on authors such as the Tharaud brothers and Pierre Benoît, he also reviewed much writing by Jewish authors (40). For instance, he warmly praised J-R Bloch's Carnaval est mort (41), and wrote the following of the important compilation by Edmond Fleg, Anthologie juive:

"Tel qu'il est, ce livre est l'instrument de travail et le document "culturel" sur le judaïsme le plus important qui ait paru en France depuis le livre sur L'Antisémitisme de Bernard Lazare" (42).

On occasion, Crémieux also turned his attention to anti-Semitism, although his critiques were controlled and even-handed. In his essay on the Tharaud brothers, who were inveterate anti-Semites (43), he wrote of their view of Judaism in Quand Israel est roi:

"Le judaïsme, sujet entre tous passionnant pour les deux frères, car ils y retrouvent à l'état pur une race, une religion, un idéal, se conservant à travers les massacres et les persécutions séculaires" (44).

Their prose style was of such quality that they deserved a place between "Gide et Larbaud" (45), according to Crémieux; he was even able to excuse the anti-Semitism of their works L'Ombre de la Croix and Royaume de Dieu because "on se sentait en plein roman" (46); yet, in common with Barrès, for example, their
"sympathie passionnée et malveillante pour le judaïsme (...) se mue dans *Quand Israël est Roi* en antisémitisme catégorique et universelle, particulièrement contagieux"(47). Crémieux also found time to criticize Barrès, Maurras and the nationalists in "Bilan d'une enquête"(48).

Yet Crémieux did not hold the monopoly on reviewing Jewish authors; from around 1924, his own reviewing became much broader in scope, a move which tended to play down rather than emphasise his "Jewishness": Crémieux was as fully "assimilated" into the *NRF* as he was in society(49). Other *NRF* personnel treated Jewish literature and writing with particular sympathy. Under Paulhan's editorship, reviewers such as Gabriel Marcel and Félix Bertaux examined the latest works(50). Bertaux, for instance, confronted the Jewish question head-on and used J-R Bloch's *...Et Compagnie* to do so(51). This work, dating from 1917 in its original form, represented more than a novel for Bertaux. He wrote:

"Jean-Richard Bloch est Juif, et c'est le problème juif qu'il a posé avec une extraordinaire lucidité. Nous sommes trop habitués à considérer que l'on naît juif comme on naît blond ou brun, pour faire la différence essentielle et restituer par un effort (...) leur caractère original aux Israélites que nous rencontrons"(52).

In a forthright admission that stereotypes had become all too common, Bertaux went on to contrast these with Bloch's more realistic appraisal:
"Ni le Silbermann de Lacretelle, ni le Bloch de Proust ne nous touchent autrement que comme des types que nous pensions déjà connaître; ils nous donnent seulement la satisfaction de penser que nous avions vu juste.

Tandis que les Simler de "Et Compagnie" donnent la sensation de découverte..."(53).

Bertaux, in generous mood, concluded that the great merit of Bloch's work resided in his ability to

"poser le problème qui fait du bien. C'est comme si l'on ouvrait largement une fenêtre, non pour s'éclairer entre soi, mais pour convier chacun à la lumière"(54).

Bertaux's review reflects the favourable atmosphere of these years when anti-Semitism went into relative decline: at the time of the naturalization law of 1927, Schlumberger praised André Maurois' (pseudonym for Emile Herzog) biography Vie de Disraeli(55).

However, this phase of calm did not last for long. L'Action française, in September 1928, broke the news of a financial scandal which many considered as a new "affaire de Panama en réduction"(56). This was the "affaire Hanau", in which Jewish financiers were directly implicated. As a result, a new, much younger generation of anti-Semites, led by Jean Drault, Jacques Ploncard and Henry Coston, went on to the offensive by launching a revived Libre Parole nationale(57). Yet in spite of encouragement from Drumont's natural heir Léon Daudet, this spasm died down to await the real explosion which would follow the better-known scandal, the Stavisky affair.

Meanwhile the NRF continued to survey a fair proportion of Jewish literature, including in 1930, a novel brutally portraying
the Jewish-Russian world of finance, Irène Némirovski's *David Golder* (58). Decourdemanche called this "un vrai roman", and found it was admirably well-structured (59). Golder's life, he wrote, reflected an "ételre recommencement", and quoted the comment that the book described "l'incompréhensible destin de tout Juif sur la terre" (60). In his account of Albert Cohen's *Solal*, Léon Bopp was more critical (61). He accused this novel of lacking unity in characterization and structure, and compared it to the sub-genre of "Juifs errants" (62). Aside from these reservations, however, Bopp praised the work for its irony, caricature and observation (63).

Yet once again the outlook suddenly became more bleak for the Jewish minority. In the same month as Bopp's review (February 1931), Georges Bernanos gave a lecture on the 25th entitled "Edouard Drumont, ou le clerc qui n'a pas trahi" (64). In this title a swirl of allusions announced a renewed phase of attacks on the Jews and the gradual, inexorable build-up of anti-Semitic feeling which, passing via Maurras and Céline, exploded with the anti-Jewish laws of Vichy in 1940 (65). As Pierrard has written, Bernanos "faisait ainsi d'une pierre deux coups: en exaltant Drumont, il attaquait le Juif Benda, auteur du célèbre ouvrage, *La Trahison des Clercs*" (66). The final product of this and other lectures and articles was *La Grande Peur des bien-pensants*, published by Grasset.

In the *NRF*, this controversial work attracted the surprisingly sympathetic attention of Thibaudet (67). In his essay he preferred
to examine Drumont's work as an example of "le journalisme du combat"; Drumont should be located with those talented right-wing polemicists whose tradition, Thibaudet believed, was much stronger than that of the left (68). This explains how Thibaudet could "admire" La France Juive:

"Cela pour prévenir que le puis admirer La France Juive sans déjeuner d'un rabbin, dîner d'un banquier, ni souper d'un auteur dramatique. Encore aujourd'hui, La France Juive reste un bouquin très fort, fort de style, d'allant, de pectus, où le mouvement du coup de poing prend son temps pour se former, se déclenche et s'abat dans une trajectoire impeccable, un bouquin certes romances apocalyptiquement mais où le romancement s'engrène sur la réalité et produit de l'action, et où le cadre de l'apocalypse s'adapte en effet à une poésie de la race" (69).

Thus Thibaudet could praise such a work for its style, its "panache": he went on to stress that it was only its conjunction with the Dreyfus Affair which "a gangréné l'arbre entier" (70). Yet the book was firmly planted within the French historical tradition, for it was based upon the mythical idea that "la masse du peuple français a été conquise, ou est conquise, ou menace d'être conquise, par une minorité ou par des minorités ou par des minorités ethniques" (71). This tradition had influenced Drumont for he was a "celtiste". By the Third Republic this idea of a cultural or ethnic invasion fuelled "le racisme et le nationalisme terrien de Barrès et de Maurras" (72). Thibaudet highlighted the importance of the mythical nature of French racialist ideas (equally applicable in the context of anti-Semitism) when he wrote:
"Cette idée raciste n'est ni vraie ni fausse, elle est viable. La critique historique ne peut l'attaquer (...) que jusqu'à un certain point (...). Dès qu'elle a été communiquée à un groupe, elle agit, elle est (...)"(73).

Thibaudet saw Drumont's racialism as partly explicable through his experience of the "Semaine sanglante" of 1871, when Paris had been "conquered" by the Provinces. Drumont, although no "communard", "vit aux mains de la République la trace du massacre de 1871"(74): hence the strongly anti-Republican political charge underlying anti-Semitism. This, and the anti-Semitism of the "République des Lettres", conspired to enter "la République tout court"(75), wrote Thibaudet, and he went on to criticize Bernanos for not mentioning what he saw as a key to interpreting Drumont, "le krach de l'Union générale"(76). For Thibaudet this prepared the way for the intense phase of Catholic anti-Semitism, attested as it was by La Libre Parole "et ses milliers d'abonnés des presbytères"(77). As the Third Republic progressed through its various phases in the last twenty years of the 19th Century, so Drumont adapted his polemic, building up to its zenith from 1892, in the "Panama scandal". Yet if "le triomphe de Drumont fut le Panama, son désastre (fut) l'affaire Dreyfus"(78), according to Thibaudet. He identified two Dreyfus Affairs, one being military, the other religious. Drumont's demise was caused by the very success of his campaign in La Libre Parole, in that it led directly to "combisme" and the "Séparation"(79). In conclusion, Thibaudet wrote that Bernanos was the "lecteur-type de Drumont", he rightly stressed that "le lecteur de Drumont (...) a fourni un type de Français qui compte dans la vie politique,
intellectuelle, religieuse, de la Troisième Épublique" (80).

Bernanos, himself a former "camelot du roi", and his resurrection of Drumont inevitably delighted L'Action française, thereby proving that anti-Semitism was deeply ingrained in the Third Republic; its political charge was high and of great value to the Right. However, another form of anti-Semitism was growing in strength in Germany: the increasing awareness of Hitler's anti-Jewish policies led to the creation in France of the "Ligue Internationale contre l'antisémitisme", which later transformed, under Bernard Lecache, into the "Ligue Internationale contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme", or "LICA". French Jews, especially those on the Left, rallied behind Bernard Lecache's movement, and, in February 1932, before the advent to power of Hitler, their monthly newspaper Le Droit de Vivre made its first appearance (81).

Meanwhile the NRF, beginning in May 1932, serialized J-R Bloch's novel Sybilla (82). Jean Grenier found that "c'est à crever de rire", adding "Fantomas est largement dépassé" (83). Of course, Grenier's was a private opinion; but it is worth contrasting it with the article by Denis Saurat in May entitled "Jean-Richard Bloch" (84). Identifying the dominant characteristic of Bloch's work as "l'inquiétude: le sens de la mort" (85), Saurat denied that this was specifically because Bloch was Jewish, and he affirmed:
"Il n'y a pas littérature juive. Les Juifs d'Angleterre sont des écrivains anglais (...). En France, les Juifs sont une province, comme les Provençaux ou les Bretons (...) Bloch (...) est premièrement français"(86).

Saurat saw Bloch's work as a form of what might be called "proto-existentialism", especially in his obsession with death(87). As escape-routes from his "impasse", Bloch's work contained its heroes and its "élus", both firmly wedded to the French side of Bloch's character(88). In the problematic area of "la race", Saurat nearly contradicted himself when he wrote "d'abord, Bloch n'a réussi encore, profondément, que des portraits de Juifs. Son esprit est français; sa manière, son intelligence, ses méthodes, ses idées sont françaises. Son sujet est juif"(89). In spite of his sometimes caricatural representations of Jews, Saurat believed that Bloch "voit dans de sang juif une sorte de tonique, qui injecté sous la peau redonnera de la vigueur au grand corps vieillissant"(90). Saurat concluded that "il n'est personne dans les lettres françaises d'aujourd'hui dont nous puissions attendre davantage"(91), although a cynic might have remarked that Bloch was recognised as a Gallimard house author.

Bloch himself was coming closer to a fellow-travelling position during this period, and he had a regular rubric at Europe in which he commented on a wide range of politico-cultural manifestations. In fact Bloch deeply offended Martin du Gard and Gide in one of his "chroniques" a few months after his novel finished serialization in the NRF. On April 30th 1933, Martin du Gard told Gide to read Bloch's April article (92). His "French" sensibilities had been
severely bruised by what Bloch had written:

"...nous désirons n'avoir plus rien de commun avec les parcs à Lenôtre, les jardins bien ordonnés, l'apologie naïse de l'héritage cartésien, de la mesure et du dépouillement"(93).

Martin du Gard felt so incensed by this "nihilism" that "à certains moments (...) j'ai senti bouillonner en moi je ne sais quel jus hitlérien!"(94). Although Martin de Gard could understand Bloch's arguments, he felt most disturbed by the fact that it had been a Jew who had "(porté) des coups d'iconocaste sur quelque chose de pur et précieux"(95). Bloch had attacked, by inference, not only the "patrimoine national", but also the NRF: "en le suivant, à quoi aboutirions-nous? A la supériorité de Céline sur Valéry?"(96). Gide replied, saying the same thoughts had occurred to him: he advanced the theory that Bloch was displaying such feelings because "il a complètement raté sa Sybilla"(97), and this, for racial reasons:

"Ces qualités d'ordre, de mesure (...) qui, chez lui, n'étaient qu'acquises, sont innées chez nous et ressortissent au plus profond de notre nature"(98).

For Gide, they had entered a "dark age" in which the values they had held so dear were no longer respected; their work, Les Thibault or Les Faux-Monnayeurs belonged to a different category and it would have been absurd for either of them to attempt such an undertaking as Sybilla.

Bloch's view was iconoclastic because for him the old cultural values and political dilatoriness of the victorious European nations had led to Hitler's rise to power in Germany:
if he called for a tabula rasa it was because the Nazis were showing their true colours. At the time of the exchange of letters between Gide and Martin du Gard, Le Droit de Vivre warned that 700,000 Jews were now under threat from the Nazi regime, and that the Jewish question was now a central issue not only in Franco-German relations, but in antifascism (99). Indeed Malraux, familiar with German-Jewish circles through his marriage to Clara Goldschmidt, rallied to the Jewish antifascist cause later that year, when he responded to a survey in Lecache's newspaper (100). Here Malraux noted that "l'antisémitisme en France est toujours une idée subordonnée" (101): by this he meant that anti-Jewish feeling could always be marshalled by Nationalist propaganda for ulterior motives (102). This may have been the case in France until the advent of Hitler, but anti-Semitic racialism per se was an integral part of Nazi policies; it was not long before such policies found favour among the small minority of genuine, racialist, pro-Nazi Frenchmen (103). Moreover, Malraux, like Barbusse in his reply, interpreted the Jewish problem as a political one requiring a socialist solution: "l'idée de race, en Europe, en 1933, ne peut signifier autre chose que l'oppression des minorités" (104). In combatting anti-Semitism (or fascism), the Jews must unite with one of the only two forces which opposed the racialists: "la démocratie ou le prolétariat"; above all, they should not believe that they could remain "au dessus des partis" (105). Malraux's support for the Jewish cause was evidently highly appreciated by "LICA" during 1933 and 1934, as attested by the
prominence given to reports of his speeches; by this time, Malraux was generally considered as a front-line NRF author.

One of those most responsible for formulating specifically racialist theories was Gobineau. He systematized the confused thinking on race which had proceeded him by dividing the Eurasian peoples into Aryan and Semitic, thereby heralding biological racialism. As Poliakov puts it, by the end of the 19th Century the Aryan myth "had achieved pride of place among men of learning". On February 1st, 1934, exactly a year after Hitler's coming to power, the NRF devoted almost all of its space to "Gobineau et le gobinisme". It is hardly necessary to point out that this issue coincided with what many believed was a genuine fascist "coup" on the 6th of that month: indeed, some, such as André Wurmser never forgave Paulhan for publishing this "tribute". Paulhan's correspondence shows that he had been preparing this issue since at least March 1933. Among the contributions from non-NRF writers were essays by Robert Dreyfus, Abel Bonnard, Bernard Fay, Daniel Halévy, Ernest Seillière and Heinrich von Keyserling. Paulhan cannot have been unaware of the potential damage the Gobineau special number might do, for apparently Paul Bourget, invited via Halévy to contribute, did not wish to do so, because "le racisme allemand le gène, et il ne s'en cache pas. Je ne doute pas que ce ne soit la raison de son silence vis-à-vis de vous".

Not all the contributions praised "le gobinisme", however. Etiemble, writing as Jean Louverné, submitted a sharp
critique and alleged that had Hitler not resorted to the Aryan myth, Gobineau's work would still be languishing "sous la poussière des bibliothèques" (114). For Etiemble, "le fascisme a lancé cet avocat prétendu de Goering" (115). Paulhan personally found that this was an exaggeration, but he did not alter the wording (116). According to Etiemble, modern ethnography was beginning to show how fraudulent Gobineau's ideas were: "la naissance relativement récente de la civilisation aryenne forçait Gobineau à rajeunir la vieille Chine" (117). Heinrich von Keyserling examined Gobineau's influence in Germany via H.S. Chamberlain, and admitted to two errors:

"J'ai eu tort, les faits le prouvent bien; Chamberlain a certainement été l'inspirateur principal de l'Allemagne qui a tenu durant la grande guerre. J'ai eu tort une seconde fois, lorsque j'ai ri, en entendant Chamberlain désigner, dès 1923, Adolf Hitler comme le prophète de l'Allemagne à venir" (118).

The most inflammatory essay, however, and the one most likely to have caused the indignation of Jewish antifascists such as André Wurmser, was Clément Serpeille de Gobineau's "le Gobinisme et la Politique moderne" (119). Here Serpeille de Gobineau demonstrated quite clearly that "gobinisme" was the direct inspiration for Nazi racialism. Summarizing Aryan "superiority" he wrote: "parmi les blancs, l'Aryan seul est doué de l'esprit social, est apte à gouverner socialement" (120). This social superiority was fundamental to National-Socialism:
"C'est pour retrouver son unité sociale que l'Allemagne hitlérienne s'est cru obligée d'éliminer les Juifs qui, servis par le régime libéral, avaient mis en œuvre toutes leurs qualités individuelles et leurs attirances raciales pour se tailler dans l'activité intellectuelle, économique et politique de l'Allemagne social-démocrate la part du lion" (121).

The author went on to contrast the superior organizing abilities of an "Aryan" nation like England, and its colonial empire, with Spain, which, he alleged, was so racially-debased that it was socially chaotic. Serpeille de Gobineau concluded that in Italy (another Latin, equally "mixed" nation) "Renaissance heroes" were working to forge a new society. For him, the fact that Mussolini's Italy was fascist was paramount:

"L'Italie moderne a senti et vu les rapprochements certains que l'on peut faire entre les idées de Gobineau et les idées sur lesquelles s'appuient les mouvements politiques actuels" (122).

If further proof were needed as to how "gobinisme" had fuelled Hitler's racialism, the impressive bibliography provided it, including a section devoted to "le Mouvement de polémique sur Gobineau et le racisme à l'avènement de Hitler" (123).

The NRF's special treatment of Gobineau appeared at a particularly crucial historical conjuncture: the Stavisky scandal (which seemed to support so conveniently the extreme right-wing equation of Radical Republicanism = Freemasonry = Jews) and the ensuing political confusion, violence and reaction, all conspired to make anti-Semitism a dominant issue. Indeed, the NRF's reactions to the events of February, particularly those
of Crémieux, became the object and cause of a bitter exchange of views within the NRF in subsequent months (124). Crémieux opened his April "chronique" with the following sentences:

"Un mois après les journées de février, on constate que tous les partis, loin d'avoir précisé, éclairé leur positions, atteignent au comble de la confusion. A l'extrême-droite, L'Action française, consciente de sa faiblesse, ajourne à 1950 le retour du roi et anathématis la guerre civile" (125).

The next month Crémieux pointed out that Charles Maurras, in L'Action française for April 10th, had taken exception to these remarks (126). Crémieux had intended quite simply to state that the February riots had demonstrated the political weakness and ineffectuality of L'Action française, that they had not even "mis en branle le mouvement qui a abouti au 6 février" (127).

Yet there was another reason for writing this letter: Maurras had singled out Crémieux as "un autre rédacteur de la NRF, un Juif celui-là" (128). Deeply offended, Crémieux wished to know whether "M. Maurras entend par là que je suis Français de seconde zone, un Français moins Français que lui, moins libre que lui d'avoir et d'exprimer des vues politiques" (129). Crémieux went on to dismiss those negative connotations of the accusation - he was not a capitalist, he had served in the war, he was not on the Left politically, nor was he a "métèque". Neither could be imagine that Maurras was accusing him of "deicide". The only alternative was that Crémieux might be a partisan of Zionism, yet he rejected that too, seeing Zionism objectively, merely as a logical consequence of anti-Semitism. Clarification was necessary:
"Alors, pourquoi "un Juif, celui-là?" Serait-ce parce que je suis de sang juif? Par simple racisme? J'aimerais beaucoup à être fixé sur ce point" (130)

A letter from Maurras arrived too late for June's issue, so the debate continued in the July number, including Crémieux's own riposte to Maurras (131). Here Maurras corrected what he believed to be inaccuracies in Crémieux's representation of Action Française ideas, and proceeded to answer the specific question of having singled out Crémieux's Jewish background. For Maurras, referring to Bernard Lazare, the Jewish tradition was dangerous, and therefore unassimilable, due to "la présence de certains éléments conservateurs et destructeurs" (132). The root of the problem, he felt, was traceable to the 1789 Revolution and subsequent Republicanism in France; democracy was too uniform to permit progress. Yet under "la royauté héréditaire" (133), Maurras could easily conceive of a "Jewish province" in France, so long as it could be controlled by statute. However, Maurras did not believe that French Jews were, or could ever be, assimilable. This, he felt, was due to the "nouvelle vague juive, un nouvel arrivage de sang juif (...) venus de l'est ou du midi comme en 1815, en 1870" (134).

A principal symptom of this later "influx" was provided by the action of Isaac-Moise-Adolphe Crémieux, who, wondered Maurras, might be related to Benjamin Crémieux. Maurras was referring to the Crémieux law of 1870 whereby French citizenship was conferred upon Algerian Jews. Maurras implied that such action was treasonable, and against the national interest "sept semaines après Sedan":
he wrote:

"ce juif nîmois sans doute assimilé depuis des siècles et porté au gouvernement par notre égalitarisme naïf, pouvait songer à tout autre chose que le service de la patrie en danger; il songeait à se retourner vers ses bons frères enburnous!"(135).

The leader of L'Action française drew a direct parallel between this event and the fact that at the time of writing, "la croix gammée fait (...) de redoutables conquêtes dans l'Afrique du Nord"(136). Once again, referring to the period since 1790, Maurras blamed the Republican régime for all the ills visited upon France, particularly by the Jews: "Israël n'a été si puissant sur la France que parce que la France souffrait des maladies du régime électif"(137).

Crémieux, in his reply, could see little to separate Maurras' attitudes to the Jews from those current in Nazi Germany:

"S'il ne dépendait que de M. Maurras, les Juifs seraient en France, comme en Allemagne nazi, soumis à un statut spécial qui en ferait effectivement des Français de seconde zone"(138).

Moreover, Crémieux indicated perceptively that since the imposition of anti-Semitic policies in Germany, Maurras had suddenly stopped alluding to "l'alliance judéo-allemande", nor did he mention that the Nazis accused Jews of rationalism, nor did he acknowledge the existence of a Jewish peasantry or proletariat(139). Again, Crémieux showed that Maurras' doctrine equated the Jewish tradition with a "Jewishness" which was completely innate, therefore inescapable. Such racialist determination bore very close resemblances
to Nazism (140). Turning his attention to the example of the
naturalization law of 1870, Crémieux corrected Maurras
demonstrating that Adolphe Crémieux (his distant cousin) had
only put the finishing touches to a "senatus-consulte de 1865" (141).
Maurras, as soon as political passions took over, destroyed the
all-embracing nature of his argument when confronted with the
hypothetical case of the assimilated Jew who was an Action française
supporter (142); such Jews had to be "immédiatement promu au grade
de "Juif bien-né\"" (143). Thus Crémieux laid bare Maurras' real
target:

"Le libéralisme français assimilateur, l'égalitarisme,
voilà au vrai l'ennemi pour M. Maurras et non pas
le Juif..." (144).

In conclusion, even Crémieux was forced to admit that assimilation
could not provide the complete solution to the Jewish question,
but it remained the best and only solution for the time being.
Anti-Semitism was an obstacle to assimilation, and that was why
Crémieux was determined to highlight "l'inanité de l'argumentation
antisémite, fût-elle signée Maurras" (145). In a final, further
point, Crémieux drew attention, in a footnote, to the important
problem of immigration: at the time of his writing, the influx
of Jews into France from Hitler's Germany was gradually increasing,
but France was by no means the only destination; many times more
than the proportion who settled in France found their way to
the United States (146). As the 1930's progressed, however, the
question of immigration became ever-more problematic and, by
1939, such "establishment" Jews as Berl were calling for a
complete halt to the influx\textsuperscript{(147)}. Even Crémieux in 1934 sounded a cautionary note regarding immigrants, calling for a numerus clausus\textsuperscript{(148)}. In this way, although Crémieux himself favoured assimilation as an approach, he could understand that some Jews would prefer the Zionist solution to being treated as "citoyens de seconde zone"\textsuperscript{(149)}. For the first time, the question of anti-Semitism had received treatment in the pages of the NRF.

In common with moves towards the united political front supported by moderate- and left- intellectuals, "LICA" successfully incorporated the Jewish question into antifascism. Malraux, for example, repeated his pro-Jewish pronouncements in May 1934, alongside Lecache, Jean Longuet, Georges Izard (from Esprit) and Léon Pierre-Quint\textsuperscript{(150)}. Moreover, the upsurge in the activity of the "ligues" after the 6th February became more menacing, and, although actual attacks on Jewish persons and property did not begin in earnest until late 1935, it was becoming clear that the "ligues" had adopted anti-Semitism and were placing it in the foreground as an issue, mimicking Nazi thuggery in Germany\textsuperscript{(151)}. Maurras was proved right in the case of North Africa: anti-Jewish riots in Constantine, Algeria, left 25 Jews dead\textsuperscript{(152)}.

In the December issue of Le Droit de Vivre, reference was made to Suarès' latest text in the NRF\textsuperscript{(153)};

"André Suarès vient, dans le dernier numéro de la NRF, de résumer, avec une magnifique partialité, ce que des millions d'hommes n'osent pas publiquement penser"\textsuperscript{(154)}. 
Quoting from the last page of this extract, *Le Droit de Vivre* urged its readers to admit that "la race est de la bête. Le choix est de l'individu et de sa vertu libre"(155). For Suarès, anything German was indeed barbaric and "de la bête"(156). However, *Droit de Vivre* did not quote from the next paragraph, in which Suarès berated Israel:

"La grande misère d'Israël est d'avoir tourné le sentiment de la justice en raison universelle. Et, par une erreur inverse, d'avoir cru que le savoir et le juste sont fonction l'un de l'autre"(157).

Suarès, himself partly Jewish, disliked Jewish "racism" or Nationalism as much as any other, for he believed all racial distinctions were below his own highly aristocratic conception of Humanism. Suarès balanced his hatred of the barbaric with an extreme distaste for what he called the "specifically" Jewish(158). He further qualified this hatred:

"Je l'ai déjà dit: je suis contre les Juifs s'ils font bande à part et s'ils ne sont pas incorporés, âme et chair, honneur et intérêt, à la nation où prétendent vivre (...)(159).

Again, Suarès counterbalanced this by writing: "Je suis pour les Israélites contre ceux qui les souillent, tous ensemble, de leur haine, de leurs injures, et de leurs calomnies"(160). These remarks help explain Suarès' own ambivalent attitude towards "Israel" in the NRF:

"Israël est alors un esprit qui, forcé dans sa mission par les sévices, la persécution et les injures, s'est incarné à la terre et s'est voué par là tantôt à tous les excès du sentiment propre, tantôt à se méconnaître lui-même"(161).
Suáres placed Nazism at the apex of a hierarchy of extremisms: in the case of Jews his antipathy was more redolent of anti-Zionism than of outright racist anti-Semitism. Thus Le Droit de Vivre could only publicise their admiration for Suáres by omitting his more unflattering comments on Israel. Suáres laid himself open to attack from all sides, a fact which endeared him to Paulhan(162). Indeed, Paulhan explained to Jouhandeau that he believed Suáres and the NRF were entirely compatible in expressing "toutes les exagérations"(163), even if it led to Schlumberger's anger (164) or to cancelled subscriptions (165).

As for Julien Benda, evidence exists in the NRF to uphold the view of Pierre Chambat, who writes: "la menace de l'antisémitisme est présente dans la pensée de Benda" (166), yet it should always be remembered that Benda, like Crémieux and Suáres, rejected Zionism as a solution to the Jewish question (167). Benda had experienced the anti-Semitism of the literary world when his book L'Ordination was denied the Goncourt prize in 1912 because he was a Jew (168); moreover, "la virulence de L'Action française ne se déchaîne qu'avec La Trahison des Clercs; elle s'épanouit vers le fin des années trente dans des appels à des opérations de basse police..."(169). Although he subordinated his Jewishness to his self-appointed rôle of "clerc" (170), "Benda ranime sa judéité devant l'antisémitisme envahissant" (171).

Due principally to his attitude to war, Benda was often cast in the stereotype rôle of "Jew as warmonger". Maurras' "appels au meurtre" were no less repulsive regarding Benda than
they would be for Blum, and the polemic between them following the publication of *La Trahison des Clercs* provided Maurras with numerous opportunities to vent his anti-Semitism (172). By mid-1935, Benda did indeed draw attention to his Jewishness, but took care to deflect criticism that he was acting out of (Jewish) self-interest (173). Moreover, in October that year, Thibaudet also drew attention to Benda's "Jewish nature" in his "Réflexion", in a discussion centred on Benda's book *Délice d'Eleuthère* (174). Taking exception to Benda's insistence (as "Eleuthère") that "il n'y a pas de vérité juive, il y a la vérité, la vérité du philosophe dans ses concepts"(175), Thibaudet applied his own theory (derived from Taine) that:

"Eleuthère ne perdrait-il pas les trois quarts de son intérêt si l'on ne l'expliquait pas par son peuple, si on ne voyait pas son peuple, ou plutôt le sacerdoce de son peuple (...) à travers lui?"(176).

Benda felt he needed to answer this judgement, especially as it had been formulated in a provocative, nationalistic context of "la passion terrienne"(177). Benda replied that his forthcoming *Mémoires* would assist Thibaudet in any clarification he required regarding his background, and emphasised that his family had raised him in an atmosphere where the values were "purement spirituelles", and which, "en tant que juive, (...) ne m'a jamais parlé de la terre et de l'amour qu'elle peut inspirer"(178). Benda insisted that not only his "lycée" education, but also his own vocation had inculcated in him "le culte de l'esprit pur"(179). Turning specifically to "le facteur juif", Benda pointed to the inconsistencies of Thibaudet's ascribing his moralism to his Jewish origin:
"Peuple sans terre, répondrai-je, mais non sans comptes de banque et, en tant que tel, peu bloqué dans l'Esprit. Ajoutez sa croyance à une vérité juive; (...) sa prétention depuis quelque temps de ranimer l'âme spécifiquement juive, l'âme de la "race élue". Ma religion de l'esprit pur a autant consisté à me nourrir d'un certain sémitisme qu'à me libérer d'un autre, à rompre, comme mon maître, avec la synagogue." (180).

The possibility of any debate on this matter between Benda and Thibaudet was precluded by the latter's death a few weeks later; yet Benda's Mémoires would appear in the NRF that year, and would contribute to the worst outburst of anti-Semitism from an author within the NRF.

The prospect of a Popular Front government was becoming more likely during these months, and there were already clear signs that a government headed by Léon Blum would unleash a ferocious wave of anti-Semitism. The hatred of the Right for Blum reached such a level that he was physically attacked by Action française supporters and "ligueurs": this act led directly to the dissolution of the "Ligue d'Action française", extended to all the "fascist" "ligues" in June 1936, after the election victory (181). On May 3rd, in spite of the anti-Semitic campaign in the extreme right-wing press (including incitements to murder), the Popular Front was elected, and a month later Blum formed his government (182).

Gide was genuinely sympathetic to the Popular Front, but Henri Massis lost no time in placing him in a highly embarrassing position. Evidently Massis had sent Gide an advance copy of his forthcoming "Lectures" rubric in La Revue universelle dated June 1st, for, on May 27th, "la Petite Dame" noted Gide's consternation (183).
Massis, having read Gide's Journal in the *Oeuvres complètes* (184), had discovered the well-known passage concerning Léon Blum and Gide's view of "Jewish" literature (185). Massis hardly concealed his delight in being able to quote Gide - an eminent fellow-traveller - and his effectively anti-Semitic sentiments of 1914, in order to discredit Léon Blum. Massis pointed to the relevance of his discovery by describing the designated personnel in the Popular Front government:

"Ce personnel ne sort pas de la classe ouvrière (...). Il se compose de fonctionnaires, de "bourgeois socialisants": intellectuels, universitaires, médecins, avocats, qui appartiennent aux professions libérales où sont nombreux ces Juifs embourgeoisés, dont M. Léon Blum est le type représentatif ..." (186).

Massis then quoted the passage in which there was an implication that Blum would one day fulfil his ambition to "établir sa supériorité dans tous les ordres..." (187). Massis extended Gide's character sketch of the individual Blum to encompass "Israel" in general:

"Israël aspire au rôle d'arbitre souverain, de contrôleur de tous les autres éléments du pays, qu'il s'agisse d'art, de littérature ou de politique" (188).

Furthermore, Massis used Gide's comments on "une littérature juive qui n'est pas la littérature française" (189), to illustrate that in fact, the Jews were, in the long run, unassimilable. Referring specifically to Gide's sentence in which he implied that he preferred silence to Jewish domination (190), Massis commented: "Cela peut de même s'entendre en bien d'autres
sortes de choses", meaning that extra vigilance and opposition would be required now that "c'est de notre existence nationale qu'il s'agit". Gide probably noticed the irony that for once Massis had not distorted a single word of what he had written; through simply applying Gide's Jewish stereotype of Blum the writer to Blum the politician, Massis had made Gide attack his political ally on the grounds of anti-Semitism.

The arrival of the Popular Front government in France lent support to the views of some anti-Semites that the Jews were in the process of taking complete control of the country, and of French interests. Marc Bloch, the historian, noted this in his work L'Etrange Défaite:

"On ne saurait exagérer l'émoi que, dans les rangs des classes aisées, même parmi les hommes en apparence les plus libres d'esprit, provoqua l'avènement du Front populaire. Quiconque avait quatre sous crut sentir passer le vent du désastre".

Moreover, the adoption of a political anti-Semitism has been noted by Marrus and Paxton:

"Anti-Semitism was plainly an important focus for opposition to Blum's Popular Front government. Those years re-shaped anti-Jewish sensibility into a political, economic, and social world view, giving it a combative edge, the cri de coeur of an opposition movement attempting to defend France against revolutionary change".

At the NRF, Paulhan arranged to have Benda's first volume of Mémoires serialized in the NRF, beginning in August 1936. Meanwhile, the anti-Jewish animosity of the exclusively NRF author Marcel Jouhandeau reached such a level that in early autumn, he was pressurizing Paulhan to publish, in the NRF,
an article which attacked Jewish influence in general, and
Benda, in particular. Paulhan refused, feeling that if he
included Jouhandeau's piece he would betray Benda:

"tu est libre de dire dans la NRF tout ce qu'il te plaît d'y dire. Pourtant, si je donnais ta lettre, n'est-ce pas moi à qui tu ferais jouer le rôle pénible? N'aurai-je pas l'air d'avoir attiré Benda dans un guet-apens, en lui laissant d'abord publier ces pages pour ensuite (si juste que puisse être ton sentiment) l'accabler? Veux-tu y songer encore"(196).

Clearly Jouhandeau had taken exception to passages in Benda's
serial, but editorially it was not possible to attack an NRF-
author towards whom Paulhan had shown much support: Jouhandeau
took his article instead to L'Action française, and "Comment je suis devenu antisémite" appeared there on October 8th (197).
Jouhandeau insisted that he had only become anti-Semitic through "patriotism" alone, not for reasons of personal rancour. He
began with an anecdote concerning Maurice Sachs' alleged disgraceful
behaviour at a reception and his scorn of France and French
history (198). Dismissing Sachs as a nonentity, Jouhandeau then
turned to Benda, supporting his assertions with references to the
serialized Jeunesse d'un Clerc (199). For example, Jouhandeau
took particular exception to Benda's tribute to his family and
their "milieu": Benda had written -

"Je vois une succession de juifs intelligents, travailleurs ironiques, amis de la science pendant que presque tout autour d'eux croupit encore dans les superstitions, agents de libération humaine, sur qui s'appuient tous les partis de progrès. En vérité, je suis honteux de m'y prendre si tard pour me sentir fier de descendre d'une telle élite, comprendre tout ce que je lui dois"(200).
Jouhandeau, a passionate Catholic, was outraged by this "free-thinking" attitude, the more so given its author was Jewish (201). Benda also denied that his father's (and his own) sense of patriotism had included any "élément instinctif, charnel, irrationnel" (202). Jouhandeau insisted that Benda, by denying this emotional attachment to France, simply could not be patriotic, and in his commentary on the text, Jouhandeau showed that his target was as much the French Revolution (and subsequent Republicanism) as the Jews, for the Revolution had emancipated the Jews (203). It was Republicanism which had "opened all the doors" to Jews and which had encouraged Jewish pride and ambition in obtaining "les premières places" (204).

In addition to this "oppression" as Jouhandeau saw it, he alleged that the Jews now had the temerity to "hate the French": Jouhandeau wrote -

"Où M. Benda se démasque un peu plus (•••) .
devient tout d'un coup
intolérable, c'est après nous avoir confié
son culte pour les valeurs posées dans
l'éternel", quand il nous exprime "sa haine
de ceux qui ne les saluent que dans l'historique" (205).

Jouhandeau could hardly contain his rage, exclaiming:

"Vous entendez? Rien que cela, sa haine, la haine
de ce petit clown sémite, et vous savez à qui elle
va, cette haine? A vous, à moi, à nous qui avons des
traditions..." (206).

He was also convinced that since the advent of Blum to power ("Blum est le vrai successeur de Louis XVI" (207)), Jews occupied all the primary places in French society: with one blow, Jouhandeau hoped he could vilify both the Republic and the Popular Front.
It was to this extent that he clearly demonstrated the political, or ideological, force of anti-Semitism. In conclusion, Jouhandeau signalled how close he was to Nazi anti-Semitism by affirming that if French Jews decided to leave for Palestine, he would willingly escort them personally; yet should even one remain, he would not be content until that single Jew were subject to a special statute (208). Much later, when discussing Le Péril Juif with Jacques Danon, Jouhandeau confirmed that:

"Les Juifs s'étaient emparé du pouvoir en France, ils conduisaient la France à l'échec que nous avons connu et qu'ils ont partagé. Le livre était donc essentiellement une critique du gouvernement de l'époque. Le Juifs vraiment intelligents ne m'en veulent pas de mon attitude (sic)"(209).

In 1936, however, it was difficult to ignore the fact that Jouhandeau was anti-Semitic per se, in addition to his extreme anti-Republicanism.

Paulhan reported to Jouhandeau that Benda had not read the article in L'Action française, but that Alix Guillain had begun to do so and Benda had left the room: moreover, he added, "Benda est (...) pris à partie par les Juifs, qui lui reprochent de les trahir"(210). Later, Paulhan gently admonished Jouhandeau for citing three names (one of whom was not Jewish) and for generalizing when he was referring to specific examples (211). Reactions to the article were varied: Grenier, never an ally of Benda, thought it "très modéré concernant J.B."(212), while Le Droit de Vivre likened Jouhandeau to Julius Streicher (213). Although Paulhan attempted to give Jouhandeau as much support as he could as editor and as a friend, he admitted to Suarès that
he was distressed by this public expression of anti-Semitism:

"Qu'auriez-vous pensé de la (...) violence antisémite de Jouhandeau? (...) Je la connaissais depuis près de deux ans. Pourtant son expression m'a étonné et peine") (214).

By mid-November, it became clear that Jouhandeau wanted to return to the offensive: "il se croit une mission", Paulhan told Suarès (215). This time, however, no newspaper would accept his article, not even L'Action française or Je suis partout (216).

Benda waited until December 1936 to comment on the various criticisms levelled at Jeunesse d'un Clerc, in particular those Jewish objections to the way he had distinguished French Jews from other Frenchmen (217). Although willing to admit that many French Jews did have an emotional bond to France, he insisted he did not feel this due to his vocation as a "clerc". The most frequent criticism, however, was that Benda's distinction provided anti-Semites with a further weapon: but again Benda insisted that "mon propre est d'écrire ce que je crois vrai, sans m'inquiéter des conséquences. En quoi je suis clerc et non spécialement juif" (218).

Meanwhile Jouhandeau continued to attempt to have more articles published, indeed, well into the first half of 1937: he met with little success (219). The second text eventually published in Le Péril Juif could well have been one such article; it included remarks made to Marcel Ayme on Jewish "predominance" in the Gallimard publishing house (220). Yet again in June, L'Action française rejected a Jouhandeau article, already refused
by Paulhan (221). These refusals were probably partly the reason for publishing *Le Péril Juif* (222). Later, once the true extent of the Nazi repression of Jews was beginning to be realized, Paulhan told Suarès that Jouhandeau "a cessé d'être antisémite" (223). Whatever his motivations had been in these outbursts, it is clear that Jouhandeau borrowed them in large part from the familiar catalogue; an extreme dislike of the Third Republic, exacerbated by the crisis of the 1930's and fuelled by Maurrassian "doctrine"; a nostalgia for the "ancien régime"; and a deeply entrenched Catholicism whose body - the Church - had been irreparably handicapped by the Radical Republic. Also, his visceral dislike of Communism was compensated by an admiration for the "virility" of the Nazi régime in Germany which led Jouhandeau close to collaboration. A recent attempt to clear Jouhandeau was firmly quashed, proving that the controversy surrounding the adoption of anti-Semitic positions outlasts their context (224).

On June 21st 1937, Blum resigned and Chautemps formed a new cabinet. Although a short-lived attempt would be made to revive this political "experiment" in March 1938, many saw the Popular Front as dying a long, lingering death (225). Also, many anti-Semites believed, like Jouhandeau, that the Jewish-led Popular Front had indeed wrought ruin upon France, which now seemed dominated by or at the mercy of every other European power. In the *NRF* for August 1937, Paulhan placed the first part of *Un Régulier dans le Siècle*, the second volume of Benda's *Mémoires* (226). The August number contained Benda's recollections
of his intellectual itinerary during the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair. Contrary to many "dreyfusistes" Benda believed that the political consequences of the Affair were equally if not more important than the judicial case itself. Too many "dreyfusistes", averred Benda, had deserted the Republican cause and its campaign against the Army and the Church. Benda went so far as saying:

"La vérité est que ces hommes, qui avaient sans doute été dreyfusistes dans la sincérité de leur coeur, ont très vite compris combien ce passé les gênerait (...) On peut dire que leur ancien dreyfusisme aura empoisonné la vie de tels de mes contemporains" (227).

This thinking underlay Benda's wish that "il existât comme une affaire Dreyfus en permanence, qui permet de toujours reconnaître ceux qui sont de notre race morale..." (228). The implications of Benda's view for the stability of France were evidently quite serious, and the expression of these attitudes did much to perpetuate the right-wing view that Benda, as a Jew, was indeed a belligerent subversive. Anticipating the very question "Que faites-vous de l'intérêt de la France", Benda replied:

"Je réponds que l'intérêt de la France m'est fort peu de chose auprès de la netteté en matière morale, et que cette préférence est une définition de ma forme d'esprit" (229).

Moreover, Benda affirmed that the 1930's had served him well in this desire (230); moreover, he categorised the First World War as "une réplique à l'affaire Dreyfus" (231).

Once again, L'Action française and its supporters immediately profited from these latest controversial statements: Maurras
reproduced extracts on August 9th, and the NRF printed a "Lettre" dated 11th August signed "A.V." as a "document" to accompany the December instalment (232). "A.V." characterised Benda as an "esprit démoniaque de dissolution" typical of "80% des Juifs en général, et 95% de l'Intelligenzia israélite" (233). These were anti-Semitic, anti-Republican views:

"...les faux semblants, le camouflage intellectuel et politique, grâce auxquels les dirigeants Judéo-Jacobins (sic) de France out réussi, depuis plus de cinquante ans à manœuvrer l'opinion de nombreux "bien-pensants", catholiques pour la plupart, ont permis un renouveau de l'activité révolutionnaire en France, menaçant de s'étendre au-delà des frontières de ce pays" (234).

"A.V." extended the Dreyfus Affair back to 1789 and warned that the fatal equation of forces "Judaïsme - Jacobinisme - Marxisme n'acceptera jamais sa défaite sans combat final..." (235). This correspondent concluded by thanking Benda for having awakened him to the true dangers confronting France. It was not Benda, however, who replied, but Drieu, who, in a curious, long text, attacked "A.V." for his Maurrassianism and his cowardly bad faith for not being willing to die for France on French soil (236).

The last part of Benda's Un Régulier dans le Siècle, was an untypically emotional summing-up of why he thought he had been a "bon clerc" (237). Here he also explained his aversion for and distrust of the ruling bourgeoisie, for their betrayal of democratic values, and how their betrayal had brought him close to Communism (238). Both Paulhan and Grenier were impressed by this last part for, after all, they could admire Benda's consistency and intellectual
rigour in the face of hypocrisy and constant vilification from the Right: Benda sacrificed his personality (Jewish or not) to Reason (239).

The literary event of the New Year period 1937–38 was the publication in December 1937 of Céline's Bagatelles pour un massacre (240). Céline's unrelieved stream of vituperation against the Jews was such that critical opinion varied enormously, both in regard to classifying the book, and in how to react to it (241). The Jewish perspective was quite clear, however: in Le Droit de Vivre Philippe Lamour was convinced that Céline had produced "un mélange du plus mauvais Gohier et du pire Julius Streicher" (242). "Non, ce n'est pas un pastiche", he exclaimed, and accused Céline of directly serving Hitler (243). As for Marcel Arland, writing in the NRF, he labelled the book a "pamphlet", but also saw it as a prolongation of Voyage au bout de la nuit (244). Arland believed Céline saw the Jews as the principal actors in the Apocalypse, but, after quoting an extract on the physical appearance of Jews, Arland wrote: "Cette virulence laisse loin derrière elle toutes les attaques antisémites" (245). Moreover, he also found the book's eloquence and lyricism highly arresting. To Arland, Bagatelles pour un massacre was everything except an anti-Semitic diatribe.

Undeniably all the anti-Semitic themes are present in Bagatelles..., themes both from the 1930's and from the turn of the century (246). Indeed, the reader is left with the impression that Céline - or Ferdinand - is the only non-Jew in creation.
Yet throughout this work - beginning with the very first page - Céline also makes numerous references to Gide and other contemporary writers, or "les raffinés"(247). Gide, and, by extension (or contamination) the NRF, were "enjuives", and on several occasions Céline passes remarks which make Bagatelles... as much an attack upon the established (therefore, for Céline, Jewish) literary world of Paris as upon anything else(248). Céline evidently abhorred the left-bank "raffinés" (ironically, as much as Berl), and delighted in incorporating them into his assault(249). The constant presence of Benda at the NRF would only reinforce Célines' view(250). Moreover, it suited Céline's temperament to liken homosexuality and Jewishness; he only had to look again to the NRF(251). The idea that Jews dominated the cultural scene was nothing new: Morand had already viciously satirized the (Jewish) film industry(252), and Eugene Weber notes that Jean Zay, the Popular Front education minister, rejected one of Céline's ballet projects for the 1937 exhibition(253). This partly explains the relevance of the "ballets" framing the book.

On March 11th, 1936, "La Petite Dame" noted that Gide had just finished "le dernier livre de Céline"(254). She reported Gide's feeling that

"Il n'est d'aucune portée quant à la question juive et qu'il ne le trouve pas moins fort intéressant comme document révélateur sur un cas morbide, et que certains pages sont d'une étonnante réussite"(255).

The next day, as Hitler swept into Austria, and as France languished without a government, Gide, Herbart and Martin du Gard discussed
the Jewish question, which, Gide now considered, was paramount. Gide's reading of Céline had inspired him: on the 15th he had finished an essay which then appeared in the April number of the NRF. The essay, significantly and deliberately divided into two parts, reflected his impression on finishing the book. The first part dealt with the work itself: Gide wrote that by including "Cézanne, Picasso, Maupassant, Racine"... etc in his catalogue of Jews, Céline was evidently joking: "Il fait son mieux pour qu'on ne le prenne pas au sérieux". Coming after Arland's review, Gide's opinion reinforced the view that "la NRF (...) était prête à assumer pour son compte n'importe quoi pour pouvoir appuyer la "position" de Céline".

Returning to the question "du Sémantisme, elle n'est pas effleurée", Gide himself separated the question from Céline's book and turned instead to Maritain's lecture "les Juifs parmi les Nations". Here Gide shows much scepticism towards Maritain's view that the Jewish question (or more accurately - stereotyped attitudes towards Jews) was socially- and historically-derived rather than racially determined. Gide mis-read Maritain's view, and re-asserted his own conviction that "la question n'est pas confessionnelle, mais raciale. Il n'y a rien à faire à cela".

Gide went on to discuss - in the void - the Jewish question as part of the problem of minorities in an alien culture, completely ignoring ideological or political variables which might give a different charge to the question. He even criticised Maritain - a converted Jew himself - for not dealing more extensively with
the "côté positif de l'apport de la race juive" (265). In spite of the Nazis' policies toward Jews in Germany, Gide adhered to his own long-standing view that the Jews in France were an alien minority which, if not wholly unassimilable, was widely at variance with his own "nature" as a Frenchman. Even Paulhan privately admitted to Jouhandeau that he suspected Gide of "un fond d'antisémitisme" (266), and Maritain, in a reply to Gide in June (267), justifiably corrected Gide's mis-reading of his lecture and pointed to the fact that it was not responsible (especially "dans une revue comme la NRF") to treat the question with frivolity (268).

Indeed, Gide did not comment on what was, in the historical context, the most interesting and apposite part of Maritain's very lucid essay. Whatever the interpretation of Céline's book, or, for that matter, however consciously or not Gide was anti-Semitic, the most important thing was to remember that "il y a, dans l'Europe d'aujourd'hui, ceux qui veulent l'extermination des Juifs, car c'est bien de cela qu'il s'agit, n'est-ce pas, en définitive? - et qui, sous l'appareil stupide du scientisme raciste ou des documents forgés, dissimulent aux autres hommes, et parfois à eux-mêmes, l'espoir fou d'un massacre général de la race de Moïse et de Jésus. Ce massacre reste un songe; les germes de haine dont s'emplit l'atmosphère sont une réalité" (269).

If Gide or others remained cynical regarding such a view, events later that year were to validate Maritain's assessment of Hitler's intentions (270). With the "capitulation" of Daladier and Chamberlain at Munich on September 30th 1938,
Franco-German relations entered an unprecedented critical phase. Paulhan assembled a "special number" on Munich which marked the NRF conclusively as "anti-Munichois" and, therefore as "pro-war"(271); among the essays was Benda's "les Démocraties bourgeoises devant l'Allemagne", a text which, conveniently enough for his enemies and anti-Semites, complied well with the stereotype of the Jew as warmonger(272). The anarchistic Le Crapouillot displayed its own anti-war attitude by publishing a special issue "Septembre 1938". Included among the "parti de la Fermeté - (autrement dit: le parti de la Guerre)" were Geneviève Tabouis, in L'Oeuvre, Henri de Kérillis, in L'Epoque, and Gabriel Péri, in L'Humanité(273). A section was also devoted to "Les Juifs et la Guerre", including Benda, whom the author of the article perceived as "un singulier mélange de bouffon, de sadique et d'incurable imbécile"(274). In a savage attack based on Benda's bellicose attitude towards Germany in the First World War as described in Un Régulier dans le Siècle, Le Crapouillot characterised Benda as a "buveur de sang", one of the oldest elements in the anti-Semite's mythology:

"Pendant la crise de septembre, M. Benda est une des publicistes qui ont le plus poussé au massacre. Il frétille à l'idée de revoir ces temps bénis de 14-18 où il pouvait chaque matin déguster un grand bol de sang frais. La paix ne l'intéresse pas, les blessés, les mutilés (...), M. Benda s'en fout jacobinement, à condition que sa petite idéologie soit sauvée, fût-ce au prix de la destruction totale de la France"(275).
This attitude, although less violently expressed, extended to the pacifist weekly *La Flèche*, where Gide's new friend Claude Mauriac had become embroiled in a complex exchange with Bernard Lecache of *Le Droit de Vivre* (276). Indeed, Galtier-Boissière, editor of *Le Crapouillot*, repeated his attack on Benda in his rubric "En toute liberté" in *La Flèche* (277). Claude Mauriac has written that Gide, during these weeks, had grown very close to the position of *La Flèche* (278).

