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"THE CHURCH AND VENETIAN POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE LATER CINQUECENTO"

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SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS

Chapter I: The Interdict and Changes in Venetian Policy: Illusion and Reality. Introduction: this study is a polemic, attacking the connection usually drawn between the political reform of 1582-3 and the hardening of Venetian attitudes towards the Curia up to 1606.

(i) Venetian support of the French Crown in the 1530s and '90s was consistent with previous policy, and was dictated by changes in France rather than in Venice. (ii) Venetian suspicion of Papal jurisdictional claims long predates 1582: some cases show a milder attitude after that reform than before. (iii) The tolerance allowed by Venice to German Protestants did not alter substantially between 1560 and 1606. The growth of the Greek community in the last quarter century can be attributed to external circumstances rather than a more liberal Venetian attitude. The features generally cited to show a change in the direction of Venetian policies are not strong enough to prove it by themselves.

Chapter II: A Manifesto for Reform? The literary history of Paruta's "Perfettione della vita politica" appears to suggest a connection with political change: but the ideas it contains are too ambiguous to have had much partisan appeal. The division of opinions which the dialogue seems to suggest is uncertain, as is its connection with contemporary political events.
Chapter III: The Problem and the Reform. The Council of X and Zonta cannot be described as "purely oligarchic" institutions, though their composition and some of their actions in the pre-reform period excited suspicion. The progress of the 1582-3 reform shows no sign of an organised programme or a shared ideology: all practical proposals for reform came from those who wished to preserve the Zonta, and even in opposition to these proposals no consistency was shown. It is not possible to identify a homogeneous group of "reformers".

Chapter IV: Reform or Reshuffle? The tenure of the main political offices was in no way altered by the reform. The family interest-groups, particularly Tiepolo-Soranzo, Foscarini-Barbaro-Zustiniani, and Priuli, largely retained through the College the influence they had previously exercised through the X and Zonta. Legislation suggests fiercer competition for a smaller number of influential posts. The ruling clique may have been narrowed by the reform.

Chapter V: Property and the Church—Economic Background. The most obvious changes in Venetian policy towards the Church are in the economic field. Growing numbers of nobles held land from clerical proprietors. Anxieties of Sarpi and Querini about ecclesiastical wealth are born out by the evidence of the previous century: clerical property was growing, but at an uncertain rate and to an unascertainable level. The taxation system put most of it out of the reach of the secular government at a time when ready money was badly needed.
Chapter VI: Property and the Church - from Principle to Policy.

In the 1560s and '70s, Venetian argument about clerical wealth and privilege was either on an entirely abstract level, discussing canon and civil law, or an entirely parochial level, discussing the vested interests of individuals. Only in the later 1580s does the argument from "state interest" appear. In 1591 famine forced Venice to assert absolute control over property and produce in the Dominio, and this became established policy in 1593-5. This is the political attitude which led to the property laws of the early XVIIth century, and so to the Interdict.

Conclusion: The Venetian governing group did not change materially, but its attitudes did. This resulted more from pressure of economic circumstances around 1591 than from an infusion of new ideology in 1582.

Appendix I: Lists of the Council of X (1572-'92), Zonta (1572-1581), Savii Grandi (1572-1602) and Savii di Terraferma (1572-1602).

Appendix II: Thirty leading senators, their political careers and connections, and their economic commitments.

Appendix III: "Alvise Michiel".
Chapter I

THE INTERDICT AND CHANGES IN VENETIAN POLICY - ILLUSION & REALITY

On April 17th 1606 Pope Paul V faced Venice with a 'monitorium' threatening excommunication, in what was to be the last attempt of the Holy See to force its will on a whole community by spiritual weapons.¹ The struggle which followed was fought out with words only, in a cross-fire of polemics;² but this naturally involved argument on how and why it had come to this, an historical problem hardly less puzzling than the abstract issues of law and sovereignty that had been raised. For both sides stood so obviously to gain so much from close political cooperation. Venice, the only truly independent secular state in Italy, might profit by the Pope's moral support in the courts of Europe and his practical help on her own frontiers. The Papacy, under the colossal shadow of Spain, could best preserve some freedom of action with the Republic firmly behind it. Representatives of both sides, however little they may have loved the prospective partner, saw and stressed

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¹ The Brief is printed in the Raccolta degli Scritti Usciti Fuori in Istante e Scritti a Mano nella Causa del Papa Paolo V co'Signori Venetiani, Coira, 1607, pp.3-7, hereafter simply Raccolta. For the publication of the Brief and relevant events, Paolo Sarpi, Storia dell'Interdetto, ed. M.D. Busnelli and G. Gambarin, Bari, 1940, pp.35f.

the need for some kind of a partnership.\(^3\) Also, the component features of the dispute seem at first sight to go back not for years, but for decades, in some cases for centuries. When in 1605 the Venetian authorities arrested two clerics, Brandolino and Saraceni, they could appeal to a concession dating from 1529.\(^4\) A law of 1604 placed the establishment of pious foundations in the Domino subject to senatorial approval; another, of 1605, stated that real property might be left as part of a legacy to an ecclesiastical institution only with the Senate's permission, and must be resold after two years.\(^5\) Pope Paul's monitorium demanded their instant repeal; but Venetian legislation to limit

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\(^3\) Reporting on his embassy at Rome (1592-5) Paolo Paruta was highly critical of Papal government but still asserted: "Talché si può questo primo ragionamento concludere col dire che riuscira sempre utile consiglio e degno della prudenza di questo Senato, celebrata con tanta laude in ogni parte del mondo, il conservarsi per quel più che si potra in union-e buona intelligenza con la Santa Sede." Opere Politiche di Paolo Paruta, ed. Monzani, Florence, 1852, Vol. II p.466. Alberto Bolognetti, removed ignominiously from the post of Nuncio in Venice in 1581, commented on the close ties of interest between Venice and the Curia in one of his reports; A. Stella, Chiesa e Stato nelle Relazioni dei Nunzi Pontifici a Venezia, Studi e Testi, Città di Vaticano, 1964, pp.259f. In spite of his own experiences, Venice was to him "honor d'Italia, scudo della Christianita, maraviglia del mondo." (Ibid. p.106).

\(^4\) Two Bulls were involved, the first of Clement VII, February 11th 1529, text printed in B. Cecchetti, La Republica di Venezia e la Corte di Roma, Venice, 1874, Vol.I p.321; reference was made to "Clerici etiam ad minores ordines promoti non beneficiati..." and it was ordained "tales...dlinquentes pro tempore judices seculares capi, inquiri et iuxta eorum demerita omnibus poenis quibus mere laici delinquentes de iure puniri deberent, libere et licite puniri possint..." The second, of 1534, was the one usually cited and was known as the "Bolla Paulina"; it provided that priests might be tried by secular magistrates in Venice for "criminibus atrocioribus". Stella, op.cit. pp.5, 49. Charges against Saraceni and Brandolino included seduction, embezzlement and murder, Sarpi, Storia dell'Interdetto, cit. pp.9-10, 13.

\(^5\) A.S.V., Senato Deliberazioni Terra, Rg.LXXIII c.151, January 10th 1604, Rg.LXXV c.19, March 26th 1605.
inheritance by ecclesiastics dated from 1232. Why then did these matters of clerical immunity become crucial only in 1606?

Approaches to this question have remained astonishingly consistent from the pamphlet-war of the early XVIIth century to the present day. There is still a Curial attitude, and a Venetian attitude. The Republican polemicists, led by Sarpi, fought with a barrage of precedents to prove the continuity of their government's policy, its acceptance by previous Pontiffs, and, consequently, the aggressive presumption of Paul V's attitude. They are followed in method, and sometimes in spirit, by many modern historians.

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6 For early Venetian legislation, see Stella, "La Proprietà Ecclesiastica nella Republica di Venezia", Nuova Rivista Storica Vol.XLIII, 1958, p.52. 1232; inheritance of real property forbidden to persons in a religious order; 1258; sanction of secular government needed for property to pass to the Church; cf. also A.S.V. Maggior Consiglio, Liber Spiritus c.66v. 28th June, 1333; property in Venice left "ad pias causas" must be resold to laymen after ten years. R.C. Mueller, Johns Hopkins thesis, 1970.

7 Sarpi, "Consiglio in Difesa di due Ordinazioni della Serenissima Republica", in Cambarin's ed. of Storia dell'Interdetto, cit.Vol.II p.3, where the law controlling pious foundations is traced in direct line to a provision of the Maggior Consiglio in 1337, extended to Murano in 1459; also "Considerazioni sopra le Censure", in Raccolta pp.37-9; Antonio Querini, Aviso delle Ragioni della Serenissima Republica di Venezia, Bergamo, 1606, p.42 (also in Raccolta, pp.13-32) appeals to "molti brevi de'predecessori" which have accepted the Venetian right to try all claries under secular justice. On the method used by Venetian writers, see the lucid comments of Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, cit.pp.417f.

8 A. Battistella, "La Politica Ecclesiastica di Venezia", N.A.V. Vol. XVI, 1898, pp.386-420; pp.401-3 are particularly relevant, but the whole article is strongly emotional. G. Cozzi, Il Dote Niccolò Contarini, Fondazione Cini, 1953, p.101, observes; "Non c'era nulla di eccezionale, in fondo, in queste disposizioni, che avavano molti precedenti," Bouwsma, op.cit. p.343f, and Stella, "Proprietà Ecclesiastica", cit. p.52f, are more cautious but similar in method.
is laid on the autocratic pretensions of the Counterreformation Papacy. To the Roman writers, on the other hand, it was the Venetians who were violating the established statutes of clerical immunity and turning from the piety shown by their ancestors in vanished centuries of prosperity. This, too, finds its way out in modern writers who approach the subject from a Curial point of view; the Ventian nobility was ridden with anti-clericalism; its actions were an affront; the Papacy had to defend its interests against active Protestant intrigues.

But in spite of their conflict of emotions, writers on the Venetian and on the Roman side show a fair degree of consistency, if not always of direct agreement, in the importance they attach to one preliminary event: the reform of the Venetian government that took place during the autumn of 1582 and the early months of 1583. This reform removed the Council of X from its predominant position in Venetian affairs, partly by stringent constitutional checks, partly by abolishing its caucus or "Zonta" of fifteen advisors, and directed all serious matters of state through the more numerous Senate; so, it appears, those who had previously had little voice in the government began to make themselves heard, and a considerable shift in policy resulted. Historical

9 "Discorso del Lelio Medici", Raccolta, p.201; A. Possevino, Risposta di T. Eugenio di Farmagosta all'Aviso mandato fuori dal Sig. re Antonio Querini, Bologna, 1607, pp.39-41.
10 P. Pirri, L'Interdetto di Venezia del 1606 e i Gesuiti, Rome 1959, p.4-5.
13 There is a risk of illogicality for writers of Venetian sympathy who
turning points are always suspect, of course, for they often prove on examination to have been invented by much later writers: but this reform seems to have been regarded as a turning point by Curial writers in its own time. Within two months of its conclusion, the Papal nuncio Lorenzo Campeggio was bewailing his difficulties in negotiating a problem of clerical rights, because of the obstinate resistance of the younger senators - the "giovani" whom he contrasted most unfavourably with the older and wiser heads in a later dispatch. Campeggio was borrowing two long standing local terms: "vecchi", meaning the old Heraclean aristocratic families who could trace ancestors among the island tribunes of the pre-communal age, "giovani" referring rather wish to maintain both a basic continuity and a change in policy; some embarrassment shows in Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, cit.; on p.226 he asserts that the reform opened "A new phase in the history of the Republic...", but admits on p.232 that the "change was not absolute." The reform will be discussed in detail later; it will be sufficient here to cite the most accessible account of the actual events, which is probably that of Romanini, Storia Documentata di Venezia, Venice, 1855, Vol. VI p.364ff.

14 N.S.Vat., Nunziatura di Venezia, Filza XXIV, c.253, dispatch of July 2nd 1583, on the rights of the Patriarch of Aquileia over the fief of Taiedo. "Intendo che lo strepito tra questi Signori è grandissimo, e mi è venuto affermato da persone che possono penetrare che in due Pregadi fatti a posta per deliberare questa materia hieri l'altro e hieri, non si ha potuto concluders cosa alcuna per l'ostinazione dei giovani, i quali prevalendo in numero non pur tengono indietro ogni buona resolutione, ma non vogliono ne anco ascoltare le proposte dei buoni."

15 Ibid. c.255, Aug.20th, 1583. "Nelle consulte di questo negotio i senatori sono stati sempre divisi in due fazioni - l'una è dei più provetti e che per ordinario sono di maggior autorità, e l'altra dei più giovani; la quale per il numero maggiore ha sino qui prevaluto nelle deliberezioni, e di questa è l'ambasciatore Donato."
loosely to those whose nobility was less hallowed by time. By the beginning of the XVIth century the two labels seem to have signified little more than a vague and subjective political dislike. But in 1583 Campeggio clearly associated the reform closely with the "giovani". Another observer actually identified "giovani" and reformers, "vecchi" with the Council of X and Zonta. The division seemed so sharp that the ambassador in Rome, Leonardo Donato, heard a rumour that the "giovani" were carrying arms to protect them from reprisals by the "vecchi". Besides this evidence labels were coming to indicate a

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16 Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p.5, is cautious about the use of this distinction in the context of 1582 as several of those associated with the reform, e.g. Ferigo Badoer, came from very old families. In fact, the list of 'new' and 'old' families drawn up by Romanin, Storia Documentata, Vol.IV, p.420, and cited by Cozzi, differs entirely from those recently drafted by G. C. Cracco from his critical examination of the arrival of 'new names' in prominent positions during the Middle Ages. Società e stato nel mediceo veneziano, Fondazione Cini, 1967, pp.113-115. Any distinction must have been largely emotional.

17 R. Cessi, "Alcuni aspetti della crisi politica veneziana al principio del secolo XVI", Miscellanea di studi storici ad Alessandro Luzio, Florence, 1933, Vol.1, pp.147-50. Cessi shows the term "giovani" was used vaguely of those who opposed the Senate's conduct of the Turkish war in 1499-1500, but adds that they offered no real alternative policy.

18 Campeggio's view appears in A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXV, cc.32v-33, Jan. 21st 1584. "...trovavondosi il Consiglio di X spogliato della Zonta e conseguentemente della sua ordinaria autorità suprema, accidente occorso fin l'anno passato e fatto tuttavia più irremediabile dalla potenza dei giovani, non resta altro magistrato che i Pregadi." Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, pp.2-3, quotes a document from the Biblioteca Corsiniana which says that the "giovani" had demolished the Zonta: but as this is anonymous and undated, it should perhaps be treated with some caution.

more definite division, there are strong suggestions from Venetian and Roman sources that policy towards the Papacy was one of the main issues involved. The diarist Francesco da Molino, a zealous critic of the Council of X and the Zonta, wrote scathingly of the continuing influence of those who "sempre applaudevano quello che voleva Sua Santità, ne distinguendo quello che deve ogni buon servitore di questa Republica e buon Cristiano."\(^\text{20}\) In 1589 Pope Sixtus himself was prepared to express to the Venetian ambassador his hopes that the decisive voice in the government would always be that of the "savii e buoni vecchi."\(^\text{21}\) A decade later and nearer to the Interdict the ex-nuncio Graziani wrote a long report for the guidance of his successor; he attached a great and sinister importance to the reform of 1582-3, outlining grimly its malign effects on Venetian public life - the incompetent administration of justice, the consequent decline in public morality, the difficulties of negotiating in confidence and the tendency for decisions to be taken by an ill-informed crowd.\(^\text{22}\) The nobility as a whole, he noted, seemed thoroughly suspicious of the Church.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^{20}\) Biblioteca Marciana, Codici Italiani Cl.VII 553/3312 c.130, May 1586; the case involved extradition of a murder suspect to Rome and will be discussed later. Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini cit.p.30, mistakes the date.

\(^{21}\) A.S.Vat.Dispacci Roma, F.XXIV c.31, September 16th 1589; the Pope remarked to Alberto Badoer, "confidava nella signoria prevaleria sempre l'opinione de' quei savii e buoni vecchi."

\(^{22}\) Brunetti, "Le Instruzioni di un Nuncio Pontificio a Venezia al suo Successore", in Scritti Storici in Onore di Camillo Manfroni, Padua 1925, pp.371-9, esp.373.

\(^{23}\) Museo Correr, Fondo Morosini/Grimani Rg.CCCLX c.504, quoted in
Besides this general evidence of a division of some kind in the Venetian nobility and a deterioration of relations with the Papacy after it came into the open in 1532, there are a number of significant personal factors to be considered in the biographies of some prominent individuals. Leonardo Donato, the militant Doge at the time of the Interdict, was linked by Campaggio with the "giovani" in the dispatches already cited.²⁴ Both Donato and his equally militant younger associate Niccolò Contarini can be traced in the same intellectual company as Paolo Sarpi during the later years of the XVI century, at the Academy or "ridotta" of the brothers Andrea and Niccolo Morosini.²⁵

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²⁴ Cf. n.15, above.

²⁵ For Donato's connection with this group, see F. Seneca, Il Doge Leonardo Donà, Padua, 1959, p.165; for Contarini, Cozzi, op.cit. pp.48-9, and notes, pp.54f. Both are mentioned as regular attendants by A. Favaro, "Fulgentio Micanzio e Galileo Galilei", Nuovo Archivio Veneto, Vol.XIII, 1907, pp.45f. The "ridotta Maurocenera" has become almost as favorite a feature of XVI century Venice as is the Platonic Academy of XVth century Florence; cf. Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.10; Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p.236 describes it as "The Social and intellectual headquarters of the new leadership..." But little specific information has yet been produced of what was discussed. A.Battaglia, Delle Academia Veneziane, Venice 1826, p.36f, has only generalities to offer; so has Favaro, op.cit. The researches of Innocenzo Cervelli are awaited with interest.
also much to be made of the curious career of Paolo Paruta; a member of a recently ennobled family, he had been out of all important positions since 1566 at the time of the reform; but in 1579 he had published his highly successful dialogue, *La Perfettione della Vita Politica*; entering the College just as the agitation for reform was getting under way, he rose rapidly to become one of the foremost statesmen of the Republic during the 1580s and 90s. The period in the political wilderness, the popular treatise on public life and duty, the rise to prominence after the reform, make up an entirely logical sequence. It seems, in fact, as if the events of 1582-3 brought forward the very men whose ideals and tenacity were to guide Venice to and through the trial of the Interdict.

Naturally, modern historians have repeatedly stressed the importance of the reform; it marks nothing less than the end of the old

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26 The Parutas were admitted to the Consiglio Maggiore as a reward for contributions during the Chioggia war. They were an immigrant Lucchese family. T. Bini, *I Lucchesi a Venezia*, Lucca, 1853, Vol. I pp.237f. V. Lazzarini, "Le Offerte per la Guerra di Chioggia e un Falsario del '400", N.A.V. Vol.IV, 1902, pp.202-13, doubts the authenticity of the document thought to prove the Parutas lent money.

27 A Pompeati, "Per la Biografia di Paolo Paruta", in *Giornale Storica della Letteratura Italiana*, Vol.XLV, 1905, pp.52-4, proved conclusively that Paruta had been Savio agli Ordini in 1566; this had been doubted by his earlier biographer A. Zeno, *Vita*, Venice, 1718, p.11.

28 Cf. especially G. Candeloro, "Paolà Paruta, La Vita Publica", R.S.I. Vol.LIII, 1936, No.4, p.52; "Il Paruta dopo la riforma percorse rapida e sicura carriera. Questo fa pensare che egli fosse tra i più validi sostenitori della riforma stessa, la quale del resto rispondeva alle sue idee..." In the records of the debates leading up to the reform there is no record of Paruta's having spoken. Thus are myths born. For his subsequent career, Pompeati, op.cit. pp.55f.
ruling class, the start of a "major shift in Venetian politics." Paruta's dialogue is seen as the expression of the reformist ideal, even as a kind of programme for the new ruling class, while his rise in the government is taken as a general sign that the way was now open to men of ability and integrity. Even historians of the Papacy, less concerned with the reform in its own right, unhesitatingly accept it as a given factor, and mark it out as a turning point in the decay of relations between the Republic and the Papacy. The words of one of the greatest will bear repeating in full.

"Some few years previously, in 1582, a change had taken place in Venice which was affected silently and was almost overlooked in the history of the Republic, but which was nevertheless of powerful influence. Up to that period, all affairs of moment had been confided to a few patricians - men advanced in years, who had been chosen from a small circle of families; but, at the time we are contemplating, a discontented majority in the Senate, consisting principally of younger members, had instituted a successful struggle for a share in the administration..."

29 Stella, Chiesa e Stato, cit.p.12. "Il trapasso del vecchio gruppo dirigente..."

30 Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, cit.p.226.

31 Stella, op.cit.p.10.

32 Bouwsma, op.cit.p.230.

33 Pirri, loc.cit. under accepts all the apparatus of a sharp division, a reform, and a sterner policy as the outcome. "Il partito giovane, che godeva una forte preponderanza in Senato, era in generale animato di spirito anticurialista e antiromano."

34 Von Ranke, History of the Popes, trans. E. Fowler, New York, 1901, Vol.II p.135. Von Ranke is discussing the emergence of an organised opposition to the combined power of Spain and the Curia, and gives the events in Venice a crucial place in this process.
This study is not an attempt to say that nothing of consequence happened in 1582. Nor is it an attempt to pretend that Venetian policy towards the Papacy never changed. But it will question whether these two events, the reform and the Interdict, can be linked quite so closely as most writers seem to wish. This is an effort to break out of what I believe has become a thoroughly vicious circle, within which any move made by the Venetian government after 1583 is automatically regarded as the exclusive responsibility of a distinct new group, as assertive and anti-curial, simply because it occurred after 1583, while anything predating that time is relegated to a vague limbo of appeasement and inertia. We shall begin by weighing up the alleged changes in Venetian politics during the later decades of the XVIth century and trying to sift illusion from reality. This will involve little new material, but perhaps some conjunction of incidents which have so far been discussed only in isolation. The second and most important stage of the argument looks at the reform in detail and examines the real facts of the assumed change in personnel and ideology. In the final section we shall try to draw the two previous stages together and inquire how far definite changes in policy may have been based on changes in the structure of government, and how far on other factors; then we shall be left with the task of showing what such "other factors" were.
(i) Venice, Europe, and the Papacy.

In discussion of the new doctrines said to be directing Venetian affairs after the reform, a large place is always allotted to foreign policy - the overall position of Venice in Europe. The Republic, it is argued, broke away from a rather servile dependence on Spain and the Papacy towards a more positive conception of her role as an independent factor in the European balance of power, and played a vital part in realising such a balance by her support of the rising power of Henry of Navarre against Spain and the Catholic League; she pursued this vision of her part even at the hazard of becoming the first Catholic state to recognise the heretic king, risking a break with the Papacy at the time and taking an important step in that progressive withdrawal from unquestioning obedience that resulted finally in the Interdict. In other words, Venice was bent on an active self-assertion that the Papacy found increasingly difficult to tolerate. 35 Support of France, then of Navarre in particular, became a feature of policy in the 1580s; so, in spite of the danger of 'post hoc ergo propter hoc' reasoning, it is natural enough to connect such a policy with the reform.

35 This paragraph attempts to concentrate much learned comment into a very small space, but I think provides a fair summary; cf. Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, pp. 6, 10-26, (the basis of most recent accounts); Seneca, Leonardo Donà, p.164f, Stella, Chiesa e Stato, pp.10-12; (both more interested in domestic, jurisdictional problems than foreign affairs); Candeloro, op.cit. under p.3, n.28, pp.54-60, (especial reference to Paruta); Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, pp. 242f, (sweeping general analysis); Von Ranke, op.cit. under previous note, pp.134-6, 141-4, 223, (connection of negotiations on French crisis with results of the reform).
The balance of this case is weighted rather heavily towards the theory of politics at the expense of the facts of diplomacy; certain Venetian writings are analysed, their implications explored, and the results aligned with a few selected facts. So what emerges often seems more an abstract and rather subjective discourse on the meaning and application of words than an examination of the facts themselves. The vital documents are Paruta's Discorsi with their eloquent and slightly self-conscious justification of Venetian policy over the previous century. Every move on the Italian mainland - the League against Charles VIII in 1496, the assistance given to Pisa against Florence and France, the Neapolitan war of the middle 1550s - is seen as another blow struck for the Freedom of Italy, another attempt to protect Italian territories from foreign princes. It is perhaps reasonable to treat this as a kind of historical perspective for the new move towards the heretical power of Henri IV of France, the effort to redress the now overwhelming balance of Spanish influence in the Peninsula.

36 Though presumptuous, I believe this charge is justified. Candeloro and Bouwsma, loci citati, base their arguments on the application of Paruta's Discorsi to Venetian policy over the French Succession - which is never examined in detail. Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, pp. 4-6, uses a celebrated speech of the Doge da Ponte, who advised cooperation with France as a counterweight to Spain; for the later years of the century, he turns to Contarini's political diaries; ibid. pp.62f. Brunetti, op.cit. under n.19, above, followed by Seneca, Leonardo Donà, passim, but esp. pp.32f, 164f, works from Donà's private papers. The general picture is that of Venetian policy as seen by individual Venetians.


38 Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p.246.
almost entirely in the abstract, Paruta lays the most patriotic emphasis on the special position and individual virtues of the Republic, in a way which might just be taken as the indirect reflection of an upsurge of independent national spirit. 39

It must be said at once that the diplomatic facts of the period hardly encourage the general view that Venice moved from "isolation and passivity" in the third quarter of the XVIth century to more active and independent participation in European affairs from around 1580, unless we are prepared simply to ignore any enterprise undertaken in alliance with Spain or the Papacy. In 1571 the Republic was protagonist in a campaign which, if disappointing in its immediate results, still ranks as one of the decisive victories of Western European history. 40 In 1583 the Senate was still prepared to negotiate on the renewal of a League against the Turks. 41 In 1592-3 even the suggestion of such a

41 A special mission was entrusted by the Pope to Latino Orsino: documents in A.S.V. Collegio, Esposizioni Roma, F.I, and A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven. F.XXIV cc.350-400: some record of debates in Museo Correr, Codice Cicogna 2555, diary of Alvise Michiel, entries of Aug. 5th - Sept. 1st. The furthest point reached was on Aug. 30th, when a speech by Jacomo Soranzo secured a 153: 34 majority in the Senate in favour of provisional acceptance of the Pope's proposals. (Nunz.Ven.F.cit.cc. 353-5). Serious discussion petered out when it became clear that Philip II was cautious. (Ibid.c.517, Nov. 26th). Leonardo Donato conveyed his opposition to the plan through a memorandum read to the Senate by a secretary, but took no direct part in the negotiations as he was ill: Alvise Michiel under Aug. 30th; it is certainly not true to say, as does Cozzi, Nicolò Contarini, p. 34, that Donato persuaded the Senate to refuse the proposal.
League was blocked. At the same time Venice shied away from joining the Turks in the destruction of the Uskok base at Segna, though her new ally Navarre was carefully trying to co-ordinate operations with the Sultan. Perhaps this was independence: but it could equally be called isolationism.

The truth is that Paruta's Discorsi, like most of his writings, can be and have been interpreted in completely different ways. Paruta recommends avoiding large scale European commitments: he sees the Venetian refusal of alliance as an important factor in Italy's long period of peace, quietening fears of Venice herself and leaving aggressive outside powers without a friendly base; alliances and leagues in general he regards with the gravest suspicion; unwieldy and disunited through conflict of interest, they are unlikely to crush a single strong power unless it is already disintegrating from within; and Paruta is

42 Paruta, La Legazione di Roma, ed. de Leva, Venice, 1887, Vol.I, pp. 38, 45-6, 50, 59-60, dispatches of Dec.1592 - Jan.1592/3 (M.V.). This was to be a defensive alliance with an eye on the French heretics as well as the Turks, and Paruta stressed (p.59) that the only people to gain would be the Spaniards.

43 For the anti-Ukok operations of summer 1592 cf. M. Kravjanzky, "Il Processo degli Uscocchi", A.V. Ser.V, Vol.V, 1929, pp.250-51. Venice co-operated indirectly by a naval blockade of Segna while the Turks moved up troops, but withdrew when it came to the point of a concerted attack. For Navarre's relations with the Porte during these years, cf. Henri IV, Roi de France, Recueil des Lettres Missives, Paris, 1846, Vol.III, pp.363-7, April 6th 1591, 607-9, April 4th 1592, letters direct to the Sultan; Vol.IV, p.119, March 20th 1594, letter to the ambassador de Breves; "et si le Gran Seigneur a l'intention de se venger quelques fois des dicts Espagnols, il n'aura jamais une plus belle commodité..."


convinced that this is not yet true of the Ottoman Empire, which would be the natural target for any such league.\textsuperscript{46} In the prevailing situation, the Republic's right course is to withdraw even from her previous policy of temporary alliances with France, or Spain, or the Empire, to balance one against the others; she must strive above all else for the maintenance of the peace she now enjoys.\textsuperscript{47} This is a strange way of preaching any kind of a role in Europe; granted that there is an assertion of the primary importance of Venetian interests, the whole tone is static, passive, isolationist; it is a self-assertion which amounts to self-obsession. Paruta's conception of the "balance of power" means simply a balance in Italy, which guarantees the security of Venice;\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{46} G. Pillinini, "Un Discorso Inedito di Paolo Paruta", A.V. Vol.LXXIV, 1964, pp.5-28, publishes a short treatise headed, "Se la Guerra Fatta a'Persiani da Amurat II Imperator de'Turchi sia stata di Benefizio alle cose della Cristianità," which he convincingly attributes to Paruta; the ideas certainly correspond with those advanced by Paruta during the discussion of a new Holy League at Rome in the early 1590; cf. n.41, above, Pillinini, pp.7-8.

\textsuperscript{47} C. Morandi, "IL Concetto della Politica di Equilibrio nell'Europa Moderna", A.S.I. Vol.XCVIII, 1940, pp.3-19, esp.6-7 for Paruta's ideas. Pillinini, "IL Rimaneggiamento Editoriale dei Discorsi
the application of the phrase "quiete universale" to the period certainly
does not suggest a very wide European perspective. The commentator who
called his ideas "una dolorosa confessione di impotenza" deserves rather
more of a hearing than she has received.49

Clearly, much of our verdict on Venetian foreign policy after the
reform must depend on an examination of how it handled its principal
problem – the question of France. First, how far did the Republic's
attitude really change and can any such change be traced to the influence
of a definite group within the governing class? Second, our view of
the Republic's "active" and "independent" role in Europe must be affec-
ted by the ultimate importance of the part she played in the French
crisis; so we must be sure of the extent to which Venice acted alone,
and of her exact contribution to the outcome. Third, it will not be
irrelevant to the more distant problems of Venice's relations with the
Papacy to enquire just how much the Senate's action over the French
question did irritate the Popes and poison the atmosphere thereafter.

The news of St. Bartholomew's Eve was received in Venice with the

to a comparison drawn in a paragraph contained in some MSS of the
Discorso sulla Neutralità (cf. n.47 above) between the contemporary
situation in Italy and that of the Greek states before the Macedonian
conquest; this might suggest that Paruta had a slightly broader
vision of the situation than some of his writings display.

49 G. Fasoli, "Sulle Ripercussioni Italiane della Crisi Dinastica
Francese del 1539-95 e sull'Opera Mediatrice della Republica di
Venizia e del Granduca di Toscana", Memorie dell'Accademia delle
Scienze dell'Istituto di Bologna, Ser.IV, No.9, 1949, pp.1-67,
immediate reference to p.9. This invaluable article is frequently
cited, but apparently not often read.
joy that was general among Catholic governments; a thanksgiving process was organised, and the Senate voted by an overwhelming majority to dispatch a congratulatory letter to Charles IX. References to the "Ugonotti" are of course frequent in the ambassadors' reports of the 1560s and 70s, and there is plenty of orthodox venom as well as the Venetian dread of political subversion. As late as 1582 the ambassador Lorenzo di Priuli does not appear to have considered Henri de Navarre a figure of any real consequence. Next year the ageing Doge Niccolo da Ponte delivered his much-discussed speech, openly urging a better understanding with France to counterbalance the power of Spain; as

50 G. Soranzo, "Come fu Data e Come fu Accolta a Venezia la Notizia della 'S. ta Barthelemy'"; Miscellanea in Onore di Roberto Cessi, Rome, 1958, Vol.II., pp.129-144. The text of the letter is given on p.142; "E stata tanta la soddisfazione ch'abbiamo sentita per il successo dell'estinzione dei nemici della santa nostra fede cat-tolica e della Maesta Vostra Cristianissima quanto e il zelo tenemo del beneficio di tutta la Cristianita..."

51 E. Albers, Le Relazioni degli Ambasciadori Veneti al Senato, Ser.I, Vol.4, Florence, 1853; the remarks of Zuanne Correr in 1569 (p.183) are typical. Dividing the Huguenots into high, middle and low, and speaking of their various motives, he comments; "A tal che si puo dire che nei primi vi sia l'ambizione, nei secondi il furto, e nei terzi l'ignoranza."

52 Wholesale identification of heresy with subversion is shown in the gloomy prophecies of Zuanne Michiel in 1561, just before the outbreak of the Religious Wars. Ibid. Vol.3, p.428. "...essendo cosa ordinaria, confermata con tanti esempi, come Vostra Serenità sa, che con la mutazione della religione, avvenga di necessaria conseguenza la mutazione degli stati."


54 "Ricordi del Doge Niccolo da Ponte per il buon governo della Patria in Pace ed in Guerra", N. Barozzi, Raccolta Veneta, Collezione di Documenti, Vol.I, 1866, pp.5-17; record of its original delivery
the decade proceeded this came increasingly to mean the Huguenot France of Navarre; by 1585 senators were talking to the French ambassador de Maise in terms of an agreement between the Crown and the Huguenots, and the settlement of religious issues by a national Council; in 1589, after the assassination of Henri III, instructions were sent to the Venetian ambassador to recognise Navarre as King of France immediately, and Henri himself was addressed as 'Vostra Maestà Cristianissima' nearly four years before he made an official profession of the Catholic Faith. In the crucial years of civil war which followed both Henri and the Huguenot general Lesdiguières seem to have received subsidies from Venice; during negotiations over the King's Re-

is given by Alvise Michiel, cod.cit. under p.22, n.41, entry of May, 1583. Michiel disliked da Ponte personally (cf.AppIII) and I doubt if much can be read into his comment "Sua Serenità era di animo molto francese." (Cozzi, Niccolo Contarini, p.4, n.3). Michiel also said of da Ponte's proposals, "...non erano punto nuove."

Cozzi, Niccolo Contarini, p.26 and n.2.

A.S.V.Senato, Deliberazioni Segrete, Rg.LXXXVII, c.99, August 21st; "se, conforme a quanto ci scrivete, Navarra sara stato declarato e giurato Re di quel Regno, volerno che, in quel caso, che come da voi e come Ambasciadore nostro in quel Regno facciate con Sua Maestà quelli uffici che sono soliti farsi in casi simili..."

Ibid.c.103, Sept.1st. "Al Smo.Re di Francia. Si come abbiamo sentito sommo dispiacere della morte del Smo.Henrico Predecessor di Vostra Maestà Cristianissima...così siamo grandemente consolati d'intendere della successione di Lei a quella corona..." The Profession of Faith was finally made on April 17th 1593; cf. Fasoli, "Ripercussioni", cit. under n.49, p.39; also below, p.29 n.85.

Fasoli, op.cit.pp.29, 34-5, cites an undated dispatch in Navarre's Lettres Missives, ed.cit. under n.43, Vol.IX, p.337; "Nous faisons bien affectueusement nous vouloir secourir de la sus dicté somme" (unspecified). The situation over Lesdiguières, who was operating in S.E. France, is less certain still; but the rumours flying in
benediction every French mission to the Pope was given diplomatic support by the Republic, and it was the Venetian ambassador Paruta who arranged the final terms between Clement VIII and the Bishop of Lisieux, under which Navarre was officially received back into the arms of the Catholic Church. 59

This impressive-looking reorientation makes it rather easy to forget that most of the relevant changes were taking place in France. At a fairly early stage, the situation of the once great kingdom beyond the Alps - drifting without effective leadership, torn by dissension and bloodshed - seems to have become a kind of ambassadors' horror story for the edification of a home government whose supreme priority, perhaps, was the maintenance of law and order. 60 Venice supported what passed for the central government of France, little though she may have respected it; at any rate by 1567 large subsidies were being granted to Charles IX, and Papal officials were well aware of the fact. 61 Then,

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60 Before the Religious wars even broke out, Zuanne Michiel, Alberi, cit. under n. 51, p. 425, warned that the religious division could bring about the destruction of the whole kingdom. Nine years later Zuanne Correr, Ibid. Vol. 4, p. 179, Relazione of 1569, was even more pointed; - "scopriro diversi accidenti i quali con l'esempio d'un tanto regno, potranno esser veri e vivi documenti a quelli che governano per regger da qui innanzi con maggior sicurezza gli stati loro." A tendency almost to turn the knife in the wound is shown in all the Relazioni from the period 1560-82 which Alberi prints.

61 Nunziature di Venezia, Vol. VIII, ed. A. Stella, Istituto Storico Italiano, Fonti per la Storia d'Italia, Rome 1963, p. 167, dispatch of Feb. 1st 1567; the nuncio Facchinetti reports a visit of the
in June 1584, the Duc d'Alençon died, leaving Navarre heir to the throne; there followed that extraordinary ideological somersault by which the Huguenots and Navarristes became, in effect, the legitimist party, while the Leaguers became the party of revolt against the Crown - an almost exact reversal of previous positions. In recognising Navarre as King of France Venice clearly saw herself as recognising the legitimate government, and did not fail to underline the essential consistency of her policy. In a wider dimension too, the element of consistency can be detected; the Republic's unerring pursuit of the political balance most favourable to her own interests. The news of St. Bartholomew's was welcome largely because threats of a combination of the French Protestants with the Crown, England, and the insurgents in Flanders were delaying Philip II's commitment of his forces to the Holy League in the Mediterranean. The massacre removed these threats,

French ambassador to the College to apologise for his king's inability to repay more than the third part of the 100,000 scudi lent him by the Republic; the reason given - Spanish activity in Flanders - was essentially that prevailing later in the century. It is clear that the Venetian ambassador of the time, Zuanne Correr, did not regard Charles IX as a good financial risk; cf. Alberi, Relazione cit. in previous note, p.198f.

For the death of Alencon and its results I have referred to De Lamar Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism - Bernadino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League, Harvard University Press, 1964, pp.41-55, where the effect of the sudden rapprochement between the Huguenots and the Crown is fully traced out.

A.S.V. Senato, Delib.Seg.cit. under n.56, c.132, letter of Dec.9th 1589. "Havemo inteso la prudente ressolute fatta dali Principi del Sangue e altri Duchi e Signori del Consiglio di Francia, la quale speriamo anco che debba riuscire secondo il loro desiderio, ne sera da noi mancato da far per servitio di quella Corona in ogni occasione buoni offici di quel modo, che habbiamo sempre fatto..."

Alberi, op.cit. Vol.4, pp.277-310, prints the Relazione of Zuanne Michiel, dispatched in 1572 to dissuade Charles IX from such an
though not in time to save the League. In 1584-5 the situation was even more dangerous, with the assassination of William the Silent and the success of Farnese rapidly advancing the Spanish cause in Flanders, while the Treaty of Joinville joined Spanish interests to those of the Catholic League in France. It cannot have needed a very profound shift in political ideology to read the logic of these events. It was a different threat, but the same principles and methods were invoked against it.

The connection of this attitude towards France and Navarre with an assumed change in the Venetian government and an infusion of new ideas would be more convincing if there were solid evidence of sharp divisions of opinion, violent debates, and narrow majorities. There is practically none. Alberto Badoer, ambassador at Rome, was exposed to the full fury of Curial reaction to his government's recognition of the heretic king, and protested briefly that they had gone too far too fast;

enterprise; pp. 280-6 outline the situation of suspicion on the Flanders frontier,

65 Jensen, op. cit. under n. 62, pp. 41-2.

66 A comment of Paruta's is perhaps relevant to the way the Venetians regarded the matter; Discorso sulla Neutralità, loc. cit. under n. 47; "...si può dire che il prevedere della Republica è stato sempre, quanto a lei, il medesimo (my emphasis), cioè, sempre avveduto e prudente; ma la diversità de' tempi ha portato che non sempre si possa ne si debba per le medesime vie camminare, per accrescere e per conservare uno stato."

67 A.S.V. Senato, Dispacci Roma, F.XXIV, c. 53, Sept. 23rd, 1589; Badoer complained that the Senate's moves "potranno concitar facilmente l'odio di tutta la Cristianità contro quella Ser. ma Republica." I. Reulich, "La Contesa fra Sisto V e Venezia per Enrico IV di Francia", N.A.V. Vol. IV, 1892, p. 251, and Stella, Chiesa e Stato, cit. p. 63, try to make this typical of the attitudes of the now discredited faction; but it does not appear that many of them had been discredited.
but the letter which addressed Henri formally as King of France was approved by an overwhelming majority in the Senate, with only 24 doubtful members in an assembly of 174. This need not affect our views, of course, if we believe that the composition of the governing class had changed completely in 1582-3, and the case will be brought into full perspective only when we have examined the structure of the Senate and College in the next section; but we must mention here that when this vote was passed, on September 1st 1589, the upper ranks of the College were still packed with men like Marin Grimani, Giacomo Foscarini, Marc-antonio Barbaro, and Zuanfrancesco di Friuli, who had held offices of similar rank before the reform.69

In fact, the Republic's French policy does not bear close scrutiny as a symptom of change either in ideologies or personalities.

The extent of Venetian influence on the final solution of the French Succession crisis has perhaps been rather magnified by the fact that for several years the Republic was the only Catholic power which had official diplomatic relations with Henri, her ambassadors served as informants and contacts for other interested parties, and consequently Venetian records are particularly rich in information. Other states played a less conspicuous, but effective, part. Immediately after her recognition

68 A.S.V. Senato, Delib. Seg. loc. cit. under n. 57; this letter, and the instructions to the ambassador, were both voted by 150 'di sì': 8 'di no': 16 N.S. As an interesting point of comparison, the letter congratulating Charles IX on the massacre of Huguenots in 1572 was voted by 162: 1: 0. Cf. Scranzo, op. cit. under n. 50, p. 142.

69 Details in Appendix I. No one, in fact, reckons that the change in 1582 was absolute; cf. Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, cit. p. 232.
of Navarre, in autumn 1589, Venice was certainly very much alone; Curial opinion was outraged at this flouting of an excommunication; at one stage the Papal nuncio had actually left Venice, and rumours of a break in relations were abroad. But there was always a suggestive coincidence between the Pope's wilder tantrums and the visits of the Spanish ambassador; in the intervals he was perfectly affable to Badoer, and rapidly calmed to an easy acquiescence before the firm diplomacy of Leonardo Donato. We cannot, obviously, tell quite what was going on in the Pope's mind; he may even have been glad that Venice had taken such a step, and so provided a possible future link; but it is certainly very likely that expressions of official ire were mainly for publicity purposes. Spain could not be directly flouted.

70 A.S.V. Disp. Roma, F. cit. c.39, Sept. 23rd. "Che dalla Serenità Vostra non solamente fosse stato scritto e mandato il suo ambasciador al Re di Navarre; ma che li fosse stato dato anco titolo di Re Cristianoissimo, il che faceva si gran rumore nell'orecchie di cadauno, perché una Republica tanto Cattolica havesse dato titolo di Cristianoissimo ad un heretico dichiarato che li buoni sudditi di V. Ser. tà non ardivano comparire."

71 This occurred as a result of the Senate's admitting the French ambassador de Maise. Raulich, "La Contesa," pp.259-60.

72 A.S.V. Disp. Roma, F. cit. c.118, Oct. 20th. "...e quasi tutti credevano che il Papa licentiasse anco me, e che fosse già in aperta rottura..."

73 Ibid. c.131, Oct. 24th. "...per li uffici fatti la Domenica dal amb. di Spagna e da diversi altri ha fatto sua S. tà qualche segno di mutazioni." Without making any new demands or objections, the Pope had suddenly expressed fury at the official reception of de Maise.

74 Sixtus told Badoer that he was most annoyed at the nuncio's withdrawal; ibid. c.124, Oct. 21st. Donato was sent on a special mission to explain the Republic's reasons and after submitting to a few weeks' hectoring, suggested that the new French ambassador might be bringing proposals for a general Council. Ibid. c.144, Dec. 16th, Raulich, "La Contesa", cit. pp.309-11, Seneca, Leonardo Dona, cit. pp.172-191.

Sixtus had feared - or expected - that other governments would follow Venice in recognising Navarre. But there was little progress in negotiations of any kind until the accession of Clement VIII in 1592. In that year Henri dispatched Vivonne de Toret, Marquis de Pisan, and Bishop Gondi of Paris to explore the chances of a reconciliation with the Papacy; the mission received the strongest possible Venetian support, the ambassador Paruta using the presence of Turkish ships off Zante to point the need for unity among Christians, but the Pope refused even to receive them. The following year, after the French bishops had 'absolved' the King on their own account at St. Denis and so brought a national schism one step nearer, a second representative, Louis Gonzaga, Duke of Nevers, was sent to Rome, and he too was given full Venetian support. Arriving in Rome in spite of the Pope's official refusal to see him, Nevers was decidedly cool about the

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76 A.S.V. Dispacci Roma, F. cit. c. 89, Sept. 16th. "Ma che in fine tutto il mondo diceva 'Venetia fara, Venetia dira;' che fara, disse, che dira questa Venetia?"

77 Fasoli, "Ripercussioni", pp. 22-6. There were three very short-lived Popes in the interim, two of whom - Gregory XIV and Innocent IX - were hostile to Navarre and zealous supporters of the League.

78 Legazione, ed. cit. under n. 41, Vol. I, pp. 6-7, Nov. 7th 1592.

79 Ibid. p. 74, Jan. 16th 1592/3 (M.V.)

80 Pastor, History of the Popes, cit. Vol. XXVI, pp. 72-3; the "Abjuration of St. Denis" took place on July 25th 1593.

81 Paruta, Legazione, cit. Vol. II, pp. 16, Sept. 18th, 24, Sept. 25th (renewed stress on Turkish threat, with news of a fleet of 200 galleys in preparation). Cf. also p. 124, Dec. 4th, attempt to keep negotiations open after all Nevers' requests had been refused.
Republic's efforts on behalf of his King, and he, like his predecessors, achieved nothing.  

But another force was working quietly in the background - Ferdinand, Grand Duke of Tuscany. His ambassador Vinta had made contact with Paruta, and the two had talked in general terms, the Florentine probably sounding out the strength of the Republic's resolution, as Sixtus had expected other states to do. 

By 1593 Ferdinand was subsidising Navarre to the tune of 200,000 scudi; it was he who pressed for the definite Declaration of Faith which Henri eventually made on May 17th 1593; after the failure of Nevers' mission, it was he who pressed for the organisation of another, when Henri was showing some signs of giving up the attempt. Venice, by this time, was largely occupied with the negotiation of domestic matters in which the

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83 Legazione, cit. Vol. I, p. 81, Jan. 23rd 1592/3 (M.V.)

84 Fasoli, "Ripercussioni", cit. p. 42.

85 Henri IV, Lettres Missives, Vol. III, p. 763, April 26th 1593; thanking the Grand Duke for his good advice, Henri concludes; "...j'ay voulu et veux de plus vous promettre, comme je fais, en foy et parole de roy, par la presente...de faire declaration et profession publique de la religion catholique selon les constitutions de l'Eglise..."

86 Fasoli, op. cit. p. 57. It seems quite clear that by the end of 1594 Henri was not inclined to make another attempt; A.S. Vat. Segretario di Stato, Francia, B.XXV, c. 234, cipher of Bishop Gondi, Aug. 21st; "Io ho trovato fatta così ferma impressione in Sua Maestà di non poter mai acquistare la sua gratia, che ho durato gran fatica in persuadergli il contrario."
Papacy was concerned - the sovereignty of Genoa, and the clerical dues of the Dominio.  87 A brief stir was caused by the dispatch of a special congratulatory embassy in summer 1594, after Navarre's coronation; 88 but Paruta plainly had no information about the preparation for the mission of Bishop du Perron, 89 or about the alarming dispatches from Gondi in Paris which seem finally to have been opening the Pope's eyes to the risks of further delay. 90 The final moves, in which Paruta acted as intermediary, involved little more than arranging formalities. 91 The Venetian initiative in this final and successful mission was rather less than it had been in the two previous and abortive attempts to secure the Rebenediction; the whole process was really deciding on the final form of a situation that had already been settled by military and political

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87 These problems, which will be discussed in detail later, fill much of the latter part of Legazione, Vol. II and the first part of Vol. III.

88 A.S.V. Senato, Delib. Roma, Rg. X, c. 17, May 14th, 1594. The scope of the embassy was to congratulate Henri on his coronation and his acquisition of Paris. Reaction at Rome was hostile; Paruta, Legazione, Vol. II, p. 251, May 21st, 325, June 4th.

89 He knew that Gondi was pressing for another mission (Vol. II, p. 430, Sept. 8th 1594) and that du Perron had been named; but he had no details and was frustrated at the lack of any decisive action (Ibid. pp. 521-2, Dec. 31st). Cf. Fasoli, "Ripercussioni", cit. p. 57. There is some sign that the Senate had rather lost interest in the instructions of March 3rd 1594, Senato, Del. Roma, Rg. cit. c. 2; Paruta is requested only to send on any further information - "perché non dovemo con tutto abbandonare la cura di si importante negotio...".

90 A.S.Vat. Segr. di Stato, Francia, B. cit. under n. 86, c. 243, cipher of Jan. 10th 1595; Gondi warns the Pope of the violent state of opinion after an attempt on the King's life, and hints that if an effort is to be made to keep France Catholic, it must be made soon; "ogn'uno confessa che questa unione non si può fare, se non con l'autorità di Dua Beat. ne."

circumstances elsewhere.

It is as easy, certainly, to err on the side of cheap depreciation as on that of exaggerated adulation; there can be no doubt that Venice took a firm and entirely consistent stand in the crucial years between 1539 and 1595, probably giving considerable moral support both to Navarre himself\textsuperscript{92} and to other potential supporters like Ferdinand de Medici. But there is no particular reason, first, to regard this as a radical departure from previous policy; and the researches of Gina Fasoli suggest both that the practical role of the Grand Duke may have been equally important to the final outcome, and that Venetian diplomatic initiative may have been petering out fully a year before that outcome was achieved. So the active and positive part played by the Republic should not be overestimated. Finally, the immediate effect on relations with the Papacy seems to have been in no way malign; Pope Sixtus, as we have shown, created some short-lived scenes for the benefit of his Spanish audience; but after the final conclusion of the negotiations Paruta noted with satisfaction that the Republic had gained greatly in reputation from the position she had adopted.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{92} Henri IV, Lettres Missives, ed. cit. Vol.IV, p.253, commenting on the Venetian embassy of summer 1594. "C'est la première légation qui est sortie d'Italie depuis mon advenement."

\textsuperscript{93} Legazione, cit.Vol.III, p.233, Sept.9th, 1595; "Io continuo le mie visite con questi illustri Signori Cardinali, nelle quali più m'avvedo e particolarmente osservo quanto di gratia e di reputazione per questo successo delle cose di Francia venga ad averne V.Ser.tà acquistata a questa corte."
(ii) The Problem of Jurisdiction

A steady intensification of jurisdictional disputes with the Papacy is constantly advanced as one of the principal consequences of the 1582 reform, and it seems clear enough from the nuncios' reports that the atmosphere of negotiation was growing progressively worse towards the end of the century. But, though much has been written of the period following the reform, and though there is no lack of studies which relate to individual features of the preceding decades, I have yet to see any systematic attempt to compare the two periods to each other. Indeed, so much has been included under the general term "jurisdictional" that such a comparison would probably be an impossible task. Control of the Adriatic, tenure of the great abbacies, payment of clerical taxes, the property laws of the early XVIIth century - all can be, and have been treated as jurisdictional questions because of the amount of legal...

94 Cozzi, Nicolò Contarini, pp.23f; Seneca, Leonardo Donà, pp.243f; Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, pp.251f; for the connection with the reform, Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.65; "I contrasti giurisdizionali, che fino alla nunziatura Bolognetti non erano mai trasessi pericolosamente (grazie all'atteggiamento benevolo, con preoccupazioni costanti per l'equilibrio italiano e europeo, dei "vecchi" verso la Santa Sede), a poco a poco s'inasprirono."

95 Cf. the comments of Graziani in 1593, quoted on p.172, n.23 above.

argument involved. But these wider problems seem to me to raise issues of power politics and economy rather than of law, and to need separate and detailed treatment. So I have tried to exclude from this section, as far as possible, all incidents which involve economic questions. By "jurisdiction" I propose to understand, first, the claims of secular and clerical justice over the individual; second, the broader application of such claims in certain communities where legal sovereignty was under dispute.

The questions to be answered are naturally very similar to those on foreign policy; whether any sharp changes in the legal structure directing clerical and secular rights can be detected; more important, whether such laws are more firmly applied after 1533 than before; whether, in consequence, there are sharper conflicts in areas of uncertain sovereignty; and, finally, whether a distinct group in Venice can be held responsible for the whole situation. This must be kept in mind constantly.

The legal background can be sketched in very few words; at the latest by 1570, the Republic and the Papacy were in utterly irreconcilable positions, and both were fully aware of the fact. The concessions of 1529 and 1534 - the "Clementina" and the "Paulina" - had given the Venetian civil authorities power to proceed against clerics 'in crimini-bus atrocioribus' in the city of Venice itself. This meant that the

97 Cf. citations in n.94 above; also M. Brunetti, "Schermaglie Veneto-Pontificie Prima dell'Interdetto", Paolo Sarpi e i suoi Tempi, Città di Castello, 1923, pp.119f.

98 Cf. citations under n.4, p.2, above. Also Bolognetti's "Relazione dell'Essercitio della Giurisdictione Ecclesiastica", in Stella,
Avogadori and the Quarantia courts, less often the Council of X, might be concerned directly in the trial and prosecution of clerics. The same result derived indirectly from other established practices; a Parte of the Senate dated 1517 condemned to perpetual exile and a fine of 300 scudi anyone obtaining a verdict in a clerical court in a case which was properly a matter for secular justice; this quickly evolved into a general right of appeal from the verdicts of clerical courts, again usually channelled through the Avogadori. Another principle, that a defendant should be tried in a court of his own status, was also thought to have the effect of concentrating cases in the secular courts.

Further still, the Republic firmly maintained that the Holy Office had been established in Venice by decree of the civil government, insisting therefore on the independence of the Venetian tribunal and on the presence of lay officials - three senatorial 'assistenti' in Venice, the rettori in the subject cities - at all hearings. This arrangement was stabilised by a Concordat with Julius III in 1551. The 'assistenti'

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Chiesa e Stato, pp.132-145, esp.135-6. The exact meaning of the phrase 'in crimini bus atrocioribus' had never been defined, so there was endless scope both for independent action by the civil authorities, who were supposed to act only in the presence of the Patriarch, and for recriminations over the precise category of any one charge.

99 Bolognetti, in Stella, op.cit. pp.137-9; the principle, popularly called "de renunciando impetratis", seems to have originated as a means of checking the high-handed summoning of cases to Rome by non-resident bishops.

100 Ibid.p.132. This appears to have been a menace chiefly in civil cases, when clerics sued to defend their property.

were cautioned to act as "coadiutori", not as "coniudices", and they did not have a voice in the final verdict; but as their brief gave them the duty of preventing injustice and defending temporal authority, they had a measure of control over what went on, and clerics plainly found their endless quibbling over points of order an embarrassing obstacle in the way of quick, smooth condemnations.

This penetration of laymen into clerical affairs was of course most unpalatable to the Curia, and Venetian practices were caught up in the general movement of the later XVIth century to assert the independent rights of the clergy and dispose of anomalies. In 1563 the twenty-third session of the Council of Trent published sweeping proclamations on the reform of secular princes, condemning all lay participation in the judgement of clerics and anathematising those who appealed from a priestly to a secular court; but the storm of protest was such that

with the aim of safeguarding orthodoxy at a time when many refugees from the Papal-Imperial wars were pouring into Venice. Cf. p.142 for the Concordat with Julius III. For further detail on executive arrangements, Bolognetti, "Del Santo Offitio dell'Inquisizione", in Stella, op.cit. pp.277-294, esp. 290-1 for the 1551 concordat.

102 Sarpi, op.cit. under previous n., Scrittura Prima, Cap.IV, in Gambarin's ed. p.121; Bolognetti, op.cit., in Stella, p.290, gives details of voting.

103 Bolognetti, op.cit. p.291; "... nondimeno le resolutioni e l'espedizioni vanno perciò molto più a lungo che non fariano, perché volendo quei signori trovarsi presenti ad ogni minimo essame di cause anco leggierissime, si spendono in questo tutte le ore delle congregazioni..."

104 The first draft was brought out in July and contained 42 clauses; (Pastor, History of the Popes, English version, Vol.XV, London, 1923, p.341); but even the 13 clause version of September printed by Sarpi, Storia del Concilio Tridentino, Florence, 1966, Vol.II, pp.980-1 (Bk.VIII, ch.7), is a formidable document; cf. esp. clause 2 (on appeals) and 5 (declaring secular princes incompetent to make any
little passed into the decrees of the Council save a generally worded exhortation that princes be true to their sacred duty as defenders of ecclesiastical liberty and prevent their ministers from laying violent hands on the clergy or clerical property. But a number of earlier provisions were slipped into the new version of the Bull "In Coena Domini" which Pius V tried to revive and publish throughout Christendom in 1568. This Bull laid down classes of person whose actions rendered them liable to excommunication, had apparently been read annually by the Popes since about 1370, and had caused little uneasiness since it had so little circulation. But Pius, besides attempting to have it published universally, revised clauses and added others. The section on the

proclamation whatever that would be binding in clerical cases.)

Pastor, op.cit. pp.343-4, 346-7, describes reactions. The final decree is printed by H. Schroeder, Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, St. Louis/London, 1960, p.517 (Session XXV, cap.20);

"...nec ab ulla baronibus, domicellis, rectoribus, aliisve dominis temporalibus seu magistratibus, maximeque ministris ipsorum principum, laedi patiantur."

Though it was one of the main points of contention between the Papacy and secular governments during the later XVIth century, relatively little seems to be known of the history of this Bull and I have not yet seen a full published version. Some account of its background and terms is given by Cecchetti, op.cit. under n.4, Vol.I, pp.445-9; other clauses aimed at Venice were I and VII (against princes receiving foreigners of a different religion); XVII and XVIII (immunities of clerical property). Useful discussion of its previous history is contained in V. Martin, Le Gallicanisme et la Reforme Catholique - Essai Historique sur l'Introduction en Francais des Decrets du Concile de Trent, Paris, 1919, p.174f; Pastor, History of the Popes, Vol.XVIII, p.35f. gives an account of its introduction in 1568. Venice agreed to publish a version of "In Coena Domini" on June 1st 1566 (Nunziatura di Venezia, Vol.VIII, ed. cit. under n.61, p.51) so it must be assumed that Pius secured approval in principle before revising the document.
administration of justice now declared excommunicate all who took part in any kind of criminal proceedings against clerical persons, and all privileges granted to secular governments were annulled. The Republic's right to prosecute clerics 'in casibus atrociioribus' according to the Clementine and Pauline concessions could hardly have been more directly attacked. Not very surprisingly, most Catholic states refused to publish the Bull.

The authorities in Rome and in Venice knew perfectly well what kind of a turn affairs had taken. In 1566 the nuncio Facchinetti warned the Papal Secretary of State that the Venetians were trying to extend the privileges of the Clementine and Pauline concessions throughout the Dominio. Paolo Tiepolo, Venetian ambassador in Rome at the same period, warned his government that "In Coena Domini" was the symptom of an outright bid for Papal superiority. What followed was natural

107 Pastor, Vol. cit. App. II and III, pp.464-6, prints the new or largely revised clauses; XI and XVI were now specifically directed against "omnes quisque magistratus...omnesque alios quoque modo se intermitterentes in causis capitalibus seu criminalibus contra personas ecclesiasticas, illas capiendo, processando, seu sententias contra illas proferendo vel exsequendo." The revocation of privileges is also printed.

108 Op. citata under n.106; in 1575 Venice gave permission for the Bull to be read in remote churches at uncrowded times. Cecchetti, loc. cit.

109 Nunziature di Venezia, Vol.VIII, ed.Stella, pp.52-4, dispatch of June 1st. "La somma è questa; che questi signori hanno una bolla che non si estende come gli si è mostrò fuori di Venezia...procuraranno forse ottener gratia da N.S. che questa bolla s'estenda per tutto il Dominio...."

110 Relazioni, in Alberi, Ser.II, Vol.4, 1858, p.179; "...avendo opinione (Sua Santità) che l'autorità sua si stende sopra tutti gli stati, e di potere quasi assolutamente in tutte le cose commandare...però desideria che si facesse a modo suo non solo nelle cose spirituali, ma anco nelle miste, anzi in quelle che sono pure temporalì, si come nella Bolla In Coena Domini si può comprendere."
enough; both sides began to entrench themselves more deeply in their opposed positions, throwing out subsidiary decrees like mines and outworks to penetrate the main enemy lines, or to defend their own. A series of Parti was carried through in Venice during the later 1560s and early 70s, clearly aimed at checking and defining the competence of the Inquisition, or reinforcing the status of the lay assistenti; property of condemned persons must pass to the legitimate heirs; there was to be no extradition of prisoners without approval of the secular government; the assistenti must be present even at hearings involving priests; those with connections in Rome would not be acceptable. 111 Two decades later it was suggested, though not actually carried into law, that permission of the secular government be required even to summon lay witnesses in cases before clerical courts. 112 Two years later the Curia launched another major offensive, with a Bull specifically designed to revoke all privileges enjoyed by secular authorities and place even the gravest charges against priests under control of ecclesiastical courts; but though it was cited at the time of the Interdict, the Pope

111 The full catalogue is given by Sarpi in "Scrittura Prima Sopra l'Officio dell'Inquisizione", cit. under p. 26, n. 102, above; in order, nos. XXVII (Council of X and Zonta, 1563); XVI (same bodies, 1567); IX (College and Capi di X, 1568); III (X and Zonta, 1574). The prominence of the Council of X and Zonta in these provisions is notable. There were also a number of political checks on those with clerical connections at this time; cf. A. Papadopoli, Leggi Veneto Intorno agli Ecclesiastici, Venice, 1864, pp. 33-4.

112 A.S.V. Collegio, Esposizioni Roma, F. III, ins. 646, April 7th 1589; the suggestion was made by Leonardo Donato in a case where the competence of the Bishop of Orsara and the lay officers was hopelessly confused; it is probably the source of Bouwsma's references; Republican Liberty, p. 251. General discussion in A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven. F.XXVI, c. 794, Nov. 13th.
responsible, Gregory XIV, died before the Bull had really been carried into effect. Not very surprisingly, another barrage of Venetian laws was thrown out about the same time; meetings of the Inquisition without the assistenti were declared void; certain charges were more narrowly limited; foreigners of different religion were exempted from prosecution except by secular courts. Perhaps the most celebrated single skirmish came in 1596 when the Papal authorities, on the publication of the new 'Index Librorum Prohibitorum', attached an oath of obedience to be sworn by printers and booksellers before their bishop and inquisitor only. This would have had the effect of making an important group of lay citizens directly responsible to ecclesiastical justice. After some months of hard negotiating the oath was remitted and the Preface to the Index given a cautiously neutral concordat form;

113 A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma, F.cit. ins.409, June 21st, 1591, report of the Patriarch Priuli; "che quanto alli laici si statuito chelll casi anco gravissimi di lesa Maestà e per lì quali fin ora si è esservato di poter ritenor li rei in Chiesa, non si potesse farlo per l'avvenire senza averne prima licentia dall'ordinario..." The Bull was mentioned by Lelio Medici in his Discorso (Raccolta, p.201).

114 Sarpi, Scrittura Prima, cit.under n.111, above; in order nos.XII (1591) XXII and XXIV (ibid.). All decrees of the Senate.


116 A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma, F.cit.ins.410. "La regola del giuramento da darsi a librari e stampatori non s'eseguisca in questo Ser. mo Domino." Brown, op.cit. in previous n., pp.149f, outlines the terms of the Concordat. The most important provisions were that new works should be submitted to the lay Riformatori della Studio di Padova, not the Inquisitors, and that the latter should restrict themselves to purely religious questions.
the contenders drew apart - if we may believe Graziani, who handled the discussions - with suspicious backward glances. 117

There seem indeed to be excellent reasons for believing Graziani; the number and scope of the Venetian laws, the breadth and tone of the Papal Bulls, certainly suggest a hardening of the legal positions on both sides. If we wish to connect Venetian attitudes in the 1590s with the advent of a new ruling group in 1582-3, then this is quite acceptable provided that the existence of such a group can be proved quite independently. But there is no need to appeal to such a change in the government to explain events; the suspicions of the Republic had plainly been aroused a good fifteen years earlier, and the Council of X and Zonta - often said to have been pro-Curial - passed a number of relevant laws in the late 1560s. The change in attitudes was gradual; there is certainly no reason for dating it only from 1583.

But in practical terms the irreconcilable principles, the tremendous pronouncements, made remarkably little difference. For between the two bristling legal positions lay a broad political "no man's land" in which individual cases were decided mainly, it seems, according to the expediency of the moment. Facchinetti's warning about the Republic's wish to extend its jurisdictional privileges was occasioned by the arrest of two priests on charges ranging from piracy to adultery and murder; but the directions he received were to proceed cautiously, as His Holiness - Pius V, soon to produce the new version of "In Coena

Domini" - was most anxious to preserve the best possible relations with Venice. The following year the Pope was even moved to express satisfaction at the exemplary punishment - decapitation and burning - meted out by the Council of X to a priest of Treviso convicted of necromancy. Yet around the same time Venice handed over one Guido Gianetti, a renegade Papal subject and professional agent, to answer charges of heresy in Rome. Five years earlier he had been released at the urgent request of his late employer, the Queen of England, to the Council of X; but by now Elizabeth seems to have lost interest, and Guido's supporters were either out of office in Venice or obliged to behave somewhat discreetly. In all these cases policy, rather than principle, appears to have decided the issue; and incessant complaints about the encroachment of the Avogadori in the late 1560s serve as a caution against

118 Cf. n.109, above; in his previous dispatch (ed.cit.p.47, May 21st, 1566) Facchinetti had mentioned "sei o otto casi" in which the Avogadori had interfered; but the directions of the Secretary of State were simply; "S.S.tà vuole che si vada per l'avenire molto riservato in simili risentimenti per non sdegnare no alterare in alcun modo quei signori." (Ibid.p.55, June 1st).

119 Facchinetti was again aghast at the breach of immunity (ibid.p.185, March 8th, 187-8, March 15th, 1567); but on receiving news of the sentence the Secretary reported; "È piaciuto a N.S.assai la dimostrazione tanto esemplare..." (Ibid.p.222, May 24th).

120 The whole extraordinary career of Guido da Fano is traced out by Stella, op.cit. under n.96, above; he held a benefice near Salisbury (op.cit.p.200) and took part in the intrigues to join Venice to the Schmalkaldian League (211). Stella considers that Guido's arrest may have been partly due to the suspicion attaching to his supporter Nicolò da Ponte at the time (234). Guido was of course a Papal subject rather than a clerical person, but similar principles were involved and the Council of X was anxious that he should be tried in Venice. (p.223).
looking for such attitudes only after 1583. There were, it is true, two very notable incidents just before the reform, in both of which the Republic gave way and which have been treated as instances of the earlier, more compromising approach to such problems. In early 1580 the Avogador Marco Venier summoned the Archbishop of Spalato, Alvise Michiel, to answer charges of misappropriating an inheritance, before the Quarantia; it could have involved banishment and a fine of 200 ducats. There were some explosive scenes in the College and much ill will had been generated on both sides by the time the case was erased from the records of the court. Then in 1582, while the reform was actually under way, the ashes of an earlier affair suddenly burst into flames. In 1576 an Hospitaller named Corsini had raided an enemy's house in Bergamo, murdered him in bed, and taken refuge in Milan under protection of Archbishop Borromeo. After various attempts to arrest him, a messenger was sent to remind the rettore of the Bull "In Coena Domini"; Marco Zustinianì arrested him, was promptly excommunicated.