Following the assassination of Ernst Vom Rath on November 7th, 1938, a ferocious wave of anti-Jewish violence broke out in Germany, during and after what came to be known as "Kristallnacht" (279). At last the Jewish question was being taken more seriously, at least to the extent that Hitler's intentions were now clearer to those who were willing to notice them. The *Revue juive de Genève* reported some of the details of anti-Jewish repression in Germany after November 11th: up to 60,000 arrests were made, whole Jewish families committed suicide, and "au camp de Buchenwald (calqué sur le trop fameux Dachau) (sic), le nombre de Juifs passés par les armes est de 200" (280). In the wake of the violence, the same review asked leading personalities to comment on the Jewish question: among the respondents were Benda and Gide (281). In his reply, Gide seemed more concerned about the style and presentation of his opinion than about making any bold, pro-Jewish, or anti-Hitlerian, statement (282). Yet at least Gide had been sufficiently worried by the repression to declare:
"Indépendamment de toutes considérations diplomatiques, la médiocrité des réactions, en France, devant de tels abus de pouvoir, m'apparaît comme un triste signe de décadence morale et de diminution de vertu. Il importe d'autant plus que quelques-uns du moins fassent entendre (...) leur protestation" (283).

One direct consequence of events in Germany was the renewed influx of refugees fleeing the repression - this in turn inevitably led to a further intensification of anti-immigrant (and anti-Jewish) feeling, voiced by, among others, the government sponsored pamphleteer Emmanuel Berl in Pavés de Paris (284). Against this ever-darkening background, Paulhan could still not avoid the Jewish question in the NRF: the issue was now inextricably tied to the increasingly likely prospect of war. It was precisely with this in mind that Jacques Chardonne submitted a series of personal reflexions to the NRF for February 1939 (285). Talking specifically of Germany and its evolution since 1918, Chardonne imputed that the Jews there had been responsible for the advent of Hitler:

"Avant l'avènement d'Hitler, les Juifs n'étaient pas très nombreux en Allemagne, à peine six cent mille. Mais depuis 1918, ils détenaient les principaux emplois, et ils ont marqué de leur influence et signé tous les événements : la révolution, l'inflation, la faillite, l'anarchie de l'argent ou de la misère" (286).

Chardonne believed that it was a typically German characteristic to be tempted by catastrophe and despair, and that this was a Jewish trait. In an astonishing and simplistic paralogism, Chardonne managed to congratulate Hitler for providing a cure for "le mal allemand":

"Avant l'avènement d'Hitler, les Juifs n'étaient pas très nombreux en Allemagne, à peine six cent mille. Mais depuis 1918, ils détenaient les principaux emplois, et ils ont marqué de leur influence et signé tous les événements : la révolution, l'inflation, la faillite, l'anarchie de l'argent ou de la misère" (286).
"L'Allemand recèle un Asiatique; c'est la part d'esprit juif qui est en lui. Aussi l'effort de régénération prendra chez l'Allemand la forme d'une révolte contre le juif. Cette victoire sur soi-même, opposée à l'esprit juif, est incarnée par Hitler.

Il n'a rien apporté, qu'une foi au peuple, un remède au mal allemand" (287).

Although Chardonne thought the attitude of the French towards Jews was different, he nonetheless demonstrated how easily some intellectuals in France were becoming convinced that a French "dictatorship" might prove salutary for the country: indeed, Chardonne signalled his collaborationism by contributing to Drieu's NRF from December 1940 (288).

During these months until the declaration of war in September, Paulhan became increasingly embattled at the review, and found himself caught between conflicting loyalties: underlying these problems a lingering anti-Semitism is detectable. In his renewed "Chronique Dramatique" for March 1939, Léautaud launched a vicious assault upon what he regarded as the unacceptable demagogy of such as Jean Perrin, Paul Langevin and Joliot-Curie (289). Léautaud believed these (and others) were guilty of charlatanism for pronouncing on political matters. Furthermore Léautaud found it intolerable that Charles Dullin, in his new production of Le Mariage de Figaro, should apply his own personal "conception" to a "classic" French drama. "C'est un scandale", remarked Léautaud, and concluded:

"Il faut que nous ayons un ministre de l'Instruction publique et un sous-ministre aux Beaux-Arts étrangers à la littérature française, pour qu'il soit permis" (290).
These were immediately recognizable as the (Jewish) ministers Jean Zay and Raoul Huisman. The "orages soulevés" by these remarks severely tested Paulhan, and, as he reported to Jouhandeau, he was divided between his loyalty to Léautaud on the one hand, and to such as Gaston Gallimard, Crémieux and Caillois (who all objected to Léautaud) on the other (291). The episode was eventually concluded by Léautaud's resignation from the review, and although Paulhan told Jouhandeau that the affair had calmed down, there had been a real risk that he too might have resigned (292). Léautaud devoted the last pages of his final submission to the "Merveilleux effets d'une Chronique dramatique", and disappeared from the NRF amid a storm of protest from indignant subscribers (293).

A further problem confronting Paulhan was posed by the recently re-established presence of Suarès in the NRF, in the "Chronique de CaërdaI" (294). The reader familiar with Suarès' polemical work would not have been surprised that Paulhan played the role of censor regarding Suarès' attacks on Hitler and Mussolini (295). Italian anti-Semitism had been made official policy relatively recently: indeed, as late as December 1937, Ciano, Mussolini's foreign minister, had written "le problème juif n'existe pas chez nous" (296). Just one year later however, a full, Nazi-inspired and implemented anti-Semitic policy existed in Italy, as reported extensively in La Revue juive de Genève (297). Suarès, who felt a deep affection for Italy and Italian culture, found this development grotesquely inconsistent, and, against all Paulhan's demands for restraint, unleashed a
violent attack upon Ciano:

"Il est infiniment probable que le Chiano (sic) et ses Chiani ont du sang juif dans les veines, comme du vent fasciste dans le cerveau (...).
Noirs bouffons, sacs à mensonges"(298).

As a direct result, fascist Italy countered by banning the NRF; Paulhan announced, on May 5th:

"Mauvaise nouvelle. la NRF se voit interdite en Italie. Chiano(qui) moins patient que Mussolini; (ou si vous étiez tombé trop juste?) Cela fait 500 abonnés de moins (...) Et plus de mille Italiens, sans doute, qui n'auront plus le réconfort (je pense) que leur donnait la revue"(299).

"Rien de tout cela n'est gai", added Paulhan, laconically(300).

One final incident placed Paulhan in further difficulty, an incident which shows how profoundly the issues of the day during these troubled months penetrated into the very heart of the NRF, to affect policy and presentation. Paulhan's loyalty towards Julien Benda, despite much opposition and criticism, remained unyielding. In one sense, Paulhan had always needed Benda to anchor the NRF firmly in "neutral" territory: although Benda's most long-standing adversary was L'Action française, he had also opposed the Left in the shape of Guéhenno and Rolland. His stance since 1936-7, however, had considerably readjusted towards the Left, in particular, the Communists. Moreover, Benda stridently opposed "appeasement" after Munich. All these factors combined to render Benda's presence in the NRF more problematic for some, especially
Jean Schlumberger. Ever since 1935, in fact, Schlumberger felt Benda occupied too much space in the review. By April 1937, Paulhan had the unpleasant duty to inform Benda that he would not dispose of as much room in the NRF as he had previously; in principle, Benda did not object to this. In his very long self-defence, Benda stressed that in all his time at the review, he had always denied having any influence whatsoever, and suspected that his political stance and his contributions elsewhere were the underlying reasons for Schlumberger's criticisms. Benda then appealed explicitly to Paulhan's sense of loyalty:

"Il est clair que si la direction veut ma peau, non pas seulement en raison de mon attitude dans la NRF mais ailleurs, et en raison de ma tendance politique générale, ma cause, - notre cause -, puisque vous voulez bien me défendre, devient singulièrement menacée".

Writing again a little later, Benda pointed to rather more sinister undertones concerning his "Jewish" presence in the NRF:

"(Schlumberger) me reproche d'avoir, depuis cinq ans, publié dans la revue tous mes ouvrages destinés ensuite à devenir des livres. On dirait vraiment que c'est moi le maître de ces publications; alors que je n'ai fait que proposer les ouvrages, qu'ensuite on a bien voulu prendre (...). Je suis aussi affecté par l'accusation d'être bien "de la race juive, avec cette volonté d'occuper toute la place dès que je suis admis dans un lieu..." C'est là rigoureusement l'antisémitisme le plus bas. Il m'est pénible de savoir qu'il siège dans les conseils de la NRF".

Benda was understandably very upset and disturbed by such aspersions, and, indeed, from this time onwards, did not occupy his customary proportion of space in the review. At the time of these letters, the "loi Marchandeau" of April 21st 1939 effectively
banned any further overtly anti-Semitic material from the Press. Fortunately for Paulhan, this law spared the NRF any additional public embarrassment.

Unlike the other major issues it had examined, the NRF had no real, delineated "parti pris" regarding the Jewish question. This is partly explained by its being tangential to other questions, like Franco-German relations, Republicanism, literary judgements and taste, or immigration. If, for some, the NRF had an anti-Jewish reputation, it was due mainly to the (usually) unconscious or culturally-acquired prejudices of some within its circle. For others on the Right, the NRF was a haven for influential, subversive, "warmongering" Jews who represented all that was dangerous in the French Republic. Yet all those major contributors of Jewish origin - Benda, Crémieux, Suarès - wrote as assimilated Jews and eschewed Jewish (and other) Nationalism. One further, central observation arising from this issue concerns the review's - but particularly Gide's - treatment of Céline's anti-Semitism. By applying purely literary or stylistic criteria to Bagatelles pour un massacre, the underlying issue was poorly treated if not dismissed, when, in retrospect, the Jewish question had already assumed dimensions of historical significance confirmed only months later by events. The "loi Marchandeau" put a temporary halt to public expressions of anti-Semitism, but the "roots of Vichy anti-Semitism" had already taken hold.

After the "capitulation" of Munich, and particularly throughout the "Drôle de Guerre", Paulhan determined to steer the NRF away
from its "neutral" course to adopt instead an attitude which deliberately opposed "appeasement", the betrayal of alliances and "peace at all costs". In a word, Paulhan and the NRF were beginning to resist.
CHAPTER SEVEN

"Resisting Delusion: the NRF in the Drift to War, 1938 to 1940".

"Et personne ne sait mieux que moi l'étrange, l'étonnant retentissement que peut avoir au dehors un article de la NRF " (Jean Paulhan to André Suarès, BD. 4970/3, 17/2/39).

"Certes, notre république semble avoir avoué, depuis vingt ans, tous les vices dont les adversaires lui font grief. Pourtant, nous nous battons pour quelque chose qui ressemble à la République" (Jean Paulhan, "L'Espoir et le Silence", NRF June 1940, p. 722).

"J'ai été, du premier jour, résistant. Il faut avouer que l'horreur, le dégoût que m'inspiraient les gouvernements de l'etre-deux-guerres a fait beaucoup pour me jeter-et me maintenir - dans ces bons sentiments (qu'il m'est arrivé d'exprimer, bien avant 1940) " (Jean Paulhan, in Claude Jamet, Le rendez-vous manqué de 1944, Editions France-Empire, 1964, p. 257).
During 1938, and especially after the conclusion of the Munich agreement on 30th September, the increasingly likely prospect of war had, once again, become the overriding issue. Munich was eventually seen as a delusion whereby an obsessive desire for peace at all costs led both Britain and France into a betrayal of their commitments to Czechoslovakia and, therefore, into capitulating to Hitler's expansionist ambitions. A French historian writing in 1979 has rightly stressed the pivotal nature of Munich, identifying it as the

"référence clé de notre histoire contemporaine, injure suprême de notre langage politique, et (Munich) marque une étape décisive dans le destin de l'Europe: on croyait la paix rétablie, on entrait en fait dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale" (1).

His point is further confirmed by a writer who lived through the Munich crisis and who, at the time, was one of those who saw it as a capitulation; writing of Munich as a contributory factor in the lack of enthusiasm among the French during the "Drôle de Guerre", Georges Bernanos noted:

"Aujourd'hui appartient encore au passé, tient par toutes ses fibres à Munich, c'est-à-dire à une date hideuse dans l'histoire de notre peuple ... Notre guerre s'ouvre sous le signe de Munich" (2).

Moreover all the issues which had dominated the period took on a different complexion during the course of 1938 and, in many ways, the two years between April 1938 and June 1940 witnessed the eventual release of all the tensions built up during the 1930's in the inevitable outbreak of war, followed by the Nazi occupation of France in 1940. The chronic ineffectiveness throughout the
1930's of French governments to contend with problems at home and abroad was gradually checked and even partially reversed after the demise of the Popular Front, particularly following the election of Daladier's more authoritarian government (3). Those who suspected Hitler's warlike intentions were proved right by his increasing belligerence following the re-occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, the Austrian Anschluss of March 1938 and his exploitation of the "appeasement" politics of both Daladier and Chamberlain. Franco-German relations were now dominated if not dictated by Hitler (4). Regarding the Soviet Union, the revelations of the show-trials and Stalin's purges, and the disappointment of fellow-travellers such as Gide, seemed to have tarnished for ever the image of Russian Communism as a form of new Humanism; some, indeed, considered supporting Hitler as a bulwark against the threat of Soviet expansionism (5). Finally, the issue of anti-Semitism remained in the foreground as France experienced a continuing influx of Jewish immigrants fleeing Hitler; the outburst of endemic anti-Semitism fired by the supposed Jewish domination of the Popular Front was exacerbated by the assassination of Ernst Vom Rath, the consequences of "Kristallnacht" and by apparent Jewish belligerence after Munich (6).

In the light of all this, and in particular in reaction to the failure of the Popular Front "experiment", Jean Paulhan had already determined to alter the course of the NRF by taking a harder, more openly political line as exemplified by Petitjean's
article "Dictature de la France", coinciding as it did with the formation of the Daladier government on April 10th 1938(7).

Indeed already in March 1938, precisely on the 12th, Gide was intensely preoccupied by the news of the Nazi Anschluss in Austria(8). Four days later, Paulhan signalled to Suarès that he too was highly perturbed by events:

"Oui, les événements sont effroyables: à mesure de quelles fautes? J'en vois plus de mille, ou une seule: il eût fallu, pour oser l'alliance de la France avec Mussolini, qui seule eût sauvé l'Autriche, et épargné l'Espagne, un roi, un dictateur ou un fou. Nous n'avions pas cela, mais de gens honnêtes et gauches, tout empêtrés de doctrines. Nous n'avions pas fini, je pense, de les payer cher"(9).

By publishing Petitjean's "chronique" Paulhan indicated that the NRF now intended to "regarder en face la réalité de 1938"(10), and that to do so properly, France had to be reunited as a nation under a strong government which would re-establish the country's military preparedness(11). In particular Petitjean called upon the Communists to affirm their loyalty to the "patrie", and Benda, indeed, on at least two occasions in the months to follow, acknowledged that the French Communists were now the only political party which held the "patrie" in true esteem.

In an "Air du Mois" for July 1938, Benda wrote:

"Toute une société, en France, a cessé d'être patriote, juste au moment où Staline a donné aux communistes français l'ordre de l'être. La politique de ce monde-là est commandée entièrement et uniquement par la haine du communisme. Ils mettraient le feu à leur maison si les communistes décidaient de la conserver. Tel est leur bon sens"(12).
Benda repeated these sentiments and developed them next month in his "chronique" "Anticommunisme et Patriotisme"(13). The effect of these texts and the attacks they drew was, ironically, to re-align the NRF more closely to the Communists than to either the government, or, for that matter, the Maurrassians, for earlier that year in February, Paulhan and Grenier had both displayed considerable sympathy for the achievement of the *Action Française* leader(14). In fact Paulhan seemed determined to make clear his indignation at Hitler's invasion of Austria by including, "en tête" of the same issue as Benda's pro-Communist "chronique", a text by Pierre Jean Jouve entitled "In Memoriam Salzburg"(15). Here Jouve, opening with an extract from his elegiac poem "Mozart" dated 1924, cast a nostalgic glance back to what he considered as the golden age of creativity in musical performing which had flourished in Salzburg between 1921 and 1937, and now suddenly cut short by Hitler's invasion:

"Cette petite fleur fine de l'Autriche, pointe de bien des siècles familiers et graves, cet édifice si proportionné de génie allemand ancien qui s'épanouissait dans de petites villes, l'envahisseur ne peut que la détruire"(16).

These comments, and the article as a whole, were certainly not overtly political, but they indicated a continuing opposition with the NRF to the spread of Fascism.

The next month, September, Paulhan inserted a ten-page essay by Petitjean entitled, significantly enough, "Après l'après-
This text was, in effect, a development of Petitjean's earlier call for a "Dictature de la France". Où en est-on?, asked Petitjean, and proceeded to answer his own question thus: "Nous en sommes, selon toute apparence, au plus bas de notre histoire". Yet the thrust of Petitjean's argument consisted basically in challenging the widely-held view that France was in the final stages of its "décadence"; he could not believe that a civilization such as France, if it was truly decadent and decaying, could spend so long meditating on causes and effects of this process. Petitjean refused to see the Popular Front as a total disaster particularly as it had shown that France was still capable of social change, even if certain sectors of society did their best to interfere with the results:

"Il a suffi qu'avec l'avènement du Front Populaire, la fraction de notre population qui était jusqu'ici tenue à l'écart de toute vie nationale y eût brusquement accès, pour que celle dont la nationalisation date de quelques décades se comportât de façon la plus contraire aux intérêts du Pays..."

All in all Petitjean remained remarkably optimistic regarding France and its civilization because, although he could not agree with Rivière's Gallocentrism,

"Nous restons même l'un des rares pays d'Europe qui ait du champ devant lui, de l'espace vital, de l'air dans ses idées, et qui ne se laisse opprimer ni par les frontières de son territoire, ni par celles de son âme"

Like Paulhan and Benda, Petitjean could not tolerate the defeatism which seemed so rife in France during these months, and he re-affirmed
his conviction that Frenchmen might again find strength through a sort of Jacobin patriotism. Petitjean went on to analyse the reasons for France's apparent weakness in the period since the 1920's. He believed the nation had placed too great a faith in those whom he called "les intermédiaires", whereby reality was not properly appreciated and therefore not properly dealt with. Another grave shortcoming had been the entirely "speculative" way in which France conceived and carried out foreign policy, founded as it had been upon "des mensonges pires que ceux du temps de guerre". The intellectuals too, according to Petitjean, had been fascinated to the point of hypnosis by "l'idée du politique", but, in the long run, they were powerless to act:

"Après quelques années d'un plus complet désordre, déportés de l'histoire, raidis par l'intellect, ils s'excitent à l'idée du politique, du social, ou même de l'action, en sont tantalisés: ils songent à l'on ne sait quel activisme impuissant et mental ..".

Yet Petitjean could detect some signs which, amid such general paralysis, were encouraging, and thus bore witness to the fact that the French were at last coming to terms with "historical reality", as he put it. He placed much faith in the youth movements which were springing up, and detected much cultural renewal and creativity. In conclusion Petitjean called upon his readers to recognize their duty to participate fully in the community, because
"l'après-guerre est bien morte, deux fois morte. A nous de ne pas nous laisser mourir de cette mort. A nous de quitter le plan des principes, pour vivre et pour bâtir" (27).

Meanwhile on the international diplomatic scene the sequence of events had begun which would lead to the signature of the Munich protocols during the night of September 29-30th (28). By the 19th September, both Paris and London instructed Prague to concede the Sudeten territory; but Hitler made new claims on the Czech state and, after a period of extreme tension during which France mobilized a million reservists and Britain put the Home Fleet on alert, Mussolini's idea for a four-nation conference was seized upon whereby the "club des charcutiers" would decide the fate of Czechoslovakia at Munich (29). It had been too late to reflect upon the outcome of September's events in the October NRF, although Arland's "Chronique de Vacances" noted how oppressive the atmosphere had become in Vienna (30). Initially Paulhan advocated circumspection in the face of events: seeking Schlumberger's advice, he wondered whether a policy of autocensorship might not be wise:-

"la situation demeure trop grave, il me semble, pour que quelque précaution ne s'impose pas. Ne pensez-vous qu'il faut nous interdire à la NRF toute attaque désormais contre l'Italie et Mussolini? (J'ai eu plus d'une occasion de voir qu'ils sont diaboliquement sensibles aux critiques de la NRF (sic), et le dernier Claudel, entre autres, n'est pas passé tout seul)" (31).

Martin de Gard told Gide on 29th September 1938 that he believed "tout vaut mieux que la guerre" (32), and, although Gide
at first shared his correspondent's enthusiasm for what he called the "victory" of Munich, he became much more hesitant. Claude Martin has shown that an important letter from Jef Last dated October 1st significantly altered Gide's appreciation of the situation, with the result that on October 9th, Gide told Martin du Gard that "je ne sais moi-même que penser". Quite simply Gide was caught between the deeply-held convictions of both his friends: Martin du Gard believed in "peace at all costs", even if this involved betraying French commitments to Czechoslovakia, while Last, a Communist, saw Munich, as "une défaite lointaine". Public opinion also attenuated: Duroselle notes that the first public opinion polls ever conducted in France showed initial approval, whilst others made later reflected a greater preference for resistance. He further analyses how the Munich agreements forced political re-alignments according to the convictions of the opinion-makers. As René Girault puts it:

"Au fond (...) en politique extérieure, tous les partis sont transcendés par des options qui proviennent de convictions profondes, non-politiciennes: les "pacifistes" et les "bellicistes" se trouvent mêlés au sein de tous les partis de gouvernement, voire même dans les partis extrêmes."

Once the implications of Munich had become clearer, and once it was realized that the options could of necessity only be for or against, Paulhan at last signalled his intention that the NRF should take a deliberate, unambiguous stance. His commitment would go to the "antimunichois" party, to resistance to Hitler.
Paulhan told Schlumberger that he was in the process of assembling three major reactions to Munich, whereby "l'on verra bien que la NRF est catholique (universelle)"(40). He explained:

"cela fera trois réactions:
Petitjean/25 ans/catholique
Schlumberger/50 ans/protestant
Benda/70 ans/juif"(41)

In another extremely important letter outlining how Benda saw the situation, Paulhan even spoke of expressing a unified "engagement" in the NRF:

"l'article de Benda tiendra, je pense, de 10 à 15 pages. Son thème sera: Chamberlain et Daladier ont refusé la guerre, par crainte de la gagner... Je voudrais bien savoir quel sera le sens de votre article (...). Je souhaiterais qu'il eût le sens d'un engagement (de nous tous) pour l'avenir. J'ai tout lieu de penser que l'article de Benda - qui sera fin, et, dans l'ensemble, plausible - s'achèvera sur une démission: "la politique des clercs" - s'il en fut jamais une - doit disparaître avec la Société "des Nations" (et je remonte dans ma tour)". C'est ici que je voudrais bien que vous repreniez la question. C'est ici qu'il nous faut la reprendre"(42).

Petitjean's "Prière pour les Copains"(43) was an emotional appeal to protect France and Frenchmen from impending doom. In a religious poetic style reminiscent of Péguy, he pleaded:

"Seigneur, camarades, faites taire tous ces représentants qui, depuis vingt ans, ne représentent plus rien. Et si Vous prenez le temps de Vous apitoyer sur eux, montrez-leur donc un jour ce que c'est que la France, qu'elle est faite de Français; faites-leur faire par exemple un exercice de mobilisation; conduisez-les devant la ligne Maginot, à quelques kilomètres de la Mort, là où j'avais la chance d'être il n'y a pas huit jours avec les copains"(44).
Petitjean called upon his (particularly French) "Seigneur" to inspire French men and women with courage and strength and to protect them from death. He concluded: "Enfin, s'il le faut pour que nous survivions (...), donnez-nous le recul de la mort, à notre heure"(45).

Benda's contribution was particularly critical and offered an acute analysis of what he saw as the complicit weakness of "les Démocraties bourgeoises devant l'Allemagne"(46). He boldly labelled the Munich accords as nothing but a "capitulation" to Hitler's ambitions. Benda found that Chamberlain and Daladier, far from being at a disadvantage regarding Hitler - in fact they were "nantis (...) d'atouts formidables"(47) - had allowed the Germans "de crier au triomphe..."(48). Indeed, argued Benda, French and British ministers had known even in May that year that

"Si leur refus de céder davantage eût amené la guerre, ils savaient à cette date que leurs pays ne le leur reprocher-eraient pas"(49).

He detected three reasons for their preferring capitulation to resistance (and possibly war): "l'humanitarisme (...) ; la crainte de perdre la guerre; (...) la crainte de la gagner"(50). The motivation underlying this third reason was the fact that Britain preferred appeasing Hitler to risking a triumph of Communism, which the British despised. Yet Benda insisted that instead of ensuring a Communist victory, surely the defeat of Hitler would represent a triumph for democracy. He then examined why these countries did not wish to win. The heart of the problem was that the bourgeois democracies could not allow true democracy
("accroissement de justice sociale, réalisation des revendications ouvrières"(51)) to damage the interests of their class:

"De cette démocratie-là, les démocraties bourgeoises ne veulent à aucun prix (j'entends si les réformes sont sérieuses). Preuve: leur insurrection contre le ministère Blum en France..."(52).

The ruling bourgeoisie had found it expedient to liken the plans for social reform in France to Communism, which they attacked not for promoting social justice, but for suppressing liberty and negating culture and civilization as they knew it(53). Benda illustrated his argument by several references to French history, stressing that

"la démocratie bourgeoise a toujours eu la haine de la Révolution, en tant que celle-ci prétend à une émancipation non superficielle mais profonde des classes inférieures"(54).

It followed for Benda that the bourgeois democracies would therefore do all in their power to assist "Les Etats hostiles à la Révolution"; again, using several historical instances, Benda accused the democracies of placing "résolûment les intérêts de leur classe au dessus de ceux de leur nation"(55).

He demonstrated that there was nothing exceptional in this, and that, at Munich, "les ministres de démocraties (...) ont eu la volonté (...) de ne pas humilier l'homme qui, aux yeux de ces bourgeoises, incarne la résistance aux montées révolutionnaires"(56).

Benda followed this analysis with four remarks. Firstly, he found that the democracies were completely misguided by
placing faith in Hitler's "order" against revolutionary "chaos". Part of the delusion derived from the fact that the democracies ignored that "le fascisme n'a rien à faire avec l'ordre traditionnel"(57). Secondly, Britain's attitude towards alleged French hegemony in Europe and a long-standing distrust of France as "le dangereux pays de la Révolution", explained British indulgence towards Germany after 1918, but especially after the signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact(58). Thirdly, Benda believed that war tended to benefit the "revendication du peuple": so, if avoiding war meant perpetuating the status quo, then the bourgeois democracies would avoid war. Finally, the ruling bourgeoisie had found it useful to exploit the reluctance of the popular majority to fight their battles; they adjusted their rhetoric accordingly which, for Benda, provided some glaring examples of sophistry(59).

Benda called for a return to the more realistic "mode de conscience nationale" current during the early formative years of his generation after 1870, when "nous étions résignés à ce que la France ne fût plus qu'une nation paisible et travailleuse et cessât, sur l'échiquier mondial, de tenir une première place"(60). But the true source of anxiety for Benda was to be found in his remarkable anticipation of the Vichy régime:

"la bourgeoisie française poussera-t-elle sa soumission au Reich jusqu'à adopter le régime fasciste, notamment la suppression de la liberté d'expression, la destruction du système représentatif, le racisme?"(61).
Answering his own question, Benda believed that this future régime would cling to some conscience - salving vestiges of liberalism whereby "on ne verra pas en France de fascisme total (...) Un fascisme larvé me paraît probable" (62). In his conclusion, Benda alluded to his own position as "clerc", and, in spite of his pride in Republicanism and the occasional triumph of "les valeurs cléricales", he re-affirmed axiomatically that "la loi de ce monde déchu est celle de classes qui jouissent" (63).

Schlumberger's essay was directed "Contre l'humiliation" (64). Commenting much later on this "embarbée la plus décisive dans ce qu'on peut encore appeler de la politique", Schlumberger remembered that "(ces) pages de la NRF (...) furent saluées par beaucoup d'amis comme un premier rappel de dignité" after the "shame" of Munich (65). As he had done with his previous essays on Franco-German relations, Schlumberger preferred to penetrate beyond the political implications of events; he sought moralistic enlightenment of "nos mobiles mêmes et nos volontés" (66). For Schlumberger, the true gravity of the situation derived from "un sentiment de honte" whereby it was impossible to ignore that through their action, France was responsible for ceding Czechoslovakia to the Nazis (67). Moreover France's "humiliation" was traceable once again to the "ravages opérés dans l'esprit allemand par les flétrissures du traité de Versailles ..." (68). Quite simply France had not been equal to the rôle designated by the Versailles Treaty; what is more, negligent disregard specifically of French aviation had deprived the nation of its ability to back its undertakings, and, by extension,
"Quand il s'agit d'un glissement qui a duré tant d'années, et sous tant de ministères, une nation est complice" (69).

His second major point was that broken French promises meant that their allies might justifiably accuse them of inconsistency, if not perfidy (70). Much advantage had been squandered according to Schlumberger, for

"Etre cru sur parole représente une force qui, pour parler réaliste, vaut cher. Les grands forbans, une fois leurs coups accomplis, donneraient beaucoup pour l'acquérir, et nous l'avons perdue sans les bénéfices d'un mauvais coup" (71).

In fact, Schlumberger placed most of his hope in the relatively calm acceptance of the call for mobilization issued on September 24th; he regarded it as a "miracle", saying "c'était comme si, dans l'angoisse commune, toutes les cellules du pays rétablissaient leur cohésion" (72). Schlumberger countered hypothetical objections to his attitude regarding the mobilization, denying that he relished the prospect of war:

"Est-il vraiment besoin de répéter qu'on peut redouter la guerre, travailler contre elle de toutes ses forces, sans moins redouter pour cela ni moins combattre certaines formes de paix. Ce que j'ai salué durant les Cinq Jours, ce n'était pas une France belliqueuse (...) mais une France qui a repris sa tension vitale" (73).

A second suggestion that France might consider "la vie caporalisée des régimes totalitaires" (74) was swept aside by Schlumberger, stressing that such a possibility was dramatically opposed to the nature of France. Drawing towards his conclusion, he repeated the familiar call:
"Le rétablissement qu'il est urgent de réussir demande une coordination nationale, sans laquelle trop d'efforts se neutralisent réciproquement ..."(75).

The ability to achieve this coordination had not completely perished, Schlumberger believed, especially when he considered the attitude of such as Armand Petitjean, whose NRF "chronique" "Dictature de la France" (76) was inspirational. In spite of the protest it had provoked, and although it was not flawless, Schlumberger felt that the article was "un symptôme de santé", all the more so since it had appeared in a review "où l'on n'aime pas la fanfare"; hence its value, because it took on a meaning "Qu'il n'aurait pas eue ailleurs" (77). Less pessimistic than Benda, Schlumberger insisted that peace was a worthy aim, but only if it proved to be an honourable one (78).

These were not the only commentaries on Munich, however; the whole of the "Air du Mois" section was given over to further, shorter reactions. In "L'Attente", Marcel Arland described his own observations of Frenchmen as he travelled through the provinces in September (79). With "aveuglement et rodomontades" obscuring the true meaning of events, all the French people could do was wait, and Arland wondered how many of the million men mobilized knew why they had been called upon to fight; it was certainly not for Czechoslovakia (80). In common with Petitjean and Schlumberger, Arland pointed to the vacuum at the centre of French life during the last twenty years:
"Encore faudrait-il que les Français eussent conscience de la France, c'est-à-dire d'une communauté, d'un dépôt, d'un devenir, - de valeurs irremplaçables. (...) L'éclat d'une telle crise permet de mesurer cet abandon, et de vérifier que le régime le plus libre doit être aussi le plus ennemi des facilités"(81).

The underlying cause of Arland's "nouveau mal du siècle"(82) took on a new importance and had grave implications in 1938: "un peuple a besoin de dieux pour mourir; et il en a un besoin pour vivre dignement"(83).

Henry de Montherlant sent Paulhan the pages which Candide had asked him to suppress on the ironically - titled "la Paix dans l'honneur"(84). Montherlant too wrote from the provinces, in his case Lorraine. His extract lambasted the French:

"Que vous le vouliez on non, lâches imbéciles, un jour viendra où l'odeur de vos cagayes sera étouffée dans l'odeur de votre sang. A moins qu'éternellement vous ne vous préserviez du sang, par la honte"(85).

Denis de Rougemont submitted a text in the form of pages from an imaginary history book(86). Like Benda, de Rougemont concentrated on the "appeasement" politics of the democracies, but differed in his "Conclusion" by applying the example of Switzerland:

"Personne de sut opposer au Fuhrer l'idéal qui avait fait jusqu'alors la force et l'équilibre dynamique de l'Occident: l'utopie agissante d'une Fédération des Égaux dont la seule Suisse figurait le microcosme"(87).

Jacques Audiberti's poetic and impressionistic text described the reaction of the bourgeoisie living around the Champs-Élysées the night after Daladier's "triumphal" return to Le Bourget (88).
Two shorter pieces by Henri Pourrat and Marcel Lecomte preceded the "Déclaration du Collège de Sociologie sur la crise internationale", signed Bataille, Caillois and Leiris (89). After first admitting their limited competence and their inability to deal with "toutes les faces de la question", the authors of the Declaration concentrated their attention on analysing the nature of the "réactions psychologiques collectives" (90) which the proximity of war had provoked. Daladier had characterized the French public as having behaved with "sang-froid, dignité et résolution", yet a more accurate choice of words would have been "consternation, résignation et peur" (91). From the point of view of the Collège itself, these events and their aftermath had indicated how necessary and relevant it was as a "foyer d'énergie": given the "absolu mensonge des formes politiques actuelles", the Collège would continue its research for "un mode d'existence collective qui ne tienne compte d' aucune limitation géographique ou sociale et qui permette d'avoir un peu de tenue quand la mort menace" (92).

Finally Paulhan - writing as Guérin in his "Bulletin" - indicated his own view in his ironical commentary on events:

"Munich. Par les accords de Munich, la paix est sauvée. La paix dans ce qu'elle a de plus plat et de plus périssable. Paris. Les tailleurs répandent le slogan: la paix nous donnant la voie de vivre, l'on s'habillera en clair cet hiver", etc. (93).

Paulhan's "Special number" on the Munich accords, although purporting to reflect what a broad church the review was, and how it could apply its ecumenism to the domain of
international relations, proved to be overwhelmingly "antimunichois", against Government policy and, therefore, anti-Peace. The nature of the essays themselves and, more particularly, the nature of the storm of protest which followed, re-established the NRF alongside the Communists in the anti-fascist camp. Martin du Gard, who had declared himself an integral pacifist in La Flèche, lost little time in signalling his profound dissent with the November number: "La NRF a pris parti. Et ce parti n'est pas le mien". As for Gide, his attitude was certainly closer to Paulhan's or Schlumberger's than to that of Martin du Gard, for he confided his complete disillusion with French foreign policy to his Journal.

Thierry Maulnier was among the first to react from the Nationalist right in La Revue universelle. A message addressed "A nos Amis, à nos abonnés" had already made it clear how the Maurrassians felt in the euphoria after Munich. In spite of their somewhat limited usefulness, Maulnier found that the collected reflexions in the NRF were "d'une assez grande stérilité". He believed that the NRF had missed the point, that the reflexions were a dangerous blend of aesthetic moralism and politics. Maulnier, refusing to see the relevance of writers such as Benda and Montherlant challenging a political and international "fait accompli", affirmed that "l'attitude de l'intelligence française doit être de travailler à faire que les événements de demain soient autant que possible différents de ceux d'hier". It did not seem to matter to Maulnier that this could only be
achieved by distortion and delusion. Maulnier's primary target was Benda, "ce professionnel du faux intellectuel" (104), and who typified that category of intellectual who proclaimed for so long his lack of interest in political tasks and priorities facing France (105). He, and they, had arrived too late, and Maulnier concluded: "Que les auteurs de nos défaites ne viennent pas juger aujourd'hui le courage de la France!" (106).

Among the most substantial and bitter counter-attacks, and one which was very close to the Government line, came from the pen of Emmanuel Berl in his subsidized pamphlet, Pavés de Paris. Entitled La NRF contre la paix (107), Berl's attack opened: "Le numéro de la NRF du 1er novembre est une vraie lamentation sur la paix de Munich" (108), and he berated the review (and later the publishing-house) to which he had once been recruited by Malraux:

"Sans doute la NRF n'est pas ce qu'elle fut jadis. Elle a perdu la plus grande partie de son importance. Il y avait au fond de Jacques Rivière un prédicateur; il y a au fond de Jean Paulhan un farceur. Tout cela n'en mérite pas moins un sérieux commentaire" (109).

Again Benda was the principal target; Berl devoted seven pages to his article, and set out to demolish his argument by attempting to devalue all his political and historical examples by showing how spurious they were in the present context. Yet Berl reserved his most concentrated vitriol for Benda's comments on how the bourgeois democracies would avoid war if their (class) interests were threatened: Berl felt that here Benda "cesse d'être ridicule pour devenir odieux" (110). Coming to Benda's pessimistic prognosis
of what would become the Vichy régime, Berl commented:

"Si un fascisme larvé paraît probable à M. Benda, c'est qu'un gouvernement de Front populaire a en quelque sorte fait le lit du fascisme en rendant illusoires et dérisoires les libertés dont la petite et la moyenne bourgeoisie ont souhaité et souhaitent encore la sauvegarde" (111).

Here Berl effectively proved Benda's thesis on the self-interest of the ruling bourgeoisie, but, given that the Government backed Berl, this was hardly surprising.

Berl's polemic was hardly less scathing regarding Schlumberger's text (112), but the most searing allegations were held until his final paragraphs on his former publisher, Gaston Gallimard, whom Berl implied was a draft-dodger and a hypocrite (113). He concluded:

"Mais je n'attaquerai pas M. Gaston Gallimard sans dire que l'offensive belliciste menée par la NRF n'est qu'un cas particulier de l'offensive générale menée contre la paix par les chefs d'orchestres invisibles qui veulent à tout prix empêcher la conciliation de la France et de l'Allemagne" (114).

Quite evidently Berl was propagating the Government view that somehow Franco-German reconciliation was still possible even if it entailed complicity with Hitler's expansionism. Many at the NRF no doubt noticed the rather disturbing irony that Berl, once the "enfant terrible" of Mort de la Pensée bourgeoise and admirer of Malraux's Garine, was now not only among the bourgeois régime's most staunch defenders, he was even in their pay (115).
If the most substantial reactions to the November issue of the NRF were highly critical, and thereby reflected the preponderance of the pro-Munich camp at this time, Paulhan's "special number" found enthusiastic support and praise in the antifascist camp, as represented by the Communist-backed Commune(116). Georges Sadoul opened his assessment by writing:

"Le numéro de novembre de La NRF est à peu près un numéro spécial consacré à la honte des capitulations de Munich (...) (Il y a) une violente indignation contre la politique de trahison menée par Daladier au cours des tragiques Journées de Septembre"(117).

This was strong language indeed, and such zealous opposition to the official line after Munich could only reflect upon the NRF, hereby so willingly applauded by the Communists(118).

The NRF for December paid homage to Francis Jammes and Apollinaire, continued the serialization of Giraudoux's Choix des Elues and concluded Chamson's La Galère: the literary emphasis had, once again, been re-established(119). Yet in "l'Air du Mois", Paulhan, this time using his own name, placed a short, highly indignant article entitled "Il ne faut pas compter sur nous"(120). Here he took exception to the way the Government and its supporters, only too conscious of "la honte" and "l'humiliation", now deflected criticism of their actions into "good advice":

"Les Ministres, les Percepteurs, et jusqu'au Président de la Société des Gens de Lettres nous prient de devenir de meilleurs Français: plus unis, mais plus travailleurs; plus intelligents, mais plus généreux; par dessus tout, prolifiques et prêts à tous les dévouements. Je regrette de dire (mais je la dis fermement), il ne faut pas compter sur nous"(121).
It was not the ordinary French people who were to blame, but the way the State and politicians wielded power which had done so much to discredit democracy, and which had done so much to promote the arguments of the anti-democrats:

"L'on n'a jamais tant parlé d'honneur que durant la chienlit de l'après-guerre. Les Moralistes nous disent encore que toute Démocratie exige, du haut en bas de l'échelle, la vertu des citoyens. C'est une affirmation imprudente: car, s'il est naturel d'en conclure qu'il faut supprimer le vice, il est à la fois plus naturel et plus expédient d'en conclure qu'il faut supprimer la Démocratie" (122).

He summarized his point of view by writing: "C'est l'Etat qui nous invite aux partis, à la division, à la différence" (123). Effectively Paulhan was insisting that he, and the NRF, would continue to resist interference from the State in affairs which were not, in his view, affairs of State. In another short note, Jean Grenier took the converse position and upbraided what he saw as the damaging tendency of intellectuals to become embroiled in matters which exceeded their competence (124).

Paulhan told Etiemble that his "petites réflexions" had been "jugées anarchiques ou réactionnaires. Ce qu'elles n'étaient pas" (125), and, in the NRF for January 1939, he returned to the question of the threat facing France, should the government pursue its "pacificist" policies (126). Part of Paulhan's concern was to show that the pacifists - however admirable their previous opposition to complicity in belligerence - could never avoid the impasse of war: "A parler franc, je ne vois pas d'institution, dans nos sociétés, mieux réglée, mieux obéie, qui la guerre" (127).

He saw the war as a rite with its conformists, heretics and
martyrs, and clearly believed that the more the nation proclaimed its opposition to violence, the more it invited attack\(128\).

He felt that, rather than risk war, the Government might consider ceding French territory:

"L'Italie, comme l'on sait, nous réclame aujourd'hui Tunis et la Corse. Et il est vraisemblable - si j'en juge par les précédents - que nous allons sous peu les lui remettre\(129\). (...) C'est aussitôt le Savoie, la Provence et jusqu'à Manosque\(130\), qu'exigeront nos voisins. Et je ne vois point du tout comment cette fois nous éviterions la guerre\(131\).

These were, indeed, daring criticisms to make during such a sensitive period. Paulhan's stance, and his committing the NRF to the "antimunichois" party, were courageous enough, given that the government was still negotiating closely with both Hitler's and Mussolini's diplomats\(132\).

However, Paulhan realized that the price of outspokenness could well involve the hostility of the government towards the NRF, or even direct intervention. Indeed, the question of censorship arose once again for Suarès, renowned for his forthright attacks upon Hitler and Germany, had at last consented to contribute his regular "Chronique de Caërdal" from January 1939\(133\). As exemplified by Berl's counter-attack on the NRF, the "quai d'Orsay" would not countenance repeated disparaging comments directed at the fascist dictatorships. A few days after the appearance of the first "Chroniques de Caërdal", Paulhan explained his motives for cutting Suarès' text:
"Ne m'en veuillez pas si je n'ai presque rien retenu de vos pages sur Hitler, ni de celles sur Mussolini... Il me semble qu'il faut tout craindre pour la France ces mois-ci. Que la NRF n'ait point à se reprocher, du moins, de lui avoir tiré un ennemi de plus-puisque ce n'est pas elle qui aurait à les combattre, puisque les chefs politiques (hélas! quels chefs) semblent vouloir à tout prix éviter l'hostilité, et la lutte".(134).

Petitjean, moreover, was coerced out of the "Quai d'Orsay" for his "notes"(135). Although the NRF had evidently struck a chord in its anti-Munich issue (136), it was beginning to take risks, for, once again, Paulhan was forced to explain his position a month later:

"Ne pensez pas que je sois lâche. Certes la Mère des Aff. Etr. (sic) (qui a subventionné déjà la brochure de Berl - immonde, non pas sotte - "La NRF contre la Paix"!"), nous a fort averti que la NRF serait poursuivie au premier article contre Hitler ou Mussolini. Cela encore importerait assez peu. Mais je pense qu'il ne faut créer à une France malheureuse, abandonnée de ses ministres; entourée de trahisons, nulle difficulté qui ne soit pas absolument nécessaire. -- Et personne ne sait mieux que moi l'étrange, l'étonnant retentissement que peut avoir au dehors un article de la NRF"(137).

The most telling remark here is Paulhan's final sentence, and confirms that, in spite of editorial policy and pronouncements (both public and private), the NRF was regarded on the outside as an influential tribune - it was not simply or solely a neutral, literary organ (138). This point is all the more central given that during this highly-charged period, the NRF was operating in a publishing world where foreign manipulation was widespread. René Girault has written:
"En 1937-1939, le monde de la presse parisienne est "actionné" par des manipulations éminentes, comme le célèbre Otto Abetz pour l'Allemagne, (...) sans oublier les services du Minculpop italien représenté à Paris par le consul Landini"(139).

The independence of the NRF is not nor was not in doubt; but its standing as an intellectuals' forum encouraged propaganda services to approach individual contributors, as demonstrated by the case of Benjamin Crémieux recorded as early as 1929 by Léautaud(140). Moreover many of the review's author-personalities, among them Giraudoux, Morand, Claudel and St. John Perse (pen-name of Alexis Léger, diplomatic secretary-general from 1933), worked in the highest positions at the "quai d'Orsay". There is little doubt that periodically Gallimard or Paulhan received "unofficial" advice from inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(141). During these confused months preceding the imposition of the official censorship in August 1939, Paulhan did not entirely sacrifice principle to caution regarding remarks he published on the conduct of state affairs. Yet he remained wary of offending the authorities, and his anxieties were justified when, due to Suarès' invective, Italy banned the NRF in May bringing a loss of some 500 subscribers(142).

Paulhan's sequence of critical, political texts culminated in two further articles, the first of which, by Jacques Chardonne, appeared "en tête" in February 1939(143). Chardonne's essay began with a glowing eulogy of French liberal capitalism which, he argued, had laid the foundations of the nation's wealth.
"Grâce à lui, en trois générations, le bien-être du manœuvre s'est accru plus qu'en vingt siècles. Il permet de satisfaire la variété des goûts et admet une sorte de liberté très chère aux Français; aussi chacun est intéressé à ces questions, même celui qui se croit étranger aux démêlés entre patrons et ouvriers"(144).

Chardonne firmly believed that the Popular Front government had damaged the nation's fabric by following the path towards collectivism:

"Le collectivisme, c'est la misère pour tous, parce que les cadres improvisés et leur superposition de contrôles absorbent le revenu national. Mais la misère peut conduire au collectivisme. Nous suivons cette voie, avec des pauses"(145).

For Chardonne the tendency towards collectivism was far more menacing than the disadvantages inherent in the French system, primarily for the reason that each European community required a different political structure, and, to the conservative Chardonne, collectivist tendencies were completely incompatible with the French character. He did not deny the nation's faults:

"Pendant vingt ans, de Poincaré à Léon Blum, c'est dans notre démocratie que l'on a discredited les mots droit, justice, paix, société des nations, en les associant à la force ou aux débris de la force, pour les employer enfin à cacher la débilité. De ce jargon, la Tchécoslovakie fut la première victime"(146).

Chardonne was most surprised by the apparent reversal produced after Munich, when the Right "voulait la paix à tout prix" whereas, hitherto, its representatives had always been willing to die for the "patrie"(147). Likewise L'Humanité - once the organ of the militant pacifist Jaurès - was now in the van of
the "war party". Yet these harmful oppositions were, in the long run, explicable through the very nature of France and the French: "nous sommes dans le pays des contradictions et des négations" (148). Politically the Frenchman, "ce révolutionnaire (...) conservateur" (149), gained most from liberal capitalism, because

"en vérité, il n'y a pas de politique fixe ou de programmes opposés à droite et à gauche. Il n'y a que des passions, et ces passions touchent à une certaine idée de la valeur humaine" (150).

The second of these texts was Paulhan's important essay "la Démocratie fait appel au premier venu", published in March 1939 (151). Paulhan's primary intent here was to show that the essence of democracy had been betrayed by the politicians and technocrats (Paulhan's word is "techniciens") of the period. His ideas are a curious blend of Rousseau, Alain, G.K. Chesterton and even Maurras. He began by identifying what were the forgotten or discarded ideals of democracy: "C'est d'abord que l'individu vaut mieux que l'Etat, c'est que la société est faite pour l'homme, non l'homme pour la société" (152). The individual was all that democracy required: "elle se donne la personne, et la personne lui suffit" (153). Secondly true democracy did not distinguish racially: "il s'agit de n'importe quelle personne, fût-elle de peau noire ou rouge" (154). Finally, echoing Rousseau, Paulhan believed that "l'homme vaut par ce qu'il a de naturel, d'immédiat, de naif, plutôt que par ce qu'il acquiert" (155). He felt that "ordinariness" was the true secret of democracy (and here Paulhan's argument takes on a certain "purity" reminiscent of Benda):
"La démocratie fait appel contre les aristocrates, et spécialement contre les aristocrates de l'intelligence - au premier venu. Et l'on en voit bien la raison: c'est que le premier venu est demeuré près de l'essentiel" (156).

With this in mind Paulhan declared: "il saute aux yeux que nous ne sommes pas en démocratie" (157).

Turning his attention to the recent crisis, Paulhan attempted to show that all the commentators who had assessed the ills of France were all right:

"En bref, tout se passe comme si la France n'avait jamais suivi le conseil de personne. Car il n'est pas une seule politique qui (...) ne nous eût évité la honte du dernier Munich, et celle des Muncichs à venir" (158).

The central weakness of the manner in which France had conducted international affairs derived from the lack of decisiveness, or rather the equivocation, which characterised the period, and which, for some (like Chardonne), epitomized France:

"De tant de bonnes intentions (...) l'on a préféré les prendre (toutes) à la fois faiblement: d'humilier l'Allemagne, mais lui permettre de découpler sa force. Accorder à l'Italie je ne sais quels services hypocrites, mais la blesser ouvertement. Feindre d'étayer la SDN, quand nous nous moquions d'elle..." etc. (158).

Such conduct was idiotic and non-democratic, according to Paulhan, and, in the final section Le prince de l'esprit, et l'homme de la rue, he returned to his own conception of democracy. Common sense and honesty were absent from politics, he implied, when pointing to the duplicity underlying French contact towards Czechoslovakia:
"l'homme ordinaire se dit tout bêtement qu'en lâchant un ami qu'il a jeté dans le danger, il se conduit comme un salaud" (160)

France was not democratic because its affairs were controlled by "les princes de l'esprit", by the apparatus of the Parties and by the "techniciens" (161). He did not deny that "il faut des savants et des techniciens" (162), but when they were in dispute, as they usually were, "je crois seulement (...) que(...) le dernier mot doit revenir (...) à l'Arbitrage, à l'Arbitraire..." (163).

This "Arbitrator" was "le premier venu", but Paulhan concluded that "quant à désigner ce premier venu, c'est une autre affaire" (164).

That this text was highly esteemed is clearly attested by Paulhan's correspondence, although Crémieux, for one, on seeing the proofs, felt that the conclusion was contradictory: if Paulhan wanted to see "un roi ou un dictateur, dis - le carrément", he exhorted (165). Jean Grenier admired the text, but he thought there may have been a confusion between "l'humanitarisme et la démocratie", a charge denied by Paulhan (166). Moreover, Grenier too felt the conclusion was too weak, but his correspondent replied that it was deliberately and necessarily so (167). In letters to Etiemble and Jouhandeau, Paulhan explained how closely his view coincided with that of the English author, G.K. Chesterton, whom he deeply admired:

"Je trouve dans Chesterton (...) ce mot étonnant: "le despotisme héréditaire est démocratique dans son essence: s'il n'admet pas que tous les hommes peuvent à la fois gouverner, du moins admet-il que n'importe qui peut gouverner" - c'est là tout le sens de ma note" (168).
Paulhan was indeed familiar with Chesterton and commentators are right to point to the influence of the 1908 text Orthodoxy. However, he also knew What's Wrong with the World?, the "social" sequel to the rather more theological-philosophical, earlier text, and, later in 1939, Paulhan included in the NRF a two-part translation of the first section of this book.

Indeed echoes of Chesterton are traceable in several letters to the reactionary Jouhandeau, who had evidently had difficulty in understanding Paulhan's March text:

"un roi est précisément un voisin, il n'a pas à être particulièrement intelligent (...), il est un homme comme vous ou moi, et en admettant qu'il est roi, et en l'aimant comme tel, nous admettons que n'importe qui peut gouverner, ce qui est le sentiment démocratique par excellence. Mais personne aujourd'hui n'a assez de confiance et d'admiration dans l'homme seul, dans l'homme qui n'est que l'homme..."(172).