121 Cf. references in n.118, above; also pp.44, 57, 64-5, 144 (from Rome), 169, 219 (from Rome).
122 Stella, Chiesa e Stato, cit.p.23.
123 The negotiations at Rome are recorded in A.S.V.Capi del Consiglio di X, Dispacci Roma, B.XXVII, ins.18-20, Feb.6th - March 5th 1580; the last dispatch makes it clear that besides the cancellation of the 'processo' Gregory XIII was hoping for some more general guarantee of the immunity of clerics. Alvise Michiel, entries of Feb.-March shows that much offence was caused in Venice by the nuncio's refering to Venier as "scelerato, infame, ambìtìoso e simili altre parole", and comments coolly of the eventual solution; "la cosa s'acquietò con poca degnità della Signoria." Stella, op.cit.pp. 23-3, outlines the debates and treats the affair as a major issue between the "giovani" as supporters of the Avodagore and the cautious "vecchi", intent on reaching a compromise.
and riposted in December 1582 by putting a price of 3000 ducats on the Archbishop's head. It took a carefully synchronised withdrawal of the two proclamations to calm the situation, and this of course left Corsini in the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities. There were certainly some sharp debates over these problems; but how far two different and definable attitudes can be detected among the Venetians is very doubtful. In discussion of the Corsini case, Paolo Tiepolo, Giacomo Foscarini, and Alvise Zorzi, all senior and established members of the Council of X, insisted on the gravity of the crime and the application of Pauline concession in the Dominio—which, after all, was one of the issues that eventually led to the Interdict. What decided the result in both these incidents was probably the development of a wider and more serious dispute over the temporal sovereignty of Aquileia; this naturally made it impolitic to confront the Papacy in minor affrays. Again, if we insist that the attitude of the government before the reform was generally moderate on such questions, we must still confront the fact that perhaps the greatest and most unpopular concession to Papal

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124 A full account of this affair is contained in G. Soranzo's article, "Rapporti di San Carlo Borromeo con la Republica di Venezia", Archivio Veneto Vol.XXVII, I940, pp.10-17. Agreement was finally reached on Jan.15th 1582/3 (M.V.), a single messenger taking the rettore's retraction from Bergamo to Milan and returning with the withdrawal of the excommunication. In Venice business was naturally confused by the reform.

125 A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma, F.I, unnumbered insert of Dec.21st, 1582. This was before the proposals for mutual retraction.

126 This suggestion is made by Soranzo, op.cit.p.15. It is also worth adding that the disruption of public business between 1582 and 83 was regarded with alarm by Leonardo Donato (Brunetti, "Da un Carteggio..." cit.n.19, above) and may have encouraged a settlement.
jurisdiction during the 1580s was made soon after it. A murder suspect from the Papal States, Marcello Accoramboni, was handed over in spite of a safe conduct granted by the Podestà of Padua, and in the face of some stern opposition from Alvise Michiel, who commented in his diary that the betrayed bravo's blood would scream for vengeance from the ground. But Sixtus V had been most understanding over the Patriarchate of Aquileia, and was exerting himself to check the piracy of the Hospitallers. It was time for a gesture in response. Even in the 1590s - the decade that ended with Graziani's gloomy prophecies - it is difficult to say just what had changed and how. Pierconte Gabuzio, another refugee cutthroat from the Papal States whom the Republic had signed up to fight the Uskoks, was tactfully dispatched to Candia instead. Furios demands for his extradition from the newly elected Clement VIII were just satisfied by the scalp of a leading subordinate.

127 The fullest account is given by Alvise Michiel, entries of Jan. 18th, Feb. 22nd, March 7th, 14th, April 19th, May 2nd, 1586. Accoramboni was implicated in the murder of the Pope's nephew Francesco Peretti; acquitted of another charge in Padua, he had been granted three days safe conduct. This seems to have been one of the outer reverberations of a round of family murders that gained much notoriety, even popularity, in Europe: cf. L. Hotson, The First Night of Twelfth Night, London, 1954, pp. 35f.

128 Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p. 36. My differences from Professor Cozzi on the interpretation of Alvise Michiel are at this point so profound that I have stated them in detail in Appendix III, q.v.

cutthroat, Marco Sciarra, whom Piero had taken on as his lieutenant.

Venice petitioned successfully for the removal of the Bishop of Liesina, proved to have violated health regulations by unloading goods from an infected ship. The inquisitor of Bergamo, who had summoned lay persons without the approval of the secular authorities, was forced by violent protests to retract unconditionally. The scoring was fairly even; there was still plenty of room for manoeuvre. Perhaps the most interesting case is that of Giordano Bruno — truly a "cause célèbre" now, though a minor affair at the time. Bruno was denounced to the Inquisition by his own patron, admitted charges of loose living, and was imprisoned in 1592; the Senate turned down the first Curial request for his extradition, on the grounds that the Venetian tribunal was independent and its verdict final; but a more urgent demand, and the recommendation of a senior Procurator that this was a fair chance of gratifying the Pope, soon turned the scale, and 'quel fra Giordano' was

130 A. Rossi, "Di una controversia fra la republica di Venezia e Clemente VIII", A.V. Vol.XXXVII, 1889, pp.259-90. Gabuzio raised a force of some 300 outlaws from the Papal States to assist Almoro Tiepolo's campaign against the Uskoks in 1592. A Venetian flotilla lifted the group across the Adriatic under cover of darkness.

133 No attempt is made here to supply an exhaustive bibliography of the case; reference has been made chiefly to V.Stampanato, Documenti della Vita di Giordano Bruno, Florence, 1933, p.139; the request was refused on Oct.3rd 1582 by 117 votes; 2:6. Cf. also L. Firpo, "Il Processo di Giordano Bruno", R.S.I.; Vol.LX, 1943, pp.542-597.
134 Report of the Procurator Ferigo Contarini printed in Stampanato, op. cit. pp.144-6. The emphasis placed on the absence of any dangerous precedents is clear; "...aggiunto anco, che egli è forestiero e
handed over. It was an almost exact repeat of the Guida da Fano case: nearly thirty years before.

So on the application of the law it is hard to draw any but negative conclusions. Tempers may have been running higher, and suspicions may have been sharper by the end of the century, as Graziani reported; but there is certainly no sign that Venetian action was being guided by a new set of values. The Venetian aim, in 1566 as in 1606, was to consolidate privilege by precedent. Saraceni and Brandolini were as much a part of this as Niccolo dalle Sardelle had been, and the Venetian authorities had no more solid reason to expect serious trouble when the two of them were arrested than there had been forty years earlier. Both before and after the 1532 reform, Venice was flexible; the Corsini, Accremboni and Bruno cases all show this quite clearly. The only constant factor was the willingness to shift with circumstances.

Certain areas in the Venetian sphere of influence were especially liable to breed jurisdictional disputes for the simple reason that legal sovereignty itself was disputed between the secular and ecclesiastical powers, generally as a result of feudal concessions long predating Venetian rule. At Trau on the Dalmatian coast the castle had been granted to the Bishop by Colomban, Duke of Dalmatia; but Venetian forces had

non suddito, crederia, che fosse conveniente satisfar a Sua Santità come si è fatto anco altre volte in casi similianti.”

135


135(a) In 1567. Cf. n. 119.
garrisoned it at the time of the Cyprus war to prevent its falling to
the Turks, at the orders of the Council of X, and retained control there-
after on the same grounds. The port of Orsara in Istria was nominally
under the temporal sway of the Bishop of Parenzo by concession of the
Emperor Otto II; but as the Uskok menace grew worse in that area Venice
naturally kept a closer watch, claiming total superiority - not implaus-
sibly - by right of her 'Dominio del Mar'.

Places like this were a continual potential source of trouble; a ludicrous incident at Orsara
in 1588 hinged mainly on whether two criminals had been arrested on the
quayside or hauled out of the harbour. But the overall situation,
and the arguments used, remained during Paruta's embassy exactly what
they had been in Bolognetti's time. There is no sign of real change;
but there was definitely a gradually increasing mutual irritation.

136 The constitutional background is given in detail by Bolognetti,
"Relazione dei Beni Ecclesiastici", in Stella, Chiesa e Stato,

l'archibugiata tirata da G.Caluzzi da Rovegno, Matteo Betussi, e
Galessio habitanti in Orsara sia stata nel porto e non dentro mare..."
The case trailed on through fantastic complexities till the Bishop
lost interest in 1590.

138 Legazione, cit.Vol.I, pp.23, 87f; Nov.28th 1592, Jan.30th 1592/3
(M.V.)

139 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXVI,c.685, Aug.5th 1589; pressing the College
for action, the nuncio Matteucci received the reply; "hbe il Vescovo
di Parenzo haveva duo soli pensieri, l'uno di riscuotere i fitti,
l'altro di questa causa." Paruta plainly found the Bishop of Trau
extremely trying and used his conduct as an answer to the Pope's
complaints about the Republic's treatment of high ecclesiastics
(Legazione, cit.Vol.I, p.245, June 26th 1593). It seems probable
that there was a kind of vicious spiral, with the Republic's greater
vigilance in the Adriatic aggravating the bishops, and the bishops
multiplying their complaints.
But on occasions an incident in one of these uncertain areas could explode into an ugly crisis. The Patriarchate of Aquileia included large expanses of Venetian and Austrian territory, so to Venice it was almost as much a buffer state as an episcopal See; its temporal powers were fixed by a vaguely worded agreement with the Republic in 1446, which brought the right of presentation to all fiefs in Friuli under Venetian sway; but some, including S. Daniele and S. Vito, were attached to Aquileia where the Patriarch held temporal supremacy. To S. Vito was annexed the fief of Taledo. So, in 1530, when the descendant of a previous holder of the fief tried to sue for additional payment on the sale, he could appeal to the Patriarchal court for support of his claims; while the actual holder could appeal, on the principle 'de renunciando impetratis', to the civil court of the Luogotenente of Udine. Both claims were supported, so the Venetian government and the Curia were drawn in and a major contest over ultimate sovereignty

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141 There are several accounts of the legal background and of the whole affair; G. de Renaldis, Memorie Storiche dei Tre Ultimi Secoli del Patriarcato di Aquileia, Udine, 1888, pp.326-35; Paschini, "La Questione del Feudo di Taledo e le Peripezie di un Patriarca", Memorie Storiche Foroigliesi, Vol.XL, 1952-3, p.75 for the legal problem; the following pages contain the minutest details of the negotiations; Seneca, Leonardo Donà, pp.126f. (largely derived from Paschini).

142 The clearest account of a remarkably opaque situation seems to me to be Seneca's; op.cit.pp.127-8. The fief had been left as a legacy to Elisabetta Savorgnan by the buyer, Fabrizio Altan; a relative of the seller, Annibale Altan, claimed further payment from Elisabetta.
developed. The negotiations are highly significant, as they dragged on through the period of the Venetian reform till 1585; so it is possible to see in detail how the assumed change in the ruling class affected the handling of a single important problem.

At the beginning the Council of X acted swiftly and drastically; hearing of the declarations made by the Patriarch Zuanne Grimani in summer 1580, it promptly annulled all actions of the patriarchal court and uncompromisingly affirmed the Republic's supremacy. The Pope's complaints were at first directed against the Council; but the members were not in a mood to be browbeaten. In the late summer of 1581 seven nobles were arrested and five tortured on suspicion of smuggling secret information to interested relations in Rome. When the ambassador Giacomo Soranzo accepted some sealed comments on the problem from the Pope's hands, so implying the Pope's right to decide the matter, he was sharply and widely censured.

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144 Alvise Michiel, entry of May 27th 1581. "Havendo inteso già molti mesi che per il Consiglio di X di quella inclita città sono stati inferiti molti danni alla Chiesa di Aquileia."

145 Francesco da Molino, Annali, c. 112-3; "... fecero per tal cagione con l'autorità del Consiglio di X poner in carcere Benedetto Zustiniano e Francesco Barbaro, parenti ed amici del Patriarca, e poco dopo anco cinque figliuoli del sopradetto Benedetto furono tormentati gravemente accio confessassero che havevano il registro delle lettere che il Padre scriveva." Date July-August 1581, Paschini, "La Questione", p. 98; Zustiniano was acquitted of anything deserving more than a year's deprivation of office; Barbaro got off entirely.

146 Alvise Michiel, entry of March 1582; "Il Ch.mo Zuanne Donato (a leading member of the Zonta) andò in renga gridando che il amb.
The affair proceeded in sharp spurts between long intervals of stagnation, one of which naturally fell during the reform. Shortly afterwards the nuncio Campeggio described in his much-quoted dispatch how the "giovani", a majority in the Senate, were blocking all progress. But whatever Campeggio's general impression, it was at this time that real attempts to find a compromise began. In May, within a few days of the conclusion of the reform, the Senate offered to "make a free gift" of the fief to the Pope - a diplomatic trap, as it assumed the Republic's possession, which was the point at issue. In August, Leonardo Donato was replaced as Rome ambassador by the milder Lorenzo di Priuli. Another long period of stagnation followed, until, like so many other lesser disputes, the matter was brought to an end by a change in the political climate. On April 10th, 1585, Pope Gregory XIII died; on the 24th Sixtus V was proclaimed his successor. The Patriarch Grimani,

havevano fatto male ad accettare la scrittura, chiamandoli Morlacchi Morlacchissimi." The Senate as a whole was gravely displeased.

147 Dispatch of July 2nd 1533, quoted in extenso p.9, n.14; Campeggio had just presented a new brief demanding restoration of the Patriarch's rights. It took the affair no further, beyond causing a great deal of offence.

148 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXIV,c.199-200, May 20th. "Le parole del decreto sono queste; 'Ci contentiamo di far libero dono a Sua B. ne di quel feudo, il quale è contentioso tra la Savorgnana e l'Altano." Campeggio saw the catch and asked the College on May 26th why there was no mention of the Patriarch. (A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma.F.I.)

149 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.cit.c.217, June 11th. Campeggio took some comfort from the election of Priuli, who was rumored to have said that the whole affair could be settled with a little tact. It was, in fact, settled during his period as ambassador.

senil, contrite and lacrimose, took the opportunity of returning to Venice, where the Senate dissolved in tears of sympathy and agreed to all his past demands.  

Whatever the impressions made, the facts seem to leave little doubt that Venetian policy was harder before the reform than after.

The fortunes of the community of Ceneda were quite closely linked to those of the Patriarchate of Aquileia, which was indeed Ceneda's metropolitan See; and many of the vicious ambiguities in the political background are only too recognisable. A Count-Bishopric of Ottonian vintage, holding nominal control over a tiny area in one corner of what is now the town of Vittorio Veneto; the whole territory signed to and fro in a series of treaties to which the bishop had not always been signatory; contradictory precedents pointing to the ultimate superiority of Venice, or of the Holy See. At any rate from the middle of the

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151 Grimani seems to have faced the Senate first on May 10th (Alvise Michiel, A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma, F.I) and fairly frequently thereafter, for though the crisis of relations with Rome was over, the affairs of the Patriarchate remained a focus of discussion. Reaction of opinion in his favour was immediate; (Paschini, "La Questione", pp. 135-6) and the Luogotenente of Udine was instructed to take no further action.

152 Lorenzo di Friuli (Relazione, in Alberi, Ser.II,Vol.4, p.293) stressed the bad feeling caused in Rome by the Republic's open refusal to recognise the superiority of the Holy See; "...scrivendolo anco nella lettera responsiva al Breve di Sua Santità." This almost certainly refers to the exchanges of May 1581. (Paschini, "La Questione", cit.p.94).

153 The basis of this whole section is Professor Cozzi's exhaustive article, "Paolo Paruta, Paolo Sarpi, e la Questione della Sovranità su Ceneda", in Bollettino dell'Istituto di Storia della Società e dello Stato Veneziano, Vol.IV, 1962, pp.176f. The territory had passed to Venice under a treaty with Giangaleazzo Visconti, 1333, had been lost in 1411, recovered in 1418, lost again in the League
Even in its now respectable function of girls' orphanage, the Count-bishop's palace at Ceneda has hardly lost the look of a robber den.
XVIth century Canada supplied, like Trau and Orsara, a permanent potential crisis, and in 1594 and '95 this potential flared into dangerous reality. The whole affair has recently been the subject of an extremely erudite study by Professor Cozzi, who treats it as a typical instance of the accelerating change in Venetian attitudes, contrasting the quiescence of the problem in the earlier decades with the sharp dispute of the 1590s, and the firm but diplomatic stand taken by Paruta at that time with the still more assertive position later adopted by Sarpi. To rework the incident in detail here would be both unnecessary and presumptuous; but the affair needs to be drawn into its political perspective and a few minor points can be added which may, perhaps, have some effect on the general interpretation. The sequence of developments is certainly suggestive. A Brief of Julius III, dated 1551, had directly asserted the temporal authority of the Count-Bishop and his responsibility to the Pope without mentioning the claims of the Republic; there was no Venetian response for eleven years, then the Council of X

of Cambrai wars, and finally recovered in 1512 (pp.176-8). Venice had levied taxes in Canada during the XVth century, but appeal cases had been heard at Aquileia or Rome (pp.179-181). The ambiguity could hardly have been worse.

154

Ibid. pp.176, 212-16. Cozzi aligns Paruta's approach to the problem with the liberal but firmly secular principles of his Perfettione della Vita Politica.

155

"Episcopus Cenetensis pro tempore existens et eius territorii comes et in temporalibus dominus existat neque ullum alium nisi Sedem Apostolicam et Romanum Pontificem pro tempore existentem in superiore recognoscat." Quoted by Cozzi, ibid. p.191.
summoned appeals from the Bishop's court to Venice. Still the conflicting forces did not produce a spark. That came only in the early 1590s, when a vicious blood-feud between two local families, the Piccioli and the Sarcinelli, drew in the rival superior powers. It was the familiar pattern of appeal and counter-appeal. The Papal Brief of 1551 was republished in October 1592 by the influence of Cardinal Camillo Borghese, later Pope Paul V - a prophetic move. Murders continued, and in Autumn 1594 the Piccioli appealed to the Council of X. At the same time representatives on the road from Genoa were held up by Venetian officials and turned back from their mission of asking the Papal authorities for a proper court of appeal. On June 17th 1595 the

156 There seems to have been a rash of troubles around 1562-3; Cozzi, op.cit.p.192, cites the blocking of an appeal to Rome by the Council of X in 1563; in 1566 the nuncio Facchinetti referred to a Parte del Senato passed 4 years earlier which called appeals to Venice. (Nunziature di Venezia, ed.Stella, Vol.VIII, p.39); and a manuscript in the Biblioteca Marciana (Cod.it.VII, 1187-8971), containing assorted notes on the Terraferma, refers (C.7) to an appeal to Venice against the Bishop's corn regulations in 1562; "dicono di esser ricorsi a questo stato, perche intendono d'esser sudditi piu di quello che del Vescovo."

157 I have not found it easy to trace the exact number of murders; A.S. Vat.Nunz.Ven.F. XXX, c.232, Sept. 24th 1594, refers to the death of the "Cav. Sarcinelli" two years before - probably before the republication of the Brief; c.III, Feb.25th 1594 tells of the murder of Antonio Sarcinelli in Venice "last week", c.118, March 12th of the Council of X's decision to probe into the death of Giacomo Piccioli. But judging by the frequent complaints of other citizens to the nuncio and the Senate, armed clashes between the factions must have been common.

158 Cozzi, op.cit.p.193. It seems from the remarks of the nuncio Taverna (A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F. XXXI, cc.53, 34, March 25th, June 3rd 1595) that the Sarcinelli were equally anxious to involve the Venetian authorities and pressed for the declaration of June 17th.

Venetian government directly declared its superiority over Ceneda and instructed the community's ambassadors that in future all appeals were to be brought before Venetian courts; a few days later the Pope replied with a threat of excommunication if the Cenedese obeyed the Venetian directive. It was a tense situation which Paruta, far more concerned about the European problem of the French Succession, just managed to calm by securing the withdrawal of both the Venetian instructions of June 17th and the Papal monitorium.

At no stage in the second half of the XVIth century was the Venetian government unconcerned about Ceneda; disputes did occur, and men like da Ponte were prepared to express themselves forcefully. But there was nothing serious enough to provoke a real confrontation, and the problem remained similar to those of Trau and Parenzo; ever present but generally quiescent. Venetian action did not always tally with the claim to "long-established supremacy" which emerged in 1595, and the senatorial directives to Paruta display a firmness and unanimity.


161 Ibid.p.229, July 29th. Cozzi, op.cit. pp.204-5, points out that the Senate did not wholly approve of Paruta's action and continued to press for firm action (A.S.V.Senato, Delib.Roma Rg.X, c.133, Sept. 8th).

162 Nunziature di Venezia, Vol.VIII, ed.Stella, p.110, 24th Sept. 1566; Facchinetti records a dispute with da Ponte over the Republic's right to raise a "taglio" for oars in Ceneda. He realised that "il fine di alcuni non è altro che di sottometter quella citta". (Ibid. p.105, Sept.14th).

163 Ibid.p.44, May 18th, 1566; an appeal from the Bishop to the College by Giovanni Maria da Ceneda turned down; p.233, Oct.18th 1567; no further action taken on the oar-taglio.
Barely a kilometre as the crow flies from the bishop's palace lies the Venetian controlled township of Serravalle, standard centre for refugees from episcopal justice.
that are undeniably new. On the other hand, the crisis of 1595 displayed in itself a number of special features which I feel have not been emphasised enough and which make comparisons difficult. This was not merely an awkward question of principle, but an imminent threat to life and property. The jurisdictional area of Ceneda was approximately three quarters of a mile across, and many of its inhabitants owned property in the Venetian-held territory which surrounded the enclave entirely. A criminal had only a few hundred yards between him and the rule of another law. Effectively, the ecclesiastical authorities were quite unable to control the situation, and the nuncio Taverna seems often to have been well aware of it. The Senate was under pressure of circumstances as well as attitudes; and in spite of all the stern

164 The declaration of superiority, June 17th 1595, was carried in the Senate by 133 votes; 0:34 'non sicuri'. (A.S.V.Senato, Delib.Roma Rg.X cc.104-5). On August 26th (ibid.c.126) Paruta was directed to force an issue at all costs. "Et poiche mostrate desiderio di saper il voler nostro circa il proceder a quello negotio, overo scopirlo col portar il tempo innanzi, vi aggiungemo nostro intendone essere di proseguir innanzi in esso negotio per vederne quel fine che conviene alla indubitata ragione della antiquissima superiorità nostra."

165 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXX, c.90, Jan.8th 1594; Taverna describes Ceneda as "due archibugiate" in width. Serravalle, which is now part of the same complex of Vittorio Veneto, was in Venetian territory. Ibid.F.XXXI, cc.23-4, March 8th 1595. "...havendo la maggior parte de' Cenedesi beni nel Dominio Veneto, e dovendo loro praticar continuamente nelle terre circonvicine, non possono senza grave pericolo dar disgusto a questi Signori."

166 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXX, c.232, Sept.24th 1594; Alessandro Piccioli and a bravo were arrested on Venetian territory and Taverna was unable to intervene though the crime had been committed in Ceneda. By the end of November the uncertainty was becoming impossible, and Cenedese agents were complaining to Taverna: "che loro non potevano star più a questa maniera, e era necessario che sapessero dove havessero da ricorrere per molti aggravii, ai quali bisogna rimediare." (Ibid.c.271).
declarations on both sides during 1595; in spite of the Senate's dis-
approval of Paruta's temporary compromise, the problem soon dropped
out of the limelight to become again what it had been - a permanent and
incurable source of mutual irritation. It was 1769 before the Republic
finally asserted the overall secular supremacy that had been the point
at issue in 1595. Really, the precise extent of the change that
seems to be represented in the directives of that year can only be
judged in the light of changes in the Senate itself; and as a prelimi-
nary to fuller examination, it may be noticed that, of the Savii Grandi
who proposed the declaration of superiority in June 1595, three had
held public office before 1582; two - Soranzo and Zustiniano - had
been members of the Council of X.

With jurisdiction, it is much as with foreign policy. Professor
Cessi's cautious comments on Venetian politics at the beginning of the
century can be applied with advantage to the later period as well.
There is some sign of argument within the ruling class, as over the
Acoramboni case, but very little sign of a definite alternative policy.

167 Cozzi, op.cit.p.207; only two members of the College, Sopranzo and
Gradenigo, unreservedly approved Paruta's policy of compromise, and
the Senate continued to press for an issue. Cf.n.164 above.


169 Senato, Delib.Roma, loc.cit. under n.164 above. One of the Savii
di Terraferma, Alvise Bragadin, was nephew of a prominent ex-member
of the X and Zonta. App.I and II.

170 Cf. the short article cited under n.17, p.10 above; Cessi argues
that there may have been some kind of an emotional division in the
nobility over the conduct of the Turkish war, but that there was
little sign of a change of policy even after a series of election
successes for the discontented group.
Least of all is there any solid reason to connect a change in attitudes towards the Papacy with the reform of 1582-3; the details of the Aquileia affair tell strongly against this, and the gradual multiplication of laws controlling ecclesiastical persons and privileges dates from the late 1560s. At the most, an already well-established tendency was being continued.

(iii) Curial Catholicism and Venetian Catholicism

Changes in religious policy are difficult to detect except in cases of really violent reformist upheaval, and the notion of a distinct and definable "Venetian religion" has been applied to practically every century from the later Middle Ages to the fall of the Republic; so it may seem the height of foolishness to restrict discussion to a few decades at the end of the XVIth century. Still, a number of the more public features of Venetian religious life, particularly the tolerance of schismatic groups of resident foreigners, did come under heavy fire at the time of the Interdict, and certain checks on the independent power

171 A. Battistella, "La Politica Ecclesiastica di Venezia", N.A.V., Vol. XVI, 1898, pp.386-420, traces a subordination of Church to State from the end of the XIIIth century; B. Cecchetti, La Repubblica di Venezia e la Corte di Roma, goes so far as to state (p.81) "... il Governo Veneto non aver mai discusso ne favorito con speciale intendimento la religione." Few would accept such a conclusion now but these two works remain the foundation of the concept of "Venetian religion".

172 A. Possevino, "Risposta di Teodoro Eugenio", pp.48-49. "...permessosi, che l'eresia di Calvino si predichi, e che i Quintinisti Flaminghi o Hollandesi nieghino l’Inferno, e che il Fondaco de’ Tedeschi sia una sentina di Luteranesimo o di Calvinismo, e che anco i Turchi habbino luoghi ove seducendo e abusando i giovini gli menano in Costantinopoli a rinegar Cristo... quale uomo di sano giudicio potra meravigliarsi se adesso il giudicio divino ha comminciato ad essercitarsi per
of the Inquisition were introduced, suggestively, during the 1590s. 173
Also, much scholarly attention has been paid recently to the private
religious convictions of prominent nobles. 174 There has been more than
a suggestion that the political reform of 1582 was linked with liberal
religious attitudes, or at least that it brought men of more liberal
views to the political forefront. 175 No attempt will be made here to
embark on a full discussion of Venetian religious life in public and in
private, but our case demands that some myths be laid — principally the
myth of a connection between what can be seen as religious liberalism
and a distinct political group. The precise nature of that apparent
liberalism needs careful scrutiny as well.

The University of Padua was an object of keen interest, often based

mezzo della facoltà e podestà del Papa?" 173

The exemption of foreigners from prosecution by the Inquisition in
1591 is perhaps the most significant. Cf.n.114.

References in Cozzi's Niccolò Contarini are common but generally
isolated; cf.pp.29-32. Seneca, Leonardo Donà, cit.pp.31f, spends
a complete chapter analysing the spiritual makeup of his hero; an
interesting development on similar lines is supplied by O. Logan's
recent article "Grace and Justification - Some Italian Views of the
XVIth and Early XVIIth Century", Journal of Ecclesiastical History,
Vol.XX, No.1, April 1969, pp.67-78. Taking as a basis the 'Evangelist'
views of writers like Gasparo Contarini on the total suffi-
ciency of Christ's sacrifice to justify Man irrespective of his own
'works', Logan tries to demonstrate the persistence of such views
in Venetian wills later in the XVIth century. It must be stressed
that Logan makes no attempt to exploit this theme politically; but
cf. next footnote.

Stella, Chiesa e Stato, ch.II, passim, pp.17-43; Bouwsma, Republican
Liberty, cit.p.254, speaks of a mysterious entity called "the par-
ticular piety of the 'giovani'".
on personal experience, to members of the Venetian nobility. To the Curia it was highly suspect, chiefly because of the substantial number of German students; the Jesuit Possevino denounced the University as an arsenal of heresy, supplying weapons of spiritual assassination to the three or four hundred Germans who crowded its lecture halls in any year. The majority, he noted, lived openly as heretics. This, of course, was polemic of the most virulent kind. But in 1565 the Council of X had agreed to the publication at Padua of the Bull "In Sacrosancta", which demanded a profession of the Catholic Faith from all wishing to take degrees in the University. If this is typical of the spirit of compromise said to have animated the Venetian government until 1582, then surely that spirit had been interrupted somewhere?

But if the publication of "In Sacrosancta" was a move towards compromise with the Curia, it was not very much more; publication was

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176 Facchinetti put the number of young Venetian nobles usually resident at Padua around one hundred (Nunziature di Venezia, Vol. VIII, ed. Stella, cit. pp.107-8). Both the Paruta and Morosini circles (cf. above n.25) centred around groups of friends from the University.

177 "Riposta di Teodoro Eugenio", cit.p.49. "...permettendosi a tre-cento e quattrocento Alemanni studenti in Padova che la maggior parte di loro vivessero hereticamente e armandosi della dottrina di questo studio, quindi poscia l'andassero a spargere in varie città ove si ritirano." Writing in 1606-7, Possevino referred to a document of Facchinetti on the dangerous consequences of this tolerance; cf. Nunziature di Venezia, Vol. VIII, loc.cit. in previous note.

178 P. Paschini, "Venezia e l'Inquisizione Romana sotto Paolo IV e Pio IV", Antonianum, Anno XX, 1945, p.62. Paschini's conclusion from a series of case histories in the 1550s and 60s is that Venice was prepared to back the Inquisition "...in modo che non avesse a pregiudicare la sua politica interna e suscitare malcontenti presso la nobiltà o nelle città o tenendo conto di quei rapporti commerciali e di buon vicinato che intendeva mantenere coi, paesi d'Oltremonte confinanti coi suoi."
one thing, enforcement another. Something of the ambivalent attitude adopted by the Council of X is shown by its handling in 1563 of the case against Alessandro Trissino, a Vicentine noble who had made many contacts during his student years at Padua, and later organised a complete Calvinist cell at Vicenza, with embarrassingly exalted accomplices in the Venetian governing class. 179 He was denounced, as form required; as tact and policy demanded, his escape was effected. 180 So, in the wider field, Facchinetti pressed for positive action to force the Lutherans at Padua into at least an outward show of Catholicism; but the Venetian authorities made it perfectly clear that they had no intention of offending a powerful neighbour, or of risking the thirty thousand ducats revenue brought into Padua annually by the foreign students. 181 In fact, the number of Germans in residence seems to have risen steadily over the second half century; 200 names show in the voting lists of the Law School in 1564, 260 in 1587, and a decade later the figure has reached

179 A. Oliveri, "Alessandro Trissino e il Movimento Calvinista Vicentino del Cinquecento", Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia, Vol.XXI, 1967, pp.54-117. Trissino's friends at Padua (p.57) seem mostly to have been Greek islanders; his Venetian contacts included Vicenzo Grimani, Vittore Correr, Zuanpaolo Contarini, Gerolano and Zaccaria Dolfin, Marin da Ca'Pesaro, Felice Bon, and Piero Diedo (p.58). Clearly, the stench would have risen far too high had the case come to trial.

180 Ibid. pp.64-6; proceedings began on March 14th 1563 at Vicenza, but were lukewarm; the escape was organised for May 31st, after insistence by Roman authorities that the case be pressed.

There were protests from the Curia, and the usual skirmishes; but the Republic would not go beyond its policy of generally worded injunctions to the 'olttramontani' to live without open scandal, refusing to establish precedents of coercion. In 1579 the Bishop Ferigo Corner, aided by a member of the University, Doctor Mercuriale, launched a major campaign to force Lutheran students to destroy heretical books and show proper respect towards Catholic priests and festivals, and in the process doctors were forbidden to attend a sick Lutheran named Henry Libot. The 'natio Germana' - the official corporate body of the German students - appealed to the Riformatori dello Studio and the Doge, who rescinded the acts of Mercuriale and confirmed the privileges of the Germans.

Virtually the same thing happened in 1587, when the Silesian Joachim Hannoldt was arrested in Venice as a result of some rather free language against the Papacy; once again, the 'natio' appealed to the Riformatori, and this time a definite ducal proclamation was issued, which forbade inquisitors to proceed against members of the 'German Nation' without

182 B. Brugi, "Gli Studenti Tedeschi e la Santa Inquisizione a Padova nella la Seconda Meta del Secolo XVI", Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Ser.VII, Vol.5, June 1894, p. 1016. The total number of Germans who matriculated between 1550 and 1599 was 6060. A serious decline seems to have set in during the early XVIIth century; A.S.V.Riformatori dello Studio, F. CCCXLVIII, ins.1, 1619, complains that numbers have dwindled to around thirty.

183 A.S.V.Capi del Consiglio di X, Dispacci Roma, B.XXVII, c.26, Feb. 13th 1579/80 (M.V.) "Le diedi poi conto delli ordini dati dalla Ser.ta Vostra perche gli scholari olttramontani di Padoa habbiano da vivere cattolicamente e senza scandalo...."

prior reference to the Riformatori dello Studio. It is interesting to find that two of the Riformatori to whom the German students gratefully attributed their successes in 1579 and 1587 were Alvise Zorzi and Zuanne Michiel, both lately prominent members of the Zonta, the latter having recently conveyed the Senate's official congratulations on the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Eve to Charles IX. The Germans at Padua considered him more than a father. As Panizzi commented, the Republic might advance along different paths in different circumstances; but she pursued her own interests, and the persons she employed must be as adaptable as the means she followed.

The suppression of the Jesuit College at Padua in 1591 concerned the German students deeply, and must be discussed in the same context as their affairs, though it involved wider problems and is open to very different interpretations between which the facts do not seem to me to admit a clear decision. The Jesuits had established themselves at Padua at an indefinite time after the middle of the century, with a licence

185 "Atti", p.233-6. This exemption of the Germans is a preliminary to the comprehensive exemption of foreign residents passed by the Senate in 1591; cf. n.114, above.


187 Cf. the quotation from the "Discorso sulla Neutralità" under n.66, above.
to award degrees granted by two Bulls of Paul III and Julius III.183 Partly, it seems, by setting up as the sole champions of the Faith in a lions' den of heresy and decadence, they succeeded in attracting a considerable number of students, moved from elementary instruction to advanced logic and theology, and by 1590 were operating as a University within the University of Padua, printing timetables of public lectures "in Gymnasio Patavino Societatis Jesu."189 Meaningful references to heresy, however oblique, were threatening to the Germans; the success of the Jesuits in attracting students was threatening to the University itself. Rivalry between the "Bovisti" and "Jesuiti" became intense, and in the summer of 1591 a group of young Venetian nobles arrived at a Jesuit lecture, yelling obscenities and proceeded to strip stark naked. The Council of X acted quickly and severely against them. 190 The University was uneasy about the effect such a moral triumph might have


189 Favaro, "Nuovi Documenti", cit.p.91. The whisper campaign mounted by the Jesuits was mentioned in a later complaint of the University authorities to the Senate, in 1597; cit. by Favaro, ibid, p.96. "Che essi conservano negli animi la pietà Christiana,...quasi i Dottori del Bo, servitori di Vostra Ser.tà, non siano Christiani..."

190 Favaro, "Lo Studio e la Società", p.431, documents on pp.479f. Fines of 100 to 500 ducats were imposed on Vicenzo Querini, Giulio Contarini, Marcantonio Corner, Alessandro Trevisan, and Lorenzo Zustiniani.
on the conduct of the Jesuits, and decided to send a special mission to
Venice to ask for the enforcement of its privileges and the suppression
of the rival College. Contributions to the expenses came from the
Germans, who obviously felt keenly interested in the success of the
mission, and whose welfare was, by implication, mentioned in the favourable Parti carried by the Senate just before the end of the year; the ancient rights of the University were confirmed, and the Jesuits forbidden to spread any instruction other than that directed at the internal purposes of their own Society. If it is accepted that the Society was bent on the destruction of freedom of thought in higher education throughout Western Europe, then it follows naturally that the Republic's decision was a defence of that freedom, and that the three ballots needed to reduce the number of abstentions even to 60 provide a sinister sign of growing Jesuit influence among the nobility. But

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195 Favaro takes a strongly anti-Jesuitical attitude throughout; "Lo Studio e la Compagnia", pp.410-422, attributes the decadence of the German Universities directly to the Society, and traces their influence in Paris. The voting figures on the two Parti were as
the point stressed in the Senate’s directive to Rettori di Padova was the threat to public order which rival Colleges must constitute; an obvious and typically Venetian anxiety. 196 Again, the repeated requests of the Commune of Padua that the Jesuits be allowed to re-open at least elementary schools contain a definite suggestion that the Society had been filling a real educational need. 197 In spite of strenuous appeals from both the ‘natio Germanica’ and the Studio that all such requests be turned down, the Venetian government was in fact surprisingly inconsistent in its support; in 1597 the Jesuits were actually granted permission to re-open schools, though they do not appear to have done so, since the Commune renewed its appeals to this effect shortly before the Interdict. 198 Really, Venice shifted and compromised between the Germans and the Jesuits in the 1590s much as she had shifted and compromised over the execution of the Bull “In Sacrosancta” thirty years before. In the event, neither side gained much. The Jesuit schools were suppressed; and by 1619 the once proud

196 Favaro, op. cit. Doc. XX; “...che la divisione e discordia nata tra quei scolari per le cause scritte ci da voi, ... non prenda maggior formento con evidente pericolo di male conseguenze e distruttione del medesimo Studio.”

197 Favaro, "Nuovi documenti", p.93. The pleas were pressed in 1594, 1596 and 1597. Each time they were opposed by the Germans and the Studio, the grounds being, (p.93) "...che introducendo di nuovo questi padri, si vengono a porre in bisbiglio le nationi oltremen
tane..."

198 Ibid. p.99, petition of April 7th, 1606.
'natio Germanica' had to report to the Riformatori that its numbers had dwindled from three hundred to a bare thirty.¹⁹⁹

Due to the fierce religious conflicts of the time, the German heretics living in Venetian territory naturally created much uneasiness. But they were not very numerous, and their influence did not extend far beyond Padua and the Fondaco de'Tedeschi. The Greeks presented the secular authorities with a problem that was less obtrusive but in reality far more widespread and far more deeply-rooted. Most of the Venetian subjects in the Stato di Mar were of course members of the Greek Orthodox Church; powerful Venetian families owned estates in the islands, or counted Greeks among their friends and relatives.²⁰⁰ There do not appear to have been any really dangerous crises; but the XVIth century produced a kind of triangular fencing match between the Curia, the Orthodox Church, and the Venetian secular authorities. In the later stages there seem to be some signs that the government was moving away from the Roman diktats towards a more flexible and tolerant attitude.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ A.S.V.Riformatori dello Studio, loc.cit. under n.182. "...sicome per l'addietro venivano in Padova 300 o più della nostra natione; così ora lo studio de'legisti non arriva quasi al numero di trenta." The reasons given were the better conditions and lower costs at universities in Papal and Granducal territory.

²⁰⁰ A complete branch of the Corner, for example, were known as the "Cornari di Candia". Cf. M. Barbaresco, Genealogie delle Famiglie Patrizie Veneziane, Vol.II, p.11f (copies in Venetian archives and Biblioteca Marc.) The list can be multiplied almost at will.

Since the rather hollow agreement at the Council of Florence in 1439, Greek subjects of Venice had been classed as "Uniates", preserving their own rites but subordinate to the Latin Church in matters of jurisdiction and dogma, obliged to insert the "filioque" clause in the Creed. This would have been practically impossible to enforce even with the full cooperation of the Venetian local authorities, and it is clear enough that the local authorities would do no such thing. A Bull of Pius IV officially placed the Greek Churches under Visitation by Latins in 1564; but in the 1530s the late Papal nuncio Bolognetti lamented that the Greeks had gradually lapsed into their old practices, omitting the "filioque" clause and running to the lay authorities over jurisdictional questions far more readily than to a Latin bishop. A Ducal directive of the Doge da Ponte, dated 20th August 1578, specifically forbade the Archbishop of Candia - the Latin Metropolitan - to interfere in the ordination of Greek priests, and this Venetian policy of leaving the Greeks to manage their own affairs unmolested was strongly endorsed by the Doge and College in 1592, when the nuncio complained that the rettori of Candia were preventing the Bishops from enforcing proper religious changes.

Giuridica ed Ecclesiastica dei Greci a Venezia nei Secoli XV e XVI, Florence, 1967; pp.96-8 incline very much towards the accepted change in Venetian policy.

202 Geanakoplos, op.cit.p.61.


204 "Relazione delle Chiese di Levante", in Stella, Chiesa e Stato, pp.295-318, esp.303, 307.
The rising fortunes of the Greek community in Venice find expression in the church of San Giorgio, completed in 1573.
practices. Meanwhile, the Greek community in Venice itself grew spectacularly in numbers and in organisation during the century; from around 4000 in 1473 it swelled to an estimated – perhaps exaggerated – 14-15,000 by the end of the next century. Work on a separate Greek Church began in 1539, and was completed in 1573; in 1580 San Giorgio dei Greci was visited by the Doge da Ponte himself, and a buzz of gossip ran through the city, for the Doge’s grandfather on his mother’s side had been a Byzantine knight, Dmitri Spandolin. From 1577 the Greeks had as head of their community an Orthodox cleric of the highest rank, Gabriele Severo, titular Archbishop of Filadelfia, who was granted a public salary; and whether or not they placed themselves directly subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople, there is no doubt that they would in no way

205 Fedalto, op.cit. p.134, App.Doc.XXIV. “...giudicando noi, che alla conservazione dell’i predetti luoghi nostri, sia necessario di conservar ai Greci i riti loro...” This compares interestingly with Pasquale Cicogna’s reply to Taverna, A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma,F.III, ins. 223, Dec.23rd 1592; “che havendo li Greci il loro rito secondo il loro modo separato dal Latino, benche ancor essi Christiani, non si erano mai li Vescovi impediti nelle cose dei Greci, lassandoli vivere nella observanza dell’i loro riti; perchè altrimente si causeria troppo grande scandalo e confusione.”

206 Geanakoplos, op.cit.pp.60-1. Possevino, “Risposta di Teodoro Eugânio”, p.46, places the figure at 14,000.


208 Alvise Michiel, Annali, cit. under n.41, p.18, above, entry of Oct. 7th, 1580 (S.Giustina’s day) “...cosa che diode da ragionare alla Città e ognuno diceva la sua, e massime che era persona discesa de sangue Greco.” On his ancestry, A. da Mosto, I Dopi di Venezia, Milan, 1960, p.297.

submit to Rome. An attempt to introduce the Gregorian calculation of Easter was firmly resisted in spite of the support of Severo himself; two noble commissioners, Ferigo Sanudo and the diarist Alvise Michiel, were appointed to negotiate with the recalcitrant Greeks, but the government would not press the matter. The nuncio Campeggio received long and evasive replies about the dangers of alienating Greek sympathies in the present political circumstances. The same reason was advanced in 1593 when the Rome Inquisition asked for the extradition of Massimo Margunio, another titular Orthodox Bishop of very dubious orthodoxy who had finally settled at Padua. The risk of arresting so prominent a person was too great, and the Senate replied firmly that he could be judged only as a temporal subject of the Republic.

210 Geanakoplos, op.cit.p.68, asserts that the Greek community in Venice was allowed to place itself under the jurisdiction of Constantinople in 1577; but Fedalto (p.101) thinks that a meeting of the community in 1583 declared independence of Constantinople as well. An act of the Patriarch Jerimiah of Constantinople in 1579 had referred to the Venetian community as "patriarcale et libero."

211 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXX, cc.317, 332, 340, 344-50, 364, Jan.12th - March 30th 1585. A typical answer is recorded on c.345; "Ma essi nella risposta si sono estesi meco nelle solite difficiltà, incolcando particolarmente quella interesse di Stato che risguarda il pericolo di alienarsi la devotone dei Greci di Levante." The attempt to agree on the date of Easter was probably a sincere effort to achieve union of the Churches; Fedalto, op.cit.p.103.

In the sympathetic attitude of an half-Greek Doge and the effective discarding by the College of even that slender pretence of Latin superiority which Rome still considered the rule, it does seem fair to detect some change of policy. The difficulty is that with this, as with policy towards France, it is extraordinarily hard to measure the change of attitudes inside Venice, and the change of circumstances outside. The growth of the Greek community was caused largely by an influx of refugees from areas newly conquered by the Turks; Venice had to provide for them, and above all, to make sure that life under the Turks did not seem preferable to life under fellow Christians. Further Turkish enterprises were constantly feared, and the loyalty of the local populations was more necessary than ever. In fact, a Parte of 1427 seems to have been the main support of later XVIth century Venetian policy.

The strongly individual nature of Venetian religious attitudes, and the government's fierce defence of its independence of action against the pretensions of Curial power, seem concentrated in one brief, intense incident which occurred just before the political reform of 1532, and so readily becomes a test-case for the study of the growing disagreements.

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213 A.S.V. Senato, Deliberazioni Mar, Rg.XLIV, cc.67-70, Parte of Dec. 20th 1578, providing for the foundation of a Greek colony at Pola in Istria. Provision was to be made for 50 Cypriot families.

214 Eg.A.S.Vat. Nunz.Ven.F.XXVII, c.51, March 3rd 1590; rumours of an impending Turkish attack on Candia to prevent its use as a base by the Hospitallers.

215 Bolognetti, Relazione cit. under n.204, above; Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.307; the Greeks had complained of interference in their affairs; "mettendo in considerazione a S.Ser.tà che questo potrebbe metterla in pericolo di perder quanto possedeva nella Grecia..."
within the governing class. In 1580 Gregory XIII, perhaps misled by overconfident and unofficial reports from Cardinal Borromeo that such a scheme could probably succeed, ordered an Apostolic Visitation of religious institutions in the city of Venice itself. After some initial delays by the Republic, the Pope made a stand on the supremacy of his religious power and insisted that the Visitation begin in spite of the Senate's resistance; again, acting according to the recommendations of Borromeo, who considered the Venetians so peaceful that they would probably cave in under real pressure. But reactions only grew sharper; the senior Savii - Paolo Tiepolo, Jacomo Soranzo, and Alvise Zorzi - all referred to the scheme as an unprecedented and unnecessary outrage to the status and privileges of the Republic. Some were even prepared to declare that, if the Pope proceeded to censures, they

216 The matter was first raised on Nov. 10th, 1580; A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma, F.I, ins. 245. The whole affair is discussed with very full documentation from Roman sources by Stella, Chiesa e Stato, pp. 30-43, where he uses it to display the tension between moderate elder senators like Paolo Tiepolo and Francesco Corner, and the younger, more militant group. Suggestive hints on the origins of the plan are provided in the letters of Carlo Borromeo to the Papal Secretary of State, printed in G. Soranzo, "Rapporti di San Carlo Borromeo con la Republica Veneta", Archivio Veneto, Vol. XXVII, 1940, Ipp. 1-40, esp. 35-38; visiting Venice in Feb. 1580, Borromeo stressed the benefits that a Visitation would bring, and suggested stern tactics if necessary; "procedesse alle pene contra di loro senza rispetto perche facendosi così, credo, che essi come amatori della quiete e riposo fugirebbero l'occasione di mettersi in simili fastidii e travagli." (p. 37).


218 A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma, F.I, inserts of Dec. 8th, 22nd, and Jan. 12th 1580/1 (M.V.) Zorzi insisted that the Visitation of Milan was no precedent as it was not a capital and had been visited before.
would take the Sacraments from Greek Orthodox priests; there were proposals for a firm response which would list the various offensive actions of the Pope against Venice, and talk of an open break was already beginning to circulate in some parts of the Dominio. Two moves saved the situation; the first was the suggestion of a compromise, narrowly approved by the Senate at the urgent recommendation of the Savii Grandi Tiepolo and Francesco Corner, and accepted by the Pope. This provided that an Apostolic Visitor be received in Venice, but that nunneries, certain lay schools, hospitals and procuracies, should be exempt from inspection. The second move was more of a blunder; Bolognetti, perhaps overanxious to prove his zeal after months of pressure from Rome, began the Visitation before official instructions arrived and was withdrawn from his post in disgrace. This left the matter in the hands of the new nuncio Lorenzo Campeggio and the Bishop of Verona, Agostino Valier, a Venetian noble of high principles and connections; they made, Alvise Michiel acidly commented, a few reforms which were little observed.

219 Stella, Chiesa e Stato, pp. 38-39, with footnotes. I have found no trace of the threat to secede to the Greek Church in the records of the College's interviews with Bolognetti on Jan. 26th and Feb. 9th, which are those reported in the dispatch of Feb. 11th quoted by Stella; cf. Coll.Esp.Roma, F.I, ins. 35, 36, 37. The Secretary Ottobon contacted the nuncio with the proposal on Feb. 20th; Bolognetti asked for leave to make a token start before official instructions came through, but this was not granted; hence the sequel.

220 A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma, F.I, ins. 80. The Secretary Ottobon contacted the nuncio with the proposal on Feb. 20th; Bolognetti asked for leave to make a token start before official instructions came through, but this was not granted; hence the sequel.


222 Entry of summer 1582, undated. "Fecero a loro costituzioni che poi fu poco osservato."
It must be said at once that this incident will not stand up to very close inspection as an example of liberal and independent religious policy, for the simple reason that the decisive point at issue was not really religious at all. The exemption of nunneries proved the crucial feature in the compromise, and the matter had been freely aired in the College beforehand. The Venetian nunneries were crowded with the daughters of nobles who had parked them there rather than face the exorbitant expense of marrying them off; to judge by the frequent comments, life as a nun was gay enough for the girls not to object, but the effect might have been catastrophic if some strong-minded foreign Bishop had tried to impose the discipline of the Council of Trent.

What the nobles were defending was a private and somewhat sordid interest. Further, though there was clearly a division among the senators over the exact length to which resistance should go, I do not feel convinced that it was quite so clearly defined as Professor Stella thinks; Paolo Tiepolo may have persuaded the Senate to accept the compromise;

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223 A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma,F.I,Feb.17th, 1580/1 (M.V.) "Dell'utilità ho discorso sopra le monache, nelle quali e tanto interesse di tutti per ciò che contentandosi le figliuole de monarcarsi, impaurite hora di queste visite straordinarie abhorrirebbono l'entrarsi, e maritandosi qui le figuole con XXm.ducati e di dote, causarebbe ciò gravissimo danno e interesse alli loro padri." (Report of the nuncio's speech, showing how he had informed the Pope of Venetian anxieties.) Alvise Michiel, loc.cit. under n.222, above, mentions the same worry. Gallo, "Una Famiglia Patrizia - I Pisani", Archivio Veneto Vol.XXIV, 1944, p.80, shows that even in the early XVIth century Alvise Pisani paid 20,000 ducats on the dowries of his five daughters.

224 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXXVI, c.104, Feb.2nd 1588; complaints that the nuns of S. Spirito "in questi tempi di Carnovale con collationi mangare, bere, sonare, cantare e ballare o in maschera intrare."
but he had spoken firmly against the Pope's methods in the College a few days earlier. Both he, and Francesco Corner, who joined in putting forward the compromise, were members of the Council of X and Zonta in 1580; but so, for that matter, was Leonardo Donato, the most feared opponent of clerical power. Before treating the compromise over the Visitation as the last triumph of the old ruling class, we need to be much clearer of what the old ruling class was, and what happened to it after the reform of 1582.

None of the evidence derived from Venetian policy towards the Papacy during the last two decades of the XVIth century seems quite sufficient on its own to indicate a major shift in the direction of government. Where there seems to be some chance of detecting a real change of front, as in attitudes towards Henri de Navarre or in the obviously increasing toleration enjoyed by the Greeks, the alteration in Venetian policy is so involved with cataclysmic upheavals on an international level that there is no need to appeal for explanation to movements within the Venetian body politic. In certain fields, the evidence is frankly ambiguous; it is hard to read the stern declarations of superiority over Ceneda issued by the Senate in 1595 without being convinced by Professor Cozzi's argument that this was a new approach to problems of Church and State; but the Aquileia negotiations which actually spanned the reform and should therefore reflect any changes of

226 App.I, below. For Donato's reputation, cf.n.15, above.
attitude resulting from it, definitely proceeded more smoothly after 1583 than before. In other areas, we find progress and development rather than change. True, a significant number of laws designed to curb clerical powers of jurisdiction were passed in the 1590s, and the nuncio Graziani obviously regarded the situation as increasingly menacing. 227 True, the Jesuit college at Padua was suppressed at about the same time. But protection of the Studio di Padova and suspicion of the jurisdictional claims of the post-Tridentine Papacy had been features of Venetian policy since the mid-1560s at least. Most serious of all, it is extraordinarily difficult to find quite that sharp division of views in debates and in voting that would indicate the existence of two clear-cut factions in competition with each other. Over the Apostolic Visitation there was clearly some difference of opinion between men like Paolo Tiepolo who worked for a compromise and those like Zuanne Donato who favoured direct resistance: but the difference seems to have been one of degree rather than of principle. Neither side advised actual submission. The recognition of Henri IV as Most Christian King - an issue alleged to have divided the nobility deeply - was in fact voted by an overwhelming majority in the Senate. Worse still, we keep finding men who had been powerful in the Council of X and reputed supporters of the Church, still occupying influential positions after the reform and proposing motions which were by no means in the Church's favour. Zorzi

227 For the relevant laws, cf.n.114: for Graziani's comments, n.23.
and Michiel asserted the immunities of the Protestant students. Soranzo
and Zustiniani proposed the declaration of superiority over Ceneda.
Minor points like these raise a host of unanswered questions. If they
could find so much common ground, what were the matters of principle on
which our two factions are supposed to have differed? If men like
Soranzo and Zorzi remained in positions of power, then in what sense
did the events of 1582 oust one dominant group? Who were the members
of the two contesting parties? We shall turn first to the preliminary
and abstract question of ideology.
Chapter II

A MANIFESTO FOR REFORM?

In 1562 the promising young intellectual Paolo Paruta was attached to the retinue of Michele Suriano and Zuanne da Leze, Venetian ambassadors to the King of the Romans. The aim was of course to gain diplomatic experience, and on this occasion the opportunities for doing so must have been even better than usual since the party was able to visit the Council of Trent on the return journey. Three years later this political apprenticeship was well rewarded when Paruta was elected Savio agli ordini at the earliest legal age of twenty five. This was an uncommon distinction, which might mark a man for the highest positions in his later political career. Re-election in 1566 seemed to assure Paruta's immediate success. Later in life he wrote that he had, indeed, found the way to promotion "smooth and easy": but we cannot


2 A. Pompeati, "Per la biografia di Paolo Paruta", Giornale storico della letteratura italiana, Vol. XLV, 1905, pp. 52-4. Before Pompeati checked the elections to the College in 1565 and 1566 from the Segretario alle voci, few believed that Paruta had held public office until 1582. See below.


now accept these words as quite the whole truth. Paruta was elected Savio di Terraferma on November 27th 1582, re-elected to the same important post nine times in the next ten years, and moved easily on to become Savio Grande del Consiglio and Procurator; but between 1566 and 1580 he had held no [public] office in the government.5 His first serious biographer Apostolo Zeno avoided the difficulty by refusing to believe that Paolo had ever been Savio agli Ordini and attributing the surprisingly slow start of such a successful career to personal reasons – devotion to study, and the affairs of a flourishing private academy.6

has been much argument about this short self examination both because of the odd reference to Paolo's public life and because the moral values expressed seem to contradict everything about his earlier life and in his previous writings. The monastic life is now put forward as the ideal (pp.4, 11), and the cardinal virtues are "la pazienza, la povertà, l'umiltà, l'ubbidienza, l'abdicazione di se stesso" (p.8). Discussion has centred on the exact extent to which earlier civic ideals are retracted: cf.F. Comani, "Le Dottrine Politiche di Paolo Paruta", Atti dell'Ateneo di Scienze, Lettere e Arti di Bergamo, Vol. XII, 1894-5, p.47; G. Candeloro, "Paolo Paruta – la Vita Publica", Rivista Storica Italiana, Vol.LIII, 1936, No.4, pp.62-4; Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, pp.256-7. It seems to me that the Soliloquio represents a sincere but temporary mental crisis; it was written during the Rome embassy (p.13), probably in summer 1595 when Paruta was ill and disillusioned by the fruitless negotiations over the Ceneda problem; cf.Coazzi, "Sovranità sopra Ceneda", p.203, on the question of the date. As Comani, loc.cit., argues, the quietist ideas had no effect on Paruta's career. What the Soliloquio does show is how near the surface the conflict of State and religion could lie even at individual level, and in the mind of one most devoted servant of Venice.

5 Pompeati, "Per la Biografia", pp.54, 57; Paolo was Savio agli Ordini in 1566 and '66, and Proveditore della Camera degli Imprestiti in 1580; this position gave him a place in the Senate, but apparently no vote.

6 Vita di Paolo Paruta, preface to Vol.III Degli Storici delle Cose Veneziane, Venice, 1718, pp.x-xi, xxvi; "Era stato finora, si come è detto, da qualunque ambizione di onori e di carichi onnimamente lontano; e se bene dagli stimoli degli amici e dei congiunti eccitato fosse da accrescere anche in questa parte nuovo lustro alla sua casa e alla sua persona, egli tuttavia non sapeva risolversi a tralasciare i suoi studi." Cf.Ib.p.vii, M. Battaglia, Delle Accademie Veneziane,
But Zeno was plainly puzzled by the words of one of his authorities, the orator Crasso; writing barely ten years after Paruta's death Crasso not only recorded his election as Savio agli Ordini but positively stated that he had tried and failed to obtain higher office thereafter. The obvious implication of these words, especially when they are set alongside the spectacular success of the later 1580s, is that Paruta had been kept out of power by the cliquish dynasts who were ruling through the Council of X and Zonta during the previous decade.

For Paolo was not living only for himself and his own studies; he was rapidly accumulating a reputation as a writer and orator. He pronounced the public oration in honour of the dead heroes of Lepanto in 1571, and wrote a pamphlet in defence of the Venetian separate peace two years later. During the 1570s he was working steadily on "La Perfettione della Vita Politica", an ethical dialogue centred on the real experience of his visit to Trent in 1562; a number of prominent figures are presented

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7 Niccolai Crassi Iunioris, Elogia Patritiorum Venetorum, Venice, 1612, pp.55-6. "...in petendis postea magistratibus ita repulsam tuli, ut ad XL usque aetatis annum, maximo vel ipsius fortunae rubore, privatus, sibique potius ipsi, quam Reipublicae viveret."

8 This explanation has been treated as certain for some time; cf. Comani, op.cit. pp.39-40; Pompeati, "Per la Biografia", p.54, is more cautious; Candeloro, "Paolo Paruta, - La Formazione Spirituale e la Dottrina Morale", R.S.I., Vol.cit. under n.4, above, No.3, pp. 74-5, accepts Comani's view; cf. also below, n.13 for some recent comments.

discussing their preference for the active and civic, or for the contemplative and religious life, and the writer's idealisation of the life of service to the community is so transparent that it is hard to imagine his recoiling from it voluntarily. Published with triumphant success in 1579, the Perfettione was reprinted in 1582 and 1586, with a French translation appearing in 1582. Probably, it had a large part in obtaining the position of official state historian for its author. Then, in 1582, came the change of political fortune and the rapid rise to prominence. There is an overpowering temptation to see this as a case of literary cause and political effect; the ambitious young idealist elbowed into the shadows by jealous rivals, gradually marshalling support through his writings and his intellectual contacts until feelings had gathered sufficient strength to sweep his friends and himself into power.

The image has a dangerously romantic appeal; Paruta has even been called 'interpreter of the general dissatisfaction and of the ferments of reform'. We hasten, first, to the crucial text in search of the

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10 This point is made by Comani, op.cit. p.42; Zeno, "Vita", under n.6, p.xvii, claimed to have seen some original drafts in the possession of Paruta's descendants which proved that the work had been begun in 1572.


12 Zeno, "Vita", loc.cit., says that the Perfettione appeared a few months before Paruta's appointment as "Storiografo pubblico'. Cf. also Zanoni, op.cit., p.21, and most recently G. Cozzi, "Cultura Politica e Religione nella Pubblica Storiografia Veneziana del '500", in (B.I.S.V.), Vols. V-VI, 1963-4, pp.256-78 (on Paruta).

13 Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.10. For the connection of ideas cf. Candeloro, "Vita Publica", p.52. "Il Paruta dopo la riforma percorse rapida e sicura carriera. Questo fa pensare che egli fosse tra i più validi sostentori della riforma stessa, la quale del resto
bubbles of ferment.

But the Perfettione is a remarkably difficult work to interpret. Clearly, it belongs very closely in its historical context; the scene, the characters, are real. Most of them were alive when the dialogue was published: by then they had faced the crisis of the Cyprus, and seen the claims of the Bull "In Coena Domini." It is only to be expected that such a work should have a very special reference to its own times. But the form, the ideas and the language are almost entirely conventional. The individual reader is left to decide for himself whether he must give a particular passage a direct contemporary relevance or pass it off as a well-worn rhetorical commonplace from the lecture rooms of Padua.

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rispondeva alle sue idee, in quanto stimolava il desiderio di azione nella nobiltà e nei giovani, ristituendo la suprema condotta degli affari al Senato." Also Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, pp. 199-200.


16 The basic traditionalism of the argument is most fully discussed by Comani and Pompeati, opera citata under n. 14, above.
The risk of vagueness and subjectivism becomes enormous, so it will be necessary to state some general principles of interpretation before turning to the text. I have worked on the assumption that the burden of proof must become proportionally heavier, as the dialogue is pressed further into its historical context. Some reflection of the moral anxieties and tensions felt by the Venetian nobility in the second half of the XVIth century is to be expected, and will need little enough proof. It should take rather more to satisfy us that a passage is a veiled exhortation to resist Papal theocracy. To prove that there are anticipatory hints of a specific event like the 1582 reform will require very strong evidence indeed. To argue, like Candeloro, that because Paruta idealised the active life he was urging the younger senators to rush into action and take control of the republic from the Council of X, is to stretch the imagination a little too far. 17

Paruta maps out the scope of his dialogue in a brief dedicatory introduction to his friend Zuambattista Valier - should man try to raise himself to the level of a God by virtue of his intelligence, or allow himself to sink to the state of a beast under the weight of his animal appetites? The scene is set, the characters introduced, the narrative passed to Francesco da Molin, whom Paolo names as having reported the discussions to him. 18 Positions are fixed rapidly; the Bishop of Ceneda, Michele della Torre, attacks the life of the diplomat as "un

17 Cf. quotation under n.13.
travagliatissimo negotio", which obliges a man to neglect his true, spiritual self in concern for the affairs of others. This argument is strongly contested by the ambassador Suriano, who rejects the Bishop's quietist ideals as wholly out of keeping with the true place of man in the Universe; man is a composite creature, the link between beast and pure intelligence, partaking of the nature of both and able to exercise his virtue only in this intermediate position; as part beast, man's life must be active, and his virtue must show itself in activity; the highest activity is that directed to the good of many, so the highest activity must be "la vita civile." The discussion of this central point and the exploration of various subsidiary questions arising from it occupies the bulk of the first two books, while the clerics and the diplomats line up on either side of the argument. But towards the end of the first book Daniele Barbaro, Patriarch elect of Aquileia, advances a series of ideas which are in one way conciliatory, in another go further than anything that has been said by any of the disputants so far.

19 Ibid. p.41.
20 Ibid.p.42. "Che altro...è il nostro vivere che operare? E tra le nostre operazioni niuna ne ha ne più nobile ne più perfetta che quella che a salute di molti è indirizzata; però, chi si metti al governo della Republica, levando se stesso dall'ozio, morte della nostra anima, si dona ad una vera e felicissima vita."
21 Barbaro's role as mediator with a bias to the civic side is shown in his words, p.107; "perciocche tanto è lontano dal parer mio che l'uomo virtuoso o felice debba nell'ozio viversi che, anzi, per ritragherne da tale opinione Monsignor Grimani, e a quella dell'ambasciadorre appressarnelo, io traposto mi sono tra loro ragionamenti". Cf. Cozzi, "Società Veneziana", p.31; but I agree with Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p.206, that Barbaro goes further in some of his attitudes than Surian.
The notion that a mere human mind can come to know God by contemplation seems to Barbaro positively presumptuous; but man can understand his love for God, deepening and developing it by love for the creation in which God shows Himself. So Barbaro agrees with Suriano in his acceptance of the virtue that leads men from the wilds to their true home in the city, teaching them useful crafts and obedience to the law; he idealises an active virtue which governs man's every action, directing it to a noble and prosperous conclusion; but he links that virtue with study, especially the study of history, by showing how it demands knowledge of the past, clear understanding of the present, shrewd forecasting of the future. Barbaro also considers that this active love of Creation can and must eventually lead to what is, effectively, a contemplative union with God, an unshakeable peace in a light of love and wisdom that admits neither confusion or darkness.

There are a number of implied denials of philosophical precedent as the discussion unrolls itself; Francesco da Molin prompts Surian's main defence of civic life with a request for arguments quite different

23 Ibid. pp. 90f, speech of Surian on 'vita civile'.
24 Barbaro's praise of 'prudenza' follows Surian's remarks fairly quickly; ibid. pp. 107f.
25 Ibid. p. 197. (Bk. II) "A formare intieramente la prudenza, tre cose vi si richiedono; cioè, il ricordarsi delle cose passate, il riconoscere le presenti, e il prevedere le future."
26 Cf. the 'grand conclusion' to Bk. I, pp. 146-9.
from those offered by the professors at Padua, who favour the active life only as a means to the contemplative; and Barbaro obliquely attacks those who take a stand on certain positions simply because they were held by Plato or Aristotle. It is certainly true that in realising civil life so emphatically, and in giving such an unquestioned first place to an active virtue, "prudenza", Paruta committed himself much further than any of his sources had done. To this extent, the Perfettione is an original work. But this is too erudite a detail to have had much immediate political impact. In plain fact, the first two books are derived entirely from an Aristotelian problem and argued in entirely Aristotelian terms. The initial division between Suriano and Della Torre stems from an ambiguity left open by the Nicomachean Ethics; did Aristotle consider the highest virtue to be "phronesis"?

28 Ibid.p.64. The whole question of imitation is under discussion.
29 It is questioned by the clerical party, of course; but Barbaro's words (p.108) leave little doubt of Paruta's view; "E quella che è più nobile d'ogni altra virtù, anzi pur che sola per se stessa è vera virtù, cioè la prudenza, quando non ritrova ells materia di adoperarsi?"

30 Candeloro, "Formazione Spirituale", pp.72-3, Cozzi, "Società Veneziana", pp.18f, tend to stress the derivative character of the Perfettione; Pompeati, "Dottrine Politiche", esp.pp.296-300, followed by Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p.200 with n.154, concentrates rather more on the novelty of the synthesis. It is necessary to distinguish very carefully between the ideas themselves and the exact degree of emphasis that is laid on them.

31 Aristotle, Ethica Bk.VI, 1140 a 25f. (Oxford Classical Text). The qualities of the "phronimos" are "...to organise efficiently what is good and right for himself, not only in single cases, but for the good life as a whole...for this reason we call Pericles and other such men wise (phronimous) because they can plan what is good for themselves and others."
the practical wisdom of human life - or "theoria" - pure contemplation of unchanging and divine concepts? The "prudenza" idealised by Suriano and Barbaro is exactly Aristotle's "phronesis", the practical wisdom of the man of affairs, while the ecclesiastics incline to a contemplative withdrawal very similar to "theoria". The analysis of secondary virtues that concludes Book II of the Perfettione is closely modelled on the version in Books IV and V of the Ethics. On the face of it, there is no need for the whole discussion to be taken as more than what it appears to be - a philosophical and rhetorical exercise, no doubt similar to many that had taken place in Paruta's own academy. How can arguments that are at once so derivative and so generally expressed be fitted more closely into their political and social background?

32 Ib. Bk. VI, 1139 b 15-35, for the definition of ἐπιστήμη or "theoria". In Bk. X, 1177 a 11f, Aristotle certainly moves towards the view that this is the highest virtue, actually calling it "the greatest", and stating that it enables men to live according to the divine element within them (b 27).

33 Some of Barbaro’s remarks in Bk II compare interestingly with the passage of the Ethics quoted in n. 31; eg. p.160 "La virtù per cui l'uomo può farsi operando felice e quella somma è d'ogni altra perfettissima, cioè la prudenza." p.196 "...diremo che alla prudenza si convenga di prendere cura in modo che ne insegni ad acquistare tutti quei beni onde possiamo felicemente vivere..."

34 Eg. Della Torre's claim, p. 41, that public affairs force a man to neglect his true self.


36 Zeno, "Vita", cit. p. vii, speaks of "...queste private adunanze, nelle quali delle cose alla vita civile et politica appartenenti egli ben spesso ragionava..."
One promising, though still rather general approach, is a critical comparison of Paruta's theories with those of other contemporary political thinkers: it can be argued that, although Paruta's ideas were definitely derivative and traditional, he was the only person to use them in quite this way, so he must have been doing so with a real aim in view. Elsewhere, political thought was polarising towards two extremes: 37 first, a practical amoralism, based in essence on Machiavelli but suitably veiled in classical erudition or disguised as a commentary on the acerbic Roman historian Tacitus; 33 second, a very extravagant moral metaphysic, largely reflecting the theocratic ideals of the Counter-Reformation Papacy. On both sides, and in all countries the emphasis was very much on absolute power. French writers like Bodin hoped for the strong prince who would end civil strife, 39 while Italians like Bozio praised a 'divine harmony' controlled by God's vicar the Pope. 40 By 1610 this tendency had gone so far that Bellarmine was prepared to place the Pope above secular princes even in temporal affairs. 41

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37 This highly condensed account is based on the lucid exposition of Firpo, op. cit. under n.14, above. Cf. also Pompeati, "Dottrina politica" pp.344f.

33 Firpo, op.cit.p.373, cites Botero, Razioni di stato, and Lipsius, Libri politici, both of 1539; also S. Ammirato, Discorsi sopra Tacito, 1594. The century produced ten editions and roughly a hundred commentaries on Tacitus.

39 Six livres de la Repubblic, Paris, 1576.

40 De Antico et Novo Statu Italicae, Rome, 1594

41 Tractatus de Potestate Summi Pontificis in Rebus Temporalibus, Rome.
the extremes, Paruta was the only man to write of political life and
duty in terms which left some room for moral decision of the individual:
instead of imposing some absolute metaphysical scheme, or disregarding
any rule save that of expediency, he traced a bond of duty and affection
between the state and the citizen. His practical interpretation of
Aristotle's Ethics does, indeed, seem to have gone against the current
of the time. This tempered eclecticism, cautiously avoiding extreme
positions, is an interesting general comment on the intellectual climate
of Venice, perhaps even some reflection of that pursuit of balance which
was the Republic's political aim. Regarding the Perfettione as part,
in any sense, of a pamphlet war, a kind of warning against the gathering
forces of theocratic Papal ideology, I find much more difficult, partly
because it is so mildly expressed, partly because it appeared somewhat
ahead of most of the extremist works with which it is compared; giving
it any part in the affairs of 1582 simply on the strength of the ideology

42 Paruta's intermediate position is stressed by Pompeati, "Dottrine
politiche", pp.348f, and Firpo, "Pensiero politico", p.331. Cervelli,
"Giudizi seicenteschi", op.cit.under n.14, pp.338-350, has some re-
country as "una compagnia di uomini non fatta a caso per breve tempo,
come quella de' naviganti, ma è fondata dalla natura, confermata
dall'elezione, in ogni tempo cara e necessaria."

43 Candeloro, "Formazione Spirituale", p.88; there is a hint of posi-
"Perche il vostro Aristotele disse, la vita contemplativa convenirsi
all'uomo, non in quanto egli è uomo, ma ben in quanto in lui non so
che divino si ritrova." The reference is to Ethics BkX, 1177 b 27,
the main point of Aristotle's commitment to "theoria".

44 Cf.Ch.I, n.n.44f; Paruta's discorsi cannot all be dated clearly;
they were not published till after his death. But they reviewed
Venetian aims over the past decades.
seems to me quite inadmissable.

A more solid and factual approach to the problem of the Perfettione has been suggested by Professor Cozzi, who turns from the analysis of ideas to the examination of characters. Admitting that the arguments are largely traditional and without much relevance as they stand, Cozzi traces the real contemporary relevance in the way they are taken by the interlocutors. On the side of withdrawal and contemplation are ranged Michele della Torre, Bishop of Ceneda, Zuanne Grimani, Patriarch of Aquileia, Filippo Mocenigo of Cyprus and - less prominent - Domenigo Bollani of Brescia. In the first two books their main opponents are Michele Suriano and Daniele Barbaro, with Francesco da Molin taking a significant minor role as the lively young idealist, eager to enquire about the civil life which he is entering. In the third book the lead passes to the two Venetian ambassadors to the Council of Trent, Matteo Dandolo and Niccoli da Ponte. All were of course historical characters, and many were still alive when the dialogue was published, so it is at least unlikely that Paruta made them express views with which they would have disagreed violently. Indeed, if a preference for the active

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45 Comandi, "Dottrine Politiche", p.39, Pompeati, "Dottrine Politiche", pp.348-9, Candeloro, quoted under n.13, above, agree in stating that Paruta's appeal was to a definite group in the Venetian state, i.e. the "giovani", who took control in 1532. I can see nothing in the text to suggest that it was meant to appeal only to one group; and any such argument of course must rely on the independent evidence that any such defined group existed.

46 "La Societa Veneziana", etc.op.cit. under n.15, above.

47 Cozzi, op.cit.pp.18f; Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p.201. Barbaro and Dandolo died in 1570, Suriano in 1574, Bollani in 1579. Da Ponte could hardly have been more prominent when the dialogue appeared,
civil life implied opposition to Papal pretensions, and if contemplation involved defending the claims of the Church, Paruta may seem to have been almost prophetic. Within a year of the dialogue's publication Zuanne Grimani had come into direct collision with the Council of X by his extreme assertion of the jurisdictional rights of the Patriarchate; the resulting dispute dragged on for five years, breeding much ill-will between the Republic and the Curia.\textsuperscript{48} Michele della Torre was dead by 1595, when the problem of jurisdiction in the Count-bishopric of Ceneda came near to dragging Clement VIII and the Republic into open conflict; but he was intransigent on one of the most dangerous open issues between Venice and the Papacy, an issue which Paruta himself was to know miserably well in later life.\textsuperscript{49} So, writing in the 1570s, Paruta selected as his main advocates of the contemplative and religious life two clerics who stood at the centre of problems that were already simmering, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{48} Cf. Ch.I (ii), with \textit{mn.ad} loc. A particularly interesting ideological detail of the negotiations is recorded by Lorenzo di Priuli in his Relazione, printed in Alberi, Ser.II, Vol.4, p.390. "La seconda cosa che per opinione universale aveva ridotto non solamente a difficoltà ma ad impossibilità la conclusione di questo negotio fu che si fece dire più volte di non riconoscere per superiore la Santa Sede...da niun altro principe esser mai stata usata questa maniera di parlare così generale in voce et in scrittura, che da troppo in faccia alla suprema autorità de'pontifici."
\item \textsuperscript{49} On della Torre, Cozzi, \textit{op.cit.}\textsubscript{p.21}; he served two periods as Papal nuncio in France, with the main task of stiffening official resistance to heresy. He died in 1586, Monzani, \textit{Op.Pol.}\textsubscript{Vol.1},p.411. On the Cenedese crisis of the 1590, cf.Ch.I (ii), and especially Cozzi's article, \textit{cit.}, under \textit{n.153}; on p.191 Cozzi touches on della Torre's attitude, and shows that the Bull of 1551 stating the Count-bishop's rights in temporal affairs was issued in his favour.
\end{itemize}
were to break out into two of the ugliest crises of the next two decades. On the other side of the argument, the choices were hardly less felicitous; Suriano was a diplomat of great experience, ready to attack the political ambition of Popes in his eloquent pursuit of neutrality for Venice, balance and harmony elsewhere. 50 Niccolo da Ponte was for two decades almost a 'marked man' at the Curia, partly for his support of the heretic Bishop of Bergamo, Vettore Soranzo, partly because of his suspicious background, partly because of his very firm stand on the Republic's jurisdictional rights; interestingly enough, his name is mentioned in disputes over Ceneda. 51 He favoured support of France; and it is certainly true that during his period as Doge, relations with the Papacy were remarkably bad; there were serious crises over the apostolic Visitation and the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Aquileia, besides a number of smaller incidents, on all of which the aged Doge took a very firm stand. Daniele Barbaro was equally well adapted to fill his special role in the discussion; at the time he was a cleric.

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actively participating in the Council and respected by his fellow ecclesiastics. But he had experience of affairs from his embassy to England; and as translator of Vitruvius and patron of Palladio, man of letters and man of the world, he expressed in his own person that brilliant style of life which he glorified in his great central speech. It seems almost as if Paruta realised his own ideal of historical "prudenza"; reviewing the immediate past and observing the present to forecast a future of increasing conflict between the active ideals of the city state and the other-worldliness of the Counter-reformation Papacy.

When we take the extraordinarily shrewd characterisation alongside the rapid success of the dialogue, it is hard not to conclude that Paruta had touched a sensitive nerve in his readers, hinting at a growing dispute within Venetian society - perhaps, as his "Soliloquio" suggests, within individual Venetians.

But Professor Cozzi's analysis does not, and was not intended to do more than fix the Perfettione in its general intellectual and political climate; to attach it specifically to 1582 we must look for more detailed and less abstract evidence, and there seems some hope of


53 Cf.n.4, above.

54 Op.cit.p.18f. Professor Cozzi's statement of his case is noticeably more cautious than the use made of it, eg.Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.10.
finding it in the third book when the argument turns from the metaphysical fundamentals of the first two towards the more practical problem of the kind of state best suited to achieve the "somma felicità" for its citizens. The model offered is, of course, Venice itself, so we have a chance of reconstructing Paruta's views on the direction of the Republic, the risks of subversion, the possibilities of reform and reorganisation. Unfortunately, traditional ideas still confuse the trail; the whole book is saturated with the patriotic self-congratulation which Paruta had inherited from Gasparo Contarini, from whom a good deal of the relevant material is borrowed with open acknowledgement. 55 There is the same concern for purity of caste, 56 the same glorification of that perfectly tempered fusion of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy that had preserved stability for so long in the midst of such confusion. 57 But this preoccupation with stability does produce some suggestive comments. Speaking cautiously of new laws, Dandolo remarks—

mancano di quel rispetto e di quella forza che l'antichità

55 Matteo Dandolo, who pronounces the constitutional conclusion to the whole dialogue, introduces the ideas as Contarini's. Op. Pol. p. 395f, Bk. III.

56 Ibid. pp. 375-90; eg. p. 376. "Gli uomini dunque nel formare una perfetta comunanza, ogni parte di lei distinguendo ed altre al servire, altre al comandare ordinando, imitarono questa loro madre e maestra Natura." Compare Contarini, De Magistratibus et Republica Venetorum, Venice, 1543, p. 11; praise for the care taken in admitting nobles to the Consiglio Maggiore, "ne qua labeb nobilium hic coetus inficeretur".

This appeal to "antichità" is significant, for it is quite certain that at the time of the reform much was made of the Council of X's emerging as a fairly recent threat to the ancient rights of the nobility.\(^5\) A prominent member of the Zonta was said to have boasted of his part in protecting a 'bravo' from justice in the words "Sumus tot reges".\(^6\) In a narrow circle, with tempers running high, words like these might just have been taken as an oblique attack on the "pochi potenti" of the Zonta for their subversion of the true form of government through the Senate. An earlier speech of Suriano's contains some similarly subtle and perhaps contrived historical analogies; contending that any usurped rule is tyrannical, whether exercised by one man or a group, Suriano reminds the others that Rome was ruled as fiercely by the Decemviri as by Tarquinius Superbus, and that Athens suffered as much from the Thirty Tyrants as from Pisistratus; indeed, the group was worse than the individual, as one man was more easily removed.\(^6\)


\(^6\) Romanin, Storia Documentata, Vol. VI, p. 365. The person involved was Zuanne Donato "delle reghe", who had a reputation for making tactless remarks. Again, cf. next Chapter.
example of the Roman Decemviri looks decidedly pointed; and a full meeting of the Council of X, with its Zonta of fifteen and the Doge with his six Consiglieri, would have made up thirty two – almost exactly the number of the oligarchs who ruled Athens after the end of the Peloponnesian War. But these elaborate speculations lead only to ambiguity and perplexity; the entire theme – degeneration of monarchy into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and democracy into mere anarchy – was a traditional topic deriving from the VIIIth Book of Plato's Republic, the IIInd and IIIrd of Aristotle’s Politics. There can be no certainty that they were meant to have a contemporary reference. With a little reading between the lines, it would no doubt have been possible to apply Paruta's words to the Council of X, and perhaps in the highly charged atmosphere of the early 1530s some actually did so. But it would have been just as easy to find passages which could be taken as warnings against opening the government too far. After the reform foreign ambassadors complained of the embarrassment of negotiating before the large numbers in the Senate; in the Perfettione, Dandolo criticises "quella Republica che è in mano di tutta una moltitudine; nella quale benché si vegga alcuna parte di virtù, non può però ella in ciascuno di tanto numero ritrovarsi in grado uguale di perfezione come fa in pochi, ovvero in un solo." The analogy of an entirely 'open' Republic like

62 Contarini, De Magistratibus, p.38.
Athens was slightly more distant; but Paruta poured eloquent praise on the closed Athenian Council of the Areopagus, and hinted at the dangers of divided counsels when too many had a hand in affairs. The analogies from history, and the lessons they point, are all vaguely worded and ambiguous; even the appeal to "antichità" is indecisive, for both sides of the debate in 1582 could and did cite traditional practice.

Somewhat earlier in the third book there seems to be a chance of finding some evidence of social tension within the ruling classes; the discussion turns to nobility, and its definition. Now it has been held with varying degrees of conviction that there was a connection between the events of 1582 and a feeling among the more recently ennobled Venetian families that they were not being allowed a fair part in the government, so we may hope for some trace of this discontent. In the Perfettione, the strictly traditionalist view of nobility as "virtù dei...

66 Ibid. p. 396. "...la varietà dell'opinioni, che suol nascere ove molti consiglano, precipita spesso la deliberazione al peggio, e la potenza divisa nodrisce le fazioni e i romori nella città."
67 The Parte put before the Maggior Consiglio on Dec. 7th 1582 with the apparent aim of saving at least the existence of the Zonta began: "Considerando li sapientissimi progenitori nostri..." A.S.V. Maggior Consiglio, Deliberazioni Rg. XXXI, Liber Frigerius, c. 93. Cf. also the account of Morosini, cit. under n. 59, above.
68 Romìn, Storia Documentata, Vol. IV, p. 420, defined a distinction between "case nuove" and "case vecchie" in the later XVth century, but he did not overwork it as a factor in the 1582 reform; Comani, op. cit. pp. 41f and Candeloro, "Formazione Spirituale", pp. 74-5, accept an underlying division as virtually axiomatic; but Professor Cozzi, Nicolò Contarini, pp. 52, is exceedingly cautious in applying it to what we know of the two sides in the 1582 debates.
"maggiori" is advanced by da Ponte, and is indeed rejected; the Bishop della Torre will admit nothing but the virtues of the individual. 69 But this, in its turn, has to be rejected as too much at variance with Venetian custom. So eventually a compromise is reached by demanding individual qualities as well as a distinguished family background - "la virtù congiunta con l'onore". 70 Da Ponte agrees that three generations will be enough to foster that established reputation which will allow a man to call himself 'nobile', for ancient houses may become barren while new families arrive from outside and flourish like trees transplanted to a more fertile soil. 71 There may well be some kind of special pleading here; the Parutas had been ennobled after the Chioggia war, and were comfortably inside the limit set by da Ponte, but had no long record of powerful officials in the government. 72 Unfortunately, all the familiar difficulties arise yet again; first, Gasparo Contarini had said almost exactly the same things about the introduction of new families into the nobility thirty five years earlier; 73 second, Paruta himself stops far

70 Ibid. p. 324. The phrase is given to da Ponte.
71 Ibid. p. 324 (requirement of three generations of "uomini illustri per merito e per degnità"), 328 (degeneracy of older families and arrival of new).
72 Cf. the works of Bini and Lazzarini cit. under Ch. I, n. 26.
73 De Magistratibus, cit. p. 10. It is a statement of fact rather than a value judgement, but the underlying thought is the same. "Quod si post eum primum civium conventum nobiles alii fuere, qui tum opibus, tum strenulis gestis Rpublicam suserint, nimirum illis omnibus ius administrandae Rpublicae concessum fuit, id quod et temporibus nostris vidimus; nam nonnulli etiam aduanae externae homines in hunc numerum civium ascint sunt, vel ob eam causam, quod nobilissimi, vel quod officiosi erga Rpublicam fuerint, eamque insigni quopiam facinore honestarint." This of course was exactly Paruta's own background.
short of giving his words a precise application, never passing beyond the general topic of social status to the more delicate problem of political representation. So there is no really adequate reason for attaching what is said to 1582 rather than 1543 or even 1330.

Even on the vital issue of Church and State the commitment is rather less clear-cut in detail than would appear from the emphatic idealisation of the active over the contemplative life. Something may be inferred from the ideas expressed by Daniele Barbaro, and from his selection for the special role he plays in the dialogue. He is the only ecclesiastic to be granted a thoroughly sympathetic portrait; a significant point, for Barbaro was a classic example of a peculiarly Venetian phenomenon, the man of affairs turned man of God. Throughout the XVIth century a succession of patricians moved across from the upper ranks of the College into the great mainland or maritime Sees; Domenico Bollani, Zuanfrancesco Morosini, Lorenzo di Priuli had all been Savii Grandi before they became bishops; by the end of the century, in the face of growing disapproval from Rome, the Senate was expressing a

74 C. Eubel and W. van Gulik, Hierarchy Catholica Medii Aevi, Vol.III, Monasterii, 1910, pp.155, 350. Morosini's previous post had been that of Venetian Bailo at the Sublime Forte, where he had successfully calmed a very ugly crisis; a Venetian commander, Gabriele Emo, had attacked a flotilla carrying an embassy from Barbary to the Sultan, and there was talk of war. A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXVI, c.282, July 28th, 1533, comments on Morosini's being raised to a Cardinalate; Francesco da Molin, c.125, definitely connected his ecclesiastical preferment with his successes in civil life.

positive preference for men of some practical experience rather than cloistered and ascetic theologians. Barbaro must rank as one of the greatest of the 'wordly Bishops'; he had the stern practical experience of an embassy in a country undergoing the first upheavals of Protestant Reform; his interests ranged from botany and astronomy to Porphyry and the Greek commentators on the Psalms; in a Dialogue on Eloquence he had laid down rules for the perfect gentleman and orator, able to sway minds and rule cities.\textsuperscript{76} All this is born out by his role in the Perfettione; an almost mystical fervour pervades his speech at the conclusion of Book I; but he rejects the crabbed solipsism of his fellow ecclesiastics, reminding Grimani that Plato's philosopher kings had to rule the city as well as study the eternal Forms.\textsuperscript{77} It is probably fair to conclude from all this that Paruta approved of this dynamic type of pastor, and it is certainly true that Rome became increasingly suspicious of such men; but this does not by itself tell us anything of Paruta's views on the formal rights and jurisdictional position of the Church. During his ecclesiastical career, Barbaro was in fact thoroughly deferential to the Pope's power.\textsuperscript{78} In Dandolo's peroration to

\textsuperscript{76} Cf. the article of Paschini, cit. under n. 52, above; Barbaro's Commentary on Porphyry was published in 1542 (p. 76), his Dialogue on Eloquence in 1557 (p. 78), his translation of commentators on the Psalms in 1569 (p. 96). The embassy to England was in 1548. (p. 80). Cf. also Paschini, "Gli Scritti Religiosi di Daniele Barbaro", Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia, Vol. V, 1951, pp. 340-9.


\textsuperscript{78} Paschini, "Letterato e Prelato", cit. p. 91 records that in June 1562
Book III of the Perfettione, the place of Religion in the State is discussed in terms which never question its supreme position; as private citizens must obey the magistrates, and the magistrates obey the Law, so all must join together in the service of Religion; the city itself must be full of priests and places of worship. Ideas such as these can hardly be said to foreshadow the property laws of the early XVIIth century.

The truth seems to be that far from pressing for any definite programme, or appealing to any particular group, the Perfettione was a work which satisfied everyone by exuding such a pervasive aura of moral and patriotic uplift that each individual reader could draw practically any lesson he wanted. There is, indeed, some ironic confirmation of this in the use made of the dialogue by more recent historians, who have produced two entirely divergent, and, so far as I can see, mutually unacknowledged interpretations. To Stella and Bouwsma, the Perfettione represents the awakening of Venice, the expression of reformist ferment: To Gaeta and Ventura, it is the last symptom of ideological stagnation, proclaiming the final ossification of the nobility into a jealous and

Barbaro proposed referring the whole question of Communion "utraque specie" for the laity from the Council of Trent to the Pope. In 1566 the nuncio Facchinetti gratefully recorded his help and influence in promoting the surrender of Guido da Fano to ecclesiastical justice; cf. Nunziature di Venezia, Vol.VIII, ed Stella, p.90. On the case of Guido da Fano, cf.Ch.I, n.120.

79 Op.Pol.Vol.I, pp.403-4. In a different context, Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p.345, points out that the ideal of a city abounding in churches was put forward by the Jesuits.

80 Cf.n.13, above.
exclusive caste. It seems certain that Paruta turned to a problem - the relative claims of country and Faith on the individual - which was very widely felt at the time. The spiritual absolutism of the post-Tridentine Papacy, and the national problems of the Venetian Republic, were acting on each other to provoke a frightful tension, whose effect on the characters in the Perfettione has been examined by Professor Cozzi. The split of opinion he traces cannot be questioned. But the clear-cut division of different persons into different political camps, which is implicit in Professor Cozzi's interpretation, I find increasingly difficult to accept. Paruta himself later wrote of his envy for monks, in their life of prayer and meditation: this may have been an isolated moment of depression, but it cannot be ignored. The background of some of the characters in the Perfettione shows similar complications. Domenigo Bollani, whom Paruta portrayed as strictly a member of the clerical party, had been Savio Grande and Rettore of Brescia before he became its bishop. Curial officials, perhaps rather ironically, respected him for his political adroitness.

81 F. Gaeta, "Alcune considerazioni sul mito di Venezia", Bibliothèque d'Umanisme et de Renaissance, Vol.XXIII, 1961, p.70, treats Paruta's ideas as a move from the earlier theories of the "mixed constitution" to a more static view of aristocratic stability. To Ventura, Paruta is a double-dyed reactionary: Nobiltà e popolo nella società veneta del '400 e '500, Bari, 1964, pp.332,365f.

82 "Soliloquio", Op.Pol.Vol.I,p.11. "O padri, o buoni padri che dentro a'vosstri chiostrì, lontani, non pur con la presenza ma co' pensieri dell' anima, dal mondo e dalle sue cure, vivete in una soavissima quiete...io per certo invidio a voi quell' ozio santo, dato tutto alle orazioni e alle meditazioni." Views of the Soliloquio are discussed in n.4, above.

protagonists of the active life, Michiel Suriano, was saved in 1571 from prosecution by the Council of X mainly by the earnest intercession of the Pope. Matteo Dondolo, who pronounces the panegyric on the Venetian state in the final book, appears in 1567 urging the instant execution of the relapsed heretic Spinola and greatly assisting the nuncio Facchinetti. The evidence from particular careers and reputations is in fact far more complicated than either the Dialogue, or even Professor Cozzi's invaluable researches, really reveal. Rather than a division between political groups, the evidence suggests a gnawing intellectual and emotional uneasiness actually within individual minds, encouraging just such tense but amicable discussions as the Perfettione itself. The popularity of the dialogue is, if anything, more likely to be explained by an almost universal moral dilemma than by any partisan appeal.

The quest for an immediate political relevance in the Perfettione depends too much on the underlying assumption that Paruta had been kept out of the government, and that he was representative of a definite section of the nobility. The evidence to this effect is in fact far less than decisive. The eulogist Crasso wrote that Paruta "repulsam massime nelle cose di stato." C. Cairns, "Domenigo Bollani, a Distinguished Correspondent of Piero Aretino", Renaissance News, Vol.XIX, No.3, pp.193f.


tulit" - was rejected in the elections. Paolo's son Zuanne Paruta was rather more precise: writing to an interested Florentine, he said that his father had for much of his life been too preoccupied by studies to push himself forward for office. I have not yet been able to check this statement completely, but the Raccolta dei Consegi in the Marciana gives a fairly comprehensive list of all candidates and the numbers of votes they received in the elections to the Senate, and in those conducted by the Senate, during the 1570s and early '80s. Paruta definitely does not appear among those who stood for the Sessanta della Zonta del Senato at any time during the later '70s. I have not found his name among those proposed for administrative posts in the City or the Dominio, though it must be admitted that here the information is far from complete. At the end of 1581 Paruta failed to be elected Savio di Terraferma, but he came fourth in an exceptionally strong field.

86 Cf. Passage quoted in n.7, above. Crasso used a Latin technicality, "repulsa", which means failure after presenting one's candidature; so, rather than a period of retirement, his words have tended to suggest a long series of disappointed attempts by Paruta to secure office.

87 This vital document from the Rinuccini manuscripts in Florence was published by V. Cian, "Paolo Paruta - spigolature", A.V., Vol.XXXVII, 1839, pp.109-131. Baccio Valori had written to the Venetian secretary Ottobon for information about Paruta, who had died recently: Ottobon enclosed a brief biographical sketch by the eldest son in his reply p.118. "...dopo ebbe a provar nelle onori la fortuna molto contraria, perché attendendo alli studi non poteva applicarsi al broglio, et essercitarsi nelle piazze; si che e stete 15 anni senza onori." This does not necessarily mean that Paruta did not stand for office, but it moderates the implications of Crasso's statement considerably.

88 Bibl. Marc. cod. it. Cl. VII, 829 (8908) cc.35v, 117, 132, 245, 308, "38" (The pagination changes at the end of the Volume).
of twenty two candidates, beating amongst others the experienced and well connected Lorenzo di Priuli. Six months later Paruta was defeated again. But in a special election held in November 1582 he reached the rank of Savio di Terraferma by a narrow margin, and seems thereafter to have had no trouble in securing advancement. There was nothing discreditable or even particularly disappointing about this performance. The evidence is incomplete, of course: but the pattern of votes in Paruta's eventual ascent to office suggests that, rather than being rejected by one governing group then acclaimed by another, he was gradually accepted by the same one. We shall need far more than Paruta's experiences to prove the existence of a well defined, rejected and discontented majority.

89 Ibid. 830 (8909) c.55v, Dec.31st 1581. Paruta had 151 votes in his favour, 85 against. Cf.App.II for Priuli's career and connections.

90 Ibid. c.73v. (failure, June 25th, 1582). C.110v, Nov.25th. Paruta was elected with 149 votes in his favour, 52 against. Bernardo Nani failed with 144 in his favour and 53 against. There is some useful discussion of all these elections in Pompeati, "Per la biografia", pp.57f.
Chapter III

THE PROBLEM AND THE REFORM

At the beginning of October 1532 the Maggior Consiglio refused to confirm three of the fifteen names put forward for the Zonta of the Council of X. At the end of November the author of the Perfettione della Vita Politica entered the College as Savio di Terraferma, now launched on a public career of uninterrupted success. How far were these two events connected? We have several day to day accounts of the crucial months of the reform; in the light of the last Chapter,


2 The documentary sources are: A.S.V. Maggior Consiglio, Deliberazioni Rg.XXXI, Liber Frigerius (1577-1583), which records the texts of the various proposals put forward and the results of the debates; Senato, Deliberazioni Segrete Rg.LXXXIII, (1531-2), is often useful for the light it sheds on the constitutional questions raised by the reform, especially when it shows business that had been handled by the Council of X being brought back to the Senate. But official documents do not of course record the speeches, which are the main object of interest in this study. Marciana Cod, it.Cl.VII 779 (7237), entitled Raccolta di Memorie Storiche per Formare la Storia del Consiglio di X; also by Zuanantonio Venier, Storia delle Rivoluzioni Seguite nel Governo della Republica di Venezia e della Istituzione dell'Eccelso Consiglio di X sino alla sua Regolazione; 2 copies studied, Bibl.Marc.Cod.it.Cl.VII, 774 (7234), and Bibl. Querini-Stampaglia Cod.it.Cl.IV, 59. Writing in the early XVII century - the latest entry I have found in Venier is under 1627 - the authors clearly had access to personal records of the debates as well as the official documents. The official history of Andrea Morosini, Degli Storici delle Cose Venetian, Vol.VII, Venice, 1720, pp.5-16, seems to me to deserve more attention than it has received; it covers the sequence of events very clearly, gives paraphrases of the major speeches, and is probably more nearly first hand than any of the other accounts. The neutral tone is interesting. Writing in the third quarter of the XVIIth century Zuanantonio Muazzo had managed to

† Om."Frigerius and Senato Segrete were both used by the author of Biblioteca..."
it would obviously be too much to expect a close ideological application of ideas as vague as those of the Perfettione; but we may at least hope for some more general answers to broader questions. It will be important, for example, to see whether the reform developed in anything like a logical and programmatic fashion, as we should expect if there was a definite, organised group behind it. Then, it may be possible to trace at least some differences of social background and political ideology between the various speakers; and it will obviously be vital to discover whether the reform was led by men like Paruta who came to prominence only after it was complete, and whether the main resistance came from established dynasts who subsequently disappeared from the political scene.

Morosini and Venier agree that though the dispute of 1582 rose from special circumstances, its roots lay far in the past; there was, in
fact, a dangerous ambiguity in the decision-making process of Venetian government, between the direct passage of power and responsibility through the Maggior Consiglio, Senate and College, and the exceptional position of the Council of X. At the foundation of all political power was the Maggior Consiglio, consisting of all male members of the nobility over twenty five and meeting each week to elect certain officials, less frequently to choose members for the Senate and Council of X, occasionally to pass or reject fundamental legislation. As it had the last word on constitutional questions, the Maggior Consiglio decided the issue of the 1582 crisis. Above it, acting as the main administrative organ of government, came the Senate; round a central body of 120 elected members gathered a rather larger number of ex officio senators, including the Doge and his six Consiglieri, the Council of X, the Procurators, the Quarantia Criminale, and various executive committees, in all a group of well over 200, though rarely at nominal strength.

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4 No attempt is being made in this study to give a full account of the Venetian constitution; the main concern is practice rather than principle. Reference has been made to D. Giannotti, Dalla Repubblica dei Venetiani, Venice, 1540, and Contarini, De Magistratibus, cit. under n.55, Ch.III above. Use has also been made of Besta, Senato Veneziano, and G. Maranini, La Costituzione di Venezia dopo la Serrata del Consiglio Grande, Venice/Perugia/Florence, 1931; J.C.Davis, The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class, Johns Hopkins, 1962, pp.20f, gives an especially useful account of the mechanics of power and promotion, on which this section is largely based.

5 Contarini, De Magistratibus, pp.11f; Giannotti, Republica, pp.21, 39; Maranini, La Costituzione, pp.78-100. At the time of the 1532 reform entry into the Maggior Consiglio at the age of 18, on payment of a fee, had been permitted for some years. Cf. Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p.7, n.1

6 Contarini, De Magistratibus, pp.34f; Besta, Senato Veneziano, pp.39f, Maranini, op.cit.pp.133-162, for details of the Senate's composition.
The Senate met two or three times per week, and all major issues of policy—war, finance, alliances—were supposed to be subject to its decision. It also elected more important officials, such as ambassadors, and governors of the subject cities. Information was fed downwards to it by a small deliberative subcommittee, the College, which was formed by the Doge and his group of Consiglieri, the Chiefs of the Quarantia, and the principal policy-making officials of State, the sixteen Savii or "Praeconsultores". Of these, the five Savii agli Ordenti were relatively unimportant, since they were generally young men under thirty whose main function was to gain experience of government. They occasionally came into the limelight when there was a question concerning their special province, maritime affairs. The five Savii di Terraferma

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7 Maranini, op. cit. p. 133, quotes Sanudo, Cronachetta, p. 103; "Consejo de Pregadi è uno consojo, il qual governa il Stato nostro". Cf. also Contarini, loc. cit. "Eo disceante et decernente et paces fluint et bella suscipiuntur; pecunia eius iussu exigitur et impenditur." This is an important remark, as it will soon become clear how much of a half truth Contarini's words had become by the later XVth century. Maranini, op. cit. pp. 195-225, discusses the Senate's competence at length.

8 Contarini, De Magistratibus, pp. 35-6; Davis, loc. cit.

9 Contarini, loc. cit. called the Savii agli Ordenti "adulescentes ac vix puberes", commenting that their importance had dwindled with that of maritime affairs in general. The only reference I have found to a Parte proposed independently by the Savii agli Ordenti is in an entry of Alvise Michiel under Jan. 1531/2 (M.V.), recording discussion over the release of a Neapolitan ship. However, the office undoubtedly gave prestige and I suspect was much used by "principali" as a means of introducing their sons and having their support at hand. Cf. Ch. II, n. 3, with refs.
were older and more experienced men in early middle age, specially en-
charged with military administration but with no real limit on their
competence. Above them again came the six Savii Grandi del Consig-
glio, older statesmen whose sphere of action was unlimited even in
theory. The College met every morning to read diplomatic correspon-
dence, interview foreign ambassadors, discuss the problems which arose
and frame the necessary proposals or Parti for submission to and approval
by the Senate. Week by week, the Savii Grandi rotated the position
of Chairman or Savio della Settimana, arranging the order of business,
making the first reply to ambassadors, summoning the Senate and placing
before it the Parti already drafted by the College. The immense
influence of the College, and of the Savii Grandi in particular, hardly
needs a comment. Nominally the Senate was the supreme deliberative
body; but, as a XVIIth century cynic put it, the Senate saw only what

10 Contarini, loc. cit. uses the phrase "cura militum", but this obviously
widened very quickly.

11 Ibid. "...de administranda Republica, de bello, de pace."

12 Ibid. pp.36-7. "Si vero cuiuspiam principis orator ad Rempublicam
Venetam accesserit, a Principe, a Consiliariis, ab universo Collegio
excipitur, auditur ab eis. Deinde consultandi tempus petunt; quo
denisso, roque a praesconsultoribus eo quem diximus modo deliberata,
senatus consultur."

13 Ibid. Cf.also "Relazione dell'Anonimo", Curiosità di Storia Veneziana
Molmenti, the document is dated between 1659 and 1665 by reference
to Domenigo Contarini as Doge. Though much of the material is rele-
vant only to the XVIIth century, there is much of general interest,
especially at the beginning; pp.360-70 give a general and practical
analysis of powers. Critical discussion in Davis, op.cit.pp.139-40.
For the competence of the College, Maranini, op.cit.pp.223f.
the College chose to show it. Proposals of the College were rarely turned down. In any case, only a member of the College could put a Parte before the Senate, and no ordinary senator could speak before the Savii had finished. It is true that a continual rotation of positions, and six months of "contumacia" or disqualification after each six months in office, kept the personnel of the College turning over, in theory at least; but a glance at the lists of Savii over a few years shows how rapidly and how often an established man could return to the same position. Even allowing for the constitutional checks, there was a remarkable degree of continuity; and, as will be shown, the Zonta of the Council of X provided a perfect means of neutralising the checks.

The three ranks of Savii formed a kind of "cursus honorum" up which a Venetian noble moved much as a Roman had climbed from quaestor to praetor, and finally to consul. A competent, lucky, and well connected patrician might become Savio Grande some time in his forties;

14 "Anonimo", p.360. "Il Collegio è l'occhio del Senato".
15 Contarini, De Magistratibus, p.37.
16 Ibid. "Nulli enim senatori locus dicendi datur, quousque praeconsultores omnes, qui id numeris subire voluerint, dicendi finem facerint." On the right to put a motion, Maranini, op.cit.p.246.
17 Davis, op.cit.pp.22-3, uses the device of "contumacia" as caution against attaching too much importance to any one office. I suspect he underestimates both the degree of continuity in the tenure of office and the extent of indirect influence which might be exercised through "dipendenti".
18 "Anonimo", pp.370-416, contains an invaluable kind of "League Table" of prominent senators, their ages, careers, and contacts included; though of particular reference, it has general application.
above that lay the Procuratorship, and, at the very pinnacle, the Dogado itself. Rarely, if ever, was it a question of direct promotion in the civil offices; a minor governorship in the Stato di Mar, an embassy at Florence or Milan might follow the first period in the College; the governorship of one of the major Terraferma cities, a tour of duty in Rome or Madrid, normally preceded election as Savio Grande. There were recognised paths of promotion in diplomatic, financial, and military posts; but the wider a man's experience, the more numerous his connections, the better, ultimately, for him.

In this three-tier structure of political power and promotion the Council of X did not, in theory, fit at all; it stood to one side of the constitution, and its department was state security, rather than policy. Panegyrist could draw eloquent comparisons between Marin Falier, Sulla and Catiline, pointing out how Venice had defeated the monster, tyranny, that had devoured all other Italian states. But no real distinction had ever been drawn between security and administration. Indeed, for a body which could proceed against the nominal head of State, it was obviously no easy distinction to draw. There was much uneasiness over the part played by the Council of X in the

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19 On the whole question of political careers, cf. Davis, op. cit. pp. 26f; there does not appear to have been anything to choose between the various lines of advance; Cozzi traces Nicolò Contarini's rise through Financial posts, op. cit. pp. 58f; Leonardo Donato and Jacomo Sorenzo specialised in diplomatic posts and provincial governorships; Jacomo Foscarini's experience was mainly with the Fleet. Cf. App. II.

20 Contarini, De Magistratibus, p. 38.
deposition of the Doge Foscari, and ten years after the event, in 1468, a Parte of the Maggior Consiglio made a guarded attempt to call the X to heel; so guarded, in fact, that the real significance of the law is in showing how far the situation had gone already. Reference was made to the "irrelevant matters, beneath the dignity of such an office" in which the X was now involved, and its true competence was declared to cover "betrayals, feuds, confusion of our public peace, the treatment of subject lands and territories, and other matters of this kind which deserve to be handled secretly". Even without the infinitely elastic final phrase, this gave the secret Council a practically open brief. The ambiguities that had developed by the XVIth century are well reflected even in Giannotti and Contarini: the Council of X supplies a power equivalent to that of a Dictator in Republican Rome, overruling the normal organs of government when necessary; it debates the most crucial issues of policy; "le quali cose", adds Giannotti with an almost perceptible trace of embarrassment, "si potrebbero anche nel Consiglio dei Pregadi trattare."  

21 A.S.V. Maggior Consiglio, Liber Regina, c. 76, Sept. 13th 1468. "Verum ut omnes scire possunt ab aliquo tempore citra excreverunt in tantum occupationes et negotia ipsius Consilii, praeestern in multis et diversis rebus impertinentibus indignisque tanti magistratus, ut necessarium sit et honor nostro maxime conveniat providere. Properterea vadit Pars quod quae pertinent ad proditiones et sectas et ad turbationes pacifici status nostri, item ad tractus terrarum et locorum subditorum et aliarum rerum eiusmodi quae secretissime tractari meruntur... sicut hactenus servatum est, remanere debent cognizioni et deliberationi Consilii X." For the background of the measure, Maranini, op. cit. p. 418.  

22 Republica dei Veneziani, p. 71.
The speed and secrecy of the X's proceedings were undoubtedly its main attraction as an instrument of state. It was a small group; it was not, like the College, bound to take its deliberations elsewhere for approval. Foreign ambassadors obviously preferred negotiating with the more compact, discreet group. So rapid action against a Marin Falier or a Francesco Foscari could easily be extended to rapid action against an outside enemy, or in any crisis of foreign affairs. "Le quali cose", wrote Giannotti, "se nel Collegio si trattassero, e poi nel Consiglio dei Fregadi si deliberassero, dove ragionevolmente s'arrebbeno a deliberare, non ariano forse con quelle circonstanze, cioè con quel silenzio, con quella prestezza e simili cose che il tempo ricerca, amministrate." In 1540, and again in 1572, it was the Council of X which had opened contacts with the Sublime Porte; secrecy was absolutely necessary in the latter case because of the Republic's commitment to Spain and the Papacy. But even secrecy might have its drawbacks; after the brilliant victory of Lepanto a separate peace that involved signing Cyprus away could not but cause widespread disillusion, and may have done much to

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23 In Jan.1583/4 (M.V.) the nuncio Campeggio regretted his inability to press ahead with plans for a new Holy League, since "non resta alla materia di Stato altro Magistrato che i Fregadi." A.S.Vat. Nunz.Ven.F.XXV,c.18; cf Ch.I, n.18. Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, pp. 3-4, shows that the French ambassador de Maisse was equally anxious.

24 Loc.cit.under n.22, above.

crystallise resentment and opposition, whether against the Council of X as an office or against the people who were in office at the time. 26

The same desire for "segretessa", coupled with the bizarre confusion of official finances, were gradually giving the X an increasingly important position in Venetian fiscal organisation as the XVIth century advanced. According to the most recent interpretation, it was this issue which really brought matters to a head in 1532. 27 Officially, the Senate controlled taxation and state expenditure. 23 Public income - to state the case in its most simple form - was derived from two main sources; first the loans - "imprestiti" - and direct taxes - "decime" - imposed by the Senate and administered by officials elected by the Senate. 29 These were not a point of contention; but the second main source of public money, the indirect taxes - "dazii" - could generate problems through their sheer complexity. "Dazii" were levied at various rates on many consumer goods and raw materials entering, leaving, or passing through the Dominio, and were handled by network of separate


27 Stella, "Publiche Entrate", cit. under n.2, above.

28 Contarini, De Magistratibus, loc.cit. under n.7, above.

29 The most important of these was the direct tax on "beni immobili", which has left extensive and rather unsatisfactory documents in the files of the Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto. As only real property and land were assessed, the source does not help with the problem of the withdrawal from trade. I have used it extensively in preparing App.II.
departments each with its own officials, its own funds, and its own book-keeping methods; until the middle of the XVIth century no real attempt seems to have been made to standardise procedure or to draw up combined accounts. 30 There were strange inconsistencies in the appointment of the various departments; most were elected by the Senate, even those which were introduced well on in the XVIth century; Proveditori sopra le Beccarie were appointed by the Senate to regulate the meat supply from 1545; another group of Proveditori took charge of the "dazio del vino" from 1574. 31 But the Collegio delle Biave, which controlled the corn supply, was elected by the Council of X. It might fairly have been argued that this was a matter of national security, but it would have been harder to carry the same point in the case of the Collegio del Sal, also chosen by the X. More important still, the revenues from these separate "casse" were gathered into the Zecca, and this, naturally considered secret, was in the charge of the X, which also appointed the Proveditori sopra la Zecca, and the Proveditori sopra le Monete to supervise the currency in circulation. 32 Rather than constructive encroachment

30 This less than thumb nail sketch of Venetian finances is derived from R. Cessi, Storia della Republica di Venezia, Milan 1944, Vol.II, pp. 132-9. No attempt is made here to give a full account of the different departments, and so far as I know, none exists. Da Mosto, L'Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Rome 1937, gives some help. For "dazzii" in general, and the involvement of the nobility in their collection, I have consulted E. Pullan, "Occupations and Investments of the Venetian Nobility in the Middle and Late XVIth century", forthcoming article, which the generosity of the author permitted me to study.


32 All this can be reconstructed from A.S.V. Segretario alle Voci, Eleziani del Consiglio di X e Zonta, Rg.XIV, 1575-97, cc. 35f.
by the X, this whole process probably represented no more than the multiplication of new departments to meet new needs. But when the X assumed control of the payment of stipends to those serving in political posts abroad, it was clearly taking some of the Senate's responsibility for public spending into its own hands; and this process apparently reached crisis level in the third quarter of the century, as a series of efforts was made to bring the sprawl of separate departments under some kind of central control. For the X, partly because of its compactness, partly because of its control of the Zecca, was best placed to take the lead. A number of the most important Parti went through the Senate; in 1563 the "dazio" on goods exported by sea or onto the Terraferma was levelled out at 5%, and in 1577/8 a normal levy of 6%, and certain special rates, were standardised for goods coming in from the East; in 1579 the Savii sopra la Mercantia were directed to look into all the departments and all the various anomalies. Naturally, a long series of reports and proposals followed. But the guiding

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Besta, op.cit.p.145; Maranini, loc.cit. Cf.also nn.7,28, above.


Bilanci Generali, Vol.I, pp.596f, documento aggiunto 167 (quater) B.

Ibid.pp.602f, doc.agg.186 (bis).

Ibid.pp.605f, doc.agg.187 (bis). Reports on the various departments dealing with wine, oil, cheese, fish, wood, iron, etc. fill the next 20 pages.
influence was definitely that of the Council of X; in 1566, after provision had been made for the preparation of three "Bilanci Generali" to check overall revenues from the City, the Terraferma, and the Stato di Mar, control of the operation was passed from the Senate to the X; when Regolatori della Scrittura were elected to standardise book-keeping and inspect the affairs of the various "casse", they too were drawn from the X and responsible to it. The scheme for the liquidation of the public debt from the Cyprus War was approved by the Council of X and carried into effect by officials drawn from its ranks. Unquestionably, control of the Zecca and of main financial positions had given the X a predominant place in Venetian fiscal affairs by the end of the 1570s; and, with the economic scene darkening, it was not a popular place to hold.

It is perhaps too easy to see these developments in the power and influence of the X as calculated encroachments, to see the X itself as

38 Stella, "Publiche Entrate", p.163.

39 Stella, op. cit. p.164, dates this move to 1578; but Bilanci Generali, p.259, doc.186, Parte of X on the control of "Pubbliche casse" dated Aug.26th, 1577, already refers to Regolatori della Scrittura.


an entirely separate body, and to lapse into phrases hinting at vicious
dualism or even oligarchic conspiracy. But, as we have tried to show,
in politics the constitutional background was hopelessly vague, and in
finance the problems of the situation were essentially new. The notion
of "dualism", too, must be handled with great care; there may have been
an abstract dualism of function between the Senate and the X, but there
were not two conflicting sets of people, one working through the Senate
and College, the other through the Council of X. Practically all the
most powerful figures of the seventies and early eighties - Alessandro
Gritti, Antonio Bragadin, Vicenzo Morosini, Marcantonio Barbaro, Zuanne
Michiel, Alvise Zorzi, Francesco Bernardo, Niccolò da Ponte, Jacomo
Soranzo, Paolo Tiepolo - were regularly members of both the College and
the Council of X. The whole idea of a small and secret Council natu-
rally conjures up images of an ingrown and jealous oligarchy; the charge
was made by contemporaries and has been repeated many times since.

But the term "oligarchy" can have only a relative and restricted signifi-
cance in the context of what was, in any case, a closed oligarchy of

42 Stella, "Publiche Entrate", p.164, speaks of "il pericoloso dualismo".
43 This question will not be developed in detail here; there were of
course Savii who were not members of the Council of X, and members
of the Council of X who were not Savii; but of the 'great' names
there is no doubt. Cf.App.I, and Ch.IV, Table I.

44 Francesco da Molin, c.117, spoke of "molti giudizi et di stato et
particolari senza molta sodisfazione, prevalendoci l'amicizie, favori
et parentele nel numero di pochi." Venier, Rivoluzioni, cc.46-8,
gave a whole section to malpractices. Cf.Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini,
Ch.I, passim; Seneca, Leonardo Donà, p.164f; Stella, Chiesa e
Stato, pp.66-7, describes the "vecchi" as "di tendenze piutosto
oligarcha".
The Council of X was in fact elected with great care and deliberation by the Maggior Consiglio - the allegedly "democratic" element in the Venetian state. Over the two months before the formal entry of a new X, on October 1st of each year, the Maggior Consiglio formed small electoral committees which submitted lists of nominees to the whole body's vote. The candidates had to be senators over the age of forty, and no more than two or three were elected at one sitting; naturally, a list of very influential men tended to emerge. These were then empowered to submit a list of fifteen further names, whom the Maggior Consiglio might approve or reject singly as the "aggiunti" or collectively the "Zonta" of the X. Such a group had first been installed with the X at the time of Marin Falier's execution in 1355, obviously with the intention of spreading responsibility as far as possible; the numbers had varied, going up to twenty five for the deposition of Francesco Foscari, and - in conception at least - to fifty at the time of the Turkish War in 1539. This request the Maggior Consiglio refused to accept. Indeed, the Zonta seems to have been largely unpopular as an institution, probably because the system of direct nomination made it too easy for the X to surround itself with an

45 Contarini, De Magistratibus, p.11.
entourage of reliable dependents; according to Venier, there were difficulties over the nominations on ten occasions during the XVIth century, and in 1532 it was over the Zonta that the full force of accumulated resentment broke.

Even so, the X and Zonta cannot simply be written off as a closed cadre, for there was a substantial turnover of members during the course of a single year. Immediately after October 1st numbers would start to be pared away by elections to the Colleg’e, or to embassies abroad; so the X and Zonta had to be 'topped up' by a series of subsidiary elections throughout the year, with new members constantly coming in right up to the time of the election of the whole new Council. Though in theory there were only twenty five elected members of the X and Zonta, on average between forty and fifty men seem to have passed through them in the course of a year. In the ten 'groups' of elections between October 1572 and October 1581 around 350 places were actually filled, and over 120 different names appear. Membership of the X and Zonta gave access

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48 Rivoluzioni, c.46; in 1509, 1512, 1519, 1540, 1542, 1548, 1558, 1559, 1562, and 1574. The X could either alter the list, or resubmit it in the hope that the Maggior Consiglio would change its mind.

49 This information is derived from a careful examination of A.S.V. Segretario alle Voci, Elezioni del Consiglio di X e Zonta, Rg.XIV. The date of a man's election is given on the right of his name, the reason for his withdrawal to the left.

50 The highest number I have found is 49, for 1570, the lowest a mere 25 for the plague-year of 1575. This is no great surprise. A.S.V. Seg.Voc.C of X, Rg.XIII, cc.2,6.

51 After some thought, I decided against offering an absolute figure simply because it might be disputed on so many problems of terminology. Should a man who was in the Council for only a few days before being elected a Savio be included or not? How do we decide cases
to the most important state secrets, with a far better chance of free
discussion than existed in the Senate under the shadow of the privileged
Savii. In one sense, the X may have been a "rival" to the College and
Senate; in another, it may have spread power and responsibility by
providing a whole alternative range of influential positions. One of
our sources records Paolo Tiepolo's threat that the abolition of the
Zonta really would open the way to oligarchy; \(^52\) in a sense he was right.

But when all this has been said to control bias, it remains true
that the records of the X during the 1570s show some highly suspicious
patterns and some even more suspicious incidents. The main danger lay
in the Zonta; as we have already said, it gave access to the innermost
affairs of state; but it was not, in the formal sense, a "magistracy"
and it did not bind a member to the period of "contumacia" linked to the
great offices in the College and to the Council of X itself. \(^53\) This
made the Zonta an exquisite instrument for achieving just that continuity
of control over major affairs of state which Venetian insistence on the
rotation of offices sought most assiduously to avoid. There were several

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52 Muazzo, Governo Antico, cit. under n.2, above, c.140. Record of
Tiepolo's speech on Nov.18th 1582. "...mostrando che nel Consiglio
di X semplice senza la Zonta si ridurrebbe il governo in oligarchia."

53 Da Mosto, L'Archivio, Vol.I, p.53 is mistaken in saying that the
Zonta carried a year's "contumacia"; one of the first aims in 1582
was to enforce one. Cf.A.S.V.Liber Frigerius, cit.under n.2, above,
c.92-3.
ways of proceeding.  The most direct was simply to stay in the Zonta, which Alessandro Gritti did, with a brief expedition into the X, right through the 1570s until eventually, in 1582, he died.54 Equally, the Zonta could be used as a kind of political refuge for preserving one's influence while serving the term of "contumacia" from another office; it clearly helped Gritti in this way, too, since he was Savio Grande ten times between 1572 and 1582. From 1571 to 1573, Antonio Bragadin alternated between the X and the Zonta. But the most interesting case I have come across is that of Francesco Bernardo, who was elected to the X in 1573, but almost immediately sidetracked into the College as Savio Grande. Still, when he had finished with the College, there was a place for him in the Zonta before the end of the year. Again, the system of direct nomination made it possible for members of the great families to organise reserves of support, or to keep a grip on the situation while one member was serving in another office. During the year 1577-78, Jacomo Soranzo was appointed Proveditore Generale in Terraferma and had to abandon his place in the Zonta; but in 1578 his younger brother Zuanne came in to keep the family represented. There may have been 350 places filled by election in ten years; but a good half of them were taken by only 23 men.

How far the corrupt verdicts and decisions attacked by da Molin really had gone is difficult to say at this distance. In general, 54

Barbaro, Vol. IV, c.181. The information on this page is derived from A.S.V. Segretario Alle Voci, C. of X Rg.XIII, XIV; detailed pagination would be tedious, and the reader is referred to App.I under the appropriate offices and years.
Morosini agrees that the situation was grave; public money had been spent for private purposes, magistracies were being held by men who were technically disqualified.\(^{55}\) A number of incidents in the years just before the reform could easily have excited suspicion. In 1579 there was a really lurid electoral scandal in the Maggior Consiglio, with three nobles - Andrea Malipiero, Vettore Soranzo and Marcantonio Grimani - accused of bribing a number of "ballottini" to pass them false "balle d'oro", which would entitle them to join the nominating subcommittees and put forward the candidates they wished.\(^{56}\) The Council of X pursued the charges against Malipiero only, and he does not seem to have been arrested. The cases against Soranzo and Grimani were dropped. Though he was not closely related, the presence of Jacomo Soranzo on the Zonta cannot have created much confidence that justice had been done to the full.\(^{57}\) In 1580 the Procuratore della Leze - one of Paruta's superiors on the expedition that formed the background to the Perfettione - was accused of misappropriating funds. He was stripped of his office.

\(^{55}\) Op. cit. under n.2, above, p.7. "Publicam pecuniam nimis liberaliter in gratiam privatorum hominum effusam; patricios plerosque majorum comitiorum legibus solutos; alios, qui vel per aetatem arcerentur, vel tempus, quo post exactos honores ad alios capessendos lege minimo idonei sunt, nondum exigissent, ad magistratus admissos; cuncta fere ad se traxisse."

\(^{56}\) A.S.V. Consiglio di X, Parti Criminali, B.XIX, first 'carte di denuncia' dated March 13th; the affair continued until the end of June. "Balle d'oro" were supposed to be drawn at hazard from closed urns, so that the influential right of nomination went by lot. The mechanics of this case will be discussed in detail later.

\(^{57}\) A.S.V.C. di X, Criminali, B.cit. May 24th; a 'proclama' was issued against Malipiero 'in absentia'; Parti of June 27th dropped the charges against Soranzo and Grimani. Barbaro, Genealogie, (A.S.V. copy) Vol.VII, pp.45,50, show that the link between Jacomo and Vettore di Benedetto was not close.
but as he had been a prominent member of the Zonta, the affair may have produced more than an individual impression. In 1582 itself, resentments multiplied as the X and Zonta were accused of passing a substantial 'golden handshake' from public funds to the Secretary Antonio Milledonne, to make up for the Maggior Consiglio's refusal to elect him Grand Chancellor. The previous year, Andrea da Leze had been turned down as a candidate for the Zonta; so, as he was a Procurator, the X expanded the number of Procurators who could attend "ex officio" from three to four. Finally, on Ascension Day, there was a fight on the Lido between a group of young nobles and a number of "bravi". Whoever was responsible, the "bravi" got their plea to the X first, and the relatives of the three wounded nobles - Gerolamo Barbaro, Piero Zorzi, and Carlo Boldu - received a stern rebuff when they went to file a 'denuncia'. One of the Capi di X, Zuanne Donato, was reputed to have made the ill-judged remark "Sumus tot reges". Gossip buzzed furiously for the rest of the summer, and on October 1st three members of the proposed Zonta were rejected.

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58 Alvise Michiel, Annali, entry of March 7th 1580. Cf. next Ch. Table I on da Leze's career; he seems to have been one of those who relied almost entirely on the Zonta.

59 Venier, Rivoluzioni, c.46.

60 Ibid., loc.cit.

61 Ibid. c.47, Muazzo, Governo Antico, c.137. "Di questa occasione di ragionamento si è entrato a parlar molto alla scoperta, che il Consiglio di X vuol esser padron di questa terra, e che li Grandi anno tirato tutto in quel Consiglio, dove a voler far bene a raddrizzare i disordini non bisognava far più la Zonta del Consiglio di X."
There was nothing exceptional about such an occurrence of course, and the following weeks show nothing approaching a prepared plan of action from any quarter. For more than two months all was confusion. The X tried to damp down resentment by proposals to prohibit purchase of the right to early entry into the Maggior Consiglio, and to bar Procurators from the Zonta entirely; but these face-saving devices were of no avail, for the Maggior Consiglio would accept neither them nor, on renewed attempts, a single member of the proposed Zonta. The tension increased throughout October; nobles became anxious to dissociate themselves from the X and Zonta, and to gain other offices; Three of the most prominent members of the rejected list, Paolo Tiepolo, Zuanne Corner and Zuanne Michiel, became Savii Grandi during the autumn. The X met only three times in two months. On November 4th the first constructive move was made with a Parte in the Senate transferring election of Savii alle Aque and Sopraprovveditori alle Biave from the X to the Senate itself, and summoning the Chiefs of the Quarantia Criminali to meetings of the Collegio del Sal in place of the Capi di X.

62 Muazzo, Governo Antico, cc.133-9, records these details. On the early weeks of the crisis, before official documents begin, he apparently had better sources than Venier or the author of the Raccolta Marciana. Morosini was less interested in trivia.

63 Muazzo, Governo Antico, c.140. "Tutti fuggivano d'esser fatti del Consiglio di X, e quelli che erano fatti della Zonta si andavano disfacendo con entrare in altri luoghi." The three men mentioned might well have become Savii Grandi anyway, but the election tallies interestingly with Muazzo's remark. Cf.App.I.

64 A.S.V. Senato, Deliberazioni Segrete, Rg.LXXXIII, cc.111-112. The X's election of various administrative and financial officials is discussed above. Cf.nn 32-41.
by the Savii with the agreement of the Capi di X, the motion passed easily. 65

On November 18th Paolo Tiepolo, as Savio della Settimana, made a weighty speech in the Senate, pointing out the dangerous dislocation of public business that was resulting from the lack of the secret Council, and the risks of leaving as small a group as the X to its own devices without a Zonta. 66 The X had been handling so much diplomatic business that in the short term, 67 at least, he may have been right. But it was December 7th before another constructive move was made towards breaking the deadlock. When it came, it was comprehensive; a Parte was brought before the Maggior Consiglio attempting in several ways to give clear definition to the words "aliarum rerum eiusmodi quas secretissime tractari merentur" in the decree of 1468. 68 The exact aim of the Parte is not quite clear, nor was it clear at the time; either it was a sincere attempt to compromise on the basis of the status quo, or it was an elaborate manoeuvre to stem further agitation by a few seeming concessions. It was moved by the Doge da Ponte, a frequent member of the Zonta before

65 Muazzo, Governo Antico, c.139.
66 Ibid. c.140. "...mostrando ai senatori in quanto malissimo stato si ritrova il governo, perche non vi ha un Consiglio segreto..." Cf. also n.52, above. Muazzo is again the only authority to record this speech.
67 Leonardo Donato, ambassador in Rome, was feeling the same misgivings as Tiepolo; M. Brunetti, "Da un Carteggio di Leonardo Dona Ambasciatore a Roma col Fratello Niccolo", Miscellanea di Studi Storici ad Alessandro Luzio, Florence, 1933, Vol. I, p.135. Letter of Nov.5th.
68 A.S.V. Maggior Consiglio, Deliberazioni, Liber Frigerius, Rg.XXXI, cc.92-3. Only 4 clauses were actually discussed on the 7th, the others being glossed "non datur in tempore."
1573, and six Consiglieri who had all recently sat in the secret Council; 69 this is suggestive, but not decisive, for this was the standard method procedure in the Maggior Consiglio. 70 Whatever the real aim, the Parte dealt principally with the correction of abuses in the existing structure, and it is doubtful if it would have made any appreciable difference to the functions and malfunctions of Venetian government in the long term. The preamble took the existence of a Zonta as read. 71 The "res secretissime" of the 1468 Parte were defined in the first three clauses as offers of confidential information or spies' reports whose disclosure might threaten state security or compromise the safety of a valued agent. 72 This was certainly a great deal stricter than the 1468 clause, and it was added that serious discussion of such questions should be passed on to the Senate; but the onus of deciding exactly what was or was not a matter of public security remained squarely with the X and Zonta, which could hold back a piece of information on the strength of a two thirds majority. 73 Similarly, the two clauses dealing with finance struck a

69 Andrea Bernardo (X, 1572,1573,1581), Piero Morosini (X,1577), Zuanne Soranzo (Zonta, 1573, X, 1580), Sebastiano Contarini (X, 1574,1578, 1581) Gerolamo di Priuli (X, 1576,1579). Frigerius, loc.cit. Only da Ponte had been a substantial office holder; cf.Ch.IV, Table I, and App.I.

70 Contarini, De Magistratibus, p.12. "Dux, Consiliarii, et Quadranginta Virorum praesides tres...soli jus habent referendi ad Magnum Concilium."

71 Frigerius, loc.cit. "L'andera parte che le materie secretissime intese per le parole contenute nella sopradetta deliberazione del 1468 le quali doverano esser abbracciate dal Consilio nostro di X con la Zonta s'intendano esser le infrascritte..."

72 Ibid. "Gli avisi segretissimi che si fossero dati in confidenza e che noi medesimamente convenissimo comunicar per servigio del Stato nostro, li quali comunicati non potrano giovar al governo nostro e risaputi apporteriano danno, perciocché farian perdere confidenza di quelli che ne li avessero fatti sapere."

73 Ibid. "Ma se sopra essi avisi occorrera farsi alcuna deliberatione,
conciliatory note by confirming the Senate's control of public expenditure in the strongest terms; but the X was to be left with the Supervision of the Zecca which had already given it such a powerful position in this field. 74 The fifth clause appeared to make concessions to the Senate and the Avogadori by directing that they should handle any cases which did not fall subject to the early sections on security; nothing, of course, was said of how much would remain when security had been duly defined by the X. 75 Finally, a period of "contumacia" equivalent to their time in office was to be imposed on future members of the Zonta. 76 The Parte made a flourishing appeal to established custom in the opening phrase "Considerando li sapientissimi progenitori nostri...", and immediately became the focus of discussion. 77

74 Ibid. "La provisione del danaro et il governo della Zecca, che deve per ogni rispetto passar segretissima, con questa espressa dichiarazione però che la dispensa di esso danaro sia fatto per il Senato..."

75 Ibid. "Quando fosse fatta alcun altra cosa oltre lo sopra specificata, possa quella esser intromessa per cadauno degli Avogadori nostri e placitata nel Senato essendo materia di Stato..." This was probably in part an attempt to avoid a recurrence of the problems arising after the Lido fight; that case was passed over to the Avogadori and the Quarantia in early November; Muazzo, op.cit.c.139.

76 Frigerius, loc.cit. "Oltre di che sia preso e statuito che la Zonta del Consiglio di X habbi la sua contumacia al modo medesimo che hanno quelli del detto Consiglio."

There seems to have been more uncertainty than dogmatic division at first. The security and finance clauses were voted together on December 7th, but with no clear result and a large abstention. On the 19th Francesco Gradenigo, one of the Capi dei Quarantia, attacked the Parte hotly as preserving an institution responsible for many acts against the established principles of the government, and demanded the abolition of the Zonta. Alberto Badoer, a Savio di Terraferma, replied that it was wrong to blame an institution for the faults of individuals; the Parte, he considered, would control malpractices; too much was owed to the secret Council, including the recent peace with the Turk, for it to be discarded. Badoer’s speech was thought to have appealed strongly to the older and more experienced nobles, but more than a third of the Maggior Consiglio abstained on the first vote and it was too late to put the motion again. So Badoer, and Gerolamo

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78 Frigerius, c. 93; the voting was as follows; 534 di si: 436 di no: 171 non sicuri. 494 di si: 539 di no: 169 non sicuri.

79 Venier, Rivoluzioni, c. 37; Morosini, Historia, pp. 8-9. "Quinimmo magis vosmet ipsos excitare atque inflammare debitis ut, si ulla in re maiorum instituta minus servata sint, errata corrigantur." The bias of one of Nuazzo’s sources starts to appear strongly at this point (c. 141v) "...introdusse cose sediziose e scandolose senza oppenero alla Parte, e niente altro dicendo, se non cose da mettere in odio il Collegio (eg. the X) e li grandi." This was Francesco di Marin Gradenigo, not to be confused with Francesco di Bortolomeo, brother of the Vicenzo, who became a powerful member of the College in the later 1530s. Cf. App. II.

80 Morosini, Historia, pp. 10-12. "...iis præsertim opinantibus, qui marturitate diurnaque rerum usu in Republica praestarent." Frigerius, c. 93, records the first vote as 620 di si: 372 di no: 447 non sicuri. "E per esser l'ora tarda fu rimessa a un altro Consiglio."

31 I have with some hesitation accepted Morosini and Nuazzo against
di Priuli, who also spoke in favour of the motion, achieved very little. On December 21st another onslaught was launched on the Parte in a speech which caused a great deal of admiration and mystification, delivered by Ferigo Badoer, an elder man who had withdrawn from public office after a distinguished career. He argued that this was a disagreement about means, not about principles; that the control of armaments, alliances, and revenues belonged properly to the Senate, that legislation was the task of the Maggior Consiglio, and that punishment and reward fell subject to the Quarantia except in the extreme situations mentioned by the Parte of 1463. He spoke in such general terms that no one was quite certain what he meant; but he seemed to be implying that the Zonta should go. A first reply by Francesco Longo, another recent member of the Zonta, produced very little impact; but then Zuanne Soranzo succeeded in turning the tide of the debate completely. The points he urged were essentially those already put forward by Alberto Badoer; the lack of security was having a bad effect on negotiations with foreign powers, and something, at least, must be done soon; there was a perfectly sensible solution before the assembly, and it deserved a trial.

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82 Venier, who records the name Jacomo; Gerolamo di Priuli was a Consigliere, and had recently been in the Council of X, so a speech from him seems likely enough. Cf. n.69, above.

82 Venier, Rivoluzioni, c.39. "...tenendo sempre conclusione, che non vi debba esser la Zonta del Consiglio di X." Morosini, Historia, p.13; "palem vero quid sentiret (arte fortasse factum) minimo enunciavit." Maazzo, Governo Antico, c.142; "molte impertinenze scandalose".

83 Venier, loc.cit. "...fu longhissimo e da molto tedio."

Probably such words carried more weight coming from a diplomat as experienced as Soranzo; it was decided that the clauses of the Parte should be voted separately and those on security just gained a majority on the second ballot.\(^{85}\) The clause on control of the Zecca followed more easily the same evening.\(^{86}\) The sections on the responsibilities of the Avogadori and the imposition of "contumacia" on the Zonta were firmly approved on the 22nd.\(^{87}\) Details of the finance clauses were finalised on the 27th, so that by the end of the year the crisis was theoretically resolved on the basis of a compromise which recognised the main powers of the X and the continued existence of the Zonta.\(^{88}\) But it proved impossible to carry anything into effect. On January 9th another full list was put forward for the Zonta, but only one, Zuanne Corner, was accepted by the Maggior Consiglio.\(^{89}\) A week later Soranzo returned to the defence of the Zonta, but the deadlock continued and there was no further attempt to put names forward.\(^{90}\) A number of circuitous measures were tried during the following months; on March 13th it was suggested that a three quarters, rather than a two thirds

\(^{85}\) The margin was very narrow; Frigerius, c. 94; 772 di si: 573 di no: 169 non sicuri. 764 di si: 582 di no: 78 non sicuri.

\(^{86}\) Frigerius, loc. cit. 933 di si: 422 di no: 78 non sicuri.


\(^{88}\) Frigerius, loc. cit.

\(^{89}\) Nuazzo, *Governo Antico*, cc. 143v-144.

\(^{90}\) Venier, *Rivoluzioni*, c. 41. "Fu benissimo udito, ma giovò poco."
majority of the X and Zonta be required to hold information back from the Senate; on April 23rd there was a guarded proposal that the Senate should have charge of any further discussion on the management of the Zecca; on the 26th came another, that the Senate should take overall charge of expenditure from the Zecca. But on all of these, the voting was inconclusive. It was at this point, Venier comments, "conoscendosi chiaramente, che il Gran Consiglio non voleva la Zonta e però non sentiva la parte che in alcun modo la coroborasse, non si parlo più di Zonta del Consiglio di X." A final attempt to preserve an inner ring for financial administration was made on May 1st, when da Ponte and his Consiglieri proposed that a subcommittee of 20 might be elected to collaborate with the Avogadori, the Savii di Terraferma, and the Council of X over the management of the Zecca; but the catch was rather obvious, and the motion was definitely rejected. Two days later came the final capitulation, with a Parte that placed complete control of the Zecca in the hands of the Senate. The crisis now seems to have been over; a

91 Frigerius, c.97. 669 di si: 663 di no: 149 non sicuri. 626 di si: 735 di no: 134 non sicuri.
92 Ibid.c.98. "Che la deliberazione che si ha da fare per mettere la Cecca nostra sotto alcun governo sia commessa e delegata al Senato nostro." 3 votes taken, last 699 di si: 585 di no: 177 non sicuri.
94 Rivoluzioni, c.43.
Council of X was in office, operating apparently on the legal and constitutional lines marked out by "Considerando li sapientissimi...", though without the Zonta which the terms of the Parte had clearly envisaged.