It is true that Paulhan's conclusion weakened the overall effect of his reflections on democracy, but his reticence is partly explained by the likelihood that he would have drawn much criticism from the Left if he had been more explicitly in favour of monarchy or dictatorship. As it was, André Wurmser's reaction in Commune provided a useful sample of how the Left saw Paulhan's remarks. Wurmser accused his friend of examining the question in the void; the "quidam", as conceived here, had as much to do with democracy as the "statue de la place de la République". However unrealistic Paulhan's appreciation of democracy was, and however powerless or unwilling he was to explicitly (or even seditiously) suggest anything better, it remained clear enough that successive
governments had disappointed if not embittered him and others at the NRF. In the same issue, March 1939, an "Air du Mois" by Grenier signalled this unambiguously enough:

"La France n'a fait ni une politique de justice ni une politique de force (...) ses perpétuels louvoiements, son inconsistence d'idées due au régime électoral et parlementaire prouvent par leurs résultats actuels qu'il y a quelque chose de pire pour un peuple qu'un mauvais gouvernement: c'est l'absence de gouvernement" (174).

For all its faults, however, the Daladier Government remained relatively buoyant (175); after Hitler's invasion of Bohemia on March 15th 1939, Daladier "s'effora de créer un climat d'union nationale" (176). Moreover, opinion polls taken at the time suggest that the NRF had gauged very well what would eventually be the majority view, that Hitler had to be resisted. Already in February 1939, 79% "(des Français) estiment que "le souci le plus urgent du gouvernement doit être de renforcer la puissance militaire"", and, although 57% believed in February that there was no threat of war, by June 1939 the figure had fallen to 34% (177). Moreover, Mayeur has shown that, contrary to the misconception, the pacifism of such as Marcel Déat ("Mourir pour Dantzig? - Non!") was, in reality, a minority view (178). This relative change of course, and government by "décrets-lois", explains why, for a few months at least, the NRF ceased to be critical of the régime. Moreover Paulhan had to contend with the internal disputes simmering at the NRF at the same time: Léautaud left the review amid much bitterness, Schlumberger attacked Benda's position, and Italy banned the review in May (179).
Yet the failure of the "Grande Alliance" during these months, following Soviet proposals delivered on April 30th, showed that the "Allies" were far from united. Benda believed that the governments of Britain and France no longer represented the desires of their people: "Leurs chefs font ce qu'ils veulent", he noted bitterly in June. He predicted accurately once again:

"Quant aux masses, elles s'éveilleront un matin, soit pour les masses allemandes avec une guerre terrible qu'aura leur chef, soit pour les masses françaises dans une vassalité totale que leur ennemi aura réalisée sans même combattre et avec l'aide de leurs ministres",

and concluded: "Je m'en veux parfois de donner mon attention à de tels cloaques".

The NRF for July 1939 opened with Petitjean's resounding tribute to Péguy, killed in action just twenty-five years before; he bore a profound relevance in 1939, argued Petitjean who, characteristically, concluded with a sombre survey of contemporary France:

"A droite, la tradition est morte pour faire place à l'anarchie, mais quelques vieux "patriotes" commencent à s'ouvrir au peuple de France. A gauche, la révolution est morte, puisqu'elle s'en tient à la défense des droits acquis; mais plusieurs comprennent que le peuple n'est rien s'il n'est pas la Nation. La victoire est bien morte, et l'après-guerre se meurt, mais de partout lèvent enfin des forces nouvelles... Péguy parmi nous ne serait pas dépayssé longtemps."

Paulhan found it increasingly difficult to make relevant comments on events, as they were now moving very quickly, in spite of the hesitation of France and Britain in international diplomacy. The
negotiations of the hoped-for military alliance between France, Britain and the USSR took eleven days to vacillate over proposals: on August 17th, the talks were suspended by the Russians(185). Paulhan wrote to Hellens explaining his fears:

"Il me semble qu'on a ce soir plus de chances de s'en sortir sans guerre - à moins que ce délai ne soit la conséquence d'un pacte inattendu, et de toutes les justifications et des aménagements qui s'en suivent. T'y attendais-tu le moins du monde?"(186).

By the 23rd Hitler and Stalin had signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact, a move which pushed Europe "vers l'inexorable"(187). Indeed Hitler invaded Poland on September 1st, France mobilized, and by the 3rd both Britain and France had declared war on Germany, honouring (reluctantly) their pledges to Poland(188). Obviously the review could not react to the fact of war until its October issue; in the meantime, however, Gaston Gallimard decided to move the review and publishing house to the relative safety of his property "Mirande", in the department of the Manche, near the Mont Saint-Michel(189).

Despite the inconvenience of the relocation, the NRF continued to appear, although it was now not only subject to all the vicissitudes of mass mobilization and printing-delays, it had also to negotiate the obstacle of the official censorship, inaugurated by "décret" on August 27th 1939(190). On September 5th Paulhan told Grenier that

"la NRF a traversé la censure sans dommages autres qu'un paragraphe coupé dans Pourrat, un autre dans Petitjean (nos deux auteurs dangereux, évidemment)"(191).
A day or so before their departure for "Mirande", Paulhan told Jouhandeau of a visit to the "Commissariat à l'Information", located in the Hôtel Continental on the rue de Rivoli:

"j'ai eu tort de m'égarer hier à la Propagande. Tu ne t'imagines pas le défaitisme de tous les gens que l'on y voit. Je les aurais fait volontiers fusiller..."(192).

Later, Paulhan reported to Schlumberger that the "Commissariat" was a "fourmilière inerte"(193). The major drawback of the censorship was that delays were inevitable between the submission of the "morasses", or first-proofs, and the final printing, a point noted by Leautaud(194). The mobilization also meant that both administrators and contributors would no longer be able to work for or submit material to the NRF: Paulhan, his wife Germaine and Gaston Gallimard were hard worked as they only had a skeleton staff. In addition to these duties, Paulhan ensured that news of the postings of staff was passed on: as Sartre put it, he was the "godmother" of the NRF(195).

Once the October issue had passed through the censorship, subscribers would have noticed Paulhan's leading article "Retour sur dix-neuf cent quatorze"(196). Here Paulhan, remembering his own circumstances at the outbreak of the First World War, remarked that, in 1939,

"ceux qui partent aujourd'hui, comme ils sont plus sages - et, je pense, plus sagement dirigés. (...) Silencieux: sans cris ni curiosité. Sans pillages. Sans trop de surprise. (...) Où sont-ils, nous ne le savons déjà plus. Qu'ils vivent tous, Que vive notre pays"(197).
Moreover, the Parties (which he saw disparagingly as "les intermédiaires entre la vérité et nous") remained just as paralysed in the face of war as they had been hitherto: "jamais les Partis n'ont été mieux déroutés, ou plus faux". Paulhan hoped that, unlike the previous war, the French would retain their reason, that the authorities would not implement "un bourrage de crâne", and that the war would be seen as a stark reality with real men, and not as a "mythe". He also hoped that the soldiers in this war would receive more recognition than they had in 1914-1918, and wrote:

"A la question: "Pourquoi te bats-tu?", faites que chacun d'eux puisse répondre: "C'est pour être un jour heureux et honoré"." (201)

Gide felt Paulhan's contribution had been "discrète et pourtant très significative", while Sartre, posted near the German border, told Simone de Beauvoir that "l'article de Paulhan m'a fait littéralement gonfler (...); s'il savait combien les types d'ici sont loin de penser à être un jour heureux et honorés!". (203)

Sartre's comments clearly show that Paulhan, despite the good intentions of his article, had somewhat misjudged the mood and opinions of the ordinary soldier at the front.

The next issue of the NRF suffered more substantially at the hands of the censors. Paulhan told Suarès, upon acknowledging receipt of November's "Chronique de Caërdal", that "j'y glisse une admirable lettre que m'a écrite Armand Petitjean 'd'Allemagne occupée', pourvu que la Censure vous respecte, le respecte". (204) As things turned out, both Suarès and Petitjean's "Chroniques"
were noticeably pruned; indeed, the whole of Page 781 was left blank. Paulhan felt it necessary to apologize to readers the next month. Petitjean, as a serving soldier, was particularly likely to be censored: in fact, anything touching on the conduct of the war or which might endanger national security had to be scrutinized. Suarès, however, poured forth his familiar invective, and, talking of Hitler's treatment of Poland, he wrote:

"Seul, le plus vil des ennemis, cinq cent mille fois assassin ose vomir l'injure sur ses victimes: il mêle son crachat à la mer immense de sang qu'il fait couler".

Remarkably enough his call for the mobilization and resistance of neutral countries escaped the blue pencil:

"Prévenus de toutes parts, les Neutres n'ont plus le droit d'être sourds (...). Neutres, c'est pour vous que la France et l'Angleterre se sont armées autant que pour elles-mêmes; pour vous qu'elles versent leur sang. C'est vous qu'elles sauvent en se sauvant; leur victoire sera la vôtre(...). Votre salut à tour dépend du nôtre".

If Suarès' text partially satisfied the censors, it caused offence among several readers, some of whom were very close to the NRF; Paulhan told Schlumberger and Suarès that the review was thought to be too bellicose. Moreover the "balance" of the November number had been damaged by Schlumberger's opposition to the publication of a text by the pacifist Giono: Paulhan believed a long-held principle had been flouted:
"(Votre position) est horrible, et dangereux, parce qu'elle ne tend à rien moins qu'à saper l'un des principes profonds de la NRF. C'est à savoir que lorsqu'un texte 1) est parfaitement beau; 2) ne contient rien d'absolument scandaleux, il faut le publier quel qu'en soit le signataire. Là-dessus je vous laisse à votre remords" (211).

Paulhan clearly wished to preserve the independence of the NRF (or at least a semblance thereof): the evidence shows, however, that the publication of certain authors, which for some signified balance, was regarded by others as provocative, if not seditious. However admirable it was to wish to debate matters of principle, the State (and its Censors) had to conduct affairs according to the rules of war. Such was Paulhan's dilemma; he would have undoubtedly concurred with the sentiments of Petitjean who, in his truncated November "Lettre", wrote:

"J'espère que la revue va conserver sa liberté et sa vie, qui deviendront scandaleuses. Pourquoi ne pas discuter maintenant des buts de guerre et des moyens de paix. Du principe même de la guerre? C'est pendant qu'il est bon et courageux d'en parler" (212).

Indeed Schlumberger made his own feelings clear in the conclusion of his "Air du Mois" "Premier mort" in November: talking of the death of the first French soldier, he remarked:

"Quand un pays consent de (sic) tels sacrifices, c'est qu'il est engagé, sans recul possible. Il nous en a désormais terriblement convaincus. Il nous a terriblement engagés, nous aussi. C'est fait. Nous n'essayerons plus de nous reprendre" (213).

Drieu, too, writing of "L'Actualité du XXe siècle" (214), believed that Revolution had been the root cause of the present internecine struggle in Europe; he concluded that a divided Europe should
unite economically and politically to establish "une vaste autarchie, parmi les débris du socialisme et du libéralisme", to restore the greatness of Europe in a "fédération européenne". In exactly one year's time, Drieu would be called upon by Otto Abetz, Hitler's ambassador in Paris, to relaunch the NRF as what Drieu came to view as one of the cultural pillars of the Greater Germany. In the meantime however, Drieu concluded that the dictators would succeed sooner or later,

"si la France et l'Angleterre ne sont pas capables dès maintenant de penser une Genève virile et humaine qui s'articule sur des pensées moins débiles que celles d'un vieux monde politicien hypocrite et incapable".

Realizing there was little point in submitting material to the censors which may have had to be immediately cut, Paulhan temporarily changed his tactics, and invited controversial authors (i.e. controversial politically) to submit non-political material; he believed it had been "un petit tour de force d'avoir extrait d'Alain, un panégyrique de l'Angleterre, voire de l'Angleterre guerrière". In the same number he inserted Aragon's poems "Le temps des mots croisés", and arranged to serialize his latest novel. The discerning reader would, moreover, have realized the full significance of Schlumberger's essay "Actualités Retrospectives-Documents sur le Patriotisme français" and, indeed, Schlumberger returned to the question next month.

The "Drole de Guerre" led many at home- in Paris- to lapse into a state of stunned complacency; inaction and lack of enthusiasm
at the front lay behind the fact that "les 'ressorts' de l'opinion publique étaient complètement détendus" (221). As Schlumberger commented later, the war "gardait quelque chose de fantomatique. N'étaient réels que le désordre de la vie quotidienne et que les départs des mobilisés" (222). It even seemed likely for a time that the censorship - at least as it affected the NRF - might be eased (223). Paulhan intended to resist the general complacency, and, in the leading pages of the January 1940 issue, he included an important essay by Schlumberger "Pour saluer l'année nouvelle" (224). "Il ne suffira plus d'être le pays de la vie facile", urged Schlumberger, and concluded:

"C'est de fond en comble qu'il faudra tout rénover, tout dérouiller et rajeunir. Personne ne pourra rentrer dans ses vieux chaussons et regagner le coin de son feu en disant: Ce n'est pas mon affaire" (226).

Paulhan agreed: he believed that the NRF had been consistent on the questions of threatened war and patriotism since April 1938:

"Je crois qu'actuellement toute valeur française, dans la mesure où elle ne joue pas contre la patrie, joue pour elle. Vivent les vers d'Aragon, et les fantaisies montagnards de Giono, et les panégyriques anglais d'Alain! C'est de là aussi que viendra le renouveau français. Et pour le reste je veux dire: "Pour tout ce qui touche au patriotisme, être aussi inflexible qu'il se peut". (…) Petitjean depuis deux ans a très bien fixé notre attitude, il me semble" (227).

This was more than simply Paulhan's personal opinion; it was a statement of faith and of editorial policy which was adhered to throughout the "Drôle de Guerre" period, and was further
confirmed by an announcement in the publicity brochure for January 1940. Notifying the subscribers of an inevitable price increase due to wartime conditions, the text underlined the fact that now the NRF and its readers needed each other more than ever:

"La guerre enfin a laissé à la NRF son aspect habituel(228). Les problèmes qu'elle pose à chaque Français et à chaque homme, ceux que déjà nous pose l'après-guerre, seront dans ses pages l'objet d'une attention constante. Si nos abonnés et nos lecteurs estiment que la NRF est digne de leur confiance, qu'ils nous aident en renouvelant sans tarder leur abonnement, en nous gagnant autour d'eux de nouveaux lecteurs. Leur amitié nous est plus que jamais nécessaire"(229).

As though to confirm this outlook, Paulhan prepared an issue for February 1940 which stands as the wartime counterpart to the November 1938 "special number" on Munich. Out of the 144-page number, some 56 pages were directly concerned with the war; it opened with Pierre-Jean Jouve's emotional poem "A la France 1940"(230). "Aux armes!", apostrophized Jouve, and he went on to liken their struggle to a battle with the Antichrist, in a sequence reminiscent of Suarès, in particular his "Chronique de Calérdal" for December 1939(231):

"La face humaine est offensée
Par le gorille à la casquette noire
Dieu souffre et la face humaine est offensée
La bête de la mer est la bête de fer
Hitlérienne! et le chiffre 666 à son front
Elle avance contre nos coeurs! A Dieu, aux armes!"(232).

In an image which conjures up Delacroix's La Liberté guidant le Peuple, Jouve's poem ends:
"La croix de Christ encor se voit contre ton sein
Et sur ton front léger le bonnet phrygien:
Poursuis à mort la guerre au tueur pourrissant
Tes beaux yeux consacrés par la Liberte pure
Le sang rouge, le bleu divin, et l'ange blanc"(233)

Julien Benda, in his last major text in the NRF, analysed "La Crise de la Morale clericale"(234). Here Benda assessed the motives behind the desire of the democratic governments to restore what he called "la morale socratico-chretienne"(235) once Hitler had been defeated. Hitler's regime had debased the old values of Justice, Truth, Trustworthiness and respect for the individual regardless of class or condition. Benda asserted that he, and others of his generation, had taken them for granted; but, towards the end of the Nineteenth Century a veritable crusade had been launched against these values. Benda's enumeration of the "actions collectives" forming this crusade were familiar to readers of La Trahison des Clercs and, in one way, his essay may be read as a 1940-postscript to the well-known book (236). German Nationalism, Marxism and those "faux clercs" Sorel, Nietzsche and Maurras had all contributed to the erosion. He estimated that any governments restoring these values would not do so completely: the achievements of the Communists, for instance, would have to be accounted for(237). Yet this imperfection was not regrettable, thought Benda, saying "tant de purete inquiête"; he concluded:

"On se demande parfois si ceux qui rêvent d'un tel monde n'éprouvent pas certaine joie, pour peu que quelque sensibilité artistique les asservisse encore, de penser qu'il ne se réalisera jamais qu'imparfaitement"(238).
The next two texts are remarkable in that they stand as invaluable documents bearing witness to the feeling of inertia which characterized the "Drôle de Guerre". Petitjean, writing as "Armand" from the Saar front, returned to a familiar theme in "Pour l'Après-guerre" (239). For him, the opening of hostilities had been "aussi peu sacrée que possible", but it had then been followed by "une période d'indicible tristesse" (240). He and his comrades at the front now realized that "la formidable mythomanie entretenue depuis près de vingt ans, en Allemagne et ailleurs, par une génération d'anciens combattants et des cohortes d'adolescents est peut-être en train de s'épuiser lentement au contact de celle qui reste, malgré tout, la réalité des réalités" (241).

The threat of death was only too real, lamented Petitjean, and he honoured a fellow-soldier Julot, among the first fatalities (242). Also part of the reality was the supreme disenchantment he and others had experienced after the mobilization: for the Communists particularly, the Nazi-Soviet Pact left them crying with rage and tearing up their Party cards (243). Already in October this had proved to be an "ersatz" war, as he put it (244); yet, "la guerre sera peut-être, cette fois, propice au mûrissement..." (245).

Petitjean held firm to his optimism when he wrote: "c'est la vie du pays entier qui peut et doit sortir régénérée de notre expérience" (246). His hope and call for a "Nouvelle Révolution Française" whereby "la Nation entrera dans notre vie quotidienne" (247) have an ominous ring when it is remembered that later Petitjean went on to "collaborate" with Drieu's NRF (248).
Secondly, André Chamson, to whom Daladier had offered the direction of the "Commissariat de l'Information" and who had preferred to be attached to the French Fifth Army among the fighting troops, sent Paulhan some extracts "d'un Carnet de Route d'un officier de liaison". "Est-ce la présence de la mort qui pèse sur tout!" asked Chamson. He qualified his affirmative answer in sentences which recall Malraux:

"Mais ce qui pèse plus encore, c'est la fraternité. Fraternité dans la solitude. Là, l'homme est plus seul qu'il ne peut l'être en aucun autre lieu du monde (...). Mais nulle part ailleurs l'homme n'est aussi fraternel à l'homme." 

Action under fire produced, for Chamson, a unique solidarity among men; his feelings were strongest for "les paysans". "Ce que j'ai fait de meilleur dans ma vie", he admitted, "c'est d'avoir témoigné pour les paysans (homme de la route hier, homme de la boue et du sang, aujourd'hui)". Moreover, reflecting upon the reasons for fighting this war, Chamson felt that "nous sommes dans quelque chose de beaucoup plus grand qu'une guerre. Nous sommes dans une métamorphose de la vie humaine". After all the hopes of the preceding twenty-five years, "deux mois ont suffi à tout balayer (...). La moitié de l'Europe est tombée entre les mains des aventuriers et des gangsters. Il s'agit d'épargner ce malheur à la France". Chamson's message was quite simple: only by resisting Fascist aggression could France be saved. There could now be no turning back; the war must be prosecuted to its conclusion:
"Guerre ou pas guerre, nous sommes partis, l'enjeu est sur la table (...). Le peuple le plus pacifiste et le plus pacifique de la terre, le nôtre, refuse la main qu'on feint de lui tendre. Il accepte la guerre, parce qu'il ne veut pas d'une fausse paix, parce qu'il n'a plus confiance dans la paix" (256).

In the "chroniques" section, Drieu, criticizing Maurras' ideas on foreign affairs, did so as a pretext for affirming his basic assumption that "il faut que quelqu'un à l'Est ou au centre de l'Europe soit assez fort pour tenir tête à la Russie" (257).

The censors, however, cut the last half-page of Drieu's text, so his speculative ideas hung in the void with no conclusion. Even more drastic was the treatment meted out to Alain's "Sur la Guerre de Finlande" (258). The Soviets' attack on Finland on November 30th, and the subsequent defeat of this neutral country, were regarded particularly severely in France as an example of Bolshevik perfidy (259). Of Alain's text not even the first sentence remained intact, and two and a half pages were excised in their entirety. The censors could evidently not tolerate mention of this sensitive war for, once again, it showed up the flagrant inconsistencies of their own Government's policy:

"Alors que l'écrasement de la Pologne, notre alliée, par l'Allemagne, notre ennemi, n'avait suscité dans les milieux politiques et dans l'opinion publique qu'un ennui distingué, l'honorable défaite d'un pays neutre crée une vive émotion" (260).

Indeed the approach to the Finland débâcle was a major contributory factor to the change of government on 21st-22nd March 1940, when the "belliciste" Paul Reynaud replaced the "munichois" Daladier (261).
The February issue of the NRF had emerged relatively unscathed from the censorship: perhaps Paulhan's negotiations with his childhood friend, Guillaume de Tarde, an administrator at the Hôtel Continental, had helped to pass the issue. In March, the proportion of texts directly treating the war diminished dramatically, except for Ramuz' "Pages d'un Neutre" and Schlumberger's "Chronique" "Les Maries et les Marthes". This text reflected upon the opposition of those who wished to remain "au dessus de la mêlée" and those for whom such a stance was inadmissible in times of war. Using a Biblical analogy, Schlumberger mused upon those "esprits (qui) se consacrent à préparer les lendemains":

"Ils s'attribuent la part de Marie qui (...) passait les journées aux pieds du Seigneur, à écouter parler de la vie éternelle, tandis que sa soeur Marthe se plaignait de vaquer toute seule aux soins de ménage (...). L'éternité est peut-être aux Maries, mais les temps de guerre sont les temps de Marthes".

The April issue contained material still less directly concerned with the hostilities. Paulhan was wise to be so circumspect, given the change of régime. Yet the gulf between the "pacifists" and the "bellicists" widened in the NRF, and Schlumberger's fears of a split were justified. Indeed Schlumberger was among the most responsible, for he baulked once again at the inclusion of Giono in April's issue. Paulhan told Martin du Gard on April 4th:

"Parce qu'il vient d'y trouver le nom de Giono, Jean Schlumberger à son tour rompt avec la NRF. Injuste certes. Ni plus ni moins que vous".
Martin de Gard was not totally surprised by Schlumberger's action, given that he had signalled his full approval of Mauriac's stance on the war and change of régime as expressed in an article published in *Le Figaro* (271). To Paulhan, Schlumberger's action "paraît fou" (272), and he wrote to Grenier asking for advice. He clearly felt, once again, that the NRF had to make its position as well-defined as possible:

"Crois-tu qu'il faudrait, en tête de chaque NRF, une ou deux pages (de préférence non signées) qui serviraient de "prise de position", donneraient à la revue une sorte de continuité, serviraient aussi à la justifier des reproches bizarres et, heureusement, contradictoires dont on l'accable. Par exemple, qu'elle est au fond défaitiste et commet une sorte de trahison en donnant Giono (dixit Schlumberger). Ou bien, qu'elle est belliciste, et peut-être pas tout à fait innocente de la guerre, avec son Benda et son Petitjean (dixit Martin du Gard, etc)" (273).

There then follows a text which Paulhan entitled "Pour la Liberté de l'esprit en temps de guerre", and which he characterized as "une sorte d'apologie pour le bourrage de crâne" (274). Suarès was asked for the same advice; summarizing his intention, Paulhan wrote: "J'y dirais que la pire censure vient des faux-bonshommes qui voudraient nous empêcher de dire qu'Hitler est un imbécile sanglant, que les Allemands, etc..." (275).

While Paulhan was wondering how to reconcile if not eliminate the differences within the NRF, the war spread, in April, to Denmark and Norway (276). The Nazis overran their latest victims in a matter of hours, according to a pattern becoming familiar: the "Blitzkrieg" would soon be unleashed on the West. The leading text placed in May's review partially fulfilled Paulhan's requirements;
this was Bernanos' "Nous retournons dans la guerre" (277).

This extract from Bernanos' wartime journal 'in exile' was an impressive reminder of the talents of this former devotee of Charles Maurras (278). Essentially Bernanos' bitter reflexions gravitated around what he saw as the treacherous split between "l'Avant" and "l'Arrière". "Je n'ai jamais senti le moindre orgueil de ce que nous appelions la Victoire", he began, and continued:

"ce que nous gardions d'orgueil n'avait pas résisté longtemps à une certaine expérience commune et vulgaire de l'angoisse, dont ne sauraient se faire aucune idée les Grands Citoyens de l'Arrière" (280).

Placing himself in an historical perspective, Bernanos believed that "notre victoire n'était pas une victoire, et nous n'avons jamais été de vainqueurs" (281). For him the greatest treachery committed by "l'Arrière" was that the "peace" they had negotiated betrayed all the sacrifices of the dead soldiers (282). Bernanos' attitude to the leaders of "l'Arrière" bore a remarkable resemblance to the criticisms of Inter-War governments already voiced in the NRF by Paulhan. Yet for Bernanos, exiled in Brazil, recent events seemed all the more pointless when a section of the Press saw the new war as a means of rehabilitating the previous one (283). In the face of such rhetoric, he felt that "il est nécessaire que ces choses soient dites" (284), for

"l'important n'est pas d'accélérer ou de retarder le cours des choses, (...) c'est d'aider à maintenir debout un petit nombre d'hommes capable de fierté" (285).
Although he was confined physically to "l'Arrière", Bernanos remained attuned in spirit to those at the front, and concluded that

"L'Histoire n'est pas faite par les heureux ou les malheureux (...) mais par les hommes qui se reconnaissent incapables au cours d'une vie trop courte de distinguer entre le bonheur ou le malheur, décident de les surmonter tous les deux, choisissent de tenir ferme à la place où Dieu les a mis, selon leurs lumières et leur conscience"(286).

Petitjean, whom Paulhan saw as one of those "capable de fierté"(287), had a further extract published from his autumn "Journal de Guerre" directly after Bernanos' text(288). A few days after the May number had appeared, Hitler began his Western offensive on May 10th; by the 13th; his Panzers had crossed the Meuse at Sedan and, two weeks later, the British Expeditionary Force was trapped at Dunkirk(289). Against this chaotic background, Paulhan was already anticipating worse to come. Writing to Jules Supervielle on May 24th, he lamented:

"C'est un mauvaise journée: Calais et Dunkerque perdus, les Belges nous lâchent. Enfin plus que jamais, espoir ... Tout est angoissant. Pourtant je m'attends à ce que l'Angleterre maintenant étonne le monde..."(290).

The key-word here is "Espoir", and it returns again in the title of Paulhan's final text in the NRF for June 1940: "L'Espoir et le Silence"(291). Echoing Chamson, here Paulhan equated hope with resistance to "une des plus grandes forces du monde (...) dressée contre nous"(292). In addition to faith placed in "l'intention" and "le génie", the French were now
"contraints aussi de ressembler à cet autre espoir que mettent en nous dix peuples torturés, dont les uns souffrent silencieux, et les autres se battent en héros"(293).

The greatest hope in the face of the threatened Nazi invasion was a political one, after all:

"Certes notre république semble avoir avoué, depuis vingt ans, tous les vices dont les adversaires lui font grief. Pourtant nous nous battons pour quelque chose qui ressemble à la République: pour la liberté des personnes, contre la servitude volontaire"(294).

In what he called "une réconciliation française", Paulhan hinted at the coming Resistance:

"En vérité, le problème a des termes si clairs qu'il serait fou de ne point espérer une réconciliation française, si chacun de nous, dès aujourd'hui, le pose et s'essaie à le résoudre, dans son secret. Dans son silence"(295).

With these words, Paulhan anticipated his own attitude in the months and years to come under Nazi Occupation. In the meantime, still in the June NRF, "Armand" assembled a selection of "Témoignages sur la Guerre"(296) intended to show "pourquoi nous épions avec tant de soin le premier souffle des hommes travaillés par la guerre"(297). However, these texts arrived too late for, by June 4th, Dunkirk had finally fallen. Only ten days later, German troops entered Paris, the Occupation had begun.

Faced with the threat of the Nazi advance the NRF uprooted again, and, not unscathed this time, fled southwards, where they settled in Villalier, near Carcassonne(298). As for the review itself, Paulhan told Suarès that "l'on nous enlève 70
pages de la NRF, par les décrets de mai. Soit. Je suis tout heureux de pouvoir donner le Paraclet"(299); but, given that the Germans reached the printers' in Saint-Amand before July's number could be finalized, Paulhan needed to worry no longer about the delicate problem of selecting material for this issue(300). The reign of the NRF over the world of intellectual and literary life in the Inter-War period had come to an abrupt end.
IN CONCLUSION

Although the Occupation put an end to the preparation and publication of the NRF, Paulhan and some of his colleagues did not remain inactive. Not long after the Armistice, moves were made to launch "une NRF de zone libre", with Pascal Pia, André Malraux, Roger Martin du Gard and François Mauriac as founder-members; the authorities in Vichy, however, withheld their permission (1). As the summer of 1940 drew on, Paulhan remained silent publicly, but kept a very close watch upon the moves being made "behind the scenes" regarding the future of the NRF. If Paulhan chose silence (and resistance), the Germans, for their part, would not allow such a valuable asset as the NRF to disappear; by September, Paulhan knew that Drieu had been called upon by Otto Abetz to relaunch the Nouvelle Revue Française; the title remained the same, but this would be a very different review (2). Drieu had initially wanted him as co-director, but "Je n'en ai aucune envie", wrote Paulhan in November 1940 (3). Moreover, as he told Hellens, even if the Germans had accepted him, he would have been betraying those Jewish contributors he had invited to the review and whom he had protected for so long, for they were to be excluded from the NRF consistent with the new anti-Jewish laws passed by Vichy before the Nazis' own laws came into force (4). "Je vais être chômeur", the former director of the NRF informed Léautaud (5). By this time Paulhan had become an enthusiastic supporter of Britain and of De Gaulle, and was instrumental in setting up "la Résistance littéraire". Another "résistant", Jacques Debû-Bridel, has honoured his role:
Paulhan himself, looking back at the role of the NRF during those inauspicious months before and after June 1940, acknowledged the review's anticipation of Resistance when, after the war, most of the texts chosen for the "Drôle de Guerre" section of the anthology *La Patrie se fait tous les jours* were taken from the NRF (7).

The NRF was, indeed, the prime mediator in publishing what was and is recognised as the most enduring literature of the Inter-War period in France; yet the review also reflected (and reflected upon) the issues which preoccupied most intellectuals at the time, whether on the Left or Right of the political spectrum. Like the gradually declining Radical Party, it had no rigid, doctrinaire ideological preferences or commitment, other than its ultimately unshakeable esteem for the French Republic. This fact, ironically enough, although it may have sometimes seemed that the NRF - through its senior "chroniqueurs" - was forever fixed in a sterile veneration of Radicalist ideals and thus consigned to political immobility, protected it from usurpation by either the extreme-Left or the extreme-Right. Even when it or its contributors fell prey to the more persuasive temptations towards expressing political commitment more forcefully, Paulhan counteracted so that the poise of the review could be re-established. In this...
way, despite certain individuals' and the public's misconceptions concerning the status of its regular personnel, and concerning its location in the centre of the range of periodical reviews, the NRF played a genuine, leading role in the promotion of intellectual debate in Inter-War Europe.

Jean Paulhan, admirably equipped to take over as editor from Jacques Rivièe after his untimely death in 1925, became, at first, gradually more willing, as a matter of policy, to consider texts which were not strictly literary, so long as they were well-written and not identifiably partisan. In the same way he usually worried little about the political views of his contributors, a partial explanation of the apparent eclecticism of the NRF, where texts by writers with Marxist affiliations would appear alongside those by writers of the moderate- and even extreme-Right. However, closer examination has revealed that those regularly involved with the review did have political preconceptions, preferences and prejudices including Paulhan himself, Gide, Benda, Alain and Albert Thibaudet. In fact these last three named not only formed the pivotal centre of the regular features - or "chroniques" - of the NRF, they were also renowned as the brightest intellectual stars in a specifically Radical-Republican firmament. To borrow Thibaudet's words, they represented all that was best in the mature Third Republic, the République des Professeurs.

Paulhan's assiduous and unflinching support for Julien Benda especially, betrays a desire at the heart of the NRF for perpetuating a non-ideological, idealistic, rationalistic conception of all that
was just and pure in the Republican intellectual tradition in France. Nowhere in this tendency more clearly illustrated than in the decision to pre-publish, in 1927, Benda's celebrated and often-reprinted work *La Trahison des Clercs*. Even Benda, determined idealist though he was, set out to interpret the role of the intellectuals within historical terms of reference which explicitly extended back beyond the Radical Republic to its origins in the French Revolution: as the 1930's progressed towards further, albeit milder, political revolution in the shape of the Popular Front, so Benda aligned himself with those whom he considered as the Twentieth-Century inheritors of the Jacobins, the Communists. The long-running debate following the publication of *La Trahison des Clercs* had effectively opened the *NRF* to intellectual exchange and had directly cleared the way towards the increasing "engagement" of its "regulars", above all Gide, Malraux, Benda and Fernandez.

The implications of these exchanges led to a regularly expressed and widespread recognition of the necessity to balance or even confront the idealistic conception of the Radical Republic with its outmoded and ineffectual political practices, as well as to modernise the ideas and ideology which underpinned them. The *NRF* publicly participated in this scrutiny and even lent itself as a platform for the expression of new doctrine although, at the same time, Paulhan learnt much about the dangers the review incurred in doing so.

To a certain extent the *NRF* had been primed for political considerations in respect of an issue which had always been present
there. The status and connections of such as Rivière, Gide and Schlumberger, their interest in Germany, as well as established editorial policy, made it impossible to ignore the central, topical issue which dominated the period, that is, Franco-German relations. The question was such that it gave rise to renewed misconceptions concerning the validity or otherwise of French attitudes to Germany following the imposition of the Versailles Treaty, misconceptions which were not overcome until it was realized, too late, that tensions between the two countries were politically and historically derived, and not explicable through differences in culture or their respective "national characters". It was only when the question began to be considered in terms of a Fascist-Antifascist confrontation that a more realistic appraisal could be made. Once this confrontation was recognised as inescapable, the issue was dropped from the review.

Continuing the international theme, Gide's long-standing search for a new, non-conformist, anti-bourgeois humanism led him for a time into expressing sympathy for Soviet Russia. This affiliation was, it is true, actively encouraged and abetted by Bolshevik sympathisers and fellow-travellers both within and outside the review; yet, once again, the interest shown in the Soviet experiment is partly comprehensible in a Radical-Republican perspective. Most important, despite the strenuous efforts of Paulhan, the NRF risked, for a time, through the expressions of faith it carried, following reviews such as Europe and Commune into the broad-Left camp: it was only Gide's disappointment with Soviet reality, and Paulhan's promotion of a critique of Marxian orthodoxy which restored balance.
As the true nature of Nazism began to be perceived in France, so the issue of anti-Semitism took on an increasingly high charge. Of course anti-Semitism was neither new nor foreign to France: its undercurrent may be detected well before the 1930's. However, as Nazi racialism spread and found favour among certain elements of the French intellectual world, the more difficult it was to exclude the Jewish question from the NRF, especially as three of the front-line regulars - Benda, Crémieux and Suarès - were all of Jewish extraction, although, significantly, they eschewed Zionism. Other contributors too, among them Gide, Léautaud and Jouhandeau - were either mildly or extremely anti-Semitic. Where compromise was impossible, resignations were threatened.

Finally, the weakness of the Third Republic (although still revered for its ideals and origins) and external factors set off an irreversible advance towards a new world war: some writing in the NRF had foreseen this by the late 1920's and, after the Munich accords of 1938, Paulhan deliberately steered the NRF towards a partisan, patriotic stance which others perceived as bellicose.

Until the final demise of the Popular Front, Paulhan had, as editor, attempted - perhaps not always successfully - to maintain balance without adopting a recognisably entrenched position. During the drift towards war, however, Paulhan noticeably changed, taking a much more firm and autocratic grip over the orientation
of the NRF. He no longer showed unreserved deference to such as his former mentor Jean Schlumberger; his attitude was, rather, one of downright bluntness, especially when editorial vetos menaced the consistency of the line Paulhan wished to take. Once the Munich agreements had been exposed more universally as the delusion they were, and once the public had adopted a more realistic outlook, the NRF, without changing its own perspective, came to represent the majority view regarding the likelihood, if not the necessity, of war. Especially after the outbreak of the Second World War - during the "Drôle de Guerre" - Paulhan reinforced his line by nurturing the intense patriotism gravitating around him, finding that it was not at all inconsistent to criticise the weakness of the régime when the homeland was threatened as a consequence.

If Paulhan's partisan attitude after Munich signifies a break with or a deviation from his previous thinking, this was, of course, imposed as a result of external, historical factors and was hardly the product of any voluntary shift in editorial policy. Overall, in fact, the treatment the issues received was ultimately subordinated to the politically- or historically-derived assumptions that the review's contributors made: Paulhan, once he had invited them, could no more stem the tide of politically-charged reactions to and implications of a work such as La Trahison des Clercs and its sequels, than prevent the NRF from reflecting (and nurturing) such debate.
Despite Paulhan's invocations of literary primacy, and despite his claims that the NRF's independence was assured by its unique, in-built "orthodoxy", editorial choices and preferences had to be imposed. Very often, especially regarding "non-literary" texts, these choices were determined by conjunctural factors. Moreover in the long run, the success of any review like the NRF is the result of the status, influence and acceptability of its contributors: these, at least, are the conditions determining commercial success from a reader's or subscriber's point of view. In this way the literary qualities and credentials of writers such as Gide or Malraux, Jouhandeau or Arland, Schlumberger or Drieu are beyond doubt: but it is certain too that the success of the Inter-War NRF must also be ascribed to its standing as an internationally-recognised forum for intellectual debate.
"Historical and Political Preoccupations in La Nouvelle Revue Française under the editorship of Jean Paulhan, 1925 to 1940"

by

Martyn Cornick

A thesis submitted in two volumes (I and II) for the degree of Ph.D. at the University of Warwick, Coventry. The research was carried out in the French Department.

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INTRODUCTION - NOTES

Place of publication is Paris unless otherwise stated.


2. La Revue critique des Idées et des Livres, 27, 25/1/20, p. 117.


4. For the inside view, cf. the opinions of Jean Paulhan and Jean Schlumberger (See Chapter One, epigraphs); for the views of the outsiders, see the following samples: André Wurmser: "...nous dévorions chaque mois, comme tout le monde, La Nouvelle Revue Française... (...) La NRF, c'était glorieux. C'était le peloton de tête, le sanctuaire des Lettres, le Panthéon des Vivants..." (Fidèlement vôtre, Grasset, 1979, pp. 51, 53).
François Mitterrand: "A dix-sept ans (...) j'avais eu mon évolution personnelle et je lisais Gide, Claudel, la NRF" (Le Nouvel Observateur, 18-24/11/68, p. 8).
Even Robert Brasillach admitted to faithfully reading the NRF: see Notre avant-guerre, Plon, 1941, p. 33.


6. ibid.

7. For a perceptive judgement of the NRF's commanding rôle in the "publishing cycle" in France, see Régis Debray, Le Pouvoir intellectuel en France, Ramsay, 1979, esp. pp. 73-94.

8. For full references the reader is referred to Claude Martin's complete index of the NRF from 1919 to 1940 in three volumes: for details, see bibliography below, Section III. These indexes, indispensable for the student of the NRF, list each issue of the review chronologically by Contents, as well as alphabetically by Contributor (referred to as NRF Index 1, 2 or 3).

9. My task was facilitated in this respect by the generosity of Mme. Jacqueline F. Paulhan; see Acknowledgements. The reader is also referred to Section I of the bibliography below, Unpublished Correspondence, for an important note regarding the presentation of references.
10. Inspection of the important and substantial volume of Paulhan's Choix de Lettres, I, 1917-1936, La littérature est une fête (par Dominique Aury et Jean-Claude Zylberstein; revu et annoté par Bernard Leuilliot), Gallimard, 1986, bears this out. (Hereafter referred to as Choix de Lettres, with date and page number).

11. As reflected by Anglès' tribute to Paulhan's achievement: "La composition du sommaire de chaque numéro, cet arrangement de fleurs, cet "ike-bana" à la japonaise, sans règles était à elle seule un tour de force critique, renouvelé chaque mois", Magazine littéraire, February 1983, p.21.
CHAPTER ONE - NOTES

1. The early NRF, founded in 1908 under Eugène Montfort and then restarted in February 1909 by André Gide, Jean Schlumberger, Henri Ghéon, Jacques Copeau, André Ruyters and Michel Arnauld, has been studied in microscopic detail by the late Auguste Anglès in his magisterial history André Gide et le premier groupe de la NRF, 1890-1910, Gallimard, 1978. The only other book-length published history is Lina Morino's "La Nouvelle Revue Française" dans l'histoire des Lettres, 1908-1937, Gallimard, 1939. Although far surpassed by Anglès for the early period, Morino's work remains informative, if shallow and descriptive. A founder's view is provided by Jean Schlumberger, in Eveils (1950), in Oeuvres, VI, Gallimard, 1960. Sylvia Caides Vagianos examined a specific relationship in Paul Claudel et la NRF, 1909-1918, Droz, Geneva, 1979. See also the interviews with Rivière and Copeau, among others, in Frédéric Lefèvre, Une Heure avec..., 2e série and 5e série respectively, Gallimard 1924 and 1929.

Michel Décaudin's article "l'Annee 1908 et les origines de la NRF", La Revue des Sciences Humaines, 68, 1952, pp. 347-58, remains informative, while the same author's La Crise des Valeurs symbolistes, Vingt ans de poésie française (1895-1914), Privat, Toulouse, 1960, examines the detailed literary-historical context of the pre-First World War years.

Jacques Rivière's review has also attracted considerable attention: Morino's study is basic, while the following items examine specific questions:
The circumstances surrounding the resumption of the NRF in 1919 and the reaction to Rivière's controversial "manifesto" are traced in detail by Jean-Pierre Cap in his introduction to Jacques Rivière-Jean Schlumberger, Correspondance 1909-1925, Centre d'Études gidiennes, Lyon, 1980, especially pp. 13-36. This is a re-worked and more complete version of his earlier article "La Reprise de la NRF en 1919 à travers la correspondance de Jacques Rivière et Jean Schlumberger" Bulletin des Amis de Jacques Rivière et d'Alain-Fournier, II, 1, 1976, pp. 9-32. A brief descriptive outline and complete index of Rivière's NRF has been provided by Claude Martin in La NRF de 1919 à 1925, Centre d'Études gidiennes, Lyon, 1983. The remainder of the Inter-War period receives similar treatment in two further volumes, La NRF de 1925 à 1934, 1976, and La NRF de 1935 à 1940, 1977.


There are three unpublished studies on the Inter-War NRF of which two concentrate upon Rivière's review. In chronological order,
these are: Bernard Garniez, "La NRF pendant la période de l'entre-deux-guerres", Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1960;
Daniel Durossay, "Attitudes politiques et productions littéraires dans le milieu de la NRF de 1919 à 1927", thèse pour le doctorat du 3e cycle, Université de Paris-X, Nanterre, 1980;
Pascal Michon, "Recherches sur l'Ideologie de la NRF (1919-1924)", mémoire de maitrise, 1981 (M. Jean-Pierre Dauphin of Editions Gallimard kindly indicated the existence of this study and provided a copy for consultation).
There exist two non-French language anthologies of texts in translation from the NRF. The first, in English, is edited with an Introduction by Justin O'Brien, The Most Significant Writings from the NRF, 1919-1940, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1958. Secondly, there is an Italian selection la NRF, scelta e note a cura di Marco Fini e Mario Fusco, Lerici editori, Milano, 1965. This selection mysteriously stops short in May 1939, thus missing some of Paulhan's most significant political texts.
Finally, for a detailed history of the activities of the publishing-house, see Pierre Assouline, Gaston Gallimard, un demi-siècle d'édition française, Balland, 1984.

5. CJP 1, p.57.
6. Les Incertitudes..., pp. 116ff, and CJP 1, p. 75.
8. Les Incertitudes..., p. 117.
9. For La Vie, see CJP 2, pp. 218-9.
10. CJP 1, p. 17.
11. ibid.
13. See CJP 1, p. 104.

14. ibid., pp. 113 and 125.

15. ibid., p. 125.

16. See Les Ecrits français, No.2, 5/1/14. Among the contributors to this review who were to become close to Paulhan later were Benjamin Crémieux and Roger Allard.

17. "Le Reproche que l'on fait aux lieux communs", Nord-Sud, No.15, May 1918.


22. Gide to JP, 15/3/19, in NRF January 1970, p. 75. See also JP to Gide, in Choix de Lettres, p. 49, 11/3/21: "j'ai ébauché un plan de propagande (...) sur le modèle à peu près de celui qui a assez singulièrement assuré au Progrès civique(...) une clientèle convaincue au point que l'appel en faveur des "presses universitaires" rendit en trente jours plus de cent vingt mille francs...". Bernard Leuilliot in a note to this selection records that Paulhan had been "engagé, le 1er janvier 1920, pour assurer la 'propagande NRF'" (ibid., p.441).


24. "La Guérison sévère", NRF February 1920, pp. 201-33, Roger Allard had recommended this text to Rivière; cf. Rivière to JP, AR., 8/12/19, and 30/12/19 accepting the text.


27. JP to Rivière and returned, AR., 12/5/20, 15/5/20.

28. ibid. (postscript).
29. "Vous êtes pour moi ce Messie que dans mes moments de plus grande fatigue je souhaitais sans espoir. Pour bien évaluer le service que vous me rendez, comprenez ceci: je ne suis pas un homme de détails; les détails m'oppriment à la lettre, le moindre vient se placer dans mon esprit sur le même plan que les choses les plus importantes; je distingue bien son insignifiance... Vous, au contraire, vous avez la faculté à la fois de ne rien négliger et de maintenir les petits soucis à distance des grands". Rivièrè to JP. AR., 15/5/20.

30. ibid.


34. "Circulaire rédigé par André Breton (et) annoté par Jean Paulhan", early 1922, BN MSS, Nouvelles Acquisitions françaises (NAF) 14316, f 129.

35. JP to Breton, in BN MSS. NAF 14316, f 68, 27/1/22.

36. "Dans une nouvelle réunion, la lecture par Paulhan des questions que le Congrès se propose de traiter, a fait une impression un peu fâcheuse. On s'est demandé si elles correspondaient bien à votre programme primitif et l'on est arrivé à cette conclusion, que leur discussion n'avait aucune chance de conduire à une définition positive de l'esprit moderne". Rivièrè to Breton, BN MSS., NAF 14316, ff 124-5, 27/2/22.

37. "Voici en gros en quoi consiste mes fonctions:
1. rassembler tous les mss. destinés au prochain numéro;
2. les envoyer à l'imprimeur (...);
3. recevoir les premières épreuves en double, les répartir entre les différents auteurs, corriger celles qui me restent;
4. renvoyer le tout à l'imprimeur;
5. corriger les secondes épreuves;
6. envoyer ce qu'on appelle le bon à tirer". Rivièrè to his aunts, quoted in J-P Cap, ed. cit., p.19. 17/12/11.
38. See above, note 22, and the long postscript to an undated letter, JP to Rivière, AR., 1922. The whole question of propagandizing the NRF became highly controversial when Henri Béraud published a collection of his articles and correspondence under the title La Croisade des longues figures, Editions du Siècle, 1924. Among other things he accused the author Jean Giraudoux, an employee at the Foreign Ministry, of being an NRF infiltrator; see Giraudoux's refutations in Frédéric Lefèvre, Une heure avec, 1ère série, Gallimard, 1924, pp. 141-53. Paulhan's review of Béraud's Lazare (NRF May 1924, pp. 628-32) effectively undermined his criticism of Gide's "grammatical lapses".


40. Rivière to JP, AR., 15/5/20: "Il faut absolument, pour que chacun de nos numéros donne vraiment la sensation de l'exquis, que nous arrivions à avoir toujours un nombre de notes suffisant pour que nous puissions choisir entre elles, comme nous choisissons entre les articles. Je vous suis donc infiniment reconnaissant de l'effort que vous faites pour augmenter l'afflux des notes. Je vous demande seulement de prendre toutes vos précautions pour que l'auteur comprenne que ma décision reste réservée".

41. For the July issue in 1920 Paulhan contacted Benjamin Crémieux; his action was approved by Rivière- "c'est une bonne recrue"; JP to Rivière and returned, AR., (June 1920).

42. JP to Rivière, AR., (1920).

43. See esp. Anglès, André Gide et le premier groupe de la NRF, p. li8f. After the split with Montfort, Copeau, Ruyters and Schlumberger formed the "comité de rédaction" (ibid., p.128).

44. Schlumberger, Eveils, Oeuvres, VI, p. 381: "pendant deux ans c'est moi qui centralisai les manuscripts, qui m'efforçai d'équilibrer les numéros, de les faire paraître à peu près ponctuellement".


46. Germaine Brée mistakenly lists Gide as "directeur" of the NRF in Vol.16 of Littérature française, "le XXe siècle, 2, 1920-1970", Arthaud, 1978, pp. 77-8 and 94, where the NRF is (again erroneously) characterised as "littéraire sans tendances politiques". See p. 78: "Le groupe de la NRF, André Gide en tête, manifeste une certaine austérité...", etc (my italics).
47. See J-P Cap, ed. cit., p. 258: "la première NRF (1909-1914) fut guidée par les valeurs littéraires d'André Gide, même lorsqu'il en paraissait éloigné par son œuvre personnelle ou ses voyages".


49. "Billet à Angèle", NRF April 1921, pp. 462-6, quoted from Incidences, Gallimard, 1924, p.52. Gide added: "Il est vrai que Rivière me fait cet honneur souvent de me demander conseil; pour moi qui surtout ai souci de donner à chacun de l'assurance, je l'encourage en ses initiatives; or c'est toujours dans celles qui diffèrent le plus de ma façon de voir, que le public se plaît à reconnaître le plus mon esprit" (ibid).

50. Critics like Henri Massis and Henri Béraud reinforced this misconception that Gide was in complete control; yet the only material results of their constant attacks was much free publicity and a boost to the sales of Gide's books (see Gide, Journal, 1889-1939, Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1951 - hereafter Journal I -, p. 797, 3/12/24.).

51. See J-P Cap, ed. cit., p. 32, and Assouline, p. 102.


53. See the recollections of Gide's companion Mme Maria van Rysselberghe "la Petite Dame", Volume 1, 1918-1929, in Cahiers André Gide 4, Gallimard, 1973, p. 46, hereafter CPD. 1. Even Marcel Proust intervened; see Lettres à La NRF, Les Cahiers Marcel Proust, VI, Gallimard, 1932, pp. 141-3.

54. Yet see Frédéric J. Grover, who notes that Gide was a candidate and that Gaston Gallimard considered him unsuitable; "Les années 30 dans la correspondance Gide-Paulhan", Modern Language Notes (MLN), 95, 1980, pp. 830-49, esp. pp. 831-3.

55. March, May to August 1925.

57. CPD 1, p. 251, 1/6/26: "Il avait pensé à reprendre une chronique régulière à la NRF qui commence à l'ennuyer un peu (encore qu'il trouve la direction de Paulhan excellente). Il avait même pensé faire plus: une petite revue à lui tout seul, qu'on aurait pu encarter dans la NRF".

58. Grover reports that Gallimard detected 'friction' between Gide and Paulhan, whom Gallimard (interviewed in 1972) believed was "très autoritaire... Il n'y a pas eu de conflit entre Paulhan et Gide car Gide n'était pas d'une nature à extérioriser le conflit"; MLN, p. 832. Cf. CPD 2, p. 192, 15/11/31 and ibid., p. 246, 5/7/32.

59. See Léautaud, Journal VIII, p. 274, 27/10/30: "Gide est dans une grande rumeur de brouille avec la NRF à cause de la publication policière que publie la maison: Détective, publication honteuse, le mot n'est pas trop fort, pour une maison que se respecte. Une vente considérable. Affaire d'argent".

Léautaud also reported that Gallimard was recouping money with Détective which he lost on the NRF; Journal IX, P. 141, 19/11/31. Cf. also ibid., p. 207, 6/4/32, on the negotiations between Gallimard and Hachette, during which Gide felt he was losing any influence over the NRF; also Assouline, pp. 235ff.