The results of the reform for the various institutions involved can be judged very clearly from official records, which leave no doubt that the financial and diplomatic supremacy of the X had been broken. Responsibility for the Collegi delle Biave e di Sal had, of course, already been removed by the Parte of November 4th; similar provisions were made for the Proveditori sopra le monete, and from 1583 the principal Zecca officials, the Proveditore and the Depositario, appear among the officials elected by the Senate. Clearly, both income and expenditure were now in charge of the Pregadi. The correspondence of Leonardo Donato from Rome reflects a similar change in the diplomatic sphere; up to the autumn of 1582 he directed a large volume of information to the X, sometimes writing twice a week and covering almost every major topic in European and Venetian politics; the Aquileia dispute, the Spanish take-over in Portugal, the Jesuit Possevino's mission to Moscow. In the later months of his embassy and afterwards, this dwindles to a tiny trickle; sometimes there are no more than two or three letters preserved from an entire year, and most are on non-political topics, relating to individuals or religious institutions. Important

97 Frigerius, c.112, November 4th 1582. Cf. also nn.64,65, above.
98 A.S.V. Segretario alle Voci, Elezioni del Senato, Rg.V, cc.149,156.
99 A.S.V. Consiglio di X, Dispacci Roma, B.XXVII; inserts 65-94 are filled by Donato's letters from 1583; Lorenzo di Priuli's, from 1583, take 95-8.
political material now passed through the College and the Senate; and it was the period immediately after May 1583 that produced the nuncio Campegio's laments of having to handle delicate and confidential negotiations through the crowd of "giovani" in the Senate. 100

Quite what this meant in terms of persons and political programmes is very much less clear. On one side of the debate over the reform the main characters really do seem to form something like a consistent group. Paolo Tiepolo, Francesco Longo, Gerolamo di Priuli and Zuanne Soranzo, who were all recent members of the X or Zonta and who all spoke more or less directly in favour of the institution at various times, were also men who either had strong ecclesiastical connections or were trusted by Papal officials. Tiepolo's exact relationship with Rome is not absolutely certain, but he was able to secure and dispense patronage, 101 and at a tense stage of the negotiations over the Apostolic Visitation in 1580 Bolognetti had said in the College that the Pope would prefer to entrust the Visitation to Tiepolo than leave the Patriarch to judge his own case. 102 Zuanne Soranzo was less heavily implicated with the Curia than his elder brother Jacomo, who had actually declared his wish to act as the Church's champion in Venice 103 and was soon to be stripped of his

100 Cf. quotations from Nunz.Ven.under Ch.I, nn.14,15 (July 2nd, Aug. 20th 1583; also citations under n.23 of the present Chapter.

101 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XIX, c.219; Tiepolo gains a benefice for a priest at Arbe, 1578. For this, and other material in this section, I have been able to consult O.M.T.Logan, Studies in the Religious Life of Venice in the XVIth and Early XVIIth Centuries, Cambridge, Ph.D. pp.52f.

102 A.S.V.Collegio Esposizioni Roma, F.I, Jan.31st, 1530/1 (M.V.)

Procuratorship and exiled for intriguing to secure a Cardinalate; but Zuanne himself escaped prosecution with his brother by only one vote. Francesco Longo was brother in law of Domenigo Bollani, bishop of Brescia and an upholder of the Contemplative Life in Paruta’s Perfettione; his death in 1584 caused much grief to Campeggio, who regarded him as a possible candidate for the Dogado. Gerolamo di Priuli was the brother and father of successive Bishops of Vicenza, and was clearly treated with respect by Papal nuncios. Other cases are less precise; Alberto Badoer seems to have been slightly alarmed at the speed of the Senate’s recognition of Henri of Navarre in 1589; but this is little to go on; Zustiniano Zustiniani, who seems to have spoken on the Parte of April 26th 1583 and had been one of the Capi di X at the time of the Lido fight, belonged to a family that had connections with the Barbaro/Grimani Patriarchs of Aquileia and with the Order of the Hospital.

104 Ibid. F.XXV, c.247, July 28th 1584. This extremely dramatic affair will be discussed further at a later stage of this study.

105 Cf. Ch. II, above, esp. n.33; his brother Marcantonio married a Bollani and links between the families were close.


107 Cf. App. II for Gerolamo’s family connections. For his reputation at the Curia, cf. the instructions of Francesco Peranda to the new nuncio de Capua in 1576, quoted by Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.9; he was grouped with the “principali” and the nuncio was advised to cultivate his brother the Bishop. The whole list repays study, as it contains the names of Tiepolo and Soranzo, besides Zuanne Corner and Zuanne Michiel, who, with Marcantonio Barbaro, were also leading members of the X.

108 Cf. Ch. I, n.67, above. I feel that Raulich and Stella rather exaggerate Badoer’s objections, which are largely to the timing of the move and show only in one dispatch.

109 Muazzo, Governo Antico, c.144v, 136. Logan, op. cit. p.235, discusses the rather uncertain link with the Grimani/Barbaro combine; Alvise
but it is not clear how these applied to Zustiniano himself. This is by no means an absolute rule; some members of the X completely refuse to fit the picture. Zuanne Donato, whose ill-chosen words had done so much to begin the trouble, was strongly anti-clerical and had fiercely denounced Zuanne Soranzo for conduct which seemed to accept the Pope's ruling over the Aquileia dispute. Da Ponte, too, had long been suspected by the Curia and had a brother living in Geneva as a Calvinist. But it seems fair to say that there was at any rate a strong group of accepted Papal supporters among the established members of the X and defenders of the Zonta.

It is on the other side of the debate — allegedly the side of positive action and reform — that the real puzzles lie. The most striking feature, perhaps, is the complete lack of the concerted programme and common ideals which have been attributed to the "reformers". The practical moves for reform, such as they were, came from those who wished to preserve the Zonta; its abolition seems to have been achieved mainly by vaguely-defined animosities and pure inertia. Even the most basic consistency of action was lacking, for "Considerando li sapientissimi..." was accepted in principle and rejected in practice. As

Zustiniani was coadiutor of Aquileia after the death of Daniele Barbaro. Unfortunately, the Zustiniani family trees do not give certain indications of Zustiniano's identity, though they show many Hospitallers.

110 Cf. quotation from Alvise Michiel, cit. under n.146, Ch.I, above.

Professor Cessi said of an earlier dispute, the essential struggle seems to have been one of persons rather than programmes. The speakers against the crucial Parte give hardly the grain of a clue; Francesco Gradenigo was a chief of the Quarantia, a fairly well paid office which did draw poorer nobles, so he might be representative of a move by a needy, excluded group to oust the wealthy members of the X. But the Gradenigo family name was very old, and there is no sign that Francesco profited by his efforts; his name does not appear in an important position in the subsequent decades. Ferigo Badoer—again, his was a very ancient family name—had already withdrawn from public life; the only thing that seems to link him with Gradenigo is a personal grudge against the Council of X, for Badoer had been prosecuted in 1563 for dealings with Henry, Duke of Brunswick, which the Capi di X had not previously cleared, while Gradenigo had apparently had a brother hanged.


113 Pullan, "Occupations and Investments", points out that the small expenses and 130-160 ducats per year stipend were attractive to poorer nobles and that the office could become a focus of disaffection. For this interpretation of the term "giovani" cf. Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, pp.5f.

114 Barbaro, Genealogie, (Bibl.Marc.copy) Vol.I, c.32; the Badoers traced a Doge in the 9th century; both they and the Gradenighi are listed among the "case vecchie" by Romanin, Storia Documentata, Vol. IV, p.420.

115 A.S.V. Consiglio di X, Processi Criminali, Rg.XI, c.30, Dec.10th 1568; correspondence in Nunziature di Venezia, Vol.VIII, ed. Stella, pp.464, 469. Badoer was attempting to secure a post for a dependant on Duke Henry's staff; he was fined 500 ducats and barred from office for 5 years.
Nothing even as roughly coherent as the group of speakers who supported the Parte can be discovered among its opponents. Those who are said to have profited by the reform seem to have been remarkably uninterested in it. Leonardo Donato had of course been in Rome during the vital months, but he returned shortly after the conclusion of the crisis to the dismay of the nuncio and the delight of the "giovani." He had kept in touch with events through his brother Niccolò, and his letters seem cautiously impartial; his main concern was that negotiations might be compromised, which was exactly Zuanne Soranzo’s anxiety. Paolo Paruta, whose writings and subsequent career have affected the interpretation of the whole event so much, was well placed to affect the issue at the end of 1582, when he was Savio di Terraferma, with his reputation as a writer and speaker still fresh and brilliant. There is no evidence of his having spoken once. The whole train of events was in fact so haphazard that it is hard to accept the idea of a programmatic connection with Paruta’s theories or anyone else’s; the last word, perhaps, should be Venier’s; "si possa credere che molte volte l’opposizione fosse fatta più ai soggetti nominati che al carico." 

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116 Muazzo, Governo Antico, c.141v. Muazzo is so biased that this detail should definitely be treated with caution.

117 In midsummer 1583; cf. Campeggio’s dispatch of Aug.20th, quoted under Ch.I, n.15.

118 Brunetti, "Da Un Carteggiol," cit under n.19, Ch.I, above, esp.p. 135, letter of Nov.5th, 1532. 

119 Rivoluzioni, c.46. This was referred to disputes earlier in the XVIth century, but the events of early 1583 make it look almost equally applicable to 1532-3.
Chapter IV

REFORM OR RESHUFFLE?

The attempt to explain the events of 1582-3 in terms of ideologies and organised groups seems to prove rather less than half satisfactory; a number of men with ecclesiastical connections or sympathies were certainly ranged in defence of the Zonta, but no real coherence or even consistency of action appears on the other side. Still, it should be possible to trace the contending groups and judge the result of the reform by reference to personalities. The rather vaguely defined "giovani" are said to have brought about the fall of the Zonta.\(^1\) The restrictive practices of the few great dynasts had clearly generated a great deal of resentment, not least by an improper manipulation of offices;\(^2\) so it is naturally assumed that a substantial group of men previously excluded from all office by their lack of connections\(^3\) now swept into power to complete "the overthrow of the conservative faction and its replacement by new men..."\(^4\) It is also tempting to generalise

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1 Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p.3 and n.1. Cf. this study, Ch.I, Introd., with nn. Campeggio was considerably less precise in his connection of the reform with the "giovani" than the anonymous source quoted by Cozzi.

2 Morosini, Historia, p.7; "alios, qui vel per aetatem arcorentur, vel tempus, quo post exactos honores ad alios capessendos legem minime idonei sunt, nondum exegissent, ad magistratus admisso." Cf. Ch.III, n.55.


4 Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p.226; Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.12,
Paruta's sudden success into an influx of new, talented men.  

It has never been claimed that 1582 brought an absolute break in the structure of Venetian government; but if the X and Zonta had roused enough hostility to eliminate the Zonta entirely, we should expect the most prominent members of those bodies in the years before the reform to fall out of the political limelight after it; and if a new group had at last gained a voice in the administration, we should expect an immediately perceptible and growing infusion of names which are not found in any position of influence before 1582. This change ought to be reflected chiefly in the lists of Savii, for, as Campeggio pointed out at the time, all important deliberation now passed through the Senate, and the Savii del Collegio organised business for the Senate.

As a basis for discussion, we must first isolate as far as possible the inner ring of nobles who controlled the X and Zonta in the 1570s —

speaks of "Il trapasso, nell'aristocrazia veneziana, dal vecchio al nuovo gruppo dirigente..."

5 Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p.230. "...Paruta, whose rapid rise now suggested that the advent of the giovani had at last opened careers to new men of talent." The same view is implied by Candeloro in his two articles on Paruta in R.S.I. Vol.LIII, 1936; cf.No.3, p.74-5, No.4, p.52, and quotations in the present study, Ch.II nn.8, 13, 17.

Stella, "Publiche Entrate", p.171, is noticeably more cautious than in his later work, Chiesa e Stato. Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p.232, admits that "the change was not absolute".

6 Stella, "Publiche Entrate", p.171, is noticeably more cautious than in his later work, Chiesa e Stato. Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p.232, admits that "the change was not absolute".

the "pochi principali e potenti" of Francesco da Molin's complaints.\(^8\)

In fact, this proves a fairly easy task. Apart from the occasional guide line, such as a directive to a nuncio on whom he could best cultivate,\(^9\) there is a quite clearly marked group of large office holders. Table I lists the nobles who were elected to the X or Zonta five times or more between October 1572 and October 1581 - the last year in which a Zonta was actually formed -, column I showing the number of places held in the X and Zonta, column II the number of elections to the post of Savio Grande over the same period.\(^10\) As a check on this, and as a further indication of the tremendous concentration of power, a more rudimentary Table II lists those who were Savio Grande five times or more during the same years. It can be seen at once that there is an almost complete overlap between the two lists. This should act both as a caution against seeking total 'duality' or complete division of the Council of X and the offices concerned with the Senate, and also as a support for da Molin's comments on the narrow oligarchy. This last point can be developed almost at will; Jacomo Soranzo was ambassador at the Imperial court in 1570, at Rome in 1573, and at the Sublime Porte in 1574; his young brother Zuanne was in Spain in 1573, France in 1575, and Rome in 1581.\(^11\) Alessandro Gritti and Francesco Bernardo each

\(^8\) Diary, c.117. Cf.Ch.III,n.44.
\(^9\) Quoted by Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.9. The list given there is brief, but it compares interestingly with Table I.
\(^10\) Information is drawn from App.I, which was compiled from A.S.V. Segretario alle Voci, Consiglio di X e Zonta, Rg.XIII and XIV, Senato, Rg.IV and V.
\(^11\) A.S.V.Seg.alle Voci, Rg.IV, cc.32v-35.
served four stretches as Proveditore in Zecca over the ten years covered by Table I. Practically speaking, the same narrow group of men fed the vital information through to Venice, decided what to do when it arrived, and controlled the money to implement the decisions.

The second two columns of Table I follow the political fortunes of these men after the reform, both as Savii Grandi and as members of the chastened Council of X. At first sight, everything seems more or less as expected; there is, indeed, a notable fall-away in the hold that they exerted over the great offices. Only eight out of twenty eight went on to fill the key positions in the College during the ten years after the reform. Another three sat in the Council of X, which in any case had much less influence. But the final column of Table I brings the situation into slightly clearer focus with a few biographical details; another nine of the original twenty eight - Gritti, Foscarì, Grimani, Pesaro, Gussoni, Bernardo, Dandolo, Loredan and Rhenier - died either before the reform or within a few months of its completion. Da Ponte of course became Doge in 1573 so was out of the running. Da Leze was disgraced in 1530. This rapidly reduces the list of those who disappear from major office in the later 1530s to six. Even with those the position is not absolutely clear-cut; Zuanne Donato may have ended his

12 A.S.V. Seg. alle Voci, C. di X, Rg.XIV, cc.35f.

13 The information is derived from Barbaro's Genealogie (A.S.V. copy, cit. in Table I simply as Barbaro) and from Vols.XVII and XVIII of the Raccolta di Consegì, Bibl. Marc.Cod. it.Cl.VII, 829-30 (3903-9), cit. as Raccolta. This document gives a valuable list of marriages and deaths opposite the relevant dates in the text.
career in the shadows; fewer of his tantrums show in the records of Alvise Michiel and he did not, apparently, gain a Procuratorship. Perhaps "Sumus tot reges" continued to ring in many ears. On Alberto and Guovo I have failed to find any information, biographical or genealogical. But Emo secured a Procuratorship in 1534, so cannot have been totally without influence, and Bollani's son Andrea was soon well established as Savio di Terraferma. There is certainly no group which can definitely be said to have been 'excluded' due to previous connection with the X and Zonta.

A fuller analysis of the senior positions in the College between October 1532 and September 1592 clarifies the true state of affairs still further. During that period, there were 167 elections to the rank of Savio Grande; the positions were taken by only forty six men, twenty six of whom had been in the X or Zonta before the reform. But these figures do not display the full resilience of the oligarchy; ninety one of the positions filled were taken by an 'inner ring' of only thirteen, every one of whom had sat in the X or Zonta before 1532, while five of them - Barbaro, Bragadin, Michiel, Morosini, and Zorzi - had been among the most powerful members of that now "discredited group". A sixth, Zuanfrancesco di Priuli, had been very closely linked to the X by his scheme for the liquidation of the public debt. A seventh,

14 There is no genealogy in Barbaro under either of these names.

15 A.S.V. Seg. alle Voci, Senato, Rg.V, c.11.

16 Cf. citations in Ch.III, n.40, above. Priuli was given an unusually long period of office - 3 years from 1577.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Periods in the X and Zonta, 1572 - 1532.</th>
<th>Periods as Savio Grande, 1572 - 1532.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alessandro Critti</td>
<td>G, of X; 1 Zonta; 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antonio Bragadin</td>
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<td>Zorzi Pisani</td>
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<td>Marco Bollani</td>
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<td>Jacomo Eno</td>
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<td>Piero Foscari</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marco Grimani</td>
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<td>Jacobo Guovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vicenzo Korosini</td>
<td>&quot; 2 &quot; 6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periods as Savio Grande, 1582 - 1592</td>
<td>Periods in C.of X, 1582 - 1592</td>
<td>Details relevant to career's conclusion</td>
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<td>D. 1591, Barbaro, Vol.II, c.138</td>
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<td>D. Jan. 1586-7, Raccolta, Vol.XVIII, c.54v</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>Periods as Savio Grande, 1572 - 1582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Filippo Alberto</td>
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<td>Leonardo da Ca' Pesaro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zuanne di Bernardo Donato</td>
<td>&quot; 4 &quot; 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;delle rengho&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobo Gussoni</td>
<td>&quot; 2 &quot; 4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuanne Michiel</td>
<td>&quot; 3 &quot; 3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(inc. 1 reserved place)</td>
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<td>Zambattista Querini</td>
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<td>Alvise Zorzi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Francesco Bernardo</td>
<td>&quot; 3 &quot; 2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Corner</td>
<td>&quot; 3 &quot; 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leonardo Dandolo</td>
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<td>D. 1591, Barbaro, Vol.III, c.318. To be distinguished from Zuanne di Piero, X, 1592, and Savio Grande several times in 1590s.</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Periods in the X and Zonta, 1572 - 1532</td>
<td>Periods as Savio Grande, 1572 - 1532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Zuanno da Lozo</td>
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<td>Niccolo da Fondo</td>
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<td>Domenigo Duodo</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Alvise Lorodan</td>
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<td>Jacomo Soranzo</td>
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<td>Gasparo Rhenier</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo Tiepolo</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Disgraced for misappropriation of public funds, Alvise Michiel under March 7th, 1580.</td>
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<td>Doge, 1578 - 1585.</td>
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<td>D. 1596, Barbaro, Vol.II, c.95 (Bibl.Marc.copy).</td>
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<td>D. April, 1580, Barbaro, Vol.VI, c.413.</td>
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<td>D. April 19th 1585, Alvise Michiel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Elected Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessandro Gritti</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacomo Soranzo</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuanne Michiel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicenzo Morosini</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcantonio Barbaro</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Francesco Bernardo</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Niccolo da Ponte</td>
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<td>Paolo Tiepolo</td>
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<td>Alvise Zorzi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Periods as Savio Grande, 1582-92</td>
<td>Record in X and Zonta, 1572-1582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Francesco Duodo</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>X, 1576, 1581: Zonta, 1579, 1581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacomo Foscarini</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>X, 1577, 1582: Zonta, 1579, 1580</td>
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<td>Zuanfrancesco di Priuli</td>
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<td>Zonta, 1572, 1575</td>
</tr>
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<td>Antonio Bragadin</td>
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<td>X, 1573, 1575, 1576, 1577, 1580: Zonta, 1572, 1573, 1578, 1580, 1581.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuanne Contarini</td>
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<td>X, 1580.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marin Grimani</td>
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<td>X, 1576, 1581.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Alvise Zorzi</td>
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<td>Zonta, 1572, 1573, 1574, 1577, 1580, 1581.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marcantonio Barbaro</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Zonta, 1573, 1574, 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonardo Donato</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>X, 1577, 1580.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicenzo Morosini</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>X, 1575: Zonta, 1572, 1573, 1576, 1578, 1580, 1581.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zustiniano Zustiniani</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>X, 1578, 1581.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferigo Samudo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>X, 1579: Zonta, 1580, 1581.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Francesco Duodo, was brother of Domenigo, a prominent figure in the X during the 1570s, but now too old and infirm to hold major office. The details are traced in Table III.

The lists of Savii di Terraferma provide evidence that is less striking than this, but perfectly consistent with it; less striking because those of an age - say 35-45 - to be Savii di Terraferma in the later 1580s will generally have been too young for a place in the X or Zonta during the previous decade. Of the forty four different names listed between 1572 and 1582, seventeen held office in the X or Zonta over the same period, and these include Leonardo Donato, Zustiniano Zustiniani, Alvise Zorzi, Zuanne Michiel, Vicenzo Morosini and Ferigo Sanudo, six of the most prominent Savii Grandi in the next decade.

Thirty of the forty four definitely went on to hold the same, or higher office in the College in the years after the reform. Between 1582 and 1592, we find the picture that this would lead us to expect; thirteen of the first twenty Savii di Terraferma elected after September 1532 had held the same position before; there is, indeed, a sprinkling of important new names, the most interesting being those of Paruta and Marco Venier, the Avogadore who had caused a great stir by prosecuting the Archbishop of Spalato in 1580. They were both elected in 1582 and

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17 Barbaro, Genealogie (Bibl.Marc. copy) Vol.II, c.95. A petition of Domenigo, asking to be excused the post of Proveditore in Zecca on the grounds of "la mia grave età...le molte mie indisposizioni", is contained in A.S.V.Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, F.CXX, June 17th 1591.

18 Members of the X had to be over the age of 40; cf. Maranini, La Costituzione, pp.409f.

19 Fully discussed by Stella, Chiesa e Stato, pp.23f.
1583. But it is 1586 before names not previously found in the College begin to appear in any quantity. This is getting suspiciously far from the reform, and many of the names are very recognisable; Francesco Barbaro was son of the immensely powerful Marcantonio, Niccolo Donato was Leonardo's brother, Andrea Bollani's father had been an important member of the Zonta, Piero Duodo and Alvise Foscarini were sons of the two most influential Savii Grandi of the decade. The symptoms are less of sharp change than of gradual and controlled co-option of a carefully selected younger generation.

The Savii agli Ordini are of practically no interest in their own right, since the office, as has been said, carried very little real power by the time relevant to this study. But it is possible to judge how the post was being used, and by whom, in the years before the reform, and to say fairly certainly that it continued to be so used afterwards. In 1573 Alvise di Priuli, son of the influential Gerolamo, was elected and served three terms in the next three years. Piero Duodo, son of Francesco, whom we have already met as Savio di Terraferrna and who was to be a forceful member of the College at the time of the Interdict, began on this career in 1579. Alvise Zorzi's son Benedetto appeared in 1581. Clearly, the office was being used as a kind of training

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20 Patronyms are very often given by the Segretario alle Voci; these can then be crosschecked in Barbaro, Genealogie-Vol.I, 76 (Barbaro); II, 30 (Bollani); II, 95 (Duodo); II, 136 (Foscarini); Bibl.Narc. copy. Cf.Seneca, Leonardo Donato, passim for the close link between the Donato brothers.

21 Contarini, De Magistratibus, pp.35-6, cit.under n.9, Ch.III.

22 A.S.V.Seg.alle Voci, Senato, Rg.V, c.15.
ground by rising members of the great families. There is not the slightest sign that this process was even momentarily interrupted by the reform; in September 1582 another son of Francesco, Andrea Duodo, was elected along with Zuanne Soranzo's son Francesco. Soranzo was re-elected the following year, this time in the company of Alvise Foscariini, whose connections with the 'inner ring' of the College were every bit as strong. He, too, was in the College at the time of the Interdict. 23

The important executive offices of which the Senate had assumed control in 1582-3 appear to have been affected as little by the change as the College. Alvise Foscarii and Paolo Tiepolo served as Proveditori sopra le Biave in 1584; between 1582 and 1587 Alvise Loredan, Alvise Zorzi, Domenigo di Priuli, Jacomo Foscariini, Vicenzo Morosini, and Ferigo Sanudo followed each other as Proveditori in Zecca; Marco Lando, Marco Bollani, Ferigo Samudo and Domenigo Duodo served as Proveditori sopra le Monete. 24 Everywhere there seems to be the same close-knit dynastic continuity. Even between 1592 and 1602 the power of the great figures of the 1570s was still very real, fading naturally as the older men were thinned out, 25 but always consolidating itself by the introduction of suitably connected new members. Zaccharia Contarini, Jacomo

23 Ibid.c.16. Cf. Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p.107 for Foscariini's later position; he was probably less powerful than Duodo.
24 A.S.V. Seg. alle Voci, Senato, Rg.V, cc.149, 154v-155.
25 Paolo Tiepolo died in 1585, Vicenzo Morosini in 1583, Antonio Bragadin in 1591, Marcantonio Barbaro in 1595. Soranzo's elder brother Jacomo was unable to hold office after 1584. Cf. Table I.
Foscarini, Leonardo Donato and Zuanne Soranzo, all one time members of the X and Zonta, still appear among the most frequent holders of the vital post of Savio Grande. They have been joined now by Vicenzo Gussoni, son of Jacobo, and Bernardo Tiepolo, younger brother of the deceased Paolo. Zuanne Dolfin, Vicenzo Gradenigo, Antonio Miani and Francesco da Molin, all Savii di Terraferma in the 1570s, now take their place at the highest level.

Concluding his account of the reform, Andrea Morosini remarked with some satisfaction that in spite of the lobbying and the laws, in spite of the abolition of an institution that had stood for so long, the whole affair was accomplished "nullo publicarum rerum detrimento." One is bound to agree. The system seems to have continued working splendidly.

But what exactly was the system which made it possible for so few men to control the vital positions in the State for so long, apparently unaffected by the jealousies and the animosity they seem to have raised? It was of course accepted even by the most zealous admirers of the Venetian constitution that the key offices in the College, the Council of X, the senatorial subcommittees, the major embassies and governorships, were bound to circulate among a fairly small group; there can only have been a limited number of men with the qualifications, the experience,

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27 Historia, p.15.
and the income required. J.G. Davis calculates that, allowing for a 'reserve' of about forty completing a period of "contumacia", around 100 nobles must have been needed at any one time to keep the important posts filled. But within this 100 there was probably always a smaller group of really influential men, holding office repeatedly, able to exert an immediate and direct effect on opinion in the fairly restricted numbers of the Senate, or even in the Maggior Consiglio, largely by their personalities and presence. This can be inferred from many sources; the instructions to the nuncio de Capua already cited; Cardinal Borromeo's suggestion that, if a few powerful men could be persuaded that a Visitation was necessary, the rest would follow easily; Bolognetti's comparison of the nobility to a rope, the whole length following if one end was pulled. There is no need to read anything

23 Giannotti, "Republica", p.73. "Di questo è necessario che seguiti che tutti questi magistrati i quali havete numerati girino in poco numero di gentiluomini." On the problems of filling some of the higher posts, cf. Davis, pp.75ff (Ch. entitled "A Manpower Shortage in the Government"). Embassies and governorships were very expensive to hold; Pullan, "Occupations and Investments", p.36, shows that by 1559 governors might be spending 5-6,000 ducats during their term of office.

29 "Decline of the Venetian Nobility", p.23.


31 Cf. Giovanni Soranzo's article, cit. under n.216, Ch.1, above; on p.30 he reproduces a letter of Feb.13th 1580; "...la forma di questa repubblica è tale che chi può più di eloquentia di saper persuadere, d'amicitia, e di parentela, quelli hanno maggior autorità e prevagliono agli altri, onde bisognerebbe col fermo sui un poco di tempo rendersi benevoli questi principali..."

32 "Vari Pregiudici alla Libertà della Chiesa", Stella, "Chiesa e Stato", p.172. "...una fune si bene intrecciata che non si può dissolversi a talmente continuata che con tirarne una parte si muove quasi tutta."
immediately sinister into this; a powerful speaker really could swing an assembly, and we can gain some idea of the influence wielded by an able Savio from our anonymous observer's tribute - a rare tribute, for such a cynic - to the historian Battista Nani. "Quando egli parla in Senato, s'ammutisce ogni strepito; tutti s'arrendono alle sue persuasioni...per ottenere l'assenso del Senato alle dimande del Collegio, basta che egli lo persuada...quello che vuole il Nani, vuole il Senato." Zuanne Soranzo's speech on December 21st 1532 clearly had a considerable effect in breaking the deadlock over the proposals for reform. The following year his brother Jacomo moved the Senate from a general hostility to a substantial vote in favour of reopening negotiations for an anti-Turkish League. In the closed circle of an oligarchy, a clever speaker was bound to carry weight, especially if his words were backed by money and prestige. Before asking whether or not the "principali" of the 1570s disappeared from the government, we should perhaps have asked whether the government could have gone on functioning without them.

But the main strength of the "principali" undoubtedly lay in their ability to control entire blocks of votes in the Senate and the Consiglio

33 Molmenti, Curiosità, cit. under n.13, Ch.III, above, pp.336f.
34 Cf.Ch.III, n.84, above.
35 Campeggio, in A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXIV, c.379, Sept.5th 1583, is studiedly vague, saying only that there were two Parti before the Senate, one to reject all further idea of a League, one to negotiate; for a while the first prevailed; "ma alla fine, havendo l'amico orato lunghissimamente e efficacissimamente, haveva ottenuto la seconda e voti 153 della 203." But Alvise Michiel in his entry of Aug.30th specifically mentions a long and effective speech by Soranzo. His contact with the nuncio is interesting, but not surprising (Ch. III, nn.103-4). The plan eventually came to nothing owing to mistrust of Spain.
Maggiore more or less at will. The means by which this was achieved can be traced out in some detail; the foundations upon which it was built are more difficult to uncover. The vital factors appear to have been the power and cohesion of the family, and the extent of its connections; "ben amicato", "potente di parenti et amici" were the phrases used to describe a really influential Venetian noble. Some obvious 'foci' of political power can still be picked out fairly easily; sons moving up the College behind their fathers and uncles, brothers whom we know to have been living together moving in and out of the same offices or operating in complementary departments of public life; Jacomo and Zuanne Soranzo, Domenigo, Francesco, and Piero Duodo, Jacomo, Zuanbattista and Alvise Foscarini all provide instances. But as we try to follow the strands of the web out through collateral branches and marriage connections, it becomes increasingly difficult to work out the details of what must in any case have been a constantly shifting pattern, and to understand its influence on particular events in a single man's career. We know, for example, that Alberto Badoer was at great pains during the 1580s to establish a link with the Corners, marrying Zorzi Corner's widow

36 "Anonimo", in Molmenti, pp.370f, gives a full analysis of the connections and friendships of the leading senators of his time; eg.p.374, on Piero Dolfin; "è ben amicato e dipende interamente da Luigi Contarini dalla Madonna dell'Orto, suo genere." Cf. also Dorromeo's letter, quoted under n.31, above. In 1572 Facchinetti commented on the importance of the rapport he had established with Jacomo Soranzo; "è gentiluomo che ha moltitudine di parenti, sara di autorità e potra far servitio..." A.S.Vat.Nonz.Ven.F.XII, c.171, Nov.29th.

37 The Soranzo brothers certainly lived together, though this does not appear to have been true of the Foscarini. The careers and connections can be followed in App.I and II.
in 1588 after his daughter and Zorzi’s son had died within a few days of their wedding in 1583. 33 We know that Marin Grinani’s daughter Laura married a Corner. 39 We know that Francesco Duodo and Lorenzo Barnarno, two of the more powerful Savii of the 1580s, were brothers in law. 40 We know that it cost the Zani 21,000 ducats to acquire Alvise Zorzi’s son Antonio as a son in law. 41 A contemporary could watch these webs being spun, know the influence of the various families involved, and comment acidly on the election of an entirely incompetent Doge through the immense strength of his "parentela". 42 But it is hard now to point directly at an office and say confidently that its holder gained through this or that connection. 43 The links were too widespread and too variable. Before his final success with the Corner, Alberto Eadoer had been married to a Friuli and a Contarini. 44 As Bolognetti said, it was a very

33 Alvise Michiel, entry of May 12th, 1583, mentions the tragic double death of the younger people; Museo Correr, MSS. Provenienze Diverse (ED) 2180/1 contains the record of Alberto’s own marriage.

39 A.S.V. Notarili, Testamenti, B.1249, Rg.i,c.173.


41 A.S.V. Notarili, B. cit.Rg.i,c.30, will of Antonio Zorzi.

42 "Anonimo", p.370, on Domenico Contarini. "Accese a questo grado il Doge presente non per merito delle qualità personali ne per vigore del broglio andato da lui ma per forza di fortuna e ampiezza di parentado con i Giustiniani...che sono omnipotenti nei voti di tutti i consigli, col Procuratore Barbarigo Cerbero, col Eadoer di S. Noisè e con diverse altre principali famiglie."

43 I feel for example that Dr. Logan, who has very kindly allowed me to use his thesis, is perhaps a little too ready to build on certain fairly distant connections between the Corner and the Pisani in his invaluable analysis of the Venetian episcopate, pp.236f.

closely woven system, and we should probably be cautious of arguing
directly from a marriage connection to a political alliance unless there
is further evidence that the families concerned were co-operating.

But the political methods in general use by the patrician cliques
can be reconstructed with relative ease, partly from occasional refe-
rences by contemporaries, partly even from theoretical discussions and
polemics, mainly from the mass of legislation which existed to control
what had obviously become ingrained and uncontrollable malpractices.

The Venetian term used to cover the whole range of activities was simply
"broglio"; now incorporated in so many languages with so many senses,
it originally signified no more than the well-trodden patch of turf
which is now the Piazzetta, where elections and other problems were dis-
cussed before the nobles went into the Palazzo. The first move, as

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45 Alvise Michiel, whose Annali are a genuine day-to-day record, is more
useful than Francesco da Molin, though there is no source for the
later XVIth century of anything approaching the calibre of Sanudo.
A well informed nuncio like Facchinetti or Campeggio was often given
inside news of debates or elections. I have also found a number of
marginal notes in the Raccolta di Consegi, Bibl.Marc.Cod.it.Cl.VII
830 (8909).

46 Molmenti's Anonimo remains useful. The vital source is Museo Correr
Cod.Cicogna (930) 3182, ins.2, Discorsetto in Propositione de'Brogli,
cited hereafter as Prop.Brog. Though it is an XVIIIth century docu-
ment, containing references up to 1727, it covers the whole range of
legislation from the XVIth century, and the author clearly wrote from
first hand experience. Three articles by A. Pilot provide useful
discussion, and print a number of popular verse polemics from the
XVIIth century; "La Teoria del Broglio nella Republica Veneta",
"Ancora del Broglio nella Republica Veneta", and "Discordini e Sco-
certii del Broglio nella Republica Veneta", Ateneo Veneto, Anno XXVII,
Vol.2, 1903-4, pp.1f, 176f, 295f.

47 A.S.V.Censori di Stato, Capitolari, B.I, Rg.i, passim.

48 M. Ferro, Dizionario del Diritto Commune e Veneto, Venice, 1780.
an important election of any kind approached, was for the interested parties to form small meetings of their closest relatives and associates; possible opponents would be discussed; the electorate, apparently, would be analysed man by man, whether it was to be the Senate or the Maggior Consiglio, and divided into "favorevoli", "indifferenti", and "contrarii". The aim then became to bring over as much of the 'floating vote' as possible, and perhaps at least to stop some of the "contrarii" from voting at all. The members of the inner circle moved among their own friends and relatives, extolling their candidate's virtues and qualifications, urging the contacts they made to make others in their turn. As the circle of supporters spread outwards, the meetings grew. 49 We can still observe some of the faint rings left by what must have been a practically continuous maelstrom of activity; a short note of the future Doge Marin Grimani strongly recommends Alberto Badoer for a vacancy among the Procurators which was expected in early 1592; 50 but a letter of the young Paolo Faruta to Count Serego of Verona shows far more of the actual mechanics of electioneering. Serego had apparently appealed to Faruta - who was a close personal friend - for his support in securing one of the civil offices of the subject towns which required sanction by the Venetian authorities. 51 Paolo apologised for his delay in

49 Prop.Brog.cc.5f.
50 Museo Correr, Cod.Cicogna 3204/1, Feb.3rd 1591/2 (M.V.) "...raccomando il Ch. mo M. Alberto Badoer Kv. q uanto la persona mia propria."
51 Lettere inedite di Paolo Faruta, ed. G. Biadego, Verona, 1835, pp. 8-9, 8th April 1570. All the letters in the collection are addressed to members of the Serego family. The office in question is not specified, and generous help from J. Law of Oxford has not produced a
beginning to circulate "in piazze", and for knowing so little about the other candidates; but he thought there were not many, and had spoken to a "gentiluomo di autorità" who entirely discounted the chances of a rival whom he had thought menacing. Guaranteeing the fullest support of his own "parenti et amici", Paolo concluded by thanking the Count for his delightful gift of asparagus.

By the time the walks in the campi, the discussions on the Rialto or outside San Marco, the secret visits, were all over, a compact and fully organised body of voters must have been ready to contest the election. It remained to be seen whether another group had organised itself better.

To some extent, all this may seem perfectly legitimate canvassing, operating at the rather higher intensity that could hardly fail to apply in a restricted electorate whose members must almost always have been personally known to one another. As the Cicogna commentator remarked, it was only natural for candidates to take the advice of their friends

Sure answer. A number of petitions in the Filze of Senato Terra seem relevant, but are only for formal recognition of the Rettore's appointment.

52 Ibid. p.9. "che di quanto potro io con li miei parenti e amici, ella sicuramente potra come di cosa sua disporne..."

53 One of the polemics quoted by Pilot, Ateneo Veneto, Vol. cit. under n.46, above, gives a vivid picture:-

"Che in piazza, in Giesa, e anche a mazzaria
e qualche volta a casa si se va
su l'ora tarda, in ver l'Ave Maria;
con preghi, e con scamoffie che se fa
e con offerte etere di servir
se procura avanzar (come se sa)
Quella Balotta."
and relatives, and it was only right for everyone to be informed of the qualities of the candidates. There was, he argued, a kind of "broglio honesto", which was not only unavoidable but necessary for the proper functioning of the government.  

In fact, even these relatively open and innocent methods were banned by law. A Parte of the Council of X in 1483 had forbidden "stare nec rogare aliquem nobilium delipso Maiori Consilio quod eligat vel velit ipsum, vel alios, ad aliquam rem." In 1517 two special magistrates, the Censcri di Stato, were elected to deal with a situation which was depicted as deteriorating rapidly; stress was laid on the "infinite intercessioni di propinqui et amici" by which nobles were trying to secure office, and the Censcri were directed to sift evidence against those suspected of such practices. Denunciations from two witnesses were sufficient basis for a conviction, two years deprivation of all office and a fine of 50 ducats were the penalty. During the course of the XVIIth century a number of laws attempted to control the means of bringing indirect pressure to bear on voters - a Parte of 1533 made it illegal for nobles to hold "pasti e conviti" the day before elections to the Pregadi. 

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54 Prop. Brog. cc. 3-6, esp. 3. "Da questi principii se viene in conseguenza che vi sia del broglio necessario, ne tutto dir si possa prohibito dalle leggi, perché se le leggi per fine primario tutte tendono alla conservazione della Republica, che togliessi via quel legame che avevo già detto, che la conserva, non ne vorebbe certamente la sua conservazione."

55 Quoted in A.S.V. Censori, B.I, Rg.i, c.18.

56 Ibid. cc. 1-2, Parte of Sept. 13th. "Potran (i censori) far inquisi- tion per ogni mezo et via possibile, se alcuno haverà fatto pratiche, overo haverà pregato lui proprio, overo per 'interposita persona'..."

57 Ibid. cc. 19-20, Sept. 19th.
to stop the kind of meetings described by the Cicogna commentator. In 1587 the rule was tightened still further, when Rettori were forbidden to send presents to potential supporters in Venice, and all public bodies were banned from social gatherings within a week of an election.

From 1533 a general appeal was made to the conscience of voters by circulating a "bussola delle preghiere" with the bags for votes for and against a candidate; those whose votes had been improperly solicited, by whatever means, were supposed to insert their "ballotte" in the neutral bag; at first a sixth, then from 1533 a fifth of the total vote in the "bussola delle preghiere", was enough to exclude a candidate.

From 1524/5 those elected on the ballot were required to appear before the Censori and swear solemnly that they had not used illicit means to gain votes. Such provisions seek to place a rather naive trust in the individual; one wonders, with the Cicogna commentator, whether they should or indeed could ever have been properly enforced. The conduct of a future Doge with the reputation of being strong, religious, and

58 Ibid. cc.22-23, Oct.21st. This seems to have been directed chiefly at the executive subcommittees, whose fairly frequent and private meetings could no doubt provide many opportunities for extending "amicitia" and discussing matters beyond the business in hand.

59 There were several laws on this subject during the century, mostly dealing with minor variations in procedure; A.S.V.Censori, B.I, Rg.1, cc.9 (1533), 12 (1535, 11th Sept.), 12v (1536, 26th Sept.), 14 (1547, Aug.2nd, 1543, Dec.7th), 22v (1583, May 22nd), 48v (1596, June 27th). The clearest modern discussion seems to me to be that of Besta, Senato Veneziano, pp.270f.

60 A.S.V.Censori, B.I, Rg.1, c.8, Jan.18th (M.V.) "...che per loro, ne per altri, non sara stato, ne sara dato, ne prom esso dinaro, ne don, ne presente ad alcun."

61 I am inclined to agree with Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.23, on Grimani's
of a leading moral philosopher, hardly encourages confidence in the efficiency of the laws.

But perhaps it was thought desirable at least to make a stand on the principle of absolute freedom of individual decision constantly stressed by the laws; for the truth was that the distinction between "broglio honesto" and "broglio illecito" which the Cicogna commentator tried to draw can rarely, if ever, have worked out in practice. Francesco da Molin saw the difficulty very clearly; everyone, voters and candidates, knew each other far too well for the normal and accepted "prattica" to stay innocent for long. It was a short step from a request for support in one election to a bargain assuring the return of the favour in the next; from there, it was easy to pass to a sworn compact, sealed by oath; beyond that, apparently, lay the full scale "baratto di voti" in which two powerful circles would unite in sworn convictions; his will (cit. under n. 39, above) provided for unusually large legacies to a number of religious foundations, including a payment of 10 ducats for 20 years to both the Jesuits and the Capuchins.

62 The original Parte providing for the appointment of Censori, cit. under n. 56, above, was very specific; "...essendo gli onori premio della vertù, siano conferiti con sincerità a quelli, che per meriti, probità, e buone operationi li hanno meritati..."

63 Prop. Brog. pp. 5-6, 12f.

64 Diary, cc.142-3. (Refering to the law of 1588, discussed below) "...per che vincendevolmente i nobili di Venetia si passano per le mani l'uno all'altro, ballotandosi oggi uno, domani l'altro, e massime nelle ballotazioni che fa il Senato per regimenti e magistrati, quei che avevano molti parenti et aderenti in esso s'intendevano insieme e convenivano, 'si mi honorerai e farai favore con gli tuoi nella tal occasione o ad alcuno dei parenti, con miei ti cambiòro, 'e sigilavano le promesse con giuramenti e sacramenti gli interessati..."
alliance to block out all opposition in favour of their own candidates. This could operate with particular effectiveness in a senatorial election, where, say, there were two Savii to be chosen from five candidates. Naturally, the use of the oath was strenuously forbidden; there were laws against it dating back to 1422; it was denounced in the first brief of the Censori in 1517; by 1588 - just 6 years after the reform that has been said to have opened the government to men of true merit - the situation was so bad that penalties for all types of lobbying were raised to 500 ducats fine and 10 years exile; it was even thought necessary for the Patriarch Trevisan to issue a general 'dispensation' from the obligations involved by such political oaths. But, since there was renewed legislation in 1593 and 1596, we must assume that even the Patriarchal absolution had little effect.

As an election approached, tactics seem to have become more open, developing into a kind of refined intimidation. Powerful candidates

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66 Basta, Senato Veneziano, p.267. Prop.Brog.c.15 agrees in citing this as the earliest law against broglio.
67 Loc.cit. under n.56, above. "Vermasiam per quanto è publca fana quelli che desiderano rimaner in qualche magistrato, in quelli prae-cipue che si fanno per cuesto Senato, astringono quelli, che li hanno a ballottar, a farsi prometter la ballotta sua con solenn sacra-mento..."
68 A.S.V.Consiglio di X, Parti Communi, F.CLXXV, Oct.11th and 13th 1583, reproduced in Censori, B.I, Rg.i, cc.16-17.
69 A.S.V.Censori, B.I, Rg.i,c.17v (C.of X and Censori to co-operate more closely in forming "processi"), Sept.13th, 1593; cc.47v-48 (all voters required to appear before Censori and supply written oath that they have not been involved in sworn exchanges of votes), June 27th, 1596.
circulated with groups of dependants, pressing supporters to remember
their promises, soliciting the still uncommitted. From the numerous
laws which attempted to check such "adunanze", it seems to have been
usual for large crowds of well-wishers and supporters, noble and non
noble, to collect on the Rialto, or in the court of the Palazzo, shouting
the name of their favourite as the voters entered the Assembly, placing
bets on his success, rearing their approval at his election. It is
hard to believe that this sort of 'direct action' had very much effect
on the result of an election, but it may have been possible for a power-
ful noble to cow some of his poorer fellows, who might need his politi-
cal or financial patronage, by an overwhelming display of wealth and
influence. It is at least significant that the problem was thought
serious enough to call for a law of the Maggior Consiglio.

But it was probably in the Palazzo itself, and during an election,
that "broglio" could take on its most virulent forms. Direct canvass-
ing obviously continued. The law of 1555 prohibited walking around the
benches while the ballot bags were circulating just as it prohibited
gathering supporters in the Piazza, and under the same penalty - 25

70 Prop. Brog. c.13.

71 The most important is certainly A.S.V. Raccolta delle Leggi Statutarie
del Ser..mo Maggior Consiglio, Rg.XXX, cc.107v-110, Aug.10th 1555,
reproduced in Censori, B.I, Rg.i, cc.21v-22v. The preamble refers
to "...le pratiche che si fanno pubblicamente e senza alcun rispetto
nella corte del Palazzo e Piazza di San Marco e di Rialto con numero
di parenti e di amici per quelli che pretendono alcuna dignità, in-
tertonendo li nobili nostri che passano per le strade..." This law
was reaffirmed in 1560, Censori, loc.cit. Between 1553 and 1593
there were eleven laws passed to check betting on the elections;
ibid, cc.36-42.
ducats fine and a year's exclusion from the Maggior Consiglio. 72 But electoral procedure was so intricate as to make tampering with the vote a less public and more promising prospect. Theoreticians felt complacent about the clever interweaving of chance - "sorte" - and individual judgement - "giudicio", sometimes used separately, usually in conjunction. Ducal elections were of course the most elaborate fusion. 73 In senatorial elections, individual judgement played the main part: small nominating committees - "mani" - were used in the choice of certain administrative officials, but Savii, Rettori and ambassadors were named in after open nomination, straight ballot. Each member wrote a name on a small "polizza", dropping it in one of the three circulating "bussole" - for, against, and "preghiere". Then a simple count followed. 74 In the Maggior Consiglio, where of course the senators themselves were chosen, "mani" of electors were first chosen by lot: members filed past three urns - "capelli" - which contained sixty gold coloured balls among more than a thousand silver; those who drew the gold balls - the "rimasti colle balle d'oro" - were declared nominators, withdrew in small groups, then returned with

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72 Ibid. "...ne debbano andar interne al consiglio ne per li banchi..."

73 In general, Contarini, Magistratibus et Republica, p.34. Procedure in a ducal election is analysed on pp.23-32. Modern comment in Maranini, op.cit., pp.106-129, 261f.

74 Contarini, op.cit.p.34 "Ciascuno dei senatori nomina colui che più gli aggrada, quindi per ciascuno si ballotta o quello a cui più ballette toccaranno che agli altri, pur che passino la metà di tutta la somma, è pronunciato eletto." Also Prop.Brog.c.11.
their list of candidates.\textsuperscript{75} There was no secrecy about the procedure here, for the name of each candidate was posted under that of the nominator who had proposed him, and there was much scope for patronage, jealousy and recrimination.\textsuperscript{76} The nominator's position could be crucial; no matter how much careful preparation had gone on in the background, a candidate had still to have his name put forward. In 1518 Marin Sanudo was assured of 500 favourable votes in the elections of Avogadori, but to his intense chagrin his name was not submitted.\textsuperscript{77} Once the names were posted, a ballot was taken as in a senatorial election.

Both the diarists and the laws seem to lay particular stress on the influence of "broglio" in the elections to the great magistracies and governorships handled by the Senate;\textsuperscript{78} though it is not absolutely clear, this probably refers mainly to the indirect 'preliminary' methods already

\textsuperscript{75} Giannotti, Republica, pp.39-48. This brief account simplifies the process considerably; the number of gold balls inserted would vary according to the number of electoral groups (2, 4, or 5 "mani").

\textsuperscript{76} Prop. Brog. c.10.

\textsuperscript{77} Diarii, Vol.XXV, p.344. "...et io Marin Saundo ne havea 500 e pi\`u certissimamente, e di quelli 10 fo in elettione...ma non li tocha la voce" (i.e. they were eliminated on technical grounds after having drawn a "balla d'oro"). For this reference I am indebted to Prof. F.C. Lane, whose assistance has been invaluable throughout this section.

\textsuperscript{78} Cf. Francesco da Molin, quoted under n.64, above; "...massime nelle ballotazioni che fa il Senato per reggimenti e magistrati..." The law of 1596, A.S.V. Censori, B.I, Rg.1, c.48 also mentions "...principalmente le eletzioni che si fanno nel nostro Consiglio di Progadi..."
discussed, to which the relatively limited numbers of the Pregadi must have been rather more susceptible than the larger body of the Maggior Consiglio. But during the actual taking of a ballot, the same methods of jobbery were probably applicable in both assemblies. A dangerously weak link was offered by the "ballottini", young non-nobles who carried ballot bags round the benches. In the Maggior Consiglio there were usually fifty of them, and apparently the number often went higher. They were in their teens, they were admirably placed to observe how the votes were being cast, to carry news from bench to bench, or to insert votes surreptitiously themselves, and they were hopelessly exposed to the bribes of noble patrons. 79 During the XVIth century six laws attempted to control their conduct, chiefly by providing for a proper list of regular "ballottini", screened by the Censori, and preventing nobles from bringing their own dependents under the guise of "ballottini straordinarii"; 80 in 1532 it was hopefully suggested that boys from the religious houses might prove better disciplined; but as the practice of 'tipping' had to be formally banned, and all previous laws restated

79 A.S.V. Censori, B.I, Rg. i, c. 31v, Parte of Aug. 8th 1532, insisting on the employment of boys from religious houses; cf. below. "...per non parlar di quelle fraudi che possono far occultamento, fanno cose molto sconvenienti e stravaganti, ingegnandosi per trarne guadagno et utilità di portar delle nove, scoprir le prove delle ballottazioni avanti che siano finite." 80 Ibid. cc. 23v-29, Oct. 26th 1537, limitation of numbers to fifty, who would be fully screened by the Censori; restatements, c. 29, Aug. 19th, 1552, c. 30, Aug. 7th, 1573, c. 30v, July 21st, 1579, latter demanding that "ballottini" be under fifteen; c. 31v, law cited in previous n.; cc. 46v-47, Aug. 7th, 1595, general restatement of existing regulations and prevention of 'tipping'.
in 1595, we must assume that this was not a success. It seems probable that tampering with the vote itself was commoner in the Maggior Consiglio, where the complex two tier procedure certainly gave wider opportunities. In the great scandal of 1579, mentioned in the previous Chapter, Malipiero, Grimani and Soranzo had conspired with several "ballotini" to secure "balle d'oro" before the formal draw for nominators took place, so assuring their own selection, putting forward the candidates they favoured, and apparently gaining large sums of money by betting on the results. The full details of this remarkable case are not quite clear; but it certainly underlines the influence of the nominators, for Alvise Michiel speaks of 470 "carte di processo"—presumably various elections affected by the device. With necessary alterations, the same trick could be worked in the ballot itself. In an election to the Pregadi in December 1586 Zuanne Soranzo and Ferigo Rhenier gained an equal number of votes. Relatives were sent out, and

81 "Non possino ne loro stessi ne altri per essi haver, ne conseguir ne alle case ne altrove alcun donativo o mancia da qual sia, che rimarrà in magistrato." Cf. last reference, previous note.

82 A.S.V. Consiglio di X, Parti Criminali, B.XIX, insert 2, charge against Vettore Soranzo, May 15th, "imputato di haver havuto intelligentia, scientia e complicita nelle operationi successe l'anno passato per andar a capello con ballotta d'oro a mano, per haver occasione di guadagnar grossa somma di danaro a scommesse." Cf. Ch. III, n. 56, above.

83 Entry of July, 1579. I have again had the help of Professor Lane's massive experience over this whole incident; it is not clear how the members of the ring could be sure of evading the various rules controlling selection of members of the same family, or how they made sure that their nominees were elected. Michiel's phrase "pugni di ballots" rather suggests that they tampered with the vote itself as well as the selection of nominators.
a re-ballot taken. Both candidates were found to have more votes than there were voters in the assembly. Amid considerable uproar Soranzo was declared elected by fourteen votes, and public conscience was salved by the reading of all laws against "broglio" at the next meeting.

Two factors in the whole problem of "broglio" are particularly relevant to the present study. The first is the decided intensification of attempts to check abuses by law in the last quarter of the XVIth century. Including the very comprehensive laws of 1538 and 1596, there were nine measures directly concerned with electoral practices between 1578 and 1596. Apart from the law of 1555, most of the proclamations in the previous twenty five years seem to have dealt with the more peripheral question of betting in terms which did, indeed, apply to the nobles but were addressed to the populace at large. It would be risky, perhaps, to conclude from the increasingly sombre tone of the preambles that lobbying really was worse in 1590 than it had been two or three decades before, but the spate of legislation tallies interestingly with the political atmosphere described by contemporary writers on the 1582

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84 Alvise Michiel, entry of Dec. 14th; Raccolta di Consegi, Cod, cit. under n. 45, above, c. 31v. The Raccolta adds the interesting detail that Lorenzo di Priuli, a ducal Consigliere, would not at first allow the announcement of Soranzo's name.

85 A full chronological list of relevant laws is given by the author of Prop. Brog., cc, 15f.; he clearly used the Capitolari dei Censori (B. I, cit). Cf. also nn. 59, 69, 80, above.

86 A. S. V. Censori, B. I, Rg. 1, cc. 33-33, records 9 laws against "scommesse" between 1553 and 1571, mostly differing little except in the gradual stiffening of penalties.
Possibly the narrowing field for economic activity was already beginning to encourage those who might, before 1570, have speculated in commerce, to seek less dramatic but surer returns from salaried state offices. The second and possibly more important factor to be noticed is that this tremendous battery of laws was totally ineffective. In fact, there were probably far more laws passed than there were nobles prosecuted. Moving from the impressive proclamations of the Censori to the records of the cases they handled, we find large numbers of ordinary citizens prosecuted for betting on the election results, and a fair quantity of "ballottini" condemned for misconduct, but between 1570 and 1600 there is not one action against a noble. The scandal of 1579 was of course handed over to the Council of X and concluded in decent obscurity. In the sentences of the Censori there is often a suspicious evasiveness; in 1573, for example, a "ballottino" was discovered with his "bussola" full of ballot balls when only one member had voted. He was prosecuted, but nothing was said about finding who was behind the affair. The reasons for this huge gulf between principle and practice are obvious enough, and must have resulted from the social and political

87 To the 1588 law (cit. under n.68, above) "Si vede cresciuta in modo l'ambizione in alcuni de'nobili nostri che posposto il timore del Sig.re Dio ne havendo la mira che dovrano al bene commune si vanno industriando di conseguir con mezzi indiretti et illeciti magistrati, reggimenti et altri dignità..." To the 1596 law (cit. under n.69, above) "Sono ridotte a termini così perniciosi le pratiche del broglio...che esclusa in tutto ogni lícita et civil maniera, si pro-cede con promesse di cambiar voti, et con minaccie et protesti..."


89 A.S.V.Censori, Sentenze, B.III, Rg.2, 3.

90 Ibid. Rg.2, c.66.
background as naturally as did the whole apparatus of "broglio"; the letters of Grimani and Paruta suggest, the Cicogna commentator openly states, that practices which were, strictly speaking, illegal, went on so widely that they were ineradicable. Except in cases of flagrant corruption, it was probably a matter of prosecuting everybody or prosecuting nobody. The first Censori elected in 1517 and after seem to have tried the former policy, and the office was suspended temporarily in 1521. No Venetian noble who was going to need votes to gain him another office in a few months could afford to make enemies at that rate.

Now it is obvious that this background of tension and mutual suspicion, this widening gap between political ethics and political conduct reflected both in the tone of the "broglio" laws and in the failure to enforce them, must be highly relevant to a full understanding of the events of 1582 and of any consequent changes in the government. To assume immediately that any powerful figure in the 1570s was one of the "pochi potenti" attacked by da Molin, and that he was therefore advancing his family interests by illicit means, would be unjust and uncritical. As has been said, it is extraordinarily difficult to follow up either

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91 Prop. Brog. c. 28. His main criticism of the legislation was that it condemned what he considered "broglio honesto". This, he thought, could not and should not be prevented. Eg. c. 15 "...sì credevono dirette le prohibitioni delle leggi non solo ai disordini già accennati, ma ancora ai brogli officiosi e moderati." Maranini, Costituzione, pp. 101f, esp. 115, seems to me amazingly naive in accepting the number and tone of the laws on procedure as a proof of Venetian electoral integrity.

92 Besta, Senato Veneziano, p. 270.
the connections or the tactics of individuals in detail. Such matters were not blazed abroad, though the evidence against some nobles is highly suggestive. But it is possible to observe some of the main "foci" of power, to watch some of the patterns formed by relatives and political allies, and - most important - to see how their fortunes were affected by the laws and by the reform.

Three of the five sons of Stefano Tiepolo, a prominent naval commander of the mid-XVIth century, were active in politics during its last quarter. Of these three the eldest, Paolo, was definitely one of the foremost statesmen of the Republic by the time of his death in 1585. Alvise Michiel gave him an uncharacteristically regretful epitaph; "...gentiluomo di singularissime qualità, gran parlatore e consultore delle cose della Republica. In somma, si stima haversi perduto il maggiore senatore a questo tempo della Republica." Paolo's career was almost entirely diplomatic; he was ambassador to France in 1555, Spain in 1560, and handled two exceptionally delicate missions in Rome in the late 1560s, when the Bull "In Coena Domini" was under discussion, and after the dissolution of the Holy League in 1573. Largely because of this, it was only in the later 1570s that he was able to play a large and consistent part in home politics; his posts in the X and Zonta, his

93 Tiepolo family tree for this branch (which was not closely linked to the Tiepolo del Banco) in Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.IV, c.125 (Bibl. Marc.) = VII, c.84 (A.S.W)
94 Entry of April 19th 1585.
95 There is a convenient summary of his diplomatic missions in Alberi, Relazioni, Ser.II, Vol.4, pp.169-70.
repeated terms as Savio Grande, seem all to come after 1577. But his influence by then was colossal; he was Procurator, a member of the commission on the Public Debt, supervisor of State security and public order by 1580. Though in high repute at Rome, and able to obtain favours from the Curia, he appears to have been discreet and came in for little criticism on this ground. Though well off - he declared an entrata of 1041 ducats in 1581 - his many diplomatic positions had definitely weighed on him heavily. Amoro, the next brother, presents an interesting contrast. Beyond making a brief appearance in the Council of X in 1530, and fathering a splendid cluth of sons on Lucia di Domenigo Moro, he seems to have played no part in domestic politics at all. Instead, he followed his father's example in the military offices, was Proveditore sopra l'Armata in the early 1530s and played a leading role in the campaign against the Usccochi until his death in 1597. Bernardo, the third brother active at this time, is a different

96 Cf. Tables I and II, and App.I. Information on the executive posts is from A.S.V. Seg. alle Voci, X o Zonta, Rg.XIV, cc.10, 45v, 51 (Sopra la Francazione), 49, 53 (Sopra li Secreti), 56v (Sopra la Quiete e Pacifico Viver della Città).

97 Cf.Ch.III, n.101, above. In early 1576 the nuncio read a warm commendation of Tiepolo's services in the College, and was heard with approval by the Doge and other members. A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVIII, c. 80, April 7th.

98 Cf.App.II for Paolo's statement to the Savii sopra le Decimo in Rialto. A.S.V.Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, F.XXIV, Sept.29th, 1561, contains a petition for more money presented on Paolo's behalf by his brothers, emphasising the ruinous expense of his embassy in Spain. I am grateful to Dr. Pullan for this reference.

99 Barbaro, loc.cit. under n.93, above. Domenigo Moro, a frequent member of the Zonta in the early 1570s, does not seem to appear after 1575. This marriage links the Tiepolo group to Zuanne Moro, a fairly frequent member of the College in the 1580s and son of Domenigo; but I have found no positive sign of co-operation.

100 A.S.V.Seg.alle Voci, Senato, Rg.V, cc.26v-27, 1581, 1583. Material
case again. He lived with Paolo, shared in a number of his economic interests, and was certainly taking some part in politics by 1582 for he spoke on the financial clauses of "Considerando li Sapientissimi progenitori..." on December 21st. 101 But though he served in the Council of X in 1584 and 1587, he does not appear in the College at all during the 1570s and 1580s, and his abrupt rise to become one of the foremost Savii Grandi of the 1590s is rather a surprise. 102 It would appear that he was acting as a kind of 'political reserve' in his brother's lifetime, moving up to fill the breach left by Paolo's death. This kind of 'triangular combination' between a senior diplomat, a military commander, and a second rank politician must have had many advantages, as it could have provided means of keeping in touch with several different aspects of public business. It would be interesting to know how much constructive planning and mutual consent the brothers applied. 103

But in the eventual outcome, none of Almoro's sons appears to have carried on the political tradition of Paolo. 104

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101 Cf. Decime returns, App. II. Bernardo seems to have been more deeply involved in the Follina scheme than Paolo. Speech on the reform is recorded by Venier, Rivoluzioni, c. 40, but without details.

102 Present Ch. n. 26, above.

103 Davis, Decline of the Venetian Nobility, pp. 62f, discusses the question of family strategy, citing among his documents (pp. 63-4) the will of Stefano Tiepolo, which urged the brothers to live together until the youngest was 30. Though the evidence advanced by Davis refers chiefly to marriage and economic affairs, the same sort of joint strategy could obviously have applied in politics as well.

104 Barbaro, loc. cit. under n. 93, above, mentions no rank above simple
The Palazzo Soranzo in Campo San Polo, home of the powerful brothers Jacomo and Zuanne Soranzo.
The Soranzo brothers, whose political apogee seems to have come at just the same period as that of the Tiepolo brothers, present an entirely different pattern. Of the five sons of the Procurator Francesco, one died in comparatively early life, one was killed at Lepanto, a third, Lorenzo, had reached the level of the X and Zonta by the time of his fatal illness — possibly the plague — in 1575. The surviving two, Jacomo and Zuanne, lived together in the family palazzo in San Paolo, both operated mainly in diplomatic posts and acquired such a hold over the major offices that by the later 1570s they were definitely one of the strongest and perhaps the most concentrated influence in Venetian public life. Starting from minor embassies to Urbino in 1549 and England in 1550, Jacomo served in France from 1554, the Empire from 1559, Rome from 1562, and the Sublime Porte from 1565. Most of the remainder of his career was taken up in special missions of the most delicate nature; to the Empire in 1570, suing for assistance in the war; to the Sublime Porte in 1575, confirming the terms of the Peace; and again to the Porte in 1581. But he also enjoyed the singular distinction of being Proveditore Generale di Mar in 1572, and Proveditore Generale in Terraferma in 1573. This, of course, was in addition to his terms in the X and Zonta, and his nine elections to the post of membership of the Pregadi and Proveditore in Cephalonia.

105

Ibid. Vol. IV, c. 117 (Bibl. Marc.) = Vol. VII, c. 50 (A. S. V.). Lorenzo's death is mentioned in A. S. Vat. Nunz. Ven. P. XVI, c. 370, dispatch of Oct. 29th 1575. The plague is not mentioned, and had not officially arrived at the time, but it was apparently a rapid illness which killed Lorenzo.
Savio Grande between 1572 and 1582. Zuanno's career was marginally less spectacular; he was in the X and Zonta only four times, and Savio Grande only six times over the same period, fulfilling missions to Rome from 1569 to 1571, to Spain in 1573, and to Rome again in 1581. But the alternation of the brothers in the College and the X is one of the most noticeable features of the later 1570s; Zuanno was a member of the X in 1578, Jacomo of the Zonta in 1579, Zuanno of the X again in 1580. The same rhythm can be found in the elections of Savio Grandi. More interesting still is the fact that on six occasions between 1577 and 1584 one or other of the Soranzo brothers was elected to the College in the company of Paolo Tiepolo, with a suggestively similar number of votes. I have looked in vain for any positive sign of a political alliance between the two families. Both were old and wealthy, though not outstandingly so; their views seem to have been roughly similar, for Zuanno Soranzo and Paolo Tiepolo both spoke in favour of the Zonta in 1582, and all were in good odour at Rome. But the usual means of tracing family connections - marriage and economic interests - yield no

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106 Alberi, Relazioni, Ser.II.,Vol.4, pp.123-6. Cf.also this ch. Table I.
107 A.S.V.Beg.alle Voci, Senato, Rg.IV cc.82, 85, Rg.V, c.105/App.I.
There is no full-synthesis of Zuanno's complete career.
If there was a "baratto di voti" between the two groups, then this was unquestionably the most formidable political configuration in Venice during the years immediately before the reform. Even if there was not, the concentration of power gathered by the Soranzo illustrates the generalities of da Molin and Morosini clearly enough. If the events of 1582-3 were an attempt, direct or indirect, to elbow the Soranzo and Tiepolo groups out of their dominant position, then the elections to the College in 1533 hardly suggest that it was much of a success. Again, Paolo, and Jacomo Soranzo were Savii Grandi. But when two men as influential as the Soranzo brothers worked so closely together in the same branch of public life, it was perilously easy to cross that ill-defined boundary between procedure and conspiracy which the Cicogna commentator later tried to draw. At the end of April 1534 a professional agent, Livio Cellino of Foligno, was arrested by the Council of X, and as the evidence against him accumulated it became obvious that both the Soranzo brothers were gravely implicated. On June 6th orders were issued for Jacomo's arrest; Zuanne escaped the same fate by only one vote. The charges were of making unlicensed contacts with foreign princes, divulging state secrets through known agents, and intriguing to secure a Cardinalate through the influence of

109 Romanin, Storia Documentata, Vol. IV, p. 420, lists both the Tiapol and the Soranzl among the older noble families. In 1570 Jacomo Soranzo declared a family income of 3055 ducats, but this was being shared by the four brothers. Cf. App. II. The Tiepolo interests were mostly in Friuli, those of the Soranzl in the Padovano and Trevisano.

Cardinal de' Medici. The trial dragged on through June and July, for the Soranzo had many supporters who exerted themselves to delay the issue, and there seem to have been some genuine suspicions that the affair was a political vendetta; on a technicality, the Avogadore Ordinario Alvise Michiel declined to handle the prosecution. But the verdict was clear-cut when it came on July 23rd; fourteen votes out of fifteen condemned Soranzo to be stripped of his Procuratorship and exiled to Capodistria for life, under threat of imprisonment and confiscation of his property if he broke confinement. Cellino was imprisoned for life.

Now it is very likely that this remarkable incident, followed within a few months by the death of Paolo Tiepolo, will have provoked results:

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Alvise Michiel, entry of June 14th, mentions in the third person his refusal to handle the affair on the ground that it was "extraordinary" and outside his competence. Under July 23rd he records that one of the Inquisitori di Stato, Zaccharia Contarini, was "accarrimo avversario" of Soranzo, and that he got very few votes when Soranzo's vacant Procuratorship was being filled. Campeggio, A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.cit.c.234, July 14th, also noticed the tension; "da questi principii di fattioni nascono già, oltre i molti mormoramenti, alcuni effetii di qualche considerazione nelle ballottazioni del Grande Consiglio." Cellino's letters are preserved in A.S.V.Inquisitori di Stato, B.929, insert 3; they are damaged by damp, and not always legible; there are letters from contacts of the Grand Duke, and from Cardinal Gasparo, which show that Soranzo had definitely made illicit contacts without statutory leave of the X; but I have found nothing obviously treasonable in the correspondence. Michiel, under June 14th, speaks of Soranzo's being incriminated by "lettere di suo pugno", which have not survived.

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A.S.V. Cons. di X, Parti Criminali, B.XXI.
in Venetian politics rather similar to the accepted picture of the "fall of the Vecchi"; the severe shaking of a group—perhaps we should say two groups—which were based on older noble families, which had been immensely powerful in the later 1570s and early 80s, which had exercised a large measure of influence through the Council of X and Zonta, and whose principal figures were definitely favourable to and favoured by the Papacy. Bernardo Tiepolo did not really take over his brother's position till the 1590s. Zuanne Soranzo seems to have been compelled to resort to very doubtful tactics even to remain in the Pregadi, and does not appear in the lists of Savii for eight years. The nobility seems to have been deeply divided by the scandal; we hear even of Jacomo's being accompanied into exile by "molti parenti et aderenti." It is perfectly possible that some of the results of the affair became connected immediately with the results of the reform which had been concluded only a year earlier, but was an entirely separate event. In any case, neither the reform nor the scandal meant the end of Soranzo influence; the Venetian nobility had a way of bending the rules in favour of its members, and within little more than two years of his condemnation Jacomo had been pardoned by another Council of X and returned to live out his remaining dozen years or so in peaceful retirement at home. Zuanne emerged from the shadows to be Savio Grande six times

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114 Cf. n. 84, above, on his peculiar election in 1586. He did not become Savio Grande again until the end of 1592.
115 Francesco da Molin, Diary, cc. 124-5.
116 Alvise Michiel under Dec. 15th, 1586. In his entry for April 21st, 1585, Michiel records an earlier plan to revoke the exile, said to have been evolved by the brothers Antonio and Luca Michiel with
during the 1590s; his son Francesco became ambassador to Spain in 1597, and was Savio di Terraferma in 1600.  