60. In 1911, Gide, Schlumberger and Gallimard each advanced 20,000 francs to found "les éditions de la NRF": see Anglès, Le Premier groupe..., p. 364-5, Schlumberger, Œuvres, VI, p. 386-7, and Assouline, p. 46. Léautaud learnt from Valéry that Gide had 400,000 francs invested in the NRF (Journal, IX, p. 305).

61. Paulhan had been in correspondence with Suarès since the late 1920's; see BS Ms. 4948 alpha et seq., and Yves-Alain Favre, who traces Paulhan's relationship with Suarès in "Paulhan et Suarès; de la littérature à l'amitié", CJP 3, "Cahier du Centenaire", Gallimard, 1984, pp. 228-39. See also André Gide-André Suarès, Correspondance, 1908-1920, ed. Sidney D. Braun, Gallimard, 1963, esp. letter 45 and notes.

62. Les Marges, April 1933, p. 221. Gide was reported as saying "(Suarès) accueille la haine comme il accueille tout ce qui peut gonfler sa voile. Il se fait le chantre de toute passion, il fait profession d'aimer la grandeur mais lui n'est pas grand, il n'est bon que quand il parle des autres; il n'est pas intéressant, de lui il n'a rien à dire" (CPD 2, pp. 303-4, and Journal I, pp. 1167-8. On Les Marges, see Jacques Rivière, "Note à propos de M. Eugène Montfort", NRF April 1921, p. 512.
63. JP to Suarès, BD 4961/7, 15/6/33. Paulhan wrote this in spite of a corrective printed in May's Les Marges; Suarès, talking again of his interview, protested that "j'aurais voulu qu'il n'en fût pas parlé (...). Laissez-moi éclairer quelques passages...". These palliative remarks were possibly due to the negotiations in train: "Ne me faites pas accuser la NRF uniquement. Il est vrai qu'on m'y a honteusement traité en 1919 et en 1921. Je n'y ai pas obtenu un mot d'estime ou de révérence depuis quinze ans (...). Mon malheur est d'être né dans une époque de clans et de partisans, sans pouvoir jamais être d'aucun. Le cas de la NRF est le cas type du clan intellectuel où un certain esprit déforme toute pensée et dénature toute critique (...). Les moeurs de la politique ont tout envahi: elles sont basses, nourries de mensonges, toutes serviles jusque dans l'insolence, toutes de clientèle et d'intérêt..." (my italics); Les Marges, May 1933, pp. 318-20.

64. JP to Suarès, BD 4965/1, 7/1/35, my italics. Paulhan is referring to Schlumberger's article "Note sur la Politique" (NRF December 1934), an important text showing how political differences within the NRF could risk splitting the group; see below, Chapters Two, Three and Four.


66. See above, notes 53 and 54.

67. Claude Martin, NRF Index 2, pp. VIII-IX.

68. CPD 2, p. 228. Relations between Rivière's widow and the NRF were sour if not bitter; see esp. NRF May 1926, for Isabelle Rivière's indignant letter of protest regarding the sceptical way the NRF talked of her late husband's religious commitment. See also J-P Cap, ed. cit., pp. 219-39.


70. Martin, NRF Index 2, p. IX. The importance of these distinctions is evident, but has been overlooked by some; see John Weightman, "La NRF", The American Scholar, Vol. 50, Winter 1980-81, No. 1, pp. 91-100.

71. See NRF April 1925, pp. 400-832. Paulhan sent out a main batch of circular letters on February 23rd (nine days after Rivière's death) asking for contributions to be returned "avant le 5 mars"; see esp. JP to Johannes Tielrooy, BN Mss. NAF. 14698, f 349, circular dated 23/2/25. In the event over 70 articles of varying length appeared, divided into six sections, over 100 pages of 'inédits', including correspondence between Gide and Rivière and a long bibliography.
Of some 110 letters available sent between 1925 and December 1939, 42 were written between 1925 and December 1926, with a further 20 despatched during 1927, leaving 48 to cover the years 1928 to 1939 inclusive.

See JP to Schlumberger, BD 25014 and 25015, (July) 1925.

See above, note 68, and JP to Schlumberger, BD 25038, (April) 1926: "Gaston me parle de la lettre d'Isabelle (i.e. for inclusion in May 1926). Un point m'inquiète, c'est la date à laquelle elle veut nous adresser sa réponse (...). Voudriez-vous lui écrire?".

See above, and Grover, MLN pp. 832-3 on Oedipe, which appeared in the review Commerce before the NRF; see also JP to Schlumberger, BD 25075 (autumn) 1930, and CPD 2, pp. 65 and 75.

On Paulhan's complaints to Gide, see MLN pp. 832-3; on his appointment as "directeur", see JP to Grenier, AP., dated 6/12/34: "G.G. m'a demandé de m'appeler "directeur" de la NRF. Il y aurait eu de l'hypocrisie à refuser (puisqu'en réalité je fais ce que fait un directeur, et que G.G. connaît surtout la revue par les plaintes de ceux de ses auteurs dont on n'a pas assez (...) parlé). Seulement, il y a aussi de l'hypocrisie à accepter, parce que je ne puis pas (...) faire de la NRF ce que je voudrais". Cf. JP to Jouhandeu, BD 3615, (December) 1934: "Cela ne change rien en rien, d'ailleurs. (Je préférerais m'être rien du tout, mais de continuer à m'en occuper de la même façon, qui est passionnante). j'ai donc accepté".

The treatment the issues received in the NRF is detailed below, Chapters Two to Seven inclusive.

e.g. JP to Adrienne Monnier, BD 4455, 11/11/34: "J'ai dû demander à Chanson de supprimer six pages, à Suares sept, que je n'ai pu garder que les "Airs du Mois" et les notes de stricte actualité, qui n'auraient plus eu de sens le mois prochain... Songez qu'il est difficile de faire une revue".

See JP to Suares, BD 4966/15, 5/12/36: "Dans quelle mesure suis-je le maître de la NRF? Ou plutôt; dans quelle mesure est-ce que je mérite d'y être le maître? Peut-être Les Fleurs de Tarbes (i.e. Paulhan's most celebrated critical work then in pre-publication) me vaudront-elles (...) une autorité qu'en ce moment je n'ai pas- ce serait peu; qu'évidemment je ne mérite pas. Enfin, je le voudrais, non pour moi".

JP to Schlumberger, BD 25102, September 1938.


Morino, p. 173.
83. On Suares, see above, notes 61-63, and below Chapter Six.

84. Claudel, a particularly fastidious author regarding the presentation of his work, lived an uneasy relationship with the NRF and Gallimard to whom his contract tied him for life. Claudel's sensitivities were most especially offended by the inclusion in the NRF during 1929 of what he considered to be scurrilous texts by Gide, Léautaud and Montherlant: Claudel loudly protested and broke with the review until Paulhan managed, with the help of Adrienne Monnier and Charles-Ferdinand Ramuz, to coax Claudel back during 1932. Claudel broke again with the review when Léautaud and Mauriac had texts published in 1939 and 1940. For further details, see the following: Vagianos, op. cit., passim; Claudel, Journal I, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1968, p. 842, December 1928; Cahiers Paul Claudel 3, Gallimard, 1961, p. 112, 27/3/29; Léautaud, Journal, VII, p. 234, 27/3/29; ibid., pp. 250-1, 264-85, etc.; JP to Monnier, BD 4442, November 1932; Ramuz to Claudel, in Ramuz, Lettres II (1919-1947), Grasset, 1959, p. 256, 10/12/32; Claudel to JP in Jean Paulhan à travers ses peintres, catalogue, 1974, p. 32, 18/12/32, and Claudel to Ramuz, in "Correspondance", NRF, July 1967, p. 168, note 1, 31/12/32. For the 1939 break, see esp. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3855, 20/10/39; JP to Grenier, AP., 19/10/39, and Léautaud, Journal, XII, p. 318, 23/10/39.

85. Paulhan had witnessed Léautaud's early break with Rivière's NRF at close quarters (see Léautaud, Journal, IV, pp. 11-159, 178, May 1922 to May 1923) and was familiar with the mischievous character of the secretary of Le Mercure de France; Paulhan, indeed, almost invited trouble when, during the second phase of contributions in 1939, he had promised complete independence. In the event Léautaud managed to scandalize many at the NRF, including Gallimard and Crémieux. This exchange, at first amusing but then tainted by Léautaud's anti-Semitism (see below, Chapter Six), led to Léautaud's resignation as "chroniqueur dramatique"; Paulhan himself had also come close to resigning, having had his loyalties split between Léautaud and Gallimard. For details, see Léautaud, Journal, XII, pp. 178-240, November 1938 to May 1939; JP to Suares, BD 4970/11, 17/4/39; JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3840, no date (1939).

86. See, for instance, the selections reproduced in the NRF for June 1978, July 1979 and February 1982, as well as the Choix de Lettres, 1917-1936, La Littérature est une fête, Gallimard, 1986.
87. The range of financial reward for publication in the *NRF* was immensely varied depending on the author. It is worth contrasting some figures: Valéry, once elected to the Académie Française, was guaranteed 30,000 francs per annum by Gallimard (Léautaud, *Journal*, V, p. 132), whereas Léautaud himself earned a mere 600 francs per month at Mercure de France (ibid., p. 215, 8/5/26). Rivière, as director of the NRF, received 2,000 per month (J-P Cap, ed. cit., p.211), which contrasts with Léautaud's payment of 250 francs for each "chronique dramatique" submitted in 1921 (Léautaud, *Journal*, III, pp. 348, 366, and IV, p.53). Fees for the "Airs du Mois" of the 1930's varied between 75 or 80 francs per page (JP to Suares, BD 4960/2, 17/12/32, and 4969/1; 16/3/38), and a maximum of 100 francs (JP to Monnier, BD 4471, 22/2/36).

88. In the period under examination (January 1925 to June 1940) the *NRF* appeared 180 times (Nos. 142-321) in a total of 28,676 pages. With Paulhan as editor the average monthly size of the review was 153 pages, increasing to 169 and a half pages as director. Until October 1926, the *NRF* appeared in 128 pages; with the expansion begun in 1927 it then progressed steadily from 144 to 160 (October 1930 until February 1937), from March 1937 to 168 pages and eventually 182 in 1938-9 until October 1939, when the privations of war reduced the pagination to 144, remaining thus until the end in June 1940.

89. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25038, April 1916. Paillart was used until December 1936 when Gallimard switched to Bussière's of Saint-Amand, in the Cher département. Cf. JP to Suares, BD 4964/6, 25/10/34, cancelling a visit due to his unforeseen journey to Abbeville.

90. JP to Grenier, AP., 25/8/37. Sometimes the mechanical nature of the review presented the converse of the same problem: on May 22nd 1940, Gide pleaded with Paulhan to remove his "Lettres du Cameroun", but this time it was too late to substitute material; Gide to JP, AP., telegram, 22/5/40; "Si possible encore vous prie instamment différer publication lettres africaines dont effet serait présentement déplorable".

91. JP to Grenier, AP., 28/5/35, and ibid., 4/9/35.

92. For the early review, see Anglès, *Le premier groupe...*, p.131; for Rivière's, see Rivière to JP, AR., 12/9/21; and JP to Lalou, BN Mss NAF 14692, f 47, May 1926.

93. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25028, January 1926; "Je songe qu'au centre de la NRF d'aujourd'hui il faudrait le désintéressement et l'énergie d'un comité- et tout particulièrement pour ce qui touche à la "direction" des notes, au choix des auteurs nouveaux. Voici mon plan: un comité d'action se réunirait tous les sept ou tous les quinze jours- il pourrait comprendre Arland, Fernandez, Groethuysen, Rambaud, un surréaliste (Vitrac?), et moi.
Il existerait, d'autre part, un sur-comité, ou comité d'anciens, comprenant Gide, vous, Giraudoux, Romains, Thibaudet, Crémioux, Bertaux, dont les membres seraient bienvenus à nos réunions, mais ne s'attireraient aucun reproche s'ils n'y venaient pas... D'ailleurs ces réunions ne seraient pas seulement consacrées à des discussions et à des échanges d'idées autour de la NRF. Je voudrais aussi qu'il y eût des communications des lecteurs". (Cf. with Morino's appreciation, p. 174, note 1.)


95. This very important phase after September 1938 and leading to the war is dealt with in detail below, Chapter Seven. Paulhan's evolving authority may also be detected in his dealings with such as Gide and Martin du Gard during 1932, when Gide was pressing to politicise the NRF; see below, Chapters Two, Three and Four.

96. See JP to Suarès, BD 4960/2, 17/12/32: writing on December 17th 1932, Paulhan urged his correspondent to despatch his copy with all speed, explaining: "Si j'y tiens c'est que la première NRF de l'année est composée avec plus de soin, ou plus d'amour - ou bien, observée plus attentivement, que les suivantes...".

97. e.g. November and December 1926; November 1929; January 1933.

98. e.g. Duhamel's Journal de Salavin I, September 1926; André Chamson's Les Hommes de la Route, September 1927. In September 1936, Paulhan told Suarès: "Il était trop tard déjà pour le numéro de Septembre. Vous ennuie-t-il beaucoup de ne les trouver que dans la NRF d'Octobre? (C'est un numéro de rentrée, qui se lit plus, et mieux, que d'autres)"; JP to Suarès, BD 4966/9, 4/9/36. "Satan tient tête à Dieu" was held over until November 1936.

99. Many examples of this care applied in composition exist in Paulhan's correspondence; see esp. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25082, 25/6/33, where he points to a potential clash between Schlumberger's "Réflexions sur la Religion" and a long essay by the anthropologist Lévy-Bruhl. See also JP to Schlumberger, BD 25012, July 1925, 25017, 16/8/25, 25023, November 1925, 25039, July 1926, etc.
100. "Giraudoux a fait doubler le tirage (...) qui est passé de 10,000 à 20,000 en un mois"; Aury, Actes de Colloque Valéry Larbaud cit., p. 76. Mme Aury does not specify, but the novel was, more than likely, Bella.

101. See Halévy to JP, AP., 22/5/28: "j'ai un manuscrit d'un nommé Giono-Colline. Ce Giono est tout à fait inconnu, nous le connaissions par Guehenno et Pouaille. Lisez Colline. Je le publie aux "Cahiers Verts" (...) très rapidement. Si vous pensez le retenir, l'intérêt serait si grande pour l'auteur (sic), que j'attendrais le moins de temps possible!". Paulhan helped administrate and compose the Princesse de Bassiano's luxury quarterly Commerce, with which Paul Valéry, Saint-John Perse and Fargue were also involved.

102. See JP to Grenier, AP., 20/5/31: "Europe donne le Grand Troupeau de Giono. Gallimard téléphone à 10h: "n'oubliez pas le copyright NRF". Brun (Grasset's commercial director) à 11h: "le copyright Grasset!" Là-dessus, coups de téléphone, injures. Il se découvre à 6 heures du soir que Jean Giono a signé deux contrats, il y a quatre et trois ans: l'un qui promet ses cinq prochains romans à G.G. (en échange d'un mensualité de 2,000), l'autre les six prochains à Grasset (en échange d'une autre mensualité de 2,000). Qui l'emportera? Le contrat Gallimard est le plus ancien, mais le contrat Grasset a été enregistré le premier. Jean Giono habite Manosque et semble bien tranquille". Cf. also André Gide-Jean Giono, Correspondance (1929-1940), ed. établie par Roland Bourneuf et Jacques Cotnam, Lyon, 1983, pp. x-xiii, letter 1 and notes, pp.3 and 57ff; also Assouline, pp. 130-2, 196.

103. "Cette publication fragmentaire m'a valu un tel courrier de reproches et d'injures (du type: "Ah, vous voulez nous obliger à acheter le volume", etc.), que je me suis bien promis de ne pas recommencer..."; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25099, 11/4/38. See also ibid., BD 25009, 20/6/25: "Il me semble que la revue ne devrait, sous aucun prétexte, servir d'appât pour la maison d'édition: elle est un tout, comme la maison d'édition elle-même, et l'aide que l'une peut apporter à l'autre ne sera efficace que si elle évite de se fonder sur des ruses."

104. Sometimes Paulhan had difficulty in persuading discountenanced authors that he was right, and that his decision could only benefit the review: see his explanation to Schlumberger regarding his refusal of Histoire des Quatre Potiers in 1935: "Il me semble que la division en tranches (qui servait si bien Saint-Saturnin) les desservirait. Je ne vois guère le moyen (...) d'éviter que la seconde partie (...) ne paraisse longue, vide, un peu traînante. A moins d'y faire quelques coupures? (Mais je ne vois guère sur quoi il serait possible de le centrer (...)). Je crains que toute cette période ne semble, en revue, un peu éparpillé et que le roman n'y perde de son équilibre. A vrai dire je suis effrayé par de Fernand pour Walther (...). Elle nous vaudra (dans un moment déjà passablement dur) quelques désabonnements, quelques

See also JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3572, January 1932, on cuts made in and interruptions to Binche-Ana, BD 3574 and BD 3553, and well as JP to Schlumberger, BD 25099, 11/4/38, on Joseph's Breitbach's Le Retour.

105. See Dalmas, pp. 52-3: "Le progrès des éditions (dont la revue était l'emblème et le prolongement) était si évident que l'éventail des ressources de la revue s'était étendu, trop étendu même (...), d'où un curieux effet à l'allure "mécánique", disait Jean Paulhan, mais qui favorisait la diffusion de la revue".

106. "Le numéro Proust (i.e. 'Hommage à Marcel Proust', January 1923) nous a valu en quatre mois (...) 450 abonnés nouveaux (janvier à avril 1923); Bella (octobre 1925 à janvier 1926) - 460; Le Voyage au Congo (octobre 1926 à janvier 1927) - 470. Le Temps retrouvé et Le Voyage au Congo réunis (février 1927 à mai 1927) - 800"; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25059, August 1927.

107. "Le livre qui, en revue, m'apparaissait touffu à l'excès, rebutant à force de complexité (...) me semble, à le relire d'un trait, parfaitement clair, ordonné dans la confusion, d'une intelligence admirable et malgré cela (je veux dire: malgré l'intelligence), profondément enfoncé dans la vie, engagé, et pantelant d'une angoisse parfois insoutenable"; Journal I, p. 1165, 10/4/33. In the review, Malraux's novel took six issues from January to June 1933. Regarding Les Conquérants, see Christiane Moatti, "Esthétique et politique, Les Conquérants, 1928-1947, ou les aventures d'un texte", in André Malraux 5, "Malraux et l'Histoire" (textes réunis par Walter G. Langlois), La Revue des Lettres Modernes/Minard, October 1982, pp. 117-57.

108. "Qu'est-ce qui l'a pris de l'écrire? Et qu'est-ce qui vous a pris de le prendre?", asked Gide; see Grover, MLN, pp. 844-5, letters dated 21/3/40 and 2/4/40.

109. For Paulhan's early attitudes of 'resistance', see below, Chapter Seven. For the defence of his choice, see Grover, MLN, p. 845: "Je n'aurais pas vécu dans le sentiment (paresseux) que tous nos amis étaient ravis d'Aragon(...). Même les dames qui ont bien connu ce temps-là (comme Mme. Paul Gallimard) me disaient, non pas à l'ordinaire des dames, qu'elles "ne supportent pas de lire un roman en tranches" mais que ce roman était le plus passionnant qu'ait jamais donné la NRF (...)", etc.
See Georges Raillard: "Le découpage d'un roman et sa publication en revue posent tout le problème de la lecture romanesque", in "Jean Paulhan et la NRF", Jean Paulhan le Souterrain, directed by Jacques Bersani, 10/18, 1976, p.112. Dominique Aury reports too that cutting novels for pre-publication was a source of amusement for Paulhan (Ibid).

Cf. Chamson's unsatisfactory novel La Galère, pre-published in seven monthly parts from June to December 1938; for the context of this publication, see below, Chapter Three. The longest serialisation was that of Proust's Le Temps retrouvé in nine parts in 1927.


RMG to JP, AP., 6/11/27, 26/2/28, 28/4/28; and, later, on "Parmi les papiers posthumes de M. Thibault" (NRF November 1928), ibid., 4/10/28.

Paulhan unconsciously praised himself when he told Ramuz in 1934 that "je m'aperçois chaque jour davantage du nombre d'amis que vous a faits Adam et Eve parmi nos lecteurs. (Un abonné) mettait Adam et Eve au-dessus de tous les romans qu'il a lus dans la NRF"; JP to Ramuz, NRF July 1967, p. 187. This work appeared from November 1933 to February 1934.

Cf. the opinions of Léautaud, Claudel and Romain Rolland; Léautaud, Journal IX, p. 34, 3/6/31; Claudel, in Vagianos, op. cit., passim, and Bernard Duchâtelet quoting Rolland: "J'admire le talent, les efforts pour toucher une tradition nouvelle, et le juste équilibre qu'ils tâchent de garder contre l'excès de liberté"; in André Gide 7, La Revue des Lettres Modernes/Minard, 1984, p. 197.


See the following: P-0 Walzer, Le XXe siècle I (1896-1920), Littérature française Vol. 15, Arthaud, 1975, pp. 248-9, and ibid., Vol. 16, pp.77-8 (Germaine Brée). Also see Georges Poulet, La Conscience critique, Corti, 1971, pp. 57-70: Alvin Eustis, Trois Critiques de la NRF, Debresse,1961; and the special number of Esprit Créateur, XIV, 2, 1974, pp. 97-192, "The Critics of the NRF", including Eustis' Jacques Rivière's Crew", pp. 138-145. Albert Thibaudet provides a contemporary view in Histoire de Littérature française de 1789 à nos jours, Stock, 1936, p. 533, and, in the NRF itself, for March 1933, he called the monthly a "poste d'écoute" (pp. 507-513).
118. Thibaudet, Histoire de la Littérature..., p.533. These critics "représentent dans la critique de la rue de Beaune (the NRF's headquarters) des formes diverses de la culture philosophique".

119. Here the emphasis will be deliberately placed upon the "non-literary" "chroniques" by Thibaudet, Fernandez and Benda. It should not be forgotten that the novelist and critic Marcel Arland wrote a regular essay on literature, artist André Lhote on art and exhibitions, and Russian émigré Boris de Schloezer concentrated upon music. Arland (1899-1986- see obituary in Le Monde, 14/1/86) was brought in under Rivière in 1922, reviewed regularly in the "Notes" section until 1933 and then took charge of the "Chronique des Romans" from January 1933 to July 1937. Lhote (1885-1962) was also introduced by Rivière and was an assiduous contributor, as was de Schloezer (1881-1969), who introduced the thought of Leo Shestov into France; see "Hommage" in NRF December 1979, pp. 920-1, and below, Chapter Five.

120. The political orientation of the NRF is examined in depth below in Chapter Three.

121. Alain is the pen-name of Emile-Auguste Chartier (1868-1951); the essays in "Hommage à Alain", NRF September 1952, by many of his former pupils, remain informative. A biography has recently appeared; André Sernin, Alain: un Sage dans la Cité, Robert Laffont, 1985. Rivière had asked Paulhan (AR., 15/5/20) to contact Alain in 1920, but he was helping his pupils Michel and Jeanne Alexandre to set up the review Les Libres Propos; see "Hommage à Alain", pp. 168-84. See also JP to Schlumberger, BD 25026, 1925: "Que penseriez-vous d'un propos d'Alain dans chaque No.? (Cela m'effraie un peu)."

122. Europe January 1928, pp. 129-52; essays by Jean Prévost, Ramon Fernandez, Jean Schlumberger and Pierre Bost. See also the reminder in NRF March 1928, p.432.


124. "Cher ami, tu t'es entouré de primaires (au mauvais sens du mot), genre Ramon Fernandez, Julien Benda, Benjamin Crémieux-qui donnent le ton à la NRF, ou Alain..."; Grenier to JP, AP., 9/3/34. It is easy to add to Grenier's list- apart from
Grenier himself, Thibaudet, Arland, René Lalou, Denis Saurat, Marcel Jouhandeau and, later, Roger Caillols, Armand Petitjean and Etiemble were all teachers. Cf. also Grenier to JP, AP., 4/10/35: "tu as besoin (d'Alain) pour ta clientèle des Écoles Normales et E.P.S.". Paulhan himself found Alain "curieux": "Il me semble que plus d'une erreur ou d'une sottise, qui est dans ses propos, s'explique par un dessein secret très précis, qu'il ne veut jamais dire" (JP to Suardes, BD 4970/28, 22/11/39).

125. Pierre Bost, "Histoires et Légendes", in "Hommage à Alain", pp. 37-44.

126. See Nicole Racine-Ferlaud's study "Le Comité de Vigilance des Intelectuels antifascistes (1934-1939)", in Mouvement Social, 101, 1977, pp. 87-113.

127. See below, Chapter Seven.


129. The NRF's Fernandez was particularly marked by Thibaudet: see "La Critique d'Albert Thibaudet", in NRF July 1936, pp. 47-54.

130. "Réflexions sur la Politique", promoted to leading-article status, is examined below in Chapter Three.


132. "Les articles de Thibaudet deviennent inouis; sa rage d'établir des rapports, des compartiments dans la littérature, est une manie qui frise l'absurde"; CPD 2, p. 489, 27/10/35, on "Une Volée", in NRF November 1935.

133. "C'est le meilleur Thibaudet que nous ayons depuis longtemps"; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25074, 23/9/30.


137. "L'approfondissement de l'oeuvre par la réflexion, de son explication par l'univers de la pensée, vous montre que l'analyse critique fait appel, aujourd'hui, aux connaissances philosophiques"; and "c'est dans les lettres qu'il faut chercher nos métaphysiques, et non dans la philosophie, qui se trouve, en France, un peu paralysée par la surveillance jalouse des savants"; in M. Rouzaud, *Où va la critique?*, 1928, pp. 188-9.


139. Fernandez talked of his work to Paulhan: "Je puis, comme tous les auteurs, souhaiter voir mes écrits paraître, mais les sentiments que je nourris pour la Revue et pour son directeur sont beaucoup plus importants que mon impatience professionnelle. J'espère seulement qu'il sera possible d'assurer aux "Essais" une périodicité plus courte, mais seulement quand le mécanisme de la revue la permettra"; Fernandez to JP, AP., 5/8/28.

140. "Je crois, d'après les échos que j'en ai, que la forme plus "générale" de mes derniers essais a plu. Je continue, donc"; Fernandez to JP, AP., 16/6/31.

141. Martin du Gard recommended Fernandez for the direction of the critical section of the review; esp. RMG to JP, AP., 29/10/31: "Un de ceux qui m'ont le plus intelligemment parlé de mon ours (i.e. Franco-German relations; see below, Chapter Four) l'étonnant et toujours inattendu Fernandez...".

142. This was after the shock of 6th February 1934, see his "Pour l'Unité d'Action" in March and "Lettre ouverte à André Gide" in April 1934—these are discussed in detail below in the pertinent contexts, Chapters Three and Five.

143. See CPD 2, p. 387, 3/6/34; see also below, Chapter Three.

144. See issues for 1/6/38, 5/8/38, 12/8/38, in the latter attacking Benda.
145. For instance see Les Cahiers de l'Emancipation nationale, November-December 1942, January-February 1943.

146. On Benda (1867-1956) see Morino, pp. 162-7. After a schooling in mathematics and history Benda became a staunch "dreyfusard", contributing to La Revue Blanche after 1898. There followed a period with Péguy and a longer campaign against Bergsonism which, in many ways, made him a natural counter-balance to Thibaudet. Benda's Belphégor (1919) provoked a long reply from Riviére in the June 1919 issue of the NRF and kept him from contributing regularly; yet it was his La Trahison des Clercs (1927) which truly established him. He deeply influenced younger writers such as Etiemble (see Mes Contrepoisins, Gallimard, 1974 pp. 219-52) and André Wurmser (see Conseils de Révisions, Gallimard, 1972, pp. 307-24, and Fidélément vôtre, Grasset, 1979, pp. 52ff). His own autobiographical trilogy is revealing and much of it was pre-published in the NRF; see also the 1968 edition with an adulatory preface by Etiemble, La Jeunesse d'un Clerc (suivi de Un Régulier dans le siècle et de Exercice d'un enterré vif) (orig. published 1937, 1938 and 1947).

147. See below, Chapter Two, for details.

148. See below, Chapter Three, for details.

149. 12 "Scholies" appeared between 1929 and 1933, as well as literally scores of book-reviews (see NRF Indexes 1 and 2). He also had eight books pre-published there (a record): these are La Trahison des Clercs (August to November 1927); La Fin de l'Eternel (August to October 1928); Essai d'un discours cohérent (October 1930 to January 1931); Discours à la Nation européenne (January to March 1933); Délire d'Eleuthère (irregularly between January 1934 and March 1935) La Jeunesse d'un Clerc (August to November 1936); Un Régulier dans le Siècle (August 1937 to February 1938); and Songe d'Eleuthère (March to June 1939).


153. "J'étais soutenu par le directeur, Jean Paulhan, qui publiait nous les écrits que je lui portais, évidemment parce qu'il savait ne nullement mener par là sa monture aux abîmes, et aussi, ai-je quelque raison de croire, par un goût qu'il avait pour eux, goût qui me touche d'autant plus que j'ai pu
constater depuis, par les siens, qu'en de nombreux points il partageait l'esprit du lieu"; Exercice d'un enterré vif, ed. cit., p. 314. In October 1935 Paulhan told Grenier "il n'y a que moi qui défende Benda"; JP to Grenier AP., (October 1935).

154. See Exercice..., loc. cit., and below, Chapters Four, Six and Seven, on Benda's preponderance in the NRF.

155. "Je trouve l'article de Benda remarquable, et ne puis trop féliciter la NRF de le donner (...). Félicitations pour tout le numéro; la NRF, grâce à vous, devient de plus en plus ce qu'elle doit être et mérite d'intéresser un nombre toujours plus grand de lecteurs"; Gide to JP, AP., 2/8/27. By 1932, Gide thought Benda to be "l'un de nos principaux conducteurs"; Journal I, p. 1148, 29/12/32.

156. Jean Grenier in particular: "de la philosophie de bazar"; Grenier to JP, AP., 11/1/31, on Benda's Discours cohérent...

157. Grenier again: "A ta place je publierais comme tu le fais quand même toujours Benda- parmi les gens qui écrivent il a un public et si l'on regarde l'ensemble des littérateurs ce n'est pas si mal que cela"; AP., 11/1/31.

158. See below, Chapter Four on Germany, and Chapter Seven on Benda's "bellicosity"; the implications for the issue of anti-Semitism are treated in Chapter Six.

159. As early as 1935, Schlumberger had protested against "la place un peu encombrante que (Benda) commence à prendre à la NRF; CPD 2, p. 479, 14/10/35.

160. Benda to JP, AP., 25/4/39. Benda continued in the same letter: "La vraie pensée de S. devrait être: il est inadmissible qu'on fasse à J.B. une place telle qu'on puisse s'imaginer qu'il dirige la revue. Ceci est un tout autre reproche qui ne s'adresse plus à moi, mais presque à S. lui-même, qui n'a pas le courage de faire acte de franc anti-libéralisme en mettant son véto sur certains de mes papiers".

161. ibid., Benda's italics.

162. Suarès had contributed to the NRF as "Caërdal" between April 1912 and June 1914; during the First World War Suarès wrote vitriolic anti-German polemic.

163. See below, Chapters Six and Seven.

164. See below, Chapter Six.

165. For instance, see the double review by Jean Prévost and Henri Petit of Péguy's Note conjointe sur M. Descartes, NRF November 1924, pp. 608-615; also Fernandez' review-article "Retour à l'Occident" cited above, treating four books in October 1926 (note 138).
166. e.g. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25008, 25/5/25; ibid., BD 25020 (late 1925); BD 25082, 25/6/33, etc. On Prévost, see Prévost to JP, AP., (1928) and JP to Prévost, AP., (1928), (brouillon); and JP to Grenier, AP., 20/12/35 and 31/12/35.

167. See, for instance, RMG to JP, AP., 29/4/30: "Cependant (...) puis-je vous dire que, si le corps de la revue se maintient très riche, la parti "notes", "critique de livres" et surtout de romans (...) s'affaiblit, me semble-t-il, de numéro en numéro. Et c'est fâcheux. La NRF renoncerait là, selon moi, à l'une de ses plus importantes missions. et à l'une de ses plus estimables traditions! Je ne crois pas être seul à l'avoir remarqué."

168. Lalou reviewed 176 books in this manner between November 1925 and March 1927.

169. See the correspondence between Paulhan and Lalou, BN MSS NAF 14692, F 21 et seq. The intention was to spread the "notules" among all the regular contributors. A "chapeau" outlined the purpose of the "revue des livres" in September 1929: "Une revue ne peut s'étendre hors de son programme, ni commenter ce qui est clair, ni discuter ce qu'elle approuve, ni répéter (même à propos d'un bon livre) ce qu'elle a dit ailleurs. Pour ne pas omettre ainsi des œuvres excellentes ou importantes, nous proposons certains jugements sous la forme la plus resserrée" (p. 431).

170. See Dominique Aury, Jean Paulhan le Souterrain, 1976, p. 108; cf. RMG to JP, AP., 9/10/30: "J'ai horreur de vos "notules"! Horreur! Cette innovation vous fait commettre cent injustices (...)", etc.

171. In particular the quarterlies Commerce and Mesures, both administered by Paulhan; he also commented favourably on Bifur and Le Grand Jeu in July 1929, Bifur and Documents in February 1930 and Le Minotaure in March 1934 and July 1939.

172. Cf. below, Chapter Two, on the exchanges following the publication of La Trahison des Clercs.

173. Dominique Aury testifies thus: "Une part de la NRF qui était particulièrement sienne, c'est cette "revue des revues", si vivante que très souvent les lecteurs commençaient par là. Paulhan était ravi; chaque fois que se créait une nouvelle revue, il se jetait dessus, il faisait de petits découpages; il écrivait immédiatement à l'auteur de tel ou tel article pour lui demander sa collaboration"; Jean Paulhan le Souterrain, p. 107.

Paulhan- as Guérin- in his first "Revue des revues", managed to deeply offend Martin du Gard, who wrote to chastize him severely for among other things having treated André Rouveyre as a 'sot': see NRF July 1927, p. 126, and RMG to JP, AP., 3/7/27, as well as Choix de Lettres, pp. 124-5 and notes.
174. See, for instance, Gide's praise of Benda and the NRF quoted above, note 155, and RMG to JP, AP., 31/3/27: "Je soupçonne ce qu'est votre double vie de travail, la fièvreuse besogne qui fait que la NRF ne cesse de croître entre vos mains (...). J'éprouve un sentiment de réconfort à voir peu à peu al consécration de ce long effort silencieux ou presque, qui vous vaut, depuis longtemps, l'estime des meilleurs".

175. Publicity brochure "de tête", March 1927, reproduced in extenso in NRF Index 2, pp. xv-xviii.

176. For instance, see JP to Schlumberger, BD 25080 (April-May 1932): "La NRF a gagné, en février (1932), 50 abonnés 15 en mars, 44 en avril. Malgré un battement de 2.000 exemplaires, l'hommage à Goethe est épuisé, recherché. Il me semble que le mouvement ascendant va reprendre, ou a repris". Europe too produced a Goethe tribute in April 1932, causing Léon Daudet to complain that there was Goethe "à n'en plus finir"; L'Action française, 21/2/32, 3/3/32, 14/3/32.

177. As shown by the advertisements in the review's publicity brochures.

178. Anglès, Bulletin des Amis d'André Gide, January 1984, p.22: "1.400 abonnés à la veille de la guerre de 1914(...) 3.000 lecteurs; je crois que c'est bien le bout du monde". Rivière told Schlumberger (in Cap. ed. cit., pp. 78 and 97, note p. 263) that the 'tirage' in August 1913 was 2,100.


180. Joseph Kvapil, Romain Rolland et les amis d'Europe, Prague, 1971, p. 88. Europe itself had 1,600 subscribers in June 1923, rising to 2,000 by the end of 1929. Pierre Gamarra, in a letter to me dated 30th October 1981, stated that the maximum "normal" printing for Europe at that time was 5,000, a figure which confirms the tendency for 'tirage' to be about double the subscription-list.

181. "Il faudrait toucher plus directement nos abonnés, il me semble - leur demander de s'intéresser à la revue, de nous faire de la propagande (...)"; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25009, 20/6/25.

182. ibid. Later the same year the trend continued: "Nous avons gagné 100 abonnés d'octobre à novembre; et les deux numéros, malgré un tirage un peu plus fort (300 exemplaires de plus), sont tout à fait épuisés"; JP to Schlumberger, BD 25023 (November 1925).

183. BD 25009, 20/6/25 (my italics).
184. BD 25059 (August 1927).

185. This figure makes the NRF a medium-sized review for, compared to reviews such as Commerce and Bifur, it had a relatively high print-run: Commerce had 800 abonnés, while Bifur claimed 400 and had a top printing of 3,000; see Jacqueline Leiner, "Préface", p. XIII, of the facsimile republication of Bifur, J-M Place, 1976. Mesures (administered Paulhan) had a declared 'tirage' of 1,800 in 1935 and 1,200 in 1937. Yet compared with the high-circulation general reviews, the NRF seems modest: for example, Plon's La Revue hebdomadaire printed, on average, 30,000 numbers a week (Robert de Saint-Jean, Passé pas mort, Grasset, 1983, p. 135), and the Revue des Deux Mondes rose from 15,000 numbers an issue in 1921 to 40,000 in 1931 (Robert Aron, Fragments de Mémoire, Plon, 1981, p.28).


187. Guéhenno's ousting from Europe in 1936 (March) caused many moderate readers to switch from what was rapidly becoming a Communist-controlled organ to the NRF; Paulhan told Guéhenno that "la NRF a depuis quatre mois quelque deux mille abonnés nouveaux (dort j'ai tout lieu de penser qu'une bonne partie vient d'Europe)", AP., 4/3/36. Meanwhile, Rolland was sceptical; he asked Guéhenno: "la pensée libre de la France peut-elle être réduite à la NRF? (dort nul ne peut jamais dire ce qu'elle sera demain- ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui)"; Rolland to Guéhenno, Cahiers Romain Rolland No. 23, p. 376. Paulhan would have delighted in this last remark.

188. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25106 (March 1939). For details of the changing nature of the NRF after Munich and during the "Drôle de guerre", see below, Chapter Seven.

189. "La NRF va bien", wrote Paulhan in November 1939: "250 abonnés de gain net pour ce mois-ci (...). Avoz que c'est un petit tour de force d'avoir extrait d'Alain un panégyrique de l'Angleterre (guerrière)"; BD 25114 (November 1939).

190. On Détective, see Assouline, pp. 207-14. Brice Parain was the "gérant" of this money-spinning weekly which quickly built up a circulation of 350,000: Gide detested it; see above, note 59. Du Cinéma, founded by Corti in December 1928, transformed into La Revue du Cinéma in October 1929; the Gallimard imprint appeared in May that year. The high quality of this review has warranted a facsimile reprint in 5 volumes. See La Revue du Cinéma, 1928 (...) 1949, Pierre Lherminier éditeur, Paris 1979. Cf. esp. "Sous la bannière de la NRF", in Vol.1, pp. xxiii-xxxi (not referenced in Assouline). Gallimard had also launched La Revue juive in 1925 (see below, Chapter Six), and La Revue musicale under Henri Prunières in 1920; see Assouline, pp. 179-83, and 109f.
191. An NRF publicity brochure for November 1932 announced that "un grand hebdomadaire littéraire illustre" was about to appear to oppose the right-wing thinking which dominated the other weeklies: "Marianne est de gauche - comme fut l'Encyclopédie", it boasted. See Assouline, pp. 216-20, and Claude Estier, La gauche hebdomadaire, Armand Colin, 1962.

192. For Berl's view of the 'arcane' Paulhan, see Patrick Modiano-Emmanuel Berl, Interrogatoire, Gallimard, 1976, pp. 53-4, and 118-9; Paulhan wrote to Guéhenno, AP, probably in late 1932: "Maurois s'indigne, de temps en temps, que la NRF parle mal ou peu de lui. Cela fait bien des incidents, rue de Beaune, auxquels je me mêle assez peu (...). Malgré quelque défiance, je ne soupçonnais pas chez Berl, une telle obstination à toiletter les gens qui le paient". Paulhan's accusation of sycophancy seemed vindicated later when Berl attacked the anti-Munich stance of the NRF, in his Government-backed pamphlet Pavés de Paris; see below, Chapter Seven.


194. At the height of the pre-"Front populaire" euphoria in May 1936, Vendredi was reaching 70,000 circulation, without endangering Marianne (then 100,000), but lagged well behind Fayard's Candide (230,000); JP to Grenier, AP, 20/5/36; on the sale, see ibid., AP, 19/1/37.

195. Paulhan vented his spleen to Jouhandeau, an extreme right-wing traditionalist: "Je serais gêné d'avoir à demander (...) quelque chose à Gaston. Il a changé avec moi, depuis quelques années, et même il ne cesse pas de changer. Comme les reproches qu'il me fait ouvertement sont absurdes, et qu'il n'y peut pas trop croire lui-même: par exemple, que la revue ne parle pas assez souvent ni avec assez d'éloges de Maurois ou de Morand, ou bien que 'la NRF n'a pas assez de retentissement', qu'il n'y a pas assez de collaborateurs "jeunes"", que "Marianne est mille fois plus vivante", etc. Je pense que simplement il n'a plus de sympathie pour moi, comme d'ailleurs il s'efforce à demeurer "gentil" dans nos relations, je ne parviendrai pas à lui demander quoi que ce soit"; JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3610 (1932-3).
196. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3789 (March 1936). Cf. below, Chapters Three and Five.

197. See above, note 187; and JP to Grenier, AP, 10/2/36: "Je crois que Gallimard va reprendre Europe (ou plutôt donne à Guéhenno la direction d'une nouvelle revue)".

198. One of the principal editors was Guillaume de Tarde, Paulhan's childhood friend. Founded by a group of professional men of various political affiliations, Les Nouveaux Cahiers (taken over from Alcan with No. 20, 1/3/38) were intended to "libérer la pensée de l'asservissement auquel la soumettent les intérêts particuliers, l'esprit de parti et l'esprit de classe". See Petitjean, NRF April 1937, pp. 644-7, on the links with 'péguyisme', and Guillaume de Tarde, "Sur Les Nouveaux Cahiers", Les Nouveaux Cahiers, No. 20, 1/3/38, pp. 13-18.


201. Pouey, p. 167: "Ce fut la catastrophe. (...) Ces meurtrissures ne m'eussent guère affecté si le coup du crochet dont avait souffert le poète n'avait blessé, par ricochet, Jean Paulhan (...). Nous la supprimâmes d'un commun accord". Cf. JP to Grenier, AP, (January 1939).

202. CPD 2, p. 146, 28/5/31; also ibid., p. 165, 14/10/31. The political and social implications and their treatment in the NRF are discussed below in Chapters Two and Three.


204. Gide to JP, AP, 4/4/32; "Jeunesse Russe", NRF January 1933, "présentation par Ilya Ehrenbourg"; see below, Chapter Five for details.

205. Mauriac, L'Echo de Paris, 10/9/32, "les Esthètes fascinés".

206. Gide to JP, AP, 21/7/32.

207. e.g. CPD 3, p. 254, 11/10/32; for detailed discussion of the repercussions of this issue, see below, Chapter Five.

208. It was uppermost in his mind as late as 1956, when he wrote to Arland at the time of the Algerian War: "Notre position d'extrême milieux (comme disait Gide) nous fait automatiquement paraître trop à droite-quand c'est la gauche, comme à présent, qui triomphe; mais trop à gauche, quand c'est la droite"; NRF May 1969, p. 1032.
Grenier to JP, AP, 9/4/35. The articles were Leiris' text "Raymond Roussel", and the latter's "Comment j'ai écrit mes livres", NRF April 1935, pp. 575-95.

"... Bien entendu, il y a des lecteurs qui trouvent dans la NRF un peu trop de saugrenu. Mais enfin est-ce qu'il n'y en a pas eu de tout temps? Et est-ce que de tout temps ce n'est pas eux qui en ont tort? C'étaient ceux qui se désabonnaient en 1911 pour Léger, en 1912 pour Fargue, en 1921 pour Breton. Mais Léger, Fargue et Breton ont tenu le coup, tandis que l'on oubliait pas mal de gens raisonnables: de 1911, Ducôte, de 1912, Llona ou Ruyters; de 1921, Gil Robin ou Nicole Stiebel. Après tout il y a eu dès l'origine une orthodoxie de la NRF qui n'allait pas sans une pointe de saugrenu (songez que le saugrenu a été longtemps ce que l'opinion publique reprochait à Claudel); JP to Schlumberger, BD 25091, 1/7/35. (This was not the first time such criticism had been levelled at the review; see JP to Guillaume de Tarde, in Choix de Lettres, pp. 157-159.)

JP to Schlumberger, BD 25091, 1/7/35.

CPD 3, pp. 8-9, 6/4/37: "Ils parlent de Paulhan, de son goût exagéré parce que quasi exclusif pour le saugrenu, genre (sic) particulièrement contraire à Jean, qui annonce l'intention de faire un prochain article sur ce sujet (...). Nous tombons d'accord que le saugrenu de Malraux, qu'il a baptisé farfelu, est pour nous complètement sans saveur, inexistant".

See, for example, the "Présentations (de la NRF)" in Oeuvres IV, pp. 361-77, especially the Radio-37 talk of late 1938, pp. 361-5. Moreover Paulhan spoke of the NRF's peculiar "orthodoxy" in a letter reproduced in Garniez' thesis in 1960: "Si je tentais de résumer la conduite de la NRF entre '20 et '40, voici à peu près ce que je dirais: c'est qu'elle s'est consacrée (...) à la défense et à l'illustration de la littérature: bref, à une certaine orthodoxie littéraire. Il est toujours facile d'être un moderniste, il est facile d'être un inventeur d'écoules, il est facile d'être un snob, il est facile d'être un fou. Il n'y a rien de plus facile que d'être un dada ou un surréaliste. Il est toujours facile de tomber. Mais la NRF, tout en se gardant d'accueillir le surréaliste ou le néo-classique, a inventé et maintenu une place pure, où la littérature peut se tenir debout, sans concessions et sans facilités. Où, tout en demeurant prête à accueillir les hérétiques, elle refusaît les hérésies" (p. 39).

RMG to JP, AP, 6/9/36.

Oeuvres, IV, p. 364.

Chapter Two below.
Among the regular contributors introduced in the consolidating phase after 1927 were Denis Marion (a cinema critic from La Revue du Cinéma and later friend of André Malraux), Jean Wahl (philosophy teacher at the Sorbonne), André Rolland de Renéville (a fugitive from Le Grand Jeu and author of poetry criticism), Denis Saurat (an Anglicist who taught for some time at the London Institut français), and Denis de Rougemont (a Swiss, recommended by Martin du Gard to Paulhan and member of the founding Esprit group).

JP to Hellens, BD 7273 (1933).


24 texts in all appeared with eight by René Daumal, three by Eugène Dabit and two each from Drieu la Rochelle, Lhote and Maurice Sachs.

NRF Index 2, p. xiii.

Martin du Gard called the new rubric "une très heureuse trouvaille", saying too that he began his reading with the "Air du Mois" (RMG to JP, AP, 21/12/33); however, barely a month later he wrote again: "Surveillez l'Air du Mois, bon Dieu, je le disais bien, ça va glisser sur la pente savonnee de la littérature d'hebdomadaires" (RMG to JP, AP, 14/1/34).

Grenier's opinion was similar: "(L'Air du Mois) fait très bien, à condition que les sujets n'y soient pas traités comme dans Candide ou Marianne"; Grenier to JP, AP, 27/12/33.

i.e. NRF March 1934, when, for once, the "mechanics" of the review allowed Paulhan to include current, topical material; see below, Chapter Three.

JP to Grenier, AP, 8/2/37.

JP to Schlumberger, BD 25098 (September 1937); Petitjean (born 1913) was a philosopher and Germanist by training; his contribution to Drieu's NRF during the Occupation has caused him since to observe a rarely-broken silence.

"Bulletin", NRF November 1939, p. 815, on "les Evénements": "les uns sont trop connus, et d'ailleurs trop graves"; quoted in NRF Index 3, p. x.

This circular is reproduced in at least two locations; in NRF May 1969, "(lettre) A René Daumal" (11/4/38), and in Jeannine Kohn-Etiemble, 226 Lettres inédites de Jean Paulhan (contribution à l'étude du mouvement littéraire en France, 1933-1967), Klincksieck, 1975, pp. 155-6. This work provides extracts from the Brasillach article in Je suis partout, 14/1/38, pp. 156-7. The letter was also received by Grenier and Caillois (AP).
229. NRF May 1969, p. 1010.

230. ibid.


232. "La NRF n'a jamais été plus vivante ni plus suggestive. Le numéro d'Avril (1938) est un chef d'oeuvre à ce point de vue. Esprit et Europe sont des revues qui ont besoin d'une unité formelle. Mais c'est très bien que la NRF garde sa pluralité qui est une richesse et qui cache une unité d'esprit"; Grenier to JP, AP, 10/4/38.

233. "Si tu adhérais complètement à un système (de manière à avoir un panorama très partiel-philosophique, politique ou religieux) la chose serait évidemment simplifiée" (ibid.).

234. See below, Chapter Seven.

235. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25108 (September 1938).

236. ibid. The issues for September (pp. 453-6), October (pp. 612-5), November (pp. 769-73) and March 1940 (pp. 384-7) were provided for. The "general interest" articles included P-L Couchoud, "Jésus, Dieu ou Homme?", September, pp. 390-415; R. Delavignette, "Le Commandant du Cercle", October pp. 552-70.

237. For a detailed analysis, see below, Chapter Seven.
CHAPTER TWO - NOTES


6. Les Cahiers du Mois, 21-22, Emile Paul, 1926. The last sentence of Arland's contribution encapsulates the tone: "Prendre conscience de ses besoins, de sa sujétion, de son destin. C'est par là qu'on est fixé a soi-même; par là, qu'on sent son poids et sa miserable grandeur" (p. 13).

7. See NRF February 1924, and "Essai", ibid., December 1925. These are collected in Arland's Essais critiques, Gallimard, 1952.

8. NRF October 1926, "Réflexions", pp. 478-86.


10. ibid., p. 797.


13. ibid., p. 4 (my italics).

14. Details and history are provided by Jean David, Le Procès de l'Intelligence, 1919-1927, Nizet, 1966. Reviews of the "Young Maurrassians" such as La Revue critique des Idées et des Livres and La Minerve française displayed an intense Nationalism and fully supported "la mobilisation de l'intelligence". The former, moreover, clung on to ideas it had nurtured before 1914 and explicitly attempted to perpetuate them after the war; see La Revue critique des Idées et des Livres, July 1919, pp. 335-50. Despite his chauvinism the editor, Jean Rivain, was generous enough to salute the quality of the NRF; see ibid., 25/1/20.

15. See, for example, Benda, La Trahison des Clercs, NRF October 1927, p. 493 (note 2).


17. ibid., p. 11. Cf. Maxence, pp. 58-60. Thibaudet exceeded the spirit and the letter of this statement in an article surveying "The Young Reviews" in France, published in The London Mercury. "It is almost impossible in France, for artists today, to divest themselves of political preoccupations". He continued: "... the young French reviews today are preoccupied with ideas first and art second. It is difficult for them, even when they are willing, to avoid a definite orientation towards politics. They are the natural voices of a generation which is prevented by actual events from indulging in detached speculation" (Vol. 1., 1919-1920, pp. 622-4). My italics. Thibaudet's stress upon the intrusion of History proved, in retrospect, to hold good for the next two decades.


19. ibid.

20. NRF August 1927, p. 129.

21. ibid., p. 133.

22. NRF September 1927, p. 319.

23. ibid., p. 325.

24. ibid., pp. 327ff, and October, p. 475.
25. NRF October 1927, pp. 477, 482-88.

26. NRF November 1927, p. 590.

27. ibid., p. 591.

28. ibid. In La République des professeurs, Grasset, 1928, Thibaudet expounds a similar view.

29. NRF November 1927, p. 594.

30. Benda's diatribe is remarkable considering that the NRF's well-being depended upon subscription support from the bourgeoisie; "La bourgeoisie actuelle, terrifiée par les progrès de la classe adverse et n'ayant d'autre souci que de maintenir ce qui lui reste de privilèges, n'a plus que l'aversion pour les dogmes libéraux, et l'homme de lettres qui veut ses faveurs est formellement tenu, s'il arbore un drapeau politique, d'arborer celui que défend "l'ordre"." (p. 594).


32. ibid., p. 605.

33. ibid., p. 606.

34. ibid.

35. The last instalment had appeared in April 1927.


37. Gide to JP, AP, dated 2/8/27, and JP to Schlumberger, BD 25064, (October 1927): "La fin du Benda est très bien" (Paulhan's italics). In his memoirs Benda remarks that Gide considered him to be a "logicien (...) redoutable", (Exercice, ed. cit., p. 316). Moreover Benda learnt later that a great source of anxiety for Gide was that the NRF had ceased to be his review, and had become "Benda's" (ibid., p. 317).


39. ibid., p. 810.


41. NRF December 1927, p. 811.

42. ibid.

43. ibid., p. 819.

44. The context of the debate shifts thus to that of Franco-German relations; see below, Chapter 4.

46. ibid., p. 835.
47. Ramon Fernandez to JP, AP, (late 1927).
49. ibid., p. 102.
50. ibid., p. 104.
51. ibid (Fernandez' italics).
52. ibid., p. 106.
53. ibid.
54. ibid., p. 107.
56. ibid., p. 20.
59. NRF March 1928, pp. 385-7.
60. NRF June 1928, pp. 825-31.
61. ibid., p. 825.
62. ibid., p. 830.
64. NRF August 1928, p. 162.
65. NRF September 1928, p. 336. Benda confirmed that the second part of La Fin de l'Eternal "dit vraiment des choses nouvelles par rapport à La Trahison des Clercs et propres à frapper le lecteur notamment dans la défense que j'ai faite de ma position quant à la question de la responsabilité de la guerre", Benda to JP, AP, 6/5/28.
66. NRF September 1928, p. 342.
67. ibid.
68. ibid., p. 343.
69. ibid., pp. 353-4.
70. ibid., pp. 355-6.
71. Thibaudet, in turn, replied to Benda in September (pp. 404-9), "Pour les Archives de La Trahison des Clercs (suite)", and Fernandez countered after the publication of the volume in "Remarques sur La Fin de l'Eternal", in NRF July 1929, pp. 104-10.

72. NRF October 1928, pp. 525ff, 536f, 551.

73. ibid., p. 550f.

74. ibid., p. 552.

75. In spite of his own serious reservations, Thibaudet returned to an assessment of the contribution of La Trahison and its sequel in "Reflexions: Histoire de Vingt-Cinq ans", NRF May 1929, pp. 708-19. Here Thibaudet is more careful to balance Benda's work in the history of the first 25 years of the century by referring to it with L'Avenir de l'Intelligence, by Charles Maurras, as "les deux formes les plus philosophiques du dialogue français autour du procès Dreyfus" (p. 708). The tone of this article is more sympathetic and Thibaudet admits that "ce qui me gêne un peu, c'est de trouver, chez ce doctrinaire, si peu de doctrine" (p. 709).

76. NRF November 1928, pp. 629-42. This essay is reproduced in Conversion à l'Humain, itself appended to the 1962 re-edition of Caliban Parle, Grasset, orig. 1928. (A letter from Guéhenno to JP (AP), shows that this essay was originally destined for the Revue hebdomadaire and that it was ready for publication much earlier than November; another letter shows that Paulhan delayed publication to coincide with the volume Caliban parle.)

77. NRF November 1928, p. 630.

78. ibid., p. 633.

79. ibid., p. 634.

80. ibid., p. 635.

81. ibid., p. 640.

82. ibid.

83. ibid., p. 641.
See, for example, NRF February 1927, "Les Essais: Esquisses pour un Humanisme Critique", pp. 250-7, in which he calls for "la constitution d'une direction intellectuelle et pratique, d'une de ces magistratures spirituelles que l'on retrouve à toutes les grandes époques, et dont la carence aujourd'hui se fait sentir. Pour qu'un homme puisse légitimement conseiller d'autres hommes, il faut bien que tous reconnaissent à la fois des limites à leurs volontés et une commune mesure à leurs sentiments". Moreover Fernandez had had the chance to rehearse this debate in the short-lived venture run by Berl and Drieu La Rochelle, Les Derniers Jours; see Pierre Andreu's preface to the facsimile reprint, J. Place, 1979, and the exchange between Berl and Fernandez in Les Derniers Jours, 20/3/27, 10/4/27 and 15/5/28. Cf. also Europe March 1927, and Crémieux's sympathetic treatment in NRF November 1927, pp. 671-6. Fernandez was to return to the debate once more with Berl in 1932; see NRF January 1932, pp. 120-8, and Berl's reply in ibid., February 1932, pp. 317-20.


NRF February 1929, pp. 259-62.

"Il n'a visé qu'à nous rappeler la réalité, l'importance, la valeur de cette masse humaine dont les politiciens se servent avant de lui interdire l'entrée des palais qu'elle leur livre" (p. 259).

ibid., p. 260.

ibid., p. 261.

ibid., p. 262.


ibid.

ibid. Regarding Berl, his "pamphlet" Mort de la Pensée bourgeoise was being published in Europe at this time, from January to March 1929.

ibid.

ibid.

"Divers", NRF April 1929, p. 592.

ibid.

ibid. Hodée's sarcasm provoked another letter from Berl reprinted in NRF May 1929, p. 744.

CPD 1, p. 402, 6/2/29.


103. ibid., p. 22.

104. ibid., pp. 30-2.

105. ibid., p. 42.

106. ibid., p. 128.

107. ibid., p. 135-7.


109. ibid., p. 120.

110. ibid.

111. ibid., p. 121.

112. ibid., quoting Berl, p. 13.

113. ibid., p. 123.

114. ibid.

115. See Berl's letter in NRF August 1929, pp. 291-2. Berl could not understand in whose name Prévost was criticising his book, on behalf of the bourgeoisie or the Revolution. Cf. Berl-Modiano, p. 49.

116. See Berl-Modiano, P. 48f. Berl added that the antagonism against defending Zola derived essentially from "un vieux fond antidreyfusard à la NRF" (ibid). Berl may have misinterpreted an aesthetic disliking for Zola in the NRF as a political one, for Anglès has noted that "la plupart des amis de Gide ont été plus ou moins "dreyfusards", et leur cœur, en dépit des déceptions, reste légèrement placé à gauche", Le Premier Groupe..., p. 186.

117. Gide to Prévost, letter dated 14/6/29, reproduced as an annex to letter 251 in Gide-RMG Correspondance 1, p. 692 (my italics).

118. ibid.

119. RMG to Gide, in ibid., p. 369, 14/6/29 (RMG's italics).


121. See above, note 30.

122. NRF September 1929, p. 393.

123. ibid., p. 395.
124. ibid., p. 399.

125. See NRF August 1929, pp. 149-82. This is the leading article in this number; for the third year running, a very important text by Benda appeared "en tête" of the August NRF.

126. ibid., p. 156.

127. ibid.


129. ibid., p. 175.

130. ibid., pp. 179-80, note "H".


132. ibid., p. 101.

133. See below, Chapter 3.

134. NRF January 1930, p. 103.

135. ibid., p. 104.

136. ibid., p. 106.

137. ibid.

138. ibid., "note 1". (Cf. Europe, December 1929).

139. ibid.

140. ibid., p. 108. Benda's article had the required effect; in NRF February 1930, pp. 295-6, a further letter from Bainville clarified Action française thinking on the specific historiographical challenge; Benda was given the last word and used it to make a further jibe at Bainville's explanation which, said Benda, was "une plaisanterie, mais pleine de signification" (ibid., p. 296). Action française "historiography" is the subject of Stephen Wilson's "History and Traditionalism - Maurras and the Action française", Journal of the History of Ideas, 29, 1968, pp. 365-80; cf. the same author's "The Action française in French Intellectual Life", The Historical Journal, XII, 2, 1969, pp. 328-50.

141. CPD 2, p. 74, 14/2/30.

142. ibid., p. 82, 31/1/30: "(Gide) nous dit que Paulhan lui a confié que Fernandez est très monté contre Benda à cause de son attitude vis-à-vis de Bainville et qu'il a même posé l'ultimatum: lui ou Benda à la NRF. Gide dit: "Vous allez voir que Fernandez va passer dans l'autre clan, ce n'est pas la première fois que je vous le dis"." Gide was proved right; after a brief phase with the pro-AEAR writers in 1934, Fernandez veered rightwards.

As for Benda, he characterised Fernandez thus: "Son propre était d'ignorer le doute, mais de rejoindre à toute suggestion par une théorie immédiate. (...) Fernandez me figurait le parfait rhéteur (...) Dévoré d'ambition politique, il fut de ceux qui ne voulurent jamais comprendre que j'appelais trahison des clercs le fait pour eux de se livrer à une manoeuvre politique, non de rappeller les Etats au respect des valeurs éternelles (...)", Exercice..., ed. cit., pp. 321-2.


144. ibid., p. 268.

145. ibid.

146. ibid., p. 269.

147. ibid.

148. ibid., pp. 269-70.

149. ibid., p. 270.

150. ibid.

151. ibid.

152. Rolland to Guéhenno, Cahiers Romain Rolland, No. 23, p. 83, 17/2/30.

153. Guéhenno to Rolland, in ibid., p. 92, 22/3/30: "Je ne sais ce que sera la réponse exactement, mais j'ai envie de laisser là cette affaire. Nous n'en finirons plus. Paulhan, qui aime jouer et entremêler les fils m'annonce qu'il publiera dans le même numéro un essai sur "Venise et Barrès" que je lui avais donné il y a plusieurs mois". Guéhenno's essay "Venise 1921 ou la dixième ombre" appeared in the same number, NRF April 1930, pp. 476-92, and Benda's "Lettre à Jean Guéhenno" in ibid., pp. 553-62. Interestingly enough, in a letter to JP (29/3/30, AP), Guéhenno asked to transfer from Grasset to Gallimard.

154. "À la NRF, où j'ai la joie de dire à Benda tout le bien que je pense de sa lettre à Guéhenno, si remarquable, excellente vraiment, et qui m'a gonflé de satisfaction", Journal I, p. 980, 5/4/30.
156. ibid., pp. 555-6.
157. ibid.
158. ibid., p. 557 (Benda's italics).
159. ibid., p. 562.
160. ibid., p. 560.
161. ibid., p. 562.
162. Rolland to Guéhenno, Cahiers Romain Rolland No. 23, p. 95, 14/4/30. Guéhenno agreed: "Sa mauvaise foi est évidente (...). Il n'y a pas lieu de répondre" (ibid, p. 97, 19/4/30).
163. "Au long d'une autre lettre", NRF July 1930, pp. 95-103, replies to a text in Libres Propos, April 1930, signed by Georges Canguilhem and Michel Alexandre. This is reproduced in Europe June 1930, pp. 302-4.
164. i.e. Essai d'un discours cohérent sur les rapports de Dieu et du Monde, serialised in NRF from October 1930 to January 1931 inclusive.
165. Between November 1929 and March 1930 three governments were formed; Cf. J-M Mayeur, La vie politique sous la Troisieme Republique, Seuil, Points-Histoire, 1984, pp. 290ff.
166. By June 5th 1931, Germany announced it could no longer pay reparations. This question is dealt with below in Chapter 4, in the context of the NRF and Franco-German relations.
168. ibid., p. 104.
169. ibid., p. 106.
170. ibid., p. 107 (my italics).
171. i.e., Jacques Rivière, "La Crise du concept de Littérature", NRF February 1924, pp. 159-70.
173. ibid.
174. ibid., p. 108.
175. ibid., p. 111.


179. Ibid.

180. Ibid., p. 316.

181. See above, note 125 et seq.


183. Ibid., p. 317.

184. Ibid., p. 327.


186. In a telling footnote Fernandez displayed his belief that "il est clair que nous retombons en enfance si une philosophie virile ne vient pas nous sauver à temps. (...) Nous nous enivrons d'images que nous prenons pour des pensées..." (*NRF* September 1930, p. 324).

187. Ibid., p. 328.

188. A detailed discussion of the Franco-German debate contained in Chapter 4 below.

189. Louis Martin-Chauffier was, in 1929, in charge of the Gallimard collection "Ne Jugez Pas", and also collaborated from that time on the project to publish Gide's *Oeuvres complètes*. See also Gide, *Journal* I, pp. 937 and 945, and *CPD* 2, p. 132, 14/2/31. "Les Clercs sur le Pré" appeared in *Les Nouvelles littéraires*, 20/12/30.

190. Ibid.

191. Ibid.


193. The best known signatories were: Claude Aveline, Jean Baruzi, Julien Benda, Emmanuel Berl, Jean-Richard Bloch, Pierre Bost, Jacques Chardonne, Benjamin Crémieux, Daniel-Rops, Roland Dorgeles, Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, Ramon Fernandez, Jean Guéhenno, Jean Giono, Gabriel Marcel, Louis Martin-Chauffier, Roger Martin du Gard, Paul Morand, Jean Paulhan, Jean Prévost, Jean Schlumberger and André Thérrive (ibid., p. 84). On p. 137 Marcel Arland was included among the later signatories.
194. ibid., p. 83. The concluding passage insisted that the true key to peace was "l'entente franco-allemande".

195. The most important text here is Crémieux's article in NRF May 1931, "Inquiétude et Reconstruction", an extract from his book of the same title published the same year by Corrèa. Cf. also Henri Massis, in his two articles in La Revue universelle (15/9/31 and 1/10/31), where he used Crémieux's thesis to attack Gide.

196. See the important series of replies to the Candide survey, "la Fin de l'Après-Guerre", 27/8/31, 3/9/31, 10/9/31, 17/9/31 and 24/9/31. Robert Brasillach interviewed Paulhan, whose response was typically equivocal: "Je crois bien, dit-il (Paulhan) trop modestement, que je n'entends rien à ces questions (...) A vrai dire, je penserais volontiers qu'il n'y a pas eu d'après-guerre, au sens où l'on entend ordinairement le mot. Mais je puis me tromper" (Candide, 3/9/31). This reply was not over-helpful, and Brasillach summed up thus: "L'après-guerre est un néant, l'après-guerre n'a rien inventé... Peut-on mieux le dire? Et qui pourrait être plus sévère?" (ibid.). Brasillach also interviewed Arland who declared that Gide's influence, so forceful during the preceding period, was now redundant (Candide, 10/9/31). Gide was very hurt by Brasillach's representation of Arland's disavowals, and Paulhan intervened to ease their reconciliation after this potentially embarrassing episode (Gide to JP, AP). Arland, in turn, clarified his own intentions in "Querelle de Générations", NRF November 1931, pp. 788-92.

197. See Weber, Chapter 16.

198. CPD 2, p. 207, 2/12/31.

199. ibid., pp. 207-8.

200. ibid., p. 208.

201. JP to Grenier, Correspondance, ed. cit., p. 39.


203. See Gide-RMG Corr., 1, pp. 494-6, letters dated 2/2/32, 3/2/32 and 5/2/32.
204. See Gide to RMG in ibid., pp. 505-7, 18/2/32, RMG to Gide, pp. 509-10, 21/2/32 and p. 511, 23/2/32. Paulhan's letter is reproduced in ibid., P. 716. It began: "C'est une habitude des écrivains assez émouvante que de signer au petit bonheur toutes les pétitions qu'on leur présente. Leur signature a si peu de poids qu'ils auraient tort d'hésiter". Paulhan's point was that the petition followed a surrealist "manifeste contradictoire et lâche" which argued, hypocritically, that "c'est de la poésie, ce n'est pas sérieux". Paulhan believed that "l'appel à l'opinion n'a d'autre but que de le (Aragon) réhabiliter auprès des Soviets. Ce manifeste contradictoire n'était guère qu'une petite manoeuvre opportuniste" (ibid.).

205. Martin du Gard, for instance, acknowledged Paulhan's reasoning: "Vos arguments, vos objections sont irrésistibles. Il est tellement évident que vous avez raison"; RMG to JP, AP, 21/2/32.

206. Gide-RMG Corr., 1, p. 508, 12/2/32 (my italics). Two days later Gide had an important conversation with Paul Valéry, who was convinced that "le misérable travail des politiciens nous mène à l'abîme, et toute l'Europe avec nous. Impossible de rassembler un front unique pour s'opposer aux ruineuses revendications des nationalistes. Il m'en persuade et je ressors de cet entretien fort assombri..."; Journal I, p. 1116, my italics.

207. Gide-RMG Corr., 1, p. 498, 10/2/32. Gide disagreed with RMG; "Je crois plus important d'amener à eux (Guéhenno, Bloch, etc.) la NRF et ses lecteurs, que de déséter celle-ci" (ibid. p. 504, 17/2/32).

208. CPD 2, p. 229, 6/3/32.


210. ibid., p. 778.

211. ibid.
212. Guéhenno wrote to Paulhan to ask: "Dites-moi où vous paraît être l'hypocrisie dans le cas de Rolland? Est-il que vous le soupçonnez de souhaiter la guerre révolutionnaire (...) dans l'instant même où il paraît condamner toute guerre? Ce serait plutôt incongruë. Peu d'hommes ont le courage d'être rationaliste jusqu'au bout" (Guéhenno to JP, AP, 4/4/32).

213. NRF May 1932, pp. 942-4. Paulhan's reply to this is dated April 16th.

214. ibid., p. 942, Guéhenno's italics.

215. ibid., p. 943.

216. ibid.

217. ibid., p. 944.

218. ibid.

219. Cf. JP to RMG, BN Mss Fonds RMG, Vol. 118, f 235, dated 9/5/32: "Si quelque nouvelle guerre éclate, il y a neuf chances sur dix pour qu'elle soit civile plutôt que nationale. (Et celle de 1914 même: civile, au dire de Benda; civile dans la pensée de tous ceux qui sont partis joyeusement se battre pour le Droit, etc.). Il est plus difficile encore de distinguer le civil du national que l'offensif de défensif; et l'existence de l'armée rouge, des hitlériens, etc., n'est pas faite pour simplifier la chose".

220. RMG to JP, AP, 29/5/32. RMG's italics.

221. ibid. My italics.

222. ibid. These remarks are derived from the discussions Gide and Martin du Gard had had in March 1932 (see above, note 208): "L'influence de Fernandez est, pour moi, exactement ce qui est souhaitable aujourd'hui pour vivifier la NRF, sans altérer sa personnalité véritable, sans rien lui faire perdre de la place à part qu'elle occupe depuis 20 ans" (ibid.).

223. ibid.


225. "Je crains un peu que vous n'appartenez à la race dangereuse des gens qui, pour se faire pardonner leur détachement ou leur inertie de jadis, se précipitent de tous les côtés, préfèrent s'engager, à savoir précisément sur quoi ils s'engagent, et montrent une bonne volonté capricieuse de tout embrouiller" (ibid.).
226. "... quand vous dites que les temps ne sont plus à éborgner les mouches, et qu'il y a plus urgent à faire, vous me jetez dans l'horreur. Les temps ne sont à rien du tout, et il n'y a rien de plus urgent aujourd'hui comme hier et comme il y a mille ans de ne pas se laisser bourrer le crâne, d'observer que les pacifistes nous content aujourd'hui les mêmes sornettes que le général Cherfils en 1914 (...)" (ibid.). On June 8th, Martin du Gard conceded: "Vous avez raison: ne pas se laisser bourrer la crâne" (RMG to AP, 8/6/32).


229. ibid. On the same page as the end of Paulhan's letter Guéhenno printed the well-known declarations by Rolland, dated 29/5/32, 4/6/32 and 17/6/32, "la Guerre vient", calling for a World Congress on Peace. "Ce que nous voulons, c'est soulever une immense vague d'opinion contre la guerre, - quelle qu'elle soit, d'où qu'elle vienne, et quels que soient ceux qu'elle menace", ibid., pp. 477-8. The NRF eventually printed this in August, pp. 318-9.

230. See Gide-RMG Corr., 1, p. 528, 7/7/32, and Annex, p. 720, and ibid., p. 529, letter from RMG dated 10/7/32, and Annex, p. 720. Cf. Littérature engagée, pp. 14-17. Both Gide and Martin du Gard complained, in their declarations, of the complete ineffectiveness of political moves to secure peace; the belief was sincere that the intellectuals' "S.O.S. désespéré" would promote the case for peace.

231. See above, note 229, and the exchange of letters between Gide and Paulhan in Grover, MLN, pp. 834-5, letters dated 12/7/32, 21/7/32 and 25/7/32. Once again Paulhan had to explain himself on his distinction between civil and national wars.


233. See RMG to JP, AP, dated 31/7/32. The Lausanne Conference on Reparations had broken down once and for all on July 19th. The rest of Martin du Gard's long letter shows how he and Gide were thinking: "Je n'avais pas attendu ça pour m'apercevoir que les gouvernements capitalistes sont aveuglés par la complication, très réelle d'ailleurs, des problèmes immédiats et nationaux, et incapables de s'entendre sur le plan général (...). Et je me disais que seul un immense mouvement d'opinion pourrait les obliger à donner le coup de barre nécessaire. Là-dessus me parvient le manifeste de R. R. qui, justement, fait appel à tous, sans distinction de parti ni de confession, pour essayer de provoquer (...) ce sursaut d'effroi et de bon sens qui pourrait encore, je crois, sauver la paix (...). Vous n'êtes pas encore parvenu à me faire regretter mon geste. Mais je connais vos diableries ..." (ibid.).

CHAPTER THREE - NOTES


3. André Malraux, Preface to Rolland-Guéhenno Correspondance, Cahiers Romain Rolland No. 23, p. 8. This judgement is corroborated by Nicole Racine, in "L'Association des écrivains et artistes révolutionnaires, la Revue Commune et la lutte idéologique contre le fascisme (1932-1936)", in Mouvememt Social, No. 54, 1966, pp. 29-47. She writes: "L'AEAR, fondée en mars 1932 par des écrivains communistes (...) se donnait (...) pour but la constitution d'un front d'intellectuels, unis sur les mots d'ordre de lutte idéologique contre la guerre et le fascisme. La constitution de l'AEAR coïncide avec un tournant dans la vie intellectuelle soviétique et l'appel aux "compagnons de route" (p. 29)".


5. Béraud, Croisade des Longues figures, p. 90.


7. Touchard, La gauche..., p. 102.


9. See Berstein again on the "jeunes turcs": "(...) un groupe de jeunes intellectuels radicaux ou radicalisants s'efforce de tirer les leçons de l'échec du Cartel et de repenser la doctrine du parti en se fondant sur le réalisme" (p. 12).

11. ibid. Nor did all the "jeunes turcs" remain Left-inclined: see Berstein, Histoire..., p. 13: "Avec la lutte contre le Front populaire, c'est en effet l'aile droite du mouvement Jeunes Turcs qui a le vent en poupe. Elle définit un néo-radicalisme fondé sur l'anti-marxisme, l'alliance à droite, voire la xénophobie et l'antisémitisme, qui ne doit plus rien aux traditions historiques du radicalisme".


14. Touchard, La gauche..., p. 125, and Jamet, art. cit., p. 184, both quoting Alain.

15. "Lettre à un Jeune Partisan", Oeuvres V, pp. 469-79, dated November 1956, where Paulhan stated that "Alain se proposait, vers 1920, de se regrouper les combistes. Or il n'y en avait plus un seul..." (p. 477).

16. Gaston Gallimard reviewed Propos d'un Normand in December 1911; see Assouline, p. 51.

17. See "Le Fonctionnement de la NRF", in BAAG, No. 61, January 1984, p. 17. Gide spoke of Alain "avec une admiration très vive" (Journal I, p. 753, 1923).

18. See above, Chapter One, note 121.

19. Gallimard, "Documents Bleus" No. 24. Fernandez reviewed this, along with Le Citoyen contre les Pouvoirs, 1926, in NRF November 1926, pp. 622-4, where he stated astutely that "(le radicalisme) d'Alain n'est pas une doctrine politique mais au contraire un moyen pour préserver l'intégrité personnelle au sein du groupe politique" (p. 623). Indeed, for Fernandez, Alain was a far greater moralist than political thinker; in the tribute to Alain in Europe for January 1928 he wrote: "Le moralisme est l'art de ménager des zones individuelles de liberté et de raison (...) quelles que soient les circonstances. Son radicalisme moral est doublé d'un radicalisme politique qui affaiblit un peu sa position sans rien lui enlever de sa grandeur" (p. 143).

20. Thibaudet, La Republique des professeurs, p. 78; this publicity stunt is also recounted by Robert Aron in Fragments d'une Vie, pp. 49-50.


23. For examples, see Hommage à Alain, NRF September 1952, pp. 7-64.


25. See above, Chapter One.
   In 1938, Paulhan remarked: "Bien que Roger Martin du Gard ou Alain se prennent pour d'honnêtes radicaux, je crois en effet que l'on découvirait chez eux des traces d'anarchie" (Oeuvres IV, p. 361).


28. "Propos", NRF April 1934, p. 691; Cf. also "Propos" in NRF September 1934, pp. 422-4, beginning "les Croix de Feu ont choisi la discipline...".

29. "Chaque mois je reçois (d'Alain) 3 Propos, entre lesquels choisir. J'apprends en même temps quel est celui qu'il préfère: je suis le plus souvent son choix, parfois non..." JP to RMG, BN Mss Fonds RMG, 118, f. 223, February 1930.

30. Martin du Gard and Grenier especially; see above Chapter One, notes 123 and 124.

31. "Alain", NRF November 1932, pp. 760-66. S. de Sacy in June that year (pp. 1110-3) also eulogised Alain.


33. L'Action française, 13/12/28.

34. ibid. This example is only one of many assaults on the NRF and its personnel; they were only to be expected from Maurras, whose political analysis was, to say the least, restricted in scope. For instance: "pour les partis de gauche, il n'est en réalité jamais question de doctrine ni même de programme. Un seul mot d'ordre, un intérêt: la lutte contre la réaction. Jamais un radical bien né ne se laissera enrégimenter sous une bannière suspecte de réaction" (L'Action française, 30/12/27); and, "le communisme dilué s'appelle socialisme; le socialisme dilué s'appelle radicalisme..." (ibid.).

35. Commune, January-February 1934, p. 577. This periodical was the organ of the AEAR.
36. ibid. Aragon was forced to back down in the next issue, for by then Alain had signed the manifesto "Aux Travailleurs!" which appeared soon after the riots of February 6th 1934. See Commune March-April 1934, p. 788.


38. ibid., p. 410.

39. Touchard, La gauche..., p. 137. Thibaudet was hugely prolific and wrote in a wide range of periodicals of extremely diverse political persuasion. The Sorbonne could have wished for no better advertisement for itself than Thibaudet; see Paul Gerbod, "L'Université et la Littérature en France de 1919 à 1939", Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 25, 1978, pp. 129-144, esp. p. 142.

40. Among the most memorable are "Lettres et la Politique", NRF December 1926, "Etats généraux", January 1927 and those for "Réflexions" published between October 1930 and February 1931 which drew Benda's two-part reply "Les Idées d'un Républicain en 1872", July and August 1931. Among the most important of all is the one which appeared as an article, not a "chronique", in April 1928, "Réflexions sur la Politique" (see below).

41. See Alain, in "Hommage à Albert Thibaudet", NRF July 1936, pp. 32-6: "on le devine boursier et radical; mais il ne tarde, autant qu'il peut, à l'avouer" (p. 34).

42. NRF July 1936, p. 37, "Thibaudet Politique et Moraliste".


44. See Roger Giron et Robert de Saint-Jean, La Jeunesse Littéraire devant la politique, eds. des Cahiers Libres, 1928; Arland's reply concluded: "Si par politique, vous entendez celle de Montesquieu, celle de Rousseau ou celle des Evangiles, je vous dirais qu'à cette sorte de politique (...) je ne ménage pas ma sympathie. Cette politique, c'est la suite, c'est l'extension de la "politique" de l'individu envers lui-même" (p. 41). As well as Gide's, Alain's influence is detectable here.
45. For Berl, see Interrogatoire, p. 57: "Herriot a été (...) l'homme politique avec lequel je me suis senti vraiment lié". Herriot presided at the banquets when Paulhan and Benda received their respective "Légion d'honneur". (See CPD 2, pp. 309, 313-4, for Paulhan's investiture, and Benda's ceremony is mentioned by Chambat, "Postface", La Trahison des Clercs, 1977, p. 392).

For Chamson's politics, see Lucie Mazauric, Avec André Chamson: Ah Dieu! que la paix est jolie!, Plon, 1972, p. 86, and Chamson, Il faut vivRE vieux, Grasset, 1984, pp. 70-3.


47. JP to Grenier, AP, 6/12/34.

48. There are three studies of Paulhan's politics:
- F. Grover, "Jean Paulhan et la Politique", in Jean Paulhan le Souterrain, pp. 187ff;
- J. Debû-Bridel, "Jean Paulhan, Citoyen", in Paulhan, Oeuvres V, pp. 483-92; and

Of these the last remembers the importance of Paulhan's role as editor of the NRF, whereas the first two tend to look - justifiably within their contexts - at Paulhan's personal political writings. For Léautaud's judgement, see Journal XII, p. 212; for Sartre's, see Lettres au Castor, I, p. 201.

The right-wing view is Jean-Louis Ferrier's, in l'Express, June 7th 1970: "homme de droite, il l'était sans doute..."; Pierre Boutang, too, in his Maurras, la destinée et l'oeuvre, Plon, 1984, detects Maurrassian influences in Paulhan: "comme l'union d'une sorte d'anarchisme et d'un monarchisme nullement dissimilé chez Paulhan" (p. 663).

49. JP to RMG, BN Mss Fonds RMG, 118, f245, 7/5/35. On his election Paulhan told Jouhandeau that "je me trouvais sur beaucoup de listes "modérées", ajouté à la place d'un nom que l'on avait rayé. Si ni les uns ni les autres ne me connaissent, c'est peut-être le nom qui plaît ou déplait. (...) Je m'intéresse mieux à Châtenay, et il vient aux réunions de vieux hommes de métier, compagnons de Tour de France et socialistes depuis Proudhon que j'aime bien" (BD 3629, 3630, the latter dated 20/5/35).

Longuet, grandson of Karl Marx, was an SFIO "minoritaire" socialist; see Lacouture, Léon Blum, Seuil, 1977, p. 136, and NRF "Bulletin", October 1938, p. 701, on Longuet's death.

50. JP to RMG, BN Mss Fonds RMG, 118, f245, 7/5/35.


52. "La méthode critique de la NRF", NRF May 1969, p. 987.

54. NRF July 1938, p. 155.

55. ibid.


57. Throughout his correspondence, Paulhan frequently pointed to the bizarre pairings he achieved in the Contents pages.

58. See Paulhan's list, in "Présentation...", p. 363: Valéry, Proust, Gide, Claudel, Giraudoux, Martin du Gard, Thibaudet, Benda, Duhamel, Romain, Aragon, Fargue, Jouhandeau, Chamson, Malraux, Montherlant, Pourrat, Supervielle, Giono and Green. Cf. the opinion of Guy Dumur: "Pour mettre tous ces gens ensemble Paulhan, j'imagine, avait trouvé un truc: il les écoutait de cet air profondément attentif qu'il en était suspect, qui leur prouvait à tous que leurs différences étaient peu de chose auprès de ces grandes vérités qu'expriment les proverbes chinois, etc. (...) Jean Paulhan est mort avec son secret" (Le Nouvel Observateur, 14/10/68, p. 47).

59. Touchard, La gauche..., p. 98; Cf. Mayeur, p. 306.

60. See Jean Goueffon's thorough analysis of "jeune turc" Jean Zay's election in the appropriately-titled "Le radicalisme entre la crise et le Front Populaire: la première élection de Jean Zay (1932)", La Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, 22, 1975, pp. 619-54.


62. ibid., p. 441.

63. ibid., p. 442

64. ibid., pp. 443-5.

65. NRF October 1932, pp. 520-38.

66. ibid., p. 525.

67. ibid., p. 527. My italics.

68. See, for instance, Mayeur, p. 314, relating how Herriot refused Socialist participation. Herriot fell on December 14th 1932.


70. ibid., p. 538.

71. ibid.

73. ibid., p. 340.

74. Berl's book was published by Rieder in 1932 after first appearing in Europe, from November 1931 to January 1932 inclusive.

75. Berl, quoted by Touchard, La gauche..., p. 103.

76. NRF June 1933, pp. 997-9, p. 998.

77. ibid.

78. ibid., p. 999.

79. ibid.

80. The bibliography is abundant in this field: see the following-
Robert Aron provides details of his own involvement in "l'Ordre Nouveau", in Fragments d'une vie, Plon, 1981, Chapter V, pp. 93-120.

81. Rieder, 1931; Cf. Loubet del Bayle, pp. 87ff.

82. NRF June 1931, pp. 942-5. Fernandez told Paulhan that Aron himself had wanted this account to appear in June's issue (AP, 1931).

83. ibid.

84. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25081, 23/8/32. In this same letter, Paulhan took the prospective issue for September and listed in detail the background of the contributors; he concluded that "je crois que le difficile serait de découvrir une jeune équipe littéraire ou philosophique d'aujourd'hui qui ne soit pas représentée à la NRF".

85. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25087, August-September 1932; Paulhan's italics.

86. ibid.
87. See above, Chapter Two.


89. See Les Chantiers Co-opératifs, Prospectus, numéro hors série, May 1932, and numbers 1 and 2, June and July 1932, where Schlumberger signed the Manifesto for the "Co-opération franco-allemande des nouvelles équipes". Cf. also Sternhell, p. 355, note 127.

90. Loubet del Bayle, p. 171.


94. Grenier to JP, AP, 14/5/32.

95. Grenier to JP, AP, December 1932.

96. JP to Grenier, AP, 20/12/32.

97. ibid.


99. ibid., p. 145.

100. ibid.

101. NRF December 1932, p. 840.

102. Europe, January 1933, p. 146.

103. ibid.

104. Europe, February 1933, p. 303.

105. ibid., p. 304.

106. See Rajeunissement de la politique, préface de Henry de Jouvenel, Corrèa, 1932, pp. 73-86. Chanson reconciled "Esprit et Pouvoir" in ibid., pp. 87ff. The survey had originally been conducted in La Revue des vivants; see Touchard, "L'Esprit...", pp. 96, 97 and notes 33-4.

107. Rajeunissement..., pp. 73-4.

108. ibid., pp. 80-2.
109. ibid., p. 86.

110. NRF March 1933, "Sur la Formation d'une Elite", pp. 523-9. This article was in part a response to Abel Bonnard's paper in La Revue hebdomadaire, 21/1/33.

111. NRF March 1933, p. 526.

112. ibid., pp. 526-7.

113. ibid.

114. ibid. Fernandez repeated these fears and anxiety over the masses in his reply to another important survey conducted by Gilbert Comte for La Grande Revue. The survey asked "Quels principes et quelles applications assureraient précisément le rajeunissement de la France dans votre vie privée, publique", etc. (November 1933). The replies, and there were many, appeared from January to June 1934. Fernandez' appeared in May 1934, pp. 378-82. Although overtaken by events, Comte considered the replies were still relevant (see June 1934, p. 572); by May, however, Fernandez had committed himself "to the masses...".

115. Touchard, "L'Esprit...", p. 99. The same author also identifies five key preoccupations central to the debate: antirationalism, antimaterialism, anticapitalism, antibourgeoisie and antiamericanism (Cf. ibid., p. 101).

116. The question of Gide's "engagement" is discussed below in the context of the USSR, Chapter Five.


118. Sternhell, Chapter Six, pp. 206-33.


120. ibid. (My italics).

121. ibid.


123. Grasset, 1933. See Loubet del Bayle, Part II, Chapter Two, pp. 269ff.

124. NRF January 1934, p. 110.

125. ibid.

126. ibid., p. 112.
This pivotal date in the history of the Third Republic in the 1930's has received much attention. In particular see Serge Berstein, *Le 6 fevrier, 1934*, coll. Archives, Julliard, 1975. Cf. Jean Lacouture, *Léon Blum*, 1977, pp. 238-48; J-M Mayeur's is the latest work to synthesize the political aftermath; see pp. 330-44, and the reactions of *La Rive gauche* are examined in Lottman, pp. 149-58.

"La crise semble toucher prioritairement cette petite propriété individuelle de la terre, de la boutique, de la petite industrie, cette catégorie de patrons-travailleurs (...) qui constitue le modèle idéologique auquel aspire la Troisième République sous l'influence du parti radical (...). C'est pourquoi les difficultés qui les frappent atteignent le régime dans ses bases les plus profondes" (Serge Berstein, *Le 6 février, 1934*, 1975, cited by Jean Lacouture, *Léon Blum*, p. 239).

Cf. Mayeur, who agrees that "le 6 février est en effet d'abord une manifestation parisienne contre la République des scandales, dominée par les radicaux de province" (p. 338).

Mayeur, p. 330; he points to the fact that "les crises, de plus en plus longues, ne permettent plus, par leur seul jeu, un reclassement et ne tiennent plus leur rôle habituel de faire avancer les solutions aux problèmes".

See above, Chapter One, notes 218-24.


147. Benda to JP, AP, 7/2/34; JP to Grenier, AP, 12/2/34. Cf. Benda, Un Régulier..., ed. cit., p. 143, where he states that February 6th and the subsequent events produced "une véritable affaire Dreyfus constante, dont j'espère qu'elle durera jusqu'à la fin de mes jours" (Cf. below, Chapter Six).


149. ibid., p. 578.

150. See Lefranc, Histoire de Front populaire..., pp. 46-7, and Annex, p. 433. See also Nicole Racine-Ferlaud, "le Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes (1934-1939)...", in Mouvement Social, No. 101, 1977, pp. 87-113. Fernandez was elected to the CVIA on May 8th when Paul Rivet stated "nous devons être présents à toutes les manifestations antifascistes et y affirmer notre position" (Lefranc, p. 47). With hindsight Raymond Aron considered most of the statements of Alain and the CVIA to be little more than verbiage; see Mémoires, pp. 132ff.


152. JP to Adrienne Monnier, BD 4446, 2/3/34, possibly intending the pun on "L'air du mois".


154. CPD 2, p. 367.


157. ibid., p. 698. Crémieux's comments on *L'Action française* drew a counterattack from Maurras on 10/4/34; Crémieux had said that "*L'Action française* (...) ajourne à 1950 le retour du roi"; Maurras' reply was anti-Semitic; see below, Chapter Six, for a discussion of his "Un Juif, celui-là", in *NRF* June 1934.


159. ibid., p. 700.

160. ibid., p. 701.

161. ibid.

162. ibid. Most of these mentioned by Crémieux have been seen as variants of fascist-syndicalist ideology by Sternhell, in *Ni droite ni gauche, passim*.

163. *NRF* April 1934, p. 702.


165. ibid., p. 692, Thibaudet's italics.

166. ibid., p. 695.

167. ibid., p. 697.

168. ibid.


171. ibid., p. 708.

172. JP to Hellens, BD 7288, 16/4/34.


176. *NRF* April 1934, p. 733. It should be noted however that Benda continued his own reflexions under the same rubric; see "Eleuthériana", ibid., pp. 734-5.

177. JP to Grenier, AP, 30/4/34.

178. See *Bulletin de l'Union pour la Vérité*, June-July 1934.

179. ibid., p. 388.

181. A very long list was reproduced in the Europe version in April 1934, pp. 601-6; Pierre Gérôme also provided a "Commentaire" (pp. 584-8) where he noted that the Party-affiliated newspapers Le Peuple, L'Humanité, Le Populaire had followed the initiative of such as Benda, Gide and others (p. 584). See also Commune, March-April 1934, "En marge d'un manifeste".

182. NRF May 1934, pp. 887-8.

183. ibid., p. 888.

184. ibid.

185. Cf. Drieu's article in NRF December 1930, "Malraux, l'homme nouveau", pp. 879-85. The similarities and friendship between Drieu and Malraux have not gone unnoticed: see Frédéric Grover, "Malraux et Drieu la Rochelle", in André Malraux 1, La Revue des Lettres Modernes/Minard, 1972, pp. 61-93, and the interview with Malraux in ibid., pp. 149-160.


190. In NRF June 1934, Eleuthère-Benda attacked Basile-Haëvy for writing "un article de bas fanatique contre le ministre Frot" (pp. 1040-1); Haëvy recognised himself and complained to Paulhan (Haëvy to JP, AP, 6/6/34), who upheld Benda's point of view (Cf. JP to Grenier, AP, 12/6/34). Haëvy also savaged the Third Republic in his La République des Comités, Grasset, 1934, reviewed by Prévost in NRF July 1934, pp. 131-4.


194. ibid., p. 427.

195. ibid., p. 430.


199. ibid., pp. 345ff.

200. ibid., p. 346.


202. NRF December 1934, pp. 894-900. The article was essentially the same as a piece intended for a Roumanian journal, as a footnote explained (p. 894).

203. ibid., p. 895.

204. ibid.

205. ibid., p. 898.

206. ibid., p. 897.


208. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3607, late 1934. Paulhan was referring to Gide's "Message au Congrès des Ecrivains Soviétiques", and Suarès' "Vues sur l'Europe", I, both in November's issue. These texts are discussed in greater detail below, in Chapters Five and Six.

209. NRF December 1934, p. 868.

210. Schlumberger commented much later on his motives in Oeuvres, V, p. 171f.
211. See below on "L'Age des Orthodoxies", April 1936.

212. See the three articles in Le Temps by Emile Henriot attacking Gide's "engagement" in December 1934.

213. See NRF January 1935, pp. 170-1, "L'Ecrivain et le Politique".

214. ibid., p. 170.

215. ibid., p. 170-1.

216. ibid.

217. Twenty years after his death, interest in Péguy was reawakening in 1935. Pierre Hamp and Jean Schlumberger knew each other from both the Cahiers de la Quinzaine and "Universités Populaires" days: see Schlumberger, Oeuvres, II, pp. 34-5, where Hamp is qualified as a sort of 'Dabit avant la lettre'. Cf. Jean Bastaire and Auguste Anglès, "Le premier groupe de la NRF et Péguy", in Bulletin des Amis d'André Gide, April 1984, pp. 171-215. What is more, Paulhan serialised Hamp's second book of memoirs in five parts from June to October 1935, Il faut que vous naissiez de nouveau. Armand Petitjean called for "de Nouveaux Cahiers de la Quinzaine" and Paulhan lent him much support: see Kohn-Etiemble 226 Lettres..., pp. 179ff, and Annex No. 9, pp. 440-3, reproducing the Manifesto.


220. ibid.

221. ibid., p. 286. Significantly enough from this time on, Fernandez' name appeared much less frequently in the review.

222. ibid., p. 287.

223. ibid., p. 288. In the same issue (pp. 295-6) Benda reviewed this book in a favourable light (it was published by Gallimard); the most original part was Chapter VI, "Itinéraire" (pp. 219-45), where Drieu retraced the steps he had taken to reach his current position. The "poetical" tone of the book derived from Drieu's free play of nouns and adjectives, for instance: "Je crois profondément que le stalinisme est un demi-fascisme et le fascisme un demi-socialisme (...)" (p. 231); and "mon socialisme, ce n'était pas le socialisme prolétarien des communistes, c'était un socialisme fasciste, un socialisme réformiste (...)" (p. 232).


226. ibid.

227. ibid., pp. 290-1.


229. Benda was critical of Marxism in "Délice d'Eleuthère" (fin.) in NRF March 1935, pp. 371-95; Pierre Herbart, "un jeune communiste", and close friend of Gide, wrote to Benda, who inserted his reply in NRF July 1935, pp. 148-50; in August 1935, "Lettre à Julien Benda" (by Herbart, pp. 301-3) was followed by "Réponse à Pierre Herbart" (pp. 303-4).

230. NRF March 1935, p. 478, "Donc, le dix février".


232. Lefranc, pp. 71-98.


234. Lefranc, p. 72. Rivet was "le premier élu du Front populaire" (ibid.).


236. ibid., p. 950.

237. ibid., p. 951.


239. ibid., p. 954.

240. Although supportive of uniting France again Paulhan remained sceptical, as his correspondence shows: he wrote to Suares: "Peut-être entendez-vous (...) les cris et les chants de ce parti confus qui va des radicaux aux communistes. C'est un jour étrange que celui où la police et l'armée protègent et guident deux sortes de factieux. Tant pis pour qui, se sentant à la fois national et populaire, voudrait passer de l'un à l'autre cortège. Il sera assommé". JP to Suares, BD 4965/10, 14/7/35, also cited by F. Grover, in Jean Paulhan le Souterrain..., p. 196. Cf. JP to Grenier, AP, 1935.

241. Lottman provides detailed coverage of the debates in *La Rive gauche*, pp. 159-185. See also CPD 2, pp. 461ff.
242. See Lottman, pp. 22-3, "Lever de rideau".

243. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3631, 24/6/35: "Nous songions beaucoup à vous deux, après la mort de Crevel. As-tu lu la lettre qu'il avait envoyée à Eluard, une heure avant de mourir? (...) (Gide dit que Crevel était persécuté, prenait volontiers pour des allusions à lui-même tout ce qu'il entendaient dire dans la rue...)".

244. NRF July 1935, pp. 121-2.

245. Cf. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3631, 24/6/35: "Au Congrès de samedi (...) Aragon a lu un discours, dit par Crevel à des ouvriers (...) en grève (Cf. Lottman, p. 170). Quand il a fini toute la salle s'est levée. Il me semble qu'il y a eu une grande émotion, qui s'adressait à Crevel".

246. CPD 2, p. 470, 30/6/35. André Breton, too, was incensed: see letter in NRF August 1935, pp. 291-3.


248. See CPD 2, p. 477, 4/10/35, and Lottman, p. 203f, who describes in detail the three manifestoes which appeared.

249. Lottman, p. 204. Cf. the discussions at the Union pour la Vérité on the three manifestoes reported in Bulletin de l'Union pour la Vérité, Nos. 3-4, December 1935-January 1936. The newly-born Vendredi reprinted Romains' text on November 8th 1935.


251. JP to Monnier, BD 4465, October 1935. Adrienne Monnier was also a signatory to the Romains manifesto. Cf. Malraux's reaction, reproduced in Le Crapouillot, January 1936.


253. NRF November 1935, p. 753.

254. ibid., pp. 757-8.

255. ibid., p. 758.

256. ibid.
257. See JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3788, extracts cited in Assouline, p. 252. The caretaker's wife was killed as a result of this attack; Gaston Gallimard preferred to think of it as an accident, but Gabrielle Gros, a commercial administrator, recounted that "les Croix de Feu nous avaient menacés, si l'on publiait le livre de Chopine (contre la Rocque) de "faire sauter la maison". (...) La Police et les experts semblaient hier pencher pour l'attentat...". "Du trottoir, jeudi, un monsieur qui passe dit: "Ah, ils ont foutu le feu à la NRF"."


259. NRF April 1936, pp. 481-93. Grenier had already noticed what he called a "Sens unique" in the "Airs du Mois", May 1935, pp. 800-1. See also Henri Lefebvre's enthusiastic exposition "Qu'est-ce que la Dialectique?", in NRF September 1935 (pp. 351-64) and October, pp. 527-39.


261. Grenier to JP, Correspondence, ed. cit., pp. 71-2, 5/2/36.

262. JP to Grenier, AP, 15/2/36. My italics. On Blum see above note 258.

263. JP to Grenier, AP, 5/3/36.

264. Cf. above, Chapter One. Paulhan told Grenier: "Ça a été ignoble, le débarquement de Guéhenno d'Europe (...) Il semble que ce soit J. R. Bloch qui reprenne la revue. (Acceptera-t-il le No. Spécial sur le pétrole que l'on voulait imposer à Guéhenno?) JP to Grenier, AP, 5/3/36.

265. From May 1936 the "comité de direction" included Rolland, Aragon, J. R. Bloch, Chamson, Friedmann, Lalou and Cassou, who was editor. See Europe, September/October 1973, p. 4.


267. NRF April 1936, p. 481.


270. NRF April 1936, p. 483.

271. ibid., pp. 484-5.
272. Grenier quoted A la lumière du marxisme, E.S.I., 1935.

273. NRF April 1936, p. 487.

274. ibid., p. 488.

275. ibid., pp. 489-91.

276. ibid., p. 492.

277. ibid., p. 493.

278. JP to Grenier, AP, 18/4/36.

279. JP to Grenier, AP, 8/5/36. My italics.


281. JP to Grenier, AP, 13/5/36.


283. Georges Friedmann, "Autour d'un manifeste", Europe, June 1936, pp. 228-40. Friedmann noticed the wording of some publicity for Paulhan's new collection Métamorphoses, where he had written: "Les orthodoxies modernes, du marxisme au thomisme, pèsent aujourd'hui de tout leurs poids sur les lettres – ici soumises à la politique, ailleurs à la morale au à la religion...". This could not have been a coincidence.


285. See NRF August 1936, "L'Orthodoxie contre l'intelligence", pp. 298-314, and "Question et réponse", NRF April 1937, pp. 642-4. Indeed Grenier gathered these and other texts and notes together and Paulhan published them under the title Essai sur l'esprit d'orthodoxie (1938). This was reviewed by Marcel Arland in his "Essais critiques" rubric, NRF September 1938, pp. 456-60.

286. See Lefranc, pp. 111ff, and Lacouture, Léon Blum, pp. 271-308.


289. ibid., p. 997.


292. ibid.

293. Lacouture, Léon Blum, pp. 301ff.

294. Grenier to JP, ed. cit., p. 89. L'Assaut appeared for the first time on October 13th 1936; on p. 7, Jean Prévost interviewed François Mauriac who, referring to Péguy, called for "un homme qui soit toute la France à la fois". The article by Brasillach referred to "Vendredi et sa famille", qualifying Benda, Gide, Malraux, Chamson and Cassou (among others) as "un concile de ratés" (p. 6).

295. JP to Grenier, AP, telegram dated 20/10/36.

296. JP to Grenier, AP, 21/10/36. Indeed Paulhan's intelligence informed him well, because in the issue for June 8th 1937, Fabre-Luce announced that L'Assaut "va fusionner avec La Liberté" (Doriot's newspaper). For a short while La Liberté du Mercredi provided a platform for the literary staff of L'Assaut. Readers were offered a bargain re-subscription to both La Liberté and L'Emancipation nationale.

297. Grenier to JP, ed. cit., pp. 91-2. Pamphlet had been a weekly run by Fabre-Luce, Jean Prévost and Pierre Dominique from 1933-34. Grenier was, all the same, evidently irritated at having to refuse 1000 frs. per month "sous prétexte qu'il contrarie une politique qui serait la mienne si j'en faisais" (ibid., p. 91).

298. JP to Grenier, AP, 27/10/36.


300. L'Assaut, 17/11/36, p. 6; Jean Grenier, "un roman d'analyse; Septembre, de Jean Blanzat". In the same issue, Fabre-Luce declared himself for Jacques Doriot.

301. JP to Grenier, AP, 1936; Grenier's articles (on Conrad and Thibaudet) appeared in 22/12/36 and 19/1/37.


303. CPD 2, pp. 567 and 570, 28/10/36, 31/10/36.

304. CPD 2, p. 595.

305. JP to Suarès, BD 4966/13, 18/11/36.


307. See below; and letters from Paulhan to Grenier beginning in February 1937 (AP).
308. See Vendredi, 9/4/36; Lottman, p. 193, and Chamson to JP, AP, 11/5/37, thanking Paulhan for his contribution: Paulhan's name was listed in Vendredi, 7/5/37.


310. NRF January 1937, p. 38.

311. March to August 1937, published by Gallimard.

312. NRF July 1937, pp. 112-3.

313. NRF April 1937, p. 584.

314. ibid.

315. "Je (i.e. Guitton) voudrais parler contre l'action. Avec ce mot-là on nous empoisonne l'existence et le monde depuis 50 ans. La guerre, c'est agir; fonder un parti, c'est agir; causer n'importe quoi, c'est agir (...). Ne pas agir, bons Dieux, mais construire. Ne pas construire, mais créer" (NRF August 1937, p. 291).


317. For details of the animosity between Gide and Vendredi, see CPD 3, pp. 40, 50-2, 63, 65, etc., and the texts in Littérature engagée, pp. 211-6.

318. Maurras had had an eventful year; on 6th July 1937 he completed his prison sentence for incitement to murder: coming only two weeks after the fall of Blum in late June, Maurras seemed to many a perfect candidate for a right-wing national leader; see Weber, pp. 392ff.


320. JP to Grenier, AP, 3/12/37.


324. ibid., p. 298.
325. Léautaud, XII, pp. 100-1, 15/2/38. He reports a visit by Lucien Combelle to the NRF: "Combelle nous raconte alors que le jour qu'il se trouvait dans le bureau de Paulhan (...). Benda était là et s'est alors élevé dans les termes les plus vêhémentes (...). "Vous ne pouvez publier cela. Maurras est un rhéteur, un sophiste, un homme de la plus grande mauvaise foi. Il n'est pas possible qu'on fasse son éloge dans la NRF". Paulhan a répliqué qu'il n'y avait aucune raison de ne pas permettre à Jean Grenier de dire ce qu'il pense sur Maurras" (p. 100).