An almost equally impressive and certainly far more stable configuration of political power was formed by the Barbaro and Foscarini families, whom we may without much hesitation call a "combination"; in this instance there is no lack of the additional evidence of mutual support which I failed to find for the Soranzi and Tiopoli. Marcantonio Barbaro has been used, not unjustly, as the typical case of a really successful Venetian patrician of the XVth century.  

His connections were prodigious; a Procurator as his father, his great uncle and his elder brother Patriarchs of Aquileia and the most distinguished Venetian scholars of their respective epochs. It is hardly surprising that Marcantonio entered the Maggior Consiglio at twenty and was Savio agli Ordini at twenty three. He spent the bulk of his middle career, as

Zuanne Soranzo and Zorzi Corner, all members of the sympathetic faction. "Li Cartaginesi si solleverono molto grandemente", and the scheme was turned down. If there was a further link between the Soranzi and the Corner, the whole combination must have been far more powerful.

117 A.S.V. Seg. alle Voci, Senato, Rg.VI, cc.61, Rg.VII, c.11.
118 C.Yriarte, La Vie d'un Patricien de Venise au XVie Siècle - Marcantonio Barbaro, Paris, 1885; pp.353-4 give a chronological table of the offices he held. It should be noted that Yriarte does not appear to distinguish between Savii di Terraferma and Savii Grandi.
120 Yriarte, op.cit.p.17.
did Paolo Tiepolo and the Soranzo brothers, in diplomatic posts, but he
may have been less practiced than they were when in 1568, on the strength
of one embassy in France from 1561, he was elected Bailo at Constantinople.  
But whatever he may have lacked in experience he must have
gained over the next six turbulent years; for three of them he was in-
terned, and at the end he had to negotiate the terms of the Peace of
Constantinople in an atmosphere so tense that it was dangerous for
Christians to show their faces out of doors. Tables I - III clearly
display the weight of his influence on his return; a leading member of
the X and Zonta in the 1570s, he was also one of the foremost Savii
Grandi in that and the following decade. He had suffered heavy finan-
cial losses during his time at the Sublime Porte; the figure of 15,000
ducats is recorded; but he continued to hold what must have been
costly diplomatic positions, welcoming Henri III in 1574, negotiating
over the frontier in Friuli in 1583, congratulating Sixtus V in 1585,
and supervising the construction of the fortress of Palma Nova in 1593.
But in his family he was thoroughly fortunate; of the four sons, Fran-
cesco had served two terms as Savio di Terraferma when in 1586 he became
coadiutor of Aquileia, and, on the death of Zuanne Grimani in 1593,

121 Yriarte, op.cit.p.74f.
122 Ibid.pp.102f.
123 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.VII, cc.151, 163, 264; I am grateful to Dr.
O.M.T.Logan for these references. Cf. Studies in the Religious
Life of Venice, Cambridge, Ph.D. p.213.
124 Yriarte, op.cit.pp.219, 301, 313, 325.
Patriarch; the third son, Alvise, who had married Jacomo Foscarini's daughter, died in 1611 before carrying his career to heights of real distinction; the second son, Almoro, and the youngest, Antonio, both became Procurators, and Almoro succeeded to the Patriarchate on his elder brother's death in 1616. Here, obviously, is a powerful family of the 1570s which did not even suffer the temporary embarrassments of the Sorenzi.

Jacomo Foscarini's political life during the period of interest is chiefly remarkable for its machine-like regularity. He was not, it must be stressed, a great political figure in the 1570s, and had only just come into real prominence in civil office at the time of the reform; he reached the Council of X in 1577, and served three times before 1532; he was Savió Grande for the first time in 1580. All the previous posts in which I have been able to trace him were connected with military or naval affairs; Proveditore in Dalmatia in 1570, Capitano Generale di Mar in 1572, Proveditore in Candia in 1574. He does not appear to have served in any diplomatic position. How he had founded his truly massive fortune I have not been able to discover, but with his connections to maritime affairs and his recommendation in 1585 that the Spanish offer of a spice monopoly at Lisbon be accepted, it seems probable that


126 A.S.V.Seg.alle Voci, Senato, Rg.IV, cc.89, 93. Cf.also C. Manfroni, "Don Giovanni d'Austria e Giacomo Foscarini", Rivista Maritima, Anno XXXVI, fasc.II, Nov.1903, pp.233-253. The general thesis is that Foscarini played a positive role in strategy after Lepanto, and maintained good relations with the Commander in Chief.
he had been active in trade. Of his views on the major problems of
the time very little can be reconstructed; his death seems to have been
regarded with a certain nostalgic regret by Papal officials in 1602, but
there is nothing to connect him to the Curia in the way of Soranzo and
Tiepolo. He seems to have maintained Venetian rights in the Adriatic
fairly strongly, but was not as regular or as persuasive a speaker as
either of them had been. Alvise Michiel obviously disliked him.

The only really notable fact about him is that after his arrival in the
first rank of political office holders in 1580 he appears in the lists
of Savii Grandi every year until his death in 1602. His reserves of
family support were also very powerful; his brother Andrea sat in the
Council of X in 1581, 1584, 1588, and 1591; the Zuambattista Foscarini
who was Savio Grande in 1592 appears to have been his son; Alvise
Foscarini, Savio di Terraferma seven times between 1592 and 1600, was
definitely another son. In fact, we can say fairly that Foscarini

127 Stella, "La Crisi Economica Veneziana della Seconda Meta del Secolo
XVI" N.A.V. Vol. LVIII, 1956, pp. 68-9. A large amount of Foscarini's
capital was invested in land later in the century, cf. App. II.

128 A.S.V. Collegio, Esposizioni, Roma, F. II, ins. 170, July 10th, 1587;
a firm speech by Foscarini on the Hospitaller attacks on Venetian
shipping. Cozzi, Nicolò Contarini, p. 94, quotes the nuncio Offredi's
remarks on his death and treats Foscarini as a typical supporter of
Papal views; I have found little positive evidence of this.

129 Entry of March 7th 1530. When elevated to the Procuratorship left
vacant by the disgrace of Zuanne da Leze, Foscarini made a somewhat
pompous speech about the merits which had gained him the dignity;
Michiel called him "uomo molto superbo".

130 Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol. II, c. 136 (Bibl. Marc. copy). The only other
possible Zuambattista seems to be a brother of Jacomo whom Barbaro
records as dying in England in 1555.
Rebuilt in the XVIIth century and now largely abandoned, this decaying tenement opposite the Church of the Carmini was once the Palazzo Foscarini-Barbaro, centre of one of the most influential combines in Venetian politics.
influence grew steadily after the reform.

The basis of the Foscarini/Barbaro connection is not entirely clear: the earliest hint I have found is the marriage of Marcantonio's son, Alvise Barbaro to a daughter of Jacomo in 1573. Foscarini wealth may have offered a tempting connection after the Barbaro financial losses during the Turkish war: and the ex-bailo, with his almost heroic reputation, must have been a prestigious associate. The two "capi di famiglia" certainly collaborated closely in the succeeding years: they lived together in a palazzo near the Carmini, joined in a large land development scheme in the Polesine di Rovigo, and eventually made affectionate bequests to each other. This formidable combine was extended even further by links with the Zustiniani: Marcantonio and Jacomo had both married into that ancient and powerful clan; Francesco Barbaro, Benedetto and Gerolamo Zustiniani were implicated and accused together in a scare over the leakage of secret information relevant to the Aquileia dispute.

131 Barbaro, Genealogie, loc.cit. in n.130: Yriatbe, op.cit.p.341.
132 Barbaro's will is printed by Yriatto, op.cit.pp.361-366: he left Foscarini a silver cup "in sogno d'amore". Foscarini's will, dated 1595, is preserved in Museo Correr, Ms.P.D.2755/II: it is a considerable economic document in its own right, and gives details of the palazzo, the 2000 ducat land contract, and the "due tavolini, di lavoro indiano" that Foscarini bequeathed to Barbaro. Cf.App. II for details.
133 Foscarini's will names his wife as Elena Zustiniani; Barbaro's was Zustignana Zustiniani, Barbaro, Genealogie, loc.cit. The precise importance of the connection is unfortunately difficult to establish. Marco and Zustiniano Zustiniani - particularly the latter - were powerful members of the College during the 1530s and '90s, but Barbaro's information is less good than usual, and I have not been able to reach any satisfactory identification. Alvise Michiel,
The Friuli present a pattern somewhat different from any of those examined so far—looser in structure, involving several branches of a large family, but equally flexible, equally resistant, and equally successful. They were perhaps not quite as powerful as the great Scerano or Barbaro groups in the 1570s; Zuanfrancesco, Domenigo and Gerolamo were all significant, but not outstanding, members of the College and Council of X; Daniele and Zorzi were relatively minor figures. Also, there do not seem to have been any Friuli in the major embassies at this stage. Zuanfrancesco we have already mentioned as the Council of X's financier in the 1570s, and he became one of the principal Savii Grandi of the 1580s; but one gains the impression that he was something of an "eminence grise", rarely coming into the open with a major speech on an important topic. He and Domenigo were cousins at one remove, nephews respectively of the mid-century Doges Lorenzo and Gerolamo di Priuli, and they seem to have held alternate positions in the X and Zonta in the early 1570s; but neither had any sons. Gerolamo came from a fairly distant branch, and on the strength of two terms as Savio di

entry of Dec. 14th, 1581, records the security scare over the Aquileia dispute, but does not give details of the evidence. Only Bonadetto Zustiniani was punished, by one year's exclusion from "consigli segreti".

The relevant family trees are in Barbaro, Genealogia, Vol. IV, cc. 12, 14, 16 (Bibl. Marc. copy). Zuanfrancesco and Domenigo were in the X or Zonta three times between 1572 and 1582, Gerolamo twice, Daniele and Zorzi once.

Cf. Ch. III, n. 40, above, for references to Zuanfrancesco's financial activities. His name rarely figures in Alvise Michiel's diary or the nuncio's correspondence.
Terraferma in 1573 and 1576, three as Savio Grande in 1577, 1579 and 1580, and periods in the Council of X in 1576 and 1579, would hardly appear to have yielded the influence which the Papal authorities attributed to him. His clerical connections were certainly strong; his elder brother Matteo was Bishop of Vicenza, and he held large estates from the Bishop of Verona. He also held land near San Vito in the Patriarchate of Aquileia, so must have been personally interested in the jurisdictional crisis of the early 1580s. Gerolamo defended the motion "Considerando li Sapientissimi progenitori..." on December 19th 1582, and must be considered a supporter of the Zonta, but he died in 1583, too soon after the reform to reveal its effect on his own career. But one of his sons, Antonio, made an abrupt and rather surprising entry as Savio Grande in 1597, and ended his life as Doge; another, Michiele, succeeded his uncle as Bishop of Vicenza. When this is set alongside Zuanfrancesco's eight terms as Savio Grande between 1582 and 1592, it becomes quite clear that Priuli power was affected by the reform no more than Barbaro and Foscarini power.

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137 694 campi near Corezzo. Cf.App.II.
138 128 campi. On the crisis of 1580-85, cf.Ch.I (ii), references under nn.141ff. It is interesting to notice that Gerolamo was elected to the X in Oct.1579, so he must have been in the Council which annulled the decisions of the Patriarchal court on July 20th, 1580.
139 Cf.Ch.III, n.81, above.
140 For these details I have used Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.IV, c.14, cit.
agitation, Campeggio attributed the election of the young Lorenzo di Friuli to the important post of Rome ambassador more to "broglio" than to his qualifications. Lorenzo was a member of yet another branch, living in relative poverty with two younger brothers; after two terms as Savio di Terraferma before the reform, he was quickly elected Savio Grande after it, became Patriarch of Venice in 1590 and ended his life as a Cardinal. His young brother Alvise became Savio Grande in 1595. We have no information about Lorenzo's attitude to the reform, but in his later career he appears to have inclined to a policy of compromise with the Curia; in his Relazione of his Rome embassy he was obliquely critical of the intransigent approach for which his predecessor Leonardo Donato had stood, and he may have seemed justified by the event, for it was during his term of duty that the troublesome Aquileia crisis was finally settled. As Patriarch in 1596 he found himself in considerable

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141 A.S.Vat.Munz.Ven.F.XXIV, c.217, June 11th, 1583. "...tuttavia pare che venga attribuito piu tosto al broglio, (come si dice qui), che ad altro rispetto, l'esser egli stato anteposto in tal elettione ad alcuni altri di maggior grado et età."

142 Barbaro, Vol.cit.c.16. As Lorenzo returned the "polizza" to the Savii sopra le Decime, their father Zuanne must have been dead. He declared only 773 ducats income between himself, Alvise and Zaccharia; it is hard to believe that his expenses in Rome could have been covered by this without help from some richer relatives. Cf.App.II.

143 Barbaro, loc.cit. App.I. Lorenzo was actually elected Savio Grande in Dec.1533, and his position reserved until his return from Rome.

144 A.S.V.Seg.alle Voci, Senato, Rg.VI, c.5.

145 Alberi, Relazioni, Ser.II, Vol.4, p.300. "La seconda cosa che, per opinione universale, aveva ridotto non solamente a difficoltà ma ad impossibilità la conclusione di questo negotio, fu quello che si face dire più volte di non riconoscere per superiore la Santa Sede..." p.291 gives a useful resumé of Priuli's public life.
trouble for publishing the revised Index without consulting the College. Neither his views nor his connections had impeded his career during the 1580s.

As has already been said, the Friuli form a much vaguer pattern than the Soranzi or the Barbari, and there is no definite proof that the different branches were collaborating; but even if their careers must be considered as separate units, the fortunes of Zuanfrancesco, Lorenzo and the sons of Gerolamo present another striking example of family continuity.

I must repeat at this point that this study is not an attempt to deny any importance to the events of 1582-3, and that the evidence cited in the present section must be kept carefully within its limits. In fact, I do not think the lists of officials depict a situation that is in any way inconsistent with that described in more general terms by the nuncios and diarists, provided that those generalisations are taken to mean what they say and no more. It is undoubtedly true that the Council of X declined in importance after 1583. We have already seen the diminishing volume and variety of business that passed through its hands. There were still powerful figures in the reformed Council of X - Domenigo Duodo in 1585, Alberto Badoer in 1586, Leonardo Donato in 1588 - but the overlap with senior members of the College which appears constantly in the later 1570s was never repeated. When the nuncio Graziani bewailed the declining influence of the X and the inferior quality of its members

146 M. Brunetti, "Schermaglie Veneto-Pontificie Prima dell'Interdetto", Paolo Sarpi e i suoi Tempi, Città di Castello, 1923, p.124f.
in 1598 he was certainly correct. "Domination of the Vecchi" in the strict sense—manipulation of the government by the same small group of senior statesmen, operating simultaneously through two deliberative councils, one of which could by-pass the other—was over after 1583. By the same token, the anxieties felt by Campeggio and Graziani about the problems of handling negotiations in the Senate through a mob of "giovani ignoranti" must have been very well founded. There will have been relatively young and inexperienced men in the Senate, some of them especially liable to be suspicious of clerical privilege, immunity and wealth; this must have been true particularly of the officials involved in the administration of justice, the Quarantia and the Avogadori. The Quarantia was a body which provided a fairly generous public salary attractive to poorer nobles, and could become something of a centre of discontent; the Avogadori had been dreaded by the nuncios long before.

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147 M. Brunetti, "Le Istruzioni di un Nunzio Pontificio a Venezia al suo Successore", Scritti Storici in Onore di Camillo Manfroni, Padua, 1925, pp. 371-9. Eg. p. 374. "Le persone le quali intervengono in quel Consiglio (di X) non sono di tanta qualità." Graziani goes on to criticise the decline in the administration of justice and "una licenza molto grande nella nobiltà e massime nella gioventù." The lists of the X in the later 1580s seem to bear out his first point; the problem of "broglio" already discussed may suggest that his second was not without foundation.

148 For Campeggio's remarks cf. Ch. I, nn. 14, 18, above. Graziani's are almost identical: Brunetti, op. cit. under previous n., p. 373; "...essendo venuta la suprema potestà e reggimento di tutte le cose nel Consiglio dei Pregadi, ed intravenendo a questo Consiglio poco meno di 300 persone, e fra queste molti giovani et molti imperi, riscese quasi impossibile che le cose che vi si trattano non si manifestino..."

the reform of 1582. It was natural enough that those whose concern was the organisation of secular justice should be among the first to clash with a social group which considered itself exempt from their authority. It was in no sense a peculiarly Venetian phenomenon; during the crucial months of the French Succession crisis the Parlementaires seem to have been among the strongest forces urging Henri IV towards a complete break with Rome. In Venice the hopeless ambiguities of the legal background, especially after the publication of the Bull "In Coena Domini", must have made the situation that much worse. There is also ample evidence to suggest the existence of serious tensions between the great office holders of the College and the less influential, rank and file members of the Pregadi. One of the most significant incidents occurred in the months immediately following the reform. In a family contest for the possession of the fief of Montirone near Brescia, Camilla Emilii tried to oust Gianfrancesco, a canon of Verona, by means of a writ "de renuntiando impetratis" from the Avogadori. Campeggio appealed to the College, and found the members thoroughly sympathetic; on June 5th 1583 the decisions of the lay court were delayed, and on October 8th they were completely annulled by a new College containing Paolo Tiepolo

150 Nunziature di Venezia, Vol.VIII, ed. Stella, pp.43, 56, 64 etc. (1566). By 1572 a slightly desperate note can be detected in Facchinetti's correspondence; A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XII, c.54, Aug.2nd. "Io di continuo ho qui vive contentioni coi S.re Avogadori per conservazione della giurisdittione ecclesiastica, et mi bisogna in ogni audienza consumere tempo per questo conto..."

151 A.S.Vat.Segretario di Stato, Francia, F.XXXV, cc.245-8, cipher of Bishop Gondi, Jan.13th 1595.
and Jacomo Soranzo. The senior senators seemed delighted, reported the nuncio, at this opportunity of deflating the "fattione dei giovani". We hear from Alvise Michiel of a hard speech against the Quarantia by the newly elected Doge da Ponte. In early 1584 the Council of X prepared to proceed with unusual severity against the Avogadore Raimondo Gritti, who was accused of accepting bribes; the Avogadori, reported Campagggio, were among the chief members of the "nuova fattione della gioventù.

The cross currents of rivalry and bitterness running to and fro across the Venetian nobility were obviously numerous, probably far too numerous to be traced even with the aid of a source like Samudo's Diarii. Some of the incidents recorded seem to reflect family feuds of generations standing rather than serious political disputes: in early 1535 an Avogadore proposed to censure a number of nobles who had left the Maggior


153 Entry of March 1578. "Il che fu attribuito alla passione d'animo che lui teneva di haver perdute alcune cause civili ad essi consiglieri, in modo che aggiunto alla mala sodisfattione universale il disgusto delli giudici delle XL, s'alienò totalmente l'animo di tutti."

154 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXV, c.18, Jan.14th 1535. Gritti was acquitted when it was discovered that the case against him was based on charges trumped up by a personal enemy, Zuambattista Bernardo; Alvise Michiel, entry of March 3rd. On this case, and on the general role of the Avogadori, Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p.25, adds useful comment, quoting parallel instances.
Consiglio before it had been officially dissolved, and a member of the Dolfin family returned to the Council to complain hotly that this was victimisation of the "case vecchie", as only three men, all from the older families, had been named. Other problems appear to have provoked "generations battles" in the simplest sense of the phrase; when the delicate question of reopening diplomatic relations with England was under discussion during the later 1570s, the "giovani", in this case the Savii agli Ordini, supported the project strongly as it would have created another diplomatic post for younger men. "Giovani" seems to be used here in its most literal sense. Again, a great deal of jealousy seems to have been felt against those who succeeded, like Zuanne Dolfin or the Corner, in tapping the wealth of the Church to ensure their own positions. Competition between merchant families with different interests also left its mark on politics. But did these

156 Ibid.F.XIX, c.249, Dec.13th 1578. "Alcuni giovani de' Savii degli Ordini sono entrati di nuovo in pensieri che si faccia ambasciador in Inghilterra conforme al desiderio della Regina, ma i vecchi dissentono, e si crede che non passera. Questo procurano i giovani per haver maggior occasioni di camminarsi all'ambasciaria, perche gia havevano questa, et quella del Re di Romani che si davano ai giovani. Hora non hanno se non quella di Savoia."
157 Cozzi, Niccolo Contarini, pp.69-70, 77-73 for ill-feeling against Dolfin's rapid ecclesiastical promotion. Pp.240, 246-8 describe the bitterness felt against the Doge Zuanne Corner and his family in the 1620s, but the Ca' Grande Corner were operating in much the same way in the 1560s; cf.App.II under Zorzi Corner.
158 Stella, "La Crisi Economica", loc.cit. under n.127, above, considers that Mercisini interests in the Levant were a factor in the refusal of the spice monopoly in Lisbon and Cadiz which Foscarini and Antonio Bragadin recommended accepting.
confused personal enmities and family rivalries really polarise during the later 1570s and early 1580s into well defined ideological positions, with the Council of X, Rome, and Spain on one side, the Senate, a more liberal religious policy, and France on the other? The events of the 1582 reform seem to give no conclusive reason for believing that this was the case. The inner ring of the governing class seems to have been largely unaffected. Perhaps the great dynasts like Tiepolo, Soranzo, Foscarini and Barbaro genuinely felt that submitting every proposal to the Senate was an intolerable surrender to the will of an inexperienced, indiscriminate crowd of hotheads. But their disappointments reflected in the dispatches of Papal nuncios cannot be taken to indicate a fundamental change in the governing class itself. The lists of the most important officials show an almost total continuity. The political fortunes of the great families suggest that they had no difficulty in retaining the same grip on the great offices of state in the 1580s as they had held in the 1570s. The tone and quantity of the legislation on electoral corruption certainly do not seem to indicate an opening and easing of the way to political promotion, hinting rather at more savage competition and growing bitterness. This is hardly surprising. After 1533, the rank and file of the Senate may have had a better chance of participating in discussion on important and secret topics, and of voting on the action to be taken; but the real influence lay constitutionally with the Savii del Collegio, and after 1533 the College was controlled substantially by those who had previously controlled the Council of X. Meanwhile, the thirty or so extra positions of authority once provided
by the Zonta had been abolished. It was only natural that competition for the remaining posts should become fiercer, for the oligarchy of office holders was if anything tighter after the reform than before it.

The reform of 1532-3 has perhaps assumed a rather inflated importance simply because it has no definite counterpart in Venetian history. This was a constitutional issue at heart, without the sinister overtones of conspiracy and subversion involved in the movements of Marin Falier and Bajamonte Tiepolo. There was of course ample precedent for fairly drastic electoral action against an established group; the Maggior Consiglio, as has been mentioned, made frequent difficulties over the approval of the Zonta del Consiglio di Dieci during the XVIth century; more serious still, in the bitterness of defeat after the loss of Modon in 1500 and the disaster of Agnadello in 1509, a considerable number of the candidates for the "Sessanta della Zonta del Senato" - the main caucus of the Senate - were rejected, and Sanudo records the names of a dozen or so established Savii who found themselves effectively out of the government on each of these occasions. The pattern of events

160 Marin Sanudo, *Diarii*, Vol.III, Venice, 1830, column 853, Sept.30th 1500. "Da matina fu fato la Zonta, ne passo solum 53. Erano a conseio 825. Cazeto prima tutti questi primarij patricij, soliti romagir... e tutti questi cazetano per esser stati del Collegio, perche la terra ei tien mal sorvicli di loro e hanno gran tc±o." Thirteen names are given. Ibid.Vol.IX, 1533, column 199, Sept. 30th 1509. "Et fo compito di balotar la Zonta. Passono solum 55, et cazete molti soliti rimanir... (col.200) Rimase molti novi e non soliti rimanir..." Fourteen names are listed. As this was a different institution, direct comparison with the events of 1532 should not be attempted, and it has yet to be proved that the upheaval was really as important as it seemed to Sanudo at the time. I owe these references to Professor F.C. Lane: for the real
in 1582 is in some ways very similar. But this time there was no
stinging shock of defeat to sharpen reactions; it must have been more
a sense of creeping disappointment that so brilliant a victory had pro-
duced no more than a decade of political humiliation, pestilence, and
economic difficulty. By its massive accumulation of economic and poli-
tical power, the Council of X and Zonta inevitably gathered most of the
resentment. But the whole situation was greatly complicated and prob-
ably only brought to a crisis by the dangerous political chicanery
which was being practiced through manipulation of a particular institu-
tion - the Zonta del Consiglio di Dieci. Hence the concentration of
opposition on that institution. So, besides its precedents in strictly
political action against a governing clique, the 1582 reform has its own
contemporary analogies in the generally stated laws of the time, with
their growing concern for the problem of political corruption. The
crisis seems to have been a genuine combination of public discontent
and personal animosity: the affronts and indiscretions recorded by
Venier, Morosini and Manzio, as well as the grave financial difficulties
traced more recently by Professor Stella. But there is another way in
which the 1582 reform can be compared both to past attacks on established
cliques and to legislation against political sharp practice - it appears
on examination to have been largely ineffective. The continuing suc-
cession of laws on "broglio" bears witness to a continuing and probably

significance of the events we await the opinions of R. Finlay,
forthcoming Ph.D, University of Chicago.
161 In spite of Sanudo's alarm at the elections of 1500 and 1509, there is no sign that any important change of front resulted. But Sanudo was able to name a significant number of nobles who fell from the centre of power on each of these occasions. It is doubtful if one could even do that for 1532. The general continuity of Venetian policy noticed in the first Chapter of this study is probably best explained on the simple ground that the policy making body remained substantially unchanged.

161 Prop.Brog.c.15f lists a continuing series of laws from the XVth to the late XVIIth century. On c.23 the author makes a wry quotation from Tacitus' discussion of proceedings against astrologors - "genus hominum quod in civitate nostra vetabitur semper, et retin nebuitur." The same comment, he feels, could be applied to "broglio" in the Venetian Republic.

Chapter V

PROPERTY AND THE CHURCH - ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

It appears to me that the reform of 1582 was principally a formal matter, and that the tendencies most commonly traced to it - a movement of Venice towards France, and a firmer stand against the Curia on jurisdictional questions - were either established well before the reform or were insignificant in conception and barren in result. But I find it strange that those who have been so ready to stress developments in these spheres have often tended to minimise what might seem the most obvious and solidly documented change in Venetian attitudes towards the Church in the years immediately preceding the Interdict - the change represented by the property laws of the early XVIIth century. The first of these, passed in 1602, severely limited litigation by ecclesiastics to regain possession of land sublet to secular persons:¹ in January 1604 a second law provided that the Senate's sanction must be

¹ A.S.V. Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, Rg.LXXII, c.49, May 23rd, 1602. A senatorial decision in a case between Francesco Zabarella of Padua and the monks of Praglia was generalised; "...che li suddetti padri di Praglia non possino al presente ne in alcun tempo pretendere attione di esser preferiti, sotto qualsivoglia titolo o colore, ne i beni possessi di laici, ne per ragione di prelatione ne per consolidation di diritti, ne per estension di linee di prime investiture ...salve pero sempre ad essi padri le ragioni sue dirette..." This law placed ecclesiastics in a weaker position by denying them any preferential consideration ("prelatione") as previous proprietors: it may also have acted as a deterrent against suing at all. M. Ferro, Dizionario del Diritto Commune e Veneto, Vol.III, Venice, 1779, pp. 49f, under "Enfiteusi" and Vol.VIII, 1780, pp.328f, under "Prelazione". Vol.III,p.51, and below,n.28, for "consolidazione".
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given before new churches could be built anywhere in the Dominio, and in 1605 a third placed the same restriction on those wishing to bequeath real property to the Church. Venetian polemicists at the time of the Interdict found it easy enough to justify these provisions by appeal to legal precedents, and some writers appear to find it easy still. This is perfectly reasonable, if we look only at the spirit of the law: as early as 1333 a Parte of the Maggior Consiglio had demanded that real property in Venice left "ad pias causas" be resold after ten years, and in 1337 another had insisted that the permission of the Signoria be granted for the building of churches in Venice: these had been accepted by the Popes reigning at the time, and were merely "confirmed and extended" throughout the Dominio by the XVIIth century laws. But looking to the ultimate effect of the laws it is hard to be more satisfied with

2 A.S.V. Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, Rg. LXXIII, c. 151, Jan. 10th 1603/4 (M. V.), Rg. LXXV, c. 19, March 26th, 1605. Cf. in general this study, Ch. I, nn. 5-8.

3 Cf. citations under Ch. I, n. 7, above: also Sarpi, "Considerazioni sopra le Censure", in Gambarin's ed. of Storia del Interdetto, Vol. II, pp. 189-90. On legacies to the Church the progression of the laws was as follows: 1333 - property so bequeathed must be resold after ten years; 1536 - after two years; 1605 - previous provision applied throughout the Dominio.

4 Cf. citations under Ch. I, n. 8, above: Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, p. 345, applies the phrases "merely extended" and "simply extended" to the laws on the building of churches and the bequests of property to the Church, echoing Sarpi's words "confermate... ed estese" almost to the letter. Cf. next n.

5 Sarpi, "Consiglio in Difesa di due Ordinazioni della Serenissima Repubblica", Gambarin, ed. cit. under n. 3, above, p. 3. Sarpi's total concentration on the similar spirit of the laws, and his neglect of their vastly different effects, are an interesting example of his propaganda technique and proof that he could slough off his normally pragmatic approach when occasion demanded.
Sarpis's adroit phraseology than the Jesuit writer Possevino in 1606.
The overcrowded and overbuilt Rialto islands were one thing: the wide
and increasingly profitable lands of the Terraferma were another. Many
thousands of times the amount of land was involved, farm land as well as
building land. Three such laws coming within the space of three years
can only be taken as a substantial development of Venetian economic and
foreign policy.

A gradual shift in Venetian economic orientation from trade to the
exploitation of mainland territories is one of the general constats of
XVIth century history, intensely studied and still keenly argued, for
the precise development, timing, and degree of the change remain wide
open to debate. But the overall pattern is clear enough: Venice had
to turn to her own hinterland first of all because of the immediate
demands of a rising population for food and the growing uncertainty of
supplies from traditional sources of imported grain. This concern
shows strongly in the writings of Alvise Corner around mid-century, and
must have played an important part in the adoption of an official policy

6 Risposta di Teodoro Eugenio, cit. under Ch. I, n. 9, p. 12.
8 F. Braudel, La Mediterranée et le Monde Méditerranéen l'Équinoxe de Philippe II, Paris, 1966, ed. Vol. I, pp. 535-6, traces the decline in supplies from Turkish territories to the central 1550s, the first official ban on exports coming in 1555.
towards "bonifiche" or reclaimed land with the definite and regular appointment of Proveditori sopra li Beni Inculti from 1556. By the 1590s the idea of Venice as a self-sufficient producer was not only a dream of economically minded statesmen like Niccolò Contarini but a definitely envisaged aim of national policy. Second, the Republic came to depend increasingly on the revenues derived from taxation of the Terraferma to support the growing costs of government and war. Returns from the direct tax on property grew from a mere 33,279 ducats in 1510 to 133,709 in 1582, and an annual contribution or "sussidio" of 100,000 ducats from the Terraferma cities became a regular feature of the national income. Paruta commented that stronger fleets had been put out


10 Contarini, Historie B'. I, quoted in Cozzi, p.312: "...le biade, le quali si dovevano in altri tempi aspettare da lontani paesi et quasi mendicare ancò da nemici, hora nel proprio erano abondanti, aspettandosi ancò di breve poterne sumministrare ad altri." The implied comparison with 'the bad old days' is an interesting symptom of changing attitudes. Also A.S.V. Compilazione Leggi, B.XIII, ins. 365, June 16th 1591, quoted in del Pane, op. cit. under n.7, p.346. "L'esperienza ha fatto riconoscere raccogliersi quantità di formenti et biave nello Stato nostro pocò man che bastevoli al bisogno, havendo questi l'anno presente, di grande et quasi inaudita penuria, supplito con poca somma di formenti et niuna altra sorte di biave gosse di paese alleno, del quale si sucile in tutti li tempi haverne gran quantità: dimodoche quando sia diligentemente provisto che non siano condotti essi formenti et biade in altra dizione...si potra stare con molto sicuro animalo, che in alcun tempo essi non mancheranno, senza ricorrer a paesi forestieri."

11 Beltrami, Forze di Lavoro, p.51 and n.1.

against the Turks in the XVIth century, with the help of these revenues, than had been possible during the Genoese wars, before the conquest of the new territories. 13 Over 200,000 ducats were spent in the Arsenal in 1594, although the Republic was at peace with the Turks. 14 So far, this turning of Venice towards her own hinterland has been examined mainly as an economic question, from many viewpoints: some effort has been made to trace the changing fortunes of individual families; 15 but remarkably little has been done to study the effects of the shifting economic structure on Venetian policy. Yet three laws such as those passed between 1602 and 1605 must obviously have a close connection to the economic problems of the time. Possibly their exact place in the shift of priorities has been edged out of the limelight by the minor commercial revival which Venice enjoyed during the last years of the XVIth century. 16


15 A. Stella, "La Crisi Economica Veneziana della Seconda Metà del secolo XVI", N.A.V. Vol. LVIII, 1956, pp. 23f, illustrates the conversion of several families from trade to landholding from notarial Acta: R. Gallo, "Una Famiglia Patrizia; i Pisani ed i Palazzi di S. Stefano e di Stra", A.V. Vols. XXXIV-V, 1944, pp. 65-223; the largest collection of relevant information so far is assembled by Dr. Pullan in "Occupations and Investments of the Venetian Nobility", cit. under Ch. III, n. 30, but unpublished at the present time.

or by the rather ill-documented theory that the new group alleged to
have taken power in 1583 was more strongly committed to trade than its
"predecessors". In any case, research has not yet got beyond the
simple assertion that the Church was accumulating too much real pro-
perty, and that the Venetian administration reacted, partly because of
its own increasing dependence on mainland property, partly because of
its new and independent spirit. Having questioned the idea of a
"new group", I can hardly appeal to a "new spirit". But the financial
documents of some of the great dynasts studied in the previous chapter
do show a growing involvement in the affairs of the Terraferma, and in
many cases a potential rivalry with great ecclesiastical proprietors:
and the problems faced by the Venetian government in the 1580s and 1590s
leave no doubt of its growing need to control and exploit the produce
of the territories under its rule. It seems to me that this steady

17 This view seems to be based on the rejection in 1585 of the Spanish
offer of a spice monopoly at Lisbon, after Jacomo Foscarini, Antonio
Bragadin, Vicenzo Gradenigo and Geronimo Lippomano had recommended
accepting it. Stella, "La crisi economica", pp.68-9. This may have
been a genuine effort to keep an independent Levantine commerce alive,
but Stella himself admits that it may have been a factional boycott
by those who still had interests in the East. It certainly does not
seem good evidence of a revitalised commercial policy. Stella, "La
crisi politica del 1532", p.160, and Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p.16,
both speak of the involvement of the great families (i.e. "vecchi")
on the Terraferma. Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, pp.240-42, adds
abstract evidence from the writings of Paruta to support the idea
of a new commercial consciousness. In fact, Paruta himself had con-
siderable Terraferma interests. Cf. Appendix II.

18 Stella, "La proprietà ecclesiastica", op.cit. under Ch.1, n.6.
Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, pp.343-6. Stella's article was glossed
"lines for further research", but little has followed.
I. THE VILLA MALCONTENTA, MESTRE.

"...hanno steso il piede sopra il Padovano, Vicentino, Trevisano, Veronese, comprando a vil prezzo tanti terreni sopra i quali hanno edificato grandissimi e per lo più inutili palagi per fasto e delitie...

(Possevino, "Risposta di Teodoro Eugenio, p. I4).

Built by Palladio for Alvise Foscari, a prominent member of the Council of X and College during the last three decades of the century, the "Malcontenta" lends some substance to Possevino's taunt.
fusion of private interest and public policy is the most likely cause of
the gradual hardening of Venetian attitudes towards the Church, as re-
lected in the laws of 1602-5, which are the only firmly fixed point in
the whole movement fashionably described as "giovani ideology". Rather
than a sudden volte-face created by a sharp change in personalities,
we should look, I am sure, for a gradual shift in the anxieties and
policies of a governing class that remained substantially the same.

The economic data that I have managed to assemble on a number of
leading Venetian nobles are included in Appendix II. The material is,
of course, incomplete and unsatisfactory. There is no comprehensive
Venetian document like the Florentine Catasto, and even the statements
of "beni immobili" preserved in the files of the Savii sopra le Docime
are drawn from different dates and do not form a full series. Other
evidence has to be pieced together like a jig-saw puzzle from wills,
private papers, and the occasional reference in public documents. Un-
less family account books are available, the discussion of a Venetian
noble's wealth must almost by definition be imperfect, as there may al-
ways be another relevant fragment. But even the assortment that has
come to light so far allows for a few inferences. The thirty nobles
examined include sixteen out of the twenty six principal Savii Grandi
between 1582 and 1602, besides a number of less prominent but important
figures like Zorzi Corner, Alberto Badoer and Francesco Longo. For
some of the most powerful foci of family influence - the Tiepolo, Soranzo,
Priuli, and Foscarini - fairly abundant evidence has emerged. The
only really serious and regrettable absentees are Vicenzo Morosini and
Zuanne Michiel, two of the foremost members of the Council of X in the 1570s and leading Savii Grandi in the 1580s. On the broadest possible level, it is perhaps worth mentioning that tenure of some real property, whether in Venice or on the Terraferma, seems by this period to have been normal among the nobility. Obviously there must have been many differences of degree, and Jacomo Foscarini and Agostino Nani, who maintained commitments both in commerce and in land, may still have been fairly typical. There are also clear differences of bias between those who, like the Longo brothers, relied mainly on rents from the City, and those who exploited "proprietà fondaria" on the Terraferma. But it is interesting to find that even men like Paruta, who wrote so eloquently of trade, its dignity, and its importance, were investing substantial amounts of capital in land during this period. The general trend was most definitely established. But of far more immediate relevance than the fact of this investment, which is in any case generally acknowledged, is the pace at which it proceeded. If the reclaiming of waste land slowed down in the 1570s, the accumulation of property by purchase certainly went ahead. Sometimes it was a piecemeal process, involving a few campi here, a few there: but some of the leaders of the College during the last two decades of the XVIth century were pouring capital


onto the Terraferma at a rate that can only suggest planned and constructive investment. Jacomo Foscarini mentions at least six separate estates, including a large area for reclamation, which he himself had acquired. Antonio Bragadin bound up more than 1500 ducats in fairly small purchases in 1570 and 1578, and at an uncertain date formed a "consorzio di bonifica" with Vicenzo Gradenigo. Alvise Zorzi increased his holdings by 154 campi even during two years of absence from Venice as Proveditore in Corfu. Alvise Foscari staked 1000 ducats in a partnership to buy woods near Treviso in 1534. The soaring prices of grain and of land, both of which approximately doubled between 1570 and the end of the century, gave the strongest possible inducement to such investments, and one should certainly resist the notion that these were simply disgruntled merchants looking for something to do with their now idle assets: this was almost certainly seen as a new form of capital investment, which now offered surer profits than foreign trade. 22 This steady accumulation of property must have had a gradual effect on the

21 Braudel, "La vita Economica di Venezia nel Secolo XVI", Civiltà Veneziana del Rinascimento, Florence, 1958, p.94, gives a graph of the price of corn between 1575 and 1603: taking 1575-80 as a base he calculates a rise of 125% in the famine years of the 1590s settling to about 100% by the end of the century. Cf.also his chart of European prices in Monde Mediterranéen Vol.I, p.469: Pullan, "Wage earners and the Venetian Economy", in Crisis and Change, pp.146-174, esp.155-6. On land prices Ventura, "L'Agricoltura Veneta", p.706, reckons the 100-120 ducats per campo represented by the Paduan Estimo of 1622 as approximately double the figure of the third quarter of the XVIth century.

22 A main theme of Ventura's article is that the Venetian proprietors regarded their holdings with an acquisitive and "capitalist" mentality, and that they sought not merely to invest but to exploit profitability to the utmost. Cf.esp.pp.708f. If such attitudes really were growing, they will certainly have hardened political reactions. The tone of Alvise Corner's minutes, and some of the San Zeno contracts, seem to bear out Ventura's suggestions. Cf.nn.87,89,below.
An "emfiteusis" land contract, renewing with Leonardo Donato an agreement made by the Abbacy of San Zeno with his father Zuambattista.

(Archivio di Stato, Verona, Archivio Antico del Commune, Abbazia San Zeno, I, Rg. 31, c. 77-reproduced by courtesy of the Director.)
attitudes of its holders: and many of them were at the very centre of power. But unquestionably the most important feature of the evidence for the present study is the widespread penetration of the nobility into ecclesiastical wealth and property. Sometimes this penetration was total: Zuanne Dolfin and Lorenzo di Priuli actually became bishops, apparently to the considerable benefit of their precarious financial positions. Sometimes it was more peripheral: Vicenzo Gradengo controlled the ius patronate of the rich abbacy of Nor San Cipriano di Murano.

But by far the most common link of layman and cleric in matters of property seems to have been the "emfiteusis" contract for the renting of land on long lease — exactly the type of agreement involved in the law of 1602. Twelve of the thirty nobles studied were concerned in such contracts, and they included many of the most prominent statesmen of the time — Leonardo Donato, the Scranzo and Tiepolo brothers, Jacomo Foscarini, Gerolamo di Priuli and Alvise Zorzi. If we include the collection of "dazii" from certain clerical communities, and part shares in related agricultural enterprises such as mills, the list can be expanded still further. The contract "in emfiteusis" was a very long-standing feature of agrarian life, dating from the later Roman Imperial epoch, but probably becoming most common during the more disturbed periods of the Middle Ages, when many large proprietors simply could not cultivate all the lands they held.

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23 Marin Grimani and Zorzi Corner. Overall, it may be said that over half the nobles studied had economic connections with the Church.

debased Greek of the title— the letting of the right to "plant" an area of land and to enjoy the produce for a period which might be unlimited, restricted to ten years, or set almost anywhere in between. Contracts "in perpetuum" were forbidden to ecclesiastical proprietors, but the limited deals could be renewed at the discretion of the parties concerned. Tenants' rights could be passed to heirs and in some cases sublet or resold by the original tenant: but the proprietor could claim precedence in a sale, and all rights reverted to him if the tenant's family became extinct. This preferential claim was termed "prolazione". In return for his privileges, the tenant or "emfiteuta" owed first, a purely formal gift to acknowledge his investiture, then an annual rent which might be paid in cash, in kind, or in a mixture of both. Failure to pay for three consecutive years left the proprietor free to reclaim his land under another legal right known as "consolidazione"; but this, and "prelazione", were denied to ecclesiastics under the 1602 law. Agreements of


27 Leonardo Donato paid the Abbey of San Zeno ten soldi or a capon: A. S. Verona, Archivio Antico del Commune, Abbazia di San Zeno, I, Rg. 31, c. 77 v, Sept. 5th, 1568.

28 "Consolidazione", and the limitations of clerical rights, are discussed by Ferro, Dizionario del Diritto, loc. cit. under n. 25, above, and by Cozzi, ed. cit. P. 155, n. I, p. 156, n. I.
this general type, especially those involving ecclesiastics, appear to have been extremely common: besides the evidence supplied by the Venetian nobles, a random sample of the "Atti Notarili" of the Abbey of San Zeno di Verona show that, of the 172 cases recorded for the four years 1578 - 1582, 136 were concerned with the formation or renewal of "emfiteusis" contracts. The general arrangements were of course very vague and flexible: the most important terms of agreement, such as the clause "ad habendum, tenendum, meliorandum et non peiorandum" to describe the tenant's duties, seem to have been stereotyped. 29 Dues do not appear to have been onerous: Leonardo Donato owed the Abbey of San Zeno only forty six lire per annum for six hundred campi. 30 But the tenant did become liable to the payment of state taxes on the income he derived from his holding, while the proprietor, if an ecclesiastical person or institution, might often be immune. 31 This was a potential source of friction.

No rules can be laid down, or even suggested, about the attitudes provoked by such contracts in lay tenants towards ecclesiastical landowners. Like the terms themselves, they were infinitely variable.

29 A.S.Ver., Arch.Ant.Comm., Abbazia S. Zeno, I, Rg.31, passim. All of the 136 relevant agreements carry the formula quoted.
30 Ibid. c.77v. An exception is provided by Bernardo Tiepolo, who paid 72 ducats p.a. for the 133 campi which he held from the Abbey of Follina. See below.
31 Ferro, Dizionario del Diritto, Vol.III, p.54. This would include not only Decime on "beni immobili" but "campatici" or land taxes: Ventura, "L'Agricoltura Veneta", pp.702-3. As will be shown later, Cardinals and monastic orders were normally exempt from all secular taxation.
Among the nobles concerned we find men as entirely different in their policies to the Church as Leonardo Donato and Jacomo Soranzo, and the whole period was one of flux and change, both among ecclesiastics and laymen. But individual case histories show a few glimpses of the overall trend. In 1570 Cardinal Borromeo, acting as new titular abbot of Follina, near Ceneda, refused to renew a lease formed by his predecessor with Stefano Tiepolo, father of the three powerful brothers, Paolo, Almoro, and Bernardo. The brothers resisted strongly, on the grounds that substantial improvements had been made to the property involved, so that they now had as large a stake in it as the Abbey and were at least entitled to put their claims before a secular court. The Curia apparently considered Paolo too useful an ally to offend over a technicality, and the affair petered out. But when the Bishop of Parenzo demanded a full payment of tithes from certain new settlers in his diocese in 1594, Paolo's brother Bernardo sat on a senatorial subcommittee which insisted that the amount be reduced so as to give the settlers the best possible chance to profit from their lands and bring the territory under proper cultivation. Obviously it is not possible to tell exactly how the 1570 affair had affected Bernardo: but he was definitely not the


33 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXI, cc.24-29, March 10th 1595: a copy of the report submitted by Bernardo, Alvise Venier and Francesco Contarini on Feb.4th is given on c.26. The settlers were Morlacchi, refugees from Turkish territory, and had been granted waste or disused land. The nuncio Taverna was exceptionally annoyed at the report, contending that the subcommittee had authority only to re-examine the case, not to pass a decision.
protector of ecclesiastical rights his brother had been. Suspicion of the ecclesiastical landlord may have been growing in many nobles during the period: already in the early 1580s Bolognetti complained of widespread resistance even to the payment of regular tithes on re-claimed land. 34

But we have some fixed points in the clear statements of their grievances against clerical wealth in general by a militant wing of Venetian opinion at the time of the Interdict itself: it is possible to crosscheck these against some features of the economic background and a few of the experiences of individual nobles. On questions of hard financial fact, Antonio Querini certainly merits more respect than the other polemicists. As he had been Sopraintendente alle Decime del Clero - this was the Venetian secular magistracy which dealt with the taxation of clerical property - he possessed a first hand knowledge of the problems lying behind the three disputed laws, and very probably supplied Sarpi with most of his factual data. 35 The substance of Querini's attack can be summarised under three heads: the Church already held too much property in the Dominio; it was accumulating too much more at too high a rate; and most of what the Church gathered was lost to the state, as, due to an uneven distribution of wealth among the clergy and the iniquities of the taxation structure, the largest

34 "De' Beni Ecclesiastici", in Stella, Chiesa e Stato, pp.119-120. This appears to refer only to tithes, not to emfiteusis dues, but feelings are likely to have been similar on both.

35 Cozzi, Nicolò Contarini, p.98.
concentrations of ecclesiastical property were often exempt. So the increase of clerical wealth constituted a direct threat to the economic and political stability of the government. Querini put the total value of clerical property in the Dominio above thirty million ducats, the income derived from it at more than a million and a half per year. The bulk of this was packed into a minute number of immensely rich benefices, chiefly bishoprics and abbacies, many of which were enjoyed by foreign princes of the Church who drew the revenue untaxed from the Dominio to squander abroad in irreligious frivolities. By implication, Querini was able to use the behaviour of ecclesiastics in "emfiteusis" contracts as an illustration of their growing rapacity: was it just, he asked, for lay tenants to be deprived of the fruits of years of labour by idle proprietors who had been content to let the land cut when it was valueless? Where they cross, Sarpi's arguments underline and develop Querini's. Without attempting an overall figure, Sarpi estimated that the clergy - perhaps one hundredth part of the total population - had by

36 Aviso delle Ragioni della Serenissima Republica di Venezia intorno alle Difficoltà che le sono Promosse dalla Santità di Papa Paolo V, Bergamo, 1606, p.10. "...e chi è quello, che sia informato delle richesse possedute da' ecclesiastici nello stato della Repubblica, e dell' accrescimento fatto in esse da certo tempo in qua, e di quello che ogni giorno si andava facendo...non vegga la manifesta diminuzione delle pubbliche forze per quello che appartiene a tutte le fattioni reali e personali che convengono sostenere li popoli per difesa e conservazione dell' esser suo?"

37 Ibid. p.12. A significant reference is made to "verediche informationi che si hanno e dai libri publici e da altre ben fondate istorizioni."


39 Ibid. pp.54-55.
stages acquired at least one quarter of the property in every area of the Dominio, more than one third of the Padovano and more than one half of the Bergamasco. 40 The "Trattato delle Materie Beneficiarie" amounts to a searing indictment of the degeneration from apostolic poverty to contemporary greed and affluence. 41 Querini's justification of the "emfiteusis" law was strongly endorsed, on the same grounds. 42 Sarpi also joined, in greater detail, in the attack on the immunity of much ecclesiastical wealth from secular taxation: he produced two "scritture" in defence of clerical contribution to state taxation: 43 less directly, he condemned the institution of the "commenda", one of the main processes by which benefices, especially rich abbacies, were passed to foreigners. During the Dark Ages, it had become common for insecure ecclesiastical communities to "commend" themselves to powerful protectors, who were supposed to derive no financial benefit from the position

41 Scritti Giurisdizionalistici, ed. Gambarin, Bari, 1958, pp.12-117. Cf. esp.p.12. "Li difetti che ci par vedere al giorno d'oggi non sono entrati nell'ordine clericale tutti insieme ne cosi eccessivi in un istesso tratto di tempo, ma da una somma anzi divina perfezione per gradi sono descesi all'imperfezione che ora è manifesta a tutti..."
43 "Delle Contribuzioni de' Chierici", and "Sopra le Contribuzioni di Ecclesiastici alle publiche Gravezzet", published in 1611 and 1616 respectively, printed in Gambarin, Scritti Giurisdizionalistici, pp.233f, 249f. Both concentrated on historical precedents for secular taxation of the clergy.
and to hold it for only six months: but this gradually reached the stage where "commendatori" were cardinals drawing the full income of an abbacy as absentee incumbents during their lifetime, and the custom was so valuable a means of buying support at the Curia that two decrees of the Council of Trent were unable to demolish it. Sarpi's general diagnosis of the economic situation was the same as Querini's: as non-taxable ecclesiastical property increased, taxable secular wealth must decline in proportion, so threatening the effectiveness of the government. Exactly the same threat was implied by Marcantonio Capello, who likened the Church to a sea which absorbed riches as irrevocably as the ocean absorbed rivers, had already taken a quarter of the Republic's wealth, and might take the rest if left unchecked.

What, exactly, were the economic realities behind these anxieties? Some isolated references appear to lend a measure of confirmation to Sarpi's estimates of clerical wealth in individual regions, but they inspire little confidence in their accuracy or mutual consistency. In a discussion with Clement VIII in 1593, Paolo Paruta set the Church's share of the Padovano at one third, the proportion later mentioned by


46 Delle Controversie tra il Sommo Pontifice Paolo V e la Serenissima Republica di Venezia, Venezia, 1606, pp.119-120.
Sarpi: but rettori made the same reckoning in 1584, and further back still, in 1560. The figure may have been a mere commonplace. Its constant recurrence hardly seem to tally with the second main Venetian contention, that the rate of ecclesiastical gains was accelerating wildly. In another interview, Paruta assured the Pope that the Church held a third of the Brescian, and here his word deserves respect, as he had recently been responsible for the completion of a general "Estimo" in the area. But the figures quoted by Paolo Corner in his Relazione of 1562 put the Church's portion of the revenues of Brescia and its territory at barely one sixth. This may hint at growth between 1562 and the early 1590s, but no exact comparison of the figures is possible.

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47 Legazione, Vol.I, p.274, July 24th. The question concerned secular interference against a legacy to the Jesuits which deprived a number of secular heirs of their anticipated patrimony.

48 Bibl.Marc.Cod.It.cl.VII, 1187 (8971), cc.15 (1560, 21 (1584). This document is entitled "Memorie e Osservazioni dello Stato della Repubblica in Terraferma" (hereafter Osservazioni Terraferma) and is a kind of scrapbook containing notes on debates, the reports of rettori, and any other bits of information on the Terraferma that seemed relevant to the author. It covers the period 1560-1610. The script is uniform throughout, which suggests that the compiler assembled an assortment of notes which were probably not his own: the layout is that of a diary, but the appearance is definitely not. Such figures as the document contains are suspiciously round and sometimes inconsistent, and it cannot be treated as a really objective source. But besides being a useful quarry of information, it is an interesting symptom of growing concern in the affairs of the Terraferma.

49 Legazione, Vol.cit.p.200, May 15th. The problem was the same, and the incident had taken place in Brescia. A.S.V.Senato Deliberazioni Terra, F.CXXII, Dec.14th 1591, contains a copy of Paruta's dispatch to the Senate reporting completion of the "Estimo". "Si ha trovato che 'l valente dei beni della Citta e del territorio per le stime fatte ascende per il netto, detratto ogni debito, alla somma di circa venticinque milioni de scudi."

50 A.S.V.Colleorg, Secreta, F.XXXVII, printed in A. Zanelli, "La Devozione di Brescia a Venezia e il Principio della sua Decadenza Economica nel Secolo XVI", Archivio Storico Lombardo, Ser.IV, fasc.33,
Estimates for Verona in 1595 and 1603 put the Church's holdings at around one quarter of the total, again near one of Sarpi's reckonings but equally lacking in real precision. One's reactions to all these vague local statements must be to ask what kind of information they were based on, and the attempts to add up the clerical property holdings in all districts and calculate a figure for the whole Dominio are hardly encouraging. Professor Stella and Beltrami suggest a total, putting forward an eighteenth century official's calculation of the previous complete assessment of ecclesiastical possessions, in 1564. The capital on the Terraferma is set at 37,246,338 ducats, bringing an annual income of 1,173,837 ducats. These are impressive quantities, especially when set alongside the 800,000 ducats income stated by the secular government at this period. But even in 1766, when he worked his figures out, Antonio Paolo Rizzi admitted that they represented no more than an academic exercise. He had extrapolated a rough total by

1874, pp.77-100. Figures on p.83: combined income of "cittadini" - 762,500 ducats; clergy in city and territory - 127,000 ducats.

51 Osservazioni Terraferma, cc.63, 79. "...si può far argomento della beni posseduti in Veronese dal clero, che sariano per più d'un quarto." (c.79).


53 Bilanci Generali, Vol.I, p.241, Dispensations de datij, 1572. This comparison, which was made by Stella, loc.cit, should be treated with a certain amount of caution as the figure of 800,000 probably does not include such items as the direct taxes on Venetians resident in the city but holding property on the Terraferma.
working from the ascertainable food prices of the central 1560s and from the statements returned by the incumbents of the various benefices, but these statements themselves were drafted in completely different forms, some of which appeared to Rizzi to be wholly arbitrary. In fact, within a decade of the assessment of the 1560s many influential clerics, including the Venetian nobles Domenigo Bollani, Bishop of Brescia, and Agostino Valier of Verona, were complaining of its hopeless inaccuracy and unfairness, and urging that a complete re-assessment be undertaken. But no such effort was made, principally because of resistance and grave administrative difficulties on the local level. The next full "Redecima del Clero" was Rizzi's, in 1766. In the meantime, not even the most exalted circles at the Curia can have known the exact value of ecclesiastical possessions in the Dominio, for the simple reason that there were no reliable means of finding it out. In 1587

54 Fondo Donà dalle Rose, B.cit under n.52, above, c.18. "...li quali (estimi) oltre di esser stati conclusi in tempi assai remoti, sono stati stabiliti parte sopra rendite notificate nette d'aggravì, parte sopra altre raguagliate ad arbitrio, e parte sopra il calcolato valor de' beni." Cf. also c.3 for Rizzi's discussion of his methods.

55 Frantic negotiations over collection of clerical dues went on right through the 1570s. A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVI, c.373, Nov.26th, 1575: Bollani and the nuncio complain that the Pope's grant of 70,000 ducats to the Republic would demand nearly twice the "due decime" at the 1564 rate that had been stipulated. A.S.V.Sant'Ufficio, Processi, B.162, July 10th, 1576, dispatch of Valier to Senate on the inequalities of the situation in Verona. A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVI, c.215, Dec.4th, 1574, sums the matter up: "Ma in ogni evento credo ben che seria giusto far nuova et più egual tassa."

56 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVIII, c.177, July 20th 1577. "La verità è, come sono informato, che li vescovi vanno lente nel far riscuotere per non pagar la parte loro." F.XIX, cc.74-5, April 19th 1578, complains of constant objections, hard-luck stories, and pleas for special treatment. Valier had the same experiences in Verona.
Sixtus V tried to organise periodical surveys of ecclesiastical property in the dioceses of each state, but pressure from the Cardinals forced him to abandon the scheme. The implication of these various reservations, recriminations and frustrations is only too clear: Querini's "libri publici" which yielded the information for his propaganda estimates in 1606 can only have been the returns for the General Assessment of 1564. There was no other source. But by the 1570s these figures were already admitted to be hopelessly unreliable. By 1606 the "Price Revolution" had really taken hold in Italy and grain prices, on which a good deal of ecclesiastical income depended, had risen by a hundred percent. But production, meantime, had certainly taken a severe blow from the plague of 1575-6. To maintain, on the strength of such evidence, as this, that there was a constant and accelerating growth of clerical property in the Venetian Dominio during the later years of the XVIth century, would be patently absurd. The only firm conclusion we

57 A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma,F.II, ins.139, Sept.5th, 1587. "Sua Stà. a richiesta dei cardinali ha deliberato che no vada più questo archivio inanzi." The College showed no interest, and there is surprisingly little information on what must have been an important project. Cf.Ch.VI, n.61.


59 The economic effects of the 1576 plague seem to me a neglected feature of the later XVIth century. Valier and Bollani both reported a decline of incomes in their dioceses, cf.n.55, above. Some background is supplied by A.S.Ver.Arch.Ant.Comm.Abbazia S.Zeno, B.X, Rg.6, 1542, cc.25-64, Rg.7, 1595, cc.50-71. These are accounts of rents paid by the Abbey's tenants in the village of Erbe. In 1542 there were 270 paying tenants: in 1595 there were only 146. A direct comparison of income is not possible, as the returns were not made on a consistent basis.
can make is that nobody, not even the highest ecclesiastical dignitaries, knew quite how much the Church held. To a government in growing need of money an unknown quantity like this must have seemed both tantalising and threatening.

An examination of the second major Venetian anxiety, the growth-rate of clerical property, is bedevilled by many of the same problems which beset the attempt to calculate a total figure for any single date. But here the records of "bonifiche", which undoubtedly played a central part in the growth of tension and rivalry between the clergy and the nobility, bring us onto firmer ground, and some spectacular gains by religious houses can be securely documented. At the end of the Middle Ages, around the period when Venice began to acquire territory on the Terraferma, ecclesiastical estates in Northern Italy seem to have been in a depressed state, perhaps due to lack of the manpower necessary to administer them properly. In 1409 the Benedictine house of San Giustina di Padova - one of the most significant and best covered cases - gave lodging but no real means of support to only three monks. But a dynamic new abbot, Ludovico Barbo, soon raised the numbers of the congregation to two hundred, while his brother Piero seems to have been equally successful as an hydraulic engineer and developer of sour land.

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61 Stella, "La Proprietà Ecclesiastica", p.57.
Revenues increased sharply, till by 1518 the monks could record an annual income of 15,592 ducats, mostly derived from rents on reclaimed land. By the mid-XVIth century the Observant Benedictines had gained a definite reputation as land developers, and were mentioned by Alvise Corner in 1556 as brilliant exponents of the "new alchemy" – the art of turning useless land to the good of the growing community. So the Venetian government was urged into official involvement in "bonifiche" with the achievements of the Paduan religious communities before its eyes. The Benedictines of Correzzola, a daughter house of San Giustina, increased their holding of "campi produttivi" from 5239 in 1518 to 9238 by 1591. For Padua, Professor Stella's researches provide signs of a definite trend: but no overall figures of clerical acquisitions are available. For Verona some kind of an overall figure is on offer: in 1604 it was reported that the clergy had increased their wealth by 300,000 ducats since 1519. But as yet there is little to show how individuals and institutions had progressed towards such a total.

Stella, "La Proprietà Ecclesiastica", pp.62-3. He cites in particular the acquisition of two estates, both over one thousand campi, between the Brenta and the Adige, and near the Euganean hills.

Quoted in Campos, Consorzi di Bonifica, cit. under n.9, above, p.111. Corner's praise was for "i fratti da Bagnoli, li Garzoni, li fratti di Candiana e di Correzuola." Cf. next note.

Osservazioni Terraferma, c.82. "Clero di Verona dal 1519 fin 1604 si ritrova che abbia acquistato per ducati tre cento nille." This is a typical and suspiciously "round" figure, more interesting because of the concern it illustrates than in itself. The account books of San Zeno do not, unfortunately, give overall figures of the Abbey's income.
the case of Brescia, there are some highly suggestive remarks in the documents which concern the disputed inheritance of 1593, 67 but I have found no trace of the growth rate of clerical property either in the community at large or in individual benefices. There is, in fact, variable but consistent evidence of an increase in ecclesiastical possessions in the main centres of the Dominio during the XVIth century.

Unfortunately, this evidence creates rather more problems than it solves about the general connection of the XVIIth century property laws with the movement of Venetian interests towards the mainland. With the Paduan Benedictines, as with so many spectacular single cases, we must ask first how far their achievements can be generalised. Querini's attack was directed principally at the bishoprics and religious houses: but there are numbers of petitions from monasteries and nunneries pleading abject poverty and begging for financial support which the Senate generally seems to have granted gladly. 68 Members of the secular clergy living on the fixed income of a parish seem often to have been in even worse straits. During the disputes over the Decime assessments in the 1570s Agostino Valier mentioned a case where a priest had tried

67 Cf. nn. 47, 49, above. Museo Correr, il Cod. Cicogna 2557, diary of Francesco Contarini, entry of July 5th, 1593. "...che i beni ecclesiastici al presente sono accresciuti alla terza parte nel Bressan..." A. Zanelli, Delle condizioni Interna di Brescia dal 1426 al 1644, Brescia, 1898, p. 157, mentions extensive grants to various religious orders.

68 For Querini's comments, cf. citations under n. 33, above. A.S.V. Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, F. CXX, Aug. 22nd, 1589, F. CXXXIII, April 3rd 1592: petitions from the nuns of S. Daniele, Venice, and S. Caterina, Vicenza, respectively. Both establishments complained of their increasing numbers and expenditure, and received extra grants of salt. Many similar cases could be cited.
to renounce his benefice on the grounds that he was quite unable to sustain life and pay the taxes imposed on him. As may be imagined, there was little sympathy between men like this and the wealthy abbacies. 69

Rather than speaking loosely of the 'expansion of ecclesiastical wealth', we should probably speak in much narrower terms of the enrichment of a fairly small number of ecclesiastical persons and institutions who possessed the resources, the flexibility, and the organisation to derive maximum profit from the economic situation. We should almost certainly make the greatest progress towards full understanding of the XVIIth century property laws through a series of studies similar to Professor Stella's on San Giustina, examining the fortunes of other great abbbacies. San Zeno in Verona, Vangadizza outside, Legnano, Follina near Ceneda, were all as rich if not richer than San Giustina. 70 Rather than "the Church" as a whole, there may prove to have been a relatively small number of powerful centres such as these which were really making impressive gains. The second problem in estimating the effect of the 'growth' is the vagueness of the time factor. Stella's figures for Correzzola, and the totals recorded for Verona, apply to the whole of the XVIth century.

69 A.S.V. Sant'Ufficio, Processi, B.162, report of July 10th 1576. Cf. n.55, above. Valier made particular mention of the agitation of the secular priests for the inclusion of the regular orders in the taxation scheme.

70 A.S.V. Consiglio di Dieci, Parti Communi, Rg.XXV, cc.89f, March 13th 1562: reassessment of the ducal tax on formal presentation to a benefice. The highest rates quoted are those of the Abbacy of Borgognoni on Torcello, of the Carcere in Padua, of San Zeno and Vangadizza. This applies to abbbacies only: bishoprics were generally valued higher, at least on paper.
century. But it is hardly less important to discover whether the bulk of these gains were made in the first part of the century, more particularly during the land reclaiming rush of the 1550s and '60s, when the Venetian government seems to have been relatively unconcerned about clerical wealth, or whether the rate really did accelerate towards the end of the century, as Sarpi and Querini implied. This is bound to affect judgement of the relative parts played by the 'rapacity' of the clergy, and by the increasing awareness of the Venetian nobility, in generating tension. In the later 1570s prominent clerics were actually complaining that their revenues were declining: 71 this may have been special pleading to try and avoid payment of Decime: or it may have been due to a genuine but temporary slump of grain prices after the plague of 1575-6: but the word of Domenigo Bollani, a man profoundly versed in both civil and ecclesiastical administration, is not lightly to be set aside.

Closely connected to this second problem comes a third: that of determining how large a part of the expanding clerical revenues were due to the expansion of property in the strict sense - acquisition of new lands through purchase, legacy, or development - and how large a part came from lands already held, due simply to more efficient exploitation or, more simply still, to the general rise in grain prices. In the records of San Zeno, which has already been mentioned as one of the richest abbacies in the Dominio, actual acquisitions of land in the 1560s, '70s

and '80s are negligible: but in 1563 the monastery entered into a 3000 scudi per year contract with a syndicate of laymen for the better cultivation of its lands at San Pietro in Valle. These were held by privilege of Urban II. In 1532 the Senate complained to the nuncio about the imposition of a 'pensione' on the Abbacy of San Gregorio, whose gross income was only 1700 ducats: Campeggio replied that the Abbot himself had admitted to drawing an income of over 2000 ducats, and that he was now hearing reports that the revenues were even greater than that, as much as 4000. In 1583 the powerful Gradenigo family wished to detach the Priorate of San Marherita di Padova, so as to preserve at least some part of the juspatronate of the Abbacy of San Cipriano, which was being taken from them. They estimated the annual value of the lands they marked out at around 1000 ducats: but the Patriarch of Venice, Zuanne Trevisan, wrote in high alarm to the Curia that the value of the land claimed by the Gradenighi was at least twice that amount, and would soon be four times as much if the present price rise was maintained.

Comparisons and equations like these cannot have failed to give the

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72 A.S.Ver. Abbazia San Zeno, I, Rg. 31, c. 103v, Aug. 7th, 1563, purchase of three and a half campi from Priamo di Gallici: c. 147, Aug. 22nd 1571, acquisition of 30 campi near San Pietro in Valle as settlement of a bad debt.

73 Ibid. c. 74f, July 3rd 1568.

74 A.S.V. Collegio Esposizioni Roma, F. I, unnumbered insert of April 24th 1582.

II. THE VILLA BARBARO, MASER.

Another Palladian masterpiece which could have supplied ammunition to Possevino. Its owner, Marcantonio Barbaro, was one of the most influential figures in Venetian politics from the early 1570s until his death in 1595.
impression that the pace of ecclesiastical acquisitions was accelerating further and further: while the opportunities for Venetian nobles to draw such comparisons certainly expanded with their property. Padua, the flashpoint of the 1602 law, was said to have one third of its lands held by ecclesiastical persons and institutions. But another third was said to be in the hands of Venetian nobles by 1560, and this is equally credible: fourteen of the nobles on whom I have assembled some kind of financial dossier either held, or had recently purchased lands in the territory of Padua. Niccolo da Ponte held no less than seven separate estates in the vicinity of Carrara. Probably the clergy continued to expand their holdings during the second half century, though I have found no reason for believing that they did so at an increasing pace. But a large and probably unknowable part of the alarm at the growth of clerical possessions may have been created by a generally inflationary climate and a swelling circle of interested onlookers.

Whatever its exact extent and speed, the tone of the Venetian legislation and the recent researches of Professor Stella seem to show that the Church made its acquisitions by two principal means: legacies of laymen "ad pias causas", and "bonifica", the improvement of sour land.

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76 Osservazioni Terraferma, c. 15. Again, the figure is suspiciously round, dividing 600,000 campi three ways between clergy, "gentiluomini e cittadini venetiani", and Paduan "cittadini".