326. ibid., p. 101. Cf. JP to Grenier, AP, 15/3/38: "On m'a beaucoup dit que ton Maurras était "très courageux" et aussi qu'il n'était pas à sa place dans la NRF. Benda en a été affligé. On m'a dit que le comte de Paris l'avait aimé...". Benda contributed a corrective view in NRF May 1938, pp. 828-31, "France et Bonapartisme"; Cf. Jean Guérin's selection of tributes to Maurras reprinted from La Revue universelle in NRF February 1937, pp. 305-8, including the text by Fernandez which Benda referred to.

327. See J-B Duroselle, Politique étrangère de la France: la Décadence, 1932-1939, Imprimerie nationale/Seuil, 1983, pp. 325-33. Hereafter referred to as La Décadence...

328. The letter is reproduced in Kohn-Etiemble, 226 Lettres..., pp. 152-3; Caillios, Grenier, Friedmann and de Rougemont were among those who also received it (AP).


331. ibid.


334. ibid., p. 158.

335. ibid.

336. For details, see Lefranc, pp. 273ff.

338. The Communists indeed heard this appeal; Aragon referred to it in his opening speech at the "Droits de l'Intelligence" conference on June 1st 1938. See Jacques Duclos, Mémoires, II, Fayard, 1969, p. 299, and Annexe III, p. 457, where Paulhan's name appears as a participant.

339. NRF April 1938, p. 665.


341. NRF May 1938, "Bulletin" ("Jean Guérin"), p. 877. Cf. JP to Grenier, AP, 4/4/38: "Quel manifeste as-tu signé?"; see also la Flèche, 25/3/38, for a presentation of these "appeals".

342. Vendredi, 13/5/38, quoted in Lefranc, p. 278.

343. Vendredi, 13/5/38, quoted in Estier, p. 72. Also Lottman, p. 193. Paulhan told Suarès, for instance, that Guéhenno and Chamson had requested some work; see JP to Suarès, BD 4169/3, 31/5/38. Vendredi finally folded for good with the "Front populaire" on 10th November 1938 (Lefranc, p. 279).

344. June to December (seven parts), 1938. The volume appeared in March 1939.


346. NRF December 1938, p. 1031.

347. de Traz, p. 365; Cf. Charpentier, p. 128.


350. Lalou, art. cit.

351. See Lalou: "Que Rabaud se trompe en pensant que le 6 février a divisé les Français en deux camps, je le crois fermement, quand je songe aux grands périls qu'il nous faut désormais affronter d'un cœur unanime".

352. NRF December 1938, p. 1036.

353. See above, note 13.

354. See below, Chapter Seven.


356. ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR - NOTES

1. The bibliography is abundant in this area. An influential British view is provided by J. M. Keynes in The Social Consequences of the Peace, London, 1922. The broader context of international relations and the determining role of the War in the Franco-German question is dealt with by Pierre Renouvin in Les Crises du XIXe siècle, Vol. 2, 1914-1929, and 1929-1945, Hachette, 1957 and 1958; for the period from 1932 to 1939, the most useful recent synthesis is Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Politique étrangère de la France: la Décadence, 1932-1939, (hereafter La Décadence.), Imprimerie nationale, 1979, passim, but esp. Chapter VI, "l'ambiance", deals specifically with intellectuals' understanding of the problem.


A history of intellectuals' involvement with "rapprochement" has been written by F. L'Huillier, Dialogues franco-allemands 1925-1933, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Strasbourg, (1971), and Jacques Bariéty and Charles Bloch have examined in depth "Une tentative de réconciliation franco-allemande et son échec, 1932-33", la Revue d'Histoire moderne et contemporaine, XV, July-September 1968, pp. 433-65.

2. Poidevin et Bariéty, p. 276, and Duroselle, La Décadence, on Mein Kampf, 1925, pp. 57-63.


4. La France et l'Allemagne, "Conclusion", pp. 397-403 (pp. 400-1).

5. ibid., p. 399.

6. La Décadence, p. 197.


10. Richard, Mosaic, p. 74. This was also one of the underlying views expressed in Benda's La Trahison des Clercs.


17. Durosay, "Les Idées politiques", p. 34.

18. ibid. Rivière's cultural anthropomorphism is similar to that of Romain Rolland and Jean Giraudoux. For a study of this interesting but misleading phenomenon, see René Cheval, "Cent Ans d'Affectivité franco-allemande, ou l'ère des stéréotypes", La Revue d'Allemagne, IV, No. 3, 1972, pp. 603-614.


22. Félix Bertaux (1881-1947), father of Pierre Bertaux, obtained the "agregation" in German from the Ecole Normale supérieure de S. Cloud, founded the French lycée in Mainz, and later taught at the lycée Jeanson de Sailly in Paris.


24. See NRF November 1920, pp. 792-805, "Lettre d'Allemagne" and Jean Paulhan, "Mort deGroethuysen à Luxembourg", NRF May 1969, pp. 946-76. In the early 1920's Paulhan and Groethuysen (1887-1946) had rooms in the same block at 9, rue Campagne-Première, Paris. Charles Du Bos also knew Groethuysen well and, in 1921, called him "le plus grand esprit métaphysique que je connaisse" (Journal, I, p. 29, August 1921); they had met in Berlin in 1907 (Journal, I, p. 359, November 1923).


27. See his essay "A propos de Kafka", NRF April 1933; he assisted Paulhan by advising on potential contributors; Cf. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25033.

28. "Alain Desportes", "Premier regard sur l'Allemagne", NRF June 1919, pp. 157-60; Cf. L'Huillier, pp. 18ff; Durosay, "les Idées Politiques", pp. 55ff, on Rivièr'e work for Mayrisch's newspaper Luxemburger Zeitung. "La Petite Dame" relates several visits to Colpach during the 1920's; see esp. CPD 1, pp. 45-50, 87-89, 90-107, etc.

30. See Durosay, "Les Idées Politiques", pp. 55-70 esp. The three NRF articles were:
   May 1921, "Note sur un événement politique", pp. 558-71;
   July 1922, "Les dangers d'une politique conséquente", pp. 5-11 and
   May 1923, "Pour une entente économique avec l'Allemagne",
   pp. 725-35.


32. Apart from Durosay, see Poidevin et Bariéty, pp. 246ff. and
   L'Huillier, pp. 15ff. The specific conferences were the
   (First) London Conference, March 1st to 7th, 1921; the Genoa
   Conference (and Rapallo Treaty), April 10th to May 19th, 1922,
   and, after the Ruhr Occupation which began on January 11th
   1923. After the July-August London Conference of 1924 and
   the fall of Poincaré the same year, prospects for Franco-
   German relations became brighter.

33. "Ce que répudie l'auteur, dans son portrait de Poincaré,
   n'est-ce pas sa propre pratique: l'esprit français, de
   conséquence ou d'entêtement, poussé jusqu'à l'immobilisme,
   à l'absurde et presque au suicide - cet esprit auquel
   Riviére avait tant sacrifié par sa psychologie des peuples?"
   (Durosay, pp. 56-7).

34. ibid., p. 57.

35. ibid. Heinrich Mann responded at length to Riviére's proposals
   of 1923 in the Neue Rundschau for June (reproduced in Mann,
   Sieben Jahre, 1929: "Antwort nach Frankreich", pp. 129-41);
   a shorter version appeared in the NRF as "Coopération
   économique seulement?", August 1923, pp. 248-53. Here Mann
   pointed out the risks of not broadening the "entente" beyond
   economics (see Durosay, p. 64 and L'Huillier, pp. 19-22).

36. "Les rapports intellectuels entre la France et l'Allemagne",
   NRF November 1921, pp 513-21.

37. See CPD 1, p. 87.


39. ibid., my italics.

40. "Les relations intellectuelles franco-allemandes", NRF
   February 1922, pp. 252-5.

41. ibid., pp. 252-3.

42. NRF June 1922, pp. 762-3, quoting from La Grande Revue, April
   1922, pp. 335-43, under the "La Vie du Monde" rubric.

43. Guéhenno, La Grande Revue, cit., p. 337.


46. NRF March 1923, pp. 469-79.

47. See above, Chapter One. On the alleged 50 NRF subscriptions taken out by the quai d'Orsay, see Béraud, pp. 129-30.

48. Béraud, p. 82 (Le Phare de la Loire, 14/5/23).

49. ibid. Switching to the Eclaireur de Nice for 17/5/23, Mauclair insisted that "la NRF ne s'occupe pas seulement de régenter la littérature. (...) Elle a une tendance politique (sic), et cette tendance est pro-allemande" (ibid). Paulhan did not forget this jibe at the "Nouvelle Revue Franco-Allemande" (see epigraph to this Chapter).

50. "La campagne menée par l'auteur de L' Allemand a eu des suites: elle a certainement frayé la voie à des contacts et des échanges actifs jusqu'à la fin des années 20 - et c'est là un premier mérite historique" (p. 22).


53. The text of Paulhan's letter, transmitting Rivièere's reasons, is as follows: "Vos considérations, si intéressantes soient-elles, entrent trop dans le vif de la politique. Nous ne pouvons guère sans inconvenance à la NRF, nous mêler de porter un jugement sur la nation belge (...). Je suis d'accord avec vous - bien que connaissant peu la question - sur son caractère factice (...) mais ce n'est vraiment pas à nous qu'il appartient de le faire ressortir. C'est sur des tendances purement littéraires que nous avons besoin d'être renseignés; ne laissez pas croire qu'elles se confondent à ce point avec les tendances politiques" (JP to Hellens, BD 7168, 4/4/22).

54. See Le Spectateur, January 1912, pp. 6-9 for "une opinion au sujet de l'accord franco-allemand", written in an atmosphere of international colonial tension; Cf. Crémieux's reply, in ibid, March 1912, pp. 140-3, with a further note by Paulhan.

55. See Poidevin et Bariéty, pp. 265ff and Duroselle, La Décadence, p. 64.

56. See Michel Soulié, La vie politique d'Edouard Herriot, Armand Colin, 1962, pp. 207-9, quoting from parliamentary sources.

57. ibid., p. 207.
58. On Viénot see L'Huillier, pp. 30ff; Schlumberger's obituary in Le Figaro of 11/10/44 and his polemical article "les deux nationalismes francais", in Lalou's Liberation weekly Gavroche, 11/1/45, p. 1. Between 1920 and 1923 Viénot worked in Lyautey's secretariat; he then studied in Germany and on his return he submitted an important article to the review which propagated "l'esprit de Genève" of the Société des Nations: "République allemande et Allemagne nationale", La Revue de Genève, April 1925, pp. 405-25. (For an exhaustive history of this review, see J-P Meylan, La Revue de Genève, miroir des lettres européennes, Droz, Geneva, 1969).


60. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25011, 1925.

61. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25012, 1925.

62. The article was entitled "Enquête sur l'Allemagne - la Sécurité par la Compréhension d'Autrui". In it, Viénot heavily criticised French revanchist attitudes as embodied in the "diktat" of the Versailles Treaty and concluded: "(il faut) nous libérer de l'obscur instinct qui nous fait condamner ce qui est différent de nous et exiger d'autrui notre rationalisme"; p. 14. Viénot's approach was typical of conciliatory attitudes during this period and had hardly changed by 1931; see Les Incertitudes allemandes, Valois, 1931, p. 12: "Que, dans les relations franco-allemandes, il n'y ait pour ainsi dire jamais de correspondance entre la question posée et les faits qu'elle voudrait connaître, que la réalité allemande n'entre pas dans le cadre idéologique que nous préparons pour la recevoir, c'est peut-être tout le problème franco-allemand".

63. See L'Huillier, p. 36, on Charles de Rohan and La Revue européenne.

64. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25013, 1925. (Paulhan was referring to the provincial lecture tours undertaken by such as Romains and Crémiéux in 1923; see NRF March 1923, p. 596).

65. ibid.

66. ibid. (Paulhan's comments also imply a literary anti-naturalism here).

67. ibid.

68. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25017, 16/8/25.

69. "Lectures allemandes", NRF September 1925, pp. 376-7; "Der Zauberberg par Thomas Mann", and "Der Kopf par Heinrich Mann", in October 1925, pp. 508-12.

71. Drieu, art. cit., p. 630.


74. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25030, 21/1/26.

75. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25032, 1926. Mann's presence in Paris was widely reported in the international Press. See also Th. Mann, "Pariser Rechenschaft", in Gesammelte Werke, Band XI, Hamburg, 1974, pp. 26ff, on the "Union pour la Vérité", and pp. 43ff for his interview with the Chicago Tribune. Moreover, Mann met Pierre Viénot on several occasions during this visit.


77. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25033, 1926. If Paulhan had been able to consult Du Bos' journal at that time, he would have found confirmation that Du Bos was becoming increasingly converted to "Europeanism". See Du Bos, Journal III, 1926-1927, 1949, p. 11, dated 2/1/26: "Pourquoi fallait-il que cet européenisme devint en France conscient? Parce que (et, bien longtemps avant la guerre, personne ne l'a mieux vu et signalé que Gide, dont sur ce point le rôle fut capital et bienfaisant) (my italics) le général et l'homme en général tant fourni à l'esprit français qu'ils n'avaient plus rien à lui apporter que redites...". Du Bos was chairman of "l'Union Intellectuelle" at that time.

78. See above, Chapter One, and Du Bos on Paulhan, in Journal II, 1924-1925, Corrêa, 1948, p. 54, (18/2/24). Also, Paulhan told Schlumberger that Du Bos had refused to restrict an article on Rivière to 10 pages as required, and produced 15 instead (see NRF January 1926, pp. 49-63). "Je serais navré", wrote Paulhan in November 1925, "qu'une rupture se produisît à propos de Jacques et d'un article sur lui". (JP to Schlumberger, BD 25023, 1925).

79. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25033, 1926.

80. ibid.

81. ibid. Georges Lecomte was, for some time, president of the "Société des Gens des Lettres".

82. Poidevin et Barriety, p. 272.

83. L'Huillier, pp. 34-7. Curtius came for the opening; see CFP 1, pp. 293-5.
84. Poidevin et Bariéty, p. 272.


86. ibid., pp. 554-5.

87. ibid., pp. 555-6.


89. NRF April 1927, p. 558.

90. See above, Chapter Two.

91. See above, Chapter Two, note 22; NRF September 1927, p. 319.

92. NRF September 1927, p. 319.

93. ibid.

94. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25066, November 1927.

95. ibid.

96. ibid.

97. Curtius had several pieces placed in The Criterion. For "The Restoration of Reason" see The Criterion, November 1927, pp. 389-97. Curtius exhorted intellectuals to revive the spirit of Reason: "only so will we overcome the various types of radicalism (unfruitful as they are, by definition) and attain the objective which is the most important of all today: the reconstruction of the European man. All those who do not want to surrender to Americanism or to Bolshevism must take their share in this task" (p. 396). See also Revista de Occidente, Vol. 17, September 1927, pp. 257-67; and Arthur J. Evans, Jr., pp. 104-6.

98. NRF February 1928, p. 287, by Ramon Fernandez.

99. NRF December 1928: "La Question des Clercs", pp. 810-9. (See above, Chapter Two, note 38 et seq.).

100. NRF December 1928, p. 812.

101. ibid.

102. ibid., p. 817.
103. ibid., p. 813.
104. ibid., p. 817.
105. The debate continued throughout 1928 and into early 1929 with Benda's *La Fin de l'Eternel* (see above, Chapter Two, notes 65 et seq.).
108. ibid., p. 291.
109. See below, Chapter Seven, and Kohn-Etiemble, p. 44f.
110. For details see Poidevin et Bariéty, pp. 273-4.
111. Esp. September 1928, pp. 353-60, and above, Chapter Two, notes 65 et seq.
112. Thibaudet, "*L'Affaire Demartial*", *NRF* August 1928, pp. 261-70. It should be remembered that in 1924, the *NRF* had upheld the then provocative view of Alfred Fabre-Luce that France had been partly responsible for the War; see "Sur l'Idee de Victoire", *NRF* May 1924, pp. 538-76, and Schlumberger, "*La Victoire, par Alfred Fabre-Luce*", *NRF* September 1924, pp. 352-4; see also Schlumberger, *Oeuvres*, III, pp. 9-10.
114. ibid., p. 263.
115. ibid., p. 264.
116. ibid., p. 269.
117. ibid., p. 270.
119. ibid.
121. ibid., p. 848.
122. "Continuons à enlever son venin à cette Affaire, à la réduire en des entretiens sous les marronniers du Luxembourg, dans la Philosophenweg de Heidelberg, ou sur le quai Wilson, qui est même fait exprès pour cela" (ibid., p. 849).

123. The NRF had, as early as 1921, given extracts from Alain's Mars ou la guerre jugée: see May 1921, pp. 527-52, and Michel Arnauld's long review-essay in NRF December 1921, pp. 733-40. See also above, note 112.
Cf. also the exchange between Crémieux and Drieu in late 1929: Crémieux's "À l'Ouest rien de nouveau, par Erich Maria Remarque...", NRF October 1929, pp. 568-9; Drieu's long letter "À propos d'À l'Ouest...", dated 7/10/29, in NRF November 1929, pp. 725-30, and finally "Revue des revues", in NRF January 1930, pp. 146-8, where Paulhan, writing as "J.G.", reproduced an extract from a Crémeux article in Candide. Paulhan's introduction began:
"L'on nous a assommés, tant que durait la guerre, de romans belliqueux, où les soldats tenaient joyeusement de petits discours à leur baïonnette, qu'ils appelaient Rosalie. Les poncifs ont changé: l'on nous écrase aujourd'hui de soldats désespérés, qui ne parlent que suicide, catastrophe et révolution. Cette nouvelle mode n'est pas plus déplaisante que l'autre: il arrive qu'elle soit pleine de bonnes intentions. Mais l'on en abuse en peu" (pp. 146-7).

124. NRF September 1928, pp. 305-15, "Lettres".
127. ibid., p. 275.
128. See L'Huillier, pp. 71-97. L'Huillier reports that Grauthoff, Viénot's German counterpart, was "bien accueilli par le service des Oeuvres françaises à l'étranger du quai d'Orsay. Viénot lui-même ne lui a-t-il pas recommandé (avec quelque perfidie, nous en avons la preuve) d'aller voir Jean Schlumberger pour trouver accès à la NRF?" (p. 71).
129. Poidevin et Bariéty, p. 274.
130. ibid., p. 279.

132. "Appel au Concile", NRF October 1930, pp. 542-54. Paulhan told Schlumberger that this was "le meilleur Thibaudet que nous ayons lu depuis longtemps". JP to Schlumberger, BD 25074, 23/9/30.

133. Quoting Renouvier, Thibaudet wrote: "La voie à suivre, selon Renouvier, est celle-ci: Déclarer que la question d'Alsace-Lorraine est une question essentiellement européenne; non pas tant d'intérêt, d'honneur et de droit français que d'intérêt, d'honneur et de droit européens" (p. 545).

134. ibid., pp. 545-6.

135. "Si l'institution de Genève fonctionne régulièrement pendant plusieurs générations, ce sera (une) adaptation progressive (des traités) qui produira les changements et le renouvellement nécessaires, assurés jusqu'ici par les guerres" (p. 553).

136. ibid., p. 554.

137. This in spite of the adoption of the principle of non-aggression pacts by the "S.d.N." in September 1927.

138. ibid., p. 554.

139. See Les Nouvelles littéraires, 11/10/30, 25/10/30, and 1/11/30, for the opinions of Gérald Bauer, Alfred Kerr and Heinrich Mann respectively.

140. Les Nouvelles littéraires, 1/11/30.


142. "Pour nous il s'agit d'enlever aux socialistes-nationaux (sic) leurs arguments (...). Il faut arriver au désarmement général (...). Vu l'intensité des relations franco-allemandes, il faudrait logiquement arriver à l'alliance (...) basée sur la raison et la communauté d'intérêts" (ibid.). Two weeks before, on October 17th, Mann had given his important speech "Ein Appell an die Vernunft" in Berlin when, warning of the dangers of Nazism, the National-Socialists in the audience attempted to disrupt the meeting (see Bürgin and Mayer, p. 92).
143. "Je ne cesse de penser à l'article de Jean. (...) J'aurais aimé être bien certain qu'il se rend compte de toute l'importance de son geste. En ce moment, après les polémiques de L'Oeuvre, les enquêtes et réponses franco-allemandes des Nouvelles littéraires (...), un article sur les relations franco-allemandes (...) va avoir en Allemagne un retentissement considérable, venant de la NRF". RMG to JP, AP, 7/11/30. The article in question was Schlumberger's "D'un certain manque d'imagination", in December 1930, pp. 757-71.

144. RMG to JP, AP, 7/11/30. RMG's italics.

145. ibid. My italics. Here is RMG's text: "Cette chronique, qui risque de faire un peu là-bas figure de manifeste intellectuel français, doit être impeccable, pesée (...), purgée de toute possibilité de malentendu. (...) Encore une fois, elle nous engage tous. C'est un geste très heureux, mais assez gros de conséquences, me semble-t-il. Je voudrais être sûr que notre modeste Jean s'en rende compte; et qu'il porte, en notre nom à tous, un coup magistral".

146. NRF December 1930, p. 757.

147. "On a bien entendu dire qu'une nouvelle guerre dépasserait en horreur la précédente et qu'elle livrerait au chaos une Europe anéantie" (ibid., p. 758).

148. ibid., p. 759.

149. "Nous sommes victimes d'une illusion verbale quand on nous parle du "Traité" de Versailles, qui n'est pas un traité puis qu'il fut dicté (...), et qui n'est surtout pas un traité de paix puis qu'il ne visait qu'à mettre le vaincu dans un état d'humiliation impuissante, de contrition" (p. 760).

150. ibid.

151. ibid., p. 763.

152. ibid., p. 765.

153. ibid. In the text quoted by L'Oeuvre (cit.), Mann had talked of Germany's 'Minderwertigkeitsgefühl', or inferiority complex.


155. ibid., pp. 767-8.

156. ibid., p. 769.

157. ibid., pp. 770-1.
158. See Oeuvres III, p. 21: "Bien que cet article date de 1930, il fait trop étroitement suite à celui de 1923 pour que je les sépare". Cf. "Sommeil de l'esprit critique", NRF March 1923.

159. For instance, Louis Martin-Chauffier, who called it "un modèle exemplaire de la sagacité, de la juste vue, et pour tout dire, du sens politique d'un clerc authentique, dès qu'il s'applique au réel"; Les Clercs sur le Prê, Les Nouvelles Littéraires, 20/12/30.

160. RMG to JP, AP, 20/12/30. RMG's italics.

161. Paulhan wrote on Christmas Eve: "Le défaut des articles politiques que publient Europe ou la NRF est, il me semble, qu'ils peuvent parler de tout, sauf de leur sujet. Si l'Allemagne, dans cinq ans, considère que l'Alsace-Lorraine lui est indispensable, nous pourrions republier exactement tel quel l'article de Jean Schlumberger: il signifiera alors qu'il faut rendre l'Alsace-Lorraine à l'Allemagne. (Et si la remise à l'Allemagne du couloir ne provoquerait pas demain la guerre, si la Pologne et la Petite-Entente se laisseraient faire, bien entendu il n'aborde pas non plus la question)." JP to RMG, BN Mss, Fonds RMG, Vol. 118, f 227, 24/12/30.

162. These four debates were of such importance that Desjardins had them published later as a book, Problèmes franco-allemands d'après-guerre, Valois, 1932. (See also Bulletin de l'Union pour la Vérité, October-November 1932). The dates and titles of the discussions are:
- 17/12/30: "Nécessité et difficultés d'un rapprochement franco-allemand", (pp. 27-75);
- 14/1/31: "Examen de quelques obstacles", (pp. 75-117);
- 14/3/31: "A la recherche des conclusions", (pp. 117-173);
- 13/6/31: "La question des responsabilités de la guerre dans le cadre des relations franco-allemandes", (pp. 173-238).
The participants included Raymond Aron, Félix Bertaux, Camille Bloch, André Chanson, Benjamin Crémieux, Georges Demartial, Ramon Fernandez, Jean Guéhenno, Jules Isaac, Jacques Kayser and Pierre Viénot, as well as several German writers and academics (but not Curtius, nor the Mann brothers).

163. See Fernandez to JP, AP, 8/12/30: he told Paulhan that on a subject of such importance, "La NRF se devait de parler nettement" (Fernandez' italics). Grasset published Dieu est-il français? with an additional "Lettre à F. Sieburg, par Bernard Grasset". As for Europe, their December 1930 issue, "Guerre et Paix", included articles on the subject by the Mann brothers (including "Un appel à la Raison"), as well as Alain, Berl ("Bellicisme français"), Léon Pierre-Quint, Guéhenno, etc. Fernandez' letter (cit. above) shows how Europe and the NRF co-operated on occasion: Fernandez acknowledged receipt of Europe's "bonnes feuilles" (Europe appeared on the 15th of the month), sent to him so that his article in the NRF for January could take account of Europe's stance.
164. "L'autre impasse", NRF January 1931, pp. 113-22 (p. 113).
165. ibid.
166. ibid., pp. 114-5.
167. ibid., p. 116.
168. ibid.
169. ibid., p. 118.
170. ibid., p. 119.
171. ibid., p. 120.
172. ibid.
173. ibid., p. 121.
174. ibid., p. 122.
175. ibid.
176. See p. 118, for instance: "Plus qu'aucun autre peuple du monde, je crois, l'Allemand est fidèle à l'irréversibilité du temps", and succeeding paragraph.
177. NRF January 1931, pp. 142-5.
178. "Tout en défendant une idée de la civilisation que je crois juste, nous nous trompons sur la façon de l'appliquer. Nous croyons qu'une civilisation est une chose toute faite" (...) (p. 145).
Fernandez returned to the question in similar fashion later that year when he reviewed Viénot's book Les Incertitudes allemandes; see "Différences nationales", NRF September 1931, pp. 463-70.
180. "(Fernandez) méconnait entièrement la pacifisme. Y voir l'"envers du communisme" relève de la plaisanterie ou de l'incompréhension. Le communisme est par excellence une doctrine du fanatisme: (...) les voies y qui conduisent sont violentes" (p. 284).
181. See Problèmes franco-allemands..., p. 53: The Paris correspondent of the Gazette de Francfort, M. Riefenberg, stated: "Je ne crois pas qu'il faille exagérer le mouvement hitlériste"; and p. 131, Professor Kern (University of Bonn): "Heureusement qu'une chose est, dans cette situation, réconfortante: c'est que la France ne donnera jamais à Hitler l'occasion d'utiliser ses troupes".

182. See Alfred Kupferman, "Le Bureau Ribbentrop et les campagnes pour le rapprochement franco-allemand, 1934-1937", in Les Relations franco-allemandes, 1976, pp. 87-97. Although Otto Abetz, for example, only became officially attached to the German embassy in 1934, he had moved in intellectual circles since the late 1920's (p. 89). See also L'Huillier, p. 116.

183. See "Le Manifeste de Notre Temps contre les excès du nationalisme, pour l'Europe et pour l'entente franco-allemande, signé par 186 écrivains". For some of the signatories, including Paulhan, see above, Chapter Two, notes 192-4; here Franco-German reconciliation was the "clé de voûte" in constructing a new, peaceful Europe. (Notre Temps was a Briandist weekly (later a daily) funded by both the quai d'Orsay and Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin; see Kupferman, art. cit., note 182, p. 91, and L'Huillier, p. 117.)


186. See above, Chapter Two.

187. See NRF November 1931, pp. 673-92. These letters had been edited by Professor Ph. Witkop, as Kriegsbriefe Gefallener Studenten, Munich, 1929, (trs. E. Herrmann). Cf. Gide, Journal I, p. 1090: "Je ne puis lire ces lettres (...) sans que des sanglots me serrent la gorge".


189. ibid., p. 709.
190. "...nous continuerons à ne savoir pas quels hommes, proches, simples et universels, ils sont au fond; eux-mêmes ils ne le soupçonnaient pas. De sorte que, par une ironie assez amère, il a fallu faire de ces enfants et de nos enfants des morts, pour arriver à connaître qu'ils se seraient compris" (p. 710).


192. ibid., my italics.


194. NRF December 1931, p. 850.

195. ibid., pp. 852-3.

196. He wrote: "La jeunesse d'aujourd'hui me paraît fort éloignée du danger d'être trop intellectuelle. On peut lire textuellement dans un roman universitaire national-socialiste: "l'intelligence est un danger pour la formation du caractère"." (ibid., p. 853).

197. ibid., p. 858.


199. NRF December 1931, p. 862.

200. Cf. above, Chapters Two and Three.

201. NRF December 1931, p. 862: "Cette conception est tout à fait générale, et rien ne le montre plus clairement qu'une déclaration faite au Sénat par Tardieu en décembre 1930, immédiatement avant sa chute. Pour expliquer la corruption scandaleuse révélée par la faillite de la banque Oustric, Tardieu remarque que les coupables étaient des gens 'dépourvus de toute culture supérieure ou même seulement moyenne. Peut-être est-ce pour cette raison qu'ils n'ont pas eu le sens critique, le sens de la mesure et des proportions que la culture classique a donnés à tant d'entre nous'".

202. ibid., p. 864.

203. ibid., pp. 865-6.
204. "Quant à la réalisation des espoirs politiques de Rathenau, elle ne sera possible (...) que si les élites des deux pays se font une idée juste des conditions spirituelles d'une collaboration franco-allemande en Europe" (p. 867). Claude Foucart's article (above, note 12) shows conclusively that in 1923, "la question des réparations était certainement un des moments de (la) nécessité lucide face aux discussions économiques et territoriales que Curtius semblait oublier" (p. 339). Curtius' forgetfulness was no less evident in 1931-2.

205. See Poidevin et Bariéty, p. 280, and Duroselle, pp. 29-43. Bariéty points out that not only did London and Rome back the abandonment of reparations, but so did the Radicals' La Dépêche de Toulouse. The disarmament talks lasted from February 1932 until October 14th 1933, when Germany withdrew from the S.d.N. The failure of the Lausanne Conference (19/7/32) finally persuaded Martin du Gard to adhere to the "Amsterdam-Pleyel" Peace Movement (see above Chapter Two).


207. Poidevin et Bariéty, pp. 281-3, and above, note 4 (Henri Michel).

208. Kessler, p. 273, 31/10/32.


210. Cf. above, Chapter Two, and below, Chapter Five.


212. Curtius, Groethuysen and Thomas Mann for the Germans, and Gide, Saurès and Ramuz for the francophones led the tribute (NRF March 1932, pp. 321-578). Curtius apostrophised at the end of his essay: "Amis de Goethe, amis de tous les pays, unissons-nous, et vivons, sous le signe du maître, le roman d'éducation de la grande famille des peuples" (p. 350). Gide stressed Goethe's extremely important influence on his own career, and pointed to his universalism: "S'il nous apparaît, à nous Français, moins Allemand que les autres auteurs d'Outre-Rhin, c'est qu'il est plus généralement et universellement humain, et c'est par lui que se rattache à l'humanité le plus largement toute sa race" (p. 368). Thibaudet's view of Goethe as being the "président" of the European ideal (p. 570) should be contrasted with Fernandez, who drew a sharp distinction between Goethe's Germany and that of 1932: "Son européénisme était fondé sur une communauté historique et intellectuelle (...) radicalement révolue (...). Son idéal de culture est aujourd'hui déraciné" (p. 578).

214. Cf. Fernandez' conclusion: "Actuellement, des deux problèmes urgents que la France intellectuelle doit résoudre, l'un est extérieur, l'autre intérieur. Elle doit décider si oui ou non les vieillards vont continuer à représenter la nation et à décerner les prix. Les deux problèmes sont étroitement solidaires. Pour le reste, je crois qu'il serait fou de renoncer aux caractères qui font notre raison d'être et que M. Curtius a si justement mis en valeur" (ibid., p. 137).

215. Reviewing Halévy's Courrier d'Europe (Grasset), Grenier wrote: "Citons (...) le chapitre où Halévy réplique à L'Essai sur la France de Curtius, qui voit la France exclusivement à travers L'Action française et la NRF (et il est certain que ces deux groupements sont loin de représenter la France entière) et défigure l'histoire de la France sous prétexte de sympathie" (NRF May 1933, pp. 845-6).

216. In eleven months from August 1932 to July 1933 inclusive, some fifteen pages only were devoted to German literature; the most important was Bertaux's tribute to Gerhard Hauptmann, whom he likened to Goethe (NRF December 1932, pp. 944-7).

217. Léautaud, reporting a lunch at the Paulhans' on 12th March 1933, wrote that all of the assembled company expected war, some in two months, some in two years. He went on to berate "la tartufferie d'Herriot qui, élu pour faire une politique de paix, fait la politique de Poincaré. Tous concluent que nous sommes tous de pauvres zéros, bernés, trompés, entretenus dans le mensonge par la presse, toute la presse, etc.", (Journal X, pp. 151-2).

218. See "Fascisme", text and notes in Littérature engagée, pp. 20-5. Cf. CPD 2, p. 292, on Vaillant-Couturier's coercion of Gide. This text ("Fascisme") was reproduced in the AEAR's brochure Ceux qui ont choisi, (1933), pp. 6-8; the contributors (including Barbusse, Rolland, Dabit, Guéhenno, Malraux, etc.) were "Contre le fascisme en Allemagne et Contre l'Impérialisme français".

219. Littérature engagée, p. 24: "dans le terrorisme allemand, je vois une reprise, un ressaisissement du plus déplorable, du plus détestable passé. Dans l'établissement de la société soviétique, une illimitée promesse d'avenir". Inspection of his Journal, however, shows that Gide remained confused by Hitler: Cf., for instance, p. 1162 (5/4/33), with p. 1169 (20/5/33) - "excellent discours de Hitler au Reichstag".


221. NRF August 1933, pp. 234-62.
222. "...nous avons voulu tenter d'éclaircir le sens du mouvement national-socialiste, sur lequel il circule, à l'heure actuelle, tant d'idées fausses" (p. 234).

223. ibid., pp. 234-5.

224. ibid., p. 236. "Cette force national-socialiste, qui apparaissait comme confuse parce qu'elle se prétendait à la fois anti-capitaliste et anti-communiste (...) était en réalité une force anti-industrielle".

225. I: "Une révolution contre la raison"; II: "Le national-socialisme, mouvement de masses"; III: "Le Sang et le Sol"; IV: "Le problème actuel - un plan de désindustrialisation".

226. ibid., p. 237.

227. ibid., p. 243.

228. ibid., p. 246. This was the "Blut und Boden" policy of Walter Darré, whose theories were integrated into Nazism from 1929-30 (cf. ibid., p. 247).

229. Cf. p. 258: "On inspire la haine de la ville et de l'industrie à ceux qu'elle fait le plus souffrir, les jeunes sans-travail..".

230. ibid., p. 262.


232. ibid. "Certains sont beaucoup affectés, vous le savez, de ces documents hitlériens. (...) Je ne les avais malheureusement pas lus encore lorsque j'ai entendu Alix Guillain (the companion of Groethuysen) s'élever contre eux. Lorsque je la reverrai je ne manquerai pas de lui dire que je ne puis désapprouver cette publication".

233. See Poidevin et Bariety, p. 288.

234. Littérature engagée, pp. 41ff, and CPD 2, pp. 366-7 (31/12/33).

235. See CPD 2, p. 365, 25/12/33. "Jean ne voit de salut que dans (...) l'entente avec l'Allemagne. "Mais, dit Gide, elle se ferait nécessairement, elle ne peut se faire qu'au nom de spectre communiste et contre la Russie. Et comme (...) je mets tout mon espoir là, je ne puis être que contre". Jean maintient que même une alliance avec l'Allemagne serait plus proche du sentiment général en France, qu'une alliance avec la Russie, etc.". Gide and Schlumberger had not changed their views a year later; see CPD 2, p. 423, 4/12/34.


237. ibid., p. 145.

238. ibid.
239. ibid.

240. ibid., p. 146. In the following "Air du Mois", Schlumberger also wrote: "Si la France est inquiète, ce n'est pas tant de l'Allemagne que d'elle-même" ("Assemblées", ibid., p. 146).


242. "Qu'est-ce que le national-socialisme?", ibid., pp. 311-22. For the provenance of this article see Baruch Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky, Oxford, 1978, p. 411, note 120.

243. Lacouture, André Malraux, p. 205, although the year is misattributed as 1935. Malraux met Trotsky at Royan on 26th July 1933; the Russian was expelled soon after the February 6th riots by the Doumergue government (ibid., p. 201).

244. NRF February 1934, p. 313.

245. "Tant que les nazis (sic) agirent comme parti et non comme pouvoir d'Etat, ils ne trouveront presque pas d'accès à la classe ouvrière. D'autre part, la grande bourgeoisie, même celle qui soutenait Hitler de son argent, ne considérerait pas ce parti comme le sien. La "renaissance" nationale s'appuya entièrement sur les classes intermédiaires (...). L'art politique consistait à souder la petite-bourgeoisie par une hostilité commune envers le prolétariat" (p. 315).

246. ibid., p. 317.

247. ibid.

248. ibid., p. 321. Cf. also: "Chaque succès de la politique extérieure et intérieure de national-socialisme signifie (...) l'écrasement du petit capital par le grand" (ibid.).

249. ibid., p. 322.

250. ibid. Trotsky's italics.

251. ibid. Julien Benda was at this time expressing a similar view: "toutes les chances de durée d'Hitler sont dans la guerre" (see his preface to the French translation of Konrad Heiden's book Histoire du National-Socialisme, Stock, 1934, p. v.)

252. NRF February 1934, pp. 393-4.

253. Cf. above, Chapter Three.


255. ibid., pp. 450-1.

256. ibid., p. 451.
257. ibid., p. 452.

258. ibid., p. 456. Yet he also believed that Fascism was a "socialisme réformiste" (ibid., p. 457).


260. ibid., p. 461.

261. ibid.


263. NRF June 1934, pp. 1038-9. This note called for the replacement in Paris of all the books burnt by the Nazis, the collection of works on Hitler's Germany and reminded readers that German émigrés (like H. Mann) had donated their libraries.


265. ibid., pp. 295-6.

266. "Réclamer une littérature allemande qui soit purement allemande, un esprit allemand qui soit purement allemand, ce n'est pas seulement donner le pas aux sentiments des valeurs nationales sur le sentiment des valeurs littéraires (...), c'est proclamer la dictature du sentiment (...) le sentiment de la nation" (ibid.).

267. August to November inclusive, 1934.


269. ibid., p. 192.

270. Cf. "Ça me dessalera un peu, cette excursion... Qu'est-ce qu'il raconte, le Ludwig? Que c'est malheureux de voir l'Allemagne des nationalistes? Bien sûr. Mais enfin, ce n'est pas Hitler qu'on va voir. Dis donc, ici, on ne t'a pas fait vivre avec le Président de la République?..." (NRF September 1934, p. 385).

271. Cf. ibid., p. 398.

272. NRF October 1934, p. 574.

273. NRF November 1934, p. 708.

274. ibid., p. 718.

275. ibid., p. 696 and 719-20.
276. NRF November 1934, pp. 641-55; and December 1934, pp. 851-65. The volume was finally published by Grasset in 1939.

277. i.e. the series "Commentaires sur la guerre des Boches", 5 Volumes, from 1915.


279. NRF November 1934, pp. 647-8.

280. ibid., pp. 648 and 650.


283. For details, see Littérature engagée, pp. 113-21.


286. Ibid., p. 463.


288. Cf. above, Chapter Three, note 235 et seq.

289. NRF May 1935, p. 802. Here Benda was anticipating the critique of René Maublanc, who inveighed against total appeasement in his Le Pacifisme et les Intellectuels, Comité mondial contre la guerre et le fascisme, 1936.

290. NRF May 1935, p. 802.

291. Ibid. Benda's final sentence was: "Ne surgira-t-il pas des rangs du personnel politique un vrai radical qui les balaiera au nom même du radicalisme: un Gambetta, un Clemenceau?", ibid., p. 802. Cf. above, Chapter Three, note 236.

292. Duroselle, p. 197.
293. See below, Chapter Seven. To a certain extent, the Germanist Armand Petitjean replaced Bertaux as literary reviewer; Bertaux only had five short "notes" published in three years, 1935-7. Petitjean's "notes" were literary except for his report of his "Visite à Dusseldorf", NRF November 1937, pp. 868-71.


295. NRF March 1935, p. 479.


297. art. cit., p. 132.

CHAPTER FIVE - NOTES

1. Franco-Soviet relations are examined in the international context by Pierre Renouvin, op. cit., for the period from 1932, see J-B Duroselle, La Décadence, passim, and a specific history is provided by Maxime Mourin, Les Relations franco-soviétiques (1917-1962), Payot, 1967.


5. See, for instance, Mourin, pp. 68-78.


8. Brice Parain, De fil en aiguille, Gallimard, 1960, p. 186. Parain was to enter Gallimard's in 1927; see below.

9. ibid., p. 179.

In 1932, Paulhan serialised J-R Bloch's novel *Sybilla* (see below, Chapter Six); here, the eponymous heroine declares her admiration: "Je ne suis pas communiste! Je ne sais pas ce que c'est d'être communiste. Je suis une pauvre danseuse bête et illettrée (...). Mais je sais où sont les gens qui ont besoin, les gens qui appellent, et, de ce côté-là, je suis..." (NRF June 1932, p. 1064).


15. ibid., p. 506.

16. See above, Chapter Four.

17. In particular, see *NRF* September 1919, pp. 511ff, esp. p. 518.

18. ibid., p. 519.

19. ibid., p. 521.

20. ibid., p. 522. Documents reproduced in Durosay's study "les Idées politiques de Jacques Rivièr", show that in his preparatory notes for the June 1919 preliminary article, "La Nouvelle Revue Française", Rivièr was intending to be far more outspoken than he was in the final printed version (pp. 93-99).


23. ibid., pp. 953-4.

24. ibid., p. 958.

25. ibid., pp. 959-60.

26. ibid., p. 962.


29. ibid., p. 201. The articles were Gide's "Dada", NRF April 1920, pp. 477-81, and Rivière's "Reconnaissance à Dada", NRF August 1920, pp. 216-37.

30. See Schlumberger, Oeuvres, II, p. 202: "Une si candide déclaration de partialité pour les "iconoclastes" (...) avait lieu dans cet angoissant mois d'août 1920, où les Bolsheviks, envahissant la Pologne, marchaient sur Varsovie (...). Dans un moment pareil, la consécration littéraire accordée aux "entrepreneurs de démolition" me semblaient d'une inopportunité provocante".

31. ibid., p. 203.

32. See Mourin, pp. 143-6.

33. See above, Chapter One, note 119.

34. NRF February 1922, pp. 134-6, and pp. 136-58.

35. Boris de Schloezer, "Présentation et traduction de 'La Confession se Stavrouguine'", NRF June 1922, pp. 647-65, and July 1922, pp. 30-57. For Gide's lectures, see his Dostoievski, Plon, 1923, and CPD 1, p. 108, 20/1/22. etc.


37. ibid., p. 372.

38. Mourin, pp. 135ff.


40. ibid.

41. See Mourin, pp. 150-3.


43. See Parain-Pingaud, p. 78. As Parain puts it, "je n'entrais pas là pour faire de la littérature, j'entrais pour gagner ma vie...", p. 79.
44. See NRF publicity brochures, 1925 and 1926, but esp. January and October 1934. A list of "les Jeunes Russes" is provided in Bernard, pp. 335-6; the collection was conceived thus: "La Révolution russe, quel que soit le jugement qu'on porte sur elle, a provoqué l'éclosion d'une nouvelle génération d'écrivains. Leur art se rattache assurément aux maîtres du siècle précédent: Gogol, Tolstoi, Dostoievski, mais il présente un caractère propre, une pensée originale, une forme renouvelée. C'est donc un aspect inconnu de la Russie contemporaine que cette collection, conçue en dehors de tout parti pris politique, révèle au public français". Publicity brochure, August 1927, p. 556.

45. NRF January 1934, publicity brochure, p. 18.

46. For instance, J. Steinberg's Souvenirs d'un Commissar du Peuple, 1930.

47. Mourin, p. 162.

48. Kupferman, Chapter Two.


50. "Arrivée en Russie", NRF October 1927, pp. 444-62. This was the first part of the book, "Vers l'autre Europe".

51. NRF October 1927, p. 462.

52. ibid.


54. Durtain's book underwent three printings to 1930; Kupferman, p. 182.

55. Caute, The Fellow-Travellers, p. 3.

56. ibid., p. 5, and his Communism and the French Intellectuals, pp. 84-5.

57. Journal VI, p. 14, 1/8/27. The serialisation ran between July 16th and October 1st.
less certain, Parain draws the same parallel: "...le communisme
était une affaire russe, d'organisation de la Russie. Il
n'était pas une solution universelle (...). Je ne pouvais pas
décider (...) si cette tyrannie était inévitable ou non,
transitoire ou pas..." (*De fil en aiguille*, p. 217).
It is well-worth recalling that in the PCF at this time the
so-called 'bolchevization' process was approved and under way.
The tactic of 'class against class' was adopted and not fully
revoked until 1934. See Racine et Bodin, p. 287, and Kemp,
Chapter Four.

59. "Le Voyage de Moscou, par Georges Duhamel (Mercure de France)",
NRF December 1927, pp. 825-7.

60. See Thérive, "Plaidoyer pour le naturalisme", *Comoedia*,

61. NRF December 1927, p. 825.

62. ibid., p. 830.

63. ibid.

64. Cf. Thérive, art. cit. (note 59), p. 827, with Caute,
*Communism and the French Intellectuals*, pp. 84-5.

65. NRF December 1927, p. 827.

66. Kupferman, p. 70.

travelled with André Beucler, whose book *Paysages et villes
russes*, Gallimard, 1928, contained nothing controversial
politically, according to Arland's "notule" in NRF July 1929,
p. 144.

68. "Russie 1927, par A. Fabre-Luce (Grasset)", NRF February 1928,
pp. 252-5.

69. ibid., p. 254.

70. Kupferman, p. 74.

71. "L'Autre Europe..., par Luc Durtain (NRF)", NRF April 1928,
pp. 549-52.

72. ibid., p. 549.

73. ibid., p. 552: "Ce point de vue non politique, qui est le vrai
point de vue de l'artiste et du savant, donne beaucoup de force
aux critiques de M. Durtain. S'il s'inquiète de telle ou telle
lacune évidente du système soviétique, c'est plutôt par
sympathie pour la Russie que par crainte ou par vanité
d'Occidental".
74. Kupferman, pp. 20-1.

75. *NRF* November 1927, p. 605.

76. ibid., pp. 605-6.


83. See *Vers l'autre flamme*, 1980, p. 325, for the itinerary.


85. *NRF* October 1929, p. 437: "...l'Affaire Roussakov n'est qu'un symptôme. Des causes qui l'ont fait éclater au dénouement qu'elle vient d'avoir, l'on trouve en jeu toute l'Union soviétique...".
86. Cf. ibid., p. 438: "C'est la classe ouvrière qui est le plus frappé dans (sic) l'URSS" (Istrati's italics), and p. 475, on the "caste cruelle, avide de domination et belliqueuse...".

87. ibid., p. 438, and Serge, p. 290, who provides a brief résumé which tallies with Istrati's longer account.

88. NRF October 1929, p. 438.

89. ibid., p. 465.

90. ibid., p. 450. Apparently, continued Istrati, "Victor Serge est terrifié: 'Jamais personne n'a eu jusqu'ici l'audace de dire aux Soviets ce que tu viens de leur lancer à la figure. Pour n'importe qui d'entre nous, ce serait la Sibérie, sans plus!'" (ibid.).


92. ibid., p. 459f, and Serge, p. 290.

93. Istrati, pp. 470ff. Here he demanded proof that Roussakov was "1) espion français, 2) antisémite cent-noir, 3) spéculateur, 4) ancien fabricant en France...".


95. "On ne leur afflige que 3 mois à Roussakov, 2 mois à sa femme, et 1 mois à Liouba Victor-Serge (...). Le juge soviétique est généreux, il ne veut pas priver ces gens de leur liberté, il les condamne seulement aux "travaux obligatoires" (Istrati's italics)"., p. 474.

96. ibid.

97. ibid., pp. 474-5.

98. Mea Culpa, Denoël et Steele, 1937.


100. L'Humanité, 4/10/29, Anon.
101. ibid., 5/10/29, anon.: "Toute cette boue, cette campagne immonde (...) est partie ingrate du complot que l'impérialisme (...) monte et conduit contre le communisme pour préparer l'agression soviétique".
On the 13th October, L'Humanité felt that Paris was the headquarters for a "furieuse offensive antibolcheviste".


103. ibid.

104. Vers l'autre flamme was originally published in three volumes, with Istrati's name attached to all three, whereas Serge and Souvarine had written the other two. This fact supports the view that the Trotskyists encouraged this affair.


106. NRF November 1929, pp. 696-702.

107. ibid., p. 696.

108. ibid.

109. ibid., p. 697.

110. ibid. Jacques Robertfrance, writing in Europe, December 1929, pp. 613-616, picked on these sentences, saying that they called for commentary. He went on to show that Benda - "prisonnier de sa définition du clerc" (p. 615) - could not continue for long to hold his position due to the moral implications and inconsistencies of the question. Benda had betrayed the real world, according to Robertfrance, by ignoring the economic and political motives behind the issues.


112. Cf. Benda's conclusion: "Il faudrait pourtant comprendre que l'idée révolutionnaire, du fait qu'elle s'est réalisée, a cessé d'être révolutionnaire, c'est la métaphysique du péché original quand elle va jusqu'au bout d'elle-même, je veux dire quand elle condamne tout ce que s'est réalisée, tout ce qui est tombé de l'idéal dans le réel, la Révolution comme le reste" (ibid., p. 702); Benda's italics.


114. ibid., p. 730.

115. ibid., p. 731.
116. ibid.

117. ibid., p. 732.

118. ibid. (My italics.)

119. Rolland was still pondering a defence of the USSR in February 1930 (see Cahiers Romain Rolland, No. 23, pp. 85-6, dated 23/2/30 and 29/2/30). On the "plan quinquennal", see, for example, L'Humanité, 15/10/30; there was almost daily praise of this achievement in the newspaper at this time. See also Kupferman, p. 166.

120. See Mourin, p. 167, who quotes Stalin's declaration: "la France (est) le pays le plus agressif et le plus militariste de tous les pays les plus agressifs et militaristes de monde".


123. ibid., p. 170.

124. ibid.

125. See above, Chapter Four.


128. See Europe, April 1931, pp. 526-57, and May 1931, pp. 76-118. The published volume carried a preface by Guéhenno; Farbman's work had originally appeared in English in The Economist.

129. CPD 2, p. 142, 14/5/31 (my italics); Cf. Journal I, p. 1044, and Maurer, p. 36. On May 17th Gide was still reading such material; CPD 2, p. 146.


131. "Histoire d'une Emancipation", NRF September 1931, pp. 384-97. Mirsky taught Russian literature at the University of London, wrote a biography of Lenin (the French translation of which was reviewed favourably by Nizan in NRF May 1935, pp. 772-3), and moved in Gide's circle of friends. They met in the South of France in September 1931; see CPD 2, p. 157, on "le prince Mirsky", and Robert Levesque, Journal, BAAG, No. 59, p. 340.

132. NRF September 1931, pp. 384-5.
133. ibid., p. 390.

134. "C'est surtout le remarquable roman de Fadéiev: La Défaite...", ibid., p. 392.

135. "... mes études historiques (...) m'amenèrent à lire Pokrowsky, le grand historien marxiste..." (ibid.).

136. ibid., pp. 394-5.

137. "Il se trouva que les mois où je "découvrais" Lénine furent des mois décisifs dans l'histoire du monde - les mois qui virent la réalisation triomphale de la première année du plan quinquennal et la grande révolution agraire dans les campagnes russes..." (p. 396).

138. ibid., p. 397.

139. Gide to JP, AP, 6/9/31: "L'Histoire d'une Emancipation est décevante, déplaisante, même. Je ne puis me faire, et de moins en moins, à cette coutumière dépréciation systématique de l'adversaire. C'est se diminuer soi-même, me semble-t-il, que de chercher à ravilir l'ennemi".


141. CPD 2, p. 164, 5/10/31. Schlumberger's objection was: "Tu sembles découvrir tout à coup des choses qui occupent des esprits depuis longtemps" (ibid., p. 163); Martin du Gard was forced to concede that "nous sommes bien trop individualistes, notre liberté personnelle nous importe bien trop", but he would have baulked at Gide's assertion.

142. CPD 2, p. 168, 18/10/31; cf. Gide's avowal that Russia interested him more than the conduct of the war in the context of his reading of Crémieux's Inquiétude et Reconstruction (1931), Journal I, p. 1083, 19/10/31, and he even managed to mention it in the same context as Martin du Gard's "non-conformist" play, Un Taciturne: "Nombreux sont ceux qui ne consentent à voir là qu'une complaisance (...), une "spécialité" à la NRF. Ils ne consentent pas à admettre la réalité, étant de ceux qui prétendent sans doute que les choses ne commencent à exister que lorsqu'on en parle. On agissait de même avec la Russie: et avec tant d'autres choses" (Journal I, p. 1087, 31/10/31). It is this type of thinking which lends support to J-P Bernard's interpretation of Gide's "engagement" as a "non-conformism"; Bernard, pp. 153-76.

144. **CPD 2, p. 224, 28/2/32.** It will be remembered that Gide and Martin du Gard were preparing to "politicise" the NRF during these months; cf. above, Chapters One and Two.


146. "Avez-vous pu donner suite à votre projet de publier des documents sur l'URSS? Je le souhaite vivement" (Gide to JP, AP, 4/4/32). On these texts, see below.

147. See Mourin, p. 172.


149. These "Pages de Journal" ran for five months until October. They occupied the following pages of the NRF (Pléiade equivalents in parentheses): June, pp. 985-1004 (pp. 946-79); July, pp. 32-42 (pp. 1022-45); August, pp. 161-72 (pp. 1045-56); September, pp. 362-71 (pp. 1057-68); October, pp. 481-506 (pp. 1099-1133).

150. "Gide (...) devient violemment anti-clérical, anti-religieux. Ét d'une façon trop simpliste, égaré par une certaine idée, à demi fausse, de la vérité" (JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3573, 1932).

151. NRF July 1932, p. 42 (Journal I, pp. 1044-5). The final sentence quoted betrays Gide's Radicalism.

152. Gide to JP, AP, 21/7/32, also cited by Grover, in MLN, p. 834. Cf. above Chapters One and Two, and Racine et Bodin, p. 294, on Communist support for the Peace Congress.

153. JP to Hellens, BD 7253, 26/7/32: "(Gide) n'est pas très content de l'accueil que l'on a fait à son Journal (...). Il y a dans Gide une sorte de "simplicité" qui fait d'abord penser: ce n'est que ça. Et puis il avait voulu frapper de "grands coups" sur le catholicisme, l'URSS, etc."


155. As outlined above, note 130, July 1931.

156. Grover, MLN, pp. 832-3.


158. JP to Guéhenno, AP, 5/9/32.
Cited in Grover, *MLN*, p. 835; this refers to the sentence in the *Journal* dated 23/4/32, where Gide wrote: "S'il fallait ma vie pour assurer le succès de l'URSS, je la donnerais aussitôt... comme ont fait, comme feront tant d'autres, et me confondant avec eux" (*NRF* October 1932, p. 500, and *Journal I*, p. 1126).


At Pontigny on September 3rd, Martin du Gard told "la Petite Dame" that Fernandez was alleging that "une militante sectaire et bien connue (...) sans nul doute a reçu de Parti mission d'"avoir" André Gide! On comprend bien, d'ailleurs, quelle importance cette conversion (sic) peut avoir pour la cause. (...) Malraux interrogé par nous, pour savoir si c'est un bruit qui court, dit qu'il ne l'a jamais entendu, il croit pourtant qu'il a dû prendre naissance à la NRF. "On voit très bien, dit-il, comment ce bruit a pu naître et le parti qu'en tirent ceux que cette conversion de Gide gêne"". (My italics; *CPD* 2, pp. 248-9, 3/9/32).

The essential source of material here is the "dossier""Gide et le communisme". This is a chronologically-ordered file of press-cuttings from the *Fonds Gide* at the Bibliothèque Littéraire Jacques Doucet (No. A.II.14), and covers the years 1932-1938 (hereafter referred to as *Doss. BD.* with item number). This document was evidently used by Alain Goulet in his "Gide à travers la presse soviétique de 1932 à 1937", *André Gide et la Revue des Lettres Modernes/Minard*, 1972, pp. 136-78, and by Maurer, who examines "le cas Gide", pp. 69ff. It is less the intention here to list examples of reactions to Gide's new position than to assess the effect these had upon the *NRF*.


ibid.


*NRF* October 1932, p. 485 (*Journal I*, pp. 1109-10). Note the force of the "donc" in this extract. *Je suis partout*, launched by Fayard in 1930, was not yet anti-Semitic, but certainly anti-Bolshevist. See P-M Dioudonnat, "Je suis partout", 1930-1944 (les maurrassiens devant la tentation fasciste), *la Table Ronde*, 1973.

*NRF* October 1932, pp. 486-7.

Cf. above, his conversations with Martin du Gard, note 141.
170. NRF October 1932, p. 491.

171. ibid., pp. 491-2.

172. This paragraph, in Journal I, p. 1117, dated 25/2/32, was cut from the earlier NRF text; perhaps Paulhan objected to such 'blind faith'. Cf. CPD 2, pp. 221-2, for Gide's conversation with Martin du Gard on the question of individualism.


174. See NRF October 1932, p. 494: "Je sens du reste mon incompétence (...). Ces questions politiques, économiques, financières sont d'un domaine où je ne m'aventure qu'avec crainte" etc. (5/3/32). And again on pp. 505-6: "Au demeurant parfaitement inapte à la politique. Ne me demandez donc point de faire partie d'un Parti" (13/6/32).

175. His proximity to Vaillant-Couturier, Malraux and Aragon increased his inability to resist being forced, against his will, to speak at various AEAR meetings (see CPD 2, passim, and Lottman, passim).

176. Gide to JP, in Grover, MLN, p. 835 (September 1932).

177. Journal I, p. 1175, June 1933. It is no accident that Gide was working on (Robert) La Nouvelle Ecole des femmes at this time, a project which developed into his 'political' play, Robert, ou l'Intérêt général; see Journal I, pp. 1208, 1220, 1235, 1252, as well as BAAG No. 54, April 1982, pp. 269-93, for Pierre Masson's "Robert ou l'Intérêt général: quelques éléments pour un procès en rehabilitation".


179. Doss. BD., gives seven major articles between 10th October (Emile Henriot in Le Temps: "André Gide Communiste") and 24th November (Daniel Gallois, L'Action française: "Conversion de l'Enfant Prodigue").


181. See L'Humanité, 11/10/32 and 14/10/32. Moscow finally signalled its approval in December, with Anissimov's Literaturnaia Gazeta article, reproduced in Les Nouvelles Litteraires, on 24/12/32. Cf. Goulet, art. cit., p. 139 and notes.

182. CPD 2, p. 254. Two days later, Gide realised the full import of this publication: "J'ai été mon propre cobaye, c'est toujours très dangereux" (ibid., p. 255).
183. "Petits-bourgeois", NRF November 1932, pp. 703-11. This was the final part of a series of reflexions called l'Amour du Prochain which Paulhan had commissioned from Chardonne; see "l'Amour du Prochain", NRF July 1932, pp. 5-28, esp. p. 5.

184. NRF November 1932, p. 706.

185. ibid., p. 710.

186. ibid., p. 709.

187. ibid., p. 711.

188. ibid.


190. L'Humanité, 6/1/33, review of L'Amour du prochain.

191. ibid.

192. See Nicole Racine's article "l'AEAR...", in Mouvement social, 1966, cit., pp. 35ff. Gide joined Vaillant-Couturier and Barbusse in the nominal 'comité directeur'.

193. Commenting directly on Gide's support for the Soviets, Léautaud remarked: "Chez Gide, (...) c'est à la fois une manifestation de curiosité intellectuelle et de sensibilité morbide. Dans quelques années, il lui viendra un autre mouvement, il fera une pirouette, cela n'a aucune importance. C'est une autre chose pour les jeunes gens de vingt-cinq ans qui suivent Gide. Il a une extrême influence sur eux. Ils seront séduits par sa curiosité. Ils le suivront. Ce peut être très fâcheux pour eux" (Journal X, p. 78, 29/12/32, my italics).

194. NRF January 1933, pp. 5-35. These texts were the result of Gide's request that the NRF should carry pro-Soviet documents; see above, note 146. Sarcasm betrayed Paulhan's attitude: "Je ne sais pas trop si les Russes ont déjà fait leur homme nouveau. Tu verras des choses curieuses dans la prochaine NRF" (JP to Grenier, AP, 20/12/32).


196. "Un ingénieur soviétique cherche de nouveaux gisements de charbon ou de minéral. Un écrivain soviétique cherche les gisements des nouveaux sentiments; il cherche l'homme nouveau" (NRF January 1933, p. 5.).

198. NRF January 1933, p. 6.

199. ibid., p. 7.

200. See above, Chapter Four; also Littérature engagée, pp. 20ff, and epigraph above.

201. See "France et Russie", Marianne, 15/2/33, and Kupferman, pp. 87ff, on Orient (Hachette), and Duroselle, pp. 75-9.

202. Gide reproduced large extracts from André Muret's article in the Revue des Belles-Lettres (Lausanne); NRF April 1933, pp. 699-702; the extracts were entitled "le communisme et le problème de la guerre".


204. Martin du Gard renewed his attack on 14th April; see Corr., I, p. 561.

205. CPD 2, p. 296, 30/3/33.

206. "Feuillets", NRF May 1933, pp. 720-7. As Claude Martin has noted, only the less controversial of these pages were incorporated in the Pléiade edition; see CPD 2, note 190.

207. NRF May 1933, p. 720. "F.V." is Fernand Vandérem, who accused Gide of hypocrisy in espousing Communism as he was about to receive 200,000 francs in 'droits d'auteur' for his Oeuvres Complètes. See the exchange in Candide, 5/1/33, Marianne, 11/1/33 and Candide, 20/1/33 (Doss. BD).

208. NRF May 1933, p. 727.

209. ibid. The quote came from Jugements, Plon, 1924.


211. See Gide to JP, AP, 9/5/33: "Mon avis est très net: n'insérez pas. En publiant cet appel, si légitime qu'il puisse être, la NRF s'aventure sur un terrain glissant et des plus dangereux. Ce n'est point là son rôle. J'ai du reste refusé ma signature personnelle, bien que sollicité de la manière la plus pressante. N'empêche que je ferai volontiers, si possible, une tentative en faveur de Serge; mais je voudrais éviter qu'on ne se servît de mon nom (comme le ferait celui de la NRF) pour diviser le parti et fortifier l'opposition".

212. CPD 2, p. 303, 12/5/33: "on sent naître une autre affaire particulière sur les sévérités russes que les ennemis de Staline tâchent d'exploiter et qui a l'oreille de Paulhan" (my italics).
213. CPD 2, p. 307, 23/5/33: "ce n'est pas que certains de leurs arguments ne soient excellents, mais pour l'instant il faut tout faire pour permettre à la Russie de réaliser ses plans...". Alix Guillain (and Groethuysen) had already deflected Gide from attractive Trotskyist ideas: see CPD 2, pp. 281 and 283-4 (16/1/33).


216. ibid.

217. ibid.

218. ibid. Cingria had compared the Russian "empire" with that of Venice, "(qui) a non seulement vécu longtemps sans statistique agraire, mais sans agriculture du tout" (NRF July 1933, p. 152).

219. NRF January 1970, pp. 76-7. Gide transcribed this letter into his Journal, which was published in extract form in the NRF April 1935, pp. 500-1. Significantly enough, however, it was subsequently omitted from the Pléiade edition and included in Littérature engagée as "Lettre à X", pp. 36-8.


221. ibid.


223. NRF July 1933, pp. 129-35.

224. ibid., p. 131.

225. ibid., p. 133.

226. ibid., p. 135.

227. See Candide, 6/7/33, "Gide et Fernandez".

228. "Sur le cas, la NRF persistait à ne pas se prononcer. Et pour cause. Car désavouer le pivot de la maison, impossible. Mais se solidariser avec lui, du côté abonnés, quels aléas!" (ibid.).

229. ibid.

231. Wall, p. 15.


233. Jean Louverné was a pen-name for Etiemble. See "Conversion?", NRF April 1934, pp. 628-48. Apparently Paulhan had accepted this essay in two long parts in November 1933, but edited it for its publication. See Kohn-Etiemble, 226 Lettres..., p. 59.

234. NRF April 1934, p. 628.

235. Kohn-Etiemble, p. 59, note 1. She adds "ce que ne contredira point, mais avalisera Gide lorsqu'il écrira son Retour de l'URSS" (ibid.).

236. "La sincérité de ces notes brutes ne risquent pas d'être altérée par les nécessités de la mise en forme dramatique ou par la dynamisme autonome d'un caractère imaginaire. Il en ressort que la "ligne générale" de Gide n'a jamais dévié. Cette apparente "gratuité" de l'œuvre et l'aisance avec laquelle on y saute de l'effusion lyrique aux raisons mallarméennes, de la chronique badine au drame biblique, ne peuvent tromper que les sots" (NRF April 1934, pp. 647-8).

237. NRF April 1934, pp. 703-8. Cf. above, Chapter Four.

238. Ibid., p. 703.

239. Ibid., p. 704.

240. Ibid.

241. Ibid., p. 705 (Fernandez' italics).

242. Ibid. Yet if liberalism were dead, Fernandez could still (rather pompously) parade his humanism: "Quand on défend comme moi un certain humanisme, fondé sur la croyance que l'homme est pour l'homme la plus haute valeur, (...) on ne saurait laisser triompher les gens qui pensent exactement le contraire sans encourir ce déshonneur philosophique qui est peut-être le plus amer de tous les déshonneurs" (ibid.).

244. See the 'exergue' to Maurice Sachs' almost immediately-devalued
book André Gide (Denoël et Steele, 1936); quoting Stalin,
Sachs wrote: "Le prolétariat ne peut atteindre la Révolution
que par une seule voie qui est celle du Parti; mais chaque
intellectuel peut rejoindre la Révolution par sa propre voie".

245. NRF April 1934, p. 706.

246. ibid., pp. 703 and 708; and above, Chapter Three. Later, in
June, Fernandez wrote to Martin du Gard thanking him for
signing the AEAR declaration adding, most interestingly: "ne
vous inquiétez pas trop (Lettre à Gide). C'était surtout de
ma part une manoeuvre tactique afin d'accuser ma position.
A les fréquenter, les cadres communistes sont d'une telle
sottise..." (my italics); Fernandez to RMG, BN Mss. Fonds RMG,
Vol. 115, p. 271, dated 17/6/34.

247. Cf. Doss BD., items 46-57, esp. Thierry Maulnier, in La Revue
universelle, 15/4/34, pp. 244-6, where he characterised
Louverné's article as "une grossièreté de pensée presque
incroyable". His text also shows how the NRF seemed to prove
the validity of Maurrassian ideas: "Le marxisme (...) ne trouve
des adhérents que parmi des esprits formés et préparés par
l'idéologie démocratique et révolutionnaire dont il n'est que
le terme et le logique aboutissement" (ibid., p. 246).
Maulnier clearly saw the NRF as a Radical-Republican organ with
"Revolutionary" potential. See also Jean de Fabrègues, La
Revue du siècle, May 1934.

N'y faudrait-il pas des "nouvelles"? Par exemple:
"L'industrialisation de la Russie se poursuit heureusement.
On trouve, au matin, dans chaque ville, 50 cadavres de
paresseux. La doctrine marxiste et l'argent américain
continuent à donner toute satisfaction" etc."

249. Kohn-Etiemble, p. 68, 18 or 25/5/34.


251. ibid., p. 997.

252. ibid., p. 998.

253. "Aucun communiste n'est chrétien, puisque c'est défendu par
Moscou" (ibid.).

254. ibid., p. 999.

255. ibid. (Thibaudet's italics).

256. ibid., p. 1000. He added: "L'un et l'autre participent plus ou
moins au malaise (...) de l'intellectuel bourgeois "qui va au
peuple" et qui, malgré toute sa bonne volonté (...) est pris
(c'est le cas de Gide) entre deux feux, ceux de la classe qu'il
quitte (Massis) et ceux de la classe dont il ne veut ni ne veut
être (Guéhenno)" (ibid.).
257. See L'Humanité, 25/6/34: "Son passage aux côtés du prolétariat qui combat pour abattre le capitalisme, c'est le signe du passage au prolétariat de toute la culture que la bourgeoisie laisse échapper de ses mains sanglantes..." (cited by Bernard, p. 169).

258. On this important phase, see Lottman, pp. 128ff; Littérature engagée, pp. 52ff, and Kupferman, pp. 102ff. For Gide's attitude, see CPD 2, p. 388, 4/6/34.

259. Mourin, pp. 186ff, 195ff, and Duroselle, La Décadence, pp. 111-21.

260. Jean Grenier, "Le Congrès des Ecrivains de l'URSS", NRF October 1934, pp. 631-2. Grenier was sceptical, even scathing, of the attitude of such as Radek, and challenged the worthiness of "socialist realism". Yet his view was not entirely negative; quoting Malraux - "tout homme s'efforce de penser sa vie, qu'il le veuille ou non" -, Grenier concluded that "c'est ainsi que le communisme ne laissera pas perdre inutilement ses grandes forces d'enthousiasme et de création et qu'il rejoindra vraiment l'expérience humaine" (ibid., p. 632).

261. "Le Congrès des Ecrivains Soviétiques", NRF November 1934, pp. 721-50. Following an introduction by J. E. Pouterman (pp. 721-2) came four sections of statements by a variety of (mainly Soviet) writers on "le Roman", "la Poésie", "les Lettres étrangères" and "Délégations et Messages". The selection ended with Gide's message, re-translated into the French from Russian, since the original was unavailable (pp. 749-50).

262. NRF November 1934, p. 727 (Cf. his attitude in "Jeunesse russe" above).

263. See NRF November 1934, p. 728, and esp. p. 729: "Je puis assurer que les jours où je travaillais dans une de ces brigades chargées d'écrire l'histoire du canal de la Mer Blanche, ont été et resteront pour moi parmi les meilleurs de ma vie d'écrivain".

264. Cf. for example NRF November 1934, p. 746: "Il ne s'agit (...) pas d'une méthode impartiale qui représenterait la vie telle qu'elle est, mais bien un choix de moments vus...", and "Nous de devons pas seulement décrire l'ouvrier héroïque et le méchant capitaliste, nous devons décrire la naissance du socialisme avec toutes ses contradictions. C'est cela que nous appelons le réalisme socialiste" (ibid., Radek's italics). Radek was purged in 1938.
265. Cf. NRF November 1934, pp. 749-50, and Littérature engagée, pp. 55-6. Yvonne Davet has clearly shown that Gide, by declaring that "la littérature n'a pas à se mettre au service de la Révolution", broke the seventh point of the official Socialist-Realism statute (Littérature engagée, p. 54).

266. This took place on 23rd October 1934; Gide's speech, "Littérature et Révolution", is reproduced in Littérature engagée, pp. 56-61.

267. NRF November 1934, p. 750.

268. Doss BD, contains some ten major articles between 25/10/34 and the end of December 1934, including three important texts by Emile Henriot in Le Temps (items 71-73). Most calumnious of all was Mauclair's piece in L'Eclaireur de Nice for 8/11/34, "Leurs Complices"; Mauclair called Montparnasse an "abcès poussé dans l'après-guerre en plein Paris, (...) un quartier général de métèques d'anti-France, récemment accrus des rebuts d'hitlérisme" (Mauclair's implicit anti-Semitism is highly significant here). He almost libelled Gide when he wrote: "Un célèbre propagandiste de l'homosexualité, riche, avide, gavé de succès et de faveurs par la bourgeoisie dont il est issu, proclame, en haine de la famille, de la propriété dont il jouit, de la religion dont il se réclame longtemps, son adhésion éclatante au sovietisme (ibid.)

269. NRF December 1934, pp. 866-71. This important text has been examined both in the light of the domestic political situation (Chapter Three) and Franco-German relations (Chapter Four).

270. NRF December 1934, p. 868.

271. "Toute pensée est inconsciemment enrôlée, diraient les marxistes; si ce n'est pas à un parti, c'est à une classe" (ibid.).

272. ibid., p. 869.

273. ibid.

274. Cf. the opinion of Pierre Herbart, reported in CPD 2, p. 423, 5/12/34.

275. The meeting took place on January 26th at the rue Visconti; Gide, flanked by Fernandez and Georges Guy-Grand of the "Union", faced the extreme - and moderate - Right in the shape of René Gillouin, Massis, Maulnier, Halévy, Mauriac and Maritain; Guéhanno was the only Left intellectual present. The debate received much coverage in the Press, and merited publication in André Gide et notre temps, Gallimard, 1935. (See the extracts in Littérature engagée, pp. 63-76.)
276. Cf. André Gide et notre temps, p. 61, where he quoted Schlumberger's dictum that "ce sont les sentiments qui mènent l'homme et non point les idées".

277. Cf. ibid., pp. 63-4: "Ainsi que Malraux le disait fort bien l'autre jour: un artiste, dans notre société, nage contre le courant au lieu de se sentir porté par lui. J'ai toujours écrit jusqu'à présent sans chercher du tout l'approbation du public; mais si, maintenant, j'ai besoin, pour écrire, d'avoir l'approbation d'un parti... je préfère ne plus écrire, encore qu'approuvant le parti".


279. e.g.: NRF March 1935, p. 484: "En rentrant dans le courant commun de sa génération, Gide se sera trouvé prendre position à contre courant. Ce ne sera pas un des moindres paradoxes de sa biographie" (my italics). In the NRF for June 1935, pp. 946-8, Paulhan reproduced extracts from a letter which Gide sent the Bulletin de l'Union pour la Vérité whereby he insisted that he had been attracted by the "question sociale" much earlier than the Congo visit, in fact, in 1893 to 1896 with Amyntas... The full text is in Littérature engagée, pp. 79-82.

280. In April 1935 the NRF resumed publication of the "Pages de Journal". Eight selections appeared, spanning the years 1933 to early 1936 (i.e. the section published in NRF March 1936, pp. 331-8). These extracts correspond to pages 1173 to 1243 of the Pléiade edition.

On Gide's noticeably cooler approach, see, for instance, NRF April 1935, p. 498: "D'humeur et de tempérament, je ne suis rien moins que révolutionnaire...", etc.; and p. 500: "...si l'on prend parti, aussitôt le parti vous prend".


284. On Paulhan, see above, note 160; on Martin du Gard, see CPD 2, p. 241, 17/6/32, pp. 278-9, 16/12/32, and cf. Gabriel Marcel's comment: "Le déplacement de celui qui, étant incroyant, est devenu chrétien, est un déplacement aussi important qu'un voyage en Russie!", in André Gide et notre temps, p. 37.
285. Cf. CPD 2, pp. 478ff (from 14/10/35) with ibid., p. 475 (2/10/35), where Gide was aware that "je me laisserais entraîner à dépasser ma pensée..." etc. See also Maurer, p. 90ff. Gide also discussed it with Martin du Gard; see Corr., II, pp. 48-50, 12/9/35.

286. See Journal I, p. 1241 (also in NRF March 1936, pp. 335-6): "Non, il serait faux de dire que mes opinions, mes pensées, n'ont pas changé, et je serais de mauvaise foi de le prétendre. Mais le grand, le très important changement est celui-ci: j'avais cru, jusqu'à ces derniers temps, qu'il importait d'abord de changer l'homme (...) et que c'était par là qu'il fallait commencer. C'est pourquoi j'écrivais que la question morale m'importait plus que la question sociale. Je me laisse persuader aujourd'hui que l'homme même ne peut changer que d'abord les conditions sociales ne l'y invitent et ne l'y aident". This shift of emphasis came nearly a month after his confiding to "la Petite Dame" that "ce qui se passe là-bas commence à m'effrayer un peu, j'ai terriblement peur d'un embourgeoisement" (CPD 2, p. 476, 2/10/35).

287. CPD 2, p. 491, 28/10/35.


289. See above, Chapter Three, where it is demonstrated that Paulhan clearly intended to distance the NRF from the imminent "Front populaire".

290. NRF January 1936, pp. 15-16 (Journal I, p. 1232, 3/8/35). Also typical in the same passage was the following: "Cette figure idéale de l'homme, je la vois, avec une épaisse masse commune, toute nimbée d'individuelles possibilités".

291. NRF January 1936, pp. 75-95. Introduced by A. Habaru, a Communist journalist who worked on Monde and L'Humanité (cf. Guessler Normand, art. cit., p. 176); these texts were all drawn from Pravda. To many in the West, the incentives system, named after its first "hero", was a very cynical way of increasing production among the mass of workers by implanting "individualistic" aspirations. The texts were reports of the records attained and broken by competing workers, backed by statistics. Saboteurs of Stakhanovists were tried and shot as enemies of the people (p. 94).

292. ibid., p. 75 (my italics).

293. ibid.

294. See Combat No. 2, February 1936, "Lettre ouverte au directeur de la NRF", by Pierre Tisserand, "un vieil universitaire de province".

295. Combat No. 3, March 1936, "Une lettre de M. Jean Paulhan...".
296. ibid. For Paulhan the NRF was "mormale" to the extent that it reflected "tous les excès et les folies de l'homme normal mais avec l'équilibre aussi que comosent dans l'homme normal, ces divers accès". In Paulhan's view, it was Tisserand who had interpreted this phenomenon as "le début d'une taylorisation de la Russie", whereas Nizan would consider it "un triomphe du travail intellectuel sur le travail physique" (ibid.).

297. CPD 2, p. 539f, 5/5/36.


299. See Maurer, Deuxième Partie, "Gide apostat (1936/37)". Although it might be desirable to detail at length the specific events of Gide's journey and its aftermath, such an enumeration would spread too far beyond the intention of this Chapter, which is, rather, to concentrate upon the journey's effect upon the NRF. Indeed it is significant that the issue was diverted by both Paulhan and Gide to more "appropriate" organs that the NRF, which was deemed to have risked enough.


301. NRF March 1936, pp. 331-8; cf. above, note 286.

302. See above, Chapter Three, on Paulhan's anti-orthodoxy, and Henri Michel, "Le Front populaire et l'URSS", in Les Relations franco-britanniques de 1935 à 1939, Editions du CNRS, 1975, pp. 215-21, on Blum's distractions from sealing a military alliance with the USSR.

303. Duroselle, La Décadence, Chapter X, esp. pp. 301-5.


305. CPD 2, p. 552, 7/9/36, and JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3712, 1936.
Paulhan "interpreted" Dabit's death for André Suarès:
"(Dabit) est mort dans un petit hôpital de Sébastapol sans médecin près de lui qui parlât français, sans pouvoir lui-même dire ou écrire le moindre mot. Gide avait regagné Moscou. Dabit avait pour l'hôpital l'horreur qu'ont tous les ouvriers (sic); et peut-être le besoin de parler, qu'ont tous les intellectuels, aux derniers moments. (...) Je ne me défais guère de la pensée que Dabit a vu en URSS la ruine des valeurs dans lesquelles il voulait mettre son espoir (...) et que de cela aussi il est mort" (BD 4966/9, 4/9/36). It is worth comparing this with Paulhan's letter to Jouhandeau, whose virulent anti-Communism evidently merited a less restrained version:
"Après trois semaines en URSS, Schiffrin, Guilloux, décident de revenir en France: ils sont éreintés (on ne dort pas à Moscou, à cause du bruit et des punaises. Si Gide dort, c'est qu'un avion l'emmène chaque soir dans un sanatorium à 40 km. de Moscou), inquiets... agacés (ils ne peuvent faire un pas sans se sentir surveillés). On interdit Gide de le voir (Dabit mourant). Gide revient à Moscou, et Dabit meurt quatre jours après, seul, déçu" (JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3717, (1936)).

Cf. Grenier to JP: "Vu Guilloux à S. Brieuc. (...) Il m'a dit des choses forts intéressantes" (AP, 17/8/36), and later: "Impression générale de Guilloux en Russie: peuple oriental mou et apathétique qu'il est très méritoire pour le parti bolchevik d'avoir su secouer et faire travailler. (...) Et puis A. Gide et ses compagnons, c'est une autre histoire" (AP, 13/9/36). When the NRF published Dabit's Carnet vert in its October issue (pp. 591-609), Guilloux noted that he felt sure this would have conflicted with Dabit's wishes; Carnets, I, Gallimard, 1978, p. 134, 1/10/36.


JP to Grenier, AP, 16/11/36.

The last sentences of Retour de l'URSS are: "L'aide qui l'URSS vient d'apporter à l'Espagne nous montre de quels heureux rétablissements elle demeure capable. L'URSS n'a pas fini de nous instruire et de nous étonner". Gallimard/Idées edition, p. 73.


Maurer, pp. 129-48.
316. NRF December 1936, pp. 1071-7. (It is a gross exaggeration to say that except for "des remarques d'"eurocommunisme" (sic)" this article would have almost been suitable for Commune; see Maurer, p. 143).

317. NRF December 1936, p. 1072.

318. ibid., p. 1073.

319. ibid., pp. 1073 and 1075: "La prétendue conversion de Gide au communisme n'a, en fait, été qu'une constatation de l'impossibilité où se trouve l'homme des basses classes de se poser la question morale si un minimum de dignité et de bien-être ne lui est pas d'abord assuré par la révolution sociale".

320. ibid., p. 1076.

321. ibid., p. 1077.

322. Among the most polemical were Lion Feuchtwanger's "Opinion d'un esthète sur l'Union soviétique", in Le Journal de Moscou, 5/1/37; Rolland's "Lettre aux Ouvriers de Magnitogorsk", in ibid., 12/1/37; André Wurmser's "l'URSS jugée par André Gide", in Commune, January 1937, pp. 567-83. Europe reproduced Georges Friedmann's essay "André Gide et l'URSS 'en tête' in January 1937, pp. 5-29. Paulhan, in fact, believed that this was the best corrective to Retour de l'URSS; see NRF May 1937, "Bulletin". Vendredi balanced Nizan's violent "Un esprit non prévenu" with Pierre Harbart's article "Faisons le point" on 29/1/37.

323. JP to Grenier, AP, 27/3/37: "Gide achève un nouveau livre sur l'URSS plus féroce que le premier". Paulhan added, on the purges: "étrange que ces révolutionnaires aient attendu pour se massacrer d'avoir de fausses dents, du ventre, de la calvitie...".


325. CPD 3, p. 26, 23/6/37; Cf. JP to Grenier, AP, 7/6/37: "Retouches va paraître...". (Gallimard, 1937).

326. Maurer, pp. 149-68; see esp. Wurmser, "Retouches à son Retour de l'URSS, ou propos d'un pharisien", Commune, August 1937, pp. 1422-36.

327. NRF August 1937, pp. 339-41.

328. ibid., p. 340.

329. ibid., p. 341: "La crise des idéologies d'après-guerre, communisme compris, est plus proche qu'on ne le croit. Fascistes, nazis et soviétistes ne vivront pas éternellement d'enthousiasme collectif et d'espoir".
330. See CPD 3, pp. 30ff, passim, and the polemic between Gide and Vendredi over his change to La Flèche, in Guéhenno's Journal d'une Révolution, Grasset, 1939, pp. 213ff, "la Querelle avec André Gide"; see La Flèche, 20/11/37, 25/12/37, and Vendredi, 16/12/37, 24/12/37, and throughout January 1938.

The literary supplements of Le Figaro also carried the reactions of several personalities to Gide's change of heart (see 14/8/37 and successive weeks); Schlumberger summed up the feelings of many at the NRF when he wrote: "Depuis que Moscou affecte d'avoir dépassé la phase où de telles contraintes étaient indispensables, on se meut manifestement dans le mensonge" (14/8/37).

Benda, however, was entering the period whereby he felt the French Stalinists (whom he could easily characterise as Jacobins) should be supported, given that they were the only Party calling for "un accroissement de justice sociale et à un respect des droits des peuples qui me sont chers" (21/8/37). Paulhan preferred to exile himself in the "domaine littéraire" (18/9/37), while Marcel Arland averred: "J'aime et je trouve beau, et trop rare, qu'un écrivain refuse de s'embrigader, et dise ce qu'il croit la vérité, quelles qu'en soient les conséquences..." (11/9/37).

331. See above, Chapter Three.


333. "Anticommunisme et patriotisme", NRF August 1938, pp. 307-9. Here Benda re-asserted his conviction that the PCF was a truly patriotic Party. This text drew fire from both Berl (Pavés de Paris, 2/9/38, pp. 3-6) and the now pro-Doriot Fernandez (in L'Emancipation nationale, 12/8/38: "Le Communisme et M. Benda").


2. Friedländer, p.18.

3. ibid.

4. ibid., p.51. Friedländer concludes by contrasting France with Germany: "...Sur le fond de l'évolution de la France contemporaine, il ne s'agira (...) que d'une poussée de fièvre conjoncturelle comme n'en suscitera même plus avec autant de violence la crise des années trente du XXe siècle. En Allemagne par contre, pour des raisons (...) particulières, on va assister à évolution beaucoup plus profonde et systématique des sentiments antijuifs" (pp. 51-2).


6. On the right-wing Press, in particular the Fayard weeklies, see Dioudonnat, Je suis partout... (cit.), passim, and Marrus and Paxton, Chapter Two, "The Roots of Vichy Anti-Semitism", pp. 25-71.

7. The following works deal in varying degrees with all these issues: Gygès, Les Juifs dans la France d'aujourd'hui, Documents et Témoignages, 1965; Béatrice Philippe, Être juif dans la société française, Eds. Montalba, 1979; Michel Winock, Edouard Drumont et Cie: antisémitisme et fascisme en France, Seuil, 1982; Paul J. Kingston, Anti-Semitism in France during the 1930's, University of Hull Press, Hull, 1983; Zeev Sternhell, La Droite révolutionnaire, Seuil, 1978; and his Ni droite ni gauche, Seuil, 1983; and, finally, Jeffrey Mehlman, Legs de l'anti-sémitisme en France, Denoël, 1984.

8. The stress on Paulhan as editor is deliberate, for it was not only his growing and manifest patriotism, but also his relatively equitable treatment of Jewish authors in the late 1930's which partly contributed to the Germans' substitution of Drieu as editor of the Occupation NRF after December 1940.


11. Her text is in NRF June 1919, p. 159: "J'ai dit "talmudique" et ceci m'amène à signaler la proportion, j'allais dire la prépondérance de l'élément juif dans la vie intellectuelle allemande. (...) Critique, théâtre, journalisme, production littéraire (...) sont envahis par les israélites; ils sont partout, avec leur esprit souple tour à tour et incisif, apportant comme un levain indispensable autant que dangereux à l'informer pâte allemande, leur sens critique, le sentiment aigu qu'ils ont du défaut de la cuirasse, leur flair, leur don d'insinuation, de pénétration psychologique, leur sensualité; certains traits de leur caractère m'assombrissent à ceux du caractère allemand et les renforcent ... " This catalogue of "Jewish characteristics" is valid for the rest of the Inter-War period as far as Jewish stereotypes are concerned; see Chardonne's view, virtually identical, below, note 287.

12. Friedländer, p. 25.


14. ibid., p. 48.


16. Berl-Modiano, p. 121.


18. ibid., p. 397.


21. See above, Chapter One.

22. Assouline, p. 42.

23. ibid., pp. 41 and 53.

24. ibid., p. 50.


26. See Journal I, "Feuillets" (1920), p. 713, where Gide writes: " Certaines de ses (i.e. de Rathenau) théories (...) me paraissent si contraires à l'esprit de la race juive que je ne pus me retenir de marquer mon étonnement (...)" etc. Gide remembered his surprise in a conversation with Groethuysen nine years later; see CPD 2, p.62, 10/11/29.
27. CPD 2, p. 63, 10/11/29.


33. NRF August 1922, pp. 163-205, and September 1922, pp. 287-328.


36. ibid., p. 181. The review appeared every two months and passed to Rieder's "à la suite d'intrigues", according to Cohen himself (quoted by Assouline, p. 182), after six issues.

37. La Revue juive, No.1, January 1925, pp. 8-9.

38. ibid., p. 9.

39. Cf. Claude Martin, NRF Index 1, p. xviii. Paulhan knew Crémieux from 1912 (see above, Chapter One).

40. Cf. "Jérôme et Jean Thauaud", NRF November 1921, pp. 557-72, and "Pierre Benoît", June 1922, pp. 670-82, Apart from such essays, Crémieux sometimes reviewed as many as five titles per month (e.g. January 1921).

41. NRF January 1921, pp. 94-7.

42. NRF September 1923, p. 347. This book met with considerable success; it was announced in the November 1934 publicity brochure (p. 389) that this work was henceforward part of the "fonds NRF". The book was reviewed again in a much different climate by René Daumal in NRF October 1939, pp. 653-4, significantly under the rubric "Littérature étrangère" (sic).


44. NRF November 1921, p. 566.
45. ibid., p. 567.

46. ibid., p. 570.

47. ibid. The Tharaud brothers' anti-Semitism was renewed with vigour in Quand Israël n'est plus roi (1934); see Saurat's review in NRF March 1935, pp. 460-2, and Philippe, p. 284.

48. NRF September 1923, pp. 287-94. This "enquête" exaggerated the influence of such as Maurras upon the younger generation and conveniently ignored Gide's. Maurras could well have remembered Crémieux's criticism when he attacked him later in 1934; see below.

49. Crémieux's family had lived around Narbonne for centuries; yet this did not prevent his eventual betrayal under Nazi occupation and his deportation and death in Buchenwald in 1944. See Assouline, pp. 120-2, p. 309; Eustis, Trois Critiques..., and Georges Dupeyron, Europe, August 1947, pp. 25-31 (commemoration).

50. Cf. for example Marcel's review of Henri Franck's Lettres à quelques amis, NRF May 1926, pp. 609-12, where Marcel extolled the virtues of Franck's thought, itself admirable for opposing the contemporary "positions trop immédiates" (p. 612).


52. ibid., p. 107.

53. ibid.

54. ibid., p. 108.


56. Gygès, p. 53.

57. ibid.

58. NRF February 1930, pp. 278-80; the reviewer was D. Decourdemanche, a young Germanist whom Paulhan brought to the review. His pen-name was Jacques Decour, and, in Occupied France, helped Paulhan to found Les Lettres françaises. He was executed at Mont-Valérien in 1942. Poliakov, II, p. 466, reminds his reader that Irène Némirowski died at Auschwitz in 1942.

59. NRF February 1930, p. 278.

60. ibid., p. 280.

61. "Solal, par Albert Cohen", NRF February 1931, pp. 278-80,
63. ibid., p. 280.
64. See Pierre Pierrard, Juifs et catholiques français (De Drumont à Jules Isaac, 1886-1945), Fayard, 1970, p. 256.
65. Marrus and Paxton, Chapter 2.
66. Pierrard, p. 256.
67. NRF June 1931, pp. 904-912, "Autour de Drumont".
68. ibid., pp. 904-5.
69. ibid., p. 905. For an analysis of "apocalyptic" literature, see Marc Angenot, La Parole pamphlétaire, Payot, 1982.
70. NRF June 1931, p. 905.
71. ibid., p. 906.
72. ibid.
73. ibid., p. 907.
74. ibid.
75. ibid., p. 908.
76. ibid., pp. 908-9.
78. Thibaudet, NRF June 1931, pp. 909-10,
79. ibid., p. 911: "l'incroyable fanatisme religieux déclenché dans le clergé régulier et séculier, et parmi les fidèles, par l'Affaire, est l'oeuvre de Drumont (...). Le frais de la guerre, Drumont en a payé son obole avec son déclin et son ruine. Mais l'Eglise a payé la grosse part, presque tout. Elle a payé, parce que le petit clergé, et une bonne part du gros, avaient emboîté le pas derrière un journaliste, malgré les avertissements de Léon XIII, qui se garda bien de se prononcer sur l'Affaire Dreyfus".
80. ibid., p. 912. On Drumont, see, for example, Winock, Edouard Drumont et cie.
81. Le Droit de Vivre eventually became a weekly in 1935; it is of interest because its emphasis was pro-Republican, pro-French and did not stridently support Zionism. It gathered many intellectuals who were either non-practising Jews, or not Jews at all, from both the Left and Centre of the political spectrum.

82. This substantial novel ran in six parts until October 1932 inclusive. It occupied over 280 pages of the review and attracted a very wide range of opinions, as shown in a long, fascinating letter from JP to Bloch himself, reproduced in Choix de Lettres, pp. 259-61, 6/7/32.

83. He continued: "J'espère qu'il y a encore plusieurs chapitres et j'attends avec impatience les compte-rendus du livre qui seront des chefs-d'oeuvres sur un chef-d'oeuvre. La vie est belle dit Jean-Richard"; Paulhan-Grenier Correspondance, p. 43, 14/5/32. In a later letter dated 29/6/32, Grenier wrote "Fez est une ville (...) étourdissante. Rien que la ville où tu vois 50.000 Benjamin Crémieux avec la barbe, la toque, et la robe de couleur" (ibid, p. 41).

84. NRF May 1932, pp. 873-87.

85. ibid., p. 873.

86. ibid. It is worth repeating that Gide's view was different; in March 1931 Gide had written the following of Henri Duvernois (pen-name for Simon Schwartzbacher) and his latest book: "C'est un exemple spécimen de cette littérature juive qui mériterait bien que l'on en écrivît l'histoire. Mendès, Tristan Bernard, Sternheim, Bernstein, Coolus, Hirsch, Croisset etc. tant dramaturges que romanciers, tous ont ceci de commun que, dans leur œuvre, toute idée de noblesse est exclue. C'est la littérature avilissante"; Journal I, p. 1035 (this section did not appear in the NRF pre-publication for July 1932). My italics. (Benjamin Crémieux's view of Duvernois had been much different; see NRF October 1922, pp. 385-96). For Gide's opinion of Bloch, see below.

87. See NRF May 1932, p. 877, quoting Bloch: "la mort, à son tour, n'est pas le contraire de la vie, autrement dit elle n'est pas un absolu opposé à un autre absolu, mais un simple aspect de l'existence".

88. See sections II and III of Saurat's article.

89. ibid., pp. 883-4.

90. ibid., pp. 884-5.

91. ibid., p. 887.


94. ibid.

95. ibid.

96. ibid.

97. ibid., pp. 565ff, dated 2/5/33.

98. ibid., p. 566.

99. See Le Droit de Vivre, March, April and May 1933; it reported that "Herriot est avec nous", and that such as Chamson, Kayser and Blum had attended and spoken at the 'Salle Bullier' meeting on April 8th.


101. Le Droit de Vivre, September/October 1933.

102. Malraux believed that, at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, "ce n'est pas en tant que Juif que les Juifs furent attaqués (...) mais dans la mesure où la propaganda nationaliste les représentait comme ennemis de l'armée. Le problème était militaire, non racial" (ibid).

103. Cf. the distinctions drawn in Friedländer, ChapterII; also Dioudonnat, Je suis partout..., passim, and Kingston, pp. 10-64, who reproduces the Police report "la Propagande anti-juive". Most of the organizations identified here were in contact with the "Centre de Propagande Anti-Juive d'Erfurt (Allemagne)".

104. Le Droit de Vivre, September/October, 1933.

105. ibid.

106. See, for instance, Le Droit de Vivre, 25/4/34, including a front-page photograph.


109. NRF February 1934, pp. 161-309. This issue also contained Trotsky's "Qu'est-ce que le national-socialisme?" (see above, Chapter Four), the second part of Giraudoux's *Combat avec l'ange* and "L'Air du Mois", pp. 311-408.

110. See *Fidèlement vôtre*, Grasset, 1979, p. 54.

111. Letters Halévy to JP, 22/3/33 and 7/5/33. See also JP to Suarès, BD 4961/8, 21/6/33.

112. A number of texts by Gobineau himself were also included.

113. Halévy to JP, AP., 7/5/33. In the same letter, Halévy mentioned that Jérôme Tharaud was reading Gobineau's *Essai sur l'inégalité des races*, and that he found it "un des plus beaux romans qu'il ait jamais lus. Peut-être vous le dirait-il en deux ou trois pages".


115. ibid., p. 234.

116. Kohn-Etiemble, pp. 60-1. Paulhan wrote: "Tout de même, Gobineau ne date pas du fascisme; et c'est en 1923 qu'Europe lui consacrait un numéro d'hommage" (p. 61). In October 1923 *Europe* indeed paid tribute to Gobineau, who died in 1882. The special issue included essays by Paul Colin, Serpille de Gobineau, Elie Faure, G. Vacher de Lapouge (very favourable), Rolland (critical), Jacques de Lacretelle (influence on Proust), Charles Vildrac, J-R Bloch, etc. Cf. the bibliography in the *NRF*, February 1934, p. 300.


119. *NRF* February 1934, pp. 250-6. Cf. Kingston, on Serpille de Gobineau who, during the 1930's, was in regular contact with the Nazi anti-Jewish propaganda centre in Erfurt.

120. *NRF* February 1934, p. 251.

121. ibid., p. 252. Thus the link is forged between the unconscious proto-Nazi anti-Semitism inherent in the comments of Mme. Mayrisch (quoted above, Note 11) and Hitler's deliberate racism.

122. ibid., p. 256.

123. ibid., pp. 308-10, section VII.
For Crémieux's analyses of February 1934, see above, Chapter Three.

"Partis à prendre", NRF April 1934, p. 698.


ibid., p. 882. Eugen Weber, in retrospect, takes a similar view; see L'Action française, Chapter 17, esp. p. 332.


ibid.

ibid., p. 883.

See NRF June 1934, "Divers", p. 1034, and NRF July 1934, pp. 100-8, "Un Juif, celui-là".

NRF July 1934, pp. 101-2.

ibid., p. 102.

ibid.

ibid., p. 103.

ibid.

ibid., p. 104.

ibid.

ibid., p. 105.

ibid.

ibid., p. 106.

Daniel Halévy would be one such example.

NRF July 1934, p. 107.

ibid.

ibid., p. 108.

For a discussion of such statistics, see Marrus and Paxton, esp. pp. 34-6, and Philippe, pp. 265-6.

See below.
148. Crémieux's footnote is important, and merits quoting in full: "La question de l'afflux continu des Juifs de l'Est mérite naturellement d'être posée; elle me paraît entrer dans le cadre des mesures générales à prendre au sujet de l'immigration, mesures très nécessaires, mais portant en temps normal sur la qualité physique et morale des individus, non sur leur origine. Quand il s'agit d'afflux massif comme pour les Russes blancs ou les Juifs victimes de l'hitlérisme, il convient de fixer le maximum digestible et de s'y tenir" (NRF July 1934, p. 108).

149. ibid., p. 108.

150. Le Droit de Vivre, 25/5/34: "Plus de 6.000 auditeurs acclament les mots d'ordre de la "LICA" et protestent contre les agressions antisémites".


152. See Le Droit de Vivre, August 1934. The riots were referred to as a "pogrom".


154. Le Droit de Vivre, December 1934.

155. ibid., quoting NRF December 1934, p. 864.

156. Cf. above, Chapter Four, on Franco-German relations. It is worth recalling that Suarès deeply angered such as Schlumberger at the NRF when he wrote of Germany: "Depuis deux mille ans, l'Allemagne est la plaie ouverte, l'ulcère de l'Europe. (...) Cette race (i.e. 'les Allemands') est l'iniquité même, comme toute race d'ailleurs"; NRF November 1934, p. 653. Paulhan told Suarès that Schlumberger and others had been placated by an (unspecified) eulogy; JP to Suarès, BD 4964/9, 27/11/34.


158. In the published volume of Vues sur l'Europe, Grasset, 1939, Suarès wrote: "j'ai horreur de tout ce qui est spécifiquement juif. Mais j'ai une horreur égale du Barbare"; p. 252 (At the time of this publication, Suarès had recommenced his "Chroniques de Caërdaïal").

159. ibid., p. 265 (my italics).

160. ibid.

161. NRF December 1934, p. 865.
162. Cf. the following comment in the published volume of Vues sur l'Europe: "Je passe pour antisémite chez les Juifs; et l'on assure que j'appartiens à Israël, chez les antisémites. L'imbécile héraut de la nation me traite d'anarchiste; et le suppôt de la termitière internationale me traite de Français fanatique" (p. 266).

163. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3607 (late 1934).

164. See Schlumberger, "Note sur la Politique", NRF December 1934, pp. 866-71; also above, Chapters Three, Four and Five.

165. See, for instance, JP to Suarès, BD 4965/1, 7/1/35: "Le dernier désabonnement reçu (...) portait que vous "insultiez les anciens combattants" (??) (sic). Explication: "partisans d'une plus grande France, comme Hitler l'est d'une plus grande Europe". Bizarre sottise".

166. See La Trahison des Clercs, "Postface", 1977, p. 403.

167. The Encyclopedia Judaica article is dismissive in tone, stressing that Benda felt his Jewishness was a burden.

168. Un Régulier dans le Siècle, ed. cit., p. 209f. Sorel and Léon Daudet were both adamant that a Jewish writer should be denied the prize.


170. Cf. Chambat's assessment: "Point de passage entre l'idéal et la réalité; la morale et la politique, le destin personnel de Benda et sa vision du monde rationaliste, le thème de l'intellectuel est traversé par une juïdité qui ne se pense que dans l'universel..."; "Postface", p. 404, my italics.

171. ibid., p. 405.

172. See, for example, L'Action française, 5/1/33, on Benda: "Il existe un écrivain juif dont l'industrie est florissante, mais à qui, pour ma part, je n'ai pas reconnu la qualité d'un honnête belligérant. Il est à pendre haut et court, comme un simple maraudeur de champ de bataille..."; quoted in Charles Maurras, Dictionnaire politique, Vol. 3, 1933, p. 461.

173. See NRF July 1935, p. 146 ("l'Air du Mois"): "Il y a un mois, je souhaitais ici même que la France se tînt armée contre les provocations de l'hitiérisme. D'aucuns déclarèrent que je prenais cette position parce que Juif et qu'Hitler persécute les Juifs. Ils n'examinèrent pas un instant si cette position était sage".
174. Gallimard, 1935. This work was irregularly pre-published in the NRF between January 1934 and March 1935. See also Thibaudet, "De l'Explication dans les lettres", October 1935, pp. 567-72.

175. ibid., p. 572.

176. ibid.

177. NRF January 1936, pp. 105-9, "Esprit pur et esprit incarné".

178. ibid., p. 108.

179. ibid.


181. See Lacouture, Léon Blum, pp. 258ff; Bodin and Touchard, pp. 29ff, and 222ff, and Eugen Weber, Chapter 19.

182. Incidentally, Le Droit de Vivre had campaigned vigorously in favour of the Popular Front; see the issue dated 2/5/36.

183. "Gide est tout occupé des manœuvres de Massis qui publie un long article où il relève tout ce que Gide a publié sur Léon Blum dans son Journal. Il exploite ses paroles tant qu'il peut et L'Action française reproduit chaque jour les passages incriminés..."; CPD 2, p. 540, 27/5/36.


185. See above, notes 15, 17 and 18.

186. La Revue universelle, 1/6/36, pp. 472-5 (p. 472); my italics.


188. Massis, art. cit., p. 474.

189. ibid.

190. "Mieux vaudrait, le jour où le Français n'aurait plus force suffisante, disparaître, plutôt que de laisser un malappris jouer son rôle à sa place, en son nom"; Massis, art. cit., p. 475.

191. ibid.

192. See, for instance, Gide, Journal I, pp. 772-3 (1924), and esp. p. 1056 (1931), on Massis' distortions.


195. La Jeunesse d'un Clerc ran in four parts from August to November 1936. See Vol. XLVII, pp. 261-90, 447-87, 618-54 and 840-75.

196. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3712 (Autumn 1936).

197. This article was later collected with others in Le Péril juif. The pamphlet is not dated (published by Sorlot); Poliakov (II, p. 461) ascribes it wrongly to 1934, while Kingston (p. 139) dates it as 1938 (he mistakenly says it was composed of two unpublished articles; in fact, the Action française article is the first of three texts) and Marrus and Paxton give 1939. Late 1937/early 1938 is most likely.

198. Maurice Sachs, a recent convert to Catholicism through association with both Cocteau and Maritain, moved in Gide's circle of acquaintances, submitted some "notes" to the NRF and supervised a collection for Gallimard; cf. Assouline, pp. 175-7. Sachs wrote a long riposte to Jouhandeau, reproduced in L'Action française, 22/10/36, with a short commentary by Jouhandeau where he merely repeated his virulent anti-Semitic sentiments. Moreover, a letter in BN MSF, Fonds RMG, Vol. 116, shows that Jouhandeau reported this very event, which took place in March 1934, to Martin du Gard (f. 104).