77 Cf. App. II. Antonio Bragadin, Zaccharia Contarini, Gabriele Corner, the Duodi, Alvise Foscari, Jacomo Foscarini, Vicenzo Gradenigo and Alvise Zorzi declared recent acquisitions more or less directly. Zorzi Contarini, Marin Grimani, Francesco Longo, Niccolo da Ponte, and Paolo Tiepolo declared property apparently held for an appreciable time, but without hinting at the length of time.
Both may cast some light, if not onto the facts, then at least onto the impressions that were being made and the positions that were being adopted. Wills, unfortunately, are exceedingly difficult documents to use, as it is hard to devise a workable method of applying them to the problem in hand: it may eventually be possible to show that the normal quantity of capital left to the Church was growing steadily during the XVIth century, but this would mean an examination of wills in all parts of the Dominio, and would be a truly enormous work. Such wills as I have studied suggest that it was usual for a Venetian noble to leave something to pious foundations, but the amounts rarely seem more than a token to salve the conscience. Sometimes they appear almost frivolous: Jacomo Foscarini's only pious bequest was two barrels of wine each year to the Jesuits. Even the Doge Marin Grimani, whose generosity was singled out for special praise by Curial writers, was certainly not beggaring his lay heirs by ecclesiastical legacies amounting to about 200 ducats per year out of an income of 2539. I have found nothing approaching

73 A surprising exception is Paolo Tiepolo, "the pious" who bequeathed nothing to the Church at all: Museo Correr, Mss.P.D.1105/24. Leonardo Donato's 300 ducats, to be distributed by the executors, was probably about the average; A.S.V.Notarili, Testamenti, B.1250, Rg. III, c.61. But it was usual for the testator to designate fixed sums of money for particular institutions over a limited period. Cf. App. II under Zaccharia Contarini.

79 Museo Correr, Mss.P.D.2755/11, will of Foscarini.

80 Possevino, Risposta di Teodoro Eugenio, Bologna, 1607, p.12, uses Grimani and Foscarini as examples of the vanished piety of the Republic, and represents them grieving for the impending downfall. Grimani's bequests are specially mentioned. For the terms of his will, cf.App.II. It should be remembered that he had no direct male heirs, and that one of his daughters was a nun.
the Brescian dispute of 1593, in which an estate of 1500 ducats was sold for the benefit of the Jesuits. Still, even small bequests and donations could snowball: in their statement to the Savii sopra le Decime in 1581 the nuns of San Giustina declared 353 ducats derived annually from rents on property in the City left to them by members of various noble families. If the law of 1536 was being applied, all this must have been accumulated over the previous two years. But it seems to have been common enough practice to evade the law. In 1591 the Savii sopra le Decime complained that many clerical holders of secular property were attempting to delay sale by quibbling over the competence of the Savii to give a verdict and going through the preliminaries of an appeal to the Senate. The competence of the Savii was promptly and unambiguously asserted by the Senate. It is not possible in the present state of knowledge to tell quite how large an economic problem was posed by the custom of making bequests "ad pias causas", in any part of the Dominio: but a few isolated facts from the City of Venice itself give an idea of why the custom came to be seen as a problem.

The term "bonificata" is generally understood to mean active endeavour

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81 Francesco Contarini, loc.cit. under n.67, above. "...certo testamento fatto ultimamente da una donna che ha lasciato tutto il suo per vendita alli Jesuiti, esherandando alcuni suoi nipoti poverissimi."

82 A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.159, pol.200. Helena and Niccolo Sagredo, Orsa Gradenstein, and Andrea Badoer were the main benefactors.

83 Cf.n.3, above, for the 1536 law. The complaints of the Savii are in A.S.V. Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, F.CXX, 24th Aug.1591. "...con termini e dilazioni impetrate dal Collegio nostro hanno tirato il negotio in lungo..."
to improve bad land, and it is now usual to regard the great religious houses as protagonists in the process.\textsuperscript{84} In certain cases, this may well be true. But a proprietor, clerical or lay, might take several different parts in a scheme, gathering profits and generating jealousies in quite different ways. It was not only houses like San Giustina that were affected by the agrarian movements of the time. At one end of the scale, landowners might act like the Paduan Benedictines, buying up cheap land, actively supervising its improvement, and reaping the revenues directly.\textsuperscript{85} At the other, they might be sleeping partners only, drawing rents on land which happened to fall within the area affected by a scheme. In this way, the Camaldolese monks of San Michele di Murano took a hundred ducats every six months from the Val Dentro syndicate.\textsuperscript{86} Between these extremes, some proprietors seem to have taken the initiative in subletting their own lands to contractors for the specific purpose of improving productivity. This was certainly the aim of the monks of San Zeno at San Pietro in Valle.\textsuperscript{87} Proprietors who let out land in this way

\textsuperscript{84} Woolf, "Venice and the Terraferma", in Pullan, \textit{Crisis and Change}, pp. 194-5.

\textsuperscript{85} Stella, "La Proprietà Ecclesiastica", p. 67. The abbot of San Giustina was frequently a member of the committee which looked after the syndicate's affairs. Ibid. pp. 68-9 trace the rising returns from the investment.

\textsuperscript{86} Museo Correr, Mss.P.D.2333, c.12, deed of Zuanfrancesco Lippomano transferring the duty of payment, 1607. The original agreement had been made in 1562, and involved estates in the Padovano and near Cervia. The full papers of the syndicate are contained in this Busta, and those with interests included Jacomo Foscarini.

\textsuperscript{87} A.S.Ver.Abbazia San Zeno, I, Rg.31, cc.72f, July 3rd 1563. Before the text of the contract, the Atti describe a meeting which had been called to discuss the low returns from this area.
were still profiting from "bonifiche", and might share many of the attitudes and ambitions of the reclaimers themselves: but the method of long lease was essentially that of the "emfiteusis" contract. The resulting mixture of old arrangements and new outlooks could become high explosive. "Bonifica" implied far more than irrigating dry land or draining off floodwater through a few 'progni': it presupposed the whole spirit - enterprising, constructive, often overtly acquisitive - that animated those concerned. Alvise Corner's reference to land reclaiming as the "true alchemy" may seem overstated, but it is fully consistent with the ways in which many reclaimers worked and wrote. We have already mentioned that the set form of the "emfiteusis" contract was vague and undemanding: the clause "meliorandum et non peiorandum" was always written in, but no specific obligations were laid on the tenant who seems to have been free to act more or less as he pleased once feudal suzerainty was acknowledged and annual rent paid. But the contract made by San Zeno for the actual improvement of its lands presents a quite startling contrast to the neutral and well-worn phraseology of the renewed leases which surround it in the records. In rather the tones of a disgruntled Board Meeting, the titular Abbot Cardinal Commendone's agents complained of the poor returns from San Pietro in Valle and of the need to impose

89 Quoted in Campos, I Consorzi, p. 111. Corner's view of land improvement as a solid investment seems to me thoroughly born out in the tone of the San Pietro in Valle contract. See below.
90 For the normal terms of an 'emfiteusis' contract, cf. nn. 24-31, above.
better supervision and better standards of cultivation. Stringent terms were then laid down for a nine-year lease: in return for the usufruct, the nine contractors were to pay 3000 crowns in gold in two instalments annually, while a further 200 crowns per year - 1800 ducats overall - were to be devoted to the improvement of the land. Exact terms were stated for the use of these funds: at least one half of the 1800 crowns were to be spent in the first three years, particularly on the planting of vines and willows, and on the improvement of irrigation.

In essence, these requirements may have been no more than extensions of the established formula "ad meliorandum et non peicrandum", but as new ambitions gathered strength old forms were bound to grow teeth. There was scope for dangerous rivalry when both tenant and proprietor were

91 A.S.Ver. Abbazia San Zeno, I, Rg. 31, c. 72v. "Constat villam, possessiones, domos et loca S. Pietri in Valle Veronae districtus spectatia Abb. S. Zenonis Maioris Veronae ob magnitudinem rei et earum numerum indigere necessaria reparatioe et provisione ac regine non vulgari circa curam gubernandi et recte collendi ipsas possessiones et reti-
nendi illarum collones et laboratores in officio, praecipue plantandi vites, opios, moros, alnes, salices, populos et alias arbores illasque exhibita diligentii solertia ad malius incrementum utilitatis reducere..." Those present were the Canon Count Guagnino, Marco de Tapis, Francesco de Suchonis and the notaries.

92 Ibid. cc. 73-74. "Conductores novem habeam integrales collectiones et frugum et introitum perceptiones, salvo nihilominus semper et reservato beneplacito Sanctae Sedis Apostolicae...cmnas et singulas possessiones ipsius Abbatiae sitas et consistentes in dicto loco S. Pietri in Valle..." 1500 crowns were to be paid at Christmas, the other 1500 on St. John's Day.

93 Ibid. c. 74v. "Detti conduttori generalmente siano obbligati procurar l'utile, beneficio, et miglioramento di detti possessioni, et spet-
imalmente nel far et mantenere fossi et arzeni..." It was even specified that 3000 vines and 800 willows must be planted in the first three years. Further expenditure on improvements might be undertaken only by permission of the Abbey.
equally set on extracting maximum profit from the same piece of land: in 1570, just two years after the San Zeno contract, Paolo Tiepolo and his brothers argued that they could not now be removed from the estates that their father Stefano had leased from the Abbey of Follina, as the improvements they had made gave them a greater stake in the property than the inactive owners could claim; Sarpi later used the same argument to defend the law of 1602.

Friction of this kind must have existed between tenant and proprietor rather than between Church and State, though the immunity of many large ecclesiastical landowners from all taxation may well have excited particular irritation. But the accidents of chance provided for more serious and fundamental collisions of secular and spiritual power over the reclaiming of land. After the second and more urgent of Alvise Corner's minutes to the Senate, the Venetian government defined its official position on "bonifiche" in a series of Parti carried during the

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95 "Sull'Alienazione di Beni Laici", in Gambarin, Istoria dell'Interdetto, Vol.II, p.106. "Ma nell' enfiteusi di centinaia d'anni, in quali si paga dieci soli per dieci campi, perché in quel tempo erano inutili alli usi umani, coperti d'acqua, dove non si cavava se non cannella, e addosso, per gran spesa e fatica di secolari cultivatori in derivar fiumi e alzar terreni, sono fatti fertilissimi, sì che valeranno mille ducati, non conviene aver il diretto per principale, ma per accessorio, essendo mutata la natura della cosa."
later months of 1556. The first move, naturally, was to regularise the appointment and fix the powers of a competent executive magistracy. This was handled on October 10th. Three Proveditori sopra li Beni Inculti were to be elected annually, and there is some sign of the general concern now felt in the demands that they should be men of senatorial rank, that they must hold this office alone, and that they must forfeit fifty ducats if they refused to serve after election. The duties of the Proveditori were a curious mixture of the administrative, the technical, and the juridical: they were to act first and foremost as a kind of central office, to which projects for the development of land would be submitted for approval; the next step was to dispatch hydraulic engineers to the sites proposed, chiefly to report on the adequacy of the water supply for irrigation, or the effect that the drainage channels necessary might have on other nearby property; aligning the engineers' reports with the original schemes, the Proveditori would then pronounce their decision on whether the plan should go ahead or not, acting if necessary as a court of appeal between those who were anxious to force ahead, and those who felt their own interests threatened by new water.

96 Corner's first minute was presented in 1540/I (M.V.): Proveditori were elected in 1546, but the appointment did not become regular until 1556. Campos, I Consorzi, pp. 19ff, 107ff.

97 I have used an invaluable selection of printed Parti in Museo Correr, Mss. P.D. (Fondo Dandolo) 977/21.

98 Ibid. "Debbano immediate che saranno stati eletti veder l'informazioni, disegni, et altre constitutioni fatte far'ora da inzegneri et altri in detta materia sopra li luoghi prefati..." The engineers' reports are filed with the "Investitute dei Proveditori": cf. A.S.V. Index 43. Buste 376-379 carry most of the material for the decades 1570-1600.
abstraction, or by a network of drainage ditches. Two further Party sought to accelerate the whole process by encouraging proprietors to form themselves into syndicates: one, for general circulation, urged individuals and institutions to collaborate in drafting schemes, mapping out the areas where they hoped to commence work, and submitting their projects to the Proveditori; another, directed specifically to the mainland rettori, instructed them to search for all possible information about likely sites within their jurisdictional areas, the owners concerned, and the interests involved. This would then be passed on to the Proveditori, who might if necessary force suspicious landlords to co-operate.

There was of course nothing directly hostile to ecclesiastical authority and interests in these provisions, and, as has been mentioned, the Paduan religious houses were held up as a shining example of industry by Alvise Corner. But numbers of ecclesiastical proprietors - the

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100 Museo Correr, Mss.P.D.cit., Parte of Dec.5th 1556. "...che ciascun particolar, consorti over communanze che sono sotto le giurisdizioni nostre possano far scoladori e ponti, canali, per ridur le sue valli a cultura con li modi e ordini infrascritti." The procedure laid down for the Proveditori was then repeated.
101 Ibid. Parte of Dec.27th, 1556. "...che dobbiate pigliare tutte quelle informationi che potrete havere da prattici et interessati e da ogn' altra persona che vi possa informare de' luoghi sottoposti alle giurisdizioni vostre, che si possono ridur a cultura cosi nell' essicar come nell'irrigar e mandarne information particolar ad essi Proveditori claramente." Cf.also Campos, I Consorzi, p.40, on the right of coercion.
102 Cf.n.64, above. These were all Paduan communities.
Bishoprics of Genesa and Parenzo, the Patriarchate of Aquileia, and the
Abbacy of San Zeno, for instance - held certain long-standing rights of
feudal superiority on their estates. San Zeno held direct jurisdiction over fourteen communities in the territories of Verona and Mantua.

Submitting to the decisions of a secular magistracy could not come easily to proprietors of this type, and it is hardly surprising to find that, when San Zeno clashed seriously with the government in 1589, one of the charges brought against the Abbacy was that of setting up its own central office to deal with cases arising over reclaimed land. Also, just as the lay authorities moved towards a firmer control and more efficient exploitation of all land without exception, the Church began serious efforts to check lay penetration into ecclesiastical property.

Clauses on improper taxation, the sequestration of benefices, and the subletting of clerical lands were incorporated into the Council of Trent's draft decree "De Reformatione Principum" in 1563, and these provisions subsequently found their way into the fifth, seventeenth and eighteenth

103 Cf. the works of Stella, Paschini and Cozzi, cited under Ch. I, nn. 136, 141, and 153.


106 The problem is discussed on a European level by Pastor, History of the Popes, Vol.XV, London, 1928, pp. 340f. He is satisfied that direct usurpation of clerical property by laymen was common, especially in Germany.
clauses of the Bull "In Coena Domini". It is not easy to document the effect this Bull had on relations between clerical proprietors and lay tenants: great offence was certainly caused when Clause V was invoked in 1580 against those who collected "dazii del clero" in the diocese of Brescia, and it is at least very probable that Clauses XVII and XVIII, which dealt with property, encouraged some stern clerics to terminate "emfiteusis" contracts much as Borromeo tried to terminate the agreement formed by his predecessor with Stefano Tiepolo.

As the records of individual dioceses and monasteries are more fully studied, it may become possible to examine the movement of clerical property in greater detail, and to crosscheck the fears of Venetian polemicists more exactly. In the meantime, it would probably be safer to suspend judgement on the facts, and pass a verdict only on the opinions. For three separate circumstances definitely converged in the later XVIth century to excite the suspicion that the Church was expanding its wealth ever further: the first was the general rise in food and land prices; the second was the strong spirit of competition that seems to have entered agrarian affairs as the campaign to reclaim waste land gathered momentum after mid-century; the third was the attempt of the Church to battlement

107 The clauses proposed are quoted by Sarpi, Storia del Concilio Tridentino, Bk.VIII, Ch.7: eventually, only an exhortation to respect ecclesiastical privileges was published: Schroeder, Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, St. Louis/London, 1960, p.517. The "In Coena Domini" clauses are discussed by Cecchetti, La Repubblica di Venezia e la Corte di Roma, Vol.I, p.446, and Pastor, op. cit.Vol.XVIII, pp.464-6, where relevant sections are quoted in extenso.

108 Alvise Michiel, entries of March 1580. Zorzi Corner, Jacomo Foscarini, Marin Grimani collected similar dazii: cf.App.II.
its own property with inviolable sanctity. Sarpi perhaps gives some sign of the growing tension in the case with which he identifies the conflict of landlord and tenant with that of Church and State in his defence of the 1602 law.

But the third main Venetian anxiety, the uselessness of Church property to the State and the consequent risk of the Church's acquiring more, is easier to document, mainly because it demands less accurate numerical evidence. We can show beyond reasonable doubt that Antonio Querini's complaints were very well grounded: the distribution of wealth among the clergy was most uneven; the taxation system was such that the assessments were wholly inexact, and the burden bore most heavily on those least able to bear it, leaving the largest concentrations of capital entirely exempt; while even of the inadequate funds that were theoretically theirs, the state treasuries in fact received only a part.

Sarpi argued in typical style that all ecclesiastical property had become so by the gift of secular persons, that the primitive Church paid secular taxes, and that the notion of clerical immunity had been established only through a series of adnit pontifical manoeuvres during the later Middle Ages. In the case of Venice, steady pressure had been

109 "Sull' Alienazione di Beni Laici", loc.cit.under n.95, above. After explaining that the rights of the cultivator must grow with the improvements he makes, Sarpi concludes: "Onde sara anch' conveniente che l'autorità secolare sopra questi contratti si la principale, e l'ecclesiastica l'accessoria".


111 "Delle Contribuzioni dei Chierici", scruttura of 1611, in Gambarin's ed. of Scritti Giurisdizionalistici, pp.233f. Sarpi started from the grass roots with a literal interpretation of "Render unto Ceasar
applied first by Eugenius IV, then by Cardinal Bessarion as legate, until in 1464 a Bull was presented requesting that Papal permission be asked before taxes of any kind were imposed on the clergy. By a formal approach to Paul II in 1467, Venice accepted the principle. It appears that the first attempt at a full, separate "Estimo" of ecclesiastical property in the Dominiio was made in 1536: it does not appear to have reflected the true values very faithfully, and a complete re-assessment was undertaken in 1564 by the Papal legate Vido Ferrereius. But even this, as has been said, was hardly a success: instead of the "verae iustae integrae et reales conditiones" requested by the legate, the clerics produced a weird rag-bag of statements, some basing the values of their benefices on returns in kind, others converting these to currency, some declaring gross income, others income after expenses.

what is Caesar's..."(p.234), and traced Papal influence from Alexander III's attempt to prevent excessive exploitation of the clergy in 1177 (p.233f).


114 The printed Brief of Vido Ferrereius is preserved in A.S.V.Sopra-intendenti alle Decime del Clio, F.LII, and refers openly to "magna et varia inaequalitas...in detrimentum pauperum et iustitiae." The legate made it very clear that he wanted accurate statements, but neglected to say how he wanted them made out.
had been paid.  As no real guide-lines had been given, it was perhaps unfair to expect anything else. But the administrative difficulties had been formidable, and the secular government was no more anxious to suffer the delays of another re-assessment than the Curia was to grope through the maze of imposing one: so this had to serve as the foundation of clerical taxation for the next two centuries.

On these valuations, two types of tax were imposed. The most important for the Venetian government and for the present study was certainly the Decima, a 10% direct charge on the value of each benefice in the Dominio which became a fairly frequent if slightly irregular part of the Republic's fiscal programme from the later 1530s. At the 1536 rate, a single "Decima" was said to bring in about 22,000 ducats, but the figure was raised to 35,000 ducats by the new assessment of 1564. These totals allowed for the expenses of collection.

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115 Individual returns are in A.S.V. Sopr. Dec. Clero, F.LXf: totals from the dioceses, tax assessments of particular benefices in F.X. On the drawbacks of these documents, cf. nn. 52-54, above.

116 A.S.Vat. Nunz. Ven. F. XVI, c. 219, Dec. 11th 1574. The Bishop of Rossano thought that a re-assessment would be the fairest policy, but doubted whether the Senate's urgency would allow for one.


118 These are the figures of Facchinetti, Nunziature di Venezia, Vol. VIII, loc. cit. under n. 113, above. Castaneto, in A.S.Vat. Nunz. Ven. F. XVI, c. 225, Dec. 13th 1574, set the overall totals at 29,000 ducats from the Terraferma and 3000 ducats from the Stato di Mar at the 1536 rate, 42,000 from the Terraferma and 7000 from the Stato di Mar at the 1564 rate. But he admitted "vero è, che non sempre si possono riscuotersi tutti." Some of the deductions must have been to cover expenses (n. 121, below) but some must have been due to speculation.
had first to be made by the Pope, and the precise number of "tenths" stated: depending on the political situation, particularly the Turkish threat, this might be two, three, or even eight Decime. The money was then collected over the next year or so, at the rate of one or two tenths of all clerical income per year, until the Pope could be approached for a new grant. The method of collection was unwieldy, due to the wide variety of persons and interests involved: the nuncio collaborated with two local Bishops, under the title of "collettori", in forming a kind of supervisory committee and court of appeal; in the separate districts matters were in the hands of thirty three "succollettori", who might apparently be either clerical or lay, and whose function was to co-operate with the Church dignitaries of the area, assemble the funds required of them to await the "collettori", and extract a certain percentage of it to pay off their own rather doubtful gangs of subordinates.

In times of acute emergency, a Pope might grant a round sum for immediate collection and use rather than a number of Decime spread over several years. On the formation of the Holy League, the Republic received

119 The Briefs in A.S.V.Sopr.Dec.Clero, F.LII, are all drafted in the form "(Duas/tres/octo) Decimas per duos/tres annos..." Cf.also Cecchotti, loc.cit.under n.117, above.


121 A.S.V.Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, F.CXX, Aug.10th 1591: the Sopra-intendenti reported that the succollettori were demanding a larger share to pay their expenses and the wages of their "ministri". A. S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVI, c.181, Oct.2nd 1574, refers to outbreaks of violence at Verona over the collection of Decime. These agents were laymen.
a promise of 100,000 ducats "sussidio" per year for five years, though in the event only two instalments were ever paid. The same assessment seems to have been used. But instead of the elaborate system of Collettori and Succollettori, the total sum was simply divided into portions - "carati" - between the dioceses, the individual "carati" being then subdivided by the bishops according to the value of the benefices concerned. The Senate seems to have preferred this method of taxation, as fewer rich clerics were exempted: but it was used very rarely, and "Venetian criticism of clerical taxation" must be understood to mean criticism of the method of raising Decime. 122

Sarpi constantly reminded his readers that all ecclesiastical property had passed to the Church by the generosity of laymen, and there is no doubt that one of the main Venetian objections to the system was its almost complete dependence on clerical authority. In 1586 the Republic began to secure some slight influence over the executive side of affairs by the appointment of two secular magistrates - the Sopraintendenti in whose files the documents are now collected - to co-operate with the nuncio and the Collettori, smooth over local difficulties, and seek the aid of the rettori if necessary. 123 But the Collettori were

122 This information is derived from a long dispatch of Castaneo during the awkward period after the Peace of Constantinople, when Gregory XIII wished to cancel the sussidio and the Senate to preserve it: A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVI, c.219, Dec.11th 1574.

always Bishops: and each grant must depend on the will of the Pope. Normally this made little enough difference, but the threat of an anti-Venetian Pope was always present, and difficulties were sometimes very real. In 1574 Gregory XIII would allow only a much reduced grant of Decime, and in 1594 Clement VIII decided to raise money on his own account to assist the Imperial campaign on the Danube, causing grave fears in Venice of a breach with the Sublime Porte. 

A second and more practical objection to the system was: that it simply did not work. There were too many people involved, too many changes of land, too many chances to evade or embezzle, and remarkably little of the money due was actually collected. In 1575 Gregory XIII granted six Decime over the next three years: by July 1577, when the three year period was nearing its end, only 41,600 ducats had been collected of a sum that was supposed to exceed 200,000. It is not clear how much of the deficit was made up. In 1591, shortly after a new grant, the Senate again complained that more than 40,000 ducats were

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124 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVI, c.215, Dec.4th 1574. This was just before the formal grant of six Decime. It is not true to say, as does Cecchetti, *República di Venezia e la Corte di Roma*, Vol.I, p.155, that Gregory refused an award altogether, but the amount involved in the sussidio was much reduced.

125 Aiding a campaign against the Turks would have been a breach of the Peace of Constantinople: this important incident will be discussed in detail in the next Chapter. Cf. Paruta, *Lerazione*, Vols.II-III.

126 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVIII, c.177, July 20th 1577. "Questi Srl. si doglione gravemente che delle Decime concesseli da N.S. di 210m. scudi d'oro per gli anni 1575, 76 e 77, non ne hanno esatto in due anni già passati più che 41,600..."
still owing on the previous levy, which had begun in 1586, and that it was difficult to find people willing to collect either the new Decime or the arrears on the old ones. This failure of funds to materialise was so generally accepted that Paruta turned it to use as an argument to persuade the Curial officials that the Venetian Decime would make not the slightest difference to the Imperial fortunes on the Danube: no more than sixty percent of the total sum envisaged, he assured them, would ever reach the Papal coffers. The reasons for this constant loss are complex. Peculation seems certainly to have accounted for a good deal. The Succollettori were allowed two percent of the total to cover their expenses and reward their efforts, but they clearly found this a very inadequate recompense: in 1602 Antonio Querini and Niccolo Contarini found that considerable sums of money were disappearing while the money collected in the various districts was awaiting final assembly by the Collettori. They tried to cure the problem by insisting that the funds were properly audited in cities with their own "camere fiscali", but legislation continued into the XVIIth century, so one must assume that the problem continued as well. The issue of

127 A.S.V. Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, F. CXX, Aug. 24th 1591.
129 A.S.V. Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, loc. cit. under n. 127, above, refers to difficulties in finding succollettori willing to work for so low a return. A.S.V. Sant'Ufficio, Processi, B. 162, July 23rd 1574, reports a dispute between a succollettore and an agent at Brescia over the payment due and its timing.
exemption was probably far more serious and certainly far more irrita-
ting to the Venetians.

All the Papal Briefs awarding Decime del Clero to the Venetian state
carry the phrase "Cardinalibus praedictis et congregationibus regulari-
bus,... ac fratribus et personis Hierosolim duntaxat exceptis." ¹³¹ The
basis of these exemptions in theory, and their application in practice,
are as uncertain as each other. When the College suggested in 1566
that the Mendicant Orders might be included in the next collection of
Decime, Facchinetti faced the Savii with the whole apparatus of hierar-
chic right and order: the duality of the Spiritual and Temporal Powers,
the superiority of the Spiritual, the immunity of Its members "de iure
divino". ¹³² But the Mendicant Orders definitely did contribute, though
at half rate, to the "sussidio" of 1570-1.¹³³ Two years after his out-
burst of theocratic eloquence, Facchinetti was involved in a contorted

of the procedure laid down by Querini and Contarini was the demand
that local "camere fiscali" be provided with an account book of the
benefices and the amounts they owed "...spesso rincontrando il loro
libro con quello delli succollettori." Contarini's intransigence
in this office is stressed by Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p. 98.

¹³¹ A.S. V. Sopr. Dec. Clero, F. LII, passim. The Briefs are not a complete
series, but they cover most of the century from 1540 on.

The main opponents of the exemptions were Gerolamo Grimani, Niccolo
da Ponte, and Marin di Cavalli. It would be hard to cutdo the ex-
tremist dogma of Facchinetti's reply: "che i beni i quali si danno
alle chiese diventano di Dio e Sancta Sanctorum, onde è cosa chiara
che i principi secolari come inferiori a Dio non vi possino metter
gravezze."

sussidio vengano haver maggiore somma, et non hanno travaglio di
essenti privilegiati et simili, se non li Religiosi Mendicanti per
la meta."
argument which had arisen from a disputed succession to the Benedictine Abbacy of San Zeno: six hundred scudi of Decime were said to be owing, and the new titular Abbot, Cardinal Commandone, claimed that they had fallen due in his predecessor's time, and should therefore be paid by his predecessor's heirs. In spite of the immunity claimed for both Cardinals and Regular Orders, and in spite of his previous determined flow of words, Facchinetti wrote anxiously to the Secretary of State for more arguments to support his case for the exemption of Cardinals. He appears to have been very unsure of his ground. In 1586, Sixtus V eventually decided to include the regular nonastic Orders in the ex-action of Decime: this must have made a considerable difference, though it will have been less than appears at first sight as a large number of the great monasteries were still held "in commendam" by foreign Cardinals. But overall, the impression is that these

134 The main executor was in this case the deceased Abbot Marco Corner's father Zorzi: cf. App. II. The dispute over payment broke after a contest for the "commenda" between the Corners' nominee, Cardinal Farnese, and the Pope's, Commandone. Nunziature di Venezia, Vol. VIII, ed. Stella, p. 477, Jan. 5th 1569.

135 Nunziature di Venezia, Vol. VIII, ed. Stella, p. 486, Jan. 22nd, 1569. "E perché V.S.Ill.ma mi dice che esso Signore Cardinale per privile-gio della degnith non è tenuto a pagar in questo caso cosa alcuna, lo dico che sarà molto a proposito che si degni farmi scrivere le regioni dove si possa sostener questa opinione..."

136 Owing to the death of the nuncio Lorenzo Campeggio, and a short interregnum, there are few documents to illustrate these negotiations. There are hints in Alvise Michiel's entries for Dec. 1585, and the result was mentioned with great satisfaction by Lorenzo di Priuli in his Relazione to the Senate: Alberi, Ser. II, Vol. 4, p. 291f. He referred to the grant as "opera non creduta mai nella corte." (p. 320).

137 Castaneo gives the total figure for the "Regulari non mendicanti" as 7730 ducats: A.S. Vat. Nunz. Ven. F. XVI, c. 225, Dec. 18th 1574. On
important exemptions were granted according to the favours of individual Popes.

The effects naturally varied a certain amount according to the number of rich benefices in the Dominio that were held by Cardinals: Agostino Valier held the See of Verona from 1585 to 1606 as a Cardinal; Zuanfrancesco Morosini, Bishop of Brescia, was raised to the Purple in 1588 and survived till 1596; Ferigo Corner was Bishop of Padua from 1577 to 1594, and a Cardinal from 1586. But the resentments and administrative difficulties created may well have been more dangerous in the long run than the actual financial loss. In 1575, for instance, Gregory XIII awarded two Decime per year for three years, envisaging a grant of around 70,000 ducats per year. But, as Castaneo and Domenigo Bollani reported in near desperation, it would have needed three and a half Decime per year to reach that figure by the time all the exemptions had been reckoned up. Three years later, with barely a quarter of the money collected, Annibale de Capua considered the situation beyond any reasonable solution. Again, as Querini later hinted, it was

his assessment of one Decima as about 42,000 Ducats, this would have raised the yield by 15-20%.


140 Ibid. F.XVIII, c.214, Sept.14th 1577. "...quasi impossibile condurre a buon fine." Bollani and Bolognetti were still wrestling with the problem the following year.
generally the richest benefices which profited by exemption, and the consequent bitterness, among the clergy themselves as well as between priests and laymen, was profound. The situation can be clearly illustrated from the single diocese of Vercna.\footnote{141}

- Total number of benefices assessed in 1564: 1198
- Number assessed at over 100 lire: 25 (including bishopric at 2151 and San Zeno at 1378)
- Total of one Decima from the diocese: 5433 ducats.
- Overall annual income of all benefices: c.53,000 ducats.
- Amount exempt from taxation: 26,000 ducats.

Writing in serious alarm to the Senate in 1576, Agostino Valier reported growing pressure from the poorer secular clergy for the reduction of the exemptions, and the inclusion of the Regular Orders. Some were in such straits that even censures no longer impressed them.\footnote{142}

Besides these semi-statutory immunities, a considerable number of benefices were exempt 'de facto' due to the use of "commenda". In effect, this meant that a rich living, generally one of the great abbeys, was "commended" to a foreign Cardinal who drew the income but was not, of course, subject to Venetian taxation so could use the money for his own purposes: hence Querini's attacks.\footnote{143} A variation of the same

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\footnote{141}{Cf.n.38, above for Querini's criticisms. The information in this table is compiled from A.S.V. Sopr. Dec. Clero, F.X, Catastico dei Benefizi, 1564, esp.cc.87f, 153, 155, aided by Valier's letter to the Senate quoted in the next note. The overall income of the diocese, and the sum of the exemptions, derive from Valier.}

\footnote{142}{A.S.V. Sant' Ufficio, Processi, B.162, Lettere e Documenti dell' Amministrazione Ecclesiastica, dispatch of July 10th 1576. This was just before the outbreak of the plague which reduced everything to a standstill and complicated collection still further afterwards.}

\footnote{143}{For objections to the "commenda", cf.citations under n.44, above. Querini's views are shown in Aviso delle Raggioni, p.14: "...siano nondimeno trasportate con diverse maniere (le richesse) ad altri}
system was the levy of "pensioni", payable to persons other than the Bishop, on the revenues of a diocese. The exact amount of money drawn from the Dominio at any one time is difficult to calculate, but it could be considerable: in 1579 pensions worth 3000 ducats per year were imposed on the See of Brescia, in favour of the Cardinals of Como, Orsino, and Commeno; the same amount was drawn from Vicenza after 1565. But again, the feelings generated against the higher echelons of the hierarchy may have been more important ultimately than the financial loss incurred. The contest between Cardinals Farnese and Commendone for the "commenda" of San Zeno in 1567 cannot have been very edifying. Cardinal de' Medici drew 1000 ducats per year pension from the diocese of Vicenza, besides enjoying the "commenda" of the Paduan monastery of Carrara. He was not obliged to relinquish this even after he succeeded to the Grand Duchy to become a foreign, secular, and by no means wholly friendly prince. Cardinal Bolognetti was granted the "commenda" of the Abbacy of Sommaga, in Concordia, less than five years after he had

popoli et ad altri citta, et in gran parte impiegate non ad uso di Religione ma a puro e mero commodo temporale et a sostentamento di splendori mondani con grandissimo scandalo de' fedeli..."

Eubel-Van Gulik, op. cit. under n.133, pp.155, 353.

Nunziature di Venezia, Vol.VIII, ed. Stella, pp.306-326, Nov.22nd. Dec.20th, 1567. Farnese held "bolle di rigresso" from the late abbot Marco Corner (p.307), but Commendone was described by the Secretary of State Bonelli as "tanto amato da Sua S. tà e tanto mio padrone". (p.306). He eventually won.

Bibl.Marc.Osservazioni Terraferma, cc.43v-44v. The Florentine Knights of San Stefano were a considerable threat to commerce: cf.Tenehti, Venezia e i Corsari, Bari, 1961, pp.48f.
been expelled with ignominy from his post as Papal nuncio in Venice. \textsuperscript{147}

These were all benefices worth several thousand ducats per year. \textsuperscript{148}

But perhaps the most offensive, if not the most financially damaging affront, was the immunity from taxation enjoyed by the Knights Hospitalers at the very period when their freebooting was starting to pose a serious threat to Venetian trade. \textsuperscript{149}

This has been a ragged analysis of the economic background to change, for the simple reason that few of the vital features have been fully documented yet, and even those that can be documented still require much detailed research into their timing and quantitative development. But some features relevant to change in Venetian policy towards the Church can be marked out. The first is the steadily increasing involvement of the leading members of the College in the wealth of the Terraferma: this should not be treated just as a general symptom of the shifting priorities in Venetian society, but as an issue which concerned the leaders of the government immediately. Second, we can be fairly sure that numbers of ecclesiastical institutions increased their property holdings substantially during the XVIth century, though we


\textsuperscript{148} A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVI, cc.228f, gives the 1564 assessments of major benefices: San Zeno owed 222 ducats per Decima, Carrara 50, and Sommaga 77, but these figures were apparently well below 1/10th of their income.

cannot yet be quite sure which institutions they were, how they made their main gains, and how fast they acquired them. Psychological factors were probably more important, if only because really objective data were no more available then than now. The general interest in more efficient exploitation of the land, and the ideology of self defence that grew out of Church reform, were two entirely separate stimuli towards a single conflict of interest. Finally, there derived from the first two factors a growing dissatisfaction among members of the Venetian government with a system of ecclesiastical taxation which was, undoubtedly, ramshackle, inequitable, and unworkable. It now remains to be seen how these factors eventually produced a policy, and how the change developed.
Chapter VI

PROPERTY AND THE CHURCH: FROM PRINCIPLE TO POLICY

In the introductory section I suggested that most of the changes said to have occurred in Venetian attitudes to Rome after the reform of 1552, can in fact be fitted quite comfortably into their historical setting as developments or simply continuations of policies already well established. In questions of property and taxation, this is hardly less true than in matters of jurisdiction and diplomacy. I have tried in the previous Chapter to isolate the economic changes as a likely background, at least, for political change: but if we are content with a search for ideological confrontation there is no need to look nearer to the Interdict than the Cyprus War.

By 1566 the immunity of the Mendicant Orders from the Decime was being discussed openly and in the freest possible terms. Niccolo da Ponte claimed that the precedent was dangerous, and that one immunity would lead to many: Marin di Cavalli went a great deal further, directly asserting the right of the secular prince to tax all property in the territories under his control, since ecclesiastical property had become solonely through the beneficence of laymen. The nuncio's reply was

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1 Nunziature di Venezia, Vol.VIII, ed. Stella, p.145, Dec.14th 1566. n...che, havendo i principi secolari facoltà di gravare i beni prima che siano della Chiesa, non era ragionevole che si fusse potuto o si possa fare alienazione o translations che annilli o sminuischi la giurisdittione loro..."
an outright declaration of the superiority of the spiritual power over the temporal, and of its immunity "de iure divino". Over the next few years the Papal officials obstructed or sidestepped the growing Venetian pressure in a manner which could hardly fail to accumulate resentment in the long term: touching appeals to Divine Law and Simple Faith were thrown into the scales against the needs of fortification in Candia and Cyprus, prising open that division of practical and metaphysical argument which was to yaw at the time of the Interdict. But with his quick results, Facchinetti must have been well satisfied: particular cases gave solid form to the general aims he had expressed. When Marco Corner, abbot of San Zeno, died in 1567, Cardinal Commendone claimed the rich benefice with the support of the Curia, Cardinal Farnese with that of the deceased abbot's family. The Senate announced its intention of hearing both sides: the Papal Secretary of State announced

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2 Ibid. "Lasciò Pietro vicario suo et i successori veri re dello spirituale et temporale: onde veggiamo che l'imperio depende dal Papa, ne alcun re puo esser libero da detto imperio se non per permissione del Papa." Cf.Ch.V, n.132.

3 Ibid.p.213, May 10th 1567; request for help with the fortification of Cyprus and Candia; discouraged as a bad precedent, p.219, May 17th. P.403, July 10th 1568. "...hieri in Collegio messer Nicolò da Ponte mi fu molestio assai et m'accusò nella materia delle Decibe, nel che fu seguito da molti altri senatori." Facchinetti replied that God had sustained them against the Turks when they were less strong, and that all would be well if only they had Faith. Bouwsma, Republican Liberty, pp.418f, makes valuable comments on the completely different intellectual approaches of the Venetian and Roman polemicists.

that the only relevant point was the Pope's wish.\(^5\) It was an ugly clash of principles, and Facchinetti had to carry his side of the case in the same outspoken theocratic terms that he had used over the Decime. The tactics worked again: but even those whom the nuncio thought his friends remarked that this was an odd style of negotiation.\(^6\) Still, the new titular abbot of San Zeno was Cardinal Commendone, and the consequent wrangle over the unpaid Decime seems also to have gone, by default, the way the Curia would have wished.\(^7\) If the Papal Secretary of State penned enthusiastic commendations of the stand Facchinetti had taken against Marin di Cavalli, and if Facchinetti himself was ready to attribute his eloquence to divine aid,\(^8\) then the reasons are clear enough: they were getting results.

Quite a lot of the fact and fiction behind the gradual decay of Venetian-Papal relations can be squeezed out of those encounters in the late 1560s. The issues at stake - clerical taxation, and the abuse of the "commendam" - were wide open at the time of the Interdict or later,

\(^{5}\) Ibid. p.317, Dec.6th. Instructions to force ahead at all costs. P.311, same day, Facchinetti confronts Senate. "Soggiunsi loro che io non era per persuaderni già mai volessero giudici tra due Cardinali..."(p.312).

\(^{6}\) Ibid. p.319, Dec.13th. "...che tutta questa materia pendeva da due capi; l'uno dalla podestà, l'altro dalla volontà di N.S." Paolo Corner, an "Assistente" at the Holy Office whom Facchinetti considered his "amico e servitore" (p.312) made hostile comments, (p.313).

\(^{7}\) Ibid. p.326, Dec.20th: official notice of the conclusion of the crisis. A.S.Ver. Abbazia San Zeno, I, RG.31, cit.passim in previous Ch., contains frequent references to Commendone as Abbot. The dispute over the unpaid Decime arose in 1569, and was probably absorbed in growing alarm at the Turkish menace: cf.Ch.V, n.134. I have found no sign of the matter's being pursued.

\(^{8}\) Nunziature di Venezia, Vol. cit. p.149: Bonelli conveys the Pope's pleasure at Facchinetti's conduct: p.403, Facchinetti replies to da Ponte "Dio gratia".
and were discussed separately or as topics of the more generally expressed polemics. Marin di Cavalli's argument, that ecclesiastical property existed as such only by courtesy of secular persons and institutions, was applied exactly by Sarpi half a century later. Why then did the Senate give way to Facchinetti? The only plausible explanation would seem to be the difference between ideology and organised policy. The problem of clerical immunity was a complex legal and ideological matter, generally argued in abstract terms: it might engage the attention of experienced statesmen with a particular cast of mind like Niccolò da Ponte or Marin di Cavalli, but seems, at least during the 1560s, to have lacked the immediacy to arouse widespread or lasting emotions among the nobility at large. At the same time individual questions, such as the disputes over San Zeno, were not argued as particular instances of a major political issue, but as personal or family affairs between Cardinal Comendone and the Corner. In the debates on all levels, two

9 Sarpi wrote special considerations of "commenda" and clerical taxation: Scritti Giurisdizionalistici, ed. Gambarin, pp.1f, 233f, 249f. The problems were handled less specifically in "Considerazioni sopra le Censure" and in Querini's Aviso delle Ragioni: cf. citations in Ch.V, nn.36-44.

10 It is strongly implicit in the early pages of the "Scrittura delle Contribuzioni de'Chierici", in Gambarin, ed.cit.p.234f.

11 The tendency of this study has been to belittle the influence of ideology on the events of this period: but the almost pathological fear felt by Curial officials for da Ponte cannot be ignored or explained away. Facchinetti reported his election as Procurator with deep gloom: A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.X, c.44, Aug.2nd.1570: to de Capua his election as Doge was a near disaster, cf.App.II. His role in Venetian politics has still to be properly examined and explained.

12 Cf.esp.Fachhineti's report of the argument over the payment of the 600 duats Decime: Nunziature di Venezia, Vol.VIII, ed. Stella,p.473,
features seem to be lacking from the Venetian side of the case: the connection between abstract ideal and particular case which must form a policy, and the union between public and private interest which must give that policy real impetus. With their line of action clearly set out by 'In Coena Domini', the Papal officials naturally had something of an advantage in negotiation.

The Cyprus war and the years immediately following it certainly did much to heighten awareness of the overall problem of clerical taxation, its inefficiency, and the consequent losses to the community. But with war, then plague, occupying minds with thoughts of mere survival, there was probably little chance for individual disputes to swell to national importance. The most interesting case is definitely the clash of the Tiepolo brothers with Cardinal Borromeo in 1570, which has already been mentioned. Though little attention has been paid to it so far, this was potentially a most dangerous crisis: the issue at stake - the precise rights of tenants in a long term "emphiteusis" contract with a clerical proprietor - was exactly that involved in Francesco Zabarella's dispute with the monks of Praglia in 1602; but Bernardo Tiepolo alone held more than ten times the eight campi which brought Zabarella's appeal to the Senate, and, eventually, one of the laws that led to the Interdict.

Jan. 5th 1569. The main attack launched on the attempt to grant the Abbacy to Commendone was the possible threat to other nobles with interests similar to Corner's: ibid. pp. 334-5, Jan. 3rd. 1568.

For the background of this affair, cf. references under n. 32 of the previous Ch. and narrative ad loc. The amount of land held by the brothers, and the improvements that had been made, are not quite clear.

The immediate circumstances of the Praglia case are set out clearly in Sarpi's "Scrittura sull'alienazione di beni laici", in Cambarin's
and the influence of any one of the Tiepolo brothers was immeasurably
greater than that of a Paduan "cittadino". Paolo Tiepolo, whom the
Curia reckoned one of its most useful allies in Venice, went so far as
to threaten action through the Avogadori "de renuntiando impetratis" -
the device of Venetian secular law most feared by clerics - if Borromeo
 persisted in his attempt. But greater events in the East preoccupied
the contestants and dictated caution: the affair simply petered out.

The questions of clerical taxation and immunity did not produce a
single, well defined "Decime crisis" during the 1570s: this did not
occur till the 1590s. Rather, a series of loosely connected paroxysms
followed one another from the outset of the Cyprus war right through the
decade. As a number of these have been used in the previous Chapter
to illustrate the hopeless inadequacy of the taxation system, it will
be enough here to sketch in the stages by which that inadequacy was born
in upon the Venetian government, and the manner in which the government
responded. Sheer clumsiness appears to have been the first practical

of 1582 Bernardo Tiepolo declared a total of 133 campi held from the
Abbey of Follina, though no strict comparison should be attempted
since land in the Padovano would tend to be far more valuable and
productive than land on the edge of the hills near Ceneda. Cf. App. II.

ando impetratis", amounting to a general appeal from clerical justice,
was discussed and deplored by Bolognetti in his "Scrittura della
giurisdizione ecclesiastica", printed in Stella, Chiesa e Stato,

A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.IX,c.16v, April 24th 1571. "...il Ch.mo II. Paolo
Tiepolo in questa materia della Lega si è portato benissimo, et non
gli v orrei dar disgusto alcuno." The Decime statements of Paolo and
Bernardo ten years later both quote holdings of Follina lands.
Cf. App. II.
problem to make a serious impact. The grant of 100,000 ducats per year made first by Pius V and repeated by Gregory XIII, brought the real difficulties into the open at a time when ready money was desperately needed. Some of the richest ecclesiastics, including the Bishop of Padua, appealed for and gained exemption: 18 four dioceses were found to lack any proper assessment on which to base their contribution: 19 and the general result can be judged from Facchinetti's report that, when the separate peace was announced in April 1573, only 8000 ducats had been collected from the clergy since the previous June. 20 The reaction to all this showed in a quite threatening exchange between the College and the new nuncio Castaneo in early October 1574. The Doge complained that the Republic received remarkably little in return for all the help and protection it gave to the Church, and urged the right of the secular government to impose taxes 'without further permission': it was, in fact, an echo of Marin di Cavalli and an anticipation of Sarpi. 21

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18 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.IX, c.21v, May 2nd 1571. "Delle Decime ben pare che l'essentione dei Sri. Cardinali et religiosi levi notabile somma, tuttavia non mancherà modo a N.S. re d'accommodare questi Signori." The exemption of the Bishop of Padua is reported in F.XII, c.252v, March 13th 1573. The Decima payable on the See was assessed at 4485 lire, the highest figure in the Dominio.


21 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVI, c.181, Oct.2nd 1574. "...doveriano da se tassare et partecipare delle gravezze come fanno gli altri, et che non si deve aspettare altro ordine (my emphasis), perché prima non
application and firmly established support were still missing. Castaneo retreated into a smokescreen of canonical hyperboles, there were rumours of consultation with Paduan doctors, and the matter fizzled out. Venice asked for a continuation of the special war "sussidio", but it was September 1575 before any definite grant of clerical taxes was made, and then it came not as 100,000 ducats per year, but as six Decime spread out over three years. Falling squarely across a time of plague and declining production, this grant served only to highlight the problems and aggravate the resentments. Agostino Valier and the clergy of Verona wrote desperately of the strain on declining revenues half of which were in any case exempt from taxation: successive nuncios lamented the funereal rate of progress, which had barely accumulated a single Decima as the period set for the collection of all six was drawing to a close; the dreaded da Fonte became more difficult by the moment after his

22 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.loc.cit: Castaneo replied that he had no brief to negotiate, but that he could not believe that so pious a state...etc. Ibid.c.186, Oct.9th, reported the consultation of the Paduan jurists.

23 Castaneo parried various requests for the direct levy in later 1574: ibid.F.XVI, cc.220f. The text of the eventual grant of Decime is preserved in A.S.V.Soprintendenti alle Decime del Clero, F.LIII, and is dated Sept.23rd, 1575.

24 A.S.V.Sant'Ufficio, Processi, B.162. Cf.previous Ch.n.142, with the figures in the Table on that page.

25 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVII, c.177, July 20th 1577 (de Capua): F.XIX, c.200, 222, Sept.13th, Nov.15th 1578 (Bolognetti). De Capua mentioned the figure of 41,600 ducats, approximately one Decima, without deduction of expenses, at the 1564 rate. Cf.citations under previous Ch.n 118.
unexpected elevation to the Dogado; the death of Domenigo Bollani in 1579 removed the strongest link between Church and State, as well as the only man who had possessed something like a clear vision of the problems involved. It was 1586 before a new Pope, Sixtus V, made the next grant. But this crescendo of inefficiency, and the sharpening of suspicions resulting from it, still had remarkably little effect on Venetian policy in particular cases. By 1579, the Abbey of Follina was again having trouble with some of its tenants, and the same Paolo Tiepolo who had resisted so firmly ten years earlier acted as Bolognetti's regular and valued advisor. Self interest seems to have remained supreme.

The early 1580s were, we must repeat, a particularly bad period for Venetian-Papal relations, with the prosecution of the Archbishop Michiel, the Visitation crisis and the disgrace of Bolognetti forming highlights while the Aquileia crisis churned on more sluggishly in the background. Even without the reform of 1582-3, it was a likely

28 Cf. document cited under n.17, above.
29 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XIX, cc.224, 311, 334-5, 338, covering most of the year. It is unfortunately never quite clear what was at stake: certain rights depended on the tenants being "livellarii" rather than "afittuarii", but the extent and nature of the rights is not declared.
30 The fullest exposition is that of Stella, Chiesa e Stato, pp.17-43.
moment for policy towards the Church to be modified: and the months immediately following the final dissolution of the Zonta produced three incidents which would, certainly, have revealed any new tendencies in the government. In early June 1583 the nuncio Campeggio was instructed to take formal possession of the wealthy Abbacy of San Tomaso de' Bergognoni on Torcello, diverting the revenues to the Camera Apostolica following the death of the Abbot Piero Trevisan and prior to a new appointment.  

This meant overriding a long-established juspatronate enjoyed by the Trevisan, and the College at first reacted very strongly: da Ponte and the future Doge Marin Grimani pressed for the sanctity of family rights in tones reminiscent of the Corner-Commendone dispute over San Zeno, and an attempt was soon afoot to short-circuit Curial designs by shuffling a fourteen year old Trevisan 'nipote' into the vacant position. But there were grave doubts within the nobility about this underhand investiture, and interest waned rapidly.  

Undignified

31 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXIV, c.223, June 18th, 1583. The formal request is recorded in A.S.V.Collegio, Esposizioni Roma, F.I, unpaginated entry of June 15th. The 5% state tax on the investiture of San Tomaso was 80 ducats, as against 60 for San Zeno: A.S.V.Consiglio di X, Parti Communi, Rg.XXV, c.89r, assessment of March 13th 1562. In the early XIIIth century Marco Trevisan had rebuilt and expanded a foundation of Burgundian Cistercians: F. Corner, Ecclesiae Venetae, Vol.XIV, Venice, 1743, pp.185-7.


34 Ibid.c.275, July 16th, 1583. A contact (possibly Jacomo Soranzo) informed Campeggio of suspicions that the investiture was simoniac.
haggling seems to have continued for some years, for the next definite appointment recorded is that of Stefano Trevisan, in 1593: and the argument was in terms of private privilege, not public policy and the need to keep Venetian money in Venetian territory. In early September 1583 the Abbey of Follina - its affairs are really due for more serious examination - was again at the centre of a significant skirmish. Anticipating Antonio Querini in his objection to letting untaxed 'pensioni' pass from his jurisdiction, the Podesta of Conegliano prevented the transport of payments due to the Cardinal of Como. Still, government opinion had not yet caught up with him: Campeggio complained to the College and secured satisfaction easily.

A few weeks later the new College was prepared to rescind an order of the Avogadri "de remuntiando impetrati", intervene in favour of a clerical claim, and assure tenure of the Brescian fief of Montirone to Gianfrancesco Emili, canon of Verona. These were minor incidents, of course: but all were concerned


36 A.S. Vat. Nunz. Ven. F. XXV, c. 273, Sept. 8th 1533. "Non lasciero di riferir a V.S.Ill.ma come il Ser.mo Principe e tutti gli altri S. ri del Collegio mostrorno di sentir condiscapere e adegno a questa innovazione del Podestä e uscrono molte parole piene di prontezza verso il servizio di V.S.Ill.ma." If any records of Follina survive, they will probably be in the Archivio di Stato of Treviso, but these confines are not easy to penetrate. Querini's views are stated in Aviso delle Ragioni, pp. 13-14.

37 The contestant was a laywoman of the same family, Camilla Emili. The development of this case sheds some light on divisions within the nobility at this time, and is discussed in Ch. IV: cf. nn. 152-154. The Savii Grandi over the period of these incidents were Marin Grimani, Antonio Bragadin, Zuanfrancesco di Priuli, Zustiniano Zustiniani,
with what was soon to become a major issue of Venetian policy, the attempt to keep property in the hands of taxable laymen, or at least of Venetian subjects. Yet at this stage the Senate hardly showed a consistent reaction, let alone a clear-cut policy. The only recognisable factor is the sensitivity over Trevisan interests, which has counterparts in the difficulties of the Tiepolo and the Corner during the two previous decades. The reform had changed little.

Though little attention has been paid to it in the general quest for a progression from reform to Interdict, there was in fact a decided thaw in Venetian-Papal relations during the central 1530s, beginning from the election of Sixtus V in April 1585 and continuing at least until the end of the following year. Both sides made substantial concessions over the Aquileia dispute: Venice handed over Marcello Acoramboni; Sixtus made an abortive but probably sincere effort to check the Hospitallers, and - most important of all for the present argument - made a grant of Decime del Clero which included the regular monastic orders. It is both unfortunate and astonishing that so little documentary evidence

Vicenzo Morosini, Francesco Corner, Jacomo Foscarini, Jacomo Soranzo, Zuanne Corner, and Paolo Tiepolo, so there is not too much need to look for changes of ideology.

33 Venice by recognising the Patriarch's rights over Taiedo, the Pope by making Francesco Barbaro coadiutor and effectively demolishing Austrian designs in the area. P. Paschini, "La nomina del patriarca", op.cit.under n.129, Ch.I.

39 Alvise Michiel, entries of Jan.-March 14th, 1536. Marcello was a murder suspect from the Papal States. Cf. Cozzi, Nicolò Contarini, p.36.

40 During 1537-83, rather later than the "honeymoon period". Cf. Tenenti, Venezia e i Corsari, p.56.
about this vital affair is yielded by the usual sources. It seems to have been formally concluded over the winter of 1535-6.\footnote{F.XXVI of the Nunziature de Venezia contains nothing relevant, perhaps because of the death of Campeggio in late summer 1535. A.S.V.Coll. Esp.Roma is equally barren. There is no printed brief in Sopraintendenti alle Decine, F.III. Odd and very uninformative references in Alvise Michiel show that negotiations were going ahead during the winter.}

In practical terms, the amount involved was probably quite a lot less than the 7780 ducats of which the assessment spoke: \footnote{A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVI, c.226, Tassa nuova (i.e. 1564 rate) di dette Abbazie e Benefizii. "Commende" and pensioni payable to foreign clerics will have reduced this considerably. F.C.III n.137.} but coming after the agitation of the 1560s, and the resentment of the '70s, the diplomatic importance of the concession must have been enormous. It is not surprising that Sixtus was nicknamed "il Papa Veneziano".\footnote{Francesco da Molin, c.127. In his report to the Senate Lorenzo di Priuli called the grant "opera non creduta mai nella corte." Alberi, Relazioni, Ser.II, Vol.4, p.320.}

So much of this study has attacked 'historical turning points' that it may seem extremely foolish to go looking for one. But the first dispute to ruffle relations between the Republic and Sixtus was regarded as a turning point by Venetian contemporaries, \footnote{Speaking of the San Cipriano crisis after his tribute to Sixtus' early friendliness towards the Republic (cf.previcuus n.), da Molin commented (c.133) "...s'incommincia a conoscere che la tanta benevolenza di Sua Santità consisteva in parole apparenti..." Alvise Michiel recorded day to day events relevant to the affair, and his diary also contains a general account with the isolated page marks "293-299". The interest of the diarists shows something of contemporary opinion.} and detailed examination does not in this case wholly demolish the impression. Ironically, it was in essence a trivial and purely internal question, no more than a
contest of interest between two noble families: it may even have been the Senate's attempt to treat it as such that magnified the affair to the undeserved dimensions it eventually achieved. Presentation to the Abbacy of San Gipriano di Murano had been a long established but, it seems, rarely exercised right of the Gradenigo family. In 1560 the monastery had been granted "in commendam" to Zuanne Trevisan, Patriarch of Venice. It was a rich, if not affluent, house, and the aging Patriarch wished to turn the revenues to more permanent use: so, towards the end of 1586, he began a series of tortuous and secret negotiations to renounce the benefice in favour of two young relatives, Zuanne Emo and Jacomo di Priuli. Trevisan planned to retain the income during his now fast declining years: Emo was to become titular Abbot with the obligation of paying 1000 ducats pension to Priuli, 2000 to Cardinal Azzolino, after the Patriarch's death. Probably expecting trouble, Trevisan tried to outflank it by dealing directly with inner circles at the Curia, telling the Venetian authorities nothing. This simply made the eventual trouble far worse. The Rome ambassador Zuanne Gritti picked up a rumour, and on January 23rd 1587 the Senate received the news that its Patriarch was collaborating with foreign Cardinals to dispose of revenues drawn from within the Venetian islands themselves.

45 F. Corner, Ecclesiae Venetae, Vol.XVIII, pp.301-2. Alvise Michiel, "p.293" mentions an excuse of Trevisan's, that the Gradenighi had been little concerned with the abbey for some two centuries.

46 The 5% state investiture tax was 50 ducats, somewhat less than San Zeno or Borgogno. Cf. document cited under n.31, above.

47 All this information is recorded in Alvise Michiel's entry of this date, from Gritti's dispatch. "Questa era una cosa brutta, serviri
All previous uncertainties and inconsistencies of policy seem to have been swallowed up in general indignation: the Savii joined together in proposing that Emo and Priuli be summoned to make an immediate renunciation, and that a severe rebuke be administered to Trevisan. The Senate approved the Parte with only fifteen dissentient votes in an assembly of a hundred and fifty. Over the next few days these plans were bundled rather unceremoniously into effect, though Trevisan and his accomplices tried hard to play for time. The College was undoubtedly rough: Ottaviano Valier as Savio della Settimana demanded outright submission to the Senate's decision and renunciation of the investiture before the letters had even arrived from Rome. He was, after all, dealing with members of the nobility who had flagrantly violated the protocol of state security. That one was a senior cleric may have seemed coincidental. It did not seem to be so to the Pope. When Sixtus realised how the Patriarch had been treated, it was his turn to

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48 Ibid., entry of Jan. 30th. The ten who voted against the motion may well have been Priuli or Trevisan connections.

49 A.S.V. Coll. Esp. Roma, F. II, ins. 260, Feb. 1st, 1586/7 (M.V.) Piero di Priuli (an uncle of Jacomo, who was only five) pleaded that it was impossible to renounce what they did not yet have. "Gli fu replicato che havevano inteso la mente del senato e alla parte si convenire obbedire senza altra replica." After a diplomatic attack of gout, Trevisan made his submission by proxy on Feb. 6th: ibid. ins. 254.

50 No member of the nobility could hold dealings with a foreign prince without permission of the Council of X. In 1568 Ferigo Badoer was fined 500 ducats and barred from office for five years for relatively innocent contacts with Henry of Brunswick. Nunziature di Venezia, Vol. VIII, ed. Stella, pp. 464, 469.
rage about a frightful change for the worse: the Devil must have got into the Savii, he thought, if they were prepared to act differently from their pious predecessors; under threat of a break in diplomatic relations, he demanded that the Senate apologise formally to Trevisan and suspend all actions against Emo and Priuli. But the Senate was by now in an awkward mood, and the attempted diktat was an ugly sequel to a month's secret intrigue. The College maintained at first that the dealings with Trevisan, Emo and Priuli had been perfectly reasonable, and fully in accordance with established practice. As pressure from Rome continued, the Savii moved at the end of February towards a compromise, suggesting that Trevisan, Emo, Priuli, and the Gradenighi should all renounce the benefice and surrender judgement to the Pope, but without the formal apologies that had been demanded. But this motion was attacked head on in the Senate by Leonardo Donato, then one of the ducal Consiglieri, in a striking speech which openly denounced the wealth and power of the clergy as a threat to the freedom of the Republic. The

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51 Alvise Michiel, entries of Feb.14th and 26th. The latter entry quotes some of the Pope's tirade as relayed by the ambassador. "...ci è al presente in Collegio uno spirito vivo che se bene Dio lo lassa prosperare e si servi il Demonio per instrumento del suo mezzo per mettere zianie fra questa sede e la Signoria, non fugira pero lungamente l'ira di Dio."


53 Ibid. ins. 232, Feb. 28th, Alvise Michiel under the same date. He adds that the Parte was moved by "tutti i savii".

54 Michiel gives two accounts of this speech, under Feb. 28th and in his review on p."299". The latter quotes Donato's theme as "molti esempi della libertà perdita di molte republiche per la grandezza de' preti; perdersi molto facilmente l'obbedienza del Patriarca, se molto ingrossasse nell'entade." The rejection was carried by 103 votes: 65.
Parte of the Savii was rejected. But the threat of a diplomatic break was apparently still too much for most senators to contemplate in cold blood: at the end of two weeks intensive and unofficial bargaining the same compromise was grudgingly accepted on both sides. There were no formal apologies, and the Gradenighi were placated by the grant of a priorate in Padua, which was detached from San Cipriano as a family juspatronate. The Senate had given, perhaps, two thirds of the way.

Much of the background to this crisis is recognisable enough. The Venetian aim was still basically to defend a vested patrician interest, and the presence of Vicenzo Gradenigo as Savio di Terraferma during the relevant months may explain a good deal of the excitement. But some changes in emphasis attract attention. At the outset at least, there is the remarkable solidarity of the College and Senate against the plan, though the Savii included men like Zuanne Michiel whom the Curia had long regarded as valuable allies. Four of the six Savii Grandi

55 A.S.V. Coll. Esp. Roma. F.II. ins. 222, March 14th 1587 records the final proposals carried to the nuncio by the Senate’s secretary Celio Magno: “renunciare in man di Sua Santità quello che gli interessati hanno renunciato.” Alvise Zorzi opposed any further concession.

56 Corner, Ecclesiae Venetae, Vol. XVIII, pp. 305-319. San Cipriano was attached permanently to the Patriarchate by Papal Bull, but it is not quite clear how the resulting division in the value of the benefice worked out, as the precise income of San Margherita was disputed. Cf. Ch. V, n. 75.

57 Michiel had been a recommended Papal contact for a good ten years: cf. Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p. 9. Of the other Savii Grandi, Valier, Sanudo, and Fescarini had been members of the X or Zonta before the reform: Gritti was well established in the College: Loredan I have not identified satisfactorily. One of the Savii di Terraferma, Andrea Bollani, also had strong connections in the “inner ring” of the 1570s: cf. Ch. IV, n. 20.
during the vital months of the crisis had once sat in the Council of X or the Zonta: Alvise Zorzi, who as a ducal consigliere drew a firm final line under the concessions of early March, had been regarded by Bolognetti as "molto favorevole alle cose della Chiesa". There are definite hints here that the almost conspiratorial secrecy of the papal proceedings had shaken even normally pacific tempers severely. This general feeling of offence could have been given a much sharper, more personal edge by the close involvement of the rather cut-at-elbow Savio di Terraferma, Vicenzo Gradenigo, whose financial embarrassments seem at this time to have been considerable and increasing. How this affected opinion is not easy to say: but Leonardo Donato apparently found some willing listeners for a speech which showed, in itself, some significant and unusual features. Alvise Michiel sourly commented that this highly pragmatic attack on clerical wealth was irrelevant - "fuori di proposito". This has normally been taken as a symptom of his conservative and pro-Curial views, but Michiel himself was certainly no defender of clerical

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59 The details of Gradenigo's finances are set out in App.II: by 1591 he was assisting his brother Francesco with the payment of over 800 ducats of debts. Francesco appears from his will (also cited in App. II) to have had other debts, some of them to ecclesiastical foundations. The problem of clerical wealth may have been very near home to Vicenzo, who became a really influential member of the College in the next decade, and had some powerful contacts like Antonio Bragadin.

60 Alvise Michiel, entry of Feb.23th. "...e disse molto fuori di proposito intorno al lasso de'preti e al cattivo dispenso dei beni ecclesiastici." For the usual interpretation, cf.Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p.36, and n.3.
privileges, and his words can perfectly well be taken at their face value. For when Donato's arguments are set alongside those used by Marin di Cavalli or Niccolo da Ponte in the previous decades, they do indeed show a certain novelty of approach. First, an individual question of basically private relevance was inflated to the level of public interest. Then again, Donato spoke not in terms of secular rights and the legal origins of clerical wealth, but in terms of present and positive political threats. It was an unusually practical viewpoint, and we need not be too surprised if it seemed "fuori di proposito."

As implied by the Senate's unwillingness to stand by its resistance, there was no sudden conversion to a total suspicion of every clerical design. If concern about ecclesiastical property really was increasing substantially, it is surprising that there was so little interest in Pope Sixtus' scheme for periodical surveys of the Italian dioceses. Yet to a plan which would appear so much in keeping with its current mood, the College replied only with a cryptic "Vi penseremo". But individual irritations continued, the issues grew more pointed, and reactions definitely grew sharper. In 1589 the nuns of San Zaccharia appealed to a will some five hundred years old in claiming vast tracts of property in the Veronese: presumably it was one of those attempts to reclaim

61 A.S.V. Coll. Esp. Roma, F. II, ins. 139, Sept. 5th, 1537. Sixtus asked for the help of Cardinals Corner and Valier in handling the Estimo in the Veneto, but there was no further discussion. Cf. previous Ch. n. 57.

62 A.S.V. Coll. Esp. Roma, F. III, ins. 633, May 7th 1589. "...pretendono da un certo testamento fatto già cinquecento e più anni il quale se havesse luogo si metteria tutto il Veronese in confusione e si levaria l'havere et l'alimento, anzi si destruggeriano affatto diversi monasterii e luoghi pii, oltra molti altri effetti perniciossissimi..."
land long sublet, which were soon to supply splendid ammunition to Sarpi and Querini, besides providing the background for the laws of 1602 and '05. This particular claim was so fantastic as to seem little more than a "try on": Valier wrote to the College in very real alarm for the state of his diocese. But unfortunately, the nuns had somehow gained the support of the Cardinal of Sens, so the matter was put before the College with the full official backing of the Curia. The nuncio Matteuci received a firm rebuff from the Doge. Some members went so far as to express amazement that so obvious a threat to the internal peace of a neighbouring state should be sponsored by leading figures in the Church hierarchy. A very ugly impression had been made: Donato's style of argument was gaining currency: and the Republic was approaching three years that were to have far-reaching effects.

Quite a lot of attention has already been given to the importance of the period between 1539 and 1591 for redirecting the economic interests of the Venetian government towards the North, and towards its own hinterland. But the political importance of these years may have been every

The affair was snuffed out so quickly that the precise legal background remains uncertain.


64 The citation under n.62, above, is drawn from Valier's dispatch to the College. The nuncio read the Cardinal of Sens' memorandum on May 19th: A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma, F.III, ins.630. Replies were as follows: "che si trattava di mezzo quasi il territorio di Verona e di metter in confusione tutta quella città; mostrandosi anco da molti questi signori meraviglia di un tentativo simile fatto a Roma con memoriali di questa natura, non mancando chi dicesse questo errore una gran cosa, e che sarebbe meglio certo lassar vivere i principi nel riposo che il S.Dio ha loro concesso senza dar occasione di metter disturbi e travagli nel loro governo."

bit as great: first, because the series of economic shocks pressed the Republic into a number of generally directed organisational measures which could not fail to produce conflicts with the various privileges and immunities collectively styled "libertà ecclesiastica", whether the government intended it or not; second, because an individual incident during this period shows Venice for the first time in that unshifting posture of self-defence which the Curial officials regarded simply as "aggression".

1590 produced the gravest food crisis that Venice had had to face during the century. The underlying causes go far beyond the scope of this study, but our argument requires at least that we show the problem to have been highly complex, in long gestation, and without immediate political overtones. In the present state of our knowledge, the sequence appears to have been roughly as follows. From about 1560, the supplies of Levantine grain which had been reaching Venice in considerable quantities during the mid-century decades were progressively choked off, first by war, then by the internal requirements of the Ottoman Empire. The demographic problems in the Veneto, which were already serious by the 1550s, must have been somewhat relieved by the plague of 1576. The full

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Braudel, Monde Méditerranéen, Vol.I, pp.535-8, dates "le boom du blé turc" from 1548-64, though (p.536) official bans on export as from 1555, grew more effective. In fact, this Eastern traffic never wholly gave out, for some supplies were coming through during the worst of the 1590 crisis: A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXVII, c.183, Feb.9th, 1591.
effect of this outbreak is still uncertain. But it seems clear that the population recovered faster than the ability of the economy to support it, either by redirecting imports to bring grain from Northern Europe, or by redeveloping and exploiting the wasted countryside of the Veneto. By the later 1580s wheat prices had already advanced something like forty-five percent on the average figure for the later 1570s, and wages were not keeping pace. Freak bad weather, bringing poor harvests and a number of unlucky wrecks, seems to have been enough to tip the situation from the critical to the catastrophic, forcing grain prices up to forty lire per stajo: this more than doubled the figure of the later '70s, and the effect on the "miseri contadini" is described by a patrician diarist in terms that leave no doubt of the impression burned into the

67 Growth in the number of mouths to be fed and in the difficulties of import gave Alvise Corner his main points in 1540 and 1556, just after the first Turkish ban. Campos, Consorzi di Bonifica nella Republica Veneta, pp.107-09. In some areas the plague knocked the population back by nearly 50%: Beltrami, Forze di Lavoro, p.167, App.1, quotes a decline from 38,000 (1572) to 20,000 (1579) in Brescia. Pullan, "Wage Earners", pp.148, 157f, mentions a rapid wage-rise after the plague.