199. These references were drawn from the August number, esp. pp. 282-90, and September, pp. 447-9.


201. Alain Finkielkraut, discussing the attraction of Republican ideology for Jews keen on assimilation in the 19th Century, uses Benda's memoirs as a source, and writes: "Si la France mystique, organique ou raciale ne voulait pas d'eux, ils adhéraient à la France jacobine et réalisaient leur intégration dans la société par le biais de ces idéologies, parfois marginales mais toujours admises: la libre pensée, l'amour de la République ou le socialisme"; see Le Juif imaginaire, Seuil, 1980, p. 110.

202. NRF August 1936, p. 285; also in Jouhandeau, L'Action française, 8/10/36.

203. "C'est faire un injure grave à la France et aux Français-que de considérer un Juif (...) comme un citoyen français et que c'est une des plus profondes inconséquences de la Révolution française que d'avoir donné aux Juifs droits de cité parmi nous"; Jouhandeau, art. cit.

204. NRF August 1936, pp. 286-7.
205. L'Action française, 8/10/36, quoting NRF September 1936, p. 448.
206. L'Action française, 8/10/36.
207. ibid.
208. "Je fais voeu ici de les signaler à la vindicte de mon peuple, tout le temps qu'il en restera un seul en France qui ne soit pas soumis à un statut spécial"; L'Action française, 8/10/36. It is precisely this type of thinking which so eased the transition to the institutionalised anti-Semitism of Vichy.
210. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3719 (October 1936).
211. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3725 (October-November 1936).
212. Grenier to JP, in Correspondance, p. 92, 24/10/36. Paulhan passed this on to Jouhandeau (BD 3727).
213. Bernard Lecache, in Le Droit de Vivre, 30/10/36; Lecache ended by saying "à tant bouffer du Juif, (Jouhandeau) ait été contaminé".
214. JP to Suarès, BD 4966/12, 29/10/36.
216. ibid. This may be partly explained by the recent imprisonment of Maurras for incitement to murder.
217. NRF December 1936, pp. 1102-3, "Plus clerc que Juif".
218. ibid. See also NRF October 1937, p. 693, "Exemples pas heureux".
219. See JP to Grenier, AP., 19/1/37: "Tous les journaux ont refusé à Jouhandeau son second article antisémite".
220. Le Péril juif, pp. 19-20: Aymé agreed that the Government might contain "too many Jews", but failed to see where else they predominated; Jouhandeau wrote: "J'aurais pu lui demander de faire seulement le tour de la maison, de notre éditeur commun où nous venions de nous rencontrer, où presque tous les directeurs de service sont israélites".
221. JP to Grenier, AP., 7/6/37: "Jouhandeau a écrit à Léon Blum pour lui reprocher de s'entourer de Juifs. Je ne sais pourquoi l'AF (sic) a refusé de publier sa lettre. Il a voulu la donner à la NRF et se fâche parce que cela ne me paraît guère possible. + Où plutôt je le sais. C'est qu'ils reçoivent de l'argent de Rothschild qui leur permet de loin en loin une manifestation, non une campagne antisémite".
The third text is marked "publié en juillet 1937". Later, *Je suis partout*, 14/1/38, published a "Résponse ouverte à M. René Schwob" by Jouhandeau, in which Schwob was berated for converting to, and therefore contaminating, Catholicism.

JP to Suares, BD 4970/2, 14/2/39.


Bodin et Touchard, Chapter 5, "L'échec".

Un Régulier dans le Siècle took six instalments from August 1937 to February 1938 inclusive, excepting November, when Paulhan made way for extracts from Malraux's *L'Espoir*.

*NRF* August 1937, p. 196.

ibid., p. 197.

ibid.

"Le 6 février, l'affaire éthiopienne, l'arrivée du ministère Blum, la guerre civile espagnole (ont) produit chez nous une véritable affaire Dreyfus constante, dont j'espère qu'elle durera jusqu'à la fin de mes jours" (ibid, p. 197).

*NRF* December 1937, p. 950.

ibid., pp. 985-9.

ibid., p. 985.

ibid.

ibid., pp. 986-8.

*NRF* January 1938, pp. 117-23. Drieu was at this time an enthusiastic supporter of the PPF. Cf.: "Je vois bien le fond de la pensée de cet A.V. Craignant d'être vaincu en France, il veut être vainqueur ailleurs. Ne pouvant vaincre comme Français, il veut vaincre comme Allemand ou Italien. (...) C'est non seulement une extrême illusion, mais une extrême lâcheté que de rêver de victoire ailleurs. Cela permet de renoncer à la lutte chez soi" (p. 122).

*NRF* February 1938, pp. 221-47; see esp. pp. 228ff.
"En somme, mon adhésion à la démocratie aura été une attitude morale plus que politique. Elle n'en a pas moins fait le jeu, m'assène-t-on, d'un parti éminemment politique et non toujours démocratique: le parti communiste. Je réponds que ce n'est pas moi le responsable, mais cette classe bourgeoise (...) qui, depuis cinquante ans, ne fait que trahir les valeurs qu'elle devait défendre(...) En tant que clerc et attaché comme tel à ces valeurs (démocratiques), je jette mon mépris à la face de cette classe de traîtres, et accepte "d'avoir fait le feu" d'un parti dont il est flagrant que sans lui elles seraient dans ma nation (...) écrasées depuis longtemps"; ibid., p. 233-4.

See Grenier to JP, AP., 23/2/38: "Même les juges les plus sévères ont aimé la fin du Régulier (sauf Brasillach qui traite J.B. de "diplodoc circoncis"...)". Cf. above, Chapter One, and Brasillach's review of the volume in L'Action française, 14/7/38.


See Dauphin, Alméras and Hewitt.

Le Droit de Vivre, 22/1/38 and 5/2/38: "Au seuil du Cabanon: M. Céline se noie dans son élément naturel". Apparently the publicity-band of the book bore the words "Pour bien rire dans les tranchées".

"L'antisémitisme est la forme la plus paresseuse, donc la plus facile de justification des impuissants et des ratés"; Le Droit de Vivre, 5/2/38.

NRF, February 1938, pp. 308-10.

ibid., p. 310. L'Action française referred to this review on 3/3/38.


See Bagatelles..., p.11. Céline lists Gide, Vandérem, Benda, Duhamel, Colette, Mme Féména, Mme Valéry (sic), Mallarmé, Bergson and Alain.
Cf. Bagatelles..., pp. 82, 83, 166, 214; also p. 216, where he writes: "J'aime encore mieux Claude Farrère que douze ou treize faux-monnayeurs (sic)".

Berl-Modiano, p. 127, and Assouline, p. 201f. Berl knew Céline well until Bagatelles...

See Bagatelles..., p.11, p. 92 ("Benda-Brothers") p. 166 ("les PluriBendas"). Cf. Jouhandeau's attitude above.

Bagatelles..., p. 214: "Je sais nettement que l'art Gidien, après l'art Wildien, après l'art Proustien, font partie de l'im placable continuité du programme juif".

See France-la-Doule, Gallimard, 1934. The press-extracts in the publicity pages of the NRF for April and May 1934 are illuminating here.

Weber, p. 352, note b, cited also in Marrus and Paxton, p. 38.


ibid. (my italics). Friedländer devotes a substantial part of his discussion of the psychological factor in anti-Semitism to the mental state of the anti-Semite (i.e. "le cas morbide"); pp. 25-34, and 47-51).

CPD 3, p. 76, 12/3/38.

ibid., p.77, 15/3/38; "Les Juifs, Céline et Maritain", NRF April 1938, pp. 630-6.

Cf. Hewitt, on Céline and the "culte de la blague", "pièce maîtresse de la propagande fasciste, parce qu'il permet de dire en plaisantant des vérités qui seraient refusées sans une apparence plus formelle" (p. 64). Arland and Gide were by no means the only critics to be taken in by this "culte de la blague": see also André Thérive, in La Revue Juive de Genève, June 1938, "La France et l'antisémitisme", and Jean-Germain Tricot, La Fête, 22/1/38: "Pour ma part, je suis persuadé que les Juifs seront les premiers à rire du livre de Céline; ils ont assez d'humour (...) pour entendre comme il faut le titre même".

NRF April 1938, p. 631.

Mehlman, p. 187.

NRF April 1938, p. 634.

This lecture was delivered on February 5th 1938, and published both in the February issue of La Vie intellectuelle, and as a pamphlet, les Editions du Cerf, 1938.
263. NRF April, p. 634-5.

264. ibid., p. 635.

265. ibid., p. 636.

266. JP to Jouhandeau: "Ce que Gide ne voit pas (...) c'est qu'il est aisé de lui répondre: "Bien. Si le mérite du Juif est celui d'une minorité, d'une exception (du vice dans l'homme), alors obligez-le à demeurer minorité. Par exemple, dans les activités qu'il tend à envahir: dans la littérature, la philosophie, la banque, etc". (BD 3809, 1938).


268. "On ne peut pas aujourd'hui (et a-t-on jamais pu le faire?) parler de la question juive avec frivolité (...) ou avec l'euphorique truculence qu'un faiseur de bagatelles (sic) met à décrire ses asticots" (p. 1022).

269. Les Juifs parmi les Nations, p. 46 (my italics).


271. For a closer analysis of the crucial reaction of the NRF to Munich, see below, Chapter Seven.


274. ibid., pp. 42-8; on Benda, pp. 43-4.

275. ibid., p. 44.


281. See *ibid.*, December 1938 (Gide), January 1939 (including Montherlant and Marcel), March 1939 (Benda, Bergery), and June 1939 (Henri de Kérillis and Maritain). Cf. also Claude Mauriac, p. 35.


284. See *ibid.*, December 1938, for examples, and for a sample French-Jewish reaction, see *Samedi*, 7/1/39, "Exemples à méditer".


287. *ibid.*

288. See *NRF* December 1940, "L'Eté à la Maurie", pp. 7-16, and see Lottman, pp. 280ff.


291. See JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3766: "... orages soulevés, entre autres, chez Gaston, Crémieux, etc, par la critique de Léautaud qui est violente..."; also BD 3863: "Gaston, Crémieux, Caillois, 50 autres, le (i.e. Léautaud) disent 'deshonorant' (mot de G.G.) pour la revue, etc. Cela fait toute une révolte". Cf. Léautaud, Journal XII, pp. 211-25, for his own version, and Roger Caillois, "Correspondance", in NRF April 1939, pp. 717-8.


294. Suarès began his "chronique" on January 1st, 1939, and held it every month (except two) until June 1940.

295. The question of censorship during this period is dealt with below, in Chapter Seven.


297. December 1938, p. 135; the report noted the visit to Italy of the Bevölkerungspolitische Kommission, whereby it became a policy imperative to "remplacer les théories désuètes de l'humanisme latin par le nouvel idéal aryo-nordique, c'est-à-dire de délatiniser l'Italie".

298. NRF May 1939, pp. 856-7.

299. JP to Suarès, BD 4970/12, 5/5/39.

300. ibid.


302. "Je crains que la cause ne soit les attaques de Berl et consorts (Drieu, par exemple) sommant sans doute (...) Gallimard de ne pas tolérer un collaborateur qui écrit ailleurs que dans la Revue (dans L'Ordre, notamment), ce que j'y écris..." (ibid.).

303. ibid.

305. Hence forth he only contributed "Airs du Mois", except for one essay in February 1940 ("La Crise de la Morale cléricale", pp. 150-61), and was entirely absent from numbers in October 1939, January, March and June 1940. With the Occupation, Benda fled into clandestinity and survived the War safely in and around Carcassonne; yet his library, notes and correspondence (including Paulhan's letters), were confiscated by the Nazis and lost. On Crémieux's fate, see above, note 49. Suarès also "went underground", but Paulhan maintained contact throughout the Occupation at different addresses in the Creuse and the Rhône. Suarès died in 1948, aged 80.
CHAPTER SEVEN - NOTES

1. Jean-Pierre Azéma, De Munich à la Libération, 1938-1944, Seuil, 1979, p. 9 (my italics). This work surveys the period using all the available historiography, especially the two volumes of the 1975 colloquium "la France sous le gouvernement Daladier", published as Edouard Daladier, chef de gouvernement, FNSP, 1977, and La France et les Français en 1938-1939, FNSP, 1978. Also indispensable, particularly for the events leading to and following Munich (30th September 1938), is Duroselle, La Décadence..., Chapters XI and XII, pp. 325-404.


3. Cf. Mayeur, La Vie politique, pp. 360ff: "Le long gouvernement Daladier, de 10 avril 1939 à mars 1940 (...), contraste avec l'instabilité des dix années précédentes. (...) Un climat nouveau se fait sentir dans l'opinion. Il révèle une aspiration à être gouverné et l'apparition des nouveaux clivages sur la guerre et la paix..." (p. 360). See also the two volumes on Daladier referred to above in note 1, and above, Chapter Three, on the political confusion of the previous ten years.

4. Cf. above, Chapter Four; also, Duroselle, Chapter XI, and Poidevin et Bariéty, Les Relations franco-allemandes..., cit., pp. 304-10.

5. Cf. above, Chapter Five, as well as Weber, L'Action française, Diou donnat, Je suis partout..., and Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers, 1963, for British attitudes to this question.

6. Cf. above, Chapter Six; also Marrus and Paxton, Chapter 2.

7. "Dictature de la France", NRF April 1938, pp. 663-5, cf. above, Chapter Three, for discussion.

8. CPD 3, p. 76.

9. JP to Suarès, BD 4969/1, 16/3/38.

10. NRF April 1938, p. 663.


13. See above, Chapters Five and Six. Berl attacked this text in Pavés de Paris, 2/9/38, pp. 3-6, "M. Benda et la Guerre des Clercs". Here, Berl characterised Benda as a "farfelu ... héritier de Spinoza" and concluded: "... il n'est pas soutenable qu'on devienne un traître dès lors qu'on préfère ce que M. Benda ne préfère pas. Tout cela est frivole. Mais d'une frivolité grosse de sang!" (ibid., p.6). See also Fernandez' attack in L'Emancipation nationale, 12/8/38, "Le communisme et M. Benda".


15. NRF August 1938, pp. 177-86.

16. ibid., p. 178.

17. NRF September 1938, pp. 478-88.

18. NRF April 1938, pp. 663-5.


20. ibid., pp. 479-80.

21. ibid., p. 481.

22. ibid.

23. ibid., pp. 484-5.

24. ibid. (Cf. above Chapter Four, on the misconceptions held by some at the NRF regarding Franco-German relations).

25. ibid., p. 486.

26. "Un mouvement de jeunes s'est fondé, qui n'a pas adopté d'autres principes que celui du mouvement et de la jeunesse: c'est le mouvement jociste- et ils sont 400.000. Le premier livre de philosophie de l'histoire qui ait été écrit depuis la guerre vient de paraître: il est d'importance. Un renouveau du théâtre français se prépare..."; p. 488.

27. ibid.

28. For details, see Duroselle, pp. 343-55. As Paulhan finalised the October issue of the NRF (i.e. on 15th September), Chamberlain met Hitler at Berchtesgaden.
29. Duroselle, pp. 343-55, and Azéma, p. 15, The USSR and Czechoslovakia were excluded.


31. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25101 (Autumn 1938). Paulhan was referring to Claudel's "Air de Mois" in the September number "Le régime du bouchon", in which Claudel wrote of Italy as a totalitarian state: "Où la police oblige chaque matin 150 millions d'hommes à se prosterner la face contre terre devant le gorille le plus immonde qui ait jamais assumé une espèce de ressemblance bestiale avec le visage humain" (p. 512).

32. Gide-RMG Corr., II, p. 151. The NRF, in fact, was still printing Alain; see his three-part pacifist allegory "Le Roi Pot", NRF September, October and November, and also Giono's text "Les Grandeurs Libres", in NRF October 1938, pp. 529-60.


38. ibid., pp. 357-64.

39. René Girault, "Les Décideurs français et la Puissance française, 1938-9", in La Puissance en Europe, ed. René Girault et Robert Frank, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1984, pp. 26ff. Girault too cites Duroselle's four "poles" of opinion, divided thus: "les pacifistes traditionnelles de la gauche; le nouveau pacifisme de droite; les antifascistes résistants de gauche, la droite nationaliste" (see Duroselle, pp. 357-64).

40. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25101 (Autumn 1939).

41. ibid. The Three texts in question were all included in the NRF, November 1938: Armand Petitjean, "Prière pour les Copains" pp. 757-60; Julien Benda, "Les Démocraties bourgeoises devant l'Allemagne" pp. 761-71; Jean Schlumberger, "Contre l'humiliation", pp. 772-83. All of the "Airs du Mois" were devoted to the crisis.
42. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25103 (Autumn 1938).

43. NRF November 1938, pp. 757-60. Subtitled "Après la Mobilisation de Septembre 1938", the text was entirely italicized.

44. ibid., pp. 758-9.

45. ibid., p. 760.

46. ibid., pp. 761-71.

47. ibid., p. 761.

48. ibid.

49. ibid., p. 762.

50. ibid. (Cf. above, note 42.)

51. ibid., p. 763.

52. ibid.

53. ibid.

54. ibid.

55. ibid., p. 764.

56. ibid., p. 765.

57. ibid., p. 766.

58. ibid., pp. 766-7.

59. ibid., pp. 767-8. Benda added a footnote: "Il s'est constitué aujourd'hui (...) un véritable fétichisme de la paix, dont la démagogie n'a manqué de s'emparer. On écrase aujourd'hui un parti en proclamant qu'il "veut la guerre", sans discuter s'il la veut (...) ou si elle est conforme ou non à l'intérêt national..." (ibid., p. 768). Benda was diametrically opposed to such pacifist intellectuals as Jean Giono who, on September 30th 1938, addressed the following telegram to Daladier: "Nous voulons que la France prenne immédiatement l'initiative d'un désarmement universel"; see Ecrits pacifistes, Gallimard/idées, 1978, p. 274.

60. NRF November 1938, p. 769.

61. ibid., p. 770.

63. **NRF November 1938, p. 771.**

64. *ibid.*, pp. 772-83.

65. *Oeuvres V, p. 177.* Finding it understandable to wish to forget the delayed shock and relief which followed Munich, Schlumberger adds here: "En revanche, il aurait fallu garder le souvenir des cinq jours de mobilisation générale qui avaient précédé l'illusoire sauvetage de la paix. La morne mobilisation de 1939 a injustement brouillé dans les mémoires celle de septembre 1938, dont la résolution et le calme eussent mérité qu'on en fût fier" (pp. 177-8).

66. **NRF November 1938, p. 772** (Cf. above, Chapter Four on Schlumberger's "moralistic" approach to Franco-German relations).


68. *ibid.*


70. *ibid.*, pp. 775-6.


72. *ibid.*, pp. 777-8 (Cf. his later view; above, note 65).

73. *ibid.*, p. 779.

74. *ibid.*, p. 780.

75. *ibid.*, p. 781.

76. See above, note 7, and discussion in Chapter Three above.

77. **NRF November 1938, p. 782** (my italics). Schlumberger quoted two extracts from this essay of which the first began: "Je suis l'un des quelques millions de jeunes hommes de France qui sont mobilisables (\ldots). Si je suis appelé à me faire tuer, je sache très exactement pourquoi\ldots", etc. (pp. 781-2).
78. "La seule paix vers laquelle nous puissions tourner nos regards n'est pas une paix béate, mais réclame autant d'efforts, de temps, d'argent, que la guerre nous aurait coûté (...). C'est seulement à ce prix-là que nous serons quittes et que, sans faillite humiliante, sans démériter de l'Europe, nous fournirons la loyale contre-partie d'une guerre évitée" (ibid., p. 783).

79. NRF November 1938, pp. 860-3.
80. ibid., p. 863.
81. ibid.,
82. See above, Chapter Two.
83. NRF November 1938, p. 863.
84. ibid., pp. 863-5, See also ibid., pp. 857-8, "Revues et Journaux", where Paulhan reprinted two pages from Montherlant's Candide article (12/10/38).

85. NRF November 1938, p. 865.
86. ibid., pp. 866-7, "Page d'histoire".
87. ibid., p. 867.


90. NRF November 1938, pp. 874-5.
91. ibid., p. 875.
92. ibid.
93. ibid., p. 877.
94. Cf. the third among Duroselle's categories or "poles" of opinion following Munich; above, note 39.
95. See "Une lettre de Martin du Gard, le 14 octobre 1938", in La Flèche, 21/10/38, where RMG directly addressed Gaston Bergery, whose "intervention à la Chambre", giving unreserved approbation to the Munich agreements, seemed to encapsulate "la bon sens et le courage". Cf. La Flèche, 7/10/38, for the complete text of Bergery's speech. Cf. RMG to JP, AP., 24/11/38: "Une revue purement littéraire, et dirigée par vous, se devait, me semble-t-il (si elle se mêlait d'actualité politique), de tenir la balance égale entre les tendances opposées. Vous en avez jugé autrement" (my italics).

96. ibid. Martin de Gard then indicated his wish that his name, for the time being, should not figure in the contents of the NRF; see JP to RMG, BN Mss, Fonds RMG, Vol. 115, f. 275, 3/12/38 and note.

97. Cf. above note 34.

98. "A quel point notre politique extérieure manque de droiture et d'honnêteté! A quel point toute politique... Je m'en retire éperdument," Journal I, p. 1326, 3/12/38. Gide had also attended the "Union pour la Vérité" meeting on November 5th 1938, but he did not find it inspiring; see CPD 3, pp. 111-2, 5/11/38, and the Bulletin de l'Union pour la Vérité, "Après Munich", October-November 1938.


100. La Revue universelle, 15/10/38, p. 129: "Par une victoire du bon sens sur l'absurde, de la vérité sur le mensonge, la paix a été maintenue. L'être de la patrie est sauf, la durée de la nation n'est plus immédiatement menacée...", etc (anon., editorial). These sentiments are archetypally "munichois".

101. La Revue universelle, 15/11/38, p. 495.

102. ibid., p. 496.

103. ibid.

104. ibid., p. 497.

105. ibid., p. 498.

106. ibid. Paulhan printed extracts from a further article by Maulnier (i.e. Combat, November 1938), and from Benda's important article (27/10/38) in La Dépêche de Toulouse, in the NRF December 1938, pp. 1062-4.

108. ibid., p. 1.

109. ibid.

110. ibid., p. 6. Berl added: "Ici nous voyons apparaître derrière le jongleur, derrière le personnage de comédie, un autre personnage capable, le cas échéant, de nombreux massacres et de nombreux crimes" (ibid).

111. ibid., p. 8.

112. "M. Jean Schlumberger est infiniment plus rusé que M. Benda (...). Il sait, comme la plupart des protestants, tout placer dans le plan moral le plus haut. Chez les protestants, l'inversion elle-même cesse d'être un Vice pour devenir un cas de conscience..." (ibid., p. 8).

113. "Sur un seul point je l'avais vu ferme et constant: ce point, c'était l'horreur de la guerre (...). Il n'a pas fait la guerre de 1914 (...), malgré son âge, malgré son excellente santé (...). Laisser la NRF faire le jeu du bellicisme par une incroyable accumulation d'erreurs et de tricheries, il n'en avait pas le droit...", etc. (ibid., pp. 13-14).


115. Cf. above, Chapter Two, on the debate surrounding Mort de la Pensée bourgeoise, 1929; Berl went on to write speeches for Pétain; see Berl-Modiano, pp. 92ff.


117. ibid., p. 1911 (my italics).

118. In fact Sadoul returned to the question next month (in Commune, January 1939, pp. 89ff), attacking Berl's November 18th pamphlet ("M. Berl lance des pavés"); Sadoul wrote: "(Berl consacre) un numéro de ses Pavés de Paris à attaquer la NRF (...), liquidant ses rancunes d'ancien employé (...) tout en servant son actuel maître, M. Georges Bonnet" (p.90). Sadoul suggested two alternative titles for the pamphlet: "Pavés de Berl, même Pavés de Berlin..." (p. 92). Berl in turn noted this attack in Pavés de Paris, 27/1/39, p. 16: "Le fait que M. Sadoul se fait le porte-drapeau de la NRF a pour moi un comique suffisant. Je ne le gâterai pas par des polémiques vaines".

119. NRF December 1939, texts by André Gide, Francis Jammes, André Rouveyre and Apollinaire; on La Galère, see above, Chapter Three.

120. ibid., pp. 1065-7.

122. NRF December 1939, p. 1065. The sentiments expressed in this piece are very close to Alain's conception of "le citoyen contre les pouvoirs"; see above, Chapter Three, and Alain Clerval, "Un démocrate, Jean Paulhan", in NRF May 1969, p. 936: "Fache qu'il pose l'excellence de la personne et non celle de l'État, de la Nation ou d'une idée, Jean Paulhan n'a jamais été un partisan". Cf. with Jacques Debû-Bridel, "Jean Paulhan, citoyen", in Paulhan, Œuvres V, pp. 483-92.

123. NRF December 1938, p. 1066.

124. ibid., pp. 1068-9. "Le Cercle carré"; "Il serait bon que les intellectuels, avant de prendre parti sur toutes les grandes questions politiques, commencent par administrer quelques choses ou gouverner quelques hommes. Si étrange que cela puisse paraître, le système athénien du tirage au sort pour la répartition des charges publiques était (dans une démocratie) plus fructueux que celui de l'élection, car ce dernier écarte les plus dignes et leur interdit par suite tout contact avec les réalités. Ce contact nous aurait épargné beaucoup de "pétitions", d'"appels", de "manifestes", ou bien les aurait fait prendre un peu plus au sérieux (p. 1069)." Moreover, Grenier gave his full approbation to the juxtaposition of these texts: "C'est parce que nous aimons le "cercle carré" que nous souhaitons que l'État se passe de notre avis (le malheur est qu'il le réclame)"; Grenier to JP, AP., December 1938. Finally, see also "Le Cercle carré (suite)", NRF January 1939, p. 173.

125. Kohn-Etiemble, p. 174. In a note (p. 175), she misattributes the reference to Paulhan's March text, i.e. "la Démocratie fait appel au premier venu".


127. ibid., p. 171.

128. Paulhan gave an exemplum from Greek history: "Cimon méprise la police et les juges. On peut le voler, pense-t-il, ce n'est pas lui qui va porter plainte. Soit. Mais que Cimon aille répétant à droite et à gauche qu'il ne portera plainte, il arrivera inévitablement ceci: c'est que Cimon sera volé" (p. 172).
129. For details, see Duroselle, pp. 390ff. Daladier, however, is quoted as insisting (on December 19th 1938) that "la France ne cédera pas un pouce de ses territoires à l'Italie, dût-il en résulter un conflit armé" (p. 391).

130. This was a scarcely-veiled jibe at Jean Giono, whose integral-pacifist manifesto "Les Seules Vérités" had irritated Paulhan to the point of commenting on it a few pages earlier: see "les Revues", NRF January 1939, p. 167.

131. ibid., p. 172.

132. See Duroselle, pp. 381-96.

133. Cf. above, Chapters One and Six.

134. JP to Suarès, BD 4970/1, 11/1/39. Paulhan felt Suarès did not fully recognise the gravity of the situation: "Mais quoi, ils sont malgré tout nos chefs et (je le crois) le respect d'un ordre injuste vaut mieux que l'anarchie. Peut-être la situation est-elle plus grave encore que vous ne le pensez. Petit-Dutaillis qui revient de Londres, Saurat qui enseigne à l'Institut français en Angleterre, m'affirment également que le seul souci de la Cité - et de Chamberlain - est de trouver un biais qui permette, fût-ce dépens de la France, l'accord avec l'Allemagne et l'Italie" (ibid.).


136. See JP to Schlumberger, BD 25106 (March 1939): "la montée continue-100 abonnés de plus en janvier, 260 en janvier-février, 140 en février-mars. Je crois que le numéro de novembre (1938) est à l'origine de tout".

137. JP to Suarès, BD 4970/3, 17/2/39 (my italics).


139. Girault, "Les Décideurs...", p.29. Cf. Duroselle, pp. 203ff, on foreign propaganda influence in France. Penetration of the Press was much deeper than is normally credited; La Revue hebdomadaire was entirely controlled by Landini (see Max Gallo, La Ve Colonne, Plon, 1970), as were Le Franciste, L'Emancipation nationale, L'Ami du Peuple. The Germans had interests in Notre Temps, Le Cri des Peuples and others.
140. Léautaud, *Journal VIII*, p. 125, 28/12/29: "Crémieux, qui est chargé au Ministère des Affaires étrangères du dépouillement de toute la presse italienne et qui est très renseigné sur l'état intérieur de l'Italie, dit que le régime qu'elle subit actuellement vaut absolument dans son genre le régime que subit la Russie. Il dit que sa fortune serait faite s'il voulait se laisser acheter par Mussolini, qu'il a été sondé indirectement à ce sujet, et qu'on ne lui demanderait pas beaucoup, nullement de célébrer le régime fasciste dans sa totalité, mais seulement de dire qu'à côté du mauvais il y a du bon, cette manière développée selon les circonstances. Mais il est par toute la nature de son esprit trop profondément républicain pour accepter de faire ce métier" (my italics).

141. See, in particular, Duroselle, Chapter IX, "la Machine diplomatique", and Assouline, passim.

142. For details, see above, Chapter Six.

143. "Politique", *NRF* February 1939, pp. 194-211.

144. Ibid., pp. 194-5.

145. Ibid., p. 196.

146. Ibid., p. 203.

147. Ibid., p. 204.


149. Ibid.,

150. Ibid., p. 208. Chardonne seemed to be both Monarchist and Radical-Republican at the same time when he wrote: "Je ne conseillerais pas à roi de venir gouverner la France, bien qu'elle en ait grand besoin. Il serait surmené et offrirait trop de prise aux révolutionnaires (...). D'où me vient cette tendresse pour un affreux régime parlementaire? Peut-être d'une grande méfiance des hommes. Il me semble qu'on ne prend jamais assez de précautions contre l'autorité" (ibid., pp. 206-7, my italics).


152. Ibid., p. 478.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid. Paulhan's italics.
155. ibid., p. 479.

156. ibid., Paulhan's italics.

157. ibid.

158. ibid., p. 480 (Paulhan's italics).

159. ibid., p. 481 (on Chardonne, see above).

160. ibid., p. 482.

161. ibid., p. 483.

162. ibid.

163. ibid.

164. ibid.

165. Crémiieux to JP, AP., 20/2/39. Crémiieux believed Paulhan could have complemented his argument: "Il manque au moins deux autres parties; il y aurait à distinguer les solutions démocratiques des solutions également bonnes, mais non-démocratiques, il y aurait surtout à traiter le problème des élites en démocratie. Si on ne traite pas ce dernier problème et si on n'y trouve pas une solution admissible, il faut en toute logique reconnaître que le sort de la démocratie est lié au sort du libéralisme, lequel est étroitement lié au capitalisme". Crémiieux's view is not essentially different from that expressed in 1934 (see above, Chapter Three).

166. See the exchange of two long letters in Paulhan-Grenier, Correspondance, pp. 111-16. Grenier's prime objection was that in a Party system democracy was farcical because candidates were chosen by the Parties and not the people: "De toute façon ce ne peut être le premier venu. Tu aurais donc dû ajouter qu'il ne pouvait être que tiré au sort et c'est là la démocratie" (ibid., p. 112). The problem was that in a modern State a universal lottery was impracticable.

167. ibid.; "L'idéal serait", wrote Paulhan, "un empereur choisi par tirage au sort, recevant un pouvoir absolu, et de temps en temps exécuté: (...) mettons tous les cinq ans. (...) j'ai la plus grande horreur de dictateurs. Un dictateur est le type même du spécialiste (...) ayant envie de gouverner, etc. (...) Mais je voulais simplement conduire au bord de ces réflexions" (ibid., p. 115). Paulhan expressed similar thoughts to Etiemble; see Kohn-Etiemble, pp. 183, 185-6.

168. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3766 (1939); also Kohn-Etiemble, p. 184.

170. What's Wrong with the World?, Cassell, London, 1910. Chesterton himself believed in an idealistic "democratic republic of a more or less Rousseauian kind: literal self-government by ordinary men, each of them secure and independent in possession of his own land or workshop (Cf. French Radicalism), ruling themselves through equal laws (...). He caught from Hilaire Belloc a romantic veneration for the French Revolution and the democratic tradition it had left behind". Quoted from Margaret Canovan, G.K. Chesterton, Radical Populist, Harcourt and Brace, New York and London, 1977, p. 76, my italics. The democracy Paulhan admired in Chesterton was, in fact, French, but filtered, and conceived in an age of social reform in Edwardian Britain.


172. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3777 (1939); also BD 3638 (1939): "je préfère sûrement un roi (à la démocratie, la folie même)", and BD 3639 (1939), "...Quel soit le régime que tu souhaites pour la France, tu ne peux souhaiter en ce moment une guerre civile (...). Mais qu'as-tu contre un roi? Et vois-tu, entre le bolchevisme et les faisceaux, une autre solution française?". Paulhan seems noticeably more reactionary when writing to Jouhandeau...

173. André Wurmser, "Divers intellectuels", Commune, April 1939, pp. 430-1. Wurmser quipped, on Paulhan's "insularity", that "il (...) a longtemps habité le Plessis-Robinson" (ibid). Cf. also his Fidèlement vôtre, p. 54.


175. See, for example, Azéma, pp. 29-30: "... on déduit des déroutes de l'année quarante que le régime était déjà moribond en 1939. A tout le moins, le bilan mérite d'être nuancé. Les contemporains eux-mêmes avaient l'impression que le régime s'était requinqué, d'abord parce qu'il subsistait quelque chose du renouveau incontestable que le Front populaire avait apporté, ensuite parce que le daladiérisme était mieux qu'une période de transition: Daladier jouissait d'une grande popularité".

176. ibid., p. 29.

177. Mayeur, p. 367.
178. "L'opinion, réalité fluide et mobile, n'est pas responsable du pacifisme et du défaitisme du personnel politique. Mais celui-ci, par ses divisions, a pu contribuer à la passivité de l'opinion, cependant bien moindre dans les faits que dans l'image qui en est parfois donné" (ibid).

179. See above, Chapter Six.

180. See Duroselle, Chapter XIII, pp. 405-35.

181. NRF June 1939, pp. 1070-1; "Politique personnelle".

182. ibid., p. 1071.

183. ibid.


185. For details, see Dutoselle, p. 433.


188. ibid. Cf. CPD 3, pp. 147ff, 1/9/39.

189. See JP to Grenier, Correspondance cit., p. 118, where Paulhan notes on September 5th that Gallimard was already contemplating the move. Cf. also JP to Schlumberger, BD 25111, 17/9/39. Léautaud found the NRF offices in the rue Sébastien-Bottin almost completely deserted (Journal XII, p. 310, 26/9/39), and mused that Gallimard had perhaps been too hasty, for he was told that the printer - Bussière - had found a suitable property adjacent to his in Saint-Amand (ibid., cf. Assouline, p. 267).


192. JP to Jouhandeau, BD 3820 (mid-September). Cf. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25111, 17/9/39, on the confusion reigning at this time: "J'ai appris hier: 1) que Pétain disait de la guerre: "C'est une aventure malheureuse". 2) que Laval, Flammé et autres étaient partisans d'une paix immédiate; 3) que dans le parti SFIO, Paul Faure, fort de l'appui des nouveaux adhérents ex-communistes, avait désormais une majorité écrasante; 4) que Lindbergh faisait campagne pour la neutralité absolue; que d'ailleurs la guerre actuelle n'était que la guerre du Comité des Forges, etc. (disent Benjamin Crémieux, Boris (de Schloezer), François de Roux, Ct. Paleirac, etc.). Vous me direz que je n'avais qu'à ne pas aller trainer dans les services de la Propagande. Eh bien, je n'y retournerai pas... Mais vraiment la France est à refaire de fond en comble, et ce n'est pas un hasard (mais, je pense, une sorte de contrainte sociale) si chaque civil se trouve si naturellement défaitiste".

193. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25116 (late 1939). Commenting on texts he sent to le Figaro during this time, Schlumberger too notes "l'inéfficacité à l'hôtel Continental. (...) Giraudoux effusait chaque jour un bulletin plein de préciosités, inintelligibles à qui n'a pas un frottis littéraire; il prodiguait des finesse que le gros public, toujours dérouté par l'ironie, comprenait à rebours; (...) Sentiment qu'on ne nous présentait pas la situation dans la vérité, qu'on nous mentait par omission...", Oeuvres V, p. 404, Cf. also Roger Cardinne-Petit, Les Soirées du 'Continental' (ce que j'ai vu à la Censure de 1939 à 1940), Jean Renard, 1942, and Léautaud, Journal XIII, p. 12, 26/2/40.

194. See Léautaud, Journal XII, p. 312, 4/10/39. "Blin m'apprend que la NRF ne paraîtra que le 15 (octobre), le nombre de pages réduit". Also ibid., p. 314, 11/10/39, when the October number arrived.

195. See above, Chapter One. Also Grover, MLN, p. 842, where Paulhan informed Gide of the whereabouts of Queneau, Petitjean, Arland, Leiris, Fernandez, Malraux and Giono. Giono was arrested in 18th September for "propos défaitistes"; see CPD 3, pp. 153ff, and Gide-Giono Correspondance cit., pp xviiiiff. Giono was eventually released on November 18th; cf. CPD 3, p. 161.


197. NRF October 1939, pp. 529-30.

198. Ibid., p. 530.
199. ibid.

200. ibid., p. 531.

201. ibid., p. 532.


203. *Lettres au Castor*, I, p. 360. Sartre added: "Je trouve beaucoup plus juste les mots de Pourrat: "Une guerre qu'on va faire comme on faisait, tout petit, une page d'écriture. Une chose embêtante, mais qu'il faut faire". Ça c'est l'opinion générale" (ibid., my italics).

204. JP to Suarès, BD 4970/26, 11/10/39. "J'irai à Paris m'en assurer, vers le 20 octobre, et prier un peu, s'il le faut", he added.

205. See *NRF* November 1939, pp. 774-79 (esp. p. 776, Suarès), and pp. 780-1 (Petitjean).

206. See *NRF* December 1939, p. 942: "Divers: Nos lecteurs ont trouvé dans la *NRF* de novembre plus d'une ligne blanche. Qu'ils veuillent bien nous excuser: les sévérités de la Censure étaient imprévisibles. Sitôt la guerre achevée, nous rétablirons, dans un supplément de la revue, les textes tronqués".

207. *NRF* November 1939, p. 776.

208. ibid., p. 778.

209. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25114 (November 1939): "La *NRF* va bien: 250 abonnés de gain (...). On me reproche beaucoup de la part faite à la guerre dans la *NRF*. Je ne dis pas seulement les énergumènes du pacifisme mais les littérateurs purs, et leurs porte-paroles (...). Gaston nous défend très bien".

210. JP to Suarès, BD 4970/28, 22/11/39: "Puis-je vous cacher ce que l'on m'écrisit de toutes parts, ce que m'écrivent en particulier tous, nos amis du front; et depuis hier seulement, trois nouvelles lettres me le disent: l'on souhaite que vous parliez un peu moins de la guerre, et de Hitler. L'on voudrait retrouver dans les "Chroniques de Cardal" ces notes brèves, les impressions, etc". Yet "on me reproche que la *NRF* de novembre n'est pas assez "de guerre". Et Suarès, alors?" (JP to Grenier, Correspondance cit., p. 124.)
211. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25114 (November 1939). Cf. Grover, MLN, pp. 845ff, on Paulhan's attitude to the Communists, equally shunned by such as Schlumberger and Drieu la Rochelle. Paulhan included several non-political texts by Aragon and Elsa Triolet, once the PCF had been suppressed on September 26th 1939 (see also Rossi-Landi, pp. 133-65). Cf. JP to Suarès, BD 4970/26, 11/10/39: "Il y a cette énorme confuse masse à qui personne ne dit rien, que pour un peu l'on confondrait avec ses chefs: les communistes. Et pourquoi les abandonner ainsi? Ils sont ceux qui ont entendi, depuis un an, le plus de vieilles chansons françaises, les plus beaux récits de l'Histoire de la France. Veut-on donc que le jour où ce seront les Russes communistes, qui, des tranchées de la Saar, proposeront de fraterniser, ils n'avaient rien à répondre? Car je ne sais si Staline dirigera quelques jours la guerre. Mais je croirais volontiers que c'est lui qui d'ici un an la règlera. Il a le pétrole, qu'il laissera ou non couler, suivant l'obéissance des autres".

212. NRF November 1939, p. 780.

213. ibid., p. 808.

214. ibid., pp. 782-9.


217. NRF November 1939, p. 789. Cf. also Fernandez' "La Solitude de l'Allemagne", NRF January 1940, pp. 106-12, where he concluded: "L'histoire nous enseigne que les Allemagnes s'étaient naturellement ordonnées à l'Europe et à son sens de l'universel. Mais ceci nous entraînerait trop loin, sur un chemin où il ne faut avancer que pas à pas" (p. 112).

218. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25114 (November 1939). See Alain, "Les Contes de Noël" (on Dickens), pp. 817-23, Alain, of course, was still an influential pacifist, and was recognised as such by the army, who interrogated him; see JP to Grenier, Correspondance cit., p. 123, 5/12/39.

219. See NRF December 1939, pp. 858-62 (these poems were later collected in Le Crève-Cœur); cf. also his (literally interminable) Pierre Mercadier ou Les Voyageurs de l'Impériale, NRF January to June 1940 (cf. above, Chapter One).

220. NRF December 1939, pp. 913-20. This essay was based upon an Anglo-French work edited by Paul Desjardins and H.F. Stewart.

221. Rossi-Landi, p. 169.

223. See JP to Suarès, BD 4970/32, 21/12/39, and BD 4971/1, 8/1/40; "On me promet, pour l'avenir, de l'indulgence (quelle indulgence?). Et peut-être même la Censure va-t-elle faire retour à Paris...."

224. See *NRF* January 1940, pp. 5-7.

225. ibid., p. 6.

226. ibid., p. 7.

227. JP to Schlumberger, BD 25116 (December 1939).

228. This was not strictly true, given the reduction in the number of pages, and the absence of such as Arland, Caillois, Queneau, etc.

229. *NRF* January 1940, leading publicity brochure, p. 11 (anon).


231. *NRF* December 1939, pp. 908-12.


233. ibid., p. 149.

234. ibid., pp. 150-61.

235. ibid., p. 151.

236. ibid., pp. 152ff.

237. ibid., pp. 157-60.

238. ibid., p. 160.

239. ibid., pp. 162-73 (The text is dated October 1939; cf. also *NRF* May 1940, pp. 599-605).

240. *NRF* February 1940, p. 163.

241. ibid.

242. ibid., p. 164.

243. ibid., p. 166.

244. ibid., p. 168.

245. ibid., p. 170.
246. ibid.

247. ibid.

248. Cf. NRF September 1941, August and October 1942, February and April 1943; also Kohn-Etiemble, pp. 184, 188-9.


250. NRF February 1940, pp. 174-83.

251. ibid., p. 174.

252. ibid.

253. ibid., p. 176 (my italics).

254. ibid., p. 178.

255. ibid., p. 179.

256. ibid., pp. 181 and 183.

257. ibid., pp. 243-6, "Maurras ou Genève" (p. 246).

258. ibid., pp. 274-6 ("Airs du Mois").

259. See Rossi-Landi, p. 47.

260. ibid.

261. For details, see Azéma, pp. 50ff, and Rossi-Landi, pp.53-67.

262. See JP to Schlumberger, BD 25116 (Winter 1939).

263. "Pages d'un Neutre", NRF March 1940, pp. 289-306. This text was concluded in NRF April 1940, pp. 492-500.


265. ibid., p. 395. Commenting on this text much later, Schlumberger wrote: "Deux tendances s'étaient opposées lors de la reprise de la NRF en 1919; elles avaient failli entraîner un schisme. Il n'aurait pas été surprenant qu'elles réapparaissent"; *Oeuvres* V, p. 413.

266. NRF March 1940, p. 397.
267. ibid.

268. See above, note 265.

269. i.e. "Pour saluer Melville", pp. 433-58; this long essay was concluded in May (pp. 606-32) and June (pp. 767-86).


271. See RMG's reply to JP, AP., 6/4/40: "La réaction de Jean ne m'étonne qu'à demi. Un vieux sang alsacien lui travaille les veines et le déporte momentanément hors de la juste mesure. Je lui avais écrit pour lui confier mon indignation devant le Mauriac du Figaro du 22 mars (où il déclare (...) que dans une partie engagée avec les tricheurs, l'on doit faire comme eux, si l'on n'est pas un nigaud) et il m'a répondu que le papier Mauriac était parfait, et qu'il eût voulu l'avoir signé!". On Mauriac's article in Le Figaro and his stance, see Lacouture, François Mauriac, pp. 345-6.

272. JP to Guéhenno, AP., 8/4/40.

273. JP to Grenier, Correspondance cit., p. 129 (April 1940). Chamson too (évacué pour choc nerveux", ibid., p. 131) believed the NRF for April 1940 had betrayed those at the front by not mentioning the war; see Gide-RMG Corr., II, pp. 201-2, 19/4/40.

Gide (who, it might be argued, proved Chamson's point) wrote to his friend: "Je m'entends fort bien avec lui, d'ordinaire. Par la tête et le coeur, ça colle. Mais ne peut m'accorder à ce qu'il dit du dernier numéro de la NRF et non point pour la raison que vous donnez: rupture entre le front et l'arrière. Non, c'est entre eux, que les mobilisés ne s'entendent pas. Et d'abord, comme vous le dites, ils sont effroyablement chatouilleux. Chamson sursaute d'indignation en ne voyant, dans la NRF, aucun reflet de la guerre".


275. JP to Suarès, BD 4971/8, 20/4/40. Once again, Suarès had provoked his readers: "Je reçois chaque jour", Paulhan told him,"(...) une lettre qui s'emporte contre Cahrdal: celle d'hier était du Commandant Bissery (...) : il paraît que vous aviez mal parlé des Allemands" (ibid.).

276. Azéma, pp. 52-3.
277. NRF May 1940, pp. 577-98. These pages were the opening of what was eventually published as Les Enfants humiliés in 1949. Henri Michaux, returning to France in January 1940, had brought the manuscript with him; see notes in Bernanos, Essais et Écrits de combat, Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1971, esp. pp. 1592ff.

278. For details of his break with L'Action française, see Jean-Loup Bernanos' essay "Bernanos et Maurras" in Scandale de la vérité, Seuil/points, 1984, pp. 7-57.

279. NRF May 1940, p. 577.

280. ibid., p. 578.

281. ibid., p. 584.

282. ibid., Cf.: "Nous demandons simplement que, déstitués de la qualité des vainqueurs, l'Arrière ne nous exploite pas, à ses fins, comme tels" (ibid.).

283. "Depuis des mois les journaux répètent à l'envi (...) que nous sommes "revenus à 1914". Ce lieu commun a pris pour moi un sens atroce..." (...) "En face des derniers événements, passée la surprise, je sais que beaucoup d'imbeciles auront pensé sans oser le dire: 'Ça nous rajeunit de vingt ans'" (ibid., pp. 588-9).

284. ibid., p. 598.

285. ibid.

286. ibid.

287. i.e. see above, note 285.

288. NRF May 1940, pp. 599-605.

289. For details, see Azéma, pp. 54-9.


291. NRF June 1940, pp. 721-2. It is this text which marks Paulhan as "un gaulliste de l'avant-première heure"; Andreu and Grover, p. 457.

292. NRF June 1940, p. 721.

293. ibid.

294. ibid., p. 722.
As late as 30th September 1940, Paulhan wrote to Léon Bopp that "les deux Français exemplaires de cette guerre ont été deux aristocrates: Charles de Gaulle et Thierry de Martel..." (NRF February 1982, p. 181). For Paulhan de Gaulle represented "l'espoir", while de Martel, an eminent French surgeon who preferred suicide to life under the Occupation, represented a form of "le silence".

NRF June 1940, pp. 723-43.

ibid., p. 725.

Cf. Assouline, p. 269, who reports that en route one of vans transporting Gallimard's archives was destroyed after a German air attack: the NRF had literally become a war-victim...

JP to Suarès, BD 4971/11, 7/6/40.

Among the authors and titles promised were: André Gide, Nouvelles Pages de Journal; Julien Benda, "Jacques Bainville et le Problème de l'Allemagne"; Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Age de Raison; Léon Brunschwig, "Le dur labeur de la Vérité"; Raymond Queneau, "A propos de Jules Romains", and Robert Musil, L'Homme sans-caractères. (Publicity brochure, NRF June 1940, p. 150.)
IN CONCLUSION - NOTES

1. JP to Hellens, BD 7322, 7323 (1940).

For an introduction to Drieu's NRF, see esp. Lionel Richard, 
"Drieu la Rochelle et La Nouvelle Revue Française des années 
noires", La Revue de l'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, 
XXV, 97, 1975, pp 67-84. See also CPD 3, pp. 199-259; Lottman, 
pp. 274ff; Claude Martin, "La NRF de Drieu la Rochelle", in 
La NRF de 1940 à 1943, Lyon, 1975, pp. ix-xliv, and the 
little-known article by Maurice Saillet, "La NRF va-t-elle 
disparaître?", in L'Effort, 29/9/40 (this newspaper was 
"pour la Reconstruction nationale"; ibid., 4/8/40). Finally, 
Assouline (pp. 270-362) relates the history of the publishing-
house under the Occupation.

3. JP to Guillaume de Tarde, NRF February 1982, p. 185; he added: 
"Il s'est trouvé que les All. non plus. Nous en sommes là. 
La NRF reparaîtra donc probablement d'ici trois mois, sous 
la direction de Drieu".

revue dont on chassait les collaborateurs juifs (Benda, 
Suarès, Wahl) et les antinazis (Bernanos, Claudel, Romains) 
que j'y avais appelés". 
Pualhan witnessed at first hand the anti-Semitism of the 
French military in an incident concerning Benda, whilst they 
were dining in Carcassonne (see JP to Grenier, Correspondance 
cit., pp. 138-9, and Jean Guéhenno, Journal des années noires, 
Gallimard, 1947, pp. 35ff).


7. See Paulhan and Dominique Aury, editors of La Patrie se fait 
tous les jours, textes français, 1939-1945, les Editions de 
Minuit, 1947. The texts included were by Pierre Jean Jouve, 
Schlumberger, Suarès, Ramuz, Bernanos, Mauriac, Aragon and 
Chamson; esp. pp. 41-94.
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Section II: Published Correspondence

Section III: Books and Articles

Section IV: Periodicals
Section I: Unpublished Correspondence

a) The Archives Paulhan (AP). Much of the unpublished correspondence consulted is in the keeping of Mme Jacqueline F. Paulhan, 3, rue des Reculettes, 75013 Paris, France. Among those series collected bilaterally with a view to eventual publication are:

Paulhan-Jean Guéhenno,
Paulhan-Roger Caillois,
Paulhan-Jean Grenier.

A selection from the latter has been published; see below, Section II.

Letters from the following correspondents to Jean Paulhan (JP) were also consulted:

Julien Benda, André Chamson, Benjamin Crémieux,
Ramon Fernandez, André Gide, Daniel Halévy,
Roger Martin du Gard, Jean Prévost and
Albert Thibaudet.

Reference in the Notes is shown by the letters AP (Archives Paulhan) and date, where certain. Where dates are approximate, brackets are used.

b) The Archives Rivière (AR). The bilateral correspondence between Jean Paulhan and Jacques Rivière is in the keeping of M Alain Rivière, 31, rue Arthur-Petit, 78220 Viroflay, France. References are to AR (Archives Rivière) and date, where certain.

c) The Bibliothèque Littéraire Jacques Doucet. The following letters of Paulhan are conserved at the Bibliothèque Littéraire Jacques Doucet, place du Panthéon, 75005 Paris, France, under the "cotes" shown (dates are indicated between parentheses):

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- JP to Adrienne Monnier: Ms. 4375 (1920) to Ms. 4479 (16/5/37).
- JP to Jean Schlumberger: Ms.-Ms. 25001 (1912) to Ms.-Ms. 25116 (1939).
- JP to André Suarès: Ms. 4948 alpha (1928) to Ms. 4971 /11 alpha (7/6/40).

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Sept - 1934.

Le Spectateur - 1912-1913.

Le Temps - 1927-1929; 1934.

Vendredi - 1935-1939.

Vigile - 1930.

Vu - 1934-1935.