68 Beltrami, loc.cit. in previous n., and p.2, traces a remarkable resurgence of the population figures, though (p.5) the city centres declined somewhat. Still, Brescia was back from 20,000 to 51,000 by 1610. Braudel, Monde Mediterranée, Vol.I, pp.533-43, shows that northern grain did not arrive in real quantity until after the 1590 crisis. The great unknown is the exact effect of the plague: Cf. Ch.V.n.59.


70 Francesco da Molin, c.162, stresses "fortune orribilissime da tramontana", as factors in raising food prices to this level. Braudel, Monde Mediterranée, Vol.I, p.543, also mentions the evil weather.
The 'campi' and arcades of the capital filled with wan fugitives from the mainland, sleeping in the open, begging for scraps, so numerous and so filthy that the Provveditori sopra la Sanita were instructed in June 1591 to treat them as a hazard to public health.

The Senate's reactions to the crisis were firm, humane and practical: in fact, it is likely that recent writers have done rather less than justice to the three part programme or relief. First, every effort was made to speed up imports from the East and North, the secretary Marco Ottobon being dispatched to Danzig on a special mission. Second and more important for the present study, the government tried to rush immediate aid to the stricken areas of the Dominio, by distributing available emergency supplies to the best effect, by loans of ready money to enable local authorities to buy grain from abroad, and — less directly — by granting delays in the payment of state taxes to free the cash for food purchases. Documents mention a round 50,000 ducats as the amount

71 Francesco da Molin, devotes c.162-4 to a detailed description.
72 A.S.V. Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, F.CXX, June 4th, 1591: 1000 ducats voted to provide emergency supplies. F. da Molin, c.164, adds the gruesome details.
73 Ventura's section on "La politica annonaria" in Nobiltà e Popolo, pp.375f, is valuable, but he does not seem to me to give the Senate credit for the variety and scope of its measures, seeing Venice as little more than a dominant, exploiting centre of oppressed satellites.
75 Several relevant instances from A.S.V.Senato, Terra; F.CXX: June 1st arrangements to transfer 500 "somme" of millet from Brescia to Padua: F.CXXII, Aug.26th, loan of 4000 ducats to the city of Treviso: Ibid, Jan.11th, 1591/2 (M.V.), loan of 2000 ducats to relieve Val di Sabio, Brescia: Ibid, Jan.30th, three months delay granted to Bergamo and
paid out in loans by the Cecca, and this hardly seems excessive in a time of national disaster: but commerce was slack, practically no revenue was coming in from the Terraferma cities, and considerable inroads were being made on local resources in the meantime. Some senators were obviously concerned about the financial problems raised by the crisis, which, if nothing else, kept the plight of the Terraferma, and the responsibilities it involved, firmly in the public eye. The third and most interesting aspect of the Venetian programme was a greatly intensified campaign against the apparently chronic problems of hoarding, price fixing by monopolist 'rings', and smuggling to more profitable markets outside the Dominio. Some areas appear to have been particularly suspect: Brescia with nearby Desenzano offering a secret route up Lake Garda to the south German towns, Verona with the Adige flowing past the very walls down to the territories of the Duke of Ferrara.

Verona in payment of sussidio contributions. These examples could be multiplied.

76 A.S.V. Senato, Terra, F. CXXII, Dec. 5th 1591, permission granted for further inroads to be made on the Peduan Monte di Pietà, though 8000 ducats had been drawn on Aug. 4th of the previous year. The (rather too round) figure of 50,000 ducats is mentioned in F. CXXII, Feb. 2nd, 1591/2 (M.V.) and F. CXXXIII, May 5th, 1592 as the total of Zecca loans.

77 A.S.V. Senato Terra, F. CXXXIII, loc. cit. in previous note, shows anxiety among Cecca officials at a Veronese request for extension on the repayment of 8000 ducats borrowed on Nov. 8th, 1590. It has been suggested that this crisis encouraged ideas of self-sufficiency in Venice; cf. in general Braudel, Monde Mediterranéen Vol. I, pp. 240-2; Pullan's comments and citations in "Wage Earners", pp. 154-5. I find this view convincing.

Two very firmly phrased laws of early June 1591 took these matters in hand. The first denounced the "unChristian practice" of buying grain at reduced prices before the harvest, then hoarding it for resale as shortage began to bite: all contracts for such purchases were annulled, and it was added that any corn held as a result of them must be restored to its vendors within a month. A week later came a far wider and frequently cited Parte: first, it severely prohibited exports of any foodstuff from the Dominio without the official permission of the Ufficio di Biave; next, it demanded a sworn statement of stocks held from all inhabitants, whatever their status or privileges, who drew part of their income from produce of the land; then, to help enforce these provisions, six special commissioners were to be appointed to tour the different districts of the Terraferma, with authority to make a virtual house to house search to discover exactly how much grain was available in each area. They were to report to the Ufficio di Biave, which would then

79 A.S.V. Senato, Terra, F.CXX, June 8th.
80 Ibid., June 16th. "...che tutti li abitanti in questa città e dogado si privilegiadi, ecclesiastici, seculari, nobili, cittadini, affittuali, etiam che pagassero affitto in danari, et altri, sia chi esser si voglia, nominee excepto, che hanno formento d'intrado alla parte, affitti, livelli, o per ogni altro modo che dir o imaginarc si possa, siano tenuti haver quelli dati in nota con sagramento nell' ufficio delle biave per i 15 agosto." A full printed text of this law can be found in the British Museum, in a folder entitled "Indici sive raccolta di tutti le parti, ducali, e proclami che si contengono ad usum D.Ionnis Sorii Vicentini". This is a collection of laws on civil administration put together about 1680, catalogued 2326 ano 5. The law is cited frequently as it makes definite mention of self-sufficiency in food production: e.g. del Pane, "Politica annonaria", p.346f; Braudel, Monde Mediterranéen Vol.I, p.530: Woolf, "Venice and the Terraferma", in Pullan, Crisis and Chance, pp.197-199.
demand such distribution as seemed equitable. The scheme appears to have been successful, for the commission was renewed the following year. For contravention of any clause of either of these two laws the same severe penalties were imposed: ten years exile and five hundred ducats fine for nobles, ten years imprisonment or fifteen years exile for cittadini, death for corrupt officials or foreigners attempting to arrange clandestine exports.

Though special mention was made in the law of June 16th of "privilegiadi, ecclesiasticii", I can see no reason for believing that any clause was specifically drafted with an eye on the great clerical property holders, or that a spate of furious disputes with Cardinals and abbacies followed the passage of this law. But hostility and suspicion would gravitate naturally to large proprietors in a famine, especially if they were foreigners claiming special privileges and

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81 Loci citati. "...far subito descrittione di tutti li formenti delli habitanti in questa citta (the spheres of duty had been laid out), andando in persona a casa aper casa et a loco per loco..." A detailed report had to be made to the Ufficio di Biave within a week of each man's return to Venice.

82 A.S.V. Senato, Terra, F.CXXXIII, June 27th, 1592.

83 Ibid. These are noticeably harsher than those imposed by a law of the Council of X, dated Dec. 9th 1562, and contained in the London collection, insert 3: only five years imprisonment, and no fines, were imposed at that date.

84 A file of 'Raspe e processi' is indexed among the papers of the Ufficio di Biave, but has unfortunately vanished into the bowels of the Frari. Still, it is unlikely that a serious scandal - say a foreign Cardinal exporting grain illegally - would have escaped the notice of Francesco da Nolin, who was much affected by the crisis and distinctly anti-clerical.
immunities. As has been seen in the cases of San Giustina and San Zeno, some of the great abbeys were powerful, progressive and ambitious landlords, and the revenues were often enjoyed by absent "commendatori".

Agents of these princes of the Church undoubtedly did traffic in grain: in 1574 Flaminio Palazzo had appealed successfully against interference from the Podesta of Conegliano. Also, with their extensive buildings, monasteries were admirably equipped to store supplies, and could command the manpower to organise transport. San Zeno even controlled the mooring rights on a stretch of the Adige. So it is not surprising that some of the Senate's directives contain, perhaps, a mild hint that the clergy were doing rather less than their duty in providing relief, and that the compiler of the "Osservazioni" took the trouble to note that the income of the Bishopric of Vicenza had risen by fifty percent during the early 1590s.

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85 A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XVI, c.27, Jan.30th 1574, directive of C. of X. "...vi commetemo...che non dobbiate in modo alcuno impedire ne lassar che sia impedito il condur delli fermenti..." One wonders what reply would have been given twenty years later.


88 A.S.V.Senato Terra, F.CXXII, Dec.5th, 1591, directive urging Paduan local organisations to provide relief. "...che l'istesso faccia anco più prontamente quel reverendo clero, quanto più l'opera è pia, trattandosi di proveder il viver a tanti poveri: la cura dei quali deve esser particolarmente raccomandata a quei prelati principalmente, che godono tanto gran parte delle rendite di quel territorio."

89 Osservazioni, Terraferma, c.69, entry of 1593. "...soleva già diotto anni affittarsi solamente otto, ma poi d'anno in anno è andato
"Ricchi sono i vescovati, ricche l'abbatie, ricchissimi alcuni monasteri..."

(Querini, Aviso delle ragioni, p. 13.)

San Zeno Maggiore di Verona, one of the oldest and richest of the great abbeys whose economic and political power seemed to form a positive threat to the Republic in the later decades of the XVIth century.
from the agony of the poor. A particular case, involving a great abbacy in a terribly stricken area, seems to concentrate and express many of the gathering fears and suspicions.

The population of Verona seems to have recovered from the plague of 1576 fairly quickly, and this probably served to worsen its plight in 1590. The loans dispensed by the Cecca were certainly heavy. The city also contained an unusually large number of rich and privileged benefices. In fact, it is easy to give the running fight between the commune and San Zeno, which dragged on from 1589 to 1592, a purely economic interpretation. Before the dispute came into the open, attention was being drawn in Venice to the wealth of the Abbey, with its fourteen fiefs, its 6000 scudi annual income, its thirty six subordinate benefices, and its 7000 dependents. Later, official complaints stressed the "camera fiscale", the bank, the four full time notaries now required to handle financial business once occupying a single clerk. It looks like a crescendo al quanto siche con occasione delle anni passati di carestia e asceso alli dodici nille ducati."

8000 ducats, according to the document cit. under n.77, above. Osservazioni, Terraferma, c.19, states the population as 65,000 in 1580. Beltrami, Forze di lavoro, p.167, quotes 52,000 as the figure for 1548.

Cf. figures cited Ch.V,n.I4I; almost half the overall clerical income of Verona was exempt.

Osservazioni, Terraferma, c.38, entry of 1583.

A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma, F.III, ins.369, Aug.26th, 1591: Veronese ambassadors before the College. "...che solendo prima cavarsi delle facende di questa abbazia una assai temue utilita, ella è ascesa al presente a migliaia di ducati."
like a paradigm case for Sarpi or Professor Stella: the ecclesiastical foundation gaining land and influence till the outraged secular authorities rose in rebellion. But the situation was far more complex. The Abbey's fiefs and privileges were held by Papal and imperial proclamations centuries old, and recognised by Venice in the early XVth century. The new factor seems to have been that driving desire to improve output which shows so clearly in the lease of the San Pietro in Valle lands. Naturally, the abbacy ran into a number of disputes with its many tenants, and not unnaturally, the vicars contended that the phrase of the Venetian privilege "jurisdictionem cognoscendi terminandique de causis et questionibus inter homines dicti monasterii" gave them the power of judging any case involving a person who held land from the Abbey. But the Veronese "cittadini" held that the phrase applied only to those who actually lived in the villages enfled to the Abbey. One Giambattista Colpano was particularly recalcitrant. From the late 1560s he squabbled incessantly with his landlords about such problems as the slaughter of bullocks. Then, in 1584, he was denied permission to dig an irrigatio n

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95 The fundamental positions of the opposing parties are shown in reports of earlier disputes between Culpano and the Abbey: A. S. Ver. Arch. Ant. Comm. Abb. S. Zeno, B.XLV, ins. 362: The first is dated March 26th 1569. An accusation dated July 2nd, 1572 is typical: "ausus fuit (sc. Culpanus) in propria domo occidere castratos illosque venales exponere".
channel. For a while there were no repercussions, but by 1589 Culpano had gained the ear of the powerful nobleman Otto Saibante: the question was raised in the Consiglio del Commune, which was sufficiently alarmed to draft a general indictment of the "aggravii" of the Abbacy and refer the whole issue to Venice. So the whole case grew out of an entirely local difficulty with a tenant long recognised as awkward. Little was new except the higher sensitivity of the civil authorities.

The list of "aggravii" provides some solid background to the laws of 1591; and also illustrates something of the state of feelings created by these calamitous years. The wider issues were dealt with first, and the Abbacy was accused of overrunning its privileges wildly in judging all cases "citra penam sanguinis", whether involving only residents within the Abbey's fiefs or persons living in the city and territory of Verona as well. Cleverly judged phrases about "a separate prince" must have seared one of the most sensitive Venetian nerves: this problem of separatist loyalties was to become a polemicist's point at

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96 Ibid., directive of Bartolomeo Turchi, vicar of Cardinal Farnese, dated May 4th, 1584.


98 A.S.Ver.Arch.Ant.Comm.Abb.S.Zeno, B.XLVI, 2107, Processo della leg. ca città contra l'abbazia di San Zeno. "Essercita (l'abbate) ancora l'autorità di mero e misto imperio...come principe assoluto e separato dalla Serenità V.r.a." It was said that edicts of the Senate or Council of X were not posted in the Abbey's demesnes.
the time of the Interdict, and the food law of 1591 laid particular
stress on the common duty and the subordination of all inhabitants,
whatever their rank and privileges, to the directives of the government.

But the attacks on the Abbey's economic organisation are of more imme-
diate interest. There was, it seems, a San Zeno bank, making advances
to dependents and handling the sale of debtors' effects: there was
a separate marketing system, with its own officers and its own weights
and measures: there were even special duties and mooring rates im-
posed by the Abbacy by virtue of certain long standing rights on the
Adige ripage. It is not difficult to imagine the effect revelations
like these must have produced in Venice at the time: the bank, and the
separate marketing arrangements provided superb opportunities for the
advanced purchase of crops; the riparian privileges on the Adige could
have been almost as useful for clandestine exports. Finally, it was
said that the Abbacy had established its own Ufficio di Beni Inculti,

99 Querini, Aviso delle ragioni, pp. 17, 25, stresses both the necessity
for the secular prince to hold superiority over all property and the
subversion that might be introduced by new Orders. Cf. also n. 80, above.

100 Processo, cit. under n. 98, above. "Pretende ancora il Rev. mo Abbate...
di drizzare un altro banco in palazzo di Estimanza... por far vender
gli beni delli debitori sodetti et vassali di essa abbazia."

101 Ibid. "...volendo che facciano anco l'officio della casa dei merc-
canti, et che tutte le inventioni et condannanze siano poste al
banco di S. Zeno..."

102 Ibid. "...novi datii, nove gabelle, et facendoli scuoder in virtù
di suoi privilegii". Cf. Fainelli, op. cit. under n. 94, above.

103 Cf. citations under nn. 78, 79, above.
which had denied Culpano the right to his irrigation channel and was trying to control the quantity of water drawn from the Adige where it flowed through San Zeno estates. If it was true that such an office had been established, then this would have constituted a direct challenge to the Venetian Proveditori sopra li Beni Inculti, who had been granted complete superiority in all cases relating to land reclamation by the Parte of 1556.

But grave as these complaints were, the Senate was extraordinarily slow in reacting. The Veronese representatives cannot have arrived much later than the end of September 1589. But the next sign of any action came at the end of January 1591, when the Abbot Marco Corner pleaded that he could not submit a case to the Senate, as he had been forbidden - quite probably at his own request - to face a secular judge for fear of setting a dangerous precedent. This appears to have been enough to scuttle effective negotiations for another seven months. It

104 Processo, cit. under n.93, above. "In oltre hanno anco eretto un ufficio di beni inculti, facendo sentenze et proclami come fossero gli istessi S.ri sopra i beni inculti in Venetia..." The duties of the Proveditori and the dangers involved for Church-State relations have been discussed in Ch.V; - Cf.nn.96-109.

105 A.S.Ver.Arch.Ant.Comm.Atti del Consiglio, Rg.XCIV, c.70, Sept.2nd, 1589, notes a request to the representatives to set off as soon as they could.

106 A.S.V.Coll.Esp.Roma,F.III, ins.444, Jan.27th, 1590/1 (M.V.) Corner said he personally would be glad to submit his case - "Ma mentre egli andava a ciò apparecchiando, li è stato fatto intendere da Ns. nuncio Ap.co che non debba impedirsene per non pregiudicarre al foro ecclesiastico". However, there is some suggestion that Corner had written to Rome first in A.S.Vat.Nanz.Ven.F.XXVII, c.179, Jan.19th. "Ho veduto quanto V.S.II.ma me comanda di eseguire in servitio del S. Abbate Cornaro per li aggravi che pretende ricevere da questi signori".
was at the height of the food crisis, in autumn 1591, that real progress began. The Veronese representatives appeared to inform the College that they had been in Venice for nearly two years, that they had no intention of accepting any judge other than their prince, and that they would like to see something happen. Corner, faced with the threat of a 'fait accompli' agreed to submit his case in writing and to abide by the verdict of the Senate provided that the hearing was kept secret and that he did not have to face the court in person. The Curia was plunged meanwhile into a thoroughly opportune anarchy of conclaves, and the chance was not missed. On May 21st 1592 a Parte of the Savii Grandi and Savii di Terraferma declared void all judgements passed by Abbey courts in temporal cases concerned with persons who were not actually resident on Abbey lands, called any future appeals from Abbey courts to the Venetian rettore, and swept away the fiscal organisation entirely. The superiority of the Abbey within its fiefs was confirmed,

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108 Ibid.ins.337, Oct.15.
109 Eubel van Gulik, Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi, Vol.III, pp.59-61. Gregory XIV died on Oct.16th, Innocent IX on Dec.30th. Clement VIII was elected on Jan.30th 1592. But the upheaval in Curial administration as the new 'nipoti' were eased into positions of power was always considerable.
110 A.S.V.Senato, Deliberazioni Segrete, Rg.LXXIX, cc.22-24. "...che la giurisdizione temporale delle rev.abbati di S.Zeno s'intenda... tra gli uomini solamente abitanti su le posseisioni e luoghi sotto-posti alla giurisdizione dell'abbatia, non compresi in alcun modo gli abitanti o cittadini di Verona."
111 Ibid.c.22v. "Sia etiandio preso che l'appellationi dell'vicarii dell'abbatia si devolvan immediatamente alli rettori nostri..."
112 Ibid.loc.cit. "Dovendosi oltre ciò levar l'abuso di introdur in
but it was made completely clear that the powers exercised were held subject to the general sway of the secular government, not to a foreign power. 113 Clement VIII, his administration barely organised, was excessively annoyed. For nearly a year he pressed and probed in various directions to get the case reopened, or at least the verdict re-examined. But through its wily ambassador Paruta the Senate played endlessly with details, and in early April 1593 the nuncio Ludovico Taverna admitted that there was nothing more to be gained. 115

Later in his period as nuncio, at the most acute stage of the Cenoda crisis, Taverna cited the San Zeno affair as the first instance he had experienced of the Senate's present tactics — enforcing a solution of its own, then negotiating interminably to wear down opposition. The result certainly presents a strong contrast to the nervousness and inconsistency of conduct displayed in the San Cipriano dispute. But significant changes appear even within the San Zeno case; earlier

_113_ Ibid., loc. cit. "Salve pero alla detta abbatia le ragioni e posses-si suoi...salve insieme sempre la supericiità e ragione del diretto dominio che e della Signoria nostra in tutti e cadauni di essi luoghi nostri."


_115_ A.S.Vat. Nuz. Ven. F. XXX, c. 64, April 7th, 1593.

_116_ Ibid. F. XXXI, cc. 89–92, July 7th 1595.
directives had warned the civil authorities against backing Culpno, and the Senate's initial hesitancy is obvious enough. Yet among the Savii who proposed the crucial Parle wore a number of long established senior statesmen, some classed now as "vecchi", some regarded even at the time as protectors of clerical rights - Alvise Zorzi, Marcantonio Barbaro, Alberto Badoer, Jacomo Foscarini and Lorenzo Bernardo. Change was coming to the Venetian government, but less of ideology and personality than of circumstance and reaction. The famine seems to have forced the Senate to state unambiguously that superiority over all property which had been implied long before: the San Zeno case gave the doctrine clear expression.

The dust was still hanging over the San Zeno affair, when news began to filter through from Brescia: to prevent a fairly small estate - some 1500 ducats - from passing to the Jesuits at the expense of

117 A.S.Ver. Arch. Ant. Comm. Abb. S. Zeno, B.XLVI, 2167, rather confused quotation, apparently dated March 5th 1583. "Vi commettemo...che ne ad instigazione di Giambattista Colpano ne di qual altro si voglia ne col mezo di inhibitione ne per altra via, dobbiate impedirvi nelle cose pertinenti ad essa giurisdizione". If my interpretation of this document is right - I am not absolutely confident - then the change in attitudes must have been truly remarkable.

118 The usual modern view of Foscarini and Badoer can be found in Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, pp.12, 38 (Foscarini): 6, 124 (Badoer). Zorzi was highly regarded by Bolognetti, Barbaro had high curial connections. Bernardo remains something of an unknown quantity, but had very solid family links. Cf. App. II of this study, under the respective names.

119 The most relevant case, perhaps, was the 1556 directive, ordering rettori to report on all proprietors in their districts with land ripe for development, and giving Proveditori authority to judge legal matters arising. Cf. quotation under Ch. V, n. 101.
possible lay heirs, the civil authorities wished to enforce a local statute which forbade property to be bequeathed to persons outside the jurisdiction of Brescian secular courts. In effect, it was a test case for 1604. To my chagrin, I have been able to discover very little about the background to this case, or even about the progress of the Senate's discussions: but the importance lies less in the purely factual side which may even have been too trivial to merit much official documentation, than in the kind of argument that was used. Pope Clement faced Paruta with the question before definite notification had got even so far as the Senate: but if he was hoping to score a quick success by browbeating the ambassador, he had chosen the wrong man. Paolo's last position had been rettore of Brescia, and he had just completed an Estimo of the territory. His Holiness might rest assured, declared the ambassador, that the Senate would handle the matter justly: but the Bresciano was small in area, and a third of it was already in the hands of various clerical institutions. Clement returned to the attack

120 The first hint is in a dispatch of Paruta: Logazione, Vol. I, p. 200, May 15th, 1593. Francesco Contarini records the same information in his diary under July 5th: Museo Correr, Cod.Cicogna No. 2557. Cozzi, Nicolò Contarini, p. 31 and n. 2, makes some general comments.

121 Considering Contarini's anxiety and the Pope's excitement, it is surprising to find the nuncio's dispatches, Senato, Terra, Collegio Esposizioni, and Senato, Segrete, all totally barren.

122 Logazione, loc. cit. under n. 120, above. Ibid. p. 239, June 19th, reports further questions, but the Senate replied on June 26th that nothing positive had arrived: A. S. V. Senato, Delib. Roma, Rg. IX, c. 130.

123 A. S. V. Senato, Terra, F. CXXII, Dec. 14th, 1591, report of Paruta and Tomaso Morosini of the completion of the Estimo.
in July, but Paruta was now wielding even sharper weapons: the expansion of Church property, he contended, was becoming a positive threat; if the present rate of expansion were maintained, it would soon be impossible for secular princes to collect the taxes needed to protect their subjects without weighing too heavily on one section of the population. The Pope, apparently quite astounded by the direct vehemence of this riposte, retreated into a whirl of agonised hyperboles. He did not raise the question again. But the importance of this exchange as a landmark in Venetian policy seems to me very great: the arguments used by Paruta, and endorsed by the Senate, mark the definite transference from the rather windy abstractions of Niccolo da Ponte and Marin di Cavalli to the hard, factually-based, reason of state argument of Sarpi and Antonio Querini. The points advanced by the polemicists of the Interdict period were put forward, in open negotiation, by Paruta. A genuine policy of secular interest and secular supremacy had emerged cut of what had been a disconnected tissue of private quarrels and

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124 Paruta, _Lerazione_, Vol. I, p.274, July 24th, 1593. "...che però, se le cose avessero a continuare così multiplicando sempre, si avrebbero finamente potuto ridurre ogni cosa alla giurisdizione ecclesiastica, a pure bisogna che i principi laici riscuotano le gravezze da’ loro sudditi e beni laici, raccontandole anco particolarmente come passino alcune gravezze regolate secondo la proporzione dei beni, onde venirebbe a restare troppo grave il peso sopra i laici."

125 Ibid. "O povera chiesa! O povera sede apostolica! Ora li principi non cercano altro più che d'intaccarla!"

126 Querini, _Aviso delle Regioni_, p.10: Sarpi, "Considerazioni sopra le censure", in Gambarin's ed. of _Istoria dell'Interdetto_, Vol. II, pp.188-9. The same points are used by Marcantonio Capello, _Della controversa tra il Sommo Pontifice Paolo V e la Serenissima Repubblica_, Venice, 1606.
disputes over public rights. From now on the conflict of principles was in the open, and a direct clash could only be a matter of time.

Any lingering doubts about the connection between political interest and the ultimate control of all property must have been wholly dispelled during the following year. The Pope, possibly encouraged by a minor imperial success on the Danube, announced his intention of suspending all grants to secular governments in Italy and collecting six Decimo del Clero over the next two years on his own account, to subsidise the Crusade against the Turks. The financial loss to the Republic would have been around 200,000 ducats, on paper at least: this was serious enough, as expenditure on the Arsenal in 1594 was to reach the record figure of 201,410 ducats. But insult was added to injury by the specific exemption of the Hospitallers, whose ravages were not the smallest factor in this inflated military budget. The Republic needed all available resources to support preparations which may well have been beyond its means. But economic considerations alone do not


128 This figure is drawn from R. Romano, "Economic aspects of the construction of warships in Venice in the XVIth century", Pullan, Crisis and Change, p. 79. I am assuming that six Decime would have brought in the sum calculated by de Capua in 1577: cf. quotation under n. 126, Ch. V.


130 Such is Romano's view, op. cit. under n. 128, above. Stella, "La
seem sufficient to explain the Senate's intransigent refusal even to negotiate over some quite promising hints of compromise which Paruta's diplomacy had wheedled out of the Curia by mid-April: it was suggested that Venice might hand over three Decime, or even twenty five percent of the total sum, to the Camera Apostolica, collecting all other funds due for her own purposes. But there was no progress.

Plans for a new anti-Turkish league had been in the air for some time, of course. There had been half-threatening enquiries from the Pasha of Bosnia about Venetian intentions. If it became known at the Porte that the Republic had subsidised imperial arms on the Danube, then this would certainly be interpreted as a breach of the Peace of Constantinople. So, when rumours spread at the end of 1594 that the Pope had summoned the Bishops of Padua, Treviso and Ceneda without informing the

Proprietà Ecclesiastica, p.73, treats this dispute - rather too readily, I think - as a typical instance of Venice's growing dependence on the taxation of real property rather than on commerce.


A.S.V.Senato, Delib.Roma, Rg.X, c.14, April 30th. "...conoscete il Senato esser così fermo e fisso nella stima che fa del presente negotio che dubitate grandemente che egli non sia per accommodarsi mai a simil risoluzione la quale facilmente potrebbe esser seme di scandolo e di non mediocre disgusto fra l'una e l'altra parte".

On this possibility, and the Venetian reaction, cf.Ch.I, nn.41, 42. The negotiations of 1592-3 probably provided the background for Paruta's Discorsi on Neutrality, Leagues, and the Continuing power of the Turk.

ambassador or the Senate, there seemed to be an appalling possibility of the Republic's being forced into a war it did not want by the claims of an outside power to manipulate the loyalties and property of some of its most influential subjects. For a few weeks the atmosphere was electric. There was even vague talk of a secession to the Greek Church. But neither side was ready to push to extremes.

The eventual solution does rather suggest that the Senate's concerns were political, rather than economic. Renewed hints of compromise were thrown out early in 1595, Paruta was instructed to explore them, and agreement was quickly reached: Venice was to collect six Decimo, and a "special gift" of 50,000 ducats would be handed to the Camera Apostolica without mention of war, the Emperor, or the Turks. This meant signing away fully a quarter of the total sum, but it was plainly regarded as a success for Venice both on the Rialto and at the Curia.

135 Paruta, _Iegazioni_, Vol.II, p.502, Dec.10th, 1594: report of rumours that Venetian clergy were being contacted by Camera Apostolica: _Ibid_.pp.514, Dec.24th, 519, Dec.31st: Bishops of Padua, Treviso and Ceneda had definitely been summoned to present accounts and promise payment of six Decimo over the next two years.

136 _Ibid_.Vol.III, p.8, Jan.7th, 1594/5 (M.V.) Paruta assured the Pope that such rumours were merely gossip. It is uncertain how the story gained currency as there is no report of it in Taverna's dispatches.

137 _Ibid_.p.16, Jan.14th. The Apostolic Treasurer had paid a late night visit to hint that the Republic might pay a "ragionevole e conveniente" proportion of the total: Paruta was ordered to try "aver piü particolari" in a directive of Feb.11th: _A.S.V.Senato, Delib.Roma_, Rg.X, c.78. Final agreement was reached, after ferocious haggling, on March 4th. _Iegazioni_, Vol.III, pp.75-6.

138 _A.S.V.Senato, Delib.Roma_, Rg.X, c.90, March 18th: Paruta was highly commended for his handling of the affair. _A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXXI_, c.34, March 25th: Taverna was afraid that this "success" would encourage the Senate to force the issue over Ceneda. As the same amount had been refused a year earlier, it seems likely that the main motive was political. Cf. n.130, above.
Certainly, the incident had united the Senate in its fear of outside ecclesiastical interference.

From this point, incidents in which Venice claimed ultimate control over ecclesiastical property can be multiplied with great ease though not, I think, with any great profit. By 1595, the Republic stood in that posture of resolute self-defence which it maintained even at the cost of a break with Rome: the tone of firm, factual reasoning in the handling of individual cases varies very little. But this protective, self-assertive policy did not leap fully armed from the head of doctrinaire idealism and reform: it evolved gradually, in reaction to changing circumstances. Many ideas of secular supremacy were common currency by the late 1560s, but they seem to have lacked the support to become policy. Over the next two decades, support slowly gathered, partly due to growing personal involvement of numbers of the nobility in the lease of ecclesiastical property, partly due to increasing dependence on landed income, both on the individual and national level, partly due to fortuitous clumsiness in a few isolated incidents, like the San Cipriano affair. Steadily, the obvious interest of individuals became connected with the existing ideals of state interest, until the general disaster of 1590 urgently demanded a practical policy. That policy had to eliminate privileged groups, and the clergy would not give up their privileges.

139 The most obviously significant is the Senate's ruling in 1603 that the clergy of Brescia must contribute to the cost of fortifying the city. This was later cited as a precedent by Sarpi, "Sopra le contribuzioni dei Chierici", in Gambarin's ed. of Scritti giurisdizionalistici, pp.254-5. The background is set out by Seneca, Leonardo Dona, pp.233-40. This was a somewhat extraordinary case which appears to me to have given clear expression, but no significant extension to the principle of the 1591 laws.
CONCLUSION

The constant aim of this study has been to examine, and I hope clarify, the various aspects of one political change. But change cannot be easily estimated across four hundred years, and against the background of a society which hardly shared the now fashionable ideology of social upheaval. When the events of 1582-3 broke upon Venice, and were relayed by gossip, rumour and correspondence round the courts of Europe, the Myth of the Republic was at its height: unshaken by the storms that had engulfed the rest of Italy, this perfectly attuned state could even look indulgently across the Alps and advance money to the now shattered Kingdom of France which had begun the cataract of foreign invasions nearly a century earlier. Here, surely, was the successor to Sparta and Rome, the perfectly balanced mixture of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. And now Venice, too, seemed for a moment to be tottering. It is hardly surprising that the wildest rumours reached Leonardo Donato in Rome, that Campeggio and de Malsse wrote despondently to their governments, and that men like Sorenzo and Tiepolo felt themselves "crushed". Any change must have appeared portentous in a society which valued its


stability so highly and idealised it so completely. The subjective element in our evidence must be taken very carefully into account. We must beware of applying the standards of what would now count as a revolution, to prove that the events of 1532-3 were really rather insignificant: but we must be equally cautious of being carried away by the shocked generalisations of some of our sources, and magnifying Venetian experiences up to the scale of what we feel a "political change" ought to be.

It is this last error, I think, that has confused the issue. Official documents and personal reports tell us that the Council of X was deprived of its "supreme authority", but reveal very little beyond the institutional side of the affair. Who, exactly, was deprived of what by whom? Annibale de Capua's list of influential contacts - which is in any case only indirectly relevant - and the handful of principal speakers in the 1582 debates, form our only composite guides to the individual makeup of the mysterious "giovani" and "vecchi" groups. Other information has to be pieced together from isolated comments that this noble was "devoto alle cose della Chiesa" or "nemico dell'autorità ecclesiastica"; comments which in themselves tell us nothing whatever about the events of 1582 and rarely identify the person concerned with anything like an organised political group. So the way was left wide open for

3 Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.9, and the accounts of Venier, Morosini, Muazzo and the anonymous chronicler, cited under Ch.III, n.2.

4 An occasional reference such as that cited under Ch.IV, n.154, seems to go further: there the Avogadore Raimondo Critti is grouped with the "fattione dei giovani", and there is an implication that the Council of X was venting its spleen on him.
speculation and inference to fill the gaps, and as different speculators exploited the various aspects of the subject which interested them they enshrined each other's theories as dogma, and built an ever higher and more imposing structure of interpretation. A general connection of the reform with the Interdict followed naturally enough from the timing of the two events, and from the alarm that the Papal nuncios obviously felt at the growth of anticlerical feeling during the intervening period. The riddle of Paruta's sudden rise to prominence suggested some link with a change in the government: so his writings were ransacked, and various features generalised as components of a new political outlook. Correspondingly, some of the nuncios' remarks about the anxieties felt by men like Soranzo, Grimani or Foscarini could easily serve as evidence of an opposing and now overwhelmed faction, however little the nuncios said about the policies these nobles actually pursued. The private papers of two doges, Nicolò Contarini and Leonardo Donato, were added to the pattern. The pattern seemed to indicate a competition between two quite well-defined groups. To Professor Cozzi, they were two groups

5 Von Ranke, History of the Popes, quoted under Ch.I, n.34.
6 Though absent from Paruta's earlier biographers like Crasso and Zeno, this interpretation became firmly established in the XIXth century in Monzani, Comani and Pompeati. More recently, it has been fully exploited in the influential writings of Candeloro. Cf.Ch.II, n.4.
7 Ch.IV, n.152: Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, pp.93f.
8 Seneca's technique of fitting Donato into an accepted pattern shows very clearly in Leonardo Donà, pp.164f - discussion of the 1531-3 Rome embassy.
which had been at loggerheads for some time before 1532, and continued
to be so for some time afterwards. But Stella and Bouwsma went further
than that: to them, 1532 represented the total triumph of the "giovani",
and a change of political direction for Venice. No new facts were
cited. 9

The most striking features about this general picture, and about
its various component parts, are the enormous reliance which those com-
ponents place on each other for validity, and, by comparison, the tiny
basis of established fact about persons and events that underlies them
all. Bouwsma's book somehow resembles a vast spinning top of precari-
cously balanced theorising, poised delicately above a tiny pinpoint of
assumed but barely documented reality.

This study has attempted to widen the basis of facts, first by ex-
tending the number of individual persons examined, second by going beyond
what people said to the frequently different evidence of what they did.
Even on the strength of the still rather undigested material that has
been used, a few modifications must be suggested to the accepted picture
of Venetian political change in the later Cinquecento. While agreeing
that there was a change of some kind, I would argue that it was a very
different and far less dramatic change than that usually envisaged:
slower, much more concerned with economic interests than with abstract
ideals; a change within individuals rather than of individuals; a

9 Bouwsma's unwarranted extension of Cozzi's conclusions is pointed out
by J.C. Davis, review of Republican Liberty, Renaissance Quarterly,
Vol. XXII, 1969, p. 371. I am grateful to Dr. Grendler of Toronto for
indicating this study to me.
gradual change, in progress long before and long after 1582, linked only remotely with the events of that year. The significance of that reform was mainly institutional. There are certainly signs that personal animosity against the "grandi" of the Council of X played a part, but there is no sign that the reform was an organised movement with a planned political alternative, and no sign whatever that it succeeded in ousting the "grandi" from their central position in the state. After 1583, the same faces appear in a now narrower circle of powerful posts. As a definable entity, the "new governing group" simply does not exist. When one returns, with this information in mind, to the sources which refer to "giovani" and "vecchi", the two labels appear simply as loose and convenient generalisations of very variable significance, and without any of the connotations of organisation and ideology that modern criticism has fathered on them. This in its turn explains the lack of any immediate shift in the Venetian position on major political issues, which has been admitted by even the most determined partisans of a radical change in 1582.

But deeper and more potent forces of change can be documented. Many of the economic factors - the lack of ships and of capital, the contracting field of commercial activity, the threat of piracy and the rise of military costs needed to meet it - have been thoroughly examined already. Together, these underlined the Commune's growing need to

10 The studies of Stella, "La crisi economica" and "La proprieta ecclesiastica" are particularly relevant: also Romano, "Constructions of Warships". Cf. Ch.V, n.15. Tenenti, Venezia e i corsari, fills in the military side of the economic problem.
rely on resources under its own direct control. The wealth of the Church, so much of which was untaxable due to privilege or untaxed due to inefficiency, could hardly fail to appear an ever more attractive target, especially as no one knew exactly how great it was. Within this broad movement of national interest, a subsidiary movement of individual interests can be traced as leading senators moved capital onto the Terraferma, frequently renting property from clerical landowners. Right to the end, I must stress that the evidence on this point needs very careful handling: we can trace the general decline of Venetian commerce, we can observe various individuals seeking alternative investments, but it is rarely possible to pinpoint a single important noble and say that he invested so much more in land, so much less in commerce, during a given period. But we can say that during the 1570s and '80s ever more leading senators were gaining first hand experience of clerical privilege, as they paid taxes to the government and rents to proprietors for the use of land whose ecclesiastical owners did nothing to it and owed nothing on it. At the same time the political leaders who had grown up against the relative commercial prosperity of mid-century were steadily thinned out by death: influence was passing to a kind of "landed second generation"; positions in the College began to go to men like Piero Duodo, Alvise Foscarini, Agostino Nani and Niccolo.

11 Sella, "Declino dell'emporio realtino" - "Crisis and Change in Venetian Trade"; Pullan, "Occupations and Investments".

12 The "emfiteusis" contracts held by the Tiepolo and Donato brothers with clerical institutions had in both cases been originated by their fathers, Stefano Tiepolo and Zuembattista Donato.
Contarini, who had served their political apprenticeship during the Decime disputes of the 1570s, or the Aculeia crises of 1580-5. It is hardly surprising that argument on ecclesiastical privileges was taking on a harder, more practical edge by the later 1580s. If there was a crucial turning point, we should place it, I think, in 1591 rather than 1582. In that year the food crisis finally forced the Senate to declare and implement its absolute control over all the resources within its jurisdiction, and left it, consciously or not, in a position where it could allow no further room for the special privileges claimed by the clergy.\(^\text{13}\) The general doctrine of secular superiority contained in the 1591 laws found practical expression in the disputes over San Zeno and the Brescian inheritance. During the same period, individual attitudes seem to have been modified: senators once thought "devoted to the Church" attached their names to the relevant Parti.\(^\text{14}\) In the early 1590s the ideas which lay behind the property laws of the early XVIIith century were given definite form. That vague "no man's land" between the stated positions of ecclesiastical and lay authority had still been wide enough to allow for political manoeuvre and compromise during the 1580s. By the mid 1590s it had narrowed so far that there was bound to be a clash sooner or later.

\(^\text{13}\) For the way various terms of the laws cut across clerical privilege, cf. Ch.VI, nn.84-89.

\(^\text{14}\) Particularly Alvise Zorzi, Marcantonio Barbaro, and Alberto Badoer, who proposed the Parte against San Zeno. Ch.VI, n.118.
Appendix I

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE VENETIAN STATE 1572-1602

(A note on presentation: as this study is aimed at providing a broad idea of the composition of the Council of X and the College rather than a minutely detailed account of each single career, I have contented myself with a rough dating system and have not recorded withdrawals due to illness, etc. The main elections to the College were in March, June, September, and December: I have therefore recorded the month of a member's election, and the month of his relinquishing office; cases of short tenure are noted in the same way. The two dates given in brackets after a name are applicable to all names in the list until the next date: generally two or three savii were chosen at the same time, though in special cases there were rather more. The abbreviation (res.) in the text stands for "luogo riservato" in the Segretario alle voci. The immediate sense of this is that a noble was elected, but could not actually hold office at that moment. How a man was able to stand in this way, and how such an election affected his eventual tenure of the office, are points which remain to be clarified completely.)
Council of X entering office, Oct. 1st 1572

Paolo Corner
Piero Venier
Zuanne Michiel
Leonardo da Ca'Pesaro
Domenigo Moro
Domenigo Duodo
Alvise Balbi
Bartolomeo Vetturi
Piero Zustiniani
Zuanne Bondimeno
Vicenzo Querini
Domenigo Zane
Antonio Tiepolo

(Zuanne Michiel, elected Savio di Terraferma, and Domenigo Moro, Savio Grande—)

(Jacomo Foscarini Dr. (not closely related to the more celebrated Jacomo di Alvise)

Andrea Bernardo.
Zonta
Jacomo Guovo
Lorenzo da Mula

Zuana Alvise Bragadin
Domenigo Moro
Niccolo da Ponte
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli
Antonio Malipiero
Jacobo Gussoni
Andrea Badier
Vicenzo Morosini
Alvise Zorzi
Piero Sanudo
Michiel Surian
Marco Cicogna
Tommaso Contarini

(co-opted for various periods, or reinstated after other duties)

Leonardo Dandolo
Jacomo Foscarini Dr.
Antonio Bragadin
Jacobo Salamon
Zorzi Pisani
Zuanne Scranzo
Tommaso Contarini
Zuanne Donato
Zonta, 1572, cont.

Julio Contarini
Vicenzo Querini
Jacobo Guovo
Lorenzo Soranzo
Marco Cicogna
Marco Bragadin

Council of X entering office, Oct.1st 1573

Zuanne Donato
Francesco Corner
Francesco Bernardo
Niccolo Venier
Vicenzo Morosini
Antonio Bragadin
Piero Foscari
Lorenzo Soranzo
Paolo Contarini
Daniele Barbarigo
Marco Cicogna

(Apart from Venier and Foscari, who became ducal Consiglieri, first 7 nominees all became Savii Grandi and were replaced by -)

Marco Zustiniani
Zorzi Corner

Zorzi Pisani
Alvise Loredan
Domenigo di Priuli
Francesco Venier
Zaccharia Gabriel
Zuambattista Querini
Filippo Alberto
Marco Lando.

Zonta, 1573

Vicenzo Morosini
Piero Zustiniani
Domenigo Moro
Marco Bassadona
Jacobo Gussoni
Andrea Gradenigo
Jacobo da Molin
Niccolo da Ponte
Jacomo Postarini Dr.
Alvise Balbi
Jacobo Emo
Bartolomeo Vetturi
Alvise Zorzi
Leonardo Pisani
Leonardo Dandolo
Zonta, 1573, cont.

(Co-options during the year).

Alessandro Gritti
Zuanne Michiel
Sebastiano Venier
Marcantonio Barbaro
Lorenzo da Mula
Andrea Badoer
Marco Grimani
Zuanne Donato
Francesco Bernardo.

Jacobo Guovo

(Gritti and Soranzo became Savii Grandi, Vettore Bragadin and Corner Consiglieri, Grimani Governatore delle Entrate; they were replaced by -)

Hieronymo di Piero Morosini
Natale Donato
Sebastiano Contarini
Piero Corner
Piero Venier

Zonta, 1574

Vicenzo Querini
Alvise Zorzi
Marco Zustiniani
Alessandro Gritti
Marcantonio Barbaro
Marco Cicogna
Lorenzo da Mula
Zuanne Donato
Zorzi Pisani
Alvise Loredan
Leonardo Pisani
Marco Bollani
Niccolo da Ponte
Jacomone Emo

Council of X entering office,
Oct.1st 1574

Alessandro Gritti
Jacomo Soranzo
Marco Grimani
Vettore Bragadin
Domenigo Duodo
Zuanne Corner
Zuanne Alvise Bragadin
Vicenzo Contarini
Bartolomeo Vetturi (?)
Leonardo Dandolo
Andrea Bernardo
Vicenzo da Molin
Zonta, 1574, cont.

(Co-options during the year)

Andrea Gradonigo
Zuanne da Leze
Sebastiano Venier
Lorenzo Soranzo
Jacobo Gussoni
Alvise Grimani
Piero Foscari.

Council of X entering office, Oct. 1st 1575

Piero Venier
Jacobo Gussoni
Vicenzo Morosini
Lorenzo Soranzo
Antonio Bragadin
Zorzi Corner.

Marco Zustiniani
Antonio di Camal
Agostino Barbarigo
Piero Foscari

Zonta, 1575

Domenico Moro
Alessandro Gritti

Piero Wetturi
Alvise Loredan
Zuan Francesco di Priuli
Jacobo Guovo
Marco Bollani
Gasparo Rhenier
Alvise Grimani
Niccolo da Ponte
Marco Cicogna
Francesco Bernardo
Tommaso Contarini
Zorzi Pisani
Leonardo da Ca'Pesaro

(No replacements of members elected to other offices are recorded for this year by the Segretario alle Voci - some indication of the stagnation of public business during the Plague.)

Council of X entering office, Oct. 1st 1576

Gerolamo di Priuli
Zuanne Donato
Francesco Duodo
Piero Zustiniani
Francesco Corner
Zaccharia Salamom
Council of X, 1576, cont.

Jacomo Emo
Niccolo Venier
Paolo Contarini
Jacomo Foscarini, Dr.
Jacobo Guovo
Paolo Tron

(Priuli was elected Podesta of Padua, Corner Savio Grande, Foscarini and Guovo Consiglieri, Salamon Proveditore del Sal. To fill these and other gaps due to illness or exclusion over technicalities, the following were co-opted during the year -)

Marco Lando
Zuambattiata Querini
Leonardo Donato
Agostino Bembo
Alvise Zustinianii
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli
Marco Trevisan
Alessandro Gritti
Antonio Bragadin
Zuambattista Gradenigo
Marin Grimani
Gasparo Rhenier

Zonta, 1576

Bartolomeo Vetturi
Antonio di Canal
Jacomo Soranzo
Lorenzo da Mula
Marcantonio Barbaro
Marco Lando
Francesco Corner
Zorzi Pisani
Zuan da Leze
Alvise Loredan
Vicenzo Morosini
Gasparo Rhenier
Zuambattista Querini
Piero Foscari.

(Vetturi died during the year, Lando, Corner and Rhenier were elevated to the X. The replacements were -)

Jacomo Gussoni
Alessandro Gritti
Paolo Tron
Domenico Duodo
Leonardo da Ca'Pesaro
Marco Bollani.
Council of X entering office, Oct. 1st 1577

Francesco Bernardo
Jacomo Foscarini di Alvise
Jacobo Gussoni
Leonardo Donato
Leonardo da Ca'Fesaro
Zuanne Michiel
Zuanne Mocenigo
Pasquale Cicogna
Marco Zustiniani
Antonio Bragadin
Zorzi Corner
Leonardo Dandolo
Zorzi Pisani

(Gussoni died in office, Foscarini was elected Proveditor in Candia, Bernardo and Donato were appointed Savii Grandi, Michiel and Mocenigo, Cicogna and Dandolo, became Consiglieri. Replacements were —)

Francesco Diedo
Filippo Alberto
Daniele di Priuli
Francesco Longo
Piero Morosini (?)
Zuanfrancesco Zustiniani
Marin Venier

Zaccharia Contarini
Antonio Cicogna.

Zonta, 1577
Alvise Zustiniani
Paolo Tiepolo
Niccolo da Ponte
Marco Grimani
Marco Bollani
Gasparo Rhenier
Zuambattista Gradenigo
Alvise Foscari
Jacobo Emo
Alessandro Gritti
Jacomo Soranzo
Marco Lando
Zuannd da Leze
Paolo Tria

Zuambattista Querini

(Da Ponte was raised to the dogado, Soranzo became Proveditore Generale di Terraferma, Emo and Tria were elected Consiglieri; Gritti and Zustiniani were disqualified on technicalities.)

Marcantonio Barbaro
Francesco Bernardo
Niccolo Venier
Zonta, 1577, cont.

Alvise Zorzi
Domenigo Duodo.

Council of X entering office, Oct. 1st 1578

Zuanne Donato
Piero Foscari
Niccolo Venier
Alvise Grimani
Agostino Barbarigo
Sebastiano Contarini (?)
Domenigo di Priuli
Francesco Venier
Andrea Bernardo
Marco Cicogna
Marco Lando
Francesco Mocenigo (?)
Zuanne Gritti (X)

(Data on other offices becomes less and less clear beyond this point; Venier was elected Consigliere, Contarini Governatore delle Entrate. The replacements were —)

Zuanpo Contarini
Alvise Loredan
Zustiniano Zustiniani
Marco Bragadino.

Zonta, 1578

Alessandro Gritti
Zuanne Scranoz
Paolo Tiepolo
Zuanne da Leze
Francesco Longo
Marco Bollani
Antonio Bragadino
Zorzi Corner
Filippo Alberto
Zuambattista Querini
Zuanfrancesco Zustiniani
Gasparo Rhenier
Leonardo da Ca' Pesaro
Agostino Bembo
Vicenzo Morosini

(Soranzo became a Consigliere, Gritti, Bragadino, Zustiniani and Morosini were disqualified. The replacements were —)

Marcantonio Barbaro
Zuanpo Contarini
Alessandro Gritti (after completing his period of disqualification)
Piero Foscari
Zuanne Mocenigo
Leonardo Dandolo
Zonta, 1573, cont.

Marco Grimani
Jacomo Emo.

Council of X entering office,
Oct. 1st 1579

Francesco Bernardo
Gerolamo di Priuli
Pasquale Cicogna
Jacomo Emo
Leonardo Dandolo
Filippo Alberto
Ferigo Sanudo
Ottavaino Valier
Vido Morosini
Vicenzo Querini
Zuanne Michiel
Alvise Foscari
Alvise Grimani
Marco Corner

Zonta, 1579

Alessandro Gritti
Marco Trevisano
Agostino Bembo
Paolo Tiepolo

Marco Bollani
Francesco Duodo
Marin Venier
Francesco Longo
Zuanne Mocenigo
Jacomo Soranzo
Zaccharia Salamon
Marco Lando
Marco Grimani
Jacomo Guovo
Zuanne Michiel
Jacomo Foscarini
Francesco Valier
Marcantonio Barbaro
Pasquale Cicogna
Marco Bragadim
Iseppo Dolfin
Zuanne da Leze.

Council of X entering office,
Oct. 1st 1580

Leonardo Donato
Francesco Corner
Zuanne Soranzo
Domenigo Duodo
Antonio Bragadin
Council of X, 1580, cont.

Antonio Tiepolo
Zuanne Contarini
Francesco Venier
Domenigo di Friuli
Marco Trevisano

(Soranzo, Bragadin and Contarini became Savii Grandi, Corner and Priuli Consiglieri, Tiepolo Capitano di Brescia, and Donato ambassador at Rome. They were replaced by - )

Iseppo Dolfin
Marcantonio Mocenigo
Zuanfrancesco Salamon
Piero Pisani
Sebastiano Emo (Gabriele?)
Michiel Bon
Almoro Tiepolo
Leonardo da Ca'Pesaro.

Zonta, 1580

Marco Lando
Marco Bollani
Alvise Zustiniani
Alvise Foscari
Filippo Alberto
Marco Grimani

Alvise Zorzi
Zorzi Pisani
Ottaviano Valier
Agostino Bembo
Vicenzo Morosini
Zuanne Michiel
Alessandro Gritti
Jacomo Emo
Iseppo Dolfin
Francesco Corner
Jacomo Foscarini
Marcantonio Mocenigo
Zuambattista Querini
Paolo Tiepolo
Jacomo Soranzo
Antonio Bragadin

Council of X entering office,
Oct. 1st 1581

Zuanne Donato
Francesco Duodo
Zorzi di Friuli
Zorzi Corner
Zuanne Gritti
Sebastiano Contarini
Council of X, I581

Andrea Bernardo
Fantin Michiel
Jacomo Venier
Luca Michiel
Marin Grimani
Vicenzo Querini
Paolo Morosini
Piero Marcello
Zustiniano Zustiniani
Marin Venier
Andrea Foscarini
Zonta, I581.
Antonio Bragadin
Ottaviano Valier
Filippo Alberto
Piero Foscari
Pasquale Cicogna
Ferigo Sanudo
Francesco Longo
Paolo Tiepolo
Alvise Zustiniani
Zorzi Pisani
Zaccharia Salamon
Jacomo Guovo
Agostino Bembo
Marco Bollani

Vicenzo Morosini
Alvise Zorzi
Alessandro Gritti
Francesco Duodo
Michiel Bon
Marco Lando
Marco Trevisan
Marco Grimani.


Domenigo Duodo
Francesco Longo
Alvise Zustiniani
Zorzi Pisani
Paolo Contarini
Domenigo di Priuli
Marcantonio Mocenigo
Alvise Dandolo
Jacomo Foscarini
Iseppo Dolfin
Francesco Barbarigo
Zuambattista Querini
Alberto Badoer
Sebastiano Erizzo
Zuanne Corner.
Council of X entering office, Oct.1st 1583
Zuanne Contarini
Marco Corner
Gerolamo di Priuli
Alvise Foscari
Marin Grimani
Gerolamo Mocenigo
Agostino Barbarigo
Zustiniano Zustinian
Luca Michiel
Zuanfrancesco Salamon
Daniel di Priuli
Zaccharia Contarini
Michiel Bon
Lorenzo Bragadin
Marco Trevisan
Lorenzo Donato
Jacomo Marcello
Matteo Pisani
Francesco Donato
Zuambattista Foscarini

Council of X entering office, Oct.1st 1584
Sebastiano Contarini
Domenigo di Priuli
Francesco Duodo
Zuambattista Querini
Zorzi Corner
Bernadino Lippomano
Ottaviano Valier
Alvise Zustiniano
Andrea Foscarini
Marcantonio Mocenigo
Marcantonio Memo
Marin Venier
Antonio Michiel
Bernardo Tiepolo
Alessandro Zorzi
Zuanne Donato

Council of X entering office, Oct.1st 1585
Piero Marcello
Domenigo Duodo
Luca Michiel
Gabriele Emo
Zaccharia Contarini
Paolo Morosini
Gerolamo Suriano
Matteo Pisani
Zaccharia Salamon
Council of X, 1585, cont.
Francesco Valier
Zuambattista Vetturi
Bernardino Vendramin
Niccolo Donato
Alvise Diedo
Ferigo Nani

Council of X entering office, Oct. 1st 1586
Ottaviano Valier
Alvise Foscari
Sebastiano Contarini
Alberto Badoer
Daniel di Priuli
Marco Zustiniani
Marco Corner
Andrea Michiel
Marco Trevisan
Andrea Foscarini
Nadal Donato
Marcantonio Miani
Lorenzo Bernardo
Leonardo Contarini
Niccolo Surffan
Benedetto Erizzo

Council of X entering office, Oct. 1st 1587
Zustiniano Zustiniani
Zuambattista Querini
Zuampaolo Contarini
Lorenzo di Priuli
Ferigo Sanudo
Zuanneo Donato (di Piero)
Alessandro Zorzi
Alvise Diedo
Zuanne Vendramin
Jacomu Marcello
Domenigo Dolfin
Iseppo Trevisan
Bernardo Tiepolo
Tomasso Morosini
Niccolo Gussoni
Bartolomeo Lippomano
Julio di Canal
Alvise Loredano

Council of X entering office, Oct. 1st 1588
Sebastiano Contarini
Andrea Bernardo (di Francesco)
Leonardo Donato
Andrea Foscarini
Council of X, 1588, cont.
Daniel di Priuli
Bartolomeo Gradenigo
Antonio Michiel
Gerolamo Suriano
Marco Trevisan
Marcantonio Longo
Bernardo Bollani
Vicenzo da Molin
Niccolo Salamon
Piero Gritti
Benedetto Erizzo

Council of X entering office,
Oct. lst 1589
Vicenzo Corner
Piero Marcello
Alvise Loredan
Niccolo Donato (di Filippo)
Tomaso Morosini
Marcantonio Miani
Zuanne di Priuli
Carlo Corner
Zuambattista Vetturi
Costantia Loredan

Council of X entering office,
Oct. lst 1589
Daniel di Priuli
Nadal Donato
Piero Pisani
Zuambattista Querini
Lorenzo Marcello
Alessandro Zorzi
Zuanne Moro
Marcantonio Longo
Piero Capello
Francesco Vendramin
Almoro Grimani
Bernardo Zane
Zuanalvise Vexier
Niccolo Gussoni
Bernardo Mocenigo
Zuanne di Priuli

Council of X entering office,
Oct. lst 1590
Piero Marcello
Alvise Loredan
Zustiniano Zustiniani
Andrea Foscarini
Marco Trevisan
Council of X, 1592, cont.
Marcantonio Memo
Vido Morosini
Marcantonio Contarini
Benedetto Erizzo
Niccolo Donato (di Filippo)
Carlo Corman
Marco Soranzo
Zorzi Pisani
Zorzi Gradenigo
Silvan Capello
Tomaso Lion
Bertucci Bondimeno
Ferigbt Rhenier
Antonio Morosini
Almoro Grimani
Almoro Pisani
Jacom Contarini
Alvise di Priuli
Niccolo Bondimeno
Niccolo Donato (di Zuambattista)
Jacom Rhenier.

Council of X entering office,
Oct. 1st 1592

Antonio Michiel
Alessandro Zorzi
Zuanne Donato (di Piero)
Alvise Zustinian
Bernardo Contarini
Antonio Miani
Zuambattista Foscarini
Bernardo Zane
Domenigo Dolfin
SAVII GRANDI DEL CONSIGLIO entering office from October 1st, 1572.

Material derived from A.S.V. Segretario alle Voci, Elezioni del Senato, Rg. IV, V, VI.

Zuanne Michiel (Oct. '72 -
Vettore Bragadin March '73)
Domenigo Moro
Zuanne Soranzo
Zuanfrancesco di Friuli
Vicenzo Morosini
Sebastiano Venier (Dec. '72 -
Zuanne Michiel June '73)
Zuanne Soranzo
Andrea Badoer
Alvise Zorzi
Niccolo da Ponte (March -
Francesco Bernardo Sept. '73)
Piero Sanudo
Julio Contarini
Zuanne Donato di Benedetto
Zuanne Michiel (res.) (June -
Jacomo Soranzo (res.) Dec. '73)
Niccolo da Ponte
Jacomo Gussoni
Jacomo Soranzo (res.)
Domenigo Moro (Sept. '73 -
Zuanne da Leze March '74)
Jacomo Soranzo (res.) (Dec. '73 -
Alvise Zorzi June '74)
Francesco Corner
Zuanne Soranzo
Alessandro Gritti
Jacomo Foscarini Dr. (res.) (March -
Sebastiano Venier Sept. '74)
Marcantonio Barbaro
Antonio Bragadin
Niccolo da Ponte (June - Dec. '74)
Zuanne Donato
Francesco Bernardo
Marcantonio Barbaro (Sept. '74 -
Alessandro Gritti March '75)
Jacomo Soranzo
Alvise Grimani (Dec. '74 - June '75)
Alvise Zorzi
Paolo Toma
Sebastiano Venier (March-Sept. '75)
Jacomo Gussoni
Vicenzo Morosini
Zuanne da Leze (June - Dec. '75)
Niccolo da Ponte
Francesco Bernardo
Jacomo Soranzo (Sept. '75 -
Alessandro Gritti March '76 )
Vettore Bragadin
Marcantonio Barbaro
Alvise Grimani (Dec. '75 -
Piero Foscari June '76 )
Domenigo Moro
Zuanne Soranzo
Zuanne Michiel
Gerolamo di Priuli
Vicenzo Morosini (March - Sept.
Antonio Bragadin '76 )
Jacomo Gussoni
Julio Contarini
Francesco Duodo
Zuanne Michiel (res.) (June -
Niccolo da Ponte (Dec. '76 )
Francesco Corner
Jacomo Soranzo (Sept. '76 -
Paolo Tiepolo March '77 )
Marcantonio Barbaro
Sebastiano Venier (Dec. '76 -
Leonardo Donato June '77 )
Zuanne da Leze

Paolo Tron
Jacomo Gussoni (March '77 -
Vicenzo Morosini Sept. '77 )
Zuanne Corner (res. Bailo
Costantinopole)
Piero Foscari (May-June stop gap)
Francesco Duodo
Alessandro Gritti
Julio Contarini
Alvise Zorzi
Niccolo da Ponte (June-Dec. '77)
Zuanne Mocenigo
Alessandro Gritti
Francesco Venier
Paolo Tiepolo (Sept.'77 - March '73)
Jacomo Soranzo
Marcantonio Barbaro
Francesco Corner (Dec.'77 - June '73)
Francesco Bernardo
Leonardo Donato
Alvise Zorzi (March - Sept. '73)
Antonio Bragadin
Zuanne Corner
Alvise Grimani
Vicenzo Morosini (June-Dec.'73)
Alessandro Gritti
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<td>Zuanne Gritti</td>
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Vicenzo Morosini (June '82 - Dec. '82)
Alvise Zorzi
Jacomo Foscarini
Paolo Tiepolo (Sept. '82 -
Jacomo Soranzo March '83)
Francesco Dudo
Zuanne Corner
Zuanne Michiel (Oct. '82 -
Ferigo Sanudo March '82)
Pasquale Cicogna (Dec. 31st '82 -
Francesco Dudo March 31st '83)
Zuanne Contarini
Paolo Contarini (Jan. 27th - June)
Marin Grimani (March - Sept. '83)
Antonio Bragadin
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli
Zustiniano Zustiniani (April-June)
Vicenzo Morosini (June-Sept. '83)
Francesco Corner
Jacomo Foscarini
Jacomo Soranzo (Sept. '83 -
Zuanne Corner March '84)
Paolo Tiepolo
Francesco Longo (Nov. '83 -
Zuanne Contarini March '84)
Marin Grimani
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli (April-June)
Francesco Duodo
Vicenzo Morosini (July-Dec.'85)
Antonio Bragadin
Zuanne Michiel
Jiacomo Foscarini (Sept. '85 - March '86)
Francesco Duodo
Ottaviano Valier
Alvise Grimani (Dec. '85 - March '86)
Alvise Zorzi
Vicenzo Morosini (June-Dec. '87)
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli (March - June '87)
Alvise Zorzi
Zuanne Michiel (Dec. '87 - March '88)
Leonardo Donato
Zaccharia Contarini (March - Sept. '86)
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli
Lorenzo Bernardo
Gerolamo Lippomano
Alberto Badoer
Maria Grimani (June-Dec. '86)
Antonio Bragadin
Vicenzo Morosini
Ottaviano Valier (Sept. '86 - March '87)
Ferigo Samudo
Zuanne Michiel
Zuanne Gritti (Dec. '86 - June '87)
Jiacomo Foscarini
Alvise Loredano
Zuanne Contarini
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli (March - Francesco Duodo Sept. '87)
Alvise Grimani
Alberto Badoer
Vicenzo Morosini (June-Dec. '87)
Antonio Bragadin
Alvise Foscari
Alvise Zorzi (Sept. '87 - March '88)
Zuanne Michiel (Dec. '87 - June '88)
Lorenzo di Priuli
Lorenzo Bernardo (Dec. '87 - June '88)
Jiacomo Foscarini
Zustiniano Zustiniani
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli (March - Marcantonio Barbaro Sept. '88)
Leonardo Donato (Dec. '88-June '89)
Gabriele Correr (dating very
Francesco Duodo confused beyond
Ottaviano Valier this point)
Alvise Foscari
Zuanne Contarini
Gabriele Corner
Alvise Zorzi
Antonio Bragadin
Zuanne Michiel
Gerolamo Surian
Bernardo Tiepolo
Lorenzo Bernardo
Jiacomo Foscarini
Zustiniano Zustiniani
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli (March -
Marcantonio Barbaro Sept. '89)
Leonardo Donato
Alvise Grimani (April-June)
Zuanne Contarini (March-June)
Ferigo Samudo
Marin Grimani (June 30th '89 -
Francesco Duodo Dec. 31st '89)
Gerolamo Lippomano (Dec. '89 -
Antonio Bragadin March '90)
Alvise Zorzi
Alvise Loredano (Dec. '89 -
Jiacomo Foscarini June '90)
Lorenzo Bernardo
Zorzi Contarini
Leonardo Donato (March-Sept.)
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli
Marcantonio Barbaro
Alvise Foscari (April-Sept.)
Paolo Paruta (March-June)
Maria Grimani
Leonardo Donato
Francesco Duodo
Alvise Zorzi (Dec. '90 -
Alvise Loredano March '91)
Antonio Bragadin
Zuanne Contarini (Oct. '90-March '91)
Antonio Miani
Vicenzo Gradenigo
Zustiniano Zustiniani
Niccolo Gussopi (March '91 -
Zuanfrancesco di Priuli
Marcantonio Barbaro
Zorzi Contarini
Alvise Foscari (March - June)
Francesco Duodo (June-Dec. '91)
Gerolamo Surian
Zuanne Moro
Niccolo Gussopi
Leonardo Donato (Sept. '91 -
Jiacomo Foscarini March '92)
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Zuanne Dolfin (Sept '94 - March '95)
Zustiniano Zustiniani
Antonio Miani
Vicenzo Gussoni (Oct '94 -
Matteo Zane March '95)
Marcantonio Barbaro
Marco Zustiniani
Alvise Bragadin
Marin Grimani
Vicenzo Gradenigo (res.)
Tomaso Contarini (Dec '94 -
Gerolamo Capello June '95)
Niccolo Gussoni (Jan.-March '95)
Zuanne Donato
Vicenzo Gradenigo (March-Sept '95)
Zuanne Soranzo
Gerolamo Suriano
Zustiniano Zustiniani (March -
Alvise Bragadin June '95)
Jacomo Foscarini (June-Dec. '95)
Antonio Miani
Niccolo Gussoni
Zustiniano Zustiniani (Sept. '95 -
Alvise Bragadin March '96)
Marco Venier
Zuanne Donato
Alvise di Priuli (Dec '95 -
Matteo Zane June '96)
Alvise Mocenigo
Bernardo Tiepolo (March-June '96)
Vicenzo Gradenigo
Leonardo Donato
Jacomo Foscarini (June-Dec. '96)
Zaccharia Contarini
Niccolo Gussoni
Antonio Miani (Sept '96 -
Niccolo Donato March '97)
Alvise Bragadin
Alvise Mocenigo (Nov '96 -
Zuanne Soranzo June '97)
Tomaso Contarini
Paolo Paruta (Jan.-March '97)
Niccolo Sagredo
Leonardo Donato (March-Sept '97)
Vicenzo Gradenigo
Bernardo Tiepolo
Francesco da Molin
Antonio di Priuli
Marco Venier (June-Dec. '97)
Jacomo Foscarini
Paolo Paruta
Matteo Zane (July-Dec. '97)
Francesco da Molin (Sept. '97 -
Niccolo Sagredo March '98 )
Niccolo Donato
Niccolo Gussoni (Oct.-Dec. '97)
Alvise Mocenigo (Dec. '97 -
Zaccharia Contarini June '98)
Zuanne Soranzo
Marcantonio Barbaro Badoer
Niccolo Gussoni (March-Sept. '98)
Vicenzo Gradenigo
Antonio di Cavalli
Zuambattista Bernardo (April -
Alessandro Zorzi June '98 )
Silvan Capello
Leonardo Donato (June-Dec. '98)
Zuanne Soranzo
Jacomò Foscarini
Zuanne Dolfin (July-Dec. '98)
Alvise Belengo (Aug.-Dec. '98)
Francesco da Molin (Sept.-Dec.'98)
Marco Venier (Sept. '98 - March '99)
Niccolo Gussoni
Alessandro Zorzi

Zuambattista Bernardo (Dec.1599 -
Gerolamo Capello June 1600 )
Zuanne Donato
Francesco Vemdramin
Jacomò Foscarini
Silvan Capello:
Bernardo Tiepolo (Jan.-March
Alvise Zorzi 1599)
Antonio di Cavalli (March -
Matteo Zane Sept. '99)
Alvise Bragadin
Jacomò Foscarini (June-Dec. '99)
Leonardo Domato
Zaccharia Contarini
Niccolo Sagredo (Aug.-Sept. '99)
Marco Venier (Sept. '99 -
Francesco da Molin March 1600)
Zuanne Dolfin
Niccolo Donato (Dec. '99 -
Niccolo Sagredo June 1600)
Niccolo Gussoni
Antonio Mero (Feb.-June 1600)
Silvan Capello
Zuanne Mocenigo (March-Sept.1600)
Alessandro Zorzi (Feb.-June 1600)
Alvise Beleango (March-Sept. 1600)
Piero Duodo
Zuambattista Vetturi
Jacomo Zane
Francesco Vendramin (June-Dec. 1600)
Jacomo Foscarini
Leonardo Donato
Zuanne Nani (Aug.-Dec. 1600)
Jacomo Zane
Marco Venier (Sept. 1600-March 1601)
Antonio di Priuli
Zuanne Dolfin (Nov. 1600-March '01)
Antonio Moro
Gerolamo Capello (di Vicenzo) (March-June '01)
Francesco Zustiniani
Gerolamo Capello (di Alvise) (March-
Niccio Donato June '01)
Andrea Dolfin
Agostino Nani (March-Sept. 1601)
Alvise Beleango
Zuamme Corner
Gerolamo Capello (di Vicenzo)
Jacomo Foscarini (June-Dec. '01)
Zuanne Nani
Zuanne Dolfin (res.)

Francesco Contarini (June-Dec. '01)
Silvan Capello
Zuanne Capello (Sept. '01-March '02)
Marco Venier
Antonio Moro
Gerolamo Capello (Dec. 1601 -
Francesco Zustiniani June 1602)
Zuanne Nani
Niccolo Contarini (Dec. '01 -
Marcantonio Erizzo March '02)
Jacomo Zane
Francesco Zustiniani
Francesco da Molin (March-Sept. '02)
Leonardo Donato
Zuanne Bembo
Marco Querini (April-June '02)
Jacomo Zane (June-Dec. '02)
Antonio di Priuli
Jacomo Foscarini
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<td>June-Dec. '73</td>
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<td>Sept. '73-March '74</td>
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<td>March '74</td>
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<td>Leonardo Donato</td>
<td>Dec. '73-June '74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alberto Badoer</td>
<td>June '74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Bernardo</td>
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<td>Tomas Morosini</td>
<td>March-Sept. '74</td>
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<td>Sebastiano Erizzo</td>
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<td>Gabriele Corner</td>
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<td>Dec. '75-June '76</td>
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<td>March-Sept. '76</td>
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<td>June-Dec. '76</td>
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Francesco Gritti
Sebastiano Erizzo
Lorenzo Bernardo (Sept. 1576 -
Zorzi Contarini March 1577)
Zuanne Gritti (res.) (June-Dec. '76)
Lazaro Mocenigo (Dec. '76 -
Ferigo Sanudo June '77)
Gabriele Corner
Zuanne Gritti
Ottaviano Valier
Alvise Soranzo (March-Sept. '77)
Sebastiano Erizzo
Francesco Longo (June-Dec. '77)
Vicenzo Trom
Zuanfrancesco Morosini
Zuanne Moro
Francesco da Molin
Vicenzo Trom (res.)
Zuanfrancesco Morosini (res.)
Gerolamo Venier (Dec. '77 -
Ferigo Sanudo June '78)
Zorzi Contarini
Piero Capello (March-June '78)
Vicenzo Trom (res.)
Zuanfrancesco Morosini (res.)
Ferigo Sanudo (Dec. '77
Zorzi Contarini June '78)
Gerolamo Mocenigo
Gabriele Corner (June-Dec. '80)
Zorzi Contarini
Zuanne Moro
Sebastiano Erizzo (Sept. '80 -
Ottaviano Valier March '81)
Zuanfrancesco Morosini (Dec. '80 -
Lorenzo Bernardo June '81)
Antonio Miani
Andrea Bollani (dating confused)
Marco Venier
Bernardo Nani
Vicenzo Gradenigo (March-Sept. '81)
Francesco da Molina
Lorenzo Bernardo (June-Dec. '81)
Ferigo Sanudo
Gabriele Corner
Zuanne Moro (Sept. '81-March '82)
Ottaviano Valier
Zuanfrancesco Morosini
Zustiniani Zustiniani (Dec. '81 -
Vicenzo Tron June '82)
Sebastiano Erizzo
Vicenzo Gradenigo (March-Sept. '82)
Alvise Michiel
Zuanne Dolfim
Zustiniani Zustiniani (June-Dec. '82)
Ferigo Sanudo
Alberto Badoer
Lorenzo di Priuli (Sept. '82-March '83)
Francesco da Ca'Pesaro
Zuanne Dolfim (Nov.-Dec. '82)
Paolo Paruta
Bernardo Nani (Dec. '82 -
Antonio Miani June '83)
Gabriele Corner
Vicenzo Gradenigo (March -
Alvise Scraza Sept. '83)
Paolo Paruta (June-Sept. '83)
Matteo Zane (June-Dec. '83)
Sebastiano Erizzo
Zuanne Dolfim
Marco Venier (July-Dec. '83)
Francesco da Ca'Pesaro (Sept. '83 -
Alberto Badoer March '84)
Antonio Miani (Dec. '83 - June '84)
Gabriele Corner
Gerolamo Mocenigo
Andrea Gussoni (March -
Paolo Paruta June '84)
Bernardo Nani (March -
Matteo Zane Sept. '84)
Costantino da Molino
Francesco Barbaro
Gerolamo Lippomano (June -
Sebastiano Erizzo Dec. '84)
Zuanne Moro
Marco Venier
Andrea Gussoni
Costantino da Molino (Sept. '84 -
Francesco da Ca'Pesaro March '85)
Paolo Paruta (Dec. '84 - June '85)
Alvise Michiel
Zuanne Moro (res.)
Gerolamo Lippomano
Bernardo Nani
Marco Venier (June-Dec. '85)
Niccolo Donato
Francesco Barbaro (created cadiutor of the Patriarchate of Aquileia while in office)
Marco Capello
Andrea Gussoni (Sept. '85 - March '86) Niccolo Donato
Costantino da Molino
Andrea Bollani
Zuanne Moro (Dec. '85 - June '86)
Paolo Paruta
Alvise Michiel
Zuambattista Bernardo (March-Sept. '86)
Bernardo Nani
Vicenzo Gradenigo (June-Dec. '86)
Marco Venier
Niccolo Donato
Alvise Mocenigo
Costantino da Molino (Sept. '86 -
Andrea Bollani March '87)
Vicenzo Gradenigo (Dec. '86 -
Zuanne Moro June '87)
Paolo Paruta
Antonio Miani
Matteo Zane (March-Sept. '87)
Alvise Bragadini
Alvise Michiel
Zuanne Dolfino (March-June '87)
Zuambattista Bernardo
Andrea Bollani March '88)
Costantino da Molino (Dec. '87 - June '83)
Alvise Bragadin
Gerolamo Capello
Zuanne Dolfin (res.)
Alvise Michiel (March-Sept. '83)
Paolo Paruta
Marco Venier (June-Dec. '88)
Zuambattista Bernardo
Alvise Mocenigo
Andrea Bollani (Sept. '83 - March '89)
Zuanne Dolfin (March '89)
Antonio Miani (Dec. '88 - June '89)
Francesco Vendramin
Costantino da Molino
Gerolamo Capello
Paolo Paruta
Vicenzo Gradenigo (March-Sept. '89)
Alvise Michiel
Zuanne Morosini
Alvise Bragadin
Giulio Michiel
Marco Venier (June-Dec. '89)
Alvise Mocenigo
Zuambattista Bernardo
Andrea Bollani (Dec. '89-June '90)
Paolo Paruta
Antonio Miani
Zuanne Moro
Gerolamo Capello
Niccolo Sagredo (Feb.-June '90)
Alvise Bragadin (April-Sept. '90)
Giulio Michiel
Francesco Bernardo
Leonardo Moramigo
Vicenzo Gradenigo (June-Dec. '90)
Marco Venier
Zuambattista Bernardo
Zuanne Moro (March - June '91)
Andrea Bollani
Francesco Vendramin
Alvise Mocenigo
Gerolamo Capello
Niccolo Sagredo (res.)
Giulio Michiel (March - Sept. '91)
Piero Ducado
Niccolo Sagredo (June -
Alvise Foscarini
Zuanne Dolfin (Dec. '91)
Leonardo Mocenigo
Agostino Nani
Marco Venier (Sept. '91 - Niccolo Donato March '92)
Piero Duodo (Dec. '91 - Marco Querini June '92)
Alvise Mocenigo
Alvise Venier (March - Tommaso Contarini June '92)
Giulio Michiel
Francesco Contarini
Niccolo Sagredo (June-Dec. '92)
Leonardo Mocenigo
Agostino Nani
Alvise Foscarini (Sept. '92 - Gerolamo Venier March '93)
Antonio Querini
Zuambattista Bernardo (Dec. '92 - Piero Duodo June '93)
Alvise Mocenigo
Marco Venier (March-Sept. '93)
Giulio Michiel
Francesco Contarini (June-Dec.
Leonardo Mocenigo '93)
Agostino Nani
Alvise Foscarini (Sept. '93 - Gerolamo Venier March '94)
Piero Duodo (Dec. '93 - Alvise Mocenigo June '94)
Zuambattista Bernardo
Niccolo Sagredo (March -Sept.
Alvise Venier '94)
Antonio Querini (June-Dec. '94)
Francesco Contarini
Agostino Nani
Gerolamo Venier (Sept. '94 - Alvise Foscarini March '95)
Alvise Bragadin
Alvise Salamon (Dec. '94 - March '95)
Gerolamo Capello
Antonio Moro (Jan.-June '95)
Gerolamo Venier
Alvise Mocenigo
Zuambattista Bernardo
Francesco Vendranin (March-Sept.
Alvise Salamco '95)
Marin di Cavalli (res.)
Andrea Morosini
Tomaso Contarini
Zuanne Mocenigo (June-Dec. '95)
Francesco Contarini
Antonio Querini
Marin di Cavalli (Oct. '95 - March '96)
Alvise Venier
Alvise Foscarini (Dec. '95 - June '96)
Antonio Moro
Niccolo Sagredo
Marco Querini
Andrea Morosini (March - Sept. '96)
Zuanne Mocenigo (June - Dec. '96)
Alvise Salamon
Antonio Querini
Maria di Cavalli (Dec. '96 - March '97)
Alvise Venier
Alvise Foscarini (Dec. '96 - June '97)
Antonio Moro
Marco Querini
Zuambattista Bernardo (March - Sept. '97)
Antonio Querini (June - Dec. '97)
Alvise Salamon
Leonardo Morosini
Alvise Venier (Dec. '97 - March '98)
Piero Duodo
Marin di Cavalli
Marco Querini (Dec. '97 - June '98)
Antonio Moro
Alvise Foscarini (March - June '98)
Fantin Corner (res.)
Agostino Nani (res.)
Ottaviano Bon (April - Sept. '98)
Tomaso Contarini
Niccolo Morosini (April - June '98)
Alvise Salamon (June - Dec. '98)
Antonio Querini
Fantin Corner
Niccolo Morosini (Sept. '98 - March '99)
Agostino Nani (Dec. '99 - March 1600)
Alvise Grima (March - Sept. '99)
Alvise Foscarini
Andrea Morosini
Ottaviano Bon (June - Dec. '99)
Alvise Salamon
Antonio Querini
Niccolo Morosini (Sept. '99 - March 1600)
Fantin Corner
Alvise Foscarini (Dec. '99 - June 1600)
Alvise Grima
Agostino Nani
Andrea Morosini (March - Sept. 1600)
Agostino Nani
Andrea Morosini (March-Sept. 1600)
Marco Querini
Alvise Venier (April-June 1600)
Alvise Salamon (June-Dec. 1600)
Francesco Contarini
Francesco Soranzo
Simone Contarini
Ottaviano Bon
Tomaso Contarini
Niccolo Morosini (Sept. 1600-March 01)
Antonio Querini (01)
Alvise Venier (Dec. 1600-June 01)
Alvise Grimani
Cristoforo Valier (June-June 01)
Francesco Contarini (March-Sept. 01)
Andrea Morosini
Ottaviano Bon (June-Dec. 01)
Niccolo Contarini
Francesco Erizzo
Anzolo Badoer (res.)
Niccolo da Molin (July-Dec. 01)
Amcro Nani
Niccolo Morosini
Antonio Querini (Sept. 1601-
March '02)

Anzolo Badoer (Dec. '01 -
Niccolo Corner June '02)
Tomaso Contarini
Andrea Morosini (March-Sept. '02)
Alvise Venier
Ottaviano Bon (June-Dec. '02)
Francesco Erizzo
Jacomu Corner
Appendix II

THIRTY LEADING SENATORS, THEIR POLITICAL CAREERS AND CONNECTIONS, AND THEIR ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS.

BADOER, ALBERTO

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1582; appointed with Francesco Barbaro and Alvise Michiel (q.v.) "a riveder la guardia di questa citta" during the interregnum of the C. of X, winter 1582-83; Savio di Terraferma, 1574, 1579, 1582, 1583-4; Savio Grande, 1586, 1592.

Political views and connections.

Strongly linked to the Ca'Grande Corner by marriage to the widow of Zorzi Correr (q.v.) in 1583: Museo Correr, Mss Provenienze Diverse (P.D.) 2130/1, extracts from the marriage contract. This may also have connected him to the San Luca Griffani, cf. Maria Grimani, below, and Ch.IV, n.50. He defended the Zonta strongly on Dec. 19th 1582: cf. Ch.III, n.80. As Rome ambassador he was alarmed at the Venetian recognition of Navarre as king of France in 1589: cf. citations under n.67, Ch.I. But his Papal sympathies must not be exaggerated; as he warned the Senate of Jesuit intrigues and was most suspicious of the Society. A.S.Vat.Bib.Nunz.Ven.F.XXVI, c.815, Dec.2nd 1589. As he was never a member of the Zonta, it is dangerous to regard him as a figure of the "established clique."

Economic commitments

No detailed statement of income available, but Museo Correr, Mss cit.
shows some of the political side of marriage. Elena Contarini, widow of Zorzi Corner, brought him a dowry of 8000 ducats and made further loans of 1500 ducats to help with the expenses of his Rome embassy. After Alberto's death in 1592 his sons Anzolo and Zuanne refused to repay this sum. Alberto had apparently sought a rich marriage alliance to support the expenses of his career.

BARBARO, MARCANTONIO.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Bailo at Constantinople during Cyprus war. Elected to the Zonta in 1573, 1574, 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579; Savio Grande, 1574 (March, place reserved), 1574, (Sept.), 1575, 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579, 1584, 1585, 1588, 1589, 1590, 1591, 1592, 1593. D.1595.

Political views and connections.

Cf. Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.I, c.199 (A.S.V.); C.Xriatle, La Vie d'un Patricien de Venise au XVime siecle, Paris, 1885. Links with the Zustiniani through his wife Zustignana di Marcantonio, and from 1573 to the Foscarini by the marriage of his son Alvise to Jacomo Foscarini's daughter, provided a large asset. His elder brother Daniele and his son Francesco were both Coadiutors to Zuanne Grimani, Patriarch of Aquileia, but no close family alliance to the Grimani of Santa Maria Formosa can be traced. One of Marcantonio's sons, Francesco, was Savio agli Ordini in 1574 and 1577, Savio di Terraferma in 1584 and 1585, Coadiutor of Aquileia in 1586, and Patriarch in 1593. Another, Almoro, succeeded to the Patriarchate in 1616. Antonio became Procurator. Barbaro connections with the Church were therefore strong, and Marcantonio's brief
drop out of the lists of major officials in the early 1580s may be an indirect result of the jurisdictional crisis over the Patriarchate of Aquileia; Francesco da Molin, Diary, c. 112-3, records that Francesco Barbaro was arrested by the Council of X in 1580 on suspicion of smuggling secret documents to Rome. He was released after questioning. None of the nuncios seems to mention Barbaro as a contact, and he does not emerge as a very positive force.

Economic Commitments.

No comprehensive statement: refs. in A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.VII, cc.151,163, 264; statement of increases in income to Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto A.S.V., Fondo cit.B.146, polizza 1214; indirect information from will of Jacomo Foscarini, see below; will printed in Yriatfe, op.cit.pp.361-366. Petitions from his sons to the nuncio in 1570 sought ecclesiastical preferences to make up for their father's losses at Constantinople, which were estimated at 15,000 ducats. But in 1574 Marcantonio stated an increase of 361 ducats in his income to the Savii sopra le Decime. His main estate was at Villa di Maser in the Trevisano, where the family villa still stands; it was subdivided into 31 small holdings, which showed returns of only 973 lire. Marcantonio had also acquired in 1573 the right to collect 168 ducats' worth of "dazi" from the communities of Feltre and Asolo, and another 15 campi of land near his villa. This polizza seems to refer only to one part of his estates. His landed investments definitely increased greatly during the later years of the century; in 1595 Jacomo Foscarini mentioned in his will a 2000 ducats investment in the Polesine di Rovigo, presumably for "bonificazioni", undertaken in partner-
ship with Barbaro. Barbaro's own will refers only to "beni, posses-
sical, et altri fondi", showing nothing more of his investments. The
largest single item for disposal is his wife's dowry of 10,000 ducats,
and two sons - Francesco and Alvise - were denied a share as being al-
ready in debt to their father for more than their due portion; in Fran-
cesco's case the reasons were an embassy to Savoy and his formal journey
to Aquileia. The financial stress of careers such as those the Barbaro
family followed was heavy.

BERNARDO, FRANCESCO

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1573, 1577; entered Zonta July 12th, 1574,
after period as Savio Grande, full year's term, 1575, entered April 13th,
1578 after period as Savio Grande. Savio Grande, 1573, 1574, 1575;
1576, 1577-78, 1579. D.1580.

Political views and connections.

No very clear information. Cf. Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.II, cc.15-21,
(A.S.V.)-there were several Bernardi prominent in politics at this time,
but none were very closely related and there is no proof of co-operation.
One of the family, Zuambattista, was connected with a C. of X. clique in
a trumped up attack on the Avogadore Raimondo Gritti in 1584; cf.Alvise
Michiel under March 3rd. There were also strong connections with the
Duodo; see below, under Lorenzo Bernardo.

Economic commitments.

A.S.V.Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.159, pol.170 declares an income
of 952 ducats p.a., of which rather more than half was derived from 6
estates around Campo Sanpiero, in the Padovano; one of the largest, of 66 campi, had been acquired in 1573. Most of the remaining income came from rents on property in the San Stefano area of Venice.

BERNARDO, LORENZO.

Political career, 1572-1602.

Elected Savio di Terraferma, 1574, 1574-5, 1576, 1576-7, 1580 (place reserved in Dec., entered office in June, 1581); Savio Grande, 1587, 1588, 1590, 1592; Bailo at Constantinople, 1592, d. same year.

Political views and connections.

Son of Sebastiano, apparently not closely linked to Francesco (above, and refs. to Barbaro, ad loc.). But strongly connected to the powerful Duodo group by the marriage of his sister to Francesco Duodo (q.v.). I have found no direct signs of the leanings of this Bernardo/Duodo combination, but as Lorenzo's main task as Bailo was to arrest his predecessor Gerolamo Lippomano for passing secrets to Spain, it seems quite likely that he had a reputation as an anti-Habsburg and a "trouble-shooter": cf. A. Tormene, "Il baileggio a Constantinopoli di Gerolamo Lippomano" N. A. V. Vol. VI, 1903, pp. 372f, Vol. VII, 1904, pp. 296f.

Economic commitments.

One brief but significant hint in A. S. V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialtò B. 149, pol. 506: in 1581 Lorenzo declares a recent addition of 124 ducats 12 lire to his income, derived from an estate in the region of Castelfranco. This was held "in affitto" from the Bishop of Treviso, in an "emfiteusis" contract.
BRAGADIN, ANTONIO

Political career, 1572-1602.

Elected to the Council of X, 1573, 1575, 1576, 1577, 1580: to the Zonta, 1572, 1578, 1580, 1581; Savio Grande, 1572, 1574, 1576, 1578, 1583, 1584, 1585, 1586, 1587, 1589, 1590, 1591. D. 1591.

Political views and connections.

Rather nebulous, considering how powerful his position appears on the surface. He was not closely related to Lorenzo Bragadin (C. of X, 1583) or Alvise (Savio di Terraferma, 1580s, Savio Grande, 1590s) -Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol. II, c.I38, (A.S.V.). He shared economic interests with Vicenzo Gradenigo (q.v.), but it is hard to trace any political consequences from these.

Economic commitments.

Scattered documents show a heavy and constructive investment in land during the 1570s. Museo Correr, Mss. P.D. No. 868, inserts 9, 78: May 2nd, 1570, contract for the purchase of 35 campi near Conselve, Padovano, at the very high cost of 1452 ducats; Jan. 27th, 1578/9 (m.V.), contract for the purchase of one more campo in the same area, again very highly priced at 60 ducats. As suggested by the cost, all this was good land, described in the contracts as "satis frumentis". But Vicenzo Gradenigo declared 120 campi of poor land, also near Conselve, which he had recently acquired "pro indiviso" with Bragadin. The statement to the Savi sopra le Decime in Rialto is dated 1581, and seems to indicate that Bragadin's investments continued and extended into the reclaiming of bad land. I have found no statement of his total income, but he clearly had a good deal of ready money.
CONTARINI, ZACCHARIA.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1577, 1583, 1585; Savio Grande, 1586, 1592, 1593, 1594, 1596, 1597, 1599. The lack of a preparatory period as Savio di Terraferma during the 1570s is surprising.

Political views and connections.

Cf. Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol. II, c. 455. His father Paolo was a Procurator, and a fairly regular member of the X in the earlier 1570s; but Zaccharia was not closely related to the other Contarini prominent at this time. He was known as a bitter enemy of the Scrainzi and took a leading part in the prosecution of Jacomo in 1584; cf. Alvise Michiel under July 23rd, this study, Ch.IV, n.112.

Economic commitments.

Evidence unsatisfactory; A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.146 pol.122i gives notice of a 2 ducats increase in his income in 1573 from the purchase of 2 campi in the Padovano; A.S.V. Notarili, Testamenti, B.1194 (Atti Secco, Protocollo Sesto), c.45, Zaccharia's will, dated Feb. 28th 1601, reveals little more. He made large charitable bequests; 100 ducats p.a. for the building of a girls' orphanage on the Giudecca, 100 ducats p.a. for 2 years for work on San Trovaso, 25 ducats to the Capuchins, the Hospital of the Incurabili, and San Zuanne e Paolo; bequests to his family seem fairly small; 100 ducats to his nephews, 50 to his sister. There is no hint of what made up the "ressiduo" which went to his five sons.
CONTARINI, ZORZI.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected Savio di Terraferma, 1574, 1577, 1578, 1579, 1580; Savio Grande, 1586, 1590, 1591.

Political views and connections.

Cf. Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.I, c.234 (Bibl.Marc.). Though not a major office holder, Zorzi had powerful connections in his uncle Tommaso, a frequent Savio Grande and member of the Zoata in the early 1570s, and his cousin Zuanne, one of the strongest Savii Grandi of the 1590s. It is not certain whether they joined Zaccharia in his opposition to the Soranzo.

Economic commitments.

A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.151, pol.1465, indicates a substantial interest in land and "bonificazione"; Zuanne declared 7 estates in the Pedovano, ranging from 60 campi downwards; a large holding in the Trevisano, 190 campi, produced 180 staia of grain in 1570, the date of the return, where it had produced only 33 the season before.

CORNER, GABRIELE.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected Savio di Terraferma, 1572, 1573, 1576, 1577, 1579, 1580, 1583, 1584; Savio Grande, 1585, 1588-89.

Political views and connections.

Not closely linked to the Ca'Grande branch (see below), and co-operation cannot be proved. But a financial link with the clergy of Padua (see
below) is suggestive.

**Economic commitments.**

A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.147, pol.1532, dated March 31st 1576, declares an increase of 50 ducats 5 lire 13 soldi from recent acquisitions. This included 7 ducats 11 lire 13 soldi from rights on the collection of Decime; the rest came from 4 small estates, all under 10 campi, all in the Padovano; on one 25 lire rent was paid to the Canons of Padua.

**CORNER, ZORZI.**

**Political career, 1572 - 1602.**

Elected to the C. of X, 1573, 1575, 1577; Savio di Terraferma, 1575.

**Political views and connections.**

Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.II, c.11 (Bibl.Marc.). His father Jacomo was a Procurator, his first cousin Federigo was Cardinal and Bishop of Padua, two of his sons Jacomo and Marco became (successive) Abbots of San Zeno, Verona. This array of ecclesiastical connections did not make Zorzi wholly well disposed to Rome; in 1567-8 the nuncio Facchettì feared his influence in disputes over the tenure and revenues of San Zeno. Cf. Nunziature di Venezia, ed. Stella, Vol.VIII, pp.307, etc.

A third son, Niccolo, married Laura Grimani, daughter of the future Doge Marin.

**Economic commitments.**

A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, pol.1034, puts Zorzi among the richest nobles I have found. He declared a total income of 3050 ducats; 1402 came from property in the city and Murano, 608 was
available "in contanti", the remains derived from various Terraferma interests; there were estates at Asolo, Castelfranco, Cittadella and Cologna. 217 ducats of "dazio" were levied on certain communities in the Padovano. The most interesting features are the 160 ducats from shares in a mill at Verona, and 72 ducats "dazio" from the communities controlled by the Abbacy of San Zeno. Probably San Zeno, which had extensive rights on the Adige, also controlled the mill. It is an interesting example of how a family combine could 'run a chain' of benefices to mutual advantage.

DOLFIN, ZUANNE.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected Savio di Terraferma, 1582, 1583, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1591; Savio Grande 1592, 1594, 1595, 1598, 1600, 1601, 1602, 1603. Bishop of Vicenza, Cardinal. The late move into the Church makes this an extreme form of a common enough Venetian nobles' career.

Political views and connections.

His father Iseppo was a member of the Zonta in 1579 and 1580. Later in his life Zuanne seems to have been considered pro-Curial; cf.Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, pp.70, 77, etc.; but in 1594-5 he had handled a mission to France to congratulate Henri IV on his coronation, and this had been extremely unpopular in Rome. Cf.Ch.I, m.83.

Economic commitments.

Uncertain. Iseppo had considerable interests in "bonificazione"; cf. Stella, "La Crisi Economica Veneziana della Seconda Metà del Secolo XVI,"
N.A.V. Vol. LVIII, 1956, p. 23; Zuanne will probably have inherited at least some part of these interests, but their value is uncertain. Some relevant comment is supplied by A.S.V. Giudici di Petitioni, B. 342, No. 7, pol. 73, inventory of Zuanne's personal effects; 2 account books containing records of business in Syria give out in 1536; files of letters from a trade contact in Lisbon stop in 1572; accounts of interests in Candia cover the period 1562-65. The gradual withdrawal is noticeable. Zuanne should possibly be treated as one of those nobles who sought ecclesiastical preferment as a means of repairing their fortunes. In the 1590s he had to bear the expenses of embassies in France and Rome. Compare Lorenzo di Priuli, below.

DONATO; LEONARDO

(Career has been covered fully, but I think not definitively, by F. Seneca, Il Doge Leonardo Donà, Padua 1959. Only serious differences from Seneca's interpretations are indicated here.)

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to C. of X, 1576, 1577, 1580, 1583; Savio Grande 1577, 1580, 1586, 1588, 1590, 1592, 1593, 1596, 1597, 1598, 1599, 1600, 1602 (DOGE, 1605).

Political views and connections.

On the question of the Zonta, Donato seems to me to have been neutral; cf. Ch. III, nn. 117, 118. The dislike of men such as Alvise Michiel may have been due less to Donato's attitudes than to his way of putting them; cf. App. III. But he was definitely the most feared of the ruling clique
in Curial circles, the first sign coming in Campeggio's dispatches of 1583. Nuncios regarded him as they had regarded Niccolo da Ponte in the 1560s and 70s.

Economic commitments.

Cf. Seneca, op. cit. p. 7, n. I have not had the opportunity to study the 'libri di conto' in the private collection of Count Donà dalle Rose, but A.S. Verona, Fondo dell'Abbazia di San Zeno I (Atti Notarili) Rg. 31, cc. 76f, shows that Donato held over 600 campi and the right to collect a number of dues, from one of the most powerful abbacies in the Dominio. These were partly inherited from his father, partly acquired by himself and his brothers. I see no reason for believing that Donato differed from most other members of the patriciate in gradual, systematic accumulation of land. How his connection with San Zeno affected his politics is not clear.

DUODO, DOMENICO.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1572, 1574, 1580, 1582, 1585; to the Zonta, 1576, 1577; d. as Procurator, 1596.

DUODO, FRANCESCO.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1576, 1581, 1584; to the Zonta, 1579, 1581; Savio Grande, 1576, 1577, 1581, 1582, 1583, 1584, 1585, 1586, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1590, 1591, 1592...d. as Procurator.
Political views and connections.

Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol. II, c. 95 (Bibl. Marc.), Vol. I, c. 135; Francesco was linked to Lorenzo Bernardo (q.v.) by marriage. Domenigo seems to have withdrawn from public life of his own accord, requesting exemption from office in 1591; cf. Ch. IV, n. 17. Piero di Francesco, Savio di Terraferma in the 1580s, seems to have been a more effective politician than his father or his uncle; cf. Cozzi, Niccolo Contarini, pp. 103f.

Economic commitments.

Fragmentary evidence only from A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B. 146, pol. 1282-3; in 1576 the brothers, who lived together, acquired 14 campi of land near Moncelose in the Padovano, increasing their income by 21 ducats per year. In the same year they bought the right of collecting 300 ducats worth of "dazii" in that area.

Foscari, Alvise.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1579, 1583, 1586; to the Zonta, 1530; Savio Grande, 1587, 1588, 1590, 1594.

Political views and connections.

Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol. II, c. 130 (Bibl. Marc.) shows little of obvious significance; being in the direct line of the celebrated Quattrocento Doge cannot have been a major asset.

Economic commitments.

The tax return "in materia delli accrescimenti", declares a rise of 432 ducats p.a. in his income, derived from extensive acquisitions in the Padovano; one estate of 300 campi, one of 110, one of 80, and several smaller properties. The Correr document is a contract for the purchase of the Boschi di Val Ecia, near Treviso, for 3000 ducats by a consortium consisting of Foscari, and the brothers Bernadin and Marco Mazzoni. The date is Nov.30th 1584, i.e. two or three years after the declaration to the Savii. Foscari was to supply 1/3 of the capital, and undertook to support the others if necessary. Cutting of the trees was to begin within three years.

FOSCARINI, JACOMO.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1577; Zonta, 1579, 1580. Elected Savio Grande every year between 1580 and his death in 1602.

Political views and connections.

Cf. Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.III, c.553, (A.S.V.); this study, Ch.IV, nn.131-133. By his marriage to Elena Zustiniani, his daughter's to Alvise Barbaro in 1573, Jacomo gained influential "parentela". Cf. this App., under Marcantonio Barbaro. Alvise Foscarini, one of Jacomo's sons, was Savio di Terraferma seven times during the 1590s. Zuambattista Foscarini, Savio Grande and a member of the C. of X in 1592, may possibly have been another son; but as Zuambattista was Jacomo's second son, and younger than Alvise, this would have been a strange situation. Andrea Foscarini, a member of the C. of X in 1531, 1534, 1538, and 1591, was
Jacomo's brother. The Foscarini were not "papalini" like the Barbari and the Zustiniani, and it is dangerous to treat Jacomo as a typical figure of "la fattione dei vecchi", first because he was never used by nuncios as a contact, second because he did not become really powerful till the 1580s. Apparently an awkward and pompous speaker, he was unpopular among the nobility - cf. Alvise Michiel under March 7th 1580 - and in the city at large; A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXXI, c.41, April 8th, 1595, mentions that Marin Grimani was more generally favoured in the election to the Dogado.

**Economic commitments.**

I have not found a complete Decime return, but Foscarini's will in Museo Correr, Mss.P.D.2755/11 suggests that he was one of the richest as well as one of the most powerful nobles of his time. It also shows a significant growth in mainland investments. Zuambattista and Alvise each received 25,000 ducats. In Zuambattista's case this sum was itemised as follows:- 10,000 ducats "trafficati, e che tuttavia si trafficano", a sign that Foscarini commercial interests were continuing. 7000 ducats worth of jewellery. 3000 ducats from the collection of Decime. 2000 ducats from various "livelli". 2000 ducats from estates amounting to 750 campi purchased in the Polesine di Rovigo in partnership with Marco-antonio Barbaro. 1000 ducats invested in the Monte Vecchio. Alvise's portion was less specifically described. It included two estates in the Polesine, and two at Stra, paying rent to the Canons of Padua; all these had been acquired by Jacomo. A mill, valued at 230 ducats. A number of houses near the Rialto. 250 ducats worth of dazi collected.
annually from the Commune and Clergy of Padua. Estates in the Piove
di Sacco, also acquired by Jacomo, but still "annegati". This seems
to indicate some interest in "bonificazione". Further items were to
be administered jointly: - the 10,000 ducat dowry of Elena Zustiniani:
An unspecified amount of property in Friuli, paying rent to unnamed
abbacies: 250 ducats of dazii from the Commune of Verona. Something
of the pace of investment is shown by A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in
Rialto, B.146, pol.1030. During his three years as Proveditore in
Candia Jacomo increased his income by 200 ducats from a "livello" paid
by the Abbot of Borgognoni; this was acquired in 1574. In 1575 he had
added an 80 ducat share in a mill and a further 200 ducats of rent from
city property near San Zulian.

GRADENIGO, VICENZO.
Political career, 1572 - 1602.
Elected Savio di Terraferma, 1580, 1581, 1582, 1583, 1586, 1587, 1589,
1590; Savio Grande 1591, 1593, 1595 (twice, with one reserved place),
1596, 1597.
Political views and connections.
Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.IV, c.100 (A.S.V.). Vicenzo made one important
connection by his marriage to a daughter of Paolo Contarini, but he was
the only one of four brothers to marry and the line had died out within
two generations. He seems to have been somewhat lumbered by a ne'er
do weel brother, see below. We may have here a classic instance of a
family's wilting under economic pressure. Vicenzo took an anti Curial
stand against the Papal attempt to dictate the succession to the Abbacy
of San Cipriano, but this was a matter of defending a family just-patronate. Cf. A.S.Vat. Nunz. Ven. F. XXVIII, c. 56, May 21st, 1588.

**Economic commitments.**

A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B. 147, pol. 1816, B. 150, pol. 1114, show Vicenzo and his brother Francesco investing heavily in land around 1580. They owned jointly four separate estates near Moncolese, in the Padovano, of 90 campi, 89 campi, 80 campi, and 62 campi. It is implied by the clause that 29 of these had been acquired by their father Bartolomeo in 1547 that the rest had been acquired since. They held two smaller properties of 7 campi each in the same area, and had also joined with Antonio Bragadin (q.v.) in the "bonificazione" of 120 campi. The yield was only 299 ducats p.a. according to the second statement. Museo Correr, Mss. P.D. 944/37, shows that in 1589 and 1591 Vicenzo had to help his brother with the payment of debts amounting to 795 ducats and 106 ducats. Francesco's will is preserved in A.S.V. Notarili, Testamenti, B. 1249, Rg. I, c. 44, and states "certo io con grandissima fatica posso viver". He notes that the estate is laded with debts, mentioning one of 325 ducats to the nuns of Sant'Iseppo. Provision was made for a natural son living in Moncolese. The will is dated 16th July, 1589, and leaves all remaining assets to Vicenzo.

**Grimani, Marin.**

**Political career, 1572 - 1602.**

Elected to the C. of X, 1531, 1533; Savio Grande, 1582, 1583, 1584, 1585, 1586, 1589, 1591, 1592, 1593, 1594. DOGE, 1595. It is noticeable
that, like Foscarini, he did not become really powerful until the 1580s.

**Political views and connections.**

Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol. IV, c.134 (A.S.V.). A member of the San Luca branch, son of the Procurator Gerolamo, he was not connected closely to the Grimani Patriarchs of Aquileia. But he was regarded as "ben affetto" and used as a contact by Papal representatives;—A.S.V. Collegio Esposizioni Roma, F.I, ins.83, Sept.16th 1583; Latino Orsino makes unofficial approaches over the question of renewing the Holy League; cf.also Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.23; Grimani sympathetic to Apostolic Visitation. He was also disliked by Leonardo Donato for his leanings towards Rome; cf. Cozzi, Nicasio Contarini, p.36. His will made substantial legacies to ecclesiastical foundations, see below. Grimani was strongly linked to the Ca'Grande Corner by the marriage of his daughter Laura to a son of Zorzi (q.v.); after special legacies, he left "mita di tutti li nostri beni di qualunque sorte" to his grandson Zorzi Corner. Through the Corner he was also connected to Alberto Badoer, whom he supported for a Procuratorship in 1591; cf.Ch.IV, n.50.

**Economic commitments.**

Fairly comprehensive evidence from A.S.V. Savil sopra le Decime in Rialto, B5153, pol.68-9 (statements of Marin and his brother Almoro, Sept.25th 1575), and from A.S.V. Notarili, Testamenti B.1249, Rg.I, c.178. His total annual income was quoted at 2539 ducats, of which 1540 came from rents in the city. He declared 68 campi near Carrara, bringing 141 ducats p.a.; 90 at Stra, worth 130 ducats p.a.; 102 campi near Montagnana, worth 155 ducats p.a.; 20 campi, and a mill at Prenumia, Padovano,
worth 152 ducats p.a. The remainder was made up from part shares in a
number of mills near Treviso, and dazii from a number of the communities
where he held land, including 1 ducat 20 lire from the Paduan clergy.
The will, dated 1602, adds certain properties near Ravenna, which Marin
directed his executors to sell, reinvesting the proceeds "in tanti fondi
nel stato della Signoria, overo in case a Venetia." He set 1500 ducats
apart for work on his house in Venice, which had already cost 2344 ducats.
The ecclesiastical legacies - the largest I have come across - were as
follows:— 10 ducats for 20 years to the Jesuits and Capuchins; 20
ducats for 20 years to Santa Croce, Santa Maria Maggiore, Santa Maria dei
Miracoli, San Sepolcro, Chiasso di Murano, the Hospitals of the Mendicanti,
San Zuanne e Polo, and the Incurabili; 20 ducats p.a. in perpetuum to San Antonio; 100 ducats "per una volta" and 20 staia of corn
p.a. to the nuns of the Convertite, Giudecca. There is a certain irony
in the legacies to the Capuchins and the Jesuits so soon before the
Interdict.

LONGO, FRANCESCO.

Political career, 1572–1602.
Elected to C. of X, 1577; to the Zonta, 1578, 1579, 1581; Savio di
Terraferma, 1572, 1573, 1574, 1577; Savio Grande, 1578, 1579, 1581,
1583–4.

Political views and connections.
Linked to the Bollani by the marriage of his sister Marietta to Jacomo
F.XIX (unpaginated) dispatch of Aug.1st, 1579; Longo immediately leaves for Brescia at the news of Bollani's illness. Francesco was well regarded by Papal officials, who regretted his death on April 24th 1584; cf.Ch.III, n.106. But he does not seem to have commanded much respect in Venice. Alvise Michiel wrote at the time of his death:—"era gentiluomo che riusciva nelle cose ordinarie mediocremente, e nelle straordinarie non si poteva promettere di lui grandi cose, per essere di timida natura e debole giudizio." He spoke in favour of the Zonta on Dec.21st 1532, but his opinions gave "molto tedio"; cf.Venier, Rivoluzioni, cit. under Ch.III, n.83. His brother Marcantonio reached the C. of X in 1588 and 1590, but they cannot be regarded as a powerful family combine.

Economic commitments.

Fairly comprehensive evidence from A.S.V.Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.159, pol.177, and Museo Correr, M3s.P.D.403, Catastico delle Cose di Casa Longo. Francesco and Marcantonio stated a joint income of only 919 ducats per annum, of which 699 came from rents in the city, 99 was "in contanti", 121 from small properties in the Padovano. The catastico suggests that the rate of investment was slow; cc.42-87 contain the deeds of the city property, mostly dating from the XIIIth and XIVth centuries; cc.194f records the purchase of 4 campi near Stra for 50 ducats 20 lire in 1572; c.205 shows that another house in the Santa Maria Formosa area was acquired in 1573. But the overall income stated to the Savii in 1531 could hardly have supported two careers in public life. It is not surprising that Francesco does not appear in lists of
ambassadors, and the governorship of Padua to which he had just been elected at the time of his death would have been onerous.

MICHELI, ALVISE. (The diarist)

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected Savio di Terraferma, 1579, 1582, 1585, 1587, 1589; appointed with Alberto Badoer and Francesco Barbaro "a riveder la guardia di questa città" over the winter of 1582-3, during the interregnum of the reform. He never reached the inner ring of the C. of X and the College, and cannot be regarded on the strength of his career as a central figure of the 'establishment'.

Political views and connections.

The exact interpretation of Michei's political diaries is sufficiently important for the whole period to be treated in a separate Appendix, see below. He was regarded by the nuncio as "di singolare intelligentia e bontà" when examining the problem of Greek affairs and the new dating of Easter; A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXV, c.364, March 30th 1585. But he opposed all Papal pretensions firmly. His obvious dislike of Leonardo Donato seems to me personal rather than political. Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.V, c.102 (A.S.V.) records that he died of a stroke while speaking on the question of a 100,000 ducat loan to Henri of Navarre in 1589. His mother was a Soranzo, which may in part explain his refusal to undertake the prosecution of Jacomo Soranzo in 1584; cf.Ch.IV, n.112.

Economic commitments.

One fragment of evidence only; A.S.V.Savio sopra le Decime in Rialto
B.148, pol.279, gives notice of the acquisition of an estate in the Trevisano, valued at 60 ducats p.a., and paying livello to the Friars of S. Maria delle Grazie. This was a typical "emfiteusis" contract.

NANI, AGOSTINO.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected Savio di Terraferma, 1591, 1592, 1593, 1594, 1598, 1599, 1600; Savio Grande, 1601. Leading member of the College during the period of the Interdict.

Political views and connections.

Confused; Barbaro, Genealogia, Vol.V, c.459 (A.S.V.) shows that Agostino's father Zorzi died in 1562, so Agostino must have been the political and financial heir of his grandfather, also named Agostino, who lived until 1535. There were five brothers, one of whom, Almoro, became Savio di Terraferma in 1601. Agostino was definitely feared as an opponent of Papal authority before the Interdict, and was a personal associate of Sarpi, Cf. Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, pp.96-7, with n.3.

Economic commitments.

Evidence widespread, but fragmentary. A.S.V.Senato, Deliberazioni Mar, Rg.LI (1590) c.1, provides for the transference of goods from a ship owned by Agostino Nani and damaged on the return run from Syria, into another vessel. Some of Agostino's landed interests may be conjectured from the tax returns of his grandfather, though it must be remembered that these will have been divided, or at any rate shared, between five grandsons. A.S.V.Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.150 pol.365 states
a total income of 3299 ducats p.a. from "beni immobili", the largest I have found declared by one man. B.140 pol.880, special statement of 1566 dealing with property held outside the Dominio, shows that 1063 ducats of the whole sum came from land held "a livello" from religious institutions in Pavia, Bologna, Mantua, and Ferrara. Major items within the Dominio stated in B.150 were as follows: 500 campi near Padua, worth 400 ducats p.a.; an estate at Villa di Pozo, worth 126 ducats p.a.; two estates in the Polesine di Rovigo, 450 campi returning 461 ducats, and 390 campi returning 220 ducats p.a., both subject to flooding; 70 campi near Camposampietro, Treviso, which were rented from the Bishop of Treviso for 4 ducats p.a. and sublet to Alvise Michiel (q.v.) for 103 ducats p.a. This item gives an idea of the complications a long standing "emfiteusis" contract could assume. The remainder of the total derived from scattered properties in the city and dazi from the communities of Treviso and Vicenza. These massive holdings do not seem to have encouraged Agostino the Younger to withdraw entirely from maritime trade. But it is interesting to find one of the most intransigent members of the nobility at the time of the Interdict with such a background of involvement in clerical property.

PARUTA, PAOLO.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected Savio di Terraferma, 1582, 1583, 1584, 1585, 1586, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1590; Savio Grande, 1590, 1597 (twice, first time for short period only). Full details of his public career are assembled by A. Pompeati, "Per la
Biografia di Paolo Paruta," in Giornale Storico della Letteratura Italiana, Vol.XLV, 1905, pp.48-66. For discussion of Paruta's absence from important office in the 1570s, cf. this study, Ch.II, pass.

Political views and connections.

Paruta's main link was to the Morosini through his wife Marianna: Zeno, Vita di Paolo Paruta, cit. under Ch.II, n.6,p.x: but I have not found it possible to attach him to any clearly defined power group. Professor Cozzi's general conclusion, that he was a firm but tactful defender of Venetian rights, seems entirely justified by the sources I have examined. Cf."Paolo Paruta, Paolo Sarpi, e la Questione della Sovranità sopra Ceneda," in R.S.V.Vol.IV, 1962, pp.176f, this study, Ch.I, n.153. Paruta joined with Alvise Michiel in opposing the immediate extradition of Marcello Accoramboni to the Pope in 1585: cf. Michiel's entries of Jan.-March. He was critical of many features of Papal government: cf. Relazione, in Monzani, Opere Politiche di Paolo Paruta, Florence 1852, Vol.II, pp.457f. But he was not entirely in sympathy with the Senate's intransigent position on the Ceneda question: Cozzi, op.cit.pp.212f.

Economic commitments.

Evidence fragmentary and partly conjectural. His son Zuanne Paruta recorded that after his marriage "ritrovandosi in quei tempi non molto copioso de' beni di fortuna, accrebbe molto la sua facoltà." Cf. V. Cian,"Paolo Paruta, Spigolature," in A.V.Vol.XXVII, 1839, p.121. In a letter to Federigo Serego, dated Feb.7th 1568, Paolo apologises for his lack of ready cash by pleading that he has just invested "tutta
quella che havea" in an Alexandrian venture. Cf. G. Biadego, Lettere Inedite di Paolo Paruta, Verona, 1885, p.5. Ibid. pp.6-7, Nov. 16th 1568, discusses the purchase of cloth from Verona and Vicenza. The natural conclusion is that Paruta was able to profit from the final trade 'boom' of the 1560s without having all his goods sequestred by the Turks at the beginning of the war. But A.S.V. Archivio Tiepolo, B. 226, Catastica della Proprietà Badoer, Lib. 242, c. 59, July 31st, 1539 records Paruta's renting an estate near Camposampietro at the high cost of 200 ducats p.a.

DA PONTE, NICOLÒ.

Political career, 1572 - 1568

Elected to the Zonta, 1572, 1573, 1574, 1575, 1577; Savio Grande, 1573, 1574, 1575, 1576, 1577. DOGE, 1578.

Political views and connections.

Most of his public life precedes our period, and continues to arouse such strong emotions that it seems best to pass only one definite comment: a critical biography of Da Ponte is a major gap in Venetian studies. He was mortally feared by every Papal nuncio whose dispatches I have read. De Capua considered his election an unfortunate and unpopular accident: A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XIX, c.53, March 22nd, 1578. Alvise Michiel criticised his attacks on the Quarantia in his entries for late March 1578. Some of the suspicion felt against da Ponte may have been due to his Greek background: his mother was the daughter of a Byzantine knight named Spandolin. Cf. Da Mosto, I dogi di Venezia, Milan 1960, p.297.

How large a following he had, and how much effect his Dogado really had
on Venetian policies, has not yet been satisfactorily demonstrated.

Economic commitments.

A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.145, pol.868 declares an income of only 1030 ducats p.a., 781 of which came from seven estates in the Padovano. These ranged from 101 campi down to 8 and were in the region of Villa di Carrara.

DI PRIULI, GEROLAMO.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1576, 1579, 1583; Savio di Terraferma, 1573, 1576; Savio Grande, 1576, 1579, 1580. D.1583.

Political views and connections.

Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.IV, c.14 (Bibl.Marc.) He was not immediately related to the other Priuli who were prominent at this time and though collaboration with Domenigo and Zuanfrancesco is a likely assumption, it cannot be proved. He spoke for the Zonta on Dec.19th 1582: cf.Ch.III, n.81. Clerical connections were probably one of the main reasons for the respect felt for him by Papal officials: cf.Stella, Chiesa e Stato, p.9. His brother Matteo was Bishop of Vicenza. One of his sons, Michele, succeeded to the Bishopric in 1595, while another, Antonio, became Savio Grande in 1597 and eventually Doge.

Economic commitments.

A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto B.150, pol.970 declares an income of only 574 ducats p.a. Most of this was derived from one large estate of 694 campi near Corezzo, on which decime were paid to the Bishop of
Verona. There were four smaller properties of 29, 27, 25 and 4 campi at Ronchi and Porto Legato in the Vercnese, held jointly with Bishop Bollani of Brescia. Priuli also declared 123 campi at San Vito in the Patriarchate of Aquileia and two estates, each of 20 campi, in Friuli. All were described as "di poco valore". The strong ecclesiastical connections are interesting in view of these fairly limited revenues. Compare Zuanne Dolfin, above, and Lorenzo di Priuli, below.

DI PRIULI, LORENZO.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.
Elected to the C. of X, 1537; Savio di Terraferma, 1576, 1579, 1582; Savio Grande 1584, 1588. Patriarch of Venice, 1590, Cardinal, 1596.

Political views and connections.
Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.IV, c.16 (Bibl.Marc.) shows that he was not closely related to Gerolamo or Zuanfrancesco: but his election as ambassador in Rome in 1583 was attributed by observers to family influence. Cf.Ch.IV, n.141. Over the Aquileia issue in 1585 and the publication of the new Index in 1596 he seems to have followed a pro-Papal policy. His brother Alvise became Savio Grande in 1595, and held the post regularly in the early XVIIth century.

Economic commitments.
A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.151, pol.1326, returned by Lorenzo on behalf of himself and his brothers Alvise and Zaccharia, declares a joint income of only 773 ducats p.a. Of this sum, 606 ducats came from one large estate of 530 campi near Bittadella, the remainder
from a small property of 4 campi outside Vicenza and from the proceeds of a number of "livelli". The Patriarchate must have brought definite financial relief.

SANUDO, FEDERIGO.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1579, 1587; to the Zonta, 1581; Savio di Terraferma, 1577, 1578, 1580, 1581, 1582; Savio Grande, 1583, 1585, 1586, 1539, 1592, 1593.

Political views and connections.

Evidence very negative; no links of real consequence are shown in Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.VI, c.563 (A.S.V.). The nuncio Campeggio was disappointed when Sanudo resigned his position without even submitting a report on the chances of persuading the Greek community to adopt the Gregorian Calendar: cf. A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XV, c.364, March 30th 1535. Cf. also Alvise Michiel, above.

Economic commitments.

Evidence fragmentary: A.S.V.Savio sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.146, pol 1306, dated 1577, declares an increase of 180 ducats in annual income from a livello with the monks of Santo Spirito; B.148, pol.302, records a rise of 14 ducats in the profits from an estate near Musseta. Federigo shared his income with his brother Andrea, who does not seem to have taken any serious part in public life.
SORANZO, JACOMO.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1574; to the Zonta, 1576, 1577, 1579, 1580; Savio Grande, 1573, 1574 (2 places reserved), 1574-5, 1575-6, 1576-7, 1577-8, 1578-9, 1579-80, 1580-81, 1582-83, 1583-84. Disgraced for passing official secrets to foreign powers, 1584.

SORANZO, ZUANNE.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the C. of X, 1570; to the Zonta, 1572, 1573, 1575; Savio Grande 1572-3 (place reserved), 1573, 1574, 1576, 1578-79, 1580, 1584, 1592, 1594, 1595, 1596, 1598.

Political views and connections.

Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.VII, c.50 (A.S.V.) reveals no "parentela" of obvious relevance. Jacomo remained single, Zuanne married a Zane and his one son Francesco was a member of the College in the later 1590s, cf.Ch.IV, n.117. There were no links with the Church close enough to explain the definite pro-Papal bias of both brothers. In 1572 Jacomo virtually offered his services to the nuncio: cf.A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F. XII, c.171, Nov.29th 1572. "Egli mostra di volere essere ardentissimo protettore della giurisdizione ecclesiastica..." Zuanne's acceptance of a written ruling from the Pope's hands on the Aquileia question caused much hostility in Venice: Alvise Michiel, entries of March 1582. Both Jacomo and Zuanne were involved in the Livio Cellino scandal of 1584, though only Jacomo was prosecuted. The main charge was of
intriguing with the Curia. Zuanne was the most consistent and effective defender of the Zonta in 1582, cf. Ch. III, pass.

**Economic commitments.**

Fairly comprehensive evidence in A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.149, pol. 766, 767, 768, joint statement of Jacomo and Zuanne, who also made out a tax return for Benedetto, who had already sailed. Date 1571. The overall income was 3055 ducats p.a. Of this sum, 1221 came from city rents. The remaining 1834 ducats derived from the produce of extensive estates around Treviso, the largest unified holdings being 150 campi at Camposampiero and the same amount at Noal. Rents were paid to the Bishop of Treviso and the commune of Castelfranco, but the exact amounts are not stated. Further information is supplied by B.151, pol. 1461, a declaration by Zuanne's wife Lisa Soranzo of her husbands acquisitions between 1566 and 1571. Still in the area of Treviso and Castelfranco, Zuanne had taken no less than 15 new properties of 20, 21, 52, 58, 35, 23, 50, 72, 15, 23, 52, 4, 14, 32 and 60 campi. Those were described as "di tristissimi fordo (sic; =sorte?), malissimo plantade, giarose, nelle quali vi sono molti prodi (prate?) impascoli, molte valle e luoghi bassi." This heavy investment in sour land seems to suggest an interest in "bonificazione".

**TIEPOLO, BERNARDO.**

**Political career, 1572 - 1602.**

Elected to the C. of X, 1584, 1587; Savio Grande, 1588-9, 1591-2, 1593, 1594, 1596, 1597, 1599.
Political views and connections.

Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.VII, c.84 (A.S.V.). Brother of Paolo (q.v.), he seems to have acted as a kind of political shield bearer until the later 1580s. By 1594 he seems to have moved considerably from the broadly pro-Curial policies followed by Paolo, for he sat on a sub-committee which recommended that certain "Morlacchi" subjects of the Bishop of Parenzo be excused payment of part of their Decime. This annoyed Papal officials exceedingly: A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXI, cc.26-7, Feb.4th 1595. Considering Bernardo's own financial involvements, his attitude on this question seems significant.

Economic commitments.

A.S.V.Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.143 pol.291 reveals an extraordinary dependence on income deriving from Church lands. From 108 ducats gross profit on 61 campi near Mestre he paid 49 ducats livello to the monks of Crosecchiari. He held 4 estates of 46, 21, 43, and 18 campi from the Abbey of Follina in Ceneda: these paid 209 ducats p.a. of which 72 ducats went in rent. At the time of this statement, Bernardo was living with Paolo, so he will not have been so badly off as this meagre income implies. The Follina lands represent one part of a large "emfiteusis" contract made with the Abbey by the Procurator Stefano Tiepolo, father of Bernardo and Paolo.

TIEPOLO, PAOLO

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the Zonta, 1577, 1578, 1579, 1580, 1581; Savio Grande, 1577,
Political views and connections.

He married twice, to members of the Pasqualigo family on both occasions: Museo Correr, Mss.P.D.1105/24, Cedola Testamentaria di Paolo Tiepolo: but he had no sons, and must have relied for his political support chiefly on his brothers Bernardo (q.v.) and Almoro, the naval commander. Cf.Barbaro, loc.cit. under Bernardo, above. Paolo was highly regarded at the Curia, and able to secure favours for dependents: cf.Ch.III, n.101; but he avoided the intrigues which ruined Soranzo. His contacts with Papal officials do seem to have caused some hostility in Venice: Alvise Michiel, undated entry of autumn 1581, comments "continuò la solita sua practica col nuncio, col dispiacere del publico". But Paolo was deeply suspicious of the Bull "In Coena Domini": cf. Relazione, in Alberi, Ser.II, Vol.4, pp.169f: and in the early 1570s he was involved in a dispute with the Abbacy of Follina over the lands he rented. A.S. Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.IX, c.16v, F.X, cc.133-4, Oct.1570 - April 1571.

Economic commitments.

A.S.V.Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.143, pol.157, declares an overall income of 1041 ducats of which 898 came from land rents or produce, the remainder from property in the city and dazii. He owned 85 campi near Mestre, 28 near Treviso, 60 near Pieve di Sacco, and had interests in 380 "campi incerti" in the Polesine di Rovigo. The latter brought only 14 ducats p.a. and 2 ducats rent was paid to the Bishop of Adri. Property held from the Abbacy of Follina was worth 142 ducats p.a. This income was apparently not wholly adequate for his political activities,
and in 1561 his brothers petitioned on his behalf for additional funds to support the Spanish embassy: A.S.V. Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, F. XXXIV, Sept. 29th, 1561. (I am grateful to Dr. Pullan for this reference).

ZORZI, ALVISE.

Political career, 1572 - 1602.

Elected to the Zonta, 1572, 1573, 1574, 1577, 1580, 1581. Savio Grande, 1572; (twice, with one reserved place) 1573, 1574, 1575, 1577, 1578, 1581, 1582, 1587, 1588, 1591, 1592-3.

Political views and connections.

This Alvise must not be confused with a namesake who was powerful at the time of the Interdict: Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p. 103. This was not a close relation, Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol. VII, c. 423 (A. S. V.) The Alvise of the later XVIth century was highly regarded by Curial officials: "senatore di grandissima autorità e molto favorevole alle cose della Chiesa" was Bolognetti's description, A. S. Vat. Nunz. Ven. F. XIX, c. 234, May 23rd, 1579. In early 1591 Zorzi was used as a contact by the nuncio Marcello who was attempting to secure grain supplies for the Papal states: but the meeting was scrupulously cleared with the Council of X. A. S. V. Collegio Esposizioni Roma, F. III, ins. 450, Jan. 23rd, 1590/1 (M. V.). In spite of this reputation, Alvise pressed for the immunity of the German students at Padua from unchecked action by the inquisitors in 1537, and seems to have been much esteemed by the 'natio' as a protector. Cf. this study, Ch. I, n. 186. There is no sign of his having been a very striking speaker. Barbaro records no marriage connections of obvious
consequence, and none of his three sons outlived him by more than ten years.

**Economic commitments.**

A.S.V. Savii sopra le Decime in Rialto, B.152, pol.1736, declares a series of substantial acquisitions made shortly before Alvise became Proveditore in Corfu, 1570: he had taken two properties of 4 campi and 90 campi in the Padovano, and a further 64 campi near Mestre on which he paid rent to the Bishop of Torcello. As all was valued at only 10 ducats, the land was presumably undeveloped. Some more general impressions can be extracted from the will of Alvise's son Antonio Zorzi, A.S.V. Notarili Testamenti, B.1249, Rg.I, c.30, dated Jan.7th 1601/2 (M.V.). The testator makes provision for 8000 ducats "fra dinari a cambio, livelli, mobili, e buoni crediti"; 4000 ducats in "perli, ori e mobili"; 6000 ducats on the value of "case, campi e livelli". The annual yield of 1000 ducats from the assets bequeathed by his father had been increased to 1500 by payments on a 21,000 ducat dowry by the Zani. This last factor gives an idea of the financial burden dowries could assume, especially as Antonio was seriously ill and expecting death any moment when he dictated the will. Assuming that Alvise had divided his estate between his three sons, the 1000 ducats per year basic income declared by Antonio would suggest that his father had been in the same bracket as Zorzi Corner and Agostino Nani.
Appendix III
"ALVISE MICHEL"

Museo Correr, Fondo Cicogna, contains two texts of a document highly relevant to this period and much quoted in the present study. Cod.Cic.2562-3-4-5 make up a four volume political diary covering the period from March 1580 to September 1586. Vol.I bears the brief Introduction: "Autore di questi diarii è Alvise Michiel", and the postscript "MDCI: A xix aosto, di Giovanni Tiepolo". The hand does not appear to me to be uniform even throughout Vol.I (e.g.pp.73f), but the dating of entries and the page markings are coherent in all the volumes. This text is generally known as the "Diarii".

Cod.Cic.2555-6 contain substantially the same material, but entries begin two years earlier, in March 1578. A scrawled sentence on the flyleaf reads, "Autore della parte di questi annali o diarii a risguardo l'anno 1535-6 è Alvise Michiel S. di Terraferma. Forse è autore anche de'precedenti anni". (My italics). The hand is uniform throughout, but there is no system of pagination, and the dating is not always consecutive: e.g. the San Cipriano affair is recorded twice, first in the day to day entries of Jan.-March 1537, then in a separate, general account after the daily entries give out. The phrase "mancano alcune carte" in the description of Pasquale Cicogna's election to the Dogado in August 1585, and occasional complete gaps in the text, show that this manuscript was assembled from a collection of loose and not very legible notes. The copyist's undertainties about the authorship,
and his difficulties in compilation, must be born in mind when using
the text. But as the period covered is slightly longer, this is the
manuscript normally cited in historical works, under the title of
"Annali". I have followed the custom of using date references, in
default of page numbers.

Personally, I feel few doubts that the memoes are those of one
man, and that the man was Alvise Michiel. Under March 31st, 1582, the
writer mentions the preoccupations caused by the death of his wife and
his own election as Savio di Terraferma. A.S.V.Segretario alle Voci,
Elezioni del Senato, Rg.V, c.10 records the entry of Alvise Michiel to
the office concerned, on that date. Barbaro, Genealogie, Vol.V, c.
102, notes under this name "Fu scrittore", also recording a re-marriage
in 1533. We may say of this Alvise Michiel that he was an active
politician, who was Savio di Terraferma six times between 1579 and his
death from a stroke while actually speaking in the Senate in 1589
(Barbaro, loc.cit.), and was also Avogadore (entries of March 31st and
June 30th, 1583). But at no stage did he break into the inner ring of
major office holders, and he cannot, on the strength of his career, be
treated as a member of an 'oligarchic establishment'. His material on
official events is impressively accurate: I was able to track the voting
scandal of 1579 from an entry of his (Ch.IV, nn.32); his account of the
fall of Jacomo Soranzo checks well against the records of the Council
of X (Ch.IV, nn.110-15); the only questionable point that has come to
my notice is an entry of early December 1530 to the effect that "H. Paolo
Tiepolo parlo per la visita (sc.apostolica)". A.S.V.Collegio Esposizioni
Roma, F.I mentions Tiepolo's advising a compromise, by exemption of some institutions, but no more than that. Michiel's notes of senators' opinions on outstanding problems, and disagreements with one another, are exceptionally valuable in the search for political groupings and divisions, and have been much used in this study.

But it is Michiel's own politics which create the main puzzle, and the main cause of my adding this Appendix. Professor Cozzi, Nicolò Contarini, p.36, calls the diarist "specchio delle opinioni del partito conservatore", classing him as somewhat anti-French (p.5,n.2) and at least relatively favorable towards compromise with the Curia (pp.27-3, 33). Michiel's writings have played an important part in framing the concept of a clear-cut division within the ruling class, and his opinions therefore deserve to be examined in some detail.

Two preliminary cautions: first, Michael was never in the Council of X or Zonta, and never rose higher than Savio di Terraferma, though by the time of his death he was fifty five - easily of an age to be Savio Grande. He was not closely related to the powerful Zuanne Michiel. So whatever his political views, the diarist cannot be treated as one of the dynasts uprooted by the reform of 1532. Second, we know practically nothing of his feelings about that reform - a most unfortunate gap in our evidence, as he could probably have revealed more than all the other witnesses. The few surviving hints suggest an anxious, pragmatic attitude very similar to that of Leonardo Donato's letters from Rome. E.g. an entry of October 1583 (=Diarii, Vol.II, c.76) records the large number of votes cast against Francesco Longo, Gerolamo di
Friuli, and Zuanne Contarini in the recent elections of Savii Granii, and continues: "Dio nostro Signore governi questo dominio, il quale è al presente in molto discordine. Nota, che si sparse voce che questi gentiluomini havevano scosso così poche ballotte, che havevano parlato in Gran Consiglio a favor del Consiglio di X..."

Michiel certainly disliked both Niccolo da Ponte and Leonardo Donato. He was annoyed by da Ponte's attack on the Quarantia (entry of March 1578), and alarmed by his visit to San Giorgio de' Greci (7th Oct. 1580). The Doge's words on the rapprochement with France he considered "non punto nuove" (May 1583), and passed the whole speech off with a sneer (Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, p. 5), but I cannot find any signs in the diarist's entry of a positive hostility to France as such. Real feeling against Donato becomes apparent after the latter failed to present a formal report of his Rome embassy due to illness (entry of early Sept. 1583). The long, general attack on clerical wealth at the climax of the San Cipriano crisis also annoyed Michiel, but he seems to have thought Donato's arguments irrelevant ("fuori di proposito") rather than irreverent, as Professor Cozzi implies (entry of Feb. 28th, 1586/7. Cozzi, Niccolò Contarini, pp. 36-8. This study, Ch. VI, n. 54).

On the other hand, Michiel admired Paolo Tiepolo greatly, lamenting his death as the loss of "il maggiore senatore a questo tempo della Republica". (Entry of April 19th, 1585). Again, though he used studiously impartial language, the diarist obviously felt strong sympathy for Jacomo Soranzo's calamities: he would not handle the prosecution as Avogadore ordinario del mese (entry of June 14th, 1584); he harps
on the condemned man's "costanza" (July 23rd), hinting at a political vendetta in pointing out how two of the Inquisitori di Stato, Agostino Barbarigo and Zuanne Contarini, were proposed for the vacant procuratorship; he criticises the Capi di X for extending the arrests and trying to turn the affair into a witch hunt (Aug. 9th). Michiel's mother was in fact a Soranzo, though not closely related to Jacomo. (Barbaro, loc. cit.).

On personal grounds, then, the evidence of Michiel's leaning towards the "vecchi", "pochi potenti" of the Council of X, leading dynasts of the 1570s, or whatever we may choose to call them, is tolerably good. But his political conduct and principles do not confirm or complete the pattern this would suggest: the evidence is either nondescript, or shows Michiel adopting positions diametrically opposite to those we would connect with men like Tiepolo and Soranzo. The nuncio Campeggio had hopes of Michiel's help in his efforts to persuade the Greek community to accept the Gregorian calendar, and described him in a dispatch as "gentiluomo in questa Republica di singolare intelligenza e di bonta" (A.S.Vat.Nunz.Ven.F.XXV, c.364, March 30th, 1585). But the diarist says nothing of his experiences, and nothing was achieved. On Latino Orsino's mission to resuscitate the Holy League, Michiel seems very non-committal: he did not speak himself, and records without any particular emotion Leonardo Donato's written message to the Senate that the plan was merely a Spanish diplomatic trick (entry of Aug. 30th, 1583). On the Aquileia dispute Michiel was absolutely opposed to any hint of concession to the Papacy: he stood firm against any proposal to pass
relevant legal documents to the Pope (entry of July 16th, 1581); he spoke with Zuanne Donato against accrediting another ambassador to Rome (Aug. 14th, 15th), and even after Zuanne Soranzo had been elected, tried to limit the scope of the mission as much as he could (Nov. 18th); towards the end of the dispute, when the Senate approved by 137 votes a proposal to pass the findings of the Paduan jurisconsults to the Pope, Michiel was one of the six who voted against the motion, and recorded angrily, "questa risoluzione far perdere la causa d'Aquileia senza alcun rimedio". (Entry of Nov. 10th, 1584). Over the problem of Marcello Accoramboni, a murder suspect from the Papal states granted temporary safe-conduct in Padua, Michiel joined forces with Paolo Paruta to oppose all the other Savii, who were prepared to hand the man over to the Pope immediately (entries of Jan. 18th, Feb. 22nd, March 14th, May 2nd, 1585/6 (M.V.) ). It is perilous and disagreeable to differ so completely on the interpretation of a text with an authority so distinguished as Professor Cozzi (Nicolò Contarini, p. 36), but I can only refer any who feel sufficiently interested to the Museo Correr and ask them to judge for themselves.

Michiel emerges, in fact, as a firm stickler for the letter of civil law: considering his frequent service as Avogadore, this is natural enough. It may also account in part for his total opposition to concessions to the Papacy, if politically desirable but legally questionable. We may treat him as a typical reactionary if we are prepared to limit the sense of that phrase to one who failed to appreciate the more recent idols of Venetian historiography, like da Ponte
and Donato: but if we want anti-Curial idols, then Michiel must stand high in the pantheon. What his work really illustrates is a highly personalised, complex, and clanish maelstrom of tensions between individuals, not a clear-cut intellectual division between political parties.
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with Abbreviations where frequent use makes this appropriate.

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